

**CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY  
OF NIGERIA'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES IN LIBERIA AND  
GUINEA-BISSAU, 1989-2010.**

**Adewole Ayodeji ADELEKE**


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**B.A (Hons.), M.Sc., M.Phil., Lagos.**

**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of PhD in International Relations  
to the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Human and Social  
Sciences, North-West University (Mafikeng Campus).**




**PROMOTER: Professor Victor Ojaborotu**


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## DECLARATION

I, Adewole Ayodeji ADELEKE, declare that the thesis entitled “**Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of Nigeria’s Conflict Resolution Initiatives in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, 1989-2010,**” hereby submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in International Relations in the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, South Africa, has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university. I declare that this is my work in design and execution and that all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

Signature.....  
Adewole Ayodeji ADELEKE

Date.....17/10/2017

Promoter’s signature.....  
Professor Victor OJAKOROTU

Date.....17/10/2017

## **DEDICATION**

Dedicated to God the Father

and  
Mary Adebanke, my love,  
and  
David Adeyinka, the beginning of my strength  
and  
Deborah Adebukola, my pride.

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
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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|                |                                                             |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>AAFC</b>    | Allied Armed Forces of the Community                        |
| <b>ACCORD</b>  | African Centre for the Constructive Restoration of Disputes |
| <b>ACDL</b>    | Association for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia         |
| <b>ACP</b>     | African, Caribbean, and Pacific                             |
| <b>ACRI</b>    | African Crisis Response Initiative                          |
| <b>ACS</b>     | American Colonisation Society                               |
| <b>AD</b>      | <i>Accao Democratica</i> (Democratic Action)                |
| <b>AFL</b>     | Armed Forces of Liberia                                     |
| <b>AFRC</b>    | Armed Forces Ruling Council (Nigeria)                       |
| <b>AFSTRAG</b> | African Strategic and Peace Research Group                  |
| <b>ALF</b>     | African Leadership Forum                                    |
| <b>AMIB</b>    | African Mission in Burundi                                  |
| <b>AMIS</b>    | African Mission in Sudan                                    |

|               |                                                                                                                                                |
|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>AMISOM</b> | African Mission in Somalia                                                                                                                     |
| <b>APU</b>    | <i>Aianca Popular Unidal</i> (Popular United Alliance)                                                                                         |
| <b>ASF</b>    | African Standby Force                                                                                                                          |
| <b>AU</b>     | African Union                                                                                                                                  |
| <b>BBC</b>    | British Broadcasting Corporation                                                                                                               |
| <b>CEAO</b>   | <i>Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i> (Economic Community of West African States)                                               |
| <b>CFA</b>    | <i>Communaute Financiere Africaine</i> (The [French] African Financial Community)                                                              |
| <b>CHOGM</b>  | Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting                                                                                                       |
| <b>CILSS</b>  | <i>Comité Permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel</i><br>(Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel) |
| <b>CNN</b>    | Cable Network News                                                                                                                             |
| <b>CONCP</b>  | <i>Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalstas das Colonias</i> (Conference of National Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies)                |
| <b>CPLP</b>   | <i>Comunidade dos Paisés de Lingua Portuguesa</i> (The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries)                                             |
| <b>DICON</b>  | Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria                                                                                                      |

|                        |                                                                                        |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>CTA</b>             | Central Tibetan Administration                                                         |
| <b>DRC</b>             | Democratic Republic of Congo                                                           |
| <b>EAB</b>             | Executive Action Bureau (Liberia)                                                      |
| <b>ECOMOG</b><br>Group | Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring                        |
| <b>ECOSOC</b>          | Economic and Social Council (United Nations)                                           |
| <b>ECOWAS</b>          | Economic Community of West African States                                              |
| <b>EEC</b>             | European Economic Community                                                            |
| <b>EITI</b>            | Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative                                          |
| <b>EPG</b>             | Eminent Persons Group                                                                  |
| <b>FAO</b>             | Food and Agriculture Organisation                                                      |
| <b>FCG-SD</b>          | <i>Forum Civico Guineense- Social Democracia</i> (Guinea Civic Forum-Social Democracy) |
| <b>FDS</b>             | <i>Frente Democratica Social</i> (Democratic Social Front)                             |
| <b>FESTAC</b>          | Festival of Arts and Culture                                                           |
| <b>FEWS-NET</b>        | Famine Early Warning System Network                                                    |
| <b>FGN</b>             | Federal Government of Nigeria                                                          |

|              |                                                                                                                |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>FLEC</b>  | <i>Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda</i> (The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) |
| <b>FLING</b> | <i>Frente da Libertacao Nacional da Guine</i> (Guinea's National Liberation front)                             |
| <b>FNL</b>   | <i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> (Algerian National Front)                                                 |
| <b>FNLA</b>  | <i>Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola</i> (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)                   |
| <b>G8</b>    | Group of Eight Most Industrialised States in the International System                                          |
| <b>GDP</b>   | Gross Domestic Product                                                                                         |
| <b>GGC</b>   | Gulf of Guinea Commission                                                                                      |
| <b>GNP</b>   | Gross National Product                                                                                         |
| <b>GNU</b>   | Government of National Unity                                                                                   |
| <b>HST</b>   | Hegemonic Stability Theory                                                                                     |
| <b>IAEA</b>  | International Atomic Energy Agency                                                                             |
| <b>IBRD</b>  | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development                                                          |
| <b>IBWA</b>  | International Bank for West Africa                                                                             |
| <b>ICC</b>   | International Criminal Court                                                                                   |



|              |                                                         |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>ICJ</b>   | International Court of Justice                          |
| <b>ICRC</b>  | International Committee of the Red Cross                |
| <b>IDA</b>   | International Development Association                   |
| <b>IGD</b>   | Institute for Global Dialogue                           |
| <b>ILO</b>   | International Labour Organisation                       |
| <b>IMET</b>  | International Military Education and Training Programme |
| <b>IMF</b>   | International Monetary Fund                             |
| <b>IMO</b>   | International Maritime Organisation                     |
| <b>INPFL</b> | Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia         |
| <b>IO</b>    | International Organisations                             |
| <b>IPA</b>   | International Peace Academy                             |
| <b>ISS</b>   | Institute for Security Studies                          |
| <b>ITG</b>   | Interim Transitional government                         |
| <b>JDA</b>   | Joint Development Authority                             |
| <b>JDZ</b>   | Joint Development Zone                                  |
| <b>JMC</b>   | Joint Ministerial Council                               |

|               |                                                                                                                         |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>LAP</b>    | Liberia Action Party                                                                                                    |
| <b>LDF</b>    | Lofa Defence Force (Liberia)                                                                                            |
| <b>LIPE</b>   | <i>Liga Guinense de Proteccao e Desenvolvimento Ecologico</i> (Guinea League for Ecological Protection and Development) |
| <b>LISGIS</b> | Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services                                                            |
| <b>LNC</b>    | Liberian National Conference                                                                                            |
| <b>LNG</b>    | Liberian National Guard                                                                                                 |
| <b>LNTG</b>   | Liberian National Transition Government                                                                                 |
| <b>LPC</b>    | Liberian Peace Council                                                                                                  |
| <b>LPG</b>    | Lagos Plan of Action                                                                                                    |
| <b>LPP</b>    | Liberia People's Party                                                                                                  |
| <b>LUP</b>    | Liberia Unification Party                                                                                               |
| <b>LURD</b>   | Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy                                                                        |
| <b>MAD</b>    | Mutual Assistance on Defence                                                                                            |
| <b>MGD</b>    | <i>Movimento Democratico Guineense</i> (Guinea Democratic Movement)                                                     |

|                 |                                                                                                               |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>MFDC</b>     | <i>Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance</i> (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) [Senegal] |
| <b>MODEL</b>    | the movement for Democracy in Liberia                                                                         |
| <b>MPLA</b>     | <i>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola</i> (The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)         |
| <b>NAM</b>      | Non-Aligned Movement                                                                                          |
| <b>NBI</b>      | National Bureau of Investigation (Liberia)                                                                    |
| <b>NEPAD</b>    | New Partnership for Africa's Development                                                                      |
| <b>NDPL</b>     | National Democratic Party of Liberia                                                                          |
| <b>NGO</b>      | Nongovernmental Organisation                                                                                  |
| <b>NIIA</b>     | Nigerian Institute of International Affairs                                                                   |
| <b>NIPSS</b>    | National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies                                                           |
| <b>NISS</b>     | National Intelligence and Security Service (Liberia)                                                          |
| <b>NPFL</b>     | National Patriotic Front of Liberia                                                                           |
| <b>NPFL-CRC</b> | National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council                                             |
| <b>NTA</b>      | Nigerian Television Authority                                                                                 |
| <b>OAPEC</b>    | Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries                                                            |

|              |                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>OAU</b>   | Organisation of African Unity                                                                                                       |
| <b>OCHA</b>  | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs<br>Emergency Fund                                                |
| <b>OPEC</b>  | Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries                                                                                       |
| <b>OCAM</b>  | <i>Organization Commune Africaine et Malagache</i> (The African and<br>Malagasy Common Organisation)                                |
| <b>OECD</b>  | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development                                                                               |
| <b>OIC</b>   | Organisation of Islamic States                                                                                                      |
| <b>OMVS</b>  | <i>Organization pour de la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Senegal</i> (Senegal River<br>Basin Development Authority)                      |
| <b>PAC</b>   | Pan African Congress                                                                                                                |
| <b>PAIGC</b> | <i>Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde</i> (The African<br>Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) |
| <b>PAL</b>   | Progressive Alliance of Liberians                                                                                                   |
| <b>PALOP</b> | <i>Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa</i> (Portuguese-speaking<br>African Countries)                                     |
| <b>PDSG</b>  | <i>Partido Democrático Socialista Guineense</i> (Guinea Democratic Socialist<br>Party)                                              |

|               |                                                                                                                         |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>PMP</b>    | <i>Partido do Manifesto do Povo</i> (Party of the People's Manifesto)                                                   |
| <b>PND</b>    | <i>Partido da Nova Democracia</i> (Party of the New Democracy)                                                          |
| <b>PRID</b>   | <i>Partido Republicano da Independencia e do Desenvolvimento</i><br>(Republican Party for Independence and Development) |
| <b>PRO</b>    | Public Relations Officers (Liberia)                                                                                     |
| <b>PRP</b>    | <i>Partido da Renovacao e Progresso</i> (Party for Renewal and Progress)                                                |
| <b>PRS</b>    | <i>Partido para a Renovacao Social</i> (The Party for Social Renewal) [Guinea-Bissau]                                   |
| <b>PSD</b>    | <i>Partido Social Democrata</i> (Democratic People's Party) [Portugal]                                                  |
| <b>PS</b>     | <i>Partido Socialista</i> (Socialist Party)                                                                             |
| <b>PU</b>     | <i>Plataforma Unida</i> (United Platform)                                                                               |
| <b>PT</b>     | <i>Partido do Trabalho</i> (Labour Party)                                                                               |
| <b>PUN</b>    | <i>Partido da Uniao Nacional</i> (Party of National Union)                                                              |
| <b>PUSD</b>   | <i>Partido Unido Social Democrata</i> (United Social Democratic Party)                                                  |
| <b>RENAMO</b> | <i>Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana</i> (The Mozambican National Resistance)                                            |
| <b>RGB</b>    | <i>Resistencia da Guine-Bissau</i> (Resistance of Guinea-Bissau)                                                        |

|               |                                                                                                                   |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>RGB/MB</b> | <i>Resistencia da Guine Bissau/Movemento Ba-Fata</i> (Resistance of Guinea –Bissau’s Resistance/Ba-Fata-Movement) |
| <b>RUF</b>    | Revolutionary United (of Sierra Leone)                                                                            |
| <b>SADC</b>   | Southern African Development Community                                                                            |
| <b>SADCC</b>  | Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference                                                               |
| <b>SAP</b>    | Structural Adjustment Programme                                                                                   |
| <b>SCSL</b>   | Special Court for Sierra Leone                                                                                    |
| <b>SIPRI</b>  | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute                                                                  |
| <b>SSS</b>    | Special Security Service (Liberia)                                                                                |
| <b>STP</b>    | São Tomé and Príncipe                                                                                             |
| <b>SWAC</b>   | Sahel and West Africa Club                                                                                        |
| <b>SWAPO</b>  | South West Africa People’s Organisation                                                                           |
| <b>TACS</b>   | Technical Aid Corps Scheme                                                                                        |
| <b>TWP</b>    | True Whig Party (Liberia)                                                                                         |
| <b>UE</b>     | <i>Uniao Eleitoral</i> (Electoral Union)                                                                          |
| <b>UEMOA</b>  | <i>Union Economique et Monetaire Quest-Africaine</i> (The West African Economic and Monetary Union)               |

|                |                                                                                                                      |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>UK</b>      | United Kingdom                                                                                                       |
| <b>ULIMO-J</b> | United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson                                                          |
| <b>ULIMO-K</b> | United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah                                                           |
| <b>UM</b>      | <i>Uniao para a Mudancal</i> (Union for Change)                                                                      |
| <b>UN</b>      | United Nations                                                                                                       |
| <b>UNAMIL</b>  | UN Mission in Liberia                                                                                                |
| <b>UNAMSIL</b> | United Mission in Sierra Leone                                                                                       |
| <b>UNCTAD</b>  | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development                                                                   |
| <b>UNDESA</b>  | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs                                                             |
| <b>UNDP</b>    | United Nations Development Programme                                                                                 |
| <b>UNECA</b>   | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa                                                                        |
| <b>UNGA</b>    | United Nations General Assembly                                                                                      |
| <b>UNICEF</b>  | United Nations Children’s Fund                                                                                       |
| <b>UNITA</b>   | <i>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</i> (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) |
| <b>UNMEE</b>   | United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea                                                                      |

|                  |                                                                  |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>UNMIL</b>     | United Nations Mission in Liberia                                |
| <b>UNO</b>       | United Nations Organisation                                      |
| <b>UNOGBIS</b>   | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau     |
| <b>UNOL</b>      | United Nations Office in Liberia                                 |
| <b>UNOMIL</b>    | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia                       |
| <b>UN-PAAERD</b> | United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery |
| <b>UNSC</b>      | United Nations Security Council                                  |
| <b>UNTAG</b>     | United Nations Transition Assistance Group                       |
| <b>USA/US</b>    | United States of America                                         |
| <b>USAID</b>     | United States Agency for International Development               |
| <b>VOA</b>       | Voice of America                                                 |
| <b>WAFF</b>      | West African Frontier Force                                      |
| <b>WAMIS-NET</b> | West-African Market Information System Network                   |
| <b>WANEP</b>     | West African Network for Peacebuilding                           |
| <b>WFP</b>       | World Food Programme                                             |



**WHO**                      World Health Organisation

**WTO**                      World Trade Organisation

## **ABSTRACT**

This study examined Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in the West African sub-region within the ambit of the principle of "concentric circles" in its foreign policy. The research was carried out with particular reference to Nigeria's peace initiatives in Liberia and Guinea Bissau under the auspices of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG.

The main objective of the research is to determine why Nigeria, considered as the sub-regional "hegemon," refused to restore peace in Guinea-Bissau as it did in Liberia, given the country's avowed commitment to conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts in Africa and other parts of the world. Conflict resolution efforts have earned Nigeria much respect in the council of nations as the "giant of Africa." This study employed content analysis of historical documents, academic works, oral interviews, government records, reports of international organisations and internet sources as a baseline for its arguments. The interdependence and hegemonic stability theories were used as the theoretical framework in which the implications of Nigeria's power dynamics within the West African sub-region was examined.

The country did not only contribute to but spearheaded the formation of the interposition force of the sub-regional ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. This deed was followed by the country's single-handed footing of the bill of ECOMOG deployment to Liberia and Sierra Leone, while the missions lasted. It was found out that the non-appearance of Nigerian troops in Guinea-Bissau against its hitherto role is greatly influenced by the limitations imposed on the country by domestic factors and internal political dynamics. This situation has added a new dimension to the analysis of sub-regional conflict resolution efforts. It has equally provided a fresh perspective on the limitations of Nigeria's role at preventing war and violence in West Africa, in relation to its size, capacity and capability in the sub-region, and what the international community expected of her.

Consequently, it is recommended that for effective sub-regional conflict resolution, Nigeria needs to continue to use its position to diffuse tensions and build a sub-regional consensus in West Africa. Its position could best be utilised through multilateral action by alliance building

within and outside the region. This is because Nigeria is the only country best placed in the sub-region to meet the challenges and responsibilities that come with sub-regional leadership.

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH EVALUATION OF THE STUDY**

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

The term “foreign policy” has not yet received a universally acceptable definition. According to Beasley, R.K; Kaarbo, J; Lantis, J.S; Snarr, M.T (2013: 2), foreign policy is meant to apply to policy toward outside a state’s territorial borders. To Christopher Hill (2003: 2), it is the sum total of official external relations conducted by an independent state in international relations. As put forward by Kalevi Holsti (1995:45, 210, 223), foreign policy covers not just a state's relations with others, but also the domestic environment from which the policy emanated in the first instance. Joseph Frankel (1975: 9) describes foreign policy as a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and supports, and the changing external circumstances, while Frederick Northedge (1968: 15) describes it as “an interplay between the outside and the inside.” Cecil Crabb (1972: 1) identifies two elements in foreign policy as the national objectives and the means for achieving them, and also argues that the foreign policy of all nations, either great or small, is the same. The sum of the positions of these scholars therefore suggest that the foreign policy of a nation refers to the general principles by which a state governs its reaction to the global environment.

The foreign policy of Nigeria, like that of any other country in the world, consists of a number of different policies for different external issues and problems within a larger foreign policy strategy (Aluko, 1981:3). Nigeria’s foreign policy runs on a fulcrum of “concentric circles,” (Gambari, 2008:58). The first of these circles represents Nigeria’s good neighbourliness with its immediate neighbours – Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and by extension, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe. The second circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with other West African neighbours. The third circle focuses on the Nigerian nation and its links to the whole continent of Africa while the fourth circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with the rest of the world and international organisations. The concentric circle theory reinforces the centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy (Akpotor and Nwolise, 1999:10) and governs the principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy. One of the fundamental principles that guide Nigeria’s foreign policy

is commitment to world peace. Another guiding principle is focus on African affairs and stability in West Africa (Olusanya and Akindele, 1989:2-3). These principles have made Nigeria active in conflict resolution in parts of the world and, in particular, in the West African sub-region. This study examines Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in West Africa by studying Nigeria's interventions in Liberia, an Anglophone country, and Guinea-Bissau, a Lusophone West African state. The study argues that although conflict resolution in the two West Africa countries was not the sole business of Nigeria, it spearheaded the formation of the interposition force of the sub-regional ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. Nigeria contributed the highest fund in footing the bill of ECOMOG deployment to both Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the previous peacekeeping missions in the sub-region, Nigeria actively participated in the deployment of its forces. However, during the ECOMOG operations in Guinea-Bissau, Nigerian contingents were not on the ground (Kabia, 2009:13).

Nigeria's foreign policy, whether under military or civilian rule, has not shifted from the African focus since 1960 when Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of the newly independent country, announced a set of national roles conceived for post-independent Nigeria (Adeyemo, 2002:4). The period between 1985 and 2010 was historic in Nigerian political history because it witnessed the succession of five political leaderships; two of the administrations were civilian and the rest military. Studies on Nigeria's foreign policy during this period have shown that each administration set out for itself an African agenda. This study argues that the additional burden on Nigeria to assume critical roles in West Africa during this period is a consequence of the demands of the first and second of the concentric circles that govern Nigeria's foreign policy approach (Fawole, 2001:16-21; Fafowora, 2001:35-57; Adeniji, 2000:4; Akinbobola, 1999:12; Okon, 1998:5; Olusanya and Akindele, 1989:2).

Nigeria was the key actor in the formation of ECOMOG for obvious reasons. Nigeria's power configuration in comparative terms to that of its West African neighbours was substantial. The World Population Review estimated Nigeria's population at over 170 million people by 2014. This figure is far more than the combined populations of the rest of the fifteen other ECOWAS member states. Nigeria has a larger economy and market, bigger and well-equipped armed forces equal in numerical strength to the armed forces of all the other countries in the sub-region

(Thomas, 2003:13). Because of these capabilities, Nigeria is indeed qualified to be a “hegemonic power” in West Africa. Perhaps, recognizing its capacity, Nigerian leaders have consistently played major roles in economic, political and security affairs of the sub-region, despite the cost implications (Agbu, 2006:72).

## **1.2 DESCRIPTION OF AREA OF STUDY**

The Republic of Liberia is a relatively small country in West Africa with Monrovia as its capital and the largest city. Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, (LISGIS) (2008:1-2) estimated its population at 3,489,072 in 2008. Today, according to World Population Review of 2014, Liberia’s population stands at 4,500,000. Liberia was established by the American Colonization Society founded in 1816 to resettle freed American slaves in Africa. The descendants of these Americo-Liberians make up 5 per cent of the country’s population as at 1987 (Liebanow, 1987:12). This small percentage of the Liberian population dominated national politics from the time they settled in the 19<sup>th</sup> century until 1980. A coup organized by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe overthrew the government of President Richard Tolbert in 1980 (Adebajo, 2002:24). The Americo-Liberian elite had benefited from the country’s close relationship with the United States while the indigenous African population was treated as second-class citizens. Samuel Doe represented the disgruntled indigenous African population that was in the majority. However, Samuel Doe ran a government that did not benefit the majority of the population. His government was pitched against an anti-Doe movement, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe’s government. A civil war ensued in 1989 that lasted for 14 years.

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a small Lusophone African country which area of 36, 125 square kilometres (Seddon & Seddon-Daines, 2005:253) and its population was estimated at 1,720,000 by the World Population Review in 2014. Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world. Colonized by Portugal, anti-Portuguese nationalist movements began to emerge in the 1950s while armed insurgency started in the 1960s. By 1972, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) was in control of two-thirds of the country during which time a bloody

liberation struggle was waged under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral. Guinea-Bissau unilaterally declared independence in September 1973 through Luis Cabral, the brother of the founder of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, and immediately an armed struggle started between the local people and the colonial masters. Hostilities ceased in Guinea Bissau as a result of a military coup in Portugal in April 1974 and in September of the same year, Portugal recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of Luis Cabral (Seddon & Seddon-Daines, 2005:254).

The roots of the war in Guinea-Bissau can be traced to the 24-year misrule of the PAIGC, while the trigger of the war was the rivalry between President Joao Bernardo Vieira and General Ansumane Mane, his army chief. The army staged a coup in November 1980 that brought in Joao Vieira. However, the new administration continued with the repressive policies of its predecessor (Ferreira, 2004:4). The conflict started in January 1998 when Vieira suspended Ansumane Mane, accusing him of supplying arms to the MFDC rebels in neighbouring Senegal. Mane staged a coup in June 1998 and a fierce battle ensued in Guinea-Bissau. ECOMOG troops numbering 712 were deployed in February 1999 but they were without Nigerian contingents. The Guinea-Bissau mission ended in dismal failure when the troops were reduced to mere spectators after one of the parties to the conflict decided to break the terms of the peace accord (Kabia, 2009:23).

### **1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The major problem in this study is the impact of domestic environment and political system on the foreign policy of Nigeria. An important theme in foreign policy analysis propounded by Maurice East *et al* (1978:104) argues that the domestic environment and political system has impact on the foreign policy of a nation. National leaders, especially the head of government, has to play a two-level game between international and domestic politics. According to Neack (2008:105), the head of government in any political system is motivated by two similar goals: retain political power, build, and maintain policy coalitions. During Nigeria's intervention in Liberia, the country was under the rule of a military junta while it was governed by a liberal democratic government during the Guinea-Bissau crisis. Nigeria had no better option than to explore diplomatic means of resolving the Guinea-Bissau crisis. The fact remains that Nigeria's

policy changed over time as influenced by what happened in Liberia. Therefore, if the Guinea Bissau crisis had happened first, Nigeria would have responded as it did in Liberia and vice versa. Towards the end of the Liberian war when the Guinea Bissau crisis started, Nigeria under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo had become war weary and it was under a democratic government. There was also pressure from home, where the economy was becoming worse, for the government to take a less expensive option at resolving the Guinea Bissau crisis. The government of Olusegun Obasanjo was able to sustain the ambition of the people who advocated for a non-military intervention in the sub-regional crises in the face of a worsening economy (Ero, 2000:7). The political environment of a country includes all laws, government agencies and lobbying groups that influence individuals and organizations in the society.

Scholars have explored the effectiveness of diplomacy and military intervention to conflict resolution (Abegunrin, 2003:148). From the end of the Cold War, the West African sub-region has witnessed an intensification of intrastate conflicts. Political leaders have tried to resolve these conflicts using various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These included commissions of mediation, ad-hoc committees, mediation by African Heads of State and the use of the Chieftaincy Institution. The use of these mechanisms did not solve the problem and failed to prevent the outbreak of violence, especially in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, which are the areas of study in this research (Adebajo, 2002:13). Since 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) resorted to employing military intervention forces as a major part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. The ECOWAS intervention force, the ECOMOG, is a non-standing army whose troops are contributed by West African armed forces. ECOMOG has intervened in intrastate conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire with some degree of success. Although these interventions did little to eradicate the root cause of the conflicts in these countries, they at least stopped the carnage and allowed an atmosphere for peace to be restored and political dialogue to begin in these countries. The ECOMOG operation in Liberia has been acclaimed by scholars as one of the most successful in the history of peacekeeping (Fawole, 2001:16-23; Olonisakin, 2000:3; Adeleke, 1995: 577-579; Alao, 1998:21).

#### **1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The research questions guiding this study include the following:

1. What were the factors responsible for Nigeria's active involvement in conflict resolution in West Africa during the period under study?
2. Why did Nigeria adopt different approaches to conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau?
3. How has Nigeria's participation in conflict resolution affected peace and stability in the West African sub-region?
4. What were the security implications of Nigeria's low level participation in returning Guinea Bissau to peace in the West African sub-region?

#### **1.5 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY**

The failure of ECOMOG to resolve the conflict in Guinea Bissau has pointed to the pivotal role played by Nigeria in sub-regional security. Nigeria's dominance has always been greatly resented by other countries in West Africa. With more than half the population and 75 per cent of its GDP, Nigeria is the most powerful country in the sub-region. Thus, the 'hegemonic' position of the country requires her to constructively use its economic and political strength to diffuse tensions and build a sub-regional consensus (Kabia, 2009:24). Nigeria's pattern of intervention in Liberia and Guinea Bissau was dictated by the internal dynamics of its politics at the time. Therefore, this study interrogates the Nigerian government's intervention in Guinea Bissau and the new dimensions which the intervention has brought to the analysis of sub-regional conflict resolution efforts. Besides, it equally provides a fresh perspective on the limitations of Nigeria's role at preventing war and violence in the West African sub-region.

#### **1.6 AIM OF THE STUDY**

The study aims to establish the reasons behind Nigeria's adoption of different approaches to conflict resolution in the two countries under study. By extension, the study aims to determine the reasons behind the absence of Nigerian troops in the Guinea-Bissau intervention which denied the ECOMOG mission vital logistic and financial support and contributed to its failure.



## **1.7 OBJECTIVES**

The general objective of this research is to explore Nigeria's conflict resolution activities in the West African sub-region. Specific objectives of the research include the following:

- To examine the domestic factors and internal political dynamics that spurred Nigeria into spearheading the resolution of the Liberian crisis and limited her participation in Guinea Bissau;
- To examine what necessitated Nigeria's different approaches to conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau;
- To determine the security implications of Nigeria's low level participation in the resolution of the Guinea Bissau crisis on the West African sub-region; and
- To assess the impact of Nigeria's participation in conflict resolution in the West African sub-region.

## **1.8 HYPOTHESIS**

The operational hypothesis of this research is: The strategic behaviour of a nation's foreign policy is dictated by the domestic environment and the internal political dynamics of the system of government. Therefore, Nigeria's different approaches to conflict resolution in the two countries under study were determined by the internal environment of the country at the period which generated different approaches and outcomes in her involvement in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.

## **1.9 SIGNIFICANCE**

Some scholarly works have been produced on the general aspects of Nigeria's involvement in conflict resolution in West African sub-region. However, the basic justification for this work is that there is no major work among those produced by these scholars that has addressed Nigeria's partial involvement in Guinea-Bissau in comparison to her full participation in resolving the conflicts in Liberia. Thus the significance of the work lies in the comparative analysis of Nigeria's approach to conflict resolution in West Africa. Apart from that, the work has the potential of opening up new trajectories for studies of conflict resolution in the West African sub-region as well as in Africa. The work also sheds more light on the touted "hegemonic power" of Nigeria in West Africa. In addition, the outcome of this research is projected as useful

for other African “hegemonic powers,” especially the Republic of South Africa in her capacity vis-à-vis other member nations of Southern African Development Community (SADC). Furthermore, this research brings into the limelight the impact of the domestic condition on foreign policy as well as the relevance of diplomacy and peace keeping in conflict resolution (Ero, 2000:7).

### **1.10 SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

This work covers two independent African countries, Liberia and Guinea Bissau. The former inherited the legacy of being established by American Colonization Society in the second decade of the nineteenth century and became self-governing towards the middle of the century. The latter had a Portuguese colonial heritage and had to engage in a bitter thirty-year long anti-Portuguese struggle before independence was achieved towards the middle of the 1970s. This study would be incomplete without looking at Nigeria’s involvement in or absence from conflict resolution efforts in these neighbouring countries.

The study covers the period 1989-2010. This was a significant era in Nigeria’s foreign policy. The period witnessed three military regimes (Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-1993; Sanni Abacha, 1993-1998; Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999); and the two civilian administrations of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2010). There was the brief administration of Ernest Shonekan between the Ibrahim Babangida and Sanni Abacha regimes. This is omitted in the scope of this study because of its very brief tenure. The period was eventful and critical for Nigeria’s foreign policy in general and its West African policy in particular. The period allows for an inquiry into whether or not Nigeria had a clearly defined policy towards the West African neighbours. The period chosen enhances a more critical approach to the understanding of the politics of and variations in foreign policy-making in Nigeria because of the governance types and different regime behaviours. The period also allows for a flow in the investigation of any continuity and change in Nigeria’s foreign policy toward West Africa. These become important because of the variants of leadership and their different agendas as far as foreign and African policy was concerned. For example, the latter part of the Babangida regime posed a lot of credibility crises for Nigeria in international politics; the Abacha period undermined Nigeria’s leadership in Africa; the Abubakar era sought reintegration

of Nigeria into global politics, and Obasanjo's tenure saw Nigeria struggling to outshine South Africa, Egypt and Ghana in order to recover its respectable leadership position in Africa, while the Yar'Adua administration followed the pattern of Obasanjo regime's foreign policy.

### **1.11 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This research adopted a combination of historical and qualitative research methods. This is necessary because of the empirical nature of the work. The historical approach is the systematic collection of data preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past events. According to Busha and Harter (1980: 90), a historical approach allows the testing of hypotheses with regards to their causes and effects in order to explain present trends and focus on the future. The examination and interpretation of evidence and the drawing of logical conclusions are essential parts of historical research (Hancock and Algozzine, 2006: 80). Therefore, with reference to this study, the utility of the historical approach lies in its centrality to understanding the historical basis of the crises in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau as well as Nigeria's peace efforts in both countries.

In addition to the historical method, this research also uses the exploratory and inductive qualitative method. Qualitative methods are appropriate when the phenomena under study are complex, social in nature and devoid of quantification (Liebscher 1998: 669). Qualitative method was useful for this study because it is essentially exploratory in nature and involves methods of data collection that are non-quantitative or non-numerical (Miles and Huberman 1994: 32). Payne and Payne (2004: 176) argue that qualitative method controls the intricacies of social life by treating actions as part of a holistic social process and context, rather than as something that can be excised and studied in isolation. The scholars also contend that the strength of qualitative research method lies in its exploratory power in providing detailed information on the subject matter of research. It also provides an in-depth understanding of human and organisational behaviour of social interactions and the rationale for such interactions. Against this backdrop therefore, the qualitative method is appropriate in the context of the complexities associated with the subject matter of this study: Nigeria's peace roles in zones of conflict. The use of qualitative methods also informs the modes of data collection as discussed below.

### **1.11.1 Data Collection**

Data for this study was generated through both primary and secondary sources. No deep statistical analysis is used in this research as it is qualitative. This is because the research makes use of purely qualitative research methods only. Therefore the research has resolved to employ the following methods of data collection: in-depth interviews, focus groups discussions and radio archives.

### **1.11.2 Primary Sources**

One of the primary sources of data for this research was personal in-depth interviews, a technique that is of considerable utility in generating first-hand information on a subject in social science research. Interviews were conducted with a number of respondents in Nigeria, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. The interviewees included government officials, military personnel, academics, journalists, and diplomats. The researcher used the structured, detailed interview technique in order to generate robust, incisive and illuminating responses from interviewees. According to Payne and Payne (2004:90), the presence of the researcher-as-interviewer and the flexibility of this technique enable “a move towards a collaborative, non-hierarchical and inclusive relationship entailing and equality of standing between the researcher and the researched.” Besides, the use of this technique potentially mitigates the problems of limited application, low response rate and limited opportunity to clarify issues or views associated with the use of the questionnaire method (Kumar 2005:114).

Focus groups or group discussions method is another one research method deployed for data collection. This was conducted among journalists in the three countries under study. This method creates a process which is different from an in-depth interview because data are generated by interaction between group participants. In focus group, participants present their own views and experience. Also they heard from other people, listen, reflect on what is said and as a result consider their own standpoint further. Focus groups are synergistic because the group interaction is explicitly used to generate data and insights. (Ritchie, *et al* 2014:212-213). It is therefore envisaged that these techniques furnish invaluable insights into the study.

The population sizes of the three countries differ considerably. The CIA World Fact Book population review of 2015 estimated the population figures of the countries as follows: Nigeria: 181,562,056; Liberia: 4,195,666, and Guinea-Bissau: 1,726,170. The total population of the three countries is equal to 187,483,892. Possible participants included government officials, military personnel, academics, journalists, and diplomats. One hundred and fifty (**150**) participants were targeted as research sample over a study area of Nigeria, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau selected through purposeful sampling. The total interviews of **150** was distributed across the three countries based on the size of population: Nigeria: **75**; Liberia: **50**, and Guinea-Bissau: **25**. It is instructive to note that in the case of Guinea-Bissau which is a Portuguese speaking country, the researcher arranged for the services of an interpreter. It is to be noted also that initial contacts were made with the possible participants in the three countries, who agreed to assist the researcher during the data collection process. For objectivity and generalisability of results, participants were divided equally in each group in their individual countries.

**1.11.3 Sample Size and Location:**

**Nigeria**

| <b>Respondents:</b>  | <b>Population size:</b> |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Military Personnel   | 15                      |
| Government Officials | 15                      |
| Academics            | 15                      |
| Journalists          | 15                      |
| Diplomats            | 15                      |
| Total:               | 75                      |

**Liberia**

| <b>Respondents:</b> | <b>Population size:</b> |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Military Personnel  | 10                      |

|                      |    |
|----------------------|----|
| Government Officials | 10 |
| Academics            | 10 |
| Journalists          | 10 |
| Diplomats            | 10 |
| Total:               | 50 |

### **Guinea-Bissau**

| <b>Respondents:</b>  | <b>Population size:</b> |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Military Personnel   | 5                       |
| Government Officials | 5                       |
| Academics            | 5                       |
| Journalists          | 5                       |
| Diplomats            | 5                       |
| Total:               | 25                      |

Grand total: Nigeria (75) + Liberia (50) + Guinea-Bissau (25) = 150.

#### **1.11.4 Selection Method**

Purposeful sampling was adopted for selection. This approach enabled the selection of participants and settings to be criterion-based (Mason, 2002: 134). The sample units were chosen because they had particular characteristics that enabled detailed exploration and the understanding of the central themes and question which the research explores (Bryman, 2012:418). Purposeful sampling was principally because of two reasons: to ensure that all the key constituencies of relevance to the subject matter were covered. Secondly, the sampling method ensured that within each of the key criteria, enough diversity was included so that the impact of the characteristic concerned was adequately explored (Ritchie, *et al*: 113).

### **1.11.5 Secondary Sources**

The main sources of secondary data for this research were books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, government legislation and reports, radio archives and the internet sources. Radio archives were immensely useful as a secondary source of data collection for this research. The internet served as an invaluable source of information for the study giving the contemporary nature of the subject matter of this research. These secondary sources provided extensive bibliographic and contextual information that complemented the primary sources.

### **1.11.6 Data Analysis**

All data obtained from primary and secondary sources was assessed through content analysis. Stone *et al.* (1966:5) define content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text.” The technique entails summarizing and reliance on “the scientific method (including attention to objectivity-inter-subjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited [to]... the context in which the messages are created or presented” (Neuendorf, 2002:10). An important element of content analysis is to delineate the object of inquiry (Altheide 1996:14), thus situating the data in the context of the subject matter of one’s research. On the basis of this technique, the researcher (drawing from qualitative insights) made inferences and isolated relevant or specific content from diverse data generated during field work. The data generated through personal interviews was analysed within the context of the operational hypothesis of this research. Generally speaking, the variables that formed the basis of content analysis were broadly thematic and relational. Responses were coded into specific content categories that are indicative of the research objectives. The study synthesised data gathered from both primary and secondary sources so as to provide a holistic analysis of Nigeria’s roles in conflict resolutions in Liberia and Guinea Bissau.

## **1.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Fairness and ethical consideration are important to the success of this work. Therefore, issues such as voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and privacy was taken into consideration. The researcher assumed that data collected from respondents may be of a high

profile nature and confidential, and could possibly have serious security implications on the respondents. Therefore, the researcher obtained permission from respondents by assuring them that their participation in the study was voluntary and that their identities, information, and other materials obtained from them was held in confidence. Since some high profile confidential information was also required from governmental departments, many of them were reluctant in giving the information as they could be held responsible after the completion and the submission of the study. However, the researcher assured them of the confidentiality of information provided by them.

### 1.13 SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS

This study is structured into seven chapters as follows:

**Chapter One: Introduction:** The introductory chapter discusses the research scope of the study. It states the background, the aims and objectives of the research, justification for the study, research questions, scope and significance of the study, research methodology and sources of the data, scope of the study and finally the outline and structure of the study.

**Chapter Two:** The focus of this chapter is review of the relevant literature and the development of useful theoretical framework for understanding continuity and change in Nigeria's foreign policy and the country's peace plan in the sub-region of West Africa. Two main theories on foreign policy, viz. theory of interdependence and hegemonic stability theory, are examined with their various variants in the social, political, economic, military and ideological realms.

**Chapter Three:** This chapter concentrates on Nigeria's policy toward West African states. It analyses those factors that have enabled Nigeria to continue to play the role of "Big Brother" to these nations despite a bitter rivalry and deep mistrust held by some of them toward Nigeria, especially the Francophone countries. There are several domestic and external factors that determined Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa, the major ones being the oil boom and later "doom", the Nigerian Civil War, the emergence of military governments, colonial history, the nature of international affairs and systems, Nigeria's membership of various international organisations and the international politics of the end of cold war.



**Chapter Four:** In this chapter, the study examines some key statistics of Liberia. It continues by delving into Liberia's distant past when the American settlers colonised the indigenous population and created a segregated and exploitative country dominated by an Americo-Liberian oligarchy for more than a century. This part also discusses the fate of the country from 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe believed to represent the disgruntled indigenous population came to power through a coup and presided over a more brutal government, and thus the origin of Liberian crisis.

**Chapter Five:** The chapter is divided into two parts. The first engages in the statistical study of Guinea-Bissau while the second part discusses the formation of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde* -PAIGC) and the anti-Portuguese struggle of the masses. The second part continues by exploring the genesis of the crisis in Guinea Bissau and how it affected the socio-political and economic life of the country.

**Chapter Six:** The chapter concentrates on the pattern of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia. It starts by discussing the formation of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG and the role Nigeria played in its establishment. The chapter also examines the pattern of Nigeria's huge investment at restoring peace to war-torn Liberia, evaluating the human and material costs to Nigeria between 1990 and 2010. The chapter concludes by attempting to answer the question whether or not Nigeria's involvement in restoring peace to Liberia was a waste.

**Chapter Seven:** Nigeria's noncommittal stance to the restoration of peace in the troubled Guinea Bissau is discussed in this chapter. A fundamental issue raised in this chapter is why Nigeria looked away from Guinea Bissau but totally committed on Liberia. While Liberia is Anglophone, Guinea Bissau is Lusophone even though it is keenly knitted with the Francophone countries of West Africa. Was Nigeria's passive role-play at restoring peace to Guinea-Bissau under the aegis of ECOMOG an extension of Anglophone-Francophone rivalry in the sub-region? What was the domestic environment and the internal political dynamics of the system of government in Nigeria during the Guinea-Bissau crisis?

**Chapter Eight:** This chapter examines Nigeria and the peace process in West Africa since the end of the Cold War. It also focuses on continuity and change in its foreign policy and probes the aftermath of the country's involvement in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. Finally, it tries to answer the question whether or not Nigeria was a hegemonic power in the sub-region.

**Chapter Nine:** This final chapter provides the summary and conclusion of the study. It finally takes a look at the future role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in West Africa.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

##### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

Although there are a number of publications on aspects of conflict resolution research, it is still appropriate to attempt a review of some of these works. This review is justified as it highlights how this research filled the gaps in the existing literature on conflict resolution. Structurally, the review is divided into four broad topics, each one dealing with a theme: Nigerian foreign policy; the Liberian crisis; the Guinea-Bissau crisis, and conflict resolution in West Africa. The last part summarised gaps identified in the literature.

##### **2.1.1 NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

It is very important to go through the literature on foreign policy making of the five political dispensations this study covers. But first, it is important to state here that foreign policy formulation is primarily the responsibility of governmental structures such as the legislative and the executive organs. These include relevant departments and ministries, parastatals and intelligence agencies (Fawole, 2001; 16-21). The mass media and organized pressure groups may also shape the formulation of foreign policy.

Olusanya and Akindele (1989) in their edited work dealing with the first twenty-five years of post-Nigerian independence external relations epitomizes those factors that have contributed towards Nigeria's foreign policy positions. These include the ethnic and religious mix, Nigeria's colonial history and her role as an oil producing nation in the global economy, her membership of many international organizations and her place as the most populated black nation in the world. Nigeria's position as the most populous Black nation in the world has largely shaped her foreign policy toward African nations. These factors have caused certain issues to dominate her foreign policy across various governments. However, each government has had distinctive priorities and style. Reactions of various countries and international organisations during the

Nigerian Civil War (1967 to 1970) served as a revelation for decision-makers. After the war, a less pro-Western stance was maintained; Africa remained Nigeria's top priority while attention was focused on complete economic independence throughout Africa, most especially, the West African sub-region.

The Babangida administration inherited the foreign policy regime of General Muhammadu Buhari which was toppled in a coup in August 1985. The Babangida administration could have been a typical example of the problem of lack of continuity in political leadership and foreign policy making in Nigeria because most of Buhari's policies were abandoned. A number of scholarly works on Nigerian foreign policy have studied the Babangida era (Gambari, 1986; Nwachukwu, 1988; Olusanya and Akindele, 1989; Oyelakin, 1989; Otubanjo, 1989; Obiozor, 1992; Mrinho, 1992; Sesay and Owoeye, 1993; Akiba, 1998; Saliu, 2006; Adeyemo, 2002; Fawole, 2003; Abegunrin, 2003; Oyovbare, 2004; Inamete, 2001; Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008; May, 2010).

There seems to be a consensus among the scholars that the Babangida administration witnessed a dynamic foreign policy shift. The works praise the administration for its strong African policy that culminated in technical assistance to needy West African states, pacific settlement of old boundary disputes with immediate neighbours, commitment to peace-keeping and conflict resolution in the region and a modest economic diplomacy in Africa and the world. Nevertheless, the Babangida era has been blamed for the serious image problem fomented by the domestic crisis generated by unbridled corruption, drug scandals, international fraud (Adeyemo, 2002) and the annulment of the 1993 Presidential elections that had disastrous effects on Nigeria's image in African and global politics. The era has been particularly faulted for adding nothing new to Nigeria's African foreign policy but recycling the old national roles (Saliu, 2006).

The Sanni Abacha era has been evaluated by various scholars as perhaps the second most interesting and challenging for Nigerian foreign policy (Akinterinwa, 1997; Fawole, 2003; Akinyemi, 2005; Onoja, 1996; Hoffmann, 1996; Osuntokun, 1997; Mbu, 1997; and Saliu, 2006). These scholars have argued that the causes of the Abacha regime's foreign policy problems were

as follows: the unresolved June 12 election, incarceration of political leaders and state sponsored violence, the lack of a clear transition programme calendar, human rights abuses like the hanging of the nine Ogoni ethnic leaders, including Ken Saro Wiwa, and general hostility to the international community. The domestic problem would not have been a big foreign policy issue if it had been well managed by the policy makers, but the Ogoni crisis culminating in the hanging of the nine leaders was badly handled (Fawole, 1999; Osuntokun, 1997; Saliu, 2006). The bad management of Nigeria's foreign policy under Sanni Abacha regime made the country become a pariah state in the international community, suffering economic and military sanctions and getting suspended from the Commonwealth (Saliu, 2006). The many problems the nation's foreign policy faced then was a consequence of instability. Despite this, the Abacha regime has been described as proactive in Nigeria's peacekeeping and conflict resolution traditional roles (Ciroma, 1995; Ofonagoro, 1996; Mbu, 1997). It boosted peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and attempted to restore the government of President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone in order to resuscitate Nigeria's relevance in regional politics.

General Abubakar's government marked a clean break from the Abacha foreign policy regime (Adeyemo, 2002; Badmus and Ogunmola, 2003). His first task was to tackle the image problem and restore the confidence of the international community in the Nigerian government. Under his regime, Nigeria remained active in the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflict resolution efforts (Fawole, 2003; Adeyemo, 2002; Ojo and Azeez, 2002). Nigeria's commitment to conflict resolution during this period was just another case of allowing old roles and same objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy on the continent. This seems to have underscored the fact that all Nigerian leaders have always pursued the same foreign policy, and guiding principles, and implemented these the same way (Bukarambe, 2000).

Studies on the Obasanjo era foreign policy include Iliffe (2011); Adebajo and Mustapha (2008); Saliu (2006); Aluko (2005); Osuntokun (2005); Akinterinwa (2005); Olokun-Aluko (2005); Adagbo (2005); Fawole (2004); Anifowose and Seteolu (2003); Abegunrin (2003) and Adeyemo (2002). Abegunrin (2003) answers three fundamental questions: how nation-states behaved in the past, why they behaved this way and how their behaviour can be predicted and influenced or controlled in the present and future. Fawole (2004) provides insights on policy making during

the Obasanjo era. The works of Akinterinwa (2005); Olokun-Aluko (2005); and Osuntokun (2005) assess Nigeria's active roles in the reorganisation of the African Union (AU), formation of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and good governance in Africa within the first four-year term of Obasanjo. The work of Saliu (2006) identifies the multiple appointments into the Foreign Service as a major drawback for foreign policy making. He sees the presence of many players, including several Ministers of Foreign Affairs in policy making processes with the actual decision taken by the President as an abnormality. During his tenure in office, President Obasanjo, like Balewa in the First Republic, doubled as the Minister of Foreign Affairs despite the appointment of Sule Lamido as the person in charge of the Ministry. President Obasanjo settled many regional conflicts while the home-front was in turmoil. During his time, there was pressure from home, where the economy was nose diving, for his government to take a less expensive option at solving the Guinea Bissau crisis. His government was able to sustain the ambition of the people who preferred a diplomatic intervention of Nigeria in the sub-regional crises (Ero, 2000).

In May 2007, Olusegun Obasanjo handed over "a poisoned presidential chalice" to Umaru Musa Yar'Adua after an election that was widely believed to be the most flawed and duplicitous in Nigeria's forty-seven-year history (Adebajo, 2010). During his short period in office, Nigeria's foreign policy voice was muffled and there were bitter complaints about the inadequate funding of Nigerian embassies abroad. Also there was a chorus of disapproval within the foreign ministry in 2007 when President Yar'Adua nominated non-career diplomats for appointment into over 50 per cent of head-of-mission positions. Apart from these complaints, within the diplomatic circles there was also an argument that the rapid expansion of Nigeria's diplomatic missions abroad had affected the effectiveness of career diplomats (Fafowora, 2008). However, much could not be done by Yar'Adua in foreign policy due to lack of experience in this area and because of the exigencies of his illness and eventual death while in office (Adebajo, 2010). There were two important legacies he left behind in Nigeria's foreign relations. First, President Yar'Adua was able to maintain his resolution against the American demand that the United States African Command should be relocated to Africa from Germany to the chagrin of the US. Also, under the administration of President Yar'Adua, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning monk and the exiled 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama was allowed to visit Nigeria. Although the Dalai Lama has been in exile in India

from his country, Tibet, since 1959, he came on a private visit to Nigeria. The permission granted him to visit was against the wish of China (Adeniyi, 2011). China does not recognise the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) which is based in India's Himalayan town of Dharamsala and represents nearly 100,000 exiled Tibetans living in 30 countries including India, Nepal, Canada and the United States (Blanchard, 2016).

Although Vision 2020 which articulated the road map and the blueprint of achieving national economic growth to making Nigeria one of the twenty biggest economies in the world by 2020 was established by the government of Olusegun Obasanjo (Itua, 2011), Yar'Adua's administration upheld the vision. The government of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua set up the National Council to develop a blueprint for the Vision in collaboration with the National Planning Commission. The blueprint provided tools for the various technical groups, including that of foreign policy, to work with and come out with some modalities. Also, the foreign policy reform panel formed by the Yar'Adua's administration in 2007 came up with a concept of "citizenship diplomacy", which was popularised by his Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Madueke. The concept of "citizenship diplomacy" according to the minister was to cater for Nigerians in the diaspora who were to be agents of change for Nigeria's battered image abroad. However, this effort could not be pushed forward by the administration due to the ailment of President Yar'Adua (Adeola and Ogunnoiki, 2015).

In January 2010, power to carry out state affairs was conferred on Goodluck Jonathan (the Vice-President), by a Federal high court of Nigeria while President Yar'Adua was receiving medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. The following month, Goodluck Jonathan resumed office as acting President following a resolution to that effect by the Nigerian upper house of legislature. With the demise of President Yar'Adua in May 2010, Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as President in accordance with the order of succession in the Nigerian constitution. Because the period of this research effort stops in 2010, not much could be written about the foreign policy of Goodluck Jonathan's government. However, the government of Goodluck Jonathan has claimed to have reviewed Nigeria's foreign policy barely a year into its assumption of power. The review, according to the government, was to reflect a "citizen-focused" approach, designed to accord the "vision of defending the dignity of humanity the highest priority" and connect foreign policy to

domestic policy while placing a greater emphasis on economic diplomacy. The foreign policy of Goodluck Jonathan believed that Nigeria being in partnership with the AU would lead the process for democracy and development in Africa. Therefore, Nigeria should support the “consolidation of democracy, good governance and human rights in the continent” (Presidential Review of Foreign Policy, 2011).

### **2.1.2 THE LIBERIAN CRISIS**

Any effort to describe the two civil wars in Liberia in only a few pages is definitely doomed to be inadequate if it aims at giving a true picture of what really happened (van der Kraaij, 2015: 58). However, with regard to works on the Liberian crisis, the following are some reviewed for the purpose of this thesis: Blahyi (2006); Boley (1983); Cain (1999); Cassell (1970); Ciment (2013); De Graaf (2012); Dunn and Tarr (1988); Ellis (1999); Farah (2004); Gardes (2013); Gboree and Mithers (2011); Huband (1998); Kamara-Umunna, et al. (2011); Kieh (2008, 2001); Kramer (1995); Kugmeh (2007); Kulah (1999); Levitt (2005); Lucas (1997); Lyons (1998); Nnoma (1999); Pham (2004); Powers (2005); Reno (1996, 1995); Richards, (1996); Sawyer (1992); Sesay (1992); Shaw (2008); Sherman (2011); Sirleaf (2009); Surhone, *et al.* (2010); van der Kraaij (2015); Waugh (2011); Williams (2006, 2002); Wulah (2005). Although, only few of these publications deal with both civil wars systematically, nevertheless, all expose the tragic scene of a collapsed state in the midst of incessant warfare.

The common argument among these scholars is that the very foundation of Liberia contained in itself the seeds of self-destruction. Liberia was established in 1847 by freed slaves from America and the American colonization society. Unfortunately, the settlers colonized the indigenous population and created a segregated and exploitative country dominated by an Americo Liberian oligarchy for more than a century. In 1980, Samuel Doe, an indigenous general overthrew the government but reinforced an even more ruthless and repressive regime. Various rebel groups rose up against Doe. Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe’s government became a challenger. He cleverly exploited the ethnic animosity and illegal timber and diamond trade to earn \$75m annually. Eventually Charles Taylor gained the upper hand and won the election in 1997 after seven years of bloody civil war. However, with Taylor in government, the crisis only got worse and he was forced into exile in Nigeria in 2003. ECOMOG, the West African



economic community peacekeeping force, although criticised for having carried out some barbaric acts, came in to put an end to the war. The international community, including the UN, was rendered almost powerless and America refused to save its former colony because she was then engaged in the Iraqi War.

The works identify some principal players and delineate the damage done in the fourteen years of bloody conflict in Liberia. They recount the pivotal role played by the international community, including the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, in helping to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The research also reveals the humanitarian catastrophe created by the civil war, highlighting the death and disease and the displacement of up to half a million Liberians.

### **2.1.3 THE GUINEA-BISSAU CRISIS**

There are thin research sources on Guinea-Bissau in the English Language, principally because Guinea-Bissau is a Portuguese-speaking country. Vigh (2006); Ferreira (2004); Hawthorne (2003); Chabal (2003); Dhada (1993); Cabral (1970); Davidson (1984, 1969); Urdang (1979), and Rodney (1970) have all provided some historical background to the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. Vigh (2006) employs the anthropological concept of "social navigation," to shed light on the mobilization of urban youth in Guinea Bissau. The book provides insights into the interplay between objective structures and subjective agency which enabled the young people to struggle and make use of the opportunistic and tactical ways available to them to expand the horizons of possibility in a world of conflict, turmoil and diminishing resources. Dhada (1993) recounts how the *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) formed a nationalist army, launched a guerrilla war and mounted a protracted drive for an independent nation-state. He tries to answer some specific questions regarding the fight to free Guinea in the book. Davidson (1969) makes use of original material from the men and women who were principal actors in the war of liberation, including Amilcar Cabral and the party, the PAIGC, to analyse the economic, political and cultural organization that paved way for a mass military victory over the Portuguese and European imperialism. Cabral (1970) is a selection of political essays and speeches by Amilcar Cabral which underscores Cabral's contentions about colonialism, neo-

colonialism, and the role of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and the working class. The work also questions whether or not a people exist in history if they do not meet Marxist criteria.

The few works that address the crisis in Guinea-Bissau include Ferreira (2004); Adebajo (2002); IPA and ECOWAS (2001), and United Nations (2000). These works assess the domestic and external dynamics of the Guinea-Bissau conflict and examine the roles and motivations of the full range of actors.

#### **2.1.4 CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA**

Most literature under review dealing with conflict resolution in West Africa reconsiders the role of the UN and regional organizations such as ECOWAS in Africa. Some of the works include Olonisakin (2008); Jaye (2003); Adebajo (2002); Fawole (2002); UN (2002, 2001 and 1998); Nass (2000); Hutchful (2000, 1999); Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin (1999); Aboagye (1999); Van Walraven (1999); Kwesi (1999); Harris (1999); Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (1998); Alao (1998); UNDPKO (1998); Adibe (1997); Vogt and Aminu (1996); Adeleke (1995); Kofi (1993) and Vogt (1992). These works examine the response of ECOMOG to the civil wars in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, which had dealt a big blow to the security arrangement in the sub region. Adebajo (2000) argues that among all of Africa's troubled regions, the West African sub-region has gone the furthest toward establishing a security mechanism to manage its own conflicts.

The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia from 1990 to 1997 was the first by a sub-regional African organization that relied principally on its own personnel, finance and military material. The 1998 intervention in Sierra Leone to restore a democratic government to power was equally unprecedented. Adebajo (2000) explores these two cases, as well as the brief and unsuccessful ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 in an incisive study of regional peace building efforts. After discussing the political, economic, and security contexts of West Africa since independence, he concludes by drawing crucial policy lessons for building peace through the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

Olonisakin (2000) generates a report based on a comprehensive literature review to assess the impact of past peace-keeping missions in West Africa and to help identify lessons learnt. The

work includes recommendations and many generic terms of reference for possible studies on the impact of regional peace support operations. It is an important contribution to the development of a framework of evaluation, with a special focus on the implications for the civilian dimension of peace support operations.

Sanghera, Marsha and Higate's work (2008) is an interesting research outcome. The research is a working paper drawing on a small-scale qualitative study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This paper provides insight into the ways in which those who work and live in this post-conflict site made sense of the styles of security provided by male peacekeepers. It subjects interview material to analyses through the gendered lens in ways that seek to examine the extent to which male peacekeepers were seen as derivatives of the 'New Man' on account of their dominant representation as 'soft warrior' in UN and other imagery. A three stage typology is developed from the data including the 'hard (traditional) warrior', the 'soft warrior/humanitarian' and the 'peacekeeper as New Man.'

Findings in this work suggest that a national contingent identity shaped participant understandings of the gendered styles of peacekeepers and the security practices to which they were subject. Here, Nigerian troops in the ECOMOG were seen as 'hard men', Bangladeshi troops were considered as somewhat 'weak' or 'soft' and Swedish and Irish contingent personnel were framed as 'fair' and 'professional.' The work concludes that different styles of peacekeeping articulated at a national level find expression 'on-the-ground', as they converge with national stereotypes held by participants. In this way, perceptions of national identity arose at the interface of

- (1) national-domestic approaches to peacekeeping,
- (2) observable security practice, and
- (3) imaginings of particular peacekeeper masculinities.

In turn, these gave rise to the content and form of national stereotypes through which male peacekeepers' masculinized identities were perceived to shape the provision of a variety of securities.

Works like Adebajo (2002); Bach (2000); Vogt (1993); Fahnbulleh (1994); Vogt and Ekoko (1993), and Gershoni (1993) delve into the complex diplomacy of the Liberian civil war. Some

of these works, Adebajo (2002) and Vogt and Ekoko (1993) pay particular attention to the role of ECOWAS, other international actors like the United States, United Nations and the African Union (AU) as well as the leadership role of Nigeria in seeking to find a lasting solution to the conflict therein.

### **2.1.5 SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED GAPS IN LITERATURE**

First, the literature on continuity and change in Nigeria's foreign policy studies is not comprehensive so also are books on Nigeria's contributions to conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. None of the literature has fully examined the central themes of this research, i.e., the reasons behind Nigeria's different approaches to conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. Second, there seems to be broad unanimity among scholars that the measurement of Nigeria's foreign policy toward African countries is egalitarian. Third, the literature has laid much emphasis on institutions more than the political actors who are the fulcrum on which the institutions rotate. It must be stressed here that the countries under study are among states in the Sub-Saharan Africa where authoritarian regimes have presided over states with weak institutional capacities, (Knutsen, 2010); (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005); (Chabal & Daloz, 1999); (Museveni, 1995). Furthermore, many of the studies on Nigeria's peace initiatives in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau are in journal articles. Therefore since journal articles look at a single and particular issue per time, it implies that they are not fully comprehensive as far as a holistic study of the topic is concerned.

Adebajo's *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* is a significant work on Nigeria's efforts at restoring peace to both countries. However, the scope of the book stops in 1999, therefore this effort needs to be followed up. Despite the fact that there is a huge amount of literature currently available, what is conspicuously missing is the singular address of the reasons behind Nigeria's adoption of different approaches to conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. These gaps are significant and this study, building on the efforts of other scholars through holistic investigations, attempts to fill the gaps herein identified.

## 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001:1-21), “theories serve as the mental lenses through which researchers view and interpret the world.” Also, Rosenau and Durfee (2000:1-6) argue that “scholars can self-consciously rely on the core practices of theory to bring a measure of order out of the inordinate complexities” that maintain international politics. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, theoretical and methodological differences in international relations have enhanced the need to employ an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, this study employs the twin theories of *Interdependence* (Wagner, 1988:461) and *Hegemonic Stability* (Snidal, 1985:579-614) to explain Nigeria’s varying degrees of involvement in the Liberian and Guinea Bissau crises.

The theory of *Interdependence*, according to Keohane and Nye (1989:9-10), characterizes relationships in a global international system. The greater the level of interdependence among states, they argue, the greater the loss of control that they experience overall or part of their decision-making independence. Interdependence always carries costs with it because it restricts autonomy. There are two dimensions to interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity in interdependence involves degrees of responsiveness within a framework, i.e. how changes in one country quickly bring costly changes in another, and how great the cost effects are. Vulnerability is an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. According to these theorists, interdependence in its two dimensions could be social, political, economic, military or ideological in nature. This means that interdependence as a theory is not symmetrical (Wagner, 1988:461). Rosecrance and Stein (1973:2) have also viewed interdependence as a relationship of interests such that if one nation’s position changes, other states will be affected by the change. Since socio-political and economic changes brought about as a result of internal crises in the two countries studied here could bring costly changes and effects in the sub-region of West Africa, hence the theory of interdependence suffices because it creates a better framework of analysis for the research.

Morse (1976:14) observed that interdependence is the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties when the outcomes of these actions are mutually contingent. According to him, interdependence does not only breed crises and various forms of linkages; it also increases the potential for any single party to manipulate a crisis for its own domestic or foreign political ends (Abegunrin, 2003:148). According to this postulation therefore, the theory of Interdependence as a framework of analysis is important to this research. This is because although the intractability of the Liberian civil war made Nigeria's involvement very unpopular at home, the international acclaim won by Nigeria's participation and leadership in the regional intervention force was seen as a good counterbalance to her pariah status in the international community at the time of General Sanni Abacha's regime (Cleaver and Massey, 2006: 213).

David Baldwin (1980: 484) made a concise summary of the arguments of Sir Norman Angell (1914), Francis Delaisi (1925) and Ramsay Muir (1933) on interdependence to include these seven submissions. First, there should be division of labour among dependent nations, since one supports the other. Two, there is involvement of exchange in the trading of one's labour for the other's. Three, exchange generates mutual benefits. Four, there is the dependence of one on the other and the opportunity costs of severing the relationship are high. Five, the reciprocity of inter-dependence serves as a constraint on the behaviour of one party relative to the other. Six, interdependence is a reality that must be endured. And seven, Sir Norman (1914) believed that the degree of interdependence varies inversely with the effectiveness of force. In addition, liberal theorists have used interdependence to justify the formation of the European Union; Richard Nixon's opening to China, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, and Henry Kissinger's conception of the idea of détente with the Soviet Union (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001: 834-59). There are two meanings of "economic interdependence" in the field of international relations. A group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those found in the others. The second group is comprised of countries that are considered interdependent "if it would be costly for them to rupture or forego their interdependent relationship" (Baldwin, 1980: 471-506).

In *Hegemonic Stability Theory*, Duncan Snidal (1985: 579-81) agrees with Mancur Olson's postulation that international public goods can only exist if a group (of states) have a single state

among them that has sufficient interest in the goods to be willing to bear the full costs of its provisions (Olson: 1965). Snidal (1985: 281) further suggests that the outcome of such “will be most likely when a single state or the hegemonic power is sufficiently large relative to all others that it will capture a share of the benefit of the public goods larger than the entire cost of providing it.” Thus, a deductive conclusion and empirical implication of Snidal’s argument of leadership and burden-bearing attributes of a hegemon sufficiently qualifies Nigeria to be “a hegemonic power” in the sub-region of West Africa. This is so because of Nigeria’s substantial power configuration in terms of population, economy and military capability vis-à-vis the rest of the fifteen other ECOWAS members.

As a result of the foregoing, this study has appropriated the *Hegemonic Stability Theory* in addition to the theory of *Interdependence* to buttress its arguments. Hegemonic stability theory is a variant of both theories of international cooperation and integration. According to Kenneth Organski (1968: 258), hegemonic stability theory is one of “the most influential and yet controversial ideas” to emerge from the discipline of international relations. It has also been argued that this theory is important in the interpretation of the American position in global politics. Therefore, because the subject of the theory is palpably connected to the activities of the United States in World politics, the debate over the theory is momentous for both the scholars and policymakers. Since the introduction of the theory in the 1970s, a considerable amount of literature has developed to review and expand the original idea. Organski (1968) has analysed hegemonic stability theory purely from an economic perspective.

The genesis of hegemonic stability theory is traceable back to the 1950s, when Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski submitted that a link existed between British hegemony and the rise of free trade in the nineteenth century. However, in the 1970s, Charles Kindleberger’s (1973:291) proposition that the cause of economic anarchy in the years between the World Wars could be ascribed to the lack of a hegemonic power has been seen as the first extensive rehearsal of the theory. Hence, it has been argued that Kindleberger (1973) laid the foundation for hegemonic stability theory which became a theoretical tool for understanding of international hegemony within conventional studies of international relations in the 1980s. In his submission, Kindleberger (1984) argued that the economic slump of the 1920s could only have developed



into a global economic crisis as a result of the fact that Great Britain was unable to guarantee the stability of a global economic system and by then the United States was not ready for the leadership role.

The main thesis of Kindelberger's hegemonic stability theory is that in the absence of a hegemon, it was quite impossible to maintain a dominant state that will be able to play a leadership role in the international system. Thus, the existence of a hegemonic power is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international economic stability. According to him, because of the opportunities to "cheat and free ride", any hegemonic power is fundamentally unstable. Stability in any hegemon could only arise when it is capable to "both bear the costs of providing this collective good and extract the support of others" (Kindelberger, 1973). He further argued that the theory entailed that one country is dominated by another when the dominated has to take into account what the dominant country does. In addition, he posited that the theory involved leadership; the act of persuading others to follow a given course of action which might not be in the short run interest of the follower were the follower truly independent (Kindelberger, 1981: 243).

Representatives of different schools of thought have devised variants of hegemonic stability theory to suit their theoretical paradigms. Robert Gilpin (1981) arguing from the realist point of view has come out that "enlightened self-interest motivated the hegemon's willingness to maintain order". However, Robert Keohane (1984) arguing from the perspective of Neo-liberal Institutionalism submitted that a hegemon was essential for the establishment of functioning global and regional institutions. Nevertheless, he postulated further that once such international institutions are built, they are capable of perpetuating and forging cooperation independent of a hegemon (Keohane, 1984: 1-17). From the foregoing, it could be deduced that the realist school of thought basically argue that hegemony enables cooperation and the establishment of international institutions while their decay is probably going to be disastrous to such hegemonic powers. The institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that "shared economic interests create a demand for international institutions and rules" and also such shared economic interests identify the functions carried out by such institutions. Keohane explains how cooperation can occur in



global politics in the absence of hegemonic powers by combining the two approaches. He therefore proposed that any functional explanation dealing with “the value of a process or pattern of interaction” must be understood through the political structure, especially the distribution of power among actors (Keohane, 1984: 182-216).

Robert Gilpin assumed that the instability in the global system was indirectly related to the economic and military capability of a hegemon (Gilpin, 1983: 88-89; Olusanya and Akindele, 1989:2). According to Gilpin (1981: 94), the most powerful state in the international system has the ability to restrain the weaker ones from resorting to violence (Gilpin, 1981:94). Notwithstanding, the ability of the hegemon to maintain peace might be an apparent demonstration of domination within its sphere of influence (Mitchell and Vasquez, 2014:203). Kindelberger and Gilpin have divided hegemonic stability theory into two distinct approaches: economy and security. While Kindelberger, a liberal economist, focused majorly on the role of the hegemon in the provision of collective goods and contribution to economic stability, Gilpin focused much more on the security implications of hegemonic power. At the sub-regional level of West Africa, Nigeria has played a prominent role in fostering regional integration. Following Kindelberger’s hegemonic stability theory therefore, Nigeria could, by its sphere of influence, resources and vantage position in the sub-region of West Africa, be considered a “hegemon” and thus, the usefulness of the theory in the interpretation adopted in this research work.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN WEST AFRICA**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

Within and outside the West African sub-region, Nigeria's immediate neighbours consist of the Francophone states of the Republic of Benin to the west; Republic of Cameroon to the east; Republic of Chad to the north-east, and Republic of Niger to the north. On the Atlantic coast to the south, Nigeria shares maritime boundaries with the Spanish-speaking Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Lusophone state of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. Nigeria shares a total of about 5,000 square kilometres of international borders with these neighbours: Benin (1000 kilometres); Niger (1500 kilometres); Chad (75 kilometres); Cameroon (1700 kilometres), and 700 kilometres with Equatorial Guinea along the Atlantic Ocean (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992).

The entity known as Nigeria today has had close relationships with other parts of West Africa, especially its Anglophone postcolonies. While the four British colonies of Nigeria (separately administered as the Southern and Northern Protectorates, before the 1914 amalgamation), Sierra Leone, the Gambia and the Gold Coast (modern Ghana), were administered separately during the First World War, they had common currency and common colonial military force, (the West African Frontier Force). However by 1936, advantages of a closer relationship and the appointment of a Governor-General for the whole four colonies were advocated by the Colonial Office in London (Ajayi and Crowder, 1987: 588-589).

The second and the final joint administration of the British West African colonies was constituted in February 1866 and lasted till November 1886. The first period lasted from October 1821 until January 1850, a year before Lagos was bombarded and conquered by the British. Under the arrangement, an administrative entity under a Governor-in-Chief, (equivalent in rank to a Governor-General) was set up to govern the colonies and the power was vested in the governor of Sierra Leone at Freetown. Thus Lagos Colony was administered from 1866 to 1874 from Freetown, Sierra Leone, and from 1874 to 1886 from Accra, Ghana (then the Gold Coast).

In 1886, the Lagos Colony was made a separate territory and placed under a governor (Ikime, 1977).

Also the West African Currency Board (WACB) was the colonial monetary authority for the British colonies of West Africa, established in 1912 with headquarters in London. The body was charged with providing for and control the supply of currency to the British West African colonies, protectorates and Trust Territories. Two major banks that operated in British West Africa during the colonial period were Barclays and the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA). They had great economic and financial influence over all the colonies from 1916 to 1960. Long after the final dissolution of the joint administration of the British West African colonies, a single currency, the British West African Pound, was in effect the trading currency throughout the region (including Nigeria) from 1907 to 1962 (Ekundare, 1973: 84, 313).

Nigeria's role of 'charismatic' leadership emerged in the sub-region immediately after independence. It is generally acknowledged that Nigeria, on the basis of its predominance in this part of Africa, could have garnered faster development in the sub-region if it had occupied a more active leadership role from independence. Twelve years into its independence, Nigeria spearheaded the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a functional forum of economic integration of the sub-region. At the formation of the organisation, Nigeria plodded along the murky track of integration arrangements with Togo, a smaller Francophone West African state. The track of economic integration of the region was made muddier for Nigeria because most countries in the region were classified among the poorest and least developed in the world. Also, the countries had different colonial experiences - British, French and Portuguese - and held divergent idiosyncratic ideological philosophies of economic development (Olaniyan, 1986: 126, 127).

A number of motives explained why Nigeria had to spearhead the establishment of an economic body for the integration of West Africa. One of the most important reasons was the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry in the sub-region. (This is discussed more extensively in the latter part of this work). The rivalry came to a head during the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970, when Cote d'Ivoire recognised the sovereignty of the embattled Republic of Biafra (Olaniyan, 1986:127).

To the Anglophone West African states, the Nigerian civil war was treated as an internal matter to be settled by the Anglophone community. After the failed Aburi mediation efforts by Ghana between Nigeria and Biafra, all the Anglophone states unsuccessfully tried to limit regional interference in the conflict. Such efforts infuriated Cote d'Ivoire. (Adibe: 2001: 23). The stance taken by Cote d'Ivoire was apparently to weaken the seemingly strong position of a united Nigeria in West Africa.

Looking critically at Nigeria's efforts at the integration of West Africa after independence, it is important to note that the position of some West African states was oppositional. For example, the leadership of Senegal had always lacked interest in an Economic Community with Nigeria as the arrowhead. This was evident in the various proposals made by the late President Leopold-Sedar Senghor in the 1970s. His prayer was that the Economic Community should be expanded from Mauritania to Zaire, obviously in order to counter-balance Nigeria's influence within ECOWAS (Garba, 2005: 42). The opposition of these two Francophone West African countries to Nigeria's leadership position in the region was a mammoth task for the country; nevertheless Nigeria continued to toe the path of economic integration of the sub-region.

The historical detour above is aimed at establishing the fact that there existed some form of relationships between Nigeria and other countries in West Africa from the pre-independence era. Although the relationships may be murky most times, nevertheless Nigeria has always maintained good neighbourliness for obvious reasons explained extensively in the body of this work. Therefore because of these reasons, it has been a major preoccupation of Nigeria's foreign policy to make friends out of neighbours cartographically bestowed on it by the European colonial legacy. This task has always been extremely difficult for Nigeria because of differences in colonial traditions and the disproportionate demographic, economic and military size of the country in comparison with other West African countries.

This chapter is divided into eight sections. Following this introductory note, the consistency in the objectives and the nuances in methods of Nigeria's foreign policy is discussed. The section that follows addresses Nigeria's foreign policy toward West Africa while the subsequent section examines those factors that underlie Nigeria's role in the sub-region. The three sections that

follow each look at Nigeria's relations with the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone West African states respectively. The final section draws some tentative conclusions on the implications of such strategic and political alliances.

### **3.2 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: CONSISTENT OBJECTIVES, CHANGING METHODS**

Scholars have always explained Nigeria's foreign policy in terms of the theory of four "concentric circles" principles of national interest. The first and the innermost "circle" represents Nigeria's own security, independence and prosperity and is centred on its immediate neighbours - Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger (and by extension, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe). The second "circle" is about Nigeria's relations with its West African neighbours while the third dwells on the continental African issues on peace, development and democratization. The fourth "circle" involves Nigeria's relations with international organisations, institutions and non-African states (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21).

Nigeria's aspiration to the exalted position of leadership in Africa is not a new development. This has been noticeable even before independence when some Nigerian leaders raised the hopes of the masses about independent Nigeria's place in Africa. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of Nigeria, recapitulated the "manifest destiny of Nigeria" to emancipate the black race from the "scourge of colonialism" in a speech he gave to the London branch of his political party in 1959 (Azikiwe, 1961). From independence, Nigerian political leaders have always wanted to play a significant role in Africa, the role America was playing in the West. Nigeria took a bold step at breaking all diplomatic relations with France in protest against nuclear tests in the Sahara in 1961. This move was clearly stated by Nigeria at the United Nations First Committee meeting of the same year. At the Geneva meeting, Nigeria laid bare its mind on the issue when it declared that the country was "opposed to the testing of nuclear weapons of any size, by any state, in any environment" (UN General Assembly, 1961a).

The move against testing of nuclear bombs was vigorously pursued by Nigeria at the subsequent Geneva Disarmament Conferences. When the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed in Moscow in 1963, Nigeria ratified this convention as

well as similar treaties in London and Washington of the same year. In addition, Nigeria pursued the policy of demarcating nuclear free zones at the United Nations in the 1960s to include Africa, in accordance with the UN Antarctic Treaty of 1961. This effort was made not only for Africa but for the whole Third World. The proposal asked that the whole continent of Africa be declared as free zone for nuclear tests and also recommended that Latin America should be treated the same. The intention of Nigeria in challenging the nuclear powers was “not to insulate Africa from the problems that faced the world, but to begin the denuclearisation of the whole world with a region [Africa] which had not yet been contaminated” (UN General Assembly, 1961b). The steps taken by Nigeria in the early years of its independence could be seen as directed at fulfilling its “manifest destiny” in Africa.

Nigeria’s “manifest destiny” in Africa is akin to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 in the United States of America. The fundamental objective of the Monroe Doctrine was to free the newly independent colonies of Latin America from European intervention. The Monroe Doctrine forbade further efforts by European nations to colonise the land or interfere with states in the Americas. Actually, the Monroe Doctrine regarded further colonisation of any part of the North and South America by any European power as acts of aggression requiring the intervention of the United States of America. This dogma has formed the cornerstone of American foreign policy and has allowed the United States to exert its own influence unperturbed (Boyer, 2006: 514). However, unlike the United States whose early leaders did not seek the approval of the countries of the Western Hemisphere with respect to Monroe Doctrine (Kissinger, 2015: 205), Nigeria sought the endorsement of other countries in the region with the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.

