

THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE STRATEGY OF THE ANC AND THE PAC :
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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PREFACE

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Opinions, attitudes and conclusions expressed in this thesis are mine and should not necessarily be construed as reflecting the attitude or opinion of the International Freedom Foundation.

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	i
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER TWO: REVOLUTION AS A TWENTIETH CENTURY PHENOMENON	11
1 CHARACTERISTICS OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY	11
2 CAUSES OF REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY	14
2.1 Long-term causes of revolution	14
2.1.1 Political preconditions	15
2.1.2 Socio-economic preconditions	15
2.1.3 Psychological preconditions	16
2.1.4 Ideological preconditions	17
2.2 Short-term causes	18
3 TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACHES TOWARDS REVOLUTION	18
3.1 Soviet approach towards revolution	19
3.1.1 Lenin's approach towards revolution	19
3.1.2 Contemporary Soviet approach towards revolution	21
3.2 The Chinese approach towards revolution	23
3.3 Third World approach towards revolution	25
4 REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AS A TWENTIETH CENTURY PHENOMENON	27
4.1 The political dimension	28
4.2 The military dimension	32
4.3 The socio-economic dimension	33
4.4 Cultural-religious dimension	35
4.5 The ideological-psychological dimension	36
4.6 The international dimension	38

	Page
5 REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE MODELS	40
5.1 Rural revolutionary warfare models	40
5.2 Urban revolutionary warfare model	43
6 CONCLUSION	44
 CHAPTER THREE: THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR"	 47
1 NATIONALISM	48
1.1 Development of nationalism as a component of people's war	49
1.2 Operationalisation of nationalism in a people's war	54
2 THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL PARTY	56
2.1 The development of the revolutionary party as a component of people's war	56
2.2 Operationalisation of the revolutionary party in a people's war	58
3 THE PEOPLE'S WAR	62
3.1 The development of the people's army as a component of people's war	62
3.2 Operationalisation of the people's army as a component of people's war	63
3.3 The military strategy of the people's war	66
4 THE UNITED FRONT	74
4.1 The development of the united front as a component of people's war	74
4.2 Operationalisation of the united front as a component of people's war	77

5	THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	81
5.1	Origins of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	81
5.2	Origins of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	83
6	CONCLUSION	84

CHAPTER FOUR: NATIONALISM AND THE PEOPLE'S ARMY PARTY AS COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

87

1	NATIONALISM AS COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	87
1.1	Nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	88
1.2	Nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	91
2	THE PEOPLE'S ARMY AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	95
2.1	The people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	95
2.2	The people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	100
3	CONCLUSION	109

CHAPTER FIVE: THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	112
1 THE PRECEPTIONS OF THE PAC AND THE ANC OF THEMSELVES AS REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES	112
1.1 The PAC's perception of itself as a revolutionary party in a people's war	112
1.2 The ANC's perception of itself as a revolutionary party in a people's war	113
2 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE PAC'S AND THE ANC'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES	116
2.1 The political programme	117
2.1.1 The political programme of the PAC	117
2.1.2 The political programme of the ANC	119
2.2 Political actions	123
2.2.1 Political actions of the PAC	123
2.2.2 Political actions of the ANC	125
3 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	129
3.1 The revolutionary party as component of the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	129
3.2 The revolutionary party as component of the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	130
4 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	132
4.1 The economic sphere	133

4.1.1	The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere	133
4.1.2	The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere	136
4.2	The social sphere	140
4.2.1	The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the social sphere	140
4.2.2	The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the social sphere	142
5	THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS A COMPONENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	146
5.1	The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the international dimension	147
5.2	The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the international dimension	149
6	CONCLUSION	154
 CHAPTER SIX: THE UNITED FRONT AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC		 156
1	THE PAC AND THE ANC APPROACHES TOWARDS THE UNITED FRONT IN THEIR REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES	156
1.1	The PAC approach towards the united front in its revolutionary strategy	156
1.2	The ANC approach towards the united front in its revolutionary strategy	158

2	THE UNITED FRONT IN THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	160
2.1	The united front in the political dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	160
2.1	The united front in the political dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	161
3	THE UNITED FRONT IN THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE ANC AND THE PAC	167
3.1	The united front in the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	167
3.2	The united front in the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	168
4	THE UNITED FRONT IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	173
4.1	The economic sphere	173
4.2	The social sphere	175
5	THE UNITED FRONT STRATEGY MODEL OF THE ANC	176
6	THE UNITED FRONT IN THE INTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	184
6.1	The united front component in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC	184
6.2	The united front component in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC	185
7	CONCLUSION	194

CHAPTER SEVEN: GUIDELINES FOR A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN SOUTH AFRICA	196
1 SYNTHESISED COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC	196
1.1 Nationalism	197
1.2 The revolutionary party	198
1.3 The people's army	200
1.4 The united front	202
2 PRINCIPLES OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY	206
2.1 Analysis of the revolutionary situation	207
2.2 A comprehensive government plan	207
2.3 Government should function in accordance with the law	208
2.4 Unity of effort	208
2.5 Defeat political subversion	209
2.6 Preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy	210
2.7 Mobilising the masses	210
2.8 Intelligence	211
3 GUIDELINES FOR THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF A PEOPLE'S COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY	213
3.1 A new political and constitutional dispensation	213
3.1.1 Stage one: declaration of intent	213
3.1.2 Stage two: acceptance of a Bill of Civil Rights	214
3.1.3 Stage three: a comprehensive political and constitutional programme plan	215
3.2 Effective political administration	218
3.3 Creating a liberal political consciousness among the masses	219
4 THE MILITARY DIMENSION	220
4.1 Reorganisation of the South African Defence Force	221
4.1.1 A professional defence force	221
4.1.2 Conscript defence force	222

4.2	Reorganisation of the national security management system	224
4.3	Operational guidelines	226
4.3.1	Target areas in intelligence operations	226
4.3.2	Intelligence warfare	228
5	THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION	230
5.1	A new economic philosophy	230
5.2	Deregulating labour relations	231
5.3	Depoliticising social forces	234
6	INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION	235
7	CONCLUSION	236
	SAMEVATTING	239
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	241

SUMMARY

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The purpose of this thesis is provide a comparative analysis of the concept "people's war" as it manifest itself in the strategies of the ANC and the PAC. The concept "people's war" within the framework of this thesis is seen as a product and manifestation of revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon.

This specific approach forced one to evaluate revolution within its historical and philosophical context as a twentieth century phenomenon in chapter two. Accordingly a variety of theories and approaches were identified that have had a direct bearing on the revolutionary thought in the Third World in the twentieth century. As a result it was necessary to briefly discuss revolutionary warfare models.

Chapter three serves as the pivot of the study in that it is in this chapter where the four components that constitute a people's war were developed. According to available research material this is the first theoretical framework ever developed according to which it may be determined whether a revolution constitutes a people's war revolution or not. The four component of the concept "people's war" namely: nationalism, the revolutionary party, the people's army and the united front therefore serve as the basis according to which the strategies of the ANC and the PAC are compared.

The presence of the concept "people's war" in the strategies of the ANC and the PAC were as a result compared in chapters four, five and six. It is the conclusion of this thesis that both the ANC and the PAC adhere to the requirements of the concept "people's war" in their respective strategies. It is furthermore suggested that the ANC has been the most successful in translating its revolutionary effort into a people's war. The PAC however, commands the most appropriate theoretical approach towards a people's war but fails to effectively implement it in practice.

The results and conclusions of the aforementioned chapters are brought together in the final chapter. These conclusions however emphasised the necessity to develop possible guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa. Specific guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy based on liberalism was as a result identified in the concluding section of this chapter.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Confusion and controversy exist over the extent to which South Africa is subjected to a revolutionary war. On the one side the assumption is maintained that the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) constitute traditional nationalist movements involved in an anti-colonial struggle. On the other side it is argued that the ANC and the PAC are involved in a modern people's war revolutionary struggle aimed at the seizure of political power and the transformation of society. Contributing to the state of confusion, controversy exists regarding the question whether PAC and ANC activities represent a national liberation war, a civil war, an armed conflict and/or a war situation.

The concept "people's war", as a manifestation of modern revolutionary warfare, is central to this problem, for never before - and this is reflected in available and published literature - has an attempt been made to develop some form of a yardstick according to which this concept could be theoretically accounted for. Nor have the ideological and historical origins of the concept "people's war" been determined. This state of affairs prompted a profound scholar of revolutionary strategy, Professor Chalmers Johnson, to write a premature autopsy on the concept "people's war" (Johnson, 1973:1-118).

Contributing to this state of confusion, the practical reality exists that most contemporary theoreticians on revolution do not reside in societies trapped in a revolutionary situation. The prevailing situation in South Africa, however, forces one to determine what the concept "people's war" entails. This is as a consequence of the fact that both the ANC and the PAC claim to adhere to the axioms of a people's war revolution, which at first glance does not seem to differ from any other revolution. Crucial questions such as the following need to be addressed and answered: What is a people's war revolution? Is the concept "people's war" applied in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC?, and How do the two organisations approaches compare?

For the purposes of this study the anatomical proposition is accepted that the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC bear the characteristics of a people's war revolution. Associated with the aforementioned the question should be posed how a scholar of revolutionary studies (especially one living in a South Africa entrapped in a revolutionary situation) should apply the knowledge acquired once the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC has been described, compared and evaluated.

OBJECTIVES

It is ironic that in South Africa - a country to which the theories of revolution are highly applicable - no theoretical study regarding the concept "people's war" as it manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC has been published. The irony lies in the fact that this concept constitutes a key-idea in the revolutionary strategy of both the ANC and the PAC. Available literature regarding the ANC and the PAC - except for the organisations' own publications - does little to address the concept "people's war" as it manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the two organisations. This fact is attributed to the confusion which exists in academic circles in South Africa and internationally regarding the concept "people's war". The availability of literature regarding the concept "people's war" was consequently also part and parcel of the research problem. Sufficient literature was available with regard to the question of what constitute a twentieth century revolution, revolutionary strategy and strategy per se in its broadest terms, and in this regard use was made, among others, of the following literature: Paynton, C.T., and Blackey, R., eds. 1971. Why Revolution? London: Schenkman Publishers; Elliott-Bateman, M., 1974. Revolt to revolution: The fourth dimension of warfare. Manchester: Manchester University Press; and Beaufre, A., 1965. Introduction to strategy. London: Faber and Faber. The aforementioned literature, however, failed to provide any substantial guidance with regard to the question of what constitutes a people's war revolution.

As far as the ANC and the PAC are concerned, a wide range of literature exists regarding the historical development of their respective resistance

struggles, but fails to address the people's war revolution paradigm in any substance. Included in this range of literature are: Gerhardt, G.M., 1978. *Black power in South Africa: The evolution of an ideology*. Los Angeles: Univ. Calif. Press; Lodge, T., 1983. *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*. Johannesburg: Raven Press; Lodge, T. (ed.). *Resistance and ideology in settler societies*. Johannesburg: Raven Press; Woodward, C.A., 1983. *Understanding revolution in South Africa*. Cape Town: Juta; Karis, T. and Carter, G.M. (eds.), 1987. *From protest to challenge: A documentary history of African politics in South Africa*. 4 vols. (Paperback editions). Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, and Davies, R. (et al.), 1984. *The struggle for South Africa*. London: Zed Press. It is in view of this vacuum important to identify the objectives of this study.

It is the primary aim and objective of this study to determine a conceptualised theoretical framework a people's war revolution. This framework consequently identify specific components that function as a yardstick or constant which could be applied when describing, comparing and evaluating the concept "people's war" as it manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC, or any other revolution. This study aims to trace the historical, intellectual and philosophical origins of the concept "people's war", so as to place those components that constitute a people's war revolution in their contemporary context. In order to create a conceptualised theoretical framework of a people's war, revolution has to be placed in its modern or contemporary context. It is therefore the purpose of this study to describe revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon.

The central question in this study is consequently: whether and to what extent the concept "people's war" manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is the overarching aim of this study to use the theoretical framework of a people's war to describe, compare and evaluate the concept "people's war" as reflected in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC so as to ascertain to what extent these two organisations adhere to the axioms of a people's war revolution. It is the final object of this study to identify certain counter-revolutionary guidelines against the background of the knowledge acquired regarding the

nature of the people's war revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC.

METHODOLOGY

This study produced specific methodological problems, primarily as a result of the fact that the concept "people's war" per se, has never before been accounted for theoretically. This necessitated a process of conceptualisation, since the method of comparison requires extensive information which is sufficiently precise. A brief historical-philosophical description and analysis of the factors which constitute a revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon was undertaken in chapter two, for a people's war also represents a revolution. Describing revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon was of further importance to the process of comparison, in that certain aspects of the dimensions of revolutionary strategy identified in chapter two had a direct bearing on two components of the people's war concept.

Understanding revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon provided the backdrop against which the concept "people's war" could be identified and its components determined. Identification and description of the components of the people's war concept were done within the historical-ideological origin of each component. This process included an explanation of how each component has become operational. Chapter three therefore serves as the engine for a comparative analysis of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC. This chapter within the comparative method paradigm, serves as the control element, for the components that represent the concept "people's war" have been classified.

The comparative method used in this study was thus more than a mere technical aid, it was a method of research. This enabled one to directly compare the components of the people's war concept as they manifest in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC, so as to understand the interactions of the components and variables. This method facilitated a dynamic and not static comparison, in that it permitted experimentation, allowing variables to be controlled, thereby permitting exploration as

reflected in the parallel comparison procedure. This method supplied the opportunity to make a microscopic comparison, in that the actual ingredients (variables) of each component (such as the composition of the respective armed wings of the organisations), could be compared on an equal basis. It was therefore possible to pinpoint the similarities and differences that exist between the PAC's and the ANC's application and introduction of the concept "people's war" in their respective revolutionary strategies. The differences and similarities that exist between the PAC and the ANC in this regard are attributed to distinct perceptions and operationalisation of the concept in the respective revolutionary strategies.

Methodologically another problem was identified and this concerned the procedure according to which the respective points of view of the PAC and the ANC were to be presented. The procedure used in this study was twofold: firstly, the contextual analysis method was used so as to interpret and accommodate the respective points of view within the revolutionary paradigm; secondly, the analytical-descriptive method was applied to place the respective points of view within the context of this study. Associated with this problem was the question regarding rhetoric and practice. The comparative method necessitates a differentiation of what could be construed as representing rhetoric and reality in the statements of the ANC and the PAC. This study per se was conducted from 1988 to 1989, a period during which the manifestation of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC became apparent and visible in South Africa. It was consequently easy to distinguish between statements that had mere rhetorical value and those that found expression in practice, thereby facilitating the process of identifying the differences between rhetoric and reality. Hence, the fact that the practical manifestations of the people's war concept were primarily used to compare the people's war revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.

A further methodological problem encountered during this study was the question of access to primary sources with specific regard to chapters four, five and six. This problem originated in lieu of the fact that both the ANC and the PAC were banned organisations during the research and

completion period of this study. The implications of this are among others that access to the policy statements and publications as well as personal contact with the respective organisations were inhibited by government policy. However, publications and policy statements were acquired by various means over an extended period of time. The question regarding the primary nature of these sources is placed beyond any doubt in that specific care was taken not to portray statements by ordinary rank and file members of the respective organisations as representing or reflecting the policy orientation of the organisations in question. Continuous research over a period of nine years has moulded one to place more value on articles written by certain authors in ANC and PAC publications than on other authors.

The authenticity of publications and the substance of their contents as reflecting the policies of the respective organisations are not questioned. The reason for this is found in the fact that it is clearly stated and quite visible on the covers of ANC and PAC publications that these are the "official organs" of the respective organisations. Contributing to the primary nature of these publications is the fact that nowhere, in any of the publications used for the purpose of this study, does a disclaimer appear which states that "the opinions and attitudes expressed are those of the contributors and should not necessarily be construed as reflecting the attitude or opinion of the respective organisations".

It is furthermore known that all the publications of the ANC and the PAC are subjected to organisational scrutiny, editorial review and approval, and in the case of both organisations members of their Executive Committees serve as chief editors. There is also no indication in ANC and PAC publications that any article or statement published in an "official organ" was retracted at a later stage. Specific use was made of the following literature: Lenin, V.I. 1980. Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Vols. 1-46; Mao Tse-tung, 1978. Selected Works, Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Vols. 1-4; Gaip, V.N., 1962. People's war. People's army. Washington: Government Publishing Office; Guevara, C., 1986. Guerilla warfare. Manchester: Manchester University Press and Johnson, C., 1973. Autopsy on people's war. Los Angeles: Univ. Calif.

Press, so as to determine the components of the concept "people's war" revolution as well as its historical and ideological origin. This was a tortuous process of literature collection and research, because, with the exception of Johnson, the other studies failed to address all four principal components of a people's war revolution.

The enormous deficiency gap in the aforementioned studies, regarding the people's war concept as it manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC, necessitated a thorough review of the large quantity of ANC and PAC publications that are available. These publications include: Sechaba, Mayibuye, Dawn, ANC ad hoc reports, ANC Struggle Update, Voice of Women, The African Communist and Umsebenzi - the official publications of the ANC/SACP alliance; Azania News, Azania Combat, PAC World, PAC Commando and ad hoc reports of the PAC. These publications provided a comprehensive representation of what the PAC and the ANC imply with the concept "people's war" and constitute the majority of sources used to describe, compare and evaluate the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. Statistically it may consequently be argued that 85% of all the sources used in this study and 97% of the sources used in chapters four, five and six constitute primary sources.

The parallel method of comparison created another methodological problem in that this method for example enabled one to compare the application of variables evident in the components of the people's war concept in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. This procedure resulted in a staggered representation which excluded a total overview of the results of the comparative analysis. This methodological problem, however, was overcome by providing a synthesised comparison of the four components of the concept "people's war" as they manifest in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. The methodology and logic of this study may be further clarified by providing a synopsis of the structure of the research.

STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH

The structure of the research can simplistically be divided into three prominent questions. Firstly: What does the concept "people's war" entail?

The answer to this question is provided within the framework of chapters two and three. Secondly: How does the concept "people's war" manifest itself in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC and what are the similarities and differences in this regard? The answer to this question is provided in chapters four, five and six. Finally: How is the knowledge acquired regarding the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC to be applied? The answer to this question is provided in chapter seven.

Chapter two of this study serves as an orientation chapter, in which revolution is placed within its twentieth century context. It should consequently be seen as that component of this study which provides clarification regarding revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon. Chapter two serves as the framework within which a better understanding can be achieved of a people's war revolution as a modern form of revolution. However, this chapter is of further value in that certain dimensions of revolutionary strategy discussed in this chapter have a direct bearing on the method and manner according to which two components of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC are compared.

Chapter three resolves the problem regarding what a people's war is and whether it constitutes a revolution. In this chapter it became necessary to begin with an historically based discussion regarding the origin of the concept "people's war", for, as has been stated earlier, no conceptualised theoretical framework exists which explains people's war as a concept with its unique combination of components. The components of the concept are classified and discussed in this chapter. Identifying the components of the concept "people's war" was of strategic importance to this study for two reasons. Firstly, it was necessary to determine what is meant by the concept "people's war", and for this reason one had to identify its characteristics. It was thus important to trace each component back to its historical and philosophical origins in order to understand the operationalisation of each component. Secondly, by identifying and classifying the components of the concept a control factor could be created facilitating a comparative analysis of comparable cases - the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. Chapter three concludes with a discussion of the origins of the concept "people's war" in the

revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC. This is crucial for it is assumed that both the ANC and the PAC subscribe within their revolutionary strategies to the axioms of a people's war.

The comparative analysis of the people's war concept as it manifests itself in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC was executed in accordance with the identified components of the concept. In chapter four a comparative analysis was made of two components, namely: the nationalism and the people's army components. These two components could have been compared in two separate chapters but in order to maintain some aesthetic format (to maintain a broad standard regarding the length of chapters) these two components were accommodated in one chapter. The manifestation of nationalism in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC was analysed comparatively in accordance with the parallel procedure. Logically this implies that nationalism as such was analysed firstly followed by a comparative analysis of the people's army.

In chapter five a comparative analysis was made of the revolutionary party component. The parallel procedure was employed once again, however on a more microscopical level. The revolutionary party as a constant comprises more variables than the aforementioned components, and consequently a parallel comparison could be made of each variable. In this regard certain dimensions of revolutionary strategy that were identified in chapter two, were employed in order to facilitate a sub-comparison. Some of these variables also comprised variables that were employed to facilitate a sub-sub-comparison. In practical terms this may best be explained by the following example:

- (i) The primary comparison in chapter five constitutes a comparison of the revolutionary party component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.
- (ii) This component, however, manifests itself in various dimensions of revolutionary strategy as identified in chapter two, with the result that a comparison was for example, made of the revolutionary party as a component in the political dimension of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC, and this constitutes a sub-comparison.

- (iii) Within the political dimension, however, certain variables such as political actions, for example, exists which resulted in a sub-sub-comparison.

This method of comparative analysis ensured that comparisons could be executed even in the smallest and seemingly insignificant details of the various instances.

In chapter six the united front component of the concept was comparatively analysed in a similar style as the set example of chapter five. However, it was as a result of the parallel procedure of comparison possible to determine the existence of an ANC united front strategy model in this chapter. The identification of this model is not superficially imposed on the chapter but is a direct result of the research process.

The final problem statement was addressed in chapter seven. In this chapter a synthesised comparison was presented of the four components of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC. The question of how to apply the acquired knowledge was attended to by providing certain guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy that could neutralise the people's war revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC, and lead South Africa towards a liberal democracy.

CHAPTER TWO

REVOLUTION AS A TWENTIETH CENTURY PHENOMENON

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a framework of that which constitutes a revolution in the twentieth century. Revolution per se is not a modern concept, but is in actual fact as old as the institution of society itself and is seen as something much more than an emphatic synonym for change in society. After all, it is important to describe revolution as a twentieth century concept so as to attain full comprehension of what is implied by the concept "people's war" as a revolution. This chapter serves as an orientation in that it places revolution in its modern context. By providing a framework of what a revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon entails, it will be possible to determine the essential characteristics of a people's war revolution. This chapter will thus focus specifically on the characteristics of revolution in the twentieth century; the causes of revolution; the prominent approaches towards revolution; revolutionary strategy and revolutionary warfare models.

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Revolutions in the 20th century can clearly be distinguished from those prior to this century, seeing that 20th century revolutions have undergone longer or shorter periods of gestation; they display a coherence of plan and organisation, and have worked themselves out on a large and wide scale. Every revolution is unique. The following broadly acceptable characteristics are consequently identified as those representing revolution in the 20th century.

The most significant characteristic of modern revolutions is that they take place mainly in the underdeveloped areas of the world, commonly known as the Third World. This is primarily the result of an increased feeling of nationalism associated with liberation expectations, which were created by the process of decolonisation after the Second World War. During this process revolution was perceived as the only method through which liberation could be achieved. In this regard Stalin said that the

revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples against imperialism in the dependent and colonial countries is the only road that will lead to their emancipation from oppression and exploitation (Franklin, 1973:150). This point of view was reiterated by Khrushchev, who stated: "Liberation wars will continue as long as imperialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible, but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily" (Garthoff, 1962:571).

A second characteristic of modern revolutions is that the process of transformation which is envisaged does not apply only to the political order, but to society in its entirety. It is generally accepted that modern revolutions attempt to change the existing institutionalised values of the social order by replacing them with new institutionalised values (Hopper, 1971:237). Modern revolution is thus described as a sweeping, fundamental change in political organisation, social structure, economic property control, and the predominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development (Bayles, 1975:134).

The final broad characteristic of revolutions in the 20th century is that in addition to violence, ideology is employed to legitimize the process by which an attempt is made to seize power in the targeted society. Propagating an ideology to legitimise the seizure of power, is perceived to be important in view of the fact that "[e]very political change requires justification ... and those changes associated with revolution are precisely the ones requiring enormous justification" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:103).

The 20th Century revolutions that have taken place and are still taking place may broadly be described as proletarian revolutions (Soviet Union 1917), national democratic revolutions (Peoples Republic of China, 1949) and most important for the purpose of this study, national liberation revolutions (Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Angola, etc.).

The development and advancement of political science has created a situation where various definitions exist which describe revolution and behaviour reflecting revolutionary actions. As a result, revolution is

often associated with specific events such as mass riots, civil disobedience, the slaying of a monarch, a coup d'etat or acts of terrorism. Revolutions in the 20th century however, involve more than this and therefore need to be distinguished from limited skirmishes with authority. It is moreover not the aim of this study to descend into a morass of definitions - a tedious exercise by any account - but rather to describe in general the focus of revolutions in the 20th century.

Most revolutions in the 20th century can be defined as attempts "to alter the conditions of social existence, to lay the foundations for an alternative order of society ... revolution is never merely the replacing of one ruling group with another; nor is it a change in the system of government alone ..." (Lubasz, 1971:253). As a result of the fact that revolutions aim at the total transformation of society, they are distinguished from other forms of uprisings. Wertheim (1974:125) stated in this regard that "there is an additional quality inherent in the concept of revolution, which revolt lacks and which basically distinguishes revolutions from any other disturbance ... the basic criterion is that a revolution always aims at an overthrow of the existing social order and of the prevalent power structure; whereas all other types of disorder, whatever they may be called, lack this aspiration to fundamental change and simply aim to deal a blow at those in authority, or even to depose or physically eliminate them".

The seizure of political power is, however, the immediate aim of any revolution, because without controlling political power no group or organisation can implement their policies in order to alter society. The seizure of political power is a vehicle which can be used either to change the value system or to replace the value system of society. Macpherson (1969:140) made the following statement in this regard: "I take revolution to mean a transfer of state power by means involving the use or threat of organised unauthorised force, and subsequent consolidation of that transferred power, with a view to bringing about a fundamental change in social, economic, and political institutions".

Revolutions in the 20th century have proved to be inherently of a violent nature, as Macpherson has indicated, and this is also explained by Lenin

who can be portrayed as the father of modern revolution. He stated: "... it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible, not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class" (Lenin, 1943,v7:10).

Revolutions in the 20th century are characterised by the fact that they attempt to create a total transformation of society, and that the actions involved in pursuing these objectives are illegal and violent.

2. CAUSES OF REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

When determining the causes of revolution, it is essential to distinguish between the preconditions, the long-term causes; and incidentals or precipitants, the short-term causes, which serve as the catalysts of revolutions (Sarkesian, 1975:31). It should be remembered that, in general, the causes of revolutions are subjectively perceived by those who participate in these revolutions, and that under specific circumstances, these could therefore contradict scientific assumptions that have been made regarding the causes of revolution.

2.1 Long-term causes of revolution

Long-term causes of revolution are those indicators which can be perceived as essential to the creation of a revolutionary situation, or the initiation of a revolution. A revolutionary situation can be described as a situation in which it is impossible for the ruling structure to maintain its rule in an unchanged form; in which it is impossible for the "upper class" to live as before; in which the wants of the revolutionaries have become more acute than usual; and in which there is a considerable increase in the activities of the masses against the ruling authorities (Lenin, 1943, v5:174). In addition, revolutions are generally portrayed as calculated, planned long-term processes, and not as sudden and uncontrolled events (Neumann, 1971:110-112). McNall & Huggins are also of the opinion that revolutions: "owe their inceptions to deep social, political, economic and psychological tensions within the social system" (Sarkesian, 1975:241).

In view of the fact that long-term causes of revolution may be present in all the sub-structures of society, it is necessary to distinguish between political, socio-economic, psychological and ideological preconditions.

2.1.1 Political preconditions

In general political preconditions for a revolution pose the question of political representation: either the lack thereof or its limited nature. It is well documented that an inflexible ruling elite, "blocking avenues for gradual, evolutionary expansion is as essential for a pre-revolutionary situation as the existence of a group aspiring at social advance and determined to achieve its objectives" (Wertheim, 1974:198). Associated with this is the concept of "rising expectations". When political repression or political discrimination decrease in a society, it is generally perceived that this situation will continue. If the situation is likely to be hindered by an obstreperous or inefficient ruling elite, then the chances of counteraction by those who are discriminated against become more likely, resulting in action where an attempt is made to overthrow the ruling elite (Cohan, 1975:195).

Related to the aforementioned are the behavioural propositions that revolutions can, and often do, become chronic, incapacitating to a large extent the nation, and that violence is a political style which is self-perpetuating (Ekstein, 1971:137). These propositions are reflected in revolutionary situations in the Third World, where examples of successful revolutions in other societies are exploited by revolutionaries to legitimize their own behaviour. Closely linked to this is the strategy of presenting demands to the ruling elite, which are in fact tantamount to demands for the abdication of the ruling elite. Political preconditions should, however, not be interpreted in isolation but in relation to other preconditions.

2.1.2 Socio-economic preconditions

Socio-economic preconditions for a revolution are a reflection of the living conditions and standard of living in a targeted society. Severe impoverishment does not serve as an a priori precondition for revolution,

and Cohan (1975:193-194) suggested that "it now seems to be part of conventional wisdom that revolutions do not begin when people in society are at the ebb of their existence ... People have lived in appalling conditions for centuries yet most have accepted ... their collective lot and left it to the few to pursue revolutionary ends".

Research has indicated that socio-economic issues usually develop into preconditions of revolution when a certain degree of socio-economic mobility or empowerment has taken place in the targeted society. This is largely due to the conditions of relative deprivation and rising expectations, where a discrepancy exists between what people want and what they receive, giving rise to a situation which is perceived to be intolerable. When a situation like this is reached, revolutionary action is usually perceived to be the only way out (Cohan, 1975:197). Davies (1962:6) argues in this regard that revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The assumption can thus be made that revolutions are usually instigated by those who are not unprosperous, but who feel restrained, cramped and annoyed, rather than downright oppressed (Brinton, 1965:250). Improvement in the socio-economic conditions of a society, rather than a continuation of the status quo, leads to a revolutionary situation. The maxim of "masses with an empty belly cannot revolt" is thus quite applicable.

2.1.3 Psychological preconditions

At the outset it is important to be aware of the fact that the perceptions of those who participate in revolutions are the only perceptions applicable when identifying the psychological preconditions. Dissatisfaction and antagonism are the primary elements which create the environment for revolution as far as psychological preconditions are concerned. Davies (1971:179) stated in this regard that it is "the dissatisfied state of mind, rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality or liberty which produces revolutions". It is thus clear that those who participate in a revolution are dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, notwithstanding the fact that outsiders to particular that situation might

be of the opinion that the revolutionaries are acting in a biased or prejudiced way. Opinions of outsiders are therefore not relevant to the revolutionaries, and Brinton (1965:250) argues that the individual who feels that he has been treated undeservedly or unjustly will revolt even if his conditions have improved.

The rational in determining the psychological preconditions is related to the perceptions of those who actually take part in and/or foster revolution. However, these perceptions are not created overnight, but take time to develop into a critical state of affairs where revolutionary behaviour becomes inevitable.

2.1.4 Ideological preconditions

Ideology has become the legitimizing factor of most revolutions in the 20th century. Ideology has, and still is, being exploited as the "corpus" of the revolutionaries' purpose to change society, and ideology has become the justification for revolutions in the 20th century. Most revolutions that have occurred in this century were aimed at so-called colonial powers and Western constitutional democracies. These revolutions were, and still are mostly waged in the name of Marxism-Leninism as ideology, against the status quo which is perceived to be of a colonial, capitalist and imperialist nature. On the other hand, a few revolutions that are currently being waged, aim to turn society away from Marxism-Leninism in the specific situations. These two kinds of ideological preconditions therefore emphasize Wertheim's (1974:210) statement that "only revolutionary ideology explicitly challenges the official status hierarchy mainly in terms of a class struggle". Ideology as a precondition with specific reference to Marxism-Leninism has become an indicator of the methods that are used to wage a revolution. Violence has become the predominant means by which an attempt is made to change society. It is clearly stated that Marxism-Leninism is inherently violent, and that violence is used "in order to achieve or retain economic and political domination, and certain rights and privileges" (Anon, 1984:274-275).

Ideology as a precondition has become a strategic component of the revolution without which no revolution can successfully be waged.

2.2 Short-term causes

The variety of short-term causes, incidentals or precipitators that could lead to revolution is so wide that any possible incidental might be regarded as a factor which could contribute to the start of a revolution. Some theoreticians have attempted to categorise these incidental conditions, and Gottschalk (1971:100-109) has courageously identified five such conditions, namely the demand for change resulting from provocations; the demand for change voiced by solidified public opinion; the hope for success as revealed in programmes for reform; faith in revolutionary leadership; and the weakness of the group in power. Reality, however, indicates that any possible incidental condition could start a revolution - such as the outcome of a court case or even an election result. Categorising incidentals is therefore nothing more than an academic exercise and a futile flight of intellectual fantasy. Elliott-Bateman (1974:288) is thus correct in his observation that incidentals are the essential catalysts which put the institutions of state power to the test.

Long-term and short-term causes of revolution should be interpreted as indicators of and not solely as conditions responsible for the initiation of a revolution. Revolution as a mode of warfare has become a powerful mechanism in contemporary international power politics. Within the current balance of power the risk attached to nuclear and even conventional war has become awesome, resulting in situations where revolutions are used to alter or change the prevailing balance of power. Revolution is thus a mechanism by means of which the status quo can be altered. A brief analysis of some approaches towards revolution becomes necessary at this stage.

3. TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACHES TOWARDS REVOLUTION

It is neither the aim nor the purpose of this study to identify and analyse all existing approaches towards revolution. Instead an attempt will be made to identify those schools of thought that might be relevant to the situation in South Africa. Consequently, three schools of thought,

namely the Soviet, the Chinese and the Third World schools, are identified.

3.1 Soviet approach towards revolution

The approach towards revolution followed by the Soviet Union is based extensively on the theory of Lenin, but when this approach is interpreted in its broadest sense, a distinction becomes possible between the classical approach of Lenin and the adaptation of Lenin's theory by contemporary Soviet revolutionary theoreticians.

3.1.1 Lenin's approach towards revolution

The success of the revolution in the Soviet Union in 1917 can be attributed mainly to Lenin's theories of revolution. The essence of Lenin's approach is that society is primarily divided between two classes and that revolution is the mechanism by which an alteration is brought about in class relations in society. He stated in this regard: "The transfer of state power from one class to another class is the first, the principal, and the basic sign of a revolution, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical meaning of the term" (Lenin, 1980, V6:33). According to Lenin this class struggle represents the struggle to abolish class once and for all. However, this struggle is perceived to be a difficult and "stubborn" struggle which could take decades to achieve its final aim - a classless society (Lenin, 1980, V24:315). Lenin's intention is clear, in that he perceived revolution to be an instrument by means of which a new social order could be created (Prokhorov, 1970, V21:669).

Lenin's approach towards revolution is based on two phases, i.e. the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution. The first phase of Lenin's revolutionary theory, that of the bourgeois revolution, is described as "a social revolution whose main task is the destruction of the rule of the feudal system or its vestiges, the establishment of the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the creation of a bourgeois state; ... A bourgeois revolution, in as much as it is called upon to ensure the free development of the capitalist system, usually ends in the transfer of power from the nobility to the bourgeoisie" (Prokhorov, 1970, V1:44-45).

The second phase of Lenin's revolutionary theory, that of the socialist revolution, only commences once the first phase has been successfully completed. The ultimate aim of the second phase is to transform society from capitalism to communism. In its broadest sense, the socialist revolution encompasses the entire period from the seizure of power to the manifestation of socialism in its highest form - communism.

A socialist revolution can thus be defined as "the most radical social revolution in the history of class society, a mode of transition from the capitalist socio-economic formation to the communist formation. It is a gigantic leap in social development that includes a host of decisive, qualitative changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the society: the seizure of power by the working class in alliance with the other strata of working people; the breakdown of the old state machine and the establishment of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the introduction of public ownership of the means of production; the creation of a system of social regulation of economic and social processes; the abolition of all forms of exploitation and oppression; the elimination of class antagonisms; the development of socialist democracy, and a cultural revolution" (Anon, 1984:203).

Lenin's approach towards revolution clearly indicates that revolution involves the total reconstruction of society. In addition, Lenin was of the opinion that a revolution could only be successful if the majority of the population, with specific reference to the working class, were to engage in the revolution (Prokhorov, 1970, V24:246). The theoretical and philosophical basis Lenin created for revolution was primarily aimed at the situation in the Soviet Union in the early years of the 20th century, creating the dilemma that his original theories - those prior to 1918 - were not applicable to the prevailing conditions in the Third World. This theoretical dilemma was, however, solved by Lenin himself and best of all by contemporary Soviet intellectuals who have adapted Lenin's original theoretical perspectives to suit conditions in the Third World.

3.1.2 Contemporary Soviet approach towards revolution

Contemporary Soviet intellectuals have successfully combined Lenin's classical theories on revolution with prevailing conditions in the Third World after World War II. Ulyanovsky, Deputy Chief, Central Committee, of the Soviet Union, International Department, has stated clearly in this regard that "Lenin evolved his teaching on the national and the international-colonial question as a component part of the theory of the revolutionary transformation of the colonial world through two consecutive stages - the stage of the democratic national liberation revolution, and the stage of the socialist revolution. He envisaged that, in keeping with the laws of historical development, the first stage would grow into the second and that this would occur in various forms and take different periods of time" (Ulyanovsky, 1978:37). The first phase of revolution (using Lenin's classification) in the Third World is thus described as a struggle for national liberation, or a national liberation revolution, or an anti-imperialist national liberation revolution, or a people's democratic revolution (Pavlenko, 1983:6). (All these concepts imply the same revolutionary process.)

Contemporary Soviet intellectuals attribute the concept of national liberation to Lenin, who stated that nations had the right to self-determination (Lenin, 1980, V22:337). The confrontation between colonial nations and their colonial occupiers is interpreted as a struggle for national self-determination, and the nature of this struggle is one of national liberation. Lenin (1980, V23:60) argued in this regard that such a revolution "can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements including the national liberation movement in the underdeveloped, backward and oppressed nations".

Contemporary Soviet intellectuals use this statement by Lenin to portray national liberation revolution as an inherent component of the first phase of revolution as identified by Lenin. National liberation revolution is perceived to be a component and specific form of social and class struggle. A national liberation revolution is not seen as a simple movement for national liberation, but rather as a profound political and

social upheaval in the life of people of dependent countries, colonies and semi-colonies, implying a revolutionary liberation from what are perceived to be oppressive societies. The format of a national liberation revolution is described as follows: "In the primary stage this (national liberation revolution) usually takes the form of a broad anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic movement of the mass of the people, aimed at achieving political independence, restructuring the state machine, pushing out foreign monopolies, creating a national industry, eliminating feudal order, and introducing profound agrarian reforms on the principle of 'land to those who till it' (Anon, 1975:220).

The mass democratic movement in dependent countries is created during this revolutionary phase. The aim of this creation is to combine all the anti-government elements in one movement, which aspires to seize political power in the target state. The revolution which is portrayed as a bourgeois or national liberation revolution, can however, only be an unfinished revolution (Zotov, 1983:66), implying that a second revolutionary process exists. This process is the phase which commences after the new ruling elite has seized power in the dependent state which now has become an independent state. According to the second phase theory, it is the task of the new ruling elite to tackle the class differentiation which exists in society after independence. A new revolutionary democratic programme should therefore be formulated in which the original assertion of "classlessness" and "national unity" is transformed into the recognition of the existence of classes and class contradictions (Kosukhin, 1985:90).

The second phase of the revolution, that of the socialist revolution in newly independent countries, is seen as a transitional phase from capitalism to socialism. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared: "The road to socialism for the young nation state runs through an historical period of transitional phases of social development, when the material and social prerequisites of socialism are being gradually prepared, and the working class and intelligentsia loyal to the people are taking shape" (Manchkha, 1983:17). This process (road) which newly independent states should follow is called the Non-Capitalist Path of Development (NCPD) and may be defined as "the gradual emergence of the objective and subjective prerequisites for

building socialism in countries that have shaken off the colonial yoke" (Anon, 1984:155).

The Non-Capitalist Path of Development is a specific form of transition to socialism in "backward" (Third World) countries, and this is quite different from socialism as it exists in the socialist countries (Ulyanovsky, 1978:18-19). The Non-Capitalist Path of Development is perceived as the only way through which the second phase of revolution can successfully be accomplished, and the only road by means of which backward people can rid themselves of all kinds of exploitation, racial discrimination, poverty and hunger (Manchkha, 1983:18). There is no predetermined time frame in which this revolutionary process should be accomplished. Ulyanovsky (1978:18) argues that: "the length of transition required for such a development is largely determined by the correlation of class forces during the period of struggle for independence".

The Soviet approach towards revolutions as expressed by Lenin's theories and the interpretation of contemporary Soviet intellectuals reflect an approach which is total. The Soviet approach, therefore, does not apply only to the Soviet Union, but has been adapted to serve as a blueprint for societies in the Third World. The Soviet approach does not only address the process of gaining power, but also the question of how this power should be used in order to transform society.

3.2 The Chinese approach towards revolution

The approach towards revolution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is primarily based on the theories and practises of Mao Tse-tung. This approach is generally known as Maoism, which is in fact a misleading concept. Maoism is not a theory of revolution that was uniquely developed, but is rather a factual interpretation and practical adaptation of Marxism-Leninism within what is called the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung. Mao's approach towards revolution evolved over a fairly long time, covering a large part of his career, and was aimed firstly at the Japanese colonial occupation of China, secondly at the nationalists in China, and lastly at the creation of a socialist state. The first and second components of Mao's approach are, however, perceived to be the same process (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:318).

The uniqueness of Mao's approach towards revolution can be attributed to the fact that he adapted the theory of Marxism-Leninism to suit practical conditions in China, thereby creating the precedent that revolutions should be structured around the prevailing conditions in the target society. This is further emphasized by Mao's assumption that where a working class is unavailable to participate in the revolution - Lenin emphasized that only a working class can lead a revolution - other classes which may be in a similar relationship could take the lead on account of their revolutionary potential.

Mao's class analysis of society, contrary to Lenin's two-class theory, constituted five classes, namely the landlord and managerial class; the middle bourgeoisie class; the class of the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletariat class; and the proletariat class (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, VI:13-22). The leading revolutionary group according to Mao was the proletariat, as a result of its strategic location in the cities and the fact that it had little to lose in a fight for a better life. Mao also made provision in his theories for alliances between revolutionary classes in their fight against the ruling classes. He described it as follows: "The leading force in our revolution is the industrial proletariat. Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie. As for the vacillating middle bourgeoisie, their right wing may become our enemy and their left wing our friend - but we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks" (Mao Tse-tung, 1978:19). It was, according to Mao, the task of these groups to lead the first stage of revolution, that of the new democratic revolution.

This kind of revolution aims at the seizure of political power, and differs from a socialist revolution in that it overthrows the rule of the imperialists and exploiting classes, but does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:327). The democratic revolution is seen as the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution (second phase), and the socialist revolution as the inevitable sequel to the democratic revolution (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:330-331). The aim of the socialist revolution corresponds to the second phase of Lenin's theory in that it transforms society from capitalism to socialism. Mao (1978, V4:41) added that this was "the road to the abolition of classes,

to the abolition of state power and to the abolition of parties ...", and that this "is the road all mankind must take". Mao's theory therefore constituted a coherent theory for a world revolution, and he argued that it was "our (the PRC's) general task to unite the whole people and win the support of all our friends abroad in the struggle to build a great socialist country, defend world peace and advance the cause of human progress" (Yin, 1983:32). The Chinese approach towards revolution serves both as an alternative to the theories of the Soviet Union and as supportive of the Soviet approach. It is therefore not extraordinary that approaches towards revolution in the Third World reflect either a Soviet or a Chinese character, or a combination of the two approaches.

3.3 Third World approach towards revolution

The confines of this study do not allow a detailed analysis or description of all the relevant Third World approaches towards revolution. It is possible, though, to identify the major characteristics of the Third World approach towards revolution. Most Third World revolutionaries accepted either the theories of the Soviet Union or China, and applied them to their own conditions. Le Duan (1970:17) argued as follows: "There has never been and will never be a unique formula, one that is suited to all circumstances and all times, for waging a revolution. One given formula may be good for a certain country but unfit for another, a correct one in certain times and under certain circumstances. All depends on correct historical conditions". Third World revolutionaries therefore adapted existing theories of revolution to their own conditions. This does not imply that they negated existing theories, but rather that they refined these theories. An expedient example of this is Guevara's reasoning that it is not necessary to wait for all the preconditions for a revolution to exist before a revolution can be initiated, but rather that actions by a "hard core" of revolutionaries can also initiate a revolution (Guevara, 1986:117-118).

The approach towards revolution in the Third World corresponds broadly to the two-phased revolutionary theory of Lenin, despite the fact that specific situations necessitate particular adaptations to this framework. For example, the revolutions in Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Bissau all went through the first phase of revolution,

that of national liberation, and are currently in the second phase, where a gradual transformation from capitalist values transcends into that of socialism (Turok, 1980:12-29). Debray (1970:71) refutes this approach and argues that, as far as the phases of revolution are concerned "the nub of the problem lies not in the initial progress of revolution but in its ability to resolve in practice the problem of state power before the bourgeois democratic stage and not after". Nzongola-Ntalaya (1982:34), a revolutionary intellectual from Zaire, perceives this theory of Debray as being "adventurist because it promotes military heroism at the expense of political direction ...". He argues further that Debray's approach "is a dogmatic position, which ignores the analysis of concrete conditions".

The most critical contribution to the theory of revolution made by Third World (specifically African) revolutionaries is the fact that they adapted Marxism-Leninism to the reality of nationalist aspirations. A profound example of this approach is Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau who worked within an explicitly Marxist discourse. Afterwards, Cabral wrote that it was the broad alliance of nationalist forces that would lead the anti-colonial struggle. As a result of the historical conditions in Guinea-Bissau where the working class was underdeveloped, Cabral argued that the petty bourgeoisie had to commit suicide as a class in order not to betray the revolution (Cabral, 1980:136). The national identity of the petty bourgeoisie, viz. the colonial occupiers, was more important than their class consciousness. Fanon argued that it could be dangerous when people reached the stage of social consciousness before the stage of nationalism. Fanon (1969:165) however, concluded: "If nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs ... it leads up a blind alley".

The primary aspect which distinguishes revolution in the twentieth century from that prior to this century is the development of revolutionary strategy. Revolutionary strategy is the most important characteristic of revolution in the twentieth century.

4. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AS A TWENTIETH CENTURY PHENOMENON

The difference between theory and strategy of revolution manifests itself in that theory addresses the "why statement" and strategy the "how and when statement". The concept "revolutionary strategy" provides one with freedom of movement in the academic sense of the word, in that it is not confined in its scope of application, like a term such as "guerrilla warfare". Revolutionary strategy is not limited to its military connotation but includes the widest possible application. Revolutionary strategy may therefore be described as an indirect strategy (Beaufre, 1965:43-44); it may also be described as a total strategy in that it encompasses the political, military, socio-economic, and psychological fields (Baucom, 1987:3-13). Beaufre (1965:133) described total strategy as follows: "In trying to describe what strategy is, I decided to start with total strategy because it is that which must direct the contest, whether it be violent or insidious, whether it be conducted in the political, economic, diplomatic or military field, or in all at once - because in fact it is total. Indeed strategy is almost unintelligible if looked at through military spectacles only, for that leaves too many vital factors out of account".

Revolutionary strategy has developed from being a military strategy - if the wide range of terms such as revolutionary warfare, revolutionary armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and national liberation war, are taken into consideration - into a total strategy, if the practical implications and fields of conduct of 20th century revolutions are taken into consideration. The subordinate nature of the military resources available to a revolutionary movement when compared with those of the target state is the precise reason why revolutionary strategy cannot be interpreted as being of a military nature only. Revolutionary strategy can therefore broadly be described as the art of controlling and utilizing one's own resources, and as far as practically possible those of the target society, to the end where the revolutionary movement's vital interests are promoted and secured against counter-revolutionary actions or potential of the target state. The criteria according to which revolutionary strategy may be analysed comprise six autonomous dimensions. These dimensions are the political, military, socio-economic, cultural-religious, psychological-ideological, and international dimensions. The fact that these dimensions

may be described separately is not an indication that each dimension can function in isolation during a revolutionary process.

