The role of the Comprador Bourgeoisies in Post-Independent Africa: The case of South Africa and Kenya

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DECLARATION

I, **Seshupo Josial Mosala**, declare that this submission is my own work. All sources utilised or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged. The thesis is submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies at the Department of Political Studies, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus.

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ABSTRACT

The African Union's *Agenda 2063* is a long-term framework for Africa to advocate for structural transformation, inclusive economic growth, and sustainable development. It seeks to catapult African countries from low-income countries to middle- and high-income countries by 2063 by eradicating poverty, stabilising the continent, addressing inequality, fostering industrialisation, promoting intra-African trade, and developing infrastructure. The *Agenda's* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan was to be implemented by African Union member states for ten years from 2014 to 2023. However, neo-colonialism in Kenya and South Africa resulted in uncertainty regarding the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Neo-colonialism can be traced from the independence processes of both countries, and included compromises made by the comprador bourgeoisies. Thus, it is important to critically analyse the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in maintaining neo-colonialism and implementing *Agenda 2063*.

These compromises led to a Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital, that has perpetuated neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is exacerbated by neoliberal economic policies underpinned by accumulation by dispossession, in which the comprador bourgeoisies play an intermediary role. Consequently, the comprador bourgeoisies in both countries guaranteed optimum conditions for exploitation, with outward and externally oriented economies geared to serve external interests. These externally oriented economies have enabled multi-national corporations to extract profits and perpetuate asymmetric economic relations with developed countries. Thus, the comprador bourgeoisies undermined development through the reproduction of structural problems in both countries in the post-independence epoch. Neo-colonialism in both Kenya and South Africa has blocked the implementation of continental development programmes that advocate self-reliance, economic independence and development. Continental programmes such as the Monrovia Declaration, Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty, the Cairo Agenda and African Mining Vision among others, were not implemented despite both countries being signatories to these programmes. Therefore, *Agenda 2063* has little prospect of being implemented due to lack of political will, rent-seeking behaviour and corruption, which derive from the comprador bourgeoisies' intermediary role. This has negative implications on the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area that came into effect

on the 1 January 2021 and demonstrates that the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital, has created a powerful lobby against development.

To break this mould of underdevelopment and none-implementation due to neo-colonialism the thesis suggests the following: structural transformation, transformative leadership, strengthening the state and its institutions, and crafting policies that takes Sub-Sahara Africa's realities into consideration.

Keywords: *Agenda 2063*; accumulation by dispossession; comprador bourgeoisies; decolonisation; Faustian pact; national liberation; neo-colonialism; and neoliberalism.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	All-Africa Convention
AAF-SAP	African-Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes
AEC	African Economic Community
AFC	Agriculture Finance Corporation
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMV	Africa Mining Vision
ANC	African National Congress
APPER	African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa
AU	African Union
AUDA	African Union Development Agency
B-BBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BIAT	Boosting Intra-Africa Trade
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
EAC	Eastern African Community
EAP	East Africa Protectorate
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
IBEAC	Imperial British East Africa Company
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
ISL	International Socialist League
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAU	Kenya African Union
KCA	Kikuyu Central Association
KNTC	Kenya National Trading Corporation
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEC	Mineral-Energy Complex
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations
MPNP	Multi Party Negotiations Process
MPRDA	Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act
MTN	Mobile Telephone Network
NDP	National Development Plan
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEM	Normative Economic Model
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGP	New Growth Path

NP	National Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programme
SARB	South African Reserve Bank
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
Stats SA	Statistics South Africa
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN-NADAF	United Nations - New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UN-PAAERD	United Nations - Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development
USA	United Stated of America
USD	United States Dollar
WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Orientation

The Sub-Saharan region has been ensnared in underdevelopment since the attainment of political independence, notwithstanding the recent economic growth in some Sub-Saharan African[1] (SSA) countries, with six of the world's 10 fastest-growing economies[2]. It has been 64 years since Ghana's independence and 58 years since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which transitioned to the African Union (AU) in 2002. Kenya and South Africa are two of the most industrialised economies in SSA, however, they are overly reliant on primary products as foreign exchange earners, with economies underpinned by commodity-driven growth and looming debt crises (Mills et al., 2017). Hence, not much structural transformation has taken place and there has been a process of deindustrialisation with an expanding informal sector (World Economic Forum (WEF), 2015; Anderson, 2015). Due to absent structural transformation, their economies have been characterised by boom and bust and by a rise in poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mbeki, 2011:17). Similar to the majority of SSA countries, Kenya and South Africa are confronted with challenges such as external debt, illicit financial flows, low levels of investment, corruption, low human development, and meagre economic growth (cf. AU Commission, 2015a; Ibrahim & Cheri, 2013).

This thesis argues that the aforementioned challenges result from the comprador bourgeoisies. The comprador bourgeoisie is a Marxist-Leninism concept referring to pliable national elites with links to foreign capital, who are too dependent on foreign capital, and who lack the will and the means to act independently (Hewison, 2008:395). Frank (1972), in analysing Latin America, made a distinction between two business groups, the pro-industry national bourgeoisies and the land-owning comprador bourgeoisies. Pröbsting (2015:85) in his analysis of Greece, also makes the separation between domestic bourgeoisies and comprador bourgeoisies, whose interests are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capital. In their analysis of Africa, Tar (2009:130) and Duara (2004:82) describe the comprador bourgeoisies as the western educated

[1] Africa has 54 countries; the thesis however focuses on the Sub-Saharan area, which excludes Egypt and the Maghreb Region (Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania).

[2] Six of the world's ten fastest-growing economies are in SSA, namely, Ghana, Angola, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, and Chad, the others being China, Burma, Kazakhstan, and Cambodia (WEF, 2019).

leadership that emerged during independence. Within this group of western educated elites, Ngugi (1981:52) differentiates between the comprador bourgeoisies and national bourgeoisies, as the latter being a faction that represents the national interest. The thesis expounds on this dynamic and agrees that comprador bourgeoisies in Africa refer to the western educated leadership that emerged during independence but, the thesis rejects the narrative of two groups. The comprador bourgeoisies are rooted in colonialism, it is the middle class that emerged during independence without economic power and who thus use the state as a vehicle for capital accumulation (Fanon, 1963:178-9). The comprador bourgeoisies vacillate between the masses of the colonised and the imperialist bourgeoisies. Fanon (1963:175) defines them as “a greedy little caste, motivated by self-interest”. Ngugi (1981:8) described Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) leadership as comprador bourgeoisies because of their perpetuation of the colonial economic model and subsequently, their alliance with imperialism. Moreover, Louw (1997:84) describes the emergence of the African National Congress (ANC) after apartheid as the emergence of comprador elites.

The thesis applies neo-colonial theory to analyse the role of comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa, with Fanon as a leading theorist. Neo-colonial theory form part of the theoretical framework devised to engage and analyse neo-colonialism phenomenon critically. Fanon offers a critical analysis of colonialism, decolonisation, intermediaries (comprador bourgeoisies) and neo-colonialism. Moreover, Fanon’s (1953) prognosis of decolonisation and neo-colonial post-independent Africa has provided scholars with one of the most specific and relevant theories to employ in the analysis of post-independent SSA (Hwami, 2016:19). Neo-colonial theory traces underdevelopment from the slave trade and the colonial epoch to a neo-colonial era. According to Rodney (1972), SSA has always been drawn into the global economic system as a subordinate whose primary role was to contribute to the development of rival capitalist powers. Nkrumah (1965) defines neo-colonialism as a process that the state, which is subject to it, is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality however, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The theory illustrates how SSA still finds itself in thrall of imperialism in post-independence periods through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), foreign aid, and free trade (Sunil, 2010). Neo-colonialism has led to a perpetuation of the colonial model of accumulation by dispossession through contemporary global neoliberal

capitalism (Harvey, 2003). Accumulation by dispossession (previously known as primitive accumulation), involves the expropriation of means and modes of production by imperialists to serve their interests.

In addition, neo-colonial theory elucidates that during post-independence, the colonial status quo persists. The multi-national corporations (MNCs) of the developed countries[3] still use their financial power in ways that impoverish the former colonies (Mwaura, 2005:13). The post-independent states' economy under comprador bourgeoisies is still concerned with marketing primary products and assembly plants that entrench neo-colonialist type industrialisation and perpetuate super exploitation through cheap labour (Fanon, 1963:151). Super exploitation entails the extraction of profits by MNCs through capital exports as productive exports and unequal exchange (Pröbsting, 2013:124). For instance, in Kenya agriculture contributes over 30 percent to the GDP with 60.4 percent in total exports, and is a source of employment for 70 percent of the total labour force (Adam et al., 2010:122). The service sector contributes immensely to the South African GDP with the domination of the finance sector, while exports are dominated by fuel and mining products (Mbeki, 2011:28). The neoliberal economic policies, which are underpinned by accumulation by dispossession in both countries, have perpetuated these outward and externally oriented economies through privatisation, liberalisation, financialisation, and deregulation. As a result of financialisation, both countries have experienced increased cross-border financial flows and speculation on their markets that coincide with capital flight (Chang, 2007:72). This illustrates neoliberalism – the growing role and power of finance in both economies (this is dealt with in detail in Chapter 2). This has been facilitated by the comprador bourgeoisies in protection of foreign capital. Consequently, the neo-colonial relations perpetuated by neoliberal economic policies in post-independence epochs has been hostile to development.

According to Turok (1987:44), neo-colonialism is contingent upon the collaboration of internal forces as agents for imperialism. The collaboration was illustrated through a compromise by the comprador bourgeoisies during the independence processes that led to nominal independence and subsequent unresolved economic and land issues. The

[3] The thesis uses the UN classification of countries based on their level of development as measured by per capita Gross National Income. Countries are grouped as high-income (developed); upper middle- and lower middle-income (developing), and low-income (least developed) countries.

compromise evolved into an ongoing Faustian pact between comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, which is demonstrated through the politico-economic system of former colonies. A Faustian pact refers to a deal made with the devil for a life of limitless wealth and pleasure in return for one's soul for eternity. The concept is taken from Goethe's (1984) *Faust*[4] (Desai, 2015:24). During independence processes the comprador bourgeoisies reached an agreement with imperialism for enrichment at the expense of economic independence and policy sovereignty which has undermined development. Neo-colonialism requires a new alliance between western educated comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital to perpetuate imperialism (Woddis, 1967:56). In *Colonialism and Neo-colonialism*, Sartre (2004:112) gives an example of an unholy alliance between imperialism and the African *petit bourgeoisie* that led to the assassination of Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the creation of a neo-colonial state under Mobutu. Ronnie Kasrils (2013) defines the Faustian moment in South Africa as when the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) took an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan on the eve of democratic elections with conditions attached that precluded a radical economic agenda. To legitimise the Faustian pact, the Mineral-Energy Complex[5](MEC) advocated for the creation of black elites through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) to maintain the MEC (Mbeki, 2009:78). This subsequently led to an agreement between the MEC and the comprador bourgeoisies to work with globalisation to maintain the system of cheap labour required by the MEC (Mbeki, 2009:78). In Kenya, the Faustian pact was created through the Swynnerton Plan that created the comprador bourgeoisies and perpetuated capitalism in post-independent Kenya (Cheche Kenya, 1982:11). As a result of the Faustian pact, MNCs continue operating more or less as before, with labour and raw material exploitation and tax dodging that works against the interests of former colonies and hinders development (Turok, 1987:23). The Faustian pact is illustrated below through the principles of neo-colonialism.

[4] Faust entered into an alliance with the devil Mephistopheles for a life of wealth and pleasure for his soul and he goes through life aided by Mephistopheles.

[5] According to Fine (2012) MEC refers to South African system of accumulation that is centered on core sectors around mining, energy, and finance, evolving with a character and dynamic of its own that has shifted over time and it can be traced to the 1870s through to the present day.

Nkrumah (1965:239) and Sunil (2010:59) have identified neo-colonial mechanisms as free trade, foreign aid, and FDI. Free trade is more detrimental to SSA than it is beneficial, as it benefits developed countries (Ake, 1996:1; Moyo, 2010:115). Developed countries with assistance from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) insist on free but unfair trade in which they maintain their collective advantage over SSA through monopoly and protectionism (Harvey, 2003:133). This resulted in SSA countries increasing their trade with no associated growth (Moyo, 2010:114). Therefore, SSA plays only a marginal role in world trade, at 1.7 percent of global exports (UNCTAD, 2016). Kenya's share in total world exports is 0.03 percent compared to its imports at 0.09 percent (WTO, 2020a), while South Africa's share in world total exports stands at 0.48 percent and their imports at 0.56 percent (WTO, 2020b). Yet, for both countries world trade plays a key role in that it has led to trade deficits in favour of developed countries, and dependency on imports. In Kenya and South Africa, manufactured products dominate imports, while exports are dominated by agricultural, fuel and mining products. Consequently, trade between African countries stands at 18 percent, far below the 69 percent between European countries, 52 percent between Asian countries, and 50 percent between North American countries (Schmieg, 2016).

The FDI in SSA is concentrated on extraction activities (Lopes et al*.,* 2017:41). However, in Kenya and South Africa, FDI has been dominated by the service sector, especially the financial sector, which has perpetuated the extraction of profits to developed countries. This has coincided with deindustrialisation and proliferation of malls (wholesale and retail) as a result of flooding of cheap products. FDI inflow comes mainly from traditional partners such as the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). Kenya and South Africa are confronted with looming debt crises. South African debt currently stand at over 81 percent of the GDP, with Kenya at 66 percent of the GDP (World Bank, 2020a; World Bank, 2020b). In addition, Kenya relies heavily on Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the USA, which comes with conditions. In most cases this has rendered the possibility of genuinely home-grown long-term development programmes unlikely (Padayachee, 2010:192). Consequently, SSA countries have made concessions to access aid, which has ensured the expansion of neoliberal policies in SSA.

The explanatory paragraphs above indicate that colonial economic structures persist post-independence. Kenya and South Africa still rely on raw material exports that are characterised by unequal trade, and FDI that is dominated by the service sector. Recent economic growth in both countries is commodity and debt-driven, which are accompanied by inequality. This clearly indicates the post-independence neo-colonial picture. The asymmetrical relations elucidated above can be explained through the general law of capital accumulation. The process of uneven development is a necessary aspect of capitalism. Therefore, the plundering of Kenya and South Africa is an integral part of accumulation by dispossession by developed countries (Harvey, 2005). The political economy in both countries is an impediment to development and has the potential to hinder the implementation of *Agenda 2063* as a continental development programme.

Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework for inclusive economic growth, structural transformation, and sustainable development (AU Commission, 2015a). It came into effect in 2014 and was adopted by the AU in an attempt to claim the 21st century as an African century. It derives from the AU's mission, which seeks to build "*an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena*". *Agenda 2063* sets out to achieve, among other things, the eradication of poverty in one generation, and to build on shared prosperity through social and economic transformation of the continent, and to establish a peaceful, secure and united democratic continent that would be an influential global player and partner (AU Commission, 2015a:2). The *Agenda's* implementation is based mostly on national governments that require transformative leadership as critical enablers. Hence, this thesis undertakes a critical analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent South Africa and Kenya, concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

The temporal demarcation for these units of analysis, Kenya and South Africa is the post-independence period from 2013 until the present. Kenya gained its independence in 1963, and South Africa attained majority rule in 1994. For this thesis, 1994 is regarded as an independence year because 1910 and 1961 saw the consolidation of racial colonial capitalism with Africans marginalisation. These so-called independence years did not alter the general colonial character of South Africa's economy, since Britain and white Afrikaner capital continued to occupy the principal economic positions in the country (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:175). The units of analysis were chosen because of regional

coverage and despite Kenya and South Africa being the most industrialised countries in their respective regions, and Kenya's economic growth, both countries have high inequality rates: South Africa, with a 0.63 Gini coefficient, has over 50 percent of its population living in poverty (Stats SA, 2019). Furthermore, in Kenya more than half of Kenyan wealth is controlled by 20 percent of the population, which has a 36.1 percent poverty rate (Oxford, 2017). The thesis seeks to put into perspective the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in this phenomenon.

1.2. Problem Statement

The Faustian pact and neo-colonialism explained above, is likely to hinder the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, has ensured that since the attainment of political independence in Kenya and South Africa, development is not part of the agenda, as MNCs from developed countries continue to exploit these countries and their people[6]. The new administrations of the newly independent nations had to guarantee optimum conditions under which MNCs could continue exploiting both countries, thus going against the wishes of their people (Rodney, 1972). Therefore, the continuation of the exploitation and neo-colonialism in newly independent nations led to non-implementation of continental programmes such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) (1980); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP) (1990); the African (Arusha) Charter for Population Participation and Development (1990); the Abuja Treaty (1991); the Cairo Agenda (1995); and the African Mining Vision (AMV) (2009) among others by the AU member states' comprador bourgeoisies.

The thesis offers a critical analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies of South Africa and Kenya in post-independent SSA as an inhibiting force concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063* as the contemporary continental developmental programme. The comprador bourgeoisies in SSA's case were mainly intermediaries who had no economic power and were used to keep the natives in line and disallow any active response to colonial rule (Schwab, 2001:9). The comprador bourgeoisies who take over power at the

[6] Note that MNCs from Kenya and South Africa are dominating their respective regions. Kenya has invested over 1.1 billion USD in Africa, majority of it going to East Africa with MNC such as KCB Group (AfDB, 2018:22). South Africa with MNCs such as Standard Bank, MTN, FirstRand, and many more has invested over seven billion USD in Africa which has perpetuated South African looting of the continent (AfDB, 2018:12-3; Poku & Whitman, 2018:53).

end of a colonial regime are an underdeveloped middle class (Fanon, 1963:149), who advocate for indigenous capitalism. Their roots can be traced from colonial periods and as a result, their contradiction with colonialism were never that deep. Critical analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies is done with the assistance of neo-colonial theory. In addition, Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972), further contributes to explaining post-independence Kenya and South Africa. The thesis builds on preceding discussions on neo-colonialism and compradorism, particularly Nkrumah's *Neo-colonialism: The last stage of Imperialism* (1965); Jack Woddis's *Introduction to Neo-colonialism* (1967); and Cabral's *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings* (1979). The critical analysis was done through examining multi-case studies on South Africa and Kenya, and their subsequent influence on their respective regions.

Agenda 2063 is a long-shared strategic framework for inclusive economic growth and sustainable development and is implementable over 50 years, which has been divided into five Ten-Year Implementation Plans. The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan is further divided into a short-term plan (2-3 years); a medium-term plan (4-5 years); and a long-term plan (10 years), (AU Commission, 2015b:77). The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan was adopted in 2014 and is now into its long-term plan. The implementation of *Agenda 2063* is mainly based on national governments and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The aspirations and goals of *Agenda 2063* must be domesticated in AU member states' national programmes and their respective RECs. Transformative leadership has been mentioned as one of the prerequisites for the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Therefore, leadership at national, regional, and continental level is paramount for the successful implementation of the *Agenda 2063,* which also encompasses monitoring and evaluation processes (AU Commission, 2015a:19). The implementation of *Agenda 2063* will allow for critical analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies of South Africa and Kenya.

As mentioned above, both countries have the largest economies in their respective regions. The comprador bourgeoisies of both countries in the post-independence period pursued neoliberal economic policies – privatisation, liberalisation, financialisation, deregulation and fiscal discipline (Adam et al*.,* 2010; Marias, 2011). Kenya has perpetuated the colonial economy through a Development Plan, The Red Plan, 1964,

The Green Plan, 1966[7], and neoliberal policies since the dawn of the millennium (Leys, 1975; Ake, 1996:19; Adam et al*.,* 2010). Post 1994, the ANC government adopted a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and a Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy[8] (GEAR), which perpetuated neoliberal economic policies (Bond, 2000; Marias, 2011). The Kenyan government adopted *Vision 2030* in 2008 and ANC government formulated the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012, both are macro-economic policies that emphasises economic growth as a way forward and are set to run until 2030. Furthermore, the comprador bourgeoisies of both countries pursued Africanisation or deracialising the economy through their co-option into the neo-colonial economy (Padayachee 2010:249). This was done through programmes such as the BEE and Affirmative Action in South Africa and Kenyanisation in Kenya, which saw comprador bourgeoisies become part of MNCs through becoming board members, shareholders, or executive members. Africanisation without structural transformation meant continuation of the colonial status quo (Lopes et al., 2017:42).

From the argument above, the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa goes against the spirit of *Agenda 2063*, which makes the clarion call for structural transformation and sustainable development unattainable. Given the orientation, the thesis will critically analyse the role of the comprador bourgeoisies of post-independent South Africa and Kenya concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The study is limited to post-independence SSA from 2013, with the adoption of *Agenda 2063* by AU to the present, while pre-Agenda information is considered as background and context.

[7] The *Red Plan* was hastily put together during the independent years; and it advocated for World Bank assistance with regard to land redistribution and attraction of foreign investment for the industrial sector (Green, 1965:259). The Red Plan was replaced by the *Green Plan* in 1966, which continued with reliance on foreign capital for investment in mining, manufacturing, electricity, water, and the hospitality industry (Rothchild, 1970:747).

[8] RDP was proposed to the ANC by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to the ANC before the 1994 elections. It aimed at creating "better lives for all" through social policies such as state housing, electrification, access to education, health care, and water for the majority of marginalised South Africans. It was replaced by GEAR in 1996, that advocated for macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline, which led to economic growth but left millions unemployed (Habib, 2013:6).

1.3. Research Questions

Given the problem statement above, this study will address the following research questions:

- How do we analyse neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism?
- What are the colonial contradictions that remained during the independence processes of Kenya in 1963 and South Africa in 1994?
- What is the relationship, if any, between former colonisers and comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya?
- What is the relationship, if any, between former colonialists and comprador bourgeoisies in South Africa?
- What is the implication of the Faustian pact on development?
- How far is the implementation of *Agenda 2063's* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in Kenya and South Africa?

1.4. Research Objectives

Flowing from the argument outlined above, the overall objective of the research is to critically analyse the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The critical analysis deal with the following objectives:

- To analyse neo-colonial theory as theory of imperialism;
- To explain the colonial contradictions that remained during independence processes of Kenya in 1963 and South Africa in 1994;
- To explain the relationship between former colonisers and comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya;
- To explain the relationship between former colonialists and comprador bourgeoisies in South Africa;
- To determine the implications of the Faustian pact on development;
- To analyse *Agenda 2063* and evaluate the progress made towards the implementation of *Agenda 2063's* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in Kenya and South Africa.

1.5. Contribution

The thesis contributes to de-coloniality as a body of scholarly knowledge. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on the leadership question in SSA, and the literature on the political economy of Kenya and South Africa.

The critical analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa contributes to the debate on leadership or lack thereof in SSA. Leadership or lack thereof has been attributed to be the catalyst in SSA's underdevelopment (cf. Schwab 2001; Southall & Melber, 2007; Mbeki, 2009; Mills, 2010; Herbst & Mills, 2012). Successful implementation of *Agenda 2063* requires transformative leadership with a political will to mobilise resources for the betterment of SSA (cf. AU Commission, 2015a; Fagbayibo, 2018). Analysis of the case studies indicates that post-independent Kenya and South Africa's comprador bourgeoisies have undermined development in those countries and will undermine the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

SSA's political economy has been a matter of debate since the end of formal colonisation (cf. Turok, 1987; Saul, 2008; Mbeki, 2011; Mills et al., 2017). *Agenda 2063* provides contemporary SSA's political economy, and the desired political economy it advocates for by 2063. Therefore, the thesis offers insight to the debate on the political economy paradigm of SSA, with specific reference to Kenya and South Africa, through the analysis of continental developmental programmes, especially *Agenda 2063*. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a contemporary picture of both case studies as characterised by neoliberal policies that have led to deindustrialisation and profit extraction by MNCs through FDI and free trade (Moyo, 2009; Saul, 2014; Signé, 2019). This is the result of a nominal independence that has ensured the perpetuation of accumulation by dispossession through neoliberalism (Mwaura, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Lopes et al., 2017). Not much has been written about *Agenda 2063* apart from a few articles questioning the realism of the agenda's aspirations and its implementation (cf. Achieng, 2014; Arowolo, 2014; Anderson, 2015; Turner et al., 2015). The thesis thus also contributes to the debate on *Agenda 2063* and its implementation.

The thesis concludes that the independence processes of both case studies led to nominal independence in which both countries found themselves under the neoliberal capitalism thrall, due to the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the

domestic business class, and foreign capital. Therefore, the thesis provides a contribution to the de-coloniality debate, which argues that SSA countries are within the colonial matrix of power (cf. Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). The thesis offers an analysis located within the post-independent neo-colonial epoch. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:3) defines contemporary SSA as a post-colonial neo-colonised world that is culturally captured systemically, politically, militarily, and economically. Through neo-colonial theory, the thesis indicates that colonialism in SSA was followed by neo-colonialism rather than post-colonialism, and that MNCs still use their financial power to impoverish Kenya and South Africa. Both case studies have seen the perpetuation of the colonial model of accumulation by dispossession through privatisation, tariff reduction and fiscal discipline, facilitated by the comprador bourgeoisies (Lopes et al*.,* 2017:41 Olivier, 2019:11). According to Nkrumah (1965), neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility, and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. Consequently, the thesis puts into perspective the saying "*Not yet Uhuru*", meaning that the majority of people in Kenya and South Africa, except for the comprador bourgeoisies are yet to taste the fruits of freedom. Furthermore, the thesis feeds into the body of knowledge related to neo-colonial theory.

1.6. Research Design

The study used qualitative research that allowed for an in-depth description and understanding of the subject under evaluation (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:53). According to Creswell (2013:44), qualitative research begins with assumptions and the use of interpretive/theoretical frameworks that inform the study of research problems addressing the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. With qualitative research, the study's epistemology is focused on compradorism in post-independent Kenya and South Africa.

1.6.1. Research Methodology

The study employed a non-comparative multi-case study method that entails analyses of secondary sources such as academic literature, research reports, and audio/visual material. The sources included literature concerning national policies, continental

programmes and neo-colonial theory, which provided a theoretical foundation for the thesis.

An exploratory, analytic and explanatory approach was used, following the selection of the theoretical literature. This research design best suited the overarching research objective, to critically analyse the comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya and South Africa concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Given the theme of compradorism, which has not received much attention in Africa, especially when compared to Latin America and the Balkans (cf. Frank, 1969; Klein, 2008; Mitrovic, 2010), exploratory research was warranted. Furthermore, explanatory research was utilised, as the thesis sought to understand the relationship between variables and also to demonstrate that one variable – neo-colonialism – causes change in another variable, development.

1.6.2. Literature Review

The literature review employed in this study highlighted four key issues and themes that related to the study: post-independent SSA; comprador bourgeoisies; underdevelopment of SSA, and *Agenda 2063*. Firstly, the question of post-independent SSA has received much attention as commentators seek to understand contemporary SSA. Post-independent SSA is engulfed in underdevelopment, and various schools of thought have attempted to explain this (cf. Rodney, 1972; Ake, 1996; World Bank, 2000; Schwab, 2001; Mbeki, 2009 & 2011; Carmody, 2011; Mills & Herbst, 2012).

Liberal economists tend to explain underdevelopment as “un-development” in the initial stages of incumbent developed nations (cf. Kalyegira, 2017). Commentators such as Herbst and Mills (2012) and Ibrahim and Cheri (2013), emphasise supposedly wrong policies pursued by SSA leaders, that have led to underdevelopment, and state that they therefore should adopt Western economic policies to catch up with developed countries. Centrists explain underdevelopment as inherent deficiencies which range from lack of entrepreneurial and technological skills and low labour productivity, to capital and investment shortages between SSA and other regions (Le Roux & Moloka, 2001:15). Commentators such as Mbeki (2009), Khaddar (2012) and Igwemma et al. (2015), have attributed post-independence challenges to issues of leadership or lack thereof.

Liberal commentators entirely fail to analyse SSA’s underdevelopment and neo-colonialism. The thesis uses neo-colonial theory to explain SSA’s underdevelopment and

the role of the comprador bourgeoisies. Fanon (1963) in the *Wretched of the Earth*, describes the character of national post-independence bourgeoisies in the *Pitfalls of National Consciousness*. His ideas are found to be relevant for new and newly mutated varieties of colonisation today (Olivier, 2019: 4). The national bourgeoisies in post-independent SSA have continued with the colonial economic system concerned with agricultural and raw materials exploitation, which is consumptive and destructive rather than productive. Nkrumah (1965) in his *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism,* explains that post-independent neo-colonial Africa, in which Africa is still subjected to imperial exploitation and economic control, has led only to nominal independence.

Marxism-Leninism, which refers to a doctrine of communism derived from the ideas of Marx and Lenin, provides a comprehensive critical analysis of capitalism, but is found wanting on neo-colonialism, hence the utilisation of neo-colonial theory. Karl Marx's 1867 *Das Kapital* (*Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*), explains economic patterns that underpin the capitalist mode of production. Exploitation of labour is described as the motivating force for capitalism, thus creating contradictions. Capitalists' exploitation of labour leads to the self-expansion of capital, which in turn leads to the concentration and centralisation of capital, described by Lenin and Hilferding as monopolistic. This, according to Marx (1840), leads to internationalisation or capital expansion. Marx is complemented by Lenin (1916) in his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, where he explains the exportation of contradictions to colonies and their international manifestation. In *Contemporary Imperialism*, Samir Amin (2003) explains contemporary globalised capitalism and accumulation by dispossession, while Mignolo (2007) contributes to the argument that coloniality is the logic of the polycentric capitalist world of today.

Current literature on *Agenda 2063* focuses on its implementation and the realism of the agenda's aspirations. Turner et al. (2015) interrogates the practicality of the *Agenda 2063* goals, with specific reference to goals regarding poverty eradication. Turner et al. (2015) conclude that SSA countries are unlikely to eradicate poverty by 2063 and that they can only reduce extreme poverty to below 4 percent by 2045. Arowolo (2014) provides a context regarding *Agenda 2063* and the challenges that have the potential to hinder its implementation. Ndou (2016) argues that for successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*, good governance is a prerequisite. For successful implementation, El Fassi and Aggad

(2014) investigate the opportunities and challenges of securing alternative financing for the *Agenda*. This thesis focuses on the *Agenda*'s implementation from the comprador bourgeoisies' point of view. Because of the relationship between foreign capital and the comprador bourgeoisies, the aspirations and goals of *Agenda 2063* might not be achieved.

1.7. Chapter Outline

This thesis is structured as eight chapters that seek to address the overall objectives of the thesis, with a critical analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent South Africa and Kenya concerning the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The second chapter of the thesis is a theoretical and conceptualisation chapter that served as a foundation for the critical analysis. Neo-colonial theory is analysed as a theory of imperialism.

The third chapter explains the independence process, which was filled with contradictions and excluded the progressive part played by liberation movements in both countries. The chapter focuses on the independence process, which established the analysis of post-independent Kenya and South Africa.

Chapter 4 analyses the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, which led to the perpetual exploitation of Kenya. The Faustian pact is illustrated through neo-colonial mechanisms in which economic policies play a critical role in preserving the colonial economy in post-independent Kenya. The post-independent Kenyan state under the comprador bourgeoisies has adopted neoliberal policies that have perpetuated profit extraction and kept Kenya as an agriculture-dependent country.

Chapter 5 analyses the Faustian pact between the comprador, the domestic business class, and foreign capital in South Africa. This relationship, which is based on preserving the interests of the comprador bourgeoisies, the MEC, and foreign capital has compromised the developmental trajectory. Neoliberal economic policies adopted by the ANC since independence have co-opted the comprador bourgeoisies in the maintenance of the MEC dominance in the economy, while economically excluding all else.

Chapter 6 illustrates that in both case studies, neo-colonialism has negatively hindered development. This was found through historical analysis of the continental development programmes. Neoliberalism also compromised development in both case studies, demonstrated through the non-implementation of continental programmes by the comprador bourgeoisies, despite their ratifying and committing to the programmes. The comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital all benefit from this underdevelopment.

Chapter 7 evaluates the strides made in implementing the *Agenda 2063* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in Kenya and South Africa. The chapter focuses on the analysis of *Agenda 2063* as an AU developmental programme.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and focuses on whether the implementation of *Agenda 2063* is possible in the current neo-colonial epoch. Neo-colonialism not only perpetuates underdevelopment, but also hinders any chance for industrialisation in neo-colonised countries.

CHAPTER 2: AN ANALYSIS OF NEO-COLONIAL THEORY AS A THEORY OF IMPERIALISM

2.1. Introduction

Every year on 25 May, Africans celebrate Africa Day, which commemorates the formation of the OAU, the struggle for independence, and their triumph over colonialism. These celebrations happen despite the harsh realities faced by the continent and its masses. The celebrations obscure the reality of neo-colonialism in SSA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:71). Conflict, the "big man syndrome[9]", corruption, poverty, inequality, unemployment, and underdevelopment are widespread throughout the continent, and have dented the chance of Africa claiming the 21st century as an African century. While cognisant of the many theoretical tools of analysis, the thesis utilises neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism to understand the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa. For this thesis, Fanon is a leading theorist. He articulates that independence processes were filled with compromises by the comprador bourgeoisies (1963:62). Woddis (1967:86-91) argues that compromise led to neo-colonialism, as is evidenced by foreign capital, foreign aid, and economic policies in the former colonies. Furthermore, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 12) argues that neo-colonialism is not the last stage of imperialism as Nkrumah (1965) would have us believe, but that neo-colonialism today underpins global coloniality in the form of globalisation. These theorists, in one way or another, argue that attaining political independence did not lead to freedom and economic independence, and that SSA still finds itself within the snare of imperialism. Thus, these theorists fall within the neo-colonial theory framework.

The utilisation of theories of imperialism is paramount to the understanding of the status quo that is dominated by global neoliberal capitalism, and the position of SSA within global neoliberal capitalism. Theories of imperialism seek to explain political and economic expansion and domination of the world by advanced capitalist countries (Noonan, 2010). These theories differ on the origins and purpose of imperialism (Winslow, 1931:714). Those of the Marxism-Leninism school of thought claim that imperialism is an economic phenomenon (Harvey, 2003). However, Schumpeter (1951) disputed this,

[9] The term within the political science, refers to corrupt, autocratic and often totalitarian rule of countries by a single person.

despite being avowedly influenced by Marx's economic interpretation of history. He claims that capitalism did not require imperialism to nurture its growth at any stage of its development, and that imperialism is an atavism (Kautsky, 1961:102; Etherington, 1982a:386). Many classical theorists reject this argument, as they continue to define imperialism as a capitalist phenomenon. Besides differing on the definition of imperialism, Hobson (1902) and Luxemburg (1951) link imperialism to the scramble for Africa and use imperialism interchangeably with colonialism (Etherington, 1982b:2). However, Hobson also argues that the colonies did not contribute to the industrial development of Britain or of any European nation for that matter. Neo-colonial theorists build on the argument of the Marxist-Leninists, and demonstrate that the plundering of SSA led to the development of Europe.

According to Fanon (1963:65), colonies in the early stages of imperialism were viewed as sources of cash crops, cheap labour, and raw materials that were turned into manufactured goods for the European markets. However, the colonies would later become markets for European products (Kautsky, 1961:111). However, the status quo was exacerbated post-independence as a consequence of neo-colonialism. The post-independence economy continued to produce primary products meant for developed countries, and economic policies ensured the exploitation of labour and the extraction of profits by MNCs. Accordingly, as a result of the Faustian pact, the economies of former colonies are geared to serve the comprador bourgeoisies and the various foreign interests that are detrimental to the masses (Mwaura, 2005:5). Such SSA economies, as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, rely heavily on the foreign investment that is still used by MNCs to impoverish former colonies, thus undermining continental development. According to Nkrumah (1965:1), MNCs from imperialist countries still benefit from exploitation of the continent and its masses. In spite of their formal sovereignty, many former colonies are economically subjugated and exploited through instruments such as foreign aid, foreign capital, foreign trade, and foreign technology (Sunil, 2010:59). This is made possible by the comprador bourgeoisies in their Faustian pact with foreign capital. Sartre (1963:1) states that when the national bourgeoisies take over power the newly independent state, in spite of its formal sovereignty, remains in the hands of imperialism.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism used in the analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya

and South Africa. Fanon is a leading theorist in the thesis, complemented by Nkrumah, Woddis, Rodney, and Cabral in their analysis of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Neo-colonial theory demonstrates that colonisation did not end with the attainment of political independence but evolved to neo-colonialism, with their economies externally controlled (Woddis, 1967:10). The chapter traces the discourse on imperialism as an economic phenomenon from classical Marxism, neo-Marxism, and Dependency Theory to neo-colonial theory, with these theories feeding off each other. The conceptualisation of the comprador bourgeoisies, the Faustian pact, and neo-colonialism derive from this analysis, since the concepts are tools that we can explain, criticise, argue and analyse (Heywood, 2013:18). The chapter begins with the conceptualisation and an explanation of capitalism, as imperialism is an extension of capitalism.

2.2. Capitalism

Scholars differ on the definition of imperialism; on one hand, there is a group from the Marxist tradition, namely, Lenin (1999), Luxemburg (1951), and Sweezy and Baran (1968) that define imperialism as an inevitable stage of capitalism. On the other hand, theorists such as Hobson (1902), Hilferding (1991) and Bukharin (1973) define imperialism as a policy of finance capital and capitalist states. Whether a policy or a stage, one deduces from the aforementioned that imperialism is a phenomenon of capitalism. Therefore, it is paramount to define and analyse capitalism in order to understand imperialism and colonialism. According to Brewer (1990:5), capitalism refers to a model of production characterised by the employment of free wage-labour in privately owned businesses producing for the market. To Marx (1961), capitalism is based on labour exploitation, through which the owners of means of production accumulate surplus value. In the capitalist epoch, land, money and labour were characterised as commodities (Polanyi, 1944:68). Capitalism has evolved with changes in production, and this has resulted in stages of capitalistic development. The following paragraphs briefly explain the development of capitalism.

Capitalism can be traced back to as early as the 13th and 14th centuries in the Italian cities of Venice, Genoa, and Florence, where features of capitalism such as individual enterprise, speculation, advances on credit, and commercial profits were found (Pirenne, 1914:1496-7; Hilton, 1952:34). Nonetheless, modern capitalism derived from England, followed by Western Europe, in the 1500s (Amin, 2007:1156). According to Comninel

(2000:2), capitalism is the natural product of unfettered development, requiring at most the removal of such obstacles as those imposed by feudalism. Feudalism gave way to agrarian capitalism, which formed part of the stages of capitalistic development, including Mercantile Capitalism; Industrial Capitalism; Finance Capitalism; and global neoliberal capitalism, which is underpinned by accumulation by dispossession.

From feudalism where land ownership was concentrated on a few, landlords and serfs were forced to work the land. Agrarian capitalism is whereby land was owned by large landowners and rented to large-scale tenant capitalist farmers (Shaw-Taylor, 2012:2) – was a process of transition to capitalism. Agrarian capitalism entails landlords who own the land and capitalist farmers who own the land and also lease the land from landlords and landless peasants who sell their labour for subsistence wages (Sua, 1990: 181; Blackburn, 2017: 472). Sixteenth century England was characterised by this three-way struggle between landlords, capitalist tenant farmers, and landless peasants working on the farms for their rent and wages. Agrarian capitalism was accompanied by dispossession of land, displacement of large numbers of people and their exploitation; patterns that were reproduced in the colonies (Wood, 1998:21). Agrarian capitalism gave way to mercantile capitalism.

Mercantile capitalism coincided with the colonialisation of colonies in America, India, and the Caribbean, and the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Gras, 1942:29). It was a system of wider trade with large amounts of capital, and an unprecedented growth of control (Gras, 1942:28). According to Marx (1954), the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn of capitalist production in Africa. Mbeki (2009) states that the principles of mercantile capitalism, selling cheap and buying dear, have remained with Africa until the present, and have contributed to the continent's underdevelopment. However, resources from the colonies assisted with the development of industrialisation in imperialist countries as these countries transitioned from mercantile to industrial capitalism (Blackburn, 2017:475).

Industrialisation entailed new techniques of machinery production dominated by railway and steamship operations, with distribution inland as well as to the coastal regions (Gras, 1942:30). Industrial capitalism coincided with Adam Smith's *laissez faire* and Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, which became the basis for free trade (Steger & Roy, 2010:2). This was contrary to mercantile capitalism, where monarchs exercised control

over their economy (Steger & Roy, 2010:2). European industrialisation resulted in the colonisation of Africa, as the continent satisfied the European industrial needs in terms of the supply of raw materials and cheap agricultural products (Rodney, 1972:163).

The colonisation of Africa was accompanied by the rise of monopoly capital – a merger between industrial capital and financial capital into finance capital. Finance capital entails the rise of monopoly capital, a shift from price competition, and a high degree of concentration (Hilferding, 1910). Monopolisation coincided with protectionism and expansion, in which large territories were occupied and closed off from foreign competition. This resulted in the scramble for Africa and the subsequent Berlin Conference (1884), to ensure protectionism was maintained and conflict avoided. Finance capital gave rise to neoliberalism, which later became associated with the Washington Consensus[10] in the 1980s.

Monopolies continue under neoliberalism and perpetuate unequal exchange in the former colonies. Given that we live in what scholars call the "age of neoliberalism", it is important to define the concept. According to Harvey (2006:145), neoliberalism refers to a politico-economic theory advocating that human wellbeing can best be advanced by maximising entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets, and free trade. It also advocates for minimal state intervention in the markets, but the theory has been criticised for its over-reliance on the markets, which is attributed to underdevelopment in developing countries (Chang, 2007:195). Neoliberalism is characterised by a monopoly of MNCs which have attained financial capacity through a shift from production to finance and rely less on banks and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Lapavitsas, 2011:611). IFIs play a critical role in the expansion of neoliberalism, since the opening of capital markets is now a condition for membership of the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank. This shift of major economic activity from production to finance has resulted in financialisation, which means that investment flows overwhelmingly into the money markets rather than into production and is speculative (Cornell, 2011:13). For instance, in South Africa, financialisation

[10] According to Bond (2000:156), Washington Consensus refers to the 1980s-1990s ideology of the World Bank, IMF, US Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and Washington thinking tanks that were sponsored by MNCs which advocated for privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, and flexibility.

resulted in MNCs listing offshore, the freeing up of exchange controls, and opening spaces in unbundled companies for BEE deals (Cornell, 2011:14).

The aforesaid capitalist development was accompanied by capital expansion. According to Sua (1979:4), capital accumulation that took place as a result of labour exploitation, and led to self-expansion of individual capital[11] and concentration capital. In turn leads to self-expansion of social capital and the centralisation[12] of capital (Sua, 1979:4). The concentration of capital and its centralisation led to a few companies dominating the market and swallowing small companies, thus resulting in monopolisation. An accumulation process is the concentration and centralisation of capital, which at some stage brings about the transformation of competitive capitalism into monopoly capitalism (Sweezy, 1987:41). The self-expansion of social capital and centralisation of capital leads to the internationalisation of capital, which in turn result in imperialism. This internationalisation of capital or capital expansion occurs when self-expansion of social capital can no longer be fully realised inside of a single capitalist social formation (Bald & Levey, 1975:20). Lenin, Hilferding, and Luxemburg, built on Marx's laws of centralisation when analysing monopoly capitalism and imperialism. Luxemburg (1951) refined the argument of under-consumption and economic stagnation that creeps into the capitalist countries forcing capital expansion in search of markets and resources. Sweezy and Baran (1968) argue the opposite, that over-accumulation results in economic stagnation, which can only be resolved through capital expansion. This demonstrates how capitalism goes around in search of cheap labour, resources and markets, which result in imperialism.

The concept of imperialism derives from a Latin word meaning "command", which became synonymous with the word "empire" since the start of the Roman Empire (Curtin, 1974:21). In the British sense, the concept referred to their policy of imposing political control over distant and alien societies (Curtin, 1974:21). The concept has evolved with time, and from the late 19th century, it came to refer to expansion. Harvey (2005) defines imperialism as a product of territorial and capitalist logics of power, where inter-state

[11] This entails a capitalist who has a certain amount of money capital (M); who buys commodities in the form of means of production and labour power and engages in production process (P); from which emerges another set of commodities (C) which in turn becomes commodity capital when the capitalist takes it to the market to be exchanged for a larger amount of money (M) (Sua, 1979:4).

[12] Centralisation of capital refers to the monopolisation process in which larger corporations swallows the smaller ones, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist.

relations and flows of power [manifest] within a global systematic accumulation of capital. The concept entails an expansion of political, economic, militarily, social and cultural hegemony through territorial conquest and/or through the imposition of ideas and values (McCormick, 2013:551). According to Lenin (1999:126), imperialism consists of capitalist countries subjugating underdeveloped territories with colonisation to control their resources and markets.

Consequently, colonisation entailed primitive accumulation such as the taking of land, proletarianisation of the natives and destroying economic and social organisations, expropriating their means of production and introducing capitalist modes of production to serve the interests of the imperialists (Luxemburg, 1951:454). Primitive accumulation evolved to what Harvey (2003:159) called accumulation by dispossession. Harvey (2003:159) defines accumulation by dispossession as a continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had treated as primitive during the rise of capitalism. This entailed the commodification and privatisation of land and the expulsion of peasant populations, and colonial, neo-colonial and imperial process of appropriation of assets that included natural resources (Harvey, 2003:159). Accumulation by dispossession was entrenched and perpetuated in post-independent SSA through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Harvey, 2003:67).

According to Lopes (1999:511), SAPs has its genesis in Africa as a response to the economic crisis in SSA during the 1970s. The SAPs were programmes of conditional lending (Thomson, 2010:197). The World Bank offered SSA countries loans against their acceptance of adjustment programmes that included a set of policy reforms in different areas and the IMF facilitating policy reforms through the Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (Meilink, 2003:6). These SAPs were part of the Washington Consensus, which had spearheaded the global trend towards greater economic liberalisation since the 1980s (Sundaram & von Arnim, 2008:2; Langan, 2015:103). To access loans and aid from the World Bank and the IMF, SSA countries were required to liberalise their economies, opening them to international and domestic private capital, and reducing the role of the state in the economy (Thomson, 2010:197). Liberalisation entailed privatisation, macroeconomic stabilisation, tariff reduction, currency devaluation and deregulation of the private sector, among other things (Langan, 2015:103).

Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius were the first states to introduce SAPs reforms in the 1980s (Thomson, 2010: 197). Kenya adopted policy documents – sessional papers committing to structural adjustment (Zeleza, 1991:39). Mwenzwa and Misati (2014:246) note that while the SAPs had envisaged benefits, they became part of the problem rather than the solution to development in Kenya. Mkandawire (2002) argued that the SAPs placed the continent on a slow growth path. Through these SAPs the World Bank and IMF introduced free market policies in Kenya, mimicking the neoliberal reforms of the Western economies of the time (Thomson, 2010:197). South Africa quickly followed suit with the adoption of GEAR in 1996, while Kenya adopted the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) in early 2000s despite the social devastation such policies inflicted upon the masses.

This section has provided a context for capitalism and imperialism that assisted with the analysis of neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism. Furthermore, the section has demonstrated that imperialism was, in effect, an extension of the capitalism system (Rodney, 1972). In the analysis of contemporary global neoliberal capitalism, the section demonstrates that neo-colonialism underpins neoliberal capitalism. Neo-colonialism perpetuates accumulation by dispossession, which is the central feature of global neoliberal capitalism that was consolidated by the SAPs (Harvey, 2003:67). The following section provides an analysis of the theories of imperialism that contribute to neo-colonial theory.

2.3. Theoretical Framework

The literature on theories of imperialism is extensive, from classical theorists to neo-colonial theorists. Theorists such as Lenin, Burkharin, and Hilferding focused on imperialism in the post-Victorian epoch, explaining the great power rivalries that culminated in World War 1 (Etherington, 1982a:385). Kautsky (1961) and Hobson defined imperialism as aggressive foreign policies attributed to a group of individuals with vested interests (Etherington, 1982a:386). Other theorists analysed imperialism while downplaying colonisation, especially in SSA (cf. Schumpeter, 1951).

The thesis provides a brief overview on theories of imperialism to clarify why neo-colonial theory was chosen to analyse the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa. The overview traces the neo-colonial theory lineage from classical Marxism, with contributions to the theory from Hilferding, Luxemburg, Lenin and

Trotsky. The classical Marxists focused on the role of monopoly, inter-imperialist rivalry, and the creation of colonies to serve the economic interests of the colonisers (cf. Luxemburg, 1913; Hilferding, 1981; Lenin, 1999). Neo-Marxists demonstrated that capitalism had underdeveloped the colonies, and that this status quo continues in post-independence with the help of the comprador bourgeoisies. Dependency theorists argue that with the help of the comprador bourgeoisies, unequal exchange persists in post-independence, and has led to the underdevelopment of periphery/satellite countries. Neo-colonial theorists explain that independence processes were full of compromises that led to the emergence of the comprador bourgeoisies and subsequently, nominal independence. Thus, the comprador bourgeoisies who emerged during independence have perpetuated neo-colonialism. Kenya and South Africa therefore find themselves within the snare of imperialism, and this has impeded development as both countries pursue neoliberal economic policies (cf. Fanon, 1963; Nkrumah, 1965; Mbeki, 2009; and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

The author is familiar with the literature of Winslow's (1931) *Marxian, Liberal and Sociological theories of Imperialism*; Etherington's (1982a) *Theories of imperialism in Southern Africa revisited*; Brewer's (1990) *Marxist theories of imperialism: A critical survey*; Polychroniou's (1991) *Marxists perspective on imperialism: A theoretical analysis*; Howard and King's (1992) *A history of Marxian Economics*; and Noonan's (2010) on *Marxist theories of imperialism: Evolution of a concept*. This thesis contributes to the discourse by adding neo-colonial theory to theories of imperialism and their analysis of post-independent Kenya and South Africa. The chapter borrows from the Winslow (1931) and Noonan (2010) typologies of imperialism. Theories of imperialism are classified in four typologies: Classical Marxism, neo-Marxism, Dependency Theory, and Neo-colonial theory.

2.3.1. Classical Marxism

Marxism is a set of ideas developed by Karl Marx (1818-1883), and even though Marx himself is not defined as a Marxist, his argument on capital expansion earns him a mention in this category. Marxism advocates for the discontinuation of private ownership of capital and means of production, and the creation of a classless society (Shivambu, 2014:21). Marx (1867) did not use the word "imperialism" but had a theory on capitalism and its development, and the impact of capital expansion on non-European societies.

Marx's analysis of capitalism is based on the theory of value[13], in which wage labour and capital are the true sources of value (Cogoy, 1972:398). Through exploitation of labour, capitalists can accumulate surplus value[14], which is then invested to accumulate more capital. Capital accumulation creates major contradictions of capital in the form of the simultaneous emergence of concentrations of wealth and capital (for capitalists), on the one hand, and poverty and oppression for the workers on the other (Marx, 1867).

Capital accumulation as explained by Marx (1867) leads to the self-expansion of capital, where those with resources to buy means of production and force people to sell their labour, find that their capital continues to expand through surplus value (Levey & Bald, 1975:20). The self-expansion of individual capital and social capital leads to a concentration and centralisation of capital (Sau, 1979:5). Expansion of capitalism constantly amplifies the demand for natural resources, land, cheap labour, etc. (Brewer, 1990:30). According to Engels and Marx (1848), capitalism must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, and make connections everywhere. This was the case with colonisation in the 18th century, especially that of India by Britain. Marx (1867) in his analysis, believed that the expansion of capital to non-European societies would lead to their development. He saw colonies as a transient stage in the formation of a wholly capitalist world economy[15] (Brewer, 1990:25). Like Brewer (1990:2), Marx argued that in some places outward expansion was driven by a need for markets. For Marx, Britain's expansion of India was based on economic factors and a search for new markets. According to Marx (1853), from 1818 to 1836 the export of cotton twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. Seen in the context of Britain's export of muslin to India, which was a meagre 1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 yards. This clearly indicates that India served as a market for British products.

Hobson (1858-1940) is mentioned here even though he was not a Marxist. He is included here due to his writing on *Imperialism: A study*, in 1902. Hobson is considered the father of imperialism theory because his writings have influenced various Marxist writers and according to Brewer (1990:20), Hobson presented one of the first coherent accounts of

[13] The theory of value can be traced from Adam Smith (1723-1790), it refers to economic value of products that is determined by amount of labour required to produce it.
[14] Surplus value refers to profit made from exploiting labour and it's a source of wealth of the capitalist class. This is the corner stone of Marx's economic theory.
[15] Marx would later revise this initial view by the 1860s (cf. Hudis, 2010; Kumar, 1992).

imperialism before Luxemburg (1871-1919). Hobson (1902) made a connection between imperialism and capitalist development and viewed imperialism as a policy influenced by wealthy financiers. Hobson (1902) argued that under-consumption led to capital expansion, and was the first theorist to link this with the “scramble for Africa”. He argued that monopoly leads to under-consumption and it is the maldistribution of consuming power that inhibits the absorption of commodities and capital within capitalist countries, which leads to the demand for opening new markets (Mitchell, 1965:409). New markets lead to better prospects of profits from foreign investment, and foreign investment leads to the conquering of colonies (Mitchell, 1965:408; Lloyd, 1972:134), thus extending Marx’s argument on expansion. Hobson (1902) further argued that dealing with under-consumption requires implementing minimum wage laws, thus avoiding the abolishment of capitalism. Imperialism to Hobson (1902) was intertwined with militarism, for expansion was war-like and the retention of control in conquered lands involved a military presence (Wood, 1983:488).

The classical Marxists include commentators such as Lenin (1870-1924), Luxemburg (1871-1919), Hilferding (1877-1941), and Bukharin (1888-1938). Hilferding (1981) was the first Marxist to theorise about imperialism, followed by Bukharin and Lenin. Hilferding incorporated Hobson’s ideas into his own development of Marxism for the 20th century (Wood, 1983:484). In his 1910 book, Hilferding (1981) analysed “organised capitalism” and explained the merging of industrial capital and bank capital into finance capital (monopoly) which leads to imperialism. Hilferding (1981) used Marx’s theory of concentration and centralisation of capital to explain monopolisation and capital expansion which, according to Marx (1887), is tied to joint stock companies. Hilferding (1981) expanded from Marx and argued that joint stock companies become a new form of organisation for capitalist firms. During this epoch, owners and/or managers advance to being shareholders, as company profits are superseded by founder profit (Brewer, 1990:90; Noonan, 2010:31; Czerwinska-Schupp, 2017:17). This merger between industrial capital and bank capital created cartels and trusts which strived for a monopoly position on the world market. Banks were behind the growth of monopoly, according to Hilferding (1981). Hilferding (1981) shared the sentiments of Hobson (1902) that during the epoch of monopolisation and imperialism, the economic role of the state becomes stronger, and this leads to militarism. Hilferding (1981) claims that capital seeks out the cheapest locations for production, the most favourable natural conditions, and the richest

natural resources. Hilferding (1981:326) claimed that Finance Capital policy has three objectives:

> a) To establish the largest possible economic territory (colony), b) to close this territory to foreign competition by a wall of protective tariffs; and consequently, c) to reserve the territory as an area of exploitation for national monopolistic combines.

It's clear from the above quotation that Hilferding (1981:325), like Hobson, viewed imperialism as a policy that leads to the annexation of foreign territories. The quotation also indicates the need of imperialist countries for markets. Hilferding further agreed that imperialism celebrates and promotes racism[16].

Luxemburg (1951) shares Hobson's (1902) emphasis on under-consumption, and also argued that competition pressure leads to capital expansion. According to Luxemburg (1951), competition between capitalists lead to expansion, in searching for raw materials and cheap labour. In *The accumulation of capital*, Luxemburg (1951) argued that capitalism cannot exist in a pure form, but only in conjunction with non-capitalist systems[17]. Thus, she agrees with Marx (1848) that capitalism needs to make connections everywhere and settle everywhere. For Luxemburg (1951), imperialism was a stage in which capitalism had forestalled its imminent collapse. Luxemburg describes expansion as a result of under-consumption because workers receive less value than that which they create, and are unable to purchase and consume all that is produced. To solve this, Le Blanc (2010:163) suggests that capitalism must expand by searching for new markets and raw materials. Expansion incorporates non-capitalist territories into Western capitalist economies (Noonan, 2010:53). For Luxemburg (1951), to sustain capital accumulation and social reproduction on an expanded scale depends on taking over and destroying non-capitalist sectors outside of the Europe and North American spheres (Hudis, 2010:77). Luxemburg (1951) stated that colonies provide fertile soil for capitalism, and that capitalism feeds off the ruins of colonies; thus, only the continuous and progressive

[16] The argument was later taken up by Sweezy and Baran (1968) and extended by Fanon (1963) on his analysis of racial-colonisation in Africa.

[17] Fanon (1963:42) later on argued that colonisation creates a Manichean colonial world that dehumanise the native.

disintegration of colonies makes accumulation of capital possible. Luxemburg (1951) agreed that imperialism is intertwined with militarism.

Like Hilferding (1981) and Lenin (1999), Bukharin (1972) focused on the formation of monopolies and their inter-imperialist rivalry. For Bukharin, imperialism was a policy[18] of capitalism. According to Brewer (1990:115), Bukharin claimed that capitalism had become so organised under finance capital that there was an amalgamation of the capitalist classes of each national bloc of capital. Such was this amalgamation of interests that the state no longer had to arbitrate over competing fractional interests, and thus could be seen as simply reflecting the policies, values and ideals of the magnates of capital. Many states are intimately tied to the capitalist accumulation process, and have become subordinated to the interests of their capitalists. This has led to increased internationalisation of the capitalist accumulation, which was Bukharin's most important contribution to the imperialism debate. Bukharin (1972) believed that the capitalist system would lead to overproduction and that the search for new markets and spheres for capital investment would necessitate new redivision of land and resources (Bukharin, 1972). Therefore, this would lead to militarism between capitalist countries. Imperialist war is an expression of the expansionist policy of monopoly capitalism (Bukharin, 1973). Bukharin (1972) followed Hilferding (1981) on the question of monopolisation. To Bukharin (1972), who was riddled with individualism and competition, capitalism enters the stage of monopoly (i.e. trusts, intergrowth of banking capital and industrial capital, and monopolistic prices).

Lenin (1999) expounded on the work of Hobson (1902), Bukharin (1972), and Hilferding (1981). It was Lenin's analysis of imperialism as a new stage of accumulation that restored the ability of Marxism to advance as a scientific understanding of the economy and society (Mcdonough, 1995:347; Wolfe, 1997:390). Lenin (1999) also argued that the emergence of monopoly capital resolved the great depression at the end of the 19th century (Mcdonough, 1995:339). According to Lapavitsas (2009:102), Lenin (1999) extended Hilferding's (1981) analysis and included "parasitical rentiers" and a greater emphasis on monopoly.

[18] Note that Bukharin's (1973) argument changed with time, he viewed imperialism as policy, sometimes as ideology and sometimes as characteristics of world economy (cf. Brewer, 1990; Noonan, 2010).

Lenin's (1999) theory of imperialism emphasised capital accumulation and its evolution and viewed imperialism as an immense accumulation of capital by a few countries. The exportation of capital as a principle of imperialism isolated rentiers from production and led to parasitism exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies (Lenin 1999:101). According to Lenin (1999:71), the export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries that have been integrated into global capitalism. Export capital take place in a few countries when capitalism has become overripe and capital cannot find a field for profitable investment (Lenin, 1999:71). For Lenin (1999:10) imperialism entailed five basic principles:

> a) The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; b) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation of an oligarchy finance capital; c) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; d) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves; and e) the territorial divisions of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed.

Lenin (1999:85) gave the simplest and shortest definition of imperialism as "the monopoly stage of capitalism". This definition is within the tradition of Marxian thinking in the early 20th century because Lenin followed Hilferding in making this claim (Willoughby, 1995:324). Lenin (1999:93) argued that finance capital and trusts have not diminished but have increased the differences in the rate of growth in various parts of the world economy; what he later called "uneven development". Lenin's theory of imperialism is reflected in Baran and Sweezy's (1968) *Monopoly capital*.