As a consequence, Nigeria’s role of ‘charismatic’ leadership emerged in the sub-region immediately after independence in 1960. It is generally acknowledged that Nigeria, on the basis of its predominance in this part of Africa, could have garnered faster development in the sub-region if it could occupy a more active leadership role from independence. Thus, twelve years into its independence, Nigeria spearheaded the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a functional forum of economic integration of the sub-region. At the formation of this organisation, Nigeria plodded along the murky track of incorporation

arrangements with Togo, a smaller Francophone West African state. The track of economic integration of the region was made muddier for Nigeria because most countries in the region were classified among the poorest and least developed in the world. Also, the countries had different colonial experiences - British, French and Portuguese - and held divergent idiosyncratic ideological philosophies of economic development (Olaniyan, 1986: 126, 127).

It is interesting to remember that Nigeria was tagged a “Frontline State” and was indeed a member of countries that were accorded that appellation in the fight against white domination in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1970s (Adebajo, 2010: 131). Other nations in the group of “Frontline States” were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (from 1980) (SAHO, 2011). Geographically, Nigeria is far away from these frontline states but because of its commitment to ripping to shreds apartheid in South Africa, the country was at the forefront of the “frontline” states. In the same disposition, Nigeria was accorded the honour of occupying the chairmanship of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid for an extended period of time.

As a result of the country’s compulsive antipathy towards apartheid in South Africa, a total identification with the anti-apartheid front was made the third strand in its African policy. Nigeria’s anti-apartheid policy was maintained on a tripod stand against the apartheid regime in South Africa until its collapse in 1994. The first one was the prohibition of trade and economic relations with the apartheid regime in compliance with the 1963 Addis Ababa resolution on Decolonisation. The second had to do with Nigeria’s strong position against any dialogue with Pretoria and regarded any from whatever quarters as a betrayal of black Africa and an insult on the dignity of the blackman. The third posture was the full support for the two internationally recognised liberation movements in South Africa; the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986: 7).

Successive Nigerian governments from independence religiously committed to the eradication of colonialism and apartheid in Africa. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s government was opposed to racism and apartheid on moral grounds while it contributed regularly to the Special Fund of the OAU liberation Committee. The Ironsi government decided to close down the Portuguese

Mission in Lagos in February 1966. His administration also prohibited ships and aircraft going to and fro South Africa from using Nigerian ports and overflying Nigerian airspace. The Yakubu Gowon administration expanded Nigeria's hostility against colonialism and apartheid in Africa in three main ways: by granting bilateral aid to the liberation movements, invitation of leaders of liberation movements to Nigeria for advice and training, and securing recognition for important liberation movements by the OAU. As a result of Gowon's efforts, such movements as the MPLA (in Angola), the ZAPU and the ZANU (in Zimbabwe), the SWAPO (in Namibia), and the PAIGC (in Guinea-Bissau) were given recognition by the OAU (Aluko, 1986: 93, 94).

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime arguably did more than any other before it to thwart colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa so much so that a scholar has tagged the era of the government as "the golden age of Nigeria's foreign policy in Southern Africa." Under Obasanjo's government, Nigeria deployed hype as a tool to dismantle apartheid in South Africa. A propagandist organisation called the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAAP) was set up and special levies were raised for freedom fighters under the South African Relief Agency while some of these liberation movements were allowed to open offices in Lagos at the expense of the sitting Nigerian government. Because of Nigeria's avowed commitment to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the country began to be invited to the meetings of frontline states from 1976. Apart from Nigeria's stance against apartheid regime in South Africa, it also led a successful battle against the Margaret Thatcher government of Great Britain that maintained a double standard policy over Zimbabwean independence. The successive civilian government of Shehu Shagari and military regimes of Mohammadu Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida kept Nigeria's anti-apartheid flag flying despite the flagging economy (Ajala, 1986: 207).

The former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, as a member of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG), was the first African leader privileged to visit Nelson Mandela in his Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison in Tokai, Cape Town, South Africa in 1986. The visit was the group's advance party, (Obasanjo was the only one allowed to see Mandela) to explore opinions and possibilities for negotiations to lay apartheid to rest and to release all the apartheid-held prisoners from gaol, including the most paramount of them all, Nelson Mandela (Iliffe, 2011: 121). It is important to note that under Nigeria's presidency of the UN Security Council



(as a non-permanent member) in May 1994, the policy of apartheid in South Africa was formally dismantled. Also the mandatory arms embargo slammed on the country was lifted and South Africa was returned to its seat in the UN General Assembly (Gambari, 2008: 72).

The collapse of the Cold War international system generated some new challenges in the internal and external affairs of African states. These countries had to grapple with such crises as the indelible debt crisis, inter- and intra-state conflicts, as well as with new problems like the combined forces of globalization and marginalization, the pandemics of HIV/AIDS and general human insecurity on the continent (Akokpari, 2001:34-55). Also, at the end of the Cold War, the US had failed to act justly in relations with Africa; for example it procrastinated and delayed action during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and failed to come to Liberia’s aid when the country fell into its time of troubles from 1989. There was no real help from the United States to stem the violence during the 1989-96 Liberian crises, notwithstanding the historic US-Liberian relations. At the start of hostilities, American forces had stood offshore Liberia or intervened solely to rescue Americans and other foreigners while Liberians were left to wallow in their troubles (Copson, 2007:4). Thus, the limited impact of the international community in Africa since the end of the Cold War had conferred on Nigeria the pivotal role of restoration of peace in the West African sub-region from the 1990s (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003: 171). Figure 3.1 below shows the map of West Africa.

**Figure 3.1: The map of West Africa showing all ECOWAS countries.**



Source: *Foundation Suisse du Service Social International*, 2010.

### **3.3 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN WEST AFRICA**

It has been asserted that West Africa as a sub-region occupies a very particular position as far as integration is concerned (Plessz, 1968: 76). West Africa varies from other parts of Africa in the size of its countries, the level of economic development, language, internal and external links. The intricate nature of West Africa has made some scholars in economic integration conclude that a study of integration efforts in the sub-region is a study in frustration (Adedeji, 1989: 67). West Africa is more fragmented than any other part of Africa as a result of the cut-throat competition for trade and territory among the European powers between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. As a result of this European rivalry, West Africa became the most heterogeneous part of Africa and a sub-region with the largest number of small states (NISER and CIRES 1989).

The fifteen ECOWAS countries share between them a total geographical area of 5,112,709 square kilometres and a total population of 343,189,555. The countries, however, vary greatly both in size and population. Cape Verde is the smallest among them with a land area of 4,033 square kilometres and a population of just above half a million (545,993). The two biggest in terms of land mass respectively are Niger, (1,267,000 square kilometres) and Mali, (1,240,192 square kilometres). However, the population of Niger is 18,045,729 and Mali has 16,955,536 people living in it. Nigeria, with a total land mass of 923,768, is the third largest in terms of land mass and has a total population of 181,562,056; the largest population of all (CIA: 2015).

The population of Nigeria represents nearly 90 percent of the total population of the sub-region. There are four major principles guiding Nigeria's policy towards its neighbours from independence in 1960 to 1967 when the civil war broke out: respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of every African state; equality of all states; non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and commitment to functional co-operation as a means of enhancing continental unity. In line with these principles, Nigeria joined the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now AU) and embraced non-alignment. However, despite the foregoing principles, Nigeria remained inactive to political and economic activities in the sub-region until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967. There are several reasons put forward by scholars to

explain Nigeria's lackadaisical and laissez-faire attitude towards political and economic happenings in the sub-region (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1983: 191).

According to Falola and Ihonvbere (1983: 191), one of the most popular arguments put forward to explain Nigeria's initial apathetic attitude toward sub-regional affairs was that those other West African countries were so limited militarily and economically to have required any urgent attention by Nigeria. The argument was expanded by the explanation that since these contiguous neighbouring states were all weak, therefore they did not possess any capability to threaten Nigeria in any serious manner. Furthermore, the argument proffered that based on the weakness of its neighbours, Nigeria did not need to develop a foreign policy with them either geographically or strategically based (Mackintosh, 1964: 207).

However, it must be pointed out here that the first series of governments that ruled Nigeria after independence were preoccupied with the problems of unity and stability as well as economic development of the country that they were left with a little time to romance with sub-continental politics. Also Nigerian governments before the 1970s oil boom were constrained to operate within limited resources and thus were forced to attend more to internal than external affairs. For instance, about the most important external action taken by the Tafawa Balewa government in West Africa was the concerted prevention of the spread of socialism by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana into the sub region (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1983: 191). Also, it dawned on Nigeria during the civil war that it needed a foreign policy based on good neighbourliness with a contiguous neighbour as "weak" as the Benin Republic. Toward the end of the hostilities, Benin allowed its facilities to be used as base for the International Red Cross to fly relief materials that apparently included munitions to cessationist Biafra (Nwokedi, 1985: 39-60).

Nigeria began to show interest in sub-regional affairs after the civil war of 1967-70. The country's new interest came as a result of two major reasons. The first was the increase in oil revenue after the civil war which enabled Nigeria to finance her external obligations better than before. Secondly, Nigeria suddenly realised that its security could not be totally isolated from the rest of the sub-region. This realisation came as a reaction to the support given to Biafra by the Francophone countries, especially Cote d'Ivoire during the war. Nigeria's feeling that there was

nothing tangible to be gained from the poorer and weaker neighbouring states was suddenly overtaken by the realities of the Biafran civil war. The truth that the country was not as secure as imagined and the role of France and its former colonies in West Africa during the war alarmed Nigeria. France was also suspected to have perfected a plan to create an exclusive Francophone economic community in the sub-region after the war to the detriment of Nigeria. All these experiences made the military government under Yakubu Gowon work assiduously towards an economic integration of the sub-region which culminated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With the establishment of this regional body, the government was able to win the confidence and cooperation of other states in the region, whatever the former colonial power had been (Ezekwe, 1983: 11).

The international oil crisis and stagflation of the 1970s was a boost to the Nigerian economy. The “oil shocks” in the Western world created by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), comprising of the Arab members of OPEC, Egypt and Syria catapulted the oil prices in the international market. This took place when these oil-producing nations decided to stop exporting oil to Europe, America and Japan for a period between 1973 and 1974 (*Time*, February 5, 1979). The OAPEC countries decided to take this action in order to punish the West, especially the United States, for supporting Israel, the Arab’s common enemy, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Arab-Israeli War). While the embargo created “the moral equivalent of war” for the non-oil producers, it was a blessing to a country like Nigeria as the crisis affected the oil prices in the international market to its advantage throughout the 1970s (Duncan, 2001: 503-522). The sudden increase in oil revenue had “created unprecedented, unexpected and unplanned wealth for Nigeria” (Oladipo and Fabayo, 2012: 32). The other West African countries did not hesitate to take advantage of Nigeria’s newfound wealth as it prepared to spearhead the integration arrangement.

With the birth of the ECOWAS in 1975, Nigeria was successful at establishing a regional community that cut across colonial, linguistic and cultural barriers. This made provision for the harmonization of all economic, social, cultural and as well as political activities. It has been argued that Nigeria’s use of financial power based on its oil revenues was a key factor in the successful creation of ECOWAS and that inadvertently, Nigeria bought its dominant position in

the West African sub-region. It is logical to agree with this assumption when looking at the mechanisms employed by Nigeria to win the support of other states in the sub-region to join ECOWAS. With Nigeria becoming a member of the OPEC in 1971, the country tactically announced its “oil boom” to the world. At its instigation of ECOWAS, there was a diplomatic use of massive pecuniary grants by Nigeria to lure even the most reluctant of those West African states into joining the ECOWAS union.

Nigeria started to host all kinds of sub-regional and regional summits to establish its influence in the region and the continent at large. By donating generously to Francophone West African countries, Nigeria won the most adamant of them all, Senegal to its side. Senegal had had an original fear that ECOWAS was going to be dominated by Nigeria. Another obdurate country that initially vehemently opposed an economic union spearheaded by Nigeria was Cote d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, through Nigeria’s gestures, the country was persuaded to see Nigeria as a waiting market for its manufactured goods. By the time these two major Francophone countries were won over to Nigeria’s side, all other Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone West African countries easily accepted Nigeria’s unquestionable leadership of the union. The landlocked states of Burkina Faso (formally Upper Volta), Niger, and Mali saw joining the ECOWAS as an opportunity to escape embarrassing tariff barriers (Ihonvbere, 1981: 143).

Between 1972 and 1975 when ECOWAS was formed and beyond, there was an immodest display of wealth by Nigeria in the sub-region. It was recorded that during some trips in the region, Nigerian leaders displayed the country’s newfound wealth by issuing out cheques at almost every stop. For instance, on an official visit to Guinea in 1972, the leader of the Nigerian delegation donated a sum of US\$500,000 to the ruling party, Ahmed Sekou Toure’s Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG). Another whopping sum of US\$250,000 was given out for cultural development in the Republic of Benin while an extra US\$100,000 was bestowed on a horticultural and nutritional centre in the same country. Even when electricity supply to Nigeria through the former National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was epileptic, the country still found it necessary to supply some West African countries with power. For example during that time, Nigeria provided Niger Republic with electricity from the Kainji Dam at a maximum rate of 30,000 kilowatts (Olatunde, 1987: 571-604). In 1973, as part of his development vision for

Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon stated that Nigeria’s economic expansion could best be achieved through regional joint programmes of balanced production, distribution and consumption of goods and services (Jalloh, 1976: 86).

Statesmen, scholars and analysts have described Nigeria as a “regional hegemon” in West Africa (Adebajo, 2008: 12; 2004: 4; 2002a: 6-7; 2002b: 17; Bach, 2004: 75-80, 85; Cilliers *et al*, 2015: 19; Mikell, 2008: 294; *This Day* August 27 2000). The recognition of Nigeria as the hegemon of the sub-region of West Africa and the “Giant of Africa” is based on some conspicuous indices. Nigeria’s population of 182 million is more than the total population of the other fourteen ECOWAS nations of 162 million. It has relatively large economic and human resources as the 5<sup>th</sup> largest oil producer in the world. At present, it has proved crude oil reserves of 37.07 billion barrels and 5. 118 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves, making it the number ten and the number nine in rank respectively in the world (CIA: 2015). Although Nigeria’s reserve-production ratio for crude oil is less than 30 years, however, that of gas is nearly 130 years by estimation (Traub-Merz and Yates, 2006: 130). Tables 3.1a below show population statistics and basic indicators for West African states.

**Table 3.1a: Population Statistics of West Africa.**

| Rank | Country       | July 2015 Projection | Average relative annual growth (%) | Average absolute annual growth | Estimated doubling time (Years) | Official Figure | Date of last figure |
|------|---------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1    | Nigeria       | 182,202,000          | 2.91                               | 4,731,000                      | 24                              | 173,000,000     | 2013                |
| 2    | Ghana         | 27,414,000           | 2.48                               | 621,000                        | 28                              | 27,043,093      | 2014                |
| 3    | Côte d’Ivoire | 23,126,000           | 2.55                               | 451,000                        | 27                              | 22,671,331      | 2014                |
| 4    | Niger         | 18,880,000           | 3.86                               | 701,000                        | 18                              | 17,138,707      | 2012                |
| 5    | Burkina Faso  | 18,450,000           | 3.26                               | 582,000                        | 22                              | 18,450,494      | 2015                |
| 6    | Mali          | 17,796,000           | 3.30                               | 568,000                        | 21                              | 14,528,662      | 2009                |

|    |               |            |      |         |    |            |      |
|----|---------------|------------|------|---------|----|------------|------|
| 7  | Senegal       | 14,150,000 | 2.92 | 401,000 | 24 | 14,354,690 | 2015 |
| 8  | Guinea        | 10,935,000 | 2.30 | 246,000 | 30 | 10,628,972 | 2014 |
| 9  | Benin         | 10,782,000 | 3.54 | 369,000 | 20 | 10,008,749 | 2013 |
| 10 | Togo          | 7,065,000  | 2.87 | 197,000 | 25 | 6,191,155  | 2010 |
| 11 | Sierra Leone  | 6,513,000  | 2.57 | 163,000 | 27 | 6,348,350  | 2014 |
| 12 | Liberia       | 4,046,000  | 2.09 | 83,000  | 33 | 3,476,608  | 2008 |
| 13 | Gambia        | 2,022,000  | 3.27 | 64,000  | 22 | 1,882,450  | 2013 |
| 14 | Guinea-Bissau | 1,788,000  | 2.58 | 45,000  | 27 | 1,530,673  | 2015 |
| 15 | Cape Verde    | 525,000    | 1.35 | 7,000   | 52 | 491,875    | 2010 |

**Sources:** Various official estimates, preliminary census results and final census results.

**Table 3.1b:** Basic indicators for West African states

| Country       | Population<br>mid 2003 (m) | Land Area<br>(’000 km <sup>2</sup> ) | GNI per<br>capita (US\$)<br>2003 | Life<br>expectancy<br>at birth | Adult<br>literacy (a<br>age 15) 2003 |
|---------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Benin         | 6.7                        | 111                                  | 440                              | 53                             | 33.6                                 |
| Burkina Faso  | 12.1                       | 274                                  | 300                              | 43                             | 12.8                                 |
| Cape Verde    | 0.5                        | 4                                    | 1440                             | 69                             | 75.7                                 |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 16.8                       | 318                                  | 660                              | 45                             | 48.1                                 |
| Gambia        | 1.4                        | 10                                   | 270                              | 53                             | 37.8                                 |
| Ghana         | 20.7                       | 228                                  | 320                              | 54                             | 54.1                                 |
| Guinea        | 7.9                        | 246                                  | 430                              | 46                             | 41.0                                 |
| Guinea Bissau | 1.5                        | 28                                   | 140                              | 46                             | 39.6                                 |
| Liberia       | 3.4                        | 96                                   | 100                              | 47                             |                                      |
| Mali          | 11.7                       | 1220                                 | 300                              | 41                             | 19.0                                 |
| Mauritania    | 2.8                        | 1025                                 | 400                              | 51                             | 51.2                                 |
| Niger         | 11.8                       | 1267                                 | 200                              | 46                             | 14.4                                 |
| Nigeria       | 136.5                      | 911                                  | 350                              | 45                             | 66.8                                 |
| Senegal       | 10.2                       | 193                                  | 550                              | 52                             | 39.3                                 |
| Sierra Leone  | 5.3                        | 72                                   | 160                              | 37                             | 29.6                                 |
| Togo          | 4.9                        | 54                                   | 310                              | 50                             | 53.0                                 |

**Sources:** The World Bank (2005), *African Development Indicators 2005*, Washington DC: The World Bank; Data for Adult Literacy: UNDP (2005), *Human Development Report 2005: International Co-operation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World*, New York: UNDP. (Culled from Kabia, J.M. 2009. *Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL*. Burlington, VT, USA and Farnham Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.



In examining the Nigerian foreign policy, Ibrahim Gambari and Margaret Vogt came out with a geographically based framework they termed “concentric circles” (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989a: 21; 1989b: 230 and Vogt, 1990: 94-95). Originally, this framework was designed to understand Nigerian defence policy but it was expanded to incorporate the political and economic components of the country’s foreign policy (Ekoko, 1990: 133). Vogt (1990: 94) in explaining the “concentric circles” mantra argued that the country’s responsibility for African security started from its own territorial boundaries and extended to those of the contiguous states, the West African sub-region and the rest of African continent. Gambari (1989b: 230) dilated more on the principle of “concentric circles” in Nigerian foreign policy. According to him, Nigeria and the nearest neighbours of Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are the “innermost” in the “circles.” The outer “circles” are the rest of the ECOWAS member states constituting the Anglophone states of Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia; the Lusophone states of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde; the Francophone states of Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania (which formally withdrew its ECOWAS membership in 2000), and Liberia. By inference, the outermost “circle” must be the rest of Africa.

Talking about the “national interests” in Nigerian foreign policy (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986: 2), Gambari (1989b: 230) submitted that the core value of Nigeria’s national interests included the country’s security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Vogt (1990:4) concurred that the national interests of the nation comprised defence of Nigeria’s borders under “core value” or what Gambari called “innermost circles.” Utete (1987: 47) also agreed that the “core value,” implicitly, national interest, is all about the security and the preservation of Nigeria’s territorial integrity. Thus all these scholars agree that Nigeria’s “national interests” are the “core value” or “innermost circles” of the “concentric circles” of Nigerian foreign policy.

Holsti (1967: 132; 1988: 123-4) submitted that the core interests of a political unit most frequently relate to those values that make for the self-preservation of such political entity. It is pertinent to state here that the subject of “national interest” in international relations is as old as the international relations itself as a course of study. After the First World War, 1919-1939, the subject was widely discussed and argued among scholars like George Kennan, Walter



Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau. After the Second World War, a lively discussion about the subject continued with such theorists as Reinhold Niebur, Harold Guetzkow, Arnold Wolfers, Kenneth Waltz, Karl Deutsch, Johan Galtung, Morton Kaplan, James Rosenau, and others.

Holsti (1967:132) paid much attention to the concept of national interests in his study of international politics. In his subsequent studies on international politics, he aligned foreign policy with national interests by building a pyramid of goals. Holsti (1967: 132) clearly defined goals into three categories, viz: the fundamental, the middle-term and long-term goals. These goals were further sub-divided into concrete and abstract ones. According to him, the fundamental goals are the core objectives of a country which must be safe guarded at all times and by any means. These included security, sovereignty and independence of the political unit, its political, social, religious and cultural institutions, and the well-being of its citizens. The concrete level of fundamental goals of a country's foreign policy were territorial integrity, national security, territorial unity, and economic well-being of the citizens, while the abstract level were protection, sovereignty and security (Holsti, 1988: 123).

The study's second hierarchy of national goals or middle range objectives on the concrete terms included weakening of opponents; support for allies and friends; development of economic opportunities abroad; regional dominance and expansion; creation and support of international institutions. In its abstract form, middle range goals comprised of the acquisition of prestige and the spreading of values like human rights, democracy and the likes abroad. Holsti's long-term goals, according to him could be described as "aspirations" which are, dispensable, selective and by choice. However, he warned that any state in the international system that opted for long-term goals usually made radical demands on all the other subjects of the system which provoked instability. He gave the concrete level example of the long-term goal as the building of "a new world order" and on the abstract level; world order, international peace and security (Holsti, 1988: 124).

In his own submission, Rosenau (1968: 34) has argued that national interest is a ready weapon employed by nation-states to explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. According to him, this very weapon also served as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies that are best for a nation in foreign affairs. Akinbobola (1995:

12) further expatiated that the national interest of a nation-state should not be equated with group, professional or ethnic interests. It must be seen as the sum totality of the aggregate of all the interests of individuals and groups within the nation-state. Akinbobola (1995) was also apt in identifying some factors that explain the domestic structure of a country. Some of these factors according to him include; the country's geographical location, type of neighbourhood, historical evolution and age of the nation, the natural resources contextualized in human and material bases, and the size and level of homogeneity of the diversity of the population. Others are the form, structure and quality of leadership, the quality of diplomacy and type of international organization it belongs, the Gross National Product (GDP), the degree of the diversification of the economy, agricultural potentiality and military capability (Akinbobola 1995: 12).

Akinbobola's synopsis of determinants of a country's foreign policy has borrowed much from Henry Kissinger's impact of domestic structure on the conduct of a country's foreign policy. He argued that in conducting a "systematic assessment" of the impact of domestic structure on the conduct of a country's international affairs, such factors as historical traditions, social values, and the economic system would have to be treated (Kissinger, 1969: 16). In his recent studies, Kissinger distinguished between traditional and humanitarian foreign policy. He opined that American national interest or what he called "balance of power" lacked a moral dimension. He maintained his argument against the United States' stand in the Arab Spring and the Syrian Cataclysm.

The upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt that started in late 2010 were supported by the West, especially the United States. The United States officially endorsed the demonstrators' demands because they were in line with the American tenets and long-term goals of "freedom," "free and fair elections," "representative government," and "genuine democracy." Also as soon as the Syrian uprising started in 2011, the American government called on Bashar al-Assad of Syria to "step aside" to give way to the citizens to "vindicate their universal rights" (Kissinger, 2014: 122-126). It is worth dredging up here that Holsti argues that any state in the international system that opted for long-term goals usually made radical demands on all the other subjects of the system which provoked instability (Holsti, 1988:124).

Nweke (1986:33-58), drew a conclusion on the major factors that composed the domestic features of Nigeria's foreign policy. According to him, these are cultural and historical forces, socio-economic structures, institutional frameworks and processes, and class formations and relations. He also argued that the foreign policy of a country is greatly determined by its domestic structure. However, the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy seem to have contained all aspects of Holsti's categorization of fundamental, middle-term and long-term goals. As it is generally agreed among scholars, the fundamental objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy have been set within the background of the promotion and protection of the country's national interests in relation with the outside world. The country's national interests consist of the following: the defence of the country's independence and territorial integrity; the restoration of human dignity to the black race all over the world; the development of global conducive political and economic conditions that promote the preservation of the territorial integrity, security and national self-reliance of all African states; the promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of Nigerians and, the promotion of world peace with justice (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986: 2).

The conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy from the beginning of its independence has been guarded by five different principles. These included non-alignment; legal equality of states; non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; multilateralism, and Africa as the cornerstone and nerve-centre of its foreign policy. Since it is possible that the nature of government in power could determine the policy of foreign decision-making processes of a nation, therefore the pursuit of the aforementioned principles could have been influenced from one regime to the other in Nigeria (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986: 3-5). Also, it is important to point out here that some objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy must have become antiquated, for example, the principle of non-alignment which abhorred formal military or political alliance with the West or the East during the Cold War is no more valid. Besides that, the objective of the eradication of colonialism and white minority rule from Africa has also become obsolete with the institution of a multi-racial democracy in the last outpost of South Africa in 1994.

The “concentric circles” principle of national interest of Nigeria’s foreign relations (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21) has been a cogent factor driving the country’s foreign policy. It has also caused certain issues to dominate across various governments from independence; with each regime having distinctive priorities and style. For example, the Gowon government focused on the complete economic independence throughout Africa and most especially on the integration of the West African countries through ECOWAS. This was why Gowon’s post-war diplomacy was specifically geared toward the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Abegunrin, 2003: 139). During the Second Republic under Shehu Shagari’s administration, ECOWAS went into rapid decline and was only reactivated during the Babangida regime (1985-1993) (Osuntokun 2011, November 17).

Under the Babangida administration, Nigeria continued to be the largest contributor to the ECOWAS budget, contributing 33.3 per cent of the group’s annual funds. Nigeria built, furnished and maintained the offices of the ECOWAS secretariat in Nigeria and hosted its annual summits in 1986, 1987, and 1991, when none of the member states was willing to accept these responsibilities. As a leading member of ECOWAS, Nigeria provided various forms of support to member states, especially granting them concessionary rates for oil and financial aid (Osuntokun 2011, November 17). The civilian regime of Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007 operated within the grand perspective of the policy of cooperation and integration in the sub-region and the rest of Africa (Osuntokun 2012, February 23). Under General Sanni Abacha, Nigeria was successful, at considerable cost, in helping to stabilize the political situation in the sub-region through imposing an uneasy peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adeniji, 1997). The Goodluck Jonathan administration did not derail the process of sub-regional integration during its tenure in office as well (Sotubo, 2015).

Adebajo has frequently equated Nigeria’s peace process in West Africa and ambition in Africa in general to “Pax Nigeriana” (2008: 3, 184-194; 2002a: 245-247; 2002b: 92-93). The expression, “Pax Nigeriana” is believed to have been created by Bolaji Akinyemi, a political scientist and one time Nigerian foreign affairs minister, to depict Nigeria’s efforts at drafting the charter of the OAU (AU) (Adebajo, 2008:12; 2002: 66). “Pax Nigeriana” is quite different from “Pax Britannica” and “Pax Americana” in that the duo sought to rule the world majorly through

colonialism. For example, between 1815 and 1914, Britain became a hegemonic power controlling an estimated 26 million square kilometres of land and 400 million people in its Empire across the world in the name of “Pax Britannica” (Parsons, 1999: 3). Also, in the modern sense of the phrase, “Pax Americana” indicates the American use of economic and military positions in relation to other nations of the world. The Marshall Plan in which the United States had spent 13 billion dollars to rebuild the collapsed economy of Europe (and Japan) after the Second World War has been considered as the American launching of “Pax Americana” (Nye, 1990: 177-192).

“Pax Nigeriana” is arguably extended to explain Nigeria’s ambition at playing a political, economic and military leadership role in Africa and not an adventure for a “Greater Nigeria” (Adebajo, 2010: 131). While the attention of the Great Powers was shifted away from Africa because of other problems elsewhere in the world in the 1990s, Nigeria had to take up the gauntlet by guarding the peace of the sub-region (Fawole, 2015). The Gulf War of 1991 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s drew the attention of the United States and other powers in the ‘coalition of the willing’ away from West Africa. The creation of the ECOWAS in 1975 made Nigeria’s military intervention in the sub-region consistent, starting with its intervention in Chad in 1979 and 1982. Nigeria has led peacekeeping missions in Liberia from 1990 to 1998 and 2003; and in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2000 (Adebajo, 2010: 231).

Nigeria has been the key actor in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG) majorly because of its power configuration in comparative terms to that of other West African countries. The active participation at the formation and an enduring commitment of Nigeria to the success of ECOMOG may not be unlikely connected to its foreign policy objectives. Most essentially, the “concentric circles” principle of national interest of Nigeria’s foreign relations (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21) might have played a very effective role here.

Apart from Nigeria, another African country accorded the accolade of “a regional hegemon” by scholars is South Africa (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003:171). It is therefore pertinent to do a

comparative analysis of both countries in the body of the work here. Before the 2014 statistical rebasing exercise which catapulted Nigeria to the position of the African largest economy (CIA World Factbook 2016), South Africa had been Africa's number one economy. In spite of this base re-computation however, South Africa has remained "a middle-income, emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, communication, energy, and transport sectors; and a stock exchange that is Africa's largest and among the top 20 in the world." Also, South Africa has remained the world's largest producer of platinum, gold and chromium (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Although South Africa's military is still regarded as being dominated by the whites (Adebajo, 2010: 61), it is a force to reckon with in Africa. The country has pursued research into "weapons of mass destruction" from the 1960s to the 1980s; during which period six nuclear weapons were assembled. However, with the coming into power of the African National Congress government in the 1990s, South Africa has dismantled all its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, making it the first nation in the world to voluntarily do so (Horton, 1999: 17).

As Nigeria maintained its support for regional integration through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), so also did South Africa through the Southern African Development Community (SADC). After the demise of apartheid regime in South Africa, the country has worked for the enlargement of membership of the regional organisation to include the following countries: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This effort has made the organisation "potentially the largest regional economy in Africa" (Hart and Padayachee, 2010:420). South Africa has further promoted regional cooperation through the formation of the South Africa Customs Union (SACU) (Alden and Soko 2005:368). Also, the country has contributed largely to the promotion of peace, security and political stability in some African countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa Republic, Sudan, Zimbabwe (Habib, 2013), as well as Côte d'Ivoire (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003:182).

Nigeria and South Africa are both militarily and economically more powerful than any of the countries in their respective sub-regions. Nevertheless, herein lies the irony: while Nigeria was

willing to carry out “swift” and “decisive” military interventions in the West African sub-region in the 1990s but unfit, South Africa which was much more able to embark on military adventurism in Southern Africa was not willing to engage in the same. Nigeria has more legitimacy in West Africa to act as a hegemon but lacked the military and economic power to do so. South Africa has possessed both the economic and military capability of a hegemon but lacked the legitimacy in its sub-region of Southern Africa. Both countries have some other powers to contend with in their respective regions even if they could exert some hegemonic tendencies. South Africa has had to shrug out with Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in Southern Africa while Nigeria has Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Liberia, Burkina Faso (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003: 172), and even Ghana to contend with in West Africa.

### **3.4 CAPABILITIES AS DETERMINANT IN NIGERIA’S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN WEST AFRICA**

The nature of resources and capabilities distribution across African states is diverse. Olav Knudsen (1979: 87-89) postulated that capability are the various resources available for use by a government to pursue its external goal. He listed these resources to include the physical, human, intellectual and economic endowments of a country. According to Rosenau (1966: 1-16, 99), concepts like size, national power and economic development are the bases for comparison in external behaviour of states. Among scholars using such concepts to study African states’ foreign policy behaviour is Brian Tomlin. Focussing on different sets of national attributes, he argued that differences in resource capabilities of African states were ready tools in understanding the differences in the foreign policy behaviour of such states (Tomlin, 1977: 192). Michael Brecher *et al* (1969: 75-101) have also used the national capability framework of analysis to show that some certain types of national capabilities are important in measuring the foreign policy behaviour of countries. These are the economic, military, diplomatic and institutional bases, as well as the level of socio-economic development of states, measured by the GNP, GNP per capita and levels of industrialisation. Thus results have shown that states that rank high in material capabilities are capable of formulating better policies and carry them out easier than the materially less-endowed nations.


Going by the assertion of Tomlin (1977:192), critically looking at the capabilities of Nigeria in relation to West Africa and the rest of the continent in general would give one a better understanding of the country's foreign policy behaviour. Substantial changes started to occur in Nigeria's capabilities in the 1970s, especially in the areas of economic, military, diplomatic and institutional resources when compared with the rest of Africa. In a complex manner during this period, contests for leadership at regional and continental levels were tied to differences in national capabilities and ideological resources. However, Nigeria's role at creating the ECOWAS in 1975 validated the connectivity between economic capabilities and leadership. In the 1970s while the ECOWAS was waxing stronger under Nigeria's leadership, the East African Community crumbled due to bitter rivalry among the three leading countries of the community; Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. However, Nigeria's leadership trend in the ECOWAS has remained constant in spite of the instability in country's political backdrop for so long a time (Khadiagala and Lyon, 2001:4).

Gilpin (1981: 43) readily agreed that the greater the capability of a country in a region, the greater is its impact upon its external environment and the greater the range of external events it would be involved in. In a recent study by Jakkie Cilliers, Julia Schünemann and Jonathan Moyer (2015: 1-28), they explored the changing capabilities of some five African countries tagged the "Big Five" for the next 25 years. In the forecast, two of these countries, Nigeria and Ethiopia were billed to increase their power capabilities while the capabilities of the rest three; South Africa, Algeria and Egypt were expected to stagnate or decline. The study also showed that of all the five countries, Ethiopia's weight was growing, that of South Africa was stagnant while Nigeria was poised to become "Africa's lone superpower," if the country could firmly tackle the socio-political problems weighing it down. The research used the Hillebrand-Herman-Moyer Index, (HHMI) that measures the capabilities of these five African countries from 1960 to 2013 and the International Futures forecasting system (IFs) to set out the expected future developments for them within a time limit of 2040. The "IFs" is a modelling system at the University of Denver's Centre for International Futures. To measure the relative power of these countries, the researchers used the index that included governance, demographics, formal and informal diplomatic networks, economic and military capabilities. Figure 3:2 below shows



regional capabilities in Africa; West Africa dominated by Nigeria has by far the biggest capabilities.


**Figure 3.2:** Showing the history and forecast of power of Africa’s five regions, measured by HHMI



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*, “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 5.

According to the ISS studies, by 2040, Nigeria would be the greatest African country by capabilities. By 2015 (when the studies was carried out), the country accounted for 0.9 percent of global power however, the research projected that its capabilities would rise to 1.6 percent of global power by 2040. Out of the “Big Five” countries, the next after Nigeria is Egypt, followed by South Africa, Algeria and Ethiopia but none of them attained to 0.7 percent of the global power within the time limit of 2040. The research also shows that by 2040, Nigeria would account for nearly 20 percent of the combined capabilities of the African continent (Cilliers, *et al* 2015:13). Figure 3.3 below shows the forecast by 2040 of the “Big Five” African countries.

**Figure 3.3:** Showing the history and forecast of power of the “Big Five” (by countries), measured by HHMI.



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS). *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 13.

In a work of this nature, it is pertinent to consider the structure, size, and external orientation of the domestic economy, the national economic objectives of successive governments and the actual output of the Nigerian economy over time. This is important because, the economic structure of a country is an important factor in the determination of its domestic and foreign policy actions (Rosenau, 2006: 157). A survey of Nigeria's economic capabilities in the first decade of its independence will clearly show that the country was driven by its leaders toward the direction of capitalism. This position was clearly supported by all Nigerian political parties. The economy was attracted to both citizens and foreigners because of its relative stability. Immediately after independence, several foreign firms showed their intention of establishing themselves in the country. In addition to the many British companies present before independence and Manhattan Bank, the Bank of America, and numerous large French firms; other Western firms that jostled to establish themselves in Nigeria after independence included Total, Dumex, Italian companies Israeli firms as well as Canada's Akari. Also the United States' Esso, Caltex and Mobil began to invest heavily in oil exploration. All these companies and many

more formed about 55 percent of Nigeria's investment capital and also represented the hopes for the country's post-independence industrialization and development.

The Nigerian economy at independence was basically agricultural. There was a mass production of such commodities as cocoa, palm oil, groundnuts, rubber, cotton and hides and skin (Alkali, 1997: 15-16). The country's economy at independence has been compared with that of Brazil which also started as an agricultural economy (Ogen, 2003: 231-234). Also at independence, looking at the occupational distribution and contribution to the GDP in Nigeria, agriculture was the leading sector. The country became the world's second largest producer of cocoa, after Brazil; the largest exporter of palm kernel, and the largest producer and exporter of palm oil. Although, agricultural methods was still based on its crude forms whereby peasant farmers relied exclusively on local implements and traditional farming methods, the agricultural sector was still able to contribute well over 60 percent of the GDP, 70 percent of the country's exports as well as 95 percent of the national food needs in the first decades of independence (Lawal, 1997: 195). However, the colonial legacy created some economic limitations on Nigeria at independence. The country was left by its colonial masters as a primary producer of agricultural goods and raw materials carefully designed to meet the industrial needs of the advanced economies of the West.

Nevertheless, agriculture which had formed the mainstay of the Nigerian economy began to decline both in its absolute size and its relative share in the overall economy. The output of the three main agricultural products and Nigerian revenue earners started to decline from the 1960s. For example by 1961, the output of groundnuts started to decline due to the flooding of the market by Chinese soya beans, production of the palm oil and its kernel began to decline in importance as a result of decreased local harvest, and Cocoa began to face a depressed market (Oji, 2011: 191-200). During this period, mining and quarrying contributed a little to the economy (*The Guardian*, 11 August, 1983). The launching of the first Development Plan by the government in 1962 was occasioned by the stress on the Nigerian economy. The six year development plan was geared toward achieving the following goals: to maintain a four percent annual increase in the rate of growth; to achieve the growth rate by investing 15 percent of Nigeria's GDP and raise per capita consumption by about one percent per annum, and to ensure that the country was reasonably self-sufficient and less dependent on external assistance. Prior to

the launching of the Development Plan, the government of Tafawa Balewa had sought assistance from Nigeria's foreign trade partners like the United States, Britain, Canada, West Germany and Switzerland. However, most of these trading partners failed to fulfil their promises and made and thereby bogging down the execution of the six-year development plan (Ibietan and Oghafor, 2013: 297-311). In effect, by this time Nigeria was still poor because oil had not yet become important as its foreign currency earner, and thus was limited in the expenditures it could garner from agriculture which was its economic mainstay. The value of Nigeria's GDP was estimated at about N2.5 billion while an average per capita income was a little over 50 naira in 1960 (Gambari, 1975: 156).

The Nigerian economic capabilities became stronger after the civil war of 1967-70, making the country to become "the most serious economic proposition in Africa" (*Daily Times*, 13 March 1970). The boom in Nigeria's economy during the second decade of its independence made it possible for the country to adequately finance its African initiatives. While the crude oil brought new opportunities for Nigeria in its African projects, most other African states, especially non-oil producing, plunged deeper into budget deficits as the skyrocketing oil prices forced them to abandon development plans. At the end of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria emerged stronger financially as a result of the petro-naira. While the revenue accruing from oil stood at ₦24.4 million or 7.6 percent of total revenue by 1966; by 1974, it stood at ₦4.9 billion or about 90 percent of total revenue. The income from Nigeria's oil gave it an economic leverage to launch its foreign policy pursuits (Ajala, 1986: 200). Therefore, by 1971 when Nigeria joined the OPEC, the country became a force to be reckoned with not only in Africa but also in the organisation. In addition, the oil crisis of 1973-4 made Nigeria more powerful in the organisation, propelling the country into the fore-front of sub-continental, continental and global affairs. As a result of the effects of the 1973-74 "oil shock" especially on the African states, Nigeria initiated and sponsored a bill in the OPEC councils for a 90-day credit concessions for Third World countries that patronised OPEC oil. The new oil wealth gave Nigeria the financial backings to spearhead the creation of the ECOWAS in 1975. It also aided the country to give substantial diplomatic and pecuniary support to African liberation movements in parts of Africa, especially in southern Africa at the time (Aribisala, 1986: 110-125).

Nigeria's new found fortune in oil revenue was expected to launch the country into the society of the newly industrialising nations by the 1980s. This could be understood considering the large amount of revenue that the crude oil contributed to Nigeria's economy during in the 1970s. Although Nigeria an OPEC member, did not participate in the embargo placed by the Arab members of the organisation against the US, Holland and other Western nations, the country partook in the sharing of the benefits that accrued as a result of the association's action. Reaping a gigantic windfall in profits, Nigeria's oil prices went from US\$3 per barrel in October 1973 to US\$11.20 in April 1974. The country also gained by preserving goodwill with some of the western states by refusing to participate in the embargo. As part of the projection of the Nigerian government for the 1980s therefore, the acquisition of a larger share in its oil industry was a priority. A scheme tagged "The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion and Indigenisation" under some decrees promulgated by the military government was a general indigenisation programme designed in 1972 and reinforced in 1977 (Mohammed, 1985: 117-135). Under the programme, Nigerians were granted compulsory ownership of certain share holdings in any foreign investments operated in Nigeria. The programme was designed to lay a solid foundation for technology transfer from the developed countries to Nigeria. Also, it was to assist in the stabilisation of Nigeria's economic growth and reduce its dependence on external economic forces. As declared by the government, the scheme was not just to transfer shares and earnings of dividends but was also designed as a strategy for making Nigerians determine their economic fortunes by themselves (*West Africa*, 2 April 1979).

While the international oil crisis of the 1970s and the effects of the 1991 Gulf War on global oil prices had boosted the Nigerian economy (Apter, 2005: 247; Duncan, 2001:503-522), slumps in the international oil prices have always been disastrous to the country's economy. This has been attributed mainly to a problem; the failure of Nigerian leaders to diversify its economy and reduce the country's overdependence on oil as its foreign exchange earners (Adebajo, 2008: 2). According to a study carried out by Alban Kitous, Bert Saveyn, Kimon Keramidas, Toon Vandyck, Luis Rey Los Santos, and Krzysztof Wojtowicz, the international oil prices have fluctuated between US\$ 30 in 2004 to about US\$ 140 per barrel in 2007. The increase in prices between those years, according to them, was as a result of increased demands from the rapidly growing economies of Asia and elsewhere. Again, there was a sharp decline in 2008 and

thereafter; prices went up once more to between US\$ 100 and US\$ 120 per barrel between 2011 and June 2014. International prices of oil suddenly tumbled as before from the middle of 2014 to the level of US\$ 26 per barrel in January 2016. According to the study, the incessant decline in the international oil prices has been traced to multifactorial causes. The most important of these polygonal factors are increase in global oil production, a decline in global oil consumption, the relativity of supply and demand of the commodity over the past years, and fluctuations in the exchange rate of the United States dollar which is the main currency for the global oil trade (Kitous, A., *et al.* 2016: 4-5). It is important to state here that the fluctuations in oil prices that have adversely affected the economy of Nigeria at one time or the other since independence has also affected the number of foreign missions the country can keep abroad (*Premium Times*, 8 September, 2015). Figure 3.4 below shows the fluctuating prices of oil in the international market between 2004 and 2016.

**Figure 3.4:** Showing daily oil price, 2004-2016 (Brent, current US\$)




**Source:** Adapted from, Kitous, A., *et al.*; 2016. “Impact of low oil prices on oil exporting countries.” EUR 27909 EN; doi: 10.2791/718384, p.4.

However, despite the socio-political vicissitudes rumbling the country at present as a result of the economic downturn, in terms of economic potential, there is no African country that can compete



with Nigeria, according to the ISS study. Its GDP is forecast to grow from a little over US\$525 billion in 2014 to slightly over US\$4.2 trillion by 2040. The only country trailing behind Nigeria in GDP in 2014 is South Africa with US\$454billion. Egypt is third with US\$263 billion; Algeria came fourth with a GDP of US\$233 billion and Angola which is not among the “Big Five” came fifth with a GDP of US\$126 billion while the last of the “BIG Five,” Morocco, came last with a GDP of US\$116 billion in 2014. It is projected that by 2040, Nigeria will constitute close to 2 percent of the global economy, up from 0.7 percent in 2014. It is believed according to the studies that the future weight of Nigeria will determine increase in Africa’s role globally (Cilliers, *et al* 2015: 7, 13). Figure 3.5 below shows the base case forecast of GDP of the “Big Five” measured in Market Exchange Rate (MER) from 2015 to 2040.

**Figure 3.5:** Showing the Base Case forecast of GDP in MER (five-year moving average)




**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper*14|March 2015, p. 14.

The ISS studies have also projected that of all the “Big Five,” Nigeria and Ethiopia are both expected to grow much faster than others between 2015 and 2040. However, Nigeria which was already the largest economy in Africa, representing over 1.5 percent of the global economy and

forecasted to represent nearly 3 percent of the global economy by 2040, is going to grow much faster than the others (Cilliers, *et al* 2015: 7, 14). Also, among the “Big Five,” the GDP per capita of Nigeria has been conjectured as the one going to be at the apex of all. Although its GDP per capita had stagnated for decades due to corruption and bad governance, it started to improve from the year 2000. According to the ISS, the trend will continue until the end of 2040 when Nigeria’s GDP per capita will overtake those of South Africa, Algeria and Egypt which had had higher GDP per capita (Cilliers, *et al* 2015: 7, 14, 19, 20). Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below show the base case forecast of average growth rates of the “Big Five” between 2015 and 2040 and their GDP per capita from 1960 to 2040 respectively.


**Figure 3.6:** Showing Base Case forecast of average GDP growth rates, 2015–2040 for the “Big Five” (five-year moving average).



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 1




**Figure 3.7:** Showing the history and forecast of GDP per capita for the “Big Five”



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 20.

Nigeria’s population has been estimated at approximately 182 million by 2015 and it is more populated than the entire countries of West Africa put together at nearly 162 million (CIA: 2015). According to the ISS research, in the group of the “Big Five” African countries, Nigeria has the highest fertility rates and is forecast to have a population of over 320 million by 2040. It is projected that the country is going to be the fourth largest population in the world by 2040 after India, China and the US (Cilliers, *et al* 2015: 7, 15). Figure 3.8 below shows the population sizes of the “Big Five” as percentages of the entire African population.

**Figure 3.8:** Showing population sizes of the “Big Five” as percentage of African population.



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 15.

Diplomatic capabilities of Nigeria at independence were poorly equipped and very weak. The British Foreign Service represented Nigeria abroad until October, 1960. At inception, the Nigerian Foreign Service lacked qualified personnel. By 1955, Nigeria was allowed to establish some foreign offices under the guardianship of the British Foreign Office. The first to be established in 1950 was the Office of the Nigerian Commissioner in London, charged with the duty of looking after the welfare of Nigerians in Britain and Ireland, promoting trade between Nigeria and Britain, and disseminating information about Nigeria to the people of Britain. Also, both the Western and Eastern regions had opened offices for their Agents-General by 1956 but did not enjoy diplomatic status (Aluko, 1981:152). Other overseas offices established before 1956 included a students' Liaison Office in the United States, the pilgrim offices in Khartoum (Sudan) and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) as well as a Labour Office in Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Po). The Nigerian diplomatic service began in 1957 when an External Affairs Division was established in the office of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa. The new division was directly under the supervision of Peter Stallard, the British secretary to the Prime Minister (Fafowora, 2008: 83).

The first twelve pioneering Nigerian foreign officers were drawn from the public service. According to Oladapo Fafowora (2008: 81-95), the recruitment was carefully done by the British colonial administration. The enlistment was not done through examination or test but by selection from Lagos capital territory and the three regions of Nigeria. The first twelve included the following: Olumide Omololu and Soji Williams from Lagos; Adedokun Haastrup, Leslie Harriman and Omotayo Ogunsulire, from the West; Philip Asiodu, Dixon Igwe, Chuks Ifeagwu, John Ukegbu and Chike Chukwura from the East; John Garba and Aminu Sanusi from the North. The twelve officers laid the foundation of Nigerian Foreign Service. However, by 1959 a total of sixteen foreign officers had been trained in England. At independence, the figure increased to fifty-five.

On the other hand, at Nigeria's independence in 1960, the British Colonial office reached an agreement with the country to establish the Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos, the High Commissioner offices in London and Accra, Ghana; diplomatic missions in Washington and

Khartoum, Sudan. Other offices agreed upon were a delegation office to the United Nations in New York, Consular offices in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Equatorial Guinea, and Libreville, Gabon. Based upon agreement too, British missions were to continue taking charge of Nigeria's affairs with other countries where there were no Nigerian representatives. The British-Nigeria joint management of Nigeria's diplomatic services at independence meant that the country had no experienced diplomats on the ground. This made Nigeria's foreign policy to be pro-Western and unbalanced during the first decade of its independence (Idang, 1973: 14).

As a result of the foregoing analysis, the country hardly carried out an independent foreign policy until the end of the first decade of its nationhood. Due to this development, Nigeria took certain diplomatic steps that gave it away as a stooge to Britain in the 1960s. A good example was the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact of 1962 that was vehemently opposed by the public and intensely debated by the political parties until it was abrogated. The Pact was to grant Britain "unrestricted overflying and air staging facilities" in Nigeria, and "to make available facilities at Kano and Lagos air fields for holding tropicalisation trials of aircraft" (Idang, 1970: 227-251; Phillips, 1964: 146). Another example was Nigeria's support for Britain's position as well as the French-Belgian intervention in the Congo crisis in 1964; Nigeria's replacement of British forces in Tanzania in 1964 and its opposition to the proposal of expelling South Africa from the United Nations in 1963. Also at the Commonwealth Conference hosted by Lagos in 1966, Nigeria tried to save Britain from diplomatic disgrace brought about by its pro-racist stance in Rhodesia (Mejak, 1983: 18).

Perhaps an exception to the fact that Nigerian foreign policy was pro-Western during the first decade of its independence was the hard stance taken by the country against the French actions in the Sahara in 1960. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, thought that the demonstration that France could successfully produce a nuclear weapon could give it an equal voice with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in the direction of global strategy, and also an opportunity to catch up with them in the nuclear race. At the end of 1959, when it became evident that France was ready to test an atomic bomb, there were mounting international protests against the action. In November 1959 for example, the United Nations General Assembly voted 51-16 (with 15 abstentions) to ask France not to carry out the nuclear tests. However, the then ongoing Algerian

War of Independence gave the French ample opportunity to test its atomic devices in the Sahara desert. During the eight-year (1954-1962) Algerian War of Independence, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FNL) (Algerian National Front) fought with the French army to wrest the country from French colonial tutelage. Seizing the opportunity at Reggan, 750 miles south of Algiers in the Sahara desert, France successfully exploded its first atomic bomb on February 13, 1960. The device was estimated at 20,000 tons of TNT which was approximately the force of the first ever atomic bomb used by the USA on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945 (*BBC News*, December 27 1960).

As a matter of national pride, France was exultant for being successful at the production of an atomic bomb and therefore went on to explode two more atomic bombs in the Sahara in April and December, 1960. The successive testing of these nuclear devices by France in Africa angered many African countries. Sudan immediately recalled its ambassador to Paris and many other African nations protested. Nigeria, a newly independent country, was forced to take immediate reaction against this development by severing every diplomatic relations with France in December 1960. The French Ambassador and his staff were expelled within just 48 hours and the French embassy in Lagos was closed down. Furthermore, Nigeria banned all French airplanes and ships from using facilities at Nigerian airports and seaports. Nigeria's reaction at banning France from using its ports facilities had serious economic effects on landlocked Nigerian neighbours and former French colonies of Chad and Niger. Therefore, the move was soon reversed (*BBC News*, December 27 1960). Nevertheless, Nigeria stuck to its initial decision to sever every diplomatic relation with France. Nonetheless, Nigeria's reactions did not go down well with the French authorities and this adversely affected diplomatic relations between the two countries for a number of years (Médard, 2008: 326).

The pro-Western Nigerian foreign policy started to change after the civil war. The adjustment in Nigerian foreign policy occurred most likely due to country's experience during the civil war. Henry Kissinger's international relations' realpolitik maxim, "...no permanent friends or enemies, only interests" dawned on Nigeria. During the civil war, Nigeria's old Western friends refused to allow its purchase of munitions to prosecute the war, and had to turn to the dreaded Eastern European countries for help. Also, it was realised that the continued existence of racist

regimes in Southern Africa was a direct threat to Nigeria's security as it was discovered that some armament deployed by Biafra against Nigeria were made in Southern Africa (Aluko, 1971: 179-180). Moreover, it was uncovered that Portugal was firmly behind Biafra, supplied it weapons and made available its island colony of Sao Tome to be Biafra's important air link (Polhemus, 1977: 48).

Therefore, the post-civil war government of Yakubu Gowon made it clear that Nigeria was not unaware that opposing colonialism and racial discrimination in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa was part of its duty to safeguard the country's own freedom and independence (Aluko, 1982: 132). Accordingly, Nigeria had to make some moves for it to play a more decisive role in fighting against white supremacist governments in Southern Africa. Consequently, the country increased diplomatic support for nationalist movements in Southern Africa while increasing its contributions to the OAU (AU) Liberation Fund, at the same time. In 1971, Nigeria led the African protest against Britain for selling some wasp helicopters to the Apartheid government of South Africa. Moreover, Nigeria was openly opposed to what it called the British government's "disregard for African opinion" and in protest withdrew from the Commonwealth's Eight Nation Committee on the security of the Indian Ocean also in 1971 (Ajala, 1986: 201).

The golden era of Nigeria's foreign policy came with the Murtala-Obasanjo regime that succeeded the post-war government of Yakubu Gowon. The government of Generals Murtala Mohammed and his successor in office, Olusegun Obasanjo was able to drive Nigeria's foreign relations to its apex towards the end of the 1970s. It is believed that during this period of excellence, "Nigeria acted with self-confidence, assertiveness and an awareness of her place in the international arena and her higher responsibilities to the black world." The era of Murtala-Obasanjo in Nigerian foreign policy has been likened to that of John F. Kennedy in the American national memory (Premium Times, February 15 2016). According to Jude Uddoh (2016), the two Generals were able to stamp their authority boldly on Nigeria's foreign policy and recorded a number of achievements and successes. Uddoh argued that they were able to attain success in foreign policy by seizing the opportunity of the peculiar authoritarian decision-making style of the military, the advantages Nigeria enjoyed as the most populated country in Africa, the buoyant



petrol-naira economy and a large army with a huge military budget. Apparently, the regime radical deportment came to the limelight with the celebrated “Nigeria has come of Age” speech delivered by Murtala Mohammed on the 11th of January, 1976 at an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU (AU), in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

“Mr Chairman, when I contemplate the evils of apartheid, my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true blooded African bleeds...Rather than join hands with the forces fighting for self-determination and against racism and apartheid, the United States policy makers clearly decided that it was in the best interests of their country to maintain white supremacy and minority regimes in Africa. Africa has come of age. It's no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar. For too long have we been kicked around; for too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside ‘experts’ to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that we can decide for ourselves; that we know our own interests and how to protect those interests; that we are capable of resolving African problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers which, more often than not, have no relevance for us, nor for the problem at hand (*Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs*, January 1976: 7-13)”.

The first litmus test of the new dimension of Nigerian foreign policy was the country's recognition of the MPLA government in Angola against the wish of the American government. The Nigerian government had hitherto favoured a government of national unity to be established by the OAU (AU) comprising the three major factions; MPLA, FLNA and UNITA for an independent Angola. However Nigeria was infuriated by the action taken by the coalition “government” of FLNA and UNITA by inviting the Apartheid government of South Africa to join them to militarily attack the MPLA-led “government.” As a result of the foregoing, Nigeria abandoned the initial plan by the OAU (AU) and swung its support for the MPLA by recognising it as the legitimate government of Angola. In addition, Nigeria gave the new government US\$ 100 million as a donation (Soremekun, 1983: 199).

The United States of America under President Gerald Ford was opposed to the MPLA government in Angola and was bitter about Nigeria's move at giving the Angolan government



full recognition. Gerald tried to persuade Nigeria to step down its recognition of the MPLA-led government in Angola and also tried to dissuade other African leaders to follow the path of Nigeria. The Murtala-Obasanjo government was adamant and remained resolute at giving full recognition to MPLA government of Angola. Nigeria's adamant resolution over the Angolan crisis led to the "Nigeria has come of Age" speech delivered by Murtala Mohammed at the OAU (AU) special summit at Addis Ababa in January, 1976 (*Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs*, January 1976: 1-2). The action taken by Nigeria encouraged many African countries to toe the Nigeria line of recognising the MPLA-led government in Angola to the chagrin of the United States of America. It should be noted here that for Nigeria to disdain and resist America on Angola was a clear indication that Nigeria had abandoned its hitherto pro-Western foreign policy.

Nigerian diplomats are among the best trained in the world, stemming from the British colonial administration that was determined to establish very high standards of entry into the service. Candidates were thoroughly screened and those who with tendencies of political agitation and considered unrepentant nationalists were ostracised from recruitment. Early recruits into Nigerian diplomatic service came from diverse backgrounds comprising scions of minor government officials, local merchants, famous families and few from aristocratic background. Nevertheless, like their counterparts the world, Nigerian diplomats are an "elite, a distinctive social category." The training of Nigerian diplomats takes place at home and abroad. At home, they are taken through an induction course organised by the Ministry of External Affairs where seminars on such topics like international law, economic, international relations, the state of Nigeria's foreign relations, and diplomacy are held. Further training is conducted for them overseas in reputable institutions like Oxford's Queen Elizabeth House, Cambridge, the London School of Economic and Political Science and Institute of Social Studies at The Hague. However, further training for Nigerian diplomats stopped with the creation of the Foreign Service Academy within the Ministry of External Affairs. Since diplomacy requires thorough and continuous training, Nigerian mid-career officers in the foreign affairs ministry are now further trained at the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru (Fafowora, 2008: 85-86). The foregoing elucidation points to the fact that Nigerian diplomats are among the best prepared and first among equals in the career of diplomacy in the world.

There has been rapid expansion of Nigerian missions overseas since the first ones were established in 1957. Although there have been calls for pruning down the number of its foreign offices for effective management (Fafowora, 2008: 87-88), today Nigeria has 119 foreign missions abroad. In 2015 alone, a whopping budgeted of ₦34 billion was earmarked to run them. There are many challenges facing Nigerian foreign relations today like the absence of a Foreign Service Commission, poor funding of foreign missions, policy inconsistencies and training deficiencies (*Premium Times*, 8 September, 2015). These challenges notwithstanding, the service has contributed much to policy making in Nigeria. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a vital role in the formulation of foreign policy. The Minister is also the chief adviser to the President on foreign affairs and in turn relies heavily on advice given by senior officers in foreign affairs as well as despatches received from Nigerian ambassadors in all parts of the world (Fafowora, 2008: 91).

In measuring the relative share of diplomatic engagements among the “Big Five,” Cilliers, *et al* (2016: 16-17) used three kinds of diplomatic interactions, viz. the number of embassies a country has overseas, the number of international organisations the country belongs, weighted by importance of these bodies, and the number of treaties held by the United Nations secretary-general signed or ratified by a country and weighted by treaty importance. In these capacities, although Egypt has dominated the group, nevertheless, Nigeria has also performed highly among the “Big Five” countries.


According to the studies, Egypt has the largest representations abroad of all the “Big Five,” with 125 embassies in 2014. It is important to point out here that in this wise, Nigeria also did not fare badly, by 2016, the country has maintained about 119 embassies in foreign countries (*Premium Times*, 8 September, 2015). Conversely, in terms of ratification of treaties and membership of international organisations in recent years, four out of the “Big Five,” Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and South Africa are at *pari passu* (Cilliers, *et al*, 2016: 16-17). Also, concerning international organisation participation and membership, Nigeria belongs to the following international governmental and non-governmental organisations: ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, D-8, ECOWAS, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCT, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS,



IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNITAR, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, and WTO. Nigeria is also a compliant country of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), as well as an observer in the Organisation of American States (OAS) (CIA: 2015). The country has been a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council for five terms of ten years: 1966-1967, 1978-1979, 1994-1995, 2010-2011, and 2014-2015 (Premium Times, 4 January, 2016).


Figures 3.9 and 3.10 below show the history and forecast of international diplomatic interactions and number of foreign embassies of the “Big Five” respectively.

**Figure 3.9:** Showing the history and forecast of international diplomatic interactions of the “Big Five.”



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 16.

**Figure 3.10:** Showing the history and forecast of number of foreign embassies of the “Big Five.”



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 17.

Another very important aspect of capabilities as determinant of Nigeria’s leadership position in West Africa is its defence. According to William Foltz (1966: 69), a strong military organisation may influence the aggregate of political goals and external ambitions of a nation. Conversely, a weak military establishment may serve as a limitation of a country’s foreign policy. Perhaps, in the realisation of the weakness of Nigerian defence at independence, the government of Tafawa Balewa entered into the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact with the British government in 1960. As part of the provisions of the Pact, Britain was to provide “assistance for the training and development of the armed forces of the Federation.” The Defence Pact was ratified by the Nigerian Parliament in November 1960 in spite of public opposition. However, after much agitation in the parliament, the Pact was abrogated in 1962 (Akindele, 1973: 45-65).

The major reason for the ratification of the Pact is still shrouded in mystery today. Nevertheless, some scholars have speculated that the ratification may not be far from an alleged mutiny that occurred in the 1<sup>st</sup> Queens Own Nigeria Regiment at Enugu shortly after independence on October 1. The mutiny, the scholars argued, may have been influenced by the Congo conflict that just started then. However before the mutiny could escalate, it was quickly nipped in the bud by

British officers in the Regiment. Although, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was abrogated in 1962, extensive military contacts remained between Nigeria and Britain for most of the first decade after independence. It is also noteworthy here that attempts to develop an effective force in the 1960s by Nigeria lacked both adequate financial input and extensive external collaboration which were essential at the time (Idang, 1970: 227-51).


Festus Onhaegbulam (1982: 108) has pointed out that over 80 percent of the officers in the Nigerian armed forces were still British in 1960, and the ratio remained constant for a long time after independence. According to Adebajo (2008b: 52), the Nigerian army was a small force of 6,000 soldiers while the complementary air force and the navy were even smaller in number of men and artillery before the civil war. The number subsequently increased to about 7,500 soldiers including 280 officers out of which only 32 were Nigerians, the highest in rank being a major (Miners, 1971: 45, 49). Shortly before the civil war of 1967-70, the number rose to 10,500 men and the wartime Nigerian army enlarged to about 270,000 strong (Dudley, 1982: 84). There was a Demobilisation Committee set up by the Gowon administration after the civil war that recommended a reduction of the force to 50,000 men by the end of the 1970s. However, the government failed to implement the recommendation. Nevertheless, by 1975 through natural wastage, the number had reduced to about 200,000 strong (Barrett, 1979:72; Othman, 1989: 129). By 1979, Nigerian army personnel were estimated at 160,000 men (Fayemi, 1994: 167, 214) and then by 1990, the Nigerian defence was summed up thus:

“... the air force had 95 fighter jets, including Hercules C-130, Jaguars, and AlphaJets, and it had developed close air support capability; the army had two mechanised divisions, two light rapid deployment divisions, one armoured division, modern artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, fighting vessels, and 257 armoured battle tanks; the navy had acquired a flagship, a landing ship, a fast patrol craft, minesweepers, and Lynx helicopters. The Nigerian military was especially concerned with developing its marine capacity in order to defend its vulnerable offshore oil in the possible event of conflict. (Adebajo, 2008b: 52).

The forgoing analysis will testify to the fact that Nigeria has always maintained a large army proportional to its population during both war and peace times. Since the end of Nigerian civil war of 1967-70, Nigeria's military expenditure had remained low until the country's involvement in the restoration of peace to war ravaged countries of West Africa. Beginning from

1990, under the aegis of the ECOWAS interventionist force, ECOMOG, Nigeria has played a leading role at quelling crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Also, recent increase in defence expenditure in Nigeria is due to the internal crisis orchestrated by the Islamic fundamentalists known as Boko Haram since 2010. According to the World Bank records (2010), percentages of Nigeria's military expenditure of the GDP for 2008 to 2010 were 0.78, 0.89 and 1.00 respectively. Figure 3.11 below shows the rate of Nigeria's military spending from 2006.

**Figure 3.11:** Showing Nigerian military expenditure from 2006.




**Source:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2015.

According to Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter Wezeman and Siemon Wezeman (2015: 5-6), although Africa as a whole has recorded an increase in military expenditure of 91 percent since 2005 in 2014, Nigeria's military spending fell for the third consecutive year to US\$2.3 billion in 2014. However, the SIPRI statistics showed that the total military spending for the country was still 79 percent higher than in 2005. Also, the figure did not include the US\$1 billion approved by the National Assembly in 2014 for purchase of military hardware and training to combat the Boko Haram insurgents. Since "the size and quality of a country's military force is a traditional indicator for measuring national power," the ISS research group on its part has compared the share of the "Big Five" African countries' military capabilities from 1960 as a percentage of total military expenditure of the continent and forecasted through to 2040. The result showed that of the five, only two; Nigeria and Algeria have had a moderate increment in their military expenditures in recent years. Although, the international prices of oil and gas have



fallen sharply, causing a downfall in Nigeria’s revenues, nonetheless, the country had to increase its military spending in order to fight the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalists ravaging the country from the north-east (Cilliers *et al*, 2015: 17-18). Figure 3.12 below shows the military expenditures of the “Big Five” forecasting them to 2040.

**Figure 3.12:** Showing the “Big Five’s” share of African military spending, history and forecast




**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 18.

Many Western scholars have regarded Africa as a bunch of countries that does not really make meaningful politics when influence is used as a measurement for capabilities. This misconception has helped to marginalise the African countries. According to Kevin Dunn (2001: 3), this misapprehension is rooted in the neo-realist, neo-liberalist as well as structuralism aspects of international relations theories. For example, Dunn argued that neo-realism concentrates only on the great powers of international relations of the Western world while neo-liberalism presupposes that Africa has no hegemonic power. Furthermore, structuralism according to Dunn uses African countries as examples of the current world systems failure. In assessing African countries’ influence in foreign policy domain as a measure of their capabilities, the ISS researchers have two benchmarks of measurements. These are the countries’ loyalty to peacekeeping missions and their membership in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the

African Union. These measures have been adopted based on the prevalence of conflict in Africa, according to the research. Also, the studies argued that the commitment of a country to peace and security initiatives in the regional or international level is an important measuring instrument to determine the leadership qualities, ambitions and influence of such a country. For example, Nigeria has consistently served on the African Union PSC since 2004, representing the sub-region of West Africa. In the other regions, representation on the Council is rotational. Therefore, it has been argued that Nigeria’s consistent membership of the PSC is an indication of its significant sub-regional influence while the alternation of membership among countries in other regions denotes how the “Big Five” are each perceived in their individual regions. Also, a country’s commitment to peacekeeping missions could be a good pointer to its capacity at formulating and implementing aesthetically consistent foreign policy (Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 20, 22). Figure 3.12 below shows the number of years each of the “Big Five” served on the AU PSC.

**Figure 3.13:** Showing the number of years served on the AU Peace and Security Council



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 22.


Nigeria has been a major contributor to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. From the country’s first participation in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, the country has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions. It has deployed military contingents, military observers, military staff officers, police units, police advisors and civilian experts to over 25 UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Some of the key UN peacekeeping operations that Nigeria had been involved included Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964; New Guinea (UNSF), 1962-1963; the India-Pakistan conflict (UNIPOM) 1965-1966; Lebanon

(UNIFIL) 1978-1983; Iran-Iraq conflict (UNIIMOG) 1988-1991; Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) 1991; Angola (UNAVEM I and II) 1991-1992 and (UNAVEM III) 1992-1995; Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990; Western Sahara (MINURSO) 1991, and Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992- 1993. Others included Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992-1994; the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 1992; Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 1992; Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993; Aouzo Strip (UNASOG) 1994; Israel (UNTSO) 1995; Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 1999; Liberia (UNMIL) 2004, and Dafur (UNAMID) 2007. The country has also featured prominently in other non-UN missions in Africa, especially in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone. During the Chadian crisis of the early 1980s, Nigerian troops were present at (Harmony I) 1981-1982, and (Harmony II) 1982-1983, to put an end to the crisis (Adebajo, 2010: 138-170). The presence of Nigerian troops was pivotal in the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) 2003; the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) 2003; the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 2004; the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) 2013 (*BBC News* 15 January, 2013), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 2007-2016 (*Amisom* 19 July, 2016).

Due to the importance of Nigeria as a stakeholder in sub-regional, regional and global peacekeeping activities, its nationals have always occupied strategic positions in UN peacekeeping. Ibrahim Gambari served as the Joint AU-UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) while Olu Adeniji served in that capacity in Central African Republic (CAR), and Sierra Leone. Margaret Vogt, another Nigerian, had served in Central African Republic as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (Adebajo, 2013: 245-268). Also, a number of Nigerian military generals have served as United Nations force commanders from the 1960s. The list include, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (ONUC, Congo) 1960-1964; (Edward Unimna (UNAVEM I, Angola) 1991; Chris Garba (UNAVEM II and III, Angola) 1991-1995; Ekundayo Opaleye (UNAMIR, Rwanda) 1993; Samaila Iliya (MONUC, Congo) 2003-2005; Joseph Owonibi (UNAMIL, Liberia) 2003-2005; Isaac Obiakor (UNMIL Liberia) 2005-2008; Martin Luther Agwai (UNAMID, Darfur) 2007-2009; Moses Obi (UNMIS Sudan, pre-partition) 2010-2011 and (UNMISS, South Sudan) 2011-2012. Obiakor and Agwai also served as Chief Military Adviser and Deputy Military Adviser at United Nations Headquarters respectively. Nigerian military generals have also served as troop commanders in the non-UN missions, Joshua Dogonyaro (Nigerian Neutral Force. Chad) 1979; Mohammed

Magoro Nigerian Neutral Force, Chad) 1979; Geoffrey Ejiga (HARMONY II, Chad) 1981-1982; Festus Okonkwo (AMIS, Sudan) 2004-2005, and Collins Ihekire (AMIS, Sudan) 2005-2007. In the ECOMOG, the following Nigerian military generals commanded, Joshua Dogonyaro, 1990-1992; Rufus Kupolati, 1992; Ishaya Bakut, 1993; Adetunji Olurin, 1994; John Inienger, 1995; Samuel Victor Malu, 1996-1997; Timothy Shelpidi, 1997-1998; Felix Mujakperuo, 1999, and Gabriel Kpamber, 1999-2000. Figure 3.14 below shows the outflow of Nigerian uniformed personnel in the United Nations peacekeeping operations from 1960 to 2015.

**Figure 3.14:** Showing Nigerian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2015.




Source: Adapted from [www.providingforpeacekeeping.org](http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org)

Nigeria was overtaken by Ethiopia by the end of 2011 and became the largest African contributor to UN peacekeeping missions among the “Big Five.” By 2014, Ethiopia became the fourth largest contributor in the world pushing Nigeria to an uncomfortable rank of number eight. Whereas Ethiopia’s contribution increased, Nigeria’s declined sharply from 6,020 in 2009 to 2,930 in 2014. Although, it has been argued that Ethiopia has rapidly increased its troops contribution to the UN missions to augment its paltry military expenditure which it has anyway discovered to be cost effective, and which Nigeria would not probably consider, domestic challenges in Nigeria has contributed to a reduction in deploying its troops in UN missions (Cilliers, *et al.* 2015: 21). By the end of the first decade of this century, Nigeria started to battle



with some domestic security challenges which have affected the country’s ability to sustain its troop contribution to the UN peace operations (Adebajo, 2013: 245-268). Instead, troops are increasingly needed in trouble spots across Nigeria, most especially in the Northeast where the Boko Haram insurgents carried out rebellious activities, and the oil-rich Niger Delta region in the South-south geopolitical zone, where militancy, oil theft and sabotage of oil installations are rampant. Figure 3.15 below shows ratio of personnel contributed by the “Big Five” to the United Nations peacekeeping missions from 2004 to 2014.

**Figure 3.15:** Personnel contributed by the “Big Five” to UN peacekeeping missions



**Source:** Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*; “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper 14* | March 2015, p. 21.

The interdependence of the Nigerian state and its neighbours could not be overemphasised. The significance of Nigeria’s geographical size, population and resources has rubbed on the neighbouring countries. The consequence of this is that the economy of the neighbouring countries has become increasingly significant since the oil “boom” era of Nigeria in the 1970s (Bach 2007: 301-321). Although, Nigeria has a history of cross-border relations with its West African neighbours from the colonial period but they were intensified in the early 1970s due to its rapidly expanding oil economy (Bach 1997: 77-102). Benefits that accrued from Nigerian economy to its neighbours also kindled an increase in trans-border legal and illegal trade activities. Also, the economies of contiguous neighbours; Togo, Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon became more dependent on Nigeria’s economy. During this period, trans-border trade

was stimulated by liberal tariff, fiscal and monetary policies that benefitted both local and regional players. Furthermore, ethnic bond and religious affinity promoted trans-state trade network without challenging existing colonial boundaries (Dagne, 2002: 62-73).

However, with the increased tariff regulations and structural adjustment programmes that came in the mid-1980s, a new sequence of trans-border networks was introduced in West Africa like in other parts of the continent. With the new introduction, there was the truncation of opportunities for the growth of trans-border flows. With this came the new commodities that have to do with illegal and criminal activities. According to Dagne (2002: 62-73), Nigeria as the commercial capital of the sub-region now emerged as the entrepôt for illegal substances- opiates and cocaine- originating from Asia and Latin America for re-exportation to Europe and North America. At the end of the 1990s, the United States had attributed a large percentage of illicit drugs coming to that country to the handiwork of Nigerian and West African drug cartels. Also in 1998, European agencies responsible for fighting illicit drug trafficking accused Nigeria of being responsible for the trans-shipment of up to 60 percent global heroin production. In the same year, Nigeria was blamed for making available a third of all cocaine consumed in Europe (Shaw, 2002: 291-316).

According to Shaw (2002: 291-316), the situation got so bad that it seemed there was no limit to the international criminal activities claimed to be perpetrated by Nigerian citizens. The country's emergence as a regional nucleus was often alluded in juxtaposition with global criminal networking. In the 1990s, Nigeria was described as a criminal state in the making by the Western governments and there was the fear that it could grow to become the criminal capital of the world (Mahtani, 2006). Also the country was accused of the internationalisation of prostitution, trafficking in human persons including human parts (US Embassy in Nigeria 2000), as well as financial fraud (Catan and Peel, 2003: 11). Because of this group of transnational criminal syndicate assumed to be Nigerians, the world began to see the African continent as getting ready to be overtaken by felonious networking which was going to play a vital role in the illegitimate international economy (Ebbe, 2003: 137-174). It should be noted that many of the criminal activities ascribed to Nigerians may not be actually committed by Nigerian citizens but the nationals of other black nations who claimed to be Nigerians for cover up. Cilliers, *et al* (2015: 5) have argued that the shifting balance of power in Africa since the end of the Cold War has

made West Africa to consolidate its position as the most powerful region in Africa. Obviously, this was largely due to the presence of Nigeria as heavyweight, and undeniably, the giant must pay the cost of greatness. Perhaps, that was why many citizens of other black African nations in Africa, especially from West African countries, both law-abiding and those with criminal disposition, wanted to be identified as Nigerians everywhere. The essay will continue by looking at Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours.

### **3.5 NIGERIA AND ITS CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBOURS**

Back to theory, we discovered that Keohane and Nye (1989:9-10) characterised relationships in a global international system with interdependence. They argued that greater the level of interdependence among states, the greater the loss of control that they experience over all or part of their decision-making independence. The economic theorists understand interdependence to be the sensitivity of economic behaviour in one country to developments or policies originating from outside its own borders (Cooper, 1972: 159). Also, we have discovered that liberal theorists have employed the theory of interdependence to justify the formation of sub-continental economic organisations like the European Union (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001: 834-59). In the field of international relations, there are two meanings of "economic interdependence." A group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those found in the others. I would like to give this group the name, "Contingency Interdependent countries."

