A theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa

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DECLARATION

I, Madimabe Tebele (Student number 23069767) declare that the thesis entitled “A theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa” is submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences with Political Studies at the North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, and is my own work and has not been submitted before by me to any other university. All of the sources used in this thesis have been acknowledged by means of complete referencing.

Date: 29 November 2024

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Maitji Abram Tebele and Rosinah Mathakane Manyaka.

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ABSTRACT

In the past three decades, many foreigners have experienced discrimination on South African soil, which has been and still is of critical concern. Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in xenophobic violence on foreigners residing in the many townships sprawled across South Africa, particularly those found in the metropolitan municipalities.

It is further estimated that ten per cent of South Africa's almost 60 million inhabitants are African foreigners from other African countries. Consequently, even though many nationalities from around the world reside in South Africa, those who often find themselves at the apex of xenophobic attacks generally are black African immigrants from countries north of the Limpopo River.

Consequently, in South Africa, the contradictions of the ideologies of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, and African nationalism as held by the current South African government (ANC) is diametrically opposed to the occurrences of xenophobia in poor townships. Given the facts as explained above, an analysis of factors such as Pan-Africanism and African nationalism as opposed to xenophobia is necessary, as reality indicates that South Africa is currently struggling to assimilate foreign immigrants into its communities – therefore indicating a need for urgent academic analysis.

Against this brief backdrop of the study, the research intends to provide a theoretical dichotomy of the occurrence of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa. This will be done by looking at the relationship between theories of xenophobia, ideology (Pan-Africanism), and the politics of survival, and how these factors subsequently lead to xenophobia, especially considering South Africa’s history and current political climate.

Key terms

South Africa; theories of xenophobia; xenophobia; Pan-Africanism; Afrophobia; foreigners; nationalism; identity politics; politics of survival; in-group; out-group.

OPSOMMING

In die afgelope drie dekades het baie buitelanders diskriminasie op Suid-Afrikaanse bodem beleef. Dit was en is steeds van kritieke belang. Die afgelope twee dekades was daar 'n toename in xenofobiese geweld teen buitelanders wat woonagtig is in die talle Suid-Afrikaanse townships, veral dié wat in die metropolitaanse munisipaliteite geleë is.

Daar word verder beraam dat tien persent van Suid-Afrika se bykans 60 miljoen inwoners van ander Afrika-lande afkomstig is. Alhoewel baie nasionaliteite van regoor die wêreld in Suid-Afrika woonagtig is, is dit meestal swart Afrika-immigrante van lande noord van die Limpoporivier wat dikwels aan xenofobiese aanvalle blootgestel word.

Die teenstrydighede van die ideologieë van Pan-Afrikanisme, Afrikanisme en Afrika-nasionalisme soos deur die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse regering (ANC) gehuldig word, is daarom diametries teenoor die voorkoms van xenofobie in arm townships. Gegewe hierdie feitestel is 'n dringende akademiese ontleding nodig van faktore soos Pan-Afrikanisme en Afrika-nasionalisme, in samehang met die voorkoms van xenofobie, ten einde die werklikhede van die assimilasie van immigrante in Suid-Afrika aan te dui.

Teen hierdie kort agtergrond beoog die navorsing waarop die studie gebaseer is, om 'n teoretiese digotomie van die voorkoms van die verskynsel van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika te verskaf. Dit sal gedoen word deur die verband tussen teorieë van xenofobie, die ideologie van Pan-Afrikanisme en die politiek van oorlewing, en hoe hierdie faktore vervolgens tot xenofobie lei, veral met inagneming van Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis en huidige politieke klimaat, aan die orde te stel.

Sleutelterme

Suid-Afrika; teorieë van xenofobie; xenofobie; Pan-Afrikanisme; Akrofobie; buitelanders; nasionalisme; identiteitspolitiek; politiek van oorlewing; in-groep; uit-groep.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Affirmative Action
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CBDs	Central Business Districts
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
GNU	Government of National Unity
IEC	Electoral Commission of South Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NSU	Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PEDIGA	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West
PSAF	Put South Africans First
SOGI	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
SoD	Soldiers of Odin
SA	South Africa
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAPS	South African Police Service
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Programme
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016:30) define xenophobia as a pandemic that is characterised by "discrimination and killing of non-members". Berezin (2006:273) and Nyamnjoh (2006:5) state that xenophobia is the fear, intense dislike, and/or hatred of difference directed towards certain individuals or groups. However, xenophobia does not exist in a vacuum. According to Berezin (2006:273), xenophobia goes beyond "time and space; history and culture". Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016:30) add that xenophobia extends itself beyond the "discrimination and killing of non-members". It can manifest itself in many shapes and forms, such as through "social, gender, economic, as well as ethnic discrimination" (Lanre-Abass & Oguh, 2016:30; Neocosmos, 2010:13).

Xenophobia can also be a process. It can be a process of "social and political exclusion" of members of society who have been identified to be non-indigenous or non-autochthonous (Neocosmos, 2010:13). According to Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016:30), when one assesses the different forms/types[1] of discrimination/prejudice that stem from xenophobia, the common denominator is that of a divided society. Lanre-Abass and Oguh (*ibid*.) refer to this as a "bifurcated society". This type of society that stems from the xenophobic pandemic introduces two segments in a society: the 'we' and 'them' factions (Vorster, 2002:297). The 'we' (being the in-group or notably 'first comers') are often regarded as the original inhabitants of the land or geographical location, whilst the 'them' (being the out-group or notably 'late comers') are seen as the intruders and the outcasts (Allport, 1954:31; Mujere, 2013:187).

Furthermore, xenophobia or hostility towards outsiders, foreigners, or non-citizens (Boehnke *et al*., 1998:586), ranging from "economic migrants, asylum-seeking refugees, displaced persons, and/or non-nationals", does not discriminate based on a country, whether classified as belonging to 'western or imperial nations', being a liberal democracy, a former communist state, or part of a recovering nation (Adam & Moodley, 2015:9). Therefore, as Loewenstein (2017:4) puts it, xenophobia as a widespread social phenomenon is indeed "coursing through the veins of today's world order", and can take place anywhere around the globe, especially abetted by the rapid "globalisation of society" (Berezin, 2006:273; Boehnke *et al.,*1998:585).

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[1] *Refer* to the ***'types of xenophobia'*** found in Chapter 2.

For the very reason mentioned above, Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016:30) and Neocosmos (2010:1) attest that xenophobia is not only rife in South Africa[2]. It also extends to other contemporary African societies such as Botswana and Namibia, as they have expanding economies and are neighbours to countries that have also been affected by the crisis of emigration. Consequently, these countries have a stream of migrants. The world at large, including countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Finland, Germany, Russia, USA and Switzerland[3]" (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:69; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999:101; Wimmer, 1997:23) have had their own share of xenophobia manifesting itself in different ways. Likewise, xenophobic incidences have become rampant with the increase of migration across Europe, and with an increase in protectionism worldviews, ideologies and policies, as witnessed during the Trump administration and with right-wing political parties that are against the welcoming of anyone deemed 'foreign'.

Similarly, many variables contribute to the incidence of xenophobia in many parts of the world. McKinley *et al*. (2001:10-11) state that contributing factors include an influx of migrants, "severe economic inequalities", and an environment that impedes persons from accessing "basic economic and social conditions" (Neocosmos, 2010:13). These factors can contribute to a rapid increase in xenophobia, especially in cases where poverty and unemployment are widespread and where the impression is created that government is doing nothing to "guarantee protection of individual rights" (Masenya, 2017:82). Another contributing factor is the "fear of loss of social status and identity" (Masenya, 2017:82). Masenya (*ibid*.) further states that xenophobia is rooted in the belief that non-citizens pose a threat (perceived or real) to the locals' "identity or their individual rights" (Neocosmos, 2010:13).

Masenya (2017:82) says that xenophobia is closely linked to the concept/theory of nationalism[4]; while Boehnke *et al*. (1998:586) view xenophobia as a form of racism, and Akinola (2018:1) maintains that "racism is a branch of xenophobia". However, the only distinguishable element is that it does not use the concept of race as a defining element. Boehnke *et al*. (*ibid*.) further state

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[2] In fact, Mngomezulu & Dube (2019:69) warn against South Africa being perceived as an anomaly when it comes to its incidences of xenophobic violence. Mngomezulu and Dube (2019:69) further state that to view South Africa as an anomaly in light of its recurring spells of xenophobic violence would in actual fact be a "misnomer at best and academic dishonesty at worst", especially taking into consideration that Ghana was one of the first African countries post-independence to "show signs of official xenophobia" (Akinola, 2018:2).

[3] This list, which is incomplete, showcases that xenophobia is widespread worldwide, even in countries with a rich democratic tradition.

[4] See Chapter 4 – 'Nationalism: 'People, society, nation and [sovereign] state''.

that xenophobia can be associated with “right-wing extremism”. Observed in the form of ‘far-right political parties anti-immigrant groups’, especially across the Nordic and West European countries such as Germany with radical right-wing terror groups like the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund[5]’ (NSU) and PEGIDA[6]; and the English Defence League from the United Kingdom (UK) (Connolly, 2015; Schröter, 2015:398; Ekman, 2018:1; Halikiopoulou, 2018). Similarly, these types of far-right groups have introduced and are promoting a new wing of nationalism known nowadays as “new nationalism”. It employs ‘mediation opportunity structure’ and a ‘civic nationalist narrative’ due to their “use of nationalism to justify their positions” on the type of policies that they want implemented in their countries, which are usually protectionist in nature, specifically with regard to immigration, economic, welfare, and social services policies (Halikiopoulou, 2018). By the same token, in South Africa, xenophobia’s relationship with nationalism is less distinct and is based more on economic class (classism), where the poorest of the poor seem to be the least tolerant because of competition for work, services, and the necessities of life (Laing, 2015).

The negative consequences of xenophobic violence include physical and psychological violence (Adam & Moodley, 2015:9), exclusion, hostility, and denial of rights and entitlement. This is often conveyed through acts of prejudice and typecasting of people. It indicates that xenophobia is indeed a volatile political and social phenomenon (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:211; Neocosmos, 2010:1; Oyedemi, 2015:61; Masenya, 2017:82; Claassen, 2017:28).

Even though xenophobia, racism, nationalism, identity politics and anti-cosmopolitanism are closely related, they are not identical (Adam & Moodley, 2015:9). Likewise, misogyny and homophobia are not identical but are closely associated as they are often a by-product of “shared patterns of social and historical rationales of their exclusion and oppression” (Yakushko, 2018:1&3). Therefore, as the study intends to provide a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa; this phenomenon will be defined as intense dislike, hatred, or fear of non-members, which often is or can be accompanied by acts of exclusion, discrimination and killing of non-members. Additionally, its targets/victims/scapegoats differ across countries and nations (Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999:101). This definition draws upon the definitions of Berezin (2006:273), Nyamnjoh (2006:5), Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016:30) and (Yakushko, 2018:3).

In the ensuing sub-section of the introduction, drawing on the vast body of research from the literature of Social Sciences, the contextual background of the study will offer a comprehensive elaboration on xenophobia in South Africa alongside the ideological exploration of Pan-Africanism

[5] Also known as the National Socialist Underground.
[6] Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA).

and African Nationalism (The African Renaissance). Furthermore, the theories of xenophobia, which may assist in understanding why xenophobia is a constant manifestation in the political environment of South Africa, will be provided for under the section that further explores the background of the study.

1.2 Background to the study

In the past three decades, many foreigners have experienced discrimination on South African soil, which has been and still is of critical concern (Matsinhe, 2011:295). Over the past two decades there has been an increase in xenophobic violence on foreigners residing in the many cities, small towns, and townships/informal settlements[7] – particularly those found in the metropolitan municipalities sprawled across South Africa, (Peberdy, 2009:2; Matsinhe, 2011:295; Masenya, 2017:82; Neocosmos, 2010:1; Yakushko, 2018:2).

In South Africa in "May 2008[8], roughly 100 000 people lost all the possessions they owned (including the different structures of housing they lived in) causing them to be displaced and having to seek refuge at churches and police stations (Peberdy, 2009:2). Furthermore, around 62 people (and it is reported that an estimated 20 people were South African) perished during the violent xenophobic attacks, and almost 700 people were left injured" (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:217; Dodson, 2010:3; Everatt, 2011:8; Laing, 2015; Patel & Essa, 2015). Images were seen locally and around the world of wounded victims of xenophobia, one of a man set alight, houses burning, and aggressors carrying bricks, knives, and sticks (Oyedemi, 2015:61; Matsinhe, 2011:297; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:217; Dodson, 2010:3; Laing, 2015).

As of 2021, it is estimated that 3.95 million migrants reside in South Africa – meaning that 6.5 per cent of South Africa's over 60 million inhabitants are immigrants[9] (Kaziboni *et al*., 2022; BBC

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[7] Such as Alexandra, Soshanguve, Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Diepsloot, Actonville, and Umlazi (*Mail & Guardian*, 2008; Everatt, 2011:13; Laing, 2015).

[8] Dodson (2010:3-4) states that political leaders expressed shock and surprise at the violent xenophobic attacks that took place in May 2008. Dodson (*ibid*.) however affirms that these xenophobic attacks were not cause for "alarm", as the hostility towards African immigrants on South African soil has "in reality been long-standing and well-documented" (Everatt, 2011:8). It was a matter of elements, which were already in place way before 2008, coming to surface.

[9] According to the United Nations Population Division, it is estimated that in 2013 an average of 2.2 million plus international migrants resided in South Africa (Gordon, 2016:548). It is further stated that between the years 2000 and 2013 the above-mentioned number was growing at a rate of 6.7 % annually – which according to research is in line with international norms (Gordon, 2016:548).

Africa, 2023). Consequently, even though many nationalities from around the world reside in South Africa, those who often find themselves at the apex of xenophobic attacks (and against whom xenophobia manifests in their everyday lives) generally are black African immigrants from countries north of the Limpopo River (Morris, 1998:1116; Oyedemi, 2015:61; Neocosmos, 2010:1; Dodson, 2010:3-4; Hågensen, 2014:iii & 19).

As a result of the ongoing xenophobic attacks against African migrants, Matsinhe (2011:295) identifies South Africa as being "phobogenic[10]". Not only are South Africans phobogenic, but Dodson also (2010:3-4) states that in a study carried out regarding migrants living in Cape Town, the findings reveal that South Africans' fear of foreigners is deep-seated and systematic. Therefore, xenophobia in South Africa conveys a "negative attitude towards foreigners" (Odiaka, 2017:43). Matsinhe (2011:295) further states that the phobia that many black South African citizens feel towards black foreigners from other African countries has seemingly contributed to the "fundamental component of South Africa's collective identification and public culture".

According to Oyedemi (2015:61), xenophobia has become a "perennial social concern" in post-colonial South Africa. This has made xenophobia a social construct that can be associated with post-independence, nation building and the development of "new national identities and idioms of inclusion and exclusion" (Neocosmos, 2010:6; Saleh, 2015:301), whereby South Africans make use of the criterion of citizenship to exclude or include (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:214,218). Therefore, South Africans will often discriminate against someone they view to be non-indigenous or non-autochthonous, especially if that individual is classified or viewed to be of African descent (Neocosmos, 2010:1). Also, the denial of xenophobia's existence by ordinary South Africans and political leaders[11] also contributes to the real impact of xenophobia in South Africa (Dodson, 2010:7).

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[10] The term 'phobogenic' originated with Frantz Fanon (1952) who described the "'black man' as 'a phobogenic object; a stimulus to anxiety among whites", therefore suggesting, "Africans are phobogenic unto themselves. That Africa is a stimulus to its own anxiety" (Matsinhe, 2011:295).

[11] For example, former President Thabo Mbeki stated in a media release on 3 July 2008, after the xenophobic attacks of May 2008, that what happened was not xenophobia, merely "naked criminal activity cloaked in the garb of xenophobia" (Dodson, 2010:7). His denialism, according to Dodson (2010:7-8), can either be contributed to a "sophisticated form of denialism or a staggering expression of ignorance", or the fact that his ideology of the 'African Renaissance' could not afford to accommodate a reality such as xenophobia (Everatt, 2011:9).

From the discussion above it can be gathered that xenophobia in South Africa is widespread, and that South Africans generally have an enmity towards foreigners (particularly African immigrants from north of the Limpopo River), or at the very least are anti-immigrant. Furthermore, xenophobia in South Africa is predominantly gendered, in other words, it is heavily male-dominated. In addition, the discourse on xenophobic attacks in South Africa constructs foreigners (African foreigners, *i.e*., Nigerians, Congolese, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, and Somalians) and Asian foreigners, who are mainly shop owners, from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and China as a threat to the "economic, social and cultural rights and entitlements of citizens" (Dodson, 2010:8; Saleh, 2015:302). Xenophobia in South Africa is seemingly justified based on the economy and social ills with which the country post-1994 still grapples. Therefore, it can be stated that because "socially constructed discourses of identity politics have been internalised by citizen-subjects, this has as a result been translated into violent action" rooted in hate and the dehumanisation of people deemed to be "alien" or "other" (Dodson, 2010:8).

1.2.1 Further exploration of the background of the study: the contradiction of the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism as exemplified in the African Renaissance

As the study unfolds, the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism[12] intertwined in the African National Congress (ANC), both as political party and as government, stand in stark contrast to the happenings of xenophobia in the country. According to Legum (1962:22), the political life of Pan-Africanism began in Nyasaland (now renamed Malawi) and South Africa. Joseph Booth is one of numerous persons credited with birthing the political life of Pan-Africanism (Legum, 1962:22). Furthermore, Legum (1962:22) states that "Pan-Africanism's slogan is 'Africa for the Africans'" and that John Chilembwe made this slogan his own. Pan-Africanism has many facets to it. It is a "philosophical and intellectual movement" which also embodies elements of political activity that were exercised by Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah and Ali Mazrui (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:2; Oloruntoba, 2018:19).

Kwame Nkrumah, lauded with the promotion of the "African personality" and "essential unity of Africa and its people" (Henry; 1959:446; Seton-Watson, 1977:339) is known for having led Ghana through the "decolonisation process until the country became the first African country to achieve independence in 1957" from British rule. Under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership, Ghana thrived.

[12] The author is cognisant of the fact that "Africanists" and "Nationalists" are not the same in person or in ideological belief/s. This will be explained further in the relevant upcoming chapters.

Kwame Nkrumah led both a socialist and nationalist administration that was "responsible for the building of new schools, railways, hospitals, a system for social security and an advanced economy". A firm believer in African liberation, Nkrumah pursued a radical Pan-African policy, playing a key role in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which played a significant role in articulating some of the concerns it had about happenings in former Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa and former colonial powers (Seton-Watson, 1977:340). According to Nkrumah, Africa's future lay in "Common Continental Planning for the Industrial and Agricultural Development of Africa as a vital necessity" (Kwame Nkrumah as quoted by Lupalo 2017:167).

Withal, Pan-Africanism is also credited with inspiring former South African president Thabo Mbeki's ideology of 'The African Renaissance[13]'. It is an ideology that former South African president Nelson Mandela identified as a "motor of Africa's renewal", of which academic literature regards South Africa as the epicentre, alongside with 'Ubuntu[14]' (Ajula, 2001:27; Kagwanja, 2006:39; Dratwa, 2023:9). In his speech 'I am an African', Mbeki (1996) echoes the words of Nkrumah but also the spiritual tradition in that he is part of all of Africa just as much as all of Africa is part of him. This is the essence of Pan-Africanism. Furthermore, Africans can and must be proud of being African. As such Pan-Africanism embodies the idea of a united Africa (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:2). Moreover, Malisa and Nhengeze (2018:10) state that former South African president Thabo Mbeki brought some optimism about the present and future of Africa with his idea of the African Renaissance and 'I am an African'[15] speech delivered on the eve of the induction of South Africa's new Constitution in 1996 (Ajula, 2001:33).

The African Renaissance, popularised by Mbeki in the mid-1990s, stemmed from the reality that albeit African countries had secured political independence, nonetheless economic independence has not yet been realised and that African countries continued to be exploited at the hands of the

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[13] Melber (cited by Kagwanja, 2006:39) states that the African Renaissance has deep genealogical roots as it is inspired by and stems from the philosophical ideas of "Pan-Africanism, African personality, negritude, Ubuntu and Black Consciousness".

[14] Ubuntu is a philosophical concept, "an ethic, African humanism, or a worldview" which is derived from a Nguni (isiZulu) aphorism: "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu" (Gade, 2012:484). Simply put, Ubuntu means: "A person is a person through other persons" (Khomba, 2011:127; Tutu, 2014:25). Ubuntu is mostly tied with the work of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former president Nelson Mandela in relation to the Truth and Reconciliation process in post-Apartheid South Africa (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:10; Gade, 2012:484).

[15] The 'I am an African' speech is also hailed for encouraging South Africans to "reflect on their identity issues" (Ajula, 2001:33).

Europeans and North Americans, and now in recent times by the Chinese (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:11). Therefore, the African Renaissance as articulated by Thabo Mbeki invigorated "respect for human rights and good governance". It further encouraged everyday practices, including science, to be grounded in "African realities and philosophies" (Ajula, 2001:33). The African Renaissance ideology also respected and acknowledged other westernised ideologies such as modernity and Marxism, but also recognised that not all Eurocentric views and solutions are befitting to the African reality and that Africa should be encouraged to apply African solutions to African problems (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:11; Ferim, 2013:143). In the words of Nkruma: "It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity, as a united Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world" (Consciousness Admin, 2014).

The end of Apartheid in South Africa, alongside the introduction of Ubuntu, created the impression that the idea of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance has finally been realised and that Africa was free at last (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:10). In actuality, the existence of economic Apartheid continued amongst South African blacks who had limited access to economic justice and resource redistribution (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018:11). Innately, the South African reality stands in stark contrast to some of the central ideologies that has called upon the resurgence of a new united Africa through its people, languages, and philosophies. Consequently, African nationalism is perceived as a myth and xenophobia has become synonymous with an intolerant South Africa that views Africans from beyond the borders of South Africa as 'alien' (Dodson, 2010:8). The reality is that xenophobia needs urgent academic analysis if "an African Renaissance is to have meaning and relevance" (Ajula, 2001:40).

Despite the fact that out of all the continents, Africa is the only continent which has a multitude of regional integration initiatives such as SADC (Southern African Development Community) and AU (African Union) that call for African unity (Lumumba, 2016:7), in reality there is a stark contrast. The contrast is that the ideas of Pan Africanism[16], African nationalism, the African Renaissance, and of achieving one free integrated continent, is failing. It is palpable that South Africa is failing at upholding the values of the African Renaissance as many Africans who find themselves within the South African borders are perishing at the hands of South Africans.

[16] Pan Africanists include Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Thabo Mbeki.

From the above discussion it is clear that xenophobia is a constant reality that is taking place on South African soil, and that many South African political leaders[17] are quick to pass xenophobia off as criminal activity. Xenophobia does not correspond to the values for which Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism stand, such as 'respect for human rights'; 'upholding universal principles of human rights'; 'instilling harmony among communities despite their differences' as well as 'fighting against all forms of exploitation and injustices, which include acts of xenophobia" (Lumumba, 2016:19). It is apparent that there is a clear contradiction between the reality of xenophobia and government ideology in South Africa. As can be seen, these ideologies stand at opposite ends to xenophobia. The question then arises, what is the cause of xenophobia [mainly] in South African townships if the official rhetoric is openness towards Africa, especially when it has been established that South Africa is one of the two geographical regions in the world that started actively practising Pan-Africanism?

The sub-section below will detail the methods (the six chosen theories of xenophobia) and procedures of the study.

1.2.2 Further exploration of the background of the study: theories pertaining to xenophobia

In this sub-section of the study, the six chosen theories of xenophobia will be discussed. These theories of xenophobia have been chosen because they are the most prominent theories in the literature consulted, and they address the premise of the study.

1.2.2.1 Economic threat theory (resource competition)

The economic threat theory (resource competition), as one of the underlying theories of xenophobia, states that when "economic conditions deteriorate", competition for essential resources such as jobs, and insufficient provision of basic services (as in the case of informal settlements sprawled across South Africa) increase. This leads to an upsurge in xenophobic violence (Claassen, 2017:7). Correspondingly, the theory advances the fact that when there are already limited resources to be shared amongst local inhabitants, when you add a mixture of outsiders to the already stretched resources, social unrest in the form of xenophobia is inevitable (Hågensen, 2014:18-19; Claassen, 2017:7; Odiaka, 2017:46; Yakushko, 2009:46).

[17] *Refer* to footnote 11.

1.2.2.2 Poverty theory

According to the poverty theory, dynamics such as economic deprivation, uneven development, inequality and/or poverty have a ripple effect in contributing to anti-migrant sentiments as poverty produces feelings of relative deprivation, angst, resentment and antagonism (Claassen, 2017:10; Hågensen, 2014:18-19). Kerr *et al.* (2019:997) further states that the poverty theory explains xenophobia "as a consequence of poverty, class formation, inequality and neoliberalism". This in turn leads to the in-group attacking the innocent but weak outgroup. South Africa is an example of this theory as it still grapples with aspects such as 'racialised and societal' inequality.

1.2.2.3 Relative deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation advances the idea that relative deprivation is a determining cause of xenophobia because it uses the "mechanism that one or one's group is worse off compared to some standard, accompanied by feelings of anger; resentment; entitlement; deservingness; dissatisfaction and frustration" (Claassen, 2017:11; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015:1 & 2; Hågensen, 2014:18). Therefore it "links perceptions of conditions and conflict" and explains how the "gap between reality and aspiration" in the native/dominant group can affect the upsurge of xenophobic violence (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015:1; Hågensen, 2014:18).

1.2.2.4 Frustration-aggression theory (frustration with government and scapegoating)

According to this theory, the frustration and powerlessness local inhabitants feel towards their government with regard to lack of 'service delivery' and government insufficiencies (corruption among government officials and institutions) is in turn spun into aggression directed towards immigrants (both attitudinally and behaviourally) (Claassen, 2017:12 & 27; Hågensen, 2014: ii & 19). Therefore, this theory hypothesises that xenophobia results from the frustration that comes with a lack of government performance (Claassen, 2017:12). Hence, immigrants are used as the "stooges" of the natives as a result of the shortcomings of government (Odiaka, 2017:46).

1.2.2.5 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory

This particular theory of xenophobia states that xenophobia occurs when a group (normally the dominant group) is weary of the fact that the other group (normally a subordinate group/s) poses a threat to their current "advantaged social position", such as their quality of life, power and privilege (Harrison & Peacock, 2010:886; Hågensen, 2014:22; Hjerm, 2007:1255; Odiaka, 2017:46). Therefore, when the dominant group realises that their current social standing might be in jeopardy because of the existence of the subordinate group/s, that is when conflict could arise, resulting in xenophobia (Hågensen, 2014:22; Hjerm, 2007:1254).

This particular theory of xenophobia is grounded on the relations among groups. There are four basic types of prejudice that characterise the dominant group (Hjerm, 2007:1254). Firstly, the dominant group is of the opinion that it is superior to the subordinate group/s. Secondly, they will identify the subordinate group/s to be non-indigenous or non-autochthonous. Thirdly, there is entitlement within the dominant group. As the dominant group, they will feel that they have the right to access certain areas of privilege, and that there are institutions that should be closed off to the subordinate group/s (Hågensen, 2014:23). Lastly, the dominant group fear the subordinate group/s as they feel that they are in a position to threaten and attack their natural superiority. This can include the subordinate group/s threatening their rights to "certain areas of advantage which include certain areas of employment; membership of particular schools, and churches" (Hågensen, 2014:23; Hjerm, 2007:1255; Odiaka, 2017:46).

1.2.2.6 Symbolic threat and normative theory

The 'symbolic threat' theory focuses on the "individual psychological process" (Hjerm, 2007:1254; Saleh, 2015:298) and is prevalent in countries perceived to be developed in the general world context (Claassen, 2017:17). In many developed countries, the general population tend to be homogeneous and are inclined to share the same national and cultural identity and norms, which are often dissimilar to those of the immigrants who customarily have "different cultural and religious traditions than the majority of the inhabitants" (Claassen, 2017:17 & 19; Harrison & Peacock, 2010:885; Odiaka, 2017:47; Yakushko, 2009:47). These differences create a symbolic threat, which can lead to xenophobic violence.

1.2.3 Application of theories to this study: the case of South Africa

The theories touched on above will be utilised in the construction of the theoretical framework of analysis. In Table 1 below (and in Chapter 5), corresponding to research question 4 and research aim 4, the framework will provide an overview of how xenophobia manifests itself in South Africa. This will be done by utilising a table and applying the six chosen theories to South Africa.

Table 1 below presents a theoretical framework of analysis where the six chosen theories are presented to establish a new theoretical framework that is befitting to the South African context.

Table 1: Theoretical framework of analysis for South Africa

THEORIES OF XENOPHOBIA	COMPONENTS OF THE THEORY	SOUTH AFRICA
1. Economic threat theory (resource competition)	a) 'economic deterioration'	?
	b) 'competition for jobs'	?
	c) 'lack of basic services'	?
2. Poverty theory	a) 'economic deprivation'	?
	b) 'limited resources'	?
	c) 'unemployment'	?
3. Relative deprivation	a) 'inequality'	?
	b) 'the egoistic–fraternalistic distinction'	?
	c) 'feelings of entitlement and resentment'	?
4. Frustration – aggression theory	a) 'corruption'	?
	b) 'lack of government performance'	?
	c) 'immigrants used as "stooges" of the natives'	?
5. 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory	a) 'dominant group feels threatened by outgroup'	?
	b) 'there are feelings of superiority from dominant group'	?
	c) 'battle to secure advantaged social position'	?
6. Symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics	a) 'homogeneity in population'	?
	b) 'homogeneous cultural identity and norms'	?
	c) 'there is a symbolic threat to homogeneity'	?

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

As xenophobia is a topic that raises moral, political, cultural, and institutional challenges, the contextual, or rather, the application of its theoretical background was provided. In the next sub-section of the study, the problem statement is discussed.

1.3 Problem statement

In South Africa, the contradictions of ideologies of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, and African nationalism (The African Renaissance) as held by the South African government (ANC) are

diametrically opposed to the occurrences of xenophobia in poor townships. Given the facts as explained above, an analysis of factors such as Pan-Africanism and African nationalism (The African Renaissance) as opposed to xenophobia is necessary.

Accordingly, against the backdrop of the study as discussed above, the research intends to provide a theoretical framework. This aspect of the theoretical framework will help in examining and interpreting the underlying meanings and patterns of relationships between xenophobia and the theories of xenophobia in South Africa, and how elements such as Pan-Africanism, identity politics and politics of survival are factors in the reoccurrence of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa. This will be done by looking at the relationship between theories of xenophobia, ideology (Pan-Africanism) and the politics of survival, and how these factors subsequently lead to xenophobia, especially considering South Africa's history and current political environment. Accordingly, the question that this study proposes is as follows: Given the theoretical background above, the question on which this thesis will focus is a theoretical analysis of the problem of xenophobia occurring in South Africa, as South Africa is currently struggling to assimilate foreign immigrants. With the problem statement discussed, the following sub-sections will detail the research questions, along with the research objectives and aims.

1.4 Research questions

The research questions for the study are as follows:

i. What is meant by xenophobia, and what are the theoretical approaches related to this concept?
ii. How does a historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflect the nature of xenophobia in this country?
iii. What role do Pan-Africanism and African nationalism play in South Africa, and what does it mean for South Africa in terms of xenophobia?
iv. How do the six theories of xenophobia manifest within the South African reality?
v. What can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa?

1.5 Research aims and objectives

The research objectives and aims of the study are as follows:

i. To provide a theoretical foundation, understanding and analysis underlying the concept of xenophobia and related theoretical approaches.
ii. To determine how the historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflects the nature of xenophobia in this country.
iii. To analyse the role that Pan-Africanism; and African nationalism play in South Africa, and to establish what the role that Pan-Africanism and African nationalism play in South Africa means for South Africa in terms of xenophobia.
iv. To analyse the extent to which the six theories of xenophobia manifest within the South African reality.
v. To provide a theoretical analysis of what can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa.

To project the above discussion on the research questions and research objectives and aims detailed above, the sub-section above leads to the central theoretical statement of this study.