Lenin continued to develop his theory of imperialism, and in 1920 at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin argued that the world was divided between the oppressor nations of the West and the colonies of the South and East. Lenin (1920) stated that 70 percent of the world population lived in oppressed nations (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, the Caribbean Islands, and some East European countries), some

under direct rule and others semi-colonies[19]. The semi-colonies thesis would be expanded by neo-colonial theorists in their articulation of neo-colonialism. In the 19th century, capitalism had grown into a world-system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation of most people of the world by handful of advanced countries (Lenin 1999:392). Lenin and Roy's (1920) analysis of colonies came with the realisation that the workers' revolution in Europe was postponed because of the proletariats being bought off by the bourgeoisies by intensifying exploitation in the colonies (Wolfe, 1997:392). This realisation led to the discovery that as such, proletariat in the colonies would not wait for the metropolitan proletariats to lead a revolution against capitalism as prescribed by Marx, as they argued for an alliance between politically conscious proletariats and peasants in colonies, supported by Communist International and the Communist Parties[20] (Lenin 1920).

In their analysis of colonies in their document; *National and the Colonial Questions*, 1920, Lenin (1920) was forced to analyse the national elites of the colonies and their relationship with the imperialist bourgeoisies. Because colonialism creates a class of intermediaries (national elites of the colony) between the colonisers and the colonised, Lenin (1920) warned that there is "a certain rapprochement between the bourgeoisies of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies, so that very often – perhaps even in most cases, the bourgeoisies of the oppressed countries, while it does support the national movement, it is in full accord with the imperialist bourgeoisies, i.e., joins forces with it against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes". According to Lenin (1920) these national elites (who take over after independence) which he later terms as comprador bourgeoisies[21], play a vacillating role between the masses of the colonised and the imperialist bourgeoisies. Lenin's writing can be traced to the conceptualisation of neo-colonialism theory.

[19] Lenin (1920) defined semi-colonies as countries that have attained formal independence but are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.

[20] Note that this took place during the Russian Revolution of 1917 in October in which politically conscious Russian proletariat sustained a revolutionary vanguard that ensured that Russia skip over the capitalist mode of production and proceed straight to a socialist revolution (Wolfe, 1997:393).

[21] The word comprador is a Portuguese word for buyer and it originated in Asia and referred to a Chinese servant to a Western merchant (cf. Heartfield, 2003:199). The word was later extended to Chinese merchant in foreign concessions, with a derogatory implication. The concept was later used by Marxists to define national elites with links to foreign capital during imperialism.

In his analysis of colonialism, Lenin concluded that two wings existed in the native bourgeoisies: one seeking revolutionary change and the other compromising with imperialism. Nath Roy, the Indian revolutionary and political activist, rejected the two wings of the national bourgeoisie thesis, and instead stressed the vacillation of the national bourgeoisies between two wings, a position which Lenin (1920) later accepted. Roy had clearly indicated that during the freedom movement, the bourgeoisies in India played a vacillating role. Lenin would later argue for the dual role of the national bourgeoisies.

Mao (1967) and Trotsky (1927) would use Roy's thesis in describing Chinese national bourgeoisies. Mao (1967) stressed that the "national bourgeoisie, when it suffers blows from foreign capital and oppression of warlords, it feels the need of a revolution and favours the revolutionary movements against imperialism but when the proletariat at home takes a militant part in a revolution, it becomes sceptical about the revolution." Trotsky (1906) expounded on this argument and described the comprador/national bourgeoisies as follows:

> "In the epoch of imperialism, the national bourgeoisie was inseparably linked to the remains of feudalism on the one hand and to imperialist capital on the other and therefore, completely unable to carry through any of its historical tasks. The weak and degenerate bourgeoisie in Asia, Latin America and Africa is too dependent on foreign capital and imperialism to carry society forward".

Leninism would later form a big part of neo-colonialism theory and its analysis of comprador bourgeoisies (Willoughby, 1995:322). Nkrumah incorporated the ideas of Lenin in his analysis and struggle against imperialism (Carmichael, 1973).

2.3.2. Neo-Marxism

Except for the work of Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), Marxist theories of imperialism had received little attention since the death of Lenin, but that changed with the writing of Sweezy and Baran's joint work, *Monopoly Capital* (1968), Sweezy's *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (1970), and Baran's *Political Economy of Growth* (1976). Sweezy and Baran extended Hobson and Hilferding's argument on the key role played by

militarism during the imperialist epoch, and the inter-imperialist rivalry. Nevertheless, they differed with classical theorists on the question of over-accumulation and development in colonies. Sweezy and Baran (1968) argued that monopoly capitalism stifles development in colonies and neo-colonial states. Monopoly capitalism utilises the flow of trade, the flow of surplus, and politico-military influence to perpetuate underdevelopment. This argument forms an integral part of neo-colonial theory and theorists such as Nkrumah (1965) and Woddis (1967) have identified trade and profit extraction as mechanisms of neo-colonialism. Baran (1976) later argued that this underdevelopment was entrenched with the help of the comprador bourgeoisies, who consume instead of produce. According to Mbeki (2009:27), elite consumption has resulted in profits diversion and capital flight that has fostered the underdevelopment of SSA countries.

In their individual projects and their joint work, Sweezy and Baran relied on under-consumption to explain the lack of demand and stagnation that they believed were integral to monopoly capital. However, they later changed the discourse to over-accumulation theory as understood within the tradition of Rosa Luxemburg (Foster, 2004; Pineault, 2016:11). According to Sweezy (1970:2), over-accumulation results when the surplus is greater than the available investment outlets. This leads to stagnation because the surplus cannot be absorbed. In their joint work, Sweezy and Baran (1968) further argued that over accumulation and monopoly capital lead to capitalism's stagnation and restriction on output and investment, instead of development. In mature capitalism, the sphere of production is incapable of absorbing new investment of the ever-expanding surplus generated by monopolies (Lapavitsas, 2009:2). Production therefore stagnates, and capital seeks refuge in circulation (Lapavitsas, 2009:2). It is only under these circumstances that lagging consumer power threatens to plunge societies into deep and permanent stagnation and hence give rise to the most monstrous and destructive forms of forced consumption (Sweezy, 1970:51).

This was clearly reflected in underdeveloped countries, where the capitalist system changed from being the engine of economic development to a hindrance (Baran, 1976:402). In underdeveloped countries the "surplus" is partly absorbed by the luxury spending of the ruling class, but much of it is transferred to the developed countries (as profits), where it contributes to the problem of absorbing the rising surplus (Brewer, 1990:21). This is typically what is currently transpiring in Kenya and South Africa, as most

countries sell raw materials and agricultural products at a meagre price and in turn spend the money on value added goods from developed countries. In addition, in both countries, MNCs are allowed to extract profits through economic policies and legislation.

The neo-Marxists focused on lack of development, a clear change of emphasis from the focus of classical Marxists, and this formed a focal point for the neo-Marxist analysis of imperialism (Noonan, 2010:100). Sweezy and Baran (1968) claimed that monopoly capital was stifling colonial industrial development and causing economic stagnation in the colonies, thus turning the classical Marxists' argument on its head. Classical Marxists believed that the introduction of capitalism would lead to industrial development in the colonies (Noonan, 2010:98). However, neo-Marxists disputed this and argued that the lack of development in the colonies was to be blamed on the relationship between the colonies and the metropolitan, which reflected dependency, exploitation and oppression (Noonan, 2010:91). Even in those countries that gained political independence, dependence was maintained in a new form through the mechanism of economic infiltration[22] (Baran, 1976:123). This method was championed by America's "open door policy" post-World War II. Baran (1976:118) noted that the domination of imperialist powers over underdeveloped countries meant a lack of industrialisation and economic stagnation. Sweezy and Baran articulated the relationship between imperialist countries and underdeveloped countries in three ways: flow of trade; flow of surpluses; and politico-military influence. Neo-Marxists furthered the argument of Hilferding (1981) and Hobson (1902) that racial superiority formed part of the ideological armoury of imperialism; a thesis which was clearly articulated by neo-colonial theorists.

In his analysis of the persistence of underdevelopment, Baran (1976) extended the argument of Lenin and Trotsky and stressed the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in maintaining underdevelopment. Baran (1976) described comprador bourgeoisies as a powerful bloc of mercantile interests linked to foreign capital that included enterprises acting as suppliers, agents and subcontractors, and those in the exporting and importing business. In championing their own interests, they also championed the interests of foreign capital, as their interests are intertwined (Baran, 1976).

[22] Note this argument is the backbone of the neo-colonial theorists.

2.3.3. Dependency Theory

The neo-Marxists' argument gave birth to the Dependency Theory, as a response to the failure of capitalist development in various parts of the world. Dependency theorists regard capitalism as a world-system that creates underdevelopment, thus contradicting Marx and the classical Marxists. According to Brewer (1990:18), capitalism is not defined by a specific relation between classes, but by production for profit in a world-system of exchange, and by the exploitation of some areas by others. To the Dependency theorists, underdevelopment is not a natural state of backwardness, but it results from the imposition of a pattern of specialisation and exploitation in the periphery (Brewer, 1990:18). Exchange relations are paramount within the theory of Dependency. The section will focus on argument of the three catalysts in the Dependency Theory realm: Andre Gunder Frank on *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*: *Historical studies of Chile and Brazil (1967)*, and his *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (1969)[23]; Samir Amin on *Accumulation on a World Scale (1971)*, *and Unequal Development (1973)*; and Wallerstein on the *Modern World-System (1974)*.

Frank (1969) defined capitalism as a system of exchange relations, to some extent moving away from Marx's theory of labour. This put a spotlight on the relations of exploitation, which were explained through metropolis-satellite relations, where the metropolis develops at the expense of the satellites. Frank (1969) extended the argument of Sweezy and Baran (1968), and like most Dependency theorists, argued that underdevelopment and economic stagnation in the colonies and former colonies resulted from the presence rather than the absence of capitalism (Wolfe, 1997:393). Frank (1969:5-7) noted that the expansion of capitalism over the past centuries had effectively and entirely penetrated even the most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world, and that most colonies and former colonies were incorporated fully into the expansion and development of mercantile, and later, industrial capitalism. For Frank and Gills (1992:1) the chain of the metropolis-satellites could be traced from five thousand years ago, differing from Lenin (1999), who traced imperialism from the 18th century.

[23] These was followed by two projects as a response to critics and modification of his previous positions: *Lumpen-bourgeoisie and Lumpen-development: Dependency, class and politics in Latin America*, 1972 and *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*, 1978.

In his analysis of underdevelopment in Latin America, Frank (1969) extended and developed Lenin's (1920) argument on the comprador bourgeoisies, but made a distinction between national bourgeoisies and comprador bourgeoisies[24]. He stressed the separation between landowning comprador bourgeoisies and the pro-industry national bourgeoisie. The landowning comprador bourgeoisies[25] proved decisive and became the dominant ruling class in Latin America, which worked with imperialists to transform Latin American countries into underdeveloped countries (Frank, 1972). Frank argued that the export-oriented comprador bourgeoisies were able to triumph over their pro-industrial counterparts with the help of imperialist Europe. Therefore, the comprador bourgeoisies in colonies and former colonies owe their position to their place in the "chain" that runs from the countryside to the imperialist metropolis (Frank, 1972:13). The comprador bourgeoisies pursued an export economy by passing legislation that made it difficult for local industries to develop and compete with European imports. This was done by brute force, like Pinochet in Chile, who crushed any dissent to the comprador policies. The comprador bourgeoisies led their countries to what Frank called lumpen-development[26]. The comprador bourgeoisies were dependent on certain European commercial and financially interested parties who bought their goods, provided credit, and serviced foreign capital (Allahar, 1990:232). These comprador bourgeoisies are responsible for perpetuating the colonial status quo in post-independence, while the national bourgeoisies are marginalised.

Like Frank (1969), Wallerstein (1974) placed emphasis on exchange relations. Wallerstein analysed the world-system into a single unit of analysis. In his *Modern World-System*, Wallerstein (1974) defined the world as core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries. According to Brewer (1990:167), there are superficial similarities between Wallerstein's core-periphery model, Frank's (1969) "chain" of metropolis-satellites, and the classical Marxists' theories of imperialism. According to Wallerstein (1974), the core countries exploit the peripheral countries through direct extraction of profits, unequal exchange, and monopoly over trade. Semi-peripheral countries were introduced as an

[24] The Eastern European commentators made a separation between the political elites, the and comprador bourgeoisie, and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in their analysis of post-socialist countries (cf. Mitrovic, 2010).

[25] Frank used comprador bourgeoisie interchangeably with lumpen bourgeoisie, by which he meant native colonial and neo-colonial elites.

[26] Samir Amin made the same argument and stressed that the comprador class adopted models which meets the requirements of the dominant global system (Liberal-internationalism).

intermediary between core and peripheral countries, with semi-peripheral countries exploiting the peripheral countries while being exploited by the core countries (Wallerstein, 1974). Therefore, peripheral countries are dependent on core countries and therefore find it hard to break free from underdevelopment.

As separated in three levels, the world-system translated into a division of labour between the three spheres. According to Wallerstein (1974:349), this division of labour was not only functional but also geographical, with economic tasks unevenly spread throughout the world-system. The division of labour has seen the partition of Africa, in which Africa provides cheap raw material, agricultural products. and cheap labour, but the division has never been static e.g. Britain during the industrial capitalism epoch changed its division of labour from agricultural exporter to the role of "workshop of the world" (Noonan, 2010:141). The same could be said of some East Asian countries. Dependency theorists argue that capital accumulation is not seen as a precondition for genuine, qualitative advance in the levels and methods of production, but rather as a redivision of fixed magnitude, a transfer of resources from the exploited periphery to the centre (Brewer, 1990:18). Frank (1969) and Wallerstein (1974) were criticised for ignoring the role of relations in production when determining the dynamics and class structure of the system (Brewer, 1990:22).

Similar to Wallerstein, Samir Amin (1931-2018) saw capitalism as a world-system upon which national states depended, and that class, modes of production, and social transformation were all to be analysed in a world context. In his *Accumulation on a World Scale* (1970), Amin argued that accumulation divides social formation into two categories: the centre, and those of the periphery, thus differing from Wallerstein (1974). According to Brewer (1990:22), Amin incorporated a formal analysis of international exchange into an account of accumulation on the world scale. Amin (1974) argued that capitalism imposes a pattern of specialisation which limits future development, and that since its inception, capitalism has always been imperialistic. Furthermore, as it is facilitated in former colonies by the comprador bourgeoisies, it leads to lumpen development. According to Amin (1976:148), at the end of formal colonisation neo-colonial regimes were characterised by the rapid enrichment of the political classes who used the state apparatus to get a share of foreign capital and invest in consumption.

2.3.4. Neo-colonial theory

After attaining political independence, SSA was mistakenly described as post-colonial, which led to post-colonialism. Post-colonialism refers to a theoretical approach that identifies a historical trajectory of societies emerging from the experience of colonisation (Mbembe, 1992:3). In *Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization*, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) is critical of this term and advocates that it leads to the myth of decolonisation, obscuring the continuing operations of coloniality of power in SSA. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:4) disagrees with the term and defines contemporary SSA as a "post-colonial neo-colonised world". He therefore forms part of the theorists who argue that the end of formal colonisation did not usher in a post-colonial system but neo-colonialism in SSA.

The following theorists, namely, Fanon (1963); Nkrumah (1965); Rodney (1972); and Cabral (2008) argue that SSA still finds itself within the snare of imperialism in post-independence, perpetuated through foreign trade, FDI, and foreign aid. For this thesis, these theorists are thus classified as neo-colonial theorists. Leading de-coloniality theorists such as Quijano (2000), Grosfoguel (2007) and Mignolo (2007), have argued that Africa and other former colonies are still entrapped and entangled in the colonial matrix of power of global coloniality, which consists of four interrelated domains: control of the economy, control of authority, control of gender and sexuality, and control of subjectivity and knowledge. Therefore, decolonisation ought to be multi-faceted and include gender, language, knowledge, culture, religion, education, economics and politics, and military. This demonstrates overlapping ideas between the two schools of thoughts.

For this thesis, Fanon is a leading theorist, complemented by Nkrumah, Rodney and Cabral. Furthermore, the author consulted classical literature on neo-colonialism such as Woddis (1967) on *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism*; Dunn (1978) on *West African States: Failure and Promise*; Mwaura (2005) on *Kenya Today, Breaking the yoke of colonialism in Africa;* and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on *Coloniality of power in postcolonial Africa: Myths of decolonisation*. These theorists argue that the end of formal colonisation was not tantamount to decolonisation and that the former colonies have attained only nominal independence, finding themselves still caught up within colonial trappings. Neo-colonial theorists extended the arguments of classical and neo-Marxists and saw that imperialism,

primarily based on economic factors and the economic exploitation of colonies, was the main focus of colonialism. This was accompanied by militarism and racism which ensured the settlers' economic privileges and the subjugation of the native.

Fanon has written extensively on colonialism, its psychological impact, anti-black racism, national bourgeoisies and decolonisation. His renowned work ranges from *Black Skin, White Mask* (1952) and *A Dying Colonialism* (1959), to *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), and *Toward the African Revolution* (1964). According to Fanon (1963:65), capital expansion was the result of a lack of capital accumulation in developed countries and the search for markets and resources in colonies by imperialist countries. Colonies were therefore treated as markets for sources of raw materials (Fanon, 1963:65). For Woddis (1967:16), colonialism enabled the imperialist powers to rob colonial peoples in a variety of ways, by securing cheap land, cheap labour, and cheap resources. Colonialism guaranteed success to the monopolies against all risks of the struggle against competitors, as imperialists controlled the markets and the sources of raw materials (Woddis, 1967:16). This contributed to the industrialisation of Western Europe, while under developing Africa in the process (Rodney, 1972).

Colonialism is defined as a system of rule which assumes the right of one group of people to impose their will upon another (Mamdani, 1973:643). This entails systematic violence, racism, dispossession, forced labour, and taxation. Colonisation would have been difficult if not impossible without the collaboration of some of pre-capitalist feudal strata – tribal chiefs. To entrench colonial rule, it required the assistance of the colonised – administrators, chiefs, police, etc. The survival of these groups was protected and propped up by imperialist troops (Woddis, 1967:56). For Woddis, colonialism represented an alliance between imperialism and local pre-capitalist forces to protect and advocate for exploitative colonial economic and social systems. From this alliance, the formation of native bourgeoisies who advocated for indigenous capitalism was derived. The colonial system was based on primitive accumulation, through which the colonial state took land from the natives and redistributed it to those who would produce what the colonial state advocated (Ake, 1996:2). This evolved into accumulation by dispossession that was perpetuated by the current globalised neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 2003:67). This was made possible by the imposition of statist economies, where every aspect of colonial economies was controlled to maintain power and domination, and to realise the economic

objectives of colonisation (Ake, 1996:2). Colonies were forced to focus on producing commodities needed by the colonisers. The system was a profitable one for the colonisers, and to remain so, the colonial powers prevented the establishment of industrialisation and development in the colonies (Larrain, 1989:9). Thus, the attainment of independence ought to have meant economic independence for the former colonies.

However, independence processes were characterised by a compromise by the national bourgeoisies (Fanon, 1963:62). For Memmi (1974), the economic aspect of colonisation was fundamental, as this was going to decide the entire future of the colonial people. The colonial powers were seeking new forms through which they could maintain the essentials of their economic domination and still wield political influence (Woddis, 1967:32). This was followed by a compromise between the comprador bourgeoisies and the former colonisers, which entailed disarming and handing over power to preferred candidates (Allen, 2005:4, Turok, 2008:40). The compromise was made possible because the difference in goals between the western educated natives and the colonialists was not that profound (Rodney, 1972). The compromise involved the withdrawal of the colonisers and satisfying the national aspirations of the western educated natives, while the peasants and the majority of workers remained exploited and oppressed (Rodney, 1972). To Fanon (1963:150) the western educated national bourgeoisies were without economic power and sought to replace the metropolitan bourgeoisies. Fanon (1963) never used the term comprador bourgeoisies, but his definition of national bourgeoisies as agents of imperialism aligned with the concept of the comprador bourgeoisies. Thus, for this thesis, the two concepts are used interchangeably.

Comprador bourgeoisies refers to pliable national elites with links to foreign capital. However, scholars differ in their application of this concept. Frank (1972), in analysing Latin America, made a distinction between pro-industry national bourgeoisies and landowning comprador bourgeoisies. The triumph of the latter over the national bourgeoisies led to an export-oriented economy that kept the country underdeveloped. Ngũgĩ (1981) in his analysis of Kenya, refers to the comprador bourgeoisies as the western educated leadership that emerged during the independence process. Ngũgĩ (1981) separated western educated leadership into two camps: one faction included the comprador bourgeoisies and the other, the national bourgeoisies. The comprador bourgeoisies are rooted in colonialism and make up the underdeveloped middle class

that took power post-independence. During the independence process, this group vacillated between the colonisers and the masses, which led to compromise and the disarming of the masses. According to Fanon (1963:62), during the height of the national struggle, the comprador bourgeoisies reached out to the colonisers for a compromise to avoid a total transformation of the system, thus demonstrating their vacillating nature. As such, the thesis rejects the two-faction thesis of the comprador bourgeoisies. Fanon (1963:149) describes them as intermediaries who have no economic power, whose benefit relies on foreign investment, and who are in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisies of the mother country whom they hope to replace.

In the case of Kenya and South Africa, the comprador bourgeoisies still refer to western educated members of the defunct KANU that still holds power today under a different banner, and ANC members in South Africa, who compromised with their former colonisers during the independence process. In *Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary*, Ngũgĩ (1981:53) refers to KANU leaders as comprador bourgeoisies in alliance with imperialism. Louw (1997:84) describes the emergence of the ANC in South Africa after the 1994 elections as the emergence of comprador elites, who would not lead the South African economy to inclusive economic growth. As former settler colonies, Kenya and South Africa both have sizeable numbers of white and Asian populations that dominate their economies. In post-independence, these domestic business classes continue to collaborate with foreign capital as they did during colonialism. In the case of South Africa, some South African firms grew to MNC status and are now listed on stock exchanges around the world. Mbeki (2009:64) makes a distinction between political elites and economic elites. To Mbeki (2009:64), the political elites have the same roots and characteristics as most of those in the rest of SSA and are therefore comprador bourgeoisies. As a result of the disarming and subsequent compromises, the domestic business class in both countries became part of the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital.

The colonisers and settlers were able to capture the ANC and KANU and disarm them through the creation of African bourgeoisies who took power in the post-independence epoch. The creation of bourgeoisies where they did not exist was made to strengthen the imperialist and capitalist camps (Cabral, 1972:71). Consequently, this prevented the emergence of anti-imperialist leadership in the former colonies (Nzongola-Ntalaja,

1984:46). In both case studies, radicals were marginalised. This led to an elite transition and compromise that was entrenched through adopted post-independent constitutions and resulted in the myth of decolonisation obscuring the reality of neo-colonialism in the former colonies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:71).

When the comprador bourgeoisies took power in the newly independent states, in spite of their formal sovereignty, the new states remained in the hands of the imperialists (Sartre, 1963:11). Independence resulted in the emergence of the comprador bourgeoisies scrambling for state privileges, indicating that they were a poor imitation of the imperialist bourgeoisies (Fanon, 1963:152). The attainment of political independence without economic independence that most of the colonies have achieved, has resulted in neo-colonialism and the perpetuation of racism. The captured ANC and KANU comprador bourgeoisies played a big role in the reiteration of the colonial economic model – accumulation by dispossession and domination of former colonies under global neoliberal capitalism. The comprador bourgeoisies clamoured for state privileges, as the state is used as a vehicle to amass wealth and continue exploitation in conjunction with the imperialist bourgeoisies. After independence, the bourgeoisies advocated for nationalisation but to them, nationalisation meant the transfer of resources into native hands, a legacy from the colonial period (Fanon, 1963:152). True to their vacillating nature, the comprador bourgeoisies were willing to side with the colonisers if it meant that they could trade places or at least share the spoils with the white supremacist colonisers and recolonise the nominally independent nation in their own nefarious neo-colonial interests (Rabaka, 2011:138).

The preservation of economic interests of the imperialists, the colonisers and the settlers' economic privileges required an alliance to function. Therefore, the comprador bourgeoisies formed a new alliance with imperialism to perpetuate neo-colonialism (Woddis, 1967:56). The practice of neo-colonialism in SSA was identified early on and was part of the agenda in the Afro-Asian Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference, which took place in Indonesia in 1955. The Conference advocated for economic cooperation as an antithesis to neo-colonialism. At the All-African People's Conference in Cairo in 1961, neo-colonialism was defined as the "survival of the colonial system in spite of the formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which became the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political,

economic, social, military or technological means" (Leys, 1975:26). Nkrumah (1965) pointed a finger at puppet governments for their perpetuation of neo-colonialism and queried how the authority to govern was given. This came not from the people but from their neo-colonial masters, who had no interest in embarking on a developmental trajectory. Woddis (1967:56) expanded on Lenin's (1920) warning on the alliance between national bourgeoisies and foreign capital and Fanon's (1963:104) argument about pacts. Woddis (1967:56) argued that new alliances were required to consolidate neo-colonialism; however, similar to the old alliances, the new alliances were skewed in favour of foreign capital, hence the term Faustian pact.

According to Goethe's *Faust* (1984), a Faustian pact refers to a deal with the devil for a life of limitless wealth and pleasure in return for one's soul for eternity. The concept has been used by many commentators (cf. Haas, 1991; Gevisser, 2009; Desai, 2015; Harper-Shipman, 2020) to explain asymmetrical relations between a more powerful individual and a less powerful individual. Haas (1991:15) used the Faustian pact to describe the relationship between the United States and the Khmer Rouge to counter Vietnam and Russia in Cambodia. Harper-Shipman (2020:12) described the relationship between the Burkina Faso government and its donors as a Faustian-type bargain in which donors, in exchange for their aid, heavily influenced the country's development trajectory. The Faustian pact is an ongoing pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business classes and foreign capital, which is illustrated through political economies that are geared to serve foreign interests. Saul and Bond (2000:7) describe the ANC's relationship with the MEC and their subsequent loan from the IMF as a Faustian pact. For the purpose of this thesis, the Faustian pact is an ongoing agreement between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital for the enrichment of the comprador bourgeoisies and the exploitation of former colonies by foreign capital at the expense of economic independence and policy sovereignty. The Faustian pact is evident in contemporary neo-colonial relations in SSA countries, and has consolidated neo-colonialism through its mechanisms of economic policy, free trade, foreign capital – loans with hefty interest rates, FDI and foreign ownership. Commentators such as Bond (2000) and Carmody (2002) use the term "elite pacting" to explain the relationship between the ANC, the MEC and IFIs, which have all seen the perpetuation of the status quo. Woddis (1967) used the term "alliance", Ngũgĩ (1981) called it the "compradorial alliance", while Turok (1987) and Mbeki (2009) chose "collaboration". All

these terms indicate a relationship between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, to preserve and consolidate neo-colonialism at the expense of Africa's masses.

The comprador bourgeoisies emerged in post-independence through a careful handover to selected heirs to ensure that foreign capital interests were preserved (Turok, 1987:53). In turn, foreign capital had to ensure that this group remained in power. Hence the rise of strong men in many neo-colonial societies, since the bourgeoisie dictatorship in underdeveloped countries draws its strength from the existence of strong leader (Fanon, 1963:166). According to Swainson (1978:359), the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital is relatively stable due to their intertwined interests and is guarded against any radical change in neo-colonialism. Therefore, the Faustian pact is detrimental to the masses (Swainson, 1978:359) as it precludes any radical change to the economy and as a result, traps post-independent states in neo-colonialism.

Westernised African elites who struggled for self-determination, were struggling for their inclusion in the colonial system in order to benefit from the spoils of colonialism (Mbeki, 2009:6). The Faustian pact was pursued through programmes such as "Africanisation", to be co-opted into the neo-colonial economy. In the South African case, the ANC wanted to create a "patriotic" bourgeoisie through the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (B-BBEE[27]), Act 53 of 2003 and Affirmative Action. Nonetheless, the bourgeoisies turned out to be parasitic and rentier instead of patriotic, which has been attributed to their looting of the state (Freund, 2006:1). As a result, South Africa is ranked 44 on the Corruption Perception Index[28] (CPI) of 2019 which is accompanied by impunity (Transparency International, 2020). Kenya pursued Kenyanisation through the Trading Licencing Act of 1967, and the formation of the Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) and the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce (KNCC) as well as settlement schemes (Lubeck, 1987:144-5). These policies were meant to preserve and perpetuate the colonial economy since they did not call for structural transformation of the colonial economy (Lopes et al., 2017:42). Thus, the comprador bourgeoisies serve as allies to

[27] The B-BBEE is a legislative framework for transformation of the South Africa's economy with the aim to advance economic transformation and enhance the economic participation of black people in the South African economy (DTI, 2020).

[28] Note that Corruption Perception Index (CPI) uses a scale from 0 to 100. 100 indicate very clean and 0 indicate highly corrupt (Transparency International, 2020).

foreign capital and are gatekeepers against decolonisation. The Faustian pact created a powerful political lobby against any radical change in both case studies. This was also done to legitimise the exploitative neo-colonial economy that continued in post-independence. Access to state jobs meant access to state resources for the comprador bourgeoisies. They replaced the former white colonial elites but despite this, the exploitation of the African masses continued as before, as did the exploitation of Africa's resources (Mbeki, 2009:6). The comprador bourgeoisies sustain and reproduce themselves by perpetuating the neo-colonial state and by perpetuating the "big man syndrome" through brute force (Mbeki, 2009:16); thus, the structures of oppression and domination are not undermined, they are merely indigenised (Caplan, 1974:131).

According to Fanon (1963:151), colonial relations persist in post-independent Africa as the national bourgeoisies still adhere to colonial economic policies. Nkrumah took Fanon's (1963) argument further by stressing in *Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism*, (1965), that in theory the newly independent states appear independent and have all the outward trappings of international sovereignty but in reality, their economic systems and thus, thier political policies are directed from the outside. Another commentator, Leong (1996), defined neo-colonialism as an indirect form of control through economic and cultural dependence with a compliant ruling elite that has neo-colonial powers, the labour, and exploitative resources to feed their insatiable appetite for finished physical or cultural commodities made by the metropole. Therefore, neo-colonialism ensures historical continuity in post-independence the continuity of economic exploitation under the cooperation of the comprador bourgeoisies (Dunn, 1978). Hence it was necessary for them to marginalise and crush the forces of anti-imperialism that wanted total liberation of the colonies, and to search for alliances to ensure the reiteration of the colonial status quo. This was done through the assassination of national liberation leaders i.e. Steve Biko, Ruth First, Solomon Mahlangu and massacres in the colonies i.e. the *Mau-Mau* rebellion; Sharpeville Massacre; and Soweto Uprising among other things and the creation of native bourgeoisie class.

In neo-colonialism, economies are geared towards serving imperialist countries (Mwaura, 2005:5). The post-independent state continues to supply its former colonisers with cheap raw materials, cheap agriculture and cheap labour, with neo-colonialist industrialisation – assembly plants industrialisation in which the state's economy to flounder (Fanon,

1963:176). Furthermore, the resources of the newly independent countries are still not used for the country's benefit, but for patronising former colonisers and the comprador bourgeoisies of the newly independent states who facilitate the exploitation of their country and its masses by MNCs of the former colonisers (Nkrumah, 1965:1). The MNCs with the assistance of their native countries continue exploiting SSA countries in the neo-colonialism epoch (Mwaura, 2005:58). Developed countries negotiate agreements with SSA countries to ensure their MNCs will pay little or no tax, are guaranteed a minimum profit and the right to repatriate all profits (Mwaura, 2005:58). Furthermore, bilateral aid and investment are tied to the procurement of goods and services from donor countries and the use of their companies on any said project (Mwaura, 2005:58). For example, investment from China comes with conditions that infrastructure projects have to be assigned to Chinese companies, thus creating jobs for the Chinese (Breuer, 2017:1). Therefore, neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism, "for those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress" (Nkrumah, 1963). Neo-colonialism not only includes former colonisers, but former colonies can also be subjected to imperial power by new actors i.e. the USA, Japan, Russia, China, etc., through the use of IFIs (Dada, 2015:83).

In the current epoch, foreign investment and international trade continue to play a key role (Sunil, 2010:59). Economic growth under neo-colonialism is commodity-driven and accompanied by major inequality. Kenya and South Africa are victims of unequal trade with developed countries because free trade and investment in raw materials has led to the countries' deindustrialisation. Foreign investment in the neo-colonial era is used in such a way as to exploit and impoverish the former colonies. The neo-colonial economy has not changed, it has merely been taken over by the comprador bourgeoisies who serve the interests of foreign capital. Exports are dominated by primary products and intra-trade is lacking, which shows a lack of unity and that the socio-economic system of exploitation devised by the colonialists is continuing (Mbeki, 2009:16). As in colonial days, economic and financial systems are linked with those of the former colonisers (Nkrumah, 1965).

Fanon (1963:59) claimed that for Africa to break away from the web of exploitation, radical overthrowing of the system and decolonisation is warranted. Fanon (1963:35-6) called for violent decolonisation, a clash between the colonised and the coloniser, that would lead to the creation of a "new man" by humanising both the coloniser and the colonised to

transform the colonial economy in the interests of the masses. This would mean a total transformation of the colonial system (Fanon, 1963:37). According to Higgott (1980:48), decolonisation entails the dismantling of the politico-administrative, cultural, economic, financial, judicial and educational procedures of the colonial period. Grosfoguel (2007) expands on this when he claims that decolonisation requires a broader transformation of the sexual, gender, spiritual, epistemic, economic, political, linguistic and racial hierarchies of the colonial world-system. This transformation ought to result in the capturing of modes, forces and means of production from foreign hands, which is paramount in attaining national liberation.

Decolonisation tends to be reduced to the attainment of political independence (cf. Zartman, 1976; Leoussi et al., 2013; Collins, 2016;). In contemporary SSA, decolonisation has been reduced to the attainment of flag independence without freedom, equality, and economic empowerment. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013), this has led to the myth of decolonisation and obscures the current neo-colonial reality. In addition, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:75) argues that decolonisation has not resulted in a complete reversal of the order of society, whereby “the last shall be first and the first shall be last”. Edward Said (1978) was critical towards the current decolonisation and argued that the colonisers’ power to create knowledge about the colonised was central to the practice of empire, therefore, the decolonisation of knowledge is impotant.

Therefore, the thesis deliberately uses the concept of post-independence instead of post-colony to describe the end of formal colonisation in SSA, though it acknowledges the colonisers’ relinquishing political power to the comprador bourgeoisies, which is equated to be the end of colonialism. Post-independence refers to the end of formal colonialism that resulted in the attainment of nominal/flag independence. The post-independence period started with the attainment of independence without economic independence by Ghana in 1957, which was reduced to “seek ye first the political kingdom...”.

Decolonisation ought to lead to the attainment of national liberation, which should encompass the freeing of modes of production and productive forces from foreign domination (Cabral, 1966). Amilcar Cabral (1969:75) warned leaders of national liberation movements that the attainment of political independence is not tantamount to the attainment of national liberation. To Cabral (1966), national liberation is the inalienable right of all people; people have a right to have their own history. Therefore, the aim of

national liberation is to regain the rights usurped by imperialism, and to free the process of developing national productive forces (Cabral, 1966). Joe Slovo (1974) reiterated Cabral's point when he argued that national liberation should address the economic question and if it fails to do so, the result will be co-option of a few black elites. Slovo (1974) further argued that in its true sense, national liberation must therefore imply the expropriation of the means of production from owners and the complete destruction of the state that serves them. Cabral (1966) rightly provides a warning that those who did not struggle for freeing the national productive forces from foreign domination were not struggling for national liberation. Hence, the clarion call that national liberation should not only advocate the complete overthrow of imperialist domination in its colonial form, but in its neo-colonial form as well (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1984:46).

According to Woddis (1967:124), the basis of defeating neo-colonialism and attaining liberation is the creation of an independent economy. This requires a series of measures that put the country's resources and enterprises into national hands by creating a state sector in the economy; diversifying the economy to industrialise and modernise agriculture; state control of trade; ownership of banking sector; and to advocate for land reform to address the landless (Woddis, 1967:124). Such actions will lead to development, and will require freedom from poverty and tyranny; poor economic opportunities and systematic social deprivation; neglect of public facilities; and intolerance or over activity of repressive states (Sen, 1999:3). These cannot all be attained by blindly adopting sterile policies perpetuated by former colonisers as has been the case in post-independence. Fanon (1963:311) calls for African leadership to reject sterile policies perpetuated by Europe and U.S., and to craft a new direction that entails different developmental trajectories. *Agenda 2063* as a continental programme is viewed as being within the purview of a new direction.

Agenda 2063 is a continental blueprint for structural transformation and sustainable development, which reflects the aspirations of the African people. It advocates for diversification of the economy from commodity-based to industrialisation, which will be accompanied by inclusive economic growth. It further calls for political and economic integration through the creation of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which will finally lead to the formation of an African Economic Community (AEC) as per the Abuja Treaty, 1991. Nkrumah (1963) noted that the achievement of national liberation

requires unity amongst African countries. Fanon (1963:159) calls for African unity under the leadership of the people in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisies, because unity under the comprador bourgeoisies has crumbled into shallow nationalism as they champion for their selfish interests. Therefore, through its objectives, *Agenda 2063* seeks the economic self-reliance and continental unity that are vital to the attainment of national liberation and its subsequent economic independence.

As previously mentioned, in the post-independence epoch, the colonial states were taken over by the comprador bourgeoisies and were not dismantled in the interests of the people but were allowed to evolve into post-independent neo-colonial states. In both case studies, it was found that the comprador bourgeoisies guaranteed the perpetuation of the colonial status quo after independence through economic policies. This brought scepticism to the implementation of *Agenda 2063,* hence the study's critical analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent South Africa and Kenya.

2.4. Conclusion

The chapter has achieved its objective to analyse neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism, and tracing its lineage from classical Marxism. Through neo-colonial theory, globalised neoliberal capitalism and the role of the comprador bourgeoisies was analysed and put into perspective in terms of Kenya and South Africa. Neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism drew on classical Marxism, neo-Marxism and the Dependency theory.

Theories of imperialism explain the political and economic expansion and domination of the world by capitalist countries. In their attempt to explain capital expansion, classical Marxists focused on monopoly capital and the under-consumption that led to imperialism. Imperialism led to the colonisation of territories which was meant to serve as a source of and market for manufactured products. Neo-Marxists argue that the capitalistic exploitation of these underdeveloped colonies and post-independent states perpetuated through trade and surplus flows and politico-military influence, was assisted by the comprador bourgeoisies. Dependency theorists conclude that underdevelopment is caused by unequal exchange that persists after independence with the help of landowning comprador bourgeoisies, thus perpetuating core and peripheral relations. Neo-colonial theory expounds on this argument, that colonialism was an economic

phenomenon that resulted in primitive accumulation, land alienation and the proletarianisation of Africans. This entrenched racism in the colonial system further perpetuated the economic privileges of the colonisers and the duality of the system.

The struggle for economic independence is paramount, however, neo-colonial theory indicates that a compromise was reached between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital that ensured the continuity of the accumulation by dispossession colonial economic model. The Faustian pact between comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital is visible in post-independent economic policies and in Africanisation, which have ensured the perpetuation of the colonial economy without any much-needed structural transformation. Under this status quo, *Agenda 2063* does not have a good chance for success due to the absence of transformative leadership and political will.

Moreover, neo-colonial theory indicates that foreign capital is used to undermine independence in former colonies and that it leads to neo-colonialism facilitated by the comprador bourgeoisies. Therefore, neo-colonial theory put the role of the comprador bourgeoisies under a microscope, which is in alignment with the objectives of this thesis.

The following chapter analyses the independence processes of Kenya and South Africa in an attempt to investigate the compromises that in both case studies led to nominal independence. Neo-colonialism and compradorism can only be traced through independence processes since independence serves as a transition to neo-colonialism.

CHAPTER 3: THE COLONIAL CONTRADICTIONS OF KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA

3.1. Introduction

The thesis analyses the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa. Thus, an explanation of the colonial contradictions that remained after the independence processes of both case studies is critical. The application of neo-colonial theory to Kenyan and South African independence processes demonstrates that the processes were filled with contradictions. Neo-colonialism and compradorism can be traced from the transition from colonialism to independence (Ogude, 1997:96). According to Fanon (1963:62), the independence processes took place amid many compromises between the national bourgeoisies and the colonisers. Historical analysis of the independence process in both case studies is warranted to show the role played by the comprador bourgeoisies in negotiated settlements, and the subsequent status quo. The chapter interrogates the colonial contradictions that remained because of compromises between the comprador bourgeoisies and the former colonisers that perpetuated accumulation by dispossession in Kenya and South Africa. Given the research objective, it is imperative to understand the roots of compradorism and neo-colonialism that have been detrimental to the development in both countries, which threaten the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

The chapter goes beyond the “sell-out” narrative and provides a more nuanced understanding of the independence processes by demonstrating that the compromises resulted from the African bourgeoisies conceptualising the national struggle as a struggle for their inclusion in the capitalist order. Mbeki (2009:6) indicated that the comprador bourgeoisies’ national struggle was always for inclusion in the colonial system, and to share in the spoils of colonialism. The author is cognisant of the literature on independence processes, but all cannot be mentioned here (cf. Leys, 1975; Cheche Kenya, 1982; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995; Marais, 1998; Bond, 2005; Saul, 2014). However, the current chapter points out class formation, the disarming of national liberation movements and the subsequent compromises that led to nominal independence. Furthermore, the analysis avoids the simplistic arguments by many radical thinkers who assert that political independence brought no change to either country (Zeleza,

1986:195). The chapter demonstrates that political change did take place, such that political independence resulted in an emerging African bourgeoisie while accumulation by dispossession continued.

In SSA political independence was not tantamount to decolonisation and national liberation. Hence, the "Not yet *Uhuru*[29]" expression that is frequently uttered amongst Africans to describe contemporary SSA. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:3) defines the current SSA as a "post-colonial neo-colonised world" that still finds itself within the colonial matrix of power. This means that the region is located within the structural, cultural, discursive, systematic and epistemological patterns of domination and exploitation by capitalist countries and their MNCs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:3). Mkandawire (2013) describes independence in SSA as "flag independence" in which the political economy, with the exception of the national flag, remained the same. Nkrumah (1965:22) stated that the attainment of political independence resulted in nominal independence. This sad state of affairs resulted from the compromises that were accompanied by finding new allies within the newly independent states to cooperate with former colonisers (Woddis, 1967:55). It is against this background that colonialism and neo-colonialism are viewed as sources of underdevelopment and inequality, unequal exchange, poverty, unemployment and corruption, all of which are endemic in SSA.

The compromises constituted a Faustian pact that worked against decolonisation. Fanon (1963:62) warned that the national bourgeoisies were too quick to compromise with the colonisers and thus perpetuated the colonial economic system in the post-independent epoch. This have entailed the co-option and racial integration of the national bourgeoisies, which was legitimised through programmes such as "Africanisation" and/or de-racialisation of the economy (Mosala, 2016:84). As a result, most of the negotiations over independence involved national bourgeoisies and excluded the progressive parts of the National Liberation Movement (Fatton, 1990). This created a host of contradictions that continue to agitate most of the African political terrain to this day (Fatton, 1990). The land question was the first contradiction and was not conclusively resolved[30]. In the case of

[29] The phrase is traced to Oginga Odinga, from his autobiography, *Not Yet Uhuru* published in 1967. It means not yet free. *Uhuru* means freedom in Swahili.

[30] Note that during the drafting of this thesis, the South Africa government was in the process of amending Section 25 of the *Republic of South Africa's Constitution* of 1996, Act 108 of 1996 to expropriate land without compensation and address the land question through the *Expropriation Bill*.

South Africa, the land was never returned to the natives[31] and in Kenya land reform had a class and ethnic character that never addressed landlessness. Firstly, both governments followed the "willing seller, willing buyer" principle, therefore legitimising native dispossession. Secondly, the independence question, thanks to the colonial authorities, gradually came to have ethnic connotations (Olukoshi, 1998:42). Lastly, the economic question ensured the continuation of perpetual exploitation of the newly independent countries. These were compromises that were detrimental to the development agenda within each country, and for the African continent.

Given that the character of contemporary Africa has been determined by its colonial origins (Young, 2016) and that neo-colonialism can be traced from the independence processes of both case studies, the chapter provides a historical analysis. This analysis demonstrates class formation during colonialism and how the national bourgeoisies reproduced their indigenous capitalist interests during the national liberation struggle. Furthermore, the analysis points to the colonial contraditions that remains in post-independent Kenya and South Africa to this day, the continuation of accumulation by dispossession that is now perpetuated through neoliberalism, and the marginalisation of the radical faction by the comprador bourgeoisies and colonisers during the negotiations. Nominal independence meant the reintegration of former colonies as subordinates of global capitalism, and co-option of the comprador bourgeoisies into colonial capitalism that ensured the reiteration and reaffirming of economic dependence (Wasserman, 1975:1). The following section provides a brief explanation of colonisation in Kenya and South Africa for the purpose of context, which gives a glimpse into the independence trajectory.

[31] Note the argument that South Africa was unsettled during the 1652 arrival of Dutch colonisers. Using the Discovery Doctrine and *Mfecane*, the colonisers have argued that South Africa was not inhabited despite the Khoi and San already being at the Cape and the Bantu Expansion coming to an end by the 10th century with Sotho-Tswana states formed south of Limpopo River and north-west of the Vaal River – central plateau of South Africa and as far as the Kalahari Desert while the Nguni people had firmly established themselves into branches located at either side of the Drakensberg range – along the Fish River, also between Tugela and Pongola River and further along Buffalo River (Thompson, 2000:3; Cobbing, 1988; Miller, 2010:2; Lye, 1967:114). This led to the establishment of Bambadyanalo Kingdom and the Kingdom of Mapungubwe which attain its wealth through its trade with Swahili Merchants in 12th century (Afigbo et al., 1968:215; Goucher et al., 1998:7).

3.2. The Colonial Era

Four centuries before colonialism, trade between Africa and Europe was predominantly slave trade (Rodney, 1973:136). According to Rodney (1973:116), it was European mercantile capitalism that set slavery and the trans-Atlantic slave trade in motion. The Mediterranean (Barbary slave trade), trans-Atlantic, East African, and Southern African slave trade gave way to colonisation, which was then considered as legitimate trade[32] (Vink, 2003:145; Vernet, 2009:38). To Africa, slave trade was exploitative and unproductive, while it contributed to development in Europe and the Americas (Rodney, 1973; Gordon & Gordon, 2001). The slave trade deprived Africa of the labour power necessary for development and had a negative socio-economic impact (Gordon & Gordon, 2001). By the 1800s, many European countries controlled small parts of Africa's land, concentrated mainly on its coastal areas. This was changed by exploration and colonisation by European powers.

Slavery was not abolished, it evolved into colonisation[33] (Gordimer, 2003:27). Industrialisation and competition between European countries brought new demands that saw slavery giving way to colonialism (Azevedo, 1993). Growing competition between European countries played a major role in the European scramble for Africa, which led to the Berlin Conference[34] of 1884-1885, hosted by the German Chancellor, Bismarck (1815-1898) at the request of Portugal (Shepperson, 1985:37-8). The Berlin Conference led to the partition of Africa amongst the European powers. This was a measure to avoid conflict, and it produced the General Act of the Berlin Conference, which laid down the principle that no annexation or protectorate would be recognised unless made effective by occupation (Trivedi, 1971:617). Furthermore, the Act made provision in respect of freedom of trade and shipping for all states in the Congo Basin, the neutrality of territories in the Congo Basin, navigation of the Congo and Niger Rivers, and forbade slave trading[35]

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[32] Mediterranean Sea slave trade was carried out by Arabs and the Turks during the Muslim and Ottoman Empire while East African slave trade was initially under took by Arabs and later Portuguese and the Dutch. The Dutch settlers introduced slave trade in Southern Africa (Vink, 2003:145).

[33] The declining of profits in concert with French monopoly over sugar and most importantly new demands from the market led to abandonment of slavery (Gordon & Gordon, 2001:41). Britain set-up an anti-slavery squadron and passed *Slave Trade Act* and *Slavery Abolition Act* in 1807 and 1833 respectively which led to the creation of protectorate and eventually colonies in East Africa (Rashid, 2014:9).

[34] Dignitaries were from Great-Britain, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Ottoman Empire, and USA.

[35] The *Brussels Conference* of 1890 attempted to complete the anti-slavery and anti-liquor work in Africa (Shepperson, 1985).

(Shepperson, 1985:39). The Congo Basin was left in the possession of King Leopold II of Belgium and was renamed the Congo Free State[36].

Colonisation was characterised by subjecting the masses to foreign rule and was resisted early on by the Zulu, Pedi, Xhosa, the San and Basotho kingdoms, which resisted Dutch and British invaders from the 1600s to the 1800s. In Kenya, the Maasai, Nandi, and Kikuyu resisted the British until 1895 (Afigbo et al., 1986). South Africa faced two waves of colonisation; Dutch colonisation that began in 1652, and British colonisation which can be traced back to 1795 and 1806. By the early 1900s, resistance was all but defeated and Britain redrew political boundaries to their own interests (Freund, 1998:73-90). Kenya and South Africa were both under a form of indirect British rule, Kenya as a settler colony and South Africa as a dominion from 1910 (Young, 2016:19). To Veracini (2007), settler colonialism was resistant to decolonisation.

Furthermore, colonisation was characterised by primitive accumulation (land alienation and forced labour) by the Dutch and British. Land was taken by force and later the dispossession was legalised through legislation to protect settlers by the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the Native Land Act of 1913 in South Africa, and Kenya's Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and 1897 Crown Lands Ordinance (Rothermund, 2006:185; Tarugaria, 2014:87). Dutch and British colonisation was involved in land dispossession that also entailed livestock appropriation, mass proletarianisation, and forced labour (Welsh, 2000; Ngcukaitobi 2018:21). African land-rich societies were reduced to land-poor societies with their people turned into paupers (Masenya & Ramantsana, 2015:98).

Land was critical to the colonies' economies. In South Africa, the colonial economy was dominated by agriculture until the discovery of diamonds in 1867, and gold in 1871. The Kenyan economy also revolved around agriculture, with settlers only being allowed to plant cash crops, while the natives were forced to provide their labour (Cheche Kenya, 1982:5). Later, large-scale farming was undertaken to produce coffee and tea. Soon thereafter a hut tax was introduced to generate income and to force proletarianisation (Omeje, 2017:185).

[36] After a series of atrocities by King Leopold II on the populace of Congo Free State in his exploitation for rubber which amount to millions of deaths and the public outcry, Belgium parliament took the colony from the king in 1908, to turn it into Belgian Congo.

The Kenyan and South African cases were thus in keeping with general colonial patterns. The colonial power controlled the markets and the production in both colonies, with the colonial economies being export-oriented and commodity-based. Produce and raw materials were sold at meagre prices from the colonies, while manufactured goods were expensively purchaced from the colonising country (Sartre,1957:19). According to Fanon (1963:159), the colonial economy was not integrated with that of the nation as a whole, but was organised to develop the economy of the colonising country. Colonialism allowed certain sectors of the economy to be rich, while the rest of the colony followed the path of underdevelopment and poverty (Fanon, 1963:159). In order to maintain profitability, the colonisers prevented industrialisation in the colonies (Woddis, 1967:18).

The British ruled through the traditional tribal authorities (Gordon & Gordon, 2001). White settlers in Kenya and South Africa were protected through a racial colonial capitalist system, while the natives lived in reserves which were governed by colonial appointed chiefs with the support of the tribal courts and policemen (Azad Rana, 1990:157). This separate development was entrenched during South Africa's apartheid years. Earlier in the colonies, separate development had bred duality, where opulence and deprivation existed side by side. Fanon (1963:39) stated that in colonies the settlers' town was a well-fed town strongly built of stone and steel, and its belly was always full of good things. Meanwhile, natives in the reservations were starved of bread and meat, and their huts were built on top of the other (Fanon, 1963:39). To maintain the status quo, the colonial administration was essentially a coercive, arbitrary and bureaucratic dictatorship (Ake, 1996:2; Omeje, 2017:185). In both countries, for control and regulation of African labour and their movement, natives were required to carry an identity document when entering settlers' towns[37]. In the case of South Africa, the native reserves and Bantustans were controlled by local collaborators (chiefs) who maintained authority and collected taxes. The native reserves played a key role in providing labour to the settlers' farms and to the mines. With the division between the settlers and the natives being ethnic and racial, Fanon (1963:37) declared that the colonial world is a world that is divided into

[37] This was a result of Pass Laws – *Native (Urban Areas) Act* of 1923 in South Africa and *Native Passes Regulations and Ordinance* in 1900s in Kenya that were both required Africans to have a pass to leave the district where they lived and worked. In the case of Kenya, it was known as *Kipande* and in South Africa as *Dompas*.

compartments. In South Africa, there were institutions for the natives, the coloureds, Indians and the settlers.

Colonisation led to development of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie, though on a limited scale. According to Mbeki (2009:55), the origin of the black middle-class dates back to the 1830s when the British realised that to crush the Xhosa resistance, they needed alliances with other African tribes. These alliances included the Khoi people and the AmaMfengu, and Gqunukwebo clans, who were introduced to the modern capitalist world and were transformed into peasant farmers (Mbeki, 2009:55). The Mfengu were early converts to Christianity, well-educated and affluent, and the most advanced section of the community. They furnished clergymen, policemen, teachers, clerks, interpreters and entrepreneurs (Gumede, 2007:37). This earned them moniker “the Jews of Kaffirland” from white traders (Gumede, 2007:38). These groups would evolve into western educated elites who worked as independent merchants, lawyers, teachers and doctors, and emerged in 1994 as powerful black elites and as the natural replacement of the Afrikaner elites while the latter continue to dominate the country economically (Mbeki, 2009:56-7).

In Kenya, the embryonic African bourgeoisie emerged from the 1920s onwards with their roots in commodity production, which was founded on the direct employment of wage labour (Swainson, 1978:360). This African emerging class was involved in trade and commodity production in the reserves, and some obtained salaried work within the bureaucracy (Swainson, 1978:360). The African bourgeoisies in Kenya initiated the production and distribution of banned products such as tea, and after independence entered industry and gained political access to large farms in the White Highlands (Lubeck, 1986:19). Missionary schools would also add to the embryonic African bourgeoisie with the development of western-educated elites (Odinga, 1967). These African bourgeoisies formed an alliance with colonialism to manage the natives (Woddis, 1967:56). After independence, politically connected African bourgeoisies inherited a productive base in capitalist agriculture with large unit of production, as the state was used to advance the scale and extend the activities of African accumulators (Lubeck, 1986:19). These African bourgeoisies would dominate national liberation movements and initially demanded inclusion into the colonial system i.e. the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) in the 1920s and 1930s, and KAU in the 1950s.

According to Fanon (1963:42), this Manichean colonial world dehumanises the native and turns him into an animal. Racism is inherent in the colonial system and manifests as the exploitation of one group of men by another (Maspero, 1964). Sartre (1957:20) argued that racism is ingrained in actions, institutions, and in the nature of the colonialist methods of production and exchange. Fanon (1967:32) and Memmi (1965:19) state that racism is part of the culture in colonies and that it reinforces economic divisions, with the coloniser being privileged and the native dehumanised. This leads to the natives being denied their human rights and being subdued through violence. According to Sartre (1963), violence was used in colonies not only to keep the natives at arm's length but to dehumanise them. This occurs while the settler establishes his domination and superiority (Fanon, 1964:35).

Colonisation consequently culminated in rebellion and revolt by the colonised i.e. the *Mau Mau* rebellion in Kenya, the formation of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) and *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) in South Africa. However, the idea of actual political independence from colonial rule did not gather momentum until the end of World War II (Woddis, 1967:31; Bohannan & Curtin, 1995:240-50), when the struggle for national liberation and independence began.

3.3. Independence Processes

In the preceding section it was argued that colonisation was fought against and resisted from the beginning; however, the call for independence reached its peak after World War II. Local and global events contributed to post-War independence. Among these events were the rise of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which led imperialist countries to lose one sixth of the earth's surface and about 10 percent of its population (Woddis, 1976:29). This was preceded by anti-imperialist congresses such as the Second Congress of Communist International in July 1920, and the Congress of the People of the East in September 1920 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The congresses advocated for anti-imperialist struggle, class alliance between proletariats and national bourgeoisies in the colonies, and warned against the vacillating nature of the national bourgeoisies (Lenin, 1920; Mao, 1967). The USSR had a major impact on the South African national liberation struggle through the South African Communist Party (SACP) and from the Second Congress of Communist International, derived the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) – a two-stage theory that to this day still anchors the ANC ideologically and politically.

The call for independence gained momentum with the adoption of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 between the USA and Britain and the 1948 United Nations (UN) adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter proclaimed "the right of all people to choose the government under which they live" (Leoussi et al., 2013:435). Moreover, the UN called for respect of the principles of equal rights and the right of people to self-determination (Collins, 2013:25). Article 15 and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights made provision for nationality and the right to development[38], respectively (UN, 2015:32-46). These not only contributed to the call for independence but also the development of former colonies. According to Ngang et al. (2018:7) the right to development implies the full realisation of the right to self-determination, including the inalienable right to full sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. This proved imperative for the national liberation movements as the basis for decolonisation is ownership of means of production and policy sovereignty (Ngang, 2017). However, the USA took advantage of the decolonisation movement and advocated for an "open door policy" for colonies by encouraging colonial powers to open up the colonies to international trade (Metz, 1984:517). Saul (2014:125) indicated that the U.S. was a major beneficiary of the demise of formal colonialism, which opened the world's borders even more widely to "Pax-Americana" capitalistic control. The U.S. then became the hub of neo-colonialism that had held the former colonies in its grip (Saul, 2014:125).

The aforementioned events would lead to the independence of India in 1947 and the Chinese Revolution in 1949, which contributed to the impetus of independence in SSA. The Chinese Revolution was led by the peasantry waging guerrilla style war from the countryside (Legassick, 2007). The guerrilla warfare tactic used to fight imperialism and the national bourgeoisies would spread around the world, leading to numerous anti-colonial revolutions (Legassick, 2007). For example, the *Mau Mau* rebellion in Kenya with their operations based in the forests, and the formation of MK and APLA in South Africa was influenced by guerrilla warfare tactics. However, these global events should not downplay the role of the national liberation movements in the struggle for independence. The thesis avoids falling into the Eurocentric narrative that granting independence was

[38] The right to development was only be formalised in 1986 by UN General Assembly through the Declaration on the Right to Development and the AU through African Charter.

planned and was going to happen with or without the national liberation struggles that perpetuate neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965:239; Zeleza, 1986:194-5).

Urbanised and western-educated Africans formed national liberation movements in advocating for independence and development. National liberation movements and newly independent states were involved in the Bandung Conference, Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 in Indonesia, and the All-African People's Conference in Cairo in 1961, which advocated for development and against neo-colonialism. However, post-independence, the comprador bourgeoisies neglected development. Hence the claim by Ake (1996:1) that development was never on their agenda in the first place because the neo-colonial political economy was hostile to development – freedom from poverty, systematic social depravation, authoritarianism and poor economic opportunities (Sen, 1999:3). Instead, comprador bourgeoisies such as Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa advocated for catching up with the West, which was tantamount to following the sterile policies perpetuated in the former colonies.

The motto "*seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto it*" purportedly made by Nkrumah, led to some compromise and was adopted by many African leaders as dogma of the liberation. This resulted in many newly independent countries becoming susceptible to neo-colonialism (Ramose, 2006:10). Hodges (1972:13) and Ramose (2006:10) concluded that Nkrumah made a tactical and egregious error by assuming that political power would automatically lead to economic independence, without arguing for simultaneous realisation during decolonisation. The was a misinterpretation of imperialist politics (Hodges, 1972:12). Nkrumah failed to understand the economics of colonialism and that the economic base determines the superstructure. Consequently, the newly independent countries could not escape neo-colonialism, given the independence processes (Hodges, 1972:12). These utterances basically reduced the national liberation to two stages: first, the attainment of political independence and second, the struggle for economic power. Nkrumah failed to realise that oppressed people must achieve concomitant control of political and economic power to reach a state of freedom and independence (Hodges, 1972:13). This is in line with the NDR which also advocated for the two-stage theory and consequently, the reproduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality in Kenya and South Africa.

