

**The security implications for failing to implement
gender equality standards: a case study of the
Kenyan national government**

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DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The glass ceiling has been broken...

I would like to dedicate this study to the women of Kenya. Thank you for your inputs and relentlessly pursuing a safer and equal environment for all. With your brilliance, wisdom and tenacity, gender equality will pass from one generation to the next.

My two daughters, Dominique and Ashley: May you also follow your dreams. Just start and keep on walking in faith.

My sister and all the women of the family: This degree is the first of many to follow.

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ABSTRACT

Gender stands central to equal development and human security today and it is important to understand the multitude of connections between security and internal conflict, including the effect of gender inequality on human security and the stability of a state. The persistence of global gender inequality and the disadvantages that women and girls face are creating conditions of female insecurity. Feminist theory in general has contributed to our understanding of the ontology of social and gender relations, and its effect on politics, economy, society, hierarchy and culture. Feminist theory is normative with emancipatory characteristics and it was radical feminism that pursues gender mainstreaming as an international strategy to advance social transformation, the empowerment of women and to promote gender equality. Since gender inequality qualifies as a threat to human security, the study of gender from a feminist perspective has in recent years been included in security studies.

In 2010, Kenya enacted a new constitution with a comprehensive Bill of Rights. The new constitution includes the “two-thirds gender principle” (Article 81) and provision for affirmative action (Article 27) to guarantee “equality and freedom from discrimination” to all its citizens. Despite the legal and institutional frameworks that create a sound foundation for the realization of gender mainstreaming to improve women’s civil and political rights, the distribution of power in the national Government of Kenya remains unequal with only 23.3 per cent female representation in parliament.

An ex-post evaluation on the 2010 Constitutional gender principle recognizes that structural resistance is used as a tool to sustain patriarchy at all levels of society, with dire consequences for human (women) and internal security. The sustained state of gender inequality and increase in female insecurity encourages female radicalization in support of extremism – an increased struggle that the Government of Kenya has increasingly been facing since 2011.

This study highlights that with a multilevel or three-tiered gender approach at the macro (political), meso- (economical) and micro-levels (social) the stronghold of patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm can be eased. A patriarchal norm can then be substituted by a gender-equal norm of respect that is conducive to human security or security equality to counter internal conflict.

KEY TERMS: Kenya, security studies, human security, feminism, gender (in)equality, gender mainstreaming, social transformation, constitution, National Gender and Equality Commission, “two-thirds gender principle, patriarchy, structural resistance, GBV, human rights violations, radicalization, female radicalization, violence, extremism, internal conflict

OPSOMMING

Geslag is 'n sentrale kategorie van ontleding wanneer dit kom by hedendaagse gelyke menslike ontwikkeling en sekuriteit. Dit is belangrik om die veelvuldige interseksies tussen sekuriteit en binnelandse konflik te verstaan, met insluiting van die effek wat geslagsongelykheid het op menslike sekuriteit en die stabiliteit van 'n staat. Die volgehoue wêreldwye geslagsongelykheid en die benadeling wat vroue en meisies in die gesig staar skep omstandighede waar vroulike onveilig is. Feminismeteorie dra by tot ons begrip van die ontologie van sosiale- en geslagsverhouding en die uitwerking daarvan op politiek, die ekonomie, die samelewing, hiërargie en kultuur. Feminismeteorie is normatief met emansipatoriese eienskappe en dit jaag die verhoofstroming van geslag na as 'n internasionale strategie om sosiale transformasie, die bemagtiging van vroue en die bevordering van geslagsgelykheid mee te bring. Aangesien geslagsgelykheid kwalifiseer as 'n bedreiging vir menslike veiligheid, is die ondersoek van geslag vanuit 'n feministiese perspektief in resente jare ingesluit by sekuriteitsstudies.

In 2010 het Kenia 'n nuwe grondwet met 'n omvattende Handves van Regte aanvaar. Die nuwe grondwet sluit die “twee-derde geslagsbeginsel” (artikel 81) en bepalings wat regstellende aksie (Artikel 27) moontlik maak in om die “gelykheid en vryheid van diskriminasie” van alle landsburgers te waarborg. Ongeag die wetlike en institusionele raamwerke wat 'n goeie basis skep vir die verhoofstroming van geslag en die verbetering van vroue se siviele en politieke regte, bly die verdeling van mag in Kenia se nasionale regering ongelyk, met slegs 23.3 persent vroulike verteenwoordiging in die parlement.

'n Ex-post evaluasie van die versuim om die geslagsbeginsel in die 2010 Grondwet te implementeer toon dat strukturele teenstand gebruik word as 'n manier om die patriargie te onderhou op alle vlakke van die samelewing, met slegte gevolge vir menslike (vroulike) en binnelandse veiligheid. Die volgehoue geslagsongelykheid en die toename in vroulike onveiligheid stook die vuur van radikalisering in ondersteuning van ekstremisme – 'n stryd wat die Keniaanse regering toenemend moet aansê sedert 2011.

Hierdie studie beveel 'n veelvlakkige of drie-laag geslagsbenadering op die makro- (politiese), meso- (ekonomiese) en die mikrovlakke (sosiaal) aan om die bastion van patriargie as 'n sosio-kulturele norm te skud. Dit kan daarna vervang word deur 'n geslagsgelyke norm van respek wat bevorderlik sal wees vir menslike veiligheid en veiligheidsgelykheid as 'n teenvoeter vir binnelandse konflik.

SLEUTELTERME: Kenia, sekuriteitstudies, menslike veiligheid, feminisme, geslags(on)gelykheid, verhoofstroming van geslag, sosiale transformasie, grondwet, *National Gender and Equality Commission*, “twee-derde geslagsbeginsel”, patriargie, strukturele teenstand, geslagsgebaseerde geweld, menseregte-oortredings, radikaliserings, vroulike radikaliserings, geweld, ekstremisme, binnelandse konflik

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGPO	Access to Government Procurement Opportunities
ARHD	Adolescent and Reproduction Health and Development
AS	Al Shabaab
BBI	Building Bridges Initiative
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plans
CoHA	Cost of Hunger in Africa
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
CTED	UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
CVE	Counter-Violent Extremism
Dreams	Determined, Resilient, Empowered, Aids-free Mentored and Safe
DTF	Democracy Trust Fund
EAC	East African Community
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FIDA	Federation of Women Lawyers
FPTP	First-Past-the-post
FPTP	Pro-Proportional Representation
GAD	Gender and Development
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFI	Girl Friendly Index
GFM	Genital Female Mutilation
GII	Gender Inequality Index

GoK	Government of Kenya
GRB	Gender-Responsive Budgeting
IEBC	Independent Electoral Boundary Commission
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LGBTQIU	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex and Unsure
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
KEWOPA	Kenya Women Parliamentary Association
KEWOSA	Kenya Women Senators Association
KEYOP	Kenya Youth Employment and Opportunities
KNAP	Kenya National Action Plan
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KWFT	Kenya Women Finance Trust
MCA	Members of County Assembly
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MP	Members of Parliament
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NA	National Assembly
NGAAF	National Government Affirmative Action Fund
NGEC	National Gender and Equality Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORPP	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
OSAGI	Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDM	Participative Democratic Model
PEPFAR	US President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief
PBIED	Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
PR	Proportional Representation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDGEA	Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa
SGBV	Sexual and GBV
SHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights
SPBIED	Suicide Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
SQT	Significant Quest Theory
STEM	Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
SWB	Sisters Without Borders
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United Nations Agency for International Aid
VERLT	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
VPN	Virtual Private Networks
WAD	Women and Development
WHO	World Health Organization

WID	Women in Development
YEDF	Youth Enterprise Development Fund

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Security studies is a study field in the discipline of political studies and one of the most important topics of concern for governments and officials involved in international relations. It is important as a point of departure to first determine whose security is under discussion. The referent object of security is either the state, called state security (protection of the state, its boundaries and institutions), or the citizens of the state, called human security (Williams, 2008:6). Primary threats to human security are identified as human rights violations and political discrimination that result in economic failure. It means both direct and indirect violence. The focus of human security is protection and empowerment (Hudson, 2005:163). Both at the national and international levels, security can be defined in different ways, and this will have important consequences for security policy and access to or the distribution of the resources of a state. It is important to understand the multitude of connections between security and various other factors – including gender. Gender inequality, for example, influences security (Detraz, 2012:2). Gender equality forms an integral part of the security of a state and without it, the promotion of the principles of good governance and the sustainability of security could become a challenge (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015:2). Human security is complementary to state security because of the emphasis on human development, human rights and the role of non-state actors. The level of human security is determined by state security, because the state remains the political actor with control over the resources (Hudson, 2005:165). From a feminist perspective, threats to security entail not only war or international instability (state security), but also domestic threats (human security) of family violence, rape, gender oppression, poverty and ecological destruction (Williams, 2017:1; Sjoberg, 2009:198; Moore, 2008:284). This study applies a feminist perspective to determine the implications for intrastate security in Kenya if gender equality is neglected.

1.2 Feminist theory: Security and gender equality

Feminism has become involved in the political sphere as it is committed to the emancipation and empowerment of women, and the broadening of social justice (Wibben, 2011:591). A baseline definition for feminism focuses on the inequality and the discrimination women face because of their sex. Furthermore, feminism calls for changes in the social, economic, political and/or cultural environments to reduce or eliminate any form of discrimination based on sex.

In its broadest sense, feminist theory is based on the ontology of social relations, particularly gender relations. Feminist theorists pursue research to better understand women's relegation to men to guide strategies for gender equality. Feminist theory starts at the level of the individual embedded in hierarchical social, political, and economic structures of a society (Tickner, 2004:46). The core of feminist theory is that men and women should be treated equally in the political, economic and social arenas. Feminist theory is based on empirical knowledge of power and oppression (Allen & Jaramillo-Sierra, 2015:94) and can be divided into three broad categories and subcategories: i) gender reform feminist theory (liberal, Marxist and development feminism), ii) gender resistant feminist theory (standpoint, radical, lesbian and psychoanalytical feminism) and iii) gender revolution feminist theory (cultural, postmodern and post-structural). African feminism developed and differs from western feminism on the basis of "bread, butter, and power" issues and is shaped by the political eras of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial on the African continent. Feminism can therefore be seen as emancipatory in nature, and it was radical feminism that promotes a bottom-up rather than top-down approach (Tickner, 2004:47). As a result, feminist scholars pursue their research with the purpose of social transformation and change on behalf of women.

A study by Melander (2005:711) confirms the work by Caprioli (2005:161), which states that the achievement of gender equality would not only rectify social injustices for women and girls in practice but will also benefit men from as they are liberated from a rigid gender hierarchy in various ways. For instance, the results of the studies by Melander and Caprioli indicate that gender equality reduces internal conflict or the insecurity of the citizens. It can therefore be argued that gender inequality has the opposite effect on the security of a state. This study confirms (see Section 4.6.3 for a discussion on female radicalization in Kenya) that gender matters and that patriarchy or gender inequality has a radicalization effect on women with implications for the national security of the Government of Kenya (see Figure 7.1 for the impact of gender inequality on the security of Kenya).

Recognizing that peace is inextricably linked to gender equality, allows for increasing female participation at all levels of conflict prevention, mediation, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the protection of women and girls during armed conflict, and the prevention of GBV (Huckerby, 2016:244).

Gender equality is also an international objective set by the UN. The UN stipulates that men and women should have equal access to opportunities and resources. In the context of the security sector, men and women should have equal decision-making opportunities with respect to the provision, management and oversight of the security needs of both genders (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015:2).

The securitization of women issues such as gender equality is a strategy to reach a specific goal, namely to guarantee the absence of threats to the “referent object” – the human being, and specifically women (Hudson, 2010:12). When women are deemed to be the “referent objects of security”, it is only fair that they have control over and insight into their own security.

An overview of the global status of gender equality, which is discussed in the next section, reflects that the objectives of feminist theory have been reached to some extent and have had a positive effect on gender equality. Therefore, this study focuses on the political involvement and commitment of adherents to feminist theory and their effort to bring social justice, to progress gender equality, and to contribute to human security.

1.3 The global status of gender equality

The status of women and gender inequality *per se* has been the subject of many discussions, studies and conferences in the international arena. The matter has received formal recognition and has been included in international policies and national laws. For instance, the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995, also known as the “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action”, acknowledged that there are inequalities between men and women in their roles and circumstances. The purpose of the conference was to advance the status and empowerment of women all over the world, with the focus on equality (UN Beijing Declaration, 1995:4). The Fourth World Conference on Women served as the starting point for many countries to transform the role and status of women from mere submission to participation in societal and political affairs (UN Beijing Declaration, 1995:1). It was the start of a positive movement towards equality for women around the world. Paragraph 182 of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995:79; Tarr-Whelan, 2010:5; Krook & True, 2012:114) includes a specific target of reaching 30 per cent of women’s active participation in all types of decision-making in democracies. However, 20 years later at the Second World Conference on Women’s Studies in 2016, speakers highlighted that this target had not been met and that 70 per cent of people in the world who live in severe poverty¹ are women and girls. Data released by UNDP in 2020, projected that due to the Covid-19 pandemic, female poverty will increase by 9.1 per cent by 2021 – undoing years of progress to eradicate extreme poverty (UNDPa, 2020:1). At the same time, women own less than one per cent of the world’s property, while they contribute more than two-thirds of the world’s working hours (PCI, 2016:1; Fox, 2016:9). Wach and Reeves (2002:1) highlight the key concerns of inequality as access to and control

¹ The international poverty line was maintained by the World Bank in 2020 at USD \$1.90 per day (World Bank, 2020:1).

over resources and the division of responsibilities in a household. Wach and Reeves (2002:1) further list socio-economic status, race or region, age and ethnicity, and social differentiation as factors that contribute to gender inequality. Nitisha (2016:1), in her analysis of equality, argues that there is no single meaning of equality, but agrees that political, economic, social, racial, sexual and gender equality are forms of equality that are of importance to social and political structures. People will be free from fear or want only in an equal society. Finally, equality essentially means the absence of special privileges (Nitisha, 2016:1). The UN, on the other hand, defines gender equality or equality between women and men as “equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys” (UN Women, 2001:1). The desired outcome is to reach a state where gender does not influence or limit access to rights and opportunities.

Gender inequality remains an obstacle to human development. Discrimination related to health, education, politics and the economy has negative consequences for the development and empowerment of women. The Gender Inequality Index (GII), developed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), measures human development in the fields of reproductive health², empowerment³ and economic status⁴. Table 1.1 displays an extraction of selected countries to compare their world ranking, human development index (HDI) with their GII. A high GII score is an indication that a great measure of disparity exists between women and men (UNDP, 2018:1).

² Reproductive health measured by maternal mortality rate and adolescent birth rates (UNDP, 2014:1).

³ Empowerment is measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by women with some level of secondary education and over the age of 25 years (UNDP, 2014:1).

⁴ Economic status is measured by females, over the age of 15 years, participating in the labour market (UNDP, 2014:1).

Table 1.1: The global GII as in 2018

Very High Human Development			High Human Development			Medium Human Development			Low Human Development		
World Ranking	HDI	GII	World Ranking	HDI	GII	World Ranking	HDI	GII	World Ranking	HDI	GII
Norway (1)	0.044	5	Algeria (82)	0.443	100	Morocco (121)	0.492	118	Rwanda (157)	0.412	95
Switzerland (2)	0.037	1	Tunisia (91)	0.300	63	Namibia (130)	0.460	108	Tanzania (159)	0.539	130
Ireland (3)	0.093	22	Botswana (94)	0.464	111	Congo (138)	0.579	145	Uganda (159)	0.539	127
Germany (4)	0.084	19	South Africa (113)	0.422	97	Kenya (147)	0.545	134	Ethiopia (173)	0.508	123

Source: UNDP (2018:1)

Table 1.1 reveals the differences between countries with very high human development (the top four countries in the world), high human development (the top four countries in Africa), with medium development (the top four countries in Africa) and countries with low human development (the top four countries in Africa). In 2014, Kenya fell in the category of low human development, and also had a lower level of human development than its neighbours in the East African Community (EAC), namely Rwanda and Uganda (UNDP, 2014:1). However, in 2018, Kenya surpassed its neighbours and moved up to the medium human development category, but its GII remains lower than its neighbours in the EAC (UNDP, 2018:1). UN Women declared that countries that have taken corrective measures by means of quotas have seen a major change in female representation in decision-making structures (Tarr-Whelan, 2010:5). Countries in the EAC are notable examples of political empowerment of women in their government structures, thus contributing to human security as illustrated by Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1: Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and gender equity in the EAC parliaments in 2020

Sources: IMF (2020:1); IPU (2020:1)

The information displayed on the x-axis in Figure 1.1 stipulates the countries in the EAC and on the y-axis the GDP per capita in USD. Figure 1.1 demonstrates that in 2020, Kenya, with a GDP of \$2075 per capita, had a 23 per cent female representation in parliament, in comparison with Tanzania with a GDP of \$1 105, but a 36.9 per cent female representation in parliament. Other comparative examples include Ethiopia with a GDP \$974 female representation of 38.8 per cent, Uganda, which had a GDP of \$915 with 34.9 per cent female representation; Rwanda which had a GDP of \$823 with 61.3 per cent female representation; and Burundi, which had a GDP of \$263 per capita and 38.21 per cent female representation in parliament. The information in Figure 1.1 demonstrates that Kenya, with the highest GDP per capita, ironically had the lowest percentage of female representation in parliament. Furthermore, Kenya is the only country in the EAC that had not met the one-third-gender principle by 2020 (IPU, 2020:1; NDI & FIDA, 2018:30; WEF, 2019:13, IMF, 2020:1). This is an indication that Kenya did not extend its wealth to develop and include females in the decision-making structures of government. According to Caprioli (2005:167), a correlation can be drawn between gender

inequality and intrastate conflict. Caprioli (2005:167) indicated that: “the higher the level of gender inequality, the greater the likelihood that a state will experience intrastate conflict.” Women’s marginalization in the social, political, economic and intellectual spheres were humanly created and can therefore be altered by taking human action.

1.4 Gender equality requirements in the Government of Kenya

The Kenyan government structure consists of the executive, legislative and judiciary legs at the national level, and 47 devolved county governments at the local level. The economic environment in Kenya remains vulnerable to external factors. The high level of youth⁵ unemployment (54 per cent in 2020 as illustrated in Figure 3.6 and discussed in Section 3.4.4.2.2) creates challenges for the already marginalized and vulnerable groups, especially women (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2006:1; Gitogo, 2020:1). UN Women, the “UN entity dedicated to gender equality and empowerment of women” (UN Women, 2020a:1), embarked on different initiatives to work in partnership with the Government of Kenya and civil society organizations to support and improve gender-friendly programmes. These programmes include:

- encouraging women to lead and participate in governance;
- assisting with the economic empowerment of women and youth so that they can benefit from public procurement and the value chains in the agricultural and extractive sectors;
- supporting programmes for women and girls to live a life free from violence; and
- including women in peace security and humanitarian processes shaped by women’s leadership and ensuring that national and devolved planning fully reflects accountability for gender equality commitments and priorities (UN Women Africa, 2016:1) as prescribed by the Constitution of Kenya. All of the above efforts are discussed next.

1.4.1 The Constitution of Kenya

The adoption of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010 brought with it political equality standards for women in Kenya. The minimum equality standard is at least 33 per cent as prescribed by

⁵ The Ministry of Youth Affairs defines youth as persons between the ages 15 to 30 (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2006:1).

Article 81 (b) of the Constitution, which states that “no more than two-thirds of members of elective bodies shall be of the same gender” in the Kenyan national and county governments (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:51). Article 27 (8) of the Constitution states that “the state shall take legislative and other measures, including affirmative action programmes and policies, to redress the disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past discrimination” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:42). Furthermore, Articles 177 (b) and 197 of the Constitution state that the gender principles should also apply in county assemblies and county executive committees (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:109). These provisions have led to women serving in county government positions after the elections in 2013, something that was impossible before the enactment of the 2010 Constitution. However, the figures remain low. According to the gender audit of the Federation of Women Lawyers in 2017, only five per cent or 96 women were elected in the 1 450 wards as members of county assemblies (MCA). In order to reach the constitutional requirement of 33 per cent, 650 women would have had to be nominated as MCA to reach 746 or 34 per cent female representation in county governments. In the case of the parliament, women filled only 23.3 per cent of the senior positions in the national government by 2017 (NDI & FIDA, 2018:30). Although these women had been appointed in public leadership positions, both as a result of merit or affirmative action, senior public leadership for national government remains reserved for men. Table 1.2 illustrated this statement. In the last Kenyan general election (2017), only 23 women were elected to serve as Parliamentarians in the NA. In comparison with the countries in the EAC and illustrated in Table 1.1, Kenya has the lowest female representation in key decision-making positions (UNDP, 2018:1, IPU,2020:1).

Article 27 of the Kenyan constitution specifically provides for the protection and promotion of the rights of marginalized groups to eliminate past discrimination. The “two-thirds gender principle” [Article 81(b)] is a direct result of Article 27. The introduction of the devolved government system in Kenya brought hope that women’s participation in county leadership would eradicate the existing patriarchal environment of leadership after the 2013 election. Women’s participation in county governments will allow for a more inclusive leadership, with the result of the formulation of gender-sensitive legislation and policies (Minayo, 2012:22). However, the guaranteed female representation in the 2010 Constitution will likely still not be met at the national government level by the next election in 2022, despite the development of a legal framework to implement Article 27. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the reality of gender equality at the parliamentary level in the Government of Kenya. The last election in Kenya was held on 26 October 2017, after the Supreme Court nullified the election of 8 August 2017.

Women elected to parliamentary positions still did not reach the required 117 female members as determined by the Constitution of 2010.

Table 1.2: Female representation in the NA of 2013 and 2017

	2013	2017
290 Constituency Members of Parliament	16	23
47 County women representatives	47	47
12 seats available for nomination	5	5
Total of 349 seats available	68 (19%)	75 (21%)

Sources: FIDA (2013:47); UN Women (2017:2); NDI & FIDA (2018:30)

Table 1.3: Female representation in the Senate 2013 and 2017

	2013	2017
47 senators	0	3
16 women senator's nomination seats available	16	16
Women nominated to represent youth and person with disabilities	2	2
Total of 67 seats available	18 (27%)	21 (31%)

Sources: FIDA (2013:47); UN Women (2017:2); NDI & FIDA, (2018:30)

According to the gender audit of Kenya's 2013 election results as illustrated in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 (FIDA, 2013:47; Mumma, 2017:3; UN Women, 2017:2), in practice, the NA has a total of 349 members, with 68 women or 19 per cent female representation, and the Senate with 18 women or 27 per cent female representation. Both the general assembly and the Senate did not meet the two-thirds gender principle after the general elections in 2017. Female politicians performed better in 2017 compared to the 2013 election, but still fall short of the 117 female members required to comply with the constitutional requirement of at least 33 per cent female representation (UN Women, 2017:2). Female representation in the NA stands at 75 women or 21 per cent and in the Senate at 21 women or 31 per cent.

Despite the fact that the statistics do not testify of success as of 2020, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya was a first step in the right direction. It offers a foundation for non-discrimination and the equality of women in 21st century Kenya. However, comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and “progressive jurisprudence” needed to provide details on the specific duties of government and to establish precedents for the way forward (Fitzgerald, 2010:66). The Constitution set a five-year deadline for the enactment of laws to implement the prescription of the Constitution. This means that the “two-thirds gender principle” should have been in place and in practice before 27 August 2015. The timeline for the implementation of the “two-third gender principle” was extended by one year to 27 August 2016. By the expiry date, the NA in the 11th parliament (2013-2017) still failed to reach the quotas as set in the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment No 4 Bill) (Waitere, 2016:1; Muchiri, 2016:1). The 11th and 12th parliaments (2017-2022) failed five times (2013, 2015, 2017, 2019) to enact the laws to meet the female threshold. Article 261(5–7) of the 2010 Constitution makes provision that in case of a petition, “the Chief Justice shall advise the President to dissolve Parliament and the President shall dissolve Parliament” (Constitution, 2010:165). On 21 September 2020, the Chief Justice and president of the Supreme Court called on article 261.

The Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs is the leading government department to promote gender equality and empower women. The State Department of Gender Affairs within the ministry is responsible for the coordination and development of gender mainstreaming at the national level and supported by gender related policies (Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs, 2015:1). The National Gender and Equality Commission was established by Act No 15 of 2011 to reduce gender inequalities and discrimination against all people, monitoring compliance with Kenya laws, treaties and conventions concerning gender equality (NGEC, 2018:1). Vision 2030, the first policy to address gender inequality, stands on three pillars, namely the economic, social and political pillars. One of the guiding political principles of Vision 2030 is the equality of citizens:

“Kenya shall be a nation that treats its women and men equally. It will not discriminate against any citizen on the basis of gender, race, tribe, religion or ancestral origin”

(Vision 2030, 2007:22).

1.5 Problem statement

The creators of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya tried to guarantee political equality for women in the government by requiring female representation of at least 33 per cent [Article 81 (b)]. Article 81(b) states that “no more than two-thirds” of members of elective bodies shall be of the same gender” in the Kenyan national and county governments (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:51). Article 27 (8) of the Constitution further requires that “the state shall take legislative and other measures including affirmative action programmes and policies to redress and disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past discrimination” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:25). Furthermore, articles 177 (b) and 197 of the Constitution require that the gender principle should also apply to county assemblies and county executive committees (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:109). This has allowed women to serve in county government positions, something that was impossible before 2010. However, despite this progressive change and the requirements provided for in the Constitution, women had filled only 19 per cent of the positions in the NA in the 11th parliament in 2013, with not much improvement after the August 2017 elections. The 12th parliament has 21 per cent female representation. Despite the fact that some women were appointed in public leadership positions, senior public leadership for national government remains largely reserved for men. In comparison with the EAC, Kenya still has the lowest number of women in key decision-making positions (IPU, 2020:1).

The Government of Kenya could face a constitutional crisis by the next election in 2022 if suitable mechanisms for affecting the provisions in the Constitution for gender representation in the NA and the Senate are not better implemented. Good security sector governance cannot meet the standards of good governance if there is no gender equality, since gender equality is a human right and a democratic principle. Besides, gender equality is essential for effective and accountable security provision and it is fundamental to the rule of law (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015:3). Lemmon cites Hillary Clinton (Lemmon: 2013:1) as noting that women are oppressed in places where the rule of law and democracy are not upheld. Furthermore, where women are empowered, the society as a whole improves and changes, contributing to regional and global security. A gender approach to elevate gender equality concerns as part of the national security agenda should address women’s roles in countering terrorism and violent extremism and address the relationship between gender equality and national security (Huckerbury, 2016:40). Therefore, the primary question that remains to be answered is: *What are the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards?*

In order to address the primary research question, the following secondary research questions and research objectives form the focus of the study and are discussed in the following subsections:

1.6 Research questions

Considering the central research statement outlined in Section 1.8, the following research questions were answered:

1. How do the views contained in feminist theory contribute to gender equality and security?
2. What is the required legal status of gender equality positions in the national Government of Kenya?
3. What are the impediments to and repercussions of not reaching gender equality in the national Government of Kenya?
4. How does gender inequality affect the security of the Government of Kenya according to feminist theory and in reality when measured against the standards of good security?
5. What could be an alternative approach for the national Government of Kenya to guarantee that gender equality is implemented as required by law and international standards to improve the security of Kenya?

1.7 Research objectives

In pursuit of answers to the primary and the specific research questions, the following objectives were addressed:

1. To study and interpret how the views contained in feminist theory contribute to gender equality and security;
2. To study and discuss the legal requirements and status of gender equality for positions in the national Government of Kenya;

3. To determine and examine the impediments to reaching gender equality in the national Government of Kenya and to explore the possible repercussions for the security of Kenya;
4. To investigate and analyse how gender inequality according to feminist theory affects the security of the Government of Kenya; and,
5. To summarize and recommend an alternative approach to the national Government of Kenya to guarantee that gender equality is promoted as required by law and international standards and to illustrate how this will possibly improve the security of Kenya.

1.8 Central theoretical statement

Feminist theory is normative with emancipatory characteristics and seeks to recommend strategies for eliminating the relegation of women – therefore gender equality (Harding, 2012a:18, 55; Gannon and Davies, 2012: 65). Feminist theory understands gender discrimination as founded on patriarchal power structures and the social construction of gender (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:2; Sideris, 2001:142). Feminists stress that gender inequality is entrenched in all structures of society, may it be family, the labour force and the economy, government and politics, religion, culture, and the media.

Feminist research aims to affect disciplinary priorities, practices and on public policy. Feminist standpoint analysis also promotes strong pro-democratic inclusiveness, objectivity and accountability to the oppressed, with positive contributions to the body of knowledge (Harding, 2012:55). It is from this perspective that security studies developed to include feminist security studies. Gender research offers knowledge that is useful for the empowerment and equality of women (McHugh, 2014:138) and aims to resist the multifarious ways in which patriarchy or hegemony have caused men to be privileged over women in contemporary social life, politics and the economy.

The persisting global gender inequalities indicate that the oppression or domination over women – human or female insecurity – cannot be separated from security studies. The redefinition of security to include a human perspective is an attempt to transform the traditional definition of security in terms of national, regional, political and economic state security to focus on the threats to human beings. Primary threats to human security were identified as human rights violations and political discrimination that result in economic failure (Wolter, 2007:79). The disadvantages women and girls face in health, education, political representation, and the

labour market, to mention a few, have negative consequences for their development and create conditions of female insecurity. Gender has become prominent in security matters due to developments such as sex as a tool of war, the increase in female suicide bombers, and women participation as soldiers and activists during conflicts. Gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of women is sacrificed. Gender inequality qualifies as a threat to human security. This also holds true for the situation in Kenya. The Women Rights Organizations of Kenya reports that violence against women and girls has reached critical levels (Womensrights, 2020:3) while Mwachinga (2020:1) highlights that poverty and insecurity in marginalized communities are exploited for radicalization and extremism.

Gender equality is a goal that was accepted by the Government of Kenya and that was enshrined in the 2010 Constitution. It is clear that inequality between women and men in Kenya is still persistent and that the members of the Kenyan parliament use the existing male-dominated institutional frameworks to control women's advancement to decision-making positions. In other words, structural resistance is used as a tool to sustain patriarchy (National Women's Steering Committee, 2015:37, Maraga, 2019:1). Female representation and therefore decision making in the Government of Kenya lags behind that of men because of unequal access to education, economic opportunities, legal representation, or social services. Women form a bigger percentage of the poor. To achieve a greater level of equality between women and men, changes in attitudes, relationships and political decision-making structures are needed (UN, 2002:1). Kileleo *et al.* (2019:373; USAID, 2020a:19) reason that sustainable development in Kenya would only be realized with an integrated gender approach to political and socio-economic development after the elimination of structural barriers. Gender mainstreaming, a global gender equality strategy promoted by feminist theory, is important for security and social justice for women and men, by including gender perspectives in all areas of development to ensure that social, political and economic goals are reached (UN, 2002:VI; Vision 2030, 2007:22). In order to address the research problem successfully, a methodological framework was followed.

1.9 Methodological framework

Qualitative research is guided by the metatheoretical assumptions with respect to epistemology and ontology. Epistemology considers the nature of knowledge and interpretation. The investigation of a research problem can be conducted in different ways based on different epistemologies, which will result in different interpretations (Bryman, 2012:27). Ontological considerations, on the other hand, are concerned with the nature of

reality and the social construction of reality. Constructivism, for example, argues that the social environment influences people, requiring a holistic approach to studying the different factors influencing social phenomena (Bryman, 2012:32).

This study is qualitative in nature. Bryman (1995:46) defines qualitative research as an approach to studying the reality of the social world. The study was conducted from a feminist theoretical perspective with a focus on gender inequality and its roots in social oppression. The approach is suitable to describe and analyse the impediments to gender equality in the national Government of Kenya. Due to its qualitative nature, this study on gender inequality is inductive. In an inductive study, conclusions are not always as certain as with deductive analysis; they are rather tentative or possible because of the creative reasoning involved (De Vos, 2002:53). The experiences and views expressed by the participants guided the researcher to conclusions on the effect of gender inequality on the security of Kenya.

Research can be either basic or applied. Applied research is a systematic examination involving the practical application of science (McNabb, 2004:13). The introduction to this research is theoretical to increase the general understanding of the relevant field and the phenomenon at hand (gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya). The research is therefore basic rather than applied. Such research is concerned with analysing theories that provide reasons for occurrences. The function of a research design is to plan the overall research strategy chosen and to ensure that one effectively addresses the research problem (De Vaus, 2001:1; Trochim, 2006:1). The study includes both a literature review and an empirical study. The purpose of the literature review is to establish a theoretical framework, to identify completed studies, and to define key terms and terminology. Chapters one to four are theoretical in nature, firstly to gain a general understanding of the contribution of the feminist theory to gender equality, secondly to determine the required legal standards for gender equality in Kenya and thirdly to determine the status of gender equality in the national Government of Kenya. Chapter four focuses on the impediments to gender equality in the national Government of Kenya and explores possible repercussions for the security of Kenya. The second phase of the research is empirical and investigated the impediments to gender equality and subsequent implications for internal security. The study context is outlined in the next section.

1.10 Study context

The study applied explorative and descriptive research designs. The explorative design was used for the compilation of Chapters 1 to Chapter 4 and was required for the formulation of the primary and specific research questions and research objectives. This design was used to study feminism, gender, and human security and to clarify the impact of gender inequality on the internal conflict from a Kenyan perspective.

This study made use of a descriptive research design that allowed for the description of the phenomenon under study using a case study (Mouton & Marais, 1994:33). Yin (2003:12) explains that, “case studies try to illuminate a decision or set of decisions, why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result.” The case at hand was a study on the effect of gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya on the security of the country. Due to its descriptive nature, the research provided rich data that lead to important recommendations for implementation in practice (Shuttleworth, 2008:1). The strength of qualitative case study research is that it allows the researcher to collect in-depth data to determine specific mechanisms between causes and effects. It was used to explain the link between programme implementation and programme results in real-life situations where interventions have not had the desired outcomes (Blatter, 2008:69). The population, sampling and data collection methods are discussed in the subsections of Section 1.11.

1.11 Population and sampling

The target population was defined before the start of the research. The target population for this study includes women in Kenya as a marginalized group. A study sample serves as a sample of the target population. For this study, the sample was purposively selected to include subject experts and female youths in Nairobi, Kenya.

Sampling is a process of selecting a group of individuals that represent the characteristics of the larger population. It can either be based on probability or nonprobability. For probability sampling, the size of the group matters as the number of people who will be included in the sample is predetermined. In nonprobability sampling the focus is on the ability, knowledge and expertise of the participants and they have to meet the required criteria (Morgan, 2008:797). This study made use of nonprobability sampling.

1.11.1 Sampling technique

In qualitative studies, the research is founded on an in-depth and highly contextualized understanding of specific phenomenon. Saturation or redundancy in data collection is used as a standard to determine sample size, rather than statistical criteria (Morgan, 2008:798). Purposive and snowball sampling, both nonprobability sample techniques, were applied to select the participants. These sampling techniques were used to ensure that the sample that was representative of the population to allow for inductive theory building and a subjective, holistic and detailed understanding. These goals were reached by interviewing a small systematically selected sample (Trochim, 2006:1; Crossman, 2017:1).

1.11.2 Inclusion criteria

Purposive sampling is based on a narrow set of criteria for inclusion to define the set of people who are suitable as prospective participants (Morgan, 2008:800). Inclusion criteria for this study entailed that the participants had to have an analytical and in-depth knowledge of the Kenyan political and security environments and/or in-depth knowledge of feminism theory and gender relations. The participants had to be fluent in English and located in Nairobi, Kenya

1.11.3 Recruitment of participants

The participants were identified based on their knowledge of the subjects of gender and or extremism and security in Kenya. Two pilot interviews were conducted with academic subject matter experts to evaluate the objectivity of the questions. For this study, female subject matter experts in gender studies were selected as a first group based on their expertise and involvement with gender issues and women's groups at the grassroots level. Secondly, experts (both genders) in political and security studies were selected because of their knowledge of extremism and its links with politics and internal conflict in Kenya. And lastly, female youths from civil society were selected to determine if or how gender inequality affects their lives.

1.11.4 Process of obtaining informed consent

According to international guidelines and ethical codes for research, informed consent from participants is a key step to ensure ethical research. This means that participants should agree to participate in the research before the commencement of the interview. Participants were informed about the purpose and methods of the research and were told that they will receive feedback once the thesis had been evaluated (Israel & Hay, 2008:432). Written and verbal consent was obtained from the participants before each interview. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting restrictions of movement, one interview was conducted telephonically. Verbal consent was received before the start of the interview.

1.11.5 Data collection

Data collection for social research involves either an empirical (primary data) or a theoretical (literature review or secondary data) data collection strategy, or a combination of the two. Data collection for this study made use of both theoretical and empirical methods. The study was conducted between 2017 and 2020. Primary data (empirical study) were collected by means of semi-structured face-to-face and telephonic interviews between July and October 2020. The Secondary data were collected by means of a literature study of scholarly sources, previously conducted empirical studies and a review of information in the media. According to McGinn (2008:804), secondary data proved to be of high quality and valuable because a longitudinal analysis has already been completed. Data collection for qualitative research is time-consuming and secondary data helped to confirm the reliability of the primary data. Ten semi-structured interviews were conducted, where after saturation was reached and the interviews were terminated.

1.11.6 Data collection instruments

The first phase of the study involved a literature study. A literature study is a useful tool to increase the researcher's understanding of the research topic under investigation. An understanding of the general and specific literature available is vital in constructing the research proposal and the specific research questions. Knowledge of where to find the required resources, how to access the information and to evaluate the quality of information is crucial (Race, 2008:489).

The second phase, the empirical research for this study, was based on a case study. The preferred means of data collection for case studies is semi-structured interviews. The case at hand was to analyse the implications for security if the national Government of Kenya fails to implement the required gender equality standards. The method of empirical data collection for this study was face-to-face interviews with purposively sampled participants. An advantage of face-to-face interviews is the likelihood of developing rapport with the participant and the observation of nonverbal clues, which allows for follow-up questions. Informed consent was obtained before all the interviews (Plano Clark, 2008:432). As indicated above, the first part of the study included a literature review. More detail about the literature will be provided in the next section.

1.11.7 Literature review

The main purpose of a literature review is for the researcher to get a clear understanding of the problem that has been identified. According to Mouton (2011:87), the literature review is an accumulated body of scholarship. Mouton emphasizes that the significance of a comprehensive literature review is:

- to familiarize the researcher with the definitions and key concepts of the study field;
- to identify and understand the theories applicable to the subject;
- to identify other academic and empirical studies in the field; and
- to prevent duplication of previous studies.

Mouton's contribution, Hesse-Biber's (2012) *Feminist research: Exploring, interrogating and transforming the interconnections of epistemology, methodology and method*, and Mchugh's (2014) *Feminist qualitative research: Towards transformation of science and society*, guided the literature review for this study. The literature review was divided into the study areas discussed below.

Firstly, the literature review explored theoretical conceptualization of feminist theory, gender equality and the correlation of gender inequality with human insecurity. This section studied feminist theory as the corner stone of the promotion of gender equality. It focused on the theoretical concepts of gender and the promotion of gender equality at the global, continental, regional and national levels through the global strategy of gender mainstreaming. The literature review explored the correlation between gender inequality and human security at a national level and the possible consequences for internal conflict.

The second aim of the literature review was to determine the legal requirements and status of gender equality in the national Government of Kenya. The literature review identified:

- the different legislative and institutional frameworks in support of the constitutional requirements set by the Government of Kenya to reach the required gender equality standards;
- impediments to implementing gender equality standards; and
- repercussions for the security of Kenya if gender equality is not applied.

The study started with the theoretical foundation of gender politics and it was consequently important to conceptualize the global status of gender equality and the level of importance. Scholars of gender and security include Detraz, author of *International security and gender*, and Lorber (1997) *The variety of feminism and their contribution to gender equality*, while Nitisha (2016) clarifies the concept of gender equality in *Equality: meaning, aspects and theories*.

Security studies developed as an academic sub discipline of international relations (IR). Security studies focuses on what security entails and the security of a referent object. Williams (2008) in *Security studies: An introduction* clarifies the goal of security studies in the context of a geopolitical situation, the survival of the individual or the state, while Paris (2001) discusses the importance of human security in *Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?* Tadjbakhs (2005) unpacks human security in *Human security: Concepts and implications*, while Lewis (2006) links human security with gender equality in *Human security: The implications of gender mainstreaming*.

Feminist scholars highlight that gender is a transformative force in research. They identify the intersecting identities with security. Tickner (1992) introduces feminist approaches to IR with her issue of "*Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*" (1992) and in 2004 with *Feminist responses to international security studies*. The contribution of gender to international security places a new emphasis on security theory and practice. Feminist scholars like Hudson, Sjoberg, Tickner, True and Gannon and Davies establish the gender bias in security and determine that gender language is included in international debates on security issues. Feminism deconstructs the gendered bias status quo concerning knowledge, claims and practices and incorporates new gender-sensitive theory of knowledge and power. These new focus areas of security enlarged the security study field to be inclusive of feminist security studies. It was Sjoberg (2009) who first used the term feminist security studies to identify and expose the importance of feminist work in reconstruction, reconstituting and transforming the study field of security studies in her work *Introduction to security studies: Feminist contributions*, and in 2016 with *What and where is feminist security studies?* True (2012) contributes to the new field of security studies with her work on *Securing feminism or feminist security studies*. Sjoberg (2010:22), together with Gannon and Davies (2012:65), explains how different feminist perspectives contribute to understanding how gender has shaped international and national politics, but Tickner (1992) argues that human security could not be secured until gender inequality in IR is not eliminated.

Labour (1997) and Richards (2014) highlight patriarchy as a powerful force in politics and as the root cause of gender oppression. Forsberg and Olsson (2016) and Sideris (2001) clarify

that feminist theory builds its understanding of gender discrimination on patriarchal power structures and the social construction of gender. It was Galtung (1969) who first identified structural violence and social injustices as factors of political violence. Caprioli (2005:165) agrees with Galtung that structural inequality is rooted in hierarchy, domination and the use of force. The concept of gender inequality and its link to internal conflict was researched and dismantled by Forsburg and Olsson (2016:2), as well as the role gender seems to play in the conduct of political violence. Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:4) in their study titled *Human rights violations and violent conflict* identify that conflict manifests itself in different forms and that there is a correlation between the violation of women's rights (human's rights) and the violation of other subordinate groups.

The *UN Beijing Declaration of 1995* laid the basis for a renewed focus on the plight of women around the world. Studies undertaken and documents prepared by UN Women to support governments with the implementation of the 12 areas that were flagged at the Beijing Conference are documented in the *Beijing Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995)*, in the document, *Concepts and definitions (2001)*, and in a renewed effort, 20 years after the Beijing conference, in *Step it up for gender equality: Member state commitments (2015)*. The African Union (AU) (2009) prepared a *gender policy* based on the report of the Beijing Conference and in 1995 at the AU conference called for the empowerment of women on the continent. UN Women supported the call of the AU. *UN Women Africa: Kenya (2016)* focusses the attention of the global and continental community on the status of gender equality and their gender programmes to support gender equality in Kenya. Furthermore, *UNSC Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008)* focus the attention of the global community on the impediments to sustainable peace and security if there is no female participation. Hudson's work, *Gender, human security and the UN: Security language as a political framework for women* unpacked the assumption that the UN is a norm-influencing global governance institution with real implications for the meaning and practice of security.

The Constitution of Kenya (2010) serves as the basis for the study on gender inequality in Kenya. A *gender analysis* of the 2013 and 2017 Kenya general elections conducted by the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and Mumma (2017) and *Kenya's failure to implement the two-third gender principle: The prospect of an unconstitutional parliament* both shed light on the seriousness of the challenge the Government of Kenya faces to implement gender equality. Muchiri (2017) explains in *Members of parliament (MPs) frustrate women in parliament* how frustrated women are despite their hopes of what a devolved political system could mean for gender equality. These hopes are explained by Minayo (2012) in *Enhancing gender equality through devolved government*. The cost of implementing the "two-third gender principle" was used as a reason for non-compliance by the Government of Kenya, but a study

conducted by the National Women's Steering Committee in 2015 titled *Implementing the constitutional two-thirds gender principle: The cost of representation*, uncovered the truth.

The National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) has the mandate “to promote gender equality and freedom from discrimination for all persons in Kenya.” The webpage of NGEC provides detailed information about the functions of the commission and its goal to reduce gender inequalities and discrimination against all people, monitoring compliance with Kenya laws, treaties and conventions concerning gender equality. The World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UN OHCHR, UNESCO and UN Women publish regular country updates on global poverty and the effects of gender inequality on the economy of states, including Kenya. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), Federation of Female Lawyers (FIDA) and USAID (2020a) conducted gender audits on the implementation of the required gender requirements based on the statistics provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Standards.

An ex-post evaluation of gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya identifies that there are barriers to the implementation of gender equality in Kenya. Despite the implementation of legal and institutional frameworks, development programmes and the inclusion of women in peace and security programmes, there is still resistance to the required female representation at the national Government level. This brings the realization that the Government of Kenya does not lack gender policies but lacks the political will to implement the existing policies in support of gender equality. Research by Mitullah (2017) and Kileleo *et al.* (2019) provide reasons for this failure. A gender audit by USAID (2020a) concludes that by not implementing the two-thirds gender principle the national Government of Kenya will not be able to transform key systems to serve the whole community. One of the areas is security. The global threat to peace and security includes violent extremism and terrorism – threats not new to Kenya.

Reports by the UN General Assembly focuses on conditions conducive to violent extremism. Research by Bouhana (2019), *The moral ecology of extremism: A systemic perspective* provides was the study by Sahgal and Zeuten (2018) *Analytical framing of violent extremism and gender in Kenya* that revealed that women might be enticed to join violent extremist groups to re-establish the norm and status of women in society. Studies by Badurdeen (2020, 2018,) and Goldsmith (2018) on *Women and recruitment in the Al Shabaab network: Stories of women being recruited by women recruiters in the coastal region of Kenya* and Botha (2014, 2015 and 2017) *Economic circumstances and radicalization in Kenya and Nigeria* focus on the unequal distribution of socio-economic opportunities as enablers for radicalization and extremism in Kenya. Ndung'u (2016, 2017) focused her research on the role of women in violent extremism in Kenya. The studies by Idris (2020) and Khalid (2019) explored the roles that women play in

countering violent extremism while Ogada (2019) analysed the content of “*Kenya’s National Strategy to counter violent extremism*” and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (2020) focused on lessons from Kenya to prevent violent extremism. The “Search for Common Ground” conducted an empirical study in Kenya on “*Strengthening the role of families and community influencers to prevent recruitment into violent extremism groups*” and UN Women contributed to the body of knowledge with empirical research on “*Gendered vulnerabilities and violent extremism in Dadaab*”.

For this literature study, books, online journals, internet articles, published empirical studies, mini- and PhD theses, the Kenyan constitution, policies and documents of the Government of Kenya and the Kenyan printed newspapers, the *Standard*, *Star* and *Daily Nation* provide regular updates of parliamentary decisions and changes in the security situation of the country. Studies by the UN Commission on the Status of Women, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Human Rights Commission, Democracy in Africa, USAID and the Kenya Women’s Lawyer Association (FIDA) contribute to a clear understanding of the status of gender equality in Kenya. In support of the research published on gender inequality and extremism in Kenya, statistics from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, the World Bank, African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund were used to strengthen and support arguments on the repercussions of gender inequality.

Various electronic sources and databases of the Ferdinand Postma Library at the North-West University supported the literature study. EBSCO Discovery Service is a powerful search engine with links to various academic search platforms. For this research, the following databases were of primary importance: Cambridge Journals Online; Directory of Open Access Journals, HeinOnline; JStor, Newspaper Source; Sage Journals Online, Refworld; Taylor & Francis Online and Wiley Online Journals. The alert service of Google Scholar provides a constant update of the latest research papers that were published on gender inequality and extremism in Kenya.

It was evident from the literature review that women in Kenya are still the disadvantaged gender despite the remedies continuously sought to bring equality. An empirical study was conducted to clarify the research gap that was identified, namely the effect of gender inequality on the security of the Government of Kenya. The development of the data collection tool for the collection of empirical data is discussed next.

1.11.8 Development of the data collection tool

Survey research is common, and surveys are the most frequently used methodology and primary data collection tool used in case studies. Methods most commonly associated with

survey research are questionnaires for quantitative research and interviews during qualitative research (Julien, 2008:847; Bryman, 2005:85). The wording of interview questions was critical for obtaining valid research data. Validity and reliability are of utmost importance in survey research. Internal validity is achieved when the required data answer the questions asked. Since the interviews were conducted with English-speaking subject matter experts, the quality of the data collected was of a high standard. External validity refers to the extent to which the sample was representative of the study population. The sample represented participants from both gender and securities studies and the youth. The reliability of a survey is reflected in the consistency of data gathered to answer the research questions (Julien, 2008:848). The analysis of the data confirmed the consistency of the answers and saturation was achieved.

For the purpose of this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Such interviews allow for structured and unstructured open-ended questions. A survey was developed based on the literature review for use during the face-to-face interviews that were conducted by the researcher. Personal semi-structured interviews positioned the researcher to judge the responses of the participants immediately and allowed for correction when a question was not understood properly. Ethics considerations play an important role in empirical research and are explained in the next section.

1.12 Ethical considerations

Qualitative research studies aim to contribute to the body of knowledge, improve current practice and change the lives of the target population. Research ethics addresses the integrity of the research activity. The research was honest and open and in line with commonly held standards of research practice (Preissle, 2008:276). The trustworthiness of qualitative research was described using the credibility achieved through participant validation and triangulation. For this study, theoretical and empirical data were collected. It was imperative to confirm that the data are a true reflection of the situation on the ground. Scientific objectivity and authentication of qualitative research are displayed in the fair representation of the different viewpoints of the participants as Walliman (2011:45) directs.

Reliability in qualitative research was achieved through dependability. This required leaving an audit trail and keeping meticulous records of all phases of the research (Rodgers, 2008:43). Meticulous recording of the research process confirmed objectivity in the data collection process. Reliability could have been affected slightly by the manner of interviewing, conditions during the interview and the rapport between the participant and the researcher (Tongco, 2007:155). The reliability of the data was not compromised. The researcher is an experienced

interviewer, and the participants were subject matters experts, which allowed for in-depth discussions. The interviews were conducted in privacy and a good rapport developed between the researcher and the participants. All the interviews were recorded and were saved electronically, together with a soft copy of the consent form.

Orb *et al.* (2001:93) indicate that qualitative research is focused on the participants in their natural environment and therefore ethics problems are subtle and different from quantitative research. Qualitative researchers must therefore address the moral implications of their representations to those they study, the academic community, policymakers, the media and the public (Preissle, 2008:277). In order to achieve this, the academic research was grounded in the feminist theory, based on the requirements of the 2010 Constitution and supported with statistics provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Standard. The results of the empirical study are in line with gender analysis conducted by FIDA, USAID and UN Women together with multilateral organizations. The study was transformative, with no moral implications and it contributes to the body of knowledge of feminist security studies.

The research adhered to the ethics guidelines prescribed by the Ethics Committee of the North-West University. This included obtaining an ethics number provided by an Ethics Committee. The ethics guidelines include that the results should be based on scientific enquiry and protocol (please refer to Attachments A and B for the scope of North-West University scientific—and research ethic committees. The study did not infringe on the lives of the participants nor was it necessary to interview officials from the Government of Kenya. The participants were subject matter experts from the private sector. For the reason that the study was completed part time and did not display any form of conflict of interest nor intervened with the profession of the researcher, and as a result, official approval for the study was not necessary. The research was designed, reviewed and undertaken in such a way that the results displayed integrity, quality, transparency while the anonymity of the participants were protected.

Anonymity in qualitative research refers to the guarantee of non-identification of each participant while confidentiality protects the identity of participants from other parties. Ethics codes of conduct require the protection of the identity of participants to safeguard anonymity and confidentiality (Ogden, 2008:45). Confidentiality is necessary to enhance the quality and validity of the data. The participants were at ease to provide their contact details to the researcher in the case of follow-up questions. However, the identity of each of the participants will remain protected following publication.

In an effort to respect the confidentiality of the participants, they were allowed to decide how much information to share and how it could be used. This discussion took place during the

process of informed consent (Ogden, 2008:680). During this process, the problem statement of the study was explained to the participants and the importance of their views, not their identity, was strongly emphasized. The participants were ensured of the highest level of professionalism by the researcher, who is attached to the North-West University, South Africa.

Confidentiality was guaranteed by coding the identifiable information of participants. Identifiable information will be stored separately from non-identifiable information. The recorded and coded interviews are on a USB device will be kept in the personal safe of the researcher for a period of five years after the publication of the research results before the recordings will be destroyed. In the case of inquiries about a specific interview, the request will first be cleared with the participant before the researcher will approve permission for access. The limitations of this study are explored next.

1.13 Limitations of the study

The empirical study identified the lack of female cohesion and a strong women's league to advance gender issues in Kenya. There is not the political will or a parliamentary feminist movement to implement the top-down approach, nor a united women's league to promote a bottom-up gender approach. The next general election is in 2022, yet women's leagues are formed according to political party alignments – exposing the lack of a feminist movement. The success of the implementation of the recommended three-tier gender approach will depend on the voluntary commitment of the private or corporate sector to embrace the “two-thirds gender principle” at the meso-level. The significance of this study is discussed in the next subsection.

1.14 Significance of the study

This study identifies that there is a positive correlation between gender inequality, human insecurity and internal security in Kenya. The persistence of gender inequality reveals that dominance over women at all levels of society cannot be separated from human security. The effect of gender inequality and the lack of women's socio-economic and political empowerment are enablers for radicalization and violent extremism when women have to fight against exclusion, marginalization, inequality and abuse – the conditions that lead many to radicalization. Figure 6.1 illustrates the cyclic interaction between gender inequality, sustained poverty and insecurity, while Figure 6.2 illustrates how the result of this cyclic interaction spearheads extremism. Radicalization is used to incite internal violence (see Figure 6.4 illustrating the impact of radicalization on national security). This violence may be latent or start

with just a perception that the Government of Kenya is not capable of protecting its citizens. The empirical research emphasized ethnic inequality as one of the root causes of gender inequality. The outcome for both ethnic and gender inequality as a result of structural discrimination, translates into poverty and insecurity. The persistence of gender inequality in Kenya could be classified as a threat to internal security.

A three-tier gender approach is recommended, which includes the current top-down strategy at a macro-level. However, the focus of the transformation strategy is on the meso-level because it is a non-political lateral economic approach to gender transformation. This meso-level gender approach acts as a bridge between the macro- and micro-levels that in Kenya are highly politicized. Education is the key to generating a critical mass of women to graduate from informal or lower job levels and to bring social transformation and the promotion of gender equality. An increase in the occupational status of women in the private sector would have a positive effect on the status of women in the public sector.

Secondly, stimulating and incentivizing a socio-cultural norm change to include marginalized women could counter radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya. This approach could be a guiding principle for donor countries and organizations that support the Government of Kenya in the counter violent extremism (CVE) fight.

1.15 Chapter layout

An outline and synopsis of the chapter division follow next.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1 served as an introduction to the study. It provided a short description of the correlation between gender equality, feminist theory, human security and internal conflict – the basis for the problem statement, research questions and research objectives. The introduction included an overview of the political and legislative background and focused on the status of gender equality in the Government of Kenya. The chapter provided the methodological framework that was used for the research, as well as a short description of the limitations to and the contribution of the study. The introductory chapter concludes with an outline and a summary of the chapter divisions.

Chapter 2: Theories and concepts of feminist and human security studies as the foundation for security

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the study. It defines the terms *gender* and *gender equality* and offers an analysis of how the views contained in feminist theory contribute to the inclusion of gender in security studies. This is followed by a detailed description of feminist theory and a discussion of its central concepts and the unique characteristics of feminist research to include feminist objectivity based on the social reality of women in mainstream research. The chapter concludes with the relationship between gender inequality and internal conflict or political violence.

Chapter 3: Kenya: Legislative and institutional frameworks to meet gender equality

Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of the legal, policy and institutional frameworks of the Government of Kenya in support of gender equality, as well as the regional and international gender instruments ratified by the Government of Kenya. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the responsiveness of the frameworks to implement the two-thirds gender principle for positions in the national Government of Kenya and an exploration of how the empowerment of women in Kenya is linked to the existing legislative and policy structures.

Chapter 4: Impediments to and repercussions of not meeting gender equality standards

Chapter 4 starts with an ex-post evaluation of gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya. The evaluation identifies the impediments to gender equality based on the patterns of power and decision making, access to and control over assets and resources and the effect of non-economic issues that have economic consequences. The second part of the chapter stresses the security consequences of maintaining the status quo of gender inequality in the legislature. It highlights that extremism does not develop in a vacuum, and structural factors at the macro-level are triggers for radicalization at the meso- and micro-levels. The chapter concludes with a study of female radicalization in Kenya.

Chapter 5: Methodological approach

Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach of the study. It emphasizes the importance of research paradigms, underlines the characteristics of a qualitative research design in social research and focuses on case study research as a method of research that allows for the collection of in-depth data to determine specific mechanisms between causes and effects. This study made use of both explorative and descriptive designs. The explorative design or literature review focuses on feminist theory as the cornerstone for gender research; defines the legislative and institutional frameworks instituted by the Government of Kenya in support of gender equality and examines the impediments and as a result the repercussions for female security. The chapter then continues with a descriptive research design based on the data collected using an empirical study. The descriptive design was found appropriate to answer the primary research question and to clarify the effect of gender inequality on the national security of the Government of Kenya.

Chapter 6: Empirical findings: Results and discussions

Chapter 6 provides a detailed description of the investigation on how gender inequality, according to the feminist theory, affects the security of the national Government of Kenya. An analysis of the empirical findings shows a parallel between gender inequality and ethnic inequality as root causes for political unrest or internal conflict and concludes that the current top-down approach to assure a more gender-equal and prosperous society, is not reaching its intended goal. The second part of the chapter continues to discuss possible alternative methods identified during empirical research to secure human and women's security as a counter to radicalization and extremism.

Chapter 7: Recommendations

Chapter 7 concludes this study. The first part of the chapter completes the study from the feminist and security studies' theoretical perspectives. The second part of the chapter provides an analysis of the impact of gender inequality on the security of Kenya. The third and last part of the chapter recommends a multilevel gender approach, focusing on the central dimensions of gender inequality in politics at the macro- or Government level, in the economy at the meso-level and in society at the micro- or community level to ensure human (physical) security for women.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS FROM FEMINIST STUDIES AND HUMAN SECURITY STUDIES AS FOUNDATION FOR SECURITY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. The chapter first defines the relevant terms and provides a deeper understanding of “gender” and “gender inequality.” The chapter then turns to a detailed description of the different feminist theories, including their central concepts on knowledge building, the unique characteristics of feminist research and its applications and challenges in practice. Thereafter, the chapter provides an analysis of how the different feminist theories contribute to gender equality, confirming its relationship with security.

Feminist empiricism is the product of a feminist analysis of a specific mode of inquiry. It urges scholars to consider who could be left out of orthodox or mainstream research models. For instance, feminist researchers interrogated and challenged existing research methods to improve the accuracy, objectivity and universality of mainstream research. Feminists proposed that mainstream research should be cognisant of the uniqueness of women, their lives and experiences. The objectivity of mainstream research, therefore, should be relayed to feminist objectivity based on the social reality of women (Hesse-Biber, 2012:9). The contributions of feminist research to the body of knowledge in gender studies and its contributions to seek social justice for women is discussed against this background.

2.2 Gender and gender relations

Originally, the term *gender* was accepted as a way to distinguish between biological sex and the socialized characteristics of femininity and masculinity (Marecek *et al.*, 2004:193). To redefine and to be able to expand on the concept, “male and female” more accurately refers to sex categories, while masculine and feminine describe gender categories. The latter signifies socially learned behaviours associated with men (boys) or women (girls) and it prescribes the appropriate behaviour for a specific sex (WHO, 2015:1). The construction of gender identities as determined by the social understanding of gender, is dynamic: the context of the meanings is changeable rather than fixed and may alter over time for an individual (Association of Women Educators, 2017:1).

UN Women refers to gender as the,

“social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationship are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected and allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context” (UN Women, 2020a:1).

Gender is furthermore defined by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1997:1) as: “...the relations between men and women, both perceptual and material. It is the central organizing principle of societies, and often governs the processes of production and reproduction, consumption and distribution.” The above is echoed by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2000:4), which described gender relations as a “complex system of personal and social relations of domination and power through which women and men are socially created, maintained and through which they gain access to power and material resources or are allocated status within society”. Bravo-Baumann (2000:102) adds that gender relations have an effect on household security, family wellbeing, planning and reproduction and in general on all other aspects of life. However, the reconstruction of gender identities means the power can be encoded into gender. This encoded power does not only distinguish between masculinity and femininity, but also creates a hierarchy, or hegemonic vision among masculinities (Wilcox, 2010:64). Gender and gender relations are therefore formed by the broader socio-cultural context and as a result can contribute to unequal life experiences for the genders.

The definition of gender acknowledges that it is a changeable social construct. However, the definition still limits gender to men or male and women or female and excludes gender fluidity, which includes descriptions such as a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and unsure (LGBTQIU) people (Hagen, 2016:326). Johnson (2011:607) clarifies that the term transgender was developed to refer to people who live in the gender opposite to their biological sex without a medical transformation. However, during the 1990s, the term was accepted to encompass all non-normative gender identities because it refers to *both* moving across (permanently or temporarily) *and* to people who are living beyond gender. Johnson (2011:607) points out that the life experiences of transgender people include marginalization, oppression, violence and poverty. As a result, a coalition between trans and non-trans feminists is possible in the struggle for social justice. For this study, LGBTQIU people are not discussed as such but are accommodated in the definition of gender inequality. To be able to understand gender inequality in a broader socio-cultural context, gender equality should first be defined.

2.3 Gender equality

The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) defines equality as equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men and boys and girls (OSAGI, 2001:1). Gender equality entails that the interests, needs and priorities of all genders are taken into consideration and that the diversity of different groups of women and men is recognized. UN Women perceive equality as a precondition for and an indicator of sustainable people-centred development (OSAGI, 2001:1).

Gender equality as a normative understanding signifies a balanced and fair distribution of resources; on the flip side, an unbalanced or unequal distribution assigns a lesser value to a specific group and is interpreted as normative intolerance (Caprioli, 2000:53). Caprioli (2005:166) confirms that with respect to the effect of gender inequality on internal conflict, an unequal domestic environment would contribute to discrimination against women and entire ethnic groups (2005:166). To stop such an escalation of discrimination and potential strife, it is therefore imperative to continuously strive to reach the most important targets of gender equality. According to the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming (1998:9), these targets include:

- the recognition and implementation of women's rights as human rights;
- the equal participation of men and women in political and public life, better described as representative democracy;
- the importance of an individual's economic independence;
- the powerful role of education in the establishment of norms and the transfer of knowledge with regard to gender; and lastly,
- the shared responsibility to remove gender imbalances in society (Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming, 1998:9).

Since gender equality is an international norm and has such an impact on internal conflict, men and women should have equal opportunities to participate in the provision of security to both genders because:

- "gender equality is a basic human right;

- gender equality is a democratic principle;
- gender equality is fundamental to the rule of law; and,
- gender equality is essential to effective and accountable security provision” (DCAF, 2015:3).

The promotion of gender equality implies attention to the needs and perspectives of women and a shift from women to gender when it comes to power and change. The next section discusses this paradigm shift.

2.3.1 A paradigm shift from women to gender

The history and development of gender since the 1970s disclosed different theoretical discussions and can be differentiated as the WID, WAD and GAD approaches. Each of the approaches refers to different theoretical standpoints on the solutions to gender inequality and refers to women, gender and change. Different models to enhance equal employment opportunities and to improve women’s access to education, skills training and healthcare, taking into consideration women’s roles as caretakers, have been introduced by mainly American liberal feminists. The first of these models with its origins in the 1980s was the women in development (WID) model with an efficiency and economic approach to allocating resources to both men and women in development aid programmes. The WID approach, inspired by liberal feminism and modernization, focused on the integration of women into development and growth, with the focus on women’s economic capacity (Davids *et al.*, 2014:1). The model did not question modernization, nor did it address the root causes of gender inequality. It is regarded as a “non-confrontational approach” (Rathgeber, 1990:491).

The women and development (WAD) approach, influenced by Marxist feminists, aimed for an idealistic revolutionary perspective of change to the world’s political, economic and social mandates to help the oppressed and poor (Davids *et al.*, 2014:1). This model was a bridge between the WID and GAD models and developed because of the modernization limitations of the WID model. This model was based on the perspective that equality is essential to improve women’s lives, but it did not address the systemic problems associated with gender inequality (Rathgeber, 1990:493). As a result, the gender and development (GAD) approach, influenced by socialist feminists came as an alternative in the 1980s to improve the WID and WAD models. The GAD model examined the inferior roles – the root causes of gender inequality – and did not focus on short-term expansions of current systems to accommodate women (Rathgeber, 1990:493). Davids *et al.* (2014:1) cited Van Driel and Deuss in saying that GAD refocused change on the concept of gender “as complex power relations shaping

people's lives". The GAD approach moved away from women as the focus and changed to gender. It means a difference in the analysis of power and change.

GAD also has fallen prey to critics because it did not take all the social factors (such as race and class) that undermine women into consideration, although it had a holistic approach to improving women's lives. GAD acknowledges the contributions of men, is sensitive to gender inequality and strengthens women's legal rights with the focus on eliminating existing power relations in society between men and women (Noor, 2010:10–12). The shift from the GAD paradigm to gender mainstreaming as a global strategy in the 1990s focused on global gendered outcomes and institutional changes (True, 2003: 370).

Additionally, the WID, WAD and GAD approaches were criticized by black women for their ethnocentrism and classism and by gay people for its hetero-normativity. People from the global South added to the complicated matter on gender and power with their criticism that these approaches were dominated by western views (Davids *et al.*, 2014:1). The importance of gender inequality was acknowledged in 1991 at the sixth summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) when the decade (1991–2000) of the girl-child was proclaimed. A National Plan of Action was formulated to address the needs of girls in the South Asian region (IDEA, 2014:82).

Despite the fact that gender equality as a concept has become widely accepted and forms part of the sustainable development goals of the UN, women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence around the globe. For instance, the UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 specifically states: "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls" and it focuses on gender equality as a fundamental human right and a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world (UN: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, 2018:1). The Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, also known as the Beijing Declaration, served as the vehicle for many countries to transform the role and status of women to participation instead of mere submission (UN Beijing Declaration, 1995:1). It was the start of a positive movement towards equality for women around the world. Paragraph 182 of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995:79; Tarr-Whelan, 2010:5; Krook & True, 2012:114) includes a specific target of reaching 30 per cent of female active participation in all types of decision making in democracies.

Gender issues, amongst other things, focus on women, their roles, access to and control over resources, division of labour, interests and social needs. Based on this background, the next section discusses the social construction, the theoretical perspectives, the central dimensions and reality of gender inequality.

2.4 Social construction, theoretical perspectives, central dimensions and the reality of gender inequality

The social construction, theoretical perspectives, central dimensions and the reality of gender inequality are discussed in subsections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4.

2.4.1 Social construction of gender inequality

Gender inequality can be explained as either a social capacity or as a norm. When referring to gender inequality as normative in a society, it concerns imbalanced resource distribution, with more focus on the power and material and immaterial resources of men than of women. An uneven distribution of resources is an indication that a lesser value is assigned to a specific group (Gizelis, 2011:524). Gender as a capacity may vary, however, but includes viewpoints related to human capital or individual investment and social capital. Gender inequality explained in the context of social capital refers to the distribution of skills, power and resources in a particular society. Human capital is linked to access to education (Gizelis, 2011:524). The World Health Organization (WHO) deems it necessary to address gender inequality as it stems from:

- differences in gender roles, relations and norms;
- from the imbalances in power relations between women and men; and,
- from factors influencing gender like ethnicity, education and employment.

These factors are the basis for discriminatory practices or social exclusion (WHO, 2017:1) and can be explained in the context of four major sociological perspectives. These perspectives will be discussed in the next subsections.

2.4.2 Theoretical perspectives on gender inequality

Gender inequality is theoretically built on the sociological perspectives of functionalism, conflict theory, interactionism and feminism. Each of the perspectives is discussed below.

2.4.2.1 Functionalist theory perspective

Functionalist theory studies society from a macro or complex perspective based on the interdependability of social structure and social function and argues that functionalism is

responsible for solidarity and overall stability (Wienclaw, 2011:112). Functionalists argue that men are responsible for task and leadership roles while women fulfil moral and expressive roles. As a result, the theory advocates that gender inequality exists based on the division of labour (pre-described roles), but in such a way to ensure that the broader social system functions in harmony. Gender, together with other social structures, contributes to the stability and solidarity of society as a whole. However, because of prescribed gender roles, feminists reason that women are suppressed in their family structures, but that functionalism disregards this position. As women enter the workforce, a change in the functioning of the system creates social problems, prompting change (Crossman, 2020:1). As gender equality increases in the workplace, women expect a more equal distribution of domestic responsibilities. This is happening to a greater extent in more developed countries (Wienclaw, 2011:115). Crossman identifies that with an increase in gender equality, a change in the system was prompted and gender inequality was explained from a conflict theory perspective.

2.4.2.2 Conflict theory perspective

Unlike the functionalist theory, which essentially promotes harmony and positivity, gender from a conflict perspective focuses on the unequal distribution of power and status between men as the dominant and women as the subordinate gender (Wienclaw, 2011:96, 111). According to this view, the focus on gender inequality underscores the universal inequality that developed because men obtained and maintained power and advantage over women in society. This privilege provided men with the advantage of control over resources in the political and economic sphere, to the disadvantage of women (Wienclaw, 2011:96, 111). The conflict theory developed from Karl Marx's work (from the early to mid-1800s) to explain the origin of social problems as the point at which the rights and powers of dominant groups suppress other groups so that they become subordinate. From an economic perspective for instance, wage inequality between the genders is a consequence of men's historic advantage over women. Because of the complexity of power, the relationship between people's experiences, struggles and nationalities and the links to global capitalism should be mapped to illuminate the influence of macro- or global politics and not only micro- or local politics on the responses of people as affected by power relations (De Vault & Gross, 2012:229). Conflict theorists, also conflict theorists who are feminists, recommend a transformation of power structures to balance the power between the two groups, in this case the two genders (Lumen, 2020:1; Crossman, 2020:10). Feminist theory developed from this and is addressed next.

2.4.2.3 Feminist theory perspective

Although feminist theory is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5, it is necessary to provide a short overview of feminist theory as part of this discussion. As a result of women's inferior position in society as identified by the GAD approach and explained from a conflict theory perspective, feminist theory developed with the exclusive goal of advancing women's position in life and to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of gender inequality (Wienclaw, 2011:96, 111). The view of gender as a social construct, as explained above in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, implies that gender inequality cannot be an individual matter, but is embedded in relationships, the economy, politics, religion and the media (Lorber, 1997:1). Feminist research has disrupted traditional ways of building knowledge and has uncovered androcentric bias in social research. Traditional or male-orientated research (pre-1980s) has meant that an over-representation of men in positions of power was justified based on the inherent differences between the sexes. However, gender-orientated research (from the 1980s and 1990s) has emphasized that gender inequity, and not the difference in sexes, prevent women from advancing to positions of organizational power (Miner *et al.*, 2012:257).

Feminist researchers radically challenge the objectivity of social research and argue that it should be transformed to include feminist objectivity. Feminist scholars reason that women have a better understanding of social reality than men because of their structurally oppressed situation (Hesse-Biber, 2012:11). Gender-related studies, group feminist theories into broad categories of gender reform feminisms, gender resistant feminisms and gender revolution feminisms (Lorber, 1997:1). These feminist metatheories are discussed in Section 2.5. Gender intersects on all levels of society and is discussed from the point of view that gender inequality is generated by human interaction. The effect of interactionism on gender inequality is discussed next.

2.4.2.4 Interactionism (symbolic) theory perspective

The last of the major sociological perspectives underlining gender studies is interactionism. The functionalist and conflict perspectives study gender inequality from the perspective of macro-level social forces or an institutional perspective, while interactionism focuses on social processes and believe that meaning can be generated from human interaction in everyday life or on a micro-level. It explains the relationships amongst individuals in a society. Gender stratification is the result of processes that centre on either cooperation, conflict or identity formation or are based on how an individual socially constructs (interprets) the world around him. Intersectional feminism, also addressed in Section 2.5.3.4.1 as part of gender revolution, more specific cultural feminism, explains how different forms of inequality can combine and

intensify each other. People's social identities (race, gender, class sexuality, immigrant status, age) can compound experiences of discrimination because of their positions and the relationships between people in a society. Broaddus (2020:209) explains intersectionality as a "lens through which a person can see where power comes and collides – where it interlocks and intersects."

Various forms of oppression interact to influence a person's wellbeing. The person is either powerful or resilient or has a low self-esteem. Due to prejudice and marginalization, minority groups suffer from low self-esteem. An interactionist approach is the only theory in which the shifting complexities of the social world, external to the individual, shape the self without deterministic effects. People are "constructed and reconstructed in and through multiple social encounters and social practices in the multiple social locations we each inhabit, enabling us to mobilize and live with the multiple identities we each embody" (Jackson & Scott, 2010:821). This section provides a theoretical background for the unequal treatment of women because on their gender and in a specific society. The next section focuses on the central dimensions of gender inequality.

2.4.3 Central dimensions of gender inequality

Gender inequality can be explained by focusing on the central dimensions of political, economic, social and physical (in) security. Each of these dimensions is discussed in the following subsections.

2.4.3.1 Political dimension of gender inequality

The first dimension of gender inequality is associated with access to political power. Forsberg and Olson (2016:2) argue that power is the basis of inequality and it is used to influence society. Caprioli (2000:55) explains that power is used as a resource or a method to reach a goal. Female representation in political institutions and / or a decision-making capacity is used as a measure to capture political power and equality. The level of female representation in the public sphere can be an indication of mere representation or actual influence. Therefore, if women are not allowed to compete in the political sphere on an equal level with men, it automatically reduces their level of access to power with a smaller possibility of influence (Caprioli, 2000:55).

Parliaments in democracies represent the people in the state. Caprioli (2000:51; 2005:162) and Melander (2005:695) propose that a high presentation of women in parliament is an indication of a more gender-equal society with a more even power distribution among the men and women representing democracy. According to the UN (2020:1) definition, "democracy

provides an environment that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms and where women and men have equal rights and all people are free from discrimination.” The values expressed by democracy and by the feminist theory emphasize equality as a tool to prevent indiscriminate power systems. As such, democracies have mechanisms available for the population to voice their discontent and to resolve conflicts peacefully by means of the judiciary. However, introducing democratic values is not a quick fix for gender inequality, despite some of the positive developments and claims in the political arena during the 20th century. Forsburg and Olsson (2016:2) established that women’s capacity to influence is rather a reflection of the gender equality norm or female development that has a positive effect on both men’s and women’s political behaviour, than a women’s political capacity alone to influence. Forsburg and Olsson’s research explains why female leaders in politics who came to power through a process of nomination and not through a strong feminist movement, will have little influence on the political decision-making processes in government. The county governments in Kenya are a speaking example of this statement (Rift Valley Institute, 2017:1).

States with strong transparent governments have accountable institutions and are associated with good governance. Such states employ more women in the political and formal labour market. Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 shows that Norway and Switzerland have a high human development and a low GII. One can deduct from this that states with good governance are more peaceful. A further deduction would be that transparency and a higher percentage of women in parliament and the government are indicators of a lower level of corruption in a state. Political corruption acts as a deterrent or prevents women’s access to parliament (UNDP, 2010:16). Since corruption creates barriers to public services or resources, it deepens female economic inequality. The economic dimension of gender inequality is discussed next.

2.4.3.2 Economic dimension of gender inequality

The second dimension according to Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3), focusses on the economic and employment rates of women, which are often used to determine personal growth. It is expected that women who occupy paid employment positions will develop their potential and foster a consciousness of political participation with the capacity to influence. A second causal effect is that gender inequality negatively affects economic growth. Research indicators on the economic status of women and their health variables linked them to political variables. Hudson *et al.* (2017:22) confirmed the report by UNDP (2010:16) on the correlation between corruption and gender inequality, mentioned in the preceding section. Their research confirmed a negative correlation between indicators of corruption and those of women’s social and economic rights. Therefore, the expansion of women’s rights has an added economic benefit. Not only will political corruption decrease because of greater equity and female empowerment

in society, but the society will see an increase in investment and growth. To put it differently, an increase in gender equity promotes economic growth. A study by Bertay *et al.* (2020:7) confirms that gender equality has a positive effect of real economic growth at the industry level and that an industry with a bigger share of female employment adds more economic value to the industry when it is located in a country with a low gender inequality score, like Sweden.

