

**Techno-economic analysis for construction and
operation of a fleet of Nuclear Power Plants in
South Africa as proposed by the IRP 2010**

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree *Master of Engineering in Nuclear Engineering*
at the North-West University

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Graduation May 2018
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I take great pleasure in extending my gratitude to those who assisted me in making this dissertation possible.

First, I would like to thank my heavenly Father, Jesus Christ. *Soli deo Gloria*. “And we know that God causes everything to work together for the good of those who love God and are called according to His purpose for them”. Romans 8:28.

I am truly grateful to my dissertation supervisor, Ms Joe-Nimique Cilliers, for her vital input, encouragement, and guidance throughout this research. It was certainly challenging at times, but with her help and moral support, it all came to pass. Great appreciation also goes to my dissertation co-supervisor, Dr. Anthonie Cilliers, for dedicating the time to provide technical and moral assistance during the compilation of this work. I thank both of you for your ideas and wise words.

I would also like to thank the staff of the Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering at the North West University (NWU), in particular Bettie Handford and Dalien Zietsman, for providing me with the necessary support when needed.

I am also indebted to Victor Moduka and Frikkie Ellis from Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (Eskom) for providing me with a great deal of information and guidance on nuclear power economics.

Also to my parents, family, and friends, thank you for the support and love you provided during this research. Thank you for all your prayers and words of encouragement.

Lastly, and most important, I want to thank my beautiful and loving wife, Jolene Collins. Thank you for your patience and understanding when I had to dedicate most of my time to this research. Your love, prayers, and unwavering support throughout enabled me to persevere in this quest. Thank you for believing in me.

ABSTRACT

The South African Government has prioritized industrialization and infrastructure investment to ensure electricity supply and distribution to its people and industries. In order to realize this, the Government intends to construct a fleet of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with a combined output capacity of 9 600 MW, which is in alignment with the updated Integrated Resources Plan (IRP 2016) for South Africa. However, before a procurement decision can be made, policymakers must first address concerns regarding the economic viability of nuclear technology. A study is therefore required to support the policy-making process.

This research proposes that a techno-economic analysis be performed in order to provide some context to the debate about the cost of nuclear energy, i.e. nuclear power economics.

The methodology for this research starts with an initial survey of literature concerning nuclear power economics and the key aspects by which it is influenced. Literature concerning various nuclear power projects and the various nuclear power plant technologies was also considered.

The scope of this research is limited to Generation III and Generation III+ plants that are currently operational, under construction, as well as approved nuclear projects that have valid contracts in place. The Generation III and Generation III+ reactor technologies that were considered for this research include the AP1000, EPR1600, Hualong One, APR1400, and the VVER1200 reactor technologies. The research focuses on accumulating costing information to be used for conducting economic simulations. The various designs were also evaluated for their technical capabilities.

A mathematical model was developed to perform the economic evaluation. The model inputs for the calculation of the Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) are explained and described. It is assumed for this research that the nuclear component industry is fully integrated with components being sourced internationally at competitive prices, and that nuclear power economics is sensitive to variations in the labour cost as well as labour productivity. The emphasis is therefore on determining the Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) for each project, were it to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, but also to observe the influence of labour cost and labour productivity on the OCC.

The different scenarios were prepared on a country-by-country basis and were developed by reference to a common set of generic assumptions for each scenario, as described in the modelling procedure (refer to § 4.1).

The Total Capital Investment Cost (TCIC) component of each project was transformed to a localized (South African) OCC for projects, were it to be constructed within the South African economic landscape.

The results indicate that the average OCC for constructing one of the five technologies within the South African economic landscape is \$2 910/kW. The technology with the lowest localized OCC is the APR1400 at a cost of \$2 293/kW.

A sensitivity analysis will also indicate which assumed or determined variable will have the greatest impact on the localized Overnight Capital Cost.

Keywords: Techno-economic, overnight capital cost, nuclear power economics, labour cost, labour productivity.

OPSOMMING

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het voorkeur verleen aan plaaslike industrialisering en investering in infrastruktuur om te verseker dat die land se mense en industrieë toegang het tot elektrisiteit. Om dit te bewerkstellig, beoog die Regering om 'n reeks kernkragaanlegte te bou met 'n gesamentlike vermoë van 9 600 MW, wat strook met die 2016 weergawe van die Geïntegreerde Hulpbronne Plan. Voordat 'n aankoopbesluit egter gemaak kan word, moet beleidmakers eers aspekte soos die ekonomiese gangbaarheid van kerntechnologie oorweeg. Om stukrag aan die besluitnemingsproses te verleen, word 'n deeglike studie benodig.

Hierdie navorsing stel voor dat 'n tegno-ekonomiese ontleding gedoen word om duidelikheid te verleen aan die debat rakende die koste van kernenergie of te wel, kernkrag-ekonomie.

Die metodiek vir hierdie navorsing begin met 'n oorsig van beskikbare literatuur rakende kernkrag-ekonomie en die sleutelaspekte waardeur dit beïnvloed word. Literatuur rakende etlike kernkragprojekte en die verskillende kernaanlegtegnologieë is ook oorweeg.

Die bestek van hierdie navorsing is beperk tot Generasie III en Generasie III+ aanlegte wat tans in bedryf is, wat in aanbou is, en goedgekeurde kernprojekte waarvoor kontrakte reeds aangegaan is. Die Generasie III en Generasie III+ reaktortechnologieë wat vir hierdie navorsing oorweeg is, behels die volgende: AP1000, EPR1600, Hualong Een, APR1400, en die VVER1200 reaktortechnologieë. Die navorsing is gerig daarop om koste-inligting in te win wat vir ekonomiese simulاسies gebruik sal word. Die verskillende ontwerpe is ook vir hulle tegniese vermoë geëvalueer.

Ten einde hierdie ekonomiese evaluering te kon doen, is 'n wiskundige model ontwikkel. Insette vir hierdie model vir die berekening van die oornag kapitale koste word beskryf en verduidelik. Daar word ook aangeneem dat die industrie vir kernkragkomponente ten volle geïntegreer is, dus kan komponente wêreldwyd verkry word teen mededingende pryse, en dat kernkragekonomie vatbaar is vir skommeling in arbeidskoste as ook arbeidsproduktiwiteit. Die klem is dus op die berekening van die oornag kapitale koste vir elk van hierdie projekte sou dit in die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomiese landskap opgerig word, en ook om die invloed van arbeidskoste en arbeidsproduktiwiteit op die oornag kapitale koste te beskou.

Verskeie scenarios is ontwikkel op 'n land tot land grondslag deur te verwys na 'n gemeenskaplike stel generiese aannames vir elke scenario soos beskryf in die modelleringsprosedure soos beskryf in § 4.1.

Die totale kapitale beleggingskoste van elke projek is omgeskakel na 'n plaaslike (Suid-Afrikaanse) oornag kapitale koste vir elke projek moontlik gemaak het sou daardie tegnologie in die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomiese landskap gebou word.

Die uitslag toon dat die gemiddelde oornag kapitale koste om een van die vyf tegnologieë vir konstruksie te gebruik, \$2 910/kW beloop. Die tegnologie met die kleinste oornag kapitale koste is die APR1400 teen 'n koste van \$2 293/kW.

'n Sensitiwiteitsanalise sal ook aandui watter aangenome of bepaalde veranderlike die grootste invloed op die plaaslike oornag kapitale koste sal hê.

Sleutelwoorde: Tegno-ekonomies, oornag kapitale koste, kernkragekonomie, arbeidskoste, arbeidsproduktiwiteit.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BU	Burn-up
BWR	Boiling Water Reactor
CCL	Cost of Construction Loan
CEU	Commission of the European Union
CGNPG	China General Nuclear Power Group
CIAB	Coal Industry Advisory Board
CIDB	Construction Industry Development Board
CNNC	China National Nuclear Corporation
DOE	Department of Energy
EDF	Électricité de France
EMWG	Economics Modeling Working Group
EPC	Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
EPCC	Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Cost
EPR	European Pressurized Reactor
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
EUR	European Utility Requirements
FOAK	First of a Kind
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDC	Interest during Construction
IEP	Integrated Energy Plan
IPP	Independent Power Producer
IRP	Integrated Resource Plan
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
KEPCO	Korea Electric Power Corporation
KHNP	Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power
KNPS	Koeberg Nuclear Power Station
LCOE	Levelized Cost of Electricity
LWR	Light Water Reactor

MW	Megawatt
NDP	National Development Plan
NETL	National Energy Technology Laboratory
NNBP	Nuclear New Build Programme
NNEECC	National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordinating Committee
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NPV	Net Present Value
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OC	Owner's Cost
OCC	Overnight Capital Cost
OCGT	Open Cycle Gas Turbine
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRIS	Power Reactor Information Systems
PWR	Pressurized Water Reactor
SA	South Africa
SG	Steam Generator
SSC	System, Structure, Component
SSE	Safe-Shutdown Earthquake
TCIC	Total Capital Investment Cost
TMI	Three Mile Island
UCLF	Unplanned Capability Loss Factor
URD	Utility Requirements Document
USA	United States of America
US EIA	United States Energy Information Administration
US NRC	United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
WACC	Weighted Average Cost of Capital
WNA	World Nuclear Association
WNN	World Nuclear News

DEFINITIONS

Advanced reactor – A nuclear power reactor with an evolutionary design (when compared with Generation II designs) with enhanced safety features.

Base load power stations – Stations capable of continuously producing large amounts of energy on a 24-hour basis; also referred to as primary energy sources.

Boiling water reactor – A nuclear power reactor in which boiling of coolant occurs in the reactor pressure vessel, with the steam resulting from boiling being directed to the turbine-generator for electricity production.

Burn-up – The percentage of heavy metal fissioned during the period in which the nuclear fuel is exposed during reactor operation. Burn-up is normally expressed in terms of megawatt days per tonne (MWd/t) or megawatt days per kilogram (MWd/kg).

Condenser – The structure in which steam that has passed through the turbine is cooled and condensed by a circulating water system, with the hot condensate being returned to the steam generators for re-use.

Confinement – An enclosure around a nuclear reactor intended to reduce, but not prevent, release of radioactive materials to the environment.

Containment – A structure around a nuclear reactor that is designed to withstand, with minimal leakage, the pressure resulting from design basis accidents, e.g. a loss of coolant accident or a main steam line break. The containment is relied upon in severe accidents to prevent or minimize the release of radioactive materials to the environment in a controlled manner.

Core catcher – An engineered device or system intended to collect core debris in the event where the reactor pressure vessel fails due to core melt-through during a severe accident.

Efficiency – A measure of the electricity generated when compared with the thermal energy produced in the reactor core.

Energy availability factor (EAF) – This is the ratio of the available energy generated over a certain period, compared to the reference energy generation over the same period. This is normally expressed as a percentage.

Enrichment – A process used to increase in the percentage concentration of uranium-235 in material intended for use in fuel rods for a nuclear power plant, normally enriched to a level of 5% for power reactors, although some use fuel enriched to just under 20%.

Hydro power stations – Conventional power systems, in which a mass of water stored behind a dam wall is released to drive turbines, which are connected to generators for power generation.

Load factors – A measure of how much electricity a power plant produces when compared with its theoretical capability.

Load shedding – A controlled process used by a utility to reduce load on the grid in order to respond to unplanned events (i.e. the loss of supply) to protect the power system from a total black-out.

Mothballed – Refers to power stations taken out of service indefinitely and maintained for restart at a later date.

MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel) – Reactor fuel consisting of both uranium and plutonium oxides (typically contains about 5% plutonium).

Payback period – The period predicted by the electricity utility during which all cost associated with the construction of a nuclear plant is recovered.

Peak – A high demand for electricity, especially early morning and evening by domestic users.

Peaking station – A station used for generating electricity when there is a sudden peak in the demand which cannot be met immediately by the base load power stations; i.e. peaking stations are employed to supplement base load stations.

Pressurized water reactor – A nuclear reactor in which the coolant is kept from boiling by a pressurizer, and in which the primary coolant is circulated through a steam generator (heat exchanger) in order to produce steam for power generation by boiling water in the secondary circuit.

Pumped storage system – Akin to a hydro power station, in which water being used for generation during peak periods is returned (pumped) to a high-elevation reservoir during off-peak periods when excess generating capacity is available.

Reactor coolant – The medium used to transfer heat from the reactor core, either to steam generators (PWR) or directly to the turbine (BWR). A variety of coolants are used, including light water, heavy water, helium, carbon dioxide, sodium, lead, and lead-bismuth eutectic.

Reflector – A purpose built metal structure used to reflect neutrons back into the reactor core to enhance fuel efficiency.

Reserve margin – Excess supply to meet unexpected demand.

Severe accident – An event sequence in a nuclear reactor that results in severe fuel damage or fuel melting.

Spent fuel – Used fuel assemblies removed from a reactor after use for energy production, either for reprocessing or for eventual disposal as high-level radioactive waste.

Station black-out – When a nuclear plant loses its normal electrical power supply, normally supplied by the electrical grid, it depends on the emergency diesel generators at the site, which is normally part of the plant design. These emergency diesel generators automatically start up and provide power to essential emergency equipment. However, if for some reason this emergency supply is not available, the plant would be in a condition called “station black-out”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	i
Abstract	ii
Opsomming	iii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	iv
Definitions	vi
Table of Contents	viii
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xi
CHAPTER 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Problem Statement.....	2
1.3 Research Aim	3
1.4 Research Methodology	3
1.5 Research Objectives and Project Scope	4
1.6 Outputs and Deliverables	5
1.7 Work Excluded	6
1.8 Research Background	6
1.8.1 Power Shortages	6
1.8.2 Energy Outlook.....	8
1.8.3 Strategy – Integrated Resource Plan 2010 (updated)	8
1.8.4 Nuclear New Build	9
1.9 Outline of Dissertation	10
CHAPTER 2 Literature Survey	11
2.1 Economic Impact	11
2.2 Capacity Overview	12
2.3 Various Energy Sources.....	14
2.3.1 Coal	14
2.3.2 Natural Gas and Diesel	14
2.3.3 Hydro and Pumped Storage	15
2.3.4 Renewable Energy	15
2.3.5 Nuclear	16
2.4 Eskom’s New Build Programme	16
2.5 Nuclear Build Projects around the World	17
2.6 Nuclear Power Economics	18
2.6.1 Nuclear Economic Definitions	18
2.6.2 Construction Delays	25
2.6.3 Labour	26
2.6.4 Labour Productivity.....	28
2.6.5 Labour Costs	29
2.6.6 Unit Labour Cost	29
2.6.7 Material Costs	30
CHAPTER 3 PWR Technology Overview	31
3.1 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Technology	31
3.1.1 Basic Operation of the PWR Technology	31

3.1.2 Reactor Designs	32
3.2 Technologies under Consideration.....	36
3.2.1 Westinghouse AP1000	36
3.2.2 AREVA EPR1600	39
3.2.3 Chinese ACPR1000 and Hualong One	41
3.2.4 Korean APR1400	42
3.2.5 Russian VVER1200.....	45
3.3 Reactor Technology Comparison.....	46
3.3.1 Safety, Regulation and Construction Schedules	48
CHAPTER 4 Economic Evaluation.....	50
4.1 Modelling Procedure	50
4.1.1 Total Capital Investment Cost	51
4.1.2 Cost on Construction Loan.....	51
4.1.3 Overnight Capital Cost (OCC).....	52
4.1.4 Total Plant Cost (TPC)	53
4.1.5 International Labour Cost	53
4.1.6 Unit Labour Cost (ULC).....	54
4.1.7 South African Labour Cost	54
4.1.8 Localized OCC	55
4.2 Results and Discussion	55
4.2.1 AP1000 Technology	55
4.2.2 EPR1600 Technology	56
4.2.3 Hualong One Technology.....	57
4.2.4 APR1400 Technology	58
4.2.5 VVER1200 Technology	60
4.2.6 Summary of Results	61
4.2.7 Sensitivity Analysis.....	62
CHAPTER 5 Conclusion and Recommendations	63
5.1 Conclusion of the Results.....	63
5.2 Recommendations	64
Bibliography	65
Appendices	72

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Reactor technologies under consideration 5

Table 2: Breakdown of NPP costs by major components (WNA, 2017) 26

Table 3: Skill level of South African workforce (Stats SA, 2016) 27

Table 4: Summary of reactor technology comparison 47

Table 5: Qualitative comparison based on construction and regulation 49

Table 6: Model assumptions 50

Table 7: Financing costs as a fraction of total construction costs 52

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1: Research methodology 3
- Figure 2: MW not available due to plant breakdowns (Eskom, 2014) 7
- Figure 3: Eskom generation plant mix (Koko and Singh, 2016) 12
- Figure 4 Typical winter and summer load profiles (Eskom, 2016) 13
- Figure 5 Total number of reactors under construction (IAEA, 2017) 17
- Figure 6: Total number of reactors by type (IAEA, 2017) 31
- Figure 7: Basic layout of a PWR (Eskom, 2016) 31
- Figure 8: The evolution of nuclear power reactors (Goldberg & Rosner, 2011) 33
- Figure 9: Basic layout of the AP1000 design (Westinghouse, 2011) 37
- Figure 10: Basic layout of EPR1600 design (Framatome ANP, 2005) 40
- Figure 11: Basic layout of Hualong One design (CNNC, 2015) 42
- Figure 12: Basic layout of APR1400 design (Doosan, 2012) 44
- Figure 13: Basic layout of the VVER1200 primary circuit (Gidopress, 2015) 45
- Figure 14: Factors influencing capital cost 48
- Figure 15: Breakdown of the TCIC (Gonzales, 2014) 51
- Figure 16: Financing costs as a fraction of total construction costs 52
- Figure 17: Generic nuclear plant cost breakdown as a percentage of total plant costs
(EPRI, 2011) 54
- Figure 18: AP1000 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe) 56
- Figure 19: EPR1600 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe) 57
- Figure 20: Hualong One Sum of ACC; SA v International (\$/kWe) 58
- Figure 21: APR1400 Sum of SCC; SA v International (\$/kWe) 59
- Figure 22: VVER1200 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe) 61
- Figure 23: Average OCC SA (\$/kW) 61
- Figure 24: Sensitivity analysis for localized OCC 62

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Energy is essential for the development of a country's economy as well as its people. This is evident in large parts of Africa where millions of people are trapped in extreme and abject poverty due to energy shortages that hampers sustainable development. Reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that more than 10 countries in Africa have 75% of their population living without access to electricity, which is an extremely damning factor considering we live in the 21st century (Brown, 2016). It is for this reason that the South African government has prioritized industrialization and infrastructure investment to ensure electricity supply and distribution to its people and industries (Brown, 2016). Investment to stimulate industrialization and infrastructure development will form the foundation for the economic growth objective in accordance with the National Development Plan (NDP, 2012).

A lack of timely coordination and planning and the delayed implementation of the South Africa's energy programmes have led to electricity supply shortages, which had a debilitating effect on the economic growth. Energy supply shortages were aggravated by a time-worn power generating infrastructure. The South African government is currently in the process of developing a plan to achieve the optimal energy mix that will ensure long-term energy security as well as a low-carbon economy.

In alignment with the updated Integrated Resources Plan (IRP), the South African Government declared its intentions to procure a fleet of nuclear reactors, which will render a total capacity of 9 600 MW (IRP, 2016).

The South African Government has signed a range of bilateral country-to-country nuclear cooperation agreements. This provided vendor companies from the signatory countries the opportunity to showcase their technologies to South Africa's nuclear experts. In 2011, the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordinating Committee (NNEECC) was formed in order to drive the decision-making process. The committee has completed various technical studies, which include in-depth studies into the cost of nuclear power, funding and financing models, and the economic impact on localization. However, a decision on the proposed vendor is still pending. The main reason for the delay is the diverging views on the economics of NPPs between factions of the general public and the elected representatives.

This research will analyse the techno-economic aspects of Generation III and Generation III+ reactor designs that are currently operational, being constructed, as well as approved projects with valid contracts in place.

The following reactor technologies are considered:

- USA – AP1000,
- France – EPR1600,
- China – Hualong1000 (ACPR1000),
- Korea – APR1400,
- Russia – VVER1200 reactor designs.

The research is designed to produce credible costing information for the use of energy policymakers when comparing power generation options in the current energy and economic policy context. It considers current real-world examples to source information on the projected TCIC for nuclear projects around the world, predominantly from the IAEA and the World Nuclear Association (WNA). On occasions, where credible parameters could not be established for a specific cost component, approximations with reliance on available literature were applied.

From the OCC, the labour cost component of each nuclear project is determined, which is compared to the cost of labour in South Africa. The labour cost and labour productivity comparison forms the basis for the calculation of the OCC for the proposed reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape.

The outcome of this study will be used as input for the development and testing of a macro-economic model. The macro-economic model will be used in a socio-economic study of the impact of the nuclear new build programme (NNBP) in South Africa, which is beyond the scope of this research.

This report should not be considered a detailed construction cost plan, but rather a scenario-dependent cost estimate prepared in advance of the detailed engineering preparations required to proceed with construction.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite the South African Government's public backing of a NNBP, minimal progress has been made in this regard. The lack of progress is primarily due to the uncertainty surrounding the affordability of nuclear technology in South Africa.

The uncertainty is intensified by reported capital costs of current nuclear new build projects such as Olkiluoto in Finland and Flamanville in France, and also the projected cost of the Hinkley Point C project in the UK. However, a study by J.R. Lovering has advised not to draw any strong conclusions about future projects based on past projects, as there is no expected cost trend for nuclear power technology (J.R. Lovering et al, 2016).

With no new nuclear power plants being constructed in South Africa over the past three decades, the amount of information on the costs of building nuclear plants is somewhat limited. Therefore, the problem to be solved in this study is the unavailability of economic data of the five different reactor technologies if it were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, as well as how the labour cost and labour productivity might impact the projected project cost.

1.3 RESEARCH AIM

The aim of the research is to produce comprehensive costing information that could be used to address the uncertainty surrounding the affordability of nuclear technology in South Africa. Emphasis is placed on the calculation of the OCC for five particular reactor technologies if it were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape. The South African Government have indicated that localization is considered to be a key factor in the selection of a vendor, therefore the research will also consider the impact labour cost and labour productivity of South Africa have in calculating the localized OCC.

1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY




Figure 1: Research methodology

The methodology used for this research (refer to Figure 1) starts with a literature survey of nuclear power economics. The initial literature survey discusses the key aspects that influence nuclear power economics. In addition to this, a high-level technical evaluation provides some insight into the differences between the reactor technologies under consideration.

The literature survey is based on information gathered from accredited international peer-reviewed journals and reports that deliberate on the economics of new nuclear power projects around the world. Reactor vendors were specifically excluded during the information-gathering process.

The calculations in this research are based on the reported total capital investment costs (TCIC) of the projects under consideration.

Firstly, the reported TCIC for all the projects were converted from nominal dollar values to constant 2016-dollar values to account for inflation. From here, the OCC for each project was calculated.

Using Microsoft® Excel®, the cost data obtained from literature was captured in a spreadsheet, which was sequentially set up to allow the reader to follow how the TCIC was used to determine the OCC of a particular project in the South African economic landscape.

The TCIC was used, together with mathematical correlations obtained from nuclear power economics literature, to calculate the OCC of each project if it were to be constructed in the South African economic landscape (refer to Appendices 9 – 30).

Finally, a cash flow model will be developed in order to calculate the total loan amount required for each project, which will allow for a high-level cost comparison. In addition to this, a sensitivity model is derived in order to determine which factor between CCL, labour cost and labour productivity, will have the most significant influence on the localized OCC.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT SCOPE

The main objective of this research is to develop OCC cost estimations for different Generation III and Generation III+ reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape. The outcome of this study will be of value to the energy policymakers to address the uncertainty surrounding the affordability of nuclear technology in South Africa.

This research only considers light water reactor (LWR) reactor designs of the Generation III and Generation III+ types, which are currently operational or under construction. In addition to this, the cost predictions for various other projects that were approved by utilities and governments around the world were also taken into consideration.

The following are the specific objectives for this research:

- Give concise introduction and background of the problem.
- Analyse and deliberate on nuclear power economics.
- Analyse and deliberate on unit labour cost, labour rates, and labour productivity within the South African construction industry.
- Analyse and deliberate on the different reactor technologies within the scope.
- Calculate the OCC of the identified nuclear new build projects.
- Calculate the labour cost component for each of the identified nuclear new build projects.
- Determine the unit labour cost (ULC) of the countries that are currently constructing or planning to construct nuclear new build projects.

- Compare the ULC of the various countries to that of South Africa.
- Determine the OCC of each reactor technology within the South African economic landscape by taking the ULC into account.
- Analyse and discuss the OCC for the different reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape.
- Conduct a sensitivity analysis in order to determine which factor between CCL, labour cost and labour productivity, will have the most significant influence on the localized OCC.
- Compile a research conclusion and produce recommendations for further studies.

Technologies to be considered in this research are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Reactor technologies under consideration

#	Vendor Country	Vendor	Reactor Design	Reason for Consideration
1	USA	Westinghouse	AP1000	Vendors with extensive experience in the construction and operation of NPPs.
2	French Republic	Areva	EPR1600	
3	Russian Federation	Rosatom	VVER1200	
4	South Korea	KEPCO	APR1400	The standardised approach from the South Korean utility has consistently delivered low execution costs.
5	People's Republic of China	CNNC	Hualong One	With 19 reactors under construction, apart from its 38 plants already operational, China is currently the country with the biggest expansion plans for nuclear energy.

1.6 OUTPUTS AND DELIVERABLES

The outcome of this research project will provide costing information that will be useful to the policymakers as a reference in the decision-making process for a NNBP in South Africa. The outputs shall include the following:

- The difference in labour cost requirements between South Africa and those countries that have current, recently constructed, or planned nuclear new build projects. This will indicate the impact of labour cost and labour productivity on OCC.
- The localized OCC of each of the reactor technologies under consideration.
- The total loan amount required for each of the different reactor technologies in the South African economic landscape.
- A sensitivity analysis.