The call for independence reached its climax in both countries after World War II. In Kenya it was with the formation of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, otherwise known as the *Mau Mau*, which led to a liberation war in the 1950s. In South Africa it was the adoption of the Programme of Action by the ANC in 1949, and the formation of liberation armies – the MK and APLA after the banning of liberation movements in the 1960s by the apartheid government. In spite of the guerrilla warfare tactics, the struggle for independence in Kenya was dominated by a gradual approach that entailed negotiations during Lancaster House Conferences, and in South Africa, the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) entailed compromises and elections, not by the nationalists mobilising their forces to defeat the colonial regime (Ake, 1996:3). In the case of Kenya, the struggle for independence involved elections under the colonial banner. In South Africa, there was a stalemate, with no clear winner between the ANC and the apartheid government under the National Party (NP). In both case studies, it was a matter of the colonisers accepting the inevitable and strategically handing over power to their chosen national bourgeoisie successors, who were trusted to advocate for their intertwined interests (Ake, 1996:3). Fanon (1963:70) argued that during the independence processes the colonialist government would seek to capture the vanguard, turn the liberation movement towards the right and disarm the people and then decolonise, thus having the chance to manoeuvre and create a platform for neo-colonialism.

The colonisation character of both case studies, the settler colony in Kenya and the British dominion and apartheid in South Africa, had an impact on the independence processes which demonstrated land and economic contradictions that have remained. Fanon (1963:149) describes this western educated leadership as the undeveloped middle class without economic power, with hopes of replacing the bourgeoisies of the mother country. The following two subsections show that those who took power in post-independence were the newly emerging comprador bourgeoisies who were rooted in colonialism (Harman, 2003). These comprador bourgeoisies reproduced their class interests during the independence processes, hence the compromises as demonstrated in the following subsections.

The following subsections illustrate that the independence processes entailed adaptation, co-option and pre-emption on the part of the colonisers (Wasserman, 1975:4). Adaption came after the capturing and disarming tactics of the colonisers, which included the

violent suppression of national liberation movements. Co-option involved the partial accommodation of the comprador bourgeoisies' national aspirations while protecting imperialist economic interests (Woddis, 1967:43). Pre-emptive measures ensured an elite transition in which the negotiations involved only compromised comprador bourgeoisies. This marginalised most of the people and ensured the perpetuation of exploitation of the proletariat and peasants in post-independence. Only then it was possible to advance to the next phase of neo-colonialism (Woddis, 1967:43). The compromises are reflected in the post-independence constitutions that legitimised dispossession by protecting private property and the economy which is underpinned by accumulation by dispossession. The following section traces the Kenyan independence process from colonial resistance to determine the character of the national liberators and the trajectory of the independence.

3.3.1. The Kenyan Independence Process

This subsection provides an analysis of the Kenya political entity to put into perspective compradorism and neo-colonialism in Kenya. This required analysis of the national liberation leaders' characters and their relationship to colonialism, which determined the independence trajectory. The subsection traces the genesis and evolution of the struggle against colonialism in Kenya, including primitive accumulation by the British colonisers, and class formation in colonial Kenya. Colonialism resulted in an unintended development of the industrial and agriculture proletariat, the national bourgeoisies and the intelligentsia in the colony (Rodney, 1972). The national bourgeoisies and the intelligentsia, despite being in an alliance with peasants and proletariats, reached a compromise with the colonisers that involved satisfying their national aspirations without in any way relieving the peasants and majority of the workers from exploitation and oppression (Rodney, 1972). Accordingly, the subsection demonstrates the reproduction of interests of the comprador bourgeoisies that led to compromise during the independence processes.

The Kenyan state, like most of the SSA states, is a creation of colonisation. Before the arrival of the Arabs, the Portuguese, and colonisation, Kenyan land was divided between three African linguistic groups: the Cushitic speaking people, the Nilotic Tribes, and the Bantu-speaking people (Hornsby, 2012:21). The Bantu people would come to dominate Kenyan politics, especially in post-independent era. The British interests in Kenyan land

resulted of their relationship with the Sultan of Zanzibar[39] and their interest in the Kingdom of Buganda[40] (Freund, 1984:69). Buganda's defeat to Britain followed the installing of a collaborator chief and the signing of a treaty in 1900 that recognised the British authority over Buganda and the rest of the areas included within the Uganda Protectorate, and subsequently the declaration of an East Africa Protectorate (EAP) (Afigbo et al., 1986:338).

The declaration of the EAP was followed by primitive accumulation, land alienation, dispossession of livestock, and proletarianisation of the natives. Dispossessed land was used for the construction of a railway from 1895 to 1901 by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), running from Buganda through Lake Victoria to Mombasa, and for farming in the highlands (Trivedi, 1971:619). According to Rodney (1972), all roads and railways led down to the sea and were built to transport raw materials and cash-crops. Land dispossession sparked clashes between British colonisers and the Nandi and Kikuyu people, which continued until late 1890s (Rothermund, 2006:185). British troops massacred over 1 500 people, mainly Kikuyu[41] and dispossessed them of thousands of cattle, sheep and goats (Azad Rana, 1990:153). Meanwhile, the Maasai people struck a deal with Britain that guaranteed the British free passage over the territory's principal trade routes (Freund, 1984:123). Land dispossession was legitimised through legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the; Crown Lands Ordinance Acts of 1897 and 1902, which gave settlers 21 to 99 year leases on Kenyan lands (Rothermund, 2006:185). The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance, which amended the Ordinance of 1902, gave each farming settler 160 free acres as an inducement to farm and further increase their lease to 999 years (Gustafson, 1995:649). All unoccupied land in the protectorate was declared Crown Land, which further enhanced the rights and privileges of the settler community, subject to the Governor's power of alienation (Home, 2012:189; Tarugarira, 2014:87). Consequently, the anti-colonial struggle in Kenya was a land and agrarian struggle.

[39] It was during this close relation with Britain that Zanzibar flourished because of commerce of British India and Britain exercised an informal control by maintaining the integrity of the Kingdom of Zanzibar with IBEAC acting as agent of the Sultan on Kenyan Land (Trivedi, 1971:616; Freund, 1984:69).

[40] Buganda was one of the wealthy and powerful inter-lacustrine kingdoms and it included some of the land of the present-day Uganda and Bunyoro Kingdom.

[41] Furthermore, British colonisers killed over 400 people in Sotick and Kisii areas and continued to steal thousands of livestock – cattle, sheep and goats (Azad Rana, 1990:153).

In June 1920, through the Kenya Annexation Order-In-Council, Britain finally consolidated its control over Kenyan lands when the status of the EAP was changed from a protectorate to a colony (Mwaruvie, 2011:178). The settler colony status would have an impact during the independence process, which they delayed. Every law that contradicted British Law was declared null and void. With the change in status from a protectorate to a colony, came a change in the Legislative Council, with Europeans allowed to elect their own representatives in 8 of their 11 constituencies (Azad Rana, 1990:157). However, true to their British nature, the colonialists saw to it that most Africans continued living in the native reservations governed by appointed chiefs, tribal courts and the police force (Azad Rana, 1990:157).

The national bourgeoisies in Kenya which were the creation of colonialism overlapped with the African ruling stratum, the police, traders and independent craftsman (Rodney, 1972). The Maasai, Kalenjin and Kamba tribes were recruited to the colonial forces (Azad Rana, 1990:156-7). The Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya formed part of other communities that were early beneficiaries of modern education. Access to education meant access to gainful employment and other economic activities (Oyugi, 1997:43). The Kikuyu quickly adopted the colonisers' social structure and culture to a capitalist mode of production (Leys, 1975:200). The "noble savages" as they were called by the colonisers, became privileged as a result of their access to modern economic processes that accompanied colonialism. They therefore formed an intermediary class and served as allies to the colonisers. Thus, colonialism politicised ethnicity and perpetuated the divide-and-rule policy in Kenya (Omolo, 2010:213). This bred animosity and provided the setting for future competition and conflict (Oyugi, 1997:43). The old system of colonial rule in Kenya consisted of an alliance between the colonisers and local pre-capitalist forces (Woddis 1967:56). This intermediary class included the emerging petit bourgeoisie, who benefited from colonial development and the precolonial exploitative class, which also pacified their societies against resisting colonialism (Collins, 2016:5). To Fanon (1963:94), the colonial system encouraged chieftaincies and kept alive the old Marabout confraternities. These traditional chiefs were used as collaborators against the national struggle, together with the lumpenproletariat (Fanon, 1963:136).

The native reserves were divided along ethnic lines, with socio-political boundaries demarcated by ordinances and supervised by Native Land Boards[42] that solidified the ethnicization of Kenyan society (Kanyinga, 2009:328; Home, 2012:181). Natives in the reserves met the labour demand from farms and farming estates in the White Highlands, where natives were only allowed to participate in the economy as cheap labour and were banned from producing cash crops to avoid them competing with the settlers. This, in conjunction with land alienation, resulted in the formation of the Kikuyu Association in 1920, which was mainly concerned with land grievances (Bennett, 1961:478). The organisation's membership was limited to chiefs, headmen, and the elders with connections to missionaries. This created a political vacuum that was filled by the formation of the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921 (later renamed the East Africa Association) by Harry Thuku[43] (1895-1970), and other African elites (Ogot, 1993:522-3). Its aim was to fight further land alienation and assert native economic rights against the settler's demand for land and lower Africa wages (Ochieng, 1985:83; Larmer, 2015:70). The perpetuation of economic exclusion led to mushrooming resistance movements such as the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, the Young Kavirondo Association, the Native Catholic Union, and the North Kavirondo Central Association (Bogonko, 1984:29; Adu Boahen, 1985:659). To advocate for their economic rights, the national bourgeoisies were obsessed with organisations. Fanon (1963:108) held that national parties in the colonies were aligned with the formation of an intellectual elite engaged in trade.

The aforementioned organisations and their successors – the KCA in the 1930s and the KAU in the1950s, reflected the stifled demands of indigenous capitalism (Swainson, 1978:361). However, the contradictions between the national bourgeoisies and the colonisers were not profound, hence the compromises during independence negotiations (Rodney, 1972). This is reflected in the demands made by these organisations and their leaders. Besides burning their resented *Kipandes* (identity documents), Harry Thuku advocated for diplomacy and wrote to the British Prime Minister to inform him of the plight of the colony. His demands were a far cry from a demand for independence (Bennett, 1961:478). Thuku never called for majority rule in Kenya but wanted the natives to be

[42] This was a creation of the Native Land Trusts to control native reserves.

[43] Harry Thuku received his early education from Gospel Missionary Society and was a government employee – a telephone operator at Government Treasury (Ochieng, 1985:83). After his detention he formed Kikuyu Provincial Association that worked closely with the British and later turned into a collaborator against *Mau Mau* rebellion (Ochieng, 1985:84).

accommodated within the colonial economy and administration (Ochieng, 1985:84). This entailed demands for the restoration of alienated land to the natives, equal rights for the natives and settlers, and the removal of handicaps placed upon Africans regarding land redistribution and agriculture (Okoth-Ogendo, 1972:12). Thuku was arrested following an unruly protest in 1922, and held in detention until 1930 (Ochieng, 1985:83).

His detention led to the "Harry Thuku Riots" in which several people were killed when his followers demanded his release (Kariuki, 2015:53). They also demanded the reform of colonialism, never its abolishment, which led to a reduction in hut tax and with it, the introduction of nominated Europeans to represent African interests, and 5 elected Indian officials[44] to the Legislative Council. Further, through Royal Instructions issued in 1923 and the creation of Local Native Councils (LNC) in 1925, and the Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, native welfare was promoted along with good governance for the native citizens (Kariuki, 2015:53-4). The diplomacy and entry-ism politics continued under the KCA, which was dominated by educated farmers and traders from the Central Province, under the leadership of Joseph Kangethe and Jomo Kenyatta as secretary (Ogot, 1993:522). The KCA had political and economic objectives that entailed the return of Kikuyu land, an end to the ban on Africans growing cash crops, the repeal of the hut tax for women, increased educational facilities of a practical nature, and elected representation in the legislative council (Adu Boahen, 1985:663; Ogot, 1993:522). In their continuation of diplomacy, the KCA sent a delegation to London in 1929 to argue the land issue with the imperial government (Hornsby, 2012:33). Jomo Kenyatta, a mission-educated worker in the Nairobi Municipal Council, was among the delegates (Celarent, 2010:722). After 20 months in London with little success in convincing the imperial government, the delegation returned to Kenya in 1931. Kenyatta[45] did not return to the United Kingdom (UK) until 1946.

In their attempt to get elected representation in the legislative council, the KCA together with the Kenya African Study Union (later renamed the KAU), supported a moderate KCA member, Eluid Mathu, to become the first African to be appointed by the governor to the Legislative Council in 1944 (Azad Rana, 1990:170). With the KAU membership mainly

[44] The Indian question was addressed in the *Devonshire White Paper* in 1923 (Kariuki, 2015:58).
[45] While in London as a student Kenyatta formed contacts with other Black and African leaders that culminated in the Pan-Africanist Conference at Manchester in 1945 (Bennett, 1961:179).

reflecting that of KCA, after the banning of the KCA, the KAU membership under Kenyatta's leadership, championed for greater African representation in the Legislative Council, and 4 Africans were nominated by 1948 (Karuiki, 2015:77; Hornsby, 2012:40). The KAU later nominated Kenyatta as one of the people to be appointed, but the governor refused to appoint him. Kenyatta was appointed instead to the African Land Utilisation and Settlement Board (Bennett, 1961:480). Many African elites continued participating in colonial institutions as demonstrated above by Kenyatta's participation in the Land Utilisation and Settlement Board. Other leaders of the KAU such as Tom Mbotela and Muchohi Gikanyo were members of the Nairobi City Council, and also participated in colonial institutions, while others took part in the LNC, which was reconstituted as the African District Council (ADC) with revenues from and responsibilities for government services. The ADC also introduced elections in certain districts to appease the African elites (Hornsby, 2012:42), which can be seen as a tactic by Kenya's African elites to replace the bourgeoisies of the mother country. According to Fanon (1963:22) colonised intellectuals wished to be assimilated in the colonisers' world. Hence, the national bourgeoisies rejected a radical approach towards colonisation and claimed that the infiltration of the Legislative Council by African members would bring forth independence (Azad Rana, 1990:173).

This rejection of a radical approach demonstrates the vacillation of the national bourgeoisies, between national liberation and imperialism. When their interests were under siege by the colonisers, the national bourgeoises felt the need for decolonisation and sought support from the colonial peasants, but when the nationalist movement took a radical approach, they became sceptical about decolonisation. The KAU's expansion led to the recruitment of trade union activists and radical youth, which saw the replacement of the moderate and reformist class at district level, and their infiltration into the KAU's regional branches (Hornsby, 2012:43). This recruitment of trade unionists saw Fred Kubai, secretary general of East African Trade Union Congress, become chairman of the KAU Nairobi Branch, and Bildad Kaggia and Paul Ngei as secretary and assistant secretary, giving a militant outlook to the KAU (Kariuki, 2015:78). The influence of the youth, war veterans, and the trade unionists forced the KAU to change its policy and call for independence from colonial rule (Azad Rana, 1990:172). This transition of the KAU from an elite group to a mass movement representing different groups, led to a call for armed struggle by leaders such as Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai, and John Mungai (Azad

Rana, 1990:173). The leadership of the KAU and especially Kenyatta, opposed this and denounced the *Mau Mau* at public meetings during 1951 and 1952, while campaigning for non-violence (Hornsby, 2012:43). To Fanon (1963:24), this was the *modus operandi* of the national bourgeoisies, "they distance themselves from the people's struggle and can often be heard in private condemning those spectacular acts that have been decreed heinous by the metropolitan press and public opinion. Their preoccupation with objectivity constitutes a legitimate excuse for their failure to act." This failure to act is because the radical transformation of the system was not aligned to their interests.

In spite objections of their radical approach, the colonial resistance and post-World War II violence by war returnees culminated in the *Mau Mau* rebellion of 1952. The Kenya Land and Freedom Army, otherwise known as *Mau Mau*, represented Kikuyu society, particularly the peasants who felt under siege because of the colonial laws and in particular, land alienation and expropriation (Freund, 1984:219). The *Mau Mau* can be traced from the KAU rank and file which were tired of politics of petitions while the colonial government continue to expropriate their land. The *Mau Mau* first carried out assassinations on those they perceived to be collaborators and lackeys of the colonial regime (Freund, 1984:219). The governor responded by proclaiming a State of Emergency and launched "operation Anvil", which led to the arrest of 24 000 suspects who were put into concentration camps (Rothermund, 2006:186). Kenyatta, Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Achieng Oneko and many more were among the arrested, and during the trial of the *Kapenguria* Six[46] it was concluded that Kenyatta was behind the formation of *Mau Mau* (cf. the Corfield Report, 1960), despite Kenyatta having denounced the *Mau Mau* at public meetings and campaigning for non-violence (Hornsby, 2012:43). This weakened the *Mau Mau* and rapidly escalated the rebellion. Leakey (1954) argued that this radicalised the *Mau Mau* members, and could be heard in their oaths: *Betuni* and *Ontongoria*[47] which came after the state of emergency. The former called for violence and the killing of traitors and colonisers, the latter for recovering stolen land. As a result, European livestock was mutilated, and fires were started. Europeans, policemen,

[46] The Trial of *Kapenguria* Six refers to the trial of Kenyatta and five senior *Mau Mau* suspects held at Kapenguria, Pokot. Kenyatta and other leaders were found guilty of oathing and leadership of an illegal organization (Hornsby, 2012:48).

[47] According to Gathogo (2014:19), KAU evoked loyalty through compulsory oath, there were three types oaths administered: *Umemba*, aoth for recruitment; the *Batuni* oath for those who were sent to the forest and the *Otongoria* oath that was administered to the leaders of the movement at all levels.

informers, non-Kikuyu headmen and oath-resisters were killed (Hornsby, 2012:43). After the arrest of many of their leaders, the *Mau Mau* fighters took to the hills and forests, initiating the *Mau Mau* rebellion. This was controlled by the Central Committee whose seat was at Banana Hill in Kenya's Central Province (Ochieng, 1985:87).

The rebellion was waged by the people of central and eastern Kenya who were against colonial land alienation, heavy taxation, racial discrimination, low African wages, and the lack of African representation in the legislature (Gathogo, 2014:19). The aim of the rebellion was to rid Kenya of the British and thus achieve independence (Ochieng, 1985:88). However, the rebellion never captured the national imagination, and was viewed as a Kikuyu affair. It was therefore easy for the colonial government to arm and finance a loyalist self-defence force, which was recruited from those that had a lot to lose from a *Mau Mau* victory (Hornsby, 2012:45). The colonisers used lumpen proletariats and nationalist loyalists to fight the rebellion because during the rebellion, not a single well-known nationalist declared affiliation with the movement, or even tried to defend the men involved in it (Fanon, 1963:117). The *Mau Mau's* sabotage element had little effect because they focused on traitors within the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities rather than destroying key transport and communication services (Hornsby, 2012:45).

The *Mau Mau* rebellion broke with the past and politics of petition and its leaders were soon isolated from the party as no well-known leader declared their support for the rebellion. According to Fanon (1963:28), the radical factions were gradually isolated and then removed altogether as the colonial police swooped down on them. This was followed by the rebellion being disarmed by collaborators and British troops. The British colonial government took three years under severe repressive conditions to control the *Mau Mau* rebellion, during which time the British troops committed many atrocities (Branch, 2009:6). Loyalists played a key role in the defeat of the *Mau Mau*, with prominent activist Harry Thuku siding with the British against the *Mau Mau*, and Jomo Kenyatta[48] denouncing and rejecting them. The suppression of the rebellion and the disarming method used were to prevent at all costs the emergence of an independent government in Kenya that represented the most consistent anti-imperialist forces (Woddis, 1967:42). By 1955 the rebellion was all but defeated, and its last commander, Dedan Kimathi, was captured by

[48] After his release Kenyatta was very critical of *Mau Mau* and under his government it was treasonable to mention the *Mau Mau* and their struggle against imperialism and for land (Durrani, 1989).

the colonial government in October 1956 (Ochieng, 1985:88). The number of fatalities ranged from 14 000 to 25 000[49], most of the fatalities involving *Mau Mau* activists and the natives (Branch, 2009:5). As demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the *Mau Mau* defeat was followed by the colonisers searching for allies to make sure that their imperialist economic interests were guaranteed.

The *Mau Mau* rebellion had set Kenya on the path to independence and Britain, against the wishes of the settlers, responded with major reforms. The reforms coincided with the Cohen Report, which articulated change in the British model with incorporation of Africans into the colonial government (Collins, 2013:26). This was a method for Britain to continue wielding power over the colonies and control over their resources, as it successfully did in Egypt in 1922. The colonial government continued with the reforms they had implemented before the rebellion. Nissimi (2006) argues that the threat of the *Mau Mau* returning was forever present in the British settlers' thoughts, and that forced reforms within colonial Kenya. Kanyinga (2009:331) states that the threat of former *Mau Mau* fighters regrouping also influenced land reform, with privileged Kikuyu getting land rights in highlands.

After defeating the *Mau Mau,* the colonisers captured the liberation movement's vanguard and turned it towards the right (Fanon, 1963:70). Many reforms followed after the rebellion. According to Morris (2016:653), in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the colonised, Oliver Lyttleton, the British Secretary of State for colonies pushed through a new multiracial constitution in 1954. As a response to *Mau Mau* and increasingly vociferous nationalist rhetoric, the British and Kenyan colonial government started to consolidate a moderate and prosperous Kenyan middle class that would remain loyal to British imperial rule (Morris, 2016:653). The Lyttleton Constitution as it was widely known, was to take effect right after the end of the State of Emergency. It advocated for multiracialism under the doctrine of trusteeship (Cheche Kenya, 1982:11). The proposed Lyttleton Constitution sought to bring into effect the principles of multiracialism but with separate ballots, privileges and roles (Kariuki, 2015:83). It did not offer self-rule and ensured that the settlers' privileges remained, a far cry from what the *Mau Mau* had demanded. However, it did achieve its principal aim of deflecting the non-Kikuyu tribes

[49] Note that this number depends on who do you consult. According to *Corfield Report* (1960), the number was 14 000 and Blacker (2007) the number is 25 000.

from supporting the *Mau Mau*'s political aims (Percox, 2001:86). The proposals meant change in the composition of the Executive Council and Legislative Council, with the settlers' continued majority in both institutions (Kariuki, 2015:83). The Lyttleton Constitution was rejected by settlers and natives alike. The latter rejected it because it did not reflect the country's demographics, and few of the nominated African Legislative Council members accepted positions in the colonial government (Hornsby, 2012:53).

The amendment of the *Legislative Council Ordinance* of 1924 and the Legislative Council Rules of 1956 led to the election of the first African representatives in 1957 (Kariuki, 2009:85). Candidates in areas that had been affected by the *Mau Mau* rebellion went through loyalty tests based on wealth, age, and military and government service, to exclude any radicals from political participation (Branch & Cheeseman, 2007:19). To ensure participation, the colonial government allowed the re-establishment of African district-based political parties, which led to the mushrooming of political parties along tribal lines (Okoth-Ogendo, 1972:11). The 1957 elections were conducted under the Lyttleton Constitution and saw the first Africans elected to the Kenyan Legislative Council (Juma, 2002:486). According to Kariuki (2009:85) the 8 Africans finally elected to the Legislative Council were: Tom Mboya (Nairobi); Odinga Oginga (Central Nyanza); Daniel arap Moi (Rift Valley); Bernard Mate (Central); Lawrence G. Oguda (South Nyanza); Masinde Muliro (North Nyanza); James Nzua Muimi (Ukambani); and Ronald Ngala (Coast), most of whom would come to dominate the politics of Kenya in the post-independent era. Most supported a gradual approach to independence, hence their call for increasing African seats in the Legislative Council and their subsequent rejection of the Lyttleton Constitution (Kairuiki, 2009:85).

In 1955 the colonial government pursued the creation of a landed class through the Swynnerton Plan[50]. Land transfer to the natives was partially prompted by concerns over foreign investor confidence, and to prevent large-scale violence (White, 2000:560). The *Mau Mau* had vociferously opposed the creation of an African middle-class (Percox, 2001:204) and saw the Swynnerton Plan as contributing to the creation of a petit bourgeoise (Cheche Kenya, 1982:11; Morris, 2016:653). Cabral (1972:71) explains that

[50] These were in line with the Mitchell Plan, which advocated a multiracial Kenya, the creation of a landed class of Africans, and improving their education, all of this under the doctrine of trusteeship (Frost, 1979).

for the colonisers to create a bourgeoisie when one did not exist, strengthened the imperialist and capitalist camp.

Land ownership was promulgated into Kenyan law by the *Native Lands Registration Ordinance* of 1959 and was replaced before independence by the *Registered Lands Act* of 1963 (Home, 2012:191). It resulted in far-reaching land and agricultural reforms, and formed the basis for future land reform (Oyugi et al., 2005:17). The Swynnerton Plan resulted in collaboration between the colonisers, settlers, and the natives. It allowed the British and the settlers to continue their control of political power and resources (Collins, 2013:23).

The British continued with their mission to "win the hearts and minds" of the colonised. They succumbed to pressure from the elites and rejected the Lyttleton Constitution by refusing to be part of the Council of Ministers and in the process, made the Lyttleton Constitution unworkable (Kariuki, 2009:85). In 1958, the then British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd proposed a second round of constitutional changes (Hornsby, 2012:55). The Lennox-Boyd Constitution raised the number of African members in the Legislative Council to 14, giving them numerical equality with the settlers' elected members and raising their number to two on the Executive Council (Oyugi et al., 2005:17). However, this did not usher in majority rule, and to many businessmen these events indicated the direction in which the political wind was blowing, leading them to reorient their businesses towards the local population (Morris, 2016:653).

The aforementioned were methods by colonisers to disarm the *Mau Mau* movement (Fanon, 1963:70). Only after the foundation of neo-colonialism is laid – finding of allies, people disarmed and creation of bourgeoisies is it possible to decolonise (Woddis, 1967:43; Fanon, 1963:70). The elections were meant as a search of loyal national leaders which were to serve as allies during the negotiations. According to Branch and Cheeseman (2007:19), in order to construct a neo-colonial base and identify loyal African leaders, the colonial state was biased towards the loyalists during the 1957 elections, advocated for preferential treatment in the course of Africanisation of the provincial administration, which perpetuated the unequal distribution of the new economic opportunities. Consequently, in 1959 the colonial government followed the Swynnerton Plan by issuing Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1958/59 on Land Tenure and Control, which opened the White Highlands to all races (Kariuki, 2009:96). But access to the White

Highlands was through the “willing seller, willing buyer” model that formed the basis for land reform in post-independent Kenya. This created a national bourgeoisie and cemented the intermediary role for the native in playing a critical role during negotiations post-independence negotiations. Land reform had ethnic connotations that influenced the composition of the post-independent Kenyan state (Kanyinga, 2009:330). These were subsequently followed by the 1960 negotiations towards independence.

To avoid further radicalisation and the shift of Kenya nationalists to communism, Britain finally accepted the inevitable – Kenyan independence (Nissim, 2006:14), but this only after the British government had created a bargaining situation after having got the national bourgeoisies under their control (Kariuki, 2015:101). In this way, Britain manoeuvred and retained economic and political control as much as possible in the post-independence epoch (Kariuki, 2015:96). Therefore, after having disarmed the people, the colonisers went ahead with decolonisation, which entailed negotiations that led to compromises. The Lancaster House Conferences were set to deliberate on Kenya’s constitutional development and its independence.

The negotiations that led to compromises made by the national bourgeoisies as allies to the colonisers, ensured colonial contradictions such as the land and economy questions remaining unresolved. The 1960 Lancaster House Conference resulted from of the boycott of the Legislative Council by Africans and Asians in opposition to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution (Kariuki, 2015:94). In London from January to March 1960, the first Lancaster House Conference was convened with the aim of deliberating on fair representation through parliamentary institutions and the provision of self-rule in Kenya (Nyanchoka, 2011:2; Tarugarira, 2014:87). The crucial issue was the land question, which had the potential to delay independence. The settlers’ main concern was land value and the guarantee of individual land titles (Karuiki, 2015:10). The conference was attended by 19 Africans[51], 17 Europeans, 8 Asians, 3 Arabs, and a British delegation led by the Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod, to chart a new path (Gustafson, 1995:651). The British dominated the deliberations, and the land question was never resolved (Nyanchoka, 2011:2). The land discussion on Macleod’s demand was postponed until after the discussion of a Bill of Rights (Karuiki, 2015:126). Britain introduced an interim

[51] Note that none of those who had taken part in the *Mau Mau* rebellion were invited to the first Lancaster House Conference.

constitution that protected private property and subsequently dealt with land that had been dispossessed. The delegation agreed on the majority rule principle through the Westminster model of government and resolved the question of the formation of nation-wide political parties (Oyigu et al., 2005:17). According to Cheche Kenya (1982:10), the bourgeoisies saw this as an opportunity for self-enrichment under African majority rule, and abandoned the demands of the *Mau Mau*. The conference furthermore resolved the formation of nation-wide political parties (Oyigu et al., 2005:17).

This led to the burgeoning of ethnically aligned political parties in Kenya that were to contest power during the 1960 elections. The national bourgeoisies formed the KANU on 27 March 1960, to contest elections. KANU had key figures within its rank and file, James Gichuru was elected as the president, and Tom Mboya became secretary general (Good, 1968:116). KANU received support from the Kikuyu and Luo, with majority of its members drawn from the KAU (Gustafon, 1995:653) thus demonstrating the continuation of entry-ism politics that dominated the KAU. KANU comprised two factions, one seeking clean break from the past and advocating for a more egalitarian society, the other advocating for continuity in replacing the departing Britons (Cheche Kenya, 1982:18-19). This conservative group which defended the status quo would win the day and dominate KANU politics for the foreseeable future. KANU adopted a Manifesto for Independence, Social Democracy and Stability that clearly articulated a trajectory for independence and post-independence governance. The manifesto accepted the “principle of fair and just compensation” for the land, and the continuation of colonial-style economic development (Cheche Kenya, 1982:19). These were incorporated in the 1963 KANU election manifesto.

The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was formed to counter KANU, with leaders from minority tribes such as Ronald Ngala, Daniel arap Moi, and Masinde Muliro advocating for regionalism as a way to protect themselves from the Kikuyu-Luo alliance (Oyugi, 1997:44). KADU was preceded by the multiracial New Kenya Group (NKG) and the Kenya National Party (KNP). KADU drew its support from the Coast, Rift Valley, and parts of the Western Province, and from the Kalenjin, Maasai, Giiriama and a few other minor tribes (Oyugi, 1997:44; Ajulu, 2007:232). The separation between KANU and KADU was not based on ideological differences but on ethnical lines. KADU elites feared being marginalised and advocated for the restoration of pre-colonial land spheres that

were inhabited and controlled by ethnic groups (Kanyinga, 2009:329). Kamba elites led by Paul Ngei also mobilised and formed the African People's Party in 1962, after being marginalised in KANU. After successfully bargaining for space in post-independent KANU government and its members offered ministerial posts, the African People's Party ceased to exist (Oyugi, 1997:44). KADU would follow suit in 1964 when its leader was given the deputy presidency in the KANU government (Oyugi, 1997:44).

In 1960 as part of a compromise, the national bourgeoisies agreed to elections under the colonial trusteeship and KADU formed a coalition government when KANU refused to form a government after their election victory, in protest of the colonial government's refusal to release Kenyatta (Hornsby, 2012:67). In October 1961 Kenyatta was released from prison after a decade of imprisonment. He subsequently became president of KANU on 28 October 1961 (Good, 1968:116). In 1962, Kenyatta delivered a speech to the Legislative Council reiterating KANU's position on the issue of land, that there would be no "free things" in an African-run Kenya, and that fair and just compensation would be offered to settlers who owned land. After his release, Kenyatta also emphasised the need for an independence deal to be made between Britain and Kenya.

This was followed by the KADU government's introduction of settlement schemes. One was the Million Acre Settlement Scheme in which land was sold to 30 000 families (Cheche Kenya, 1982:25). Funds to purchase the land were to be sourced from Britain and the World Bank, with loans later paid back by Kenya (Wasserman, 1975). This allowed settlers to give back the land on their own terms once they had as far as possible, secured their interests (Kanyinga, 2009:329). The purpose of the schemes was not to settle the landless and address landlessness but to Africanise the highlands, mixing African and European farmers and stabilizing the land market (Hornsby, 2012:63). The whole process was done in a way not to impact economic stability (Kanyinga, 2009:329).

It is against this background that the Second Lancaster House Conference was held in April 1962, with the land question at the centre of the discussions (Kairuki, 2009:150). KANU and the settlers agreed on the need to expand the land purchase and settlement programmes (Hornsby, 2012:71) and that the constitution was to be based on the Westminster model – bicameral legislature and decentralisation of power. The Third Lancaster House Conference in 1963 included the final constitution, which recognised individual rights, including property rights, thus protecting the settlers' land and the wealth

they had amassed during colonisation (Gustafson, 1995:653). This entrenched the "willing seller, willing buyer" model in post-independent Kenya, with the KANU government preserving the colonisers' privileges. The conference was followed by elections in Kenya, and after KANU's victory, the party formed a government with Kenyatta as a Prime Minister. The KANU government advocated for Kenya to remain within commonwealth, and that land reform should not compromise high agricultural standards. Upon amendment of the constitution in 1964, Kenya became a republic with Kenyatta the President. This marked the end of 70 years of colonial rule (Nyanchoka, 2011:2).

In addressing the land question, the KANU government enacted the Registered Land Act of 1963 to facilitate control over land transactions, but the Act kept many of the provisions of the Native Lands Registration Ordinance of 1959, which was created by the colonial government (Adam et al*.,* 2010:315; Home, 2012:191). The government then offered to finance private people to buy land outside the settlement areas. New land policy in post-independence Kenya entailed trust Land, government land, settlement schemes, and group ranches (Adam et al., 2010:315). According to Kariuki (2015:357), the British government used land negotiation process to find allies to safeguard British interests.

3.3.1.1. The Land Issue

From the Swahili People's resistance against the Portuguese to the *Mau Mau* rebellion, the struggle against colonisation was always a struggle for land and against its dispossession. Fanon (1963:127) stated that when the colonised think of liberation they think in terms of violence, in terms of taking land back from the foreigner, and in terms of national struggle and armed insurrection because for colonised people, the land is first and foremost concrete, and of essential value (Fanon, 1963:44). "The land brings them bread and above all, their dignity" (Fanon, 1963:44).

That KANU and KADU adopted the constitution as representative of the Kenyan people symbolised a compromise on their part that led to the land question being unresolved, because both parties were committed to buy back the land from the settlers. Firstly, protection of private property without addressing the land question legitimised the dispossession of the natives by the colonisers. Secondly, the "willing seller, willing buyer" clause meant that natives would be buying back their stolen property, and then only if the

settlers agreed to sell. Consequently, land reform in Kenya had a class character and ethnic connotations. The majority of those who benefited from the settlement schemes and land reform were ethnic groups which had political power, such as the Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin etc., whose political position was reinforced by their economic position. The Kikuyu were large beneficiaries compared to other communities, creating the perception that the schemes were devised to satisfy land hunger among Kikuyu rather than in other communities (Kanyinga, 2009:331).

During land reform, government emphasised privileged purchases of land and its transfer to those that had the ability to pay (Kanyinga, 2009:332). This meant that those with political influence and deep pockets were the main beneficiaries of large land holdings in the highlands (Kanyinga, 2009:332). Therefore, land reform and settlement schemes were never meant to address landlessness, but to serve the intertwined interests of the comprador bourgeoisies and colonisers. This process co-opted comprador bourgeoisies into the colonial economy (Wasserman, 1975: 7).

Meanwhile, the land was purchased at inflated prices with money lent by the British government and the World Bank, with most ownership of fertile land concentrated amongst the politicians (Cheche Kenya, 1982:12). Therefore, land reform served the colonisers and comprador bourgeoisies, as it provided funding to the departing settlers and capital accumulation and class formation to the comprador bourgeoisies, and was abandoned the moment it no longer served that purpose (Leys, 1975). Settlement schemes such as the Swynnerton Plan were attuned to the needs and advantages of the European system, and thus largely preserve them (Wasserman, 1976:151).

The loans from Britain and the World Bank meant that Kenya continued to be economically dependent on Britain. This eliminated any nationalisation aspirations that the “radicals” had and removed their right to make and control policy (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:64). The failure to address the land question also meant failure to address the colonial economy, which was based on land ownership. As a result, post-independent land reform entrenched deeply felt resentment between the ethnic groups and perpetuated the widening divisions between the landed and the landless, the rich and the poor (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009:268). Land has continually been a source of conflict and violence in Kenya; the 2007 post-election violence is a case in point.

3.3.1.2. The Economy

Under Kenyatta, KANU compromised over land and the economy in return for power and British support for Kenya (Hornsby, 2012:73). The national bourgeoisies who formed a large part of the landed African class that was created during the transition, resisted radical departure from the colonial economy. Instead, they opted for continuity with the past and no break from the colonial system (Hunter, 1975; Cheche Kenya, 1982:19). Much of the colonial structure remained in post-independence Kenya, to be perpetuated by the comprador bourgeoisies on behalf of the colonial powers. According to Odinga (1967), in post-independent Kenya it was "not yet *Uhuru*" because the structure of colonial exploitation had not been properly removed. This is in line with the Wasserman (1976) argument that independence in Kenya, while breaking authoritative linkages, reaffirmed and enhanced others in the form of economic dependency, development assistance, foreign investment, and the political, social, and economic compatibility of the elite's objectives.

Post-independent Kenya continued with colonial capitalism dominated by export-oriented cash crops (coffee and tea), a large smallholder agricultural sector, and foreign capital. Its modest manufacturing sector was also dominated by foreign capital, and has been reduced to assembly plants (Fanon, 1963:176; Hornsby, 2012:5). Kenyatta emphasised economic growth over development and redistribution with a trickledown effect (Cheche Kenya, 1982:25). This reproduced the colonial socio-economic ills in the form of inequality, poverty, and unemployment. Kenya kept her existing ties with western countries, especially Britain (Kenya remained a member of Commonwealth after independence), in order to access foreign aid, foreign investment, and overseas markets for her products[52] (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:85). The government entered into joint ventures with foreign capital, but such programmes were largely in the interests of the national bourgeoisies (Leys, 1975).

The comprador bourgeoisies opted for co-option by the colonisers and wanted to be well placed to take over positions vacated by the departing British and to maintain the pattern and direction of colonial rule (Leys, 1975). This co-option was legitimised by the pursuit

[52] After independence Kenya entered into an agreement with European Community (now EU) to be part of the *Yaounde Convention* which entailed economic cooperation.

of Africanisation/Kenyanisation of the economy and the state and was a way that the creation of a national bourgeoisies could be undertaken, by providing access to jobs in the expanding public sector (Olukoshi, 1998:42). Kenyanisation without structural transformation meant reproduction of the old colonial order (Lopes et al., 2017:42). Therefore, Kenyanisation/Africanisation was a measure of capital accumulation by the national bourgeoisies, which was effected through legislation such as the Trades Licencing Act of 1967, and formation of KNTC and the KNCC, which excluded non-citizens (Lubeck, 1987:144/5; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:85). Because of the importance of the intermediary sector, Fanon (1963:180) called for the sector to be nationalised post-independence because of their importance; it failed however, because nationalisation must serve the people of Kenya. The sector was taken over by the comprador bourgeoisies without changing its colonial character, which has meant a continuation of the exploitation of the Kenyan masses. In addition, for the petit bourgeoisie, access to state jobs meant access to state resources. In the case of Kenya, this had ethnic connotations, which is the reason why the state is such a contested terrain in Kenya, often leading to violence.

3.3.1.3. The Despotic Government

The Lancaster constitution built the Kenyan government around the Westminster model with a participatory parliament. The Kenyan political system, however, came to be dominated by the president, as parliament came to derive its legitimacy from the president under Kenyatta (Mwaura, 1997:6). In 1964 Kenyatta amended the constitution and he became head of the state and the government (Tarugaria, 2014:88). This led to the centralisation of power in the office of the president with parliament rubber stamping the president's decisions, which resulted in the executive perpetuating their interests at the expense of the masses. The bourgeoisie dictatorship of Kenya drew its strength from the existence of their leader – Kenyatta (Fanon, 1963:166).

According to Fanon (1963:166), in underdeveloped countries the leader stands for moral power, in whose shelter the thin and poverty-stricken bourgeoisie of a young nation decide to get rich. KANU would turn against democracy because the attainment of political independence meant change in the composition of the state's managers rather than in the character of the state (Ake, 1996; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:77). After the absorption of KADU into KANU in 1964, Kenya became a *de facto* one-party state that

lasted until 1966[53] and a *de jure* one-party state under Moi's presidency (Mwaura, 1997:5; Larmer, 2015:74). Conscious of the danger that the extremely demagogical and confused attitude of the rival party threatened the ruling party that emerged after independence, it tried to disband its competitor and to condemn it to illegality (Fanon, 1963:120). The one-party tactic was chosen by the bourgeoisie because they had been economically powerless, unable to bring about coherent social relations, and stood merely on the principle of its domination as a class (Fanon, 1963:165).

As part of the colonial allies that attained the means of production and political power, Kenyatta and his tribesmen were able to use their positions to dominate and reproduce their wealth (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006:11). Immediately after independence, the comprador bourgeoisies indicated their inner purpose to become part of the company of profiteers, exploiters and the aider and abettor of the young bourgeoisies which is plunging into the mire of corruption and pleasure (Fanon, 1963:166). Under the comprador bourgeoisies the Kenyan political system is ran through as series of patronage, clientelism and corruption which was made possible by nominal independence. This dominated the post-independent state, which perpetuated exploitation and subjugation of the masses on behalf of foreign capital. Post-independence Kenya was dominated by the KANU generation, from Kenyatta, to Moi (1978-2002) to Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013), who led with an iron fist. According to Branch and Cheeseman (2007:28) the elites were still in charge of the state which meant that the state remained the same despite undergoing some periodic changes. The dominance of the comprador bourgeoisies also meant that Kenya's political economy transitioned from one dominated by white settlers to one dominated by a combination of native and international capital (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:61).

Wasserman (1975:7) identified three themes that have characterised decolonisation globally, especially in Africa. He identified: adaptation of colonisers to decolonisation; co-option of national bourgeoisies into colonial economies; and pre-emptive mass discontent. In Kenya, the colonisers came to terms with decolonisation but positioned themselves to the negotiate from a position of strength (Corfield, 1960). This included defeating the *Mau Mau* and ensuring that under no circumstances would an anti-

[53] Kenya People's Union (KPU) was formed in 1966 by Odinga to challenge KANU until it was banned in 1969 (Tordoff, 1984:102).

imperialism force emerge in Kenya. This disarming tactic was followed by other reforms to win the “hearts and minds” of the colonised. Co-option of the national bourgeoisies followed. Britain did this well, by separating the loyalists from the radicals through the 1957 elections. The landed class they created through the Swynnerton Plan became their allies, and this alliance led to compromise during the negotiations. Cabral (1972:71) argues that the creation of the bourgeoisies strengthened imperialism and capitalism. The comprador bourgeoisies embraced this intermediary position and became business agents for foreign MNCs, thus dominating Kenya’s political economy and perpetuating neo-colonialism (Fanon, 1963:152-3). During the independence processes, Kenya attained only nominal independence. The Kenyan economy continues as an export oriented colonial economy, with the post-independent Kenyan state being used as a vehicle for wealth accumulation by the comprador bourgeoisies and to perpetuate neoliberalism. This is evident in the *Vision 2030* blueprint.

The colonial state in Kenya was not abolished to serve the interests of the masses, and their discontent was controlled. The Kenyan negotiations were dominated by the elites, and any mass gatherings were prevented. According to Wasserman (1975:6), the marginalisation of the masses during negotiations was necessary to ensure compromises were reached that would allow the comprador bourgeoisies to safeguard British interests during the negotiations and in post-independence, and that they would act as gatekeepers against any fundamental changes.

3.3.2. The South African Independence Process

Contemporary South Africa is a creation of colonisation, and as in most African countries, resistance to colonialism is as old as colonisation itself. It can be traced from Autshumao[54] and the Khoi resistance to Dutch colonisation of the Cape, through the Frontier Wars[55] to the Bambatha Rebellion[56]. However, for this thesis, analysis of the South African independence process starts from the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, which saw South Africa become a single political entity. This in no way suggests that the

[54] Authumao, also known to settlers as Harry the Strandloper, was the leader of the Goringkaikona tribe, he was banned to Robben Island after the war with Dutch settlers but later brought back for the peace negotiations between the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC) and the Khoi People.

[55] In the 9 Frontier Wars that took place between 1776 to 1878, the natives struggled against dispossession of the land and livestock against, firstly by the Dutch, and later the British.

[56] Bambatha KaMancina was a leader of the AmaZondi Clan of the Zulu people and resided in the Mpanza Valley in KwaZulu Natal. The rebellion was due to the British rule and taxation.

pre-1910 colonial resistance is irrelevant, but pre-1910, South Africa had four political entities: two British colonies and two Afrikaner republics. In 1910 Britain formalised their colonial conquest of South Africa and consolidated racial capitalism (Shivambu, 2014:35). The 1961 proclamation of the republic by the NP government ended the dominion status but perpetuated colonisation until the country's democratic elections in 1994. Hence, the thesis uses 1994 as independence year.

The following historical analysis indicates that the struggle against colonialism, especially by the ANC has always been a struggle for inclusion of the national bourgeoisies into the colonial system, particularly as their class character meant the reproduction of their class interests. Fanon (1963:149) states that the national middle-class sought to replace the middle-class of the mother country without decolonisation. This led to nominal independence, as the same economic relations continued between South Africa and Britain. According to Fanon (1963:98), after independence the national middle-class would appeal for help from former coloniser which result in the former colonial power reinforcing its colonialist trade channels and the former colony becoming an economically dependent country.

After Britain had won the South African War[57] (1899-1902), which had resulted from the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886, Britain annexed the Boer Republics, the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*, and the Orange Free State (Afigbo et al., 1986:273; Drew, 2002:11). In 1908, Britain held National Conventions in Durban, Cape Town, and Bloemfontein on the proposed constitution[58] which led to the South African Act of 1909 (Natrass, 2017:137). The Act was adopted by the British Parliament in 1909 and led to the amalgamation of the four British colonies: the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*, the Orange Free State, the Cape Colony and the Natal Colony, to form the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Thompson, 2000:153). The 1910 constitution saw South Africa becoming a British dominion and perpetuating the marginalisation of Africans. Racial segregation was practiced by the South African government under Prime Minister Louis Botha (Thompson, 2000:153).

[57] This war is also called Second Anglo-Boer War. The First Anglo-Boer War broke out in 1880 after the attempted British annexation of Transvaal in 1877 which Transvaal won with the help of Orange Free State.

[58] African People's Organization (APO) which was formed in 1902 campaigned against the formation of South African Union. The organization ceased to exist in 1923.

As a response to further marginalisation and the proposed Land Act, a group of African elites in Bloemfontein formed the South African Native National Congress in 1912 (renamed the ANC in 1932) (Ngcukaitobi, 2018:111). This was an organisation of an elite group of small businessmen, teachers, clerks, clergymen, lawyers and chiefs, which advocated for recognition by South African government of "civilised" Africans as citizens, able to take part in the political and socio-economic activities of the country (Natrass, 2017:142). The ANC would further advocate for diplomatic strategy in their interactions with the South African and British governments (Ngcukaitobi, 2018). In an effort to avoid being branded by white government as an organisation that acted illegally or unconstitutionally, the ANC remained a moderate organisation favouring gradual reforms, and did not question the legitimacy of the segregationist South African state (Terreblanche, 2002:280).

The co-option politics that were reflected through the "recognition of civilised Africans" set the tone for the ANC throughout the national struggle, as demonstrated in the following paragraphs. The ANC's entry-ism politics are clearly shown in their reaction to the Native Land Act, Act 27 of 1913. Prior to the promulgation of the Land Act, the Botha government perpetuated proletarianisation and further marginalisation by passing the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, and the Mines and Works Act of 1911, which prohibited African workers from striking and protected white mineworkers against competition from Africans (Terreblanche, 2002:269). The Native Land Act of 1913 was partially the result of the Lagden Commission[59] and prohibited Africans from purchasing freehold land outside of scheduled areas such as the reserves, locations, and many farms owned by individuals or groups of Africans (Feinberg & Horn, 2009:42). Furthermore, the Act also abolished sharecropping and squatting as a means of accessing land on farms (Beinart & Delius, 2014:670). The aim of anti-squatting was to force Africans to be wage labourers (Feinberg, 2006:123). The Act afforded the natives 7 percent of South Africa's land with whites taking the lion's share; however, this was increased to 13 percent with the passing of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The Act had a wide impact on South Africa's

[59] The Lagden Commission focused on land ownership in 1903 and recommended territorial segregation and that restrictions upon the purchase of land by the native were necessary in the future South African Union (Feinberg & Horn, 2009:42).

political economy, and is still visible to day. It led to the expropriation of land owned by natives, and the dispossession of their cattle, sheep and goats.

In spite of the economic and social devastation caused by the Native Land Act, the criticism it evoked from the ANC did not constitute concrete political action. Many ANC leaders wrote and published material against the Act, that reflected their diplomatic stance (Feinberg, 2006:124). Solomon Thekisho Plaatje, the then ANC Secretary General, (1916) wrote that as the result of the Act, “the South African native found himself not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth”. With regard to the Act, another ANC leader, Selby Msimang, wrote the following (Ngcukaitobi, 2018:132):

> “There was a great deal of upheaval, particularly in the Free State. African farm labourers were uprooted, sent away. All conditions of employment were changed under this Act. You would see a number of families driving their stock in the country not knowing where to take them to.”

ANC leaders continued criticising the Act, and hosted protest meetings throughout the country (South African History Online (SAHO), 2019). However, these meetings were reduced to “talk shops” without resulting in any coherent action. According to Terreblanche (2002:264) during World War One the ANC refrained from criticising the act. This was in line with the ANC’s insistence on diplomacy during the struggle against colonisation and their politics of inclusion (Rantele, 1998:3). The ANC continued with its diplomatic tactics and wrote to Governor General Gladstone, asking him to withhold his support of the Act, to which he responded that it was not within his constitutional function to do so (SAHO, 2019). In 1914, the ANC sent a delegation to England to petition British parliament to invoke its imperial veto over South African legislation, without any success (Hall, 2014:3; Ngcukaitobi, 2018:111). The delegation also wrote to King George V requesting his intervention, but this too did not bear any fruit (Hall, 2014: 3). The ANC continued with their criticism of the Act and voicing their grievances to the Natives Land Commission (Feinberg, 2006:120).

The aforementioned created a Manichean system in which the settler and the settler’s towns were well fed at the expense of the natives (Fanon, 1963:41) who were dehumanised through racism and having their land appropriated through primitive

accumulation. Racism made possible the shameless exploitation of one group of people by another, which reached a high stage of technical development (Fanon, 1964:38). Hence, military and economic oppression preceded, legitimised, and made possible racism in the colonies (Fanon, 1964:38). The dominion was used as a source of raw material, and laws were enacted to compel peasants to take up wage labour, to introduce systems of forced labour, and to sanctify a system of land tenure that robbed the peasants of their land (Woddis, 1967:15). The land question, which formed the basis of the national struggle in South Africa, would form part of the concessions made by the comprador bourgeoisies in 1955.

The discriminatory laws led to radicalisation of the black resistance and formation of organisations such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and the Industrial Workers of Africa, in 1917 and 1919 respectively (Drew, 2002:39; Terreblanche, 2002:281). Nonetheless, neither organisation called for independence; they advocated for workers' rights, the abolishment of pass laws, and boycotting high prices (Wickins, 1973:8; Leonard et al., 2018:6). The ICU worked with the ANC and with the International Socialist League[60] (ISL), that was formed in 1915 and contributed to the formation of the Communist Party of South Africa[61] (CPSA) in 1921 (Drew, 2002:52). Many leftist organisations, including the ISL, came together to form the CPSA – a South African affiliate of Communist International (Bunting, 1998:26). Initially, the CPSA called socialism and for the unity of workers, regardless of race and gender, against colonial capitalism (Legassick, 2007:158). Socialism advocates for workers' power, which was tantamount to a call for majority rule at the time. However, the white-dominated CPSA failed to unite the South African working class, let alone struggle for independence. Only in 1928 did the CPSA overtly call for a South Africa independent from Britain.

Under the tutelage of Communist International, the CPSA adopted the "Native Republic" thesis, which called for an "independent South African Native Republic as a stage towards the workers' and peasants' republic, guaranteeing protection and complete equality to all national minorities" (Legassick, 2007:157). This was a paradigm shift from the inclusive

[60] The formation of ISL was the result of a split within Labour Party over the issue of First World War (Bunting, 1998:23).

[61] The CPSA dissolved voluntarily in June 1950 to avoid the coming into effect of *Suppression of Communism Act, Act 44 of 1950*, however, in 1953 the CPSA reorganised illegally as the SACP and contributed in to the drafting of the *Freedom Charter*.

politics that dominated African politics since the formation of the Union of South Africa. Nevertheless, this was the embryonic form of the two-stage theory that separated national liberation into two stages and made neo-colonialism possible. The “Native Republic” thesis also resolved that the CPSA should participate in the national bourgeoisie movement while retaining its full independence (Bunting, 1998:39). Its’ participation should be based on objectives to transform the ANC into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation against the capitalists and British imperialists, based upon the trade unions and peasants’ organisations, while systematically developing the leadership of workers and the Communist Party in these organisations (Bunting, 1998:39). However, the communists were marginalised by Pixley Ka Isaka Seme and Richard Mahabane’s leadership of the ANC (Glaser, 2012:13). Moreover, the CPSA was accused of chauvinism, totalitarianism, and misdiagnosis of South African colonialism, which led to the pursuit of the NDR, and the consequent entrenchment of colonial contradictions (Mafeje, 1997:12).

In 1923 the ANC held a conference in response to the Jan Smuts government, which opened debate on the establishment of a Republic of South Africa. This divided the ANC membership (Ngcaweni, 2014:67). Instead of reaching resolution on the debate, the conference adopted the *African Bill of Rights for South Africa*, which contained a statement of the five rights to be included in the Bill of Rights (Ngcukaitobi, 2018:4), and were reproduced in Africa’s Claims in South Africa, the Freedom Charter, and the 1989 Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. This would set the tone throughout the ANC’s national liberation struggle. The Bill of Rights read as follows (Ngcaweni, 2014:68):

- That the Bantu inhabitants of the Union have, as human beings, the indisputable right to a place of abode in this land of their fathers.

- That all Africans have, as sons of the soil, the God-given right to unrestricted ownership of land, their land.

- That the Bantu, as well as their brethren, have, as British subjects, the inalienable right to the enjoyment for those British principles of the ‘liberty of the subject, justice and

> equality of all classes in the eye of the law' that have made Great Britain one of the greatest world powers.

The fact that they saw themselves as British subjects demonstrates the ANC politics of diplomacy and inclusion. The ANC continued to be an elite party that was non-existent on the ground, and led the formation of the All-African Convention (AAC), a united front between the ANC, CPSA and the ICU to promote African rights through boycotts, strengthening the nationalist movement, and to respond to the Hertzog government's proposed Bills: the Native Representation Bill; Native Trust and Land Bill; and the Native Urban Areas Amendment Bill (Thompson, 2000).

The ANC continued to participate in colonial institutions and refused to take part in the popular struggle against colonialism. According to Rodney (1972), this was because the contradictions between the national bourgeoisies and the colonisers were not that deep. To Fanon (1963:149), the national bourgeoisies sought to replace the bourgeoisies of the mother country, as their demands were for indigenous capitalism and not its abolishment. In 1936, the Union of South Africa's parliament passed the Native Trust and Land Act that made it possible to repeal the constitutional provision guaranteeing voting rights in the Cape Province, through passing the Native Representation Act of 1937 (Feinberg, 2006:123). After the removal of a limited African male franchise in the Cape Province, in its place the government introduced the Native Representative Council (NRC) which included 12 elected and 4 nominated African representatives to act as a statutory body with no executive or legislative authority (Glaser, 2012:14). Despite opposing the NRC, the ANC encouraged its members to stand for the new body, and some within the ANC fought for and obtained seats (Terreblanche, 2002:282; Glaser, 2012:14), consequently tacitly agreeing to the principle of white trusteeship, and the strengthening patronage ties between African leaders and the system of white political domination (Terreblanche, 2002:282). This indicated that a stratum of the society was in alliance with the colonisers in maintaining colonialism (Woddis, 1967:23).

The ANC remained absent in popular struggles such as the bus boycott. Urbanisation had sparked struggles over municipal services – housing, transport, wages, and informal trade (Glaser, 2012:17). In the early 1940s these led to bus boycotts in Alexandra in protest against an increase in fares, and other economic grievances (Sipuka, 2012:35).

Bus boycotts took place in August 1940, October 1942, and in August 1943 and 1944 (Sipuka, 2012:35). The ANC was also not involved in the 1946 miners strike.

The 1946 miners' strike in the Witwatersrand that was met with police brutality contributed to a shift in the national liberation movement from a policy of concession to more dynamic and militant forms (Naicker, 1976). The strike was organised by the African Mine Workers' Union, formed 1941, with the help of the CPSA (Naicker, 1976). This change to a militant form of national liberation resulted in the formation of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) in 1943. Nevertheless, despite its demands for freedom of expression, unionism, and its rejection to work for the colonial state, it did not advocate for independence, thus adding to the already existing organisations that advocated for inclusion in the colonial system (Kayser, 2002).

According to Glaser (2012:18) the ANC's lack of participation was because the ANC viewed the state as something that could be pursued rather than resisted, but this changed with the apartheid government. In the pursuit of a diplomatic strategy, the ANC Policy Conference on 16 December 1943, adopted the Africa's Claims in South Africa document. Through the document, for the first time the ANC advocated for majority rule in South Africa, and full citizenship rights for the African people of South Africa (Turok, 2008:20). However, it did not give any direction on whether the majority rule should or should not continue under British dominion. Thus, the document shied away from advocating for independence, but called for the abolishment of all discrimination based on race and the freedom to participate in the economy (Turok, 2008:20). Furthermore, the ANC called for access to land, fair labour practice, and the right to participate in the economy (Turok, 2008:20-21):

> "The right to an equal share in all the material resources of the country – the right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land, individually or collectively, both in rural and urban areas. Industry and labour: a right for equal opportunities to enter all occupations, equal pay for equal work, removal of the colour bar in industry and the right of African workers to collective bargaining. Commerce: we object to all practices that impede the obtaining of trading licences by Africans in urban and rural areas, and we equally condemn the confinement of African

> economic enterprise to segregated areas and localities. Therefore, demand freedom of trading."

Besides the call for majority rule, the document also called for the inclusion of Africans into the colonial economy within the capitalist framework. Therefore, the economic demands did not seek to break with the economic setup of the colonial government, but rather, the continuation of capitalism (Mosala, 2016:36). This reinforces Rodney's (1972) argument that contradictions between the colonisers and the national bourgeoisies are not that deep.

The policy conference also resolved on the formation of the ANC Youth League (hereafter Youth League), which was established in 1944. Under Dr Alfred Xuma's leadership, the ANC left the AAC and continued sitting on advisory boards and voting for whites to represent blacks in the whites-only parliament (Tabata, 1948:8). As a result, many of the ANC leaders were built by the white press i.e. Dr Xuma and Dr. John Dube before him, who were described by the press as great leaders (Tabata, 1948:6). The formation of the Youth League was viewed as a paradigm shift in ANC politics. Tabata (1948:4) had warned that the ANC was stuck in the past, while a Youth League would be the product of modern conditions with a modern outlook. The founding manifesto of the Youth League reflected this by being critical of the ANC leadership; it accused the leadership of focusing on the interests of the African elites rather than on the masses (Sikupa, 2012:37). As such, the Youth League felt that the ANC had failed to progress and was inactive. Furthermore, the ANC leadership was blamed for lacklustre recruitment that kept the ANC an elite organisation with cautious tactics and participation in state structures (Glaser, 2012:32). The Youth League was formed under the leadership of Sisulu, Tambo, Mda, Makhele and Sobukwe, with Lembede as president and Mandela as secretary (Twala, 2009:158) it was guided by African Nationalism and dominated by Africanists who led the constant criticism of the ANC's cooperation with communists and non-Africans (Glaser, 2012:33).