An analysis of gender inequality on lifetime earnings looked at the gender gap in wages. The gender gap in wages relates to the status and capacity of women and their influence in society. Globally, women are paid two-thirds what men are paid (Woden *et al.*, 2020:5). Research by Payscale identified that the gender pay gap increases with career progression and so does the opportunity gap. Women are promoted at a slower pace and are 50 per cent less likely than men to be appointed at an executive level. Financial marginalization or gendered hierarchies are clear separation lines between male and female and indicative of a set of social practices and beliefs that promote male superiority and female subordination (Payscale, 2020:1). A crisis like Covid-19 exposes the economic and security vulnerability of women. The economic consequences were far-reaching and increased existing gender inequality levels. A change in a person's economic situation has an effect on the social dimension of the family (UNDP, 2020:16; Payscale, 2020:1). Social inequality is addressed in the next section.

2.4.3.3 Social dimension of gender inequality

The social construction of gender inequality as discussed in Section 2.4.1 refers to the value added to individuals based on their gender and focuses on indicators such as i) fertility rates (Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 illustrates that the size of the family negatively affects the probability of the girl-child to be empowered), ii) distorted sex ratios (with one-child policy in China) and iii) human investment (as displayed by Table 1.1 in Chapter 1) (Forsburg & Olsson, 2016:3).

The first indicator, fertility rates, according to Regan and Paskeviciute (2003:292) (Caprioli 2005:167; World Bank, 2018:XIV, Woden *et al.*, 2020:6) establishes a correlation between high fertility rates and gender inequality. Sen (2001:474) emphasizes that the enhancement of women's active agency and the empowerment of women broaden social care, result in a reduction in child mortality and neglect, and a decrease in fertility and population overcrowding rates. Regan and Paskeviciute (2003:292) link high fertility rates to lower female political participation and less economic access for females. Females with many dependent children reduce the probability for the children to develop professional organizational and communication skills or to pursue professional careers (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). The contrary confirms that low birth rates increase women's ability to be economically independent. In summary, female employment does not guarantee empowerment and liberation, but

increased employment does increase women's level of participation in society, and probably in politics. Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3) conclude that the fertility rate as an indicator of gender equality explains both direct and indirect forms of power in gender relations. Research by Woden *et al.* (2020:12) confirms a strong correlation between gender inequality and fertility because girls who drop out of school early, have children early and tend to have bigger families.

A second indicator used to measure gender inequality in the social dimension is distorted sex ratios resulting in a male surplus because of the value assigned to gender. Distorted sex ratios result in more males than females being born (normal sex ratio in 2020 is 1.018 men to women). This is usually due to society adding value to the male gender, like in China and India (Li, 2020:1). An unbalanced sex ratio reveals an exaggerated level of gender inequality due to sex selection or sex-selective abortions. Due to the higher value put on males, sons receive preference over daughters in terms of nutrition, healthcare and education (Den Boer & Hudson, 2017:119).

A third indicator, according to Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3), is the focus on human investment based on gender. The gender inequality women experience (mothers) affects both boys and girls and leads to a high risk of stunting and child mortality. Investing in female education can improve education and career opportunities and delay child marriages and early childbearing. In some middle and high-income countries, gender parity was reached through education (Woden *et al.*, 2020:12).

Basic education for girls has improved due to international norm development by means of the Millennium Development Goals. Globally, an average of 89.3 per cent of girls versus 89.9 per cent of boys completes their primary school and 76 per cent of girls versus 75.3 per cent of boys their lower secondary school. However, child marriages (35.1 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa) and early childbearing are still negatively affecting the education of girls in lower-income countries like Kenya (Woden *et al.*, 2020:5) Therefore, education became a less relevant measure against gender inequality. Figure 2.1 reveals that school enrolment rates in developing countries have improved from 83 per cent in 2000 to reach a high of 91 per cent in 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa displayed the greatest progress with an increase from 52 per cent in 1990 to 80 per cent in 2015.




Figure 2.1: Adjusted net enrolment rate

Sources: UNMDG Report (2015); World Bank (2020a)

The bottom line is that female education is directly correlated with the economic aspects of the labour market. It affects the distribution of labour and influences employment positions and the employment levels of women in the formal sector and public administration. Girls are often regarded as a financial burden for the family and therefore disadvantaged when it comes to education. Girls are married off by their parents to alleviate the financial strain and are condemned to a life of poor health, large families and financial dependence on their husbands (Kobia *et al.*, 2020:1). In conclusion, a difference in the literacy rates of males and females in a population is an indicator of a gender inequality norm, but also the level of human investment in a society in general (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:3).

Standpoint feminism (see Section 2.5.3.3.1 for a discussion on standpoint feminism) in conjunction with intersectional feminism (see Section 2.5.3.4.1 for a discussion on intersectional feminism) highlights that the world is divided in between the haves and the have-nots; the developed and developing; the donors and beneficiaries and the prosperous Global North and the marginalised Global South.

International women's day marches in March 2019 illustrated the differences in the challenges that women face in the two hemispheres. Women in Latin America (as part of the Global South) marched against femicide, abortion control and rape as a way to make visible the invisible world of resistance and resilience. In the United States of America and Canada (as part of the Global North) women illustrated their dissatisfaction about pay inequality, the president of America and public education (Khan, 2020:1). Feminist perspectives from the Global South

depart from local experiences (standpoint), unlike the North perspectives that tend to be universal. Some of the women movements from the Global South that represented post-colonial feminism, third world feminism, African feminism, Latin American feminism, transcultural feminism, among others, were generally characterized by the Anglo-Saxon and European feminists as movements of women who were either poor or poorly schooled, workers or women that were dominated and/or were victims in their societies.

Menezes (2020:3) cites Saffioti (1987), indicating that women in the Global South are not only oppressed by social relations of domination, but the oppression also intersects with class and patriarchy as a system of oppression, as was highlighted by Walby (1990:20) and discussed in Section 2.5.3.3.2.1. In Africa in particular (see Section 2.5.5 for a discussion on African feminism), feminism is concerned with "bread, butter, and power" issues. African feminism distinguishes between strategic gender needs that are feminist in nature and women's daily needs (Hudson, 2005:170). The focus on social inequality, specifically in the Global South, naturally guides the discussion to the physical (in) security of women, which is discussed in the next section.

2.4.3.4 The physical or (in)security dimension of gender inequality

The fourth central dimension to measure gender inequality is the physical dimension or the (in)security of women. The security of women in this instance may refer to aspects that indirectly affect life expectancy and maternal mortality, as well as legal protections specifically for women. In this regard, Olsson (2016:4) uses the perception of security equality as an alternative to the physical insecurity of women. Security equality focuses on the distribution of resources for protection against the different forms of violence, because violence tends to be gender-specific. It is therefore, possible to measure the number of resources promised through legal protection for instances such as domestic violence and rape in comparison to violence that primarily involves males (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:4). Gender equality as a normative understanding signifies a balanced and fair distribution of resources. On the flip side, an unbalanced or unequal distribution assigns a lesser value to a specific group and is interpreted as normative intolerant. Therefore, the unequal distribution of resources contributes to an unequal domestic environment that would contribute to discrimination against women and entire ethnic groups (Caprioli, 2000:53). In other words, an unequal domestic environment based on political, economic and social injustices is a source of internal conflict and is measured against the central dimensions of gender inequality with the focus on access to power.

With respect to the security sector, the security sector cannot meet the standards of good governance without gender equality. This is due to the argument that gender equality is a human right and a democratic principle that is fundamental to the rule of law (see Section 2.3). Gender equality is essential for effective and accountable security provisions. If those actors in government who are formally responsible for security do not take the threats against women into account, measures will be neither effective nor accountable. To put it differently, the security sector should provide state and human security “within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights. The different forms of insecurity are gender-specific and dictate the roles of security providers as well as perpetrators of violence” (DCAF, 2015:6).

As highlighted by Caprioli (2000:53), gender inequality contributes to unequal access to resources and instability, high levels of structural resistance and institutional violence and crime. Therefore, gender inequality leaves women vulnerable to security threats like GBV. GBV is a serious threat to human security and includes domestic violence, gender-selective murders, forced and child marriages, harmful cultural practices, sexual violence and harassment, stalking and trafficking in humans. GBV reflects and reinforces gender inequality (DCAF, 2015:7). However, gender inequality intersects with other social factors and differs in context and location. The reality of gender inequality is discussed in the next section.

2.4.4 The reality of gender inequality

“Nature creates differences; societies turn them into inequalities” (Tahar Ben Jelloun)

In reality, gender inequality is a collection of unrelated and interlinked problems since the world is severely unequal when it comes to the sharing of the burden of hardships among women and men. Although gender inequality exists in most parts of the world, it is not the same everywhere and becomes evident in a variety of forms. It is important to take note of the links between the different inequalities. These inequalities feed on one another and a country can move from one type of inequality to another. According to Sen (2001:466–468), there are the following varieties:

- **Mortality inequality:** Gender inequality is so entrenched in some societies that being born female can have disastrous consequences for girls. In some parts of the world, inequality is life threatening and there are unusually high mortality rates for women as opposed to men. It is a direct consequence of societies with a gender bias in health and nutrition and

is called mortality inequality. China and India have high excess female mortality rates (Tabutin *et al.*, 2017:1).

- Natal inequality: Another form of gender inequality is natal inequality, where baby boys are preferred over girls. This leads to high-tech sexism where parents make use of modern techniques to determine the gender of the foetus. Further widespread gender asymmetry can be seen in areas of education, training and professional work. This is usually because society attaches more value the male gender, like in China and India (Li, 2020:1).
- Basic-facility inequality means that girls suffer from deprivation of educational opportunities. Kenya can be presented as an example where the education of boys still receives preference over that of girls (KNBS, 2019:1).
- Special-opportunity inequality reveals itself as far as fewer education and professional training opportunities for young women in comparison to young men. Figure 2.1 in this chapter demonstrates the UN Millennium Development Goals Report of 2015, which shows that significant progress has been made with the attempt to eradicate the inequalities that exist in school education.
- Professional inequality: Directly linked to the aforementioned, is professional inequality where women often face greater difficulties to find employment or promotions than men.
- Property inequality: Inequality in property ownership is quite common across the world, but its seriousness depends on the laws of a specific country. In Kenya, access to land depends mainly on male inheritance and women own only per cent of the registered land titles (USAID, 2020a:21; Sen, 2001:468).
- Household inequality: Lastly, Sen (2001:468) refers to household inequality, where the sharing of the burden of the household and childcare is unequal (UNDP, 2020:12). The persistence of “division or accumulation of labour” or household inequality has far-reaching implications for the knowledge and professional work of women (Kangas *et al.*, 2014:8). According to UN Women, young women raising children are 25 per cent more prone than men to live in extreme poverty, which has lasting effects on mother and child (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2020:1).

The indicators to determine gender inequality differ from country to country and should be studied in conjunction with the social role of women in the economic and political environment of a country. Social welfare support systems and differences between urban and rural areas

may affect the abovementioned indicators (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:4). These indicators are also interdependent, and they are difficult to look at in isolation.

It is against this background that feminist scholars focus their research on social transformation and change on behalf of women. In an attempt to balance the scales between men and women, feminist resistance movements highlight the imbalances between the two sexes and contribute to the establishment of a gender mainstreaming strategy as an international phenomenon adopted by many countries and implemented by local governments. The history of feminism and its contribution to the development of feminist theory is discussed in the next section.

2.5 Feminist theory and gender equality

Section 2.3 dealt with the broad concepts and terminology of gender equality, and feminist theory was mentioned in passing. It is the aim of this section on feminist theory and gender equality to emphasize the transforming power of feminism to significantly transform life for all. Although gender equality is more easily accepted throughout the world, it remains but a part of feminism. However, for many, the word feminism is controversial. This section clarifies the meaning of feminism and discusses the feminist movement's contribution to the development of a feminist theory and the mainstreaming of gender. First the term "feminism" and its history is discussed, followed by an in-depth discussion of feminist theory and its related metatheories. In Section 2.7.7.2 the nexus between feminist theory and human security is discussed.

2.5.1 Defining feminism

Watson (2014:1) explains that UN Women define feminism as "the belief that men and women should have equal rights and opportunities. It is the theory of the political, economic and social equality of the sexes". Freedman (2001:1) rationalizes that feminism refers to a set of core propositions and beliefs of all the different variations or meta-feminist theories. A baseline definition for feminism focuses on the inequality and the discrimination women face because of their sex. Furthermore, feminism calls for changes in the social, economic, political and/or cultural environments to reduce or eliminate any form of discrimination based on sex.

Offen (1988:150) believes that feminism is an ideology that incorporates a broad spectrum of international ideas based on male-centred political and intellectual discussions to oppose gender inequality. As a result, feminist theory developed as a discourse to analyse the historical processes responsible for inequalities of power and privilege and to epistemologically contribute to the body of knowledge from a feminist perspective to seek social justice in the present. Offen (1988:150) makes a point of ensuring that feminism should not be viewed as a

subcategory of religion or liberal, social or Marxist ideology. Feminism emerged as a concept that includes both ideology and movement for socio-political change grounded in male privilege and women's subordination in a given society (Hesse-Biber, 2011:11). The primary point of analysis is the physiological differences and the differential social construction of the behaviour of the sexes. Feminism is concerned with the independence and freedom of women regarding to basic issues of the family and its relation to the state and the sharing of political, social and economic power between the sexes (Lorber, 1997:8). Feminism resists men's claims about what is best for women without consulting them in the family and society. Feminism, therefore, challenges patriarchal thought, social hierarchy and control mechanisms. It aims to terminate a masculinist hierarchy and to rebalance social, economic and political power to create a society with respect for the physiological differences of both sexes (Napels, 2013:664). Hooks (2000:240) emphasizes feminism as a movement to end sexist oppression and systems based on sex, race and class oppression. Furthermore, Hooks stresses that feminism has the power to significantly transform life for all and not only to benefit a certain race, group or class of women. Feminism manages to recognize the need to eradicate the primary cultural basis and roots of sexism or any form of oppression (Hooks, 2000:240). Feminism as a movement and the contribution of collective resistance movements to the development of feminist theory and the mainstreaming of gender is reviewed in the next section.

2.5.2 Historical overview of feminist resistance movements as a precursor for gender equality

The baseline definition of feminism is the ideology that the male culture is bias towards women and the roots of sexism or any form of female oppression should be eradicated from society to ensure the general upliftment of women. Collective resistance feminist movements developed firstly to appeal for changes in the social, economic, political and or cultural environments. Secondly, they want to reduce or eliminate any form of oppression or discrimination; and finally, they campaign for women's legal rights. These resistance movements can be divided into four phases, known as the feminist waves.

2.5.2.1 The first and second feminist waves

The first of the waves responded to female exclusion from the political, social, public and economic spheres. It developed out of an environment of industrialism and liberal social politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with a focus on suffrage and addressing legal obstacles to gender equality (Rampton, 2015:1). The second wave lasted from the 1960s to 1980s with the focus on equal social and legal rights for women. The second wave of feminism was diverse and according to Tong (2007:26), three schools of thought could be identified

namely liberal, Marxist-socialist and radical feminism. It was during this wave of feminism that the inequalities women experienced on a cultural and political level were highlighted and women were encouraged to take action against sexist power structures (Tong, 2007:26, 28; Vasilopopou, 2014:489). However, women of colour felt excluded from these women's movements and women's studies. They started using the term "third-world feminism" to include global issues of colonization, immigration, racism and imperialism that did not concern the second wave of feminists. It was the willingness of a multicultural group of feminists to understand and accommodate each other on race, ethnicity, tradition, and culture that led to the metamorphosis of the second wave of feminism into the third wave (Ferber *et al.*, 2007:520).

2.5.2.2 The third feminist wave: "Third-world feminism"

Third-wave feminism, with its roots in the mid-1980s, arose in the early 1990s to challenge the over-emphasizing of white middle-class women, or hegemonic feminism, as neutral and normative. Chakraborty (2007:107) highlights the existence of hegemonic feminism and the fact that feminists are not equal. Third-wave feminism diverted from the politics of the individual and studied the reasons why human oppressions co-create and co-maintain each other. Lotz (2007:74) reasons that third wave feminism is concerned with a broad range of interlocking issues in the form of a new social movement, more than merely women's issues. As a result, the third-wave became known for third-world feminism. Third-world feminism is concerned with the global struggle for human rights, which includes women's and gender issues. It confronts 21st-century issues affecting women and others subjected to sexual harassment and domination (Heywood & Drake, 2007:122). Third-world feminism, with a local and national focus, and transnational feminism, with a transnational focus, share two mandates. Firstly, third-world women's oppression and resistance should be historically located, and secondly, their voices should be respected (Heywood & Drake, 2007:120). Therefore, third-world feminism has provided women with more influence, visibility and cultural significance. This led to the apparent deauthorization of patriarchy and a "shift from top-down, hierarchical cultural power, to power focused in multinational corporations and dependent upon global flows" (Heywood & Drake, 2007:120). This apparent decentralization has enabled some women in the first world to narrow the wage gap, but the same decentralization increased inequity between nations with consequent effects on the environment. As a result, "ecofeminism" came to the forefront (Heywood & Drake, 2007:120). Since the 1990s transnational feminism became the dominant voice for third-world women who categorically reject nation-states and nationalism as relevant to feminism (Herr, 2014:1). Third-wave feminism is thus shaped by globalization and the new global economy it adopted, as well as social and political challenges worldwide (Cortes *et al.* 2012:1). Activists of the third wave focus on "women's issues" and

environmental issues, human rights issues and anti-corporate activism and the relationships between these. Third wave-feminism represents feminists of all generations with the emerging of new forms of activism brought by globalization (Heywood & Drake, 2007:118). Special attention is given to feminism in Africa in subsection 2.5.5.

As the third wave accommodates diversity and change, the biggest impact has been technology. The internet has given feminism a global scope, with more individuality allowing women to confess their pain and debate feminist politics, with different analyses of social systems of sex and gender inequality at an international level (Whelehan, 2007:XVI). However, the individuality inherent to technology and supported by globalization has contributed to the concentration of wealth with the already wealthy and an escalation of inequality in terms of the income distribution, with adverse effects on disproportionately poor women (Heywood & Drake, 2007:119). Munro (2013:1) underlines that technology shifted the onus of change onto the individual, with a limiting effect on wide-reaching change. This fact is displayed in Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.

Despite various opinions that this wave was the end of feminist movements, women remain committed to activism – political, peace, environmental, anti-immigration and anti-racist activism (Moore, 2007:138). A decline in women-only activism may be visible, but as stated above, feminism adapted in the 1990s and has resumed new vibrant forms that are more active in multiple social struggles. Feminism has become a complex combination of abilities to provide solutions to feminist issues with the potential for improving women's lives (Moore, 2007:138). The battle for women continues and has taken a new format with far-reaching results. As a result, feminism entered a new phase.

2.5.2.3 The fourth phase of feminism: The global internet connection

Scholars differ on the existence of this new phase (2008 onwards). Although some scholars argue that the internet has facilitated a shift, those who maintain that an increase in internet use does not necessitate a new era of feminism, challenge this argument. Gill (2012:145) argues that the media in general forms part of the post-feminist discourse. According to Gill, post-feminism refers to the fact that women see themselves as equal to men and there is no need for feminism anymore. Gill defines post-feminism as a “type of sensibility that focused on the notion that femininity is a bodily property, it is a shift from objectification to subjectification, the emphasis on self-surveillance and discipline, individualism, choice and empowerment, a resurgence in ideas of natural sexual difference, a strong sexualisation of culture and wider focus on consumerism” (Gill, 2010:145). However, it is clear that the internet, with its “hashtag activism”, assisted with the creation of a global community of female activists, creating

networks of social and legal support to trigger greater political engagement (Aitken, 2017:4). The internet is not only used for discussion and activism but also creates a “call-out culture” in which sexism or misogyny could be challenged (Munro, 2013:1). The internet enables international feminism that deals with different local expressions of populism, xenophobia, sexism and nationalism. The online safety zones encourage global sisterhood, strengthen women to speak out and stand up for women’s rights (Orgad, 2014:141). This virtual experience in social media has created a new possibility and voice, which developed into a new women’s movement and prepared the ground for social protests. In 2016 this movement stretched from Poland to Argentina, from Italy to India, claiming self-determination, legal rights, a social life free of sexism, GBV and racism (Peroni & Rodak, 2017:1).

In 2019 global attention was paid to the revolutionary women’s movement in Sudan, who assisted in bringing down the 30-year regime of President Omar al-Bashir. The women’s movement started from communication via WhatsApp and grew by the use of Facebook and Instagram to organize and influence other women to join the movement. The rural women in Sudan, who are particularly restricted by patriarchal family structures, recorded their support for the movement and shared it via Facebook or Twitter. The women of the revolution started a private Facebook page where GBV during the protests were exposed and to raise funds for the revolutionary movement. In an attempt of the government of Sudan to block social media, the women of the revolution used virtual private networks (VPN) to hide their locations and continued to use social media as a source of communication (Robertson, 2019:1).

The shift to internet activism reflects the intersectionality of contemporary feminism. Different axes of oppression overlap with being a “woman”, but some argue that this is not reason enough to be called feminism (Phillips, 2014:15, Munro, 2013:1). In an attempt to draw attention to these differences, a tactic called “privilege-checking” was developed to remind people not to talk on behalf of others. This phrase reveals that mainstream feminism is still dominated by straight white middle classes. While there is still controversy about the existence of a new phase in feminism movements, the internet provides a voice to challenge formerly accepted norms and sexist opinions for the women still marginalized by the mainstream (Munro, 2013:1).

Since 2008, feminism has been revitalized by online activists with the support of key celebrities and the #Me Too Movement in 2017 to expose sexual violence. Digital media created new means to organize campaigns and mobilize the masses against issues of inequality. The power of social media to unite and inform is undeniable. Important to note is the participation of a younger generation, mainly younger than 30 years of age, of newly “self-identified feminists” as the dominant users of social media (Phillips, 2014:15). In Kenya women are trying to

highlight gender inequality and the fact that women are the largest demographic group, by means of a Twitter campaign called: “We are 52%” (#WeAre52pc) (Kimani, 2020:1). In Afghanistan the #AfghanWomenWillnotGoBack is a trending hashtag used by the Afghan Women’s Network to promote gender transformation and as a tool in support of the peace process in Afghanistan. #MyRedLine has been used by the women to share short video clips on redlines for peace agreements. Although social media is creating both opportunities and risks, female inclusion in civil society and gender equality in general has expanded. Technology provides a mode of communication for women who are physically and culturally restricted and muted, to participate in the process of gender transformation (Robertson, 2019:1). For this reason, the current online movement implies a new phase in feminism.

To the contrary, and discussed in Section 4.6.2, since the Islamic State (IS) designed a “virtual caliphate” on Twitter in 2012, is the fast-moving role of online media as a way to mobilize, recruit, support and raise funds for violent extremism. Women are interested in violent extremism and account for 33 per cent of the online searches for violent extremism information. Because of the preference of jihadi groups that women should fill noncombat roles, women are likely to be online supporters, recruiters and perpetrators by disseminating online propaganda. Extremist groups are using distinct online recruitment strategies to recruit women and to engage their support for violent extremism (Johnson et al, 2020a:2,14).

The strength of feminism in the late 2010s guaranteed interactionism and incorporation of intersectional identities, which had been excluded from the first waves. Feminists in the 21st century are more educated and aware of the exclusion of the “other”, due to the accessibility of information on feminist theory and debates presented in a manner that is more active than academic. Feminism has expanded during the latest phase, with new writers and activists like Jessica Schuster, Ealasaid Munro and Mel Aitken to fight the cause. However, the unregulated virtual space has become a hostile environment of abuse and creates a backlash with an antifeminist disposition to silence many because of fear of the onslaught (Aitken, 2017:9).

The independence women enjoy by means of technology could also be used in counterproductive ways. For instance, Twitter was used to vilify President Donald Trump’s female opponent during the 2016 United States presidential election, Hillary Clinton, on sexist and gender terms. Social media, with all its technologic advances, has limitations for the advancement of feminism. Despite social media’s capacity for collectivism, consciousness-raising and expression, it can also replicate patriarchal and male supremacist views that suppress and silence women (Aitken, 2017:5).

The latest phase in the feminist movement emphasizes the importance of the media for progressing gender issues. For instance, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) included media in their theme for 2018. The review theme for 2018 was “Participation in and access of women to the media and information and communications technologies and their impact on and use as an instrument for the advancement and empowerment of women” (UN Women, 2017:1). The advantages of the media help feminists to uncover the scale of gender inequality and “force” the strategy of gender mainstreaming as a global strategy. The metamorphosis of the feminist movements necessitated an evolution of the definition of feminism based on its political history of gender politics. Feminism is gender-driven and features as such in contemporary feminist theories. These theories are discussed next.

2.5.3 Feminist theory

Feminist theory describes and explains how gender systems interconnect with what is ethical and normatively fair and acceptable in society.

2.5.3.1 Development of contemporary feminist metatheories

Feminist scholars pursue their research with the goal of social transformation and change on behalf of women. Harding (2012a:18) refers to emancipation as one of the important goals of feminist research, while Hesse-Biber and Leckenby (2012:18) highlight that knowledge building in support of this goal enforces democratic acceptance for this theory. This section provides a historical overview of the development of feminist theory and research practice.

The history of feminism is an expansive history of politics that integrates women and gender politics. It focuses on women’s efforts to be acknowledged as equal members of their particular communities, and their perspectives and concerns. Feminist claims are political claims for change that come to the forefront in times of political unrest. Feminism, as political history, inevitably contains women’s constant pursuits for equality, for civil rights in education, economic opportunities and property rights, as well as political inclusion. Equally important, feminism includes personal claims to mobility, control of their bodies and fertility and criticizes sexual or other forms of abuse. A slogan that links the history of feminism to politics is: “the personal is political”. It had its origin during the second wave of feminism (Offen, 2011:1).

Furthermore, the history of feminism points out the gendered analysis of fundamental concepts in politics such as representation, nationality, democracy and citizenship. These concepts contribute to rights, equality, liberty and justice, which are building blocks for modern nation-states and market economies. In developing nation-states and transnational communities, feminism embraces the relationship between men and women and challenges male authority

in families, along with the established male breadwinner culture. It includes efforts to reform secular and religious marriages and considers the possibility of divorce. Feminism re-examines gender politics, from personal politics to international and transnational women's organizations, activism and women's promotion of peace. Additionally, the history of feminism also encompasses the history of antifeminism (Offen, 2011:1).

In the present, feminism is organized, gender-driven with network formation, responsible for state-building and national aspirations. Emancipatory changes in the status of women at the educational, economic, legal and social level is a prerequisite for building a strong nation-state. Evidence demonstrates that the pressure of feminist movements on nation-states and religious institutions has helped to improve and develop a more women-friendly environment (Offen, 2011:1). According to Lorber (1997:1), the contribution of the feminist movements to the development of feminist theory can be divided into three broad categories. These categories include i) gender reform feminist theory, ii) gender resistant feminist theory, and iii) gender revolution feminist theory.

2.5.3.2 Gender reform feminism

Feminist ideas have changed due to limitations, criticism and its contribution towards gender inequality. Nevertheless, all the metatheories have insight into the challenges of gender inequality and have come up with strategies to remedy these problems. Feminists stress that gender inequality is entrenched in all structures of society, be it, family, work and the economy, government and politics, or religion and culture. Therefore, gender equality necessitates social and not individual results. The metatheories include, according to Lorber (1997:8), liberal, Marxist (or social feminism), and developmental feminism.

2.5.3.2.1 Liberal feminism

Liberal feminism's is a traditional perspective that was established as part of the first wave of feminism with its main focus to mainstream gender equality in the public environment. These feminists reasoned that equality in the private sphere will enhance public equality. Liberal feminists argued that women and men are not that different by nature and should have equal access to education, equal pay, and better working conditions. They furthermore argued that society mistakenly believes that women are less intellectually and physically capable than men. They do not seek revolutionary changes but want to change the existing public structures with an emphasis on gender equality via political and legal reform. The main contribution of this metatheory was to focus on the discrimination against women in modern society and to campaign for the same rights and privileges as men (Lorber, 1997:10; Lewis, 2017a:1; Freedman, 2001:5).

As such, liberal feminism promoted marriage as an equal partnership. Naturally, they fought for abortion and reproductive rights and for the ending of domestic violence and sexual harassment. In the public sphere, liberal feminism aimed to gain access to jobs, being promoted and being paid equally in conventionally male-dominated occupations. Liberal feminists see the state as the protector of individual rights and the promoter of equality. Liberal feminism entails a constructive engagement with the political and legislative process to fight gender inequality on an economic level. It promotes social transformation and probably had the biggest impact on women's lives by introducing affirmative action measures within existing state and legal structures (Lorber, 1997:9; Lewis, 2017a:1).

Critics of liberal feminism focused on the theory's lack of criticism on basic gender relations and biological differences, its reliance on the state for equality, and the absence of race and class analysis. The omission of race and class triggered the intersectionality theory. In recent years, individual or I-feminism has promoted female competition in the world as it is. This development put the two theories in opposition to each other (Lewis, 2017a:1).

2.5.3.2.2 Marxism and socialist feminism

Socialist feminism developed from Marxist feminism, arguing that liberal feminism only addressed the inequality of the middle and upper classes and not different economic realities. Social feminists included gender, class, and race as factors contributing to economic oppression. While Marxist feminists claimed capitalism as the principal source of women's oppression and capitalists as the main beneficiaries, socialist feminists fused the analysis of gender inequality with social and economic reproduction (Armstrong, 2020:1). Freedman (2001:5) associated gender inequality or discrimination against women with the result of a capitalist system and the unequal division of labour between men and women, as well as the unpaid reproductive function of women that is related to the system. Thus, women's oppression is directly linked to their dependence on a husband. Lorber (1997:10) simplifies Marxist and socialist feminisms as severely critical of the family as a source of women's domination and manipulation. It made women dependent on their husbands and when in a formal job, normally at a lower salary than men, she is still responsible for the household, giving birth and providing emotional stability by creating the home as a retreat for their husbands. The solution to redress this form of gender inequality was paid maternity leave and affordable child care. To address women's economic dependence on men or state programmes for survival, a weight was allocated based on the worth of a job, the qualifications needed, skills used, danger involved or management over people. Salaries were linked to the weight of a job, irrespective of gender. The focus of Marxism and socialist feminism was the liberation of women in the public and

economic environment (Armstrong, 2020:1). The third metatheory of the gender reform feminist theories is development feminism.

2.5.3.2.3 Development feminism

Development feminism addresses the exploitation of women in postcolonial countries. Women in postcolonial and developing countries work at reduced salaries in comparison to men, normally as blue-collar workers. Due to the low wages, women supplement the family income with agriculture. In non-patriarchal societies, women did become economically independent with more status and power, while in patriarchal societies, the status of women remains low. Development feminism contributes in two ways to feminist theory. The first is by equating women's status with control over economic resources in developing countries, and secondly, to underscore the political issue of women's rights versus cultural and national traditions. At the same time, these women are resistant to colonialism, but their contribution to economic independence aligned them with the characteristics contained in colonialism, namely individualism and economic independence. Nevertheless, indigenous women have struck a balance between economic benefits for community/family support instead of individual gain. However, development feminism is frequently confronted by the cultural principles that give men control over women (Lorber, 1997:13).

Regardless of the life-changing transformations brought about by gender reform feminism, women daily face inequalities or discriminations with disappointing effects. These discriminations in the workplace or family environment gave birth to gender resistance feminism, which is discussed next.

2.5.3.3 Gender resistance feminism

Gender highlights the inequalities in the balance of power that historically discriminated against women. It pays attention to specific behaviours or group dynamics that sustain the inequality of women. Lorber (1997:16) identifies radical, lesbian, psychoanalytical and standpoint feminism as gender resistant feminisms. For this study, only standpoint feminism and radical feminism are discussed owing to the emphasis it places on patriarchy.

2.5.3.3.1 Standpoint feminism

The main link between all the resistant feminisms is that women and their perspectives should play a central and visible role in knowledge, culture and politics (Lorber, 1997:21). Standpoint theory is built on the basis that an individual woman's interpretation is shaped by her own political or social experience. Standpoint theory was inspired by women political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, anti-positivist histories, sociologies and philosophies of sciences as it

developed in the United States and Europe. Standpoint theorists underscore the amalgamation of a naturalistic or experiential concept of knowledge as a means to define a person's standpoint of understanding of the world. Contributing to this view is the fact that the structure of societies has epistemological effects (Harding, 2012b:46).

Harding (2012:50) highlights several themes within standpoint theory that provides a better understanding of the multiple sources of knowledge building. Firstly, knowledge and power are linked and maintain each other. This link is supported by the location of a person within a social structure. Each of these standards either enables or limit the insights of the people about the world around them.

The hierarchical structure of societies based on ethnicity, race, gender or class supports the legitimacy of the dominating group, while the dominated group has a different opinion. Gender hierarchies reveal a set of social practices, values and beliefs that promote male domination and superiority (Row Botham, 1983:27). Furthermore, these hierarchical structures or institutions employ an elaborate system of rules and punishments to strengthen their dominion. This is seen as natural and is enforced in all aspects of life (Grant, 1993:161). Cockburn (2001:15) believes that "gender is used as a benchmark to determine access and power and is the rubric under which inequality is justified and maintained". This structural inequality of power designs conditions for social control over women (Sideris, 2001:142). Standpoint analysis also promotes strong pro-democratic inclusiveness, objectivity and accountability to the oppressed, with positive contributions to the body of knowledge (Harding, 2012: 55). Lastly, an oppressed group must become a group for itself and not only in itself. It takes women's movements to create group consciousness and to further feminist perceptions. Feminist standpoint research has the possibility of emancipation and aims to affect disciplinary priorities, practices and public policy. Feminist standpoint research contributes to the inclusion of feminist security studies in the security studies discipline. Feminist security studies are discussed in Section 2.7.7. It was the radical feminists who raised awareness of structural inequality based on patriarchal norms. The role of radical feminism as a category of gender resistance feminism in the promotion of gender equality is discussed in the next section.

2.5.3.3.2 Radical feminism

Radical feminism resists existing political and social structures because of their ties with patriarchy. It focuses on the patriarchal origin of gender inequality or social dominance over women based on sex. It is important to mention that radical feminism is in opposition to patriarchy, not men. Radical feminism explains the following issues from a patriarchal resistance viewpoint: Firstly, radical feminism explains rape as the abuse of patriarchal power,

not as seeking sex; and prostitution as a result of sexually and economical oppression of women. Secondly, radical feminism explains that the culture of marriage, motherhood, and the nuclear family, is based on patriarchal norms (Lewis, 2017b:1), while Freedman (2001:5) blames the exploitation of women on a patriarchal system, which is independent of all social structures. Thirdly, Larbor (1997:17) claims that radical feminist manages to turn patriarchy upside down because patriarchy is blamed for rape, battering, child abuse, incest, poverty and war.

Instead, radical feminism aims to dismantle patriarchy and focuses rather on culture change, which undermines patriarchy, without adjustments to the existing systems through legal means. Radical feminism raises awareness of women's oppression through consciousness-raising groups, actively providing services, organizing protests and by the use of art exhibitions (Lewis, 2017b:1). Lewis (2017b:1) mentions that the following issues are important to ensure gender equality from a radical feminist point of view:

- Firstly, women should decide over reproduction, abortion and birth control.
- Secondly, pornography as an industry is harmful to women.
- Thirdly, traditional gender roles should be evaluated and removed from private and public policies.

Patriarchal thinking is based on socially constructed gendered dichotomies. Public/private distinction forms an integral part of the feminist definition of patriarchy. Some feminists request the term patriarchy to be replaced by gender oppression because they argue (Barret, 1986:10) that the biological differences between men and women do make provision for differences in roles, but should not become the basis for male dominance. It is from this feminist point of view that the social construction of patriarchy is discussed in the next section.

2.5.3.3.2.1 Social construction of patriarchy

Feminists argue that patriarchy is a social construct based on biological differences and strengthened by religion, political and socio-economic structures in society, which vary based on culture, religion, class and ethnicity over time and place. Patriarchy is defined by as Tickner (2001:1197) "a social system in which men unjustly hold exclusive dominance over social institutions as well as positions of power, privilege and authority in a society that is oppressive to women and children." Hooks (2004:23) clarifies patriarchy as "repression of all emotions, except fear; the devastation of individual will-power and the repression of thinking that differs from the dominating figure's way of thinking".

Feminists challenge patriarchy due to it is still present in the knowledge, ideology, values and practices that are dominant in society in the twenty-first century. Wood (2019:2) explains patriarchy as an oppressive and repressive ideology that advocates superiority and control over women and all other people in his care. Patriarchy as an ideology is sustained through social structures, the media, education and religion. By means of religion, patriarchy controls marriages, families and households and the ideology is passed on from father to son. The ideology is denoted as a “rule of men over women” and stretches over social, economic, and political boundaries and developed into a hierarchal structure. Due to patriarchy, women develop a sense of inferiority and submission, but when women challenge it, men often resort to “coercion, intimidation and violence” (Wood, 2019:2). Richard (2014:95) agrees and identifies that at times, a fake sense of gender shame develops that suppresses a healthy sense of moral conscience and guilt that otherwise would have opposed unfair practices of violence.

Richards (2014:92) explains that patriarchy has been, for a long time, a powerful force in politics hidden in democracy. Patriarchy expresses itself in extremely gendered standards of how a successful man and submissive women should be. However, the danger of patriarchy in politics, as displayed by Hitler’s totalitarianism, unveils itself in shaming and humiliation when questioned or challenged, followed by unfair practices of violence. Harding (2012:55) identifies that dominant male groups hide the political consequences of their employed practices, but through science and politics, feminists as representatives of the oppressors could expose these institutionalized versions. In his broad analysis of the role of patriarchy in human oppression throughout history, Richard (2014:95) argues that a feminist-based ethics of care is required to ensure more humane and all-encompassing democratic politics.

Since patriarchy is a social construction, feminists believe that with continued efforts the continuity of patriarchy can be overcome in the future (Tickner, 2001:1198). Ironically, Hooks (2004:23) lists “blind obedience” as the foundation of patriarchal thinking. It shapes the values of our culture, of which most is taught by our mothers, stating that many female-headed households promote patriarchal thinking with much more passion than two-parent households. Hooks highlights the role women play in sustaining the patriarchal culture, even if only men are rewarded by the system. Therefore, Hooks (2004:24) reiterates that feminist theory builds its understanding of gender discrimination on patriarchal power structures and the social construction of gender (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:2; Sideris, 2001:142).

Feminist theory further characterizes men as supreme with reference to power, control and decision making. Women are not only subordinate to men but also become victims of disadvantages, deprivations, discrimination and exploitations (Tickner, 2001:1197). Male

dominance in society is justified, legitimized and institutionalized through patriarchy. This social construct permits men to oppress women in the political, social and economic field with the harmful effect of a gender binary. Patriarchy historically emerged as a way to justify the autocratic rule of religious leaders and is therefore in opposition to a system of free and equal voice as advocated by democracy (Richards, 2014:142).

Walby (1990:20) believes that because patriarchy as a social construct is embedded at all levels of a society, it should be defined as “a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women”. The use of the term social structure implies a rejection of both biological willpower and the view that every individual man is in a dominant position and every woman is subordinate to him. A system of social structures implies that patriarchy should be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction. Walby (1990:20) identifies six deep structures. Although these structures are relatively autonomous, they have causal effects on each other by blocking gender equality at the political, economic and social level, reinforcing gender inequality and triggering female insecurity. The consequences of these social structures are discussed in Section 2.4.3 under the central dimensions of gender inequality. According to Walby (1990:21), these structures are:

- The patriarchal mode of production assumes that women are the producing class, while their husbands are the commandeering class. Women’s household labour is expropriated by their husbands or cohabitants. If women are not engaged in waged labour, they are fully dependent on her husband.
- Patriarchal relations in waged employment benefits men. Women are excluded from managerial and/or the higher paid positions. In the twenty-first century, the gender gap in waged employment remains enormous (see Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 for a discussion on female participation in the formal sector and the gender wage gap in Kenya).
- Patriarchal relations in the state provide men with political and economic power that results in systemic bias towards patriarchal interests in policies and actions (see Figure 3.5 for female representation in the various regions in Africa and Figure 3.7 for female representation in the Government of Kenya).
- Male or gender-based violence (GBV) is legitimized by the state by means of a lack of enforcement of the current laws against GBV (see Sections 3.4.4.2.3 and 4.3.1 for a discussion on the level of GBV in Kenya).
- Patriarchal relations in sexuality focus on compulsory heterosexuality.

- Patriarchal relations are strengthened by the cultural institutions of education, religion and the media (see Section 4.6 for a discussion on the implications of patriarchy in Kenya).

Gender resistance feminism pays attention to specific behaviours or group dynamics that sustain the inequality of women, which is predominately based on patriarchy. Gender revolution feminists on the other hand focus on the interlocking structures normalizing gender inequality and it is discussed in the next section.

2.5.3.4 Gender revolution feminisms

Gender revolution feminists deconstruct the interlocking structures that had been identified and argued by the second wave of global feminists. The second-wave argued that women internationally should work together to passionately attend to women's political, social, economic, sexual and reproductive systems to ensure freedom. It was these second wave feminists that analysed how cultural productions, especially through the mass media, justifies and normalizes inequality and the subordination of women. Women of colour in the United States and developing nations insist on highlighting women's differences – the origin of multicultural and global feminism (Tong, 2007:30). Lorber (1997:25) also credits the destabilization of the mentioned dominant social order to the work of men's feminism, postmodern feminism, social construction feminism and the queer theory. The contribution of multi-ethnic/cultural feminism and postmodern feminism is explored in the next section.

2.5.3.4.1 Intersectional feminism (cultural / multi-ethnic / multicultural / multi-racial)

Feminism issues will never be “one size fits all”. Intersectional, multi-ethnic, multicultural or multi-racial feminisms emerged as an amalgamation of aspects of women's studies and refer to feminism of colour. It was the omission of class and race during the second wave of feminism that emphasized that the “multiple jeopardies” and “interlocking systems of oppression” (racism, sexism and classism) are never separable and that one aspect of inequality is not more unequal than another (Tong, 2007:30; Hooks, 2000:57).

The ultimate goal of intersectional feminists is to increase the necessity for flexible, viable solutions to accommodate different types of oppression to which women of all cultures are exposed. Intersectional feminism emphasizes the local and the global by introducing the minority perspectives. It is a growing field of study and incorporates intersections of oppression intending to promote equality across borders of race, class and gender (Ferber *et al.*, 2007:519). Oppression and privilege oppose each other and are based on a cultural and institutional problem (Ferber *et al.* 2007:523).

An intersectional approach that examines the effect of how different forms of inequality intersect with oppression and privilege, is needed. Those who are most affected by gender inequalities and GBV, are also the most impoverished and marginalized women in rural or high-density areas. People living with disabilities, young girls, transgender and gender non-conforming youth in these areas are further disadvantaged. The fact that marginalized communities are most affected by the devastating effects of natural disasters or climate change is not a mere coincidence. As simultaneous crises develop internationally, intersectional feminism illuminates the connections between linkages and fights for justice and liberation (UN Women, 2020f:1). Intersectional feminism matters more because:

- The impacts of crises are not uniform, and countries and communities are facing multiple compounding threats. It is often the most vulnerable, as is evident from the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, who are most affected because of long-standing inequities and decades of discriminatory practices.
- Injustices must not go unchallenged. Questioning power structures and addressing the root causes of inequalities are critical for building a future that leaves no-one behind.
- International crises laid bare the structural inequalities that shape the lives of people. This creates a chance to redefine the new “normal” to be fair to all (UN Women, 2020f:1).
- An intersectional approach that addresses gender power across race, class, economic status, sexual orientation and gender identity, age and other status is critical for transformative change and will increase women’s participation in peace and security structures. It will identify and build on existing community-led initiatives by creating spaces for women’s meaningful participation. Women are often ignored despite their intimate knowledge on the ground. It will further recognize structural barriers, cultural norms and practices that contribute to the marginalization of women during and after conflict. The gendered binaries of women as victims of war could be replaced to recognize women as actors in roles of peace mediators, humanitarian responders and combatants. Defining women and children as victims of war reinforces gendered structures of military and security. The adoption of an intersectional approach will move away from male-dominated peace structures and amplify the roles of women in existing women-led structures. This gender inclusive approach will move away from militarized security to human security and gender justice (Bafo, 2019:1). The importance of the inclusion of women in CVE structures in Kenya to promote gender justice was

discussed in Section 4.6.3.1.1. The contribution of postmodern and post-structural feminism to bring change is discussed in the next section.

2.5.3.4.2 Postmodern and post-structural feminism

Postmodern, post-structural and critical feminist approaches are important to the development of feminist theory because of the radical strategies they offer to bring about change. Postmodern feminism incorporates postmodern and post-structuralism theory and differs from other feminist theories on the basis that gender is self-constructed through language. Through deconstruction, these theories support feminists to expose taken-for-granted matters of subjectivity, performativity, politics and language as a norm for research. They have the following principles in common:

- Firstly, objectivity from a feminist view must be reconsidered and researchers should be accountable for their perspective and the power of recreation of what and how they see.
- Secondly, it is important that the mode of writing acknowledges the subjectivities in the language used at the time of writing.
- Thirdly, the relation between power to resistance, freedom and emancipation and its depending and limiting effect should be understood.
- Fourthly, the presence and influence of binary categories should be considered.

These binary categories such as man/woman can easily become laden so that *man* refers to knowledge and reason and *woman* to ignorance and emotion. Post-structural and postmodern feminists want to deconstruct and interrupt these binary categories because of their grip on thought and identity and the importance of their understanding of power within a political and social context. These deconstructive approaches modify what was accepted as normal and natural to be unlikely (Gannon & Davies, 2012:68). In support of postmodern and post-structural feminism, critical theories in feminism, on the other hand, uses discourses of equity, inclusion and social justice to confront existing power structures and practices – a straightforward approach to emancipation and social transformation. In critical theory, power tends to be connected to oppression or domination (Gannon & Davies, 2012:68).

Postmodern feminism has been criticized as too white and western and for not including issues of race and class. The post-structural feminist theory, inclusive of political theory, race theory and psychoanalysis, maintains that difference is the most powerful tool that women possess in their struggle against domination. This contribution provides third-world feminists with more

influence, visibility and cultural significance in their struggle against gender inequality. "Third-world feminism" distances itself from the western forms of feminism and focusses the attention on the struggles of women around the world. African feminism corresponds with "third-world feminism" and the difference with western feminism is debated in the next section.

2.5.4 Feminism in Africa

Feminists in Africa have managed to depoliticize feminism and argue that feminism is individualistic and each feminist attaches a different meaning to it (Woodhull, 2007:159). African feminism differs radically from the western forms of feminism, but links with the third feminist wave, known as third-world feminism (see Section 2.5.2.2). Woodhull (2007:232) argues that the importance of third-world feminism can only be seen if one relinquishes the frameworks of the west and by pays attention to the struggles of women around the world. African feminism is concerned with "bread, butter, and power" issues and is shaped by the political eras of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial on the African continent. Hudson (2005:170) identifies that African feminism distinguishes between strategic gender needs that are feminist in nature and women's daily needs. This shift of consciousness creates relatively strong women's organizations, but weak feminist movements run the risk of becoming counterproductive. However, the colonial eras are dissimilar across Africa and as a result feminism differs from region to region. This locality conceptualizes identity (culture, history, geography and ideology), but its relevance in the society is important to ensure that gender theory contracts legitimacy within the security discourse. In reality, women should be agents of change to promote protection and empowerment and not be seen as victims (Hudson, 2005:170).

Nevertheless, African feminism can be divided into the following categories according to what is regarded as female oppressors: culture and tradition; religion, socio-economic and socio-political issues; role of men (patriarchy); race and sex or sexuality; and the culture and role of the military. African feminism deals with "women first as human, rather than sexual beings" (Gordema, 2010:36). Hudson (2006:6) argues that the "security of all people is linked to the security of the women on the continent". Kangas *et al.* (2014:1) explain the statement by Hudson by saying that if the root causes of female oppression are not addressed, the same concerns will reinforce gender inequality (Kangas *et al.*, 2014:1).

African feminism has detached itself from notions of colonialism, race and class as a way of explaining the position of African women in the twenty-first century. African feminists do not appreciate the term feminism because of its connotation with western women's struggles (Atanga, 2013:302). This argument implies that African women are content in their positions

of subordination and with the “beasts of burden” (Gordema, 2010:37). The debate on the non-Africanism of feminism creates tension on two areas of disagreement, as was highlighted by African feminists to disregard western feminism. The first is the interaction between women and men in the private and public domain, and the second is the preservation of the national culture and the authenticity of these spaces. Notwithstanding the fact that African women want to create their own identity and detached themselves from class and race, gender resistance feminism pays attention to specific behaviours or group dynamics that sustain the inequality of women. There is no doubt that the feminism discourse in Africa is driven by middle-class educated women (intellectual African feminist), but it was the plight of the majority of poor and uneducated women that highlighted the differences between African and western feminism (Gordema, 2010:39).

Atanag (2013:320) argued that there can be a middle ground between African and Western feminism, because both feminisms are driven by the same broad goals of respect, equality and transformation to live lives free from violence and insecurity. Therefore, contemporary African feminism acknowledges the differences of the African continent with respect to culture and diversity. Contemporary African feminism challenges the status quo of patriarchy in the struggle for social, economic and cultural transformation. Woodhull (2007:162) remarks that feminists in Africa defend women’s rights through local grassroots movements, and Gouws (2007: 29) identified that feminist activism in Africa has been dominated by NGOs. The feminist course in Africa is supported by the various UN organs and the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women (Woodhull, 2007:162), World Bank, IMF and other international monetary institutions. Gouws highlighted that women’s activism has been depoliticized due to the fact women leaders have been appointed in institutional politics, like parliaments. A second reason would be government policies of pursuing gender mainstreaming (Gouws, 2007:29). Nevertheless, the global role of liberal feminists to reform and mainstream gender provides a new direction for gender application to be included in policies and institutions for the benefit of all. Gender mainstreaming as a global strategy is discussed next.

2.6 Gender mainstreaming as a global strategy to strengthen gender equality

Gender mainstreaming as a transformation strategy is the result of different feminist theories. Liberal feminists introduced the principle of affirmative action in the 1980s (see Section 2.5.3.2.1 for a discussion on liberal feminism), but gender mainstreaming as a new concept appeared for the first time after the UN Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985. Only a decade later in 1995, gender mainstreaming as a strategy was explicitly

endorsed by the Platform for Action which was adopted at the end of the UN Fourth World Conferences for Women in Beijing, China (Council of Europe, 1997:13).

Gender mainstreaming can be viewed, as a “corrective” gender strategy to male domination (Gouws, 2007:29), and for theory development with the goal to mainstream gender equality into governing policies and institutional organizations. Gender mainstreaming summarizes the dilemmas in feminist theory and practice and provides a new direction for debates and future application (Walby, 2003:19). True (2003:69) supposed that gender mainstreaming initiatives balance the need to recognize gender differences with the objective of gender equality to transform institutional practices in states and governance. Because gender mainstreaming was established as a global strategy for achieving sustainable economic development for women at the Beijing Platform for Action in China in 1995, the European Union and its member states adopted the agenda and became the lead agency for the development of the strategy (Walby, 2003:19). Gender mainstreaming received widespread endorsement by individual governments, regional bodies like the “Nordic Council of Ministers”, the “Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development” (OECD), the “Organization of American States” and global governance institutions. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution 1997 mainstreaming the gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the UN system. The ECOSOC conclusions 1997/2 (UN: Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, 2002:V) defined gender mainstreaming as:

“Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”

UN Women is the global supporter of gender equality and is working to develop standards to support the 93 governments that made particular commitments to overcome gender inequality (UN Women, 2015a:1). UN Women is creating this environment by making use of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and by means of Millennium Development Goal 3 and Sustainable Development Goal 5 promote gender equality and the

empowerment of women. For the effective implementation of gender mainstreaming in post-war states, a participative democratic model (PDM) was developed to heighten the effect of war on women, poverty and human rights violations, and to incorporate the empowerment of women in state reconstruction and peacebuilding. The PDM requires cooperation between governments and civil society. Literature reveals that the successful implementation was informed and advanced by the engagement of the civil society with women's movements (UN Women, 2015a:1).

The UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (2002:VI) claims that gender mainstreaming has changed organizations, structures, procedures and cultures and increased the awareness, knowledge, and capacity. UN Women reveals that countries that have taken corrective measures by means of quotas have seen a major change in women representation in decision-making structures (Tarr-Whelan, 2010:5). However, the analysis by Walby (2003:4) questions the model of implementation. An integrative political approach, where women's concerns were integrated and added to an existing paradigm (adding women), without challenging the structure, is less likely to be rejected, but the impact would be less significant. The second is agenda setting, with the focus on transformation and the reorientation of the existing policies paradigms and ends, a change in decision-making processes and the prioritizing of gender equality objectives (Walby, 2003:4). Joseph et al (2011:8) argued that gender mainstreaming would only be successful if the culture of an organization was changed first. It was reasoned that masculinist values and norms are so entrenched in the deep structure of most organizations, or for the same account in government structures, that it is accepted as normal. As a result, organizational and governmental structures would be resistant to gender transformation. The gap between policy and successful implementation developed because of the failure to transform the deep structure of governments where masculinism (or patriarchy) and resistance reside. The level of gender inequality or genderedness of government or organizational structures would be a challenge to mainstream gender (Joseph et al, 2011:14).

The UN has developed clear mandates for gender mainstreaming in areas of poverty reduction, macroeconomics, health, education, trade and disarmament. The implementation of gender mainstreaming is essential for safeguarding human rights and social justice for both genders. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) focusses the attention on the importance of including women in peace agreements and their full participation in post-conflict societies (UNSC, 2000:10). Lee's (2013:382) examination of whether the UN's gender mainstream policy has been a successful mechanism for integrating feminist principles, highlighted that UN bodies were not held accountable for monitoring progress. Lee's (2013:382) indicates that in the last two decades, women's concerns were addressed by

international organizations, UN resolutions and through treaties and judgements by international criminal courts. Inequality has been successfully addressed by feminist scholars and gender mainstream policies are now declared a priority within the UN

True (2003:274) identified three enabling factors that have put gender mainstreaming on the global policy-making agenda:

- the use of language for promoting gender equality. Feminist scholars have created theoretical language and causal ideologies that inspire gender mainstream initiatives. Powerful slogans like: “women’s rights are human rights and human rights are women’s rights” have changed the view of the world around us (True, 2003: 275);
- the proliferation of women’s networks and transnational linkages. Feminist activists have to influence transnational networks to leverage political support and to share information and resources. Women’s groups have been able to access international funding to strengthen the gender discourse. With access to international legal instruments, such as the “UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAR), feminists have expressive women’s interests in a variety of issues while at the same time, reinforced the local women’s groups. Women’s NGOs have empowered the UN Women’s conferences and in turn the UN has opened spaces for women’s global influence (True, 2003:277).
- An increase in gender-sensitive women and men in foreign policy and global governance positions. Feminist policymakers have built bridges to women’s NGOs and stressed the importance of gender policy entrepreneurs to change institutions where they have been employed. As individuals, gender policy entrepreneurs could use their positions and influence to pursue policy changes for gender justice (True, 2003:279). A critical mass of 30 per cent was identified to advance a feminist agenda in a historical male-orientated structure.

Joseph et al (2011:13) argued that despite the enabling factors, the successful implementation of gender mainstreaming rests on the establishment of effective accountability mechanisms at a national government level, that has progressed beyond a technocratic, depoliticised approach (Joseph et al, 2011:13). The implementation of a transformative political approach, as explained by Joseph et al (2011:8) and Walby (2003:4) would determine the success of gender mainstreaming as a policy in practice. True (2003:383) identified the lack of sensitivity to gender differences in power, resources and opportunities, meaning the theory-practice gap,

as a constraining factor. Joseph et al (2011:19) identified that insufficient knowledge (lack of sensitivity to gender differences) and consequently insufficient engagement with the organizational or governmental ideology, beliefs and norms, would hamper gender mainstreaming. Therefore, tension between mainstream and feminism developed or whether the transformation is more effective from the outside than from within the current structures.

The lack of insufficient knowledge on gender differences identified by Joseph et al. (2011:19) and True (2003:383) has dire consequences for gender mainstreaming in the security sector. People affected by sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) have different security needs based on their gender orientation. SGBV includes psychological or emotional violence such as sexual harassment, rape and sexual abuse, child sexual abuse, child marriage, female genital cutting, marital rape, dowry-related violence, female infanticide, killing of females because they are females, forced prostitution, sex trafficking, and sexual violence during war.

Males and people with same sex sexuality, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or other sexual identities also experience high degrees of SGBV. The importance of security sector reform based on a gender sensitive analysis of threats and gender accountability on security issues could not be emphasized more. A critical pre-requisite for gender mainstreaming of security is the transformation of those cultural attitudes that endorse and promote (S)GBV (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2016:84). Security institutions also have to be more gender-inclusive, since security sector actors have been seen as perpetrators rather than protectors of gender-based violence and local communities fear them. This results in under-reporting of GBV and this in turn affects human security of a state (See Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on security-related legislation and the involvement of security actors in GBV during national elections in Kenya). The slow pace of security sector reform (lack of gender mainstreaming) in the Government of Kenya (see Section 6.6 for a discussion of the empirical results) was identified as one of the greatest contributors to radicalization (both male and female), mainly because the Kenyan security sector is largely gender-insensitive (Participant F, 2020).

Asal et al (2020:2) determined that formal institutions, specifically in countries like the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where women have limited access to politics, may not improve female representation in government. The prevalent belief that gender equality is a western influence hampers the transformation of traditional norms about gender hierarchies. Gender quotas are not reaching the intended goal of gender equality in ethnically diverse societies and as a result the focus has shifted from gender transformation at a country level to gender transformation at the organizational level. Asal et al (2020:2) determined that through organizational membership, women would be able to gain access to power and would develop

the capacity to influence society at large. The conclusion by Asal et al (2020:2) is in line with Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3) that established that women who occupy paid employment positions would develop their potential and foster a consciousness of political participation. The research by Asal et al and Forsburg and Olsson focused the attention on the importance of gender ideology and the effect it has on organizational behaviour and non-violent means to solve disputes. Gender ideology influences technical choices within movements and has the potential to enhance mobilization with the likelihood of peacefully communicating political opinion (Asal et al, 2020:2). The research also draws the attention to the importance of grassroots participation in countries where traditional female political participation is prevented by socio-cultural beliefs that women belongs to the private sphere and fears that gender equality would erode cultural values (Asal et al, 2020:14).

Russia is an example that the Beijing Declaration that was adopted at the Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing, China in 1995, twenty-five years ago, can be achieved if the whole society is driven by a common agenda of mutual support for gender transformation. Russia followed a non-political gender approach without gender quotas. Russia claimed that true gender equality was achieved through reliable gender policies of economic empowerment and access to productive employment or entrepreneurship. This strategy helped women to fully realize their potential and increased not only female representation in the Russian Government, but also in women in some of the most senior decision-making positions in the Russian Government (Maksimych, 2020:11). The Womenomics initiative of Japan is another example where the empowerment of women led to 72.6 per cent female labour participation in the Japanese labour market in 2019. This is in contrast to 30 per cent female appointments in the Government of Japan in the same period. However, the Covid-19 pandemic exposed that these female gains in the public sphere were in non-regular jobs such as part-time or contract positions without stability, promotional opportunities or benefits. During April 2020 (Covid-19 pandemic) 73 per cent of the jobs lost in Japan, were female (Wilson, 2020:1).

Notwithstanding the criticism about the successful implementation of gender mainstreaming, feminism has managed to raise awareness about gender equality. It has brought gender equality into the mainstream rather than dealing with it on an ad hoc basis. Changes in domestic norms and institutions because of gender mainstreaming, shaped states IR and policies. Gender injustices are increasingly acknowledged as a concern in international security (True, 2003:372). As a result, the emphasis that feminism places on gender equality has made a huge contribution to the academic field and its inclusion in security studies. The correlation between gender equality and security is discussed in the next section.

2.7 Correlation between gender equality and national security

Security can simply be defined as the “absence of insecurity or threats” (Tadjbakhs, 2005:5). However, Galtung (1964:2) refers to the absence of insecurity as negative peace – this means to be free from direct violence (personal insecurity, assault, riots, terrorism, war ext.). On the other hand, positive peace is a long-standing process with the purpose to achieve the absence of indirect or structural violence.




Figure 2.2: Concept of peace and violence

Source: Galtung (1964:2)

Figure 2.2 illustrates that peace is not merely the absence of insecurity or direct violence, but positive and lasting peace is the absence of structural violence. Therefore, peace refers to eliminating the root causes of conflict and the integration of human security. Galtung (1964:2) explained that since personal and direct violence are often the result of conflict in a social structure, it would be better to focus on structural violence because this would reveal the causes and effects of violence and conditions for peace. This expanded definition of peace

and security to a structural perspective serves to transform the traditional definition of security in terms of national, regional, political and economic security to focus on the threats to human beings. Galtung explained and added that culture can be used to justify and legitimate direct or cultural violence. The flow of violence would be from cultural via structural to direct violence (Grewal, 2003:4). Primary threats (violence) to human security are identified as human rights violations and political discrimination that result in economic failure. National Therefore, the guarantee to national security (or positive peace) is favourable social, political and economic conditions, the protection of human rights and the promotion of human development (Tadjbakhs, 2005:5). Hudson (1998:1) explains in more detail that in Africa in particular, security issues are manifested in a myriad of interconnected relationships between:

“...political liberalisation and democratisation and a rise in crime, corruption, drugs and small arms trafficking; between failed attempts at democratisation and instilling a culture of human rights protection and the unwillingness of military elites to accept the primacy of civilian rule; between economic decline, debt and structural adjustment on the one hand, and poverty, scarcity of resources, population growth and migration on the other hand; as well as between migration, displacement of people, the rise of ethno-nationalism, disease and violence”.

The term national security is generally explained as the capability of a state to protect its internal values from external threats – meaning state security. Hudson (1998:1) refocuses the attention on the internal security matters affecting national security. Therefore, security should be understood in national terms and should include all challenges posed to the security of a nation, may it be environmental, health, cyber, influence or propaganda. These threats are far removed from external traditional military threats. Security implies a risk worth defending, while “national” focuses the attention to the level of defines. In other words, a threat to national security recognises that the citizens of a state need the state’s protection against external or other threats that only the state can protect them from, may it be trade-related, medical-related (protection against the Covid-19 virus) or the protection of jobs. Therefore, national security fundamentally refers to the interests of the nation. It links security with nation and prioritizes national needs, national prerogatives and national decision-making (Cohen, 2020:806).

Security studies developed as an academic subdiscipline of the discipline of IR. The study of IR focuses on all political interactions between different international actors or sovereign states, international and multinational organizations and or influential private citizens, whereas security studies is concerned with the maintenance of the security of these actors or people (Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:64). Therefore, security studies focus on what security is, whose security is important, the meaning of the referent object, what the security issue is and how security

can be achieved (Blanchard, 2003:1290, Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:62). This clarifies that the goal of security studies is to understand the current geo-political situation and to ensure the survival of each individual or the state itself (Williams, 2008:5; Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:63). Lewis (2006:13) states that security studies neglect the cultural, ideological and daily survival of the referent object by focussing on macro-level politics. However, Kangas *et al.* (2014:1) confirms that violent conflict affects genders differently. Men suffer to a greater degree in combat while women are disproportionately affected through sexual violence, displacement, social and economic vulnerabilities and loss to livelihood.

True (2012:193) cites Laura Sjoberg as saying that gender is a transformative force in research and the application of intersecting identities of security, as was identified by Hudson (1998:1) above. Lewis (2006:13) confirms this view. Feminist scholars, like Sjoberg, Hudson and Tickner, work within the security study framework and on international and multinational levels of interstate relations, international negotiations, and peacebuilding processes, as well as with security issues that deal with the broader definition of security, such as factors like environmental security or criminal activities.

Feminist scholars identify the gender bias in security and core concepts like the state, violence, war and peace (Blanchard, 2003:1292). The state is constructed on gender binaries of inside/outside and public/private, protector/protected and perpetrator/victim that are important in IR. Women are trapped on the inside private (domestic), which makes abuse and subordination invisible (Williams, 2017:1; Lee, 2013:373). Gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of some citizens, namely women, is sacrificed. Gender is central to securing peace and security and if the impediments to greater gender involvement in state-building are not addresses, the same concerns will reinforce gender inequality (Kangas *et al.*, 2014:1). On analysing women in conflict, feminist scholars determined that gender language is included in debates on nuclear strategy, immunity principle, peacekeeping and the military (Sjober, 2009:198; Blanchard, 2003:1292). There is a strong link between stereotypical gender roles and the failure to provide female fighters in conflict with access to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (Kangas *et al.*, 2014:1). In addition, feminist scholars use the knowledge on sexual violence and rape to heighten “rape as a weapon of war” as a focus of security studies (Blanchard, 2003:1301; Sjober, 2009:198; Lee, 2012:380). A feminist perspective of security is critical of the masculine foundation of a state-centric approach to security and suggests a mechanism where the merging of masculine and feminine values may assist the goals of human security to surpass that of the state. Women’s security must be examined in terms of gender roles before the goals of human security can be met (Hudson, 1998:1; Hendricks, 2006:3; Lewis, 2006:9)

The contribution of gender to international security places a new emphasis on security theory and practice (Blanchard, 2003:1292; Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:63). Secondly, feminism deconstructs the gendered bias status quo with regard to knowledge, claims and practices and incorporates new gender-sensitive theory of knowledge and power (Hudson, 1998:1). These new focus areas of security enlarge the security study field to be inclusive of feminist security studies. The status of feminist security studies is discussed in Section 2.7.7.

In 1988, Ann Tickner introduced feminist approaches to IR with her issue of “Women and International Relations” (Tickner, 1992:1; Scheyer *et al.*, 2019). Tickner underlined the fact that the focus of IR is based on a male perspective and experience. She believed that men’s affinity for war and power politics makes their presence in and contribution to the academic field of IR more authentic. Tickner quoted Ronald Reagan, the president of the United States in 1985, that women will not understand the political issues to be discussed at the Superpower meeting in Geneva in 1985: “Women are not going to understand ‘missile’ throw-weights or what is happening in Afghanistan ... most women would rather read the human interest stuff of what happened” (Tickner, 1992:1). The perception was that military and foreign policy are areas of strength – power, autonomy, independence and rationality – all prominent male characteristics that are needed for the development of foreign and national defence policies (Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:62; Blanchard, 2003:1305). Women who did make it into IR were considered as too weak and emotional to take decisions affecting national security. Masculinity and politics are binaries and in international politics valued and applauded in the name of defending a country. This development of hegemonic masculinity is a social construct that sustains and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order, very visibly, in IR (Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:68; Blanchard, 2003:1292).

The understanding of gender is based on binaries of male and female characteristics, referring to power and strength and emotional and weak (Tickner, 1992:1). Sjoberg (2009:18) explains that in the context of IR, gender refers to “a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics”. Gender social hierarchies are social and political structural features that influence opinions and views in and of the world. Feminist scholars approach their research through a gender lens, with the focus on women and men, masculinities and femininities, gender hierarchies/order, intersectionality (race, class, gender) and power, in order to highlight variables of importance in international politics. Feminism with its focus on transformation approaches international politics from various perspectives (Williams, 2017:1; Blanchard, 2003:1307; Sjoberg, 2010:22).

Feminist scholars reason that gender and not women is the driving force behind who, how and what we study in global politics. They agree that the international system is gender hierarchical

(Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:63). Therefore, what seems to be objective knowledge might be subjective knowledge of the privileged hidden as neutral and objective by the privileged, who are allowed to think for everyone as long as they do so objectively. Feminist scholars, on the other hand, stress that all knowledge is guided to understand the world from the perspective of disadvantaged people and actors. It is from this point of view that feminist scholars in IR highlight and change the injustices exhibited by the global world (Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:63). Feminist scholars brought the struggles of women to the forefront, making the invisible visible, emphasizing women as subjects and not the object of men (Hudson, 2005:170). By including gender as a central area of analysis, it characterizes gender as constitutive with a causal factor in international politics (Scheyer *et al.*, 2019:63). The constitutive claims of feminist theory have causal implications for how security matters influence and are influenced by global politics (Sjober, 2009:196). A realist feminist perspective focusses on the role of gender in strategy and power politics between states, while liberal feminists highlight that the subordinate position of women in international politics can be rectified with the inclusion of women in the present international structures of global politics. Critical feminists on the other hand push for a gendered identity and gendered power in international politics (Sjoberg, 2010:22). Critical theories are supportive to the commitment of emancipation (Gannon & Davies, 2012:65; Wibben, 2011:591). Scheyer *et al.* (2019:63) identified Sweden as the leading state in “feminist foreign policy”. However, although its feminist foreign policy is transformative in nature, the focus of the policy is to heighten the visibility of women and girls and not gender power relations. Scheyer *et al.* (2019:65) indicated that by revisioning security through a feminist only and not a gender lens, feminist foreign policy may not achieve its purpose for change.

Postmodernism, post-structural and critical theories have helped feminists to break loose from issues like subjectivity, performativity, politics and language. Feminist research attempts to make a difference and to emancipate subordinated groups from oppression (Wibben, 2011:591). Postmodernism (equated with humanism) sees reality through the eyes of individuals or social groups (Matos, 2015:1). Post-structuralism on the other hand implies that theory and reality cannot be separated and that “we see what we are taught to see in the concepts we learn” (Gannon & Davies, 2012:65). Sjoberg (2010:22) highlights that the function of post-structuralism is to focus on the linguistic meaning of words that empower the masculine or marginalize the feminine in international politics. Feminist constructivism focuses on how gender has shaped international politics while postcolonial feminism reflects on the development of colonial relations of domination and subordination under imperialism. African feminism is a speaking example of feminist constructivism (Gordema, 2010:36). Ecological or ecofeminism focuses on the intersection between the treatment of women and minorities in a

nonhuman environment. In this context, feminism focuses on the “oppression of nature” (Sjoberg, 2010:22; Moore, 2008:288).

Feminist perspectives focus on the root causes of oppression and gender inequality and seek international strategies to end them (Lewis, 2006:9). By using standpoint theory, feminists claim that the oppressed have a better understanding of the reality than the oppressor (Harding, 2012:50). Social feminism tries to understand the position of women in multiple roles in an attempt to find a single standpoint from which female oppression could be explained. It emphasizes patriarchy as the norm that oppressively formed women’s lives (Armstrong, 2020:1). Postmodern feminists reason that the notion of standpoint is impossible due to racial, class and cultural differences. They rather promote a multiplicity of women’s voices to be heard. The view of postmodern feminism is a slight warning to feminists not to create a one-fits-all approach (Matos, 2015:1).

Feminist perspectives experiences add a new perspective to economic hardship and the relationship between militarism and structural violence (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:2; Sideris, 2001:142). These new threats to the wider description of security, namely human security, demand new solutions. The maintenance of security, human and state, is always central to IR (Tickner, 1992:1). Feminists argue that human security will not be attained until gender inequality in IR is eliminated. Research by Aggestam *et al.* (2019:24) on gender and diplomacy found that foreign diplomacy is resistant to international feminist theory. It is the social dimension of gender that emphasizes the value assigned to individuals based on their sex that either classifies them as superior or inferior based on a political, economic or social class. This is the origin of gender inequality as it relates to personal insecurity (Forsburg & Olsson, 2016:3). The intersection between feminism and security is explained in the next section.

2.8 Feminist security studies

Contemporary feminism theory divides feminist perspectives based on difference, inequality and oppression. Theories of gender inequality focus on the biological differences and as a result the unequal access to and distribution of resources, which provides men with a premeditated and deliberate advantage of power. Theories of gender oppression are viewed through the lens of power (Hudson, 1998:1).

The feminist waves developed as a consequence of inequalities on the political (inability to vote), economic (discrimination in employment, education and property rights) and social (on the basis of sex) conditions to protect women from the insecurity (harm) it caused. Third-wave

feminists highlight the threat posed by gender subordination interlinked with class, race and sexuality, as well as nationality-based discrimination (Heywood & Drake, 2007:122; Matos, 2012:10).

It was Ann Tickner who in her work called: "Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security" who first applied feminist theory to IR (Tickner, 1992:1). The adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) (UNSC, 2000:1) to mainstream gender in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction proved that gender is relevant in global governance. Besides gender's importance for IR and global governance, gender became prominent in security matters such as sex as a tool of war, the increase in female suicide bombers, and women participation as soldiers and activists against conflicts (Williams, 2017:1).

Contributing to the development of feminist security studies was the work of Spike Peterson, "Gendered States". He proclaims that the way states claim to provide security for their citizens is determined by the influence of gender in global politics (Sjoberg, 2016:45). The feminist quote of "personal being political" or rephrased by Enloe as "the personal is international and the international is personal", constructed intersections between global politics, personal security, international security and links between gender, race and class security (Williams, 2017:1). It was Sjoberg who started using the term feminist security studies to identify and expose the importance of feminist work in reconstructing, reconstituting and transforming the study field of security studies (Sjober, 2016:46).

Feminist scholars' approaches to security define security broadly on multidimensional terms. Firstly, they focus on William's explanation of what security involves and to whom should it be applied (Williams, 2017:1). From a feminist perspective, threats to security entail not only war or international instability, but also domestic threats of family violence, rape, gender oppression, poverty and ecological destruction (Williams, 2017:1; Sjoberg, 2009:198; Moore, 2008:284). Feminists highlight that secure states often host insecure women (Hudson, 2006:6). Taking a second look at Enloe's phrase: "the personal is international and the international is personal", feminist studies of international security determine how the security of the individual relies on national and international politics and how international politics affect the security of the individual at the domestic level. Secondly, Sjoberg (2009:199) mentions the masculine hierarchy of international security and the unequal competitive social order associated with it. If this status is not changed, masculinity will appear as a unitary concept dominating social relations (Williams, 2017:1). Thirdly, feminist studies highlight that gender matters in theory and practice. By analysing the causes, the outcomes can be predicted. A broader study of feminist security studies includes the security elements of human security,

domestic violence, economic security, social security, and environmental security. The final common theme accentuated by feminist security studies is that the omission of gender from international security does not solve the security problems (Sjober, 2009:203).

Feminist security has been compared to the Copenhagen school and human security approaches. The connection between feminist security and these two approaches is examined next in subsections 2.7.7.1 and 2.7.7.2.

2.8.1 The Copenhagen school

The Copenhagen school has a critical approach to security studies and is focused on the social dimensions of international security. They argue that securitizing actors through the “speech act” of identifying a security concern raises security. This approach looks at threats to states through matters that are socially constructed (Romaniuk, 2018:1). Scholars of this approach perceive the understanding of security as old-fashioned, underdeveloped and simple-minded. They argue that security is affected on five levels of analysis and by five sectors. It is affected at the individual, state and substate, and international and sub-international level by the military, political, economic, societal and environmental factors. This school of thought believes that security is not static and is constructed by securitizing actors. The securitizing process has three phases:

- The first stage is called the speech act phase. This includes the identification of an external threat like climate change before a referent object (state or group of states).
- The second phase is securing special actions to protect the referent object. It is prioritized above normal politics and special actions are taken to address the concern.
- By prioritizing a concern, its status is elevated, and it is addressed in terms of policy making, it is funded and receives media attention (Romaniuk, 2018:1).

Feminist’s criticism of the Copenhagen security approach underlines the failure to accommodate the power dynamics inherent to securitization and those whose security is neglected because they lack the ability to speak. Certainly, the biggest omission of this approach is gender and the emotional dimensions attached to security (Romaniuk, 2018:1; Sjoberg, 2009:208). The second of the approaches is human security and it is discussed in the next section.

2.8.2 Human security

The second approach regards feminist theories in IR as part of human security. Historically, the focus of security was the protection of the state, its boundaries, people and institutions as the referent object – which is why it was called state security. The focus on the protection of the referent object has widened over the last 20 years (2000 to 2020) and has moved away from the state to include the protection of the economy, food security, the environment, health, personal security, community and political security, while taking into consideration the welfare and identity of people. Therefore, the focus of human security is protection and empowerment (Hudson, 2005:163). The security of all other referents – international, regional, the state, the community and the group – derives from the authority of the human individual's right to dignity (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:1). Hudson (2005:163) explains that the emphasis in human security has shifted from the security dilemma of states to a survival dilemma of people. Lewis (2006:12) underlines that the diversity of factors that pose threats of want and fear are strengthened by neo-liberal economic models and market-driven policies with intensifying consequences for poverty, food security and economic exclusion of the majority. These new threats, which incorporate states and internal conflicts, cause an increase in radicalism in security studies. The addition of gender perspectives could have a further effect on the radicalization of human security studies. Hudson (2005:165) is of the opinion that human security is complementary to state security because of the emphasis on human development, human rights and the role of non-state actors. The level of human security is determined by state security, because the state remains the political actor with control over the resources.