1.7 WORK EXCLUDED

Due to time constraint, some of the following topics will not be discussed in this research report, whereas others will purely be introduced:

- The development and testing of a macro-economic model to be used in a socio-economic study of the impact of the NNP in South Africa.
- Reactor design: Existing design data used to represent each concept.
- The debate on nuclear safety.
- Generation I, II, & IV reactor technologies.
- Detailed discussion on levelized cost of electricity (LCOE).
- Detailed discussion on operation and maintenance cost (O&M).
- Detailed discussion on material costs.
- Detailed discussion on weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
- Detailed discussion on NPV and IRR.

1.8 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

1.8.1 Power Shortages

The South African national power system became severely strained in the latter months of 2007 due to the ever-increasing demand for electricity. This increase in demand was mainly due to economic and social development. The power system became more and more constrained due to the generating fleet not being as reliable as it once was and the failure to bring new generating capacity on line. The outcome of this was that at times, electricity demand exceeded the supply. In order to protect the national power system, Eskom, the state-owned power utility, had to resort to controlled rotational load shedding. This became customary in the latter months of 2007 (Eskom, 2014).

Eskom embarked on various interventions in an attempt to meet the increasing demand, and in so doing, attempted to limit the impact of what was then deemed an energy crisis. The interventions included upgrades performed on infrastructure, which resulted in improved plant performance and reliability. Eskom also re-commissioned units at three power stations that were mothballed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the country was experiencing electricity overcapacity (Fin24, 2011). Through these interventions, Eskom managed to produce almost 3 800 MW in additional capacity, bringing some alleviation to the constrained power system. However, even these interventions could not preclude load shedding entirely.

In an attempt to eliminate load shedding, Eskom made a decision to operate their ageing coal power stations at full capacity for extended periods. This interfered with the plant maintenance regimes, resulting in much needed maintenance being deferred. This strategy enabled Eskom to suspend load shedding in May 2008, a feat that lasted for most of a 4-year period (Eskom, 2014).

The global financial crisis of 2008 also led to an economic downturn, which caused a decrease in the demand for electricity, yet bringing some alleviation to the constrained power system (Van der Nest, 2015).

Ultimately, the deferred maintenance strategy would catch up with Eskom with intermittent plant breakdowns becoming regular phenomena (refer to Figure 2). In November 2014, South Africa was again exposed to load shedding when a coal silo collapsed at Majuba power station. The collapsed silo hindered the delivery of coal to the operational units of power station, causing a loss of 3 000 MW. This, as well as other unplanned outages, showed in the energy availability factor (EAF) for Eskom’s fleet declining from 85% to 75% over five years since 2008 (Eskom, 2014).




Figure 2: MW not available due to plant breakdowns (Eskom, 2014)

At times, up to 34% of the installed generating capacity was unavailable due to planned and unplanned outages, leaving as little as 29 115 MW to serve the country with a peak demand of just over 37 000 MW (Eskom, 2014).

Since then, plant availability has improved vastly from 67.84% in April 2015 to 77.3% in March 2017. The major role players in this step change were Eskom reinstating and adhering to a

rigorous plant maintenance schedule, the extensive operation of the open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) until late 2016, and the economic downturn which caused a decrease in the demand for electricity (Eskom Integrated Report, 2017).

1.8.2 Energy Outlook

The lack of access to a secure electricity supply remains one of the biggest barriers to the development and prosperity of the people of South Africa, and to a greater extent, the African continent. As a result, millions of people remain trapped in debilitating poverty (Brown, 2016).

At present, Eskom owns and operates a generation capacity of close to 42 100 MW (nominal), which amounts to 96% of the South African electricity needs (Koko and Singh, 2016). International best practice prescribes a reserve margin of 15% within any electricity supply system in order for it to be considered “healthy”. This reserve margin is designed to cater for unexpected surges in demand (US EIA, 2012).

The highest ever peak supply of just over 37 000 MW was recorded in 2014 (Kenny, 2015). Due to the increase in population, the current peak supply could be well over 37 000 MW. This assumption is backed up by Eskom stating that the reserve capacity has been reduced from the 15% level to about 8%, which is insufficient for reliable supply (Eskom, 2017). The situation will deteriorate over time as more power stations, especially the conventional coal-fired power stations of which 65% is already past their mid-life point, will reach the end of their operational life. In order to address this, the South African Government has prioritized the supply and distribution of electricity to its people and industries (Brown, 2016).

1.8.3 Strategy – Integrated Resource Plan 2010 (updated)

In October 2010, the South African Government released, through the Department of Energy (DOE), a draft integrated resource plan (IRP) for the period 2010-2030, which outlines the country’s electricity demands in order to meet the objectives of the national development plan (NDP). Part of the objectives of the NDP is to ensure that at least 90% of the population will have access to grid electricity by 2030 (NDP, 2012).

The IRP was released in early 2011 for public consultation on matters such as:

- Energy security and affordability in order to progress local industry.
- Recommendations on how to diversify the power sources.
- Recommendations on how to reduce climate change.

The revised plan, passed by Cabinet in March 2011, strives for a balanced scenario, aiming to produce the best trade-off between least investment cost, climate change mitigation, diversity of supply, localization, and regional development (IRP, 2016).

Due to a number of developments in the energy sector in Southern Africa as well as the demand outlook that has changed since the approval of the IRP 2010-2030, Government deemed it necessary to update the IRP for the period 2020-2050 (IRP, 2016). The public was again given the opportunity to interrogate the choices and cost assumptions used by the policymakers to reach their conclusions regarding technology choices.

The updated plan predicts that the existing capacity will start to decline dramatically from 2025 onwards, with significant plant retirement occurring in 2031, 2041, and 2048 as the majority of the coal-fired power stations come to their end of life. This means that only 20% of the current electricity generation capacity will remain come 2050 (IRP, 2016). The updated IRP states various requirements in order to maintain an adequate supply in support of economic growth. One of the requirements is a nuclear new build programme that will generate an additional 9 600 MW, with the first unit coming on line by 2026 (IRP, 2016).

1.8.4 Nuclear New Build

In 2007, Eskom's Board approved a plan to expand its generation fleet. The idea was to construct a fleet of nuclear power stations that would increase generating capacity to nearly 80 GWe. However, in December 2008, Eskom announced a decision to put their nuclear build programme on hold as the procurement process stalled in the wake of the global financial crisis. At the time, the South African Government supported Eskom's decision, as they believed it to be too expensive (WNN, 2008).

The nuclear new build plan was revisited following the approval of the IRP 2010, in which it was recommended that the nuclear component of the total energy mix be increased to 13.4% by 2030. The current nuclear contribution to the total generation mix is about 4.4%, which is less than a third of the required 13.4%.

The South African Government has stated its stance on nuclear on many occasions, and this was backed up by the approval of the IRP 2010. In November 2011, Government established the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordinating Committee (NNEECC), which is a leadership structure at state level. Led by the then Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe, this committee, containing eight Cabinet members, was given the authority for decision making, monitoring, and general oversight of the nuclear new build programme (Van Wyk, 2013).

To date, minimal progress has been made with regard to procurement. In order to meet the objective of a 13.4% nuclear contribution by 2030, nuclear power plants (NPPs) need to come on line from 2026 (DOE, 2016).

1.9 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

This research report comprises six chapters, the contents of which are as follows:

- **Chapter 1** – Introduction, Background, Problem Statement, Research Aim, Research Methodology, Research Objectives and Project Scope, Outputs and Deliverables, Work Excluded, Research Background, and the Outline of Dissertation.
- **Chapter 2** – Literature Survey discussing the economic impact of load shedding in South Africa, South Africa's Capacity Overview, Eskom's New Build Programme, Nuclear Build Projects around the World, as well as Nuclear Power Economics.
- **Chapter 3** – PWR Technology Overview.
- **Chapter 4** – Economic Evaluation of Reactor Technologies under consideration for South Africa's NNB, Results and Discussion.
- **Chapter 5** – Conclusion and Recommendations.

The chapters are followed by:

- **Bibliography**
- **Appendices**

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY

In the early part of the twentieth century, electricity supply in South Africa was mainly driven by the demand from the mining industry, which has been a key factor in developing South Africa's economy over the years. This supply came in the form of various power projects initiated by the South African Government, through Eskom, during the 1960s and 1970s. These projects were predominantly coal-fired power stations. The majority of power stations were positioned in the north and north-eastern parts of South Africa where the bulk of coal reserves are concentrated. In order to supply the increasing demand from the coastal regions in South Africa, the South African Government opted to build the country's first NPP near Cape Town in the Western Cape, with construction starting in the mid-1970s (WNA, 2016).

Eskom's ambitious build programme led to the country having a large electricity reserve margin in the early 1980s, which permitted relatively low electricity prices. However, this resulted in a lack of investment in new generating capacity, as well as electricity tariffs not being reflective of what would be required to support future capital expansion projects (Koko and Singh, 2016).

Since 1990, energy consumption has increased rapidly, the chief consumers being industrialization and infrastructure development due to the growth in population. In addition to this, energy consumption also intensified after 1994 when the democratically elected Government initiated the mass rollout of electrification in order to lend a new sense of belonging to people who were previously excluded from accessing electricity services. In South Africa, access to electricity for household usage in the mid-1980s was at a mere 35%. Since then, this figure has more than doubled to 83% by 2011 (DOE, 2015). Electricity has become one of modern society's greatest necessities after food, water, and shelter; hence, it can be expected that the demand for electricity will continue to rise (Wilson, 2009). The South African Government envisage having more than 90% of the population to have access to electricity by 2030 (DOE, 2016).

In order to cater for the increase in energy demand, additional capacity is required. However, a lack of timely coordination and planning delayed the implementation of the country's energy programmes, which has subsequently led to serious supply shortages.

2.1 ECONOMIC IMPACT

The intermittent power outages that occurred between 2007 and 2015 have led to a decline in the South African economy and investor confidence (Van der Nest, 2015).

The South African economy relies heavily on the large-scale, energy-intensive mining industry (US EIA, 2015). This was evident in the wake of Eskom's decision to enter into interruptible load agreements with key customers in the mining industry and various other industrial sectors. Even though Eskom's load shedding schedule was broken down into two-and-a-half-hour periods per

area, it significantly affected industry operations. For large industries such as mining operations or steel foundries, power outages lasted much longer. It normally takes several hours for miners to be evacuated from the mines, and smelters and refineries have complex restart sequences that require up to a full day or even longer to get production up and running again. This resulted in significant loss of production time (Van der Nest, 2015).

South Africa relies heavily on the export of its precious metals and coal to finance its current account deficit. As a result, the load shedding on mining operations led to a strong depreciation of the Rand, as well as a stalling of economic growth and downward revisions in growth forecasts. Several rating agencies have also downgraded the country's credit rating, which has had a negative impact on the outlook of the country as an investment destination (Van der Nest, 2015).

Industrialization and infrastructure development, especially in the mining sector, were key aspects in driving the South African economy over the years to become the second largest economy in Africa (US EIA, 2015). Energy security is therefore crucial for the realization of the NDP's objectives, one of which is achieving economic growth of 5.5%, currently estimated to be around 4% (Joemat-Pettersson, 2015).

2.2 CAPACITY OVERVIEW

At present, Eskom owns and operates a generation capacity of close to 42 100 MW (nominal), which amounts to 96% of the South African electricity needs (Koko and Singh, 2016). The remaining 4% is being provided through local authorities, industry, and other imports through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Eskom's generating fleet comprises a variety of sources as illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Eskom generation plant mix (Koko and Singh, 2016)

Operation of an electric power system is dictated by the daily load requirements of the country. For most power systems in the world, there is a required minimum level of demand for electricity over a 24-hour period. This required minimum level is termed the “base load” of the power system. The concept of base load demand is illustrated in Figure 4, that is, the area below the green 24 000 MW line.

Base load capacity is traditionally supplied using fossil fuels and nuclear. These stations normally operate continuously at a steady load for 24 hours per day, and are generally only shut down for scheduled maintenance or emergency repairs. South Africa’s base load capacity is predominantly supplied by several coal-fired power stations and by one nuclear power station (Eskom, 2016).

The demand for electricity varies throughout the day due to changes in business operations and residential activities. This results in the demand increasing to a higher-than-usual level over a 24-hour period. The higher-than-usual demands are termed “peak loads”. Peak loads are the highest load demands above base load demand (refer to Figure 4), that are experienced throughout a 24-hour period. In South Africa, the main peaks usually occur from around 06:00 in the morning and lasts until about 09:00. A second peak period is normally experienced from about 16:00 until 21:00. During these times, demand approaches the available capacity (Eskom, 2016); refer to Figure 4.




Figure 4 Typical winter and summer load profiles (Eskom, 2016)

Generally, base load power stations do not have much flexibility for following the load variations. For this reason, they are supplemented with more flexible peak-load and intermediate-load power stations. Peak-load and intermediate-load power stations start up rapidly and can go from shutdown to full load within minutes in order to meet peak demands. In South Africa, these peak-load and intermediate-load power stations comprise pump storage, hydroelectric, and OCGTs.

2.3 VARIOUS ENERGY SOURCES

2.3.1 Coal

South Africa is amongst the top 10 producers of coal in the world, which also makes it one of the leading coal export nations (CIAB, 2016). As a result, coal is relatively inexpensive, hence it being a favourite for electricity production. This is borne out by the 85.1% share that coal-fired power stations have of the total primary energy generated (Koko and Singh, 2016).

However, burning coal for energy production has become a controversial issue as it is considered to be a leading contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the primary cause of global warming according to the Union of Concerned Scientists USA (UCSUSA). For this reason, the use of fossil fuels for energy production has come under scrutiny in recent years as GHG is also deemed to have a negative impact on respiratory health. This led to the international community implementing various policies in attempt to limit GHG emissions.

South Africa is said to be the leading emitter of carbon dioxide in Africa, accounting for 40% of emissions in Africa and the 13th largest emitter in the world (US EIA, 2015). This is putting the South African Government and Eskom under pressure, which is one of the reasons why the IRP is aiming for a diverse energy supply in order to limit the effects on climate change (Integrated Energy Plan, 2016).

2.3.2 Natural Gas and Diesel

In South Africa, as in most other countries, OCGT and diesel engines are mostly used when the demand exceeds the maximum output, i.e. for peak load production. Currently, OCGT and diesel-powered generators contribute 5.4% to the total generated capacity. They are generally more expensive to operate in the South African economic landscape due to the uncertainty surrounding proven gas resources and the volatile price of crude oil. However, in countries such as North America where abundant gas reserves are available at a relatively low price, gas is widely used as an alternative base-load solution (WNA, 2015).

During the period when load shedding was prevalent in South Africa, Eskom used the OCGTs to supplement the base-load stations. However, this came at a very high expense; in the region of R8.7 billion compared to a budgeted R2.9 billion (Eskom Integrated Report, 2016).

Currently, South Africa has limited gas resources at its disposal, but the South African Government has initiated various surveys in order to establish the potential of shale gas resources in the country. Initial estimations indicated approximately 485 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources (US EIA, 2015). Should this be confirmed, South Africa would be in a position to explore the potential of using natural gas as a low-carbon alternative for electricity generation. This potential was enhanced by the discovery of gas reserves along the southern coast (offshore) of South Africa (Modise and Mahotas, 2016). In addition to this, there is also the possibility of sourcing gas from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Namibia. Based on these estimates, the option of natural gas shows real potential in South Africa (Modise and Mahotas, 2016).

2.3.3 Hydro and Pumped Storage

The current generation plant mix includes two conventional hydroelectric power stations and three hydro pumped storage schemes. These two types of stations have a combined installed capacity of 2 000 MW which accounts for 4.7% of Eskom's total generating capacity (Koko and Singh, 2016).

In order to generate hydroelectricity, a significant difference in elevation is required between two platforms that will allow water to flow from the top platform to the hydro generating plant at the bottom. South Africa has no great prospects in terms of water resources combined with a favourable landscape required for a hydro generation plant; hence the small contribution to the total generating capacity.

South Africa supplements its electricity supply by importing capacity from hydropower facilities in neighbouring countries such as Mozambique (Cahora Bassa), Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire (DOE, 2015).

2.3.4 Renewable Energy

Renewable energy technology options were marginalized in the past due to Eskom having had excess capacity. Developments were often left to a few pilot projects largely driven by the international donor community. However, since the first implementation of load shedding in 2008, the landscape has changed dramatically. Such is the drive for renewable energy technologies that it is forming the basis of the energy mix proposed in the IRP. Consequently, the IRP 2010 has set a target of 17 800 MW (equivalent to 42%) of renewable capacity, comprising largely solar (photovoltaics and concentrated solar power) and wind (DOE, 2015).

The main objective of this initiative is to provide for some stability in terms of supply in the short to medium term as renewable technologies take considerably less time than conventional power stations to come on line and be integrated with the system (Joemat-Pettersson, 2015).

At present, Eskom has few commercially operating renewable power sources, amounting to 100 MW (0.2% of total capacity). Since 2011, the country has introduced a world-class competitive bidding process, which to date has attracted 92 independent power producers (IPPs) who will contribute in excess of 6 327 MW (DOE, 2015).

2.3.5 Nuclear

Eskom has one nuclear power plant in its generation fleet, namely Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (KNPS) located about 30 km north of Cape Town. KNPS is a Generation II plant, based on the French CP-900 MW reactor technology.

KNPS is the only commercially operated NPP on the African continent and comprises two pressurized water reactor (PWR) units. Construction of the two reactors units, done by the French consortium Framatome (now Areva), began in 1976 with the first unit starting commercial operation in April 1984 (WNA, 2015). This means that the KNPS is now approaching the 40-year operational life span of a conventional NPP, which will be around seven years from now, in 2024. This might have some impact on the IRP and the objectives of the NDP. As an interim measure, Eskom is in the process of conducting a self-assessment with the view on long-term operation, along with the implementation of various plant modifications at KNPS in order to prolong the plant's operating life to 60 years (Austin, 2015).

KNPS contributes 1 860 MW to the national grid, which amounts to 4.4% of the total generating capacity, and has an availability factor of 83.9% (IAEA, 2017).

As part of the long-term energy security strategy, the South African Government has highlighted nuclear to be an integral part of the future energy mix alongside a variety of renewables and low-carbon fossil fuel sources (Joemat-Pettersson, 2015).

2.4 ESKOM'S NEW BUILD PROGRAMME

Eskom is currently expediting the construction of three major power projects across the country. This comprises two new coal-fired power stations, Medupi and Kusile in the Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces respectively, consisting of 6 units each with a combined installed capacity of 9 600 MW once completed (Eskom Integrated Report, 2016). In addition to this is the Ingula pump storage facility in Kwa-Zulu Natal, comprising 4 units, which came into full commercial operation in January 2017.

On 23 August 2015, Eskom announced the commercial operation of the first unit at Medupi (unit 6) which added 794 MW to the South African national grid (Alstom, 2015). This was shortly followed by the commercial operation of unit 5 on 3 April 2017 (Reuters, 2017).

Unit 1 of Kusile power station was connected to the national grid for the first time on 27 December 2016. This facility, once fully commercially operable, will add 800 MW to the

national grid. Together these projects promise to add roughly 11 000 MW to the grid between June 2015 and May 2020 (Eskom Integrated Report, 2016).

2.5 NUCLEAR BUILD PROJECTS AROUND THE WORLD

The focus currently is on renewable energy technologies, predominantly subsidized wind and PV solar systems, and how these technologies can be incorporated into current and future energy mixes. Renewable energy technologies have great potential for a variety of applications, but the debate on whether renewable technology can be employed to produce large-scale continuous supply of electricity, i.e. base load demand, is still ongoing (WNA, 2015).

Historically, coal and nuclear have been the sources for large-scale base-load power generation, not considering countries such as the North America where the price of gas is relatively low and its future supply fairly secured. However, the use of fossil fuels is becoming less favourable with national policymakers and the public due to CO₂ emission and the perceived detrimental effects it has on climate change and human health (WNA, 2015).

There is an ever-growing demand and consumption of energy due to population growth and industrial development in developing countries (WNA, 2015). As a result, many countries, mainly in Eastern Europe and Asia, are retaining nuclear as a primary energy source. China, Russia, and India are currently among the countries with major nuclear new build projects. Globally, there are 58 reactors under construction in 15 countries, with 19 of these being in China (IAEA, 2016); refer to Figure 5. Various other countries, including South Africa, are also considering nuclear build projects to form part of a balanced energy mix (IRP, 2016).




Figure 5 Total number of reactors under construction (IAEA, 2017)

Despite the upturn in the international number of nuclear new build projects, the proposed NNBP in South Africa remains a controversial issue. This is mainly due to the uncertainty around the associated cost, i.e. what a nuclear fleet will cost, and whether the country can afford it. In an attempt to address this, the NDP called for an investigation into various aspects of the NNBP, including cost, before a procurement decision is taken (NDP, 2012).

2.6 NUCLEAR POWER ECONOMICS

A review of available information indicates that the average capital investment costs of advanced nuclear power plants were estimated to be at about US \$5 945/kW in 2015 dollars (US EIA, 2016). Findings from various studies that have been performed on nuclear economics indicate that nuclear energy projects are capital intensive and their economic competitiveness is heavily influenced by its construction schedule and the associated interest charges (WNA, 2017). Other factors that also have an impact on nuclear economics are the rising costs of capital, higher global commodity prices, and skills shortages (US EIA, 2016).

2.6.1 Nuclear Economic Definitions

2.6.1.1 Total Capital Investment Cost

The total capital investment cost (TCIC), also referred to as the “all-in cost”, is the total up-front cost incurred for constructing an NPP and bringing it to a commercially operable state (EMWG Guidelines, 2007). Several studies on nuclear power economics consider the TCIC by far the most important factor in the cost of nuclear electricity (D’haeseleer, 2013).

The TCIC, here expressed in \$/kWe, consists of the total overnight construction cost (OCC) and the cost involved in repaying the cost of construction loan (CCL). Mathematically, the TCIC can be expressed by the following formula:

$$TCIC = (CCL) + (OCC)$$

2.6.1.2 Cost of Construction Loan

The cost relating to the construction loan is a combination of the cost incurred due to interest during construction (IDC) and the cost incurred due to escalation (Gonzalez, 2014).

2.6.1.2.1 Interest during construction

Interest during construction (IDC) is the amount payable on the up-front financing cost required to bring the plant to a commercial operating state (D’haeseleer, 2013). As soon as the project capital is raised and the construction payments begin, an interest payment becomes due to investors (equity) as well as interest payments to service loans (debt). These interest payments on debt and equity are applicable from the start of construction until commercial operation (EMWG Guidelines, 2007).

Nuclear power technology is known for having relatively high up-front cost and generally takes longer to construct when compared to construction cost of other electricity generating sources. This makes IDC a significant cost component in the evaluation of nuclear power economics (US EIA, 2016).

IDC is influenced by factors including the construction period, the OCC and the reference time for OCC, the financing arrangements, the discount rate (WACC), and inflation (D'haeseleer, 2013). These factors allow for IDC to be determined through the following equation (CEU, 2008):

$$IDC = OCC \times (IDC)_{fract}$$

Where: $(IDC)_{fract} = \sum_{k=1}^{C_T} W_k [(1 + r)^{C_T - (k-1)} - 1]$

OCC = Overnight Construction Cost

(IDC)_{fract} = The additional fraction of the OCC due to interest during construction

C_T = The construction period [months]

W_k = The fraction of the total capital expended in year k

r = The discount rate

NOTE: The discount rate “r” is expressed in decimal form and that “W_k” and “r” are both expressed in either nominal or real terms (D'haeseleer, 2013).

2.6.1.2.2 Cost escalation

Cost escalation is essentially the cost incurred due to increased materials and labour costs as a result of inflation. The cost escalation is normally predicted by considering some of the following factors (D'haeseleer, 2013):

- Change in the inflation rate.
- Change in the project schedule.
- Change in the predicted price evolution of particular goods and services.

Historical data, in particular cost estimates or actual construction costs, are used in order to extrapolate this information.

2.6.1.3 Overnight Capital Cost

The overnight capital cost (OCC) is described as the cost of a construction project excluding the finance cost, i.e. as if the project was completed “overnight” with no interest incurred and no escalation cost taken into consideration. The OCC comprises base construction costs (also referred to as the engineering, procurement, and construction cost), owner’s costs, contingency costs, as well as the first core costs and commissioning cost (EMWG Guidelines, 2007).

2.6.1.4 Engineering Procurement and Construction Cost

The engineering, procurement, and construction cost (EPCC) is described as the most-likely plant construction cost and comprise the direct costs, indirect costs, and the cost of services provided by the EPC contractor (D'haeseleer, 2013). The EPCC makes provision for costs that relate to site preparation, materials, equipment, manpower aspects, as well as the supervision services for construction, engineering, and licensing activities (D'haeseleer, 2013).

The direct cost comprises the cost of the physical plant equipment as well as the labour and the materials to assemble it, and accounts for 60% of the EPCC cost (WNA, 2017).

The remaining 40% of the EPCC is allocated for the indirect cost and other services provided by the EPCC contractor. This accounts for all the costs that are not directly associated with the plant and comprises supervision of construction, engineering, and licensing activities, design and project management services, as well as support labour (Mitev, 2014; EMWG Guidelines, 2007).

2.6.1.5 Owner's Cost

A study by William D. D'haeseleer explains several definitions of owner's cost (OC). All these definitions concur that the OC is dependent on which costs are accepted by the owner outside the EPCC contract, i.e. all the cost that the utility owner will have to cover from its own resources (D'haeseleer, 2013). The OC will vary from project to project but in most cases, it will include the following (US EIA, 2010; WNA, 2017):

- Development cost including preliminary feasibility and engineering studies, environmental studies, licences and legal fees, and project management and insurance cost.
- The purchase of land and the preparatory site works to prepare the site for construction.
- Site works, including construction of administration and associated buildings, as well as the plant switchyard.
- Owner's contingency as well as property taxes during construction.