4.1 The political dimension

It has become a truism to state that revolutionary strategy is 80% political and 20% military. It is, however, not possible to indicate within the confines of this study the various approaches towards the political dimensions in revolutionary strategy; rather, an attempt will be made to indicate and discuss the most influential approaches regarding the political dimension.

Revolution is perceived first and foremost as a political struggle between classes for state power. Lenin was of the opinion that the most revolutionary class (the workers) could not lead a revolution en masse on account of their uneducated and disorganised nature. Realities, he was sure, could lead to the failure of a revolution, and because of this Lenin determined that the working class should be led by a vanguard. This was Lenin's most significant contribution to revolutionary strategy within its political dimension, because he identified the criteria as to why a vanguard or political party was needed, and how this party should function. He stated in this regard "We are the party of a class and therefore almost the entire class should act under the leadership of our party as closely as possible. But it would be smug complacency to think that at any time under capitalism the entire class or almost the entire class would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its vanguard" (Lenin, 1943, V7:240).

The vanguard party is seen as the pivot of political organisation, implying that the party is the controlling body of the revolution. In addition the party should not be large, as large numbers would allow counter-revolutionary elements to create divisions within the vanguard. Stalin stated in this regard that "it should be remembered once and for all that the strength and weight of a party, and especially of the Communist Party, depends not so much on the number of its members as on their quality, their staunchness and devotion to the cause of the proletariat" (Weeks, 1987:66).

The revolutionary party represents the masses and determines their strategies in the political dimension. The party does not succumb to the will of the majority, but determines that will. Lenin argued that "in times of revolution it is not sufficient to ascertain the 'will of the majority': Nay, one must prove to be stronger ... we see innumerable examples of how the better organised, more class-conscious, and better armed minority forces its will upon the majority and vanquishes it" (Lenin, 1943, V2:182). The party should also be organised along the principle of centralism, in order to function properly and guide the masses systematically. This entails one set of rules and a uniform party discipline as well as one leading organ. It is stipulated that the majority should submit to the minority. Failing these conditions, Lenin argued that "the party of the working class cannot be a real party and cannot carry out its tasks in guiding the class" (Short History of the CPSU, 1945:50).

The party is portrayed as the pivot of what is called the finest elements of the working class, who must be in direct contact with the masses. The party serves as the training school for the leadership of the masses and according to Stalin, is the only organisation competent to transform all non-party organisations into accessory organs, thereby linking them with the working class as a whole (Stalin, 1940:78). This formation, where different groups are linked to the party, is known in contemporary revolutionary terminology as the democratic movement of progressive forces. Mao emphasized the strategy of forging alliances between the party and other progressive and democratic movements (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:199-200). The formation of a political party, usually a Communist party, is one of the strategic components of revolutionary strategy. Manifestations in Africa specifically indicate that, contrary to the Soviet and Chinese revolutionary models, revolutionary movements create a broad national democratic movement of which the party is only a component during the first phase of the revolution. The party as such takes the leading role only after the achievement of national independence.

The formation of alliances is a critical component of the political dimension, in that it forces the party to be flexible. This is essential in order to make compromises, with the aim of achieving a revolutionary

objective, that of political power. Lenin was of the opinion that it is "the task of a truly revolutionary party not to renounce compromises once and for all, but to be able throughout all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principle, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of preparing the way for revolution and of educating the masses for victory in the revolution" (Lenin, 1943, V6:208). Participating in the existing political structures of the target state is important to Lenin, and is portrayed as a strategic manoeuvre, for "as long as you are unable to dispose the bourgeois parliament and every other type of reactionary institution, you must work inside them ... Participating in the bourgeois parliament actually proves to the backward masses why such parliaments need to be done away with" (Lenin, 1943, V10:44-45). Participation is seen as the ideal strategy for the revolutionaries to take advantage of every rift - even the smallest - among the ruling class in order to create divisions within their ranks (Lenin, 1943, V10:112).

Guevara however disagreed with Lenin and stated that "people must see clearly the futility of maintaining a fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate" (Taber, 1970:31). Stalin, on the other hand argues that making demands in civil debate is a part of revolutionary strategy, and is perceived as slight skirmishes. Political reforms by the ruling class are thus seen as concessions which are the by-products of the revolution. According to Stalin these political reforms could be used and transformed into instruments by means of which the ruling regime can be disintegrated. Stalin (1940:79) also stated that "the revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining the legal work with the illegal work for the revolutionary preparations of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie".

Defining the interrelationship of political work and military activity was one of the major contributions Mao made to the revolutionary strategy. He stated clearly that "party organisational work and mass work are directly linked with the armed struggle; there is not, and cannot be, any party work or mass work that is isolated and stands by itself" (Mao Tse-tung, 1963:8). Mao did, however, stipulate that the party control the military and that military action is always subjected to political control. He argued: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle

is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party" (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:224).

The revolutionary party is a strategic component of the political dimension. The party as vanguard of the revolutionary class has to educate the masses in the revolutionary spirit and prepare them for revolutionary action. Panomarev, former head of the Soviet Union International Department, was of the opinion that such work is never in vain and is repaid a hundredfold (Panomarev, 1980:133). Political action is the most important component of revolution, and military action serves merely as a means to an end. Mao stated clearly in this regard: "War is the continuation of politics. In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action, since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character" (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:152). Mobilising the masses politically within the target state is more important than a military victory. Mao argued that the masses would create a vast sea in which the enemy could be drowned; neglecting political activity would thus inevitably lead to defeat (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:228).

The military wing of a revolutionary organisation had, according to Mao, a specific political role. Mao stated in this regard that the military wing fights not merely for the sake of fighting but conducts propaganda among the masses, by means of which the masses can be organised, armed and trained in order to establish revolutionary political power (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V1:106). Within China it was an important task of the military to help the masses establish revolutionary political power and set up party organisations. To Mao the political dimension was more important than a military battle and he said that "all military actions are means to achieve certain political objectives while military action itself is a manifested form of politics ..." (Pustay, 1965:38). Political work was thus the most important component of the political dimension and this political work included using "the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic) and concentrating them (through study turning them into concentrated and systematic ideas) then going to the masses and propagating and explaining these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them, and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action" (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V3:119).

The political dimension is clearly the nucleus of revolutionary strategy because it is that component that underlines the necessity of revolutionary struggle. It is furthermore the dimension that gives purpose to the revolution, regardless of the legality or legitimacy of such a revolution. The political dimension also influences the other dimensions because it determines the process according to which those dimensions develop and function.

4.2 The military dimension

The military dimension in revolutionary strategy is a priori, an indication that this dimension comprises military action or armed violence. However, military action - despite its important role - is not decisive in a revolutionary struggle. Military action is undertaken in support of the objectives of the other dimensions, aiming by means of armed violence, to tie the ruling elite's military forces down in order to bring about the collapse of the ruling elite in the other dimensions. The military dimension is therefore synonymous with the concept of an armed struggle, which in fact is the means by which this dimension is implemented. Mao argued that "without armed struggle there would be no place in China for the proletariat and the Communist Party, and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task" (Mao Tse-tung, 1963:6). The armed struggle is thus perceived to be an extension of politics.

Various concepts and terminology are used to describe the armed struggle during a revolutionary process. The most popular terminology includes the following: guerrilla warfare; insurgency warfare; armed liberation struggle; and revolutionary warfare. These terms used to describe military action do however, in the final analysis, imply the same type of action, despite subtle strategic and tactical differences. Within the framework of 20th century revolution these actions are subordinate to political control. Lenin stated categorically that "the party of the proletariat can never regard guerrilla warfare as the only, or even as the chief method of struggle; it means that this method must be subordinate to other methods ..." (Lenin, 1980, VII:221). Both Lenin and Mao stated clearly that the military command of a revolutionary movement should be subordinate to its political command; failing this a revolution is doomed to fail

(Lenin, 1980, V11:219 and Sarkesian, 1975:9). Cabral added to this by arguing that the political and military leadership of the revolutionary struggle is one (De Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982, V3:165). The military dimension is thus clearly not an end in itself but rather a means to an end.

The military dimension is essentially the strategy used by an inferior force (revolutionary forces) against a militarily superior force. Taber (1970:29) uses the following analogy to describe this situation: "... the guerrilla fights the war of a flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough, the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws". The revolutionary fights a protracted war in which the strategic aim initially is survival. Taber (1970:53-54) describes this kind of war as a flea (the guerrilla) that bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him. The guerrilla therefore does not seek to destroy his enemy with a blow, but rather to bleed him and feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and morale. Time is needed in this strategy in order to breed more fleas that can start a local infestation which develops into an epidemic. It is thus clear that a military decision is avoided during the initial stage of the military dimension of revolutionary strategy.

The military dimension is an important component of revolutionary strategy in that the ultimate failure or success of a revolution is determined by the correct utilization of the military dimension. This dimension can however not be implemented in isolation and is always subordinate to another dimension with specific reference to the political dimension.

4.3 The socio-economic dimension

The struggle within this dimension is aimed at the existing and developing socio-economic system of the target state. Revolutionaries aim to disrupt, undermine or destroy the existing value system, the mechanisms of the bureaucratic and administrative control systems, the infrastructure as well as the economic system (Elliott-Bateman, 1974:146). Disruption or

distruction of these systems is aimed at developing a state of ungovernability which, according to Lenin, is supported by actions which are aimed at the assassination of individuals, chiefs, and subordinates in the army and police (Lenin, 1980, VII:218).

Revolutionary action within this dimension is aimed at law and order per se, consequently leading to the situation where the police force and local authorities have to act against revolutionaries. As a result of these actions, both the police and local authorities are portrayed by the revolutionaries as functionaries or puppets of the ruling government. When this situation is reached, a clear distinction between the socio-economic and political dimensions becomes impossible to make. This creates a favourable position for the revolutionaries in that they attempt to politicise every component of their revolutionary strategy. It is therefore the objective of the revolutionaries to reduce or eliminate popular support for and trust in the governing bodies of the target state (Elliott-Bateman, 1974:343-346). The interrelationship of the socio-economic and political dimensions was also emphasized by Lenin who argued that: "Every economic fight of necessity turns into a political fight, and social democracy must indissolubly combine the economic with the political fight into a united class struggle of the proletariat" (Burns, 1935:575).

However, revolutionaries aim not to destroy every component of the administrative structure, but only that which can easily be replaced. Those which are not easily replaceable are infiltrated and undermined in order to weaken their operational ability. This is deemed a necessity in that a situation is created where the local population develops an attitude of discontent towards these institutions (Elliott-Bateman, 1974:346). Against this backdrop, revolutionaries attempt to create their own alternative structures in order to legitimize themselves as a feasible and reasonable alternative to the ruling government.

Direct attacks on economic installations and disruption of economic activity by means of trade union actions are also important components of the socio-economic dimension. Revolutionaries attempt, by means of these actions, to force foreign investors to divest from the target state, and so to curtail and stop economic growth within the target state. Trade

unions are therefore powerful institutions which are utilized by revolutionaries for revolutionary objectives. The demands of trade unions, for example, during a revolutionary situation, are not confined to the employer-employee structure but to society in its broadest sense. Lenin stated in this regard that trade unions "should not confine themselves to protecting the economic interests of the workers. They must mould the class consciousness of the proletariat and become a very important channel of political agitation and revolutionary organisation" (Dictionary of Scientific Communism, 1984:226). Pavlenko added to this by arguing that trade unions should "oppose more and more resolutely the rise in prices, inflation and encroachments on their economic and social gains" (Pavlenko, 1983:111).

The socio-economic dimension inevitably becomes a part of the political dimension during a revolution. This is once again an indication of the superiority of the political dimension viz à viz the other dimensions of revolutionary strategy.

4.4 Cultural-religious dimension

The cultural-religious dimension has become an important component of revolutionary strategy in the Third World. This dimension is perceived by revolutionaries, with specific reference to Latin America and Africa, as the motivation for the actions and sufferings of the revolutionaries. The cultural-religious dimension involves a struggle between the existing value system of the target state and the value system of the revolutionaries which manifests itself in the church, educational and cultural institutions (Elliott-Bateman, 1974:334-338).

The cultural component of this dimension has developed into a strategic element of the revolutionary struggle in Africa. Cabral argued in this regard: "Whatever the conditions of subjection of a people to foreign domination and the influence of economic, political and social factors in the exercise of this domination, it is generally within the cultural factor that we find the germ of challenge which leads to the structuring and development of the liberation movement" (Cabral, 1980:143). Giap also linked the cultural struggle to the political, economic and social struggle and argued that revolutionary movements must develop a "culture

of resistance" which can foster revolutionary ideas (Giap, 1962:97-98). Cabral was more emphatic about a "culture of resistance" by linking it directly to the military dimension. He believed that "the armed liberation struggle implies a veritable forced march along the road to cultural progress ... the armed liberation struggle is not only a product of culture but also a factor of culture" (Cabral, 1980:152-153).

The prominence of the religious dimension was most evident during the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua where it functioned as the uniting factor and driving force during the revolution. The religious dimension is used by revolutionaries to justify - on religious grounds - their struggle as a just one and to state that people have the right to rebel against a government (Belli, 1986:IX). The religious dimension of revolutionary strategy was developed into a theology in itself, generally known as liberation theology, which, according to revolutionaries, provides Christians with a re-interpretation of Marxism and socialism (Novak, 1986:6). Liberation theology is also used to mobilize the population of the target state in that it is portrayed as the practical liberation of the human which is brought about by means of political liberation (Peeters, 1986, VIII:38-45).

The cultural-religious dimension is perceived as the dimension which provides a "vision" of the future order that is to be developed by means of a revolution.

4.5 The ideological-psychological dimension

The ideological-psychological dimension is a crucial component of revolutionary strategy, primarily as a result of the fact that actions taken within this dimension are aimed at the hearts and minds of the citizens of a targeted state. Ideology can thus be regarded as the message or vision of the revolution, whilst the actions taken by the revolutionaries to influence their target audience can be regarded as the techniques of psychological warfare.

Ideology has a direct influence on the political, socio-economic, military, cultural-religious and international dimensions. To a large extent it determines the envisaged political and economic order, as well

as the social value system of the future society in the target state. The existing conditions within a target state are usually interpreted and attacked from a specific ideological perspective. Since the revolutions in both the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, Marxism-Leninism has become the most prominent ideology adhered to by revolutionaries. This can largely be attributed to Lenin who argued that "there can be no talk of an independent ideology ... the only choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course, for mankind has not created a 'third' ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology" (Lenin, 1943, VI:156). The fusion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and revolutionary struggle of the oppressed is thus, according to Maksudov, necessary and inevitable, in order to give the struggle a political content (Maksudov, 1983:15).

Nationalism however, has proven to be an important ideological approach in Africa where it has been used as the primary motivation for the destruction of external control over a target state (Said, 1969,:69). Nationalism refers therefore to a "state mind" and a psychological condition where supreme loyalty is to the nation. This has however, created a conflict of interest within revolutionary movements because nationalism and Marxism-Leninism are incompatible. This is a result of the fact that Marxism has not formulated a theory of the nation (Poulantzas, 1980:93). Pragmatism within the Third World has however, given rise to the situation where nationalism is tolerated by the hard core Marxist-Leninists within revolutionary movements.

The following Marxist-Leninist provision clarifies this phenomenon: "There are periods in national liberation movements however, when nationalism of an oppressed nation may emerge as a programme for national revival, as the ideology and policy of the struggle against imperialism and for political and economic independence, for sovereignty and all-round development of their nation. Marxist-Leninists regard nationalism filled with such general democratic content as historically justified, and support it if that is the case, without losing sight of those forces that only use the general democratic struggle to conceal their true face and are prepared to betray the nation's interests at any moment" (Anon, 1984:147). Fanon (1969:165) added to this when he stated that, if nationalism is not made

explicit or enriched and deepened by a transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, it inevitably leads up a blind alley. Nationalism is, however, merely exploited by revolutionaries who are fighting Marxist-Leninist aggression, because Marxism-Leninism in fact disregards the national question. Ideology serves as the pivot of any revolutionary strategy and the resulting psychological actions taken.

The psychological component can broadly be described as political warfare. Propaganda techniques are a strategic component of this dimension. These techniques are used to win over popular support for the revolutionaries and discredit the government. The ultimate aim of these techniques is to create a climate of collapse in which the morale of the civilian and the military elements of the government as well as the population disintegrates (Baylis, 1975:143). Propaganda within a revolution could also have a military connotation which is manifested in armed propaganda. The aim of these actions is to demonstrate to the population that the government is ineffective in controlling revolutionary actions, and that the revolutionaries are in a position to attack the target society at will. The ideological-psychological dimension has become a component without which no revolutionary strategy in the 20th century can survive.

4.6 The international dimension

The international dimension is a strategic component of modern revolutionary strategy, mainly as a result of states becoming more and more interdependent during the 20th century. This phenomenon includes, for example, the de facto or de jure recognition which a state or organisation receives from the other states in the international community of states. To a revolutionary organisation international recognition is of vital importance, and some have even been accredited with observer status in the General Assembly of the United Nations. This kind of recognition is important for revolutionary organisations, because they usually portray themselves as a viable alternative to the government in their target state. Activity by the revolutionary organisations in the international dimension or, as Beaufre (1965:110-111) describes it, the "external manoeuvre", is aimed at assuming for itself the maximum freedom of action while at the same time paralysing the target state's government by a

multitude of actions, including political, economic, military and psychological measures.

Revolutionary organisations try, by means of the aforementioned measures, to obtain and secure international support for their cause. This includes moral, political and material support such as financial assistance; military equipment; military training; and safe military bases in other countries (Campbell, 1967:288-290). Mobilising international moral and political support in order to isolate the target state is essential to revolutionaries within this dimension, because international pressure against a target society usually results in an alteration of the status quo in a target society. International mandatory economic sanctions, for example, could severely affect public opinion within a target society, resulting in a possible increase in the credibility gap, and an increase in conflict within the target society, thereby aiding the revolutionaries directly or indirectly. If the area of conflict is situated within the sphere of influence of the superpowers, then the international support received by revolutionaries could increase, because premature legality through some sort of recognition could be given to the situation, resulting in an increase in diplomatic activity within the international dimension. Elliott-Bateman (1974:309) is in this regard of opinion that such a situation will lead to a position where the revolutionary situation comes under the spotlight of international scrutiny, making it more difficult for a policy of elimination by the target government to be carried out successfully.

Psychological measures, with specific reference to propaganda measures, are a critical component of the international dimension. The revolutionaries cast themselves internationally in the role of "David" and force the target state's government into the role of "Goliath" in the mind of the public. Taber (1970:91) argues in this regard that every act and announcement of the revolutionaries plays on the sympathies and sense of justice of the global witnesses to the struggle, attempting to create the picture of a courageous people fighting for independence against monstrous forces of tyranny and oppression. Technological advances in communications, such as transistor radios, television and satellites as well as competition between international broadcasting and written press corporations for sensational reporting also enhances the immediacy of

psychological measures. Revolutionaries also call on the rules and regulations of international law in order to discredit the target society and increase their own visibility. It is perceived to be suicidal for revolutionary movements if they fail to maintain visibility and keep the world aware of their real or imaginary revolutionary progress. In this way, the international dimension can be seen as the artery that assures a revolutionary organisation of sustained revolutionary initiative.

Revolutionary strategy as defined and described in this context is a macro-perception, necessitating a brief discussion of some aspects of revolutionary warfare models, in order to indicate to what extent prevailing conditions within a target state influence the revolutionary strategy used.

5. REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE MODELS

It is important to give a review of some revolutionary warfare models in order to determine to what extent revolutionary theory and revolutionary strategy are applied and implemented in a revolutionary situation. Describing revolutionary warfare models is important when the difference which exists between theory and practice is taken into consideration, implying that that which is usually propagated is in the final analysis subservient to the prevailing realities in the objective environment. For the purpose of this study, a distinction will be made between rural revolutionary warfare models and urban revolutionary warfare models.

5.1 Rural revolutionary warfare models

Rural revolutionary warfare models are ipso facto based on the assumption that a revolution in the countryside will necessarily envelop and engulf the cities (Sarkesian, 1975:3). It is possible to distinguish between the specific examples in this regard, namely the Mao Tse-tung, the Giap, and the Guevara rural revolutionary warfare models. The rural revolutionary warfare model formulated by Mao is widely acknowledged as the leading model. Mao formulated a model which comprised three phases, representing a defensive phase as the first phase, a strategic stalemate phase as the second phase, and a strategic offensive phase as the third and final phase.

The defensive phase is characterised by the fact that the capability of the revolutionary forces is inferior to that of the government forces, forcing revolutionaries to concentrate their actions initially on political mobilisation accompanied by tactics such as terror, murder, sabotage, propaganda, intimidation and coercion, in order to influence the population. Direct contact with the government forces is avoided so as to prevent an annihilation of the revolutionary movement (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:153-172; Sarkesian, 1975:9). The strategic stalemate phase is characterised by the fact that the revolutionaries increase their capability. Guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, hit-and-run tactics, as well as the sabotage of communication and logistical installations are introduced. Revolutionaries increase their sphere of influence by creating new revolutionary-controlled areas, and amalgamating these liberated areas into larger, self-sustaining entities. The revolutionaries try to seize the initiative during this phase by attacking on a broad front in order to tie the government forces down, and dispersing them when possible (Lass, 1975:92-95; Mao Tse-tung, 1967:174-178).

The strategic offensive phase is the final phase of the Mao revolutionary warfare model, and it is during this phase that the revolutionaries seize power. The emphasis on guerrilla tactics is gradually shifted to that of mobile and positional warfare. When this stage is reached, the revolutionaries are usually equal or superior in capability viz à viz the government forces. The final battles of the revolution are thus fought in the cities; the government has all but lost the war and victory of the revolutionaries is inevitable (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:210-211). Mao's revolutionary warfare model is unique in that it serves as the model upon which other revolutionaries base their models, as well as the fact that Mao's model was first of all aimed at the occupational forces of Japan in China and later at the nationalist forces in China. Mao's model is therefore the ideal example of how revolutionary theory and strategy were adapted to the practical conditions in China. The large territory of China, the population distribution, and the initial defeats that Mao suffered, determined, to a large extent, the nature of the Mao revolutionary warfare model.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commanding general of the Viet Minh Army at Dien Bien Phu, formulated a rural revolutionary warfare model based

largely on that of Mao. Giap did, however, adapt Mao's original model to comply with the prevailing conditions in Vietnam. One of the major differences between Giap's model and that of Mao was the fact that Giap identified the importance of external support, a factor Mao neglected. This adaptation has become a strategic component of most revolutionary warfare models today. Giap's model comprised three phases, namely: a phase of contention, an equilibrium phase, and a counter-offensive phase. These phases are in theory similar to those of Mao, with the exception that Giap emphasized that the second phase could only develop into the third phase once the revolutionary forces were superior, and international public opinion favoured the revolutionary forces (Pustay, 1965:43).

The development and final outcome of the Indochina revolution were different to the original revolutionary warfare model. This was as a result of the fact that there were two distinct theatres of operation in Vietnam in 1950. The Northern Theatre (the Tonkin Delta) was marked by an advanced stage of operations, while the Southern Theatre (the Mekong Delta) was still in an early stage of development (Pustay, 1965:43). Giap's model was implemented fully in the Southern Theatre where the final battle was a conventional battle. The importance of the Giap model lies in its flexibility, facilitating an introduction of more advanced phases of the revolutionary warfare model where conditions are suitable.

Ernesto "Che" Guevara formulated a rural revolutionary warfare model for Cuba, relying to a large extent on Mao's original model (Lass, 1975:143). Guevara's model comprised three phases: a tactical defence phase, an equilibrium phase, and a people's army phase. Guevara also emphasized, in the first phase, the importance of the survival of the revolutionary forces. Tactics such as mobility, speed, surprise, and the preparedness of the revolutionary forces were important to Guevara (Guevara, 1986:58-59). The increase of political and military activities of the revolutionaries is an important phenomenon of Guevara's second phase. The result in Cuba was that large numbers of the population were drawn into the struggle during this phase. Contrary to Mao, however, Guevara insisted that guerrilla units should return to their strategic, permanent base area in order to regroup, train and resupply, and rest prior to another strike (Guevara, 1986:121-138). The creation of a people's army as the final

phase is similar to Mao's strategic offensive phase and Giap's counter-offensive phase (Burton, 1977:103).

Guevara's most significant contribution to the body of rural revolutionary warfare was his inclusion of suburban warfare. He described in great detail the organisation, equipment and missions of suburban guerrilla units as well as the concept of complete subordination of these units to the general headquarters of the rurally based revolutionary movement (Guevara, 1986:75-77). Guevara's adaptation of Mao's model to the situation in Cuba is indicative of the essence of revolutionary warfare models.

5.2 Urban revolutionary warfare model

It is not possible to identify an urban revolutionary model per se, as a result of the interrelationship of rural and urban revolutionary warfare. However, it is possible to categorise Marighella's revolutionary warfare model as an urban model despite the fact that he stated clearly that "urban guerrilla warfare or psychological warfare in the city depends on the rural guerrilla" (Moss, 1971:20). Marighella's model however, concentrated specifically on urban actions which he perceived to be in support of rural revolutionary warfare. The assumption can thus be made that Marighella's model is in fact a specific phase or stage of revolutionary warfare. This assumption is substantiated by Marighella's statement: "Beginning with the city and the support of the people, the rural guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion" (Moss, 1971:41).

Within the urban context Marighella identified the workers (on account of their knowledge of the industrial environment in the cities); the small farmers (on account of their ability to communicate with the uneducated); the students (on account of their revolutionary potential); intellectuals (on account of their influence); church leaders (on account of their manipulative ability); and women, as leader elements of urban revolutionary warfare (Moss, 1971:41-42). Marighella specified that urban guerrillas should operate and organise themselves in small groups of not more than five members. This ensured mobility and provided urban guerrillas with the element of surprise which government forces lacked

within the confines of a city. Techniques used by urban guerrillas included sabotage, direct armed attacks on government installations, ambushes, street riots, strikes, armed robbery and assassinations of government officials (Moss, 1971:24-37). It is thus clear that Marighella's intention with his urban revolutionary warfare model was to create conditions where the rurally orientated guerrilla could operate more freely whilst government forces were tied down in the cities.

Revolutionary warfare models are a manifestation of the prevailing conditions in a target society. It is evident that no revolutionary model can be applied at random to a revolutionary situation without adapting it to suit the circumstances of a target society. The flexibility and uniqueness of revolutionary warfare models contribute continuously to the body of revolution. The prevailing conditions in South Africa and the development of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) are indicative of the development of modern revolution. Concepts such as "revolutionary party"; "united front" (Mao); "people's army" (Giap); and "revolutionary nationalism" (Third International), have developed into components of the concept "people's war" within the South African situation. These components of the concept "people's war" will be analysed and discussed in the following chapters.

6. CONCLUSION

Revolution as a twentieth century phenomenon has an increasing influence on both the micro- and macro-dimensions of the body politic. Within the micro-dimension, revolution influences the balance of power in the target state. As a result of revolutionary actions, and despite counter-measures being taken to prevent revolution, the ruling government is no longer in a position to rule in the same manner as prior to the revolution. Revolution also influences the macro-dimension, as it may be used to alter the global balance of power. This has given rise to the situation where leading world powers - as a reflection of the conflict of interests which exists between them - have been associating themselves either with the revolutionary organisations or the ruling government of a target state. This is a manifestation of the ideological struggle which exists in the world today,

and it is obvious why ideology has become such an important vehicle in revolution.

Revolution in the twentieth century is much more than a specific event such as a mass riot, civil disobedience, or terrorism; it has become a specific mode of conflict. Revolution does not only entail the seizure of political power, but also the strategy according to which the "new" society is to be created from the "old" society, indicating that revolution has become a total concept. Three types of revolution have occurred during the twentieth century, namely a proletarian revolution, a national democratic revolution, and a national liberation revolution. National liberation revolutions, however, are incompatible with the proletarian and national democratic revolutions. National liberation revolutions may be described as the phase preceding the commencement of either the proletarian or the national democratic revolutions. National liberation revolutions are thus confined solely to the Third World where a struggle for national independence takes place. It is commonplace to find a situation where the process of national liberation is followed by what is called a "socialist revolution", where society is transformed according to specific ideological foundations.

The causes of revolution in the twentieth century can be categorised into long-term and short-term causes. Long-term causes include those elements which are considered to be necessary and essential for the creation of a revolutionary climatic and situation. These elements could be of a political, socio-economic, ideological or psychological nature. Short-term causes on the other hand are events or a combination of events which initiate or start the revolution. It should, however, be remembered that the causes of a revolution are unique to the situation where the revolution occurs. No specific formula exists by means of which it can be determined whether a revolution is in fact going to take place. Long-term and short-term causes are therefore only specific indicators.

Approaches towards revolution identified in this chapter can specifically be associated with revolutionaries themselves. Other approaches were consciously negated as it was intended to identify only those theories developed by leading revolutionaries that have had an influence on the development of the concept "people's war". A distinction was made between

the approaches of the Soviet Union (Lenin and contemporary intellectuals); the PRC (Mao Tse-tung); and the Third World. The theory of revolution in the twentieth century begins with that of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and ends with the adaptations made by Soviet intellectuals and Third World revolutionaries to the original theories of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung.

It is not possible, within the confines of this study, to identify individual revolutionary strategies, and for this reason a broad identification of revolutionary strategy has been made. This strategy, comprising six dimensions, is a comprehensive account of prevailing revolutionary strategies in the twentieth century. This revolutionary strategy model indicates clearly that modern revolution consists of 80% political actions and 20% military actions. It is also evident that not one of the individual dimensions described can operate in isolation, which once again underlines the fact that revolution is a total concept.

The revolutionary warfare models which have been discussed indicate that revolutionary action is flexible and adapts itself effortlessly to the restraints of a specific environment. The development of revolutionary warfare models from a purely rurally orientated phenomenon to the inclusion of urban warfare, is furthermore indicative of the development of revolution in the twentieth century.

Revolution in the twentieth century is much more than an emphatic synonym for change and has become a sophisticated instrument in the bringing about of political change. It is obvious that revolution manifests itself in various practices, thereby necessitating a descriptive analysis of a people's war revolution as a revolutionary practice. It is accepted that a people's war revolution constitutes a twentieth century revolution. In this regard it is important to determine what factors constitute a people's war as a twentieth century revolutionary phenomenon. Chapter three will for this purpose focus specifically on what factors constitute the concept "people's war".

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR"

Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, communist theorising about the further spread of communism by means of revolution concentrated on the concept of "war of national liberation". Communists were forced to co-opt nationalist struggles in order to bring about successful communist revolutions. Every revolution and upheaval after the Bolshevik Revolution contained a nationalist component (Berlin, 1972:21). The reasoning behind the process where nationalism was incorporated into the communist revolutionary struggle, was an attempt to ensure that the masses participated actively in the revolutionary process. By hijacking the nationalist factor, communist revolutionary organisations hoped to gain mass support for their struggle, not on the basis of their communist values and goals, but on the basis of their tactically and strategically adopted nationalist values and goals. This strategic manoeuvre created the conditions for the advancement of the concept "people's war".

The concept "people's war" arose from the historical communist effort to make the desire for national self-determination part of communism's appeal. Mao Tse-tung, a follower of Lenin, redesigned Lenin's approach towards revolution during the 1920's and early 1930's in order, to make it feasible in China, and from these modifications the concept "people's war" emerged (Taylor, 1971:1-6). The reason why Mao created the people's war concept was to undercut the Koumintang Movement's (KMT) monopoly regarding nationalist aspirations in China. Mao portrayed the Chinese Communist party as the true representatives of the peasants' (the majority in China) nationalist aspirations, while depicting the KMT as imperialist lackeys. By means of this strategy Mao was successful in incorporating peasants and the workers in the rural areas, and students and small traders in urban areas into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During the 1930's the CCP became the legitimate representative of the masses' aspirations for national self-determination. The revolution in China therefore became a revolution of the masses (peasants and workers) which is generally referred to as a people's war (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2: 318-327).

A further contribution to the concept "people's war" was made during the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese revolution was significant in that it indicated how the concept "people's war" could develop and adapt to new political-military circumstances. The Vietnamese people's war indicated that "people's war" was a feasible military means for employing revolutionary force against a powerful foe. The Vietnamese people's war revolution furthermore indicated that a people's war need not ultimately gain a favourable military decision in a final conventional battle, but could rather unnerve and bring a target government to its knees by shattering its will, resulting in a political victory (Johnson, 1968: 35-41). This contribution, that a people's war revolution could achieve its objectives in a revolutionary political manner, divorced a people's war revolution from the militarist approach of other revolutionary processes. It was the Vietnamese people's war that gave rise to the rule of thumb: "If the defenders don't win, they lose; if the guerrillas don't lose, they win" (Johnson, 1973:53).

All people's wars constitute a revolution, but not all revolutions constitute people's wars. The distinction between a people's war revolution and a non-people's war revolution is found in its composition. The concept people's war revolution comprises four components: nationalism; the revolutionary political party; the people's army; and the united front (Johnson, 1973:36-46). However, these can only be discussed and analysed in terms of their historical and ideological origins, as well as of their practical realisation. This chapter will focus on the concept of people's war and its components.

1 **NATIONALISM**

For the sake of coherence nationalism will firstly be discussed within the framework of its historical and ideological origins, and then within the framework of how this component is brought to fruition within a people's war.

1.1 Development of nationalism as a component of people's war

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Marxist-Leninists were initially faced with the dilemma that, in their ambition to spread Communism to the rest of the world, they did not take the role and realities of nationalism into consideration. The prevailing conditions in large parts of the world, mostly in the underdeveloped countries where revolution could become endemic, did not correspond to the historical conditions in Russia where the Bolshevik revolution took place. The revolution in Russia was not aimed at an élite which could be defined as a foreign or an occupation élite, while most underdeveloped countries were characterised by the existence and presence of such a foreign or occupational power. The debates in these countries on liberation were preoccupied with national liberation rather than with class liberation or the class struggle.

Tortuous efforts were as a result made by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians to explain how nationalism and Marxism-Leninism were politically compatible. (As was indicated in Chapter Two, in theoretical and dialectical terms, Marxism-Leninism and nationalism are politically incompatible.) These efforts by Marxist-Leninists, however, clearly indicate that the political circumstances in the Third World forced them to take cognizance of nationalism and its potential as a mobilising factor, which could be exploited to the advantage of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organisations. In addition the consequences of Marxist-Leninist attempts to accommodate nationalism within a revolutionary situation are highlighted when hindsight is used and the conclusion is made that Marxism-Leninism has only succeeded in the Third World when it was able to co-opt a national liberation movement in its struggle to seize political power, and failed whenever it was opposed, or isolated from a national liberation movement.

Efforts to indicate how Marxism-Leninism and nationalism are politically compatible resulted in the creation of concepts such as "the right to self-determination", "anti-imperialism", "anti-colonialism", and "anti-capitalism". Nationalism is not accepted as an independent and self-sufficient issue by Marxist-Leninists, but rather as being subordinate to the politics of class. Lenin did, however, say that

nationalism could never be disregarded. He continued by saying that although class antagonisms had relegated the national question to the background, it could never be categorically asserted that some particular national question could appear temporarily in the foreground of the political arena (Lenin, 1980, V6:59-61). This approach, however, did not suffice for oppressed nations, because their first and foremost aim was to achieve national liberation. With this in mind Lenin developed the concept of "the right of nations to self-determination", in which he argued that "the demand for liberation of the colonies is nothing more than the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination" (Lenin, 1980, V22:337). Lenin's concept of the right of nations to self-determination provided not only an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist and a general "democratic" charge but also a socialist charge which linked it to the international socialist revolution against imperialism which Lenin argued was impossible unless the right of nations to self-determination was recognised (Zotov, 1983:23).

During the early 1920s, nationalism, however, was still perceived as an element external to the class struggle, but Lenin emphasized that, during the struggle for self-determination, greater use should be made of the conflicts that arose in the sphere of nationalism as grounds for mass action (Lenin, 1980, V22:146). National independence or self-determination is accepted as an absolute right and described as a basic "democratic" task of the proletariat. Lenin (1980, V21:143) concluded that if socialism was not linked to a revolutionary approach to all issues, including nationalism, it would remain a hollow phrase. This line of argument formulated the basis upon which Lenin forged a relationship between the colonial issue, the imperialist issue and the national issue. As a result, this issue has become inseparable from that of a national liberation revolution, or more specifically from a people's war when it is raised.

Lenin, however, was not overly concerned with precisely defining nationalism, for according to him, it was not a theoretical problem but one of political practice. This viewpoint can be ascribed to Lenin's firm conviction - which he shared with Marx - that the nation is a transient phenomenon which is bound to disappear under socialism. This, however, did not materialise and the Comintern was forced to make further adaptations

to Lenin's ideas. The formulation of the concept of the right of nations to self-determination provided the foundation which the Comintern, Mao Tse-tung and other Third World revolutionaries could use to create a synthesis between nationalism and Marxism-Leninism within their revolutionary programmes.

The Comintern and especially the Third International, by means of devious efforts continued to explain that Marxism-Leninism and nationalism were politically compatible. The influence of Third World Communist party delegations on the congresses of the Third International resulted in steering the debate vis à vis nationalism in the direction of its relationship with the national liberation revolution (bourgeois revolution) as the first phase of revolution. This brought about in the Comintern a decisive shift and a blurring of distinctions between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution, as well as the loss of any distinction whatsoever between anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and the socialist struggle, at the Seventh Congress of the Third International (Warren, 1980:109).

The contribution of the Third International to the concept of people's war was the identification of the relationship that exists between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism during the first phase of revolution, as well as the adaptation of the original orientation of national-democratic or bourgeois revolution to that of national liberation revolution. Consequently, for the first time national liberation revolutions were no longer regarded as a secondary complement to the international proletarian revolution. The Seventh Congress of the Third International also advised Third World Communist parties, that decisive class issues should be avoided during the first phase of revolution in order to assure that all national and social forces were drawn into the struggle against national oppression (Degras, 1971, V3:377). This was clearly a tactic to avoid a situation where the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism could be compromised as a result of an over-emphasis on the class struggle, which could consequently alienate possible allies in the struggle against national oppression. In addition, the Third International declared that the national liberation movement or mass democratic movement, when fighting national oppression, was the progressive movement,

but when the struggle for social emancipation (phase two) commenced, the progressive mantle passes to the working class and its vanguard. This policy was for example implemented in China where the Koumintang Movement (KMT) was recognised as the progressive national movement and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to play the role of hand-maiden to the nationalist cause (Gruber, 1924:404).

The major debacle of the Chinese revolution in 1927, however, forced Mao Tse-tung to adapt the original strategy of the Comintern as regards the subservient nature of the Communist Party to that of a national movement. Mao identified the bourgeoisie element within the ranks of the nationalist movement, which actually served the interests of imperialism directly and separated it from the main force of the national liberation movement, which comprised the petty-bourgeois and the peasants. This distinction made by Mao has been one of the most important developments concerning the concept of people's war. Mao redirected the debate by indicating that the peasants (the masses in China) would play a decisive role in any revolution in China and that they were the custodians of nationalism. The Comintern's advice regarding the interrelationship between the nationalist movement, which turned out to be a bourgeoisie nationalist movement, and the Communist Party was disregarded by Mao after 1927, and he forged a new relationship between the Communist Party and the masses in China.

In this way Mao succeeded in creating a powerful synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and the national peculiarities of the war in China. Blaut (1987:212) is therefore correct in his observation that nationalism in the broadest sense of the word ceased to be an autonomous force or process, and became a form of class struggle. Mao succeeded in advancing the logic of the nationalist struggle to its full consequences - the nationalist mobilisation of all the people in a colonised and oppressed country. The synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism was therefore expressed by Mao Tse-tung, and this accentuated a new form of nationalism in a people's war. He was adamant that Marxism-Leninism had to be fused with the specific historical conditions and the given national format (national peculiarities) of China. Mao (1978, V2:209) said: "Being Marxists, Communists are internationalists, but we can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of

our country and acquires a definite national form". This approach was even reiterated in the Communist Manifesto and the Problem of Nationalities of 1948, in which the following is clearly stated: "Under conditions of imperialism the masses of oppressed nationalities are the natural allies of the working class in its struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. In order to strengthen this union, the proletariat must support the demands of the masses, must defend the right to self-determination of nations and must actively struggle for the realisation of the right" (Weeks, 1987:186).

Mao's success in linking the national liberation struggle to the objectives of the Communist Party and the socialist revolution, led to his success in China. Claudin (1975:554) is correct when he concludes that "it is well known that the close connection between those two aspects (Marxism-Leninism and nationalism) was the secret of the communist victory in China". The revolutionary wave in the Third World after the Second World War emphasised the role of nationalism, and these revolutionaries went furthest in theorising on the nature of the nationalist and Marxist-Leninist component of the people's war. Consequently, they perceived and described imperialist domination and race discrimination as the motor of history. The concepts of patriotism and national unity entail a commitment to social change, including an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist attitude, which constitutes a central theme in their work and practice.

The acceptance of nationalism as a form of class struggle has brought about the intellectual assumption that true national emancipation can only be achieved after the final victory of the class struggle, which will result in resolving the contradictions of the exploitative system. The synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism provides the people's war with an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist and social democratic charge which, of course, includes international proletarianism. The essence of this synthesis is that national people's war revolutions are at their roots class struggles for state power. Blaut's (1987:23) observation that they "(national struggles) are class struggles because the engine which drives them is the exploitation

of one or several classes by a ruling class" again emphasises this conclusion.

1.2 Operationalisation of nationalism in a people's war

The synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism constitutes the ideological framework of revolutionary-nationalism in which a people's war is waged. The political, socio-economic and cultural aspirations of the masses - the source of a people's war - are united with the ideology of a people's war. The people's war is actually portrayed as possessing a purely nationalist character. It is within this framework that the masses are made conscious of alternatives to the existing order. Politically speaking, the masses are provided with an ideological vision of a future society, something the majority of them did not possess before the start of the people's war. Economically, nationalism provides the masses with a vision for a future economic dispensation which, resulting from the synthesis between nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, will be a socialist economic order.

However, nationalism is best expressed by the cultural awareness of the masses. This awareness, or the lack thereof, is utilised within the framework of revolutionary nationalism to indicate to the masses that they have been deprived of their cultural heritage as a result of foreign domination and colonialism. Cabral stressed that cultural awareness was the only response to the "irreconcilable contradiction between the colonized society and the colonial power, between the exploited and the foreign exploiters" (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V3:200). Cultural awareness is thus associated with nationalist awareness. Agostino Neto compared culture with the creation of a "new man", and in an official MPLA document it was stated that culture serves as the awakening of the consciousness of the black man (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V3: 178-179 and 190). In this sense, cultural awareness represents the attempts of the masses to retain their nationhood.

Cultural awareness as a manifestation of nationalism is an attempt by the masses to identify themselves as a people and as a nation and not as exploited servants of a foreign culture. Exploitation endured by the

masses represents the era of a foreign cultural occupation. Within the context of people's war, the development of a "high culture", which represents the patriotism of the masses and their feeling of national unity, is a natural consequence of nationalism. Culture within a people's war not only represents traditional folk-dancing, poetry and literature, but a new cultural or national reality. The following statement from a Frelimo document serves as an indication of what is meant by a new culture: "Today a new culture is being developed based on traditional forms with a new content dictated by a new reality. This reality is constituted first of all by the liberation struggle itself, but also by the common effort of Mozambicans originating from different places and tribes who are united in the struggle for the construction of a new Mozambique. From this point of view, culture plays an important role in the reinforcement of national unity" (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V3:195).

Thus the masses are the torch-bearers of culture and nationalism, while, at the same time, being the source of these strivings, and the only entity truly capable of creating and preserving them. This is why inculcating nationalism is such an important aspect of the cultural awareness of the masses. This allows the other components, which focus primarily on the organisation and mobilisation of the masses, to achieve their goals. Cabral stressed that culture was the foundation of liberation, and that only societies that preserve their culture were able to mobilise and organise themselves to fight against domination. He was convinced that "the struggle for liberation was above all an act of culture" (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V2:201). The synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism, primarily expressed by the cultural awareness of the masses, serves as the ideological foundation of a people's war revolution.

This nationalist ideological approach of a revolutionary organisation also manifests itself externally in good relations between states and organisations that adhere to the same form of nationalism. As a result of the ideological compatibility which has developed over the years, Marxist-Leninist orientated states also maintain good relations with revolutionary organisations fighting a people's war. Giap (1961:36) maintained that revolutionary organisations waging a people's war do not

fight alone but have "the support of progressive peoples the world over, and more especially the peoples of the brother countries, with the Soviet Union at the head".

In the people's war, revolutionary nationalism is an important component representing a synthesis between traditional nationalism and Marxism-Leninism and thereby creating a new form of nationalism that is utilised in the people's war.

2 THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL PARTY

The people's revolutionary political party (subsequently referred to as the "revolutionary party") is the second component of the concept of people's war. The revolutionary party is largely a direct consequence and practical ramification of nationalism. Nationalism has to be adopted and expressed by some entity - in a people's war it is the revolutionary party. The revolutionary party becomes the vehicle by means of which nationalism is fostered and established in practice.

2.1 The development of the revolutionary party as a component of people's war

The revolutionary party in a people's war is not just another political party adopting revolutionary or radical ideas. It is a well-strategised, organic structure that functions solely for the purpose of advancing the people's war. The revolutionary party does not appear overnight, claiming to represent the masses; rather, it is created along well-structured guidelines that are usually adapted to specific environmental conditions. The Third International was the first entity to identify specific guidelines for the revolutionary party as component of the concept of people's war. Within the framework of the right of nations to self-determination, the Third International determined that independent Communist parties had to be created, and that these parties were to form strategic alliances with national movements, but that they were not to amalgamate with these movements (Degras, 1971, VI:144). These alliances between national movements and Communist parties were seen as historically inevitable, for Communist parties had to convince the broad masses that

they were a leading force in the struggle for national independence. In this regard the Third International declared as follows: "The worker movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries must first of all win for itself the position of an independent revolutionary factor in the anti-imperialist front as a whole. Only when its importance as an independent factor is recognised and its political independence secured, are temporary arrangements permissible and necessary" (Degras, 1971, VI:390).

This rhetorical approach differed remarkably from the practical orders given by the Comintern to the CCP in China, where the CCP was forced to subject itself to the KMT. This historical fact, which had resulted in the 1927 debacle in China, where the Communist forces were nearly wiped out by the Nationalist forces, actually gave rise to the role of the revolutionary party in a people's war, as Mao was forced to formulate a new strategy for the role of the revolutionary party in a people's war after 1927. This new strategy concluded that the peasantry, and not the nationalist bourgeoisie (KMT), would play a leading role in the struggle for national independence in China. However, according to Mao's thesis of the "non-antagonistic contradiction", an alliance with the national bourgeoisie was not excluded from the new strategy. According to this thesis an antagonistic contradiction existed between the national bourgeoisie and the masses under the leadership of the Communist Party. This contradiction could however develop into a non-antagonistic contradiction if the alliance was correctly handled. In this regard Mao (1967b:312) stated that given the prevailing conditions in China, the antagonistic class contradiction could, if properly handled, be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods.

The leadership role of the revolutionary party was, according to Mao, inevitable because the masses of China's peasantry and petty bourgeois were eager to play an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, VI:192). This leadership role embraced both the national and the proletarian revolutions (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:330). Mao (1978, V3:331) was convinced that no political party except the Communist Party was capable of leading the two

revolutions to complete fulfilment. He stressed, however, that this was only possible once the revolutionary party was organised on a national scale and comprised a broad mass character (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V3:331). In this way the revolutionary party was instrumental in establishing the revolutionary nationalist ideological character of a people's war. The revolutionary party's leadership role was determined by its apt application of nationalism. The revolutionary party had, as a result of it being the custodian of nationalism, to be created as the first step in a people's war revolution.