1.6 Central theoretical statement

The central theoretical statement that forms the foundation of the study is that xenophobia is a recurring problem in South Africa with many factors that come into play, such as public perceptions (the group threat and power-conflict theory; the relative deprivation theory) and political influences (frustration with government and the scapegoating theory). In this regard, the dominant/in-group (the natives) blame the subordinate group/s or "outgroups", who happen to be foreigners, refugees, and asylum-seekers, for societal ills such as a lack of employment (politics of survival). Thus, locals blame foreigners for the fact that they are unemployed (poverty and the resource competition theory). The locals are of the opinion that foreigners accept and/or steal jobs as they are prepared to work for a wage below the minimum wage. The locals also allege that crime[18] escalates because of foreigners, as they are involved in criminal activities such as

[18] Comaroff and Comaroff (2001:649) state that many locals hold the view that the crimes that immigrants commit are in themselves the unravelling of the social fabric. Therefore, foreigners are seen as the

drug and human trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration. In addition, local businesses do not flourish as the businesses owned by foreigners lure away their customers (Masenya, 2017:84; Neocosmos, 2010:1-2; Dodson, 2010:5; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001:649).

Another factor that comes into play is the fact that South Africa is one of the largest economic hubs in Africa, which leads people from Asia and Africa to perceive South Africa as a lucrative country to start a business and a new life. Similarly, people from war-torn countries on the African continent (such as Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, the DRC, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic), have sought out South Africa as a place of refuge. Hence, with the flood of immigrants into South Africa, xenophobia has reared its ugly head on numerous occasions in the past decades, as well as in recent times. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African nationalism intertwined in the ANC, both as political party and as government, stand in stark contrast to the xenophobia that is taking place in South Africa.

In inference, the discussion on xenophobia, Pan-Africanism and African nationalism, and the six chosen theories of xenophobia advances explanations for the elevated levels of violence and hostility towards foreigners in South Africa. Thus far, the study indicates that the six theories feature in the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. The theories also indicate that xenophobia does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, xenophobia is influenced by a variety of factors that reflect upon the social standing of an individual or group (race, nationality, and/or economic class) and the environment.

1.7 Methods and procedures

Bak (2004:25) states that the research methodology section in a study has the role of providing the reader with a clear indication of how the researcher will go about achieving the research objectives that have been identified. Bak (*ibid.*) adds that the goal of the research methodology is to explain in as much detail as possible the methods and procedures to be used and applied in the study.

According to De Vos (2011:17), a research design is the choice that the researcher makes in selecting the different elements relevant to the study. This is done by integrating the different

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destroyers of a tightly woven social fabric that many communities have built and preserved for many years, if not centuries.

elements in a systematic and logical manner, ensuring that the research problem of the study is addressed in an effective manner, and that the objectives of the study are reached (*ibid*.).

There are three types of research designs that can be applied to Political Studies/Sciences, namely qualitative, quantitative or a mixed-method approach (mixed approach), which includes both the previous two designs. The study will be conducted using a qualitative research design (desktop research). Creswell (2003:14-30) states that a qualitative research design is suitable for "exploring and understanding of the meaning of phenomena where specific problems are identified that should be addressed". Therefore, this type of research design is able to assist in exploring and analysing the social phenomenon, which in this case is xenophobia. Such a design is usually associated with the uncovering of the deeper meaning of a phenomenon in the real world and relies on philosophical analysis, conceptual analysis, and a literature review from reliable academic sources in the subject field (Creswell, 2003:14-30; Babbie & Mouton, 2001:646; Fox & Bayat, 2007:7,10,65).

Qualitative research allows selected issues to be studied in greater depth and offers a platform for openness by being able to describe the phenomena under scrutiny in detail by means of the written word, and through narrative and descriptive analysis (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:37-38; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:2). Qualitative research places more emphasis on methods of observation and analysis that "stays close" to the research subject. It also allows for the non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:646; Fox & Bayat, 2007:7,10,65). This aspect of qualitative research will help in examining and interpreting the underlying meanings and patterns of relationships between xenophobia and the theories of xenophobia in South Africa, and how elements such as Pan-Africanism, identity politics and politics of survival feature in the reoccurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. Moreover, a qualitative research design offers the researcher a "set of interpretive mechanisms that makes the world perceptible to the researcher and which will aid the researcher to interpret an occurrence in the real world better and to make more sense of it" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:2). This approach can lead to an increase in knowledge on the phenomenon under study and can assist in developing something out of the knowledge (Winstanley, 2012:12).

According to Venter (2012:25), "deduction is the process of logic where that which is held to be true is used as basis for the explanation of the new or unexplored". Therefore, the theory and construct of the study will be used deductively. Thus, the research methodology regarding xenophobia in general, as well as in South Africa, will be applied.

1.7.1 Review of the literature

To assess whether there are adequate sources available to undertake the study, various sources and databases were consulted. These indicated whether there were sufficient sources of information available to undertake the study and fill the gap in the existing literature:

i. The NWU Institutional Repository (NWU-IR) was consulted as it is a digital archive that "collects; preserves and distributes research material created by members of the NWU" (NWU, 2017). This type of source material is advantageous as it has a variety of collections ranging from the "Africana Collection; conference papers; electronic thesis and dissertations; journals to even academic publications" (NWU, 2017).

ii. The North-West University, Justus-Liebig University and Stellenbosch University Library Catalogue System were consulted as it allows for multiple searches of catalogues for books, e-books, journals, digital records, and other media necessary to undertake the proposed study. In these library catalogues, a wide range of primary sources can be found, which include databases such as One-search; Google Scholar; AtoZ Journal and eBooks List; EbscoHost; and African Journals (previously SAePublications).

iii. The Libguides of the above-mentioned three universities' webpages were monitored regularly, as they comprise the universities' webpages consisting of different subject groups constantly updated by the universities' faculty librarians.

iv. Catalogues of theses and dissertations of South African universities form a fundamental literature basis for this study, specifically as a method of reference to see where the gap is in the study.

v. Another essential part of the core literature is found in books; thus, the catalogue of books available at the Ferdinand Postma Library (NWU), as well as books that are available via Interlibrary Loans (books from universities other than NWU) have been consulted.

vi. Newspapers from around the globe (both online and printed) that have covered breaking news on xenophobia, form a core part of the literature as newspapers cover events as they happen.

Apart from the various sources and databases, which were dealt with above as part of the review of the literature, the source material for this study (as explained above) consists of the following:

i. The core literature applicable to this proposed study is made up of primary sources, such as books and academic journal articles from notable authors on the topic of xenophobia, such as Crush and Ramachandran (2010); Neocosmos (2010); Dodson (2010); Nyamnjoh (2006); Boehnke *et al.* (1998); and Schröter (2015).

ii. Web pages and various publications from the Institute of Security Studies in South Africa; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; Xenowatch; and Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) will constantly be monitored.

iii. A second category of relevant source material is found in the format of printed as well as online newspapers that have documented xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Media outlets and newspapers will include *Mail & Guardian*; *City Press*; *The Daily Maverick*; CNN; *Washington Post*; *The Telegraph*; *Aljazeera*; *TIME*; and *The Guardian*. Furthermore, footage (video clips as seen on various television news network channels and YouTube) containing xenophobic attacks will form part of the literature.

iv. In addition, keywords such as 'South Africa; theories of xenophobia; xenophobia; Pan-Africanism; foreigners; nationalism; identity politics; Politics of survival; in-group; out-group' were used in the different search engines.

Moreover, the databases also indicated that no other Master's or PhD students are currently engaged in similar studies at other South African universities.

1.7.2 Ethical considerations

When conducting research, the researcher has the right to get to the truth, but that truth should not be arrived at through infringing upon another person's rights, such as the right to privacy, anonymity, safety and so forth. Furthermore, in conducting the research, the researcher should always have a clear distinction between right and wrong. It might sometimes prove to be more difficult for the researcher to be able to distinguish what is right or wrong, as often while conducting the research, researchers can completely miss the ethical issue (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:520). However, for the sole undertaking of the study, the proposed study will be that of a desktop one (desktop research). Therefore, the ethical considerations consist of ensuring that the proposed

study is socially responsive and is conducted in a responsible manner where the researcher carries the burden of accountability.

Below, the chapter demarcation of the study is provided.

1.8 Chapter layout

To meet the set objectives, the study will unfold in six chapters, briefly outlined below:

CHAPTER 1: Introduction to the study

Chapter 1 consists of the orientation and problem statement. The focal point of this chapter is to introduce the topic of the intended study by discussing the theoretical understanding of variables/concepts, as well as to motivate why this study should be undertaken, together with an introduction of the research methodology and the research objectives and questions.

CHAPTER 2: Understanding the conceptual and theoretical analysis underlying xenophobia

Chapter 2 of the proposed study provides a theoretical foundation to understand and analyse the concept of xenophobia and related theoretical approaches.

CHAPTER 3: An analysis of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa

Chapter 3 of the study determines how the historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflects the nature of xenophobia in this country.

CHAPTER 4: What role do Pan-Africanism; identity politics and the politics of survival play towards xenophobia in South Africa

Chapter 4 aims to ascertain whether Pan-Africanism; African nationalism and politics of survival contribute towards xenophobia in an ideological Pan-African government with a poor indigenous population, such as South Africa.

CHAPTER 5: Application of the six chosen theories of xenophobia

In Chapter 5, the study seeks to understand to what extent the six theories of xenophobia manifest within the South African reality.

CHAPTER 6: Findings, recommendations, and conclusions

Chapter 6 provides a theoretical analysis of what can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. Furthermore, it will present the conclusions of the study by summarising the findings in relation to xenophobia in South Africa.

1.9 Conclusion: Significance of the study

South Africa, far from being exceptional or singular, is one of the geographical places where there is a growing phenomenon of xenophobia or anti-immigrant sentiments. This can be gathered from the fact that the contradictions of ideologies of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, and African nationalism (The African Renaissance) as held by the current South African government (ANC) is diametrically opposed to the occurrences of xenophobia habitually in certain parts of townships. Furthermore, the discussion on xenophobia; Pan-Africanism and African nationalism; and the six chosen theories of xenophobia advances explanations for the elevated levels of violence and hostility towards foreigners in South Africa. Given the facts as explained above, an analysis of factors such as Pan-Africanism and African nationalism (The African Renaissance) as opposed to xenophobia is necessary, as reality indicates that xenophobia needs urgent academic analysis.

Accordingly, the value of this study is to provide a theoretical framework of the occurrence of the phenomenon of xenophobia occurring in an ideological Pan-African government with a somewhat poor indigenous population such as South Africa. This will be done to assess the relationship between the theories of xenophobia, ideology (Pan-Africanism) and the politics of survival, and how these factors subsequently lead to xenophobia, and what can be learnt from this. Furthermore, this will be done by combining the theoretical and empirical insights from the chosen geographical context, namely, South Africa.

CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS UNDERLYING XENOPHOBIA

2.1 Introduction: What is xenophobia and its correlation to social and political psychology?

In the present-day world order, xenophobia is an exclusionist ideology and a "social and human rights issue" (Vorster, 2002:303; Hervik, 2015:798). It is a discernible "central social-cultural ideology". In 2016 the term 'xenophobia' was proclaimed "2016 word of the year" (Yakushko, 2018:2). Therefore, since xenophobia[19] is a socially observable worldwide phenomenon that is multifaceted and multicausal (Yakushko, 2009:44; Yakushko, 2018:12), and a concept that describes a "form of anti-immigrant prejudice" which is attached to a "crisis of moral panic; and often at times delusionary fear" (Akinola, 2018:55; Soyombo, 2008:87), it is imperative to provide for the theoretical analysis underlying this social phenomenon.

Consequently, anyone deemed to be non-autochthonous or an outsider is often classified in a homogenous group titled 'foreigner' (Odiaka, 2017:43-4; Naidu & Benhura, 2016:8), thus making it possible for the devaluating of said group/person or even for the negative connotations of that group to be grounded (Saleh, 2015:300; Soyombo, 2008:86). Saleh (2015:304) states that when the discourse of xenophobia is discussed on a global scale, it always includes the narrative of the political economy, which is affiliated to neoliberal policies. In this narrative, factors such as how the economically vulnerable in-groups feel towards immigration are reviewed (Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013:112; Watts, 1996:99). Saleh (2015:304) further states that xenophobia cannot be discussed without addressing identity politics, as identity politics[20] addresses elements such as culture[21], and how culture weaves itself into globalisation, and how globalisation in the end fosters a state of "hybridity, fluidity and moral anomie" (McKaiser, 2019). Ultimately, its by-product is the explosion of xenophobic violence.

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[19] The antonyms of xenophobia are 'xenophilia' or 'xenocentrism' which indicates a predilection for "foreign people, ideas, values and products" (Soyombo, 2008:87).

[20] *Refer* to 'Symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics (*see* pg. 47 of current chapter)' & Chapter 4.

[21] *Refer* to 'cultural xenophobia', see pg. 25 (ibid).

Additionally, when addressing the concept 'xenophobia', it is impossible to exclude the narrative of social or political psychology[22], or the dynamics of cognisance in the prejudiced personality (Allport, 1954:215), as will be noted in the discussion of the theories of 'realistic group threat theory and power conflict theory', 'relative deprivation' and 'frustration with government and scapegoating'. This is important to take into cognisance, as xenophobia is viewed by some academicians to be a "psychological state of hostility or fear towards someone identified to be non-autochthonous" founded on the grounds of racial, cultural or religious[23] difference (Yakushko, 2009:44; Akinola, 2018:55; Soyombo, 2008:87 & 91; Sanchez-Mazas & Licata, 2015:802). Tummala-Narra (2020:50) even refers to this psychological side of xenophobia as the "psychoanalytic perspective of xenophobia", thus indeed indicating that there is an intrapsychic psychological element to xenophobia (Hervik, 2015:798).

Hence, as previously stated in the introductory chapter, xenophobia is without doubt also influenced by the "individual psychological process" and "socio-psychological anomie" (Hjerm, 2007:1254; Saleh, 2015:298; Yakushko, 2009:37). It is therefore evident that some fresh insights on the psychological nature of the prevailing violence under study should be provided for. This will be addressed by laying out the theoretical base of the study. Consequently, the theories or the relational terms that go hand in hand with xenophobia will be delved into. They are the following: resource competition; poverty theory; relative deprivation; frustration with government and scapegoating; 'realistic' group threat theory and power conflict theory; and finally symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics. By the same token, in the second part of the introduction, the different types of xenophobia will be expounded upon.

2.1.1 Further conceptual clarification of the delineation of the concept 'xenophobia'

Saleh (2015:298) further describes xenophobia as the intense dislike of the non-autochthonous subordinate group by the "nationals of a recipient state" who do not want the target out-group to be around them (Odiaka, 2017:43; Akinola, 2018:55; Soyombo, 2008:87; Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:2). Additionally, Soyombo (2008:86) states that within the occurrence of xenophobia, there is a visible distinction between the non-autochthonous subordinate group (out-group) and the

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[22] According to DiMuccio and Knowles (2020:25) political psychology is the discourse on the "psychological origins of political attitudes, ideologies, and behaviour" which can be associated to integrants such as "personality traits, racial attitudes (***See*** 'racial xenophobia' pg. 24 of current chapter), economic stressors (***See*** 'economic threat theory' pg. 32 (*ibid*)), and intergroup dynamics (***See*** 'group conflict threat and power theory' pg. 43 (*ibid*)).

[23] Refer to the different '*types of xenophobia*', *see* pg. 23 (*ibid*).

nationals of the recipient state (in-group). The sharp distinction that can be identified is that members of the in-group have rights and obligations, whilst the same cannot be said about the members of the out-group (Soyombo, 2008:86). Therefore, xenophobia is reflective of the "socio-historical mode of an intolerance; disgust or hatred of immigrants" by the nationals of the recipient state (Yakushko, 2018:1; Soyombo, 2008:86-7).

Hatred; racism[24]; ethnocentrism; nationalism; nativism; indigeneity; autochthony, exclusion and violence are all relational terms [of the forms of belonging or non-belonging] that often go hand in hand with xenophobia and can thus assist in the understanding of xenophobia (Yakushko, 2009:44 & 47; Soyombo, 2008:86; Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:2; Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:71). Hence, xenophobia occurs on the foundational blocks of [behavioural] prejudice (which can be encouraged through the socialisation process); deviant behaviour; and stigmatisation, and draws negative connotations on people based on their nationality (Blumer, 1958:3; Saleh, 2015:298; Odiaka, 2017:43; Yakushko, 2009:45). In addition, Ejoke and Ani (2017:164) state that the foundational blocks upon which xenophobia takes place are often guised with the concept of nationalism[25]. Telling signs of xenophobia include violence, "inhuman treatments against tolerance, law and dignity" (Ejoke & Ani, 2017:164). Therefore, Kollapan (cited by Harris, 2002:170) states that not only is xenophobia an attitude, but it is also an activity that results in bodily harm and damage as a result of a violent practice. Hence, Dratwa (2023:2) states that we tend to see xenophobia as "only something that *'happens'* to people or is *'done'* to them". However, it is important to take note that xenophobia is also something [an act] that "people *'do'* and actively produce" (Dratwa, 2023:2).

2.1.2 Further conceptual clarification of the delineation of the concept 'xenophobia': Types of xenophobia

To further shed light on the delineation of the concept of 'xenophobia', the current sub-section will break down the different types of xenophobia – as they are approaches deemed as a valid

[24] Especially racism and ethnocentrism as "xenophobic attitudes may lead to discriminatory actions against foreigners on the grounds of nationality or ethnicity, which can thus be associated with racial discrimination" (Odiaka, 2017:43; Soyombo, 2008:86). Furthermore, Yakushko (2009:44) states that in the past decade definitions of the term 'xenophobia' have been linked to ethnocentrism, as ethnocentrism is based upon the notion that "one's own group or culture is superior to others" (Ejoke & Ani, 2017:166; Soyombo, 2008:90).

Refer to ***'symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics' – see*** pg. 47 of the current chapter and '***Chapter Four (4)',*** which will further elaborate and expand on this statement.

explanation for hatred. Therefore, as a result of the copious amounts of primary sources of literature consulted for the current literature review chapter, the study has identified five (5) types of xenophobia. They are the following: racial xenophobia; religious xenophobia; cultural xenophobia; ethnic xenophobia, and political xenophobia.

2.1.2.1 Racial xenophobia (racephobia)

Racial xenophobia, which also has elements of symbolic racism[26] (such as the dominant group being of the opinion that their group's morals and values are superior to that of the subordinate group (Rios *et al*., 2018:213)) is an attitude and act of "[sociocultural] prejudice, bias and intolerance" based on an individual or a group's race, which is brought about because of biological attributes such as skin pigmentation; dogma; greed and fear (Vorster, 2002:296-7; Akinola, 2018:1). Blumer (1958:3) further states that race prejudice subsists within a sense of group position rather than being influenced by a set of feelings that members belonging to a certain racial group might harbour towards another racial group. Racial xenophobia [symbolic racism] is also governed by the inability to change the racial status quo to accommodate the marginalised out-group (McLaren, 2003:916; Kinder & Sears, 1981:416).

2.1.2.2 Religious xenophobia

Religious xenophobia often takes place in a country where there is a dominant religion or secular nature. The presence of members of the out-group makes the members of the in-group feel that there is a threat to their original existing values and society's norms (McLaren, 2003:917; Hervik, 2015:799). In consequence, it leads to the 'othering' of the other, and the occurrence of prejudice and discrimination. Hence, Geschiere (cited by Mujere, 2013:197) states that "religious belonging is becoming as important as autochthony". Thus, according to Hervik (2015:800), religious xenophobia can also take place in the form of discriminating against religious artefacts of members of the out-group, as witnessed in many Western nations such as France where there were protests [which were further exacerbated by political and media-based debates (Cea D'Ancona (2018:11)] against the Muslim headscarf and the law that states: "public-sector workers – from teachers to post office or train station staff – are prohibited from wearing the hijab, the burqa, a visible cross, turban or Jewish kippa" (Chrisafis, 2013). Omoluabi (2008:59) further

[26] According to Kinder and Sears (1981:416) symbolic racism is "rooted in the deep-seated feelings of social morality and propriety, and early political and value socialisation where racial prejudice and stereotyping is learned".

affirms that religious xenophobia towards the “minority religions are an attitudinal disposition aimed at intimidating the ‘unbelievers’”.

Furthermore, what can be noted in countries where religious xenophobia is rife, is that other immigrant groups will not experience the same high levels of prejudice and discrimination. For instance, a secular nation or nation of which, say, the dominant religion is Catholicism, will tend to have a higher level of anti-Muslim prejudice, such as witnessed in many parts of Western Europe – including countries like Germany or Switzerland – where the building of Minarets was banned, which for the Swiss are representative of the “religious and political rise of Islam” (Abdeleli, 2019; Guimond *et al.,* 2014:170). Again, reasons that members of the dominant religion will proffer for not being welcoming or accommodating of the members that belong to ‘χ’ religion, are that they question how members of ‘χ’ religion would be compatible with their core principles such as ‘democracy’, ‘personal freedom’, *etc.* (Sahgal & Mohamed, 2019). Importantly, Guimond *et al.* (2014:170) state that the danger in marginalising religious minority groups is that it can lay the foundation for “extremism and fanaticism” to take place.

2.1.2.3 Cultural xenophobia

Cea D'Ancona (2018:1) and Wimmer (1997:22) state that the cultural differences of the immigrants are considered to be a cultural threat and problem to the social order, beloved values, national identity and unity of a country – especially in countries that value civic citizenship (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:819; Guimond *et al.,* 2014:155). Therefore, cultural differences are deemed to be responsible for some of the xenophobic conflicts or sentiments that will or do transpire between the immigrants and the native/s [born]. Wimmer (1997:22) further proclaims that there is the perception from the in-group members that the members of the out-group are incapable of assimilation (Cea D'Ancona, 2018:11). The explanations that the members of the in-group conjure up to explain this belief of theirs, are that the out-group members often come from a semi-feudal or feudal structure, thus associating the out-group members with ‘backwardness’. Therefore, the argument that members of the in-group put forward is that members of the out-group cannot assimilate into the cultural or class structures already in place, or that belonging to a tribe or clan different to that of the host communities or country is cause for their inability to assimilate, as well as factors such as linguistic differences and practising a different religion or religions[27] (Wimmer, 1997:22; Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:820; Halikiopoulou, 2018).

[27] As a matter of course, throughout the history of mankind, the claims that members of the in-group hold with regard to members of the out-group’s inability to assimilate can be discounted as false. There has

Cea D'Ancona (2018:11) has further remarked that the perceived feelings of cultural threat are the pretexts that members of the in-group utilise to avoid co-existence with members of the out-group. This makes it possible for them to still hold onto perceptions and practices of prejudices and conservatism, and to further preserve their ideals of 'cultural homogeneity' and establish dominance over them (Wimmer, 1997:22 & 25).

These feelings can be encouraged via prejudices that stem from cultural and ethnic differences rather than "innate or biogenic traits" found in the "immigration population and the fear of loss of national characteristics" (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:2; Marger, 1994:31; Omoluabi, 2008:59). Hervik (2015:799) states that due to fear of loss of national characteristics and the notion of cultural incompatibility, this type of prejudiced behaviour has introduced a new school of thought coined as 'new racism' (neoracism). Thus, owing to the consideration of immigrants viewed in the above-mentioned light, Cea D'Ancona (2018:1) avows that this viewpoint is the 'second' most firmly established approach that explains racism and xenophobia.

To put it succinctly, cultural xenophobia is rooted in the [erroneous] belief of 'cultural incompatibility' and the preservation of 'cultural homogeneity', as well as the belief that members of the out-group are incapable of assimilating into their host communities and countries. Thus, the stumbling block of cultural xenophobia is that it can be guised as cultural conflict – which, needless to say, is not the entirety of the truth as, in essence, immigrants are capable of undergoing a process of acculturation. However, as much as the members of the out-group are capable of undergoing acculturation, the downside of this practice is that it ignores the "diverse ethno-national backgrounds" of the members of the outgroup and further places emphasis on "uniformity and homogeneity". Together with the assumption that the dominant group's culture is socially superior (Guimond *et al.,* 2014:146-8), gaslighting the identities of the members of the out-group through "reducing and even eliminating" the differences between the out-group and

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been movement of people since the beginning of time – as noted for instance in the collection of religious texts found in the Bible with the children of Egypt moving to Canaan.

Immigration (the movement of people) is still occurring today due to various reasons. As Wimmer (1997:23) has stated in his work, Germans were able to assimilate in the USA, Italians were able to do the same in Switzerland, Indonesians were also completely able to integrate in the Netherlands, as well as the Irish in Great Britain – and this point can be further cemented with examples seen from 'Third Culture Kids' and 'Third Culture Adults' who are able to juggle both the cultures of their parents and the [new host] country in which they find themselves.

their host communities, this action is often carried out under the guise of 'civic integration' (Guimond *et al.,* 2014:146; Bloemraad *et al*., 2008:160).

2.1.2.4 Ethnic (ethnocentrism/ethnophobia) xenophobia

According to Leach *et al*. (2008:762) ethnocentrism provides valuable insights into illustrating the goings-on of "ethnic and other group conflicts", especially as "group conflict is often understood in terms of ethnicity" (Leach *et al*., 2008:762). Therefore, it is not surprising that Sides and Citrin (2007:478) affirm that in "interest-based theories of immigration, ethnic competition over scarce resources is the motivating force of resistance to immigration". Hence, Lake and Rothchild (1998:9) confirm that "competition for resources[28]" can be an attributing component to the scourge of ethnic conflict/xenophobia, as the presence of the members of the out-group poses a threat to the in-group's material well-being.

Furthermore, ethnic xenophobia also occurs when xenophobia "takes on the features of autochthony[29]". It largely alludes to the fact that ethnocentrism is viewed to be a deliberate, organised endeavour by members of the in-group to resuscitate or disseminate selected aspects of their culture when they feel that their own culture is being threatened by the arrival of the out-group members (Hervik, 2015:799). This often transpires when members of the out-group are not foreigners but happen to be 'strangers' to "one's locality or province, ethnic or language group" (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:2). Accordingly, we see the frosty unwelcoming of the "internal ethno-cultural/racial other".

By way of illustration of the viewpoint above, South Africans moving within South Africa are often labelled 'outsiders'. This labelling is solely based on "ethnicity, language, and geographic origins" and is the result of the Apartheid administration, which created homelands (also known as Bantustans) with the goal of turning Black South Africans into 'foreign natives' within their own birth country (Misago, 2017:8). An exemplar of this will be when a Sepedi-speaking person from Limpopo province in South Africa moves down to the Eastern Cape in South Africa where most of the people who reside there are Xhosa and speak isiXhosa.

In inference, most members of the in-group who are not fond of immigration and foreigners will take an ethnocentric-cultural view in relation to an ideology of social and national identity, which can be restricting immigration (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:71; Cea D'Ancona, 2018:2; Hervik,

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[28] *Refer* to 'Economic threat theory (Resource competition)', *see* pg. 32 of current chapter.

[29] *Refer* to *Figure 2, see* pg.31 of current chapter.

2015:799). This is not surprising, as studies have indicated over the years that in-group members prefer their own groups over other groups (out-groups) (Leach *et al*., 2008:762), thus alluding to a type of nationalism in action known as 'ethnic nationalism'. Therefore, ethnic xenophobia transpires along ethnic rifts within the nation-state and embodies a call for cultural self-defence – particularly bearing in mind that the nation-state stems from ethnicity, which is a crucial form of group identity (Leach *et al*., 2008:760; Omoluabi, 2008:59). Furthermore, Sanchez-Mazas and Licata (2015:803) state that after immigration has taken place, the occurrence of inter-ethnic relations generally takes on the following steps: "avoidance, conflict, and accommodation".

2.1.2.5 Political xenophobia

Watts (1996:112) states that political xenophobia is deeply rooted in "prejudice and stereotypes" – such as how it found its home in nativism and anti-Semitism, for instance. Hence, political xenophobia takes place when political elites use tactics such as public policy (civic nationalist rhetoric) to discriminate against non-members, ethnocentrism and/or nationalism to either pacify or exclude their political opponents from contesting elections or participating actively in the arena of political life (Halikiopoulou, 2018; Mujere, 2013:187; Watts, 1996:97). In addition, Halikiopoulou (2018) states that radical right political parties (especially those found across Europe and North America) make use of a civic nationalist narrative to "promote anti-immigrant rhetoric" such as pushing the agenda that "certain cultures and religions are intolerant and inherently antithetical to democracy". By the same token, some politicians even make use of political xenophobia as a way to pander to their constituencies to garner votes for themselves or their political party – particularly in or during a political climate that might not be too receptive of the 'other'[30]. A case in point is when Donald Trump vilified and wanted to side-track and delegitimise then running President Barack Obama by stating that he could not run for the presidency as he supposedly had a Kenyan passport, consequently disqualifying him as an American [born] citizen in his eyes; or when former Zambian President Frederick Chilumba started inquiring about the "nationalities of prominent opposition leaders" – thus using the criterion of 'foreigner/non-belonging' as a way to disqualify or limit their participation in active politics (Mutanda, 2022:333).

In short, the above discussion indicates that political xenophobia usually emanates from a sense of threat to the political culture (Watts, 1996:97 & 100). Moreover, political xenophobia is used

[30] *Refer* to Chapter 3 - Footnote 72 & 73 for further examples of political xenophobia in action.

predominantly by political elites symbolically as a means to "claim rights to authority, belonging, resources and further entrenching the 'Us and Them' dogma"[31] (Mujere, 2013:186).

Figure 1 below expands on the delineation of 'political xenophobia' in diagram form.

Figure 1: Political xenophobia



Source: Tebele (2024)

2.1.2.6 Concluding remarks to subsection – types of xenophobia:

Overall, the common denominator among the 'types of xenophobia' discussed is the presence of what is known as the 'Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory (Farivar, 2022)' and 'outgroup derogation' (Gordon, 2016:557), wherein there is discontentment towards mass immigration. Furthermore, there is the feeling that members of the out-group are there to pollute and replace

[31] An example of this is how the "political elites in Zimbabwe attached belonging to either being an indigene or 'mwana wevhu' (son of the soil) as well as undertaking a campaign to clean out the urban slums of Zimbabwe" (Mujere, 2013:201). This campaign which took place in 2005 went by the name of 'Operation Murambatsvina [the literal meaning of 'Murambatsvina' being "getting rid of the filth" or "Move the Rubbish"] or Restore Order' as a way to get rid of those who do not belong or have a real 'rural home' to return to within the borders of Zimbabwe (Mujere, 2013:201; Reliefweb, 2005; HRW, 2005). This operation naturally affected "Zimbabwean citizens of Malawian, Zambian or Mozambican, or of other foreign origin" the most.

the existing social order. In these cases, feelings of insecurity and anxiety run quite high. We can see this in the “consciousness of the distinction and tension between” members of the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’, whether the distinction and tension arise from racial, religious, cultural, or ethnic differences, or the threat that political opponents feel or perceive from their political opponent who might be considered as an outlier when looking at the general demographic of said country, and in turn, use political xenophobic propaganda to their advantage.

Therefore, what the discussion of the ‘types of xenophobia’ has revealed to the study thus far is that xenophobic attitudes are also distributed excessively disproportionately over the population (Wimmer, 1997:27), meaning that not all instances of the presence of migrants are perceived to hold the same threat. For instance, as Dratwa (2023:14) has noted, a country that consists of a dominant white and/or Christian population will feel the outmost threat towards African or Muslim immigrants.

Figure 2 below presents the delineation of the concept ‘xenophobia’ explained in diagram format. Again, to an extent, Figure 2 also provides an overview of the discussion that will take place under the current chapter, as well as the predominant terms and keywords that will be used throughout the study. As can be noted in Figure 2, xenophobia is tied to ‘nationalism’; ‘hate’; ‘violence’; ‘classism’; ‘ethnocentrism’; ‘racism’ and ‘nativism’. Furthermore, factors such as the political economy, policies, and identity politics [or lack thereof] can contribute towards the scourge of xenophobic violence that can take place in the form of the ‘theories’ and ‘types’ of xenophobia.

Figure 2: Delineation of the concept 'xenophobia' explained in diagram format



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

2.1.3 Theories of xenophobia

In this sub-section a discussion on the 'theories of xenophobia' will take place. This sub-section aims to discuss the theories in detail as well as to observe if there are connections that are overlapping between them, as well as how the theories speak to the chosen theoretical framework. Aside from the discussion, an informed critique (evaluation of strong and weak points) of each theory will be provided, as "informed criticism is an important feature of Science" (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:161). Viewed together, what do these theories tell us?

2.1.3.1 Economic threat theory (resource competition/deprivation)

As xenophobia is also fundamentally a socio-economic problem, the study saw it fit to incorporate the 'economic threat theory' as one of the core theories of the study. To attest to the aforementioned point, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) view the economic threat theory (resource competition) as a relevant social psychological theory in explaining the phenomenon of xenophobia, as it recognises that competition for scarce resources (or 'asymmetrical economic power') best explains ethnic/intergroup conflict within the realm of xenophobia (Monroe *et al.*, 2000:433; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:150; Sanchez-Mazas & Licata, 2015:804; Gordon, 2016:549). Additionally, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011:150) affirm that natives who belong to the economically vulnerable group, or are semi-illiterate to illiterate, or share the same "socio-economic position" as members of the out-group, are often the ones who are against the advancement of other groups (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013:438-440). Therefore, the economic threat theory stems from an environment where economic and social conditions are often unfavourable (Magnum, 2019:2; Arrocha, 2019:254). Moreover, Pedahzur & Yishai (1999:104) state that in recent decades the economic threat theory has evolved to being entwined with the power-conflict theory.

