Lost time: Disillusionment in Christiaan Olwagen's *Johnny is nie dood nie* (2017)

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ABSTRACT

The film *Johnny is nie dood nie* uses temporal strategies on various levels to express disillusionment as a theme. These temporal strategies include interjected memories (flashbacks), dreams and ontological overlaps between "reality" and fiction, and between present and past. These strategies entail a manipulation of time narrated and are interpreted in Genettian terms as the *discourse time* of a story.

I argue for a conceptualisation of time as subjective and existential. How time is conveyed as such is salient to the construction of disillusionment as a leitmotif in the film through characters' experiences of time, and the cinematographic and narratological manipulation of time for the viewer to interpret. Disillusionment, being predicated on past hopes and present discontent (as well as future hopes and its discontents) depends on the passage of time and the notions of memory and anticipation, both expressions of subjective time.

Interjected with layers of flashbacks and dreams, the film relates a narrative unfolding of events in 2002, but this unfolding is peppered with memories and hauntings from 1989 and some references to 1987 and 1988. The film's non-chronological movement through time brings the past and present into sharp focus: smashed hopes, idealised memories, and deeply disturbing dream content co-exist side by side. The characters' disillusionment in the film is contextually related to real events - the Voëlvry movement, student days, and most poignantly: South African realities of the time, and the reaction of some members of the Afrikaner youth's emerges from their disappointment in their expected future as they realise their future ideals have failed to actualise. Voëlvry was the voice of a generation of disillusioned Afrikaners (in the late 1980s) who anticipated a better future and again experienced disillusionment years later as their expectations of the future collapsed and failed to actualise. Between their first and second disillusionment is thus time spent in anticipation – a *lost time* of hopes and dreams.

To explore these temporalities as constructive of the theme of disillusionment, this study presents an interpretation of Lise's dream, in which present and past - and also personas, notably Johnny's - conflate in disturbing ways that also have a bearing on the present. Further interpretations explore the character of Johnny with reference to the figure of Johannes Kerkorrel (the *nom de plume* used for the Afrikaans singer and songwriter Ralph Rabie), since Johnny's character conflates with Kerkorrel's on many levels in the film, most notably in terms of disillusionment and (eventual) suicide.

The conflation of reality and fiction, past and present, and dream and wakeful state occurs through temporal augmentations brought about by music, conversations, flashbacks, and

contextual knowledge. Lise's dream and Johnny's character and suicide are arguably the film's most poignant manifestations of disillusionment and thus the focus of investigation in interpreting the theme.

Keywords: Post-classical narratology, Time, disillusionment, Johnny is nie dood nie, cinema, narrative time, cinematographic time, Voëlvry, Johannes Kerkorrel

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The film *Johnny is nie dood nie* (2017), directed by Christian Olwagen, presents the story of four friends, Lise, Dirk, Anja and Hein in 2002, while flashbacks to 1989 (also a few brief flashbacks to 1987 and 1988) tell the story of the characters' experiences of life in South Africa from a white middle-class Afrikaans-speaking student perspective, and especially of the Voëlvry movement during their student years in Stellenbosch. Although not called a movement at the time, Voëlvry was a group of musicians who came together to express their anger and frustration with the political, social and cultural conditions of the Afrikaner culture and society in the late 1980s. Johannes Kerkorrel (Ralph Rabie) is generally regarded as the figurehead of the movement who became the voice of a generation of young and disillusioned Afrikaners.

Johnny is nie dood nie was released in 2017. The cast includes Roelof Storm (Johnny), Rolanda Marais (Lise), Albert Pretorius (Dirk), Ilana Cilliers (Anja) and Ludwig Binge (Hein). The main characters are Johnny, Lise, Dirk, Anja and Hein. There is a significant overlap between Johannes Kerkorrel and Johnny, who, contrary to the title of the film, dies in 1989. Johnny and Kerkorrel merge, in Lise's mind, into the same person, and the name Johnny (the character's) is similar to the name Kerkorrel assumed at a later stage in his career (Johnny K). This conflation becomes a leitmotif of disillusionment in the film since both Kerkorrel's and Johnny's lives are characterised by disillusionment (with various aspects of life in South Africa at the time) and also end in suicide. The name of the film is an obvious allusion to the 2008 Koos Kombuis song "Johnny is nie dood nie" from the album *Bloedrivier* (Blood River) with the same line[1].

[1]The lines in the song poignantly refer to Ralph Rabie/Johannes Kerkorrel's life and music, telling of broken dreams and ending in the repetive *Johnny is nie dood* nie, as if to stall the horror of the suicide. The song was released in 2008, six years after Rabie's death:

[…] Van die bruto pyn en hartseer elke fokken keer as jy probeer
Om 'n difference in die land te maak om 'n lied te skyf wat mense raak
'n Finale helder antwoord op die suiwerste akkoord op jou kitaar
Jy't gesê jy wil 'n date maak in die nasionale pad
Jy wou jou mense ompraat om 'n nuwe kans te vat
Maar daar was vlieë op jou windscreen en depressie was jou baas
Johnny is nie dood nie, Johnny is nie dood nie
Johnny is nie dood nie jy's net uitgepaas […]

Contextually related matters such as Afrikaner mores, military conscription and, of course, apartheid, emerge as salient concerns in the film. Based on Malan Steyn's stage show by the same name (2011), the film arguably forms part of a larger sense among Afrikaners who feel the need to explore the Afrikaner psyche, especially in the complex aftermath of apartheid (comp. Mayne, 2017).

The film presents various flashbacks that suggest the reasons for the characters' collective and individual disillusionment. The film also includes a significant, troubling and recurring dream (Lise's dream recurs [four times] and is a focus of this study, although Hein's [her university boyfriend] dream is also significant) that forms the central thrust of this characters' disillusionment since it relates a conceptually impossible temporality that speaks of the acute sense of loss Lise experiences.

Loosely based on actual events, the film explores different ways in which characters experience disillusionment individually and also collectively. Overlaps between reality and fiction, as noted, also present in the characters, are further accomplished by means of actual footage and music as well as a non-diegetic voice-over that anchors the film in its temporal reality.

Voëlvry represented an artistic resistance against stifling Afrikaner mores of the time, notably embodied by the National Party (NP) government. These concerns deeply affected the filmic characters during the 1980s, but permeate aspects of the "present" (2002) in the film, where it is felt that the liberatory sense associated with Voëlvry was lost, resulting in the confusing and painful experience of disillusionment.

[…] From the gross pain and sadness every fucking time you try
To make a difference in the country to write a song that touches people
A final clear answer to the purest chord on your guitar
You said you wanted to make a date in the national road
You wanted to persuade your people to take another chance/way
But there were flies on your windscreen and depression was your boss
Johnny is not dead, Johnny is not dead
Johnny is not dead, you're just passed out […]

- *Johnny is nie dood nie, Koos Kombuis (2008)*

During the 2000s, the characters' expectations, hopes and ideals seem to have come to nothing, so that the characters experience a profound sense of disillusionment with themselves and the hopes they had as students for South Africa.

These experiences of disillusionment are told through the unfolding of events in the film, but more pointedly, by temporal strategies such as flashbacks, memory narratives, and dreams, among others. For example, one becomes aware of the significance of time and temporal overlaps from the opening scene in the film, where on-screen text and a non-diegetic voice-over situate the present moment in 2002, but the music of Johannes Kerkorrel is playing non-diegetically (from 1989), and Lise relates a dream, situated in a non-temporality that draws on the past, anticipates the future and grapples with the present.

In this sense, the film can be said to represent these characters' take on disillusionment at various times and through different reactions. There are two temporal "real" storyworlds (the 1980s and 2002) and one major dream world (Lise's dream; again, Hein's dream is important and is addressed, but is not a focus of the study). The story is told through temporal strategies, including flashbacks, music, memory, ontological instability (particularly with reference to Lise's dream) and the conflation of time and character within contextual issues that result in shared and individual experiences of disillusionment. Disillusionment, in brief, is a feeling of disappointment when expectations about something, someone or someplace fail to deliver or live up to those expectations. It is closely related to melancholy and nostalgia, both of which are predicated upon a complex relationship with an idealised past vis-à-vis a disappointing present. The interconnectedness of time and disillusionment is central to the present study.

The present study explores the time and temporalities as constructive of the theme of disillusionment in the film *Johnny is nie dood nie*. A few important scenes and sequences highlight the concerns of the present study.

A brief synopsis of *Johnny is nie dood nie* demonstrates the concerns of the present study. The film starts as the character Lise awakes from a very unsettling but unfinished dream in which past and imaginary time conflate (the dream recurs and ends in the climax of the film). A non-diegetic voice-over tells of Johannes Kerkorrel's suicide on 12 November 2002, bringing a further and "actual" temporal stratum into the narrative. Throughout the film, the non-diegetic voice-over sets the backstory of the fictional characters within genuine historical events such as PW Botha's time as South African state president, the 1986 state of emergency, mandatory conscription during the 1980s, the establishment of the Vrye Weekblad in 1987 (the first anti-apartheid newspaper in Afrikaans), the formation of the Gereformeerde Blues Band

(Kerkorrel's band) in 1987, the first alternative Afrikaans rock concert in 1988, the Voëlvry tour in 1989 and Kerkorrel's suicide in 2002.

A dominant narrative thread in the film is the 2002 barbecue, where the characters discuss mundane, everyday issues to highlight their "ordinariness", juxtaposed with their memories of the past, the impact of Voëlvry, and the anger of a repressed Afrikaner youth during the 1980s. The 1980s are set against the backdrop of the National Party (NP) state's control, mandatory conscription, the security police, the Border War, Voëlvry and the freedom that white South Africans experienced. The flashbacks to the time between 1987 and 1989 also lay the foundation for their later lives and their later disillusionment through their hopeful anticipations of a better future.

Poignantly, Lise's dream creates a parallel reality based on temporalities drawn from various periods. As I noted, at the beginning of the film, Lise presumably awakens from a dream. This dream is shown fragmented throughout the film and is resolved at the end. The dream shows Lise following Johnny, first along a riverbed and then through a forest until they reach a tree – echoing the place in which Johannes Kerkorrel was found hanging from a tree after his suicide, which traumatised many Afrikaners (Kitchen, 2022).

The character Johnny (Johan de Klerk) is ontologically unstable. This instability relates to his name and role as a musician that overlaps with the genuine historical figure of Johannes Kerkorrel/Ralph Rabie. The two characters are also conflated through their suicide narratives and in the context of Lise's dream. The film uses the music of Voëlvry to create mood and connect the characters to the music of Voëlvry and the ideals the movement inspired towards. Furthermore, some of the characters of Voëlvry become off-screen (unseen) characters who greatly influence the storyworld.

The story interweaves and overlays a complex range of temporalities (past, present, future, imagined and anticipated) through a variety of strategies, such as flashbacks and dreams, to convey disillusionment. The manipulation of time narrated conveys the experience of disillusionment from the characters' perspectives. Time, arguably, becomes the central mechanism through which the theme of disillusionment can be expressed.

1.2 Time: philosophical, narratological and cinematographic considerations

Time: philosophical considerations

Time is a continuum that is measured in terms of succeeding events that create the past, present and future. Heidegger (1996:389-390) states that the concept of time is inseparable from the human experience because we allow the past to exist in the present through memory, and due to our human tendency to be concerned about things, we even allow a potential future event to exist in the present. Time is a fundamental dimension of the human experience. Strictly speaking, time is not observable as an object in the world, but it manifests and becomes perceivable through things that change and things that stay the same (Heidegger, 1996:16, Ricœur, 1980:175). Together with the spatial parameters of height, width, and depth, time constitutes a fourth dimension, which makes it possible to locate and measure events and experiences (Hawking, 1998; Hoffman, 2009; Einstein, 1920; comp. also Bakhtin, 1981).

Although time is objectively measurable (minutes, hours, days, years, decades), time also has an experiential dimension that relates to a human, subjective perspective of temporality (Atkinson, 2020; Bergson *et al.*, 1962; Rovelli *et al.*, 2018; Waugh, 1999). Seen thus, we interpret time from a personal vantage point, so that temporal awareness is influenced by our recollections of the past and our anticipations of the future.