This approach, which may be described as the Maoist approach, was altered by Guevara and Debray to comply with the conditions in Latin America, with specific reference to Cuba. Debray and Guevara argued that, within the framework of a people's war in Latin America, it was not possible to organise a revolutionary party first. They were of the opinion that popular forces could win a war; that it was not necessary to wait until all the conditions for waging a revolution existed; and that an insurrection could create a revolution (Guevara, 1985:47). Debray (1967:106) elaborated on this when he said: "The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerrilla force itself. The guerrilla force is the party in embryo". The military aspect of a people's war was thus perceived to be more important than the political one. Debray (1967:116) argued: "The guerrilla force is the political vanguard in nuce and from its development a real party can arise". History, however, indicates that the leftist notion of Guevara and Debray was only successful in Cuba, failing dismally in other centres of Latin America. The conclusion may therefore be made that the formation of a revolutionary party is a prerequisite for the commencement of a people's war.

2.2 Operationalisation of the revolutionary party in a people's war

To a large extent, the success or failure of a people's war revolution is determined politically. Within the parameters of people's war political work, the primary function of a revolutionary party, is of strategic importance. The target audience of political work is the masses, who have to be cultivated and nursed, to ensure that they become aware of the circumstances surrounding them. This awareness can only be created by

means of specific political tactics and strategies employed by the revolutionary party.

In order to seize political power the revolutionary party has to be intimately linked to the masses, and must absorb from them those ideas that will take shape as concrete guidelines. Lenin (1980, VI9:409) said: "To do service to the masses and express their interests, having correctly conceived these interests, the advanced contingent (the revolutionary party), of the organisation must carry on all its activity among the masses, drawing from the masses all the best forces without any exception, at every step verifying carefully and objectively whether contact with the masses is being maintained and whether it is a live contact. In this way, and only in this way, does the advanced contingent train and enlighten the masses, expressing their interests, teaching them and directing all activities of the masses." This statement by Lenin contains the essence of what constitutes the role of the revolutionary party in a people's war.

It is imperative that the revolutionary party must help the masses, learning from them and moving with them towards national and social emancipation, in order to succeed in its revolutionary goal. The revolutionary party must serve and express the needs of the masses, rather than being commanders or dictators imposing their will on the masses. It is not the aim of a revolutionary party to win the masses to their side for the sake of the party's selfish interests, but to take the side of the masses in order to help them realise their objective interests, which are manifested in their struggle. This process was defined by Mao as "from the masses to the masses". This meant to "take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in action" (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V3:119).

The revolutionary party has to accept the fact that every social group poses specific problems that have to be taken into consideration. Consistent with this attitude, the revolutionary party would have to follow Lenin's appeal to go to "every variety and category of the toiling

masses and learn to approach the masses with particular patience and caution so as to be able to understand the distinctive features in the mentality of each stratum of the masses" (Lenin, 1980, V31:192). The revolutionary party should therefore have the "ability to lead the masses to revolutionary positions in such a manner that the masses may, by their own experience, convince themselves of the correctness of the party line" (Pomeroy, 1984:25). The significance of the revolutionary party within a people's war is determined by the extent to which the masses believe that they can be liberated by their own efforts, guided by the revolutionary party.

However, it is only possible for the masses to become aware of their circumstances and convince themselves of the correctness of the revolutionary party's line, once they are fully informed about the aims and objectives of the people's war revolution.

The tactic used within a people's war to inform and convince the masses of the revolutionary party's role and programme is known as political education. As Gomez (1967:34) correctly observes: "No claimants to political leadership of any movement can expect to succeed unless they throw themselves into the thick of the struggle. No group can really take the lead merely by declaring itself to be the vanguard". The revolutionary party, therefore, by means of political education, conducts explanatory work amongst the masses, whereby the reactionary nature of the ruling government is exposed. Alternatives to every issue of the ruling government's policies are offered by the revolutionary party. This usually reflects an objective need for progressive change in the target society. Political education is the corner stone of politicization in the target society. Lenin (1986, V23:241) wrote: "The real education of the masses can never be separated from their independent political, and especially revolutionary struggle. Only struggle educates the exploited masses. Only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its ability, clarifies its mind and forges its will". The revolutionary party therefore attempts constantly to raise the consciousness of the masses by means of political education.

Raising the consciousness of the masses is however only possible if the revolutionary party is able to provide the masses with "a clear-cut and

concrete political programme" (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:229). This enables the party to educate the masses politically through their own experience, raising their consciousness to a new stage of revolutionary struggle (Dictionary of Scientific Communism, 1984:182). The synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism is embodied in the masses by means of political education, based on the contradiction between the nation and imperialism (Giap, 1961:43). The revolutionary party portrays itself as a credible alternative to the ruling government in the target state. The political line of the revolutionary party, based on the synthesis between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism, determines the process and development of the people's war. Giap (1961:35) ascribes the success of the Vietnamese revolution directly to the political guidance of the revolutionary party. It may thus be concluded that the revolutionary party fulfils a pivotal role in the political dimension of the people's war.

The political party also controls the military dimension of a people's war. Political control prevents the development of a militarist tendency within the revolutionary movement. Giap (1961:119) described the revolutionary party's leadership over the military as follows: "The party's leadership of the army is an absolute one. This leadership reveals itself politically: to imbue the army with the party's revolutionary line in order to make it the faithful implement of the party in the carrying out of the revolutionary task". The leadership role of the revolutionary party, according to Mao (1967:56) included the following: "The party must actively attend to and discuss military work. All the work must be discussed and decided upon by the party before being carried out". Rules and regulations concerning the tasks, the relationship between military and political approaches, as well as the relationship between the people's army and the masses are determined by the revolutionary party (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:56).

The revolutionary party's organisational structure is usually reflected in the organisational structure of the people's army. This includes the structuring of the party within the people's army, on a company branch level, a battalion committee level, a regimental committee level and an army committee level (Pomeroy, 1984:171). Direct internal political control in the people's army is exerted by a political commissar, whose task it is "to supervise the soldiers' committee in carrying out political

training, to direct the work of the mass movement, and to act at the same time as the secretary of the party branch" (Pomeroy, 1984:169). Giap (1961:121) added that "great attention must be given to the work of building the party and political works, and the system of the party committee and political commissar must be firmly maintained".

The revolutionary party is the most important structural component of the people's war. The revolutionary party constitutes the direct link between the masses and the revolution, making it a people's war revolution. The revolutionary party provides the masses with a revolutionary purpose, making it possible for them to associate themselves with the revolutionary struggle, and so creating a revolution of the masses by the masses. The correct approach by a revolutionary party will provide victory: a misdirected approach could lead to the destruction of the revolutionary party and bring about even more hardship for the masses. The correct approach signifies a situation where the masses can identify themselves with the revolutionary struggle and project it as their own struggle.

3 THE PEOPLE'S ARMY

The occupation and resultant oppression by foreign powers in colonial and semi-colonial countries is interpreted as a fundamentally violent act. Revolutionaries waging a people's war revolution consequently accepted ipso facto that their instruments for liberating their countries had to be equally violent. The only instrument capable of being equally violent therefore was a military organisation of the masses, also known as the people's army.

3.1 The development of the people's army as a component of people's war

Within the theory of people's war two divorced opinions on the role and function of a people's army have developed. On the one hand, Mao Tse-tung emphasised after the 1927 debacle that the revolutionary party had to build its own army and keep that army exclusively under party control (Johnson, 1973:14). Debray and Guevara, on the other hand, were of the opinion that the people's army should be formed before the revolutionary party could be created. Debray (1967:119) argued: "The setting up of military focus, not political focus is decisive for the future". This

approach however, reflects a militaristic approach, which Mao described as a detrimental development of the revolutionary process. Debray's (1967:119) approach that "one must go from the military focus to the political movement" has also been repudiated by revolutionaries in Africa adhering to the principles of a people's war. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1982:34) argues: "The foco theory is adventurist because it promotes military heroism at the expense of political direction, and places the liberation of peoples in the hands of guerrillas who are initially cut from them. Moreover, it is a dogmatic position, which ignores the concrete analysis of concrete conditions". In this regard Cabral (1982:166) stated that: "We must combat the mania of militarism and make each combatant an exemplary militant of our party".

It is clear, therefore, that the mainstream people's war revolutionaries reject Guevara's and Debray's militaristic approach, and that it is generally accepted that the revolutionary party should create the people's army. Giap (1961:54) said that an army could only be a people's army under the leadership of the party, which alone had converted it into a revolutionary people's army. However, Guevara and Debray's approach is not totally rejected, because the Cuban example has indicated that their approach is feasible. A people's war revolution is characterised by flexibility and adaptability.

3.2 Operationalisation of the people's army as a component of people's war

A typical characteristic of a people's army is its unique composition. A people's army usually comprises three categories of forces: a regular force, a regional force, and a militia or self-defence force. Giap classified these forces as follows: "The regular army and regional forces form the people's army. The militia and self-defence forces are the armed force of the masses" (Turok, 1980:141). This classification is indicative of the interrelationship which exists between the people's army and the masses. The distinction between these forces only becomes clear as the revolutionary struggle progresses (Giap, 1961:141). The regular and regional forces consist of trained and full-time cadres, divided into divisions, regiments, battalions and companies (Giap, 1961:141). These forces confront government forces on a direct, or indirect, and a regular

or irregular basis. Subsequently the military dimension is developed to its full potential by means of the activities of these forces.

The militia and self-defence forces form the nucleus of the people's army of the masses. These forces consist of semi-armed forces: peasants and workers by day, and soldiers by night. The first objective of these forces is the protection of the immediate sphere of their interests, be this a farm, or a town, against government forces or their lackeys. Self-defence units are vitally important to a people's war, and Burchett observed that "to discard the concept of self-defence would be to deprive revolutionary forces of a proved and tested weapon of vital importance" (Pomeroy, 1984:226). Therefore the establishment of self-defence forces is viewed as a concrete embodiment of the policy of arming the people militarily, which is a form of organising of the masses into the armed forces (Giap, 1961:141).

The establishment of self-defence forces is a logical and inevitable development of the military dimension in a people's war. These forces consequently provide natural leaders and fighters of a high morale, because they are protecting their own environment, which is construed to be representative of the interests of the masses and the nation. The formation of self-defence forces serves as a further method to mobilise the masses, and reaches full fruition only when the entire nation is engaged in the people's war (Pomeroy, 1984:226-228). Self defence forces in a people's war are portrayed as the most democratic form of armed force in that they represent the people and are appointed by the people.

Self-defence forces play a supportive role to the regular and regional forces in, for instance, replenishing them, protecting them in local areas, and serving as a frontline during guerrilla operations. In addition, self-defence forces create underground structures that are utilised both by themselves and by the regular forces (Giap, 1961:140-143).

The integration of the people's army into the masses is the form of military organisation which is most suitable for the full realisation of the power of the entire people, the entire country and the entire nation (Turok, 1980:305). This type of military organisation is regarded as the

best possible means by which to unite the armed forces and political forces, the armed struggle and the political struggle, and the art of an entire people's insurrection and the people's war revolution. This is a strategic incentive for the people's war, in that the attainment of self-reliance is considered a prerequisite for ultimate victory. The people's army does not develop into a major force overnight, but takes time to become a major force, as Lin Piao (1984:196) correctly observes: "The growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a universal law of development, a universal law of people's war". The development of the people's army comprises a process during which they believe that by their very example they can attract the masses to support the people's war revolution.

The people's army combines political action with armed violence in order to enhance the objectives of the people's war. This is achieved either as a result or as an indirect consequence of armed violence, which creates an environment where the political objectives can more easily be accomplished. The people's army therefore functions as a political instrument, which attempts to incorporate the masses as a whole in the struggle (Giap, 1961:49). The army attempts to unite with the masses in order for the masses to accept the army as their own. Mao (1967:260) was convinced that once this condition was met, such an army would be invincible. The people's army is therefore not perceived as something exclusive or removed from the masses. In this regard Mao (1967:91) stated: "The people's army must demonstrate to the whole nation that it is the people's friend, fighting at all times in the forefront of the revolutionary war in defence of the people's interests and for their freedom and liberation". Giap (1961:53) added: "Our army is a people's army because it defends the fundamental interests of the people, in the first place those of the toiling people, workers and peasants".

The political awareness of the members of the people's army is of strategic importance during a people's war. They receive political education in order to become politically conscious and to acquire a general knowledge about those issues which concern the masses (Pomeroy, 1984:169). The people's army fulfils specific political tasks, including educating the masses politically (arming the masses with a political consciousness); organising the masses; helping them to establish

revolutionary political power, and establishing party organisations amongst them. Mao (1967:54) was convinced that if a people's army failed to achieve this, then it would lose its meaning and the very reason for its existence. In this regard Correia stated: "The worst thing is to give someone a weapon when he does not know what to use it for" (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V3:173). Armed operations by the people's army will clearly be of no avail if the masses cannot identify with them. The people's army fights for the realisation of a political aim and such a struggle does not end until national emancipation is achieved (Pomeroy, 1984:231).

In conclusion: it is the revolutionary party that builds the people's army, determines the nature of its tasks and defines its political and military principles (Giap, 1961:115). The people's army has no other interest beyond that of the masses. This being the case, the people's army and the masses are of the same mind, which according to Giap (1961:124) makes this relationship similar to that which exists between "fish and water". Mao (1967:305) declared: "Without an army standing on the people's side, it is impossible for the Chinese people to win freedom and unification". This reflects emphasises Giap's (1961:121) notion that political work is the soul and sinews of the people's army.

3.3 The military strategy of the people's army

The military strategy of the people's army is based principally on the predetermined strategy of waging a long and protracted armed struggle. This preparedness distinguishes a people's war militarily from any other non-people's war revolution. According to Mao (1967:197) the strategic advantage of a protracted war lies in the fact that in the course of such a war more people could be drawn into the armed struggle. Both Mao (1967:208) and Giap (1961:46) maintained that a people's war could only succeed in arousing the masses to unity when it was a protracted war. This would allow the militarily inferior people's army to achieve a position of superiority in the people's war revolution. People's wars that have been and are currently waged in Africa also reflect a prolonged and protracted nature. In an official publication, in the early stages of its people's war, Frelimo stated: "We must not have illusions that the war will last

one week and that we will then be independent. No. This war will last for some time, it will be a hard one ... We must conduct a prolonged war" (De Breganca & Wallerstein, 1982, V3:146-147).

As previously indicated, the existence of a people's army as a component of a people's war is determined by its commitment to wage an armed struggle. This armed phenomenon is generally designed to elicit at least one of three kinds of intervention, namely:

- intervention by foreign imperialist forces whose depredations may bring about the mobilisation of the masses;
- intervention by international socialist forces in order to support the revolutionary party and masses, and to prevent counter revolutionaries from defeating the people's war revolution; and
- intervention by the masses of the countries themselves, as their aspirations for dignity and social change are mobilised by the examples of heroism which the people's army provides (Johnson, 1973:88-89).

The central theme in these interventions is the masses. The first two kinds of intervention refer to direct intervention by foreign forces that could serve as a catalyst to provoke the masses to such an extent that they become involved in the struggle en masse. The third kind of intervention most commonly found in a people's war is the mobilisation role of the people's army. The people's army mobilises the masses by taking the lead in actions against the perceived oppressive ruling government. The logic behind this kind of intervention is that the masses will follow the people's army as a result of the example which the people's army provides, culminating eventually in a mass populist insurrection. The example provided for the masses by the people's army is determined by the military strategy followed by the people's army. This model is however complex and very flexible due to the fact that individual environments determine the final character of each military strategy. It is possible to identify the following, broadly-based people's war military strategy model which comprises three stages: that of guerrilla warfare; that of equilibrium; and that of a final, offensive stage.

Stage one: Guerrilla warfare

The initial stage of a people's war, in the military sense of the word, comprises two phases, namely a phase during which "strategic themes" are pursued, and a phase of elementary guerrilla warfare. However, these phases should not be regarded as two clinically separate phases, as a result of the fact that certain tactics designated for a specific phase may be used in another.

Phase one: Strategic themes

In the initial phase of the military exponent of people's war it is difficult to make a clear distinction between that which constitutes a military action and that which constitutes a political action of the people's army. Specific political themes such as "making the country ungovernable", "confronting the enemy directly" and "advancing to people's power", for example, are directly and indirectly synchronised with acts of terror and armed propaganda. Terror of this nature is construed as revolutionary terrorism which usually manifests itself in acts of indiscriminate terror. These acts of indiscriminate terror reflect Lenin's (1980, VII:173-174) observation that "terror is a bloody war of extermination which includes the assassination of individuals, chiefs and subordinates in the police and army". Thus terror is an important tactic during the initial stage of a people's war which, according to Lenin, should not be rejected in principle. He mentioned that "terror is one of the forms of action that may be perfectly suitable and essential at a definite juncture in the battle" (Lenin, 1980, VII:17). The aim of revolutionary terrorism is to destroy or render unworkable by means of force governmental structures, be they political, economic or social. The assassination of individuals is therefore considered an important tactic, for those who are assassinated are accused of being representatives of the ruling government.

Acts of terror aimed at coercing and intimidating the masses are described as armed propaganda. These actions result in a wide range of publicity for revolutionary groups, and are initially construed as being more important than the actual military success or failure of the operation (Hough, 1980:9-11). It is a common perception of revolutionaries that

their acts of indiscriminate terror and armed propaganda will force the government to apply more structured violence, reflected in more repressive measures aimed at the masses, which will then create the conditions under which the masses will be drawn into the people's war struggle. It is consequently argued that this will allow the regular forces to infiltrate on a wider scale and to commence their guerrilla actions.

Phase two: Guerrilla warfare

The start of guerrilla warfare in a people's war depends largely on the success of the first phase, namely inculcating a revolutionary consciousness amongst the masses pursuing specific strategic themes. A guerrilla war can only be initiated successfully once the masses accept the guerrillas as their own army. Guerrilla warfare in its initial stage is characterised by "low risk" actions. These actions are designed in such a way that the guerrilla may live to fight another day, while the chances that he may be captured or eliminated are minimized. Mao (1967:158) described these actions in their initial phase as units which concentrate maximum force on a specific target; units which act secretly and swiftly; units which attack the enemy by surprise; and units which bring a battle to a quick decision. The strategic aim of these units in the initial stage is not to be trapped in the tactic of passive defence but rather to disperse. This allows the guerrilla to operate on a wide front. Guerrilla warfare during this phase is an offensive mode of warfare, of which the objective is to attack and withdraw, in order to continue the battle on another day. Guerrilla units should therefore only attack the enemy when it is weaker, so as to preserve itself. Guerrilla warfare is scattered warfare which is waged in order to wear the enemy out and tie him down (Giap, 1961:104).

The first stage of the military strategy of a people's war is utilised for the purpose of mobilising the masses and preserving the revolutionary armed forces in order to expand the people's army and prolong the struggle overall. This stage of military strategy is crucial for the further development of the people's war in general. If the people's army is unable to survive during this stage and to increase the level of actions against the government to a more advanced stage, then such a people's war is doomed.

Stage two: Equilibrium

This stage is distinguished by the fact that the correlation of forces prevalent in a people's war gradually begins to move in favour of the revolutionary forces. It is during this phase, and as a result of the protracted nature of a people's war, that the inferiority of the people's army vis-à-vis government forces starts to disappear. This stage is divided into two phases, namely: guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare.

Phase one: Guerrilla warfare

The first phase of equilibrium is a natural continuation of the last phase of the first stage. Guerrilla warfare in this phase, however, can be distinguished from the elementary guerrilla warfare of the first stage, in that the people's army shows a steady growth and acquires the characteristics of a visible military force (Guevara, 1986:53). During this phase initial small guerrilla actions are replaced by larger guerrilla operations, such as major guerrilla force strikes at government installations (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:158).

The main thrust of guerrilla warfare actions in this phase is directed at the destruction of government manpower, in order to create a position of equilibrium. Guerrilla warfare therefore becomes more sophisticated, and the weaponry used by guerrillas is equal in standard to that used by the government forces. These weapons are mainly captured from enemy forces. Guerrilla warfare actions are also carried out more frequently behind enemy lines so as to disperse and/or tie government forces down. Guerrilla warfare gradually develops into mobile warfare - a form of fighting in which principles of conventional warfare gradually appear and increasingly develop, but which still bears the character of guerrilla warfare. (Giap, 1961:102-106)

Phase two: mobile warfare

Mobile warfare is a sequel to the development of sophisticated guerrilla warfare in a people's war. Since a people's war is a protracted war, it is possible for guerilla units to undergo the training necessary to gradually transform them into regular, conventional-type forces. The mode of

operation is gradually regularised, and guerrilla warfare develops into mobile warfare (Mao Tse-tung, 1978, V2:107). It is for this reason that mobile warfare in its initial phases resembles guerrilla warfare. During this phase the people's army increases in numbers as the shift in the correlation of forces and balance of power favours the revolutionaries. The dictum of "fight when you can win, move away when you can't win", is applicable to this phase (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:139). At this time a crushing defeat of the people's army on the battlefield could result in a reversal of its advantageous position.

The continuation of the tactic of annihilating government forces is essential during this phase, because such a continuation assures the people's army favourable conditions to expand their military strategy to the next stage. Giap (1961:108) stated in this regard: "Mobile warfare had to be accelerated to annihilate big enemy manpower, and concurrently create new conditions for a further extension of the war". It is during this phase that the government forces start to reduce their attacks on revolutionary strongholds, as a result of being denied freedom of movement. Consequently, the military dimension or the physical war starts to swing in favour of the revolutionaries, resulting in more victories gained by the people's army in direct battles with government forces.

Stage three: The final offensive

Once this stage of a people's war is reached militarily, the chances of the government reversing the situation diminish. During this stage the people's army becomes the superior force, and mass popular insurrections take place in government strongholds, forcing the ruling government to negotiate a political settlement or to capitulate politically. If the ruling government fails to negotiate a settlement, the people's war is carried out to its full consequences. This stage comprises two phases: mobile warfare and the final assault.

Phase one: Mobile warfare

The first phase of this stage consists of mobile warfare which is a continuation of the previous stage. In this stage however, mobile warfare becomes conventional, losing its guerrilla warfare characteristics.

Special operations and the besieging of government strongholds, as well as the capture of these strongholds, take place during this phase (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:142). The operational directions and battle lines of the people's army become more stable, resulting in positional warfare. Mao (1967:214) stated in this regard: "Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise in importance. While positional defence cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and requirements". At the conclusion of this stage the initiative of war rests firmly with the people's army.

Phase two: The final assault

A people's war usually reaches this phase once the ruling but besieged government refuses to hand over power to the revolutionary party. The final offensive consequently commences and culminates in the people's army over-running government strongholds and marching into the target country's capital and seizing political control. The final offensive therefore constitutes a process where the ruling government is dealt a final military defeat.

This military strategy model of a people's war functions within a specific environment. However, despite the possible environmental effects, it does reflect the major components of a military strategy model of a people's war.

The rural and urban dimension of the military strategy

The rural and urban dimension of the military strategy is inherently a part of the aforementioned model. This dimension is however discussed separately in order to indicate the flexibility of the military model of a people's war. The rural and urban dimension is firstly determined by the location of the revolutionary potential in a target society, that is, in which sector of society the revolutionary potential is structured; and, secondly, by the topographic nature of the target state, that is, is the topography suited for rural infiltration and the creation of liberated base areas, or should initial urbanised guerrilla warfare be used to wage

a people's war? In China, the revolutionary potential existed among the peasants and petty bourgeoisie but the topography of China compelled Mao to use rural areas as his organisational base. He therefore mobilised the masses in the rural areas, from where he launched his military actions (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:166-172). Similar conditions were prevalent in South Vietnam, forcing the Viet Cong to articulate the existing revolutionary potential in the rural areas (Pike, 1966:269-272). In every society where a people's war is waged local conditions determine whether the war has a rural or an urban character.

The ideal situation seems to be that of a rural setting, where it is possible to create liberated areas during the initial stage of a people's war. These areas provide the revolutionaries with a physical base from where they can operate and expand their control. These areas are usually fully controlled politically and socio-economically by the revolutionaries (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:171-172). Where it is not possible to create liberated areas immediately, the focus of revolutionary activity usually shifts to the urban areas. Characteristically this type of people's war is of a longer and more protracted nature, where the progress or advance from one stage to another is more difficult to accomplish. The failures of the people's war revolutions in Bolivia and in Malaysia are clearly a manifestation of the aforementioned. In a military sense a people's war can not be advanced artificially. One may therefore conclude that a people's war, militarily speaking, is primarily a war with a predominantly rural dimension, although stage one could solely be waged in urban areas.

The people's army as a component of people's war may be regarded as a natural antipode to the perceived violent nature of the oppression the masses are enduring. However, the people's army is subject to the control of the revolutionary party and is not an end in itself. The people's army provides the masses with both military and political capability: a mechanism that provides the revolutionary party and the masses with a leverage they need to confront the ruling government.

4 THE UNITED FRONT

The essence of a people's war lies in the role the masses play in such a revolution. The ratio of participation by the masses determines to what extent the synthesis, of revolutionary party and people's army, has been accepted by the masses. History has however proved that spontaneous participation of the masses in a revolution during the Twentieth Century is non-existent. The fourth component of a people's war focuses solely on the masses and their participation in the revolution. This component is called "the united front", and seeks to bring together and to unify all the potential social forces in the struggle against a common enemy.

4.1 The development of the united front as a component of people's war

The united front in a people's war is created under the leadership of the revolutionary party. On the strength of its political consciousness and leadership role, the revolutionary party identifies and unites social forces in a target state within a united front. This indicates that a people's war requires a mobilised population that supports guerrilla actions (Johnson, 1973:14). The revolutionary party leads the united front, and is not itself absorbed by the united front (Le Duan, 1980:106). The united front, comprising social forces known as progressive democratic forces, provides the people's war with a mass-based character, which is perceived as a revolution by the masses for the masses.

The composition of the united front is influenced by the concrete situation in the target state; the class structure of the population; the degree and sharpness of social contradictions; the level of their exacerbation; and the political maturity and organisation of the working class and other progressive democratic forces. The different social forces are united in a united front by the utilization of those demands which are generally associated with the different social forces. In this regard Mao (1978, V3:244) stipulated that the demands for freedom, democracy and liberty, which are espoused, should be that of the social forces. The successful outcome of a people's war revolution is predetermined by the alliance created between all the social forces which for one reason or another co-operate with the revolutionary party. During this process the revolutionary party therefore refrains from expressing such notions and

policy objectives which could create divisions within the united front, and in this respect Mao (1978, V2:429) advised that nationalism should be used as the main ideological principle in the struggle for national liberation.

Hence astute leadership of the revolutionary party will assure that the broadest possible united front is formed (Giap, 1961:44). The revolutionary party should therefore be capable to make an accurate estimate of strong and weak points of the ruling government. If this is not done the revolutionaries are unable to fully understand the necessity of organising a broad revolutionary united front, or of using it as a means of organising and rallying millions of people who are potentially on the side of the revolutionaries (Mao Tse-tung, V1:164). In order to involve millions of people, correctly analysing and identifying these forces is crucial. Mao (1978, V2:422-423) described this process, with reference to China, as follows: "Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban bourgeoisie. Building up communist organisations throughout the country, developing mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women and children, winning over the intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy". Giap (1961:33) described this process with regard to Vietnam as "a vast assembly of all forces capable of being united, neutralising all those which could be neutralised, dividing all those possible to divide in order to direct the spearhead at the chief enemy of the revolution".

During the course of development of the people's war, the coalition of participants in the united front may undergo changes. Various progressive democratic groups may leave the united front for various reasons. On the other hand, however, new progressive democratic groups are brought into the struggle, reinforcing the united front and expanding its basis. The creation of a united front under the leadership of the revolutionary party does not imply that it is brought about by means of top-level agreements. The united front develops and changes according to the spontaneous development of the people's war. During the development of the struggle, the masses see the necessity for joint action by all the forces that oppose the ruling government. The struggle and efficiency of a united

front depend on a co-ordinated programme of action that represents the interests of all the progressive democratic forces united in such a front. A process of extensive and thorough political mobilisation is followed to transform the united front into a formidable political force within a people's war (Mao Tse-tung, 1967:228).

The mobilisation of the masses politically, throughout the country, is equated with a vast sea in which the enemy (the ruling government) can be drowned. The scenario creates the conditions that could substitute the revolutionary's inferiority in arms and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in a people's war. Giap (1961:33) said: "In the face of an enemy as powerful as he is cruel, victory is possible only by uniting the whole people within the bosom of a firm and wide national united front". Political mobilisation therefore includes informing the masses about the aim of the struggle and identifying their role in such a struggle. This will ensure that each group and individual will understand why it is necessary to unite and fight a people's war, and why this concerns them. The revolutionary programme is popularised among the masses by means of political education conducted by the united front. In this regard Mao (1967:229) stated that: "We must link the political mobilisation for the war with developments in the war, with the life of the people and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends".

Issues directly influencing the masses, such as rent increases, consumer goods price increases, and living conditions, are politicised in order to mobilise the masses. Giap (1961:44-45) purported that all issues influencing the masses should be exploited to mobilise them. Effective mobilisation in a people's war manifests itself in actions such as consumer boycotts, rent boycotts and "stay aways" as mechanisms of mass resistance. These forms of resistance are used as methods by means of which the ruling government is confronted in a non-military manner, in order to provoke more strenuous measures by government, which could unite the masses even further. Machel perceived such actions as representative of politically liberated areas, which did not mean the complete expulsion of the physical presence of the ruling government but "Who do the people follow?" (Seegers, 1977:132) Further practical examples of this are the creation of people's power structures, such as people's committees, street

committees and area civic associations. The Communist Party of Peru describes these structures as "united front committees that give concrete expression to the joint dictatorship of the workers, peasants and petty-bourgeoisie" (A world to win, 1987:88).

4.7 Operationalisation of the united front as a component of people's war

The united front is therefore clearly a crucial component of a people's war, because it is the element that addresses the masses and serves as basis for the other components. The united front principle functions in all the dimensions of a revolutionary strategy but has a specific bearing on the social dimension. It is through the involvement of this dimension in the revolutionary struggle that a revolution acquires a mass or people's character. It is thus important to indicate some social areas that are of specific importance to the united front.

Health

General health services are continually attacked by revolutionaries, who brand these services as inadequate, and who portray a situation in which the masses are being deprived of good health care institutions. Machel's attack on health care conditions in Mozambique, when he stated that lack of concern was displayed by health workers treating members of the exploited masses, branding the system as exploitative, is a clear reflection of how this situation is used by revolutionaries (Munslow, 1985:144). Accusations such as these are made during a people's war, so as to mobilise the masses and to create progressive organisations focusing on health to form part of the united front. The aim is to set demands on the ruling government which, when met, will create a greater economic burden on the government on the one hand, and on the other could be used by the united front to prove to the masses that it could force the ruling government to comply with its demands. Rumours and disinformation are also spread among the masses in order to discredit government health care services. Machel, for example, described health care centres in Mozambique as centres for maltreatment and humiliation, demonstrating unbridled capitalist exploitation (Munslow, 1985:144). Such strategies are

thus used to mobilise the masses against specific institutions of government so as to decrease the government's legitimacy base.

The youth

As an element of society, the youth is an important social force in the united front. Composed of scholars, students, the working youth and the unemployed youth, the youth to a larger degree than any other group, is aware of the inability of the prevailing system in the target society. This prompted Lenin (1980, V9:384) to describe the youth as "the vanguard of revolutionary democracy". The existence of an eternally rebellious spirit within the youth - a reflection of the age-old conflict of generations - is utilised to its full potential by the revolutionary forces. The youth is described as the "uplifters", implying that they are the forces that advocate the revolutionary spirit (Lenin, 1977:80-83).

Within the framework of a united front, the youth is not allowed to follow its own modus operandum or to determine its own course; because such freedom could be detrimental to the people's war. In this regard Eduardo Mondlane, former president of Frelimo, stated that the youth can only be useful to the people's struggle if it accepts the leadership of the revolutionary party (De Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982, VI:108-109). The youth is therefore drawn into the united front by organising it into national, regional and district youth movements. By means of these structures the youth is employed to educate and mobilise the masses. Mao (1978, V2:247) maintained that the youth must unite and become one with the masses, for "only then can a mighty force be created".

The women

A common feature of a united front in a people's war is the broader participation of women. This is largely the result of the perception that women are the most oppressed and exploited group in society (Turok, 1980:157). As a group, women are of extreme importance to the united front. They exert influence over all the sectors of society: the youth, the workers, the aged, educationists and combatants (Guevara, 1986:132-134). Lenin (1980, V32:161) was convinced that "you cannot draw the masses into politics without drawing in the women as well". It is

common practice in a people's war to create progressive democratic women's organisations as a part of the united front. Machel observed: "The liberation of women is not an act of charity. It is not the result of a humanitarian or compassionate position. It is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, a guarantee of its continuity and a condition for its success" (De Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982, VI:132).

Culture

Culture is an important component of mobilisation used within the united front, because it represents the identity of the exploited masses. Culture is used as an element to mobilise the masses, placing emphasis on their cultural heritage. Culture represents nationalism, and these concepts are exploited by the united front to make the masses aware of their national identity. This, according to the revolutionary paradigm, creates division between the masses and the exploiter of society, whose national aspirations are irreconcilable with those of the masses. By means of the actions taken by the united front within the cultural sphere the masses are made aware of their environment (De Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982, V3:178-200). Borochoy (1973:116) may be considered correct in his observation that the struggle of oppressed nationalities takes a cultural form, where class antagonisms may be mollified. All the social contradictions within a society are portrayed as national ones, along which lines the masses are mobilised. A culture of resistance with a mass character is consequently developed, and this heightens patriotism and hatred of the ruling government.

Religion

Religion has become an important element of the social sphere of the principle of the united front in people's wars during the 1970s and 1980s. Religion, as an element of the united front, manifests itself in the support that the revolutionaries receive from the church, both spiritually and physically, and in the mobilising effect that the churches have on the masses. The concept of liberation theology has therefore become an important factor within the united front. Within this sphere the church is expected to side with the perceived oppressed masses, and in this regard

Nkomo declared: "The church, as the conscience of the people, has the right and duty to make its voice heard on such a definite question of right and wrong" (De Braganca & Wallerstein, 1982, VI:174-175). If the church refuses to support the revolutionaries it is branded as a supporter of the ruling government and part of them (De Braganca & Wallerstein, 1982, VI:170-174).

The premise of religion in the united front, that is, liberation theology, is to equate the revolution with the interests of the poor people of the Bible for "Jesus said that whatever we do for the poor we do for Him" (Marxism and Christianity in Revolutionary Central America, 1983:89). Therefore, it is the aim of progressive democratic religious institutions to legitimise people's war in terms of religion, while the masses are told that the religion they adhere to, is an imperialist fabrication. Liberation theologians therefore attempt to convince the masses that God as they know Him, represents the revolution and that every guerrilla represents Jesus Christ. Ernesto Cardenal revealed that the motivation for this comparison is to indicate to the masses that there is no religion other than the religion of liberation, and he stated that: "God does not exist, nor does Jesus Christ exist, nor did they ever exist; those are only terms the traditional bourgeois church has taught the people to keep them enslaved. In this sense, the true God is the revolution, and in this case, each of you (guerrillas) is Jesus Christ." (Marxism and Christianity in Revolutionary Central America, 1983:109). In this way religion is used to mobilise the masses and to confront the ruling government, while the existence of God and that of Jesus is denied. Religion is also used within the united front to legitimise the "just war" being waged by the revolutionaries.

The social sphere in the united front is clearly the one component which places the revolutionaries in direct contact with the masses. If this sphere were successfully exploited by the revolutionaries, mass mobilisation and mass participation would be assured. As previously indicated, the ultimate aim of the people's war is the total involvement of the masses in order to bring about a total mass insurrection. The united front as an organic component of people's war ensures the involvement of the masses without which a people's war cannot be waged.

This element finally distinguishes a people's war revolution from any other kind of revolution. The concept "people's war" has become an integral part of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC and the ANC. It is therefore important to give an indication of why and when these two organisations accepted the people's war strategy as their revolutionary strategy.

5 THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

In the early sixties the PAC and the ANC embarked upon a path of armed revolution aimed at liberating black South Africans from racial oppression. The original format of both organisations' strategies and tactics was that of guerrilla warfare. During the seventies, however, both the PAC and the ANC started to employ the concept "people's war" in their revolutionary rhetoric.

5.1 Origins of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

The PAC was the first black political organisation to adopt an armed struggle as a means to achieve its political objectives. During the early sixties, it was an extremely popular organisation among black South Africans, being responsible for mass political upheavals which resulted in the Sharpeville incident of March 21, 1960. As a direct result of the events at Sharpeville, the PAC was banned on April 8, 1960 by the South African Government. However, it had anticipated this and by March 1960 had already started organising to go underground. During its initial years of being banned and as an illegal organisation, the PAC's revolutionary strategy was based on a type of blitzkrieg guerrilla war. By this means the PAC sought to seize power; a situation in which the government would be compelled to hand over political power over to the PAC.

A large number of PAC members were subsequently sent to countries such as Egypt, Algeria, the Congo, Ghana and the People's Republic of China for military training. The PAC's aim was to infiltrate a large number of PAC-trained members into South Africa, in order to bring its blitzkrieg-type

of guerrilla war to fruition. Support of these guerrilla operations would be secured by intimidation of the black population which, according to the strategy, was destined to spread to white sectors of the South African society (Zulu, 1986:24-68).

However, the PAC's attempts to implement its revolutionary strategy were effectively foiled by countermeasures taken by the South African Police from 1961 to 1967. The failure of the PAC's blitzkrieg-type of guerrilla war strategy is attributed to its inability to envisage the large-scale countermeasures that would be taken by the South African Government - more than 15 000 PAC-orientated individuals were arrested during this period. The PAC also maintain that, at that stage of the revolution, it had not yet learnt how to build up a people's fighting force (PAC, 1975:8). The countermeasures by the South African Government further forced the PAC to reorganise itself after 1968. This process of reorganisation included an evaluation of the PAC's blitzkrieg-type of guerrilla war strategy. During 1973, as a result of the evaluation of its revolutionary strategy and the influence of military advisors from the People's Republic of China in PAC camps, the PAC adopted a people's war strategy as its new revolutionary strategy. In 1978, this strategy was officially accepted as PAC policy at its Arusha Conference in Tanzania (PAC, 1986:5). The essential and most strategic concept to manifest itself in the PAC's decision to apply the people's war revolutionary strategy, was its realisation and acceptance of the fact that it alone could not liberate South Africa, but that the people should liberate themselves under the leadership and guidance of the PAC (PAC, 1975:3).

The PAC adheres fully to a people's war revolutionary strategy and defines it as "a war which is waged by the broad masses of the people in an oppressed country under the leadership of a revolutionary political party. The oppressed people organise themselves to fight the enemy directly as well as indirectly" (PAC, 1975:157). This definition reflects the major components of the PAC's people's war strategy, that of the revolutionary party, the people's army and the united front policy. These components constitute the basic principles of the PAC's people's war revolutionary strategy (PAC, 1975:2).

5.2 Origins of the concept of "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The ANC was also banned on April 8, 1960 and was consequently forced to organise itself underground. The ANC adopted a revolutionary strategy which included an armed struggle. The ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was formed on December 16, 1961, with the aim of confronting the South African Government militarily. The arrest in 1962 of Nelson Mandela and nine other members of Umkhonto we Sizwe - who constituted the High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe - forced the ANC to reorganise itself externally (Booyse, 1987:32-34). The process of reorganisation continued until 1969, at which time the first National Consultative Conference of the ANC was held outside South Africa. This conference was held at Marogaro, in Tanzania, and served as a major strategy-planning conference. It was at this conference that the ANC's revolutionary strategy - that of a protracted guerrilla struggle - was accepted as official ANC policy (Mzala, 1987:22).

The revolutionary strategy of the ANC was originally based on a revolutionary armed struggle which was described as a "political struggle by means which included the use of military force even though once force as a tactic is introduced it has the most far-reaching consequences on every aspect of our [ANC] activities" (ANC, 1969:8).

On account of its shift in strategy to one of guerrilla war, the ANC expected its struggle against the South African Government to progress from a lower to a higher stage of revolution. During 1978, however, the ANC realised that its guerrilla war strategy was not leading to the seizure of power in South Africa. As part of the ANC's attempts to formulate a new revolutionary strategy, a high-profile ANC delegation accompanied its research department on a visit to the People's Republic of Vietnam. During their stay of six months, members of the ANC's research department studied the principles of a people's war revolution. During 1978, as a direct result of this study tour and the research department's report, the National Executive Committee of the ANC accepted a resolution which stated that a people's war revolutionary strategy would replace the original revolutionary strategy that had been accepted in 1969. The people's war strategy, however, was not implemented immediately, as the

ANC had to reorganise itself to wage a people's war, and the strategy change had to be officially accepted by the National Congress of the ANC (Mzala, 1987a:23-24).

The organisational phase for a people's war lasted three years, and the strategy was only officially accepted at the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC in 1985, which was held in Zambia. During this conference people's war was defined as "a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrections" (ANC, 1985a:16). The major components of the ANC's people's war are identified as the people's army and the united front policy, while the role of the revolutionary party is however, not mentioned. This is also reflected in an earlier ANC statement, when Tambo (1984:4) identified the four pillars of the revolution upon which the people's war was based, as: the all-round activity of the underground structures; united mass mobilisation and action; the people's army and its armed struggle; and the drive to isolate South Africa externally.

The above analysis of the origin of both the PAC's and the ANC's people's war strategies indicates that both opted for a people's war revolution strategy after the failure of their initial guerrilla warfare revolutionary strategies. It is also evident that the PAC and the ANC differ in their approaches towards a people's war revolution. This assertion is underlined by the fact that the strategy of the PAC is based on the Chinese model of Mao Tse-tung; while the strategy of the ANC is broadly based on the Vietnamese model which was formulated by Giap.

6 CONCLUSION

The concept "people's war" describes a specific form of revolution waged mostly in colonial and semi-colonial countries in the Third World. A people's war constitutes a long and drawn out revolution which is usually described as a "just war" in terms of international law (Giap, 1961:27). The premise of a people's war is to secure the participation of the masses by educating, organising, mobilising and arming them in order to ensure their participation in the revolution. The most accurate definition of

people's war is that of Samora Machel, who stated: "The people's war is made and won by the masses. What makes it possible to overcome the enormous material shortcomings and gain victory is the participation by hundreds of thousands, or millions, of individuals in the various tasks that are required, from armed combat to reconnaissance of the enemy" (Munslow, 1985:54).

A people's war revolution represents the first phase of a revolution, which has been identified in Chapter one as, amongst others, a national democratic or national liberation revolution. This form of liberation revolution is however, specifically waged on a massive base. The four components of the people's war are those elements which distinguish a people's war revolution from other revolutions. Some revolutions may, however, also reflect some of these components but the unique inter-relationship between them is represented only in a people's war.

Nationalism as a component is a definite gestation and synthesis of traditional nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, which serves as a transmitter of historical consciousness as part of class consciousness. The compatibility created between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism has provided Marxist-Leninists with the advantage of claiming that true national emancipation can only be achieved in a society which is not based on class. National aspirations in a people's war are employed as a medium of mobilisation and organisation without which no revolutionary party, people's army or united front can function properly. In this way it has become possible for semi-colonial and colonial countries to fight for self-determination without losing their nationalist character.

As the second component, the revolutionary party fulfils the role of a vanguard or leader during a people's war. The correct political line of the revolutionary party assures that distrust of the final objectives of the party does not become apparent during the people's war. The revolutionary party succeeds in convincing the masses that they must, and should, liberate themselves. As a result of this and of the guidance that the masses received during their struggle for national liberation, the party secures for itself a leadership role after national liberation. The people's army as component of a people's war, becomes a functional component of the masses, without which they cannot survive. The people's

army therefore, in fact becomes the masses and consequently represents their ambitions and interests. The people's army is the physical structure that is capable of protecting and liberating the masses.

The united front is the representative body of the masses, reflecting their demands and interests. The united front, under the leadership of the revolutionary party, conditions the masses to act in unity, thereby refuting their individualistic character and leading to the situation where they now accept a collective character. It is then assumed that the essential transformation to socialism would be accepted by the masses.

The question to be addressed now is: to what extent does the concept "people's war" manifest itself in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC. It is thus crucial to determine to what extent the application of the people's war concept in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC differs and correlates. In order to answer these questions it is necessary to analyse, compare and evaluate the manifestation of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC, against the background the four components of the concept which have been identified and described in this chapter.

Two components namely nationalism and the people's army will be analysed, compared and evaluated in chapter four, so as to determine the level of manifestation of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC. In similar fashion the revolutionary party and the united front components will be analysed, compared and evaluated in chapters five and six respectively.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONALISM AND THE PEOPLE'S ARMY AS COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The extent of incorporation of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC can only be determined if a comparative analysis of the respective processes of incorporation of the four components in the revolutionary strategies is made. This process will be accompanied by an indication of what is advocated in rhetoric and what is actually visible, in practical terms, in the revolutionary process. This chapter will specifically indicate how nationalism and the people's army as components of the concept "people's war" have been incorporated in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. The differences and similarities between as well as specific adaptations to these components, in the process of incorporating them into the respective strategies, will also be identified and compared. It is, however, important to indicate at this stage that the order of presentation of each component is not an indication of the relative importance or priority of that component. The four components of a people's war are equal in value and should be interpreted in such a way. Nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of both the PAC and the ANC will be comparatively analysed followed by an analysis of the people's army component.

1 NATIONALISM AS COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

Nationalism as a component of the concept "people's war" is primarily an indicator of the ideological content apparent in a revolutionary strategy. Nationalism, as indicated in Chapter three, within a people's war indicates to what extent a revolutionary movement is able to synthesise nationalist aspirations for self-determination and the Marxist-Leninist

class struggle. It is important to analyse how both the PAC and the ANC have incorporated nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in their strategies and then to compare the two.

1.1 Nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

The PAC's approach towards nationalism is historically based; even the name "Pan Africanist" has a direct bearing on nationalism, and more specifically African nationalism. African nationalism is regarded by the PAC as a dynamic national liberation creed aimed at the creation of a united nation out of heterogeneous tribes, and at setting Africa free from foreign domination and colonial leadership (Karis & Carter, 1972: V3:310). Nationalism is defined by the PAC as "the divine destiny of an oppressed people seeking freedom from foreign oppression and exploitation, and has nothing to do with fascist nationalism nor with bourgeois nationalism, nor with the neo-fascist nationalism of the Afrikaner" (PAC, nd:38). In this respect, nationalism is directly associated with the concept "nation", explaining why the PAC compares its liberation struggle with that of any nation fighting for its right to self-determination. This right is perceived as the inalienable right of indigenous people to determine and shape their own destiny (PAC, 1975:126).

According to the simplistic view of the PAC, private ownership of the means of production and private accumulation of capital are entrenched in the white sector of society, and the country is therefore described as a colonial society (PAC, 1975:116). It perceives the ruling white minority as having entrenched all the political, social, economic, cultural and military power in its own hands, giving rise to a situation where all indigenous political organisations have been forced to serve as a subordinate tool of white rule, thereby instituting colonialism in South Africa (PAC, 1975:121). The nature of the PAC revolution is first of all a struggle for national liberation which will assure human equality.

Human equality, however, comprises both political and economic equality. In this regard the PAC has stated that "political equality is a demand for equal political rights for the adult citizens of a given country, and the

abolition of all sectional privileges. Economic equality means the abolition of all distinctions based on class antagonism in social production" (PAC, 1975:126). This is a clear indication that the PAC perceives the struggle in South Africa as a class struggle too. However, the class struggle and national struggle are regarded as synonymous within the South African context. The PAC states: "The history of past society has been one of class struggle and ours is no exception to the rule ... Today we have employers and workers, the rulers and the ruled, the bourgeois and the proletariat, the oppressors and the oppressed ..." (PAC, 1975:4). The white population in South Africa are seen as the representatives of the bourgeois and oppressor class, while black South Africans are perceived to represent the proletarian and oppressed class. Whites are thus described as shareholders in "the SA Oppressors Company (Pty) Ltd" (PAC, 1984:8).