2.6.1.6 Contingency Cost

Contingency cost is the cost that is added upfront to the OCC to cater for uncertainties and errors in the initial estimation. It also caters for the unpredictability that comes with site-specific differences (NREL, 2012). Operational experience has shown that contingency costs are likely and expected to be incurred, even though they cannot be explicitly determined at the time of cost estimation (NETL, 2011).

Project contingency does not make provision for potential changes from external factors such as changing regulatory requirements, major design or project scope changes, natural disasters, labour unrest, or project funding limitations (EMWG Guidelines, 2007).

2.6.1.7 Weighted Average Cost of Capital

The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) represents the overall cost of financing which would be incurred by a utility raising the funds to be invested in a nuclear project (IAEA Nuclear Contracting Toolkit, 2016). The WACC for a proposed project is calculated by taking into account the split between debt and equity financing, i.e. how much of the financing will be via share issuance versus how much will be borrowed. The WACC can be calculated by using the following formula (IAEA, 2016):

$$WACC = (k_E \times \text{share of Equity}) + (k_D \times \text{share of Debt}) \times (1 - t)$$

Where: k_E = *Estimated cost of Equity.*

k_D = *Estimated cost of Debt.*

t = *Tax rate faced by the company.*

$(1 - t)$ = *The tax deductibility of corporate borrowing.*

The WACC for a proposed project is compared to the utility's cost of capital, also known as the discount rate, to determine the feasibility of the proposed project, i.e. if the minimum return on the proposed project will be sufficient to satisfy its creditors, the owners, and other providers of capital (IAEA, 2016).

The WACC of a project is dependent on various project related risks. If the project is deemed high risk, the cost of debt and equity will also be higher which will result in the investors seeking a higher return on investment (US EIA, 2016).

2.6.1.8 Discount Rate

The discount rate caters for the time value of money by taking unforeseen investment risk into account. This is based on the concept that money that is to be paid or received in the future will be less valuable than money paid or received in the moment (IAEA, 2016). A utility will therefore only proceed with a new venture if forecasts show that a proposed project will be profitable, i.e. its expected revenues will be larger than its expected costs. Ultimately, the discount rate makes it possible to estimate how much the project's future cash flow would be worth in the present (net present value). The higher the discount rate, the smaller the present investment needs to be to achieve the revenue required for the project to succeed. The EMWG recommends the use a discount rate equal to the WACC, which will be the expected return on investment (EMWG, 2007).

2.6.1.9 Net Present Value

The net present value (NPV) is a common component in discounting future cash flows and widely used to analyse the profitability of a proposed project. To assess whether the cash flow of a new project is sufficient to reimburse the investment and capital costs used to finance a project, investors calculate the NPV. NPV calculations are based on expected prices and takes into account the variation and uncertainty of the expected prices over time (IEA and NEA, 2015).

This is done by calculating the difference between the discounted, or present, value of the revenues that will be accrued over the commercial life of a project, and the investment made during construction, operation, and for the purpose of decommissioning (G.S. Rothwell, 1997). The calculation for the NPV is done by using the following formula (G.S. Rothwell, 1997):

$$NPV = \sum \frac{(R_t - C_t)}{(1 + r)^t}$$

Where: R_t = "Cash in-flow per period" which is the revenue expected in each future period t .

C_t = "Cash out flow per period" which is the cost in each future period t .

r = The real discount rate.

A positive value for the NPV implies that projected earnings generated by a project exceed the initial cost, i.e. the project earns a higher yield than the assumed discount rate (Winkler & Streit, 2008) whereas a negative NPV implies that the proposed project will not deliver a sufficient return (IEA and NEA, 2015). The NPV will not be covered as part of this study as it is not the objective to compare profitability of the various generating sources under consideration.

2.6.1.10 Internal Rate of Return

The internal rate of return (IRR) of a project is that rate of return, or interest rate, at which the NPV of that particular project becomes zero and is used to show the effect of the construction lifetime on the cost of capital (Winkler & Streit, 2008). This means that the project's expected revenue in each future period is equal to the cash outflow in each future period. In order to calculate the IRR, the same formula as calculating NPV is applicable. The formula is as follows (G.S. Rothwell, 1997):

$$NPV = \sum \frac{(R_t - C_t)}{(1 + r)^t}$$

Where: R_t = "Cash inflow per period" which is the revenue expected in each future period t .

C_t = "Cash outflow per period" which is the cost in each future period t .

r = IRR.

In this calculation, estimated discount rates are used and adjusted in an iterative process to determine the value of the discount rate at which the NPV equals zero, which is the value of IRR (IAEA INPRO, 2014). Generally, the higher a project's internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake the project (Winkler & Streit, 2008).

2.6.1.11 Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)

The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), normally expressed in \$/MWh, is the most common standard and measure used in the energy industry to do an overall competitiveness assessment of a variety of electricity generating technologies. LCOE is described as the constant unit cost for generating electricity, charged by the utility to cover the cost for owning, operating, and maintaining a power plant over its entire lifetime (WNA, 2017). The key inputs into calculating the LCOE include the OCC, the fixed and variable operations and maintenance (O&M) cost, the fuel cost, the financing cost, the expected operational lifetime, and the assumed load factor. The LCOE can be calculated by the following formula (D'haeseleer, 2013):

$$LCOE = \frac{[OCC \times CRF + FOM]}{8760 \times LF} + VOM + FC$$

Where: *OCC = Overnight capital cost (\$/kW)*

$$CRF = \text{Capital recovery factor} = \frac{r(1+r)^N}{(1+r)^N - 1}$$

N = The expected operational lifetime of the plant (years)

r = The discount rate

FOM = Annualized fixed operation and maintenance Cost (\$/kW-yr)

VOM = Annualized variable operation and maintenance Cost (\$/kWh)

LF = Annualized load factor of the plant

FC = Annualised fuel cost during plant lifetime operation

It is important to recognize that the LCOE measure for a particular technology is purely hypothetical due to taking into account various industry-based assumptions and financing terms. As a result, this may differ from the real prices (D'haeseleer, 2013).

2.6.1.12 Operation and maintenance (O&M) cost

The operations and maintenance (O&M) cost forms part of the plant operating cost. The other constituents of operation cost include the fuel costs and the provision of funding for the decommissioning of the plant, as well as the treatment and disposing of used fuel and wastes (WNA, 2012).

O&M costs comprise non-fuel related O&M costs and fuel costs (US EIA, 2010). The non-fuel related O&M costs can be divided into three categories namely fixed O&M cost (FOM), variable O&M cost (VOM), and major maintenance cost (US EIA, 2010).

The FOM costs are those that do not vary significantly with any changes in production. These include, but are not limited to, the following (US EIA, 2010):

- Monthly fees and bonuses paid out to permanent staff.
- Plant support equipment, which includes equipment rentals and temporary labour.
- Plant-related general and administrative expenses, i.e. internet, postage, telephone, etc.
- Routine preventive and predictive maintenance performed during operations.
- Maintenance of general plant areas as well as systems, structures, and components (SSCs).

VOM costs are those that are production-related and vary with electrical generation. These include, but are not limited to, the following (US EIA, 2010):

- Water usage for production processes, e.g. demineralized water production.
- The disposal of general and radioactive waste, as well as wastewater.
- Chemicals, resins, catalysts, and gases.
- Lubricants.
- Consumable materials and supplies.

For the purpose of this study, the fuel cost will form part of variable O&M cost (D'haeseleer, 2013).

Major maintenance costs are generally those incurred during extended maintenance and re-fuelling outages. This depends on the maintenance and refuelling strategy, as well as original equipment manufacturer recommendations and requirements. These major maintenance costs include, but are not restricted to, the following:

- Scheduled major overhauls in order to maintain the SSCs.
- The maintenance labour and spares required for major overhauls.

Historical data shows that the O&M cost has a tendency to increase as the plants get older (WNA, 2012).

2.6.1.12.1 Fuel cost

Fuel cost includes the cost incurred for purchasing new fuel, as well as the allowances provided for plant decommissioning and the management of used fuel and waste disposal. Contributions are normally made over the economic lifetime of the plant in order to have the necessary funds available when required for the treatment and disposal of used fuel and nuclear waste, as well as the decommissioning of the power plant (WNA, 2016).

2.6.2 Construction Delays

Nuclear power generation has always been a contentious issue, mainly due to concerns regarding uncontrolled release of radiation and the generation of radioactive waste during the nuclear power cycle. In order to ensure safe operation of nuclear facilities the nuclear industry is strictly regulated by national and international regulatory bodies during construction, commercial operation, as well as decontamination and decommissioning.

The siting, construction, operation, decontamination, or decommissioning of any nuclear installation must be authorized by way of a nuclear licence, which is granted by the National Nuclear Regulator as defined in National Nuclear Regulatory Act (Act no. 47 of 1999). However, before this licence is granted, the regulating authority requires the utility to demonstrate that it has the necessary management skills and resources, and that it can master all the systems needed to operate the reactors. The licensing process as well as regulation have become some of the main factors influencing nuclear power economics (Kidd, 2011).

Protracted construction schedules lead to the delay of the commercial operation of the reactor. The delay of the commercial operation has a knock-on effect on the sale of electricity, which leads to a loss of income, which ultimately results in the utility not being able to repay the sum of the overnight and accrued interest charges (Cohen, 1990). The delay of construction due to regulation was particularly evident in the aftermath of the accidents at Three Mile Island (TMI) in March 1979 and at Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986. This resulted in the United States regulatory authorities introducing more stringent criteria for licensing NPPs (Greenpeace, 2008).

Reactors that were under construction at the time of the TMI accident were eventually completed at 2.8 times the median cost, and 2.2 times the median construction period of those reactors that were completed before the TMI accident occurred (J.R. Lovering et al, 2016).

A more recent example of how rigorous regulatory requirements have affected the construction schedule of an NPP, is the unit 3 of the Olkiluoto power plant in Finland. Olkiluoto unit 3 was the first ever EPR 1600 reactor design to be constructed in the world. Construction of the unit began in July 2005, with a planned construction period of 60 months, and commercial operation expected in 2010. However, construction issues highlighted poor workmanship and poor oversight of construction activities. This led to an investigation by the Finnish nuclear regulator

STUK, and resultantly caused major construction delays. Following the initial delays, completion of the project was set at over 7 years. However, more recent projections have put the start-up date at 2018 (WNN, 2014). The estimated cost of completion in December 2012 was put at €8.5 billion, almost three times the original delivery price of €3 billion (BBC news, 2012).

The economics of nuclear power electricity generation is important for decision making on choices for future electricity supply. The following sections will provide some insight into the various cost components of nuclear economics.

2.6.3 Labour

The successful outcome of any project—successful meaning that the project is completed within the cost estimate—depends on the adherence to the execution plan and the assumptions without any deviation (EPRI, 2015). Labour is integral to the adherence to the execution plan, especially for large civil projects. This is notable in the construction experience of the Medupi and Kusile projects. Eskom initially reported that the first unit of Medupi would be on line by 2012, followed by the first unit of Kusile a year later. However, due to labour strife and skills shortages, commercial operation of these projects only started in August 2015 and December 2016 respectively (Alstom, 2015; Eskom, 2016).

Table 2: Breakdown of NPP costs by major components (WNA, 2017)

Equipment	Percentage
Nuclear Steam Supply System	12
Electrical and Generating Equipment	12
Mechanical Equipment	16
Information and Control System (incl. software)	8
Construction Materials	12
Labour on Site	25
Project Management Services	10
Other Services	2
First Fuel Load	3
Total	100

The economics for the new NPPs that were constructed over the last decade show significant variation in the capital cost for nuclear power projects in different countries, most notable when comparing cost data from projects in East Asia, Europe, and North America (WNA, 2017). This is influenced by a number of factors, which include the following (WNA, 2017):

- Labour cost and labour productivity, i.e. the level of skill and experience of the labour force.

- Whether the utility is building multiple units, which will allow for a streamlined licensing process.
- Experienced project management capacity with significant civil engineering project experience.
- The commodities and manufacturing capacity needed in the design and construction of new power plants (Schlissel and Biewald, 2008).

The South African Government has emphasized that localization will be a key factor in the selection of a preferred vendor; therefore it is important to understand the impact of the labour cost and labour productivity on capital cost calculations.

The sections that follow consider the factors that influence the labour component, and how this may affect the project capital cost of a nuclear project. The focus will mainly be on labour cost, labour productivity, and other factors that may influence construction cost of an NPP in the South African economic landscape.

2.6.3.1 South African Labour Force

Currently, South Africa has an employment rate of around 74%. The breakdown of the skill level of the South African workforce is described in Table 3 below (STATS SA, 2016):

Table 3: Skill level of South African workforce (Stats SA, 2016)

Skill Level	Percentage	Occupational Group
Skilled	25	Managers
		Professionals
		Technicians
Semi-Skilled	46	Clerks
		Sales and Services
		Skilled Agriculture
		Craft
		Machine Operators
Low Skilled	29	Elementary
		Domestic Workers

The construction industry in South Africa is a significant employment provider, providing employment to more than 1.18 million people, either permanently employed or on a contract basis (Stats SA, 2016). In addition to this, there is also further employment opportunities created that stems from the construction industry; these include the materials manufacturing and supply sector, as well as in the services sector. Around 70% of the labour employed in the South African construction industry is either semi-skilled or low skilled (CIDB, 2015).

2.6.4 Labour Productivity

Labour productivity is essentially a tool that is used to measure labour effectiveness relative to a standard (EMWG Guidelines, 2007). It measures the ratio between the actual output produced per standard period worked, or per standard unit cost. This is described in the following equation:

$$\text{Labour Productivity} = \frac{\text{Total Output}}{\text{Total Input}}$$

Where: *“Total Input” = standard time (h) or standard cost (\$).*

From the equation above, it can be concluded that the more output is produced over a given period, or at a certain cost, the higher the productivity.

External factors such as inflation, the national economy, as well as competition from other service (labour) providers may affect productivity. However, labour productivity is the one factor over which the utility has more control.

A study that focuses on labour productivity and work conditions in the South African construction industry indicates deterioration in the labour productivity over the last decade (CIDB, 2015). The main reason behind the deterioration in the labour productivity is believed to be labour unrest. Labour unrest is caused mainly by disputes over earnings, be it wages, bonuses, or other compensation disputes. In 2013, this labour unrest accounted for around 76.6% of the total working days lost (CIDB, 2015).

Other factors that may affect labour productivity include the following (CIDB, 2015):

- The skill level of the workforce. If the workers become more skilled with the relevant training, then this can increase productivity. A skilled workforce generally requires minimal supervision and produces work of a higher quality, whereas unskilled labour requires more supervision in order to produce an acceptable standard of work.
- Technological advancement. The incorporation of new technology and automated processes, machinery, and equipment is some of the factors that improved productivity.
- Labour rights and regulations. The rigorous labour legislation makes it difficult for an employer to dismiss lacklustre workers, which may result in deterioration in productivity. However, the absence of such regulations could lead to the employer demanding more from the workforce in order to generate higher turnover, which in turn will affect worker morale and in the process diminish labour productivity.

With labour productivity declining over the last decade, it means that a utility might need more labourers to do a particular job. It is therefore widely expected that the number of labour hours required for the construction of an NPP in South Africa would be higher than that of other countries (EPRI, 2015).

2.6.5 Labour Costs

Labour cost differs from country to country which is also one of the reasons why capital cost for nuclear projects varies between countries, particularly between the emerging industrial economies of East Asia, and the developed economies of western Europe and North America (WNA, 2017).

The labour cost of a construction project is dependent on the number of labourers employed to perform construction activities, and the average wage of these labourers, including benefits (Rothwell, 2016).

$$\text{Labour cost} = L \times P_L$$

Where: L = Labour; number of employees

P_L = Price of labour; average wages and benefits

The number of employees required to do a specific job within a certain period is based on the labour productivity, whereas the wages and benefits are normally governed by country-specific labour rights and regulations (CIDB, 2015).

In South Africa, labour rights and regulations have become an ingrained element of South African society (CIDB, 2015). This is illustrated by the fact that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) forms part of a formal alliance with the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), and the South African Communist Party. As a result, market forces are not allowed to dictate wage levels on the basis of supply and demand. Instead, labour rights and regulations are used to some degree to address the problem of poverty and inequality in society that was created by the apartheid regime (CIDB, 2015). It can therefore be expected that the cost of labour will remain relatively high for the foreseeable future.

2.6.6 Unit Labour Cost

The unit labour costs are defined as the average cost of labour per unit produced, which is mostly used as a broad reflection of international price competitiveness (OECD, 2017). It represents a direct link between productivity and the cost of labour used to generate an output, and can be expressed in the following way (OECD, 2017):

$$\text{Unit Labour Costs} = \frac{\text{Cost of labour}}{\text{Unit of output (labour productivity)}}$$

An increase in a country's unit labour cost represents an increased reward to the labourers of that country for their contribution. However, if the increase in cost of labour becomes far greater than the labour productivity, then the country's economy might lose its competitive edge (OECD, 2017).

2.6.7 Material Costs

Historically, the cost of bulk materials in South Africa has been relatively inexpensive due to its abundant mineral resources (McCarthy, 2005). However, a study of power generation technology for the IRP of South Africa states that even though the prices of raw materials remain relatively inexpensive in South Africa when compared to the United States, the potential savings are offset by higher production costs. The higher production cost results from a declining labour productivity, relatively high cost of labour, and the use of less sophisticated production processes and techniques (EPRI, 2015).

In addition to this, it has been established that the supply chain for nuclear components has become fully integrated and globalized, i.e. components for nuclear plants are being sourced internationally (Groskopf, 2016). Many of the heavy manufactured components can now be sourced from various suppliers in different countries around the world. In the past, there were only a few manufacturers of nuclear components, especially the larger equipment such as reactor pressure vessels, SGs, and turbines. Nowadays, there are at least twenty-three manufacturers spread across eleven countries that can supply this equipment (Groskopf, 2016). Essentially, this has enabled the prices of nuclear systems, structures, and components to become more comparable internationally, making the cost thereof more predictable. Based on this, it is assumed in this study that the material costs are internationally comparable, i.e. nuclear material cost is the same everywhere in the world.

CHAPTER 3 PWR TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW

3.1 PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR (PWR) TECHNOLOGY

The first commercial nuclear power plant was the Shippingport Power Station in Pennsylvania. Shippingport was a light water reactor (LWR) and was connected to the grid for the first time in December 1957 (IAEA, 2017).

In April 2017, there were 448 commercial NPPs operating in 30 countries around the world with a total capacity of more than 391 120 MW (IAEA, 2017). The list of commercially operated power plants includes a variety of reactor technologies, with over 80% being LWRs of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) or boiling water reactor (BWR) designs (IAEA, 2017); refer to Figure 6.




Figure 6: Total number of reactors by type (IAEA, 2017)

3.1.1 Basic Operation of the PWR Technology

The basic operation of a PWR is illustrated in Figure 7. A conventional PWR operates through heat transfer that takes place between three interdependent systems, i.e. the primary, secondary, and tertiary systems. These three systems are physically separated from one another in order to limit the spread of radioactive effluents (Lamarsh, 2001).




Figure 7: Basic layout of a PWR (Eskom, 2016)

Heat is generated in the reactor core by the fission of uranium atoms. This heat is transferred to the primary coolant, which, in the LWR design, is water. When the reactor is at power, the primary coolant pumps maintain a continuous flow of primary coolant through the reactor core during steady state and transient conditions. This

ensures that the heat is evacuated from the core and transferred to the secondary side of the steam generators (SGs) The primary coolant is maintained under pressure (normally around 15 MPa) by a pressurizer to prevent the primary coolant from boiling; hence the name, pressurized water reactor (Lamarsh, 2001).

The heated coolant is pumped through three independent closed looped SGs where it transfers its thermal energy to the secondary system through a large number of narrow tubes that act as a heat exchanger (Lamarsh, 2001).

On the shell side of the SG, secondary coolant, also known as feedwater, is pumped into the SG. This feedwater is under a lower pressure (normally 7 MPa) compared to that of the primary system (normally 15 MPa). In the SG, the feedwater absorbs the heat through the SG tube walls until it starts to boil and generates steam. The steam is conveyed to turbines. As the steam moves through the turbine it expands and produces work that causes the turbine to rotate. The turbine shaft is connected to the stator of an electric generator (Lamarsh, 2001).

After giving off most of its energy whilst passing through the turbine, the secondary water-steam mixture is cooled down to a condensate in another heat exchanger, i.e. the condenser, before being pumped back to the steam generator as feedwater. In certain NPP, the feedwater is pre-heated in order to increase plant efficiency and also to minimize thermal shock in the SG tubes (Lamarsh, 2001).

The tertiary system, also called the cooling loop, is normally an open loop circuit, which is used as the heat sink. During normal operation, cool water (13°C at Koeberg NPP) is pumped through the condenser, in order to cool the water-steam mixture. The cool seawater absorbs the latent heat from the water-steam mixture that exits the turbine. This is done through a large number of heat exchanger tubes in the condenser. The heat transfer process increases the temperature of the seawater from 13°C to about 24°C before the water is returned to the sea.

3.1.2 Reactor Designs

Nuclear reactor technology for commercial electricity production has been around since 1957, which means the nuclear power industry stretches over six decades. During this time, many developments have taken place. These developments were based on research findings, lessons learned from industry, as well as policy amendments in response to the nuclear incidents that occurred at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. In order to distinguish between reactor designs, the nuclear industry introduced a system in the late 1990s whereby reactor designs are classified in generational groups (refer to Figure 8).




Figure 8: The evolution of nuclear power reactors (Goldberg & Rosner, 2011)

The sections that follow give a brief overview of the various generation designs. These designs will be evaluated for their technical capabilities only.

3.1.2.1 Generation I

Generation I reactors are the early prototype designs that were established in the 1950s and 1960s. These reactors were mainly designed for plutonium production, which was used in nuclear weapons and naval applications, i.e. submarines. Westinghouse, a United States utility, used this prototype technology for the basis of the first land-based PWR (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011). This was closely followed by a General Electric initiative, also in the United States, who developed the BWR technology (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011).

BWRs essentially started the trend of using nuclear energy for commercial electricity production. Safety was not a main priority during these early designs. The developments were mainly motivated by the search for higher thermal efficiencies, lower system pressures, the ability to stay on-line for longer periods, and the better utilization of uranium resources (WNA, 2012).

Wylfa Nuclear Power Station in Wales was the last commercially operated Generation I plant to be decommissioned. Decommissioning took place in December 2015 (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011). Generation I reactor technology falls outside the scope of this research.

3.1.2.2 Generation II

Generation II reactors were designed for the reliable production of electricity for commercial use. These reactors were initially designed to have an operational life of 40 years. Generation II reactors are characterized by the Westinghouse (American) and EDF (French) fleets, which

started operation in the late 1960s and form the bulk of the reactors used for commercial electricity production in the world today. These reactor designs employ what is known as “traditional active safety features”. This involves electrical and/or mechanical operations that are initiated automatically or manually by the plant operators. Generation II reactor designs have some engineered safety systems, i.e. safety systems that will operate passively and function without operator control or loss of auxiliary power (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011).

One major disadvantage of Generation II designs is the production of significant quantities of nuclear waste. The nuclear waste, also referred to as spent fuel, generally requires reprocessing or depositing, which adds to the operating cost of the power plant (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011). Generation II reactor technology falls outside the scope of this research.

3.1.2.3 Generation III

Generation III designs are based on the construction and operating experiences of the Generation II Westinghouse and EDF fleets. These designs were developed by incorporating inputs from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the USA and the European utility requirements (EUR). The inputs came from the utility requirements document (URD) which was developed by EPRI and EUR. The URD prescribes the requirements for the newer generation of nuclear power plants, i.e. advanced LWRs or Generation III designs. These requirements are based on the lessons learned from the nuclear industry with regard to safety. Fundamentally, the URD ensures that additional passive safety features are incorporated in new reactor designs (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011).

Generation III nuclear reactors are essentially Generation II reactors with evolutionary, advanced design improvements. These improvements were also aimed at increasing plant operational life to the order of 60 years, with the potential to greatly exceed 60 years before the need to the overhaul major equipment or reactor pressure vessel replacement (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011).

The objectives of Generation III reactor design improvements are as follows (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011):

- Standardised designs that will expedite the licensing process. This provides potential for a reduced construction period and also reduced capital cost.
- Simple yet robust designs that will allow for ease of operation and maintenance, and are less prone to operational upsets.
- Increased availability and longer operational life, typically 60 years.
- Improved safety performance with inherent safety features.
- A core damage frequency that is about ten times better than the current United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) requirement of 1×10^{-4} .

- Increased resistance to proliferation.
- Greater use of passive safety features compared to previous generation reactors.
- Higher burn-up rates that will allow for more effective and efficient fuel usage, whilst reducing the amount of waste generated.

3.1.2.4 Generation III+

Generation III+ reactor designs are essentially advanced Generation III reactor designs with the incorporation of innovative passive safety features. The Generation III+ reactor design was also motivated to achieve higher fuel burn-up factors than any predecessor, and thus reducing fuel consumption and waste generation (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011). A defining feature of Generation III+ reactor designs is the need for larger integral forgings, which will further enhance safety. Reports suggest that Generation III+ reactor designs require around twice the amount of large forgings compared to that of Generation II reactor designs (Jackson, 2012).

The Generation III and Generation III+ PWR designs that are currently being constructed around the world are:

- The American design – Westinghouse AP1000 is based on the Westinghouse AP600 reactor design with increased power output.
- The French design – European pressurized reactor (EPR1600) is an evolutionary descendant of the Framatome N4 reactors and the Siemens power generation division Konvoi reactors.
- The Chinese design – Hualong One design is based on Framatome’s 900 MW three-loop Generation II design.
- The Korean design – APR1400 is an advanced PWR design that evolved from the Korean next generation reactor, i.e. US System 80+ design.
- The Russian design – VVER1200/392M.

3.1.2.5 Generation IV

Generation IV reactor designs are still in the development phase and are expected to only reach maturity by 2030. The motivation behind the designs is mainly an improvement in sustainability, safety and reliability, economics, proliferation resistance, and physical protection, when compared to earlier reactor technologies (Sholly, 2013). Generation IV reactor technology falls outside the scope of this research.