Nevertheless, Cea D'Ancona (2018:2) cautions that when alluding to the economic threat theory in relation to xenophobia, it must be taken into consideration that the economic threat theory does not only hinge on a "demographic balance" but also on "one's personal economic situation", irrespective of the perception of whether there is indeed legitimate and/or illegitimate competition from the members of the out-group (Wimmer, 1997:21). This can take form in the battle for jobs whereby employers make use of immigrant workers to provide cheap labour to cut down on costs (referred to as the 'split labour market theory') (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:818). Consequently, natives are not provided with employment, thus leading to feelings of prejudice and resentment towards the immigrants – particularly economic migrants; "foreign-born manual workers and foreign-born unemployed" (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:819; Saleh, 2015:303; Yakushko, 2009:46; Magnum, 2019:2).

Furthermore, Yakushko (2018:68) and Magnum (2019:2) state that competition for limited resources between the in-group and out-group often leads to the "perceived impact of immigration on crime, schools, and welfare programmes where [economic] migrants are perceived to piggyback off on the welfare state" (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:819; Sides & Citrin, 2007:478). Correspondingly, competition for resources habitually does lead to conflict as every so often immigrants are regarded to be a drain on a country's already limited resources and are identified as "competitors and culprits" for poor economic conditions (Sides & Citrin, 2007:478; Omoluabi, 2008:58). In consequence, feelings of economic threat as experienced by members of the in-group can lead to discriminatory policies that do not support migration (Wimmer, 1997:25; Cea D'Ancona, 2018:11).

- **Criticism of the economic threat theory (resource competition/deprivation)**

Soyombo (2008:99) states that as credible as the economic threat theory may present itself, a chief criticism it faces is that economic factors are considerably complex (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:150). It is therefore impossible to touch on all the economic factors that might bring about intergroup bias. For example: it is not only the poor, those with a low educational level, and unemployed people who are xenophobic. Well-off members of an in-group can also be xenophobic. Therefore, members of the in-group who find themselves to be gainfully employed may be xenophobic, particularly if they are of the opinion that their tax contributions go towards members of the out-group. This could be, for example, in the form of government using the tax money towards providing shelter and services to immigrants escaping political incompetence and economic mismanagement from their respective countries of origin[32] (Arrocha, 2019:246). However, speaking from the perspective of the economic threat theory, "the reality at the end of the day is that the poor, those with a low-level education, and the unemployed are the most likely to engage in xenophobic acts" (Soyombo, 2008:99; Manevska & Achterberg, 2013:438-440).

The second critique of the theory is that even though members of the in-group might argue that employers hire immigrant workers to provide cheap labour in order to cut down on costs, as a result *they,* the natives, are left unemployment. However, the reality is that often at times members of the in-group do not want to do labour that is considered to be 'dirty' or 'dangerous' (Sides &

[32] An example of this will be when Germany took in an estimated 500 000 asylum-seekers in 2015 (Faiola, 2015). This led to a rapid rise in xenophobic attacks in Germany. This included the setting alight of an apartment building in Meissen that had been renovated to accommodate asylum seekers from war-torn countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Eritrea, Albania, and Pakistan (Faiola, 2015; Cullen & Cullinane, 2017).

Citrin, 2007:478). As a result, that type of work will be passed on to immigrants as they are willing to do the work, and also at a cheaper rate.

2.1.3.2 Poverty theory

Poverty – not a lone ranger in contributing to xenophobic violence – is identified as a socially created construct/structural contradiction that affects the 'poor, the underclass and the underprivileged' (Sánchez, 2006:37) "as a result of economic decay and uneven development due to structural adjustment and deindustrialisation[33]", among other factors (Saleh, 2015:302). Furthermore, Sen (2008:7 & 12) states that the approach of 'political economy' (linking it back to the economic threat theory) sheds some light on the 'poverty theory' as one of the theories of xenophobia as it views "poverty and inequality as the root cause of violence and lack of peace"[34]. Accordingly, Sen (2008:7) states that when people are experiencing the suffering of poverty, it can breed intolerance, anger, and fury, and if there are foreigners in the vicinity, they can become scapegoats[35]. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that one of the unfortunate consequences of the poverty theory within the realm of xenophobia, according to Arrocha (2019:247 & 251) and Sen (2008:7), is that those fleeing "failing states, political strife, fear, economic destitution and extreme poverty" are usually perceived by the host government and host local communities as being a burden to "their already challenging economic, social and public safety problems".

Hence, for example, when speaking about the South African narrative, often at times xenophobia stems from a socio-economic context (Warner *et al*., 2003:42), whereby the current post-apartheid democratic dispensation has not taken radical leaps[36] in completely addressing the poverty that many black South Africans are experiencing (Saleh, 2015:303). Thus, poverty becomes one of the main influencers towards the spurge of xenophobic attacks.

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[33] According to Sánchez (2006:37), it can be further attributed to "capitalist relations of production", the role that national and multinational enterprises together with the policies of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank play in contributing towards further unemployment, underemployment, and low-wage employment – both nationally and globally.

[34] *Refer* to 'South Africa's 'Triple Challenge': Poverty, inequality, and unemployment' – *see* pgs. 66 - 67 of Chapter 3.

[35] *Refer* to 'Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating', *see* pg. 37 of current chapter.

[36] *Refer* to *Figure 10*: The three stages (3) in a transitional process, *see* pg. 78 of Chapter 3.

- **Criticism of the poverty theory**

The poverty theory has a reasonable claim within the theories of xenophobia as it explains the mechanisms of the origin and presence of violence from different realms. This can be through [global] political economy, acknowledging the human psyche and its ability to generate and harbour feelings of frustration and despair that arise due to sufferings of poverty, and relative deprivation. Moreover, this theory also aligns with the other theories of xenophobia, such as the 'economic threat theory', 'relative deprivation' and the 'frustration-aggression theory'. It succinctly explains the roots of [xenophobic] violence in broader terms – thus making it a sound lens that will further assist this study in answering the research questions and objectives of ***(iv)*** and ***(v)*** as set out in the introductory chapter.

2.1.3.3 Relative deprivation

Gurr (1970:23) defines 'relative deprivation' as a social psychological concept and a feeling that arises when there is a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' (Pettigrew *et al*., 2008:386; Leach *et al*., 2008:765; Smith *et al*., 2012:203). Pettigrew *et al*. (2008:386) further state that the relative deprivation theory theorises an idiosyncratic state that shapes "emotions, cognitions and behaviour". It forms a connection between the individual and interpersonal/group. Therefore, the relative-deprivation theoretical framework argues that the strategic (social) psychological factor in generating social unrest (such as anti-immigrant prejudice) or providing the stimulus for drastic change is a sense of relative deprivation [occasionally brought upon by some negative self-schemata] (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:150; Monroe *et al*, 2000:424), especially when the desired reality is far from the reality of the person or social group desiring it (Runciman, 1966:22; Berkowitz, 1972:79; Harris, 2002:171; Džuverovic, 2013:55). Therefore, according to Harris *et al.* (2018:229), relative deprivation can be used as an important determinant of immigrant prejudice, such as when the in-group deem themselves and their national group as relatively disadvantaged in comparison with the out-group.[37] Conversely, relative deprivation also "stems from the perception of equality and difference" (Sanchez-Mazas & Licata, 2015:804; Wimmer, 1999:21).

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[37] This type of feeling and comparison is referred to as ***'Fraternal Relative Deprivation [group centred]'*** as it accounts for an unfavourable comparison between social groups; or when an individual belonging to *said* group is of the opinion that their social group is deprived (Runciman, 1966:10; Smith *et al*., 2012:204). It is further argued that when feelings of relative deprivation stem from a group setting, they usually are characterised with 'outgroup prejudice' (Smith *et al*., 2012:204).

Furthermore, if feelings of relative deprivation arise due to comparison within a social group, this branch of relative deprivation is referred to as ***'Egoist Relative Deprivation [individual centred]'*** (Runciman, 1966:10; Smith *et al*., 2012:204).

When this occurs, feelings of resentfulness (jealousy) and deprivation arise – or as Smith *et al*. (2012:204) refer to it, *"angry resentment"*.

In addition, Runciman (1966:10) states that it is imperative to take into account that relative deprivation may differ in **a)** significance (the significance of relative deprivation speaks to the extent of the difference between the desired reality of the individual and the perception of the reality from the individual's viewpoint); **b)** regularity (the regularity of relative deprivation speaks to the percentage of a group who are affected) or even **c)** severity (the severity of relative deprivation speaks to the intensity with which the deprivation is felt).

Hence, the feelings of relative deprivation are interpreted as an "intrapsychic process". They are often subjective and arise when the "nationals of a recipient state" are of the opinion that they are getting less than they usually feel they are entitled to (Harris, 2002:171-2). Therefore, there are feelings of resentment and awareness of injustice (Runciman, 1966:10). The relative-deprivation theory often found in the literature of social psychology gives clarity on the negative incongruity taking place between the legitimate expectations and existing realities of the in-group (Pettigrew *et al*., 2008:386; Ejoke & Ani, 2017:167; Runciman, 1966:9 & 11).

The main objective of the relative deprivation theory is to provide a psychological explanation for scapegoating[38] (Harris, 2002:172). Hence, the relative deprivation theory offers an analytical interpretation of xenophobia from the inside out as it is argued that the "psychological process of relative deprivation is founded on social comparison – which is often used as a pillar to maintain one's self-esteem, self-worth, or even social identity" (Insko *et al*., 1992:273; Harris, 2002:172). Accordingly, the social comparison upon which relative deprivation rests is influenced by factors such as employment; shelter; education; and even competition for women (Harris, 2002:172).

In closing, the study has established that most feelings of relative deprivation often emerge from a place of comparison, cognitive appraisal, and economic deprivation (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:150; Smith *et al*., 2012:204; Leach *et al*., 2008:765).

- **Criticism of the relative deprivation theory**

A criticism that can be levelled against the theory of relative deprivation is that it places more emphasis on the individual and group shortcomings, rather than also paying attention to a 'social system' that has directly or indirectly contributed to the feelings of deprivation amongst individuals

[38] *See* Figure 3, pg. 40 of current chapter.

or members of the social group due to the failure of attaining economic and social parity with the individual or social group to which they are comparing themselves (Marger, 1994:31).

However, the upside of this theory is that it does offer an explanation for social behaviour (Smith *et al*., 2012:203), and how comparison can take place between groups. It further describes how feelings of anger and resentfulness can arise due to fraternal and egoist relative deprivation. Owing to the theory of relative deprivation, it can be better understood why members of the in-group who find themselves in precarious economic or social positions might not be the most inviting and accepting of migrants. Additionally, as this study takes place within the scope of Political Science, this theory will come in handy when it comes to explaining xenophobia within the borders of South Africa, specifically since relative deprivation within Political Science serves the purpose of "focusing on people's comparisons of their present situation with either their past, future, desired, or deserved selves" (Smith *et al*., 2012:204).

2.1.3.4 Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating

According to Allport (1954:215, 343) the frustration theory of prejudice, also referred to as the scapegoat[39] theory, is a "psychological theory" rooted in the psyche of man to "soften the disappointments and frustrations of life" (Džuverovic, 2013:56; Gurr, 1970:23). Furthermore, according to Monroe *et al*. (2000:436) the frustration-aggression theory "focuses its attention on the instantaneous social situation", such as paying attention to the "thoughts and feelings" of the aggrieved individual or group, and the general effects of those "subjective reactions on actions" (Monroe *et al.*, 2000:436). In addition, to support the view of Allport (1954:215) and Monroe *et al*. (2000:436), Odiaka (2017:45) and Harris (2002:171) state that scapegoating forms part of the earliest psychological and sociological theories, which is "useful in predicting hostile intergroup

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[39] According to Allport (1954:245) the term 'scapegoat' originated in the famous ritual of the Hebrews, which is illustrated in the Book of Leviticus (16:20-22). In this passage of the Bible, the goat is used as a scapegoat for the sins committed by the children of Israel.

Therefore, metaphorically speaking, the same way the sins of the children of Israel where symbolically transferred onto the goat, it is the same way members of the in-group create a frustration-scapegoat to momentarily transfer their frustration and aggression.

However, as history has proven plenty of times, the transfer of the in-group's frustration and aggression unto the scapegoat is often not a 'momentarily' action – but can be an action that is prolonged and has long damaging effects. Such as in the case of ordinary Germans participating in the mass killings (scapegoating) of Jews due to factors such as "widespread economic distress resulting from the Great Depression" and Jews perceived as economic threats by the Germans (Monroe *et al.*, 2000:438).

behaviour" (Ashmore, 1970:268). This theory sets out to expound upon prejudice, discrimination, and techniques of dominance as a channel by which people express their hostility as a result of [personal] frustration/s, as anger, frustration and aggression want a personal victim, and want it now (Yakushko, 2018:1; Marger, 1994:93; Allport, 1954:258; Gurr, 1970:23).

In addition, the scapegoating theory is a psychological process that is complex, as it also concerns itself with the "sociocultural factors" involved in the selection[40] of the scapegoats (Allport, 1954:244; Berkowitz, 1972:79). Therefore, according to Soyombo (2008:89) and Wilson & Magam (2018:93), the frustration-aggression theory is a form of misplaced anger towards immigrants as a result of "aggression always being a consequence of frustration" and deprivation[41] (Dollard, *et al*., 1939:1; Secord & Backman, 1964:423; Gurr, 1970:23).

Akinola (2018:62) maintains that the frustration-aggression/scapegoating theories appeal to "apologists of xenophobia". Consequently, the scapegoating theory theorises xenophobia in terms of "broad social, political and economic factors (real material interest)" (Allport, 1954:244; Secord & Backman, 1964:42). It further implies that the positive or negative wellbeing of the economy has a direct impact on the intensification of hostility or animosity towards foreigners (Harris, 2002:171; Yakushko, 2018:1; Akinola, 2018:63).

Furthermore, this theory positions "xenophobia within the context of social transition and change[42]" (Harris, 2002:171), whereby the underlying factor in scapegoating is attached to endemic conditions such as ongoing deprivation, poverty, unemployment, violence, cultural and economic transitions (Odiaka, 2017:46; Yakushko, 2009:45; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011:93). Therefore, scapegoating can take place in an environment where members of the in-group harbour the same feelings of despondency and dejection (Allport, 1954:148). Equally, the above-mentioned factors create a culture of survival. From this culture of survival emerges a scapegoat, and the scapegoat tends to be the foreign national.

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[40] When it comes to the selection of scapegoats, it must be taken into consideration that different groups are singled out for different reasons (Allport, 1954:244). This point will further be elucidated upon in Chapter Three (3) where the study will illustrate how South Africans (in-group) normally select African and other Asian immigrants (out-group) to be their scapegoats as compared to their European counterparts who also have equally settled in South Africa.

[41] *See* Figure 3, pg. 40 of current chapter.

[42] *See* Figure 10, pg. 78 of Chapter 3.

In addition, the aim of the scapegoating theory is to explain how the “native-born group” view themselves as ‘perfect model citizens’, whilst foreigners are demonised and blamed for limited resources (such as jobs; housing; healthcare and education) (Odiaka, 2017:46; Harris, 2002:171; Yakushko, 2018:67). Therefore, in this theory explaining xenophobia, the “nationals of a recipient state” who habitually find themselves to be in a “perilous economic and political position” often create a “frustration-scapegoat” as the agent/cause of frustration is normally too powerful to be confronted (Soyombo, 2008:89 & 99; Harris, 2002:171; Yakushko, 2018:1; Akinola, 2018:60). Inopportunely, the “frustration scapegoat” happens to be the foreigner who is perceived to be a threat to limited resources (Harris, 2002:171; Soyombo, 2008:89 & 99).

According to Harris (2002:172) and Yakushko (2018:1), patterns of immigration that are influenced by “historical events or other quandaries” (such as political instabilities or wars), politics, economics and the patriarchy further contribute towards the scapegoating process. In addition, unfortunately, one of the misfortunate misdemeanours regarding the displacement of anger [as illustrated in Figure 3] carried out by the members of the dominant group unto the chosen scapegoat/s is that the dominant members often do not realise or recognise that they share a common fate with the scapegoats. They often fall under and share the same social strata and have a common ‘enemy’ – such as a weak economy and government, a political elite that does not care or deliver adequately on important issues. Therefore, ideally, instead of actively selecting scapegoats on whom to vent their frustrations, dominant members should attempt to rally together with the ‘prospective’ scapegoats towards achieving a common good and struggle – ideally one that got the members of the dominant group riled up in the first place.

Figure 3 below offers an explanation of the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory. Allport (1954:350) states that in the figure explaining the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory, the figure itself takes on three (3) stages: a) the first stage is where the frustration enhances the probability of generating aggression to a certain degree; b) the second stage is where aggression becomes displaced upon relatively defenceless “goats (out-group)”; and c), the final stage is where this displaced hostility is rationalised and justified by means of blaming, projecting and stereotyping (Ashmore, 1970:268; Berkowitz, 1972:80).

Figure 3: Delineation of the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory explained in diagram format

Source: Allport (1954:350) and *(Ashmore, 1970:264)* (reworked by author; 2024)

In addition to Figure 3, which offers an explanation of the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory, an additional figure (Figure 4) is provided with the aim to illustrate the relationship between 'relative deprivation' and the 'frustration-aggression' (scapegoating) theory. The study notes that both theories are intertwined, as alluded by Gurr (1970:23) and Harris (2002:172), with both stating that there is an inseparable affiliation between the two theories, as dissatisfaction (frustration) and deprivation are habitually allied in the choice of the scapegoat (Gordon, 2016:549). Furthermore, the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory provides the psychological dynamics to explain the potential way in which relative deprivation can generate collective violence (xenophobia).

Figure 4: Relationship between 'relative deprivation & frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

Figure 5 will demonstrate how in essence elements such as 'individualism', 'society' and 'interpersonal psychology' overlap [*or* are interrelated] with the frustration-aggression theory because at its core, as alluded by Monroe *et al*. (2000:436), the frustration-aggression theory "hypothesis focuses its attention on the instantaneous social situation". For that to happen the individual is involved, which in turn creates an environment where intergroup relations can take place – and all of this is guided by interpersonal psychology. It links this point with the introductory part of the chapter where it is stated that "it is impossible to exclude the narrative of social or political psychology, or the dynamics of cognisance in the prejudiced personality" when delving into the subject matter of xenophobia.

Figure 5: Frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

Ultimately, the frustration-aggression theory expounds on the narrative that when a person or group find themselves at the receiving end of prejudiced behaviour, they then in turn take that same prejudice and inflict it on those they perceive to be weaker and lower than them (Allport, 1954:153). It is also important to realise that scapegoating is not a novel concept. It is centuries old.

- **Criticism of the frustration-aggression theory**

Ashmore (1970:270) states that the scapegoat theory can be criticised on a theoretical level – such as treating intergroup behaviour on the basis of "interpersonal, intragroup, or through an intrapsychic phenomenon" (Jackson, 1993:396). Henceforth the study acknowledges that one of the criticisms of the frustration theory stems from the works of Allport (1954:216) when he stated that the weakness of this theory is that it does not address or rather lacks the ability to "explain the choice of scapegoats or targets of displaced aggression". It is notably lacking in furnishing an "explanation of prejudice at the individual level" (Ashmore, 1970:270), exclusively along the lines of why some groups are chosen to be the targets of scapegoating rather than others (Marger, 1994:94).

A second criticism of the scapegoat theory is that it is assumed that scapegoats ought to be visible and relatively defenceless; however, that is not always the case, according to Ashmore (1970:270).

In addition, a further criticism of the theory is that "one scapegoat is sufficient and that his punishment readily brings a closure to the brief period of distress" (Allport, 1954:259). However, that is not often so as Marger (1994:94) argues that victims of the displaced aggression may themselves harbour feelings of great antagonism towards the dominant group. Still, Soyombo (2008:100) further states that an additional criticism of this theory is that "it is not in all situations of frustration that people respond in aggressive ways, and that it is not all people who experience frustration that respond in an aggressive manner". This criticism of the theory aligns with the views of Marger (1994:94) who maintains that this theory leaves certain questions unanswered, such as "under what conditions will frustration not lead to aggression?" or "how and why may these responses be produced?" or "how do hostile intergroup attitudes get their start?" (Ashmore, 1970:270).

In conclusion, this study recognises that the frustration-aggression theory on its own is not enough to explain the root causes of xenophobia, or by no means an inevitable progenitor to aggression. Hence, supplementation from other theories is required as it would be unfair not to recognise the theoretical importance and value that the other 'theories of xenophobia' will add to understanding the phenomena of xenophobia.

2.1.3.5 'Realistic' group conflict threat and power theory

Sides and Citrin (2007:478) state that in "both interest-based and identity-based theories, a sense of threat[43] is a prior condition of hostility to immigration". It is especially so if there is competition over [scarce] resources, which will every so often lead to the [unfavourable] stereotyping of the group that is deemed not be deserving of the resources (often at times the group being the [disadvantaged] out-group) (Jackson, 1993:398-9). Hence, the study has deemed it appropriate to include the *'intergroup threat theory',* which houses both the 'realistic group conflict threat and power theory', alongside the 'symbolic threat normative theory' to gain deeper understanding of how prejudice originates by looking further at the conceptual and theoretical analysis underlying the phenomenon of xenophobia. It is effectively considering that resistance to immigration or anti-immigrant prejudice centres on the notion of threat, as specified by Pettigrew and Tropp (2011:155) when they heed that immigration is regarded as a threat to the in-group's livelihoods, culture, and the orthodox practices established by members of the in-group – especially if the size of the out-group is deemed to be too 'large' in the eyes of the in-group (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011:816). Above and beyond, these two theories, which are parallel to each other and recurrently coexist, and are rooted in "intergroup competition, historical, anthropological, sociological and social psychology (social and political identity)", will further assist in understanding why xenophobia is considered to be a threat to the in-group. In addition, it will explain whether these feelings [of threat] are influenced by "objective social and economic conditions or in cultural and psychological predispositions".

One of the countless recompenses of including the 'realistic group conflict threat and power theory' and 'symbolic threat normative theory' is that both theories approach prejudice as an intergroup phenomenon. It also recognises that prejudice or bias in most cases arises or occurs "only under extreme and complex circumstances" (Rabbie, *et* al., 1989:172; Insko *et al*., 1992:273; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999:104). This is of significance within the scope of this study, as the literature consulted regards prejudice as an intergroup problem rather than an interindividual problem – especially taking into account that xenophobia is a form of prejudice against an [out] group that is perceived to be foreign, strange or even a source of impurity.

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[43] According to Jackson (1993:398-9) that sense of threat can range from "real or imagined threat to the safety of the group (***e.g.***, outgroup members are contributing to the crime statistics with high percentages), economic interests (***e.g.***, they are taking away our jobs), political advantage (***see*** political xenophobia – pg 7), military consideration, identity, interests, or even social status" (Rios *et al*., 2018:212) – thus linking these 'threats' to the previously mentioned four (4) theories of xenophobia and even the types of xenophobia.

By the same token, Lancee & Pardos-Prado (2013:114) and Mustafa & Richards (2019:1051 & 1053) disclose that the group conflict threat and power theory is a theory developed in the 1950s and is a universal theory "predicting negative views toward immigrants" and intergroup conflict (Marger, 1994:103; Jackson, 1993:395). In addition, the group conflict threat and power theory further assists in the delineation of xenophobia by offering a perspective that explains xenophobia in terms of the "conflicts between classes and groups of people in a capitalist system" (Soyombo, 2008:101; Monroe *et al.*, 2000:425).

Henceforth, the group conflict threat[44] theory pertains to socioeconomically vulnerable members of the in-group who harbour feelings of threat when they are interacting with members of the out-group "in ways that challenge their self-image", peculiarly due to scarcity of jobs; housing; lack of economic benefits and social services (McLaren, 2003:915; Yakushko, 2009:47; Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013:106; Cea D'Ancona, 2018:1). When this occurs, members of the in-group often react in a hostile manner towards members of the out-group because they perceive a real threat from the members of the out-group (McLaren, 2003:915). Furthermore, the perception of a threat or competition over resources occurs on two main levels: ***(a)*** on an individual level [personal] and ***(b)*** on a group level [collective] (Sides & Citrin, 2007:479). Therefore, when the individual feels that their livelihood or government welfare programmes are under threat owing to the presence of members of the out-group, this in turn develops into a scenario where the group that the individual belongs to must perceive this threat as a collective threat (McLaren, 2003:915).

To further advance the above-mentioned theme of group conflict threat theory, particularly with relation to competition over scarce resources, Ashmore (1970:257) states that the nature of the realistic group conflict theory can be simplified into the following two categories: positive continuum (when the groups involved/in question are positively interdependent) or negative continuum (when the groups involved/in question are negatively interdependent). The negative aspect of the continuum refers to two elements: dominance and competition. According to Ashmore (1970:257), dominance and competition are some of the key influences in the development of prejudice. To boot, according to the literature consulted, there are three types of intergroup conflict (also referred to as struggles) that have been identified: political conflict/struggle, ideological conflict/struggle, and racism (Ashmore, 1970:258). Ashmore (1970:258) states that political conflict refers to "competition for scarce political, economic, and geographic resources" – as indicated in the discussion on ***'political xenophobia'***. Ideological

[44] Equally important to take note of: Feelings of threat felt on an individual or collective level are not only economical. They can range from members of the in-group feeling threatened on aspects of "freedom and rights; security and prosperity" among other notable threats (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:155).

conflict surfaces due to polarity in worldviews, which can pertain to lifestyle (e.g., cultural and religious differences – as shown with the discussion on ***'cultural and religious xenophobia'*** where Muslim women are ostracised by their host countries in the West for wearing a religious artefact, in this scenario being a headscarf, hijab, niqāb or burka). Ultimately, racist conflict as maintained by Ashmore (1970:258) "is the struggle for biological dominance".

In essence, the group conflict threat and power theory is founded upon the notion that the constant changing of economic conditions is there to provide clarification for anti-immigrant apprehension (Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013:107). To support the view of Lancee and Pardos-Prado (2013:107), Cea D'Ancona (2018:1) asserts that economic hardship does influence "ethnic prejudice and anti-immigrant views". It is thus evident that according to Cea D'Ancona (2018:1) the effect of economic hardship does play a role in activating prejudice and prejudiced behaviour that already is latent (Rios *et al*., 2018:213).

Additionally, in this theory, members of the in-group are perceived to be generally rational beings whose actions are symptoms of the frustration they feel towards the out-group and being "concerned about the greater good of the society they find themselves in" (McLaren, 2003:915; Soyombo, 2008:101). Consequently, this theory argues that the feelings of angst and irrational antipathy towards members of the out-group result from the in-group feeling threatened by the out-group, particularly when it comes to variables threatening the dominant group's position of power, privilege, and competition for already limited resources (Marger, 1994:103; Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013:108; Magnum, 2019:3; Mustafa & Richards, 2019:1051).

According to Blumer (1958:4) there are four (4) basic types of feeling[45] that are apparent in the prejudice of the dominant group. Figure 6 explains Blumer's (1958:4) disquisition of group position (realistic group conflict threat and power theory) in diagram form, especially considering that the 'realistic group threat theory and power conflict theory' are driven and characterised by a dominant-subordinate relationship. As noted in the discussion above, Ashmore (1970:258) alludes to the fact that the dominant-subordinate relationship is predominantly a power conflict, which in most cases turns into xenophobic conflict, *i.e.,* alluding to the 'racist' branch of intergroup conflict.

[45] *See* Figure 6, pg. 46.

Figure 6: Characteristics of members of the dominant group



Source: Blumer (1958:4) and Ashmore (1970:258 - 263)

Figure: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

- **Criticism of the 'realistic' group conflict and power theory:**

One usefulness of the 'realistic group conflict threat and power theory' is that it is one of the "firmly established theories that explain 'intergroup hostility' and aim to study intergroup behaviour in a holistic manner" (Jackson, 1993:395-6). It ranges from factoring in the influence of the 'socialisation process' to its emphasis on psychology, understanding how identity politics [social identity theory] such as 'ingroup identification' arise within the individual who is a member of a [certain] group, especially after intergroup hostilities have taken place, such as xenophobic incidences (Jackson, 1993:398 & 400). It further offers many contemporary social scientists an insight into 'dysfunctional intergroup relations' – which is useful for the current study as it offers various explanations into the workings of how xenophobia can come about – particularly within and among groups.

However, one of the downsides of the theory, according to Jackson (1993:397), is that often this theory cannot estimate or conclude intergroup relations through a hypothesis. For the hypothesis to take place within the theory, factors such as the broader social context of the existence of an outer group must be taken into cognisance. Jackson (1993:407-8) states that an additional shortcoming of the theory is that it believes that most intergroup hostility can be halted by reducing competition [for scarce resources]. However, it does not have the formular on how to go about it in order to enhance tolerance amongst groups.

2.1.3.6 Symbolic threat and normative theory and normative ethics

Abdi (2011:692) and Sides & Citrin (2007:479) state that unlike the economic threat theory, which explains xenophobia as emanating from competition for scarce resources or material concerns, the symbolic threat and normative theory at the opposite end of the arrow hinges on the pillars of "early political and value socialisation", and further "concerns itself with protecting certain cultural symbols of the dominant group" by differentiating themselves from the subordinate group/s (Rios *et al*., 2018:216; McLaren, 2003:916; Monroe *et al.*, 2000:431), thus exposing a link between "cultural discordance" and threat (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:155). Furthermore, normative theory links to the "psychology of decision making as it concentrates on ethical behaviour". Therefore, one of the advantages of applying the normative theory to this study is that the normative theory will further assist the study in understanding what about xenophobia is deemed 'unethical'.

In addition, the symbolic threat [theory] (also related to social/cultural identity theory) is brought on by differences in "shared culture; values; beliefs; morals; and attitudes between the in-group and out-group members", as often an individual's self-concept is derived from their affiliations within their own social groups (McLaren, 2003:913; Yakushko, 2009:47; Sanchez-Mazas &

Licata, 2015:804; Cea D'Ancona, 2018:1). Therefore, the symbolic threat and normative theory[46] embodies fundamentals of ethnicity, identity politics,[47] nationalism (which also refers to the "belief in the superiority of one's nation over others"), and the "long-held notions of citizenship within nation-state borders" (Yakushko, 2009:45; Bloemraad *et al*., 2008:154). Hence, the current theory under discussion also interprets xenophobia as one of the ways of "reassuring the national self and the protection of its boundaries" (Wimmer, 1997:27). For all intents and purposes, the politics of difference[48] and nationalism "offers a vision of the self" as it stipulates to people who they are and "gives people a history and forges social bonds" (Dhamoon, 2009:1; Miller, 2000:62; Baumeister, 2000:196; Heywood, 2007:145&155). In addition, Sanchez-Mazas and Licata (2015:804) mention that the perception that members of the out-group undermine existing national values suggests that xenophobia indeed correlates with nationalism (Rios *et al*., 2018:213).

It is further maintained that all forms of nationalism speak to the issue of difference politics (Jazeel, 2009:165), as according to Sides and Citrin (2007:480) national identity is the "basis of self-categorisation and emotional attachment". Continuing with this threat, Pletsch (1999:198) views identity politics to be a "kind of reinfection of nationalism". Thus, Heyes (2016) and Baumeister (2000:196) assert that identity politics speaks to a "wide range of political activity or theoretical analysis", whereby identity politics exerts pressure on the democratic political system to make room for various marginalised groups, as well as offer a platform on which differences are to be acknowledged, and tensions and conflict are to be dealt with (Miller, 2000:62; Bernstein, 2005:48).

Likewise, identity politics can refer to a sense of collective identity to which the nation-state caters. Kenny (2004:1) states that identity politics is founded upon a culture that collectively groups itself together based on collective identities, such as people using identity politics to determine whether an individual or group belongs to their "political in-group or outgroup" (Nyamnjoh, 2006:3; Mujere, 2013:186). Upon arriving at a conclusion, it will be gauged whether that individual or group is deserving of reverence or disparagement (Feinberg *et al*., 2017:1). According to Feinberg *et al.* (*ibid*.), although recent studies indicate that overt discrimination, such as racial discrimination, is

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[46] Marger (1994:98 & 103) states that the normative theories of "prejudice and discrimination go well beyond the earlier psychological theories" and tend to centralise themselves fundamentally on the transference of "ethnic prejudices" through the gateway of the socialisation process, including the social institutions that necessitate discriminatory behaviour.