The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 defined human security as the “protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment” (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:160). In support of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Human Development Report was compiled and the phrase “freedom from want and freedom from fear”, was born (Hendricks, 2006:1). Human security became the primary focus in international, regional multinational organizations tasked with security and development. Human security has become the global standard for insecurity. (Tadjbakhs, 2005:5). This multilevel holistic approach of security includes compensation for structural inequalities. In other words, the interdependence of the different levels of security could affect the security of one another. The primary role of the state is to protect its citizens, but experience has highlighted that governments pose the biggest threat to human security in the name of state security. This new threat to human security is exposed by intrastate and crime violations (Mack, 2002:5).

States tend to focus on state security (the absence of external threats to the state) because it is easier to measure than human security. However, the UN has foreseen this consequence by implementing the MDGs. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, 189 states signed the historic millennium declaration. An evaluation of the MDGs confirms that there has been progress on all the goals, but that the challenges to secure human security are complex and persistent (UN: MDG Report, 2015:1). As a result, in 2016 the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” with 17 sustainable development goals (SDG) was adopted by the UNDP to build on the progress made by the MDGs and to safeguard peace and prosperity for all people on the planet. The strategic focuses of the SDGs are to alleviate poverty and reduce economic inequality, to advance democratic governance and peacebuilding and to manage climate change and disaster risks (UNDP, 2018). Goal 5 of the SDG, gender equality, makes provision for women and girls to have equal rights and opportunities and to be able to be free of want or fear, free of violence and discrimination.

Women’s equality and empowerment are integral to all the SDGs. It can be said that the SDGs depend on Goal 5. UN Women revealed that 49 countries lack laws protecting women from domestic violence, while a further 39 obstruct inheritance rights for daughters and sons. To improve gender equality by 2030, urgent action is needed to eradicate the many root causes of discrimination that still exist in private and public spheres and are curtailing women’s rights (UN Women, 2018:1). States cannot be safe when basic human rights are not met and when the dignity of humans are threatened because of unemployment, abuse, rape and disease. The commonalities between human security and feminism are strong, but gender stands central as the category of analysis to determine how unequal social and state structures impact negatively on the security of individuals (Williams, 2017:1). A natural assumption would be that there is a positive relationship between gender inequality and internal conflict or violence (Sjoberg, 2009:206). This assumption is examined next.

2.8.3 Gender as a factor in emergency and internal conflict or political violence

This section pays attention to the different needs and circumstances of both men and women in the context of violence in a non-conflict state. Research by Anderlini (2010:2; Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:4; Tickner, 1992:54; Caprioli, 2003:200; Caprioli, 2005:162) reveals that economic and socio-cultural dynamics are contributing to the causes and repercussions of violence. By analysing the human dimensions of fragility, factors that could contribute or prevent violence could be identified. Analysis from the standpoint of the people, rather than the state or government, would be more beneficial to prevent violence. The sections below reflect on the factors influencing internal conflict, human rights violations, grievances and gender inequality as predictors of violence.

2.8.3.1 The factors influencing internal conflict

The act of violence is present when people are influenced to such an extent that their actual behaviour is below their potential actions (Galtung, 1969:168). The mode of influence is applied on two levels. The first is the physical level, which includes bodily harm or the restriction of movement, meaning uneven access to transport to keep a population in the same place. The second is on a psychological level where brainwashing, lies and indoctrination or threats serve to decrease or hurt mental potentialities. Positive or negative influence is used to decrease or increase the constraints of the oppressed. The third method of influence is the presence of an object to display displeasure, may it be the throwing of stones or the testing of nuclear missiles. The most important is the presence of an actor – the subject. The presence of an actor would lead to personal or direct violence. On the other hand, indirect violence is present when violence is built into the structure where it leads to unequal power and subsequently to unequal life experiences because of the uneven distribution of resources, access to education or health services. Galtung also refers to structural violence as social injustice. It presents itself on two levels – the manifest (observable) or the latent (potential of violence) (Galtung, 1969:172). Shannon *et al.* (2017:1) explained that structural violence manifests itself in institutionalized social structures such as poverty, racism and gender inequality and that a structural violence framework recognizes intersecting inequalities in the suppression of human potential. Galtung identifies the difference between the potential and the actual as the cause for conflict (Galtung, 1969:172).

Structural violence is the result of systematic exploitation, the deprivation of basic human needs or the unequal distribution of resources, which becomes part of the social order as a way to maintain power. Cultural violence refers to learned attitudes and beliefs. Both structural and cultural violence creates the justification for direct violence, be it physical or verbal. Structural inequality is a precursor for structural violence because of the notions of poverty and political repression (Bobichand, 2012:1). Galtung identifies four basic components of structural violence. They are:

- the asymmetrical distribution of labour and benefits;
- the psychological control over the oppressed, resulting in the agreement of the oppressed;
- fragmentation, which separates the exploited; and
- marginalization used by the exploiters to create a privileged class with their own rules (Caprioli, 2005:164).

In addition to structural violence as researched by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6), added horizontal and vertical inequalities are grounds for political violence. Greed and grievances are both motivators for horizontal and vertical dissatisfaction. Greed is based on the correlation between discrimination, inequality and violence. In the case of greed, people are willing to take action against a government if they believe that they will gain something. With reference to grievances, people take action to express dissatisfaction about social injustices or inequalities. Grievances also develop because of perceived horizontal or individual and/or vertical or group inequalities. Horizontal inequalities refer to economic inequalities based on shared political, cultural, religious or social identities, while vertical grievances refer to inequality amongst groups.

The research by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6) identifies that conflict manifests itself in three forms namely: i) violent protests; ii) terrorism; and iii) internal conflict. It can be assumed that the aggrieved or greedy will start with lower cost violence first and it will increase in the same order in which the forms of violence are listed. The cost of violence will determine the order – from non-violent, violent, terror attacks to civil war. Firstly, it can be concluded that the probability for violence will increase as the size of the population that is excluded from political and economic powers grows. Therefore, with an increase in horizontal inequality, the risk for escalation in all forms of internal conflict also increases (Gurr, 1968:1104). Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:4) conclude that the past is a predictor of the future. A consistent predictor of violent conflict in the future is violent conflict in the past because it is hard to break cycles of conflict once it has started. The study by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019) further analysed human rights violations as a predictor for violence. This is discussed in the next section.

2.8.3.2 Human rights violations as a predictor of internal conflict

Based on the definition of structural violence by Galtung (1969:172), Shannon *et al.* (2017:1) explain that structural violence manifests itself in institutionalized social structures and that a structural violence framework recognizes intersecting inequalities in the suppression of human potential. Ho (2007:1) recognizes that structural violence is responsible for human rights violations, explaining that when fundamental human rights cannot be met because of inequalities like racism, poverty and gender, then structural violence becomes a structural violation of human rights.

Research on human rights violations and violent conflict as a predictor for internal conflict has determined that human rights violations include both horizontal and vertical grievances, as was explained above. The research identifies a positive correlation between the violation of

women's rights (human's rights) and the violation of other subordinate groups in a society. If women's rights are not respected, the probability that the human rights of marginalized groups in the country will be respected, is unlikely. The more women are discriminated against in a society, the greater the probability that the state will dominate subordinate groups. In other words, low respect for women's rights is low respect for minority rights (Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:10). The correlation between the repression of women's rights and greater political violence can be explained by looking at the variation of the capabilities of women in a country versus their expectations. Their expectation can be measured against their male counterparts inside or female counterparts outside the country. Unmet expectations are in line with grievances that are consistent with the relative deprivation theory, which is discussed in Section 2.7.3.3.

Lewis (2006:13) emphasizes that gender cannot be examined in isolation from the political system of a state. In democratic states, the presence of political parties is important. However, their relevance is weakened when basic human rights are not met or become the subject of continued abuse, when people fear for their lives because of high crime rates or the existence of preventable diseases, and lastly when people lose their dignity because of unemployment or sexual violence. To guarantee women's human security in a state, the society should be open about and challenge the many forms of gender violence (human rights violation) in all the diverse societies where it affects over half the world's female population. Anderlini (2010:7) emphasizes that the security of women is a predictor of the stability of a state and is necessary for economic development. The deterioration of women's security and gender inequality is an early sign of a crisis and violence. Women are also the first to face new threats of insecurity like extremist recruitments or increases in organized crime such as human and sex trafficking. Other human rights abuses are human trafficking, FGM and child brides. These threats are often under-prioritized, although they are contributors to broader national instability (DCAF, 2015:7). Based on these threats, Sjober (2009:203) indicates that the omission of gender from international security does not solve the security matters. For the same reason, security sector reform is necessary to protect human security, the *rule of law and respect for human rights* (DCAF, 2015:7). GBV is a human rights violation, but because of the vastness of the problem, it is discussed separately in the next section.

2.8.3.2.1 Gender based violence as an indicator of internal conflict

Due to the influence of feminism, GBV has become a visible issue and has been acknowledged as abuse of women's human rights. The atrocity of the problem turned it into a sectoral concern instead of it being an integrated part of human security. The heightened focus on gender violence extended investigations into other gendered dimensions such as militarism, ethnic

formation and conflict and nationalism (Lewis, 2006:11). Lewis uses Rwanda as a case study to unveil that conflict has deep roots in gender relations, identities and ideology. Rape, sexual slavery or sexual torture are used as weapons of war and/or play an important role in ethnic cleansing. Lewis identifies (2006:11) the importance of gender identities in the formation of ethnic or national identity formation. This clearly explains why women experience exceptional forms of violence during conflict.

Anderlini (2010:7) underlines that the physical security of women is a predictor of the political stability of a state. Female life expectancy is part of this. Where the life expectancy of women is not close or similar to that of men, there is an indication of the dangers and disadvantages that women face with obtaining healthcare, and a lack of access to economic and social opportunities. Linked to socio-economic difficulties is domestic violence. Anderlini underlines the correlation between domestic and public violence. Studies in Sri Lanka and Nepal confirm that young women who joined gangs or insurgencies did so because they escaped from an abusive environment or were taking revenge for abuse by state authorities. The research revealed that female suicide bombers or women who had been radicalized were motivated based on a combination of factors as summarized in Figure 4.7. Sexual and other forms of GBV include marital rape, FGM forced and child marriages. Women and girls are the most affected and directly targeted – be it the victim of a crime of opportunity, a tactic to instil fear, to display power or they are used as a tactic of war. In the long run, sexual diseases, emotional damage and bodily harm affect existing tensions and trigger revenge or retaliatory violence (Anderlini, 2010:12). As a result, grievances as a predictor for internal conflict are discussed next.

2.8.3.3 Grievances as a predictor of internal conflict

Grievances develop in societies where there are conflicting interests or competition for power and or scarce resources. The manner in which these grievances are addressed affects the risk of internal conflict (Caprioli, 2003:200; Caprioli, 2005:162; Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011:148). Forsberg and Olsson (2016:4) explain that in a masculinized political culture, the threshold for violence is lower. Confirming this fact is the persistence of violence and domination over women as a result of patriarchal societies where violence is considered normal, therefore legitimate. In these societies norms of intolerance develop with regard to women, sexual or ethnic minorities or political opposition groups. It is likely that a superior group attitude will develop towards inferior groups. It can be anticipated that in high-level male-dominant political societies, the threshold for violence would be low and that violence would be used as a means to resolve conflict. Therefore, the level of gender inequality is a reflection of how a society handles existing grievances on the highest decision-making levels.

Caprioli (2005:163) explains that internal conflict is based on grievances that motivate a group for violence and a sense of injustice with a strong historical undertone. The research found that systemic discrimination is a greater predictor for violence than deprivation or inequality. In other words, internal violence is most likely when a group has a common identity of association of frustration based on relative deprivation and a history of discrimination. A strong group identity increases the possibility of violence. A deprived group must weigh the consequences of action versus inaction, causing an economic impact. A civil war is likely when a group has the economic means and weighs their action against the counter action of greater repression or facilitation from the government. It is important to understand that cultural norms supportive of violence to address grievances are more likely to promote internal conflict. Gender inequality as a predictor for internal conflict is addressed next.

In research to determine the relationship between poverty and radicalization, Botha (2017:1) established that economic conditions beyond poverty provide favourable circumstances for the recruitment of radical groups. These conditions are built on inequality and can be explained using the relative deprivation theory of Ted Gurr. The deprivation theory explains the difference between what people expect and what they get – the primary source of frustration. Deprivation comes in the form of marginalization based on gender, ethnic, tribal or religious differences (Gurr, 1968:1104; Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:80). Botha argued that the possibility for violence and radicalization increases when economic development and political representation visibly divide people on the abovementioned factors.

Research by Botha (Jamah, 2014:1) on the recruitment of Al Shabaab sympathizers in Kenya that 65 per cent of participants joined the militant group because of discrimination and/or collective punishment by the security forces of the Government of Kenya. Nearly all the members who joined either Al Shabaab or the MRC did so while experiencing high levels of frustration – a clear indication of the role emotions play in the radicalization process. The executive director for the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate indicated that 10 to 20 per cent of foreign terrorist fighters are female and are the targets of violent extremists (Coninsx, 2018:1). The executive director for UN Women confirmed this statement and argued that in the recent decade, women's political, economic and social rights are under increased of attacks. A lack of respect for women's rights has the probability to increase political violence and the increase in terror attacks (Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:22). Gender inequality as a predictor of violence is discussed next.

2.8.3.4 Gender inequality as predictor of internal conflict

To evaluate the role of gender violence in internal conflict, Galtung's (1969:172) explanation of structural violence is applied. When it comes to exploitation, females have different opportunities for development than men. Structural violence in a country is upheld by i) gender stereotyping, ii) socialization; and iii) threats of violence (Sideris, 2001:142). These factors are used to identify women as inferior. Women having fewer job opportunities outside the household and bigger family responsibilities are a result of fragmentation (Gizelis, 2011:524). This restricts women's socialization or political activation (WHO, 2017:1). Lastly, the three characteristics are used to marginalize women, to create a social set of gender hierarchies with male superiority and domination versus female subordination (Shannon *et al.*, 2017:1). Structural violence is maintained by cultural norms and serves as the vehicle to institutionalized cultural violence. In other words, cultural violence is used to justify and legitimize structural violence, even let it look and feel right (Mack, 2002:5). Despite the gains made by feminism or the mainstreaming of gender, multiple causes of violence against women exist (Anderlini, 2010:12). Inequality in power sharing is the basis for all acts of violence (Caprioli, 2005:164; Wienclaw, 2011:96, 111). Gender is represented in both structural and cultural violence and therefore forms the basis of structural inequality. Gender is used as a standard to determine access and power and to justify and maintain inequality (Cockburn, 2001:15).

The relationship between gender inequality and internal conflict revolves around two aspects. The first explanation is that gender inequality may be linked to an increase in internal armed conflict or political violence, the second is that it can be explained that gender equality contributes to resolving internal conflict without violence (Cockburn, 2010:139). These explanations are based on either the norms related to gender equality or the social capacity related to the different social dimensions of gender inequality as discussed in Section 2.4.3.3 in this chapter (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016:4).

It has been demonstrated that gender inequality in social, political, economic and on intellectual level are humanly created and can therefore be altered. Social change can only be achieved if the origin of inequality is clearly defined. Forsburg and Olsson (2016:2) researched the concept of gender inequality, its links to internal conflict and the role gender seems to play in the event of political violence. Tickner (1992:54) highlights the significance of cooperation and interdependence, the elimination of violence and unfair social relations and stresses the importance of social concerns over military powers as the basis for security. She quotes from the agreement of the 1985 Women's International Peace Conference that "security meant nothing if it was built on the insecurity of others". The mentioned conference recognized the

changing nature of conflict and the effect it has on women and children. Subsequently, the UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) was adopted (UNSC, 2000:1).

Caprioli (2005:162) links gender inequality with internal violence based on grievances that develop because of social injustices that motivate male groups to use violence as a correction method (Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:10). This motivation is based on frustration among individual males or groups when they do not receive what they expect or deserve (Jamah, 2014:1). Furthermore, frustration is a breeding ground for aggression and collective action (Botha, 2017:1). The culmination of such grievances or deprivation does not necessarily lead to violence in society, but it is indeed a result of underlying cultural norms that legitimize and facilitate violence (Gurr, 1968:1104). Caprioli identifies that inequality between men and women obstructs to sustainable or positive peace (Caprioli, 2005:163; Caprioli, 2003:198). Sections 2.7.3.1 and 2.7.3.2 reflect on the correlation between different forms of violence in non-conflict states.

Cockburn (2010:139) confirms that structural inequality is rooted in hierarchy, domination and the use of force. Marginalization and a constant threat of violence against women assure the acceptance of structural inequality. When the tolerance of violence is supported by structural violence, the occurrence of both inter- and intrastate violence will increase, because violence is ingrained in the culture and used as a tool to settle conflict (Gurr, 1968:1104). Cockburn's (2010:13) conclusion is supported by Galtung's explanation that peaceful states apply the same set of norms in both domestic and international settings based on respect for the rights of the opponents. Then the opposite should also be true, that norms of intolerance and economic inequality should fuel domestic and international violence as a tool for conflict resolution (Cockburn, 2010:139). It is clear that gender plays an important role in internal conflict.

The link between gender inequality and violence leads to the conclusion that inequality between men and women is a barrier to sustainable peace. For this reason, the marginalization of women and the social relationships of domination and subordination should be eliminated to achieve peace (Bertay *et al.*, 2020:7). Gender inequality directly affects structural inequality, which is based on the norms of discrimination and violence. Caprioli (2005:167) states that the higher the level of gender inequality in a country, the greater the probability that the state will experience intrastate conflict.

Gender inequality contributes to poor governance of the security sector by potentially contributing to political and socio-economic instability and high levels of structural and institutional violence and crime. An analysis of this statement clarifies that gender inequality

sustains impunity, corruption and human rights abuses that jeopardize democratic processes, and economic and social stability (DCAF, 2015:6). If inequality is a possible source of frustration and conflict, then equality should lead to peace. The relationship between gender equality and peaceful resolutions is discussed next.

2.9 The relationship between peaceful resolution and gender equality

Hudson (1998:1) believes that a secure community can be created with decentralized and interdependent ways, together with gender sensitivity. Such a process would entail that feminist notions of security be integrated into the mainstream discourse and that women should not merely be taken on. Secondly, the connections between political, socio-economic, cultural and physical and environmental threats are merged into daily life activities, influencing women's security needs (Bertay *et al.*, 2020:7). A feminist perspective on the management of daily threats would not only promote a non-violent environment but would also cultivate an environment of respect (Hudson, 1998:1).

Forsberg and Olsen (2016:5) underscore that gender equality as a norm prescribes respect and peaceful conflict resolution. This will prevent grievances from escalating into violent conflict or post-conflict countries from relapsing into violence. Norms of respect between men and women will transpire into societal relations, political parties and ethnic groupings. Once the norm of respect is instilled in a community, research confirms that even at the group and individual levels, differences are settled using non-violent means (Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:10).

Research confirms a correlation between a state's level of militarism and sexism and women's inequality (Cockburn, 2010:139). Gender inequality may lead to low enough levels of social pluralism to create a higher level of militarism. The positive link between militarism and masculinity guarantee men a higher social status than women. This correlation will influence the level of aggression a state displays through foreign policy. With the increase in female presentation in decision-making structures, it is accepted that states will revert to less militaristic foreign policies (Caprioli, 2003:200). Similar research by Forsberg and Olsen (2016:5) reveal that high levels of investment in women and greater access to resources give women the capacity to influence a society and to uphold networks and structures to prevent a conflict relapse. Consequently, peacebuilding and peacekeeping will have a greater chance of success with the inclusion of local women and men partners. Similarly, with higher levels of respect for women's rights will reduce the level of violence during violent protests and decreases the number of predicted terror attacks (Cangranelli *et al.*, 2019:18).

The research results concluded that due to women's caring characteristics, greater presentation in government will pacify state aggression internationally. A second conclusion is that the absence of hierarchical violence associated with male domination will lower aggressive foreign policy (Tickner, 1992:1; Blanchard, 2003:1292). The same conclusion can be made for the security forces. The more female representation there is in the security sector, the less violent it becomes. A natural conclusion would be that the higher the status of women in a community, the greater the chance for an overall change in societal values and not women's values only (Hudson, 2005:170).

The inclusion of women in societal sectors, politics, government and the labour force will strengthen the state capacity and governance associated with peace. A study by Melander confirms that democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies only when they promote gender equality. An equal distribution of power between men and women will diffuse conflict. In the absence of women in government, women's groups can play a significant role in conflict resolution, especially in a male-dominated environment (Forsberg & Olsen 2016:5).

2.10 Conclusion

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the world is starting to realize that sustainable development is based on the empowerment of women and girls.

Chapter 2 focused on the inequality between women and men and investigated the link between gender inequality and the internal security of a state. Gender equality forms a vital part of the security of a state and without gender equality, the maintenance of peace and security becomes a challenge for the security sector of the state.

The insecurity of women and their inferior position in the political arena with their subsequent marginalization in socio-economical spheres led to the development of feminist theory. The theory developed with the exclusive purpose to uncover gender-biased research, the stronghold of patriarchy on power in society and the binary of women with private and emotional. The feminist theory is based on critical forms of oppression and subordination based on individual and collective resistance to the subordination of women. Feminist perspectives focus on the root causes of oppression and gender inequality and seek international strategies to end them. As a result, the process of gender mainstreaming has become an international phenomenon driven by the UN with positive results for women development and inclusion in peace and security structures, decision-making structures in

governments and in boardrooms in the corporate sector – positions previously mainly reserved for males.

Feminists argue that human security cannot be attained until gender inequality in IR is eliminated. Feminist scholars are working within the security study framework and on international and multinational levels of interstate relations, international negotiations, peacebuilding processes, as well as with security issues that deal with the broader definition of human security to promote gender equality. Gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of some citizens, namely women, is sacrificed (human security). Marginalization and the constant threat of violence against women assure the acceptance of structural inequality as normative. Structural inequality is based on the norms of discrimination and violence and the origin of grievances and frustration in and between communities. Gender inequality sustains impunity, corruption and human rights abuses (inclusive of GBV) that jeopardize democratic processes, economic and social stability. GBV involves sexual harassment and violations, domestic violence, gender-selective murder (also female infanticide), human trafficking, FGM and child brides.

Research confirms that the higher the level of gender inequality in a country, the greater the probability that the state will experience internal conflict or political violence. If inequality is a possible source of grievances and conflict, then equality should lead to peace. Gender equality as a norm prescribes respect and peaceful conflict resolution. A natural conclusion is that the higher the status of women in a community, the lower is the risk for conflict. The inclusion of women in societal sectors, politics, government and the labour force strengthen state capacity and governance, which is associated with peace.

The next chapter, Chapter 3, pays attention to the progress made by the Government of Kenya and civil organizations with the process of gender mainstreaming. The chapter outlines the legislative and institutional frameworks to meet gender equality standards.

CHAPTER 3: LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS IN KENYA TO MEET GENDER EQUALITY STANDARDS

3.1 Introduction

“Kenya shall be a nation that treats its women and men equally. It will not discriminate against any citizen on the basis of gender, race, tribe, religion or ancestral origin” (Vision 2030, 2007:22).

Chapter 2 focused on the basic tenets of feminist theory and its contribution to gender transformation in the political, economic, security and social sectors. This led to the conclusion that feminism re-examines gender politics, from personal politics to international and transnational women’s organizations, activism and women’s promotion of peace. Feminism aims to transform gender relations for the benefit of women. Gender relations highlight the inequalities in the balance of power, which historically discriminated against women and contributed to their insecurity (Offen, 2011:1). This chapter aims to reach the second research objective as was outlined in Section 1.6.2: “To study and discuss the legal requirements and status of gender equality for positions in the national Government of Kenya”. The chapter provides a more in-depth overview of the legal, policy and institutional frameworks of the Government of Kenya in support of gender equality, as well as the regional and international gender instruments ratified by the Government of Kenya. The chapter concludes with a summary of the responsiveness of the frameworks to implement gender equality standards for positions in the national Government of Kenya, as was promised by President Uhuru Kenyatta, the current president of Kenya (2013–2022).

In 2015 at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, President Kenyatta expressed the commitment of the Government of Kenya to the empowerment of women and girls in terms of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. He promised the enactment of the appropriate legislation and the formulation, implementation and enforcement of gender equality policies. The Government of Kenya further committed to ensuring women’s full participation at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life. The President concluded that progress for women is progress for all and that “investing in women is more than a matter of rights— it is the right thing to do” (Kenyatta, 2015:3).

3.2 Brief orientation with respect to the diversity of the people of Kenya

This section provides a short background on the political history of Kenya, the diversity of the population, the ethnic representation in government and the historical development of the different constitutions of the Government of Kenya since independence from the United Kingdom in 1963.

3.2.1 Independence from colonialism

Kenya became independent from the United Kingdom in December 1963 after the Kenya African Nation Union (KANU) won the majority of seats in the May 1963 general election. Jomo Kenyatta, father of the current Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, became the first Kenyan prime minister after independence in December 1963. In 1964, under a new Independence Constitution, Kenya became a republic with Jomo Kenyatta (1964–1978) as the first president of the Republic of Kenya (Gascoigne, 2001:1). Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the presidency alternated between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities as displayed in Figure 3.1. A breakdown of Kenya's ethnicity is provided in the next section.




Figure 3.1: Ethnic diversity of Kenyan presidents (1964 – 2022)

Ethnic identity is the most important variable in Kenyan politics and defines why and how politicians seek, retain and cede power. The politicization of ethnic identity is one of the main causes for the political violence that Kenya has experienced since its independence in 1963. Ethnic groups vote as a block and are directly linked to a political party. Votes are collected based on ethnic identities and politicians stoke fear of rival ethnic groups. Political power often translates into ethnic domination with the possibility to use/abuse state authority to access and

channel resources to the benefit of the ethnic group and alliances in power (Biegon, 2018:15). This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. In 2007, ethnic inequality and lack of power-sharing in the Government of Kenya have resulted in severe election violence. This led to a demand from the community for a new power-sharing model and constitution. However, it is important to mention that the boundaries of the current county governments, based on the new 2010 Constitution (see Section 3.3 for an overview of the Constitutional process in Kenya), were again drawn according to ethnic lines. The ethnic diversity of the population and the civil service is discussed in Section 3.2.2.

3.2.2 Ethnic diversity and civil service

During the 2010s, Kenya became a multi-political party state with a confirmed population of 47.5 million people in 2019. Females accounted for just over 24 million or 50.5 per cent of the population (KNBS, 2019:1). The diverse population can be classified into three different language groups, namely the Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic. Altogether, Kenya has 44 indigenous groups, of which the five largest groups (the big five) are the Kikuyu (8.1 million), Luhya (6.8 million), Kalenjin (6.3 million), Luo (5 million) and the Kamba (4.6 million). These groups represent almost two-thirds of the population of Kenya. This ethnic configuration has direct implications on Kenya politics, forming of political parties or coalitions and voting patterns. Figure 3.2 illustrates the ethnic diversity of Kenya (KNBS, 2020:1).




Figure 3.2: Ethnic diversity of the population in 2020

Source: KNBS (2020:1)

Despite not having one dominant ethnic group, Figure 3.3 demonstrates that in 2020, six out of the 44 tribes were represented in prominent top management positions in the public service, with the Kikuyu taking the lead in numbers. This is displayed in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3.3: Ethnic diversity in top management positions in the civil service

Source: Mkwale (2020:10)

A report by the National Cohesion and Equal Opportunity Committee highlights (September 2020) that 80 per cent of public service jobs are occupied by the six biggest ethnic groups (Mkwale, 2020:10). However, the Kikuyu represents 29 per cent, the Kalenjin 11 per cent, the Luhya 10 per cent, Luo 8 per cent, Kamba 6 per cent and the Meru 5 per cent of the top management positions in the public service (Mkwale, 2020:10; Kisia, 2020a:4). Together the biggest tribes fill 50 per cent of the jobs in top management positions in government, while the same three tribes represent 44 per cent of the population (Mkwale, 2020:10; Kisia, 2020a:4). The Kikuyu is the only tribe that has a bigger representation in the top management of the government than its representation in the population. Fifteen of the ethnic groups are not represented in top management civil service jobs (Kisia, 2020a:4). Ethnic politics is based on identity politics, which could be organized in alignment with race, religion, gender or age. It claims to advance the interests of particular groups in society and by extension to counter the interest of others. Therefore, people in Kenya also unite around perceived or actual political, social and economic injustices that relate to the wider society of which they form part of (see

Section 2.8.3.3 for a discussion on grievances as a predictor of internal conflict and Section 4.6 for a discussion on radicalization in Kenya). The empirical research highlights the correlation (see Figures 6.5 and 6.6 for an illustration) between ethnic and gender inequality in Kenya – both because of marginalization and exclusion.

General elections in Kenya are highly contested as the members of opposition parties try to break the control of the Kikuyu tribe in government – the reason for the post-election violence in 2007. The last presidential and general election in 2017 was no different. The Kenyan Supreme Court nullified the August 2017 general election on the basis of credibility after the court had received a petition from the opposing NASA coalition. A repeat presidential election followed in October 2017 with the current president, President Uhuru Kenyatta, as the winner, after the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, withdrew from the repeat election. An analysis of the 2017 elections revealed that neither devolution, the current political system, nor the 2008 power sharing deal effectively addressed ethnic inequality in Kenya. To the contrary, political coalitions were largely formed based on ethnic lines and promises of ethnic rewards. Both coalition building and devolution are based on ethnicity as a basis for local and national politics (Asingo, 2018:118). This is particularly true in the north-eastern counties of Kenya, where voters are influenced by local-regional politics of tribal structures ruled by elders and chiefs, irrespective of the legal requirements of the national Government of Kenya. These regional politics would have an adverse effect on gender equality in the region. However, since Kenya is a multiparty democracy, voters who do not agree with the tribal system have the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice during the national elections (Kivuva, 2018:54).

On 9 March 2018, Kenya was pleasantly surprised when the political opponents shook hands and revealed the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) to unite the country and address the gaps in the 2010 Constitution. However, it has become the source of political tension in view of the next election in August 2022. On 21 October 2020, the BBI report was handed over to the drivers of the initiative. The BBI report of inclusivity recommended a referendum before June 2021 to transform the 2010 Constitution, to change the government system, and to address discrimination in public appointments, including the appointment of women (Mkwale, 2020:10; Kisia, 2020a:4; Ogila, 2020:1). BBI could be perceived as a move in the direction of issue-based politics instead of ethnic politics. According to Biegon (2018:15), issue-based politics focus on values, principles, politics and issues of the day, rather than on personalities and ethnic identities. In Kenya the emphasis of issue-based politics is on basic needs, infrastructure development, unemployment, corruption and gender inequality to mention a few. Section 3.6 discusses the importance of the BBI report on gender equality in Kenya. The next section discusses religious diversity and the socio-cultural implications for gender in Kenya.

3.2.3 Religion and its societal implications

Kenya is perceived as a Christian country as Christianity is practised by 85.5 per cent of the population. Muslims represent 11 per cent of the population, while other religions, including Hinduism and African traditional religions, represent 3.5 per cent of the population (KNBS IV, 2019:12). Attoh (2017:159) emphasizes that the Christian religion, gender and patriarchy are interwoven social constructs and that religion sustains patriarchy. One of the consequences of this interaction is that religion embeds male domination in society, which influences the relationship between men and women, with an adverse effect on human and gender rights. The KNAPII (2020:10) highlighted cultural and religious factors as an emerging security threat for women in Kenya because of the patriarchal nature of the Kenyan society. The effect of religion in support of patriarchy in Kenya is also in line with a study conducted by Hudson and Leidl, referenced by Nossel (2016:164). This study found that sexism and patriarchy were so deeply embedded in some societies that it makes gender mainstreaming difficult for local activists or leaders and they struggle to achieve lasting gains (Nossel, 2016:164). There is also a positive correlation between religion and ethnicity and women's chances of being employed. Protestant and atheist women are more likely to be employed than Catholic and Muslim women in Kenya (USAID, 2020a:20). The next section provides a historic overview of the constitutional processes in the Government of Kenya and how each constitution influenced gender transformation in the civil service.

3.3 A historic overview of the constitutional processes in the Government of Kenya

This section provides an overview of the Independence Constitution, the Repealed Constitution and the new 2010 Constitution of the Government of Kenya and the provision that was made for gender in each of the constitutions.

3.3.1 The Independence Constitution of Kenya

Following independence from its former colonial power in 1963, Kenya's first constitution was adopted in the same year. The Independence Constitution made provision for a Bill of Rights, a Westminster-style government headed by a prime minister and a multiparty system (Glinz, 2010:2). Already in 1964, this constitution was amended to create the Office of the President, who became both the head of state and the government, while the position of prime minister was withdrawn. This amendment guaranteed the centralization of powers and the maintenance of strong state structures (Glinz, 2010:2). This constitution was drafted without consultation with or contributions from the people, especially not the women of Kenya. Consequently, during

the first general election held in May 1963, women were not allowed to be party officials, nor to contend for seats in parliament. The first election exposed the challenges women faced with respect to inclusion in political party structures, a theme that would remain over the years. The Independence Constitution “systematically marginalized and actively suppressed women” in all areas of life in Kenya (Owuor, 2016:14). It was altered in 1966 to invest all emergency powers in the president and again in 1968 when the power to elect the president was moved from the NA to the voters (Owuor, 2016:15). In 1969, the alterations were incorporated in the Repealed Constitution. The Independence Constitution and the Repealed Constitution’s Bills of Rights were catastrophic for women. Section 70 in Chapter 5 of the Repealed Constitution stipulates that: “every person in Kenya is entitled to fundamental rights and freedoms... colour creed or sex” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 1969:77) while Section 82(3) of the same chapter makes provision for protection against discrimination based on colour or creed only. Discrimination on the basis sex was omitted from Section 82(3) (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 1969:89). Owuor (2016:16) believes that together with other subsections, a barrier was formed to prevent equality for women under the law in Kenya. The rights of women were not protected in the Repealed Constitution and it made no provision for affirmative action to ensure gender equality (Owuor, 2016:17; Glinz, 2010:5).

It became clear that the newly independent Government of Kenya had failed to institute a democratic government and the rule of law where people elect their leaders, enjoy political rights and freedom of expression as prescribed by the Independence Constitution. This resulted in Kenya being transformed into a single party, non-democratic state in 1980 where people had no political rights in decision-making and no freedom of expression. A provision in the then prevailing constitution was added that banned new political parties (Glinz, 2010:2). Under increasing pressure from the public, the ban on political parties was lifted in 1991, and in 1992, multiparty political rule returned. Requests for a constitutional review started in 1996 to ensure credible elections. Despite few amendments in 1997 and extensive amendments in 1998, a formal constitutional review process was started in 2000. In 2005, the parliament passed the draft constitution, but the Kenyan voters rejected it in the same year in a referendum. An analysis of the no-vote draft constitution revealed that excessive powers were allocated to the executive branch (President Kibaki – yes-vote) while the voters preferred a political system with devolved powers and a prime minister (which would have been Raila Odinga and the reason for the no-vote) as the head of the government (Simenyi, 2008:3).

The December 2007 post-election violence (after Odinga from the Luhya tribe lost the election against Kibaki from the Kikuyu tribe) due to election rigging left more than 1000 people dead and 350 000 displaced (Cooke, 2009:1). The violence was directed at Kikuyu members, but retaliation killings of non-Kikuyus started. After quick intervention from the international

community, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act was ratified after a power-sharing deal between the opposition parties in February 2008. One of the obligations of the Accord was the drafting of a new constitution and after a yes-vote in the referendum on 4 August 2010. The current 2010 Constitution was enacted on 27 August 2010, replacing the Independent (1963) and the Repealed Constitution of 1969 (Cooke, 2009:1, Glinz, 2010:3). The Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), as the primary women's rights society in Kenya, actively participated in drafting the new constitution and managed to constitutionalize women's rights as part of the Bill of Rights. FIDA further played a key role in educating civil society about the new constitution before the constitutional referendum and endorsement on 4 August 2010 (Maingi, 2011:69).

The people of Kenya struggled due to the injustices of discrimination, corruption, nepotism, exclusion and ethnic rivalries tolerated by the Independence and Repealed Constitutions. The inclusion of the people of Kenya in the process of drafting the new Constitution resulted in a comprehensive Bill of Rights, the inclusion of equal gender opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social areas as well as a two-layered democratic government (Glinz, 2010:4). The legal framework in Kenya, as a requirement of the 2010 Constitution, laid a sound foundation for gender equality in government and politics. The gains made for women in the 2010 Constitution are reviewed in the next section.

3.3.2 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya established a two-layered government – the national government and the 47 county governments – as displayed in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4: Organs of the Government of Kenya

Source: Constitution of the Government of Kenya (2010:14)

The Government of Kenya therefore consists of the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, as well as the 47 devolved county governments. The legislature (parliament) consists of two houses: the national assembly (NA) and the Senate (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:14). The NA represents the constituencies and determines the national revenue allocation, together with overseeing the expenditure by the national government. It further acts as administrator and exercises oversight of state organs and check-control of the executive (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:59). According to Nyamwange and Amutabi (2016:205), the NA as the more important and powerful decision-making organ has to be transformed to ensure gender empowerment and equality. The Senate represents the 47 county governments (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:60). Section 3.4.1 provides a complete description of the requirements for the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” in the two houses and the county governments.

The struggle for and by the women in Kenya did not take place in isolation, but was shaped by international action. The UN and the world conferences on women played an important role.

The pressure from the UN on regional bodies and national governments, including the Government of Kenya, to mainstream gender equality is discussed next.

3.3.2.1 The 2010 Constitution: International influences and standards

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya makes provision in Article 2 (5 & 6) that “general rules of international law” or “any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:14). The Government of Kenya accommodated the vision of international agreements and conventions, that the participation of women in political decision making when represented in large enough numbers, will allow them the opportunity to influence and development policies. The UN by means of four world conferences on women and “The Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” (CEDAW) set in motion global gender movements; greater protection for women; and women’s inclusion into national governments and international policy-making structures.

Already in 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the CSW to provide recommendations to the council on how to empower women, to promote gender equality, and to highlight the barriers to women’s development (UNGA, 1979:1). CSW arranged four world women’s conferences. The first of these world conferences took place in 1975 in Mexico City, with influential outcomes. The “First World Plan for Action” was adopted with its appeal to governments to develop approaches that would eliminate gender discrimination and promote gender equality in peace and development. A direct outcome of the first conference was the adoption of the “The Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” (CEDAW) in 1979 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (UNGA, 1979:1). In Article 3, the convention demanded that all state parties had to take “all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women” and Article 7 requested States to take “all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country” (UNGA, 1979:2;3).

The second world conference took place in Copenhagen in 1980 and the conference recommended that special actions be taken to improve adequate healthcare, and to increase employment and education opportunities for women. The third conference was held in Nairobi in 1985 and identified three sectors for improvement. This includes equality in social participation, political participation and decision making (UN-NGLS, 2009:1). However, it was only during “The Fourth World Conference on Women” in 1995 that a standard was set for “large enough numbers” to form a critical mass needed for transformation. Paragraph 182 of the Beijing Declaration includes a specific target of reaching 30 per cent of women’s active

participation in all types of decision making in democracies (Beijing Declaration and platform for Action, 1995a:79). Kenya was among the 189 countries that endorsed the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action to achieve gender equality by 2030 (UNDP, 2002:5).

UN Women worked in conjunction with the AU to ensure that the strategic objectives outlined by the Beijing Platform for Action were adopted and that programmes for the transformation and empowerment of women in Africa were institutionalized (AU, 2003:2). As African governments committed to promoting the international requirements for gender equality, the AU developed various frameworks, policies and programmes at the continental, regional and sub-regional levels to guide national governments with the process. The “Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (also known as the Maputo Protocol) was developed and signed on 11 July 2003 to guarantee comprehensive rights for women (AU, 2003:3). Article 9 of the Maputo Protocol specifically addresses women’s rights to participate in political and decision-making processes without being discriminated against and to promote equal representation of women and men in all electoral processes and as equal partners in the development and implementation of state policies and development programmes (AU, 2003:11). The Maputo Protocol has similar provisions than CEDAW but took a more Africanised approach and its definition of women includes girls. Women are defined as “person of female gender, including girls” (ACPF, 2020:16).

In 2004, the heads of state and government of member states of the AU, of which Kenya is part, reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of gender equality by agreeing to the “Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa” (SDGEA). The declaration calls for the sustained implementation of gender equality in the AU and at national level. This implied the ratification of the “Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa”, and the protection of women against violence and discrimination. The SDGEA reaffirms its commitment to UNSC Resolution 1325, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and Millennium Development Goal 3 (AHCHPR, 2004:10).

After the evaluation of UN Millennium Development Goal 3, the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women in 2015, it was clear that gender inequality persists. In Africa, the regions display significant differences in female representation in national governments. East Africa took the lead with the highest representation of women in parliament, followed by Southern, Central, West, and North Africa (UNMDG, 2015:23). A visual distribution of the representation in 2014 can be seen in Figure 3.5. An analysis presented in The Global Gender Gap Report of 2020 revealed that sub-Saharan Africa has closed 68.2 per cent of the gender

gap in general. At such a pace, it would take approximately 95 years to reach gender equality. Kenya is placed 109th out of 153 countries in 2019 (WEF, 2019:6, 9).




Figure 3.5: Percentage of women in national parliaments per African region

Source: UNMDG (2015:23)

As seen in Figure 3.5, East Africa is leading on the continent with women in national governments. Women constitute about 60 per cent of the population of the EAC. The EAC states have taken various steps to address the imbalances between men and women. In 2016 the EAC Gender Equality, Equity and Development Bill was passed (EAC, 2017b:1) and on 17 September 2018, the EAC launched their gender policy (EAC, 2018b:1). Table 3.1 illustrates the progress made in the seven countries in the EAC.

Table 3.1: Female representation in East African parliaments

EAC Rank	Country	Lower or single House			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% Female
1	Rwanda	2018	80	49	61.3 per cent
2	Ethiopia	2015	547	212	38.8 per cent
3	Burundi	2020	123	50	38.21 per cent
4	United Republic of Tanzania	2020	393	145	37 per cent
5	Uganda	2016	459	160	34.9 per cent
6	South Sudan	2016	400	113	28.46 per cent
7	Kenya)	2017	416	96	23 per cent

Sources: IPU (2020:1); NDI & FIDA (2018:30); WEF (2019:13)

Table 3.1 displays female representation in national governments in the EAC. Rwanda has the highest female representation with 61.3 per cent in the lower house, while Kenya has the lowest of the seven states, with 23 per cent. South Sudan is the only other state in the EAC that does not meet the recommended international standard of 30 per cent female presentation in decision-making positions in government. Contrarily to female representation in parliaments in the EAC, Table 1.1 displayed that Kenya has medium human development in comparison to its neighbours who were ranked with low human development in 2018 (UNDP, 2018:1). In 2020 the African report on child wellbeing (ACPF, 2020:XXVi) scored Kenya 17th out of 52 African countries on the girls-friendliness index (GFI). It is a rating of fairly friendly towards girls. Mauritius (1st), Tunisia (2nd) and South Africa (3rd) scored the highest as friendliest towards girls. Rwanda scored 12th as friendly while Tanzania scored 32nd, Uganda 34th and Ethiopia 40th and ranked as less friendly.

It is the opinion of FIDA that the Government of Kenya adopted a firm international foundation as required by the 2010 Constitution for the promotion of women's rights (FIDA, 2013:12). However, as displayed in Table 3.1, Kenya did not meet the required international standard of

30 per cent by 2020. Despite not meeting the required standard, the next section focuses on the Government of Kenya's pursuit of gender equality to improve the female presentation in the national Government of Kenya.

3.4 The pursuit of gender equality and the “two-thirds gender principle”

The preamble of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya recognizes a government built on the fundamental principles of “human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:12). Article 10 (2b) further binds all state organs, officers and public officials to the national values and principles of governance, which include human dignity, equity, inclusiveness, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:15). These provisions aim to improve women's civil and political rights. A detailed discussion of the constitutional provisions follows below, also referred to as the women's gains in the 2010 Constitution.

3.4.1 The “two-thirds principle of gender representation”

The first of these gains for women is the “two-thirds principle of gender representation” and is for sure one of the most important improvements of the 2010 Constitution. This principle has been repeated in both the Bill of Rights and under the “general principles for the electoral system”. Chapter 4 of the 2010 Constitution, The Bill of Rights (please refer to Attachment C), part two, Article 27(8) addresses equality and freedom from discrimination (Clause 4) and clause 8 of the same article requires that the Government of Kenya “shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle of not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:25). Clause 8 refers to Article 81(b) of the Constitution (please refer to Attachment D), which requires that the electoral system shall comply with the “two-thirds gender principle”. This principle stated: “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:51).

The full implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” has only realized at county government level (2013 and 2017 elections), but neither in the NA nor the Senate. The 2010 Constitution dictates that the threshold of 33 per cent per gender should be upheld in county governments (please refer to Attachment E). If the threshold is not reached in the election, the county must nominate members of the minority gender to meet the requirements of the Constitution of Kenya (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:108). However, although the 2010 Constitution provides for the “two-third gender principle” of representation,

it failed to provide clear terms of implementation at the national government level. In 2012 the Supreme Court of Kenya stipulated that the realization of “the two-third gender principle” should be enforced progressively (FIDA, 2013:14; Mwita, 2017:44).

The 2010 Constitution provided a five-year deadline for the enactment of laws to implement the prescription of the Constitution. Therefore, the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” should have been completed before 27 August 2015. The timeline for the implementation of the “two-third gender principle” was extended by one year to 27 August 2016. By the expiry date, the NA still failed to reach the quotas as set in the Amendment Bill No 4 to 2010 Constitution (Waitere, 2016:1; Muchiri, 2016:1). Five attempts by the 11th and 12th parliaments failed because of a lack of a quorum (Odunga, 2017:3; Bosco, 2019:1).

However, the 2010 Constitution makes provision for different methods to reach the “two-thirds gender principle”. Article 27 of the Constitution makes provision that each person in Kenya should equally benefit of the law, and in Clause 8 it states that the “State shall take legislative and other measures” to implement the “two-thirds gender principle” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:25). These “other measures” mean that in the absence of legislation, political parties are bound by the Constitution to implement this objective. Statistics from the 2017 elections showed that of the total number of registered voters, 47 per cent were female versus 53 per cent male. The total number of youths between 18 and 35 years represented 51 per cent of the total number of registered voters (IEBC, 2020:3). It would therefore be expected that these statistics should be reflected in the political structure of Kenya. Table 3.2 in Section 3.5 reflects on the gender representation in the national government after the 2017 elections.

3.4.2 Kenya’s electoral system

Kenya makes use of a combination of two mechanisms in their electoral system, namely the first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems. The FPTP is internationally the most frequently used but is criticized for a “winner-takes-all” approach and is perceived as unfriendly towards women (Catalyst, 2018:1). In Kenya, a society that is disinterested in the promotion of female representation in competitive and active politics, the FPTP electoral system further aggravates women candidates, as it does not address the injustices or disadvantages amassed in the past (FIDA, 2013:9). This system produces an overly confrontational political contest that is prone to violence and used by men who hire gangs and run night-time campaigns (see Section 6.5 for a discussion of social unrest). Political contests require huge capital outlay, and in the patriarchal culture of Kenya, it is still more favourable to men irrespective of ethnic, religious or class divides (see Section 6.10 for

a discussion of the influence of female political leadership). Women's participation in the male-led political parties with strong ethno-regional representations, has been confined to accommodating power and voting, not representation (Akech, unknown:1)

The second mechanism of the electoral system, the PR, is used to elect an assembly or a council. A PR system makes provision for proportionate representation of seats won by a political party versus the number of votes received. Kenya uses a closed party list system developed by the leadership of each political party to be handed over to the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC). No amendments are allowed to the lists after submission. Article 88 of the Constitution established the IEBC. However, the fair representation provided for by the PR system does not achieve that purpose in Kenya because the "allocation of the nominated seats is based on the number of elective seats won by the political parties" and not by the number of votes received. Therefore, this type of PR system is biased in favour of larger political parties. Smaller parties, which tend to engage more women in politics, are not allowed the opportunity to nominate many members. Secondly, the nomination of candidates on the lists is subjected to manipulation by the party owner and leadership (FIDA, 2013:9).

In an assessment of the electoral system, FIDA (2013:10) observed that the current electoral system could be conducive to sustainable women's representation. This assessment was strengthened by the judgement on petition 19 of 2017. The judgement concluded that political parties have an obligation to promote gender equality even during the nomination process. Political parties are bound by provisions 10, 19, 20, 27, 56, 81(b) and 91 (1) of the Constitution. This includes that the nomination process for the 290 elective positions for the NA and the 47 elective positions for the Senate must adhere to the "two-thirds gender principle" (Mwita, 2017:25).

Political parties are funded by the public, and therefore classified as public bodies. Article 88 (4)(d) provides that the IEBC is responsible for the "regulation of the process by which parties nominate their candidates for elections" (Mwita, 2017:30) and should take deliberate steps to ensure that political parties comply with the "two-thirds gender principle" (Mwita, 2017:37). The judgement on the petition on 19 March of 2017 concluded that the Constitution obligates the IEBC to reject all party lists for candidates for the 290 NA positions and the 47 county positions for the members of the Senate (parliament) that do not comply with the "two-thirds gender principle". On 20 April 2017 a court order was issued to political parties to implement the "two-thirds gender principle" during the nomination process for parliament within six months from the date of judgement (Mwita, 2017:44). This judgement applies to the next election in 2022.

3.4.3 Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution: Affirmative action

Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution furthermore makes provision for “equality and freedom from discrimination”. It protects against discrimination and inclusion for women in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. This article makes provision for affirmative action programmes and policies with the aim of redressing the discriminatory factors experienced by individuals or groups in the past (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:24). Article 21(3), additional to Article 27, makes provision for the “implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms” for vulnerable groups, including women (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:20), while Article 54 focusses on the rights of persons with disabilities, including women with disabilities (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:36). Article 56 demands that affirmative action programmes be designed for marginalized and minority groups to be included in governance and all spheres of life (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:38).

The 2010 Constitution by means of Articles 97 (NA) and 98 (Senate) makes provision for affirmative action seats for women. The NA consists of 290 members of which the voters in the counties must elect 47 women representatives. For the Senate, which consists of 47 members, political parties shall nominate 16 women members. The article further demands that of the four members representing persons with disabilities and the youth, two must be women (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:61). The Constitution in Article 100 is clear that parliament should enact legislation to promote women, youth and other marginalized groups in parliament. Article 100 is vital for the realization of the “two-thirds gender principle” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:61).

The introduction of the devolved government system in Kenya brought hope that women’s participation in county leadership would address the existing patriarchal environment of leadership. Women’s participation in county governments would allow for a more inclusive leadership, with the result of the formulation of gender-sensitive legislation and policies (Minayo, 2012:22). The Constitution set out principles in Article 175 for governing county governments. Article 175(c) reiterates that the “two-thirds gender principle” should be applied (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:108). The Constitution also makes provision for the values and principles of public service in general and by means of Article 232, includes equal advancement for both men and women from minority groups in all state organs in both levels of government (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:140).

3.4.3.1 Legislation in support of Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution

The Government of Kenya developed essential acts in support of Articles 27(8), 81(b) and 100 to address the “two-thirds gender principle”. First, the Elections Act, 24 of 2011, is directly linked to Article 81 (b). The purpose of the Elections Act was to provide for the conduct of all elections, referenda and for election dispute resolutions (Elections Act, 2011:6). An assessment of the incorporation of the “two-thirds gender principle” proved that only the mandatory gender equality provisions were included without providing clarity on implementation via the PR mechanism. The Act failed to make provision for the principal voter register to be gender-disaggregated, which would have facilitated the monitoring of the under-registration of women voters (FIDA, 2013:18)

The Elections Act includes an Electoral Code of Conduct that binds the government, political parties and candidates, as well as their officials and agents to “to promote free and fair elections in a climate of tolerance in which political activity may take place without fear, coercion, intimidation or reprisals” (Elections Act, 2011:70). Sections 5(f) specifically encourages the promotion of gender equality, while Section 6(j) clearly condemns discrimination based on sex, pregnancy or marital status during elections (Elections Act, 2011:70, 72). The inclusion of these provisions should encourage a friendlier political environment for women in Kenya. Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Code of Conduct provide pathways to address any infringements. It can be addressed by either the IEBC or the High Court on request of the IEBC (Elections Act, 2011:74, 75).

In support of the Elections Act, the 2010 Constitution in Part 3, Articles 91 and 92, specifies the basic requirements and legislation for political parties. As a result, the Political Parties Act, 11 of 2011, came into effect on 1 November 2011 and makes provision for the registration, regulation and funding of political parties. The Act includes women under “special interest groups” (Political Parties Act, 2011:6) and is clear that political parties “shall promote inclusiveness, democracy and participation” when formulating policies and nominating candidates (Political Parties Act, 2011:6). Article 91(f) of the 2010 Constitution expects every political party “to respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and gender equality and equity” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:58). In case a political party does not meet the constitutional requirements as per Article 91, Section 4 of the Political Party Act states that the Registrar of Parties should not register such an association of persons as a political party (Political Parties Act, 2011:7). This implies that according to Section 7(d), political parties that do not apply the “two-thirds gender principle” cannot be register, and according to Section 25 (2b), is not entitled to funding from the Political Parties Fund (Political Parties Act, 2011:16). However, despite clear legal guidance, the IEBC as the controlling body

did not implement the Elections or the Political Party Acts in the general elections of 2013, nor 2017. After a petition in 2017 to force the IEBC to reject political party lists that do not meet the “two-thirds gender principle”, the court ordered that political parties have six months to comply – which provided for a gradual realization that the rule will apply to the next election in 2022. However, according to Article 261(5–7) of the Constitution, if both the Senate and NA do not meet the two-third threshold, upon a petition, “the Chief Justice shall advise the President to dissolve Parliament and the President shall dissolve Parliament” (Constitution, 2010:165).

On 21 September 2020, the chief justice and president of the Supreme Court just did that and advised the president to dissolve the parliament after receiving five petitions in 2019 and a sixth in 2020 (Maraga, 2020:10). But on 24 September 2020 the High Court used Article 165 (3) of the same Constitution, to suspend the advisory of the Chief Justice because it caused public anxiety and that a bench of three judges must interrogate the chief justice’s decision exhaustively. It must be noted that the president is not bound by a timeline to dissolve parliament, but once he decided to do so, bi-elections should be held within 90 days (Insight, 2020:4). Thiankolu (2020:1) explains the impact of the advisory as follows: Firstly, should the president refuse to dissolve parliament, he will be in breach of the 2010 Constitution and complicit with parliament. Secondly, parliament does not have the legal mandate to approve or oversee matters and lastly, the validity of any transactions executed by parliament between the dates of the advisory and the date of dissolution could be challenged in court and be nullified.

Irrespective of non-adherence to Articles 81(b), parliament passed various other laws to guarantee the “implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms” for women as required by Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution. These laws, as listed underneath, make provision for equality in access to education; access to economic opportunities, equality in marriage; equal parental responsibility; the physical protection of women, the protection of matrimonial property and women’s rights to inheritance and land ownership. These acts are:

- “The Counter-trafficking in Person Act, 8 of 2010, revised in 2012;
- National Gender and Equality Commission Act, 15 of 2011;
- Citizen and Immigration Act, 12 of 2011;
- The Prohibition of FGM Act, 32 of 2011, revised in 2012;
- Micro and Small Enterprises Act, 55 of 2012;
- Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 20 of 2012, Revised Edition (2014);
- Matrimonial Property Act, 49 of 2013;

- Marriage Act, 4 of 2014;
- Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, 21 of 2015;
- The Land Act and Land Registration Act, 3 of 2012 and revised in 2016;
- Basic Education (Amendment) Act, 17 of 2017” (Lichuma, 2017:2–3);
- Proposed Reproduction Healthcare Bill, Senate Bill, 23 of 2019 (withdrew on request of civil society organizations for further discussion).

Traditional customary practices in Kenya ignored the right of women to access land. Women could only access land through their husbands and youths through their fathers. Article 60 (1f) of the 2010 Constitution (Go, 2010:42) addressed the “elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs and practices related to land and property in land”. Three new land laws created statutory rights and gender equality for women or spouses to access land. The Land Registration Act, 3 of 2012; the Land Act, 6 of 2012 and the National Land Commission Act of 2012 outlined measures to protect the rights of women or spouses. These measures made provision for spousal registration of land rights; secure inheritance rights of unmarried daughters; and public awareness campaigns to influence female inheritance and to secure the rights of spouses to matrimonial property. The legislative framework for land addresses the discrimination against women in Kenya extensively, but implementation is still limited due to the persistence of cultural practices and social norms (Kimeu & Maneno, 2017:14).

3.4.3.2 Security-related legislation

In addition to the gains women made under the 2010 Constitution, security-related legislation before the 2010 Constitution attempted to create a secure environment for non-violent elections. Sexual and GBV is a constant violation in Kenya, but with heightened occurrence during election periods (Ambani, 2016:144). A survey conducted by UNICEF in 2014 confirmed that 66 per cent of women aged 18 to 24 in Kenya had reported physical violence before the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2014:85). Odhiambo (2017:12) quotes the Kenya Cabinet Secretary for Public Service Youth and Gender Affairs and notes that the state of gender violence in Kenya is “shocking” with 47 per cent of women between the ages of 15 and 49 having experienced some form of violence. The most common forms of violence in Kenya are physical, sexual and emotional violence. More shocking is the fact that women between the ages 15 and 24 accept or believe that men have the right to physically abuse women (UNICEF, 2014:85).

In the context of elections, SGBV is used as a weapon for ethnic intimidation and gender oppression and it has been repeating itself in electoral contests since the adoption of multiparty

politics in 1991. It is used as a tool to enforce power structures and highlight inequalities due to political practices built on belief systems and cultural norms (Ambani, 2016:144). The Sexual Offences Act of 2006 was adopted to mitigate SGBV and it makes provision for the prevention and protection of all persons from unlawful sexual acts (Sexual Offences Act, 2006:5⁶). Only strict application of this Act will improve the level of safety women are guaranteed from SGBV during elections. The widespread post-election violence after the 2007 presidential elections demonstrated the government's inability to apply the Sexual Offences Act. Women and children were the targets of attacks and could not find safety in their own homes, in schools, police stations or other public places of safety. Although most of the offenders were non-state actors, members of the police and other security forces responsible for the protection of civilians, were co-offenders (Open Society Foundation, 2017:1).

Before and after the elections in 2013 and again in 2017, GBV was again used as a tool to discourage women from running for leadership positions. Female aspirants faced multiple forms of resistance, like sexual harassment, threats, intimidations and ridicule. Two hundred and one (most were women and girls) cases of sexual abuse were reported in 11 counties where observers had been deployed during the 2017 election. The actual number might be much higher. The election report by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) indicated that only 22 per cent of the survivors reported the cases to the police and only 19.8 per cent sought medical treatment. Of much concern is that the profile of the perpetrators. Civilian to civilian sexual violence represented 45.5 per cent of the cases, while police-to-civilian sexual violence represented 54.6 per cent. Inconsistencies in the legal system were also identified as the definition of sexual violence in the Election Offences Act differs from that in the Sexual Offence Act (OHCHR, 2019:i). Despite a comprehensive Bill of Rights in the 2010 Constitution and Kenya being a signatory to international and regional human rights and women's treaties, the Government of Kenya is failing in its responsibility. National policies on GBV and health have not been adopted into laws in the country governments and this has resulted in insufficient protection measures and resource allocations (UN OHCHR, 2019:6, 11).

Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4 illustrates the correlation between education and GBV. Since the enactment of the Police Service Act in 2011, the focus moved to community policing and the establishment of GBV desks at police stations. The initiative was rolled out at some of the police stations, but since it was introduced in 2014, it has not been active. Due to a rising number in GBV cases in 2020, a fresh attempt was launched by the police service to reactivate gender desks at police stations across the country. The gender desk should be manned by

⁶ In Kenya the legal age of consent is 18 years of age.

trained police officers, specifically when dealing with gender and child cases (Baya, 2020:1). It was reported that in October 2020, at least 3 000 health care workers and 1 500 police officers still needed orientation on GBV and FGM (UNOCHA, 2020:1).

The county governments of Kwale, Kilifi and Mombasa set up six tele-counsellor centres to support county GBV hotlines (UNOCHA, 2020:1). Five shelters for GBV (four in Nairobi and one in Mombasa) were opened and are operational. Due to a shortage of government counselling centres, NGOs have stepped in to fill the vacuum. Various support resources for victims and situations have been established because rape, abuse, and the violation of women and children's rights have become rampant in Kenya. Not only do victims fail to get justice, but they also lack the emotional, moral and financial support to help them to recover lack (Winston, 2017:1). In 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, GBV increased and as a result, teenage pregnancies were also highlighted. A web-based Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SHR) online portal was activated by New Faces, New Voices Kenya (a group of lawyers and counsellors) to confront GBV, teenage pregnancies and maternal mortality. A WhatsApp platform was also launched for victims to confidently contact counsellors and lawyers for support and guidance. Mums Village Kenya, an NGO, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, trained medical personnel in all 47 the counties on the Covid-19 virus via their Imara TV Channel (Kariuki, 2020:1).

GBV could be explained from various angles of analysis – from a social perspective at the level of the dyad, family, peer group, school, religion, or media, or from a state perspective that encourages male violence and maintains women as a vulnerable class of potential victims. It can also be viewed from a feminist perspective, stressing that the gendered nature of violence against women has its roots in a patriarchal social system. However, the role that individual and biological causal factors on each of the levels play, cannot be ignored (NRC, 1996:51). From a social learning perspective, GBV is explained as borne from the view that the consequences deliver a positive result. The perpetrator releases tension, feels better, achieves its purpose by stopping arguments, but most importantly, the act is seldom accompanied by serious punishment. If it is explained from an institutional level (family, school, and religion), the family where all socialization begins (also violent behaviour), affects intimate partner violence if the offender experience neglect, physical abuse, and separation or was exposed to parental violence. Boys from violent parents tend to abuse their intimate partners. Correspondently, patriarchal socio-cultural norms have a bigger effect on men to become offenders of GBV than men raised in more gender-equal homes (NRC, 1996:61). Feminists explain GBV as an option of control over the spouse. Culturally sanctioned beliefs historically legitimized gender violence to exercise control over a spouse. The opposite may also be true, that men convert to violence based on feelings of powerlessness and inability to accept reality

or rejection (NRC, 1996:58). The cycle of GBV is a point of concern in a strong patriarchal society like Kenya.

The Counter-trafficking in Person Act, 8 of 2010, (revised in 2012) criminalized all forms of human trafficking and makes provision for victim care. Women and teenage girls are more exposed to human trafficking due to their gender. This is compounded by the intersections of poverty and lack of education. Victim care differs in standard, and the government mainly relies on NGOs to manage safe houses and shelters. Two national hotlines are operational 24 hours daily all year round. Government agencies responsible for trafficking are underfunded and understaffed. The Government of Kenya improved cooperation with foreign governments, international organizations and NGOs on law enforcement efforts to arrest and assist with criminal proceedings in this global crime. In 2019 the Government of Kenya identified 853 victims, of whom 275 were adult women, 351 were girls and 227 were boys. It was also reported that girls were transported to Somalia for sex trafficking. Together with NGOs and civil organizations, anti-human traffic awareness about child sex trafficking, labour trafficking and migrant workers' rights are promoted at high-level events (US Department of State, 2020:1).

The legal framework noticeably makes provision for the inclusion of women in economic, social and political structures. This is supported by policies to guide decisions and to achieve realistic outcomes. The gender policy framework is explained in the next section.

3.4.4 Gender equality policy framework

The Government of Kenya has developed national policies relevant to gender equality and non-discrimination. This section looks at the policies accelerating progress and resisting discrimination of vulnerable groups.

3.4.4.1 Vision 2030

The first of the policies addressing gender inequality is Vision 2030. It is a long-term development policy for the country to create a “globally competitive and prosperous nation with high quality of life by 2030 that transforms Kenya into a new industrial, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment.” The vision is built on the pillars of the economy, the social environment and politics as enablers, and is divided into successive five-year plans (Vision 2030, 2007:1).

Vision 2030 addresses gender mainstreaming under the social pillar and includes gender-sensitive programmes, policies and plans to ensure that the needs of women are addressed.

Gender mainstreaming interventions include the promotion of the gender mainstreaming agenda in all the counties; enactment of a national affirmative action policy; the development and implementation of the national gender policy; establishment of a Gender Research and Documentation Centre; collection of gender-disaggregated data and public campaigns against FGM (Vision 2030, 2007:1). The social pillar of Vision 2030 also includes special provisions for Kenyans with disabilities and people from previously marginalized communities.

Vision 2030 includes programmes to support women's empowerment, persons with disabilities and the youth with economic empowerment. The 2018 World Bank country economic update reveals that the percentage of Kenyans living under the international poverty line of USD 1.90 per day has dropped from 43.6 per cent in 2005/6 to 35.6 per cent in 2015/16. With a poverty reduction rate of 1 per cent per year, Kenya cannot eradicate poverty as planned by 2030 (World Bank, 2018:1). The Covid-19 pandemic will increase poverty, inequality and unemployment, with devastating effects on female-headed households, which constitutes 30.2 per cent of the poor population (UNDPa, 2020:11).

The World Bank highlighted in 2007 that gender inequality in Kenya has serious economic implications. Addressing gender equality will contribute to improved outcomes for women, their families and the country as a whole (Nalo, 2007:xxi). As a result, the Government of Kenya has rolled out various programmes and established financial support funds to assist women to overcome dependency and poverty. These agencies are administered under the State Department for Gender, discussed in Section 3.4.5. The National Government Affirmative Action Fund (NGAAF) was established under the social pillar of Vision 2030 to complement the Government of Kenya's dedication to addressing the disadvantages experienced by women, youth, vulnerable people and persons with disabilities. The fund was established under the Public Finance Management Act of 2012 and the Public Finance Management (National Government Affirmative Action Development Fund) Regulations 2016. The objectives of the fund are first to improve financial facilities for women and to improve the social empowerment of the target group. Secondly, it should be used to render services to survivors of any form of GBV, as well as for the establishment of rehabilitation and counselling centres for drug and substance abuse. Lastly, the Fund should be used for civic education informing the community about the existence of affirmative action and gender mainstreaming support programmes (NGAAF, 2016:141).

3.4.4.2 The National Policy on Gender and Development

The National Policy on Gender and Development serves as the foundation for the government to reduce gender imbalances by guiding different sectors and agencies. The policy laid the

framework for sectoral policies, practices and programmes on gender mainstreaming, GBV and GRB(GBR). This policy is a revision of the National Gender Policy and includes procedures to strengthen the link between the national and the county governments to shape gender interventions at county level through County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs). The policy is administered by the State Department for Gender, which is discussed under the institutional framework in Section 3.3.5 (Ministry of Public Service and Gender, 2019:1). The Government of Kenya has formulated GRB guidelines and a gender mainstreaming guidance note for CIDPs, but it was not approved by parliament and therefore not enforceable. As far as GRB is concerned, it reached a low awareness level with little success for a gender budget-making process. In 2018, 13 counties did not have a budget for gender matters and most counties allocated between five to seven per cent of the county budget to gender activities (USAIDa, 2020:24). The need for a transformative leadership style with a focus on equitable outcomes instead of maintaining the status quo was expressed. The lack of sex-disaggregated data at the county level further restrains gender interventions or tracking gender progress as it affects women and marginalized vulnerable groups (USAIDa, 2020:25). The effectiveness of the National Policy on Gender and Development's sectoral policy implementation is evaluated next.

3.4.4.2.1 Education sector

In the educational sector, several policies have been adopted to increase access to education for girls. These include low-cost boarding schools and mobile schools in arid and semi-arid lands; free primary education, free secondary day education; re-entry of girls who drop out of school because of pregnancies; affirmative action in the allocation of bursaries; admission of girls to universities and the appointment of qualified female education managers at schools and at the administrative levels (USAIDa, 2020:18).

An evaluation by UNESCO in 2017 (UNESCO, 2017:1) on the success of mainstreaming gender equality through the education system in Kenya delivered mixed results. The delivery of sexual and health education is still a disputed issue and parts are taught as a module under life skills. However, teenagers felt it was insufficient (UNESCO, 2017:1). Teacher preconceptions resulting in limited preparation, together with poor multi-sector coordination constrain sexual and health education (USAIDa, 2020:35). An evaluation of the comprehensive sexual orientation in the school curriculum provided evidence of gaps in content and delivery. Seventy-five per cent of teachers reported teaching all the topics of the comprehensive sexuality programme, while only two per cent of the students responded by saying that they received all the lessons. Delivery of information on the use of contraceptives varied and 71 per

cent of teachers accentuated abstinence as the best or only method of prevention – for both pregnancies and transmitted diseases (UNESCO, 2017:1).

3.4.4.2.2 Youth unemployment sector

The level of unemployment among the youth in Kenya forced the Government of Kenya to develop the National Youth Policy in 2006. One of the objectives of the youth policy is to identify the challenges and mainstream youth issues as part of national development. The policy endorses gender equity and equality to eliminating gender discrimination and violence (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2006:4). The Ministry of Youth Affairs defines youth as being between the ages of 15 to 30. Women account for 50.5 per cent of the population (KNBS, 2019:1).




Figure 3.6: Youth unemployment rate Q2 2020

Source: Gitogo (2020:1)

Figure 3.6 demonstrates that more than 50 per cent of the youth was unemployed in quarter 2 of 2020. The unemployment rate for the age group 20 to 24 rose with 10.1 per cent and for the age group 25 to 29 with 14.3 per cent from the first to the second quarter of 2020. The combined unemployment rate for the population has risen from 14.3 per cent in quarter 1 to 22.6 per cent in quarter 2 of 2020. The sharp rise in unemployment was due to the impact of Covid-19 (Gitogo, 2020:1).

In an effort to alleviate unemployment among the youth, the Government of Kenya delivered on their 2010 Constitution and Vision 2030 policy promises and developed a National Youth Empowerment Strategic Plan for 2016–2021. The Government of Kenya in 2018 already

launched large youth training and development programmes through the Kenya Youth Employment and Opportunities Programme (KEYOP). Youths are also able to access the Youth Development Fund and the funds set aside for women as mentioned in the discussion of Vision 2030. Youths, gender and persons with disabilities will likewise benefit by means of affirmative action from KEYOP. KEYOP provides that a minimum of 30 per cent of government's procurement through Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) should be made available to enterprises owned by youth, women and persons with disabilities (Kobia, 2018:1).

3.4.4.2.3 Security sector: Gender-based violence

The eradication of financial inequality between the genders will make women less dependent, therefore less vulnerable to gender or sexual violence. Guterres (2018:1) underscores that GBV and abuse of women is not only a big hurdle to inclusive and sustainable development, but is also the manifestation of a lack of respect. In the male-dominated society of today, the failure to recognize the equality of women is tied to issues of power and control, which are also a political issue with far-reaching consequences (Guterres, 2018:1). The Government of Kenya realized that SGBV is a result of uninformed cultural values of the society (NGEC, 2017:16). Sexual harassment incidents of pupil-to-pupil were 40 per cent higher in schools in the poorest communities (ACPF, 2020:XXI). Thus, the security sector developed the National Policy for Response to GBV in support of the Sexual Offences Act of 2006. The policy provides enforceable rules to prohibit SGBV, which disproportionately affects women and girls – more so during election periods. The purpose of the policy is to safeguard gender equality and the empowerment of women, to contribute to their social and economic development and to help them escape the iniquities that contributed to their unfavourable position. The policy emphasizes public disclosure of harassment to demonstrate to offenders that SGBV will not be tolerated or used as a tactic of intimidation during elections (NGEC, 2017:16).

Despite the comprehensive legislation and severe penalties for perpetrators, women and girls are still victims of serious violent crimes or even death. The liability of proof is very high and, in general, offenders are released on technicalities (Lichuma, 2017:5).

3.4.4.2.4 Health sector

A natural transition from SGBV would be to protect adolescent girls from unintended pregnancies. The Ministry of Health defines adolescents as persons between the ages of 10 and 19. The Adolescent and Reproduction Health and Development (ARHD) Policy was developed in 2003 and revised in 2015. One of the broad objectives of the policy is to “increase gender equity and equality in sexual and reproductive health amongst adolescents” (Ministry

of Health, 2015:17). The purpose of the policy is to “reduce sexual transmitted disease or infections”, to “reduce early and unintended pregnancies”, “reduce harmful traditional practices”, to “reduce sexual and GBV”, reduce “drug and substance abuse” and to “address sexual and reproductive health and rights and needs of marginalized and vulnerable adolescents” (Ministry of Health, 2015:18). Additionally, in the health sector, the Free Maternity Service Policy, the National Health Policy and the National Nutrition Action Plan were adopted to improve the access of women and girls to health services. The National Policy on Family Promotion and Protection was adopted to protect and include the family unit in development strategies (USAID, 2020a:180). In 2020 the Senate considered a revision of the proposed 2014 Reproductive Health Care Bill to address the multiple reproduction health care risks, amongst other things, unsafe abortions and unplanned pregnancies among women in Kenya. Kenya has an above average maternal mortality rate with 342 versus 210 deaths per 100 000. Each year between 5 000 to 7000 women die because of complications during pregnancy or related to childbirth. An estimate of 35 per cent or approximately 2 600 women and girls die of unsafe abortions. Teen pregnancies are at a prevalence of 18 per cent (one in five girls), which irreversibly affects their health and socio-economic status (Baswony, 2020:1). Conversely, due to controversiality and opposition from religious groups, politicians and civil society lobby groups, the bill was recalled from the Senate. It will be the already marginalized women and girls who will be affected negatively by poor sexual health and reproductive outcomes (Ajayi & Mwoka, 2020:1). Cultural beliefs were identified and discussed in Section 6.9 as the biggest barrier in implementing laws.

Dreams (Determined, Resilient, Empowered, Aids-free Mentored and Safe) is a public-private partnership programme that focusses on empowering young women and advancing gender equality in health, education and economy. Through partnerships with faith-based and non-governmental organizations, Dreams addresses structural inequalities to prevent the spread of HIV among the most vulnerable – teenage girls. Together with PEPFAR (US President’s Emergency Plan for Aids relief) a decline of 25–40 per cent in new infections was observed (USAIDb, 2020:1).

The national average for FGM in Kenya is approximately 21 per cent for the ages 15 to 49 and 12 per cent for the ages 15 to 19, despite the Prohibition of FGM Act, 32 of 2011, which was enacted in 2011 and revised in 2012. The region with the highest FMG is the north-eastern part of the country with 98 per cent. Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4 illustrates that this is a predominantly Muslim area of the country and also the area most targeted by radicalization and attacks by Al Shabaab. Most girls undergo FGM between the ages 10 and 14, making them eligible for early marriage (USAID, 2020a:39). The Government of Kenya has adopted a national policy for the eradication of FGM in 2019. The policy conforms to the Prohibition of

FGM Act, is anchored in Sustainable Development Goal 5 and contributes to SDG 3 and 4 “to promote education empowerment, eliminate early marriage and adolescence pregnancy, child labour, risk of GBV and HIV infection as well as eliminate poverty” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2019:2). It is the vision of the government, in conjunction with law enforcers, religious and traditional leaders, to eradicate FGM by 2022. There is a positive correlation between FGM, child marriage and teenage pregnancy. The practice is deeply rooted in socio-cultural norms, gender inequality, and poverty. FGM has a negative effect on agency and the empowerment of young women and girls with a comparable impact on their level of decision-making and economic independence. This practice mainly benefits the girl’s parents (early marriage) with adverse effects on her health and education (USAID, 2020a:40).

With the abovementioned programmes actively in place, the Government of Kenya reached a milestone in its efforts to elevate previously disadvantaged groups. The gender legal and policy frameworks fully recognize the gender equality in Kenya. However, the implementation requires a collective effort from government and civil society. As such the Government of Kenya founded commissions with the objective of promoting gender equality and to ensure freedom from discrimination. The next section discusses the institutions responsible for enforcing the “two-third gender principle” in elective bodies, as well as their mandates to promote gender equality.

3.4.5 Institutional Framework to Support Gender Equality

The Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs is the leading government department and was created in 2015 to promote gender equality and empower women, to manage the public service and to empower the youth. The Ministry revised the National Policy on Gender and Development to ensure the participation of women, persons with disabilities, youth and ethnic minorities and developed the National Equality Policy to guide the implementation of the constitutional equality requirements in all sectors (NDI & FIDA, 2018:19). The Ministry is divided into two state departments – the State Department of Gender Affairs and the State Department of Public Service and Youth Affairs (Ministry of Public Service, Youth and gender Affairs, 2015:1).