3.2 TECHNOLOGIES UNDER CONSIDERATION

The South African Government has entered into negotiations with a number of nuclear vendor countries with the aim of procuring a fleet of NPPs that will render a total capacity of 9 600 MW (DOE, 2015). Each country was given the opportunity to present their strategy on how and where they can participate in the outlay of South Africa's proposed nuclear new build programme. The consultation process ended late in March 2015 when the South African Government concluded their pre-procurement preparatory phase. This was done by signing inter-governmental framework agreements (IGFA) with the USA, the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, the Russian Federation, Japan, and Canada (DOE, 2015).

The sections that follow will briefly explain each technology under consideration. It will conclude with a summary highlighting the main features and key differences.

This study will focus on Generation III and Generation III+ reactor technologies, limited to the following designs:

- AP1000 (USA)
- EPR1600 (France)
- Hualong One (China)
- APR1400 (Korea)
- VVER1200 (Russia)

Reactor designs from Japan and Canada are not considered in this study due to their limited construction and operation experience in the field of PWR (PRIS, 2017). Japan operates predominantly BWRs, whilst Canada employs mostly heavy water reactors.

The assessments done on the reactor technologies are based on technical information available in the public domain, i.e. the vendors were not engaged at any stage during the process.

3.2.1 Westinghouse AP1000

Westinghouse has contributed to the successful construction and operation of almost half of the world's 440 nuclear plants (Jackson, 2012). The AP1000 was designed with great emphasis on passive safety according to URD requirements. It is currently the only Generation III+ reactor design to have received design certification from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC).

The AP1000 is a scaled-up version of the AP600 reactor design, which was of the Generation III technology, but was never constructed. The design is functionally similar to that of the AP600 design, but with requirements to increase the capacity of the containment building, reactor

vessel, SGs, reactor coolant pumps, and pressurizers in order to accommodate the increase in thermal power.

The AP1000 reactor is of the Generation III+ design with a capacity of 1 115 MWe net (1 200 MW gross), at an average fuel BU of 60 GWd/tU. It was designed by Westinghouse in the United States and has a two-loop (two hot legs), four-reactor coolant pump design (four cold legs).

The fuel design of the AP1000 is based on the fuel design used successfully in plants in the USA and Europe, which is the 17 × 17 fuel assembly design. It can operate on enriched uranium dioxide of less than 4.95% enrichment, or alternatively on MOX fuel. The AP1000 design also claims to have an 18-month fuel cycle (EPRI, 2015).

The AP1000 design philosophy focuses on extensive plant simplification and claims to have 50% less valves, 35% less pumps, 80% less piping, 80% fewer heating, ventilation, and cooling units, 45% less seismic building volume, and 70% less cable than any standard PWR (Mykle Schneider et al, 2015).




Figure 9: Basic layout of the AP1000 design (Westinghouse, 2011)

The simplification provides potential to lower the complexity of safety systems, produce smaller plant footprints, and enable modular construction techniques. This in turn, provides potential to decrease the construction schedule and capital costs. This is all done while still maintaining the high quality and safety standards of regulating authorities. Plant simplification further provides potential for simplified O&M processes due to fewer components and less construction material than previous Westinghouse PWR designs (ARIS, 2017).

The designers of the AP1000 reactor technology claim to have achieved the following (Lambert & Nghiem, 2014):

- A greatly simplified plant, which enhances licensing processes and reduce customer costs.
- Simplified safety systems.

- Passive safety systems for accident mitigation with no requirement for emergency diesel generators in cases where off-site power sources are not available.
- Shorter construction schedules. This can be achieved through modular construction techniques whereby the AP1000 units are manufactured in modules in factories and then shipped (rail and/or barge) to the construction site upon order. This creates potential for enhanced construction and for improved cost control since the project is less affected by supply chain challenges.

The safety systems that are unique to the AP1000 design (Lambert & Nghiem, 2014):

- Natural forces such as pressurized gas, gravity, natural circulation, and convection to serve safety-related functions and ensure the safe shutdown and cooling of the reactor with no operator action required during a loss of all on-site and off-site alternating current (ac) power.
- In-containment refuelling water storage tank, situated above the reactor core, which acts as an additional source of water injection with the core make-up tanks and the accumulators.
- An externally cooled steel containment vessel which surrounds the nuclear island.
- The capability to rapidly depressurize the containment.
- Canned reactor coolant pumps to reduce the probability of leakage and to improve reliability.
- In the case of core melt, flooding of the core prevents core debris from spilling into the containment.
- A seismic design (SSE) of 0.3 g.

Westinghouse claims a construction period of approximately 3 years for the NOAK plant, which is extremely ambitious when compared to the industry average of 9.4 years (Mykle Schneider et al, 2015).

The world's first AP1000 unit commenced construction in Sanmen, China, on 19 April 2009, with the start-up expected in the first 6 months of 2018. A second unit is being constructed in parallel, with its schedule running a year later than the first unit (WNA, 2016). The cost for the dual units at Sanmen was estimated at an OCC of \$3 204/kW (WNA, 2016).

Other AP1000 reactor construction projects include (ARIS, 2017):

- Haiyang 1, 2 (Shandong province, China) which started construction on 24 September 2009.
- Vogtle units 3, 4 (Georgia, United States) which started construction on 9 March 2013.

- VC Summer units 2, 3 (South Carolina, United States) is planned with an approved contract in place.

3.2.2 AREVA EPR1600

The European pressurized reactor (EPR) is a Generation III+ reactor design produced by Areva. It is an evolutionary design based on the construction and operating experiences of the N4 reactors in France and Konvoi reactors in Germany. The key objectives of this design include improved economics, safety, and reliability (EPRI, 2015). The design approach aims to guarantee its safety objectives through the following:

- Redundancy and diversity to guard against single failures.
- An optimized combination of active and passive safety systems.

The EPR1600 has four loops, each containing a steam generator and a reactor coolant pump. The core is considerably larger than that of any other reactor design, producing a net output 1 600 MWe and with a fuel cycle ranging between 12-24 months. The core consists of 241 fuel assemblies (17 × 17 lattice with 265 rods per assembly) and is surrounded by a neutron reflector, which allows for optimized fuel utilization and protection to the pressure vessel against radiation damage (EPRI, 2015). The reactor can operate on low enriched uranium, i.e. up to 5%, or MOX fuel and allows for a flexible operating cycle, ranging from 12 to 24 months.

Safety systems of the EPR are designed to be mechanically simple and arranged in accordance with the general principles of diversity, redundancy, and physical robustness (IAEA, 2016). The plant design only incorporates those features and materials that have shown superior performance over the last 40 years of nuclear power plant operation, improving both reliability and O&M costs (EPRI, 2015).

Construction methods for the EPR focus more on on-site assembly rather than modular construction due to the large number of components and high volume of materials (EPRI, 2015).

Key design features of the EPR design include the following (Framatome ANP, 2005):

- Reactor coolant system is contained in a double-layered containment structure.
 - * The first layer (on the inside) is the pre-stressed concrete containment shell, furnished with a steel liner.
 - * The containment shell is enclosed by a shield building wall, made from reinforced concrete, with an annular space between the two buildings.

- The reactor building internal structures and components, the fuel building, and two of the four safeguard buildings are protected against aircraft hazard and external explosions.
- Four safeguard buildings, one of which houses the main control room of the reactor, which also houses the reactor safety and control systems. These include the safety injection system, emergency feedwater system, and the residual heat removal system. Each safety system in each of the safeguard buildings is capable of performing the entire safety function for the reactor, providing redundancy and divisional separation. Two of the safeguard buildings are protected by the same reinforced concrete structure as the reactor, able to withstand impact by an aircraft and explosions. The other two safeguard buildings are not protected against aircraft hazard or external explosions.
- Safeguard buildings are strictly separated into four divisions around the reactor building, which restricts damage from external events to a single safeguard building.
- In the event of a loss of off-site power, each safeguard building is powered by a dedicated emergency diesel generator.
- An additional core make-up system in the form of an in-containment refuelling water storage tank (IRWST).
- In addition to the four safety-related diesels (fuelled for three days), two independent diesel generators are available, along with emergency dc batteries to power essential equipment during a postulated station black-out (SBO) event.
- A core catcher, in the form of a dedicated area in which molten corium is collected following a postulated worst-case severe accident.
- A seismic design (SSE) of 0.25 g.




Figure 10: Basic layout of EPR1600 design (Framatome ANP, 2005)

The EPR was the first Generation III+ reactor to be deployed. The first EPR project to have gone into construction was at Olkiluoto unit 3, in Finland, with construction starting in August 2005. The projected cost in December 2003 was estimated at €3.2 billion. Currently, this unit is still under construction with a projected cost of more than €8.5 billion and commercial operation planned for December 2018 (WNA, 2017).

Other EPR projects that are currently being constructed include Flamanville unit 3 in France and two units at Taishan NPP in China (Jackson, 2012).

3.2.3 Chinese ACPR1000 and Hualong One

Currently, China is the country with the largest nuclear energy expansion programme, having 19 reactors under construction, apart from its 38 reactors that are already in operation (PRIS, 2017). China has successfully developed domestic PWR designs through technology transfers from utilities such as Westinghouse and AREVA, while incorporating the lessons learned of their construction and operation experiences gained over the years.

The Hualong One reactor, also referred to as HPR1000 by the Chinese Government, is a Generation III nuclear design jointly developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the China General Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG). The Hualong One design is a merger of two Chinese designs, namely the ACPR1000 and the ACP1000 designs (Lambert & Nghiem, 2014). Both these designs are evolutions of the Generation II+ CPR1000 reactor design. The CPR1000 is based on the French M310 technology, which forms the basis for nuclear power technology in China (WNA, 2017).

The Hualong One design has a three-loop reactor coolant system. It has a design capacity of 1 092 MWe net (1 150 MWe gross), with a core design of 177 fuel assemblies, each 3.66 m in length, at an average BU of 45 000 MWd/tU. Furthermore, the design is in line with China's latest safety regulations, the American (URD), and European (EUR) standards, as well as major post-Fukushima safety requirements (Sholly, 2013). As a whole, the design meets all the technical and economic standards required of Generation III and Generation III+ reactors.

Key design features of the Hualong One design include the following:

- Double containment of which the outer containment can withstand large impact.
- A core catcher.
- Active safety systems backed up by passive safety elements.
- Enhanced seismic protection (SSE) – tolerance of 0.3 g.




Figure 11: Basic layout of Hualong One design (CNNC, 2015)

The first Hualong One reactor started construction on 7 May 2015 at Fuqing 5, with construction scheduled to be completed in 2019, and followed by Fangchenggang 3, where construction started on 25 December 2015 (IAEA, 2016). Another Hualong One project started in Pakistan at KANUPP-2 on 20 August 2015, followed by KANUPP-3 on 31 May 2016 (PRIS, 2016).

The target cost for the reactors under construction in China is in the region of \$3 500/kW (WNA, 2016).

China is in the process of developing a strong nuclear export market based on the success of its initial units. The Hualong One design successfully completed the generic reactor safety review (GRSR) governed by the IAEA in December 2014 (EPRI, 2015). The international use of the design will still depend on meeting country-specific standards and requirements, but passing the IAEA safety review should make this process easier (EPRI, 2015).

3.2.4 Korean APR1400

South Korea currently has 25 operating reactors, and has three more reactors under construction, which is of the APR1400 technology (PRIS, 2017). The APR1400 is a standard evolutionary advanced PWR design, jointly developed by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) (EPRI, 2015). The APR1400 design

is based on the reactor development, construction, and operational experiences of the OPR1000 reactor design. The OPR1000 reactor design is an indigenous Korean reactor, which was based on the Westinghouse System 80+ reactor design. As of September 2016, a total of 12 OPR1000 units are operational in Korea, demonstrating performance of the highest order (IAEA, 2016).

The objectives for the designers of the APR1400 technology included (WNA, 2016):

- Enhanced safety features.
- Engineering improvements to alleviate transients or operational occurrences.
- Improved economics.
- Improved seismic robustness.
- Increased size and coolant inventory of the pressurizer and steam generators that allow for higher design margins.

The APR1400 design has a two-loop reactor coolant system with a design capacity of 1 400 MWe nett (1 455 MWe gross) (ARIS, 2017). The APR1400 fuel and core was designed to allow for diverse fuel management strategies. The core consists of 241 fuel assemblies, each with a height of 3.81 m, and provides for an average fuel cycle of 18 months at an average BU of 55 000 MWd/tU (ARIS, 2017).

Key features of the APR1400 design include the following (ARIS, 2017):

- Direct vessel injection that allows emergency cooling water to be directly injected into the core in the case of a LOCA.
- A safety depressurization system that allows for the depressurization of the containment following a transient, without releasing significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment.
- Vessel cooling and cavity flooding systems to aid in-vessel retention of the corium in the case of a severe accident with core melt.
- Increased redundancy with regard to core make-up capability.
- Enhanced in-containment hydrogen mitigation systems that control the hydrogen build-up during or after a severe accident.




Figure 12: Basic layout of APR1400 design (Doosan, 2012)

The APR1400 received design certification by the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety in May 2003. The first unit, Shin-Kori 3, commenced construction on 16 October 2008 and started commercial operation on 29 December 2015, with an estimated OCC of \$2 300/kW (WNA, 2017). Other APR1400 projects that are currently under construction in Korea include (PRIS, 2016):

- Shin-Kori 4 – Started construction on 19 August 2009,
- Shin-Hanul 1 – Started construction on 10 July 2012,
- Shin-Hanul 2 – Started construction on 19 June 2012.

South Korea has experienced sustained construction cost reductions throughout its nuclear power history (J. R. Lovering et al, 2016). With its modular construction approach, it is envisaged that construction time will reduce further from 52 months to 36 months for the APR1400 (EPRI, 2015).

As with China, South Korea has ambitions to make advancements in the export market. The US NRC accepted the application from KEPCO and KHNP to complete the US design certification of the APR1400.

In 2012, construction started on the first of four APR1400 units at Barakah in the UAE. It is reported that the first unit, which is now more than 87% complete, is scheduled to start up in 2017, with all four units due to be on line by 2020 (WNN, 2016). The current OCC estimate for the UAE project is approximately \$3 571/kW (EPRI, 2015).

3.2.5 Russian VVER1200

VVER reactors are developed by OKB Gidropress, which is a subsidiary of the Russian utility Rosatom. Russia's nuclear experience stretches well over 50 years, having played a part in the successful design, construction, and operation of more than 60 reactors worldwide (PRIS, 2017).

The current most advanced deployable Russian PWR design is VVER1200/AES 2006. This design is based on the design of the proven VVER1000 technology, which was used in the AES-92 and AES-91 plants series (Goldberg & Rosner, 2011).

There are two types of AES-2006 designs. The first type is the VVER1200/V-392M design, which was developed by Moscow Atomenergoproekt, on the basis of the AES-92 design. The second type is the VVER1200/491, developed by Saint Petersburg Atomenergoproekt, on the basis of the AES-91 design. It is basically the same design, employing different cooling systems (ARIS, 2017). The objective of the designers for both these designs were to reduce capital cost, while maintaining a high level of safety through the employment of active and passive safety systems.

The VVER1200/AES 2006 is Generation III+ design and retains the four coolant loops of the VVER1000 series, with a design capacity of 1 109 MWe nett (1 198 MWe gross). The core consists of 163 fuel assemblies, each 3.75 m long, and allows for a fuel cycle of 12-18 months, at an average BU of 60 GWd/tU (WNA, 2017).




Figure 13: Basic layout of the VVER1200 primary circuit (Gidopress, 2015)

Distinctive design features of the VVER1200 include the following (ARIS, 2017; Lambert & Nghiem, 2014):

- Horizontal steam generator designs with proven performance. Industry OE indicates

steam generators in Russian plants have operated safely and efficiently for over 40 years without the need for them to be replaced.

- Hexagonal fuel assemblies,
- Double layered containment consisting of an inner containment steel lining, 1.2 m thick pre-stressed concrete structure, and a 0.6 m thick reinforced concrete outer containment (acts as a secondary containment).
- An increased primary coolant volume that act as a damping mechanism for operational transients.
- Increased secondary feedwater volumes to aid the cooling capability of the core via natural circulation mechanisms.
- No penetrations in the reactor lower head for enhanced vessel integrity.
- The reactor pressure vessel is forged as one piece; i.e. no longitudinal welds. This enables less frequent maintenance and surveillance tests on the RPV.

Russia's Atomstroyexport successfully constructed and commissioned Tianwan 1 and 2 (VVER1000/V428 power plants) in China, as well as Kudankulam 1 and 2 (VVER1000/V-412) in India. The first VVER1200/V-392M design is in the commissioning phase at Novovoronezh II unit 1 in Russia. The projected OCC of the Novovoronezh II project is estimated at \$2 933/kW (WNA, 2014). Other VVER reactors that are still under construction include (Lambert & Nghiem, 2014):

- Baltic – Started construction on 22 February 2012.
- Leningrad II, unit 1 – Started construction on 25 October 2008.
- Leningrad II, unit 2 – Started construction on 15 April 2010.
- Novovoronezh II unit 2 – Started construction on 12 July 2009.
- Tianwan unit 3 – Started construction 27 December 2012.
- Tianwan unit 4 – Started construction 23 September 2013.

3.3 REACTOR TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON

The assessment has yielded some key differences between the designs under consideration. Although certain technologies have distinct advantages over others, most of the design features of the technologies are comparable.

The main differences are highlighted in Table 4, supplemented by the descriptive bullet points.

Table 4: Summary of reactor technology comparison

Reactor Design	Loops	Pumps	Generation	Capacity Gross (MW)	Capacity nett (MW)	Containment Structure	MOX Fuel	Fuel Cycle (months)	Safety Features	SSE	Qualitative Summary	Projected Construction (months)	Projected Cost (\$/kW)
AP1000	2	4	III+	1200	1115	Double	Yes	18	Passive safety systems.	0.3 g	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extensive use of passive safety features by using natural forces such as pressurized gas, gravity, natural circulation, and convection. No requirement for emergency diesel generators. Extensive simplified design using 50% less valves, 35% less pumps, 80% less piping than any standard PWR. Smaller plant footprint. In-containment refuelling water storage tank, which allows for an additional core make-up source. Externally cooled steel containment dome, which surrounds the nuclear island. 	36	3204
EPR1600	4	4	III+	1750	1600	Double	Yes	12-24	Combination of active and passive safety systems.	0.25 g	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Double layered containment structure. Four safeguard buildings, all strictly separated, with each housing reactor safety and control systems capable of performing the entire safety function for the reactor. Considerably larger core compared to other reactors. Core is surrounded by a neutron reflector, which allows for optimised fuel utilization and protection of the pressure vessel against radiation damage. Safety objectives are ensured through redundancy and diversity to guard against single failures. Make use of emergency diesel generators. Considerably larger plant footprint compared to other reactors. 	57	3737
Hualong One	3	3	III	1150	1092	Double	Still under consideration	18	Combination of active and passive safety systems.	0.3 g	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China is one of the few countries to have recent power plant construction experience. It is also the country with the largest nuclear energy expansion programme, having 20 reactors under construction. The Hualong One design is in line with China's latest safety regulations, the American (URD) and European (EUR) standards, as well as major post-Fukushima safety requirements. Comparable to other Generation III designs. 	50	3500
APR1400	2	4	III+	1455	1400	Single	Yes	18	Combination of active and passive safety systems.	0.3 g	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single containment structure. Direct vessel injection allows emergency cooling water to be injected directly into the core in the case of a LOCA. A safety depressurization system that allows for the depressurization of the containment building following a transient, without releasing significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment. Vessel cooling and cavity flooding systems to aid in-vessel retention of the corium in the case of a severe accident with core melt. Increased redundancy with regard to core make-up capability. Enhanced in-containment hydrogen mitigation systems that controls hydrogen build-up during and after a severe accident. Employ modular construction techniques. 	48	2300
VVER1200	4	4	III+	1195	1109	Double	Still under consideration	12-18	Combination of active and passive safety systems.	0.25 g	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Horizontal steam generator designs with proven performance. Unique double-layered containment structure. An increased primary coolant volume that act as a damping mechanism for operational transients. Increased secondary feedwater volumes to aid the cooling capability of the core via natural circulation mechanisms. No penetrations in the reactor lower head, which brings about enhanced vessel integrity. Forged reactor pressure vessel shells without longitudinal welds. This enables less frequent maintenance and surveillance tests on the RPV. 	54	2933

3.3.1 Safety, Regulation and Construction Schedules

Research has shown that a direct link exists between safety, regulation, construction, and the capital cost of a project (Cohen, 1990; Goldberg and Rosner, 2011; J. R. Lovering et al, 2016). This link has often proven to be one of the great weaknesses in the project life cycle of NPPs, and as a result, policymakers have set objectives for designers to produce designs that will have the right balance in terms of the four influencing factors. Refer to Figure 14.

The following strategies were suggested to avoid or limit the impact of the aforementioned concerns (Goldberg and Rosner, 2011; WNA, 2015):

- Standardized designs for each reactor type, in order to expedite the licensing process, which could potentially reduce construction time and capital cost.
- Simplified yet robust designs, which allows for a smaller plant footprint with fewer SSC and gives potential for ease of operation and makes the plant less susceptible to operational transients.
- Greater use of passive safety features, which relates to the simplification of the design, thus making use of less equipment and materials.




Figure 14: Factors influencing capital cost

Modern reactor technologies are experiencing various levels of success in terms of construction, with quite a few of the Generation III and III+ projects being hampered by regulatory issues. This has intensified the drive for utilities to make use of design standardization, which will also allow for the deployment of generic regulatory safety reviews and thus streamlining the licensing process. A streamlined licensing process will have a positive impact on the construction schedule. A protracted construction schedule leads to a delay of the commercial operation of the reactor. The delay of the commercial operation has a knock-on effect on sales of electricity, which leads to a loss of income, which ultimately results in the utility not being able to repay the sum of the overnight and accrued interest charges (Cohen, 1990; Goldberg and Rosner, 2011).

Construction delays of nuclear projects due to regulation were particularly prevalent in the aftermath of the accidents at TMI in March 1979 and at Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986. This was mainly due the US regulatory authorities introducing more stringent criteria for licensing NPPs.

Table 5 offers a qualitative summary of the designs under consideration with the focus mainly on the aspects mentioned earlier, namely safety, construction, and regulation. It predicts which aspects may have the most impact on the construction schedule, and ultimately the capital cost of a certain reactor technology.

Disclaimer: No elimination of one or more of the technologies was intended.

Table 5: Qualitative comparison based on construction and regulation

Design Differences - Qualitative		Financial Benefit / Drawback
AP1000	Extensive Plant Simplification	Benefit: Regulation and construction – less components, resulting in smaller plant foot print.
	Passive Safety Systems	Benefit: Less components Drawback: Regulation – less conventional safety systems, structures and components
	Modular Construction	Benefit: Construction schedule – allows for enhanced construction schedule (36 months).
EPR-1600	Redundancy and Diversity of Safety Systems	Benefit: Regulation – increased redundancy. Drawback: Regulation – complicated design
	Complex Plant Design	Drawback: Construction and regulation – big plant footprint due to a great number of components and large volume of materials used for plant construction.
Hualong One	Construction Experience	Benefit: Construction – recent NPP construction experience with the largest nuclear energy expansion programme (20 reactors under construction). Drawback: Regulation – limited international construction experience.
	Safety Systems	Benefit: Regulation – active safety systems (new) backed-up with passive safety (old) elements.
APR-1400	Containment Structure (Single)	Benefit – Construction Drawback: Regulation – due safety concerns.
	Construction Experience	Benefit: Construction – recent NPP construction experience in South Korea as well as in the UAE. Drawback: regulation – limited international experience.
	Increase Coolant Volumes	Benefit: Regulation – conventional safety systems with increased coolant and secondary feedwater volumes.
VVER-1200	SG Design	Benefit: regulation – proven design, over 40 years OE.
	Reactor Pressure Vessel Design	Benefit: Construction – forged as one piece, i.e. no welding activities on-site (modular construction).
	Construction Experience	Drawback: regulation – limited international experience.

CHAPTER 4 ECONOMIC EVALUATION

This part of the study explains the development of a spreadsheet-based economic model for the purpose of calculating the OCC for each of the technologies if it were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape.

Calculations were made based on the relationships between cost variables as described in Table 6.

Table 6: Model assumptions

Cost Variable	Value	Reference
TCIC = OCC + CCL		Gonzalez, 2014
CCL = IDC + cost due to escalation	Calculated	D'haeseleer, 2013
OCC = EPCC + contingency + owner's cost		Gonzalez, 2014
EPCC	0.694% (OCC)	Assumption
TPC = EPCC + contingency cost		D'haeseleer, 2013
Contingency cost	1.2 (EPCC)	Gen IV International Forum, 2014
Owner's cost	20% (TPC)	NTEL, 2012
Material cost	74% (TPC)	D'haeseleer, 2013
Labour cost	26% (TPC)	D'haeseleer, 2013
Labour rates	Calculated	www.worlddata.info, 2017
Labour productivity	Calculated	www.tradingeconomics.com, 2017
Unit labour cost	Calculated	www.worlddata.info, 2017
O&M cost (including fuel)	\$83 333 333/y	WNA, 2017
Loan payback period	30 years	IRP, 2016
Discount Rate	8,2%	IRP, 2016
Load factor	90%	IRP, 2016

4.1 MODELLING PROCEDURE

The spreadsheet provides introductory information on each of the projects under consideration. Reference is made to the project owner (country), the name of the power plant project, the vendor, the reactor technology employed, the number of units, as well as the gross capacity for the plant.

The cost calculations are based on the TCIC of a particular project as obtained from literature. The TCIC represents the “all inclusive construction cost”, including the EPC cost, contingency cost, owners’ cost, as well as the finance cost (Gonzalez, 2014); refer to Figure 15.