Ricœur ([1983]2012:57–69) focuses on how narrative can relate time as a human experience. He argues that we experience time in two ways: First, we experience time as a linear sequence – for instance, the passing minutes in an hour, the passing hours of the day, the passing days of the month and so forth. This form of time is representational of the progression of our lives, referred to as objective or cosmological time. Ricœur ([1983]2012:57-67) distinguishes existential time from cosmological time. Existential time is experienced in terms of the past, present and future through memory, attention and anticipation. Time is, therefore, a complex experience where cosmological time and existential time are interlaced. Not only do we experience time as a linear sequence, but we also orientate experiences, occurrences and the succession of time in terms of the past (memory), present (attention) and future (anticipation). The significance of this is that disillusionment, the focus of the present study, is dependent on the phenomenology of time in terms of past memory, the present now and an anticipated (better) future – and thus on the objective passing of time, but more significantly, on the existential, experiential dimension of time.

As both narratologist and philosopher, Ricœur's (2012) conceptualisation of existential time (together with arguments by Rovelli (2018:37), Carter (2011:311), Augustine (1960),

Heidegger (1996:392–394) and Currie (2006)), are salient to the present study, and have a bearing on how time narrated can be framed.

Time narrated

From the perspective of narrative theory, time is both an analytical classification that describes the relationship between different levels of narrativity as well as a dimension of the narrated world, also referred to as the diegetic whole (Scheffel *et al.*, 2014). Bal (2017, 2001; 2013) argues that time, together with space, are the most basic elements of a story. She defines a narrative as *a temporal unfolding* (Bal, 1991:146).

The father of classical narratology, Gérard Genette (1980), conceptualised *storytime, narrating time* and *discourse time* as three temporalities present in all narratives. Each one of these temporalities corresponds to a specific perspective of time associated with the narrative. *Storytime* is the time the characters in the story experience, while *narrating* time constitutes the time of the telling or unfolding of the story. *Discourse* time refers to how narrated time is manipulated to communicate ideas, themes and leitmotifs. This latter form of time is especially salient for the present study, where the pursuit is to explore the construction of disillusionment through different manners of temporal telling.

Time: filmic strategies

Deleuze (1986a, 1986b) argues that cinema, in particular, can reflect human experience of time by creating two images of *time*. The first is an objective measurable time related to movement, while the second is an expression of human thought and the experiential construct of time through notions such as memory, recollection, anticipation, hope and desire.

Film is a sequential art form. The passage of time is thus an essential feature of cinema. David Bordwell (1985:12) notes that cinema combines a variety of co-creative techniques in order to construct a storyworld for a specific result with overall meaning/significance in its entirety. Filmic events are presented successively through time, to create, according to Cohen (1979:92), “the diegetic whole” of the film world. In other words, the diegetic whole is the imaginative storyworld of the filmic narrative over time. A viewer perceives this diegetic world through a defined perspective presented through a constructed or composed timeline. The notion of a sequence of events (a temporal unfolding; cf. [Bal, 1991:146]) deeply connects stories to time. In *Johnny is nie dood nie*, disillusionment articulates through manipulations of time that structure the narrative.

Cinematographic temporal strategies that manipulate the psychological and experiential dimensions of time include flashbacks and dreams. These strategies are used in *Johnny is nie dood nie* to structure the cinematic timeline – the 2002 narrative is interrupted by flashbacks and dreams to allude to things in the past that have a bearing on the characters in the present and through iterated presentations and suspended or condensed durations of actual events. Through these temporal strategies, time as subjective, existential and experiential is foregrounded to highlight the characters' experience of disillusionment.

1.3 Disillusionment

A basic definition of the term *disillusionment* is a feeling of disappointment resulting from the discovery that something is not as good as one believed it would be (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2020). This definition is predicated on the notion that an expectation collapses or fails to deliver, and it, therefore, depends fundamentally on the progression of time. Thus, disillusionment is a disappointing outcome when an expectation is not met over time. A comparison of past events and present results is implied.

Disillusionment is, furthermore, associated with challenges that comprise an ambiguity or shattering of beliefs about the world (Maher *et al.*, 2020: 948). These challenges are often linked to social and personal consequences like political instability, aggression and interpersonal relationship dynamics.

Niehuis and Reifman (2019:466) describe disillusionment in terms of relationship psychology and liken it to a transition from positive affect and perceptions of a partner or situation to a corresponding negative affect and perceptions of that partner or situation over time. The idealised version of the partner or situation in the past is compared to the reality of the present, resulting in the anticipation of dread regarding the future. These authors emphasise the role of *idealisation* in the experience of disillusionment; the object of idealisation is disappointing over *time*. Therefore, disillusionment also refers to a sense of hopelessness that emanates from a disruption of a person's assumptions and idealisation of situations or people.

In his book *Between Utopia and Disillusionment* (2005), political scientist Henri Vogt argues that post-communist disillusionment was directly connected to certain revolutionary utopias. Vogt (2005:143) defines these utopias as "a series of dreams and aspirations". The post-communist disillusionment resulted from dealing with economic collapse, corruption, the return of the communist elites, and aspirations of future utopias of freedom. Specific sets of challenges, such as social fragmentation, an increasing sense of individuality and uncertainty

about the future, turned these utopias into disillusionment. The connotation of failed expectations and aspirations reflects the term's negative burden.

David Medalie (2010:37) proposes that post-transitional[2] literature in South Africa is driven by utopian and dystopian aspirations, where the past is revealed as a false idealism, a kind of deceptive utopia. Many of these texts are dystopian in their approach to the past and present and project dreadfully into the future. Such works include, for example, J.M. Coetzee's *Disgrace* (1999), Lauren Beukes' *Moxyland* (2008) and *Zoo City* (2010) and Ceridwen Dovey's *Blood Kin* (2007). Medalie (2010:42) argues that these dystopian landscapes are not embedded in the complexities of the apartheid past but rather stem from the disillusionment of the confused post-apartheid present. Post-transitional South Africa, in his view, projects itself as the point in social development that cannot, it seems, be perfected by social change.

In a similar vein, Thabo Tsehloane (2010:80) argues that after an extended period of anticipating the introduction of a new directive and the emergence of a new united society, South Africans experienced an "exhaustion of hopefulness" that prevented imagining any further possibilities of socio-political change. South African society struggles to conceive a different future than its current anticipation, despite the disillusionment felt with the present and a longing for an alternative social condition in the future. Tsehloane (2010:80) proposes that South Africans imagine the post-apartheid period as the end of history that cannot be transcended. The result is ambivalent and confusing narratives about the new post-transitional condition, which projects a dystopian future. In political science, Block (2011:28) defines disillusionment as a gap between *what is* and *what ought (or is hoped) to be*. Disillusionment, at present, prevents South African society from imagining *what ought to be* as something positive (Tsehloane, 2010:81). Instead, this society lives in dreadful anticipation of the uncertain future. The utopia that was fervently hoped for in the early years of post-apartheid has turned dystopic.

The problem with utopia and the imagination of the future is that it is an idealised perspective of the future because it anticipates a better life. Such anticipations/dreams of the future are based on perceptions of the present and the past. An idealised perspective does not prepare individuals for possible setbacks on the path to new societies/orders. There therefore exists a disjunction between the ideal and the reality as the future actualises (Meaney, 2018:358).

These conceptualisations of disillusionment characterise it as a negative state of being that emerges from the disruption of an individual's core assumptions, resulting in sadness,

[2] The term *transitional* in this context refers to a process of transitioning or becoming. A transitional period often overlaps the "old" and "new" and can cause tension between them.

confusion, disappointment and a loss of hope. The illusion is lodged in the belief that the term *happiness* signifies something concrete and not something abstract like *hope* (Heighton, 2020:18). We tend to resist disillusionment because it is a painful experience. Disillusionment means we have to acknowledge the truth, come to terms with the deceptive utopia (the lie we told ourselves), and accept the false self's death[3].

In narratives of disillusionment, the reader or viewer is compelled to witness the progressive disillusionment of a character or sets of characters. Freeing oneself from the bond of disillusionment often comes too late for characters, and the consumer of the text is left with the unease of dissatisfaction felt by the character. This dissatisfaction may pertain to different temporalities: a character may be dissatisfied or disappointed with their present situation or circumstances. This character then looks back at the idealised past and may be concerned about the future. As the anticipated future actualises and the results are not as expected, the character experiences disillusionment in various senses of the term.

1.4 Problem statement and research questions

This study is concerned with how temporal suggestions and strategies (narratologically, cinematographically) bring about existential experiences of time that function to construct the theme of disillusionment in *Johnny is nie dood nie*.

The following research questions direct the aim of the study:

1. How are time and temporalities – philosophically, narratologically and cinematographically speaking – conceptualised in the literature in the field, and how are these relatable to one another? *I answer this question through a literature study to demonstrate the salience of existential, subjective notions of time that are foregrounded in the film.*

2. In which ways does the Voëlvry movement echo disillusionment through temporalities made manifest in different dimensions of the film? *I answer this by investigating the*

[3] A cinematographic example of the portrayal of disillusionment is also apposite in the present discussion. During the late 1980s early 90s, Taiwanese filmmakers, known as the Second New Wave, thematically investigated the experiences of urban dystopia and the paradoxes of postmodern individualism. For example, Chen Guofu's *Guozhong nüsheng* (*Schoolgirl*, 1989) and Cai Mingliang's *Qingsaonian Nuozha* (*Rebel of the Neon God*, 1992). These films show the confusing reality of the country's shift in politics and identity during that time through a disenchanted yet realistic view of life in Taiwan (Deppman, 2009:436). These cinematic works aim to portray disillusionment as realistic and not necessarily pessimistic. They explore the subjective perspectives of these characters reflecting the complexities of Taiwanese history and politics and the dread of the future.

characters Lise and Johnny and specifically focusing on Lise's dream(s) and Johnny's suicide narrative with a view to explore the manners in which both dream and suicide are predicated on complex imaginings, memories and shattered hopes, as these are predicated on subjective experiences of time and temporalities.

3. How do temporalities related to the film speak to this experience of disillusionment? *I explore the role of temporalities (in philosophical, narratological and cinematographic terms) in the film as functions of the portrayal of disillusionment, in order to demonstrate how the film represents a complex play of temporally driven storytelling interwoven with real-life material also to reflect broader anxieties in South Africa*.

1.5 Thesis statement

Johnny is nie dood nie uses the composition of time to support a storyworld in which disillusionment is constructed as a central leitmotif. Disillusionment emerges in the story against the background of South Africa in the late 1980s and the early 2000s as dissatisfaction with the present, an idealised remembrance of the past (in 2002) and future hopes of characters are crushed by the reality of circumstance.

I thus argue that disillusionment as a temporally charged experience is thus narrated through various narratological and cinematographic means. Firstly, the film tells the story by oscillating between the various times depicted, and secondly, through dream-time. Finally, time also comes into play in the conflation of characters and, by implication, subjective temporal experiences. Thus, the film is told through temporalities that foreground time as existential, experiential and subjective. This break in chronology allows for stronger and more frequent comparisons between these two periods. It is in these comparisons of temporal experience that the theme of disillusionment is constructed.

Discourse time manipulates the telling of the story and thus narrated time to foreground time as subjective and existential. This foregrounding of existential time makes it possible for the viewer to relate the characters' experience of time to the experience of disillusionment. In particular, I argue that the contextual realities of South Africa during the late 1980s and the early 2002s as a foil for this period provide fertile soil for the exploration of disillusionment felt by a generation of young(ish) white Afrikaners.

1.6 Methodology

This is a qualitative study, of which the first section comprises a literature review of salient theoretical points of departure. Here, time and temporalities, as well as ways of narrating time in cinema, will be explored. The second section presents an interpretation of the film *Johnny is nie dood nie* in light of the theoretical insights gleaned from the first section.

1. *Literature review*

The literature review presents a perusal of broader philosophical conceptualisations of time in objective and subjective (or existential, experiential) terms. Subsequently, I explore time in the context of narratives with an emphasis on Genette's (1980, 1990) conceptualisations of time narrated to explore the narration of existential time in stories. I then deepen the exploration of time in narratives by focusing on time in the cinematic context as conceptualised by Deleuze (1986a, 1986b).

A library search yielded no academic sources related to the film *Johnny is nie dood nie* by the time of this study, as well as a paucity of popular sources such as film reviews or articles. Also, a Nexus search revealed that no similar studies have been undertaken.