The second group are countries considered to be interdependent if severance of relations between them would cause some costly effects (Baldwin, 1980: 471-506). A good example of the second type of interdependence is that between the industrialised countries and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The industrialised countries of the West were heavily dependent on petroleum imports from the producers of the commodity, OPEC. A brief severance of relations between the Western countries and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Producing States (OAPEC, who were also members of OPEC) in 1973, resulted into a period of "oil shock" and bad effect on the economy of the industrialised countries (Duncan, 2001: 503-522). A good example of the first group or what I referred to as "Contingency

Interdependent countries” is the relations between Nigeria and the whole countries in the sub-region of West Africa. Effects of contingency interdependence come to play any time Nigeria’s economy nosedived. For example, the current economic downturn in Nigeria has affected the economy of the rest of the sub-region (*Thisday*, August 2, 2016).

Perhaps, due to the above considerations, some scholars have come to the conclusion that the whole countries of West Africa are Nigeria’s neighbours, albeit by diplomatic principle (Adedeji, 2004: 21-49, Garba, 1991: 40-48, Olaniyan, 1986: 126-140, Osuntokun, 2008: 142). However, for the purpose of this work, it is pertinent to look closely at Nigeria’s relations with its contiguous neighbours. The attempt here is to examine the cordiality or otherwise of their relations with Nigeria. The countries that fall into this category are: Benin Republic to the west, Niger to the north, Chad to the north-east, Cameroon to the east, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe to the south. It is equally important to note that none of these nations is Anglophone; Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are Francophone while Equatorial Guinea is “Hispanophone” (Spanish-speaking), and São Tomé and Príncipe is Lusophone. Figure 3.16 below shows the map of Nigeria and its immediate neighbours.

**Figure 3.16: The map of Nigeria and its immediate neighbours.**



Source: <http://www.doctorpence.blogspot.com/2015>.

### **3.5.1 NIGERIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN**

The Republic of Benin (Dahomey until 1975) is a weak economy largely dependent on Nigeria for economic survival. Benin and Nigeria share much in common. There are many ethnic groups of common ancestors overlapping the border that divides the two countries. These include the Yoruba and the Egun (Gun) in the south, the Bariba (Borgawa) at the centre and the Hausa and Fulani to the north of Benin. These ethnic nationalities provide cultural affinity with their kith and kin in Nigeria. Much of southern and central parts of what is today Republic of Benin were for a long time under the powerful old Oyo Empire that which central authority was located in today's south west Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2008: 147).

The big population size of the Yoruba in Benin might have prompted one of the major political parties in Nigeria during the First Republic, (the Action Group) to propose the annexation of the Yoruba-speaking part of Benin with Nigeria in the 1960s. The proposal bred mistrust in the relations between the two countries and infuriated France, Benin's former colonial master (Ede, 1986: 183). This could have explained one of the reasons why France supported the course of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. Also, Benin apart from initially taking side with Biafra arranged facilities for the International Committee of the Red Cross to airlift arms, food and drugs to the rebels (Osuntokun, 2008: 148; Ede, 1986: 183). The move might have been taken by France and Benin to weaken the Nigerian federation.

Political analysts have classified Benin as "radical" in orientation because of its socialist stance and heavily skewed towards France, its former colonial master. However, the country is friendly with Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2008: 147; Ede, 1986: 183) as it has always had identical stand with Nigeria on most African issues. This apparently emanated from the country's dependency on Nigeria for its economic and political stability. It is believed that of all Nigeria's contiguous neighbours, Benin Republic posed the least threat. Despite the initial rebuff of the idea of Nigeria annexation of the Yoruba-speaking parts of Benin by the Action Group of Nigeria in the early 1960s, Sourou Migan Apithy of Dahomey (Benin) once called for a political union between Nigeria and Benin in which Niger and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) could also come in, early in the 1970s (Ede, 1986: 183). Justin Ahomadegbe-Tometin, one of Apity's colleagues in the Presidential Triumvirate, firmly supported the move for a political union between the two



countries (Osuntokun, 2008: 147). However, this move failed to work as President Hamani Diori of Niger and the government of France frowned at it (Ede, 1986: 183). Migan Apithy was Prime Minister of Dahomey (Benin), between 1957 and 1958, the President between 1964 and 1965, and member of the country's Presidential Triumvirate from 1970 to 1972.

Also because of the political instability in Benin during the first twelve years of its independence from France, the country and Togo, its neighbour to the west expressed the idea of a political union with Nigeria. The situation was so bad in Benin during the first decade of its independence that the country recorded the change of its constitution five times, president ten times and about ten successful or failed coups d'état. Also its embassy in Lagos was shut down as a result of the inability of the Beninois government to maintain it. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria during the time refused the political union. The desire of the Beninois leaders to have some kind of confederal arrangement with Nigeria came up again in the late 1970s when Mathieu Kerekou, the President of Benin proposed a merger between the two countries. However, the Nigerian leader at the time, Matthew Olusegun Obasanjo later rejected the idea (Osuntokun, 2008: 147, 148).

The common border between Nigeria and Benin has always been a source of tension from the 1960s because of smuggling, illegal immigration and organised cross border crime that are prevalent (Ede, 1986: 183). Smuggling between the two countries and across the rest of the sub-region has become well organised that it currently constitutes a serious security problem to Nigeria. Chief items smuggled include petroleum products from Nigeria and rice and used cars (Tokunboh from Europe) and other imported goods smuggled through Benin to Nigeria. In addition to this is the constant incident of violent armed robbery and car hijacking from Nigeria and smuggled across the border for sale in other parts of West Africa. The border was always closed to curb the activities of cross border armed robbers in the 1990s. Despite the unwholesome incidents of smuggling and cross border crime across the border of the two countries, the expanded ports facilities in Cotonou has become an entrepot for goods imported into Nigeria. It is estimated that about 75 per cent of goods handled by the Cotonou's port are meant for the Nigerian market (Osuntokun, 2008: 149).

There have been more cooperation agreements between the two countries than differences between them. These agreements became solidified after the Nigerian civil war. In 1972, a trade agreement followed by an interest-free loan of two million naira payable in 25 years was reached with Benin. The 24 kilometre Idiroko-Porto Novo highway was reconstructed by Nigeria to the tune of 2.7 million naira in 1972. Also between 1975 and 1978, the 43.5 kilometre Lagos-Badagry-Cotonou highway was expanded and entirely financed by Nigeria at the cost of 40 million pounds. In 1978, an accord on defence, air and sea services was reached between the two countries. As part of the agreement, Beninois military personnel were trained by Nigeria. Other mutual cooperation between them included the building of a cement factory at Onigolo and a sugar industry at Save in 1975. The cost of the Onigolo cement factory was 59 million pounds and Nigeria held 41 per cent equity share of the factory (Osuntokun, 2008: 148; Ede, 1986: 184).

Cooperation agreements between the two countries notwithstanding, there were some time when relations between them went sour. For example in 1981, the military forces of the Republic of Benin invaded the villages of Illo, Tungan-Goge, Gulma and Danchadi in Sokoto State. The invasion did not reach a crisis situation unlike the Cameroonian and Chadian episodes, and the then Beninois President, Mathieu Kerekou visited Nigeria to explain himself that the invasion was not a calculated design on the part of his country. Although Nigeria viewed the invasion as embarrassing and humiliating, the government however accepted Kerekou's explanation and apology and later sent a fact finding mission to the border (*West Africa* March 30 and April 20, 1981). The border invasion however served as an eye opener to both countries, especially Nigeria. Although, Benin Republic was a member of ECOWAS and had joint business ventures with Nigeria, there were no serious attempts to establish close communication links between the two countries. By then, a telephone call between the two capitals of Lagos and Cotonou, less than 150 kilometres had to go through Paris or London. Thus, the invasion made the leaders of the two countries to realise the importance of proper communication channels between them (*New Nigerian* April 16, 1981). Sequel to the border invasion, the Nigeria-Benin Joint Border Commission that met in 1974 and agreed to demarcate the border in three phases was reactivated (Department of Information, Lagos, *Press Release* 957 June 15, 1981).

Nigeria-Benin borders have had to be closed down a number of times since both countries achieved independence from their colonial masters in 1960. The shutting down of the borders had always bordered on accusation of smuggling and trans-border crimes. A typical example of such incidence was the closure of the borders between the two countries by Nigeria in August 2003 over cross-border crime, including smuggling of petroleum products and food items, armed robbery and human trafficking. Nigeria had earlier complained that apart from armed robbery, smuggling and human trafficking across the borders, its traveller citizens had always been harassed and their money extorted by Beninois touts under the noses of Beninois security operatives. The Nigerian authorities also alleged that armed bandits from Benin always disappeared into the Benin side of the border, which topography they knew well, after their nefarious activities in Nigeria (*IPS* 13 and 16 August, 2003). Nigeria also demanded for the extradition of one Ammani Tijjanni, a Nigerian citizen living in Benin and who was notorious for receiving vehicles stolen from Nigeria. Although, the government of Benin Republic denied all the allegations but also vowed to curb trans-border crimes in its country, which promise it later reneged. The closure of the borders by Nigeria in August 2003 therefore emanated from the failure of the then Beninois President, Mathieu Kerekou to fulfil the promise made in July the same year at the African Union summit in Maputo, Mozambique to put an end to the trans-border crisis. In this case, Nigerian Immigration, Customs, State Security Service and anti-border crime police unit were involved in enforcing the order to tighten the border. After a week of closure, Nigeria decided to open the borders based on agreement between the two countries (*VOA News* 15 August, 2003).

Nigeria still honours the protocol on the free movement of persons, goods and services among the sub-regional 15-member ECOWAS states. It is mandatory on the side of Benin Republic also to respect the protocol as a foundation member of the economic community. Although Benin has a close affinity with France, its former colonial master which relationship made it to misbehave at times, nonetheless, the country should realise that its closest neighbour is Nigeria to which it should always seek to live with in harmony. Benin Republic has always been accused of allowing small arms and ammunitions to be smuggled through it to Nigeria which business is inimical to Nigeria's security. Benin should learn how to diplomatically operate with its two masters; Nigeria at home and France abroad and also realise that Nigeria is the closer of the two



masters. Benin's economy and survival as a nation is closely tied to Nigerian economy. This is the reason why any closure of the borders between the two countries has always caused misery for the country as well as thousands of traders who ply the busy Cotonou-Lagos route. Each closure of the borders had practically ended in shutting down of the economy and businesses of Benin Republic.

### **3.5.2 NIGERIA AND NIGER**

Religious (Islam), historical, cultural and ethnic affinity between Nigeria and Republic of Niger has defied the 1500 kilometre long border that demarcates the two countries. The borderline like that between Nigeria and Benin was determined by the Anglo-French agreements of 1890 and 1904 (Ede, 1986: 184). Three major ethnic groups in Nigeria: Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri also make up of about 50 per cent of the population of Niger and thus, the three share the historical legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem Borno Empire between them (Osuntokun, 2008: 144).

It was believed that some top Nigerian armed forces officers were from Niger and equally some top Nigerien military officers were from Nigeria (Ede, 1986: 184). There has been free movement of goods and people for centuries across the border that later divided them. Also from the independence of the two countries in 1960 to date, there have been cordial relations between them. Niger, a landlocked country depended solely on Nigerian ports facilities for its imported commodities from abroad. Nigeria is also the second biggest trading partner after France. The business of smuggling across the border between the two countries is historical, in the 1960s when northern Nigeria produced much groundnuts, the product was the major smuggled item into Niger for foreign exchange earnings. However, from 1970 when Nigeria started experiencing the oil "boom", petroleum products took over from groundnuts as the major item of smuggling. Herd of cattle cross the border from Niger for sale in Nigerian markets annually.

Nigerian relations with Niger have been cordial. Niger supported Nigeria during the Nigerian civil war, an attempt by France to sway Nigerien support for Biafra failed (Ede, 1986: 184). Hamani Diori, the first President of Niger, was keenly involved at brokering peace between the warring factions of the Nigerian civil war. Immediately after the civil war, Nigeria solidified its

relations with Niger with the establishment of the Nigeria-Niger Commission. Through this Commission, Nigeria has made available generous grants to Niger which included the supply of 30,000 kilowatts of electricity from Kainji hydro-electric dam annually since 1972. Nigeria has always come to the rescue of Niger during the time of natural disasters. A good example was the donation of 250,000 pounds relief materials in 1974 when a drought devastated the country. Many other supports from Nigeria have followed especially during the Nigeria's neighbour (Niger) economic difficulties (Osuntokun, 2008: 144, 145; Ede, 1986: 185).

The town of Birnin Konni in Niger Republic which was part of Konni province of Sokoto Caliphate under Sultan Attahiru II could have possibly been in Sokoto State of Nigeria today. The carving off of Konni with Niger Republic is a good example of how the colonial masters created artificial divides between kith and kin. Konni was a trade-off between the British and the French for the latter to give up its fishing rights in Newfoundland. Britain gave away Konni and Maradi to the French at the London Anglo-French Boundary Delimitation conference of May 1906 (*Leadership* 8 December, 2014). However, due to historical, cultural and religious affinities that bonded the people living on both sides of the divide together, Zinder, Konni and Maradi (all in Niger Republic) are today part of the Kano-Katsina-Maradi Corridor square kilometres of intensive trans-border trade between the Nigeria and Niger Republic. Food security and cross-border trade joint report (July 2006), the square kilometres comprised of Kano and Katsina States in Nigeria and Maradi province in Niger Republic covering about 83,000 square kilometres. The mission discovered that the area represents the polarisation of the economies of both countries along the 1500 kilometres border that divide them. This is a populous area encompassing the heartland of Hausa lands of Northern Nigeria with its beehive of economic activities and southern Niger Republic with its rich agriculture. The epicentre of this commercial corridor is ringed around four major Nigerian cities of Kano, Zaria, Kaduna and Jos. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 below illustrate the Kano-Katsina-Maradi corridor, M<sup>2</sup>K and the centre of the corridor located within Nigeria respectively.

**Figure 3.17:** Map showing the Kano-Katsina-Maradi corridor, M<sup>2</sup>K



Sources: SWAC/OECD 2004; adapted from CILSS, *et al*; Joint Mission Report, July 2006, p.6.

**Figure 3.18:** Map showing the centre of the Kano-Katsina-Maradi corridor located within Nigeria.



Sources: SWAC/OECD 2004; adapted from CILSS, *et al*; Joint Mission Report, July 2006, p.6.

According to the joint report (2006:6), trans-border trade in agricultural products comprised of livestock and grains from Niger and manufactured products from Nigeria, as well as products re-exported en route from Benin and Togo to Nigeria via Niger. Nigeria remains the major supplier of grain to Niger, especially during the periods of its food shortages because of the relative advantages of proximity of the areas of production between the two countries, cheaper fuel price in Nigeria and the reduction of transport costs. Also, traders from both sides understand each other perfectly, being majorly of the same Hausa language speakers, relating by family, religious and lineage links. Northern Nigeria and southern part of Niger form one grain production basin in which markets are integrated perfectly and there is easy circulation of products. The Kano–Katsina–Maradi corridor is a major trade area in West Africa linking the Gulf of Guinea to North Africa and the Middle East for a very long time.

Livestock is the Niger's major revenue earner and 97 percent of it finds their way to Nigeria annually, while Nigeria is the Nigerien major supplier of grains, especially millet and corn. Nigeria is the largest producer of grains in West Africa accounting for about 59 percent of the total regional production. The country has comparative advantages over all other countries in the region as a result of its agro-climatic conditions, the adaptation capacity of its farmers who have modernised their production system in line with the development of regional trade, as well as the government agricultural support policies. Although some countries in the West African Sahel were able to place ban on exportation of grains until the 1990s, the porosity of Nigeria-Niger borders prevented the strict administration of the ban (CILSS, *et al*, 2006: 9-10).

Nigerian traders are reputed to have had a good mastery of the Nigerien market which asset afforded them to compete favourably well with their Nigerien counterparts. Especially during the harvest season, Nigerian cereal traders stockpiled their grains in Maradi, Niger in anticipation of the lean or "hunger" season. Also, the socio-cultural affinities between Hausa traders from both sides of the borders have being a catalyst that has always helped the smooth running of the trans-border trade transactions (CILSS, *et al*, 13). Although, it has been estimated that some 200,000 tons of Nigerian millet and corn cross over to Niger every year (OECD, 2001), trans-border flows of grains are difficult to measure. Unlike trade in livestock, mobility of cereals is not

subject to custom registration procedures at the borders, thus making it difficult to quantify the actual volume of cross-border trade in grains between the two countries (CILSS, *et al*: 15, 20).

Apart from trade in grains and livestock, contraband goods like textiles, rice and used vehicles are also traded across Nigerian-Nigerien borders. Cross-border livestock trade between the two countries is very important, in this sector; Niger has a comparative advantage as a result of abundant land for grazing, the quantity of livestock, the quality of the meat produced, and relatively low cost of transportation to Nigeria. Trans-border livestock trade between the two countries is very advantageous to Niger because Nigeria being the largest market in the sub-region gulps more than half of total livestock imports annually. Nigerien official sources claimed that 97 percent of its annual livestock exportation is for Nigeria. Thus, cattle from Niger constantly find their way to consumption markets in southern parts of Nigeria in their droves. Demands for livestock in Nigeria always go through the roof during both the Christian and Moslem traditional festivals of Christmas, New Year, Eid-el-Kabir and Eid-el-Fitr. It has been predicted that Nigeria's demand for Nigerien livestock will continue to increase as a result of its urban and industrial development, population growth, and improvement in the living conditions of the population (CILSS, *et al*: 21, 28).

Complementarities between Nigeria and Niger are based on ecological, political and economic factors as well as the integration of sectors of production, marketing, processing and trade policy. For example, cereals and livestock import and export are closely linked together in the relations between the two countries. Nigeria supplies livestock feeds and veterinary materials while Niger reciprocates by making available its livestock and meat for Nigeria. It is important to note here that food security in Niger Republic largely depends on trans-border trade in agricultural and livestock products with Nigeria. The survival of Nigeriens is hugely dependent importation of food items from neighbouring countries, most especially Nigeria (CILSS, *et al*: 30, 36, and 48).

Although, Nigerian relations with Niger have been anchored on good neighbourliness based on mutual complementarity between the two countries most of the time, however in the course of the history of their relations, Niger had carried out some hostile policies against Nigeria. For example in 1977 with the assistance of France, Niger constructed two dams on Rivers Lamido

and Maggiya. These dams disrupted the irrigation scheme along the River Kalmano in Sokoto State of Nigeria. In the ECOWAS, Niger is known to be a supporter of Nigeria's moves; nevertheless, at the African Union and the United Nations, there have been occasions when their interests differ. The occasional differences of opinion may be as a result of the French influence over Niger (Ede, 1986: 184).

### **3.5.3 NIGERIA AND CHAD**

The Republic of Chad got her independence from France in 1960. The country was weakened by the long-drawn internal conflict which started immediately after independence. The internal conflict that made the newly independent Republic vulnerable to foreign intervention, particularly by France and Libya was caused by the wide dissatisfaction between the southern and northern citizens of the country. The seemingly insurmountability of the Chadian conflict resulted in France making a secret arrangement for Nigeria's direct mediation in the crisis. Nigeria's role at negotiating a ceasefire between the warring factions resulted to the two Kano peace talks of March and April 1979, and the three Lagos national reconciliation conferences. Under the agreement, President Felix Malloun agreed to step down in order to make for peace and reconciliation in Chad and was granted asylum in Nigeria from 1978 to 2002 (Osuntokun, 2008: 146; Garba, 1991: 44; Ede, 1986: 187).

In 1978, a contingent of Nigerian peace keeping force under the leadership of Colonel Mohammadu Magoro arrived at Ndjamenas the Chadian capital to maintain the peace. This mission was a failure particularly due to France's underhandedness. In 1981, Nigeria sent another batch of troops based on the OAU's (AU's) decision on a multilateral peace-keeping force under the leadership of General Geoffrey Ejiga. General Ejiga's OAU peace-keeping force largely drawn from the Francophone states also failed apparently due to the Francophone states excessive loyalty to French interests (Ede, 1986: 186).

Scholars of Nigerian foreign policy have all agreed that Nigeria neglected Chad in its foreign policy agenda in the 1960s. Oscar Ede (1986: 187), Joseph Garba (1991: 44) and Akinjide Osuntokun (2008: 146) agreed in their submissions that Nigeria refused to attend to the needs of

Chad, a desperately poor country which was plunged into a devastating internal crisis not long after its independence. Instead of Nigeria's timely and copious assistance to Chad during the time of its need, Nigeria's action was that of "benign neglect." Nevertheless, the "benign neglect" posture of Nigeria's foreign policy toward Chad in the early 1960s did not affect personal relationships among the peoples of the two countries as many Chadians flocked to Nigeria during the Nigerian civil war and fought as mercenaries. Also, as a result of the Chadian crisis, from the 1960s, many refugees from that country had flocked to Nigeria and at a time they numbered 200,000 (Fawole, 2008: 100).

However in 1969 during the civil war, Nigeria was completely taken aback with the presence of fully armed French elite troops in Chad stationed close to Nigeria-Chad border. This was a time when France openly declared support for the course Biafra. The Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon summoned the Chadian leader, François Tombalbaya to a bilateral summit in Maiduguri, Nigeria in 1970. At the meeting, Nigeria expressed its annoyance at the presence of the French troops in an area in Chad so close to Nigeria during the time Nigeria was going through a national strife. Gowon insisted that Tombalbaya asked the troops to leave promising to replace them with Nigerian soldiers. Nevertheless, France and Chad remained adamant and maintained the troops there (Fawole, 2008: 99).

There have been some periods of unprovoked skirmishes between Nigerian and Chadian military forces at the borderland. The 75-kilometre border between the two countries on the shallow Lake Chad is known to be unreliable because of the shrinking and seasonal fluctuation of the lake due to the environmental and ecological factors. This problem has made it easier for the Chadian forces to invade Nigerian territory in 1983 occupying many Nigerian islands before they were chased back by the Nigerian forces. This has also necessitated the militarisation of Nigeria-Chad border and the construction of the Baga-Doro road to facilitate quick military response in case of an invasion from Chad (Osuntokun, 2008: 146). The 1981 and 1983 border clashes between the Nigerian army and the Chadian gendarmes brought up some misunderstanding between the Nigerian army and the government. While the Shehu Shagari's administration refused to close down the Nigeria-Chad border in order not to rupture bilateral relations between the two countries and also wanted a "limited military action" against the Chadian gendarmes on the two



occasions, the Nigerian army perceived the situation and acted differently. In 1981, the Nigerian army pursued the Chadian interlopers 50 kilometres into their territory; in 1983, Nigerian troops engaged the Chadian trespassers in a total war on Lake Chad. It has been argued that the two military actions by the Nigerian army contradicted the statements of command from the Shagari's government (Akinrinade, 1988: 56). Nonetheless, analysts have rightly observed that the Nigerian military fully understood the national security implications of the incessant attacks from Chad (Fawole, 2008: 101).

### **3.5.4 NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROON**

Of the 5,000 kilometre long Nigerian international boundaries, that between Nigeria and Cameroon is the longest, (1,700 kilometres) and the most disputed. The border extended from the Lake Chad in the north to the Bakassi Peninsula into the Atlantic Ocean in the south. The boundary has a rich history of several times of redrawing in 1885, 1890, 1913, 1919-1921, 1961 and 2003 (Check, 2011: 2; Osuntokun, 2008: 154; Bekker, 2003: 387-398). Cameroon was a German Protectorate until 1916 when the combined troops from Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa annexed it from Germany. The Kamerun Campaign which was part of the hostilities of the First World War on the continent of Africa took place in the German Protectorate of Kamerun (Cameroon). The British, French and Belgians invaded Cameroon from August 1914 to March 1916. A detachment of the West African Frontier Force from the British Colony of Nigeria first saw action during the occupation of Cameroon. Although most of the fights took place in Cameroon but skirmishes also broke out in the Colony of Nigeria (Paice, 2009: 299; Ngoh, 2005: 349; Strachan, 2004: 31).

An Anglo-French condominium was established after its annexation from Germany in 1916, however, the joint British-French administration failed (Elango, 1985: 656-673). The unworkability of a British-French co-administered Cameroon resulted into a division of the territory between then in 1919. One third of the territory was given to Britain and administered as part of its Colony of Nigeria while the balance of three-quarters went to the French to be governed as part of French Equatorial Africa. This arrangement was formalised by the League of Nations in 1923 when Cameroon was handed over to the two colonial powers as the British Cameroon and French Cameroon Mandated Territories respectively. In 1946, the two territories



became United Nations Trusteeships under Britain and France. Britain held a plebiscite in its own part of Cameroon in 1961 under the auspices of the United Nations as a result of which the northern half opted to join Nigeria and the southern half voted to unite with the Republic of Cameroon (Check, 2011: 1; Kurian, 1982: 304).

The incessant disputes over Nigeria-Cameroon border has made relations between the two neighbouring countries thorny over the years (Check, 2011: 2; Osuntokun, 2008: 154; Ede, 1986: 185). The border dispute was promoted by the issue of Bakassi Peninsula which has a high potential for hydrocarbon deposits. The disputed territory of Bakassi Peninsula is some mangrove swamp dotted with small islands occupied by predominantly by Nigerian fishermen settlers (Anene, 1975: 56). Therefore the most important issues that triggered the disputes included the rights over the oil-rich peninsula, the sea reserves and the fate of the local populations. There have been efforts by the two countries to put an end to the problem immediately after the Nigerian civil war in 1971 (Check, 2011: 2, 4). However, the agreement between the two countries collapsed twice in 1981 and 1993.

Tension started to mount in in 1981 when the Cameroonian Army fired and killed five Nigerian soldiers. The aggression against Nigerians continued in 1992 and 1993 when the Cameroonian gendarmes openly killed some Nigerian civilians resident in Cameroon during the English-speaking Cameroonians agitation for autonomy (Tariiebae and Baroni, 2010: 205). In 1993, Nigerian troops invaded the territory and in 1995, General Sanni Abacha, the then Nigerian military head of state ordered the Nigerian Army to occupy the peninsula (Osuntokun, 2008: 155). Both the Nigerian military and civilians suffered heavy casualties between two years from 1994. In 1996, diplomatic sources revealed that over fifty Nigerian soldiers had been killed and some incarcerated in Cameroonian prisons (*New York Times*, 1996: 7).

The Cameroonian government took legal action in 1994 by filling a law suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) at The Hague (*ASIL Insights*, June 10 1998). Cameroon was full of confidence that the case will skew in its favour for some reasons. The 1913 Anglo-German agreement shifted the boundary of the peninsula from its original position in Nigeria to the side of Cameroon. Also, the Cameroonian defence harped on the “Maroun Declaration” of

1975 between Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon where Gowon allegedly gave away Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon (Olumide, 2002: 7). Cameroon was at ease and felt justified also with the anticipated outcome of the World Court judgement arguing that Nigeria was only using its demographic advantage on the peninsula as an occupational tactic to claim the ownership of the territory. Nigeria's argument at the ICJ was premised on the verity that majority of the population in the disputed areas were Nigerians and that Nigeria had administered the people for long which fact may be interpreted as a form of sovereignty over the peninsula. However, Nigeria's argument was thrown out by the World Court (Check, 2011: 2).

The Nigerian-Cameroon case over Bakassi dragged on at the World Court for good eight years with the two sides defending their arguments; the case was finally decided in 2002 when the ICJ ceded Bakassi peninsular to Cameroon. In order to follow up on the ICJ ruling, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan established a Mixed Commission comprising representatives of both Nigeria and Cameroon. The formation of the Mixed Commission was predicated upon the outcome of a September 2002 Paris peace meeting called by Kofi Annan in which both Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon were invited. At the meeting, the ICJ verdict was released to the two presidents and they agreed to respect the expected decision of the World Court and also establish a mechanism for implementation (Tariebbae and Baroni, 2010: 206).

The Mixed Commission was mandated to demarcate the land boundary between the two countries, withdraw civil, military and police forces, and transfer authority in relevant areas along the boundary. Part of the mandate of the Mixed Commission also included the demilitarisation of the Bakassi peninsula, the protection of the rights of the affected populations on both sides of the boundary, development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation, and the reactivation of the moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) (UN Office for West Africa, 2014/095). The Commission was successful in its assignments of the withdrawal of the two countries' civil, military and police forces around the Lake Chad area in 2003. As part of its assignment, thirty-three villages surrounding Naga'a, Tchika, Liman, and Darak were handed over to Cameroon while Dambure was allotted to Nigeria. Also the maritime boundary between the two countries was demarcated while the

Bakassi peninsula was officially handed over to Cameroon on August 14, 2008 (Cameroon Tribune, Dec. 17, 2003).

Although Nigeria accepted the ICJ judgement over Bakassi however, it is pertinent to note that until now, the technical aspect of the international waters between Nigeria and Cameroon had yet to be fully determined (NTA news, May 6 2016). Nigeria's submission to the ICJ judgement on Bakassi case has made the country to become, in Africa and elsewhere, a model and a mentor in efforts to combine multilateralism with conflict resolution through arbitration and the rule of law. It took Olusegun Obasanjo a politically courageous decision before he finally adhered to the World Court's verdict over the issue. This he had to do in the face of a vehement opposition to the decision of the International Court of Justice to restore Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon at home (Bach, 2007: 312).

It is very important here to observe some convolutedness of Nigeria-Cameroon frosty and thorny relations. Regardless of incessant provocation by the Cameroonian gendarme and the army over the issue of Bakassi peninsula, Nigeria maintained a level of peace and good neighbourliness with Cameroon. Also the two basic assumptions over Cameroon's behaviour pertaining to the Bakassi peninsula controversy needed to be examined here. The first assumption states that the weight of Nigeria's diplomatic presence in Africa and influence in international organisations had stampeded Cameroon into seeking the International Court of Justice to resolve the crisis. The second supposition was that France had influenced the final decision of the ICJ because Gilbert Guillaume, a French national had headed the World Court at the time. After all, these hypotheses may be true! It is a well-known fact that Nigeria's diplomatic presence in Africa is a mammoth and its influence in global organisations is frightening enough for a smaller country like Cameroon to seek justice over a disputed territory from the World Court. Also, the French undue influence on her former colonies in Africa is legendary; it is worth of note that in 1995 when Sanni Abacha ordered the Nigerian army to occupy the Bakassi peninsula in the face of Cameroonian persistent vexation, France sent military advisers to support Cameroon in the dispute.

### **3.5.5 NIGERIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS TO THE SOUTH**

#### **3.5.5.1 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea**

Nigeria's neighbours in the Gulf of Guinea to the south are Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. Equatorial Guinea is made up of a mainland province and five other islands out of which Bioko, (formerly Fernando Po) is about 100 kilometres away south-east of the Nigerian coast (Osuntokun, 1978: 1). Nigeria shares a total of 700 kilometres of maritime boundary with this "Hispanophone" (Spanish-speaking) country. The island of Bioko was initially colonised by the Portuguese but the Spanish took it over from them in the fifteenth century. The first record of Bioko's relations with Nigeria had to do with the British occupation of Lagos. From this island, Captain John Beecroft mounted the naval invasion of Lagos in the nineteenth century. Shortly after the British occupation of Lagos up until the first half of the twentieth century, colonial Nigeria supplied huge labour to the Spanish plantation economy of Bioko (Aworawo, 2010: 92; Osuntokun, 2008:150).

From the foregoing, it would be interesting to discover that from the opening decades of the nineteenth century, relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea had been majorly economic and strategic. Britain had had a vested interest in the island of Bioko to make it its West African naval base in preference to Freetown on the mainland. Two reasons had prompted Britain's special interest in Bioko, first was to suppress the trans-Atlantic slave trade and second, to protect trade in palm oil on the adjacent Niger Delta, (which later became part of Nigeria) after the abolition. Beginning from 1827, the island of Bioko had been populated by immigrants from what later became Nigeria, together with the indigenous Bubi population. In addition to these were the Creoles from Sierra Leone many of who interestingly traced their ancestral root back to "Nigeria." Cocoa, an important cash crop which later became one of Nigeria's major export earners was introduced from the island of Bioko. The economic tree got to Bioko in 1854 from Sao Tome where the Portuguese first introduced it to Africa in 1822 (Martino, 2012: 55; Osuntokun, 1978: 2).

With the expansion of the cocoa plantation economy in Bioko at the beginning of the twentieth century, there was need by the colonial Spanish to recruit more labourers from elsewhere.

Various areas were considered from central Africa down to West Africa for the recruitment; however it was in Liberia that many immigrant plantation labourers were allowed to be “legally” recruited between 1903 and 1913. In spite of this, some illegal migrant labourers were also recruited among the Ibo and Ibibio of Nigeria in large numbers during this time. Up till 1942 when the first agreement between colonial Nigeria and Bioko took place, no Nigerian labourer went to the island legally (Martino, 2012: 40-43, 59; Osuntokun, 1978: 6).

The pro-German attitude of Spain and its Equatorial Guinea colony as well as the illegal recruitment of Nigerians as labourers in Bioko during the First World War, frozen the relations between the two colonies during the war. There were some diplomatic altercations between Sir Lord Lugard of Nigeria and Angel Barrera, the Governor-General of Equatorial Guinea, and also between the foreign ministers of Britain and Spain during the time. However, the irony of the event was that it was during the Second World War, (in 1942) that the colonial authorities in Nigeria entered into a formal agreement with Equatorial Guinea to legally recruit migrant labourers from Nigeria. This was possible even though Britain was vehemently opposed to the regime of General Franco Francisco of Spain who was noted to be an unrepentant ally of the Axis Powers during the war. An argument proffered by some scholars to explain away the incident was that Britain had allowed the colonial authorities in Nigeria to go into such an agreement with the Spanish Equatorial Guinea in order to persuade Spain to keep out of the Second World War (Osuntokun, 1978: 6).

There had been incessant complaints by Nigerian immigrant labourers, (although illegal) in Bioko of their abuse and ill-treatment in the hands of plantation owners in the 1930s. This prompted the colonial authorities in Nigeria to appoint a labour officer and stationed at the British Consulate in Bioko to superintend the welfare of these immigrant labourers. As a follow up to this, the Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea labour agreement of 1942 included some provisions for better condition of service for Nigerian immigrant workers in Bioko. The agreement which gave the right of recruitment to John Holt and Company Limited, a British syndicate, also included some attendant clauses. Some of the clauses included the age limit of eighteen years for the recruits, medical certification of recruits before embarkation and the provision of medical care for the recruits in Equatorial Guinea. Other clauses in the agreement included the attestation to

the validation of labourers' contracts both in Nigeria and at their arrival in Equatorial Guinea, regular payment of wages, proper housing, paid leave and regular working hours (Osuntokun, 1978: 6).

Although this agreement was in force up to 1950, yet there were constant protests by the labourers over violation of labour rights. With the revision of the agreement in 1950 and the transfer of right of recruitment of labourers in Nigeria from John Holt to the Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency, the working conditions of labourers improved and were in conformity with the conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Martino, 2012: 56). Nevertheless, there continued to be bitter complaints by these labourers about inhuman treatment doled out to them even after the review of the agreement in 1950. Therefore between 1953 and 1957, the pre-independent government of Nigeria sent out three powerful delegates consecutively to Equatorial Guinea to investigate the problem. Each of these delegates was led by the then Federal Minister of Labour and Social Welfare: 1953, Samuel Ladoke Akintola; 1956, Festus Samuel Okotieboh, and 1957, John Modupe Johnson (Osuntokun, 2012: 6).

Each of the missions was able to negotiate improved working conditions for Nigerian immigrant workers in Equatorial Guinea. Nevertheless, it has been argued by some scholars that while Nigeria negotiated for improved conditions of service for its citizens in Equatorial Guinea, it also sought for and got some fiscal returns on each of the labourers from their masters (Osuntokun, 2008: 151; 1987: 7). Indubitably, the agreement between them on "the payment of a capitation fee of five pounds sterling on each labourer to the Federal and Eastern regional governments in lieu of the taxes payable by these Nigerian workers in Fernando Po", would have put their conditions of service at the mercy of their Spanish plantation owner overlords.

Similar in nature to the campaign mounted by the Action Group for Nigeria's annexation of the Yoruba districts of Benin Republic in 1960 was the cry for the taking over of Fernando Po, (Bioko) by Nigeria by another political group in 1961 (Osuntokun, 2008: 151; 1978: 8). The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, (NCNC), a junior partner in the Northern People's Congress's (NPC's) dominated First Republic agitated for a forced union between the two countries. The advocates of annexation believed that Bioko was to Nigeria what Goa, a former

Portuguese province (off the coast of south west India) was to India which it annexed in 1961. The annexation of Equatorial Guinea was seriously considered during the regime of General Murtala Mohammed when there was an unbroken persecution of Nigerians in the country persisted. The government first considered invading the country but later shelved the idea and opted for the evacuation of thousands of Nigerians resident there by air and sea. The action and reaction on both sides tended to freeze the relationships between the two countries until 1979 when the authoritarian regime of Macias Nguema was overthrown in Equatorial Guinea (Osuntokun, 2008: 1515).

The two dominant factors of labour and strategic location that defined relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea could not be over emphasised. As pointed out in the preceding chapters, Nigerian labour had been very vital to the economy of Equatorial Guinea from the colonial times up to the 1970s. In addition to this is the geographical location of Bioko Island which is very strategic to Nigeria. After the defeat of Germany in Cameroon by the combined forces of Nigerian (West African Frontier Force) and the French Equatorial African troops during the First World War, Fernando Po Island (Bioko) was occupied by the defeated German army and from here, Nigeria was threatened until the end of the war (Paice, 2009: 299; Ngoh, 2005: 349). Also, because of the pro-German stance of Spain during the Second World War, the dispositions of the Spanish settlers on the island to Nigerians were hostile and antagonistic. However, the importance of the geographical location of Bioko to Nigeria came to the fore during the Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970. Apart from the sympathy Nigerian settlers (who were mostly of Igbo stock) and the indigenes had for the course of Biafra, the airport facilities on the island were used by the French and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to transfer food, arms and war materials to the Uli Ihiala airstrips of the Biafran secessionists (Osuntokun, 2008: 151; 1978: 9).


The new regime of Obiang Nguema tried its possible best to improve the relations between Nigerian and Equatorial Guinea by entering into a joint agreement with Nigeria in 1982. The specific areas covered by the joint agreement were cultural, commercial, agricultural and good neighbourliness. However, Nigeria was alarmed by the action of Equatorial Guinea at seeking the military protection of Morocco in 1985 when the country suffered a general inflation that culminated into a failed military coup. The situation also opened the gateway for the apartheid

South Africa to approach Equatorial Guinea to provide it the much needed military protection. In reaction to this development, Nigeria quickly changed its tactics by appointing a resident ambassador who immediately entered into some naval and air force agreements with Equatorial Guinea. These steps were considered diplomatically and strategically necessary by Nigeria for two obvious reasons. First, the country was located close to Nigerian offshore oil fields and other economic installations, and second, the apartheid South Africa was on the ground in Equatorial Guinea! The apartheid regime of South Africa was an avowed enemy of Nigeria due to Nigeria's activities at thwarting the regime in Southern Africa during this period. Therefore Nigeria had the cause to be perturbed that Equatorial Guinea might have entered into some anti-Nigerian alliance with South Africa. This development created some tension in the relations between the two countries and prompted Obiang Nguema to pay a visit to Nigeria in 1987 in a bid to reassure Nigeria of its country's loyalty to Nigeria's security. The visit was reciprocated the following year by Nigeria's foreign affairs minister, Ike Nwachukwu and crowned by an exchange visit by President Ibrahim Babangida in 1990. During these visits, some concessions were made to Equatorial Guinea in order to push away Nigeria's enemies out of its shores (Aworawo, 2010: 91; Osuntokun, 2008: 152).

Some domestic, economic and political changes that took place in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea as well as some changes in global politics in the 1980s and the early 1990s made for a record improvement in relations between the two countries. The end of the brutal regime of President Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and the shift from cocoa to crude oil as the major source of income for example put an end to the maltreatment of Nigerian labourers on its cocoa plantations. The ill-treatment of Nigerian immigrant workers in Bioko had been a baneful to cordial relations between the two countries for decades. The collapse of the Cold War in the international system, the end of apartheid regime in South Africa as well as the reliance on crude oil as the major source of national income by the two countries has sustained their relations. Figure 3.19 below shows the Nigeria/Equatorial Guinea Maritime boundary delimitation.



**Figure 3.19:** Map showing the Nigeria/Equatorial Guinea Maritime Boundary Delimitation



**Source:** Adapted from D. Aworawo, “Diplomacy and the Development of Equatorial Guinea, 1900-1990”. Doctoral Thesis, University of Lagos, 2002, p.267.

**3.5.5.2 Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe**

Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, a Lusophone African country is another southerly neighbour of Nigeria’s in the Gulf of Guinea. The country is an archipelago made up of two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, and several other small islets out of which the two biggest ones are Tinhosas Grande, and Rolas (on the Equator). São Tomé and Príncipe was a Portuguese colony until 1975 when it attained independence without experiencing guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese unlike its other colonies. For several decades beginning from the fifteenth century, the island country served as slave stations between the Congo and Portugal. Flourishing sugar-cane plantations were established by the sixteenth century with the help of slaves imported from other Portuguese colonies. Cocoa was introduced in 1822 and the country grew to become the largest producer of the product in the early 1900s (Kurian, 1982: 1517-1518). Cocoa was

introduced into Nigeria and other West African countries from São Tomé and Príncipe (Aworawo, 2010: 90; Osuntokun, 2008: 151).

Nigeria's relations with São Tomé and Príncipe have been convivial right from its independence from the Portuguese in 1975. Tragedy struck the relations on May 26 1980 when a 12-man delegation from Nigeria on a defence diplomatic mission to São Tomé and Príncipe perished in a plane crash involving their Nigerian Air Force Fokker F27. The Nigerian minister of state for foreign affairs, Abubakar Umar was a victim of the plane crash (*ASN*: May, 1980). South Africa courted São Tomé and Príncipe in the early 1990s and tried to contrive a military coup d'état in order to destabilise the country, the failed effort brought São Tomé and Príncipe closer in ties with Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2008: 153). A military coup toppled the government of President De Menezes on July 26 2003 while on a state visit to Nigeria (*BBC News Archives*, 2003), when the President returned to São Tomé and Príncipe a week later, President Obasanjo of Nigeria helped to restore him back to power (Osuntokun, 2008: 153).

As a result of more crude oil discoveries in the Gulf of Guinea, there has been increased cordiality in relations between Nigeria and its southerly neighbours, mainly based on joint oil agreements. The reserve–production ratio for Nigerian gas was estimated at 125 years and less than 30 years for oil. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most promising global reserves of energy wooed by multinational oil corporations. The use of deep water drilling technology by these multinationals had resulted in a number of new discoveries in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, even as far away as Mauritania (Bach, 2007: 302).

Therefore, Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe took into consideration the need to address issues relating to overlapping maritime boundaries between them by signing a 45-year treaty in 2001. The “Treaty on the Joint Exploration of Oil and Other Resources existing on the Existing Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States”, also involved the establishment of a joint Development Zone (JDZ). The provision of the treaty included a 60: 40 per cent ratio of the resources sharing formula to Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe respectively; the establishment of the Joint Development Authority (JDA) to develop and manage the petroleum and other

resources in the JDZ, and the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) to have the overall political responsibility and supervise the JDA (JDA EITI, 2014: 4). By October 2003, oil companies had started to bid for offshore oil blocks controlled by Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe and by 2005, both countries had signed their first offshore oil exploration and production-sharing agreement with international oil firms. These were closely followed by the 2007 and 2009 joint maritime military commission agreements to protect their common oil interests in the Gulf of Guinea (*BBC News Archives*, 2003-2009).

### **3.6 NIGERIA AND THE ANGLOPHONE WEST AFRICA**

The term Anglophone West Africa refers to both a linguistic as well as a geographical location of some five independent states on the West African coast. They are distinguished by the common use of the English as official language and similar legal system for administrative and diplomatic purposes. The Anglophone West African states are- Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Liberia. They have in common historical, ideological and institutional experience. While four of them were colonised by the British, Liberia was settled by the African diaspora from the Caribbean and the Americas in the nineteenth century. Although, the four former British colonies were administered separately prior to the First World War, they once operated a common colonial military force and currency (Ajayi and Crowder, 1987: 588-589) [Discussed in details in the introductory part of this chapter]. Shortly after independence, these countries distanced themselves from their former colonial master, unlike their Francophone counterparts. Their choice of distancing themselves from Britain, it is argued, cost them some loss of “privileges” as well as some badly needed resources for development. They also constituted themselves to an anti-apartheid army demanding for the complete liberation of Africa and an immediate end to colonial rule in southern Africa to the chagrin of Britain (Adibe, 2001: 17, 22).

The Gambia is a small Anglophone country geographically embedded within Senegal, a Francophone West African country. The country’s population of 1,967,709 inhabits its 11,300 square kilometres of water and landmass (CIA, 2015). The Gambia’s entire boundary of 756 kilometres determined by the Anglo-French agreement of 1889 is completely shared with Senegal. The country was under the British colonial administration from 1816 to 1963, when it

got its political independence (Kurian, 1982: 637, 638). Nigeria has always provided military assistance to the tiny country, especially in the 1970s and 1980s and also enjoyed concessionary supplies of crude oil from Nigeria like other West African countries (Adebajo, 2008: 13; 2002a: 210).

The Gambia was a big time beneficiary of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme established in the mid-1980s. The programme was a South-South international assistance scheme established as an example of international volunteer service scheme. The programme borrowed much from the US Peace Corps scheme established by the late American President, J.F. Kennedy in the 1960s. The scheme was intended to open a new window in Nigeria's external relations and promote its foreign policy especially in the face of dwindling resources earned from oil in the 1980s. TAC was based on deployment of highly skilled Nigerians to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) member countries. The Gambia received the highest number of volunteers two-yearly than any other recipient country since the scheme started in 1987. Between 1987 and 2004, it received 363 volunteers made up of medical doctors, nurses, other health workers and other professionals. Also between 2004 and 2006, 81 Nigerian TAC corps members served in The Gambia. Furthermore, Nigeria made available seasoned judges to serve as the nation's chief justices in the past and also helped the country to staff its national university opened in 1999. Nigeria has helped The Gambia to start a national youth service scheme like that of Nigeria's NYSC programme (Adebanwi, 2011: 30-31). Nigeria has gone a long way in assisting The Gambia to alleviate the implausible dearth of manpower resources prevalent in the country.

It is interesting to note that The Gambia was also keenly interested in occupying the African one Security Council seat slot. The country was ready to contest with Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Senegal and Libya in the race to represent Africa in the United Nations Security Council (*This Day*, 19 April, 2006). Nigerian and The Gambian relations have always been cordial since the independence of the latter in 1963; however, the country had opposed Nigeria's position in some international issues sometimes. A good example was The Gambia's opposition to Nigeria's perceived way of how the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) could work out for the benefit of Africans. Nigeria in agreement with other African nations like South Africa, Senegal and Algeria presented NEPAD for Western countries' financial support at the G8

summit in Genoa, Italy in 2001. The African countries requested for some US\$ 64 billion aid in terms of direct foreign investments in Africa for a period of 5 years. However, The Gambian President, Yahya Jammeh vehemently opposed the proposal with the statement that

“Africa’s socio-economic development must come from us (Africans). NEPAD will never work. You come with a programme and depend on nothing but begging. I Yahya Jammeh will not knee down before any man and beg. I will only knee before God. If NEPAD is an African project, why take it to Westerners to approve it? That is why I am skeptical about it. Did G8 bring their agenda to Africa for us to approve it? If the problem is an African one, what I believe is that before talking to the G8- the very people who are responsible for the problems we have today- we should have brought it to Africa, and each country should have gathered its intellectuals and allowed them to debate it, as we did with the African Union Project. We need the input of the masses. They are the ones who can make it happen and the ones to pay the taxes and who will do the work in order to translate it into reality. But some said no and packed it up, took it to the G8- the grandfathers (Bafalikike, 2002: 18)”.

In January 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria led a move to prevent the military President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh from becoming the ECOWAS chairman. The opposition from the Nigerian leader should have been based on the decisions reached at the 22<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Algiers, Algeria in 1999. At the summit, President Obasanjo and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa had initiated that AU membership should not be extended to any future government that came to power through military coup. This provision was slammed on Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau between the summit and 2003 (Iliffe, 2011: 221, 282).

Nigeria had maintained cordial relations with Liberia until the change of government in that country in 1980. The Shehu Shagari administration was furious with the violent take-over of government by Samuel Doe in Liberia in 1980; the Nigerian government reacted by imposing economic sanctions against the regime (Sesay, 1985: 21-45). However, the history of relations between the two countries shows that Nigeria’s presence in Liberia during the country’s crisis (which is a subject matter of this thesis) happened to be its highest event since 1960. Many scholars have diverse ways of explaining the reasons behind Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia (Adebajo, 2008: 184-187). Scholars like Byron Tarr (1998: 150-170); Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1994: 272); Terry Mays (1994: 114), and (van der Kraaij, 2015: 62-63) have come out with reasons like the closeness between Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria and his Liberian counterpart, Samuel Doe; hostage taking of Nigerians, and the attack on the Nigerian embassy by Charles Taylors’

NPFL. Other causes as put forward by these scholars included the possibility of Libya forging a tripartite alliance between it, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire against Nigeria in the sub-region, and the capability of France to form an anti-ECOMOG political economic alliance in West Africa.

Nonetheless, Adebajo (1988: 187-189) gave three alternative explanations to Nigeria's interposition efforts in Liberia under the aegis of ECOMOG. He stressed the idea of "Pax Nigeriana" and the inordinate ambition of Nigerian leaders in the sub-region; Babangida's immoderate aspiration to make a hero of himself, and the excessive determination of the Nigerian army to exhibit itself as the military powerhouse of West Africa. In spite of the foregoing reasons, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubts that Nigeria was an instrument of restoration of peace to Liberia, a country which was ravaged and raped by a fourteen-year civil war. The actual cost of Nigeria's human and fiscal commitments to Liberia is still a subject of animated debate among scholars and analysts today. However, it is certain that Nigeria's self determination to bring peace and return Liberia to the path of true democracy was at a great economic budget to it at a time when the country had a hangover burden of over US\$ 33 billion external debt (Adebajo, 2002b: 52).

Sierra Leone is another Anglophone and a Commonwealth member West African country Nigeria had maintained hospitably warm relations with from its independence in 1961. In the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria embarked on intensifying inter-African socio-economic co-operation for the better living of African peoples. The governments of Nigeria attempted to do this in a number of ways including bilateral trade, scientific, technical and cultural agreements with some African states. Specifically between 1966 and 1975, Sierra Leone was among the 25 African countries Nigeria established joint economic commissions with (Aluko, 1986: 92).

Very similar to the case of Nigerian-Liberian relations, Nigeria's relations with Sierra Leone became most important during the time the country was going through a national strife in the 1990s. However, it should be noted that Nigeria had had some of its troops on the ground under a status-of-forces agreement before the arrival of the ECOMOG in 1998 (Olonisakin, 2008: 9). The about 900 Nigerian troops were the personal bodyguards for Ahmad Tejan Kabbah the



Sierra Leonean president (Adebajo, 2002b: 87). It is also noteworthy that Nigeria took over the payment of the daily salaries and feeding of the 368 Sierra Leonean soldiers who were part of the ECOMOG troops in Liberia by 1997. These soldiers who had not been paid by their government since 1996 also received the arrears of their salaries, courtesy of Nigeria too (Oladipo, 1997:16). Nigeria decided to its troops from Sierra Leone in 1999 due to domestic pressure on the government as well as the taking over of the peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Olonisakin, 2008: 43). Even at that, by 2000 when the removal took place, Nigeria did not withdraw all of its troops but 8,500 out of 12000 while the rest were incorporated with the UN force, UNAMSIL (Adebajo, 2002a: 252). The unusual British intervention in Sierra Leone its former colony in 2000 to assist the crumbling UN peacekeeping mission generated some Anglo-Nigerian rivalry for influence between them (Adebajo 2010: 138).

Like in the case of Nigerian intervention in Liberia, many reasons have been put forth by scholars as justifications for Nigeria's peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone. Although Nigerian troops were not the only contingents present in Sierra Leone during this period, nevertheless, they constituted more than 90 percent of the ECOMOG troops. Between 1998 and 1999, Nigeria contributed 12,000 out of the 13,000 soldiers that made up ECOMOG interventionist forces in Sierra Leone while it spent an average of US\$ 400 million annually on the mission. Adebajo (2008: 189-194) has listed the opinions of scholars concerning the huge Nigerian presence in Sierra Leone to include, its hegemonic ambitions in West Africa and its desire to protect the governments of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Lansana Conté in Sierra Leone and Guinea respectively. Other personal views of the scholars include, Nigeria's urgent need to prevent a build-up of chain of warlords in the three Mano River states of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea; to maintain a strategic presence in that corner of Africa; used as an opportunity for Nigerian soldiers to plunder Sierra Leonean diamonds, and as a diversionary measure employed by Sanni Abacha to prevent his regime from danger and instability at home (Berman and Sams, 2000: 25-33; Mortimer, 2000: 189-202; Richards, 1996: 21).

All the positions presented by scholars in the foregoing were analytically scrutinised, disproved and negated by Adebajo and in turn he presented three main arguments to explain himself (2008:

193-194). He testified to the fact that his explanations might have been mentioned in the passing but they were the major reasons why Nigeria was dutifully committed to restoration to Sierra Leone as it did in Liberia. According to him, Nigeria's exculpation in Sierra Leonean mission included the furtherance of Nigeria's ambitions in West Africa, used as concealment for the Sanni Abacha regime to shield off international sanctions, and employed by some Nigerian army generals for personal enrichment. The vindications expressed by Adebajo here were similar to those he put forward as the main reasons why Nigeria was hell-bent on restoring peace to Liberia as well. Thus, it could be deduced from these arguments that the principal reason for Nigeria's peace efforts in the sub-region of West Africa in the 1990s was the establishment of the country as the hegemon of the region. However, despite the hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria in West Africa, its timely intervention in Sierra Leone as it did in Liberia had saved the entire sub-region from conflagration.

Of all the former British West African colonies, Nigeria's relationship with Ghana was the frostiest. Immediately after independence in March 1957, Ghana withdrew from many of the common institutions that bound the former British colonies of West Africa together. Choosing to establish its own national institutions, Ghana opted out of the Royal West African Frontier Force (WAFF), the currency board and the West African airways. Kwame Nkrumah's strong anti-colonial stance, forceful personality and lack of faith in Nigeria concerning his pet pan-African project were some of the causes of friction between Nigeria and Ghana during their first decade of independence. There was a big gap between Tafawa Balewa and Kwame Nkrumah because of their divergent opinions on issues relating to the treatment of former colonial masters, pan-Africanism as well as roles to be played by Nigeria and Ghana in African unity. Between 1961 and 1963, the differences between the leaders of the two countries degenerated to the situation whereby there was an exchange of invective language between them (Aluko, 1976: 122-139).

As the first British sub-Saharan African colony to be independent after World War II, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah believed it was the leader and spokesman for the other African states. However, this assumption put Ghana at loggerheads with Nigeria when Nigeria saw itself occupying the same position in Africa. Nkrumah believed that Nigeria was so big and suffered problems of internal cohesion at independence which problem weighed it down as it



concentrated on solving them at the detriment of focusing on African unity. The problems, as Nkrumah saw it has made Nigeria to be conservatively and perpetually tied to the apron string of its former colonial master, Britain, which could assist with technocrats, military and economic aid. He felt that his position of leadership in Africa was threatened by the independence of Nigeria in 1960. The mutual distrust between Nigeria and Ghana was so fierce that the Nigerian government often accused Nkrumah of encouraging communism in Nigeria and planning to unseat the government (Flint, 1960: 23-31). The rivalry between the two newly independent nations involved a direct political challenge as well as an ideological misunderstanding. Nigeria saw Ghana as capable of using the Western Region of Nigeria as a base to destabilise the country politically.

The ideological differences between the two countries reflected in the way either of them saw the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC) crisis of 1960 to 1964. According to Bolaji Akinyemi (1978: 68), Ghanaian officials at home claimed that Nigerian mercenaries were involved in the Congo crisis. This assertion sent demonstrators into the streets of Accra in their hundreds who later attacked the Nigerian High Commission buildings. In Nigeria, members of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress were poised on a revenge mission to burn down the Ghanaian High Commission in Lagos. In Kinshasa (formerly Léopoldville), Nigerian students demonstrated in front of the Ghanaian embassy in protest against what they believed to be an unfair treatment of the Nigerian mission in Accra. The rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana made each of them lead a different group of opinion about their participation and the involvement of ONUC in the Congo. Nigeria as a leading member of the OAU (AU) “moderate” or “Monrovia” group of states supported by its allies, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Togo, Tunisia, Somalia, and Sudan favoured the United Nations’ position to hold the Congo together as one. This group wanted ONUC to be independent of the Kinshasa’s government while the world body worked toward political solution to the Congo problem. On the other hand, the “radical” or “Casablanca” group of the OAU (AU), led by Ghana and supported by its members, Egypt (United Arab Republic until 1971), Guinea, Mali and Morocco, argued that the United Nations should support the position of Congolese nationalists like Patrice Lumumba and that ONUC should desist from working for the actualisation of neo-colonialism in the Congo (Goode, 1967: 46-47, 52-53; Phillips, 1964: 124).

Nigeria was worried that should the position of the “radical” group led by Ghana be successful in the Congo, Nigeria viewed as pro-Western, would be the next target (Akinyemi, 1978: 72). For example, after the assassination of Patrice Émery Lumumba’s in January 1961, Ghana had moved that the United Nations troops in the Congo (DRC) be replaced with an all- African force. This move was vehemently resisted by Nigeria in order to block Ghana from having its way. Also, during the civil war of 1964-1965 in the Congo (DRC), Ghana had supported the move by the OAU (AU) to mediate but Nigeria opposed it because it saw mediation as an encroachment on the Congo’s sovereignty as well as going contrary to the charter of the organisation. Instead, Nigeria supported the intervention of the United States and Belgium on the side of the government of Moise Tshombe (Aluko, 1981: 31). Thus, Nigeria sought for a solution to reduce the influence of Ghana on the unfolding events in the Congo so that such influence would not jeopardise Nigeria’s core value and foreign policy goals (Aluko, 1976: 163).

It is noteworthy to mention here that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961), was particularly unsettled about the Nigerian-Ghanaian unhealthy relations during the first decade of both countries’ independence. He lamented that Nkrumah of Ghana had the tendency of colluding with the political leaders of southern Nigeria, who shared the same ideology with him, against the northern Nigerian leaders to subvert and break up the country (Dayal, 1976: 102-103). Nigeria suspected Ghana to be an accomplice in the Togolese military coup of 1963 (Cervenka, 1968: 5) as well as being a conspirator with Cameroon on Nigeria-Cameroon agitation over Southern Cameroons. It was the intention of Nkrumah’s Ghana to prevent Nigeria from being “too big” (Thompson, 1969: 77-79). It was insinuated that Nkrumah had a hand in the eventual overthrow of Balewa government in 1966 because of his attitude toward the military coup that toppled the government. Nkrumah was said to have hailed the coup and saw it as liberation for Nigeria while he provided political asylum for one of the coup plotters, Emmanuel Ifeajuna (Ademoyega, 1981: 21).

The military government that overthrew Nkrumah’s administration in Ghana tried to mend fences in Nigeria-Ghana relations. For example, the Joseph Ankrah government tried to mediate in the Nigerian crisis through a series of meetings held with the leaders of the Federal

government and Biafra at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967 but failed (Aluko, 1976: 230). Ghana remained neutral during the Nigerian civil war, although there was a mark of Biafran sympathy (Aluko, 1981: 136-137). Relations between the two countries suffered a humiliating defeat again in 1969 when the new government of Ghana headed by Kofi Busia expelled 140,000 Nigerians from his country. The Ghanaian government gave 20,000 Biafrans refugee status in empathy for the ongoing Nigerian civil war. Busia's government took this action after it had failed to secure the OAU (AU) support for its position in averting the starvation of Biafrans as a result of the economic blockade slammed on them by the Federal government of Nigeria. Also, the Ghanaian government had been unsuccessful in bringing the two sides of the Nigerian civil war back to the negotiating table (Brydon, 1985: 561-585). The personal friendship between Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo and Ghana's Frederick Akuffo, both of who were at the helms of affairs in Nigeria and Ghana respectively in 1979, blossomed relations between the two countries.

However, with the overthrow of Akuffo's government and the coming to power of Jerry Rawlings in 1979, relations between the two countries nose-dived again. Obasanjo disapproved the mass execution of former Ghanaian leaders, including his friends, carried out by Rawlings and his band of junior Ghanaian military officers of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council government (Ogunsanwo, 1980: 70). Obasanjo responded to the executions carried out by the new Ghanaian leader by candidly condemning it and when his government sensed that the executions would not stop, it slammed some economic pressures which included oil embargo on the Rawlings government. Rawlings accused Nigeria of interfering in the internal affairs of Ghana, although the academic community in Nigeria supported the position of Rawling's government (Tarr, 1993:71, 80). With both countries returned to civil rule in 1979, relations between them became normalised as both new leaders, Shehu Shagari of Nigeria and Hilla Limann of Ghana consulted each other on African issues. It was noted that Limann was among a few West African leaders consulted by Shagari regarding the country's proposal for setting up an African peacekeeping force for Chad (Ihonybere, 1994).

However, the second coming to power of Jerry Rawlings in 1981 made the already frosty relations between the two countries far from being abated. Shagari fearing that the second military coup staged by Rawlings in Ghana would be a bad example for Nigeria in the face of a

deteriorating economy (Ihonvbere, 1994). The government of Shagari therefore welcomed the new Rawlings administration into power with economic embargo which included oil (Forsythe, 1993: 114-115). Furthermore in 1983, the Nigerian government ordered the expulsion of all illegal foreigners, especially Ghanaians, from Nigeria (Brown, 1989: 251-273). The Muhammadu Buhari military regime that took over from Shagari's administration continued with the hard line posture of Nigeria's relations with Ghana. The Buhari government believed that Nigeria's dwindling economy was caused by corruption as well as economic sabotage carried out by unregistered aliens, and thus embarked upon the deportation of more Ghanaian citizens from Nigeria in 1984 (Aluko, 1985: 539-560).

By 1985, Nigeria-Ghana relations started to blossom again after nearly two and half decades of suffering terrible emasculation and cut-throat rivalry. The Ibrahim Babangida administration which came to power in 1985 stopped the mass deportation of foreigners, including Ghanaians, lifted oil and economic embargo on Ghana and extended credit facilities to the Rawlings regime. Ghanaian government responded to the gestures of the new Nigerian military regime by praising its pan-African virtues and leadership role in Africa. Subsequently, high level diplomatic contacts began and by 1990, Ghana was able to work together with Nigeria in setting up the interventionist regional force, ECOMOG to forestall the Liberian crisis (Adibe, 1994: 349). For eight years (1990-1997), Ghana was Nigeria's important ally in the ECOMOG force in Liberia (Hutchful, 1999: 97-117). This was because the then Ghanaian President, Jerry Rawlings was a strong advocate of regional integration and very active as the ECOWAS chairman between 1994 and 1996, when Liberia was going through a national strife. Rawlings also saw the importance of stability in Sierra Leone by sending troops to ECOMOG and provided humanitarian assistance for hundreds of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in his domain (Adebajo, 2008: 190). Over the years, more bilateral and multilateral projects continued to manifest in the relations between the two important West African countries. For example, by October 2006, the construction of an offshore pipeline between the two countries was completed and gas started to flow through to the Aboadze thermal power plant in Ghana by March 2007. Stakeholders in the joint project that cost some US\$ 500 million to construct included the two countries' national corporations; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, (NNPC) and Ghana's Volta River Authority (VRA).

Multinationals involved in the gas project included Chevron Texaco, Shell, SoBeGaz and SoToGaz. (Bach, 2007: 301-321).

Although, relations between Nigeria and Ghana had been most of the time frosty for the first twenty-five years of their independence, nevertheless, at the level of interpersonal relations among citizens of both countries, the story was that of an entire independent development. For example, after the mass deportation of Nigerians by President Busia in 1969, many of them still remained back in Ghana. Some of the deportee find their way back to Ghana which they had made their second home before the country's independence in 1957. Also, many Ghanaians find their way back to Nigeria after the two mass deportations of 1983 and 1984 some of who are today permanent residents. Most importantly, citizens quietly contributed positively to the economic well-being of their host communities while rivalry at the governmental level between their two countries last. For example, this researcher was taught in school by Ghanaian expatriate teachers in the 1980s; these gentlemen remained the best to have ever taught him.

### **3.7 NIGERIA AND THE FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA**

Since Nigeria's contiguous neighbours are all Francophone, (except Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe to the south), and much has been said about Nigeria's relations with them in the preceding paragraphs, this essay will proceed by looking briefly at Nigeria's relations with the rest of Francophone West Africa. It is pertinent also to note that out of the four Francophone countries that are Nigeria's contiguous neighbours, two of them- Chad and Cameroon- fall outside the geographical demarcation of "West Africa."

One of the lasting legacies left behind by the French colonial policy makers was "a unique and distinct group of Francophone countries whose leaders identify with a greater French-speaking community, (*la francophonie*)" (Schraeder, 2001:41). This legacy could be identified in the cultural, economic, political and military lives of these nations. In West Africa, almost all the nine Francophone countries of Benin, Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo are practically under the French influence. Nigeria's relations with these nations, scholars have argued, are conditioned by the French factor. These analysts opined that Nigeria's relations with any of these countries is measured by

the French response to it because of the latter's strong influence on them (Schraeder, 2001:41, Ede, 1986: 176).

The reason of strong French influence on its former colonies may not be far-fetched from the country's vision at creating an empire in order to acquire the status of an imperial power in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The French constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics did not make provisions for the independence and separate existence for its African colonies. The stance of the French governments then was to keep their colonies as part of France for ever, with the policy of "no independence from French Federation." However, the anti-colonial forces within the Anglophone territories which made way for their independence as well as the opposition of Guinea to the French confederation policy changed the French government attitude to the independence of its colonies. Francophone West African countries were granted their independence like their Anglophone counterparts in the 1960s; however this independence was limited because their economic, political and cultural survivals were still tied to France's apron strings (Ede, 1986: 176,177).

The Francophone countries' constitutional, judicial and political arrangements were patterned after the French system. Their monetary control was under the CFA (Colonies Francaises d'Afrique) established by De Gaulle in 1945 and strongly tied to the French economy (Ede, 1986:180). The French factor in the psychology of French West African states in their relations with non-francophone states is remarkable. On many of the issues in the sub-region and Africa in general, Francophone states toe the line of France. Wherever Nigeria's stance is divergent to those of the Francophone states, the French secret long arm is at play. Nigeria had always perceived France as a stumbling block at the actualisation of its "Manifest Destiny" in West Africa and a threat to its national security. France also considered Nigeria as an impediment at following its cultural and economic policies in the sub-region (Fawole, 2008:99). For example, in an attempt to balance Nigeria's strength in the then yet to be established ECOWAS, in 1973 France nudged five of its former West Africa colonies; Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to form the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) (Adebajo, 2002a: 46).

Some investigation into the French rivalry with Nigeria in the sub-region would suffice to illustrate the point of the research here. Jean-François Médard (2008: 314-333) has thoroughly scrutinised the critical moment, the changing pattern and the endurance in Franco-Nigerian relations from its inception in 1960 till June 2005. The action of Nigeria in protest against the French atomic bomb tests in the Sahara desert in 1960 infuriated the then French President and one of the most formidable and awe-inspiring in the history of France, Charles de Gaulle. The effect of the action made relations between the two countries become sickly and the malady lingered for quite a long time. For example, it was only after five years (1965) that the French reopened their embassy in Lagos and thereafter, France took some reactions that might have taken root from Nigeria's actions of 1960.

According to Médard (2008: 326), in the 1960s, France vehemently opposed Nigeria's associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Also, during the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970, France did not hesitate to formally recognise the secessionist Biafra, although without breaking diplomatic relations with Nigeria. Spurred by the Ivorian Félix Houphouët-Boigny, France and Côte d'Ivoire wanted the Balkanization of Nigeria in order to drastically reduce its power in the sub-region. Interestingly, France schemed that the crude oil from a successfully seceded oil-rich Biafra would be a great access to it. Thus, France aided by some of its former colonies in Africa, especially Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, embarked on some frantic efforts at making sure that Biafra was a success. For example, Gabon airport facilities were used by the French Red Cross to fly medical supplies mixed with munitions into the Biafran enclave. However, it is surprising to note that some Francophone neighbours of Nigeria like Cameroon and Niger refused to yield themselves to France to be used for sabotage.

The scenario of Franco-Nigerian rivalry from the 1970s to the 1990s was heightened by two dissimilar events; the Chadian crisis of 1979 and 1982 and the French newfound friendship with the apartheid South Africa. The two Chad crises were a bone of contention between Nigeria and France, while France wanted Nigeria to find a lasting solution to the lingering problem, Nigeria yielded itself a willing partner. However, both countries disagreed bitterly on the *modus operandi*. Also, France was not at ease with Nigeria over its relations with Libya at that particular time. Between 1970 and 1994, the French friendship with the apartheid regime of



South Africa was a cause of constant worry for Nigeria. Therefore throughout that duration, Nigeria had heavily and constantly criticised every tacit support given to that regime by France. Most importantly, Nigeria contested the French supplies of weapons and nuclear materials to South Africa during this period. The tension only disintegrated and died down with the end of apartheid in 1994. About the most recent event that whipped up sentiments in Nigerian-French relations was the Bakassi peninsular issue between Nigeria and Cameroon. France had supported her old colony, Cameroon in the case that was laid to rest at the International Court of Justice at The Hague largely in favour of Cameroon in 2002 (Médard, 2008: 326, 329).

On sub-regional level, Médard (2008: 326) listed Franco-Nigerian competitiveness to include the French encouragement of its former colonies to create regional political and economic organisations, and Nigeria's attempt at weakening them. A good example of the French overture to its "sphere of influence" was the creation of the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) in 1973, which membership was only francophone. The attempt of Nigeria at weakening these organisations was the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975. In 1990, Nigeria was the driving force of the formation of ECOMOG as an interposition force in West Africa. According to Robert Mortimer (1996: 297), the Francophone ECOWAS-member states were careful of what they saw in an ECOMOG they were made to believe was an attempt by Nigeria to propagate a *Pax Nigeriana* in the sub-region. The establishment of ECOMOG in a way had contributed to the revival of the age-old Francophone-Anglophone divide. Initially, the francophone states were opposed to the interpolator force, nevertheless, six of the francophone countries; Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger and Senegal later contributed troops into the organisation. With the establishment of ECOMOG, France had suspected Nigeria at building a military hegemony in the sub-region while Nigeria on the other hand wanted to counter the French military and economic influence in West Africa (Médard, 2008: 327).

Many Franco-African relations scholars have affirmed and explained in their works how France has embarked on reforms over the years that have eroded "direct domination" of its former colonies in Africa or its "sphere of influence." Jean-François Médard (2008: 314-333); Frederic Lejeal (2003: 427-430); Tony Chafer (2002: 343-363); Xavier Renou (2002: 5-26); Peter Schraeder (2001: 41-65); Gabriel de Bellescize (2000: 7-28); Turid Laegreid (1999: 231-251);



Rowland Marchal (1998: 355-372) and Rody McKinnon and Roger Charlton (1996: 463-470) have all demonstrated how France's relationship with her former colonies in Africa, *Françafrique* has undergone some crisis which led to a transition. Contrary to the general expectation that the collapse of the Cold War international politics caused a crisis in French traditional relations with its African former colonies, Médard (2008: 315) has argued that it was not but merely contributed to it. According to Médard, from 1960 when Charles de Gaulle of France granted many of its former colonies in Africa political independence to 1994, *Françafrique* was a success. However, from the 1990s, the system had started to face challenges due to decline in the quantity of French aid to Africa, a new French policy that was more economically oriented and the country's redirection by focusing on other non-francophone African states. Other causes that spent *Françafrique* were structural break-up of the system, policy disjointedness, economic downturn of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, globalisation, economic deregulation, structural adjustment programme, and various African crises. The last two events that served as a nail in the system's coffin were the devaluation of the CFA franc and Rwandan genocide of 1994 carried out by the French-backed Hutu militia. Drastic changes took place in the French policy toward Africa as a result of all these occurrences (Médard, 2008: 318).

The foregoing factors have brought some reforms to France relations to Africa. The French Ministry of Co-operation that once solely catered for Francophone African countries was scrapped and put under the *Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement* (DGCID) (Ministry of International Cooperation and Development). The implication of this was that all Francophone African states would be treated like others even in sharing a dwindling bilateral economic aid. The reform gave way to multilateralism in French military interventions in Africa and which meant reduction of the number of its troops on African soil. The evidence of this was the logistical and financial aid given by France to support armies majorly from the Francophone African countries to resolve crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) (1997 to 1999), Guinea-Bissau (1999) and Côte d'Ivoire (2003). It should also be noted that multiplicity of conflicts in the French "sphere of influence," Congo-Brazzaville (1990s), Rwanda (1994), Central African Republic (1997, 2006), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Côte d'Ivoire (2004) and Chad (2006, 2008) had greatly eroded the spirit of *Françafrique*. Médard even suggested that the system might have died with the death of its two strongest advocates;

President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, *le vieux* (the old one) of Côte d'Ivoire in 1993, and Jacques Foccart, a chief adviser for French government in 1997 (Médard, 2008: 319-322, 333).

The Ivorian civil war that started in 2002 was an event that really put *Françafrique* to the test. Côte d'Ivoire was the closest ally of France in the West African sub-region and had always been subjected to special treatment by the former colonial master. However, the French reaction to the civil war in that country proved that things had fallen apart in the French relations with this country and the centre cannot hold. The Ivorian crisis led to the Bouaké bombing killing nine French peacekeeping soldiers and an American civilian in the northern part of the country. The French retaliated immediately within minutes by shooting down the jets, Russian-made Su-25 fighter-bombers, apparently under the direct order of President Jacques Chirac of France. France also sent three Mirage fighter jets to Gabon and deployed additional troops protect its citizens in Côte d'Ivoire (*New York Times* 3 November, 2004). In the process of the French retaliation, the small Ivorian air force was destroyed leading to a demonstration in Abidjan where 50 civilians were shot down by the French army. It is surprising to note that to restore peace to Côte d'Ivoire; France refused to act unilaterally unlike in the past but allowed the United Nations and ECOWAS to arrange the peace (Médard, 2008: 321-322).

Due to the disintegration of *Françafrique*, France has learnt to develop stronger tie with non-French speaking African countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana. Unlike ever before, France recognised and accepted Nigeria's leadership in West Africa by supporting the country's intervention in Liberia and now relate with Nigeria as an equal partner. France contributed much to the 2006 Paris Club of nations' cancellation of the US\$ 30 billion Nigeria owned the Club; seven percent of the debt owed to France only. Diplomatically, from 1993 France had been closer with Nigeria. Jacques Chirac paid a state visit to Nigeria in 1999, being a first ever by a French President; he repeated the visit twice in 2004. President Olusegun Obasanjo reciprocated by visiting France in 2005 with an agenda on more French investment in Nigeria, debt relief from France and its support for a huge debt cancellation by the Paris Club of governments, and the country's support for Nigeria in its bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. President Obasanjo's 2005 visit also afforded France the opportunity to brief him the French

position in Togo, Darfur and Côte d'Ivoire in his capacity as the then chairman of the African Union (Médard, 2008: 327-330).

Surprisingly, while bilateral and multilateral rivalries were raging between Nigeria and France, economic relations ran smoothly. According to Médard (2008: 330-332), while there were political disconnections between them, Nigeria remained the fourth largest economic partner of France after the United States, Britain, and Germany. He also noted that the French investments in Nigeria were more important than its investments in all the Francophone West African countries put together. For example, French investments in Nigeria amounted to €4 billion in 2004, coming second after the United States. Total, one of the most important French multinationals in Nigeria has continued to invest heavily in country. Thus, as political and diplomatic relations between Nigeria and France became more and more cordial, so the French investments kept increasing in the country. France seems to be more of a collaborator in Nigeria fulfilling its "Manifest Destiny" in West Africa now than an adversary.