According to the PAC the struggle in South Africa comprises both a national and a class struggle, which takes place simultaneously. The revolution is therefore a national struggle as a result of the struggle of black South Africans' to free themselves from white rule, and a class struggle in that blacks, as the majority of the population, have to sell their labour to whites, which confirms that blacks are the proletariat (PAC, 1976: 106-112). Within this approach nationalism has ceased to be a question of cultural autonomy, because it is perceived to be an instrument used by the white ruling class to oppress blacks (PAC, 1975:110). In this context the class struggle is regarded as the only vehicle that will allow blacks to become the nation they deserve to be (PAC, 1976:17). The national struggle is waged in conjunction with the class struggle "in order to change the political status of our people from that of an oppressed subjected nation into that of a free sovereign society capable of deciding its own destiny" (PAC, 1982:5). The national and class struggles, are therefore not viewed as two separate struggles taking place in South Africa, but as one struggle displaying the characteristics of both. Nationalism is seen as the right to self-determination of South Africa's indigenous peoples, and the right to exist as a distinct and indivisible nation. This question, however, is fully associated with the question of land ownership, from where the class struggle is developed in the PAC people's war strategy (PAC, 1976:166).

The PAC's people's war revolutionary strategy is aimed at ending feudal relations on the land by creatively reforming the character of land tenure, and by adjusting the relations of production. According to the PAC, this can only lead to the ending of capitalism, from which colonialism derives its source and strength (PAC, 1986:5). Revolution is regarded as the only method by means of which the oppressed in South Africa can be liberated. The following statement has been made in this regard: "There are no intermediaries and therefore the decisive factor of the struggle for national independence and self-determination is the clear understanding consequent upon the fact that the goal of the revolution cannot be a new policy or a change of heart on the part of the racist regime and its imperial masters, but must be a determined struggle to overthrow and replace the reactionary ruling classes by the revolutionary classes which must become the new and permanent rulers of the country" (PAC, 1982:1).

The aims and objectives of the PAC are similar to those of most revolutionary movements in that "the principal object of all political struggles in the world is to seize and consolidate power" (PAC, 1975:63). However, the PAC's final political objective is to establish an Africanist socialist democracy in South Africa (Mlambo, 1988:4). The process by which such a society is to be brought about comprises two stages, namely a first stage of national democratic revolution; and a second stage during which society is transformed into a socialist society. This process is defined as follows: "The national democratic revolution is the period during which all the institutions of state power will be moulded, and is also the period of laying down the foundation for the transition from capitalist to socialist reconstruction" (PAC, 1975:12). The national democratic revolution is essentially anti-feudal and anti-imperialist in character, aimed at destroying foreign rule: this is the gist of the PAC's revolution (PAC, 1975:19). The PAC pursues a revolutionary struggle that is guided by the principles of a "nationalist class struggle". Ideologically speaking, the "people's war" revolutionary strategy of the PAC includes the fundamental principles of both a nationalist struggle against a foreign ruler and a class struggle. The PAC, as indicated, has succeeded in synthesising the right to self-determination and the class struggle into a people's war nationalism. The component of nationalism as identified in

chapter two has thus been fully incorporated into the people's war revolutionary strategy of the PAC.

1.2 Nationalism as component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The ANC's approach towards its people's war revolutionary struggle, and the role nationalism plays in the struggle is historically based. This assumption is principally based on the fact that the ANC is the oldest black resistance movement in South African politics. The ANC refers to its struggle as a national struggle, although Meli (1988:81), a member of the ANC National Executive Committee, has stated that "the ANC's ideology has always been that of African nationalism, but it has never been perceived as a form of narrow nationalism". He continues by saying that the ANC's "approach has undergone changes with the passage of time, largely as a result of the fact that the ANC has undergone changes" (Meli, 1988:81). This attitude and observation can largely be attributed to the influence of the SACP within the ANC.

Further clarification regarding the ANC's approach towards nationalism comes from Mzala (1988:51), who states that "our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an élitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the masses". This is clearly an indication that the classical reference to nationalism - which implied that a struggle was based purely on the aspirations of a nation to achieve independence - has been revised by the ANC to induce more than national liberation. Mzala (1984:44), argues that narrow nationalism represents the ideology of the petty-bourgeois who erect a "Chinese wall" around nationality and national aspirations. He continues by stating that the national struggle manifests itself in socio-economic and class emancipation (Mzala, 1984:66). The correction of economic injustices is thus perceived to be represented by the solution of the national question (Mzala, 1988:51). This approach evidently indicates that a definite class struggle content has been introduced into the nationalist struggle of the ANC.

The ANC's attitude towards the relationship between nationalism and the class struggle is clearly explained by Meli (1988:79), who argues that "the concept of class struggle in South Africa must of necessity incorporate the principle of national self-determination for Africans and nationally oppressed blacks". The ANC's concept of national self-determination is based on the assumption that the South African society comprises two antagonistic social systems, that of a capitalist and pre-capitalist African society. The capitalist society, according to Meli (1988:XIX), has "obliterated the nascent will and embryonic national consciousness" of the pre-capitalist African society. The ANC is convinced that the capitalist society in South Africa has inculcated among African people a feeling of inferiority and a rejection of their own heritage (Meli: 1988:XIX). This is also the reason why the ANC maintains that the national question or nationalist content of its struggle should not merely be treated from a narrow historical basis but from a class basis (Mzala, 1988:51). Evidently the ANC views the situation in South Africa as one characterised by a class contradiction and a national contradiction. However, it clearly states that while class and nation are necessarily two distinct categories, it is wrong to view social antagonism and national contradictions as isolated from each other (Mzala, 1984:68-69).

The aforementioned assumption is thus related to the ANC's conviction that capitalism and colonialism are synonymous (ANC, 1984:1-2). This point of view, however, can largely be attributed to the influence of the SACP, which has stated that South Africa represents a situation which may be identified as that of "colonialism of a special type" (SACP, 1962:15-17). The combination of the national and class struggle which is being waged by the ANC, has theoretically been justified by the SACP's concept of "colonialism of a special type". This concept is defined as follows: "On one level, that of white South Africa, there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of industrial monopolies and the merging of industrial and financial capital But on another level, that of non-white South Africa, there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation" (Wolpe, 1988:62).

The ANC clearly attempts to amalgamate the national struggle for self-determination and the class struggle. The nature of the struggle is

first of all a nationalist struggle, which is not an end in itself, but a stage or one of the stages towards a non-exploitative society, which is represented by a socialist society (ANC, 1985b:53). The struggle being waged by the ANC in South Africa therefore represents an anti-colonial, anti-capitalist and an anti-imperialist national liberation struggle (BN, 1982:15). The ANC attempts - theoretically at least - to link nationalism and the class struggle. In this regard Dialego (1987:64) observed that "our liberation movement sets out to link national and class struggle rather than to simply lump them together; to synthesize them, not to separate them; to relate them rather than to merely collapse one into the other." The ANC therefore declares that "because of the operations and consequences of race-class oppression in South Africa our struggle has both a national and a class basis. These two aspects are inseparably bound, because black workers are oppressed both as members of a national group and as a class. It is this dual oppression which imparts to our struggle both class and national aspects simultaneously" (BN, 1982:15).

The combination of nationalism and the class struggle is regarded as a progressive ideology, for, according to the ANC, it will lead to the destruction of colonialism and capitalism in South Africa (Mzala, 1984:43). The ANC's struggle has therefore obtained an internationalist character in that it is not viewed solely as an individual country's problem, but as a world problem of emancipating the oppressed peoples and colonies from the yoke of capitalist imperialism (Mzala, 1984:123).

The ANC's revolutionary strategy is aimed at destroying the power of the white minority government and replacing it with popular power - that is, with a government whose authority, according to the ANC, will derive from the will of all the peoples in South Africa (Tambo, 1984:4). The unique situation with regard to the alliance between the ANC and the SACP which is also a reflection of the synthesis of the nationalist right to self-determination and the class struggle, implies that two distinct objectives exist (Jordan, 1986:146). Slovo (1987a:26) clarifies this assumption by claiming that the ANC leads the struggle to national liberation, while the SACP will lead the struggle to socialism. Slovo (1986a:27) emphasises in this regard that the SACP will support the ANC in its objective to obtain national liberation, but will "ensure that the

working class and its aspirations are not swamped by other social forces who may see liberation as consisting solely of replacing the white face by a black one in the seat of exploitation". The people's war strategy, however, relates similarly to the stage where the ANC/SACP alliance attempts to bring about a national democratic revolution in South Africa. It is within this framework that the ANC states that " we [ANC/SACP] must begin to use our accumulated strength to destroy the organs of government of the apartheid regime. We have to undermine and weaken its control over us, exactly by frustrating its attempts to control us. We should direct our collective might to rendering the enemy's instruments of authority unworkable. To march forward must mean that we advance against the regime's organs of state power, creating conditions in which the country becomes increasingly ungovernable" (Tambo, 1985:71).

Some contradiction exists between the PAC and the ANC in their approaches towards nationalism as a component of their people's war strategies, but both organisations base their commitment to the nationalist struggle on historical circumstances and conditions. The ANC, however, has acknowledged that its nationalist orientation has changed during the course of its revolutionary struggle. This change can largely be attributed to the direct and indirect influence of the SACP. The SACP has stated adamantly that, without the leadership of the SACP, meaningful liberation will only be a "pipe dream" for the ANC (Mzala, 1983:71).

One of the major contradictions between the PAC and the ANC is their classification of the current society in South Africa. The PAC's assumption and conviction that South Africa represents a typical colonialist society, which originated in 1652 with, what they call a white settler invasion, does not differ from that of most anti-colonial struggles which have been waged in the underdeveloped world. The ANC's approach that South Africa represents "colonialism of a special type" is clearly an attempt to link the class struggle ideology with the national liberation struggle. This fact becomes more obvious when it is considered that this linkage process was first employed by the SACP in 1962, while the ANC began to propagate "colonialism of a special type" as its concept during the 1980s. The controversy between the PAC and the ANC as regards the colonial status of South Africa, has had an influence on the way in which both were able to synthesise nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. This

manifests itself in the fact that the PAC perceives its struggle to be both a national and a class struggle waged as one struggle, while the ANC attempts to make a distinction between the nationalist and the class struggle. Both movements maintain that blacks are the oppressed nation, while only the ANC views both black and white workers as representing workers in the class struggle. The PAC, however, lumps blacks as a nation and blacks as a worker-exploited class together in its approach towards the liberation struggle.

The difference in application of the nationalism component in their respective people's war strategies does not imply that either the PAC or the ANC is correct or incorrect in their respective approaches, but it rather confirms the fact that the concept "people's war" is flexible and can be tailored by any organisation to comply with a specific revolutionary situation.

2 THE PEOPLE'S ARMY AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The presence of the people's army component in a revolutionary strategy is an indication of the fact that a revolutionary movement has opted to use armed violence as a means to bring its revolution to fruition. Both the PAC and the ANC have opted to wage an armed struggle to further and implement the aims and objectives of their respective revolutionary strategies.

2.1 The people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

The Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), is the armed wing of the PAC, and is described as its people's army. APLA is described as "the army of the people, fighting for the people's interests in their entirety and involved in all aspects of the people's productivity" (PAC, 1975:61). Domingos (1988:14), is of the opinion that "without a people's army the oppressed masses have nothing". He concludes by saying that the masses would be without any hope of ever liberating themselves without a people's army as it would be impossible to wage an effective struggle such as a people's war.

According to a military combat manual, APLA consists of two kinds of forces. The primary force component is a regular force that is subdivided into regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. The regular force component consists of regular troops who are fully trained and able to do combat. The secondary force component is an auxilliary force called a militia movement, and comprises the masses who are assembled on a nation-wide basis. The members of the militia are not fully-trained combatants, but are locally trained by means of crash courses. Militia forces are basically in essence self-defence units that protect themselves and the gains that the regular forces have achieved (PAC, 1975:180-184).

According to the PAC, the armed struggle depends on the following preconditions: a sound mass base (that is, total support by the masses); a sound party organisation; a fairly strong armed force; terrain favourable for military operations; and economic resources sufficient to sustain an armed struggle (PAC, 1975:13). Thus armed struggle waged by APLA is a mass-orientated struggle and should not ignore the masses during its implementation (PAC, 1983:7). The armed struggle is described as a protracted struggle, and Mgweba (1987:13) argues that if it were not, it would be to the benefit of the South African Government. The blitzkrieg style of armed struggle followed by the PAC during the 1960s has effectively been dropped. It has been argued that the blitzkrieg strategy was the surest way by which the PAC could achieve the contrary effect, at a high blood price. Dimpho, (1988:12) maintains that "they (PAC) are not gamblers who stake their fate and future on the chance of a single throw of the dice".

The military strategy of the PAC is of a protracted nature and comprises three stages. These stages are identified as a stage of guerrilla warfare, one of larger military operations, and a final stage that would result in the seizure of political power.

The stage of guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla warfare as the introductory stage of the military strategy of the PAC, is characterised by the tactic of small-scale military operations. These include acts of sabotage, ambushes and the assassinations of so-called agents of the state and collaborators of the

apartheid system. During this stage, APLA-units are deployed on a nation-wide scale. Each of these units is given specific orders which manifest in specialised types of attacks such as, for example, assassinations (Mazambane, 1988a:10). This tactic, for example, has manifested itself in an attempted assassination of unarmed members of municipal police in March 1988, when four members were injured in the attack (Dimpho, 1988b:4); and a rocket attack on an elderly couple's farmhouse in the Messina area (PAC, 1988:13). The first stage of the military strategy of the PAC is thus waged by an armed force with limited resources, against a powerful and well armed enemy (Dimpho, 1988:12). The following principle of warfare is implemented for this purpose: "you fight your way, we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and we move away when we cannot" (PAC, 1975:164).

Their rhetoric indicates that, during this stage, the PAC would deploy and concentrate its forces in the rural areas. This strategy makes provision for APLA units to organise, train, arouse and mobilise peasants and farm labourers in such a way that a situation can be created that will represent an agrarian revolution (PAC, 1975:20). In typical Maoist fashion, the PAC aims at creating rural base areas from where APLA units will be able to operate. These areas are intended for conversion into sustained strongholds, where the masses could be mobilised and the South African forces attacked on an equal footing (PAC, 1975: 160-161).

These planned rural base areas are basically similar to the liberated zones concept that was coined by Mao Tse-tung, and are perceived to be a strategic component of the military strategy. PAC reasoning in this regard is that it is a basic principle of a people's army to create rural base areas. "The basic principle of people's war is to organise and arm the people, who must be concentrated in a rural base area behind the enemy lines. Guerrilla war cannot grow or last long without base areas which form the rear of the guerrillas" (PAC, 1975:158). Despite PAC rhetoric in this regard, limited APLA actions have been initiated in South Africa's rural areas. Since 1980, only one attack - that on a farmhouse in the Messina area - was initiated by the PAC in the rural areas. All the other attacks that have occurred in the rural areas where PAC involvement was evident, were initiated by the security forces of South Africa. These include, for example, such incidents as that where APLA units were

captured in road blocks, or where they were captured in the veld when attempting to infiltrate South Africa from neighbouring countries.

As a result of the situation mentioned above practical APLA operations have been diverted to urban areas in South Africa. According to its Secretary of Defence, Sabelo Phama (1988:2), diverting APLA actions to the urban areas is necessary to tie down South African security forces in the urban areas, so as to allow other APLA units to infiltrate and activate the rural areas. APLA attacks, characterised by Scorpion machine pistol and F1 defensive handgrenade attacks, have increased in the urban areas of South Africa since 1986. Some of the primary areas of attack, have been the PWV-area and Bisho, the capital of the Republic of the Ciskei.

The current nature of the guerrilla war strategy employed by APLA is primarily one of urban terrorism, while focusing on rural areas as well. APLA force deployment focuses on infiltrating 60 percent of its units into rural areas and 40 percent into the urban areas. A rural deployment unit comprises ten or more members, while an urban unit comprises not more than four members. While urban units are tasked to attack targets in urban areas, rural units focus their activities on gathering intelligence and identifying areas suitable for guerrilla warfare and the establishment of base areas (Mazambane, 1988a:8-11). The urbanised nature of the military strategy is therefore merely an intermediate tactic, because the PAC is convinced that the only effective armed struggle will have to be waged in the rural areas (Dimpho, 1988:11-12).

Visible manifestations of PAC military strategy and the theory behind it clearly contain a contradiction. It is obvious that the PAC has not even reached the rudimentary phase of applying the first stage of its military strategy.

The stage of larger military operations

This stage is based on the assumption that the PAC has accomplished its aims and objectives as set out in the first stage. The PAC assumes, within the parameters of this stage, that it will be able to attack government forces from liberated areas by means of mobile and larger forces. These attacks would result in pitched battles where government forces will be

defeated, and would bring about a situation where the balance and the correlation of forces would swing in favour of the PAC. The practical manifestation of such a situation would be characterised by spontaneous mass insurrection in non-liberated areas, and would result in large sections of government forces joining the ranks of APLA (PAC, 1975:20-22).

The stage of the political seizure of power

This stage will be characterised by extensive mobile warfare operations, positional warfare and conventional warfare. The PAC is of the opinion that, as a result of the change in the correlation of forces, its military forces would be superior to those of the incumbent government. During this stage, APLA will comprise regular military divisions that aim to confront government forces in a direct military confrontation. In typical Maoist fashion, this strategy aims to create a situation where cities and urban strongholds are surrounded and overrun by APLA forces. This will force the government to either hand over political power or to face total annihilation (PAC, 1975:22-24). The military victories of APLA during this stage, according to the strategy, will be accompanied by a general mass insurrection where the government will be unable to govern the country (PAC, 1976:152-156).

The military strategy of the PAC is theoretically a copybook reproduction of Mao Tse-tung's military strategy. Despite the confinement of its strategy to military combat manuals and political rhetoric, specific practical adaptations to the strategy have been made. The implementation of an urbanised terrorism tactic is indicative of the fact that the PAC had to dovetail its strategy to achieve visibility inside South Africa. The contradictions that exist between theory, rhetoric and practice indicate that PAC military strategists have, as yet, not taken into consideration the military capability of the South African Government. The PAC therefore still has to come to grips with the fact that the successful implementation of its military strategy and for that matter the incorporation of its people's army in its revolutionary strategy, depends on the PAC's ability to establish itself as a revolutionary party in South Africa, and to undertake such actions that would reflect the existence of a people's army. APLA's claims of being a people's army must be echoed by

the masses, and only then will it in fact constitute a people's army. Little evidence of this acceptance by the masses in South Africa, is however, forthcoming, thereby casting doubt on the PAC's ability to incorporate the people's army component of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy.

2.2 The people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) is the military wing of the ANC and is seen as the one instrument necessary for the advancement of the armed struggle (Mkwanazi, 1989:24). According to the ANC (1969:8), MK was created for the following reasons: "The first was the need to create a military apparatus and, more particular, to recruit large numbers of professional cadres who could be trained and who would form the core of future guerrilla bands. The second was the need to demonstrate effectively to all that we were making a sharp and open break with the process of the previous period which had correctly given emphasis to militant struggle short of armed confrontation. The third was the need to present an effective method for the overthrow of white supremacy through planned rather than spontaneous activity".

MK as an instrument of armed force is regarded as being rooted in the masses, drawing its strength from their ranks, thus qualifying as a people's army (Cabesa, 1986:36). Since its initial years, the composition of MK has developed into the following definable structures: rural-based guerrilla units; underground urban groups; a regular force; and self-defence units. The rural-based units operate in rural areas and their operations include gathering of intelligence and the political mobilisation of the masses in these areas. The underground urban units are based in factories, other work places and residential areas, and include combat groups, sabotage units, elimination squads, part-time combat teams and political educational groups. The regular forces of MK include both the aforementioned groups and those MK members based in training camps in Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The self-defence units consist of progressive democratic organisations such as people's committees and street committees that protect themselves and MK cadres against the South African security forces (Kasrils, 1988:5). These self-defence units come

into being as a result of the popular participation of the masses, who aim to protect themselves (ANC, 1987d:5).

According to Joe Modise (1986:3), its commander, the aims of MK are the following: MK has to inspire the masses to resist oppression in order to effectively draw them into the armed struggle; MK has to destroy the administrative structures of the South African Government in order to make it impossible to govern, thereby rendering the policy of the Government unworkable; and MK has to drain the resources and manpower of the South African Government. A fourth aim is added by Cabesa (1986:31), who is of the opinion that MK has to destroy the will to resist of the South African security forces. The military strategy of MK is based on the principles of a protracted struggle. Mashinini (1985:25) describes the protracted struggle and the reasons why it has been adopted as follows: "To protract the war will offer us an opportunity to build, consolidate and arm our people in different politico-military organisation levels, step-by-step, from a materially weak position into a position of superiority over the enemy in all fields and with every means to gain rapid and decisive victories in all battles".

The military strategy of the ANC is of a protracted nature, reflecting specific Maoist and Vietnamese characteristics. The military strategy, however, also reflects certain characteristics that have never been evident in any other revolutionary strategy. This phenomenon is described by Tambo (1984a:102) as follows: "I think that although guerrilla struggles have been guided by certain models and have reflected a certain pattern, that does not alter the essential fact about guerrilla warfare - which is that it adapts to the objective and even subjective conditions in which it is being carried out. It must take into account and modify the situation that prevails. We must develop a strategy and tactics which correspond to our real situation. That is why there would be features in our struggle which have not been observed elsewhere. It is simply because we have had to adjust to our own conditions".

The military strategy of the ANC develops through three main stages: the stage of guerrilla warfare; the stage of equilibrium; and the stage of the general offensive (Manthatha, 1982:9). Each of these stages is also divided into two distinctive phases (Booyse, 1986:78-79).

The stage of guerrilla warfare

This stage could be divided into two phases: that is, a phase that comprises "strategic themes", and a phase of genuine guerrilla warfare. These phases are distinctive, but certain tactics associated with one phase could be implemented during the other.

The phase of "strategic themes"

This phase comprises specific acts that comply with specific politically identified themes. Such themes, for example, are "confront the enemy directly", and "make apartheid unworkable and the country ungovernable". Armed propaganda is also included in this phase. MK acts committed with the objective of enhancing specific "strategic themes" are clearly definable as revolutionary terrorism (Booyse, 1988:9). These MK acts are primarily confined to urban centres (Manthatha, 1982:9), and armed operations are primarily committed by underground urban groups with the objective of engaging the South African security forces in major industrial areas, in order to arouse the working class in the country (Gungushe, 1983:54).

MK armed operations during this phase reflect a definite urban warfare character which indicates that the ANC does not intend to follow classical models where rural areas were activated first. Tambo (1982:19) clarifies this phenomenon as follows: "For the question of the terrain not being the typical terrain that Mao talks of in his writings on guerrilla warfare. We don't have that terrain but we are coming out with new methods of struggle". Along the same lines Cabesa (1986:38) argues that MK actions are aimed at urban targets during the first phase, because South Africa is such a highly industrialised country.

The first "strategic theme" used by the ANC, could be identified as armed propaganda which includes attacks on the socio-economic infrastructure in South Africa. Revolutionary terrorism acts related to armed propaganda reached an all-time high in 1983, when they constituted 75 percent of all terrorist incidents, while they have since increasingly shown a downward trend (Booyse, 1986:82). The statement is made that armed propaganda was implemented to create those conditions that would make it possible to

pursue other "strategic themes". Thus armed propaganda was not aimed at mobilising the masses, but at allowing a situation to develop where themes specifically aimed at the mobilisation of the masses could be implemented (Manthatha, 1982:10).

The pursuance of "strategic themes" such as "confronting the enemy directly" and "making the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable" started in 1984. Armed acts (incidents of revolutionary terrorism) associated with these themes include: murders and attempted murders on members of the police, state witnesses, town councillors, municipal police and members of self-governing states; sabotage attacks on administration buildings; and armed attacks on South African Defence Force buildings and police stations. Examples of these attacks, which reached a high incidence level between 1984 and 1987, are the assassination of Mr Piet Ntule, the late Minister of Internal Affairs of KwaNdebele, and the attempted assassination of Mr L.T. Landers, the Deputy Minister of Population Development in the House of Representatives (Booyse, 1988b:5).

The ANC clearly attempted to exploit the prevailing political unrest situation in South Africa between 1984 and 1987 by advancing the first phase of its military strategy - trying to revolutionise the masses - by attacking perceived "puppets and stooges" of the South African Government. The active participation of the masses in violent actions resulted in grotesque incidents such as necklacing, where town councillors and suspected informers were burnt to death by placing a gasoline-dosed tyre around the victim's body and setting it alight. Chris Hani (1986:18), the Deputy Commander of MK, stated with regard to the necklace that "as far as I am concerned the question of the necklace and how it should be used belongs to all of us, to the ANC, to the democratic movement. We should sit down and discuss amongst ourselves how we should mete out justice". The objective of revolutionary terrorism incidents associated with these "strategic themes" and the necklacing was to intimidate the apolitical population and lower the morale of the security forces. The ANC was successful in implementing these "strategic themes", compelling the South African Government to take abnormal action, by instituting a general state of emergency. The ANC was therefore successful in revolutionising the situation inside South Africa to such an extent that it became impossible for the Government to continue to rule as before.

The effective implementation and maintenance of the state of emergency, however, in turn forced the ANC to take abnormal action, such as acts of indiscriminate terror against the civilian population. Acts of indiscriminate terror accelerated and constituted more than 50 percent of all terrorist incidents in 1988 (Booyse, 1988b:6). Indications that indiscriminate terror would increase in South Africa were already evident in December of 1986, when Hani (1986:18) stated: "We are going to increasingly come across a situation where comrades in anger are going to react and deal with white civilians".

The increase in indiscriminate terror during 1988 resulted in a major rift between the political and military leadership of the ANC. Hani and Tswete, the political commissar of MK, stated in June 1988 that incidents of indiscriminate terror aimed at the white population would increase (Hornsby, 1988:7). Tambo repudiated these statements by stating that it was not the intention of the ANC to increase its attacks on civilians and target whites specifically (McEwen, 1988:13). The contradictions between the political and the military leadership resulted in a situation in which the National Executive Committee of the ANC (1988c:15) was compelled to state publically that it did not intend to attack civilian targets.

Despite the positive indications for the ANC that it would be able to advance its armed struggle in 1986, the effective implementation of the state of emergency resulted in the ANC being forced back in its military strategy. The ANC is therefore still primarily confined to the first phase of the first stage of its military strategy.

The phase of genuine guerrilla warfare

The second phase of genuine guerrilla warfare is seen as a natural development following the successful implementation of the first phase, the reason being that the conditions for a guerrilla war to be waged have been created during the first phase. Thus guerrilla warfare is "the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched, it is neither static nor does it take place in a vacuum" (ANC, 1969:9). In addition guerrilla warfare is a tactic used to force the ruling government to become more oppressive.

The military strategy of guerrilla warfare provides for the use of tactics such as hit-and-run actions. The objective of hit-and-run attacks is to engage the South African security forces in battle where it is least expected. MK is of the opinion that hit-and-run tactics will spread all over the country, consequently the South African security forces will be stretched to their limits, making them weaker and more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks (Manthatha, 1982:10). Hit-and-run action has resulted in attacks on police stations and the deployment of landmines and anti-personnel mines in the border areas of South Africa. However, guerrilla warfare actions constitute less than seven percent of the total revolutionary armed incidents that have occurred in South Africa to date (Booyse, 1988b:6).

The strategic objective of guerrilla warfare actions is the reduction of the South African security forces, both in terms of personnel and material (Manthatha, 1982:11). With regard to guerrilla warfare, the ANC has conceded as follows: "Our war of liberation has definitely entered this first stage and is visibly growing ... However, the path immediately ahead is not a rosy one. To reduce the strength of the enemy considerably and transit to the next stages of the people's war, fierce battles are still to be fought" (Manthatha, 1982:11). The ANC has evidently not reached the phase of genuine guerrilla warfare and is still confined to revolutionary terrorism.

The stage of equilibrium

The stage of equilibrium is that stage of the military strategy where the balance and correlation of forces are supposed to swing in favour of the ANC. Rhetoric regarding the stage of equilibrium is limited, which may be attributed to the ANC not having contemplated that the armed struggle would reach this stage in practice. This stage is theoretically divided into two phases, a phase of continued guerrilla warfare and a phase of mobile warfare. It is believed that guerrilla warfare actions would transcend into more mobile warfare actions on account of the fact that the enemy forces and the guerrilla forces would be on an equal footing (Manthatha, 1982:11).

The transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare will be characterised by "a form of fighting in which the guerrilla forces are organised in bigger units and armed with relatively advanced weapons, that group themselves rapidly and launch lightning attacks; advancing rapidly and withdrawing quickly" (Manthatha, 1982:12). It is envisaged that the total infrastructure of South Africa will be rendered ineffective when mobile warfare is introduced into the military strategy. The ANC assumes that it will succeed in scattering the security forces all over the country during this stage (Manthatha, 1982:12-13). The ANC will thus shift its emphasis from urban actions to rural actions. MK and its regular units will engage the South African security forces in a direct way, and presume that they will defeat the security forces.

The stage of the general offensive

The stage of the general offensive will in the final analysis, bring about the seizure of political power. As a direct result of the successes of the second stage, ANC forces will be larger, for the masses will have joined the ranks of MK. This stage will develop from a phase of mobile warfare to that of positional warfare (Manthatha, 1982:3). It is during this stage that the ANC plans to implement genuine rural warfare, which includes the creation of rear base areas and liberated areas. The ANC is of the opinion that liberated areas and base areas can only be created during the last stage, having been prevented until then by the South African security forces' capability to overrun these areas: "The switch-over to positional warfare, let alone the establishment of liberated zones is possible when and only when we (the ANC) are as well-armed as the enemy. To apply positional warfare or to establish liberated zones before this important condition is met, would be to doom ourselves to defeat and destruction" (Manthatha, 1982:14).

The creation of liberated areas is thus associated with the successes MK would presumably achieve during the implementation of positional warfare. ANC rhetoric assumes that the South African security forces, in the wake of MK military successes, would be "forced to abandon and surrender many positions and withdraw to entrench itself in the big cities" (Manthatha, 1982:13). These captured areas would then be occupied by the ANC and would serve as liberated areas where people's rule would be established. It is

envisaged that all the rural areas in South Africa will be liberated in such a fashion, resulting in a situation where the urban centres are surrounded (Manthatha, 1982:4). The regular army of the ANC will engage the South African security forces in a conventional warfare manner, including the digging of trenches, the setting up of fortifications, attacking the security forces at will and defeating them (Manthatha, 1982:13).

If a favourable political solution - the ANC taking over political power - is not reached at this stage, the ANC assumes that it will defeat the South African Government in a final military battle. The ANC is convinced that "the growth of our army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, its consolidation with and among the masses, above all workers and peasants, will put to shame all bourgeois military strategies. Our adherence to the principles of splitting the enemy forces, maintaining the element of surprise will see us emerge victorious over the racist monopoly, capitalist SADF. It will see our revolutionary military science humiliating racist bourgeois military science. To the racist military we promise to break their spinal cord on the battle field. Their Dien Bien Phu is still coming" (Gungushe, 1983:58).

The military strategy of the ANC is an example of a unique adaptation of revolutionary warfare. The strategy, and more specifically the rural and urban dimensions of the strategy, has clearly been adapted to the South African environment. It is also obvious that no rigid divisions exist between the phases or stages of the military strategy: tactics associated with a specific phase or stage could be implemented in another. Examples of this are the introduction of landmine warfare in the first phase of guerrilla warfare and a rocket attack on the headquarters of Northern Transvaal Command. The implementation of the military strategy, however, is not compatible with that of the political strategy. This fact is clearly a factor of major concern to the ANC.

Both APLA and MK are regarded as representatives of the people's army. This, however, is a contradiction, for the South African population is viewed as one people, and two people's armies cannot represent all the people because if they did there would not have been two armies. Broadly speaking the composition of both APLA and MK is the same as they both

consist of regular and self-defence forces. However, the fact that the ANC distinguishes between rural and underground urban groups shows that it has adapted to the South African environment.

To a certain extent the military strategies of the ANC and the PAC are similar: both start with guerrilla warfare which finally develops into conventional war. When the strategies are compared it is clear that the military strategy of the PAC is largely textbook based, while the military strategy of the ANC incorporates both textbook theory and practical adaptations. The successes and visibility of the military strategy of the ANC, when compared to that of the PAC, indicate that ANC strategy is far more sophisticated. This makes it obvious why MK armed acts constitute about 90 percent of all terrorism committed in South Africa.

The most significant differences between the military strategies of the PAC and the ANC are their respective approaches towards rural and urban dimensions. The PAC, which reflects a typical Maoist strategy, is determined to concentrate the bulk of its military effort on the rural areas. Those PAC acts that do occur in urban areas are regarded as part of an intermediate stage. The PAC is thus committed to create and establish base areas and liberated areas in the first stage of its military strategy. The ANC, however, having taken the practical situation in South Africa into consideration, has made it clear that it does not intend to create or establish liberated areas before the implementation of stage three of its strategy. The PAC has not analysed the situation in South Africa, and has not contemplated the capability of the South African security forces to overrun liberated areas as soon as they are created in the first stage. This contradiction existing between the PAC and the ANC is also an indication that the ANC is the one organisation which is in touch with the situation in South Africa.

The conclusion could be made that the ANC has succeeded in introducing the people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy. This is clearly evident in both the ANC's rhetoric and practical implementation of its military strategy as well as the acceptance it receives from the masses. The PAC on the other hand has only succeeded in convincing itself that APLA fulfils the requirements of being a people's army. This perception is obviously not shared by the masses and

the limited amount of APLA-related armed operations could also be attributed to the fact that it receives limited popular support. It is therefore not possible to state categorically that the PAC has incorporated the people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy, as a result of the lack of physical evidence in this regard. The qualified statement can thus be made that the PAC still intends to incorporate the people's army as a component of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy as reflected in its rhetoric and publications.

The successful incorporation of the people's army in the revolutionary strategies of the ANC and the PAC poses a serious national security threat to the South African government. Without having planned this, these two military strategies complement each other. The rural and urban military objectives of the respective people's armies during the first stage could force the South African security forces to counter APLA and MK operations in both urban and rural areas. This could lead to a situation where the security forces are over-stretched during an intensified APLA and MK military campaign. Specific weaknesses of the security forces could be exposed in such a campaign. This could result in both the ANC and the PAC taking military advantages which could be detrimental to the morale of the security forces and the population in general.

3 CONCLUSION

Two components of the concept "people's war", those of nationalism and the people's army party were analysed and discussed in this chapter in order to determine whether these components have been incorporated into the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. Following this process a comparative study was conducted in order to determine the similarities and differences that exist in the process both the PAC and the ANC follow to incorporate these components into their respective revolutionary strategies. The comparative analysis therefore focussed on both the rhetoric and practice with regard to the incorporation of these concepts into the respective revolutionary strategies. It is therefore possible to draw the following conclusions.

The PAC has succeeded in incorporating the nationalist component into its rhetoric and its approach in this regard is similar to that which has been identified in chapter two. The PAC regards its revolutionary struggle as a "nationalist class struggle" which incorporates the fundamental principles of a nationalist struggle for self-determination and a class struggle against exploitation. Class and nation have thus effectively been lumped together into a nationalist orientation. The ANC on the other hand regards its revolutionary struggle as both a nationalist struggle for self-determination and a class struggle against exploitation. The ANC therefore does not lump nation and class together in the way the PAC does, but perceives them as two separate struggles that are related. Despite the difference in approach, it can in the final analysis be concluded that both the PAC and the ANC have effectively introduced and incorporated the nationalist component of the concept "people's war" into their respective revolutionary strategies. The difference in approach, however, once again reaffirms the flexible nature of the concept "people's war".

It is apparent from the comparative analysis of the people's army component that both the PAC and the ANC are waging an armed struggle. Both APLA and MK consist of regular and auxiliary forces which indicates that they aim at incorporating the masses or sections thereof into the respective military wings. Only MK, however, has succeeded in a limited way in drawing a small component of the masses into its ranks by means of weekend training. The theoretical military strategies of the PAC and the ANC differ to the extent that only the ANC's strategy has taken the practical environment in South Africa into consideration. The question of the creation of liberated areas is in this regard of strategic importance, and the ANC has acknowledged the fact that it will not be possible in the military sense to create such areas before the third stage of its military strategy, while the PAC believes that it will be possible during the first stage.

Both the PAC and the ANC have theoretically well strategised military strategies, but manifestations of them indicate that both are confined to revolutionary terrorism. Even in this regard the PAC has not achieved the military visibility of the ANC, which implies that the PAC's military wing enjoys limited to no popular support. However, while it is possible to state that both the PAC and the ANC view their military wings as a

people's army, the PAC has clearly not yet succeeded in incorporating the people's army component into its revolutionary strategy. The ANC on the other hand has succeeded in introducing aspects of its people's army into its revolutionary strategy. Practically, however, the fact that it has not been able to advance militarily in 25 years from the revolutionary terrorism sphere, indicates that the ANC is experiencing difficulties in utilising the people's army component to its ultimate potential. In the final analysis, it is possible to conclude that the people's army component is part of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC, but that neither has succeeded in fully institutionalising this component in their revolutionary strategies.

Based on the comparative analysis of the nationalist and people's army components, the conclusion may be drawn that as far as the manifestation of these two components in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC is concerned, both follow the axioms of people's war concept. It will, however, only be possible to determine the total application of the people's war concept when all the components have been analysed, compared and evaluated.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

It is discernible from the previous chapter that nationalism and the people's army have visibly been incorporated into the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. The revolutionary party is an additional component of the concept "people's war" which needs be analysed, compared and evaluated in order to determine the extent to which the concept has been applied to the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is possible to apply some of the dimensions of the revolutionary strategy paradigm that was identified in chapter two to facilitate the analysis, comparison and evaluation of the revolutionary party as a component of the people's war concept, in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.

1. THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE PAC AND THE ANC OF THEMSELVES AS REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES

The revolutionary party as a component of a people's war is a well-strategised, organic structure of the revolution that functions solely for the purpose of advancing the people's war. The revolutionary party is usually the first component which is developed when a movement embarks on a people's war strategy. The people's war strategies of the PAC and the ANC make provision for the existence of a revolutionary party. It is in this regard important to indicate what the PAC's and the ANC's perceptions of themselves are as revolutionary parties in a people's war.

1.1 The PAC's perception of itself as a revolutionary party in a people's war

According to the PAC, the revolutionary party is the most important component of their people's war strategy. The PAC describes itself as a revolutionary party and, specifically, as a "revolutionary party of a new type". This definition implies that a "revolutionary party of a new type" constitutes an organisation involved in a political struggle in the broadest sense of the word, and more specifically in political agitation

(PAC, 1976:139). The PAC is of the opinion - which it shares with Mao - that the formation of a revolutionary party is the most important step to be taken when a people's war strategy is launched. It argues that the creation of a revolutionary party will ensure correct leadership for a people's war (PAC, 1976:168).

The revolutionary party constitutes a permanent organisation that specifically represents the workers and the peasants. According to the PAC, this gives the revolutionary party a pivotal role: that of influencing the nature and direction of the people's war. The PAC as a revolutionary party therefore constitutes the pivot and the rule of the workers and peasants, which offers the only road towards the building of a socialist state in South Africa (PAC, 1975:145). The revolutionary party represents the proletarian revolutionary centre of the struggle for liberation - national as well as social emancipation (PAC, 1976:142). As a revolutionary party the PAC does not constitute a mass organisation, but "a small, compact core of the most reliable, experienced and hardened people" (PAC, 1976:140).

The PAC fulfils the role of a vanguard that leads the masses and raises them to the level of a revolutionary war. The revolutionary party embodies a revolutionary centre that follows a correct political policy; that has a thorough understanding of the problems of strategy and tactics in the military, economic and cultural fields; that can master an armed struggle; and that is capable of establishing and leading a revolutionary united front (PAC, 1976:15-20). The PAC as a revolutionary party functions in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism. In this regard the PAC defines its main task as that of leading and directing the people's war (PAC, 1975:18). The PAC, from its own point of view, represents a revolutionary party similar to that which has been identified in chapter two. The PAC - the political aspect - is thus the revolutionary party component of its people's war revolutionary strategy.

1.2 The ANC's perception of itself as a revolutionary party in a people's war

The ANC declines to describe itself as a revolutionary party. The reason for this is obvious when one analyses the leadership profile of the ANC.

The ANC is generally referred to as a liberation movement that has an alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP). This alliance is referred to as the liberation or revolutionary alliance, since the leadership of the alliance rests with the ANC. The nature of the ANC struggle and its perception of this struggle indicate that the ANC does not represent a revolutionary party, but rather a broad national movement. The alliance between the ANC and the SACP, however, could be described as an organ that functions as a revolutionary party. This assumption is based on a statement by Tambo (1981:4), who said that the alliance between the ANC and the SACP "is not merely a paper alliance, created at the conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement of leaders. Our alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle. We have built it out of our separate and common experience".

The alliance between the ANC and the SACP should be interpreted within the framework of the two-phased national liberation struggle - of which the people's war strategy only represents the first phase - waged by the ANC/SACP alliance. This aspect is emphasised by Macintosh (1987:46), who claimed that "the national struggle in our conditions cries out for the organised participation of the working class and its class political organ - the party. And equally, the struggle for socialism cries out for a vigorous and strong national involvement of the African people which heads the liberation front - the ANC". The revolutionary alliance is therefore not perceived to be an accident of history (Tambo, 1987:202). This unique phenomenon is clearly in line with what the Third International suggested when it stated that a relationship between a Communist Party and a national liberation movement should be created during the first phase of the revolution.

The SACP describes itself as a vital component of the revolutionary alliance headed by the ANC, and claims to have no interests separate from any contingent of the alliance (SACP, 1980:37). The SACP, however, does state emphatically that its participation in the alliance is the best method by which the interests of the working class can be protected (SACP, 1981:430). The alliance with the ANC does not prevent the SACP from fulfilling its primary role - that of the builder and midwife of socialism. The SACP does not aspire to take over the leadership role in

the alliance for, as Slovo (1986a:22-23) argues: "If correct leadership of the democratic revolution requires the strengthening of the national movement [ANC] as the major and leading mass organisational force, then this is precisely the way in which the party will exercise its vanguard role".

The revolutionary party in the ANC's people's war strategy is thus represented by both the ANC and the SACP. It is accepted that the SACP, being a Communist party, has its own broader political objectives but that these objectives are subjected to those of the ANC during the implementation of the people's war or the struggle for national liberation. This assumption is verified by Nyawuza (1986:53), who stated that "the Communist Party is organised as a party outside the ANC but active within the ANC. Those communists who are active within the ANC do not become 'nationalists'. They remain proletarian internationalists and patriots who fight within the national liberation movement to achieve internationalist positions: to infuse concepts and aspects of proletarian internationalism into the broad struggle for national liberation". The revolutionary alliance is thus the revolutionary party component of the people's war strategy of the ANC.

The contradiction that exists between the PAC and the ANC with regard to the revolutionary party component of their respective people's war strategies is once again a reflection of the fact that the people's war revolutionary strategy is flexible. The PAC approach, however, is theoretically speaking more in line with what Mao Tse-tung and Giap envisaged in a revolutionary party. The ANC approach on the other hand reflects definite correspondence with what the Third International advised. It is however, only possible to determine whether the PAC's and the ANC's perceptions of themselves as revolutionary party's are accurate, if an analysis is made of how the revolutionary party component is reflected and represented in their revolutionary strategies.

In order to analyse, compare and evaluate the revolutionary party component in the people's war strategy of the PAC and the ANC, the analysis will be divided into four sections. This division is made in order to provide a streamlined process of analysis, comparison and

evaluation, as a result of the fact that the revolutionary party as a component of the concept "people's war" influences the total spectrum of issues related to the revolutionary strategy. The totality of the revolutionary party's influence on the revolutionary strategy will be discussed in terms of political, military, socio-economic and external dimensions. The objective of this method of comparative analysis is aimed at determining whether the PAC and the ANC have succeeded in establishing themselves as revolutionary parties.

2 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE PAC'S AND THE ANC'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES

A revolutionary strategy based on the concept "people's war", like any other revolutionary strategy, has as its objective the seizure of political power in the target state. The revolutionary party therefore has a pivotal position in this process, for it is the revolutionary party that determines and conducts political work in the target society. The revolutionary party therefore attempts to cultivate, nurse, mobilise and activate the masses politically. This process of educating the masses politically is usually done by providing the masses with a political alternative. The revolutionary party's political alternative is usually represented in a political programme which provides a vision of the future society which inter alia convinces the masses to participate in the revolution. Associated with the political programme are political actions that are undertaken by the revolutionary party in order to popularise its political programme and these actions also serve as indicators of the revolutionary party's commitment to the revolutionary process. The revolutionary party's relevance in the political dimension can therefore be determined firstly by means of establishing whether a revolutionary political programme exists and whether the masses are aware of it, and secondly whether a revolutionary party undertakes such political actions that are aimed at popularising itself and its political programme.

2.1 The political programme

The existence of a political programme in a revolution is of strategic importance, in that it serves as a declaration of intent on behalf of the revolutionary party. The political programme is thus directly associated with the revolutionary party and they become synonymous during a revolutionary process. Popular support for a political programme is therefore also an indication of actual and potential support for the revolutionary party. It is therefore, within the political dimension, important to determine what the political programmes of the PAC and the ANC are, and whether the masses are aware of these programmes and whether they support them.

2.1.1 The political programme of the PAC

The PAC is fully aware of the strategic value of a political programme in a people's war revolution, and it emphasises the fact that such a programme should be used to make the masses aware of the reasons why a revolution is waged. The PAC regards such a programme as a guide for the masses in their endeavour to liberate themselves. Therefore, according to the PAC (1975:64), a political programme should be popularised amongst the masses by means of leaflets, bulletins, pamphlets, newspapers, plays and films, and by word of mouth. The importance of the PAC's political programme to its revolutionary struggle is compared to the arteries in a human body (PAC, 1976:194).

The assumption is generally made that the PAC's political programme and its constitution are synonymous, as the constitution espouses a commitment to African nationalism. The PAC's revolutionary programme is set out in its Ten Point Programme of Azania (Essack, 1982:41), and contrary to the PAC's constitution, it emphasises the acceptability of a future socialist South Africa. The main demands and aspirations of this programme can be summarised as follows:

- To overthrow imperialism and settler colonialism, and to establish people's power.
- To dismantle the judiciary, and to replace it with a revolutionised legal system.

- To unify the Azanian nation, and to achieve recognition of a nation's right to self-determination.
- To expropriate all imperialists, bureaucrats and their lackeys, and to create an independent and prosperous national economy.
- To continue the struggle against all forms of imperialist culture, and to abolish all culture and cultural institutions that promote colonialism and tribalism, developing only a truly national and scientific culture.
- To introduce free medical services.
- To introduce rehabilitation programmes.
- To unify the world proletariat and oppressed nations with all peace-loving nations.
- To improve working conditions for the workers.
- To grant peasants their demands on land (Essack, 1982:41-43).

The Marxist-Leninist inclination of this programme is self-evident, a position which is further emphasised by the statement that the people of South Africa should be taught new and proper values, which will ensure that they become the nation they deserve to be. According to the PAC (1976:17), these values are represented in socialism, because socialism is the only ideology capable of solving social problems. The creation of a socialist consciousness amongst the masses is of the utmost importance to the PAC, for it is claimed that a socialist consciousness has to exist in order for the masses to be mobilised (PAC, 1986:2). Socialism as an ideology is thus used as the generator for the political programme as it "expresses the needs and aspirations of the people, and makes up the political platform of every leader and every political party that claims to have the interests of the people at heart" (PAC, 1976:16). Socialist consciousness is regarded as the means by which the masses inside South Africa can be made aware of the conflict that exists in society, and that socialism claims to resolve.

There is no general awareness in South Africa regarding the PAC's revolutionary political programme and its commitment to socialism. To a large extent, this is the sole reason why the PAC is currently experiencing difficulties in convincing the masses of the legitimacy of its people's war revolution. The PAC has conceded this, and has formulated a new set of principles which was announced by Mlambo during 1988

(Mlambo, 1988:4). These principles have been formulated in order to provide the impetus for the creation of those conditions where the masses could become aware of its political programme. These principles can be summarised as follows:

- Apartheid cannot be reformed and must be totally eradicated.
- The primary instrument for change in South Africa is not the current government, nor the white minority, but the oppressed masses.
- The racist regime cannot be wished away by non-violent forms of struggle, and for this reason an intensification of the armed struggle is necessary.
- The South African regime should be isolated internationally.
- The introduction of the East/West conflict in the revolution of the national liberation struggle in South Africa should be resisted (Mlambo, 1988:4).