The State Department for Gender is responsible for the coordination and development of gender mainstreaming on a national level, supported by the gender-related policies. The department is responsible for the implementation of a gender management system in line with international and regional gender treaties and conventions. It further has the function of promoting equitable socio-economic development between the two genders and to expand credit financing for women, youth and persons with disabilities. One of the most important

functions of the department is to ensure equal female representation in public appointments. The department is responsible for the maintenance and coordination of sex-disaggregated data, coordination of activities on anti-FGM and coordination of programmes to reduce GBV. It has also an oversight function over the four semi-autonomous government agencies managing the Women Enterprise Fund, the Uwezo Fund, the NGAAF and the Anti-FGM Board. These funds were discussed in Section 3.4.4.1 under Vision 2030 (Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs, 2015:1).

The Gender Sector Coordination Group is situated in the Department of Gender Affairs to synchronize technical support and provide direct assistance on gender issues between the government, development partners and non-state actors (NDI & FIDA, 2018:19). Within the Gender Sector Group, subgroups focus on thematic sectors covering GBV, socio-economic empowerment, women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and women in leadership and decision making. Similar structures should have been devolved on county government level, but this has only been partially achieved. In the counties where the Gender Sector Coordination Groups are functional, it includes government and civil society and provides a platform for active participation in civil society, community-based organizations, and grassroots women's networks (USAID, 2020a:24). In the same way, the appointment of gender officers at senior levels in the public service was not fully achieved. Gender focal points were created in the Ministries of Livestock and Fisheries Development, Trade, Water and Irrigation, and Education. Furthermore, these officers were appointed on levels within the hierarchies where they lack the mandate, capacity and budget to fulfil their tasks efficiently (USAID, 2020a:19).

The struggle to reach gender equality in Kenya is an affirmation of the study conducted by Hudson and Leidl as cited by Nossel (2015:456). Despite various laws, policies and programmes implemented by the Government of Kenya to improve the financial status of women, finances remained the barrier, keeping women from participating at the same level as men for positions in public office. Figure 6.1 illustrated the cyclic process among gender inequality, poverty and insecurity. Financial strain was also identified as one of the primary push factors for radicalization (see Section 4.6.3 for a discussion on female radicalization in Kenya). The launch of the Democracy Trust Fund (DTF) by the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs in November 2018 is an initiative of Echo Network Africa to help fund women who are seeking leadership positions in public office in 2022 (Mwololo, 2018:1).

The Constitution of Kenya required that an independent commission be established to monitor the implementation of gender mainstreaming. The functions of NGEC will be discussed next.

3.4.5.1 National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC)

An act of parliament established the NGEC in August 2011 (please refer to Attachment F for the duties of the Human Rights and Equality Commission). NGEC derives its mandate from Articles 27, 43 and Chapter 15 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, and Section 8 of the NGEC (Chapter 15) of 2011. The goal of the NGEC is to reduce gender inequalities and discrimination against all people, monitoring compliance with Kenyan laws, treaties and conventions concerning gender equality (NGEC, 2018:1).

NGEC has the function “to promote gender equality and freedom from discrimination for all persons in Kenya”. The commission has to monitor, advise and facilitate all policies, laws and administrative regulations in all public and private institutions. The commission is also responsible for facilitating gender mainstreaming and affirmative action implementation policies, coordinating public education programmes, conducting audits and preparing annual reports for parliament on the status of gender equality. It is further required that NGEC works with the KNCHR, the Commission on Administrative Justice and other related institutions to guarantee efficiency and to coordinate activities related to gender equality and freedom from discrimination. NGEC is also at the centre of the national institutional framework to ensure that the provisions of the social pillar of Vision 2030 that deals with gender, vulnerable groups and the youth are executed by all sectors (NGEC, 2018:1). The NGEC has an office in Nairobi (headquarters) and five regional offices from where the women of Kenya are served (NGEC, 2020).

While the NGEC was established as an independent commission to monitor gender mainstreaming, two female parliamentary caucuses were established in 2011 to facilitate the networking of women parliamentarians and to integrate gender into laws and policies. They are the Kenya Women Parliamentarians Association (KEWOPA) and the Kenya Senators Association (KEWOSA) (Informationcradle, 2018:1). All women parliamentarians from both the Senate and the NA belong to KEWOPA. KEWOPA's functions are based on the following strategic areas: Firstly: legislative and oversight. It pursues the individual and collective legislation of members of parliament (MPs), advances monitoring, offers leadership skills and increases MP's participation in parliamentary committees. Secondly, it has a representation function: It seeks the improvement of the representation of MPs with regard to constituency management and interaction with voters on policy and community issues. Thirdly, it has a political party function: This function focusses on the enhancement of MPs' participation in political party activities. Lastly, KEWOPA has an institutional strengthening function. The purpose of this function is to advance the secretariat of KEWOPA's institutional capacity to

strengthen the members in their legislative, political and representative functions. Similar caucuses are in existence in the county governments (Informationcradle, 2018:1).

Furthermore, the KEWOPA Strategic Plan for 2019–2023 identifies 10 key legislative areas of importance. Four of these areas directly address human security in Kenya. KEWOPA undertook to, among other things, to develop legislation to i) directly address violent extremism, ii) to participate in the development of legislation to implement UNSC 1325 on WPS, iii) to address human trafficking and other crimes, and to iv) address SGBV (KEWOPA, 2018:25).

The Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission works closely with NGEC to guarantee women freedom from discrimination. It was established under Section 59 of the Constitution as the operational arm of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act (2011). The purpose of the commission is to guarantee that the Bill of Rights included in the Constitution is implemented. The Commission therefore has a monitoring, reporting, and advising function (KNAP, 2016:18).

The NGEC and the State Department of Gender Affairs under the UN-GOK Joint Programme work on a GBV framework to: i) prevent; ii) provide guidelines for psychological support and care for the victims; and iii) guide the legal interpretation for punishment. The NGEC also supports county governments with the development of GBV policies at the county level. In the 2020 gender analysis, it was reported that both the State Department of Gender Affairs and the NGEC experienced staffing and financial constraints that impede their goal of mainstreaming gender across government, vertically and horizontally (USAID, 2020a:19).

Furthermore, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission was established for the purpose of uniting communities, preventing conflict between the Kenyan communities, and safeguarding women against ethnic violence (KNAP, 2016:18). The work of this commission is especially important during election periods when it works closely with the IEBC and the Registrar of Political Parties.

3.4.5.2 Electoral commissions

The IEBC has the constitutional mandate to conduct the elections of all public institutions and has an obligation to uphold the “two-thirds gender principle”. The IEBC works within the framework of the Elections and Political Parties Acts to ensure compliance with the gender principle. According to FIDA, the IEBC restricted its function to the implementation of the gender principle to party lists only (NDI & FIDA, 2018:21).

The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) plays an important role in the implementation of Articles 27 and 81(b) of the Constitution. During the 2017 elections the ORPP instituted a gender-sensitive nomination checklist to guide political parties and to conduct audits on the compliance of political parties with regard to the implementation of the gender principle. The political parties are fundamental in advancing the appointment of women in elected positions. Although political parties claim to meet the gender requirement in their governing bodies, women usually occupy positions with a marginal influence on party decisions. During the 2017 elections, political parties helped more women to vie for office by reducing the nomination fees by half (NDI & FIDA, 2018:21). Together with political parties and the IEBC, non-governmental organizations play an important role to support women during elections.

3.4.5.3 Non-governmental organizations

The role that non-governmental organizations like civil society organizations, the private sector and religious organizations play are important to hold the Government of Kenya accountable for the implementation of the constitutional “two-thirds gender principle”. Civil society organizations provided technical assistance, created hotlines for reporting violence, coordinated with political parties and the IEBC, recruited and trained female candidates, provided media exposure and supported regulatory bodies to accomplish their mandates. Groups like the Democratic Institute (NDI); FIDA; Kenya Women Holding and Women’s Empowerment Link focused on enhancing and training female candidates during the 2017 elections. Tuvuke played an important role in improving media coverage and awareness raising of female candidates. Some organizations supplied campaign materials while other organizations engaged political parties to apply the “two-thirds gender principle”. In 2018 Echo Network Africa proactively established a fund for women who are seeking leadership positions in public office after the 2022 elections (NDI & FIDA, 2018:25). The UNSC through Resolution 2242 (2015:3) acknowledged the important roles that civil society and women’s organizations played in the promotion of Resolution 1325, but the UNSC remained concerned about persistent barriers that prevent the full implementation of resolution 1325 (see Sections 2.5 and 2.7 in Chapter 2). According the UNDP, the lack of adequate platforms for public participation, inclusiveness and citizen feedback at county levels, is contributing to ineffective service delivery (USAID, 2020a:24).

The Government of Kenya is committed to meeting international and regional standards as prescribed by the different treaties. The development of gender equality legislation that is supported by the necessary legislative, policy and institutional frameworks is a speaking example of cooperation between civil society and the state to strengthen the influence of

women. The next section reviews to what extent the implementation of these policies and frameworks improved conditions for women in education, basic health and in the security sector in Kenya.

3.5 Strengthening the influence of women

The wider impact of women's empowerment and gender equality would lead to legislation with broader impact and would normalize the idea of women as leaders. Even if women's representation fails to deliver results in the short term, women's representation in national governments could serve a symbolic role in balancing the opportunities between male and female youths. More gender-sensitive policies would shift girls' expectations about gender equality and create a bright future for women for generations to come (Bouka *et al.*, 2017:21). This would only be possible if boys and girls have equal access to education, economic opportunities, access to health services and enjoy human security.

3.5.1 Education

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya guarantees girls the right to education. According to a World Bank report (2018:1), Kenya's literacy rate increased with 11 per cent to 84 per cent from 2005 to 2015. While primary school enrolment reached 87 per cent in 2015, the completion of secondary school seems to be a challenge, with the rate further declining at the tertiary level and with university education, as illustrated by Figures 4.3 and 4.4 in Chapter 4.). The completion rate of girls in primary education in Kenya is 87 per cent versus 98 per cent in South Africa. Primary school completion for girls in Tanzania is 84 per cent, Rwanda 61 per cent, Ethiopia 52 per cent and in Uganda 45 per cent (ACPF, 2020:56). On the quality of education or "learning poverty", Kenya scored 455 out of 625 marks in 2020. It is above the world average of 431 for upper-middle-income countries (ACPF, 2020:55).

The UN CSW noted the lack of improvement in closing the gender gap in rural areas where girls are more likely than rural boys to be excluded from education. The barriers to girls' equal access to education results in feminization of poverty, child labour, early and forced marriages and unpaid care or domestic work. The abovementioned places a heavy strain on girls' or women's advancement into the paid labour market or their entrepreneurial skills with dire consequences for social protection, pay and pension contributions, as was demonstrated by Table 3.5 in Section 3.7 (ECOSOC, 2018:5). Lack of access to basics like water supply is a further contributing factor to high school dropout rates amongst girls. A programme started by the First Lady of Kenya in support from the "Red Cross Society, the African Cotton Industry and Children Investment Fund Foundation" aims to improve menstrual hygiene, adolescent

sexual and reproductive health education, nutrition education and life skills – all to empower girls to complete their education (Musyoka, 2018:1).

In the 2020/2021 national budget of Kenya, the education sector received 26 per cent (Kenya Shilling 497.7 Billion or 4.5 Billion USD), the biggest share of the national budget. The education budget made provision for 11.93 per cent for free secondary education, 2.49 per cent for free primary education and 1.26 per cent for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions. A further 0.4 per cent was allocated for the recruitment of 5 000 teachers in this financial year (Okoth, 2020:1).

3.5.2 Economic development

An act of parliament named The Kenya Uwezo Fund Act established the Uwezo Fund in 2015. The Act consolidated the Uwezo Fund, the Women Enterprise Fund and the Youth Enterprise Development Fund into one (Kenya Uwezo Fund Act, 2015:2597). The purpose of the fund is to provide youth, women and persons with disabilities the opportunity to generate self-employment by offering funding for community driven projects, enterprises or business (Kenya Uwezo Fund Act, 2015:2599). The Women Enterprise Fund (WEF) provided microfinance credit and financial support to women and ten years after its establishment, more than 80 000 women have benefitted from the fund (Kuruoya, 2018:1). The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) financially supported young women and men to address the challenge of unemployment in Kenya (YEDF, 2017:1). In July 2020, a total of 22 993 youth groups, 42 309 women groups and 1 941 groups for persons with disabilities across the 47 counties have made use of the Uwezo Fund (Mutua, 2020:10). The youth and women are further supported by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 33 of 2015 [Section 53(6)], which makes provision that “all state organs and public entities during their procurement and disposal planning are required to reserve a minimum of 30 per cent of the budgetary allocations to enterprises owned by women, youth, persons with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups” (Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015:1998). The treasury of the Government of Kenya reserved a further two of the 30 per cent for people with disability (KenGen, 2016:ii). With regard to land, the National Land Policy (2009) was developed to acknowledge that women and men could own property on an equal basis (USAID, 2020a:18). Hudson and Leidl (Nossel, 2015:456) concluded after their research that increased economic participation by women lead to greater prosperity in a society and the eradication of the oppression of women helps to stabilize societies.

3.5.3 Health system

The 2010 Constitution specified that health services are devolved to become the function of county governments. Governance of the health system is divided into three divisions: Legal, planning and political. The Health Act, 21 of 2017, legally guides the health system and planning is guided by technical plans and documents. At the national level, health programmes target the marginalized groups because of gender, norms and relations. The political framework is shaped by a promising political agenda. Planning, resourcing and administrative decisions are taken at the county level and have an impact on the access to health services. There has been a positive correlation between the literacy rate and maternal health of women. However, the health policy ignores socio-cultural traits like gender that either restrains or enhances access to health services. This is due to the fact that in the planning phase, at a county level, gender is side lined and specific gender needs are not addressed (USAID, 2020a:26). The proportion of pregnant girls in Kenya who did not deliver in a health facility or who did not received assistance from skilled attendants were above 25 per cent in 2020 (ACPF, 2020:61).

The First Lady of Kenya launched the “Beyond Zero Campaign” healthcare programme to assist women in 2017. The Government of Kenya aimed for 100 per cent universal health coverage (UHC) by 2022. The purpose of UHC is to provide healthcare to any person without the financial burden and the focus of UHC will be on preventable and primary health care. Approximately 74 000 children under the age of five died in Kenya in 2016, while about 6 000 women die annually while giving birth. Many of the deaths could have been prevented with small interventions. Despite the progress made in reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality, Kenya missed its 2015 MDGs. It means women and children were not given the most basic of rights – “the right to life and wellbeing” (Schultink *et al.*, 2018:1). The Government of Kenya launched a UHC pilot programme with the biometric registration of residents (in Kisumu, Isiolo, Nyeri and Machakos counties) in September 2018. A minimum of 3.2 million Kenyans will benefit from the pilot programme (Kajilwa, 2018:1; Mulwa, 2018:1). However, in January 2020 the government recognized that the healthcare system of the country was weak and that the focus had shifted from curative to preventative healthcare to reduce the number of patients that visit referral facilities. The Cabinet Secretary for Health acknowledged that the insurance model did not achieve much (Otieno, 2020:1).

The UN CSW highlighted the unequal access to public healthcare services in Kenya and women experience substantial disparities in reproductive healthcare, which leads to greater maternal and infant mortality rates. However, the “Beyond Zero Campaign” launched by the First Lady of Kenya in 2017 pledged to enable more Kenyans to access quality healthcare and

to eliminate maternal and child mortality and HIV/Aids (Schultink *et al.*, 2018:1; USAID, 2020:27). The “Beyond Zero Campaign” also delivered mobile clinics to serve vulnerable and marginalized communities in all the counties. The Campaign will also press for the inclusion of quality health care in the UN SDGs (Kejitan, 2018:1). In the 2020/2021 national budget, the health sector received Kenya Shilling 117.7 Billion. Kenya Shilling 50.3 Billion (42.7 per cent) of the health budget was allocated to enhance UHC, Kenya Shilling 4.1 Billion (3.48 per cent) for free maternity services and Kenya Shilling 19.2 Billion (16.3 per cent) for Malaria/HIV and Tuberculosis (Otieno, 2020:1). Based on data from the WHO Global Health Observatory, the Government of Kenya spends 8 per cent of the total government expenditure on health services. In Africa Zimbabwe spends the highest with 15.2 per cent, while Tanzania spends 9.5 per cent, Rwanda 8.9 per cent and Uganda 5.1 per cent (ACPF, 2020:49).

3.5.4 Security

Notwithstanding the advances in education, support for economic development and the health sector, women in Kenya are exposed to high levels of insecurity because of sexual GBV and armed conflict. Kenya is a signatory of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women peace and security. Therefore, the first Kenya National Action Plan (KNAP) was developed to take the changing nature of insecurity into account. Human security, with the focus on the protection of individuals, was incorporated into the plan. KNAP was titled “*Kuhusisha Wanawake ni Kudumisha Amani*” meaning, “to involve women is to sustain peace”. Because KNAP recognizes human security, threats to security include social, economic, political and environmental factors. KNAP notes that women’s unequal access to resources and services reduce their opportunities. As a result, KNAP promotes the constitutional values of gender equality, gender inclusion and participation. It was implemented over the period 2016–2018 (KNAP, 2016:2). KNAP is based on the successful implementation of the Constitution of Kenya, national laws, regional treaties and policies related to external security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. At the national level, KNAP focusses on the implementation of laws and policies to end violence against women, the promotion of gender mainstreaming and the protecting of human rights. KNAP relies on government institutions, involvement of civil society and the private sector for the successful realization of the plan (KNAP, 2016:15). The strategic leadership and oversight of KNAP is managed by the institutional framework provided by the two lead ministries, namely “The Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs” and “The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government”. The Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs play important roles in providing external security (KNAP, 2016:18). As a continuation of the government’s commitment to women’s security, a second phase and Second Action Plan (KNAPII 2020–2024), were implemented in 2020. KNAPII identifies that only efficient systems, structures and processes

for the operationalization of the developed laws, policies and plans will ensure effective prevention and response measures for women. The plan specifically focuses on critical security priorities unfolding in Kenya. These new security threats include climate change, violent extremism, GBV, forced migration and human trafficking, and humanitarian disasters. As the new security threats span different sectors, all major ministries responsible for security in Kenya (see Section 3.5.4.1 for a discussion on the Kenya national security) will be involved in the implementation KNAPII (UN Women, 2020g:1) under the strategic leadership of the Ministry of Public Service and Gender (UNDPb, 2020:1; UNSC, 2015:6). KNAPII identifies structural inequalities, devolution and cultural and religious factors as emerging security issues (KNAPII, 2020:09).)

Under UN Resolution 1325 (2000), countries made big strides in prompting gender mainstreaming in peace and security. However, Ndung'u (2016:1) highlights that the resolution did not make reference to the role of women in security issues caused by terrorism and as a result radicalization. Ndung'u is of the opinion that Kenya should adopt the objectives of KNAP to accommodate more women in peace and security leadership and participation as a measure to counter radicalization and the recruitment of females (either as enablers or emphasizees) into organizations with terrorism links. However, Security Council Resolution 2242 (UNSC, 2015:2) noted the change in the global threat to peace and security and acknowledged that an increase in violent extremism can be favourable to terrorism. In support of Ndung'u's view, a key message from the UN Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) is that, "Gender-blind counterterrorism policies and practices have the potential of not only being ineffective, but to also negatively impact women and girls' rights" (see Section 4.6.3.1 for a discussion on the effect of gender-blind policies on CVE) (Coninsx, 2018:2). This underscores the importance of Ndung'u's conclusion.

The changing nature of the global threat to peace and security demands more attention for women to fill positions of influence for the maintenance of international peace and security (UNSC, 2015:2). Kenya, as a host to millions of refugees and with repeated occurring droughts and locus plagues, is subjected to an increased threat to human security. The Kenyan national security structure, as the organ to provide human and state security, is discussed next.

3.5.4.1 Kenyan national security

Kenya National Security is responsible for the protection of citizens against internal and external threats. Kenya National Security consists of three arms namely, the Kenya Defence Force, the National Intelligence Service and the National Police Service. Chapter 14 Article 240 of the Constitution of Kenya requires the establishment of a National Security Council

(Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:143). The National Security Council has nine members, of which two are women. Unfortunately, the under-representation of women in the top leadership of the security services is a reality. A female heads the Ministry of Defence, while the Kenya Army, Air Force and Navy are all headed by men. As a result, the Defence Council consists of six members, of which one is a woman (Lichuma, 2017:6). It is remarkable for a female Cabinet Secretary to head the Defence Force. However, according to Wahiu (2018:94), observers pointed out that the Chief of Staff of the Defence Force (a man) is the tactical, operational and administrative head of the military – which creates the impression that a female Cabinet Secretary for Defence was just a token appointment. Statistics about gender transformation in the KDF was scarce and not updated to 2020. A study by ISS in 2016 revealed that female officers constitute 8 per cent of the defence forces (Bouka & Sigsworth, 2016:11).

The slow progress towards gender transformation can be explained against the background of the lack of gender mainstreaming in the national GoK and resistance against gender transformation of the security forces, a sector that is traditionally occupied by men. The impediments to gender equality in Kenya (see Section 4.2.1 for a discussion) mean that structural resistance on a macro or government level prevents women from a career in the GoK. Unfriendly female KDF human resource policies contribute to a lack of female training, and as a result, a lack of promotion. Table 4.3 (a partial list of university enrolments in 2019 revealed that only 2 923 women (11 per cent) versus 24 800 men enrolled for military science at a university in Kenya. These statistics might change after KNAPII launches the first gender policy in the defence docket with the purpose to include more women in peacekeeping missions and to promote women to higher levels of decision making in the defence structures (UNDPb, 2020:1; UNSC, 2015:6). The deployment of the KDF domestically is strictly controlled and authorised by the NA. It only happens in instances of a national emergency or disaster or to restore peace in a part of Kenya affected by unrest and instability. The deployment of the KDF is confined to strict time frames and should be published in the government gazette before its commencement (Constitution of Kenya, 2010:147).

The National Intelligence Service is headed by a male director-general with the support of seven male directors and one female director (Lichuma, 2017:6). The National Police Service comprises of the Kenya police and the administrative police. The police service is headed by a male inspector-general with two male deputy inspector-generals (Lichuma, 2017:6). It should be mentioned that the National Police Service Act, 11a of 2011, Section 14 (b) ensures that one of the three top management positions of inspector-general or the two deputy-inspector generals should be female. However, the act was amended to remove the gender requirement.

UN Women (2020g:1) confirmed that 14 per cent of the police force, in 2020 were female and that The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government integrated gender into the peace and security structure and announced an increase of women in the service from 8 per cent in 2015 to 14 per cent in 2020.

In general, the representation of women in peace and security structures and committees is quite low and women mostly fill supportive positions. This concern of under-representation of women in peace and security processes and in senior political positions at all levels of decision-making internationally is shared by the UNSC. Resolution 2242 (UNSC, 2015:3) underscores that together with under-representation, insufficient gender-sensitive humanitarian responses and support for women to fill leadership positions, together with a lack of adequate financing for women in peace in security is damaging to the maintenance of international peace and security. In Kenya the slow progress of gender transformation in the security structures has a negative effect on national security (see figure 7.1 for an illustration of the effect of gender inequality on the internal security of Kenya and Figure 7.3 for a trajectory of the gender strategy in Kenya). In the light of the aforementioned, in the next section, the level of female representation in decision-making leadership positions in the Government of Kenya will be determined.

3.6 Representation of women in the national Government of Kenya

The women of Kenya regard Article 27 (8) in the Bill of Rights, which addresses equality and freedom from discrimination as critical enablers to create space for women in leadership at the executive and national level. Article 81(b) requires that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:51). Unfortunately, the absence of clear legal direction on the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” across government has failed many aspiring women. In 2020, 10 years after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, Article 81(b), has not been fully implemented. An analysis of the 2017 elections, indicated only 172 of the 1 862 people elected were women. That amounts to 9 per cent only (NDI & FIDA, 2018:30). Despite the low representation of women in parliament, Table 3.2 demonstrated that 26 women were elected to parliament in 2017 in comparison with four in 2002, and 16 in 2013. The 2017 election was a milestone for women. For the first time 3 women were elected as governors and three as senators (NDI & FIDA, 2018:30).

Table 3.2: 2017 general election results by gender

	Elected (number)		Nominated (number)		Total (percentage)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Total	Women
Members of the NA	267	23	7	5	302	9
47 women representative members to NA	0	47	0	0	47	100
Senators elected (67 = 47 elected senators from the counties, 16 nominated women, 2 women representing youth and persons with disabilities)	44	3	2	18	67	31
Total in parliament	331	73	9	23	416	23
Governors elected	44	3	0	0	47	6
County assembly ward representatives (MCA)	1334	96	97	650	2177	34
Total in government	1731	179	106	673	2689	32

Source: NDI & FIDA (2018:30)

According to Table 3.2, 23 women were elected for the NA and a further five nominated in 2017. This brought female representation to a total of 9 per cent in the NA in 2017. Together with the 47 women representatives elected to the NA, the representation of women in the NA stands at 21.48 per cent. It is still a far cry from the required 33 per cent. Female representation in the Senate is much closer to the constitutional requirement. Three women were elected to the positions of senators and another 18 nominated to the position. The total of 21 women represents 31 per cent of the Senate. The NA and the Senate forms the parliament. In total, 96 women out of a total of 416 MPs represent 23.3 per cent. This is 10 per cent less than the constitutional requirement in Article 81(b) of 33 per cent.

Forty-four of the 47 county governments were compliant with the “two-thirds gender principle” after the 2017 elections (NDI & FIDA, 2018:31). Ninety-six women were elected as MCA while 650 women were nominated to positions as MCAs to meet the “two-thirds gender principle”. However, despite the nomination of women, three county governments do not meet the gender

requirement. The nomination of women is done by the IEBC based on political party lists (NDI & FIDA, 2018:31). The use of quotas allowed for the nomination of women MCA to comply with Article 27 (8) of the Constitution. However, it is important to highlight the difference in mandate and access to resources between elected and nominated legislators. Although women represent 34 per cent of MCAs in 2017, their influence in Kenyan politics remained limited (Rift Valley Institute, 2017:1). As most women at national and county level occupy nominated positions, they do so with limited power, resources and influence (Rift Valley Institute, 2017:1). Figure 3.7 summarized the gender representation in the national Government of Kenya in 2020.




Figure 3.7 Female representation in the Government of Kenya

Sources: KNBS (2018:279); Standard (2020:1)

Female presentation in parliament is reflected in the committees. Only four out of 43 of departmental committees in parliament (NA and Senate) are chaired by women. Not only are all the technical committees in parliament chaired by men, but female membership in these technical committees is equally low. In the NA, representation of women in the Finance and National Planning Committee is at 11 per cent, Public Accounts Committee at 11 per cent, National Security at 5 per cent and Budget and Appropriations at 21 per cent (UN Women, 2018:1).

At the Senate level, men chair all departmental committee and the membership of women is equally low. In the Finance and Budget Committee 22 per cent are women, at Information, Communication and Technology women representations stands at 11 per cent while similar, 11 per cent of women sit on the Devolution and Inter-Governmental Relations Committee (UN Women, 2018:1). Table 3.3 summarized and provides a comparison of the representation of women in key decision-making positions in the Government of Kenya between 2018 and 2019.

Table 3.3: Key decision-making positions by sex in the Government of Kenya: 2018–2019

Position	2018				2019			
	Number				Number			
	Female	Male	Total	% (F)	Female	Male	Total	% (F)
Cabinet Secretary	6	16	22	27.3	7	17	24	29.2
Principal Secretary	8	32	40	20	10	34	44	22.7
Diplomatic Corps	13	43	56	23.2	14	40	54	25.9
Governor	3	44	47	6.4	2	45	47	4.3
Deputy Governor	7	40	47	14.9	8	38	46	17.4
NA	76	273	349	21.8	76	273	349	21.8
Senator	21	46	67	31.3	21	46	67	31.3
Member of County Assembly	761	1 463	2 224	34.2	737	1 456	2193	33.6
Supreme Court Judge	2	5	7	28.6	2	5	7	28.6
Court of Appeal Judge	7	12	19	36.8	7	12	19	36.8
High Court Judge	40	42	82	48.8	40	42	82	48.8
Magistrate	215	244	59	46.8	269	234	503	53.5
Kadhis	0	54	54	0.0	0	53	53	0.0
County Commissioner	14	33	47	29.8	6	41	47	12.8

Sources: KNBS (2020:344); Standard (2020:1)

The representation of women in the highest public service, the cabinet secretaries, represents 29.2 per cent of the cabinet in 2019 versus 27.3 per cent in 2018. The Constitution allows for a maximum of 22 ministries in the executive branch. The president appoints the cabinet secretaries. In 2020, seven of cabinet secretaries are female. Female cabinet secretaries are assigned to head the influential ministries of: Foreign Affairs, Defence, Industrialization and Trade & Enterprise Development, Sports, Culture & Heritage, Water & Sanitation and Irrigation, Public Service & Gender and Lands & Physical Planning (Ayub, 2020:1; Standard, 2020:1; KNBS, 2020:344).

At an institutional level, the Kenya judiciary made remarkable progress to meet the gender standard. The representation of female High Court judges stands at 48.8 per cent while 53.5 per cent of Magistrates are female (KNBS, 2020:344). The gender representation of the judiciary indicates that there is a critical mass of women with the potential to be successful leaders. In contrast to the judiciary, at the community level, female leaders are nearly non-existing. Table 3.3 displays that there are no female Kadhis, which further complicate the legal assistance to women in Muslim communities (KNBS, 2020:344). It is important to mention that this layer of leadership has a strong influence on socio-cultural norms and practices and is an important entry point for behavioural change.

However, Table 3.3 demonstrated that by 2020, 10 years after the implementation of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the cabinet, NA, Senate, and Supreme Court are all still in violation of the “two-thirds gender principle”. Five failed attempts between the 11th and the 12th parliaments (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019) to pass legislation to meet the constitutional requirement on national government level was a clear indication that the political goodwill to mainstream gender equality at national government level was lacking, until the release of the BBI report in October 2020 (see Section 3.2.2 for a short discussion on the BBI). With the release the report, it was noted that a large number of submissions have been received from women about exclusion and marginalization because of socio-cultural and political measures, preventing women from realizing their rights under the 2010 Constitution (BBI Steering Committee, 2020:7).

To address the gender agenda and to correct female marginalization and the lack of the implementation of the constitutional “two-thirds gender principle” it was proposed that a political representation system to implement, monitor and to ensure that the executive arm of the government follows the “two-thirds gender principle” be established. The system proposed by the BBI Steering Committee mirrored the existing NGECC (see Section 3.4.5.1 for a discussion

on the NGECC) with similar functions. The report also focused on the provision of free hygiene products for girls in public education [the implementation of Section 2(b) of the Basic Education Amendment Act (2017)] and the improvement for social protection of girls (to fast-track the enactment of the Menstrual Health Management Bill) (BBI Steering Committee, 2020:7). The Government of Kenya spends 2.3 per cent of the GDP on social protection versus a median of 4.2 per cent for Africa (see Section 4.3.1 for a discussion on SGBV). The BBI report, called the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 2020, receives stern opposition from both male and female lobby groups indicated that the BBI initiative is an illegitimate process, driven by its proponents to the benefit of a certain group of people. Although significant changes to the 2010 Constitution were proposed, Table 3.4 outlines proposed amendments to Articles 98, 180 and 91 to advance gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya (Kisia, 2020b:8).

Table 3.4: BBI proposals to realize the “two-thirds gender principle”

ARTICLE	CURRENT FEMALE STATUS	PROPOSED GENDER CHANGES
98 Senate	• The Senate consists of 47 members each, elected by registered voters in the county. Sixteen women nominated by political parties, plus one woman representing the youth and one woman representing people with disabilities • Currently there are 21 women or 31 per cent female representation in the Senate (three elected, 16 nominated and two representing youth and people with disabilities)	• “The Senate to consists of 94 members, being one woman and one man from each county, elected by the registered voters of the county” • Female representation in the Senate will be at 50 per cent with 47 women
180 County Governors	• County and deputy county Governors elected by registered voters (no affirmative action) • Three female Governors elected (six per cent) • Four counties have governors with deputy governors of the opposite gender	• Candidates who vie for the governor’s position should nominate a person of the opposite gender as a running mate.
91 Political Parties	• Article 91 reads that political parties “shall promote inclusiveness, democracy and participation” when formulating policies and nominating candidates” • Female representation of the NA (through elected positions) is 9 per cent	• Political parties to take measures to implement the “two-thirds gender principle” for members in elective or appointive bodies • If this proposal is accepted and implemented, the female representation in the NA will meet the threshold of 33 per cent

Sources: Constitution of the Government of Kenya (2010:1); Ayaga (2020:5)

The effects of the non-implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” on the empowerment of women and girls are summarized in Section 3.7 and Table 3.5 and are discussed next.

3.7 Empowerment index for Kenyan women and girls

A study by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), together with State Department of Gender, UN Women and UNICEF, determined that the household circumstances of women essentially determine their level of equality in the political, economic and cultural spheres of life. Kenya has made creditable gains to increase women's equality through the legal and institutional systems, but the Global Gender Gap Report of 2020 indicates that Kenya is not on par with the gender target set out in the UN's Sustainable Development Goal 5, which aims for the empowerment of girls and women by 2030 (UN Women, 2020:1). Based on data from the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey of 2014, Table 3.5 summarized the key findings of the measures that were used to determine the chances for women's empowerment in Kenya. The table demonstrated that the empowerment of women in Kenya is linked to the existing legislative and policy structures.

Table 3.5: Women's Empowerment Index

	DESCRIPTION	STATISTICS
LOCATION	General Average of Kenya	29 per cent
	Urban Areas	40 per cent
	Rural Areas	22 per cent
HOUSEHOLD INCOME	High Income	53 per cent
	Low Income	7 per cent
MARITAL STATUS	Single (never married)	37 per cent
	Women in Relationships	27 per cent
	Divorced	25 per cent
	Separated	17 per cent
	Widows	12 per cent
EDUCATION LEVEL OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLDS	Higher Education	62 per cent
	Secondary Education	39 per cent
	No Education	10 per cent

	DESCRIPTION	STATISTICS
SIZE OF FAMILY	Women with No Children	41 per cent
	1 -2 children	36 per cent
	3-4 Children	24 per cent
	5+ children	13 per cent

Source: UN Women (2020:1)

The table displays that a girl's history is a predictor of her future. Girls that grow up in the rural areas are from a low-income household have only a 7 per cent chance of equality. Girls that grew up bigger families and where the head of the household has limited to no education have 13 and 10 per cent changes on gender equality. The table illustrates that girls who are from a higher income and smaller family have 53 and 63 per cent chance of an equal career in life. It is important to mention that girls who come from a family where the head of the household has higher education, has the biggest change with 63 per cent to be able to participate on an equal level on political, economic and social levels. The importance of education is again emphasized for elevating girls and women to a more gender-equal life. According to UN Women, women and girls will be impressive contributors to political, social and economic transformation if they are given the same opportunities as men and boys. Table 3.5 is a powerful tool to guide gender mainstreaming programmes and policies in an attempt to reach Sustainable Development Goal 5 before 2030 (UN Women, 2020:1). The next section will provide a summary of the responsiveness of the frameworks put in place to realize gender equality in the Government of Kenya.

3.8 Summary of the responsiveness of the frameworks to implement gender quality standards

The national Government of Kenya is running the risk of undermining the rule of law and threatening the gender improvements protected by the 2010 Constitution if the “two-thirds gender principle” is not realized in the national government. In the absence of a gender bill, to increase in the number of seats for women in the NA [the expansion of the public wage bill, to the taxpayer would have been minimal (IEA, 2015:34)], the “two-thirds gender principle” can only be reached by means of affirmative action [Article 27(6)] as provided by the 2010

Constitution (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:24). It means, only 233 seats out of 490 seats will be available for male representatives in future. This affirmative action measure may create resistance by the male parliamentarians to change (USAID, 2020a:31). On the other hand, currently in 2020 female representation in parliament is not meeting the “two-thirds gender principle” and it is a transgression of Article 27 of the Constitution, in other words, the 2020 parliament is unconstitutional (USAID, 2020a:31). By not implementing the “two-thirds gender principle” the national Government of Kenya will not be able to transform key systems to serve the whole community with quality, inclusivity, accountability and efficiency because of the difference in decision-making powers between nominated and elected female leaders in national and in county governments. The next section links practice with theory to understand the reasons why the mainstreaming of gender in the national Government of Kenya is resisted.

3.8.1 Theoretical explanation for gender mainstreaming in the Government of Kenya

Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5 for a discussion on feminist theory and gender equality) focused on the core of feminist theory with the aim of social transformation and change for the benefit of women. Feminists stressed that gender inequality is entrenched in all structures of society, may it be family, religion and culture or work, the economy or politics and the government. As a result, feminist theory developed from a plurality of feminist approaches towards women’s subordination, its causes and consequences. Liberal feminism focusses on gender equality in the public domain and pursues gender transformation via political and legal reform. Liberal feminists (see Section 2.5.3.1.1 for discussion on liberal feminism) see the state as the protector of individual rights and the promoter of equality. However, the importance of post-structural feminist theory (see Section 2.5.3.3.2 for a discussion on the post-structural feminist theory) and as a consequence, the development of Third World and African feminism (see Section 2.5.4 for a discussion on African feminism) could not be excluded in the discussion of gender transformation in Kenya. Woodhull (2007:232) argues that African feminism is concerned with “bread, butter, and power” issues and was shaped by colonial political eras on the African continent. African feminism distinguishes between strategic gender needs that are feminist in nature and women’s daily needs. Because of this shift in consciousness, African feminism has created relatively strong women’s organizations, but weak feminist movements. Women’s organizations run the risk of becoming counterproductive (Hudson, 2005:170).

In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution provided for women’s legal rights and the inclusion of gender mainstreaming through affirmative action measures in Article 27 (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:24). However, the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming would depend on the model of implementation. An integrative approach added women’s concerns to an existing political structure without changing the culture of the structure. The impact of this

approach would be less significant. The inclusion of the Article 81 in the 2010 Constitution could be explained based on Townley's (2019:80) clarification of internal conflict and quotas. The women of Kenya's need for gender mainstreaming was integrated into the new constitution and implementation is based on quotas or a top-down approach. Because the patriarchal culture of the Government of Kenya was not changed before the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, gender mainstreaming was confronted with power equations and gender specifics that resisted the change in systems to allow for a gender-equal society. In Kenya, as women are entering the public and corporate domains that are male-dominated, gender equality is resisted by the privileged because it calls for the sharing of power and resources (Kameri-Mbote, 2016:59).

The women in Kenya realized that the gender provisions included in the 2010 Constitution were inadequate to ensure a gender balance in the Kenya society. The lack of a strong feminist movement in Kenya, and confirmed during the empirical research (see Section 6.11 for a discussion on grassroots influences) is maintaining the status quo of an uneven gender society. Hudson (2005:170) identified the restrictive effect of African feminism on feminist movements while Gouws (2007:29) highlighted the depoliticizing effect on female activists after they have been appointed in parliamentary positions, as weakening gender movements. It reflects that women are changed from gender activists to politicians – promoting a political and not a gender agenda. Gouws (2007:29) also indicated that gender mainstreaming could be viewed as a corrective strategy to male dominance, but because a gap developed between policy and practice in the gender mainstreaming strategy, the structure (national Government of Kenya) resists gender transformation in the government that is based on gender mainstreaming.

3.9 Conclusion

Ironically, the Government of Kenya struggles to meet the 2010 Constitution's requirement of the "two-thirds gender principle" in 2020, while the third Women's Conference was held in Nairobi in 1985. It identified three sectors for improvement, namely social participation, political participation and decision making (UN-NGLS, 2009:1). Thirty-five years later these sectors still need transformation.

The Government of Kenya's commitment to gender equality and empowerment is revealed in its constitutional provisions, policies and legislation and building capacity by means of structures and mechanisms to operationalize it. The 2010 Constitution, in contrast to the Independence Constitution of 1963, is the backbone of the Government of Kenya's legal and

institutional framework and laid a firm foundation for the promotion of gender equality. Article 81(b), the “two-thirds gender principle”, is supported by legislation and operationalized on county government level by a comprehensive institutional framework. However, implementation has mixed success in county governments where nominated female leaders experience discrimination in decision-making forums. Although it proved that affirmative action could deliver positive results for female representation in government, only 172 (9.2 per cent) of the 1 835 elected members were women. However, for the first time in the history of Kenya, three women were elected in the position of senator and three as governors. Their success is an indication that women who served in nominated positions gained experience and are more likely to win an elected position. Consequently, the failure to pass legislation to meet the “two-thirds gender principle” in parliament is a clear indication that the system is resisting mainstreaming gender equality at national government level and that the quota system implemented in the county governments is not transforming the political environment. The proposals made by the BBI Steering Committee and defined in the BBI report that was released in October 2020, to improve gender equality in the national Government of Kenya, might untangle the power knot that dimmed the hope for political transformation in Kenya. Conversely, the BBI initiative received opposition from both male and female opposition groups.

In general, the Government of Kenya through its Vision 2030 policy, developed gender-sensitive policies and instituted programmes to advance women, youth and people with disabilities. The successful implementation of funding mechanisms for women to become economically independent and the creation of a fund for women, who are seeking leadership positions in public office after the 2022 elections, is a sign of the cooperation between government and the private sector to enhance gender transformation.

The State Department for Gender, in the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender has the national mandate to promote gender equality and female empowerment through the gender mainstreaming programme. To ensure accountability, the independent NGEC was established to hold the government accountable for the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle”. As far as GRB is concerned, it only reached an awareness level with little success for a gender budget-making process. This negatively affects the mandate of NGEC.

Notwithstanding the progressive legal, policy and institutional frameworks to improve the lives of women in Kenya, the culture of economic and political practices is male-dominated. Male hegemony is the reason why males are seen as the natural leaders and females as natural subservient. In patriarchal societies male hegemony is pervasive and GBV is used as a tactic to enforce power structures and highlight inequalities sustained by political practices to prevent

women from participating in political electoral processes, historically a male-dominated domain. Patriarchy is considered as the main reason for the general institutional failure to reach the “two-third gender” threshold in parliament as prescribed by Article Articles 27 and 81(b) of the 2010 Constitution.

GBV and abuse of women in Kenya is persistent and is not only a big hurdle to inclusive and sustainable development, but is purely a lack of respect. GBV is cyclic and can be explained from a social, state or feminist perspective. With the latter stressing that the gendered nature of violence has its roots in a patriarchal social system. The reinstitution of gender desks at police stations is a positive move in the right direction. Together with the assistance of NGO’s, GBV victims are provided with counselling and legal assistance. Access to healthcare services is still unequal and the promise of a Universal Health Care System by 2022 seemed not reachable. Education received priority with the biggest share of the national budget, but girls are still marginalized due to socio-cultural and economic reasons.

In the patriarchal society of Kenya, the failure to recognize the equality of women is tied to issues of power and control, which is political but with far-reaching economic consequences. It is clear that the achievement of gender equality in Kenya pertains more than changing laws. It requires sustained political will, a combined effort between the civil society and government, leadership from both genders, changes to socio-cultural norms and attitudes for the full realization of the gender laws and policies for a gender-equal society. As indicated in Chapter 3, the inclusion of gender provisions in the Constitution alone is not enough to transform a society. The next chapter, the impediments to gender equality in Kenya and as a result the repercussions that developed because of an unequal society is discussed in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4: IMPEDIMENTS TO, AND REPERCUSSIONS FOR, NOT MEETING GENDER EQUALITY STANDARDS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA

4.1 Introduction

The main objective or core of feminist research is to contribute to social transformation. As a result, gender studies highlight the inequalities in the balance of power that historically discriminated against women and contributed to their insecurity (Offen, 2011:1). It can therefore be argued that a state could be the creator of insecurity – rather than security – in countries where the international standard of 33 per cent female presentation in government is not reached. Feminists reason that the thinking of security is patriarchal and it contributes directly to specific forms of insecurity for women. As a result, gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of some citizens, women are sacrificed.

Chapter 3 provided an in-depth overview of the legal and institutional frameworks of the Government of Kenya that support gender equality. By 2020, 10 years after the implementation of the progressive 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the NA, Senate, Cabinet, and Supreme Court were all still in violation of constitutional Article 81(b), which requires that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:51). Notwithstanding the progressive legal framework to improve the lives of women in Kenya, the culture, economic and political practices remain male-dominated.

This chapter provides an objective assessment of the implementation of gender equality standards by the national Government of Kenya to determine its development efficiency, impact and sustainability. This is in line with research objective 3, as was laid out in Chapter 1, to determine and examine the impediments to reaching gender equality in the national Government of Kenya and to determine what the repercussions may be for the security of Kenya. Firstly, the strategies of proponents and opponents as well as the impact they may have on each other is analysed and secondly the factors resisting social change are examined.

This requires a re-evaluation of the significance of the promotion of gender equality by the national Government of Kenya. The circumstances under which gender policy adaption took place and the alliances formed among the stakeholders that drove the process have to be determined. Furthermore, the security consequences of maintaining the status quo or non-compliance with gender inequality in the legislature are highlighted. The first section of the chapter contains a discussion on the impediments to gender equality while the second part of the chapter (Section 4.4 to Section 4.6) focuses on the repercussions for the security of Kenya

if gender equality is not improved. Section 4.4 focuses on the repercussions of gender inequality and first discusses radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism in general. Section 4.5 provides a multilevel analysis of radicalization while radicalization in Kenya is discussed in Section 4.6 and female radicalization is discussed in Section 4.6.3.

4.2 Re-evaluation of gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya

David Easton, in 1953, defined politics as the “authoritative allocation of values for the whole society” within a political system (Easton, 1957:384). Easton explained that a political system is an interaction between the community and the political system and that human behaviour in a political system either creates an input or demand for change where after human behaviour will be affected by the output from within the political system. Therefore, this input-output interaction makes a political system responsive to the environment in which it is embedded (Miller, 1971:199).

This input-output model of Easton can be applied to the political system in Kenya. Consequently, due to severe post-election ethnic violence in 2007, the political community displayed a demand for a new political system supported by a new constitution. The immediate output to satisfy the demand was the endorsement of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act that followed after a power-sharing deal between the opposition parties in February 2008. One of the requirements of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act was the drafting of a new constitution as was explained in Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3. The specific inclusion of women’s rights as part of the Bill of Rights (Article 27) in the 2010 Constitution guaranteed more female opportunities in political, economic and socio-cultural spheres as well as in leadership positions in the two-layered democratic government (Glinz, 2010:4). The women of Kenya regarded the Bill of Rights as a critical enabler to create space for women in leadership in parliament. According to the input-output model of Easton, the output (2010 Constitution) was reached based on specific support from the political system to satisfy the demand for a political settlement and the drafting of the new constitution in 2008. On the contrary, the passing of the gender bill, to enact the “two-thirds gender principle”, included in Article 81(b) of the 2010 Constitution, did not enjoy the same level of support, which was exposed by the repeated failure of the gender bill. Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3 displayed the gender representation of the legislature. It can therefore be concluded that the patriarchal nature of the Kenyan society enjoys support to maintain the status of male hegemony – a socio-cultural norm in Kenya. As concluded in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3, despite a new constitution, male values still receive preference in decision-making structures.

Bergqvist *et al.* (2013:282) focused on the conditions for gender equality adoption and identified two factors that are conducive to the successful adopting of gender equality policies: 'alliances' and 'framing'. FIDA as the agents of change for women in 2008 used a strategy of framing against the injustices of discrimination, corruption, nepotism, exclusion and ethnic rivalries allowed by the Independence Constitution to gain a support base or forming of alliances with their male counterparts for the inclusion of a "two-thirds gender" threshold in the 2010 Constitution (ODI, 2016:27). In addition, the resistance to meet gender equality standards in Kenya can also be explained through the views of Townley (2019:80) on the predictors of women's political representation in sub-Saharan Africa. According to Townley (2019:80), internal conflict and quotas (top-down approach) were identified as important predictors based on two reasons. Internal conflict breaks down barriers between male and female on a social, political and economic level and allows changes in the political system. Since the political system undergoes a process of change, often-constitutional change, women's organizations, like FIDA did, would use the opportunity to form alliances for the inclusion of women's rights and greater female representation in government. This top-down approach, legislative or reserved seat quotas is less effective than voluntary political party quotas (Townley, 2019:89). The second reason according to Townley (2019:80) is the adoption of gender policies after conflict to encourage international donors to donate finances for the restoration, rebuilding and resettlement of the internally displaced. The inclusion of gender equality standards in the 2010 Constitution, after the 2007 post-election violence, as well as the Government of Kenya's failure to meet legislative gender quotas in parliament by 2020, strongly corresponds with Bergqvist *et al.* (2013:282) and Townley's (2019: 89) research. Table 3.3 demonstrated this. A decade after the implementation of the new Constitution of Kenya in 2010, the NA, Senate, cabinet and Supreme Court were all in violation of the "two-thirds gender principle". An attempt to vote for the Constitution of Kenya (Amendments) Gender Bill failed five times (2013, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019) of which four times were due to lack of a quorum (Mwere & Owino, 2018:5; Thiankolu, 2020:1). An observation from both the last failed attempts were the absence of female lawmakers in the NA. The commitment of the Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA) to support the Gender Bill in 2018 and 2019 was questioned due to a lack of visibly lobbying efforts from KEWOPA (Mwere, 2019:1). On the other hand, FIDA concluded the February 2019 failed attempt, that despite the gains made under the 2010 Constitution, women in Kenya still faced systemic discrimination and there is a clear resistance for the implementation of the "two-thirds gender principle" (Muindi, 2019:14). The factors affecting the "two-thirds gender principle" are analysed next.

4.2.1 Impediments to gender equality in Kenya

Research conducted by Adhiambo-Oduol in 2003 and cited by Kasomo (2012:57) identified obstacles that were preventing women from advancing in the political sphere in general. These are socio-cultural beliefs; attitudes that men are superior to women (patriarchy) and the use of an institutional framework to control women's advancement in the labour market that consequently leads to an absence of female participation in decision-making processes. The application of these obstacles in the Kenya context is discussed in the next section.

4.2.1.1 Patterns of power and decision making

The repeated failure of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendments) Gender Bill inspired The Chief Justice of Kenya and FIDA in 2019 to conclude that gender transformation in the Parliament of Kenya, is obstructed by the patriarchal nature of the Kenyan society and that the implementation of the "two-thirds gender principle" will disrupt patriarchal interests of the political elite (Maraga, 2019:1). Therefore, Maraga (2019:1) agrees with Adhiambo-Oduol and Kasomo (2012:57) that the members of the Kenya parliament used the prevailing male-dominated institutional frameworks to control women's advancement to decision-making positions. In other words, structural resistance is used as a tool to sustain male hegemony. This observation concurs with Bergqvist *et al.* (2013:281) who recognized that resistance to gender reform is often invisible or hidden and it seldom manifests itself as such.

The first obstacle to gender equality identified by Adhiambo-Oduol (Kasomo, 2012:57) was socio-cultural beliefs and attitudes that men are superior to women. However, gender as a social structure assists in understanding how gender is embedded in the individual, interactional, and institutional dimensions; and how the creation of difference is the very foundation on which inequality rests (Mitullah, 2017:1) and according to Caprioli (2005:164) being used as a weapon against women. As the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs stated in 2019: "The law that ties our hands is cultural, whenever we want to make a change, we are reminded of patriarchy. Cultural bonds continue to hinder women in making progress and taking charge and control of our own lives" (Kobia, 2019:1). Women in Kenya have limited say in the household decision-making and over their own bodies, called the Mwenye Syndrome in the local language of Kilifi County in Kenya. Women are considered the "property" of men after dowry was paid, regarded as secondary to men, and are essentially engaged in unpaid family care or self-employment around the house (USAID 2020a:20).

Caprioli (2005:164) explained what Adhiambo-Oduol (Kasomo, 2012:57) meant with structural violence. Caprioli (2005:164) clarified that structural violence renders personal violence unnecessary with the quote “personal violence is for the amateur who uses guns while structural violence is for the professional who uses social structure”. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic emphasized the inequalities and structural violence that women and other vulnerable groups in Kenya continue to endure (Womensrightsc, 2020:3). The new reality of isolation and quarantine in 2020 intensified socio-economic challenges and inequalities, which triggered an increase in rape, domestic and intimate partner violence. The Women Rights Organizations of Kenya reported that violence against women and girls became critical. However, the allocation of resources by the government omitted the fact that reduced income opportunities, loss of jobs and livelihood offered fertile ground for the increase of GBV (Womensrightsc, 2020:3). Hence, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 highlighted the manner in which women in Kenya faced resistance at all levels of society and that structural violence became a precursor for physical violence in an emergency.

Kileleo *et al.* (2019:373) reasoned that sustainable development in Kenya would only be realized with an integrated gender approach in political and socio-economic development after the elimination of structural barriers. An analysis of the quota system by USAID (2020a:19) in county governments revealed that structural impediments and exclusion tactics persist and are male bias; that social perceptions hamper the effectiveness of the quota system and that structures for the promotion of gender equality are underfunded. Patriarchy persists on both the institutional and the individual level and that the marital status of women has far-reaching implications for political female representation. This results in married women having limited decision-making powers, but unmarried women are further discriminated against and compared to men in the political sphere.

The Second Progress Report on Implementation of the Standard Development Goals (SDG) in Kenya in 2018 revealed that, because of the patriarchal Kenyan society, women experience discrimination especially, with regard to control and landownership (Civil Society, 2019:32). Despite a change in laws with regard to property and inheritance in Kenya (Matrimonial Property Act, 49 of 2013), an audit by the Kenya Land Alliances in 2018 determined that for the period 2013 – 2017, 10.3 per cent of land title deeds were issued to women in comparison of 85.6 per cent to men. In terms of hectares, women got 1.62 per cent of the land in comparison to 97.76 per cent that was issued to men (KLA, 2018:1). These unequal norms on land ownership affect access to credit and leadership positions.

With this in mind, it is important to understand how oppressed women conceptualize power. Women conceptualize power in three stages according to Yeatman. The stages of power were identified as i) coercion (oppression); ii) protection and then iii) capacity (Vickers, 2015:762). Women, who feel powerless, experience power as oppression in dominance and subordination relations. However, with a decline in domestic domination, some women experience protection as power, but they still have relatively little power and depend on the government for protection (Vickers, 2015:762). Paradoxically, as more women are included in democratic decision-making processes, power is conceptualized as capacity, freedom and democracy (Vickers, 2015:762). It is only when women are empowered through the right to own and inherit land, to be elected to political offices, and to be included in political and civic engagement, that women in Kenya will be able to build their own capacity and actually will experience a feeling of freedom provided by democracy.

This conclusion was supported by an analysis by Afrobarometer (Mitullah, 2017:3) on the abovementioned issues. It was further disclosed that Kenyan women see gains in gender equality, but support for women's empowerment remained uneven as illustrated by Table 3.3 (KNBS, 2020:344; Standard, 2020:1). This harmed the programs intended to include gender in development agendas and policy dialogues. While gender inclusion is operationalized through policy, legal provisions and programmes in Kenya, gender equality as a principle of sustainable development falls short (Mitullah, 2017:1; Kileleo *et al.*, 2019:375). In support of the commitments made by the Government of Kenya, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, more than 50 per cent of men and women believe that equal opportunities and treatment for women have improved. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which shows that some gender equality shortfalls persist. Kileleo *et al.* (2019:372) identified that the election and slow appointment of women to decision making positions in the legislature, economic inequality and harmful socio-cultural beliefs, still affect the empowerment of women in Kenya.




Figure 4.1: Equal opportunities and treatment for women

Source: Mitullah (2017:4)

The information illustrated on the x-axis in Figure 4.1 provides the views of the different genders based on qualifications and ages while the y-axis is providing the percentages of people who have seen some improvement in gender equality in Kenya. According to the information provided by Afrobarometer (Mitullah, 2017:4) a majority of Kenyans feel there were improvements in gender equality. Men were a bit more convinced than women (57 per cent versus 54 per cent) that there has been some progress while young people between the ages 18 – 35 years (56 per cent) and the best-educated people with post-graduated education (72 per cent) saw an improvement in gender equality in Kenya. The information in Table 4.1 displayed that the better people are educated (72 per cent) versus no formal education (35 per cent) has a huge impact on how they perceive gender transformation. It can be concluded that education supports gender equality.

The information presented in Figure 4.2 presented public opinion if men and women should have equal opportunities to be elected as political leaders. The y-axis displayed the information based on gender; education and urban-rural residency while the x-axis provided the percentages of opinions. Conflicting to the status of female leadership in the legislature (see Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3) public opinion expressed in Figure 4.2 showed that 81 per cent of

women and 66 per cent of men indicated that women and men should have equal political opportunities to be elected to office. This opinion is equally shared by 74 per cent of Kenyans living in rural and 73 per cent urban areas. Contributing to this positive opinion is education. The better qualified the people (78 per cent with post-graduated education versus 51 per cent with no formal education), the stronger the opinion that women and men should have the same opportunity to be politically elected (Mitullah, 2017:12). It can be concluded that with education the mindset about gender equality can be changed.




Figure 4.2: Women should have the same chance as men of being elected

Source: Mitullah (2017:4)

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 clearly exhibit positive public opinion about equal opportunities for women in general and in politics, despite the reality and inequality in the appointment of women in the public administration as displayed in Table 4.1 and to decision-making positions in government as displayed in Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3. This inequality is a continuation of the facts provided in Figure 4.3 that the enrolment for females are higher than males at the primary school level, but more males are proceeding to secondary and tertiary education. The information displayed in Table 4.1 provides an overview of gender appointments in the Government of Kenya since the enactment of the 2010 Constitution

Table 4.1: Wage employment in public administration (2010 – 2020)

YEAR	WOMEN	MEN
2010	37 per cent	68 per cent
2011	38 per cent	62 per cent
2012	36 per cent	64 per cent
2013	35 per cent	65 per cent
2014	27 per cent	73 per cent
2015	36 per cent	64 per cent
2016	36 per cent	64 per cent
2020	37 per cent	68 per cent

Sources: KNBS (2017:48); USAID (2020a:47)

Table 4.1 displays the disparity in employment between women and men in the public sector. Since 2010 women occupied just more than one-third of the positions in the Government of Kenya in comparison to two-thirds of men. These statistics are contradicting the views of the public, as displayed in Figure 4.2 that women should enjoy equal opportunities as men. This discrepancy between public opinion and reality in 2020 could be explained by the imbalance in tertiary education between men and women as displayed by Figure 4.4.

Due to the fact that employment opportunities are based on the level of education in Kenya, educational opportunities are distorted in favour of males and this will most likely adversely affect economic growth (Global, 2020:11). The marginalization of girls to advance to higher and tertiary education restricts them to positions in the informal sector or labour-intensive export sector jobs. 54 per cent of small and medium enterprises are owned by women (Global, 2020:11). An investment in female development will be beneficial for greater investment in the health and education of their children and as a result the improvement of human capital and future improvement of the national income (USAID, 2020a:21).

The Kenya national census conducted in 2019, disclosed a population of 47 564 296 of which 23 548 056 (49.5 per cent) were males, while 50.5 percent or 24 014 716 were females (KNBS, 2019:1). A study completed by Oxfam in Nairobi, Kenya concluded that men spend more hours in paid work than unpaid care or domestic work (UCDW). According to the research findings, men spent an average of 25.2 hours versus 13.4 (1.5 times) hours respectively on paid work. Research results signified that in some of the counties a female worker spends 84

per cent of her time in UCDW, which is 5.3 times more than a male worker (Civil Society, 2019:31).

In rural communities, climate change further contributes to the burden of care. Reduced access to water and fuel increases travel distances. The burden of care that is already highly skewed against women, increased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, due to the closing of schools and caring of extended family members. Furthermore, women represent 75 per cent of the health sector workforce in Kenya, which increased their possibility of infection (UNDP, 2020:12).

It can be concluded that the public is conscious about gender equality, but as displayed by Tables 4.1 in this chapter and Table 3.3 in Chapter 3, structural resistance, based on the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy resists support for the realization of a gender-equal society. This conclusion was supported by empirical research and discussed in Section 6.9. The next section will discuss how access to and control over assets and resources affects women's agency.

4.2.1.2 Access to and control over assets and resources

Gender inequality affects economic growth (Bertay *et al.*, 2020:7). A disproportionate burden of care and lack of control over assets and income is affected by culture, literacy and location and most definitely affects women's economic empowerment (UN Women, 2020:1). Consequently, when women experience uneven constraints in access to physical assets like land and capital (12.3 per cent of women have access to formal finance) (Global, 2020:11), services like legal representation and health, access to information or suffer from attainment to education or labour markets, female productivity and economic growth will be negatively affected (AFDB, 2019:13; Bertay *et al.*, 2020:7). In terms of income, in general, women earn 58 per cent less than men and men also have three times more probability to have access to formal loans (USAID, 2020a:21).

Employment opportunities are based on the level of education and a lack of education is the biggest contributor to relative deprivation. The UN Secretary-General's report on the African Regional High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism that the threat of violent extremism in Africa (2019) is driven by a lack of education and poverty (UNSG, 2019:1). Botha (2014:17) surmised on the subject of extremism and terrorism in Kenya, that the highest percentage of members, who joined the extremist group, Al Shabaab and the separatist organization, MRC, only has primary education. The number of recruits decreased with an increase in education and only few members have tertiary education (Botha, 2014:17). Radicalization in Kenya is discussed in

Section 4.4 and female radicalization in Kenya is discussed in Section 4.4.3. But above all, the correlation between gender development and education cannot be emphasized enough.

4.2.1.2.1 Education

The empirical research, in Section 6.2.2.7 in Chapter 6, highlighted that education in Kenya is sacred and that parents would sacrifice a lot to send their children to university. The information in Figure 4.3 illustrates the proportion of students based on gender that was enrolled in learning institutes in 2017. Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the enrolment rate of the genders was almost equal for primary and secondary school, but there was a significant drop in the enrolment for both genders at the tertiary level. Only 60 per cent of the 82 per cent of male students that were enrolled in secondary school were enrolled at tertiary education while only 40 per cent of the 80 per cent of female students that were enrolled at secondary school were enrolled in tertiary education. That is a drop of 40 per cent of female enrolment. The difference between the genders at tertiary level was 20 per cent in comparison to 2 per per cent in secondary school in 2017.

Reasons for the difference in the significant difference in the numbers between male and female tertiary enrolment were contributed to socio-economic and cultural reasons. There is a positive correlation between FGM, child marriage and teenage pregnancy and are deeply rooted in socio-cultural norms, gender inequality, and poverty (USAID, 2020a:40). This information was confirmed during the empirical research and discussed in Section 6.8.




Figure 4.3: Proportion of people attending school

Sources: KNBS (2017:33); Wanzala (2020:1)

The information provided in Figure 4.3 based on gender explains that all children have equal opportunities to education in Kenya, but Figure 4.4 illustrates that until 2017 only 40 per cent of females in comparison to 60 per cent males advance to tertiary education. Little or no improvement was recorded for females that advanced to tertiary education in the enrolment period from 2013 to 2016, but the gender gap was reduced with 6 per cent from 20 per cent in 2017 to 14 per cent in 2019. Figure 4.4 illustrates that 43 per cent of the students enrolled in public universities in 2019 were female students in comparison to 57 per cent male students (Wanzala, 2020:1). It is important to notice that on a post-graduate level the difference between male and female enrolment was only 2 per cent. In 2017, seven per cent male students in comparison to five per cent female students were enrolled for postgraduate courses. The data did not differentiate between full time and part-time enrolments at the post-graduate level.




Figure 4.4: Student enrolment at public universities 2013/14–2019/2020

Sources: KNBS (2017:41); Wanzala (2020:1)

The information in Table 4.2 displays the total number of students that were enrolled at various learning institutes during 2019 in Kenya. The information displayed that a total of 11.6 million students that left the learning institutions after completion. 14 million students never had been to school or left the learning institution before completion of the qualifications. 2.4 million more students did not complete the qualification Table 4.2 also displays a big drop in student numbers between primary and secondary school and an even bigger reduction in student numbers after secondary school and college or university enrolment (KNBS, 2019:1). Unfortunately, the data did not differentiate between the genders.

Table 4.2: Student enrolment in Kenya in 2019

TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS AT A LEARNING INSTITUTE	17.8 million
number of students left school / learning institution after completion	11.6 million
number of students left school / learning institution before completion	6.9 million
number of people that have never been to school	7.1 million
number of students in primary school	10 million
number of students in secondary school	3.3 million
number of students in college / technical training	500 000
number of students in university	471 000
number of people that have completed university education	1.3 million

Source: KNBS (2019:10)

The empowerment of women is crucial to sustainable development because investing in women has a multiplier effect and could be called “smart economics”. Women reinvest a big share of their gains into their families and the community. Women create peaceful and secure communities, which is needed for economic growth. It is therefore important to include gender issues in the very early stages of education. By educating a woman, you are educating the next generation. The education of women and as a result the economic empowerment of women is a necessity for sustainable development and produces the highest returns of all development investments (Ongwae, 2017:1). In Africa, women entrepreneurs are more probable to uplift other women and to invest in the health and education sectors of their communities (Ongwae, 2017:1). Investing in girls’ education, health and wellbeing have manifold benefits to society and goes beyond entitlements to boost the welfare of societies at large. It is a long-term strategy for sustainable development. Table 3.5 (Women’s empowerment index) confirmed the multiplier effect of education on the girl-child.

Women’s economic empowerment is one of the pathways to gender equality and influence and greater female political participation. As indicated above, tertiary education is a necessity for the personal development and agency of women in directing the careers of women in the

public and private sector. Table 4.3 provides a partial list of subjects and the number of male and female students enrolled during 2019.

Table 4.3: A partial list of university courses and enrolments by gender in 2019

SUBJECT	MEN	WOMEN
Agriculture	57 384	29 760
Business (Commerce Accounting Finance Marketing Administration Management Insurance Hotel Management Tourism etc.)	384,905	394,697
Chemistry	10 082	5 097
Computer Sciences (Mathematics-based programming)	71 221	49 127
Economics	28 308	15 945
Education	309 538	431 055
Engineering And Technology	283 514	24 177
Law	18 468	14 831
Mathematics	16 118	6 725
<u>Medicine</u>		
Nurses	57 082	113 076
Doctors	15 818	12 497
Dentists & Pharmacists	15 347	18 400
Laboratory & Radiologists	22 691	24 433
Military Science	24 800	2 923
Physics	3099	739
Political Science	6 628	3 486
Social Work	14 214	31 257
Systems Sciences (Interdisciplinary – improving processes with computing technology)	32 139	39 723

Source: KNBS (2019:160)

Power is knowledge and determines a person's position in a social structure. University degrees, which deliver the higher value job positions, are in the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) fields. Table 4.3 demonstrates that 5 097 and 739 women are enrolled in Chemistry and Physics (44 per cent) versus 10 082 and 3099 male students. Mathematics shows a similar picture with 6 725 (per cent per cent) female students versus 16 118 male students. However, in engineering and technology female students represent 8.5 per cent of the students it is a macabre 24 177 versus 283 514 male students. Women are better than men represented in business (394 697 versus 384 905), education (431 055 versus 309 538), social work (31 257 versus 14 214), systems sciences (39 723 versus 32 139) and in the medical careers, except for Doctors (KNBS, 2019:160).

In total 54 per cent of students enrolled for STEM degrees, which is critical to meet the skills required for the “Big Four” Agenda of President Kenyatta (2011 – 2022). Male students represent 63, and female students 37 per cent of the STEM degrees (Wanzala, 2020:1). Ericsson (2020:4) attested that a gender gap in mathematics (boys outperform girls) does not exist in the entry school years, but developed as children are socialized into school. The mathematics gender gap shows a positive correlation with societal gender equality. A second conclusion could be drawn. A mother's adherence to traditional cultural gender norms has a negative effect on a girl's relative performance. The research clarifies that the negative effect of cultural norms could be mitigated by the influence of the environment. Ericsson determined that in a gender-equal society, the norms of the parents would have a slighter effect on the performance of girls (Ericsson, 2020:139). It could be concluded with the introduction of a gender-equal norm in primary school, girls would have the same performance in STEM than boys.

What is of concern is the much lower female than male enrolments in Computer Sciences (49 127 versus 71 221), Economics (15 945 versus 28 308) and Political Science (3 486 versus 6 628). An advanced level of education in the mentioned fields would assist women to apply on an equal level with men for positions in the formal sector and politics. Because women are less represented in STEM and the economics courses, it disadvantages women from positions higher in status and remuneration in professional careers – therefore with less influence in socio-economic and political transformation (KNBS, 2019:160). The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 exposed that women are well represented in the service industry and as a result were financial, because of the closure of the tourism and restaurant industries, the most affected by the pandemic. It can be concluded from the literature review, and it was confirmed with the empirical research that attainment of female students is negatively affected by socio-cultural and economic factors that has a multiplier effect on female participation in the labour force.

4.2.1.2.2 Female labour force participation in Kenya

The economic dimension is one of the central dimensions of gender inequality. Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3) identified that women in the formal sector will develop a consciousness of political participation with the capacity to influence. A second causal effect of the research was the positive correlation between a state's economic growth and gender equality and thirdly that a negative correlation between gender equality and corruption exists. To put it differently, an increase in gender equality promotes economic growth.

World Bank (2018:XIV) on poverty and gender assessment in Kenya displayed that the labour force participation for women is 70 per cent and for men 77 with a higher employment rate of women in the central and western parts of the country than in the north-eastern part. There is a correlation between the lower labour force employment rate in the north-eastern part of the country and the number of Al Shabaab attacks as displayed in Figure 4.9 (World Bank, 2018:XIV). The wellbeing of the people in the north-northeastern counties of Kenya lags significantly, behind that of the rest of Kenya. People in Kenya who live below the poverty line decreased from 46.8 per cent to 36.1 per cent from 2005 to 2015. However, the absolute number of people living below the poverty line in urban settings increased from 2.3 to 3.8 million and in the north-northeastern part of Kenya increased from 2.4 to 3.2 million in the same period. The estimated poverty rate in the rural areas is 40 per cent where 80 per cent of the people live (UNICEF Kenya, 2019:26). The international poverty rate in 2020 was 33.1 per cent (World Bank, 2020c:1).

The study by the World Bank on poverty and gender assessment in Kenya also revealed that small children reduce (every child 0–5 years) women's likelihood with two per cent to be in the labour force (World Bank, 2018:XIV). One of the categories of women that joined extremist groups was classified as agents of stat- building with the first and foremost task to give birth to as many children in the shortest space of time (See Section 4.4.3.2.1 for a discussion on female pull factors). Table 3.5 illustrated that the size and location of the family negatively affect the probability of the girl-child to be empowered. Hence, big families negatively affect women's probability to participate in the labour force and that of the future of the girl-child. Long-term effects of poor socio-economic conditions affect growth and psychosocial stimulation of children, specifically under five years of age. This leads to undernutrition and stunting.

The Kenya country report on the "Cost of Hunger in Africa" (CoHA) study revealed that the rate of stunted children in Africa has decreased from 42.1 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2018. However, the absolute number of children increased from 46.4 million to 58.8 million children

in the same period. East Africa contains 40.7 per cent, the largest proportion, of stunted children in Africa. In Kenya 26 per cent or 1.8 million children under the age of five were stunted in 2018 (UNICEF Kenya, 2019:26). The percentage of girls suffering from stunting in Kenya was calculated at 22 per cent versus 33 per cent in Ethiopia and Rwanda and 27 per cent in Uganda in 2020 (ACPF, 2020:66). Undernutrition and stunting increases the burden on social and health services to both the family and the government, because undernourished children are at higher risk for morbidity and mortality while stunted children are likely to repeat school years and or drop out of school due to lower cognitive and physical development. Accordingly stunting will negatively affect an adult's productivity (UNICEF Kenya, 2019:44). Consequently, the participation of women in the formal, informal and agriculture sectors in Kenya is discussed in subsections 4.2.1.2.2.1 and 4.2.1.2.2.2.

4.2.1.2.2.1 Formal sector

A labour force analysis by USAID (2020a:47) revealed that the public service provides employment to 3.8 per cent of the labour force. Women represents 37 per cent in general, but only 23 per cent at the national level and 47 per cent in county governments. Women who occupy jobs in the formal sector, are mostly employed in the service sector and education. Women are also employed (65–75 per cent) in labour-intensive sectors, like flower exports, textiles (75 per cent) and tourism (33 per cent) (USAID, 2020a:49). These statistics correlates with the female enrolments in business and education studies as displayed by Table 4.3. Table 4.4 summarized the men's and women's participation in the labour force market in general.

Table 4.4: Gender participation in the labour force in Kenya

	MEN	WOMEN
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION	77	70
WAGED EMPLOYEES	50	30
SERVICES	42.5	42.5
AGRICULTURE	40	55
INDUSTRY	18	5

Source: World Bank (2018:XIV)

Table 4.4 illustrates that 50 per cent of men versus 30 per cent of women receive wages. Men and women are equally represented with 42.5 per cent in the service sector while 55 per cent of women versus 40 per cent of men work in the agriculture sector. This is discussed in Section 4.2.1.2.2.2. Men occupy 18 per cent of the jobs in the industry versus 5 per cent of women (World Bank, 2018:XIV). The lower percentage of women in the industry reflects the lower percentage of female students that are enrolled for STEM subjects. However, more women than men are working in agriculture while female students are almost 50 per cent less than male agriculture students (USAID, 2020a:47).

A special report by Equileap (2019:10) on gender equality in the corporate sector verified that 90 per cent of women in sub-Saharan Africa and most women in Kenya work in the informal sector. The average score of gender equality in the corporate world in Kenya is 26 per cent for the 60 companies that participated in the survey. Women account for 23 per cent (but globally 22 per cent) of board members in Kenya in 2019. This represented a 1 per cent increase from 2017, but a 10 per cent increase from 2012 to 2019. Executive officers filled 22 per cent (but globally 15 per cent) and senior management filled 28 per cent (but globally 21 per cent) of positions. Sixty-two per cent of the companies have equal career development opportunities for men and women on all levels of the company. However, the growth forecast for the next 20 years predicted that there would be a shift towards a more equal formal economy in Kenya. Kenya outperformed the global average of women in top positions. The global gender wage gap is 23 per cent, but the Kenyan gender wage gap is 32 per cent. Financial advice from Equileap (2019:11) was that investors rather focus on gender-equal institutions and that the exclusion of women from senior management positions could be risky for the economy of Kenya. International companies, like MasterCard, Microsoft and Coca Cola to mention a few instituted social responsibility initiatives to promote job creation, of which 70 per cent will be reserved for your women and youth (USAID, 2020a:48). As indicated in the opening sentence of this section, most women in Kenya are working in the informal sector.

4.2.1.2.2.2 Agriculture and informal sector

The unemployment rate, displayed by Figure 3.6 in Section 3.4.4.2.2 in Chapter 3, demonstrated that the unemployment under youth (15–30 years of age) in the second quarter of 2020 was more than 50 per cent (Gitogo, 2020:1). As a result, an estimated 83 per cent of the population is engaged in the informal sector of which women represents 60 per cent. From a young age, men and women are categorized along a formal-informal labour divide. Due to few opportunities and lower levels of education, 36 per cent of women, at the age of 19, already started with a family and will probably enter the more flexible informal sectors of farming or micro-businesses (KNBS, 2014:1; Heyer, 2019:1). While young men can pursue different

pathways to economic independence and financial security, women are more likely to rely on relationships or informal channels for financial support to manage their lives and livelihoods (Heyer, 2019:1). Section 3.5.1 discussed the barriers to girls' education in Kenya. Gender inequality sustains poverty with threats to human security (poverty, lack of health care, child labour, early and forced marriages, UCDW, GBV, FGM ext.). The cyclical process between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity was confirmed during the empirical study and discussed in Section 6.3 and illustrated in Figure 6.1. The abovementioned placed a heavy strain on the girls' or women's advancement into the paid labour market or the development of their entrepreneurial skills with dire results for social protection, pay and pension contributions.

Table 4.3 displays that only half of the agriculture students are female (51 per cent), while Table 4.4 illustrates that 50 per cent of the agriculture work force is female yet women only own 1.62 per cent of the hectares, in Kenya (KLA, 2018:1). Without title deeds, women are unable to access credit, share in markets or access cooperative membership (AFDB, 2019:10). Additional to the shortage of land, women do not have control over the income from the crops they produce, have no ownership of the livestock and other productive measures while they also have to carry the burden of care (AFDB, 2019:10). Patriarchy is still a strong force in the agriculture sector despite the progress made by gender mainstreaming. Economically viable projects developed through women empowerment were taken over by men and female farmers are absent in the mega projects like the Galana Irrigation Scheme to improve food security. In agriculture the gender of poverty remains female (AFDB, 2019:12).