### **3.8 NIGERIA AND THE LUSOPHONE WEST AFRICA**

Shortly after independence in 1960, Nigeria had committed itself to the total liberation of other colonies still under one colonial master or the other in Africa. Nigeria supported the establishment of the African Liberation Coordination Committee as a specialised agency for the purpose of the independence of these remaining countries. Apart from the Southern Africa, the Liberation Committee was dutifully committed to liberation struggles in the former Portuguese enclaves of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in West Africa in addition to the other three former Portuguese colonies in Africa (São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola and Mozambique). In Guinea-Bissau, the Committee identified and supported the *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde* (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde) (PAIGC) (Gibson, 1972: 7-9). Nigeria was also committed to this Committee to ensure that many of those countries got their independence as soon as possible. For example, the Nigerian government mounted pressure on the Executive Secretariat of the Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania to open an office in Conakry, Guinea in 1971 in order to effectively coordinate the assistance rendered toward the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau (Aluko, 1986: 93).

In pursuing vigorous foreign policy in the 1970s, some among Nigerian leaders suggested that its armed forces should be physically involved in the struggle to free Africa from colonialism, especially, the Lusophone West African country, Guinea-Bissau. The country happened to be the only one country in the sub-region which was still under the Portuguese colonialism until 1974 (*Daily Times*, 21 March 1970). Because of the Portuguese brutal colonial policy in its African exclaves, shortly after the 1966 coup in Nigeria, the military government under Aguiyi Ironsi shut down the Portuguese mission in Lagos. Later during the Nigerian civil war in 1968, the Gowon government had to ban Portuguese ships and aircraft from using Nigerian seaports and airports facilities when it became glaring that Portugal supported the cause of Biafra (Aluko, 1976: 96). In addition to Nigeria dealing on one-on-one with Portugal as a result of its overtures to the embattled Biafra, the Nigerian government started to give moral and material support to freedom fighters. Nigeria provided bilateral assistance to the freedom fighters including those in the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau by supplying them with trucks, military hardware, medical provisions as well as clothing and food (*Nigerian Observer*, 28 October 1971). Also, the government went ahead to invite some of their leaders to Nigeria including Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau before his assassination in 1973 (*Daily Times*, 21 July 1971).

In dealing with the newly independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria had to contend with the split that took place in the country shortly after independence in 1974. The country was split into two: Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Guinea Bissau was under President Louis Cabral, (the brother of the murdered revolutionary, Amilcar) while Cape Verde was governed by Aristides Pereira. However, both countries were governed under a single political party, PAIGC make relations between them very difficult (Garba, 1991: 42). The complication in relations between these two countries and Nigeria since their independence notwithstanding, Nigeria has been able to maintain cordial relationships with both. On occasions however, relations between Nigeria and the two Lusophone states have been strained. For example as a result of Nigeria's domination in the sub-region, Cape Verde refused to sign the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence. This protocol was designed to create Allied Armed Forces of the West

African Community making up of units of national armies and a Defence Council (Adeniji, 1997: 4).

One of the most decisive moments in relations between Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau, like in the cases of Nigeria- Liberia and Nigeria-Sierra Leonean relations, was during the Bissau Guinea crisis. Nigeria-led ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau without Nigerian contingents (which is a subject of this research) was a very brief one. The short intervention which took place between February and May 1999 involved contingents from The Gambia, Niger and Togo (Berman and Sams, 2000: 128-138); however, after four months following factional battles, the troops had to withdraw disgracefully (Ero, 1999: 61-65). The refusal of Nigeria to contribute troops to ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau has been adjudged to have happen because of the internal political dynamics of the country during the period. The country's contributions to the interventionist forces elsewhere in the sub-region have been enormous; the government thus had to review its involvement in future missions in the face of dwindling resources and disapproval of the citizens at home. It should also be pointed out here that the failure of the ECOMOG engagement in Guinea-Bissau (without Nigeria's contribution) has pointed to the fact Nigeria's factor remained crucial in maintaining the peace in West Africa (Adebajo, 2008: 21). It lent credence to the truth that Nigeria is the only country in the sub-region "that is capable of projecting power beyond its national borders" (Osuntokun, 2008: 157).

### **3.9 CONCLUSION**

Without gliding into psychological analysis, it could be deduced from a close examination of Nigeria's aspiration to attain the leadership position in West Africa from independence, that the country had spent fortunes in both human and monetary terms. Nigerian leaders from Yakubu Gowon to Sanni Abacha believed that lavishing Nigeria's earnings on the less economically endowed nations of West Africa can buy it the position of leadership in the sub-region. For instance, General Gowon believed that Nigeria's wellbeing depended on its "economic strength" to lead the sub-region. However, did Nigeria's "economic strength" translate to ostentation? How rich was Nigeria? In 1973, Nigeria's Gross National Product (GNP) according to the World Bank was the equivalent of US\$620 per capita. Comparing Nigeria with Côte d'Ivoire with US\$940 in per capita GNP during the same period, the latter was better off than Nigeria.

Certainly, oil was responsible for Nigeria's economic position in Black Africa in the 1970s; nevertheless, the country's economic position was not particularly strong in comparison to the rest of the world and some other areas of Africa at that time.

This thesis is in total disagreement with Kunle Amuwo (*SAILA Policy Briefing* 111, October 2014) who argued that Nigeria does not have a coherent foreign policy and that Nigeria has lost its pre-eminence in Africa, especially in West Africa despite the pivotal role it played there. The consistency of Nigeria's foreign policy is glaring. For example, during the "golden age" of Nigerian foreign policy, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime was able to take difficult and precarious decisions on Southern Africa, especially concerning Angola and the apartheid South Africa. The trend was able to be maintained by successive governments although with varying degrees of success. The Babangida administration was able to resuscitate the comatose ECOWAS and civilian government successfully placed the country back into position of international recognition after years of suffering as a pariah state. Also, because of the basic tenet of good neighbourliness in Nigeria's foreign policy with its immediate neighbours, the country has not actually wielded all forces at its disposal against any one of them. Instead of doing this, Nigeria's security organisations have always worked together in harmony with the intelligence agencies of neighbouring countries in order to maintain regional stability. For the aforementioned reasons therefore, Amuwo's argument may not be well-founded.

To further rebut Amuwo's argument, it should be noted that the only minor cases that involved Nigeria using some level of power against certain neighbouring countries included the 1983 border scuffles with Chad, the 1976 military confrontation with Equatorial Guinea, and the 1988-1989 skirmishes with Cameroon over Bakassi peninsular. However, it should also be noted that the first brawl between Nigeria and its neighbour, Chad, took place as a result of a misunderstanding between the civilian government of Shehu Shagari and his military generals. Also, the last two combats between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria and Cameroon took place under the military regimes of Murtala-Obasanjo and Sanni Abacha respectively.

Although the French colonial legacy that brought close affinity between her and her former colonies in West Africa could not be easily wished away, nonetheless, Nigeria was able to stand

up to France in the sub-region. Nigeria was able to withstand the French hegemonic tendencies in West Africa from 1960, when *Françafrique* was strong until the system started to wane and eventually collapsed in the 1990s. The collapse of the system made France to consider forging stronger relations with other non-French speaking African countries including Nigeria. Granting that there is a measure of consistency in Nigeria's foreign policy, nevertheless, there is an unhealthy weakness embedded in it. Nigeria was always confident that it is an unassailable country whereas it is surrounded by Francophone countries. However, the country's leaders were always jittery, unsettled and disturbed whenever an external force came to the fore to support any of the neighbouring countries on issues concerning Nigeria. Important examples that readily come to mind in the case included, the support France and Israel gave to Cameroon over Bakassi, the Moroccan military protection over Equatorial Guinea in 1985, the overtures of Apartheid South Africa to the same country at the same period, and the presence of France, Libya and the United States in Chad at different times. Despite this weakness, the sense of maturity in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy must be acknowledged. Nigerian governments from independence have been able to wave aside the often belligerent public opinion about the country's relations with the immediate neighbours. This has enabled the country to maintain peaceful relations with its next door neighbours and down play the tendentious opinion that Nigeria is a bully to their smaller and less powerful countries.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### BACKGROUND TO CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The history of the Liberian crises is a story of horror, devastation and wreckage. It is the saga of a people who hitherto endured thirteen decades of deep-seated resentment, divisions and animosity but eventually ended in nearly a decade-and-half internecine and most grotesque civil war. This chapter accounts for a “bloody carnival” (Smith, 1998: xi) on the historic Grain Coast or the present Liberia, where an early trade in the spice known as “grains of paradise”, (*Fromomum melegueta*) (Britannica, 2016) was traded between African and the Portuguese. It was a civil war of unimaginable experiences of violence, slaughter, mayhem and carnage. It is a chronicle of men who died either because they took a stance or not, of pregnant women who had crossed the lines in search of food and who had their bellies slashed open with their babies brutally ripped from their wombs (The Guardian, March 22 2006). Atrocities were routine as entire villages were abandoned by people trying to escape the fighting, families were burnt alive, children raped and decapitated. It was a cruel ethnic cleansing; much of it carried out by children soldiers (WGBH, October 10 2002).

Liberia was seen in the international community as one of the most politically stable countries in Africa, although with a conservative regime based on one party system. However, later events proved the country to be a powder keg which exploded when Sergeant-Major Samuel Kenyon Doe executed a most violent coup d'état in 1980. Samuel Doe's regime introduced a period of dictatorship, human rights violation, and a deplorable economic decline which eventually culminated into a fourteen-year civil war. The record of the aftermath of a decade-long rule of Samuel Kenyon Doe, whose bloody coup wrongly interpreted as the historic revenge of the natives against the Americo-Liberians was a bitter one. More than anything else in its history, the war devastated the country and heavily traumatised and divided the people (van der Kraaij, 2015: xxvi).

The account of the US response to the war is a memoir of America's politics of betrayal and abandonment of a people who really believed they were Americans. Although the United States of America turned Liberia into the closest African country to itself during the Cold War



international system, its reaction the Liberian civil war was that of fickleness. Liberia was the American “ally” with Firestone, an American blue-chip establishment and the largest rubber plantation in the world; the Robertsfield airport, modified for stop-overs by American military forces; the US military installations and a sophisticated intelligence relay station; and the Voice of America’s transmitting station for the entire continent of Africa. The Liberian flag and its currency were “borrowed” from America. With all these, Liberia considered itself “Little America” and the fifty-first American state, nevertheless the tragedy that followed proved this assumption to be Liberia’s mistaken identity (Smith, 1998: xiii).

At the inception of Samuel Doe’s government, the United States saw Liberia as strategic to protect valuable US facilities and military access rights. Also Liberia was important to America in protecting its private investments and to prevent the spread of Libyan, Soviet and other Communist influences. Most importantly, America kept Liberia until then “because of the unusual historic relationship, to avoid a major defeat or embarrassment for the United States through Liberia’s political or economic disintegration.” As a result of these reasons, the American government gave Doe’s regime more support and loan than any government before it. During these crises, Liberians were still so emotionally tied to the U.S. and they believed that America would save them from their woes. When U.S. Navy helicopters landed in Monrovia, it was thought that they had come to rescue Liberians. Instead, they were there to evacuate the Americans. The US citizens were urged to depart the boiling Liberia for the neighbouring country of Cote d’Ivoire (WGBH, October 10 2002). There was no real help from the United States to stem the violence during the one and half decades of Liberian troubles (Copson, 2007: 4).

The mayhem that was the Liberian civil wars was launched by Charles Ghankay Taylor forty-five days after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War international system. This he did after having benefitted from Libyan and Burkina Faso support, extracted favour from Cote d’Ivoire and exploited the frustrations of Liberian exiles (Smith, 1998: xii). After five years in exile, Charles Taylor returned in 1989 to launch a conflict with appalling violence and mass executions in sites across the country. The armies of youngsters toppled the constitutional authority and set to obliterate the small educated class (Huband, 1998: xvi).

Charles Taylor, an old crony of Samuel Doe was a mixed Gola and Americo-Liberian; he graduated from an American college and broke out of a Massachusetts jail, where he had been held after Doe accused him of embezzlement. He was back to get rid of Doe. Taylor's promise that "This war is about justice; it's about equality and about fair play. This war is about the right to self-determination and the safeguard of the sovereignty of this nation," turned out to be a war of vengeance as thousands of Manos and Gios joined Taylor, seeking retribution against Doe's Krahns and their allies, the Mandingos (WGBH, October 10 2002). The civil war turned Liberians into "'monsters' in blue jeans and checked shirts", and confronted by primitive tribalism, ineffable cruelty, ethnic hatred and vicious drug abuse (Smith, 1998: xii). The reign of terror of the kid soldiers left the country a wilderness and since the end of the civil war, Liberia has remained weak and fragile.

Our effort in this chapter is not to slither into psychological analysis of the Liberian civil wars but to look at the background to the conflicts that set Liberia up in flames in the 1990s. The chapter is divided into six parts with the first segment being this introduction and part two, the key statistics of Liberia. The third section attempts a brief recount of the history of Liberia from 1821, when the freed slaves from the Americas first settled there until 1980 when the government changed hands from the Americo-Liberians to the indigenous African population. The fourth part of the chapter examines Liberia from 1980 with the coming into power of Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, who "represented" the indigenous African population to the beginning of hostilities in 1989. The fifth section investigates the fourteen-year civil war, tracing the causes to both domestic politics and the loss of external support for Samuel Doe. The last segment draws a conclusion. Figure 4.1 below shows a map of Liberia and the neighbouring countries.

Figure 4.1: Map showing Liberia and its contiguous neighbours



Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>

## 4.2 LIBERIA: KEY STATISTICS

The Republic of Liberia is located a few degrees north of the equator on the south coast of the western bulge of Africa. It extends 548 kilometres ESE to WNW and 274 kilometres NNE to SSW (Kurian, 1982: 1071). It has a total area of 111,369 sq. kilometres making up of 96,320 sq. kilometres of land and 15,049 sq. kilometres of water. Its Atlantic Ocean coastline is 579 kilometres. Liberia's international land boundary of 1667 kilometres is shared with three countries as follows: Guinea (590 kilometres); Cote d'Ivoire (778 kilometres), and Sierra Leone (299 kilometres) (CIA Fact Book 2016). The border with Sierra Leone was determined by the Anglo-Liberian Agreement of 1885 and the borders with Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire were determined by the Franco-Liberia Agreement of 1892 and 1907-1910 (Kurian, 1982: 1071).

Liberia is rich in iron ore deposit and was once the biggest exporter in Africa and ranked third in the world (van der Kraaij, 2015: xxv). Other natural resources include timber, diamonds, gold and hydropower. Its principal exports are iron ore, gold and timber (CIA Fact Book, 2016). Liberia's iron is of high-grade ore mined on the Mano River, Mt. Nimba, the Bong Mountains, and at Wologisi while diamonds is mined in the lower Loffa River area. Other mineral discoveries include bauxite, copper, columbite-tantalite, lead, manganese, tin, barite, kyanite and zinc (Kurian, 1982: 1081). Agricultural products of Liberia included rubber, (which outranked all other agricultural products in its contribution to export earnings), coffee, cocoa, rice, cassava, palm oil, sugarcane, banana, sheep, goat and timber. Only 20 per cent of Liberia's land area is considered agricultural land. The unemployment rate according to 2003 estimate was 85 per cent and the population living below poverty line was 63.8 per cent according to 2007 estimate (CIA Fact book, 2016).


The CIA Fact Book (2016) recorded that Liberia was transshipment point of illicit drugs for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine for the European and United States markets. The Fact Book had it that corruption; criminal activity, arms-dealing, and diamonds trade provided significant potential for money laundry. However, the lack of well-developed financial system limited the country's utility as a major money-laundry centre. According to the World Bank (2005-2010), the GDP (purchasing power parity) for Liberia in 2010 was \$2.7 billion, the GDP (real growth rate) stood at 6.1 per cent while GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) was \$683.8.

## **POPULATION**

According to the 2008 Population and Housing Census of Liberia, the population was 3,489,072. The population in 1984 was 2,101,628, thus there has been a rise of 1,387,444 people between 1984 and 2008. Liberia's first census was conducted in 1962, followed by the 1974 Population and Housing Census. In 1984, the third census programme was executed but unlike the censuses before it, the final report was never published. During the civil war, the manuscript and most of the data went missing. Going by the United Nations prescriptions, Liberia should have held two censuses in 1994 and 2004 but the disruptions of the civil war prevented this to happen. The

increasing trend in the population has been recorded since 1962 as Figure 4.2 below will show (LISGIS, 2008: 2).

**Figure 4.2:** Showing the Liberian population change from 1962 to 2008.



**Source:** LISGIS, Monrovia: 2008 Population and Housing Census.

Figure 4.1 shows that the average annual increase rose between 1974 and 1984 declined slightly by 2008. Table 4.1 below indicates that the growth rate, mean yearly percentage change and average annual increases were appreciably high and increasing in the seventies and eighties but the table also points to current a decrease in 2008.

**Table 4.1:** Showing population trend in Liberia.

| Table 4.1:<br>Population Trend,<br>1962 – 2008 Index | 1962      | 1974      | 1984      | 2008      |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Population                                           | 1,016,443 | 1,503,368 | 2,101,628 | 3,489,072 |
| Population change                                    | -         | 486,925   | 598,260   | 1,387,444 |
| Average annual increase                              | -         | 40,577    | 59,826    | 57,810    |
| Percentage increase                                  | -         | 48        | 40        | 66        |
| Annual rate of growth                                | -         | 3.3       | 3.4       | 2.1       |

**Source:** LISGIS, Monrovia: 2008 Population and Housing Census.

Comparing the population of Liberia with other countries in the Sub-Saharan region, its population size is relatively small; however, the yearly rate of growth of over two per cent is still



high. Table 4.2 clearly shows that similar post-conflict countries in Africa have lower rates of population growth; nevertheless, the rate of population growth in Liberia looks more like those for Sub-Saharan countries that have not been engaged in civil wars.

**Table 4.2:** Showing Population Density and Growth Rate of some Sub-Saharan African Countries

| Country        | Year | Population  | Density (sq. m) | Growth Rate |
|----------------|------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Liberia***     | 2008 | 3,489,072   | 93              | 2.1         |
| Sierra Leone** | 2004 | 4,976,871   | 177             | 1.8         |
| Cote d'Ivoire  | 2005 | 18,154,000  | 143             | 1.6         |
| Sudan*         | 2005 | 36,233,000  | 36              | 1.9         |
| Guinea*        | 2005 | 9,402,000   | 97              | 2.2         |
| Ghana*         | 2005 | 22,113,000  | 238             | 2.1         |
| Nigeria*       | 2005 | 131,530,000 | 364             | 2.2         |

Sources: \*United Nations: *World Population Policies 2005*, Department of Economic Affairs, Population Division, ST/ESA/SER.A/254: New York, 2006  
 \*\*Government of Sierra Leone, 2004 Population and Housing Census  
 \*\*\*Government of Liberia, 2008 National Population and Housing Census (Culled from LISGIS, Monrovia: 2008 Population and Housing Census).

In the Liberian ethnic composition, the principal divide is majorly between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous people. The Americo-Liberians are the descendants of the early settlers who emigrated from the New World and the indigenous people are the aborigines. The ranks of the Americo-Liberians often include the “Congoes” whose ancestors were freed from captured slave ships, and some detribalised people of indigenous origin. This group is therefore referred to as the “civilised” or the “lettered” people. The rest of the population are made up of over twenty other ethnic groups (Kurian, 1982: 1072). The major ones include the Kpelle who made up of 20.3, per cent; the Bassa 13.4, per cent; the Grebo, 10 per cent; the Gio, 8 per cent; the Mano, 7.9 per cent; the Kru, 6 per cent; the Lorma, 5.1 per cent; the Kissi, 4.8 per cent, and the Gola, 4.4 per cent. Others constituted 20 per cent of the population (LISGIS, 2008).

The Liberian government recognized 16 ethnic groups (called tribes) apart from the descendants of the free blacks from the Western Hemisphere, (the Americo-Liberians). Those accorded recognition were the major ones mentioned above in addition to the Mandingo, the Belle, the Gbandi, the Dey, the Mende, and the Vai. These spoke different languages and comprised 95 per cent of the population (Ngaima, 2003: 29). The Vai like the Mandingo migrated into the present day Liberia from an area in today's Guinea in the seventeenth century. The Vai were Muslim and mainly known for being one of the few tropical African peoples to have developed their own system of writing (van der Kraaij, 2015: 4). Thus the various groups had existed in their respective localities before the arrival of the settlers in 1822. Those who lived in close proximity to the settlers had a higher percentage of educated natives than those who lived in the hinterland, such as the Lofa, the Kpelle, the Lorma, the Dan, the Mano, and the Krahn. The people that lived within close proximity to the Americo-Liberians also had access to better jobs and were able to easily assimilate with the mainstream of the dominant culture (Lyon, 1997: 5).

The sixteen recognised 'tribes' of Liberia were divided into three major sub-groups based on linguistic variation and phonetic. The three sub-groups were: the West Atlantic people, the Kwa, and the Mande. The West Atlantic people included the Bassa, the Grebo, the Belle, the Krahn, the Dey and the Kru. The Kwa group included the Gola and the Kissi ethnic nationalities who were the first to come in direct contact with the American Colonization Society. The third sub-group, the Mande was the largest of the three and included the Mandingo, the Vai, the Gbandi, the Kpelle, the Lorma, the Mende, the Gio and the Mano. The Mande group was not fully integrated into the Liberian society until 1964, when the three subgroups, then known as the Hinterland became four counties in equal status to the five original counties, with full representation in the country's two legislative houses (Lyon, 1997: 6).

In addition to about ten local languages commonly spoken in Liberia, the English Language and a local variant, the Liberian Pidgin English was also spoken as a second language. The most common native languages included Gbande (the population speaking it reduced drastically as a result of the civil wars which caused many speakers to flee to neighbouring Guinea), Mandingo, Krahn, Mende, Belle and Dei. These languages are also spoken in neighbouring Guinea, Ivory

Coast and Sierra Leone. (van der Kraaij, 2015: xvii). The percentage of the ethnic composition is shown in Table 4.3 below. The 2008 Population and Housing Census recorded that majority of Liberians were adherents of Christianity. The religion of Islam was also fairly represented. The population census accounted for 85 per cent of the population as Christians, 12.2 per cent as Muslims, 0.6 as traditional believers, 0.2 per cent as constituting other religions while 1.4 per cent as professing none religion, as depicted in Table 4.4 below.

**Table 4.3: Liberia: Percentage of Ethnic Composition.**

|        |       |       |     |      |     |       |       |      |        |
|--------|-------|-------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------|------|--------|
| Kpelle | Bassa | Grebo | Gio | Mano | Kru | Lorma | Kissi | Gola | Others |
| 20.3%  | 13.4% | 10%   | 8%  | 7.9% | 6%  | 5.2%  | 4.8%  | 4.4% | 20.1%  |

**Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2008 census]).**

**Table 4.4: Liberia: Percentage of Religion Adherence**

|           |        |             |       |      |
|-----------|--------|-------------|-------|------|
| Christian | Muslim | Traditional | Other | None |
| 85%       | 12.2%  | 0.6%        | 0.2%  | 1.4% |

**Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2008 census]).**

Going by the 2008 Population and Housing Census of Liberia, the total population would double by 2024 if the annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent persisted. The population density was 93 persons per square miles (as depicted in Table 4.2 above); comparing this with some Sub-Saharan African nations, it is moderate by African standard. The most densely populated area was Montserrado County, with the population density of over 1500 persons per square mile. Also, the County has the highest total population accounting for 32 per cent of the national population. Monrovia, the capital city and the administrative hub with its social amenities is located here; therefore these accounted for the area to be the most densely populated in the country ((LISGIS, 2008). Other densely populated counties in Liberia included Margibi, Maryland, Bomi and Nimba. Moderately populated counties included Bong, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Cape Mount, while the sparsely populated counties were Gbarpolu, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, River Cess, River Gee and Sinoe. Cities that recorded more than 19,000 inhabitants according to the census included Gantu, Buchanan, Gbarnga, Kakata, Voinjama, Zwedru, Harbel, Pleebo, Foya, and Monrovia with a total population of more than one million inhabitants.



Liberia’s system of government is Presidential Republic. The previous constitution was used from independence in 1847 until October 1983 when the latest was drafted. The revised version was adopted by referendum in July 1984, became effective from January 1986 and amended in 2011. There are 15 administrative divisions called counties which include: Bomi, Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Bassa, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Lofa, Margibi, Maryland, Montserrado, Nimba, River Cess, River Gee, and Sinoe (CIA Fact Book, 2016). The first governors were American Agents appointed by the Colonisation Society and it was only in 1847 that the Republic of Liberia was established with a United States-type of constitution (Kurian, 1982: 1074). The list of the Liberian Presidents from 1848 is shown in Table 4.5 below.

**Table 4.5: List of Liberian Presidents from 1848.**

| President                     | Year      |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| Joseph Jenkins Roberts        | 1848-1856 |
| Stephen Allen Benson          | 1856-1864 |
| Daniel Bashiel Warner         | 1864-1868 |
| James Spriggs Payne           | 1868-1870 |
| Edward James Roye             | 1870-1871 |
| Joseph Jenkins Roberts        | 1871-1876 |
| James Spriggs Payne           | 1876-1878 |
| Anthony William Gardner       | 1878-1883 |
| Alfred Francis Russell        | 1883-1884 |
| Hilary Richard Wright Johnson | 1884-1892 |
| Joseph James Cheeseman        | 1892-1896 |
| William David Coleman         | 1896-1900 |
| Garretson Wilmot Gibson       | 1900-1904 |
| Arthur Barclay                | 1904-1912 |

|                                             |                               |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Daniel Edward Howard                        | 1912-1920                     |
| Charles Dunbar Burgess King                 | 1920-1930                     |
| Edwin James Barclay                         | 1930-1944                     |
| William Vacanarat Shadrack Tubman           | 1944-1971                     |
| William Richard Tolbert                     | 1971-1980                     |
| Samuel Kenyon Doe                           | 1980-1990                     |
| Amos Sawyer (Interim-President)*            | November 1990-August 1993     |
| Bismarck Kuyon (Interim-President)*         | August 1993-November 1993     |
| Philip Banks (Interim-President)*           | November 1993-February 1994   |
| David Kpormakor (Interim-President)*        | February 1994-September 1995  |
| Wilton Sankawulo (Interim-President)*       | September 1995-September 1996 |
| Ruth Perry (Interim-President)*             | September 1996-August 1997    |
| Charles Ghankay Taylor*                     | 1997-2003                     |
| Moses Blah**                                | August 2003-October 2003      |
| Charles G. Bryant (Transitional-President)* | October 2003-January 2006     |
| Ellen Sirleaf Johnson*                      | January 2006-                 |

**Sources:** Liebanow, J.G. 1969. *Liberia: Evolution of Privilege*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

**\*van der Kraaij, F. 2015. *Liberia: From the Love of Liberty to Paradise Lost*. Leiden: African Studies Centre.**

**\*\*Moses Blah completed Charles Taylor's term.**

An adventure into the chronicles of the Presidents of Liberia from 1848 depicted a unique history of Liberia as an African country. The Presidents from Joseph Jenkins Roberts (1848-1856), the first President to Alfred Francis Russell (1883-1883), were all born in America. Also born in the United States were William David Coleman (1896-1900) and Garretson Wilmot Gibson (1900-1904) the twelfth and the thirteenth Presidents respectively. The fourteenth President, Arthur Barclay was born in Barbados, British West Indies while the sixteenth Liberian President,

Charles Dunbar Burgess King (1929-1930), was born by Sierra Leonean parents (Kraaij, 2015: 140).

In terms of re-election into office, Joseph Jenkins Roberts (1848-1856), the first President was elected six times. Stephen Allen Benson (1856-1864), the second President was elected four times, while Daniel Bashiel Warner (1864-1868), the third President and the author of the Liberian national anthem (CIA Fact Book, 2016) was elected twice. James Spriggs Payne (1868-1870) was elected twice and Anthony William Gardiner (1878-1883), the eighth President was elected three times and became the first to resign from office. Hilary Richard was the first Liberian President born in Africa, although of American parentage, he was elected four times. James Cheeseman (1892-1896) was the eleventh President, elected three times and became the first to die in office. Other Presidents that served more than one term in office included William David Coleman (1896-1900) who was elected twice and became the second President to resign from office; Daniel Edward Howard (1912-1920), the fifteenth President, elected twice, and Charles Dunbar Burgess King (1929-1930), the sixteenth President and elected three times. King also became the third Liberian President to resign from office (Kraaij, 2015: 140).

Arthur Barclay (1904-1912), the fourteenth President was elected three times and became the first President to serve a four-year term in office while Edwin James Barclay (1930-1944), the seventeenth President, elected twice and became the first to serve an eight-year term. The longest serving Liberian President was William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman (1944-1971). He became the eighteenth President, elected six times and the second to die in office, Tubman suddenly died in office after being re-elected for the seventh time (van der Kraaij, 2015: 5). Edward James Roye (1870-1871), the fifth Liberian President was the first to be deposed and assassinated in a coup d'état while William Tolbert Jr. (1970-1980), the nineteenth President and the second to be removed from office and assassinated in a coup. Samuel Kanyon Doe (1980-1990) was the twentieth Liberian President and the first from the local ethnic nationality, the Krahn, to ascend to that position in the country. He became the first military-style President of Liberia and the third to be deposed and assassinated in a military coup. Charles Ghankay Taylor (1997-2003) became the twenty-first President of Liberia after he was elected following the end of the civil war he had started. He became the fourth President to have resigned from office. Moses Blah

(August –October 2003) completed Charles Taylor's term and thus regarded as the twenty-second Liberian President and the second from the local national ethnicity, the Gio. Blah was the Liberian Head of State that occupied the office for the shortest period of time- three months. The incumbent, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who was elected in 2005 became Liberia's second female Head of State and the first elected female African President (van der Kraaij, 2015: 141).

During the Liberian civil war in the 1990s, there were six interim Presidents who were in power. These included: Amos Sawyer (November 1990-August 1993); Bismarck Kuyon (August 1993-November 1993); Philip Banks (November 1993-February 1994); David Kpormakor (February 1994-September 1995); Wilton Sankawulo (September 1995-September 1996), and Ruth Perry (September 1996-August 1997). Ruth Perry was the first female Head of State in Liberia. During peace talks in 2003 in Ghana, Charles Gyude Bryant was "elected" by the Liberian representatives of the fighting factions, political parties and civil society to head Liberia's transitional government between October 2003 and January 2006 (van der Kraaij, 2015: 141).

It is very interesting to note that the fifth President of Liberia Edward James Roye (1870-1871) was a "pure" descendant of the Ibo ethnic stock of Nigeria. He was a great grand-son of one of the slaves taken from what is now eastern Nigeria into the United States of America. He was born in Newark, Ohio, United States of America in 1815 and became the first pure black to become President in Liberia. Edward Roye immigrated to Liberia in 1846, a year before independence was declared and became Liberia's fifth President in 1870. When he was elected into the office of the Presidency in 1869, he was one of the wealthiest men in Liberia. Within a year in office, Roye was deposed in the first coup d'état in Africa's oldest Republic (Holsoe, 1971: 41-53).

Also unique is the history of Liberia was account of its presidential term of office. In 1847 the President's term of office was two years. However during the administration of the fourteenth President, Arthur Barclay (1904-1912), the term of office was changed to four years. The seventeenth President, Edwin James Barclay (1930-1934), and the cousin of Arthur Barclay changed it to eight-year term. It was restored to four years under the eighteenth President, William Tubman (1944-1971), who was re-elected for a record of six terms. During the tenure of

the nineteenth President, William Tolbert (1971-1980), it was reverted to eight years. However in today's Liberia, the Presidential term of office is six years and the President can only succeed himself or herself once.

A unique historical statistics of Liberia's presidency indicated that Liberia had had 23 Presidents, 6 Interim-Presidents and a Transitional President. Liberia happened to be the first African country with an elected female President. In all, the country has produced 12 Presidents born in the United States and 11 born in Liberia. Of the 11 born in Liberia, only two were of full Liberian ethnic nationality descent. Out of all the 23 Liberian Presidents from 1848, three were assassinated, two died in office, and four resigned their presidential office. Also, two were deposed in civil coups, one in a military d'état, and one deposed during a civil war. A president served for twenty-seven years (the longest) and another served for only three months (the shortest). Having gone through the key statistics of Liberia, the thesis would proceed by looking at a brief history of Republic of Liberia beginning from 1847 until 1980.

#### **4.3 LIBERIA FROM 1821-1980**

The Foundation of Liberia was laid between 1816 and 1821. Shortly after the American Revolutionary War that took place between 1775 and 1783, a number of slaves were freed by their owners while some others bought their own freedom. After the freedom, many of the former slaves were refused to be accepted as full citizens into the American society. The condition of the ex-slaves therefore prompted some prominent Americans to move to their rescue. Popular among these were the Governor of Virginia, James Monroe, (who later became the American President), James Webster, and James Baldwin. Included in this group were some Black Americans from the Philadelphia Bethel Church like Elijah Caldwell and Robert Findley. The group met in Washington, D.C. in December 1816 and agreed to establish an "American Colonization Society" in order to facilitate the creation of a state for free Blacks. Two locations were initially suggested: Louisiana in Missouri, USA and a point on the coast of West Africa. Finally, the group agreed to pick a place on the coast of West Africa on the premise that the choice would help in nurturing Christianity and civilisation as well as promoting democracy in Africa (Sherwood, 1917: 209-228).

In April 1820, American Colonization Society sent its representatives, Samuel Mills and Ebenezer Burgess to the coast of West Africa in search of a piece of land for the relocation of the freed slaves. They were instructed to consult with the "Saints of England," another organization that had successfully implemented similar ideas with the establishment of Sierra Leone in 1787. In 1820, the two representatives first travelled to England, and then to West Africa, where they met with the governor of Freetown. From Sierra Leone, they sailed to the basin of the Mesurado River in today's Liberia where they came across indigenous chiefs and an expanse of land. When representatives returned to the United States, they informed the Board of the American Colonization Society that based upon the British experiment, relocation of the ex-slaves to the West African coast of their choice was the best alternative. Therefore in January 1821, the first group of 86 immigrants and three white Agents left the United States for West Africa. In April 1821, after three months they left America, they arrived at the Sherbo Island off the coast of Sierra Leone. Both the immigrants and the United States Agents experienced the attack by malaria on the island and suffered heavy casualties; all the three white Agents died, as well as and thirty-two of the eighty-six freed slaves also (July, 1970: 39).

The survivors of the malaria attack relocated to Ducor, an island off Cape Mesurado in December, 1821. In the same month, the representatives of the settlers met with the indigenous chiefs and negotiated for a parcel of land on the site where Monrovia is now located. Shortly after the immigrants began to settle down at their new location, a problem of land ownership supervened between them and the indigenous inhabitants. The new development occurred because there was the practise of communal ownership of land among the natives before the arrival of the immigrants and they could not understand the new idea of private property brought by the settlers (Cassell, 1970: 143). There was an added dispute between the natives and the Americo-Liberians when the latter began to impose regulations on trade and commerce within the area occupied by them. The problems culminated in natives attacking the settlers in December 1821, but the timely intervention by the United States Navy saved the situation. However, intermittent squabbles continued between the two groups until Sao Boasa, a powerful local chief mediated between them. Thus the intervention of the United States gun boat and the

mediation of the native chief temporarily resolved conflicts between the indigenous people and the first Americo-Liberian settlers (Henries, 1966: 33-34). A second batch of thirty immigrants arrived from the United States in March 1822 (Dormu, 1970: 23).

A breakaway of the ACS formed another group known as the Maryland Colonization Society and sent representatives to Liberia in 1833 to negotiate with the Grebo and Krahn peoples for a separate land to settle their own immigrants. Some settlers from this group landed in 1834 and inhabited what is known today as Cape Palmas in Maryland County. Upon their arrival they negotiated for additional parcel of land and were given the land off the Atlantic Ocean known today as Harper by the Kru and the Grebo. This group referred to themselves as “Maryland in Africa,” and were independent of the settlers of Monrovia who had arrived some years earlier. However, tension developed over the question of ownership of land when more Maryland group of immigrants arrived between 1835 and 1836. The land friction developed into a full-blown war between them and the indigenous peoples twice in 1838 and 1855. Finally, the war weary and financially exhausted new state of Maryland joined Liberia in 1856 after the cessation of hostilities and became the fourth county of Liberia (Lyon, 1997: 18).

Another set of immigrants who arrived Liberia just before the declaration of Liberian independence in 1847 were the “Congo people” or the “Congoes.” The American navy patrolled the African coast to enforce the US government’s ban on importation of slaves from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Slaves that were freed from intercepted slave ships were taken to the colony of Liberia. Majority of these emancipated slaves came from the Bight of Benin and the coast of what is today Nigeria, as well as from Angola and Congo in Central Africa. The freed slaves were therefore known to the Americo-Liberians as the “Congo people” or the “Congoes.” Although, recaptured slaves from the Atlantic Ocean with the efforts of the American navy had been relocated to Monrovia many times before Liberia’s independence, the operation of 1845 was a major one. The American navy arrested a slave ship by the name “the Pons”, laden with 756 slaves from Cabinda in Central Africa in December, 1845. The recaptured slaves who were discharged in Monrovia on December 16, 1845 were mainly made up of a population of children between the ages of 10 and 20 years, majority of them being boys (van der Kraaij, 2015: 3, 4). In 1855, eight years after Liberia’s independence, a group of eighty-three

immigrants arrived from Jamaica; among them was Edward W. Blyden who became an enlightened intellectual and one of the foremost African nationalists. The new immigrants settled at Robertsport purchased from the chief of the Vai in 1856 (Staudenrou, 1976: 197).

The American Colonization Society had always supported these recaptured slaves without the assistance of the United States government. However, in the case of the new arrival of the recaptured slaves, neither the ACS nor the colony had sufficient funds to provide support for them. Therefore the ACS finally decided to find them homes with settler families serving them as wards. Officially, these wards were members of the families they were attached to but in practice, they were often used as extra pairs of hands (van der Kraaij, 2015: 4). According to Alfonso Dormu (1970: 23), the arrival of the re-captured children-slaves in 1845 ruptured the American Colonisation Society's "Apprenticeship Act" of 1821. The Act required that children be recruited from the indigenous communities to live with the settlers until they reached the age of twenty-one in the case of boys, and eighteen in the case of girls in order to facilitate the education of the indigenous population. However, the fact that the majority of the settlers preferred the newly arrived freed children-slaves who were considered more manageable than children of the indigenous people, led to the abrogation of the apprenticeship method in 1857.

From the foregoing therefore, the second batch of thirty immigrants who arrived from the United States in March 1822 (Dormu, 1970: 23); together with the forty-seven survivors of the first eighty-six immigrants who landed in 1821 (July, 1970: 39); the Maryland settlers who arrived between 1834 and 1836 (Lyon 1997: 18); the 756 recaptured children-slaves from Cabinda in 1845 as well as many other recaptured slaves before them (van der Kraaij, 2015: 3), and a group of eighty-three immigrants who came from Jamaica in 1855 (Staudenrou, 1976: 197), constituted the first group to establish a community that would gradually evolve to become a nation known today as Liberia. The 1820 plan of government in the new settlement of Liberia stipulated that any newly arrived immigrant was to be given a parcel of land and that the parcel of land should be developed in two years. A new immigrant would have to construct a house and farm the land, and failure to do so would result in the forfeiture of such land. After some years of cooperation with the Agent on the issue, the immigrants rebelled against the land policy. The



settlers argued that the two years that were required to construct a house was unrealistic and illogical due to job scarcity in the new settlement (Dormu, 1970: 23).

The United States Agents were appointed directly by the Board of the American Colonisation Society to head the government of the colony from 1822 to 1839. They were responsible for all matters pertaining to the activities of the settlers and negotiated with the natives for the purchase of the first original parcel of land from the indigenous chiefs. These agents also promoted the image of the colony to the Board of the American Colonisation Society and other humanitarian organizations, both for financial support and for sending more ex-slaves to Liberia. In 1825, the offices of a Vice Agent and two Justices of Peace were created. As stipulated in a new constitution, the position of the Vice Agent was for the settlers' group. The new development made for harmonious relationship between the Agents and the settlers and gave the settlers a sense of responsibility, respect and dignity. For the first time, the settlers started to govern themselves. The constitution of 1825 divided the new government into various committees, including Agriculture, Public Works, Colonial Militia, and Health. In 1847 when Liberia became independent, the various committees were elevated to Cabinet status. As the colony of Liberia began to expand with the purchase of lands for the towns of Bushrod Island, Caldwell and Paynesville, there was the need for a larger administrative system. The settlers started to compare the status of Liberia with that of Sierra Leone established before it (Staudenrous, 1976: 69).

The refusal of the government of the United States of America to declare Liberia its Colony and the paucity of funds from the parent American Colonisation Society, forced the Board to grant Liberia a "Commonwealth Status" in 1839. The Agent became the Governor while the Vice Agent who was a member of the immigrant group, became his deputy and directly elected by the settlers. The first governor to be appointed by the ACS Board was Thomas Buchanan while Joseph Roberts, was elected Vice Governor. Governor Buchanan died in 1841 and was replaced by Joseph Roberts, the Vice Governor. Thomas Buchanan was the first and last white governor to head the Colony. From 1841 when Joseph Roberts became the Governor, he was confronted with a lingering conflict with the British and French colonial powers in West Africa. For example, the British trading ships that berthed and used the Liberian ports facilities in Monrovia and Greenville refused to pay tariffs to the Liberian government claiming that Liberia was a

private enterprise and therefore had no authority to tax an individual or a nation (Dormu, 1970: 73).

According to Huberich (1974: 153), when the situation deteriorated to the point of British occupation of the north-western part of Liberia in 1845, the Colonization Society decided to grant Liberia independence. The idea of an early independence was received with mixed feelings among the Black and Mulatto settlers. The Blacks suspected that an early independence would make the Mulattoes dominate the administration of the country while the Mulattoes fully supported the idea of an early independence. However, a compromise was reached between the two groups and Liberia became an independent nation on July 26, 1847. A constitution was drafted with the help of John Simon Greenleaf, a Harvard law Professor. The Constitution was adopted in 1847 and had some degree of similarity with the Constitution the United States and a flag that looked like that of America (van der Kraaij, 2015: 5). However, Henry Lyon (1997: 18) has argued that the writers of the Liberian Constitution denied constitutional rights to the majority of its population, the indigenous people who constituted almost ninety-nine per cent of Liberia's population at the time.

Liberia in 1847 was a very small country. There were only three political subdivisions of Montserrado County, Grand Bassa County, and Sinoe County. The new nation was about one hundred and thirty miles in length along the Atlantic coast and about forty miles in breadth extending into the hinterland. The population was just ten thousand and while the recaptured slaves or the "Congos" outnumbered the "Americo-Liberians", they were not considered citizens and therefore were not allowed to vote. The first election in Liberia after the 1847 independence was not based on political or ideological differences, but on the colour of the skin. The context was between the Republican Party formerly, known as the True Liberian Party; representing the light-skinned settlers or the Mulattoes, and the Independent Party, representing the dark-skinned immigrants. Governor Joseph Roberts of the Republican Party became the first President. After Liberia became independent in 1847, no nation recognised it until 1848 when Great Britain became the first country to do so. The early recognition of Liberia by Britain made it possible for the new nation to purchase the Mano River from British government. In 1852, France, the Netherlands and Brazil recognised Liberia while it took the United States of America fifteen

years after Liberia's independence to recognise it as a sovereign nation. The recognition of Liberia by the United States as late as 1862 has been criticised as very disappointing considering the special relationships between the two countries (Lynch, 1976: 166).

The political development of the new settlement was a gradual process which saw the election of 1855 very competitive and more exciting than the past three elections in which President Roberts had run unopposed. Although, President Roberts wanted to run for a fifth term, but the delegates to the 1855 convention disallowed him arguing that eight years was enough. The delegates made it clear that it was time for the more populous dark-skinned citizens, to assume the leadership of the country in order to instil new ideas and dynamism. Therefore, President Robert's vice, Stephen Benson, a dark-skinned settler from Grand Bassa County was nominated. President Benson's appointment of the opposition leader and his supporters into higher positions in the new government had virtually made Liberia to become a one party state by 1855. Also, skin-based politics had not completely disappeared. In spite of the tireless efforts of the former President to make sure that the dark-skinned and Mulatto could be fully represented in the government, his moves were always suspected by the dark-skinned settlers. Therefore, the Pyrrhic victory won for unity by the settlers through a compromise in 1847 gradually declined and finally collapsed in 1855. By this time, the "Congoes" had been given the right to vote, and had identified themselves with the dark-skinned settlers, many of who lived in close proximity to them (Staudenrous, 1976: 197). According to Edwin Yancy (1965: 83), the "Congoes" played a decisive role in the election of Vice President Benson in 1855.

Before 1868, Liberia operated a one party system. However there continued to be an agitation by the dark-skinned settlers that their light-skinned and Mulatto counterparts dominated the ruling Republican or True Liberian Party. In 1868 therefore, the dark-skinned settlers resigned from the government and formed an opposition party called the True Whig Party. In the election that followed, the new opposition True Whig Party defeated the ruling party (*The Daily Listener*, February 26, 1982). Meanwhile, the indigenous peoples of Liberia were counted out of the political calculation of Liberia throughout the nineteenth century. It was Edward Blyden, an immigrant from the West Indies who arrived in Liberia in 1855 that spearheaded the first opposition to the Americo-Liberians' hold on political power. Blyden fell in love with the

African culture, customs and traditions and demanded that the government of the settlers incorporate the indigenous Liberians into the federation by building schools and roads in the interior and offer the indigenous children scholarships (Henries and Henries, 1966: 119). Also, in the nineteenth century, the settlers refused to grant citizenship to the indigenous peoples until 1904 (Huberich, 1974: 203). As a result of the aforementioned developments, Liberia lost one-third of the land earlier claimed by the settlers for it to the British and the French colonial powers (Guannu, 1985: 28).

According to Lyon (1997: 41), the settler government of Liberia abused the indigenous population with the forced recruitment of the people to work on the Spanish cocoa plantations on Fernando Po island (now Bioko), by the second decade of the twentieth century. The government contracted the services of Woerman and Company, a German firm and the Liberian militia for the purpose. The government earned some revenue on the economy of forced labour. Apart from the recruitment of the locals for forced labour in the far away Fernando Po Island, President King also forcibly recruited the natives to work on his farm and other farms belonging to officials of his government. The British government saw this as an outright method of continuation of the abolished slave trade and reported the matter to the League of Nations. The government of Liberia denied it anyway, but a petition written by Thomas Faulkner, a Liberian politician to the United States, Britain and the League of Nations, on the same matter in 1929 jostled the League of Nations to make investigations. The outcome of the investigations indicted the Liberian government. The panel recommended that Liberia should be placed under the international trusteeship council of the League unless its government could carry out a major reform which included the resignation of President King and Vice President Yancy which both did.

Despite the fact that Liberia and Ethiopia were the only two African countries whose independence was recognised at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, (Abegunrin, 2009: 142), Britain and France were still interested in the partitioning of Liberia after the conference. As a result of the Anglo-French interest in Liberia therefore, the settler government of Liberia was forced to extend citizenship to the indigenes and also made its presence felt by building military bases in those areas it had earlier claimed. Although Britain was the first nation to recognise the independence of Liberia shortly after its independence in 1848 while France did so in 1852, both

European powers were still in dividing Liberia between them. There was a dispute between Liberia and the British Colony of Sierra Leone over the Mano River area hitherto claimed by Liberia in 1887 in which, the Colonial British government demanded that the Liberian government renegotiate its border with Sierra Leone. The aftermath of the disputation was the forceful ceding of the area beyond the Mano River to colonial Sierra Leone in 1888. Also on the south eastern as well as the eastern part of Liberia which separated the country from the French Colony of Guinea, the French took possession of tracts of land in 1892. These two European colonial powers premised their argument of taking over of these lands from Liberia on Liberia's ordinary hypothetical claim on the lands (Holden, 1966: 213).

The genesis of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) emanated from the Agent of the Colonization Society who deemed it right to form a permanent military as a result of threats from the indigenous people to the new settlement. The force then known as the Colonial Militia was made up of men between the ages of sixteen and sixty who were recruited for compulsory military service. The maximum age limit was reduced to fifty as more freed slaves arrived. The militia was later referred to as the Liberia Frontier Force and today known as the Liberia National Guard (LNG) or the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Officers of the military were drawn largely from the lower class of the Americo-Liberians while non-commissioned officers came mainly from the indigenous group. The militia was used by the settler government to collect hut taxes from the locals and forcibly recruit them as labourers on the Americo-Liberian farms. Later in the twentieth century, the militia was engaged in forceful recruitment of the indigenes as plantations labourers in Panama and the Spanish colony of Fernando Po Island in central Africa. The Liberian military had been used to silence political opposition. A good example was the use of the military by President Tubman to eliminate William Coleman, the son of the thirteenth President of Liberia, John Coleman and the chairperson of the opposition party in 1955 (*The Independent*, May 17, 1955).

In 1944, William Vacanarat Shadrack Tubman became President of Liberia, and was in power for twenty-seven years, serving longer than any of the Presidents before him. It has been argued that Tubman used the office of the presidency to advance his personal political ambitions, more than any president before him (Tipoteh, 1992: 57). To Tubman, the establishment of state

security became a matter of greatest priority after the presidential election of 1955. President Tubman was noted to have excessively used the "Emergency Power" the constitution granted to Liberian Presidents in 1932; when evoked, the emergency power caused the constitution and the *habeas corpus* to be suspended. Following the Second World War, demand for rubber increased which correspondingly led to an increase in the production of Firestone rubber in Liberia. As rubber production increased by the end of the 1950s, so did corporate taxes, royalties and other contributions to the government Treasury (Dunn and Tarr, 1988: 90). However, there was no serious attempt to modernise the country despite economic boom occasioned by the end of the Second World War (Clover, *et al*, 1966: 4-5).

In order to guard against a possible challenge to his presidency and also prevent any coup d'etat in Liberia which was the order of the day elsewhere in West African countries at the time (Wreh, 1972: 54), Tubman established a secret police network that was unprecedented in the history of Liberia. With the establishment of the Criminal Investigation Division of the police force in the 1950s, Tubman expanded the security apparatus during the following ten years by creating the Special Security Service (SSS), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Executive Action Bureau (EAB), the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and the Public Relations Officers (PRO), who spied on his political opponents. Opponents of his government were arrested, tortured, and jailed. A good example was a journalist, Frederick Taylor, who was jailed for fifteen years for writing an article in 1955 criticising the Tubman administration. Thus as a result of the money made available to the president due to the post-war economy boom, by 1971, the Tubman's security apparatus was in full control of Liberia. It has been argued that a close review of the twenty-seven years of the Tubman presidency would show that he carefully designed some political schemes in order to incite the indigenous people, who had felt alienated by past administrations against the settlers, especially the ruling Americo-Liberians, for his own political gain (Lyon, 1997: 52, 53).

The inception of the Cold War international system boosted the political relevance of President Tubman in the eyes of America. Tubman became the most trusted American ally while his neighbours, Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea, attacked capitalism and United States' imperialism. As the world became more and more bipolar with



each superpower controlling its own sphere of influence, the quest for reliable allies superseded the desire to promote democracy. As a result, during the Cold War democracy was compromised for the superpowers' quest for world domination. In Liberia, any individual or group movement that challenged the ruling party was branded a communist. Challenges to the Tubman administration, including criticisms by the student union were characterized as being communist or socialist inspired or propaganda. Therefore, the Cold War became part and parcel of the Tubman administration's ability to sustain itself for some good than twenty-seven years in office (Lyon: 1997: 58).

According to Dunn and Tarr (1988: 121), the 1970s was characterized by turbulence in the history of Liberia. The last years of President Tubman's era were marked by economic stagnation and political repression. His administration was overwhelmed by economic crisis due to fluctuations in Liberia's primary export commodities of iron ore and rubber, and an unprecedented increase in the price of crude oil in the international market. The Liberian government was cajoled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to consider austerity measures which led to wide discontent among the populace and eventually graduated to an increasingly assertive opposition. The ruthlessness of the ruling party forced the opposition to go underground and in order to protect his regime from being taken over by the military; President Tubman expanded the size, the budget and the influence of the police and other security forces. Thus, shortly before his death, Tubman had turned the country over to the security forces and many citizens thought there was going to be power struggle or a civil war because there was not a definite successor before his death in 1971.

William Richard Tolbert was Vice President for nineteen years before he succeeded Tubman in office in 1971. President Tolbert attempted to further ethnic representation in his government through appointments but this made his administration and its policies irritating to the more conservative elements of the ruling True Whig Party. However, Tolbert stole the heart of the people with the single act of returning an amount of \$10,000 to the government treasury in October 1971. The amount was the unused balance of his foreign travel allowance. This event had never occurred in the history of Liberia, thus many considered Tolbert to be fiscally responsible and a reformer of the old political system (Liberian Ministry of Information,

Vol.101195: 346). Tolbert was poised on running a government based on, “self-reliance for the realization of a wholesome functioning society” (Liberian Ministry of Information, Vol.101195: 412). He also called for the re-examination of the Liberian Constitution, especially the Declaration of Independence which preamble read “The love of liberty brought us here. We the citizens of Liberia were long ago inhabitants of the United States of America ...” The various proposals were appealing to many Liberians especially, the youth, the intelligentsia, and some progressive members from the previous administration including Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, his Minister of Finance, (Liberian Ministry of Information, Vol.101195: 138) and the incumbent President of Liberia.

Tolbert's friendship with the socialist world with his government's gesture of opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations led to increased radicalism at home, while socialism was becoming more attractive to many Liberians, especially to students of the higher institutions. However, the expectation of the indigenous class that the days of political domination by the Americo-Liberians had come to an end with Tolbert in office crashed in 1972 with his nomination of a descendant of the settlers group to the office of the Vice President. The class distinction that had been part of the Liberian political process from the arrival of the pioneer settlers in 1822, first between the dark-skinned and the Mulatto; and now between the descendants of the freed slaves and the indigenous peoples was therefore elongated. Another irritating move made by the President was the appointment of his brother and a business tycoon to the office of the Minister of Finance. While still transacting private business, Stephen Tolbert used his influence as the Minister of Finance and his family ties with the President to out stage less influential Liberians to gobble up businesses. When the Liberian press began to reveal some of these basic contradictions in Tolbert's administration, he became more repressive. He sought for and got the use of the old “Emergency Power” from the parliament, and wielded it for his own advantage. All this increased the suspicion of Tolbert's genuine commitment to democratising the Liberian political institutions (Lyon, 1997:67).

According to the TRC report (2008: 101), by 1975, the business empire of President Tolbert and his family was an enormous one. This was visible and became an issue of national debate, especially through the efforts of the ever inquisitive Liberian press. The President who was Vice



President for nineteen years before his ascendancy to the Presidency had business interests covering fisheries, poultry, heavy equipment, textiles, manufacturing, rubber plantation, rice and oil palm industries. In addition to his business holdings, President Tolbert's family members had a grip on the government as well. Apart from Stephen Tolbert, the President's brother and the Finance Minister, another of his brothers, Frank Emmanuel Tolbert, was President Pro Tempore of the Liberian Senate (the second-highest-ranking of the Senate [after the American Senate system]). Other members of President Tolbert's family in government were Benedict Tolbert, a son and a member of the House of Representatives; Burleigh Holder, son-in-law and Minister of Defence; Tonia King, son-in-law and deputy Immigration Chief, and Christine Norman, daughter of the President and deputy Minister of Education (*Associated Press*, March 18 2014).

Therefore by 1975, challenges to the Americo-Liberian hegemony did not only come from the indigenous population, but also from within the ruling class as well. Many members of the ruling class had by then come to the conclusion that the destiny of Liberia was tenaciously linked to the political progress of the indigenous groups. Sooner, the opposition forces in Liberia found the administration of President Tolbert no more acceptable to them, especially after the death of the Vice President, James Greene in 1977. It was widely believed that Jackson Doe, the man from one of the indigenous groups who was bypassed in 1972, might be nominated for the vacant post of the Vice President this time, in order to convince the locals and other progressive elements within the ruling party. However to the surprise of many Liberians, Tolbert named a sitting Bishop and a descendant of the freed slaves to succeed the late Vice President. The incident led the coalition of progressive forces to openly declare their opposition, for what they considered to be Tolbert's hypocrisy. The opposition called for the resignation of the president and demanded for the formation of a coalition government by progressive forces (Lyon, 1997: 70-71). President Tolbert ordered the arrests of the leaders of the opposition party, accusing them of designing a grand plan to overthrow his government (Liberian Ministry of Information, Vol.11290: 3).

According to Lyon (1997:69-73), before the military coup d'état that ousted the ruling True Whig Party and the government of William Tolbert in April 1980, there had been three rumoured coups in the history of Liberia from 1955. The accusations of coup plotting to overthrow the government of William Tubman levelled against Colonel Thompson in 1963, the former Vice

President Clarence Sampson in 1966 and the Ambassador Henry Fahnbulleh in 1968, were always thought by the masses to be part of Tubman's tricks to intimidate critics of his government and silence his political opponents. Therefore, resorting to violence as an alternative to a political resolution which was alien to Liberia (Cole: 1959: 29), became a reality with the military coup d'état of April 12, 1980. The coup was executed by a group of seventeen semiliterate junior soldiers of indigenous background led by a twenty-eight year old Master-sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. The group of soldiers was composed of seven sergeants, eight corporals, and two privates with none of them having gone beyond secondary school. This unwieldy group thus put to an end to a hundred and thirty-three years old minority rule of the Americo-Liberians. The early morning coup claimed the lives of President William Tolbert (who was disembowelled), and twenty-seven of his guards. The military junta that called itself the "Peoples Redemption Council" (PRC) accused the Tolbert's old regime of corruption, treason and violation of human rights (Steven, 1987: 7).

That the dictatorial and corrupt government of William Tolbert had been overthrown was a big relief to the Liberians. The coup d'état was supported by many indigenous as well as Americo-Liberian intellectuals including Charles Ghankay Taylor, who was appointed the Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA) by the new government. However, the respite lasted only for a short time as lawlessness, public disorder; massive arrests and public executions trailed the new government. In April 1980, thirteen members of the deposed government were publicly executed. The gory manner the execution took place was appalling and disgusting to the world. After a brief trial of the accused men in a military style, they were found guilty and condemned to death, tied to stakes and shot without being blindfolded while the shooting was greeted with jeers from a teeming crowd of spectators. The international community was fed with photographs and video tapes of the gruesome execution in which the new head of state, Samuel Doe posed (van der Kraaij, 2015: 51, 52). Both Liberians and the international community were in deep shock over the turn of events, because there was the feeling that those executed would be most needed by the military junta and the country as a whole for their intellect and experience (*The New York Times*, April 24, 1980).

In the April 22 public execution, the lives of the Vice-President, Bennie Warner and four other ministers: Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, (Minister of Finance); Estrada Bernard, (Minister of Labour, Youth and Sports); Elwood Dunn, (Minister of State for Presidential Affairs), and Johnny McClain, (Minister of Communication) were spared (van der Kraaij, 2015: 51). However, some thirteen government officials and leaders of the True Whig Party (TWP) were luckless as they were executed by firing squad. They included, Frank Emmanuel Tolbert, (President pro tempore of the Senate); Richard Henries, (Speaker of the House); Reginald Townsend, (National Chairman of the TWP); Clarence Parker, (Treasurer of the TWP); James Pierre, (Chief Justice); Joseph Chesson, (Minister of Justice); Cecil Dennis, (Minister of Foreign Affairs); Frank Stewart, (Director of the Budget); James Phillips, (former Minister of Agriculture and of Finance); Cyril Bright, (former Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs); David Neal, (Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs); John Sherman, (Assistant Minister for Commerce and Trade), and Charles King, (Deputy Minister for Agriculture) (Sirleaf, 2009: 102).

#### **4.4 LIBERIA FROM 1980-1989**

The execution of the thirteen former civilian leaders by the government of Samuel Doe was followed by the arrest and execution of the Vice Chairman of his People's Redemption Council (PRC), Thomas Wey Syen, and other five members of the Council in August 1981. They were arrested, tried and found guilty for an attempted coup d'état. Samuel Doe accused the Vice Head of State, Wey Syen, of receiving five million dollars from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya for the purpose of overthrowing his government. Samuel Doe intended to return the government to the civilians but also had his eyes on the presidency. However, the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia who was also a member of the People's Redemption Council, Thomas Quiwonkpa, continued to argue that the best circumstances under which Doe could run a credible campaign would be for the military leader to resign from the army, become a private citizen and contest in the elections. Quiwonkpa believed that if Doe was subsequently elected; his government would not be considered a military government. Samuel Doe's insistence made the Commanding General resign from both the army and the government (*The Daily Observer*, June 15, 1983).

The junta suspended the Constitution of Liberia, disbanded the Supreme Court, and confiscated the properties of the top members of the overthrown government. As common to most of the West African countries after a coup d'état, strong promises were made by the new military government to put right the wrongs of the past civilian administration. Although, many Liberians felt totally at ease with the new change of government but the international community condemned the violent taken over of power by the military men. Many African countries equally condemned the bloody coup d'état in Liberia. Although a sizeable number of the government in African countries came to power through similar means but they disagreed with the gory manner that the coup was executed. The assassinated President, William Tolbert was the sitting Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), [now African Union, (AU)] during the period and was reputed to be a leader that commanded a deep respect from his brother-Presidents.

To demonstrate African leaders' misgiving about the new government in Liberia, its delegation to the special session of the OAU Council of Ministers that was in session at that time was disallowed to partake in the conference in Lagos, Nigeria (Kufuor, 2002: 380). Also, at the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) Summit in Lome, Togo, the Liberian delegation led by Samuel Doe himself was refused participation (Mbgeoji, 1999: 31). However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, (TRC) reported that the initial decisions of ECOWAS to ostracize Doe and his administration over the coup and assassinations, was overcome by US diplomatic efforts and overtures to West African leaders on Doe's behalf (TRC 2008: 113). Later on when the Doe administration indicated that executions would be discontinued, his government was recognised by the OAU and Liberia's delegation was welcomed at the OAU's Seventeenth Annual Summit of July, 1980 (Kufuor, 2002: 381).

According to Loewenkopf Martin (1976: 238), of all African Heads of State, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire was most saddened by the ignoble death of his friend and in-law, William Tolbert. Houphouet-Boigny's foster daughter, Daisy was married to Benedict Tolbert, the son of president Tolbert (Williams, 2002: 80). It should be noted that President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire regarded as the patriarch of the Francophone West Africa, played a decisive role in the Liberian civil war that came ten years after the brutal assassination

of his friend and his son-in-law. Tolbert junior took refuge in the French embassy in Monrovia during the time of the putsch but was later snatched from the embassy by Doe's soldiers and killed despite repeated appeal from Houphouet-Boigny to the junta to spare his life. The disregard for Houphouet-Boigny's plea among other reasons might have been responsible for his strong support for the revolt against Samuel Doe's government later on (2002: 81). President Houphouet-Boigny facilitated the planning of the insurgency while the Burkinabe President, Blaise Compaore connected Charles Taylor with Muammar Gadhafi of Libya. It is worthy of note here too that the President of Burkina Faso was also married to one of Houphouet-Boigny's daughters (TRC, 2008: 117).

With the junta in government, new political elite whose culture of politics was in no way different from the old regime emerged in Liberia. The new regime was imbued with corruption, political intolerance and human rights abuses. The military government was soon divided against itself while rumours of coups and counter coups were widespread. While some members of the PRC preferred a leaning towards the communist Soviet Union, some preferred sustaining the Liberian connection with the USA. Samuel Doe and General Quiwonkpa took pro-American stance while Thomas Wey Syen and his group who were soon to be eliminated were pro-communist. By 1985, Samuel Doe had eliminated more than half of the seventeen men who along with him toppled the Tolbert's government five years before. While Doe cracked down on opposition ethnic nationalities, he was busy establishing his own ethnic group, the Krahn and their Mandingo supporters to gain relative political ascendancy over other ethnic groups in dominating political appointments in Liberia (Mgbeoji, 1999: 33, 36).

Right from the time a call made for a speedy return to democratic government, Doe had intended to succeed himself as the President of Liberia. A committee headed by Amos Sawyer was set up to draft a new constitution for Liberia. It should be noted that all gestures to Amos Sawyer from the junta to head the government from the beginning were declined by him, except the chairmanship of the Constitution Drafting Commission, which he accepted (TRC, 2008:114). The committee submitted a draft constitution in April 1983. New political parties were formed with Doe establishing the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), and declaring himself the party's presidential candidate. Other political parties formed included, the United People's

Party (UPP) led by Gabriel Bacchus Mathews, the Liberian People's Party (LPP) led by Amos Sawyer, the Liberian Action Party (LAP) led by Tuan Wreh, and the Unity Party (UP) led by Edward Kessely. It is pertinent to note that the new Liberian constitution limited the qualifying age for the presidency to 35 years; therefore Doe was not qualified to run. However, his true birth date of May 6, 1952 was manipulated to show that he was born in 1950, thus qualifying him to run for the elections (Mgbeoji, 1999: 35).

Under a chaotic situation of intimidating opposition parties' leaders, the Liberian presidential election was held in October 1985, and despite allegations of electoral irregularities, Samuel Doe was announced the winner of the elections (Mgbeoji, 1999: 36). The United States government under Ronald Reagan declared support for the outcome of the elections and Doe's presidency. In November 1985, General Thomas Quiwonkpa who had earlier resigned from the government and the army in protest against Doe's interest to run in the elections (*The Daily Observer*, June 15 1983) staged a coup to overthrow Samuel Doe and install the acclaimed winner of the elections, Jackson Doe (no relation to Samuel). His earlier resignation from Doe's government landed him in trouble and he fled Liberia for Cote d'Ivoire on allegations of treason. During his exile in Cote d'Ivoire and in the United States, he had resolved to return to Liberia and stage a coup against Samuel Doe. The political confusion in Liberia in 1985 therefore gave him an ample opportunity to overthrow the government. However the coup ended in a fiasco as a result of bad timing, the use of unorthodox methods and lack of support from the United States. At the end of the three-day coup, General Quiwonkpa was brutally killed and his body mutilated and cannibalized (Ellis, 2002: 146). It was argued that Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Charles Taylor were involved in the coup, although both of them denied it later (van der Kraaij, 2015: 56). Samuel Doe thereafter organised reprisal attacks on the ethnic Gios and Manos of General Quiwonkpa in Monrovia, Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties for supporting the coup (Adebajo, 2002:46).

When Doe was inaugurated as the first President of the Second Republic of Liberia in January 1986, he continued with his reprisal attacks against the Nimba people in the military and security forces. These retaliatory attacks made his government to be increasingly unpopular and isolated (TRC, 2008: 116). Samuel Doe's government went fantastically corrupt after his inauguration in 1986 as he became the sole controller of state resources and unleashed terror on his real and



imagined political enemies. Doe's corruption and records of human rights violation hit the United States straight in the eye by 1988. The US also discovered that aid money to Liberia did not get to the poor citizens for whom it was intended but lost to corruption. In the early years of the Doe administration, American loan to Liberia exceeded US\$500 million (TRC, 2008: 113). It has been argued that the gigantic American aid to Liberia during this period was a clear indication of the US support for Doe's coup because of Tolbert's nonaligned policies. However, the US position, it was argued, was that it was necessary to protect its assets and counter the spread of socialism in that part of the world. Thus, Liberia became the highest per capita aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa and Doe's government being the highest recipient ever; much more than that received by all previous Liberian governments combined (Copson, 2007: 4). When Doe refused to cooperate with the United States accounting experts sent to assist, aid to Liberia was suspended for some time (TRC, 2008: 116).

It was a common phenomenon in Africa for a government in power to allege plots of destabilisation in order to divert people's attention from urgent issues on ground (Copson, 1971: 53). During Samuel Doe's leadership of Liberia, neighbouring West African countries, especially Ghana were constantly identified as enemies that did not want him to be president. When Quiwonkpa was accused of plotting to overthrow Doe's government in 1983, Ghana and the Soviet Union were implicated. Also during Quiwonkpa's second attempt to unseat Doe in November 1985, Sierra Leone was accused of complicity while the nationals of Ghana, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire were alleged to have been involved in the coup attempt. However as indicated by Mgbeoji (1999: 37), there may be an element of truth in Doe's allegation of foreign complicity in overthrowing his government. For example, the Charles Taylor insurgency which started in 1989 was launched from Nimba, an intersection border County between Liberia, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire, with full support of West African nationals as part of the rebel forces. Also, Thomas Quiwonkpa with his dozens of heavily armed men entered Liberia through Sierra Leone in November 1985 to unseat Samuel Doe via a coup d'état (Ellis, 1999: 146).

The Liberian economy continued to nose-dive in the 1980s as demand for its major export products of iron ore, rubber and limber was falling rapidly in the international market. For Doe to sustain himself in power, he diverted much of Liberia's resources to finance his politics of



personal survival (Huband, 1998: 43). Meanwhile, opposition to Doe's government abroad, mainly in the United States and the West African sub-region, continued unabatedly as some members of the opposition fled the country for fear for their lives. Among those who went on exile were Amos Sawyer and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, both who were victims of Doe's ruthlessness. The duo and others in the Diaspora like Tom Woewiyu formed the Association for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia (ACDL) as a pressure group in the United States, clamouring for a return to constitutional rule in Liberia without Doe (TRC, 2008: 116-117). While Liberians in the Diaspora continued to mount pressure from exile, opposition to Doe's government grew stronger at home, especially from the Nimba County. The September 1987 rebellion in the County forced the government to enter into a Liberian Treaty of Non-Aggression and Security Cooperation with the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Guinea. However between July 1988 and March 1989, two separate plots to unseat the Doe government originating from the Nimba County were uncovered. The first one was led by Nicholas Podier, Doe's former deputy and the second by Gray Allison, the Minister of Defence. Nevertheless, while Doe was grasping at straws, the final straw that broke the camel's back was Charles Taylor's coup of December 24, 1989 (van der Kraaij, 2015: 59).

#### **4.5 THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WARS**

Prelude to the Liberian civil war, the senior cadre of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was dominated by the Americo-Liberians. This development created disaffection among the indigenous ethnic nationalities that constituted the bulk of the ordinary soldiers. When Doe came to power, he made the matter of alienation worse both in the government and the military. The most important military positions were filled by his Krahn ethnic nationality while the Gio and Mano ethnic groups were systematically purged from the army. Doe also used the now Krahn-dominated army as an instrument of oppression thereby destroying the fragile ethnic unity in Liberia. After the execution of General Thomas Quiwonkpa who led the 1985 failed coup, Doe used the opportunity to purge the Liberian army of the few remaining Quiwonkpa's Gios in the army. As the Gio and the Mano from Nimba County were alienated from the army, also Samuel Doe deprived Jackson Doe, a Gio politician (also from Nimba County) of his 1985 presidential electoral victory. In addition, Samuel Doe made a lopsided appointment of his Krahn ethnic group, which was just about 5 percent of the country's total population, in his government. Some

ethnic Mandingos who were supporters of the Krahn also benefitted from Doe's disequilibrium appointments. While Americo-Liberians were deeply offended by the reprehensible execution of their former leaders, the Gio and the Mano felt highly disaffected (Adebajo, 2002b: 45, 46). Charles Taylor might have made use of the unfriendliness of the Gio and the Mano to Doe's government to launch a rebellion via their territory courting their unhindered support.

Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor was born in Arthington near Monrovia by a Gola mother and an Americo-Liberian father (van der Kraaij, 2015: 59) who was severally a sharecropper, teacher, lawyer and judge. The son of the Americo-Liberian judge was part of the Samuel Doe-led coup that overthrew William Tolbert's government in 1980. Taylor was appointed the Director General of the General Services Agency (GSA) under Doe's regime until 1983 when he was sacked for embezzling an amount of money estimated at 1 million dollars and paying it into an American bank account. Charles Taylor was jailed in the United States but escaped from gaol with other inmates by sawing their way out in September, 1985 (*Daily Star*, October 5 1985). However, Charles Taylor's easy escape from the American prison has generated some arguments. According to van der Kraaij (2015: 60), unconfirmed but persistent rumours had it that American intelligence services and the CIA were involved in Taylor's escape after he had struck a deal with them on gathering and feeding them with information on Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.

Shortly after he had escaped undetected from the US, he arrived in Libya where he and other NPFL fighters took part in guerrilla training under Muammar Gaddafi (*The Economist*, May 31 2007) at his al-Mathabhal al-Thauriya al-Alamiya revolutionary headquarters in Benghazi (van der Kraaij, 2015: 70). Taylor later left Libya and travelled to Cote d'Ivoire, where he funded the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (Ellis, 1999: 1-16). It should be noted that Charles Taylor had earlier established the NPFL in the United States with the active support of prominent figures like Amos Sawyer, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Tom Woewiyu. Charles Taylor was in Ghana where he got into trouble and was jailed in 1987 but shortly regained freedom. He later went to Burkina Faso, where he lived in a house in the capital of Ouagadougou, which rent was paid by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. He also used this residence as his base for travelling to and from Libya (van der Kraaij, 2015: 59). From Cote d'Ivoire on Christmas Eve of 1989, Charles

Taylor launched a Gaddafi-funded armed insurrection to overthrow Samuel Doe's government, leading to the first Liberian civil war (Ellis, 1999: 1-16).

It is important to stress here that the international conspiracy in Liberia's civil war was as intriguing as the war itself. The trio of Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya had played very decisive roles by providing backing to Taylor's NPFL in various forms, for obvious reasons (Amnesty International, 14 December 2004). Both Houphouet-Boigny and Compaore had never forgiven Doe for cold-bloodedly murdering their friend and in-law William Tolbert and his son, Benedict during the 1980 coup, and therefore were poised for revenge by all means. Gaddafi with his hard-line tendency of supporting anti-Western rebels anywhere in the world fully backed Taylor's rebellion because of his belief that Doe was an American apologist (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61). He also saw the rebellion as an opportunity to get his own pound of flesh from Doe for his pro-American stance on the U.S anti-Libyan policies as well as closing down of the Libyan embassy in Monrovia in 1981 (Ellis, 1995: 181).

It is also pertinent to point out here that Charles Taylor prepared an environment conducive for him to operate without much hindrance by stealing the hearts of certain African leaders. Taylor presented himself to Rawlings of Ghana as his "understudy," to Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire as a son, to Eyadema of Togo as a lover of France, to Compaore of Burkina Faso as a business associate, and to Gaddafi of Libya as a comrade in anti-Western revolutionary. Taylor also became close friend to military leaders of these countries whose political leaders were as well his confidants. Thus, Taylor was able to garner support from a group of leaders who were to themselves, enemies of sort (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011: 261). Therefore, the international conspiracy made it possible for the NPFL army which consisted of the Mano and the Gio combatants as well as hired Burkinabe soldiers to enter Liberia through Cote d'Ivoire at the point where the borders of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia meet. While Abidjan provided the entrepôt for the rebels, Ouagadougou and Tripoli provided training bases and arms to facilitate the insurgency. The governments of the three African countries and the opposition Liberians in the United States initially financed the NPFL (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61). As the civil war raged

on the international plot intensified as the soldiers of Guinea and Sierra Leone fought alongside ULIMO against the NPFL and its Sierra Leone allies, the RUF (Adebajo, 2002b: 49).

There were two phases of the Liberian civil war. The first took place between December 1989 and January 1997 (Adebajo, 2008: 178) and the second lasted between July 1999 and August 2003 (Jaye, 2003). The number of the dead may never be known. The United Nations estimated the number of deaths in the wars to over 250,000 and twice as many were wounded and traumatised. Stephen Ellis (1999) suggested that the number must have been in the approximation of 100,000. According to van der Kraaij's estimation (2015: 58), more than 700,000 Liberians must have fled the country to escape the civil wars.

#### **4.5.1 THE FIRST CIVIL WAR: 1989-1997**

According to Peter Dennis (2006: 12-15), eight major factions fought in the first Liberian civil war. These included, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL); the National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson (ULIMO-J); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah (ULIMO-K); the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF). The INPFL was an offshoot of NPFL; this faction was formed when the founder, Prince Yormie Johnson split from Charles Taylor in July 1990. The Krahn and the Mandingo ethnic groups formed the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) in 1991 but split into two in 1994. ULIMO-J, mostly dominated by the Krahn was led by Roosevelt Johnson while ULIMO-K, majorly Mandingo was headed by Alhaji Paul Kromah. The NPFL-CRC, led by Sam Dokie, Tom Woewiyu and Laveli Supuwood split from the NPFL in 1993. In 1994, the LDF was formed and led by Francois Massaquoi and mostly attacked the ULIMO-K. The same year, the LPC headed by George Boley was formed by the Krahn and the former AFL soldiers while the remnants of the old AFL regrouped and joined the conflict.