2. *Reading and interpretation of the film*

The interpretation of the film begins with a focus on Lise's dream as central to her experience of disillusionment. Furthermore, through Lise's dream, the conflation of Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel occurs through the similarities in their narratives. This gives rise to the last interpretation section, which explores Johnny's character and suicide in the context of disillusionment.

For the interpretations, I focus on the Genettian *discourse time* of the story and the functionaries that structure this narrative temporality. These functionaries (order, duration and frequency), also conceptualised by Genette (1980, 1990; cf. Genette & Culler, 1983), guide the exploration to answer how the discourse time is constructed and manipulated to construct the theme of disillusionment.

1.7 Ethical issues

This is a no-risk study and was granted ethical clearance by the North-West University's ethics committee.

1.8 Work plan and chapter division

The first chapter presented a contextualisation of the problem under investigation, as well as relevant contextual and theoretical concerns.

The second chapter presents a consideration of contextual issues that relate to the film also as addressed by Voëlvry artists. Voëlvry as a resistance movement is briefly considered, followed by a reflection of matters emerging from the lyrics of Voëlvry artists, including, but not limited to, military conscription, apartheid, and feelings of being oppressed by prevalent Afrikaner values. These issues are raised by the film: by its music, voice-overs, storyline, and/or characters' dialogue and are thus briefly explored before proceeding to present an interpretation of the film. The chapter ends with a reflection on the position of Kerkorrel in Voëlvry and beyond.

In the third chapter, salient theoretical matters are considered. In particular, I investigate time from a broad philosophical point of view, as well as time and narrative, culminating in an exploration of time and temporalities in cinema. Chapter Four explores Lise's dream as emblematic of disillusionment told through a subjective (but also linearly unfolding) temporal lens. The dream, itself a temporary non-state, draws on the character's previous experiences but also manipulates events to create a disturbing vision of disillusionment.

In Chapter Five, the interpretation is continued, this time with reference to the character of Johnny in the film, with specific emphasis on the ontological overlap between Johnny, the film character, and the character of Johannes Kerkorrel. Here, the conflation of temporalities and subjective temporal experiences is conveyed through the implied merging of character and real-life person.

Conclusions, final insights and recommendations for further research appear in Chapter Six, which concludes the study.

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALISATION – VOËLVRY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

2.1 Introduction

The film *Johnny is nie dood nie* (Johnny is not dead; 2017, directed by Christiaan Olwagen) alludes to the figure of Ralph Rabie, or more notably, Johannes Kerkorrel (the best-known *nom de plume* of Ralph Rabie) and the Voëlvry movement of 1989. These are contextual leitmotifs that are brought to bear by means of various narrative and contextual references. The Voëlvry movement refers to a loose association of young, white, middle-class Afrikaans musicians emerging in the late 1980s in South Africa, culminating in the Voëlvry Toer (tour) that travelled the country. Short-lived and without a particular programme or leader, Voëlvry emerged as the voice of young white Afrikaners' discontent with much of the South African political and social dispensation of the time, as well as a desire to challenge traditional mores associated with Afrikaner identity (including, amongst others, racial supremacy, stifling social mores, blind patriotism in the face of apartheid and the Border War, censorship, Christian National education, homophobia and patriarchal norms; cf. Laubscher, 2005)[4]. Their pursuit can be likened, retrospectively, to a "creative" change of tongue, to use the Afrikaans poet Antjie Krog's parlance[5].

In *Johnny is nie dood nie*, the music of Voëlvry and specifically Kerkorrel is heard during regular intervals. Musical diegesis not only represents insight into the characters' state of mind, but helps to create a temporal plane that references the 1980s in South Africa from the perspective of young Afrikaners. Furthermore, the non-diegetic narrator also relates content pertaining to time: he tells of the first alternative Afrikaans rock concert in 1988, the Voëlvry tour in 1989 and specifically the Voëlvry concert at Drie Gewels Stellenbosch, which the group of friends (the filmic characters) attended – thus establishing an overlap between the actual concert and the fictionalised events in the film[6].

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4 Afrikaner history and identity have been extensively theorised, notably by Giliomee in his now-canonical publication *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people* (2003); the literary identity of the Afrikaner was interrogated by JM Coetzee in his *White writing: On the culture of letters in South Africa* (1988). A proliferation of publications and positions exist in terms of Afrikaner discourse. For present purposes, Laubscher's "traits" (the author's term, 2005) mentioned here as issues of concern to the Voëlvry movement and Johannes Kerkorrel are taken into consideration.

5 Krog, A. 2003. A change of tongue ('n Ander tongval). Johannesburg: Random House.

6 It is worth noting that 1989 represents a year of great international change and upheaval: the events at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, and Glasnost and Perestroika in Russia and the end of the Cold War were under way, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall. In South Africa, the process of unbanning the ANC was under way (this would happen on 11 February 1990).

The name and actions of the character Johnny, Johan de Klerk, also allude to Johannes Kerkorrel, who preferred to be called Johnny K during a later period in his musical career. There are also parallels between the death of the character Johnny in 1989 and that of Kerkorrel (Rabie) in 2002. Johnny hanged himself in a forest from a tree – much like Kerkorrel's suicide at the Botrivier marsh near Kleinmond.

The film suggests further parallels between Johnny (the character) and Kerkorrel. Johnny is in a band and wants to become a famous musician. The way Johnny dresses and the sunglasses he wears on stage are reminiscent of Kerkorrel's stage image. Kerkorrel was the driving force of the Voëlvry movement – indeed, he was positioned, not necessarily by choice, as the face of the movement and thus forced into a rather public role.

The persona of Johannes Kerkorrel was positioned as the figurehead of the movement also because he was arguably the most explicitly visible critic of the Nationalist Party government and certain Afrikaner mores through his music. Voëlvry emerged, for a large part, due to a sense of disillusionment of young Afrikaners with the social and political situation in South Africa at that time. Voëlvry can be regarded as something of a resistance movement, challenging the regime in a time of isolation, a state of emergency, the perceived threat of communism, international sanctions, and township violence. South Africa was, in reality, governed by fear and uncertainty, what Laubscher (2005:311 quoting Norval, 1996) refers to as a time when 'signifiers that were previously fixed became dislodged and started to float, open for articulation into a new imaginary'. Hegemonic structures and institutions of Afrikanerdom were targeted and deconstructed, and a period of seeking for new expressions of Afrikanerness ensued (Laubscher, 2005).

In this chapter, I investigate the Voëlvry movement in order to establish a contextual backdrop to the film and salient concerns emanating from the film. From here, the movement is related to a number of broader social realities that have a bearing on the music of the movement. The final section of the chapter is devoted to an exploration of the figure of Johannes Kerkorrel, whose presence is not only felt in the character of Johnny in the film, but whose rise and demise haunts the characters and many Afrikaners.

2.2 The Voëlvry movement

Voëlvry: early stirrings

Voëlvry can be said to be emblematic of Frith's (1996:11) contention that "making music isn't a way of expressing ideas; it is a way of living them". Laubscher (2005:311) adds that "music participates in, and articulates, identitary discourse". Salient moments in the emergence of the Voëlvry movement demonstrates these contentions.

Historically speaking, Voëlvry's predecessors can be traced to the late 1970s and early 80s when a group of Afrikaans musicians began to explore music and lyrics that seemed to be critical of the establishment. Called the Musiek en Liriek (Music and Lyric) movement, much of their music was popular, although not representative of mainstream Afrikaner culture at that time (Hagen, 1999:18). Musiek en Liriek was a new type of Afrikaner music: using original melodies and lyrics to address real-life issues instead of what can be called a rather escapist, and mostly jolly Afrikaans song tradition up until that time. Among the main contributors to this genre are Anton Goosen, Koos du Plessis and Laurika Rauch, all of whom created music with depth and a new sense of honesty (Ballantine, 1989: 305-310). The Voëlvry movement emerged in the context of Musiek en Liriek's "alternative" Afrikaans music, which was growing and gaining support during the early 1980s.

There emerged, significantly, another movement in Afrikaans music, labelled the Alternative Afrikaans Music Movement. This name was given primarily because of the term "first alternative Afrikaans rock concert" the media used to describe the concert at the Pool Club in Johannesburg in 1988. The Alternative Afrikaans movement, and later Voëlvry more so, was critical, satirical and contemptuous of traditional Afrikaner values such as Christian National education, imaginings of racial supremacy, and other identifiers that Laubscher (2005) refers to as a "trait list". Further traits include stubbornness, authoritarianism and a belief in being "planted" in Africa as God's select people (cf. Giliomee, 2003; Barber, 1999:136; comp. "National Party (NP)", 2011). As a people, the Afrikaner has been theorised extensively, and thus for present purposes I refer to selected issues that are related to Voëlvry's take on the Afrikaner at the time.

In 1983, James Phillips (1959-1995) released the song Hou my vas Korporaal ("Hold me tight Corporal") on the album *Who is Bernoldus Niemand*? under the pseudonym Bernoldus Niemand. This song was an iconoclastic moment in Afrikaans music: openly disdainful of military conscription (on which I expand below) but also of homophobia, the Border War (also a matter I address below and in the next chapter) – and moreover: an *Afrikaans* song that blatantly rejected a regime[7] (Hopkins, 2006:151). The song also challenged the emergence of

[7] Indeed, the song became an anthem for movements campaigning for the end of conscription that was particularly highlighted in the End Conscription Campaign (Hopkins, 2006:151)

militarised masculinity associated with conscription that would "make a man" out of boys (cf. Baines & Vale, 2008).

As one of the most prominent members of Voëlvry, Koos Kombuis (born André le Roux du Toit; Kombuis, 2000:295 – known during the movement as André Letoit, in homage to the esteemed Sestigers (Sixties) novelist Etienne Leroux) credits Niemand as the first musician to make Afrikaans protest music. Phillips' music career started in the late 1970s. During this time, Phillips played for bands such as Corporal Punishment (Karl Helgard, James Phillips, Mark Bennet, Henry Jansen, Herbie Parkin) and Illegal Gathering (same band members as Corporal Punishment) (corporal punishment suggestive not only of actual punishment still being meted out but also of subtle shady connotations this may have; and illegal gathering, which was of course strictly forbidden), and who sang in English (Ross, 2006; Hopkins, 2006; Bezuidenhout, s.a.). He adopted phrases as bands' names that referred to aspects of autocratic apartheid control, thereby illustrating his rebellious attitude. Bernoldus Niemand en Die Swart Gevaar (which was his stage band) actively participated in the events that shaped the Voëlvry movement (the first of these events was the First Alternative Afrikaans Music Concert, held in 1988).

Koos Kombuis (b. 1954) started out as a fiction writer[8], but became aware of the music of Bernoldus Niemand. Already during the early 1980s, Letoit shifted his attention to music, performing mostly in Stellenbosch to student audiences. Niemand's *Hou my vas Korporaal* would serve as a source of inspiration in Letoit's decision to turn to music, as he felt that literature would not spread his anti-establishment (anti-apartheid) message the same way that music could (Kombuis, 2000:296–299). His book *Seks, drugs en boeremusiek: Die memoires van 'n volksverraaier* (Sex, drugs and "boeremusiek": The memoires of a traitor of the nation) first published in 2002 provides a fascinating and iconoclastic narrative of the movement and the tour, and of the general disarray of both Voëlvry and the country at the time.

On the other side of the country, in Johannesburg, Rabie and some friends also started to create songs in protest against the political ideologies of the NP government, and on 7 December 1986 they performed their songs in a cabaret at the Black Sun theatre (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Van Zyl, 2003). Shortly after, André Letoit released *Ver van die ou Kalahari* (Far from the Old Kalahari) in 1987. The title track on Letoit's album is a reworking of Charles Segal's 1958 song *Die Ou Kalahari*, which literally describes the Kalahari

[8] Among his novels are *Suidpunt-jazz (*1989 *HAUM), Somer II* (2003 H&R) and *The secret diary of God* (2003) *Struik,* respectively published under the name André Letoit *(Suidpunt* and *Somer)* and Koos Kombuis. For many years a columnist for the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper *Rapport* , at present he writes for the English newspapers *The Guardian* and the *Daily Maverick* under the *nom de plume* Johnny Kitchen. This name likely also brings homage to Johannes Kerkorrel's one-time stage name Johnny K.

landscape and the Afrikaner's desire to live in the great outdoors, in a manner of speaking. Letoit's version, on the other hand, comments on the emigration of white people during the late 1980s, also coined the brain drain. Letoit referred to this white emigration as the chicken run, commenting on how white South Africans abroad remark on life in South Africa from a comfortable distance.