These principles were formulated as an intermediate strategy in an attempt to popularise the PAC as the revolutionary party. The perception exists that these principles were formulated so broadly by the PAC so as to ensure that the majority of people who are opposed to apartheid could be drawn into its people's war. An acceptance of these principles will therefore inter alia imply acceptance of the PAC as a revolutionary party and a possible alternative to the South African Government.

2.1.2 The political programme of the ANC

The ANC is knowledgeable of the fact that a political programme, which identifies the aims and objectives of its revolution, is critical during a people's war revolution. The ANC therefore accepts that it "cannot assume that the fact of national oppression automatically drives the people to revolutionary positions. Our ideas have to be taken to the people and explained. Only when our [the ANC's] ideas capture the imagination of the masses can we speak of them as a material force for the revolution" (BN, 1982:12). The ANC's ideas and political principles are represented by the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955 by the ANC and various other organisations as a statement of principles. The Charter has subsequently become the principal political programme of the ANC. The principles of Freedom Charter can be summarised as follows:

- The people shall govern.
- All national groups shall have equal rights.
- The people shall share in the country's wealth.
- The land shall be shared amongst those who work it.
- All shall be equal before the law.
- There shall be work and security.
- The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened.
- There shall be houses, security and comfort.
- There shall be peace and friendship (ANC, 1985b:1-4).

The Freedom Charter is portrayed as a revolutionary document by the ANC, as those changes indicated in the Charter could not be achieved without the destruction of the political and economic order in South Africa (ANC, 1985b:24). The Freedom Charter as a revolutionary political programme therefore creates a basis for a united democratic movement of all forces opposed to oppression inside South Africa (Mzala, 1985b:23). The Freedom Charter is portrayed as the minimal programme on which consensus would have to be reached by those opposed to the system of apartheid in South Africa. Pallo Jordan (1986:159), a member of the ANC's National Executive, clarifies this with his statement that "the Freedom Charter is a programme around which the widest spectrum of forces opposed to white racist domination can be mobilised". Acceptance of the Freedom Charter is regarded as a precondition for the development and radicalisation of the ANC's revolution (ANC, 1985:52). The Freedom Charter embodies the visions of the masses which, according to Nzo (1985:68), Secretary General of the ANC, are irreconcilable with those of the South African Government.

As the political programme of the ANC, the Freedom Charter represents the total sum of the ANC's national democratic aspirations. It is obvious that cornerstones of the ANC's principles are embodied in the Freedom Charter (Mzala, 1985c:83). The fundamental perspective of the kind of liberation the ANC is fighting for is represented in the Freedom Charter (Tambo, 1980:2). The Freedom Charter, however, is not portrayed as the sole property of the ANC, but as that of the masses, and for this reason it is also referred to as the People's Charter (Mzala, 1985d:3). This generalisation is made to provide the opportunity where the ANC can state

that the Freedom Charter represents its programme for a national democratic revolution (Mzala, 1985e:31-32).

The Freedom Charter furthermore serves the purpose of indicator. This refers to the fact that groups, organisations and individuals are questioned on their attitude towards the Freedom Charter. If the reflected attitude is favourable towards the Charter, then it is perceived to imply that common ground exists between these groups and the ANC. Mzansi (1984:25) clarifies this in his statement that "today it is around the Freedom Charter that all political forces and groupings are obliged to define their positions". This attitude was also reflected in the "Dakar Talks", when delegates from South Africa met with ANC delegates in May 1988. Delegates from South Africa were openly confronted to state their positions vis-à-vis the Freedom Charter (Eloff, 1988). During these discussions the Freedom Charter was used as an example of how those who differed fundamentally could find common ground in their mutual support for the Freedom Charter. The ANC stated categorically at Dakar that those who support the Freedom Charter are grouped with the ANC on one side, while those who do not are grouped with the South African Government on the opposite side (Louw, 1988).

The Freedom Charter, which represents the basic political programme, is said to indicate the envisaged future political alignment of an ANC-liberated South Africa. Meli (1988:127) is of the opinion that "the Freedom Charter demands that South Africa must come out of the imperialist camp and join the community of freedom and peace-loving peoples of the world". Meli's categorisation of the imperialist camp, which is represented by the system of Western democracy, as the non-peace loving side of the world community, therefore indicates that it is envisaged that a future South Africa under ANC leadership will be part of the socialist world community. The Freedom Charter has been criticised from both the non-socialist and the socialist-orientated sections in South Africa, where the non-socialists argue that the Freedom Charter represents a socialist future and the socialists claim that it does not. These attitudes, and the fact that the Freedom Charter was formulated in 1955, forced the ANC to make certain concessions with regard to the Charter. Hence it has become general practice within the ANC's political rhetoric since 1987 to state that the Freedom Charter should not be a stumbling block to unity

(Denga, 1988:66). This approach is evidently aimed at uniting both socialists and non-socialists around the broad framework of the Freedom Charter, rather than allowing it to become an instrument of division.

Against the background of the intensified debate around the Freedom Charter both inside and outside South Africa, the ANC introduced another policy programme during 1988. This policy programme is referred to as "the constitutional guidelines for a democratic South Africa". However, these constitutional guidelines, were not formulated to replace the Freedom Charter. As regards the relationship between the Freedom Charter and the constitutional guidelines, the ANC has stated that "the Freedom Charter remains today unique as the only South African document of its kind that adheres firmly to democratic principles as accepted throughout the world. Amongst South Africans it has become by far the most widely accepted programme for a post-apartheid country. The stage is now approaching where the Freedom Charter must be converted from a vision for the future into a constitutional reality" (ANC, 1988b:1). The 24 broadly formulated constitutional guidelines which the ANC made public during 1988 therefore serve as an indication of what it refers to as the constitutional reality of the Freedom Charter.

Compared to the PAC, the ANC has been far more successful in its attempt to formulate a political programme that could be used as a medium to popularise the ANC as a revolutionary party inside South Africa. The PAC on the other hand has been forced to formulate an intermediate political programme comprising five broadly based principles as a manoeuvre to popularise itself as a revolutionary party. This attempt by the PAC seems to have been a futile exercise, because the perception continues to exist that the PAC as a revolutionary party, still represents the Pan Africanist alternative that is contained in its constitution. The ANC has thus succeeded in establishing itself as a revolutionary party as a result of the acceptance by the masses of its political programme. Even the South African based Institute for a Democratic Alternative South Africa (IDASA), is presenting seminars to popularise the political programme of the ANC, and various University faculties are presenting the "constitutional guidelines for a democratic South Africa" as a formal component of specific study guides. Political actions implemented by a revolutionary

party serve as confirmation of its success in establishing itself as a revolutionary party in a people's war revolution.

2.2 Political actions

Political actions represent those techniques used by the PAC and the ANC to further their political objectives. These political actions constitute a variety of tactics and strategies used by both the PAC and the ANC, and are ultimately aimed at the seizure of political power. The most prominent and definable political actions of both the PAC and the ANC will be discussed.

2.2.1 Political actions of the PAC

Political actions by the PAC are primarily aimed at the political education of the masses, for they need to liberate themselves under the leadership of the PAC. Political education essentially constitutes that process by which the masses are told and made aware of the reasons for waging a revolution (PAC, 1975:64). The essence of political education constitutes the following:

- a process that enables the masses to respond intelligently to what is taking place around them;
- an educational process that is in line with the vital interests of the masses;
- a process that will culminate in a genuine political consciousness and revolutionary activity among the masses;
- a process by which the masses are educated and trained to respond to all cases of tyranny and violence from a class point of view; and
- a process by which the masses acquire political knowledge, thereby making them aware of the details and aspects of political life (PAC, 1976:178-179).

The PAC's ability to politically educate the masses in order for them to be mobilised is well documented. The Sharpeville incident of March 21, 1960, was a direct result of such a political education campaign, which was codenamed the "Status Campaign". This campaign aimed at educating black South Africans on their second-class citizenship in the country. The

net result of this campaign was the PAC's "anti-pass campaign", which resulted in 67 people being killed in police counter-action in Sharpeville. The 1976 Soweto uprising was also largely due to PAC involvement. During 1975 a united front was created between the PAC and internal groups such as the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRS) and the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in Botswana. This African National Front aimed at exploiting the educational conditions in black schools to bring about insurrection - Zeph Mothopeng, President of the PAC, was instrumental in organising students in Soweto for action against the government. Mothopeng and 17 others were arrested and charged under the Terrorism Act of 1967. They appeared in court in Bethal on January 8, 1978, where they were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for their role in the Soweto uprisings of 1976 (PAC, 1986b:2-7). During this trial it was also alleged that Mothopeng stated in early May 1976 that student unrest in Soweto would result in a countrywide revolution (Anon, 1978:3).

The PAC, however, suffered a major setback as a result of the Bethal court case in which 18 of its prominent leaders inside South Africa were imprisoned. The direct consequences of this court case are clearly reflected by the lack of PAC political activity inside South Africa between 1977 and 1987. However, elementary PAC activities started to take place after 1987 in South Africa (Booyse, 1987b:1-4). These elementary PAC activities indicate that it still adheres to the principle of educating the masses politically. Thus, current policy is focused on individual men and women, families and villages, that are to be turned into political battlefields (Mazabane, 1988:20). The key to PAC success in the past is attributed to its ability to create underground structures inside South Africa. These structures are described as the vehicles which ensure that the masses are politically educated and mobilised (PAC, 1983:22-23).

Practical manifestations of the PAC's political actions were non-existent during the 1980s. This aspect can be attributed to the fact that the PAC has been unable to re-establish itself as a revolutionary party in the country, bringing about a situation where the PAC's target audience is unaware of the PAC's political programme and their aims and objectives. Historical success of the PAC with regard to political actions, however,

indicates that it is capable of waging a political struggle. Its future success, however, will depend on its ability to popularise its political programme and principles during the 1990s, as the political situation in South Africa has changed dramatically compared to 1960 and 1976.

2.2.2 Political actions of the ANC

Political actions of the ANC are aimed at bringing about the kind of society visualised in the Freedom Charter. In order to achieve this, the ANC maintains that the old order, that of apartheid, must be broken down and destroyed. Tambo (1986:3) argues that "our [the ANC's] strategic goal must be to shift the balance of strength decisively in favour of our struggle through the further ripening of the revolutionary situation beyond the point where the regime is not able to rule the old way, to the stage where it is in fact unable to govern". South Africa should therefore be made ungovernable, and the process of government unworkable. Tambo (1987b:214) continues: "The accomplishment of these tasks will create the situation for us to overthrow the apartheid regime and for power to pass into the hands of the people as a whole".

The ANC's political actions are guided by two pillars of its people's war revolutionary strategy, namely the pillar of the all-round activity of the underground structures, and the pillar of the united mass action of the people (Tambo, 1985:70). It is obvious that the main thrust of the ANC's political activities is aimed at it not being carried out by a politically conscious minority, but by the masses themselves (Trevor, 1984:70). The ANC accepts that mass participation in a revolution does not take place spontaneously, and that the masses should be educated about the reasons and need for a people's war revolutionary struggle. The task of educating and organising the masses within the ANC's strategy is carried out by its underground structures. It is these structures that take charge of the revolution at the grassroots level inside South Africa (Tambo, 1989:18). Underground structures are rooted among the masses and, once this is achieved, Mzala (1985:24) claims that no banning or arrest of the leadership elements can weaken such structures, because they have become a material force in the revolution.

The ANC's underground structures should not be confused with the aim of creating a united front of organisations; these structures are in actual fact the instruments that can ensure that a united front of organisations be created. These structures have manifested themselves in South Africa in the form of street committees, block committees, area committees and people's committees, which function as political organs and fulfil a leadership role in the mass struggle, constituting "a microcosm of a united front" (Mashinini, 1987:3-5). These committees are perceived as an alternative type of power which represent a people's state in the making (SACP, 1986:4). Hence, people's committees are organs of revolutionary power that express the will of the masses. Mashinini (1986:21) defines the principal tasks of people's committees as follows:

- Organising the masses and transforming the no-go areas into strong mass revolutionary bases;
- creating areas of insurrection and self-government;
- ensuring that the expelled and rejected organs of apartheid power do not return to the no-go areas; and
- escalating activities and spreading them to yet unaffected areas.

According to the SACP (1988b:10), the creation of people's committees represents a major leap forward in the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. The speedy success of the people's war revolution is attributed to the creation, development and consolidation of the people's committees as organs of both popular and revolutionary power (Mashinini, 1987:6). It is the ANC's intention to bring about a high level of political consciousness among the masses by means of its underground structures, which would convince the masses to play an active role in the revolution (ANC, 1987b:5). The masses will then realise that they have to stand together, organise together and confront the government (Maharaj, 1984:5). Mass action is the immediate objective of the people's committees, thereby creating mass revolutionary bases in all the black residential areas throughout the country (ANC, 1987b:5).

The tactic of people's committees is to remove, little by little, from the government its ruling power, which would result in a situation where it would be possible to refer to these areas as liberated areas - at first from a political point of view (Migwe, 1982:85). The ANC (1984b:8)

therefore suggests that "our slogan - 'The counsellors must go, power to the people!' - means that we must establish organs of people's power in the process of struggle. It means that our organisations, the Civic Associations and anti-rent committees should exercise the will of the people wherever we are and thus transform the struggle against township councils into a nation-wide offensive against the entire system of government". The ANC advises its members to systematically assault and eliminate policemen, town counsellors, informers and any pro-government elements in the townships. Mandla (1985:26) describes the aforementioned as follows: "Life in the townships is no longer like it was before. It is interesting to imagine how it feels to live and move around there, in liberated townships in which maintaining order means turning them into undeclared operational areas. Here collaborators and informers live in fear of petrol, either as petrol bombs being hurled at their homes and reducing them to rack and ruin, or as petrol dousing their tretchorous bodies which are set alight and burned to a charred and despicable mess". This therefore represents a situation where the administrative organs of the government have been destroyed and its "administration stooges sent scurrying away like scared reptiles, leaving the township, location or village a people's territory" (Migwe, 1982:85). This, according to Tambo (1986:9), is how the ANC should impose its own popular loyalty on the country and establish itself as an alternative power.

Manifestations of the ANC's political rhetoric in direct political actions manifested themselves in South Africa in 1984. Large-scale political upheaval and unrest were evident in most of the black residential areas in the country. The creation of people's committees to lead the upheaval was the order of the day, and a number of black residential areas were rendered ungovernable. Justice van Dijkhorst of the Supreme Court of South Africa (Transvaal Division) clearly illustrated the effectiveness of the ANC's mass mobilisation actions and underground activities in his judgement in the case of the State vs Baleka and 18 Others (Van Dijkhorst, 1988: 508-897). Mashinini (1987:3) referred to the prevailing situation in South Africa during 1984 to 1987 as follows: "For the first time after many decades of struggle, the organised material force necessary for the destruction of the apartheid system has become a reality in South Africa". The South African Government was not able to govern in the old way and was

forced to declare a state of emergency in order to stabilise the situation in the country.

The state of emergency normalised the situation in South Africa to such a degree that the revolutionary gains that the ANC and its front organisations had made by means of its political actions were neutralised within a period of one year. The ANC, however, also contributed to the success of the government to normalise the situation, in that it was not capable of exploiting its revolutionary gains or bringing them to fruition. The ANC's ineffectiveness in exploiting the situation is clearly reflected in its attempts to push the revolutionary climate to a higher stage without consolidating its immediate gains. To a large extent, this resulted in the failure of the ANC's political strategy.

The political theories and direct actions of both the PAC and the ANC clearly demonstrate that these organisations are capable of bringing about political insurrection within the current status quo. The events of 1960 and 1976-1977 indicate that the PAC has the ability to educate and mobilise masses politically. Constraints on the PAC over the last decade, however, have degraded its ability to mobilise the masses. The general political unrest of 1984-1987 was the first practical manifestation of the ANC's political ability. The political actions of the ANC however, are by far superior to those of the PAC. This could largely be attributed to the success of the ANC in establishing itself as a revolutionary party in the political dimension of its people's war strategy. The PAC however, on the other hand still relies on its historical successes in maintaining for itself a position as a revolutionary party. The ANC succeeded in the 1980s to institutionalise its political programme and itself as a revolutionary party in the political realm in South Africa. It is clear from the aforementioned that the ANC has been far more successful in establishing itself as a revolutionary party than the PAC.

In order to determine the success of the PAC and the ANC in establishing themselves as revolutionary parties further, an analysis and comparison of the role of the revolutionary party in the military dimension needs to be made.

3 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The revolutionary party in a people's war revolutionary strategy ensures that the revolution does not adopt a character of militarism. In order to prevent militarism the revolutionary party has to exert political control over the military dimension. The revolutionary party must therefore subject all military strategies and tactics to the political objectives of the revolution. It is in this regard important to determine whether the PAC and the ANC have succeeded in incorporating their revolutionary party in the military dimensions of the revolutionary strategy.

3.1 The revolutionary party as component of the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

In its revolutionary strategy the military dimension of the PAC is guided by five distinct elements: an accurate political line which is correctly applied; a heroic disciplined people's army; a competent military command; a solidly united nation; and a strong base of operation among and with the masses (PAC, 1980:5). The military dimension depends on the political directives of the PAC as a revolutionary party, and political guidance and supervision are exercised over military actions (PAC, 1975:175). The political control of the PAC over its military wing is clearly illustrated by the following statement: "Our political struggle has now entered the phase of armed revolution. Our new military machine is also a political machine and vice versa" (PAC, 1975:108-109). Military objectives and actions of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing of the PAC, should continually be interpreted within the framework of the party's political objectives, making the military objectives and actions an extension of political objectives. The military dimension therefore, is a means to an end and not an end in itself. In this regard the PAC maintains that "the deciding factor is not the weapon but the people" (PAC, 1983:7).

Political policy forms a strategic component of the overall military dimension, and it is even argued that people go to the military battlefield to register their political victory, and to consolidate it (PAC, 1976:9). APLA cadres are trained in order to be able to communicate

politically with the masses and to provide them with political solutions that may be brought about by military actions (PAC, 1975:160). APLA members therefore accept that they are political fighters who have to do political work among the masses all their lives. The PAC approaches its military dimension from a position of relative weakness, which is borne out by the fact that its members infiltrated South Africa initially with the sole purpose of conducting political work among the masses (PAC, 1976:61-64). Political actions by members of APLA against the South African Government constitute the foundation of the revolutionary party and its involvement with the military dimension (PAC, 1975:160).

In spite of its rhetoric, little evidence of the revolutionary party's active involvement in the military dimension within South Africa exists. This is largely due to the fact that the PAC did not fully succeed in establishing itself as a revolutionary party in South Africa during the 1980s. The role of the revolutionary party in the military dimension is therefore obviously dependent on its role in the political dimension. However, existing rhetoric does indicate that specific guidelines do exist to ensure that the revolutionary party will be in a position to control the military dimension.

3.2 The revolutionary party as component of the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The fact that the ANC does not per se constitute a revolutionary party does not alter the situation where its military dimension and military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) are subjected to political leadership. According to the ANC (1969:8), the primacy of the political leadership is "unchallenged and supreme, and all revolutionary formations and levels (whether armed or not) are subordinate to this leadership". Kasrils (1988:3-9), member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and head of military intelligence, states clearly that ANC political policy and strategy determine the military strategy of MK and that politics guides the gun. No separation between military and political leadership exists therefore in the people's war strategy of the ANC, and the military dimension is thus an instrument of political policy. The military dimension, or the armed struggle, is defined as follows: "Revolutionary armed struggle is a political struggle by means which include the use of

military force, and the victory we strive for has as its aim the seizure of power by the people, led by their political vanguard the ANC" (ANC, 1987b:18).

When the rhetoric of its political leaders is evaluated, militarism is rejected by the ANC, and it is argued that "preparation for armed struggle means political preparation, that is, the political mobilisation of the masses around their concrete grievances" (Migwe, 1982a:15). However, this policy principle seems to have created dissention amongst the ranks of MK, in that they question the ability of the revolutionary party to make sound military decisions. In this regard Shambela (1986:14) argues that "it is the political leadership that, because of its tasks and place of coordinating and directing all the activities of the movement, can more ably direct the military leadership and give it its strategic tasks. It is necessary that when the political leadership takes such decisions the military should be present to influence them".

Political control on the ground level within MK is administered by political commissars. Stated ANC policy is that: "It is the specific task of commissars to ensure that the political line of the ANC becomes the essential component of the thinking of every member of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the unfailing guide to their actions" (Aluko, 1984:22). MK cadres are thus not only military exponents but political leaders who influence and organise the masses politically (ANC, 1987c:44). Stated ANC policy with regard to the military dimension is the following: "The armed struggle must be based on and grow out of mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military action" (ANC, 1985a:12).

With regard to the role of the revolutionary party in the military dimension of a people's war strategy, the conclusion is made that party or political control over the military component is of paramount importance. The PAC has a visible advantage (in rhetoric at least) in this regard, for it considers itself to be a political party that exerts direct control over the military dimension. The position of the ANC, as a result of it

not being clearly defined, could create the situation where the "militarist component" of the ANC could question the feasibility and correctness of political control over the military dimension. However, the ANC has co-opted the leaders of its armed wing into the political decision-making process, thus creating opportunities for militarists to determine their own agenda within the broader strategy of the ANC. This issue will be elaborated upon in the following chapter where the people's army as component of the revolutionary strategy will be discussed.

It is apparent, in rhetoric at least, that both APLA and MK are politically controlled, and that their agendas are subjected to political ratification. It may seem that neither the PAC nor the ANC bears a militaristic attitude towards its people's war strategy that is compatible with the ideas of Guevara and Debray, who were of the opinion that the military dimension was superior and more important than the political. It is also possible that MK in particular, could adopt a militaristic approach in the event of the ANC renouncing violence, as a means to seize power or as a strategic manoeuvre to involve the South African Government in a process of negotiation. The revolutionary parties in both the PAC's and the ANC's military dimensions are comparatively similar, despite the fact that the practical realisation of the PAC's rhetoric in this regard is not yet forthcoming and the possibility that certain military elements within the ANC could become out of control.

4 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS COMPONENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The revolutionary party has a central role in the socio-economic dimension, in that it provides political leadership to workers and trade unions in the economic sphere, and in that social forces accept the leadership role of the revolutionary party in its actions. In order to determine whether the PAC and the ANC have succeeded in establishing themselves as revolutionary parties in the socio-economic dimension a comparative analysis will firstly be made of the respective economic spheres and secondly of the social spheres.

4.1 The economic sphere

The role of the revolutionary party in the economic sphere is primarily focused on the workers and the trade unions in the target society. Vibrant and visible worker and trade union conflict with the employers and the government, is usually a practical indication of the revolutionary party's role in the economic sphere.

4.1.1 The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere

The attitude of the PAC towards the working class in South Africa is largely an extension of its approach towards nationalism. The working class is regarded as the black population which, according to the PAC, is the oppressed nation. The process whereby class and nation are lumped together can therefore be clearly detected in the economic sphere. According to the PAC the working class in South Africa consists of only black workers, however elements of the larger society such as the tradesmen, shopkeepers, handicraftsmen, and peasants are also included in the definition of the working class (PAC, 1975:6). As the most militant class in society, according to the PAC, the working class has an historic mission to abolish the prime basis of social injustice in South Africa. This basis of social injustice is represented by private ownership of the means of production, which has divided society into rich and poor and into exploiters and the exploited (PAC, 1975:69). The working class is regarded as the only class in society possessing those fighting qualities required to accomplish the task of "abolishing capitalism" (PAC, 1986:3).

The PAC as the revolutionary party sees itself as the vanguard of the working class. This role of the PAC is described as follows: "It is our duty as a Party of the working class to take particular care in the formulation of the form and content of our political and ideologic education for the working class. We must make sure that the working class understands its historic role; that it has grasped the relevant principles correctly and thoroughly. Our working class must first of all be imbued with its class ideology as well as its class norms and principles. It must have the revolutionary vigour and confident courage of its class. Our Party should struggle to make our working class what it should be. It must be tempered in struggle, so that in turn, it will temper the masses after

its own example" (PAC, 1976:30-31). The PAC is thus of the opinion that if the working class were to liberate itself, it would accordingly be able to liberate society, resulting in the elimination of all forms of political and national oppression. Thus, in the final analysis, the working class is the builder of a socialist society (PAC, 1975:70).

Despite its class consciousness, the working class also possesses other qualities which are seen as crucial qualities for the revolution. These qualities include the workers' collectivist nature instilled in them during the daily work process, and providing them with a capacity for strict discipline and united action which contributes to a high degree of organisation (PAC, 1975:69). The recommended structural and organisational vehicle that should be used by workers to exemplify their aspirations and demands is the trade union. The trade union movement is perceived by the PAC as the only organisational instrument that can be used by workers inside South Africa (PAC, 1976:29). Trade unions provide workers with a newly found social relationship towards each other - the collective combination of their strength. This provides them with the opportunity to fight back and to make demands on their employers. Demands such as higher wages, shorter working hours and improved working and health conditions are seen as strategic revolutionary demands (PAC, 1975:55).

Trade unions are regarded as instruments through which workers and the broader population can be mobilised. Combined mass and worker action that is directed by the trade union movement is an integral part of the economic dimension, in that it attempts to wrest economic concessions from the South African Government. Industrial strikes associated with political actions by the masses are regarded as an important means by which the exploited class/nation could achieve its aims (PAC, 1975:103). Industrial actions by trade unions are thus equal in value and substance to political acts against the state (PAC, 1986:30). Trade union activity is defined as follows: "Trade union activity should be part of the greater cause of mankind to break down the exploiting system and establish a social order in which man will live in harmony with other men. This is a political task which can only be brought about by political means. Trade union activity should therefore be part of the struggle for national and social liberation, a complementary activity to the people's armed struggle" (PAC,

1975:104). Trade unions, within the PAC definition, enjoy an exceptionally wide scope and greater political activity.

The PAC formed its own labour wing in 1983, when it created the Azanian Trade Union Co-ordinating Centre (ATUCC) in Tanzania. The PAC intended to give direction and leadership to trade unions in South Africa via ATUCC. The PAC does not support the black consciousness orientated trade unions in South Africa openly. It chooses to support the total spectrum of trade unions on account of its perception that it (the PAC) is the vanguard of all workers in South Africa. Certain trade unions such as the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), at its launching, associated itself with the PAC by raising the PAC flag (Africa Confidential, 1987:4). The PAC is divorced from the ideological battle raging within trade union movements inside South Africa and this, for example, led to a situation where the PAC was unable to exploit the wide range of anti-ANC and anti-Freedom Charter sentiments that were present in South Africa during 1986-1987. The PAC, although totally out of touch with the situation on the ground, recommended that all workers should unite in NACTU and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as a common and principled stand against apartheid (Mlambo, 1988b:14).

This naive approach of the PAC therefore allowed Charterist and pro-ANC trade unions to engulf and amalgamate pro-PAC trade unions into their ranks. When the PAC realised that pro-ANC trade unions had seized the moral high ground, it responded as follows: "The PAC leadership urges all the NACTU affiliated trade unions in Azania to resist all attempts by the ANC to co-opt them under their umbrella of political manipulations and to remain loyal NACTU affiliates, with the view of preserving their highly esteemed working class ideals of eradicating exploitation of man by man and emancipate themselves economically and socially. These Charter initiated intentions, are a recipe of breaking down the progress and achievements which NACTU itself has gained so far" (Ebrahim, 1988:3-4). This last-ditch attempt by the PAC is symptomatic of its position as revolutionary party being out of touch with the practical environment in South Africa. The PAC was therefore not successful in preventing unity talks between NACTU and COSATU in February 1989. There is no indication that unity has been achieved, but the fact that such talks have taken

place is detrimental to the position of the PAC as revolutionary party in the economic sphere.

4.1.2 The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere

The ANC focuses specifically on the role of the worker and the trade union movement in the economic sphere. The ANC, contrary to the PAC, does not see itself as the vanguard of the workers. This role, within the revolutionary alliance, is left to the SACP, which officially claims to be the vanguard of all the workers in South Africa (SACP, 1988c:41). The ANC does, however, describe the workers as the leading force in the struggle for national liberation (Gaetsewe, 1978:18). It is thus stated ANC policy that "the future of the people of South Africa is in the hands of the workers. Only the working class in alliance with other progressive minded sections of the community can build a happy life for all South Africans" (ANC, 1980:13).

The working class in South Africa, according to the ANC, comprises both white and black workers, but blacks constitute the majority of workers. Workers are thus not defined as a nation, but as "all propertyless persons who are employed to produce surplus value in return for a wage which is the cost of their subsistence" (Nyameko, 1980:29). As a result of their superior numbers within the working class, blacks are regarded as the leading force in the revolution (Inquilab, 1980:18). This view is shared by Slovo (1988:6), who argues that it is the black working class who suffers the most intense form of national dominance. This therefore tempers the workers and makes them the most revolutionary class. It is therefore argued that "of all classes amongst the black oppressed it is the working class which has nothing to lose but its chains in the struggle for revolutionary - transformation ... It is they who create all the country's wealth, working together in large concentrations at the point of production. And this experience of working together teaches them organisation. It teaches them to understand the system and the collective strength which they can bring to play against it" (Slovo, 1982:17).

Class and nation is not lumped together by the ANC, but it is clear from its attitude towards the working class that national emancipation is bound up with the economic emancipation of the working class. This is indicated

by the fact that the people's war is seen as some form of class struggle. The argument is generally used that to ensure that the revolution will continue towards socialism - the working class has to assert its role as the dominant class force in the present stage of revolution. It is also argued that the working class should act on behalf of all the sections of society in South Africa (SACP, 1987:1). Slovo (1988:21) is of the opinion that the working class must ensure that it emerges as the politically-dominant social class in the post-apartheid state. "This can only be achieved if the working class wins a place now as the leading social force in the inter-class liberation alliance." The labour struggle is thus put on an equal footing with the political and armed struggle (Tambo, 1984a:102).

One of the major objectives of the revolutionary party in the economic sphere, is to make the working class aware of being exploited. Spontaneous action by the workers when they revolt against this oppression is seen as protests against national and class exploitation (Majola, 1982:8). Worker struggles at the working place, be that in factory or farm, complement the political struggle of the masses and the armed struggle of MK (Botha, 1981:4-5). Workers are advised not to be active only in the working place but also in society in its broadest sense. "The workers must be active whenever people come together in struggle, whether at national, regional or local levels. The UDF, youth organisations, womens organisations, civic street committees, students, church-goers etc, must all feel the influence of the workers' militancy and dedication" (SACP, 1987:2). The ability of the working class to mobilise the masses in order to win new gains and concessions from the government is seen as the guarantee against the people's war revolution being suppressed (Reader, 1980:84).

The workers' militancy is channelled into the trade union movement, which is seen as the representative of the workers in the work place. The most important trade union movement is the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which serves as the labour front of the revolutionary alliance; it has become common practice to refer to the ANC/SACP/ SACTU alliance. SACTU, however, does not represent the vanguard, for that is the role of the SACP, but focuses more specifically on worker-related issues. SACTU describes its task within the revolutionary alliance as follows: "The task before us at present is to equip and lead the workers in vital

struggles against attempts of exploiting classes and government to place upon the shoulders of the working people the burden of the immense cost of apartheid" (Luckhart and Wall, 1980:12).

Organising workers into worker movements, that is, trade union movements, is the ultimate goal of SACTU, because such a process would imply inter alia that the workers are also politically active (SACTU, 1984:24). The workers can therefore only assume their leadership role once they are initiated into a trade union (Nyameko, 1980:29). The measure of organisation and discipline the worker receives within the trade union is perceived to be vital for the broader scope of the struggle: this implies that the worker uses his discipline and organisational capability in the environment outside of his workplace, such as in his community establishment. Nyameko (1985:55) therefore argues that the trade union is the starting point for the awakening of a revolutionary consciousness that can lead to the overthrow of the government.

The importance of trade unions in the economic sphere does not only reflect on the need for workers to become members of trade unions, but also for trade unions to extend over industrial boundaries. This implies that a federation of trade unions is a strategic step within the economic sphere. Pityana (1984:14) indicates that "trade union unity and the formation of an umbrella body for all unions is of strategic importance because it will increase the strength of the workers and bring them close to achieving liberation". Trade unions as the mass legal organisation of the working class should, in order to fulfil their task, ensure that they never become illegal (SACP, 1987:2). Press (1984:29-32) is of the opinion that when a trade union compromises its legal status, a powerful force will be lost in the struggle against the South African Government, and the position of the ANC as the revolutionary party would consequently also be compromised.

The creation of trade union unity based on the classification of industry is an important strategy within the economic sphere (SACP, 1987:2). The purpose of this is to have a united stand per industry; that is, one trade union should bargain with employers in a specific industry, for example mining, and not more than one trade union. Another objective is to unite these industry-based unions into one federation of trade unions which can

bargain for all workers on a national basis. The ANC is of the opinion that when such a situation is reached, the trade unions can confront the government politically (Nyameko, 1987:53). The struggles waged by the trade unions then become an integral part of the broader liberation struggle, and in this regard Tambo (1984:9) voiced the following opinion "In our situation, the victory of the trade union struggle is unattainable except as an integral part of the victory of the political, ideological and military struggle. The struggle of the working class is, therefore, and must be, an integral part of the national liberation struggle".

December 1985 was a turning point in the economic sphere when a national trade union federation inside South Africa was created. Prior to the launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU, in December 1985, SACTU attempted to give direction to trade unions such as the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The logistical handicap that existed between SACTU, which was situated in Lusaka, and trade unions in South Africa made it basically impossible for SACTU to implement a co-ordinated trade union strategy in South Africa (SACTU, 1984:24). The creation of COSATU is not seen as a replacement for SACTU but rather an extension of it. It has in this regard been stated that: "SACTU has a vital role to play in ensuring that the principles upon which it was founded continue to inspire and give direction to the growing forces of trade unionism in our country. It is for this reason that SACTU can continue to be a legitimate spokesman of the genuine trade unions of the South African workers" (Nyameko, 1985:44).

The creation of COSATU introduced a new dimension into the trade union and worker struggles in South Africa. COSATU is officially described by the ANC as the only progressive trade union federation in South Africa, and workers are urged to become members of this trade union (Tambo, 1987b:9). It therefore comes as no surprise that the COSATU leadership slavishly follows all the tasks and strategies which the ANC, the SACP and SACTU have identified. One of COSATU's intentions is to merge its affiliates into twelve super unions that can be identified in each industry. Workers will not be represented in a haphazard way with members being drawn from various industrial sectors, but workers will hereby be represented on a substantial basis in their own industry (Vukayi, 1985:94). The ANC has been successful in establishing itself as a revolutionary party within the

economic sphere by means of its alliance with the SACP and SACTU. The fact that trade unions and trade union federations such as COSATU consult with the ANC on a continuous basis reaffirms the aforementioned assumption (Stilton, 1988:65).

When the PAC is compared with the ANC regarding its role as revolutionary party in the economic sphere, the conclusion is necessarily drawn that the PAC, as far as the practical environment is concerned, is a non-factor. The ANC on the other hand has been, by means of its alliance with the SACP and SACTU, successful in influencing trade unionism within South Africa which has a direct influence on the economic sphere at large. The influence of both the PAC and the ANC as revolutionary parties in the economic sphere is however, underdeveloped. It can be expected that both organisations will attempt to expand their influence in this sphere in the future. This will be directly related to both organisations' attempts to institutionalise the concept "people's war" in their revolutionary strategies.

4.2 The social sphere

The role of the revolutionary party in the social sphere is not clearly defined as a result of the diversity that exists in this sphere. The revolutionary party as a component of the concept "people's war" aims by means of its influence in the social sphere to provide the revolution with a mass character. Social forces such as the youth, women and church organisations are strategic targets for the revolutionary party. It is therefore the objective of revolutionary parties to influence social forces, leading to a situation where the leadership role of the revolutionary party is generally accepted by the social forces.

4.2.1 The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the social sphere

The relatively low political and military profile of the PAC as a revolutionary party in South Africa over the last fourteen years has had a direct influence on its role in the social sphere. One is thus forced to analyse the rhetoric of the PAC with regards to the social sphere, not being able to use their role in practice as a yardstick. PAC rhetoric regarding its role in the social sphere is also limited to its view of the

youth and no mention whatsoever has as yet been made regarding other social forces in society.

The youth

The youth is regarded as of the utmost importance to the revolutionary struggle of the PAC. Education of the youth is therefore a strategic objective of the PAC, because it provides the youth with the vision of the future and a mission to build a new nation (PAC, 1982:16-17). The youth according to the PAC is involved in the revolution because its involvement reflects the point of view that it is preparing itself for its own future (Muendane, 1986:29-30). The PAC regards the youth as having particular revolutionary value: "It is the dynamism and enthusiasm of this young generation of revolutionaries that is one of the PAC's main focus points. This group of revolutionaries needs direction and leadership and the PAC of Azania is their real hope" (Moleko, 1984:21). It is therefore the PAC objective "to win over the largest possible number of students to a quite definite set of political and social ideas, or establish the closest possible bond between the students and a definite political group outside the student body" (PAC, 1976:47).

The youth is thus regarded as the budding leaders of their people in embryo and the choice before them is whether to take their place alongside the people in their struggle for national and social liberation or to allow themselves to be trained as lackey's of "the white foreign invaders and their black local running dogs" (PAC, 1975:64-67). Students must therefore, according to the PAC be organised into a youth movement. These students must then receive a definite set of political and social ideas and a bond has to be established between the students and the PAC. It is therefore essential to the PAC that the youth should be mobilised to form secret cells in the schools and universities and organise themselves into study, research and activist groups, in order to create a political consciousness (PAC, 1976:52).

It appears at present that the PAC regards the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU), founded in 1981, as the most important youth movement in South Africa. The PAC equates AZANYU's tasks with those of the now defunct South African Student Organisation (SASO) - of the late sixties and

seventies - in that it is AZANYU's task "to organise the youth and to acquaint them with black past history and to work with other progressive and genuine black organisations representative of our people" (Moleko, 1984:21). No indication exists that the PAC is at this stage attempting to institutionalise itself among the youth. Success of the PAC in the political and military dimensions could contribute to a process where it may begin to activate social forces.

4.2.2 The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the social sphere

Since the incorporation of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy, the ANC has emphasised the role of social forces in the revolutionary struggle. Social forces in specific sectors such as the youth, women, cultural and religious sectors have in this regard been specifically identified. The total spectrum of society - that is, the black, white, coloured and Indian population - has been targeted. The methodology used by the ANC to institutionalise itself within the social sphere centres around the process of popularising the Freedom Charter and the Constitutional Guidelines of the ANC among the different social forces. The acceptance of the Freedom Charter and the Constitutional Guidelines by social forces is inter alia perceived as an indication of the legitimization of the ANC in the social sphere. It is however important to indicate what the ANC's perception of specific social forces is, as well as to what extent this manifests itself in practice.

The youth as a social force

The youth as a social force is one of the most strategic targets of the ANC as reflected in their rhetoric. It was concluded at the Second Consultative Conference of the ANC in 1985 that: "The youth is an important section of the fighting forces in our struggle. The young generation constitutes the future. For the future of any revolutionary movement it is important to give particular attention to the development and participation of the youth in the struggle for liberation" (ANC, 1985a:9). Hlanganani (1985:21-30) outlines the position of the youth in the revolutionary struggle when he stated: "But for revolutionaries it is not enough just to be aware of the death-defying militancy, the extreme sacrifice displayed by our gallant youth. It is not enough even to applaud

the young people and assure them with statements that they are the hope of our future. Our most important responsibility to the young people is to give them correct political guidance and leadership. By this I mean giving them such political education that will enable them to understand the causes of their indomitable drive to struggle, the character of their social composition".

Educating the youth is thus an important and strategic objective of the ANC as revolutionary party, for such education would ensure that the youth accepts the leadership role of the ANC. This point of view was also stressed at the 1985 Conference of the ANC when it was resolved: "The position that our youth has come to occupy in the mass democratic struggle in our country has made the task of organising and educating the young even more important" (ANC, 1985a:9). Manifestations of ANC influence among the youth are found in the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) formed in April 1987. SAYCO's slogan, "Freedom or Death - Victory is Cetain" is the same as that of Umkhonto we Sizwe and its colours are black, green, gold and red - paralleling the colours of the ANC and the SACP. SAYCO's president, Peter Mokoba is a veteran ANC activist who has served a jail sentence for undergoing ANC military training and carrying out acts of sabotage (Anon, 1987:12). The ANC reaffirmed its acknowledgement of SAYCO as the leadership movement of the youth in South Africa during Tambo's new year's address in 1989 (Tambo, 1989:24).

Women as a social force

Women as a social force play a very important role in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC. Women played an important role during the fifties in the ANC strategy by means of the ANC Women's League which was the main affiliate of the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) which was inaugurated on April 17, 1954. FEDSAW disappeared from the South African political scene when the ANC Women's League was banned. Since the introduction of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC new strategies have been developed to reactivate the women in South Africa and to convince them to take part in the revolutionary struggle. The ANC links the emancipation of women to the seizure of power in South Africa (Ginwala, 1985:22). It was therefore resolved at the 1985

Conference of the ANC that "the true liberation of our womenfolk can only come about with the destruction of the apartheid system" (ANC 1985a:6).

The Commission on Strategy and Tactics recommended at the 1985 Conference that: "Urgent measures should be taken to ensure their (women) participation at all levels of our liberation struggle. In deployment and promotion of cadres we recommend positive discrimination in favour of women. The progressiveness and success of our Movement will largely depend on the participation of the womenfolk". It was also recommended that "the women's section should be revitalised and activated to ensure the effective implementation of all programmes and decisions relating to the mobilisation and education of women" (ANC, 1985a:5). The ANC (1987:1) therefore stated that: "one of our most urgent tasks is the building and strengthening of democratic organisations and to raise the level of participation of our women in the struggle for liberation". The first manifestation of the reawakening of the role of women in the liberation struggle appeared in 1987, when the Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW) committed itself to the involvement of women in the liberation struggle under the leadership of the ANC as the revolutionary party (Sara, 1988:3-7). A fair amount of organisation is also undertaken to reconstitute FEDSAW in order for it to function efficiently once again (ANC, 1989:1).

The Church as a social force

The church and the religion front have been recognised as a strategic component of the social sphere and the ANC is of the opinion that the political consciousness of the religious community should be raised, "influencing them to accept the policies of the Movement, especially the Freedom Charter, and a commitment to the creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa, all should strive to convert them into centres of resistance and struggle" (ANC, 1985a:10). Religion is thus viewed as an instrument which can be used to legitimize the revolutionary struggle, and discredit the South African Government. Frank Chikane, Secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) stated in this regard in the official mouthpiece of the ANC, Sechaba, that it was the South African Government "which was deliberately obstructing peace in our country and encouraging violence among our people" (Chikane, 1988:5).

Organised religion is equated with any other "material force" in the broad-allied and multi-strategised revolutionary struggle of the ANC and it is accepted that: "The church, as all religion, has a particular scope of operation which needs to be recognised, so that it can be supplemented by other revolutionary forces" (Lamola, 1988:7). The role of the church and religion in the liberation struggle and its partnership with the ANC should "continually engage in a critical evaluation of the process and dynamics of our [ANC's] revolution" (Lamola, 1988:8). Cedric Mayson, (1987:54), is thus convinced that the church and religion represent a battle field which necessitates an analysis of the forces involved in the conflict and their relation to the revolutionary struggle. The Kairos Document is presented by the ANC, as "the standard of revolutionary South African theology, and [the Kairos Document] marked the trail that the church has to travel before it can be a servant of the revolution" (Lamola, 1988:9).

The church, according to the ANC, from a revolutionary point of view has two possible roles:

" - A force of struggle. This is a view that inspires agitation for the conscientisation of the church leadership. The goal of this perception of the church would be the wish to see the church in South Africa as a liberated zone, and also as the embodiment of the struggle of the masses, that is, as 'the ANC at prayer' ...

- A site of struggle ..., just as the factory and the school ground are sites of struggle, so is the church. It is an arena where people come together to form a community, and from which they get whatever inspiration and protection they can. From there, they launch out towards the enemy, either 'in the name of the church' or as individuals who have been mobilised by relevant theology" (Lamola, 1988:10).

It is thus obvious that the church and religion have a definite revolutionary potential as far as the revolutionary strategy of the ANC is concerned, which emphasises the fact that it follows Lenin's dictum that "religion is the opium of the masses". The ANC is however not prepared to allow the church and its leaders to determine their own agenda, and have thus warned church leaders not to become an end in themselves: "An atmosphere is being created in which the church leaders and institutions are led to develop a false self-confidence and come to believe that they

can handle and lead a process of political change, to an extent where they will want to impose their own kind of methods of struggle and solutions which have not been subjected to the general review of the liberation movement" (Lamola, 1988:8).

This rebuttal of church leaders could have been directed at individuals such as Desmond Tutu and Alan Boesak who, according to opinion polls in 1987 and 1988, had more individually based support than Tambo and Slovo for instance. This could be viewed as a threat by the ANC in that the possibility always exists that both Tutu and Boesak could - as in the case of Mzorewa in the former Rhodesia - cut a deal with the South African Government. The establishment of an ANC religious department in 1988 could be viewed as an attempt by the ANC to undercut the potential leadership role of some of the church leaders in South Africa.

The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the social sphere is apparent from its rhetoric and practice. They have been successful in identifying and influencing the social sphere to such an extent that specific social forces can now be directly associated with the ANC and its objectives. The manifestation of this phenomenon will however be discussed in Chapter four which deals, among others, with the united front component of the concept "people's war" in the social sphere.

5 THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AS A COMPONENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The international dimension is of strategic importance to revolutionary movements in that it is usually from actors in this dimension that revolutionary parties receive political, economic, military and humanitarian support, without which it would be impossible to continue with the revolutionary struggle. The revolutionary party relies on the external dimension for legitimacy and acceptance and therefore undertakes specific actions in order for it to be recognised as a legitimate representative of the target state and its population. It is thus the primary objective of a revolutionary party in the international dimension to isolate and discredit the government of the target state, and if possible replace the target government internationally. It is therefore

important to determine to what extent both the PAC and the ANC have succeeded in legitimising themselves, and endeavoured to isolate the South African government from the international environment.

5.1 The role of the PAC as a revolutionary party in the international dimension

The PAC is internationally recognised as one of the national liberation movements of South Africa as set out in the 1974 General Assembly of the United Nations resolution GA 3411G (xxx). This resolution maintains that "the racist regime of South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the people of South Africa". The "legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements by all possible means, for the seizure of power by the people and the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination" is recognised and it is stated that the national liberation movements of South Africa, including the PAC, are the "authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people" (General Assembly res. GA 3411 [xxx], 1974).

The United Nations

The PAC as revolutionary party has been accredited with observer status at the General Assembly of the United Nations and may therefore participate, on invitation, in activities of the General Assembly. The PAC also participates on a de facto basis in the activities of various United Nations committees such as the Special Committee Against Apartheid and the Centre Against Apartheid (Booyse, 1986a:25-33). The United Nations provides the PAC with an international podium from which it can carry out its objective of isolating the South African Government internationally. It was to this effect that Mlambo (1986:9) addressed the General Assembly, condemning the South African Government and calling for support for the PAC's struggle from the international community. Mlambo also made use of this platform to accuse South Africa of contravening Chapter Seven of the United Nations manifesto: "If there was ever a regime against which the provisions contained under chapter seven should have long applied, it is the illegal minority regime of South Africa".

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The OAU recognises the PAC as a national liberation movement in accordance with the criteria laid down by the Liberation Committee of the OAU, in October 1973 for the recognition of such movements (Freudenschuss, 1981:126). The PAC has observer status in the OAU and takes part in its activities. This is significant in that the OAU has the ability to initiate any resolution regarding Africa in the United Nations, while South Africa is not a member of the OAU. The principal OAU committee which deals with the South African situation, is the 22 member Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa, also known as the Liberation Committee. This Committee has its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and meets twice a year - in January and June - to discuss issues related to the liberation of Africa from colonialism (Anon, 1984:). The PAC participates in the functioning of the Liberation Committee and in July 1986 requested R2 665 600 in financial, R551 803 in administrative and R2 672 740 in military aid (PAC, 1986:6-8). However the factional strife, byzantine leadership intrigues and lower rank rebellion that plagued the PAC during the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in the PAC losing the respect of the majority of member states which resulted in the PAC being isolated (Isaacs, 1987:6).