The war started on the Eve of the 1989 Christmas. It is quite interesting to note that the onslaught commenced just 45 days after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, signifying the end of the Cold War international politics (Smith, 1998: xii). Charles Taylor launched his belligerency with a handful

of his NPFL Libyan-trained rebels, (about 200 in number) on his native Liberia, crossing over from the neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire through Nimba County (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61). His aim was to fight through to the capital, Monrovia and unseat the sitting government of Samuel Doe. As Taylor's army marched toward Monrovia, the Gio and Mano ethnic nationalities joined the NPFL and in no time, the hitherto tiny army grew into a 12, 500-strong force. Although the main elements of Taylor's army were the Gio soldiers and farmers from Nimba County, they were also joined by mercenaries from neighbouring countries of Burkina Faso, the Gambia and Sierra Leone. The Gio army (NPLF) with the assistance of these foreign mercenaries settled old ethnic scores with their Krahn and Mandingo counterparts by killing them in their numbers (Adebajo, 2002b: 46). It is pertinent to note that NPFL initially enjoyed an enormous support within Nimba County because of the atrocious acts of brutality against them by the government of Samuel Doe after the 1985 Quiwonkpa-led attempted coup (Dennis, 2006: 4).

It has been argued that Taylor's choice of Nimba County as a platform to launch his insurrection was strategic. Charles Taylor was able to convince the people of Nimba County that his rebellion was partly in response to their desire to revenge the acts of cruelty of Doe and his Krahn ethnicity on them. Many citizens of Nimba who flee the country because of Doe's brutality on them believed in Taylor's campaign, gave him their support and joined his army. The common mission that united these elements despite their differences was the elimination of Samuel Doe, his Krahn ethnic group with their Mandingo supporters and take over the power at the central by all means. The Gios of Nimba were still smarting over the failure of Samuel Doe to allow Jackson Doe, one of them, who was believed to have won the 1985 presidential election to succeed him in office. Also, Taylor used this opportunity to whip up sentiments among the Americo-Liberians, a group he partly belonged, and assured them that his mission was partly to avenge the 1980 execution of their former leaders by Samuel Doe. It must be pointed out however that by the end of the first year of his rebellion, Taylor had lost popular support (TRC, 2008: 118-119).

Ideological explanation is a very important aspect of analysing a civil war. According to Francisco Sanin and Elisabeth Wood (2014: 213-214), ideology in a civil war is "a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the objectives pursued on behalf of that group,

and a programme of action...” Ideology, according to them is significant in two ways: serving as an instrumental value for armed groups and coordinating external actors, including civilians in a war. They further argued that ideology must be recognised for its important role in explaining observed variation in the behaviour of armed groups in a civil war. They believed that neglecting ideology in a giving civil war leaves major happenings like mass killing and restraint in violence against civilians unexplained in such a war. Furthermore, Sanin and Wood observed that ideology is a fundamental aspect of the internal life of armed groups because they produce, transmit and discuss ideas, divide and fight around ideas as well as take major decisions based on ideas.

However, it is interesting to note that none of the faction leaders in the Liberian civil war identified his ideological grounds of involvement in the war (Adebajo, 2002b: 47). In Sanin and Wood’s submissions on the ideology of civil war (2014: 214), an ideologically based civil war identified a constituency, the challenges the constituents were confronted with, the objectives to pursue on behalf of the group, a programme of action as well as strategies and organisations for the accomplishment of set objectives. In the case of the Liberian civil war, none of the war lords provided an inkling of deep-seated idea on how to bring about socio-political and economic changes in Liberia after the civil war, but all based their ideologies on self-aggrandizement. Charles Taylor fought to remove a democratic government but was opposed to the tenets of democracy. The anti-Taylor factions claimed that they were fighting for the democratic rights of Liberians but were led by ethnic war lords who lacked democratic trustworthiness (Adebajo, 2002b: 47).

As the NPFL advanced on Monrovia, the Armed Forces of Liberia, (AFL) launched counterattacks against Taylor’s forces. The Mandingoes and the Krahns continued to suffer much of NPFL’s brutality until 1991, when they jointly organised the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). Meanwhile, Prince Yormie Johnson, a Gio from Nimba County and former aide-de-camp to Thomas Quiwonkpa split from Taylor and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL) in July 1990 fighting against both the NPFL and AFL. Also, both the INPFL and NPFL continued to fight separately for the capturing of Monrovia while the AFL defended it (Dennis, 2006: 4-5). Nevertheless, Samuel Doe’s desperate



attempt to stop the invading armies of the NPFL and the new INPFL by using the AFL boomeranged as many more disgruntled Liberians joined the army of either the NPFL or INPFL. The NPFL were in total control of a larger part of Liberia within six months when the AFL still struggled to keep Monrovia from invasion (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61).

At the point when Liberia was up in flames, the whole countries in the West Africa were deeply concerned about the security implications of the civil war on the sub-region. The ECOMOG was specifically created because of the Liberian crisis. Nigeria which had earlier acted as the driving force for its formation provided much of its funds and force when the crisis lasted. (The issue of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia under the auspices of the sub-regional Economic Community's interventionist force, ECOMOG is a core subject of this research effort and discussed extensively in chapter six of it). However at this juncture, it is highly imperative to state that Nigeria's active involvement at restoration of peace in Liberia went beyond its military prowess or economic buoyancy, its concern about stability in the sub-region and the killing of scores of Nigerians by Taylor's NPLF soldiers at the beginning of the war in 1990. (There is also an all-encompassing discussion of this in chapter six).

It is also important to observe that in August 1990, the ECOWAS' interposition force, ECOMOG entered the conflict under the premise of a cease-fire and peace deal, without an agreement with the NPFL. Samuel Doe's visit to the ECOMOG headquarters at the Free Port of Liberia in September 1990 spelt doom for him. At this location, the invading army of Prince Yormie Johnson's INPFL arrested swept him away to their Caldwell base where he was tortured to death. According to Dennis (2006: 5), the September 1990 Doe's visit to the Free Port of Monrovia's ECOMOG headquarters was at the invitation of the force commanders where he was urged to accept exile outside Liberia. It is however unfortunately inexplicable how the forces of ECOMOG could not have saved the life of the President from the INPFL soldiers. Were the circumstances that led to Doe's invitation to the ECOMOG's headquarters and his torture and death in the hands of the warlord Yormie Johnson's men conspiratorial?

After Samuel Doe's death, the two warring factions; Yormie Johnson's INPFL and Taylor's NPFL continued to fight for the control of Monrovia. Meanwhile, Johnson continued to claim to



be the president of Liberia for three months until a cease fire agreement was reached by the warring parties (van der Kraaij, 2015: 63). ECOWAS negotiated the cease fire agreement and organised the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) at a conference of all Liberian politicians held at Banjul, Gambia to be headed by Amos Sawyer, a university professor. However, Charles Taylor refused to recognise the Interim Government of National Unity and continued fighting (Dennis, 2006: 5). It could be argued here that Taylor's refusal to cooperate with the Interim Government may not be far away from the inability of ECOMOG to reach a cease-fire and peace deal with him at the time the ECOMOG forces were entering the war to interpose.

Also, after the death of Doe, former AFL soldiers formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) which successfully fought against the NPFL. By then, the NPFL had under its control over 90 per cent of Liberia. The success of ULIMO against the NPFL, it was suspected, could have been a probable backing given to it by the ECOMOG forces. However, misunderstanding between the leaders led to the splitting into two of the movement along ethnic divides: Roosevelt Johnson, a Krahn leading ULIMO-J and Alhaji Paul Kromah, a Mandingo heading ULIMO-K. By now, the fundamental development in the Liberian crisis was that the civil war had turned into a fight between ten different factions. Apart from the initial seven factions in combat, three more offshoots sprouted to join the war. For example, in the northwest ULIMO fought not only with the NPFL but also with the Lofa Defence Force (LDF), an NPFL splinter group whose leader, Francois Massaquoi had close ties with Taylor. The Bong Defence Force (BDF) was another splinter group based in the centre of the country and allied to ULIMO-K of Alhaji Paul Kromah and fought against Taylor's NPFL. Another offshoot of the AFL, Liberia Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley fought the NPFL from the east of the country (van der Kraaij, 2015: 64, 66).

From the forgoing, it could be deduced that many forces were against Charles Taylor's NPFL from all fronts. It must not be forgotten that at the beginning of the war in 1989, Taylor commanded the respect of many Liberians, both the indigenous ethnic and the Americo-Liberian nationalities. This was because of his superior argument against the continuity in power of the government of Samuel Doe which many saw as oppressive. Unfortunately within a year of

Taylor's insurgency, many Liberian citizens who had earlier supported his move were disappointed and opposed him because of the atrocities of his goons. Under-aged kids were recruited, drugged, provided with guns and sent to battle and to their deaths. The hands of men and young boys were severed from the rest of their bodies, many girls were raped to death and women's pregnancies were gorged out. Although, many of the warring factions were guilty of war crimes, but the NPFL fighters were the most blameworthy.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions stipulated a set of war crimes which included wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health of victims; extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or civilian to serve in the forces of the hostile power; wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or protected civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial; unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected civilian; unlawful confinement of a protected civilian; and taking of hostages. Additional Protocol II of 1977 of the Conventions relating to the protection of victims of non-international war also prohibited making civilians and undefended localities the object or inevitable victims of attack. According to the Protocol, citizens who did not take direct part or have ceased to take part in the hostilities should be treated humanely (ICRC, 1980). Article 4 the Additional Protocol II concerning civil wars stated in part that the following constituted war crimes:

“violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishments; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault;...”

However, many of the warring factions in the Liberian civil war were guilty of these war crimes. At the beginning of the hostilities, the NPFL was accused of widespread atrocities in the Krahn and Mandingo areas as they were advancing on Monrovia (Dennis, 2006: 5). In July 1990, the AFL was accused of cold-bloodedly massacring of 600 Liberians who had taken refuge in a Lutheran church in the capital, Monrovia (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61). The same AFL soldiers had invaded the JKF hospital in Monrovia killing many of the patients in the wards, a week before the Lutheran church massacre. There were mass executions of the Krahns by the NPFL at

Paynesville and other suburb areas of Monrovia in July 1990. A local river was clogged up with the dead bodies of victims. Also in October 1992, the NPFL rocketed and mortared Monrovia killing not less than 3,000 civilians, including five American nuns in Gardenersville (Huband, 1998: 146, 175, 214). The five American nuns, some of them killed in the convent house were; Sister Barbara Ann Muttra, 69; Sister Joelle Kolmer, 58; Sister Shirley Kolmer, 61; Sister Kathleen McGuire, 54; and Sister Agnes Mueller, 62 (Africa Watch, June 1993).

It was not only the NPFL that was known to have deployed an army of drugged child soldiers, the LPC, fighting against the NPFL from the east of the country, was also guilty of war crimes, of human rights violations and recruitment and deployment of child soldiers. A glaring example of this phenomenon was the case of George Boley, the leader of the LPC who settled in the United States after the war. The former warlord was arrested in 2010 by the American government, put on trial and found guilty of using child soldiers in the Liberian civil war. Boley was ultimately deported under the United States 2008 Child Soldiers Accountability Act, which prohibited the entry and residence of persons in the United States who were guilty of the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers. ULIMO-K troops were also noted to have committed a number of atrocities, including the engagement of child soldiers, torture, summary executions of captured members of enemy groups, as well as the killing of many innocent civilians. Forced cannibalism was also reported to have been carried out by the ULIMO-K in Lofa County in 1993 (van der Kraaij, 2015: 61-66).

According to 'Funmi Olonisakin (2004: 245-50), a significant number of disgruntled juveniles existed in West Africa before the crises that erupted in the region from the later part of the 1980s. These young children were deprived of meaningful future because of decades of political exclusion, mismanagement and economic stagnation that produced unemployment and grinding poverty in the sub-region. These itchy and angry set of young people were readily available for use as juvenile fighters in the hands of the Liberian warlords. Children soldiers were easy targets of the Liberian civil war because two important reasons. Firstly, they were cheaper and more easily influenced than adults, who can migrate, hide or fall under the pressure of armed factions. Apart from the fact that adult soldiers were more expensive to maintain, they were also more difficult to discipline and command as well as more susceptible to transfer of loyalty at crucial

moments. Secondly, children were easily brainwashed and not difficult to be emotionally attached to their adult military commanders. Olonisakin also gave five reasons why children yielded themselves to be recruited as fighters. These included, survival, redressing societal problems through violence, avenging the killing of relatives, possession of weapons as sense of empowerment and as well as an opportunity to live in a world of childhood fantasies as learned by them from their exposure to the global media culture of violence.

An estimated number of 15,000 to 20,000 juveniles including girls and young women were used in various capacities as soldiers during the Liberian civil wars (Aboagye, 1999: 44). The first reported recruitment of child soldiers in the modern history of violence in West Africa took place during the Liberian civil war and the first faction to use juvenile soldiers was the NPFL. There were some reasons why recruitment of child soldiers was inevitable to the warring factions in Liberia. To support his rebellion which had lost popular support by the end of its first year (TRC, 2008: 118-119), Charles Taylor had to resort to engagement of children in combats. Also, as some of Taylor's best trained soldiers went away with Prince Yormie Johnson's INPFL faction, there was a need for replacement. AFL's reprisal attacks in Nimba and Lofa counties left many children orphans who were persuaded to join factional fighters to revenge the deaths of their loved ones. Child soldiers were also promised food and security in the face of chaotic situation in Liberia. Nevertheless, many of these young chaps were press-ganged into the rebellious armies in the face of dearth of adults to be recruited as fighters (Olonisakin, 2004: 248-9).

The child soldiers were notorious in their various activities; the most infamous being Charles Taylor's "Small Boys Unit" (Ellis: 2002: 79). The unit consisted of a battalion of juvenile combatants who were constantly fed with assorted and dangerous narcotic substances under which influence they committed cruel and untoward atrocities against unarmed civilians. The disreputable atrocities were not limited to the NPFL alone as other factions' child soldiers did the same (Olonisakin, 2004: 249). In their fiendish activities, the child soldiers disembowelled pregnant women, cut-off limbs of their victims or summarily executed them. Many a time, victims of their brutality were mostly members of their families or communities. Boy soldiers were encouraged to rape their mothers and sisters for immunity against sympathy and rational thinking (*The Guardian*, August 13, 2003). Girl soldiers were also involved in these barbaric

escapades, and were unexpectedly said to more vicious than their boy counterparts, against the natural norm of femininity. Apart from using these children as soldiers, the NPFL, AFL and other factions also engaged them as spies, labourers as well as sex slaves (Aboagye, 1999: 44).

There were various peace agreements arranged by the ECOWAS countries to put an end to the Liberian civil war from 1990 when the hostilities started, however the implementation of all failed until the Abuja peace accord of 1995 was reached. (The thirteen failed peace agreements would be discussed in more details in chapter six of this work). The NPFL warlord, Charles Taylor unexpectedly succumbed to a peace deal initiated by Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana but brokered by Sanni Abacha of Nigeria in June 1995. In August 1995, a peace meeting was called in Abuja, Nigeria and was attended by all the Liberian faction leaders, representatives of the civil society and the Inter-Faith Committee of Liberia. At a subsequent Abuja ECOWAS leaders' meeting few days later, which Charles Taylor attended with a large entourage, an agreement was reached whereby the three most powerful warlords, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and George Boley were nominated to the membership of the Liberian Council of State, in an extended six-member Council. Other faction leaders like Roosevelt Johnson, Hezekiah Bowen, Tom Woewiyu, Francois Massaquoi and Sam Dokie were compensated with cabinet posts (Adebajo, 2002b: 59-60).

The first Abuja Accords of August 1995 has been considered by analysts as a tactic to return peace to Liberia at all costs by offering the warlords juicy cabinet positions as baits in an interim government. Under the agreement signed on August 19, the exclusive authority for military enforcement action was returned to ECOMOG. In the previous Akosombo Accord of September 1994 brokered by Jerry Rawlings between Taylor, Kromah and Bowen; the responsibility of restructuring the Liberian army and military enforcement was accorded to the ineffective and war-lord dominated Liberian Transitional Government (LNTG). The Abuja Accord also agreed that cease-fire should come into effect in the same month of August and empowered ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to be deployed throughout the country (Adebajo, 2002b: 56,57, 60-61). By September, in accordance with the Abuja Peace Accords, the seven factions joined hands to form the Liberian Council of State. Nevertheless,

despite this agreement, fighting continued unabated and 1996 saw some of the Liberian deadliest battles.

The Abuja Accords-initiated Liberian Council of State began to experience serious internal wrangle by April 1996. Distrust set in among the factions which led to two months of street battles (Dennis, 2006; 13). The ensuing battles took a new dimension as old foes formed alliances. Taylor's NPFL in alliance with Kromah's ULIMO-K fought Johnson's ULIMO-J in coalition with the AFL and the LPC. At the end of the two-month battles, more than 3,000 people were killed in Monrovia. This unpleasant situation in Liberia even after the first Abuja Accords made the ECOWAS postponed elections earlier scheduled to take place in August 1996 to May 1997 (Adebajo, 2002b: 62). Due to the inexorable actions of the warlords and members of the Liberian Council of State, a supplemental agreement to the Abuja Accords, the "Abuja Supplement" or Abuja Accords II was signed in October 1996. The agreement called for a cease-fire, disarmament of the combatants, free elections and sanctions for any faction that refused to comply (Dennis, 2006: 13). As part of the sanctions against erring factions, the Abuja Supplement threatened to propose travel and residence restrictions, freezing of business activities and assets and exclusion from electoral process by ECOWAS foreign ministers. And for further obstinacy on the part of any faction, Abuja II empowered ECOWAS to impose the OAU (AU) 1996 summit resolution recommending a war crimes tribunal (Adebajo, 2002b: 62).

In accordance with the timetable laid out by the ECOWAS heads of state in an extraordinary meeting in May 1997 in Abuja, Liberia's elections was shifted from May to July 1997. In an election closely monitored by local as well as international observers, Charles Taylor was declared winner, garnering nearly 75 percent of the vote. The nearest runner-up in the elections was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf with 9.58 percent of the votes (Dennis, 2006: 5). In the elections, an estimated 75,000 refugees took part while more than 20 percent of Liberian population who were still in exile did not partake in the elections. Many of these refugees who resided in the neighbouring countries still believed it was not safe to return to Liberia. However, based on Taylor's performance in the presidential election, analysts have concluded that even if the 20 percent disenfranchised refugees came home to cast their ballots, his victory could not have been otherwise affected (Adebajo, 2002b: 65). Also, some have speculated that Taylor won because

many citizens who were tired of war believed that electing him was the only way to end the crisis. (Dennis, 2006: 14). Although the international observers deemed the elections free and fair, nevertheless there were some irregularities purportedly expected of a country which was coming out fresh from a civil war (Adebajo, 2002b: 65).

Charles Taylor's victory in the July 1997 presidential elections could generally be expected. Although the elections according to international observers were free and fair, however, it could not be doubted that voters had been intimidated. Average Liberian electorates felt threatened to cast their ballots against the warlord-turned Presidential candidate as their election catch phrase of "He killed my ma, he killed my pa, but I voted for him," clearly portrayed (van der Kraaij, 2015: 69). Taylor had made it clear before the election that the worst thing that could happen to him was to lose the election and that he could not imagine giving in to defeat. Also, Charles Taylor had become extremely wealthy through his illegal activities of selling stolen diamonds, timber, rubber, gold and iron ore in the areas he controlled during the war. He had used part of this ill-gotten wealth to buy over the electorates through his vigorous campaign over privately-owned media houses as well as dishing out raw cash to the cash-stripped war-famished populace (Adebajo, 2002b: 65). With these advantages at Taylor's disposal, it was little wonder then that he defeated all his opponents, almost all who were former co-warlords, at the presidential elections. While Taylor cleared a whopping 75 percent of the votes, his closest rival, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came second with only 10 percent. The other former war-lords; Alhaji Kromah and George Boley divided the remaining votes between them. It should also be noted that, Jackson Doe, the undeclared winner of the 1985 presidential elections did not take part in the July 1997 polls because he had already been killed by Taylor's men at the beginning of the civil war, in 1990 (van der Kraaij, 2015: 70). Jackson Doe would have been a more credible contender to Taylor at then elections.

The inauguration of Charles as the 22<sup>nd</sup> President of Liberia and Enoch Dogolea as his vice did not solve the country's problems. The new government inherited a nearly empty national treasury. With only \$17,000 in its kitty, the country had a domestic debt of \$200 million and external debt of \$3 billion hanging on its neck (Adebajo 2002b: 66). The country was badly damaged with the capital, Monrovia virtually in ruins; many government buildings and the



existing infrastructure severely damaged. The war nearly annihilated the modern economy and terribly frightened foreign investments. Many were afraid for Liberia's future as critics wondered how Taylor could salvage the country from the valley of political and economic woes and move it forward (van der Kraaij, 2015: 71). The security situation in the 150-year old Republic was overwrought. Post-civil war regular forces of Liberia comprised of the combination of the AFL, the Liberian National Police (LNP), the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), elite special forces from a number of neighbouring West African countries as well as the Special Security Service (SSS), a heavily armed men recruited to protect the President (Dennis, 2006: 15).

It is important to note here that the ATU was created by Charles Taylor shortly after his inauguration in 1997. The unit was the best equipped in Charles Taylor's security apparatus and was headed by his first son, Charles McArthur Emmanuel. Initially, the unit was put in place to protect government properties and installations. Subsequently, the security outfit's headquarters at its Gbatala base in the jungle of Bong County was used to rape, torture, beat to death and burn alive any opponent of Taylor's government. ATU's headquarters was also used for summary execution of civilians, prisoners and recruitment and deployment of juvenile soldiers during the second Liberian civil war. Charles Taylor Junior was also notorious for giving orders to kill or killing with his own hands, he also engaged in illicit diamond trade in Sierra Leone as well as in arms trafficking in company with Leonid Minin. Emmanuel Taylor, a US citizen was arrested in the United States in 2003 and tried under the 1994 American law prohibiting citizens from being involved in torture outside the US. In 2009, Taylor Junior was found guilty of being responsible for torturing his father's opponents in Liberia and imprisoned for 97 years (van der Kraaij, 2015: 72-73). It is also pertinent to note that Charles Taylor and his son, Emmanuel were business collaborators with Leonid Efimovich Minin, the well-known Ukrainian international arms trafficker (Brunwasser, 2002). Minin was notorious for his illegal arms dealings mostly with West African warlords (Traynor, 2001).

#### **4.5.2 THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: 1999-2003**

With Taylor in power, Liberian problems continued unabated, if peace ever existed, it was short lived. Many Liberians were still internally displaced and many more were refugees in neighbouring countries. The economy was virtually closed down as many of the investors had

left during the war. The resultant effect was the shutting down of mines and the abandonment of rubber plantations. There was a pervasive unemployment and grinding poverty. The monies from international donors meant for alleviating the messy situation ended in the bank accounts of Taylor and his goons. The Taylor years had fared very badly and worse still, a scenario supervened in the country engulfing many neighbouring countries and threatened to blow up the sub-region in flames. In addition to the chaotic situation at home, Taylor's activities in the sub-region tried to drag the neighbouring countries into the tangle. He was accused of involvement with the Sierra Leonean rebels, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a revolutionary trained together with Taylor at Gadhafi's military base in al-Mathabh al-Thauriya al-Alamiya, Benghazi, Libya (van der Kraaij, 2015: 70).

The RUF had been fighting the government of Sierra Leone under President Joseph Saidu Momoh since 1991 by which time Taylor was also fighting the government of Samuel Doe in Liberia. Foday Sankoh's rebellion in Sierra Leone led to the military coup that unseated Joseph Momoh and brought Valentine Strasser to power in 1992. According to van der Kraaij (2015: 72), Taylor's friendship with and support for Sierra Leone's RUF might not be far from the country's secret support for ULIMO and the spirit of comradeship between him and Foday Sankoh. As a result of Taylor's support for RUF, the United Nations imposed sanctions on the Liberian government, including the following: an arms-importation ban, a ban on foreign travel by top members of the government and their immediate families, and ban on trade in "blood diamonds" (Dennis, 2006: 5).

Guinea was drawn into the crisis by facilitating the entrance of an armed group, Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), into Liberia through its border. The LURD based largely in the northern County of Lofa was formed by former members of ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J, and other elements opposed to Taylor's government. Led by Sekou Conneh, a business tycoon married to the daughter of Guinean President, Lansana Conté began hostilities with Taylor's government from 1999 and continued through 2002. By the year 2000, it was believed that the LURD was in control of 80 percent of Liberia, however, Taylor maintained Monrovia (Dennis, 2006: 6). President Charles Taylor sent his former NPFL combatants, mainly drugged child soldiers and the newly formed Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) under the leadership of

his son Charles Taylor Junior to fight the LURD rebels. Not unlike the first civil war, both the NPFL and the LURD fighters were accused of widespread human rights violations against innocent civilian victims. Both factions were also guilty of deploying juvenile combatants who carried out the acts of arson, murder, rape and cannibalism with impunity. Throughout the time the hostilities lasted, the LURD held a firm control over one-third of Liberia to the west (van der Kraaij, 2015: 73).

The second Liberian civil war was achieving an international dimension by 2002 when the Guinean army rose up to defend their country's sovereignty against invasion by Charles Taylor's army. At the same period, the RUF rebels had entered Liberia from Sierra Leone with the help of Guinean rebels. The LURD ceased the opportunity and relied on the support from the Sierra Leonean government, which had turned anti-Taylor because of Taylor's backings for the RUF rebellion (van der Kraaij, 2015: 74). In 2003, an offshoot of LURD, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerged in Côte d'Ivoire. The MODEL, made up of mainly Krahn fighters and headed by Thomas Nimely, was reported to have been supported by Grand Gedeh, Sinoe, and Grand Kru; counties to the south east of Liberia (Dennis, 2006: 6). According to van der Kraaij (2015: 74), MODEL was also backed by the government of Cote d'Ivoire. Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire was probably on a revenge mission as a result of Taylor's support for the Ivorian rebels fighting his government. Thus, while the LURD was in total control of one-third part of Liberia to the west, the MODEL kept a tight grip on another one-third part of the country to the east; Charles Taylor's government was left with the last one-third of Liberia to the centre. However, Taylor's portion of Liberia was sooner overrun by the combined attacks of the LURD and the MODEL on Monrovia in 2003.

The efforts of ECOWAS to find a diplomatic solution to the second Liberian war failed. The Economic Community later deployed ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) which was a Nigerian peacekeeping force. The United States on its part merely sent troops to protect the American Embassy in Monrovia. Charles Taylor was now faced with a plethora of problems; the military defeats by the LURD and the MODEL were embarrassing, the war crimes indictment by the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) was humiliating. With intensified fighting by the LURD and the MODEL, Taylor reluctantly agreed to take part in an ECOWAS-arranged peace

conference in Accra, Ghana. According to Dennis (2006:6), in the hope that the Ghanaian authorities would arrest Taylor and hand him over, the Office of the Prosecutor of the SCSL unsealed the indictment against him. However, Ghana did otherwise and Taylor escaped back to Monrovia while heavy fighting continued in and around Monrovia for a few more months. Under a severe international pressure, finally in August 2003, Charles Taylor was forced to resign and accepted an ECOWAS-brokered peace deal that offered him a political asylum in Nigeria. Under the agreement, he proposed an ECOWAS vanguard intervention force.

Taylor was succeeded, albeit, for a short period (three months), by his vice and the second Liberian President from the indigenous people (after Samuel Doe), Moses Blah. Blah's short tenure in office was followed by a transition interim government headed by Gyude Bryant, a Liberian business man. It is pertinent to note here that the Accra agreement of 18 August 2003 marked the official end of the Liberia civil war (van der Kraaij, 2015: 75). Also, in October 2003, the United Nations set up the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and took over peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS by assimilating it. The primary assignment of UNMIL in the years that followed included active disarmament of warring factions, demobilization of the former combatants and reintegrating them into the society, unfolding rebuilding efforts, supervising humanitarian aid and maintaining the peace.

Many arguments have been put forward to explain the reasons behind the Liberian civil war. Reasons ranged from economic motives to ethnic chauvinism. Although the agitation against Americo-Liberian monopoly of power to the exclusion of the indigenous peoples as a reason was a plus point Charles Taylor effectively tapped into, nevertheless, colonial legacy could not totally explain the reasons behind the Liberian civil war. Also, unlike domestic conflicts in some parts of West Africa which bordered on secession; for instance, Biafra in Nigeria and Casamance in Senegal (Kandeh, 2004: 146), the Liberian crisis was not (van der Kraaij, 2015: 67), but dwelt more on the struggle to capture state power. According to William Reno (1998, 217-227), conflicts in Africa were fuelled by a combination of national and international forces. At the national levels, decay in government structures, the sliding of state and non-state actors into criminal activities, and the conspiracy of government officials, rebel groups and armed gangs to engage in criminal activities were some potent factors. At the international level, local conflicts

were invigorated by rogue states and illegal trade in arms, drugs, and trafficking of illegal goods across international borders by crime syndicate networks. The Liberian case could conveniently fit into an admixture of Reno's submission.

Explaining the economic motives and perspectives behind the Liberian civil war, van der Kraaij (2015:66) cited the analytical statement made by William Twaddell, a top official of the American State Department to the US Congress in June 1996. In the statement, Twaddell claimed that from 1990 to 1993, the stolen diamonds, timber, gold and iron ore by Liberian warlords valued at \$422 million per year. The warlords proceeded to sell these items in Europe and used the proceeds to buy weapons. Distinguished warlords also had individual entrepôt through which they received their commodities of war; Charles Taylor's NPFL used Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO-K used Guinea, and Johnson Roosevelt's ULIMO-J, Nigeria. According to Adebajo (2002b: 65), Charles Taylor alone earned an estimated US \$450 million from illegal tapping and selling of resources in the areas he controlled during the war. It is also obvious that a warlord like Charles Taylor became stinking rich from his and his son's association with Leonid Minin, the notorious Ukrainian arms dealer (Brunwasser, 2002), who was also reputed to be a major supplier of arms to warlords in the sub-region (Traynor, 2001). Thus, it is evident that the warlords made enormous revenues from their illegal exports during the war.

In van der Kraaij's opinion (2015: 66-67), "economic motives were not the main reason for the proliferation of warring parties and the ruthlessness and cruelty of the war." He argued that the main reason for the Liberian civil war was ethnic or "tribal" chauvinism. According to him, because of the hatred of one "tribe" for another, the warring factions were all out to annihilate one another. I want to totally disagree with van der Kraaij's assumption. The war could not have been totally "tribal" as van der Kraaij himself further pointed out that the leaders of all the warring factions knew each other well. The main warlords who were Charles Taylor, Prince Johnson, Alhaji Paul Kromah, Roosevelt Johnson, George Boley, Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie, and even local warlords like Milton Blahyi (General Butt Naked), female rebel leaders like Black Diamond and Martina Johnson must have run across one another in the administration of Liberia before the hostilities. As van der Kraaij had suggested, "the leading warlords combined their

military role with political ambitions.” Also, other Liberian politicians who did not lead any faction nor fight during the war, like Jackson Doe, Henry Boima Fahnbulleh, Baccus Matthews, Amos Sawyer, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Byron Tarr, Togba-Nah Tipoteh and Winston Tubman, knew each other and all the warlords well. Therefore the main reason for the Liberian crisis as succinctly and inadvertently pointed out by van der Kraaij in the body of his arguments was a duel for the capturing of total state power, “symbolised by the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.”

Right from the onset, the United States of America had indicated its unwillingness to get involved in the Liberian civil war. The most important reason may not be too far from the fact that the war occurred at the end of the Cold War when Africa was of little strategic importance to the United States. Also, it was a period when America was engaged elsewhere much more strategically important, the Middle East, where Saddam Hussein attempted to annex the oil rich Kuwait (Kramer, 1995). Also, the United States never forgave Samuel Doe for wiping out a generation of Americo-Liberian oligarchy on his path to power in 1980 (Salawu, private communication, August 4 2016). However, Liberia being the closest ally of the US in Africa, America was concerned about Libya’s overture to Liberia which starting from the middle of the 1980s. After an initial disappointment by Samuel Doe, Gaddafi was ready to bankroll whoever indicated a willingness to overthrow Doe’s government in Liberia. Libya was out to revenge Doe’s closing down of its embassy in Monrovia, the “People’s Bureau” and expelling its diplomats in the 1980s when the US pressurised him to sever relations with Libya. There were many reasons why Washington was disconcerted about Tripoli’s advance to Monrovia. America was uncomfortable with Libya’s unrepentant anti-Israeli posture; its close ties to the Soviet Union; its long record of sponsoring and harbouring terrorists, like the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), the Irish Republican Army and the Marxist revolutionaries in Central America.

According to Kenneth Noble (1998), Liberia had represented another step in Gaddafi’s dream of building a pan-Islamic African federation across the continent. When this ambition was foiled by America, Gaddafi wanted to get back at the United States for frustrating his efforts at extending an influence across the Middle East and Africa. Libya’s response was to give arms and money to Liberian dissident groups and to train and sponsor Charles Taylor who was ready to invade Liberia in December 1989. Two of the reasons why Gaddafi wanted to get involved in Liberia were to foment mayhem and support revolutionaries, and also to poke an eye out on the

Americans. Thus, Libyan agents began to recruit Liberian dissidents based in neighbouring countries, particularly Sierra Leone, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ghana. At one point during the 1980's, several hundred Liberians were training in Libya in different terrorist camps. Two of the prominent Liberians trained in Libyan terrorist camps included Boima Fahnbulleh, a former university professor and Samuel Dokie, who later became a warlord. However, the biggest Liberian contingent to be trained in Libya was led by Charles Taylor who was then an obscure figure. During the Liberian civil wars, nearly all of the arms and money expended came from Libya.

American investment in Liberia during the Cold War was enormous. United States owned Firestone, the largest rubber plantation in the world and the Robertsfield airport was used by American military forces. The Voice of America's transmitting station for the African continent; many United States military installations and an American intelligence relay station were all planted in Liberia. Also, the Liberian currency was American (Smith, 1998: xiii). However, despite America's huge investments in Liberia and Gaddafi's mastermind of an insurrection in the country, it is very surprising that the United States had to minimally contribute to stemming the Liberian crises. Although, when the United States discovered that the NPFL rebels had been trained and armed by Muammar Gaddafi, it briefly considered supporting Samuel Doe. The US had sent two military observers to the AFL camp in Nimba County in January 1990 to help the AFL contain the Libyan-supported insurgency, however, the United States soon withdrawn and stated its intention to remain neutral (Adebajo, 2002a: 56). By June 1990, the American government sent warships with 2,500 Marines, moored off the Liberian coast, protected the lives of American citizens and guided strategic American installations in the country. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, later made a public declaration that the solution to the conflict was a Liberian affair and that the US Marines were there only to evacuate American civilians. By August 1990, the United States had evacuated the rest of its citizens from Liberia (van der Kraaij, 2015: 62).

#### **4.6 CONCLUSION**

The civil war in Liberia erupted at a time in history when the attention of the West was shifted elsewhere and made the country a pawn in the hands of greedy warlords. The chess players, warlords, gambled with thousands of innocent lives who died unnecessarily. The Liberian civil



war depicted one of the scenes of post-racial human condition in Africa and the Western conspiracy against the “black” continent. Africa was the victim of the Cold War and post-Cold War era. The Western negligence of Liberia at its time of need reminds one of Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and other “zones of conflict” in Africa. Bosnia was better resolved than Liberia. The Western policy makers paid lip service to the support for humanitarian assistance, disarmament and demobilization, recovery and rehabilitation in Liberia. A paltry pledge was made toward reconstruction of Liberia while Bosnia’s reconstruction got a huge support.

It is inexplicable why America had to keep its distance and left an old ally to descend into a deep crisis. Was it because of the US preparation for the approaching First Gulf War at the time? The Cold War was just over with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Was it the end of the Cold War international system that depleted American interest and concern for Liberia? Samuel Doe came to power and cold-bloodedly murdered a whole generation of the ruling Americo-Liberian oligarchy in the 1980 military coup. Did the United States deliberately allow Liberia to blow up in flames in revenge of Doe’s assassination of the ruling Americo-Liberians? Herman Cohen, the former American Secretary of State for African Affairs, testified before Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 that, in the first half of the 1990s, American government had agreed that Charles Taylor, the NPFL leader would assume power after President Samuel Doe had voluntarily pulled out of office under the US pressure. Why did the United States government back out from the plan before it could be put into practice? It is really incomprehensible why the United States abandoned Liberia to its fate.

The danger of ex-child soldiers in Liberia posed a lot of problems to the country and the sub-region in general. Perhaps, except George Boley, the leader of the LPC who was arrested in 2010 by the American government and tried for using child soldiers in the Liberian civil war, there was no other warlord tried for the deployment of juvenile soldiers. Boley was deported from America under the United States 2008 Child Soldiers Accountability Act, which prohibited any person found guilty from entering and residing in the US. Also apart from the American initiative of arresting and trying one of the former warlords for engaging teenage soldiering, no individual or body in Liberia, West Africa or external organisations involved in peacekeeping efforts in

Liberia addressed the fundamental issue of children affected by the war. The post-first-civil-war disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) programme did not either address the problems of war affected children. There was nothing significant done through this programme to improve the condition of the children. This was the reason why many of these children easily find their way back in 2002 to join the AFL and ATU under the leadership of Charles Taylor Junior to combat the armies of the LURD and the MODEL during the second Liberian civil war.

Probably, the only charitable effort of international repute at addressing the effects of the war on Liberian children was that of Robtel Neajai Pailey, a Liberian scholar at SOAS, University of London. In her book, *Gbagba* written for the children, Robtel dissuaded them from engaging in public corruption which was believed to have been one of the remote causes of the Liberian civil war.

Each of the warlords and faction leaders deemed himself qualified and appropriate enough to rule Liberia, however, Liberians were wise to have voted for Taylor. If they did not, the war could have continued. Charles Taylor was a bad loser, he declared that he could not imagine not winning the elections and could not contemplate conceding defeat. They had to vote for him to bring a little peace to their lives after the horror. The war that lasted nearly two decades, what has it achieved? The thousand innocent citizens whose lives were wasted, has it put an end to what Taylor called “the shame Liberians feel at the Doe government?” Taylor came to power through violence. He dare not have contested the Liberian presidency some years before because of that consciousness of losing the elections. Having gone through Liberia, the work proceeds to Guinea-Bissau another important sub-topic of this thesis.

## CHAPTER FIVE: THE GUINEA-BISSAU CRISIS

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

There are four Guineas on the world map: Republic of Guinea in the south-western West Africa (Francophone); Equatorial Guinea in the west coast of West-Central Africa (Hispanophone); Papua New Guinea in the South West Pacific (Anglophone), and Guinea-Bissau in west coast of West Africa (Lusophone) (Kurian, 1982: 579, 699, 717, 1399). The one year (1998-1999) civil war in the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau is our focus of research.

A bitter civil war ensued in Guinea-Bissau between June 1998 and May 1999. The war had a damaging effect on the lives of the citizens of the country. Hundreds were killed; many more were displaced while the capital city, Bissau was badly destroyed. Not long after the hard-won independence from the Portuguese in 1974, the *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde* (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde-PAIGC) started to rule the country with the philosophy of grassroots participatory democracy but was soon overtaken by authoritarianism (Fernandes, 1994: 83). Although the rivalry between President Joao Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira and the army chief, General Ansumane Mané was the immediate cause of the war; however, its origin could be traced to the tyranny and misgovernment of the PAIGC for the first 24 years of the country’s independence (Adebajo, 2002b: 112-113). The party became corrupted by repressive and despotic rulers leading to a military coup that brought “Nino” Vieira to power in November, 1980. However, the new administration under “Nino” was as brutal as the government before it. There was the concentration of power in the presidency and the use of security forces to stifle opponents. In January 1998, Vieira suspended the army chief, Ansumane Mané, accusing him of arms deals with the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance*, (the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance- MFDC) rebels from the neighbouring Senegal. Mané in reaction to his suspension staged a coup on 7 June 1998 which led to the civil war (Kabia, 2009: 138). Figure 5.1 below shows Guinea-Bissau and its neighbours.

**Figure 5.1: Map showing Guinea-Bissau and its contiguous neighbours**



Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>

## 5.2 GUINEA-BISSAU: KEY STATISTICS

Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a small country of 1,726,170 people with total land mass and water of 36,125 square kilometres with maritime claims of 12 nautical miles (CIA, 2016). The country has a total international land boundary of 724 kilometres and shares it with Senegal and Guinea, both Francophone countries. The borders with the two Francophone countries were determined through a formal treaty in 1886 and demarcated in 1905 by a joint commission. The country is made up of the mainland Bijagos Archipelago and numerous coastal islands like Jeta, Bolama, Melo, Pecixe, Bissau, Areicas and Como. The Bijagos Archipelago itself has many islands, the most important ones being Caravela, Caraxe, Formosa, Uno, Orango, Orangozinho, Bubaque and Roxa. The peoples of Guinea-Bissau comprised of African ethnic groups who constitute more than 95 percent of the total population, the mesticos, Cape Verdean mulattoes and the assimilados who constitute about two percent of the population (Kurian, 1982: 579, 718).

Guinea-Bissau is divided into nine administrative regions (regiao) of Bafata, Biombo, Bissau, Bolama/Bijagos, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, and Tombali.

## POPULATION

The total population of 1,726,170 is divided among the Fulani, Balanta, Madinga, Papel, Manjaco, Beafada, Mancanha, Bijago, Felupe, Mansoanca, and Balanta Mane ethnic groups in the country (CIA, 2016). The *mestiços*, the Cape Verdean mulattoes and the *assimilados* constitute the most important ethnic minorities in Guinea-Bissau (Kurian, 1982: 718). While the *mestiços* constitute persons of mixed race, the *assimilados* are the indigenous inhabitants considered to be assimilated culture and some standard social-economic pattern of behaviour. During the colonial times, the *assimilados* status carried with it certain civic advantages which included access to Portuguese law (Chabal *et al*, 2002: xi, xii). The population of Guinea-Bissau, according to the 2015 revision of the UN World Population Prospects was 1,634,196 in 2010, compared to 849,886 in 1980 and 535,429 in 1950 (UN-WPP, 2015). The proportion of the population below the age of 15 in 2015 was 39.53 percent, 57.14 percent were aged between 15 and 65 years of age, while 3.34 percent were aged 65 years or older (CIA, 2016). The percentage increase of the population was 2.4 and 2.44 in 2013 and 2014 respectively (World Bank, 2014).

Between 16 and 30 ethnic and linguistic groups are identified in Guinea-Bissau by most scholars. However, the most widespread and the second largest ethnic group remained the Balanta, who occupy the central region of the country. The largest ethnic group so far are the Fulani (Peuhl or Fula) subgroups who could be found in the northern parts of Guinea-Bissau. Other groups like the Madinga, Papel and Mandjack or Manjaco settled in the central region. The Bijagos who numbered less than 30,000 in population have been identified to constitute the most distinct inhabitants of the country (Falola and Jean-Jacques, 2016: 283). The Bijagos lived in some 88 scattered islands and due to difficulties of communication with mainland Guinea-Bissau therefore, there developed a considerable degree of autonomy that has shielded their ancestral art and culture from outside influence. Bijagos were able to develop a society that is characterized by a unique kind of patriarchy and many artefacts for daily and personal use (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 52).

The Luso-Africans or *mestiços* (of mixed blood) are a group of Bissau-Guineans emotionally attached to its identity since the 16<sup>th</sup> century; they distinguish themselves from other Africans by language, religion, profession and residence. While the Luso-Africans who are the minority claim European identity irrespective of their skin colour, the black Africans were classified as inferior to them. Although the official language in Guinea-Bissau is Portuguese, only about 14 percent speak it; some 44 percent of Bissau-Guineans speak *Kriolu*. Kriolu is a mixture of old-fashion Portuguese and local languages like Papel and Mandjack or Manjaco. The language, also spoken in the neighbouring Senegal and The Gambia was encouraged by both the government and the PAIGC during the war of independence (Falola and Jean-Jacques, 2016: 283). Tables 5.1 to 5.4 and Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below show the various data about the Bissau-Guinean population.

**Table 5.1: Guinea-Bissau: Percentage of Ethnic Composition.**


**Total: 1,726,170** (CIA, 2016).

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Fulani       | 28.5% |
| Balanta      | 22.5% |
| Madinga      | 14.7% |
| Papel        | 9.1%  |
| Manjaco      | 8.3%  |
| Beafada      | 3.5%  |
| Mancanha     | 3.1%  |
| Bijago       | 2.1%  |
| Felupe       | 1.7%  |
| Mansoanca    | 1.4%  |
| Balanta Mane | 1%    |
| Others       | 1.8%  |
| None         | 2.2%  |

**Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2008 estimate]).**



**Figure 5.2:** Showing Guinea-Bissau population trend.



Source: The World Bank Group, 2016.

**Table 5.2:** Showing Guinea-Bissau’s decennial population from 1950 to 2100

| year | population est. |
|------|-----------------|
| 1950 | 535,429         |
| 1960 | 616,407         |
| 1970 | 711,828         |
| 1980 | 849,886         |
| 1990 | 1,056,208       |
| 2000 | 1,315,455       |
| 2010 | 1,634,196       |
| 2020 | 2,068,363       |
| 2025 | 2,300,944       |
| 2050 | 3,564,038       |
| 2075 | 4,726,942       |
| 2100 | 5,489,322       |

Source: United Nations-WPP 2015 Revision.



Table 5.3: Guinea-Bissau: Age Grades

| Age grade         | Percentage | Total Male by Age | Total Female by Age |
|-------------------|------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 0-14 Years        | 39.53%     | 340,575           | 341,747             |
| 15-24 Years       | 20.18%     | 172,787           | 175,511             |
| 25-54 Years       | 32.3%      | 277,820           | 279,762             |
| 55-64 Years       | 4.66%      | 30,010            | 50,354              |
| 65 Years and over | 3.34%      | 21,671            | 35,933              |


Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2015 estimate])

Table 5.4: Guinea Bissau: Life Expectancy

| Average Life Expectancy | Male Life Expectancy | Female Life Expectancy |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| 50.23 Years             | 48.21 Years          | 52.31 Years            |

Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2015 estimate])

Figure 5.3: Showing life expectancy at birth.



Source: The World Bank Group, 2016.

**Table 5.5: Guinea-Bissau: Median Age**

| Total Median Age | Median Age (Male) | Median Age (Female) |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 19.9 Years       | 19.4 Years        | 20.4 Years          |

**Source:** Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2015 estimate])

**Table 5.6: Guinea-Bissau: Dependency Ratio**

| Total Dependency Ratio | Youth Dependency Ratio | Elderly Dependency Ratio | Potential Dependency Ratio |
|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 78.4%                  | 72.8%                  | 5.7%                     | 17.7%                      |

**Source:** Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2015 estimate])


According to the UNESCO Education for All (EFA) (2012), although the population of the primary education was growing at a rate of 1.4 percent, howbeit, it still remained mainly rural and poor. The report showed that school coverage had improved considerably, with 62 percent of the children finishing primary education in 2010. The UNESCO study revealed that the country was far from achieving universal primary education and the system was still producing a low sustainable level of education. However, the world body also discovered that at almost all levels, pyramids of the Guinea Bissau education tremendously expanded over the past 10 years. Access to education in the country was now universal while two thirds of children complete primary school as against 26 percent in 2000. The number of pupils who completed lower secondary and upper secondary education was also on the increase; also the number of graduates of higher education had increased significantly. Figure 5.7 and Table 5.3 below respectively show the Bissau-Guinean literacy rate and the gross enrolment of primary school pupils.

**Table 5.7: Guinea-Bissau: Literacy Rate**

| Total Literacy Rate | Literacy Rate (Male) | Literacy Rate (Female) |
|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| 59.9%               | 71.8%                | 48.3%                  |

**Source:** Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2015 estimate]).

**Figure 5.4:** Showing the gross enrolment ratio of primary school pupils.



**Source:** The World Bank Group, 2016.

The economy of the country is wholly dependent on subsistence agriculture in cashew nut exports, accounting for more than 80 percent of its foreign earnings. This makes the country to be one of the poorest in the world. Also important to its weak economy are fishing, logging and international aids. Because of the country's traditional dependent on the export of cashew nuts which price fluctuated in the international market, Guinea-Bissau has faced economic uncertainties and destabilisation of government finances. For example, the country's economy shrank by an estimated 1.5 percent in 2012 due to lower production of cashew as a result of the internal strife and a fall in world prices of cashew nuts (WTO, 2012:77). During the colonial times, the country was divided into three agricultural zones each for the cultivation of palm trees, rice and peanuts (Kurian, 1982: 722). Rice is an important agricultural product in Guinea-Bissau and remains the principal staple food crop in the country. The country had exported surplus of the product to Portugal, Cape Verde, Senegal and The Gambia in the past. However, the armed

national liberation struggles in the 1960 and early 1970s disrupted agricultural activities and rice production in particular (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 24). According to George Thomas Kurian (1982: 722), in 1977, a severe drought that hit the country reduced it to importing a huge amount of foodstuffs to balance the deficit in production. Table 5.8 below shows the average paddy rice area cultivation in Guinea-Bissau from 1961 to 2007.

**Table 5.8:** Showing the Average Paddy Rice Area Cultivation in Guinea-Bissau.

| Year      | Area Cultivated (Hectares) | Production (Metric Tons) |
|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1961–1965 | 66,200                     | 48,400                   |
| 1966–1970 | 34,000                     | 40,100                   |
| 1971–1975 | 44,000                     | 37,800                   |
| 1976–1980 | 70,000                     | 52,400                   |
| 1981–1985 | 102,600                    | 95,630                   |
| 1986–1990 | 53,700                     | 109,370                  |
| 1991–1995 | 65,084                     | 127,413                  |
| 1996–2000 | 65,613                     | 98,746                   |
| 2001–2005 | 66,384                     | 89,767                   |
| 2006      | 65,000                     | 106,000                  |
| 2007      | 65,000                     | 88,700                   |

Source: Republic of Guinea-Bissau, *Diagnostic Trade Integration Study*, 2010, FAO Stats, 2008. (Culled from Mendy, P.K and R.A Lobban Jr. 2013. *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*. (Fourth Edition). Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press Inc., p.24.

The production of rice, peanuts and palm oil and its kernel was very important during the colonial days in Guinea-Bissau, but today cashew production has taken over the prime position. Since 1976, cashew nut has become the largest export product for the country wherein about 85 percent of the population depend on. Guinea-Bissau ranks third in the production of cashew nuts in Africa after Nigeria and Cotê d’Ivoire (UNIOGBIS, 11 April 2016). Based on the advice of the World Bank and the IMF in 1987, the government of Guinea-Bissau embarked on some structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that resulted in boosting the production of cashew nuts by increasing producer prices, among other things. Cashew trees began to be cultivated in many areas of the country which had hitherto never produced it in the past. Bissau-Guinean women were also employed in selling of nuts, wine and juice to boost their income. The government also made available cash or barter exchanges, usually at the rate of two kilos of rice for one kilo of

nuts, as a form of encouragement to the farmers in the late 1980s and early 1990s when cashew prices were high in the international market (Forrest, 2002: 241-242). Because of the importance of this agricultural product to the national economy of Guinea-Bissau, the government focused carefully on its production to the exportation stage. Notwithstanding, the inability of the government to reorder cashew plantations, it is argued, is turning the supposedly blessing of the product into a national curse. Over the years, mismanagement of land for production has destroyed thousands of hectares of such land therefore giving way to more pressure on virgin forests (UNIOGBIS, 11 April 2016). Table 5.9 below shows export of raw cashew nuts by Guinea-Bissau between 1999 and 2012.

**Table 5.9:** Showing Guinea-Bissau Raw Cashew Nuts Exports, 1999-2012.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Total Exported<br/>(Metric Tons)</i> | <i>Purchasing Price in<br/>Bissau (US \$/MT)</i> | <i>Total Value<br/>(US \$ million)</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 1999        | 62,224                                  | 700                                              | 43,556,800                             |
| 2000        | 72,720                                  | 800                                              | 58,176,000                             |
| 2001        | 78,000                                  | 750                                              | 58,500,000                             |
| 2002        | 72,800                                  | 600                                              | 43,680,000                             |
| 2003        | 75,000                                  | 650                                              | 48,750,000                             |
| 2004        | 93,200                                  | 650                                              | 60,580,000                             |
| 2005        | 96,100                                  | 650                                              | 62,465,000                             |
| 2006        | 92,300                                  | 750                                              | 69,225,000                             |
| 2007        | 115,700                                 | 750                                              | 86,775,000                             |
| 2008        | 118,600                                 | 820                                              | 97,252,000                             |
| 2009        | 136,300                                 | 700                                              | 95,410,000                             |
| 2010        | 123,000                                 | 850                                              | 104,550,000                            |
| 2011        | 167,000                                 | 1,250                                            | 208,750,000                            |
| 2012        | 145,000                                 | 1,100                                            | 159,500,000                            |

Source: BCEAO, 2012: Comissão Nacional de Caju, 2012. (Culled from Mendy, P.K and R.A Lobban Jr. 2013. *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*. (Fourth Edition). Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press Inc., p.24.

This former Portuguese colony is poor in natural resources; the only traces of which were the bauxite fields in the eastern part of the country and promises of some offshore oil deposits. Although several offshore oil discoveries have been made, however, their commercial viability was still uncertain (WTO, 2012: 77). The French consultants, Beicip-Franlab has continued with prospecting for oil on the country's maritime claims while bauxite mining is controlled by Bauxite Angola with a large mining concession in the country (*African Business*, June 2014). Big

deposits of bauxite and phosphate were discovered in the 1970s but they were yet to be mined for lack of infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau's bauxite deposit was estimated at about 200 million tons (Kurian, 1982: 723).

Perhaps a most awkward thing about the economy of Guinea-Bissau is the illegal trafficking in narcotic substances that is commonplace in the country. It has been argued that as a result of the mixture of limited economic potentials, weak institutions, widespread corruption, and a conducive archipelago-like geographical environment of Bissau the capital, the country has turned out to be a stop-over station for drugs bound for Europe. The country has become an increasingly important transit point for the Latin American cocaine going for sale in Europe (CIA, 2016). According to Stephen Ellis (2009: 191), Guinea-Bissau became the country most engulfed in narcotic trade in West Africa. Trafficking in narcotics has probably become the most lucrative economic activity in Guinea-Bissau, and since 2005 the country has been identified as Africa's "first narco-state" (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 123).

According to Mendy and Lobban Jr., it was discovered that figures of influence and privilege in Guinea-Bissau, ranging from top government officials to high-ranking military officers sponsored drug peddling. Through well-connected syndicates, the release of detained notorious drug traffickers and disappearance of seized narcotics from government vaults were facilitated. Military premises were used to stockpile cocaine for transshipment to Europe. For example in 2007, two Colombian drug barons; Juan Pablo Rubio and Luis Fernando Arango Mejia were arrested in Guinea-Bissau in connection with a large quantity of cocaine. However, it was discovered later that the two narcotic moguls were soon released on bail and both subsequently vanished! (Ellis 2009: 191-192). Scholars however believed that the inefficiency of institutions, insecurity and poverty in the country, as well as inadequate assistance from the advanced countries, which are themselves victims, have reduced Guinea-Bissau to the vulnerability of the formidable Latin American drug cartels (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 123).


As a result of the weak economy, Guinea-Bissau is heavily dependent on international aid. Since independence, various international donor and development organisations have been of unilateral

assistance to the country. Principal among these donor organisations are the African Development Fund (AfDf), E.U. Institutions, IDA, Portugal, IMF Concessional Funds and the UNDP. According to the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS), the net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Guinea-Bissau as at 2012 was US\$ 78,870,000 (UN-OHRLLS, 2016). Between 2007 and 2011, the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) in partnership with other international donor organisations embarked on a rural project, the *Projet d'appui au développement régional et local de la région de Gabú-PADRL* (Regional Development project in Gabu) that gulped over US\$5 million (UNCDF, 2016). In the 1980s, the country badly needed foreign aid most especially when it was faced with budgetary and payments deficits (Olaniyan, 1996: 75).

The former Portuguese colony was “converted” into the Francophone “sphere of influence” from the 1970s when France urged old independent countries like Liberia and the newly independent Lusophone African countries of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea-Bissau into the French orbit through direct aids. In 1976, France signed an agreement on cooperation with Guinea-Bissau similar to those with Francophone countries. The agreement covered agriculture, reconstruction, international communication, technical, mineral and hydro-geology (Ede, 1986: 178, 194). The country adopted the CFA franc in 1997, replacing the Guinea-Bissau peso in what many regarded as an exchange of the old colonial master, Portugal for a new one, France (Adebajo, 2002b: 114). Other countries operating the *Communauté Financière Africaine* (CFA) (African Financial Community) in West Africa are Benin, Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (Burson and Lahre, 1991). The country had a Per capita GDP of US\$ 614 in 2010 and more than 33 percent of the population was still living on less than US\$ 1 per day. The Human Development Index (HDI) average annual growth for the country between 2000 and 2010 was 0.9percent, compared with 2.1percent for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa and 1.68 percent for other very low-ranking countries. However, it has been argued that the country’s bad score on HDI was due to grinding poverty, very low incomes as a result of widespread unemployment and a life expectancy of 48.6 years coupled with difficulty in getting access to good healthcare (WTO, 2012: 77). Figures 5.5 and 5.6 below show Guinea-Bissau’s GNI per capita and the annual GDP growth respectively.



**Figure 5.5:** Guinea-Bissau: The GNI per capita.



Source: The World Bank Group, 2016.

**Figure 5.6:** Guinea-Bissau: The annual GDP growth



Source: The World Bank Group, 2016.

According to Toyin Falola and Daniel Jean-Jacques (2016: 284), a large proportion of Bissau-Guinean population still engage in ancestor and spirit worship. Adherence to traditional religious

practices is widespread amidst the Biaffada or Beafada, Brame/Papel, Balanta, Cassanga, Cobiana, Banhun, Cunante, Bayote, Nalu, Mancanha and Felup ethnic groups living along the coast, south and the central regions and the Bijago Islands. The CIA World fact book (2016) estimated Muslims in the country to be 45.1 percent of the population. This has made Guinea-Bissau the only Portuguese-speaking nation with a Muslim majority. Majority of the Muslim population were the Fula (Peuhl or Fulani) and Madinga (Malinke) ethnic groups living in the north and northeast of the country. Most Muslims were Sunni with minorities of Shia and Ahmaddiya denominations. The Christian population in the country according to CIA (2016) was estimated at 22.1 percent; this included the Roman Catholics and Protestants who were concentrated in Bissau and other large towns. Although adherents of Islam were in the majority in Guinea-Bissau, Christianity had been the official religion because of its links to Portugal. The Roman Catholic missionaries had enforced the policy of assimilating the locals into the religion in the 1500s. Nevertheless, the aficionados of both religions still believed in sorcery and ancestral worship and they remained devoted to this traditional cause (Falola and Jean-Jacques, 2016: 285-286). Figure 5.10 below shows the percentage of religious adherence in Guinea-Bissau.

**Table 5.10: Guinea-Bissau: Percentage of Religion Adherence**

| Muslim | Christian | Animist | None | Unspecified |
|--------|-----------|---------|------|-------------|
| 45.1%  | 22.1%     | 14.9%   | 2%   | 15.9%       |

**Source: Author’s compilation. (See CIA World Fact Book: 2016 [based on 2008 estimate])**

The country practices a semi-presidential republic system of government. Cabinet is nominated by the Prime Minister appointed by the president. The president is directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in two rounds; if needed for a 5-year term, there is no term limits. The Prime Minister is appointed by the president after due consultation with party leaders in the National People's Assembly. The Legislative arm of government, the *Assembleia Nacional Popular* (National People's Assembly) is a unicameral of 102 seats. Members are directly elected by proportional representation who served 4-year terms. The Judiciary is headed by the *Suprema Tribunal Justica* (Supreme Court) consisting of nine judges organized into Civil, Criminal, and Social and Administrative Disputes Chambers. The country’s constitution was promulgated in

May 1984 and amended in 1991, 1993, and 1996. It practices a mixed legal system of civil law incorporating the Portuguese and the early French civil code and customary laws.

Shortly after independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau started to experience political and military turbulence. The military took over government in 1980 through a coup d'état that brought Joao Bernardo Vieira to power. There were many attempted coup d'états for a decade from 1980 that tried to remove him from power. Bernardo Vieira contested the 1994 elections and won as the President, however, he was removed from office in 1999 due to a military mutiny that resulted to civil war between 1998 and 1999. An election was organised by the transitional government in 2000 and Kumba Yala, a leader of the opposition won and became the president. After three years in office, Yala's government was toppled by the military and Henrique Rosa headed an interim government. In 2005, the former President, Vieira was re-elected but was murdered in March 2009. Malam Bacai Sanha was elected in June 2009 but died through natural causes in 2012. A transitional government took power until 2012, when Jose Mario Vaz was elected president in 2014. Political unrest within Senegal, a neighbouring country in 2006 resulted in the influx of thousands of refugees into Guinea-Bissau with the attendant problems of trans-border raids and illegal arms smuggling (CIA, 2016).

### **5.3 GUINEA-BISSAU: BRIEF HISTORY**

The Portuguese reached the region of what is known today as Guinea-Bissau towards the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, however, it was not until the 20<sup>th</sup> century that their colony was firmly established. The Portuguese settlers in Guinea-Bissau were engaged in slave trading and later established a slave plantation society. From 15<sup>th</sup> century, the many islands of modern Guinea-Bissau were used by the Portuguese for transshipment of African slaves to the New World. The political economy of slave trade had been expanded by the Portuguese in the 18<sup>th</sup> century in and around this area. While Britain outlawed the Trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1807 and slavery by 1833, Portugal reneged to follow suit until 1836 when it abolished the trade and slavery in 1869. The abolition of the illegitimate trade soon gave way to trade in palm oil, its kernels and other commodities produced in Africa. Decades after the infamous Otto von Bismarck's Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Portugal was still unable to have a firm grip on its colony of Guinea-Bissau (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 6-8). The Berlin Conference was instrumental to the

splitting of the African continent among European powers without the consent of Africans (Adebajo, 2010: 3).

By virtue of the Berlin Conference, the areas that made up today's Guinea-Bissau were allocated to the Portuguese among few other territories in Africa including Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique. Imperial Portugal could not claim its Bismarckian largesse of Guinea-Bissau at a go due to overstretched scarce resources and the fierce resistance by the indigenous peoples. The local African rulers in Guinea-Bissau, who had prospered immensely from the old slave trade, had no interest in allowing the Portuguese further inland than the fortified coastal settlements where the trading had taken place. Thus, it took several brutal military expeditions by the Portuguese to take over the mainland Guinea-Bissau by 1915 and while the islands fell to them by 1936 (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 10).

Not unlike other colonial powers in Africa, the Portuguese imperial philosophy in Guinea-Bissau was *missão civilizadora* (civilization mission) and salvation to the *gentio* (the heathen) peoples. Portuguese colonial policy was *assimilado* (assimilation), a doctrine based on the superiority of its culture over that of its colonial subjects. The policy of *Assimilado* that borrowed many features from the French similar colonial policy of Assimilation entailed the complete destruction of native societal culture and integrating the local people into the “superior” Portuguese culture through gradual education. To the Portuguese, colonial education was necessary for *assimilado* to be complete because it was only through literacy and fluency in the Portuguese language that the *assimilado* status could be conferred on the natives. Also, colonial training was necessary for recognition as a *civilizado* (a civilised citizen) and as a symbol of acceptance into the “culturally superior” Portuguese community. The Portuguese aim at pursuing this vision in Guinea-Bissau as elsewhere in its other African colonies was to fulfil its colonial policy of binding “her colonies to the mother country in a rigid fashion” and making the interests of the colonies “entirely subject to the interests of Portugal” (Kurian, 1982: 65). However, according to Mendy and Lobban Jr. (2013: 11, 38), the colonial education in Guinea-Bissau was a kind of education designed by the Portuguese to teach the indigenous peoples only how to read, count and write and not to become doctors or engineers. The Portuguese colonial mission in

Guinea-Bissau was soon violently opposed by the people like in many other parts of Africa, at the turn of the century.

#### 5.4 THE FORMATION OF PAIGC AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA-BISSAU

The *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde*-PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) was founded by Amílcar Cabral and others in 1956. It was established as the *Partido Africano da Independência* (the African Party of Independence) and was based on the *Movimento para Independência Nacional da Guiné Portuguesa* (the Movement for the National Independence of Portuguese Guinea) founded by Henri Labéry and Amílcar Cabral in 1954. Other founding members included Luis Cabral, Aristides Pereira, Fernando Fortes, Júlio Almeida and Elisée Turpin. Amílcar Cabral was the first secretary-general while Rafael Barbosa became its first president (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 305). The PAIGC as a revolutionary movement was at the forefront of agitations against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Another important action group in the country was the *Frente de Luta Pela Independência Nacional da Guiné*-FLING (The Struggle for the National Independence of Guinea-Bissau) founded in 1962 (Kurian, 1982: 720).

In other Portuguese African colonies, there were similar movements formed to oppose colonialism and quicken independence that was believed Portugal had unnecessarily delayed. In Angola, there was the formation of the *Movimento para a Libertação de Angola*- MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in 1956; the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*- FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) established in 1954, and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*- UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) founded in 1966. In Mozambique the *Frente da Libertação de Moçambique*-FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) was formed in 1962. Of the other two movements in Guinea-Bissau, the only group that put up some credible opposition to the PAIGC was FLING. FLING whose influence on the country was minimal was based in Dakar, Senegal and opposed to the union of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (Kurian, 1982: 65,720, 1264). The PAIGC remained the only movement that sustained formidable fight against the Portuguese through armed struggle until attainment of independence for both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The PAIGC led a ten-year nationalist war from 1963 to 1974, and although heavily

outnumbered by the Portuguese army in ratio 3 to 1, the movement adopted guerrilla tactics to its own advantage (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 11-12).

Throughout the period of opposition to Portuguese rule in Africa, only the PAIGC (in Guinea-Bissau), the MPLA (in Angola) and the FRELIMO (in Mozambique) were able to sustain organised anti-colonial struggles. However, the PAIGC was the only one out of them all that was able to maintain national unity, politically mobilised the rural populations, profitably subordinated armed action to political objectives, defended liberated areas from counter-insurgency campaigns and used diplomacy to attract international and metropolitan support. The PAIGC was the most successful of all the Portuguese anti-colonial movements in Africa not only in the above mentioned standards but was able to wedge together in unity both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde until after independence when each went its separate way. Whilst anti-colonial movements were determinedly organised to wrest their countries from the Portuguese tutelage in all its African colonies, Portugal itself was faced by three insurmountable challenges on the matter. The Portuguese armed forces were ill-equipped for colonial wars, there were insufficient resources for it to expend on counter-insurgency in its scattered African colonies coupled with the small size of its army. All these factors, it is argued, have contributed to the defeat of the Portuguese army by the nationalists in all its colonies (Chabal, 2002: 8-9, 12-13).

An important contributory factor to the success of anti-colonial movements in Lusophone Africa was the availability of good leadership, especially in Guinea-Bissau. Amílcar Cabral's successful diplomatic overtures to some Western nations, especially Holland, Canada and the Scandinavian countries in the 1960s and early 1970s attracted a huge amount of support for the movement. Cabral made sure that there was unity among the various ethnic groups as well as the two separate countries (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) at all costs. He also strategized by politically mobilising the countryside while ensuring the political control of the armed faction of the PAIGC (Chabal, 2002: 81, 115). Cabral left indelible impact in liberation movements in other Portuguese African colonies as well. He was not only a co-founder of both the PAIGC and the MPLA (in Angola) in 1956 but also became the spokesman for the *Conferência das Organizações das Colónias Portuguesas*- CONCP (The Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies). CONCP was a united anti-colonial front established in 1961 to



organise the efforts of all nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies toward the attainment of independence from Portugal (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 30).

The nationalist movements in Guinea-Bissau like in the other two mainland Portuguese African colonies of Angola and Mozambique started with the vision of insurgency as a last resort. They all agreed to go into peaceful and genuine discussions based on independence with their colonial master. However, failure on the part of Portugal to enter into peaceful negotiations on decolonization with them bred war (Chabal, 2002: 4). Therefore at some stage, anti-colonial movements in Guinea-Bissau resorted to violence effectively spearheaded by the PAIGC. The Pijiguiti Massacre of 1959 provoked the start of some hostilities in Guinea-Bissau where the Portuguese soldiers had opened fire on protesting dockworkers and killed 50. The mass slaughter forced many Bissau-Guineans to join the PAIGC which had pushed for independence. By this time, Portugal still considered the movement as irrelevant and took no serious action to suppress it. The massacre also prompted the leadership of the PAIGC to operate from exile by opening a new headquarters in Conakry, Guinea in September 1959 and resorted to armed struggle against the Portuguese. Also in 1961, the PAIGC with FRELIMO (in Mozambique) and MPLA (in Angola) combined to form the *Conferência das Organizações das Colônias Portuguesas*-CONCP. Effective armed struggle against the Portuguese by the PAIGC started in March 1962 with the use of guerrilla tactics and by January 1963, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence started (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 305). The war fought by the *Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo*- FARP (People's Revolutionary Armed Forces), the military branch of PAIGC was symbolised by sabotages, and attacks on Portuguese military barracks and commercial interests (Yabi, 2010: 15).

While some European countries and Canada financially assisted the anti-colonial struggles against the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau (Chabal, 2002: 81), Cuba's combatants were on ground fighting alongside the PAIGC's nationalist army until independence. Similar action was taken by Cuba in Angola and Mozambique during the countries' fight against the Portuguese colonialism (*Liberation* 26 January, 2014). As a result of the ongoing Cold War in the international politics, Guinea-Bissau's nationalist army also got some assistance in kind from the USSR and China. It should be pointed out here that the Portuguese army performed poorly in Guinea-Bissau as a result of its involvement in colonial battles in three countries at the same time. The war of



independence against Portuguese colonialism started in Angola in 1961, Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Apart from the simultaneous battles the Portuguese forces had to contend with in these countries, in Guinea-Bissau, it was too late for Portugal to realise that the PAIGC was a formidable force to combat with. The PAIGC concentrated its attacks on Portuguese barracks and other military installations and by 1967, the nationalist forces were in effective control of two-thirds of Guinea-Bissau (Humbaraci and Muchnik, 1974: 140-144). However, by 1970, the Portuguese Air Force began to win battles against the nationalist army and invaded Conakry in the Republic of Guinea to free the Portuguese prisoners of war kept there by the PAIGC. The USSR and Cuba responded by sending more weapons to the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau via Nigeria while Nigeria and Algeria declared open support for the PAIGC (Chilcote, 1972: 57-61).

According to Basil Davidson (1981b: 135-138) and William Minter (1972: 173), with the failure of the Portuguese government to eliminate the nationalist movements in its African colonies by military action, a new plan of action was set. The scheme entailed disrupting the anti-colonial movements through the promotion of the ploy of penetration and assassination. The first victim of that plot was Eduardo Mondlane, president of Mozambique Liberation Front who was killed by letter bomb in February 1969 (Sterling, 2010:133). Amílcar Cabral was the next in line; he was assassinated by Inocêncio Kani, a PAIGC naval commander in January 1973 (Chabal, 1983: 133). The conspiracy to kill Cabral involved a well arranged infiltration into the PAIGC by the Portuguese agents. Minter (1972: 173) suggested that the Portuguese agents were either former members of the PAIGC who were won over while in prison or mere make-believe deserters from the Portuguese forces. The assignment of the infiltrators was to win over or counteract others in the PAIGC and sell to them the idea that the Portuguese would grant Guinea-Bissau independence alone if the party could be destroyed, exclude Cape Verdeans from the nationalist movement or leave Cape Verde islands for the Portuguese. Although, the subversion to assassinate Cabral was successful nevertheless, the intrigue to overthrow the leadership of the PAIGC was a failure (Chabal, 1983: 133).

Eight months after the murder of Amilcar Cabral, the PAIGC declared a unilateral independence for Guinea-Bissau. The United Nations promptly recognized the independence of the country as

the world body denounced the Portuguese colonial rule as “aggression and occupation.” The timely *Revolução dos Cravos* (Carnation Revolution) of April 1974 staged by officers overthrew the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal and introduced a new dimension to Portuguese colonialism. The revolution brought in a new regime that ended the corporatist authoritarian regime of *Estado Novo* (New Regime) which started in Portugal in 1933. The new regime quickly ordered cease-fire and began negotiating with leaders of the PAIGC and other liberation movements in the Portuguese African colonies. By October 1974, Portugal officially recognised the Republic of Guinea-Bissau government controlled by the PAIGC (Lloyd-Jones and Costa Pinto, 2003: 22). At the end of the War of Independence in Guinea-Bissau, more than seven thousand black African soldiers who had served as Portuguese military commandoes, security forces and armed militia were given the choice of either going back home to join their families or be incorporated into the PAIGC army. Their refusal to join the army of the new ruling government earned them summary execution (Munslow, 1981: 109-113). Thus, Guinea-Bissau became the first Portuguese colony in Africa to be independent while Mozambique followed in June 1975, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe in July 1975 and Angola, in the middle of civil war, also became independent in November 1975.

It was the heart desire of the founding fathers of the PAIGC, especially Amílcar Cabral that the two separate entities of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde should be a joint independent country ruled together. However, from the beginning of their relations there had been some visible differences, although the two were ruled under a single party, the PAIGC. There was clash between Cape Verdean educated elite the rural Bissau-Guineans recruited as guerrilla soldiers during the war at the time of formulating the bi-national project of the two nations (Yabi, 2010: 15). The Bissau-Guineans disliked the role played by the Cape Verdeans, who were successful entrepreneurs, but regarded as colonial stooges to the Portuguese. Also, while the Bissau-Guineans were proud of their heritage as pure Africans, the Cape Verdeans considered themselves more as Creole than African. The Cape Verdeans also cherished their close affinity with Portugal to the detriment of the Bissau-Guineans. They were also classified as *civilizados* (the civilised) according them a social status a near equality to the Portuguese as distinguished from the *indígena* (local) African masses (Forrest, 2002: 250).

Above all, the Cape Verdeans, although considered political union between the two as economically advantageous to them because of poverty of resources in Cape Verde, however, they as well saw bi-territoriality as a political liability. Thus, from the beginning of the link between the two countries there had been some unforeseeable possibilities of separation. Therefore, the 1980 coup that ousted the government of President Luiz Cabral, himself a Cape Verdean put an end to the union. His successor, João Bernardo (Nino) Vieira, Luiz' former prime minister was a Bissau-Guinean (Chabal, 2002: 52-53). The Cape Verdean faction of the PAIGC put the final seal to the separation in 1981 when it formed the *Partido Africana da Independência de Cabo Verde*- PAICV (African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde) (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 12-13).

## **5.5 THE GUINEA-BISSAU CRISIS**

The peculiarity of Guinea-Bissau history has many things to do with its post-independent social-political and economic situation. Few years into its independence, the country was widely regarded as an African model of a successful political and economic peasant revolution. However, as the country turned to be one of the poorest countries in the world with a fragile economy and a high rate of illiteracy, it was ill-prepared to govern itself. Furthermore, a once promising country headed by zealous revolutionary leaders soon drifted into a corporate dictatorship (Adebajo, 2002b: 112-113). Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, (2010: 15) has linked Guinea-Bissau's eccentric history to three interwoven factors: difference in colonial experience, war of independence and belated political freedom. Guinea-Bissau is the only country in the sub-region that got its independence through armed struggle, one of the only two former Portuguese colonies in West Africa and one of the last to gain its independence in the region. The country shared its border with the Republic of Guinea and Senegal that had obtained their political independence 16 and 14 years respectively before its own independence. For a long time, Guinea-Bissau was isolated by its neighbours who had had entirely different colonial experience. During the time of its isolation, Cape Verde that had a similar colonial experience and fought alongside with it during the war of independence against the Portuguese remained its only ally in the sub-region. Also, the colonial masters left Guinea-Bissau devoid of solid political, economic and administrative foundations necessary for the future development of the newly independent nation.