As a journalist, Rabie interviewed Letoit about the album for the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper *Rapport*. Letoit invited Rabie to join him at his first scheduled concert at the Sterreweg Theatre in Bloemfontein (in 1987). By this time, Dagga-Dirk Uys was Letoit's self-appointed manager. According to Uys, this first collaboration between André Letoit and Ralph Rabie at the Sterreweg theatre was the beginning of what would develop into Voëlvry (Ross, 2006). Uys would play a central role in the movement as he organised the first alternative Afrikaans rock concert in 1988 and the national Voëlvry tour in 1989.

Rabie established his new stage persona, Johannes Kerkorrel, before the Sterreweg concert in Bloemfontein after meeting André Letoit.

According to Rabie, he created another identity to separate his stage persona from his work as a journalist (De Bruin, 1997; Nieuwoudt, 1997; Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003). However, he was later fired from *Rapport* for the political content of his songs (Pretorius, 2004; De Bruin, 1997; Nieuwoudt, 1997). The persona of Kerkorrel wore sunglasses and swim goggles on stage, allowing the shy and diffident Ralph Rabie to become the politically outspoken Johannes Kerkorrel. During this time, Kerkorrel and Letoit wrote and performed a cabaret called *Piekniek by Dingaan,* obviously referencing the narrative of the Voortrekker Piet Retief who together with his men was slaughtered by the Zulu chief Dingane after failing to broker a land ownership transfer deal. Retief has since been hailed as a martyr of the Afrikaner "sacred history" (also see Laubscher, 2005). The cabaret highlighted not only the discontent of young Afrikaners with the prevailing narrative of their identity, but also the paranoia of the time – especially of the NP regime (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003). In particular, the so-called "Rooi Gevaar" (Red Danger or communism) was a cause of anxiety. This is described in the *Dictionary of South African English* as: "'The red peril', communism; the political tactic of encouraging an unreasonable fear of communism; a communist". Added to this were the "Swart Gevaar" (Black Danger, referring to the fear of black domination) and "Khaki Gevaar" (fear of English domination). Finally, there was, among Kuyperian Afrikaner Calvinists, talk of the "Roomse Gevaar" (Roman-Catholic Danger) as noteworthy NP paranoias (Pyper*,* 1972). The cabaret eventually evolved into Die Gereformeerde Blues Band, performing as Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band (The Reformed Blues Band) (Grundling, 2001:8; Jacobs, 1995:5; Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003).

After the performance of Piekniek by Dingaan at the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (currently the University of Johannesburg) in 1988, Hanepoot van Tonder (Jannie van Tonder, b. 1963) joined the band on drums and trombone. Van Tonder approached Willem Volume (Willem Moller, b. unknown) to join as a guitarist. Shortly after this, Piet Pers (Gary Herselman, b. unknown) joined as the band's bass player and then Karla Krimpelien (Tonia Selley, b. unknown) as a multi-instrumentalist and vocalist (Hopkins, 2006; Ross, 2006).

The band performed live and developed a large following among younger Afrikaners (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). According to Kombuis (2000; also see Pretorius, 2004), Kerkorrel struggled to cope with the movement's success and would become irritated after a good review in the media (as a resistance movement, they would rather be known for shocking and aggravating Afrikaner culture and society; good reviews did not reflect their politically oriented anti-establishment mission).

The band's manager, Dagga-Dirk Uys, organised the first alternative Afrikaans rock concert on the 25th of March 1988, at the Pool Club in Johannesburg, which was attended by roughly 900 people (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004; Le Roux, 1989). After the event, the alternative Afrikaans music movement, as the media labelled them after the concert, released the Voëlvry album. The word "voëlvry" has two meanings, one of which can be translated to "free as a bird" or "outlaw" in Afrikaans. If a person is declared "voëlvry", they are seen as traitors and no longer protected by law. Any citizen may prosecute a person declared "voëlvry". Another meaning relates to a sexual connotation. Voël is also the crude Afrikaans word for penis, and this testifies to the risqué aspect of the movement - the male member being "free" is sexually suggestive.

Stage names of Voëlvry members have similar absurd, iconoclastic and ridiculing qualities. Rabie based, rather tauntingly, his stage name on the term for church organ ("kerkorrel"), which was seen as an instrument used in the holy setting of church, coupled with the Evangelical name Johannes. Of course, the church was a hands-off institution. Rabie told of an incident during his student days, when he was an organist at a local church in Potchefstroom and one day played a reworked version of a Beatles song while the congregation was exiting the church. One of the elder members recognised the song and Rabie was fired as organist (Combrink, 2022). In this vein, Rabie suggested that the names of the musicians of the band (and of Voëlvry) reflect "the absurdity of the society we belong to, […] to ridicule the cultural identity we were part of" (cf. Byerly, 1998:20).

Names of members thus announce as well as renounce, according to Laubscher (2005:314). Johannes Kerkorrel also flirts with associations with John the Baptist, and Koos Kombuis'

rather absurd association with the word kitchen is a reminder of Afrikaans' early status as kitchen Dutch. Names such as Randy Rambo and the Sewing Machines (in Afrikaans, Spulse Rambo en die Naaimasjiene – "naai" being crude slang for sex) confirm that *noms de plume* here were also *noms de guerre* – indicating a "readiness for battle" by the very names the Voëlvry members chose for themselves (Laubscher 2005:314). Dagga-Dirk Uys should also be mentioned here; even saying the word "dagga" (marijuana) out loud at the time was risqué.

The main figures (performers at the concert/contributors to the album) were Bernoldus Niemand (James Phillips) en Die Swart Gevaar (The Black Peril); André Letoit (before becoming Koos Kombuis); Randy Rambo (Theunis Engelbrecht, b. 1965) en die Roughriders (the name of a condom brand), Khaki Monitor (Tonia Selley, Wilhelm Saayman, Peni Flascas, Sheree Harrison and Steven Howells), Mr Mac and the Genuines (Samuel McKenzie, 1924-1990), Koos (Neil Goedhals, b. 1957 and Marcel van Heerden, b. 1952), Die Kêrels (Gary Herselman), Pieter van der Lugt (b. 1961) and Johannes Kerkorrel en Die Gereformeerde Blues Band.

After the *Voëlvry* album, Johannes Kerkorrel and Die Gereformeerde Blues Band recorded the album *Eet Kreef!* (Eat crayfish; released in 1989). Six of the nine songs on *Eet Kreef* were banned by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) because of their political content and challenge to apartheid ideology, and thus of course this album became a must-have among alternative Afrikaners (Erasmus, 2017; Hopkins, 2006; Pretorius, 2004).



Figure 2.1: Voëlvry album cover (1988)

Figure 1.2 & 2.3: Eet Kreef! album front and back covers (1989)



Figure 2.4: Voëlvry tour poster (1989)

Figure 2.5: André Letoit on stage (1988)



Figure 2.6: Bernoldus Niemand on stage (1988)

Figure 2.7: Bernoldus Niemand en die Swart Gevaar (1988)



Figure 2.8: Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band (1988)

Figure 2.9: Johannes Kerkorrel (1988)

The government began to put pressure on Kerkorrel to silence him: his concerts were ambushed, stink pods/bombs were thrown at him and his car was vandalised. He was portrayed as a satanic predator with a psychological disorder (Fouché et al., 2009); made out by the apartheid government as the ultimate Afrikaner traitor, outcast and terrorist (essentially declaring him, in a twist of irony, "voëlvry") (Pretorius, 2004; Brynard, 1990; Retief, 2002). The strong reaction by the government caused tensions within the movement and the internal stress between group members continued (and would resurface many years later towards the end of Rabie's life) (Pretorius, 2004). Kerkorrel started to drift away from the movement and at the end of 1989, he left the country briefly for Amsterdam, The Netherlands (Botes, 2002; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). Shortly after this, the members of Voëlvry went their separate ways. Bernoldus Niemand ceased to exist as James Phillips continued his music career. André Letoit changed his name to Koos Kombuis in 1990 (Kombuis, 2000:369) and continued with his career as novelist and newspaper columnist, although he still performed for many years. The Voëlvry movement was officially over.

Voëlvry used traditional symbols such as folk songs to make fun of the Afrikaners and the establishment (Pretorius, 2004). Rabie later reflected that they (Voëlvry) used rock and roll as a platform to protest against the perception that Afrikaners were a homogeneous group who all supported the NP government and all it stood for (Ackermann, 1999). Voëlvry helped to free the Afrikaner's mind from the ideological chains of the establishment (Ackermann, 1999; Pretorius, 2004).

2.3 Reflection – Voëlvry: Afrikaners expressing disillusionment

Voëlvry was born during a volatile and uncertain time in South Africa, as Afrikaner society entered into a period of transition and confusion, many becoming frustrated with conservative Afrikaner values. Increasingly, especially young Afrikaners did not want to be associated with traditional Afrikaner mores and the NP regime, in the face of the realities of apartheid, conscription and state control. This meant questioning what it meant to be an Afrikaner. Voëlvry voiced the anger and disillusionment felt by many as these related to the actions and policies of the National Party[9]. The brutality of the internal and external conflicts and the control the NP regime had on the country and the people became known in a piecemeal fashion in

[9] Among the countless disturbing events of the 1980s in South Africa, the so-called Rubicon speech by PW Botha, President at the time can be mentioned. Reforms were expected to be announced and were deemed irretrievably necessary, yet Botha refrained from announcing any such reforms during this speech delivered on 15 August 1985. ("PW Botha gives the 'Rubicon' Speech in Durban | South African History Online", s.a.)

spite of strict censorship on information and ideological positions that countered that of the regime. In this way, Voëlvry became an accessible channel of expression for young, disillusioned Afrikaners in the 1980s (Grundlingh, 2004; O'Meara, 1997; Hopkins, 2006). The movement spread a politically, socially and culturally conscious message aimed at the notion of uniform Afrikaner culture and thus enabled an Afrikaner anti-autocratic rebellion.

For the followers of Voëlvry, this rebellion gave them a platform to critique cultural and social constraints associated with Afrikaner society and to express their individuality and aversion to the NP regime. In this sense, the movement also represented a brief moment of enthusiasm for young Afrikaners, creating hope for a different future. For young Afrikaners of the 1980s, disillusionment was felt with the past, together with the desire to shape a future devoid of the ideological chains of traditional Afrikanerdom. Thus while providing a brief and hopeful respite, Voëlvry was sparked by disillusionment as *raison d'être*. The movement also ended in disillusionment.

Nonetheless, the movement had an impact on a significant portion of Afrikaner youth (Hopkins, 2006:75). O'Meara (1997:368) argues that Voëlvry was meaningful in understanding Afrikaner society's anguished condition in the late 1980s and, consequently, in the socio-political transition that followed. Afrikaner society was suffering a sense of discontent and insecurity, which the movement represented and expressed. The state's control started to unravel due to external pressures like sanctions against South Africa and internal stresses such as protests, insurgencies and armed resistance.

Alternative and protest movements in literature, art, music and media started exposing realities to the public. Voëlvry translated the discontent and an underlying feeling of guilt into an angry and anarchistic music movement. Voëlvry had historical importance and the alternative Afrikaans music movement became the voice of a generation. However, the movement's influence was limited to (mostly young) white middle-class Afrikaners and therefore only influenced a small portion of South Africa. After the end of apartheid and the transition to a new political system, this group's disappointment in the outcome of their expectation would lead to their (second) disillusionment. They were disappointed in the realities of economic and social segregation and the hardships left in the aftermath of apartheid. Probably most pertinent was the group's disappointment that their movement appeared to have had little impact on the breakdown of the apartheid system. Their lasting contribution is lodged, most likely, in the liberation of Afrikaans: it was now used in Voëlvry lyrics in its slang, real-life guise – and also for resistance purposes, not for nationalist interests.

After the movement reached its pinnacle in the 1989 tour, it lost its drive and dissolved – the "real" Voëlvry movement was thus very short-lived. The political circumstances of the country changed with P.W. Botha's resignation and F.W. de Klerk's repeal of apartheid and his introduction of "the new South Africa" (also see Williams, 1999). Voëlvry became rebels without a cause.