The Africanists were instrumental to the adoption of a Programme of Action in 1949, as a response to apartheid. Afrikaner economic hardship, labour competition, and the *Swartgevaar* (Black Peril), reignited Afrikaner nationalism that led to the formation of the Carnegie Commission of 1929-1932 (Dubow, 1991:7). The Commission investigated poor whites and found that poor Afrikaners constituted 10 percent of the white population

at the time, with the bulk of coming from rural areas, having been displaced by South Africa's rapid industrialisation (Seekings, 2007:377). The Carnegie Commission called for government intervention and the establishment of a welfare state (Seekings, 2007:337). In 1948, the NP won the elections and the NP government under D.F. Malan implemented apartheid, which entrenched the exploitation of African workers (Thompson, 2000:187). According to Fanon (1963:52), apartheid is simply a form of division into compartments of the colonial world, and the native had to learn his place and not go beyond certain limits. The Afrikaners served as collaborators of the imperialism that formed the anti-decolonisation lobby.

The adoption of the Programme of Action by the ANC at the 1949 elective conference was accompanied by changes in leadership, James Moroka became the president, Walter Sisulu the secretary general, and 7 out 15 newly elected executive were from the Youth League (Glaser, 2012:12). The Programme was drafted in 1948 by the Youth League and was heavily influenced by the Africanists within the organisation[62] (Plaatjie, 1994:60). The Youth League was "inspired by the desire to achieve national freedom that meant freedom from white domination and the attainment of political independence" (Raboroko, n.d:28). The programme for the first time the Programme called for independence from Britain and thus, a break with previous ANC policy. Moreover, its objective was to confront the apartheid government through strikes, boycotts and in defiance of unjust laws (Ngcaweni, 2014:89). These militant activities were on a large scale and took place with greater frequency than ever seen before (Ngcaweni, 2014:128). The ANC had transitioned from a passive to a militant organisation, and from an elite organisation to a mass-based movement. Nonetheless, the Freedom Charter contradicted the Programme, and led to the purging of Africanists from the ANC.

The Freedom Charter was adopted at the 1955 Congress of the People, which was held in Kliptown near Johannesburg (Koster, 1985:17). The Freedom Charter was a liberal document similar to the African Bill of Rights for South Africa and Africa's Claims in South Africa, rather than a socialist document as many had claimed. Firstly, the Freedom Charter called for a liberal democracy characterised by private property and a Bill of Rights, it did not call for decolonisation which would lead to independence (Ndlovu-

[62] According to Plaatjie (1994:60), the Programme of Action was firstly drafted by Mda and later on Sobukwe and Pitje contributed to the document as well.

Gatsheni, 2013:175). Therefore, the Freedom Charter called for nominal independence. Secondly, the Freedom Charter sought nationalisation of the mines, banks, and monopoly industries, and to share the country's wealth among its people (Koster, 1985:17). This was to happen within the framework of capitalism, as emphasised by the call that "all people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and enter trades, crafts and professions". According to Mandela (1956:284) "for the first time in the history of this country, non-European will have the opportunity to own land in their own name and right; mills and factories, and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish as never before". This quote demonstrates that the Freedom Charter also allowed for Africans to enter the colonial economy and advocate for indigenous capitalism. Thirdly, the land question: the clause that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it" obscured the land question and made it a difficult issue to resolve (Plaatjie, 1994:93). This was tantamount to absolving the land usurpers from the responsibility of dispossessing Africans of their land (Plaatjie, 1994:92). It went against the spirit of the Programme of Action, which championed repossession of land from the land usurpers and was integrated in the 1996 constitution, making land repossession difficult if not impossible by perpetuating private property and capitalism. The Freedom Charter declared that "the land shall be shared among those who work it" (Congress Alliance, 1955). The implementation of the Freedom Charter would serve as the first stage of the NDR – a transitional stage in which certain forms of capitalism may have appeared to a limited extent (SACP, 1962; Ntsebeza, 2016:928). Ironically, this first stage would keep South African leaders as managers of the economy under neo-colonialism.

The ANC adopted the *Freedom Charter* as its official policy in 1956 (Shivambu, 2014:47), and it led to a breakaway party, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) being formed in 1959. The breakaway resulted from years of marginalisation of the Africanists within the ANC and its Youth League, after the replacement of the *Programme of Action* by the Freedom Charter (Glaser, 2012:59). To Fanon (1963:28), the radical voices within national liberation gradually become isolated and were then removed altogether. The PAC was the more radical organisation of the two, with Robert Sobukwe elected as its first president in 1959. Nonetheless, the PAC was marginalised during the 1990s negotiations, as the ANC took centre stage. According to Fatton (1990), the progressive parts of the national liberation movement were excluded during negotiations, paving the way for compradorism.

During its formative years, the PAC adopted the Positive Action Campaign to mobilise support, and formed the Africanist Task Force (Houston et al., 2015:25). The Positive Action Campaign was directed against instruments that maintained the racist apartheid laws. To the oppressed people this was going to lead to a total strategy for liberation (Gumede, 2017:45). This campaign allowed the PAC Africanists to continue intensifying their anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid (Natrass, 2017:186). Their first programme involved an anti-pass law demonstration across the country, with large numbers in Langa and Sharpeville supporting the demonstration. These peaceful protests entailed the burning of pass books by protestors, on whom the police opened fire killing two people in Langa and 69 people in Sharpeville (Natrass, 2017:187). This led to the mass arrest of the PAC leaders in April 1960, and the banning of liberation movements (Legassick, 2007:233). This disarming method by the apartheid government became a norm throughout the apartheid epoch. The violent repression was also meant to dehumanise the colonised and reduce them to a state of non-being. PAC responded to the ban by going underground and forming an armed wing called POQO, later renamed APLA.

The ANC followed suit and launched MK in November 1961, moving away from its non-violence principle that had proven to be a failure (Koster, 1985:37). MK had chosen sabotage tactics from four choices: revolution; guerrilla-warfare; terrorism; and sabotage, starting with the latter on 16 December 1961 (Koster, 1985:37). The banning of organisation forced leaders from both organisations into exile in an attempt to organise liberation armies. Contrary to MK the APLA carried out attacks on apartheid-created institutions, collaborators, security agents, white civilians, and perceived PAC dissidents (Lipede, 1994:154; Lamb, 2003:7). APLA carried out their operations within South African borders, while MK wanted to launch attacks from outside South Africa. The MK guerrilla warfare did not readily lead to great success in terms of effective combat, and did little to shake the confidence of the regime (Saul, 2014:81). In exile, the PAC started to decline because of leadership struggle, while the ANC established itself as the legitimate South African national liberation party on the international stage (Leeman, 2015:329).

The declaration of the Republic in 1961 by NP government citing interference in domestic issues as reasons for their declaration of independence, points out that settlers were the enemies of the colonised. This led to a brutal decolonisation processes that entailed violent suppression of the natives. According to Verancini (2007:2), the true enemy of the

colonised was the European settler. In response to the Declaration of Independence, the SACP adopted a document in a 1962 conference that conceptualised South Africa as "Colonialism of a Special Type" (CST). The Road to South African Freedom document identifies two South Africa's – "white South Africa" with an imperialist state and "non-white South Africa" as a colony (SACP, 1962). The SACP (1962) defined this situation in which the coloniser and colonised lived side by side as CST:

> "Whites held a monopoly of political rights with their right to vote and be elected to parliament and governing bodies. Have access to economic opportunities, educational opportunities, and high paying jobs. They owned eighty-seven percent of land, mines, factories and banks. While two-thirds of the population – blacks, were suffering from national oppression, robbed of their ancestral land, only thirteen percent of land was set aside for African occupation. No access to economic activities, quality education, and decent healthcare for black South Africans. They were regulated bypass laws and exploited in their work, in mines and industries and on farms."

According to the SACP (1962), this justified the pursuit of the NDR which was to resolve these contradictions. The two stage theory reduced the economic struggle to an afterthought and have kept South Africa as nominally independent. This was by extension of the Freedom Charter and was no different from what was done throughout Africa with the "*Seek ye first the political kingdom"* principle (Ntsebeza, 2016:928). Those within the Marxist Tradition (cf. Hudson, 1986; Visser, 1997) see this as a misdiagnosis which led to the adoption of the wrong antidote that has led to the rise of neo-colonialism. Hudson (1986) simply defined Africa as a settler colony, and Fanon (1963:42) defined what the SACP describes above as a Manicheism world of colonialism that dehumanises the colonised. Fanon (1963:44) argued that only decolonisation would rid the former colony of this duality which is still visible in post-apartheid South Africa.

The ANC adopted this misconception in 1969 at the Morogoro Conference. The adopted Strategy and Tactics document called for national liberation of the African people and declared that national liberation is part and parcel of economic liberation because racism and capitalism in South Africa were intertwined, and that it was inconceivable to speak of

political liberation without economic liberation (ANC, 1969). However, the adoption of the NDR and the Freedom Charter reduced this to mere rhetoric, as South Africa's attainment of nominal independence perpetuated racism and white supremacy. This thesis would come to dominate ANC policy documents and policies. Hence, the two nations theory articulated by former president Thabo Mbeki[63]. The two nations principle is still used by ANC ideologues in defining contemporary South African society, and led to the government adopting the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (ASGISA) and the New Growth Path (NGP), in an attempt for the second nation to catch up to the first nation, and to formalise the informal economy. Hence, the call to create patriotic bourgeoisies through BEE.

The political vacuum left by the banning of national liberation in early 1960 led to the formation of various organisations against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s, including the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM); the Azanian People's Organisation[64] (AZAPO); the IFP; United Democratic Front (UDF); and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The apartheid government responded violently when they suppressed the Durban Strikes in 1973 and the Soweto Uprising in 1976 (Turok, 2008:25). The Soweto Uprising that started on 16 June 1976 and spread throughout the country, resulted from the government's introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, and the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Mafeje (1978) states that the Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC) coordinated and organised the students' actions, thus rejecting any claim that either PAC or the ANC were behind the uprising. The uprising shook the apartheid government to its core and indicated to the international community the brutality of the apartheid government. According to Giliomee (1995:89), the uprising affected investor confidence and by the mid-1970s the framework in which business operated had deteriorated with the GDP having declined from 5.7 percent in the 1960s to 3.4 percent in the 1970s, to 1.5 percent in the 1980s.

The business world reacted to the decline in GDP and the deteriorating business climate in the country by putting pressure on national liberation movements, especially the ANC,

[63] Addressing parliament in 1998, the then deputy president characterised South Africa as divided in two nations, one, white, economically prosperous with proper education and health infrastructure and the other one, black and poor with more informal economy and grossly underdeveloped economic, educational, and communication system.

[64] AZAPO was formed in 1978 after Soweto Uprising with an armed wing called Azanian National Liberation Army (AZNLA) and it was banned in 1987, subsequently, forced to go underground.

for negotiations and searching for alliance partners. In 1978, the Urban Foundation was formed with the help of the business sector led by Harry Oppenheimer, Anton Rupert and Johannes van der Horst (Shivambu, 2014:104). The Urban Foundation advocated for modest reforms that will take place gradually (Esterhuyse, 2011). Cyril Ramaphosa was the first Deputy Chairperson of the Urban Foundation and went on to lead the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) (Shivambu, 2014:104). This created a platform for the business sector of South Africa to constantly engage with the ANC, as it did in Lusaka, Zambia in 1985 and Dakar, Senegal in 1987 (Saul, 2014:86).

While the ANC started negotiations with the business sector, the people of South Africa took to the streets, heeding Oliver Tambo's call to make South Africa ungovernable (Turok, 2008:26). The people demanded the release of Mandela and other political prisoners. Fanon (1963:72) stated that this brings the colonised people closer to the colossal task of destroying the colonial system with barren slogans – "Release X or Y". Moreover, the ANC's disinvestment campaign started taking its toll on the country's economy and undermining its accumulation and legitimisation strategies (Terreblanche, 2002:250). The apartheid government responded with the proclamation of a State of Emergency that remained in force throughout the 1980s, and the formation of a Tricameral Parliament which included the Coloured and Indian people. Africans were simply excluded and encouraged to participate politically in their respective homelands. Around this period, the ANC decided on a two-track negotiation process involving negotiations with capital and the apartheid government to determine the outcome of South Africa's national liberation (Saul, 2014:83). The following paragraphs show that these negotiations were filled with compromises, which put into perspective the so-called "miracle" transition, arguing that it was a co-option of the ANC through Rainbow-ism of Mandela, which resulted in reconciliation without justice.

The negotiations started in the 1980s, preceded by disarming tactics by the apartheid government. The negotiations were a means to search for allies and given the fact that contradictions between the national bourgeoisies and the colonisers were not that deep, compromises were easily made. In the 1980s South African business leaders arranged meetings with the ANC in Lusaka, Zambia and Dakar, Senegal. It was after one of the meetings in Lusaka that Anglo-American Corporation chairman, Gavin Relly, claimed that

he had the impression that the ANC was not keen to be seen as a Marxist organisation and that they had a good understanding of the need for free enterprise (Saul, 2014:86).

This was followed by many encounters between the ANC and South African business leaders. The Dakar meeting in 1987 between ANC exile leadership and 61 white South Africans, mostly Afrikaners, was organised by the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA) (Gevisser, 2009:194). One of the meetings took place in London on 24 June 1987 between business leaders from South Africa and Britain, and ANC leaders such as Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj, Aziz Pahad, and Jacob Zuma (Shivambu, 2014:108). According to Terreblanche (2012:14), from October 1987 to February 1990, a group of Afrikaner academics were involved in 7 clandestine meetings with ANC leaders, which mainly took place at the Mells Park estate in Somerset, Britain. These meetings resulted in the capturing and disarming of the ANC and influencing the content of negotiated settlements to safeguard their capitalist interests, as illustrated below (Shivambu, 2014:108). The Consultative Business Movement (CBM), formed in 1988, would broker peace between the NP government and the ANC, which led to the events of 1990 (Shivambu, 2014:109).

In 1989, while in exile, the ANC released the Harare Declaration, which set preconditions and was the blueprint for negotiations (Shivambu, 2014:28). Through this document the ANC indicated its readiness to negotiate, despite its Kwabe Conference resolution that the ANC would not negotiate. In addition to the Harare Declaration, the ANC adopted the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, which was viewed as the blueprint for a future democratic South Africa. However, the document would shift from the Freedom Charter on the question of land and assured protection of private property, while affirming the imperative of the Freedom Charter and calling for a mixed economy (Turok, 2008:30). But this was merely calling for continuation, as during that time South Africa had a mixed economy and powerful parastatals. After much pressure from the international community, national liberation movements, and the business community, the NP government finally relented and its president, FW De Klerk, announced the release of political prisoners and the unbanning of the national liberation movements in 1990. This was preceded by bilateral negotiations between Mandela and members of the apartheid government. In the *Talking to the Enemy* section of his autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom,* Mandela indicated that from the late 1980s prior to his release, there had been

meetings between himself as the ANC representative, and the NP government. According to Fanon (1963:72-3), to disarm popular rebellion, colonial regimes release political prisoners and hold discussions with them and endow them with independence on condition that they restore order.

The bilateral meetings continued after the unbanning of national liberation movements (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:516). Both parties believed they were entering the negotiations from a position of strength, but the conflict between the two had reached a stalemate with no clear winner, hence the call for negotiations. In time this changed, with the NP gaining the upper hand (Sisk, 1993:78). This made reaching agreement difficult, as each party tried to foster a transition from their own perspective (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:527). The ANC continued with its demand for an interim government to lead the country towards democracy, and the NP wanted a guarantee of power-sharing in post-apartheid to ensure that the Afrikaners were not dominated (Barnes & De Klerk, 2002:26). The bilateral negotiations led to the ANC suspending the armed struggle, which shocked many within the ANC, especially Chris Hani and Harry Gwala (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:521). The bilateral negotiations broke down as a result of the Sebokeng Massacre by the police, which was followed by clashes between ANC and IFP supporters (Thompson, 2000:248). It was later discovered that the violence was sponsored by the De Klerk government in an effort to disarm the ANC and completely break down the negotiations (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:521). The UN Observer Mission assisted in quelling the violence, which sped up the multiparty negotiations that finally led to the signing of the Peace Accord in 1992.

In December 1991, CODESA comprised 238 delegates from 19 political parties divided into 5 working groups on specific issues: the creation of a climate for free political activity; constitutional principles; transitional arrangements; the future of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states; time frames and their implementation (Rantete, 1998:174). The PAC and AZAPO boycotted the negotiations, while the PAC continued with the arm struggle (Lepede, 1994:140). This meant that the ANC was the only genuine liberation movement left to negotiate (Thompson, 2000:254). CODESA 1 ended in a failure but played a significant role in laying a foundation for multi-racial negotiations. It was followed by a white-only referendum on the question of reforms (Strauss, 1993:349). The parties signed a *Declaration of Intent* which stated: “South Africa

will be a multi-party democracy with separation of powers and human rights, and the constitution will be the supreme law in a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexiest South Africa" (Barnes & De Klerk, 2002:27). This created a way for the adoption of the interim constitution of 1993.

During this time, the ANC was bombarded with scenarios of the post-apartheid economy by the business sector, and the ANC eventually succumbed to the pressure and released documents on economic policy, such as the Discussion Document of Economic Policy in 1990; the Draft Resolution on ANC Economic Policy, 1991; and Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 1992. These documents reiterated the ANC's commitment towards a mixed economy, but their position changed from "growth through redistribution" to "redistribution through growth", which entailed the trickle-down economics of neoliberal policy. According to Marais (2001:126), from 1992 throughout the negotiations the ANC's economic thinking would increasingly take on the principles of neo-liberal dogma. Terreblanche (2002:96) indicated that before the acceptance of the IMF loan, the TEC presented the ANC with a signed secret protocol on economic policy. It committed the post-apartheid government to a neo-liberal, export-oriented economic policy and a redistribution through growth strategy. This was defined by Ronnie Kasrils (2013) as a Faustian moment which would haunt South Africans for the foreseeable future. In May 1992, CODESA 2 attempted to resolve the deadlock between the ANC and NP government, without success.

During CODESA 2, their Working Groups 1, 3 and 5 had reached agreement, while Working Group 2 which was dealing with constitutional principles, remained deadlocked, eventually leading to the collapse of CODESA 2 (Barnes & De Klerk, 2002:28). The NP government and the ANC later resumed negotiations and this led to a new Multi-Party Negotiations Process (MPNP) (Barnes & De Klerk, 2002:29). The PAC participated this time around, and only AZAPO continued with the boycott. The MPNP continued where CODESA had left off and contributed to the creation of the Interim Constitution of 1993 (Thompson, 2000:256). The Constitution protected private property, thus making it difficult to address the land question, which served as the basis of South Africa's national liberation. The Transitional Executive Council Act of 1993 adopted in parliament created a TEC to facilitate the process and lead the country to the 1994 elections (Shivambu, 2014:98). The TEC co-existed with the South African government and the Bantustan

governments in regional and local government, finance, law and order, stability and security, defence, foreign policy and elections (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:536). The creation of the TEC was a victory for the ANC, since this had been a precondition for them to start the negotiations but remained elusive until then because of the refusal of the NP government.

The TEC and Derek Keys, the Minister of Finance, signed a General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT), accompanied by a letter of intent in which the IMF committed the future government to austerities in return for 850 million USD loan to South Africa (Shivambu, 2014:4). One of the conditions of the loan would see the ANC abandon its policy on land and committing the post-apartheid government to "willing seller, willing buyer" land reform, despite its epic failure in many African countries. According to Bond (2000:47), the GATT reduced tariffs by 36 percent, providing for relatively low-cost imports. This mainly benefited the already rich and exacerbated the country's unevenness (Bond, 2000:47). Various sectors were affected by these tariff reductions, but lack of governmental protection led to thousands of jobs being shed. The ANC agreed to the sunset clauses proposed by Slovo that prescribed a government of national unity (GNU) for a period of five years, and guaranteed white people's jobs in the public sector (Gevisser, 2009:230). For the ANC, this was aimed at allaying the fears of the civil service, including the security forces of the apartheid state, and the white minority in general (Maharaj, 2008:26). It represented an inter-racial compromise which preserved white peoples' economic privileges. Despite multi-party negotiations it was clear from the 1980s that any settlement in South Africa hinged on a bilateral agreement between the ANC and the NP (Rantete & Giliomee, 1992:157), thus reducing it to an elite transaction. This was followed by the democratic elections in 1994 and the adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 that entrenched private property, and consequently, inequality between the races.

3.3.2.1. The Land Question

The national question in South Africa was based upon the agrarian question, given the primitive accumulation, the dispossession wars, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, and the Natives Land Act, Act 27 of 1913, all of which had laid the foundation of the struggle in South Africa (Bunting, 1998:39). It was therefore inconceivable that national liberation

could be attained as per Cabral (1972) without addressing the land question. The decolonisation process as per Fanon (1963) ought to address the land question.

The ANC land policy was never radical, the ANC never called for the land to be returned to its rightful owners. The Freedom Charter clause proclaiming that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it”, further complicated and obscured the land question. But the call for land redistribution to those who work it, is an attempt to address the national question. The Freedom Charter declares that “all shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose”. The ANC abandoned this principle of redistribution when they agreed to section 25 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. This section makes it difficult if not impossible to redistribute land and thus to banish hunger. Section 25, subsection (4) (a) makes provision for land reform, but subject to compensation, thus legitimising dispossession and forcing those who were dispossessed to buy back their land.

The ANC inherited a massively unequal distribution of land from the colonial and apartheid past, which was entrenched by the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Section 25 provides protection for property holders and the right to restitution. The ANC then adopted the “willing seller, willing buyer” model to address the land question. South African land reform is categorised into land redistribution, aimed at providing access to land for black South Africans; land restitution, to restore land to its original owners or provide alternative compensation to the dispossessed; and tenure reform to secure the rights of people living under insecure arrangements on land owned by others (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), 2016). The government targeted that 30 percent of the land would be distributed by 2014, which it has since failed to achieve. Land reform has been characterised by price inflation, corruption and patronage, which has led to reproduction of inequality and poverty.

3.3.2.2. The Economy

In the colonies, “you are rich because you are white, and you are white because you are rich” (Fanon, 1963:40). This applied in South Africa especially during the apartheid era. The ANC realised this in their 1969 Strategy and Tactics document, that national liberation ought to entail economic liberation. However, the NDR led to co-option and perpetual postponement of the attainment of economic liberation.

During the transition negotiations, the ANC moved from an egalitarian economic position to one of neoliberalism. This can be seen through the acceptance of the IMF loan with its conditions, signed for by Pravin Gordhan. The ANC moved away from the Freedom Charter provision on nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly industries to dismantle monopoly capital (Koster, 1985:17), leading to the adoption of redistribution through growth, which has its roots in neoliberalism. Nationalisation would have led to distribution of the country's wealth to the people (Koster, 1985:17). The shift was cemented by Nelson Mandela (1994) who distanced the ANC from any Marxist rhetoric, including nationalisation. In this, Mandela was contradicting an earlier statement he made in 1990 regarding nationalisation: "the nationalisation of mines, banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and any change in this view is unlikely".

The 1996 South African constitution and the Slovo sunset clauses constituted a compromise by the ANC to the imperialists and settlers. The compromises embodied in the sunset clauses saw the neoliberal economy continuing after the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had gained its autonomy and independence. It ensured that Chris Stals continued as the SARB governor until 1999 and guaranteed South Africa's incorporation into the global economy through GATT. Agreement on the sunset clauses also ensured that NP leaders continued occupying strategic positions under the GNU such as the Executive Deputy President (F.W. De Klerk), Finance Minister (Derek Keys), Mineral and Energy Minister (Pik Botha), and the Minister of Agriculture and Land (Kraai van Niekerk) (Shivambu, 2014:114). According to Shivambu (2014:114), this was to ensure that the ANC embraced neoliberalism as a strategic policy direction on the adoption of the constitution in 1996, when ANC government was on the verge of adopting GEAR, the GNU collapsed. To Bond et al. (2007:131) the constitutional principles, sunset clauses, and the GNU were undertakings given by the incoming government to ensure investor confidence and strengthened the hand of white monopoly capital.

The ANC championed co-option, which was legitimised through B-BBEE. However, the creation of "patriotic" bourgeoisies without structural transformation led to the continuation of a colonial economy. Furthermore, B-BBEE has resulted in parasitic bourgeoisies who thrive through corruption, patronage and clientelism. According to Ramaphosa (2011) as quoted by Shivambu (2014:98), CODESA negotiations entailed parallel negotiations, not just for economic policy content and direction, but for specific business deals, including a

deal with Vodafone which intended to invest in South Africa. It is therefore apparent that the ANC had a consensus with business and the NP government about post-apartheid South African integration into the neo-liberal world (Shivambu, 2014:98).

Continuation, which was perpetuated by a lack of change in the economic system of South Africa, has kept privileges of the whites intact, feeding the roots of racial supremacy in post-apartheid South Africa (Memmi, 1974:53). The current status quo does not represent even a shadow of liberation. Led by the ANC, the post-apartheid government of national unity inherited a contradictory legacy – a strong market economy whose acceptance was the result of negotiations and socio-economic ills, high rates of unemployment, abject poverty, and inequality in the distribution of income (Terreblanche, 2002:25; Turok, 2008:47).

3.3.2.3. Post-Apartheid South Africa

The ANC won the 1994 democratic election and formed the GNU with the NP and IFP. Application of the sunset clauses ensured the taking over of the apartheid state rather than dismantling and reconstructing it for the benefit of the masses. The first few years of post-apartheid were characterised by economic growth without development, and this led to deepening inequality. Successive post-apartheid governments have continued with neoliberal policies and their trickle-down economics. The adoption of GEAR led to capital flight, mostly to London by South African companies (Mbeki, 2011:27). As a result, the post-apartheid economy has continued to serve the country's capitalists, with majority of Africans left behind.

The South African independence process have shown the character of the ANC and its leaders. The ANC strove for the politics of inclusion, and never decolonisation. Mandela put this succinctly, when he said during the Rivonia Trial: "the ANC has never in any period of its history advocated revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society". Even the Freedom Charter does not call for revolutionary change, but the continuation of colonial capitalism with inclusion of the "patriotic bourgeoisie". In *Long Walk to Freedom*, Mandela (1995) refuted that the Freedom Charter was a blueprint for socialism, and said it was rather a blueprint for African-style capitalism.

The negotiations between business and the ANC that began after the 1976 Soweto Uprising with the formation of the Urban Foundation, ran through to the 1985 Lusaka, and 1987 Dakar meetings, and were a platform for the disarming of the people and search for allies. It was during these negotiations that the ANC began to rethink its position on the economy. This resulted in a compromise on the economy and the land question, which had formed the basis of the struggle. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:175), the negotiation phase was used as a time to soften the ANC leadership into accepting neo-apartheid and neo-colonialism as liberation. Therefore, in 1994, as in 1910, South Africa gained democracy, and the process of de-racialisation of society began without decolonisation and liberation taking place (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:175). The economy was left un-changed with continuation of neoliberalism that perpetuated inequality and poverty. The independence process resulted in a nominal independence that was made possible by the Faustian pact between whites and the ANC elites. This Faustian pact can be seen in B-BBEE and the continuing co-option without structural change.

3.4. Chapter Analysis

Independence of most SSA countries did not usher in the golden era as was expected, except for countries such as Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia and Mauritius. The historical analysis on colonialism and decolonisation served to give the reader a better understanding of the post-independence epoch. The historical analysis demonstrated that the class characteristics of the national bourgeoisies meant their class interests, such as indigenous capitalism, which were not much different from the interests of the colonisers. The interests of colonised intellectuals and business elites were identical to those of the colonialist bourgeoisies (Fanon, 1963:23), hence the politics of accommodation and inclusion of the comprador bourgeoisies during the independence processes in both case studies. In both case studies, the colonisers would embark on disarming tactics that ended in the creation of bourgeoisies through Africanisation or Kenyanisation. This demonstrates that the bourgeoisies advocated for inclusion. The national middle class, as Fanon (1963:149) called them, were convinced that they could advantageously replace the middle class in their mother countries.

Consequently, this was followed by a compromise between the comprador bourgeoisies and the colonisers. Fanon (1963:62) warned that the national bourgeoisies were too quick

to make compromises with the colonisers at the expense of the masses, and explained the question of compromise during the decolonisation struggle:

> This idea of compromise is very important in the phenomenon of decolonisation, for it is very far from being a simple one. Compromise involves the colonial system and the young nationalist bourgeoisie at one and the same time. The partisans of the colonial system discover that the masses may destroy everything. Blown-up bridges, ravaged farms, repressions, and fighting harshly disrupt the economy. Compromise is equally attractive to the nationalist bourgeoisie who, not clearly aware of the possible consequences of the rising storm, and genuinely afraid of being swept away by this huge hurricane and never stop saying to the settlers: We are still capable of stopping the slaughter, the masses still have confidence in us, act quick if you do not want to put everything in jeopardy.

The independence negotiations of both countries indicate compromise between comprador bourgeoisies, the colonisers and settlers such as resorting to the colonial economic system in post-independence, which meant that the comprador bourgeoisies accepted the Manichean world that characterised colonialism. This ensured reproduction of the colonised sector having little living space; their shacks were squeezed tightly together with people piled one on top of the other, while the colonisers lived in sector that is built to last, all stone and steel with lights and paved roads (Fanon, 1963:4). This is reflected in the gap between the rich and poor in both countries. In Kenya, 20 percent of the population owns over 50 percent wealth of the country, with poverty at a 36.1 percent headcount ratio (World Bank, 2020a). In South Africa, the wealth of three South African billionaires is equal to that of the bottom half of the country's population, with over 50 per cent of South Africans living in poverty (Oxfam, 2017b). This situation may have been

worsened by the Covid-19[65] pandemic that was followed by lockdowns and loss of employment[66].

The plight of the colonised is perpetuated by their landlessness that was never resolved in post-independence. Furthermore, the compromises were entrenched in both constitutions, and became the supreme law in both countries. The compromises are seen through the perpetuation of accumulation by dispossession type of economy and the unresolved land question. The land question was abandoned, despite the initial struggle being against land dispossession and alienation by the colonisers. To the colonised, land is of the most essential value as it brings food and above all else, dignity (Fanon, 1963:44). In South Africa's case, the unresolved land question reinforced racism, legitimised dispossession, and reduced Africans to wanderers and beggars in their own land. In Kenya, land reform had a class and ethnic character and was never meant to address landlessness. To Woddis (1967:124), addressing the land question by giving land to the landless would lead to an independent economy, the antithesis of neo-colonialism.

Leaving the colonial economy intact meant that newly independent countries were subjected to the dominance of capitalist countries. The perpetuation of neoliberal capitalism in the post-independence epoch resulted in crony capitalism or comprador capitalism in the former colonies, which in turn caused the comprador bourgeoisies to fail in their historical task of creating bourgeoisie rule in former colonies (Trotsky, 1906; Cabral, 1979). Kenya continued on with colonial patron-client capitalism and South Africa with neoliberal economy. Their failure to recapture the modes and forces of production by the comprador bourgeoisies meant co-option and failure to achieve national liberation (Cabral, 1963).

This compromise followed a disarming process that in the case of Kenya entailed violent crushing of *Mau Mau* and creation of a bourgeois landed class. In the case of South Africa, "patriotic bourgeoisie" were created through B-BBEE. Kenyanisation and B-BBEE

[65] Covid-19 refers to an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered Coronavirus.

[66] The World Bank (2020c) envisioned a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020, making it the biggest global recession in decades. In Kenya, Covid-19 pandemic have eroded progress made in poverty reduction, forcing an estimated 2 million more Kenyans into poverty. In South Africa the GDP fell by over 16 percent between 1st and 2nd quarters of 2020 and data shows that 2020 2nd quarter experienced the biggest fall in GDP since 1960 with over 2 million people losing their jobs (Stats SA, 2020).

were key elements in the colonisers co-option and accommodation of the comprador bourgeoisies, who served as allies during negotiations and in the post-independence epoch (Beall et al., 2006:693). According to Cabral (1972:71), creation of the bourgeoisie where one did not exist before was a way of strengthening the imperialist and capitalist camp. Through this, the comprador bourgeoisies would embrace their intermediary position. The national bourgeoisies played an intermediary role in decolonisation in which they insisted that all foreign companies should pass through their hands. They served as a transmission line between the nation and capitalism, which covered the ugly face of neo-colonialism (Fanon, 1963:152). Together with nationalisation, this was not in the interests of the people but it simply meant that the unfair advantages of the colonial period were transferred to the natives (Fanon, 1963:152).

In addition, as part of the compromises, the comprador bourgeoisies adopted the values of the colonisers and were prepared to fight for them and the colonised to live in peace in the newly independent state (Fanon, 1963:9). However, the colonisers were only interested in coexisting with the colonised under colonial conditions, hence, their perpetuation in the post-independent neo-colonised world. The historical analysis above indicates that the negotiated settlements involved the basic maintenance of the colonial economic system, including respect for private property rights (Carmody, 2010:260).

This compromise, which was made possible by the comprador bourgeoisies, led only to nominal independence. Though the end of formal colonisation in Kenya and South Africa was a breakthrough against imperialism, both case studies found them still within the thrall of imperialism and neoliberal economic dominance. Therefore, national liberation had not been attained. National liberation entails regaining the historical personality of the colonised people, and people's productive forces – their ability to produce and reproduce a social existence that rejects imperial domination (Cabral, 1979; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1984).

The end of formal colonisation in SSA was a breakthrough against imperialism but was "not yet *Uhuru*". To address this, national liberation involved defeating the comprador bourgeoisies. Given that the comprador bourgeoisies were allies of the colonisers, it was necessary for the independence struggle to combine the overthrow of foreign political rule and foreign economic domination with the defeat of those traditional domestic forces,

economic and political, which stood in the way of democracy and revolutionary change (Woddis, 1967:26-7).

3.5. Conclusion

The historical analysis indicates that the struggle for many of the western-educated comprador bourgeoisies was a struggle for inclusion. The chapter has avoided conflating the “selling out” narrative with compromise discourse and indicates that the struggle was always compromised under the western-educated comprador bourgeoisies. From KCA and KAU to KANU and the ANC, the comprador bourgeoisies wanted to be part of the system, hence the compromises between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital that led to nominal independence. Therefore, this chapter has gone beyond the sell-out narration.

To understand contemporary SSA’s political, social and economic state, it is necessary to understand the history of colonialism and the independence processes that contributed to this epoch. Colonisation was followed by primitive accumulation by the settlers, entailing dispossession, appropriation and exploitation. This made the land question central and paramount to the struggle of the African colonies. The independence processes left many contradictions, the land question being one of them.

The independence process in both Kenya and South Africa indicates a sharp rupture in the political sphere, but continuity in the economic sphere. The negotiations described in both case studies indicate compromise between the comprador bourgeoisies and the former colonisers, which perpetuated dispossession in post-independence. As the result the land question and the colonial economy was never resolved which meant continuity. The comprador bourgeoisie failed to capture the modes and forces of production from their foreign dominators, which would have freed up the process of development in the national productive forces. This failure resulted in nominal independence in both countries, as they failed to attain national liberation.

The independence process also caused the marginalisation of radical factions and co-option of the comprador bourgeoisies into colonial capitalism. *Mau Mau* activists were abandoned in Kenya, and in South Africa, PAC and AZAPO were marginalised due to the negotiations being dominated by the ANC. The compromise has led to taking over the colonial economic system instead of dismantling it to serve the masses. In Kenya,

comprador bourgeoisies took over in the post-independence epoch, resulting in the rise of strongman, Jomo Kenyatta.

The following chapter explains in detail the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital in Kenya, which is critical in understanding the current status quo.

CHAPTER 4: THE FAUSTIAN PACT BETWEEN THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIES AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN KENYA

4.1. Introduction

According to Mohiddin (1970:296), independence was granted on the basis of continuation of the established system, and not its destruction. The previous chapter illustrated that the independence processes in both case studies were reluctant, repressive and opportunistic (Fatton, 1990). Chapter 3 also indicated that the elimination of the colonial administration was not tantamount to decolonisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:333). The negotiations in Kenya, which included liberal Europeans and some settlers visiting Kenyatta in prison, led to compromises that were concluded after his release (Wasserman, 1976:82). As per Fanon (1963:62), compromises were very important during decolonisation, especially during negotiations. Neo-colonial theorists (cf. Cabral, 1979; Fanon, 1963; Nkrumah, 1965) have argued that the comprador bourgeoisies reached compromises with the colonisers and abandoned national liberation for their own interests. The compromises resulted in an ongoing Faustian pact/alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, which manifests throughout the political economy of Kenya.

In *Devil on the Cross*, Ngũgī (1982) illustrates how the compromises and the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies and the colonisers led to the rescue of the colonisers from crucifixion and the perpetuation of colonialism in a new form in Kenya. As a result, the exploitation and oppression of ordinary Kenyans continues under neo-colonialism that perpetuated by the Faustian pact. According to Swainson (1978:359), post-independent Kenya was characterised by an alliance between foreign capital and the national bourgeoisies that was detrimental to the masses. The comprador bourgeoisies inherited a ready-made state with sufficient resources to make their rule profitable without having to come to terms, other than those of the colonisers, with the country's problems (Wasserman, 1976:134).

Lenin (1920) was the first to warn about the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital, which had stalled and countered radical change. This shows the critical role played by the comprador bourgeoisies in neo-colonialism. The Faustian pact was the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and

foreign capital for their perpetual exploitation and self-enrichment at the expense of the masses. The Faustian pact entailed the incorporation of local personnel into executive jobs and boardrooms of MNCs, the financing of local politicians by MNCs to do their bidding, and the replacement of former white administrators with black ones (Leys, 1975:17). This saw the comprador bourgeoisies entrench their intermediary role that was apparent in their rent-seeking behaviour. Carmody (2002:257) and Beall et al. (2005:684) stated that the elite pact ensured the continuation of the colonial economy, thus perpetuating neo-colonialism[67] and the settlers' economic privileges.

As illustrated in Chapter 3, the comprador bourgeoisies grew in the womb of the colonial regime and desired to protect and enhance its alliance with foreign capital (Ngũgĩ, 1981:53). They sought to do this through neo-colonialism, which kept Kenya within the imperialist domain that prevented it from moving towards radical change (Woddis, 1967:57). Neo-colonialism is sustained politically, economically, socially, culturally militarily, epistemologically and technologically through subtle or direct domination (Mwaura, 2005:160; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:4). However, this chapter emphasises the economic factors of neo-colonialism and analyses the mechanisms of neo-colonialism such as economic policies, free trade, foreign capital, and foreign ownership. According to Woddis (1967:86), neo-colonial activities lie in its economic policies, such as assisting MNCs to continue exploiting the country and its masses. This is evident in Kenya, as early economic policies followed the rhythm of the colonial economy through its numerous development plans and later its sessional papers, ERS and *Vision 2030*, that were underpinned by neoliberalism. As a result of these policies, the Kenyan economy is dominated by agriculture and the service sector, perpetuating profit extraction (Mills & Herbst, 2012:80).

The objective of this chapter is to explain the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital in Kenya. To achieve this objective, the chapter interrogates the political economy of Kenya – economic policies, ownership, foreign capital, and foreign trade. Economic policies such as Kenyanisation have ensured that the comprador bourgeoisies benefit through co-option as they become

[67] Note that neo-colonialism underpins global coloniality which is defined as long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, power and knowledge production (cf. Mignolo 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

part of MNCs, and privatisation as they purchase state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for next to nothing and continue the exploitation of labour. They perpetuate the objectives of neo-colonialism by retaining the same economic relationship between imperialism and the former colonies. Furthermore, the analysis also exhibits the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies who are reduced to being business agents to foreign MNCs. The chapter begins with an analysis of the post-independent state to determine the character of the ruling class in Kenya.

4.2. Post-Independent Kenyan State

The definition and purpose of the state has been a bone of contention for many scholars over many years. For instance, in *The State and Revolution*, Lenin (1936) argued that the state is a representation of one class over another. However, for Hobbes and Locke, the state was the result of a social contract – the willingness of people to move beyond the state of nature (Agbude, 2011:114). Locke further argued that the state is similar to a neutral judge who seeks to protect people's lives, liberty, and property. Hegel (1967) argued the opposite: to him the state is a supreme body with supreme rights and is the highest form of social existence. Therefore, freedom of the individual is subordinated to the supreme will of the state (Agbude, 2011:118). More or less, the colonial state represented one group over another, being authoritative and violent towards the natives. According to Mbembe (2001), the postcolonial state was inherited from and shaped by the colonial state. As a state takes its shape and character from its leaders, it is imperative to analyse the comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya, to have a better understanding of the post-independent Kenyan state.

The Kenyan comprador bourgeoisies are a product of colonialism (Ngũgĩ, 1981:53). Colonialism, and subsequently proletarianisation, were accompanied by the emergence of an embryonic African bourgeoisie (Swainson, 1978:360). The comprador bourgeoisies emerged during the independence processes, and ever since have reproduced themselves by maintaining the status quo. According to Branch and Cheeseman (2006:11), the comprador bourgeoisies that emerged during the independence processes not only attained the means of production because of the Faustian pact, but also assumed political and institutional capacity to verify their dominance. From 1966 to 1992 Kenya was a one-party state. In the 1992 and 1997 elections, KANU remained in power through violence and vote rigging. The comprador bourgeoisies' dictatorship in Kenya drew its

strength from the existence of their leader, at first Kenyatta, followed by Arap Moi and Kibaki. Kenya's four presidents since independence were members of KANU, and in spite of changes to the legislature and the executive, the state has shown continuity. These leaders gave the post-independent state a certain trajectory.

At this point it is imperative to remind the reader of the definition of comprador bourgeoisies. It has been established that comprador bourgeoisies in the SSA context are western-educated bourgeoisies who emerged during the independence processes (Woddis, 1967:56). This group struggled for inclusion in the colonial economic system, and eventually reached a compromise with the colonisers that left the majority of peasants and the proletariats out in the cold. Fanon (1963:175) defines them as "a little greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it". For this thesis, the comprador bourgeoisies are the western-educated leadership that emerged during independence processes with no economic power, but who have since used the state as a vehicle for capital accumulation. They are in alliance with the foreign capital of MNCs and IFIs, in whose interests capitalist governments determine their relationships with other SSA nations (Mwaura, 2005:6). The following paragraph deals with the autonomy or lack thereof of the comprador bourgeoisies, since their interests are subordinated to the interests of foreign capital.

In the 1970s, there was debate regarding the level of autonomy the comprador bourgeoisies enjoy, and whether they should be regarded as a ruling class due to their ties to foreign capital. However, they have been described as auxiliary, dependent and/or *petit bourgeoisie* (Swainson, 1978:358). Von Freyhold (1977:76) notes that because post-independent leaders did not determine the process of economic reproduction in their countries, they could not be called the ruling class. Leys (1975) concurs and describes the national elites in Kenya as auxiliary bourgeoisies who are overly dependent on foreign capital. However, these arguments simplify and neglect the reality: having emerged as political elites without economic power, the national bourgeoisies used the state as a vehicle for capital accumulation and to amass wealth which is obvious through Kenyanisation. Despite the comprador bourgeoisies being caught in the web of foreign capital, they have levels of autonomy in their social formations (Lubeck, 1987:144). Thomson (2010:97) gives an example of the nationalisation and indigenisation acts made

by the comprador bourgeoisies that created tension and contradictions between the alliance partners. While these may exist, the comprador bourgeoisies are submissive to the imperative of imperialism's neo-colonial policies (Turok, 1987:68).

The comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya are in an ongoing Faustian pact with the domestic business class and foreign capital. The Faustian pact perpetuates self-enrichment on the part of the comprador bourgeoisies and continuing exploitation on the part of the domestic business class and foreign capital, which is detrimental to economic independence. This alliance is relatively stable due to intertwined interests, and guards against any radical change to neo-colonialism (Swainson, 1978:359). The Faustian pact is demonstrated through the economic policy trajectory of Kenya, its ownership patterns, and the incorporation of the comprador bourgeoisies into MNCs as board members, executives and/or shareholders.

The character of Kenya's post-independent state has remained the same despite independence (Ake, 1996:3). It continues to be despotic, and relies on violence and coercion, patronage and exploitation (Agbude, 2013:25). This was made evident by the Garrisa and Wagalla massacres in 1980 and 1984[68], respectively and the post-election violence in 2007 and 2017. According to Leys (1975:23), the comprador regimes are apt to be authoritarian, and this has created an environment conducive to their looting of the state. For instance, under former president Moi, 158.3 billion Kenyan Shillings were looted in what became known as the Goldenberg Affair (Branch, 2011:219).

According to Mbembe (2001), post-independent states are strongly influenced by the modalities of SSA's integration in world trade, especially in the way in which their ruling elites integrate into international networks. By having links with foreign capital, post-independent states under comprador bourgeoisies are geared towards serving MNCs and IFIs. As a result, the economy becomes export and externally oriented, with the post-independence state playing the role of defending capitalism (Turok, 1987:95). In Kenya, the government did this by curbing the trade unions. It placed all trade unions under the Department of Labour (DoL) and co-opted their leaders. This demonstrates that post-independent states not only represent one class over another, but also serve the interests

[68] Garissa and Wagalla Massacres against ethnic Somali residents by Kenyan government in Garissa District and Wajir County and both entailed the killing of people through setting their residential area on fire, executions and raping of women.

of MNCs and IFIs at the expense of the people. The paragraphs below demonstrate the Faustian pact between comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital through the mechanisms of neo-colonialism. They illustrate the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya in which the post-independent state pursues neo-colonial economic policies to continue their exploitation of labour, the extraction of profits, and that their asymmetrical economic relations and patterns of ownership remain unchanged.

4.3. Kenyan Economic Policies

According to Mwaura (2005:1), the exploitation of SSA countries has increased in scope and scale since independence, particularly in the last decades of the 20th century and the early 21st century. This shows that SSA countries find themselves within the snare of imperialism in which economic policies play an important role. This section indicates that the comprador bourgeoisies have entrenched neo-colonialism through neoliberal economic policies.

During independence, Kenya saw a careful handover to selected heirs, despite going through a bitter liberation struggle (Turok, 1987:53). This led to a formal withdrawal of the colonial power with foreign capital continuing to make profits working in harmony with the comprador bourgeoisies (Hunter, 1975:40). The comprador bourgeoisies entered into a Faustian pact with the domestic business class, which was made up of a small European and Asian population that had remained in Kenya after independence and foreign capital. Their presence ensured a high degree of reiteration of the colonial system by taking over the economy instead of changing it (Turok, 1987:55). The failure to dismantle the colonial economy led to the emergence of neo-colonialism and the pursuit of economic policies that favoured foreign capital (Mwaura, 2005:39).

According to Leys (1975:254), the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism was a planned transition aimed at preserving the monopolistic colonial economic structure in the interests of foreign capital by coming to terms with the comprador bourgeoisies. Thus, after independence, Kenya continued to be in the orbit of capitalist countries. Post-independent economic policies retained the same economic relationship with former colonisers, with the exception of those policies created by the African bourgeoisies (Leys, 1975:255). According to Barkan (1984:134), the Kenyan bourgeoisies' interests were tied

to those of international capitalism. As a result, and similar to most SSA countries, Kenya simply followed the rhythm of the colonial economy and adopted the Development Plan, 1964-1970 and the Development Plan, 1966-1970 (Ake, 1996:19).

These economic policies ensured that MNCs continued with their exploitation of Kenya and its people. The comprador bourgeoisies further benefited by becoming board members, shareholders or executives of the MNCs, thus ensuring the continuation of exploitation. Based on the assumption of rapid growth, both plans emphasised foreign aid and foreign investment as tools to assist economic growth, which was targeted at a 7.1 percent annual rate (Heyer, 1966). They managed to achieve 6 percent GDP growth, Kenyanisation, and improved service (Hornsby, 2012:128). Nevertheless, economic growth without structural transformation meant the rise of inequality and poverty. The development plans were influenced by the World Bank's Report No, 11143 of 1963, *The Economic Development of Kenya*, that prioritised agriculture through the perpetuation of the Swynnerton Plan in post-independence and advocated fiscal discipline (Green, 1965:259; World Bank, 1963:3). These policies emphasised privatisation and openness to international trade and foreign capital (Healey & Robinson, 1992:56). In their attempt to attract investment, the government provided foreign MNCs with subsidies that exacerbated profit extraction (Langdon, 1981:48). The MNCs came to dominate the Kenyan economy – manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, banking and agriculture, and in the process had considerable influence on the political leadership of the country (Langdon, 1981:31). Due to the lack of structural change, the development plans benefited MNCs as they continued to extract profits, through his son-in-law, Jomo Kenyatta formed part of Lonrho Plc, and some of his family members became part of the Commercial Bank of Africa, which later merged with the NIC Group to create Kenya's third biggest bank (Langdon, 1981:141; Irwin, 2015:5).

In 1965, the KANU government passed Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, titled African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, under the guidance and input of the World Bank and the donor community (Achola et al., 2004: 43). The continued presence of World Bank officials with regard to economic policy drafting, indicates a lack of policy sovereignty in post-independent Kenya. The sessional paper, similar to its predecessors, called for foreign investment and maintenance of existing relations with major western industrial nations, particularly Britain, to gain foreign aid and investment, build overseas

markets for Kenyan products, and expand tourism (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:85). The sessional paper was pro-Western, and its aim was to sell Kenya to potential foreign entrepreneurs, of whom the British were key targets (Cullen, 2017:148). This became apparent when the Kenyan government passed the Foreign Investment Promotion Act to protect FDI and guarantee the right of MNCs to repatriate profits, which encouraged and incentivised foreign capital.

British investment, especially in the early years of independence was significant, with British MNCs investing in the financial sector, manufacturing, and agriculture (Cullen, 2017:150). British MNCs such as Unilever's Brooke Bond, which produced 23.5 percent of Kenya's tea in 1972, continued to benefit through investment in the agricultural sector, as well as Barclays in Banking (Langdon, 1981:32). British investors and subsequently the British government, sought to protect not only their investments, but the environment of stability that encouraged and made these profits possible (Cullen, 2017:151). This saw the reinforcement of colonial relations that led to capital accumulation and rapid Kenyanisation of the economy (Ochola, 2016:8).

Kenyanisation refers to a co-option strategy that encouraged the comprador bourgeoisies to cooperate with foreign capital. Barkan (1984:134) indicated that the policy to create bourgeoisies started with the land settlement schemes, and the transfer of European-owned farms to Africans during and after independence. This was followed by the Kenyanisation policy of the KANU government, which led to the passing of legislation such as the Trade Licensing Act of 1967. The Act excluded non-citizens, most of whom were Asians, from trading in rural and non-urban areas and led to the formation such as KNTC, the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK), and the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC), which facilitated Kenyanisation of the economy and of the public sector (Ochola, 2016:8). Kenyanisation took place within the capitalist framework, and was aimed at creating a local bourgeoisie through state power (Zeleza, 1991:36).

Agricultural production was the basis of national accumulation for the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya, as most local investment in trading and manufacturing had been financed from agricultural surpluses (Lubeck, 1987:143). Various SOEs were either created or reorganised for capital accumulation in the fields of agriculture, industry, transport and communications, finance, and services (Zeleza, 1991:37). Through the KNTC, which dealt with import and export trade, the comprador

bourgeoisies penetrated the wholesale and retail sectors that traded in cement, textiles, basic foodstuffs and farming implements (Leys, 1975:151). In addition, Kenyanisation included Africans filling positions within foreign MNCs and attempts by the state to localise the ownership of major corporations (Swainson, 1978:371). According to Cheche Kenya (1982:44), the MNCs allowed the comprador bourgeoisies to draw high salaries as executives, and substantial dividends as shareholders and/or take part in lucrative sub-contracting ventures. In return, the comprador bourgeoisies ensured that the MNCs enjoyed certain privileges and operated without undue government interference. This made the comprador bourgeoisies parasitic and unproductive. They imitated and impersonated a productive capitalist ruling class while being willing collaborators with foreign capital (Cheche Kenya, 1982:2). For instance, in the 1970s, Kibaki, as Minister of Finace was a big proponent of the Kenyanisation of Barclays and Standard Bank. He brought in local shareholders and insisted that the bank management was changed to include Kenyan nationals (Morris, 2016:663).

Kenyanisation was criticised for its elitism as ordinary Kenyan citizens were unable to participate in the ownership and control of large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises (Himbara, 1993:99). Despite their local ownership, most of these enterprises remained reliant on foreign technology agreements to run their enterprises (Lubeck, 1987:158). Kenyanisation was not embarked on to satisfy the needs of the nation but rather to perpetuate neo-colonialism by replacing the colonisers with comprador bourgeoisies and transferring existing unfair advantages into their hands. In most cases this has led to looting of the state, as the comprador bourgeoisies entrenched corruption in the newly independent state (Fanon, 1963:171).

During the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki eras, corruption was rife, which led to a crisis in governance (Achola et al., 2004:12). Large sums of money were lost when government bureaucrats, parastatal executives, and MNCs implemented Kenyanisation through corrupt means (Achola et al., 2004:12). In addition to offers of direct employment by MNCs, many officials were offered other bribes (Khamisi, 2018). The looting brought many comprador bourgeoisies ownership of sizable parts of the means of production (Cheche Kenya, 1982:44). In the 1990s, Moi’s government paid the firm Goldenberg Plc 1 billion USD as part of a so-called export compensation scheme for the fictitious export of gold of which Kenya produced little (Svensson, 2005:19). This indicates that public

sector corruption cannot prevail without private sector involvement (Khamishi, 2018) and that the Faustian pact between the MNCs and comprador bourgeoisies involved looting the country. Corruption in Kenya has hindered accelerated growth, development, and the fight against poverty (World Bank, 2016). This has led to Kenyan citizens perceiving their country as being among the most corrupt societies of the benchmark countries (World Bank, 2016:18). Kenya was ranked 137 out of 180 countries in 2019, down from 139 in 2015, with a CPI score of 28, indicating the current administration's lack of impact in the fight against corruption (Transparency International, 2020).

The looting was also exacerbated through privatisation of parastatals that took place during the implementation of SAPs in Kenya by comprador bourgeoisies. Kenya's SAPs was a response to the debt crisis and introduced neoliberalism into Kenya in the 1980s. Mwaura (2005:22) warned that privatisation meant that Kenyan resources would be dominated by foreign MNCs which would export their surpluses overseas. Indeed, this minimised the role of the state in the economy after years of dominance over the comprador bourgeoisies' capital accumulation. The SAPs advocated for liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and a free market economy (Thomson, 2010:197). Liberalisation opened the country to foreign capital and cheap manufactured products, crippling the nascent industrial sector in Kenya and making it vulnerable to external shocks (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:90). Privatisation also led to much of Kenya's industry and manufacturing firmly moving into foreign hands (Turok, 1987:147). Foreign capital bought out many local companies; Lonrho took over the East Africa Standard newspaper, and Steel Brothers bought Baumann & Co. Moreover, foreign companies such as Firestone, United Steel, Del Monte, Schweppes, Nomura and Mitsui dominated the manufacturing sector in Kenya (Leys, 1975:118). Deregulation contributed to this neo-colonial picture by keeping real wages low to ensure capital accumulation.

The KANU government showed its commitment to the SAPs by passing Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980 on Economic Prospects and Policies (Zeleza, 1991:39-40). This was followed by Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth that provided a fundamental and long-term approach to development in Kenya until the 2000s (Azindow, 2011:151). These sessional papers committed the government to structural reforms in trade, fiscal and monetary affairs and labour issues; advocated for austerity in the public sector and privatisation; and facilitating the growth of capital

markets, which kick-started capital market reform in the late 1980s in conjunction with institutional and policy reform (Ngugi et al., 2006:3). The commitment to SAP reforms was followed by structural adjustment loans from the World Bank and the IMF, worth 70 million USD making Kenya among the first countries to introduce SAP reforms (Thomson, 2010:197).

According to Kanyinga and Okello (2010:539), the neoliberal economic austerity measures that were adopted under the SAPs advocated accumulation by dispossession through privatisation. In Kenya, privatisation resulted in SOEs being sold to the comprador bourgeoisies at below their market price (Tangri, 1999:58). Economic and trade liberalisation resulted in the collapse of the local textile industry and the opening up of non-traditional horticultural exports (Mensah, 2006:51). As a result, agriculture continued to be the most important sector, while industrial projects had to meet the conditions of their donors, such as the World Bank and the IMF (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:159-65). Primary products such as tea and coffee continued to dominate the export oriented economy, with export earnings lagging behind import costs (Ogot &Ochieng, 1995:170). According to Mensah (2006:51), the beneficiaries of economic liberalisation were largely the capitalists, the MNCs with the presence of the comprador bourgeoisies, and exporters who were able to compete locally and internationally. Neo-colonialism continued, with Kenya providing cash crops to Europe, in particular Britain, and acting as a market for Western-manufactured goods. During this period, food prices rose in response to the lifting of fixed prices for agricultural products, resulting in poverty increase in Kenya, especially in its rural areas (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1998:71; Branch, 2011:234).

The SAPs continued until late 1990s when SOEs were privatised and austerity measures were imposed within the government (Shilaho, 2018:15). They were followed by a political transition that took place in the early 2000s that saw the end of almost 40 years of KANU rule and the emergence of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under the leadership of Kibaki, accompanied by economic transition in the form of ERS (Adam et al., 2010:17). The ERS consisted of an “orthodox” economic reform agenda aligned with market-friendly policies advocating for fiscal control, macroeconomic stability, and limited government and foreign investment (Adam et al., 2017:17). The ERS set the foundation for *Vision 2030* that was adopted to help transform Kenya into a middle-income economy and an industrialised country that would be globally competitive and prosperous with a high

quality of life by the year 2030. *Vision 2030* entails three pillars, namely, social, political and economic pillars with six priority sectors: Tourism, Agriculture, Wholesale and Retail, Manufacturing, Financial Services, and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) (Adam et al., 2010:44).

Vision 2030 perpetuates neoliberalism and consequently, neo-colonialism, in which agricultural and financial sectors are emphasised. The prioritisation of agriculture has kept Kenya as a primary producing country in global trade and ensured retention of the country's economic relationship with imperialism that has led to perpetual exploitation by the MNCs. Kenya's overreliance on agriculture and tourism as foreign exchange earners exposed the country to external shocks during the Covid-19 pandemic as traveling is banned and commodity prices slump. Kenya's reliance on commodities has made the country susceptible to illicit financial outflows that are estimated at 8.3 percent of government revenues (AU & ECA, 2015:17). This can be attributed to financialisation in Kenya, and the ease and speed that capital can be moved around in the world (Poku & Whitman, 2018:2). Financialisation refers to shifts in major economic activity that led to speculation and hot money investment instead of investment in the production of tangible goods (Cornell, 2011:13). *Vision 2030* called for poverty eradication, and a decrease in unemployment and inequality; however, these are premised on the neoliberal policies of privatisation, liberalisation, and trickle-down economics, which rarely reach the downtrodden. The implementation of *Vision 2030* came after the 2007 post-election violence that undermined the economy, and the 2008 global recession (Kinuthia, 2013:63).