[47] Also known as difference politics, or the politics of recognition, or the politics of identity.

[48] Identity politics and politics of difference are used interchangeably throughout the study.

slowly waning, whereas discrimination based on identity politics[49] is rampant and is indeed on the rise.

However, according to McKaiser (2019), identity politics as a theoretical analysis or political activity can be there to shine light on the lived-in experiences of injustices of people founded on attributes such as “gender; class; race; biological and social constructed markers”. Hence, numerous factors contribute to an individual or group associating themselves through identity politics (Feinberg *et al.,* 2017:1-2). Some of these factors stem from a "confluence of bottom-up influences", which can include "genetics (ethnic identity), physiology, personality, and principles that refer to the maintenance of a sense of belonging with one’s heritage and culture, and the continuance of that culture’s values and practices” (Saleh, 2015:303), as well as a confluence of top-down influences, including political elites (political discourses) and the media (media [dominant] discourses,[50] and [often at times] sensational reporting in the press) (Feinberg *et al*.,

[49] An example is how policy and legislation regulating borders/entrance in the USA is based upon identity lines. For instance, Dhamoon (2009:1) states: “Borders are policed not only on the basis of a ‘war against terrorism’ but also on nationalist, racial and economic terms”. This can be observed through how the USA discriminates refugees/migrants from African states, those coming from majority-Muslim states, as well as Mexicans and Latinos (Arrocha, 2019:2467). The challenge the incoming out-group faces according to Arrocha (2019:247 & 250) is a “growing culture of social, economic and political exclusion and segregation”.

[50] This can be exemplified by the way in which the media and some of its political elites portray certain migrants (out-groups) (Arrocha, 2019:247). A case in point will be how the media covered the 2015 European refugee crisis and the xenophobic attacks of the early nineties (Kleist, 2017:3). Kleist (2017:3) states that the manner in which the media covered the refugee crisis and xenophobic attacks in Germany could be perceived as stereotyping the “other”; the “other” deemed to be the “refugee or the non-member”.

This could be witnessed in the way the media portrayed foreigners as criminals, and often used derogatory terms. Therefore, according to Schröter (2015:405), the political deadlock and the manner in which the German media reported on the political climate of West and East Germany in the early nineties (especially on the crisis of asylum seekers and immigrants standing in endless queues at German border controls) ignited a significant number of xenophobic attacks in Germany, which were carried out by a violent nationalist minority.

Additionally, the same can be said about South Africa in how media discourses do impact opinion on migration and xenophobia as reported by Mattes *et al.* (1999:8) by pointing out how the media [negatively] covers issues of cross-border migration in South Africa – particularly pertaining to undocumented, illegal migration.

Another case in point is how [negative] media rhetoric has moved online in the past decade. Interestingly enough, [negative] media discourses regarding immigration and the fear of foreigners polluting one’s society are not only exacerbated by traditional media. Anti-immigrant groups and movements have come to the forefront and are using social networks to organise themselves and spread the fear of

2017:1-2; Dodson, 2010:8). Consequently, media and political discourses have the power to sustain identity politics in a complicit manner, resulting in an increase in feelings of cultural threat and xenophobic brutality on foreigners (Wimmer, 1997:226; Dodson, 2010:8; Cea D'Ancona, 2018:11; Arrocha, 2019:247).

Therefore, as identity politics is understood as a means whereby procedures and/or policies, which aim to exclude or disparage groups or individuals who do not share an identity with the "bearers of mainstream cultural identities", it is not surprising that the metamorphosis in identity politics and nationalism can pose a serious threat to the natives' identity. Thus, acts of violence towards 'outsiders' are initiated by natives as an outlet to communicate their feelings of angst towards the 'outsider' who is deemed to be a symbolic threat to an otherwise historical; social cohesion; order; stability and social bonds that have been forged over many centuries (Calhoun, 1993:213; Baumeister, 2000:196; Miller, 2000:62; Heyes, 2016; Yakushko, 2009:46).

- **Criticism of the symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics:**

The first criticism with regard to the 'symbolic threat and normative theory' is the use of the 'media opportunity structure'; and how it plays a role in using its power through the media (Rios *et al*., 2018:225) in sustaining identity politics in a complicit manner by capturing the rhetorics of the mediatisation of xenophobia, resulting in "moral panic and politics of fear[51]", as well as excusing

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having foreigners in one's midst. An example of anti-immigrant groups will be the 'Soldiers of Odin – SoD' who are also an "anti-Muslim" group founded in Finland, Kemi in 2015 as a response to the European migrant crisis (Ekman, 2018:1). Due to its mobilisation through social media, it rapidly grew throughout Europe (Ekman, 2018:1).

Also, continuing with the South African example, 'Put South Africa First – PSAF' members and 'Operational Dudula' members have created and produced posters, pamphlets, and leaflets, which were shared online to entrench the idea of how members of the out-group pose a threat to the South African society and are indeed the unravelling of society's fabric (Dratwa, 2023:17).

[51] This can take place via the dispersal of information via various media discourses – where this information can suggest that there is a danger to the existing social order [such as society's morals and values are on a decline] (Rios *et al*., 2018:225).

Particularly today with information being so readily available at the fingertips of society via various media outlets such as social media, X (formerly and colloquially known as Twitter), Facebook, YouTube. Plus, it has been proved to be a powerful tool in generating panic amongst the public, especially when it comes to 'hot topics' [such as migration politics, terrorism, and the economy] where there is a great deal of 'fake news' floating around, and readers do not do due diligence in verifying any of it from reputable media outlets.

the fact that cultural and political self-defence can be racist and xenophobic by opposing the 'cultural other' (Hervik, 2015:798-9).

The second rhetoric that the 'symbolic threat and normative theory' does not address is that although the in-group might feel threatened by the out-group, these feelings do not necessarily mean the in-group has the desire to completely remove the out-group from society (McLaren, 2003:915).

Figures 7 and 8 below are both a presentation of how group conflict and the symbolic threat theory are interwoven, as proved by the literature presented thus far in the study. This is especially so when taking into account that both realistic group and symbolic threat theory can be influenced by negative contact that has taken place between members of the in-group and out-group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011:155). In essence, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that when there is a willingness from government to open its borders to immigration, members of the in-group often feel conflicted and are weary of the fact that members of the out-group can become a threat to their national identity. When this arises, violence can take place in the form of cultural xenophobia. Also important to note is that the 'group conflict theory' feeds into the 'economic threat theory (resources competition)' and vice versa.

Figure 7: Relationship between Xenophobia and Theories: Interest-based and identity-based theories



Influenced by:

[Driving Forces]

- Objective social and economic conditions
- Media [based debates] and Political Discourses
- Political Xenophobia

- *Economic Threat Theory (Resources Competition)*

- In cultural predisposition

- *Cultural Xenophobia & Ethnic Xenophobia*

- Psychological predispositions

- *Relative Deprivation*

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

Figure 8: Relationship between Cultural Xenophobia, Group Conflict & Symbolic Threat Theory



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

The concluding remarks to the sub-section on the theories of xenophobia will be furnished below. The aim of the sub-section is to provide a bird's eye view on what are the strong and weak points of the chosen theories of the study. It also discusses the connections and overlaps between themes and how they speak to the whole theoretical framework of the study. Therefore, viewed together, what do these theories communicate to us?

2.1.4 Concluding remarks to sub-section: theories of xenophobia

To wind up the discussion on the 'theories of xenophobia', one can liken them to the thoughts of the philosopher Hobbes (1651:46), who stated that most of the time conflict stems mainly from three sources: 1) ***competition*** (economic advantage), 2) ***diffidence*** (fear and defensiveness), and 3) ***glory*** (desire for status). Accordingly, Hobbes's (1651:46) 'sources of conflict' impeccably sums up the six (6) theories utilised in this study to explain xenophobia and some of its root causes. Therefore, xenophobia materialises as a phenomenon that can be tortuously linked to structural violence, as structural violence speaks to the "social, economic, political, and psychological" correlations of power, mistreatment and exclusion among individuals and members in a society (Abdi, 2011:694). On this account, xenophobia speaks to the matters of unresolved issues of "symbolic and economic resource redistribution/deprivation" (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:7). Hence, it is evident that in the 'economic threat theory (resource competition)', economic advantage or the lack thereof contributes to the scourge of xenophobic violence. Furthermore, due to the lack of access to the economy or labour market, resources, competition for resources, the fear and defensiveness mechanism of which Hobbes speaks will arise within members of the in-group, as for most individuals status is important.

Additionally, it cannot be overlooked that the theories of deprivation and frustration are interspersed, as demonstrated by Berkowitz (1972:79) when he mentioned that when an individual is deprived, frustration amplifies within the individual, which leads to antagonistic behaviour (Allport, 1954:215). Moreover, one of the main reasons the frustration-aggression theory is utilised in the study is because the theory itself is easy to understand. It offers a foundation of validity because it is a theory that is well-founded and likely corresponds accurately to the real world in explaining some of the root causes of xenophobia as seen in its discussion.

To conclude Chapter Two (2) Figure 9 below highlights the chapter in generic terms by providing a figure that illustrates some of the main root causes of xenophobia as discussed throughout the chapter. Importantly, the study urges the reader to take into cognisance that it is impossible for the chosen six theories to possess a monopoly of insight, or to offer a solitary guidance into explaining xenophobia as a phenomenon. However, each theory as it stands on its own provides some valuable insights.

Figure 9: General root causes of xenophobia



CHAPTER 3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

The literature consulted has yielded results indicating that even though South Africa has been reaping the fruits of democracy for three decades, xenophobia is still ubiquitous. It is widespread, a social concern and a recurrence in South Africa's socio-political environment, and it has worsened throughout the years (Saleh, 2015:298 & 304; Harris, 2002:169; Naidu & Benhura, 2016:7; Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:3). Not only does South Africa grapple with violence that is deep-rooted, sociological, and structural; xenophobia in South Africa also carries elements of nativism, cultural, racial, and ethnic xenophobia, where exclusion from the in-group (South Africans) is based on cultural and/or ethnic background (Warner *et al*., 2003:36). Xenophobia in South Africa also transcends on an ethnocentrism and racial level.[52]It "manifests itself in various forms, varying from everyday street-level abuse from citizens, to discrimination (in the workplace), harassment by government officials (such as police officers[53]), and recurring spells of widespread xenophobic violence in varying intensity and scale[54]" (Warner *et al*., 2003:36 - 43; Kangwa, 2016:537; Misago, 2017:9; Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:68; Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:3).

Furthermore, what makes xenophobia worrisome in South Africa is that it is linked to the infringement of human rights (Ejoke & Ani, 2017:164); and poses a threat to the bilateral and

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[52] *Refer* to types of xenophobia: 'racial and ethnic (ethnocentrism) xenophobia', *see* pgs. 24 & 27 of Chapter 2.

[53] It is understood that police officers in South Africa play an active role in contributing to xenophobia, either by "under or over policing African migrant communities" and the migrant body (Dratwa (2023:2).

[54] Xenowatch (2024) is a tool used to monitor xenophobic discrimination across South Africa. The statistics it has calibrated indicate that between the dawn of democracy and October of 2024 there have been an average of '1 125 + recorded incidents of xenophobic discrimination'. From these incidences, research indicates that an estimated 659 people have perished as a result, with a number of 128 458 displaced persons, and an average of 5 428 shops that have been looted or targeted as a result of the xenophobic incidences of the past 30 years.

Refer to ***'Map 1'***, pg. 83.

multilateral relations that the South African government has in place with other nations, particularly the African states[55] (Soyombo, 2008:91; Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:68).

This chapter must provide an analysis of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa, as South African history points to a track record of a 'culture of violence' and a precarious 'social cohesion'[56], especially considering that South Africa as a society "regards violence (vigilantism to be more precise) as a legitimate means of protest". South Africa's long history and socio-political space have always thrived on violence (particularly in townships, hostel dwellings and informal settlements), during apartheid (where violence occurred on a vertical level[57]) and even post-apartheid (with violence taking form in a horizontal[58] manner) (Akinola, 2018:65; Misago *et al*., 2009:10 & 12; Everatt, 2011:27-28).

3.1.1 An analysis of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa

South Africa has a history of replacing segregation with unity, legislated racism with equality and replacing apartheid with democracy (Harris, 2002:169). Furthermore, Odiaka (2017:48) reveals that South Africa's [institutional] history has effectively always been a history of inter/intra-group conflict and [unregulated] human migration[59] (Akinola, 2018:54; Misago *et al*., 2009:10 &15; Marger, 1994:358), dating to precolonial, colonial, and now post-colonial times (Odiaka, 2017:48).

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[55] For instance, the xenophobic attacks that took place during 2015 and September 2019 led to strained relations between South Africa and other African countries. An instance that illustrates what is being discussed is when "Nigerian Vice President Yemi Osinbajo cancelled his scheduled appearance at a World Economic Forum event in Cape Town, South Africa. Furthermore, Nigeria recalled its high commissioner and repatriated some 600 of its citizens" (Thurston, 2019).

In addition, there were also the boycotting of and retaliatory attacks in other African countries (Nigeria and Tanzania) against businesses belonging to South Africans such as in the case of MTN (a South African telecommunications company); and Shoprite, where both business entities were vandalised as a result of the xenophobic attacks (Thurston, 2019).

[56] Particularly due to the lack of tolerance for foreigners.

[57] In this study vertical violence refers to when violence occurs between the state and its citizens.

[58] Horizontal violence refers to violence occurring between "citizens or rival political and other social factions" (Misago *et al*., 2009:10).

[59] In the early 1900s, South Africa's surge of migration ["massive population movement"] was a result of the newly discovered minerals – diamonds and gold. Therefore, due to local labour not being sufficient for the mine bosses, migrant labour from neighbouring countries was required (Wilson & Magam, 2018:96-97).

However, Harris (2002:169) observes that South Africa's current post-colonial phase has presented an assortment of prejudiced practices[60] and victims. In this instance, the victim is presented as 'The Foreigner'.

Oyedemi (2015:61) states that the first xenophobic attacks in South Africa date back to the 1980s, thus revealing that xenophobic sentiment did exist in South Africa's national body politic pre-1994 (Everatt, 2011:31). The first major xenophobic attack post-democracy occurred in 1998[61] (Akinola, 2018:58). This was due to events relating to the unstable political, economic, and social climate (such as civil war and drought) occurring in neighbouring countries, which resulted in an estimated mass influx of 250 000 to 350 000 immigrants seeking refuge in South Africa (Peberdy, 2009:6-7; Masenya, 2017:82). The constant and rising influx of immigration[62] has created numerous challenges ranging from clogged "basic service provision" to limited opportunities for the "growing number of youths", worsened by ineffective governance and an increasing rate of unemployment (Akinola, 2018:59-60; Abdi, 2011:695).

In addition, Oyedemi (2015:61) and Otu (2016:74) state that the end of apartheid and South Africa's ascendancy to democracy saw the country being welcomed by many nation states, which then opened the doors to globalisation. Soyombo (2008:96) maintains that in modern-day society globalisation can be associated with incidences of xenophobia, and evidently globalisation contributes to xenophobia being an occurrence in South Africa. Pursuing this reasoning, Mngomezulu & Dube (2019:68) support Soyombo (2008:96) by illustrating that, theoretically speaking, xenophobia is a phenomenon that is tied with the "politics of the dominant group/s after independence" or liberation is achieved. Thus, as Soyombo (2008:96) has observed, due to the emancipation of the members of the dominant group, in the case of South Africa this emancipation

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[60] Which has been carried over from apartheid policies that encompassed "negative political rhetoric – ranging from the dispossession of land, violence in its various forms, racism and intolerance (Everatt, 2011:27)", which then activated institutionalised discrimination in the past.

[61] Prior to the above-mentioned attack, there were other sporadic xenophobic attacks in 1994 and early 1995. Like the other attacks that have been noted in the study, most of them started in Alexandra township in Johannesburg (Peberdy, 2009:2).

[62] In 2012 alone, an estimated "three million people immigrated to South Africa, including 171 702 asylum seekers and 57 899 refugees" (Akinola, 2018:3). In addition, Kaziboni *et al*. (2022:6) reported that as of 2019, "280 004 refugees were recorded in the country of whom 189 491 were asylum seekers and 90 513 had official refugee status".

subsequently resulted in an exchange of a “global network of capital, commodities, cultures, and cross-border movement of people” in South Africa.

The spasmodic “xenophobic cultural environment in South Africa, it is stated, is bloody and has contributed towards political fluidity” (Saleh, 2015:298). However, what is notable is that the ‘black-on-black’ narrative of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa is influenced by South Africa’s history of a past system that practised institutionalised racial segregation, as well as a history of colonial legacy.[63] This led to “South Africa being perceived and treated as a European outpost located on the African continent” (Saleh, 2015:302; Odiaka, 2017:43; Akinola, 2018:1). Furthermore, Akinola (2018:57-58) asserts that the seclusion that South Africa experienced during apartheid formed a basis for the “fear and distrust of immigrants”. What is more is that the country’s isolation meant that South Africans did not have the opportunity to share an “Afrocentric feeling of togetherness” with other African states (besides southern Africa); hence, it found it difficult to incorporate foreigners from north of the Limpopo border (Akinola, 2018:58).

Likewise, Misago *et al*. (2009:10 & 15) states that the negative political environment under which the Apartheid government functioned (particularly with the assistance of the [dysfunctional] ‘Aliens Control Act’) contributed to the negative perceptions South Africans held of migrants (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:4). This view is supported by the research that was carried out respectively by Misago *et al*. (2009:10 & 15) and Warner *et al*. (2003:41) from and across various townships in South Africa, whereby foreign participants were stating that the psychological scarring left by the Apartheid regime was still roaming wild in the psyche of many South Africans. Evidently, the Apartheid government has encouraged hatred of outsiders. That hatred has been passed down to the youngsters of post-Apartheid South Africa, who are now socialised to adopt a culture of discrimination, particularly towards foreigners of African origin.

Crush and Ramachandran (2010:212) state that the collapse of Apartheid has resulted in the emergence of three main migration patterns. The first migration pattern noted was the sheer upsurge of temporary regular and irregular cross-border movement (also referred to as the ‘crisis of sovereign borders’) between South Africa and its neighbouring countries[64] (Crush &

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[63] On this point, Akinola (2018:1) and Khoapa (2016:2) state that currently, “xenophobia in Africa is a condition generated by past symptoms of colonialism”, and additionally, “colonialism militarised African societies and imposed a violent character upon the state, leading to the institutionalisation of a culture of violence within the state and society”.

[64] Odiaka (2017:42) states that South Africa’s history of refugees and asylum seekers dates as far back as the 1980s, when the country hosted a number of Mozambican refugees, who at the time were estimated to be around 350 000. Out of that number, it is estimated that precisely 20% of Mozambicans

Ramachandran, 2010:212; Neocosmos, 2010:6; Odiaka, 2017:42). This resulted from migrants having had no means of accessing South Africa legally but had the desire to work in other sectors than mining and commercial agriculture (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:212). This migration pattern, according to Crush and Ramachandran, (2010:212) resulted in irregular migration increasing.

The second pattern that was noted was that South Africa transformed itself into an appealing economic hub, which enticed migrants from West, East, and Central Africa to start businesses [both in the formal and informal sector] in South Africa.

The third migration pattern that emerged was that South Africa became a refuge for many asylum-seeking immigrants from Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Sudan (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:212; Peberdy, 2009:18). Later on, "people with the status of asylum seekers who were waiting for decisions on their refugee status included nationalities from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, Bangladesh, India

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have since returned home (Odiaka, 2017:42). Therefore, South Africa's upsurge of migrants has been happening long before Apartheid's authoritarian regime tumbled.

However, the difference between regular and irregular cross-border movement during Apartheid as compared to the new dawn of South Africa's democracy, is that during Apartheid, the Apartheid system did not recognise refugees until 1993. This was exacerbated by the fact that before the 1960s, borders in many parts of the southern African region were either non-existent, or where they did exist, they were poorly managed (Williams cited by Akokpari, *et al*., 2013:319). In addition, it is noted that since South Africa signed a treaty with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union (AU), on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1994, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa has indeed increased (Odiaka, 2017:42; Peberdy, 2009:12).

It is further argued that pre-1994 the 'general breakdown' of or 'inadequate border control' has been blamed for the mass influx of foreigners (Misago *et al*., 2009:10 & 29).

Withal, on the other side of the coin, a general breakdown of or lack of border control is still cited as one of the contributing factors of xenophobic violence post-1994. Kapp (2008:1987) further states that the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) argued that the xenophobic violence that took place in South Africa in 2008 was due to a general breakdown in border control. Moreover, then president Thabo Mbeki failed to take precautionary measures to address Zimbabwe's on-going political and economic crisis, which led to an elephantine illegal Zimbabwean population in South Africa.

On the upside, the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attacks led to bilateral agreements between South Africa and neighbouring countries to establish 'border control areas'. In addition, the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attacks led to a "new special temporary residence permit being issued to Zimbabweans when the government realised that there was an upsurge in the numbers of Zimbabweans entering South Africa since the economic collapse of the country in the early 2000s" (Peberdy, 2009:10-11).

and Pakistan" (Peberdy, 2009:18). The inadvertent consequence of this was an upsurge in animosity towards foreigners (Oyedemi, 2015:61).

Contrary to Oyedemi's (2015:61) suggestion that xenophobic attacks in South Africa were the result of the world re-opening its doors and welcoming South Africa on the international stage, Matsinhe (2011:295) is of the view that a contributing factor that invigorated the spurts of xenophobic violence across South Africa is the "colonially crafted history of colonial group relations and ethnic divides (tribalism) in South Africa" (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:3). This argument is supported by Saleh (2015:302&303), who contends that the cultural and social isolation[ism] of black South Africans from the rest of the African continent during the era of Apartheid solidified South Africans' "we-ness" against other Africans. Saleh (2015:303) further states that the segregation of black South Africans from the rest of Africa contributed towards a genre of identity politics that accentuated an ideology of exceptionalism and the cultural superiority complex defined by black South Africans' "closeness to European-ness or whiteness".

Saleh (2015:303) and Odiaka (2017:44) further assert that what contributes to the "otherness" narrative is not a result of South Africa's geographical location. Instead, this "otherness" stems from "physical features (such as skin complexion, vaccination marks, traditional scarification marks, accent and dress code); cultural; culinary; phonetic and other markers of difference" (Langa, 2011:106; Peberdy, 2009:13). Crush and Ramachandran (2010:217) have pointed out that the general unfavourable impression that South Africans have of African foreigners is based on their country of origin (therefore, not all foreigners in South Africa are victimised equally)[65] (Harris, 2002:170). It indicates that xenophobia in South Africa is not a 'general' hatred or fear of strangers or foreigners or what is deemed to be strange or foreign, but rather a 'general' dislike

[65] Interestingly enough, with the wide range of literature that has been consulted for this study, the study notes that victims of xenophobic attacks have been different and have evolved to a certain extent throughout the years. For instance, the study has revealed that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, victims of xenophobic attacks were mainly asylum seekers or refugees from countries such as Angola, DRC and Somalia. Xenophobic attacks during 2008 and 2015 were targeted against foreigners who owned businesses (who had some measure of economic power) in South Africa, particularly in the townships. Accordingly, during this period the victims were mostly Somalians, Ethiopians, and Pakistanis (and those from/of [South] Asia[n] origin). Then from 2007 the literature indicates that foreigners who experience the most everyday micro-aggression forms of xenophobia are mostly Zimbabweans and Mozambican migrants (Warner *et al*., 2003:36-43; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:212; Dodson, 2010:8; Saleh, 2015:302).

Furthering the point above, in recent years – *circa* 2019 – a new category of xenophobia victims has emerged, which is that of 'male foreign-born truck drivers' (Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:3; Tau, 2019).

of *'certain'* foreigners[66] (Warner *et al*., 2003:36). For instance, South Africans have a more favourable impression of migrants with whom they share a common language, cultural or historical affinity, such as migrants from Botswana, Lesotho, and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland).

Conversely, in the introductory chapter of the study it was noted that xenophobic attacks mainly take place in the townships and urban informal settlements that are located in the metropolitan municipalities[67], thus identifying South Africa's xenophobia to be rooted in 'micro-politics' (Misago *et al*., 2009:2; Akinola, 2018:56). However, studies that have been carried out on xenophobic attacks in South Africa have identified Johannesburg as the "centre stage". This means that xenophobic violence in South Africa is often ignited in Johannesburg, and then the xenophobic attacks spread to other metropolitan areas (Matsinhe, 2011:297).

The violent xenophobic attacks that stand out the most to date, as previously declared in the introductory chapter, include the country-wide xenophobic attacks of April and May 2008[68] (the largest by far since post-democracy) which were carried out under the infamous movement titled "Buyelekhaya[69]" (go back home). Then followed the attacks of early 2015 and April 2019 (Akinola,

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[66] For instance, African foreigners from Ghana and Senegal are generally well accommodated by the locals in South Africa (Akinola, 2018:1).

[67] Metropolitan municipalities are mainly found in the following provinces: Gauteng; Western Cape; Eastern Cape; Free State; Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal (Everatt, 2011:13; Saleh, 2015:298&304). In addition, refer to *footnote 7 of Chapter One,* which mentions some of the townships where xenophobia has occurred.

[68] In addition to the xenophobic attacks that took place in 2008, there was an upsurge of xenophobic attacks in the previous year (2007) whereby an estimated 100 Somalians were killed, alongside the looting and setting fire of their businesses and properties (Odiaka, 2017:45; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011:83).

[69] In February 2022 another anti-immigrant group by the name of "Operation Dudula" emerged. As from May 2023 it has registered itself as a political party with the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), making it eligible to contest the 2024 elections (Masuabi, 2023). Moreover, Operation Dudula emerged as a disgruntled South African group that "accuses undocumented foreign nationals of involvement in criminal networks, as well as taking jobs meant for locals" (eNCA, 2022; Masuabi, 2023). As a point of interest, it is also worth noting that the word 'dudula' itself in isiZulu means to literally 'remove by force'. It can therefore be deduced that Operation Dudula's order of the day is to forcefully push foreigners out of South Africa.

Pursuing the above point further, the study has noted that with the anti-immigrant groups, one can characterise them under the banner of 'vigilantism'. More often than not, these groups emerge because they strongly feel that the government, local leaders and the police force are dismally failing in protecting their own people against [undocumented] foreign criminals who are operating human trafficking rings in South Africa, peddling drugs, chasing local businesses out of business, occupying social housing known as RDPs in South Africa, as well as taking away 'low-skill jobs' from the locals.

2018:61; Harris *et al.,* 2018:228). These xenophobic attacks mainly took place in central business districts (CBDs), suburbs, the townships [and informal settlements] of Alexandra; Kagiso; Jeppestown; Cleveland; Gladysville and Protea Glen, amongst other places in South Africa (Peberdy, 2009:2). The xenophobic attacks mainly targeted foreign nationals[70] from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, who were "accused of sexual crimes and stealing the locals' jobs" (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011:92). As a result of the attacks, a significant number of foreigners were left "homeless as they were forced from or fled their homes and businesses, thus finding themselves in positions of extreme vulnerability" (Peberdy, 2009:2; Odiaka, 2017:45; Akinola, 2018:61; Harris *et al.,* 2018:228). These attacks are described to have been a result of a myriad complex issues relating to the economy; sluggish development; the political landscape; as well as cultural factors; including both contemporary and historical components (Dodson, 2010:4; Saleh, 2015:298).

3.1.2 Further historical and contemporary contributors to xenophobia in South Africa

Contributors to xenophobic attacks in South Africa include the inadequate legal standing some migrants have within the communities in which they find themselves. This makes them "easy or soft targets" of mob violence/vigilantism; public frustration with the government; "poor service

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They see it as their sole aim to bring justice to these types of social problems facing South Africans, even if it means that they have to resort to xenophobic violence.

Needless to say, on the other end of the spectrum there are pro-immigrant groups (NGOs) operating within South Africa, such as the 'African Diaspora Forum'; 'Peace Action', 'Lawyers for Human Rights' and 'Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia (KAAX)'. Their sole aim is to "monitor, document, and report incidents of xenophobia against foreign nationals in South Africa" as well as providing refuge when needed and giving a voice to migrants stationed within South Africa (Vourlias, 2015).

[70] According to Dube (2018:1008), South Africans from minority ethnic groups, and South Africans who are perceived as having physical features similar to neighbouring African [Zimbabwean and Mozambican] migrants were also targeted during these attacks. For example, South African Shangaans (BaTsonga) who mostly reside in Limpopo were also attacked in those fateful xenophobic events (Everatt, 2011:8); thus, attesting that South Africa's xenophobia is also ethnocentric in nature.

Ironically, BaTsonga are also found in Mozambique and Zimbabwe — and the biggest constituency of BaTsonga are found in Mozambique. They make up more than two million of the Mozambican population. Incidentally, even though past attacks and literature indicate that South Africans have a more positive affinity towards migrants with whom they share the same cultural background, such as MaSwati and BaTswana, sadly these feelings do not translate when it comes to the BaTsonga people.

Regrettably, this does not come as a surprise as some xenophobic South Africans even view the Limpopo province and the tribes that reside there as being part of neighbouring Zimbabwe. Hence, when xenophobia attacks break out, one finds South Africans victims being Tsonga most of the time.

delivery; migrants living in townships competing with poor skilled South Africans for scarce resources in the townships; housing and public services" (Saleh, 2015:298; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:216; Dodson, 2010:5; Abdi, 2011:695; Kapp 2008:1987).

The above-mentioned factors point to deep-seated ongoing structural violence being alive in South Africa, since the mentioned contributors to xenophobia have always been politicised.

In the following sub-section of the chapter, further historical and contemporary contributors to xenophobia in South Africa will be discussed.

3.1.2.1 Lack of resources, lack of leadership

Ashmore's (1970:263) work on 'Social Psychology' touches briefly on how political leaders use prejudice, which in turn perpetuates and increases intolerance[71]. This statement by Ashmore (1970:263) could not be truer for the South African case. As noted by several academicians, the denial of xenophobia's existence and exaggeration of immigration numbers by ordinary South Africans and political leaders [72] also contribute to the real impact of xenophobia in South Africa (Dodson, 2010:7; Kangwa, 2016:535). Moreover, Masenya (2017:82) and Neocosmos (2010:2) maintain that state institutions and the type of leadership that can be found in communities could be a contributing factor towards encouraging or institutionalising xenophobic attacks (Fourchard

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[71] *Refer* to types of xenophobia: 'political xenophobia', *see* pgs. 28-29 of Chapter 2.

[72] For example, former president Thabo Mbeki stated in a media release on 3 July 2008, after the xenophobic attacks of May 2008, that what happened was not xenophobia, merely "naked criminal activity cloaked in the garb of xenophobia" (Dodson, 2010:7). His denialism, according to Dodson (2010:7-8), can either be contributed to a "sophisticated form of denialism or a staggering expression of ignorance", or the fact that his ideology of the 'African Renaissance' could not afford to accommodate a reality such as xenophobia.

Likewise, literature consulted in the study does reveal that Mbeki was not completely erroneous in arguing that the xenophobic violence that took place was criminal (Everatt, 2011:13). It was indeed also criminal, as some citizenry body politic took the opportunity to gain financially by looting township retail owners. However, there is denialism in viewing what happened as only criminality – as it was more than that.

Additionally, former president Jacob Zuma is guilty of the same denialism as former president Thabo Mbeki, when after the xenophobic attacks of 2015 Zuma reassured the world during a parliamentary sitting that South Africans are "generally not xenophobic" (Patel, 2015). The statement was naturally a contradiction to what has been taking place on the streets of South Africa.

& Segatti, 2015:7). Simultaneously, it is noteworthy to take into cognisance that politicians and traditional leaders pander to the role that fragile masculinity plays in politics.

Neocosmos (2010:2) and Dodson (2010:4) affirm that politicians, traditional leaders, state actors and state institutions/bureaucracies in South Africa have contributed towards the creation of a culture of xenophobia by passing the buck to "illegal immigrants". Xenophobic attacks are being blamed on the victims of xenophobia because they have entered South Africa illegally, in conjunction with placing strain on the country's already limited resources and/or engaging in criminal activities (Saleh, 2015:304; Akinola, 2018:54). Additionally, South African leaders (whether local leaders; traditional leaders; prominent politicians who are mostly members of mainstream political parties) are notorious for using spurts of xenophobic violence as a platform for attaining power and protecting their political interests[73] (Akinola, 2018:56; Mujere, 2013:186 Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:3).