Since 1990, after Nelson Mandela's release, and then under a government of unity until 1994, South Africa tentatively started to move from a dark period of oppression in the direction of democracy. The unthinkable has happened – apartheid was ending. Voëlvry started in a time when the media were censored and writers, musicians and other artists reported on the truth. Moreover, art was not only reporting, it also created a sense of solidarity among artists and their followers against a common enemy (Brink, 1999:65). With the end of apartheid, resistance artists lost their status as "cult" figures in whom a culture searched for truth in its fight against the lie embodied by the establishment (Brink, 1999:67). These artists were no longer a source for information and the truth, which is what energised them during the days of resistance.

By the early 1990s, some of the ex-Voëlvry members were recording new material as solo artists or in new bands. Most of the new content, post-Voëlvry, of the ex-Voëlvry members, reflected the past's pain and suffering through self-reflection processes. Through these songs, these artists were attempting to process the guilt and anger of the past, leading to their disillusionment after the political transition. Koos Kombuis captures this sentiment in the new lines of the Bloedrivier (2008) version of the song "Johnny is nie dood nie", which he dedicates to Johannes Kerkorrel, Johnny K, whom the film draws a parallel with, through the character Johnny: The song tells, as I noted in an introductory footnote, of Kerkorrel/Rabie's despair, crushed hopes and death – and the inability to accept this death (uitgepaas / passed out referring to an inebriated sleep):

> […] Van die bruto pyn en hartseer elke fokken keer as jy probeer
> Om 'n difference in die land te maak om 'n lied te skyf wat mense raak
> 'n Finale helder antwoord op die suiwerste akkoord op jou kitaar
> Jy't gesê jy wil 'n date maak in die nasionale pad
> Jy wou jou mense ompraat om 'n nuwe kans te vat
> Maar daar was vlieë op jou windscreen en depressie was jou baas
> Johnny is nie dood nie, Johnny is nie dood nie
> Johnny is nie dood nie jy's net uitgepaas […]

[…] From the gross pain and sadness every fucking time you try
To make a difference in the country to write a song that touches people
A final clear answer to the purest chord on your guitar
You said you wanted to make a date in the national road
You wanted to persuade your people to take another chance/way
But there were flies on your windscreen and depression was your boss
Johnny is not dead, Johnny is not dead
Johnny is not dead, you're just passed out […]

- *Johnny is nie dood nie, Koos Kombuis (2008)*

Conscription

Since 1967, white South African men were conscripted into either the South African Defence Force (SADF) or the South African Police (SAP) to control the unrest inside the country and the ongoing conflict in Angola and Namibia (the so-called Border War[10]), which began in 1966. By the 1980s, compulsory conscription was lengthened to 720 days (two years), with an additional 30 days annually in the Citizen Force, a division of the South African Police, for eight years (Davenport, 1991:440; Winkler et al., 1989). Border War insurgent activities also increased during the 1970s and 1980s as the SADF engaged in warfare against Angola, which was supported by Cuban soldiers. In a rather unsettling turn of events, the army was also used against the people of South Africa in townships to control growing unrest among black South Africans, and township violence across the country became rife and deadly.

Defenders of apartheid and the war in Namibia and Angola promoted it as a defence against communism (Davenport, 1991:455). South West Africa was a territory under South African administration from1915 to 1990 – South West Africa had been a German colony and during the First World War was practically occupied by South Africa, which was one of the allies of the British. This situation lasted until 1990 when South Africa relinquished the status quo and SWA became Namibia and achieved full independence. The apartheid government used the country as a base for operations against the communist party in Angola (at first supported by

[10] The South African Border War took place between 1966 and 1990 in northern South West Africa and Angola. The war started as a conflict between the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and South African authorities who were controlling South West Africa at that stage. Furthermore, pressures from within South Africa were building with protests and demonstrations escalating to armed resistance against the state. The NP government used conscripts as fodder to fill the SADF and SAP. The South African Border War was part of Namibia's and Angola's fight for independence and later Angola's civil war. It was a complicated and destructive war which would leave serious scars on all the participants, which in the end also involved Cuba (with the support of the Russians..

the U.S. and particularly Henry Kissinger) (Clayton, 1999; Stapleton, 2010; Weigert, 2011). In response, the United Nations called for sanctions against South Africa in 1977 and many multinational companies withdrew from the country. By the 1980s, the South African economy was suffering from the effects of external sanctions and internal boycotts (Levy, 1999:6). The ongoing war in Angola and South Africa's military occupation of Namibia required huge financial resources and aggravated this economic hardship (Du Preez, 2010:88–90). Generally, the war, initially sold as an exercise in patriotism and a stance against communism, became hugely unpopular, as did conscription practices. *Beyond the Border War: Perspectives on South Africa's late Cold War conflicts* (edited by Baines & Vale; 2008) revisits art, radio, literature and related social, political and historical perspectives emanating from the Border War and its discontents. This publication also highlights veiled and less veiled attempts by white Afrikaners to subvert the grand "liberatory" narrative offered by the NP government.

Censorship and resistance

The NP government increasingly censored the media during the apartheid period, keeping the majority of the white population fairly uninformed about the stark realities of the country's situation (Afọlayan, 2004:176). Indeed, since the NP assumed control in 1948, any form of protest against the government was banned, at times leading to violence and the incarceration or exile of many anti-apartheid figures, most famously Nelson Mandela (1918-2013) (Davenport, 1991:418; also see Du Preez, 2010; Winkler *et al.,* 1989). Individuals who attempted to expose the truth were prosecuted or exiled.

Several prominent Afrikaans writers opposed the state and mainstream Afrikaner society. André P. Brink's 1973 novel *Kennis van die Aand* (Knowledge of the Evening) was banned in 1974. In 1975, the government banned Breyten Breytenbach's volume of poetry *Skryt* (a pun that in Afrikaans can be a play on words such as Screech/Write/Shit: 1972) and found him guilty on charges of terrorism, sentencing him to nine years in prison. The NP regime banned *Skryt* because of its references to the names of prisoners who died in detention. The volume also contained a poem called *butcher*, aimed at the former prime minister (1966-1978), B.J. Vorster. Etienne Leroux's *Magersfontein, O Magersfontein!* (1976), is a satire of Afrikaner history, ideology and values which insulted prevailing political sensibilities to the degree that the government banned the novel in 1977, together with a range of other Afrikaans literary works until the mid-1980s (McDonald, 2010: 354-361).

There was, therefore, a strong presence of resistance in Afrikaans literature as especially the so-called Sestigers (sixties) writers felt they had to engage critically with the socio-political and

cultural contexts of that time. These writers opposed the mainstream Afrikaner culture and society in their novels and poems. André (publishing as André P Brink in Afrikaans) Brink was a central figure of political resistance in Afrikaans literature publishing novels such as' n *Droë Wit Seisoen* (A Dry White Season, 1979), *Die Muur van die Pes* (The Wall of the Pestilence, 1984), *States of Emergency* (1988) and *Die Kreef Raak Gewoond Daaraan* (*The Lobster Gets Used to It*, 1991; English version, *An Act of Terror*). Through these works, Brink reacted to the political realities of apartheid by depicting political oppression and rebellion, the 1976 Soweto uprisings, torture and death, exile, interracial conjugal relationships, sabotage, espionage and revolutionary action.

By the 1980s, many other artistic expressions also reflected resistance. The documentary photographer David Goldblatt, for example, captured images of the conditions of apartheid, portraying issues such as poverty and infringement of human rights. Sue Williamson's pivotal book *Resistance art* was published in 1989, and gave prominence to visual art's role in the struggle. Artists such as William Kentridge commented on aspects of social injustice in works such as *Casspirs Full of Lov*e (1989), which suggests the impossibility of using a war machine to enforce peace. Penny Siopis presented the decline of colonialism in her work *Melancholia* (1986), combining in a claustrophobic space African references and symbols of European culture as the remains of history, signifying excess and discontent.

Theatre and film were especially instrumental in speaking against the regime, with plays such as *Woza Albert* (1981) by Percy Mtwa, Mbongeni Ngema and Barney Simon, many of Athol Fugard's plays, and films such as *Mapantsula* (1988).

Notable is also the contribution of the Afrikaans comic filmmaker Leon Schuster, whose films *Boetie gaan border toe* (followed by *Boetie op manoeuvres*) and *Oh, shucks, here comes UNTAG* represent the Border War in a light-hearted, almost slapstick way – as do his hugely popular songs about the war. The lyrics of popular his singalong song *Ag man, dis lekker in die army* (O man, it's nice in the Army) (the ratel [or honey badger], an extremely tough animal, was the nickname given to a particularly effective armoured vehicle used by the South African forces) attest to this, making light – and fun – of the war:

> *Ag man, dis lekker in die army*
> *Van Tempi tot Grootfontein*
> *In 'n ratel op Otavi*
> *Of hoog in bos-aeroplane…*

[Oh man, it's nice in the army
From Tempi to Grootfontein
In a ratel on Otavi
Or high in bush-aeroplane…]

This situation points to a rather chilling co-existence of terror and joviality.

A notable body of literature called *grensliteratuur* (border literature) emanated from this period. Described as apocalyptic, works such as Alexander Strachan's *'n Wêreld sonder grense* (A world without borders) (1984), Louis Kruger's (1984) *'n Basis oorkant die grens* (A base across the border) and numerous similarly themed novels saw the light. This trope is associated with disillusionment with the hegemonic and, it turned out, lying regime of the time, and the senseless bloodshed and trauma endured by conscripts on both side of the Border War conflict. Slightly more recently, Mark Behr's *Die reuk van appels* (1993; also published in English as *The smell of apples*) explores a range of deeply painful aspects of the war through the eyes of an eleven year-old protagonist.



Figure 2.10: Going home. Marabastad-Waterval route (1984)

Figure 2.11: Flushing Meadows and Lighting Masts, Site B, Khayelitsha, Cape Town (1987)

Figure 2.12: Casspirs full of love (1989)



Figure 2.13: Melancholia (1986)

2.4 Johannes Kerkorrel

Ralph John Rabie was born on 27 March 1960 in Johannesburg. For most of his childhood, he grew up in towns such as Hendrina, Middelburg and Ermelo on the Highveld of the Eastern Transvaal (now the Mpumalanga Province), a landscape filled with power plants, enormous smoke emitting towers, mine dumps and flat earth that extend for kilometres on end (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; cf. Brynard, 1990; De Bruin, 1997; Joubert, 2002). (It has the dubious distinction of having the highest levels of smoke emission, thus air pollution caused by electricity generation via coal in the whole of South Africa.) With the international isolation brought about by apartheid at this time, the Afrikaner culture was hegemonic. It was an era of religiosity, stubbornness, conformity and authoritarianism (Goodwin & Schiff, 1995; Leach, 1989; Lambley, 1980). The NP was in power and it constantly reminded the Afrikaner whites of their “sacred history” (cf. Moodie, 1975) - one in which God had called the Afrikaner to be His agent in Southern Africa (Laubscher, 2005). Rabie’s family belonged to the Apostolic Faith Mission – a reformist church subscribing to Pentecostal dogma (Pretorius, 2004). In this context, Rabie developed and eventually created the persona of Johannes Kerkorrel as a subversion of this political and cultural climate (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; cf. De Bruin, 1997; Joubert, 2002; Le Roux, 1989).

Rabie's father worked for Eskom as an engineering assistant and his mother, Annie, was a housewife. His father's work meant the family moved around frequently, ending up in Sasolburg in 1976, where Rabie matriculated in 1977. According to his mother, Rabie was a very shy, sensitive child and musically very gifted (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). His parents bought him an organ at the age of four, and by the age of eleven, Rabie was playing at weddings (Pretorius, 2004). He also played piano and guitar and enjoyed playing songs by Neil Diamond and Bob Dylan, as he never enjoyed the Afrikaans music of the time, according to family members (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003). He would often make biting fun of Afrikaans music.

Figure 2.14: Ralph Rabie and two school friends (1977)

Figure 2.15: Ralph Rabie (1981)

Rabie attended the University of Potchefstroom for Christian Higher Education from 1978 to 1980, where he studied industrial psychology, English and journalism (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Viljoen, 2005; Laubscher, 2005). While at university he met An Grobler whom he married in 1980, while still studying. Together they worked on a poetry publication, *Lens*, which the university rector banned after two publications (Pretorius, 2004; Booyens & Robinson, 2002). In 1981, Rabie started his honours degree in English literature at the University of Cape Town while performing in restaurants and bars for extra money. In 1982, after completing his honours, Rabie started his two years of compulsory military conscription (Pretorius, 2004; cf. De Bruin, 1997). During this time, Rabie's son, Reuben, was born in 1983.