The economic policy of the comprador bourgeoisies has influenced the composition of the economy in Kenya. The structure of the Kenyan economy demonstrates an economy that relies on primary goods exports, tourism, and speculation, instead of investment in production, thus perpetuating neoliberalism. In Kenya's current GDP of USD 87.78 billion, agriculture, forestry and fishing amount to 30 percent of the GDP (AfDB, 2018:22). According to Adam et al. (2010:122), agriculture is a source of employment for about 70 percent of Kenya's total labour force. The service sector dominates the GDP at 49.9 percent (AfDB, 2018:22). Tourism makes a major contribution to the service sector, with over 2 million visitors generating billions in USD (Mills & Herbst, 2012:81). However, this sector has been vulnerable to external shocks such as the Great Recession of 2008, the

current Covid-19 pandemic, and instability and insecurity issues. In addition, the financial sector takes a large chunk of the service sector's contribution to the GDP and this rise of financial service coincides with financialisation. Finacialisation saw Kenya have the largest banking population in Africa through M-Pesa, a mobile phone-based money service, the proliferation of financial products, mergers of local commercial banks, and investment by foreign commercial banks (Muiruri & Ngari, 2014:51; Mills et al., 2017:160). This escalated foreign ownership in the economy and increased speculation. Manufacturing constitutes 11.9 percent of Kenya's GDP, while industries such as construction and mining stand at 8.2 percent of the GDP (AfDB, 2018:22). According to Adedeji et al. (1990:38), in the 1970s manufacturing in Kenya constituted 10 percent of the GDP. Therefore, the sector's current 11.9 percent to GDP shows little change and contributes to the lack of structural transformation in Kenya.

In addition to agriculture sector's contribution to the GDP and being the largest source for total labour force, the sector also forms 60.4 percent of exports which demonstrates its dominance in Kenya. Kenya's economic policies influence the composition of its economy, as together with the compradors bourgeoisies, the MNCs invested in agriculture, the finance sector and tourism, continue to benefit. For example, the Kenyatta family own Brookside Dairies with Danone, and the Moi family has a stake in Kenya's banks and hostels (Oxfam, 2017:11).

The aforementioned demonstrates the perpetuation of neoliberalism, underpinned by the colonial model of accumulation by dispossession. Thus, post-independent Kenya adopted and utilised the colonial government's framework to govern its society (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246). Kenya's championing of economic growth over equity for its people meant that the post-independent government built on institutions and policies inherited from the colonial epoch (Barkan, 1984:5). The paragraphs above demonstrate that Kenya's neoliberal economic policies led to profit extraction and the decimation of its nascent industry, thus confining the country to a primary production state and perpetuating asymmetrical economic relations between Kenya and developed countries. The neoliberal economic policies in post-independent Kenya have also had an impact on patterns of ownership.

4.4. Patterns of Economic Ownership in Kenya

Neo-colonial economic policies as explained above have influenced patterns of ownership in post-independent Kenya. Liberalisation has opened the economy to foreign ownership and in the process, foreign capital has had a considerable influence on the political economy. The means of production are still dominated by foreign capital and to a lesser extent the white and Asian domestic business class, and a small number of comprador bourgeoisies. This constitutes neo-colonialism in post-independent Kenya because it is inconceivable to talk of national liberation without talking of national productive forces and means of production having been completely freed from all and any kind of foreign domination (Cabral, 1966; Pröbsting, 2013:26). Freeing the means of production from foreign capital enables post-independent states to be free to pursue a developmental trajectory that is beneficial to its people. According to Cabral (1966), the act of freeing the means of production from foreign capital is tantamount to freeing the process of development of national productive forces.

However, the compromise that took place during the independence process has ensured that the means and forces of production remain in foreign hands, although some modifications were made to existing structures. In Kenya there was a degree of industrial development under the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policy, and some changes in land tenure and the agrarian system (Woddis, 1967:87). The land settlement schemes that led to the creation of the landed class was due in part to modifications made to existing policy, which included the transfer of European-owned farms to Africans. By 1968, about 2,306,600 acres of land had been transferred to Africans (Barkan, 1984:135). These land schemes were a brilliant stroke of colonial policy because Africans were made to pay for land stolen from them, with the settlers inflating prices for land that they had developed through the crass exploitation of African labour (Barkan, 1984:135). This kept Kenya within the imperial thrall, since the money used to buy the land was a loan from Britain and the World Bank. Politicians such as Kenyatta, Njonjo and Moi came to own large swaths of land, resulting in their descendants having interests in Kenya's agri-business. In addition to Brookside Dairies, the Kenyatta family owns 500 000 acres of Kenya's arable land, and the Moi family owns Sian Roses and Kiptagich Tea Estate and among many others. Kenya's wealthiest families are dominated by politically connected elites, with land ownership providing the core of their wealth (Oxfam (2017:11). These

families include the Kenyatta, Moi, Kibaki, Odinga, Karume, Kulei, Biwott, Michuki, Saitoti, Nyachae, and Mwau families (Oxfam, 2017:11).

The land settlement schemes were abandoned the moment they stopped serving the neo-colonial agenda and started threatening economic stability. Land reform, which was part of Kenyanisation, had stifled growth in the agricultural sector. Accordingly, the Kenyan floriculture industry was exempted from the wave of Kenyanisation (Chandra, 2006:16), and remained under the control foreign-owned companies and members of Kenya's minority Asian and European communities (Jaffee, 1992:11). According to Lubeck (1987:142), in the 1970s about a million acres of mixed farms within the former highlands remained in expatriate hands. Furthermore, more than a million acres of ranch land and plantations – coffee, tea and sisal – seemed likely to remain in foreign hands because of their high capital value (Leys, 1975:63). Kenyanisation was thus unsuccessful in agriculture, as it was in most other sectors (Chandra, 2006:352). Land concessions which formed part of the contradictions of the independence process, were part of the colonialists' and settlers' privileges that were made possible by compromise, entrenchment of property rights, and legitimised dispossession (Kariuki, 2015:355). The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and the Land Control Act restricted foreign land ownership to only 99 years' leasehold. However, this is difficult to implement because foreigners own the land jointly with Kenyans through public companies such as the Limuru Tea Co. Ltd, Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd, Sasini Tea and Coffee Ltd, etc. Under the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital ownership, the agricultural sector has continued growing cash crops for the export market while the country imports food.

Consequently, in Kenya there are varying degrees of inequality in land ownership, its access and use (Syagga, 2006:289). According to the Kenyan Land Alliance (2015:4-5), land is an important resource in Kenya, but only 17 percent of the land is arable with a high rainfall to support the production of tea, coffee, pyrethrum, horticulture, and floriculture, and food crops such as maize, wheat, potatoes, pulses and dairy farming. 32 percent of the land is semi-arid, with low average rainfall. This arid land supports mixed farming and livestock farming, leaving over 50 percent to nomadic pastoralism (Kenyan Land Alliance, 2015:5). Kenya has three land tenure systems: government-owned land, trust land, and freehold land (Veit, 2011:2). Ten percent of Kenyan land is under government ownership, with 20 percent of private freehold land held by individuals and

private groups (Veit, 2011:2). The freehold land includes most of the highly valued agricultural land. Nevertheless, over 65 percent of Kenyan land is communal, with county councils serving as custodians on behalf of the communities (Syagga, 2006:308).

The same Kenyanisation policy was pursued in the industrial sector with emphasis placed on taking Africans into partnerships. Several funds were established for Africans to buy shares in foreign-owned businesses, and to establish new enterprises (Barkan, 1984:135). In addition, Kenyanisation advocated for positions within MNCs which saw companies such as Lonrho and Mackenzie Dalgety[69] appointing Kenyans as managers. Jomo Kenyatta's brother-in-law, Udi Gecaga and Nephew, Ngengi Muigai were appointed in Lonrho and Mackenzie Delgety as managers repectively (Swainson, 1978:372). According to Swainson (1978:372), these appointments represented a Faustian pact between foreign firms and prominent members of the comprador bourgeoisies. Through Kenyanisation, the comprador bourgeoisies were able to fulfil their intermediary role of serving on MNCs boards of directors, or as MNCs executives and shareholders. In this way, Kenyanisation ensured that the interests of foreign MNCs were not in conflict with the interests of many Kenyans, especially the comprador bourgeoisies (Holtham & Hazlewood, 1976:18). Nevertheless, this did not alter the ownership patterns in the industrial sector.

The comprador bourgeoisies used the post-independent neo-colonial state to enhance its control over the commercial sector of the economy (Swainson, 1978:366). Barclays Bank in Kenya was a point in case, as it offered shares and board seats to comprador bourgeoisies, which indicated the Faustian pact (Morris, 2016:663). In the corporate sector, Kenyanisation also resulted in the creation of a managerial class, with a share of MNCs financial affluence going to it; a process that the MNC sector was fine with (Langdon, 1981:40). Furthermore, the Kenyan state's efforts to nurture and support the formation of an indigenous capitalist class led to civil servants being allowed to engage in business with the state, leading to the erosion of integrity and corruption in the public sector in Kenya (Soludo et al. 2004:209). As a result, politicians and their descendants ended up having stakes in MNCs such as the Trans-National Bank and the Sankara Hotel Group, First American Bank, the Heritage Group of Hotels, CFC Stanbic Bank,

[69] Note that at the time, Mackenzie was one of the largest foreign-owned firms in Kenya with interests in exports/import trade, agriculture and manufacturing (Swainson, 1978:372).

Mediamax, and so on, which was reflective of the Faustian pact between comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital.

The comprador bourgeoisies continue to use the state for capital accumulation in this current epoch. Staying true to their intermediary nature, the comprador bourgeoisies' Kenyan government passed the Companies Act No. 17 of 2015. The Act's section 975 (2)(b) made it mandatory for foreign companies establishing branches in Kenya to demonstrate that Kenya citizens held at least 30 percent of the shares (Republic of Kenya, 2015). This was repealed after much outcry from the business sector, by the Finance Act No. 38 of 2016, section 85. However, in 2019 the National Information Communication and Technology (ICT) policy was passed, which mandated that Kenyan individuals or corporations had to own at least 30 percent of any tech venture operating in the country. This was preceded by the Local Content Bill, 2018 that sought to indigenise the oil and gas industry in Kenya. Thus, proving that from the beginning the comprador bourgeoisies directed their efforts towards activities of the intermediary type (Fanon, 1963:179).

Despite these programmes, much of the Kenyan economy is owned by the domestic business class with the manufacturing sector continuing to be foreign-owned. The manufacturing sector is dominated by non-metallic mineral products, motor vehicles, transport equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, and food and beverages (Chen et al., 2015). The MNCs serve the domestic and international markets and take advantage of regional markets such as the East African Community (EAC); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Furthermore, the textile industry in Kenya exports to the U.S. through Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA[70]) (Chen et al. 2019). In Kenya, the automotive sector has focused on retail distribution and after sales services and more recently, locally assembled vehicles (UNCTAD, 2019:157). General Motors has a plant in Kenya, General Motors East Africa together with Associated Vehicle Assemblers, which assembles for Toyota, and Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers, which assembles for the Hyundai Corp., and

[70] AGOA is a U.S. Trade Act enacted in 2000 to enhance market access to the U.S. for qualifying SSA Countries which has since been renewed to 2025.

DT Dobie for Volkswagen (Deloitte, 2016:25). In Kenya, manufactured goods account for 37 percent of the total merchandise exports to SSA countries (AfDB, 2019:6).

The service sector has overtaken the manufacturing and agriculture sectors in Kenya (Chen et al., 2015:13), which, among other African countries, has been a net exporter of services since 2005 (UNCTAD, 2015:24). Financial services are dominated by the banking and insurance sectors. The former is growing and stable, while the insurance sector is the fastest growing in Africa, with 11.9 percent growth registered in 2015 (Business Sweden, 2016:8). Kenya has 42 commercial banks, the majority being foreign-owned, including leading banks such as Standard Chartered Bank; Barclays Bank of Kenya; Kenya Commercial Bank; Bank of India and Citibank N.A.

Kenya is a country of scarce mineral resources in comparison to other SSA countries but it has quantities of gold, copper, ilmenite, tantalum, and non-metallic minerals such as soda ash, limestone, fluorspar and fossil fuels (Jacobs, 2016: 21). Large mining projects in Kenya are owned by Tata Chemicals (Tata Chemicals Magadi), Canada Base Company, Kenya Fluorspar Company, and Australian-owned Base Titanium Limited (BTL) (Jacobs, 2016:21-2). This demonstrate the mineral sector is dominated by foreign companies which affect value addition and beneficiation in Kenya.

The failure to decolonise has led to the failure to take over the means of production by the comprador bourgeoisies. The comprador bourgeoisies settled for a Faustian pact as intermediaries – a transmission line between the nation and capitalism that reflects neo-colonialism (Fanon, 1963:152). In *Not Yet Uhuru*, Odinga (1967) warned against comprador bourgeoisies that were prepared by missionary education and imperialism, years prior to independence and their exacerbation of neo-colonialism and only them have enjoyed *Matunda ya Uhuru*[71]. Despite the little modification that comes with independence, the economy perpetuates primary production and financialisation while deindustrialising under the comprador bourgeoisies. Consequently, foreign capital is rewarded as the country serves as a source of cash crop and raw materials and a market for manufactured products. In addition, they continue to extract profits from the neo-

[71] This means “fruits of independence”.

colonial economy and exploiting labour while the comprador bourgeoisies sells to foreign MNCs raw materials cheaply.

4.5.Foreign Capital in Kenya

According to Mwaura (2005:5), neo-colonialism is similar to colonialism, being a system of organised exploitation through foreign investment. Loans and FDI in Kenya have led to profit extraction and preserving the neo-colonial status quo. Profit extraction resulted from the neoliberal economic policies of the comprador bourgeoisies. Loan repayments were central to the co-option and socialisation of the nationalist regime (Wasserman, 1976:174). FDI and loans ensured that Kenya's right to development was usurped by the MNCs and IFIs to preserve their own economic and political interests.

Since independence, Kenya has received aid in the form of loans and grants from Britain, the USA, EU countries, and IFIs to bolster the economy and buy back land from departing settlers (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:88). For a Million Acre Settlement Scheme, GBP 16.3 million in aid was made available (Wasserman, 1975:131). British aid to Kenya was dominated by the land transfer programme, and involved loan repayments and interest equivalent to 5.9 percent of the Kenyan GDP in 1964, which did not change much until the introduction of the SAPs (Holtham & Hazlewood, 1976:34). Foreign aid was also used to ameliorate the balance of payments and budget deficits during Moi's tenure, which kept Kenya in permanent loan (Murunga & Nasongo, 2007:278). British involvement in the land settlement schemes led to it protecting settlers' interests through appointing people to administer the schemes and over-value of the land (Wasserman, 1975:131). The loans kept Kenya under the thrall of imperialism and ensured that the Kenyan government did not deviate from the neo-colonial political economy.

Foreign aid, especially British aid, has been dwindling for years now (Nyamwange, 2009:3). According to Andersen et al. (2020:40), Kenya is an aid-dependent country and receives annual disbursements of 1.1 percent of its annual GDP from the World Bank and 3.7 percent of its annual GDP from ODA and various other donors. In 2019, Kenya received USD 635 million from U.S. agencies for HIV/Aids, and for agriculture, health, defence, and food security (USAID, 2020). Despite this aid, the Kenyan poverty rate stands at 36.1 percent, with inequality rising. Therefore, aid has perpetuated corruption and led to donor control of the market and economic policy (Mwaura, 2005:59). The

structural adjustment loans were accompanied by conditions such as opening up and liberalising the economy. The World Bank's (2020) Policy Research Working Paper titled *Elite Capture of Foreign Aid*, shows the extent of the aid looted by politicians in developing countries. According to the paper, Kenyan comprador bourgeoisies looted over USD 3 billion of the World Bank aid payment over two decades and stashed it offshore (Andersen et al., 2020). In *Dead Aid*, Moyo (2009) argues against aid in SSA, and that aid has been and continues to be an unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster. Moyo (2009) further argues that aid has helped make the poor poorer and growth slower, while encouraging corruption and conflict. It is against this background that commentators such as Moyo (2009) and Sachs (2016) declared that aid in SSA has failed to lead to development and called for FDI to be made available instead.

Foreign loans to SSA countries have led to profit extraction that comes with servicing the debt. Mwaura (2005: 61) argues along the lines of Woddis (1967:87) that loans are provided by developed countries to maintain neo-colonialism in poor countries, and for the payment of high interest rates to extract profit and undermine policy sovereignty. Kenya's debt to GDP ratio stood at about 56 percent in 2019, an increase from 45 percent in 2010-2014 (AfDB, 2018:11). The country's debt has since increased to 65 percent of GDP, possibly exacerbated by the current Covid-19 pandemic (Kivuva, 2020). Government debt currently stands at Kenyan Shillings (KES) 6.649 trillion, composed of KES 3.496 trillion in external debt, and KES 3.153 trillion in domestic borrowing (Kivuva, 2020). Kenya will have to spend a staggering KES 904.7 billion on servicing its public debt in the new financial year (Kamndaya, 2020). The lion's share of the debt is owed to China, which surpassed the World Bank in becoming Kenya's leading creditor. This has led to China becoming Kenya biggest trading partner, with Chinese products dominating the Kenyan market, and 22.6 percent of Kenyan imports coming from China. Chinese loans have financed major infrastructure projects in Kenya such as railways, roads, ports, and power, with Chinese companies playing the critical role of contractors in many of these projects (Onjala, 2018:715). This has created an asymmetrical relationship between Kenya and China to the advantage of China, which some commentators have labelled "new colonialism".

The start of the 1970s saw dwindling foreign aid and increased FDI in Kenya (Nyamwange, 2009:3). However, the FDI was used for exploitation and not development,

to perpetuate neo-colonialism. The post-independence ban on FDI in agriculture for the purpose of Kenyanisation led to manufacture being the main recipient of foreign capital (Hornsby, 2012:132). During independence, the manufacturing sector contributed 9.5 percent to the Kenya GDP, which at the time was amongst the highest in SSA (Fahnbulleh, 2006:34). FDI investment was protected through the Foreign Investment Protection Act[72] of 1964 (Kinuthia, 2013:48). Commerce and manufacture were foreign-owned and controlled (Cheche Kenya, 1982:47). The Kenyan government continued with its ISI which was accompanied by development in the agriculture sector (Kinuthia, 2013:47). The ISI led to MNCs not previously established in Kenya such as Firestone, United Steel, Schweppes and many more, to move into manufacturing for the domestic market (Leys, 1975:118). FDI enabled foreign MNCs to own means of production in Kenya, making profit extraction possible. The comprador bourgeoisies looked away because they formed part of these MNCs through Kenyanisation (Mwaura, 2005:29). The adoption of SAPs was accompanied by the IMF and the World Bank imposing export-oriented strategies on manufacturing, but with little success (Kinuthia, 2013:47). The export-oriented strategies were imposed to meet the conditions of the donors and provide incentives for MNC investors, thus hindering industrialisation (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:165). This saw many foreign-owned MNCs starting joint ventures with local companies owned by the domestic business class (Leys, 1975:118).

The 21st century saw the manufacturing sector contributing 14 percent to Kenya's annual economic growth (Ajayi, 2006:122; Chen et al., 2015:12). Nonetheless, Kenya has been dominated by a neo-colonial type of industrialisation – assembly plants and light manufacturing and in the process failing to achieve the levels of industrial growth and development to which it aspired (Fahnbulleh, 2006:33). The majority of Kenyan manufacturing output is produced by firms that are either subsidiaries of foreign companies or work under multinational license, while domestic industries are crippled by liberalisation (Mwaura, 2005:29-32). The Kenyan government continued with an export-oriented manufacturing sector dependent on imported materials, and motor-vehicle assembly (AfDB, 2018a:22). The manufacturing sector included light manufacturing such as the manufacture of soap, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries and textiles, for preferential markets (AfDB, 2018a:22). As a result, low skilled manufacturing in textiles, clothing and

[72] *Foreign Investment Protection Act* of 1964 curbed capital outflow in Kenya while further reaffirming with the West (Hornsby, 2012:129).

leather started to pick up, with investors from Asia taking advantage of preferential and regional markets (UNCTAD, 2018:9). With investment from Tata India, General Motors, Toyota, Hyundai and Volkswagen, Kenya is becoming a key player in the East African automotive industry (UNCTAD, 2018:9). However, foreign capital and the domestic business class, in a Faustian pact with the comprador bourgeoisies, have ensured that they limit industrialisation in Kenya through this neo-colonial type of industry.

FDI has been dominated by the service sector, which has been the driver of growth in Kenya at 71 percent of the GDP (Ajayi, 2006:122; AfDB, 2019:6). However, ICT industries are beginning to dominate FDI inflow, with companies such as MTN and Intact Software expanding into Kenya (UNCTAD, 2018:41), along with U.S. companies such as Boeing, Microsoft, Google, IBM, Intel, and Oracle, which has earned Kenya the nickname Silicon Savannah as the ICT market value grows (UNCTAD, 2018:41). This has led government to invest heavily in the broadband sector, with 4 undersea fibre optic cables that land off the coast of Kenya (International Trade Administration (ITA), 2020). The comprador bourgeoisies passed the National Information Communication and Technology (ICT) policy in 2019, in an attempt to indigenise the sector with some politically prominent families having stakes in foreign MNCs i.e. the Moi family has interests in Chesco Ltd, Cable Wireless, and Safaricom[73] communications company in Kenya. According to ITA (2020), computer hardware accounts for 60 percent of the total ICT investment, and its being imported from abroad.

It is on this basis that the Kenyan government resolved to build a new high-tech city-centre outside Nairobi, called Konza Techno City (Poku & Whitman, 2018:71). However, since the government's declaration of intent in 2016, little progress has been made on the construction of the said city, indicating a gap between policy formulation and implementation, which the Sub-Saharan comprador bourgeoisies are famous for. Kenya still relies heavily on foreign technology as indicated above, with over 60 percent of its imports being manufactured products, especially machines. Lack of technology has hindered development, causing industrialisation and agriculture to suffer (Ake, 1996:153),

[73] Safaricom Kenya is a listed mobile operator in which Vodafone of UK and Kenyan government own majority of shares.

the reason being that the comprador bourgeoisies, through their economic policies, have kept Kenya down in global markets as merely an agricultural products supplier.

The hospitality industry in Kenya, which is dominated by the tourism sector, attracts considerable sums of foreign exchange each year (Thomson, 2010:25). However, similar to the manufacturing sector, the tourism sector is foreign-owned and controlled by MNCs such as the hotels Intercontinental, Hilton, and the Sarova Stanley. To wa Thiong'o (1981:59) tourism leads to the prostitution of the whole country, with the building of clubs, casinos and hotels for tourists. The tourism sector has led to consumerism, which has seen the proliferation of shopping malls in many Kenyan cities.

FDI continues to be disproportionately European and British in origin. The U.S. has invested in beverages and pharmaceuticals through Johnson & Johnson (Hornsby, 2012:129). As a result, this has kept Kenya on a neoliberal trajectory. Kenya's mining sector, which provides 14.7 percent of the GDP, is the second-highest growth sector and is attracting investment from abroad (APRM, 2017:178). MNCs from India, Canada and Australia dominate this sector with interests in gold, copper, ilmenite, and tantalum (Jacobs, 2016:21). Oil discovery and exploration has attracted investment and rejuvenated the importance of an extractive industry in Kenya (APRM, 2017:176). Kenya is currently producing 2 thousand barrels of oil daily from its Lokichar Basin located in north-west Kenya. Oil is being explored by joint venture partners that comprise the Kenyan government, Tullow Oil, Africa Oil, and Total. *Vision 2030* has identified mineral discoveries in Kenya as an additional priority sector (APRM, 2017:176). Kenya joins the list of SSA countries that continue to sell unprocessed raw minerals at meagre prices and being a victim of MNCs price transfer in their attempt to avoid tax. Therefore, FDI continues to exploit Kenya instead of development, exportation of unprocessed minerals also means exporting jobs by comprador bourgeoisies that could have been made during processing and value addition.

In Kenya, FDI inflows in 2019 decreased by 18 percent to USD 1.3 billion, performing poorly in comparison to the 2018 FDI inflow of USD 1.6 billion (UNCTAD, 2020:34), despite the oil discovery in 2012 and several projects in Information Technology (IT), and health care. However, the FDI stock stood at USD 15.7 billion in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2020:34). FDI in Kenya is directed at sectors such as ICT sector, banking, tourism,

infrastructure, and extractive activities. Investors include the UK, South Africa, the Netherlands, Belgium, and China (Santander Trade, 2020).

Kenya is an important source of intra-Africa investment, accounting for 51 greenfield projects throughout Africa, and capital investment of USD 1.1 billion (AfDB, 2018:12-3). For example, one of Kenya's MNCs, the KCB Group, has created a footprint on the African continent by becoming the largest banking institution in East Africa, with an asset base of KES 595 billion (USD 5.85 billion) and a market capitalisation of KES 105 billion (USD 1.02 billion) (AfDB, 2018a:22). Both FDI and domestic investment have contributed to Kenya's economic growth, with its GDP having grown by 6.3 percent in 2018, from 5.6 percent in 2015 (APRM, 2017:66). Agriculture, manufacturing, ICT and the retail sector continue to play critical roles in the Kenyan economy. However, economic growth has been characterised by modest FDI inflow, looming debt crisis, and inequality and poverty. Through *Vision 2030*, the government continues its attempt to attract foreign capital. Kenya's wholesale and retail expansion and the proliferation of malls in in larger cities, shows the reverse side of deindustrialisation as a result of cheap imported goods (Mkandawire, 2014:175).

4.6.Kenyan Trade

From the slave trade to colonialism, SSA's integration into the global political economic system has always been as a subordinate. Trade has played a critical role in this asymmetrical relationship. According to Rodney (1972), SSA's underdevelopment has its roots in the era of international trade. The colonial trade principle, where colonies sell their produce and raw materials cheaply while buying manufactured goods at high prices, still dominates the trade relations between Kenya and developed countries. This has resulted in trade deficits and unequal exchange between Kenya and developed countries.

In contemporary times, exploitative trade takes the form of free trade areas in the former colonies (Rodney, 1972). Free trade is perpetuated in order for the penetration of the MNCs in former colonies (Rodney, 1972). This has ensured that MNCs in former colonies benefit and perpetuate trade liberalisation and unfavourable terms of trade[74]. To Fanon (1963:179) former colonisers took precautions when setting up neo-colonialist trade

[74] Note that MNCs from countries such as China, Israel, India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Australia, etc. have taken advantage of this unfair trade agreements and even protecting them.

conventions which would undermine industrialisation in former colonies. This so-called free trade is an unfair trade in which SSA countries are forced to decrease tariffs while the developed countries use protectionism measures to keep SSA products out of their countries (Moyo, 2009:115).

Free trade was used by Britain as leverage to maintain most of the advantages in its original colonial relationship with Kenya, hence, free trade featured in the negotiations (Wasserman, 1976:13-4). In post-independence, Kenya continued its reliance on external trade (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:169). Kenya was part of the Second Yaoundé Convention[75] of 1969, and Lomé Convention, which advocated for free trade and preferential trade. In 1976, Kenya became the first country to sign a National Indicative Programme for co-operation with the European Community under the Lomé Convention (EU Commission, 2015). These Conventions maintained the dominance of European economic interests over Africa (Hurt, 2012:497). Through the Lomé Convention, former colonisers secured stable access to Africa's strategic raw materials, while gaining preferential trade in additional markets, and finding convenient outlets for their industries' excess capacity (Martin, 1982:231). Therefore, the Lomé Convention was a neo-colonial pact, joining Europe and Africa in a contractual relationship of little value to Africa and great benefit for Europe (Martin, 1982:231).

Kenyan trade was characterised by the import of manufactured products and over-reliance on coffee and tea exports with fluctuating prices (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:169). This was profitable for foreign MNCs as they could buy low and sell high. It was also profitable for the comprador bourgeoisies due their rent-seeking behaviour and their inclusion as board members, shareholders or managers of these MNCs. After independence, newly independent states exported raw materials at low prices to firms in Europe that specialised in unfinished products (Fanon, 1963:152). This led to trade deficits, with export earnings lagging behind import costs (Branch, 2011:111). In Kenya, these trade deficits contributed to the decline of agricultural output in the late 1970s, before the adoption of SAPs (Oppong & Oppong, 2004:88).

[75] This followed the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and First Yaoundé Convention of 1963-1969 which Nkrumah equated to the Berlin Conference and both treaties mark the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa (Martin, 1982:229). The treaties also perpetuated division between SSA countries (Martin, 1982:230).

The introduction of SAPs saw Kenya become export-oriented (Adam et al., 2010:115). MNCs such as Unilever, the parent company of Limuru Tea Plc, and Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd under Ngong Tea Holdings Ltd, together with their comprador bourgeoisie allies continued to benefit under the export-oriented economy. The government later introduced Manufacture under Bond (MUB), an incentive to manufacturers to import machinery and raw materials for exclusive purpose in the manufacture of goods to export, and Export Processing Zones (EPZ) that offered incentives such tax holidays and exemption from import duties and VAT on inputs to the benefit of foreign MNCs (Adam et al., 2010:116). This was followed by trade liberalisation by the Kenyan government in the 1990s. Trade liberalisation compounded the already serious capital flight situation, while the government lost much-needed tariff revenue that exacerbated the trade deficit (Mwaura, 2005:19). According to Mwaura (2005:32), exports grew by 8.4 percent in 2004, while imports swelled by 19 percent, resulting in trade deficits that led to the collapse of local industries and factories closures, which increased unemployment, poverty, and crime. This occurred because of Kenya's long-time membership of the WTO. Trade liberalisation overseen by the WTO benefited only a few countries (Carmody 2002:259); for example, Sameer Africa[76] in Kenya closed its tyre manufacturing company because of stiff challenges from cheaper tyre imports from China (Mutegi, 2017).

Kenya became a member of the WTO in January 1995 and had been a member of GATT since February 1964 (WTO, 2020a), and is signatory to many of the WTO agreements. Kenya's trade policy sphere is thus affected by the WTO multilateral trade rules, and by its reform of tariffs and other trade policy instruments (Adam et al., 2010:120). Kenya's GATT membership led to a tariff reduction on manufactured goods, which served developed countries well but put Kenya's import substitution under pressure. Other agreements included the Agreement on Agriculture; the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and the Textiles and Clothing Agreement, among others. The Textiles and Clothing Agreement ceased to exist, but not before decimating the textile and clothing industry in many developing countries, including Kenya, and affording countries such as India and China access to wider markets, with consumers being charged lower prices (TRADSA, 2019:114), thus, making it difficult for Kenya to compete against these low-cost competitors. The Agreement on Agriculture proposes tariff reduction by an average

[76] Sameer Africa plc is a tyre factory in Kenya under the Sameer Group.

36 percent in developed countries, and 24 percent in developing countries, but Europe's Common Agricultural Policy and the United States' subsidisation of farmers has made it difficult for agricultural products from countries such as Kenya to compete (Adam et al., 2010:122). According to Mwaura (2005:20), trade related investment measures (TRIM) prevent African governments from restricting the operations of foreign investors who force countries such as Kenya into non-discrimination of foreign MNCs. This has undermined manufacturing in Kenya (Mwaura, 2005:20).

The paragraphs below demonstrate unequal exchange between developed countries and Kenya, which has perpetuated profit extraction and dependency. Kenya's reliance on agriculture, which provides 30 percent of GDP and dominates the country's export trade, means great rewards for agri-business MNCs and the comprador bourgeoisies. As of 2017, the Kenyan economy's total exports were as follows: agricultural products, 60.4 percent; fuel and mining products, 11 percent; manufactured products, 28.4 percent; and 0.2 percent for others (WTO, 2020a). This clearly indicates a country that is over-reliant on exporting primary products to earn foreign exchange, and equates to over 70 percent of all exports. Kenya's imports are dominated by manufactured products at 61.8 percent, agricultural products at 20.2 percent, and fuels and mining products at 17.6 percent (WTO, 2020a). Agricultural export products consist of tea, cut flowers and flower buds, coffee, cigars, cheroots, cigarillos, figs, pineapples, and avocados, compared to its imports of wheat and meslin, maize, rice, and palm oil, indicating an economy that is geared towards serving foreign interests, while it imports food such as maize, rice and wheat (WTO, 2020a). Non-agricultural products exported include petroleum oils, titanium ores and concentrates, and iron products. Imports include automatic data-processing machines, motor vehicles, and petroleum oils. According to Mwaura (2005:26), this neo-colonial picture entails the cheap exportation of mineral and agricultural products and importing costly manufactured products. This is clearly indicated by Kenya's trade deficit, as the country's value of exports is USD 6,086 million compared to USD 17,260 million in imports (WTO, 2020a).

Kenyan exports are destined to end up in the EU at 21.2 percent, Pakistan at 10.8 percent, followed by Uganda at 10.4 percent, the USA at 8 percent, and Tanzania at 4.8 percent. Many imports come from China at 22.6 percent, the EU at 12 percent, India at 9.9 percent, the United Arab Emirates at 8 percent, and Saudi Arabia at 6.6 percent

(WTO, 2020a). Kenya is a member of EAC which is a major destination for Kenya's exports (Muluvi et al., 2012:20). The EAC accounts for 53 percent of Kenya's total exports to the rest of Africa, and 24 percent of its total exports to the world (Muluvi et al., 2012:20). Kenya exports lime, cement, fabricated construction materials and consumer goods to Uganda, however, this has declined with Uganda's industrialisation in recent years (TradeMark East Africa, 2018). Tanzania is the destination of Kenyan manufactured products such as soap, foodstuffs, and cleansing and polishing products (TradeMark East Africa, 2018). Kenya is also a member of COMESA, with exports to these regions having grown from KES 45 billion in 1997 to KES 86.2 billion today, while imports increased from KES 1.7 billion in 1992 to KES 28.6 billion, with Egypt being the biggest COMESA market for Kenyan tea (Adam et al., 2010:123). Through its membership of the EAC and COMESA, Kenya is part of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) with SADC, the building block for AfCFTA, commenced operations on 1 January 2021.

Kenya is one of 36 countries that have ratified and deposited the AfCFTA agreement. However, it will be difficult for Kenya to trade under AfCFTA because it is part of the EAC Customs Union, many of whose members have yet to ratify AfCFTA. Its successful implementation is dependent on national leaders dealing with tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. For Kenya, this will require the implementation of *Agenda 2063,* which seeks to deal with the country's infrastructure, the free movement of people and capital, economic diversification, and industrialisation. However, given Kenya's current leadership, the implementation of AfCFTA is uncertain. Kenya is yet to introduce *Agenda 2063* in parliament and domesticate it which demonstrate their intermediary role. Also, there is a possibility that the proposed bilateral trade agreements between Kenya and the U.S. and Kenya and the UK will undermine the AfCFTA and the ECA Customs Union protocols.

The trade agreements between Kenya and developed countries show asymmetric economic relations that favour the developed countries. These agreements have perpetuated neo-colonialism in which Kenyan exports are dominated by primary products and its imports by manufactured products. Since the signing of the National Indicative Programme in 1976 under the Lomé Convention, Kenya and its EU partnership has grown to be of advantage to the latter. The multilateral trade policies between Kenya and the EU are characterised by economic partnership agreements (EPA), which have indicated the openness of its market to EU imports (Adam et al., 2010:125). The EPA was

completed in 2014 and led to Kenya losing its preferential access to the EU because it was not a Least Developed Country (LDC) (European Commission, 2015:2). According to the European Commission (2015:5), 87,8 percent of Kenya's exports to the EU are primary products, and 11,4 percent are manufactured goods, while 84,2 percent of its imports from the EU are manufactured products, 13,4 percent are primary commodities, and 1,2 percent, others. This has further entrenched the trade deficits between these trade partners. Kenyan exports to the EU are dominated by cut flowers at 39 percent, tea and coffee at 29 percent, and peas at 22 percent. Its imports from the EU include machinery and appliances, chemical products, transport equipment, and vegetables products (European Commission, 2020a:2).

Kenya is also part of the USA's AGOA. Through AGOA the U.S. has perpetuated neoliberalism, as it calls for a market-based economy that protects private property rights, incorporates an open rules-based trading system, and minimal government interference in the economy (U.S. Congress, 2000). Furthermore, the Act calls for the elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment through the creation of an environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment, the formation of capital markets, and combating corruption (U.S. Congress, 2000). Kenyan exports to the U.S. have increased since 2016 and are dominated by apparel, agricultural products such as cut flowers, horticultural produce and minerals and ores, while imports from U.S. are dominated by transportation equipment, chemicals, oil and gas, computer and electronic products, and machinery (USAID, 2020). In early 2020, the U.S. government and the Kenyan government announced their intention to formulate a Free Trade Area Agreement between their two countries in an effort to further establish trade.

4.7.Chapter Analysis

The above sections have indicated that neo-colonialism has been perpetuated through instruments such as economic policies, foreign aid, foreign capital, and trade (Sunil, 2010:59). This is made possible by compromises that led to a Faustian pact. The previous chapter demonstrated that compromises were reached during the independence processes between the comprador bourgeoisies and colonisers in Kenya. This was possible because contradictions between the colonisers and the comprador bourgeoisies were not that deep. The compromises involved leaving the exploitative system unchanged leaving the peasants and many of the country's workers in poverty. These

compromises resulted in Kenya attaining a nominal independence in which its national productive forces are yet not freed from imperialism. The compromises were entrenched within the constitutions of country in the post-independence epoch.

The chapter expanded on that point, indicating that the compromises led to an ongoing Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital. The European and Asian bourgeoisies that collaborated with imperialism during colonisation form part of the Faustian pact to preserve their class positions and champion global neoliberal capitalism. This meant the preservation of the status quo in which the values and the position of foreign capital within independent countries was protected. The Faustian pact was made apparent above through the analysis of neo-colonialism mechanisms such as economic policies, free trade, foreign ownership of means of production, and foreign capital.

The post-independent Kenya under the comprador bourgeoisies is an enabling state that has ensured the exploitation of the country by MNCs continues unabated. This is apparent in the outward-looking economy of Kenya that is geared to serve external interests. The economic policies of the post-independent state have perpetuated this externally oriented economic outlook, which has kept Kenya as a primary producing country for developed countries, consequently exacerbating the asymmetrical economic relations between Kenya and these developed countries. After independence, Kenya continued with the colonial stance on economic policies and in 1980s it pursued SAPs that were underpinned by neoliberalism. With the advice of MNCs and IFIs, and especially the World Bank, Kenya pursued an erroneous policy trajectory that resulted in continuing the advantages of the comprador bourgeoisies. Moreover, the comprador bourgeoisies advocated for trickle-down economics, a system that never reached the downtrodden and exacerbated inequality (Lopes et al., 2017:4).

Since gaining independence Kenya has been under the guidance of World Bank experts and the country's Development Plans were influenced by *The Economic Development of Kenya, a* World Bank report (World Bank, 1963). Moreover, the Sessional Papers, the ERS, and *Vision 2030* were also influenced by inputs from the World Bank and the SAPs. Kenya's acceptance of loans and aid from developed countries and IFIs has meant their acceptance of advisors from those countries and multilateral institutions that had previously undermined the country's policy sovereignty. These policies meant the

preservation of the status quo that was legitimised by the creation of the comprador bourgeoisies through Kenyanisation. This saw the comprador bourgeoisies incorporated into foreign MNCs as partners, shareholder, board members and/or managers. To Ake (1996:81) in the end, indigenisation turned out to be only a strategy of incorporation; at best the comprador bourgeoisies improved the ownership of the economy, but not its control. The drive for indigenisation did not alter the division of labour between foreign capital and the comprador bourgeoisies, although it may have improved the access of the latter to business opportunities (Ake, 1996:81). In many instances, indigenisation was accompanied by corruption that bought the comprador bourgeoisies ownership of a sizable part of Kenya's means of production, properties, and land (Cheche Kenya, 1982:80; Iqbal et al., 2015:9). According to Fanon (1963:12), the comprador bourgeoisies, who emerged during independence, were complicit in looting national resources and their insistence on nationalisation was for the purpose of plundering the nation.

Kenya's economic policies prioritised FDI, which led not only to foreign ownership of the economy, but also gave foreign capital immense influence in the country's political economy. Similar to many SSA countries, Kenya is aid dependent. Accordingly, donors have influenced the country's economic trajectory, thus usurping the Kenyan's right to development. According to Wasserman (1976:138), aid from the World Bank hindered the settlement schemes from addressing landlessness and dictated who could produce what, and how. As a result, the trade liberalisation advocated by IFIs has perpetuated unequal exchange and deindustrialisation. This is evident in poverty increase and the increase of slums around major cities.

The above-mentioned demonstrates that neo-colonialism perpetuated through neoliberal economic policies is anti-development. Hence, Ake's (1996:1) argument that development was never on the post-independent agenda to begin with. The comprador bourgeoisies have no interest in development, industrialisation and structural transformation because they derive their authority to govern from foreign capital (Nkrumah, 1965). Accordingly, neo-colonial relations, in which the comprador bourgeoisies play an intermediary role, undermine Kenya's right to development. This creates uncertainty about the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

4.8.Conclusion

Chapter 4 has illustrated that the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, exists through neo-colonialism in Kenya. In addition, the study's analysis suggests that the mechanisms of neo-colonialism such as its economic policies, trade, foreign ownership and foreign capital demonstrate the extent of colonial relations in Kenya. The comprador bourgeoisies have perpetuated the neo-colonial status quo due to their intermediary role in undermining industrialisation and development. The Faustian pact and this intermediary role have been cemented through Kenyanisation, a policy that has entrenched the role of the comprador bourgeoisies as business agents of foreign MNCs and ensured that they reap the benefits of independence while the majority is economically excluded.

Neo-colonialism is perpetuated through neoliberal economic policies. Since independence, Kenya has pursued the pattern of a colonial economy with privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation that have undermined the Kenyans' right to development. Neoliberal economic policies advocated by the post-independent Kenyan state have been underpinned by accumulation by dispossession, which forms an integral part of privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation. These policies prioritise the FDI that has led to super-exploitation of the workers and foreign ownership of the economy. Moreover, the dominance of FDI has created an obligation among the comprador bourgeoisies to appease foreign investors and MNCs.

As a result, the structural problems that underpinned colonial Kenya have reproduced themselves. Inequality has increased as demonstrated by the increasing slums around major Kenyan cities, and poverty affects 36.1 percent of the population. This demonstrates that neo-colonialism perpetuates underdevelopment. The following chapter analyse the Faustian pact in South Africa.

CHAPTER 5: THE FAUSTIAN PACT BETWEEN COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIES AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN SOUTH AFRICA

5.1. Introduction

Chapter 3 demonstrated that neo-colonialism was rooted in the transition from colonialism to independence, in which colonial contradictions remained (Ogude, 1997:96). The negotiations that started in the 1980s in South Africa resulted in a compromise in which the land ownership and the economic questions were never resolved. The negotiations resulted in the ANC leadership accepting neo-apartheid and neo-colonialism as liberation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:175). Consequently, in 1994, South Africa gained democracy and the process of de-racialisation was started without decolonisation and liberalisation taking place (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:175). wa Muiu (2008:149) expands on this fact, and declares that the ANC got a neo-colonial settlement that left it without any security or control over South Africa's economy. In allowing the modes and forces of production to remain captured, this reinforced racial supremacy and the economic privileges of the white population in South Africa. In 1994, the compromise was obscured and legitimised by buzzwords such as "miracle" transition and "rainbow nation".

The negotiations that can be traced back to the formation of the Urban Foundation, were used by business South Africa and the NP government to find allies and disarm the popular movement against colonialism. According to Wasserman (1975:4), the colonisers had to adapt and find new tactics to continue with their exploitation of SSA. Consequently, through co-option, the colonisers found allies within the new states who co-operated with the West and allowed their countries to remain within the orbit of Western influence – economically, politically, militarily, and ideologically (Woddis, 1967:55). This was done to preserve the values and positions of colonisers by changing their methods of influence, structures and institutions, and identifying with new leaders (Wasserman, 1975:5). In South Africa, allies were identified during the struggle for independence and the negotiations. Kasrils (2013) indicated that a Faustian pact was made between the ANC, the domestic business class, especially the MEC and international capitalists, that haunts the poor to this day.

The compromise and subsequent, ongoing Faustian pact excluded the possibility of a comprehensive redistribution policy in the post-independence epoch (Terreblanche,

2012:67). As a result, the economy was left unchanged while the interests of the majority of South Africans were neglected. The Faustian pact saw the mining, finance and comprador bourgeoisies' interests reign supreme in post-independent South Africa (Shuvambu, 2014:125). Preservation of the status quo was legitimised by co-option of the ANC leadership through policies such as BEE and Affirmative Action. Accordingly, the lack of structural transformation that was perpetuated by neoliberal economic policies adopted in the post-independent era continued, resulting in the reproduction of structural problems such as poverty, inequality and unemployment.

The South African comprador bourgeoisies continued with neoliberal economic policies that had started under the NP government in the 1980s (Terreblanche, 2012:60), and the ANC government adopted GEAR which led to capital flight, mass unemployment and poverty (Carmody, 2002:263). In South Africa, the post-apartheid economy has been characterised by deindustrialisation, investment strike, dumping of cheap products and the subsequent proliferation of malls. Their intermediary role and the rent-seeking behaviour of the comprador bourgeoisies ensure that MNCs pass through their hands first undermines industrialisation. Therefore, under the comprador bourgeoisies, the economies of former colonies still prioritise primary products such as mining and agriculture without value addition, assembly plant industrialisation, and service sectors dominated by financial sectors to perpetuate speculation.

The chapter argues that in the post-independence epoch, foreign capital is dominant and in alliance with the dominant sections of the comprador bourgeoisies (Lubeck, 1987:50). This is apparent in the neo-colonial relations that are illustrated through mechanisms of neo-colonialism, economic policies, free trade, foreign ownership and foreign capital. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that the comprador bourgeoisies played an intermediary role in post-independence that undermined development. According to Fanon (1963:149), the national bourgeoisies of underdeveloped countries do not engage in production, invention, building, or labour; they are completely channelled into activities of the intermediary type. The intermediary role is entrenched through BEE, demonstrating that economic policies lie at the centre of neo-colonialism. In South Africa, neoliberal economic policies have entrenched neo-colonialism that has ensured retaining the exploitative economic system of colonialism and apartheid. To successfully analyse the

Faustian pact, it is necessary to understand the role of the post-independent state in the neo-colonial epoch.

5.2. The South African Post-Independent State

The post-independent state in Africa is viewed as an enabling state which has allowed MNCs to continue exploiting the country and its masses. As a result, it was important to analyse the role of the state in perpetuating neo-colonialism in South Africa. According to Turok (1987:94), African states are characterised as instruments of imperialism and mere intermediaries. To Mbembe (2001), this is because the post-colonial state has replicated, internalised, and totalised the power structures introduced through colonisation. The post-independence state ensures continuities in economic relations and pursues the role of the defender of neo-colonialism. Also, because of neo-colonial relations, we have seen the unbridled accumulation by the comprador bourgeoisies that has widened the gap with the working-class masses and created immense poverty among the rural and urban poor (Turok, 1987:54), hence, the call during independence negotiations to dismantle the colonial state and create of an inclusive state to serve the masses.

Compradorism and Faustian pact have impacted SSA post-independent states, which continue to be despotic, reliant on violence and coercion, assumed patronage and exploitative dimension (Agbude, 2013:25). In the case of South Africa, the sunset clauses ensured its inheritance of the apartheid state with its personnel intact, and without transformation. South Africa might not be despotic, but it has definitely assumed patronage and has maintained an exploitative dimension. The ANC government has continued labour exploitation through casualisation and labour brokers, and it has built a mass-based patronage system, which is evidenced by state capture (Desai, 2018:500). This has seen the post-independent state being privatised and serving a small clique of people while the majority are excluded (Ake, 2000:37). The struggle for the control of the state in South Africa is happening within the ANC.

Patronage has led to a bloated state that has become strategic for massive corruption, while simultaneously weak and struggling to provide services to its people (APRM, 2017:104; Ake, 1996:38). This is apparent given the number of ministries in South Africa a decrease from 37 government departments during Zuma's tenure to 30 departments under the current administration. These departments are led by ministers, deputy

ministers and director-generals, and burden the public purse. According to Mahlaka (2021), during the 2019-2020 financial year, the government spent ZAR 623.8 billion in public servant remuneration. Politics have become the primary source of capital accumulation by the comprador bourgeoisies through the state (Agbude, 2013:26). Looting has brought the comprador bourgeoisies ownership of major property and land (Turok, 1987:56). For instance, state capture cost South Africa ZAR 1.5 trillion (Merten, 2019). Municipalities, in the words of the former Auditor General Kimi Makwetu (2020), are where the money goes to waste, with ZAR 1 billion spent on “consultants”, and over ZAR 32 billion on irregular expenditure. Thus, the state is seen as a theft machine captured by its corrupt and rent-seeking leadership (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:80).

As clearly demonstrated in Chapter 3, the ANC is an organisation of the elites, who through their demands were able to reproduce their class interests during independence, which led to co-option. This elite class can be traced from the colonial era: president Cyril Ramaphosa, one of the major BEE beneficiaries, is a former deputy chairperson of the Urban Foundation, a brainchild of the business sector during apartheid. This group of comprador bourgeoisies emerged during the independence processes and accepted neo-colonialism and democracy instead of liberation. This is evidenced by their taking over the economy and co-opting instead of transforming it, despite their declaration that “it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of wealth of the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy”.

As a result of the comprador bourgeoisies, the post-independent state fulfils the same kind of function as the colonial state with respect to the international capitalist system (Turok, 1987:51). Through economic policies, the comprador bourgeoisies have perpetuated neoliberalism and profit extraction by MNCs. Woddis (1967:86) emphasises this by pointing out that economic policies of post-independent states are directed at assisting the profit-making functions of MNCs, and at providing the Western powers the necessary economic power in the new states so that they are able to wield political influence over the post-independent government. Moreover, the economic policies of South Africa have entrenched exploitation, kept the country as primary producing country, and exacerbated deindustrialisation. Therefore, the post-independent South African state preserves the country’s place in the international division of labour, and suppresses

internal revolutionary ideas and movements (Turok, 187:51). For instance, South Africa continue to depend on raw materials to earn foreign exchange, as 49 percent of South African exports are mining and fuel products (WTO, 2020b). Furthermore, the Marikana massacre and other labour actions in the country has been met with violence by the South African state, a case in point regarding the suppression of internal revolutionary movements. Alavi (1972) admits that the relationship between former colonisers and the post-independent state is different from the colonial period, but because of neo-colonialism, post-colonial states are still organs of the imperialists. As such, the post-independent state perpetuates neo-colonialism, and economic policies play a critical role in that regard. According to Woddis (1967:86) Politico-economic policies lie at the centre of neo-colonialism.

5.3. South African Politico-economic policies

After independence, South Africa went through economic growth of over 5 percent until 2007 (Mbeki, 2011:18). However, this economic growth was not accompanied by poverty reduction and inequality decline, the reason being the absence of structural transformation and that this economic growth was without development (Lopes et al. 2017:1). According to Lopes et al. (2017:1), the neo-classical model of growth was neither inclusive nor sustainable. As a result, economic growth did not translate into a commensurate reduction in poverty rates and the creation of decent jobs, because of limited structural transformation and continued heavy reliance on primary commodity production and exports (Lopes et al. 2017:2). South Africa was still locked in mercantilism, in which it continues to sell cheap raw materials and buy expensive manufactured goods. This can be attributed to the compromise that meant the reiteration of the colonial economic model in the post-independent epoch.

The so called “miracle” of South Africa’s democratisation/independence was not a miracle but a compromise that saw the signing of an IMF loan to ensure that the post-apartheid government continued with neoliberal policies that advocated for macroeconomic stability, liberalisation, and trickle-down economics. The signing of the Marrakesh Agreement[77] led to the establishment of the WTO and advocated for liberalisation of trade

[77] The Marrakesh Agreement derives from the Marrakesh Declaration signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, marking the end of the twelve-year long Uruguay round.

policies to stimulate manufactured exports, among other things (Jeffery, 2010:240). Bond (2000:253) states that South Africa's transition involved an elite pact which saw the ANC's economic paradigm shift. This led to the shelving of the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) document, *Making Democracy Work: A framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa*, which advocated for state intervention and investment in social and physical infrastructure – housing, education, health, electrification and road development (Gumede, 2007:87). Furthermore, the MERG document called for a developmental role for the SARB (Gumede, 2007:89). MERG was dropped before the launch of the TEC in December 1993 (Padayachee, 2006:1).

South Africa was a settler colony and a British dominion that developed a huge settler business class comprised of English commercial elites and Afrikaner elites who served as collaborators to imperialism (Verancini, 2007:2; Mbeki, 2009:42-3). As a result of the compromises, these groups retained their economic privileges, and thus the South African Faustian pact was made between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, including the MEC, and foreign capital. According to Terreblanche (2012:66), in the 1980s the MEC had convinced the NP to accept the policies of privatisation and neoliberal globalism. The MEC were also responsible for the ANC economic policy shift between 1990 and 1994, which started with their meetings in the 1980s. Consequently, in 1994 Mandela would reject any form of nationalisation as ANC policy. In post-apartheid South Africa, it was the interests of the MEC that reigned supreme, perpetuating structural joblessness (Shivambu 2014:43).

In its final days, the apartheid government had started going down the path of macroeconomic management and neoliberalism, which became the model for post-apartheid economic policy (Bond, 2000; Jones, 2002:20). The post-apartheid government adopted the RDP, which was revised many times to be in alignment with macroeconomic management, and advocated for firmer commitment to fiscal, monetary discipline and privatisation (Jeffery, 2010:240). Before it was adopted, the RDP was scrutinised by the World Bank, the IMF, and the governments of Britain, the U.S., France, Germany and Japan, to check that it was market-friendly, and crucial sections of the programme were amended to accommodate their suggestions (Gumede, 2007:79). This is a clear indication of South Africa's lack of independence with regard to economic policy, as Nkrumah (1965) had argued in *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*.

The RDP and subsequently the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, had maintained the independence of the SARB[78] which continued to deliver on its mandate on price stability and inflation targeting, just as it did during the apartheid era (Jeffery, 2010:240). The independence of the SARB and the retaining of its governor, Chris Stals, in post-apartheid was seen as important in renewing access to private international capital markets (Carmody, 2002:258). It also meant the protection of monetary policy from democratic politics, and thus built business confidence (Carmody, 2002:258). As a critical area of economic policy, parliamentary control over the SARB was removed altogether (Gumede, 2007:77). The RDP was replaced by a more neoliberal-friendly policy – GEAR, which was introduced as a strategy for the rebuilding and reshaping of the economy (Gumede, 2007:77).

In 1996 the ANC government adopted GEAR, an orthodox economic reform programme influenced by the MEC, and similar to the NP's Normative Economic Model (NEM) released in 1993 (Carmody, 2002:257; Terreblanche, 2012:60). GEAR advocated for privatisation, tariff reductions, fiscal discipline, and tax incentives to stimulate new investment and liberalisation, which would lead to lowering the interest rate and controllable inflation, and bring the budget deficit down, but at a devastating social cost (Legassick, 2007:459). Both the local business community and foreign capital lobbied for this package of policies. The implementation of GEAR led to capital flight, with MEC companies such as Anglo American, Old Mutual, Investec, Sasol and SABMiller (later bought by ABInbev), shifting their primary listing abroad, and others adopting a joint listing (Mbeki, 2011:34). This allowed South African MNCs to expand their operations abroad while disinvesting in South Africa, which they previously could not do under the sanctions against apartheid. This made the MEC the biggest beneficiaries of democratisation, while exploitation continued unabated in post-apartheid. GEAR advocated to attract investment, but the actual effect was to increase the outflow of domestic capital – USD 2.3 billion in 1997 (Ashman et al., 2011). Foreign capital benefitted through privatisation, as almost all FDI in South Africa around that period was related to the purchase of existing assets through privatisation and mergers, i.e. acquisition of 30 percent of Telkom (Bond,

[78] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, chapter 13, section 224(1), declared that the Reserve Bank must perform its functions independently and regulated by an act of parliament (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1996). Note that during the drafting on this chapter, there was an intense discussion regarding the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank within the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters had introduced the motion in parliament.

2000:193). The comprador bourgeoisies also benefitted from privatisation. For example, the consortium of former Director-General of Communications, Andile Ngcaba, was involved in a ZAR 6.6 billion BEE deal with Smuts Ngonyama[79], the then ANC spokes-person, who stood to make ZAR 160 million from the same deal. While South African MNCs, the comprador bourgeoisies, and foreign capital reaped rewards under GEAR, inequality and poverty increased, as the majority of poor South Africans who suffered under apartheid continued to suffer in post-apartheid South Africa.

The adoption of the GEAR strategy coincided with the resolution of the ANC regarding de-racialising the economy instead of economic transformation, which was written in its discussion document, *The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation* (1998). This was followed by the BEE Commission legitimising the co-option of the comprador bourgeoisies into the neo-colonial economy, which meant the preservation of cheap labour by the post-apartheid government (Mbeki, 2009:78). This compromise was meant to satisfy the nationalistic aspirations of the comprador bourgeoisies while exploitation of the workers and peasants continued (Rodney, 1972). Labour deregulation was part of the GEAR strategy that was advocated by the MEC to maintain the cheap labour system for purposes of exploitation. The ANC government implemented this through the introduction of labour brokers and labour casualisation that has since led to underemployment in South Africa.

The suffering continued in post-apartheid as a result of the Faustian pact that continued to maintain the neoliberal capitalist system with its entrenched privileges (Simutanyi, 2006). The post-apartheid government chose economic policies that attracted foreign investors, global financiers and credit ratings agencies with macroeconomic policies geared towards keeping inflation and government deficits low (Mbeki, 2011:30). Furthermore, the government liberalised trade and financial flows and increased integration of the South African economy into global markets, to the detriment of the country (Mbeki, 2011:30). After meagre economic growth, GEAR was replaced by ASGISA in 2006, which was followed by the NGP in 2010. Both policies continued with macroeconomic stability and trickle-down economics, which never took place as

[79] In his defence of the deal, Smuts Ngonyama made his famous utterances: "*I did not join the struggle to be poor*" which puts in to perspective the reason for their involvement in the struggle and their role in contemporary post-independence epoch.

inequality, unemployment and poverty were further reproduced in post-apartheid South Africa. To contain the popular discontent that stemmed from these challenges, the ANC developed one of the biggest welfare programmes to appease the downtrodden. The irony here is that this was an indication of their failure to take the country forward and to push for inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.

In place of transformation, the ANC resolved to deracialise the economy in the late 1990s. This was followed by the co-option of the comprador bourgeoisies into the neoliberal economy. The ANC government passed legislation that legitimised this co-option, which cemented the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies and the domestic business class and foreign capital. The legislation that led to capital accumulation and the subsequent creation of the comprador bourgeoisies, includes the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, Act 53 of 2003; the Employment Equity Act, Act 55 of 1998 that encompasses Affirmative Action; the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), Act 28 of 2002; and the recently adopted Mining Charter 2018. These policies are meant to incorporate the elites into executive jobs and the boardrooms of private and foreign firms and to increase black ownership, particularly in the mining sector, but this has only benefitted politically connected people and precipitated corruption in the public sector (Beall et al., 2005:693). According to Beall et al. (2005:693), these legislations, especially B-BBEE, were an accommodation between the ANC and white big business, reflecting trade-offs between maintaining macroeconomic stability and accepting globalisation on the one hand, and transferring economic power to blacks on the other. In addition, the MNCs that are accredited with B-BBEE are able to garner lucrative deals from the state. The impact of the aforementioned legislation and the evidence of the Faustian pact was apparent after the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference, with 28 members of the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) involved in or having interests in 69 companies worth billions of rands (Russell, 2009:178).

The creation of a bourgeoisie that did not exist before has led to corruption and massive capital accumulation for many of the black elite. According to Mbeki (2007), BEE has stifled growth and spurred corruption, which has led to a culture of cronyism and entitlement. Iheduru (2004) argues along the same line as Mbeki but includes white businesses, therefore indicating that the looting of the country was a Faustian pact.

Iheduru (2004:23) states that corruption and fronting for white capital have become endemic to the BEE process that has begun to acquire neopatrimonial characteristics, as government departments and agencies have yet to develop the capacity to monitor compliance. Corruption costs South Africa billions, and nowhere was this clearer than under Jacob Zuma's leadership, during which corruption cost South Africa ZAR 1.5 trillion. The State Capture documents indicate how corruption is entrenched in the South African government, and how multi-national accounting firms such KPMG, PwC, and Deloitte have ensured that Gupta companies looted the government (Ebrahim, 2020). The Zondo Commission[80] has opened the lid on how SOEs such as Eskom, South African Airways (SAA), and Transnet among many, were looted billions of rands. For example, McKinsey and their local partner, Trillian[81], looted ZAR 1.6 billion in "fees" for advice to Eskom on a turnaround, and had plans to get a further ZAR 7.8 billion from the heavily indebted SOE (Evans, 2017). These looting sprees under the ANC government had a devastating effect, costing the country 76 000 jobs annually and wiping out a third of South Africa's GDP (Patel, 2017; Merten, 2019). The mass looting of Eskom exacerbated load-shedding and can be attributed to the mismanagement of the SOE, and has also been detrimental to the South African economy.