The Frontline states

The Frontline states comprising Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique which came into being as an Entente Cordiale, with the aim of liberating southern Africa from colonial rule, is another organisation which provides the PAC with international recognition while describing the South African government an illegal government. The relationship between the PAC and the Frontline states does not appear to be healthy at present and two member states of the Frontline states, Angola and Zambia, have not provided the PAC with representation in their countries (Isaacs, 1987:319). The PAC was also excluded from Frontline state meetings in Maputo (March 1982), Harare (February 1983), Arusha (April 1984) and Lusaka (March 1985). This is not seen as formal de-recognition of the PAC, but the PAC was omitted in Frontline communique's and only SWAPO and the ANC received declared support for their revolutionary struggles (Isaacs, 1987:32-34).

The deterioration of the political and revolutionary acceptability of the PAC within the Frontline states is firstly attributed to it not being able to wage a revolution in South Africa and secondly, to the influence the Central Information Agency (CIA) of the United States had in the PAC until 1985 (Isaacs, 1987:41-47). Indications do however exist that Mlambo has embarked on a concerted effort to institutionalise the PAC once again in the Frontline states (MLambo, 1988c:31-33).

Bilateral relations

The fact that the PAC is experiencing difficulties in establishing and maintainig itself within its natural support base - the OAU and the Frontline states - influences its bilateral relations with other states. The PAC claims to have official representation in 16 countries, but Isaacs (1987:34-36), the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the PAC, disputes this fact and argues that: "in most cases the PAC does not have formal offices but is represented by its members in their countries of domicile". Members of APLA do however receive military training in Libya, Iran, Syria, Yugoslavia, Kampuchea and the People's Republic of China (Zulu, 1986:46-47). And this could serve as an indication of some form of bilateral recognition the PAC receives.

However, it is obvious from this analysis of the role of the revolutionary party in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC, that the inability of the PAC to project its revolution inside South Africa severely influences it in the international dimension. The role of the revolutionary party in the international dimension as well as in the socio-economic dimension and to a lesser extent in the military dimension, is determined and influenced by its role in the political dimension. Only once the PAC is able to institutionalise itself as a political player inside South Africa will it be able to expand its role as revolutionary party in the other dimensions.

5.2 The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the international dimension

The ANC, as in the case of the PAC, is internationally recognised as one of the national liberation movements of South Africa, as setout in res. GA

3411G (xxx) 1974. In order to isolate South Africa internationally - one of the declared pillars of its revolution - the ANC operates internationally in international, continental, and regional organisations as well as in non-governmental organisations and individual states.

The United Nations

The ANC has also been accredited with observer status at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Tambo addressed the General Assembly for the first time in 1977. The ANC uses the international platform provided at the United Nations to attack the South African government by comparing it to Nazi-Germany of the 1930s and 1940s. Tambo (1981a:7) for example stated at an international conference organised by the General Assembly that: "Botha and the party he leads allied themselves with the Nazi's and opposed South Africa's entry into World War II. The nationalist party shares with the Nazi's a common ideology and brutality, and has taken upon itself the mantle of Hitler. It has become a fountain of that ideology and maintains close links with fascist and racist groups".

This strategy to link the national party to the Hitler regime has worked effectively in favour of the ANC and has contributed to the fact that South Africa is perceived as an outcast nation. It is therefore obvious why Tambo (1981a:3) stated in front of an international audience: "Let us, therefore, ... be very clear about the nature of the problem with which we are dealing. We are not discussing a normally law-abiding member (South Africa) of the international community that has had a momentary lapse. We are dealing with an outcast, one who continues to follow policies that have been declared a crime against humanity, a regime that has repeatedly acted in defiance of United Nations resolutions". The mere fact that the ANC is allowed to participate in the workings of the United Nations, is viewed by them as a legitimization of their role: "the fact is liberation movements of Southern Africa have taken part in diplomatic conferences, and have participated in the work of UN Committees, and have been recognised by governments either as representatives of the people's of South Africa or as bearers of rights" (ANC, 1981:13).

The easy access the ANC has to international forums is therefore fully utilised by it to attack the South African government and call on the international community for support. Calls for support by the ANC are usually made against the background of South Africa's violation of the International Declaration of Human Rights and Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter (Nkobi, 1983:4). The ANC has made effective use, and continues to do so, of the anti-South African attitude at the United Nations, in order to institutionalise itself as the sole representative of the majority of people in South Africa.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The ANC is also recognised by the OAU as a national liberation movement and has observer status at this organisation. The ANC and the PAC receive equal treatment at the OAU but unconfirmed reports indicate that the ANC receives preferential treatment from the Liberation Committee (PAC, 1986:9). The ANC has also been specifically praised by the OAU for its continued efforts inside South Africa to overthrow the government, and a OAU resolution of 1983 stated that the OAU "commends the ANC, the vanguard of the national liberation movements of South Africa, for the continued intensification of the armed struggle, and salutes the combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe who continue to register victories" (Anon, 1983:16-17).

The Frontline states

The ANC has to a large extent succeeded in establishing itself within the Frontline states as the only viable national liberation movement in South Africa. Since March 1982 the Frontline states have made mention of only the ANC as the legitimate national liberation movement in South Africa in its official communiques. The Frontline states are also prepared to give official sanctuary to the ANC and have stated that "the Frontline states reaffirm their recognition of the external operations of the movements [ANC and SWAPO] and reassert their intention to give shelter to them" (Anon, 1984:6). The Frontline states' commitment to the ANC also influenced the united front component of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC and will be analysed in Chapter four.

The Non Aligned Movement

The ANC also has observer status at the international conferences of the Non Aligned Movement which endorses the armed struggle of the ANC as a just and legitimate struggle (Mayibuye, No 3, 1983:8). The anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist attitude of the Non Aligned Movement is described by Tambo (1983a:9) as the "common understanding that took the ANC to Bandung and Belgrade and has led to our continued participation in your (NAM) deliberations since then. Thus the struggle against colonialism has been a primary objective of this movement, and must remain on the agenda until the last vestiges of alien rule are removed. By definition we are fellow combatants of people fighting for national independence, peace and security everywhere". The ANC's participation in international governmental organisations has provided it with the opportunity to expand its bilateral relationships with various countries.

Bilateral relationships

The ANC has representatives in about 46 countries and some of these representatives have been accredited with ambassadorial status, in for example Kenya and the Soviet Union (ANC, 1989:12). The ANC has extremely good relations with socialist countries and certain European countries. Tambo (1984a:11) described these relations as follows: "The socialist countries remain a solid pillar of support to our national liberation struggle. We are assured of their continued internationalist solidarity till the triumph of our revolutionary struggle ... We are particularly cognisant of the consistent support we receive from Sweden and other Nordic countries, from Holland, Italy and Austria to mention a few". It is only possible to comprehend the wide range of ANC international bilateral relations if it is taken into consideration that the official mouthpiece of the ANC, Sechaba, appears monthly and in each issue about three to four pages are devoted to the international contacts of the ANC. No less than four different international events involving the ANC are discussed in these sections of Sechaba. The ANC also has a wide range of contacts with non-governmental organisations and is also a member of some of these organisations.

The role of the ANC as a revolutionary party in the international dimension is the most advanced and sophisticated component of its revolutionary strategy. The ANC has until now not suffered any major setback in the international dimension and is increasing its influence in this dimension continuously. The international isolation of the South African government could therefore be attributed to the ANC's effective exploitation of the government's internal political policy of apartheid or racial segregation.

It is evident from the aforementioned analysis that the PAC has not been able to establish itself as a revolutionary party in the international dimension to the extent the ANC has been able to. This is despite the fact that the PAC and the ANC receive equal treatment at the United Nations and the OAU. A wide range of reasons exist as to why the ANC has been more effective than the PAC in the international dimension, of which the following could be viewed as the most important:

- The PAC has not been able to establish itself inside South Africa as a legitimate revolutionary party.
- The ANC has been able to exploit its limited visibility in South Africa to its own advantage internationally without any tangible revolutionary gains to substantiate its claims.
- The ANC and not the PAC was able to exploit the internal political unrest in South Africa during 1984 to 1987, to its own advantage.
- The ANC has been able to institutionalise itself as a nationalist group representing black South Africans internationally.
- The ANC has been able to ensure for itself superpower support via the Soviet Union while the PAC is linked to such countries as Iran and Libya.
- The ANC has been able to out-manoeuvre the PAC in the Frontline states.

It can thus be expected that the ANC will try to entrench itself further internationally while the PAC will try to make up lost ground.

6 CONCLUSION

The revolutionary party component was comparatively analysed in terms of both organisations' perceptions of themselves as revolutionary parties and their regard to the incorporation of the revolutionary party component into the political, military, socio-economic, and international dimensions of the respective revolutionary strategies in order to determine whether this component has effectively become part of PAC and ANC strategies.

It is apparent from the PAC point of view that it regards itself as a revolutionary party. The PAC does not only perceive itself as the leader of the revolutionary process but also as the political entity that will ensure national as well as class emancipation. The ANC on the other hand declines to describe itself as a revolutionary party. Manifestations in practice of the leadership role of the ANC indicate that it, in conjunction with its strategic alliance with the SACP and the SACTU (the revolutionary alliance), could be described as a revolutionary party. It is also impossible as a result of the leadership amalgamation on the executive level to make a definitive distinction between the objectives of the ANC, the SACP, the SACTU and the revolutionary alliance.

The process of incorporating the revolutionary party component into the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC was comparatively analysed in terms of rhetoric (the existence of a political alternative) and practice (political actions undertaken by the PAC and the ANC to establish themselves as revolutionary parties). It is evident from the analysis that the PAC and the ANC have in rhetoric alternative political programmes, but that manifestations on the ground indicate the fact that only the ANC has succeeded in establishing itself as a revolutionary party. It is therefore possible to conclude that the ANC has incorporated the revolutionary party component into the political dimension of its revolutionary strategy, while the PAC is still in the process of achieving this objective.

It is obvious from the analysis that both the PAC and the ANC as revolutionary parties control their respective military wings and that military actions are subjected to political control. But the PAC as a result of its position within the political dimension has not succeeded in establishing itself and its military wing inside South Africa. With regard

to the socio-economic dimension and specifically the economic sphere, both the PAC and the ANC have indicated their leadership role in terms of rhetoric. The ANC, however, has been the only one to institutionalise itself as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere. The fact that the PAC is a non-factor within the practical environment in the economic sphere is once again attributed to its position within the political dimension. The PAC is, in the social sphere, once again able to identify social forces in its rhetoric but unable to establish its leadership role as a revolutionary party in the practical environment. The ANC on the other hand has institutionalised itself as a revolutionary party in the social sphere.

It is apparent from the analysis of the international dimension that both the PAC and the ANC have been accredited with equal status as far as international inter-governmental organisations, for example the United Nations and the OAU, are concerned. But the PAC has once again so far failed to institutionalise itself internationally as a revolutionary party, a fact that is once again attributed to its position in the political dimension. The ANC on the other hand has gained international recognition for its role as a revolutionary party in South Africa.

It is possible therefore to conclude that both the PAC and the ANC, as far as the revolutionary party component is concerned, have incorporated the concept "people's war" into their respective revolutionary strategies. This conclusion is not a contradiction as far as the PAC is concerned, as a result of the fact that PAC rhetoric clearly indicates that it intends to introduce and incorporate the revolutionary party as component of the concept "people's war" in its revolutionary strategy despite the practical difficulties it experiences. It would be premature to make an emphatic statement that both the PAC and the ANC adhere to a people's war revolutionary strategy, therefore a comparative analysis of the united front component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC becomes necessary and will follow in chapter six.

CHAPTER SIX

THE UNITED FRONT AS A COMPONENT OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

It is clear from the previous chapters that nationalism, the people's army and the revolutionary party have visibly been incorporated in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. The united front is the final component of the concept "people's war" that needs to be analysed, compared and evaluated in order to determine the extent to which the concept has been applied to the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is possible to apply some of the dimensions of the revolutionary strategy paradigm identified in chapter two to facilitate the analysis, comparison and evaluation of the united front as a component of the people's war concept in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.

1. THE PAC'S AND THE ANC'S APPROACHES TOWARDS THE UNITED FRONT IN THEIR REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES

The united front is the one component of the concept "people's war" which aims to unite all forces - political, military, economic, social and external - against the incumbent government. The united front in a revolutionary strategy determines the level of consciousness of the masses and their preparedness to involve themselves and participate in the revolution. It is therefore important to determine first of all, what the PAC's and the ANC's approaches are towards the united front as a component of the concept "people's war" in their respective revolutionary strategies.

1.1 The PAC's approach towards the united front in its revolutionary strategy

The united front within which all revolutionary people are united in a broad front is a declared principle of the PAC's people's war revolutionary strategy (PAC, 1975:2). This united front, however, is subjected to the broad policy and organisation of the PAC as a

revolutionary party. The PAC accepts the responsibility that the success of the united front depends on the PAC's effective leadership as a party (PAC, 1976:54). Furthermore, the PAC has also declared that the principle of a united front is based on the fundamental reality that the PAC cannot liberate the masses alone, but can only lead the masses to liberate themselves (PAC, 1975:3). The formation of a united front against the South African government is thus viewed by the PAC as one of its primary tasks, and therefore it is its political duty to unite all those who should be engaged in the struggle against white minority rule (PAC, 1975:189).

The united front as envisaged should therefore constitute a combination of forces which should be as diverse as possible in its composition assuming thereby that "all the forces in conflict with the racist regime" will be included in such a front (Mlambo, 1988a:4). The PAC (1980:3) therefore maintains that "unity should manifest itself politically in a united front of all those who have conflict with the enemy and are capable of being won over to the side of the revolution or otherwise neutralised; militarily it must acquire a mass revolutionary character in which the people take full part alongside the guerrilla armies; organisationally it must enable the people to mobilise, train, arm, and defend themselves under the vanguard leadership of the national liberation movement". It is implied that all the schools of thought, which are neither willing to capitulate to, nor compromise with, imperialism in general and white domination in particular, be accommodated within a united front in order to build up the revolutionary political power of the people (PAC, 1976:65).

The forces which constitute such a united front are identified by the PAC as African intellectuals, businessmen, and the African urban and rural proletariat (PAC, 1975:190). South Africans who are currently engaged in negotiations with the South African government, such as leaders of national independent states, self-governing territories and municipal councillors, are therefore excluded from this united front. White participation is also excluded, which is indicative of the PAC's anti-white sentiments, despite the statement of Pokele (1986:10), former chairman of the PAC, that "we are not anti-white", or the statement of Mlambo (1988:4) that the PAC is not aiming at the liquidation of white people as a people, only at the demise of white domination. The PAC's

stated united front policy implies that it wants to unite all who are against white domination. However, as a result of the diversity of organisations, groups and individuals, this policy could create major obstacles for the PAC. The PAC's stated policy on a united front provides that those who participate in a united front should retain their political independence, to ensure that the revolution is not disrupted and led astray by the vacillation or betrayal which accompany political rivalry within a united front. The only prerequisite the PAC sets for participants in a united front is that there should be unanimity over the specific political objective of the front - the ending of white minority domination (PAC, 1975:192). The united front is thus seen as an integral part of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC, and moreover as that component which provides the revolution with its mass-based character.

1.2 The ANC's approach towards the united front in its revolutionary strategy

The policy of creating a united front is an integral part of the ANC's revolutionary strategy as defined by Tambo (1984:4). He pointed out that the all-round activity of the underground structures and the united mass action of the people constituted the essence of a united front policy. The formation and creation of a united front is regarded as a mechanism by means of which the masses can be convinced to participate in the revolution. The ANC declares: "Our slogan, forward to people's power, encapsulates the fundamental truth that the victory cannot be won without the active and conscious participation of the masses of the oppressed people themselves". (ANC, 1985:7). It is an objective of the ANC to consolidate unity of all classes, strata and national groups in order to assure the participation of the masses in a united front against apartheid (Mzansi, 1984:23).

The process of actively involving the masses in a united front is not perceived as an easy task, on account of the existence of fundamental differences between anti-apartheid groups and individuals in South Africa. The ANC, however, is convinced that the differences that divide the masses should be put into perspective, as these differences keep the masses, who share a common goal, divided. The SACP's (1988:4) point of view is reflected as follows: "However, the organisations which make up the

coalition will certainly differ on many issues: for example forms of action and future goals. These differences cannot be used to break up the coalition; but they must be discussed and debated freely". It is argued that "while acknowledging the differences, it has come to be recognised that the common ground for an alliance, at least in the first place, on specific issues leading perhaps to a broader, more programmatically based united front programme, must be found" (Stilton, 1988:66). When common ground is found - that is, mutual opposition to apartheid and a commitment towards its eradication - a united front is defined as a league of autonomous political organisations, groups and individuals who express similarities of ideas and positions in relation to a given political situation on matters affecting common interests (Mashinini, 1987:5).

For the ANC to advance its revolution to a "higher stage" the creation of a broadly based united front is seen as imperative (Slovo, 1986b:21). According to Slovo (1977:175), the united front should accommodate two fundamental propositions: it should not be ambiguous on the question of the primary role of the most oppressed African masses, and, secondly, those belonging to the other oppressed groups, and those whites who show themselves ready to make common cause with ANC objectives, must be fully integrated on the basis of individual equality. The ANC considers a united front to be a broadly based anti-apartheid front representing all the different social forces opposing apartheid (ANC, 1988:7). In this way it can ensure that the South African government is isolated internally, which will lead to the weakening of its power base and will create the conditions under which the government could be removed from power (SACP, 1988:4).

The united front component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC, is visible in all the dimensions of this strategy. The united front will thus be discussed within the framework of each dimension leading to a final analysis and identification of the united front in order to provide a model of this component. This model will indicate to what extent the united front, in the various dimensions, creates a total strategy, which contributes to the people's war revolutionary strategy of the ANC, as it is currently implemented inside South Africa.

It is crucial, in order to limit confusion, to make a comparative analysis of the united front in each of the dimensions of the revolutionary strategy in which it manifests itself. The various dimensions that will be discussed include the political, military and socio-economic dimensions which constitute the internal manouvre of the revolutionary strategy. The united front as it manifests in the international dimension will also be discussed.

2 THE UNITED FRONT IN THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The united front in the political dimensions of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC consists of those strategies and tactics used to amalgamate the revolutionary objectives of the PAC and the ANC with the political aspirations of the masses. The united front usually manifests itself in this dimension in the creation of front organisations, and alliances that are either tactical or strategic in nature.

2.1 The united front in the political dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

It has been indicated that the PAC sees the united front as a mechanism which provides the revolution with its mass character. The aim of the united front is thus "to strengthen and coordinate the political activities of the mass organisations in order to increase the fighting capacity of the oppressed and dispossessed majority ideologically, organisationally and militarily to explore areas of principled unity with organisations and individuals who have a contradiction with the enemy, to programme those who identify themselves with the just aspirations of the dispossessed majority" (Mlambo, 1986:7). Thus the logical direction for the united front to follow is "to start from a position of weakness and gradually raise the level of mass struggle to the point where the balance of forces between us [the PAC] and the enemy will change in our favour" (PAC, 1976:63-64).

However, the practical conditions and realities in South Africa indicate that the PAC's objectives and aims with regard to the creation of a united front are still an academic or theoretical exercise only. There is no

practical evidence to substantiate PAC rhetoric regarding a united front led by the PAC in South Africa. The Administrative Secretary of the PAC, Mkwanazi (1985:4), however, did indicate that serious attempts were being made by the PAC to create a united front in South Africa. This was also confirmed by Zulu (1986:20-25), who indicated that one of his tasks within South Africa was the creation of an organisation called the Patriotic Africanist National Front (PANAFRO), which could serve as a broad united front. There is no indication that such an organisation exists, which leaves the PAC without a legal or semi-legal front organisation in South Africa. During December 1988 the President of the PAC, Mothopeng (1988: 6, 8 and 18), confirmed that the PAC did not have a legal or semi-legal front organisation in South Africa that could serve as a united front.

The PAC, against the background of it being unable to create a united front in the political dimension, opted to attempt to hijack existing political formations in South Africa. One such organisation is the National Forum, towards which the PAC continuously reflects a positive and supportive approach. The PAC is of the opinion that the National Forum must "rally a political army capable of waging the struggle for the transfer of political power to the oppressed. It must concretise in national unity, the principal organisational link capable of facilitating the creation of a powerful apparatus for seeing the revolution through to its dialectical conclusion" (PAC, 1985:7-8). The PAC is clearly trying to use the National Forum as a bridgehead in its attempt to institutionalise a united front in the political dimension. The conclusion can therefore be made that the PAC has not been able to incorporate the united front as a component of the concept "people's war" into the political dimension of its revolutionary strategy.

2.2 The united front in the political dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The purpose of a united front in the political dimension is to isolate the South African Government internally. In order for the South African government to be isolated internally the ANC's united front has to comprise a broad spectrum of anti-apartheid forces. The process and efforts employed to unite all the anti-apartheid forces, are described as a "heightened level of the struggle" (Denga, 1988:55). Those forces which

should constitute a broad united front are described by Stilton (1988: 64-67) as the revolutionary alliance, mass democratic movements, opposition groups outside existing mass democratic movements such as Black Consciousness groups, and white liberal and democratic organisations. Denga (1988:58-59) also includes apolitical black community groups; genuine patriotic organisations which pursue some form of socialism; and individuals in the white community who are breaking with apartheid and its structures. The participation of whites in the united front has become an important component of the ANC's united front policy (Slovo, 1987b:6). The primary white target groups for participation in the united front are those groups and individuals who have opted for the extra-parliamentary alternative in South African politics. These groups and individuals, however, are "not part of the revolutionary forces, but they contribute to the weakening of the main enemy and some of them are clearly part of the opposition line-up" (Slovo, 1986B:22-23).

The concept "opposition line-up" was explained during the Dakar talks of 1987, when a group of South Africans met with an ANC delegation in Senegal. Thabo Mbeki, ANC Chief of Publicity and Information, stated that all these forces who do not associate with the ANC constitute the government-orientated line-up, while those who do associate with the ANC are part of the opposition line-up (Louw, 1987). In this way the ANC has created a simplistic definition of society in South Africa, where society is divided into two camps: those associated with the ANC (the democratic forces) and those who do not associate with the ANC (the enemy or counter-revolutionary forces). According to the ANC the coalition of anti-apartheid forces is dictated by a revolutionary necessity and therefore represents the shortest possible route to the ANC's final objective. According to this approach it becomes important for the ANC to make "concessions to prospective allies" in order to assure the broadest possible united front. This attitude of the ANC reflects a certain degree of theoretical sophistication in its rhetoric, in that Lenin advised revolutionary groups to make concessions to possible allies. The following statement of the ANC confirms this: "We will at times find ourselves having to work with some forces within the bantustan system and the racist parliament. But it is a 'compromise' in a qualified sense, for the mass democratic movement [the ANC] in general does not abandon its strategies, forms of struggle or its campaigns" (Denga, 1988:61).

According to the ANC, the existence of a broad anti-apartheid political unity, be it among progressive democrats or in a broad coalition, does not imply that it is a monolith of South Africans in general. This coalition, which constitutes a united front, is "based on actual classes and strata with common, different and sometimes contradictory aims" (Denga, 1988:59). The united front is thus a dynamic organism that will undergo organisational and political changes in the process of development. An agreement on some broad principles - such as being against apartheid - does not imply that a structural relationship will emerge amongst the components of the broad coalition. The ANC, however, is of the opinion that it could be "the beginning of a long process of joint actions, and, so to speak, 'confidence-building measures' which culminate in local, regional and national structures. In the process of struggle, circumstances could so change that the formation of a structured coalition becomes necessary. New forces could join a front after a period; others could have justifiable reasons to insist on a bigger, broader front" (Denga, 1988:63).

The formation and creation of a broad coalition of anti-apartheid organisations that could manifest itself in one broad united front is a strategic political objective of the ANC. As a result of the combination of a broad spectrum of organisations, groups and individuals in such a front, attention will not be focused on those issues that could lead to a division within the united front. The principle is that the front should serve its desired purpose, involve the masses at all levels, and not lead to the weakening of the coalition and its democratic organisations (Denga, 1988:63). To link together the diversity of forces, the ANC focuses its attention - within the united front - on the broad and mutually shared objective, that of ending apartheid.

The ANC started to organise the creation of a broad anti-apartheid united front in 1980 as part of its organisational phase for a people's war. The success of the organisational phase is represented by the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) during August 1983 (Tambo, 1987b:6). The launch of the UDF is described by the ANC as follows: "Within the context of this year's (1983) campaign for united action the launching of the United Democratic Front constitutes a phenomenal stride towards the consolidation of our political arsenal" (ANC, 1983:26). The SACP added to

the ANC's statement by declaring that "the urgent and fundamental task forcing all genuine revolutionaries and patriots is to build upon this achievement and not allow petty differences to stand in the way of creating the broadest possible democratic opposition and resistance to race rule in all its forms" (SACP, 1983:37). The creation of the UDF is attributed to the fact that "over the years, the entire democratic movement of our country has amassed a tremendous wealth of experience in the field of organisation and mobilisation. In most cases at different stages of the struggle, when new initiatives were undertaken, the correct chord was struck, bringing the entire orchestra into harmony. The birth of the United Democratic Front was one such development" (Denga, 1988:54).

The UDF is the principal movement inside South Africa which fosters and espouses the ANC's united front policy principles, and is described as an outstanding example of the political maturity of the oppressed people. The ANC also maintains that the UDF "is a product of the years that our country's forces of progress have spent first to mobilize the masses of our people into action and to draw them into mass organisational formations, second to ensure that these masses adhere to common political platforms and, thirdly, that this political unity finds expression in the kind of organisational unity which enables the people to move as one mass political army of revolution, under one command, focusing on the central question of all revolutions, whether peaceful or violent, the question of sheer power" (ANC, 1986:6-7).

The UDF is viewed as a front organisation for united action against apartheid (Mzansi, 1984:25). It is projected as a people's movement which is a key motive force for political progress under present conditions in South Africa (Stalker, 1988:19). It is the opinion of the ANC that the masses can only be drawn into the UDF if the ANC itself plays an active role within the UDF (ANC, 1985a:7). This active role, according to the ANC, will manifest itself in the control the ANC's underground structures exercise within the UDF. The de-exciled ANC elements who constitute the underground structures should therefore transfer "the initiative of the liberation process to the actual arena of our (ANC's) struggle, inside South Africa" (Mzala, 1985:25).

The emphasis placed by the ANC on the participation of whites in the united front is largely attributed to the political reform process instituted in South Africa by the government, where people who are not white are drawn into the political decision-making process. The normal and expected response of the ANC was to draw that group which constitutes the ruling government's power base into the "opposition line-up". The strategy and tactics that were accepted at the ANC's Second Consultative Conference in 1985 state: "To ensure that democratic whites become active participants in the struggle we recommend that: they work increasingly to popularise the End Conscription Campaign. ... The formation of support groups for conscientious objectors, war resisters and supporters. ... White democratic organisations that have sprung up in the same areas in the country should broaden their ranks and include the growing number of whites who feel uncomfortable in Botha's 'new style political deal' eg. the PFP youth" (ANC, 1985a:11). Developments within "white politics" since 1986 have created more divisions within progressive white politics resulting in the ANC focusing specifically on organisations such as the Five Freedoms Forum, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) and the National Democratic Movement (NDM) for inclusion in the united front (Stilton, 1988:56). Other groups who have been specifically identified for inclusion in the united front include the Johannesburg Democratic Committee (JODAC); the Detainees' Parents' Support Committee (DPSC), and the Black Sash (Denga, 1987:71).

Despite the fact that the UDF and its affiliates were responsible for the wide range of political unrest which occurred in South Africa from September 1984 until the end of 1987, forcing the South African Government to declare a state of emergency to curtail the unrest, the ANC is not satisfied with the UDF's progress. The fact that sharp divisions and conflict exist within the leadership of the UDF, and its failure to identify a political programme of action and a set of strategic and tactical objectives, is of major concern to the ANC. The emergence of contradiction between the national leadership of the UDF on the one hand and regional and local collectives on the other, and the failure of the UDF, its affiliates and the ANC's underground structures to solve the political question, is also of concern to the ANC (ANC, 1987:3-4). The UDF has also not succeeded in reaching and involving the majority of the masses, including: youth, women and sport bodies; church and religious

bodies; Hindu and Moslem groups; NAFCOC and Inyandza, the governing party in KaNgwane, who all lack a political vision (Denga, 1988:56). The ANC has, however, resolved that a bilateral meeting with representatives of the UDF and an "All-in Conference" of all anti-apartheid democratic forces in South Africa will take place in the period 1988 to 1990 (ANC, 1987:16). It is expected that these meetings will serve as a forum where current problem areas concerning the implementation of the united front policy will be ironed out. The attempted launch of such a Conference will be discussed later when the united front strategy model is identified.

The approaches of both the PAC and the ANC towards the united front in their political dimensions are theoretically sound in that both make provision for the inclusion of a wide spectrum of organisations, groups and individuals within a united front, on condition that these participants are opposed to the South African Government and committed to its eradication. The PAC's clinical approach towards its united front policy indicates that this policy was formulated in a laboratory-type situation which ignores the practical realities of the South African situation. The PAC's attitude towards its united front policy is clearly entangled in those conditions which prevailed in the underdeveloped world during the 1950s and 1960s. The ANC's approach towards its united front policy, on the other hand, reflects an attitude which is soundly based on the political environment which exists within South Africa. The PAC's united front policy also reflects a commitment to only the non-white community in South Africa, while the ANC's policy includes all the sectors of society. The discrepancies that exist between the theoretical approach of the PAC and that of the ANC towards the united front are reflected in the practical environment within South Africa.

Manifestations of the PAC's united front policy are non-existent within South Africa, as a result of the fact that no organisation in South Africa propagates or strives to bring the PAC's united front policy to fruition. On the other hand, the ANC's united front policy is clearly visible in South Africa, on account of the activity of the UDF and its affiliates. The ANC's attempts to incorporate white progressive democratic elements are evident from the contacts and meetings that have taken place between the ANC and these groups since 1986. The change in these organisations' stated attitudes towards the ANC and its policies is also a reflection of

the fact that some of the organisations are becoming part of the opposition line-up, while others are rapidly moving away from the status quo in South Africa.

The ANC and the PAC attempt to unite the broadest possible association of organisations, groups and individuals within a united front against the South African Government. However, the success of this attempt depends upon a broadly based political programme, which will determine the feasibility of such a united front. Such a political programme usually comprises specific political principles which contain those guidelines which are to be adhered to within a process where a united front policy is implemented. It seems that the ANC has decided to use the concept of "being opposed to apartheid" as the political slogan around which organisations and individuals can be united in a broad front against the South African Government. The PAC, however, has not institutionalised its rhetoric regarding a united front in the political dimension of its revolutionary strategy and as a result it may be concluded that it has not reached this level of incorporating the concept "people's war" into its revolutionary strategy.

3 THE UNITED FRONT IN THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The united front in the military dimension represents that component which combines political and military action into one concerted effort. The united front in the military dimension therefore represents a practical indication of how a combination of political and military operations are used to mobilise the masses and convince them to unite in their actions against the target government. An effective combination of political and military operations could therefore result in the revolution bypassing specific stages if it manifests itself in a sustained mass insurrection.

3.1 The united front in the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

The united front policy and its application on the military dimension of the PAC is not reflected in existing policy statements. This may be ascribed to the insignificant political profile of the PAC in South

Africa. The introduction of a combined politico-military strategy has been a policy principle of the PAC since 1974, and it has stated as follows: "No small revolutionary core which is faced with a revolutionary situation can expect to seize and organise political power without winning to its side substantial numbers of the masses of its population" (PAC, 1975:160). The objective of a politico-military strategy is to create a united front among the masses who support the PAC politically and militarily. The PAC acknowledges that there could be no greater army than the mobilisation of the people as a whole. The united front policy aimed at politico-military action is viewed as the one instrument that could lead to the mobilisation of the masses. The effective implementation of such a policy could result in a mass insurrection.

The PAC is convinced that such a policy could only be implemented from a relative position of weakness. This policy should gradually raise the level of mass politico-military action to a point where the correlation of forces and the balance of forces change in its favour (PAC, 1976:64). The decisive factor is thus evidently not the weapon, but the people (PAC, 1983:7). It is the objective of the united front policy to organise the masses into political and military armed units, who will serve as instruments of mobilisation (Mazabane, 1988:20). The energies of the masses, according to the PAC, could thus be harnessed by the politico-military units. Accordingly, the energy that would be released by these units could result in the liberation of the oppressed in South Africa (Dimpho, 1988:12). Combining political and military actions among the masses is viewed as the one strategic component which will determine the outcome of the people's war. Evidence of this is however not found in South Africa as far as PAC participation is concerned. The possibilities reflected in this policy could be detrimental to the counter-revolutionary process in South Africa.

3.2 The united front in the military dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The united front policy of the ANC is a strategic component of the military dimension. The primary objective of this policy is to get the masses involved in the military struggle. For the policy to be successful this involvement should take place on a massive scale. The ANC (1985a:2)

specified as follows: "The armed struggle must be based on and grow out of mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action". The concept of an armed revolutionary people's war presupposes the ever-growing politico-military actions and active participation of the masses in this struggle (ANC, 1987d:5).

According to Mzala (1987b:6), combining political and military work is the most strategic component of a people's war, in that such an amalgamation could create the environment where a total and massive insurrection becomes inevitable. Mkhwanpzi (1989:25) elaborated on this when he stated that "the art of people's war centres around the merging of the efforts of the political army of the masses with the revolutionary army. To be successful, people's war must have a coordinated pooling of political and military efforts, throughout the country". Thus the armed struggle of MK should be centred around the people's struggle, that is, the internal political struggle represented by, for example, people's committees (Theresa, 1989:26). MK armed actions have to be sensitive to their implications on the political struggle of the masses inside South Africa, for it is the masses who suffer the most as a result of mistakes made by MK (Aluko, 1982:15).

The effective combination of the underground political movements with the armed wing (MK) is thus the linchpin of the people's war strategy of the ANC (Mzala, 1987b:2). The development of underground structures to facilitate combined politico-military work is critical to an all-round people's war (ANC, 1985a:12). With reference to the military component, Kasrils (1988:3) remarked that "the development of the armed struggle depends on it being rooted among the people - our MK combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a people's war". These underground movements therefore have a dual role in that they supply a support base for military operations and they politicise the masses to such an extent that MK cadres are welcomed among them.

The process of incorporating MK cadres into the political underground structures ensures that the ANC has its "finger on the pulse" of the changing popular mood; it ensures that continuity, purpose and direction is given to these structures; it ensures that these structures know how to use each victory as a step to even greater victory; and it ensures that every available avenue is used to advance the revolutionary cause which could improve the quality of the masses' political offensive (Mkhwanazi, 1989:25). The political underground and the MK combat forces will grow side-by-side during the implementation of this united front policy (Kasrils, 1988:7). Combining the armed and political struggles in the underground structures is regarded as a means of making the masses realise that they have to stand together and organise together. In this regard the ANC (1984:5) has stated that: "We have to reach hands from every area of our struggle, and to link particularly between the mass overt struggles and the underground and armed struggles of our people". The political underground and the armed struggle is thus the core of the people's war revolution (Mkhwanazi, 1989:25).

Incorporating MK units into political underground structures highlights the concept of arming the masses (ANC, 1987d:5). The ANC (1983b:71) has stated as follows: "Our aim is a war fought by the entire people, not only in strikes and demonstrations but precisely in the field of armed struggle". The masses should thus move away from aimless, sporadic acts of violence to purposeful and organised mass violence - "where there was a stone must now be a handgrenade, where there was a stick or iron bar there must be an automatic rifle" (Migwe, 1982:81). The ANC (1984c:5) voices its opinion thus: "Our people should not be mere spectators in the intensifying political and military blows against the enemy. Every form of support should be given to our cadres (MK) as they confront the enemy in the cities and villages of our country. The doors of the houses of our people should be open to our cadres. Everybody should realise that he has got a role to play to ensure the success of our military operations".

The ANC is committed to militarise the underground political structures, and for this purpose provision is made for crash courses in elementary weapon training over weekends inside South Africa. Specific sectors of society that are earmarked for such training include workers, migrant workers, university and secondary school children, and small, carefully

selected groups from villages. It is therefore argued that "in this way the primary task of the many MK cadres would be to multiply themselves among the people inside the country rather than all of them doing the actual fighting at this stage" (Migwe, 1982:83). Such an intensification of the armed struggle would parallel an intensified process of mass politicisation (ANC, 1984d:7). The seizure of power is seen as the product of a protracted struggle where the mass political and armed struggle becomes merged, resulting in a mass insurrection (Mkhwanazi, 1989:25).

The strategy of combining the political and military struggles, and how these relate to one another, passes through different phases, depending on changes in the practical environment. The ANC is convinced that "it is vital to have under continuous survey these two inter-dependent factors in our struggle and the place which political and military actions occupy in each phase" (ANC, 1985a:12). The politico-military struggle is therefore coordinated on a national level by the Politico-Military Council (PMC) which comprises members of the SACP, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), Umkhonto we Sizwe and the political leadership of the ANC. The aforementioned members of the PMC are all also members of the National Executive Committee of the ANC. The PMC is the executive body which formulates and executes the revolutionary strategy of the ANC. The PMC, however, is divorced from the practical situation in South Africa because it is situated in Lusaka. To overcome this situation, the PMC has created Regional Politico-Military Councils (RPMC's) based in South Africa's neighbouring countries. These RPMCs liaise with the PMC and with structures within South Africa. These structures within South Africa are Area Politico-Military Councils (APMCs) which co-ordinate the political and military struggle inside South Africa. The APMCs co-ordinate and liaise with Area People's Committees (APCs) which comprise people's committees, civic organisations, street committees and block committees in specific regions in South Africa (ANC, 1985a:12-15).

These combined political and military structures were largely responsible for the country-wide unrest that started in South Africa in September 1984. The viability of the united front in the military dimension was clearly demonstrated between 1984 and 1987, where all sectors of society were, in one way or another, involved in the unrest. The ANC, however, was not successful in utilizing the prevailing conditions to the extent where

a mass insurrection would have been inevitable. If such an insurrection had occurred, the people's war revolutionary strategy would have made such inroads that the South African Government would have been forced to increase its level of violence against the population - resulting in a spiral of violence with no known outcome. Effective counter-measures by the South African Government prevented a situation where the visible revolutionary climate could have become a self-sustained phenomenon. The united front policy within the military dimension - that is, the active combination of political and military actions - is clearly a strategic component of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC.

In spite of its rhetoric, the PAC has not been able to implement a united front policy in its military dimension. The failure, until now, of its political dimension is largely to blame for the failure of its military dimension. The ANC, on the other hand, has been relatively successful in conducting its united front policy within the military dimension, something that would not have been possible if it had not been for the relatively high profile of its political dimension. However the ANC was not prepared in 1985 for the successes its united front policy produced. This resulted in major strategic mistakes, in that those combined politico-military actors on the ground started to act impulsively. The military component of the united front was clearly not capable of keeping up with the developments in the political component, and consequently barbaric acts such as necklacing murders were committed by the masses, on account of the fact that MK was not present to "mete out justice". This indicates that major logistical, command and control problems existed during this period. These problems, and the impulsive reactions of the elements that were out of control provided the South African Government with the opportunity to arrest a large section of the leadership elements on the ground, thereby bringing the implementations of the united front in the military dimension to a definite halt.

The united front in the military dimensions of the PAC and the ANC, is a major threat to national security in South Africa. The possibility of these dimensions being implemented on a parallel basis or in a united effort will provide the South African Government with unknown security considerations. The combination of political and military acts, embedded in the masses, does not provide the South African security forces with an

identifiable target. This increases the problematic possibility of the South African Government increasing state violence, which could result in the population being forced into the ranks of the PAC and the ANC.

4 THE UNITED FRONT IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The incorporation of the united front in the socio-economic dimensions is for the purpose of this study divided into the economic sphere and the social sphere. This is done in order to facilitate a microscopic comparative analysis of the united front in the socio-economic dimensions of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.

4.1 The economic sphere

The united front component of a people's war revolutionary strategy manifests itself within the economic sphere in those activities that aim at uniting various trade unions in a revolutionary orientated federation of trade unions that aim at uniting trade unions (the workers) with the masses, and that aim at uniting workers with the people's army. The united front within the economic sphere serves as that revolutionary instrument which provides the revolutionary organisation with an opportunity to incorporate the workers into the overall revolutionary struggle.

There is no evidence currently in both rhetoric and practice that the PAC has made any provision for the implementation of the united front in the economic sphere. This could to a large extent be attributed to the current status of the PAC in the political and military dimension - a situation that is related to the inability of the PAC to establish itself as a revolutionary party inside South Africa.

The ANC on the other hand has started to incorporate the united front component of its revolutionary strategy in the economic sphere. The most significant development in this regard has been the launch of COSATU, when more than 35 trade unions were united into one trade union federation. In direct correlation with the united front ideas COSATU has committed itself to create 12 super industrial trade unions; With the adoption of the

Freedom Charter in July 1988 by COSATU at its second congress, the trade union federation embarked on a new political road. This can be directly linked to the strategic objective of involving the workers in the political dimension.

By accepting the Freedom Charter, COSATU acquired a significant political profile which is important in the broader framework of the united front policy of the ANC. The trade union struggle of COSATU has been effectively linked to the political struggle of the ANC by means of accepting the Freedom Charter. The statement made by Ramaphosa, the Secretary-General of NUM, that "the struggle on the shop floor cannot be separated from the wider political issues", indicates this linking process (Cape Times, 1985). Naidoo, the Secretary-General of COSATU, reaffirmed that linkage when he stated: "We reiterate that it is our legitimate and democratic right as a representative trade union to address the political demands of our members" (Cape Times, 1985). The trade unions in South Africa and more specifically COSATU, attempt to increase the revolutionary potential in the country. The ANC has also been successful in coopting leadership elements in NACTU which, as a result, entered into unity talks with COSATU in February 1989. COSATU on account of its position in the economic sphere has been described as one of the key organisations in the mass democratic movement by the ANC, which implies that COSATU is accepted as a political force (Stilton, 1988:65). This indicates that it is assumed by the ANC that the workers and the masses have united in the mass democratic movement.

It is stated ANC policy that workers should be drawn into the armed struggle. "Special attention needs to be given to drawing workers into MK. This is vital for both the overall perspectives of people's war as well as for the possibility of mobilising for a long-lasting national work stoppage backed by our oppressed communities and supported by armed activities aimed at bringing the regime to its knees" (ANC, 1985a:7). Numerous sabotage incidents have also taken place that were clearly aimed at being an indication of armed support for strikes and work stoppages (Booyse, 1987:14-15).

A new strategy has been introduced into the economic sphere of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC. Since 1984, co-ordinated actions such

as consumer boycotts and stay-aways occurred in South Africa that were clearly aimed at the economy. Consumer boycotts are described as an economic weapon in a people's war, for it unites the people around their grievances; it places pressure on white voters who are shopkeepers; it brings about a high degree of organisation among the oppressed masses (between trade unions and other organisations); it activates the people politically and it gives them a political consciousness and discipline (Middleton, 1986:9-11). Effective consumer boycotts were launched in Uitenhage during 1985 and 1986, resulting in various shopowners having to close their businesses. Stay-aways on the other hand, are aimed at bringing industry to a standstill in an attempt to cripple the economy (Nyameko, 1985b:69-71). These strategies are an attempt to combine the struggle of the workers with that of the masses. The ANC has clearly succeeded in introducing the united front component of the concept "people's war" into the economic sphere of its revolutionary strategy. The manifestations of the united front in the economic sphere over the last 24 months in South Africa are however only the beginning of the practical evidence of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC.

4.2 The social sphere

The presence and success of the united front in the social sphere are predetermined by the success of the revolutionary party in identifying social forces and convincing them to accept the leadership of the revolutionary party during the revolutionary struggle. The united front in the social sphere however, is one of the most strategic components of a people's war revolution. It is this component which provides a revolution with its mass or "people's" character. The successful implementation of the united front in the social sphere could lead to a mass insurrection that turns a revolution into a people's war.

It is clear from chapter three that the PAC has not succeeded in identifying and/or creating social forces, other than AZANYU to assist it in the implementation of the united front component in its revolutionary strategy. The PAC continues to provide lip service to the united front idea in its rhetoric, without creating any structures to facilitate social forces. The united front component as far as the social sphere of the PAC

is concerned, is at this stage (1989) non-existent. The united front can only come to full fruition when the masses (by means of social forces) are drawn into the revolution and linked up with the political, military and economic forces. Only once these requirements have been met by the PAC can reference be made to its united front in the social sphere.

The ANC on the other hand has realised the strategic importance of the social sphere and those forces operating within it and their relevance to the united front component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC. The ANC has been successful - as indicated in chapter three - in identifying specific key organisations present in the social sphere inside South Africa. The ANC has also claimed responsibility for the creation of various of these organisations that operate as social forces. Tambo (1987d:8) stated in January 1987 that: "We have also succeeded to create mass democratic organisations representative of the conscious and active masses" and he continued to identify the UDF and the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) by name.

The ANC envisages that it will be able, by means of the united front component of its revolutionary strategy, to revolutionise and draw social forces into the revolutionary struggle. Social forces such as youth movements, womens movements, sport bodies, religious organisations both Christian and non-Christian, teacher organisations, parents' associations and cultural organisations, should according to the ANC united front principle, be drawn into a united mass democratic movement (Denga, 1988:54-59). The current impact and possible impact in the future of the united front component of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategy of the ANC, can only be fully comprehended once an analysis of the united front (as a) strategy model, is made.

5 THE UNITED FRONT STRATEGY MODEL OF THE ANC

The ANC adopted the concept "people's war" as part of its revolutionary strategy in August 1979 (See chapter three). However, in 1979 the ANC was not in a position to implement the concept "people's war" and its components in its revolutionary strategy. With regard to the united front component - which was the most difficult to implement - the ANC had to proceed with an organisational phase in order to create favourable

conditions for itself for implementing the united front strategy. This organisational phase of the united front strategy extended over four years, each year serving as a foundation for the implementation of the strategy.

The first foundation year of 1980 was used by the ANC to popularise its political programme, the Freedom Charter. It is a general principle that a revolutionary organisation has to popularise its political alternative in order for the masses and the social forces may to able to choose between the revolutionary political alternative and any other political programme in the target state. For this reason 1980 was designated by the ANC as the "Year of the Charter", when a massive drive was undertaken to popularise the Freedom Charter in South Africa (Tambo, 1980:2-14). The second foundation year of the organisational phase, 1981, was aimed at mobilising and activating a strategic sector or social force in society. The youth, against the backdrop of the 1976-1977 internal unrest in South Africa that was spearheaded by the youth, and the incidents of student violence that occurred in South Africa during 1980, was selected as the strategic social force. The ANC therefore designated 1981, as the "Year of the Youth" and started to popularise its aims and objectives among the youth. ANC rhetoric during this year continuously referred to the youth as the "young lions" who had to influence and revolutionanise other sectors of society (Tambo, 1981a:2-12).

The third foundation year of the organisational phase, 1982, was related to the second in that it attempted to mobilise and activate the remaining social sectors of society. The ANC continually referred to the revolutionary potential of the youth in its rhetoric, and exhorted other soical forces to follow their example. For this purpose 1982 was designated as the "Year of Unity in Action", implying that all the social forces had to become aware of their respective roles and unite in the revolutionary struggle (Tambo, 1982:2-12). The fourth foundation year of the organisational phase, 1983, was the year during which the organisational phase for the creation of a united front had to be completed. The various activated social forces had to be united during this year in order to provide a springboard for the ANC within South Africa. For this reason 1983 was designated as the "Year of United Action", and it culminated in the creation of the UDF in August 1983

(Tambo, 1983:1-12). More than 450 different social forces affiliated themselves to the UDF of which the majority were black community based organisations.

It seems that the ANC was convinced that its revolutionary struggle would acquire a new dimension with the launch of the UDF and the subsequent internal political unrest that started on September 3, 1984. The ANC therefore continued to designate yearly themes that could be associated with the united front strategy and its implementation. The first year after the organisational phase, 1984, was designated by the ANC as the "Year of the Women" (Tambo, 1984:2-10). This was a further attempt by the ANC to activate the women in society to become part of the revolutionary struggle: "We wish to stress the need, at the present hour, for the emergency on the political scene of a women's movement that is politically and organisationally united" (Tambo, 1984:6). In the wake of the participation and leadership role of the youth in the internal political unrest during 1984, the ANC once again stressed the role of the youth by designating 1985 as the "Year of the Cadre". This year was also internationally designated as the year of the child (Tambo, 1985:5).