Devoid of meaningful mineral resources of commercial value, Guinea-Bissau's economic mainstay was agriculture. However, the country lacked a capable human resource to reinforce the base of the agricultural economy. Majority of educated elite were Cape Verdeans or *mestiços* (mixed race) while the rural Bissau-Guineans, especially the Balantas constituted the bulk recruited as guerrilla fighters during the liberation war. Many of these became members of the armed forces after the war. Luis de Almeida Cabral, who became the first president after the assassination of his half-brother, Amilcar, was belaboured with the difficulty of maintaining the PAIGC's unity. Dissension became frequent within the party as a result of feelings by Bissau-Guineans that they were marginalised by the Cape Verdeans (Yabi, 2010: 15-16). The feeling of being victims of Cape Verdean marginalisation by the Bissau-Guineans stemmed from colonial arrangements. The colonial Portuguese employed Cape Verdeans and the Fulanis as district and village administrators respectively to the neglect of other ethnic groups like the Balantas and the Manjacos. By 1980, some 200 Cape Verdeans were engaged as government administrative officials in Guinea-Bissau leading to more agitation among the local ethnic groups. Also, Luiz was in constant fear of Guinea-Bissau dissidents based in Senegal despite assurances from the Senegalese President, Léopold Sédar Senghor (Adebajo, 2002b: 113).

Luis Cabral promoted Cape Verdean officers in the army in order to protect himself against the majority Balantas who constituted the bulk of the military officers and to consolidate himself in power. This attempt led to a bitter rivalry between Luiz and João Bernardo Vieira, a Papel by ethnic origin but with a widespread support from the majority Balantas in the army who fought alongside him during the war of independence. With the support of the national army and his position as speaker of Peoples' National Assembly and Prime Minister from September 1978, Vieira was in a vantage position to successfully challenge Luis Cabral's presidency (Yabi, 2010: 16). Hatred against the Cape Verdeans heightened in 1980 when the PAIGC formulated some national constitutional proposals that stipulated that Cape Verde's president must be a Cape Verdean while the presidency of Guinea-Bissau had no restriction. The tension generated by the constitutional proposals coupled with the difficulties generated by acute shortages of rice, the most important staple food in the country led a bloodless coup. The coup was organised by João Bernardo (Nino) Vieira, the prime minister and commander of the armed forces and supported

by the military (Forrest, 2002: 251). The successful overthrow of Luiz Cabral's government by Vieira did not only put an end to the bi-national project started by Amílcar Cabral but also saw to the relocation of many Cape Verdeans back to Cape Verde (Yabi, 2010: 16).

As a result of his being a hero in the liberation war, Nino Vieira's government enjoyed some popular support at first. However, he lacked the ability to wedge together a strong political, economic and social project for Guinea Bissau. Subsequent to the coup, Guinea-Bissau lost Cape Verdeans' influence as well as their technical and administrative skills. Vieira proceeded to maintain his power by relying on the PAIGC and the army. To maintain his power, Vieira liberally distributed favours to the army but failed to reform and modernise the force that was given only practical training for the purpose of the nationalist war. He concentrated all powers in his hands as president and strengthened his authority but refused to counterbalance the coup plotting ambitions of potential opponents (Yabi, 2010: 16). Most expectedly, the most serious threat to Vieira's power came from the military as was common in sub-Saharan African countries from the 1960s. Vieira's consolidation of power led to some internal rupture in the country that resulted into some real or imagined attempted coup d'états. In the first six years of his regime, Vieira announced the uncovering of some coup attempts. The first was alleged to have been carried out in 1983 by his vice president, Victor Saúde Maria and in 1985 by the head of the armed services, Paulo Correia. Maria escaped the hangman's noose by running away to Portugal but the unfortunate Paulo was executed with six others in 1986 (Forrest, 2002: 251).

However, it must be noted that Vieira's execution of Paulo Correia and others despite national and international pressure against the action had some trait of ethnic cleansing in order to safeguard his hold on power. For example, many of those accused and found guilty of the 1985 attempted "coup" including Correia were of Balanta ethnicity (Galli and Jones, 1987: 78). Another prominent Balanta executed as a result of the phantom coup was Viriato Pã, who was a successful lawyer and highly-referred general prosecutor for the government. Two mass graves of people believed to have been executed for their roles in the attempted coup of 1985 were discovered in 1999. These and more despotic tendencies of Vieira alienated his government the more to the people. Spurred by international donors, especially the IMF/World Bank funding as a condition for further aid, Vieira agreed to implement some economic and political reforms in the

1990s. He moved the country from a one party state to multi-party democracy in 1991 and organised elections in 1994 (Forrest, 2002: 252). Not surprisingly, the PAIGC won the first multi-party democratic elections of 1994 and Vieira became the first elected president of the country. In the parliamentary election, the PAIGC won 62 seats out of 102 while the rest seats were shared among the new opposition parties. The *Resistência da Guiné-Bissau-Movimento Bafatá* (Resistance of Guinea-Bissau-Bafatá Movement) or the Movement-Bafatá, headed by Domingos Fernandes Gomes won 19 seats and became the main opposition party. The *Partido para a Renovação Social*- PRS (Party for Social Renewal) won 12 seats, The *União para a Mudança*-UM (Union for Change) 6 seats and the *Frente de Luta Pela Independência Nacional da Guiné*-FLING (The Struggle for the National Independence of Guinea-Bissau), 1 seat.

However, the importance of the Kumba Yalla-led PRS as one of the opposition parties could not be overemphasised. In a second round of presidential election of August 1994, the party came second with 47.98 percent while Vieira's PAIGC led with 52.02 percent of the votes. Yalla's electoral backbone was his Balanta kinsmen in the army who gave him an unflinching support while Vieira was also supported by a cross-section of the ethnic groups. Although it has been argued that the electorate did not vote on narrow ethnic basis, however, the 1994 democratic elections in Guinea-Bissau had come to introduce ethnicity in the country's politics and the army as depicted by the election results (Forrest, 2002:253). A new democratic dispensation did not prevent Nino Vieira from holding tightly to power as the constitution still gave him much power. The new democratic government did little or nothing to arrest the economic crisis in the country and also failed to carry out any meaningful reform in the armed forces (Yabi: 2010: 16-17). The economic crisis in the country got worsened by inefficient accounting, corruption and funding miscalculations that rendered the government unable to pay workers' salaries forcing civil servants to embark on incessant strikes (Forrest, 2002:254).

Uneasy tension bred by years of accumulated dissatisfaction in the body politics as well as the military led to a bitter civil war in 1998. The civil war was triggered off by personal feud between two actors: President João Bernardo Vieira and his chief of army staff, Ansumane Mané. Mané had served as deputy commander to Vieira during the war of independence (Adebajo, 2002b: 115), he was a political ally who had engineered the coup that catapulted





Vieira to power in 1980 and a bosom friend. The problem between the two was based on the suspicion by Vieira that Ansumane Mané was an embryonic coup plotter against his government. Mané was suspended as military chief of staff by Vieira in January 1998 on trumped-up charges of engaging in secret arms dealings with the Casamance rebels fighting against the neighbouring Senegalese government. In doing this, President João Vieira wanted to satisfy the Senegalese and by extension, the Francophone governments of which his government was lately courting for aid (Forrest, 2002: 254-255). Guinea-Bissau joined the Francophone *Union Economique et Monétaire de l'Ouest Africaine*-UEMOA (the West African Economic and Monetary Union) and adopted its currency, the CFA franc, in July 1997. In exchange for Guinea-Bissau's overtures to the Francophone association, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal had put much pressure on Vieira to put an end to the underground sales of arms to the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance*-MFDC (Movement of Democratic forces of Casamance) by some elements in the Bissau-Guinean army. Ansumane Mané was made the scapegoat. (Yabi, 2010: 17).

Following Mané's sack from office, Bissau-Guinean soldiers loyal to him asked for the resignation of Vieira and the formation of an interim government to organise new elections (Yabi, 2010: 17). The military revolt of 7 June, 1998 quickly led to a war between the rebel soldiers supporting Mané and the loyalists of President Vieira. According to Simon Massey (2006: 84), the complex foreign relations and influences of Guinea-Bissau were contributory factors in the war. These factors have also helped to explain why many external actors were eager to mediate in the crisis. Furthermore, the quick response of the Senegalese and the Republic of Guinea soldiers in support of Vieira, was argued, "suggested the extent to which Vieira had invested his own political loyalties externally." However, it is pertinent to note that the response of the leaders of Senegal and Republic of Guinea to Guinea-Bissau's conflict was both national and personal. Apart from the bilateral defence agreements between the two countries and Guinea-Bissau, each leader had some other reasons to justify his purpose. For example, Abdou Diouf of Senegal wanted to prevent a Mané-led government in Guinea-Bissau who he believed would be an ally to the secessionist Casamance in Senegal. Diouf was also all out to defend João Bernardo Vieira, his Guinea-Bissau soul friend with all power at his disposal. For Lansana Conté of Republic of Guinea, he was out to support his two good old friends, Vieira and Diouf, in order to maintain a close affinity with a group of leaders in the region that included



Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone. Conté also wanted to prevent his country from being a host to another deluge of refugees that may result from the conflict as he had some half of a million of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in already in his country (Adebajo, 2002b: 116).

While only about 1500 out of the 3500-strong Bissau-Guinean army were loyal to Vieira in the war, Senegal sent nearly 3000 soldiers in addition to hundreds more from Republic of Guinea to join them. Mané and the bulk of the Bissau-Guinean soldiers who remained loyal to him were massively supported by the rural population including the veterans of the liberation war and other armed militiamen (Forrest, 2002: 265-258). Despite Vieira's recruitment of young people called the *Argentas* from his Pepel ethnic group who constituted his militiamen (Kabia, 2009: 138) in addition to the foreign troops, the pro-Mané fighters had an upper hand in the war. The local support given to the Mané rebels ensured the failure of the foreign troops and the fall of Vieira government. Although, a ceasefire agreement was reached in July leading to a signed peace accord in August 1998, nevertheless war erupted twice thereafter. The first one took place during the first week of October 1998 with Senegal sending 1000 of its specially trained army to supplement the 3000 on ground. Also, between November 1998 and January 1999, various peace agreements were reached between the warring factions and the ECOWAS. The ECOWAS agreed to send some troops to supervise the transition to a new government comprising representatives of both factions. Nevertheless, the unworkability of the transition government and the arrival of munitions in support of Vieira from Republic of Guinea pushed aside the Abuja Accord and led to the eruption of another round of hostilities in May 1999 (Forrest, 2002: 258).

The May 1999 conflict was the decisive battle in the Guinea-Bissau civil war. While ECOWAS was in an urgent need of international financial assistance to deploy its ECOMOG interposition force in Guinea-Bissau in agreement with the Abuja Accord, war still ragged on (Yabi, 2010: 18). The Mané rebels fought fire with fire with the Vieira loyalists supported by Senegalese soldiers until the later were forced to surrender. The army of Ansumane Mané took over Guinea-Bissau shortly after and President João Bernardo Vieira fled the country to The Gambia and later to Portugal ending his 19 years tenure in office. Mané led a brief military government which sooner chose two civilians; Malam Bacai Sanha, the former speaker of the parliament as head of

an interim government, and Francisco Fadul as his prime minister. Nevertheless, the military continued to make major decisions for the provisional government. The post-war national elections were conducted between November 1999 and January 2000 which was won by the *Partido para a Renovação Social*-PRS, led by Kumba Yalla. Yalla had started making political sway since the country's first democratic elections in 1994 when he came second in a second round of presidential election (Forrest, 2002: 259).

During the first year of Yalla's presidency, Mané refused to submit himself to his authority and he remained the most dreaded figure in the army. He turned down all overtures made by Yalla to make him part of his government. However, Mané preferred to remain independent and assume the supervisory role in the same government. He was killed in November 2000 in a clash with Veríssimo Correia Seabra over the position of the Chief of Defence Staff. Henceforth it became possible for Kumba Yalla to run his government with free hands; however, himself turned out to be a dictator. As a result of paucity of technocrats in his government, the economy grew worse and soon courted the wrath of international financial supporters, including the IMF which withdrew much of their aid. Economic misfortune, lack of further support from international donor organisations and frustration from the citizens brought about a new coup d'état staged by the chief of defence staff, Veríssimo Correia Seabra in September, 2003. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2004 and won by the PAIGC's candidate Carlos Gomez Junior. With the majority seats in Parliament, the party's candidate became the new Prime Minister, ushering the historical party back to power. In October, Veríssimo Correia Seabra, the head of the junta that overthrew Yalla died in a cross fire of military mutiny over the non-payment of salaries, deplorable conditions of soldiers and corruption in the military. The interim president, Henrique Rosa, continued until the presidential election was organised in June 2005. (Yabi, 2010: 19).

The new chief of defence staff, Tagme Na Waie with the support of the army organised the 2005 presidential election. Although, Nino Vieira and Kumba Yalla were barred from participating in the country's political activities for ten and five years respectively, both find their way round the legal ban and presented themselves as presidential candidates. It is argued that a combination of powerful internal and external factors made Vieira stage a triumphant come-back into Guinea-Bissau politics after six years of exile in Portugal. Certainly, without assurances from the new

chief of defence staff, Tagme Na Waie, Vieira would not have ventured back into Guinea-Bissau talk less of standing as a candidate in the presidential election. There would have been some deals between him and Tagme knowing fully well that the head of the armed forces would have sought for revenge because of his torture and incarceration in the hands of his security apparatus during the 1985 phantom coup. The validation of the candidature of the former president Kumba Yalla by the country's Supreme Court was part of the internal factors that made it possible for the banned politician to present himself as a presidential candidate too. Perhaps the most intriguing external factor that brazenly backed up the come-back of the exiled Vieira was his old friend, Lansana Conté, the president of Republic of Guinea who provided him with a military helicopter for his return voyage (Yabi, 2010: 19). Thus, the 2005 presidential election was between three former presidents; Malam Bacai Sanha, Kumba Yalla and João Bernardo Vieira. Vieira won.

## **5.6 CONCLUSION**

Unlike any other country in the sub-region of West Africa, Guinea-Bissau had to go into military combat with its colonial master, Portugal, before its independence. Perhaps, this experience has made the Bissau-Guineans a people that most jealously guard their political independence. The heroes of war of liberation inherited a country that was ill-prepared structurally, administratively and economically for independence. The Portuguese bequeathed a country that was inherently dependent on aid from international donor organisations. The paucity of natural resources of commercial value was a bane of a country that was solely dependent on impoverished agricultural economy. The bi-nationality project of the founding fathers was a failure as a result of early colonial manipulations and inherent differences between the two nations.

An ill-trained but politically conscious army recruited from the poor local population purposely for the war of independence metamorphosed into the armed forces of the nation. The armed forces became more politically awakened after independence and challenged the privileges enjoyed by the Cape Verdean educated elite. To the Bissau-Guineans, the Cape Verdeans were colonial stooges while the Cape Verdeans considered themselves as next to the Portuguese. While Bissau-Guineans were proud of their African heritage, the Cape Verdeans cherished their affinity to the Portuguese. Cape Verdeans were ready to enjoy economic advantages of a

political union with Guinea-Bissau but feared political liability in bi-nationality. Furthermore, the colonial Portuguese classified Cape Verdeans as *civilizados* and majority of other African peoples as *indigena*. Therefore the bi-territorial aspirations of Amílcar Cabral and others had with it seeds of failure from the foundation. The 1980 coup put an end to the union and the subsequent formation of the Cape Verdean faction of the PAIGC sealed the deal.

João Bernardo Vieira's rule between 1980 and 1999 were wasted years, marked by imagined episodes of coup attempts that were brutally suppressed. During his first six years in power, he imagined three attempts to unseat him and accused mostly opposition figures for the plots. Vieira worked more at preventing his potential rivals within the army to topple his regime. The 1990s donor-inspired democratic transition was rammed down Vieira's throat by Guinea Bissau's external allies, especially France and Portugal. Although, Vieira allowed a gradual liberalisation of the political system by introducing multiparty rule in 1990 and conducting elections in 1994, however the reforms were allowed in order to legitimise despotism. The democratic transition programme produced a set of elections criticised as fraudulent by the opposition parties and their candidates. Although Vieira won the election, however, the electoral victory badly damaged his authority and reputation. He lost the loyalty of his former power bases in the PAIGC and the armed forces. His autocratic and repressive style of leadership led to widespread discontent amongst military and the citizens. The army's grouse with him were in legions: delays in the payment of salaries, political interference in the army, forced demobilisation of ex-combatants of the nationalist war and corruption in the military hierarchy.

The Guinea-Bissau civil war left behind it damning human, psychological, social and economic consequences. The eleven months war resulted in hundreds of deaths of innocent citizens, further stagnation of the country's enfeebled economy and the destruction of its scanty infrastructure. At the beginning of the war the country was ranked 172 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The war made the economy worse making it more dependent on donations from the Bretton Woods Institutions. The essay has gone through the historical background of Guinea-Bissau, the war of independence and post-independence governance of the country which gradually led to the bitter civil war. Guinea-Bissau will be revisited in chapter seven as the thesis proceeds to chapter six.

## **CHAPTER SIX: PATTERNS OF NIGERIA'S INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA**

### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

The sub-region of West Africa has been characterised by conflicts and violence beginning from the 1990s. However, the root of the conflicts went farther back than the 1990s when there were intermittent crises brewed in the Casamance region of Senegal, Liberia and Sierra Leone and elsewhere in the region. The political leaders in the region brainstormed on what steps to take in order to stem the tide of the crises. The best option to the leaders then was to bring about the economic integration of the peoples of the region (Agbu, 2006:2). One of the earliest economic unions established in West Africa was the Mano Rivers Union (MRU). The union established in 1973 as an intergovernmental institution comprised of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. The aim of the organisation was to integrate the economies of member states and coordinate developmental programmes in the areas of peace building, promotion of trade, development of industry, energy, agriculture, natural resources, transport and telecommunications, as well as monetary and financial affairs (MRU, 2016). In 1975, there came a broader and larger regional organisation, the ECOWAS, which incorporated all the sixteen countries in the sub-region until the pulling out of Mauritania in 2000. The establishment of the biggest organisation in the sub-region was part of a strategy to promote economic well-being and development of member countries (Kabia, 2011: 1-3).

Despite the establishment of these and more economic unions in the sub-region, internal crises that attracted external factors persisted, especially from the 1990s. Conflicts were in greater dimensions most especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau beginning from the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The coordination of peace efforts and regional cooperation has been a Herculean task in West Africa. Although, West African peoples share a common African heritage but they were made to undergo different colonial experience: British, French and Portuguese. Also, European colonisation of West Africa left the countries in different shapes and sizes, from the very big, like Nigeria to the very tiny, like Cape Verde. Diversity in inherited colonial languages and standard pattern of behaviour, level economic development as well as natural endowment were some of the factors that tend to disunite these countries (Adeniji, 1997:2). The post-Cold War era thrust devastating intra-state conflicts on West Africa

which most times spilled over to the neighbouring countries calling for sub-regional resolution efforts (Randa, 1999: 59; Wilkinson, 1998: 64). It seemed that none of West African countries was spared of internal conflicts toward the close of the last century. There were cases where democratisation was installed but failed to strengthen the polity but instead there were bitter struggles over resource control graduating into ethnic chauvinism (Agbu, 2006: 3).

Thus, chief among incidental products of the collapse of Cold War international system, were inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa, and in particular, West Africa. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War generated some other new challenges in the internal and external affairs of African states. African countries had to grapple with crises such as indelible debt crisis, the combined forces of globalisation and marginalisation, the pandemics of HIV/AIDS and general human insecurity on the continent (Akokpari 2001, 34-55). Also at the end of the Cold War, the United States and the rest of the West had failed to act justly in relations with Africa. For example, the US procrastinated and delayed action during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and failed to come to Liberia's aid when the country fell into its time of troubles from 1989. There was no real help from America to stem the violence during the 1989-1996 Liberian crises, notwithstanding the historic US-Liberian relations (Huband, 1998: 100, 181). An animated argument occurred among scholars last decade concerning the attitude of the Western nations, especially the United States, toward Africa and West Africa in particular in the early 1990s.

Many of the scholars believed that the attention of the West was shifted elsewhere to the Middle East during the Gulf War when West Africa boiled in the 1990s (Cohen, 2000: 1-16; Copson, 2007: 4; Ellis, 1999: 162; Gershoni, 1993: 21-43; Huband, 1998: 104, 105). Therefore, the limited impact of the international community in Africa since the end of the Cold War had conferred on Nigeria the pivotal role of restoration of peace in the West African sub-region from the 1990s (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003, 171). However, it must be pointed out here that Nigeria was not without its own internal crisis (Agbu, 2006: 3) during the period it led others to put an end to the Liberian conflicts (Fawole, personal communications, March, 3 2015). This chapter examines the pattern of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia under the umbrella of ECOMOG.

## 6.2 FORMATION OF THE ECOMOG AND THE ROLE OF NIGERIA

Ira William Zartman (1966: 28) observed that African states had little control over their security and environment at independence. The observation may not be far from the fact that many of these countries were still tied to the apron strings of their colonial masters after independence. Thus, this was the position that many West African countries found themselves for many years after independence until the 1990s when escalating conflict and instability jostled the leaders to realise that economic prosperity in the absence of peace and security was unachievable. From the late 1970s, political leaders in West Africa started to adopt some security protocols, which were precursors to some security outfit for conflict resolution and peace building in the sub-region (Kabia, 2011: 1). Although the ECOWAS treaty of 1975 did not provide any security role for the sub-regional organisation, however, subsequent occurrences that threatened the collective security of the sub-region made provision for such (Akinyeye, private communication, February 28 2015).

The need to include a defence protocol in the ECOWAS Treaty became urgent as a result of incessant military coup d'états that brought political instability which plagued many of the member countries coupled with a threat of external invasion in the 1970s (Kabia, 2011: 1-3). For example, in an attempt by the Portuguese army to flush out Bissau-Guinean nationalist fighters who had made Conakry their capital-in-exile, Republic of Guinea was invaded in November 1970. However, during the Portuguese invasion an attempt to kill or kidnap President Sekou Toure of Guinea failed (The Economist, 22 November 1980). Also in January 1977, an externally sponsored attempted coup supported by France, Gabon and Morocco led by the notorious mercenary, Bob Denard took place against the government of Republic of Benin (Faligot and Krop, 1982: 75).

With this scenario unfolding in the sub-region, ECOWAS adopted the Non-Aggression Treaty forbidding member states to use force or aggression against each other in 1978. Closely following the Non-Aggression Treaty was the Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) of 1981. MAD gave mutual aid and support to any member which was facing any armed threat and such threat was considered as directed against all members of the organisation. Response mechanisms including a Defence Council, Defence Committee and a regional wide interposition force, the



Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) were also created to support MAD. Nevertheless, all these mechanisms were either too weak to implement or ineffective as conflict prevention and resolution management tools. This, it has been argued that, the protocol focused more on external threats than internal instability of member nations (Akinyeye, private communication, February 28 2015).

Furthermore, the international agreements whose institutions were never established, some critics saw as a strategy by political leaders to employ in serving their interest by safeguarding their regimes. The failure to implement the protocol was envisaged by critics as a result of the historical Francophone-Anglophone rivalry in the sub-region, especially, the perceived hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria in West Africa by the French-speaking countries. The mutual suspicion between them heightened when the protocol called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all member nations. Majority of these foreign troops were stationed in the Francophone countries whose security and defence were still closely tied with France. Above all, the existence of an all-Francophone security apparatus, the *Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en matière de Défense*-ANAD (Non-aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement) from 1977 put paid to the survival of MAD (Kabia, 2011: 1-3).

The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) came into being specifically because of the Liberian crisis and other conflicts that emanated thereafter in the sub-region. The economic community's interposition force later to be known as ECOMOG I was established as a result of a conflict that came with some unparalleled carnage in the history of African civil wars. The lack of timely and dependable international response to the crisis compelled ECOWAS to come in. Although there were some local mediation arrangements inside Liberia to prevent the conflicts from escalating into a civil war, but it all failed. For example, the mediation efforts of Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC), comprising the National Muslim Council (NMC) and the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) put together in June 1990 collapsed. The uncompromising tendencies of the various faction leaders in the Liberian conflict ruined the efforts of the IFCM (Adebajo, 2002a: 61, 86).

The decision of ECOWAS to form an interposition force and intervene in the Liberian war was taken at the body's Standing Mediation Committee, (SMC) meeting in August 1990 at Banjul, The Gambia (*The West African Bulletin*, October 1999). From the establishment of the force up to the temporary solution to the conflict in 1997, according to Akinyeye (personal communication, February, 28 2015), Nigeria diplomatically, financially and militarily shaped its activities in an authoritative manner. It is pertinent to note here that at its inception, the failure of the Ghanaian-led forces to prevent the death of Samuel Doe from the hands of the INPFL rebels facilitated Nigeria's take-over of the command. The replacement of the Ghanaian field commander with a Nigerian also made it possible for subsequent commanders to come from Nigeria and while taking orders directly from the Nigerian Ministry of Defence (Prkic 2000: 262). However, the command structure of ECOMOG soon led to a serious tension between the two countries (Adebajo, 2002a: 73-75).

The Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991 to 2002 (Gberie, 2005: 6) gave birth to ECOMOG II. The civil war was the outcome of Charles Taylor's promise to avenge Sierra Leone's hosting of ECOMOG I and allowing it as its base to bomb the NPFL positions in Liberia, and the country's refusal to give him a diplomatic passport (Sessay and Hughes, 2005: 2-3). Bad governance, worsening economic conditions and the collapse of the Abidjan Agreement/ ECOWAS Peace Plan of November 1996 to October 1997 prolonged the civil war (TRS Sierra Leone: 2004). ECOMOG II was established in August 1997 to assist in the reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Adibe, 2002: 131). Here, as required, Nigeria's involvement was pivotal; the bulk of the force was formed by its troops and all the commanders were Nigerian. According to Adebajo (2008: 189-194), out of the 13,000 troops deployed between 1998 and 1999, Nigeria provided 12, 000. He has also argued that the most important reason why Nigeria was involved militarily and diplomatically in Sierra Leone was to represent its leadership in the sub-region. This is against some general assumptions that Nigeria was present there for some concealed reasons. The ECOWAS deployed ECOMOG III to put an end to the brief but bitter Guinea-Bissau civil war of 1999 but was not as successful as the two previous ones (Adebajo, 2002b: 63, 93, 117). (This is discussed more elaborately in chapter seven of this work).

From the start of the Liberian conflicts, the international community stood aloof while Liberians were left to their fate. The ECOWAS was thus forced to arrange an ad hoc solution to the indelible security situation. Nigeria, obviously the sub-regional power subsequently spearheaded the move for the formation of ECOMOG to intervene in the crisis. Nigeria played a major role in Banjul at the first session of the standing committee on Liberia that set up the ECOMOG intervention force in 1990 (*The West African Bulletin*, October 1999). Under the Abacha regime in 1993, ECOWAS remained the major focus, and ECOMOG the most important regional cooperative undertaking in which Nigeria was involved. While the intractability of the Liberian civil war led Ghana and other major participants in the peacekeeping mission to threaten to pull out, General Abacha became resolute. The unyielding and tenacious attitude of Abacha toward ECOMOG's resolution of Liberian conflict earned his regime some approval by a section of the international community that had hitherto given it a dirty look. The international acclaim won by Nigeria's involvement and leadership in the regional intervention force was seen as a good counterbalance to her pariah status in the international arena at that time (Adeniji, 1997:34).

In May 1990 while the Liberian civil war raged on, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to find a peaceful means of putting an end to the crisis. However due to uncompromising attitudes of factional leaders in the war, the ECOWAS committee established and deployed the first troops of the body's Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Notwithstanding, there were some West African leaders, especially from the French-speaking countries and the NPFL rebel leader, Charles Taylor who vehemently opposed the deployment. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who later became the elected president of Liberia in 2006 initially opposed the ECOMOG intervention in 1990 and called it an invasion force. Johnson-Sirleaf rather preferred the American force to intermediate (*West Africa*, August 1990: 2231). The formation of the interposition force was majorly credited to the Anglophone West African countries while several of their Francophone counterparts were initially opposed to the deployment. The reason for their initial disagreement may not be far from the interest some of the leaders had in the civil war. For example, Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côté d'Ivoire supported the attempt of Charles Taylor to overthrow Samuel Doe's regime in the first instance (Berman and Sams, 2000: 88-89). However, many of the Francophone states later

contributed contingents to ECOMOG at least to “dilute the Anglophone dominance in the force” (Adebajo, 2002b: 52).

At the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers meeting in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1998, an agreement was reached upon the recommendation that ECOMOG should formally take up the peacekeeping operations in West Africa. Although, a consensus was not reached on the future role of ECOMOG, however, the Yamoussoukro accord recognised the dominant role Nigeria played in the sub-regional intervention force (Abegunrin, 2003: 14). The contribution of troops alone by Nigeria would tell the story of its enormous input vis-à-vis other member nations. After the formation of ECOMOG in 1990 for example, Nigeria provided 5,000 out of the 6,000 troops needed; this represented 84 per cent of the total troops. Between 1991 and 1993, the country accounted for 10,000 out of the 12,000 troops for ECOMOG, representing 80 per cent contribution. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, Nigeria contributed whopping 75 per cent, 85 per cent and 82 per cent of troops respectively to the intervention force (Ajayi, 2004: 205). The above statistics did not only show the magnitude of Nigeria’s contribution of contingents to the force but also the consistency at which the deployment was made.

Nigeria under the military regime of Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida saw the need to advance the country’s pursuit of foreign policy objectives by joining the ranks of nations that engaged their military abroad for that purpose (Fawole, 2008: 98, and personal communication, March 3 2015). The military regime pushed for the global acceptance of its intention to intervene in the Liberian crisis at the United Nations in August 1990 amidst opposition from sections of Nigerian citizens at home. Some of the reasons advanced by Nigeria were to stop the scene of carnage going on in Liberia and assist the people to restore their democratic institutions. While the lobby was going on at the international arena, the Nigerian leaders also schemed for the country’s support at the sub-regional level by wooing the Anglophone countries of Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia for the approval of ECOMOG. Babangida’s diplomatic campaign for ECOMOG among his West African heads of government counterparts yielded some results. The crusade forged a formidable affinity between Babangida and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana which like-mindedness became a stronghold for the establishment of ECOMOG and remained the bastion for the survival of the force throughout the Liberian civil war. Babangida’s overtures to

Dawda Jawara and his acceptance and recognition of ECOMOG also paid off. The Gambian President and the ECOWAS elder statesman's support for ECOMOG was very crucial as the incumbent chairperson of the body and its Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). The leader of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh readily supported Babangida's aspiration because of the personal relationships between them (Adebajo, 2002a: 52-53).

One can arguably consider the correlation and bond between the leaders of the Anglophone and mistrust by their Francophone counterparts over the establishment and deployment of ECOMOG in the light of Margaret Hermann's arguments. Hermann (2005: 178) analysing personality characteristics that affect foreign policy behaviour posited that leaders with low levels of distrust among themselves tended toward a participatory orientation in foreign policy. She also advanced that there was a tendency among leaders with a high level of distrust of others to develop independent orientation of the foreign policy of their countries. While Herman's first postulation described the rapport between the Anglophone leaders over the establishment of the ECOMOG, her second argument embraced their Francophone colleagues over the issues. Burkina Faso was the first Francophone country to renounce ECOMOG publicly when its leader, Blaise Campaoré declared military support for Taylor's NPFL in September 1990. In addition, Abdou Diouf of Senegal and Nicéphore Soglo of Benin Republic doubted the ability of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire saw the ECOMOG approach unrealistic and in agreement with Soglo, preferred the United States or United Nations troops to replace ECOMOG. With the active backing of Campaoré, Togo, Mali and Niger initially declined to support the ECOMOG as well (Adebajo, 2002a: 86, 104)

The only Francophone country that supported ECOMOG from the beginning was Guinea and for obvious reasons. Not only that Guinea had some 30,000 of its citizens trapped inside the war-torn Liberia but also happened to be one of the three countries directly affected by the overspill of Liberian refugees into their territories. Earlier in the war, Charles Taylor's NPFL had briefly attacked Guinea's Macenta Province. For quite a long time, there had been no love lost between Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire that supported the NPFL, and which had earlier invaded Guinea's territory. Anglophone countries readily supported Nigeria over ECOMOG for some important reasons as well. While the Gambian leadership was at the forefront of the establishment of

ECOMOG and contributed some of its first 3,000 soldiers deployed, Sierra Leone was wary of Taylor's NPFL and determined to crush it. Dawda Jawara was suspected to have had some ulterior motives in blindly supporting the idea of an ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002a: 62, 64).

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out here that Samba Kukoi Sanyang, the leader of the 1981 aborted coup in The Gambia and some of his soldiers were fighters in Taylor's NPFL. Also, the Sierra Leonean rebels in the ranks of the NPFL, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by Charles Taylor, had vowed to subvert the country. ECOMOG used Freetown as the staging post for its intervention in Liberia in 1990. In addition, the Sierra Leonean city was the rear base for Nigerian soldiers in Liberia as well as the take-off points for Nigerian air force in bombing NPFL positions in Liberia. In retaliation, the NPFL supported the RUF to invade Sierra Leone in 1991, sparking a new war in the sub-region. It is pertinent to observe here that the imbroglio over the establishment and deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia among West African countries tended to open the old wounds of francophone-anglophone rivalry that had refused to heal overtime (Adebajo, 2002a: 86, 104; 2002b:52).

Both Nigeria and Ghana had a strong believe that ECOMOG was the answer to instability in the West African sub-region and both countries tended to be soul mates in this credence. For example, not unlike Nigeria, the Ghanaian government strongly supported intervention to avert regional instability and adverse effects of spill over of refugees to neighbouring countries. Also like Abuja, Accra frowned at the activities of external actors like Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso that adversely contributed to the Liberian crisis (Adebajo, 2002a: 63). As the Jerry Rawling's government in Ghana was worried, likewise, the two successive military governments of Ibrahim Babangida and Sanni Abacha in Nigeria were apprehensive while the first civil war in Liberia lasted. Among other reasons, the Nigerian government was concerned about the damage the Liberian conflict, if it remained unchecked, could do to the stability of the sub-region and ECOWAS in particular. Thus, these Nigerian military leaders wanted to advance *Pax Nigeriana* as the possible solution to instability in the sub-region (Adebajo, 2002b: 48).

However, regardless of the close affinity of purpose which the seeking of practical solution to the Liberian crisis brought between Nigeria and Ghana; the sensitive issue of deployment and management of ECOMOG brewed some tension between two countries (Akinyeye, personal

communication, February 28 2015). While Nigeria supported an uncompromising stance against the NPFL and Charles Taylor, Ghana maintained some political flexibility with the rebel leader (Adebajo, 2002a: 112). We pointed out earlier in this chapter that the inability of the Ghanaian-led ECOMOG to save the life of Doe from the hands of Prince Yeduo Johnson's INPFL fighters made way for Nigeria to take over the command of the forces. Subsequently, command instructions for the force directly flowed from the Ministry of Defence in Abuja (Prkic 2000: 262).

### **6.3 THE ECOMOG AND LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR**

The Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was the first sub-regional interposition force established in Africa that mainly dependent on its own troops, finance and military supplies and equipment. The military organisation also made history as the first of such the United Nations had sent military observers only to support (Adebajo, 2002b: 15). The ECOWAS signed the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. The protocol provided for a formal foundation for a regional security outfit. Some scholars have argued that until the adoption of the protocol, the involvement of Nigeria and some ECOWAS countries in peacekeeping and enforcement in Liberia had been on an impromptu arrangement shaped mainly by Nigerian policies (Gershoni 1993: 21-43, Ellis 1999: 162).

With the assent of other ECOWAS heads of States, the Nigerian military president, Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) was reputed to have instigated the formation of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May 1990. In addition, Babangida played a leading role in the establishment of the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990. Interestingly, these scholars agreed that the main purpose behind the move by the Nigerian Head of State was to bring about a cease-fire in Liberia, and establish an interim government as well as organising general elections within a year. However, according to Gershoni and Ellis, the initial decision of the leading countries of ECOWAS, especially Nigeria to intervene in Liberia was a mere opportunity "for experimenting *Pax Africana* on an *ad hoc* basis."



Although these scholars have concluded that the Nigerian military president had taken those steps with “a mixture of personal inclination,” nevertheless, we note here that since the Liberian crisis took place during a critical period in African history, those steps taken by Nigeria were nothing but imperative. The Liberian civil war occurred during the post-Cold War era when the West, especially the United States, disinclined to intervene in African and specifically Monrovia affairs (Copson, 2007:4). Therefore, the unwillingness of the United States to be actively involved in the solution to the Liberian crisis and the sub-region in general thrust upon Nigeria, in coalition with the other willing West African countries, the responsibility of spearheading a cease-fire arrangement in the troubled region. In addition, since there was a failure to proffer sustainable political solutions through conference diplomacy, sub-regional steps taken by Nigeria were necessary (Adibe 2002: 124, van Walraven 1999: 83-84). Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the military government of Sanni Abacha that succeeded that of Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria reconciled with Charles Taylor and his NPFL forces in June 1995. Thereafter, the NPFL no longer had to face ECOMOG’s hostility and to some extent the rebel forces even enjoyed some support from the Nigerian military (Prkic 2000: 273-274). Therefore, the argument that Nigeria’s enthusiastic intervention in Liberia was for the experimentation of *Pax African* may not hold water after all.

There is this polemical issue about the legality of the ECOMOG. Adebajo (2002a: 63-65; 2002b: 50) argued spiritedly that the establishment of ECOMOG was far from conforming to the constitutional requirements of ECOWAS. He also contended that the standing mediation committee, the body that gave birth to ECOMOG, was founded on precarious legal foundations. Citing articles 1, 2 and 5 of the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol, he argued that the protocol only committed members to settling disputes peacefully; avoiding support for subversion or aggression, and referring disputes to a committee of ECOWAS Authority. Adebajo also looked into articles 7 and 8, 12, and 13 of the 1981 Protocol that gave room for member countries’ ministers of defence and foreign affairs to discuss “intervention strategies,” the creation of a Defence Council and the establishment of the Allied Armed Forces of the Community respectively. In furtherance of his argument, he noted that the 1981 Protocol allowed intervention only in three cases: a threat externally propelled a conflict between two member states, and an externally sustained internal conflict. According to him, although the Liberian

conflict was externally supported by Libya, the mere fact that the foreign support was delivered through Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, two member countries, nullified the argument of external support. Adebajo also argued that not all members had ratified the 1981 protocol and none of the bodies stipulated by the protocol was created by the time of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia. He therefore opined and concluded that the line of reasoning used in establishing the interventionist force was more political than legal as neither the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression nor the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Defence guidelines were religiously followed.

Other critics of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia have largely hinged their arguments on the strength of international law. They argued that the interpolation contravened the norms of the customary international law forbidding intervention in domestic conflicts, according to Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (1995: 9). Although, this principle had been established since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations also forbade the global body itself from intervening in domestic affairs of any state (Khare, 1985: 132). It was this intimidating legal perspective that served as the tower of strength for the ECOMOG's critics. The critics held forth that the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia would have been lawful if the government in power then in Liberia had invited ECOWAS to intervene in the conflict. In the absence of invitation by the effective government, according to some critics, ECOMOG in Liberia would have been legal as well, if the ECOWAS had summoned the various factional war lords and obtained their consent before the intervention (Kufour, 1993: 533, 543). Critics concluded that in the absence of both possibilities, the United Nations remained the only legal body that could intervene in the conflict. Comparing ECOWAS intervention in Liberia with the internationally condemned United States' invasion of Grenada with troops from other seven Caribbean countries in 1983 (Gilmore, 1984: 107-108), critics roundly denounced ECOMOG deployment in Liberia.

There were several reasons put forward to justify ECOWAS deployment of EOMOG in Liberia despite a barrage of criticisms. These validation mainly based on the collective security of the sub-region were defended both at the regional and supranational levels. At the United Nations Security Council, Nigeria had argued that the ECOWAS in agreement with the entire leaders of the West African sub-region as well as from the OAU came in to avert the situation in Liberia

from degenerating into a threat to international peace and security (UN, 22 January 1991: 8). President Ibrahim Babangida, who was also the ECOWAS Chairman at that particular time, justified the deployment of ECOMOG on the ground that the Liberian crisis had a destabilising effect on West Africa (Kufour, 1993: 528). In October 1990, Ibrahim Babangida confirmed the legality of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia by referring critics to Article 52 of the UN Charter pertaining to the role of ECOWAS and other regional organisations across the world. He also affirmed the excuse of the deployment of the interventionist force:

“...if events are such that have the potential to threaten the stability, peace and security in this sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others in this sub-region, was duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to either avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and security...” and that “Nigeria and other responsible countries in this sub-region” should not “stand by and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass graveyard.” “...the reasons for our dynamic but positive action in the Liberian crisis are not mysterious...they are to ensure collective security ...of our peoples.” (IBB, Press Briefing, 31 October, 1990).

However, as potent as the arguments of these critics sound, we must point out here that the United Nations Secretary General had declared that ECOWAS intervention in Liberia did not need prior authorisation from the UN (Ofodile, 1994: 414). In addition, it is important to note here that the concept of collective security is solely based on the theory of universality and indivisibility of peace (Akindele, 1976: 3). Therefore, ECOMOG activities in resolving Liberian conflict might not be very unconstitutional. Furthermore, history is replete with events of similar interventions as measures to safeguard regional security. A good example of such interventions in history was the 1823 coalition of the British, French and Russian forces in putting a stop to the Greek civil war considered as a real threat to the security of Europe. Also between 1875 and 1876, the whole of Europe had to intervene militarily in the Turkish violence that was a menace to European security (De Lima, 1971: 126). It may therefore not be unusual or unconstitutional for a coalition of states whose collective security is being threatened, (as the Liberian civil war later turned out to be) by the internal turbulence in one of them to put such a troubled state in order.

According to Janet Fleischman (*Africa Watch*, June 1993), although the UN has contributed beyond measure to the supply of emergency relief and humanitarian aid to Liberia when the war

started, the global body failed to address the crisis in political terms until November 1992. Perhaps, the UN might have waited for almost three years after the crisis erupted before taking action because it considered the Liberian crisis as a regional one best solved by the regional organisation, the ECOWAS. The UN and the African Union (AU) co-joined the peace process in Liberia first, by reducing the influence of Nigeria in ECOMOG, to appease the NPFL and gain its confidence. This they did by encouraging the inclusion of contingents from Senegal and Mali as well as AU peacekeepers from Tanzania and Uganda and the UN peacekeepers from other nations of the world. Although the overall contribution of troops by the two bodies was less than 3,000, however, they sanctioned ECOMOG's actions (Adebajo, 2002b: 51).

Initially, the UN resolution established an observer force, the ECOMOG Military Observer Group in 1990 but in 1993, the Security Council set up the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which mandate ended on September 30 1997. UNOMIL was a small group of 78 men, partly deployed to checkmate the perceived excesses of ECOMOG troops and to persuade Taylor to honour the cease-fire agreement reached by all factional leaders in Geneva and Cotonou in July 1993 (Adibe 2002: 124, van Walraven 1999: 83-84). The UN also established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) to succeed UNOMIL in November 1997. UNOL was a post-conflict peace-building support initiative set up by the world body to assist the Liberian government in consolidating peace after the July multiparty elections in the country. However, the inability of the new government in Liberia and opposition leaders to resolve their differences on governance hindered the peace-building efforts of UNOL (UN Resolution 1497, 2003).

The disagreement between the government and opposition leaders, lack of national reconciliation, human rights abuses and harassment of political opponents resorted to a renewed civil war in 2003. The intensified second Liberian civil war with its attendant human carnage prompted the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution establishing a multinational force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (UN Resolution 1497, 2003). The establishment of UNMIL in September 2003 naturally terminated the mandate of UNOL. Meanwhile, the factional parties in Liberia had signed a Comprehensive Agreement in Accra in August 2003 asking the UN to deploy a force in Liberia to support the National Transitional Government and

to assist in the implementation of the Accra Accord. The Accra Agreement paved way for the workability of UNMIL in Liberia. Based on the unanimous adoption of a resolution by the UN Security Council on 19 September 2003, UNMIL was deployed in Liberia on October 1. The 3,500 troops from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo who had been serving with ECOMIL were drafted into the UN peacekeeping and UNMIL forces in Liberia (UN Resolution 1509, 2003).

The United States, which had surprisingly remained indifferent to the conflict in its former colony and ally in Africa, did not totally support ECOMOG effort in Liberia. Although, the US applauded the initial success of ECOMOG of driving the NPFL forces out of Monrovia but accused the force of backing ULIMO. Furthermore, the United States regarded the interim government headed by Amos Sawyer not only as endemically corrupt but also as a partisan tool in ECOMOG's hands. Thus, the American peripheral backing for ECOMOG activities in Liberia resulted in an unsatisfactorily small logistical and financial support from the United States (Adebajo, 2002a: 92-93). Perhaps, one of the incidents that pushed United States to consider a tougher stance against Taylor's NPFL was the gruesome murder of five American nuns by the rebel forces in Monrovia in October 1992. Nevertheless, the proposal by the US to take a more stringent position against Charles Taylor did not translate into more financial support for ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002a: 106). However, towards the end of the mission, the US provided some logistics support through the American company, Pacific Architects and Engineer which supplied the force with trucks and drivers (Leatherwood 2001: 20-21; Khobe, 2000:ISS Monograph No 44). The initial refusal by the US to support ECOMOG in Liberia has been explained to be partially because of the tense relations between Nigeria and the US during the period. In addition, the decision may be the American wary approach to prevent in Liberia a repetition of its October 1993 failed mission in Somalia (Adebajo, 2008: 183).

The ECOMOG faced severe criticism based on corruption, looting, non-professionalism, bias and prejudice, and abuse of human rights during its deployment in Liberia. Africa Watch, an American-based human rights group was the first of such organisations to accuse ECOMOG of looting and raiding during the troops' exercise to ward off the NPFL from central Monrovia in October 1990. The United States authorised its \$16.5 million contribution to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia in 1995 to be spent majorly on Tanzanian and Ugandan ECOMOG contingents while

access to the fund by West African contingents was completely cut off. The United States based its decision on lack of accountability among the West African troops. The State Department's annual report for 1995 indicted ECOMOG troops of looting the iron ore industry of Buchanan and Monrovia's Bong Mining Company. ECOMOG's senior officials confirmed some of these damning indictments. Many Liberians believed that throughout its mission in Liberia, corruption and organised looting by ECOMOG soldiers were commonplace, hence the acronymic re-coinage of ECOMOG by the people to mean, "Every Car or Movable Object Gone" (Adebajo, 2002a: 80, 173; Ellis, 2001: 265-266).

With reference to professionalism, Senegalese contingents were initially adjudged the best, being the most courteous to civilians and did not loot as much as the others did. One of the leaked cables of the United States government in November 1992 acquitted the Senegalese and Guinean contingents of non-professionalism and indiscipline. Part of the leaked cable quoted thus:

"ECOMOG... has not acquitted itself with distinction, with the notable exception of the Senegalese and Guineans. Some elements of the other contingents have been worse than useless, repeatedly abandoning positions without a fight and leaving to others the task of recovering terrain..." Janet Fleischman, (Africa Watch, June 1993).

However, the service of the Senegalese soldiers was fleeting after six of them were killed by Taylor's rebel army during a gun battle between the two forces in Vahun, Lofa County on May 28 1992 (Adebajo, 2002a: 108). Senegal withdrew its 1,800 strong army in January 1993 on the pretext that the troops were needed back at home to man the polling stations during February Presidential elections as well as confronting the Casamance separatist group (Adebajo, 2002a: 102; African Watch, June 1993). Meanwhile, the 1995 U.S. State Department's annual report was doubtful about the professionalism of the bulk of ECOMOG soldiers. For example, the report found Nigerian contingents guilty of drug trafficking and Ghanaian troops of child prostitution (Adebajo, 2002a: 173). Furthermore, ECOMOG was alleged to have succumbed to bias and prejudice in its Liberian mission. There was a belief that ECOMOG was the source of ULIMO and AFL weapons, since it was difficult to track where the factions obtained their weapons. A statement credited to the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau had it

that, ECOMOG "...abandoned its neutrality when it began to arm the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)..." Ann Reid, (INR, April 6, 1993).

On abuse of fundamental human rights, ECOMOG was accused of indiscriminate bombing and strafing of civilian targets using Nigeria's Alpha jets, especially on Charles Taylor held territory. Places bombed included the port of Buchanan and areas around Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel and Greenville. During these air raids, there were violations of medical neutrality as hospitals were destroyed. The main commercial street of Kataka was attacked by mid-day in December 1992 where the civilian population was strafed indiscriminately. Although, many Liberians felt that when ECOMOG had failed to enforce a peaceful solution to the crisis, it was dragged into the war as a warring faction. Thus, its role had changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcing while its rules of engagement was more aggressive. ECOMOG forces denied bombing civilian targets, however, the civilian population in this territory became terrorised by the mere sound of the jets (Africa Watch, June 1993).

The action unfortunately turned away the people's loyalty to ECOMOG toward a solid support for Taylor and thereby preventing the intended effect of breaking the will of the NPFL to fight. Nevertheless, we must critically consider the precarious state of the peacekeepers here; "...they not only can use force if they feel threatened and are empowered to disarm the warring factions, but they can also attack targets that might contribute to a threat against them." In addition, although, a peacekeeping force must be an "impartial arbiter" but at the same time, its role could change into that of "peace enforcer" due to circumstances (Africa Watch, June 1993). For example, in the city of Monrovia, ECOMOG's role as peacekeeper had to abruptly change to peace enforcer in 1992 when Taylor's NPFL attacked the city and ECOMOG had to defend it (van der Kraaij, 2015: 69).

Regardless of ECOMOG's criticism, ECOMOG started to accomplish some set objectives, especially between September and November 1990. For example, the General Dongoyaro led force was able to repel the NPFL rebel forces from central Monrovia, set up a buffer zone, capture Spriggs Payne Airport, and blockade the port of Buchanan (Magya, 1998: 59-65). The steps taken cut off arms supply to the NPFL and forced Taylor to accept a cease-fire in November 1990. Also, it was possible for ECOMOG to establish its headquarters while



electricity and water were restored, and humanitarian assistance work once abandoned recommenced in Monrovia (Adebajo, 2002a: 80). In addition, the ECOMOG action resorted in the confinement of the AFL and the INPFL to their barracks and the restoration of semblance of peace and order in the city. Most importantly, the ECOMOG military option allowed the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer (Africa Watch, June 1993). The NPFL's 1992 "Operation Octopus" attack on Monrovia left many of the city dwellers dead, but ECOMOG forces were able to prevent Taylor's rebel soldiers from capturing the city. There was a belief in Liberia that for the timely intervention of ECOMOG, Taylor's forces would have destroyed the city of Monrovia (van der Kraaij, 2015: 69).

It is pertinent to point out in this section of the essay that there were series of diplomatic moves through peace talks sponsored by ECOWAS to reach a political solution to the Liberian civil war, even while the war was ongoing. Unfortunately, almost all the peace arrangements appeared to be unworkable. From Banjul Meeting of August 7 1990 (ECOWAS SMC Banjul, August, 6-7 1990), to the Ceasefire Agreement, June 17 2003 at Accra, Ghana, all deteriorated into the habitual pattern of reneging on commitments to honour the agreements. Taylor and his NPFL were the chief culprits in breaking agreements, each time accusing Nigeria of wanting to commit genocide on the Liberians as a result of deployment of ECOMOG forces (Africa Watch, June 1993). After the preliminary peace meetings, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) agreed with NPFL demands with the inclusion of ECOMOG troops from other ECOWAS countries apart from Nigeria, the UNOMIL, and the UN observers as part of the agreement. At subsequent peace meetings, cease-fire agreements were reached, however, many a time, these agreements will be jettisoned leading to another round of agreements (van der Kraaij, 2015: 69). The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and the political parties was the final peace agreement. The comprehensive peace agreement was signed on August 18 2003 (USIP, August 18 2003). Table 6: 1 below depicts the various peace agreements from the beginning of the Liberian civil war to 2003.

**Table 6:1:** Showing the Liberian Comprehensive list of Peace Agreements.

| S/N | Peace Agreement                                | Date               | Venue                        |
|-----|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| 1   | Banjul Communiqué, ECOWAS Plan                 | August 7, 1990     | Banjul, The Gambia           |
| 2   | Bamako Ceasefire                               | November 28, 1990  | Bamako, Mali                 |
| 3   | Banjul Joint Statement                         | December 21, 1990  | Banjul, The Gambia           |
| 4   | Lomé Agreement                                 | February 13, 1991  | Lomé, Togo                   |
| 5   | Yamoussoukro I Accord                          | June 30, 1991      | Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire  |
| 6   | Yamoussoukro II Accord                         | July 29, 1991      | Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire  |
| 7   | Yamoussoukro III Accord                        | September 17, 1991 | Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire  |
| 8   | Yamoussoukro IV Accord                         | October 30, 1991   | Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire  |
| 9   | Geneva Ceasefire                               | July 17, 1993      | Geneva, Switzerland          |
| 10  | Cotonou Agreement                              | July 25, 1993      | Cotonou, République du Bénin |
| 11  | Akosombo Agreement                             | September 12, 1994 | Akosombo, Ghana              |
| 12  | Acceptance and Accession to Akosombo Agreement | December 21, 1994  | Accra, Ghana                 |
| 13  | Accra Clarification of Akosombo Agreement      | December 21, 1994  | Accra, Ghana                 |
| 14  | Abuja Agreement (I)                            | August 19, 1995    | Abuja, Nigeria               |
| 15  | Supplement to Abuja Agreement (II)             | August 17, 1996    | Abuja, Nigeria               |
| 16  | Ceasefire Agreement                            | June 17, 2003      | Accra, Ghana                 |
| 17  | Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement            | August 18, 2003    | Accra, Ghana                 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from: Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Final report, Volume II: Consolidated Final Report*, 2009, p. 159/160 (Culled from, van der Kraaij, F. 2015. *Liberia: From the Love of Liberty to Paradise Lost*. Leiden: African Studies Centre, p. 142).

#### **6.4 PATTERNS OF NIGERIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERIA, 1990-2010**

Based on a comprehensive mandate from the ECOWAS, ECOMOG troops totalling 3,000 arrived in Liberia on 25 August 1990 (Ero, 1995: 1). Coincidentally, Nigeria found itself again using the multinational peacekeeping tool of resolving a foreign policy crisis eight years after its

withdrawal from Chad. In addition, the Liberian crisis had challenged Nigeria's sub-regional foreign policy goals and the principle of "concentric circles," according to Aworawo (personal communication, January, 23 2015). Therefore, Nigeria had to repeat a pattern of its Chad experience in Liberia, albeit more wisely this time (Mays, 1993:95). The country had intentionally allowed the ECOWAS to mandate its monitoring group, the ECOMOG arrangement in Liberia, while the formation and operations of the force were in full control from Abuja. Based on Nigeria's operations in Chad where it failed to resolve all political issues involved, Mays identified the combination of power and finesse applied by Nigeria in its military engagement in Liberia. Apart from Nigeria's maintenance of full control over peacekeeping operations, the country also tried to secure ceasefire before deployment of its troops and made necessary arrangements for multiple ways to obtain needed finances. In addition, the country employed its own solutions to logistical and transportation needs while keeping to the barest minimum external influence over the troops.

While these arrangements were made, Nigeria became responsible for the supply of the largest size of troops and the bulk of finance. By January 1993, out of the 16,000 ECOMOG troops on the ground in Liberia, Nigeria provided 75 per cent and spent 90 per cent of the cost of operations. The balance of 4,000 soldiers or 25 per cent came from Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone. This gave ECOMOG the offensive strength to battle Taylor's estimated 10,000 NPFL rebel forces, especially during its abortive "Operation Octopus" declared on ECOMOG in October, 1992 (Adebajo, 2002a: 121; 2002b: 48). Immediately after the formation of the interventionist force in 1990, Nigeria contributed 84 per cent of troops needed. Between 1991 and the end of 1993 when the demand for ECOMOG troops increased, the country contributed the lion share and in the years 1995, 1996 1997 when the force stood at 8,000, 7,000 and 11,000 respectively, Nigeria contributed 75, 85 and 82 per cent of troops separately (Ajayi 2004:205).

Mays (1993: 110-112), opined that the three distinguishing intervention features were Nigeria's strategies to have greater political control over ECOMOG in comparison with the country's experience in Chad under the aegis of the defunct OAU (AU) between 1981 and 1982. However in this essay, I would like to treat those features as patterns of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia. The first was the creation of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, which Nigeria

spearheaded. The Nigerian Military President, Ibrahim Babangida prodded his co-ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to approve at the May 1990 annual summit. Babangida assured them that the approval of the SMC was in accordance with the 1981 ECOWAS Defence Pact (Akabogu, 1992: 79). In the face of the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry in West Africa, ordinarily, the Francophone countries were not supposed to easily succumb to the overtures of formation of an SMC from Nigeria. Surprisingly however, the French-speaking countries supported the proposal and two of them; Togo and Mali became members of the SMC. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Francophone countries could have given their support for the formation of the SMC and the creation of ECOMOG because they thought both would fail (Vogt, 1992: 159).

Perhaps, the conception of the lack of success of ECOMOG by the Francophone states initially made Mali and Togo, both members of the SMC, as well as Côte d'Ivoire refused to contribute troops to the force (Adebajo, 2002b: 52; Mays, 1993:111). Nigeria most likely must have envisaged fierce opposition to the establishment of ECOMOG from the Francophone West African states. Thus, the formation of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee as led by Nigeria might be a strategy to legitimise the establishment of ECOMOG and persuade the Francophone states to join subsequently. Ibrahim Babangida had used his personal relationships with the leaders of the Anglophone countries of Ghana, The Gambia and Sierra Leone to gain their support. However, the Francophone states were vehemently opposed to the idea. Togo, although an SMC member refused to support ECOMOG based on an argument that the initiation could lead to more bloodshed. Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Senegal were in opposition to what they believed was an SMC appropriation of the powers of ECOWAS Authority. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire countered what seemed to be attempted hegemony in West Africa while Burkina Faso saw Nigeria as an the American stooge in Liberia. Overall majority of the Francophone states kicked against an unacceptable cast-iron certainty called the SMC and ECOMOG to them, was an invasion force (Adebajo, 2002a: 53, 62-64).

The SMC as crafted was intended to play a mediating role rather than imposing solutions on conflicts (Adebajo 2002a: 65). The structure of the SMC entailed that a state under attack had to inform the Executive Secretary in writing for him to refer the matter to the Committee for

settlement. Based on this, Samuel Doe forwarded a letter to the SMC requesting assistance to finding a constitutional solution to the Liberian crisis. Doe put forward his considered opinion about how best the crisis could be resolved by asking for an ECOWAS peacekeeping force to preclude the tension (Weller, 1994: 60-61). Doe's appeal resulted to a proposal for the formation of a cease-fire monitoring group, ECOMOG and the subsequent establishment of an interim government in Liberia (Vogt, 1992: 159). The evidence that Doe invited ECOWAS peacekeeping force himself through the instrumentalities of the SMC nullified the argument that Doe appealed to only two of the ECOWAS member states- Nigeria and Togo to come over and assist him in thwarting the rebellion (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994: 262). Also, the defence advanced by some Francophone states in refusing to support the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia was a nullity. ECOWAS responded to the invitation of the *de jure* government of Liberia and therefore, ECOMOG was not an invasion force (Weller, 1994: 67-72).

The second pattern of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia was fielding of ECOMOG. A wise military strategy taken by Nigeria was to initially insist that Ghana should provide a force commander for ECOMOG in order to mitigate the fears of Taylor's NPFL (Adebajo, 2002a: 62) while Guinea was to appoint his deputy. In addition, a Nigerian naval force was had stationed off the Liberian coast before the formation of ECOMOG (Mays, 1993: 111). However, it seemed that ECOMOG under the leadership of the first Force Commander, a Ghanaian, Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo was not effective enough to restrain the notorious activities of Liberian rebel groups, especially, Taylor's NPFL in and around Monrovia. In September 1990 soon after the death of Samuel Doe in the hands of Prince Johnson's INPFL, Nigeria's Major General Joshua Dogonyaro took over from Quainoo. Under the leadership of Dongoyaro, ECOMOG mandate had to change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and within a limited time, rebels forces were flushed out of Monrovia and peace restored to the city. Because Nigeria was poised to exhibit dominance in the creation, fielding, and operations of ECOMOG, it did not dilly-dally in overthrowing the leadership of the Ghanaian General when the situation looked like the forces had been held to ransom by Taylor's rebels in Monrovia in 1990 (Adebajo, 2002a; 78-80, Mays 1993: 111).

While Nigeria saw it as a duty to take the pride of place in the formation, fielding and functionality of ECOMOG, Ghana grumbled about the abrupt change in field commanders. Ghana complained that the decision was not a collective one made by ECOWAS but unilaterally taken by Nigeria. Some of the ECOWAS member states readily accepted Nigeria's prime position in operations of ECOMOG. For instance, Togo although a member of the SMC, disagreed to contribute troops (Adebajo, 2002a: 64, 112), and acknowledged that ECOMOG was "an effective Nigerian war machine." Another proof affirming Nigerian leadership of ECOMOG by other countries in the sub-region, was the action and reaction of the Sierra Leonean leadership to the infiltration of Taylor's forces into that country. Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone, by principle was supposed to have approached the ECOWAS Chairman and the President of The Gambia for help from ECOMOG during the 1991 NPFL sortie into Sierra Leone, but he quickly accosted Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria for military assistance (Mays, 1993:112).

The third pattern adopted by Nigeria in its contributions to restoration of peace in Liberia was the domination of ECOMOG political approval and spearheading the appeal funds. By ethical standards, the chair of ECOWAS, The Gambia was supposed to take political actions on behalf of the body, however, the responsibility was taken over by Nigeria. For instance, it was Ibrahim Babangida and not Dauda Jawara that sent diplomatic representatives to the Francophone states of Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, and Togo when they refused to support ECOMOG deployment in Liberia. In the United Nations, Nigerian Foreign Minister and the country's permanent representative to the UN, Rilwanu Lukman and Ibrahim Gambari respectively spoke for ECOWAS instead of delegates of ECOWAS or Jawara himself. In addition, it was Nigerian emissary that met with the UN Security Council representatives from the United States, Britain, Russia, and France to solicit for financial assistance for ECOMOG. As passionately argued by Terry Mays (1993:112), Nigeria definitely applied the political lesson gained from the Chadian experience to have come out with these line of patterns in its involvement in Liberia.

Despite the widespread criticism aimed at the soldiers in Liberia during the early period of ECOMOG mission (Africa Watch, June 1993), the level of professionalism and discipline of the Nigerian armed forces could not be overemphasised. The role of each of the armed forces; the

army, navy and air force, was distinct but complementary. According to Ahmed Sule (2013:8), the functions of the Nigerian Army during their mission in Liberia included, assisting in establishing a safe and secure environment; disarmament supervision, disengaging and withdrawing former combatants, monitoring and supervising cease-fire agreements; supervising prisoner exchanges and, assisting in the establishment and implementation of arms control regimes. On the other hand, in addition to sea lifting of troops and logistics from other ECOWAS countries and deployment of naval assets, the operational tasks of the Nigerian Navy was multifarious. These included, sea surveillance and blockade of supply of arms and ammunition to the rebels; control of shipping; provision of gunfire support to ground troops from the sea; search and rescue mission, and policing of ships conveying relief materials. From its Lungi International Airport base in Liberia, the Nigerian Air Force also provided close air support to ECOMOG ground forces in addition to some other air support operations. Very important operational tasks like, air reconnaissance; transportation of troops, logistics and materials, evacuation of casualties, and aerial patrol for observation and sight reporting of incidents taking place on the ground (Sule, 2013: 11-15).

It takes high professionalism for an army to go through such trainings as “observation techniques, negotiation and mediation skills, surveillance and supervision, information gathering, presence patrolling, and investigation of complaints,” of which Nigerian armed forces went through as part of their pre-deployment preparations (Sule, 2013: 8 and, Generals Kwabe and Maigari, personal communications, February 25 2015). The deployment of some naval assets by the Nigerian Navy such as two Fast Attack Craft Missile, one Landing Ship Tank (LST), two Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMV), one Tug, three Merchant Ships and one Oil Tanker, to support ECOMOG operations speaks volume of its efficiency (Sule, 2013: 11-15, and Commodore Ojediran, personal communication, January 26 2015). The professional standards of the Nigerian Air Force was highly commendable and least expected in its ECOMOG mission in Liberia, especially as it was the first time to be deployed for such an operation since 1964. The air force was able to use visual observation and detection methods like air photography, radar, infra-red, electronic and acoustic devices to undertake its air reconnaissance operations. The air force was also able to deploy such military flying machines as Dornier 228 light transport



aircraft, Alpha Jets, C-130 military transport planes, and NAF Super Puma helicopters during the mission (Sule, 2013: 8, 11-15).

Disarmament, resettlement and elections programmes supervised by ECOMOG came to a conclusion on 19 July 1997 (Lt. Col. Adams, personal communication, January 26 2015). The most powerful Liberian warlord and the most detestable enemy of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG forces won the presidential election (Leatherwood 2001: 24). The intention of Nigeria to withdraw its troops started with the interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan in 1993. Shonekan, who succeeded Ibrahim Babangida, the initiator of ECOMOG believed that the continued financing of ECOMOG by Nigeria was too strenuous on the country's economy. Ernest Shonekan therefore attempted to withdraw the 12,000 strong Nigeria ECOMOG soldiers by March 1994. Sanni Abacha who took over from the interim arrangement in November 1993 did not carry out the threat of outright withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Liberia, he merely reduced the strength of the forces to 6,000 strong in November, 1994 (Adebajo, 2002a: 133, 135). However, following Charles Taylor's electoral victory in July 1997, and his continued opposition to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, the last Field Commander, General Timothy Shelpidi, was ordered to withdraw the remaining forces in Liberia by the end of 1998 (Adebajo, 2002a: 233-234; Iliffe, 2011: 218).


By the time Nigerian troops were finally leaving Liberia, there were testimonies about them that invalidated the belief held earlier on by some Liberians about their professionalism and discipline. The United Nations Chief Representative, the US Ambassador and American officers on the ground in Liberia spoke highly of the proficiency of Nigerian troops (Sanghera, Henry and Higate, 2008: 9-10). With heavy investment by Nigeria in the formation, fielding and operations of ECOMOG, it is understandable the reason why the country wanted to be at the helm of its affairs (Generals Kwabe and Maigari, (Rtd.), private communication, February 2015). An opportunity offered itself only when Samuel Doe was murdered by the INPFL rebels at a time when General Quainoo was the Force Commander. When General Dongoyaro took over from Quainoo, he was succeeded by an unbroken line of Nigerian Generals (Adebajo, 2002a: 81; Agetua. 1992: 83-85). Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below respectively depict ECOMOG Commanders from 1990-1999 and the Command Structure of ECOMOG under General Joshua Dogonyaro.

**Table 6.2:** ECOMOG Commanders from 1990-1999.

| Rank               | Name of Commander  | Country | Office          | Duration of Command   |
|--------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Lieutenant General | Arnold Ouainoo     | Ghana   | Force Commander | July 1990-Sept. 1990  |
| Major General      | Joshua Dogonyaro   | Nigeria | Field Commander | Sept. 1990-Feb. 1991  |
| Major General      | Rufus Kupolati     | Nigeria | Field Commander | Feb. 1991- Sept. 1991 |
| Major General      | Ishaya Bakut       | Nigeria | Field Commander | Sept. 1991- Oct. 1992 |
| Major General      | Tunji Olurin       | Nigeria | Field Commander | Oct. 1992- Oct. 1993  |
| Major General      | John Shagaya       | Nigeria | Field Commander | Oct. 1993- Dec. 1993  |
| Major General      | John Mark Inienger | Nigeria | Field Commander | Dec.1993- Aug. 1996   |
| Major General      | Victor Malu        | Nigeria | Force Commander | Aug. 1996- Jan. 1998  |
| Major General      | Timothy Shelpidi   | Nigeria | Force Commander | Jan.1998- March 1999  |
| Major General      | Felix Mujakperuo   | Nigeria | Force Commander | March 1999            |

**Source:** Compilation by the author.

**Table 6.3 :** The Command Structure of ECOMOG under Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro.



**Source:** Adapted from Nkem Agetua. 1992. *Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro*. Lagos: Hona Communications. Pp. 83-85 (Culled from Adibe, C.A. 2001. “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in Anglophone West Africa” in Khadiagala, G.M. and T. Lyons (eds.). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. P. 26).

### 6.5 COSTS OF NIGERIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERIA

Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia was bitterly criticised at home. The criticism was based on the high cost of maintaining the peace in a foreign land in the face of an unhealthy economy at home. However, the army and the government defended their action in Liberia as one of maintenance of the peace and a demonstration of good neighbourliness in the sub-region (Adebajo, 2002a: 171). It has been argued that the real human and material costs of Nigeria’s

intervention in Liberia and by extension, Sierra Leone may never be known. This may not be because such facts and figures were shrouded in official secrecy. Some estimates put the number of dead Nigerian soldiers at over 1,000 (Sanghera, Henry and Higate, 2008: 9-10; *Thisday* August 4 2003; *Nigerian Tribune*, October 9 1999). Included in the number of Nigerian military casualties was Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, who was on secondment to Sierra Leone as Chief of Defence Staff from 1998 to 2000, after serving his term as Commander of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. He died of encephalitis (brain inflammation), in a Lagos hospital a week after he was evacuated back from Sierra Leone (*Tempo*, 3 May 2000). Apparently, the illness was not unrelated to the trauma of war. Additionally, the number of Nigerian civilians who paid the supreme price, including two journalists, Krees Imodibie and Tayo Awotusin; could not be determined (*Nigerian Tribune*, October 9 1999).

In money and materials, the exact amount was also based on estimations. Like figures of civilian and military casualties, no Nigerian administration from Ibrahim Babangida to Abdulsalam Abubakar ever disclosed them to neither Nigerians nor the international community. Nevertheless, Nigeria's military adventure to Liberia was believed to have gulped much of the country's revenues from 1990. Most arguably, part of the windfall from Nigeria's oil sales amounting to US\$12.4 billion during the Gulf War in 1991 (Adebajo, 2008:2), was wasted on the interposition in the Mano River Union. Scholars have come out with different estimations of the actual amount ranging from, US\$2.8 billion (Abegunrin, 2003: 14), US\$4 billion (Olonisakin, 2008: 44), to US\$8 billion (Iliffe, 2011: 218; Agbu, 2006: 72; Ajayi 2004:205; Adebajo and Landsberg 2003: 190). The administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, declared the ballpark expenses on Nigeria's peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone to be in the neighbourhood of US\$8 billion (*Nigerian Tribune*, October 9 1999). Thus in the current calculation in naira and kobo, Nigeria spent in excess of ₦3.5 trillion in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This amount was gargantuan compared to what the country spent in its first peacekeeping efforts ever; Nigeria expended an approximately US\$46 million on the Congo-UN Peace Force from 1961 to 1964 (*Daily Times*, 17 April 1965).

According to Commodore Ojediran (personal communication, January 26 2015), Nigeria could probably not be able to account for the material lost incurred during the Liberian civil war due to

its military unpreparedness and blind haste with which the mission commenced. He however affirmed that Nigeria lost some aircraft, war vessels and tanks while a naval ship sank in the operation; all estimated at billions of naira. He mentioned the instance of two of Nigeria naval ships meant to carry battalions for amphibian operations, that were destroyed beyond repairs. However, to serve as a parenthetical summation of Nigeria's expenses on peacekeeping operations generally, President Obasanjo confirmed in 2001 that Nigeria had spent US\$13 billion in 12 years (*BBC News Profile*, Thursday June 17 2004). Nevertheless, this estimation could probably be a crude one going by the military tradition of writing off revenues expended in operations (Adebajo, 2008: 193).

Interestingly, it has been argued that Nigeria gained politically from the Liberian operations, however, there was nothing to show for it economically despite the mammoth human and material sacrifice the country made (Agbu, 2006: 74-75). If Nigerians could criticise the amount of US\$46 million the government spent on the first peacekeeping in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 as prodigal (Ogba, 1986: 63), to say the least, the over US\$8 billion spent on Liberia and Sierra Leone was extravagantly wasteful. Such expenditures were grossly out of tune with the economic realities on the ground in Nigeria. It is doubtful if Nigeria could ever recoup the money spent on Liberia. For example, it is known that no Nigerian company was awarded any contract in the reconstruction of Liberia, except the supply of military hardware and training of personnel. This is unlike a country like the United States of America and its companies which recovered the dollars expended on peacekeeping with the acquisition of contracts of reconstructing such nations after the war (*Daily Post*, May 22 2013). For instance, construction firms from the US and some others from countries in the "coalition of the willing" took up the rebuilding projects in Iraq after the protracted war in the country (Al Jazeera, December 11 2009).

## 6.6 CONCLUSION

The deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia, was within Africa, the first laudable attempt to launch a regional security scheme since the OAU (AU) planned to form a continental military outfit to interpose in Chad in 1981. Based on its experience in Chad in the 1980s, Nigeria realised that it cannot embark on the peace mission to Liberia alone without the support of other countries in the

sub-region. The country's leaders were quick to spearhead the formation of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), which served as the supporting structure on which the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), stood. Since Nigeria saw it a sense of duty to take the pride of place in the formation, fielding and functionality of ECOMOG, apart from being that driving force behind the formation of the SMC, the country also pushed forward a smaller country, Ghana, to provide the first force commander. Nigeria did this as a strategy to mitigate the fears of Taylor's NPFL and those of other member nations of ECOWAS that Nigeria was all out to exert its authority over the sub-region. Meanwhile as a further strategy to hold sway over ECOMOG the country dominated ECOMOG political approval and lead the appeal funds.

Nigerian intervention in Liberia as it did in the Congo between 1960 to 1964 was to prevent a core value challenge. It was the country's reaction to disallow an ethnic based civil war and the overthrow of an elected national government. Nigerian took up the gauntlet to lead as the supposed hegemon in the sub-region and encouraged the others who were so willing to follow. Nigeria accepted it as a duty to maintain political stability of West Africa which was so germane to its own national stability. The country would neither tolerate a situation that was poised to affect its economic interests nor a government that would have a domino effect on political stability in the sub-region. Nigeria rejected a regime in Liberia likely to be headed by Charles Taylor who was capable of using his army to overthrow many elected governments in West Africa, knowing fully well that his army was made up of dissidents from neighbouring countries. Most importantly, the negligence of the Western nations about the situation in Liberia after the Cold War, thrust Nigeria into leading others to restore peace in Liberia. Having gone through the formation of ECOMOG, the role, patterns and costs of Nigeria's involvement in this chapter, the essay would progress to the following chapter where it would look at Nigeria and its conflict resolution efforts in Guinea-Bissau.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: NIGERIA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GUINEA BISSAU

### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

A few years after multiparty elections took place in Guinea-Bissau, a civil war broke out. The long-time dyed-in-the-wool conflict in the neighbouring Casamance, a region in southern Senegal, was a determining factor in the Guinea-Bissau civil war of 1989 to 1999. The dominant ethnic group in Casamance, the Jola, shared cultural affinities with their kith and kin, the Balanta of Guinea-Bissau who harboured the PAIGC fighters during the war of independence (Massey, 2006: 85; Stride and Ifeka, 1971: 6). There was a feeling of economic domination of the Jola by the Wolof, the majority ethnic group in Senegal. This sentiment made the Jola, who constituted about 4 per cent of the population in Senegal, form a separatist movement in 1982. The *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance*-MFDC (Movement of Democratic forces of Casamance), advocated for the independence or an autonomous administrative status for Casamance (*Nationalia*, March 23, 2010). The rise in tension among political and military leaders in Guinea-Bissau was closely linked to the Jola agitations in Senegal (Yabi, 2010: 17). The immediate cause of the civil war in 1998 was a personal vendetta between President João Bernardo Vieira and his chief of army staff, Ansumane Mané (Adebajo, 2002b: 115). (The remote and immediate causes of the civil war are discussed at length in chapter 5 of this thesis).

The civil war was an unusual one which started between Vieira, and his bosom friend, Mané, but lasted with extensive human, socio-economic and psychological aftermaths. The army was in support of João Vieira while the rebels, under the name, *Junta Militar para a Consolidação da Democracia, Paz e Justiça*-JM (Military Junta for the Consolidation of Peace and Justice), fought on the side of Ansumane Mané. Both citing bilateral defence accords, Senegal sent 2,200 soldiers and Guinea, 400 men and helicopters to battle on the side of João Vieira. Senegal seized the opportunity to flush out the MFDC from their traditional abode while the MFDC fought alongside JM against their avowed enemy, the Senegalese. Apart from the cordiality between Lansana Conté and João Vieira, Guinea was wary of implications of refugee influx into its own country (*Africa Research Bulletin* June, 1998). However, the military intervention of the two neighbouring countries exacerbated the tempo of a mêlée as the citizens considered this as an open affront and thus attracted the rekindling of the die-hard Guinea-Bissau nationalism.