Rabie commented that he felt his military conscription was a waste of two years (Pretorius, 2004; cf. De Bruin, 1997). After he finished his conscription in 1984, he started working for *Die Burger* newspaper in Cape Town, where he later became a sub-editor (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004; cf. Engelbrecht, 1988; Joubert, 2002; Le Roux, 1989). He continued to perform in restaurants and in 1986 performed his first politically orientated cabaret in Green Point (Cape Town), written by Elmarie Kitshoff (Pretorius, 2004). During the performance, he wore sunglasses to overcome his shyness and nerves. Rabie then moved to Johannesburg where he started working for the magazine *De Kat* for a couple of months before he became a sub-editor for the *Rapport* Sunday newspaper (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004; Van Zyl, 2003; Joubert, 2002). Rabie and his wife were divorced in 1986, and he has over time positioned himself as gay.

2.5 Post Voëlvry – Johnny K, JK and Johannes

After Voëlvry had lost steam by the end of 1989, Rabie felt that he needed time to process the chaos of recent events, work through his divorce and come to terms with his sexual identity (Fouché *et al.*, 2009). He struggled to cope with the leadership role ascribed to him during Voëlvry's heyday. He did not see himself as part of the struggle against apartheid anymore; instead, he felt he was only a "singing journalist" (Pretorius, 2004; Fouché *et al.,* 2009). The album *Eet Kreef* (1989) was released in Europe and Kerkorrel gained a measure of fame and popularity as the new face of the Afrikaner (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003).

Figure 2.16: Ralph Rabie in Amsterdam (1990)

In 1990, Kerkorrel was invited to perform at one of Europe's biggest music festivals, the Dranouter Festival in Belgium. Shortly after, he started working for a Belgian radio station. During this time, he met famous Dutch singer Stef Bos, and they would later (1992) record an album together. Rabie later reflected in an interview that he felt like he amputated a part of his psyche while in exile (Ackermann, 1999), echoing one of the deep sentiments associated with the Afrikaner: that of a sense of connectedness to the land – as noted by JM Coetzee (1988:22), the Afrikaner is often characterised thus: "through farms he is rooted in the past; through the farms he has substance". The entanglement of nostalgia, contempt and hopeless connectedness to one's land is a defining nodal point of Afrikaner identity (Laubscher, 2005:31), and is as evidenced in Coetzee's summation as it is in Kombuis's lyrics in the song *Boer in beton*[11]. "For this [Kerkorrel's] generation, the city is where you end up with the pain of a deluded past, the cynicism of a disgraced present and the uncertainty of a precarious future".

Rabie returned to South Africa in September 1990 and recorded a new album, *Bloudruk*. The national tour of the album, *Die Blou Aarde toer*, during which he wanted to be known as Johnny K, commenced in 1991. This album reflected Rabie's awareness of the struggle between a

[11] This song is about living in the Afrikaner cities, hidden and masking one's true self to the world because your beliefs do not align with those around you.

public performer (Johannes Kerkorrel) and a private person (Ralph Rabie) (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003).

Johnny K extended his social conscience and commented on the ozone layer, corruption, violence, poverty, and the invisible handcuffs of capitalism in a more global sense (Tahmm, 1992). With this persona, Rabie attempted to shift his focus from apartheid politics to more universal issues. In this vein, Brink (1999:67) notes that artists whose oeuvres were mainly predicated on the expression of resistance to sustain their creative self, are likely to feel the need to address other more universal moral dilemmas and problems when the system they resisted, falls. For example, the album *Bloudruk* is more concerned with social commentary than politics, essentially positioning itself as a wish list for a new social dispensation in South Africa. Although the album was hugely successful, critics perceived Johnny K as “too pop for alternatives and too alternative for pop” (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003). Die *Vrye Weekblad* gave him a cover story, yet a whole page was dedicated to criticising the album, the media releases and the publicity photographs.

Figure 2.17: Bloudruk album cover (1991)

Figure 2.18: Bloudruk press photos (1991)

Drama followed the 1992 publication by the Afrikaans novelist Koos Prinsloo of his book *Slagplaas* (farm/place of butchering). Explicit about gay sex, Prinsloo referred to his "so-called friend, the pop star" in the book, detailing numerous personal stories. This angered Rabie to the extent that he publicly assaulted Prinsloo over presumed references to him (Rabie) in the book, saying that he (Rabie) was identifiable through Prinsloo's stories. For Rabie, the line between his public persona and his personal life had been crossed, and he went back to Europe (Pretorius, 2004). During this time, in most of Rabie's interviews, he expressed a heavy-heartedness – indeed, a disillusionment about South Africa and the level of violence and general chaos in the country, which disturbed him greatly. His popularity grew in Belgium, with a new album recorded with Stef Bos and two Belgian television documentaries on him (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004).

A few months after the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela in 1994, where Kerkorrel sang the wildly popular *Halala Afrika* (from the *Bloudruk* album), he recorded his next album, perhaps ominously called *Cyanide in the Beefcake – Who killed Johannes Kerkorrel?* (Grundling, 2001; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004; Botes, 2002; Burger, 2002). The album was Rabie's personal reflection of the end of the persona of Kerkorrel, the painful past, and his desire to move on from the past. Some of the songs were vengeful, while others showed his desire to move away from being seen as the one who led a rebellion against the establishment (Pretorius, 2004). Rabie's demise became visible during this time, when he as Johnny K had become paranoid and nihilistic (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). His

behaviour was erratic; at the media launch of the album, he walked off-stage halfway through the performance (Burger, 2002; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). He toured South Africa to promote the album, but received numerous negative reviews, which bothered him a great deal. However, his European tour of the album was a huge success. It seems few in South Africa knew how famous Rabie actually was in Europe (Pretorius, 2004; Maas & Strijdonk, 2003).

In 1995, Rabie's father died, and he returned to South Africa (Cape Town), where he started working on his fourth album *Ge-trans-for-meer*. During this time he changed his stage name again, this time to JK. The album included the track *Al lê die berge nog so blou,* an Afrikaans folk song that Rabie reinterpreted by changing the sex of the person to whom the love song is directed from "sy" (she) to "hy" (he). He moved to Johannesburg in 1997, where he met his life partner Demetrios Demetriou. At this stage, he was engaged in conflict with his record company (Gallo Records) about his contract (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003). He was also working on a stage play dealing with sexual identity *(Johnny Cockroach* – a play on his stage name and written for him by Breyten Breytenbach) but had to be replaced because of his paranoid and erratic behaviour.

Shortly after, Rabie changed his stage name to Johannes because he wanted to be "free of the Afrikaner baggage of the past", according to him (De Bruin, 1997; Nieuwoudt, 1997). At the time, he was also in a public conflict with Dagga-Dirk Uys about lyrics in some of the old Voëlvry songs (Maas & Strijdonk, 2003; Pretorius, 2004). He toured through South Africa and Europe with Demetriou (who did the lighting) and in 2000, he released his lyrical album *Die Ander Kant* (Pretorius, 2004). The album expressed his search for serenity and peace and a return to love and the simple things in life.

Die Hart is 'n Eensame Jagter (The heart is a lonely hunter) is a final album Rabie worked on during 2002, but it would never be released. Rabie noted in an interview that "if you are not careful, too much time spent with negative things can tear you down" (Beyers, 2002).

On 12 November 2002, Ralph Rabie committed suicide at the Botrivier marsh near Kleinmond in the Western Cape (Pretorius, 2004). A canoeist came across Rabie's abandoned car at the Botrivier marsh. The car seats were bloodstained, and the keys were still in the ignition. When the police arrived, they followed a bloody trail from the car through a densely bushed area. About 100 meters in, the police found Rabie, and a grisly scene unfolded. He was hanging by his belt from a tree, and there were four cuts to his neck with blood running down his arms. The police found a utility knife at the scene ("Post-mortem", s.a.; "Kerkorrel left 3

suicide notes", s.a.; "Kerkorrel 'was murdered' | News24", s.a.). Rabie's suicide resembles that of his partner Carel-Brink Steenkamp in 1990 (Fouché *et al*., 2009).

Ralph Rabie's suicide letter:

> *Mammie,*
>
> *Ek hoop jy kan my vergewe, ek het regtig nie meer die krag om aan te gaan nie. Ek weet nie meer wat om te doen om alles te betaal nie, en is op die stadium reeds R27 000 oortrokke. Die bekommernis daaroor dryf my tot raserny, en ek sien in die komende paar maande geen uitkoms nie: hoewel ons goed gedoen het by Aardklop, was dit nie genoeg om al die onkostes te dek nie. Teen die tyd dat ons volgende jaar weer werk het, is dit reeds te laat. Teen daardie tyd is ek so diep in die skuld, dat hulle my in elk geval sal toesluit: Ek vrees die dag dat ons geen kos meer het om te eet nie: ek het ook onlangs ontdek dat al die werk wat ek op my computer gedoen het vir my nuwe album, verlore geraak het. Ek weet nie hoe ek weer van voor kan begin nie. Vir my is daar geen uitweg nie, ek het goed daaroor nagedink.*
>
> *Vir jou ondersteuning en liefde deur die jare sê ek baie dankie: ek bid dat die Here my sal vergewe en dat julle met die tyd sal verstaan en aanvaar.*
>
> *As daar iets is in die huis wat julle nodig het en kan gebruik, kan julle dit vat met al my liefde.*
>
> *Tot ons mekaar eendag weer sien.*
>
> *Jou seun,*
>
> *Ralph.*
>
> [Mommy,
>
> I hope you can forgive me, I really don't have the strength to go on anymore. I no longer know what to do to pay everything, and at this stage I am already R27 000 overdrawn. The worry about it drives me to a frenzy, and I don't see any outcome in the next few months: although we did well at Aardklop, it wasn't enough to cover all the expenses. By the time we get back to work next year, it's already too late. By then I'm so deep in debt that they'll lock me up anyway: I fear the day we'll have no food left to eat: I've also recently discovered that all the work I've done on my computer got lost for my new

album. I don't know how I can start all over again. For me there is no way out, I have thought about it well.

I thank you very much for your support and love over the years: I pray that the Lord will forgive me and that you will understand and accept in time.

If there is anything in the house that you need and can use, you can take it with all my love.

Until we see each other again one day.

Your son

Ralph.]

The Afrikaans cultural community was shocked, even traumatised by the horrific death of Ralph Rabie. While his last years, tours and concerts seemed to portray a waning star, Rabie has left indelible tracks in the Afrikaner psyche as the image of liberation of Afrikaans music and a poet who represented the longing and disillusionment of a generation.

Rabie/Kerkorrel's legacy is still felt among many Afrikaans speakers. After his death, a large exhibition and concert series were held at the annual Klein Karoo National Festival. In 2022, twenty years after his death, a documentary on his life was released with the title *Kerkorrel,* directed by Neil van Deventer.

CHAPTER 3: TIME – THEORETICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, NARRATOLOGICAL AND CINEMATOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES

3.1 Introduction

Time as a concept has captivated scholars from diverse fields such as physics, mathematics, philosophy and phenomenology and even neuroscience[12]. These scholars attempt to understand and explore time as both an empirical and a philosophical concept – examining time from cosmological or "objective", but also from experiential and existential (thus "subjective") angles.

I first address relevant philosophical perspectives on time, after which strategies of time narrated are explored. These insights are then related to cinematographic representations of time. In order to demonstrate the argument that time is first and foremost subjectively experienced, this argument is brought to bear on theories pertaining to how time is narrated and cinematographically portrayed, where the subjectivity of time is foregrounded by theorists such as Genette (1988) and Deleuze (1986).

3.2 Time as a concept in an abstract, philosophical sense

3.2.1 Introduction

In this section, I explore time as a concept that is profoundly connected to being human. I investigate time from both cosmological and existential angles to explore "objective" and "subjective" conceptualisations of time respectively. Time as subjective is especially important in terms of the human experience thereof, and how this experience relates to how we interpret our existence. I set out to demonstrate the complexity of time and a number of salient perspectives on this concept to develop the argument that time, in many senses, is first and foremost a subjective phenomenon. Therefore time is existential, experiential and phenomenological rather than, first and foremost, an objective phenomenon.