B-BBEE[82] has strengthened capitalism in post-apartheid South Africa, and perpetuated neoliberalism. The objective of the B-BBEE policy was to increase ownership, management, and control of businesses by black citizens, especially black women (Butler, 2011:1). This was done without any structural change to the colonial economy, hence the criticism regarding the policy, as commentators declared it as co-option by white oligarchs to deracialise the South African economy. BEE is characterised by cronyism, capitalism, fronting, self-enrichment and parasitism (Wakeford, 2004). Early BEE transactions included SANLAM and Anglo-American setting aside shares for black businessmen, and the creation of the New African Investment Limited (NAIL). Prominent beneficiaries included Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Lazarus Zim and Patrice Motsepe – all of whom represented the peak of the BEE elite (Southall, 2012:12). The

[80] Zondo Commission of Inquiry is investigating allegations into State Capture and is headed by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo.

[81] Trillian is a consultancy company with Regiment Capital as its parent company and it is associated to Gupta-associate Salim Essa and Tokyo Sexwale (Head, 2019).

[82] This is the same model which was used in post-1948 for Afrikaner economic empowerment towards equality with English elites and throughout SSA as Africanisation.

politically connected have used the Mining Charter and MPRDA Act 28 of 2002, to be co-opted in the mining sector i.e. president Ramaphosa through Shanduka had shares in Lonmin and Glencore. Thus, the South African government followed economic indigenisation to cement the Faustian pact.

Ramaphosa is a minority shareholder in Lonmin and was a board member before his return to politics, and the company has moved hundreds of millions of dollars to Bermuda since 2000 (Poku & Whitman, 2018:51). In addition, companies such as De Beers and Mobile Telephone Network (MTN), which Ramaphosa chaired, are involved in offshoring their profits in an attempt to avoid tax. This demonstrates how vulnerable a financialised and commodity underpinned economy is to illicit financial flows. According to the AU and ECA (2015:27), South Africa has lost over 2 billion dollars of revenue through offshoring of profits by MNCs, and is ranked at 13 in terms of illicit outflows among developing countries. The current neoliberal economic policies have made the South African economy susceptible to illicit financial flows; data shows that the open and commodity underpinned economy are vulnerable, and that MNCs are involved in trade mispricing.

Habib (2013:6) asserts that neoliberalism, with its privatisation, liberalisation and macroeconomics accompanied by the black empowerment agenda, consolidated and reinforced the divided social structure bequeathed by apartheid, although with some de-racialisation among its upper echelons. South Africa has one of the highest inequality rates in the world, with the majority of its people marginalised, and a Gini coefficient of 0.63 (World Bank, 2018). Steve Biko (1979:150) warned that the political freedom which South Africa found itself today, would be meaningless without economic independence. He further argued that if South Africa were merely to change the faces of those in governing positions, black people would continue to be poor, and few blacks would filter through into the so-called bourgeoisie (Biko, 1979:150). Post-independence in South Africa has been characterised by the rise of a small, politically connected black business elite, black professionals, and the appointment of highly paid black civil servants, while over 60 percent of the country's blacks remain in squalor (Habib, 2013:6). This has led to conspicuous consumption among comprador bourgeoisies, which saw Chris Hani's (1992) fears manifest into reality when he warned: "What I fear is that the liberators will emerge as elitists who drive around in Mercedes-Benzes and use the resources of this country to live in palaces and to gather riches".

The liberalisation undertaken by the post-apartheid government has led to major deindustrialisation in South Africa (Carmody, 2002:269). The manufacturing sector's contribution to real annual GDP growth in South Africa has declined since 2010, resulting in over 200 000 jobs being shed (Herbst & Mills, 2015:97). The NDP adopted in 2012 provided no strategy to deal with deindustrialisation, despite its reliance on the manufacturing sector to create as many as 700 000 jobs by 2030 (Herbst & Mills 2015:99). Notwithstanding the NDP's bold propositions of job creation, creating a capable and developmental state[83], expanding infrastructure, transforming society and economic growth, poverty has worsened, inequality and unemployment have increased, corruption is entrenched, and the economy has been in recession since its implementation. However, the NDP continued with GEAR's trickle-down economics and macroeconomic stability (Satgar, 2012:35; Alloggio & Thomas, 2013:108).

The NDP seeks to decrease unemployment, halve inequality, and eradicate poverty and by 2030, but it shies away from addressing the structural problems of the economy, land ownership and economic transformation (National Planning Commission, 2013; Moyo & Mamobolo, 2014:956). According to Lopes et al. (2017:1), economic growth without structural change to the economy, cannot translate into poverty reduction and job creation. The MEC's perpetual monopolies have caused high levels of structural joblessness and unemployment (Shivambu, 2014:43). The NDP fails to provide a political and social agenda to bring about transformation in the mining and agriculture industries – the primary sources of wealth for the dominant class and fails to challenge the modes of production upon which they depend (Alloggio & Thomas, 2013:110). In addition, the policy uncertainty and lack of political will within the ANC has led to lack of implementation, and reduced the NDP to a concept piece, instead of a living, breathing, policy document (Progressive Leader, 2019:40), while those on the left accuse the NDP of deviating from the Freedom Charter and disadvantaging the working classes and the majority of South Africans (Jim, 2013; Moyo & Mamobolo, 2014:954).

South Africa's economic policies have perpetuated the county's economic structural problems. The economy is dominated by the financial sector and is shedding the

[83] According to Chang (2007) developmental state refers to the state intervention directed at the development of productive forces, through efforts to expand industrial development and modernisation among other things.

manufacturing sector. According to the World Bank (2020), the South African GDP stands at USD 368.29 billion. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 3 percent of the GDP (World Bank, 2020). Industry, which consists of manufacturing, mining and construction amount to 29.7 percent of GDP, with manufacturing contributing 13 percent, followed by mining at 8 percent and construction at 4 percent (Stats SA, 2020:10). South African exports are dominated by the agriculture, mining and petroleum sectors at a combined 49 percent. The Service sector, which encompasses of finance sector; transport, storage and communication; wholesale and retail trade; real estate; travel and tourism; catering and accommodation, stands at 67 percent to GDP. The finance sector dominates the service sector with 20 percent to GDP, which explains the financialisation of the economy.

In post-independence, financialisation coincided with the adoption of neoliberalism and de-industrialisation. Financialisation in South Africa meant speculation instead of investment in production (Cornell, 2011:13). This saw South Africa's MNCs unbundle, while others relocated their principal listing to the London Stock Exchange (Cornell, 2011:13). According to Mbeki (2011:27), financialisation in South Africa caused economic volatility and uncertainty, negatively affecting conditions for investment and employment. Manufacturing's contribution to GDP growth declined, but the contribution of services, especially financial services, led to growth of the GDP (Mbeki, 2011:18). However, this growth was accompanied by debt-driven consumption and financial speculation in finance and insurance, transport and storage, and in wholesale and retail services (Mbeki, 2011:23). This resulted in a rise in unemployment and the outsourcing of jobs in the service sector. The growth of employment in wholesale and retail trade can be associated with the growth of debt-driven consumption and the skyrocketing of non-banking personal loan institutions (Mbeki, 2011:26).

The continuation of neoliberal economic policy has led to liberalisation, which is detrimental to South Africa's nascent industrialisation. The government continued to cut tariffs more deeply than it was required by WTO, exposing industries to major competition (Carmody, 2002:259). This led to dependence on resource-intensive industries, with negative implications for sustainability (Carmody, 2002:269). However, liberalisation benefitted the vehicle, parts and accessories assembly sector (Carmody, 2002:268). This export-oriented sector has benefitted from lower tariffs, but its rewards might be short-lived since it might lead to total eradication of the domestic motor industry (Mbeki,

2011:24). The indigenised neoliberalism that continued in post-independent South Africa has led to the reproduction of poverty and unemployment, as economic growth has not been accompanied by poverty reduction and job creation. As per Stats SA (2019), over 50 percent of South Africans are living in poverty and inequality increased with the economy contracting by 3,2 percent in the first quarter of 2019 and 7 out of 10 industries are taking a knock and manufacturing, mining, construction and trade contributing to the fall.

The paragraphs above illustrate that South Africa's neoliberal economic policies ensured that foreign capital and the domestic business class, the MEC continue to benefit at the expense of the masses. Through these policies the comprador bourgeoisies have guaranteed that the status quo remains while those who struggled under apartheid continued to struggle. Neoliberal economic policies have led to capital flight and deindustrialisation and have maintained foreign capital and the MEC's grip on the economy.

5.4. South African Patterns of ownership

In South Africa, economic transformation or redistribution has been part of the discourse since the end of apartheid, with many calling for the implementation of the Freedom Charter. Hence, legislation such as the B-BBEE Act, Act 53 of 2003; the Employment Equity Act, Act 55 of 1998, and MPRDA, Act 28 of 2002, and despite slogans such as "Radical Economic Transformation" (RET) and "Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime", much of the economy is still in the hands of the domestic business class and foreign capital. The following paragraphs demonstrate the skewed economic ownership in favour of the domestic business class and foreign capital.

South Africa is defined by two dominating elites: the political elites who have the same roots and characteristics as most of the rest of SSA, and the economic elites who dominate the economy (Mbeki, 2009:63). The political elites, in this case the comprador bourgeoisies, have used state power for capital accumulation, while the economic elites run a dynamic private sector with their rights constitutionally entrenched and enforceable through the judiciary. This has given the comprador bourgeoisie little room for manoeuvre (Mbeki, 2009:63). The ownership relations were unintended consequences of sanctions and disinvestment in the 1970s and 1980s, as South African firms grew to be MNCs and

formed part of an emerging-markets class, but differed from their counterparts in that they did not remain based in the markets from which they originated (Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016:85). The post-apartheid adoption of neoliberalism led to South African firms being able to expand globally, with some moving their headquarters abroad, and their listings from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the New York and London Stock Exchanges[84]. According to Mbeki and Mbeki (2016:85), these companies expanded abroad while maintaining only a market presence in South Africa, but to an extent where some still retain market dominance in the local mining and service sectors.

The comprador bourgeoisies entered into a Faustian pact with the economic elites, the domestic business class, and foreign capital that was against decolonisation. As a result, despite the land question underpinning the national liberation struggle in South Africa, it was left unresolved. Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 protected private property without addressing the colonial dispossession. Consequently, land ownership did not change much. As can be seen in the Land Audit Report of 2017, 72 percent of the 37 031 283 hectares of farms and agricultural holdings were owned by individual white landowners, followed by Coloureds at 15 percent, Indians at 5 percent and Africans at 4 percent (DRDLR, 2017:2). In urban areas, 3 percent of urban land is owned by 93 percent of the total owners of land, with an average of 0.4 ha per owner (DRDLR, 2017:2). This indicates the landlessness of many Africans in South Africa, with many in the township areas living on top of one another. This has perpetuated settler economic privileges, and inequality and poverty in South Africa.

The Faustian pact for black land ownership was cemented through programmes such as BEE. Mbeki (2009:66) noted that BEE was invented by South Africa's economic oligarchs, that handful of white businessmen and their families who control the commanding heights of the country's economy i.e. mining and its associated chemical and engineering industries, and finance. This resulted in the emergence of a small politically connected elite, largely from politically-brokered and state-financed transfers of corporate ownership (Habib, 2013:7). ANC leaders such as Ramaphosa amassed wealth estimated at USD 450 million, with interests in the MTN Group, McDonald's South African subsidiaries,

[84] As per Mbeki and Mbeki (2016:85) this means South African MNC raise capital and operate in and grow through acquisitions from foreign markets.

Glencore, Coca-Cola bottling plants, and Shanduka Investments[85] which owns stakes in mining entities and financial institutions. Other leaders such as Pravin Gordhan have shares in Remgro, Steinhoff International, British American Tobacco Company, BHP Billiton, ABSA and Nedbank. This clearly demonstrates the Faustian pact between the domestic business class and foreign capital and the comprador bourgeoisies who play the role of intermediaries.

The government framed the above as “part of economic transformation”, however, their economic transformation was meant to protect the status quo as majority of South Africans are economically excluded. Post-apartheid, the economy continued to be in the hands of the domestic business class and foreign capital. This was detailed in a 2017 National Treasury Research Report, *Ownership of JSE-listed Companies*, which states that 10 percent of JSE-listed companies are held directly by black people, with 13 percent held indirectly through pension funds, unit trusts and life policies (Thomas, 2017:20). However, Thomas (2017:20) claims that 22 percent is held by white South Africans and 39 percent by foreign investment. To Minister of Transport Mbalula (2017), this pattern of ownership has put South Africa at the mercy of external forces that shape the country’s politics through capital accumulation. Mbeki (2009:73, 2011:16) posits that the industrial structure and concentrated character of the South African economy was shaped by the long-standing dominance of mining and minerals processing, and the central role of the MEC, which, according to Shivambu (2014), continued to dominate in post-independence. The MEC comprises a quarter of the economy, encompassing mining, petrochemicals, electricity generation and semi-processing manufacture in collaboration with foreign capital (Bond, 2000). Hence, the perpetuation of a neoliberal export-oriented economy in post-independent South Africa.

The South African economy is dominated by the service sector (finance and insurance, real estate and business services, and wholesale and retail trade) followed by manufacturing and mining (SARB, 2019; UNCTAD, 2019; World Bank, 2019). While the mining sector is dominated through the MEC, Anglo American is the dominating force in mining (diamonds, coal, iron ore, platinum group metals, nickel, and manganese),

[85] In 2016 the president sold his 30 percent stake in Shanduka which merged with Pembani Group to form a Pan African Industrial Holdings Group with USD 900 million in assets.

followed by Sibanye-Stillwater[86] as the second largest producer of gold in South Africa and the largest primary producer of platinum (Anglo American, 2019; Sibanye-Stillwater, 2019). Other companies in mining include Implats, Gold Fields, and Anglo-Gold Ashanti. To some extent, there have been linkages in South Africa between mining and industrial capital (Shivambu, 2014:86). Through the Mining Charter and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, politicians and politically connected individuals such as Baleka Mbete, Tokyo Sexwale and Mamphela Ramphela among many, acquired shares in Goldfields and Harmony Gold (Desai, 2018:506). Consequently, vast resources from South Africa are not employed for her development, which could take place through value addition, but are used for the development of other developed states. Nkrumah (1965:84) argued that if Africa's raw materials could be used for her own development, this would place her among the most developed regions on the globe. Instead, the economy in South Africa is geared to serve the interests of the domestic business class and foreign capitalism, while the working class is exploited.

Given the sanctions and disinvestment of the apartheid era, from the 1960s onwards South African manufacture mainly relied on ISI which impacted the ownership composition. Through the MEC, the manufacturing sector processed minerals into metals, which they exported (Mbeki, 2009:76), but since the establishment of the democratic government, deindustrialisation has been followed by liberalisation, with the economy losing industrial capacity (Mbeki, 2011:23). The automotive sector – motor vehicles, parts and accessories, has been the only growing industrial sector because government implemented an industrial policy and a clear programme for it in 1994 (Mbeki, 2011:24). As a result, the manufacturing sector is to some extent, foreign owned. Privatisation, which the government undertook after 1994, has changed the ownership composition of means of production, with FDI inflow dominated by acquisitions. Nissan and BMW are big players in the automotive sector in South Africa, having recently expanded their operations in the country (Brown, 2019).

Service sectors have dominated and surpassed mining and manufacturing in attracting FDI inflow (SARB, 2019). MNCs such as Anglo American through FNB, Liberty Life and the Standard Bank group, Nedbank, etc. continued to be in the hands of white South

[86] Note that during the drafting of this chapter, Sibanye-Stillwater was in the process of acquiring Lonmin Plc.

Africans with limited changes in directorship, as demanded by B-BBEE and Affirmative Action. This illustrates continuity and lack of structural change in South Africa has guarded against any radical change. Agriculture is still dominated by the Afrikaner elites, but the two largest agro-conglomerate groups, Afgri and Senwes, have been sold or joint ventured with international finance and trading companies, Agrigroupe and Bunge (AfDB, 2018b:23). This demonstrates how entrenched foreign ownership in the South African economy as a result of the government's prioritisation of FDI and liberalisation.

The previous paragraphs have demonstrated that the economy is still in the hands of the domestic business class and foreign capital. However, since democracy, a small number of comprador bourgeoisies have emerged as owners of the means of production. This is tantamount to the comprador bourgeoisies transferring the unfair advantages of the colonial period into their own hands (Fanon, 1963:152). Foreign ownership has led to profit extraction, capital flight through price transferring, especially by mining conglomerates, and keeping the economy as a primary producing state in the global markets. Lack of ownership of means of production has also impacted policy independence and ownership of the development approach. In addition, mining MNCs such as Glencore and Anglo American have contributed to the degradation of the environment and water pollution in South Africa (Bloomberg, 2019).

5.5. Foreign Capital in South Africa

The boycott and disinvestment movement led to the flight of foreign capital from South African shores. This changed with the democratisation process and the reintegration of South Africa to global neoliberal capitalism. The TEC signed an agreement with the IMF for a loan of USD 850 million from the IMF's Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility to help South Africa with its balance of payments difficulties (Gevisser, 2009:250). The loan resulted in conditions that warned against any radical change of the political economy in South Africa, which Terreblanche (2012:64) believes was the GEAR policy of 1996 in its embryo form. Kasrils (2013) defines this moment as the Faustian moment between the ANC and foreign capital. The conditions included South Africa signing the GATT and ANC's assurance that the economy would be managed responsibly (Gumede, 2007:77). The loan was followed by what was called "transitional aid" to entrench democracy in South Africa. This turned into development aid as the post-apartheid government grappled with triple challenges – unemployment, poverty and inequality.

The Faustian pact resulted in South Africa's reintegration into global neoliberal capitalism, consequently maintaining its system of cheap labour required by the MEC and foreign capital. This was followed by FDI inflows into the country and the expansion of South African MNCs i.e. the Anglo American Corporation, Sanlam and Standard Bank. The continued dominance of the MEC and the banking and insurance section in post-independence continued to shape the South African economy (Mbeki, 2011:16). The MEC's dominance resulted in financialisation, market liberalisation, and continued reliance on mining products as foreign exchange earners. Investment was encouraged in areas of the economy that were fuelled by financial speculation and debt-driven consumption by the affluent, and disinvestment took place in manufacturing and mining. (Bond, 2000:26). Foreign hot money investment in speculative stock and bond markets led to currency volatility, but never to the challenging of existing monopolistic conditions, the transfer of technology, job creation or products for local market consumption (Bond, 2000:187). The comprador bourgeoisies watched over deindustrialisation, as resources were moved from production to consumption. The expansion of MNCs was accompanied by a limited inflow of foreign capital. Carmody (2002:264) indicates that between 1994 and 1999, South African MNCs invested USD 1.6 billion abroad, exceeding the amount of investment that came into the country. Disinvestment by South African MNCs led to over-reliance on FDI, while the government encouraged investment through deregulation, privatisation and fiscal restrained (Makgetla, 2004:264). FDI inflow in the early years of post-apartheid was attributed to privatisation and the return of companies that had disinvested during the apartheid years (Ajayi, 2007:6). However, investment inflow remained modest, as South African MNCs chose to keep their capital in reserve rather than invest it in South Africa (Mbeki, 2011:22).

South Africa has one of the richest mining reserves globally, worth an estimated USD 2.5 trillion more than Russia and Australia (Herbst & Mills, 2015:124). Yet the South African mining sector has been declining at an average 1 percent annually since the early 2000s (Herbst & Mills, 2015:124). Anglo American continued to dominate the mining sector in post-apartheid, with interests in gold mining at 40 percent; uranium mining, 70 percent; and dominance in diamonds through its subsidiary De Beers (Shivambu, 2014:88). Cyril Ramaphosa and Mamphela Ramphele were appointed to the Anglo American board, clearly indicating the Faustian pact (Carmody, 2002:264). This became common practice between the comprador bourgeoisie and owners of means of production. The creation of

BEE was necessary to maintain the MEC, which was done during the negotiations (Mbeki, 2009:78). Platinum and other resources brought FDI from MNCs in Australia, Canada, and the EU in the form of Exxaro Resources, Assore, Sibanye Stillwater, Northam Platinum, and many more (PWC, 2017:8). According to Mignolo (2007:39), FDI is used extensively as a form of control and dominance by developed countries. This dominance was transferred from developed countries to MNCs, in whose interests their relationship with SSA nations was determined (Mwaura, 2005:6). In SSA, foreign investors control big business and then leave with all the profits (Saul, 2014:51). Moreover, foreign investors dictate the developmental trajectory of post-independent states and perpetuate externally oriented economies i.e. the South African mining sector is externally oriented, and value addition that could be gained from its minerals and lead the country to industrialisation is ignored.

South Africa was a major destination for foreign capital in Africa, especially FDI, but since its 41 percent decline of FDI because of underperformance in the commodity sector and political uncertainty, it has been overtaken by Egypt and Nigeria. (Ajayi, 2006:7; UNCTAD, 2019:42). Historically, big mining companies have worked closely with foreign-owned banks, but as a result of apartheid sanctions, this became challenging. However, in the 1980s Anglo American bought Barclays Bank and renamed it First National Bank (FNB) (Makgetla, 2004:275), and as a result, the financial sector continued to play a critical role in post-apartheid South Africa. There was a rapid growth in the financial sector in post-apartheid and the service sector became the largest contributor to the GDP (Mbeki, 2011:16-18). After moving their listing to London, financial institutions such as Liberty Life through Standard Bank, Sanlam, and Old Mutual continued to monopolise the service sector in South Africa. Barclays London undertook a joint venture with Volkskas Bank in South Africa, to form Absa (Vestergaard, 2001:29). FDI in the service sector has taken the form of acquisitions, which do not create a significant number of jobs (Carmody, 2002:267). Growth in the service sector was accompanied by a decline in the industrial sector which led to dependence on manufactured imports and large trade deficit. This in turn led to increased dependence on foreign capital inflows to maintain the balance of payments (Mbeki, 2011:16). The MNCs continued with their exploitation and profit extraction, and poverty, unemployment and inequality became omnipresent.

The FDI inflow derives mainly from traditional partners such as the EU and the USA which are heavily invested in mining and quarrying, services, and manufacturing in South Africa (Ajayi, 2006:183). Major investors are from the U.S., which remains the largest source of FDI into South Africa, and is focused on services industries (UNCTAD, 2018:42). Manufacturing in South Africa is export-oriented and is dominated by the automotive industry, with investments from Japan's Isuzu and Nissan, Germany's BMW and Volkswagen, and the Beijing Automotive Group Co. (UNCTAD, 2018:42). FDI is concentrated in Gauteng and the Western Cape province, with majority FDI inflow in those regions (Ajayi, 2006:183). Therefore, continuing with colonial spatial development. According to Fanon (1963:159), colonialism hardly ever exploits the whole of a country, and this allows certain sectors to become relatively rich, while the rest remain underdeveloped. Colonial South Africa perpetuated spatial development in Durban, Johannesburg-Pretoria-Ekurhuleni, Port-Elizabeth, and Cape Town, which has been replicated by the current neo-colonial government, while the rest of the country remains underdeveloped. This has ensured the continuation of migrant labour.

According to UNCTAD (2020:34), in South Africa FDI inflows decreased by 15 percent to USD 4.6 billion in 2019. Nevertheless, FDI stock increased to USD 151 billion, an improvement from USD 127 billion in 2018. Table 5.1. and 5.2. indicate FDI stocks by country and industry. Below Table 5.2. shows that FDI in South Africa is directed at service sector, mining and manufacturing. This explains the financialisation of the South African economy that coincided with deindustrialisation.

Table 5.1: FDI stocks by country

Main investing countries 2018,	**in %**
United Kingdom (UK)	**29.4**
The Netherlands	**19.5**
Belgium	**9.6**
U.S.	**6.5**
Japan	**5.7**

Germany	**4.5**
China	**4.5**
Australia	**4.1**

Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, March 2020

Table 5.2: FDI stock by Industry

Main Invested Sectors	**2018, in %**
Financial and insurance services, real estate and business services	**39.4**
Mining and quarrying	**25.5**
Manufacturing	**16.6**
Transport, storage and communication	**11.0**
Wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation	**6.4**
Community, social and personal services	**0.8**

Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, March 2020

South African MNCs have also looted the SSA region and serve as one of the biggest country-based sources of FDI in Africa (Poku & Whitman, 2018:53). South African MNCs have invested over USD 7 billion in Africa, with 17 percent invested in projects and are a major source of FDI in Southern Africa and the leader in terms of greenfield projects (AfDB, 2018b:12-3). MNCs such as FirstRand, Standard Bank, MTN, SABMiller breweries, the Anglo-American Corporation, and Vodacom among many, draw out excessive FDI profits from Africa (Poku & Whitman, 2018:53). The role of the South African MNC has been described as the systematic internal looting of Africa by South Africa, especially the main retail chains (Poku & Whitman, 2018:53). For example, in 2016, the Standard Bank Group's Africa regions franchise contributed 30 percent to its

total income and 25 percent to its headline earnings (AfDB, 2018b:26). This South African role in Africa is viewed as sub-imperialism (Bond, 2013:251).

It has been established that foreign capital is an important feature for growth in the case of any developing nation, but this has meant the loss of policy sovereignty by newly independent states such as Kenya and South Africa, which have to advocate for certain policies and conditions to secure loans and FDI. The sectors that dominated in terms of FDI have had little trickle-down effect with regard to human development, and manufacturing does not generate much-needed employment but has created a relatively small and semi-skilled labour force with high wages. There ought to be human development with regard to the living conditions but unemployment, poverty, inequality and underemployment because of super-exploitation has persisted, which has to do with the structural problems inherited by the comprador bourgeoisies. Investors in manufacture mainly from East Asia have taken advantage of regional markets and access to preferential markets such as U.S. AGOA in both case studies. Foreign capital has resulted in foreign ownership of means of production, which has had a direct impact on wealth transfer out of South Africa, and unduly influenced politico-economic issues (Nulty, 2012:107).

5.6. South African Trade Regimes

The following paragraphs demonstrate that trading policies, which were derived from neoliberal economic policies, were meant to keep up neo-colonial relations between South Africa and developed countries. Exports in South Africa are characterised by primary products, while imports are dominated by manufactured goods, from which ensue trade deficits and unequal exchange. The status quo was exacerbated under globalisation and neoliberalism, which led to trade liberalisation. Under the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independence, the pursuit of neoliberalism and trade liberalisation meant that the pattern of unequal exchange continued, resulting in the of subordination of the indigenous SSA economy (Settles & McGaskey, 1996).

International trade is critical to South Africa, given that South Africa is considered the gateway to Africa. The South African share in world total exports is 0.48 percent, with a 0.57 percent share in world total imports (WTO, 2020b). South African integration into global markets entailed trade liberalisation and the GATT (replaced by the WTO in 1994)

and led to a 36 percent reduction in tariffs in the pursuit of free trade. Free trade as advocated by the WTO in impoverished SSA countries does not lead to reduction of poverty but its perpetuation (Sachs, 2005:195). To Chang (2007), free trade reduces freedom of choice in poor countries. To SSA countries, the WTO backing has reduced policy options, especially for industrial or investment policy (Sundaram, 2005). In addition, free trade has led to cheap products from China, India and Southeast Asian countries flooding SSA countries. This has meant the displacement of local suppliers in favour of those in industrialised countries, and has led to deindustrialisation and joblessness. Accordingly, the post-apartheid government lost much-needed revenue, and joblessness has maintained the country's unevenness (Bond, 2000:47). Nonetheless, the comprador bourgeoisies' government persisted with trade liberalisation, and ended up in a free trade agreement with the EU that entrenched unequal exchange. In 2014, South Africa passed a Special Economic Zones Act which preserved free trade (Gumede, 2015:71).

In the 1980s the South African mining industry accounted for 70 percent of the country's exports, but this has since declined. The trade composition below demonstrates an economy that is reliant on primary products, mining products to be exact, which reflect the dominance of the MEC in the economy as a result of the Faustian pact. The economy's total exports are broken down as follows: agricultural products 13.2 percent, fuels and mining products 35.8 percent, manufacturing 43.5 percent, and other at 7.5 percent (WTO, 2020b). Agricultural products and fuels and mining products amount to 49 percent combined, which indicates reliance on primary products as foreign exchange earners. Imports are dominated by manufactured products at 65 percent, fuels and mining products 17.5 percent, agricultural products 8.9 percent, and other at 8.7 percent (WTO, 2020b). The country's exports and imports indicate a trade deficit in manufactured products that dominate imports, and in primary products that dominate exports. The exports value is USD 93 982 million compared to the imports value of USD 113 940 million. Exports of agricultural products include maize, apples, pears, grapes, wine of fresh grapes, and citrus fruit, compared to imports of rice, meat, cane, wheat and meslin, and palm oils (WTO, 2020b). The non-agricultural products exports entail platinum, coal, motor vehicles, gold, and iron ore, compared to petroleum oils, crude oil, motor vehicles, and machinery as imports (WTO, 2020b).

The trade agreements between South Africa, the EU and the USA indicate trade deficits that are perpetuated by South Africa's overreliance on primary products. Liberalisation has increased China's reach within the country, as shown by deindustrialisation in the textile and steel industries i.e. ArcelorMittal may consider closing its steel factory in Saldanha Bay as a result of competition from cheaper steel from China among other things, which would lead to two thousand jobs being lost. South African exports going to the EU stand at 21.7 percent, to China 9.8 percent, to the USA 7.5 percent, to India 4.7 percent, to Japan 4.7 percent, and to others, 51.5 percent. Imports coming from the EU are 30.8 percent, from China 18.3 percent, from the USA 6.6 percent, from India 4.7 percent, from Saudi Arabia 4.6 percent, and from others 35 percent (WTO, 2020b).

South Africa signed a free trade agreement, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU the early 2000s (Hurt, 2012:498). However, the TDCA was replaced in 2016 with the EU-SADC EPA which included Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, and Eswatini. According to Hurt (2012:496), the EPA has locked the SADC region into a neoliberal development model that advances the EU hegemonic position within the region. This also ensures that SADC is in a policy straightjacket that will restrict policy change and thus undermine policy sovereignty, regional coherence and unity, and restrict the ability of these economies to diversify, although not all SADC countries are included (Hurt, 2012:496). This led to further deindustrialisation in South Africa (Bond, 2000:217). South African trade with the EU is as follows; exports to the EU entail primary products such as agricultural products, fuels and mining products, and machinery and transport equipment, while imports from the EU include machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and other semi-machinery (European Commission, 2020b). Trade in the service sector is also dominated by the EU countries.

According to the AGOA criteria, South Africa is eligible for AGOA in 2020 and also qualifies for apparel and textile benefits (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020). In addition to AGOA, South Africa also signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the U.S. with the aim of expanding trade in goods and services between them, and to encourage private sector investment in the two economies. Export products from South Africa to the U.S. are dominated by primary products such as metal manufactured products, miscellaneous manufactured commodities, transportation equipment, agriculture products, and minerals and ores (Nauman, 2020). Under AGOA,

motor vehicles, South African citrus, and wine from grapes have entered the U.S. duty free (Nauman, 2020). Imports from U.S. to South Africa comprised of machinery, vehicles, mineral fuels, aircraft, and agricultural products. Since AGOA's inception, South Africa has maintained a trade surplus (in goods trade) with the U.S., while the U.S. dominates trade in services (Nauman, 2020).

South Africa joined Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) in 2010 to form BRICS as one of the emerging economies. This meant trade integration between South Africa and these countries, which are dominated by China with 9.8 percent of South African exports go to China and 18.3 percent of South African imports come from China, followed by India, Brazil and Russia. According to Monyamane (2020), South Africa's exported goods to China are at USD 8.6 billion, and goods imported from China, USD 17.1 billion, which has resulted in a trade deficit of USD 8.5 billion. Exports to China are dominated by raw materials and agricultural products, while imports from China are dominated by manufactured goods and electronics (Monyamane, 2020). Textiles and cheap steel from China have affected South Africa's industrialisation. The inclusion of South Africa to BRIC, has been questioned by many commentators because they believe that the inclusion of South Africa into this intergovernmental organisation does not make sense, as its economy is small compared to the other BRIC countries. According to Ngwane & Bond (2020), South Africa is being used as a gateway to African markets and as a lubricant for neoliberalism.

South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa is dominated by manufactured and service exports and indicates traits of sub-imperialism. South Africa's MNCs dominate trade in the SADC region and in the rest of Africa, and mainly trades with members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and the SADC member states under the Free Trade Arrangement (FTA). In 2019, 27 percent of South Africa's exports were within Africa, and 12 percent of its world imports were from Africa (Tralac, 2020). South African export products include goods vehicles, coal, iron and steel, and apples, the latter mainly to the SADC states and Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda. Imports are dominated by crude oil from Nigeria, Togo and Ghana (Tralac, 2020). In an effort to push for intra-Africa trade, South Africa through SADC has joined the TFTA and signed the AfCFTA.

Negotiations with AfCFTA are at the Phase 2 level, which covers investment and competition policy and interim trade regimes and came into effect on 1 January 2021.

Phase 3 negotiations are pending. Nonetheless, South Africa is yet to trade under the AfCFTA because Botswana, as a member of SACU, has not ratified the continental free trade agreement. As the most industrialised economy on the continent, South Africa would benefit greatly from AfCFTA, but this will depend on the actions of the national leadership in creating an environment conducive to free trade. A capable state, strong institutions and political will are required from the current South African leadership for the successful implementation of AfCFTA.

Since democratisation, South Africa has pursued trade liberalisation in its efforts to attract FDI, but for South Africa this never happened (Carmody, 2002:259). The post-independent government therefore created a favourable climate for foreign investors with a variety of concessions and liberal provisions for the repatriation of profits (Zeleza, 1991:36).

5.7. Chapter Analysis

The above mentioned put into perspective the sentiments of Smuts Ngonyama (2004): "*I did not join the struggle to be poor*" and that former Minister of Trade and Industry, Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka (2005) when she advocated that "*blacks should not be ashamed to be filthy rich*". Through BEE and corruption, the comprador bourgeoisies have managed to become wealthy while the majority of South Africans were economically marginelised. As a result, Hani's fears materialised, as former "liberators" emerge as elitists and use the state as a vehicle to gather riches.

The post-independent state under the comprador bourgeoisies is exploitative and oppressive. Through the post-independent state, the comprador bourgeoisies have adopted and championed neoliberal policies that ensured the continuation of exploitation of South Africa by foreign MNCs through extraction of profits and labour exploitation. Since 1994, the neoliberal economic policies adopted in post-apartheid have advocated for the eradication of poverty, inequality and economic growth; however, they are premised on privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation. In addition, the policies advocate for a trickle-down economy, which never reached the downtrodden, as demonstrated by the reproduction of structural problems in post-independent period. These policies firmly integrated South Africa to the West's neoliberal ship on the waters of globalisation (Kankwenda, 2004:4).

The neoliberal economic policies also ensured that the comprador bourgeoisies entrenched neo-colonialism. The post-independence economy was not set on a new footing despite indigenisation. Indigenisation obscured the fact that the economy remained unchaged and thus, allowed the status quo to continue in post-independent South Africa and cemented the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies. Accordingly, the economy of South Africa continues to be commodity-driven, evidenced by the boom and bust that characterised the post-independent economy.

In an attempt to appease investors, the ANC government adopted policies that guaranteed optimum conditions for the MNCs to continue exploiting the masses. Foreign investment in the neo-colonialism epoch increased the gap between South Africa and developed countries, and perpetuated unequal exchange. Thus, with the help of the WTO, trade has maintained South Africa's position of a subordinate in global trade.

The above-mentioned illustrates that post-independence development model lacked transformative ideology, and resembled the colonial model of accumulation by dispossession (Lopes et al., 2017:41). The South African neo-colonial economy is geared towards white riches and black poverty, as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer (Mokonyane, 2011:94). Therefore, neo-colonial relations in South Africa are an impediment to development and undermines the country's right to development. According to Leys (1975:27), neo-colonialism reproduces and further extends underdevelopment. This is evident in the fact that the majority of South Africans live in extreme poverty amid high rates of unemployment. To maintain the status quo, the comprador bourgeoisies use force against their people, as it can only be through violence that mass exploitation and gatekeeping is sustained (Iqbal et al., 2015:9; Ogude, 1997:95).

5.8. Conclusion

Chapter 5 has indicated the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital, which facilitates neo-colonial relations in South Africa. Within the pact, the role of comprador bourgeoisies plays the intermediary role that is entrenched through BEE. This is evident in the comprador bourgeoisies' consumption attitude, instead of production and innovation in post-independent South

Africa. BEE ensures the preservation of the exploitative system and protects the privileges of settlers and colonisers created by colonial power.

Through their states which control the IFIs, the MNCs have been able to influence policies through their conditions, liberalisation and privatisation. For instance, South Africa's USD 850 million loan from the IMF included the adoption of GATT and neoliberal policies by the post-apartheid government. This clearly indicates the lack of policy sovereignty in South Africa. The neoliberal economic policies have influenced trade and led to over-reliance on primary products as foreign exchange earners. This perpetuates unequal exchange and trade deficits between South Africa and developed countries in post-independence epoch. Accordingly, the Faustian pact is clearly indicated in the chapter which has been detrimental to the development trajectory in South Africa and subsequently the continent.

Nkrumah (1965:178) argues that neo-colonialism is not only aimed at exporting capital but also at controlling the overseas markets. Therefore, its strategically gate-keeps against any steps towards industrialisation, hence, the difficulty of championing structural transformation. The following chapter is a historical analysis illustrating the negative impact of neo-colonialism on development in both case studies.

CHAPTER 6: DETERMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAUSTIAN PACT ON DEVELOPEMENT

6.1. Introduction

Chapter 3 demonstrated how the independence processes of both case studies served as a transition to neo-colonialism. The roots of neo-colonialism are found in the formation of a class with comprador elements during colonialism. Distiller (2006:49) explains that this creation of colonialism cannot create a truly post-colonial nation. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated the existence of Faustian pacts that have perpetuated neo-colonialism in both case studies. The comprador bourgeoisies have ensured the perpetuation of neo-colonialism that has led to outward-looking economies through mechanisms of neo-colonialism. As a result, the post-independent states governed by comprador bourgeoisies have adopted economic policies that guarantee the optimum conditions under which MNCs can exploit both countries and their people. These economic policies have perpetuated the extraction of profits by MNCs and exacerbated foreign ownership through foreign capital. Furthermore, the policies created by the comprador bourgeoisies as allies to foreign capital, and maintain asymmetrical economic relationships between developed countries and former colonies. In the neo-colonial epoch, foreign capital is used for exploitation rather than for development (Nkrumah, 1965). The neoliberal economic policies adopted by the comprador bourgeoisies are hostile to development and have entrenched neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism underpinned by accumulation by dispossession has been detrimental to developmental trajectories. As a result, Kenyan development challenges include poverty, inequality and continual weak private sector investment (World Bank, 2020a). Kenya's economic growth, which averaged 5.7 percent in 2019, is accompanied by inequality, with the country's top 10 percent of households controlling 42 percent of total income, while the bottom 10 percent control less than 1 percent (Owiti, 2015:548). This is also accompanied by a 36.1 percent poverty headcount ratio (World Bank, 2020a). South Africa is faced with the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality. As of December 2020, South Africa had a Gini coefficient of 0.63 that showed high inequality with unemployment at 32.5 percent, thus more than 50 percent of South Africans are living in poverty (Stats SA, 2020). This indicates the lack of transformative ideologies in

their economic policies, and their neoliberal policies resemble the colonial economic model of accumulation by dispossession (Lopes et al. 2017:41). According to Harvey (2003:67), accumulation by dispossession has become a much more central feature within global neoliberal capitalism, with privatisation as one of its key elements. Thus, it can be said that development was never on the post-independence agenda to begin with (Ake, 1996:18).

Neo-colonialism is detrimental to the masses and prevents former colonies from taking any decisive steps towards industrialisation and subsequent independence, as exploitation of the indigenous market is the prime objective (Nkrumah, 1965:178). Leys (1975:27) takes the argument further and states that neo-colonialism reproduces and further extends underdevelopment, which will lead to dependent capitalist development that resembles the old colonial system less and less closely. Hence the status quo of conflict, poverty, unemployment, disease, inequality and underdevelopment continue to besiege the continent after more than 50 years since the formation of the OAU. For example, the World Bank (2019), using the poverty measure of US$ 1.90 per day, declared that Africa could be home to 90 percent of the world's poor by 2030 if drastic measures are not taken[87]. As the result of population growth, the number of poor people in Africa has increased from 278 million to more than 416 million (World Bank, 2019).

It is argued that the Faustian pact and neo-colonialism hindered development in post-independent Kenya and South Africa. Accordingly, this chapter highlight the link between key variables, neo-colonialism influence on development in both case studies. This is illustrated through a historical analysis of continental programmes such as the OAU Charter, the Monrovia Declaration, LPA, the Cairo Agenda, etc. that shows the comprador bourgeoisies' lack of implementation of continental development programmes. The non-implementation of continental programmes are used as examples to demonstrate that neo-colonialism hinders development. The chapter indicates the role of the AU and RECs in non-implementation of continental programmes, and the vacillation of the comprador bourgeoisies between neo-colonialism and development. In the post-independence period, the comprador bourgeoisies embarked on trickle-down economics and pursued industrialisation by invitation through maintaining close links with the former colonisers

[87] This could be exacerbated by the current Covid-19 pandemic, which has led to a halt in the world economy, and a global recession worse than the 2008 recession (World Bank, 2020c).

(Lopes et al. 2017:40). While they did ratify continental programmes advocating self-reliance and structural transformation. In the process making apparent the vacillating nature of the comprador bourgeoisies. Thus, reducing the AU and its development summits to grand gestures, performative and theatrical plays without intention for implementation (Death, 2011a:2). The following section defines the concept of development which is imperative in understanding development in the African context. This is followed by an analysis of the AU and RECs and their role in implementation or non-implementation of the continental development programmes.

6.2. Development Concept

Chapters 2 and 3 provided a brief definition of development concept. However, to indicate that neo-colonialism undermines development in both countries, an in-depth definition is required. The development concept is used by liberalists, Marxist-Leninists, and Pan-Africanists alike. In SSA, the concept is important to unlocking funding from lenders (Cornwall & Eade, 2020:12). Ake (1996:10) argued that African leaders have used development as a pretext to advance their agenda at the expense of the masses. Therefore, given its elusive and polysemic meaning, it is imperative to provide a definition to avoid falling in the trap of buzzwords and tautology. The fact is that colonialism deliberately held up development, while the independence struggle had called for development. But, to the comprador bourgeoisies, development meant Westernisation, hence, their obsession of catching up with the West that led to a false start.

Neoliberalists narrowly define development in terms of Gross National Production (GNP) growth and put emphasis on free markets, which they claim will lead to economic growth that trickles down to the benefit of everyone (Thomas, 2000; Abuiyada, 2018:115). Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 and 5, economic growth in both case studies is accompanied by inequality with no trickle-down effect. This has led to Edwards (1993:80) and Abuiyada (2018:115) arguing that development should reduce poverty, unemployment, and inequality, and enrich the lives of all people in society. This thesis uses Sen's (1999) definition on development, as it fits the SSA context well. According to Sen (1999:3), development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom, poverty and tyranny; poor economic opportunities and systematic social deprivation; neglect of public facilities and intolerance, and over-activity of a repressive state. This definition calls for socio-economic transformation from a current state to a desired state, that entails

inclusive economic growth in concert with increased availability and distribution of basic goods such as food, shelter, health, education and security, which will improve the level of living (Pearson, 1992; Diale, 2009:11). On a continent that suffers from instability, hunger, poverty and corruption, the aforementioned are critical to SSA's development. The continental programmes as demonstrated below have set out to address these challenges but fail at the point of implementation. The following section explains the role of the AU and its organs, and RECs in the implementation of continental programmes.

6.3. The African Union and Regional Economic Communities

The AU Commission has identified continental inter-governmental organisations such as RECs and the AU and its organs[88] to facilitate the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. This warrants analysis of these institutions to determine their role in the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, especially as the weak AU and RECs have previously undermined implementation of continental programmes and their developmental agendas. Through the AU and RECs, post-independent states continue to perpetuate neoliberalism. According to the AU Commission (2015b:66), *Agenda 2063* involves multiple actors and envisages developing effective capacity at the level of AU organs such as the Pan African Parliament (PAP); African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); African Union Development Agency (AUDA); and RECs, in this case COMESA, EAC, IGAD and SADC. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the role of the AU and RECs in post-independent SSA.

Mwaura (2005:44) decries the lack of leadership at the continental level, which he argues aggravates the effects of poor leadership in individual African states. However, this study argues that the AU and RECs are made up of post-independent neo-colonial states, and that the lack of leadership in those states governed by comprador bourgeoisies has manifested at the continental and regional levels. In turn, this aggravates the effects of poor leadership in member states. The comprador bourgeoisies reproduce and sustain themselves by perpetuating neo-colonialism at continental and regional levels. Therefore, the defunct OAU and the AU are used as tools by the neo-colonialists (Mwaura, 2005:44). The championing of gradual integration instead of rupturing with the West, and creation

[88] Note that actors are not limited to the AU, RECs and member states only but also NGOs, civil organisations, private sector, etc.

of a federation as was argued by the Casablanca Group during formation of the OAU, was the genesis of neo-colonialism on the continent.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, SSA was characterised by a struggle for independence, balkanisation, apartheid, colonisation and neo-colonialism. It is against this background that the OAU was formed on the 25 May 1963, with 32 signatories of newly independent governments in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, who were tasked with championing independence and integration in Africa (Karbo & Murithi, 2018:18). It was during this conference that the debate on continental unity ensued, with Nkrumah calling for Africa to unite or perish. The argument was that unity was better positioned to drive economic growth and independence. This led to a splinter between the radical Casablanca Group led by Egypt, and Ghana which was for rapid rupture with the West followed by formation of a federation, and the Monrovia Group which included the francophone countries and Nigeria, which favoured gradual integration via regionalism. The Monrovia Group eventually won, as most African leaders did not support radical change (Gariba, 2015; Bruey, 2017).

The OAU founding document – the OAU Charter, calls for the eradication of all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa, and defending sovereignty, territorial integrity[89], the independence of African states, and the integration and unity of Africa (OAU, 1963; Osei, 2018:21). The document further called for an "effort to achieve a better life for the people of Africa", and political and economic cooperation (OAU, 1963). For this to be possible, the comprador bourgeoisies had to create conditions for the realisation of the right to development – harnessing natural and human resources of the continent for the total advancement of Africans (Ngang, 2017:1). The OAU Charter was followed by numerous continental programmes that further advocated for development and economic integration. Nonetheless, the comprador bourgeoisies who took over during the formation of the OAU, reduced the organisation to a moribund state with weak institutions that continued to undermine the implementation of continental programmes.

[89] This led to a principle of no violation regarding inherent colonial borders in post-independent epoch. The OAU declared that newly independent state in post-independence era shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of independence (OAU, 1963; Zoppi, 2013:51).

In response to the OAU's failure and paradigm shift from the struggle against colonialism to economic development and integration, at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the AEC in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, the assembly decided to establish the AU (Schlumberger, 2009:73). This constituted a shift from dependency-based development thinking to envisaging development in terms of self-determination and self-sufficiency (Ngang, 2017:76), and was followed by the adoption of NEPAD under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.

Leadership continued to be a problem within the AU as the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of the OAU in addressing challenges confronting the continent continued under the AU (Osei, 2018:22). The AU continued turning a blind eye to authoritarian rule and human rights abuse despite its right to intervene through Article 4 of the Constitutive Act (Kioko, 2003:807), which had certain values and standards for member states to adhere to, such as respect for human rights, democratic governance, and the condemnation of unconstitutional changes in government (Kioko, 2003:807). Regardless, the abuse of human rights continued unabated under the comprador bourgeoisies, which earned the AU the moniker of Club of Incumbents (who seek to maintain their power) (Omorogbe, 2011). In addition, under the comprador bourgeoisies, the AU still relies on donor funding to execute its mandate which undermines the principles of ownership, the ability of the AU Commission to execute its mandate, and its sovereignty (Lembede, 2015:2). Under the disciplining power of global capital and the policing eye of the World Bank and IMF, the comprador bourgeoisies espouse a model of development based on free market principles (Frimpong, 2012). Leadership or the lack thereof, has resulted in weak institutions within the AU that are supposed to ensure adherence to the continental programmes, values and standards set out by this organisation. Organs such as the APRM, PAP, AUDA and the Court of Justice in Arusha, Tanzania have been rendered useless under the comprador bourgeoisies. Therefore, the AU is merely used as a platform for rhetoric and theatrics, while neoliberalism is perpetuated.

The weakness of the OAU warranted the formation of the RECs, which serve as the building blocks of political and economic integration on the continent. According to Karbo and Murithi (2018:19), the OAU's weak position and evident inability allowed sub-regional organisations to gain ground and occupy the space that would otherwise have been held by the continental organisation. There are 19 regional and sub-regional organisations in

Africa with differing objectives, capacities, levels of functionality, and overlapping membership. Only eight, however, are recognised by the AU (Karbo & Murithi, 2018:205). These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), COMESA, EAC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), SADC, the IGAD, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). It is on the back of these regional bodies that the AEC would be formed and eventually, AfCFTA attained. Coordination and cooperation between the RECs and the AU have not been exemplary, hence the call by the Constitutive Act of the AU to "coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future RECs for gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union" (Karbo & Murithi, 2018:206).

The comprador bourgeoisies have also used the RECs as an extension of the post-independent neo-colonial states. This is demonstrated in two ways: firstly, numerous regional communities indicate divisions and overlapping which hinders their progress, secondly, trade agreements between the RECs and developed countries reflect asymmetry and neo-colonial relations. This overlapping and multiple RECs memberships is illustrated in Figure 6.1 in what is described as the "spaghetti-bowl effect" that has undermined the very same unity it seeks to purport (Sparks, 2016:51). This overlapping membership complicates policy management, increases confusion between the AU, national governments and the RECs, and leads to objectives which are uncoordinated or duplicated (Sparks, 2016:51). This has resulted in conflicts of interests and overlapping commitments within the RECs which undermine the attainment of the AEC (Tanyi, 2015:8). This has reduced their effectiveness and perpetuated exploitation, resulting in fragmented and disorganised levels of compliance to regional trade protocols, as MNCs take advantage of this disunity (Tanyi, 2015:8). Furthermore, the spaghetti-bowl model perpetuates balkanisation which is made possible by divide and rule and subsequent neo-colonialism.

Figure 6.1. Spaghetti-Bowl Model/Effect



Source: Sekyere, 2017:21.

Figure 6.1 indicates that the case studies under review in this thesis have overlapping memberships from different RECs with different mandates. South Africa is a member of SACU and SADC, while Kenya is a member of COMESA, EAC and IGAD. This resulted in difficulties in completing bilateral trade agreements, e.g. the TDCA between South Africa and *de facto* SACU members and the EU excluded other SADC members, and South Africa being left out of the preferential trade between SSA and the EU (Hurt, 2012:498). The TDCA was replaced by the SADC-EU EPA which included SACU members and Mozambique, while other members (Comoros, DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius) were negotiating as members of COMESA and the EAC (Tralac, 2018:1). This overlapping made reaching an EPA difficult between the EAC and the EU, as the EAC negotiated the EPA with the EU, while Tanzania pursued an EPA under SADC. According to Adam et al. (2010:125), this posed major policy challenges because under the EAC customs union, countries were bound to sign an EPA as a customs territory. In 2007, this led to major difficulties and an interim goods-only EPA with the EAC group (Adam et al. 2010:125).

The EPAs between SADC, EAC and the EU perpetuated neo-colonialism through the pursuit of liberalisation, which undermined industrialisation. In 2014, the EU-EAC EPA was concluded; similar to the SADC-EU EPA, it advocated for market and trade liberalisation (European Commission, 2015; Tralac, 2018:2). EPAs continue to perpetuate asymmetrical trade relations in Africa – regressive trade and economic relations in which neoliberalism has become hegemonic (Langan, 2015:102). In addition, Kenya and South Africa continued to provide primary products to the EU while importing finished products. This resulted from their commodity-dependent economies which fostered capital accumulation in Europe, thus establishing structural impoverishment in the colonies for centuries of colonialism (Rodney, 1972). The comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya and South Africa used the AU and RECs as an extension of power and a gateway to neoliberalism in their respective regions. This resulted in weak institutions which failed to ensure that member states adhered to the continental programmes, and led to non-implementation as per the analysis below. The following historical analysis indicates the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa.

6.4. Contextual Analysis of Continental Programmes

Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated the intermediary nature of the comprador bourgeoisies of Kenya and South Africa. Through the ongoing Faustian pact, the comprador bourgeoisies in both countries remain agents of imperialism and perpetuate neo-colonialism through neoliberal economic policies such as economic liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. Therefore, neo-colonial political economic relations in Kenya and South Africa impede their development. In championing self-reliance, democratisation, sustainable development and structural transformation, the continental programmes called for development. As neo-colonialism is anti-development, this explains the non-implementation of the programmes by the comprador bourgeoisies in both countries. This section has elucidated the reasons why the comprador bourgeoisies, in remaining true to their intermediary nature, opted for neo-colonial economic policies instead of continental development programmes. The adoption of neo-colonialism led to underdevelopment and reproduction of structural challenges in both countries.

According to neo-colonial theorists (cf. Nkrumah, 1965; Woddis, 1967; Cabral 1972), to defeat neo-colonialism and attain complete liberation, requires the establishment of an independent economy. This entails utilising the nation’s resources for development and

diversification of the economy that will be accompanied by basic industrialisation, modernisation of agriculture, trade that is beneficial to the country, and ownership of the banking sector (Woddis, 1967:124). Self-reliance and structural transformation on the part of post-independent states would be a prerequisite to decolonisation and national liberation.

In addition, decolonisation embodies the total liberation of all sectors: education, religious, military and cultural; economic independence; democracy; and continental unity (Ogude, 1997:97). Unity refers to an all-union government and is the first requirement for destroying neo-colonialism. To Nkrumah (1965:253) and Fanon (1963:164), African unity is critical in the struggle against neo-colonialism and the attainment of economic independence. Moreover, democracy, which is anti-colonial, is the only way to de-marginalise Africans and give them some control in the development process (Ake, 1996:119). Therefore, in the context of democracy, development in the case of SSA can only be related to and driven by social will (Ake, 1996:119).

However, the comprador bourgeoisies opted for neo-colonialism through their neoliberal economic policies, and explains their antipathy to democracy. The comprador regimes opt to be authoritarian and avoid citizens' participation. In addition, they rejected continental unity in 1963 in favour of gradual integration. During the formation of the OAU, the Monrovia Group that included francophone African countries and Nigeria, rejected a rapid rupture with former colonisers and the call for a federation in Africa, in favour of gradual integration. This gradualist approach has not been to the benefit of Africa and Africans (Gumede, 2020:33). To Fanon (1963:159), the national bourgeoisies in defence of their immediate interests rejected African unity for narrow nationalism. This led to the reproduction and sustaining of the comprador bourgeoisies at the continental level through preserving and protecting post-independent neo-colonial states. One of the aims of neo-colonialism is to create internal conditions in former colonies that assist with the retention of political power in the hands of those who are prepared to co-operate with imperialism (Woddis, 1967:117). This has allowed the comprador bourgeoisies to provide MNCs with the conditions to continue exploiting former colonies through profit extraction and labour exploitation.

Accordingly, this section illustrates that neo-colonialism in both case studies has perpetuated underdevelopment. The section further, demonstrates that the intermediary

role of the comprador bourgeoisies in the post-independent epoch is anti-development. The comprador bourgeoisies are concerned with consumption instead of production, and do not create markets for African producers but act as a major drain on domestic funds that might otherwise have gone into productive investment (Mbeki, 2009:20/1). According to Mbeki (2009:27), elite consumption contributes to fostering the continent's underdevelopment. Therefore, the section uses the non-implementation of the continental development programmes as an example to demonstrate that neo-colonialism hinders development, and that the failure of the AU to ensure adherence to continental programmes by member states has attributed to underdevelopment in both case studies.

The comprador bourgeoisies vacillate between development and neo-colonialism. They play to the audience when they pronounce against imperialism at AU summits and conferences, while they are agents of imperialism. The section proves to the reader that the comprador bourgeoisies' call for economic independence and self-reliance is mere rhetoric, as they pursue neoliberal economic policies. Moreover, it proves that the AU summits are simply moments of political theatre, performative enactments for legitimacy and authority (Death, 2011:1). Their rhetoric is used to lull people to sleep and obscure the collaborative politics of the comprador bourgeoisies and can be described as "talking left, walking right", indicating contradictions between their utterances and their actions (cf. Bond, 2006). Having created a conducive environment for MNCs to continue exploiting both countries, the comprador bourgeoisies also benefit from this exploitation because they now form part of the MNCs through the Faustian pact. They facilitate this exploitation and use the post-independent states to enforce labour deregulation on behalf of the MNCs, thus ensuring that labour remains cheap and docile (Turok, 1987:23).

The comprador bourgeoisies' vacillation between development and neo-colonialism is explained in the following paragraphs. In post-independent Kenya and South Africa, they have pursued neo-colonial economic policies in the form of Development Plans (1964-1970; 1966-1970; 1970-1974; & 1974-1978) in Kenya and GEAR in South Africa, while committing to continental developmental programmes such as African Declaration on Cooperation, Development, and Economic Independence (1973), the Monrovia Declaration (1979), and the Cairo Agenda (1995). Therefore, accentuating Woddis's (1967:86) statement that the comprador bourgeoisies continue to perpetuate and defend capitalism through the economic policies of post-independent states. Furthermore, this

explains the comprador bourgeoisies' collusion with the World Bank and IMF that adopted continental programmes such as the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), the New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) and NEPAD, that entrenched SAPs in the SSA region. These programmes were derived from Western development traditions that neglected Africa's historical background.

As a result of the Faustian pact, not all programmes that were adopted at continental level were progressive; some perpetuated neoliberalism that entailed privatisation, economic liberalisation, currency devaluation, and labour deregulation, implemented under SAPs. According to Gumede (2020:14), the SAP era was referred to as a lost decade in which the neoliberal package reigned supreme. Comprador bourgeoisies such as Kenyatta and Thabo Mbeki were determined to catch up with the West (Ake, 1996:11). This obsession led to the adoption of ineffective policies and consequently, a false start. Development experts from IFIs and developed countries encouraged these ineffective policies in an effort to tie the countries to global neoliberal capitalism. In the post-independence period, the comprador bourgeoisies embarked on trickle-down economics which they believed would benefit the rest of the population as the economy grew. They continued to export unprocessed raw materials and agricultural products that earned the necessary foreign exchange to import manufactured goods from the West (Lopes et al., 2017:40). Lastly, they pursued industrialisation by invitation through maintaining close links with their former colonisers (Ake, 1996:16). By doing this they continued to imitating Europe, which Fanon (1963:312) had warned against.

Despite the rhetoric that came from the OAU, the comprador bourgeoisies through neoliberal policies continued with neo-colonialism that involved an externally controlled economy with economic policies advocating for profits extraction, labour exploitation, and retaining economic asymmetry. In December 1963, Kenya joined the OAU, becoming the 34th member state and a signatory to the OAU Charter of 1963. Despite of being a signatory to the OAU Charter, which calls for utilisation of the continent's resources for its development and the betterment of the African people, Kenya adopted development plans that saw continuation of the colonial economy (Ake, 1996:19). The development plans (1964-1970 & 1966-1970) gave a comparative advantage as they emphasised

agriculture (Ruthenberg, 1966:108) and aligned with the World Bank's Report No: 11143, *The Economic Development of Kenya* (1963), which advocated for dependence on agriculture (Green, 1965:259). The plans called for acceleration of the process of land consolidation and registration and increasing resources in the agricultural sector that would increase production and development of irrigation farming (Ruthenberg, 1966:108).