Subsequently, the majority of the loyalist soldiers fighting on the side of Vieira, except the Presidential Guard, deserted and supported by ex-combatants of the liberation war, fought on the side of Mané against the Guinean and Senegalese invading forces. The Guinea-Bissau civil war continued until a peace agreement was reached in Abuja in November, 1998 (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 126; Massey, 2006: 85).

## **7.2 ECOMOG AND THE GUINEA-BISSAU CRISIS**

There were two military interventions in the Guinea-Bissau crisis. The first was the incursion of the armed forces of the two neighbouring countries, Senegal and Guinea, in support of President Vieira, and the second was the deployment of ECOMOG III intervention force (the third after Liberia and Sierra Leone). At their July 1998 meeting, the ECOWAS authorities backed Vieira's government as legitimate, supported the intervention of Senegalese and Guinean armed forces while they recommended an ECOMOG interposition force in the troubled country. A committee of seven made up of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal was set up to chart a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Later, the working group was expanded to a nine-member committee to include Togo and Cape Verde. The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* – CPLP, including Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe were also involved in the resolution of the conflict. The CPLP's resolution was the outright withdrawal of the Senegalese and the Guinea troops and their instant replacement with forces from these Portuguese-speaking states. The collective opinion of the Lusophone countries with regards the process of resolving the crisis was vehemently opposed by their ECOWAS counterparts, as they saw it as act of usurpation and interference in the sub-regional internal affairs (Kabia, 2009: 138-139).

Although Portugal and all other CPLP member states accepted the stand of the ECOWAS on the legality of Vieira's government as supported by the UN, OAU (AU), and the EU; the right resolution was contested. The disagreement between the two bodies did not stop the Bissau-Guinean factions from continuing fighting. The battle started to have a devastating effect on the population of the country with hundreds killed, the capital ruined and thousands of people fleeing the country (Massey, 2006: 84, 86). The debilitating condition of the citizens of Guinea-

Bissau forced both the ECOWAS and CPLP to jointly negotiate peace between the two factions in July 1998 and subsequently, the November 1998 Abuja comprehensive peace accord was signed. The Abuja agreement called for a cease-fire, government of national unity, the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean armed forces and their replacement with ECOMOG observer troops from other ECOWAS states (excluding Senegal and Guinea); manning of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal border with ECOMOG observer forces; the creation of a buffer zone between the warring factions; the disarmament and demobilisation of the fighters; the provision of security by ECOMOG forces to allow the distribution of humanitarian assistance and the organisation of elections to be monitored by ECOWAS and CPLP (Adebajo, 2002b: 117-119; Kabia, 2009: 139).

Under the chairmanship of Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, the ECOWAS was eager to implement the November 1998 Abuja peace agreement. To this end, a government of national unity was formed in February 1999 headed by Francisco José Fadul as the Prime Minister. The head of the interim government, José Fadul, was a personality independent of the political parties and like Mané, had family roots outside Guinea-Bissau. Fadul attempted to mobilise external assistance for the reconstruction of the scanty infrastructure in Bissau, battered by the civil war in preparation for the elections scheduled for November 1999. In April, he went on a travel tour of Europe canvassing for aid for Guinea-Bissau. He obtained US\$4 million and US\$2.3 million backing from Portugal and Sweden respectively (Adebajo, 2002b: 125, 127; Yabi, 2010: 18). Following the election of Kumba Yala as President in February 2000, Fadul was replaced as Prime Minister by Caetano N'tchama (Bogdan, 2005: 272). A radical politician, once out of office, Francisco Fadul believed that Guinea-Bissau was a failed state and then called for the UN annexation of the country as a protectorate for ten years (*Diário de Notícias*, April 12 2009 and *Asemana*, April 13 2009).

Before ECOMOG forces came in there were unsuccessful mediating roles played by some African and “extra-continental” actors. Some of these included representatives of Portugal, Angola and Sweden in Guinea-Bissau, as well as a high level delegation sent by Muammar Gadhafi of Libya. Also, Yahya Jammeh of the neighbouring Gambia made some fruitless efforts at putting an end to the Guinea-Bissau conflict after visiting the surrounding countries like

Guinea, Cape Verde, Mauritania, and Senegal to garner support. However, Jammeh's futile endeavours were based on the premise that the cultural, historical and personal links between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau could not be overlooked. For instance, Ansumane Mané, the factional leader had traced his family roots to The Gambia. Most importantly, Jammeh had worked assiduously towards an amicable resolution of the Guinea-Bissau crisis fearing most the humanitarian liabilities his country was likely to bear as a result of the civil war. The proximity of the two countries could provoke cross-border violence because of the connections between the Bissau war in the north and the Casamance insurgency in the south of The Gambia. Also, Jammeh was afraid of a deluge of refugee influx into The Gambia from the war-ravaged nation (Massey, 2006: 88).

By far the most remarkable individual efforts at amicable settlement of the Guinea-Bissau conflict arguably came from a Roman Catholic Bishop. The Bishop of Bissau, Father Settimio Arturo Ferrazzeta, tried to use his remarkable influence in the country to strike a deal between the warring factions at the beginning of the crisis. According to Simon Massey, (2006: 88), despite such conducive factors like:

- moral legitimacy; an ability to advance a party to the conflict's political standing;
- an international audience; a network of information and contacts; secrecy; and
- neutrality,

available to the Bishop, he failed to broker peace between the two warring factions as a result of his strong favour towards Mané. Bishop Ferrazzeta died of a heart attack in January 1999. When all attempts made by Father Ferrazzeta tragically ended, various bodies and governments to proffer a peaceful solution to the civil war failed, and on July 3 Vieira pleaded with the ECOWAS for military intervention by the ECOMOG. Nations, individuals and organisations were biased in trying to reach a solution to the Guinea-Bissau crisis. For instance, Massey has argued that it was not only Father Ferrazzeta who was not unbiased in favour of Mané. ECOWAS was also partial in managing the conflict, coming down in favour of and endorsing Vieira. Also, France supported the intervention by the Senegalese and Guinean armed forces in support of Vieira. In addition, the war time prime minister, José Fadul, accused the French air force of bombing Mané positions and others reported the recruitment of French mercenaries to fight on Vieira's side in the battle of Bissau (Massey, 2006: 88-90).

Due to financial and logistical constraints, only 600 ECOMOG troops arrived in Guinea-Bissau in February 1999 from four countries in the region; one Anglophone and three Francophone - The Gambia, Benin, Niger, and Togo, . However, the Guinea-Bissau ECOMOG operation was augmented by an additional 112 men, increasing the number to 712 by March. ECOMOG III succeeded in reopening Bissau's airport and securing its seaport, but was unable to implement a key term of its mission. As an intervention force, part of article 3 of the Abuja peace agreement empowered ECOMOG forces to provide security along the border between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. However, the troops were unable to enforce it due to some unanticipated circumstances. Their small number coupled with poor logistics ruined their chances of implementing this proviso of the agreement. The troops worked with a few and unserviceable vehicles; they had no radios and other communication tools. This condition made the mission non-operational during the night hours and rendered the troops to be holed up in the city of Bissau. Mané seized the ECOMOG limitations and staged a coup that overthrew Vieira's government and forced him into exile in Portugal in May 1999. Meanwhile, as the confrontation ensued between the rival factions, the weak and dispirited ECOMOG forces remained mere onlookers (Adebajo, 2002b: 121; Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 126 ; Yabi, 2010: 18).

As soon as the Abuja peace accord was signed in November 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS). The mandate of the body was to augment reconciliation, reinforce democratic institutions and develop an assimilated approach to peace building programmes which were part of the peace agreement (Agbu, 2006: 57). Nevertheless, the peace-building process in Guinea-Bissau lacked international financial support. For instance, the Geneva Round Table Conference for Guinea Bissau held in May 1999 pledged more than US\$200 million towards peace building efforts like the organisation of elections, de-mining of land mines, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters into civil society, reunification of the army and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. However, only US\$8 million (World Bank: US\$3 million, EU: US\$3 million, and IMF: US\$2 million) was released to the country before its elections in 1999. It was not until after the elections in 2000 that Portugal and France recommenced aid while the World Bank approved a US\$25 million economic rehabilitation and recovery credit only in May of the same year. The dearth of funds adversely affected the efforts of the transitional government to

implement the aforementioned peace building programmes. Nevertheless, after the withdrawal of ECOMOG, UNOGBIS took over the external assistance for the transitional process and peace building in the country (Adebajo, 2002b: 125; Ferreira, 2004: 47; Kabia, 2009: 141; Yabi, 2010: 18).

In a similar development, the poor financing of ECOMOG III and the situation on the ground in Guinea-Bissau made it difficult for the force to implement the peace accord. For instance, the Abuja agreement empowered ECOMOG to disarm the presidential guard and take over the responsibility of the security of the President and Prime Minister. However, the tense situation, inadequate number of men and lack of necessary equipment hampered the troops and effectively rendered the Abuja peace accord null and void. ECOMOG troops were helpless and became mere spectators when the May 1999 coup d'état that ousted Vieira by Mané took place. The difficulties in financing ECOMOG operations and the May coup d'état were the twin excuses put forward by the ECOWAS for withdrawing ECOMOG III from Guinea-Bissau in June, barely five months after its deployment (Yabi, 2010: 18). However, before ECOMOG's withdrawal, the force also facilitated the disarmament process and recovered some weapons from the combatants. According to John Kabia (2009: 140), ECOMOG III's abysmal failure in Guinea-Bissau, "... underlines the argument that peacekeeping troops in complex political emergencies require a robust strategy to force compliance from warring parties." Apparently, it is only Nigeria which could enforce such "robust strategy" in the sub-region.

### **7.3 NIGERIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE RESOLUTION OF GUINEA-BISSAU CRISIS**

ECOMOG III was the first operation of its kind in a Lusophone West African state while the force's deployment in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003 was the first in a Francophone country. ECOMOG operations in both non-Anglophone countries shared two other distinct similarities. While crises in two countries started as military insurrections, Nigeria was militarily absent in both for intervention efforts. Nigeria's refusal to intervene in Guinea-Bissau in particular was definitely conspicuous (General Maigari and General Kwabe (Rtd.), personal communication, January 25 2015). James Kabia (2009: 137) has argued that the characteristics of ECOWAS' interposition in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau added a new dimension to peacemaking and peacekeeping

analysis of West Africa. According to him, Nigeria's military non-appearance in both countries has opened a new dimension to evaluating the age-old Anglophone-Francophone rivalry and Nigeria's important position in the security of the sub-region. Arguably, the long-standing Anglophone-Francophone competitiveness played a major role in Nigeria's absence in Cote d'Ivoire, and in Lusophone Guinea-Bissau on the assumption that the latter was "converted" into a Francophone country (Akinyeye, personal communication, February 28, 2015). This argument may ride on the back of the intrigue that trailed the fielding and functioning of ECOMOG III by the Francophone members of ECOWAS.

In all honesty, the galling Anglophone-Francophone rivalry among the West African countries reared its ugly head in their efforts at restoring peace to Guinea-Bissau. The competitive action has been a crucial factor in shaping the sub-region's economic, political and security decisions. The planning and execution of ECOMOG mission in Guinea Bissau would suffice to support this argument here. The ECOWAS authority dispatched the Nigerian ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone, General Timothy Shelpidi, to carry out a pre-deployment assessment of the force in Bissau in November 1998. The General recommended the deployment of a 5000-strong force to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement and the deployment began with 110 men from Togo between December 1998 and January 1999. General Shelpidi assumed that having done the needs assessment, the force would be under his command. This was not to be as a novel controversy reared its ugly head when the deployment of the troops took place without his knowledge. On a visit to Togolese troops in Bissau in December 1999, Shelpidi was informed by their Commander, Colonel Gnakooude Berema, (a Togolese), that the force was under Togolese and not Nigerian command (Adebajo, 2002b: 199-122).

The stark question remained about how Nigeria, with its capabilities to provide the bulk of personnel and resources needed in such an emergency, could be so unfairly treated. After all, the country had dominated and sustained peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In addition, all the contributing countries to the mission in Guinea-Bissau were relatively smaller countries which were financially and militarily incapable of maintaining such a protracted campaign as the case demanded. It is also important to note that the Francophone countries-dominated ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was only able to deploy after France had provided

it with financial and logistical support. Also, with all the support that France provided, the force remained incapacitated due to poor financing. It was the inherent weakness in ECOMOG III that Mané utilised to topple Vieira's government in the midst of the turbulence (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004: 295). The sine qua non of it all was that many states in the sub-region, especially the Francophone countries, were still suffering from the fever of Nigeria's domination (Kabia, 2009: 140).

Nigeria's military non-appearance in Guinea Bissau has been termed its own way at hitting back at the rival Francophone countries. Scholars like John Kabia (2009: 137) and Simon Massey (2006: 90) have argued that Nigeria wanted the rival Francophone states to be in charge in order for them to know how it feels to be "undermining sub-regional peace efforts." Although they opined that Guinea Bissau was Lusophone, Nigeria was likely to see it as part of "them," because of her overtures to the Francophone states as evidenced by her desire to join the CFA Franc zone. Nevertheless, a note of caution was necessary here as a post-mortem question arose: how Francophone was Lusophone Guinea-Bissau? Many a scholar has argued that Lusophone Guinea-Bissau might be considered Francophone because of some steps taken by the country under the leadership of Vieira. However, could this notion be completely true? Scholars like Kalevi Holsti (1976: 31, 375); Robert Jervis (1976: 6); Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson (1985: 165); Ole Holsti (1979: 99-109), and Margaret Hermann, *et al* (2001: 83-131), have outlined foreign policy decision-making by examining qualities of a leader. They discovered that an individual leader wielded much influence on the decision-making of a nation. Joe Hagan (1995: 117) also argued that "government leaders have to deal with pressures and constraints from domestic political sources, as well as the international political system." The argument of Hagan correlates with the decision of João Vieira to drag his country into the community of Francophone states.

Stephen Rock (2000: 12) argued that appeasement is "...the policy of reducing tensions with one's adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement." He also opined that "...a state pursuing a policy of appeasement will ultimately make greater sacrifices than its opponent." Going by these arguments, it should be noted that Vieira took the decision to join the Francophone *Union Economique et Monetaire de l'Ouest Africaine*-UEMOA and adopted its



currency, the CFA franc, in July 1997 for two reasons. First, Vieira took the move in order to appease Senegal which had accused Guinea-Bissau many times of supporting the Casamance insurrection by carrying out underground sale of arms to the rebels. Second, Lusophone Guinea-Bissau suddenly became Francophone apparently to attract the sympathy of other Francophone governments, especially France, whose administration Vieira was courting for aid. It is pertinent to note that Vieira inherited an aid-dependent economy (Forrest, 2002: 254-255). Finally, the fact that Guinea-Bissau remained Lusophone despite all Francophone overtures was evident during the civil war. Both Portugal and France tried to outperform each other in their decisions to involve themselves in the war either directly or by proxy (Massey, 2006: 91). Thus, Anglophone-Francophone rivalry may not stand the test of time as a major point of argument concerning Nigeria's military absence in Guinea-Bissau.

Disputably, it may not be totally true that Nigeria eschewed its responsibilities towards restoration of peace to Guinea-Bissau. Although Nigeria was absent militarily in the country, diplomatically, the bulk still landed on Nigeria's table (Aworawo, personal communication, January 23 2015). The country played host to the signatories of the Abuja 1998 peace agreement (for Guinea-Bissau), like it did for Liberia in 1995. When Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia struck a deal with the two Guinea-Bissau warring factions in Banjul in October, representatives of both sides were flown to the ongoing Abuja ECOWAS Foreign Ministers summit meeting. Here, further agreements were reached that led to the November 1988 "Abuja Agreement." Among other things discussed earlier in the chapter, the Abuja accord made provisions for the evacuation of the Senegalese and Guinean troops from Guinea-Bissau, and to be replaced with an ECOMOG interposition force. Also, the Abuja accord reduced to nominal the role of the CPLP in the whole event. In addition, Nigeria's Head of State, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, together with Yahya Jammeh, and the Foreign Ministers of Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo continued post-summit discussions with the warring factions (Massey, 2006: 94).

Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that Nigeria played a prominent role at the October 1998 Abuja sub-regional ministers meeting. Here, it was recommended that the mandate and functions of ECOMOG should be expanded beyond Liberia and Sierra Leone to include Guinea-Bissau. Most significantly, Nigeria was among the Committee of Seven, later, Committee of Nine,

appointed to implement the agreement (Adebajo, 2002b: 117). Factually, Simon Massey (2006: 90) may not be totally right in his assertion that Nigeria's "partiality" drove it away from Guinea-Bissau intervention. Also, Massey may not be entirely wrong by suggesting that the newly elected Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, was anxious to evacuate Nigerian ECOMOG contingents from Liberia and Sierra Leone back home while he did not contemplate sending a single trooper to Guinea-Bissau. In addition, Massey may be completely right in his opinion that the absence of Nigeria in Guinea-Bissau created room for discrepancies in favour of the Francophone countries in the formulation of ECOMOG III policy. The situation worked most favourably for Senegal especially, and by extension, its colonial master, France. However, Portugal also realised that the absence of Nigeria would likely create a vacuum that France and its former colonies in the sub-region would quickly fill. This made Portugal, with the support of the CPLP, to call the shots in defence of the future of its former colony.

#### **7.4 RATIONALE BEHIND NIGERIA'S PASSIVITY IN GUINEA-BISSAU**

It is important to examine other avenues beyond the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry as the source of Nigeria's reluctance to participate militarily in bringing back peace to Guinea Bissau, contrary to what it did in Liberia. The argument proposed here is that Nigeria's pattern of intervention in the two countries was not whether Liberia was Anglophone or Guinea Bissau was Lusophone, but its reaction to the latter was due to the internal dynamics in Nigerian politics at the time. Nigeria was forced to explore more diplomatic means of resolving the Guinea Bissau crisis. The fact remained that Nigeria's policy changed over time as influenced by what happened in Liberia. Also, if the Guinea Bissau crisis had happened first, Nigeria would have responded as it did in Liberia and vice versa. Unequivocally, towards the end of the Liberian war when the Guinea Bissau crisis started, Nigeria had become war weary. There was pressure from home where the economy was becoming worse. The newly elected government of Olusegun Obasanjo was able to sustain the ambition of the people who advocated for non-military intervention of Nigeria in the sub-regional crises again in the face of a worsening economy (Aworawo, private communication, February 23 2015, Lagos).

It is factually correct to argue that without Nigeria, there would be no ECOMOG. Nigeria was the first country to land in Liberia, securing the airport and seaport for others to come, including

the Americans (Lt. Col. Adams, private communication, January 26 2015). It has also been demonstrated in the earlier sections of this research how Nigeria bore the brunt of deployment, fielding and operations of the ECOMOG intervention forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone from 1990 to 1998. Right from the inception of ECOMOG in 1990, many Nigerians had condemned the military government of Ibrahim Babangida for unnecessarily squandering the country's financial and human resources on a mission considered futile. This agitation was contrary to Nigerians' attitude of total support for their country's contributions toward the dismantling of white minority governments in Southern Africa in the 1970s (Adebajo, 2002a: 53-54).

Added to the economic implications of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia at a time when the country was undergoing serious economic debacle was the concern of the people. However, sustained military spending on intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was rather possible under the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha as citizens could not force their will on the government that ruled by military fiat and decree (Adebajo, 2002a: 53-54). The above statements are in partial agreement with Massey's (2006: 95) argument that Nigeria was not willing to take a leading role in the Guinea-Bissau peace process "because of diplomatic overstretch and domestic preoccupations." However, the same have stricken a total blow against his other argument that the country's non-appearance had "emphasised the limitations of Nigeria as regional hegemon, whilst underlining the region's reliance on Nigeria for effective conflict management."

The new civilian government under Olusegun Obasanjo voted into power in February 1999 had to succumb to the will of the people. This was due to much pressure from the National Assembly, the press and the general public calling unanimously on the civilian administration to set aside all external military spending. The shelving of extra-military budgets by removing Nigerian ECOMOG troops from Liberia was only muted under the Interim National Government of Ernest Shonekan in 1993. However, the withdrawal of Nigerian soldiers from Liberia and Sierra Leone under the civilian government of Obasanjo was akin to an evacuation of Nigerian contingents to Chad under the elected government of Shehu Shagari in 1982. The political implications of the the sustainability of such military adventures would foment disastrous reactions at home. Not only did Obasanjo withdraw 71 per cent of Nigerian soldiers from Sierra

Leone in 2000, but he also made sure that the rump was incorporated into the UN troops that took over the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations (Adebajo, 2002a: 251-252; 2002b: 18). Obasanjo maintained his steel determination to prevent additional military obligations on the part of Nigeria by refusing to send peacekeeping troops to the war-torn Côte d'Ivoire on request in 2003. He withdrew the last Nigerian UN troops in 2005 (Iliffe, 2011: 218, 219), meaning that Nigeria could not have been involved in all areas (Fawole, personal communication, March 3 2015).

Arguably, the personal characteristics of Olusegun Obasanjo played a huge role in Nigeria's change of intention in Guinea-Bissau and by extension, Côte d'Ivoire, during his tenure as president. Hermann (1980: 7-46), using four broad types of personal characteristics: beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style to study 45 heads of government discovered that subjective idiosyncrasies of political leaders affect the foreign policy behaviour of their governments. The four types of personal characteristics, according to her, were expected to affect both the style and content of foreign policy of the respective countries. Furthermore, the study classified the heads of government into two categories of aggressive and conciliatory leaders, and she concluded that:

The data suggest that aggressive leaders are high in need for power, low in conceptual complexity, distrustful of others, nationalistic, and likely to believe that they have some control over the events in which they are involved. In contrast, the data suggest that conciliatory leaders are high in need for affiliation, high in conceptual complexity, trusting of others, low in nationalism, and likely to exhibit little belief in their own ability to control the events in which they are involved (Hermann, 1980: 8).

Perhaps, Obasanjo belonged to Margaret Hermann's aggressive category of leaders. In his "provisional account" of Olusegun Obasanjo, John Iliffe (2011: 1-3) traced four themes of his characters. He saw him as an individual deeply rooted in his native Yoruba culture; unrepentantly nationalistic and patriotic about "the Nigerian project;" a lover of power and the use of it, and possessing the ability to understand the rapid national and international changes that took place within the context in which he had functioned. This is in tandem with Hermann's position that since beliefs and motives play significant part in interpreting the environment, political leaders are most likely predisposed to urging their governments to be coherent with such images. According to her, the beliefs and motives of these political leaders function as the

compass making way for them through their political and administrative course (1980: 10). Obasanjo's biographical accounts suggest that the man's decisions were always "based on political calculations" (Iliffe, 2011: 3).

## **7.5 IMPLICATIONS OF NIGERIA'S PASSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN GUINEA-BISSAU TO WEST AFRICA**

Nigeria's military non-appearance in Guinea did not go without some implications on the sub-region and the continent at large. The first outcome of Nigeria's absence was the rise of a trilateral rivalry involving Portugal, France and the ECOWAS over the sub-region's security. At the time France was scheming to use Senegal and Guinea as its front in the war. Portugal also nudged the CPLP into joining the debacle. While the CPLP implicitly supported the Mané faction, the ECOWAS was solidly behind the government of Vieira. There were a series of disagreements between the CPLP and ECOWAS over interests after the July 26, 1998 meeting between the warring factions and the CPLP on the Portuguese warship *Corte Real* off the coast of Bissau. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the warring factions called for the withdrawal of the Senegalese and Guinean forces from Guinea-Bissau and their replacement with military observers from the CPLP countries. The ECOWAS accused Portugal of "neo-colonial behaviour" following the meeting and its offer to send contingents to serve in a proposed peacekeeping force only under the auspices of a CPLP, rather than under the ECOWAS's ECOMOG. Also, a clash of interests emerged after the signing of the MoU as Portugal and the CPLP insisted that dialogue would resolve the problem, while Francophone members of ECOWAS believed that a military solution to the conflict was the best ( Adebajo, 2002b: 117; Massey, 2006: 91-92).

It has been argued that the success of the CPLP in mediating the Guinea-Bissau crisis has put ECOWAS in the position of backbencher in the negotiation. To confirm the second fiddle position played by the ECOWAS in the mediation, the standpoint of the Committee of Seven on the Guinea-Bissau rebellion and stance of the CPLP in their August 4, 1998 meeting in Accra was benignly propitiatory. A subsequent joint Consultative Meeting between the ECOWAS and CPLP was held on August 25 in Praia, Cape Verde and formalised the truce of July 26 into a cease-fire. Nevertheless, the earlier mollifying attitude of ECOWAS and its condescension to the

CPLP warped this agreement, and could not stop fighting from resuming in mid-October. Fundamentally, the absence of Nigeria in Guinea-Bissau projected the banality of the French and Portuguese colonial hegemonic tendencies in West Africa. Simon Massey in a laconic expression, succinctly sums the Franco-Portuguese competitiveness thus:

Without Nigeria the Francophone bloc directed an ill-conceived, unrealistic and ineffective ECOWAS response to the conflict with active support from its *extra*-African sponsor, France. Indeed, the peace process was notable for the continued involvement of former colonial powers in sub-regional security dynamics. France used its influence within the Francophone bloc of ECOWAS to further its support for the incumbent Vieira, whilst Portugal sought to counter French influence and re-establish its own position in Guinea-Bissau by resuscitating an essentially cultural entity - the CPLP (Massey, 2006: 93, 95).

Awkwardly, extra-regional instead of sub-regional mediators broke the truce in Guinea-Bissau as a result of Nigeria's absence. The effect of this was that rival mediators with contrary objectives worked at variance with the security well-being of the sub-region (Massey, 2006: 95). The two extra-regional mediators, Portugal and France had their gains and losses. Portugal legitimised its intervention as compelled by the CPLP and used the platform to invigorate the moribund cultural organisation (MacQueen, 2003: 14). France was less successful in its adventure in Guinea-Bissau. Its support for the Senegunean intervention yielded no tangible results as the Ansumane Mané faction it opposed eventually came to power (Massey, 2006: 95). ECOMOG interposition in Guinea-Bissau could have been highly successful, perhaps more successful than the force's Liberian and Sierra Leone operations if Nigeria had been encouraged by the Francophone bloc to participate. Adebajo (2002b: 121-122), argued that giving the overall command of the force in Guinea-Bissau to Nigeria's General Shelpidi would have been a tacit way of retaining Nigerian support for the force. However, did Nigeria gain anything from its military nonappearance in Guinea-Bissau? Most importantly, the twisted allegation that ECOMOG was the furtherance of Nigeria's foreign policy in the sub-region was perhaps finally put to rest (Berman and Sams, 2000: 132).

## 7.6 CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the French funding and logistical assistance, the deployment of ECOMOG forces was slow in Guinea-Bissau. It lacked the adequate number of men needed and fell short of fulfilling its mandate. In the history of ECOMOG, the Guinea-Bissau operation was the first



time when the demand by a major party to a conflict would be honoured. Mané's faction, the *Junta*, insisted that ECOMOG III should be devoid of Senegalese and Guinean soldiers, and it was so. The ECOMOG operation was not too successful either, and this had some consequential effects on the sub-regional security. Apart from being the first of its type in a non-Anglophone country, it was the first ECOMOG operation that Nigeria declined to participate in. As a result, the mission ended in a near fiasco when the troops were reduced to mere onlookers in the face of the warring parties' refusal to adhere to the peace agreement. Consequently, Guinea-Bissau was reduced to an arena of unhealthy rivalry between Portugal, France and the ECOWAS. This thesis proceeds now to chapter eight where a comparative assessment of Nigeria's approach to the resolution of the Liberian and Guinea Bissau conflicts is attempted.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN LIBERIAN AND GUINEA-BISSAU.

#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

There was a popular argument that Nigeria, having become a democracy since 1999, was unable to project power because of some overwhelming internal burdens, aggressive conflicts and insurgency at the home front. Perhaps because of the nature of military governance, military regimes that preceded the democratic government were able to intervene in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises. The result might be Nigeria's ability to project power. There were two instances of Nigeria's incapacity to stick out as it did under military regimes given by Cilliers, *et al* (2015: 23). First was Nigeria's withdrawal from the race for the candidacy of the AU Commission chair which made way for South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2012. The second example was the refusal by the two countries to which Nigeria restored peace between 1990 and 1998, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This was compounded by Togo's refusal to vote for Nigeria in an election to the UN Security Council in 2009. However, it should be noted that South African Dlamini-Zuma's election into the AU post was heavily criticised, especially by some smaller African nations. This was because since the establishment of the AU in 2002, there had been an unwritten rule that regional powers including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Kenya should not lead or occupy key positions in its major institutions (*Africa in Focus*, July 13 2016). Dlamini-Zuma's election was therefore South Africa's violation of a "gentlemen's agreement" (*Daily Maverick*, June 28 2016).

The apparent act of betrayal of a benefactor exhibited by Liberia and Sierra Leone in their refusal to support Nigeria's candidature in the UN Security Council in 2009 had not prevented the country from occupying enviable positions in the global body. Nigeria has been elected non-permanent member of the Council for five times since independence; the last being the 2014-2015 period. Also, the country was privileged to have held the chair of several of the world body's special Committees, including the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and



Resolution in Africa. In addition, Nigeria served as one of the three vice-chairs in accordance with resolution 1540 (2004), on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the country had the prestige of being one of the two vice-chairs of the UN Security Council Committee created pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning Sudan (*Daily Trust* April 2 2014). A Nigerian woman, Amina Mohammed, was appointed United Nations deputy Secretary-General in December, 2016. Due to the goodwill that Nigeria enjoyed from the world body, the country's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, Tijjani Bande, was appointed Acting President to preside over the 81<sup>st</sup> Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in May 2017, following the absence of the Assembly's President, Peter Thomson (*Vanguard*, May 12, 2017). Apparently, all these privileged positions were occupied by Nigerians under democratically elected regimes.

## **8.2 NIGERIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN WEST AFRICA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

A critical look into Nigeria's activities in the peace processes in West Africa after end of the Cold War is necessary here. The aftermath of the First World War produced the League of Nations to sustain global cooperation on security matters. After the end of the Second World War, a number of supranational organisations of which the United Nations was the most important, were established to maintain peaceful co-existence among nations. However, the end the Cold War did not come up with a truly pacific "new world order," to collectively identify, understand, and address global menaces that surpass the capacity of any one nation for a solution. The collapse of the Cold War and first test of the new world order was the 1991 Gulf War (Freedman, 1991: 195-196). Also, the resultant effect of both the collapse of the Cold War and the failure of the new world order were the incessant violent conflicts in Africa; where the West African sub-region was the most affected. Thus, the major government business in Africa continued to be conflict alleviation and resolution while some of the disputes remained obdurate (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011: 555). Formal and informal methods of conflict management were employed to resolve some of these problems, yet results have remained unsatisfactory and conflicts intractable. Critical examples were the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sudan (Okwechina, personal communication, January 29 2015).

Added to the problem of inter- and intra-state conflicts and general human insecurity in Africa after the collapse of the Cold War international system, according to Akokpari (2001:34-55), were the encumbrances of fiscal debt, forces of globalisation and marginalisation and the plague of HIV/AIDS.

After the failure of UNOSOM, the UN Operation in Somalia between 1992 and 1995, conflict management with respect to Africa changed hands from the international to regional. Also, Chapter VIII, Article 52, Paragraph 2 of the UN Charter was resuscitated to make way for peaceful settlement of local conflicts via regional arrangements before referring such conflicts to the Security Council. The global organisation's resolution in this regard was that the sub-regional organisation would be favoured as the key mediator and the body "best fit" to tackle a continental dispute (Massey, 2006: 86, 87). The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established by the OAU (AU) in June 1993 for Africa to take care of its own problems (Bakwesegha, 1997: 73). According to Aworawo (personal communication, January 23 2015), despite the hope that the Mechanism would be able to confront and resolve African conflicts, a dearth of funding and political will among member states assailed the plan.

It was discussed at length in chapter two of this study that the apathy of Western nations toward Africa (Mikell, 2008: 282; Rosati, 1988: 493) at the close of the Cold War dawned on the continent with the former's taciturn reaction to the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises, as well as Rwandan genocide of the 1990s (Copson, 2007:4). Thus as the Gulf War of 1991 and the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s drew away the attention of the United States and other Western powers from Africa, a vacuum was created in West Africa that urgently needed to be filled (Adebajo, 2010: 231). Indisputably, the lackadaisical tendencies of the West conferred on Nigeria the duty of stage-managing the script of Article 52, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter from the 1990s in the West African sub-region. The body "best fit" in this wise was the ECOWAS and the tool, ECOMOG, while Nigeria was the driving force (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003: 171).

The initiatives taken by Nigeria in West Africa have been equated to "Pax Nigeriana" (Adebajo, 2010: 131) which was fundamentally different from "Pax Americana" (Johnson and Reisman,

2008: 508-510; Nye, 1990: 177-174) and “Pax Britannica” (Parsons, 1999: 3). While the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana were aimed at conquering the world and revamping the collapse of the European and Japanese economies respectively, “Pax Nigeriana” represented Nigeria’s ambition at playing a political, economic and military leadership role in Africa (Adebajo 2010, 131). For instance, according to Alade Fawole (personal communication, March 3 2015), if Nigeria had looked the other way, Liberia and Sierra Leone would have been consumed in civil strife fires and the result would have been a disaster to the black race.

### **8.3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY**

Back to the theory of “concentric circles” in Nigeria’s foreign policy, it is evident that exponents of this theory advocated that the epicentre of all its four strands was the national interests (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21). What constituted national interests in international relations had always kindled controversies. While the generic meaning of national interest or *raison d’etat* (“reason of State”) may be summed up as a country’s economic, military and cultural goals and ambitions; the specific connotation of the idiom may be different from clime to clime and among scholars.

For example, Jean de Silhon admitted that national interests constituted “a mean between what conscience permits and state affairs require” (Franklin, 2001: 80-81). However, Martin van Creveld (1991: 217), acknowledged that considering national interests as comprising “whatever any society considers good and useful for itself,” was apparently unimaginative. In agreement with van Creveld, Joseph Nye (1999: 23-24) argued that “a democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the difference between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy.” Nye believed that national interests were a set of shared priorities which included human rights and democracy which can set relations with the world.

Thus, it could be deduced from the foregoing that national interests could be either amoral, unethical or principled. For instance, the American foreign policy process is not being,

“driven by popular moralism, but by the American interest defined strictly in terms of the hegemonic promotion of the values at the heart of the American legacy...it is driven by

expediency, and this is perhaps why it is often so complex and contradictory” (*The Guardian*, November 14 2003).

Therefore, it is pertinent to note that national interest is most important in determining the foreign policy stance of a nation and is jealously guarded by it. National interest is a ready weapon employed by nation to evaluate the sources or the adequacy of their foreign policy. This weapon also serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies that are best for a nation in foreign affairs (Rosenau, 1992:34). Nevertheless, according to Akinbobola, the national interests of a country should not be equated with group, professional or ethnic interests. They must be the sum total of the aggregate of all the interests of individuals and groups within the nation-state (Akinbobola, 1995:12). They could differ based on priority and strategy and could also vary as dictated by external factors. Also, the revaluation of a nation’s national interests depends on how such a country acts in a given situation.

According to Mikhail Troitsky (*Foreign Affairs*, June 19 2015), national interests are a “public declaration of a country’s needs and intentions based on an assessment of the current situation.” He opines that national interests have some important functions they perform. These include the establishment of priorities to avoid wasteful use of resources, prevention of government from gaining political advantage over the opposition, and provision of strict criteria for evaluation by the public. Most importantly, Troitsky argued that national interests ensured continuity and change of quintessential aspects of the foreign policy of a nation. The authors of Nigerian foreign policy agreed from its inception in 1960 that some of the topmost national interests of Nigeria would include; the defence of the country’s independence and territorial integrity; the promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of Nigerians and, the promotion of world peace with justice (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986: 2) among others. However, this thesis in agreement with Troitsky, submits that change and continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy as determined by its national interests was based, at a time, on “an assessment of the current situation.”

Continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy could be ascertained from the principles and objectives guiding the country’s external relations discussed in chapter three of this thesis. In analysing the foreign policy of a nation, Akinbobola (1995: 12) identified some factors that explain its

domestic structure. Some of the factors included a country's geographical location, type of neighbourhood, historical evolution, age of the nation, the natural resources contextualized in human and material bases and the size and level of homogeneity of the diversity of the population. Others were the form, structure and quality of leadership, the quality of diplomacy and type of international organizations it belonged to, the Gross National Product (GDP), the degree of the diversification of its economy, agricultural potential and military capability. Nigeria's location within the African region had made the principle of Africa as the centre-piece of its foreign policy a continuum (Aluko, 1980: 1). Thus, such factors as geography, history and the type of neighbourhood compelled all successive regimes to first secure its immediate external environment which is West Africa, and Africa, by extension (Nwosu, 1995: 58-59).

However, the dwindling economic fortune that set in from the 1980s called for some changes in the country's foreign policy (NIIA, June 30 1988). Despite the plummeting economy of Nigeria, the country was capable of fielding ECOMOG alone in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. However, Nigeria asked for the contributions of other countries in order to provide legitimacy and acceptability for its actions in a sub-region where every step taken by it is highly susceptible to criticism by other smaller and less-endowed nations. Nevertheless, Nigeria's near-single handed bankrolling of the military adventures in these two West African states heightened the pressure for change in Nigeria's foreign policy (Adebajo, 2002a: 48, 251). Mustapha (2008: 368-382) came out with a poser about the interplay between Nigeria's domestic forces and the external environment. He argued that Nigeria may not be, after all, positioned to play the role of a "middle power" in its foreign policy projections due to some inherent weaknesses. Therefore, as in Egypt, domestic priorities ranging from economic downturn to increase in security challenges drew away Nigeria's attention and resources from external engagements (Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 11). The urgent consideration of the above statement might have prompted the Obasanjo government to be resolute in its determination to stop sending troops to ECOMOG, (Iliffe, 2011: 218-219, 282; Adebajo, 2002b: 18).

According to Iliffe (2011: 217-222), a major task and success of the first term of Obasanjo's presidential regime was the restoration of Nigeria's battered international image. Obasanjo worked assiduously during his first term in office to put Nigeria once again on "the mainstream

of the international community.” The Abacha years of tyrannical rule maintained the pre-regime’s annulment of June 1993 elections, and effected the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and ten other Ogoni campaigners in November 1995. The brutal regime also occasioned the detention of some key members of opposition groups and organised assassination gangs bankrolled by the state (Alao, 2011: 5-6). The oppressive activities of the Abacha junta earned Nigeria suspension from the Commonwealth for “serious violation of the principles set out in the Harare Declaration’ (including the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa)...” The Commonwealth also condemned the regime’s “undemocratic and human rights abuses which reverberated across the world” (thecommonwealth.org). The suspension lasted for more than three years (*Premium Times*, December 30 2012).

Furthermore, the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo launched a reappraisal of the country’s foreign policy by seeking “maximum international exposure” for it as soon as it was elected into office in 1999. This was necessary in order to secure debt forgiveness for the heavily indebted country. The country’s debt synopsis before Obasanjo was elected as president in 1999 was approximately US\$ 30 billion (Alao, 2011: 5). Obasanjo sought debt cancellation by embarking on diplomatic visits to many countries of the world, paying particular attention to his call to some key nations like United States, Britain, France, and South Africa. In recognition of the economic weakness of the country, he was eager to reduce Nigeria’s external commitments and possibly, through multinational institutions (Iliffe, 2011: 217). In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Obasanjo had put it forward succinctly that it was time for:

...the Security Council to assume its full responsibility, specifically in Sierra Leone and other flashing points in Africa. For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in our sub-region...Nigeria’s continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop (Obasanjo: 1999: 6).

Because of his beliefs and strong motives, and perhaps in furtherance of his efforts at reducing Nigeria’s external spending, Obasanjo finally ended the recurring wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone diplomatically. In Liberia, a rebellion hostile to Taylor’s government erupted in 1999, and by February 2002, the rebels had fought their way to the vicinity of Monrovia. To avert renewed bloodshed in that country, Obasanjo nudged Taylor into asylum in Nigeria while a fresh election



ushered in Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the new Liberian President. In Sierra Leone, while Obasanjo planned for a phased withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG troops from that country in May 1999, he concluded a peaceful alternative. In July, Obasanjo compelled President Tejan Kabbah of the main faction in the war, the RUF, to form a coalition government with support from the USA and Britain (Iliffe, 2011: 217-219). Apparently, in order to share the burden of keeping the peace on African continent, Obasanjo encouraged South Africa to participate in peacekeeping starting from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)(Landsberg, 2008: 209). In furtherance of their newfound cordiality, the two countries formed the South African-Nigerian Bi-National Commission in October 1999. The Commission was for dialogue over economic and other forms of cooperation between the two countries (*This Day*, August 18 1999).

The contributions of the leaderships of the two countries to the discarding of the OAU and formation of AU could not be overemphasised. Both Obasanjo and Mbeki accepted the need to supplant the OAU but rejected Gaddafi's dream of an Nkrumah-like United States of Africa (USAf) with a common currency and army, and an elected president serving a five-year term in office. Both leaders refused the example of the United States but favoured the specimen of the European Union. The second option carried the day at the Sirte (Libya) Declaration, establishing the AU on September 9, 1999 (Landsberg, 2008: 207). A significant feature of the new body pushed by the duo of Obasanjo and Mbeki was the refusal of the new organisation to admit any future military regime as a member. By 2003, this provision had been applied to military juntas in The Comoros Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau (Adebajo, 2008:22).

In their endeavour to maintain peace and stability of the continent, the two leaders also pushed for the right of the new organisation to interfere in the affairs of member states in cases of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" or "serious threat to legitimate order." This move was a departure from the defunct OAU where non-interference in domestic affairs of member states was a golden rule. Also, it is pertinent to remember that at the formation of the OAU in 1963, Nigeria supported the creation of a weaker organisation, "in order to avoid supranational tendencies and rivalry between states that might generate conflict" (Gambari, 1975: 159). The two leaders also supported the initiative of NEPAD; Obasanjo most especially deemed it prudent



to use it as a tool for obtaining debt relief from Western creditors (Iliffe, 2011: 221; Landsberg, 2008: 206-207).

Elsewhere in Africa, Obasanjo used “quiet diplomacy” to arrive at settlements for Nigeria in some of those problems with neighbouring countries that had become insurmountable over the years. In 2000, Nigeria succeeded in dividing up the disputed waters of the Gulf of Guinea between it, São Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Apart from the delineation of maritime borders with São Tomé and Príncipe, the Nigerian government was able to strike a deal with the country in the establishment of a Joint Development Zone on its side, but with the head office of the Authority in Abuja. In the deal, Nigeria enjoyed control of 60 per cent of the oil (Frynas, Wood and Soares de Oliveira, 2003: 62-80). Because of his commitment to African-wide affairs, little was done by his government to seal the Franco-Anglophone rift in the sub-regional ECOWAS (Iliffe, 2011: 221).

However, this thesis submits that Obasanjo might have thought that Nigeria had done so much for West Africa, especially in its restoration of peace to the two war-ravaged countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, that its attention was needed yonder Africa. Back at home, the case of the Bakassi Peninsula lost by Nigeria at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was a test for Obasanjo’s acclaimed Nigerian patriotism as well as his international propriety (Iliffe, 2011: 2, 222). He handled the matter with uttermost diplomatic care by ordering official silence on the issue, and asked for the intervention of Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, not willing to cede a metre of Nigerian land (*The Guardian*, November 17, 2002). Nevertheless, Obasanjo finally acceded to the verdict of the ICJ on the case in September 2002 (Tariiebae and Baroni, 2010: 206).

In his bid to maintain friendships with “countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy,” Obasanjo gave special consideration to the United States and Britain and France. He worked relentlessly to ensure that relations with these global economic gladiators assisted in his aspiration to bring about internal economic developments (Alao, 2011: 5). For instance, in his ambition to retrain and re-professionalise the Nigerian army for the purposes of peacekeeping, he turned to the United States for assistance. Although the gesture angered the army who felt

humiliated, it made Nigeria to become the main legatee of American military assistance in Africa. The move also earned Nigeria the accolade of becoming a “moral superpower” (*This Day*, August 27 2000). Obasanjo’s efforts at placing Nigeria on the world map again and win the favour of its biggest creditor made his government fall back on Britain more than any government before it. His government’s symbolic friendship with Britain made him become a chief mediator between it and the government of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (*This Day*, November 16 1999 and April 12 2000). Although efforts at persuading Mugabe either to resign or form a coalition government with the opposition party failed, he retaliated to please his white friends by insisting that Mugabe must not attend the December 2003 Abuja Commonwealth Conference (*Mail and Guardian*, January 9, 2004).

#### **8.4 THE AFTERMATH OF NIGERIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERIA AND GUINEA-BISSAU**

The LURD rebels who had demanded for Taylor’s resignation since 1999 vigorously battled his government continuously for weeks during the first half of 2003. Controlling 50 per cent of the country, the rebels in this renewed battle recorded the worst bloodshed in Liberia since 1990 (*Thisday*, July 7 2003). While Taylor was attending a peace conference in Accra in June 2003, he was being indicted for war crimes during the Sierra Leon war of the 1990s by the UN-supported International Crimes Court. The court issued an international warrant of arrest on him on June 4, 2003. Taylor was indicted by the United States prosecutor, David Crane, for backing rebels during the war in return for blood diamonds. The warrant read in part, that Taylor was accused of “bearing the greatest responsibility for war crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law within the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.” Analysts felt that Taylor’s actions deliberately spread instability in the sub-region of West Africa. Although the international court expected the Ghanaian authorities to effect the arrest, Taylor was safely ferried back to Liberia by the Ghanaian government (*Thisday*, September 6, 2003). The Sierra Leonean rebels who emerged from Liberia in 1991 were infamous for hacking their victims as well as carrying out mass rape and recruitment of child soldiers (*Daily Champion*, June 8 2003).

While the international warrant of arrest was issued on Taylor by the ICC, an option of political asylum was initiated by France with the support of the US and Britain in order for peace to reign

the Mano River Union. For instance, after the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war in 2002, the fear of Taylor still remained. It was believed that renewed hostilities in Liberia were a threat to the peace in the neighbouring countries. France was worried by a possible crisis in the sub-region which would likely engulf its former colonies, and therefore thought that the best solution was to remove Taylor from the scene (*Africannews*, July 13, 2003). President Obasanjo persuaded Taylor to consider the option of an asylum anywhere as the United States pressurised him to leave office. However, Taylor insisted that he would not until an international peacekeeping force arrived in Liberia. Subsequently however, Taylor contemplated South Africa; for uncertain reasons, or Taiwan; where some of his alleged sponsors were, as asylum base before finally settling for Nigeria. Before considering the final options, it was Taylor's wish to spend his years in exile in either Libya or Burkina Faso which France vehemently opposed. France ruled out these two potential options for Taylor because Gaddafi and Campaore were his personal friends and the US and Britain in particular would disapprove of Taylor being harboured by either of those "unfriendly states." However in principle, the UN frowned on Taylor's asylum in Nigeria or elsewhere, meaning that he avoided prosecution at the crimes court tribunal in Sierra Leone (*Africannews*, July 13, 2003; *Thisday*, July 7, 2003).

Taylor would not have been exiled elsewhere other than in Nigeria but for certain reasons. For instance, his initial application for political asylum by Libya was tacitly turned down by Gaddafi. In 2003, Gaddafi had just paid nearly US\$ 4 billion in compensation to the families of victims of the Pan American Flight 103 and the French U.T.A. plane which his intelligence officers had blown off over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, and the Sahara Desert in 1989 respectively. Around the same period also, Gaddafi witnessed the despicable disposition of Saddam Hussein by the coalition of Western countries led by the US. Furthermore, he was troubled by the economic problems Libya was facing as a result of American sanctions and boycott of its oil. Thus, Gaddafi was ready to purge himself of all radicalism and do the bidding of the West by shunning Charles Taylor (*The Comet*, September 4, 2003). Therefore, he discreetly directed him to seek refuge from his "black brothers."

Also, South Africa turned down Taylor's request for political asylum (*The Guardian*, December 11, 2003). Thus, the onus was now on President Obasanjo to accept Taylor's asylum in Nigeria

(Amusan, personal communication, August 2 2016). Apparently, Obasanjo did this to lessen the burden of Nigeria in peacekeeping in Liberia and other parts of the region that were likely affected by Taylor's continued stay in power. Another interest of Nigeria protected by Obasanjo in his acceptance of Taylor's asylum was the lives of Nigerian citizens and businesses resident in those countries likely to be affected by attacks from Taylor's forces. Most importantly, Obasanjo seized this opportunity to demand for the provision of human and material resources for peacekeeping operations in Liberia from the Western countries to which the UN, Britain and the UN succumbed (*Africannews*, July 13, 2003).

It is pertinent to note that President Obasanjo demanded from the international community, especially the UN, that he would not want to be stampeded into releasing Taylor to the ICC before he gave him asylum in Nigeria. Also, the decision was not a unilateral one by Nigeria as the AU and ECOWAS supported the move. Definitely, it was expedient for Nigeria to spearhead Taylor's political asylum because of some new developments in the sub-region (Okwechina, personal communication, January 29 2015). There was a renewed threat from the rebel groups armed by Taylor in neighbouring Guinea Conakry, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone as well as the rump of his army in Liberia. These groups vowed that should Taylor be sent to appear before the international court to answer charges against him, they would engage in permanent guerrilla warfare in the sub-region (*Africannews*, July 13 2003). Perhaps the United Nations might also have studied the situation on the ground to coerce the organisation into relaxing its insistence on the arrest and trial of Taylor at its special court in Sierra Leone. Obviously, it dawned on the UN that its hunt for Taylor had become an obstacle for him leaving Liberia. Nevertheless, the United States of America swore that Taylor's asylum in Nigeria did not remove the indictment in any way from him. It is important to note here that the Nigerian government knew it would face some difficulty if the UN maintained its intention to try Taylor (*The Guardian*, August 13, 2003).

Understandably, many people in Nigeria were opposed to Taylor's asylum in Nigeria for reasons ranging from the political, security to the spiritual (Salawu, personal communication, August 4 2015). For instance, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), surprisingly a government agency, believed that granting Taylor political asylum in Nigeria would send a

wrong signal to the international community about the country's commitment to human rights protection. The situation, they argued, looked as though Nigeria was endorsing human rights violations and maladministration among African leaders. The body also reasoned that accommodating Taylor in Nigeria could look like a plot by the country to shield him for standing trial for war crimes before the international court tribunal in Sierra Leone (*The Punch*, July 18, 2003). Of course, while some analysts saw Obasanjo as an American stooge in the whole drama (*Thisday*, July 27, 2003), others reasoned that keeping Taylor anywhere in the sub-region of West Africa made Liberia to be within his reach and vulnerable to his potential subversion through rebel forces (*Sunday Tribune*, August 10 2003).

Still others saw harbouring Taylor in Nigeria was particularly dangerous for the country as two of his compatriots and rivals - Yormie Johnson and Roosevelt Johnson - were exiled in Jos and Lagos respectively at that time. Also they argued that keeping Taylor in Calabar in particular did not augur well for Nigeria because of the close proximity of the town to Cameroon, a country which had hitherto kept constant mutual suspicion about Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula (*The Guardian*, August 13, 2003). Furthermore, there was the fear that bodies like the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and other human rights organisations would inundate Taylor with many legal proceedings over the death of Nigerian citizens, including journalists, in the hands of his rebel forces during the war (Jendele, personal interview August 11 2016). To the spiritually inclined, they were afraid that should Taylor be harboured by Nigeria, there was the likelihood that the "...the sins of Charles Taylor will be visited on Nigeria," and Nigerians would "...suffer as a result of the problem of one man." Therefore, they did not want "...the sins of Charles Taylor to be visited on Nigeria" (*Daily Champion*, July 14, 2003).

Nevertheless, as many people opposed Taylor's political asylum in Nigeria, some section of the intelligentsia supported Nigeria's position on his political asylum. Both Bolaji Akinyemi and Bola Akinterinwa believed that Nigeria's hosting of Taylor conformed with the best international practice. The duo also agreed that providing Taylor with political asylum by Nigeria was indispensable to restoring and maintaining peace and security in Liberia and the whole of the sub-region in general. Bola Akinterinwa reasoned that the July 2003 visit of President George Bush to Nigeria was partly aimed at nudging Nigeria into providing asylum for Taylor from



where he would be extradited (*Thisday*, July 27, 2003). Akinyemi questioned the international warrant of arrest issued on Taylor. He asked why it should be an African sitting President so warranted when leaders of countries like North Korea and Myanmar who had committed worse war crimes were left free (*The Comet*, August 21 2003). Against all odds, Taylor handed over power to his deputy, Moses Blah, and arrived in Nigeria in August 2003 (Iliffe, 2011: 218). He was accompanied by three African Presidents: Obasanjo, Mbeki and Kuffor (*The Guardian*, August 23 2003).

Undoubtedly, the trepidation of those opposed to Taylor's asylum in Nigeria were justified. Apparently, the NHRC's arguments were based on Obasanjo's demands from the international community before he accepted the responsibility of sheltering Taylor in Nigeria, that he would not stand to be pestered by them to hand him over to the ICC. Taylor lived like a "visiting president" in Nigeria, moving from his original accommodation to the Presidential lodge, granting newspaper interviews and travelling around the country freely (*The Comet*, August 21, 2003; *The Guardian*, November 14 2003). He was reputed to have arrived in Nigeria with so much diamond and cash that Nigerian banks competed to get his attention (*The Comet*, December 11, 2003). The NUJ and other parties, including some Nigerian victims of amputation acts by Taylor's men in Sierra Leone filed different court cases against him (*The Guardian*, October 15 2003). An international human rights group took their case against Taylor to the UN headquarters in New York. They accused him of spreading corruption among Nigerian security personnel deployed to protect him by giving them bribes from ill-gotten money laundered from Liberia. He was also alleged of bribing senior Nigerian state and local government officials with luxury vehicles. Additionally, Taylor was implicated in the financing of some political parties in Liberia as well as training and arming a small but formidable group of rebels in some West African countries (*The Guardian*, May 22 2005). Taylor was also alleged to be sponsored by Al-Qaeda to destabilise some West African countries while using his Nigerian abode as a base to manipulate the then ongoing Liberian elections (*Daily Champion*, July 26 2005; *Nigerian Tribune*, May 25 2005).

Taylor subsequently became a diplomatic nuisance to Nigeria as the United States threatened to cut aid to the country if it refused to release him for prosecution while it offered US\$ 2 million

reward for his capture. Afterward, a fresh warrant of arrest was issued on Taylor by the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) in December 2003. The same month, Northbridge Services, a security outfit based in Britain, offered to kidnap Taylor for prosecution at the UN International court in Sierra Leone (*The Guardian*, November 14, 18 and December 10, 2003). As public opinion differed on Taylor's political asylum in Nigeria, so also was the issue of handing him over to the ICC among Nigerians. Femi Falana asked the Nigerian government to release Taylor to the war crimes tribunal based on Article 59 of the Statute of Rome, to which Nigeria was a signatory. Akinyemi gave two options to the government to either move Taylor to the interior part of Nigeria for safety or encouraging him to surrender himself to the ICC while some criticised the futility of moving him to the hinterland as he could be kidnapped anywhere (*The Punch*, November 10, 2003). Meanwhile, the Nigerian government beefed up security around Taylor while it defended its stance on keeping him in various fora ((Iliffe, 2011: 218; *The Guardian*, December 10 2003). Both at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), Abuja in December 2003 and the 11<sup>th</sup> UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok in April 2005, the Nigerian government vowed that it would keep Taylor as long as his home government did not request for his transfer to Liberia (*Daily Champion*, December 21 2003; *The Guardian*, May 10 2005).

Eventually, the new government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia requested the Nigerian government to hand over Taylor to its custody in March 2006. The request was made much to the discomfort of Johnson-Sirleaf who had wished Obasanjo could have surrendered Taylor directly to the ICC without involving her new fragile government in the process. However, President Obasanjo also declared that he did not want to have anything to do with the Sierra Leone tribunal (*The Guardian*, March 27 2006; *The Punch*, March 29 2006). Meanwhile, Taylor had escaped from his Calabar sanctuary on March 28, 2006, reminiscent of his breaking of gaol in Boston, Massachusetts in the 1980s. He was intercepted by the Nigerian Customs Service at Gamboru-Ngala, a Nigeria-Cameroon border, near Maiduguri the same week and handed over to the Liberian authorities who ushered him to UN force for onward transfer to the ICC in Sierra Leone (*The Guardian*, April 2 2006). Whereas the UN special court in Sierra Leone was set up to try those most responsible for committing war crimes during the country's 1990s civil war; the eventual arrest and readiness for prosecution of Taylor by the court made it move its sittings to



The Hague from Freetown in 2008. The court took the step because of concerns that Taylor's presence in Freetown would affect stability and security in the sub-region (*Thisday*, July 15 2009).

There was controversy surrounding Taylor's disappearance from his Calabar abode that the Nigerian security operatives, with the nod of the government, connived with him to escape. However, this allegation was vehemently denied by the Nigerian government through President Obasanjo himself (Iliffe, 2011: 219; *The Comet*, April 4 2006). Meanwhile, history was not "kind" to Taylor contrary to the valedictory speech he delivered to his supporters in Liberia shortly before he went on asylum in Nigeria in 2003. Taylor, a former Baptist lay preacher, prophesied that he would come back to Liberia, "God willing," (*The Guardian*, August 13 2003). Although he went back to Liberia, nevertheless, by a twist of fate, he never met his "congregation," but a band of the UN soldiers who ferried him to justice. Notwithstanding Taylor's trial by the ICC, a big question still remained unanswered as to why Taylor was not charged for war crimes he committed in Liberia but those he did in the neighbouring country, Sierra Leone. Taylor himself was disappointed in the ECOWAS and the AU who had promised to drop all charges against him if he agreed to step down as president in 2003. He felt much betrayed by Obasanjo himself (*Thisday*, July 15 2009).

Apart from Taylor's saga in the post-war Liberian relations with Nigeria, there were some important aftermath events that adversely affected Nigeria. One of such after-effects was the HIV/AIDS pandemic among Nigerian soldiers who went for the ECOMOG mission in Liberia. Many of the soldiers, including top officers, who came back alive did so half-dead, having contracted the deadly HIV/AIDS virus during the mission (*Nigerian Tribune*, October 9, 1999). Statistics from UNAIDS Report on Nigeria showed that 11 per cent of Nigerian ECOMOC soldiers were infected with HIV/Aids virus (Afaha, 2015: 135-153). Equally, Nigeria had to encounter some humanitarian encumbrances and liabilities by hosting more than 7,000 refugees; (5, 517 Liberians, and 1, 603 Sierra Leoneans) at the Oru-Ijebu Refugee Camp, Ogun State for more than 15 years (*The Guardian*, July 7 2005; June 9 2008). Unfortunately however, while many Liberian refugees continued to live in Nigeria at the expense of Nigerian tax payers, after the end of the civil war those Nigerians resident in Liberia were not spared of open hatred.

Shortly after the war, Nigerians in Liberia continued to live in a very challenging environment. As late as 2008, on a daily basis, there were cases of assault, illegal arrest and detention of Nigerians. Also, the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia was often raided (*Sunday Punch*, August 31 2008). It was really a bad way Liberians paid back for Nigeria's largeness of heart.

Corruption was rife among the military top brass during the Nigerian ECOMOG mission to Liberia. Soldiers were grossly remunerated in contradiction to the actual amount they were supposed to get as salaries and allowances over a period of ten years when the mission lasted in Liberia (Afaha, 2015: 135-153). Not only were soldiers poorly equipped, they were often sent to the war front without weapons, starved and reduced to fending for themselves. On a particular Nigerian warship where Nigeria naval men were starved of meat for four months, until pork came to their rescue; four men, including an officer died of gas explosion while cooking for themselves (Commodore Ojediran, personal communication, January 26 2015). Unfortunately, much of the funds budgeted for the mission and siphoned by the highest echelon in the army were written off by the government as ECOMOG expenses (Adebajo, 2008; 193). Nevertheless, the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 2000-2001 exposed the venality. However, a contingent of returnee ECOMOG junior soldiers who protested their exploitation by the generals in Akure in July 2008, were court-martialled and jailed while the corrupt officers were cautioned. Many wounded soldiers were lying on their sick beds in military hospitals across Nigeria until help came their way with the inception of democratic governance in 1999. There was also the problem of family detachment among Nigerian soldiers who were away from their families for long times. The resultant effect of this was the siring of several hundreds of thousands of children by the soldiers through Liberian women, many of whom never knew their fathers (Afaha, 2015: 135-153). This researcher witnessed in 1999, how a Liberian lady brought her daughter to Nigeria to come and meet her father who served as a Nigerian ECOMOG soldier during the Liberian civil war. The woman went back to Liberia disappointed because the Nigerian soldier refused to accept the girl as his daughter.

There were other areas of assistance by Nigeria to Liberia from the end of the civil war to 2010. Nigeria's commitment to a hitch free election in post-war Liberia prompted it to train 300 Liberian police officers in 2005 in readiness for the elections of the same year (*The Guardian*,

September 19 2005). In the following year, Nigeria sent its medical doctors to go and resuscitate Liberia's health sector that was badly affected by the civil war. In addition, a number of Nigerian personnel were sent out to the country under the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme while 30 Liberian security service officers were trained in Nigeria to provide protective details to President Johnson-Sirleaf (*The Guardian*, March 9, 2006; *The Punch*, March 26, 2006). The government of Liberia got a debt relief of 27 per cent of its total debt to Nigeria from the government of Umaru Musa Yar'adua in 2007. The debt cancellation was extended to the country by Nigeria in order to hastening its economic recovery after the civil war (Thisday, November 21, 2007). Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the two countries in August 2007, a battalion of 600 soldiers was sent from Liberia for training in Nigeria by February 2008. The training of the Liberian soldiers by Nigeria was necessary in preparation to securing their country after the withdrawal of the UNMIL forces from the country (*The Guardian*, January 16, 2008). The attention in this thesis now shifts to Guinea-Bissau.

Although Nigeria desisted from participating militarily in returning peace back to Guinea-Bissau during its 12 months civil war, it continued with its bilateral assistance to the country immediately after the war. In 2001 for instance, the Nigerian government made available the sum of US\$ 1 million to the country to restructure its armed forces. This gesture indicated Nigeria's readiness to play a pivotal role in the sub-region by assisting the less financially buoyant countries despite its own economic difficulties at home (Adebajo, 2002b: 130). Regardless of this, Nigeria-Guinea-Bissau relations were stressed in September 2003 when Nigeria took exception to a military coup that toppled the government of President Kumba Yala.

José Ramos Horta of Timor-Leste who was the special envoy of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), tactically supported the military intervention. He had argued that the coup was seemingly welcomed by the people of Guinea-Bissau. Also, even though most members of the UN Security Council condemned the coup, they nevertheless "expressed an understanding that it had occurred because of a deteriorating political and economic situation in the country" (UNSC *Press Release*, September 29 2003). Notwithstanding the seemingly calculated support for the September 2003 coup in Guinea-Bissau, the Nigerian government roundly condemned it; stating that the coup was "unwarranted and unconstitutional." President

Obasanjo therefore asked the military junta to restore the deposed government with immediate effect (Onuorah, 2003: 1-2; *The Guardian*, September 15, 2003).

The refusal of the junta to effect a reversion to *status quo ante* earned Guinea-Bissau a ban from the AU summit in 2003 (Adebajo, 2008: 22). The sanction was based on the agreement reached by the organisation in its 1999 Algiers conference stating that no government that came to power through military means should be admitted into the continental body. The ban notwithstanding, President Obasanjo went on to persuade the Bissau-Guinea military government to engage a team of military technocrats to assist in organising elections in 2003 (Iliffe, 2011: 221, 282). As AU Chairman, Obasanjo approached the leader of the military junta, the country's former Chief of Staff, General Veríssimo Correia Seabra, and told him that the problem of the country "is not military but political and economic," and pronounced that, "soldiers are part of the problem, not the solution." Obasanjo's reaction to the coup coupled with other reasons, forced the soldiers to stop from assuming power but instead they appointed a civilian interim president, Henrique Pereira Rosa, to organise elections in 2005 (Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 22). It is important to note here that Nigeria's reaction to the 2003 Guinea-Bissau's military coup had tried to emphasise something. The reaction had indicated that although Nigeria was not a military donor in the restoration of peace in the country during the 1998-1999 civil war, Guinea-Bissau remained part of Nigeria's inner "concentric circle" of its foreign policy.

## **8.5 NIGERIA: A HEGEMONIC POWER IN WEST AFRICA?**

We shall revisit the hegemonic stability theory in this section of the thesis in order to make a point. Snidal (1985: 579-81), and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966: 266-279) agreed that international public goods can only exist if a group of states have one of them ready to bear the costs. Such a state or the hegemonic power must also be sufficiently larger than the others. For Kindelberger (1981: 243), for international economic stability to be maintained, one country had to dominate the others. The dominant one must be able to persuade others to follow a given course of action which may not be in the interests of the followers. Gilpin (1981: 94), on his own part argued that the hegemon or the most powerful state in a group has the ability to restrain the weaker ones from resorting to violence. Thus, the ability of the hegemon to maintain the peace might be an apparent demonstration of domination within its sphere of influence (Mitchell &

Vasquez, 2014:203). In the application of the foregoing argument to Nigeria, chapter three of this work has analysed the portrayal of the country by some scholars, analysts and statesmen as a “regional hegemon” (Adebajo, 2008: 12; 2004: 4; 2002a: 6-7; 2002b: 17; Bach, 2004: 75-80, 85); “regional anchor” (Mikell, 2008: 294); “moral superpower” (*This Day* August 27 2000), and one of the “potential locomotives of Africa’s development and stability” (Cilliers *et al*, 2015: 19).

Another “hegemon” in its own right and sub-region, and a virulent contender with Nigeria in the African leadership scrum is South Africa. The capacity and capability of these two countries were compared and contrasted in chapter three of this research. Nevertheless, it is very important to point out here that, although the Nigerian economy was formally recognised as the biggest in Africa in 2014, South Africa remained the only African country that is a member of the G20 and BRICS (the group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Also South Africa is the only African country out of the European Union’s ten global strategic partners, giving it international weight that Nigeria may probably be short of. South Africa is identified as a developed economy by African standards (Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 7-8, 24). The legitimacy of both countries as “hegemons” in their respective sub-regions is still questioned by most of their smaller neighbours, although both are militarily and economically superior to them all.

In comparison with the United States, Fawole (personal communication, March 3 2015), has differentiated Nigeria’s type of “hegemony” as “leadership” as distinct from America’s kind of “dominating power.” Nigeria’s capacity to provide leadership in its sphere of influence in a variety of contexts like security, finance, trade is weaker in comparison to the United States of America for instance. The American utilisation of this capacity and its leadership role has made it accepted as legitimate by its European and Asian allies (Adebajo, 2002a: 7). Making reference to the work of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, Adebajo and Landsberg (2003: 173) stress that the ability to apply power without using force with the agreement of other states, and the ability to pay military and economic costs are critical factors in exercising hegemony. Nigeria as a potential hegemon in the sub-region of West Africa lacks these fundamentals.

Mustapha (2008: 369-382) doubted whether Nigeria could play the role of a “middle power” in view of the mutual effect of domestic forces and external environment. He quickly identified the principal challenges of Nigerian foreign policy to include, domestic, regional, extra-regional, and professional constraints. Nigeria’s potential of being the largest country in Africa and the biggest black nation in the world, coupled with the huge revenue from oil, have been banes of its development. Lack of the entrenchment of foreign policy objectives, the privation of the exact definition of citizenship as well as misuse of oil wealth are some of Nigeria’s domestic weaknesses. The misappropriation of oil revenue has promoted the culture of waste, which in turn has increased the tempo of ethnic jingoism. Frailty crept into the military institution as a result of inadequate financial and logistical support, leading to the presence of foreign troops in the sub-regional waters due to the inadequacy of the local forces to man the seas. Increased fraternity with the Western countries has not really paid off because of the government’s absence of internal legitimacy. Therefore, it could be reasonably argued here that institutional decay and governance deficit adversely affected all facets of endeavour, including the foreign affairs ministry. Here, lack of professionalism compromised the foreign policy power projection (Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 7-8, 25). All these have cumulatively added to the resultant inherent domestic instability in the land.

Thus, the Achilles heel in Nigeria’s aspiration of becoming a regional hegemony is the country’s daunting domestic instability. Indubitably, a few African countries and none in the sub-region of West Africa can compare with Nigeria in terms of economic and military capabilities. Nevertheless, poverty of leadership and maladministration have plagued a country so richly endowed in natural resources. The misappropriation of wealth accrued from the oil boom of the 1970s by both military and civil administrations resulted in economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The surge in oil revenue promoted the rapid expansion of the state and its role in economic activities, especially in public expenditure. However, the lack of accountability and fiscal irresponsibility of those in government led to corruption and gross expropriation of the national fund (Budina, Pang and van Wijabergen, 2007:3-7). Due to an endemic corruption, some have identified Nigeria as a ‘prototypical example of private interests’ that took over ‘the public domain, creating a neo-patrimonial and anti-developmental state’ (Bach, 2010:1). The resultant effect of embezzlement of public fund by the few was the deteriorating economic and

living conditions of the majority. Grinding poverty as a result of mass unemployment (World Bank, 2013:8) made way for aggravating tensions in ethnic relationships among the diverse national groups in Nigeria.

As a result of long years of neglect, paucity of development and build-up grievances, there were internal security challenges. As the clamour for resource control in the form of land, economic benefits or political power by the various ethnic nationalities increased, so also domestic instability heightened. The consequences of this were incessant armed struggle, civil unrest and militancy. The most volatile areas as far as armed struggle and youth restiveness were concerned were the Niger Delta (Asuni 2009: 3) and the North East. In the former, the militants destroyed the fabric of the economic mainstay of the country by vandalising oil pipelines and in the latter, Boko Haram insurgents destroyed many innocent lives and much property (Awodola and Ayuba, 2015: 254). Elsewhere in the country, ethnic clashes, and other criminal activities like cattle rustling, kidnapping and armed robbery were commonplace (*The Guardian* November 27, 2016). It has been identified that these crises emanated from the inability of Nigerian leaders to come to terms with the many years of development challenges confronting the country (Odigbo, Udaw and Igwe, 2014: 14). The Fund for Peace's fragile states index for 2017 positioned Nigeria as the number 13th most fragile state in the world. On the high alert table of the institution, Nigeria ranked as number five among such countries as Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Guinea, Pakistan, Burundi and Zimbabwe (FFP, 2017).

Nigeria began to make impressive progress in terms of economic growth rate, investment climate and GDP from the 2000s. The results of the 2013 rebasing exercise placed Nigeria at the top of Africa's GDP table and made it the biggest economy on the continent, closely followed by South Africa. Although as the largest oil producer in Africa and a country in which government revenue was based on oil, the rebasing procedure discovered that the non-oil sector of the economy was responsible for rapid economic growth (World Bank, 2013:2). Nevertheless, Nigeria is still confronted with the overwhelming social, economic and political challenges. Despite its new status as the largest economy in Africa, more than half of its population lives in abject poverty (World Bank 2013: 8-9). According to Habib Adam (2009:150), every hegemon is a pivotal state endowed with military and economic resources as well as a strong political and



socio-economic standing to pursue its vision. Elements of this socio-economic and political status are sound economic development, national capability, social structure, political organisation, political accountability and good leadership. However, Nigeria lacks in many of these criteria as the country struggles to overcome domestic encumbrances to assume regional hegemony.

However, there is still hope for Nigeria. Cilliers, *et al*, (2015: 23-25) in their study of foreign power projection concerning the African “Big Five,” have exempted Nigeria from other African countries that may likely remain minor powers with “implications for their influence over issues of global governance,” by 2040. The study discovered that internationally, Nigeria had punched below its height in winning over more international actors, institutions or regimes. As far as capabilities were concerned, the study argued, Nigeria was the rising prime candidate with Ethiopia straggling behind it from a far distance. Despite its punching below capacity, according to the study, Nigeria was the only African country with the aptitude to emerge as an international major player. The advantage of Nigeria being the largest economy would also increase according to the study’s projection. Nevertheless, these projections could not be attained, the study opined, if there were tenacious domestic instability, indelible corruption, socio-political violence and inability to securing an all-inclusive political-economic system by Nigeria. Table 8.1 below summarises the trends of capabilities and power projection for the African “Big Five.”

**Figure 8.1: Showing the current capability and trends for power projection among the African “Big Five.”**

| Country      | Current capability | Future trend | Current power projection |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| Ethiopia     | Low                | ↑            | Above its weight         |
| Nigeria      | High               | ↑            | Below its weight         |
| South Africa | High               | ↓            | Above its weight         |
| Egypt        | High               | ↓            | Below its weight         |
| Algeria      | Modest             | ↓            | Below its weight         |

Source: Adapted from Cilliers, J. *et al*, “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures Paper14*|March 2015, p. 24.

## 8.6 CONCLUSION

From the political, military and economic points of view, Nigeria still lacked the capability to function as a hegemon in the sub-region of West Africa. Above all, there was no strong international support for the country to effectively act in that capacity. Nigeria is yet to have strong economic institutions for promoting leadership and maintaining security in the sub-region. Its legitimacy as a hegemon is still questioned by its neighbours, especially Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana who have the capability of challenging its hegemonic tendencies in the sub-region. Nigeria can therefore be tagged, at best, an aspiring hegemon, or a "moral superpower" as Bill Clinton docketed in August, 2000 (Iliffe, 2011: 219). As a potential hegemon, the country is still suffering from the tendentious malaise of a regional power that is yet to dispel the horror of domination it has created in the hearts of smaller neighbouring nations. Some of the other West African actors are yet to come to terms with the challenge that Nigeria can appropriate to itself the right to lead others in the sub-region. Thus, Nigeria's hegemonic propensity is yet to be accepted by the potential hegemonised, for example, the Nigeria-led ECOMOG deployment in Liberia and Sierra Leone was suspected by the Francophone-ECOWAS members as a ploy by the country to establish its 'Pax Nigeriana' in West Africa.

Nigeria's dream of becoming a hegemonic power in West Africa could only be fulfilled if there was a fundamental change in its domestic stability, governance capacity and political leadership. This thesis proceeds to the last chapter, which concludes the critical arguments advanced so far in the research.

## CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

### 9.1 INTRODUCTION

The final chapter of this thesis presented a sum total of the evaluation and appraisal of the research . It also set forth the findings emanating from the study as it made useful recommendations and suggestions for further research. The focus of this thesis has been an examination of the changing stance of Nigeria's foreign policy in relation to conflict resolution in the West-African sub-region, with particular reference to Liberia and Guinea Bissau, by using Interdependence and Hegemonic Stability theories as framework of analysis. The theories were applied to test Nigeria's contributions to peacekeeping and the use of diplomacy in resolving crises under the auspices of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. In addition, the purpose behind this project involved an assessment of its operational hypothesis: *The strategic behaviour of a nation's foreign policy is dictated by the domestic environment and the internal political dynamics of the system of government.* This was undertaken to determine whether or not Nigeria's different approaches to conflict resolution in the two countries studied were proscribed by the internal political environment of Nigeria at the respective periods.

### 9.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

This thesis set to understand whether or not the Afrocentric standpoint of Nigeria's foreign policy as well as its principle of concentric circles held fort in relation to the country's different approaches to conflict interventions in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. Why did Nigeria contribute both militarily and diplomatically to the restoration of peace to Liberia but only partook in a diplomatic solution to the Guinea-Bissau crisis? Was it because Liberia is Anglophone and Guinea-Bissau Lusophone? Or was Nigeria's disparity of purpose an extension of Franco-Anglophone rivalry in the sub-region? Was it due to dissimilar domestic and internal political environment in Nigeria at different periods? What were the implications of this to Nigeria's foreign policy and what are the security implications on West Africa? These were the fundamental questions answered in the foregoing chapters of this thesis. Whereas Chapter One laid the basis for the intellectualisation of the study, Chapter Two established and linked the

study with the current and existing literature. The second chapter also positioned the study within a framework of interdependence and hegemonic stability theories.