Like in the agriculture sector, women play significant roles (60 per cent) in the informal sector of the country. Poverty in the informal enterprise sector is lower than in agriculture. As a result, the level of poverty in Kenya was reduced from 43.6 to 35.6 per cent between 2005 and 2015. This was achieved through the diversification of the rural livelihoods and with supplementing farming with informal small enterprises (AFDB, 2019:12). Despite the lack of sex-disaggregated data, the Government of Kenya indicated that 48 per cent of micro, small and medium-size enterprises are female owned. Two-thirds of these enterprises are in the rural areas of which 85 per cent are in the informal sector.




Figure 4.5: Micro-, small and medium enterprises

Source: AFDB (2019:12)

The information illustrated on the x-axis in Figure 4.5 provides an overview of the gender and type of owner- or partnerships of micro, small and medium businesses. In addition, the x-axis also indicates if the enterprise was licensed or not. The y-axis provides the percentages. Figure 4.5 displays that men are more prone to register their businesses than women and that single ownership is preferred above partnerships. However, when partnerships were formed, preference was given, in both licensed and unlicensed enterprises, to a male-female combination than same- gender partnerships. Although it was not identified as such in the literature, a natural conclusion would most probably be, that a male-female partnership would be a couple or members of the same family. It can also be deducted that the most of the enterprises are female owned (60.7 per cent) and are unlicensed while 32.2 per cent of enterprises owned by women are licensed. The picture looks different for men. Most of the enterprises that are male owned (47.9 per cent) are licensed versus 31.4 per cent that is not licensed. More of the partnerships are licensed. 16.5 per cent male-female partnerships are licensed versus 6.4 per cent that is not licensed. Most of the unlicensed businesses are operated from home and female owners most probably are the only employee (AFDB,

2019:12). It was established that female-run businesses earn 43 per cent lower profits than their male counterparts (USAID, 2020a:49). This finding is explained in the next paragraph.

The financial contribution of women to the total GDP of Kenya is largely unclear, because the contribution of the informal sector cannot be adequately calculated. Access to finances remains one of the biggest barriers that women in Kenya face. Despite the fact that some legal laws were changed to accommodate gender, women are still subjected to customary laws and cultural practices which limit women and widow's rights to land and property (Kimeu & Maneno, 2017:14). The location of women, especially in the rural areas in the absence of a well-developed infrastructure, is time-consuming and burdensome. For the same reason, access to financial institutions is difficult and put strain on women in rural areas. This was confirmed by the unequal disbursement of the Uwezo Fund (the purpose of the fund is to provide youth, women and persons with disabilities the opportunity to generate self-employment) with a smaller distribution in the disadvantaged counties. Underspensing of the fund was more visible in poorer counties in comparison to richer counties (Guguyu, 2019:12).

The one-size-fit-all financial approach is not only gender blind, but also hinder the ability to measure the progress of women on an annual basis. Moreover, this approach inhibits targeted policy interventions. More accurate targeting should be done to ensure that those who deserve the interventions get the benefit (Ngunjiri, 2019:27). The Women's Fund displayed that almost three-quarters of the beneficiaries having completed only primary or less education. This is affecting women's judgement and business skills. Women also constantly need to manage household and business priorities to meet their individual needs (Guguyu, 2019:12). Table 3.5 is a helpful tool to refine policies to meet the target populations.

Due to a societal mindset about the financial potential of women in Kenya, financial institutions need intensive interventions to recognize the importance of the female market segment and to confront the many obstacles that exclude women from financial access. A combined effort of the Government of Kenya and the financial sector to fund female enterprises will ultimately lead to a stronger and more sustainable economy in Kenya and to build Kenya's missing middle class (Ngunjiri, 2019:27). Only 12 per cent of women in Kenya have access to formal financing in comparison to 13.9 per cent in Uganda, 5.4 per cent in Rwanda and 6.4 per cent in Tanzania (USAID, 2020a:50). This finding might be an explanation of why most female enterprises, according to Figure 4.5 are not licensed. Most women rely on social financing (informal groups, lending and borrowing across social networks, shopkeeper finance and more) to manage economic shocks, bridging cash gaps and to meet their goals. In 2020 in Kenya, 160 534 registered women's groups, which provides informal savings and borrowing facilities exist (USAID, 2020a:50). These relationships also offer emotional and non-financial

support. It is clear that in Kenya the financial landscape is gendered with binaries formal/informal and men/women leaving women to fight for themselves through informal alternatives to raise and educate Kenya's future generations (Heyer, 2019:1). The Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT) was identified during the empirical research and discussed in Section 6.11. It was established as a micro financial organization to offer financial services to low-income women only. In 2020, the Kenya Women Microfinance Bank is one of the biggest micro-financial institutions in Kenya with branches throughout the country.

Kenya's digital (cell phone or mobile money) financial services provided women access to finances and a medium to do financial transactions independently without the help of a financial institution. Mobile money allows for both formal and informal financial options on the one hand, but on the other hand it reinforced the existing gender divide of female/informal and men/formal. Mpesa⁷ accessibility has helped with women's economic transformation and personal independence. (Heyer, 2019:1). Mpesa has moved an estimated 185 000 women from farming into micro enterprises in the proximity of their homes. 31 per cent of females versus 20 per cent of males rely entirely on Mpesa accounts (USAID, 2020a:51). Information communication technology is an important tool to facilitate money transfers and to provide access to information and markets for the economic transformation of women. Table 4.5 illuminates the use of Information communication technology between the genders.

Table 4.5: Information technology communication use

	URBAN		RURAL	
	% of MEN	% of WOMEN	% of MEN	% of WOMEN
Mobile Phone Use	62	62	40	40
Internet Use	25	20	16	11
Computer Use	24	19.3	6.3	4.4

Source: USAID (2020a:21)

⁷ Mpesa is a Kenya mobile banking service that allows for the transfer and storage of money through mobile phones. No bank accounts are needed. A person opens a Mpesa account at the cell phone service provider. M stands for mobile and pesa means money in Swahili.

Table 4.5 illustrates that women are on par with men in the use of cell phone technology in both urban and rural areas. There is a gender gap in the use of the internet with women lagging behind men in both urban and rural areas. Twenty-five per cent of men is using the internet in urban and 16 per cent in rural areas versus 20 per cent of women in urban and 11 per cent of women in rural areas. The use of computers in urban areas strongly relates to the use of internet in these areas with men using 24 per cent and women 19.3 per cent. The use of computers reduces dramatically for both men and women in the rural areas with the percentage of men only 6.3 per cent and women 4.4 per cent. Barriers such as electricity, cost, network coverage and technical literacy are contributing to Kenya's digital gender gap in rural areas (Kinyua, 2017:2).

With limited access and control over finances, women's dependence on people for support increase which has limiting effects on female education, access to health services and economic independence. A lack of awareness of legal reforms and legal support services available and prohibiting traditional norms have delayed female economic transformation. The African Development Bank (AFDB, 2019:13) concluded that the importance of gender and the economic contribution of women indirectly contribute to the national GDP, but it is not always measurable. However, the Government of Kenya estimated that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises contribute as much as 20 per cent to the GDP of Kenya. This is despite non-economic issues that have clear economic consequences like GBV, cultural restrictions on female economic activities together with intrahousehold financial dynamics strongly influence decision making over control and allocation of the family resources (AFDB, 2019:13). These non-economic factors are discussed in the next section.

4.3 Non-economic issues with clear economic consequences

Forsberg and Olsson (2016:4) explained in Section 2.7.3.3, that in a masculinized political culture (patriarchal societies) the threshold for violence is lower. In these societies norms of intolerance develop with regard to women, sexual or ethnic minorities or political opposition groups. Confirming this fact is the persistence of GBV and domination over women to the extent that GBV is considered normal, therefore legitimate.

4.3.1 Sexual and gender-based violence

SGBV is widespread in Kenya, despite the provision of legislation, and the adoption of policies, as discussed in Sections 3.4.3.2 and 3.4.4.2.3. GROOTS Kenya's (a national movement of grassroots women-led community-based groups) research on violence against women,

displayed that the majority of violence against women is domestic, as high as 84 per cent in Laikipia County (Civil Society, 2019:30). The level of education could be a predictor for domestic, sexual or emotional violence.




Figure 4.6: Women and men aged 15–49 who experienced physical violence (caused by spouse) measured against the level of education

Source: KNBS (2017:54)

The y-axis in Figure 4.6 provides information on the gender and level of education of each gender while the x-axis provides the percentages of physical violence that the genders endured measured against their level of education. The information displayed in Figure 4.6 demonstrates that with higher levels of school education, GBV against women in Kenya subsides. However, the same is not true for men. The KNBS (2017:54) revealed in their analysis of sexual and emotional violence, a similar trend than the information provided on physical violence. Figure 4.2 in this chapter agrees with the information presented in Figure 4.6 that with higher levels of education a gender-equal mind-set develops with a higher level of tolerance towards women in Kenya.

The importance of the information revealed by Figure 4.6 will become more evident with female economic transformation. The risk with an increase in female income, in Kenya, could come with an increase in domestic conflict or partner violence about the sharing of the income –

especially in strong patriarchal households. The danger that borrowed money could be handed over to husbands for non-productive use and result in over-borrowing which will lead to indebtedness and persistent vulnerability. With an increase in women's employment contributions without a decrease in the unpaid care work of women, could firstly lead to the overburdening of women or secondly to more domestic conflict as women will spend less time on household tasks. With more women in traditionally male employment jobs, the possibility of an increase in gender base violence in the workplace or when women are using public transport to travel to and from work exists (USAID, 2020a:54). Ericsson (2020:1) established, that even in a gender-equal society like Sweden, a positive correlation between female economic empowerment and domestic violence is positive and substantial. An increase in female economic independence triggers a male backlash with an increase in the husband's risk of negative behaviour such as stress, anxiety, substance abuse and assault. Research by Bones (2016:59) in Malawi, is in agreement with the findings by Ericsson (2020:1). Bones determined that wives that have three or more years of education than their husbands are more likely to experience physical and emotional violence. A similar trend was established for women that are earning more than their husbands. It can be concluded that with an increase in female education and financial independence come an expectation of an increase in decision-making power in the family. A decline in female social and economic dependence upset the traditional gender power structure in the marriage. Bones (2016:67) underlined the importance to educate both men and women equally to alleviate the risk of domestic violence for women.

In 2020, since the start of the global COVID-19 pandemic, Kenya experienced a surge in cases of domestic and GBV. A third of crimes reported in this period were related to sexual violence due to heightened levels of stress, uncertainty and fear while people's movements were restricted and confined to living conditions (Motive *et al.*, 2020:1). As a result, adolescent pregnancies in Kenya were illuminated. However, statistics released by the KNBS in 2019 based on a 2014 survey conducted by the National Council on Population and Development revealed that 28,932 (3 per cent) girls aged between 10 to 14 and 349,465 (40 per cent) of girls 15 to 19 years respectively became impregnated every year. This translated to 18 per cent early motherhood (up to the age of 19) and remained unchanged since 2008 (KNBS, 2014:78). In comparison Woden *et al.* (2017:17) presented that an average of early births before the age of 18 as 26.33 per cent and before the age of 15 as 4.9 per cent in the 25 countries that were used in their research on early childbirths, in 2017. In 2015 the Government of Kenya revised the ARHD Policy of 2003 to address the persistence in adolescent pregnancies. The purpose of the policy as discussed in Section 3.4.4.2.4 of Chapter 3, was to reduce unintended pregnancies. Though the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 illuminated

adolescent pregnancies is a crisis in Kenya but by the time of writing in November 2020, new data that the pandemic had an increase in adolescent pregnancies were not yet available. The general rate of teenage pregnancies in Kenya is contributed to socio-economic and cultural factors as well as a lack of sex education (Mugambi, 2020:1).

Notwithstanding the reasons for teenage pregnancies or GBV, but what is of importance is the protection of the girl-child's basic human and constitutional rights, because this generation of girls is half the next decade's adult population. The welfare, social, physical and economic security of the next generation is compromised if gender inequality and the wellbeing of today's girl-child is not improved. GBV comes with a huge cost to human development and productivity in the economy. The prevention, rather than treatment of GBV and addressing cultural bonds that continue to hinder women in making economic progress (USAID, 2020a:45) is imperative. GBV-response and counselling systems are weakened by inadequate coordination of reporting, limited budget allocations, weak medical services, incomplete investigations and as a result low levels of prosecution. This dismal situation undermines referrals, counselling and justice through the formal institutional system (USAID, 2020a:35). The Government of Kenya spent 2.3 per cent of the GDP on social protection in comparison with the median of 4.2 per cent for Africa. Besides Rwanda and Djibouti spent 7.3 per cent and Ethiopia 4.2 cent on social protection in 2019 (ACPF, 2020:44). Furthermore, by not strengthening women's presence in decision-making, peace and security or investing in her economic and personal agency, will rather promote than prevent radicalization of the youth – as discussed in Section 4.2.2. Besides, Anderlini (2010:7) and Lewis (2006:11) identified GBV as an indicator of internal conflict (see Section 2.8.3.2.1 for a discussion on GBV and internal conflict), because of the dimension of the problem, GBV is turned into a security sector problem instead of being integrated in human security.

Gender equality is a vital part of sustainable development and is linked to the UN SDGs. The linkage between gender equality (SDG 5) and extreme poverty and food security (SDG 1 & 2), access to health services and water and sanitation (SDG 3 & 6), education and decent work (SDG 4 & 8), climate change (SDG 13) is inter-connected with peace and strong institutions (SDG 16) (Civil Society, 2019:32). The multitude of connections between gender inequality and security is illustrated with the abovementioned data and confirmed by civil society research in Kenya. It is important to understand that gender equality forms an integral part of the security of a state and without gender equality, the promotion of the principles of good governance and sustainability of security become a challenge (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015:2). It is therefore important to understand the interconnection between gender inequality and the status of women, violent conflict and its effect on human rights.

Forsberg and Olsson (2016:4) indicated that the presence of gender inequality may contribute, directly or indirectly to an increased risk of social violence or internal violent conflict.

Section 4.4 focuses on the repercussions for security if gender inequality is not addressed. The general characteristics of radicalization and extremism will be addressed first. The terminology will be explained where after the conditions and drivers conducive to violent and female extremism will be deliberated. Section 4.4.1.1 briefly discusses the influence of Al Shabaab in East Africa and Kenya. Section 4.5 provides a multilevel analysis of radicalization whereas Section 4.6 focuses on radicalization and extremism in Kenya. Section 4.6.3 explores female radicalization and Section 4.6.3.1 studies the effect of gender-blind CVE policies on female radicalization in Kenya.

4.4 Repercussions for security due to gender inequality

The maintenance of sustainable democracies relies on the democratic principles of equality and human rights. The promotion of these democratic principles is hampered by global developments and security challenges such as extremism, violent extremism and terrorism. (UNGA, 2015:4). Individuals or ideologies can be extremist, but non-violent. But when values oppose the core values of democracy and violence become part of the extremist activity, this uncertainty is overcome. Members of any ideology have the potential to resort to violence – a sign that violent extremism is not associated with a specific ideology or religion (OSCE, 2019:21). Violent extremism undermines the collective efforts taken by countries to maintain peace and security, promoting development and the rule in law in an effort to protect human rights (UNGA, 2015:4).

4.4.1 Defining radicalization and violent extremism

Violent extremism, because of its diversity triggered various definitions at the national level and at times is used interchangeably with terrorism. Due to the variations in the individual or social contexts, motives and features, it is difficult to define violent extremism. However, it is generally observed that violent extremism is broader than terrorism, but legally does not constitute an act of terrorism (UNGA, 2015:2; OSCE, 2019:21). Violent extremism includes messages of hate and violence, together with religious, cultural and social intolerance (UNODC, 2018:1). The United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defined violent extremism as the “encouraging, condoning, justifying or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goals (USAID, 2011:2). The OECD defined violent extremism as the “promotion of views which foment and incite violence in furtherance

of particular beliefs, and foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence” (OECD, 2016:2). The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) defined extremism as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist” (Government of United Kingdom, 2015:9). It can be concluded that violent extremism (male and female) in Kenya is motivated by Kenyan foreign intervention, but it is driven by threats to human security based on ethnic inequality (see Figure 7.2 in Section 7.7 in Chapter 7) to achieve political, religious ideological and economic goals.

Radicalization refers to a process where individuals are introduced to an open ideological message and belief system that inspires a movement from mainstream to more extreme views. In other words, the possibility of a moral change developed. Radicals challenge the status quo and can be a positive force of change, because of their open-mindedness. However, radicalization is often associated with extremism, which refers to close-mindedness (Speckhard *et al.*, 2017:4). The Human Rights Council defined radicalization in terms of a “process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations”. This may include the “willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals” (HRC, 2016:8). The Human Rights Council emphasized that the process of radicalization is highly individualized and includes many different forms. It’s only by analysing the social-psychological distinctions within beliefs, feelings and behaviours, social and political factors and that the pathway to radicalization will be understood. Radical or extremist views do not constitute a security breach but when such views are translated into violent acts, it becomes a security concern (HRC, 2016:8). Therefore, “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature” are defined as acts of terror (FBI, 2020:1). Schmid (2004:377) in his discussion of the problem that exists with the definition of terrorism, quoted the United States Department of Defence’s (DOD) definition as “Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological”. Bloom (2011:1) described terrorism as the “ultimate weapon of the weak” and explained that groups that were unsuccessful with conventional tactics on the battlefield use unconventional tactics to stir terror behind the battle lines and now focus their recruitment on the weakest members of society – women and children. Al Shabaab fits Blooms’ profile of a terrorist organization.

4.4.1.1 4.4.1.1 History of Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab, meaning “the youth” in Arabic, is a Somalia based independent organization driven by Salafi ideology. Al Shabaab served as the military wing for the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) but separated in 2006. Its first suicide attack was in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2007 – killing 73 people (CISAC, 2019:1). The group’s aim is to replace the Government of Somalia with a Somalian state strictly ruled by Sharia law and framed the Somalia struggle as a global jihadist movement. In 2008 Al Shabaab pledged alliance to Al Qaeda to attract foreign fighters and monetary donations from Al Qaeda supporters (CISAC, 2019:1). In 2018 it was estimated that the group has between 7 000 – 9 000 members (Herbling *et al.*, 2018:1) and Ndung’u reported (2017:20) that according to a UN assessment, in 2014, Kenyans represented 10 per cent of Al Shabaab membership.

On 11 July 2010, Al Shabaab was responsible for a suicide bombing in a restaurant in Uganda. It was the first attack outside Somalia (CISAC, 2019:1). Al Shabaab redirected its focus to Kenya after Kenya invaded Somalia in 2011 to retake the port of Kismayo (Somalia) from Al Shabaab control and to end Somali migration across the border into Kenya territory. Al Shabaab’s resilience and strategic cohesion makes it one of the most durable and innovative terrorist actors (Petrich & Donnelly, 2019:1) and in 2017 Al Shabaab was identified as the deadliest in Africa (Warner & Chapin, 2018:IV). Al Shabaab’s tactics include bombings, suicide bombings, kidnappings, vandalism and shootings, extorting taxes, criminal activities and invest in support networks beyond their control to exploit governance gaps (Petrich, 2020:1). It was reported that Al Shabaab has engaged in rape, sexual torture and sexual slavery (Matfess, 2020:6).

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping mission is stationed in Somalia since 2007 (UNSC, 2007:1) and Al Shabaab focused attacks on AMISOM soldiers and troop-contributing countries in an attempt to clear Somalia from foreign influences. However, Al Shabaab is mainly targeting Kenya only and it is theorized that it is an attempt to provoke Kenya security forces to crackdown on Somalis living in Kenya. This is an Al Shabaab strategy to win and exploit the sympathy of the Somali community in Kenya. Kenya’s well-developed tourism industry provides soft targets for attacks and Kenya’s independent media provides international publicity (CISAC, 2019:1). Radicalization in Kenya is discussed in Section 4.6 and Figure 4.8 in the same section provides statistics and a picture of Al Shabaab’s presence in Kenya.

To understand the pathways to radicalization, explanations on macro-level (structural), meso-level (socio-psychological or group influences) and the micro-level (personal factors) that act, as contributors to the cause of violent extremism are probed next as summarized in Table 4.6.

4.4.2 Drivers of radicalization

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2019:29) has clustered factors that drive or enable violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in the following groups:

- individual socio-psychological factors that includes emotions and grievances of frustration and anger mainly based on injustices and exclusion (OSCE, 2019:29, Zmigrod et al, 2019:3; SFCG, 2019:11);
- closely related to the abovementioned factors is trauma or other psychological triggers that can be experienced because of individual experiences;
- social factors that are related to marginalization, stigmatization and discrimination (or perceived discrimination) to education or employment opportunities (UNGA, 2015:22; Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018:78; Botha, 2014:13);
- political factors comprised of grievances that are a result of government actions or non-actions that are central to alienation and injustices. Political factors can be influenced by ideology and religion (Botha, 2015:40);
- culture and identity crises develop due to culture marginalization – especially when second-generation immigrants lack a sense of belonging in their new environment (Bouhana, 2019:17; Saltman and Smith, 2015:08);
- group dynamics influences the behaviour of the members belonging to a certain group. When people do not experience a sense of belonging to mainstream society, they tend to associate with others who have similar needs. Groups with strong charismatic leaders will be popular (Saltman & Smith, 2015:8; UNGA, 2015:8);
- radicalizers or groomers target vulnerable people with grievances and by means of persuasion; manipulation or pressure motivates them to join the course of violent extremism and (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018:78; Botha, 2014:13) and

- lastly, social media not only provides aggrieved or like-minded people with connectivity, but also accelerate the process of radicalization or self-radicalization (OSCE, 2019:29; Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020:6).

Two main categories of drivers were identified and divided into pull or push factors and are discussed in the next subsection.

4.4.3 Conditions conducive to violent extremism

The General Assembly Report A/70/674 (UNGA, 2015:6), quoted by Saltman and Smith (2015:8) identified trends and patterns of radicalization that distinguished two main categories of drivers, namely push and pull factors. The UN identified push factors as conditions derived from structural factors in a society, while Salman and Smith explained push factors as the conditions that make a person vulnerable to a process of radicalization. Pull factors, on the other hand, is identified by the UN as the psychological or individual motivations why radicalized people convert to violent extremism while Salman and Smith identified the positive and empowering things that extremism groups offer and other groups do not as pull factors (Saltman & Smith, 2015:8). The next two subsections will study both the push and pull factors.

4.4.3.1 Push factors

Push factors can be explained from a structural context from which it emerges. Push factors are socio-economic, political and cultural in nature.

- Firstly, a lack of socio-economic opportunities in states where the government fails in maintaining sustainable economic growth, where unemployment, poverty and inequality are high, corruption levels are elevated and the government fails to manage ethnic relationships, might alienate and isolate people. The search for a new identity and alternative sources of income is provided by extremist organizations (UNGA, 2015: 8; Saltman & Smith, 2015:8).
- Secondly, inequality, may it be ethnic, gender, religious or on socio-economical levels, may increase inter-communal tensions because of discrimination and alienation and restricted access to resources and public opportunities (UNGA, 2015:8). Saltman and Smith (2015:08) explained that a feeling of your “in-group” is under attack develops.

This in turn may persuade the marginalized to turn to violent extremism for settling the score.

- A third push factor is when a political environment is characterized by poor governance, corruption, repressive policies and practices that lead to human right violations and abuses of the rule of law. Violent extremists exploit a state of repression to gain community sympathy and support for their ideology. Prolonged and unresolved conflicts and radicalizations in prisons are further sources of radicalization (UNGA, 2015:08; Bloom and Lokmangoglu, 2020:4). The radicalization of women in prisons was not addressed in this study.
- The research highlighted that some push or pull factors have gender-specific nuances, but when it comes to the key motivations for recruitment to extremist structures, both genders responded to push factors of dissatisfaction with the current political and economic conditions; the need to escape social or political pressures of their communities; personal experience of abuse or humiliation or the death of a family member by state security forces and institutional grievances amongst the Moslem population (Sahgal & Zeuten, 2018:7; Romaniuk *et al.*, 2018:165).

As mentioned earlier, the process of radicalization is highly individualized and only by analysing the social-psychological distinctions within believes, feelings and behaviours, social and political factors, or also called the pull factors, the pathway to individual radicalization will be understood. These pull factors are discussed in the next subsection.

4.4.3.2 Pull factors

The strength of push factors relies on pull factors on an individual level for radicalization and recruitment. Pull factors refer to individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action and are based on:

- Positive and empowering dynamics that extremist groupings use as enticements for the recruitment like a sense of belonging and spiritual or divine purposes. Men and women are lured by the description of a utopian society, full of adventures or romantic events creating a sisterhood/brotherhood. Recruits are told that they are heroes if they join the “good” course of extremism to challenge the existing status of inequality - a prospect of glory and fame (Saltman & Smith, 2015:08).
- Secondly, “collective grievances and victimization stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention” are breeding grounds for the

excitement of emotional reactions to be exploited by extremists. The memories of the grievances are kept alive to stimulate revenge against the oppressors (UNGA, 2015:22).

- Emotional provocation is closely linked with the distortion or exploitation of religious beliefs, ethnic, political or ideological differences to legitimize the perspectives and violent actions of extremists during the recruitment process (UNGA, 2015:22).
- However, despite the abovementioned factors, recruitment by extremists would not have been successful without supportive social networks. Charismatic extremist leaders, informal family networks and lately, social media are all enabling pathways for radicalization (UNGA, 2015:22).

The UN (UNGA, 2015:21) on the other hand focused on the reasons why extremists are successful to motivate some individuals in a community to convert their grievances into violent extremism. Firstly, individual backgrounds or personal experiences play key roles in motivating people. When an individual had a negative experience or witnessed torture or death by security forces, experienced unfair trials or personal humiliation or that of a family member, lost property or as small as the refusal of a personal loan can serve as motivation for extremism. Although highly educated people also join extremist organizations, the majority of the members have only elementary levels of education with little religious knowledge. These factors are contributing to the vulnerability of people to indoctrination and the yearning for acceptance that is provided by extremist group membership. A study in the MENA established pull factors include religious ideology, nationalist goals and aspirations and selective incentives provided by the violent extremist group such as stability or financial rewards (Cachalia *et al.*, year:7).

4.4.3.2.1 Female pull factors

Sahgal and Zeuten (2108:5) revealed that women might be enticed to join violent extremist groups to re-establish the norm and status of women in society. Prime motivators are the need to overcome feelings of victimization by women who deviated from the norm or status of women because of rape, infertility, low of no marital prospects. Moreover, the shame after experience (sexual) violence and the need for redemption are dominant incentives for recruitment or martyrdom. Zmigrod *et al.* (2019:3) explained the psychological motivations behind these female extreme behaviours based on the “significant quest theory” (SQT). The extreme behaviour reveals “means of obtaining or restoring an individual’s experience of personal significance and efficacy”. The loss of significance, women experienced, through personal or shared humiliation can be a motivator as a means of restoring meaning. Women advanced to the frontlines of violent extremism, as recruiters, propagators, suicide bombers,

and targets, as well as leaders working on de-radicalization, counter-messaging, and peacebuilding. From a psychological and motivational perspective research identified that women are emotionally motivated based on revenge, redemption, relationships and respect (acting out of passion) while men are inspired by religion, nationalism or the desire for combat (Bloom, 2011:8, 11). However, Zmigrod (2019:2) is of the opinion that the role of cognitive processes in extremism has been overlooked and women's willingness to sacrifice may be rooted in mental rigidity.

Besides, relationships and kinship networks are strong predictors where activism among relatives is present for the recruitment of females into extremism structures. It is important to mention that relationships are a stronger predictor for the recruitment of women than religion or ideology (Ndung'u *et al.*, 2018:17; 38). According to Bouhana (2019:9; 13), location and the environment (where) play an important role in recruitment as who they are. People who live in environments characterized by socio-economic strains, conflict and repression and who perceive violence and rule/law-breaking as justifiable are more vulnerable for participation in extremism.

State repression of groups would motivate the leadership of a group to recruit from a broader array of recruits, including women. Repression derails logistical operations of organizations, and female recruits are tactically appealing because of the surprise factor. As such women are used in mobilization operations that demand secrecy, surprise and stealth. Therefore, minority or political groups in repressive regimes are likely to adhere to a gender-inclusive ideology. Religious ideology is aligned with patriarchy and women's roles in Islamist organizations are mainly limited to caregiver tasks (Asal *et al.*, 2020:5). Recruitment of women into Al Shabaab is through marriage, women-to-women recruitment and proselytization efforts (Matfess, 2020:7). Bloom and Lokmanoglu (2020:5) challenged the gendered-neutral lens of female extremism analysis and concluded that women may be recruited as fighters to: i) substitute manpower, ii) women are more expandable than men, iii) female terrorists draw more media coverage than male terrorists, iv) the presence of women stimulate men to join extremist organizations to challenge women's strength and v) women have unique tactical benefits.

Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan (2104:206) acknowledged that nation-states should learn from the self-centred broadmindedness of terror groups, in understanding the significance of the role of women in societies. Terror groups realized that "Violence against women in conflict zones leads to violent social movements driven by women". In September 2019 this conclusion came to life when women, although non-violent, took their protests to the streets in South Africa, to voice their resentment against GBV in South Africa (World Economic Forum, 2019:1)

and in December of the same year women in Sudan brought down a 30-year old regime (Jenkins, 2019:1).

Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan (2104:206) established that more women in patriarchal societies are participants in acts of terrorism. It explains the mindset prevalent in a patriarchal society where there is a preconception about the status and ability of women. However, Johnson et al (2020:1) argued that women, despite the preconception about the status of women in a patriarchal society, all over the world support patriarchy, although it benefits men only. Therefore, the question remains: Why would women join an extremist group that limits female roles and reduces basic human rights? The answer to the question could be found in tailored sexist gender ideological promotional messages (mostly through the internet), intentionally bestowed upon women to lure them to the violent extremism cause. These messages apply a specific gender ideology that promotes and link women with home, violence with armed masculinity, justify patriarchy from a traditional religious perspective and reject feminist ideas of gender equality (Johnson et al, 2020:2). Women's specific messages encourage strictly conservative women's professions that can be utilized as a way to gain access to heaven. These professions include: being a servant to Allah, a good wife to a husband by prioritizing his wishes and a good mother that never neglects childcare duties (Johnson et al, 2020:9). Pearson (2020:1) highlighted that women admire the power of maternalistic roles and the power to create and rear a new society. These female aspirations would be found in both jihadi and radical right extremism.

Women who moved from homemakers to "home breakers" communicate a strong message about the issues in society that drove them to a suicidal finale. Historically, women have been victims to a much greater degree than perpetrators of violence. The increasing trend of female bombers is of concern because of its implication that women will become key players in future terrorist attacks. Warner and Chapin (2018:24) confirm this conclusion. In the timeframe between 2006 and 2017, Al Shabaab used ten women (4.63 per cent) in attacks, as illustrated in Figure 4.9, while Boko Haram, operating mainly in West Africa, deployed between 288 and 422 women or girls, which translates to more than 50 per cent of their attacks (Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020:8). It is important to highlight that it is not known if the attacks were committed with person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED), meaning a device was attached to a person or suicide person-borne improvised explosive devices (SPBIED). In the latter the person deliberately and knowingly killed themselves in the process of detonating their device. Al Shabaab claimed that its success rate with female suicide bombers is too low and they rather use male suicide bombers (Warner & Chapin, 2018:24). Matfess (2020:8) confirmed that Al Shabaab rarely used women in front-line combat as fighters or suicide bombers. The data about the ages of the female suicide bombers are still unclear, but it is

estimated that Al Shabaab is using people of consenting age, while in contrast, many of Boko Haram's female (suicide) bombers are teenagers or children younger than 13. Rajivan and Senarathne (2010:5) highlight that women join radical movements for the sameness (gender equality) rather than the differences they advocate. Women often have access to the same education and training as men in the extremist environment. This creates a positive change for women, who then feel empowered and confident. Petrich and Donnell (2019:1) conclude that terrorist groups will continue to use female suicide bombers because of their effectiveness in surprise and disguising an attack and to attract attention. The blind female (suicide) bomber that Al Shabaab used to launch an attack in the office of the Mayor of Mogadishu in July 2019, serves as a perfect example.




Figure 4.7: Al Shabaab suicide bombers by gender from 2006–2017

Source: Warner & Chapin (2018:23)

The new roles adopted by women who joined extremist networks have evolved from supporting to more dynamic, tougher, fanatical and more loyal roles. The Council of Europe's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CODEXTER, 2016:6) identified three distinct types of roles for women in violent extremism:

- Firstly, as agents of state-building. The first and foremost task of women joining Daesh (ISIS) is to give birth to as many children in the shortest space of time. Bloom and Lokmanoglu (2020:8) added that women in the "caliphate" were used a commodity to recruit, reward and retain male fighters. In this category, women are responsible for logistics and support in the roles of mothers, wives, nurses, teachers and Doctors (CODEXTER, 2016:6; Latif et al, 2020:5).
- The second category is recruiters. Women as recruiters, mostly of other women, spread propaganda and prepare new recruits to overcome objections from their families before joining an extremist group (CODEXTER, 2016:6). The internet is affording women to participate in the global jihad and express their fanatical support without compromising their position in society (Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020:6).
- And lastly, women as active participants in encouraging and partaking in extremist or terrorist activities (CODEXTER, 2016:6). It became evident that women and girls are used in roles to spread propaganda, as spies, combatants or financial facilitators (Ndung'u & Salifu, 2017:4). It became clear that local drivers of female radicalization vary drastically, but human rights violations, and specifically GBV, stand out as an important female driver (CTED, 2018:2; Cingranelli *et al.*, 2018:2; Idris, 2020:5). Fisher *et al.* (2018:10) studied the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism in Turkey and found that gender equality is the "fault line" between the West and Islam. The study established a positive relationship between female imbalances and an increase in terrorism. It must be taken into consideration that a combination of factors could motivate radicalization.

4.4.3.3 A combination of pull and push factors

The radicalization process is characterized by external or environmental, including domestic and international factors as well as internal or personal circumstances. However, an analysis of political socialization provides important insights into an individual's increasing involvement in radical causes. The nexus between socialization and radicalization happens gradually from socialization to radicalization and then towards extreme behaviour. Therefore, the political socialization process is a lifelong developmental and moulding path through which citizens develop political maturity that enables them to relate to their immediate political situation. Thus,

the politically aligned citizen chooses nationalism, patriotism, to support certain political movements and developed a self-image of rights and responsibilities. Three factors that influence the political socialization process, highlighted by Lewis Froman and empirically tested by Botha (2015:4), confirmed that political involvement (macro-level or structural level), the environment (meso-level and social interaction) and personality or micro-level are contributing to radicalization (OSCE, 2019:31).

Table 4.6 reiterated how a combination of the push and pull factors together with influences from the community may trigger an individual decision that the state of dissatisfaction experienced on a macro level justified a moral change in your belief system that inspires a movement from mainstream to more extreme views.

Table 4.6: Levels of influence on radicalization

MACRO-LEVEL (aggravators and discontent)	MESO-LEVEL (pressure or enablers)	MICRO-LEVEL (psychological and moral changes)
structural or push factors	group or community influences	individual motivations or pull factors
Strains ▪ Lack of socio-economic opportunities ▪ Lack of maintenance of sustainable economic growth • Unemployment • Prolonged poverty • Scarcity of socio-economic opportunities	Geographical influences ▪ Geographic concentrations ▪ Need to escape social or political pressures from the community ▪ Institutional grievances amongst the Moslem population	Motivations ▪ Positive and empowering dynamics used as enticements ▪ Sense of belonging ▪ Divine purposes ▪ “utopian” society ▪ Adventures ▪ Romantic events (sisterhood) ▪ Recruits are heroes if they join good cause of extremism to challenge the system of inequality
Segregation ▪ Inequality • Gender • Ethnic • Religious • Socio-economic levels • Feeling of “in-group” is under attack (Intercommunion tensions) • Restricted access to resources	Radical Entrepreneurs ▪ Sympathy of community members ▪ Ideology ▪ Influence of social media ▪ Common enemy: Government of Kenya and western allies	Individual backgrounds ▪ Negative experiences ▪ Witnessed torture of death by security forces ▪ Experienced unfair trails ▪ Personal humiliation (family member) ▪ Loss of property ▪ Refusal of financial aid ▪ Limited education ▪ Little religious Knowledge

• Restricted access to public opportunities		
Governance ▪ Poor governance ▪ Corruption ▪ Repressive Policies & practices ▪ Discrimination & marginalization ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Ruthless treatment by security forces ▪ Abuses of the law / discriminatory application ▪ Weakening State-citizen relationship ▪ Social distrust in government institutions (disillusionment)	Ethnic Inequality ▪ Devolved governments formed on ethnic lines ▪ Exclusion from county governments ▪ Focus on suffering of communities ▪ Political culture of impunity ▪ Countering plight by providing materialistic and/or spiritual support	▪ Collective grievances and victimization stemming from: ▪ Domination ▪ Oppression ▪ Subjugation ▪ Foreign Intervention ▪ Memories of grievance are kept alive to stimulate revenge against oppressors ▪ Emotional provocation & exploitation of: ▪ Religious believes ▪ Ethnic differences ▪ Political Differences ▪ Ideological differences
Norm Setting ▪ Absence of explicit law enforcement ▪ Tolerance of extremist norms	Female backgrounds ▪ Re-establish norm and status of women in Society ▪ Relationship and kinship networks ▪ To gain respect ▪ Personal abuse of humiliation ▪ Death of a family member	Female Individual backgrounds ▪ Need to overcome feelings of victimization ▪ Rape ▪ Infertility ▪ Low or no marital prospects ▪ Shame after (sexual) violence ▪ Need for redemption
		Processes ▪ Social networks ▪ Charismatic Extremist Leaders ▪ Informal family Networks ▪ Social Media

Sources: Sahgal & Zeuten (2108:5); UNGA (2015:22); Badurdeen & Goldsmith (2018:78); Botha 2014:13; Bouhana (2019:8)

It became clear that drivers of radicalizations differ in level, context, location and motivation. Therefore, a one-fit-all CVE approach will be ineffective. Using a multilevel analysis, an individual's capacity for self-regulation in the prevention of radicalization is discussed in the next section.

4.5 Multilevel analysis of radicalization

Bouhana (2019:12) structured the thinking of extremist tendency around moral propensity and explain it by means of a multilevel analysis of extremism, called the S5-inference framework (see Figure 4.7). It is explained that radicals will challenge the status quo on the macro- and meso- levels, as summarized by Table 4.6, because of their open-mindedness but without taking extreme action (OSCE, 2019:21). Nonetheless, through radicalization an individual may adopt extremist actions as morally legitimate. However, it will depend on the individual's capacity for self-regulation based on one's commitment to moral values that some individuals are more sensitive to group moral anchors in conflicting moral environments. Moral superiority is a characteristic of extremist belief systems [stemming from domestic influences, such as politics, religion, social, racial, or environmental (FBI, 2020:1)] and explains why violent extremist groups overthrow normative consensus. However, Speckhard *et al.* (2017:4) are of the opinion that radicalization (open-mindedness) is often associated with extremism, which refers to close-mindedness with strict ideological markers.

On an individual level [socio-psychological factors that include emotions and grievances of frustration and anger mainly based on injustices and exclusion (OSCE, 2019:29)], low self-control was identified as the clearest indicator to susceptibility (first 's' in S5-inference framework) to moral change and political aggression – irrespective of the ideological background of a person. The interactionism theoretical perspective of gender inequality (see Section 2.4.2 for a discussion on the interactionism perspective) identified that marginalized and minority groups suffer from low self-esteems. Psychologists concluded that extreme ideology is related to self-regulation (Bouhana, 2019:12). Cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes, including taking your own life for the group as well as harm to others. It is further proposed that ideological rigidity is rooted in mental inflexibility and as a result ethnocentric thinking as well. Consequently, people with an inflexible thinking style adhere more strictly to ideologies. It is therefore possible to scrutinize the general population for precursors by identifying an individual's willingness to fight and sacrifice himself for his ideological in-group. It was established that both cognitive and emotional or motivational (push and pull factors) factors are responsible for extreme and pro-group movements. UNGA (2015:22) cited examples of emotional provocation or exploitation of religious beliefs, ethnic, political or ideological differences. Zmigrod *et al.* (2019:2) identified the positive correlation between cognitive inflexibility, religion, ideological commitment to conservatism and political extremism. Figure 4.7 illustrates how factors on different levels influence the radicalization process.




Figure 4.8: S5-Inference framework

Source: Bouhana (2019:12)

The level of susceptibility, are supported by the risk of exposure to extremism-enabling environments – therefore better explained as social selection and the second “s” in the S5-framework. Social selection by means of your location (residence or neighbourhood) or status (socio-economic status, social group status in ethnic or religious groups or professional status) affects a person’s exposure and participation in place-based activities. Hence a social environment is conducive for exposure to extremism (Bouhana, 2019:17). ‘Red flags’ and pointers such as socio-economic strain because of lack of sustained economic growth,

unemployment, poverty and inequality and restricted access to resources and public opportunities are used to identify susceptibility in their endeavours for recruitment (UNGA, 2015:8). Even people who have a high tolerance for susceptibility to moral change, may because of their sustained habitual exposure to extremism environments, become vulnerable to extremism (Saltman & Smith, 2015:8). The third “s” S5-framework refers to the setting or place people would spend their time – even a virtual setting that would enable extremism and are characterized by certain socializing affordances⁸. These affordances are:

- The first is cognitive affordances. Certain features in an extremist-enabling setting would mobilize people’s interest and stimulate openness to the adoption of a set of new moral beliefs. These micro-level features can include emotional factors like fear because of feelings of insignificance and loss of control. The promotion of adventurous actions as a counter for perceived injustices, alienation, adverse change in social status and as a result threat to survival. The search for a new identity and alternative sources of income is provided by extremist organizations (Saltman & Smith, 2015:08). Extremism-enabling features focus on the familiarization of constant exposure to the setting or by intensifying the effectiveness of exposure – as an example to CVE opinions. Recruiters emphasize the suffering of communities or individual victims and counter their plight with the provision of materialistic and/or spiritual support (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018:78; Botha, 2014:13).
- The second of the socializing affordances focus on the features in a setting that promote extremist-supportive moral norms as morally legitimate and superior and extremist moral systems as the best option for action. This action-orientated aspect of the extremist narrative can be regarded as a key feature of the extremist ideology, for the reason that it makes the extremist ideology seems clear and actionable (“things to do”) for the otherwise cognitive uncertain (“things to believe”) people. And as mentioned before, by familiarization of constant exposure over a time, the “outside the norm” morals become the new standard (Bouhana, 2019:29).
- The third of the socializing affordances, and the greatest of the influencers are based on relationships or attachments (Botha, 2015:6). The effectiveness of the family setting who provides for the physical and emotional security of their children develops an

⁸ The term affordance is used in ecological psychology where it is “understood as perceived action-possibility, which emerges out of the interaction between a particular person and a particular environment at a particular time”. Affordance perception is depending on an individual’s needs, intent and capabilities (Bouhana, 2019:29).

attachment and a caregiving relationship between parent and child. Ultimately children will form new relationships with peers, teachers and spouses who will come with their own set of influences. An extremist-enabling setting, to those who already embrace extreme morals, strengthens the sense of attachment. Charismatic extremist leaders, informal family networks and lately, social media are all enabling pathways for radicalization (UNGA, 2015:22).

- The last of the social affordances is recognized by “ineffective law-relevant social control”. Extremism exploits a political environment that is characterized by poor governance, corruption, repressive policies and practices that lead to human right violations and abuses of the rule of law or when corruption levels are elevated (UNGA, 2015:8). This means that people with the authority to enforce legal norms in a specific setting, either lack the means or the willingness to do so. Alternatively, extremist-supportive individuals control the specific setting. As a result, both formal and informal systems are in support of an extremism-enabling moral setting (Bouhana, 2019:17). Violent extremists exploit a state of repression to gain community sympathy and support for their ideology (UNGA, 2015:8).

The fourth “s” in the S5-framework refers to the social ecology – both online and offline or broadly speaking to the macro or structural level. There are several plausible processes, which could shape moral ecologies. The first is social segregation based on religion, ethnicity and culture and the government fails to manage ethnic relationships (UNGA, 2015:08). This will foster alleged group competition with an increase in disadvantages and social disorganization. Saltman and Smith (2015:08) explained that a feeling of your “in-group” is under attack develops. As a result, the level of trust in the formal or legitimate authorities and the effectiveness of law enforcement and procedural justice will be undermined or perceived as being damaged. Furthermore, the effectiveness of informal deterrence, the unopposed support for extremist norms and the unmonitored exposure to radicalization agents will most probably be contributing factors in the rise of extremist-enabling social ecologies with collective or individual experiences of hardship and a lack of real social support (Bouhana, 2019:19).

The fifth “s” in the S5-framework focusses on the drivers of extremism-supportive morals on a macro or systemic level. In democracies, the law is used as the most effective normative mechanism that influences norm-making. It is therefore imperative, that the fair application of the law and effective procedural justice to citizens should clearly communicate the

condemnation of unacceptable or extremist actions. On the contrary, when mechanisms enhancing the normalization of extremist norms, values and behaviour (through mainstream or social media, political speech and or cultural products) are prominent or tolerable, it may result in the standardization of an extremist moral system. Consequently, the enforcement of the moral rules of conduct of society by formal (courts and police structures) or informal (social behaviour and control of citizens) governance structures will determine the trust between citizens and public authorities. Political factors (influenced by ideology and religion) comprised of grievances that are a result of government actions or non-actions that are central to alienation and injustices will create a perception of loss of trust in moral authorities will damage the legitimacy and undermine state representatives' authority (OSCE, 2019:29). Systemic processes of discrimination or exclusion that encourage effective or symbolic segregation between social groups will probably increase an extremist-supportive moral ecology – or perceived as a threat to a group's status Badurdeen & Goldsmith (2018:78) and Botha (2014:13) revealed that Al Shabaab based its recruitment strategies on injustices and focus on the Government of Kenya and its western allies as the common enemy. The occurrence of a group-threat perception because of systemic processes that give rise to collective or individual strains will likely impact on normative, governance and segregation processes. In Kenya, Muslim youth indicated that they have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to the 'collective punishment' of the Government of Kenya, which treat all Somali and Kenyan-Somali citizens as extremists. This point was confirmed during the empirical research (see Section 6.5 for discussion on social unrest). The perception by some Kenyan citizens that their ethnic/religious identity is under threat would stimulate radicalization. The consequences of ethnic inequality were confirmed during the empirical research and were discussed in Section 6.7. Members who joined Al Shabaab or the MRC in Kenya shared their experiences as summarized in Table 4.7 (Botha, 2015:6). It can be concluded that changing the system rather than changing people is the more effective strategy, because the vulnerability of the people is fundamentally system dependent (Bouhana, 2019:23).

The closing remarks at the African Regional High Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism and the Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya (July 2019) were that state violence and the abuse of power (explained by systems in the S5-Inference Framework) give rise to extremism and terrorism. Extremism does not develop in a vacuum, and structural factors on a macro level are the triggers for radicalization.

4.6 Radicalization in Kenya

The UN recognized that the aim of extremists or extremist organizations is to provoke states to over react (spread fear) and then exploit ill-perceived actions for their own advantage

(UNGA, 2015:5). This method was identified as an Al Shabaab strategy and discussed in Section 4.4.1.1. Violent extremism increases perceptions of insecurity, which can lead to repeat unrest with negative effects for sustained economic growth. Violent extremists focus on development challenges, then intensifies these grievances to create a cycle of decline with severe effects on marginalized groups in particular.

As mentioned in Section 4.4.2.1, violent extremists contribute to insecurity and use volatile security situations as a basis for their violent actions to undermine state authority and destabilizing the immediate territory and surrounding regions as demonstrated by the presence of Al Shabaab (discussed in Section 4.4.1) and MRC in Kenya. The Mombasa Republic Council was formed in 1999 as an active secessionist movement to obtain independence for the coastal region of Kenya, which differs in linguistic, ethnicity, history and is mainly followed by supporters of the Muslim religion (McGregor, 2012:1). These groups exploit the macro or structural grievances as summarized by Figure 4.8.

4.6.1 Macro- or structural grievances

In Kenya, Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018:78) and Botha (2014:13) confirmed that the scarcity of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination and marginalization, poor governance assisting the weakening state-citizen relationship, violation of human rights, and discriminatory application of the rule of law are all contributing push factors. Mazuri *et al.* (2018:153) further specified that under development and continuous development failures since independence are additional factors pushing people to more radical perceptions. Sahgal and Zeuthe (2018:2) supplemented the abovementioned list and indicated that due to limited opportunities and a perceived influence over one's future, people are susceptible to radicalization. SCE (2019:33) identified ruthless and demeaning treatment at the hands of security services to be an indirect driver of violent extremism. In 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Government of Kenya's response and the implementation of the Covid-19 related directives by the police, have contributed to existing tension between the security forces and the communities. The increase in political and religious tension created favourable conditions for the promotion of radical narratives (Ouma, 2020:5).

The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA, 2018:1) reported that the robust action by the Kenya security forces to control security challenges in the state, negatively affect education. An increase in retaliatory attacks on schools and teachers were experienced after Kenya deployed troops in southern Somalia in 2011 – especially in the north-eastern parts, on the border with Somalia. Non-state groups were identified as responsible for the violent attacks on schools and teachers. The most prominent attack was on the Garissa

University College in 2015 killing 147 people, mostly non-Muslim believers (GCPEA, 2018:1). Crisis group reported (Abdille, 2019:1) that since 2015 more than 247 small-scale attacks were launched in the region resulted in hundreds of teachers, nurses and construction workers to flee. As a result, in 2018, reportedly 250 schools were closed, and 2000 teachers have been transferred to safer regions. Ouma (2020:4) reported that during the emergence of Covid-19 in 2020, Al Shabaab exploited the pandemic and the closure of academic institutions to advance their ideology by means of online radicalization and recruitment.

The lack of education in the northeast regions of Kenya deepens socio-economic challenges, stunting development and increases a sense of abandonment that are exploited and fuelling radicalization. Primary school enrolment in the region is 37 per cent (Abdille, 2019:1) versus the national enrolment of above 80 per cent in 2017 (see Figure 4.3) (KNBS, 2017:33). The most attacks were targeted against teachers, not only because of their location and numbers, but Al Shabaab opposes nonspiritual education due to the corrupt and foreign ideas it teaches Muslim children (see Section 4.4.1). The academic performance in the region has dropped since Al-Shabaab focused its attacks on teachers. The campaign of Al Shabaab to destroy education institutions, denying educational opportunities to the youth and creating insecurity in an already poor and under-served region, comes at a huge cost for the future of Kenya (Abdille, 2019:1). Al Shabaab focused on secondary and Islamic schools in Mombasa and Nairobi to radicalize and recruit students for support or direct combat. In several cases between 2013 and 2017, teachers were convicted and sentenced for the indoctrination and recruitment of students (Wanzala, 2017:1).




Figure 4.9: Attacks attributed to Al Shabaab 2011–2018

Source: Abdille (2019:1)

Figure 4.9 displayed the location and frequency of attacks by Al Shabaab in Kenya. It is clearly visible that most of the attacks were executed along the more than 600 km border with Somalia and in the predominantly Muslim areas of the country (Abdille, 2019:1). Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (2020:20) cited another 18 attacks in 2019, which resulted in 967 fatalities between October 2011 and December 2019.

In 2017 it was reported that universities in Kenya became the new centres for radicalization and recruitment. According to the Commission for University Education, in 2016, 44 university students of which 17 were female joined terror groups to fight in Somalia. Students pursuing medicine, nursing, psychology, engineering and law were targeted. One of the participants in the Garissa attack was a trained Lawyer from the University of Nairobi. An increase in the use of technology necessitated radicalization recruiters to broaden the target group to include

people with advanced technology skills (Wanzala, 2017:1). Table 4.3 in Section 4.2.1.2.1 showed that female students are well represented in medicine, nursing and law, but female enrolment in engineering and technology is extremely low. Also, in September 2020 the Government of Kenya froze the bank accounts of nine terror financiers. One of the suspects was a fourth-year female medical student at the Kampala International University in Uganda. She was accused of information sharing via the internet with the Islamic State (IS) group (Ombati & Bwana, 2020:2). Influences from the community play an important enabling role and are discussed next.

4.6.2 Meso- or group influences

Meso-level or group influences is geographical constructed and can either be a push or a pull factor. In the case of Kenya, according to the S5-inference framework (discussed in Section 4.5) geographical location is important. The Kenya communities that live alongside the border with Somalia and along the east coast are mostly sharing the same religion, ethnicity and culture and are used as an entry point by radical or extremist entrepreneurs to gain the sympathy of communities to share their extremist ideology. SFCG (2019:10) determined that youth at risk would first approach people in their immediate vicinity like their peers and their family, extended family or friends for advice. (Figure 4.8 clearly displayed the location for Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya).

Although personality on a micro-level is an important determinant, Botha (2015:6) focused on external primary or meso-level (family, friends and school) and secondary (media) factors as contributors to the radicalization process in Kenya. By means of an empirical study, the effect of external factors on the political socialization process to join Al Shabaab or the MRC were determined and are summarized in table 4.7. These organizations shared the same religion, but different ideologies. Al-Shabaab is a Somalia extremist group while the MRC is a domestic group that pursues a secessionist agenda. Muslim youth indicated that they have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to the 'collective punishment' of the Government of Kenya, which treat all Somali and Kenyan-Somali citizens as extremists. The perception of some Kenyan citizens that their ethnic/religious identity is under threat will stimulate radicalization. Members who joined Al Shabaab or the MRC in Kenya shared experiences as summarized in Table 4.7 (Botha, 2015:6).

Table 4.7 explained the importance of relationships in the process of influencing. In the case of Al Shabaab 68 per cent of the participants indicate that introduction to politics was done at home. Seventy-one per cent of the participants joined the organization with a friend and similarly 71 per cent recruited a friend to join Al Shabaab. The participants were motivated by

frustration or grievances. SFCG (2019:11) confirmed the research by Botha and highlighted that peers play a more important influencing role than family members in recruiting Al Shabaab followers.

Extremist networks focus on radical entrepreneurs, the influence of social media (virtual spaces), religious institutions and the sympathy of community members to introduce extremist ideologies. Badurdeen & Goldsmith (2018:78) and Botha (2014:13) revealed that Al Shabaab based its recruitment strategies on injustices and focus on the Government of Kenya and its western allies as the common enemy. Violent extremists are exploiting the distinct relationship between the role of religion, ideology and identity and the bearing it has on individuals, communities and institutions. Strong religious beliefs are manipulated to advance fanatical ideological ideas (SFCG, 2019:11).

Table 4.7: Meso-level factors of radicalization in Kenya

FAMILY	AL SHABAAB	MOMBASA REPUBLIC COUNCIL
Discussed politics with children	68 per cent	78 per cent
Introduced by a relative to the organization	4 per cent	7 per cent
FRIENDS		
Introduced by friends to the organization	38 per cent	66 per cent
Joined the organization with a friend	71 per cent	82 per cent
Recruit a friend to the organization	71 per cent	82 per cent
Joined the organization on his own without introduction of an intermediary	21 per cent	20 per cent
LEVEL OF FRUSTRATION:		
8 – 10 (highest tier)	48 per cent	54 per cent

Source: Botha (2015:6)

The medium of communication that is used to make contact is a critical part of radicalization and the most popular spaces likely to be used for radicalization are social media platforms, video and cinema theatres, mosques, youth meetings and seminars/workshops, cultural and sports events, boda-boda (motorbike) stages and academic institutions (SFCG, 2019:20). Figure 4.10 illustrates the different mediums of communication used for radicalization.




Figure 4.10: Mediums of communication used to recruit youth to join violent extremist organizations in Garissa and Tana River

Source: SFCG (2019:20)

Figure 4.10 illustrates that the top modes of communication were phones, social media and in person. Thirty-seven per cent of participants indicated that recruitment was done by phone calls and text messages, 20 per cent said it was done via social media (WhatsApp and internet) while 18 per cent indicated that face-to-face meetings were used (SFCG, 2019:20). The higher percentage of phone use versus WhatsApp and social media usages could be contributed to the difference in cell phone models and a lack of finances to purchase smartphones. The same SFCG report (2019:22) identified unemployment (59 per cent) as the primary reason and

poverty as the second major reason for community frustration that pushed youth to violent extremism.

Recruiters emphasize the suffering of communities or individual victims and counter their plight with the provision of materialistic and/or spiritual support. Al Shabaab exploits socio-economic and political injustices (perceived or actual) in the targeting of youth. While the coastal areas of Kenya were identified as centres for recruitment because of a lack in educational opportunities, unemployment and marginalization by the Government of Kenya, Rift Valley, Nyanza and western Kenya were added to the traditional fertile grounds (Naymori, 2016:1). The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 created an ideal opportunity for radicalization, based on the lack of basic needs to prompt many youths to join extremist groups as a matter of survival. Radicalized family members focused on the vulnerability of idling school and tertiary students (Praxides, 2020:1). The next section focusses on female radicalization in Kenya.

4.6.3 Female radicalization in Kenya

The role of gender inequality and the lack of women's socio-economic and political empowerment are often emphasized as enablers for violent extremism and women have to fight against exclusion, marginalization, inequality and abuse – the conditions that lead many to radicalization and conflict (UNSG, 2019:1). Although in East Africa, women's activity as supporters of violent extremism was established, it received little attention. In general women were classified in categories of victims or peacebuilders therefore de-radicalizers, introduced as security allies and sources of communal and familial resilience (Sahgal & Zeuthen, 2018:4).

Poor governance and corruption are contributing to the absence of trust in the Government of Kenya and is supporting the weakening state-citizen relationship - creating disillusionment by its citizens. The introduction of the devolved government system in Kenya in 2010 brought hope that women's participation in county leadership would eradicate the existing patriarchal leadership. Women's participation in county governments would allow for a more inclusive leadership, with the result of the formulation of gender-sensitive legislation and policies (Minayo, 2012:22). The devolved county governments were formed on ethnical lines and employment opportunities are still based on political support and sustained marginalization. Radicalizers prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth and women who are disappointed by the Government of Kenya's political culture of impunity (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018:80). Romaniuk *et al.* (2018:171) concluded that the best-intended CVE programs would fail if the actions by the Government of Kenya encourage the same grievances that fuel extremism (see Section 4.6.3.2).

It became evident that women and girls that have joined extremist organizations are used in roles to spread propaganda, as spies, combatants and recruiters. Women as mothers, partners, sisters, daughters and girl/friends are increasingly valued as direct or indirect sources of support for the operations of the organization that has been joined. Ndung'u and Salifu (2017:4) identified the following supporting roles that women in Kenya provide:

- accommodating and taking care of extremist family members or terrorists;
- providing food for family members being arrested on charges of extremism or preparing food for extremists;
- act as financial facilitators for the funding of extremist organizations;
- act as medical caretakers for extremist fighters who have been injured in Somalia;
- provide domestic functions in Al Shabaab training camps; and
- serve as company to provide comfort for terrorists. This is normally in the form of marriage and members of extremists groups tend to marry the sisters of other members (Ndung'u & Salifu, 2017:4).

It was only after three women targeted and carried out an armed attack in a police station in Mombasa in September 2016, that the potential role of women combatants in extremist endeavours in Kenya came to the fore (Badurdeen, 2018:26). Mazuri *et al.* (2018:153) highlighted the coastal region of Kenya as a hotspot for the radicalization of women. The Mombasa attack underlined the relationship between women and extremism as a subject of attention in Kenya.

The Security Services in Kenya noted that Al Shabaab changed tact and started using women in roles of combat and executing of attacks, intelligence gathering, planning and coordination. It is believed that women befriend Kenya Security Officers to gather intelligence (Sunday Nation, 2019:1). Petrich and Donnell (2019:1) identified that Al Shabaab treated women from Kenyan, who joined the organization, differently than the Somali women in the organization. Somali women are treated in line with conservative Islam ideology and are more likely to be taken as legitimate (forced) wives of the fighters, while less strict rules applied to Kenya women that are used as sex slaves and for domestic labour. It transpired that Al Shabaab formed a partnership with Kenya sex workers as informers in the neighbourhoods of Majengo and Eastleigh in Nairobi. These neighbourhoods are popular under Somali residents and as result high levels of suspicion and presence by the Kenya security forces. Therefore, the security

forces are targeted by the sex workers and became the focus of information collection (Petric & Donnell, 2019:1). It emerged that Al Shabaab recruiters in the coastal regions of Kenya, are predominantly female and are targeting youth, both male and female to join the group. It was also reported that women in refugee camps are actively recruiting and participating in the logistics of recruiting members for Al Shabaab (SFCG, 2019:10). Figure 4.10 illustrates the different communication methods that are used by Al Shabaab recruiters.

The recruitment of Al Shabaab supporters can be voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary recruitment methods include abductions (from schools, markets or homes), the use of propaganda and indoctrination in schools, offering of monetary or material incentives or a combination of persuasion and force (Ndung'u *et al.*, 2017:21). Badurdeen (2020:1) differentiated between the different levels of voluntary recruitment of women and girls. The recruitment of some women and girls are based on allegiance and social interactions independent of religious, ideological or cultural resonance on the one hand, but on the other hand participation is guided by gender norms of submission and subordination within the social structure. Voluntary recruitment is based on independent decision-making and some women joined extremist organizations to exercise agency within a patriarchal system of oppression and are attracted to the Al Shabaab network for liberation and the picture of a utopian caliphate that is painted by recruiters.

Ndung'u *et al.* (2017:32) identified economic strain as a stronger female motivator than ideology in Kenya and highlighted the positive correlation between poverty and extremism. Poverty is a driving force behind extremism, but violent extremism intensifies poverty. This cyclic process was confirmed during the empirical study and illustrated in Figure 6.1.

The prominence of family and friends were illuminated by Botha (2015:6) and summarized in Table 4.7, as primary in the recruitment process. Ndung'u *et al.* (2017:32) provided reasons like kingship, revenge by widows or wives that are following their husbands/breadwinners to join Al Shabaab. SFCG (2019:10) explained that women recruiters find it easier to create bonds, promote sisterhood and belonging and to socialize with both genders. It was established that a correlation between dysfunctional families (absence of authority models in the family) and vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment exists. Extremist recruiters exploit the void left by absent parents by pretending to be mentors or father figures. This is in line with the response from Participant C (see Section 6.4 for a discussion on moral change).

UN Women (2020:1) studied the gendered vulnerabilities to violent extremism in Dadaab, a town in Garissa County and near the Somali border. It was determined that Al Shabaab exploits female vulnerabilities due to insecurity, based on GBV, economic strains and lack of justice.

Dadaab is also the site of the Dadaab refugee camp and in April 2020 was hosting 217 513 refugees and asylum seekers UN Women (2020:2). The Dadaab refugee camp was established because of the civil war and humanitarian crises in Somalia. Kenyan women actively participated in Al Shabaab human trafficking schemes to provide women for Al Shabaab camps on the border between Kenya and Somalia. Women are described as the “invisible infrastructure of Al Shabaab” because of the significant role women played in the enabling, supporting and facilitating of violent extremism (Ndung’u & Salifu, 2017:3).

However, in 2015 Adan, together with three other women (Adan was uncovered as recruiter and coordinator of ‘Alshababes’) were arrested for their voluntary Al Shabaab membership and collaboration to carry out terror attacks in Kenya, while *en route* to Somalia as Shabaab brides. It was noted during Adan’s trial that she was also suspected of being the mastermind behind the terror attacks on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in 2013 and the Garissa University, Kenya in 2015. However, in 2015 the four accused were acquitted for a lack of evidence at the time of the trial (Mkongo, 2020:18). Notwithstanding Adan’s release, it was revealed that she was the coordinator, facilitator, and recruiter of girls with professional skills such as accountancy and medicine to join extremist cells, before their acceptance as members of Al Shabaab and ISIS (Mkongo, 2020:18). In 2019 the United States of America listed Adan on their terror sanction list for “assisting in sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technical support for, or financial or other services to, or in support of ISIS” (Daily Nation, 2019:1). Although based in Kenya, Adan has established a financial network that operates in Europe, the Middle East, the Americas and Eastern Africa. In 2020 the Government of Kenya listed Adan for funding terrorism in Kenya. She was identified as the link between main financiers and Al Shabaab’s terror cells (Mkongo, 2020:18).

More prominent women who were active participants in terror attacks were, Violet Kemunto, the wife of Farou, the mastermind behind the DusitD2 hotel Complex attack in January 2019. She hosted the attackers before the incident. Another, Miriam Abdi, was used as a courier for the weapons for the same attack. Both women are still free. Nuseiba Hajji, the spouse of an ISIS-point man in East Africa was used to manage financial facilitation hubs. And the well known “white widow”, a leader in Al Shabaab and mother of four children from the UK who joined Al Shabaab after the killing of her husband in London (Petrich and Donnell, 2019:1). Additionally, in July 2019, Al Shabaab used a blind female suicide bomber to launch an attack in the office of the Mayor of Mogadishu (Sunday Nation, 2019; 1). The next section will discuss the adverse effect of gender-blind CVE policies.

4.6.3.1 The effect of gender-blind policies on CVE

The UN CTED (Coninsx, 2018:2) warned that, “gender-blind counterterrorism policies and practices have the potential of not only being ineffective, but to also negatively impact women and girls’ rights or serve as motivation for recruitment (Coninsx, 2018:2). Gender is an important factor because of the specific threat posed by women and the specific needs and vulnerabilities of women in the context of responses to terrorism, including softer preventative and CVE mechanisms. None the less, some good practices have been identified and the participation of local grassroots organizations and the involvement of women in the design and implementing of tailored and context-specific programs are reaping results.

Under UN Resolution 1325 (2000), countries made big strides in prompting gender mainstreaming in peace and security. Security Council Resolution 2242 (UNSC, 2015:2) noted the change in the global threat to peace and security and acknowledged that an increase in violent extremism can be favourable to terrorism while Resolution 2395 (UNSC, 2017:5) *“reaffirmed the need to increase attention to women and youth in all work on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, and noting the importance of incorporating, as appropriate, the participation of women and youth in developing strategies to counter-terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism”*. The UNSC acknowledged the roles of women and youth to sustain peace and security and reaffirmed the need to include gender in national CVE policies. Prevention to radicalization is more effective than mitigation and the role of women as psychological barriers for men and other women to join extremist groups cannot be more under stated. The next section will discuss the inclusion of gender in the national CVE policy and CVE responses by the Government of Kenya.

4.6.3.1.1 Women and counter-violence extremism responses in Kenya

Kenya’s approach to countering violent extremism and terror is guided by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) that was passed in 2012. POTA provides the legal framework for the security forces to combat and investigate terrorism. The CT functions in Kenya are divided among the three branches of the National Police Service, the National Intelligence Service and elements of the KDF: The branches of the National Police Service include: i) The Kenya Police Service (paramilitary GSU CT, Traffic Police), ii) the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit) and iii) the Administration Police (Border Police Unit). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) works with private security companies on the prevention of soft targeted attacks. In 2019, the Government of Kenya started with an interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force (US Department of State, 2019:1).

After the Al Shabaab attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in 2013, the Government of Kenya re-evaluated the counterterrorism strategy and policy framework and in 2014 the Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA) was passed. Yet in 2015, after the Al Shabaab attack on the Garissa University College the Government of Kenya broaden its approach to violent extremism and launched the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016. This devolved and development-orientated strategy focused on mitigating the drivers of violent extremism through employment and life skills (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, 2020:21). The NSCVE made provision for tailor-made County Action Plans (CAPs). Violent extremism is not monolithic through Kenya and each county should deal with radicalization based on the needs of the community (Ogada, 2019:1). In 2019, after Al Shabaab attacked the DusitD2 hotel complex, the Rapid County Action Plan (RCAP) model was deployed. By July 2019 all the counties had developed CAPs and RCAPs (Khalid, 2019:1). The DusitD2 attack was planned and executed by Non-Muslim Non-Somali Kenyans within Kenya – the first in Kenya (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, 2020:21). Section 4.6.3 discussed the role that women have played in the DusitD2 attack.

The gender analysis conducted by USAID (2020a:38) indicated that the current responses to Kenya's CVE are not designed to address the significant role that women play in fuelling radicalization. Kenyan women have been gender-stereotyped as wives and mothers of victims of extremism and not depicted as perpetrators of violence, despite the diversity of functions and roles they play in support of violent extremism. There is not a clear executing plan for the NSCVE on county level neither for the National Counter Terrorism Centre's CVE strategy. These national efforts should be included in the community efforts (CAPs or RCAPs) of countering violent extremism. Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (2020:29) shared the view of USAID (2020a:38) but identified additional challenges. The actors, responsible for the implementation of the CAPs, were not familiar with the complex roots of radicalization or were unconscious of local political and security sensitivities. The mishandling of information put already at-risk communities in harm's way. As a result, some of the programs were counterproductive and were aiding Al Shabaab (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, 2020:35). Ndung'u *et al.* (2017:v) identified that women's needs are not addressed by the current CVE policies.

The women in Kenya are faced with a national problem of radicalization and recruitment of especially youth based on the factors, summarized in Table 4.6 in Section 4.4.2.3. The aggressive reaction of security forces after the Westgate shopping centre and Garissa College attacks instilled feared in the communities and inhibited cooperation with security forces. UN Women (2020:6) reported that in 2020, government counterterrorism operations in Dadaab

entails round-ups and mass arrests and includes often curfews. These security service's actions affect both genders negatively. Women (in Dadaab and at the east coast of Kenya) are not included in counterterrorism actions irrespective of the fact that the security service's actions significantly impact their movements and human rights. As a result, their voices remain silent. This approach to counterterrorism stimulates a response of not belonging amongst the refugees and could be exploited by Al Shabaab. The tension between the community and security services stimulates radicalization. Findings from the SFCG (2019:31) study indicated that countering violent extremism (VE), should include peaceful youth-police relations, psychological support to victims, a database to trace missing people and the mediation of conflict in the north-eastern region of Kenya (SFCG, 2019:31).

In 2019, Kenya's approach to CVE was described as largely "gender blind" by the civil society. This created challenges for the effectiveness of CVE in general, but women in specific. The study by Mesok (2019:6; 12) reflected on how CVE approaches negatively affected women in Kenya. Civil society organizations (CSO) identified the following impeding issues:

- CSO identified the issue of language and indicated that the definitions of CVE and counter terrorism (CT) are not clearly defined, and the two issues are mixed. As a result, the scope of CVE is expanded to the scope of CT and result in human rights violations. CVE are internationally and not locally driven and VE is stigmatizing ethnic and religious minority groups (Mesok, 2019:13).
- CVE is seen as a donor-driven agenda and is promoting state and international (western) security above the needs of the communities. CVE is perceived as an "industry" in Kenya. Small organizations with little or no CVE experience are designing CVE programs because of the huge amounts of resources available. Community-based organizations (specifically women) that partnered with international organizations (on issues non-CVE related) are negatively affected and face funding challenges. CSO that did not refocus their work to CVE could not continue with their activities (Mesok, 2019:16).
- The expansions of the legal and political agendas to CVE were shrinking the space of civil society. Laws on countering CT funding have curtailed the work done by CSO. Women are caught between VE, security forces and restricted security measures. Any CSO that works with CVE has to register with the National Counterterrorism Centre and has to share activities and information. This becomes a risk for the families and communities involved. Furthermore, the focus on CVE in Kenya overshadows all other human insecurity issues. GBV and Police brutality are not treated with the same

urgency than CVE (Mesok, 2019:19). The status of female insecurity was confirmed during the empirical study (see Section 7.6.4).

- The persistence of hard CVE approaches by state security organizations lead to human rights violations, extra-judicial killings and disappearances in the name of CT. These actions fuel discontentment amongst families and in ethnic Somali communities (Mesok, 2019:2). The delay in the security sector reform was identified as an enabling factor during the empirical study (see Section 7.6.4).
- The association of CVE with the “global war on terror” increased Islamophobia and anti-Muslim violence globally, with particularly negative consequences and the stigmatization of Muslim women (Mesok, 2019:24). Ethnic inequality was identified as an enabler for radicalization and discussed in Section 7.6.4.
- The Government of Kenya’s approach to VE is ideological, while CSO argued that VE exists because of political, economic and social marginalization. Therefore, CVE should be driven by gender equality and human security (Idis, 2020:19). Structural resistance was identified as the root cause for gender inequality in the Government of Kenya and was discussed in Section 7.6.1.

Women from civil society and different ethnic and political backgrounds identified the void and exclusion of women from CVE. Female CSO formed several groups, in the recruitment “hot spots”, nationwide to act as a bridge between the community and state forces to counter radicalization and extremism. These groups formed part of a women’s network called Sisters Without Borders (SWB). By means of art, sport and support groups for mother who have lost children, SWB are building trust between state forces and the youth in an attempt to reduce susceptibility for recruitment. SWB became a trusted Government partner in shaping policies on gender and security because of their community knowledge. SWB proofed that peace and security cannot be guaranteed without the full engagement of local women. SWB through their dedicated efforts, started to have a voice for female participation in security policy development (Barbera, 2020:1).

Another successful national civil society organization, Advocacy for Women in Peace and Security Africa (AWAPSA) was established in 2016 and has about four million members. The purpose of AWAPSA is to empower women politically, economically and socially to secure female leadership positions. AWAPSA works with the “National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the national coordination body, to include female perspectives into the national security policies. AWAPSA has two main goals: firstly, to improve the relations between the

Police and communities by facilitating meetings and sharing information with the Police and secondly to assist with the rehabilitation and reintegration of specifically women and girls who are returning from violent extremism groups. The success story of AWAPSA and SWB focused the attention on the importance of civil society lead initiatives (ICAN, 2019:72).

Based on the discussion of the moral ecology of extremism, it is not unsurprising that the UN is convinced that the “creation of open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies”, respecting human rights and with economic opportunities for all, is the most palpable alternative to inequality and an increase in violent extremism. It is the best strategy to make violent extremism unattractive (UNGA, 2015:3).

4.7 Conclusion

Chapter 4 analysed the circumstances under which Article 81(b) was included in the 2010 Constitution and it explained the failure of the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” in the national Government of Kenya and gender mainstreaming in general was analysed in Chapter 4. The non-action of the Government of Kenya to maintain the status quo on gender inequality and the multiple failures to adopt a gender bill seem to be tools of resistance or methods of structural violence to prevent female inclusion in the senior decision-making positions of parliament. It was further revealed that voluntary political party quotas increase women’s representation, while legislative or reserved seat quotas – a top-down approach, is less effective. While gender inclusion is operationalized through policy, legal provisions and programmes, gender equality as a principle of sustainable development falls short of reaching the goal.

The role of gender inequality and the lack of women’s socio-economic and political empowerment are often emphasized as enablers for radicalization or violent extremism. Women have to fight against exclusion, marginalization, inequality and abuse. A combination of the push and pull factors together with influences from the community may trigger an individual decision that the extent of dissatisfaction experienced on a macro-level justifies a moral change on an individual level, and in a belief system that inspires a movement from mainstream to more extreme views. Radicalization increases perceptions of insecurity and focusses on development challenges like inequality, poverty and poor governance, and then intensifies these grievances to create a cycle of decline with severe effects on marginalized groups. Education is particularly important. The lack of education deepens socio-economic challenges, stunting development and increasing a sense of abandonment. Poor governance

and corruption are contributing to the absence of trust in the Government of Kenya and is supporting the weakening state–citizen relationship, leading to disillusionment among the marginalized groups.

The sustained state of gender inequality and female insecurity drove women, who in general were seen as victims or peacebuilders therefore, de-radicalizers and sources of communal and familial resilience, to accept more dynamic, tougher, fanatic and loyal roles in extremist organizations. It is evident that women and girls are used in roles to spread propaganda, as spies, combatants and recruiters. Women as mothers, partners, sisters, daughters and girl/friends are increasingly valued as direct or indirect sources of support for extremist operations. Relationships and kinship networks are strong predictors where activism among relatives is present for the recruitment of females into extremist structures. It is important to mention that relationships are a stronger predictor for the recruitment of women than religion or ideology. Women's willingness to sacrifice their socio-cultural morals to that of an extreme nature may be rooted in mental rigidity.

It was established that cognitive and not only emotional or motivational (push and pull factors) factors are responsible for extreme and pro-group movements. The multilevel S5-Inference framework identified self-control as a clear indicator to susceptibility to a moral change and political aggression, irrespective of the ideological background of a person. Consequently, people with an inflexible thinking style adhere more strictly to ideologies. Susceptibility is affected by the effectiveness of the political system, the setting, social selection and social ecology of a person. Systemic processes of discrimination or exclusion that encourage effective or symbolic segregation between social groups will probably increase an extremist-supportive moral ecology.