Furthermore, Masenya (2017:85) and Dodson (2010:7) state that the South African government's (lack of political leadership) inability and/or "failure or disregard to maintain the rule of law" has contributed to the uprising of xenophobic attacks (Kangwa, 2016:535). The government's incapability to protect communities has led to an upsurge in crime and has given room for people to resort to crime and violence "without fear of arrest or successful prosecution". This is witnessed during xenophobic attacks where community members are looting shops owned by foreign nationals as well as setting some foreigners alight. In these scenarios, as the study notes, those undertaking such actions are making use of the political and mediation opportunity structure. By using what Ekman (2018:2) refers to as ***1)*** the "logic of numbers (mass demonstrations and the spectacle of numbers), ***2)*** the logic of damage (property destruction or large-scale disruptions that attract media attention and demonstrate seriousness), and ***3)*** the logic of bearing witness (public

[73] As was noted during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks where local politicians distanced themselves from the xenophobic violence taking place due to the "fear of losing legitimacy or political power in the 2009 national elections" (Akinola, 2018:56).

Furthermore, the role that local leaders; traditional leaders; and prominent politicians play in fuelling xenophobic attacks is one of the reasons South Africa's xenophobic attacks are classified to be taking place within the arena of 'micro-politics'.

An example that showcases that leaders in South Africa do contribute to the frequent spurts of xenophobic attacks was when in 2015 the Zulu monarch compared foreigners in South Africa to "amazeze" (lice or fleas), and stating that foreigners should pack their bags and go back home (Akinola, 2018:66; Kangwa, 2016:535 & 537).

performance and civic disobedience)". This is all used as a means to communicate needs not being met by those in charge. In this, we can also see the scapegoating of the foreigner.

The aforementioned contributors to xenophobic attacks in South Africa indicate that nationalism and identity politics are not the only contributing factors, but that governance (or rather the lack of good governance in many communities) does play a role in stirring the pot that ends up seething into xenophobic violence.

3.1.2.2 South Africa's 'Triple Challenge': Poverty, inequality, and unemployment

What has been dubbed by various experts as South Africa's 'triple challenge' – poverty, inequality and unemployment – has contributed tremendously to the constant flare-ups of xenophobic incidences in South Africa (Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:4). South Africa's trifecta, 'triple challenge', has led to economic hardship or lack of "access to economic opportunities", which has further contributed to feelings of outrage, desperation, a sense of injustice and gross inequality (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:71). Locals are of the opinion that foreigners are besieging their communities as well as the job markets, leaving little or no opportunities at all for the locals (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:216; Masenya, 2017:84; Dodson, 2010:5). Areas in the job market economy (notably in the informal economy) that are heavily contested, and which locals maintain are besieged by the members of the out-group, include menial jobs involving house cleaning, gardening and truck driving services.

Additionally, in the agricultural sector most of the employment is seasonal. Because the agricultural sector finds it difficult to find seasonal agricultural workers, commercial farmers mostly employ migrants from neighbouring countries as seasonal farmworkers. Due to the agricultural sector preferring migrant farm workers to work for them seasonally – and this being supported by the regulatory system in South Africa that allows labour brokers to employ and regularise contract workers – has indeed resulted in feelings of economic threat internalised by the locals (Peberdy, 2009:7). This has led to xenophobic attacks in commercial farms in certain parts of South Africa, such as at De Doorns in the Western Cape, where locals (the dominant group) have relayed that farm owners prefer to hire migrants from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe (Peberdy, 2009:7).

The above-mentioned factors, according to Gordon (2016:549), lead to "economic frustration, feelings of insecurity and increased prejudice towards the immigrants". Locals articulate the fact that due to the minimum wage bill acceptance by African migrants, the latter have turned themselves into 'contemporary, modern-day slaves' in South Africa (Dratwa, 2023:16). Contrarily, aside from the previous perspective, there is also the perception of foreigners (especially

Somalian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nationalities) who are seen to be owning the township economy, and as a result have turned themselves into people for whom South Africans [must] work. The fear surrounding this is that native-born and future South African children will be calling foreigners 'boss' (Dratwa, 2023:16).

It is further stated that foreigners in South Africa are resented by wealthier South Africans as well, who are of the opinion that their tax goes towards "providing shelter and services to people seen to be pouring into South Africa to escape political incompetence and economic mismanagement further north of the Limpopo border" (Dodson, 2010:5).

3.1.2.3 Vigilantism (vigilante politics) – 'message crimes'

Misago *et al*. (2009:11-12) state that xenophobic violence in South Africa can also be viewed from the angle of the "social construction of crime". This discourse on xenophobic violence in South Africa argues that foreign nationals on South African soil are viewed as criminals. Therefore, attacks against them are deemed to be a form of social law enforcement or vigilantism[74] (Misago *et al*., 2009:11-12; BBC Africa, 2023). Moreover, those who administer this type of action deem their behaviour to be honourable, and a rational reaction to what is taking place at street level.

In addition, evidence points to the fact that "instigators of xenophobic attacks often come from groups [or anti-immigrant groups such as Buyelekhaya and Operation Dudula] who have taken it upon themselves to be the protectors of South Africa's social fabric (Dratwa, 2023:1-17; BBC Africa, 2023). Pursuing this thread, message crime implementers are classified as those 'who are economically vulnerable and unable to compete effectively in a modernising economy and society, while the targets are those who are able to do so" (Hågensen, 2014:19; BBC Africa, 2023). Incidentally, this point made by Hågensen (2014:19) and as observed by the documentary produced by BBC Africa (2023) showcases that South Africa's xenophobia is also an outcome of frustration and aggression. Acts such as vigilantism/looting foreigners' spaza shops and the produce/products of foreign street vendors/traders, intimidating migrants by asking them if they have the relevant papers to be in South Africa or even run their businesses, are passed as "compensatory justice" (Akinola, 2018:59; BBC Africa, 2023).

[74] *Refer* to Footnote 69.

Furthermore, from this perspective the study argues that perpetrators of xenophobic violence in South Africa make use of political and institutional uncertainty to pass along their gruesome acts of violence as heroic acts of vigilantism, as they are protecting South African national territory.

Additionally, due to the rule of law not being upheld all the time, foreigners who are indeed carrying out criminal activities have also contributed towards 'compensatory justice' that has been applied to many innocent foreigners. This can be seen with Operation Dudula, where they argue that the reason they are carrying out compensatory justice is to protect South Africans who have suffered and are still suffering at the hands of criminals, some of whom happen to be non-South Africans. Therefore, they have taken it upon themselves to uphold the rule of law, which they feel the South African Police Service (SAPS) have failed to uphold.

3.1.2.4 Societal, cultural beliefs, and public perceptions towards outsiders: The cultural assimilation narrative

Not speaking the local [vernacular] language/s, *"difficulty"* in assimilating[75] is causing a cultural wedge between foreigners and host communities and is a further contributor to xenophobia in South Africa, especially in economically marginalised sections/parts of the townships (Dube, 2018:1010).

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[75] In a study carried out in mid-1997 by SAMP, the majority of participants held the view that "immigrants are inept of assimilating into the South African nation" (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:1). However, what this study has noted is that 25 plus years since the survey/s carried out by SAMP, foreigners are not incompetent of assimilating (on this point, the study would like to indicate – as mentioned in Chapter Two under the heading of ***'Cultural Xenophobia'*** and ***'Footnote 27'*** – that any foreigner is capable of adapting or assimilating into their new surroundings. Acculturation is possible with the help of the host communities). But rather the locals around them do not make it possible or easier for them to assimilate. Due to this, many foreigners living in townships across South Africa prefer to keep to themselves or be surrounded by people who come from the same country as theirs, as they already feel alienated around and by South Africans.

An illustration of the current ***footnote (75)*** and how not speaking the local vernacular is cause for a cultural wedge between migrants and host communities can be found in the work of Warner *et al*., 2003:38 where one of the participants was quoted as saying:

"I was [staying] in Langa ... It was very, very separatist ... many people speak only Xhosa. They know that you [are a] foreigner, and you speak little English, but nobody want[s] to know about your language ... [they] only speak with you in Xhosa. And you don't understand ... you say help me, [but] nobody going to help you."

A further contributing factor mentioned by Masenya (2017:85) and Comaroff & Comaroff (2001:649) relates to the [widespread] stereotyping of foreigners or the stereotypical image South Africans appear to hold regarding migrants, and the perceived negative impact their presence brings to their host countries/communities (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:19). This relates to the "societal and cultural beliefs" (cultural stereotyping) constructed/informed by second-hand [mis]information by the dominant locals, where foreigners are labelled as carriers of diseases such as HIV; and other forms of social ills (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:2; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:216; Dodson, 2010:6; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011:95).

Further contributors to xenophobic attacks in South Africa include conspiratorial thinking regarding immigrants and immigration, negative, sometimes uninformed media coverage[76] (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:8; Dratwa, 2023:14-15); "public perceptions/opinions[77] and political influences" whereby foreigners; refugees; asylum-seekers are blamed for societal ills such as lack of employment, where locals blame foreigners for their joblessness[78]. Abdi states that foreigners are accepting and/or stealing jobs way below the minimum wage, as they are not necessarily covered or protected by the statutory benefits attached to the employment of citizens[79] (Abdi, 2011:698).

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[76] On this point, refer back to 'Footnote 50 & 51' found in Chapter Two under the heading of 'Symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics.'

[77] Ongoing changes in patterns of migration in South Africa since 1994 have resulted in the percentage of asylum seekers increasing throughout the years – especially from the rest of Africa (this excludes the SADC region) and Asia (Peberdy, 2009:16). This has caused South Africans to question "migrants' legitimacy as refugees". Accordingly, the public perceives asylum seekers or economic refugees to be bogus, and this has resulted in creating "strong tensions between immigrants and South Africans" (Saleh, 2015:305).

In addition, im/migrants are perceived as a group that does not have the necessary papers or documents that allow their stay in South Africa (Peberdy, 2009:14). However, that is not often the case – as existing data does show that many African migrants do have the necessary documents that give them permission to live, work, study, and trade here in South Africa (Peberdy, 2009:14).

[78] It is important to note that when it comes to the negative attitude that the dominant group holds towards the out-group, most often, "like with any stereotype, its legitimacy is less important" (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:19). People want to believe what they want – especially if they are looking for a scapegoat, or a way to rationalise their negative attitudes without the guilt.

[79] Yakushko (2009:45) affirms that the perception that foreigners are 'stealing' jobs from the locals is an ideology founded in ethnocentrism and can thus lead to political xenophobia — this point ties back to the ***'Types of xenophobia'***.

Crime,[80] it is stated, is committed by foreigners as they are involved in criminal activities such as drug laundering; human trafficking; prostitution and illegal immigration[81]; and local businesses are not flourishing due to businesses owned by foreigners luring away the customers of locally owned businesses (Masenya, 2017:84; Neocosmos, 2010:1-2; Dodson, 2010:5; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001:649).

Consequently, the above observations on cultural stereotyping, public perceptions and opinions lead to foreigners being perceived as an inherent social political threat, or 'vermin' (Misago *et al*., 2009:12). This serves as further support for Comaroff & Comaroff's (2001:649) view that foreigners are understood to be the reason behind the "unravelling of the cultural and social fabric itself" – the elements in a society that are perceived to be responsible for the "defiling, or even polluting of the healthy social body" or nation's health (Monroe *et al.*, 2000:440; Mattes *et al*., 1999:1). Paradoxically, the study has noted that during the xenophobic attacks, South Africans commit/ted the exact crimes they accuse foreigners of perpetrating (Everatt, 2011:29).

3.1.2.5 Violent (unhealthy) masculinities: Traits of 'hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity'

The study of violent masculinity[82] falls under the umbrella theme of gender psychology and gender politics. It further assists in garnering understanding of issues of gender, and to what extent gender factors in social problems (Harrington, 2020:1-2; DiMuccio & Knowles, 2020:25). By definition: hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity refers to the apprehensive feeling by males that they fall short in meeting the fraught 'set/imposed' masculine[83] (gendered prescriptions and proscriptions) and cultural standards and norms established within the society in which they live

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[80] Comaroff and Comaroff (2001:649) state that many locals hold the view that the crimes that immigrants commit are in itself the unravelling of the cultural and social fabric itself. Therefore, foreigners are seen as the destroyers of a tightly woven cultural and social fabric that many communities have built and preserved for many years, if not centuries.

[81] Neocosmos (2010:1) state that even though in South Africa xenophobic attacks are frequently directed at African nationalities, there is a trend in the media whereby Nigerian and Mozambican nationalities are the two nations that are often singled out for perpetuating illegal activities such as drugs and illegal immigration.

[82] Also referred to as "traditional masculinity ideology" (Salam, 2019).

[83] It is worth noting that the study fields of 'Anthropology, History, and Psychology' acknowledge that 'masculinity' or the term 'manhood' or what it means to be a 'real man' has made headway like moving sand throughout societies during various points in history (DiMuccio & Knowles, 2020:25).

(DiMuccio & Knowles, 2020:25). This state of mind can habitually lead to an aggressive stance on politics, as fragile and toxic masculinity is factored to be a determinant of political behaviour (DiMuccio & Knowles, 2020:25). Likewise, hyper-masculinity, hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity can be associated with behavioural patterns and beliefs such as violence and aggression, which are utilised as an indicator of power (Salam, 2019).

An illustration of this can be found in an opinion piece on the 'Senekal *'farm'* murder case' in South Africa, written by Mckaiser (2020), where he speaks of the toxic masculinity behaviour that was displayed by "a handful of racist white right-wingers" and "the annoyingly inconsistent populist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)". Mckaiser (2020) interprets the behaviour of these two incongruent groupings outside the Senekal Magistrate's Court in the Free State as being "addicted to toxic masculinity that finds violent expression in their politics." This can also be witnessed in displays of weapons such as "guns, sticks, pangas, etc.", which to a certain extent can be interpreted as an extension of their toxic masculinity.

Considering the above description of toxic masculinity, it is not surprising that the vast portion of xenophobic violence in South Africa can be attributed to elements of violent masculinity, traits of hegemonic, fragile, "bruised male egos", and toxic masculinity. Many academics have noted that perpetrators of xenophobic violence in South Africa are mostly (young) black South African men (which is not astonishing as young men have been identified to "invoke powerful discourses on autochthony") (Warner *et al*., 2003:41; Mujere, 2013:190). Victims[84] of xenophobic violence on South African soil are mainly African foreign nationals [from Sub-Saharan Africa]. They are especially foreign men who are identified as a threat and are blamed for "flashing their money around" and for "stealing the local women from the local men" (Morris, 1998:1117 & 1120; Harris, 2002:170; Warner *et al*., 2003:36-41; Neocosmos, 2010:1; Dodson, 2010:5; Masenya, 2017:82 and Otu, 2016:91).

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[84] On this point, it is imperative to note that South Africa's xenophobia is also mainly targeted at people or groups of people who are not "strangers" to South Africa/ns, but who have been long-term immigrants and have been sharing the same living space/s as well as interacting with fellow South Africans.

From this point of view, victims of xenophobia in South Africa are known to South Africans. The only marker of difference is that the victim is not regarded as a "bona fide or indigenes" member of the in-group. Conversely, what can be noted as interesting is that many social psychologists (such as Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp) who are proponents of the 'contact theory [contact hypothesis]' will note that this theory does not work within the actuality of the South African case study, mainly because the premise of this theory postulates that contact between the non-members and their host community will alleviate group tensions and possibly promote "tolerance and acceptance" (De Angelis, 2001).

The verity that perpetrators of xenophobic violence in South Africa are mostly black South African men, and that their victims are largely foreign men, supports the view established in the commencement section of Chapter Three of this study that violence in South Africa is indeed deep-rooted and structural.[85] This argument is also supported by Harrington (2020:2), who maintains that "gender-based violence is historically and culturally specific" and is influenced by both structural and situational power relations. This cannot be truer, given the South African context.

To further advance the above-mentioned theme on 'traits of hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity', an ethnographic study carried out by Abdi (2011:692), which was supported by data collected in the form of formal interviews with Somali and Ethiopian refugees living in South Africa and South Africans in townships, revealed that aspects of 'hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity' do indeed play a role in the incidence of xenophobic violence. Some of the foreign men interviewed smugly revealed that they believed that the local men were jealous of them (the foreigners) as 'they', the foreigners, were successful in getting the local women and were competing successfully with the locals and efficaciously running them out of business (Abdi, 2011:699). Correspondingly, a study conducted in Cape Town in the early 2000s as part of a Psychology Honours research project, as reported by Warner *et al*. (2003:36 - 41), indicated that participants of the study reported experiencing the most hostility from Black South African men as well as Black policemen. Incidents included Black policemen tearing up their passports when found on the street, being stopped by Black men to ask if they had money, and then proceeding to ransack them. As a result, male foreigners reported feelings of anxiousness when they encountered a Black man or Black policeman on the street.

Above all, due to the fear of being ostracised, or the 'failure' by South African men in maintaining the fraught 'set/imposed' traditional masculinity ideology and cultural standards and norms established within the society in which they exist (such as failing in 'securing' local women or successfully competing with foreign nationals who set up businesses in their communities), South African men resort to 'compensatory' behaviour, which manifests in the form of xenophobic violence as a form of strategy and indicator of power to not risk or diminish their status as 'real men'. When this happens, it is fragile and toxic masculinity in action.

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[85] Warner *et al*., (2003:43) state that the "Apartheid regime created circumstances that deprived many [Black] men of traditional ways of demonstrating power – such as being the breadwinner and having a say in governing the community". Hence, they harboured feelings of threat, frustration, and relative deprivation with the presence of foreign [men] who allegedly seemed to be doing much better than the local Black men in areas where they felt they should be taking ownership or be in charge.

It is worth noting that the current discussion on 'traditional masculinity ideology', which aims to explain further the historical and contemporary contributors of xenophobia in South Africa, is immersed in the xenophobic theories of 'relative deprivation' and 'frustration-aggression (scapegoating)'. It expressly takes into account that when these two theories collide with each other, it tends to lead to collective violence — as also indicated under the heading of 'Vigilantism – 'message crimes''.

3.1.2.6 General life frustrations; jealousy; threat and entitlement

Feelings of relative deprivation play an important role under this sub-heading, as indicated in the work of Warner *et al*. (2003:41). Locals feel that the freedom they fought for so long should only be reaped by them – and that members of the out-group do not deserve access to unentitled benefits (Mattes *et al.,* 1999:25). Locals should not be competing with foreigners for jobs, women, or a better life. Additionally, in a focus group study carried out by Everatt (2011:21), participants were recorded to have stated that they believed the South African government was too accommodating towards foreigners. They even asked questions such as: "Why would government deliver food parcels to displaced foreigners at refugee camps and leave them (South Africans) to go to bed hungry?" Accordingly, in a society where the gap between rich and poor is too wide and levels of unemployment are extremely high, it is no surprise that feelings of relative deprivation will arise, leading to the need for a scapegoat, and the scapegoat being the foreigner.

To reiterate, everyday micro-aggressions of xenophobia arise due to feelings of jealousy. Studies have indicated that South Africans (especially those who are low-skilled) feel that foreigners are more business-savvy than they are (Everatt, 2011:21-22). A documentary titled "Fear and Loathing in South Africa" produced by BBC Africa (2023) shows how one South African indicates that foreigners have seen a gap in the business model of informal vendors and are selling second-hand clothes, which sell like hotcakes. This alludes to the fact that foreigners have identified and seized needs that South Africans have not perceived to lead to a decent profit, and have turned those needs into thriving businesses, such as opening hair salons and displaying their arts and crafts in tourist locations around the country.

3.1.2.7 Political upheaval and economic mismanagement from home-states of immigration: Macro factors

The first six (6) mentioned contributors to xenophobia as a phenomenon concentrated on the discourse of the stemming contributors within the South African geographical landscape. However, there is a major macro-factor into which this chapter has not yet delved, namely, why are there migrants in South Africa (who mostly happen to be economic migrants/refuges and

asylum seekers)? What has been the driving force for most migrants to seek 'refuge' in South Africa, even knowing that South Africa is infamous for some of the ghastliest xenophobic attacks globally?

Sources indicate that bad leadership, poor governance, economic meltdowns and increasing political unrest (such as civil wars, coups d'état, and insurgent groups[86] which have had a negative impact on human security) in countries such as the DRC, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, have persuaded their own people to seek refuge in other countries, as the situations in their own countries are in dire distress (Kapp, 2008:1987; Kangwa, 2016:543; Mutanda, 2022:332). In addition, discriminatory legislation in some African countries has caused citizens from states such as Zambia and Senegal to flee from persecution related to sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) and to seek asylum status in South Africa. Above all, the various developmental challenges that many states across Africa experience [including many African states' inability to manage their own heterogeneity post-colonialism (Akokpari, 2013:308)] have led to a downpour of migrants into South Africa.

3.1.3 Xenophobia in South Africa: Post 1994

In this chapter, aside from the above-mentioned documented dates of xenophobic attacks in South Africa; and together with anti-immigrant *movements* such as 'Buyelekhaya' and anti-immigrant *groups* like 'Operation Dudula', a 15-month ethnography study conducted by Dratwa (2023:1 & 14) at the height of the corona virus pandemic (2020 – 2022), noted that xenophobia in South Africa had moved online [xenophobic online campaigning]. The campaign carried with it the undertones of the 'replacement conspiracy theories' and used the theory of 'political and mediation opportunity structure' to its advantage. This xenophobic online campaigning took place in the form of "posting and sharing nationalistic, anti-immigrant, and especially anti-African content" (Dratwa, 2023:5), with hashtags (#) such as 'All foreigners must leave'; 'We want our country back'; and 'Clean up SA' emerging on social networks like X (Twitter) and on Facebook pages and groups such as 'Put South Africans First (PSAF) [87] – which is currently regarded as one of the largest xenophobic online communities in South Africa' (Dratwa, 2023:5). This is a clear indication that xenophobia in South Africa does not take place only in the 'physical realm', but also in the digital world (Dratwa, 2023:4).

[86] Such as the **Ansar al-Sunna** (locally known as al-Shabaab), an Islamic insurgent faction operating in the region of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique.

Similarly, according to Dratwa's (2023:5) ethnography study, points of discussion among the members and followers of the pages and groups would touch on topics such as crime being committed by migrant nationalities, government corruption, and how employers prefer African migrants to South Africans. Importantly, the study also notes that the hate speech that is communicated by proponents of xenophobia uses the 'right of freedom of speech' to communicate their hate and frustration with having foreigners in their communities. For a country like South Africa, actions carried out by members and movements such as PSAF and Operation Dudula undermine the country's democracy and its core values.

Hence, Matsinhe (2011:295) identifies South Africa as being "phobogenic[88]". Not only are South Africans phobogenic, but Dodson (2010:3-4) states that in a study carried out on migrants living in Cape Town, the findings have revealed that South Africans' fear of foreigners is deep-seated and systematic. Xenophobia in South Africa therefore harbours a "negative attitude towards foreigners – particularly African and Asian foreigners" (Odiaka, 2017:43). Matsinhe (2011:295) further states that the [afro] phobia that many black South African citizens feel towards black foreigners from other African countries has seemingly contributed to the "fundamental component of South Africa's collective identification and public culture". Therefore, the xenophobia in South Africa overlaps with afrophobia (also referred to as 'black phobia') [89] and hinges on the "politics of belonging" because, contradictorily, white foreigners from Europe and North America are tolerated and are not regarded through the same lenses as African foreigners (Naidu & Benhura, 2016:8-9; Dube, 2018:1005). Furthermore, Wilson and Magam (2018:93) state that afrophobia in South Africa acts as a means to vent frustration against the current political system.

Additionally, according to Oyedemi (2015:61), xenophobia has become a "perennial social concern" in post-colonial South Africa. This has made xenophobia a social construct/struggle that can be associated with post-independence (which has racist roots due to the legacy of Apartheid) (Soyombo, 2008:86), nation building and the development of "new national identities and idioms

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[88] The term 'phobogenic' originated with Frantz Fanon (1952) who described the "'black man' as 'a phobogenic object; a stimulus to anxiety among whites", suggesting, therefore, that "Africans are phobogenic unto themselves; that Africa is a stimulus to its own anxiety" (Matsinhe, 2011:295).

[89] The term 'afrophobia' is defined as Africa's fear and hatred of itself. It is a more nuanced variant of xenophobia as it directs its fear of strange and foreign people specifically towards foreigners from other African nations (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:73).

In relation to the study and taking the South African context into account, 'afrophobia' in this case expresses the ill-disposed biases that some Black South Africans hold towards [mostly Black] African foreigners (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019:72).

of inclusion and exclusion" (Neocosmos, 2010:6; Saleh, 2015:301; Fourchard & Segatti, 2015:2), whereby South Africans use the criterion of citizenship to exclude or include (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 214,218). South Africans will often discriminate against someone they view to be non-indigenous or non-autochthonous, especially if that individual is classified or viewed to be of African descent (Neocosmos, 2010:1; Akinola, 2018:63).

From the above review it can be gathered that xenophobia in South Africa is widespread. There is an ethno-linguistic, race and class bias in xenophobic attacks (Warner *et al*., 2003:36 – 41; Chiweshe, 2016:135; Dube; 2018:1008) and South Africans generally have an enmity towards foreigners (particularly African immigrants from north of the Limpopo River). At the very least they are anti-immigrant, and xenophobia in South Africa is predominantly gendered – whereby men and women experience xenophobia in different ways. In other words, xenophobic violence is heavily male-dominated due to contributing factors such as violent masculinity, and traits of hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity.

In addition, what can be gathered from the above literature review is that the discourse on xenophobic attacks in South Africa constructs foreigners (especially African foreigners/Black non-nationals, *i.e*. Nigerians, Congolese, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians and Somalians) and Asian foreigners/Asian non-nationals who are mainly shop-owners from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and China, as a threat to the "economic, social and cultural rights and entitlements of citizens" (Dodson, 2010:8; Saleh, 2015:302).

It can be further gathered that xenophobia in South Africa is 'justified', based on the economy and social ills with which the country still grapples post-1994. Due to this very reason, foreigners have become scapegoats for the slow progress made in addressing socio-economic ills since liberation from Apartheid rule. In conclusion, it can be stated that because socially constructed discourses of identity politics have been internalised by citizen-subjects, this has as a result impacted on social cohesion and has been translated into violent action rooted in hate and the dehumanisation of people deemed to be "alien" or "other" (Dodson, 2010:8).

3.1.4 Concluding remarks

Overall, the current chapter has indicated that because of South African communities embracing nativism and xenophobia as a response to a deep fear of the "other", who is no longer embraced as an immigrant or a refugee but as an "illegal alien", "illegal criminal" or "invader" (Arrocha, 2019:249), it has resulted in serious human rights violations against foreigners in South Africa. To conclude the discussion of the current chapter, two (2) 'Figures'; two (2) 'Tables' and a 'Map'

will be provided. The goal of the ‘Figures’, ‘Tables’ and ‘Map’ is to provide a birds-eye view synopsis of the current chapter.

The first ‘Figure’ to be displayed will be Figure 10, which indicates that the contributors to xenophobia are mostly attributable to South Africa’s failure in realising the “socialisation” stage, or as Kangwa (2016:535) puts it, South Africa has failed to deliver beyond the electioneering point where the maintenance of the values and principles of democracy has not been upheld. Pursuing this argument, Kangwa (2016:535) and Everatt (2011:32) are in agreement by opining that one of the contributors to xenophobia in South Africa is that the country, during its transition from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule, has managed to achieve the first two phases (the liberalisation and democratisation phase) but has failed in achieving the final stage of the transitional process, which is the ‘social and economic equality’ stage.

The failure of the government to achieve the ‘socialisation’ phase has resulted in major socio-economic and socio-political problems that have been major cultivators and contributors of xenophobic violence. The study thus far is indicative of the fact that xenophobia in South Africa rather stems from socio-economic and political factors [instead of symbolic threat theory]. This leads to frustration, aggression and foreigners being turned into scapegoats as a way to also gain the government’s attention so that eventually the ‘socialisation’ stage can be actualised. This is the stage where social and economic equality can be achieved for all; especially taking into consideration that in South Africa the gap between rich and poor is criminally wide.

‘Figure 10’ below explains the ‘transitional process’ in more detail.

Figure 10: Three steps in a transitional process – Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democratic Rule



Source: Everatt (2011:32); O'Donnell (1986)

Figure: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

'Table 2' below distinguishes the difference/s between 'xenophobia' and 'afrophobia' in table format.

Table 2: Differences between *'Xenophobia'* and *'Afrophobia'* in Table Form

'XENOPHOBIA'	***'AFROPHOBIA'***
• Xenophobia is a global phenomenon.	• Afrophobia has a geographical focus.
• "Xenophobia is directly related to ethnocentrism or the belief that one group is superior to another".	• Afrophobia is a more nuanced variant of xenophobia.
• Xenophobia can be explained as an "intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries."	• Afrophobia is perceived as 'Africa's fear and hatred of itself'.
• Xenophobia is tied to the feelings of threat by nationals of a recipient state. The threat can be 'economic', 'symbolic' or power related.	• Afrophobia speaks to the biases or hostility that African nationals will have or show towards African nationals of other African states --- (*e.g. as in the case between SA and most African states or the xenophobia that occurred between Ghana and Nigeria in the 1960s, late 1980s & early 1990s due to Ghana's 'Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 and Nigeria's infamous 'Ghana-must go' anti-immigration acts*, *or the ongoing xenophobic attacks that took place in Gabon*

	where different immigrant populations from Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea where victims of Afrophobia between early 1962 – 1990s, or Mobuto expelling Congolese Tutsi {Banyarwanda} in the 90s (Refworld, 2004; Akinola, 2018:2; Mutanda, 2022:333)). - Afrophobia is violence by Africans against fellow Africans.
• Xenophobia refers to the fear of the 'other' in general terms.	• Afrophobia refers to the fear of the specific other.

Source: Mngomezulu & Dube (2019:71)

Table: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

'Table 3' below provides a birds-eye view summary of the main xenophobic violence occurrences that the study has addressed or mentioned.

Table 3: Brief Summation of '*Chapter 3'* in Table Form

Year (s) of main xenophobic violence incident (s) OR Occurrence(s) as noted in the study	How xenophobia manifests in South Africa (especially during 'peak times')	Victims of Xenophobic attacks in South Africa	Geographic region of occurrence

• 1980s • 1994 • 1995 • 1998 • 2007 • 2008 • 2015 • 2019 • 2020 – 2022 (Peak Covid Years)	• Murder • Assault • Grievous body harm • Looting • Robbery • Arson attacks • Displacement • Intimidation & Threats • Verbal Harassment • Online Bullying – carried out by 'anti-immigrant social movement online communities *[xenophobic online campaigning/ activism]*	• ***African foreigners/Black non-nationals (mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa)***: - Nigerians, Congolese, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, and Somalians • ***Asian foreigners/Asian non-nationals (mainly from South Asia):*** - who are mainly shop-owners, from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and China • Male foreign-born truck drivers. • Most victims are coming from the same (historically) oppressed groups	• ***Cities*** (central business districts – CBDs), small towns, Townships, hostel dwellings and informal settlements that are located in the Metropolitan municipalities, rural areas: - ***Rural Areas – Farms & Townships:*** Alexandra; De Doorns; Isipingo; Kagiso; Jeppestown; Cleveland; Gladysville; Diepsloot; Actonville; Umlazi and Protea Glen amongst other places in South Africa - ***Main Cities:*** Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg - ***Metropolitan Municipalities:*** City of Cape Town, eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, City of

		as the perpetrators.	Johannesburg, City of Tshwane - ***Provinces:*** Gauteng; Western Cape; Free State; Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal - ***Online:*** *Via* social networks (such as X (Twitter) & Facebook)

Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

'Map 1' below provides a birds-eye view of the total number of xenophobic discrimination incidents by location between 1994 and 21 October 2024. As can be seen on the map, most of the frequent 'hotspots' and flare-ups of xenophobic violence in the country are located in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, and Western Cape provinces. The 'hotspots' in Gauteng take place in and around the City of Johannesburg; Tshwane and Mogale City. In the Western Cape the 'hotspots' are in and around the City of Cape Town; Overstrand Local Municipality; Breede Valley Municipality and Saldanha Bay Municipality. In the KwaZulu-Natal province, the 'hotspots' are in and around eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality; Msunduzi and uMhlathuze Local Municipality. The Eastern Cape province has its 'hotspots' in and around Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality. It is of no surprise that most incidents of xenophobic violence take place in metropolitan areas where there is a "relatively high level of economic opportunities and rapid urbanisation" (Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:7-8).

Map 1: Map showing total xenophobic discrimination incidents by location: 1994 – 18 October 2024



Source: Xenowatch (2024)

Figure 11 below provides the theoretical framework of how xenophobia takes place in South Africa. This is explained in diagram format. As can be noted in *'Figure 11'*, xenophobia in South Africa overlaps with 'afrophobia' and 'identity politics'. South Africa's xenophobia is further affected by elements such as 'macro- and micro-structural' factors; 'social-economic [classism]' factors; the socio-psychological anomie; vigilantism and struggles with one's self-esteem as a result of dynamics such as poverty, economic threat and relative deprivation. Additionally, xenophobia in South Africa is ubiquitous and has features of 'new racism (neoracism)' and the use of derogatory terms such as *'Makwerekwere'* and *'Amagrigamba'*.