Chapter Three concentrated on Nigeria's foreign policy toward its counterpart West African countries, analysing the factors that made it to continue to play the role of "Big Brother" to them. In doing this, I analysed the consistent objectives and changing methods of Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa while assessing the capabilities that determined the country's leadership role in the sub-region. In this chapter also, I evaluated Nigeria's specific policies towards individual and groups of countries in West Africa, starting with the contiguous neighbours of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé é Príncipe; all which formed the inner ring in the "concentric circles." Nigeria's particular relations with the Anglophone group, and the rest of the Francophone and Lusophone countries in the sub-region was also reviewed. In assessing the determinants of Nigeria's leadership role in West Africa, the chapter studied roles played by the country's foreign policy in attaining this. The thesis argued that Nigeria's role of 'charismatic' leadership emerged in the sub-region immediately after independence in 1960. Twelve years down its independence, Nigeria fronted the formation of ECOWAS (Olaniyan, 1986: 126, 127). From the time of independence too, its foreign policy has always been driven by the "concentric circles" principle of national interest (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21), with each regime having distinctive priorities and styles.

The third chapter of this thesis identified that substantial changes started to occur in Nigeria's capabilities in the 1970s, especially in the areas of economic, military, diplomatic and institutional resources when compared with the rest of Africa. The country's leadership trend in the ECOWAS remained consistent in spite of the instability in the country's political backdrop for so long a time (Khadiagala and Lyon, 2001:4). Chapter Three also adopted the results of a forecast study by Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer (2015: 1-28) in exploring the changing capabilities of some five African countries, including Nigeria. In measuring Nigerian capabilities using such indices as governance, demographics, formal and informal diplomatic networks, economic and military capabilities, the West African sub-region remained dominated by Nigeria, which by far retains the biggest capabilities for the next 25 years. The results also showed that Nigeria was positioned to become "Africa's lone superpower." Looking at Nigeria's relations

with its neighbours in West Africa in chapter three, it was confirmed that the country has maintained good neighbourliness with them all, with only Cameroon proving the most difficult. Cameroon, whose southern part had been governed as part of Nigeria under the British colony until the 1961 plebiscite, has always regarded Nigeria as a bully. Perhaps, this was the reason why the country became Central African and decided not to be part of the West African sub-region politically (Bumunang, personal communication, September 17 2016).

A bone of contention between the two countries had always been the issue of the Bakassi peninsula which contains rich hydrocarbon deposits. The most important issues that triggered the disputes between them included the rights over the oil-rich peninsula, the sea reserves and the fate of the local populations (Check, 2011: 2, 4). The Cameroonian government took legal action in 1994 by filing a law suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) at The Hague (*ASIL Insights*, June 10 1998). The case dragged on at the World Court for eight years until it was finally decided in 2002 when the ICJ ceded the Bakassi peninsular to Cameroon. The then Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, established a Mixed Commission comprising representatives of both Nigeria and Cameroon with the outright consent of the presidents of the two countries (Tariiebae and Baroni, 2010: 206). The Mixed Commission was mandated to demarcate the land boundary between them, withdraw civil, military and police forces, transfer authority in relevant areas along the boundary, demilitarise the peninsula, protect the rights of the affected populations on both sides of the boundary, develop projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation, and reactivate the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC, UN Office for West Africa, 2014/095). The study discovered in this chapter that Nigeria's submission to the ICJ judgment on the Bakassi case has made the country to become, in Africa and elsewhere, a model and a mentor in efforts to combine multilateralism with conflict resolution through arbitration and the rule of law (Bach, 2007: 312).

Chapter Four summarised the history of one of the two countries selected as case studies for this thesis. It reviewed a century old history of Liberian colonisation, the Americo-Liberian oligarchy in the country from 1980, when Samuel Doe, an indigenous nationality, presided over a tyrannical government leading to a civil war. I argued that with the junta in government, there emerged a new political elite in Liberia whose culture of politics was in no way different from

the old regime. The new regime was suffused with corruption, political intolerance and human rights abuses, and soon divided against itself. Meanwhile, the execution of the thirteen former civilian leaders by the government of Samuel Doe did not go down well with a sizeable number of heads of government in African countries, even though many had come to power in the same way and through similar means. They disagreed and were bitter with the gory manner in which the coup was executed, especially, the assassination of President William Tolbert who was the sitting Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) [AU] during the period. Chapter Four impeccably showed that Samuel Doe had intended to succeed himself as the President of Liberia right from the time a call for return to democracy was made (TRC, 2008:114). Power-hungry Doe, though unqualified to run for the presidency due to the new Liberian constitution limiting the qualifying age to 35 years, manipulated his age to qualify to run for the elections. Although the October 1985 election was chaotic and rife with irregularities, Doe was announced the winner and duly recognised by the US government under Ronald Regan (Mgbeoji, 1999: 36-36).

In Chapter Four, this thesis uncovered the Liberian economy nose-diving in the 1980s due to a fall in the demand for its major export products on the international market. Nevertheless, for Doe to sustain himself in power, he diverted much of country's resources to finance his politics of personal survival (Huband, 1998: 43), while opposition to his government at home and abroad continued unabated (TRC, 2008: 116-117). While there were a series of unsuccessful plots to unseat Doe's government from September 1987, that of December 24, 1989 spelt doom for Liberia. Charles Taylor, born of a Gola mother and an Americo-Liberian father, who was severally a sharecropper, former Baptist lay preacher, teacher, lawyer, judge, an American gaol escapee, and trained in guerrilla warfare under Muammar Gaddafi led the coup that plunged Liberia into a 14-year bitter civil war. It was also clarified in this chapter that Taylor manipulated ethnic chauvinism existing among the diverse Liberian indigenous people to launch his Gaddafi-funded armed insurrection to overthrow Doe's government (*Daily Star*, October 5, 1985; *The Economist*, May 31, 2007; *The Guardian*, August 13 2003; van der Kraaij, 2015: 59,70).

Chapter Four of the thesis also established the international conspiracy in Liberia's civil war in the trio of Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and Muamar

Gaddafi of Libya playing decisive roles by providing backing to Taylor's NPFL in various forms. Reasons behind their backing of Taylor ranged from desire to seek revenge for the killing of family members and friends, to support for anti-Western rebels fighting Doe, a man considered as an American apologist.

It was also highlighted in the chapter that the civil war was fought in two phases between 1989-1997 and 1999-2003, by eight major factions: the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL); the National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson (ULIMO-J); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah (ULIMO-K); the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF). As important as ideological explanation is in analysing a civil war (Sanin and Wood, 2014: 213-214), the thesis ascertained in chapter four that none of the faction leaders in the Liberian civil war identified his ideological grounds of involvement in the war. None of the warlords also provided a clue on how to bring about socio-political and economic changes in Liberia after the war. The war claimed an estimated number of 250,000 and twice as many wounded and traumatised with over 700,000 fleeing the country to escape war (Adebajo, 2002b: 47; Ellis, 1999: 1-16, 1995: 181; Dennis, 2006: 12-15; van der Kraaij, 2015: 58, 61).

Chapter Five recapped the history of Guinea-Bissau; the second country used as case study for this thesis. It also established that unlike any other country in the sub-region of West Africa, Guinea-Bissau had to go into military combat with its colonial master, Portugal, before its independence was attained. Perhaps, this experience has made the people of Guinea-Bissau a people that most jealously guard their political independence. The heroes of the war of liberation inherited a country that was ill-prepared structurally, administratively and economically for independence. Also, the Portuguese bequeathed a country that was inherently dependent on aid from international donor organisations with a paucity of natural resources of commercial value. An ill-trained but politically conscious army recruited from the poor local population purposely for the war of independence who in time metamorphosed into the armed forces of the nation. However, the armed forces became more politically awakened after independence (Olaniyan,



1996: 75). This chapter verified that a few years into its independence, Guinea-Bissau, widely regarded as an African model of a successful political and economic peasant revolution, became one of the poorest countries in the world with a fragile economy. It was also discovered that a once promising country, headed by zealous revolutionary leaders, soon drifted into a corporate dictatorship due to differences in its colonial experiences from the rest of the other West African neighbours, the war of independence and belated political freedom (Adebajo, 2002b: 112-113; Yabi, 2010: 15)

Chapter Five discovered that the PAIGC, a revolutionary movement at the forefront of agitations against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, was founded by Amilcar Cabral and others in 1956 (Kurian, 1982: 720). An important contributory factor to the success of anti-colonial movements in Guinea-Bissau, like in other Lusophone Africa, was good leadership. Amilcar Cabral successfully attracted a huge amount of support for the PAIGC from some Western countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. He also united the various ethnic groups as well as the two separate countries; Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, at all costs. The failure on the part of Portugal to enter into peaceful negotiations on decolonisation with Guinea-Bissau and other Lusophone countries in Africa bred anti-colonial wars. The PAIGC had its headquarters outside the country in Guinea Conakry in 1959, and led other anti-colonial movements in Guinea-Bissau to armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial government from 1962. With the use of guerrilla tactics and assistance from Cuban, Soviet and Chinese fighters, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence started by January 1963, (Chabal, 2002: 4, 81, 115; Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 305). In 1970 when the Portuguese side was taking an upper hand in the war, the USSR and Cuba ferried more weapons to the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau via Nigeria, while the country declared its open support for the PAIGC (Chilcote, 1972: 57-61).

It was ascertained in this chapter that eight months after Amilcar Cabral was murdered by a Portuguese agent, Inocêncio Kani, the PAIGC declared a unilateral independence for Guinea-Bissau. The United Nations promptly recognised its independence, while the new regime that came to power via a coup d'état in Portugal officially recognised the independence of Guinea-Bissau controlled by the PAIGC in October 1974 (Chabal, 1983: 133; Lloyd-Jones and Costa Pinto, 2003: 22). Furthermore, the fifth chapter established that it was the desire of Amilcar

Cabral that the two separate entities of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde be a joint independent country ruled under one administration. However, the bi-territorial aspirations of Amílcar Cabral and others had with it seeds of failure from its foundation. Therefore, the irreconcilable differences between them made the two countries to go apart in 1981. The thesis also discovered in this chapter that in the 1970s, Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, experimented with becoming a Francophone state. The push factor was the French direct aid which also made the country to adopt the CFA franc in 1997 as a national currency, while replacing its peso (Adebajo, 2002b: 114; Ede, 1986: 178). Because of its poor economy, weak institutions, corruption, and geographical location, the country became most engulfed in narcotic trade in West Africa and turned out to be an important transit point for Latin American Europe-bound narcotics. Since 2005, Guinea-Bissau has been identified as Africa's "first narco-state," with drug peddling often sponsored by top government officials and high-ranking military officers (Ellis, 2009: 191 Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 12-13, 123).

Chapter Five also noted that João Vieira's rule between 1980 and 1999 were wasted years, marked by imagined episodes of coup attempts that were brutally suppressed. Uneasy tensions bred by years of accumulated dissatisfaction in the body politics as well as the military led to a bitter civil war in 1998. The civil war was triggered off by personal feuds between two actors: President João Vieira and his chief of army staff, Ansumane Mané (Adebajo, 2002b: 115). It started as a military revolt in June 1998, and quickly led to an eleven months war between the rebel soldiers supporting Mané and the loyalists of President Vieira. It was discovered that the complex foreign relations and influences of Guinea-Bissau were contributory factors in the war. These factors also helped in explaining why many external actors were eager to mediate in the crisis (Massey, 2006: 84). The quick response of Senegal and Guinea in support of Vieira, for instance, was both national and personal to the leaders of both countries. Diouf of Senegal wanted to prevent a Mané-led government in Guinea-Bissau who he believed would be an ally to the secessionist Casamance in Senegal. Conté of Guinea also wanted to prevent his country from hosting another multitude of refugees consequent to the conflict. He had had some half of a million of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees already in his country. Both Diouf and Conté wanted to defend Vieira, their soul friend with all he power at their disposal. While the war raged on, ECOWAS was in dire need of international financial support to deploy its interposition force,

ECOMOG, in Guinea-Bissau, in agreement with the Abuja Accord (Adebajo, 2002b: 116; Yabi, 2010: 18).

Chapter Six concentrated on the patterns of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia. In the chapter, it is argued that ECOMOG was established to stop the genocide in Liberia in particular, and the incessant violence and conflicts that engulfed the West African sub-region from the 1990s. Although the problems started prior to 1990, efforts of leaders to bring about economic integration with the formation of economic unions like the MRU and ECOWAS did not yield much result. The effects of the post-Cold War era worsened intra-state conflicts which often spilled over to neighbouring countries and threatened the whole of the West African sub-region (Agbu, 2006:2-3; Kabia, 2011: 1-3; Randa, 1999: 59; Wilkinson, 1998: 64). African countries, including West Africa, faced other crises such as indelible debt, the combined forces of globalisation and marginalisation, and the pandemics of HIV/AIDS at the end of the Cold War (Akopari 2001, 34-55). The end of the Cold War also saw the neglect of Africa by the US and the rest of the West (Huband, 1998: 100, 181). This chapter established that the attention of the West was shifted elsewhere in the Middle East during the Gulf War in the 1990s, when West Africa boiled (Cohen, 2000: 1-16; Copson, 2007: 4; Ellis, 1999: 162; Gershoni, 1993: 21-43; Huband, 1998: 104, 105). Therefore, the international neglect of Africa by the West since the end of the Cold War conferred on Nigeria, despite its own internal crisis, the role of restoration of peace in the sub-region from the 1990s (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003, 171).

The chapter noted that the ECOWAS treaty of 1975 did not provide any security role for the sub-regional organisation, however, subsequent occurrences that threatened the collective security of the sub-region made provision for such. With this scenario unfolding in the sub-region, ECOWAS adopted the Non-Aggression Treaty in 1978, closely followed by the Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) of 1981. Nevertheless, all these mechanisms were either too weak to implement or ineffective as conflict prevention and resolution management tools. I also argued in this chapter that Nigeria diplomatically, financially and militarily shaped the formation and the activities of the ECOMOG in an authoritative manner (Akinyeye, private communication, February 28 2015). This chapter also reported that ECOMOG was the first sub-regional interposition force established in Africa that mainly depended on its own troops, finance and

military supplies and equipment; and the first of such that the UN had sent military observers only to support (Adebajo, 2002b: 15). Furthermore, the chapter pointed to the polemical issues bordering on the legality of ECOMOG and its lack of conformity to the constitutional requirements of ECOWAS (Adebajo 2002a: 63-65; 2002b: 15, 50). However, I argued that the validation of ECOMOG was hinged on the collective security of the sub-region based on the theory of universality and indivisibility of peace, and the support of the UN which declared that the force needed no prior authorisation from the UN (Akindele, 1976: 3; Ofodile, 1994: 414).

The chapter also noted that Nigeria under the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida utilised the ECOMOG to advance the country's pursuit of foreign policy objectives by joining the ranks of nations that engaged their military abroad for that purpose (Fawole, 2008: 98, and personal communication, March 3, 2015). While the Babangida government lobbied for support at the international forum, it also schemed for approval at the sub-regional level by wooing the Anglophone West African countries. Both efforts yielded much results (Adebajo, 2002a: 52-53). Under the Sanni Abacha regime in 1993, ECOWAS remained the major focus, and ECOMOG the most important regional cooperative undertaking in which Nigeria was involved. While other major participants in the peacekeeping mission threatened to pull out due to the intractability of the Liberian civil, General Abacha was resolute. Abacha was able to do this in the face of strong opposition from some West African leaders, especially the Francophone countries and the NPFL rebel leader, Charles Taylor. His determination toward ECOMOG's resolution of Liberian conflict earned his regime some approval by a section of the international community that had hitherto given it a dirty look (Adeniji, 1997:34). Furthermore, the Yamoussoukro Accord of March 1998 recognised the dominant role Nigeria had played in the sub-regional intervention force (Abegunrin, 2003: 14). For instance, the contribution of troops alone by Nigeria would tell the story of its enormous input vis-à-vis other member nations. At no time between 1990 when ECOMOG was formed, and 1999, when its troops were withdrawn, did Nigeria contribute less than 75 per cent of the entire peace-keeping force (Ajayi, 2004: 205).

In this chapter, the study proved that the UN and AU co-joined the peace process in Liberia by reducing the influence of Nigeria in ECOMOG to appease the NPFL and gain its confidence. The two bodies did this by encouraging the inclusion of contingents from Senegal and Mali as

well as AU peacekeepers from Tanzania and Uganda, and the UN peacekeepers from other nations of the world with troops less than 3,000 in strength (Adebajo, 2002b: 51). UN established an observer force, the ECOMOG Military Observer Group, in 1990 and in 1993, UNOMIL, whose mandate ended in September 1997. UNOL, a post-conflict peace-building support initiative was set up by the world body in 1997 to succeed UNOMIL. Renewed fighting in Liberia prompted the UN to establish UNMIL in September, 2003. UNMIL was a multinational force comprising Nigerian troops and others from some West African countries previously serving with ECOMIL (Adibe 2002: 124, van Walraven 1999: 83-84; UN Resolution 1497, 2003). This chapter also established that there were a series of diplomatic moves through peace talks sponsored by ECOWAS to reach a political solution to the Liberian civil war, even while the war was ongoing. Unfortunately, almost all the peace arrangements appeared to be unworkable. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the rebels and the political parties signed on August 18, 2003 (USIP, August 18, 2003; van der Kraaij, 2015: 69).

This chapter argued that the US surprisingly remained indifferent to the conflict in Liberia; its former colony and ally in Africa, and did not totally support ECOMOG efforts until the tail end of its mission there. This chapter engaged two reasons to support the argument: the existence of tense relations between Nigeria and the US during the period; and the American experience of October 1993 failed mission in Somalia (Adebajo, 2008: 183, 2002a: 106; Leatherwood 2001: 20-21). In this chapter, I also pointed out that ECOMOG was severely criticised based on corruption, looting, non-professionalism, bias and prejudice, and abuse of human rights during its deployment in Liberia (Ellis, 2001: 265-266). Regardless of its criticism, the force accomplished some set objectives between September and November 1990. It was established in this chapter that between this period ECOMOG repelled the NPFL rebel forces from central Monrovia, set up a buffer zone, captured Spriggs Payne Airport, and blockaded the port of Buchanan. Also, Taylor was forced to accept a cease-fire while the force established its headquarters in Monrovia. Electricity and water were restored and humanitarian assistance work resumed in the city (Adebajo, 2002a: 80; Magya, 1998: 59-65). Furthermore, ECOMOG was able to confine the AFL and the INPFL fighters to their barracks and allowed the establishment

of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer (Lt. Col. Adams, private communication, January 26 2015).

Based on Mays (1993: 110-112) three distinguishing intervention features of Nigeria in Liberia, Chapter Six of this work treated those features as patterns of its involvement in Liberia. These were the creation of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, the fielding of the troops, and domination of ECOMOG political approval and appeal funds. This chapter argued that Nigeria used the first pattern to legalise the deployment of the force in accordance with the 1981 ECOWAS Defence Pact, and win over the Francophone countries to its side (Akabogu, 1992: 79; Vogt, 1992: 159). The second pattern was the military strategy adopted to later take over the ECOMOG force commander-in-chief after initially insisting that Ghana should provide the first force commander, and also to allay the fears of the NPFL (Adebajo, 2002a: 62). The third pattern was engaged by Nigeria in order to dominate the diplomatic as well as the financing aspects of the mission. In agreement with Mays (1993:112), Nigeria definitely applied the political lesson gained from the Chadian experience to have come out with these patterns in Liberia. Chapter Six also pointed to the level of professionalism and discipline of the Nigerian ECOMOG forces in Liberia. The role of each of the armed forces; the army, navy and air force, was distinct but complementary (Sule, 2013: 8, 11-15). The chapter also directed attention to the highly professional pre-deployment training given to Nigerian ECOMOG troops as well as some sophisticated assets deployed (Generals Kwabe, Maigari, Commodore Ojediran and Lt. Col. Adams, personal communications, February 25 and 26 2015).

Finally in Chapter Six, the costs of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia were visited. The thesis argued that the Liberian mission was bitterly criticised at home based on the high costs of maintaining the peace in a foreign land in the face of an unhealthy economy at home (Adebajo, 2002a: 171). This chapter also established that the real human and material costs of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia may never be known because such facts and figures were shrouded in official secrecy. However, some estimates put the number of dead Nigerian soldiers at over 1,000 (Sanghera, Henry and Higate, 2008: 9-10), while additional numbers of Nigerian civilians, including two journalists, also paid the supreme price (*Nigerian Tribune*, October 9 1999). Monetary loss was estimated at about US\$8 billion (Iliffe, 2011: 218; Agbu, 2006: 72; Adebajo



and Landsberg 2003: 190; *Nigerian Tribune*, October 9 1999). Nigeria could also not account for the material losses incurred during the Liberian civil war due to its military unpreparedness and blind haste with which the mission commenced (Commodore Ojediran, personal communication, January 26 2015). The thesis concluded its sixth chapter by affirming that the money and material expended by Nigeria in peacekeeping in Liberia, to say the least, was extravagantly wasteful.

Chapter Seven of this thesis dealt with Nigeria's noncommittal stance to the restoration of peace in the troubled Guinea-Bissau. A fundamental issue raised in this chapter is why Nigeria looked away from Guinea-Bissau yet totally committed to Liberia. This chapter established that while Liberia is Anglophone, Guinea-Bissau is Lusophone and keenly knitted with the Francophone countries of West Africa. The thesis tried to answer the question of whether or not Nigeria's passive role-play at restoring peace to Guinea-Bissau was an extension of Anglo-Francophone rivalry in the sub-region. It also verified what the domestic environment and the internal political dynamics of the system of government was in Nigeria during the Guinea-Bissau crisis. The chapter also established that there were two military interventions in the Guinea-Bissau crisis. The first was by the armed forces of the two neighbouring countries, Senegal and Guinea in support of President Vieira, and the second was emblematic in ECOMOG III. The chapter noted that at their July 1998 meeting, the ECOWAS authorities backed Vieira's government as legitimate like the UN, AU and EU did. ECOWAS supported the intervention of Senegalese and Guinean armed forces while they recommended ECOMOG interposition force in the troubled country. Also, a committee of nine including Nigeria and six other countries was set up to chart a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Portugal, with its former colonies in the CPLP, was also involved in the resolution of the conflict (Massey, 2006: 84, 86).

This chapter noted that there was a clash of interests between ECOWAS and the CPLP over the best way to resolve the crisis. While the ECOWAS wanted the Senegunean troops to remain, the CPLP wanted them replaced with forces from Portuguese-speaking countries. ECOWAS resisted the CPLP move while the war raged on. However, an agreement was reached, leading to the November 1998 Abuja comprehensive peace accord (Kabia, 2009: 138-139). The Abuja agreement called for a cease-fire; government of national unity; the withdrawal of Senegunean



troops and their replacement with ECOMOG forces excluding contingents from Senegal and Guinea. Other provisions of the peace accord were manning of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal border with ECOMOG observer forces; the creation of a buffer zone between the warring factions; the disarmament and demobilisation of the fighters; the provision of security by ECOMOG forces to allow the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the organisation of elections to be monitored by ECOWAS and CPLP. As part of the implementation of the Abuja agreement, a government of national unity was formed in February 1999 headed by Francisco José Fadul as the Prime Minister (Adebajo, 2002b: 117-119; Kabia, 2009: 139).

Chapter Seven identified that all national, regional, supranational and individual efforts including those of Father Ferrazzeta, the highly respected Catholic Bishop of Bissau, failed before ECOMOG came in. The chapter also noted that due to financial and logistical constraints, including international financial support, only 712 ECOMOG troops from four countries in the region were deployed for the Guinea-Bissau mission. Although the ECOMOG forces succeeded in reopening Bissau airport and securing its seaport, the small number of the troops coupled with poor logistics made it impossible for the troops to implement key terms of its mission. Due to the insurmountable problems encountered by the troops as well as the May 1999 coup, ECOMOG III withdrew in June (Adebajo, 2002b: 121; Mendy and Lobban Jr., 2013: 126 ; Yabi, 2010: 18). I argued in this chapter that the Guinea-Bissau ECOMOG mission failed because of Nigeria's absence (John Kabia 2009: 140). The failure of the mission also indicated that it was only Nigeria that was capable of maintaining robust peacekeeping efforts in the sub-region (Generals Maigari and Kwabe, personal communications, January 25 2015).

This chapter followed the line of Kabia's (2009: 137) argument that Nigeria's military non-appearance in Guinea-Bissau as well as in Cote d'Ivoire opened a new line of evaluating the age-old Anglo-francophone rivalry and the importance of Nigeria's position in the security of the sub-region. This argument was strengthened by two incidents that happened before and during the war. With the process of "conversion" of Lusophone Guinea-Bissau to Francophone beginning from the 1970s, Nigeria might have likely considered it Francophone. Secondly, the intrigue that trailed the fielding and functioning of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau by the

Francophone members of ECOWAS was a big insult to Nigeria (Akinyeye, personal communication, February 28 2015).

ECOWAS gave the assignment of pre-deployment assessment of ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau to the Nigerian ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone, General Shelpidi, in November 1998. Having completed the assignment, he was expected to take over the command of the force. However, he was not only kept in the dark about the deployment of the troops, but was also briefed in December 1999 that the force was under Togolese and not Nigerian command (Adebajo, 2002b: 199-122). The question remained, how could Nigeria with its capabilities to provide the bulk of personnel and resources needed in such an emergency coupled with its success story in Liberia and Sierra Leone be so unfairly treated? (Amusan, personal communication, August 2 2016). Nigeria's absence may therefore be a way of asking the rival Francophone states to feel the sore of undermining sub-regional peace efforts Kabia (2009: 137; Massey 2006: 90). The chapter also argued that there was the Francophone factor in the deployment of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau as the Francophone countries-dominated ECOMOG force was only able to deploy after France had provided it with financial and logistical support (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004: 295).

Furthermore, in chapter seven the thesis did a rebuttal of the assumption held by some scholars that Guinea-Bissau was more Francophone than Lusophone because of its overtures to the former. The assumption has put forth a question in this chapter: how francophone was Lusophone Guinea-Bissau? This chapter tried to answer the question by arguing that as government leaders are keen to deal with domestic political as well as international pressures (Hagan, 1995: 117), Vieira might have been prompted to adopt the CFA franc in July 1997 for two reasons. The reasons were, chapter seven argued, the need to appease Senegal that had incessantly accused it over support for Casamance rebels, and the need for the country to attract more aid from France. The chapter therefore argued that the fact that Guinea-Bissau remained Lusophone despite its fraternity with the Francophone and this was evident and unmistakable during the civil war, when both Portugal and France tried to outperform each other in their decisions to involve themselves in the war either directly or by proxy (Massey, 2006: 91). Chapter seven also established the argument that Anglophone-Francophone rivalry was not the main reason for Nigeria's military absence in Guinea-Bissau as Nigeria did not totally avoid its

responsibilities at restoration of peace to Guinea-Bissau. I argued that although Nigeria was absent militarily in the country, diplomatically, the bulk still landed on its table (Aworawo, personal communication, January 23 2015). Nigeria hosted the signatories of the Abuja 1998 peace agreement (for Guinea-Bissau) like it did for Liberia in 1995.

Chapter seven sought to look for other reasons beyond the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry as the main source of Nigeria's absence in Guinea Bissau in order to establish the central justification. The argument commenced by negating Massey's (2006: 90) opinion that "partiality" drove Nigeria away from Guinea-Bissau. The suggestion made by Massey that the newly elected Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, was anxious to send back home Nigerian ECOMOG contingents from Liberia and Sierra Leone while he lacked interest in sending a troop to Guinea-Bissau was upheld. The chapter therefore proceeded to establish the central justification of why Nigeria militarily absented itself from Guinea-Bissau. The country's pattern of intervention in the in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau was beyond Anglo-Francophone rivalry or "partiality," but the internal dynamics in Nigerian politics at the time. The thesis argued here that Nigeria was forced to explore more diplomatic means of resolving the Guinea Bissau crisis as the country's policy slightly changed over time , especially having been influenced by what happened in Liberia. I also argued that if the Guinea Bissau crisis had happened first, Nigeria would have responded as it did in Liberia and vice versa. Towards the end of the Liberian war, when the Guinea Bissau crisis started, Nigeria had become war weary. There was pressure from home where the economy was becoming worse. This forced the newly elected government of Obasanjo to sustain the ambition of the people who advocated for Nigeria's non-military intervention in any future sub-regional crises (Aworawo, private communication, February 23 2015, Lagos). The country had to take the step nonetheless the fact that without Nigeria, there would not be ECOMOG (Lt. Col. Adams, private communications, January 26 2015). This chapter although argued here that Obasanjo's personal characteristics played a huge role in Nigeria's change of intention in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire during his tenure as president (Ilfie, 2011: 1-3).

Finally in chapter seven, the essay established an argument that Nigeria's passive involvement in Guinea-Bissau did not leave the sub-region and the continent without some implications. The

work maintained that the first of such was the rise of a trilateral rivalry involving Portugal, France and the ECOWAS over the sub-region's security. I argued that France was schemed to use Senegal and Guinea as its fronts in the war while Portugal encouraged the CPLP to join the debacle. Between the CPLP and ECOWAS, there were a series of disagreements; while the former supported the Mané faction, the latter was solidly behind the government of Vieira. Both bodies bickered over interests on how best to resolve the conflict (Adebajo, 2002b: 117). I also argued that the engagement of the CPLP in mediating the Guinea-Bissau crisis made the ECOWAS play second fiddle. The absence of Nigeria resuscitated the banality of Franco-Portuguese colonial hegemonic tendencies in West Africa. Since the situation worked most favourably for Senegal, by extension it worked for its colonial master, France. Because Portugal realised that the absence of Nigeria would likely create a vacuum that France and its former colonies would quickly fill, Portugal, with the support of the CPLP, called the shots in defence of the future of its former colony. As a result of extra-regional instead of sub-regional mediators breaking the truce, rival mediators with contrary objectives worked at variance with the security well-being of the sub-region (Massey, 2006: 91-93, 95).

Chapter Eight examined Nigeria and the peace process in West Africa since the end of the Cold War while focusing on continuity and change in its foreign policy. Also, the chapter tried to look at the aftermath of the country's involvement in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. Finally, it attempted to answer the question of whether Nigeria was a hegemonic power in the sub-region or not. It was established in this chapter that one of the after-effects of the collapse of the Cold War in the international system were the incessant violent conflicts in Africa and in particular, the West African sub-region (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011: 555). The chapter also observed that formal and informal methods of conflict management were employed to resolve some of these problems, yet results have remained unsatisfactory and conflicts intractable (Aworawo and Okwechina, personal communications, January 23 and 29, 2015). I argued in this chapter that the initiative taken by Nigeria at the restoration of peace in West Africa equated to "Pax Nigeriana" (Adebajo, 2010: 131) was fundamentally different from "Pax Americana" (Nye, 1990: 177-174) and "Pax Britannica" (Parsons, 1999: 3). I submitted that while the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana were aimed at conquering the world and revamping the collapse European and Japanese economies respectively, "Pax Nigeriana" represented Nigeria's ambition at playing a

political, economic and military leadership role in Africa (Adebajo 2010, 131). If Nigeria had looked the other way when Liberia and Sierra Leone boiled, West Africa would have been consumed by the fires of civil and political strife and the result would have been a disaster to the black race (Fawole, personal communication, March 3 2015).

In chapter eight, I equally argued that although Nigerian foreign policy ran the wheel of “concentric circles” principle, yet the advocates of the theory agreed that the epicentre of it all is the country’s national interests (Gambari, 2008: 70-71; 1989: 21). My argument continued in supporting the fact that national interest is most important in determining the foreign policy stance of a nation and is most jealously guarded by it. These interests must also be the sum total of the aggregate of all the interests of individuals and groups within the nation-state (Akinbobola, 1995:12; Rosenau, 1992:34). I also noted that national interests may differ based on priority and strategy, and could vary as dictated by external factors. Nevertheless, the revaluation of a nation’s national interests depended on how such a country acted in a given situation. In agreement with Trotsky’s (*Foreign Affairs*, June 19, 2015) observation that national interests ensured continuity and change of quintessential aspects of the foreign policy of a nation, I argued in this chapter that change and continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy as determined by its national interests was based on “an assessment of the current situation.” Continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy could be ascertained from the principles and objectives guiding the country’s external relations as discussed in chapter three of this thesis. I observed that the dwindling economic fortunes that set in from the 1980s called for some changes in the country’s foreign policy (NIIA, June 30 1988).

Also, I submitted in this chapter that despite the plummeting economy of Nigeria, the country was capable of fielding ECOMOG alone in Liberia and Serra Leone in the 1990s, however, the country’s military adventures in these two West African states heightened the pressure for change in Nigeria’s foreign policy. It could then be argued that domestic challenges like bad economy and general insecurity drew away Nigeria’s attention and resources from external engagements and prompted the country to stop sending troops to ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002a: 48; Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 11; Iliffe, 2011: 218-219; Mustapha (2008: 368-382). Furthermore in this chapter, I noted that Obasanjo’s administration launched a reappraisal of the country’s foreign



policy by seeking “maximum international exposure” for it as soon as it was elected into office in 1999. Apart from the government seeking debt cancellation for the heavily indebted country, he also sought for cessation of Nigeria’s singlehanded bankrolling of peacekeeping efforts in the sub-region (Obasanjo: 1999: 6). I also argued in this chapter that, probably to reduce Nigeria’s external spending, Obasanjo finally ended the recurring wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone diplomatically. Obasanjo worked Taylor into asylum in Nigeria while a fresh election ushered in Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the new Liberian President while in Sierra Leone, he concluded a peace alternative by compelling Kabbah to form a coalition government with the RUF (Iliffe, 2011: 217-219). I also pointed out in this chapter that in order to share the burden of keeping the peace on African continent, Obasanjo encouraged South Africa to participate in peacekeeping (Landsberg, 2008: 209).

Therefore, as chapter eight of this thesis has sought to establish the tenets of continuity and change in Nigerian foreign policy, it is also important at this juncture to test the operational hypothesis of the work: *The strategic behaviour of a nation’s foreign policy is dictated by the domestic environment and the internal political dynamics of the system of government*. Testing the hypothesis is an attempt to determine whether the foreign policy goals of Nigeria altered or remained unchanged through eight military and four civilian governments (from Balewa to Jonathan). This project has reviewed Nigeria’s foreign policy including its military engagements in the Congo (DRC)(1960-1964); Chad (1980-1882), and Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990-1999) in chapters two, three and six in order to find out whether the methods altered or remained unchanged covering the time of independence in 1960 to 2010, when the period of this thesis lapsed. This study discovered that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars threatened Nigeria’s African foreign policy goals. Babangida was quick to justify his military involvement in ECOMOG, Abacha used it to shore up his discredited regime while Obasanjo utilised it for the redirection of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Thus, while Nigeria’s African foreign policy goals have remained unchanged since 1960, the methods of achieving them inclined to alter a bit. In this case, the operational hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, Holsti’s (1982: 8) statement that major foreign policy change rarely occurred stands.

Furthermore in chapter eight, I discussed the aftermath of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. We discovered that the rebels in Liberia wanted the resignation of President Taylor or there would be no peace at all. Also, the chapter established it that the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) had accused Taylor of war crimes and issued an warrant of arrest on him. Furthermore, the chapter indicated that because Taylor had accepted to resign and go on exile outside the country for peace to reign, he needed an asylum badly. I argued that since Taylor was denied political asylum by countries like Taiwan, South Africa, Burkina Faso and Libya, the lot fell on Nigeria to give him an abode (*Africannews*, July 13,2003; *Thisday*, July 7 2003). I pointed it out in this chapter that Obasanjo demanded from the international community that he would not want to be stampeded to release Taylor to the ICC before he accepted to give him asylum in Nigeria. Also, the decision was not a unilateral one by Nigeria because the AU and ECOWAS supported the move. I argued that was exigent for Nigeria to spearhead Taylor's political asylum because of some new threat of violence by Taylor's rebels in various countries in the sub-region if he was arraigned before the ICC (Okwechina, personal communication, January 29 2015). Chapter eight also discovered that many people in Nigeria were opposed to Taylor's asylum in Nigeria for reasons ranging from the political, security to the spiritual (Salawu, personal communication, August 4 2015). Nevertheless, some section of the intelligentsia supported Nigeria's position on his political asylum describing it as the best international practise (*Thisday*, July 27 2003).

In chapter eight also, the thesis realised that Taylor subsequently became a diplomatic nuisance to Nigeria when he finally arrived as the United States threatened to cut aid to the country if it refused to release him for prosecution. A fresh warrant of arrest was issued on Taylor by the ICC in December 2003. (*The Guardian*, December 10 2003). I argued that as public opinion differed on Taylor's political asylum in Nigeria, so also was the issue of handing him over to the ICC among Nigerians (*The Punch*, November 10, 2003). We discovered that Nigerian government continued to keep Taylor and promised to keep him until his home government asked for him, despite the demand by the international community to surrender him for justice (Ilfie, 2011: 218). Eventually, the government of Liberia requested the Nigerian government to turn over Taylor to its custody in March 2006 and he was handed over that same month after an attempt to escape out of Nigeria (*The Guardian*, April 2 2006). Apart from Taylor's asylum in Nigeria, chapter



eight also discovered some other aftereffects of Nigeria in Liberia. The thesis argued that due to Liberian civil war, many of our soldiers came back home with HIV/AIDS, Nigeria had to hosts thousands of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees while many Nigerians still face severe persecution in Liberia after the war (*Sunday Punch*, August 31 2008). Nigeria continued to extend bilateral assistance to Liberia and Guinea-Bissau after the war.

The last segment of chapter eight sought to answer the question whether Nigeria was a hegemonic power in the West African sub-region. The thesis started by revisiting the hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1981: 94; Kindelberger 1981: 243; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966: 266-279; Snidal, 1985: 579-81 where prominent scholars have maintained that for stability to be maintained, one country has to dominate the others and the dominant one must be able to persuade others to follow a given course of action which may not be in the interests of the followers. In the application of the foregoing argument to Nigeria, I argued that in chapter three of this work there was the portrayal of Nigeria by some scholars, analysts, and statesmen as a “regional hegemon” (Adebajo, 2008: 12; Bach, 2004: 75-80); “regional anchor” (Mikell, 2008: 294); “moral superpower” (*This Day* August 27 2000), and one of the “potential locomotives of Africa’s development and stability” (Cilliers *et al*, 2015: 19). Also, the country has been regarded as a “pseudo hegemon” (Amusan, private communication, August 2 2017).

Before answering the question whether Nigeria was a hegemon or not, the thesis quickly pointed to another “hegemon” in Africa - South Africa. I argued that in comparison with the United States Nigeria’s type of “hegemony” as “leadership” is distinct from America’s kind of “dominating power” (Fawole, personal communication, March 3 2015). Nigeria’s capacity to provide leadership in its sphere of influence in a variety of contexts like security, finance, trade is weaker in comparison to the United States of America. The American utilisation of this capacity and its leadership role has made it to be accepted as legitimate by its European and Asian allies. I argued that the ability to apply power without using force with the agreement of other states, and the ability to pay military and economic costs are critical factors in exercising hegemony. (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003: 173). Nigeria as a potential hegemon in the sub-region of West Africa lacks these fundamentals. The Achilles heel in Nigeria’s aspiration to become a regional hegemony is the country’s daunting domestic instability (2008: 369-382). However, I finally

argued that there is still hope for Nigeria as it was the only African country that possessed the aptitude to emerge as an international major player (Cilliers, *et al*, 2015: 23-25).

### **9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

The topic of this thesis should be of great concern to scholars and government officials alike. In the pursuance of foreign policy goals of Nigeria and any nation for that matter, national interests must perform their key functions. National interests must establish a line of foreign policy priorities in order to avoid the under-utilisation as well as over-use of resources. Experiences in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau have underlined Nigeria's indispensable position in the security of the sub-region of West Africa. While the Liberian mission succeeded because of Nigeria's presence, the ECOWAS force in Guinea-Bissau became a dismal failure because of the country's absence. Nigeria should continue to use its position to diffuse tensions and build a sub-regional consensus in West Africa. Its position could best be utilised through multilateral action by alliance building within and outside the region. This is because Nigeria is the only country best placed in the sub-region to meet the challenges and responsibilities that come with sub-regional leadership. In doing this however, Nigeria should take a cue from America and its companies who recoup every dollar spent on peacekeeping missions with contracts of reconstructing the nation. The companies also go as far establishing American values in those nations to compensate for the little loss they must have incurred. Contrary to the America experience in Iraq and elsewhere after the war, no Nigerian company was awarded any reconstruction contract in Liberia after the war. Nigeria's role in peacemaking should not just end when peace had returned to the beneficiary country.

### **9.4 CONCLUSION**

Critically looking at Nigeria's capabilities vis-à-vis West Africa and the rest of the continent in general would give one a better understanding of the country's weight. The greater the capability of a country in a region, the greater is its impact upon its external environment and the greater the range of external events it would be involved in. Studies have indicated that the population of Nigeria estimated at approximately 182 million in 2015, and more than the population of the entire countries of West Africa put together at nearly 162 million; will keep growing rapidly. With the highest fertility rates Africa, the country is forecast to have a population of over 320

million by 2040, becoming the fourth largest population in the world after India, China and the United States. For the next 25 years, Nigeria has been projected by these studies to increase in its power capabilities to become “Africa’s lone superpower.” At present, despite the economic problem the country is going through, in terms of economic potential, there is no African country that can compete with it. Nigeria’s GDP is forecast to grow from a little over US\$525 billion in 2014 to slightly over US\$4.2 trillion by 2040. It is also projected that by 2040, Nigeria will constitute close to 2 percent of the global economy. However, all these are attainable only if the country could firmly tackle the socio-political problems weighing it down, in particular official corruption. The parting question of this research effort is: Are Nigerians ready for these?

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## ANNEXURE A:

### CERTIFICATE OF LANGUAGE EDITING



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7<sup>th</sup> July, 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

### CERTIFICATE OF LANGUAGE EDITING

I, Muchativugwa Liberty Hove, confirm and certify that I have read and edited the entire thesis **CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES IN LIBERIA AND GUINEA-BISSAU, 1989-2010**, by **Adewole Ayodeji ADELEKE**, student number **25404725**, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of **PhD in International Relations** to the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, **North-West University (Mafikeng Campus)**.

**Adewole Ayodeji ADELEKE** was supervised by **Professor Victor Ojakorotu** of the North-West University.

I hold a PhD in English Language and Literature in English and am qualified to edit academic work of such nature for cohesion and coherence.

The views and research procedures detailed and expressed in the thesis remain those of the researcher/s.

Yours sincerely

Dr M.L.Hove

Original details: Dr M.L. Hove (22055215) C:\Users\22055215\Desktop\CERTIFICATE OF EDITING.docm  
7<sup>th</sup> July, 2017

File reference: Dr M.L.Hove

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**ANNEXURE B:**  
**ORIGINALITY REPORT**

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: A  
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA'S CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION INITIATIVES IN LIBERIA AND GUINEA-BISSAU,  
1989-2010.

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ORIGINALITY REPORT

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SIMILARITY INDEX

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INTERNET SOURCES

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PUBLICATIONS

**%5**  
STUDENT PAPERS

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PRIMARY SOURCES

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| <b>1</b> | followscience.com<br>Internet Source                     | <b>%1</b>     |
| <b>2</b> | www.slideshare.net<br>Internet Source                    | <b>%1</b>     |
| <b>3</b> | Submitted to Seminole Community College<br>Student Paper | <b>&lt;%1</b> |
| <b>4</b> | trcofliberia.org<br>Internet Source                      | <b>&lt;%1</b> |
| <b>5</b> | www.emansion.gov.lr<br>Internet Source                   | <b>&lt;%1</b> |
| <b>6</b> | www.bristol.ac.uk<br>Internet Source                     | <b>&lt;%1</b> |
| <b>7</b> | www.liberiapastandpresent.org<br>Internet Source         | <b>&lt;%1</b> |
| <b>8</b> | Bach, Daniel C.. "Nigeria's 'manifest destiny' in        | <b>&lt;%1</b> |

**ANNEXURE C:**  
**APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

Private Bag X2046,  
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Republic of South Africa

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MAFIKENG CAMPUS

**Faculty of Human and Social Sciences**  
**School of Research and Postgraduate Studies**

**APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL (2014)**

|                           |                                                                                                                                                    |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Student Name              | A.A Adeleke                                                                                                                                        |
| Student Number            | 25404725                                                                                                                                           |
| Degree                    | PhD- International Relations                                                                                                                       |
| Supervisor                | Prof V. Ojakorotu                                                                                                                                  |
| Co-Supervisor             |                                                                                                                                                    |
| Registered Research Title | Continuity and change in foreign policy: A comparative study of Nigeria's conflict resolution initiatives in Liberia and Guinea- Bissau, 1989-2010 |

The Higher Degrees Committee of the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences has carefully studied your revised proposal and the correction report submitted on 24 October 2014.

I am glad to inform you that the Committee is generally satisfied with the revised version of your proposal and hereby grants you permission to officially proceed with your research. Please note that your registered title cannot be changed without the written approval of the FHDC.

The committee further approved Prof Victor Ojakorotu as your study supervisor.

May I take this opportunity to wish you all the best with your research.

Kind regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Akim Mturi'.

**Prof Akim Mturi (PhD)**  
**Director: School of Research and Postgraduate Studies**

## ANNEXURE D:

### CERTIFICATE OF ETHICS APPROVAL OF PROJECT



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**Ethics Committee**  
Tel: +27 18 299 4849  
Email: [Ethics@nwu.ac.za](mailto:Ethics@nwu.ac.za)

#### ETHICS APPROVAL OF PROJECT

The North-West University Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-RERC) hereby approves your project as indicated below. This implies that the NWU-RERC grants its permission that provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other authorisation that may be necessary, the project may be initiated, using the ethics number below

**Project title:** Continuity and change in foreign policy: A comparative study of Nigeria's conflict resolution in initiatives in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau (1989-2010)

**Project Leader:** Prof V Ojaborotu  
**Student:** AA Adeleke

**Ethics number:** NWU-00309-14-A9

**Approval date:** 2014-11-04

**Expiry date:** 2019-11-03

Special conditions of the approval (if any): None

#### General conditions:

While this ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, please note the following

- The project leader (principle investigator) must report in the prescribed format to the NWU-RERC:
  - annually (or as otherwise requested) on the progress of the project,
  - without any delay in case of any adverse event (or any matter that interrupts sound ethical principles) during the course of the project
- The approval applies strictly to the protocol as stipulated in the application form. Would any changes to the protocol be deemed necessary during the course of the project, the project leader must apply for approval of these changes at the NWU-RERC. Would there be deviated from the project protocol without the necessary approval of such changes, the ethics approval is immediately and automatically forfeited.
- The date of approval indicates the first date that the project may be started. Would the project have to continue after the expiry date, a new application must be made to the NWU-RERC and new approval received before or on the expiry date.
- In the interest of ethical responsibility the NWU-RERC retains the right to:
  - request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project;
  - withdraw or postpone approval if:
    - any unethical principles or practices of the project are revealed or suspected,
    - it becomes apparent that any relevant information was withheld from the NWU-RERC or that information has been false or misrepresented,
    - the required annual report and reporting of adverse events was not done timely and accurately,
    - new institutional rules, national legislation or international conventions deem it necessary.

The Ethics Committee would like to remain at your service as scientist and researcher, and wishes you well with your project. Please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Committee for any further enquiries or requests for assistance.

Yours sincerely

Linda du Plessis

Digitally signed by Linda du Plessis  
DN: cn=Linda du Plessis, o=North-West  
University, ou=Research Ethics  
Committee, email=Linda.DuPlessis@nwu.ac.za,  
c=ZA  
Date: 2014.12.22 15:49:44 +0200

Prof Linda du Plessis

Chair NWU Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (RERC)

**ANNEXURE E:**  
**LETTER OF APPROVAL OF FIELD WORK (I)**



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
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MAFIKENG CAMPUS

**FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**Department of Politics & International Relations**

25 November 2014

Mr Adeleke Ayodeji Adewoloe (PhD Candidate)

Dear Adeleke,

**RE: APPROVAL FOR YOUR FIELD WORK**

Following an earlier approval of your Research Proposal by the Higher Degree Committee of the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences of the North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, South Africa. I am pleased to convey to you further approval to commence your field work for the purpose of generating and collating data relevant to your Thesis, as soon as possible.


By this approval, it is understood that you will visit the under listed Institutions/Agencies in Nigeria, Liberia and Guinea Bissau among others, as highlighted in your proposal for the purpose of your inquiry:-

- **Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- **Federal Ministry of Defence**
- **Nigerian Universities**
- **NIIA**

However, you reserve the initiative of making additional contacts with any other Non-Governmental Organizations relevant to your field of inquiry.

I take this opportunity to wish you all the best in your research interactions.

Kind regards

Handwritten signature of Prof V. Ojakorotu, dated 25/11/2014.

Prof V. Ojakorotu, (PhD)

Head,

Dept of Politics and International Relations

Office: +27 18 389 2259

Email: victor.ojakorotu@nwu.ac.za

**ANNEXURE F:**  
**LETTER OF APPROVAL OF FIELD WORK (II)**



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
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*Professor Victor Ojakorotu*  
**FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
*Department of Politics & International Relations*  
*Email: victor.ojakorotu@nwu.ac.za*  
*Office Phone: +27 (0)18 389 2259*  
*Cell: +27 783756718*

04 April 2016

Mr Adeleke Ayodeji Adewole (25404725)

**RE: APPROVAL FOR YOUR FIELD WORK**

Following an earlier approval of your Research Proposal by the Faculty Higher Degree Committee, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences of the North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, I am pleased to convey to you further approval to commence your field work for the purpose of generating and collating data relevant to your Doctoral dissertation, as soon as possible **(April - May, 2016)**.

By this approval, it is understood that you will visit the under listed Institutions/Agencies, among others, as highlighted in your proposal for the purpose of your inquiry:-

- Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
- The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg,
- The Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria,
- Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos
- Federal Ministry of defence, Nigeria
- Liberian & Guinean Bissau embassies in South Africa

However, you reserve the initiative of making additional contacts with any other agencies relevant to your field of inquiry.

I take this opportunity to wish you all the best in your research interactions.

Kind regards,

**Prof V. Ojakorotu, (PhD)**



**ANNEXURE G:**  
**RESEARCH TOOL (QUESTIONNAIRE)**  
**(ENGLISH)**

Dear correspondent, I am a PhD student of North-West University, Mafikeng, South Africa conducting a research on this topic: "Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of Nigeria's Conflict Resolution Initiatives in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, 1989-2010." The main objective of this research is to examine the different roles performed by Nigeria in the restoration of peace to Liberia and Guinea-Bissau under the auspices of ECOMOG and the reasons behind its different approaches. The aim of this questionnaire is to determine how you as a citizen of Nigeria, Liberia or Guinea-Bissau experienced the effectiveness of Nigeria's intervention in the crises that engulfed the two nations during our period of study. Please be informed that all your answers will be kept **COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL** and that you are at liberty to withdraw your participation in this research any time you so wish. Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. **THANK YOU!**

**(A) BIO-DATA**

1. Age.....2.Sex.....3.Nationality.....

4. Educational Background: Post-Graduate [ ] Tertiary Education [ ] Secondary Education [ ]

Primary Education [ ] Professional Education (e.g. military or paramilitary Academy) [ ]

No Formal Education [ ].

5. Occupation.....

6. Place of Work/Institution.....

7. Years of Experience at work.....

8. Present position occupied by respondent.....

9. Contact Address (e-mail or cell phone number).....

**(B) QUESTIONS**

Please mark the answer that best indicates your opinion.

|   |                                                                                              | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------|-------|----------------|
| 1 | Nigeria's participation in the ECOMOG restoration of peace to Liberia was highly successful. |                   |          |       |                |
| 2 | Nigeria's leadership in conflict resolution in Liberia was very crucial.                     |                   |          |       |                |



|    |                                                                                                                                                                  |  |  |  |  |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| 3  | The absence of Nigerian troops among other ECOMOG forces in Guinea-Bissau prolonged the crises in the country.                                                   |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | ECOMOG did not really need the presence of Nigerian forces to restore peace in Guinea-Bissau.                                                                    |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | Nigeria is a hegemon in the West African sub-region.                                                                                                             |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | Nigeria is not powerful enough to maintain the peace in the West African sub-region.                                                                             |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | Nigeria spent so much money to restore peace in Liberia.                                                                                                         |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | Nigeria did not pay much attention to the restoration of peace in Guinea-Bissau because of the foreign policy stance of the government in power then in Nigeria. |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | The domestic factors and internal political dynamics in Nigeria prevented it from active involvement of ECOMOG restoration of peace in Guinea-Bissau.            |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in West Africa has affected the peace of the region positively                                                             |  |  |  |  |

11 Any additional opinion you wish to express.....

.....

.....

THANK YOU SO MUCH!

**Oral Interview Schedule**

- 1) What do you understand by international conflict?
- 2) Give examples of international conflicts?
- 3) How best can international conflict be resolved?

- 4) Is it only the military that should be involved in conflict resolution?
- 5) If “no” who else should participate in conflict resolution?
- 6) Are you familiar with Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution?
- 7) Can you mention specific instances of Nigeria’s involvement in international conflict resolution?
- 8) Do you know anything about Nigeria’s involvement in conflict resolution efforts in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau under the auspices of ECOMOG?
- 9) How will you rate Nigeria’s involvement in conflict resolution in Guinea-Bissau?

Please give reason(s) for your assessment.

- 10) How will you rate Nigeria’s intervention in the Liberian crisis with the support of the other ECOWAS states? Please give reason(s) for your assessment.
- 11) How was Nigeria’s involvement in international conflict resolution in the Liberian crucial to the peace of West Africa?
- 12) In your personal view, how did Nigeria’s involvement in international conflict resolution in Liberia different from that of Guinea Bissau?
13. In your own personal view, why was Nigeria’s involvement in conflict resolution in Liberia more pronounced than that of Guinea Bissau?
14. What do you think Nigeria should have done differently in her involvement in conflict resolution in Liberia and Guinea Bissau?
15. Do you think Nigeria committed so much resource (both human and material) to the restoration of peace to Liberia?



**ANNEXURE H:**  
**INSTRUMENTO DE INVESTIGAÇÃO (QUESTIONÁRIO)**  
**(PORTUGUESE)**

Caro correspondente, eu sou estudante de PhD da Universidade de North-West, Mafikeng, África do Sul conduzindo uma investigação sobre este tema: "Continuidade e mudança na política externa" Um Estudo Comparativo de resolução de conflitos Iniciativas da Nigéria na Libéria e Guiné-Bissau, 1989- 2010 ". O principal objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar os diferentes papéis desempenhados pela Nigéria na restauração da paz à Libéria e Guiné-Bissau sob os auspícios da ECOMOG e as razões por trás das abordagens diferentes. O objetivo deste questionário é determinar como você, como cidadão da Nigéria, Libéria ou Guiné-Bissau experimentou a eficácia da intervenção da Nigéria nas crises que engoliram as duas nações durante a período de estudo. Informamos que todas as respostas serão mantidas **COMPLETAMENTE CONFIDENCIAIS** e que você tem a liberdade de retirar sua participação nesta pesquisa qualquer momento que desejar, por favor, responda às seguintes perguntas para o melhor de seu conhecimento. **OBRIGADO!**

( A) de BIO- DADOS

1. Idade ..... 2. Sexo ..... 3. Nacionalidade.....
4. Formação: Pós-Graduação ☐ Ensino Superior ☐ Ensino Secundário ☐ A Educação Primária ☐ Educação Profissional (e , g, militar da academia paramilitar ☐ Nenhuma Educação Formal ☐.
5. Ocupação .....
6. Local de trabalho / Instituição .....
7. Anos de experiência no trabalho ..... ..
8. A posição atual ocupada pelo entrevistado ..... .
9. Endereço de contato ( e-mail ou número de telefone celular ).....

(B) Perguntas

Por favor, marque a resposta que melhor indica sua opinião

|    |                                                                                                                                                                       | Discordo<br>totalmente | Discordo | Concordo | Concordo<br>totalmente |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|----------|------------------------|
| 1  | A participação da Nigéria na restauração ECOMOG da paz para a Libéria foi muito bem sucedida.                                                                         |                        |          |          |                        |
| 2  | A liderança da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos na Libéria foi muito importante.                                                                                     |                        |          |          |                        |
| 3  | A ausência de tropas nigerianas entre outras forças ECOMOG na Guiné-Bissau prolongou a crise no país .                                                                |                        |          |          |                        |
| 4  | ECOMOG não precisou da presença de forças nigerianas a restaurar a paz na Guiné-Bissau                                                                                |                        |          |          |                        |
| 5  | A Nigéria é hegemom na sub-região Oeste Africano.                                                                                                                     |                        |          |          |                        |
| 6  | Nigéria não é suficiente forte para manter a paz na sub- região Oeste Africano.                                                                                       |                        |          |          |                        |
| 7  | Nigéria gastou tanto dinheiro para restaurar a paz na Libéria .                                                                                                       |                        |          |          |                        |
| 8  | Nigéria não prestou muita atenção para a restauração da paz na Guiné-Bissau por causa da orientação da política externa do governo no poder , em seguida, na Nigéria. |                        |          |          |                        |
| 9  | Os fatores domésticos e dinâmica política interna na Nigéria impediu de participação activa de ECOMOG restauração da paz na Guiné-Bissau                              |                        |          |          |                        |
| 10 | O papel da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos na África Ocidental tem                                                                                                  |                        |          |          |                        |

|  |                                        |  |  |  |  |
|--|----------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
|  | afetado a paz da região positivamente. |  |  |  |  |
|--|----------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|

11. Qualquer aditamento a parecer que você deseja expressar

.....

.....

MUITO OBRIGADO

Cronograma Entrevista Oral

- 1) O que você entende por conflito internacional?
- 2) Dê exemplos de conflitos internacionais?
- 3) Qual a melhor forma de conflitos internacionais pode ser resolvido?
- 4) É apenas o militar que deve estar envolvido na resolução de conflitos?
- 5) Se "não" quem mais deve participar na resolução de conflitos?
- 6) Você está familiarizado com o papel da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos?
- 7) Pode mencionar casos específicos de envolvimento da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos internacionais?
- 8) Você sabe alguma coisa sobre o envolvimento da Nigéria nos esforços de resolução de conflitos na Libéria e Guiné-Bissau sob os auspícios da ECOMOG?
- 9) Como você avaliaria o envolvimento da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos na Guiné-Bissau? Por favor, dê motivo (s) para sua avaliação.
- 10) Como você avaliaria a intervenção da Nigéria na crise da Libéria com o apoio dos outros membros da CEDEAO? Por favor, dê motivo (s) para sua avaliação.
- 11) Como foi o envolvimento da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos internacionais na Libéria crucial para a paz da África Ocidental?
- 12) Na sua opinião pessoal, como é que o envolvimento da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos internacionais na Libéria diferente da de Guiné-Bissau?
13. Em seu próprio ponto de vista pessoal, por que foi o envolvimento da Nigéria na resolução de conflitos na Libéria mais pronunciada do que a Guiné-Bissau?

14. O que você acha Nigéria deveria ter feito de forma diferente em seu envolvimento na resolução de conflitos na Libéria e Guiné-Bissau?

15. Você acha que a Nigéria comprometeu tanto de recursos (humanos e materiais) para a restauração da paz na Libéria?

## ANNEXURE I:

### FIELD TRIPS AND ORAL INFORMATION

The following persons were interviewed as part of field trips and oral information.

| S/N | Title       | Name               | Age | Occupation               | Place of Interview      | Topics Covered                                   | Nationality | Date of Interview |
|-----|-------------|--------------------|-----|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1   | Gen. (Rtd.) | G. Kwabe           | 65  | Retired Military Officer | NDA Kaduna, Nigeria     | Nigerian Military and Conflict resolution.       | Nigerian    | 25/01/15          |
| 2   | Cdre.       | S.O. Ojediran      | 56  | Naval Officer            | NDA Kaduna, Nigeria     | Costs of Nigerian intervention in Liberia.       | Nigerian    | 26/01/15          |
| 3   | Lt. Col.    | J.B. Adams         | 45  | Military Officer         | NDA Kaduna, Nigeria     | Nigeria, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.              | Nigerian    | 26/01/15          |
| 4   | Gen. (Rtd.) | I.B. Maigari       | 60  | Retired Military Officer | NDA Kaduna, Nigeria     | Nigeria and the ECOMOG                           | Nigerian    | 25/02/15          |
| 5   | Prof.       | O.A. Akinyeye      | 58  | Professor                | UNILAG Lagos, Nigeria   | Nigerian Foreign Policy                          | Nigerian    | 28/02/15          |
| 6   | Dr          | David Aworawo      | 47  | Associate Professor      | UNILAG Lagos, Nigeria   | Change and continuity in Nigerian Foreign Policy | Nigerian    | 23/01/15          |
| 7   | Dr          | Iwebunor Okwechina | 50  | Senior Lecturer          | OAU Ile-Ife, Nigeria    | Benefits of Nigeria's contributions to Liberia.  | Nigerian    | 29/01/15          |
| 8   | Prof.       | W.A. Fawole        | 60  | Professor                | OAU Ile-Ife, Nigeria    | Nigeria and hegemony in West Africa.             | Nigerian    | 03/03/15          |
| 9   | Dr          | O.R. Olaopa        | 45  | Civil Servant            | NACETE M Abuja, Nigeria | The public and Nigeria's interven-               | Nigerian    | 10/03/16          |



|    |       |                      |    |                        |                               |                                                        |             |          |
|----|-------|----------------------|----|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|
|    |       |                      |    |                        |                               | tion in<br>Liberia.                                    |             |          |
| 10 | Prof. | S.O.<br>Amusan       | 55 | Professor              | NWU<br>Mafikeng,<br>S. Africa | Nigeria<br>and hege-<br>mony in<br>West<br>Africa.     | Nigerian    | 02/08/16 |
| 10 | Prof. | Abiodun<br>Salawu    | 48 | Professor              | NWU<br>Mafikeng,<br>S. Africa | Nigerian<br>Press and<br>the<br>Liberian<br>civil war. | Nigerian    | 04/08/16 |
| 11 | Dr    | J.A.<br>Hungbo       | 48 | Associate<br>Professor | NWU<br>Mafikeng<br>S. Africa  | Nigeria<br>and<br>Taylor's<br>asylum.                  | Nigerian    | 11/08/16 |
| 12 | Mr.   | Erio<br>Muxito       | 30 | Research<br>Fellow     | NWU<br>Mafikeng<br>S. Africa  | Nigeria<br>and Luso-<br>phone<br>Africa.               | Angolan     | 12/08/16 |
| 13 | Mrs.  | A.A.<br>Aboat        | 36 | Research<br>Officer    | NWU<br>Mafikeng<br>S. Africa  | Nigeria<br>and West<br>Africa                          | Ghanaian    | 15/08/16 |
| 14 | Mr.   | Emmanuel<br>Okiror   | 30 | Research<br>Officer    | NWU<br>Mafikeng<br>S. Africa  | Nigeria<br>and<br>Africa                               | Ugandan     | 24/08/16 |
| 15 | Mr.   | Enoch<br>Obuolo      | 30 | Research<br>Officer    | NWU<br>Mafikeng<br>S. Africa  | Nigeria<br>and<br>Africa                               | Kenyan      | 24/08/16 |
| 16 | Mr.   | Emmanuel<br>Bumunang | 37 | Student                | Megacity<br>S. Africa         | Nigeria<br>and<br>Cameroo<br>n                         | Cameroonian | 17/09/16 |
| 17 | Mrs.  | Evernice<br>Gororo   | 41 | Teacher                | Megacity<br>S. Africa         | Nigeria<br>and<br>Sothorn<br>Africa.                   | Zimbabwean  | 17/09/16 |

## **ANNEXURE J:**

### **NIGERIA AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

Foreign Peace-Keeping Operations: Nigerian Commanders, 1960-2012



#### **(A) Nigerian Commanders of Peace-Keeping Missions**

1. Major General JIU Aguiyi Ironsi (ONUC, CONGO 1960-1964-United Nations)
2. Major General Edward Unimna (UNAVEM I, ANGOLA 1991-United Nations)
3. Major General Chris Garba (UNAVEM II & III, ANGOLA 1991-1995-United Nations)
4. Major General Ekundayo Opaleye (UNAMIR, RWANDA 1993-United Nations)
5. Colonel Joshua Dogonyaro (Nigerian Neutral Force-NNF, CHAD 1979-Bilateral)

6. Colonel Mohammed Magoro (Nigerian Neutral Force-NNF, CHAD 1979-Bilateral)
7. Major General Geoffrey Ejiga (HARMONY II, CHAD, 1981-1982-OAU)
8. Major General Samaila Iliya (MONUC, CONGO 2003-United Nations)
9. Lieutenant General Joseph Owonibi (UNMIL, LIBERIA 2003-2005-United Nations)
10. Lieutenant General Chika Obiakor (UNMIL, LIBERIA 2005-2008-United Nations)
11. Major General Festus Okonkwo (AMIS, SUDAN 2004-2005-AU)
12. Major General Collins Ihekire (AMIS, SUDAN, 2005-2007-AU)
12. General Martin Luther Agwai (UNAMID, SUDAN 2007-2009-United Nations)
13. Major General Moses Obi (UNMIS, SUDAN 2010-2011-United Nations)
14. Major General Moses Obi (UNMISS, South Sudan 2011-2012-United Nations)

#### (B) ECOMOG CHRONICLE OF COMMAND

1. Major General Joshua Dogonyaro, 1990-92
2. Major General Rufus Kupolati, 1992
3. Major General Ishaya Bakut, 1993
4. Major General Adetunji Olurin, 1994
5. Major General John Irienger, 1995
6. Major General Samuel VL Malu, 1996-1997

7. Major General Timothy Shelpidi 1997-1998

8. Major General Felix Mujakperuo, 1999

9. Major General Gabriel Kpamber, 1999-2000

(C) OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN WHICH THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATED.

1. Bilateral Special Training and Security Mission in Tanzania – 1964

2. Indo-Pakistan (UNIPOM, 1965-1966- United Nations)

3. New Guinea (UNSF, 1962-1963-United Nations)

4. Lebanon (UNFIL, 1978-1982-United Nations)

5. Iran-Iraq (UNIMOG, 1988-1991-United Nations)

6. Namibia (MINURSO, 1991-United Nations)

7. Cambodia (UNTAG, 1992-1993-United Nations)

8. Somalia (UNOSOM, 1992-United Nations)

9. Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR, 1992-United Nations)

10. Mozambique (UNOMOZ, 1992-United Nations)

11. Aouzo Strip (Chad) (UNASOG, 1994-United Nations)

12. Central African Republic (CAR), (MINURCAT, 2007-2010-United Nations) Source:

<http://www.wordpress.com>

## ANNEXURE K:

### NIGERIA'S FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 2010

| S/N | Names                                         | Period Served           |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1   | Sir<br>Abubakar Tafawa Balewa                 | 1960-1961               |
| 2   | Dr.<br>Jaja Anucha Wachukwu                   | 1961-1965               |
| 3   | Alhaji<br>Nuhu Bamalli                        | 1965-1966               |
| 4   | Dr.<br>Akoi Arikpo                            | 1967-1975               |
| 5   | Major General<br>Nanven Joseph Garba          | 1975-1978               |
| 6   | Major General<br>Henry Edmund Olufemi Adefope | 1978-1979               |
| 7   | Professor<br>Ishaya Sha'aibu Audu             | 1979-1983               |
| 8   | Chief<br>Eleazar Chukwuemeka [Emeka] Anyaoku  | 1983-1983               |
| 9   | Professor<br>Ibrahim Agboola Gambari          | 1984-1985               |
| 10  | Professor<br>Akinwande Bolaji Akinyemi        | 1985-1987               |
| 11  | General<br>Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu           | 1987-1989; 1990-1993    |
| 12  | Dr.<br>Rilwanu Lukman                         | January- September 1990 |
| 13  | Ambassador<br>Matthew Tawo Mbu                | January- November 1993  |
| 14  | Ambassador<br>Babagana Kingibe                | 1993-1995               |
| 15  | Chief<br>Tom Ikimi                            | 1995-1998               |
| 16  | Ambassador<br>Ignatius Chukuemeka Olisemeka   | 1998-1999               |
| 17  | Alhaji<br>Sule Lamido                         | 1999-2003               |
| 18  | Ambassador<br>Oluyemi Adeniji                 | 2003-2006               |
| 19  | Dr.<br>Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala                    | June- August 2006       |
| 20  | Professor<br>Joy Uche Angela Ogwu             | 2006-2007               |
| 21  | Chief<br>Ojo Maduekwe                         | 2007-2010               |
| 22  | Henry Odein Ajumogobia                        | April 2010-July 2011    |

Source: Compiled by the author.

**ANNEXURE L:**  
**PhD ADMISSION LETTER**



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho  
South Africa, 2735

Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775  
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac.za>

MR AA ADELEKE  
P O BOX 7938 IKEJA GPO  
LAGOS  
NIGERIA  
...

Ref No **25404725**  
Email:

2014/03/25

Dear MR ADELEKE

**2014 ADMISSION: PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (104 140 1)**

We are pleased to inform you that you have been admitted into : **PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS** the programme.  
However, please note that your admission is subject to the following:

- a) That a minimum number of students (as determined by the University) are admitted and registered for the above programme. in the event that the said minimum number of students does not register the registrations will be cancelled.
- b) Submission of your original degree certificate(s) to the Admissions Office.
- c) Students who will graduate in the 2014 academic year must submit their original degree certificates immediately after graduation.
- d) Students who obtained their undergraduate and subsequent degree(s) from other universities must apply for 'admission to status'. The prescribed application fee is R 320.00, and the application forms are available at the Admissions Office.
- e) Students with foreign qualifications must submit Evaluation Certificates from the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). SAQA's contact details are: (012) 431 5000/5107.

International students will not be permitted to register without a valid study permit. Attached is a letter to support your application for a study permit which must be presented to a South African High Commission or Consulate.

We have already allocated you a student number **25404725**. Please quote it in all your future correspondence or enquiries with the University. Registration dates is in mid-Jan to mid-Feb, but the exact time and dates will be communicated to you in due time. Please note that Admission to a programme of study does not automatically imply admission to a University residence. If you have applied for admission to a University residence, you will be contacted by the residence office in due course. The residence office may be contacted on telephone number (018) 389 2285 (Ms Nel) or 108 389 2823 (Mr Freeman).

We hope that your studies will be both rewarding and enjoyable.


Yours Faithfully

pp 

THE REGISTRAR  
MR. R.L. KETTLES

## ANNEXURE M:

### CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2014



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho  
South Africa, 2735

Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775  
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac.za>

### CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2014

It is hereby certified that

**ADEWOLE AYODEJI ADELEKE** (date of birth 1970/02/03)  
(student number 25404725 - 2014)

is registered as student on the Mafikeng Campus Campus for

**PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**FULL TIME (First Year)**

MC Faculty of Human and Social Sciences

Curriculum L911M INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


Academic year : 1

Historical year : 1

Modules:

HIRE 9 71

THESIS




Registration date: 2014/03/25

Date of issue: 2014/03/25

Last date of qualification and module amendments:

Year Subject 2014/02/28

pp CAMPUS REGISTRAR





**ANNEXURE N:**  
**CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2015**



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho  
South Africa, 2735

Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775  
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac.za>

**CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2015**

It is hereby certified that

**ADEWOLE AYODEJI ADELEKE** (date of birth **1970/02/03**)  
(student number **25404725 - 2014**)

is registered as a student on the Mafikeng Campus Campus for  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**FULL TIME (Final)**

MC Faculty of Human and Social Sciences

Curriculum L911M INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Academic year : 2  
Historical year : 2

**Modules:** HIRL 971 (H)

\*H = core module; X = non-core module; A = additional module

**Registration date:** 2015/07/30

**Date of issue:** 2015/07/30

**Last date of qualification and module amendments:**

**Year Subject** 2015/02/27

**pp CAMPUS REGISTRAR**

**ANNEXURE O:**  
**CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2016**



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho  
South Africa, 2735

Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775  
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac.za>

**CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2016**

It is hereby certified that

**AYODEJI ADEWOLE ADELEKE**

(Date of birth: 1970/02/03)

(Student number: 25404725 - 2014)

is registered as a student on the **Mafikeng Campus Campus**  
(MC Faculty of Human and Social Sciences)

for

**PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Curriculum - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (L911M)

**FULL TIME ( Final)**

Academic year : 3  
Historical year : 3

**Modules:**

HIRL 9 71 (H)

Module: H = core module; Module X = non-core module, A = additional module



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

**05 APR 2016**

**Admissions Office**

Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho 2735

Tel: 018 389 2525

Fax: 018 389 2485

**Registration date:** 2016/04/05

**Date of issue:** 2016/04/05

**Last date of qualification and module amendments**

\*\*\*

\*\*\*

**pp CAMPUS REGISTRAR**

**ANNEXURE P:**  
**CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 2017**



NORTH-WEST  
UNIVERSITY  
NOORDWES  
UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG

UNIVERSITY  
OF THE BOPHIRIMA  
REGION  
MABUS

Private Bag X2046, Mm  
South Africa, 2735

Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775  
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac>

**PROOF OF REGISTRAT ON 2017**

It is hereby certified that

**AYODEJI ADEWOLE ADELEKE**

(Date of birth: 1970/02/03)

(Student number: 25404725 - 2014)

is registered as a student on the **Mafiken Campus Campus**  
(MC Faculty of Human and Social Sciences)

for

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
Curriculum - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (L911M)

**FULL TIME ( Final)**

Academic year : 4  
Historical year : 4

**Modules:**

HIRL 9 71 (H)

Module: H = core module, Module: X = non-core module, A = additional module



2017/04/20  
AYODEJI ADEWOLE ADELEKE  
Private Bag X2046, Mm  
South Africa, 2735  
Tel: (018) 389-2111  
Fax: (018) 392-5775

**Registration date:** 2017/04/20

**Date of issue:** 2017/04/20

**Last date of qualification and module amendments**

**Year Subject**

2017/02/17

**pp CAMPUS REGISTRAR**

# ANNEXURE Q:

## NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUBMIT DOCTORAL THESIS

### NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUBMIT MASTERS OR DOCTORAL MINI-DISSERTATION, DISSERTATION OR THESIS

Notice must be given to the Examinations Office at least three months prior to submission.  
Failure to fill in the form in full will render the notice defective.



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY  
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA  
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT  
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

#### Examinations Office

Tel: (018) 389 2577

Fax: (018) 389 2404

Notice is hereby given of intention to submit a dissertation/ thesis as indicated

|                                           |                                                                                                                                                          |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| Student number:                           | 25404725                                                                                                                                                 |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Title, Initials and Last Name:            | MR A. A. ADELEKE                                                                                                                                         |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Degree programme registered for:          | PHD INTERNATIONAL RELS.                                                                                                                                  |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Type of submission (Mark with an X):      | <input type="checkbox"/> Mini-dissertation <input type="checkbox"/> Full Master's dissertation <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Doctoral Thesis       |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Faculty:                                  | HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES                                                                                                                                |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Address (correspondence):                 | % PROF VICTOR OJAKOROTU<br>DEPT. OF INT. RELATIONS NWU                                                                                                   |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Contact phone number (O/H):               | +27743207599/+27840228488                                                                                                                                |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| E-mail address:                           | xelowadeleke@yahoo.com                                                                                                                                   |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Name of Supervisor/ Promoter:             | PROF VICTOR OJAKOROTU                                                                                                                                    |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Title (exactly as registered & approved): | CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY:<br>A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION<br>INITIATIVES IN LIBERIA AND GUINEA-BISSAU, 1989-2010. |     |                                              |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Intended submission date:                 | Mark with an X                                                                                                                                           | MAY | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOVEMBER | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 |  |  |  |

|                    |      |   |   |   |   |
|--------------------|------|---|---|---|---|
| SIGNATURE: STUDENT | 2007 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
|                    | DATE |   |   |   |   |

#### CONFIRMATION BY THE SUPERVISOR/ PROMOTER

I, Ojokoroti Victor, the promoter/ supervisor of the above-mentioned student, hereby confirm that:-

- ☒ 1. the student will likely be ready to submit the dissertation or thesis at the above-mentioned date; and
- ☐ 2. the registered title above is correct; and
- ☐ 3. examiners have been recommended to the Dean for appointment.

|                                 |      |   |   |   |   |
|---------------------------------|------|---|---|---|---|
| SIGNATURE: SUPERVISOR/ PROMOTER | 2007 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
|                                 | DATE |   |   |   |   |