Figure 15: Breakdown of the TCIC (Gonzales, 2014)

4.1.1 Total Capital Investment Cost

The total capital investment cost (TCIC), also referred to as the “all-in cost”, is the total up-front cost incurred for constructing an NPP and bringing it to a commercially operable state (EMWG Guidelines, 2007).

The TCIC reported for all the projects within the scope of this study were converted from nominal dollar values to constant 2016-dollar values to account for inflation. This was done by multiplying the initial dollar amount by an inflation factor. The inflation factor is the ratio between the consumer price index (CPI) in 2016 and the CPI at the time when the project cost was estimated (x). The inflation factor was calculated in the following manner:

$$\text{Inflation factor} = \frac{CPI_{2016}}{CPI_x}$$

The inflation adjusted TCIC (\$) was then divided by the gross capacity (kWe) for each project, in order to get the TCIC in \$/kWe.

$$TCIC = \frac{\text{Total project cost (\$)}}{\text{Gross capacity (kWe)}}$$

4.1.2 Cost on Construction Loan

The cost relating to the construction loan (CCL) is a combination of two cost components, i.e. the cost incurred due to interest during construction (IDC) and the cost incurred due to escalation (Gonzalez, 2014). The cost relating to the construction loan is therefore dependent on the construction period as well as on the cost of capital. The relationship between these two factors is described in Table 7 (D’haeseleer, 2013).

Table 7: Financing costs as a fraction of total construction costs

	Construction Period		
	One Year	Five Years	Ten Years
5% cost of capital	2%	12%	22%
10% cost of capital	4%	22%	40%
15% cost of capital	6%	30%	54%

It is assumed that all cash for the capital expenditure (CAPEX) will be supplied as capital investment by the South African Government, i.e. no loans and thus no interest on debt. Taking the estimated construction schedule of each power plant into consideration, and assuming a cost of capital of 10%, the CCL was calculated through interpolation by using Table 7 as a reference. Figure 16 presents a graphic interpretation of the data in Table 7.




Figure 16: Financing costs as a fraction of total construction costs

4.1.3 Overnight Capital Cost (OCC)

The overnight capital cost (OCC) is described as the cost of a construction project as if the project was completed “overnight” with no interest incurred and no escalation cost taken into consideration, i.e. excluding the financing cost. The OCC of the projects within the scope of this study were calculated by making use of the relationship between the TCIC (\$/kWe), OCC (\$/kWe), and the CCL (\$/kWe) as described in the cost breakdown of TCIC (Gonzales, 2014). This relationship is as follows:

$$TCIC = OCC + CCL$$

$$\therefore OCC = TCIC - CCL$$

4.1.4 Total Plant Cost (TPC)

The OCC comprises the EPC cost, contingency cost, as well as the owner's cost (Gonzales, 2014).

$$OCC = EPCC + Contingency\ cost + Owner's\ cost$$

Where: $EPCC + Contingency\ cost = Total\ plant\ cost$

For this study, it is assumed that contingency costs add an additional 20% to the EPCC, i.e. the base cost (EMWG Guidelines, 2007), and that the owner's cost is 20% of the total plant cost (TPC) is (NETL, 2012).

$$\therefore Total\ plant\ cost = 1.2\ EPCC$$

$$Owner's\ cost = 0.2\ total\ plant\ cost$$

$$\therefore Owner's\ cost = 0.2 \times 1.2\ EPCC$$

$$\therefore Owner's\ cost = 0.2 \times 1.2\ EPCC$$

$$OCC = 1.44EPCC$$

$$\therefore EPCC = \frac{OCC}{1.44}$$

$$\therefore Total\ plant\ cost = 1.2\ EPCC$$

4.1.5 International Labour Cost

The labour cost of a construction project is dependent on two factors, i.e. the number of labourers employed to perform construction activities and the average wage of the labourers that are required (Rothwell, 2016). According to a study done by EPRI, the labour cost accounts for 26% of the total plant cost, with the remaining 74% accounting for the material cost (EPRI, 2011).




Figure 17: Generic nuclear plant cost breakdown as a percentage of total plant costs (EPRI, 2011)

4.1.6 Unit Labour Cost (ULC)

The ULC represents the link that exist between the cost of labour (\$/h) and the labour productivity. The UCL was determined for each power plant within the scope of this study in order to do a comparison between the ULC of the country where the power plant is constructed and the ULC of South Africa.

The labour productivity was determined by the mathematical ratio:

$$Unit\ labour\ costs = \frac{Cost\ of\ labour\ (\frac{\$}{h})}{Labour\ productivity\ (\frac{\$}{h})}$$

Where: $Cost\ of\ Labour = L \times P_L$

$L = Labourers\ (number\ of\ employees)$

$P_L = Price\ of\ labour\ (average\ wages\ and\ benefits)$

$$Labour\ productivity = \frac{Total\ output}{Total\ Input} = \frac{Gross\ domestic\ product\ (\$)}{Average\ no\ of\ hours\ worked\ annually\ (h)}$$

$$ULC_{ratio} = \frac{ULC_{International}}{ULC_{South\ Africa}}$$

4.1.7 South African Labour Cost

The ULC comparison ratio was used to determine the labour cost of each power plant if it were to be constructed in the South African economic landscape. The South African labour cost was calculated as follows:

$$Labour\ cost_{SA} = (UCL_{ratio} - 1) \times labour\ cost_{International}$$

4.1.8 Localized OCC

The South African labour cost was used to calculate the OCC of each power plant if it were to be constructed in the South African economic landscape, using the previously defined relationships between labour cost, TPC, owner's cost, and the OCC. These relationships include:

$$TPC_{SA} = \Delta labour\ cost + labour\ cost_{International} + Material\ cost_{International}$$

$$EPCC_{SA} = \frac{TPC_{SA}}{1.2}$$

$$OCC_{SA} = EPCC_{SA} \times 1.44$$

4.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The main objective of this research was to produce comprehensive costing information for five different reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape in order to address the uncertainty surrounding the affordability of nuclear technology in South Africa. This was achieved by evaluating open-source data gathered from 23 nuclear projects (44 plants) in 12 countries. The results of this evaluation are discussed below. The evaluation produced the following results:

4.2.1 AP1000 Technology

Three AP1000 reactor technology projects were evaluated. In addition to these projects, there is one other nuclear project, namely VC Summer in South Carolina USA that was approved by the authorities and has a valid contract in place. The calculated OCC for these projects ranges between \$2 771/kW (Sanmen in China) and \$3 976/kW (Vogtle in the USA), with an average of \$3 327/kW.

The two projects in China were the first AP1000 reactors to be ordered and constructed, of which the construction at Sanmen started in April 2009, with Haiyang starting construction five months later (PRIS, 2017). These types of projects are called first-of-a-kind (FOAK) projects, i.e. the plant has not been constructed or operated anywhere in the world before. As a result, the construction costs of these plants are generally higher compared to the subsequent nuclear projects of its type. Subsequent nuclear projects are projects that are of the same reactor technology and are normally constructed at the same site as the FOAK project. The subsequent projects are also known as nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) projects.

The inflated cost for FOAK projects is normally attributed to unforeseen issues that are experienced during FOAK construction. A case in point for the AP1000 reactor technology was the issues that were experienced with the design and supply of the reactor coolant pumps for both the Chinese AP1000 projects (Mykle Schneider et al, 2015).

If the different AP1000 projects were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, the localized OCC ranges between \$2 862/kW (VC Summer project in the USA) and \$4 330/kW (Haiyang project in China), with an average localized OCC of \$3 580/kW.

On average, the OCC of the projects that were constructed in the USA (\$3 220/kW) are less than the projects that were constructed in China (\$3 941/kW).




Figure 18: AP1000 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe)

4.2.2 EPR1600 Technology

Three projects were evaluated of the EPR1600 reactor technology that is currently being constructed. Added to this, is Hinkley Point C in the UK that was approved by the authorities and has a valid contract in place. The OCC for these projects ranges between \$5 078/kW (Hinkley Point C in the UK) and \$1 625/kW (Taishan in China), with an average OCC of \$2 985/kW.

The first EPR1600 project to have gone into construction was at Olkiluoto unit 3 in Finland, with construction starting in August 2005 (PRIS, 2017). Other projects that followed were Flamanville (unit 3) in France and Taishan NPP (units 1 and 2) in China (Jackson, 2012).

To date, it has been reported that all the EPR projects at Olkiluoto 3, Flamanville 3, and Taishan I & II incurred construction delays. The delays were related to quality control issues experienced at Olkiluoto 3 (FOAK project issues). The first issue that caused major delays was the finding of

irregularities in the concrete used for the building of the basemat of the reactor. There were also manufacturing errors, relating to quality issues on welding joints on the tops and bottoms of the reactor pressure vessel (Mykle Schneider et al, 2015). However, the issue that had the greatest impact on the construction of EPR1600 projects was the redundancy requirements for instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, which took Areva almost five years to resolve (Mykle Schneider et al, 2015).

Results for the EPR1600 projects indicate a decrease in the OCC for post-Olkiluoto projects.




Figure 19: EPR1600 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe)

If the different EPR1600 projects were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, the localized OCC ranges between \$5 075/kW (Hinkley Point C project in the UK) and \$2 009/kW (Flamanville project in France), with an average localized OCC of \$2 985/kW. If the Hinkley Point C project data is omitted from the research, then the average localized OCC of the EPR1600 project is reduced to \$2 288/kW.

4.2.3 Hualong One Technology

With 19 reactors under construction, apart from its 38 plants already operational, China is currently the country with the biggest expansion plans for nuclear energy (PRIS, 2017). Most of the reactors that are being constructed as part of this expansion programme are of the Generation II type. The Hualong One technology is a Generation III reactor design that was developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the China General Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG). Currently, there are only three Hualong One projects under

construction. The projects include the Fangchenggang II project in China, consisting two units with an OCC of \$1 779/kW and the Kanupp project that is being constructed in Karachi, Pakistan, with an OCC of \$3 239/kW. In addition to these two projects, there is the Fuqing project (units 5 and 6) being constructed in China. However, due to a lack of economic information, this project was omitted from the research.

The Kanupp project is the first Chinese reactor technology project to be constructed outside of the borders of China. It is therefore to be expected that the OCC of the Karachi project would be higher, in this case, almost double the cost of the reference project Fangchenggang II. However, the OCC is still within the \$3 500/kW that the Chinese Government envisaged for the Hualong One technology (WNA, 2016).




Figure 20: Hualong One Sum of ACC; SA v International (\$/kWe)

If these Hualong One projects were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, the localized OCC ranges between \$2 279/kW (Fangchenggang project in China) and \$2 841/kW (Kanupp project in Pakistan).

4.2.4 APR1400 Technology

Construction of the first APR1400 reactor in the Republic of Korea started in October 2008 at Shin-Kori II unit 3, with unit 4 starting construction almost a year later in August 2009 (PRIS,

2017). In addition to this project, there are two other APR1400 projects underway. These include a two-unit plant being constructed at Shin-Hanul (unit 1 and unit 2), and a 4-unit plant currently under construction in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The plant in the UAE is the first APR1400 to be constructed outside of the borders of South Korea.

KEPCO disclosed that the major factors considered, and which got them the Barakah contract, despite facing strong competition from France, USA, and Japan, was the relatively low construction cost and short construction time that KEPCO achieved (WNA, 2017). This was backed up by various studies that showed that the South Korean utility have experienced sustained reductions in construction cost throughout its nuclear power experience (Jessica R. Lovering et al, 2016).

This is visible in the OCC figures for the APR1400 projects currently under construction which ranges between \$3 070/kW (Barakah in the UAE) and \$1 777/kW (Shin-Hanul I in South Korea), with an average of OCC \$2 162/kW.




Figure 21: APR1400 Sum of SCC; SA v International (\$/kWe)

It should be noted that some of the APR1400 projects also incurred delays due to quality control issues with cables. However, the cost implications of these project delays were not disclosed and it can therefore be expected that the cost mentioned before could be slightly higher than determined here.

If these APR1400 projects were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, the localized OCC ranges between \$2 293/kW (Shin-Hanul project in South Korea) and \$2 447/kW (Shin-Kori project in

South Korea), with an average localized OCC of \$2 293/kW. Again, the higher OCC of the Barakah plant is to be expected since it is the first APR1400 to be constructed outside of the borders of South Korea. Although having a slightly higher OCC than the projects being constructed in South Korea, the Barakah project cost is still comparable to, and in some instances even better than, the AP1000 and the EPR1600 projects that are being constructed outside of its country of origin.

4.2.5 VVER1200 Technology

The VVER1200 reactor design is being constructed in four countries, at seven sites, around the world, with another two projects planned with valid contracts in place. This makes the VVER1200 technology the most employed technology of the five technologies under consideration. Russia's nuclear experience stretches well over 50 years, having played a part in the successful design, construction, and operation of more than 60 reactors worldwide (PRIS, 2017). Together with Areva and Westinghouse, Rosatom is one of the most experienced utilities in terms of power plant construction and operation, be it in national or international nuclear power projects.

The OCC for the VVER1200 projects under consideration as well as the planned projects with approved contracts, ranges between \$4 892/kW (Hanhikivi in the Finland) and \$1 416/kW (Taiwan I in China), with an average OCC of \$2 912/kW.

The OCC for the Kaliningrad project in Russia and the Hanhikivi project in Finland is relatively higher, compared to the cost of the other VVER1200 projects. It should also be mentioned that for both these projects the OCC calculated is only for a single unit. The key issue here is that all the supply chain costs, including the design, construction, production of equipment and the qualification thereof, are all being borne by a single unit. Resultantly, the OCC is expected to be higher than that of twin-unit plants.




Figure 22: VVER1200 Sum of OCC; SA v International (\$/kWe)

If these VVER1200 projects were to be constructed within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, the localized OCC ranges between \$4 958/kW (Kaliningrad in Russia) and \$1 814/kW (Tianwan I in China), with an average localized OCC of \$3 134/kW.

4.2.6 Summary of Results

The results indicate that the average OCC for constructing each of the different reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape, taking into account South African labour cost and labour productivity, ranges between \$2 293/kW (APR1400) and \$3 580/kW (AP1000).




Figure 23: Average OCC SA (\$/kW)

The results show that the technology with the least localized OCC is the APR1400 at a cost of \$2 293/kW. This is slightly cheaper than the localized OCC for the Hualong One technology, which came to \$2 560/kW.

The costs for constructing the AP1000 (\$3 580/kW), VVER1200 (\$3 134/kW), and the EPR1600 (\$2 985/kW) technologies within the South African economic landscape is noticeably higher than that of the other two technologies. However, the cost of the VVER1200 technology is influenced by the number of projects that are currently under construction. There are 0.75% more VVER1200 projects than AP1000, and 125% more VVER1200 projects than EPR1600 projects.

The average OCC for constructing one of the five technologies within the South African economic landscape is \$2 910/kW.

4.2.7 Sensitivity Analysis

The sensitivity analysis as performed to determine how certain factors will influence the localized OCC. The graph below illustrates the effect that labour cost, labour productivity and CCL have on localized OCC.




Figure 24: Sensitivity analysis for localized OCC

The resulting graph indicates how sensitive the localized OCC is to variations in CCL and the labour cost, but most sensitive for the labour productivity. This validates the assumption that labour cost and labour productivity could potentially have a great influence on the capital cost nuclear projects.

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSION OF THE RESULTS

Over the past five years, the South African Government has on numerous occasions expressed their commitment to plan and build a fleet of NPPs. Despite the South African Government's public backing of a NNBP, minimal progress has been made in this regard. The lack of progress is primarily due to the uncertainty surrounding the affordability of nuclear technology in South Africa.

In this research, the economics of various international nuclear projects have been analysed in order to determine the OCC for five particular reactor technologies within the South African economic landscape. In addition to this, the research also discussed the various Generation III and Generation III+ nuclear technologies that are currently available for construction. The technology evaluation concluded with a qualitative summary that highlights the key differences between the various technologies. Although certain technologies have distinct advantages over others, most of the design features of the technologies are comparable.

The economic evaluation concluded that the average OCC for constructing one of the five technologies within the South African economic landscape is \$2 910/kW. The technology with the lowest localized OCC is the APR1400 at a cost of \$2 293/kW. This is marginally cheaper than the localized OCC for the Hualong One technology, which came to \$2 560/kW. The OCC for constructing the AP1000, VVER1200, and the EPR1600 technologies within the South African economic landscape is somewhat higher at \$3 580/kW, \$3 134/kW, and \$2 985/kW respectively.

The updated IRP conservatively assumes an OCC of \$5 981/kW (2016 dollar value) for advanced nuclear power stations (IRP, 2016). This figure is noticeably higher—more than double the average localized OCC calculated for the different projects evaluated in this research. However, in a country such as South Africa where construction of nuclear reactors has not occurred for more than 30 years, any nuclear project would be considered a FOAK project. As a result, the OCC for the first dual units to be constructed as part of the NNBP are expected to be somewhat higher than the figures calculated in this research.

However, South Africa can benefit from the experiences, both good and bad, of other FOAK projects. This is demonstrated where KEPCO is constructing the first AP1400 reactor beyond the borders of South Korea in the UAE at the Barakah NPP. To date, no significant delays have been reported and construction is on schedule for all four units. Unit 1 is almost complete and commercial operation is expected in 2018 (WNA, 2017). A key factor to be considered is that South Korea, China, and Russia have continuously been involved in nuclear construction activities; even during the time when the USA and the Western European countries decided to

halt the construction of nuclear power facilities in the 1990s. This enabled a continuum of learning on the manufacturing, construction, and commissioning of NPPs, which allowed for a standardised design approach and enhanced regulation processes, which in turn, can lead to sustained construction cost reductions (Jessica R. Lovering et al, 2016).

A similar approach as in the UAE can be assumed for South Africa NNBP. It can therefore be concluded that it is highly likely that the OCC for a fleet of NPPs can be below \$5 000/kW, which will result in an estimated total cost of a R600 billion, and not the R1 trillion as published in the South African media (EWN, 2017).

A sensitivity analysis validated the assumed influence of labour cost and labour productivity; therefore, although it accounts for only 26% of the TPC, the cost of labour as well as labour productivity has a real impact on the cost of nuclear. This aspect is important as the South African Government is calling for localization to be a key factor in contract negotiations.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made with regard to follow-up studies:

- Develop a cash-flow model to calculate the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the Net Present Value (NPV) of all the technologies within the scope. This can be of great help to policymakers as it can show the effect of different construction time lines and selling electricity at different points on a timeline, displaying the effect of cost of capital during the expensive construction phase of a nuclear power plant (NPP).
- A further study could also be conducted to determine the effectiveness of using standardised design and licensing approaches, and the cost implications thereof.
- This study can be enhanced by the taking into account the economic data of other countries that have new build programmes, e.g. India.

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APPENDICES

- Appendix 1 Interpolation CCL 73
- Appendix 2 Cost of Labour Calculation 74
- Appendix 3 Labour Productivity Calculation 75
- Appendix 4 International Labour Calculation 76
- Appendix 5 Localized OCC Calculation 77
- Appendix 6 Localized OCC Summary 78
- Appendix 7 Localized OCC Grouped 79
- Appendix 8 Amortization: Ostrovets, Belarus 80
- Appendix 9 Amortization: Tianwan I, China 81
- Appendix 10 Amortization: Tianwan II, China 82
- Appendix 11 Amortization: Hanhikivi, Finland 83
- Appendix 12 Amortization: Paks, Hungary 84
- Appendix 13 Amortization: Kaliningrad, Russia 85
- Appendix 14 Amortization: Leningrad II, Russia 86
- Appendix 15 Amortization: Novovoronezh II, Russia 87
- Appendix 16 Amortization: Akkuyu, Turkey 88
- Appendix 17 Amortization: Taishan, China 89
- Appendix 18 Amortization: Olkiluoto, Finland 90
- Appendix 19 Amortization: Flamanville, France 91
- Appendix 20 Amortization: Hinkley Point C, United Kingdom 92
- Appendix 21 Amortization: Fangchenggang-2 (3&4), China 93
- Appendix 22 Amortization: Karachi, Pakistan 94
- Appendix 23 Amortization: Shin-Hanul I (1&2), South Korea 95
- Appendix 24 Amortization: Shin-Kori III (5&6), South Korea 96
- Appendix 25 Amortization: Barakah, UAE 97
- Appendix 26 Amortization: Haiyang, China 98
- Appendix 27 Amortization: Sanmen, China 99
- Appendix 28 Amortization: Vogtle (Georgia), USA 100
- Appendix 29 Amortization: VC Summers (South Carolina), USA 101

APPENDIX 1 INTERPOLATION CCL

Country	Site	Construction	% CoCL
Belarus	Ostrovets	5	0.22
China	Tianwan I	8	0.33
China	Tianwan II	6	0.25
Finland	Hanhikivi	5	0.22
Hungary	Paks	8	0.33
Russia	Kaliningrad	8	0.33
Russia	Leningrad II	8	0.33
Russia	NovovoronezhII	10	0.4
Turkey	Akkuyu	6	0.25
China	Taishan	8	0.33
Finland	Olkiluoto	13	0.51
France	Flamanville	11	0.44
UK	Hinkley Point C	7	0.29
China	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)	4	0.18
Pakistan	Karachi	6	0.25
South Korea	Shin-Hanul I (1&2)	6	0.25
South Korea	Shin-Kori II (3&4)	7	0.29
South Korea	Shin-Kori III (5&6)	5	0.22
UAE	Barakah	6	0.25
China	Haiyang	8	0.33
China	Sanmen	8	0.33
USA	Vogtle (Georgia)	7	0.29
USA	V.C. Summer (South Carolina)	7	0.29

APPENDIX 2 COST OF LABOUR CALCULATION

Source: <https://www.worlddata.info/average-income.php>

	SA	Belarus	China	Finland	Hungary	Russia	Turkey	France	UK	Pakistan	South Korea	UAE	USA
Monthly salary (local currency)	28042.00	770.60	5169.08	3392.00	274799.00	37640.00	7029.00	2957.00	2211.73	104.73	3480465.00	18003.00	3816.86
Covertion factor (local currency to \$)	0.08	0.54	0.14	1.09	0.00	0.02	0.28	1.09	1.29	1.00	0.00	0.27	1.00
monthly salary (\$)	547	467	688	3728	1048	810	932	3246	3533	126	2300	4861	3533
weekly salary (\$)	125.88	107.47	158.33	857.95	241.18	186.41	214.49	747.02	813.07	29.00	529.31	1118.65	813.07
ave work week (hr)	45.00	40.00	40.00	40.00	40.00	40.00	45.00	35.00	38.20	48.00	40.00	48.00	40.00
ave cost per labour hour (\$)	2.80	2.69	3.96	21.45	6.03	4.66	4.77	21.34	21.28	0.60	13.23	23.31	20.33

APPENDIX 3 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY CALCULATION

Country	GDP (US\$ billion)	No of workers	Ave no of hrs worked annually	Labour Productivity
Belarus	54.61	4372600	2080.00	6.00
China	11064.66	776030000	2122.98	6.72
Finland	232.40	2439000	1646.00	57.89
Hungary	121.72	4367928	1749.00	15.93
Russia	1331.20	71800000	1978.00	9.37
Turkey	717.88	26672000	1832.00	14.69
France	2418.84	27798000	1482.00	58.71
United Kingdom	2861.10	30668000	1674.00	55.73
Pakistan	271.05	57420000	2282.60	2.07
South Korea	1377.87	26622000	2113.00	24.49
UAE	370.29	3910000	2216.07	42.73
United States	18036.65	153000000	1790.00	65.86
South Africa	314.57	9690000	2215.20	14.65

APPENDIX 4 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CALCULATION

Country	Site	Vendor	Technology	Units	Gross Capacity (kWe)	CPI Ratio	Cost after inflation	TCIC (\$/kWe)	CCL (\$/kWe)	OCC (\$/kWe)	EPC Cost (\$/kWe)	TPC Cost (\$/kWe)	Material Cost (\$/kWe)	Int Labour cost (\$/kWe)
Belarus	Ostrovets	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	2	2 400 000	1.11	\$ 10 459 615 287	4 358	959	3 399	2 361	2 833	2 096	737
China	Tianwan I	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428)	2	2 120 000	1.06	\$ 4 479 219 512	2 113	697	1 416	983	1 180	873	307
China	Tianwan II	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428M)	2	2 120 000	1.11	\$ 4 269 400 616	2 014	503	1 510	1 049	1 259	931	327
Finland	Hanhikivi	Rosatom	VVER V-491	1	1 200 000	1.01	\$ 7 525 541 206	6 271	1 380	4 892	3 397	4 076	3 016	1 060
Hungary	Paks	Rosatom	VVER-1200	2	2 400 000	1.01	\$ 12 218 065 693	5 091	1 680	3 411	2 369	2 842	2 103	739
Russia	Kaliningrad	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	1	1 194 000	1.11	\$ 7 639 980 050	6 399	2 112	4 287	2 977	3 573	2 644	929
Russia	Leningrad II	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	2	2 340 000	1.14	\$ 7 388 892 863	3 158	1 042	2 116	1 469	1 763	1 305	458
Russia	NovovoronezhII	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392M)	2	2 400 000	1.19	\$ 5 617 632 390	2 341	772	1 568	1 089	1 307	967	340
Turkey	Akkuyu	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392)	4	4 800 000	1.05	\$ 23 096 579 179	4 812	1 203	3 609	2 506	3 007	2 225	782
China	Taishan	CGN + EDF	EPR 1600	2	3 500 000	1.14	\$ 8 486 352 982	2 425	800	1 625	1 128	1 354	1 002	352
Finland	Olkiluoto	Areva	EPR 1600	1	1 720 000	1.05	\$ 9 889 535 267	5 750	2 932	2 817	1 957	2 348	1 737	610
France	Fliamanville	EDF (Areva)	EPR 1600	1	3 260 000	1.01	\$ 12 000 187 328	3 681	1 620	2 061	1 432	1 718	1 271	447
UK	Hinkley Point C	Areva	EPR 1600	2	3 300 000	1.00	\$ 23 600 000 000	7 152	2 074	5 078	3 526	4 231	3 131	1 100
China	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)	CGN	Hualong-1	2	2 300 000	1.03	\$ 4 989 043 491	2 169	390	1 779	1 235	1 482	1 097	385
Pakistan	Karachi	CNNC	Hualong-1	2	2 300 000	1.03	\$ 9 933 012 530	4 319	1 080	3 239	2 249	2 699	1 997	702
South Korea	Shin-Hanul I (1&2)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	1.10	\$ 6 632 369 667	2 369	592	1 777	1 234	1 480	1 096	385
South Korea	Shin-Kori II (3&4)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	1.12	\$ 7 053 034 096	2 519	730	1 788	1 242	1 490	1 103	387
South Korea	Shin-Kori III (5&6)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	1.03	\$ 7 229 022 202	2 582	568	2 014	1 398	1 678	1 242	436
UAE	Barakah	KEPCO	APR1400	4	5 600 000	1.11	\$ 22 919 940 150	4 093	1 023	3 070	2 132	2 558	1 893	665
China	Haiyang	Westinghouse	AP-1000	1	1 250 000	1.14	\$ 6 305 210 146	5 044	1 665	3 380	2 347	2 816	2 084	732
China	Sanmen	Westinghouse	AP-1000	1	1 250 000	1.03	\$ 5 170 467 103	4 136	1 365	2 771	1 925	2 309	1 709	600
USA	Vogtle (Georgia)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	2	2 500 000	1.02	\$ 14 000 000 000	5 600	1 624	3 976	2 761	3 313	2 452	861
USA	V.C. Summer (South Carolina)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	2	2 500 000	1.02	\$ 11 199 893 552	4 480	1 299	3 181	2 209	2 651	1 961	689