Figure 11: Theoretical Framework - Xenophobia in South Africa explained



[1] In *In* South Africa, the etymology of the derogatory term used to refer to foreigners (who mostly are African immigrants) is 'makwerekwere' or 'amagrigamba'. '*amaKwerekwere'* is a term which originates from isiXhosa which means "somebody speaking an unfamiliar language" (Saleh, 2015:307; Abdi, 2011:693; Dube, 2018:1010).

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

CHAPTER 4 WHAT ROLE DOES PAN-AFRICANISM, IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL PLAY IN XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA?

4.1 Introduction: Nationalism and African Nationalism (Pan-Africanism)

As already stated in the introductory chapter, the study is indeed cognisant of the fact that "Africanists" and "Nationalists" *(refer to footnote 12)* are not the same in person or in ideological credence. In this light, the current chapter deems it important to explore the differences between "Africanists" and "Nationalists". In order to do this, the concepts of 'Nationalism' and 'African Nationalism – Pan Africanism' – will be further explored to shed light on these two concepts.

Furthermore, the goal of this chapter is to delve deeper into the roles that Pan Africanism, identity politics and the politics of survival play in xenophobic violence in South Africa. With these three elements at play, the chapter anticipates that the discussion will furnish something that will be of succour in understanding the phenomenon that is xenophobia in South Africa, particularly considering that in the introductory chapter the study asked the pertinent question of: "What is the cause of xenophobia, particularly in South African townships, if official rhetoric is openness towards Africa?" Subsequently, the sole aim of this chapter is to cast light on this particular question.

4.1.1 Nationalism: 'People, society, nation and [sovereign] state'

Before delving further into the subject matter of 'African Nationalism' as a political ideology, the study deems it fit to provide a brief contextual background on the concept of 'Nationalism', as the theory of 'African Nationalism' is sired by the theory 'Nationalism'.

Heywood (2007:155) states that the word 'nation' has been in use since the 13th century. From 1870 to 1914 it rapidly gained ground with the help of the "democratisation of politics alongside with a modern administration in tow with citizen mobilisation and citizen influencing state" (Hobsbawm, 1990:110). Since then, nationalism has become "a theory of political legitimacy" and identifies its role as "a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind" (Gellner, 1983:1 & 48) – particularly when in practice it leans more towards unifying rather than dividing (Anderson, 2006:3; Hobsbawm, 1990:33; Calhoun, 1993:213). Pletsch (1999:197-8) went as far as dubbing nationalism as the "original identity politics", thus signifying the role of Nationalism to contribute towards identity formation, "unification and expansion" of the nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1990:33). Berezin (2006:273) adds that since the late 18th century the modern nation-state has

been the focal point of “modern territoriality and fertile terrain” – particularly because in that era, according to Hobsbawm (1990:38), there was progression in human evolution where small groups grew larger [e.g., “from family to tribe, to region, to the nation-state, to the globalised world’ and henceforth]. Eventually it became a breeding ground for outbreaks of warfare and xenophobia due to nationalism’s shift from ‘liberalism’ to ‘radical right’ shrouded by chauvinism and imperialism (Hobsbawm, 1990:121). With this, according to Heywood (2007:143), we see “individuals and groups starting to be classified as nationalists” and nation-states partaking in the development and implementation of hostile policies that can be used to ward off foreigners they do not want on their terrain. Nevertheless, before the 18th century the term ‘nation’ had no political connotation – for the most part in international politics.

As the years progressed, by the mid-19th century the term ‘nationalism’ became the “language of mass politics” and was generally recognised, acknowledged, and understood, or rather defined, as a “political doctrine or movement” that aimed to address the “character, interests, rights and duties of nations with the objective of furthering the interests of said nation” (Seton-Watson, 1977:3). Accordingly, it signified the political doctrine and movement of Nationalism as being that of achieving independence and national unity (Seton-Watson, 1977:3). Consequently, this resulted in Nationalism also becoming the face of “social cohesion; order; and stability” (Calhoun, 1993:213; Hobsbawm, 1990:40). This can be further attributed to political happenings such as the ‘French Revolution’ and the ‘American Declaration of Independence’ which carried the nationalism function of both social and political change (Seton-Watson, 1977:6). In addition, Pletsch (1999:198) pronounces that Nationalism since WWI has continued to constantly thrive and mushroom itself across the world – especially after WWII came to an end in 1945.

Pursuing this discussion further, nationalism is also the belief that the “nation is the central principle of political organisation” (Heywood, 2007:143), which makes sense as Gellner (1983:1) deems Nationalism to be “primarily a political principle”. Heywood (2007:143) maintains that nationalism is based upon two schools of thoughts/assumptions. The first school of thought regards humanity to be naturally divided into separate nations (Calhoun, 1993:213). The second school of thought views the nation to be the “most appropriate and perhaps only legitimate entity of political rule” as nationalism gives legitimacy to the state [as according to the definition of the ‘state’ by Max Weber the ‘state’ “possesses the monopoly of factors such as the right to legitimate violence[90]]” (Gellner, 1983:3; Anderson, 2006:3; Heywood, 2007:143; Kellas, 1991:1).

[90] Here we can see how the nation-state has the advantage of possessing power, legitimacy, and authority.

Continuing with the above established train of thought, the study recognised a third school of thought: Nationalism also speaks to the issue of borders, or as Hobsbawm (1990:10) and Anderson (2006:4) put it, Nationalism is a sort of 'cultural artefact'; social engineering. This third school of thought observes 'Nationalism' as a 'cultural artefact' that is/has been human engineered and often signifies the issue of belonging or non-belonging (the creation or the struggle to keep homogeneity). It is often based on the grounds of shared language, religion, and culture (linguistic and ethnic nationalism) – and even ecology – thus assigning 'Nationalism' as a 'socio-cultural' concept (Hobsbawm, 1990:5; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013:1-3).

Accordingly, nationalism is a form of 'social organisation' that creates an identity [social, cultural, and political] as it stipulates to people who they are (Gellner, 1983:49). This can be observed in [pre] and modern societies where nationalism is practised in many formats, such as through geographic region, flags, national anthems, national/public holidays, ethnicity, along racial lines (*e.g.* Afrikaner Nationalism), language, usage of passports, and even sport where "persons and teams symbolising nation-states" compete in the name of 'national self-assertion' – which in the end "gives people a history and forges social bonds" (Hobsbawm, 1990:101-130 & 142; Heywood, 2007:145 & 155; Leach *et al*., 2008:760). All in all, as Gellner (1983:1) succinctly puts it: "Nationalism allows nations to have their own political roofs" – which indicates that in the same way humans have a yearning to have an actual 'roof' [shelter] over their heads[91]. The same goes for the nation-state. It makes way for the relationship between the nation-state and the individual to take place and be recognised and acknowledged; therefore, honouring the link between the 'personal-self' and 'national-identification'.

To culminate the brief discussion on Nationalism, 'Figure 12' is provided, which affords a birds-eye view synopsis on the concept of 'Nationalism'.

[91] This can be attested by how refugees or asylum seekers flee their home-states due to conflict, mismanagement of their home countries by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats etc., the moment [they] are able to find another nation-state to call home, often at times they are keen to become naturalised citizens so that they too can belong to somewhere and have a [stable] 'political roof' over their heads.

Figure 12: Nationalism



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

As the study continues to develop, the lens will be attuned to Pan-Africanism – a 'supra-nationalist' movement where Edward W. Blyden is regarded as one of the advocates of African Nationalism (Kasanda, 2016:180). African Nationalism as a political ideology – cultural and geo-political movement is a: "subjective feeling of kinship or affinity shared by people of African descent. It is a feeling based on shared cultural norms, traditional institutions, racial heritage, and a common historical experience (Khapoya, 2013:139)". Accordingly, literature consulted indicates that African Nationalism existed prior to colonialism (Khapoya, 2013:139). Thus, providing proof and cementing that African Nationalism prior to white settlement on the African continent, there was already a strong sense of 'national identity' in place amongst African societies, where outside

control and influence was not welcome, nor passively accepted (Khapoya, 2013:139-140). Therefore, indicating the 'well-structured social and political institutions' that were already existing before colonization took place (Khapoya, 2013:139-159). Moreover, African Nationalism has birthed several types of nationalisms that have emerged in Africa – which have been influenced by different variables such as: 'colonial oppression and WW1 +2' (Khapoya, 2013:141-159). They include "local nationalism, regional nationalism, nation-state nationalism, continental African nationalism, Black nationalism or Pan-Africanism[92]". However, for the sole purpose of the study, the lens will be accorded to Pan-Africanism as the study has recognised it as a theoretical toolset that will best explain the phenomena under study. This analysis will be carried out in the next sub-section.

4.1.2 Pan-Africanism[93]

A myriad number of people (activists and intellectuals) and certain movements/events are credited with the uprising of Pan-Movements and Pan-Africanism: From the literary works of

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[92] Geiss (1969:189 & 191) further state that "Pan-Africanism is largely African Nationalism – and that this further alludes to the interdependence of both these two concepts".

[93] Literature consulted indicates that Pan-Africanism is mainly divided into five (5) groupings/categories:

"**1.** ***Trans-Atlantic Pan-Africanism*** (which focuses on the solidarity between descendants who are African-American and those who are Native born Africans); **2.** ***Trans-Saharan Pan-Africanism*** (this grouping of Pan-Africanism focuses on the relationship "between people from Maghreb and those residing South of the Sahara), **3.** ***Sub-Saharan Pan-Africanism*** (this grouping of Pan-Africanism attunes its lenses to the relationship amongst the population residing South of the Sahara – it therefore looks at elements relating to 'culture, languages, similar economic activities and political affinities amongst Black African countries'), **4.** ***Trans-American Pan-Africanism*** (it focuses on "Black consciousness between those of African descent in North America, the Caribbean and Latin America)", and **5.** ***Global Pan-Africanism*** (this final grouping is inclusive of everyone – including the Arab world and the indigenous populace found in North America such as the Native Indian Americans, the Aborigines populace of Australia *etc*.)" (Geiss, 1967:720; Kasanda, 2016:182).

Observation: The above mentioned ***five (5) groupings/categories of Pan-Africanism*** indicates [the three continents] where Pan-Africanism stems from and, where it originally was practised – North America (including the West Indies); Africa and Western Europe (Especially in Great Britain) (Geiss, 1967:720).

The five (5) groupings/categories of Pan-Africanism further reveal the ***three (3) dimensions/facets of Pan Africanism***. Martin (2012:57) alluded to: **a) Culture** (the goal of Pan-Africanism culturally is to "reclaim Africa's heritage, history, culture and values"; **b) Politics** (this facet directs its energy to regaining Africa back) and the **c) Economy** (facets speaks to addressing elements that caused the collapse of Africa – such as 'balkanisation of Africa') – **also** ***see*** 'Figure 15: Pan-Africanism: Further Explained'.

Ottbah Cugoano [also known as John Stuart] and Gustavus Vassa [also known as Olaudah Equiano], to freed Afro-American slaves such as W.E.B. Du Bois and George Padmore, and Caribbean intellectuals such as Marcus Garvey and Henry Sylvester Williams (Geiss, 1969:187-190; Seton-Watson, 1977:322; Akokpari *et al*., 2013:309; Kasanda, 2016:182). In addition, Pan-Africanism [a race-based theory] is an ideological force [political concept] that was partly inspired by the abolitionist movement in America, Britain, West Africa and [former] British West Indies (Geiss, 1969:187-188). Likewise, Pan-Africanism also came about as an alternative tool in the 20th century to fight off the clutches of colonialism on the African continent and to get rid of the "colonial government of European foreigners"– therefore to "prove Africa's right to independence" (Geiss, 1969:189; Geiss, 1967:721; Seton-Watson, 1977:339; Oloruntoba, 2018:9 & 18).

Pursuing this further, Geiss (cited by Akokpari, *et al*., 2013:309) and Kasanda (2016:179) state that Pan-Africanism can be traced back to African diasporas and a "Pan-African Conference held in London back in 1900, from the 23rd – 25th of July. All the same, Geiss (1969:187) and Kasanda (2016:179) indicate that although Pan-Africanism only gained momentum after the 2nd WW[94] ended (as seen with the 6th Pan-African Congress which took place in Manchester, England 1945 (Seton-Watson, 1977:332)), it is important to note that it goes as far back as the late 18th century. By then it was born through the literary texts on the 'three-way trans-Atlantic trade'[95]. Which later on was coined 'the triangle of Pan-Africanism' (Geiss, 1969:187). What these literary texts on the 'three-way trans-Atlantic trade' written by then freed former 'slaves' (also referred to as the 'modern elites' back then) did was to breathe life into the conception of Pan-Africanism. What is more, Padmore and Nkrumah are touted with bringing Pan-Africanism back from the

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Furthermore, the five (5) groupings/categories also indicate the global appeal and importance Pan-Africanism held and still hold up to today – in Africa and the diaspora.

[94] What contributed to Pan-Africanism gaining momentum after the 2nd WW was due to the fact that the audience of Pan-Africanism grew. This growth in an audience was further assisted by the growing access Black people had to education, wanting a platform where they could articulate their political grievances and frustrations, as well as starting to enjoy the fruits of belonging to trade unions (Geiss, 1969:192; Seton-Watson, 1977:332).

[95] Also known as the 'Slave Trade', 'Triangular Trade', 'Triangle Trade', or 'the Atlantic Slave Trade'.

diaspora onto African soil[96]. Ergo, the goal then according to Geiss (1969:188) was to utilise Pan-Africanism into a tool used for "political agitation and action in the 20th century".

Bearing the above discussion in mind, it is thus not astounding that Mazrui (1995:35) established that Pan-Movements emerged as a result of 'nightmare and dream; anguish and vision'. Therefore, this indicates that there is a duality to Pan-Africanism[97]: That of ***'Liberation'*** – political emancipation; which was envisioned by the African diasporans and practised by the "First generation of African heirs of Pan-Africanism" as stated by Kasanda (2016:180-181) and the other duality of the branch being that of ***'Integration'*** (Mazrui, 1995:35; Martin, 2012:55).

Due to the above-mentioned facts, Pan-Africanism can therefore be viewed as a movement that came into being as a response to "white ['classical European'] imperialism and colonialism". Where one of the goals of the movement was to provide a platform for Black people across the globe where there would be an establishment of a "single nation and common destiny" with the aim of fighting off discrimination, exploitation, improving the lives of Black people and harnessing a sense of 'shared blackness'[98] (Geiss, 1967:720-1; Kasanda, 2016:193).

4.1.2.1 Concluding remarks to sub-section: On-going critique of Pan-Africanism

Even though Pan-Africanism achieved its first leg of the race, it does have its own inherent weaknesses, seeing how it has been lagging behind in its second leg of the race. It has encountered several problems – which are still ongoing: such as unending conflicts [military coups, incessant civil wars in countries such as Sudan, Central African Republic, and Mali, and outright terrorism]; failure in achieving the 'integration branch'[99]; encountering challenges in

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[96] Other Pan-Africanists worthy of note include Nnamdi Azikiwe (regarded as the Father of 'Nigerian Nationalism) from Nigeria, Hashtings Banda from Nyasaland (now known as Malawi), and Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya (Seton-Watson, 1977:322).

[97] ***Refer*** to 'Figure 14'.

[98] Also understood as 'race solidarity' or 'race consciousness'.

[99] According to Martin (2012:56 & 64), non-fulfilment of the 'integration branch' of Pan-Africanism (particularly during the first decade of the struggle for independence, and after independence was attained in many African countries in the 60s) was due to the ***1)*** 'Northern Border' problem left behind by former colonial powers; ***2)*** then African leaders unwilling to abandon their newly found positions of power in favour of a "broader political entity"; ***3)*** fear of Nkrumah turning himself into a political messiah [super president] of the African continent; ***4)*** untoward interference by then western 'superpowers' USA and France – diminishing any hopes of an integrated Africa; ***5)*** and applying Western solutions unto African problems – as indicated with the idea of a 'United States of Africa', modelled after the 'United States of America' idealism/structure.

developing Africa according to the general world standards of what constitutes a 'developed nation or continent'; balancing between modernisation whilst still battling to preserve what is authentic and unique to Africa and its people (languages, rituals, traditions, culture, etc.). To boot, there has been a bucket load of critique flying amongst Africans regarding balancing modernity vs Africanism. Parents are critiqued for speaking to their children only in English or French and discarding their native tongues. Even in the Pan-African Parliament in 2021 there has been disagreements pertaining to leadership, trusteeship issues, etc.

Currently on the African continent, Pan-Africanism is utilised as a means to address the problems that colonialism created and left behind. Former imperial governments created unnecessary territorial divisions [man-made borders] that have further divided Africa along the lines of social and cultural divisions (Henry 1959:446; Seton-Watson, 1977:339; Martin, 2012:64; Akokpari *et al*., 2013:305). This, naturally, is a further source of "poverty and dependency" and has inadvertently been feeding into the scourge of xenophobia that has been taking place across the African continent – especially since the 1960s[100]. Hence, the current goal of Pan-Africanism is to "create an overall African identity" that will help in unifying Africa and laying some of its problems to rest (Akokpari *et al*., 2013:305), as according to Mazrui (1995:35) the 'integration' branch of Pan-Africanism has not met its objectives – especially on the African continent. Mercifully, the 'liberation' branch of Pan-Africanism was successfully achieved (Mazrui, 1995:35).

Presently in Africa, Pan-Africanism is practised through the AU[101] (which is ironically identified as the leading advocate of Pan-Africanism) and its 17 main various institutions and programmes, such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), African Central Bank, the African Heads of State and Government summits, and 15-member Peace and Security Council (Kagwanja, 2006:38), alongside other organisations such as New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013:10).

However, what still remains relatively accurate about Pan-Africanism as observed by Henry (1959:446) and Geiss (1967:719) over half a century ago is that Pan-Africanism is still a 'complex

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[100] ***Refer*** to 'Table 2' – Chapter Three of study.

[101] Sadly, the critique that was levelled against the OAU has followed the AU. The critique is that just like the former OAU, the AU is constantly failing African states when it comes to successfully addressing issues such as conflicts [coups, civil wars, etc.] within African states and between African states; and promoting democracy adequately (Kagwanja, 2006:37-8). It therefore puts a question mark on the AU's vision of a successful Pan-African continent.

phenomenon', with each person attaching their own meaning to it according to their own understanding, background, and alternating worldviews they espouse to in their own private lives. Pursuing this point further, often it is not practised in a "uniformed or well disciplined" manner, as well as being identified to serve as a smokescreen used by some politicians to carry out their own ulterior motives (Henry, 1959:447) – hence, the critique being that Africa has gone from overcoming its twin evils of colonialism and racism, only for 'neo-colonialism' to take place post-independence (Seton-Watson, 1977:338; Kagwanja, 2006:37-8). Correspondingly, what also still remains true of Pan-Africanism up to date, is that it is still an 'active political force (Geiss, 1967:719)', and an ideology attached to individual and group identity, as well as belonging.

Below are Figures 13, 14 and 15. Figure 13 provides a general understanding and agreement of the concept of 'Pan-Africanism' in diagram form. Figure 14 illustrates the 'branches of duality' that make up Pan-Africanism. It can be noted that on the left side of the image the tree is lush, green, and thriving. This reveals to us that the 'liberation' branch of Pan-Africanism has achieved what it set out to achieve in terms of liberating its 'subjects' from the clutches of colonialism, white imperialism, and Apartheid. Contrariwise, the right side of tree is dull and lifeless. This depicts the other branch that Pan-Africanism must still achieve, such as a unified Africa where its nation-states and regions [Southern Africa; Central Africa East Africa; North/Arab Africa; West Africa] practise more regional [economic, cultural, political, and military] integration and stability successfully and are also free from evils such as civil war, insurgent groups, famine, xenophobia, *etc*. However, as lifeless as the branches seem to be on the right-hand side, there is hope that someday they will match their counterparts on the left-hand side.

Figure 15 further depicts how Pan-Africanism has various mechanisms to it – or is tied to a variety of components (such as being viewed through a functionalist or gradualist approach). In addition, Figures 13 and 14, alongside Figure 15, similarly caution against Pan-Africanism being viewed or understood through one lens. Even the Founders and 'Advocates/Followers' of Pan-Africanism had/have different interpretations and insights on Pan-Africanism (on what Pan-Africanism is, what its role was, and what its role ought to be in the modern-day world). Hence, Pan-Africanism has differing thoughts and applications of it – and Figures 13, 14 and 15 are representative of that belief.

Finally, before Figures 13, 14 and 15 are presented below, the study saw it fit to consolidate the Pan-Africanists mentioned throughout the study into a Table format {***see*** Table 4}. They appear in the order of 'first' appearance in the study.

Table 4: Notable Pan-Africanists *{as noted in the study}* Consolidated in Table Form

Pan-Africanist	**Country**
Joseph Booth	Nyasaland/Malawi
John Chilembwe	Nyasaland/Malawi
Kwame Nkrumah	Gold Coast/Ghana
Ali Mazrui	Kenya
Thabo Mbeki	South Africa
Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba	Kenya
Julius Nyerere	Tanganyika/Tanzania
Edward W. Blyden	America, Liberia
Ottbah Cugoano [***aka*** John Stuart]	Ghana, Great Britain
Gustavus Vassa [***aka*** Olaudah Equiano]	Nigeria, Great Britain, America
W.E.B. Du Bois	Ghana, America
George Padmore	Trinidad and Tobago
Marcus Garvey	Jamaica
Henry Sylvester Williams	Trinidad and Tobago
Nnamdi Azikiwe	Nigeria
Hastings Banda	Nyasaland/Malawi
Jomo Kenyatta	Kenya

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

Figure 13: Pan-Africanism



Source: Author's construct

(Tebele, 2024)

Figure 14: Pan-Africanism {The Branches of Duality}



Image of Tree: **Kindpng (2019)**

Source: **Mazrui (1995:35) & Kasanda (2016:180)**

Figure 14: **Author's construct Tebele (2024)**

Figure 15: Pan-Africanism: Further Explained[102]



[102] ***Refer*** to 'Footnote 93' on the discussion of the **'three (3) dimensions/facets of Pan Africanism' -** Figure 15 presents that discussion in diagram form.

4.1.3 Identity politics

Even though in Chapter Two (2) under the sub-section of ***'symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics'***, 'identity politics' [which forms part of 'identity theory'] was expounded upon to a certain extent; Chapter Four (4) takes into cognisance the importance of continuing with this thread from where Chapter Two (2) clocked out, particularly taking into cognisance that identity politics has been one of the rudimentary constant features throughout the study [especially as it has been established that identity politics has the aptness to be "utilised incredibly powerfully in the cause of violence due to identity politics' ability to pit one identity group against the other if the need arises" (Sen, 2008:14; Pletsch, 1999:202), making an entry as early on as Chapter One (1). Additionally, this study would like to point out that, as with any other subject, topic or term, there will always be substantial disagreement over what constitutes that particular subject, topic or term. Bearing the above-mentioned statement in mind, this study would like to make it clear that identity politics for the purposes of this study is understood in symbolic, economic, cultural, [social] psychological, and political terms.

This brings us to Bernstein (2005:47- 48) and Monroe *et al*. (2000:419) who articulate that 'identity politics' is a commonly used term across the Social Sciences and the Humanities realm with the aim to describe phenomena that range from "multiculturalism, ethnicity, gender, race, nationalism, groups mobilisation (*such as*: women's movements, civil rights groups, LGBTQIA+ movement, separatist movements, green politics movements, *etc*.) to electoral politics" (Pletsch, 1999:202). In addition, according to Alcoff and Mohanty (2006:7), identity politics is "neither positive nor negative" – nor can it be excluded from the narrative of psychology, as "identity politics is psychological in nature" (Bernstein, 2005:52; Monroe *et al*., 2000:419), thus, linking this statement to that of Mckaiser (2020) that "identity politics is sharply contested all over the globe". This can be witnessed in the way identity politics is dominantly featuring in political structures, in the "organisation of liberal movements today" as well as challenging existing societal arrangements (Alcoff & Mohanty, 2006:7; D'Cruz, 2008:ii; Leach *et al*., 2008:759). Mckaiser (2020) further cements the fact that identity [politics] is so important to a point that as a society or even as individuals we cannot deny its existence.

We are all tied to an identity or identities – "even if these identities are given at birth, socially constructed or imposed on us by society – either through political, economic or cultural forces" (Sánchez, 2006:35; Bernstein, 2005:50; Jazeel, 2009:165; Kasanda, 2016:192). No one is free of/from identities – whether our identities stem from "physical; cultural; culinary; phonetic and

other markers of difference"[103] as previously stated in Chapter Three (3); thus, indicating the role 'identity' plays in affecting 'political' behaviour (Monroe *et al*, 2000:419).

Furthermore, identity politics has created and provided a space and platform especially for minority and marginalised groups[104] to be heard and seen, as well as allowing for the re/claiming and affirming of their threatened identities, and rightly contesting for material resources and belonging within the arena of political life (Pletsch, 1999:202; D'Cruz, 2008:x; Leach *et al*., 2008:759; Jazeel, 2009:166). It showcases that identity politics is also there to play the role of the "recognition of hurt" which can come about because of "shared histories and stories of oppression" (Bernstein, 2005:50; Pletsch, 1999:202). Often it reveals the agony of non-belonging rather than a sense of collective identity – which ironically results in the formation of distinct social groups which often sway away from bearers of mainstream cultural identities. Below, identity politics is going to be discussed in relation to 'multiculturalism', 'the politics of class', and 'Africa' – the goal with regard to this ensuing section is that it can further guide the study in unearthing the different variables that constantly lead to the occurrences of xenophobic violence in South Africa.

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[103] An example of this will be how the Apartheid government in 1948 passed legislation that determined how South Africans would be divided into their own 'respective' race group categories. Physical features [such as one's skin colour, hair texture, nose size] and the notorious pencil test, as adjudicated by white state bureaucrats, determined whether you would be identified as Black, White, Coloured, or Indian (Mckaiser, 2020; Everatt, 2011:8). This example clearly indicates how identity politics is a "distinct political practice" (Bernstein, 2005:48). According to Leach *et al*. (2008:766) the statement above further indicates how identity politics seeped in ethnic identification creates the breeding ground for conflicts and violence – as further witnessed with former Nazi Germany and the genocide in Rwanda.

Another example of how no one is free of/from identities was when during the 2008 xenophobic attacks, your right to be spared from the attacks was determined by your ability to answer to the Zulu question of "yini le?!" – "what is this?!", asked while pointing to body parts (such as the elbow). The correct answer was required to be given in isiZulu. If you failed to do so, you were identified as non-belonging to South Africa – hence in these attacks, South Africans also became victims as not all South Africans are Zulu or Zulu speaking (Everatt, 2011:8). This scenario indicates the power of identity politics and also confirms that South Africans who are provocateurs or instigators of xenophobic violence use the criterion of ethno-linguistic differences in othering others.

[104] Such as noted with 'contemporary feminist identity politics'.

- **Identity politics and multiculturalism**[105]

Multiculturalism is a term that can be used to describe the demographics of a society (***e.g.*** Canada is a more multicultural society than the Comoros) (Bloemraad *et al*., 2008:160). In addition, multiculturalism is a [recent] pluralistic and intergroup ideology and "normative political theory" that can be practised by both the individual, various institutions and government (Bloemraad *et al*., 2008:160). Importantly, multiculturalism is a "positive evaluation and basic response to diversity" and speaks to group differences (such as the [acknowledgment, appreciation, and accommodation] of racial and ethnic differences – particularly of "minority group identities") that can exist and can be found within the body-politic of a nation state (Rios *et al*., 2018:226; Guimond *et al.,* 2014:146 & 150; Morrison, 2010:1648-9). Multiculturalism permits for the "multicultural approach" of a "dual-identity" (Guimond *et al.,* 2014:150), where an individual is free to be identified simultaneously as [for example] both American {nationality} and Afro-Latina/o {race + ethnicity}. To bring to a close the [broad] definition of 'multiculturalism', Guimond *et al.* (2014:151) state that multiculturalism can be viewed and understood through the following four (4) lenses, which is that multiculturalism can be used: ***(1)*** as a 'demographic description', ***(2)*** as a tool for government policy; ***(3)*** as an ideology; and lastly ***(4)*** as a 'normative political theory developed by political philosophers'. Likewise, in addition to Guimond *et al.'s* (2014:151) uses for multiculturalism, Morrison (2010:1648) states that multiculturalism can be used as a tool to work through some of the challenges that can stem from a "diverse society".

However, as much as multiculturalism can embody positive attributes such as contributing towards diversity, the opportunity to learn from each other, affording members of the dominant group the opportunity to develop a 'woke' mindset, and allowing diverse groups to coexist peacefully with each other, its very existence can unfortunately be viewed and treated as undesirable (Morrison, 2010:1649). As every so often, societies that were previously predominantly homogeneous (in terms of shared history, race, ethnicity, language, culture, and religion) can habitually view multiculturalism as a threat to the [core] existing 'social order' (Morrison, 2010:1648). Here it can be noted how national identification and the importance of one's nationality [belonging] to the self-concept is at play, as well as how "multiculturalism conflicts with assimilation".

For example, the dominant members of a nation-state might feel threatened by the traditions and customs from members of the out-group. As a consequence, instead of embracing

[105] This sub-section on 'identity-politics and multiculturalism' links with the theories of 'Realistic' group threat theory and power conflict theory', and ***'Symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics'.***

'multiculturalism' in their midst, a threat is felt towards the dominant groups' 'mainstream' culture – thus a feeling of threat to one's identity is introduced[106] – and the dire consequences of that are feelings and act/s of prejudice (Rios *et al.*, 2018:225-7). Additionally, according to Rios *et al.* (2018:231) and Morrison (2010:1648) the feelings and [acts] of prejudice will not only be directed towards members of the out-group [immigrants], but 'non-immigrant minority groups' will also feel and experience the negative side effects of the out-group members contributing towards multiculturalism in their existing communities. Equally, in this type of scenario, realistic and symbolic threats are triggered within the psyche of the members of the dominant group (Rios *et al*., 2018:227).

- **Identity politics and classism *(the politics of class)***

Pletsch (1999:197-9) states that classism emerged as a populist ideology – used to explain the "disparities in income and life opportunities", and principally driven by socialists, designed with the aim to "compete with nationalism". This was especially the case during the 19th century period when nationalism was beginning to gain momentum in the era of the French Revolution, and assisted citizens in making sense of the new social order (Pletsch, 1999:199–200), alongside philosophers such as Karl Marx using the "class struggle as an engine of social change" (Pletsch, 1999:200). For this reason, the discourse on class as a social theory enabled citizens in the shaping of their own worldview through the lens of social and economic status (Pletsch, 1999:199–200). Therefore, class is 'socially constructed' and 'all encompassing' (Langston, cited by Barone, 1999:10).

With Pletsch (1999:200) stating that 'class' as a conceptual tool formed an "important part of the language of social theory", consequently this allowed for the 'concept' of 'class' and 'class experience' to be successful as a means of 'identity' (Barone, 1999:10). Likewise, due to the likes of Marx, Weber and other 19th century social theorists, contemporary society cannot observe itself without critically engaging with the concept of 'class' (Pletsch, 1999:201). Nowadays, class speaks to the "disparities between the life chance of the elite and the less privileged" – as well as the gap that keeps on increasing between the rich and the poor with regard to equal access to material wealth and better life chances (Pletsch, 1999:201). Therefore, the link between identity politics and the politics of class is that, according to Pletsch (1999:201), identity politics is simply

[106] According to Morrison (2010:1649) the feeling of 'threat' can be valid, as sometimes multiculturalism does challenge members of the dominant group to "relinquish some of their core values" in order to accommodate and preserve some of the core values the new members of society bring into their newly found political roof.

utilised as another tool in redressing the inequalities in life chances (standard of living) between the classes and does so consciously.

- **Identity politics and Africa**

According to Oloruntoba (2018:9 & 11) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga (2013:3), Africa still struggles with its own identity post-independence due to the legacy of colonialism, its imposed 'artificial' borders, and "post-colonial debacle of statism and dictatorial leadership" (Bongmba, 2004:295). Bongmba (2004:295) further states that the elements as mentioned above have "shaped, battered, and inhibited" the identity of African people, and as a result, Africans are attempting to reclaim their distorted identity. Additionally, Oloruntoba (2018:10) and Bongmba (2004;295) both articulate the view that Africa's crises of identity has been "reinforced by self-hate and subsequent xenophobic (Afrophobic) attacks". It is noted that Africa's identity crisis is rooted in "tribalism (linked to pre-colonial ethnic divisions), linguistics[107], even 'the whims of modernity', class domination (classism), and political intolerance of Africans against Africans". In this confliction of the 'politics of African Identity', Bongmba (2004;295) states that Mbeki's idea of the African Renaissance and his 'I am African speech' has tried to renew and recover Africa's [lost] identity.