[12] Physicists and mathematicians such as Albert Einstein (1920), Steven Hawking (1998) and Carlo Rovelli (2018), philosophers from Aristotle (cf. Bostock, 1980) to Augustine (1960) to Bergson (1962) and Ricœur ([1983] 2012), and neuroscientist such as Mary-Brit Moser, Edvard Moser (2014) and Albert Tsao (2018) all dedicate extensive research and thought into the concept of time. This demonstrates how time has occupied scholars from diverse disciplines.

3.2.2 Cosmological and existential time

As noted, time is intrinsic to being human. We measure our lives in days, years, or decades – these, as I note, have an "objective" dimension. However, our inner lives are conditioned by a subjective experience of time – and thus of days, years and the like. For instance, memory, loss, mourning, success, victory, anticipation for the future and even the evanescence of beauty are deeply bound to time. We observe the cycles of nature – day turns to night which turns into day (Egyptian view of time[13]); summer becomes winter only to return the next year. Through these processes, we observe the cyclical nature of time.

Also, human life can be described as a seemingly linear passage of time from birth to death – echoing the linearity that we observe in nature, with all living things sharing the journey from birth to death with humans. Things, therefore, seem to grow older as time passes, which suggests this linear progression. We may thus, in one sense, perceive time as governed by the "objective" rules of the universe, but also by human experience. In short, the universe suggests a procession of cycles through day and night, summer and winter (rebirth) – but also of the finitude of life and its corollary: death. As we proceed further away from our time of birth, our past expands while our future shortens, bringing us closer to death. We thus observe both circular time and linear time through cycles of life and death.

In short, humans experience time in two ways (Ricœur, 2012:5–6; Rovelli *et al.*, 2018:37, 143; Heidegger, 1996:384, 386, 392–394; Hawking, 1998:6, 15; Holford-Strevens, 2005:4; Hoffman, 2009:63, 133). The *first* of these, also called objective time, is thus a cosmological conception of time where we experience time as a collective, linear, chronological progression through the cosmos (Rovelli *et al.*, 2018; Tsao *et al.*, 2018; Moser *et al.*, 2014; Ricœur, 2012), while the *second* refers time experienced as existential (Augustine, 1960; Carter, 2011; Hawking, 1998; Heidegger, 1996).

The cosmological view of time holds that time unfolds in a continuous line that extends from past into the future. Objective measurements such as hours, days and the like mark this view of time. This topology of time emanates from the ideas of thinkers as diverse as Plato (428-348 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) in ancient Greece, and was picked up by especially Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) in 17th century England.

Aristotle, for example, already argued that time does not have a beginning or end (cf. Bostock, 1980:148). There would, in his mind, have to be the first moment in time for time to have a

[13] According to Kamrin (2017), the Egyptian day began at dawn and was divided into 12 hours day and 12 hours night according to the movement of the sun and the stars. Other ancient cultures from Asia, Africa and America used water clocks to measure the flow of time using gravity.

beginning. However, this first moment in time can only be counted as a moment in time if this first moment comes between an earlier period in time and a later period in time. This moment is then, paradoxically, inconsistent with being the first moment in time. Newton, for example, argued (cf. Rynasiewicz, 2022) that time exists independently of human events. The progression of time therefore, in his mind, occurs independent of human intervention. There are a past, present and future, over which humans do not have control, in Newton's view.

The conception of time as linear and chronological implies a progression from one point to another, thus from the past to the present to the future. This progression, because it is measured by the hours in a day, the days in a week, the weeks in a month and so forth, is also referred to as clock-time. In one sense, humans perceive time in this way because of, among others, circadian rhythms in nature[14] (Moser *et al.*, 2014:466; Hawking, 1998:147).

This view of time is, however, arguably also existential in nature, because all experience is subjectively processed. Rovelli (2018:66) suggests, in this regard, that time is a complex network of events onto which we project sequences of past, present and future. The concept of "forward in time" is the direction in which we wish to gain information. "Back in time" is how we reassemble the past and interpret information (Coëgnarts & Kravanja, 2012:86–87). These are all subjective processes.

Therefore, in the "objective" sense of the word, the universe or cosmos controls linear time, irrespective of our existence. To make sense of this linearity, people have conceived various devices or clocks, from the sundial to very accurate atomic clocks, that can help to measure and record this form of time. Through a universal agreement (time as consensual) we coordinate our activities to clock time. However, as I argue, our brains do not perceive the duration in time with the same standardised units of measurement like a clock does (seconds, minutes, hours, etc.) (Tsao *et al.*, 2018).

Also, we tend to also attempt to measure time in measurements of duration, not least to account for nature's seeming linearity *and* circularity (Augustine, 1960:136, 255; Holford-Strevens, 2005:109). Our recording of the past is linked to the notion of duration as we remember a certain period of time or even the past as a duration in time and the present as a

[14] Circadian rhythms are natural processes that respond to cycles of light and dark, such as our cycles of sleeping during the night (darkness) and being awake during the day (light). The sun rises in the morning and sets at night in a cycle that repeats indefinitely. Also, interestingly, many cultures deal with death by believing that life continues after (a person's) death; this suggests that the cosmological cycle of time continues without the presence of humans.

new duration in time. Clearly, we also interpret duration subjectively as long or short, depending on our interpretation (emotional, existential) of time passing in that moment.

One can then infer that time as existential, on the most basic level, pertains to how humans orientate themselves with regard to their experience of time. Past, present and future are not experienced with specific durations, and the past may not be felt as an emotionally measurable period between two points or the present *now* as having any duration. Instead, we prescribe or project duration onto events and experiences so that we can interpret those events and experiences. We may, for example, label a time-period such as the 1960s or 1980s, referring to decades with a standard duration of ten years and a specific *feel* to that era. One may also label a meeting using a standardised duration of an hour. However, the experience of an hour or a decade can seem subjectively long or short, depending on the experience of the duration and not the actual time measured.

Therefore, in our *experience* of time, we project sequences of time as the past, present and future (Rovelli *et al.*, 2018:66). Living in the present, we carry our past with us through our memories. This influences how we perceive our present, as well as our anticipation of the future. Our lens of the present is therefore conditioned by memories and anticipation, among others. We tend to base our judgement, hopes and expectations of the present and the past on our past experiences. Our perception of time is thus affected by our experiences and can therefore not be described as an objective experience of time. Time then, as far as our personal experience is concerned, is experienced subjectively, while it is perhaps first and foremost regarded from a cosmological, an objective and measurable vantage point. Temporal notions of existence may also be projected onto what may be believed to be a timeless existence after death.

Augustine (354-430 AD) (1960:255) during the fourth century grappled with the paradox of measuring time and the existence of time beyond the human experience. He reasoned that time has no being as such, since the past no longer exists, the present does not remain, and the future has not yet happened. However, we may also speak of time as having *being* by referring to the past as a referent of what has been, the present as being and the future as what will be.

Augustine can be said to have favoured a phenomenological concept of time (although, of course phenomenology as a scholarly field has not been coined as such before well into the twentieth century), and described time as essentially a human experience, instead of it being cosmological. He suggests that this time is a process of thought (thus psychological), meaning

that we conceive time as an extension of the present to measure time as it passes (Carter, 2011:311).

In a rather long yet relevant line of argument, Augustine (1960:259) explored measuring the flow of time as it passes. He attempted to discern a way to measure time passing while it simultaneously continues and ceases to exist, showing time's multiplicity (cf. Carter, 2011:309). Augustine used the example of reciting a song by heart or listening to music. While reciting, as the sounds exist, they exist as impressions recalled from memory (Wiskus, 2020:275, Confessions: 9.10.24). Sounds still to be pronounced thereby become signs in expectation. The sounds that remain in memory are thus measured and not the spoken sounds. With this example, Augustine illustrates that the present changes and is not a fixed point, nor a passing point, but a present intention or instance, because the person reciting the song intends to utter the sounds. Augustine's (1960:263) argument proposes that a person does not journey through the present. Instead, the present is a person's conscious mind consigning the future to the past. In this process, the past increases (lengthens) as the future diminishes (shortens) until it is completely absorbed into the past.

The future, therefore, cannot diminish into the past without a conscious mind to control the process (comp. Heidegger, 1996:424; Ricœur, 2012:12; Rovelli *et al.*, 2018:52–54; Tsao *et al.*, 2018:57). This process entails the functions of expectation, attention and memory – the expectation of the future, attention to the present, and memory of the past.

Therefore, time also pertains to the expected future that passes through the attended present into the remembered past (Ricœur, [1983] 2012:17–20). The expected future and the remembered past reside in the present's extension of time. This corroborates my argument that the *second* and most relevant conceptualisation of temporality for current purposes is concerned with time as experiential, existential and subjectively felt; time is embedded in our experiences, hopes and memories.

The subjective perspective of time Is, however, not only "emotional" and thus "unscientific" in nature. Neuroscientists Mary-Britt and Edvard Moser (2014)[15] discovered that our brains do not encode time explicitly or in a linear manner. Instead, what our brains measure is a subjective temporality derived from the ongoing flow of experience (Moser *et al.*, 2014). Our neural clocks operate by organising the flow of our experiences into an ordered sequence of events. The ordering of these events produces the subjectivity of time. Therefore, subjective

[15] The Mosers won the Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine in 2014 for their detection of brain cells with a strong time-coding signal inside the brain.

time is generated and measured by our brains through experience and the succession of events within the experience (Tsao *et al.*, 2018).

In a similar vein, theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli (2018:1, 66) propounds that time is an illusion, and that our perception of time's flow does not necessarily correspond to physical reality. In *The Order of Time* (2018), Rovelli discusses the physics[16] and philosophy of time, and argues that time is more illusive (and, arguably, elusive) than a universal ticking clock. He argues that the flow of time is a subjective feature of the human experience and not an objective description of the universe. It is worthwhile to note that Einstein's early twentieth century theory of relativity also positions space-time as an elastic, flexible continuum that distorts time depending on a person's relative speed and proximity to a mass[17] (Laugharne-Thornton, 1922:641). In other words, the rate at which time is felt to pass depends on an individual's frame of reference.

3.2.3 Time: memory and expectation

I would like to interrogate the notions of past, present and future in the light of memory and expectation a little further. Ricœur ([1983] 2012:53) refers to this existential experience of time as phenomenological, and argues that this form of time enables us to position and orientate time in relation to our experiences. He proposes that language offers a measurement of the past and future as "long" (long ago) or "short" (shortly before), but language does not describe how the future "contracts" and the past "grows" ([1983] 2012:11). Every day, we get closer to the future we anticipate, while moving further away from the past.

However, we always exist in the present and carry our memories of the past and our anticipation of the future with us in this moment. The present is, according to Carter (2011:304), an indivisibly instant moment with no duration (comp. Heidegger (1996:390) notion of a series of "nows"). The past and future, therefore, seem to constitute our experience of time articulated in language from a present perspective. In a similar vein, Augustine (1960:206, 250) concluded that the past and future only exist in or through the present (cf. Carter, 2011:307-308). In other words, we discern the past – indeed through the lens of the present – and thus we also predict the future, but from the position of the present as informed by a recounting of the past. Recounting the past suggests that the past, and time itself, are

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16 The notion that time passes or flows subjectively is, as noted, a physics question but, more significantly, one related to human experience. Rovelli (2018:66; also see Augustine, 1960:256; Ricœur, 2012:5, 12–13; Tsao *et al.*, 2018:58) refers to the flow of time or time passing as an emotional experience that is connected to how humans think about time.

17 Furthermore, Einstein (1920:8–10) argued that space and time are inextricably linked. One can foreground time for purposes of discussion or investigation, but space and time are fundamentally intertwined.

deeply related to memory. Through the act of reflecting, we bring the past into the present through memory. On the other hand, predicting the future infers anticipation or expectation. These may have optimistic or pessimistic overtones.

The way in which we build memories through traces of the past has a bearing on the present, and how we process this information to anticipate the future. We are connected to the past through memories and similarly connected to the future through anticipation. Therefore, in the sense of past, present and future, the metaphor of a continuous line is a metaphor for making sense of time as also having a cosmological dimension (Hoffman, 2009:134; Holford-Strevens, 2005:87). We believe that we have a clearer picture of the past than the future because we do not have traces of the future as "memories" (Carter, 2011:309, 321).