APPENDIX 5 LOCALIZED OCC CALCULATION

Country	Site	Vendor	Technology	Units	Gross Capacity (kWe)	Int Labour cost (\$/kWe)	Labour Rate (\$/hr)	Labour Productivity (\$/labour hr)	ULC International	ULC ratio	Labour cost SA (\$/kWe)	Difference in Labour Cost (\$/kWe)	TPC SA (\$/kWe)	EPCC SA (\$/kWe)	OCC SA (\$/kWe)
Belarus	Ostrovets	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	2	2 400 000	737	2.69	6	0.45	2.34	989	253	3 085	2 571	3 703
China	Tianwan I	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428)	2	2 120 000	307	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	639	332	1 512	1 260	1 814
China	Tianwan II	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428M)	2	2 120 000	327	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	681	354	1 613	1 344	1 935
Finland	Hanhikivi	Rosatom	VVER V-491	1	1 200 000	1 060	21.45	58	0.37	1.94	995	-65	4 011	3 343	4 813
Hungary	Paks	Rosatom	VVER-1200	2	2 400 000	739	6.03	16	0.38	1.98	725	-14	2 828	2 357	3 393
Russia	Kaliningrad	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	1	1 194 000	929	4.66	9	0.50	2.60	1 488	559	4 132	3 443	4 958
Russia	Leningrad II	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	2	2 340 000	458	4.66	9	0.50	2.60	734	276	2 039	1 699	2 447
Russia	Novovoronezh II	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392M)	2	2 400 000	340	4.66	9	0.50	2.60	544	205	1 512	1 260	1 814
Turkey	Akkuyu	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392)	4	4 800 000	782	4.77	15	0.32	1.70	546	-236	2 771	2 309	3 325
China	Taishan	CGN + EDF	EPR 1600	2	3 500 000	352	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	733	381	1 735	1 446	2 082
Finland	Olkiluoto	Areva	EPR 1600	1	1 720 000	610	21.45	58	0.37	1.94	573	-38	2 310	1 925	2 772
France	Flamanville	EDF (Areva)	EPR 1600	1	3 260 000	447	21.34	59	0.36	1.90	403	-44	1 674	1 395	2 009
UK	Hinkley Point C	Areva	EPR 1600	2	3 300 000	1 100	21.28	56	0.38	2.00	1 098	-2	4 229	3 525	5 075
China	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)	CGN	Hualong-1	2	2 300 000	385	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	802	417	1 899	1 583	2 279
Pakistan	Karachi	CNNC	Hualong-1	2	2 300 000	702	0.60	2	0.29	1.53	370	-332	2 367	1 973	2 841
South Korea	Shin-Hanul I (1&2)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	385	13.23	24	0.54	2.83	703	318	1 799	1 499	2 159
South Korea	Shin-Kori II (3&4)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	387	13.23	24	0.54	2.83	708	321	1 811	1 509	2 173
South Korea	Shin-Kori III (5&6)	KEPCO	APR1400	2	2 800 000	436	13.23	24	0.54	2.83	797	361	2 039	1 699	2 447
UAE	Barakah	KEPCO	APR1400	4	5 600 000	665	23.31	106	0.22	1.15	100	-565	1 993	1 661	2 392
China	Haiyang	Westinghouse	AP-1000	1	1 250 000	732	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	1 524	792	3 609	3 007	4 330
China	Sanmen	Westinghouse	AP-1000	1	1 250 000	600	3.96	7	0.59	3.08	1 250	650	2 959	2 466	3 551
USA	Vogtle (Georgia)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	2	2 500 000	861	20.33	66	0.31	1.61	530	-332	2 982	2 485	3 578
USA	V.C. Summer (South Carolina)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	2	2 500 000	689	20.33	66	0.31	1.61	424	-265	2 385	1 988	2 862

**APPENDIX 6
LOCALIZED OCC SUMMARY**

Country	Site	Vendor	OCC SA (\$/kWe)
Belarus	Ostrovets	Rosatom	3 703
China	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)	CGN	2 279
China	Haiyang	Westinghouse	4 330
China	Sanmen	Westinghouse	3 551
China	Taishan	CGN + EDF	2 082
China	Tianwan I	Rosatom	1 814
China	Tianwan II	Rosatom	1 935
Finland	Hanhikivi	Rosatom	4 813
Finland	Olkiluoto	Areva	2 772
France	Flamanville	EDF (Areva)	2 009
Hungary	Paks	Rosatom	3 393
Pakistan	Karachi	CNNC	2 841
Russia	Kaliningrad	Rosatom	4 958
Russia	Leningrad II	Rosatom	2 447
Russia	NovovoronezhII	Rosatom	1 814
South Korea	Shin-Hanul I (1&2)	KEPCO	2 159
South Korea	Shin-Kori II (3&4)	KEPCO	2 173
South Korea	Shin-Kori III (5&6)	KEPCO	2 447
Turkey	Akkuyu	Rosatom	3 325
UAE	Barakah	KEPCO	2 392
UK	Hinkley Point C	Areva	5 075
USA	V.C. Summer (South Carolina)	Westinghouse	2 862
USA	Vogtle (Georgia)	Westinghouse	3 578

APPENDIX 7 LOCALIZED OCC GROUPED

Country	Site	Vendor	Technology	OCC SA (\$/kWe)	Total Capital Cost	Total Capital Cost for per plant	Total Interest Accumulated & O&M Costs	Total Loan amount	LCOE (\$/MWh)
Belarus	Ostrovets	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	3 703	\$ 4 443 032 625	\$ 4 443 032 625	\$ 22 247 549 203	\$ 26 690 581 828	47.02
China	Tianwan I	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428)	1 814	\$ 1 922 648 766	\$ 1 922 648 766	\$ 12 463 591 199	\$ 14 386 239 965	28.69
China	Tianwan II	Rosatom	VVER (AES91/V428M)	1 935	\$ 2 051 402 953	\$ 2 051 402 953	\$ 12 963 406 159	\$ 15 014 809 112	29.94
China	Taishan	CGN + EDF	EPR 1600	2 082	\$ 3 642 660 523	\$ 3 642 660 523	\$ 19 140 559 366	\$ 22 783 219 889	27.52
China	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)	CGN	Hualong-1	2 279	\$ 2 620 921 098	\$ 2 620 921 098	\$ 15 174 236 700	\$ 17 795 157 797	32.71
China	Haiyang	Westinghouse	AP-1000	4 330	\$ 5 412 864 663	\$ 5 412 864 663	\$ 26 012 370 938	\$ 31 425 235 601	53.15
China	Sanmen	Westinghouse	AP-1000	3 551	\$ 4 438 716 240	\$ 4 438 716 240	\$ 22 230 793 292	\$ 26 669 509 533	45.10
Finland	Hanhikivi	Rosatom	VVER V-491	4 813	\$ 5 776 146 750	\$ 5 776 146 750	\$ 27 422 607 188	\$ 33 198 753 938	58.48
Finland	Olkiluoto	Areva	EPR 1600	2 772	\$ 4 768 456 677	\$ 4 768 456 677	\$ 23 510 823 147	\$ 28 279 279 824	34.76
France	Flamanville	EDF (Areva)	EPR 1600	2 009	\$ 6 549 057 653	\$ 6 549 057 653	\$ 30 422 994 527	\$ 36 972 052 180	23.97
Hungary	Paks	Rosatom	VVER-1200	3 393	\$ 4 072 186 020	\$ 4 072 186 020	\$ 20 807 948 009	\$ 24 880 134 029	43.83
Pakistan	Karachi	CNNC	Hualong-1	2 841	\$ 3 266 744 676	\$ 3 266 744 676	\$ 17 681 279 723	\$ 20 948 024 399	38.51
Russia	Kaliningrad	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	4 958	\$ 5 920 329 786	\$ 5 920 329 786	\$ 27 982 315 886	\$ 33 902 645 672	60.02
Russia	Leningrad II	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 V-491	2 447	\$ 2 862 879 367	\$ 2 862 879 367	\$ 16 113 502 176	\$ 18 976 381 543	34.29
Russia	NovovoronezhII	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392M)	1 814	\$ 2 176 591 833	\$ 2 176 591 833	\$ 13 449 380 841	\$ 15 625 972 674	27.53
South Korea	Shin-Hanul I (1&2)	KEPCO	APR1400	2 159	\$ 3 022 003 470	\$ 3 022 003 470	\$ 16 731 211 075	\$ 19 753 214 544	29.83
South Korea	Shin-Kori II (3&4)	KEPCO	APR1400	2 173	\$ 3 042 280 844	\$ 3 042 280 844	\$ 16 809 926 459	\$ 19 852 207 303	29.98
South Korea	Shin-Kori III (5&6)	KEPCO	APR1400	2 447	\$ 3 425 619 579	\$ 3 425 619 579	\$ 18 298 021 245	\$ 21 723 640 823	32.80
Turkey	Akkuyu	Rosatom	VVER AES-2006 (V-392)	3 325	\$ 3 990 172 067	\$ 3 990 172 067	\$ 20 489 575 448	\$ 24 479 747 515	43.12
UAE	Barakah	KEPCO	APR1400	2 392	\$ 3 348 598 844	\$ 3 348 598 844	\$ 17 999 032 012	\$ 21 347 630 855	32.23
UK	Hinkley Point C	Areva	EPR 1600	5 075	\$ 8 374 260 592	\$ 8 374 260 592	\$ 37 508 307 678	\$ 45 882 568 270	58.78
USA	Vogtle (Georgia)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	3 578	\$ 4 472 287 778	\$ 4 472 287 778	\$ 22 361 115 710	\$ 26 833 403 488	45.98
USA	V.C. Summer (South Carolina)	Westinghouse	AP-1000	2 862	\$ 3 577 796 218	\$ 3 577 796 218	\$ 18 888 760 564	\$ 22 466 556 782	38.00

APPENDIX 16 AMORTIZATION: AKKUYU, TURKEY

Country	Turkey							
Plant	Akkuyu							
Technology	VVER AES-2006 (V-392)							
Vendor	Rosatom							
	Loan amount	\$3 990 172 067						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$330 111 706						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$3 990 172 067	\$330 111 706	\$327 194 110	\$2 917 597	\$83 333 333	\$413 445 040	\$3 987 254 471
	2	\$3 987 254 471	\$330 111 706	\$326 696 006	\$3 156 840	\$83 333 333	\$413 186 179	\$3 984 097 631
	3	\$3 984 097 631	\$330 111 706	\$326 415 918	\$3 415 701	\$83 333 333	\$413 164 952	\$3 980 681 930
	4	\$3 980 681 930	\$330 111 706	\$326 112 864	\$3 695 788	\$83 333 333	\$413 141 985	\$3 976 986 142
	5	\$3 976 986 142	\$330 111 706	\$325 784 959	\$3 998 843	\$83 333 333	\$413 117 135	\$3 972 987 299
	6	\$3 972 987 299	\$330 111 706	\$325 430 165	\$4 326 748	\$83 333 333	\$413 090 246	\$3 968 660 551
	7	\$3 968 660 551	\$330 111 706	\$325 046 279	\$4 681 541	\$83 333 333	\$413 061 153	\$3 963 979 010
	8	\$3 963 979 010	\$330 111 706	\$324 630 914	\$5 065 428	\$83 333 333	\$413 029 675	\$3 958 913 583
	9	\$3 958 913 583	\$330 111 706	\$324 181 489	\$5 480 793	\$83 333 333	\$412 995 615	\$3 953 432 790
	10	\$3 953 432 790	\$330 111 706	\$323 695 211	\$5 930 218	\$83 333 333	\$412 958 762	\$3 947 502 573
	11	\$3 947 502 573	\$330 111 706	\$323 169 058	\$6 416 495	\$83 333 333	\$412 918 887	\$3 941 086 077
	12	\$3 941 086 077	\$330 111 706	\$322 599 761	\$6 942 648	\$83 333 333	\$412 875 743	\$3 934 143 429
	13	\$3 934 143 429	\$330 111 706	\$321 983 782	\$7 511 945	\$83 333 333	\$412 829 060	\$3 926 631 484
	14	\$3 926 631 484	\$330 111 706	\$321 317 292	\$8 127 925	\$83 333 333	\$412 778 550	\$3 918 503 560
	15	\$3 918 503 560	\$330 111 706	\$320 596 150	\$8 794 414	\$83 333 333	\$412 723 898	\$3 909 709 145
	16	\$3 909 709 145	\$330 111 706	\$319 815 874	\$9 515 556	\$83 333 333	\$412 664 764	\$3 900 193 589
	17	\$3 900 193 589	\$330 111 706	\$318 971 616	\$10 295 832	\$83 333 333	\$412 600 781	\$3 889 897 756
	18	\$3 889 897 756	\$330 111 706	\$318 058 129	\$11 140 090	\$83 333 333	\$412 531 552	\$3 878 757 666
	19	\$3 878 757 666	\$330 111 706	\$317 069 735	\$12 053 578	\$83 333 333	\$412 456 646	\$3 866 704 088
	20	\$3 866 704 088	\$330 111 706	\$316 000 294	\$13 041 971	\$83 333 333	\$412 375 598	\$3 853 662 117
	21	\$3 853 662 117	\$330 111 706	\$314 843 158	\$14 111 413	\$83 333 333	\$412 287 904	\$3 839 550 705
	22	\$3 839 550 705	\$330 111 706	\$313 591 137	\$15 268 549	\$83 333 333	\$412 193 019	\$3 824 282 156
	23	\$3 824 282 156	\$330 111 706	\$312 236 450	\$16 520 570	\$83 333 333	\$412 090 353	\$3 807 761 586
	24	\$3 807 761 586	\$330 111 706	\$310 770 679	\$17 875 256	\$83 333 333	\$411 979 269	\$3 789 886 330
	25	\$3 789 886 330	\$330 111 706	\$309 184 715	\$19 341 027	\$83 333 333	\$411 859 075	\$3 770 545 303
	26	\$3 770 545 303	\$330 111 706	\$307 468 702	\$20 926 992	\$83 333 333	\$411 729 026	\$3 749 618 311
	27	\$3 749 618 311	\$330 111 706	\$305 611 975	\$22 643 005	\$83 333 333	\$411 588 313	\$3 726 975 306
	28	\$3 726 975 306	\$330 111 706	\$303 602 997	\$24 499 731	\$83 333 333	\$411 436 062	\$3 702 475 575
	29	\$3 702 475 575	\$330 111 706	\$301 429 283	\$26 508 709	\$83 333 333	\$411 271 326	\$3 675 966 866
	30	\$3 675 966 866	\$330 111 706	\$299 077 324	\$28 682 423	\$83 333 333	\$411 093 081	\$3 647 284 443
	31	\$3 647 284 443	\$330 111 706	\$296 532 505	\$31 034 382	\$83 333 333	\$410 900 220	\$3 616 250 061
	32	\$3 616 250 061	\$330 111 706	\$293 779 010	\$33 579 201	\$83 333 333	\$410 691 545	\$3 582 670 859
	33	\$3 582 670 859	\$330 111 706	\$290 799 729	\$36 332 696	\$83 333 333	\$410 465 759	\$3 546 338 163
	34	\$3 546 338 163	\$330 111 706	\$287 576 147	\$39 311 977	\$83 333 333	\$410 221 458	\$3 507 026 186
	35	\$3 507 026 186	\$330 111 706	\$284 088 231	\$42 535 559	\$83 333 333	\$409 957 124	\$3 464 490 627
	36	\$3 464 490 627	\$330 111 706	\$280 314 306	\$46 023 475	\$83 333 333	\$409 671 115	\$3 418 467 152
	37	\$3 418 467 152	\$330 111 706	\$276 230 920	\$49 797 400	\$83 333 333	\$409 361 653	\$3 368 669 753
	38	\$3 368 669 753	\$330 111 706	\$271 812 695	\$53 880 787	\$83 333 333	\$409 026 815	\$3 314 788 966
	39	\$3 314 788 966	\$330 111 706	\$267 032 176	\$58 299 011	\$83 333 333	\$408 664 521	\$3 256 489 955
	40	\$3 256 489 955	\$330 111 706	\$261 859 655	\$63 079 530	\$83 333 333	\$408 272 518	\$3 193 410 425
	41	\$3 193 410 425	\$330 111 706	\$256 262 987	\$68 252 052	\$83 333 333	\$407 848 371	\$3 125 158 373
	42	\$3 125 158 373	\$330 111 706	\$250 207 392	\$73 848 720	\$83 333 333	\$407 389 445	\$3 051 309 653
	43	\$3 051 309 653	\$330 111 706	\$243 655 238	\$79 904 315	\$83 333 333	\$406 892 886	\$2 971 405 339
	44	\$2 971 405 339	\$330 111 706	\$236 565 807	\$86 456 469	\$83 333 333	\$406 355 609	\$2 884 948 870
	45	\$2 884 948 870	\$330 111 706	\$228 895 044	\$93 545 899	\$83 333 333	\$405 774 276	\$2 791 402 971
	46	\$2 791 402 971	\$330 111 706	\$220 595 277	\$101 216 663	\$83 333 333	\$405 145 273	\$2 690 186 308
	47	\$2 690 186 308	\$330 111 706	\$211 614 930	\$109 516 429	\$83 333 333	\$404 464 693	\$2 580 669 879
	48	\$2 580 669 879	\$330 111 706	\$201 898 194	\$118 496 776	\$83 333 333	\$403 728 304	\$2 462 173 103
	49	\$2 462 173 103	\$330 111 706	\$191 384 686	\$128 213 512	\$83 333 333	\$402 931 532	\$2 333 959 591
	50	\$2 333 959 591	\$330 111 706	\$180 009 071	\$138 727 020	\$83 333 333	\$402 069 424	\$2 195 232 571
	51	\$2 195 232 571	\$330 111 706	\$167 700 655	\$150 102 636	\$83 333 333	\$401 136 624	\$2 045 129 935
	52	\$2 045 129 935	\$330 111 706	\$154 382 948	\$162 411 052	\$83 333 333	\$400 127 333	\$1 882 718 884
	53	\$1 882 718 884	\$330 111 706	\$139 973 190	\$175 728 758	\$83 333 333	\$399 035 282	\$1 706 990 126
	54	\$1 706 990 126	\$330 111 706	\$124 381 832	\$190 138 516	\$83 333 333	\$397 853 681	\$1 516 851 610
	55	\$1 516 851 610	\$330 111 706	\$107 511 982	\$205 729 874	\$83 333 333	\$396 575 190	\$1 311 121 735
	56	\$1 311 121 735	\$330 111 706	\$89 258 805	\$222 599 724	\$83 333 333	\$395 191 862	\$1 088 522 011
	57	\$1 088 522 011	\$330 111 706	\$69 508 867	\$240 852 901	\$83 333 333	\$393 695 102	\$847 669 110
	58	\$847 669 110	\$330 111 706	\$48 139 434	\$260 602 839	\$83 333 333	\$392 075 607	\$587 066 271
	59	\$587 066 271	\$330 111 706	\$25 017 708	\$281 972 272	\$83 333 333	\$390 323 313	\$305 093 998
	60	\$305 093 998	\$330 111 706	\$0	\$305 093 998	\$83 333 333	\$388 427 332	\$0
				\$15 489 575 447.60		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$24 479 747 514.95	

APPENDIX 20 AMORTIZATION: HINKLEY POINT C, UNITED KINGDOM

Country	UK							
Plant	Hinkley Point C							
Technology	EPR 1600							
Vendor	Areva							
	Loan amount	\$8 374 260 592						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$692 812 592						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$8 374 260 592	\$692 812 592	\$686 689 369	\$6 123 224	\$83 333 333	\$776 145 926	\$8 368 137 368
	2	\$8 368 137 368	\$692 812 592	\$685 643 987	\$6 625 328	\$83 333 333	\$775 602 649	\$8 361 512 040
	3	\$8 361 512 040	\$692 812 592	\$685 056 162	\$7 168 605	\$83 333 333	\$775 558 100	\$8 354 343 435
	4	\$8 354 343 435	\$692 812 592	\$684 420 134	\$7 756 431	\$83 333 333	\$775 509 898	\$8 346 587 005
	5	\$8 346 587 005	\$692 812 592	\$683 731 953	\$8 392 458	\$83 333 333	\$775 457 744	\$8 338 194 547
	6	\$8 338 194 547	\$692 812 592	\$682 987 340	\$9 080 639	\$83 333 333	\$775 401 313	\$8 329 113 907
	7	\$8 329 113 907	\$692 812 592	\$682 181 670	\$9 825 252	\$83 333 333	\$775 340 255	\$8 319 288 655
	8	\$8 319 288 655	\$692 812 592	\$681 309 934	\$10 630 922	\$83 333 333	\$775 274 190	\$8 308 657 733
	9	\$8 308 657 733	\$692 812 592	\$680 366 716	\$11 502 658	\$83 333 333	\$775 202 708	\$8 297 155 075
	10	\$8 297 155 075	\$692 812 592	\$679 346 154	\$12 445 876	\$83 333 333	\$775 125 364	\$8 284 709 199
	11	\$8 284 709 199	\$692 812 592	\$678 241 906	\$13 466 438	\$83 333 333	\$775 041 678	\$8 271 242 761
	12	\$8 271 242 761	\$692 812 592	\$677 047 110	\$14 570 686	\$83 333 333	\$774 951 129	\$8 256 672 075
	13	\$8 256 672 075	\$692 812 592	\$675 754 341	\$15 765 482	\$83 333 333	\$774 853 156	\$8 240 906 593
	14	\$8 240 906 593	\$692 812 592	\$674 355 564	\$17 058 252	\$83 333 333	\$774 747 149	\$8 223 848 341
	15	\$8 223 848 341	\$692 812 592	\$672 842 088	\$18 457 028	\$83 333 333	\$774 632 449	\$8 205 391 313
	16	\$8 205 391 313	\$692 812 592	\$671 204 506	\$19 970 505	\$83 333 333	\$774 508 344	\$8 185 420 808
	17	\$8 185 420 808	\$692 812 592	\$669 432 643	\$21 608 086	\$83 333 333	\$774 374 063	\$8 163 812 722
	18	\$8 163 812 722	\$692 812 592	\$667 515 487	\$23 379 949	\$83 333 333	\$774 228 770	\$8 140 432 773
	19	\$8 140 432 773	\$692 812 592	\$665 441 125	\$25 297 105	\$83 333 333	\$774 071 563	\$8 115 135 669
	20	\$8 115 135 669	\$692 812 592	\$663 196 665	\$27 371 467	\$83 333 333	\$773 901 465	\$8 087 764 201
	21	\$8 087 764 201	\$692 812 592	\$660 768 158	\$29 615 928	\$83 333 333	\$773 717 420	\$8 058 148 273
	22	\$8 058 148 273	\$692 812 592	\$658 140 515	\$32 044 434	\$83 333 333	\$773 518 282	\$8 026 103 840
	23	\$8 026 103 840	\$692 812 592	\$655 297 405	\$34 672 077	\$83 333 333	\$773 302 815	\$7 991 431 762
	24	\$7 991 431 762	\$692 812 592	\$652 221 159	\$37 515 188	\$83 333 333	\$773 069 680	\$7 953 916 575
	25	\$7 953 916 575	\$692 812 592	\$648 892 662	\$40 591 433	\$83 333 333	\$772 817 428	\$7 913 325 141
	26	\$7 913 325 141	\$692 812 592	\$645 291 227	\$43 919 931	\$83 333 333	\$772 544 491	\$7 869 405 211
	27	\$7 869 405 211	\$692 812 592	\$641 394 475	\$47 521 365	\$83 333 333	\$772 249 174	\$7 821 883 846
	28	\$7 821 883 846	\$692 812 592	\$637 178 190	\$51 418 117	\$83 333 333	\$771 929 640	\$7 770 465 729
	29	\$7 770 465 729	\$692 812 592	\$632 616 169	\$55 634 402	\$83 333 333	\$771 583 905	\$7 714 831 326
	30	\$7 714 831 326	\$692 812 592	\$627 680 062	\$60 196 423	\$83 333 333	\$771 209 819	\$7 654 634 903
	31	\$7 654 634 903	\$692 812 592	\$622 339 195	\$65 132 530	\$83 333 333	\$770 805 058	\$7 589 502 373
	32	\$7 589 502 373	\$692 812 592	\$616 560 376	\$70 473 398	\$83 333 333	\$770 367 107	\$7 519 028 975
	33	\$7 519 028 975	\$692 812 592	\$610 307 694	\$76 252 216	\$83 333 333	\$769 893 244	\$7 442 776 759
	34	\$7 442 776 759	\$692 812 592	\$603 542 293	\$82 504 898	\$83 333 333	\$769 380 524	\$7 360 271 861
	35	\$7 360 271 861	\$692 812 592	\$596 222 128	\$89 270 300	\$83 333 333	\$768 825 761	\$7 271 001 561
	36	\$7 271 001 561	\$692 812 592	\$588 301 710	\$96 590 464	\$83 333 333	\$768 225 508	\$7 174 411 097
	37	\$7 174 411 097	\$692 812 592	\$579 731 818	\$104 510 882	\$83 333 333	\$767 576 033	\$7 069 900 215
	38	\$7 069 900 215	\$692 812 592	\$570 459 194	\$113 080 775	\$83 333 333	\$766 873 302	\$6 956 819 440
	39	\$6 956 819 440	\$692 812 592	\$560 426 215	\$122 353 398	\$83 333 333	\$766 112 947	\$6 834 466 042
	40	\$6 834 466 042	\$692 812 592	\$549 570 533	\$132 386 377	\$83 333 333	\$765 290 243	\$6 702 079 665
	41	\$6 702 079 665	\$692 812 592	\$537 824 684	\$143 242 060	\$83 333 333	\$764 400 077	\$6 558 837 605
	42	\$6 558 837 605	\$692 812 592	\$525 115 675	\$154 987 909	\$83 333 333	\$763 436 917	\$6 403 849 697
	43	\$6 403 849 697	\$692 812 592	\$511 364 528	\$167 696 917	\$83 333 333	\$762 394 778	\$6 236 152 780
	44	\$6 236 152 780	\$692 812 592	\$496 485 787	\$181 448 064	\$83 333 333	\$761 267 184	\$6 054 704 715
	45	\$6 054 704 715	\$692 812 592	\$480 386 989	\$196 326 806	\$83 333 333	\$760 047 128	\$5 858 377 910
	46	\$5 858 377 910	\$692 812 592	\$462 968 089	\$212 425 604	\$83 333 333	\$758 727 026	\$5 645 952 306
	47	\$5 645 952 306	\$692 812 592	\$444 120 840	\$229 844 503	\$83 333 333	\$757 298 676	\$5 416 107 803
	48	\$5 416 107 803	\$692 812 592	\$423 728 116	\$248 691 752	\$83 333 333	\$755 753 202	\$5 167 416 050
	49	\$5 167 416 050	\$692 812 592	\$401 663 189	\$269 084 476	\$83 333 333	\$754 080 999	\$4 898 331 574
	50	\$4 898 331 574	\$692 812 592	\$377 788 938	\$291 149 403	\$83 333 333	\$752 271 675	\$4 607 182 171
	51	\$4 607 182 171	\$692 812 592	\$351 956 998	\$315 023 654	\$83 333 333	\$750 313 986	\$4 292 158 517
	52	\$4 292 158 517	\$692 812 592	\$324 006 840	\$340 855 594	\$83 333 333	\$748 195 767	\$3 951 302 923
	53	\$3 951 302 923	\$692 812 592	\$293 764 768	\$368 805 753	\$83 333 333	\$745 903 854	\$3 582 497 171
	54	\$3 582 497 171	\$692 812 592	\$261 042 846	\$399 047 824	\$83 333 333	\$743 424 004	\$3 183 449 346
	55	\$3 183 449 346	\$692 812 592	\$225 637 727	\$431 769 746	\$83 333 333	\$740 740 806	\$2 751 679 601
	56	\$2 751 679 601	\$692 812 592	\$187 329 388	\$467 174 865	\$83 333 333	\$737 837 587	\$2 284 504 736
	57	\$2 284 504 736	\$692 812 592	\$145 879 766	\$505 483 204	\$83 333 333	\$734 696 303	\$1 779 021 532
	58	\$1 779 021 532	\$692 812 592	\$101 031 274	\$546 932 827	\$83 333 333	\$731 297 434	\$1 232 088 705
	59	\$1 232 088 705	\$692 812 592	\$52 505 206	\$591 781 318	\$83 333 333	\$727 619 857	\$640 307 387
	60	\$640 307 387	\$692 812 592	\$0	\$640 307 387	\$83 333 333	\$723 640 720	\$0
				\$32 508 307 678.45		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$45 882 568 270.31	