The conditions for peace were discussed in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. Positive peace refers to the absence of indirect or structural violence and negative peace refers to freedom from want and fear – or direct violence. The study of IR focusses on the political interactions between different international actors, while the goal of security studies is to understand the geopolitical situation of the state and to focus on the security of the referent object. Lewis (2006:13) states that security studies neglect the cultural, ideological and daily survival of the referent object in preference of macro-level politics. Blanchard (2003:1292) establishes the gender bias in security and says that gender binaries men/women are linked to outside/inside and public/private and that women are trapped in the inside and confined to the private, which make abuse and subordination invisible. Gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of some citizens, such as women, is sacrificed. Kangas et al. (2014:1) highlight that if the impediments that should have promoted greater gender involvement in

state-building are not addresses, the same concerns will reinforce gender inequality and threats to human security. From a feminist perspective, security threats not only entails war or international instability, but also include domestic threats of family violence, rape, gender oppression, poverty and ecological destruction. By analysing the causes, the outcomes can be predicted. Mark (2002:5) recognizes that governments pose the biggest threat to human security in the name of state security. Cangranelli et al. (2019:10) stress the correlation between low-respect for women's rights, is an indication of low respect for minority rights. Anderlini (2010:7) emphasize that the security of women is a predictor of the stability of a state and the deterioration of women's security and gender inequality is an early sign of a crisis and violence. Women are the first to face new threats of insecurity like extremist recruitments. Chapter 4 disclosed that extremism does not develop in a vacuum, and structural factors on a macro-level are the triggers for the radicalization of individuals and communities in Kenya.

Gender inequality in Kenya is approached from a liberal feminist perspective (see Sections 2.5.3.1.1 and 3.8.1) via political and legal reform. Women see the state as the protector of individual rights and the promoter of equality at the political level. At the same time, the Government of Kenya may pose a threat to human security in the name of state security. It is clear that in Kenya, gender transformation should rather be approached from outside the government structures. Extremism and women (human) rights abuses are addressed from a security point of view – in parallel with gender equality. The literature was quiet about the consequences of gender inequality for the security of Kenya and about the role that women in Kenya play in maintaining the status quo of an uneven gender society. The last research objective of the study, as outlined in Section 1.6.5, was to recommend an alternative approach to realize gender equality in Kenya. It is against this background that the empirical study was conducted. The research approach and research design followed to investigate the effect of gender inequality on the security of Kenya will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework underlying the study, the research paradigm, research design and methodology used for this study. The methods used to ensure research quality and ethical considerations conclude the chapter.

This qualitative research study was guided by those interconnected metatheoretical assumptions with respect to epistemology and ontology that form the foundation of such research. Epistemological considerations refer to the different ways to interpret social reality independent of human perception – in other words gaining objective knowledge (Bryman, 2020:27; Saunders, 2009:127). Ontological considerations are concerned with the form and nature of social entities – the existence of things. Different research paradigms explain that reality is socially constructed and has an influence on people or is influenced by people (Bryman, 2012:32; Saunders, 2009:129).

This study sought to describe and analyse the impediments to and resulting repercussions of gender inequality in Kenya. Due to its qualitative nature, this study on gender inequality was an inductive study. The experiences and views of the participants guided the researcher to a conclusion on the effect of gender inequality on the security of Kenya.

The study included both primary and secondary research. The first phase involved the secondary research, which entailed a literature review with the purpose of defining key terms and concepts and establishing a theoretical framework. This theoretical exploration is contained in Chapters 1 to 4. The aims of the literature review were firstly to gain a general understanding of the contribution of the feminist theory to gender equality, secondly to determine the legal standards for gender equality in Kenya, and thirdly to determine the status of gender equality in the Government of Kenya. This phase of the study was conducted from 2017 to 2020.

The second phase of the research was the primary or empirical research and was conducted from July to October 2020. This involved gathering primary data from the field for analysis to gauge the current state of gender equality. The purpose of the primary research was to investigate the impediments to gender equality and subsequent implications for internal security. Detail about the population, sampling techniques, instruments, and data collection procedures and analysis follows in this chapter.

5.2 Theoretical framework

The role of theory in research remains challenging. Creswell (2014:67) states that the way theory is used influences its position in qualitative research. Theory (Silverman, 2013:224) explains sets of concepts that are used to explain a phenomenon – thus an up-front explanation (Creswell, 2014:67). They are the impetus for research. Reeves (2008:1) sees theories as providing complex and comprehensive conceptual understandings of things that cannot be pinned down: how societies work, how organizations operate and why people interact in certain ways. Theories provide different “lenses” through which to look at complicated problems and social issues. They focus the attention on different aspects of the data and provide a framework within which to conduct analysis. Theory can be used as an endpoint or a transformative support lens where the development of theory is deductively based on the data provided by the interviews (Creswell, 2014:68).

Feminist theory (see Section 2.5.3) was the predominant theoretical framework for this research. In recent years, feminist theory has shown noteworthy development in relation to qualitative research. The increase in qualitative feminist studies has drawn attention to women’s perspectives (Hardin, 2012a:18). Feminist research highlights gender inequality with its roots in social oppression (Taylor *et al.*, 2016:17). As discussed in Section 2.5.3, current feminist research is gender-driven with the focus on emancipation and social transformation. However, gender is not the only point of departure in feminist research. Attention should also be given to the issues of race, ethnicity, social status and their intersectional connections with politics, economy and human security.

Qualitative research cannot be value-free. Values determine the understanding and presentation of data, whether intended or not (Taylor *et al.*, 2016:26). Therefore, feminist research interrogates and challenges mainstream research to include feminists’ perspectives. Feminist research emerged from a desire to expose women’s inferior position in society, so it was initially presented from a powerless, marginalized and oppressed point of view (Taylor *et al.*, 2016:26). Collective resistance feminist movements (see Section 2.5.2 for a historical overview of feminist resistance movements as a precursor for gender equality) added different values to female oppression and as a result, contributed to different approaches to feminist theory and the development of feminist metatheories. Feminist theory can be divided into the categories of: i) gender reform feminist theory; ii) gender resistant feminist theory and iii) gender revolution feminist theories. Gender revolution feminists identified that feminist research cannot be a “one size fits all” approach and focus their attention on “Third-world feminism” and specifically on feminism in Africa (see Section 2.5.4 for a discussion on feminism in Africa). Silverman (2013:224) explains how models, paradigms, philosophical worldviews

(Creswell, 2014:5) or research methodologies provide a framework for how reality is interpreted. These paradigms are presented in the next section.

5.2.1 Research paradigms

Research paradigms play a vital role in social sciences and are defined by Guba (1990:17) as a “basic set of beliefs that guides action”. Creswell (2014:6) on the other hand refers to these paradigms as worldviews that provide a general philosophical orientation to a study. Different researchers adhere to different paradigms and will therefore base their research approach on either post-positivism, constructivism, transformative or pragmatism to shape their research approach. The elements of each of the paradigms are reviewed next.

Post-positivism is an extension of positivism. Positivism values scientific method or empirical research and represents the traditional form of research. Post-positivists acknowledge that in reality, knowledge cannot only be built on measurement. Whereas positivists argued that causes determine the outcomes as found in experiments, post-positivist approaches have a greater openness to include both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The knowledge is deductive and is based on empirical observation and measurement with the aim of testing or verifying existing theory. Theory is used as the basis from which such research is conducted (Creswell, 2014:7). As such, it is more applicable to quantitative research.

In contrast with positivist or post-positivist research, in social sciences a constructivism or naturalistic approach is applied using qualitative research. Social constructivists seek to understand the complex world of the individual. Knowledge is built on multiple participant views on the focus of the study. The data obtained from the participants are influenced by social construction and the historical and cultural norms in an individual's life. Researchers therefore aim to understand the context in which a participant live by considering the participant's interpretation of reality. The focus of qualitative research is largely theory generation. Despite the constructivist worldview including social research as a scientific form of research, some researchers think that a constructivist paradigm does not do enough to highlight and change the plight of marginalized people (Creswell, 2014:9).

A transformative paradigm advocates a research design that is a combination of politics and political change to focus on an action agenda to challenge social oppression. Such research focuses on issues of inequality and empowerment, oppression and suppression, or domination and alienation. A transformative approach provides a united voice, intensifying the consciousness or advancing reform and change to benefit marginalized groups. The

importance of the transformative paradigm is to focus research on inequalities based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability and socio-economic status that result in uneven power structures (Creswell, 2014:10).

Like with constructivism, knowledge building based on the transformative paradigm is inductive. Induction is a form of reasoning that renders conclusions are more probable, without entailing the conclusion. David Hume in the 18th century sceptically identifies the “problem of induction” and reasons that induction provides no justifiable rational conclusion that future futures can be based on past futures, because then it could have been proven with deduction. Or as Hume puts it: “From causes which seem similar we expect similar effects” and that cannot be true (Hume, 1910:37).

In deductive analysis, the conclusion is contained in the evidence, whereas with induction the conclusion is a future event, in other words a prediction. Inductive reasoning justifies knowledge through observation/experience. Conclusions are generated on the basis of the generalization that the unobserved will probably be akin to the observed. Induction realizes that if there is a pattern, there is some correlation. In other words, future futures would probably resemble past futures. (Speaks, 2005:1; De Vos, 2002:53). Conclusions in social sciences are not possible without induction reasoning, although future predictions based on induction reasoning have only a probable chance to materialize exactly as predicted. It is on this premise that the conclusion could be drawn that the persistent structural violence in the GoK is a threat to national security because Kenya experienced ethnic violence in the past, and it will probably experience internal conflict in the future (see Section 2.8.3.4 for a discussion of gender inequality as a predictor of internal conflict).

Research designs for social research include narrative research, phenomenology, ethnography, ground theory and case study research with the purpose of testing or verifying existing theory (Creswell, 2014:65). Theoretical perspectives guiding the transformative paradigm are feminist theories, radicalized discourses, critical theory, queer theory and disability inquiry (Creswell, 2014:65). As explained in Section 5.2, feminist theory guides this study because of its transformative characteristics.

Pragmatism is the philosophical foundation for mixed-method research with multiple methods, different assumptions and different forms of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2014:11). Once the researcher understands the paradigm, Guba (1990:17) suggests the researcher should select the “basic set of beliefs that guides action” to best support the type of study proposed. The different research designs are addressed next.

5.3 Research design and methodology

There are three basic research designs available, namely quantitative, qualitative or mixed-method inquiry. The research designs provide direction for the selection of the research methods. It outlines the strategy that will be used to bring together all the components of the study in a logical way to achieve the outcome. In other words, the research design is the blueprint for the data collection, measurement and analysis. Mouton and Marais (1996:33) emphasize that the aim of a research design is rational decision making to maximize the validity of the research findings.

Quantitative research is based on the measurement of phenomena that can be expressed in quantities or numbers. It can be used in combination with qualitative research (research with words) in a mixed-method design, often used in social sciences. Pure quantitative research is mainly used for research in natural sciences where precision is required and results are subjected to statistical analysis (Kothari, 2004:3). For the purpose of this study, a qualitative research design was selected.

5.3.1 Qualitative research design

The qualitative research design is used to study human opinions, motivations and themes. Thus, qualitative research is concerned with quality and depth when investigating human behaviour with the aim to discover the underlying motives for human decisions in a particular situation. It is rich and descriptive of a certain narrative. The researcher attempts to comprehend experiences, perspectives and meanings by using words instead of numbers. As a result, a qualitative study applies non-statistical methods and is based on small samples (Vosloo, 2014:328).

Qualitative research focuses on the natural setting of the study participants. The data collection must stay focused on the meanings presented by the participants and it should not be influenced by the views of the researcher or presupposed ideas from the literature. Qualitative research is mainly inductive, meaning that the data are organized into themes or categories (Bryman, 1995:46). The focus is on the process rather than product and the search for meaning is central. Furthermore, qualitative research is emergent and reflexive and should be adapted to accommodate the participants. Due to its holistic nature, qualitative research involves multiple perspectives and is influenced by different factors (Creswell, 2014:186). The development of contemporary feminist metatheories as discussed in Section 2.5.3 provides evidence for Creswell's (2014:186) statement above, that feminist theory is based on pluralistic approaches and viewpoints. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, one of the possible methods to

collect data when doing qualitative research is a case study. This study employed case study research. The characteristics of case study research are discussed next.

5.3.1.1 Case study research

Case study research is one of the most challenging research strategies in social sciences. Be that as it may, its distinctive contribution to understanding complex social occurrences allows researchers to contribute in a holistic and meaningful manner to knowledge about individuals, groups or organizations on the political, social or economic levels of life, therefore make it an important research method (Yin, 2003:2).

Yin (2003:12) refers to Schramm to define case study as a research strategy as follows: “case studies try to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result”. Yin explains case study research as an empirical inquiry that studies current occurrences in within their real-life contexts when the margins between occurrences and context are not visible. Secondly, a case study inquiry relies on multiple sources of evidence, which requires triangulation. A case study research design is therefore an inclusive method that can include both single- and multiple-case designs (Yin, 2003:15). A concern developed that case study research based on a single case does not provide evidence for scientific generalization. Yin (2003:10) explains that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations. A case study does not represent an entire sample. The goal of case study research is to refine and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to detail frequencies (statistical generalization). The strength of qualitative case study research is that it allows the researcher to collect in-depth data to determine specific causes and effects (Blatter, 2008:69). In the case of this study, the research probed the causes and the effects of gender inequality. The primary research question for this study was: “What are the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards”.

Case study research remains a controversial method of data collection but is sought after in social sciences when in-depth knowledge of a complex situation is needed – whether to arrive at broad generalizations or to present single cases. It is used to explain the link between programme implementation and programme results in real-life situations. Easton (in Miller, 1971:199) explains that human behaviour in a political system creates a demand for change, where after human behaviour will be affected by the output. Case study research can be described as input-output-interaction research in a specific environment (Mouton & Marais, 1994:33). It describes the programme intervention and at the same time illustrates certain areas of importance that require transformation. Case study research is used to investigate

areas where interventions did not have the intended outcome. Lastly, case study research can be used for meta-evaluation – a study to evaluate another study (Yin, 2003:15). Blatter (2008:69) highlights that case study research links programme implementation and programme results with real-life situations. Chapter 3 described the different programmes implemented by the Government of Kenya to mainstream gender equality, while Chapter 4 served as an ex-post evaluation of gender transformation in Kenya and identified impediments and possible consequences for the failures identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 identifies the causes and effects and the mechanisms between them. Figure 5.1 displays the theoretical and methodological approaches used for this study.




Figure 5.1: Theoretical and methodological approach

Source: adapted from Saunders (2009:124).

The case at hand is the failure of the national Government of Kenya to implement the required constitutional “two-thirds principle of gender representation” (see Section 3.4). Section 3.8.1 in Chapter 3 summarized the programmes that should have been implemented by the Government of Kenya based on the 2010 Constitution to realize the gender equality requirement of Article 81(b) (output) and reasons why they were not implemented (result). A breakdown of the research methodology used to collect data on the causes and the effects of the failure of the Kenyan is presented next.

5.3.2 Research methodology

The research methodology refers to the choices that researchers make about which methods of data collection and analysis would best suit the case at hand. Therefore, the methodology describes how the researcher performed the study (Silverman, 2013:225).

This study applied both explorative and descriptive research methods. The purpose of the explorative method was to gain new insights into the research topic, which was not well defined in the preliminary stages of the research. Explorative research helped to identify the central thoughts and concepts of the study, namely feminism, gender equality, patriarchy, human security, radicalization, extremism and terrorism. The application of the explorative design led to insight and comprehension and was mainly based on secondary research. The explorative design was used for the compilation of Chapter 1. A literature review was suitable for the formulation of the primary research question and objective and the identification of further research.

5.3.2.1 Literature review

The literature review was the first stage of the study. A literature review is a vital first step when undertaking researching because it provides the theoretical background to the proposed research problem and gives clarity and focus. Therefore, the purpose of the literature review was to acquaint the researcher with the body of knowledge on feminist and gender research and the link between gender inequality and human security. It allowed the researcher to determine the links between existing knowledge and the research proposed to clarify new ideas and to develop or improve the research methodology (Kumar, 2011:32; Creswell, 2014:285). After the empirical research, a return to the literature study helps the researcher to integrate the new research and the existing body of knowledge. This enables the researcher to demonstrate how new research has contributed to the body of knowledge. During the integration process, the researcher either accepts or disputes earlier research (Kumar, 2011:32; Creswell, 2014:285). The empirical research conducted for this study on the

implications of the Kenyan government not meeting gender equality standards agrees with the findings of the literature review as presented in Chapters 2 to 4.

Some of the secondary or theoretical data used to compile the literature review relied on a larger longitudinal literature study available to researchers interested in gender studies to Kenya. Additional secondary data were collected from multiple sources such as published data in books, research journals, and research articles published on online databases, government publications, websites and the database of the North-West University Library. Primary data collection is time-consuming, therefore existing secondary data were used to confirm and increase the reliability of the primary data (McGinn, 2008:804). However, because the reliability of secondary data is beyond the control of the researcher, its integrity was established before it was used (Bryman, 2012:313).

Based on the literature review, this study was divided into the following areas of study: The first task was to conceptualize feminism and its efforts to mainstream gender equality (see Section 2.5). This first section studied feminist theory (see Section 2.5.3) as the cornerstone for the promotion of gender equality (see Section 2.3) and the effects of gender inequality for both human and national security (see Sections 2.7.2 and 2.7.3). The second step was to define the different legislative and institutional frameworks (See Section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3) to support the constitutional requirements set by the national Government of Kenya to reach gender equality standards (see Section 3.4.). Despite the implementation of legal and institutional frameworks, development programmes and the inclusion of women in peace and security programmes, there is still resistance to the required female representation at the national government level (see Section 3.6). This insight from the literature became the third focus. The fact that the Government of Kenya does not lack gender policies, but lacks the political will to implement the policies, aggravates the poor state of gender equality and has implications for national security (see Section 4.2). The literature is quiet on how much gender inequality affects human security and therefore the security of Kenya. This study used a case study method to fill this gap in the literature.

The study continued through an empirical study and descriptive research that allowed for the explanation of the phenomenon under study. The descriptive design was based on the data collected by means of an empirical or field study.

5.3.2.2 Empirical research

The second phase, the collection of primary empirical data, involved case study research. The data were collected by means of semi-structured interviews. The data collected were used to

describe the status and consequences of gender inequality in Kenya. Descriptive research is defined as the accurate description of the facts and characteristics of a population or area of interest as it occurs in the participants' natural habitat (Mouton & Marais, 1996:43; Dulock, 1993:154). The goal of descriptive research is to collect accurate data and provide an in-depth description of the situation in the field without any influencing. Descriptive studies provide rich data that lead to important recommendations for implementation in practice (Shuttleworth, 2008:1). In the case of this study, a descriptive design was found appropriate to answer the primary research question: *"What are the implications for the security if the Government of Kenya does not meet the required gender equality standards?"* The focus of the empirical study was to clarify the effect of gender inequality on the national security of Kenya (See Figure 7.1).

Due to the focus of humans of social research, three human characteristics should be considered when collecting data. The first is rationality. Rationality refers to the human ability to make free decisions, to reason about human existence, and to determine one's future. In other words, humans are capable of defining their "situatedness", to interpret it and to behave proactively (Marais, 1996:76). The second characteristic is historicity, which refers to the fact that humans create their own history but are also the products of history. This explains human tradition and the fact that humans have hope for the future. As Mouton and Marais (1996:76) state, humans "possess a historical consciousness". The third characteristic is that humans are normative and reason in terms of what they perceive as proper. These human characteristics have to be taken into consideration when conducting qualitative research (Mouton & Marais, 1996:76). With this in mind, the target population and sampling methods are discussed next.

5.3.2.2.1 Population

Before the start of any research, the target population must be defined. The target population refers to the entire group of people of interest to the researcher and the group of people to whom researchers want to generalize the research conclusions (Miner *et al.*, 2012:248). The target population for this study was the marginalized group of citizens – women in Kenya. The part of the population or group of people a researcher can get access to is known as the accessible or study population (Miner *et al.*, 2012:248).

5.3.2.2.2 Study population

The study population serves as the sampling frame from where the researchers draw a sample. For this study, the study population included topic-specific experts (of both genders) in the fields of gender, security and political studies based on their expertise and close involvement

with gender issues and women's groups in government and at a grassroots level. Secondly, the study population included experts (both genders) in political and security studies because of their knowledge on extremism and its linkages with politics in Kenya. Thirdly, the study population included women from civil society to determine what they perceive as normative with regard to gender equality in Kenya, and if or how gender inequality affects their daily lives. The population was limited to participants residing in Nairobi, the capital and seat of the national Government of Kenya. Nairobi is home to the UN's headquarters in Africa and in 2020, 23 UN agencies were operating from Nairobi. As a result, Nairobi is home to many academic institutions, multilateral organizations, private security consultation and management agencies and NGOs.

5.3.2.2.3 Sampling

Sampling is a process of selecting a group of individuals that represent the characteristics of the larger population. The sample size is a representation of the total population enumerated for analysis. The two possible sampling techniques are probability or nonprobability sampling. In probability sampling, also called random sampling, the size of the group matters as the number of people who are included in the sample is predetermined. The advantage of this method is that it allows for random sampling and the research conclusions can be generalized to the target population. In nonprobability or convenience sampling, the focus is on the ability, knowledge and expertise of the people about the research topic. They therefore have to meet the required criteria as explained in Section 5.3.2.2.1.1. However, researchers should be cautious when generalizing the research conclusions, as the sample may not be a full representation of the study population (Morgan, 2008:797; Miner *et al.*, 2012:249).

5.3.2.2.4 Sample size and sampling technique

In qualitative studies, the research is founded on an in-depth and highly contextualized understanding of specific phenomena and criteria. Saturation or redundancy is the point in qualitative data collection where no new information or themes emerge from the data analysis. Saturation was used as a standard to determine the sample size and data collection was discontinued at this point (Morgan, 2008:798, Saunders *et al.*, 2018:1, Gerring, 2017:1).

The researcher defined the sample design before the start of data collection to include experts on gender and extremism in Kenya, as well as women from different layers of society to represent the target population. Balancing sample size is the most challenging task, as the sample should not be too excessive or too small. An optimal sample allows efficiency, reliability and flexibility and must be a true reflection of the population with a small margin for sampling error. Factors that may influence sample size are the parameters of the study or budget

constrains (Kothari, 2004:57). Archibald and Munce (2015:34) identify that the sample size in qualitative research is linked to data analysis. It happens that emerging data necessitate changes in the participant recruitment strategy or the sample size.

Nonprobability sampling was applied, based on deliberate selection. Deliberate sampling is also known as purposive sampling and constitutes a specific selection from the population. Purposive sampling is based on a narrow set of criteria for inclusion to define the set of people who are suitable as prospective participants (Morgan, 2008:800). In support of deliberate or purposive sampling, judgement sampling strengthened the researcher's decision to select a specific sample, which would be considered as representative of the population (Kothari, 2004:15).

The snowball technique was used to purposefully select the participants. These sampling techniques are used to ensure that the sample was representative of the population to allow for inductive theory building and a subjective, holistic and detailed understanding. These goals were reached by means of investigations of small systematically selected samples. Inductive theory building is possible where observations in social research discover patterns that can be applied universally (Trochim, 2006:1; Crossman, 2017:1).

This study was based on the case of non-compliance to the 2010 constitutional "two-thirds gender principle" by the Government of Kenya. The preferred means of data collection for case studies is semi-structured interviews. The method of empirical data collection for this study was face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key participants who were selected by using purposive, judgement sampling from civil society, multilateral organizations, NGOs, academic institutions, research institutions and political and security risk assessment consultancies. The identification of participants continued by means of snowball sampling until saturation was reached and the data collection ceased. The identification of participants is discussed in Section 5.3.2.2.3. However, a set of inclusion criteria was applied to set the boundaries for research participants.

5.3.2.2.5 Inclusion criteria

Inclusion and exclusion criteria refer to predefined characteristics and set the boundaries for the selection of participants to be included in a research study. In qualitative research, the establishment of specific inclusion criteria is important to ensure that the participants have the knowledge and exposure to provide the information needed to answer the research questions. A good selection of inclusion criteria will improve the validity of the study, make it more cost-effective, reduce ethical challenges, but even more, effective inclusion criteria will guarantee

the homogeneity of the sample and ensure the possibility of finding a true connection between intervention and outcomes. Exclusion criteria on the other hand are the characteristics that would disqualify participants from participating in a specific research study (Salkind, 2010:1).

Purposive sampling is based on a narrow set of criteria for inclusion to define the set of people who are suitable as prospective participants – information-rich people with knowledge related to the topic of interest (Morgan, 2008:800, Palinkas *et al.*, 2015:1). Criterion sampling is the most common purposive sampling method. The inclusion criteria for this study entailed that the majority of participants should have an analytical and in-depth knowledge of the Kenyan political and security environments and/or in-depth knowledge of feminism theory and gender relations. The participants had to be English-speaking and located in Nairobi, Kenya. The process of recruitment is discussed next.

5.3.2.2.6 Identification of participants

The identification of participants in qualitative research is challenging and resource-intensive. There is often a misalignment between the time and resources needed for participant identification and the overestimation of available and eligible participants. Failure to identify these challenges and to develop strategies to counter them may impact negatively on the feasibility and the quality of the research. Archibald and Munce (2015:34) highlight that the personality of the recruiter, institutional gatekeeping, the behaviours and differences of the participants and the process of determining the sample size have implications for the identification of research participants. It is important to remember the link between research participant identification and data analysis.

The researcher identified one of the academic institutions of higher learning in Nairobi as a point of departure for a pilot interview with a male lecturer responsible for gender studies. A second pilot interview was conducted with a female lecturer at a different academic institution of higher learning in Nairobi to ensure that the questions were objective and focused. Personal appointments were made with the identified research participants. Using the snowball technique, the sample size was enlarged until saturation was reached. Ten participants were interviewed and it was sufficient, based on the saturation principle. The data collected were detailed and accurate to guarantee the authenticity and trustworthiness of the research process. The criteria to measure quality are discussed in Section 5.3.3.

The participants were selected for their research and knowledge, and/or exposure to or involvement in gender perspectives and feminism theory. The following aspects identified suitable participants:

- involvement in gender policy formulation and implementation;
- NGOs focusing on gender development and support at the grassroots level;
- involvement in women's organizations;
- multilateral organizations focused on security issues in Kenya and the region;
- analytical and in-depth knowledge of the Kenyan political environment;
- analytical and in-depth knowledge of the Kenyan internal security environment;
- analytical and in-depth knowledge of radicalization and extremism in Kenya;
- a legal background with regard to gender issues and gender awareness training; or
- enrolment in mixed gender academic institutions in Nairobi.

The researcher intended to collect the data only from participants by means of face-to-face interviews. However, the COVID-19 pandemic made this unfeasible. For one of the interviews, the researcher had to make use of a mobile phone, but the interview was still recorded. Although electronic communication can leave a digital footprint that would affect the anonymity of the participant, the contact numbers of the participants were not shared. Personal appointments were set telephonically before each interview and each of the participants was informed what could be expected during the interview and that informed consent is needed.

Judgement sampling were used to select participants from civil society, multilateral organizations, NGOs, academic institutions, research institutions and political and security risk assessment consultancies. Two female students from different academic institutions and levels of education were included to collect data on the treatment of female students by their peers and the Teachers/Lecturers. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the participants and their fields of expertise.

Table 5.1: Profile of the research participants

Age	Sex	Nationality	Expertise	Career / Employment
50-60	W	Kenyan	Gender and policy expert	Gender Specialist at a Kenyan NGO
	M	International	Specialist in Kenyan domestic politics and regional security	Manager at an East African political and security risk management company
	M	Kenyan	Political Expert (PhD in International Politics)	Employed at an embassy in Nairobi
40-50	W	Kenyan	Specialist on gender transformation at grassroots level	Manager at an international NGO
	W	Kenyan	Political and security risk analysis	Manager at a regional risk management consultancy
30-40	M	Kenyan / International	Political and security risk analysis	Research fellow at an independent Think Tank on international security
	W	Kenyan	Advocate, legal and gender policy advisor	Advocate
20-30	W	Kenyan	B Comm student and community leader	University
	W	International	Security specialist on Al Shabaab and Somalia	Multilateral Organization
18-20	W	Kenyan	Student: Gender experience at school	Student at a mix gender school with a female headmaster

Table 5.1 reveals that eight of the participants were selected for their knowledge on domestic politics, gender equality and the security environments in Kenya. The two female students were selected to provide information on the relationship between male and female students and the student/lecturer/teacher relationships at their different academic institutions. The participants were interested in the topic and enthusiastic to share their knowledge and expertise. All interviews were conducted in a positive and relax manner.

5.3.2.2.6.1 Process of obtaining informed consent

The purpose of informed consent and the consent process in qualitative research is to protect and respect human research participants during the research process. The *Nuremberg war crimes trial* and the *Tuskegee syphilis study* are two extreme examples of unethical standards in social research. These events forced the re-evaluation of ethics standards to better protect the rights of research participants (Trochim, 2006:1). A number of key principles were established to describe the system of ethical protection.

The first principle is the voluntary participation of the participants. This principle is to prevent researchers from pressuring participants to cooperate in specific research. Closely linked to voluntary participation is the principle of informed consent, which requires that all participants should be fully informed about their i) rights; ii) the aim of the research; iii) the research procedures that will be used; iv) if the participants are expected to be exposed to any risk or harm; and lastly, v) what the benefits for their participation would be (Israel & Hay, 2008:432). The purpose of the process of informed consent is for participants to be provided with adequate information about the research to decide if they want to participate. They should be informed that they can withdraw from the research at any time. A third principle is privacy. All research provides assurances of confidentiality and states that research information will only be made available to people directly involved in the study. However, the standard of anonymity may be applied if the participants wish to remain anonymous during the interview process. Although this is a stronger level of confidentiality, it may create challenges if the researcher has to revisit the participants. In an effort to ensure that researchers consider all possible ethical matters, academic and research institutions have ethics or review boards to evaluate if research proposals adhere to the applicable ethics principles. An analysis of research proposals helps to both protect the institution as well as the researcher against potential legal actions and to address any visible outstanding ethical matters (Trochim, 2006:1; Shahnazarian *et al.*, 2017:2–4). The Ethics Committee of the North-West University approved this study (See Annexures A and B for the “Scope of North-West University Scientific Research Ethics Committees”).

The participants agreed to voluntary participation in the research before the start of their interviews. All the participants were provided with a short explanation of what the interview would entail when the personal appointments were set. A written consent form (See Annexure G) was provided and signed by each of the participants. The signed forms and recorded interviews were electronically stored and are in the researcher's safekeeping.

5.3.2.2.7 Data collection

The first phase of the study was conducted by means of a literature review (see Section 5.3.2.1). The second phase was completed by means of empirical research. The data collection method for the primary or original data for this study was based on case study research (see Section 5.3.1.1). The case at hand was the failure of the Government of Kenya to implement gender equality standards. The preferred method of data collection for this case study research was semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews allow a researcher to collect focused, qualitative recorded data that will move the research on the case study from general to specific insights. Because of its flexibility, fluid structure and freedom to probe for more information on a given answer, semi-structured interviews demand greater interviewing skills and a deeper knowledge of the case study at hand. The flexibility allows for the unexpected, and therefore makes interviewing time-consuming and analysis more complicated. This method is used to clarify the case at hand and uncover thick descriptive data from participants (McCammon, 2019:1).

The interviews for this study were face-to-face with key participants who were purposively selected. Personal semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to judge the responses of the participants immediately for correction when a question had not been understood properly (Walliman, 2011:92; Brinkmann, 2014:290). The researcher is an experienced interviewer and managed the interviews in a relaxed manner. The development of the semi-structured interview schedule for the collection of the empirical data is discussed next.

5.3.2.2.7.1 Development of the data collection tool

The interviews schedule allowed for structured, but open-ended questions. The interview schedule was tested in two pilot interviews to ensure that the data would be of a high quality. The analysis of the data confirmed a consistency in the answers from the participants (please refer to Attachment H for the research questionnaire). The criteria to measure quality are discussed in Section 5.3.3.

5.3.2.2.7.2 A reflection on the data collection process

The empirical study was conducted from July to October 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the unnatural circumstances, participants (except for one) were still willing to meet face-to-face. The researcher met all the participants at their places of preference. These interviews were conducted either in gardens or outdoor spaces in Nairobi.

The selection of the participants was focused on subject matter experts outside the government structures. To the surprise of the researcher, two interviews were cancelled on very short notice just before the interviews without participants offering to reschedule the appointment. Two appointments were set for telephonic interviews, but at the scheduled time of the interview the selected participants' phones were switched off. Because the participants were selected for their knowledge on the research topic, the identification of new participants was a time-consuming process. Experts that were contacted by email for interviews, did not respond to the researcher's request for interviews. Some gender specialists that were recommended were fully occupied and were in the process of developing online helplines and reporting centres for reporting GBV. Notwithstanding the circumstances, the quality of the information was not compromised and saturation was reached early in the interview process.

5.3.3 Criteria to measure quality

The criteria to measure quality research include precision, accuracy, reliability and validity. Accuracy and precision contribute to greater reliability and validity – the criteria for quantitative research results. Qualitative research designs on the other hand are used to study human opinions, motivations and themes. Thus, qualitative research is concerned with quality, better defined by credibility, dependability, authenticity and confirmation (Vosloo, 2014:330).

5.3.3.1 Trustworthiness and authenticity in qualitative research

The quality of the research results of a qualitative study is measured for their appropriateness and accuracy. In a quantitative research design, this is referred to as the validity of the study, measured against the criteria of the research instrument that was applied. The central question is whether the research instrument measured what it was supposed to measure (Kumar, 2011:177). Babbie (2007:146) defines validity as the “extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”.

Reliability in quantitative research, according to Kumar (2011:181), refers to research instruments that are consistent, stable, predictable and accurate. The greater the degree of

consistency and stability, the more reliable instrument is. Babbie (2007:150) clarifies that reliability measures the consistency of results when using the same measure, while validity refers to the accuracy of results. In contrast, qualitative research is flexible, and data are collected by means of exploration. This includes multiple methods and procedures. The quality of the research results in qualitative research can be measured by means the parallel concepts of trustworthiness and authenticity. Kumar (2011:185; Trochim *et al.*, 2006:162) explains that indicators closely related to validity and reliability in qualitative research are credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability:

- **Credibility:** Credibility in qualitative research (internal validity in quantitative research) is established from the perspective of the participant, who is the only person who can judge the quality of the results.
- **Transferability:** The degree to which the research results can be generalized or transferred (measured as external validity in quantitative research) is based on the thoroughness of the description of the research results. Part of the description of the results includes the changes that occurred and how it affected the approach to the study.
- **Dependability:** The researcher has to account for the changing context. This is called dependability and is comparable to reliability in quantitative research.
- **Conformability:** Conformability refers to the degree to which the results, although unique in nature, can be confirmed by other researchers or by means of a data audit. This indicator provides objectivity to a qualitative research process (Trochim *et al.*, 2006:162).

Feminist research is conducted in a larger historical context and it is therefore important that the “evidence of experience” should take the individual characteristics of man, women, black, white, hetero- or homosexual, location and historical experiences into account in the process of seeking meaning. Best practice to address differences and to ensure objectivity is to explicitly acknowledge the difference in social location between that of the researcher and the participant. Participants should receive recognition for their contribution to feminist research as “subjects in their own right,” instead of “mere victims of an overarching patriarchy.” It is therefore essential to understand the politics of representation in feminist research (De Vault & Gross, 2012:215; 227). Contributing to the integrity of qualitative feminist research is the application of morally correct ethical standards. Ethical norms guarantee researcher accountability to prevent fraudulent research practices and are discuss next.

5.4 Ethical considerations

Research ethics addresses the integrity of the research study. Ethics in research demand increased attention, as ethical considerations are extensive and present through the whole research process. Ethics are connected to morality and address issues of right and wrong. Resnik (2015:1) defines ethics as “norms for conduct that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.” Resnik explains that ethical norms refer to the validity and reliability of research; it promotes “values that are essential to collaborative work” like trust and mutual respect; it ensures that researchers are accountable to the public, and lastly, it promotes moral and social values. Ethical failures in research have serious implications for the subjects of research – whether humans or animals (Resnik, 2015:1; De Vault & Gross, 2012:225).

Before to the study, researchers should familiarize themselves with the codes of ethics of professional associations that would be involved in the research. Simultaneously, researchers should have their research design reviewed by an institutional review board of the educational institution under which the study is conducted (Creswell, 2014:95). For this study, after the approval of the research proposal, an “Application for Approval of Scientific Projects with Human Participants” was submitted to the Faculty of Arts Ethics Committee and the NWU-IRERC committee. Permission to continue with the study was granted by both committees, with authority number NWU-00717-17-A7.

Qualitative empirical data collection during 2020 required additional ethical and safety precautions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. UN Women (2020:4) warns that it is important not to prioritize data collection over the safety of participants. The researcher should weigh the risks to the participants against the anticipated benefit of the data. These considerations were taken into account when collecting data for this study. As a result, one of the interviews had to be conducted telephonically. The researcher made sure to still adhere to the required ethics principles. The remainder of the interviews were conducted in locations where social distancing could be maintained.

During the data collection process, written informed consent was obtained from each of the participants in the face-to-face interviews and verbal consent was obtained for the telephonic interview (please refer to Attachment G for the written consent form). The participants were assured of confidentiality and that the data will be stored digitally for a minimum of five years, where after it will be destroyed. Access to raw data would only be granted to the supervisor of the researcher and only for auditing purposes. Lastly, the analysis, reporting and sharing of information should be accurate. There should be accuracy during the interpretation of the data. The researcher should give an objective account without taking sides, suppressing or falsifying

information or inventing findings to meet the researcher's needs. Fraudulent research practices constitute scientific misconduct (Creswell, 2014:99; Babbie, 2007:67). The research for this study was honest and open and in line with commonly held standards for research (Preissle, 2008:276).

It is imperative to confirm that the data presented is a true reflection of the situation on the ground. The credibility of the information was established using data saturation. The case study results can be generalized to theoretical propositions and not populations. The results of this study can be generalized to developing countries, because women face the same restrictions, remain marginalized and form the bigger portion of the poor internationally, with devastating effects for human security. The dependability of the information was established with good interviewing and administrative skills. No corrections to the data collection process were needed. Lastly, the research results corresponded with a gender analysis conducted by FIDA and UN Women and USAID. The objectivity and conformability of the results are above doubt. The study was transformative and contributed to the body of knowledge on feminist security studies.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the methodology and research design for this study. This study was guided by the transformative research paradigm. The theory development was based on induction. Qualitative research aims to provide thick descriptions of the data collected. This qualitative study was conducted in two phases. The first phase of the study included a literature review and was explorative. The purpose of the literature review was to gain knowledge of the feminist theoretical framework and its intersecting possibilities for security studies. The literature study explored feminism and gender and the contribution of the feminist theory to feminist security studies, gender equality standards and the status of gender equality in the national Government of Kenya. It furthermore probed the impediments to gender mainstreaming and the consequences of this for human security.

The second phase, or the empirical study, focused on the collection of primary data through case study research. Case study research allows for the collection of in-depth data, in this case determining the causes and effects of gender equality interventions that did not have the expected outcome. The method of empirical data collection for this case study was face-to-face interviews with key participants. Participants were purposively sampled by means of the snowball technique based on their expertise in the fields of gender and security studies.

Interviews were ceased after data saturation had been reached. The empirical research was conducted from July to October 2020. The results of the data collected exhibited consistency – an indication of the trustworthiness and authenticity of the research process. The objectivity and conformability of the results were confirmed by means of comparison with other research studies conducted on the status and impediments to gender inequality in Kenya. The next chapter discusses the empirical results and findings.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the empirical research. The empirical research was divided into two parts. The focus of the first part of the empirical study was to answer research question four as set out in Section 1.6: “How does gender inequality affect the security of the Government of Kenya according to feminist theory and in reality when measured against the standards of good security? The findings are covered in Sections 6.2 to 6.7. Additionally, the empirical research explored solutions to the question of how to create gender-sensitive mindset changes to ultimately prevent moral changes. These findings are discussed in Sections 6.8 to 6.11. Chapters 5 and 6 addressed the fourth research question.

Chapter 5 described the sample and the identification of the participants who agreed to voluntary participation in the research. The findings are discussed by looking at the participants’ opinions on each separate issue included as part of the interview schedule. The issues included are:

- the use of structural resistance as a tool to prevent gender mainstreaming;
- to establish if a correlation between gender inequality, poverty and female insecurity exists;
- to determine if women could be radicalized based on the level of insecurity they endure;
- to ascertain if an increase in violent extremism would be contributing to internal or political violence;
- to establish if gender inequality contributes to poor governance of the security sector and human rights abuses;
- to establish if a correlation between ethnic and gender inequality exist;
- to explore solutions to attain girls in school and in tertiary education;
- to search for approaches to change the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy;
- to establish the influence of female parliamentarians on gender transformation in the Government of Kenya; and

- to explore the possibility of a bottom-up radical feminist approach to promote gender transformation in Kenya.

The responses to these issues will be discussed in the subsections that follow.

6.2 Structural resistance

Question 1 of the interview schedule investigated the possibility of structural resistance as a tool to prevent gender mainstreaming in the national Government of Kenya. The ultimate purpose of structural resistance is to bring about gender inequality and to create push factors in this direction on a macro-level. Most of the participants believed that there is such structural resistance and Participant B indicated it this may even be unconscious. Participant A believed that men have an attitude of superiority with regard to political position, even in cases where women are better skilled or qualified for a position. Men in the national government are holding on to power and their privileged position, and according to Participant B, they do this by keeping women ignorant and divided. Participants C and J agreed that structural resistance (see Section 2.7.3 for a discussion on the factors influencing internal conflict) is clear from the fact that the government did not pass the gender bill, putting Kenya behind its neighbours in the region (see Table 3.1 for a demonstration of female representation in the parliaments of the EAC). Participant C also indicated that structural grievances create push factors and as a result, pull factors, because the one could not exist without the other. Participant D indicated that men dominate the political sectors where strong lobbying and networking are required. Past marginalization makes it difficult for women to compete on equal grounds with men in elections and as a result for positions in the national government. Participant E replied that it is not as such the lack of recognition of the importance of women in society that is the greatest obstacle, but rather that men control the resources in the national government. This Participant saw this is the reason why the “two-thirds gender principle” in the 2010 Constitution is not reflected in the resource allocations for positions in the national government. Participant E explained further that although there is a consciousness of the importance of the role of women in society, there is no willingness to share control and allow for influence at a national level. Participant F was of the opinion that the top-down approach for mainstreaming gender as prescribed by the 2010 Constitution was just about balancing the numbers and consequently no change has really taken place. The same Participant mentioned resource allocation as an obstacle, saying that many resources are allocated to the Ministries of Defence and Interior (Internal Security), and that the Covid-19 pandemic exposed the imbalance in the resource allocation. Alternatively, two of the participants, Participants D and F mentioned that Kenya

has more women voters than men, but this does not correspond with positions for women in the national government. The participants concluded that the structural resistance sustains gender inequality in national government. Participant I, an advocate who works with gender issues, indicated that the Constitution is clear about affirmative action measures to implement the “two-thirds gender principle”. With affirmative action, women can be nominated to reach the two-thirds threshold (please refer to Annexure B for Article 27(6) of the 2010 Constitution). However, the same constitution provides citizens with the freedom to vote for their preferred candidates and many citizens argue that they do not want women leaders forced on them for the sake of gender equality. The Participant believes that the men in the government do not understand the importance of gender equality and therefore resists female leaders.

In addition, the perception of superiority that is created because of male dominance is carried over to universities. Participant G indicated that it is customary that courses are male-dominated. The ratio of male to female students in the accounting department at the university is 80:20. According to Participant G, at the university, even female lecturers would give preference to male students. Table 4.3 classified accounting and commerce as business subjects together with all the service delivery subjects like marketing, hotel management and tourism. Females are better represented than males in courses for professions in the service delivery sector, with 394 697 versus 384 905 students. However, statistics from the 2019 census revealed that in subjects in the fields of economics and STEM, typically with a more numeric nature like accounting, female students were not as well represented. For economics, 15 945 (56 per cent) female students were enrolled versus 28 306 male students (KNBS, 2019: 60). The gender difference in STEM subjects was higher with 63 per cent male enrolment versus 37 per cent female enrolment (Wanzala, 2020:1).

Participant I confirmed the opinion of Participant H that careers are gender-biased. It was mentioned that some primary school children in Kenya were asked to draw fire fighters, not firemen. All the firefighters were male. On another occasion, primary school children were asked to indicate the gender of a medical doctor. Again, they all answered that doctors are male. The conclusion was that as early as primary school; children associate careers with a specific gender. This is in line with the student enrolment discussed in the previous paragraph.

With regard to the management of boys and girls at secondary schools, Participant G indicated that safety in mixed-gender secondary boarding schools is not a problem for girls. Participant H indicated that the genders are treated equally in mixed-gender secondary boarding schools without compromising the safety of the girls. It is important to mention that the school in question has a female principal. Participant H confirmed that policies adopted in the education sector, to secure a more equal education environment for girls, are delivering positive results.

One of the aspects, discussed in Section 3.4.4.2.1, was the appointment of qualified female education managers at schools to ensure the security of girls.

The answer to the first question if the Government of Kenya is using gender inequity as a tool to prevent gender mainstreaming or the implementation of the required “two-thirds gender principle”, is structural resistance. It was indicated that the importance of women in society is recognized, but that men control the resources in the national government. The next question explored a possible correlation between female insecurity and gender inequality and is discussed next.

6.3 Female insecurity

Question 2 assessed the possibility of a correlation between gender inequality and female insecurity in Kenya. All the participants mentioned that economic strain has a direct negative effect on women and girls – and as a result their security. In general, in Kenya, the boy-child receives preferential treatment above the girl-child (see Section 2.4.4 for a description of the reality of gender inequality and Table 4.4 for an illustration of gender participation in the labour force in Kenya). Participant A added that a women’s economic status determines her security status. Participant B was in agreement and indicated that women have to rely on their husbands for security. Participant F indicated that women are marginalized and economically disempowered, which make them dependent on males or family structures in a patriarchal society (see Figure 4.6 for an illustration physical violence caused by spouse in comparison with the level of education). Participant F poignantly said that poverty has a female scent. Participant D indicated that it would be difficult to provide evidence that gender inequality is a precondition for insecurity but explained that there are pointers to assess that it is the case.

Participant B replied that economies grow and economic power is sustained under female leadership and provided Rwanda as an African example – a country with more than 60 per cent female representation in national government. Rwanda has been stable and safe for the past years (see Table 3.1 for an illustration of female representation in the parliaments in the EAC). Participant B indicated that gender equality is perceived as an outside western concept that is applied in Africa (see Section 2.5.2.2 for a discussion of third world feminism and Section 2.5.4 for a description of feminism in Africa). Often, donor funding for projects in Africa drives gender equality. Once the funding ends, the drive for a gender-equal society also ends. The remarks of Participant B align with the discussion about feminism in Africa as discussed in Section 2.5.4. Woodhull (2007:162) explained that, in Africa, human rights are defended by

non-governmental organizations in a transnational public environment and feminists in these countries defend women's rights through local grassroots movements supported by the "UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women". Participant B stated when development aid decreases; social services are the first to suffer, with serious implications for the security of women. Participants B and F indicated that the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the extent of gender inequality in Kenya. Since women are often the owners of micro-businesses (with lower levels of education) or occupy jobs in hospitality and service delivery, 75 per cent of the people who lost their jobs during the pandemic were female (see Table 4.4 for gender participation in the labour force and Figure 4.5 that illustrated that 60 per cent of unlicensed micro-, small and medium enterprises are owned by women, 55 per cent of the agriculture labour force is female, while 30 per cent of women are wage employees). Participant B indicated that during the pandemic, GBV increased because of a decrease in household income. Participant C agreed with Participant B concerning GBV, but also indicated that the level of crime, in general came down. Participant C explained that crime depends on ability, opportunity and intent. People were isolated or quarantined in the same space, so the opportunity for crime in general decreased, but for the same reason, GBV increased. During the pandemic, the safety of girls came to the fore and teenage pregnancies were highlighted. Participant H indicated that in general, girls who fell pregnant do not return to school and subsequently become the burden of a family who may already be financially strained. The teenager and her child become financial dependents because the fathers run away or disown the children leaving the young mother vulnerable and dependable on somebody for their daily survival (see Section 4.3 for a discussion on non-economic issues with clear economic consequences).

Participant E indicated that inequality creates a feeling of discontent, and in the long run, discontent will find its way to security because socio-economic factors determine people's standard of living (see Section 2.7.3.1 for a description on the factors influencing internal conflict). At an individual level, people improve their standard of living through education. At the level of national governance, the standard of living is increased through infrastructure developments to create more formal jobs and a future without discontent. Participant E identified that unfortunately, the citizens of a county do not always benefit from the jobs created by the national government for infrastructure development in their counties. This fuels discontent. Participant D accentuated the building of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) line between Nairobi and Mombasa as a point of tension between the national Government of Kenya and the Mombasa county government. The completion of the SGR line left many people in Mombasa unemployed (Participant D, 2020) People living along the coast of Kenya likewise expressed their discontent and stated that the "coastal region is not seen as part of Kenya" as

they feel marginalized. An increase in unemployment will have a snowball effect on women in the region, who are already marginalized (see Section 4.4.1 for a discussion of radicalization and violent extremism).

Participant E highlighted that the closer people live to the poverty line, the better the probability that criminal activities would increase. However, as expressed in literature, not all poor people turn to crime. However, Participant C indicated that push factors are created by structural grievances and these include inequality, poverty and police brutality (see Table 4.6 for a summary of the levels of influence on radicalization). As mentioned by the other participants, the push factors keep women in poverty, because the people at the extreme ends of the pyramid are women. Participant F agreed that gender inequality does contribute to female insecurity, because women do not have livelihoods of their own, but they will nonetheless do anything for their children to continue with education beyond primary school. People sacrifice much to take their children to tertiary education. Participant F mentioned that in Somalia, girls are supporting their families more than boys. Participant I confirmed the multiplier effect of empowered women. According to this participant, even if a woman has very little money, she would use it wisely for the family. County governments in Kenya governed by women are doing better than those governed by men (Participant I, 2020). The participant is of the opinion that there is a systemic problem that women are prevented from being empowered. Therefore, women should go for a bottom-up approach, because the top-down approach is not reaching the intended goals.

Participant D indicated that in addition to what has been mentioned about big national development projects, the annual revenue sharing for county governments was a hot discussion in August 2020. For the past 10 years after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, marginalized counties with low populations received a lion's share of the national budget to enable them to uplift their communities. However, this did not translate into economic opportunities for the people at a grassroots level. In 2020, the developed and densely populated counties demanded that the national budget be distributed based on the population and tax contribution of a county. Previously marginalized counties may in future receive a smaller budget with fewer economic and development opportunities. This creates the possibility of discontent among the inhabitants. It is worthwhile to mention that the new revenue formula created a split in the political class and unhappiness among some of the county governors. Ethnic inequality has crept back into national politics and that the inequality between counties would lead to discontent among the citizenry and the creation of latent conflict between the counties.

Participant C mentioned that he worked in a project where he monitored the link between GBV, gender inequality and violence. He suggested that there is a cyclical interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity as illustrated by Figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1: Cyclical interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity

Participant J focused on the location of women. Women close to cities are marginalized, though they have access to information and services, while women in rural areas experience a double dose of inequality. They are marginalized and they do not have access to information and services. Internet services are language bound and in rural areas, people speak local dialects only.

The answer to the question if a correlation between gender inequality and poverty could be established, yielded positive results. Figure 6.1 illustrated the cyclical interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity. The next question, Question 3 focused on the consequences of this interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity is not broken. This question is discussed next.

6.4 Moral change

Question 3 aimed to evaluate if the discontent that women may develop because of prolonged gender inequality, poverty and insecurity are enough to push them towards radicalization and or extremism as an alternative method to change the status quo. Participant A stated that a higher level of education, especially among women in Nairobi, gives them more freedom and resilience against radicalization. Participant B indicated that she would be careful to make a connection between poverty, insecurity and radicalization because of the effect of pull and push factors on people. However, she indicated that a poor female narrative is connected to radicalization, because these women have nothing to lose. She mentioned that a second narrative is the important role that women play in their communities – they are the custodians. If a husband or son is radicalized or mistreated by Kenyan security forces, it creates anger in the family and leaves the possibility of the entire family being radicalized. Since the CVE budget is linked to security, the harsh “policing” is a radicalization enabler instead of a preventer.

Participant C highlighted the difference between radicalization and recruitment for extremism and referred to different models of radicalization. Many radical supporters do not engage in radical or extremist actions. People join extremist groups through enablers or recruiters. Radicalizers or enablers are currently targeting females and will focus on the adverse effects of gender inequality in Kenya. It was highlighted that a change in the social structure of the family is being exploited for recruitment. Family members in single-parent households are vulnerable and are targeted by recruiters. The participant mentioned a positive correlation between low school enrolment due to poverty, and radicalization – with specific reference to Kwale County. It was emphasized that the purpose of radicalization is to create a moral change in a person’s belief system that inspires a movement from what is acceptable for the mainstream to more extreme views. These views are in line with the conditions conducive to violent extremism that was discussed in Section 4.4.2 and a combination of pull and push factors that was discussed in Section 4.4.3.2. They also resonate with the different levels of

influence as illustrated in Table 4.6. Figure 6.2 illustrates what was established by the literature review and confirmed by the Participants C, D, E and F, I and J.



Figure 6.2: Extremism mix

Participant C raised two concerns though. The first was that foreign governments spent many resources on CVE in Kenya and there is a lack of evidence on whether it has any countering effect. The second was that violence against women and girls (VAWG) projects should recognize that gender inequality and violence against women influences all other types of security, as was illustrated in Figure 6.1 and discussed in Section 4.3. Participant I believed that GBV would radicalize women. Participant E confirmed that radical elements would prey on the discontent of women because of the insecurity they experience in the country. In Kenya violence is not new, and as long as you have a common enemy, people can be radicalized and recruited to join extremist organizations.

Participant D indicated that since 2015, reports of the radicalization of women increased. The profile of such woman changes from that of a victim to that of a recruiter or radicalized supporter. Participants D and C listed two incidents in Kenya where women were active participants in extremist attacks. Three women attacked the central police station in Mombasa (2016) while in 2015, five women were arrested in Kenya when they tried to cross the Somali border on their way to Syria to become jihadi brides. Participant C indicated that the wife of the

leader in the DusitD2 attack (2019) in Nairobi played a supporting role in planning and executing the attack. These female profile changes are in line with the discussion of gender inequality and security in Section 4.4.2.2.1 and female radicalization in Section 4.6.3.

Participant F identified the push factor of poverty and a search for change, together with the pull factor of finding identity in a place pictured as a “rosy environment” as the most common radicalization focus (see Section 4.6.3 for female radicalization in Kenya). Participants C and D mentioned the jihadi brides as an example while. Participant I indicated that she saw how innocent-looking romantic messages, on a WhatsApp social platform, to school girls had an underlying message of radicalization. Table 4.7 illustrates that relationships play a key role in the recruitment process to join extremist organizations. Participants G and H were not aware of any radically aligned individuals or organizations at their respective educational institutions. Figure 6.3 illustrates how radicalizers will exploit the condition of insecurity in Kenya to radicalize people.

Participant J underlined the correlation between marginalization, poverty and radicalization. It was indicated that marginalized people are easily radicalized – not just into Al Shabaab, but also into the militia in Kenya. Youths were recruited in Kiambu County neighbouring Nairobi to take part in political rallies in September 2020 (Participant J, 2020a). Their willingness to join a militia group is purely based on poverty. When people have no other income and they are offered money, they are susceptible to being radicalized because they have nothing else. This statement is in line with the discussion on female radicalization in Section 4.6.3. Young people will measure up the risk to their lives, because they have nothing to lose. Participant J concluded that people may die while fighting, but they may also die because of hunger. So, they will rather take the risk of joining an extremist group. Participant J explained that Kenyans depend on land for their income, but that the male family members are mainly the inheritors. The father usually divides his land among his sons. Over time it has become uneconomical to sustain a family on a small piece of land. As a result, Kenyans are becoming poorer, and poverty leads to radicalization and youths joining militia groups (Participant J, 2020b). Participant J stated that poverty is the root cause of all bad behaviour.

Figure 6.3 below demonstrates how structural resistance is exploited by extremists to promote extremist moral values as was identified by the participants. It also shows how threats to human security, because of unfavourable political and economic factors, are exploited to radicalize women. Participants C, D, E, F and I noted that if gender inequality is not addressed and women remain exposed to poverty and insecurity, the probability exists that they may become susceptible to radicalization and vulnerable for recruitment into extremist organizations. The multilevel analysis of radicalization discussed in Section 4.3.2 explained

that together with structural resistance social selection, settings and social ecology all have an effect on susceptibility and vulnerability to recruitment.




Figure 6.3: The relationship between female insecurity and extremism

The answer to the question, if discontent will motivate women to be radicalized because of prolonged exposure to gender inequality, poverty and insecurity, is yes. When a person is for long enough exposed to radicalization and or extremism, the person will accept an alternative method to change the status quo. The next section, Section 6.5, explores the relationship between extremism and social unrest.

6.5 Social unrest or internal conflict

Question 4 aimed to determine if the increase in radicalization and extremism in Kenya is creating a sense of insecurity or is eroding confidence in the ability of the Government of Kenya

to guarantee internal peace and security. The question probes whether it is a contributing factor to latent social unrest or outright internal conflict. Participants A, C, D, and E are political and security analysts, and without any doubt confirmed a relationship between radicalization, extremism and social unrest or internal violence. Kwale, Kilifi and Mombasa, as well as the northeast counties bordering Somalia, were identified as places where the local inhabitants live in fear of both the Government of Kenya and Al Shabaab (See Figure 4.9 for an illustration of attacks attributed to Al Shabaab in Kenya). Inhabitants would rather side with Al Shabaab, which promises them work or money than support the government, whose policing methods are punitive. These conclusions are in line with the inference framework, illustrated in Figure 4.8 and discussed Section 4.5. It was confirmed that systems, social selection, settings and social ecology do strengthen susceptibility.

Participants D and E used the post-election violence of 2007 as an example of latent discontent ignited by dissatisfaction (see Section 3.2.2 for a discussion on ethnic diversity in the civil service). It was stated that radicalization and extremism is nothing more than a concentration of the factors that create discontent. If you merge people's discontent based on socio-economic circumstances and mix it with an extremist ideology, you surely have an internal security issue on hand. Participant D identified, 2011, when Kenya invaded Somalia, as the turning point for Kenya's internal security (see Section 4.4.1 for a discussion on radicalization and violent extremism). Ever since, security has been prioritized and resources from NGOs, foreign governments and the Government of Kenya were allocated to counter violent extremism – without eliminating the threat of an extremist attack. Participant D is of the opinion that the Government of Kenya is not addressing the push factors created by gender inequality, sustained poverty and insecurity at a grassroots level. It was stressed that it will be more effective if the development partners could focus their resources on the sectors that could improve the quality of life of marginalized communities. With the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in Kenya, the development partners went the extra mile to improve health facilities. It would be helpful if the same kind of initiative could be applied to improve education facilities in the areas inclined to radicalization and extremism. Participant D and E felt that contentment will be a better counter for radicalization and prevent internal violence. Participant C raised the concern earlier that there is no evidence that the current CVE methods are producing the expected outcomes. The statement from Participant C is in line with the adverse effects of gender blind CVE policies that were discussed in Section 4.6.3.1.

Participants B and F identified tension between the marginalized communities and the Government of Kenya as a push factor that increases people's vulnerability to radicalization. Participant F identified that police brutality and the stereotype that Muslims are most often

radicalized are also sources of discontentment, but the Participant is of the opinion that the emotions are not strong enough to ignite social unrest. However, the participant qualified that the significance of the current situation of insecurity should not be left unattended for too long. The prevention of radicalization lies in better relationships between religious leaders and the Government, and in a change in the manner in which the police is executing their duties from them being a police force to be a police service. She further said that the historical injustices committed by the security sector between 1963 and 2008 exposed at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) were not addressed. People living along the coast have reverted to violence because the injustices committed in the past were carried forward and have not stopped. Participants I and C and agreed with Participant F that police or security force training should be reformed. Police behaviour is increasing instead of preventing extremism.

Participant A, B, C, and F agreed that radicalization and extremism could be, but is not a prerequisite for social unrest. It was not sure if women will be equally active participants in social unrest without having been radicalized before. Participants D and E answered were sure that areas along the east coast of Kenya have been radicalized and already promote extremism as an alternative to bring change.

Participant J mentioned that the political dynasties (Kenyatta, Moi and Odinga families) in Kenya are creating unemployment and that this may cause revolution. In preparation for the 2022 presidential election, Deputy President (DP) Ruto is campaigning against the dynasty politics. The DP represents the biggest group and women form a large part of that group. Participant J concluded that the bigger the discontent among the electorate, the higher the possibility of violence (Participant J, 2020e). The discussion about discontent is in line with the grievances as a predictor for internal conflict in Section 2.7.3.3.

In addition, Participant J mentioned that a new narrative developed and that Al Shabaab radicalizes university students. These students are well educated but with limited opportunities. Their skillset makes them valuable for recruitment. Another factor is the corruption in the government. Children are taught in school to do the right thing, but the example from the government is the opposite, and then students are vulnerable to radicalization. A lack of hope for the future motivates students to join extremist groups (Participant J, 2020c).

Participant J mentioned in Section 6.4 that the vulnerability of the unemployed youth is exploited by politicians to do their dirty politics and intimidation (Participant J, 2020d). Participant J remarked that Al Shabaab uses the same methodology. A natural conclusion could be that the politicians are themselves radicalizing the youth. The participant indicated

that this trend would become more visible as the country edges closer to the 2022 elections. Politicians have their own private armies in their regions to defend them that each would call “my people”. Militia politics was popular in the early 2000s, but these groups were eliminated by the internal security of the government (around 2002). However, the structures still exist. The participant predicted that the elections in 2022 would be more violent than the post-elections violence in 2007 because of the level of political competition, the level of unemployment and the level of disillusionment among the citizens (Participant J, 2020).

The statements by the participant were in line with the statistics presented in Figure 4.9. Figure 6.4 demonstrates the progression of discontentment and the possible effect of radicalization on the security of Kenya.




Figure 6.4: Impact of radicalization on national security

The answer to the question, if the increase in radicalization and extremism in Kenya is creating a sense of insecurity or is eroding confidence in the ability of the Government of Kenya to guarantee internal peace and security, is positive. Figure 6.2 illustrates the answer to the question.

The first four questions concentrated on the radicalization impact of gender inequality on the security of Kenya. Law enforcement was highlighted by several of the participants as supporting radicalization and extremism. Question 5 addressed the security sector as custodians of peace and security in Kenya and the participants' responses to this question are discussed in the next section.

6.6 Security sector reform

Question 5 aimed to determine if the slow pace of gender reform in the security forces contributes to poor governance of the security sector and as a result lead to human rights abuses by the security officers. Participants I, B, C, D, E, F, and G agreed that the security sector is one of the greatest contributors to radicalization in Kenya, mainly because the security sector is largely gender-incentive. The "two-thirds gender principle" has not been applied and women are appointed as mere tokens. Participant F indicated that the number of women currently employed in the security sector would not be able to change its discourse (see Section 3.5.4.1 for a discussion about the personnel statistics). Participant D added that based on the job descriptions, it is a male-orientated environment and even when women were appointed they are accommodated in more supportive roles such as administration or traffic regulation. The critical security department, the police service, is male-dominated. This statement is confirmed by the GBV statistics provided in Section 3.4.3.2. However, Participant F indicated that due to an increase in GBV and the emphasis on VAWG, more female police officers have been appointed to handle related cases and to assist the victims. Although Participants F and G mentioned that female police officers are managing the GBV desks and cases in the police service, the exploitation of GBV victims is still common. Participant G indicated that some of the female police officers demand payment before they take a statement or investigate the case.

Participants I and C and discussed the need for reform in the training of security personnel. Both participants mentioned that civil society forms part of the security sector reform process. Participant I indicated that the leadership of the police service is positively inclined to change and support from the civil society. The participant indicated that the police service has a mandate and instructions on how to police, and that instruction is that policing should be punitive. This method can only be changed by the influence and participation of civil society. Participant C is confirmed that SCOs are involved with "train-the-trainer" courses in the police service.

Participants I, B, C, D, E, F, and G agreed that the failure to reform the police sector and their punitive methods of policing have consequences such as human rights violations that in fact are radicalizing people. Their statements correspond with the discussion of the police as offenders as discussed in Section 3.4.3.2. The 2017 post-election report by the KNCHR identified that police officers were responsible for 54.6 per cent of the sexual violence cases reported. The responses provided in Section 6.4 indicated that GBV committed by security forces radicalizes women. Participant F stated that the police often miss information because of their punitive methods. Radicalized returnees fear cooperating with the police and to sharing their experiences. The returnees are afraid of retaliation by the police service. Another source of information that is neglected is information offered by Women of Wisdom or from the elder system. These structures are valuable early warning systems, but their inputs are not recognized or valued. UN Women reported similar information that was discussed in Section 4.6.3 as part of female radicalization in Kenya. Ironically, Participant F indicated that even the members of the NGOs working with gender issues are male-dominated.

Participant J did not see a correlation between gender inequality and security sector reform. He highlighted that the cabinet secretary of defence is a woman. He was of the opinion that if the government was concerned about too few women in security, they should have appointed a woman as the police commissioner. The current president prefers to work with people with a security background – he might think that they are less corrupt and that the quality of their work is of a higher standard.

The answer to the question if there is a correlation between gender inequality and poor governance in the security sector, is yes. The punitive policing methods and have consequences such as human rights violations that are radicalizing people.

The first five questions explored the relationship between gender inequality and insecurity and its effect on the national security of Kenya. One possible conclusion based on the contributions of the participants is that without remedial actions to create a gender-sensitive mindset, discontent amongst citizens may increase in already marginalized areas of the country. The next section considers if there is a relationship between ethnic inequality and gender inequality.

6.7 Ethnic inequality

The purpose of question 10 was to determine if there is a correlation between ethnic inequality and gender inequality. Participants agreed that there is a positive correlation. However, Participant A qualified that gender inequality, because it is intertwined with social norms, varies among the different regions. The further a person lives from the urban centres, the bigger the

gender differences become. Perceptions of gender in pastoral communities are vastly different from communities involved in crop production based on social norms. The answer from Participant I collated with Participant A. Participant I indicated that Kenyans base their identities on ethnicity more than on nationality or with the Constitution for that matter. As a result, patriarchy is accepted as part of the culture among some ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups view a patriarchal society as protection of women. The Participant did not provide details. It was only when ethnicity was abused that gender inequality became an issue. Participant I highlighted the fine balance between ethnicity as protection and ethnicity used to advance a certain alliance. A contemporary culture, found in the urban areas of Kenya was acknowledged. It is where ethnicities and cultures mix and it includes even pop culture. This boiling pot of cultures makes it difficult for people to identify with one pure identity.

Participant B explained that the politics in Kenya is ethnically and not ideologically driven and the masses votes on the advice of the kingpins. It was concluded that ethnicity drives inequality. Participant C highlighted that some of the ethnic groups have no female representation in government while others have more women. It was identified that ethnic inequality is being used as a method of radicalization to create the perception that the national government cannot provide or project the citizens of the country and can therefore not guarantee a life free from fear or want.

Participant D highlighted that male politicians imply that support for female politicians will not create wealth for the people she is representing. The proposed formula for the division of county revenue in 2020 was based on population statistics and it accentuated the level of inequality in Kenya. It created tension among the political elite; because it was obvious that resource allocation was intended to benefit certain ethnic blocks that would have created ethnic inequality (see Section 3.2.2 and Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for a discussion on the ethnic diversity of the population). Participant D explained that ethnicity forms the lines of division and control and those tribal backgrounds provide people and political parties with a certain status.

Participant D underlined that 50 per cent of the voters are women, but the election results proved that women voted according to ethnic and not gender lines. Tribal influences drive women away from politics and consequently from positions in decision-making structures in the national government. Participant G indicated that ethnic superiority creates ethnic inequality and that this has always been present in Kenyan politics. As a result, the voters will rather support male politicians, even if the female candidate outperforms her opposition. Participant A applied the same reasoning; that political parties would rather position male candidates to oppose other male candidates.

Participant F responded that ethnic inequality is the root cause of the persistence of gender inequality. Women are encouraged to join political parties because it is the best path for access to positions of influence. However, female parliamentarians in 2020, advanced ethnicity to the detriment of the gender agenda. The “Common Women’s Agenda” (women’s group) reminded women that they are fighting for affirmative action and not the politics of men. It emerged in 2020 that men are preparing for the 2022 elections but that women were not involved. This means that women will not be included in positions of influence after the 2022 general elections. Participant F indicated that changing the gender mindset before the election could prevent this. Participant I was in agreement with Participant F and conveyed that female politicians confessed that although they support the gender agenda, they have allegiances to specific political parties and to keep their positions, they have to vote according to the political agenda of the party.

As has been noted by the participants and displayed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the binary of tribal dynasties with superiority and hegemony versus the binary of inferiority and submission that exists among ethnicities influences ethnic inequality. Comparatively the same response is carried over from ethnicity to gender. The social construction of patriarchy, based on superiority and hegemony, was discussed in Section 2.5.3.3.2.1, plays into gender inequality and creates mindsets of inferiority and submission. The outcome for both ethnic and gender inequality translates into structural discrimination, poverty and insecurity.




Figure 6.5: Correlation between ethnic inequality and gender inequality




Figure 6.6: Correlation between ethnic inequality and internal conflict

Participant F highlighted that a society that more resilient to influences when decisions are based on a win-win attitude, mutual respect for all the citizens and when both gender and ethnic inequalities are addressed. Otherwise, ethnicity will be used as a tool to solve differences and that translates into rebellion and secession. To summarize, patriarchy (Richards, 2014:92) has been, for a long time, a powerful force in politics, hidden in democracy (see Section 2.5.3.3.2.1 and Section 4.2.1.1 for a discussion on the social construction patriarchy and the effect it has on patterns of power and decision making in Kenya).

The answer to question 10, if there is a correlation between ethnic inequality and gender inequality was confirmed. The Correlation between gender equality and national security is based on Galtung's structural violence as discussed in Section 2.7. Ethnic inequality via structural resistance results in direct violence. Furthermore, it was identified that ethnic inequality is used as a method of radicalization. By merging gender and ethnic inequality the perception is created that the national Government of Kenya, cannot provide or project the citizens of the country and a life free from fear or want (human security) cannot be guaranteed.

A gender-sensitive mindset change, by eliminating patriarchy in Kenya, is crucial in the prevention of violent extremism and internal conflict or social violence. The prominence of gender equality as a contributor to the prevention of social violence and the resolution of internal conflict without violence cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, Questions 6 to 9 were included in the questionnaire to explore a counter-proposal that can bring a general gender mindset change for a better understanding of the advantages of a more gender-equal society. Sections 6.8 to 6.11 examined possible ways to promote gender equality.

6.8 Mindset change

The emphasis of Question 6 was to determine what could be done to counter the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy. Knowledge is power and it determines a person's status in a social structure. The extent of a person's knowledge is linked to the person's level of education. However, many girls do not complete high school and in 2020, only 43 per cent of females versus 57 per cent of males advanced to tertiary education (see Figure 4.4 for an illustration of the statistics). One question was how we can keep girls in high school and encourage them to pursue tertiary education. Most of the responses advanced financial and cultural reasons for girls not completing secondary school or advancing to a tertiary institution. Participant A remarked that the youth unemployment rate is high in Kenya and if a high school student already has financial difficulties, they do not see the need to consider tertiary education. It was also indicated that it is culturally accepted or even expected to marry early, so girls do not see the need for continuing with higher education.

Participant B said that education is the counter for gender inequality. Research confirms that educating a girl is more beneficial than educating a boy. Sensitizing girls about their worth and developing strong and confident girls should start at home. Otherwise, biology becomes a girl's destiny, as identified by the literature study and the reality of gender inequality was discussed in Section 2.4.4. Women should in the first instance be politically educated to create a mindset change so that they can make their own political decisions without any male influence. Furthermore, a good academic education will help to support themselves. Otherwise, as long as a woman is financially dependent on a husband, the boy-child will be favoured for completing school and tertiary education. Only if the mother is financially independent, will she make sure that the girl-child completes her schooling and progress to tertiary education. The participant indicated that parents do not put the same pressure on girl-children to perform or to take STEM subjects than on the boy-child. This later in life becomes a handicap. This statement was confirmed with the student enrolment statistics provided in Table 4.3. Male students represent 63 and female students 37 per cent of the STEM degrees (Wanzala, 2020:1). Parents (especially fathers) still have the mindset that the daughter will marry at a young age, have children and be taken care of by her husband. Participant B indicated that a new approach to keep girls in school would need a curriculum change, which will be very difficult.

Participant C was of the opinion that it would be powerful to focus on educating the girl-child and creating a mindset change in them about their status in life – beyond that of being married and having children. The participant highlighted that Kwale County is a fertile recruitment area for extremists and happen to have one of the lowest school enrolment statistics in the country. In general, school enrolment is lower in the predominately Muslim areas of Kenya along the coast. It reinforces the push and pull factors on a macro- and meso-level. With a higher level of education, it will be possible to create a social structural transition for girls from a subordinate position to independence. The participant believed that if funding is merely made available to keep girls in school, there will be a backlash from the Kenyan community. Participant C agreed with Participant B that there should be a curriculum change, which will not be easy to accomplish.

Participant D explained that there are multiple factors related to economics and culture that contribute to the low numbers of girls completing high school. Economic reasons play a significant role. When the government realized that the girl-child was often not taken to school at all, they made primary education free. It did not only educate the girl-child, but it also caused a drop in child labour and even more importantly, in child trafficking. Girls could go to school instead of being taken by foreigners to the city centres with a promise of work. The same

factors apply to high school and tertiary education, even in cases where the girls compete well with the boys. The pressure on the girl-child to become financially independent, complete their studies, earn an income or get married is high. Girls will settle for diploma courses after school because it will get them into the job market quicker. If that trend can change so that girls first remain in high school and then use the same campaign to advance them to tertiary education, women will come together and realize the importance of supporting each other. At the same time, a strong female workforce will develop that will be good for the corporate world and influence the government (see Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 for a discussion on the formal sector). Participant E indicated that education is sacred in Kenya, but if you do not have a connection, you will not find employment in the formal sector in Kenya. The participant emphasized that the perception exists, particularly in the rural areas, that the role of women is to have children because children are perceived “as a pension fund” for the parents in their old age (see Section 4.2.1.2.2 for a discussion on female labour force participation in Kenya and the effect that the number of children has on a women’s likelihood to participate in the labour force).

Participant F thought that a mindset change starts with changes at a young age so that children can grow up with the right mindset. No better place and time than pre-primary and primary schools. Female teachers predominantly teach these levels, but the change in the current state to promote a more gender-friendly society, should occur at all levels of society. The root assumptions of patriarchy that are instilled as normative in the Kenyan society should be addressed and unlearned, first in the family structure where the normalization of patriarchy has its origin and where GBV thrives. The level of GBV during Covid-19 shocked the nation (see Section 4.3 for a discussion on non-economic issues with clear economic consequences). Ways and means should be found to unlearn what has been imparted through patriarchy. Secondly, the elders in the community should be approached and helped to gain a deeper understanding of gender equality. They should see that traditional practices are wrong and that cultural practices deny girls educational opportunities. An example is the traditional initiation of teenage boys into adulthood. At these ceremonies, the initiates are taught to view girls and women as “sexual objects” and afterwards the initiates are encouraged to seek intimacy with teenage girls, one of the root causes of teenage pregnancies. The boys who do not engage in sexual relationships are criticized or accused of having dysfunctional sexual organs. The cultural practice of parents viewing their daughters as a source of income to be married off to cattle-rich old men deprive girls not only of education and self-development but guarantees a future of dependency, control and poverty without hope. Thirdly, religious leaders should be sensitized about how they preach the message. There should be a message of respect and honour towards both genders, otherwise patriarchy is sustained and reinforced through religion in culture. Approaching the Muslim elders and creating a change towards a gender-sensitive

mindset will ensure changes in the Muslim systems and communities. If these traditional and cultural practices are not addressed, they lay the wrong foundations and put boys and girls on the wrong path (see Section 2.7.3.3 for a discussion on grievances as a predictor for internal conflict and Table 4.6 for an illustration of physical violence caused by spouses). Fourthly, children and families should be educated in conflict resolution and how to resolve basic conflict in a non-violent way – in other words how to live in peace. The literature study highlighted the link between domestic and public violence and it was discussed in Section 2.7.3.2.1. It is important to provide girls with life skills and not only academic skills. Participant F agreed with participant C and D that a curriculum change will be needed to mainstream these proposals. Lastly, it will not be very costly or difficult to help girls in Kenya attend tertiary education because most of the counties have universities. Equally important, there should be a greater focus on vocational training to help people to help themselves.