This was followed by some economic growth, with real GDP averaging 6.5 percent per annum and agriculture and manufacturing attaining an average annual growth rate of over 5 and 10 percent respectively (Adedeji et al., 1990:38). However, the economic growth failed to provide for the basic needs of the people as a whole (Turok, 1987:16). The manufacturing sector was dominated by small and medium-sized light industries that largely relied on the import-substitution strategy and achieved only limited diversification (Adedeji et al., 1990:39). The focus on the agriculture sector perpetuated unequal exchange between the former colonisers and Kenya, as foreign MNCs made their profits from unequal trade (Howard, 1978:20). European settler farmers and the comprador bourgeoisies benefitted from the export of cash crops in Kenya through their land ownership and being part of the MNCs. However, the focus on cash crops undermined the capacity of the country to attain self-sufficiency in food (Mwaura, 2005:77). As a result, in 1965 Kenya suffered from food shortages and near famine (Hornsby, 2012:135). Their focus on agriculture by the comprador bourgeoisies led to a neglect of industrialisation, subsequently retarding industrialisation in Kenya.

The Kenyan post-independent government continued with development plans, and in 1965 adopted Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. Similar to its predecessors, it advocated for privatisation and prioritisation of the agricultural sector as the foreign exchange earner (Holtham & Hazlewood, 2011:7). These programmes had no intention of changing the inherited colonial economic and social structures (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:96), and led to the majority of people being excluded and marginalised in the socio-economic system of the country. According to Ogude (1997:92), independence did not usher in any comfort or economic gain for the peasants and workers, only the comprador bourgeoisies emerged as the beneficiaries of freedom.

As indicated in Chapter 4, post-independent economic policies in Kenya reiterated the colonial economic policies of the past. This reiteration meant wholesale adoption of the

inequality underlying the colonial system by the then KANU government (Cheche Kenya, 1982:38). According to Fanon (1963:142), the comprador bourgeoisies did not change the legacy of the economy in post-independence. As a result, economic growth did not usher in development, and the living conditions of Kenyans deteriorated (Turok, 1987:56) while the comprador bourgeoisies used the state as a vehicle for gross looting and consumption instead of for production (Turok, 1987:56). The comprador bourgeoisies used their political power to enrich themselves while colluding with the West to exploit and plunder their own country and people (Mwaura, 2005:41).

In 1973, the OAU adopted the African Declaration on Cooperation, Development, and Economic Independence, to address challenges raised by the Economic and Social Commission during the OAU formation conference in 1963. The OAU reaffirmed its commitment to industrialisation, improved infrastructure, intra-trade and structural transformation (OAU, 1973:2). In addition, the OAU declared it would mobilise resources of the continent for its development, that it would defend the economic independence of Africa and advocated for the continent to be treated as an equal partner. They would do this by countering the practices of MNCs that are contrary to Africa's interests (OAU, 1973:2). This coincided with the global oil crisis that aggravated Kenya's economic crisis and their adoption of the Development Plan 1974-1978. The plan was influenced by the World Bank's *Economic Progress and Prospects in Kenya*, drafted in 1972. Despite the economic crisis, the comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya continued with gross over-indulgence and importing luxury goods without restraint (Cheche Kenya, 1982:64). According to Mbeki (2009:27), this is another way in which comprador bourgeoisies contribute to fostering the continent's underdevelopment, since their profits are diverted to elite consumption and capital flight. Nonetheless, the IFIs went ahead to give the Kenyan government aid, illustrating how flawed the Western aid policies are and have contributed to the continent's economic decline (Ayittey, 2005:50). Kenya forms part of the aid-dependent countries, but has achieved little with the ODA it receives from the U.S. and IFIs. Instead, poverty has increased, and the aid has been looted by the comprador bourgeoisies and stashed offshore (Andersen et al., 2020).

The comprador bourgeoisies continued to keep Kenya as a supplier of primary products to the benefit of MNCs through unequal exchange and labour exploitation. The development plans ensured entrenchment of foreign capital in Kenya on a scale never

witnessed before (Murunga & Nasongo, 2007:267). Foreign capital controlled key sectors of the economy, the productive agriculture sector, and the manufacturing and service sectors (Murunga & Nasongo, 2007:267). Kenya's economy started declining in 1974, and was exacerbated by the death of Kenyatta in 1978, which resulted in political uncertainty. The decline was attributed to poor international terms of trade, inappropriate agriculture policies, and inadequate credit (Oppong & Oppong, 2004: 88). By the 1990s, Kenya's economy was still externally oriented, and industry was dominated by foreign MNCs and foreign investors who exported their surpluses abroad (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:90). This still holds true in the current epoch, as the agricultural sector earns 60.4 percent of total foreign exchange and employs 70 percent of the total labour force in Kenya (Adam et al., 2010:122).

Lack of implementation of the continental programme can be attributed to the weakness of the OAU/AU and its failure to provide a facilitating role to ensure that member states adhered to the programmes. This non-implementation was exacerbated by the fact that the OAU/AU under the comprador bourgeoisies did not provide operational plans for the programmes, therefore making it difficult to enforce them. These programmes were without any specific strategies and operational plans for achieving the states' commitments to promoting growth within the defined context (Poku & Whitman, 2018:27). Maloka (2002:22) concurs with the sentiments and argues that the problem in Africa is not a shortage of ideas but the operation of those ideas. This was the case when the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (hereafter ECA) adopted the Revised Framework of Principles for Implementation of the New International Order in Africa in 1976, and the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-reliance in Economic and Social Development for the Establishment of a New International Order in 1979. There was no plan in place to ensure adherence, and while the comprador bourgeoisies committed to these programmes they failed to implement them, again showing their vacillating nature. The failure of Morovian Declaration culminated in the adoption of the LPA in 1980 by OAU.

Despite its Development Plan 1979-1983, in 1980 Kenya joined the countries that adopted the LPA, which was viewed as the first genuinely indigenous programme. It blamed the economic woes of the continent on colonial exploitation and neo-colonialism and advocated for economic growth, self-reliance, structural transformation and

economic integration in order to overcome backwardness. It identified agriculture and food security, industry, natural resources, science and technology, trade and finance and infrastructure as factors that needed to be addressed to achieve economic growth (OAU, 1980:4). The plan also called for an increase in ODA for Africa's least developed countries, indicating dependency (Ake, 1996:23). Following the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Kenya was beset with economic problems of external and internal origin (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:151). Under Moi the Kenya government remained committed to a capitalist-oriented mixed economy with economic policies that guaranteed private property ownership and encouraged foreign investment through legislative provision for the repatriation of profits (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:152). These objectives were totally opposite to those the LPA was calling for, and foreign capital ignored the LPA while developed countries refused to reorient their economic relations with Africa to address the policies of the plan, rendering it inoperable. It was quickly abandoned by the comprador bourgeoisies who then showed willingness to reform their economies along the lines suggested by the World Bank study and the increasingly adopted SAP (Ake, 1996:26). In 1980 Kenya adopted the SAP, and was among the first countries in SSA to sign for and receive a structural adjustment loan of USD 70 million with conditions such as currency devaluation, privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation (Thomson, 2010:197).

In 1981The World Bank responded with the adoption of the Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for Action programme, otherwise known as the Berg Report. According to Mkandawire and Soludo (1998:41) the Berg Report provided the immediate intellectual precursor to the introduction of SAP policies. Adoption of the programme was at the request of the African governors of the World Bank and the IMF, in reaction to the bleak picture provided by the 1972 World Development Report (Ake, 1996:24). In response, the Berg Report advocated for privatisation of parastatals, trade liberalisation, effective public sectors and giving market forces more latitude to bring about dynamism and efficiency (Ake, 1996:24). The Berg Report was an embryo form of neoliberalism in SSA, and the above-mentioned objectives became part of the SAP (Heidhues & Obare, 2011:55).

The adoption of SAPs was preceded by Kenya's debt crisis. The country's debt ballooned from British Pounds (GBP) 86 million in 1964 to GBP 578 million in 1979, that was mostly

looted by the comprador bourgeoisies (Cheche Kenya, 1982:63). The comprador bourgeoisies' government in 1980 adopted the Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980 on Economic Prospects and Policies, committing the government to reforms in areas of fiscal and monetary affairs such as austerity, industrial strategy and agriculture development, to access the loan to service the debt (Zeleza, 1991:39). This was followed by a USD 175 million loan from the IMF on January 1982, and USD 131 million structural adjustment loan from World Bank in July 1982 (Hornsby, 2012:359). These loans further entrenched SAPs in Kenya and pushed post-independence Kenya further into debt. In 1986, the Kenyan government adopted Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth, to push for trade reforms, privatisation, and a public sector and free market (Ngugi et al., 2006:3). To ensure compliance with the conditions of the loan, IFIs provided expatriate staff and technical assistance which saw development responsibility being outsourced to the World Bank and the IMF, thus ensuring the reproduction of neo-colonial notions of development (Ake, 1996:19). According to Woddis (1967:71), the expatriate staff that remained after independence to assist the newly independent state, becomes an obstacle to genuine advancement. The conditions of devaluation of the Kenya Shilling increased Kenya's external debt by 43 percent (Mwaura, 2005:70). Foreign Capital benefitted from the labour deregulation and capital outflow that came after penetration of the Kenyan economy by foreign capital, and the comprador bourgeoisies benefitted from privatisation, which saw Kenyan SOEs sold below their market value (Tangri, 1999:58). The introduction of SAPs into Kenya also caused deindustrialisation that kept the country as a supplier of primary products to global markets. The SAPs caused a decrease in economic growth in Kenya of 8.7 percent before the SAPs, and 3.5 percent after SAPs (Mwaura, 2005:68).

Under the tutelage of the UN, in 1986 the OAU adopted APPER, which was quickly followed by UN-PAAED to which Kenya became a signatory to ensure the implementation of SAPs on the continent (Mabula, 2013). The APPER was rooted in the Berg Report and entrenched SAPs through advocating for privatisation, market liberalisation, cutting government expenditure and increased resource mobilisation (Arrighi, 2002:9). This represented a Faustian pact moment between the comprador bourgeoisies, the OAU and IFIs, and foreign capital, which saw the abandonment of the LPA. Arrighi (2002:9) describes APPER as a compact between African states and the international community for joint action towards the resolution of the crisis and culminated to UN-PAAERD. In 1986

at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa, the UN-PAAERD 1986-1990 was adopted and was lauded as a unique cooperation between the international community and the OAU (Kidane-Mariam, 2001:157; RCM-Africa, 2015:36). These SAPs led the Kenya government to reduce subsidies in education, health, energy and other social sectors (Mwanzia & Strathdee, 2010:16). In addition, they led to the rationalisation of the public sector and privatisation of some government functions and services such as transport, energy, and housing (Mwanzia & Strathdee, 2010:16).

To their proponents, SAPs and subsequently, APPER and UN-PAAERD were introduced to tackle structural problems, poor investment, and macroeconomic policy in Africa and to mitigate the adverse effects of crises in Africa, while championing transformation and development (Lopes, 1999:511; Hiedhues & Obare, 2011:58). To African leaders the APPER was viewed as an effort to pull African countries out of the crisis of economic stagnation and decline, and onto the path of recovery and development, and to champion rehabilitation and reconstruction (Kidane-Mariam, 2001:155). However, in Kenya these programmes worsened the development bottlenecks, increased rural poverty, and despite efforts to attract FDI, investors could not be enticed because of high transition cost and inherent risk of investment with weak and inexperienced local partners. As a result, the programmes contributed to a significant decline in economic activity and entrenched underdevelopment in Kenya (Lopes, 1999:513-4). Implementation of the UN-PAAERD was extremely high with 61 percent of SSA countries having reached the target of 20 to 25 percent of investment in agriculture, with 69 percent of the countries having embarked on structural adjustment, and 39 percent undertaking stabilisation measures (Ake, 1996:29). In addition, these countries implemented macroeconomics reforms in which 72 percent reduced subsidies; 67 percent initiated an employment freeze; and 50 percent carried out exchange rate adjustment (Ake, 1996:29). These programmes worsened socio-economic conditions in Kenya (RCM-Africa, 2015:37).

The SAPs were implemented until the late 1990s with the Kenyan economic crisis – when Kenya's economy suffered 100 percent inflation and a budget deficit of 10 percent of GDP (Oppong & Oppong, 2014:89). Kenya adopted the World Bank and IMF-sponsored programme of economic reform and liberalisation that involved increasing privatisation, strict fiscal discipline, abolishment of government price control, and import licensing and foreign exchange controls (Oppong & Oppong, 2004:89). This took place in 1989 despite

the OAU and ECA adoption of AAF-SAP as an alternative to stabilisation policies (Rasheed & Chole, 1994; Mabula, 2013). The programme advocated for human development, economic growth, reducing external dependence, and transformation over adjustment programmes, therefore returning to the principles of the LPA (Rasheed & Chole, 1994; Ake, 1996:40). This was followed by the UN General Assembly adopting UN-NADAF in 1991, notwithstanding the AAF-SAP indicating the continuing clash of developmental programmes between the IFIs and the OAU.

Implementing the LPA resolution, the OAU heads of state and government signed the Abuja Treaty in Abuja, Nigeria, establishing the AEC in 1991. The treaty called for mobilisation of Africa's resources for the general wellbeing of its people (OAU, 1991:3). The Abuja Treaty that came into force in 1994, is a blueprint for African integration and its objectives are to promote economic, social and cultural development; advance African economic integration to increase self-sufficiency and endogenous development; create a framework for development; and to mobilise human resources and capital (DIRCO, 2003). Moreover, the AEC aims to promote cooperation and development in all aspects of human activity with a view to raising the living standards of the African people, maintaining economic stability, and establishing a close and peaceful relationship among member states. This was to be achieved in 6 stages over the course of 34 years, from 1994 to 2028 (DIRCO, 2003). Through these stages and the timelines, one is able to indicate a lack of implementation with regard to the Abuja Treaty, with many deadlines not met. This explains the shifting of goal posts through the adoption of programmes such as NEPAD and more recently, *Agenda 2063*, and illustrates the lack of political will of the comprador bourgeoisies with regard to implementation of continental development programmes.

The first stage of Abuja Treaty called for strengthening of the RECs and forming more regional communities where they do not exist, which should take place within the first 5 years. The RECs would form the building blocks for the AEC. The second stage, also to be done within five years, involved seeking the eradication of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers between African countries, harmonisation of customs duties and activities among the RECs and strengthening of sectoral integration (OAU, 1991:10-1). The removal of tariff barriers is critical to the economic integration, especially with intra-Africa trade being the lowest in the globe at 18 percent, that indicates more externally oriented economies. This results from commodity-based economies, lack of infrastructure, high customs

duties, lack of capital, and human movement between countries that are identified in *Agenda 2063*. The third stage of the programme declared that within a period not exceeding 10 years, the Free Trade Area (FTA) should be established. The fourth stage called for establishment of a Customs Union at the continental level within 2 years. The fifth stage required the establishment of a Common Market through the adoption of common policy, harmonising of monetary, financial and fiscal policies, and application of free movement for the people. The sixth stage advocated the integration of all sectors through the formation of a Single African Market, a Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union, a Single African Central Bank, a Single African Currency, and a PAP (OAU, 1991:10-1).

The Abuja Treaty proposed a linear model of integration that was undertaken by Europe to form the EU. This model is underpinned by 5 progressive stages of economic integration: FTA to a customs union, a common market, monetary union and political union (Vickers, 2017:6). However, this model as inappropriate for Africa and unrealistic for comprador bourgeoisies. The model fails to take into consideration Africa's economic and political realities: lack of infrastructure, weak institutions, conflict, lack of structural change and prescribed unrealistic targets (Vickers, 2017:9). Moreover, the model focuses on trade and market liberalisation rather than addressing constraints to intra-trade, including the lack of critical country and regional productive capacity and poor infrastructure network (Vickers, 2017:10). This explains why the Abuja Treaty was not implemented, as many deadlines were not realised, reducing this treaty to a wish list of the comprador bourgeoisies. Despite the formation of PAP and the ratification of AfCFTA by African countries, none of the structures at stage six have been established. The PAP, which will play a critical role in the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, was established in 2004; its members are appointed and it has consultative and advisory powers instead of the usual executive checks and balances (Cilliers & Mashele, 2004:76). The AEC advocated for the creation of an FTA through the gradual removal of intra-trade tariff and non-tariff barriers, and established a Customs Union by means of adopting a common external tariff (OAU, 1991:10). Despite being behind schedule, the AfCFTA became operational in January 2021 with Kenya and South Africa among countries that ratified it. As per the AU Commission report (2019:1), negotiations between member states are at an advanced stage, with 90 percent of tariff lines for non-sensitive products, 7 percent for sensitive products, and 3 percent for excluded products being adopted.

The ongoing Faustian pact facilitated by the Kenyatta to the Moi presidency in Kenya continued with privatisation, liberalisation, currency devaluation and macroeconomic stability that form an integral part of neoliberalism, which hindered self-reliance and structural transformation and the implementation of many of the aforementioned continental programmes. Hence the continuous repetition of objectives in these programmes, casting doubt on the implementation of *Agenda 2063* and indicating the failure of the comprador bourgeoisies to implement progressive continental programmes. The continental programmes were contrary to their business interests, hence, non-implementation.

The Cairo Agenda for Action on Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development could not escape the reality of non-implementation. It was adopted in 1995 to attain collective self-reliance and achieve self-sustaining development (OAU, 1995). The agenda identified the lack of implementation of continental programmes that had paralysed their collective effort to fight underdevelopment and called for structural transformation of African economies through industrialisation, ownership of mineral resources for the benefit of African people and championed intra-trade, and fair-trade deals (OAU, 1995). It further called for measures within a specified time frame to ensure the satisfactory implementation and follow-up of decisions made for the development of the continent (OAU, 1995). However, countries continued with non-implementation and Kenya continued with its neoliberal policies – liberalising Kenya's financial system, trade and privatisation that led to the capital flight of USD 2.5 billion by 1991, and rising inflation driven by deregulation (Hornsby, 2012:470). The South Africa government joined the OAU on the 23 May 1994 after its democratic elections, becoming the 53rd member state, thus consigning the country to continental programmes. Nonetheless, it adopted GEAR in 1996 which purported neoliberalism and in the process conflicting the Cairo Agenda for Action.

Kenya continued with SAPs through the 1990s and received USD 5 billion in structural adjustment credit from the World Bank after the resumption of multiparty elections which was accompanied by the usual conditions of austerity, privatisation and a free market economy (Oppong & Oppong, 2004:119). South Africa followed suit and adopted GEAR with its neoliberal economic agenda in 1996, bringing an abrupt end to RDP. Through GEAR, a series of deregulation measures were introduced including liberalisation of

foreign exchange, privatisation of state assets, and measures to attract foreign investment (Habib, 2013:80). The strategy had a mixed economic impact: on the one hand it reduced inflation and South Africa's meagre economic growth of 2.8 percent and reduced government debt as a percentage of GDP from 49.5 percent in 1996 to 33 percent by 2004, and on the other, GEAR had a devastating social impact as levels of inequality and poverty increased drastically during the period (Habib, 2013:81). However, MNCs and the domestic business class were able to move their money abroad, which perpetuated capital flight. Politicians and politically connected people benefitted through BEE deals and foreign MNCs through privatisation and various mergers as demonstrated in Chapter 5. Therefore, it was in their best interests to perpetuate neoliberalism in post-independent South Africa.

The replacement of the OAU by the AU resulted from a shift in development thinking, from dependency to self-sustainability, and led to the Constitutive Act of the Union on the 11 July 2000. The Act replaced OAU Charter and continued with objectives of preceding continental programmes – acceleration of political and socio-economic integration of the continent, international cooperation, promoting peace and security, and promoting sustainable development at the economic level (OAU 2000:14). However, the Act was followed by neoliberal-influenced NEPAD, which was adopted in 2001 and ratified by the member states in 2002. According to Adésínà et al. (2006:6), NEPAD is underpinned by neoliberalism and derives its reading of post-colonial history from the Berg Report and its anti-poverty approach based on trickle-down economics. NEPAD rehashed SAPs, demonstrating the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies and foreign capital. The implementation of NEPAD was dependent on the availability of external resources, indicating the dependency of the comprador bourgeoisie on developed countries (Landsberg, 2003:8). This push of neoliberal economic policies over the continental development programmes ensured that only a few people would enjoy the fruits of freedom. Through privatisation and liberalisation, MNCs were able to continue their exploitation of Kenya and South Africa through the extraction of profits. The comprador bourgeoisies who formed part of the MNCs, benefitted from maintaining the exploitative status quo. This ensured that both countries remained in the same position in world trade, with economies geared to produce and serve external interests. Kenya's exports are dominated by their agricultural sector at 60.4 percent, and South Africa's by

their agriculture, fuel and mining products, at 49 percent. Both countries are heavily invested in their export sectors (Mwaura, 2005:7).

NEPAD was seen as a manifestation of GEAR at the continental level which championed liberalisation of markets and limited state intervention (Adésínà et al., 2006:8-9). The ERS of Kenya were in line with the NEPAD objectives – fiscal control, macroeconomic stability, privatisation, and poverty reduction through trickle-down economics (Adam et al., 2010:17). During the ERS period from 2003-2007, the Kenyan economy grew but without decreasing poverty rates and inequality, with the economic structure remaining the same. It was followed by the adoption of *Vision 2030* in 2008.

At that time, the South African president was a chief proponent of NEPAD and ensured that South Africa extended NEPAD objectives through GEAR. The social devastation caused by GEAR would see an increase in social expenditure, especially through the form of social support grants, which saw the number of recipients increase from over 2 million in 1999 to over 6 million in early 2004, and then to an astounding 12 386 396[90] by late 2007 (Habib, 2013:88). In 2007 GEAR was replaced by ASGISA – a reform programme to cut poverty and unemployment (Gumede, 2007:168). ASGISA was an extension of GEAR premised on trickle-down economics, based on the assumption that growth in South Africa's industrial and developed first economy would filter through to the poor second economy (Gumede, 2007:147). ASGISA was followed by the NGP and subsequently the NDP, which continued with neoliberalism. Policies from both countries resulted in outward-looking economies, which explains their 18 percent intra-African trade. Furthermore, they created an environment for exploitative trade policies such as AGOA and EPAs.

In 2009 the AU Commission adopted the African Mining Vision (AMV) to create a transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development (AU Commission, 2009). Given the massive amount of minerals on the continent, the vision is paramount and if implemented, will lead to diversification in Africa's economies and value addition.

[90] In 2018 this number had risen to 17.8 million poor South Africans receiving social grants, and large number being of Africans demonstrating the perpetuation of apartheid poverty composition in post-apartheid. This number is probably increased because government had introduced Covid-19 social relief to assist people that have who had been negatively impacted by Covid-19.

However, implementation has been slow with only Lesotho having adopted the AMV through the development of a Country Mining Vision (Oxfam (2017b:2). Both South Africa and Kenya are among the non-implementing countries, which is clearly indicated in their export-oriented mining activities. South Africa's Mining Charter and Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act 28 of 2002 are preoccupied with indigenisation rather than industrialisation, thus entrenching the Faustian pact between the domestic business class, foreign capital and the comprador bourgeoisies. In Kenya, the Mining Act, No.12 of 2016 and the Local Content Bill of 2018 are concerned with licencing, affirmative action, and indigenisation rather than the value addition which would come with industrialisation.

The AU's adoption of Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA), championed industrialisation on the basis of value addition and processing and local input from SSA mineral resources and agricultural sector. This would be critical to economic growth and development in both countries. However, their externally-oriented economies established by the comprador bourgeoisies undermined this plan, while liberalisation has led to deindustrialisation in both case studies. Agricultural sectors[91] through the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), were identified as a critical in providing the value chain with agribusiness that would offer a unique opportunity for inclusive development in SSA. Nevertheless, the agricultural sectors in both case studies are geared towards serving the interests of foreign MNCs, with South Africa exporting fruits and wine, while Kenyan exports are dominated by tea, coffee and flowers. Infrastructure was also mentioned as a critical aspect in the industrialisation of SSA, and the AU adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) which is yet to be domesticated in domestic plans of both countries. According to Turok (1987:15), the biggest failure of SSA economic policies was their failure to develop value addition in the mining and agriculture sectors.

Regardless of the OAU/AU resolutions on agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure and structural transformation as indicated in the aforementioned programmes, Kenya continued to import food. South Africa is faced with an energy crisis and load-shedding due to corruption at Eskom, the country's electricity public utility thus contributing to the

[91] Note that the agriculture sector remains the primary employer of 60 percent of workers in SSA (UNIDO, 2016).

energy crisis that has already engulfed the continent. According to Mills et al. (2017:68-9), Africa requires USD 93 billion annually to address its infrastructure backlog. More than half of that amount would be spend on power, as 600 million Africans have no access to electricity. Hence, *Agenda 2063* is still concerned with the same resolutions of over 50 years ago, indicating no change due to lack of implementation by the OAU member states.

The discussion above demonstrates that neo-colonialism perpetuated through neoliberalism hinders development and result in non-implementation of continental development programmes. Illustrating their vacillation tendencies, the comprador bourgeoisies during AU summits committed their countries to self-reliance, sustainable development and structural transformation, while implementing neoliberal economic policies underpinned by accumulation by dispossession. This takes place despite their rhetoric at AU summits regarding development and economic independence in SSA, reducing the multilateral organisation to a performative and threatrical platform. To Fanon (1963:163) the comprador bourgeoisies are incapable of putting into practice a programme with any humane content, in spite of their fine-sounding declarations that are devoid of meaning as the speakers bandy about phrases copied from European treaties. The neoliberal economic policies were supposed to ensure that former colonies catch-up with Western countries, however, they led to a false start and underdevelopment. Lushaba (2006:3) argues against the catch-up mission of the comprador bourgeoisies and states that Africa cannot possibly develop by modernising or become like the modern West.

The continuation of the colonial model of accumulation by the comprador bourgeoisie has perpetuated non-implementation of continental programmes. This is clearly indicated in former AU Chairperson, the Hon. Moussa Faki Mahamat's words, when he pointed out that since 2001, some 1 800 decisions have been taken by the AU with many of them still lagging behind in implementation (Saffee, 2018). The comprador bourgeoisies have outsourced their development agenda to external development agencies. They rely on expatriate stuff for technical assistance and donors for resources which has meant the perpetuation of neoliberalism. This has led to clash of agendas between the AU and IFIs with the World Bank and IMF winning the day. In 2010 NEPAD underwent reform because of its challenges and in 2013 at the AU Summit, *Agenda 2063* was adopted to address

underdevelopment and carry on the positive economic outlook that has taken place since 2000.

6.5. Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated the link between key variables that point to neo-colonialism having led to underdevelopment in Kenya and South Africa. Neo-colonialism has hindered any implementation of continental development programmes advocating for self-reliance, structural transformation, sustainable development, and economic independence. This has accentuated neo-colonial theorists' argument that neo-colonialism gatekeep against any steps towards industrialisation, and that it perpetuates underdevelopment through control of the markets. In both countries, colonial relations have led to outward-looking economies that serve the interests of foreign capital, the domestic business class and the comprador bourgeoisies at the expense of the masses.

The historical analysis has indicated that the comprador bourgeoisies have utilised the economic policies of both post-independent states to maintain neo-colonialism. They have guarded against any radical change to the status quo, hence the lack of implementation of continental development programmes. The Faustian pact has been detrimental to the continental programmes as the comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya and South Africa use their position to champion their intertwined interests with the domestic business class and foreign capital. In both cases, they have reduced AU summits, where continental development programmes are adopted, to theatrical play without implementing. The comprador bourgeoisies continue to "talk left, while walking right". They continue to sound anti-imperialism, while, advocating and implementing neo-liberal capitalism agenda. The comprador bourgeoisies adopted neoliberal economic policies to catch up with the West; however, these policies are proven to be hostile to development.

Neo-colonialism has hindered the implementation of continental development programmes such as the Monrovia Declaration, LPA, the Abuja Treaty, the Cairo Agenda, AAF-SAP, AMV and AIDA among many, hence the perpetuation of lack of industrialisation, lack of infrastructure, poverty, inequality, disease, instability and security issues. Accordingly, this has created uncertainty towards the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

CHAPTER 7: AN ANALYSIS OF *AGENDA 2063* AND THE FIRST TEN-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that neo-colonialism hinders development in Kenya and South Africa and that it has led to the non-implementation of continental development programmes. This has reproduced and extended underdevelopment by keeping both economies externally oriented, with over reliance on raw materials and agricultural products for foreign exchange, thus maintaining asymmetrical economic relations between both countries and developed countries. Neo-colonialism has guarded against any radical change in both countries. In South Africa for instance, despite much debate on nationalisation of the mines, which would entail value addition, and a commitment of government to the establishment of a state bank and a sovereign fund, the comprador bourgeoisies are yet to implement any of this. Thus, the Faustian pact has created a political lobby group that is against any radical change in SSA.

As a result, implementation of *Agenda 2063* and the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan remain uncertain. Lopes (2015) argued at the AU-REC-ECA-AfDB coordination meeting of the Committee of Ministers that "part of the problem in the past is that we have had good documents which were not implemented, and we do not want *Agenda 2063* to share the same fate. It is about how we can create a continent with shared prosperity". However, because of neo-colonialism, *Agenda 2063* is likely to suffer the same fate of non-implementation. Overall, *Agenda 2063* does not stand a good chance of successful implementation because among other reasons, the comprador bourgeoisies lack the political will, and this affects resource mobilisation. In both countries there are weak institutions that undermine monitoring and evaluation, and absence of citizen participation in the politics and economy of their societies. Post-independent Kenya and South Africa are undermined by corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and patronage that has further undermined their capabilities and public sector efficiency. For successful implementation, the AU Commission (2015b:64) identified transformative leadership, a capable state, a strong private sector, the rule of law and democracy as critical enablers.

The chapter seeks to analyse *Agenda 2063* as a continental programme and evaluate the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in Kenya and South Africa, to gain a better

understanding of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in the post-independence era. This includes an evaluation of the strides made in implementing *Agenda 2063*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in both case studies. The lack of implementation of previous continental programmes has seen the reiteration of resolutions by the AU Commission which include eradication of poverty and inequality, acceleration of industrialisation, infrastructure construction, integration and inclusive economic growth that are in alignment with the principles of self-reliance and economic independence. The aspirations and goals of *Agenda 2063* are clearly outlined in the following section.

7.2. The Context of *Agenda 2063*

The AU *Agenda 2063* derives from the AU's vision "*to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena*", *Constitutive Act* of 2000 and the 2013 AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration by heads of state and government. The Solemn Declaration resulted in African leaders emphasising and reiterating their commitment to addressing Africa's structural problems by implementing *Agenda 2063*. *Agenda 2063* seeks to build and learn from its predecessors. According to the AU Commission (2013:5), *Agenda 2063* is a logical and natural continuation of previous continental programmes and the challenges they sought to address that persist to this day.

Agenda 2063 is a vision and action plan that is grounded in the ideas of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance[92]. It incorporates past lessons and experiences of Africa and differs from its predecessors in that it has an operational plan, and its people oriented (Saffee, 2018:2). *Agenda 2063* is the result of a popular consultation with participants throughout Africa (DIRCO, 2015:6-8). This has resulted in ownership of the programme by African citizenry that puts it apart from previous programmes and allows Africans to find solutions to their problems through grass roots participation (Addaney, 2018:190). This has been identified as one of the critical enablers of the implementation of *Agenda 2063* (Tella, 2018:717). For a wide participation and ownership by ordinary Africans there

[92] Note that the thesis does not get into the debate regarding African Renaissance. There are commentators that view African Renaissance as a copy-cat of the European experience, which is devoid of any meaning and tantamount to the empty rhetoric that is usually perpetuated by Africa leaders i.e. *Ujamaa* and *Harambee*. However, to many within the Pan African tradition, African Renaissance speaks to Africa's renewal – the liberalisation of African states and their economies, the institutions of value that must replace corruption and incompetence, and a peaceful Africa and Africa-centred engagement to promote trade and sustainable development (Bongmba, 2004:291).

is a call to incorporate *Agenda 2063* into the existing educational system and make it be available in native languages (cf. Addaney, 2018; Fagbayibo, 2018).

Agenda 2063 is a continental programme implementable for 50 years and broken down into 5 ten-year implementation plans. Furthermore, *Agenda 2063* is segmented in three phases, short-term (10 years); medium-term (10-25 years) and long-term (25-50 years) (Fagbayibo, 2018:630). *Agenda 2063*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan entails goals, priority areas, milestones, targets, etc. Each goal is divided into priority areas, 2023 targets, and milestones and has designated actor(s), either national, REC, and/or continental, to coordinate and implement (AU Commission, 2015b:16-17). The starting point for member states is the creation of national focal points for *Agenda 2063* with national legislature as a framework for its development (AU Commission, 2015b:82-3). This will be followed by member states launching the *Agenda 2063* and its domestication into national development plans i.e. the NDP in South Africa and Kenya's *Vision 2030* (AU Commission, 2015b:82-3). This should be done within the specific time frame – in the first year of the implementation plan.

To challenge the status quo, *Agenda 2063* envisages structural transformation where the developmental trajectory moves away from commodity-based economies to an industrial oriented and diverse economy. Neo-colonial theorists such as Fanon (1963), Nkrumah (1965) and Rodney (1972) posit that the comprador bourgeoisies have continued with commodity underpinned economies that are rooted in colonial capitalism and are thus anti-development. The neo-colonial theorists understood that commodity prices are attached to the prices of manufactured goods, which make African economies vulnerable to the shocks in the global economy[93] (Mwaura, 2005:66). A commodity underpinned economy simply retards industrialisation and champions exploitation through trade, thus increasing the neo-colonial dependency (Mwaura, 2005:66). A case in point is that the current Covid-19 pandemic has hurt commodity-underpinned economies especially in countries that rely on oil, such as Nigeria and Angola.

Despite its Pan-Africanist roots and its call for structural change and self-reliance, *Agenda 2063* does not want to break with capitalism and is therefore designed to operate within

[93] The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis argues along the same lines, that commodity prices are relative to those prices of manufactured goods, and in the long term, a declines in prices of manufactured goods causes the terms of trade in primary produced based economies to deteriorate.

a neoliberal framework (Fagbayibo, 2018:632). Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, SSA has been under the Washington Consensus cloud. *Agenda 2063* calls for self-reliance and structural transformation on the one hand, and for macroeconomic stability on the other hand (Heidhues & Obare, 2011:55; Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2018:357). According to Fagbayibo (2018:633), the AU's economic integration covers the prescriptive logics of neoliberalism: ease of flow of transitional capital and expansion of regional markets. This will entail the eradication of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers between member states and the RECs. However, this economic integration is critical to intra-trade and to continental integration, as clearly articulated in Pan Africanism.

In addition to the aspirations of *Agenda 2063* that include inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, and integrated and a peaceful continent, the AU Commission has identified certain flagship and fast-track projects for the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063.* The AU Commission (2015b:10) has stated that these projects are to be implemented immediately within the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan. The successful implementation of these projects is expected to mobilise and sustain the commitment of the African citizenry to *Agenda 2063* (AU Commission, 2015b:4). The projects include improvement of transport networks in Africa and integration through the construction of the Integrated High Speed Train Network and establishment of a Single African Air Transport Market[94]. The completion of the Grand Inga Dam Project in the DRC is also listed which will assist in addressing the energy crisis within the continent. The flagship projects also entail the creation of a Pan-African E-University; formulation of a Commodities Strategy; establishment of an Annual African Farming Conference and the Continental Free Trade Area by 2017; the African Passport and Free Movement of People; Silencing the Guns by 2020; Africa Outer Space Strategy; and establishment of the African Continental Financial Institution, all of which are in line with the AEC (African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), 2016:15; Tella, 2018:717).

Agenda 2063's aspirations and goals coincide with *Agenda 2030 – Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs). Over 17 SDGs overlap with the aspirations and goals of *Agenda 2063* (UNECA, 2018). Therefore, the attainment of *Agenda 2063* goals would mean the successful implementation of the SDGs and monitoring and evaluation would

[94] This will see the Yamoussoukro Declaration, 1999, which advocates for open skies for Africa being implemented for further integration.

be easier. The AU contributed to the SDGs through the Common African Position[95] *(CAP)* on the post-2015 Development Agenda. *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* seek sustainable development and structural transformation on a global scale while ensuring that the entire world's population enjoys minimum standards of living (AU Commission, 2014:2; UNECA, 2016:1; Corringan & Gruzd, 2017:6). Furthermore, *Agenda 2063* incorporates other continental programmes such as Boosting Intra-Africa Trade (BIAT); PIDA; CAADP; AMV and AIDA, which when implemented will ensure the successful implementation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan and AfCFTA. The following section demonstrates the uncertainty around implementing *Agenda 2063*.

7.3. Analysis of *Agenda 2063*

In this section the author argues that neo-colonialism, which is proven to be hostile to development, will hinder the implementation of *Agenda 2063* in Kenya and South Africa. The previous section signified that the aspirations of *Agenda 2063* are not new, but there has been constant goal post shifts since 1963. As a result of lack of implementation since 1963, SSA continues to be confronted by the same challenges – poverty, lack of infrastructure, meagre economic growth, inequality, lack of integration, lack of industrialisation and minimal intra-trade, which *Agenda 2063* seeks to address. The Faustian pact has led to neoliberal economic policies in Kenya and South Africa that have resulted in non-implementation of the continental programmes, as was clearly explained in Chapter 6.

Many within the AU hope that *Agenda 2063* under the AU framework is aimed in the right direction. Only with collective dedication and a targeted approach, will Africa live up to *Agenda 2063*'s realisation (Saffee, 2018). This section argues that *Agenda 2063* and the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan do not stand a good chance of successful implementation because of the comprador bourgeoisie's lack of political will. The comprador bourgeoisies continue their commitment to neoliberalism and perpetuate corruption that undermines the institutions and the state. This has eroded the confidence and morale of the citizens in their states, which in turn undermines the people's participation in development of the society. As per le Pere (2016:13), the failure of

[95] CAP is a continental post-2015 development agenda with six pillars and *Agenda 2063* built on elements of CAP.

continental programmes stemmed from political instability and was largely due to stopping the planning process, institutional and bureaucratic weakness, poor plan design and implementation, and over-ambitious targets. This section emphasises weak institutions, neoliberalism, corruption and over ambitious objectives as potential impediments to the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, thus demonstrating that the comprador bourgeoisies and their Faustian pact are detrimental to *Agenda 2063*.

The objectives of *Agenda 2063* include the eradication of poverty in one generation, reducing income inequalities and addressing youth unemployment as well as building on shared prosperity through social and economic transformation of the continent. Therefore, the implementation of *Agenda 2063* by individual national states will elevate African countries' economies from low-income to middle and high-income economies with the collective GDP proportionate to Africa's share of the world population and natural resources endowments (AU Commission, 2015a:3). *Agenda 2063* also advocates for democratisation of the continent and making Africa secure and peaceful through ensuring that all guns are silent by 2020 (AU Commission, 2012a:2). The realism of these objectives remains a bone of contention to many commentators such as Turner et al. (2015) and Ogbonnaya (2016). According to Turner et al. (2015:2), the reduction of extreme poverty to the 3 percent target by 2030 is a not reasonable goal for many African states. The World Bank (2019) states that Africa could be home to 90 percent of the world's poor by 2030. Turner et al. (2015) argued that extreme poverty in Africa can be reduced to 20 percent by 2030, 10 percent in 2045 and 3 percent by 2063. Therefore, elimination of poverty in one generation is not realistic, given that most African countries performed poorly with regard to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) One. The target might even be more difficult with the current pandemic which, according to the World Bank (2020c), has undermined the actions of governments across SSA in their struggle against poverty. This will leave many African countries behind and many of those states will by then bear the greatest burden of poverty globally (Turner et al., 2015:2).

According to le Pere (2016:18), one of the reasons for the failure of continental programmes is the over ambitious targets of the comprador bourgeoisies. For them, this is part of the theatrical and symbolic dimensions of authority and legitimacy (Death, 2011:1). This is exactly the case with regard to the AU 2023 targets on "silencing all the guns by 2020". This resolution was never underpinned by any effort to resolve conflict in

various African countries. The has been no effort to curb illegal weapons smuggling in conflict hot spots by protecting the borders, or to ensure political and economic inclusion of the marginalised majority. Democratisation in SSA is paramount, as most conflicts in Africa are contestations of resources and the state. In fact, conflicts have increased: Islamists are gaining ground in Mozambique, in Libya warring factions continue to clash and fighting between federal troops and Tigray rebels continue in Ethiopia. These are some of the examples. The failure to achieve such unrealistic targets leads to goal post shifting by the comprador bourgeoisies, as they did with the Abuja Treaty, which is set to be in force for a duration of 34 years over 6 stages. In the Africa Day Celebration in Pretoria, Ethiopian scholar Mammo Muchi (2014) called *Agenda 2063* a “pretext for African leaders to drag their feet” and Ndizera and Muzee (2018) question why African leaders look so far ahead. *Agenda 2063* relegates African integration and economic development to 50 years ahead, when it is obvious that none of those leaders that advocate for it will be alive to see it (Ndizera & Muzee, 2018:152), indicating that the current SSA leadership is not serious about African integration and economic development.

Hence, emphasis on transformative leadership as an enabler to implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Transformative leadership speaks to political will and the leadership question on all levels – national, regional, and continental that are necessary for moving *Agenda 2063*’s implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes forward. However, as indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, the comprador bourgeoisies dominate the political economy of both case studies. Mwaura (2005:41) claims that African leadership is weak and visionless, and has allowed the plunder of Africa. Fanon (1963:52) described African leadership as intermediary, with no mission to transform the nation and merely a transmission line between nations and capitalism. The comprador bourgeoisies sustain and reproduce themselves by perpetuating neo-colonial relations in Kenya and South Africa through exploitative socio-economic systems. Therefore, the comprador bourgeoisies would not bring about the change that is required with the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

The Faustian pact is echoed through the economic relationship between comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital, which will be detrimental to *Agenda 2063*. As articulated in Chapters 4 and 5, the Kenyan and South African

economies are externally oriented with underpinned commodities and financially dominated economies. Through their neoliberal economic policies, the South African economy is liberalised by its integration in global financial markets that made cross-border financial flows and speculation easier (Mbeki, 2011:27). As a result, FDI has been dominated by the financial sector with the manufacturing contribution to the GDP declining and financial services to GDP growth growing (Mbeki, 2011:18). In Kenya, the agricultural sector contributes about 30 percent to the Kenyan GDP, with exports at 60.4 percent followed by the service sector, which is in turn dominated by tourism and e-services (Adam et al., 2010:26). Kenya imports food while it exports cash crops, demonstrating its outward-looking economy. These economic policies influenced ownership in the economy, which shaped the economy's structure. As a result of foreign ownership of the economies, these countries and their RECs trade more with the outside world than within the continent, with the EU taking the largest share of their exports (Gumede, 2020:7). In South Africa, 21.7 percent of exports go to the EU, while 21.2 percent of Kenyan exports go to the EU (WTO, 2020a; WTO, 2020b). The call of *Agenda 2036* goes against hunger and malnutrition and for food production, but this is undermined by the landlessness in both countries that is the product of a negotiated compromise. These hinder the call for structural transformation and industrialisation through value addition, as advocated by *Agenda 2063*. Furthermore, the EPAs entered into between the EU and the RECs might impact negatively on the implementation of AfCFTA.

The comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya and South Africa have undermined human development in their respective countries through their neoliberal economic policies. The economic growth registered by African countries during the 2000s has not reduced poverty as was expected, because of underlying inequalities (Cheru, 2017:208). Inequality is rife in Kenya despite the economy having grown at an average of 5 percent since 2005. More than half of Kenya's total wealth is controlled by 20 percent of the richest population, with more millionaires set to be created in the coming 10 years (Oxfam, 2020). The fruits of economic growth are not trickling down to the poorest, with the poverty rate at 36.1 percent of the population (Ehrhart et al., 2020). South Africa is regarded as one of the most unequal country in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63 and more than half of the population living in poverty (Stats SA, 2017). This demonstrates that the majority are left behind, with only few politicians and their families enjoying the fruits of freedom. For instance, Ramaphosa has acquired USD 450 million through his interests

in mining, retail and the service sector, and Kenyatta family is one of the wealthiest families in Kenya through their interests in agriculture and the banking sector. Therefore, shared prosperity as envisaged by *Agenda 2063* remains elusive because of lack of structural transformation and neoliberalism. Past commodity booms reinforced inequality and shied away from much-needed inclusive growth, and commodity-based economies have not created the jobs that are critical to shared prosperity. Education have also contributed to reproducing inequality within the society despite African countries making progress with the MDG Two, primary school enrolment.

SSA countries are renowned for their oldest and the longest-serving leaders in the world. As a result, leadership or lack thereof has always been a concern when it comes to continental development. Leadership at all levels is critical, especially at member state level, because sovereignty is vested in national entities (AGA, 2019:6). As clearly indicated in the previous section, leadership at national level has always been a hindrance, as the comprador bourgeoisies have put their interests intertwined with foreign capital above that of their own people and the continent. Hence, the analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa with regard to the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. According to Branch and Cheeseman (2006:28), despite periodic change that took place in Kenya, the fact that the executive traces back to KANU sometime in their history, shows that the state itself has not changed. South Africa under the ANC – the dominant party, has perpetuated neoliberalism and corruption with impunity. The current Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the rot in the leadership of both countries, with millions of U.S. dollars looted by politicians and government officials (Igunza, 2020; Smit, 2020). This demonstrates that leadership or lack thereof, could continue being a problem with regard to the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

Both countries are ranked among the most corrupt on the globe by Transparency International. This, together with the rent-seeking behaviour of the comprador bourgeoisies undermines the call for good governance and the rule of law for successful implementation of *Agenda 2063* (AU Commission, 2015a:5). To Fanon (1963:172), in the post-independent states, privileges multiply and corruption triumphs, while morality declines, as the intermediary position of the comprador bourgeoisies serves their looting. South Africa is rated amongst the most corrupt countries in SSA, with 64 percent of its citizens of the view that corruption has increased from 2018 to 2019, and 70 percent

thinking that the government is doing a bad job in tackling corruption (Pring & Vrushi, 2019:53). The South African police are considered to be amongst the most corrupt institutions, which translate into undermining the rule of law (Pring & Vrushi, 2019:53). In Kenya, 67 percent of Kenyans believe that corruption has increased from 2018 to 2019, with 66 percent considering the police one of the most corrupt institutions in Kenya (Pring & Vrushi, 2019:38). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 71 percent of the citizens were of a view that government is doing a bad job in tackling corruption (Pring & Vrushi, 2019:38). The comprador bourgeoisies of both countries have used their control of the state to entrench rent-seeking through Kenyanisation and B-BBEE, which undermines the productivity of the economy and the possibility of new investment (Jumanne & Keong, 2018:16).

The rampant corruption in both countries has undermined institutions, especially the justice systems, as indicated by the number of people who view the police as corrupt. In Kenya, 28 percent of the people believe that judges and magistrates are corrupt, while in South Africa, 32 percent of the people believe that judges and magistrates are corrupt (Pring & Vrushi, 2019:38-53). As a result, corruption in both case studies act as brakes on development (Mwaura, 2005:14). However, despite the rife corruption, IFIs continue to lend money to both governments with their loan conditions accepted, and in return make profit (cf. Rosauer, 2020; Vilkas, 2020). The people's perspective on the justice system has a negative impact on the fight against crime in South Africa, and the country is known as the most unsafe country in the world. This has affected the economy badly, especially the tourism sector. This would have a negative impact on the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, since the *Agenda* seeks to improve human security, to reduce violent crime, the drug trade, human trafficking, the trade of illegal arms, and piracy and all forms of illicit trade in Africa (AU Commission, 2015a:6). Moreover, this further undermines a peaceful and secured Africa as articulated in *Agenda 2063* document and subsequent, shared prosperity and sustainable development.

The undermining of the judiciary in South Africa is tantamount to undermining democracy, since an independent judiciary is the cornerstone of democracy, which is a prerequisite for a peaceful and a secure continent. In South Africa under the ANC government, the courts, and the Chapter 9 institutions have come under attack in an attempt to cover corruption. In Kenya, the comprador bourgeoisies' actions have undermined democracy

and led to the post-election violence that engulfed Kenya in 1992/3, 1997 and 2007, as attempted by the comprador bourgeoisies to stay in power (Kanyinga, 2009:326). The 2007 post-election violence turned ethnic between supporters of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU), which saw two thousand people killed and as many as three thousand displaced from their homes (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009:259). On many occasions Kenyan elections are not free and fair, and the 2017 elections were characterised by a political impasse between Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. These actions by the comprador bourgeoisies would undermine *Agenda 2063* which prioritises democratic values and citizens' participation. Hence the call for structural democratisation to be adopted in place of processional democratisation (Ake, 2000:186). Structural democratisation entails the simultaneous restructuring of the state and transformation of the society (Ake, 2000:186). It also encompasses human dignity, human rights, and rule of law, which were denied during colonialism.

The comprador bourgeoisies have undermined continental integration through the pursuit of gradual and linear integration. The dominance of the Monrovia Group during the formation of the OAU led to gradual integration. In 1991 the OAU adopted the Abuja Treaty – a Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) as a blueprint for Africa's integration, of which *Agenda 2063* is an extension. *Agenda 2063* seeks to promote regional and continental integration based on the ideas and values of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance (AU Commission, 2015a:4). Political and socio-economic integration is advocated through free movement of people, goods, capital, infrastructure, and services between African countries. Unity, which has been advocated since 1963, is seen as a tool to counter colonialism, economic subjugation, neo-colonialism, occupation[96] and the balkanisation of Africa (AU Commission, 2015a:4). The comprador bourgeoisies committed to end all forms of colonialism and occupation of African territories by 2020, which was another farfetched target given that in 2020, the U.S. recognised the claim of Morocco over Western Sahara by establishing a consulate in the disputed territory. The Abuja Treaty and *Agenda 2063* advocated for the creation of CFTA and African continental financial institutions such as the African Central Bank, African Monetary Fund, African Investment Bank, etc. to form the AEC. In the process of

[96] The AU committed to end the occupation of Chagos Archipelago under the UK, the Comorian Island of Mayotte under France and Western Sahara under Morocco by 2020 (AU Commission, 2015a:4).

creating the CFTA, the AU Commission adopted the BIAT, with the aim of deepening Africa's market integration and increasing the volume of trade between African countries (AU Commission, 2012:3).

The CFTA used the RECs as building blocks, and the TFTA, and was finalised in 2014 between EAC, COMESA, and SADC[97] (UNCTAD, 2016:2). On a continent which lacks integration, intra-African trade currently stands at 18 percent compared to other regions, thus integration is a necessity. From the Treaty of Rome to the Yaoundé Convention to the Lomé Convention, the African and European relationship has undermined integration and perpetuated the export of raw materials and agricultural products (Martin, 1982:233). The current SADC-EU EPA and EAC-EU EPA indicates the Faustian pact that has perpetuated these asymmetrical relations and seeks to lock the region into neoliberalism and promote open regionalism (Hurt, 2012:495). Neoliberalism promotes export-oriented and commodity-based economies that undermine structural transformation; thus, intra-trade, economic integration and open regionalism pose a threat to the coherence of regional projects (Hurt, 2012:495). *Agenda 2063* therefore seeks to improve intra-African trade to 50 percent by 2045 and increase Africa's share of global trade from 2 percent to 12 percent (AU Commission, 2015a:5). The reason for this meagre share of global trade is commodity trading, therefore, for Africa to improve its share of global trade, structural transformation is critical. Trade is identified as an important engine for economic growth and development, but in Africa, trade has not served as a catalyst for rapid sustainable growth and development (AU Commission, 2012:1). Africa remains a primary commodity export-oriented economy and lacks intra-trade. Most African countries enter bilateral economic relations with developed countries despite being in RECs. Thus, instead of cooperating they compete for markets with their counterparts, which undermines integration.

In January 2012 at the 18th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the assembly of heads of state and governments adopted the decision to establish AfCFTA, with 2017 being the deadline (AU Commission, 2012:1). The AU Commission missed the 2017 deadline and AfCFTA was only ratified in 2019 and came in operation on 1 January 2021. Once it is operational, it will constitute the largest free trade bloc in the world, and will be

[97] Note that over 20 countries have signed the agreement but only 4 – Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda have ratified it (Gumede, 2020:8).

a key instrument for the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063* and economic growth, through trade that will counter poverty, unemployment and inequality. For the successful implementation of AfCFTA, trade facilitation constraints such as tariff barriers and infrastructure need to be addressed. The AfCFTA will see to it the removal of trade barriers, tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, which will lead to an increase of trade in goods and services between member states (Vickers, 2017:2). However, the RECs have the potential to hinder successful implementation of AfCFTA in resistance to trimming down their size and responsibilities (Gumede, 2021:10). African integration seeks to follow the EU linear model of integration (Vickers, 2017:8). However, the model is deemed inappropriate for Africa and leads to unrealistic targets and deadlines for integration which ignore the existing political, economic and institutional realities on the ground. Vickers (2017:10) argues that developmental regionalism is the only alternative to Africa's integration. Developmental regionalism will prioritise infrastructure, market integration, and structural transformation to diversify production structures. AfCFTA is envisaged to be mutually beneficial to all member states, but there are fears amongst African leaders that this will lead to marginalisation of small countries.

According to the AU Commission (2015a:4), by 2063 Africa will be a united continent with a world-class infrastructure that criss-crosses the continent and improves integration and intra-African trade. PIDA has identified transport, energy, water and ICT infrastructure to boost trade, spark economic growth and create jobs (AU Commission, 2012:1). *Agenda 2063* seeks to construct a High Speed Train Network, ICT by installing broadband and optic fibre cables throughout the continent, open Africa's skies through single air transport and improve access to electricity (AU Commission, 2015a:5). For this to take place, Africa needs more than USD 93 billion annually for infrastructure, with a chunk of that money going towards solving the energy crisis (Mills et al., 2017: 69; AfDB, 2019). The Grand Inga Dam will address the power crisis, together with solar wind mills and wind turbines. If implemented, these measures will reduce energy costs and improve access, as power usage rises from 39 percent to nearly 70 percent in 2040, with 800 million Africans having access (AU Commission, 2012:3). These plans have no detailed strategy on how they will be implemented; for instance, the Grand Inga Dam Project faces resource shortages, which makes its completion in the first 10 years of *Agenda 2063* unlikely.

These mega projects are not new to Africa. In the 1970s, the African Group at the UN in concert with the OAU and ECA, advocated a Trans-African Highway Project which would stretch from Mombasa to the Lagos highway via Uganda, the DRC, and many other African countries (Ndizera & Muzee, 2018:152). The project was stillborn and never took off, despite much hype and pledging made at the conference, which was held to raise funds. In the 1980s the Trans-Africa Highway Bureau that was established to manage the project, ceased to exist (Ndizera & Muzee, 2018:152). The Yamoussoukro Declaration which advocated for open skies for Africa, has been reduced to theatrics and performative gestures without implementation. The lack of implementation and corruption from the comprador bourgeoisies has hindered infrastructure, and corruption has had a negative impact on any quality of infrastructure that exists (Gupta et al., 2000). In Kenya, the government has built a railway track to nowhere – 120km from Nairobi, through the Central Rift Valley, and stopping at a remote village (Wasike, 2019). This has managed to plunge the country into massive debt. In South Africa, major infrastructure projects have been the source of corruption i.e. the construction of Medupi and Kusile power stations were meant to cost the country ZAR 69.1 billion and ZAR 80.6 billion ZAR respectively, but those cost have increased to ZAR 208.7 billion for Medupi, and ZAR 239.4 billion for Kusile, with the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) alleging theft of ZAR 139 billion (Donnelly, 2019).

Funding, which is identified as the critical enabler for the implementation of *Agenda 2063,* remains a challenge for such a huge project. Hence, the AU Commission (2015b) has formulated a Resource Mobilisation Strategy (RMS) to raise funds. To avoid the past repeating itself, the AU Commission has emphasised the need to tap into African wealth to finance its development agenda (El Fassi & Aggad, 2014:1). The RMS identified potential sources of finance in Africa as domestic taxes, mineral resources, remittances, sovereign wealth, and market capitalisation (El Fassi & Aggad, 2014:5). This will result in self-reliance and avoidance of over-dependence on external donors, which was detrimental to previous continental programmes (AU Commission, 2015b:72-4). The AfDB is leading the mobilisation of funds for the execution of *Agenda 2063* at all levels – continental, regional and member state, especially for the Fast-Track Projects (AU Commission, 2015b:72-4). However, funding from many African countries is unlikely as most countries are failing to keep up with their annual AU fees, while the organisation

relies on external funders to stay operational. It remains the key responsibility of African leadership to mobilise resources for the benefit of all Africans (Addaney, 2017:189).

Industrialisation is paramount to trade and structural transformation. SSA is the least industrialised region in the world with exception of South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria. Post-independent SSA has been characterised by a de-industrialisation process (Anderson, 2015). In SSA, manufacturing accounts for only 14 percent of the GDP and 1.5 percent of the world manufacturing (Mills et al. 2017:131). This is the lowest compared to all the regions in the world (AfDB, 2019). Market liberalisation and trade liberalisation, which form part of neoliberalism, have led to deindustrialisation in Kenya and South Africa, and coincided with the financialisation of their economies.

Manufacture in Kenya and South Africa is heavily concentrated on low technology products such as food, textiles, clothing, and footwear and assembly plants and is not involved in the medium and high technology segments of global manufacturing which is characterised by rapid growth (AU Commission, 2008:1). As a result, Kenya and South Africa has not kept pace with China and South Korea despite being at the same level of independence (Anderson, 2015). AIDA and *Agenda 2063* have clearly articulated that industrial growth in Africa could be powered through beneficiation and value addition (AU Commission, 2015a:2). This would require ownership of the raw materials by African states to ensure the peoples' benefit. Hence the call by AMV to manage Africa's extractive industry to promote inclusive and sustainable development, structural transformation and inclusive economic growth (Busia, 2015). Science, technology and innovation should underpin industrialisation in fostering structural transformation in manufacturing sectors and addressing job creation, inequality, and poverty (AU Commission, 2015b:16; AU Commission, 2017). Education plays a critical role in this regard.

Education has been touted as important to the success of *Agenda 2063*. Commentators (cf. Addaney, 2017:182) argues that the current education is not responsive to the 7 aspirations of *Agenda 2063*, hence the call for educated and skilled citizenry, underpinned by science, technology and innovation (AU Commission, 2015a:2). With science and technology fostering structural transformation, research and development would be critical to the SSA education system, especially towards industrial development. Therefore, member states are expected to reach a one percent expenditure on research and development by 2023 (AU Commission, 2015b:29). Furthermore, member states

should develop and implement research and development policies for the growth of marine resources businesses, ocean economy, the African high speed train network, infrastructural development, and national commodity exchange (AU Commission, 2015b:32-40). Research and development would be critical for SSA's health system especially in combatting communicable diseases within and across countries (AU Commission, 2015b:19).

Education that is underpinned by research and development would also be critical to skills development, and access to it is imperative. *Agenda 2063* will continue to increase access to childhood, primary and secondary education – universal primary and secondary education will be visible by 2023 (AU Commission, 2015b:17). Access to tertiary education is also emphasised, with a need for technical skills for ambitious projects. Hence, the call for a creation of a Pan-African e-University as articulated by the AU Commission (2015a). *Agenda 2063* advocates that at least 70 percent of secondary school students not entering tertiary education are provided with a range of options for further skills development (AU Commission, 2015b:27). Through education and skills development, inter-generational social mobility will be possible (AU Commission, 2015b:17). However, despite these resolutions and targets, in Kenya nearly 1 million primary school-aged children are not attending school (Oxfam, 2020). This makes Kenya the 9th highest number of any country in the world with their level of spending on education continuously decreasing since early 2000s (Oxfam, 2020). In South Africa, investment in public education failed to translate into desired outputs. There is a massive gap between private and public education. The public education system requires huge amounts of money but produces a lot of dropouts and graduates who are inappropriately qualified for the South African economy (Mbeki, 2009:97). This has resulted in skills shortages in sectors such as medicine, engineering, and ICT. Unequal access to education has reproduced inequality in both countries. Improved access to education should be accompanied by universal access to quality health care and service by 2030.