Above all and in closing this sub-section, the study would like to emphasise that regardless of the different identities out there, at the end of the day identities are fluid; intersectional and an ongoing process – susceptible to change.

[107] *Refer* to Footnote 101.

Figure 16: Identity Politics

IDENTITY POLITICS:

Consists of a Cluster of:

1. **Multiculturalism (tied to *Pluralism & intergroup ideology*, *normative political theory*, and *social psychology*)**
2. **Distinctive Political Practice**
3. **Exclusive Political Alliances**
4. **Political Activism (*relates to addressing disparities that arise due to material inequalities*)**
5. **Cultural Activism**
6. **Psychology {*Social and Political Psychology*}**

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

4.1.4 Politics of survival

As mentioned in the opening chapter, the goal of this current chapter is to provide a conceptual theoretical framework that will further abet this study in examining and understanding how and why the politics of survival feature in the re/occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. Simply, because one of the main reasons the study has chosen to explore the subject matter of 'politics of survival', it is because the study has recognised a severe gap in the literature. Most studies on xenophobia recognise important elements such as 'identity politics', 'economic deprivation' and 'symbolic threat theory' as key ingredients or contributors to understanding and explaining the phenomenon of xenophobia. However, given that the spotlight has not been cast or afforded on the subject matter of 'politics of survival' (also recognised as 'limited politics' in this study), this sub-section of the study wishes to rectify this in the hope of unravelling something quintessential. It might lead to an increase in/contribution in/of knowledge on the phenomenon under study and can thus assist in developing and contributing something new to the body of knowledge and filling a substantial gap in the existing literature.

If one looks at the discussions thus far in the study, especially looking at Chapters Two and Three, the common thread tying these chapters together is on the shared theme of 'survival'. From looking at the theories, and how they are fundamentally about survival – *i.e*. survival of the nation-state whereby citizens have shared fears that they will be crowded out by migrants, particularly migrants coming from neighbouring and war-torn countries, as seen in many instances with South Africa, the UK, France and USA (New South Institute, 2024). Survival of culture relates back to the 'symbolic threat theory where the fear is that too many foreigners will dilute the existing culture and way of life, survival of employment (this will often relate to a country that has been experiencing slow or negative growth in the economy and there is a projected economic downturn. In addition, migrants are viewed as a threat or hindrance to accessing of work opportunities for the locals and are seen as direct competition for those types of work opportunities.

Everything boils down to the survival of the individual. Under this synopsis, relative deprivation emerges which has ties to subjectivity and features quite acutely under the topic of discussion. In this regard, many elements come out to play: such as the lack of access to basic human rights (right to life, dignity, food, shelter, education, safety, etc.). Therefore, when conditions are deemed to be unbearable – whether because of political strife, environmental factors such as floods and droughts due to the effects of climate change and global warming, it unfortunately leads to migration patterns emerging like the world is currently seeing with the migration crises occurring in Sudan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ukraine, Lebanon, Palestine and many other countries across the globe. Therefore, people flee conditions deemed to be unbearable in search of

‘greener pastures’. Unfortunately, when many migrants arrive at their new locations that they deemed to be much better than their origins, more often than not they are met with distaste. An example will be like what the Sudanese are experiencing in Ethiopia, Kenya and even Egypt. Therefore, when looking at xenophobia from a different perspective, which is the politics of survival, it shows people committing heinous acts in order to keep what they consider to be important and even sacred to them. This of course arises from a variety of factors; the battle for resources, since with the accumulation of people one will find that resources are diminishing. This brings about questions such as: ‘Who deserves access to these resources?’ Is it those that came ‘first’ or ‘last’? It then leads to other questions such as: ‘Who is the original inhabitant?’ ‘What rights come along with being the original inhabitant?’ These questions highlight one of the regrettable factors relating to politics of survival, which is that scarcity makes something latent visible.

This means that the unfortunate thing with politics of survival is that it creates divisions and even crystalises divisions. By way of further illustration, in Chapter Two under the discussion of “Ethnic (ethnocentrism) xenophobia” it is mentioned that “after immigration has taken place, the occurrence of inter-ethnic relations generally takes on the following steps: ‘***avoidance, conflict, and accommodation***’”. However, if one looks at the South African case, or even other parts of the world such as Germany, that is not the premise. In South Africa’s case, the steps look more like a Ferris wheel or hamster wheel as they go round and round, and sometimes even up and down. To explain the analogy further, in terms of xenophobia, ‘avoidance’ and ‘accommodation’ in the South African case has never been the problem. However, in the case of ‘inter-ethnic relations’, the steps are repeatedly disrupted by ‘conflict’. The flare-ups of conflicts are a result ‘of the politics of survival’ coming out to play. This is of course due to a broader context of political and economic struggles for power and access. And when that arises, a scapegoat has to emerge.

Pursuing this further, the last point mentioned above indicates how central the ‘scapegoating theory’ is at the heart of the study as it is able to explain ‘politics of survival’, which ergo explains the phenomenon of xenophobia within the South African geo-political space. As established throughout the study (Chapters 1-6), scapegoating features at the heart of xenophobia. To allude further to this, scapegoating is used as a tool in the politics of survival. When natives are struggling to make ends meets, foreigners are to blame. When politicians are failing the electorate, they turn the blame on foreigners who will take the fall, and in the process assisting them to see another day in office. When local men fail in securing relationships with local women, once again foreigners are the ones to take the fall. The above examples illustrate that at the centre of scapegoating is the desire to survive and be able to save one’s own face.

The forthcoming subsection will address the following question as set out in the introductory chapter: “What is the cause of xenophobia [mainly] in South African townships if official rhetoric is openness towards Africa?” This subsection will optimistically bring the study closer in understanding xenophobia as a phenomenon that has taken root in many parts of South Africa.

4.1.5 The contradictions of the ideology of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism as exemplified in the African Renaissance: The South African case

According to Durkheim (1997) and Hook & Harris (2000), the injustices of the past that characterised the Apartheid era were carried into the new democratic dispensation – albeit in a new form. The only difference is that the face of the ‘scapegoat’ changed, thus the perpetrator donning a new face. Durkheim (1997) and Hook & Harris (2000) further state that when that happened in the new South African democratic dispensation, it wiped away the illusion of the “Rainbow Nation”, thus, threatening the Rainbow Nation’s ideology of the African Renaissance. This was seen as particularly disappointing as the African Renaissance was imagined as an ideology that was to lead to regional and international ‘integration’.

There is critique, though, that South Africa’s imagined practice of the African Renaissance rather turned into “South African nationalism with the goal of attempting to realise South Africa’s ambition for continental leadership instead of Pan-Africanism” (Kagwanja, 2006:40), thereby doing away with “regional identity and exacerbating tensions caused by nationalistic identities”. This could be witnessed in the way South Africa rejected the idea posited by the SADC to “eliminate all internal borders between SADC member states” (Akokpari, *et al*., 2013:320). It is argued that the stance South Africa has taken in the past and still takes with regard to issues of borders [or border control][108], among other things, closely reflects on South Africa’s unwillingness to advance regional identity and ‘integration’, but rather reflects its stance of advancing its own national identity and interests (Akokpari, *et al*., 2013:320). The above statement attests to South Africa’s failure/unwillingness to advance the ‘integration’ branch of Pan-Africanism.

Notably, however, often at times in matters pertaining to regional [AU, SADC] integration, free trade within regional affiliations, South Africa seeks its own terms, *i.e.,* as seen with current SA

[108] This being witnessed recently, when the Minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Motsoaledi, announced the reinstating of ‘transit visas’ for people passing through the country (South Africa), en route to its neighbouring countries. Aaron Motsoaledi stated that the reinstating of the transit visa rules, which were discontinued in 2015, was done in order to curb illegal activities and illegal immigrants from entering South Africa (eNCA, 2022; Shuma, 2022).

President Cyril Ramaphosa seeking and strengthening bi-lateral relations with neighbouring countries Mozambique, Botswana and the Kingdom of Lesotho. Naturally, those 'friendly' bilateral relations are sought with South Africa's interests in mind, such as how trade relations can be improved and managed, and also how those nations can assist South Africa with regard to its ongoing energy crisis and water problems (SAnews, 2022; The Presidency, 2022; SABC News, 2022).

This suggests that the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa is a political and 'socio-psychological anomie' that goes against the grain of what the 'Rainbow Nation' stands for (Ejoke & Ani, 2017:165). However, this is not shocking as Mazrui (1995:35) once observed that "Africans are better at uniting for freedom than at uniting for development."[109] Hence, the main critique against Pan-Africanism is that it had promised the results of an integrated continent that would lead to the "economic, psychological and mental decolonisation of the continent" (Oloruntoba, 2018:9). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that South Africa (especially its populace) is struggling and failing to uphold the values of Pan-Africanism[110], where on several platforms South Africans have conveyed that they view the practice of Pan-Africanism on South African soil as an ideology that "oppresses, takes away and hurts South Africans" (Dratwa, 2023:10). Hence, South Africans are asking out loud the pressing question of "why should Africa unite in [our] country (Dratwa, 2023:9)?" Withal, we are further seeing the contradiction of the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism, especially in the current ruling party (ANC) of South Africa.

However, in closing this sub-section, the study urges the reader to also consider the other side of the coin with relation to the current sub-heading under discussion by considering the important statement uttered by Kasanda (2016:183) when he observed that "Pan-Africanism is not a homogenous trend of thought relying on the unanimity of its members". Perhaps the argument the study is trying to evoke in this case is that even though critique has been levelled against South Africa's own undertaking of the African Renaissance, the question the study puts to the

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[109] *See* 'Figure 14'.

[110] Observation: The study would like the reader to note that often at times ideologies are frequently utilised by the political elites to garner support from the general public. However, more frequently than not, ideologies such as Pan-Africanism do not translate well when it comes to the realities with which the general populace grabbles. When elements such as basic needs are not met or provided for, people are not going to seek ideologies such as the 'African Renaissance' for assistance with their problems. They will often act opposite to that in order for the government to meet their needs. In government meeting people's needs, ideologies such as Pan-Africanism can be fully utilised.

reader is what ought to be the right process or action in marrying the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism as is exemplified in the African Renaissance in the South African case, when reality indicates that many African states whose political systems are still predatory and persecutory in nature[111] are still struggling with upholding the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and failing to use that as a footprint to better the lives of their own people, thus in hindsight reducing the number of foreigners in South Africa. On the other hand, Okhonmina (2023:29) states that solutions can be found "around economic interdependence and regional power leadership" on the African continent.

4.1.6 Concluding remarks to Chapter Four (4)

From the outset of the study as indicated in its opening chapter, it was apparent that there was a clear contradiction between the reality of xenophobia and existing government ideology in South Africa. It led the study to arrive at the following question: "What is the cause of xenophobia [mainly] in South African townships if official rhetoric is openness towards Africa? To answer this question, Chapter Four then became one of the dedicated chapters to undergo the process of yielding some answers to this pertinent question, particularly as literature indicates that South Africa is failing at upholding the values of the African Renaissance and Pan Africanism as outlined by the then ruling party of the ANC[112].

In order to address this question, the study deemed it fit to start the discussion by eloquently laying the theoretical foundation in the hope of unearthing the answer to the question that was put in Chapter One. To do that, Chapter Four opened with a definition of 'nationalism', and how all the forms of 'nationalism', *i.e.* African nationalism and Pan Africanism, are birthed from the concept of nationalism. The discussion then highlighted the importance of statehood, since statehood is tied to important elements such as identity (national identification, kinship to one's land), and legitimacy. The discussion on nationalism opened the gateway to the discussion on Pan-Africanism, as Pan-Africanism is one of the ideologies in which the study is grounded. In order to answer the above question as stipulated in Chapter One, it was important for the study to provide a theoretical background to the ideology of Pan-Africanism. The important take-away from this discussion was that Pan-Africanism initially had two core goals: to achieve liberation and

[111] *Refer* to 'Political upheaval and economic mismanagement from home-states of immigrants: Macro factors – *see* pg. 73 of Chapter 3.

[112] Since the outcome of the 2024 general elections that took place on 29 May 2024, the ANC which has been the governing party of South Africa has now entered a government of national unity (GNU).

unity across the African continent. However, only one facet of the goal was achieved, which was that of liberation.

Even up to the present time, Africa as a continent still grapples with unity across the continent. A significant number of African countries such as Sudan, Mali and Burkina Faso are currently under military rule, thus showing that unity across Africa is becoming a non-viable option. It facilitates the study to understand why the occurrence of xenophobia is not in accordance with the values for which Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism stand. As noted under the subsection, *'The contradiction of the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism as exemplified in the African Renaissance: The South African case',* as much as there have been discussions between different nation-states that belong to the same inter-governmental organisation such as SADC about opening borders and allowing for the 'free movement' of people, at the end of the day individual member states always choose what is in their best interest.

Such is the case with South Africa. This discussion also brings us to the importance of identity politics and the politics of survival. Identity plays a quintessential role in deciding who one wants in their circle. The same goes for nation-states. Therefore, from what has been discussed, it is no surprise that xenophobia is a particularly worrying feature across South Africa, even if official rhetoric is openness towards Africa. This of course ties back to the politics of survival, and how those that struggle to meet their everyday essential needs will not have the space or time to accommodate outsiders who also lack the same basics.

Figure 16 below provides a synopsis of the current chapter. Figure 16 shows that xenophobia links and correlates to nationalism, particularly because nationalism has been used as a tool whereby "individuals and groups start to classify as nationalists and nation-states start partaking in the development and implementation of hostile policies that can be used to ward off foreigners they do not want on their terrain". Here we see how nationalism leads to the creation of identity politics, which further feeds the scourge of xenophobia. This then becomes a never-ending cycle, as indicated with the analogy of the Ferris wheel.

Chapter Four (4) presented in Diagram Format

Figure 17:

Succinctly put:



Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

CHAPTER 5 APPLICATION OF THE SIX (6) CHOSEN THEORIES OF XENOPHOBIA

5.1 Introduction: Application of the six (6) chosen theories of xenophobia to the South African case

Chapter Five serves a fundamental role in the study in that it is the analysis chapter of the thesis. It will apply the six chosen theories of xenophobia that were initially introduced in Chapter One and richly expanded on in Chapter Two. The overall goal of the study is to understand the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa, and why xenophobia manifests itself in the way it does within the borders of South Africa, particularly taking into consideration that xenophobic behaviour differs from country to country, and even from region to region.

In this salient chapter of the study, the six chosen theories of xenophobia will be applied to the South African case. It will be important to note how different factors, such as public perceptions (which relate to the group threat and power-conflict theory; and the relative deprivation theory), locals blaming foreigners for their unemployment status (poverty and the resource competition theory) and political and media influences/discourses (frustration with government and the scapegoating theory), play an optimal role in recurring spells of xenophobic violence and other xenophobic tendencies (symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics).

The study foresees that the application of these theories will beyond doubt shed further light and link the current chapter to the 'problem statement' and 'central theoretical statement' as expounded in the introductory chapter. What is more important (and another core reason for undertaking this study), is to contribute to the body of knowledge in the discipline of Political Science with reference to the sub-field of migration studies.

The study views the ensuing analysis as particularly important as the study thus far has already indicated and determined that xenophobia in South Africa does not occur in a vacuum. It can rather be traced along the three distinct lines of race (Black and Asian), the economic factor (classism, poverty, and employment status/availability), and nationality (African and Asian nationalities)[113]. This all links back to the politics of difference as expounded on in Chapter Two and at length in Chapter Four. It feeds further into the worldview that foreigners are the "destroyers and unravellers of a tightly woven social fabric that many communities have built and preserved

[113] ***See*** Figure 2 (Chapter Two) and importantly Figure 11 (Chapter Three).

for eons of years (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001:649)" within their own localities, and most importantly, the nation-state where they find themselves currently located.

5.1.1 Application of theories to the South African case

5.1.1.1 Economic threat theory (and resource competition)

The theoretical discussion on the 'economic threat theory' in Chapter Two of the study observed that: "competition for limited resources between the in-group and out-group often leads to the perceived impact of immigration on crime, schools, and welfare programmes where [economic] migrants are perceived to piggyback off on the welfare state". This statement is indeed applicable to the South African case as there are rising and growing concerns amongst South Africans. Complaints have emerged detailing foreigners (particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans) as filling up South African hospitals[114] and schools – thus making it difficult for South Africans to access primary services such as health and education for their kids (News Central TV, 2022). As a result, citizens complain that the general quality of social welfare in South Africa has dropped, is compromised and under severe duress due to 'many' foreigners making use of government resources that should only be serving the citizen-politic and particularly the noticeable South African taxpayer.

These sentiments are echoed by prominent South African politicians. A case in point was when the then Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of Health in Limpopo, Dr Phophi Ramathuba, in August 2022 was vocal about who should first be assisted in public institutions such as hospitals and clinics (News Central TV, 2022). Her strong stance on this matter was viewed as extremely xenophobic and dehumanising, whilst some viewed it as her having the interests of South Africans at heart and that it was within her right to address the increasing influx of particularly illegal patients (who happen to come from several neighbouring countries) into South Africa.

There are also complaints that foreigners in South Africa take up all the menial labour work – especially gardenwork, housework, and nowadays construction work too. This can be witnessed through the many developers and contractors in the sector of construction that are hiring foreign help/builders over South Africans. This issue also speaks to the asymmetrical economic power at

[114] In a study conducted by Munyewende and colleagues it was ascertained in several interviews where the subjects under study were Zimbabwean women who stated that they came to South Africa to access health-care services as it was much easier to access such services in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. However, it was also highlighted during the interviews that there were always pending issues of "financial constraints, confusion about eligibility for treatment, and negative attitude from the health care practitioners" (Mutanda, 2022:343).

play. Conversely, in this scenario and specific theory applying to the SA case, it is evident that threat perception plays a mammoth role, such as in terms of ‘who is also a threat to me?’ ‘Who do I have to compete with to gain a slice of the pie when most of it has already been distributed to others?’.

The frustration arises not only because of the limited resources that have to be shared with other downtrodden citizens, but the fact that those limited opportunities have to be shared with people who are not native to the land. In consequence, circling back to the discussion on the ‘economic threat theory’, one of the facts given is that competition also arises among the “economically vulnerable group who shares the same socio-economic position”. Likewise, an individual’s economic circumstances can contribute to the outward perspective they might have on an immigrant group – which can lead to malign feelings. This cannot be truer for the South African case. Sadly, in this theory, taking into account the lack of economic opportunities in the country (especially for those who are considered to be youth, and the large previously disadvantaged South African populace), immigration in this context is seen as harmful. Previous studies even show that the majority of black people in SA view ‘immigration’ as one of their top 10 fears (Gordon, 2016:557). This competition for resources has led to conflict and constant feelings of deprivation, angst, feelings of under-achievement and hopelessness, which is worsened by the constantly shrinking economy of the country.

In conclusion, if one were to re-visit the hypothesis made in Chapter One, Table 1, the hypothesis does hold true. Yes, ‘economic deterioration’, ‘competition for jobs’, and ‘lack of basic services’ are all salient and recurring factors that make the ‘resource competition’ theory a valid theory for explaining and understanding why xenophobia manifests itself in the way it does on South African soil.

5.1.1.2 Poverty theory

Unfortunately, even though major positive transformations have taken place since 1994, Abdi (2011:694) states that “the physical and material insecurity of the majority of the population has actually worsened since 1994” due to the country’s plummeting economy and uneven development experienced. This is due to a number of reasons, such as the looting of state coffers and an unsteady global market. Given the high levels of poverty in South Africa, it is not surprising that many impoverished South Africans deem foreigners (especially foreigners who share the same physical space as them) as threats, and this has further led to feelings of relative and economic deprivation. To give context to these feelings of animosity arising from members of the in-group towards the out-group members, as of October 2023, according to Statista (2023), 18.2 million people in South Africa were living in abject poverty (and this number is expected to

increase yearly, with guesstimates indicating that by 2030 an average of 19.1 million people will be living in abject poverty in South Africa). Considering the aforementioned data, this reveals that the bulk of the population living in South Africa survive on less than 1.90 U.S. dollars per day. This is problematic. Abdi (2011:698) drew the inference that it is not shocking that migrants who are competing for the same bread ticket as [poor] South Africans [especially those who reside in economically vulnerable communities] are exposed to some of the harsh conditions and realities experienced by the locals who also cannot escape most of the structural violence plaguing the country, which has been inherited from the previous pre-democracy administration.

Abdi (2011:698) goes on to state that "violence against migrants is part and parcel of an accepted and generalised violence that is disproportionately afflicting poor black South Africans in informal settlements and in some areas of townships". This behaviour is not surprising, as noted in Chapter Two, "poverty and inequality can be the root cause of violence and lack of peace (Sen, 2008:7), thus breeding "intolerance, anger, and fury". Notably, South Africa is exemplary of this behaviour, thus attesting its suitability to the 'poverty theory' to also best explain why xenophobia manifests itself the way it does on South African soil.

Concludingly, looking at the numbers, alongside the back-up of literature, this indicates that poverty is one of the key contributors to xenophobia worldwide. When applying this framework to the South African case study, especially with the jarring numbers predicted for the future, xenophobia will remain a prevalent thorn on the South African geographical landscape. The anticipated rampant increase of poverty in the next two decades implies that the constant crimes, antagonism, and attacks against foreigners who own spaza shops in marginalised communities in South Africa, will continue for the foreseeable future, whether out of [literal] hunger, anger, frustration, unspent angst, and energy from unemployed youth who do not know where to find a positive outlet at which they can direct their unspent energy.

5.1.1.3 Relative deprivation

South Africa features within the relative deprivation theory as a social psychological concept because there is indeed a gap between reality and expectations, between the 'ought' and 'is', which eventually generates feelings of resentment and an awareness of injustice. Consequently, [legitimate] expectations generally created by the gap between reality and aspiration, and by the government too, tend to lead to feelings of entitlement and deservingness, often resulting in resentment, anger, dissatisfaction, and frustration as the government continuously fails to deliver on many important aspects of society. It ranges from the issue of land reform (land [re]distribution), providing schools with decent sanitation (and even textbooks), free tertiary education, to failure to create employment for a burgeoning youth. The latter are in many respects

eager, adequately skilled and qualified to enter the job market across the various sectors in the country (whether within the primary sector, secondary, tertiary, and even the quaternary sector). It showcases that the current government is dismally failing in implementing and reaching the 'socialisation process', as seen with ***Figure 10*** in Chapter Three.

Likewise, even though during the Apartheid era, relative deprivation was always a chokehold felt and experienced by people of colour when they compared their dim circumstances (either in terms of human rights issues or violations, material wealth, access to basic services such as education, health care, recreational facilities) as compared to their white counterparts, it has become even more of an issue post-democracy. This is especially so with the high numbers of African foreigners settling in many parts of South Africa and who are doing seemingly better than their black counterparts. This has led many Black South Africans who find themselves in particularly impoverished circumstances to become more than ever aware and conscious of their deprivation (Gordon, 2018:249). Consequently, it fuels the negative self-schemata that many black people are grappling with due to dire circumstances such as poverty and economic deprivation. This has further led to frustration with economic deprivation and sensing the inequality between the haves and have-nots of the country even more acutely. A perfect illustration of this is the scenario that was painted in Chapter Three where it was stated that often ***"feelings of threat, frustration, and relative deprivation will arise with the presence of foreign [men] who allegedly are seemingly to be doing much better than the local Black men in areas where they feel they should be taking ownership or be in charge"***. This can pertain to foreigners running successful Spaza shops and general stores in the townships, rural areas, and CBDs as a result of the strength of their social network, which guarantees them competitive pricing, making it possible to offer a range of goods to their patrons (Liedeman, 2013).

Pursuing the above discussion, interestingly enough, South Africa features within Runciman's (1966:10) theory of 'fraternal relative deprivation'. In many cases of xenophobia, or considering how natives feel about foreigners, there always hangs in the air an unfavourable comparison between the two social groups – South Africans vs African and Asian foreigners, OR foreigners who are succeeding against all odds vs natives who cannot scramble anything to make a living; and individuals who belong to the ingroup who outwardly state that their social group is deprived and relatively disadvantaged. This can be perfectly viewed in interviews conducted by members of 'Operation Dudula' as witnessed through a documentary produced by BBC Africa (BBC Africa, 2023). Here we can observe how the theory assists us in diagnosing that feelings of relative deprivation, generated by the presence of members of the outgroup, succeed in individuals who belong to the ingroup forming a much deeper connection between themselves and members of

the ingroup because of shared feelings such as anger, and hatred emanating from their outlook on the members of the outgroup who share their surrounds and even scarce resources.

To conclude, feelings of relative deprivation run deep in South Africa. It is assisted by the comparison South Africans have with African and Asian foreigners, such as viewing foreigners to be doing much better than them, are more successful than them at almost everything (businesswise, pinpointing and grabbing opportunities, even getting 'on' with the ladies), and have a strong sense of identity. They work well amongst each other and provide each other with the necessary support systems. In the end, they succeed in securing and solidifying their social capital and standing in South Africa (especially the economy, and some would even further argue and say the underbelly of the criminal world too). All in all, the discussion on 'relative deprivation theory' through the lens of social psychology cements the fact that "feelings of relative deprivation stem from a group setting, which are usually characterised by 'outgroup/immigrant prejudice' (Smith *et al*., 2012:204; Harris *et al.,* 2018:229)". It further assists in shaping emotion, cognition, and behaviour. This statement cannot be truer for the South African case, making it a salient theory in understanding the phenomena of xenophobia.

5.1.1.4 Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating

South Africa's ascent to democracy had the international community and many South Africans hopeful (especially the majority black population who were mostly previously marginalised) about the fruits democracy promised to bear. Unfortunately, according to Gordon (2018:249), the new democratic dispensation has revealed the "unequal distribution of resources and wealth" in the country, further highlighting the exponentially growing gap between the poor and the wealthy. The country is still divided along the distinct lines of race, with a few black [political] elites featuring within the 'wealthy people' sub-group with the help of policies such as Affirmative Action (AA), Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and what is infamously dubbed as tenderpreneurship. In the same breath, the jarring unequal distribution of resources sadly has led to a large population of South Africans feeling angry and frustrated, and ultimately these feelings have generated an aggressive outlook on life. Unfortunately, this has led to a search for a scapegoat. Evidence in the literature consulted for the study indicates that violence against foreign nationals is organised and led by [local] groups (such as Operation Dudula), and by individuals who use popular frustration as a means of mobilising people to commit violence. It highlights that the vulnerability and powerlessness of foreigners do not matter in the search for a scapegoat. There is no display of compassion, injustice, or solidarity with those being exploited (Dratwa, 2023:16). This has led the study to probe what brings about such strong feelings of frustration and aggression, particularly among the majority black population. As the foundation has been laid in the previous

four chapters, it is evident that these feelings of frustration and the need for a scapegoat stem from unfulfilled promises, socio-economic expectations, and underdevelopment, which are linked to historical reality and ineffectual post-apartheid leadership as well as poor governance, which are all cause for frustration (Warner *et al*. 2003:41; Dodson, 2010:7; Kangwa, 2016:535; Kaziboni *et al*., 2022:4).

Pursuing this discussion, Adepoju (2005) maintains that immigrants in South Africa become the targets of attacks and hostility from the local population and are blamed for any and every economic, social, and political problem. We can further tie this discussion to what is discussed under 'vigilantism' in Chapter Three of the study. Vigilantism, corrective justice, or whichever jargon or term is preferred, actually guises the scapegoating that politicians and angry xenophobic South Africans have perfected. Violence is guised as vigilantism and self-administered justice (Misago *et al.,* 2010:10), exacerbated by an "impoverished township life" which also suffices to explain scapegoating (Heribert & Moodley, cited by Akinola, 2018:59).

In addition, according to Heribert and Moodley (cited by Akinola, 2018:59) the perception of foreigners "swamping, flooding, drowning, polluting a nation, introducing diseases, peddling drugs, defrauding the locals and seducing women conjures up the threat of strangers lurking to invade and undermine a virtuous people – an age-old tactic to construct an enemy". Besides, it is interesting to note that somehow South Africans do 'use' scapegoats (mostly African and Asians foreigners) for what one can term, 'special occasions', particularly because "the agent/cause of frustration is normally too powerful to be confronted (Soyombo, 2008:89 & 99)", which typically is the government. South Africans on the other hand also make use of scapegoats as a way to garner the attention of the government. The violent xenophobic behaviour that breaks out during xenophobic attacks (on special occasions) draws national and international media attention and forces politicians out of their hiding holes. Nevertheless, contradictorily, the same politicians turn around and place the blame for the dysfunction they contribute in running the country on innocent African and Asian migrants.

Overall, the study also deduces that perhaps why South Africans are not selecting people of European descent as scapegoats, as Matsinhe (2011:295) suggested and written at length in Chapter Three (3), is because South Africans are indeed phobogenic and Afrophobic unto themselves. They do not realise that they share a joint fate with the scapegoats, that they fall under the same social strata and share the same enemy, which is a government or a political system that has deeply failed them. This echoes Wilson and Magam's (2018:93) observation that frustration-aggression explains afrophobia.

Continuing the thread above, as discussed at length in Chapter Two, one of the criticisms of the theory is that ***"one scapegoat is enough and that his punishment readily brings a closure to the brief period of distress"*** (Allport, 1954:259). The point Allport (1954:259) makes is applicable to the South African case study (ergo scapegoats are only needed on 'special occasions'). South Africans normally make use of African and Asian immigrants as scapegoats, but only for a short period of time. Normally, when xenophobic attacks do break out in South Africa, it is due to a ***trigger.*** It can be a consequence of a poorly performing economy, or it is a Nigerian found harbouring victims of human trafficking at their place in Hillbrow or Yeoville, or has been caught in their yard with a laboratory for making drugs, or his business has been ransacked by the police and counterfeit goods have been found (The Citizen, 2022).

In summation of this theory, public frustration with government; poor service delivery; state failure; and corruption all lead to scapegoating. Violence and crime are seen as something that was imported into South Africa by foreigners. Foreigners are blamed for taking and occupying 'free' [social] housing meant for locals, whilst the locals have to take out house bonds/loans or continue living in shelters that are not safe or temporary in nature, such as shacks, or someone's 'backroom'. Even if in certain moments or in retrospect this perception does carry an element of truth, it is not the entirety of the truth, such that as foreigners are seen as 'roaming free' and having more rights than locals. Sadly, many foreigners always feel on edge when they go out in public. Some even state that they will not go out alone in public, only if they are in a group. In a nutshell, experiences of micro-aggression amongst African and Asian migrants have become the norm for them.

Also, before concluding, an imperative point to make is that citizens feel ignored by the government. Questions that have arisen during fieldwork[115] that has taken place since 1994 are, why is government going out of its way to assist foreigners when South Africans themselves are struggling, such as providing food security, shelter, etc., when many South Africans go to bed hungry. This leads to jealousy, anger, and frustration where citizens feel unnoticed, and that their pleas and feelings are being disregarded by a government that is supposed to have their best interests at heart.

To draw to a close, let us look back at the example of the MEC of Health in Limpopo. In a video shown across traditional and new media, we can see how the patient lying on the hospital bed is being used as a scapegoat by the MEC. The patient is blamed for taking away the limited

[115] For instance, fieldwork conducted by Crush and Ramachandran (2010) Warner *et al*., (2003).

resources of that province. In the same breath, with cameras present, MEC Phophi Ramathuba makes use of this opportunity to deliver a message to the neighbouring countries, namely, “I can only look after what is mine. Yours which is illegal I do not have the resources to stretch and accommodate. My department is already struggling as it is”.

Figure 3.1 below is an extension of Figure 3 as noted with its application in Chapter Three. Figure 3.1 aims to apply the theory of the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory to the South African case. It explains the three stages that result in scapegoating. In the case of South Africa, feelings of frustration are usually instigated by the dire economic and social circumstances, whereby the government is failing in keeping its end of the bargain. This is followed by the frustration turning into aggression. It is in this stage that setting alight of foreigners and looting of businesses owned by African and Asian migrants take place. Then comes the third stage where political elites and anti-immigrant groups use migrants (scapegoats) as their stooges to explain their violent behaviour and prejudice they hold against them.