The internal political activity of sectors of society reached such an intense level in South Africa during 1985, that some observers described the internal political unrest as a form of mass insurrection. In 1985 the military presence of the ANC in no way matched the internal political unrest and it is assumed that the ANC, in order to emphasise the armed struggle and the military dimension of the united front strategy and as well as the fact that Umkhonto we Sizwe was 30 years old, designated 1986 as the "Year of Umkhonto we Sizwe - The People's Army" (Tambo, 1986:2-12). The following three years, 1987 - "The Year of Advance to People's Power" (Tambo, 1987d:2); 1988 - "The Year of Forward to United Action for People's Power" (Tambo, 1988:2-3) and 1989 - "The Year of Mass Action for People's Power" (Tambo, 1989a: 2-13) have also been devoted to the united front strategy. The failure of the ANC to advance their revolution to a new stage and the success of the South African Government with the implementation of the state of emergency forced the ANC to reconsider its original assumption regarding its united front strategy.

It is clear from developments since 1989 that the united front of the ANC consists of four components.

The revolutionary alliance

This is the first component of the united front and consists of the alliance between the ANC, the SACP and SACTU. This alliance is generally referred to as the revolutionary alliance, regarded as the essential core of the united front (Stilton, 1988:64). It was not necessary for the ANC to create this component of the united front when it adopted the people's war concept, because the revolutionary alliance had already been in existence since the early sixties. This alliance functions in unity as the participants share a common objective that is set out in the principles of its national democratic revolution (Anon, 1989:1).

The fraternal alliance

This is the second component of the united front and comprises the alliance that exists between the ANC and key organisations in the mass democratic movement. The key organisations that have been identified by the ANC are the UDF, COSATU, the NECC, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and SAYCO (Stilton, 1988:65 and Denga, 1988:55-63). The alliance that exists between the revolutionary alliance and the key organisations in the mass democratic movement is described as the fraternal alliance as a result of the fact that all participants in the alliance share common national democratic goals that are set out in the Freedom Charter and the constitutional guidelines of the ANC (Denga, 1988:55-63).

The patriotic alliance

This is the third component of the united front and consists of the fraternal alliance (that is, the ANC, the SACP, SACTU, the UDF, COSATU, the NECC, the SACC and SAYCO) and organisations inside South Africa that pursue some form of democracy or socialism, but who, according to the ANC, are blinded by misconceptions (Denga, 1988:59). Organisations included in this definition are adherents to Black Consciousness, such as AZAPO and NACTU; and ultra-left groupings, which supposedly include the Cape Action

League (Denga, 1988:59 and Stilton, 1988:65). The alliance between the fraternal alliance and the aforementioned organisations is referred to as the patriotic alliance (Denga, 1988:59). The existence of this alliance is ascribed to the "complete agreement about the need to overthrow the apartheid system and to install a democratic regime dedicated to revolutionary transformation of the apartheid system" (Stilton, 1988:65).

The broad democratic alliance

This is the final component of the united front and consists of the patriotic alliance (that is, the ANC, the SACP, SACTU, the UDF, COSATU, the NECC, the SACC, SAYCO, AZAPO, NACTU etc.) and those social forces that aim to bring about democratic change in South Africa also referred to as the "fourth force" (Stilton, 1988:67). The fourth force could for practical purposes be divided into a black and white sector. The black sector comprises those groups that have an apolitical outlook and those who are associated with the system of apartheid; while the white sector consists of those organisations that are predominantly controlled by whites who are opposed to the South African government.

The black sector comprises apolitical youth and womens organisations; sports bodies; church and religious bodies such as the Independent churches; Hindu and Moslem dominated groups; the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC); teacher organisations, small businessmen; and "system" associated groups such as Inyandza in Kangwane (Stilton, 1988:56 and Anon, 1989:1-2). The white sector includes organisations such as the Five Freedoms Forum (FFF); the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS); the End Conscription Campaign (ECC); the former National Democratic Movement (NDM); the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA); the Johannesburg Democratic Committee (JODAC); the Detainee's Parents' Support Committee (DPSC); the Black Sash; the former Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and its youth wing; the Concerned Citizens Campaign (CCC); and Jews for Social Justice (JSJ) (Denga, 1987:71; Denga, 1988:54-59; Stilton, 1988:67; Anon, 1989:2 and ANC, 1985a:11). The alliance between the patriotic alliance and the aforementioned groups is generally referred to as the broad democratic alliance as a result of all participants' opposition to the South African

government and the shared objective to bring about a democratic society in the country (Denga, 1988:59 and Stilton, 1988:67).

The united front strategy also functions on four levels which correspond to the composition of the united front. The four levels are interrelated, but in order to explain their functioning one has to analyse the levels individually.

The level of the revolutionary alliance

The components of this level, that is the ANC, the SACP and SACTU have since 1968 been functioning as a microcosm of a united front externally. This level is from a revolutionary point of view perceived as the most important, because it is the revolutionary alliance which is the principal executive of the revolutionary programme. It is the revolutionary alliance which by means of the revolutionary party determines the objectives of the united front strategy and was therefore the first level to become operational in the political, military, economic and social dimensions of the revolution. The revolutionary demands of the South African situation however forced the ANC to activate the second level of its united front strategy.

The level of the fraternal alliance

The fact that the revolutionary alliance could not bring its united front strategy to fruition forced it to activate the fraternal alliance level. This implied that legal front organisations had to be created (the creation of the UDF for example) inside South Africa to continue the work of the revolutionary alliance. Indications that this level of the united front strategy was being implemented, became apparent during the political unrest between 1984 and 1987, and it involved the political, the military, the economic and the social dimensions of the revolutionary strategy. Events between 1984 and 1987 indicated an attempt by the ANC to merge its operations with those of the mass democratic movement inside South Africa, by means of exploiting underground structures (Mkhwanazi, 1989: 25 and Kasrils, 1988:7).

The ANC was successful in operationalising this level, when it is taken into consideration that the South African government was forced to introduce state of emergency regulations to counter the operational capabilities of this level of the united front strategy. The success of the counter-revolutionary measures implemented by the South African government forced the ANC to try and activate the patriotic alliance and the broad democratic alliance levels simultaneously.

The levels of the patriotic and broad democratic alliances

These levels were activated by the ANC simultaneously in order to create the broadest possible unity of anti-government social forces. The objective was to isolate the South African government internally and to dislodge it and the foundations of the apartheid system from the masses (Stilton, 1988:66-67). The first indications that this level was activated appeared in 1987 when the ANC introduced its tactic of holding talks with identified social forces in the patriotic and broad democratic alliances. These included talks with so-Afrikaner intellectuals at Dakar and with NACTU in 1987, and subsequently, with delegates from for example: the National Soccer League; the South African Rugby Union; NUSAS; NDM; student bodies, womens organisations and IDASA. The central theme during these talks was the concept of "common unity against apartheid" and "the need for a democratic future for South Africa".

A strategic manoeuvre by the ANC, with regards to the patriotic and broad democratic alliance levels, has become evident: the ANC has left the option of co-operation with groups in these alliances to the key organisations in the mass democratic movement. The strategic significance of this - despite the legality aspect - resides in the fact that once unity is created between the mass democratic movement and other identified groups and organisations, the phenomenon could be used to indicate a so-called spontaneous internal unity against the South African government and the system of apartheid. Some examples of this have manifested themselves in South Africa, for instance: the Concerned Citizens Campaign; the End Conscription Campaign; the Fasting for a Just Peace Campaign; the combined JODAC/UDF Call on the Whites Campaign; the Million Hand Signature Campaign; the White Anti-apartheid Conference of the FFF; the campaign

against the amended Labour Relations Act; and the Open City Campaigns (Denga, 1987:62; Denga, 1988:54 and Anon, 1989: 2 and 7).

However, the most significant event in this regard would have been the proposed Anti-Apartheid Conference that was due to have taken place in September 1988. This conference was however, banned by the South African government. The two themes that are of strategic importance to the united front strategy would have been discussed at this conference; that of "unity and organisation against repression" and that of "one person one vote in a united South Africa" (Anon, 1989:1-2). Some of the aims of this conference were: to unite the broadest possible range of anti-apartheid forces; to broaden the base of opposition to apartheid; to reach out to elements that were not yet committed to the mass democratic movement's liberation struggle; to reach out to organisations from whom the mass democratic movement differed politically; and to explore ways and means of forcing permanent co-operation between the mass democratic movement and those organisations outside it (Yembe, 1989:16-17).

Some of the organisations that were invited to attend and participate in the Anti-Apartheid Conference include the Democratic People's Party (DPP) of Transkei; the Progressive People's Party (PPP) and the Seoposengwe Party of Bophuthatswana; the Inyandza Movement of Kangwane; the Natal Indian Congress (NIC); the FFF; NUSAS; Black Sash; NAFCOC; IDASA; the NDM and the PFP (Anon, 1989:1 and Yembe, 1989:17-21). It is apparent from the broad spectrum of invited delegates to the Anti-Apartheid Conference that COSATU and the UDF as key organisations in the mass democratic movement (the call for such a conference was made during the second national congress of COSATU in May 1985) wanted to broaden their base of influence.

The united front strategy of the ANC is thus clearly a comprehensive strategy in that it makes provision for a wide range of tactics that encompass a succession of events from non-violent resistance to armed struggle. The structure of the united front strategy - that is the four levels - indicates that when it is fully institutionalised and operational, a mass or "people's" character would necessarily become part of the revolutionary struggle. It is therefore expected that the ANC will in the 1990s continue to implement and introduce aspects of its united

front in the various revolutionary dimensions in order to bring the strategy to its full fruition - that of isolating the South African government internally.

6 THE UNITED FRONT IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

The united front is a strategic component of the international dimension in a revolutionary strategy, in that it aims at uniting international public opinion against the target state. The united front component of the concept "people's war" is usually implemented by means of a wide range of tactics and strategies in the international dimension. The main thrust of such strategies and tactics regards the legality of the incumbent government in the target state and the "just war" nature of the revolutionary struggle. Revolutionary organisations therefore portray the government of the target state as an illegal and unjust government which is a threat to international security. Both the PAC and the ANC have claimed that the South African government and its policy of racial segregation- apartheid - are a threat to world peace and stability. It is against this background important to determine how and to what extent the united front component has been incorporated into the international dimensions of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC.

6.1 The united front component in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the PAC

It became apparent in chapter three that the PAC as a revolutionary party has not been successful in establishing itself internationally as a serious revolutionary organisation. This aspect has had a detrimental and direct effect on the PAC in its attempts to consolidate opposition against the South African government. The PAC has as a result - and this has become obvious since 1987 - forged links with organisations, groups and countries that are generally regarded as extremely leftwing. This is an indication of desperation on behalf of the PAC in order to create some form of united front against South Africa internationally.

One of the first groups with whom the PAC forged links was the City Anti-Apartheid Group (City AAG) in the United Kingdom. The City AAG

consists of a Trotskyite faction which broke away from the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) of Britain in October 1984. Davies-Webb (1989:92-94), argues that the alliance between the PAC and the City AAG happened more by coincidence than through careful planning, because both were faced with a legitimacy dilemma. As a result the PAC has been receiving prominent publicity in Trotskyite orientated newspapers in London such as Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism! and City AAG publications. The new love found between the PAC and Trotskyite groups in Britain has however contributed little to the PAC's efforts to create a PAC orientated united front in the United Kingdom.

The PAC also attempts to create a united front in the Moslem world by forging links with Libya and Iran among others. This has resulted in APLA members receiving military training in these countries. PAC detachments also fought with members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon, where three members of APLA were killed (Marari, 1988).

The lack of credibility of the PAC has clearly forced it to associate itself with these extremely radical organisations and countries, thereby contributing to the fact that the PAC has not yet succeeded in incorporating the united front component into the international dimension of its revolutionary strategy. It is expected that this situation will continue until such time that the PAC succeeds in establishing itself as a credible revolutionary party both inside and outside South Africa. The current flirtation with extremist groups could in the long-term have a detrimental affect on the PAC and its attempts to institutionalise itself and its revolutionary struggle against South Africa.

6.2 The united front component in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC

The ANC has been extremely successful in incorporating the united front component of the concept "people's war" into the international dimension of its revolutionary strategy. It can be argued that this aspect of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC is superior to any other component. The ANC has devised a unique strategy by means of which it has been able to incorporate the united front successfully into the international dimension. The ANC has been using the theme of "apartheid" as the pivot

theme in this regard, around which international condemnation of the government in South Africa has been called for. The apartheid theme has in various stages been supplemented with other themes that also convince international public opinion of the injustices that prevail in South Africa. Only four supplementary themes - those of people's sanctions; children in detention; release Mandela; and detentions without trial - will for the purpose of this study be identified, in order to indicate how the united front component has been incorporated into the international dimension.

The apartheid theme

The ANC has through the manipulation of the apartheid theme succeeded in creating an international situation where the concept of apartheid and the moral outrage associated with it, are directly associated with the South African government. The objective of the ANC with its united front in the international dimension manifests itself in international governmental and non-governmental organisations. The ANC has - as indicated in chapter three - succeeded in establishing itself as revolutionary party internationally with the result that these forums are utilised as some form of a united front against the South African government.

The General Assembly of the United Nations accepts, on an annual basis, resolutions condemning the "apartheid regime", and the Special Committee Against Apartheid - a special committee of the General Assembly - has on one occasion appealed "to all member states, specialised agencies and other organisations in the United Nations system, as well as to inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, students, churches, trade unions and womens organisations, to increase their assistance to freedom fighters (ANC) of South Africa" (SCAA, 1981:2). This is a clear identification of the range of opposition forces intended to be part of the anti-apartheid united front internationally, that aim to isolate the South African government. Guennadi Oudovenko (1987:1), of the Soviet Union and vice chairman of the SCAA stressed that these forces of opposition must exert influence over their governments and generate "powerful public opinion" against South Africa. International conferences are also hosted by the United Nations to generate support for the ANC internationally and increase international public condemnation of South Africa. A specific

example in this regard is the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, that was organised by the United Nations to generate opposition against South Africa (Sechaba Oct, 1983:9).

The frontline states have also become an important component of the united front against South Africa internationally. These states have been manipulating the concept of apartheid to such an extent that it is now argued that the mere existence of the policy of apartheid destabilises the frontline states. When these states, by means of their political leaders, address audiences, continued reference is made to the destabilising efforts of the South African government with the result that international aid is provided to these countries, while they reaffirm the necessity to overthrow the South African government by means of an ANC-led revolution (Frontline, 1981:1-4 and Frontline, 1984:1-6).

The most phenomenal development of the united front in the international dimension is reflected in the non-governmental organisational level. A wide range of organisations have appeared internationally that assist the ANC in its attempt to create an internationally based united front. Most of these organisations have received recognition as a result of their anti-apartheid stance, and of these the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in the United Kingdom, is the most notable. This organisation has developed from a small fringe organisation in the 1960s to an organisation with an annual budget of R4,5 million in the 1980s (AAM, 1988:47). This organisation has been instrumental in establishing a united front against South Africa in Europe and has organised public demonstrations against what it calls apartheid that have been attended by more than 80 000 people (AAM, 1986:2). The AAM does not act or take any decision regarding South Africa on its own but consults and awaits ANC consent for every activity it undertakes (AAM, 1988a:6). The ANC has, by means of its control over the AAM, been successful in manipulating public opinion in the United Kingdom to the extent that South Africa is generally condemned for its policy of apartheid. The public support the AAM receives is thus an indication of the extent to which the ANC has been successful in creating a united front against South Africa in the United Kingdom. The organisational structure and membership of the AAM increased between 1986 and 1988 as follows:

- the AAM had 75 branch offices in 1986 and by 1988 this increased to 135 branch offices;
- the AAM had 650 affiliated organisations in 1986 and by 1988 it had 1 100 affiliated organisations; and
- the AAM had 4 500 individual members in 1986 and by 1988 this figure increased to 18 000 individual members (AAM, 1987:38; and AAM, 1988:45).

The anti-apartheid theme has also resulted in a wide range of public opinion support for the ANC in the United States (US) where various anti-South African organisations have started to organise on the anti-apartheid ticket. The anti-apartheid movement in the United States serves as a solidarity committee or united front support apparatus for the ANC, a transmission belt to influence US public opinion with the goal of influencing US policy towards South Africa. Waller (1989:70.74), identified twelve US based groups that operate solely on the anti-apartheid ticket, and they are: the American Committee on Africa; the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sports and Society; the International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa; the South African War Resisters; TransAfrica; the Washington Office on Africa; the American Friends Service Committee; the Association of Concerned African Scholars; the Congressional Black Caucus; the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility; the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and the National Black United Front. These organisations have in the period between 1985 and 1988 been successful in influencing public opinion to such an extent that a general anti-South African attitude currently prevails in the US. Waller (1989:76), has also determined that the anti-apartheid movement in the US has effectively been penetrated by the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and that the anti-apartheid theme has given leftwing radicals in the US a rallying point they needed to confront the rightwing in the US - something that had not been possible since the Vietnam war.

The existence of the united front against apartheid in the United Kingdom and the United States can be viewed as part of a strategic manoeuvre by the ANC, in that these two countries are generally perceived as the traditional allies of the South African government. And by influencing public opinion in these two countries the ANC and its united front hope to

influence future policy considerations regarding South Africa in these countries. The implementation of supplementary themes has thus proved to be effective in this regard. Similar pro-ANC orientated public organisations exist in other European countries as well as in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South East Asia, and Latin America. All these organisations have as their common objective the delegitimization of the South African government's and rallying support for the ANC in their respective countries. The South African government continued adherence to an internal political policy based on racial segregation, has in the past and continues to provide the ANC and its international united front with the necessary means to maintain a moral highground position regarding the South African situation.

This fact as well as specific developments inside South Africa have furthermore provided the ANC and its international united front with alternative political themes that have been used effectively to supplement the apartheid theme and generate more moral outrage against the South African government.

Supplementary themes

This analysis is not intended to provide detailed research on how the sanctions issue has been developed into a supplementary theme, but rather serves as an indicator of how the issue has been manipulated in order to create the international isolation of South Africa, and how it has effectively been portrayed as an instrument to bring about the final eradication of apartheid. Tambo (1981:7-10), stated at an international conference on sanctions against South Africa in 1981, which was organised by the United Nations and held in Paris, that if the Security Council of the United Nation's imposed mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa it would imply that the world "unite for peace" in South Africa. He continued by identifying the purpose of economic sanctions as follows. "The purpose of sanctions is: (a) to force South Africa to abandon its racist policy of apartheid and to put an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia; (b) to demonstrate, by action, the universal abhorrence of apartheid and solidarity with the legitimate aspirations and struggles of the people of South Africa and Namibia; (c) to deny the benefits of international co-operation to the South African regime so as to oblige it

and its supporters to heed world opinion, to abandon the policy of racist domination and to seek a solution by consultation with the genuine leaders of the oppressed people; (d) to undermine the ability of the South African regime to repress its people, commit acts of aggression against independent States and pose a threat to international peace and security; and (e) to remove economic support from apartheid so as to mitigate suffering in the course of the struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia for freedom, and thereby promote as peaceful a transition as possible."

This theme identified by Tambo has been effectively used by the ANC's international united front in its attempts to generate international public opinion and support for comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The AAM in the United Kingdom initiated a concerted campaign in 1983 to generate support for economic sanctions against South Africa. This campaign reached a peak during 1987 which was designated by the AAM as the year of people's sanctions against South Africa. The AAM (1987:1), argued that "the acid test of opposition to apartheid is the issue of sanctions. To fight for sanctions is the touchstone of genuine solidarity with the liberation struggle. To resist sanctions is to support apartheid". This campaign year of the AAM culminated in October 1987 in a mass demonstration in London which was attended by more than 75 000 people (AAM, 1987a:1). It is significant in this regard to take into consideration that mass demonstrations that were organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) could not raise this kind of attendance in London (Morning Star, 1987:3). The fact that 75 000 people participated in a mass demonstration calling for mandatory sanctions against South Africa is a clear indication of the extent to which public opinion in the United Kingdom has been influenced by the AAM.

The sanctions campaign in the US has been more spectacular with regard to the incredible growth the anti-South African lobby has shown since 1984. The concerted pro-sanctions campaign in the US started on November 21, 1984, when Robinson, the executive director of TransAfrica, led protestors on a march in front of the South African Embassy in Washington D.C. These marches culminated in more than 7 000 people, including 22 members of the House of Representatives, being arrested, in more than 20 cities, for demonstrating against apartheid and in favour of economic sanctions. By

June 1987 more than 62 percent of the people in the United States were aware of the actions taken by the anti-South African lobby (Waller, 1989:82). These actions provided the ANC united front with a major impetus to force the Executive branch of the US government to impose, in 1986, comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa.

Waller (1989:82) however, is convinced that the sanctions campaign against South Africa provided socialists in the US with the opportunity to form a united front not only against the South African government but also against the Republican Party controlled Executive Branch of the US-government, and capitalism in general. He quotes Janice Love, a member of the US anti-apartheid movement, in this regard: "Since the United States, Europe and Japan are South Africa's most important economic partners, activists see sanctions as an easily accessible issue from which to politicize and mobilize their constituents on the broader questions of economic and racial justice. Thus from this ideological vantage point advocating South Africa's economic isolation may not be an end in and of itself, so much as a means or a catalyst to raise broader issues about the role of capitalism in the world."

The theme of sanctions against South Africa has thus contributed to the creation of an effective united front against South Africa in the United States that has now also brought about a collective of individuals who promote other pro-Soviet orientated issues. The influence of the pro-ANC united front in the US was clearly demonstrated in May 1989 when Congressman Ronald Dellums forced president George Bush to meet with Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Washington D.C., in order to ensure that Bush would not introduce further economic sanctions legislation against South Africa in the US Congress during the 1989 legislative process (Sellars, 1989). This is significant, if it is taken into consideration that general consent exists in Washington D.C., that the Bush Administration's foreign policy process was for the first six months of its term of office in total paralysis (Nickel, 1989).

Various other supplementary themes have been utilised effectively internationally by the anti-apartheid united front to increase international condemnation of the South African government and to enhance the international anti-apartheid united front's and the ANC's credibility.

Since 1987, for example, supplementary themes such as the following were utilised:

- (a) "Children in detention": this theme has resulted in a hearing and markup before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the House of Representatives in the US Congress, on July 29, 1987; various international conferences regarding the detention of children in South Africa were organised internationally, including Free South Africa's Children: A symposium on Children in detention, organised by the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law. The proceedings of this symposium were published in full in the Human Rights Quarterly of the John Hopkins University (Lockwood, 1988:1-108).
- (b) "The release of Nelson Mandela" this theme that has been in existence since the early 1980s, reached a peak during 1988 - the 70th birthday of Mandela - when an internationally televised rock music festival was held to commemorate Mandela's 70th birthday. The concert called "Freedom at 70" was watched by more than 600 million people world-wide and was described by the AAM as, "the biggest, most exciting programme of activities the AAM has ever organised" (AAM, 1988a:5).
- (c) "The release of political detainees" this theme is specifically aimed at the practice of detentions without trial, and became prominent in the early 1980s when an AAM affiliated "South Africa: The Imprisoned Society" (SATIS) organisation was formed (Hoile, 1987:17). This campaign was aimed at reaching a peak during 1989, but this did not happen as a result of a problem regarding the synchronisation of the campaign. The AAM held a 24 hour vigil in 1989 for hunger strikers in South African prisons (AAM, 1989:3) and the ANC circulated about 600 000 leaflets calling for the release of detainees who were supposedly on a hunger strike in South Africa at the end of January 1989 (ANC, 1989:1-2). However, the AAM and ANC campaigns regarding the hunger strike were launched before detainees in detention in South Africa started with their hunger strike at the end of February 1989, and the

scandal surrounding Winnie Mandela resulted in the hunger strike campaign being a failure. This event, however, indicates to what extent the international united front of the ANC is dependent on developments inside South Africa in order for it to direct its campaigns. It was furthermore evident from this event that the ANC attempted to initiate a specific development in South Africa which it and the united front could utilise internationally. It should be remembered that the ANC published its leaflets regarding the hunger strike in January 1989 - the process preceding such an event or campaign comprises at least four weeks' of organisation, planning and the printing of leaflets. This indicates that this campaign was already on the "drawing board" in November or December 1988, long before political detainees started with the hunger strike.

The international united front of the ANC has as a result of the combination of international social forces developed into a formidable political force. The international united front has succeeded in isolating South Africa politically, economically and socially, which includes isolation from international sport, cultural events, and free travel for example. The utilisation of the anti-apartheid theme supplemented by other themes has proved to be an effective strategy to isolate South Africa internationally. The incorporation of the united front in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC has been successful, and is without any doubt the most compelling aspect of its revolutionary strategy. It is therefore, as reflected in the aforementioned analysis, not practical to compare the PAC's and the ANC's incorporation of the united front in their respective strategies, because of the fact that the PAC's international united front is basically non-existent. It is however, important to note that the social forces that are involved in the united fronts of the PAC and the ANC internationally incorporate a spectrum of forces that could be placed on a political continuum that ranges from right of centre to the extreme radical left of centre. This fact leaves the South African government with only a small political force in the international environment through which it could attempt to legitimise itself.

7 CONCLUSION

This chapter provides an analysis, comparison and evaluation of the two remaining components of the concept "people's war", those of the people's army and the united front, in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is as a result of this comparative analysis possible to draw the following conclusions.

The united front component of the concept "people's war" can also be described as the people's or mass-based component, and is therefore a comprehensive and far-reaching component. The comparative analysis of the united front, for this reason, had to be subdivided in order to indicate and determine its comprehensive nature. A comparative analysis was thus firstly made of both the PAC's and the ANC's approach towards the united front component whereafter the study was divided into the various dimensions of revolutionary strategy. The political, military and socio-economic dimensions were specifically identified in order to indicate how the PAC and the ANC attempt to isolate the South African government internally inside the country. The international dimension manouevre indicated to what extent the PAC and the ANC have been successful in incorporating the united front into the international dimensions of their respective revolutionary strategies and whether they have been able to isolate the South African government internationally.

It is apparent from the comparative analysis of the theoretical approach towards the united front component and associated rhetoric that both the PAC and the ANC view the united front as a strategic component of their respective revolutionary strategies. The comparative analysis of the practical manifestation of the united front component, however, indicated on the one hand, as far as the PAC is concerned, that the united front component is at this stage only a mirage of its rhetoric. On the other hand, however, the ANC has succeeded in introducing the basic principles of the united front component into its revolutionary strategy. It was thus possible, as a result of the analysis of the united front in the political, military and socio-economic dimensions, to determine a strategy model of the ANC's united front. The conclusion was therefore drawn that the ANC has succeeded in incorporating the united front component into its

revolutionary strategy and that it is in the process of operationalising this component.

One of the most significant conclusions of this study concerns the united front component in the international dimension of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC. While the PAC has not been able to incorporate the united front component into its revolutionary strategy, the ANC has been extremely successful in this regard. It is apparent from the comparative analysis that the ANC has by means of the united front component been able to isolate the South African government internationally to a large extent. It is furthermore apparent that the South African government - that is, the National Party - has, by means of the perceived continuation of the political policy of racial segregation, contributed to the success of the ANC and its united front internationally.

It is now possible - against the backdrop of chapters four and five - to conclude that both the PAC and the ANC have incorporated the concept "people's war" into their respective revolutionary strategies. However, it is true that the PAC specifically has not succeeded in implementing the concept "people's war" practically in its revolutionary strategy despite the fact that its theoretical approach and rhetoric claim that it has. The ANC on the other hand has succeeded in implementing some aspects of the concept "people's war", for example, the revolutionary party and the united front component in the international dimension of its revolutionary strategy. The conclusion can thus be drawn that both the PAC and the ANC adhere to a revolutionary strategy based on the axioms of the concept "people's war".

The future development of the PAC's and the ANC's revolutionary strategies into fully fledged people's war revolutions is a definite threat to a free and open society in South Africa. It is thus, as a direct result of the potential success of such revolutionary strategies, crucial that specific guidelines for a possible counter-revolutionary strategy be identified. It is therefore the objective of chapter seven to pinpoint certain guidelines that could contribute to an effective counter-revolutionary strategy, that would result in a prosperous and free South Africa.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GUIDELINES FOR A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

One is confronted directly with the question of how to apply the knowledge gained in chapters four, five and six regarding the manifestation of the people's war concept in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is the objective of this chapter, against the backdrop of a synthesised comparison of the concept "people's war" in the revolutionary strategies, to identify some counter-revolutionary strategy guidelines for South Africa. Such guidelines can only be identified once the principles of a counter-revolution have been described.

1 SYNTHESISED COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT "PEOPLE'S WAR" IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES OF THE PAC AND THE ANC

It has been determined that both the PAC (1973) and the ANC (1978-1979) accepted the people's war revolutionary strategy as their official revolutionary strategies after the failure of their respective guerrilla warfare strategies. It was further determined that both organisations accepted the people's war revolutionary strategy as the one strategy that would lead them to the revolutionary seizure of power in South Africa. In this regard the PAC defined a people's war as "a war which is waged by the broad masses of the people in an oppressed country under the leadership of a revolutionary political party. The oppressed people organise themselves to fight the enemy directly as well as indirectly". The ANC on the other hand defined it as "a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrections".

Both organisations have identified the unique essence of a people's war, in that it is primarily based on the indirect, direct and mass participation of the perceived oppressed population in the revolutionary struggle. It is also apparent from the analysis that the approaches of

both the PAC and the ANC towards a people's war revolutionary strategy were influenced by the models they studied respectively - in the case of the PAC the Chinese model of Mao became applicable, and as far as the ANC is concerned, the Vietnamese model became their revolutionary guide. The similarities and differences between the PAC's and the ANC's approaches towards a people's war revolution, are as a result clearly discernable from their respective attitudes towards the four components of the concept.

1.1 Nationalism

The respective attitudes of the PAC and the ANC towards nationalism and the way in which it has been incorporated into their respective revolutionary strategies, reflect, to a degree, the theoretical and practical discrepancies that exist between the two organisations with regard to the people's war revolutionary strategy. The PAC views nationalism as "the divine destiny of an oppressed people seeking freedom from foreign oppression and exploitation", while the ANC argue that their perception of nationalism should "not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an élitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the masses". This difference in approach indicates that the ANC has given the approach of a nation's right to self-determination a lesser priority if any, while the PAC continues to view the right of a nation to self-determination as a crucial component of its approach towards revolutionary nationalism and the people's war as a whole.

It is in this regard obvious why the two organisations differ as far as the synthesis between nationalism and Marxism-Leninism (the right of a nation to self-determination and the class struggle), is concerned. The synthesis between nationalism and Marxism-Leninism according to the PAC is a spontaneous event in accordance with its view that blacks wage a revolution against white rule as a nation on the one hand, and on the other hand as a class, because blacks have to sell their labour to whites, thereby confirming the proletarian status of blacks. The South African situation is thus seen as a colonial and capitalist society, because a colonialist society, in its view derives its source and strength from capitalism.

The ANC, however, does not view the synthesis of nationalism and Marxism-Leninism as a spontaneous event, and argues that the revolutionary struggle is both a national and class struggle taking place simultaneously. The national and class struggles are thus not lumped together, but perceived as separate and equal struggles. It is for this reason that the ANC has adopted the colonialism of a special type paradigm, in order to distinguish between the national and class struggles, thereby legitimising the role of the SACP. The theoretical purity of the approach of the PAC, however, has in practice not reached the ascendancy of the approach of the ANC. The ANC has clearly succeeded in applying its approach in practice, hence the fact that its nationalist status has never been questioned. Despite the difference in approach, both the PAC and the ANC have succeeded in the objective of synthesising nationalist and class aspirations into a comprehensive revolutionary nationalism, thereby successfully incorporating the component of nationalism into their people's war revolutionary strategies.

1.2 The revolutionary party

The difference that exists between the approaches of the PAC and the ANC with regard to the revolutionary party as a component of their respective people's war revolutions, is a manifestation of the fact that the approach of the PAC is theoretically based, while the approach of the ANC has to a large extent been developed by means of practical experience. The PAC sees itself as a political party which leads the revolution, while the ANC declines to describe itself as a revolutionary political party. It is thus evident from the discussion and analysis in chapter three that the PAC constitutes a revolutionary political party in theory, while the strategic revolutionary alliance between the ANC and the SACP constitutes a revolutionary party in practice. Both the PAC and the ANC are thus within the framework of the people's war revolutionary strategy viewed as revolutionary parties. The actual roles of the two organisations as revolutionary parties are manifested in the manner in which the revolutionary struggle is waged.

The revolutionary party component of the people's war revolution is firstly determined by the position of the revolutionary party in the political dimension as reflected in the existence and knowledge of a

revolutionary political programme as well as the political actions of a revolutionary party during a people's war revolution. The ANC has, when compared to the PAC, been far more successful in popularising its revolutionary political programme or political alternative. The wide spread knowledge of the Freedom Charter and more recently of the constitutional guidelines of the ANC, compared with the lack of popularity of the Ten Point Programme of Azania or the five principles of cooperation formulated by the PAC, confirms the status of the ANC as a revolutionary party. A comparison of the political actions of the PAC and the ANC during the eighties leaves no doubt that the ANC has succeeded in institutionalising itself as a political player in South Africa, while no reference at all is forthcoming of a serious political role for the PAC. The analysis of the revolutionary party nature of the PAC and the ANC as components of the military dimensions, identified one of the weak points of the ANC, in that clear indications exist that there is a definite tendency towards militarism in the military wing of the ANC. This is not evident in the PAC and can be attributed to the fact that the PAC exerts, as a constituted political party, political control over its military wing. The manifestations of militarism in the ANC could thus erode its political profile and position and even lead to a split in the organisation in the wake of a political shift in favour of negotiations. The inability of the ANC to constitute itself as a revolutionary political party as prescribed in theory could thus have a negative influence internally on the organisation. The co-option of military leadership elements into the political structure of the ANC could thus be seen as an intermediate manoeuvre to minimise militarism in the organisation. The role of the revolutionary party in the socio-economic dimension is determined by the extent to which it provides political leadership to the workers and their trade unions as well as to the variety of social forces, and to what extent these forces accept that leadership. It is clear from the analysis that the ANC has by means of SACTU and COSATU established itself as a revolutionary party in the economic sphere. The PAC on the other hand has clearly as a result of its self proclaimed vanguard leadership role, misinterpreted the situation in South Africa, leading to the situation where its role and leadership in the economic sphere have deteriorated to a position of no influence at all. The strategic mistake of the PAC in trying to represent all workers resulted in the ANC successfully establishing itself in the economic sphere as reflected by

COSATU's allegiance to the ANC. The nonexistence of the PAC within the social sphere has provided the ANC with the opportunity to win over to its side a wide spectrum of social forces, an aspect that is clearly reflected in the united front component of the people's war revolutionary strategy. Within the international dimension, both the PAC and the ANC as revolutionary parties, are accepted and recognised as non-governmental actors in the international political environment. However, practical manifestations indicate that only the ANC has been able to assert itself in the international political environment, as reflected by the fact that the PAC has been excluded from Frontline state meetings and it does not have observer status at the Non Aligned Movement, for example. The ANC has been successful in the international political environment to officially have talks with a wide range of heads of government, while some of its diplomatic representatives enjoy ambassadorial status. The ANC has been successful in establishing itself as a revolutionary political party in its people's war revolutionary strategy. The PAC on the other hand does adhere to the theoretical guidelines as far as the concept "people's war" is concerned, but it has not succeeded in transforming theory and rhetoric into practice. The result has been that it is unable to portray itself as a revolutionary political party in the South African situation, while the ANC continues to increase its status as a revolutionary political party.

1.3 The people's army

The people's army as a component of the concept "people's war", serves as that aspect of the revolutionary strategy that aims at the violent seizure of political power. The PAC describes its military wing as "the army of the people, fighting for the people's interests in their entirety and involved in all aspects of the people's productivity", and the ANC views its military wing as that component needed to inspire the masses to resist oppression in order for them to be drawn into the armed struggle. It has been clearly indicated in the analysis that as far as the PAC is concerned, its envisaged role for APLA has only manifested itself in rhetoric while MK of the ANC has succeeded in creating for itself a profile of violence in South Africa.

The differences that exist in force composition between APLA and MK, are a further indication of the textbook orientation of the PAC towards people's war and the practical orientation of the ANC. The regular force composition of APLA does not reflect the realities of the type of revolutionary struggle it is involved in, while the regular force composition of MK clearly indicates an adaptability to the practical environment. The subdivision of its forces into rurally-based guerrilla units; underground urban groups; regular forces and self-defence units by the ANC, while the PAC relies on the conventional division of forces indicates that the ANC is far more in contact with the situation in South Africa than the PAC. The force composition furthermore indicates that the ANC has structured MK in such a way that the facilitation of mass participation and mass insurrection may be easily accommodated within MK as the people's army.

The military strategies of both the PAC and the ANC are based on the concept of a "protracted war". The actual military strategy of the ANC is in theory and practice superior to that of the PAC, and contributes largely to the fact that the military visibility of APLA is nonexistent in South Africa. A comparison of the military strategies of APLA and MK therefore indicates that the strategy of APLA is based on textbooks and has not been formulated in battle. The successes of the ANC as far as the people's army component is concerned should thus be attributed to the successes of MK operations within the country and their ability to provide military training to recruits.

Both MK and APLA are confined to the first stage (revolutionary terrorism) of their revolutionary military strategies and these operations are primarily restricted to urban areas. The fact that MK accounts for more than 80 percent of terrorism in South Africa is an indication that it is more successful in incorporating and implementing its military strategy, while APLA has only reemerged in the military sense of the meaning in 1987. The fact that MK is more visible than APLA is a further indication that it receives more popular support than APLA. The people's army component of the people's war strategies of the PAC and the ANC remains the least successful aspect of both organisations' revolutionary strategies. However, the successful implementation of the people's army component by both the PAC and the ANC poses a serious threat to national security in South Africa. The rural orientation of the PAC and the urban

orientation of the ANC could result in the masses being mobilised in both the rural and urban centres of the country. Mass insurrection in these centres could as a result force the revolutionary struggles of both the PAC and the ANC to higher and more advanced stages. The failure of both the PAC and the ANC to fully implement and institutionalize the people's army components of their people's war revolutionary strategies has contributed to the fact that neither has been able to organise and sustain a general insurrection which is the ultimate objective of a people's war revolution.

1.4 The united front

The united front component of a people's war revolutionary strategy is that aspect which provides the revolution with its mass (people's) character, and it is aimed at isolating the South African government internally and internationally. The PAC is of the opinion that all the forces in conflict with the South African government should be united in one front. This perception is shared by the ANC, and it believes that a united front is imperative for a successful people's war. The definition of the PAC of "all forces", however, is not as broadly based as that of the ANC. The PAC overtly excludes white participation in this united front, while the ANC maintains that all forces irrespective of their differences should be part of a united front as long as they oppose the South African government. This exclusive approach of the PAC in association with its status as a revolutionary party in practice, has resulted in a total failure of its united front component and its people's war revolutionary strategy in the broader sense.

It is clear from the analysis in chapter four that the PAC has not succeeded in establishing or implementing the united front component of its people's war revolutionary strategy inside South Africa. This has provided the ANC with the opportunity to launch and implement its united front component without having to compete overtly with another liberation movement. The freedom of movement the ANC achieved in this regard, has thus manifested itself in tangible revolutionary gains for the organisation as far as the united front component of its people's war is concerned. The ANC has, within the political dimension, succeeded in creating for itself a political profile that is being perceived as a

viable political alternative to the South African government. The united front component has afforded the ANC a legitimate role as a political player in any future political dispensation in South Africa. The continuous broadening of the "opposition line-up" into a broad united anti-apartheid front provides the ANC with the opportunity to increase its influence in the country which could result in the facilitation of a total or partial mass insurrection if the Government does not comply with the increase in political demands of black South Africans. The effective implementation of the united front component in the political dimension is further characterised by the fact that participating forces are not questioning the political and or ideological vision of the ANC.

The objective of the united front component in the military dimension is clearly demonstrated by the ANC's view that "the armed struggle must be based on and grow out of mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation and resistance, with the aim of actively weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action." Events during the period 1984-1986 clearly demonstrated this intention of the ANC when it was partially able to amalgamate the military operations of MK with the underground political structures in existence in South Africa. This phenomenon known as arming the masses is a critical component of the united front in a people's war revolution in that it facilitates both the political and military mobilisation of the masses, which normally results in an insurrection.

The ANC has also succeeded in implementing the united front component of its people's war strategy in the economic sphere. The ability of COSATU to unite more than one million workers into one trade union federation is a vivid demonstration of the united front influence of the ANC in the labour field. The increased political profile of COSATU and its public commitment to the ANC and the liberation struggle as well as its leadership role within the political dimension internally, indicates that the united front component of the people's war strategy of the ANC is secured within the economic sphere. The ability of ANC support and front organisations to create strategic alliances with a spectrum of social forces is a clear indication that the united front component is being implemented in the

social sphere. The continuous talks and negotiations internally based social forces have with the ANC at various centres in the world is a further indication of the united front component of the people's war strategy at work.

The united front strategy model of the ANC in the internal manoeuvre of its revolutionary strategy is an indication of the ability of the ANC to adapt its people's war strategy to the changing conditions in South Africa. The united front strategy model of the ANC comprising four levels of implementation and four different alliances is a vivid demonstration of the fact that the ANC is implementing the principles of a people's war revolution. The possibility therefore exists that the ANC could isolate the South African government internally if it continues to increase the effectiveness of its united strategy. It is thus clear that the united front component of the people's war strategy of the ANC is the most strategic aspect of its revolutionary strategy. The fact that the PAC has been unable to implement the united component of its people's war revolutionary strategy, therefore clearly contributes to non-existence of its people's war in the practical sense of the word. The inability of the PAC to implement the united front component of its people's war strategy internationally is in accordance with the analysis in chapter four ascribed to the low profile of the PAC as a revolutionary party both inside and outside of South Africa. The ANC on the other hand has been extremely successful in implementing the united front component of its people's war strategy internationally. The tactic used by the ANC to concentrate on specific themes internationally within the united front component, has proved to be successful. The continued isolation of the South African government internationally as reflected in economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and continued international criticism, is thus attributed to the success of the united front component of the people's war strategy of the ANC. The most significant aspect of the united front component of the ANC has been its ability to internationalize South African based political issues, such as the system of political and racial segregation (apartheid), children in detention, the release of political prisoners, and the release of political detainees.

There exists no doubt that both the PAC and the ANC have introduced the concept "people's war" into their revolutionary strategies. The ANC, however, has been the most successful in implementing and incorporating the components of a people's war strategy into its revolutionary strategy. It is assumed that both the PAC and the ANC will continue in the nineties to follow the principles of a people's war revolution and that this will lead to a definite decrease in political and socio-economic stability in South Africa in the continued political reform in the country. The movement towards the creation of a free and open society in the country could thus become the victim of revolutionary objectives of the PAC and the ANC, thereby stalling the process or even halting the process of moving towards a liberal democracy in South Africa. It is against this backdrop of strategic importance that a counter strategy has to be developed to protect the movement towards a liberal democracy and halt the implementation of the people's war revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. It is thus the purpose of this chapter to identify certain guidelines that could contribute to the process of formulating a comprehensive counter-revolutionary strategy.

However, one should bear in mind - as history has shown - that no counter-revolutionary strategy aimed at a people's war revolutionary situation has ever succeeded. This pessimistic attitude focuses on specific problem areas facing a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa: "Counter insurgency is always taxing and disheartening, for its remedial measures are invariably slow to take effect when they do at all: there is consequently a temptation to turn to indirect methods leading to 'political solutions' especially social betterment and meeting the guerrillas' propaganda grievances, in the hope of depriving them of the popular support. ... Yet it is logical that, if the guerrillas aim uncompromisingly at absolute power, there is no halfway house that can content them, ... Leninists, because they turn their back on 'strategic compromise' cannot be appeased - they have to be outwitted. ... Satisfaction of grievances - 'minimum programs' - only leads to the framing of new ones, even though that is no reason for neglecting them" (Duncanson, 1981:118). Creating a counter-revolutionary strategy requires choices of both the objectives of the strategy (ends), and the resources, the instruments, the techniques and actions which will be used to implement the strategy (means). A counter-revolutionary strategy should

involve a multi-dimensional assault on the revolutionaries (the PAC and the ANC) and their strategies.

The principal issue a counter-revolutionary strategy faces, is how to defeat the revolutionaries without alienating the population (the masses). It is imperative in this regard that the people should be convinced that they together with the incumbent government share a common goal: that of defeating the PAC and the ANC. Cooperation must be established between the people and the government, for "if this cooperation between the people and the government does not develop, the counter- insurgency campaign is doomed to eventual failure" (Pustay, 1965:86). The people must be convinced to cooperate to the extent that they will be prepared to fight and even to die to protect their life, liberty and property against the revolutionary onslaught of the PAC and the ANC. Consequently the population must always be taken into account in all planning regarding a counter-revolutionary strategy, regardless of the level of operations. In view of establishing a counter-revolutionary strategy the South African government should keep in mind that "winning a counter revolution will take massive organisation, dedication, sacrifice and time. The government must decide early if it is willing to pay the price. Halfmeasures lead only to protracted, costly defeats" (McCuen, 1969:330).

Thus it is suggested that a multidimensional and coherent counter-revolutionary strategy be developed for South Africa. It is important, however, that certain fundamental principles, which serve as prerequisites, be identified before guidelines for a multidimensional counter-revolutionary strategy for South Africa are discussed.

2 PRINCIPLES OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

A range of principles are to be considered when formulating a counter-revolutionary strategy. Despite the unique character of any counter-revolutionary strategy, these principles are fundamental to the successful construction and implementation of a counter-revolutionary strategy. These principles need not necessarily be interpreted as the "rules of a counter-revolutionary war", but they do serve as specific indicators which contribute to the efficiency of a counter-revolutionary

strategy. The following principles are discussed in terms of their relevance to the South African situation.

2.1 Analysis of the revolutionary situation

The formulation of a counter-revolutionary strategy would be futile if attempted without a thorough knowledge of the revolutionary strategy employed against the country. This means that those who determine and formulate a counter-revolutionary strategy should have a comprehensive understanding of the revolutionary process and the prevailing revolutionary situation (Thompson, 1967:50). A thorough understanding of the revolutionary strategy and process will enable counter-revolutionary strategists to distinguish and differentiate between the various stages and phases of the dimensions of the revolutionary strategy, as well as determining where the revolutionary organisation finds itself in respect of these dimensions. The revolutionary potential may for example be more advanced in the political than in the social dimension, hence the discrepancy that exists between revolutionary rhetoric and revolutionary actions.

A thorough analysis of the revolutionary situation will therefore ensure that the counter-revolutionary strategy constitutes a total strategy. Galula (1968:95) is convinced that "the issue (the scope of counter-revolutionary strategy) is never clear, the objective is the population; military and political action cannot be separated; and military action - essential though it is - cannot be the main form of action". The revolutionary situation is to be viewed as an illness that needs a counter-revolutionary strategy to serve in essence as preventive, therapeutic and regenerative medicine for the illness (Pustay, 1965:83).

2.2 A comprehensive government plan

The formulation of a counter-revolutionary strategy is only possible when a comprehensive government plan exists. Fundamental to this plan is a clear and unequivocal political aim. Thompson (1967:51) observes that such a political aim should include the establishment and maintenance of a free and independent country which is politically and economically stable and viable. A comprehensive government plan should describe the tasks and

responsibilities required to implement it to prevent a breakdown and duplication of the plan. Thompson (1967:55) believes that "the plan must be positive, forcing the insurgents to react to government measures, but flexible enough to take advantage of success. Only in this way can the initiative be held. If there is no plan or if the plan is not followed consistently, then gradually but perceptibly the government will find itself in the position of merely reacting to insurgent initiative. From this position it is not easy to recover."