Participant G emphasized that girls tend to be satisfied with very little. This is especially the situation in the rural areas where girls think that they have reached their goal if they have completed high school. If the parents are not well educated, neither the parents nor the girls realize the importance of education (see Table 3.5 for the women's empowerment index). Parents may make sacrifices to educate the boys, but they are not willing to do the same for the girls. They expect the daughters to stay home until they get married – which happens at a young age. When it comes to the difference between day schools and boarding schools, boarding schools are for sure better options for the girl-child. Girls in day schools do not achieve the same academic results as those in boarding schools because of the extra burden of care given at home.

Participant H mentioned that peer pressure and teenage pregnancies keep girls with respect from completing school. This participant feels that teen pregnancies are a consequence of poor parenting (see Sections 3.4.4.2.1 and 4.3 for a discussion on teenage pregnancies). In addition to parental guidance, schools offer sex education (see Section 3.4.4.2.1 for a discussion on the effectiveness of sex and health education in the schools). On the other hand, peer pressure redirects girls to focus on “rich” boys at university. They are under the impression that self-development is not important if they can marry rich. Unfortunately, the difference in the level of education in such marriages also comes with a difference in the level of respect, with serious consequences for the woman in the relationship. As the educated person and the breadwinner, the man has control over his wife. Participants I and H agreed that girls do not see the need for furthering their education. The girls from rural areas find working as a house manager in one of the cities as a great accomplishment. Participant I highlighted the lack of career counselling and an understanding of the gender laws developed to support women at

the school level. Educated girls are more confident in making their own decisions, especially when it comes to child marriages. Participant I further stressed that the education of the parents, and more so the mother, has a great influence on the parents' view of why the girl-child needs to attend school.

Participant J focused on the cultural barriers of early marriages. He did indicate that universities have lowered the entrance requirements of some courses for women to ensure that more women enrol at higher tertiary institutions (see Table 3.4 for university enrolments). Participant I emphasized the importance of the role of civil society to create a gender-sensitive mindset because as Participants I, B, C and F indicated, it would be difficult to bring change using the school system. The statements of Participants I, B, C and F are in line with empirical research by UNESCO in 2017 and USAID in 2020 on the success of mainstreaming gender equality using the education system in Kenya. An evaluation of the success reported mixed results. The results of the research were discussed in Section 3.4.4.2.1.

The answer to the question, how to attain girls in high school and encourage them to pursue tertiary education, except for financial reasons, is based on a mindset change. Gender transformation through a mindset change is based on gender resistant feminism and from a radical feminist approach. To create an equal gender mindset, the following socio-cultural factors that are affecting girls should be transformed:

- patriarchy is instilled as normative in the Kenya society and should be unlearned and eliminated;
- religious leaders should be sensitized to not strengthen patriarchy through their messages;
- harmful traditional and cultural practices that are denying girls to complete their education should be explained to parents and be unlearned;
- families should be taught to resolve conflict in a non-violent way and not by means of GBV;
- the binary boys/girls with natural sciences (STEM)/social sciences or languages should be changed; and
- the mindsets of girls should be changed. Beyond academic skills, girls should also be provided with life skills to be independent thinkers.

It was determined that patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm has the biggest effect on the education of the girl-child. As a result, the reason for the lasting gender inequality and the role of patriarchy in the Kenyan society is investigated in the next section.

6.9 Norm development

Question 7 focused on the role that women play in maintaining patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm even if it only benefits men. All the participants mentioned the role of and respect for religion in Kenya and the role of the man in society versus that of women. Participant A is of the opinion that women in Kenya are strong enough to take a stand against patriarchy despite the importance it carries in religious circles. Participant B indicated that schools enforce the norms of the society. Therefore, to eliminate patriarchy, it should be confronted at the family level. Participant I stated that patriarchy has to be changed and unlearned at home, because the Constitution is just a paper. If this socio-cultural norm is not changed at home, female oppression will not be eliminated. Participant B explained that patriarchy is a behavioural and an attitudinal perception that is fed by culture, religion and economic status. This statement aligns with the feminist perception of patriarchy as explained in Section 2.5.3.2.1.1. There should be a multi-phased approach to bring a mindset change in a strong patriarchal society like Kenya. Since education enforces social norms, it should be one of the focus areas. Participant B indicated that a second approach should be to reform government policies. This will only be possible if you create a critical mass of alternative thinkers. Participant C was of the opinion that a mindset change is an individual process within a culture. Therefore, it should be addressed as early in people's lives as possible. Participant C explained that patriarchy is like FGM in Kenya. Although FGM is dangerous, it is so embedded in the culture that it would be difficult to change without law. One way of changing a practice is to declare it illegal. This view is in line with what the Government of Kenya did with FGM (see Section 3.4.4.2.4). The Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 32 of 2011, revised in 2012 declared this practice illegal. Legislation to support gender equality to eliminate female discriminatory practices was discussed in Section 3.4.4.2.4. Section 3.4.3.2 highlighted that the patriarchal socio-cultural norm causes more men to become offenders of GBV than is the case for men raised in more gender-equal homes (NRC, 1996:61). Participant C indicated that the percentage of teen pregnancies and people with HIV are higher in the western region of Kenya, which is associated with Christianity (Participant C, 2020; KENPHIA, 2018:VIII). Participant J said that cultural beliefs are the biggest obstacle in implementing laws. This statement proved to be true and was confirmed with the withdrawal of the proposed Reproduction Healthcare Bill, Senate Bill No 23 of 2019 (see Section 3.4.3.1 for a discussion on the legislation in support of Article

27 of the 2010 Constitution). Despite of the legislative framework, girls still have babies early in life. However, the he highlighted that the family values are respected in Kenya and even when teenagers have babies, their parents support them.

Participant F indicated, by using the governmental gender working groups could change patriarchy. The Participant confirmed that women do sustain the patriarchy in Kenya, but it is concealed because it is connected to politics, and men control politics. Participant D acknowledged that women in Kenya are actively involved at a social level where no wealth is created. As a result, they have no political influence and are therefore subjected to patriarchy because of its connection to politics, as indicated by Participant F. Participant B pointed to economic status as a similar factor.

Participant F highlighted that economic disempowerment makes women dependent on men in a patriarchal society. Patriarchy sets the foundation for structural resistance and structural violence in the formal sector. Women unconsciously hold on to the patriarchal mindset and they have to be challenged to think outside the box and to bring changes for women in the communities. Participant I indicated that mothers must be educated together with their children about the consequences of patriarchy. According to Participant F, the Gender Commission is doing just that with a booklet for women titled “Expanding our territory” to help women see that they can use their female qualities to solve issues in the communities. So, it is imperative to create a mindset change among women already in politics. These women have the positions and the potential to bring a much-needed change. They just have to understand what the change is they have to create.

Participant G acknowledged that society is responsible for the inferiority and subordinate behaviour of women. Women do not even attempt to take a stand because society treats men as superior. The statement from Participant A differs from Participant G based on social selection as explained in Section 4.5 and illustrated by Figure 4.8. Participant H indicated that the behaviour of women in society is mainly based on how she is treated by her husband in the family structure. She relates the family structure to religious background (see Table 4.6 for the effect of group and community influences). Participant H uses the example of religious studies being taught as a subject in school, but that Bible study is the prerogative of each child. Students from different religious backgrounds school together, but do not pray together. This proves that different religions can live peacefully together.

The answer to the question, on how to eliminate patriarchy, is within the power of women. Patriarchy is a socio-cultural norm that is shaped by culture, religion and economic status.

Therefore, by focusing on the power of women within the society, the effect of patriarchy could be reduced. Women should be educated of their positions of power in or as:

- Women as mothers are laying the foundation of boys and girls at home. Respect and gender equality should already be learned at home. Socio-cultural norms are formed at home.
- Women as pre-primary and primary school teachers. Socio-cultural norms are enforced by education. Gender norms are 'rules' of how boys and girls should act. These 'rules' are learned early in life and establish a life cycle of gender stereotyping. Mothers and teachers can change gender stereotyping with how they raise girls and boys. Table 4.3 demonstrated that 431 055 female students versus 309 538 male students were enrolled to study teaching. Therefore, more women than men are employed as teachers.
- The governmental gender working groups to focus the attention of women on the female role in founding and sustaining the patriarchal norm and that the female role is concealed because patriarchy is connected to politics and men control politics.
- To reduce and break the cycle of GBV (see Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on GBV in Kenya). It was established that the patriarchal socio-cultural norm causes more men to become offenders of GBV than is the case for men raised in more gender-equal homes (NRC, 1996:61).

It will therefore be possible to use a multi-phased radical feminist approach to reduce the strong influence of patriarchy on politics and as a result of gender inequality in Kenya. Radical feminism aims to dismantle patriarchy and focuses rather on culture change, which undermines patriarchy, without adjustments to the existing systems through legal means (see Section 2.5.3.2.2 for a discussion on radical feminism). Section 6.10 investigates the influence of the current female politicians on transforming gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya.

6.10 The influence of female political leadership

The purpose of Question 8 was to determine the level of influence that KEWOPA has to influence the parliamentary processes to advance the gender agenda in the national government. The role and function of KEWOPA were discussed in Section 3.4.5.1. The participants highlighted that the power and economic advantages men enjoy because of patriarchy are used as tools to resist the inclusion of women in the national Government of Kenya. Participant A highlighted that men are financially stronger than women because of past privileges, which makes campaigning very difficult for women. Men still receive preference on the election ballots, therefore political parties would rather front men to compete against men. Participant B highlighted that the women in parliament are ethnically aligned and not political enlightened. The participant felt that KEWOPA has become a “club for politicians” and that the role of the 47 women county representatives is not seen or felt in their respective counties. Participant C believed that Kenyan male politicians have used patriarchy for decades and will continue to do so in the future.

Participant D indicated that women are not a politically united front because of a lack of resources. However, at the grassroots level, women are a formidable force. The elected female politicians in county governments were not given the required resources to meet their goals and to promote gender equality. Female county representatives were perceived as competition for male elected politicians and this prevented them from executing their duties. Participant D mentioned that KEWOPA’s repeated failure to gain support to pass the gender bill is a good example of the fact that women have to mobilize like-minded men since they do not have women’s representation and support at a grassroots level. Furthermore, the men in the General Assembly obstructed KEWOPA so that female affirmative action appointments could not threaten their positions. An alternative to affirmative action would be to nominate women to meet the two-thirds gender principle, which will be costly.

Participant F explained that the women currently in parliament (KEWOPA) are from a multiparty democracy and their values are political and not gender aligned. The failure of the gender bill demonstrates the impact of negotiated democracy on women’s leadership. Participant F indicated that the timing of the last gender bill is suspicious because it served before parliament at a time when many women would not have been present. As a result, there was no quorum, and the gender bill could not be passed. The Law Society served the chief justice with a petition to advise the president based on the Constitution to dissolve parliament for not meeting the two-third principle, and on 21 September 2020, the chief justice did advise the president accordingly. Political parties are not serious about including critical women leaders in the party lists. They only include women to reach basic requirements. The participant

also identified that the female politicians of KEWOPA are divided according to party lines. However, civil society is working with the Gender and Equality Commission to mobilize women via radio at a grassroots level to advance the gender agenda. The response by Participant F confirmed the research by Gouws (2007:29). It was highlighted that women as activists' power to transform institutions in South Africa have been depoliticized due to the fact that women leaders have been appointed in institutional politics, like parliaments (see Section 2.5.4 for discussion on feminism in Africa and Section 3.8.1 for a discussion of the partial success of gender mainstreaming in Kenya).

Participant I indicated that from a legal perspective, women lobby groups look at the repeated failure of the gender bill and attempt various models to pass the bill. Even when a male politician (he-for-she-approach), Chepkonga, presented the gender bill, it failed. Only four out of 47 counties meet the two-thirds gender principle. Even the counties with female governors do not meet the gender standard. Female politicians are honest about the fact that they have to advance party politics above gender mainstreaming and as a result do not promote gender mainstreaming in the national Government of Kenya.

Participant J indicated that men would never allow women to campaign at the same level because campaigning requires finances; it goes with fake news, abuses and late hours of campaigning. Men also say that there are no seats for free, but the participant feels that parties should be more creative to nominate women. The participants suggest that political parties should have an agreement that certain constituencies should be identified for only women but admit that it will be difficult because the electorate will not allow it. Men will not allow that more women will be elected in 2022 general elections. According to the participant, men will always be ahead of women because it is generational. The empowerment of women will not happen in the space of one year before an election. Together with the empowerment of women, comes the education of the voters. If the voters are not educated, they will vote for the male candidates. So, voter education is a societal function.

The answer to the question if KEWOPA has enough influence to transform the parliamentary processes to advance the gender agenda in the national government, is no. It can be concluded that KEWOPA is ethnically or politically and not gender aligned and that political parties are expected to rather focus on political than gender issues. The repeated failure on the side of KOWOPA to mobilize the MPs to support gender mainstreaming shows the impact of negotiated democracy on female leadership. The lack of a quorum reveals that male structural resistance to implementing affirmative action to reach the required gender quotas is alive. The top-down approach as prescribed by the 2010 Constitution has not been reaching the intended goal. It was clearly stated, that the female politicians do not form a united front to

promote gender mainstreaming (see Section 3.4.5.1 for a discussion on the role and functions of KEWOPA). The low level of KEWOPA's visibility at the grassroots level was identified as one of KEWOPA's weaknesses (KEWOPA, 2018b:11). The next question focuses on the level of female cooperation at the grassroots level as an alternative to the lack of a united female political front.

6.11 Grassroots influences

The purpose of Question 9 was to determine the extent of female cooperation at the grassroots level in the counties and between well-established and respected women's groups, like Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (MYWO) and female parliamentarians. The answers to Question 8 showed that participants felt that the alternative to the top-down approach should be found for the advancement of the "two-thirds gender principle". Participant A indicated that a bottom-up approach would be a better option, but contrary to Participant D's response in the previous section that women on the grassroots level form a formidable force, Participant B indicated that small women's groups at the grassroots level are not holistic in approach and gather for economic and social reasons. They are not centres or forces for transformation or empowerment (see Section 3.8.1 for an explanation of the theoretical feminist approach followed in Kenya). Participants stressed that if women do not rally at the grassroots level, the gender bill will not succeed. Participant C agreed with Participant B and mentioned that successful women's movements are based on a bottom-up approach.

Participant D indicated that female county representatives are expected to rally women at the grassroots level, but as indicated in the responses to Question 8, structural resistance hampered this function. Participant D explained the non-performance of the female county representatives by referring to a lack of resources. On the other hand, an elected county member to parliament is allocated a budget. Secondly, a county is much more expansive than the constituency of an elected member. Thirdly, the male counterparts experience the female county representatives as competition at the grassroots level and do not allow them an opportunity to advance women's agenda on the ground. This has a diminishing effect on the role of a female representative in a county. A few of the female county representatives tried but was overshadowed by politics and not given recognition for their work. Participant E indicated that the role of a female county representative at a national level is not delineated. It seems the position was created to reach gender quotas, but without the necessary power, gender equality is not possible. The accomplishments of women these positions are measured in terms of dollars. The question arises, was the intention to uplift the women in the county or the enrichment of individual females? Participant B, D, E and F mentioned that the impact of female county representative is yet to be seen in the counties.

Participant B indicated that there is not a women's leader in parliament who represents the constituency called "women". The launch of the first draft of the BBI report in 2019 demonstrated exactly this fact when the women divided into two opposing political groups. Participant B mentioned that the 2019 revolution in Sudan was started and driven by women. What is needed in Kenya is, women at the decision-making table and women who hold the women at the table responsible for the implementation of the decisions made. The participant underlined that if the female politicians are not being held accountable, the gender bill will not change the gender direction of government.

Participant C indicated that the most successful influence of change was created through bottom-up movements. The feminist movements discussed in Section 2.5.2 confirm this statement. "In the absence of the political will of the national Government of Kenya to implement the "two-thirds gender principle", a bottom-up approach will bring change at all levels of society" (Participant C, 2020). Participant E mentioned the bottom-up approach as a way to influence and change. The participant indicated that the management of family structures and the provision of basic needs are the responsibility of women in communities. Consequently, women established and manage micro-financial organizations like the KWFT (see Section 4.2.1.2.2.2 for a discussion for the contribution of women to the informal sector). It developed into a microfinance bank that was originally established by women to offer services to only low-income women. If these existing female service delivery structures built at the grassroots level could be lobbied to bring change, a bottom-up women's movement will be effective to create a more gender-equal political society. Participant F indicated that MYWO was once a stepping stone for women into politics, but because of political interference by the KANU political party of President Moi, the group was rendered powerless and was redirected to serve the mission of KANU.

Participant D signalled that some women in parliament are concentrating on social issues, issues with a gender nuance. When a female judge served as a parliamentarian, she successfully passed the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, 21 of 2015. If more women could be in decision-making structures, similar policies will be approved and implemented, policies that have direct implications for the quality of life for women in Kenya.

Participant F provided a brief history of the women's movements in Kenya and concluded that after the Beijing Women's Conference (1995), women's movements were cohesive and able to mobilize quickly. Women were united under the Kenya Women's Political Caucus to influence male leaders on matters that were hostile towards the women's agenda. However, after 2010, it seems that women leaders who are the products of a multiparty democracy are political aligned and are not taken seriously. Kenya is a signatory to all international, continental

and regional gender declarations, but the national Government of Kenya found it difficult to honour the two-thirds gender principle in the 2010 Constitution. Participant F mentioned that the BBI report forced the gender sector of Kenya to have a common approach again (see Section 3.6 for a discussion on the BBI proposals). The “Common Women’s Agenda” was created in late November 2019 to refocus the politically aligned female leaders to have a common gender approach (Participant F, 2020). During the lockdown to address the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the necessity of a consolidated women’s approach was exposed when women identified that the Kenya National Emergency Response Committee does not have a gender expert on the committee. Without a gender-responsive mentality, the gaps in service provision would not have been identified. The new women’s group is getting traction with 230 women already included in the group’s WhatsApp-group (the social media platform that is used). The social media platform makes communication and lobbying easy. There is cooperation between the “Common Women’s Agenda” and MYWO, although MYWO is a women’s organization for the elite and does not concentrate on grassroots gender political matters. The participant confirmed that the KANU government compromised MYWO and that people lost faith in the ability of the organization to promote gender issues. The “Common Women’s Agenda” will also work together with the Gender and Equality Commission to mobilize women at the community level to promote the gender agenda in their respective structures. The successful mobilizing of the Common Women’s Agenda by means of a WhatsApp-group demonstrates the advantages of technology for gender mainstreaming as discussed in Section 2.5.2.3.

Participant I confirmed the responses of the previous participants and clearly stated that Kenya have women’s lobby groups that are politically driven, but the country does not have feminist groups (see Section 3.8.1 for a discussion on the feminist approach that is followed in Kenya). The gender agenda in Kenya is driven by NGOs or other organizations that have no political allegiances (Participant I, 2020). The participant identified the necessity for the male parliamentarians to understand the reason for gender balance and female influence at a national government level. The remarks of Participant I are in line with research by Woodhull (see Section 2.5.4 for a discussion on feminism in Africa) and the response of Participant B that feminism in Africa is driven at a grassroots level by NGOs.

The answer to the question if female cooperation at the grassroots level is strong enough to form a bottom-up movement, the responses varied. Although Participant B indicated that successful women’s movements are based on a bottom-up approach she qualified that in Kenya, the small women’s groups at the grassroots level are not holistic in approach and gather for economic and social reasons only. Participant C indicated “in the absence of the

political will of the national Government of Kenya to implement the “two-thirds gender principle”, a bottom-up approach will bring change at all levels of society”. It was indicated that the gender agenda in Kenya is driven by NGOs or other organizations that have no political allegiances. As a result, the “Common Women’s Agenda” developed to fill the void and will work together with the Gender and Equality Commission to mobilize women at the community level to promote the gender agenda in their respective structures. It can be concluded, that the women in Kenya realized that the only way to influence and change gender inequality is through a bottom-up approach.

6.12 Conclusion

The semi-structured interview schedule for empirical research was divided into two sections. Six of the questions focused on the correlation between gender inequality and the national security of Kenya. The remainder of the questions concentrated on key areas of development to bring change.

The empirical research confirmed that there is structural resistance to gender mainstreaming and the implementation of the “two-third gender principle” as required by Article 81(b) the 2010 Constitution. The “two-thirds gender principle” is not reflected in the resource allocation for positions in the national Government of Kenya filled by nominated women. Although there is a consciousness of the importance of the role of women in society, there is not a willingness to share control and allow for influence at a national level. Men in the national Government of Kenya are holding on to power and their privileged positions by keeping women divided at a party-political level.

The push factors created by structural resistance are inequality, poverty and police brutality. This leads to discontentment among both men and women and it creates a cyclical interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity. If women are exposed to poverty and insecurity, the probability exists that they would become susceptible to radicalization. The security sector is gender-insensitive and the failure to reform the security sector and their punitive methods of policing is one of the contributing factors to radicalization. Radicalization is used to incite social unrest. Sometimes the radicalization is latent or there is just a perception that the Government of Kenya is not capable of protecting its citizens.

The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya revealed the connection between ethnic inequality and violence. The empirical research emphasized ethnic inequality as one of the root causes of gender inequality. The outcome of both ethnic and gender inequality is structural

discrimination, poverty and insecurity. In summary, the top-down approach is ethnically influenced and is not contributing to a more gender-equal and prosperous society (see Figure 3.3 for the ethnic diversity of top management positions in the civil service).

A radical feminist approach is recommended as an alternative for the liberal feminist approach that is used to promote gender transformation in Kenya. A radical feminist approach is multi-phased and bottom-up, involving all levels of society. Gender sensitizing should start with the family structures, and continue at schools from pre-primary or primary school level and at a religious level. Men and women should be sensitized to the security implications of sustaining patriarchy and gender inequality. A fundamental change in the gender views of people at all levels of society is important to prevent moral decay with long-lasting security implications.

These aims can be reached if women pursue a united women's agenda. Since 2010, women leaders in Kenya have advanced a political and not a gender agenda. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the threat to women and girls and the lack of a united women's front. However, there is a growing interest in community-based women's organizations and self-help groups. If guided by women in influential leadership positions, the women groups can be greater forces for change through stronger cooperation, networking, partnerships, and capacity development. It seems there is a need to start a bottom-up approach to address the chronic poverty and vulnerabilities that women and girls in many communities face. To recite the Executive Director of UN Women: "Women are radically impatient for change. It is an impatience that runs deep and it has been brewing for years".

Lastly, the holistic development of the girl-child is of paramount importance. Keeping girls in high school and sending them on to tertiary institutions will strengthen the position of women in a social structure. Together with the bold investments to promote employment for women and youth in the private sector, this would help the women of Kenya to counter poverty and insecurity. Feminists argue that human security cannot be assured until gender inequality is not eliminated. The origin of gender inequality lies in the appreciation of people based on their gender, and this quickly translates into personal insecurity for the less appreciated. Therefore, the guarantee to national security is favourable social, political and economic conditions, the protection of human rights and the promotion of human development. The conclusion of the study follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA TO GUARANTEE THAT GENDER EQUALITY STANDARDS ARE IMPLEMENTED AS REQUIRED BY LAW AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

7.1 Introduction

This thesis used an ex-post evaluation to answer the primary research question stated in Chapter 1: *“What are the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards?”* Firstly, therefore, the study focused on feminist theory and its political alignment and commitment to ensure social justice, the promotion of gender equality and its contribution to security. Secondly, the study embarked on a gender analysis to question the possibility of achieving state security if the security of female citizens is compromised. In other words, if the principles of human security are not being followed. Gender inequality translates into personal insecurity at a macro-, a meso- and a micro-level in the political, economic and social spheres.

This thesis pursued five objectives in its effort to investigate the level of gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya. The first three objectives were achieved through a literature study (Chapters 2 to 4). The first objective was to investigate and interpret how the views contained in feminist theory contribute to gender equality and its effects on security. Chapter 2 provided a detailed examination of feminist theory, considering its central concepts of knowledge building, the unique characteristics of feminist research and its new emphasis on human security. Feminist perspectives focus on the root causes of gender inequality and pursue international strategies to eliminate them.

The second objective was to determine and discuss the legal requirements and status of gender equality standards in the national Government of Kenya. Chapter 3, discussed the demand for and outcome of a new constitution, together with the provisions the new 2010 Constitution for the “not more than two-thirds gender principle” (Article 81b) and the supportive acts to guarantee the implementation of “all rights and fundamental freedoms” for women as required by Article 27(2) of the new Constitution. Notwithstanding the advances made in some of the sectors, women in Kenya are still exposed to high levels of human insecurity.

The third objective was to determine the obstacles to reaching gender equality standards in Kenya and to explore the possible repercussions for the security of Kenya. Chapter 4 evaluated the political responsiveness, in other words, the implementation or the effectiveness of the output required by the new constitution to guarantee human security for women in Kenya.

Chapters 5 and 6 addressed the fourth objective. An empirical study was conducted to investigate how the persistence of gender inequality affects the security of Kenya. The last and fifth objective of the thesis, discussed in this chapter, was to recommend an alternative approach to create a critical mass of women to transform and create a more gender-equal society.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part concludes the study on feminist theory and perspectives on security studies. The second part illustrates how a change in the systems at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels can reduce the vulnerability of Kenyans to radicalization since this vulnerability is fundamentally system dependent. The next section provides the central theoretical statement of the study.

7.2 Central theoretical statement of the study

Chapter 1 introduced the study and deliberated on the persistence of gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya due to pervading patriarchy. The research is grounded in the feminist theory to assess the possible implications for the security in Kenya if gender inequality is upheld. Feminist theory investigates gender inequality at an individual level but posits that inequality is rooted in hierarchical political, economic and social structures and undermined at an intellectual level. Based on the feminist perspective, the study argues that gender inequality is limiting females and by implication, human development. Gender research reveals how to expose and resist the different ways in which patriarchy may be concealed in a democracy.

The persistence of gender inequality cannot be separated from the principles of human security. Since feminist theory focuses on gender relations with a commitment to social transformation and change, it further shifts the focus to internal security. The concept of human security developed as the global standard and approach to security. The structural disadvantages that women and girls face with regard to exclusion at a social level and the affect it has on political and economic levels, are detrimental for all human development and create conditions for insecurity. Gender inequality therefore qualifies as a threat to human security.

Gender inequality can be described by focusing on the central dimensions of political, economic, social and physical security. Financial marginalization or gendered hierarchies are indicative of a set of social practices and beliefs that promote male dominance and female subordination. A positive correlation between women in employment and their level of participation in society and politics could be drawn.

The Government of Kenya responded to citizens' call for a new and gender inclusive constitution in 2008. The outcome was the new 2010 Kenyan Constitution. A precursor to the new Constitution, Vision 2030, clearly stated that: "*Kenya shall be a nation that treats its women and men equally. It will not discriminate any citizen on the basis of gender, race, tribe, religion or ancestral origin*" (Vision 2030, 2007:22). However, despite this progressive change in the new Constitution and the fact that some women were appointed to public leadership positions, senior public leadership positions in the national Government of Kenya remains largely male-dominated (see Section 1.3.1 for a short discussion on the 2010 Constitution of Kenya and Tables 1.2 and 1.3 for the transformation of female representation in the NA and the Senate after the 2013 and 2017 elections).

A greater extent of equality and security in Kenya will require changes in attitudes towards patriarchy and relationships, in political decision-making structures, in education, religious and cultural practices. These changes are achievable through the creation of a gender equality social norm. Social transformation and change, the emphasis of feminist theory, is the focus of the creation of a secure environment for women and men in all areas of development at the social, political and economic levels (see Section 2.4.3 for a discussion of the central dimensions of gender inequality).

The next section focuses on the contribution of feminist theory and the relationship between gender inequality and human insecurity. This is a synopsis and discussion of the findings presented in Chapter 2.

7.3 Theories and concepts of gender and human security studies as the foundation for security

Chapter 2 dealt with the research question: How do the views contained in feminist theory contribute to gender equality and security in general? The chapter was divided into two parts. The first discussed the development of feminist theory and its emphasis on gender inequality, and the second part discussed the influence of gender inequality on the security of a state. Section 2.2 argued that gender is a social construct and the reconstruction of gender identities provides gender with encoding power that not only distinguishes between male and female but also creates a hierarchy. This social construct leads to women's subordination in the family structure and the unequal distribution of power and status between men and women. The privilege of the hierarchy provides men with an advantage of control over resources in the political and economic sphere and forms the origin of wage inequality between the genders.

Feminist theory aims to contribute to a better understanding of gender inequality and to uncover how gender, as a social construct, is embedded in the social fabric of society and how being born female can have disastrous consequences for girls. Gender-orientated research identifies that gender inequality and not the difference between the sexes, is preventing women from progressing to positions of decision making in government or the private sector. Section 2.4.4 discussed how different types of gender inequalities are linked and feed one another and that a state could move from one to another. Inequalities concerning access to basic facilities or the deprivation of educational and special opportunities for professional training are directly linked with professional inequality. As a result, women face greater challenges in terms of employment or promotion than men. Notwithstanding challenges to employment and promotion, women face further financial marginalization because of a gender gap in wages in such circumstances (see Section 2.4.3.2 for a discussion of the economic dimension of gender inequality). UN Women offers a summary (Table 3.5) of how the different types of gender inequalities are linked; showing that education, location and the size of a family determine the future of a girl-child. Research by Equileap (2019:10) recognizes that in the corporate world, women are paid 23 per cent less than their male counterparts globally, but in Kenya, this number stands at 32 per cent (see Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 for a discussion of female participation in the formal sector in Kenya).

The development of contemporary theories of feminism highlights the imbalances between the two sexes. Liberal feminism (see Section 2.5.3.2.1 for a discussion on liberal feminism) introduced, part of the second wave of feminism between 1960 and 1980 (see Section 2.5.2.1 for a discussion on the second feminist resistance movement), promotes social transformation and by all probability, has had the biggest impact on uplifting women's lives by introducing affirmative action measures. Liberal feminists (see Section 2.5.3.2.1 for a discussion on liberal feminism) see the state as the promoter of equality. Gender mainstreaming could be viewed as a "corrective" gender strategy to male dominance and mainstream gender equality into governing policies and institutional organizations. This emphasis that feminism has placed on gender equality has led to its inclusion in security studies as an academic discipline.

7.3.1 Gender mainstreaming

The successful implementation of gender mainstreaming as a strategy has to be evaluated on a state-by-state basis, measured according to the establishment of effective and accountable mechanisms for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy on a national governmental level (see Section 2.6 for a discussion on gender mainstreaming and Section 3.8.1 for a discussion on the responsiveness of the frameworks to implement gender equality standards in the Government of Kenya). Gender mainstreaming could be achieved in

at least two ways, namely by an integrative or an agenda-setting model. The latter, agenda-setting, is focused on the transformation of organizational and governmental structures, the reorientation of the existing policies paradigms and a change in decision-making processes with the prioritizing of gender equality objectives (Walby, 2003:4). The integrative model seeks to incorporate or add women to existing policy frameworks without challenging organizational or governmental structures. It was established that the appointment of feminist activists into parliaments, depoliticized their power and neutralized feminist movements within a government structure. A gap between policy and practice was identified and insufficient knowledge and engagement with governmental ideology, beliefs and norms would obstruct gender mainstreaming. Gender transformation through a quota system in ethnic diverse societies does not reach the intended transformational goals. As a result, the focus shifted from gender transformation on a country level to gender transformation on organizational level. It means greater emphasis is placed on economic gender transformation. Therefore, gender transformation should be driven through female organizational membership and influence from outside government structures. This highlighted the importance of grassroots participation in countries where socio-cultural norms, like patriarchy, prevent women from equal access to political structures of decision making. Consequently, gender mainstreaming would be less successful without the elimination of patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm, because a patriarchal structure would be resistant to gender transformation on all levels of the society.

7.3.2 Patriarchy as a constrain to gender transformation

Gender-resistant feminism focuses on a specific behaviour or group dynamics that supports inequality. One of the socio-cultural norms that are in direct contrast with gender equality, is patriarchy. Radical feminists, in particular, aim to undo patriarchy and rather focus on its root causes in the given culture (see Section 2.5.3.3.2 for the radical feminists' focus on gender). A patriarchal society is characterized by male dominance. Consequently, patriarchy creates an environment of dependency, a gender-based division of labour and insecurity for women. Patriarchy has been a powerful force in politics and is connected to the binary of masculinity and politics (see Section 2.5.3.3.2.1 for a discussion on patriarchy). Ironically, female "blind obedience" has been identified as supporting patriarchal thinking. This shapes the values of a culture and is taught by mothers to their children. Women themselves have been identified as a source of sustaining a patriarchal culture, even if it is to the benefit of men. In addition, schools and religious institutions have been identified as mediums that further support and reinforce the characteristics of patriarchy as socially and culturally accepted. The place of patriarchy in the culture and society and its effect on the political system in Kenya was confirmed by the empirical research and discussed in Section 6.8. On the contrary, it was also

established that women in patriarchal societies tend to participate in acts of extremism or terrorism (see Section 4.4.3.2.1 for a discussion on female pull factors). Gender is being applied as an ideology to lure women to join extremist organizations that are generally highly paternal. The focus is placed on the power of maternalistic roles to create and rear a new society. The admiration for maternalistic roles would be found in both jihadi and right-wing organizations.

Feminist theory builds its understanding of gender discrimination on patriarchal power structures and the social reconstruction of gender. Gender determines access and power and patriarchy is the custom that justifies and maintains inequality. This structural inequality not only “designs” conditions for male hegemony, but is based on the norms of exclusion and structural resistance – the very source of discontent and female insecurity. The emphasis on gender inequality contributed to the inclusion of gender in security studies and the contribution of feminist theory to feminist security studies is discussed in the next section.

7.3.3 Feminist theory and security

Feminist scholars like Tickner (1992:1), Sjoberg (2009:198; 2016:46) and Lewis (2006:11) reason that gender and not women are the driving force behind who, how and what is studied in global politics. It is important to note that the maintenance of the security of the human and the state is always central to IR. For example, a gender analysis questions the achievement of state security if the security of women is neglected (human security) and is discussed in Section 2.8.2. From a feminist perspective, threats to human security include domestic threats of family violence, rape, gender oppression, poverty and ecological destruction. Human security became the primary focus in international, regional and multinational organizations tasked with security and development. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) focused the attention of including gender mainstreaming in peace and security agreements and women’s participation in post-conflict societies to promote sustainable conditions for human security (see Section 3.5.4 for the development of KNAP to implement UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) in Kenya).

Gender became a prominent part of security matters during wars such as the complex war in Syria (2011 to date) due to the prominence of sexual abuse as a weapon of war, increased cases of female suicide bombers, and women participating as soldiers and activists against the conflict. This trend is also evident in Africa where the Boko Haram and Al Shabaab extremist groups (see Section 4.4.1 for a short history of Al Shabaab and Section 4.6.1 for Al Shabaab’s activities in Kenya) recruit and use females as instruments for attacks. Al Shabaab used approximately 5 per cent female suicide bombers since 2006 (Galehan, 2019:1; Warner

and Chapin, 2018:23), but since 2011 Al Shabaab's activities in Kenya steadily continued. Section 4.4.2.2.1 discussed the pull factors for the radicalization of women in general, and in Section 4.6.3 specific to Kenya.

These new trends of women becoming involved in conflict make it clear that states may come under threat when basic human rights are not met and when the dignity of all humans, especially women, are threatened due to economic strains, unemployment, abuse, rape and disease. These conditions create a state of insecurity and drivers for radicalization as discussed in Section 4.2.2.2.1 and summarized in Table 4.6 and confirmed by the empirical study (see Figure 6.3). Feminists highlight the fact that secure states often host insecure women because of a host of factors. Threats to human security (to want and to fear), are strengthened by economic models and market-driven policies that increase the probability of poverty, food insecurity, economic and the political exclusion of the majority of people in a state. These new threats include governments. The empirical study confirmed (see Section 6.5 for a discussion on the possibility of political unrest in Kenya) that with big development projects, the government of Kenya could be creating discontent among communities in the coastal and north-eastern parts of Kenya. Economic and political exclusion are drivers for radicalization, internal conflict or political violence. The addition of a gender ideology to radicalization could have a further negative effect on human security with more women being radicalized, as was confirmed and discussed in the same section of Chapter 6 as well as in Section 4.6.3. The security of a state will remain fragile if it was built on the insecurity of some of its citizens.

The higher the level of gender inequality in a state, the greater the probability becomes that a state will experience internal or political violence. In patriarchal political cultures, the threshold for violence is lower (see Section 2.8.3.3 for a discussion on grievances as a predictor for internal conflict). The persistence of violence and domination over women is linked with a patriarchal society where violence in everyday societal interactions is considered normal and therefore legitimate. In South Africa, the Department of Police reported that between April 2018 and April 2019, nearly 3 000 women were murdered. This phenomenon was amplified by the Covid-19 pandemic and described as a second pandemic that hit the country (Emi, 2020:1). In such societies, norms of intolerance develop with regard to women, sexual or ethnic minorities or political opposition groups. Section 2.8.3.2.1 discussed how low respect for women's rights is an indication of low respect for minority and human rights. Concerning the Kenyan case study, Figure 4.6 illustrates that SGBV in Kenya is high. Section 3.3.1 clarified the need for a new constitution because of severe ethnic violence after the presidential elections in 2007. Women in Kenya were not exempt from an increase of GBV during the

Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and as a result, the empirical research confirmed that the women in Kenya face a great level of insecurity (see Section 6.3 for feedback from the participants).

It is important to understand that cultural norms that support violence to address grievances are more likely to promote internal conflict or lead to political violence. Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:4) explain (see Section 2.8.3.3) that it is difficult to break cycles of violence. It is argued that the best predictor for violent conflict in the future is violent conflict in the past. Structural inequality in the form of social injustice or structural violence is the result of systematic exploitation, the deprivation of basic human needs or the unequal distribution of resources that become part of the social order – and a source of discontent or grievances.

Consequently, grievances that developed based on injustices and discontent could be the breeding ground for aggression and group action. The manner, however, in which these grievances are handled, could determine the likelihood of internal conflict. Gender inequality therefore, contributes to poor governance in the security sector by potentially contributing to political and socio-economic instability and high levels of structural and institutional violence and crime. An analysis of this statement clarifies that gender inequality sustains impunity, corruption and human rights abuses that jeopardize democratic processes and economic and social stability.

Kenya is known for its violent protests (which spurred a new Constitution and was discussed in Section 3.3.1), human and women rights abuses, and extremist and terror attacks (see Figure 4.8 for Al Shabaab's activities on Kenyan territory). Research by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6) identify that conflict manifests itself in three forms and in the same order, namely: i) violent protests; ii) terrorism; and iii) internal conflict (see Section 2.8.3.1 for the discussion on factors influencing internal conflict). Kenya should actively address the inequalities at the horizontal and vertical levels (see Section 2.8.3.3 for discussion on grievances as a predictor for internal conflict) to prevent the next level of conflict, namely internal conflict.

Gender equality as a norm prescribes respect and peaceful conflict resolution (see Section 2.9 for the discussion of the relationship between peaceful resolution and gender equality). The application of gender as an ideology affects technical choices and has the potential to communicate political opinion in a non-violent way (see Section 2.6 for gender mainstreaming as a global strategy to strengthen gender equality). Norms of respect between men and women could essentially develop into non-violent societal relations, political parties and ethnic groupings. As such, once the norm of respect is instilled in a community, differences are settled using non-violent means. The empirical study confirmed in Section 6.8 that a mindset change

and respect for both genders would only be possible if the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy is replaced with a gender equality norm in Kenya.

The links between political, socio-economic, cultural, physical and environmental threats therefore merge in daily life activities, directly influencing women's security needs. A feminist perspective on the management of daily threats not only promotes the creation of a non-violent environment, but also an environment of respect. The empirical study identified that the root causes of patriarchy that are instilled as normative in the Kenyan society have to be unlearned and should be addressed at all levels of society (see Section 6.9 for a discussion on norm development in Kenya). The empirical study confirmed the research by Joseph et al (2018:8) that if the structure and culture of government are not transformed, the structure will resist gender mainstreaming.

Gender is used as a category of analysis to determine how unequal social and state structures impact negatively on the security of individuals (see Section 2.7.3.2.1 for a discussion on GBV as an indicator of internal conflict). A natural conclusion would be that the higher the status of women in a community, the lower the risk for human rights violations and violent and internal conflict. The inclusion of women in all layers of the community will strengthen state capacity and governance associated with peace. If inequality is a cause of discontent and conflict, then equality should be the counter and positively affect the security of all individuals. If Kenya does not implement gender equality standards as was set by the Constitution, the level of discontent could prompt internal conflict.

The answer to research question 1: "How do the views contained in feminist theory contribute to gender equality and security? Feminist theory led to the mainstreaming of gender as a global gender affirmative action transformation strategy and the inclusion of gender into decision-making structures of states. Feminist theory highlighted the correlation between gender inequality, human security and internal conflict. Feminist theory recognized that governments pose a risk to human security in the name of state security. Women's equality and empowerment are contributing to human security and human security is complementary to state security. A state cannot be safe if basic human or women's rights are threatened. The inclusion of women in societal sectors, politics, government and the labour force strengthen state capacity and governance, which is associated with peace. Therefore, feminist theory contributed to the inclusion of gender into security studies. The next section discusses the responsiveness of the legislative and institutional frameworks of the Government of Kenya to mainstreaming gender equality.

7.4 Kenyan legislative and institutional frameworks to meet gender equality standards

Chapter 3 dealt with the research question: “What are the legal requirements for the gender equality of positions in the national Government of Kenya?” The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, in contrast with the Independence Constitution of 1963, is the backbone of the Government of Kenya’s legal and institutional framework and laid a firm foundation for the promotion of gender equality. Article 81(b), the “two-thirds gender principle” of the Constitution, is supported by legislation and implemented at the county government level by a comprehensive legal and institutional framework (see Section 3.4.3 for a discussion on Article 27(6): Affirmative Action and Section 3.4.5 for a discussion on the institutional framework to support gender equality).

The NGEC was established in 2011 to facilitate gender mainstreaming and affirmative action implementation policies, laws and administrative regulations in public and private institutions (see Section 3.4.5.1 for a discussion on the functions of NGEC and KEWOPA). In the same year KEWOPA was established with an oversight and monitoring function to improve female representation and participation in both the Senate and the NA (see Section 6.2.2.9 for the influence of KEWOPA in parliament). In addition, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and religious organizations are playing important roles to educate and strengthen the political influence of women in Kenya (see Section 3.4.5.3 for the role that non-governmental organizations play in Kenya to promote gender transformation and Section 6.11 for feedback from the participants on gender transformation at the grassroots level).

Notwithstanding all the laws and policies and the establishment of an institutional framework to promote the “two-thirds gender principle”, the 12th parliament (2017–2022) of Kenya had failed to pass legislation that would be in line with Article 81(b) of the 2010 Constitution by September 2020. Five attempts (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019) between the 11th parliament (2013–2017) and the 12th parliaments to pass legislation by 2020 to meet the constitutional requirements at the national government level failed. This is a clear indication that the political structure to mainstream gender equality at the national government level is resilient. However, Article 261 (5–7) makes provision that, upon petition, “the Chief Justice shall advise the President to dissolve Parliament and the President shall dissolve Parliament” and on 21 September 2020, the chief justice advised the president accordingly (see Section 3.4.3.1 for the impact of the advisory). It appeared that the drafters of the 2010 Constitution anticipated structural resistance by including Article 261 in the 2010 Constitution.

Although the 2017-elections in Kenya proved that affirmative action can deliver positive results for female representation in government, only 172 (9.2 per cent instead of the required 33 per cent) of the elected 1 835 parliamentarians were women. Although the 2010 Constitution makes provision (Article 175) for women to be nominated in the 47 county governments to reach the one-third threshold, the Constitution in Article 100 indicates that parliament should enact legislation to promote women, youth and other marginalized groups in parliament.

Table 3.2 demonstrates that 26 women were elected to parliament in 2017 in comparison with four in 2002, and 16 in 2013. However, for the first time in the history of Kenya, three women were elected as senators and three as governors. Their success, being elected and not nominated, is an indication that women who have served in nominated positions gain experience and are more likely to win an elected position than women who have never been in any political office at all. It is important to mention that in 2020, 32 per cent of the cabinet secretaries were female in comparison to 27.3 per cent in 2017. Table 3.3 further displays that the NA has 21.8 per cent female representation and the Senate 31.3 per cent in 2020.

With its Vision 2030 policy, the Government of Kenya developed gender-sensitive policies and started programmes to uplift women, youth and people with disabilities. The implementation of funding mechanisms for women, although with partial success in the rural areas, to become economically independent and the creation of a fund for women who are seeking leadership positions in public office after the 2022 elections, is a sign of the cooperation between government and the private sector to enhance gender equality in the Government of Kenya. Section 3.5.2 discussed the economic development acts and funds to support women's economic development.

Notwithstanding the progressive legal framework to improve the lives of women in Kenya, the economic and political culture and practices seem to remain male-dominated. As discussed in Section 2.5.3.2.1.1, in patriarchal societies like Kenya, male hegemony is pervasive and GBV is used as a tactic to enforce power structures and highlight inequalities sustained by structural resistance to women participating in political electoral processes. This was evident in the 2007 post-election violence and it continued after the implementation of the new 2010 Constitution and in the 2013 and 2017 elections (see Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on the use of GBV as a tool to discourage women to vie for parliamentary leadership positions). Financial constraints, as exposed by Figure 3.6, and female participation in the labour force as discussed in Section 4.2.1.2.2, remain two of the reasons women could not campaign and participate on the same level as men during the election in 2017. The empirical research (see Section 6.2 for a discussion on structural resistance and Section 6.3 for a discussion on female insecurity) confirms that a cyclical interaction between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity (see

Figure 6.1 for an illustration) persists. In the same section, Section 6.3, the empirical research highlights that women are differently marginalized or oppressed based on location (rural and urban divide) or faith (Muslim and Christian divide) as explained in Section 4.6.3.1.1. All these intersectional factors contribute to gender inequality, tolerate male hegemony in politics.

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By 2020, women in Kenya are still exposed to high levels of insecurity because of SGBV and conflict. Unfortunately, the under-representation of women in the police service and top leadership positions in the security services are a reality. A post-election report by the National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) after the 2017 election indicated that police-to-civilian sexual violence represented 54.6 per cent of the sexual violence reported during the election of 2017 (see Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on the post-election report).

Kenya is a signatory to the UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on women peace and security. A second KNAP (2020–2024) was developed in 2019 to replace the first KNAP (2016–2018) and to continue the focus on effective prevention and response measures for women in situations of armed conflict in support of UNSC Resolution 1325(2000) (see Section 3.5.4 for a discussion on both the KNAPs). This new action plan launched the first gender policy in the defence sector aimed at the inclusion of women to higher levels of decision making in the defence structures. By 2020, the representation of women in decision-making positions in the security structures, remain below the threshold of 33 per cent (see Section 3.5.4.1 for a discussion of female representation in the Kenya National Security).

At the institutional level, the Kenya judiciary has made remarkable progress to meet the gender standard. Table 3.3 displayed that the representation of female High Court judges during the 12th parliament in 2019 stood at 48.8 per cent, while more than half of Magistrates, 53.5 per cent, are women. Women represents 36.8 per cent of Court of Appeal Judges. In contrary to the institutional level, at the community level, female leaders are absent. In Kadhis courts, which provide legal assistance to Muslim communities, there has been no progress and there is no female representation. This layer of leadership has a strong influence on socio-cultural norms and practices and can be used for behavioural change.

The answer to the research question, “What are the legal requirements of gender equality in positions in the national Government of Kenya?” is that the parliament in 2020, 10 years after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution and with 23.3 per cent female representation, violates the “two-thirds gender principle” [Article 81(b)] of the Constitution. The next section focuses on the factors that cause the resistance to political, economic and social change and the repercussions of this for security.

7.5 Impediments to and repercussions of not meeting gender equality standards

Chapter 4 dealt with research question 3, “What are the impediments to and repercussions of not reaching gender equality in the national Government of Kenya?” The first part of Chapter 4 discussed the impediments to gender equality, while the second part paid attention to the repercussions of gender inequality.

7.5.1 Impediments to gender mainstreaming

The contribution of gender studies is to uncover the inequalities in the balance of political power, the economy and the society of a state that discriminates against women and contributes to their insecurity. These central dimensions of gender inequality (see Section 2.4.3.1 for a discussion on the central dimensions) are independent though interlinked, and according to Forsberg and Olsson (2016:2) unequal distribution of power between the genders is used as a method to reach a goal and to influence society. These impediments are discussed in the next subsections.

7.5.1.1 Conditions under which the “two-thirds gender principle” was included in the 2010 Constitution

The conditions under which the “two-thirds gender principle” was included in the 2010 Constitution explains the disappointment about gender mainstreaming in the national Government of Kenya. Research by Forsburg and Olsson (2016:2) (see Section 2.4.3.1 for a discussion on these conditions) on this aspect shows that voluntary political party quotas (the presence of a gender-equal norm) increase women’s representation and influence in government, while legislative or reserved seat quotas (capacity only) – a top-down approach, is less effective. Based on Townley’s explanation (2019:80), when a political system undergoes change, often-constitutional change, and in most cases after internal political violence, the political system is more receptive for the inclusion of gender policies. A second reason according to Townley (2019:80) is the adoption of gender policies after conflict to

encourage international donors to donate finances for the restoration, rebuilding and resettlement of the internally displaced. The inclusion of gender equality standards in the 2010 Constitution, after the 2007 post-election violence, as well as the Government of Kenya's failure to meet legislative gender quotas in parliament by 2020, strongly corresponds with Townley's (2019: 89) research. Table 3.2 reflected the representation of women in the parliament of Kenya and Table 3.3 displayed the female representation in decision-making positions in the public service. Consequently, control over female representation in decision making is explained next.

7.5.1.2 Control of female representation in decision making

Control of female representation and decision making in political institutions is used as a tool to uphold political power and stifle gender equality. Gender equality is beneficial to a society and the state as a whole. It increases levels of education, therefore reduces poverty, it allows for better access to health services and relates to internal peace. It can therefore be argued that a state can be an architect of its own insecurity if the international standard of 30 per cent female representation in Government is not implemented and the society is not transformed. The parliament of Kenya, with 23.3 per cent female representation in parliament and 37 per cent of the positions in the public service (see Table 4.1 for wage employment in the public administration from 2010 to 2020) going to women, is not only in violation of their own constitution and the "two-thirds gender principle", but it can be argued that Kenya could be an architect of its own insecurity (see Section 4.4 for a discussion on the repercussions due to gender inequality).

7.5.1.3 Structural resistance in public and private domains

Institutional frameworks are used as a tool of resistance to prevent gender transformation and female influence, in decision-making processes. Despite various progressive pieces of legislation being enacted, since 2010, to support gender equality, the Kenyan society is still predominantly patriarchal, and women are constantly sidelined and discriminated against. This is in line with the research by Caprioli, Forsburg and Olsson (see Section 2.4.3.1 for the political dimension of gender inequality) that if women are not allowed to compete in the public sphere at an equal level with men, it automatically reduces their probability of influence. (see Section 4.4 for a discussion on the repercussions due to gender inequality).

The mainstreaming of gender entails more than changing the Constitution, laws and developing policies. The integration of gender equality into the political system, based on a quota system (top-down approach), was confronted by resistance from the patriarchal culture

and the government structure resists gender mainstreaming as a “corrective” transformation strategy. As a result, structural resistance became a tool to prevent gender transformation on a macro level. An analysis of the quota system revealed that excluding tactics persist and are male bias and that the structures for the gender equality are underfunded (see Section 4.2.1.1 for a discussion on patterns of decision making). Contributing to the low pace of gender transformation is the lack of a strong feminist movement in Kenya. Feminist movements are restricted by the ideology of African feminism and the depoliticizing of gender activists after appointment in parliament. Gender transformation requires sustained political will, leadership from women and men, and changes to cultural norms and attitudes to successfully implement gender sensitive laws.

Therefore, structural resistance controls women’s influence in the public and private domains in Kenya. Women in Kenya have more success in participating in the formal labour force in the private sector (see Table 4.4 in Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 for an illustration and discussion of gender participation in the formal labour force in Kenya). There was a slight increase (of 1 per cent to 23 per cent from 2017, but a 10 per cent increase from 2012 to 2019) of females as members of boards, which allowed Kenya to outperform the global average of 22 per cent. This is in contrast to the 7th East African ranking of Kenya with regard to political empowerment (see Table 3.1). Women’s inclusion in the private sector is an indicator that there could be a shift towards a more equal formal economy in Kenya (see Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 for a discussion). However, despite this achievement, the gender pay gap in Kenya remains greater than the global average. Globally, women are paid 23 per cent less than their male counterparts, but in Kenya, this number stands at 32 per cent.

While gender inclusion is put into practice through policy, legal provisions and programmes, gender equality as a principle of sustainable development falls short – exposing the policy-practice gap. With this in mind, the next section deliberates on economic inequality.

7.5.1.4 Economic inequality

Women’s economic empowerment is one of the pathways to gender equality. As discussed above, women occupy 37 per cent of public service positions and 22 per cent in the private sector. Youth unemployment reached more than 50 per cent in the second quarter of 2020. Consequently, women in Kenya own approximately 48 per cent of micro-, small and medium enterprises, and therefore the female contribution to the national GDP is not always measurable, but the Government of Kenya estimated it as much as 20 per cent. Figure 4.5 illustrates that 60 per cent of female micro-, small and medium enterprises are not licensed. Table 4.4 in Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 illustrates that 55 per cent of women contribute to the work

force in the agriculture sector, yet 1.63 per cent of the hectares are female-owned (KLA, 2018:1). Although women are supplementing the household income with agriculture or micro, small or medium enterprises, their economic independence is influenced by the disproportionate burden of care work, their lack of control over assets and income, their literacy rate and their physical location. Women in rural areas have fewer economic opportunities than women living closer to urban centres. Only 12 per cent of women have access to formal financing and accordingly, women rely on social or informal financing structures. Due to a societal mindset about the financial potential of women, the financial landscape is gendered with binaries formal/informal and men/women leaving women to fight for themselves through informal alternatives for survival. A lack of female awareness of legal reforms and legal support services available that are prohibiting traditional norms have delayed female economic transformation even further. With limited economic opportunities, female education, access to health services and economic independence are hindered. (see Section 4.2.1.2 for a discussion on access to and control over assets and resources).

Gender inequality sustains poverty with threats to human security (poverty, lack of health care, child labour, early and forced marriages, UDCW, GBV, FGM ext.). The cyclical process between gender inequality, poverty and insecurity placed a heavy strain on the girls' or women's education and advancement into the paid labour market. Long-term effects of poor socio-economic conditions lead to undernutrition and stunting that affects growth and psychosocial stimulation of children and negatively affects an adult's productivity. The percentage of girls suffering from stunting in Kenya was calculated at 22 per cent in 2020 (ACPF, 2020:66) (see Section 4.2.1.2.2 for a discussion on female labour force participation in Kenya). There has been a positive correlation between the literacy rate and the maternal health of women. The estimated poverty rate in the rural areas is 40 per cent where 80 per cent of the people live in comparison to the global poverty rate of 33.1 per cent in 2020 (UNICEF Kenya, 2019:26). A UNDP analysis of poverty in Kenya determined that female-headed households constituted 30.2 of the 35.6 per cent of the general poor population in Kenya. As a result, a positive correlation between economic and political inequality can be drawn. Poverty was identified as the strongest driver for female radicalization. Gender inequality is the synonym for economic inequality. Both political and economic inequality affects the socio-cultural status of families that is explained next.

7.5.1.5 Social inequality

Employment opportunities are directly linked to the level of education and a lack of education is the biggest contributor to poverty. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that although education is available to both genders, 43 per cent of female pupils advance to tertiary education in

comparison with 57 per cent males in 2019 (as was displayed by Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4). Socio-cultural and economic reasons like FGM, child marriage and teenage pregnancy are prohibiting factors for girls to complete secondary and tertiary education. Figure 4.6 illustrates that education not only influences gender perceptions but is also a counter for domestic violence – thus a defence against the personal insecurity of women. Ericsson (2020:4) established that a mother's adherence to traditional cultural gender norms affects a girl's relative performance in mathematics. The gender gap in STEM enrolments at the university level and displayed in Table 4.3 shows a positive correlation with societal gender equality.

The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the failure of the Government of Kenya to fully implement the existing gender laws and policies – specifically concerning domestic violence and the prevention of teen pregnancies as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Eighteen per cent of girls before the age of 19 became pregnant every year. The unequal access to public healthcare services and substantial disparities in reproductive healthcare, result in the death of approximately 6 000 women and 74 000 children under the age of five annually. The proportion of pregnant girls in Kenya who did not deliver in a health facility or who did not receive assistance from skilled attendants were above 25 per cent in 2020 (ACPF, 2020:61). The Government of Kenya launched a UHC in 2018, but by 2020 acknowledged that the insurance model did not achieve much (see Section 3.5.3 for a discussion on the Kenya health system). The Government of Kenya spends 8 per cent of the total government expenditure on health services (ACPF, 2020:49).

The central dimensions of gender inequality proved how the economic status of women and their health variables linked them to political and security variables. The repercussions for not mainstreaming gender is explained in the next section.

7.5.2 Repercussions for not mainstreaming gender equality standards

The second part of Chapter 4 discussed the repercussions of not mainstreaming gender equality and as a result the preservation of patriarchy, an increase in radicalization and female extremism and threats to human and state security. These repercussions are explained in the next subsections.

7.5.2.1 Preservation of patriarchy

Patriarchy persists on both the institutional and the individual level. As the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs stated in 2019: "The law that ties our hands is cultural, whenever we want to make a change, we are reminded of patriarchy. Consequently, if patriarchy as a norm is not replaced by equality and respect for women, there

is a probability of a positive correlation between a more gender-equal society and an increase in (domestic) GBV. Ericsson (2020:1) and Bones (2016:67) established that with an increase in female education and female economic empowerment women, surpassing that of their husbands, a backlash of GBV developed. USAID (2020a:54) warned against a similar development in Kenya if more women will occupy traditional male positions. As a result, when power or control structures built on patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm, are challenged, it might manifest in GBV. A reasonable conclusion is that higher female education is a threat to patriarchy and power and control that comes with it.

Section 3.4.3.2 underlined that the Government of Kenya has realized that GBV is the result of uninformed socio-cultural morals (strengthened by patriarchy); though the correction of GBV is security sector and punitive related instead of preventative and education-based. The importance of education (as illustrated by Figure 4.6) to prevent rather than to correct GBV will become more important in Kenya if the society becomes more gender-equal.

Women have been identified as a source of sustaining a patriarchal culture (see Section 2.5.3.3.2.1 for a discussion on patriarchy and Section 6.9 for responses from the participants). It was established that more women in patriarchal societies are supporters of extremism because of oppression and low self-esteem (see Section 4.4.3.2.1 for a discussion on female pull factors). Contrary to how women experience patriarchy, extremist recruiters use gender as an ideology to recruit women to sustain extremist organizations – in even stricter patriarchal conditions. It was established that women admire the power of maternalistic roles and the power to give birth and rear a new society – with extremist morals. These female aspirations would be found in both jihadi and radical rightwing extremism. Ericsson (2020:4) established that mothers who adhere to traditional cultural norms influence a girl's relative performance. Bouhana (2019:12) identified that cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes and that ideological rigidity is rooted in mental inflexibility. Although patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm is in direct contrast with gender equality and linked to female poverty, it is unconsciously sustained by women's "blind obedience". Subsequently women's "blind obedience" is exploited by extremism to further extremist ideology.

As mentioned above low self-control (linked to quality and level of education) was identified as the clearest indicator of susceptibility to moral change. In other words, by marginalizing girls, the Government of Kenya not only restricts them to professions in the informal sector and most probably to poverty, but also makes them vulnerable to radicalization. Therefore, the price to pay for patriarchy is an increase in female radicalization. However, female radicalization can be prevented if the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy can be replaced with a gender equality norm. The female radicalization is discussed next.

7.5.2.2 Radicalization and increase in female extremism

Repercussions for a society that does not promote the democratic principles of equality and human or gender rights, is hampered by security challenges such as radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Radicalization is a “process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations” (HRC, 2016:8) – meaning a person undergoes a moral change. The conditions conducive to radicalization and violent extremism were discussed in Sections 4.4.1.1 and 4.5 while Table 4.8 summarized the push and pull factors and the different levels of influence. As explained by Bouhana (2019:12) in Section 4.5, ideological rigidity is rooted in mental inflexibility and results in ethnocentric thinking. Consequently, cognitive inflexibility determines and predicts extremist attitudes. Accordingly, people with an inflexible thinking style adhere more strictly to ideologies. Research by Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018:78), and Botha (2014:13) identified that most of the people who join Al Shabaab have only a primary school education. The inclusion of social media as recruitment methods refocused the targets for radicalization to include secondary school and university students.

Economic, political and social exclusion are drivers for radicalization, internal conflict or political violence. Figures 6.1 and 6.3 illustrate that the cyclic interaction between gender inequality, sustained poverty and an increase in female insecurity can be categorized as systems, structural or push factors (see Table 4.6 for the push and pull factors). Poverty is a driving force behind extremism, but extremism is driving poverty. The greatest of these influences that motivate people to adopt a new set of moral beliefs is based on relationships as exhibited by Table 4.7. It was established that radicalizers prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth and women who are disappointed by the Government of Kenya’s political culture of impunity (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018:80). It was determined that Al Shabaab exploits female vulnerabilities due to insecurity (caused by patriarchy), based on GBV, economic strains and lack of justice.

In 2016, female radicalization in Kenya came under the spotlight with the armed attack on a police station in Mombasa carried out by three women. This illuminated the role of women in executing attacks, intelligence gathering, planning and coordination, logistical support, financial facilitators, moral encouragement, and as wives as direct or indirect sources of support in extremism and to Al Shabaab. The focus on women as victims or CVE in Kenya moved to women in support of extremism and Ndung’u and Salifu (2017:4) described women as the “invisible infrastructure of Al Shabaab” because of the significant role women played in the enabling, supporting and facilitating of violent extremism. The evolvement of female radicalization in Kenya was discussed in Section 4.6.3.

The coastal region, known for poverty and high unemployment and disillusionment among communities, was identified as fertile ground for female radicalization. The Al Shabaab recruiters in the coastal region of Kenya are predominantly female and are targeting youths, both male and female, to join the group. Additionally, the neighbourhoods of Majengo and Eastleigh in Nairobi are popular among Somali residents and as a result it has become the focus of the police service. It came to light that Al Shabaab formed a partnership with Kenyan sex workers to successfully infiltrate the police service in these neighbourhoods (Petrich and Donnell, 2019:1).

Research on mediums of communication (see Figure 4.10) revealed that recruitment is done by phone (most popular), in person or via social media, mainly WhatsApp groups. Badurdeen (2020:1) differentiated between the different levels of voluntary recruitment of women and girls while Ndung'u et al (2017:32) identified a positive correlation between poverty and extremism, although extremism increases poverty. It was established that although Al Shabaab's use of female (suicide) bombers are low in comparison to Boko Haram in West Africa, terrorist groups will continue to use female (suicide) bombers because of its high effectiveness in surprise and disguising an attack and the attention it focuses on the group's modus operandi. (Warner and Chapin, 2018:24) (see Section 4.4.2.2.1 for female pull factors). The support role that women played in the DusitD2 hotel complex attack in January 2019 is confirmation that the role of women evolved beyond domestic support.

Coninx (2018:2) explained (see Section 4.6.3.1.1) that "gender-blind counterterrorism policies and practices have the potential of not only being ineffective but to also negatively impact women and girls' rights or serve as motivation for recruitment". The aggressive reaction of security forces after the Westgate shopping centre and Garissa College attacks, instilled fear in the communities and inhibited cooperation with security forces. UN Women (2020:6) reported that in 2020, government counterterrorism operations in the Dadaab refugee camp entails roundups and mass arrests and includes often curfews. It creates a sense of not belonging that is exploited by Al Shabaab. The Government of Kenya treat all Somali and Kenyan-Somali citizens with suspicion and as extremists (Botha, 2015:6). These security service's actions affect both genders negatively and the tension stimulates frustration and radicalization. A skills deficit and mishandling of information while implementing CVE CAPs was counterproductive and rather assisted Al Shabaab (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, 2020:35). Gender Analysis conducted by USAID (2020a:38) indicated that the current responses to Kenya's CVE are not designed to address the significant role that women play in fuelling radicalization (see Section 4.6.3.2 for a discussion on counter-violence extremism responses) and standardization of an extremist social ecology.

Several plausible processes could shape moral norms in a social ecology based on religion, ethnicity and culture. This will create alleged group competition with an increase in disadvantages and social disorganization and will undermine the trust in the capability of the government to protect or to provide for the community. This will in turn curtail the effectiveness of informal control measures. When mechanisms enhancing the normalization of extremist norms, values and behaviour (through mainstream or social media, political speech and or cultural products) are prominent or tolerated, it may result in the standardization of an extremist moral system. Systemic processes of discrimination or exclusion that encourage effective or symbolic segregation between social groups will probably increase an extremist-supportive moral ecology. Some of the processes contributing to strains are socio-economic inequality and power imbalances. Kenyan citizens living in the north-eastern region and along the east coast of Kenya experience high levels of frustration (see Table 4.7) with the government of Kenya because of unequal access to economic and political opportunities. Al Shabaab uses this perception of socio-economic and political injustices (perceived or actual) to target the youth. While the north-eastern region and coastal areas of Kenya have been identified as hotspots for recruitment due to the lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and marginalization by the Government of Kenya, the areas of Nairobi, the Rift Valley, Nyanza and western Kenya were added to the traditional fertile grounds. It is important to mention that the new recruitment focus areas are in traditional Christian societies and allocated across Kenya. The next section reviews how the spread in the standardization of extremist social ecologies also increases female radicalization. These threats to human and state security are addressed in the next section.

7.5.2.3 Threats to human and state security as a result of failing to implement gender equality standards

Radicalization and extremism do not develop in a vacuum. Structural factors at the macro-level are triggers for radicalization, meaning governments trigger radicalization and extremism because of inequality and human rights abuses. This statement was confirmed by the S5-inference framework model that identified system or structural (push factors) as the basis for discontentment in a community. However, it does not disregard the existence of individual or pull factors as motivation for some people to join an extremist group. Extremists use volatile security situations as the basis of their violent actions to undermine state authority and destabilize the immediate territory and surrounding regions. Radicalization and extremism aimed at the Government of Kenya, as discussed in Section 4.6 can be traced back to 2011 when Kenya's military invaded Somalia. Al Shabaab pledged retaliation (see Section 4.4.1 for a discussion on Al Shabaab). Because of Kenya's geographical location as neighbour to

Somalia, frequent attacks are executed on Kenyan territory as displayed in Figure 4.9 (see Section 2.6 for a discussion between gender inequality and national security).

The location and frequency of attacks in the north-eastern parts of Kenya not only creates a vacuum with respect to education, access to health and economic opportunities, but a fertile setting for radicalization and recruitment. Figure 4.9 demonstrates how the discontentment of non-state groups with the Government of Kenya at a macro-level, escalate and create an environment conducive to radicalization and recruitment. Due to the insecurity and fear created by the Al Shabaab attacks, a void is left as professional teachers and nurses left the region. As a result, the academic performance in the region has dropped, denying youths educational opportunities and creating insecurity in an already poor and under-served region. This creates a sense of abandonment among community members, which comes at a huge cost to the security and future of Kenya.

Another prominent repercussion is that, due to the slow pace of security sector reform, extremist-supportive individuals influence ineffective law enforcement in social areas. Figure 4.9 displayed that most of the attacks that have been executed in Kenya were in scarcely populated areas along the border with Somalia and where inhabitants mostly follow the Islamic faith. These areas were difficult to safeguard and most often targeted by Al Shabaab where a new social ecology would be established.

Therefore, Chapter 4 can be concluded and the answer to the research question on what the impediments and repercussions are for the Government of Kenya if they do not implement gender equality standards can be summarized according to the central dimensions of gender inequality as discussed in Section 2.4.3:

i) With respect to the political dimension, the non-compliance with Article 81(b) and the under-representation of female leaders in parliament by means of structural resistance to implement the “the two-thirds gender principle” is used as a tool to uphold patriarchy, political power and gender inequality. The top-down approach to mainstream gender in the national Government does not reach the intended goal of 33 per cent female representation (see Section 4.2.1.1 for a discussion on patterns of power and decision making).

ii) With respect to the economic dimension, female exclusion using gendered hierarchies and male domination in the public and private sector are used to promote male superiority and female subordination and is directly linked to a gap in wages. In Kenya, women are paid 32 per cent less than their male counter parts. Women in Kenya own approximately 48 per cent of the micro-, small and medium enterprises and represent 55 per cent of the informal

workforce in the agriculture, yet they own one per cent of the hectares that are registered as land title deeds (KLA, 2018:1). As a result, women are economically marginalized and female-headed households constitute 30.2 of the 35.6 per cent of the poor population in Kenya (see Section 4.2.1.2 for a discussion on access to and control over assets and resources in Kenya).

iii) With respect to the social dimension, human investment is based on gender. In Kenya, fewer girls than boys complete secondary school and advance to tertiary education. Employment opportunities are directly linked to the level of education and a lack of education is the biggest contributor to poverty. A higher level of education is a counter to GBV, thus a counter to female insecurity. Consequently, if patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm is not replaced by equality and respect for women, it would be difficult to create the right conditions for a more gender equal society to decrease GBV (see Section 4.2.1.2.1 for a discussion on the impediments to female education).

iv) With respect to the security dimension, the physical insecurity of women in Kenya, also described as security inequality, has been increased by the government as they did not promote the democratic principles of equality and human or gender rights. The result is increased security challenges such as radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. It has led to an increase and the evolvement of female radicalization and extremism in Kenya, from supporters to active participants (see Section 4.6.3 for a discussion on female radicalization in Kenya). A further repercussion is that if the security sector does not take the threats against women into account by implementing gender-sensitive CVE policies, this sector is neither effective nor accountable. Punitive treatment by the security forces is one of the biggest motivators for radicalization and extremism in Kenya and Kangas et al (2014:1) highlighted that if the impediments that should have promoted greater gender involvement in state building are not addressed, the same concerns would reinforce gender inequality and threats to human security - a case that has been proved in Kenya.

In conclusion, gender equality increases levels of female political participation; it increases levels of education, therefore reduces poverty and violence and guarantees internal peace. The impediments to mainstreaming gender are having dire consequences for the security Kenya. The next section discusses the assessment of the impact of gender inequality on the security of Kenya.

7.6 An assessment of the impact of gender inequality standards on the security of Kenya

The empirical research aimed to answer research question 4 in Section 1.6: “How does gender inequality according to feminist theory affect the security of the Government of Kenya?” The findings of the empirical research were discussed in Chapter 6 and are subsequently summarized in Sections 7.6.1 to 7.6.4. The questions in the interview schedule focused on the impact of political, economic and social dimensions of gender inequality and explored solutions to ultimately prevent moral changes and secure human security. A conclusion of the empirical research is provided in Section 7.6.5. The impact of each dimension (political, economic and social) will be discussed next.

7.6.1 Political dimension

Political equality refers to equal access to political power because power is used to influence society. The empirical research investigated the effect of structural resistance, the influence of female parliamentarians and grassroots on women’s access to decision-making structures in the Government of Kenya.

- **Structural resistance:** The first question in the interview schedule focused on the reason why the national Government of Kenya does not meet the gender standards as prescribed by the Constitution (see Section 6.2 for a discussion of the empirical research). The results showed that because men still fill more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, they use their influence to control gender mainstreaming and are not willing to share power and allow female influence at a national level. By controlling parliament, men control the national political sphere and resource allocation. This statement is in line with research by Caprioli, which shows that if women cannot compete with men on equal grounds in the public sphere, the situation automatically controls their access to power and reduces their influence in general (see Section 2.4.3.1 for a discussion on the political dimension of gender inequality). The top-down approach (affirmative action) using the Constitution to mainstream gender in the Government of Kenya has the goal of balancing the numbers (representation only), but because no structural or norm change has taken place (women were added to an existing structure), the Government structure resists gender transformation at a macro-level. The gap between policy and practice leads to the unfair distribution of political power and resources, and the unequal access to socio-economic opportunities, the control over power and resources are male-dominated that affects security equality of women and it threatens human and internal security.

- **Impact of female political leadership:** A question in the interview schedule focused on the role that KEWOPA play to fulfil their mandate “of representing the citizenry (women) in economic and social development, as well as playing an oversight role over the executive arm of the Government” (Informationcradle, 2018:1) to implement gender mainstreaming. The empirical findings (see Section 6.10) stressed that female politicians are ethnically (See Section 7.3.1 for a summary on gender mainstreaming) and not gender aligned and therefore do not form a united female front. Gouws (2007:29) explained that women’s gender activism is eliminated by their appointment in parliaments (see Section 2.5.4 for a discussion of feminism in Africa). Women are turned into politicians that are promoting a political and not a gender strategy (see Section 3.8.1 for a discussion of gender mainstreaming in Kenya). As a result, gender mainstreaming as a strategy and policy is failing because the culture of the Government was not changed before policy changes were introduced.
- **Grassroots influences:** A question focused on the power of women groups at the grassroots level and the responses were discussed in Section 6.11. The discussion in Section 7.6.9 illustrated the power of patriarchy on the political system and that an alternative approach for the current top-down (affirmative action) and liberal feminist approach should be found to advance gender transformation in the society and national Government of Kenya.

Responses from the empirical research revealed that successful women’s movements are based on a bottom-up movement. “The Common Women’s Agenda” was created in late November 2019 to refocus the politically aligned female leaders to have a common gender approach. The “Common Women’s Agenda” will also work together with NGEC to mobilize women at the community level to promote the gender agenda in their respective structures. The successful mobilizing of the “Common Women’s Agenda” by means of a social platform demonstrated the advantages of technology for gender transformation as discussed in Section 2.5.2.3 (the promotion of gender by means of the internet).

The empirical research identified that existing women’s groups like the Maenedeleo Ya Wananwake (MYWO) is a well-established and respected women’s group that focuses on the domestic and not political transformation of women. Gender transformation in Kenya in 2020, is best explained by Hudson (2005:170). It was identified that African feminism distinguished between strategic gender needs that are feminism in nature and women’s daily needs. This shift in consciousness created relatively strong women’s organizations, but weak feminist

movements that run the risk of becoming counterproductive. The void of a feminist movement was identified and the “The Common Women’s Agenda” attempted to breach the gap and initiated a bottom-up feminist movement to seek transformation in culture, social structures and behaviour.

This is the first sign that the feminist approach to gender transformation in Kenya should rather be driven from a radical (see Section 2.5.3.2.2 for a discussion on radical feminism) and contemporary African feminist standpoint (see Section 2.5.4 for discussion on African feminism) that focuses on the norm, culture and organizational changes. Radical feminism aims to undo patriarchy without adjustments to the existing systems through legal means (See Section 2.5.3.3.2 for a discussion on radical feminism).

It can be concluded that the liberal feminist approach to gender transformation, based on gender mainstreaming and legal processes is inadequate. A radical feminist approach to norm and culture change, as an alternative political approach to gender transformation in Kenya would be more effective. This means a shift from state or political to organizational or economic gender transformation.

7.6.2 Economic dimension

UN Women perceive equality as a precondition for and an indicator of sustainable people-centred and sustainable economic development (OSAGI, 2001:1). The empirical research investigated the correlation between economic inequality and female insecurity. A question in the interview schedule focused on the relationship between gender inequality and female insecurity (see Section 6.3 for a discussion of the responses). The marginalization of women, but specifically economic marginalization, has a direct negative impact on the development and economic empowerment of girls and women. Because of economic inequality, many women in Kenya are limited to the informal sector for an income. Gender inequality sustains female poverty and creates female insecurity. Their economic status keeps them in lower-income communities, associated with higher levels of insecurity. Figure 6.1 illustrates the cyclical interaction between gender inequality, sustained poverty and insecurity. The multi-analysis of radicalization discussed in Section 4.3 and illustrated by Figure 4.7 indicates that sustained habitual exposure to a specific social environment would affect a person’s moral value system. It can be concluded that because of the prolonged period that women in Kenya are exposed to inequality and insecurity when offered an extremist alternative, it would persuade them to join an extremist organization. This is in line with findings by Ndung’u et al. (2017:32) that a positive correlation between poverty and extremism exists (see Section 4.6.3

for a discussion of female radicalization in Kenya). Poverty was identified as the strongest driver for female radicalization.