Figure 3.1: Application of the frustration-aggression (scapegoating) theory applied to the South African case



Source: Author’s construct (Tebele, 2024)

5.1.1.5 Realistic group conflict threat and power theory

In South Africa there is a strong feeling and sense of the 'realistic group and conflict threat' theory that occurs both on individual and group level. Citizens feel that immigrants are a threat to their ability to secure a livelihood, amongst other variables, and that they aggravate the economic hardship that is rife in many areas across the country. South Africans also feel strongly that they fought Apartheid, and the generation before them also did. Then the question that arises is, "why should foreigners be the ones who reap the fruits of [our] hard-fought democracy?" Of course, with many South Africans pursuing this narrative, they might ask themselves why is it that South Africans are not acknowledging the role that many African countries played in assisting South Africa in securing its democracy and defeating the evil that was Apartheid? The truth is that when poverty and inequality are rife in one's community and country, spurred on by a poorly performing economy and a corrupt government, it brings about feelings of relative deprivation and frustration. Then the psyche does not make space or time to acknowledge those who have now become the 'object' of their frustration.

Feelings of realistic group threat amongst South Africans arise because they believe that the little bit of advantaged social position they hold (perceived or real) is being challenged by the members of the outgroup that share the same locality as they do. What spurs on these feelings of threat and conflict is that members of the in-group feel a keen sense of their already declining quality of life, power, and privilege being in jeopardy. This is exacerbated by feelings of belonging and entitlement and being able to clearly distinguish who is non-indigenous. Feelings of threat and conflict are further aggravated when government and its various institutions are [deemed to be] too accommodating to those that are viewed as being non-autochthonous by the local members, such as children of migrants being able to access space in schools (a case in point: over the years this has become a big bone of contention, particularly in provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape, where even the locals struggle to secure space for their own children at public schools due to an ever-increasing population in those provinces stemming from factors such as internal movement of citizens; thus, one can imagine the uproar when locals see children of migrants having secured space, especially in public schools), get access to health care, and migrants having secured the right to run their businesses, even with the correct documentation. All of this, of course, already leads to a prior condition of hostility towards immigration, which is steeped in unfavourable stereotyping[116] of the members of the outgroup.

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[116] ***See*** Chapter Three (3) on the discussion of 'Societal, cultural beliefs, and public perceptions towards outsiders: The cultural assimilation narrative'.

Continuing this thread, one of the factors that brings about fear and prejudice arising from the different African and Asian nationalities that reside in South Africa is the perceived number of immigrants in the country. Many South Africans complain that there is an elephantine number of Nigerian, Mozambican, Zimbabwean, Somalian/Ethiopian, Malawian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nationalities residing in South Africa. In most cases the perceived high numbers of African and Asian foreigners are false and are not as high as xenophobic citizens and politicians make it out to be. Even with reputable data that has been collected, analysed, interpreted, and presented by Statistics SA and other reputable research institutions that projects the accurate number of African and Asian foreigners, xenophobic citizens and politicians still dismiss it to maintain their prejudiced views and to pander to the electorate.

Continuing further, some of the aspects that generate a feeling of threat in the psyche of South Africans are concerns over safety. There is a significant element of truth to this that cannot be ignored. Members of the ingroup are worried about nationalities such as Nigerians who introduce and sell drugs in their communities, run human trafficking syndicates and occupy buildings illegally, which they use for some of their illegal businesses, such as prostitution and drug peddling. All these concerns on safety are not false; however, not all Nigerians or all foreigners partake in criminal activities. This is a sector in which government is dismally failing, by not upholding the rule of law and allowing lawlessness to take root and continue without respite. The other safety concern is with regard to health issues, where a series of spaza shops run by Pakistanis and Bangladeshi nationalities across the country have been found to sell expired foodstuffs, or to manufacture their own foodstuffs in unsanitary conditions without the necessary authorisation/paperwork (Sithole, 2023). This also results in the manufacturing of counterfeit goods. One of the disadvantages of foreign nationals who manufacture fake food and other products, aside from the glaring health concerns, is that government loses out on tax from those productions. According to Tax Justice South Africa (TJSA) and the SA Revenue Service, this behaviour has dismally affected the country's fiscus to the tune of billions of rand (Sithole, 2023). It is revenue that otherwise could have been used towards education, health, and community development.

Another factor that also brings about feelings of threat is that South Africans do feel challenged by the success that mostly black African foreigners seem to be achieving. The way that African foreigners go about their way of life here challenges the self-image that particularly poor South Africans may hold. Here, identity politics plays a role. Of course, when someone who has come out of nowhere seemingly does better than you in many aspects of life, it is natural that feelings of hostility and jealousy will arise within the psyche of the members of the ingroup. In closing, the

discussion on ‘Realistic Group Conflict Threat and power theory’ indicates that South Africa is an archetypical example of this theory.

5.1.1.6 Symbolic threat, normative theory, and normative ethics

When looking at this theory under discussion and thinking about its applicability to the South African case, then the questions that come about are the following: The violence carried out on foreign bodies – how can it be interpreted? Is it a case of blatant xenophobia, or is it patriotism on the part of South African citizens? What is it that South Africans are protecting? It is also important to look into the issue of identity politics and partially acknowledge that xenophobic violence in South Africa is an indication that South Africans are still grappling with the development of new identities. They are trying to reconcile their past with the post-democracy present, as well as trying to find out who they are within Africa against the backdrop of Pan-Africanism. How do they fit in within Africa and its people? What are their roles?

It is unlike case studies such as Germany and Switzerland where there are deeply entrenched concerns about protecting certain cultural symbols of members of the in-group. In such cases, in the above-mentioned countries, xenophobia harbours an accentuated element of racism, nationalism, and religious elements such as Islamophobia and anti-Semitic tendencies, whereby the xenophobic attacks seem to be organised and are carried out by various right-wing groups/protestors who want to protect their country’s identity from ‘foreigners’ (Boehnke *et al*., 1998:586; Connolly, 2015; Schröter, 2015:398). In contrast, South Africans are not threatened by migration because of a perceived threat that migrants might challenge South Africa’s orthodox practices or cultural predispositions. South Africa’s xenophobic attacks are mostly ignited by socio-economic circumstances, such as the lack of jobs. It does not hinge on a link between “cultural discordance” and symbolic threat.

Likewise, symbolic threat theory also speaks to ideological conflict/struggle. Again, that is not the case with South Africa. On the other hand, this theory is deemed to be prevalent in countries perceived to be developed and whose population is generally homogeneous. Therefore, in this sense, the symbolic threat theory does not apply to the South African case as South Africa in many respects is still a developing country, with a non-homogenous population that does not necessarily share the same cultural identity and norms. However, the members of the out-group to whom South Africans are generally xenophobic, tend to share the same cultural and religious traditions. Nigerians, for example, are both Igbo and Christian; Somalians, Ethiopians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis are Muslim and are bound by religion that clearly articulates how they should treat their fellow brothers.

However, one of the fundamentals of symbolic threat and normative theory does feature in the South African case. That is the element of identity politics. South Africans make use of identity politics to determine if a particular out-group is deserving of reverence or disparagement. In many scenarios as mentioned throughout the study, the nationalities with which South Africans share the same collective identity and ethno-linguistic background, such as amaSwati, Basotho and Batswana nationalities, do not face the same disparagement and the utter discontent that their presence stirs within the psyches of xenophobic South Africans as compared to nationalities that come from West Africa (*i.e.* Nigerians and Cameroonians) and Asia (Pakistanis and Bangladeshis).

Equally so, as mentioned in Chapter Three, South Africans have been separated from the rest of the continent due to Apartheid and its policies, which did have an impact on the psyche of South Africans, especially black South Africans. As cited by Saleh (2015:302&303), the isolationism South Africans experienced during the Apartheid era has bled into post-democracy South Africa, where South Africans do deem themselves in many cases to be better than their African brothers and sisters. Saleh (2015:302&303) states this is because of "South Africans' closeness to European-ness or whiteness" rather than Pan-Africanism due to the separation between black South Africans from the rest of the continent.

Drawing this section to an end, unlike the first five theories that were applied to the South African case, which all fit the South African case like a glove, the elements of the current theory under discussion do not entirely fit into the South African case. However, the nexus of political identity does play a role due to a group of bottom-up influences that speak to elements such as ethnic identity and physiology. Quite pointedly, if there is something South Africans are good at, it is grouping people and classifying them into groups where they should rightfully be together.

Concluding remarks

To draw to a close this chapter, a cursory analysis of the chapter is provided. If one peruses the closing remarks of Chapter Two, it can be noted that the words of Hobbes (1651:46) are used to provide a birds-eye view on some of the elements that bring about conflict. "Competition, diffidence, and glory" as stated by Hobbes (1651:46) are some of the sources of conflict. When the study revisits the six theories applied to the South African case, one can attest that indeed competition, diffidence, and glory feature within the six theories – and *de facto*, also features within the South African case. Within the South African geo-political arena, there is indeed competition for resources due to 'economic deterioration', 'competition for jobs', and 'lack of basic services (failure in public service delivery due to poor governance'). When this occurs, it leads to the poverty theory. When 'economic deprivation', 'limited resources', and 'unemployment' occur,

relative deprivation arises. This happens because 'inequality' becomes rampant in communities, then 'the egoistic-fraternalistic distinction' and 'feelings of entitlement and resentment' come about, as members of the in-group can detect that current circumstances are not going to improve sooner than anticipated. This is worsened by the fact that members of the out-group who share the same locality as the in-group are seemingly doing better with the same resources and circumstances than they are.

This leads to the frustration/aggression theory where a scapegoat has to be found, sometimes to lessen the pain and humiliation members of the in-group are feeling. Elements such as 'corruption', and 'lack of government performance' are factors that ignite the anger felt by the hapless and hopeless dominant group. This results in 'immigrants being used as "stooges" of the 'natives' (Odiaka, 2017:46). Why does this happen? The 'dominant group feels threatened by the outgroup', 'there are feelings of superiority from the dominant group' and dominant members 'battle to secure an advantaged social position'. With this, we see how the 'realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory' is relevant and applicable to the South African case. In other countries anti-immigrant prejudice can arise due to a 'homogeneity in population', and members of the in-group wanting to keep it that way, as well as wanting to protect their 'homogeneous cultural identity and norms'. Thus, when there are 'aliens' in their midst, 'there is a symbolic threat to homogeneity'. However, with this theory, 'symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics' do not apply as much to the South African case as compared to the first five discussed and applied theories.

Table 1 (a) below shows in table format how the theories apply to the South African case.

Table 1 (a): Theoretical framework of analysis for South Africa – Application of theories to the case of South Africa

THEORIES OF XENOPHOBIA	COMPONENTS OF THE THEORY	SOUTH AFRICA
6. Economic threat theory (resource competition)	d) 'economic deterioration'	✓
	e) 'competition for jobs'	✓
	f) 'lack of basic services'	✓
7. Poverty Theory	d) 'economic deprivation'	✓
	e) 'limited resources'	✓
	f) 'unemployment'	✓
8. Relative deprivation	d) 'inequality'	✓
	e) 'the egoistic–fraternalistic distinction'	✓

	f) 'feelings of entitlement and resentment'	✓
9. Frustration – aggression theory	d) 'corruption'	✓
	e) 'lack of government performance'	✓
	f) 'immigrants used as "stooges" of the natives'	✓
10. 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory	d) 'dominant group feels threatened by outgroup'	✓
	e) 'there are feelings of superiority from dominant group'	✓
	f) 'battle to secure advantaged social position'	✓
7. Symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics	d) 'homogeneity in population'	✗
	e) 'homogeneous cultural identity and norms'	✗
	f) 'there is a symbolic threat to homogeneity'	✗

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

In conclusion, the study has reached an apex where it calls for an in-depth analysis of what has been discussed thus far. In the introductory chapter it was stated that the primary purpose of Chapter Six would be that of serving to arrive at the conclusions to the study by summarising the findings of the study in relation to providing a theoretical framework of the occurrence of the phenomenon of xenophobia in an ideological Pan-African government with a somewhat poor indigenous population, such as South Africa. Furthermore, the final and upcoming chapter will provide a theoretical analysis of what can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. Likewise, it will present the conclusions to the study by summarising the findings in relation to xenophobia in South Africa.

CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

This thesis at its origin posed the following question: 'What is the cause of xenophobia [mainly] in South African townships if official rhetoric is openness towards Africa?' This question led the study down a labyrinth of exploring xenophobia from an academic standpoint. This included looking at the theories of xenophobia, the types of xenophobia, the history of xenophobia in South Africa, and how xenophobia manifests itself in South Africa. Xenophobia was also looked at through the lens of Pan-Africanism and identity politics. Most importantly, the notion of politics of survival was brought into the study as it was hypothesised from the conception of the study that it would yield something of importance – especially in explaining the gruesome acts of xenophobia, particularly on innocent bodies.

The goal of the current chapter is to explore whether the evidence provided in the previous chapters supports the hypotheses advanced in the introductory chapter. Thereafter, the current chapter will reflect on the contribution the study has made to the discipline. Subsequently, shortcomings, limitations, and possibilities for future research will be advanced.

6.1.1 Findings and summary of chapters

Chapter One of the study was devoted to setting the tone of the study by providing the background to the study and the problem statement. From the outset of the study, it was indicated that South Africa indeed grapples with xenophobia as a pertinent social issue. To commence with the study, it was seen as fitting to provide a customary contextual synopsis of what xenophobia is. This was done by accessing the numerous works and literature of scholars like Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016), Nyamnjoh (2006), Masenya (2017), Crush and Ramachandran (2010), and many other notable scholars relevant to the topic under the microscope. By determining beforehand what *xenophobia* meant as a term, the study has been able to ascertain from the outset that xenophobia is a complex term – that it does not 'exist in a vacuum', and that it can be likened to a kaleidoscope. It is a kaleidoscope revealing that xenophobia is multifaceted and can occur through "social, gender, economic, as well as ethnic discrimination", alongside social and political exclusion. What also became discernible from the commencement of Chapter One was that xenophobia consisted mainly of two 'teams': the 'we' and 'them' factions. This aspect of xenophobia became an ongoing pattern that continuously emerged throughout the study.

Thenceforth, the contextual background of the study was provided. In this sub-section of the chapter, a comprehensive introduction to xenophobia and how it features in the South African geographical landscape, alongside the ideological exploration of Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism (The African Renaissance) was expanded upon. This was done in combination with the theories of xenophobia in the hope that the six selected theories will offer a better understanding of why xenophobia is a constant manifestation in the geo-political environment of South Africa.

Chapter One also enlightened the study by providing the problem statement of the study; the research questions; the research objectives; the leading theoretical statements/arguments; the research methodology and research design; the databases that would be consulted for the literature review study; the provisional chapter layout and finally the significance of the study. Chapter One was then rounded off by stating the value of the study, which will be to 'provide a theoretical framework of the phenomenon of xenophobia occurring in an ideological Pan-African government (South Africa) with a somewhat poor indigenous population'.

Chapter Two of the study found it obligatory that from the outset a chapter be dedicated to the conceptual and theoretical analysis underlying xenophobia. The chapter that was assigned this task was Chapter Two of the thesis. Conversely, in order to meet the objectives of the chapter, it was imperative to focus on a discussion of the theoretical perspectives of xenophobia. This was done by dividing the chapter into four (4) sub-sections.

The sub-sections were as follows: The introduction (sub-section one of Chapter Two) provided background information on xenophobia's correlation with social and political psychology. The chapter deemed it important to do so as primary literature indicated that the individual psychological process did play a role in the happenings of xenophobic violence. In addition, a further conceptual clarification of the delineation of the concept 'xenophobia' was provided. In understanding what the definition of 'xenophobia' was, it meant that the study had created the foundation upon which the study could take place.

Furthermore, the ensuing sub-section of the chapter introduced the types of xenophobia. This allowed the study to gain the understanding that there was mention of racial xenophobia (prejudice based on race), religious xenophobia (prejudice based on religious beliefs, e.g., Islamophobia), cultural xenophobia (prejudice against people from different cultural backgrounds), ethnic xenophobia (prejudice against people from different ethnic backgrounds), and political xenophobia (political xenophobic propaganda). Depending on how one assesses the above-mentioned different conflicts, incidents that may be described as racial violence, ethnic conflict, religious violence, etc., can qualify as xenophobic violence. Most importantly, sub-section

two of Chapter Two is rounded off with Figure 2, which presents the delineation of the concept 'xenophobia' explained in diagram format. What is important to note about Figure 2 is that it is one of the contributions the study is making to the current existing scholarly literature.

Sub-section three of Chapter Two discussed the theories of xenophobia in depth, and provided limitations for each critique. Thus, it emphasised that as accurate a theory might be in providing answers to understand a phenomenon, it should not be expected that a single theory could possess a monopoly to insight. Accordingly, the theories of xenophobia revealed that xenophobic conflict stemmed from competition for resources (resource competition and poverty theory), fear and defensiveness (relative deprivation and frustration-aggression theory), and desire for status or ownership (group conflict and power theory, and symbolic theory). The chapter was finalised with the concluding sub-section and Figure 9, which provided the general root causes of xenophobia.

Chapter Three: For the main reason that the locus of the study was 'a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa', it was imperative that the study had an entire chapter dedicated to 'an analysis of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa'. This chapter would provide the study with the platform to unearth how the historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflected the nature of xenophobia in this country. Therefore, to address the above research objective, an introduction was provided. The introduction from early on drew the gruesome picture that South Africa as a country was riddled with a track record of a culture of violence and unstable social cohesion. The introduction was then followed by an analysis of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa.

This analysis focused especially on the period from the 1980s until the present day. Naturally, South Africa's former system of institutionalised racial segregation under the all-white government contributed to a surge of inter/intra-group conflict and [unregulated] human migration. The historical happenings dating to precolonial and colonial times had unsurprisingly contributed to the assortment of prejudiced practices dished out to foreign bodies by [mostly angry black male] South Africans. The chapter further identified 'seven (7) historical and contemporary contributors to xenophobia in South Africa'. This included 'lack of resources, lack of leadership', which highlighted the fact **that** politicians also 'nurtured conspiratorial thinking' as stated by Dratwa (2023:14), and scapegoating of foreigners. Furthermore, the discussion can be tied back to the economic, poverty and scapegoating theories underlying the theoretical foundation of this study.

The next component that was looked at was 'South Africa's 'triple challenge': poverty, inequality, and unemployment'. The next component that was discussed was 'vigilantism (vigilante politics) – 'message crimes''; followed by 'societal, cultural beliefs, and public perceptions towards

outsiders: the cultural assimilation narrative'; then 'violent (unhealthy) masculinities: traits of 'hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity''; 'general life frustration; jealousy; threat and entitlement'; and the final component discussed being 'political upheaval and economic mismanagement from home-states of immigrants: macro factors'.

What was evident from discussing the historical and contemporary contributors to xenophobia in South Africa was that xenophobia would not disappear or dramatically be reduced as long as the economic status and living conditions of the poor remained unchanged, especially considering that xenophobia in South Africa was not merely a hatred of foreign nationals. It is about classism – the power and class struggle between the poor of the poorest. To defeat xenophobia means changing various institutions to bring equity, economic power and transformation, and having accountable bureaucrats and politicians who will drive the requisite positive change.

In addition, the chapter has also made it clear that as is the case of South Africa, contact with foreigners does not reduce the likelihood of xenophobic attacks. Foreigners assimilating into their new communities does not stop the occurrence of xenophobia. It does not even do so when the contact is of equal status. Moreover, South Africans choose who they want to be scapegoats because they are convenient and powerless (the same way that anti-Semites during Nazi rule chose Jews to be scapegoats) – and the lack of and inconsistent application of the rule of law does not help.

The discussion of the sub-section, 'the historical and contemporary contributors of xenophobia in South Africa', was followed by the sub-section on 'xenophobia in South Africa: post-1994'. The biggest take-away from this sub-section is that xenophobia in South Africa has also become organised, with anti-immigrant *movements* such as 'Buyelekhaya' and anti-immigrant *groups* like 'Operation Dudula' coming to the fore. In addition, access to social media has even moved xenophobia online, as evidenced by Facebook pages and groups such as 'Put South Africans First', and hashtags (#) such as 'All foreigners must leave'. Whether xenophobia moving online can also be classified as online bullying instead of xenophobia, can be a topic that can be pursued for further studies.

The chapter was rounded off with a conclusion, which was accompanied by Figure 10 explaining the 'transitional process' from authoritarian rule to democratic rule, especially because South Africa also had a transition between these two types of rule. The concluding sub-section of the chapter also included ***'Table 2',*** which distinguished the difference/s between 'xenophobia' and 'afrophobia'. It was important that this table be provided, given the context that perpetrators of xenophobic violence in South Africa were mainly black people targeting majority black African foreigners. In providing the table, it allowed for the study to dispel any ambiguity that may arise

as to whether the violence perpetrated on foreign bodies was xenophobia or afrophobia. ***Table 3*** also accompanied the concluding part of the chapter. ***Table 3*** provided an overview of the occurrences of the main xenophobic violence that the study addressed or mentioned in the chapter. Consequently, ***Table 3*** furnished a birds-eye view summary of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa by indicating the 'year (s) of main xenophobic violence incident (s) OR occurrence(s) as noted in the study; by stating how xenophobia was manifested in South Africa (particularly during 'peak times'); and highlighting the victims of xenophobic attacks in South Africa as well as the geographic location of the violence. Additionally, ***'Map 1'*** was provided, which offered a birds-eye view of the total number of xenophobic discrimination incidents by location between 1994 and 2022. Lastly, Figure 11 introduced a new theoretical framework of how xenophobia took place in South Africa. In essence, the Tables and Figures in Chapter Three are a new theoretical framework that this study has introduced and contributed to the existing literature.

In addition, to conclude the summary of Chapter Three, the study shows how the 'theories of xenophobia' relate to the 'historical and contemporary contributors of xenophobia in South Africa'.

Table 5: The 'theories of xenophobia' and their relation to the 'historical and contemporary contributors' of xenophobia in South Africa

Historical and contemporary contributors of xenophobia in South Africa	***Theories of xenophobia related to historical and contemporary contributors of xenophobia in South Africa***
• *Lack of resources, lack of leadership*	• Economic threat theory (resource competition) • Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating
• *South Africa's 'Triple Challenge': Poverty, inequality, and unemployment*	• Economic threat theory (resource competition) • Poverty Theory • Relative deprivation
• *Vigilantism (vigilante politics) – 'message crimes'*	• Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating • 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory
• *Societal, cultural beliefs, and public perceptions towards outsiders: The cultural assimilation narrative*	• Relative deprivation • 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory

• *Violent (unhealthy) masculinities: Traits of 'hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity'*	• Economic threat theory (resource competition) • Relative deprivation • Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating • 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory
• *General life frustration; jealousy; threat and entitlement*	• Economic threat theory (resource competition) • Poverty theory • Relative deprivation • Frustration-aggression theory: frustration with government and scapegoating • 'Realistic' group threat and power-conflict theory

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

Chapter Four remains one of the most crucial chapters of the study as it was built from the beginning in an effort to rejoin the statement that was articulated in the problem statement of the introductory chapter. Chapter One of the study hypothesised that in South Africa, the contradictions of the ideologies of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, and African nationalism (The African Renaissance) as held by the South African government (ANC) were diametrically opposed to the occurrences of xenophobia in poor townships. The study then deemed it important that Chapter Four be tasked with expounding on the analysis of factors such as Pan-Africanism and African nationalism (The African Renaissance).

Subsequently, Chapter Four of the study opened with an introduction. The introduction and sub-section thereafter offered an in-depth discussion of the concepts of 'nationalism' and 'African Nationalism (Pan-Africanism)'. This introductory sub-section was followed by the discussion on identity politics. It was important that this sub-section be included in the study, as from the outset of the study literature indicated that, generally, happenings of xenophobia were tied to the 'crisis' or 'threat' of identity. The 'symbolic threat, normative theory and normative ethics theory' supported this hypothesis. The discussion on 'identity politics' was clubbed with a discussion on multiculturism, classism (the politics of class), and identity politics in Africa. These three 'sub-themes' were chosen because of their relevance to the South African case. South Africa is a diverse country that hosts a multitude of people from different tribes, nationalities, races, religious groups, and diverse socio-economic backgrounds. To boot, South Africa has a very colourful history that still has an impact on many important factors among its population, such as who has

the means of production, who is employable, who gets to reside where, and so forth. Additionally, as Dratwa (2023:11) has indicated, South Africans tend to re-weaponise the past to validate their xenophobia, and in the process “shift victimhood”.

Consequently, this sub-section was followed by an equally important sub-section, which was a discussion on the politics of survival. The goal of this sub-section was to abet this study in examining and understanding how and why the politics of survival features in the re/occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa. The results it yielded were that more often than not, members of the in-group will commit heinous acts of xenophobia to protect what they feel they are entitled to and are in danger because of an influx or presence of foreigners. This can vary from wanting to protect their land, cultural identity, economic opportunities, and so forth.

The sub-section that followed was the heart of Chapter Four, as it would provide some insights into the statement that was hypothesised in the introductory chapter. Chapter Four identified that the cause of xenophobia [mainly] in South African townships, if the official rhetoric is openness towards Africa, was because “South Africa’s imagined practice of the African Renaissance rather turned into South African nationalism with the goal of realising South Africa’s ambition of continental leadership instead of Pan-Africanism”. Simply put, South Africa put itself first, ahead of any ideology related to regional and international ‘integration’ – especially if it deemed it would be to its detriment. However, to counter-act national self-interest, and for Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism to be realised successfully on the continent, the best way to go about it, according to Okhonmina (2023:29), was for “national sovereignty and interest to marry continental interests”. Therefore, there should not be conflicting ideas or actions.

The chapter culminated in a summation of the chapter.

Chapter Five: the study sought to understand to what extent the six theories of xenophobia were manifested within the South African reality. As a result, a theoretical analysis of what could be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa was provided, thereby making a contribution to the existing literature.

Chapter Six of the study is dedicated to summarising the discussions and findings of the previous chapters, discussing the contributions the study has made to the current literature, as well as the limitations the study encountered. Chapter Six began by introducing the aim of the chapter; followed by summarising the findings under their respective headings. This was followed by the ‘Study synopsis: research objectives and questions’. Additionally, Chapter Six culminates by giving an overall conclusion to the study and what lessons can be taken from the study.

6.1.2 Study synopsis: research objectives and questions

As initially indicated in the introductory chapter; to meet the set research questions and objectives, six chapters were dedicated to the study. Thereby, Table 6 below shows the corresponding chapters to the attended research questions and objectives.

Table 6: Research objectives and questions with corresponding chapters

Research Questions		***Research Objectives***		***Corresponding Chapters***
i.	*What is meant by xenophobia, and what are the theoretical approaches related to this concept?*	i)	To provide a theoretical foundation, understanding and analysis underlying the concept of xenophobia and related theoretical approaches.	• Chapter Two
ii.	*How does a historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflect the nature of xenophobia in this country?*	ii)	To determine how the historical analysis of the occurrence of the contemporary history of xenophobia in South Africa reflects the nature of xenophobia in this country.	• Chapter Three
iii.	*What role do Pan-Africanism and African nationalism play in South Africa, and what does it mean for South Africa in terms of xenophobia?*	iii)	To analyse the role that Pan-Africanism; and African nationalism play in South Africa, and to establish what do the roles that Pan-Africanism; and African nationalism play in South Africa mean for South Africa in terms of xenophobia.	• Chapter Four
iv.	*How do the six theories of xenophobia manifest within the South African reality?*	iv)	To analyse the extent to which the six theories of xenophobia manifest within the South African reality.	• Chapter Five
v.	*What can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the occurrence of*	iii)	To provide a theoretical analysis of what can be learnt from the theoretical framework of the	• Chapter Six

xenophobia in South Africa?	occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa.	

Source: Author's construct (Tebele, 2024)

6.1.3 Contribution to the existing body of knowledge

This study has contributed to the existing body of knowledge by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework of the occurrence of the phenomenon of xenophobia in an ideological Pan-African government (South Africa) with a somewhat poor indigenous population. This analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa has showcased that xenophobia cannot be viewed through one lens only. It has achieved this by bringing in six important theories of xenophobia that were scattered all over the existing literature, and demonstrating how they can be applied practically to a case to understand the phenomena that are currently taking place in a certain region of the globe. In addition, the study has challenged existing conventional views by showing that there are driving forces to xenophobia, and as a result advancing understanding of the theories. As an outcome of this study, new patterns were identified explaining the occurrences of xenophobia in South Africa.

Additionally, the study can be of use and enhance further debate in organisations such as the UNHRC, and the security cluster in South Africa, such as Home Affairs. Importantly, as much as the study has taken these six theories and applied them to the South African case, they can also be applied to any case study around the world, especially as the world is currently facing a migration crisis where people are being displaced due to a variety of reasons, such as harsh climate conditions and fleeing warzones.

In conclusion, the Tables and Figures that are throughout the study, present a new theoretical framework that this study has introduced and contributed to the existing body of literature. It can be used in future studies that will be using research methodologies such as grounded theory and deductive research – thus providing a blueprint for future research endeavours.

6.1.4 Limitations for further research

The study made use of desktop research and did not collect empirical data in the form of conducting interviews. This is a limitation as the study does not have the insights of such data that could perhaps have added a new angle to the study.

6.1.5 Themes for further research

The study makes the following recommendations for future research:

- Future research can further explore whether xenophobia moving online can also be classified as online bullying instead of xenophobia; in addition also look at whether social media contributes to the scourge of xenophobia.
- Future research can also explore what can be done to quench xenophobic attacks and further look at whether a comprehensive approach dealing with the political, social, educational, economic and cultural issues can decrease happenings of xenophobia.

- The other suggestions the study makes for future research are to further explore "normative theory" and "normative ethics" because these two theories concentrate on ethical behaviour, therefore exploring the questions, "what about xenophobia is deemed 'unethical?" and "is there a moral responsibility or moral obligation?"

6.1.6 Final thoughts

In closing, the study has also gathered that xenophobia occurs because there are instigators of xenophobia. That could be seen in the discussion on ***'Violent (unhealthy) masculinities: Traits of 'hegemonic, fragile, and toxic masculinity'*** and ***'Vigilantism (vigilante politics) – 'message crimes''*** as discussed in Chapter Three (3) of the study. Additionally, as stated in the beginning of Chapter Two (2), xenophobia is unfortunately not only an attitude in South Africa, but it is also an activity that has caused bodily harm and damage as a result of this violent practice, which is grounded in the individual's psychological process and socio-psychological anomie. Furthermore, in Chapter Two (2) it is mentioned by Sanchez-Mazas and Licata (2015:803) that after immigration has taken place, the occurrence of inter-ethnic relations generally takes the following steps: "avoidance, conflict, and accommodation". Interestingly enough, in the South African case there is a back-and-forth between the 'conflict' and 'accommodation' phases/steps.

Literature also indicated that in South Africa avoidance of migrants has never been an issue, especially because South Africans (particularly miners) have been working with a lot of migrant labour from neighbouring countries, and living together in mining compounds, also known as hostels. Moreover, many migrants reside in many townships and rural villages in South Africa, together with the locals. Thus, in the South African case there is often harmony between South Africans and the out-group. Then something in the geo-political space triggers that 'peace', which leads to conflict. This showcases that perhaps the 'hope' that xenophobia in South Africa could become a thing of the past if South Africans interact with foreigners is merely mythical. This scenario makes the phenomenon of xenophobia an intriguing phenomenon to be studied within South Africa's geo-political and economic space.

Additionally, an interesting point to take note of regarding the study, is that xenophobia also hinges on three factors: the first one being ***'Psychology; Victims/Scapegoats'*** (Why do the victims look the way they do? What about them makes them stand out?). Accordingly, as the study reflects, what is clear is how 'scapegoating' is a common theme of the contributors of xenophobia. Foreigners are used as stooges for public frustration, for politicians to blame on, for angry men who are not doing well in life due to macro and micro factors to pass their anger on. Similarly, xenophobic physical violence is mostly carried out by black males who hardly have access to economic opportunities. Their outlook on 'successful' foreigners who share the same space as them is a reminder of what they desire to be, but are facing challenges, either due to mentality or the environment in which they find themselves, that make it quite difficult for them to make something of themselves.

Secondly, the study also hinges on '***Threat'*** (xenophobia occurs because people are feeling threatened, whether symbolically, economically, ethnically, etc.; if elements of threat were non-existent, xenophobia would probably also be non-existent). In finality, the study indicates that ***'Economy'*** is the common weaving threat among the six chosen theories. Xenophobia arises due to the threat to access to a better standard of living. Therefore, xenophobia in South Africa should be seen as a socio-political problem, not an economic problem.

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ANNEXURES A: CERTIFICATE OF EDITING

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To Whom It May Concern

This is to certify that the doctoral thesis entitled

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has been edited for English language grammar, spelling, syntax, style, pleonasm, tautology, in-text referencing and footnotes, punctuation, and appropriate academic register

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Neither the research content nor the author's intentions were altered in any way during the editing process.

Signed at Pretoria on 03 December 2024
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