2.3 Government should function in accordance with the law

The principle that government should function in accordance with the law is fundamental to any counter-revolutionary strategy. When a government functions outside of or above the law it will in the long run have to face the consequences of such behaviour. Thompson (1967:54) is convinced that "in the long-term, adherence to the law is a great advantage to the government. It helps to make all officers and civilian officials responsible and accountable for their actions. It puts torture and the shooting of captured terrorists in their place: however great the provocation, both are crimes and the latter murder". The entrenchment of the judiciary's independence during a counter-revolutionary struggle could thus ensure that the government functions in accordance with the law. A psychological attitude, where the government is portrayed as the 'cops' and the terrorists as the 'robbers', should be created (Thompson, 1967:54). If the government fails to function in accordance with the law it will forfeit the right to be called a government, and it cannot then expect its citizens to obey the law (Thompson, 1967:53). By functioning in accordance with the law, the government will ensure that it is projected as the reasonable and innocent victim of the revolutionaries.

2.4 Unity of effort

The principle of unity of effort of a counter-revolutionary strategy is extremely complex. This principle emphasises the comprehensive and multidimensional nature of a counter-revolutionary strategy. According to this principle, a counter-revolutionary strategy should involve the use of political, psychological, economic, social, military and organisational action which is implemented from the smallest rural association of

individuals to the national and international level. McCuen (1969:58-59) suggests that "these actions must be carefully coordinated in unified doctrine and plans to achieve specific objectives. Each unified plan must be backed by detailed plans of civic action, political operations, economic operations, security, military operations, etc., which coordinates all available resources to achieve the required objectives". This principle therefore reaffirms the assumption that a counter-revolutionary strategy should be a total strategy.

2.5 Defeat political subversion

This principle focuses on the fact that a revolutionary strategy is aimed at the seizure of political power. The objective of a counter-revolutionary strategy should be aimed at defeating the revolutionary political message (political subversion). Revolutionaries claim that "you can kill the man but not the idea", emphasising that a counter-revolutionary strategy should aim at destroying the "idea": once this is accomplished the man (guerrilla) will necessarily follow. The success of revolutionary political subversion depends on the political consciousness of the masses, making the prevention of contact between the revolutionaries and the masses a strategic counter-revolutionary manoeuvre. Thompson observed that: "As the (counter-revolutionary) process develops, the guerrilla units will themselves be forced to cross the line in an attempt to make contact with, and support, their political organisations and to secure their sources of supply. The area of the heavy line (that distance between the guerrilla's and their front organisations) is turned into a sort of barrier, and will become the killing ground because the guerrillas will be forced to fight the government where it is ready for them and at its greatest strength". Depriving the revolutionaries of their contact with internal political subversive groups will force the guerrillas to adopt "spectacular" methods in order to assure their supporters within the target state that the revolution is still continuing. Such spectacular methods usually result in indiscriminate terror, and allow the government to indicate to the masses that the revolutionaries and their political messages are actually aimed at the masses. In this way the process of corroding the "acceptability" of the revolutionary political message will have started.

2.6 Preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy

This principle of counter-revolutionary strategy was coined by McCuen (1969:52) with reference to the military situation in a rurally orientated counter-revolutionary strategy. However, this principle should not be restricted to the military aspect of a counter-revolutionary war strategy, but should be applied to all foundations of the incumbent government. In other words, the principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy should also be implemented in the political, economic, social and international spheres.

2.7 Mobilising the masses

The success of any counter-revolutionary or revolutionary strategy is determined by the support of the masses in the target society. The revolutionaries and the incumbent government are therefore competing for the same objective. However, the history of past counter-revolutionary strategies indicates that, in most cases, the government has been late and slow to adhere to this principle, and its initial response has generally been too modest to be effective. The government should adhere to two prerequisites before it would be able to mobilise the masses and receive their support: it should, first of all, convince the masses that it is committed to the defeat of the revolutionaries and, secondly, it should convince the masses that it is capable of protecting them (Paget, 1967:176).

The objective of the government should therefore be to control the hearts and minds of the masses. Paget (1967:177-178) is convinced that a government will be able to control the hearts and minds of the masses:

- if it understands and respects the feelings and aspirations of the masses;
- if it is a firm and fair government, so that law and order is maintained and the interests of the masses safeguarded and not exploited by those in power;
- if it is able to establish a sound national government;
- if it is able to provide "civic action" which implies providing aid in a variety of forms to the masses; and

- if it is able to put across its own case frequently and forcibly.

By means of its counter-revolutionary strategy, the government should instil in society that sense of security and commitment that will provide the masses with the opportunity and general willingness to resist revolutionary intimidation and coercion. Maintaining control over the masses throughout a counter-revolutionary campaign is of strategic importance (Pustay, 1965:88). The counter-revolutionary strategy should be developed from the population upwards, because the revolutionaries and their organisations are tactically the strongest at the grass roots level allowing them to undermine the preparedness of the masses to subject themselves to law and order (Galula, 1968:75). By means of its counter-revolutionary strategy, the government must convince the masses that it (the government) is the lesser of two evils; if this is accomplished, the government will be able to mobilise the masses (Kidson, 1971:50-60). The government should not allow a situation to develop where it loses the support of the minority favouring its cause. Galula (1964:75-76) indicated that "in any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on the favourable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority".

2.8 Intelligence

The formulation of an effective counter-revolutionary strategy is not possible without sound intelligence. In this regard Paget (1967:178) argued that "counter-insurgency intelligence must cover a wide field and deal not only with the operational organisation and capabilities of the insurgents, but must try also to expose and to understand their minds, their mentality and their motives. The influence that they are likely to exert over the populace must also be anticipated so that their efforts at subversion and intimidation can be thwarted". Sound counter-revolutionary intelligence will also provide insight for the counter-revolutionary strategists on how revolutionaries react to the implementation of the counter-revolutionary strategy; in this way ineffective components of the counter-strategy may be adapted or excluded. Counter-revolutionary intelligence does not comprise only a security or military component, but

it is multidimensional, a fact which emphasises that intelligence should be gathered with regard to every aspect of the revolutionary strategy and struggle.

Various other principles of counter-revolutionary strategy have been identified by a number of counter-revolutionary strategists. However, these principles will not be discussed as they have been formulated to cover specific revolutionary situations. The principles discussed above are generally accepted as fundamental to the development of any counter-revolutionary strategy. These principles should be taken into account when a counter-revolutionary strategy for South Africa is formulated. Formulating a counter-revolutionary strategy for South Africa is a comprehensive and complex process, and only a few guidelines will be identified in this chapter, to serve as pointers for those responsible for formulating a counter-revolutionary strategy for South Africa. It must also be stated that the guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy identified in this chapter are not intended to streamline the unjust system of apartheid employed in South Africa, but are aimed at reducing the acceptability of the revolutionary message, and of the revolutionaries, in order to convince the masses that a PAC or ANC revolution is not in their (the people's) interest.

It is accepted a priori that a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa will be based on the people and on the fact that the government has not lost de jure control of any part of the country. The researcher, in identifying specific guidelines, is aware of the fact that the South African government is slow in responding to the revolutionary threat, and that it is also reluctant to commit the extensive resources and political will required to eradicate the revolutionary threat. It is not the objective of this chapter to identify the nuts and bolts of a counter-revolutionary strategy, but rather to identify guidelines that could contribute to the creation of a multidimensional counter-revolutionary strategy. Guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy will therefore be identified within the framework of the political, military, socio-economic, and international dimensions. These guidelines are not reactionary in nature, for any counter-revolutionary action taken purely in reaction to revolutionary actions constitutes a surrender of initiative to the revolutionaries.

3. GUIDELINES FOR THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

The political dimension is the most important dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa. Both the PAC and the ANC have stated that their revolutions are political struggles for the seizure of power. The political dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy is that dimension by which the government must ensure that the masses acquire a political consciousness and a political will to defy PAC and ANC attempts to seize power in the country. The prevailing political dispensation in South Africa is not conducive for the masses to be convinced that the political programmes of the PAC and the ANC do not serve the interests of masses. Cosmetic reforms to the system of apartheid, such as the presentation of "old apartheid in new structures" will not persuade the masses to resist the revolutionary onslaught. Cosmetic reforms are nothing but defensive reactions regarded by the masses as the products of fear and expedience rather than of sincerity. The objective is to identify some guidelines that could contribute to an effective counter-revolutionary strategy to rid South Africa of the current political impasse and political paralysis. These guidelines will focus on policy aspects as well as actions.

3.1 A new political and constitutional dispensation

If accepted by the government, this guideline could be the most strategic component of a counter-revolutionary strategy. However, the objective is not to develop and formulate a new political and constitutional dispensation for South Africa in this section, but rather to identify aspects that could contribute towards such a process. The guidelines pertaining to a new political and constitutional dispensation may be said to comprise three stages.

3.1.1 Stage one: declaration of intent

It is important that government should announce a declaration of intent (a statement of principle) to indicate its sincerity in regard to a new dispensation. Such a declaration should include the following:

- a declaration of the government's commitment to the total abolishment of the system of apartheid and its obsession with group rights;
- a declaration of the government's commitment to the principle of full, equal and effective participation in the same government for all South Africans;
- a declaration of the government's commitment to the individual's right to life, liberty and property;
- a declaration of the government's commitment to a system of minimal government, thereby indicating that the foundations of the future state will rest on the consent of the individual citizen to be governed, and the actions of state would be judged according to their impact on the interests of each individual citizen;
- a declaration of the government's commitment to a decentralised society where the state has no interests of its own, thereby limiting the danger of mob rule; and
- a declaration of the government's commitment to a liberal democratic political dispensation.

3.1.2 Stage two: acceptance of a Bill of Civil Rights

Acceptance of a Bill of Civil Rights by the government should further contribute towards vouching for the sincerity of its efforts to bring about a free South Africa. A Bill of Civil Rights is important for South Africa because the population have been born into a welfare state orientation which engenders the feeling that they have a claim in justice on "society" for the provision of particular things which it is in actual fact the duty of that society to provide. A Bill of Rights, and not a Bill of Human Rights, is required in South Africa, for certain civil rights are particularly threatened, and need safeguarding if a democratic government were to work. However, it should be remembered that none of the traditional civil rights, for example, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of

association or disassociation, can be, or ever have been, absolute rights that may not be limited by the general rules of law.

A general requirement when embodying civil rights in a formal Bill of Civil Rights in South Africa is that the power of government, as far as it extends, ought to be used justly. Specific caution should be used not to introduce so-called social and economic rights into a Bill of Civil Rights. These rights, for example, freedom from want and freedom from fear, are claims to particular benefits to which every human being is presumed to be entitled, without any indication as to who or what is under the obligation to provide these benefits, or by what process they are to be provided. These socio-economic rights demand as their counterpart a decision that "somebody" should have the duty of providing what the others are to enjoy. Hayek (1978:103) correctly observed: "It is, of course, meaningless to describe them (socio-economic rights) as claims on 'society' because 'society' cannot think, act, value, or 'treat' anybody in a particular way. If such claims are to be met, the spontaneous order which we call society must be replaced by a deliberately directed organisation: the cosmos of the market would have to be replaced by a taxis whose members would have to do what they are instructed to do ... From this it follows that the old civil rights and the new social and economic rights cannot be achieved at the same time and are in fact incompatible, these new rights could not be enforced by law without at the same time destroying that liberal order at which the old civil rights aim." Socio-economic rights, therefore are sophisms that threaten to destroy individual liberty, and the government should be aware of the dangers associated with these rights when it adopts a Bill of Civil Rights.

3.1.3 Stage three: a comprehensive political and constitutional programme plan

The government should provide South Africans with a comprehensive political and constitutional plan which explains government's commitment to a liberal democracy. It is obvious that the issue in South Africa is how far one should move, which implies that what we should be seeking is a constitution that frames the laws in such a way that the freedom of each

can co-exist with the freedom of all. The search for a constitution and political dispensation in South Africa is not for a perfect one, but for a solution which has the least, or most pardonable inconveniences. The political and constitutional dispensation identified by Leon Louw and Francis Kendal in their book The Solution, is a tangible framework and a guideline which government could follow when it draws up a new, comprehensive, liberal political and constitutional plan for South Africa.

The acceptance by government of a new liberal political and constitutional dispensation would provide a counter-revolutionary strategy with the impetus needed to render the revolutionary strategies of both the PAC and the ANC unworkable. The declaration of intent would deprive both the PAC and the ANC of their most valuable political weapon - their resistance to apartheid. In addition, a Bill of Civil Rights and a liberal political and constitutional dispensation would force the PAC and the ANC to either renounce their revolutionary intentions or to state clearly their non-liberal and non-democratic objectives with regard to their respective visions of a future South Africa. In addition, a new liberal political and constitutional dispensation would frustrate PAC and ANC attempts to classify South Africa as a colonial state or a colonial state of a special type without declaring their Marxist-Leninist and world revolutionary order intentions.

The movement towards a liberal democracy as component of the political dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy would have a negative influence on the revolutionary party component of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. A Bill of Civil Rights and a stated commitment to a liberal democracy would provide the masses with a sincere, reasonable and democratic alternative to apartheid and to the political programmes of the PAC and the ANC. The people's choice between a minimal government provided for in a liberal democracy, and a maximum government as reflected in the political programmes of both the PAC and the ANC, should be in favour of the minimal government. The symbolism projected in the status of the PAC and the ANC as revolutionary parties and liberators of the masses from apartheid authoritarianism would disappear against the background of a liberal democracy. The "need" for and "purpose" of a national liberation revolution in South Africa would cease in the wake of a new liberal democracy. However, it is generally accepted that neither

the PAC nor the ANC intends to bring about a liberal democracy in South Africa; a process aimed at bringing about a liberal democracy would force the PAC and the ANC to abandon their facade of being "nationalist" revolutionaries. Thus the people's choice would constitute a choice between freedom and Leninist enslavement.

Against the background of a liberal democracy in South Africa the role and function of the people's army as a component of the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC would become redundant. The claim of waging a "just war" would have no foundation or purpose at all, for the people in South Africa would be free. There would no longer be a "legitimate" reason for the continuation of a policy of violence, for any continuation of such a policy would be against the interests of the people. The united front component of the people's war revolutionary strategies of the PAC and specifically of the ANC would be faced with a major dilemma. The united front strategy of the ANC in the internal manoeuvre would, against the backdrop of a movement towards a liberal democracy, have lost its principal rallying cry - the need to unite all social forces against apartheid. The array of liberal, progressive and democratic organisations and individuals that currently form part of the united front strategy of the ANC would be forced to be true to their values and abandon their fascination with the revolutionary cause by participating in the move towards a liberal democracy. Whatever these front organisations do, the united front strategy of the ANC based on its opposition to apartheid would become unworkable.

A liberal, democratic political and constitutional dispensation for South Africa is clearly the most strategic component of an effective counter-revolutionary strategy. Kidson (1971:53) is convinced that a political programme which is sincere will attract the support of the masses: "In this connection it is worth noting that if all other things are equal, people will prefer to back a limited advance offered by the government than more far-reaching reforms offered by the insurgents because of the greater likelihood of getting something." The PAC and the ANC would be faced with the dilemma that their revolutionary strategies - which hide behind the smokescreen of apartheid - would become impossible to implement, unless a major reconstruction of their respective strategies takes place. However, it is assumed that both the PAC and the ANC will not

cease their revolutionary efforts, whether South Africa becomes a liberal democracy or not. It is therefore necessary to identify other guidelines within the political dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy.

3.2 Effective political administration

An effective political administration system is of crucial importance to the eventual success of a counter-revolutionary strategy, for it provides the government with the means to keep a finger on the pulse of the popular mood in the country. The government's commitment to a liberal democracy will remain nothing but a good intention if the machinery does not exist to execute this policy, and to ensure its impact throughout the country. Local, provincial and central political administration in South Africa should

- be in touch with the needs and aspirations of the masses;
- be capable of creating an environment of stability and of law and order;
- be capable of communicating directly with the population;
- be capable of providing solutions to legitimate grievances of the population; and
- be a fair system, which is non-discriminatory and not given to make appointments to positions in its administration on political grounds.

Every effort and technique should be used to prevent corruption within the administrative process: in September 1984 revolutionary activists had no difficulty in convincing the masses to kill town councillors of the Lekoa Town Council, owing to the perception among the masses that these town councillors were corrupt. During the period 1984 to 1987, legitimate grievances and revolutionary objectives were effectively combined to render the majority of black towns in South Africa administratively ungovernable. It is therefore important to adhere to the following

principles of effective administration: "The first is that an administration will function effectively only if it has the respect and cooperation of the people. This respect and cooperation must be earned, not compelled, by the behaviour and helpfulness of all officials in their dealings with the public. The second is that there must be complete confidence between senior and junior officials. Junior officials must be supported all the way up the line by senior officials above them, so that initiative and keenness in carrying out their duty are encouraged, and mistakes are rectified, not covered up ... " (Thompson, 1967:79-80).

A political administrative process geared to implement a liberal democratic system would have a detrimental effect on the people's war revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC. Such an administrative system would deprive the PAC and the ANC of the relative freedom of movement and freedom to intimidate and coerce currently enjoyed on account of the trust and confidence the masses would have in the political administrative process. The administrators would find it easy to convey to the masses the advantages of a free society and the evils of the revolutionary process. Legitimate complaints would also be detected and rectified before the PAC or the ANC could utilise them in their revolutionary processes. It would become possible for administrators to identify the leadership components in society in advance of the revolutionaries, with the result that these leadership elements could be trained and educated regarding the benefits of a free society, allowing them to educate the masses. This would deprive the PAC and the ANC of a large resource of revolutionary cadres.

3.3 Creating a liberal political consciousness among the masses

The provision of a new political and constitutional dispensation and an effective political administration necessarily lead to a third guideline within the political dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy: that of the creation of a liberal political consciousness among the masses. A sincere government political plan and an effective administrative system implementing the latter would provide the opportunity to raise the political consciousness of the masses regarding the benefits of a free society - liberal democracy. An expanding number of people who accept the

bona fides of a liberal democracy would result in a diminishing number of people who are influenced by the PAC and the ANC.

The advantages of the new liberal political order should continually be compared to the destructive nature of the political programmes of the PAC and the ANC. The masses should be given the choice of supporting freedom as reflected by a liberal democracy, or of being enslaved again as reflected by the Marxist-Leninist implications of the political policies of the PAC and the ANC. Support for freedom must also be equated with the process of nation-building. The masses must be brought to realise that it will only be possible to build a nation within a liberal democracy, and not within the political structures envisaged by the PAC and the ANC. However, the creation of a liberal political consciousness among the masses is dependent on the masses being able to experience the freedom that is provided by a liberal democracy. It would not be possible to create a liberal political consciousness among the masses if the government did not institutionalise a liberal democracy in South Africa.

The existence of a liberal political consciousness among the masses would render the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC unworkable. The plausibility of every principle associated with a liberal democracy would highlight the totalitarian nature of the revolutionary nationalism adhered to by both the PAC and the ANC. Consequently, the PAC and the ANC as revolutionary parties would no longer be associated with the concept of freedom, with the result that MK and APLA and their actions would become the enemies of freedom in South Africa. Any united front strategy implemented by the PAC and the ANC would also be perceived not to be in the self-interest of the masses.

4 THE MILITARY DIMENSION

For the purpose of this study, the military dimension of the counter-revolutionary strategy will include the National Security Management System, as the South African Defence Force (SADF) gained de facto control of it during the P.W. Botha era in South African politics. Guidelines that will be identified within the military dimension will be both policy orientated and operationally orientated. It is of strategic importance for a counter-revolutionary strategy that the defence system

should be perceived by the masses to be the one instrument which protects them from an external threat. The current nature and character of the defence system (the SADF and the national security management system), however, do not comply with this criteria. The defence system in South Africa should be reorganised so as to be accepted by the masses.

4.1 Reorganisation of the South African Defence Force

In view of both the prevailing situation and the guidelines for a new political and constitutional dispensation, the current structure and function of the SADF is unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. The SADF is perceived to be the defence force of apartheid and this association will remain, unless the defence force is reorganised.

4.1.1 A professional defence force

The concept of a professional defence force is the ideal option associated with a liberal democracy. Creating a professional defence force in South Africa would foil PAC and ANC attempts to project the SADF as the enforcer of apartheid legislation. The movement away from conscription would also derail the efforts of pro-revolutionary social forces, such as the End Conscription Campaign, to discredit the SADF. Thus, a professional defence force would be able to divorce itself from being perceived as a political instrument, thereby ensuring that it concentrates on its objective of defending all South Africans.

However, the option of a professional defence force in South Africa becomes distorted when the current level of education within the non-white sector of society is brought into consideration. Against this background it would be more difficult for non-white South Africans to compete on an equal footing with their white counterparts for employment within a professional defence force. Such a situation could re-awaken historical prejudices against the defence force. It is therefore suggested that a transitional manoeuvre be accepted, where a fully conscript defence force is created, such as the defence force in Switzerland.

4.1.2 Conscript defence force

The existence of a fully conscript defence force in Switzerland reaffirms that such a defence system is fully compatible with a liberal democracy. Within the principles of a liberal democracy, national defence is not only the concern of the central government, but also that of the regional and local government, as well as the individual. It is suggested that in a liberal democratic South Africa, national defence should be based on the principle of progressive independence, implying a national defence policy approach in which it is recognised that freedom can only prevail when all individuals are free. This policy approach entails that South Africa should have an adequate defence capability to secure the freedom of each individual. The protection of freedom therefore depends on the participation of all individuals in a system of compulsory military service, because an individual in a liberal society has the right to call on his fellow individuals to join in structures that provide security. The argument of John Stuart Mill (1976:51) is of strategic importance to the South African situation: "Our notion, therefore of the claim that we have on our fellow creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility (freedom)".

Compulsory military service in a liberal democratic South Africa should be applied absolutely and unconditionally, and must not be refused on either ethno-religious or political grounds. The conflict between the individual's conscience and the protection of freedom should be settled in favour of the state. Compulsory military conscription should apply to all South Africans over the age of 18 years, with the objective of creating a people's militia. The concept of a people's militia does not imply an armed body of men with no systematic training or a permanent command structure, it refers to an established military organisation that requires the people to perform a long-term military service. This compulsory military service should extend over a period of twenty years. Excluding a call to active service for either a part or the whole of the people's defence force - an eventuality arising particularly from an external threat - normal periods of military service must be used for training. Training for the people's militia should be divided into basic training and supplementary training.

Basic training is the process of initial training provided to members of the people's militia which enables them to exercise their defence functions. This phase should take place over a period of about 16 to 20 weeks, and should be completed by all before the age of 22 years. Supplementary training should take place on an annual basis for a period of not less than three and not more than six weeks. Some of the initial training will be repeated during these training periods, but the major emphasis will be on more instruction and in-depth training. Supplementary training should take place in the unit to which each individual was originally assigned, that is, the same company, battalion, regiment and division. This would provide members of the people's militia with a sense of security based on learning, experience, comradeship and practice. Certain specialists, non-commissioned officers, officers and regimental commanders should be trained at special schools to prepare them for duties such as those of commanding officers or operational staff.

The people's militia should consist of an army, a navy, an air Force and medical components. Cohesion within the people's militia will be ensured by allowing individuals from specific geographical regions such as cantons to serve together at operational levels. The administration of the people's militia should be spread across the country, embracing federal, canton and local levels. A defence force based on the people's militia will contribute to the process of creating national morale and national unity in a liberal democratic South Africa.

A conscript defence force based on the concept of a people's militia would be an effective counter force to the people's armies of the PAC and the ANC. Within the framework of a people's militia, more South African households would be involved in the struggle against the revolutionary processes of the PAC and the ANC. The people's militia would thus defend their freedom and that of the liberal democratic society against the threat of a PAC and ANC people's war revolution. However, this guideline cannot be implemented in isolation, with the result that the national security management system will also have to be reorganised as part of the military dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy.

4.2 Reorganisation of the national security management system

The current national security management system in South Africa is perceived to be a political instrument in the hands of the government. Within a liberal democracy, this system will be unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. It is therefore suggested that the national security system in a liberal democracy be managed on a federal basis. Management in this context does not imply the creation of several departments, each duplicating the other in terms of operations and bureaucracy, but a functional and organised composition. National security policy in a liberal democratic South Africa should be coordinated by a Special Cabinet Committee on National Security (SCCNS) that would receive advice from a National Intelligence Agency (NIA). A federal government would thus make its decisions regarding national security policy in accordance with advice it receives from the SCCNS.

The SCCNS will serve in an advisory capacity to a federal government, coordinating intelligence it receives from the NIA, and it will coordinate the implementation of national security policy as formulated by a federal government. The SCCNS may comprise the following members:

- the President of the Federation;
- the Minister of National Defence;
- any coopted minister;
- any coopted governor of a canton;
- the Director General of the NIA and the National Defence Force; and
- any coopted head of a canton police department or any other department.

The National Intelligence Agency will provide the SCCNS with intelligence regarding the development of a threat or a possible threat against South Africa. The NIA should comprise three divisions: an international division (currently the National Intelligence Service); an internal division (currently the Security Branch of the Police); and a military division (currently the Directorate of Military Intelligence). The Director General of the NIA should be a professional intelligence officer, who would be accountable directly to the SCCNS and to the office of the President of the Federation. In view of the liberal democracy guideline, the Presidency

will rotate between individuals and or/political parties, with the result that power would not be abused or mismanaged in such a system. Each division of the NIA should have its own director, and the occupants of these positions should rotate between divisions to ensure that a capable successor can be appointed as Director General at any time.

Centralising the national security system into one agency will ensure that duplication of functions is minimalised and that departmental competition - which paralyses the current system - will be excluded. The international division will therefore focus on operationalising its functions externally to determine threats to the state. The internal division will focus its functions on the internal national security situation in South Africa. The internal division will not have the power of arrest and will cooperate with local and canton police departments in this regard. Suspects, when arrested, should be brought to trial in a Federal Court, because a threat in terms of national security will be regarded as a threat against the Federation. The military division will focus its functions on the military threat against the Federation. Compartmentalisation will ensure that disputes regarding jurisdiction in terms of national security management will not occur, with the result that the masses will not be confused as to who is responsible for the maintenance of national security. This system of national security management will be clearly divorced from military and police involvement, making it more acceptable to all South Africans. The new national security management system (this includes the intelligence organisation) will no longer be perceived to be a powerful instrument of government to oppress the masses, but as an instrument that aims to secure each individual's freedom.

During a counter revolutionary war, more than in any other type of war, the intelligence agency (NIA) is in the forefront of the military dimension, and the border between intelligence work and combat activity becomes blurred. Thus it is important to identify certain operational guidelines for the role of the intelligence organisation in a counter-revolutionary strategy.

4.3 Operational guidelines

As previously discussed in this chapter, sound intelligence is one of the fundamental principles of a counter revolutionary strategy. It is important that within the South African concept some guidelines for intelligence warfare operations be identified. A distinction in this regard will be made between guidelines for target areas in intelligence operations and guidelines for intelligence warfare (Godson, 1986:131-141).

4.3.1 Target areas in intelligence operations

The following target areas are by no means the only possible ones, but they are essential when setting out guidelines.

The political and ideological systems of the PAC and the ANC

The political and ideological systems of the PAC and the ANC constitute strategic targets for intelligence operations. It is therefore essential that the ideology of each organisation be understood and its evolution, change, and increase or decrease in influence be closely monitored to understand the PAC and the ANC - a prerequisite when planning a counter-revolutionary war against them. To gain a comprehensive knowledge of the political and ideological systems of the PAC and the ANC, the following components are to be carefully monitored:

- the leaders of the PAC and the ANC, because they operate more in the open and are easier to identify than operational elements;
- the publications and radio broadcasts of the PAC and the ANC;
- the meeting places where PAC and ANC members are recruited, including what was said, who attended and where it was held;
- the social forces (protest movements) such as the UDF, AZANYU and other organisations that reflect support for either the PAC and the ANC; and

- the operational affiliates of the PAC and the ANC, both internally and internationally.

The organisational and operational infrastructure

Intelligence regarding the operational infrastructure of the PAC and the ANC is of strategic importance to the counter revolutionary strategy, as these structures are the instruments for the violent operations of the PAC and the ANC. Intelligence warfare operations forming part of the counter-revolutionary strategy should focus on how the operational infrastructure of the PAC functions, that is, what process operational planning follows until an act of violence is committed. With regard to the ANC, intelligence should be available to counter-revolutionary strategists on the functions and tasks of underground structures; area people's committees; area politico-military councils; regional politico-military councils; politico-military councils; external coordination committees, and the national working committee. The organisational infrastructure of the PAC and the ANC is closely related to their respective operational systems. Therefore, the more the knowledge gained of the operational systems, the more will be known of their infrastructure, and vice versa.

The operational activities of the PAC and the ANC

This is one of the most difficult targets of intelligence warfare operations as only a select number of participants share the knowledge of imminent PAC and ANC operations. Thus it would be desirable that the various operational centres of the PAC and the ANC be infiltrated. Intelligence warfare operations should also extend to the infiltration of PAC and ANC operational groups. However, it is crucial that considerable attention be given to the establishment of reliable and fast communication systems, to enable sources within the PAC and the ANC to transmit intelligence to their respective controllers, in order to take preventative action.

The support infrastructure

PAC and ANC operations within South Africa do not take place in a vacuum; specific supportive infrastructures exist that assist both organisations.

These supporters' and sympathiser systems must therefore be penetrated. These systems may be easier to penetrate than the closed revolutionary systems of the PAC and the ANC. Such support systems usually include active front organisations of the PAC and the ANC, intellectuals, lawyers who defend PAC and ANC members in court, doctors who administer medical aid, and others who supply information and shelter. Penetrating the supportive system may make it easier to penetrate the PAC and the ANC. Undermining and even eliminating the support system could also reduce PAC and ANC capacity for action.

4.3.2 Intelligence warfare

A wide range of intelligence warfare operations could be launched against the PAC and the ANC: the following guidelines serve as indicators.

Covert counter operations

The emphasis here is on the technique of operations, which is covert and limited in scale compared to operations such as pre-emptive strikes or cross-border raids. Covert counter operations are designed in such a way as to avoid leaving any evidence of the attacking force. These operations should never be formally acknowledged even if evidence leaves no doubt of the identity and origin of the attackers. Covert counter operations should be launched against the leadership elements of the PAC and the ANC. (The 1963 Rivonia trial, where the top echelon leadership of Umkhonto we Sizwe was captured, resulted in the ANC only being able to continue with their armed struggle in 1976; effective operations against the PAC in 1968 resulted in the PAC being unable to launch any military operations in South Africa until 1987.) Covert elimination operations against PAC and ANC leadership elements could take the form of a direct attack on their leaders, an indirect attack by means of a parcel bomb, or they could be performed in such a way as to leave doubt whether they were performed by the government or by a rival group within the PAC or the ANC.

Covert counter operations should also be launched against strategic PAC and ANC installations, such as operational centres, private apartments, training bases and selected internal front organisations and their leaders. The advantage of covert counter operations is that they employ

the very tactics used by the PAC and the ANC, and no absolute defence can be devised against such operations. The PAC and the ANC will be forced to divert considerable attention, manpower and resources to self-defence actions. As a result, they could be tied down in efforts to defend themselves, causing morale to drop among their members.

Psychological warfare

Psychological warfare is a powerful weapon that should be used against the PAC and the ANC. Against the backdrop of an envisaged liberal democracy in South Africa, the spectrum of psychological warfare initiatives becomes unlimited. Psychological warfare operations, however, should be aimed at the most vulnerable area of both the PAC and the ANC - the motivation of its members and the readiness of others to join PAC and ANC ranks or to remain and operate within their frameworks. Psychological warfare operations that could be implemented include, for example, the following:

- undermining internal cohesion within the PAC and the ANC by spreading rumours of traitors, spies and informers in their ranks;
- undermining internal cohesion within the front organisations and supportive systems of the PAC and the ANC by spreading rumours of coopting leaders of the mass democratic movement into the system, traitors, spies and informers in their ranks;
- undermining the credibility of the leadership and command of the PAC and the ANC as well as of their internal front organisations;
- creating friction and rivalry among leaders of the PAC and the ANC as well as among their front organisations;
- promoting conflict between the PAC and the ANC, as well as between their respective front organisations;
- driving a wedge between the PAC, the ANC and their internal front organisations; and

- spreading disinformation, rumours, gossip and false statements regarding the PAC, the ANC, their leaders and their front organisations.

The policy and operational guidelines identified within the military dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy will, in association with the political dimension, render the people's war based revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC unworkable. The creation of a people's militia and a national security management system aimed at protecting the liberal state will deprive both the PAC and the ANC of valuable slogans used to lure individuals into the revolutionary struggle. Effective intelligence warfare operations will tie the PAC and the ANC down in their host countries, with the result that their revolutionary visibility inside South Africa will decline.

5 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The socio-economic dimension, which influences the quality of life of the masses, should have as objective the maintenance and if possible the increase of prosperity in the target society, because it is a potent weapon against the revolutionaries (Kidson, 1971:50-54). It is therefore suggested, within the socio-economic dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy, that a principal guideline be the acceptance of a new economic philosophy compatible with a liberal democracy.

5.1 A new economic philosophy

The 1980s have proved internationally that government involvement in and control of the economy is the surest way to lead society down the path of impoverishment. The government should thus not form part of the economic dimension in a counter-revolutionary strategy, but should divorce itself from its control over the economy. It is generally accepted that government control of the production of wealth is the control of human life itself, and for this reason it is incompatible with the liberal democratic political guideline. Von Mises (1949:239) argued as follows: "The pure market economy assumes that government, the social apparatus of compulsion and coercion, is intent upon preserving the operation of the market system, and protects it against encroachment on the part of other

people". The government should implement economic reforms that would lead to the creation of a private free-market economy, which in essence, is the new economic philosophy South Africa needs. A private free-market economic policy will accelerate the demise of sectional interest groups, thereby minimising the temptation for individuals or groups to control the levers of government.

A private free-market economy is based on freedom of movement; private ownership of property; freedom of exchange; freedom of contact; freedom of association and dissociation; and freedom of entry into the market, underlining once again the assumption that a liberal democracy and a private free-market are compatible. The strategic economic issue facing a counter-revolutionary strategy is not the redistribution of wealth but the redistribution of opportunity in order to create wealth. Privatisation and deregulation are significant instruments which could assist the government in its attempt to annul its role in the economy. Wealth creating mechanisms contained in a private free-market will also contribute to a process of depoliticising the economy. A private free-market would encourage entrepreneurial talents in people who merely need the chance to exercise them. The freedom brought about by a private free-market will serve as a lever to move people towards new confidence in themselves and their ability to improve their own lives.

On account of the private free-market economy, the socialist and mixed economy tendencies of the PAC and the ANC will be perceived by the masses as manoeuvres to deprive the people of their individual freedom. Thus the free-market economic philosophy is the antithesis of PAC and ANC policies, for it is a people's economy that provides each individual with the opportunity to develop his or her creativity to its full potential. By means of a private free-market economy the masses will create for themselves vested interests in society, thereby depriving the PAC and the ANC of the slogan that the South African economy is based on class and is exploitive in nature.

5.2 Deregulating labour relations

The current nature of labour relations in South Africa contributes to the effectiveness and influence of PAC and ANC revolutionary strategies.

Labour relations, as part of a counter-revolutionary strategy, should be deregulated to depoliticise the labour market. This entails the scrapping of much of the current morass of labour legislation. The existence of an extremely regulated labour market in South Africa is the result of government invariably over-reacting to the labour question, and implementing regulations to solve the perceived labour problem, rather than leaving it to the market forces to resolve. As indicated previously, government intervention in the economy in any form is invariably counter productive, the labour market being no exception. The primary problem confronting conventional thinking within government regarding labour relations is the perception that labour, on account of its human aspect, is not a commodity, but something special requiring protected rights and privileges. Labour, however, is a commodity (something of value) which the employee will always sell and which the employer will always buy.

Trade unions, like any other interest groups, dislike competition in the market place, especially in the market for labour. Since trade unions derive their strength from membership numbers, they demand exclusive and monopolistic privileges to entrench their power in the economy. This includes collective bargaining powers; work preservation clauses to ensure that dismissals do not occur; the right of picketing to deny employers the ability and right to recruit individuals outside the trade union; and closed-shop agreements which exclude those who could be employed at a lower wage. These special privileges which trade unions are seeking and which government legislation grants, are essentially a protection racket, for society is coerced to bend the rules to allow trade unions to carry out their activities. These demands by trade unions are restrictions which constitute a violation of the individual's right to freely engage in economic activity by selling his labour on terms that are determined solely by the mutual preferences of seller and buyer. Labour legislation which protects trade union power enables them to pressure employers and non-unionised employees to succumb to demands that would otherwise not be tolerated in a free economy. Labour legislation therefore discriminates against those employees who would want to negotiate a better contract for themselves from an individual position. Individual uniqueness and advantage, for example superior ability, experience and training, is therefore coercively redistributed within the confines of the trade union which is protected by government legislation. Thus individuals are unable

to rise above their fellow workers and are trapped in an artificial environment of mediocrity.

Labour relations between employer and employee need not be treated differently from other relationships, and the terms of a labour relationship, like any other relationship, should be strictly between the parties involved. Therefore, a labour relationship constitutes an agreement mutually arrived at between an employee and an employer, and it is not a relationship between all employees and all employers. The relationship or partnership between employer and employee is governed by a mutually negotiated contract, which implies that both sides have to be free to negotiate any of the terms of the contract. This contract will consequently serve as the most important instrument for settling any labour dispute, and both parties will have recourse to contract law via the courts of law, which are the most neutral arbiters in any dispute. As in any other contract, the courts of law will ensure accountability by both sides to the terms of the labour contract.

It is obvious that labour relations should be deregulated and that government should withdraw itself from the labour market, as the "neutral referee" of labour relations. A free labour market, where labour is not protected by government legislation as a privileged commodity, will still allow trade unions to operate, but they will be established by means of employees' free will and free choice. In such an environment, the individual employee will be able to join or resign from a trade union by choice, without fear of intimidation or coercion. A deregulated and free labour market will make provision for and encourage competitive trade unions, allowing individuals to make a choice between trade unions in order to determine which trade union will best serve their interests. In addition, competing trade unions will reduce the ability of management and of trade union bosses to unilaterally dictate the conditions of employment. Trade unions in a deregulated labour market in South Africa will undergo a transformation from coercive monopolies to specialised institutions aimed at enhancing and protecting their members' interests.

A deregulated labour market in South Africa will force the PAC and the ANC to redesign their revolutionary strategies with regard to the role of the "worker" in a people's war revolution. Within a deregulated labour market,

trade unions will be deprived of their revolutionary potential as a revolutionary pressure group or revolutionary force. Consequently the political value of trade unions will be marginalised. SACTU, COSATU, NACTU and ATUCC will not be able to forcibly project themselves as the vanguard of employees' political aspirations. In a free-market, the Marxist-Leninist concept of the class struggle, which these trade unions use, will become meaningless.

5.3 Depoliticising social forces

Depoliticising the existing anti-apartheid social forces in South Africa is a crucial guideline for a counter-revolutionary strategy. However, the guidelines that have so far been identified would contribute greatly to the depoliticisation of the social forces. The guidelines within the political dimension of the counter-revolutionary strategy would deprive pro-revolutionary social forces of the issue (apartheid) that has contributed to their existence and effectiveness as political pressure groups. By eliminating the concept of apartheid from the debate, social forces in South Africa will be forced to either support the development towards a liberal democracy, or to state their ideological commitment to a non-democratic ideology. Those social forces that do not support the creation of a liberal democratic state will then be identified as social forces that are operating against the interests of the masses. The ultimate battle in South Africa - the battle between the forces of freedom and the forces of enslavement - will consequently be forced into the forefront of any debate on the structure of a future society.

The policy-orientated guidelines identified within the military dimension will also contribute to the depoliticisation of social forces. The creation of a defence and national security system, aimed at protecting the individual's freedom and based on the individual's participation, will prevent social forces from equating the liberal democratic system with that of a Nazi or police state system. The economic guidelines will influence the daily activities of the masses, and will contribute to prosperity in the country, with the result that the liberal democratic society could not be compared to an unjust system. Exploitation, the class differences and the class struggle would, in a liberal democracy, cease to be fundamental issues, except if propagated by Marxist-Leninists and

socialists, who, in any event, will be regarded as the enemies of freedom. On account of the existence of a free society, claims to the right to self-determination and economic emancipation will have no bearing on the South African situation.

The depoliticisation of social forces in South Africa, as part of the counter-revolutionary strategy, will deprive the PAC and specifically the ANC of a strategic force component of their people's war revolutionary strategies. It will then not be possible for the ANC to unite a broad spectrum of forces against the government, in order to isolate it internally. Neither the PAC nor the ANC in this scenario will be able to continue with a people's war revolution and they will each be forced to revert back to the classical revolutionary struggle where a Marxist-Leninist movement attempts to seize power within a liberal democracy, or they will be forced to abandon their revolutionary strategies and become part of the liberal democracy. The creation of a liberal democracy therefore forces both the PAC and the ANC into a no-win situation.

6. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The international dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy is dependent on the successes of the political, military and socio-economic dimensions. In this regard it is accepted that internal developments within South Africa would determine the composition of the international dimension. It is accepted ipso facto that the effective implementation of the aforementioned guidelines will result in the PAC and the ANC being internationally isolated if they refuse to abandon their revolutionary struggles. The focus of the international community will, as a result, be placed on the PAC and the ANC to become part of the liberal democratic South Africa.

The creation of a liberal democracy in South Africa will thus enable a diplomatic mission to actively sell a new South Africa to the international community. The preconditions presented to the current government will have disappeared and the country will be able to enter the

realm of international politics, without being perceived to be an oppressive society.

International forces supporting both the PAC and the ANC will consequently be forced to state clearly whether they are in favour of a free or an ANC/PAC controlled South Africa. A readjustment of international public opinion will have to take place, as a result of the existence of a liberal democracy in South Africa based on freedom, liberty, democracy and equality. The international dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy, as a result of the effective implementation of the guidelines, will be identified in the other dimensions, bringing about the isolation of the PAC and the ANC in the reasonable world.

7 CONCLUSION

This chapter is the natural outcome of what has been discussed in chapters four, five and six, bearing in mind that a revolution will not solve the political complexities of South Africa. This chapter therefore identified fundamental principles of a counter-revolutionary strategy as well as guidelines for a multidimensional counter-revolutionary strategy. The guidelines that were identified were not developed to streamline apartheid in order to defeat institutionalised PAC and ANC revolution. On the contrary, these guidelines indicate that the only effective counter to PAC and ANC revolution is the creation of a liberal democracy in South Africa, in which every individual has an interest in the maintenance of the new system. By providing the masses with a vested interest in a liberal democracy in South Africa, the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC become threats to the interests of the masses.

The principles of a counter-revolutionary strategy that were identified in this chapter are components fundamental to a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa. These principles should therefore be regarded as rules of counter-revolutionary war that should not be ignored in any counter-revolutionary strategy. The guidelines for a multidimensional counter-revolutionary strategy that were identified therefore also have to be considered against the background of the identified principles.

In this chapter it was furthermore determined that a counter-revolutionary strategy in South Africa had to be based on the masses, that the government had to have the political will to implement the guidelines and that it had to be committed to defeat the PAC and the ANC. The guidelines that were identified within the multidimensional counter-revolutionary strategy do not constitute a coherent or comprehensive counter-revolutionary strategy but are indicators or components of a possible counter-revolutionary strategy, that will defeat the revolutions waged by the PAC and the ANC. These policy and operational guidelines should thus be viewed as pathfinders towards the creation of a coherent and comprehensive counter-revolutionary strategy.

It is apparent from this chapter that the system of apartheid as South Africans know it can not be justly defended against the revolutionary struggles of the PAC and the ANC, despite the fact that these revolutions are intent on creating an even more unjust society. While only eleven guidelines were identified in this chapter, the proposed changes and their consequences in the revolutionary strategies of the PAC and the ANC are clearly of a great magnitude. The guidelines identified within the political dimension imply a total and comprehensive political and constitutional restructuring of South Africa which, if ignored by the PAC and the ANC will result in both of them being forced into political obscurity. PAC and ANC rejection of the liberal democracy that should be brought about by the guidelines within the political dimension would result in both of them being regarded as the enemies of freedom by all freedom-orientated South Africans.

The policy guidelines identified within the military dimension would result in the creation of a people's defence system that would annihilate the revolutionary struggles of the PAC and the ANC. In addition, the operational guidelines would render the revolutionary struggles of the PAC and the ANC unworkable. The guidelines identified within the socio-economic dimension would deprive both the PAC and the ANC of their internal support base that is constituted in trade unions and social forces. This chapter also indicates that it will not be necessary to develop any strategies or tactics within the international dimension of a counter-revolutionary strategy, provided that the internal political, military and socio-economic guidelines are effectively implemented .

The guidelines for a counter-revolutionary strategy, however, need to be implemented before the PAC and the ANC are able to institutionalise the people's war revolutionary strategies. The sincerity of these guidelines will not be questioned if they are implemented before either the PAC or the ANC reaches its objective of waging a people's war revolution. The South African government, therefore, needs to implement or commit itself to the implementation of a free and just society in the country within the next two years.

SAMEVATTING

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TITEL : DIE KONSEP "VOLKSOORLOG" IN DIE REWOLUSIONÊRE STRATEGIEË VAN
DIE ANC EN PAC: 'N VERGELYKENDE STUDIE

Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om 'n vergelykende studie van die konsep "people's war" (volksoorlog) te maak soos wat dit in die rewolusionêre strategieë van die Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) en die African National Congress (ANC) voorkom. Die konsep "volksoorlog" binne die konteks van hierdie proefskrif word as 'n produk en manifestasie van rewolusie as twintigste eeuse verskynsel beskou.

Hierdie benadering het dit genoodsaak dat rewolusie as twintigste eeuse verskynsel in die tweede hoofstuk, binne die historiese en filosofiese konteks daarvan beskryf word. Hierdie beskrywing het gevolglik spesifiek na die verskillende benaderings en teorieë verwys wat 'n definitiewe invloed op rewolusionêre denke in die Derde Wêreld het. Dit was in hierdie verband ook belangrik om na rewolusionêre strategieë en enkele rewolusionêre oorlogsvoeringsmodelle in die breë te verwys.

In hoofstuk drie is 'n raamwerk bestaande uit vier komponente ontwikkel waaraan die konsep "volksoorlog" gemeet word. Dit is volgens alle aanduidings die eerste teoretiese raamwerk wat ontwikkel is om te bepaal in welke mate 'n rewolusionêre stryd aan die vereistes van 'n volksoorlog voldoen. Die vier komponente, te wete: nasionalisme; die rewolusionêre party; die volksweermag, en die verenigde front, het as die vertrekpunt

gedien waarvolgens die konsep "volksoorlog" soos wat dit in die rewolusionêre strategieë voorkom, vergelyk is.

Die voorkoms van die konsep "volksoorlog" in die rewolusionêre strategieë van die PAC en die ANC, is gevolglik in hoofstukke vier, vyf en ses binne die raamwerk van die vier komponente vergelyk. Dit was egter noodsaaklik, aangesien twee komponente van die volksoorlog direk binne die raamwerk van die dimensies van rewolusionêre oorlog-strategieë manifesteer, om in die vergelykende studie daarna te verwys. Dit is die bevinding en oordeel van hierdie vergelykende studie dat beide die PAC en die ANC wel aspekte van die konsep "volksoorlog" in hulle rewolusionêre strategieë geïnkorporeer het. Daar is bevind dat die ANC die suksesvolste is in sy pogings om sy rewolusionêre stryd in dié van 'n volksoorlog te verander. Die PAC beskik wel oor 'n suiwer teoretiese benadering ten opsigte van 'n volksoorlog, maar die organisasie het tot dusver nie daarin geslaag om dit effektief in die praktyk te implementeer nie.

Die bevindings wat in hoofstukke vier, vyf en ses gemaak is, is in die finale hoofstuk saamgetrek. Die gevolgtrekkings wat hier gemaak is het onder andere tot gevolg gehad dat die belangrikheid van 'n teen-rewolusionêre strategie in Suid-Afrika beklemtoon is. Enkele riglyne wat tot die formulering van 'n omvattende teen-rewolusionêre strategie kan bydra, is gevolglik in hierdie hoofstuk geïdentifiseer. In hierdie verband is dit beklemtoon dat 'n teen-rewolusionêre strategie wat op die filosofie van 'n liberale demokrasie gebaseer is, die enigste strategie is wat enige hoop op sukses in Suid-Afrika het.

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