Gender mainstreaming using quotas is not reaching the intended goal of gender transformation in ethnically diverse societies and the focus on gender transformation has shifted from country to organizational level. On an organizational level, it would be easier to first change the culture of the structure before gender equality is implemented. A gender agenda strategy would ensure gender transformation instead of gender representation. Furthermore, Asal et al (2020:2) determined that through organizational membership, women would be able to develop agency, gain access to power and would develop the capacity to influence society at large. The conclusion by Asal et al (2020:2) is in line with Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3), that established that women who occupy paid employment positions would foster a consciousness of political participation. The research by Asal et al and Forsburg and Olsson focused the attention on the importance of gender ideology and the effect it has on organizational behaviour and non-violent means to solve disputes.

Economic gender transformation is in support of a radical feminist gender transformation approach to transform the community and to influence government cultures from outside the formal structures. Economic gender transformation would advance gender equality, female security and social security.

7.6.3 Social dimension

The empirical research investigated the correlation between female education and economic aspects for females in the formal sector. The research focused on the creation of a gender mindset change as a prerequisite for a cultural norm change. Women have been identified as a source of sustaining the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy and as a result, a higher value is put on males, and sons would receive preference over daughters in terms of nutrition, healthcare and education (Den Boer & Hudson, 2017:119).

- **Mindset change:** A question in the interview schedule focused on the attainment of girls in school and tertiary education, to uplift women in the society, to counter GBV and radicalization. The responses were discussed in Section 6.8. The empirical findings emphasized the importance of education, both in creating a positive mindset change towards gender (from primary school level) and to keep girls in school (see Section 4.2.1.2.1 for a discussion on the role of education to empower girls and women). The bottom line is female education affects the distribution of labour and influences employment positions and the employment

levels of women in the formal sector and public administration. It would bring down GBV, teenage pregnancies, child labour and decrease child trafficking (see Section 4.3 for a discussion on non-economic issues with clear economic consequences). The high level of domestic violence as exhibited in Figure 4.5 is a consequence of a patriarchal dominant political society. The post-election violence in 2007 and the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 illustrated that structural violence is a precursor to an increase in gender-based or physical violence when a country is in a state of emergency. It was established that 47 per cent of women between the ages of 15 and 49 experienced some form of violence. As a result, women between the ages of 15 and 24 accept that men have the right to physically abuse them. The use of GBV as a tool of discouragement during elections was discussed in Section 3.4.3.2 and the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on GBV was discussed in Section 4.2.1. A higher level of education would create a social structural transition for girls from a subordinate position to being independent thinkers who can take decisions about their own bodies. Girls should understand that knowledge is power and that it is directly linked to their economic independence (see Section 7.6.2). They are interlinked, maintain each other and are linked to the status of a person in a social structure. With a mindset change, a strong female workforce would develop that would have a positive effect on the corporate world. Table 3.5 (women's empowerment index) explains the effect of a mindset change on the empowerment of girls. A mindset change to keep girls in school can be the start of gender-equal norm development.

- **Norm development:** A question in the interview schedule focused on the role that women play in maintaining patriarchy and the responses were discussed in Section 6.9. The participants noted that the Constitution and “two-thirds gender principle” is for many Kenyans just a piece of paper and that patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm should be changed at home in an attempt to eliminate female oppression. In Kenya, patriarchy is attitudinal and behavioral, probed by culture, religion and economic status and enforced through education (see Sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2 for legislation to eliminate female discriminatory cultural practices). Therefore, patriarchy should be addressed at home first and thereafter from the primary school level, where most of the teachers are female. Table 4.3 illuminated that 431 055 women versus 309 538 men studied education in 2019 (KNBS, 2019: 160) (see Section 2.5.3.2.1 for a discussion on standpoint feminism). An additional suggestion was to change patriarchy as a norm by means of governmental gender working groups because women are unconscious of the fact that the patriarchal

mindset should be challenged and that women in most cases are responsible for instilling the socio-cultural norm at the family level. The women in politics are well placed to challenge the patriarchal norm because gender equality counters corruption in the public sector (Section 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 for discussions on the political and economical dimensions of gender inequality). Figures 4.1 illustrated that 57 per cent of men believe that women and men should be equally treated. Figure 4.2 demonstrated that 66 per cent of men believe that women should have the same chance to be elected to a position in government. Despite a gender-equal consciousness only nine per cent of women were elected as members of the NA in the 2017 election. This statistic (see Table 3.2) illustrated that women are not voting for women and unconsciously preserve the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy in politics. According to the population census of 2019, women account for 50.5 per cent of the population (KNBS, 2019:1).

It can be concluded that it is within the power of women to replace the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy with a gender-equal norm to alleviate the power and control male politicians in Kenya enjoy because of patriarchy. The empirical study identified that a radical feminist approach would be an alternative to gender transformation and the prevention of radicalization in Kenya.

7.6.4 The physical security dimension

The empirical research investigated the correlation between gender inequality and radicalization or a moral change, security sector reform, ethnic inequality and internal conflict. Each of these factors is addressed next.

- **Moral change:** A question in the interview schedule focused on the possibility that women could be radicalized because of structural grievances and the responses were discussed in Section 6.4. The empirical research highlighted that push factors have been created in Kenya because of structural resistance (see Table 4.6 and a discussion of structural grievances in Section 4.6.1). Strain, segregation, governance and norm-setting are listed as factors that are exploited by extremist recruiters because of the adverse effects they have on female education and development. Figure 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrated the correlation between female insecurity based on structural resistance and the development of extremist moral values. The multilevel analysis of radicalization discussed in Section 4.5 explained that together with structural resistance, social selection, settings and social ecology all have an effect on susceptibility and vulnerability to recruitment. The empirical findings highlight that

radicals and extremists prey on the insecurity that women face in Kenya and it was in agreement with the discussion of meso- or group influences (see Section 4.6.2 for the discussion). The empirical research emphasized that; Al Shabaab exploits areas with high levels of unemployment and poverty (along the east coast of Kenya) for radicalization and recruitment. It related with a statement by Ndung'u et al (2017:32) that economic strain is a female motivator for radicalization (see Section 4.6.3 for a discussion of female radicalization in Kenya). However, the level of education was identified as a possible counter to radicalization and recruitment for extremism. This is in line with the discussion on individual cognitive flexibility that was discussed in Section 4.5. Violence is not new to Kenya, and as long as there is a common enemy, women will be radicalized. These statements are confirmed by the increase of female extremists since the attack on the police station in Mombasa in 2016 (see Section 4.6.3 for a discussion of female radicalization in Kenya). Where women in Kenya were categorized as victims or preventers of radicalization before 2016, it is clear that the profile of radicalization in Kenya has changed. The empirical findings pointed out that gender inequality and GBV affects all other types of security. Equally important, there is no evidence that CVE has a countering effect. This is in line with a statement by CTED, (Coninsx, 2018:2), that identified the threat of gender-blind CVE/CT policies as having a negative effect and serving as motivation for extremism rather than CVE (see Section 4.6.3.1.1 for a discussion of women and responses to CVE in Kenya). A gender analysis conducted by USAID in Kenya in 2020 firstly indicates that the current responses to CVE are not designed to address the role that women play in fueling radicalization, and secondly, that there is no clear plan of execution for the NSCVE on county level, nor for the National Counter-Terrorism Centre's CVE strategy (see Sections 4.4.3.2 and 3.4. for a discussion of the KNAP in support of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000). The findings of the empirical research were in line with Mesok (2019: 6; 12) that identified how CVE approaches negatively affected women in Kenya. If gender inequality, gender rights abuses and the punitive treatment by security forces are not addressed, women will become susceptible to radicalization and vulnerable for recruitment into extremist organizations. The increase in female radicalization as discussed in Section 4.6.3 serves as confirmation. The influence of the community/group and individual motivations (see Section 4.6.2 for pull factors and meso- or group level influences in Kenya) would further serve as justification for a moral change in a person's belief system that inspires a movement from what is acceptable for the mainstream to more extreme views. As a matter of fact, research by Petrich and Donnell (2019:1) identify that Al Shabaab recruiters in the coastal regions of Kenya are predominantly female and are targeting the youth, both male and

female, to join the group and that women in Nairobi are active Al Shabaab informers. The next section discusses the correlation between radicalization and security sector reform.

- **Security sector reform:** A question in the interview schedule focused on gender inequality in the security sector and the responses were discussed in Section 6.6. The empirical research underlines the need for security sector reform in the fight against human and gender rights violations and radicalization, mainly because the security sector is a gender-insensitive sector and police officers were responsible for 54.6 per cent (see Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on security-related legislation and the use of GBV as a weapon of ethnic oppression) of the sexual violence cases reported after the 2017 general elections. Gender inequality was identified as contributing to poor governance of the security sector, and gender inequality sustains human rights violations that jeopardize social stability. This information is in line with the research of Mesok (2091:6,12) that identified the persistence of hard CVE approaches (human rights violations, extra-judicial killings and disappearances) in the name of CT (see Section 4.6.3.1.1 for a discussion of women and CVE responses in Kenya). If the security sector does not take the threats against women into account, it is neither effective nor accountable (see Section 2.3 for a discussion on gender equality and the security needs of women). The empirical research highlighted that the injustices committed by the police service members (during the 2007 post-election violence) and uncovered at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2008, have not been addressed. People living in the coastal areas of Kenya reverted to violence because the injustices committed in the past by police service (2007) members were carried forward (to the elections in 2013 and 2017) and have not stopped. Punitive policing methods were identified as one of the push factors for radicalization (see Sections 3.4.3.2 and 4.6.2 for a discussion on police brutality in Kenya). The responses identified that security sector reform will only be possible with the influence and participation of civil society – which is already the case. As indicated in the aforementioned section, the fear of the community for the police service motivates communities to rather side with Al Shabaab. The positive contribution of CVOs like Sisters Without Borders, act as a bridge between the community and security service members to release tension between the community and the security services (see Section 4.6.3.1.1 for a discussion on women and CVE responses in Kenya). On the other hand, the fearlessness for the security sector was identified in Section 4.6.3. Women infiltrated the police service and work as informers for Al Shabaab in Nairobi (Petrich and Donnell, 2019:1). It can be concluded that the slow pace of security sector reform and as a result

the low level of female representation in the security services, sustains punitive and hard methods of policing. This statement is in line with findings by Mesok (2019:2) that hard CVE approaches, in the name of CT, fuels discontent in ethnic Somali communities. The association of CVE with the “global war on terror” increased Islamophobia with particularly negative consequences and the stigmatization of Muslim women in Kenya (Mesok, 2019:24) (see Section 4.6.3.1.1 for a discussion of women and responses to CVE in Kenya). The next section will discuss the correlation between ethnic inequality and gender inequality.

- **Ethnic inequality:** A question in the interview schedule focused on a correlation between gender inequality and ethnic inequality and the responses were discussed in Section 6.7. The empirical research highlighted the importance of ethnicity in Kenya and pointed out that Kenyans identify more with their ethnic and cultural backgrounds than with the Constitution (see Figure 3.2 for an illustration and Section 3.2.2 for a discussion of the ethnic diversity of the population). The post-election violence of 2007 is a stark reminder of the importance of ethnicity in politics. Structural resistance and the unequal distribution of political power, unequal access to economic opportunities and ethnic stereotyping are indicators of ethnic inequality (see Section 2.7 for a discussion on direct and indirect violence). Ethnic inequality (or cultural violence) is being used as a method of radicalization to create the perception that the national Government of Kenya cannot provide nor protect the citizens in the eastern regions (Islam-orientated) of the country. Ethnic inequality was identified as one of the root causes of gender inequality in Kenya. It can be concluded that a correlation between ethnic inequality and patriarchy exists as illustrated by Figures 6.5 and 6.6. The outcome of both ethnic and gender inequality is structural discrimination, poverty, and insecurity. The empirical research highlighted that the Government of Kenya treat all Somali and Kenyan-Somali citizens with suspicion and as extremists. The perception among Kenyan citizens that their ethnic or religious identity is under threat stimulates radicalisation (see Section 4.6.3.1.1 for a discussion of women and responses to CVE in Kenya). General elections in Kenya are highly contested as the members of opposition parties try to reduce the control of the Kikuyu tribe in government. Ethnicity was the reason behind the post-election violence in 2007. It can be concluded, as long as ethnic inequality in Kenya is a reality, gender inequality will be sustained. The correlation between radicalization and internal conflict will be interpreted next.
- **Social unrest or internal conflict:** A question in the interview schedule focused on a possible correlation between radicalization and social unrest and the responses were

discussed in Section 6.5. Structural resistance (push factors) and police brutality (including human rights violations) serve as motivators for the increase in female radicalization, but the empirical research confirmed that the same factors are motivating both genders to join extremist organizations. The interviews confirmed that there is a relationship between radicalization, extremism and social unrest or intrastate violence. The fact that inhabitants in the north-eastern and coastal regions of Kenya live in fear of both the Government of Kenya and the extremist group, Al Shabaab, supports this finding. Inhabitants in these regions would rather side with Al Shabaab, which promises them work or money, instead of supporting the Government of Kenya, whose policing methods are punitive and stereotype all Moslems as radicalized (see Section 4.6.2 for discussion on group influences in Kenya). It was highlighted that 2011, when Kenyan security forces invaded Somalia, was a turning point for Kenya's internal peace. Ever since, Al Shabaab has been using the unequal distribution of political and economic power to its benefit to recruit Kenyan citizens to join the group. A discussion of radicalization in Kenya and an illustration of Al Shabaab attacks can be found in Figure 4.9. Section 4.6.3 discussed the radicalization of women and underlined the role that Kenyan women played in the DusitD2 hotel complex attack in Nairobi in 2019. The empirical research highlighted that if the Government of Kenya does not address the push factors created by structural violence, sustained poverty and insecurity at the grassroots level, social unrest or internal conflict will not be eliminated. This is in line with the discussion of push factors in Section 4.2.2.2.1, and as indicated in the previous section, violence is not new to Kenya. Cangranelli et al. (2019:6) explained in Section 2.7.3.3 that the best predictor of violent conflict today is violent conflict in the past because it is hard to break cycles of conflict once started. Kenya experienced serious post-election violence in 2007 as citizens showed the need for a new constitution (see Section 3.1.1 for a discussion on the development of a new constitution for Kenya). Cangranelli et al. (2019:6) identified that internal conflict manifests itself in three forms namely: i) violent protests; ii) terrorism; and iii) internal conflict (see Section 2.7.3.1 for a discussion on the factors influencing internal conflict). The cost of the violence will determine the order – from non-violent, violent, terror attacks to internal conflict. A lack of respect for women's rights has the potential to increase political violence and terror attacks. There is a correlation between the violation of women's rights (human's rights) and the violation of other subordinate groups in a society. In other words, low respect for women's rights is low respect for minority rights (see Section 2.7.3.2.1 for a discussion of GBV as an indicator of internal conflict). As explained by Section 4.4 (the repercussions for gender inequality) and illustrated in Figure 4.9, terror attacks are also not new to Kenya. The empirical research and the literature study agree that an

increase in radicalization and violent protests is a predictor for social unrest or internal conflict. It can be concluded and demonstrated by Figure 6.4 that the progression of discontent and radicalization would have negative consequences for the national security of Kenya.

The answer to the research question: “How does gender inequality according to the feminist theory affect the security of the Government of Kenya” is summarized in the conclusion of the empirical research and explained in the next section.

7.6.5 Conclusion of empirical research

The empirical study answered the primary research question: *“What are the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards?”*

Feminists argue that human security cannot be ensured until gender inequality is eliminated. It is the social dimension of gender that emphasizes the value assigned to individuals based on their gender, classifying them as superior or inferior in a political, economic or social class. Kenya is no different. A gender perspective highlights the inequalities in the balance of power that discriminates against women and contributes to their insecurity. This study confirms that at a macro-level, structural resistance is used as a tool to prevent gender mainstreaming and the implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” as required by the Article 81(b) of the 2010 Constitution. Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6) (see Section 2.7.3.3 for a discussion on grievances as a predictor for internal conflict) identified that grievance is a predictor of political violence and internal conflict. A lack of respect for women’s rights has the potential to increase violent protests and violent extremism or terror attacks. In other words, low respect for women’s rights is low respect for minority rights (see Section 2.7.3.2 for human rights violations as a predictor for internal conflict). There is a positive correlation between the violation of women’s rights (human’s rights) and the violation of other subordinate groups in a society exists. The empirical research and the literature study is in agreement that an increase in radicalization and extremism is a predictor for social unrest or internal conflict.

Article 27, the Bill of Rights of the 2010 Constitution, specifically provides for the protection and promotion of the rights of marginalized groups to eliminate past discrimination. The “two-third gender principle” (Article 81b) is a direct result of Article 27 to promote gender rights. Figure 7.1 illustrates a positive correlation between a lack of respect for women’s rights and an increase in female participation in violent extremism and or terror attacks. As indicated by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6), violent protests and terrorism are followed by internal conflict. The

widespread violence and gender and human rights abuses after the 2007 presidential and general elections and again after the elections in 2013 and 2017, demonstrated a lack of gender respect. GBV was used as a tool to discourage women from pursuing leadership positions in government. Female aspirants faced multiple forms of resistance, like sexual harassment, threats, intimidation and ridicule (see Section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion on the security related legislation to protect the rights of women in Kenya). Based on the empirical study and research by Cangranelli *et al.* (2019:6) on gender inequality as a predictor for internal conflict, Figure 7.1 illustrates that Kenya will be facing internal conflict in the future.




Figure 7.1: Impact of gender inequality on the security of Kenya

The empirical research uncovered, as illustrated by Figures 6.5 and 6.6, that ethnic inequality has a direct impact on the managed persistence of gender inequality. A lack of or a low level of respect for women's rights is low respect for ethnic rights. Like in the case of gender inequality, ethnic inequality is a cause for internal conflict. This empirical induction is in line with the theoretical research completed on gender as a factor in internal conflict (see Section 2.7.3.2.1 for a discussion on GBV and Section 2.7.3.4 for gender inequality as indicators for internal conflict).

Figure 7.2 illustrates that the elimination of gender inequality is dependent on solving ethnic inequality in the highly political and patriarchal society of Kenya. By not implementing the “two-thirds gender principle” and mainstreaming gender, the Government of Kenya might become the architect of its internal conflict.




Figure 7.2: Inequality circle

Research by Caprioli (2005:162) (see Section 2.7.3.4 for a discussion on gender inequality as a predictor for internal conflict) established a link between gender inequality and internal violence. The literature study concluded that inequality between the genders is a barrier to sustainable peace. For this reason, the oppression of women, because of the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy, should be eliminated to achieve positive peace. Gender inequality is maintained through structural resistance, which is based on the norms of discrimination and violence. Caprioli (2005:162) established that the higher the level of gender inequality in a state, the greater the probability that the state will experience internal conflict. Section 7.5.1.1 outlines the conditions under which the ‘two-thirds gender principle’, that should have transformed the national Government of Kenya, was included in the 2010 Constitution.

7.6.5.1 Negotiated structural resistance

Article 27(6), the Bill of Rights of the 2010 Constitution makes provision for a gender quota system, but Table 3.3 demonstrated that in 2020, a decade after the implementation of the 2010 Constitution, the NA, Senate, Cabinet and Supreme Court are all in violation of the “two-thirds gender principle”. The KEWOPA has a duty to promote gender mainstreaming. The commitment of KEWOPA was questioned due to a lack of visible lobbying efforts for the passing of the gender bill, which has failed five times (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019).

A re-evaluation of gender transformation in the national Government of Kenya (Section 4.2) uncovered that previous internal conflict and quotas were identified as important predictors for gender inclusion in legislation. Internal conflict breaks down barriers between males and females at the social, political and economic levels and allows changes in the political system. This conclusion was confirmed in 2020 when the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee indicated that the ‘two-thirds gender principle’ was only agreed upon in 2008 to stabilize the country after the post-election violence of 2007 (Owino, 2020:1). Women in Kenya still face systemic discrimination and structural resistance to the implementation of the ‘two-thirds gender principle’ in the national Government of Kenya. Consequently, a petition was served to ask that “the Chief Justice shall advise the President to dissolve Parliament and the President shall dissolve Parliament” – a step that was taken by the Chief Justice on 21 September 2020 (see Section 3.4.3.1 for legislation in support of Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution).

Figure 7.3 illustrates that because of structural resistance gender mainstreaming is not transforming the Kenyan society, but rather harms security.




Figure 7.3: An illustration of the trajectory of the Government of Kenya's gender strategy (2010 – 2020)

The demographic background of Kenya is an indicator that the road to gender equality will not be an easy one. Figure 6.6 demonstrates the correlation between ethnic and gender inequality, while Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2.2 demonstrates that six out of the 44 tribes dominate the public service, with the Kikuyu tribe as the dominator. Section 2.4.1.3 argues that social transformation could only be achieved if the origin of inequality is clearly defined. The inequality circle, Figure 7.2, illustrated that political transformation at the macro-level will be difficult if the structural culture of the Government of Kenya is not changed. Figure 7.3 illustrates the current trajectory of gender transformation in Kenya. As things stand in 2020, it will take another 95 years (Global Gender Gap Report of 2020) to reach gender equality in Kenya (see Section 3.7 for a discussion on the empowerment of girls and women in Kenya). This prediction does not account for the effect that gender inequality has on the security of Kenya. In that event an alternative, non-political gender approach, outside the government structures should be considered and will be explained next.

7.7 Recommendations

The last research objective of the study is to recommend an alternative approach to gender mainstreaming in Kenya so that men and women can have equal opportunities to realize their potential, contribute equally to the economy of the country, and benefit equally from participation in their communities. As seen in the discussion of gender equality in section 2.3, women's capacity to influence should be centred on gender equality as a norm that has a calming effect on both male and female political behaviour, rather than gender as a capacity to balance the numbers. A gender-responsive mindset change goes beyond men and women; it explores how attitudes about gender and socio-cultural norms influence vulnerability to radicalization and how it intersects with ethnicity and sex.

7.7.1 A societal mindset versus a norm change

Both the empirical and literature studies revealed that the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy (see Section 2.5.3.2.1.1) is purposefully used to maintain gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya. This unintentionally propagates a socio-cultural moral change from the mainstream to the more radical and extremist, with devastating effects for the security of both men and women (see Section 4.6 for a discussion of radicalization in Kenya).

The resistance to gender reform is often invisible or hidden and it seldom manifests itself as an obstruction. In Kenya, men are winning the gender battle, but are losing the radicalization war. Changing the attitude or existing mindset on gender from the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy to gender equality as the new norm requires a three-tiered gender approach. This approach has to

focus on political, economic and social transformation at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of society. While policy, legal provisions and programmes mandate gender inclusion (liberal feminist approach), gender equality as an international principle of sustainable development falls short of reaching the goal. UN Women, (2020:1) identified that Kenya is not on par with the gender target set out in the UN's SDG 5, which aim for the empowerment of girls and women by 2030. It means Kenya is missing the target with 85 years.

The 2010 Constitution makes provision for the mainstreaming of gender equality using capacity development or quotas (affirmative action provided for in Article 27(6) of the 2010 Constitution) in both the national and county governments of Kenya. It is a top-down approach at the macro- or structural level. Isidiho and Sabran (2016:268) explained that the intent of the top-down approach (balancing the numbers) is used by the ruling government as a control mechanism to include the subordinate groups in the governing structure to secure the sustainability of the ruling government and security under the notion of the liberation of the marginalized. In 2020, in the Government of Kenya the top-down approach is tokenistic and is not able to solve the security needs or demands of women and the community at the grassroots level.

Feminist theory is based on knowledge of power and gender discrimination and is seen as emancipatory. Radical feminism promotes a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. A bottom-up approach is also referred to as a democratic or a people's participation process at the community or the micro-level. This approach requires the involvement of the local community in all spheres of life to address their needs within their socio-cultural environment (see Section 6.11 for the need for a bottom-up approach in Kenya). As indicated Section 2.5.3.2.1.1, patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm is based on the socially constructed dichotomies of public/private and men/women. The patriarchal norm shapes the values of the Kenya culture, which is taught at home and strengthened at school and in church. The empirical study (see Section 6.9 for a discussion on norm development) highlighted the role of women, because of their blind obedience, in sustaining patriarchy. It is therefore important to educate both genders on the damaging effects of patriarchy for civilization. This can be accomplished by a mindset change as illustrated in Figure 7.4.

Patriarchy as a social construct (identified by radical feminism) can be changed and replaced by the gender equality norm (see Section 6.8 for a mindset change in Kenya). It was established that a norm change should be established as a very young age. The struggle for gender equality first has to influence socio-cultural beliefs before structural resistance can be addressed. This has to start at home and primary school level. Thereafter it is the work of both men and women at the macro-, meso- and micro-level (illustrated by Figure 7.5 and discussed in Section 7.7.2) to

diminish the gendered stereotypes and adopt a gender-centric approach to equally support women to reach their full political, economic and social potential.

Figure 7.4 below demonstrates the compound value of a gender-equal society and the positive effect that a mindset change, would have for both the genders. A gender-centric attitude would foster respect between males and females, strengthen relationships between the genders, enhance cognitive flexibility, with an added value of economic transformation. Figure 7.4 illustrates the process of creating a mindset change.




Figure 7.4: Mindset change

Source: Adapted from Women's World Banking (2018)

Gender resistance feminist scholars stress that the world should be studied from the disadvantaged and perpetrators' (standpoint feminist) perspective. It is from this point of view that feminist perspectives focus on the root causes of oppression and gender inequality and how they relate to personal insecurity. Threats against human rights (gender rights), which incorporate states and internal conflicts, cause an increase in violent extremism (see Section 2.8.2 for a discussion on human security).

The empirical and literatures studies identified an elevated level of discontent among the marginalized communities along the east coast and the north-eastern border (illustrated in Figure 4.9) of Kenya. Section 4.6 discussed the increase in structural grievances responsible for radicalization. Figure 6.4 summarized the effect of patriarchy on personal security and showed that extremists exploit insecurity. The empirical research emphasized that since 2016, Kenya has experienced an increase in female radicalization as explained by the radicalization mix in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 and discussed in Section 4.6. To prevent the pace of deterioration in security, an alternative approach to gender transformation is suggested. It is therefore recommended that a multilevel gender transformation strategy for Kenya be developed.

7.7.2 A three-tiered gender approach

A multilevel gender approach should focus on the central dimensions of gender inequality in politics at the macro-level, in the economy at the meso-level and in society at the micro-level to ensure the human (physical) security of women and the society as a whole. This recommended approach is illustrated in Figure 7.5 and discussed next, based on the different levels of influence.

7.7.2.1 Macro-level political transformation

The 2010 Constitution (see Section 3.3.3) makes provision for the “two-thirds principle of gender representation.” Article 27 (8) addresses equality and freedom from discrimination (Clause 4) and clause 8 of the same article requires that the Government of Kenya “shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle of not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender” (Constitution of the Government of Kenya, 2010:25). This is a top-down approach to political gender transformation by means of gender mainstreaming and affirmative action with reserved seats for women (quotas system). It is a non-confrontational strategy or a liberal feminist approach (see Section 2.5.3.1.1 for a discussion on liberal feminism) and seeks gender transformation within the existing government and legal system. However, this approach has had limited success.

It was established that KEWOPA is failing to execute its mandate of gender mainstreaming in the Government of Kenya. Gouws (2007:29) explained that gender activism is reduced by the appointment of women as legislators (see Section 2.5.4 for a discussion of feminism in Africa). As a result, gender mainstreaming as a strategy and policy is failing. A second reason provided is, if the culture of the structure, in this case, the Government of Kenya, was not changed before gender equality was introduced, the structure would resist the change. Because of years of male governance, masculinity is accepted as normative and the culture of the Government of Kenya. The next section explains why gender transformation from an organizational, meso- or economic level should be introduced.

7.7.2.2 Meso-level economic transformation

A gender transformation strategy at the meso-level or organizational level is a non-political, lateral economic approach to gender transformation. This gendered approach acts as a bridge between the macro- and micro-levels that are highly politicized in Kenya. The goal with a meso-level approach is to ultimately influence political decision-making at the macro-level, and reduce economic strains at the micro-level. This was exemplified by the Russian strategy, discussed in Section 2.6

Figure 7.5 illustrates that a lateral feminist movement at the meso-level or in the private and corporate sector, could drive the gender agenda much faster. However, this implies keeping girls in school and guaranteeing that more than 43 per cent (see Figure 4.3) of girls that complete secondary school proceed to tertiary education. The same figure illustrates that there is only a two per cent difference between the sexes at the post-graduate level. This implies that if more girls can be kept in school and encouraged to complete tertiary education, the difference of two per cent at a post-graduate level could be equalized. That would provide women with the same academic skill sets to compete on equal grounds with men at a meso- or organizational level.

The research conducted by Equileap (2019:10) and discussed in Section 4.2.1.2.2.1 (female participation in the formal sector) revealed that in the corporate world, Kenyan gender statistics outperform the global average of gender equality. As a result, it was predicted that there would be a shift towards a more gender-equal formal economy in Kenya. Financial advice from Equileap (2019:11) was that, investors rather focus on gender-equal institutions and that the exclusion of women from senior management positions in the private sector, could be risky for the economy of Kenya. International companies with a presence in Kenya instituted social responsibility initiatives to promote job creation, of which 70 per cent will be reserved for women and youth in Kenya (USAID, 2020a:48). This opportunity should be seized to empower the women of Kenya for the generations to come.




Figure 7.5: Three-tiered gender approach

Economic gender transformation at the meso- or organizational level, would have a compounded effect on the micro- or community (grassroots) level. However, paid employment for women does not guarantee empowerment and liberation, but, importantly, increased paid employment does increase women's level of participation in society and politics. Section 2.4.3.2 underlined that women who are in paid positions foster a consciousness of political participation with the capacity to influence (Forsburg and Olsson, 2016:3). Table 4.4 demonstrated that 30 per cent of women fill waged employment versus 50 per cent of men in Kenya. Female development at a meso-level would develop strong female leaders who will be able to resist patriarchal supremacy at the macro-level. It is therefore recommended that a concerted effort should be made to provide girls in secondary school with the necessary career guidance to focus on careers that require STEM subjects. Table 4.3 (a partial list of university subjects and student enrolments by gender in Kenya in 2019) illuminated that in total, 54 per cent of students enrolled for STEM degrees, which is critical to meet the skills required for the "Big Four" Agenda of President Kenyatta. Male students represent 63 and female students 37 per cent of the STEM degrees (Wanzala, 2020:1).

The empirical study established gender inequality sustains female poverty and creates female insecurity. Figure 6.1 illustrates the cyclical interaction between gender inequality, sustained poverty and female insecurity. Therefore, the struggle to reach gender equality in Kenya is further complicated by economic gender inequality. Financial barriers encourage socio-cultural norms (like child or early marriages) that prevent girls from completing their education, it prevents women from vying on equal ground with men for positions in government and it was established that poverty increases women's vulnerability to radicalization and extremism. Poverty was identified as the strongest driver for female extremism. The urgency to address economic gender inequality cannot be emphasized enough. The last level of the three-tiered gender approach, the micro-level is explained next.

7.7.2.3 Micro-level socio-cultural transformation

UN Women (UN Women, 2020e), says that, "gender norms are ideas how men and women should act. We internalize and learn these 'rules' early in life. This sets up a life cycle of gender socializing and stereotyping. But we can change these expectations, starting with how we raise girls and boys." This means a cultural norm change based on a radical feminist approach and illustrated and explained in Figure 7.4. Consequently, at a micro-level or at the community level, starting with the family, the school and the church, a socio-cultural norm or a gender equality mindset should

be learned using a bottom-up approach. This would be possible using the following initiatives, among others:

- **Incentives versus dowries:** Importantly, girls should be kept in school. The barriers to girls' equal access to tertiary education result in the feminization of poverty, child labour, early and forced marriages and UDCW. This places a heavy strain on girls and women's advancement into the paid labour force market, acquiring the skills needed to claim high-quality jobs or the development of their entrepreneurial skills. The empirical study (see Section 6.4) revealed that despite the resources spent on CVE strategies in Kenya, there is a lack of concrete evidence of the countering effect. Mesok (2019:6; 16) identified that CVE in Kenya is donor-driven and CVE is perceived as an "industry". Small CSOs with little or no CVE experience are designing CVE programmes because of the huge amounts of resources available. Civil society community-based organizations (specifically catering for the needs of women) that partner with international organizations (on issues not related to CVE) are negatively affected and face funding challenges. CSO that did not refocus their work to CVE could not continue with their activities (Mesok, 2019:16). Therefore, it is recommended that the approach to CVE should be education driven and funding allocated by NGOs, donor partners and foreign governments be relayed to sponsor education and efforts to keep girls in school and tertiary education. With an education CVE focus, political, economic and social marginalization could be overcome. Figure 7.1 clearly illustrated the path to radicalization and internal conflict. Peace (both positive and negative) could be guaranteed with incentives and scholarships. Incentives could be paid to parents after girls have completed secondary and tertiary education. Financial incentives would change socio-cultural norms coupled with economic gender inequality. This initiative is three-fold:

- (i) the Government of Kenya is already investing in free primary education and the promotion of gender equality interventions should start at home and reinforced from primary school level;
- (ii) an investment in adolescent girls' attainment in education will break the female poverty cycle sustained by marginalization, child and early marriages. Incentives and scholarships would motivate girls to complete secondary school and advance to tertiary education. This would provide

girls with agency to become financially independent and to be a force of influence; and

- (iii) with better education a career for girls in the formal sector will be more plausible;
 - (iv) but most importantly, girls should develop cognitive flexibility and tenacity to take pride in their femininity and become female trailblazers for “Generation Equality: Realizing Women’s Rights for an Equal Future”, 25 years after the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 (UN Women, 2020:1). Higher levels of education reduce poverty; it allows for better access to health services and relates to internal peace (see Section 6.5 for a discussion on social unrest or internal conflict).
- **A feminist movement:** It was identified and discussed in Section 6.11 that since 2010, the start of democracy in Kenya, female leaders advanced a political and not a gender agenda (see Section 6.10 for the discussion on the impact of female political leadership and Section 7.6.1 for an explanation by Gouws for this tendency). As a result, the lack of a united feminist movement in Kenya is a counter for gender transformation. A demand for community-based women’s organizations and self-help groups was identified. In other words, a demand for a bottom-up approach to address the insecurity that women and girls have to endure in their places of safety, because of gender inequality. By means of the empirical research, it was identified, that in the absence of the “two-thirds gender principle”, a bottom-up approach could bring change at grassroots levels. It was reported that the gender agenda in Kenya is driven at the grassroots level by NGOs or other organizations that have no political allegiances. A feminist group, called “The Common Women’s Agenda” was created in late November 2019, to fill this void. Together with NGEC, “The Common Women’s Agenda” could mobilize women at the community level to promote the gender agenda in their respective structures on the county level. A radical feminist approach to gender transformation would stimulate bottom-up gender transformation in the county governments with lasting effects.
 - **A combined non-governmental organization effort:** The role that NGOs and CSOs, the private sector and religious organizations play, is important for a norm change from that of patriarchy to gender equality. Idis (2020:19) identified that the Government of Kenya’s approach to CVE is ideological, while the

outcome of this study was in line with the argument of CSOs that VE in Kenya is driven by political, economic and social marginalization. Therefore, CVE should be driven by education and gender equality to firstly create negative peace and human security. This would reclaim the space of CSOs that have been curtailed by the expansions of the legal and political agendas and CVE laws on the countering of CT funding. The focus should be returned to human security issues. The role that CSO in the prevention of CVE play, should be refocused to education. The empirical research revealed that radicalization and extremism in Kenya are driven by the radical mix (Figure 6.2) and punitive, hard policing methods (see Figure 6.2 and Section 6.4 for discussion on moral change). The NGEC, SWB, AWAPSA, GROOTS and The Common Women's Agenda, to mention a few would be able to assist KEWOPA to have a presence at the grassroots level and to fulfilling its mandate to mainstream gender on a macro level. The creation of an equality gender mindset change would neutralize a moral change in the hubs of radicalization (see Section 4.6.3.2 for women and CVE responses, Section 6.8 for a mindset change and Section 3.4.5.1 for a discussion on the NGEC and KEWOPA). This would be an ideal opportunity to educate the community on the socio-economic advantages of a change in cultural norms and respect between the sexes.

- **Religion:** Kenya is perceived as a Christian country (KNBS IV, 2019:12), where Christianity is practised by 85.5 per cent of the population. Ottoh (2017:159) established that in the Christian religion, gender inequality and patriarchy are interwoven social constructs and that religion sustains patriarchy. This influences the relationship between men and women with an adverse effect on human and gender rights. The effect of religion in support of patriarchy is so deeply embedded in Kenya that it makes gender mainstreaming difficult. Consultations with religious leaders would be crucial to discuss how they could convey the message of relationships/marriages without the binary superior/inferior. The message should always be based on mutual respect between the sexes. Religious leaders and elders have huge networks and enjoy high levels of respect in the community. Their contribution to eliminating patriarchy could have a snowball effect to create a gender mindset change – specially to reduce domestic, GBV and rape. It was discussed in Section 3.3.4.2 that GBV and SGBV is a result of uninformed cultural values in the society. In the male-dominated society of Kenya, the failure to recognize the equality of women is tied to issues of power and control as explained under Section 7.5.2.1.

These political issues have far-reaching consequences for inclusive and sustainable development.

- **Train-the-trainer:** Equally important is parent and teacher education, codes of conduct, attitudes and behaviours towards patriarchy and gender equality, in pursuit of socio-cultural free education. A gender analysis by USAID (2020a:40) in 2020 showed that very few teachers had an in-depth understanding of what gender equality in education might mean, while many were hostile to women's participation in public life and any form of social engagement. Teacher training, textbook content and comprehensive sex orientation could help to overcome explicit gender bias (see Section 4.2.1.2.1 for discussion on education). Ericsson (2020:4) attested that the gender gap in mathematics shows a positive correlation with societal gender equality – in other words, it is created in school. With the institution of a gender-equal norm in primary school, girls would have the same performance in STEM than boys. It was also established that a mother's adherence to traditional cultural gender norms has a negative effect on a girl's relative performance. The increase in GBV during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 was discussed Section 3.4.3.2. As a result, adolescent pregnancies in Kenya were highlighted. Research uncovered that teenage pregnancies are not a new phenomenon and approximately 380 000 (18 per cent) girls between the ages of 10 and 19 became pregnant every year. The literature study and empirical research supported that comprehensive sexual orientation is included in the school curriculum, but the execution might be inconsistent. Parents also have to be blamed for not providing sexual education to their children. It became apparent that teenage pregnancies could be curtailed at a community level. The success of the 2020 launched campaign: Stop Teenage Pregnancy: Adopt a Teenage Mum (an initiative in one of the counties by the chairperson of KOWOPA), still has to prove its merit, but it was a move in the right direction. Sex education at school should include education to the boy-child who should learn from an early age to condemn sexual and domestic violence and to respect girls and women. Boys and men should be educated on the National Policy for Response to GBV and the punitive measures included in the Sexual Offences Act of 2006. More legislation or policies are not needed, provided that the existing legal framework is fully implemented and executed to protect women (see Section 3.4.4.2.1 for a discussion on the education sector).

The female cycle of poverty could be broken and the security of humans be guaranteed with joint programmes between all stakeholders, the county governments, women groups and religious leaders, together with the education of parents about the harmful effects of some socio-cultural practices on the future of the girl-child and the economy of the county. Figure 7.5 illustrated that with the multilevel gender approach, human security equality could be guaranteed. This matter is explained in the next section.

7.7.2.4 Human security or security equality

Tadjbakhs (2005:5) defines security as the “absence of insecurity or threats,” also referred to as negative peace. Galtung (1964:2) defines positive peace as the absence of indirect or structural violence (See Section 2.6 for a correlation between gender equality and national security). Primary threats to human security (see Section 2.7.2 for a discussion on human security) are identified as human rights violations and political discrimination that result in economic failure. It means both direct and indirect violence. The focus of human security is protection and empowerment (Hudson, 2005:163). Therefore, the guarantee to human and state security is favourable social, political and economic conditions, the protection of human rights and the promotion of human development, or positive peace. The empirical and literature studies exposed that Kenya is marred by human and gender rights violations. Kenya has reached a level of medium human development in 2018 while the other countries in the EAC are still on the level of low human development (UNDP, 2018:1). In comparison, South Africa and Botswana have reached levels of high human development (see Table 1.1).

In Kenya, gender inequality is linked to an increase in internal conflict based on unequal power distribution. Cultural violence (ethnic inequality) is used to justify and legitimize structural violence and even makes it look and feel right. Despite the gains made by feminism or the mainstreaming of gender, multiple causes of violence against women exist. As gender is represented in both structural and cultural violence, it forms the basis of structural inequality. Inequality could be a source of active or latent social conflict. Extremist groups exploit the socio-economic and political injustices (perceived or actual) to radicalize women and the youth. Fertile areas for recruitment are firstly the marginalized and unemployed, secondly secondary schools, and recently universities (see Section 4.6.1 for a discussion on structural grievances in Kenya). The Government of Kenya identified the coastal areas as traditional centres for recruitment. It was identified that the Government of Kenya approaches CVE from an ideological perspective, while radicalization is driven by poverty because of a lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and marginalization. The focus on Figure 4.9 (location of

attacks by Al Shabaab) confirms this statement. However, new focus areas of recruitment have been identified namely Nairobi, Kiambu, Isiolo, Nakuru and others. It is an indication that Al Shabaab's traditional focus on ideology has changed. Radicalizers now target disillusioned members of communities such as youths and women who are disappointed by the Government of Kenya's political culture, economic and social marginalization and physical insecurity (see Section 4.6.2 for a discussion on meso- or group influences).

The S5-Inference Framework (See Figure 4.8 and discussed in Section 4.5) introduced an extremist preventative perspective by focusing on education. Cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes. Ideological rigidity is rooted in mental inflexibility. Consequently, people with an inflexible thinking style adhere more strictly to ideologies. This point was confirmed by Ericsson (2020:4) that traditional mothers have a negative effect on girls' relative performance. Political scientists, policy makers and educators can use the finding that cognitive information processing styles could warn of extremist attitudes, as a prevention method to draw an all-inclusive profile of susceptibility factors for extreme and radicalized behaviour. This approach could be used to teach children and citizens in vulnerable communities to be more cognitively flexible (Zmigrod, 2019: 21). Psychological research concludes that cognitive flexibility develops rapidly during the preschool years of development but continue to develop until young childhood. Cognitive flexibility does not only influence behaviour but has significant effects on academic achievement and on health status during adulthood. As a consequence, cognitive flexibility empowers a person to think differently, to change perspectives and to be adaptable to the continuously changing environment (Buttelman & Karbach, 2017:1). Consequently, the inclusion of CSO will have a greater chance of success to prevent radicalization and recruitment for extremism in the identified "hot spots". This confirms the research by Caprioli as discussed in Section 2.8 (discussion on the relationship between peaceful resolution and gender equality). Women's caring characteristics and greater presentation in government and the corporate environment would pacify state aggression. The more female representation in the security structures, the less violent it becomes.

Figure 7.5 illustrates that with the protection of human security (economy, food security, the environment, health, personal, community and political security) as discussed Section 2.7.2, extremism and internal conflict could be prevented and positive peace could be established. However, the opposite is also true. The empirical study identified that gender inequality and VAWG (human insecurity) affect all levels

of security. Human security is complimentary to state security because of the level of human development, human rights violations and the role of non-state actors. The level of human security is determined by the state because the state remains the political actor with control over the resources (Hudson, 2005: 165). The empirical study highlighted in Section 6.4 that there is a lack of concrete evidence that CVE is having the intended countering effect and VE remains a threat to human and state security. Figure 7.6 explains as to why CVE is not reaching its goals.




Figure 7.6: Drivers of violent extremism

Source: Allan et al (2015)

Figure 7.6 and Table 4.6 is in line with the empirical and the literature studies. Macro-level or structural grievances are the primary drivers of radicalization in Kenya. At the meso-level, the Somali and Kenya-Somali communities live along the border with Somalia and the east coast of Kenya are sharing the same religion, ethnicity and culture. These communities are marginalized and unemployment is high. The poverty

and insecurity in these regions are exploited by Al Shabaab. As a result, these communities are the target of government CVE programs. Mesok (2019:2) reported that the persistence of hard CVE approaches by state security organizations lead to human rights violations, extra-judicial killings and disappearances in the name of CT. These actions fuel discontentment amongst families and in ethnic Somali communities. The Government of Kenya's approach to VE is ideological (Idis, 2020:19), while the empirical and literature studies identified, that VE is mainly created by structural factors (political, economic and social marginalization) on a macro-level. Structural resistance was identified as the root cause of ethnic and gender inequality in the government of Kenya. Consequently, the CVE strategies of the Government of Kenya is focused on the meso- and individual levels and are not in line with the primary root causes of extremism on the macro-level.

Given the discussion of the three-tiered gender approach, the conclusion is that education is the most plausible counter for radicalization in a gender unequal society. Gender norms are the "rules" for how men and women should treat each other, and they are learned early in life. It starts with how parents raise their girls and boys. These early life lessons can either strengthen or eliminate the binaries of superior/inferior with a patriarchal or a gender-equal norm. The first has devastating implications for human and state security while the second, the inclusion of women in societal sectors, politics, government and the labour force, will strengthen state capacity and governance, which is associated with peace. An equal distribution of power between men and women would diffuse conflict.

The contribution of women from CSO to CVE confirms the research by Forsberg and Olsen as discussed in Section 2.8. Women grassroots groups play a significant role in conflict resolution, especially in a male-dominated environment. The development of a strong feminist movement at the grassroots level to bring social transformation and a concerted effort to sponsor more women to apply for jobs in the formal sector to create an economic transformation would allow women to fully realize their potential to influence political transformation. To summarize, a non-political gender approach, as explained by the three-tier gender model, would speed up gender transformation in support of positive peace in Kenya.

The next section, Section 7.8 discusses the theoretical contribution of this study to the body of knowledge of feminist research.

7.8 Theoretical recommendations

The purpose of academic research is to contribute to the body of knowledge of a study discipline. The production of knowledge rests on the principles of neutrality, empiricism and positivist thinking. The research conducted for this study was guided by the sociological perspectives of gender (functionalist, conflict, feminist and interactionism) as discussed in Section 2.4.2. The interactionism perspective focusses the attention on the social complexities external to the individual that are reshaping people without them knowing the outcome, while feminist theory focusses on women's inferior position in society and to transform women's representation in positions of power. Gender stands central to the creation of social hierarchy and the effect it would have on politics and the distribution of power. Secondly, gender is a personal social construct, and each person lives gender differently based on their identity, environment and culture.

This study identified structural violence by the government (based on the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy) as the root cause for gender inequality. It sustains female poverty and contributes to human insecurity. Secondly, the condition of female insecurity is an enabling factor for female extremism in general. Therefore, the study established that gender inequality in Kenya is conducive to extremism.




Figure 7.7: The extremism mix

Reproduced from Chapter 6, Figure 6.2

By observing the increase in female radicalization in Kenya, the contribution to the body of knowledge of feminist theory based on the analysis of gender inequality and its link with human security is intersectional. An intersectional approach is transformative and interdisciplinary and focuses on how differences are combined to create a new feminist praxis in pursuit of social justice. Intersectional knowledge is grounded in the diverse and daily life experiences of people and is seen as an important tool linking feminist theory with practice. It can be argued that gender is interlinked with other forms of inequality based on the difference in socio-economic environments. This study on gender inequality is interdisciplinary and links feminist theory with human security as demonstrated by Figure 7.1. The conclusion of this study

contributes to the body of knowledge of feminist security studies. Firstly, this study managed to:

- recognize how the security of women is related to national politics;
- demonstrate that secure states could contain insecure women – that prolonged gender inequality is contributing to the insecurity of women;
- demonstrate how Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia is affecting the security of women on a national level – how the “personal is international and the international is personal” (Sjoberg, 2009: 198);
- reformulate the roles of women in national security. It demonstrates that ethnic inequality interlinked with gender inequality increases female extremism;
- underline that a feminist remedy to gender inequality could be epistemologically essential for the theory and practice of security, and lastly,
- emphasize that gender equality can be a transformative force in the prevention of internal conflict.

Secondly, at the operational level, this study offers a solution to redress gender inequality using education (academic and life skills). Education is the best remedy to:

- transform female empowerment;
- counter female radicalization in Kenya;
- address GBV.

Gender stands central in the creation of a social hierarchy, with repercussions for the macro-, meso- and micro-levels; therefore, the remedy should be implemented at all the levels. Figure 7.4 illustrates the effect of education and its contribution to a gender-equal norm change. Figure 7.5, a three-tier transformative gender approach, is capable of transforming structural, institutional and cultural factors because this approach is transformative (political, economic and social) based on security equality values, as were demonstrated with Figure 7.5.

In conclusion, this study has met the research objectives outlined in Section 1.6. Furthermore, the three-tier gender approach illustrated in Figure 7.5 offers a response to the problem statement set out in Section 1.5. The next section examines the limitations of the study.

7.9 Limitations of the study

The study was conducted from 2017 to 2020. In 2017, Kenya had two presidential elections and GBV was used as a tool to discourage female political participation. In 2018, to the surprise of the country, a handshake (BBI) between the president and the opposition leader shook the political play field. What looked like a political settlement, turned out to be a declaration of war by the political elite (Maraga, 2019:1). In 2019, Al Shabaab attacked the Dusit-2 hotel complex in Nairobi and in 2020 the Covid-19 global pandemic affected the economy of the country (UNDP, 2020:4). All these events had severe implications for gender equality and the promotion of the gender agenda in Kenya. As a result, the efficiency of the Constitutional “two-thirds gender principle” was questioned. On 21 September 2020, the chief justice advised the president to dissolve parliament based on the repeated failure of the gender bill and the non-implementation of the “two-thirds gender principle” by the parliament. Kenya is preparing for general elections in 2022, but women’s allegiances are formed according to political party alignments. The 12th and current parliament (2017 – 2022) lacks the political will and there is no parliamentary feminist movement to enforce the top-down approach. Kenya does not have an established united feminist league to promote a bottom-up gender approach. However, the influence of NGOs and CSOs could help to overcome this weakness.

The success of the implementation of this three-tier gender approach will depend on the meso-level. A positive trend of gender equality in the corporate sector in Kenya was discussed in Section 4.2.1.2.2.1. Studies by Forsburg and Olsson (2016:3) underline that women who occupy positions in the corporate sector, would foster a consciousness of political participation with the capacity to influence. Caprioli (2000:56; 2005:164) confirmed that female participation in the formal sector is responsible for an increase in gender equality.

The theoretical contribution of this study is based on an intersectional and interdisciplinary transformational approach that promotes a radical feminist standpoint. It differs from the liberal feminist standpoint from which gender equality in Kenya is driven. This study highlights that a traditional African feminist approach does not transform the society to the benefit of all women. A contemporary African feminist approach is needed. As a result, the implementation of this model should rather be driven from human security and radical feminist perspectives from outside government structures, which will be difficult without a strong feminist movement. The next section identifies areas for further study.

7.10 Recommendations for further research

This study developed a radical feminist approach to address gender imbalances at all levels of society. Various matters were identified that could support gender transformation in Kenya with further investigation and research. Further research could include:

- a longitudinal study to test the power of a financial incentive as a method of social transformation to replace the patriarchal socio-cultural norm with that of a gender-equal norm;
- a study to ask the question of whether the political behaviour of the current female leaders inspires or discourages potential young women to choose a career in politics;
- a comparative study between counties/departments with female governors/cabinet secretaries and those with males leaders to determine the comparative levels of corruption in these county/departments since research shows that corruption decreases when female participation increases;
- a study to probe the question of whether certain tribes in Kenya are more gender-equal friendly and the reasons for the results; and
- an examination of the effect of gender equality on GBV to determine if there would be a male push back in Kenya.

7.11 Conclusion

Chapter 7 has concluded the study by triangulating practice with theory. The general research question of the thesis was: “What are the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards”. This study revealed, with an ex-post evaluation of the implementation of Article 81(b) of the 2010 Constitution, that Kenya is a strong patriarchal society and that the mainstreaming of gender equality in the national Government of Kenya is barred using structural resistance, irrespective of the provision of Article 27(6). Notwithstanding the advances made in the county governments, the judiciary and the formal sector, women in Kenya are still exposed to high levels of human insecurity.

Patriarchy as a socio-cultural norm is in direct contrast with gender equality. A patriarchal society is characterized by male dominance, male identification, male centeredness and male obsession with control. Consequently, patriarchy creates an environment of dependency, a gender-based division of labour and insecurity for women. Patriarchy has been a powerful force in politics and culture and is established at home, reinforced by the education system and religious institutions. This structural inequality of power creates the conditions for social, political and economic control over women based on the norms of discrimination and structural resistance – the source of discontent. The Kenyan state could therefore be the architect of its own insecurity if gender transformation is not implemented. A natural conclusion is that the higher the status of women in a community, the lower is the risk for conflict. The inclusion of women in all layers of the community will strengthen state capacity and governance, which is associated with peace.

The persistence of gender inequality reveals that dominance over women at all levels of society cannot be separated from human security. The disadvantages women and girls face with regard to health, education, the exclusion on political and economic levels, are detrimental for human development and create conditions for insecurity. Feminists highlight that secure states often host insecure women because of a diversity of factors that pose threats of want and fear. It was determined that the higher the level of gender inequality in a state, the greater the probability that a state will experience internal conflict.

The role of gender inequality and the lack of women's socio-economic and political empowerment are often emphasized as enablers for radicalization or violent extremism. Women have to fight against exclusion, marginalization, inequality and abuse – conditions that lead many to radicalization and extremism. The S5-inference multilevel framework explained how low self-control is the clearest indicator for susceptibility to moral change and political aggression and that an extreme ideology is related to self-regulation. Consequently, cognitive inflexibility determines and predicts extremist attitudes. It transpires that systemic processes of discrimination or exclusion could ultimately lead to a change in moral values from what is accepted in the mainstream to be ideological motivated, on an individual level.

The extremism mix demonstrates that connections between political, socio-economic, cultural, physical and environmental threats are merged into daily life activities, influencing women's security needs. Radicalization is used to incite internal violence – it may be latent or just a perception that the Government of Kenya is not capable of protecting its citizens. The empirical research emphasized ethnic inequality as one of the root causes of gender inequality. The outcome for both ethnic and gender inequality as a result of structural discrimination is poverty and insecurity. The managed persistence of gender inequality is a threat to internal security.

Knowledge equals power. They are interlinked, maintain each other and are linked to the status of a person in a social structure. A reasonable conclusion is that higher female education is a threat to patriarchy and the power and control that comes with it. A positive correlation between gender-based-violence and an increase in gender equality was proved by Ericsson (2020:10 and Bones (2016:67). By marginalizing girls and women, the Government of Kenya not only restricts them to jobs predominantly in the informal sector, and most probably to poverty, but also makes them vulnerable to radicalization. The price to pay for patriarchy is an increase in female radicalization. Women may be enticed to join violent extremist groups to re-establish the norm and status of women in a society based on insignificance, personal or shared humiliation and the inferior position of women in society. Women have advanced to the frontlines of violent extremism, as recruiters, informers, propagators, suicide bombers, and targets, as well as leaders working on de-radicalization, counter-messaging, and peacebuilding.

The relationship between gender inequality and internal conflict revolves around two arguments. The first explanation is that gender inequality may be linked to an increase in internal conflict or it can be explained that gender equality contributes to resolving internal conflict without violence.

Both the empirical and literature research determined that the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy and male hegemony (ethnic inequality) is purposefully used to maintain gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya, but unintentionally propagate a moral change from the mainstream to more radical and extremist, with devastating effects for the security of both human and state.

Gender transformation in Kenya is driven by a liberal feminist standpoint in the public domain via political and legal reform. Liberal feminists see the state as the protector of individual rights and the promoter of equality by means of gender mainstreaming as an affirmative action strategy [Article 27(6)]. The 2010 Constitution makes provision for gender equality by means of capacity or quotas [Article 81(b)] in both the national and county governments. It is a top-down (patriarchal) approach at the macro- or structural level. However, the women in Kenya realized that the gender provisions included in the 2010 Constitution are inadequate to ensure a gender balance in the Kenyan society. Contributing to this dilemma is the influence of African feminism. African feminism redirects the focus from strategic gender needs that are feminist to women's daily needs, which are tactical in nature. Because of this shift in consciousness, African feminism has created relatively strong women's organizations, but weak feminist movements. The lack of a strong feminist movement was confirmed during the empirical research and identified as a reason for the failure of the gender bill.

Therefore, a bottom-up approach (or a radical feminist approach) looks like an alternative option for social transformation in Kenya. It would be time-consuming while the level of discontent at the micro-level and in the marginalized communities is building up. To reduce the probability of internal conflict, a three-tier gender approach based on the equality norm is proposed. This includes the development of a strong feminist movement at the grassroots level to bring social transformation and sponsoring more women to apply for jobs in the formal sector to create economic transformation. This would allow women to fully realize their potential to weaken patriarchy and influence political transformation at the institutional level. Therefore, the guarantee to human and state security is equally social, political and economic conditions through human development.

Given the discussion of the three-tier gender approach, this study concludes that education is the most plausible counter for radicalization in a gender unequal society for three reasons. Firstly, investing in young children, the socio-cultural norm of patriarchy could be replaced with a gender-equal norm. This would break the poverty cycle with many benefits for the mothers in future. Secondly, investing in adolescent girls would improve their educational probabilities and delay child or early marriages and early childbearing. This could prepare girls for tertiary education and an economic independent life with agency. Thirdly, investing in women would improve employment and earning opportunities in the formal sector and women would have the capacity to influence and consciously promote gender equality at a political level.

This study concludes that a multidimensional gender approach as an alternative to the liberal feminist gender transformation approach, to implement gender equality standards, would be the secure option.

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ANNEXURE A: SCOPE OF NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY SCIENTIFIC- AND RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES



1. BACKGROUND

Scientific integrity and research ethics forms an integral part of the quality of research in any discipline. These differential contexts of disciplines, different risk levels of studies (*no to high*), as well as institutional, national and international legal and regulatory requirements, require the development of different sets of expertise, experience, and capacity in scientific/proposal committees (SC) and research ethics committees (RECs), to effectively review and monitor such studies. It also considers responsible planning, conduct and reporting of research findings. Research also require different levels of scientific and ethical consideration and oversight by these SCs and RECs.

Ethics specifically not only considers moral issues, the protection of research participants (humans and animals), as well as the impact of research on the environment, but also protects researchers and the institution. The approach to research ethics may differ in various disciplines, but they all share a common set of minimum requirements. In multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary research, a complimentary approach is required.

Therefore, the North-West University has positioned itself by establishing a specific scientific- and research ethics committee structure. This document provides a guideline to SCs and RECs to explain the scope of studies to be first reviewed by a SCs and then the appropriate REC within the NWU, as well as a roadmap for referral of studies to the appropriately positioned REC (Note: See the ethics clearance flow process in appendix A).

All of these RECs have been approved by the Faculty Boards of the various faculties within which they reside as well as the Senate Committee for Research Ethics (SCRE). Some of these RECs are also legally required to be registered with the National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) as a national regulatory body.

2 TERMINOLOGY:

2.1 Ethics clearance

Ethics clearance refers to the process of review and decision-making by a REC about the final risk level of a study and whether it has to undergo an expedited or full face-to-face ethics review by the REC.

2.2 Ethics review

Ethics review refers to the process of an independent expedited or full face-to-face review and decision-making, based on a SOP of the REC. The process is based on the scientific principles of a proposal's adherence to minimal ethical norms and standards in research activities, as well as giving attention to all possible ethical considerations. The REC can approve, require amendments or reject a proposal. Approval includes the final risk level of the study, the duration of the study (one year with further extension based on review of a monitoring report or application for extension) and reporting requirements. All amendments should be approved and adverse effects or incidents reported to the REC. A formal letter of decision by the REC is issued to the researcher/postgraduate student.

2.3 Risk

Risk refers to the potential of harm occurring to a participant as a result of participation in research. Possibility and extent of harm e.g. mild or severe, should be assessed.

2.4 Vulnerability

Vulnerability of the participant refers to the diminished ability to fully safeguard one's own interest in the context of a specific research project/study. This may be caused by limited capacity or limited access to social goods like rights, opportunities and power; limited freedom to make choices; or relatively incapable of protecting own interest. Vulnerability is not an absolute condition but rather occurs on a sliding scale depending on personal and environmental circumstances (DoH, 2015; Regulation relating to research with human participants. R.719 of 19 September 2014).

2.5 Context

Context refers to the nature of the study e.g. health, non-health, animal etc.

2.6 Health research

Health research is defined as *“research that contribute to biological, clinical, psychological or social welfare matters, including processes as regards humans;*

causes and effects of and responses to disease; effects of the environment; health care systems; new pharmaceuticals, medicines, interventions and devices; new technologies to improve health and health care” (DoH, 2015:7 1.1.3).

2.7 Health-related research

Health related research refers to any research conducted by disciplines other than health disciplines about topics or participants within the field of health or investigating or striving to improve the bio-psycho-social wellbeing of human participants.

3. SCIENTIFIC/PROPOSAL COMMITTEES (SC)

3.1 Purpose of scientific/proposal committees

In the *Terms of Reference for the Management of Research Ethics at the North-West University* document, approved by Senate in November 2018 under point 1.2.5 it states that “*before any research may be conducted scientific approval must be granted for a project/study by the relevant scientific/proposal committee*”.

The scientific/proposal committee (SC) will review and approve the science of the project/study and make a preliminary assessment of the:

- *Scientific validity and integrity*
- *The potential risk level*
- *Whether there are potential vulnerable participants involved*
- *The context of the study*
- The SC then refers the application to an appropriate REC for ethics clearance.

3.2 Issuing of a letter of scientific approval

In the case of a *low to high risk study* that is referred for review by a REC, the SC should issue a *letter of scientific approval* to the researcher signed by the chairperson indicating their decision. The letter is attached to the ethics application.

3.3 The referral process for ethics clearance

All studies are referred to an appropriate REC for ethics clearance. The decision to which REC the SC should refer the study is based on 1) the risk level of the study (participants or researchers), 2) whether it involves vulnerable participants, 3) whether it will negatively impact on the environment, 4) the risk to the reputation of the NWU,

as well as 5) the nature of the study.

- A *no risk study* is considered by the SC and recommended to the Faculty REC (FREC) for clearance using a *template* and *linking the proposal*.
- A *low risk study* is considered by the SC and recommended to the Faculty REC for clearance and review (*except in the case of health or health-related studies where it is referred to NWU-HREC; or animal studies where it is referred to either NWU-AnimCare-REC or NWU-AnimProd-REC*).
- A *medium to high risk study* or a *study involving vulnerable participants*, is considered by the SC and recommended to the appropriate NHREC- registered REC for ethics clearance and review.
- A *health or health-related study* is considered by the SC and recommended to the NWU-HREC for clearance and review *irrespective of the risk level*.
- An *animal research study* is considered by the SC and recommended to the appropriate animal REC for clearance and review *irrespective of the risk level* (NWU-AnimCare-REC or NWU-AnimProd-REC).
- A study with a *potential negative impact on the environment* is considered by the SC and recommended to the appropriate REC for clearance and review.
- A *study with potential reputational damage to the NWU* is considered by the SC and recommended to the appropriate REC for clearance and review.

4. FACULTY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES (FREC)

Each of the eight Faculties of the North-West University have at least one Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC) responsible for reviewing *no risk to low risk studies* as well as overseeing and managing compliance with the requirements of ethical research in *no and low risk studies*. Note: The exception is *health and health-related studies*; and *animal studies* where *low risk* is also referred to the appropriate NHREC-registered REC. In a *no risk study*, the completed template and proposal received from the SC are reviewed and the decision of the SC ratified by the FREC, a pre-allocated ethics number (received from the research support office) provided to the study, a letter of decision provided to the researcher, as well as the research support office informed of the study with its allocated number. Note: The *letter of decision* has to indicate that the study has been reviewed, cleared and has no risk. In a *low risk study*, the ethics application is taken into full review by the FREC, a pre-allocated ethics number (received from the research support office) provided to the

study, a letter of decision provided to the researcher, as well as the research support office informed of the study with its allocated number. Note: *The letter of approval* has to indicate that it has been reviewed, approved, the risk level and the period of approval, other requirements.

5. NATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL REGISTERED RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NHREC-registered REC)

Specific circumstances that require referral to appropriately mandated RECs are indicated below:

- Should the study be 'health or health-related', statutory regulations require that review is by a NHREC-registered Health Research Ethics Committee, *for all low to high risk studies*.
- Should the study involve *animals*, statutory regulations require that review is by a NHREC-registered Animal Research Ethics Committee, *for all low to high risk studies*.
- Should the study be a *medium or high risk study* or involve *vulnerable participants*, the ethics application should be referred to an appropriate NHREC-registered REC, based on the focus of the study.
- Should the study topic otherwise fall outside the expertise of a particular FREC, this should also be referred to another FREC or NHREC-Registered REC with the appropriate expertise. See table below for the detail explanation.

NWU-HSSREC

(North-West University Human Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee)

REC-080615-047

Key factors for making decision:

- 1) Studies within the broad field of humanistic disciplines that research human functioning in social, political, institutional, cultural and historical environments and developmental contexts.
- 2) Other studies in the Faculty of Humanities that involve medium to high risk studies or involve vulnerable participants.
Not health or health-related studies

ANNEXURE B: NWU ETHICS CLEARANCE FLOW PROCESS



Scientific review by a Faculty Scientific/Proposal Committee (SC)

Actions by the SC:

Review *all research* applications and *refer all studies* to the appropriate Research Ethics Committee (REC) for ethics clearance.

- *No risk studies*: Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher. Complete a template, attach the proposal and send to the FREC for ethical clearance.
- *Low risk studies*: Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC Refer the researcher *to the FREC* (Note: Except if health or health related research to the NWU-HREC; if animal studies to the NWU-AnimCare- REC or NWU-AnimProd-REC)
- *Medium to high risk studies or a study involving vulnerable participants*: Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC Refer the researcher to the *appropriate NHREC-registered REC* (based on the scope of the RECs)
- *All health or health-related studies* irrespective of the risk level has to be referred to the *NWU-HREC* ^[17]_[SEP] Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC Refer the researcher to the NWU-HREC ^[17]_[SEP]
- *All animal studies* irrespective of the risk level has to be referred to *either the NWU-AnimCare-REC or NWU-AnimProd-REC* Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC. Refer the researcher to the NWU-AnimCare-REC or NWU-AnimProd-REC
- A study with a *potential negative impact on the environment* should be referred to the *appropriate NHREC-registered REC* Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC
- A study with *potential reputational damage to the NWU* should be referred to the *appropriate NHREC-registered REC* Issue a letter of scientific approval to the researcher that they have to attach to the ethics application to the REC



Ethical clearance by the appropriate REC

Human studies or impact on the environment
Medium or high risk studies or a study involving vulnerable participants
Full review by the appropriate NHREC-registered REC
All health and health-related studies (NWU-HREC) All studies in Humanities (NWU-HSSREC) All other studies that is not health or health-related or from Humanities (NWU-EMELTEN-REC)

Obtain a pre-allocated ethics number from the research support office Provide an ethics number to the study Letter to the researcher of the REC's decision (review, approval, risk level, period of approval, other requirements) After consideration by the REC, send the allocated ethics number to the research support office to be captured on VSS

Scope of NWU SCs and RECs August 2019

File Reference: 1.3.26

ANNEXURE C: CONSTITUTION OF KENYA: CHAPTER 4 - THE BILL OF RIGHTS

PART 2 – RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

ARTICLE Equality and freedom from discrimination

- 27.
- (1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.
 - (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.
 - (3) Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres.
 - (4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.
 - (5) A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against another person on any of the grounds specified or contemplated in clause (4).
 - (6) To give full effect to the realisation of the rights guaranteed under this Article, the State shall take legislative and other measures, including affirmative action programmes and policies designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past discrimination.
 - (7) Any measure taken under clause (6) shall adequately provide for any benefits to be on the basis of genuine need.
 - (8) In addition to the measures contemplated in clause (6), the State shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.

ANNEXURE D: CONSTITUTION OF KENYA: CHAPTER 7 – REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE

PART 1 – ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND PROCESS

- ARTICLE 81 The electoral system shall comply with the following principles
- (a) freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights under Article 38;
 - (b) not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender;
 - (c) fair representation of persons with disabilities;
 - (d) universal suffrage based on the aspiration for fair representation and equality of vote; and
 - (e) free and fair elections, which are—
 - (i) by secret ballot;
 - (ii) free from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption;
 - (iii) conducted by an independent body;
 - (iv) transparent; and
 - (v) administered in an impartial, neutral, efficient, accurate and accountable manner.

Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.

Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.

ANNEXURE E: CONSTITUTION OF KENYA: CHAPTER 11 - DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS

PART 1 – OBJECTS AND PRINCIPLES OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT

ARTICLE Objects of devolution

174

The objects of the devolution of government are-

- (a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;
- b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity;
- (c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;
- (d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development;
- (e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities;
- (f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya;
- (g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya;
- (h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya; and
- (i) to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.

175. County governments established under this Constitution shall reflect the following principles—

- (a) county governments shall be based on democratic principles and the separation of powers;

(b) county governments shall have reliable sources of revenue to enable them to govern and deliver services effectively; and

(c) no more than two-thirds of the members of representative bodies in each county government shall be of the same gender

PART 2 – COUNTY GOVERNMENTS

ARTICLE County Governments

176. (1) There shall be a county government for each county, consisting of a county assembly and a county executive.

(2) Every county government shall decentralise its functions and the provision of its services to the extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so.

ARTICLE Membership of county assembly

177. 1) A county assembly consists of—

(a) members elected by the registered voters of the wards, each ward constituting a single member constituency, on the same day as a general election of Members of Parliament, being the second Tuesday in August, in every fifth year;

(b) the number of special seat members necessary to ensure that no more than two-thirds of the membership of the assembly are of the same gender;

(c) the number of members of marginalised groups, including persons with disabilities and the youth, prescribed by an Act of Parliament; and

(d) the Speaker, who is an ex officio member.

(2) The members contemplated in clause (1) (b) and (c) shall, in each case, be nominated by political parties in proportion to the seats received in that election in that county by each political party under paragraph (a) in accordance with Article 90.

(3) The filling of special seats under clause (1) (b) shall be determined after declaration of elected members from each ward.

(4) A county assembly is elected for a term of five years.

ANNEXURE F: CONSTITUTION OF KENYA: CHAPTER 4 – THE BILL OF RIGHTS

PART 5. KENYA NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMMISSION

ARTICLE Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission

59. (1) There is established the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission.
- (2) The functions of the Commission are—
- (a) to promote respect for human rights and develop a culture of human rights in the Republic;
 - (b) to promote gender equality and equity generally and to coordinate and facilitate gender mainstreaming in national development;
 - (c) to promote the protection, and observance of human rights in public and private institutions;
 - (d) to monitor, investigate and report on the observance of human rights in all spheres of life in the Republic, including observance by the national security organs;
 - (e) to receive and investigate complaints about alleged abuses of human rights and take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated;
 - (f) on its own initiative or on the basis of complaints, to investigate or research a matter in respect of human rights, and make recommendations to improve the functioning of State organs;
 - (g) to act as the principal organ of the State in ensuring compliance with obligations under treaties and conventions relating to human rights;
 - (h) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or any act or omission in public administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be prejudicial or improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice;

- (i) to investigate complaints of abuse of power, unfair treatment, manifest injustice or unlawful, oppressive, unfair or unresponsive official conduct;
 - (j) to report on complaints investigated under paragraphs (h) and (i) and take remedial action; and
 - (k) to perform any other functions prescribed by legislation.
- (3) Every person has the right to complain to the Commission, alleging that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened.
- (4) Parliament shall enact legislation to give full effect to this Part, and any such legislation may restructure the Commission into two or more separate commissions.
- (5) If Parliament enacts legislation restructuring the Commission under clause (4)—
 - (a) that legislation shall assign each function of the Commission specified in this Article to one or the other of the successor commissions;
 - (b) each of the successor commissions shall have powers equivalent to the powers of the Commission under this Article; and
 - (c) each successor commission shall be a commission within the meaning of Chapter Fifteen, and shall have the status and powers of a commission under that Chapter.

ANNEXURE G: RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

I, Alta Strauss, am currently registered as a PhD student in Development and Management at the North-West University in South Africa. The registered title of my thesis is: ***“The security implications for failing to implement gender equality standards: a case study of the Kenyan national government”***. My research focuses on the implications for the security of Kenya if the Government of Kenya fails to meet the required constitutional gender equality standards.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN RESEARCHER AND PARTICIPANT

If you are willing to participate in this study, please read and complete form carefully. Please underline/ring the appropriate responses, sign and date the declaration at the end.

- I understand that participation is voluntary YES / NO
- I understand that all interviews are treated with the utmost of confidence. Confidentiality is ensured by using pseudonyms when referring to participants where it is regarded as necessary, or requested by the participant. YES / NO
- I understand that this study considers opinions and it is crucial to record them to have an accurate reflection of what was said. All recorded interviews will be transcribed verbatim and no one besides myself, or on request, my promoter, will have access to the recorded or transcribed interviews. All transcriptions will be kept at my home in a fire-proof safe. Do you give permission for recording? YES / NO
- I understand that the audio recording will be used solely for research purposes and will be destroyed on completion of the research. YES / NO
- I understand that during the interview, that the Researcher may write down some notes and that I am welcome to ask questions at any time. YES / NO
- I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an explanation. YES / NO

I freely give my consent to participate in this research study.

Name:

Organization:

Signature: Date.....

Researcher: Date.....

ANNEXURE H: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Do you think gender inequality in the national Government of Kenya is used as a tool to prevent gender mainstreaming or the implementation of the required Constitutional “two-thirds gender principle” in the decision-making structures of the Government of Kenya? Please explain your answer.
2. There is a positive relation between gender inequality and poverty and by not mainstreaming gender equality, poverty is maintained. Therefore, unemployment / unpaid care work / jobs in the informal sector make women dependent on social structures for financial support and personal support. Do you think that gender inequality contributes to female insecurity in Kenya and why?
3. To recite the Executive Director of UN Women: “Women are radically impatient for change. It is an impatience that runs deep and it has been brewing for years”. Do you think that the inequality women are exposed to (socio-economic conditions of marginalisation / inequality of opportunities / GBV or physical insecurity) would push women to extremism as a possible method of change? If possible, could you support your answer with examples?
4. Extremism is on the increase in Kenya – specifically under the unemployed youth as a result of economic inequality and poverty. Violent extremism is contributing to insecurity or a sense of insecurity to undermine the Government’s authority. What is your opinion? Can it be concluded that an increase in extremism (contributes to a decline in the trust of the Government of Kenya to guarantee internal peace and security) would be contributing to internal violence?
5. According to your opinion, does gender inequality contributes to poor governance of the security sector and as a result lead to human rights abuses?
6. Knowledge equals power and is link to the status of a person in a social structure. Statistics provided by the KNBS (Kenya National Bureau of Standards) exhibited that with higher levels of education, GBV subsides and the UNCT established that an increase in the level of education is the best counter against violent extremism/terrorism. Despite the fact that girls and boys have equal access to education, 43 per cent females incomparison to 57 per cent

males student advance to tertiary education. What could be done to balance the scales to counter inequality in tertiary education?

7. The role that women play in maintaining patriarchy (systemic discrimination) even if it only benefits men, is based on the powerful role education/religion/culture plays in establishing cultural norms or the transfer of knowledge. What is your opinion? When should gender equality and respect between boys and girls be addressed in the school curriculum?
8. KEWOPA (Kenya Women Parliamentary Association) “has a duty of representing the citizenry in economic and social development as well as playing an oversight role over the Executive arm of the Government. This unique mandate, “if well utilized will coordinate, assist and fast track the realization of the socio-economic and political development agenda of the nation by the women leaders” (KEWOPA Strategic Plan 2019-2023). How would you explain the contribution of KEWOPA to assist or what was the obstruction with the passing of the Gender Bill? Or was the talk about women left for the men? (Top-down approach)
9. An oppressed group must become a group for itself and not only in itself. Why do women at grassroots level not use existing women’s groups like the *Maenedeleo Ya Wananwake (MYWO)* to empower women and to eliminate gender inequality (Bottom-up approach)?
10. According to your opinion, do you think there is a correlation between ethnic and gender inequality? Please explain your answer.

I thank you for your valued responses.