APPENDIX 21 AMORTIZATION: FANGCHENGGANG-2 (3&4), CHINA

Country	China							
Plant	Fangchenggang-2 (3&4)							
Technology	Hualong-1							
Vendor	CGN							
	Loan amount		\$2 620 921 098					
	Annual interest rate		98%					
	Loan period in years		60					
	Monthly Payment		\$216 831 936					
	O&M		\$83 333 333					
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$2 620 921 098	\$216 831 936	\$214 915 530	\$1 916 406	\$83 333 333	\$300 165 270	\$2 619 004 691
	2	\$2 619 004 691	\$216 831 936	\$214 588 353	\$2 073 552	\$83 333 333	\$299 995 238	\$2 616 931 140
	3	\$2 616 931 140	\$216 831 936	\$214 404 380	\$2 243 583	\$83 333 333	\$299 981 296	\$2 614 687 557
	4	\$2 614 687 557	\$216 831 936	\$214 205 320	\$2 427 557	\$83 333 333	\$299 966 210	\$2 612 260 000
	5	\$2 612 260 000	\$216 831 936	\$213 989 937	\$2 626 616	\$83 333 333	\$299 949 887	\$2 609 633 384
	6	\$2 609 633 384	\$216 831 936	\$213 756 894	\$2 841 999	\$83 333 333	\$299 932 226	\$2 606 791 385
	7	\$2 606 791 385	\$216 831 936	\$213 504 740	\$3 075 043	\$83 333 333	\$299 913 116	\$2 603 716 342
	8	\$2 603 716 342	\$216 831 936	\$213 231 910	\$3 327 196	\$83 333 333	\$299 892 440	\$2 600 389 146
	9	\$2 600 389 146	\$216 831 936	\$212 936 708	\$3 600 026	\$83 333 333	\$299 870 068	\$2 596 789 119
	10	\$2 596 789 119	\$216 831 936	\$212 617 299	\$3 895 229	\$83 333 333	\$299 845 861	\$2 592 893 891
	11	\$2 592 893 891	\$216 831 936	\$212 271 699	\$4 214 637	\$83 333 333	\$299 819 669	\$2 588 679 253
	12	\$2 588 679 253	\$216 831 936	\$211 897 759	\$4 560 238	\$83 333 333	\$299 791 330	\$2 584 119 016
	13	\$2 584 119 016	\$216 831 936	\$211 493 157	\$4 934 177	\$83 333 333	\$299 760 667	\$2 579 184 839
	14	\$2 579 184 839	\$216 831 936	\$211 055 377	\$5 338 780	\$83 333 333	\$299 727 490	\$2 573 846 059
	15	\$2 573 846 059	\$216 831 936	\$210 581 699	\$5 776 560	\$83 333 333	\$299 691 592	\$2 568 069 500
	16	\$2 568 069 500	\$216 831 936	\$210 069 179	\$6 250 237	\$83 333 333	\$299 652 750	\$2 561 819 262
	17	\$2 561 819 262	\$216 831 936	\$209 514 633	\$6 762 757	\$83 333 333	\$299 610 724	\$2 555 056 505
	18	\$2 555 056 505	\$216 831 936	\$208 914 615	\$7 317 303	\$83 333 333	\$299 565 251	\$2 547 739 202
	19	\$2 547 739 202	\$216 831 936	\$208 265 394	\$7 917 322	\$83 333 333	\$299 516 049	\$2 539 821 881
	20	\$2 539 821 881	\$216 831 936	\$207 562 938	\$8 566 542	\$83 333 333	\$299 462 813	\$2 531 255 338
	21	\$2 531 255 338	\$216 831 936	\$206 802 880	\$9 268 999	\$83 333 333	\$299 405 212	\$2 521 986 340
	22	\$2 521 986 340	\$216 831 936	\$205 980 497	\$10 029 057	\$83 333 333	\$299 342 887	\$2 511 957 283
	23	\$2 511 957 283	\$216 831 936	\$205 090 679	\$10 851 439	\$83 333 333	\$299 275 452	\$2 501 105 844
	24	\$2 501 105 844	\$216 831 936	\$204 127 896	\$11 741 257	\$83 333 333	\$299 202 487	\$2 489 364 587
	25	\$2 489 364 587	\$216 831 936	\$203 086 165	\$12 704 040	\$83 333 333	\$299 123 538	\$2 476 660 547
	26	\$2 476 660 547	\$216 831 936	\$201 959 012	\$13 745 772	\$83 333 333	\$299 038 116	\$2 462 914 775
	27	\$2 462 914 775	\$216 831 936	\$200 739 432	\$14 872 925	\$83 333 333	\$298 945 690	\$2 448 041 850
	28	\$2 448 041 850	\$216 831 936	\$199 419 846	\$16 092 505	\$83 333 333	\$298 845 684	\$2 431 949 346
	29	\$2 431 949 346	\$216 831 936	\$197 992 055	\$17 412 090	\$83 333 333	\$298 737 478	\$2 414 537 256
	30	\$2 414 537 256	\$216 831 936	\$196 447 185	\$18 839 881	\$83 333 333	\$298 620 399	\$2 395 697 374
	31	\$2 395 697 374	\$216 831 936	\$194 775 635	\$20 384 752	\$83 333 333	\$298 493 720	\$2 375 312 623
	32	\$2 375 312 623	\$216 831 936	\$192 967 018	\$22 056 301	\$83 333 333	\$298 356 653	\$2 353 256 321
	33	\$2 353 256 321	\$216 831 936	\$191 010 095	\$23 864 918	\$83 333 333	\$298 208 346	\$2 329 391 403
	34	\$2 329 391 403	\$216 831 936	\$188 892 704	\$25 821 841	\$83 333 333	\$298 047 879	\$2 303 569 562
	35	\$2 303 569 562	\$216 831 936	\$186 601 687	\$27 939 232	\$83 333 333	\$297 874 253	\$2 275 630 330
	36	\$2 275 630 330	\$216 831 936	\$184 122 807	\$30 230 249	\$83 333 333	\$297 686 389	\$2 245 400 081
	37	\$2 245 400 081	\$216 831 936	\$181 440 658	\$32 709 130	\$83 333 333	\$297 483 121	\$2 212 690 951
	38	\$2 212 690 951	\$216 831 936	\$178 538 573	\$35 391 278	\$83 333 333	\$297 263 185	\$2 177 299 672
	39	\$2 177 299 672	\$216 831 936	\$175 398 517	\$38 293 363	\$83 333 333	\$297 025 214	\$2 139 006 309
	40	\$2 139 006 309	\$216 831 936	\$172 000 977	\$41 433 419	\$83 333 333	\$296 767 729	\$2 097 572 890
	41	\$2 097 572 890	\$216 831 936	\$168 324 838	\$44 830 959	\$83 333 333	\$296 489 131	\$2 052 741 931
	42	\$2 052 741 931	\$216 831 936	\$164 347 256	\$48 507 098	\$83 333 333	\$296 187 688	\$2 004 234 833
	43	\$2 004 234 833	\$216 831 936	\$160 043 513	\$52 484 680	\$83 333 333	\$295 861 526	\$1 951 750 153
	44	\$1 951 750 153	\$216 831 936	\$155 386 862	\$56 788 424	\$83 333 333	\$295 508 619	\$1 894 961 729
	45	\$1 894 961 729	\$216 831 936	\$150 348 366	\$61 445 075	\$83 333 333	\$295 126 774	\$1 833 516 654
	46	\$1 833 516 654	\$216 831 936	\$144 896 713	\$66 483 571	\$83 333 333	\$294 713 617	\$1 767 033 083
	47	\$1 767 033 083	\$216 831 936	\$138 998 025	\$71 935 224	\$83 333 333	\$294 266 581	\$1 695 097 860
	48	\$1 695 097 860	\$216 831 936	\$132 615 644	\$77 833 912	\$83 333 333	\$293 782 889	\$1 617 263 948
	49	\$1 617 263 948	\$216 831 936	\$125 709 908	\$84 216 293	\$83 333 333	\$293 259 534	\$1 533 047 655
	50	\$1 533 047 655	\$216 831 936	\$118 237 901	\$91 122 029	\$83 333 333	\$292 693 263	\$1 441 925 627
	51	\$1 441 925 627	\$216 831 936	\$110 153 191	\$98 594 035	\$83 333 333	\$292 080 559	\$1 343 331 592
	52	\$1 343 331 592	\$216 831 936	\$101 405 533	\$106 678 746	\$83 333 333	\$291 417 613	\$1 236 652 846
	53	\$1 236 652 846	\$216 831 936	\$91 940 568	\$115 426 403	\$83 333 333	\$290 700 305	\$1 121 226 443
	54	\$1 121 226 443	\$216 831 936	\$81 699 476	\$124 891 368	\$83 333 333	\$289 924 178	\$996 335 075
	55	\$996 335 075	\$216 831 936	\$70 618 614	\$135 132 460	\$83 333 333	\$289 084 408	\$861 202 615
	56	\$861 202 615	\$216 831 936	\$58 629 122	\$146 213 322	\$83 333 333	\$288 175 777	\$714 989 293
	57	\$714 989 293	\$216 831 936	\$45 656 491	\$158 202 814	\$83 333 333	\$287 192 639	\$556 786 479
	58	\$556 786 479	\$216 831 936	\$31 620 105	\$171 175 445	\$83 333 333	\$286 128 883	\$385 611 033
	59	\$385 611 033	\$216 831 936	\$16 432 735	\$185 211 832	\$83 333 333	\$284 977 900	\$200 399 202
	60	\$200 399 202	\$216 831 936	\$0	\$200 399 202	\$83 333 333	\$283 732 535	\$0
				\$10 174 236 699.58		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$17 795 157 797.28	

APPENDIX 25 AMORTIZATION: BARAKAH, UAE

Country	UAE							
Plant	Barakah							
Technology	APR1400							
Vendor	KEPCO							
	Loan amount	\$3 348 598 844						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$277 033 586						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$3 348 598 844	\$277 033 586	\$274 585 105	\$2 448 481	\$83 333 333	\$360 366 920	\$3 346 150 363
	2	\$3 346 150 363	\$277 033 586	\$274 167 091	\$2 649 257	\$83 333 333	\$360 149 681	\$3 343 501 106
	3	\$3 343 501 106	\$277 033 586	\$273 932 038	\$2 866 496	\$83 333 333	\$360 131 867	\$3 340 634 610
	4	\$3 340 634 610	\$277 033 586	\$273 677 711	\$3 101 548	\$83 333 333	\$360 112 593	\$3 337 533 062
	5	\$3 337 533 062	\$277 033 586	\$273 402 529	\$3 355 875	\$83 333 333	\$360 091 738	\$3 334 177 186
	6	\$3 334 177 186	\$277 033 586	\$273 104 783	\$3 631 057	\$83 333 333	\$360 069 173	\$3 330 546 129
	7	\$3 330 546 129	\$277 033 586	\$272 782 621	\$3 928 804	\$83 333 333	\$360 044 758	\$3 326 617 326
	8	\$3 326 617 326	\$277 033 586	\$272 434 042	\$4 250 966	\$83 333 333	\$360 018 341	\$3 322 366 360
	9	\$3 322 366 360	\$277 033 586	\$272 056 879	\$4 599 545	\$83 333 333	\$359 989 757	\$3 317 766 815
	10	\$3 317 766 815	\$277 033 586	\$271 648 789	\$4 976 708	\$83 333 333	\$359 958 830	\$3 312 790 107
	11	\$3 312 790 107	\$277 033 586	\$271 207 235	\$5 384 798	\$83 333 333	\$359 925 366	\$3 307 405 310
	12	\$3 307 405 310	\$277 033 586	\$270 729 475	\$5 826 351	\$83 333 333	\$359 889 159	\$3 301 578 959
	13	\$3 301 578 959	\$277 033 586	\$270 212 537	\$6 304 112	\$83 333 333	\$359 849 983	\$3 295 274 847
	14	\$3 295 274 847	\$277 033 586	\$269 653 211	\$6 821 049	\$83 333 333	\$359 807 594	\$3 288 453 798
	15	\$3 288 453 798	\$277 033 586	\$269 048 021	\$7 380 375	\$83 333 333	\$359 761 729	\$3 281 073 423
	16	\$3 281 073 423	\$277 033 586	\$268 393 204	\$7 985 566	\$83 333 333	\$359 712 103	\$3 273 087 857
	17	\$3 273 087 857	\$277 033 586	\$267 684 693	\$8 640 382	\$83 333 333	\$359 658 408	\$3 264 447 475
	18	\$3 264 447 475	\$277 033 586	\$266 918 084	\$9 348 893	\$83 333 333	\$359 600 310	\$3 255 098 581
	19	\$3 255 098 581	\$277 033 586	\$266 088 612	\$10 115 503	\$83 333 333	\$359 537 449	\$3 244 983 079
	20	\$3 244 983 079	\$277 033 586	\$265 191 125	\$10 944 974	\$83 333 333	\$359 469 432	\$3 234 038 105
	21	\$3 234 038 105	\$277 033 586	\$264 220 043	\$11 842 462	\$83 333 333	\$359 395 838	\$3 222 195 643
	22	\$3 222 195 643	\$277 033 586	\$263 169 332	\$12 813 544	\$83 333 333	\$359 316 209	\$3 209 382 099
	23	\$3 209 382 099	\$277 033 586	\$262 032 463	\$13 864 254	\$83 333 333	\$359 230 051	\$3 195 517 845
	24	\$3 195 517 845	\$277 033 586	\$260 802 371	\$15 001 123	\$83 333 333	\$359 136 828	\$3 180 516 722
	25	\$3 180 516 722	\$277 033 586	\$259 471 412	\$16 231 215	\$83 333 333	\$359 035 960	\$3 164 285 507
	26	\$3 164 285 507	\$277 033 586	\$258 031 313	\$17 562 175	\$83 333 333	\$358 926 821	\$3 146 723 332
	27	\$3 146 723 332	\$277 033 586	\$256 473 127	\$19 002 273	\$83 333 333	\$358 808 733	\$3 127 721 059
	28	\$3 127 721 059	\$277 033 586	\$254 787 169	\$20 560 460	\$83 333 333	\$358 680 962	\$3 107 160 599
	29	\$3 107 160 599	\$277 033 586	\$252 962 963	\$22 246 417	\$83 333 333	\$358 542 714	\$3 084 914 182
	30	\$3 084 914 182	\$277 033 586	\$250 989 172	\$24 070 624	\$83 333 333	\$358 393 129	\$3 060 843 558
	31	\$3 060 843 558	\$277 033 586	\$248 853 530	\$26 044 415	\$83 333 333	\$358 231 278	\$3 034 799 143
	32	\$3 034 799 143	\$277 033 586	\$246 542 765	\$28 180 057	\$83 333 333	\$358 056 155	\$3 006 619 087
	33	\$3 006 619 087	\$277 033 586	\$244 042 518	\$30 490 821	\$83 333 333	\$357 866 672	\$2 976 128 265
	34	\$2 976 128 265	\$277 033 586	\$241 337 250	\$32 991 069	\$83 333 333	\$357 661 652	\$2 943 137 197
	35	\$2 943 137 197	\$277 033 586	\$238 410 151	\$35 696 336	\$83 333 333	\$357 439 820	\$2 907 440 860
	36	\$2 907 440 860	\$277 033 586	\$235 243 029	\$38 623 436	\$83 333 333	\$357 199 798	\$2 868 817 425
	37	\$2 868 817 425	\$277 033 586	\$231 816 203	\$41 790 558	\$83 333 333	\$356 940 094	\$2 827 026 867
	38	\$2 827 026 867	\$277 033 586	\$228 108 378	\$45 217 383	\$83 333 333	\$356 659 094	\$2 781 809 484
	39	\$2 781 809 484	\$277 033 586	\$224 096 511	\$48 925 209	\$83 333 333	\$356 355 053	\$2 732 884 275
	40	\$2 732 884 275	\$277 033 586	\$219 755 670	\$52 937 076	\$83 333 333	\$356 026 080	\$2 679 947 199
	41	\$2 679 947 199	\$277 033 586	\$215 058 881	\$57 277 916	\$83 333 333	\$355 670 131	\$2 622 669 283
	42	\$2 622 669 283	\$277 033 586	\$209 976 955	\$61 974 705	\$83 333 333	\$355 284 994	\$2 560 694 578
	43	\$2 560 694 578	\$277 033 586	\$204 478 312	\$67 056 631	\$83 333 333	\$354 868 276	\$2 493 637 947
	44	\$2 493 637 947	\$277 033 586	\$198 528 779	\$72 555 275	\$83 333 333	\$354 417 387	\$2 421 082 672
	45	\$2 421 082 672	\$277 033 586	\$192 091 385	\$78 504 807	\$83 333 333	\$353 929 526	\$2 342 577 865
	46	\$2 342 577 865	\$277 033 586	\$185 126 124	\$84 942 202	\$83 333 333	\$353 401 659	\$2 257 635 663
	47	\$2 257 635 663	\$277 033 586	\$177 589 712	\$91 907 462	\$83 333 333	\$352 830 508	\$2 165 728 201
	48	\$2 165 728 201	\$277 033 586	\$169 435 315	\$99 443 874	\$83 333 333	\$352 212 522	\$2 066 284 327
	49	\$2 066 284 327	\$277 033 586	\$160 612 257	\$107 598 272	\$83 333 333	\$351 543 861	\$1 958 686 056
	50	\$1 958 686 056	\$277 033 586	\$151 065 708	\$116 421 330	\$83 333 333	\$350 820 371	\$1 842 264 726
	51	\$1 842 264 726	\$277 033 586	\$140 736 341	\$125 967 879	\$83 333 333	\$350 037 554	\$1 716 296 847
	52	\$1 716 296 847	\$277 033 586	\$129 559 967	\$136 297 245	\$83 333 333	\$349 190 546	\$1 579 999 602
	53	\$1 579 999 602	\$277 033 586	\$117 467 131	\$147 473 619	\$83 333 333	\$348 274 083	\$1 432 525 983
	54	\$1 432 525 983	\$277 033 586	\$104 382 681	\$159 566 456	\$83 333 333	\$347 282 470	\$1 272 959 527
	55	\$1 272 959 527	\$277 033 586	\$90 225 307	\$172 650 905	\$83 333 333	\$346 209 546	\$1 100 308 622
	56	\$1 100 308 622	\$277 033 586	\$74 907 028	\$186 808 279	\$83 333 333	\$345 048 641	\$913 500 342
	57	\$913 500 342	\$277 033 586	\$58 332 650	\$202 126 558	\$83 333 333	\$343 792 542	\$711 373 784
	58	\$711 373 784	\$277 033 586	\$40 399 174	\$218 700 936	\$83 333 333	\$342 433 443	\$492 672 848
	59	\$492 672 848	\$277 033 586	\$20 995 152	\$236 634 413	\$83 333 333	\$340 962 898	\$256 038 435
	60	\$256 038 435	\$277 033 586	\$0	\$256 038 435	\$83 333 333	\$339 371 768	\$0
				\$12 999 032 011.62		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$21 347 630 855.45	