Member states are expected to adopt Minimum Social Protection policies, which entail provision of essential health care, and to domesticate an African Health Strategy by 2017 (AU Commission, 2015b:5). This will expand access to quality health care services, particularly for women and girls (AU Commission, 2015b:12). *Agenda 2063* advocates for healthy and well-nourished citizens, and a functional African Centre for Disease Control

providing leadership in coordinating continental efforts to combat communicable diseases in SSA countries (AU Commission, 2015b:16-9). By 2023, all forms of malnutrition and maternal, child and neo-natal mortalities would be reduced by at least 50 percent (AU Commission, 2015b:19). HIV/AIDS deaths and malaria would also be reduced by 50 percent, with access to anti-retroviral drugs for persons with HIV/AIDS being universal (AU Commission, 2015b:19). This will require mass investment in the health care system by African leaders. Under the comprador bourgeoisies, many citizens in both case studies do not have access to healthcare. In Kenya, a quarter of the population lacks access to healthcare, with an estimated 2.6 million people falling into poverty or remaining poor due to ill health each year (Oxfam, 2020). In the case of South Africa, the health system is two-tiered, with the poor heavily dependent on the under-resourced public sector, while the wealthy with private medical insurance use the private medical sector (Gordon et al., 2020:1). In South Africa, the poor are more likely to experience poor health, disabilities, and the simultaneous occurrence of more than one disease (Gordon et al., 2020:1). The status quo in both case studies is taking place despite resolutions made by the NDP and Kenya's *Vision 2030* in addressing unequal access to healthcare, and has led to the call for a universal health coverage scheme (Ilinca et al., 2019:1; Gordon et al., 2020:1). However, the current looting by the comprador bourgeoisies, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, has put in doubt the implementation of any universal health coverage scheme.

For the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*, there are enablers, or critical success factors. They include citizen participation, especially the youth and women; transformative leadership; a capable developmental state; an efficient public service; and a strong private sector with symbiotic relationships, wherein democracy, the rule of law, justice and equity prevail, and a result-based approach and revitalised strategic planning guiding investors towards the priorities of *Agenda 2063* (AU Commission, 2015b:64). Stakeholders should be included from the inception of *Agenda 2063* to its implementation, through monitoring and evaluation. This might prove to be difficult as the Kenyan and South African citizenry are continuously marginalised by the comprador bourgeoisies to secure and consolidate their power.

A capable developmental state and efficient public service can be undermined by various factors such as weak institutions, patronage, and blurred lines between the state and

political parties. Where deployment is based on loyalty rather than merit, patronage and clientelism have undermined a capable state in Kenya and South Africa. Therefore, it will undermine the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Weak institutions are the result of the "big man syndrome" in SSA countries, which has manifested at the continental level in the AU and its organs. Weak institutions have also undermined democracy, justice and the rule of law in the region. This impedes investor confidence in the region, as comprador bourgeoisies continuously threaten property law and the symbiotic relationship between the private and public sectors. According to Mbeki (2009) and Mills (2010), SSA is without patriotic and innovative leadership, hence, the current status quo.

Monitoring and evaluation are important in the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, which requires strong institutions. This means a continuous function that involves systematically collecting data from inception and efficiently and effectively assessing it to measure the realisation of intended results (Kimaro & Fourie, 2017:2). Through monitoring and evaluation, performance and progress will be documented and reported to indicate whether *Agenda 2063* is achieving its objectives and reaching its target audience (Kimaro & Fourie, 2017:2). Monitoring and evaluation can contribute immensely to the achievement of *Agenda 2063*'s aspirations. Institutions such as the AU Commission, the APRM, AUDA, PAP, and AfDB[98] play a monitoring and evaluation role in *Agenda 2063* (Corrigan & Gruzd, 2017:5; AGA & APRM, 2019:4).

Successful implementation of *Agenda 2063* will result in African countries being amongst the best global performers in quality-of-life measures through the attainment of inclusive economic growth, with a fully functional African common market and the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services (AU Commission, 2015a:3). The continent will move away from consisting of low-income countries to middle and high-income countries. However, because of the neo-colonialism in both countries, the implementation of *Agenda 2063* is highly questionable, as clearly demonstrated above. The following section demonstrates the lack of implementation of *Agenda 2063* by Kenya and South Africa.

[98] Note that beyond the general descriptions of these institutions little attempt was made to provide specifics from these institutions with regard to *Agenda 2063*. AU Commission is expected to mobilise technical and financial support from member states and partners while PAP is expected to provide a legislative guideline to RECs and national parliaments (cf. Fagbayibo, 2018).

7.4. Implementing *Agenda 2063*

As indicated above, Africa's success in realising the aspirations of *Agenda 2063* depend on the post-independent member states' efforts towards implementation of the agenda (Muigua, 2019:1). Moreover, the comprador bourgeoisies and their ongoing Faustian pact put the implementation of *Agenda 2063* and the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan at risk, as it is imperative to domesticate and incorporate *Agenda 2063*'s letter and spirit into national and regional programmes (le Pere, 2016:19). The post-independent states under comprador bourgeoisies have perpetuated neoliberalism, corruption and patronage, which has entrenched the weak institutions and incapacitated the state. Therefore, the post-independent state under the comprador bourgeoisies is detrimental to the implementation of the *Agenda*, as is shown in the following paragraphs. South Africa's implementation is off-track and Kenya is yet to introduce the *Agenda* in parliament.

The post-independent member states are not only responsible for implementation but also for the monitoring and evaluation of both processes and the outcomes of the implementation (AU Commission, 2015b:58). Furthermore, member states are required to mobilise resources for the execution of the national agenda i.e. to launch and adopt *Agenda 2063*; domesticate *Agenda 2063* into their visions and plans; and develop policy guidelines on the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of *Agenda 2063* by various stakeholders (Muigua, 2019:4). Stakeholders within member states entail provincial/ regional governments, municipalities, the private sector, civil societies, and labour. RECs such as SADC, EAC, IGAD, and COMESA facilitates the adoption of *Agenda 2063* by member states while also playing a key role in implementation and monitoring and evaluation (AU Commission, 2015b:58).

The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan includes the adoption of *Agenda 2063* by member states for a period of two years, which includes the formation of *Agenda 2063* Focal Groups/ National Advisory Groups and the National Planning Authority; definition of goals and targets and the introduction of *Agenda 2063* in parliament (AU Commission, 2015b:77). The remaining years will be dominated by capacity building, implementation, monitoring and evaluation by member states who will be encouraged to align their national planning to the *Agenda*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan cycle, which is divided into short-term, 2-3 years; medium-term, 4-5 years; and long-term, 10 years (AU Commission, 2015b:77). *Agenda 2063* recognises the diversity of the continent; hence it

has given each country ample policy space to formulate policy that suit its conditions and to arrive at the continental goals and targets (AU Commission, 2015c:7).

The NDP and *Vision 2030* are long-term developmental plans for their countries, and both seek to make their country globally competitive with high-income economies by 2030. Both plans are based on the foundations of macroeconomic stability; labour deregulation; trickle-down economics; industrialisation underpinned by science, technology and innovation (STI); privatisation; minimum state intervention; and growing an inclusive economy while eradicating poverty, unemployment, and inequality (Moyo & Mamobolo, 2014:949; Muigua, 2019:6). Some of these objectives overlap with those of *Agenda 2063*, thus making domestication and implementation of easier. However, others contradict the objectives of *Agenda 2063*, but these policies are premised on neoliberalism and seen within the framework of catching up with the West, which led to false start.

The formulation stage by post-independent member states ought to have started in 2014 – the first year of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan in both case studies. South Africa, through its deployment of Dlamini-Zuma to the AU, was a leading proponent of *Agenda 2063*. In 2014, the South African government through their Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) was responsible for facilitating consultation with the youth, academics and think tanks, women, civil society, and businesses (DIRCO, 2015:2). This was to live up to the people-driven programme resolved at the AU Policy Organ in a meeting held in Equatorial Guinea in June 2014, that each member state was to consult domestically to ascertain the different views of stakeholders, and to submit these results before the end of the year (DIRCO, 2015:2). The contributions made in these consultations formed parts of *Agenda 2063*. Kenya would form part of 31 countries that had been sensitised on implementation of *Agenda 2063* and on the process of domestication (AU Commission & ECA, 2016:3). However, Kenya is yet to introduce *Agenda 2063* in parliament, while there has been some focus on *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* by Kenya government. In South Africa, *Agenda 2063* was introduced in parliament, and its adoption and domestication discussed. Domestication will ensure the building of state institutions and thus citizens' participation, and will invoke commitment from the member states and facilitate their collective progress in implementing *Agenda 2063* (AU Commission & ECA, 2016:7).

In 2021, *Agenda 2063* is in its eighth year of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan and has passed its medium term. It is against this background that the implementation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan and *Agenda 2063* are evaluated in both case studies and their respective regions. The focus will be on Aspiration One of *Agenda 2063*: "*a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development*". Aspiration One has 7 Goals with 13 Priority Areas (AU Commission, 2015b:16-7). The goals range from high standards of living and well-educated citizens to modern agriculture and environmentally sustainable climate-resilient economies (AU Commission, 2015b:16-7). The continental aggregate score of Aspiration One is 29 percent with Goal Four, "*transformed economies*", at a mere 18 percent (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:1). This clearly indicates a lack of structural change and the continuation of neoliberalism with commodity-underpinned economies that are vulnerable to world shocks. As a result, it comes as no surprise that Goal Five, modern agriculture for increased productivity and production, is at an 8 percent aggregated score continentally, indicating a lack of mechanisation of agriculture and thus of structural transformation (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:1).

There has been progress with regard to a few Fast-Track/Flagship Projects, which are supposed to engender the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. By January 2021, Kenya and South Africa formed part of countries that had signed and ratified and deposited AfCFTA, which started operations in January 2021. To date, 54 countries have signed and 37 have ratified AfCFTA so far, but South Africa and Kenya cannot yet trade under the AfCFTA interim regime because of custom union protocols (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:2). This was followed by 29 AU member states signing the Solemn Commitment to establish the Single African Air Transport Market, and 18 of those also singing a Memorandum of Implementation to remove any air service restrictions (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:2). The beginning of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan saw South Africa and DRC signing the Grand Inga Memorandum of Understanding, which led to the development of the Treaty on Grand Inga Hydropower Project (RSA Parliament, 2014:382). This was a commitment from the South African government on investment in the construction of the transmission infrastructure from the DRC to South Africa, from which South Africa would receive 5 000 megawatts (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:33). Unfortunately, the construction of the Inga Hydropower Dam has been delayed by the Spanish Company, *Actividades de Construcción Servicios* (ACS) withdrawing from the project as a result of

a dispute with their Chinese counterparts (Laudette, 2020). Furthermore, the project has been plagued by funding problems (Laudette, 2020). The “Silencing the guns” by 2020 remains a wish, as SSA is engulfed by conflict in Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali and Chad. The “Silencing the guns” fast track project is rendered meaningless without the backup of necessary policy and institutional rigour (Karbo & Murithi, 2018:257).

Some progress has been made on the free movement of people and the African passport (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:2). 32 countries have signed the Protocol of the Treaty relating to the Free Movement of Persons, their right of residence and right of establishment (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:2). Free movement of people has also improved with various countries honouring the call to free movement of people and improved visa openness. Kenya, together with many EAC countries has liberalised their visa regime with a new visa on arrival policy for all Africans, which promotes open borders and boosts trade between African countries (AfDB & AU Commission, 2018:17). This saw Kenya move into the top 10 countries on the Visa Openness Index (AfDB & AU Commission, 2018:17). However, xenophobic attacks, which characterised South Africa in 2019, undermine such initiatives.

As part of the domestication of *Agenda 2063* by individual countries, in the first year (2014) of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan, the South African government had to create national focal points for *Agenda 2063*, create an advisory body, launch *Agenda 2063*, and implement a capacity development plan (AU Commission, 2015b:82-3). In a reflection of the comprador bourgeoisies’ attitude to continental programmes, the Kenyan government failed to start the aforementioned process as part of domestication of *Agenda 2063*, and failed to introduce the *Agenda* in parliament. As a result, Kenya did not join the countries that were evaluated in February 2020. Nonetheless, to evaluate Kenya’s progress, the author takes a look at the implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs*, as some overlap. For the thesis, the analysis focussed on Goal One, Two, Three, Four, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven which overlap with Aspiration One of *Agenda 2063* and seven of its goals. However, in many cases the data is not available or is out of date, with some going as far back as 2006, which demonstrates the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in the implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs*, given the importance of evaluation and monitoring.

Agenda 2030 – SDGs, Goal One seeks the eradication of poverty by 2030. According to the data, more than one third of Kenya's population lives below the poverty line and 37 percent of the population lives below the international poverty line (USD 1.90 per day), while 36.1 percent lives below the national poverty line with only 26 percent of those people getting social assistance from government (AUDA, 2020a). This is in spite of *Agenda 2063's* calls for the provision of Minimum Social Protection Policies by member states covering essential health care, the unemployed, elderly persons and persons with disabilities (AU Commission, 2015b:5). This signifies an increase in the proportion of people living below the international poverty line from 31 percent to 37 percent in 2015, with a 24 percent prevalence of undernourishment (AUDA, 2020a). At this rate, it seems unconceivable that hunger can be eradicated by 2030 as specified by *Agenda 2030 – SDGs*, given the increase from 21 percent in 2013 to 24 percent in 2016, which coincides with the implementation of *Vision 2030*, despite its anti-poverty rhetoric.

Furthermore, Goal Three of the SDGs seeks to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all people of all ages. According to AUDA (2020a), in Kenya there was a decline in the maternal mortality ratio of 510 per 100 000 live births in 2015, which is above the low-income countries' figure of 462 per 100 000 live births. The SDGs goal target is to reduce the number to less than 70 per 100 000 live births in 2030, but this seems unlikely, given that the number has only improved from 510 in 2015 to almost 600 per 100 000 live births (ECA, 2017:51; Mo Ibrahim Foundation (IMF), 2017:35). Moreover, the under-fives mortality rate of Kenya hovers above 40 per 1 000 live births (EAC, 2017:25-35). This indicates the deterioration in the Human Development Index, which is a reflection on education, health, and strong institutions. There has been a decrease in government's education expenditure which stands at 18 percent as of 2017 from 27 percent in 2005 and 1 percent of the GDP spend on Research and Development (AUDA, 2020a). However, 60 percent of children and young people have achieved a minimum proficiency level in reading and mathematics.

Goal Eight of the SDGs calls for "*achieving a higher level of economic productivity through diversification, technology upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high value-added and labour-intensive sectors*". However, Kenya has no data on how this diversification trajectory is progressing, except for the annual growth rate at real GDP per capita that stands at 2 percent, on the back of the agricultural sector and the service

sector. Goal Nine seeks to build resilient infrastructure and industrialisation with improved rail and road infrastructure and manufacturing value-added per capita at USD 118 (AUDA, 2020a). Nonetheless, manufacturing comprises light manufacturing instead of technology and machinery intensive manufacturing. There is no data available for Goal Ten, which deals with reducing inequality nevertheless, Goal Eleven demonstrates that inequality is rife and on the increase with 47 percent of the urban population living in slums in Kenya (AUDA, 2020a).

The attaining of targets such as eradication of poverty, zero hunger and reducing inequality by *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* is in doubt, given that economic growth is accompanied by poverty and inequality. The gap in education and health and lack of access to both health care and education as Kenyan government reduces its expenditure on these essential services, exacerbates inequality. Economic growth takes place on the back of the agriculture and service sector which indicates lack of diversity and will hinder the 2030 targets on diversifying the Kenyan economy. The comprador bourgeoisies have continued to push for neoliberalism that is detrimental to development and non-implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs*. The comprador bourgeoisies' inertia is also echoed in a snail pace implementation of *Vision 2030*. Since the implementation of *Vision 2030*, Kenyan economy growth has been meagre at an average rate of 4 percent with poor performance in key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism (Anyanzwa, 2016). In conjunction with high governmental debt, the implementation of the vision is at risk (Anyanzwa, 2016). The implementation of the *Vision 2030* in the First Medium-Term Plan (2008-2012) has ranged between low and moderate (Kilonzi & Ndung'u, 2014:89). The implementation of the *Vision 2030's* Flagship Projects faced challenges such as corruption, lack of resources, poor coordination and lack of coherence between directorates (Nkirote, 2011:3; Mwita, 2013:29).

Unlike Kenya, the South African government has introduced *Agenda 2063* in parliament and has started the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The overall score for South Africa is 23 percent and thus, is described as off the mark as far as the implementation of *Agenda 2063* goes. Figure 7.1 below indicates that South Africa has performed badly in almost all *Agenda 2063*'s aspirations, which is a cause for concern. For Aspiration One, "*a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development*", South Africa recorded 19 percent, with its manufacturing sector continuing to contract, although

marginally, by 0.5 percent to 12.3 percent between 2013 and 2019 (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:13). Aspiration Three recorded 13 percent, the second-lowest, as a result of entrenched corruption, lack of good governance and undermining of the rule of law. As can be seen in Figure 7.1, the implementation of four aspirations are off the mark, with a further three aspirations above 30 percent – a cause for concern.

Figure 7.1. South Africa's performance by All Aspirations



Source: AUDA, 2020b.

Figure 7.2 below records the goals of Aspiration One, and provide a clear picture of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent South Africa with regard to the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Goal One: "*a high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all*". South Africa scores 29 percent and reflects the high poverty rates in South Africa, the high inequality and high unemployment. According to Stats SA (2020), more than half of the South African population lives in poverty, with unemployment at 32.5

percent official definition and expanded definition standing at 43.1 percent. In Goal Two: "*well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation*", the country scored zero. This is in spite of the huge investment in public education, which has failed to translate into the desired outputs. Thus, South Africa's economy is deprived of skills in sectors such as medicine, engineering and ICT (Mbeki, 2009:97). Goal Three is based on "*healthy and well-nourished citizens*", which is hindered because of the country's two-tiered health system, with the poor likely to experience poor health, disability, and the simultaneous occurrence of more than one disease (Gordon et al., 2020:1). The maternal mortality rates decreased from 143 to 121 per 100 000 live births, while the under-five mortality rate South Africa is slightly above 40 per 1 000 live births (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:11).

In Goal Four, which seeks to transform the economy and create jobs, South Africa has scored 14 percent. This goal speaks to structural transformation which is critical for inclusive and people-centred development (Lopes et al., 2017:2). The comprador bourgeoisie government is failing to transform the economy, further perpetuating inequality in South Africa. The country has continued with economic policies geared towards foreign capital rather than the development of the country. Under the NDP, the ANC government continues prioritising FDI, macroeconomic stability, and economic liberalisation. The current Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to a recession that saw mining decrease by 2.8 percent, manufacturing by 2.6 percent, electricity generation in South Africa by 3.1 percent, and retail trade sales by 4.2 percent, all of which have contributed to unemployment (Stats SA, 2020). In Goal Five: "*modernisation of agriculture*" and Goal Six: "*acceleration of the blue economy*", South Africa has scored zero (AUDA, 2020b). The blue economy is yet to be tapped, despite government resolutions about it during President Zuma's tenure, and agriculture is still to be modernised, which has undermined food production. The South African government's land reform programme has failed and has contributed to poverty and hunger. The above indicates the reluctance of the comprador bourgeoisie to implement *Agenda 2063*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan. Figure 7.2 shows South Africa's performance in all its goals.

Figure 7.2. South Africa's performance by All Goals



Source: AUDA (2020b)

In Goal Ten, South Africa scores one 1 percent, which speaks to its infrastructure or lack thereof, that is critical to its development. Under the comprador bourgeoisies' government especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, infrastructure has deteriorated, with the rail sector being the worst affected. South Africa has also seen deterioration in transparency and accountability; property rights; and anti-corruption measures, which have all contributed to the corruption in the public and private sectors, and hindered investment and economic growth (cf. MIF, 2017:53-60). As a result, South Africa achieved a low score on Goal Eleven: "*entrenching democratic values, justice and the rule of law*" and Goal Twelve: "*creation of capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels*". These scores illustrate the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies, which undermines the implementation of *Agenda 2063* and South Africa's development.

The aforementioned goals have been broken down into priority areas, as demonstrated in Figure 7.3, which shows the lack of implementation of *Agenda 2063* by South Africa.

Priority areas derive from the goals. For Aspiration One there are 13 priority areas for stakeholders during implementation.

Figure 7.3. South African performance by Priority Areas



Source: AUDA, 2020b

Priority Area One on incomes, jobs and decent work, South Africa scored 1 percent which reflects of the jobs loss bloodbath South Africans have had to become accustomed to. Poverty, inequality and hunger is at 30 percent in Priority Area Two, with South Africa referred to as the most unequal society in the world. The Priority Area on STI, manufacturing and value addition, score is zero, demonstrating that lack of structural transformation and deindustrialisation that has encompassed South Africa since independence. The marine, tourism, and agricultural sectors, as priority areas, have also scored zero, indicating that much work is needed in these sectors.

The comprador bourgeoisies in South Africa have hindered the implementation of *Agenda 2063* through their pursuit of neoliberalism. Neoliberal economic policies have ensured a lack of structural transformation and the reproduction of poverty, unemployment and

inequality. Since independence, majority of South Africa have been excluded economically and this has been exacerbated under the NDP, which advocates for privatisation, trade and market liberalisation and trickle-down economics. Therefore, the NDP is believed to have been a premature forecast for the South African future (Progressive Leader, 2019:49). Living standards of the masses continue to decrease under the leadership of the comprador bourgeoisies and their ongoing Faustian pact with the domestic business class and foreign capital.

The lack of implementation in Kenya and South Africa of *Agenda 2063* has negatively impacted the AU score and those of their respective RECs. Regions are not measured according to their RECs, but according to geographic locations. The AU Commission and AUDA (2020:1) state that East Africa (excluding Kenya) has recorded the highest performance, with an aggregated score of 48 percent against the 2019 targets and that Southern Africa has recorded the lowest aggregated score of 25 percent against the 2019 targets (AU Commission & AUDA, 2020:1). These scores of member states and RECs have contributed to the overall continental score of 33 percent, which is a cause for concern. However, the scores demonstrate declining poverty rates and improvements in the Human Development Index scores since the start of the implementation of *Agenda 2063* in 2014. Progress has, however, slowed (MIF, 2017:25; ECA, 2017:26).

This section has demonstrated that the comprador bourgeoisies are detrimental to the implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* and *Agenda 2063*. Moreover, it shows that the neoliberal economic policies that entrenched neo-colonialism in both countries have hindered the implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* and *Agenda 2063's* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan. Both agendas have been characterised by poor implementation in both countries, and this can be attributed to the neo-colonialism that illustrates the existence of the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital for the perpetual exploitation of post-independent Kenya and South Africa. The lack of implementation of *Agenda 2063* will have a negative impact on the implementation of AfCFTA. For a successful implementation of AfCFTA, non-tariff barriers such as infrastructure, diversification of the economies, industrialisation and integration need to be addressed which *Agenda 2063* has set out to address. Therefore, implementation of *Agenda 2063* is imperative to the implementation of AfCFTA.

The aforementioned is reflective of the comprador bourgeoisies' intermediary and anti-development role in post-independent epoch. They have hindered progress in the previous continental programmes through vacillation, false starts and non-implementation and if the implementation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan is anything to go by, the comprador bourgeoisies will undermine *Agenda 2063*. The comprador bourgeoisies have continued with catch-up economic policies, reiteration of colonial economy and the adoption of neoliberal economic policies underpinned by accumulation by dispossession. Accordingly, the consumptive and rent-seeking attitude of the comprador bourgeoisies, goes against the spirit of *Agenda 2063*. In both case studies this has resulted in neo-colonialism that hinders the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. Consequently, *Agenda 2063* is aimed at lulling the general public, especially marginalised majority in Africa into contentment until 2063. In addition, the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies has enabled MNCs and IFIs to usurp the right to development from both countries.

7.5. Conclusion

Chapter 7 has demonstrated that neo-colonialism in both countries has began to negatively impact the implementation of *Agenda 2063.* With the comprador bourgeoisies pursuing neoliberalism in both case studies, Kenya is yet to introduce *Agenda 2063* in parliament and its far from achieving sustainable developmental goals, as poverty increase, inequality on the rise, and deterioration in Human Development Index. In South Africa the *Agenda 2063*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan implementation is off track with an overall score of 23 percent which is evident in massive unemployment, landlessness and lack of structural transformation. Evaluation of the implementation of both the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of *Agenda 2063* and *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* demonstrates the comprador bourgeoisies' lack the political will to implement, consumptive and rent-seeking attitude. These can be attributed to comprador bourgeoisies' intermediary and antidevelopment role and neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism seeks to control the markets of former colonies, gatekeeps against any fundamental change, and perpetuates underdevelopment. The comprador bourgeoisies will undermine *Agenda 2063* as it is not in their best interests. The comprador bourgeoisies play the role of intermediaries in the post-independent epoch, in which they serve the economic, military and political interests of developed countries and their MNCs. In maintaining the status quo, they are rewarded through BEE and Kenyanisation

programmes. As a result, the right to development, which advocates self-reliance and utilisation of the continent's resources for its development, is undermined. The comprador bourgeoisies have used patronage and rent-seeking behaviour to stay in power and entrench neoliberal capitalism. As a result, under the comprador bourgeoisies, development was never on the agenda in the post-independent epoch.

The aforementioned has demonstrated that it will be difficult if not impossible to pursue a development trajectory under this neo-colonial epoch. The reason being that the comprador bourgeoisies reproduce themselves by maintaining the neo-colonial system. The following chapter focusses on determining the realism of the implementation of the developmental programmes in the neo-colonial epoch and concludes the thesis.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Introduction

Analysis of the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent South Africa and Kenya with regard to the implementation of *Agenda 2063* is the central theme of this thesis. The past 58 years of underdevelopment in Kenya, and the past 27 years of underdevelopment in South Africa have been examined, as has the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The thesis has demonstrated that the comprador bourgeoisies in both case studies have played intermediary roles in the post-independent epoch that led to neo-colonialism. This means that the comprador bourgeoisies engage only in consumption, and are content in their role as business agents who guarantee optimum conditions for the MNCs to continue exploiting Kenya and South Africa. Neo-colonial relations are perpetuated by neoliberal economic policies that are underpinned by the colonial economic model of accumulation by dispossession, which undermined development and implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The post-independence period in these former British colonies had not ushered in the golden era as expected. Instead, Kenya and South Africa are engulfed in poverty, high unemployment, inequality, debt crises, disinvestment, governance crises, low human development, and corruption. The thesis utilised neo-colonial theory in analysing these post-independent occurrences.

Fanon was chosen as the leading theorist for the thesis because of his analysis of colonial Africa and decolonisation. He is complemented by Woddis, Nkrumah, Rodney and Cabral. Neo-colonial theory points to the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism and its operations. The thesis utilised neo-colonial theory because of its analysis on colonisation, decolonisation, post-independence, violence during decolonisation, the comprador bourgeoisies, and democracy, or lack thereof, in SSA. Thus, being better suited for the analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent epoch. In its analysis of the comprador bourgeoisies, neo-colonial theory provides a historical context for the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism.

Through neo-colonial theory, the thesis has demonstrated that the case study countries never entered a period of post-colonialism despite the wide-spread belief that obscures reality. This was due to the compromises made by the comprador bourgeoisies to former colonisers that led to neo-colonialism. To Turok (1987:9), this entailed the manipulation

of the independence processes to ensure certain continuities which safeguarded imperial interests. Fatton (1990) claims that these independence processes were reluctant, repressive and opportunistic, which led to colonial contradictions remaining. Therefore, the compromises ensured that the colonial system continued with minor changes, and the creation of comprador bourgeoisies to collaborate with imperialism, while the colonial model of accumulation by dispossession continued through neoliberalism, instead of the obliteration of the entire colonial social and economic forms (Cheche Kenya, 1982:85).

The compromises led to a Faustian pact that is reflected through the neo-colonial economy. The Faustian pact refers to an alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and foreign capital, for the perpetual exploitation and self-enrichment of the comprador bourgeoisies at the expense of economic independence. The Faustian pact entailed the incorporation of local personnel into the executive jobs and boardrooms of foreign MNCs, thus the creation of the comprador bourgeoisies and/or replacing former white administrators with Africans. This was illustrated through the analysis of the existence of neo-colonial mechanisms such as economic policies, foreign capital, foreign ownership, and trade in Kenya and South Africa. Neo-colonialism was perpetuated through neoliberal economic policies – privatisation, liberalisation, labour deregulation and macroeconomic policies that led to profit extraction, foreign ownership, a commodity underpinned economy, and retaining the asymmetrical economic relationship between imperial countries and former colonies. Such conditions are hostile to development, and hence, development was never on the agenda during post-independence. Therefore, neo-colonialism hindered the implementation of *Agenda 2063's* First Ten-Year Implementation Plan, demonstrating that the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa was anti-development.

Colonialism and neo-colonialism is the logic of global neoliberal capitalism (Mignolo, 2009:39). Therefore, it is impossible to imagine genuine liberation happening within polities that remain subordinated to the imperatives of global capitalism (Saul, 2008:49). This has resulted in scholars from dependency and de-colonial traditions calling for "delinking[99]" or "disengaging" with global neoliberal capitalism, because SSA's integration into global capitalist accumulation was as a subordinate partner. To develop, SSA needs

[99] According to Amin (1990:60) delinking refers to the strict subjection of external relations in all fields to logic of internal choices without regard of the world capitalist rationality

to delink or disengage from global capitalism and pursue socialism (cf. Frank Gunder, 1969; Amin, 1990; Mignolo, 2007; Gumede, 2020). Throughout the thesis, it has been demonstrated that neoliberal economic policies have been detrimental to development in Kenya and South Africa and have led to outward-looking economies that serve external interests. As a result, restructuring of both countries' integration into global neoliberal capitalism is warranted. In *Architects of Poverty*, Mbeki (2011) argues that the problem with SSA countries is a type of mercantilism. To move away from this problem, restructuring is necessary and will require a change from neoliberal capitalism. Aspiration Seven of *Agenda 2063* calls for an "*Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner*". This would mean reconstruction of the current international division of labour and that SSA stopped exporting raw materials without beneficiation and value addition and championed an inward-looking economy that would improve intra-trade. However, first and foremost, SSA countries need to craft their developmental trajectory and stop following "advice" from MNCs and IFIs. This will not only ensure the taking back of the right to development, but will capture the modes, forces and means of production from foreign hands. Methodologically, this chapter uses a deductive approach flowing from the previous chapters. It is structured as follows: introduction, evaluation of findings of the thesis, key findings, recommendations and conclusion.

8.2. Evaluation of Findings

Since independence, Kenya and South Africa have been characterised by "boom and bust" conditions that can be attributed to their reliance on primary production. After independence, the Kenyan GDP grew at an annual average of 6.6 percent, and this impressive record of growth continued until the debt crisis (Opponng & Oppong, 2004:88). After a long slump, Kenyan GDP growth has recently picked up, putting Kenya among the fastest growing economies globally. This was the case in South Africa with an economic growth of 5 percent after independence, and over 5 percent from 2005 to 2007 (Mbeki, 2011:18). However, this growth in GDP was accompanied by increasing inequality, high unemployment and poverty rates, and violent crime (Oppong & Oppong, 2004:88; Mbeki, 2011:17). According to Lopes et al. (2017:1), such growth is underpinned by the neo-classical models embraced by many former colonies and are neither inclusive nor sustainable. To Mbeki (2011:18), this was the wrong type of growth, accompanied not only by high unemployment and inequality, but by growing private sector

indebtedness, and a decline in productive services and in the manufacturing sector. Growth in the absence of structural transformation is growth without development, because it is yet to translate into a commensurate reduction in poverty and the creation of decent jobs (Lopes et al., 2017:2). Chapter 1 provided this as a context to give a neo-colonial picture of both case studies.

In making sense of this lack of development and continuing exploitation of Kenya and South Africa, the thesis utilised neo-colonial theory. In Chapter 2, an analysis of neo-colonial theory as a theory of imperialism put into perspective the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa. The chapter served as a conceptualisation and a foundation upon which the argument of the thesis is based. The neo-colonial theory was chosen by the author over other theories of imperialism such as Marxism, neo-Marxism, and Dependency Theory because of its comprehensive explanation of the post-independence epoch, the colonial economy, neo-colonialism, and the role of the comprador bourgeoisies. Neo-colonial theory is superior in its explanation of issues confronting the masses who live on the African continent, such as neo-colonialism, neo-colonial violence, race and ethnic relations, and elusive democracy.

Chapter 2 started with an analysis of capitalism to give context to colonialism and neo-colonialism and to understand the global neoliberal capitalism in which Kenya and South Africa find themselves. The need for capitalism to constantly expand in search of cheap labour, minerals and markets led to colonisation. Industrialisation coincided with the colonisation of Africa by major European powers (Rodney, 1972:163). Colonialism was underpinned by accumulation by dispossession that took place through primitive accumulation – land dispossession, livestock expropriation, exploitative taxes and proletarianisation. Accumulation by dispossession continued in post-independence through neoliberalism, privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation. Neoliberalism was introduced in SSA through SAPs which Kenya was among the first countries to adopt, with South Africa following suit in the early 1990s.

Chapter 2 analysed theories of imperialism to explain capitalism and colonialism. As per the analysis of neo-colonial theory, colonisation was made possible through alliances between the colonisers and pre-capitalist feudal strata – tribal chiefs, administrators, police, etc. After the compromises between colonisers and the colonised, this class emerged as leaders in post-independence. The compromises were made possible

because contradictions between the western educated leaders and the colonisers were not that deep. The compromises came after the disarming process by the colonisers that entailed violent suppression and the creation of comprador bourgeoisies. The compromises were critical to the independence processes and led to a nominal independence – the attainment of political independence only, without economic independence which resulted in neo-colonialism. Fanon, in *Wretched of the Earth* clearly indicates the character of those who emerged at post-independence as intermediaries who took on the role of managers for Western enterprises, thus consigning their countries to becoming neo-colonial post-independent states to Europe (Fanon, 1963:154).

The preservation of the economic interests of imperialism was consummated with an alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital. The Faustian pact between them consolidated neo-colonialism that led to an economy geared towards serving imperialist countries, thus undermining development with economic growth. In addition, the resources of the former colonies were not used for their benefit, and foreign capital was used as an exploitative tool. Therefore, decolonisation and national liberation was never attained, as national productive forces and modes of production remained in foreign hands.

Chapter 3 provided a historical analysis to establish that the status quo in Kenya and South Africa resulted from the colonial past (Fahnbulleh, 2006:33; Gumede, 2015). The chapter focussed on the colonial contradictions that remained in post-independence, and demonstrated that the western-educated national bourgeoisies formed during colonialism reproduced their class interests during the independence process and demanded indigenous capitalism. This resulted in the compromises that satisfied the aspirations of most of the national bourgeoisies, and the colonisers withdrew without relieving the peasant majority, who were the most exploited and oppressed (Rodney, 1972). The compromises can be traced to the Lancaster House Conferences, negotiations in the case of Kenya, and the 1980s negotiations between South African business and the ANC and CODESA and MPNP negotiations that ushered in democracy in the case of South Africa.

In Kenya, the independence process entailed a brutal confrontation between the *Mau Mau* and Britain. This violent suppression of the *Mau Mau* rebellion by the British and the creation of comprador bourgeoisies through Swynnerton Plan were a disarming tactics.

This plan advocated for the creation of a landed class that would serve as allies to British imperialism. This alliance was made during the Lancaster House conferences, and led to the adoption of the Kenyan constitution that entrenched dispossession through protection of private property. Therefore, the landlessness that resulted from colonisation was never resolved. The land reform schemes came after independence and perpetuated landlessness, as the KANU government adopted the "willing seller, willing buyer" model. The land reform schemes and Kenyanisation took on ethnic and class connotations with the politically connected and the Kikuyu being the biggest beneficiaries. The colonial economy in Kenya was never resolved and the country continued with the economic policies established by the colonialists. This was legitimised through Kenyanisation, in which large number of comprador bourgeoisies were included in the neo-colonial economy. This involved the comprador bourgeoisies entering into partnerships with foreign MNCs, becoming shareholders in foreign-owned MNCs, and/or taking up management positions (Barkan, 1984:135).

In South Africa, the struggle waged by the ANC was a struggle for inclusion, which was evident in their demand for recognition as "civilised" Africans as citizens to be able to take part in the political and socio-economic activities of the country (Natrass, 2017:142). This set the tone for the character that the struggle would take. The ANC continued to participate in colonial institutions even after apartheid, a clear indication of collaborative politics. The adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 that advocated for African capitalism as per Mandela (1994), demonstrated the contradictions between the national bourgeoisies and the colonisers are not that profound. The negotiations that started in the 1980s reinforced this, with the ANC eventually moving from its policy on nationalisation to redistribution through growth, which saw their adoption of neoliberalism. The 1993 the interim constitution protected private property, thus legitimising colonial land dispossession. The land reform in South Africa also took the form of "willing seller, willing buyer" and thus, reinforced racism since it is inconceivable to talk of colonial capitalism without talking about race. The land question, which formed the basis of the national question and the anti-colonial struggle, was relegated to nothingness despite the ANC's admission through their *Strategy and Tactics* document at the Morogoro Conference in 1969 that "*it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without the return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow the*

existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not represent even the shadow of liberation." However, the economy was left unchanged, with the ANC government perpetuating neoliberal economic policies. The comprador bourgeoisies were rewarded through BEE for preserving the neoliberal character of the economy and their integration into global capitalism as a subordinate primary producing hinterland to imperialism.

The compromises shown in the case studies resulted in nominal independence for Kenya and South Africa, as the national production forces and means of production remain in foreign hands, the colonisers having found allies to perpetuate imperialism through the western-educated national bourgeoisies. According to Fanon (1963:70), the formation of the national bourgeoisies by the former colonisers succeeded in disarming the people and capturing the national liberation movement. Therefore, national liberation was not attained and the national economy of post-independence was not set on a new footing. According to Cabral (1964), one of the essential aims of neo-colonialism is to create national bourgeoisies to put the brakes on revolution, and to enlarge the possibilities of the comprador bourgeoisies as neutralisers of revolution.

The Faustian pact resulted from the compromises that are demonstrated through analysis of the mechanisms of neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism has many dimensions; social, military, political, cultural and economic, among others. Chapter 4 emphasised the economic aspects in determining the Faustian pact in Kenya. The chapter analysed the mechanisms of neo-colonialism; its economic policies, foreign ownership, foreign capital and trade. To Woddis (1967:86), at the centre of all activities of neo-colonialism lie its economic policies that ensure profits extraction by foreign MNCs, and the foreign ownership that has given Western powers enough economic power to wield political influence and entrench capitalism through their creation of the comprador bourgeoisies. Furthermore, neo-colonialism aims at retaining the exploitative economic relationship between imperialism and former colonies while keeping former colonies as primary producing hinterlands.

Independent Kenya saw the Faustian pact between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class and the foreign capital that led to the formal withdrawal of the colonial power, but with foreign capital continuing to make profits. Kenya continued with colonial capitalism under which the settlers' dominance was replaced by the dominance

of the comprador bourgeoisies. The comprador bourgeoisies adopted policies through the post-independent neo-colonial state that allowed for the provision of repatriation of profits (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:152). Through these economic policies, the former colonisers ensured that Kenya remained in the orbit of capitalist countries. The Development Plans and Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya advocated for privatisation, fiscal discipline, foreign investment and foreign ownership, and were influenced by the World Bank. Some of these measures were entrenched during the adoption of SAPs, which saw the implementation of liberalisation, austerities, labour deregulation, privatisation, and fiscal discipline. These neoliberal economic policies accelerated foreign ownership in Kenya, as foreign capital dominated and perpetuated the commodity based economy. The comprador bourgeoisies benefitted from this through the Kenyanisation that led to corruption in Kenya. This group used their political power to continuously bolster their power and wealth. Neoliberalism was further implemented through ERS in the early 2000s, and the adoption of *Vision 2030*, which perpetuated underdevelopment and reproduced poverty and inequality in Kenya.

Chapter 5 explains the Fastuan pact in South Africa. The comprador bourgeoisies in alliance with white business class and foreign capital, used the post-independent neo-colonial state to pursue neoliberal economic policies through GEAR, that was similar to the NP's NEM policy. This led to profit extraction and the capital flight of many South African and foreign MNCs. The ANC government passed legislation to legitimise co-option of the comprador bourgeoisies into neo-colonial economy. This legislation involved the B-BBEE Act, the Employment Equity Act, the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. It allowed MNCs to do business with the state and/or get mining licences if they maintained certain B-BBEE scores. However, this did not change ownership composition, and foreign MNCs and the white business class still dominate the JSE. The ownership composition had a bearing on the structure of the economy, with the economy geared towards serving imperial interests. Foreign capital has exacerbated the extraction of profits from South Africa, and exports are still dominated by primary goods, demonstrating deindustrialisation. Trade liberalisation has led to SADC-EU EPA and AGOA of the U.S. that put South Africa into a neoliberal straight jacket. These neoliberal economic policies reproduce structural problems such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate that privatisation, labour deregulation, devaluation, and liberalisation resulted in neo-colonialism that has hindered development in both Kenya and South Africa, because their economies serve the interests of imperialism. Free trade has ensured that both countries' integration into global neoliberal capitalism is as subordinate partners. Therefore, free trade is detrimental to Kenya and South Africa because it has led to deindustrialisation and the exportation of much needed jobs. FDI is dominant in extractive activities and the service sectors, and has been accompanied by deindustrialisation. This can be seen through the proliferation of shopping malls due to cheap imported goods that have undermined local industry (Mkandawire, 2014:176). The proliferation of shopping malls also results from speculative real estate investment and consumption (Mkandawire, 2014:175). Mbeki (2011:23) argues that the growth in debt-driven consumption and speculation in financial and real-estate markets, led to investment and employment in certain chosen service sectors and in construction, proving that the comprador bourgeoisies' actions have had detrimental effects on the masses.

Chapter 6 illustrated that neo-colonialism has perpetuated underdevelopment in Kenya and South Africa. This was demonstrated through the historical analysis of the continental programmes and that the post-independent politico-economies in Kenya and South Africa are hostile to development. Hence the argument that development was never part of the post-independent agenda. As the post-independence exploitation of indigenous markets is neo-colonialism's prime objective, it attempts to control markets by preventing developing countries from taking decisive steps towards industrialisation (Nkrumah 1965:178). South Africa and Kenya's comprador bourgeoisies' push to catch up with developed countries led to the adoption of neoliberal economic policies underpinned by accumulation by dispossession that gave rise to a false start in both cases. After independence, the comprador bourgeoisies erroneously adopted comparative advantage whereby they continued to export unprocessed raw materials and agricultural products; trickle-down economics; and industrialisation by invitation of former colonial countries (Lopes et al., 2017:40). This took place despite the rhetoric about development at AU summits and commitment to provide funding and implementation. Despite the AU's adoption of progressive continental programmes such as the LPA, Abuja Treaty, the Cairo Agenda for Action, and the AMV, Kenya and South Africa have continued with policies that are contrary to development. This exposes their vacillating nature of "talking left,

while walking right". The comprador bourgeoisies utilised the AU platform for theatrics instead of a platform for liberation. This behaviour undermined development and led to scepticism regarding the implementation of *Agenda 2063*.

Chapter 7 demonstrates that neo-colonialism as an independent variable impacts on the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*. The comprador bourgeoisies' intermediary and anti-development role resulted in lack of political will, corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. The implementation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan, or lack thereof, indicates that the comprador bourgeoisies continue to perpetuate neoliberalism at the expense of continental development programmes. As indicated in Chapter 6, the Faustian pact and neo-colonialism have hindered development and led to the lack of implementation of continental programmes that seek development. *Agenda 2063* could not escape this reality, as it calls for structural transformation and sustainable development. South Africa's performance score in the *Agenda 2063* aspirations and goals was 23 percent, and was described as off-track and cause for concern. Dismal performances were identified from Goal One: *A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens* to Goal Five: *Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production*. Goal One came in at a low 29 percent, Goal Two and Five at zero percent, and Goal Three and Four at 7 and 14 percent, respectively. The *Agenda's* lack of implementation in South Africa is visible through the continuing impoverishment of its citizens. Stats SA (2017) indicated that over 50 percent of South Africans live in poverty.

Kenya is yet to introduce *Agenda 2063* in parliament, but as shown in *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* implementation report, poverty has increased in Kenya as have the number of people living in slums throughout the country, indicating a rise in inequality and deterioration of Human Development Index. The lack of implementation of *Agenda 2063* in Kenya and South Africa is an indication of the comprador bourgeoisies' anti-development stance and their intermediary role in the continental agenda. Despite the call for transformative leadership by *Agenda 2063*, the comprador bourgeoisies have compromised its implementation. This will have a negative impact on the implementation of the AfCFTA.

Chapter 8 aims to demonstrate that through their intermediary role, the comprador bourgeoisies have entrenched neo-colonialism in both countries, to the detriment of their development agendas. This is evident in their pursuit of neoliberal economic policies that

have perpetuated outward and externally oriented economies. These economies are underpinned by accumulation by dispossession that has exacerbated liberalisation, privatisation, financialisation and deregulation, and led to deindustrialisation and speculation instead of investment, with undue influence on the political economy by actors from without. As a result, the political economy in both countries is directed at assisting the profit-making functions of MNCs and retained the same economic relationship between developed countries and Kenya and South Africa. As demonstrated above, the politico-economic conditions in both case studies have impeded development and exploited the people of Kenya and South Africa. Key findings from the previous chapters are summarised and concluded below.

8.3. Key Findings

According to Fanon (1963:35), decolonisation is simply the replacing of a certain "species" of men by another "species" of men. This requires "the last to be first and the first last". Therefore, decolonisation is a process of the creation of a new man (Fanon, 1963:36). It does not mean the mere replacement of one group of people by another, but a rejection of colonial values, the colonial system, and abolishment of the Manichean colonial world, and will lead to the unity of the colonised. The decolonisation process should involve the capturing of modes and forces of production from any foreign domination, leading to the attainment of national liberation (Cabral, 1966). This attainment means regaining the rights usurped by imperialism, that will free the process of development of national productive forces (Cabral, 1966). This entails the abolishment of colonial economic systems and the creation of an independent economy through industrialisation and diversification (Woddis, 1967:124), and regaining the right to development by the natives that implies the full realisation on the right to self-determination that include inalienable right to full sovereignty over natural wealth and resources (Ngang et al., 2018:7). Thus, former colonies would use their resources for their country's development. According to Sen (1999:3), development refers to freedom from poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, and systematic social deprivation.

Decolonisation as articulated above did not take place during the independence processes in Kenya in 1963 and South Africa in 1994 because these processes entailed compromises that involved adaptation of the colonial elites to the removal of colonial authority. This led to a search for allies and the co-option of national bourgeoisies to the

colonial system to preserve its exploitation and control mass discontent (Wasserman, 1975:4). The compromises led to colonial contradictions remaining, and integrated the national bourgeoisies into positions of authority in which they could protect the interests of the colonial system (Wasserman, 1975:1). As a result, the comprador bourgeoisies from both countries never regained the right from the colonisers to develop their own countries.

The comprador bourgeoisies' compromises during independence processes led to an ongoing Faustian pact that is illustrated through neo-colonial mechanisms. A Faustian pact in this case refers to the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisies, the domestic business class, and foreign capital, for the right to perpetual exploitation and self-enrichment at the expense of the masses. Neo-colonialism has led to an outward-looking economies that is geared to serve external interests and have perpetuated neo-colonialism through economic policies underpinned by accumulation by dispossession (Hanson & Hentz, 1999:501). This has led to nominal independence and undermines Kenya and South Africa's right to development. The compromises and ongoing Faustian pact illustrate the intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies as agents to foreign MNCs. The prescriptions for decolonisation and development below demonstrate their intermediary role, and are summed up thus (Nkrumah, 1965; Cabral, 1966; Woddis, 1967):

- Freeing completely the modes and forces of production from any foreign domination.
- Rejection of colonial values and colonial system that should lead to abolishment of colonial economic system.
- Creation of an independent economy through industrialisation, modernisation of agriculture and diversification of the economy. This means an inward-looking economy, based on proportional development.
- Continental unity led by the people.
- Utilisation of the nation's resources for its development and democratisation that will de-marginalise Africans in the development processes and give them control.

These prescriptions were intended to defeat colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to complete national liberation. Abolishment of the colonial economic system was imperative because post-independent states cannot perpetuate a colonial economy that is meant to maintain and consolidate underdevelopment. According to Mbeki (2009:6) the colonial system was not designed to develop any productive capacities in the colonies, hence the need to create inward-looking, independent economies. However, the comprador bourgeoisies advocated for economic policies centred around neo-colonialism (Woddis, 1967:86). Neo-colonialism entrenched through neoliberal economic policies is summed up thus:

- Privatisation of public assets to open up new fields of capital accumulation is critical for neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005:153). Both case studies embarked on this in post-independence, and it resulted in profits extraction by foreign MNCs and foreign ownership that influenced the structure of the economy.

- Financialisation was the result of deregulation that allowed the financial system to become one of the main centres of redistribution activity through speculation and predation (Harvey, 2005: 154). This saw a surge in the financial sectors of both countries and gave foreign capital a firm grip on those economies, accompanied by speculation and hot money investment that led to currency instability, especially in South Africa.

- Trade and market liberalisation led to the countries opening up to foreign capital and foreign goods. In both case studies, it resulted in deindustrialisation and loss of income from tariffs.

- Labour deregulation ensures the exploitation of cheap labour in former colonies. To Rodney (1972), the perpetuation of cheap labour in post-independence formed part of the compromises. In South Africa, labour exploitation continued through labour brokers and labour outsourcing.

All the above was meant to continue the dominance of foreign MNCs on former colonies and keep former colonies subordinate to global neoliberal capitalism. Therefore, the comprador bourgeoisies perpetuated neo-colonialism in both case study countries. They ensured profit extraction by foreign MNCs, and foreign ownership that has ensured former

colonisers continue to wield political influence. Furthermore, the comprador bourgeoisies retained the former economic relationships with the colonisers. This ensured that trade was dominated by primary products that were sold cheap, and that imported manufactured goods were bought at high prices. This neo-colonialism demonstrates that the Faustian pacts in Kenya and South Africa are anti-development and undermine industrialisation.

The neo-colonialism epoch hindered the implementation of *Agenda 2063*, which advocates for structural transformation and sustainable development. *Agenda 2063* calls for eradication of poverty, African unity, infrastructure development, industrialisation, democracy and self-reliance for development to move SSA from low-income countries to middle- and high-income countries by the years 2063. These objectives offer the only way out of neo-colonialism and towards the attainment of genuine and complete economic independence for the African continent. For operationalise purposes, *Agenda 2063* has 7 aspirations ranging from economic development, integrated Africa to peaceful and secured Africa, democracy and good governance (AU Commission, 2015a:2).

According to Ake (1996:6), immediately after new nations achieve independence, many of their political economies become hostile to development. Through post-independence neo-colonial states, the comprador bourgeoisies have pursued and implemented neo-colonial economic policies i.e. *Vision 2030* and NDP. In South Africa, the ANC used the implementation of neoliberalism to strengthen its relationship with business, which anchored its relationship with powerful business interests (Hanson & Hentz, 1999:501). This demonstrates the Faustian pact and the role of the comprador bourgeoisies in serving foreign MNCs and pursuing neo-colonialism. The intermediary role of the comprador bourgeoisies in post-independent Kenya and South Africa goes against the spirit of *Agenda 2063*. According to Leys (1975:27), neo-colonialism reproduces and extends underdevelopment, thus making it difficult if not impossible to implement continental development programmes in the neo-colonial epoch. This breeds marginalisation of the continent in which global capital, in its constant search for new investment opportunities, finds them less and less in Africa (Saul, 2008). This simply means that Africa's development, and the dynamics of global capitalism, are no longer convergent, if they ever were (Saul, 2008).

In pursuing neoliberalism, the comprador bourgeoisies serve the aspirations of the emerging national bourgeoisies at the expense of the majority of their people (Mosala, 2016:119). To Turok (1987:51) this is the function of a neo-colonial state under comprador bourgeoisies fulfilling the same function as the colonial state with respect to the international capitalist system, which entails preserving the country's place in the international division of labour. According to Fanon (1963:152-3), the national bourgeoisies are quite content with being the West's business agents, and play their part in a most dignified manner. However, they are incapable of carrying out any developmental mission whatsoever (Fanon, 1963:137).

Many scholars provide a guide on development trajectory for SSA (cf. Amin, 1990; Mbeki, 2011; Mills et al., 2017). Scholars of the dependency and decolonisation tradition have argued for delinking or disengaging from global capitalism to address development crises in SSA and pursue socialism. However, mainstream scholars such as Schwab (2001), Guest (2004), and Mills and Herbst (2012), advocate for more privatisation and liberalisation of the SSA economies. Both strategies have been tried in SSA without any success. Hence, the researcher's argument that restructuring SSA's integration with global neoliberal capitalism is warranted, without excluding foreign capital as socialism purports. According to Nkrumah (1965), the struggle against neo-colonialism is not aimed at excluding capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries, but at preventing the financial power of the developed world being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed. The following section outlines recommendations on what needs to be done to ensure development.

8.4. Recommendations

What is to be done? This is a critical question, especially as the thesis has identified the hinderances to development in Kenya and South Africa. The answer to the question is provided in the form of recommendations on how to address underdevelopment in both countries as per the key findings. The recommendations include, but are limited to transformative leadership, reconfigured states, and strong institutions.

The AU Commission (2015b:112) identified critical success factors to ensure the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*. However, the researcher believe that these factors cannot be limited solely to the implementation of *Agenda 2063*. They should be

implemented to breaking from neo-colonialism and creating conducive environments for development. According to the AU Commission (2015b:112), the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*'s First Ten-Year Implementation Plan requires the rule of law, effective participation, mobilisation of resources, capable states, an effective public sector and strong private sector among other things.

The role of the neo-colonial state in the post-independence epoch is to serve the interests of capital at the expense of the masses. The post-independent state under the comprador bourgeoisies has perpetuated neo-colonialism through the implementation of neoliberalism. As a result, these post-independent states need reconfiguring. According to Agbude (2011:114), to champion development requires the reconstruction of the concept of the state in Africa, with the purpose of producing a state that integrates the people into policies and pursues a development ideology that is people-oriented. A capable state that will channel taxpayer's money into industrialisation and nurture certain new industries through tariff protection, subsidies, and other government support (Chang, 2007). Throughout history, the state has played a critical goal in the development of its country. According to Swatuk (2018:119), there is irrefutable evidence that early (France, the UK, Germany and the U.S.) and late (Japan, Asian Newly Industrial Countries (NIC) and China) developers did so on the back of active and capable states. For both Kenya and South Africa to develop, they need capable and democratic states that are capable of channelling resources from certain sectors, into industrialisation.

Throughout the thesis it has been argued that neoliberalism is bad for SSA, especially its outward-oriented nature, which has meant the continuation of mercantile capitalist traits. In *Architects of Poverty*, Moeletsi Mbeki (2009) argues on why African capitalism needs to change from mercantile capitalism and accumulation by dispossession, to industrial capitalism. In addition, Mbeki (2009:7) argues that independence did not bring economic transformation, but entrenched the economic inequalities inherited from colonialism. Therefore, structural transformation is warranted, as it would lead to economic independence, which is the antithesis of neo-colonialism. Woddis (1967:124) considers that fundamental to defeating neo-colonialism and completing liberalisation is the creation of an independent economy. This can only take place with the implementation of continental programmes and in this case *Agenda 2063*, which advocates for sustainable

development and structural transformation accompanied by infrastructure development, intra-trade, and economic and political integration.

This would require dissolution of the Faustian pact and replacing it with transformative leadership, as argued by the AU Commission (2015b:64). Transformative leaders should be guided by progressive ideology as in the case in Pan Africanism and African Renaissance values, with the responsibility of bringing about transformative change and awareness of the global environment the continent find itself[100]. The guidance of Pan Africanism would demonstrate thought leadership – leadership based on progressive ideologies, beliefs and orientations with significant impact appeal, while shunning colonial values (Gumede, 2015b:92). Therefore, transformative leadership should entail patriotic and visionary leaders who ensure that young Africans are empowered with the determination to address Africa's challenges in the rule of law, democracy, and underdevelopment, and build capable institutions for peaceful, corruption free, inclusive societies and sustainable development (AU Commission, 2015b; DIRCO, 2015:70; ACBF, 2016:47; Corrigan & Cruzd, 2017:12). In other words, leaders who will craft Africa's developmental trajectory instead of following the sterile development policies of Europe and the U.S. and their institutions (Fanon, 1963:315).

Fanon (1963:311) warned national bourgeoisies against mimicking or following European policies and development trajectories. He further asserted that national bourgeoisies should craft their own development trajectory. This is in alignment with thought liberation that calls for the discovery of self as an able and capable human being that can produce progressive thought, actions and achievements (Gumede, 2015b:93). Leadership must therefore pursue economic policies which are based on conditions that seek to liberate the people. According to Gumede (2015b:93) thought leadership, thought liberation, and critical consciousness should assist in ensuring that Africa pursues its own development path, which, given the history of the continent, is ideal for obtaining such conditions. Furthermore, for Africa to avoid dominant powers interfering in its development process, it must embrace economic policies that advocate transformative and inclusive growth to address the inequality and poverty in SSA.

[100] Transformative leadership should be accompanied by thought leadership, thought liberation and critical consciousness which is critical for sustainable development and structural transformation (cf. Gumede, 2015b).

Other critical factors include political commitment from the continental and member states' leadership. As indicated in Chapter 6 poor leadership in member states has manifested on continental and regional levels which in turn has reproduced neo-colonialism and aggravated the leadership in member states. This phenomenon has derailed development in SSA and perpetuated weak institutions. A strong AU and RECs would ensure harmonious and predictable working relationships between them, popular participation and adherence to continental programmes, monitoring and evaluation, and successful mobilisation of funds for continental development (AU Commission, 2015b:112). Other critical factors include the inclusion and empowerment of citizens. In the view of the researcher, these would not only see to the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063*, but to the dissolution of neo-colonialism in SSA.

8.5. Conclusion

Despite the popular narrative of post-colonialism that accompanies the South African celebration of Freedom Day, 27 of April each year, and Madaraka Day, 01 of June each year in Kenya, the two countries are yet to go through decolonisation. They find themselves under neo-colonialism perpetuated by the comprador bourgeoisies. This has resulted in both countries' economies being geared towards serving imperialism. Post-independent economic policies have guaranteed optimum conditions for profit extraction by foreign MNCs, foreign ownership, and the continuation of commodity-underpinned economies, thus the unequal economic relationship between imperialism and the former colonies has been maintained. This demonstrates the role of the comprador bourgeoisies as intermediaries and servants of imperialism.

The status quo is detrimental to development in both countries, evident in their poverty and inequality rates, where over 50 percent of the South African population lives in poverty with 32.5 percent unemployment and a Gini coefficient of 0.63, while in Kenya, 37 percent of the population lives below the international poverty line, and 47 percent of urban residents lives in slums. In spite of this, the comprador bourgeoisies in Kenya have not yet implemented the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of the *Agenda 2063*, and South Africa's overall score is described as off-track and cause for concern. The current rate of Kenya's implementation of *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* indicates that its 2030 targets will not be reached. Neo-colonialism has hindered the implementation of *Agenda 2063* in South Africa, and *Agenda 2030 – SDGs* in Kenya. The comprador bourgeoisies continue

serving imperialism and are not interested in development, only in enriching themselves and setting up conditions for exploitation.

Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible to implement continental development programmes in the neo-colonial epoch in SSA, because current global neo-colonial capitalism safeguards Western dominance with the assistance of the World Bank, the WTO, the IMF, and the comprador bourgeoisies. Therefore, the need remains for transformative leadership that would guarantee the changing of African capitalism and the adoption of progressive economic policies that do not mimic those of the former colonisers. This should take place with thought leadership, thought liberation, and critical consciousness.

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