APPENDIX 26 AMORTIZATION: HAIYANG, CHINA

Country	China							
Plant	Haiyang							
Technology	AP-1000							
Vendor	Westinghouse							
	Loan amount	\$5 412 864 663						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$447 812 766						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$5 412 864 663	\$447 812 766	\$443 854 902	\$3 957 864	\$83 333 333	\$531 146 099	\$5 408 906 799
	2	\$5 408 906 799	\$447 812 766	\$443 179 200	\$4 282 408	\$83 333 333	\$530 794 942	\$5 404 624 391
	3	\$5 404 624 391	\$447 812 766	\$442 799 248	\$4 633 566	\$83 333 333	\$530 766 147	\$5 399 990 825
	4	\$5 399 990 825	\$447 812 766	\$442 388 139	\$5 013 518	\$83 333 333	\$530 734 991	\$5 394 977 307
	5	\$5 394 977 307	\$447 812 766	\$441 943 320	\$5 424 627	\$83 333 333	\$530 701 280	\$5 389 552 680
	6	\$5 389 552 680	\$447 812 766	\$441 462 025	\$5 869 446	\$83 333 333	\$530 664 805	\$5 383 683 234
	7	\$5 383 683 234	\$447 812 766	\$440 941 264	\$6 350 741	\$83 333 333	\$530 625 339	\$5 377 332 493
	8	\$5 377 332 493	\$447 812 766	\$440 377 801	\$6 871 502	\$83 333 333	\$530 582 636	\$5 370 460 991
	9	\$5 370 460 991	\$447 812 766	\$439 768 134	\$7 434 965	\$83 333 333	\$530 536 432	\$5 363 026 027
	10	\$5 363 026 027	\$447 812 766	\$439 108 474	\$8 044 632	\$83 333 333	\$530 486 440	\$5 354 981 395
	11	\$5 354 981 395	\$447 812 766	\$438 394 722	\$8 704 292	\$83 333 333	\$530 432 347	\$5 346 277 103
	12	\$5 346 277 103	\$447 812 766	\$437 622 443	\$9 418 044	\$83 333 333	\$530 373 820	\$5 336 859 060
	13	\$5 336 859 060	\$447 812 766	\$436 786 836	\$10 190 323	\$83 333 333	\$530 310 493	\$5 326 668 737
	14	\$5 326 668 737	\$447 812 766	\$435 882 710	\$11 025 930	\$83 333 333	\$530 241 973	\$5 315 642 807
	15	\$5 315 642 807	\$447 812 766	\$434 904 446	\$11 930 056	\$83 333 333	\$530 167 835	\$5 303 712 751
	16	\$5 303 712 751	\$447 812 766	\$433 845 963	\$12 908 320	\$83 333 333	\$530 087 617	\$5 290 804 431
	17	\$5 290 804 431	\$447 812 766	\$432 700 686	\$13 966 803	\$83 333 333	\$530 000 821	\$5 276 837 628
	18	\$5 276 837 628	\$447 812 766	\$431 461 495	\$15 112 080	\$83 333 333	\$529 906 909	\$5 261 725 548
	19	\$5 261 725 548	\$447 812 766	\$430 120 691	\$16 351 271	\$83 333 333	\$529 805 295	\$5 245 374 277
	20	\$5 245 374 277	\$447 812 766	\$428 669 941	\$17 692 075	\$83 333 333	\$529 695 349	\$5 227 682 202
	21	\$5 227 682 202	\$447 812 766	\$427 100 229	\$19 142 825	\$83 333 333	\$529 576 388	\$5 208 539 376
	22	\$5 208 539 376	\$447 812 766	\$425 401 801	\$20 712 537	\$83 333 333	\$529 447 671	\$5 187 826 839
	23	\$5 187 826 839	\$447 812 766	\$423 564 102	\$22 410 965	\$83 333 333	\$529 308 400	\$5 165 415 874
	24	\$5 165 415 874	\$447 812 766	\$421 575 711	\$24 248 664	\$83 333 333	\$529 157 709	\$5 141 167 210
	25	\$5 141 167 210	\$447 812 766	\$419 424 273	\$26 237 055	\$83 333 333	\$528 994 661	\$5 114 930 155
	26	\$5 114 930 155	\$447 812 766	\$417 096 416	\$28 388 493	\$83 333 333	\$528 818 243	\$5 086 541 661
	27	\$5 086 541 661	\$447 812 766	\$414 577 676	\$30 716 350	\$83 333 333	\$528 627 359	\$5 055 825 312
	28	\$5 055 825 312	\$447 812 766	\$411 852 398	\$33 235 090	\$83 333 333	\$528 420 822	\$5 022 590 221
	29	\$5 022 590 221	\$447 812 766	\$408 903 648	\$35 960 368	\$83 333 333	\$528 197 349	\$4 986 629 853
	30	\$4 986 629 853	\$447 812 766	\$405 713 100	\$38 909 118	\$83 333 333	\$527 955 552	\$4 947 720 735
	31	\$4 947 720 735	\$447 812 766	\$402 260 928	\$42 099 666	\$83 333 333	\$527 693 927	\$4 905 621 070
	32	\$4 905 621 070	\$447 812 766	\$398 525 677	\$45 551 838	\$83 333 333	\$527 410 849	\$4 860 069 232
	33	\$4 860 069 232	\$447 812 766	\$394 484 136	\$49 287 089	\$83 333 333	\$527 104 558	\$4 810 782 143
	34	\$4 810 782 143	\$447 812 766	\$390 111 188	\$53 328 630	\$83 333 333	\$526 773 152	\$4 757 453 512
	35	\$4 757 453 512	\$447 812 766	\$385 379 659	\$57 701 578	\$83 333 333	\$526 414 570	\$4 699 751 934
	36	\$4 699 751 934	\$447 812 766	\$380 260 144	\$62 433 107	\$83 333 333	\$526 026 585	\$4 637 318 827
	37	\$4 637 318 827	\$447 812 766	\$374 720 829	\$67 552 622	\$83 333 333	\$525 606 784	\$4 569 766 205
	38	\$4 569 766 205	\$447 812 766	\$368 727 290	\$73 091 937	\$83 333 333	\$525 152 560	\$4 496 674 268
	39	\$4 496 674 268	\$447 812 766	\$362 242 281	\$79 085 476	\$83 333 333	\$524 661 090	\$4 417 588 792
	40	\$4 417 588 792	\$447 812 766	\$355 225 501	\$85 570 485	\$83 333 333	\$524 129 320	\$4 332 018 307
	41	\$4 332 018 307	\$447 812 766	\$347 633 345	\$92 587 265	\$83 333 333	\$523 553 944	\$4 239 431 042
	42	\$4 239 431 042	\$447 812 766	\$339 418 633	\$100 179 421	\$83 333 333	\$522 931 387	\$4 139 251 621
	43	\$4 139 251 621	\$447 812 766	\$330 530 314	\$108 394 133	\$83 333 333	\$522 257 780	\$4 030 857 488
	44	\$4 030 857 488	\$447 812 766	\$320 913 153	\$117 282 452	\$83 333 333	\$521 528 938	\$3 913 575 036
	45	\$3 913 575 036	\$447 812 766	\$310 507 385	\$126 899 613	\$83 333 333	\$520 740 331	\$3 786 675 423
	46	\$3 786 675 423	\$447 812 766	\$299 248 343	\$137 305 381	\$83 333 333	\$519 887 058	\$3 649 370 042
	47	\$3 649 370 042	\$447 812 766	\$287 066 061	\$148 564 423	\$83 333 333	\$518 963 817	\$3 500 805 619
	48	\$3 500 805 619	\$447 812 766	\$273 884 831	\$160 746 705	\$83 333 333	\$517 964 869	\$3 340 058 914
	49	\$3 340 058 914	\$447 812 766	\$259 622 740	\$173 927 935	\$83 333 333	\$516 884 009	\$3 166 130 979
	50	\$3 166 130 979	\$447 812 766	\$244 191 158	\$188 190 026	\$83 333 333	\$515 714 517	\$2 977 940 953
	51	\$2 977 940 953	\$447 812 766	\$227 494 186	\$203 621 608	\$83 333 333	\$514 449 127	\$2 774 319 346
	52	\$2 774 319 346	\$447 812 766	\$209 428 063	\$220 318 580	\$83 333 333	\$513 079 976	\$2 554 000 766
	53	\$2 554 000 766	\$447 812 766	\$189 880 517	\$238 384 703	\$83 333 333	\$511 598 554	\$2 315 616 063
	54	\$2 315 616 063	\$447 812 766	\$168 730 073	\$257 932 249	\$83 333 333	\$509 995 655	\$2 057 683 814
	55	\$2 057 683 814	\$447 812 766	\$145 845 292	\$279 082 693	\$83 333 333	\$508 261 318	\$1 778 601 121
	56	\$1 778 601 121	\$447 812 766	\$121 083 959	\$301 967 474	\$83 333 333	\$506 384 766	\$1 476 633 647
	57	\$1 476 633 647	\$447 812 766	\$94 292 197	\$326 728 807	\$83 333 333	\$504 354 337	\$1 149 904 840
	58	\$1 149 904 840	\$447 812 766	\$65 303 510	\$353 520 569	\$83 333 333	\$502 157 413	\$796 384 271
	59	\$796 384 271	\$447 812 766	\$33 937 751	\$382 509 256	\$83 333 333	\$499 780 340	\$413 875 015
	60	\$413 875 015	\$447 812 766	\$0	\$413 875 015	\$83 333 333	\$497 208 348	\$0
				\$21 012 370 938.00		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$31 425 235 601.02	

APPENDIX 28 AMORTIZATION: VOGTLE (GEORGIA), USA

Country	USA							
Plant	Vogtle (Georgia)							
Technology	AP-1000							
Vendor	Westinghouse							
	Loan amount	\$4 472 287 778						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$369 997 716						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$4 472 287 778	\$369 997 716	\$366 727 598	\$3 270 118	\$83 333 333	\$453 331 049	\$4 469 017 660
	2	\$4 469 017 660	\$369 997 716	\$366 169 310	\$3 538 267	\$83 333 333	\$453 040 911	\$4 465 479 393
	3	\$4 465 479 393	\$369 997 716	\$365 855 381	\$3 828 405	\$83 333 333	\$453 017 120	\$4 461 650 988
	4	\$4 461 650 988	\$369 997 716	\$365 515 710	\$4 142 335	\$83 333 333	\$452 991 377	\$4 457 508 653
	5	\$4 457 508 653	\$369 997 716	\$365 148 185	\$4 482 006	\$83 333 333	\$452 963 524	\$4 453 026 647
	6	\$4 453 026 647	\$369 997 716	\$364 750 524	\$4 849 531	\$83 333 333	\$452 933 387	\$4 448 177 116
	7	\$4 448 177 116	\$369 997 716	\$364 320 254	\$5 247 192	\$83 333 333	\$452 900 779	\$4 442 929 924
	8	\$4 442 929 924	\$369 997 716	\$363 854 702	\$5 677 462	\$83 333 333	\$452 865 497	\$4 437 252 462
	9	\$4 437 252 462	\$369 997 716	\$363 350 975	\$6 143 014	\$83 333 333	\$452 827 322	\$4 431 109 449
	10	\$4 431 109 449	\$369 997 716	\$362 805 942	\$6 646 741	\$83 333 333	\$452 786 016	\$4 424 462 708
	11	\$4 424 462 708	\$369 997 716	\$362 216 217	\$7 191 774	\$83 333 333	\$452 741 324	\$4 417 270 934
	12	\$4 417 270 934	\$369 997 716	\$361 578 134	\$7 781 499	\$83 333 333	\$452 692 966	\$4 409 489 435
	13	\$4 409 489 435	\$369 997 716	\$360 887 728	\$8 419 582	\$83 333 333	\$452 640 643	\$4 401 069 853
	14	\$4 401 069 853	\$369 997 716	\$360 140 709	\$9 109 988	\$83 333 333	\$452 584 030	\$4 391 959 866
	15	\$4 391 959 866	\$369 997 716	\$359 332 434	\$9 857 007	\$83 333 333	\$452 522 774	\$4 382 102 859
	16	\$4 382 102 859	\$369 997 716	\$358 457 881	\$10 665 281	\$83 333 333	\$452 456 496	\$4 371 437 578
	17	\$4 371 437 578	\$369 997 716	\$357 511 615	\$11 539 834	\$83 333 333	\$452 384 783	\$4 359 897 744
	18	\$4 359 897 744	\$369 997 716	\$356 487 755	\$12 486 101	\$83 333 333	\$452 307 189	\$4 347 411 643
	19	\$4 347 411 643	\$369 997 716	\$355 379 938	\$13 509 961	\$83 333 333	\$452 223 232	\$4 333 901 683
	20	\$4 333 901 683	\$369 997 716	\$354 181 280	\$14 617 778	\$83 333 333	\$452 132 391	\$4 319 283 905
	21	\$4 319 283 905	\$369 997 716	\$352 884 332	\$15 816 435	\$83 333 333	\$452 034 101	\$4 303 467 469
	22	\$4 303 467 469	\$369 997 716	\$351 481 035	\$17 113 383	\$83 333 333	\$451 927 752	\$4 286 354 086
	23	\$4 286 354 086	\$369 997 716	\$349 962 667	\$18 516 681	\$83 333 333	\$451 812 681	\$4 267 837 406
	24	\$4 267 837 406	\$369 997 716	\$348 319 793	\$20 035 048	\$83 333 333	\$451 688 175	\$4 247 802 358
	25	\$4 247 802 358	\$369 997 716	\$346 542 204	\$21 677 922	\$83 333 333	\$451 553 459	\$4 226 124 435
	26	\$4 226 124 435	\$369 997 716	\$344 618 852	\$23 455 512	\$83 333 333	\$451 407 697	\$4 202 668 923
	27	\$4 202 668 923	\$369 997 716	\$342 537 785	\$25 378 864	\$83 333 333	\$451 249 982	\$4 177 290 059
	28	\$4 177 290 059	\$369 997 716	\$340 286 071	\$27 459 931	\$83 333 333	\$451 079 335	\$4 149 830 129
	29	\$4 149 830 129	\$369 997 716	\$337 849 716	\$29 711 645	\$83 333 333	\$450 894 694	\$4 120 118 484
	30	\$4 120 118 484	\$369 997 716	\$335 213 580	\$32 148 000	\$83 333 333	\$450 694 913	\$4 087 970 484
	31	\$4 087 970 484	\$369 997 716	\$332 361 281	\$34 784 136	\$83 333 333	\$450 478 750	\$4 053 186 348
	32	\$4 053 186 348	\$369 997 716	\$329 275 093	\$37 636 435	\$83 333 333	\$450 244 861	\$4 015 549 913
	33	\$4 015 549 913	\$369 997 716	\$325 935 838	\$40 722 623	\$83 333 333	\$449 991 794	\$3 974 827 290
	34	\$3 974 827 290	\$369 997 716	\$322 322 764	\$44 061 878	\$83 333 333	\$449 717 975	\$3 930 765 412
	35	\$3 930 765 412	\$369 997 716	\$318 413 418	\$47 674 952	\$83 333 333	\$449 421 703	\$3 883 090 460
	36	\$3 883 090 460	\$369 997 716	\$314 183 505	\$51 584 298	\$83 333 333	\$449 101 137	\$3 831 506 163
	37	\$3 831 506 163	\$369 997 716	\$309 606 740	\$55 814 210	\$83 333 333	\$448 754 284	\$3 775 691 952
	38	\$3 775 691 952	\$369 997 716	\$304 654 680	\$60 390 976	\$83 333 333	\$448 378 989	\$3 715 300 977
	39	\$3 715 300 977	\$369 997 716	\$299 296 551	\$65 343 036	\$83 333 333	\$447 972 920	\$3 649 957 941
	40	\$3 649 957 941	\$369 997 716	\$293 499 056	\$70 701 164	\$83 333 333	\$447 533 553	\$3 579 256 777
	41	\$3 579 256 777	\$369 997 716	\$287 226 166	\$76 498 660	\$83 333 333	\$447 058 159	\$3 502 758 117
	42	\$3 502 758 117	\$369 997 716	\$280 438 898	\$82 771 550	\$83 333 333	\$446 543 782	\$3 419 986 567
	43	\$3 419 986 567	\$369 997 716	\$273 095 075	\$89 558 817	\$83 333 333	\$445 987 226	\$3 330 427 750
	44	\$3 330 427 750	\$369 997 716	\$265 149 059	\$96 902 640	\$83 333 333	\$445 385 032	\$3 233 525 110
	45	\$3 233 525 110	\$369 997 716	\$256 551 469	\$104 848 657	\$83 333 333	\$444 733 459	\$3 128 676 453
	46	\$3 128 676 453	\$369 997 716	\$247 248 877	\$113 446 246	\$83 333 333	\$444 028 457	\$3 015 230 207
	47	\$3 015 230 207	\$369 997 716	\$237 183 472	\$122 748 839	\$83 333 333	\$443 265 644	\$2 892 481 368
	48	\$2 892 481 368	\$369 997 716	\$226 292 704	\$132 814 243	\$83 333 333	\$442 440 281	\$2 759 667 124
	49	\$2 759 667 124	\$369 997 716	\$214 508 893	\$143 705 011	\$83 333 333	\$441 547 238	\$2 615 962 113
	50	\$2 615 962 113	\$369 997 716	\$201 758 810	\$155 488 822	\$83 333 333	\$440 580 966	\$2 460 473 291
	51	\$2 460 473 291	\$369 997 716	\$187 963 220	\$168 238 906	\$83 333 333	\$439 535 459	\$2 292 234 385
	52	\$2 292 234 385	\$369 997 716	\$173 036 391	\$182 034 496	\$83 333 333	\$438 404 220	\$2 110 199 889
	53	\$2 110 199 889	\$369 997 716	\$156 885 562	\$196 961 325	\$83 333 333	\$437 180 220	\$1 913 238 564
	54	\$1 913 238 564	\$369 997 716	\$139 410 366	\$213 112 153	\$83 333 333	\$435 855 852	\$1 700 126 411
	55	\$1 700 126 411	\$369 997 716	\$120 502 203	\$230 587 350	\$83 333 333	\$434 422 886	\$1 469 539 061
	56	\$1 469 539 061	\$369 997 716	\$100 043 571	\$249 495 513	\$83 333 333	\$432 872 417	\$1 220 043 548
	57	\$1 220 043 548	\$369 997 716	\$77 907 331	\$269 954 145	\$83 333 333	\$431 194 809	\$950 089 404
	58	\$950 089 404	\$369 997 716	\$53 955 920	\$292 090 384	\$83 333 333	\$429 379 637	\$657 999 019
	59	\$657 999 019	\$369 997 716	\$28 040 492	\$316 041 796	\$83 333 333	\$427 415 622	\$341 957 223
	60	\$341 957 223	\$369 997 716	\$0	\$341 957 223	\$83 333 333	\$425 290 557	\$0
				\$17 361 115 709.69		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$26 833 403 487.82	

APPENDIX 29

AMORTIZATION: VC SUMMERS (SOUTH CAROLINA), USA

Country	USA							
Plant	V.C Summers (South Carolina)							
Technology	AP-1000							
Vendor	Westinghouse							
	Loan amount	\$3 577 796 218						
	Annual interest rate	98%						
	Loan period in years	60						
	Monthly Payment	\$295 995 359						
	O&M	\$83 333 333						
	Total Interest							
	No.	Beginning Balance	Payment	Interest	Principal	O&M	Total Payment	Ending Balance
	1	\$3 577 796 218	\$295 995 359	\$293 379 290	\$2 616 069	\$83 333 333	\$379 328 693	\$3 575 180 149
	2	\$3 575 180 149	\$295 995 359	\$292 932 664	\$2 830 587	\$83 333 333	\$379 096 584	\$3 572 349 561
	3	\$3 572 349 561	\$295 995 359	\$292 681 523	\$3 062 695	\$83 333 333	\$379 077 552	\$3 569 286 866
	4	\$3 569 286 866	\$295 995 359	\$292 409 788	\$3 313 836	\$83 333 333	\$379 056 958	\$3 565 973 030
	5	\$3 565 973 030	\$295 995 359	\$292 115 772	\$3 585 571	\$83 333 333	\$379 034 676	\$3 562 387 459
	6	\$3 562 387 459	\$295 995 359	\$291 797 645	\$3 879 588	\$83 333 333	\$379 010 566	\$3 558 507 872
	7	\$3 558 507 872	\$295 995 359	\$291 453 433	\$4 197 714	\$83 333 333	\$378 984 480	\$3 554 310 158
	8	\$3 554 310 158	\$295 995 359	\$291 080 995	\$4 541 926	\$83 333 333	\$378 956 255	\$3 549 768 232
	9	\$3 549 768 232	\$295 995 359	\$290 678 017	\$4 914 364	\$83 333 333	\$378 925 715	\$3 544 853 867
	10	\$3 544 853 867	\$295 995 359	\$290 241 995	\$5 317 342	\$83 333 333	\$378 892 671	\$3 539 536 525
	11	\$3 539 536 525	\$295 995 359	\$289 770 219	\$5 753 364	\$83 333 333	\$378 856 917	\$3 533 783 161
	12	\$3 533 783 161	\$295 995 359	\$289 259 758	\$6 225 140	\$83 333 333	\$378 818 231	\$3 527 558 021
	13	\$3 527 558 021	\$295 995 359	\$288 707 438	\$6 735 602	\$83 333 333	\$378 776 373	\$3 520 822 420
	14	\$3 520 822 420	\$295 995 359	\$288 109 829	\$7 287 921	\$83 333 333	\$378 731 083	\$3 513 534 499
	15	\$3 513 534 499	\$295 995 359	\$287 463 215	\$7 885 530	\$83 333 333	\$378 682 079	\$3 505 648 969
	16	\$3 505 648 969	\$295 995 359	\$286 763 580	\$8 532 144	\$83 333 333	\$378 629 057	\$3 497 116 825
	17	\$3 497 116 825	\$295 995 359	\$286 006 574	\$9 231 780	\$83 333 333	\$378 571 687	\$3 487 885 045
	18	\$3 487 885 045	\$295 995 359	\$285 187 493	\$9 988 786	\$83 333 333	\$378 509 612	\$3 477 896 260
	19	\$3 477 896 260	\$295 995 359	\$284 301 248	\$10 807 866	\$83 333 333	\$378 442 448	\$3 467 088 394
	20	\$3 467 088 394	\$295 995 359	\$283 342 331	\$11 694 111	\$83 333 333	\$378 369 775	\$3 455 394 283
	21	\$3 455 394 283	\$295 995 359	\$282 304 783	\$12 653 028	\$83 333 333	\$378 291 144	\$3 442 741 255
	22	\$3 442 741 255	\$295 995 359	\$281 182 156	\$13 690 576	\$83 333 333	\$378 206 065	\$3 429 050 678
	23	\$3 429 050 678	\$295 995 359	\$279 967 473	\$14 813 204	\$83 333 333	\$378 114 010	\$3 414 237 475
	24	\$3 414 237 475	\$295 995 359	\$278 653 186	\$16 027 886	\$83 333 333	\$378 014 406	\$3 398 209 588
	25	\$3 398 209 588	\$295 995 359	\$277 231 128	\$17 342 173	\$83 333 333	\$377 906 634	\$3 380 867 415
	26	\$3 380 867 415	\$295 995 359	\$275 692 461	\$18 764 231	\$83 333 333	\$377 790 026	\$3 362 103 184
	27	\$3 362 103 184	\$295 995 359	\$274 027 623	\$20 302 898	\$83 333 333	\$377 663 855	\$3 341 800 286
	28	\$3 341 800 286	\$295 995 359	\$272 226 269	\$21 967 736	\$83 333 333	\$377 527 338	\$3 319 832 550
	29	\$3 319 832 550	\$295 995 359	\$270 277 204	\$23 769 090	\$83 333 333	\$377 379 627	\$3 296 063 460
	30	\$3 296 063 460	\$295 995 359	\$268 168 315	\$25 718 156	\$83 333 333	\$377 219 804	\$3 270 345 304
	31	\$3 270 345 304	\$295 995 359	\$265 886 497	\$27 827 044	\$83 333 333	\$377 046 875	\$3 242 518 260
	32	\$3 242 518 260	\$295 995 359	\$263 417 571	\$30 108 862	\$83 333 333	\$376 859 766	\$3 212 409 398
	33	\$3 212 409 398	\$295 995 359	\$260 746 192	\$32 577 789	\$83 333 333	\$376 657 314	\$3 179 831 610
	34	\$3 179 831 610	\$295 995 359	\$257 855 760	\$35 249 167	\$83 333 333	\$376 438 261	\$3 144 582 443
	35	\$3 144 582 443	\$295 995 359	\$254 728 313	\$38 139 599	\$83 333 333	\$376 201 245	\$3 106 442 844
	36	\$3 106 442 844	\$295 995 359	\$251 344 415	\$41 267 046	\$83 333 333	\$375 944 795	\$3 065 175 798
	37	\$3 065 175 798	\$295 995 359	\$247 683 038	\$44 650 944	\$83 333 333	\$375 667 315	\$3 020 524 854
	38	\$3 020 524 854	\$295 995 359	\$243 721 428	\$48 312 321	\$83 333 333	\$375 367 082	\$2 972 212 532
	39	\$2 972 212 532	\$295 995 359	\$239 434 965	\$52 273 932	\$83 333 333	\$375 042 230	\$2 919 938 601
	40	\$2 919 938 601	\$295 995 359	\$234 797 013	\$56 560 394	\$83 333 333	\$374 690 740	\$2 863 378 207
	41	\$2 863 378 207	\$295 995 359	\$229 778 749	\$61 198 346	\$83 333 333	\$374 310 428	\$2 802 179 861
	42	\$2 802 179 861	\$295 995 359	\$224 348 986	\$66 216 611	\$83 333 333	\$373 898 930	\$2 735 963 250
	43	\$2 735 963 250	\$295 995 359	\$218 473 984	\$71 646 373	\$83 333 333	\$373 453 690	\$2 664 316 877
	44	\$2 664 316 877	\$295 995 359	\$212 117 231	\$77 521 375	\$83 333 333	\$372 971 940	\$2 586 795 502
	45	\$2 586 795 502	\$295 995 359	\$205 239 225	\$83 878 128	\$83 333 333	\$372 450 686	\$2 502 917 374
	46	\$2 502 917 374	\$295 995 359	\$197 797 222	\$90 756 135	\$83 333 333	\$371 886 690	\$2 412 161 239
	47	\$2 412 161 239	\$295 995 359	\$189 744 974	\$98 198 138	\$83 333 333	\$371 276 445	\$2 313 963 102
	48	\$2 313 963 102	\$295 995 359	\$181 032 443	\$106 250 385	\$83 333 333	\$370 616 161	\$2 207 712 717
	49	\$2 207 712 717	\$295 995 359	\$171 605 484	\$114 962 916	\$83 333 333	\$369 901 733	\$2 092 749 800
	50	\$2 092 749 800	\$295 995 359	\$161 405 514	\$124 389 876	\$83 333 333	\$369 128 723	\$1 968 359 925
	51	\$1 968 359 925	\$295 995 359	\$150 369 146	\$134 589 845	\$83 333 333	\$368 292 325	\$1 833 770 079
	52	\$1 833 770 079	\$295 995 359	\$138 427 797	\$145 626 213	\$83 333 333	\$367 387 343	\$1 688 143 866
	53	\$1 688 143 866	\$295 995 359	\$125 507 257	\$157 567 562	\$83 333 333	\$366 408 152	\$1 530 576 304
	54	\$1 530 576 304	\$295 995 359	\$111 527 233	\$170 488 102	\$83 333 333	\$365 348 668	\$1 360 088 202
	55	\$1 360 088 202	\$295 995 359	\$96 400 846	\$184 468 127	\$83 333 333	\$364 202 306	\$1 175 620 075
	56	\$1 175 620 075	\$295 995 359	\$80 034 096	\$199 594 513	\$83 333 333	\$362 961 942	\$976 025 562
	57	\$976 025 562	\$295 995 359	\$62 325 273	\$215 961 263	\$83 333 333	\$361 619 869	\$760 064 299
	58	\$760 064 299	\$295 995 359	\$43 164 325	\$233 670 087	\$83 333 333	\$360 167 745	\$526 394 212
	59	\$526 394 212	\$295 995 359	\$22 432 181	\$252 831 034	\$83 333 333	\$358 596 548	\$273 563 179
	60	\$273 563 179	\$295 995 359	\$0	\$273 563 179	\$83 333 333	\$356 896 512	\$0
				\$13 888 760 564.13		\$4 999 999 999.98	\$22 466 556 782.01	