The future manifests in the present through expectation, hope or even dread. Expectation precedes events. Therefore, expectation is an impression in the present about future events that do not yet exist (Ricœur [1983] 2012:11-13). Interestingly, there is a parallel between expectation and memory, because these concepts are impressions about either the future or the past that exist in the present. One can infer from Ricœur that memory and expectation or anticipation are both processes of thought managed by our conscious minds. We control these processes by selecting what information to focus on, and what to dismiss. We use information from the past to make decisions and anticipate the future outcomes of our choices. These processes occur in the moment of now, the present, as we move from the past to the future. There is thus a constant archiving of present information that passes as memories, while (re)interpreting these memories to form impressions of the future as expectations.

However, measuring the present seems impossible, because it passes and appears to be evanescent (Heidegger, 1996:388, 407, 417, 424; Ricœur, 2012:12–16; Carter, 2011:304, 308). Passing, in this sense, can be interpreted as being in transit, on one's way somewhere, and is thus temporary. The idea of passing through determines time as relative to some period. In other words, all interactions between intervals or moments of time are experienced in relation to a given period, and are informed by both memory and anticipation.

Rovelli (2018) suggests that instead of thinking about the future as such, we consider the memories we have of the past and then anticipate the possible future based on the information of the memories. This notion of time harks back to Augustine's example of a song's recital. The music's meaning comes from the notes played now and the memories of the previous notes that form the present instance (cf. Augustine, 1960:253). We use memories to anticipate the future and emotionally charge our perception of time through this process (Carter, 2011; Tsao *et al.*, 2018). Time, for us, while perhaps consensual if regarding it in cosmological terms

of past, present and future, is not primarily rational. Rather, it is something in which we experience.

The following section explores how time is told. In other words, I explore how time is conceptualised in narratological terms, continuing the argument that the telling and experiencing of time in the consumption of narrative texts (in the broadest sense to include film, games and the like) is deeply subjective. To this end, salient perspectives on time narrated are explored and consolidated into a theoretical framework from where cinematographic strategies and narratological corollaries of telling time are explored.

3.3 Time narrated

3.3.1 Introduction

In this section, I continue my exploration of time by narrowing the focus to the context of narratives. I explore time as the basis of all narratives. The focus is, to a large degree, Genette's (1980) temporal distinction between order, duration and frequency to explore how time is manipulated to narrate time.

3.3.2 Time as essential for narrative

Narratologist, humanities scholar and curator/artist Mieke Bal (2017:146, 1991:166) proposes that the most basic definition of a story is *any illustration of a temporal development*. She describes this temporal development as a transition that takes place from one situation to another. A transition is usually brought about by an act caused by someone or something. Therefore, a narrative is the product of a series of transformations (Scheffel *et al.*, 2014). This definition suggests a linear narrated time which is artificially (in the sense of artfully) transformed by the act of telling. Furthermore, this definition assumes *causality* as a basic element in narratives, and by default a basic element of time because narrative texts, by virtue of being experienced over time, have a linear unfolding during the act of reading (as well, of course, as numerous other temporal possibilities suggested by the text). A similar claim can be made with regard to film, which also unfolds, at least on the level of watching, chronologically when watching the film.

Bal (1978, 2001), indeed, explores time as salient to any narrative, naming the four elements of narrative time, space, character and event. She (2019:142) propounds that time structures the narrated world, and distinguishes among three types of time related to a narrative. These are (1) the time of *making*, (2) the time of *viewing* and (3) the time *narrated*, which are present

in the reading of any text (of course, assumption of this study is that a film, visual artwork or the like are all texts that can be read). In other words, all texts suggest, at the very least, the time of production, the time of consumption by the reader or viewer of the text, and the time or temporalities related in the narrative world or storyworld.

The storyworld is the fictional world that unfolds over time in which the characters live. Thomas Pavel (1986:52–54) conceptualised this term, and argues that a reader experiences the storyworld (or fictional world) represented in a narrative in relation to their experience of reality. Through this process the reader becomes an agent who co-constructs the storyworld from the text. The reader therefore interprets the storyworld from their own perspective, which is also conditioned by their experience of reality[18]. The storyworld is an augmentation (significantly – also subjective temporal augmentations) of the experience of reality as a series of interconnected worlds (Pavel, 1986:55). For the purposes of the current discussion, the notion of storyworld is salient because it encapsulates time, space, and processes of thought through a text and its consumption.

Any reading of a narrative text (or, by extension, film) involves superimposing two worlds: the fictional and the actual, through a sequence of events or a timeline. Readers engaging with texts are momentarily persuaded that the characters are real, and that statements about them are true in the world they occupy in what has been called the willing suspension of disbelief (Pavel, 1986:56). The storyworld, in this sense, assumes mythical dimensions. These mythical aspects refer to conventions that allow for an implied contractual agreement with the consumer of the text by providing conditions for the sequence of events to make sense.

3.3.3 Genette's three narrative temporalities

In *Narrative discourse* (1980) and *Narrative discourse revisited* (1988) Genette argues that time in narratives appears in categories of three different temporalities (cf. also Bal, 2019:146). Specifically, Genette proposes *narrating time, story time* and *discourse time* as the three temporalities or levels of time in narratives. He examines Marcel Proust's novel *La recherche du temps perdu* (1913, *Remembrance of things past*) and proposes a complex multi-layered theory with concepts that make it possible to analyse the variety of temporal relations in narrative discourse. Genette's system of temporalities has been adapted to various media such as film, video games and digital media (Chatman, 1980:63–79; also see Ryan, 2004; Bordwell & Thompson, 2008; Herman *et al.*, 2010).

[18] Reality is experienced subjectively, existentially.



Figure 3.1: Genette's three narrative temporalities

The act of narrating makes it impossible not to locate the story according to time, because it implies progression or unfolding over time (Genette, 1980:215) thus, Genette's *narrating time* is the first temporal level in narratives. Ricœur ([1983] 2012:122) also notes that the successive characteristic of time is a shared aspect of both cosmological and phenomenological temporal conception. This is because as the story unfolds through the temporal sequence or cosmological time, this process by default creates in itself phenomenological time as past, present and future. From the present perspective, time can be extended into the past or the future through memory or anticipation (Genette 1980:217). Narrating time therefore corresponds with phenomenological time, and allows for the juxtaposition of past, present and future. However, as Ricœur ([1983] 2012:123) notes, this phenomenological time is imprinted, however subjectively experienced, also on a cosmological timeline, because the order of succession is immutable in a cosmological sense.

Story time, Genette's second temporality, refers to the dimension of the narrative that organises the storyworld. This dimension is centred on the recreation and interchange with other elements of the narrated world. Story time serves as a reference and orientation parameter defining the relation between the chronological order of the events and their order of presentation in the story (Genette, 1990:22). The world of the story is an assemblage of

spatio-temporally linked elements organised by time into a narrative (Ronen, 1994:199). Ronen (1994:199) similarly argues that time frames the setting for events, characters, and actions. Importantly, time is simultaneously shaped by these elements it organises.

Story time is a product of clear and shared understandings of forms of narrative creation in the storyworld. Furthermore, story time is a form of cosmological time because a linear sequence is implied. This is the time where events in the story are ordered into the storyworld. In film, specifically, the construction of the story time in a narrative *facilitates* the measurement of the storyworld as a set duration. A filmic storyworld thus lasts a specific duration – this notion is further addressed below.

Finally, *discourse time* refers to the time it takes to consume the text. In filmic terms, it is the playtime or viewing time of the story. In other words, it is the physical time span needed by the film to tell the story (Chatman 1978:62). In literature, discourse time refers to the temporality of the text, with reference to the time of reading the text (Genette, 1980:34). Genette refers to this as pseudo-time because it is false, fictional tell-time that is standing in for a true time. Discourse time occurs in relation to story time and narrating time.

For purposes of the present study, I also adopted Genette's temporal model of *order, duration* and *frequency* as structuring principle of how time is narrated, because these principles structure filmic narrative simultaneously on narratological (memories, attention, expectations, duration of events, importance of events) and technical levels (cinematography and editing: flashbacks, flashforwards, duration of shots and linkage within the scene, repetition of shots or scenes, and the like).



Figure 3.2: Functions of discourse time

Order, duration and frequency have a direct bearing on the temporal manipulation of narrating a story. In this regard, Genette (1980:35, 1990:74, 131) argues that *discourse* time manipulates the telling of the storyworld. I thus augment his three-tiered topology of time I present in figure two to argue for positioning order, duration and frequency as functions of Genette's discourse time, because they essentially manipulate and shape the *discourse* time.

3.3.4 Order, duration and frequency: functions of discourse time

Discourse time is the manipulation of story time through or in relation to narrating time by using various techniques and temporal suggestions. I elaborate on discourse time in relation to story time by using Genette's (1980:34) three categories: *order*, *duration* and *frequency*.



Figure 3.3: Illustration of narrative temporalities

The illustration above shows the interconnectedness of temporalities in narratives. I conceptualised the following visual representation from Genette's three narrative temporalities where I include the principles of order, duration and frequency under *discourse time*. The illustration consists of a circle, a rectangle and a triangle.

The circle represents the storyworld and its concept of time because we associate the circular shape with the concept of a world (earth and planets as such are all represented by round shapes – although in physics they are not necessarily round). The rectangle is a representation of a thick line or arrow portraying the narrating time that unfolds the storyworld linearly. The triangle embodies the manipulated perception of time, time subjective and experiential, and the unfolding storyworld through the principles of order, duration and frequency.

As this illustration shows, story time is the time of the storyworld, where the characters live, while narrating time refers to the unfolding of the storyworld (over time) through telling. Discourse time is how the telling of the storyworld is manipulated. This manipulation occurs through order, duration and frequency. In other words, we look through the viewfinder of discourse time at narrating time unfolding the storyworld (story time or storyworld time).

In the category of *order*, the divergences between discourse and story are called *anachronies*, which also refer to the manipulation of time (discourse time vs. storyworld time) (Genette,

1980:35). Here, Genette differentiates between analepsis or flashback and prolepsis or flash-forward. Analepsis and prolepsis may differ in terms of their range, relationship and distance to the central narrative line. For instance, in *Johnny is nie dood nie,* there are flashbacks to the 1980s from 2002. Fifteen years are excised between the two periods. Although not depicted, this timespan still existed in the narrative world. Therefore, the duration of story time is fifteen years condensed into the duration of an hour and forty minutes of discourse time (the time needed to view the film).

Discourse time is constructed by the completion of the narrative's time sequence. Ordering the events into a sequence results in the mental and physical co-construction of a storyworld by the consumer of the text (Pavel, 1986:55–56; Genette, 1990:37). Furthermore, incidents are repositioned in the mind of the consumer in the timeline with adjusted durations that do not necessarily correspond to durations in the real world. In other words, storyworld events usually do not resemble the duration of events in actuality. This reordering and adjustment results in the (re)construction of cosmological time of the story. This construction is the fabula.

Narratologically speaking, the distinction between the *fabula* and *sjuzhet* is salient. A fabula refers to the chronological order of events contained in the story, while the sjuzhet is the representation of events not necessarily chronological or corresponding to duration in reality. This means that the fabula is the "what actually happened" of the story and the sjuzhet is the way the story is organised. Narrative plots usually suggest a beginning, middle and end, which are often achieved through flashbacks or flashforwards. For example, in the classic film *Citizen Kane* (1941) by Orson Welles, where the story starts with the death of the main character and then tells his life through a series of flashbacks intermixed with a journalist's "present-time" investigation of the main character's life. The fabula, in this instance, is the actual life of the main character the way it chronologically happened, while the sjuzhet is the way the story is told. The fabula is thus a mental process of chronological re-ordering. However, this definition of the term describes the fabula as somehow fixed and something to be discovered by the reader.

The category of *frequency* refers to the connection between the number of occurrences in the story and the number of times these happen. Frequency can occur in different modes. Singular telling narrates once what happened (Genette, 1990:38–39; Bal, 2017:111–114). Telling many times what happened once is, of course, repetitive and accentuates the importance of the event in relation to the story.

According to Deleuze ([1968] 2014:94), when we think we repeat. For example, if I think of a leaf, I repeat something of the actual leaf in my mind. As I engage in judgement between four

leaves from the same type of tree, I have to repeat four times to come to some conclusion. For Deleuze, this is a process of generalising because we are looking for resemblances between two things. We know what green is even if there are different shades of green. We know what the shape is even though it is slightly different from leaf to leaf. Generalising is a basic action of thought and in order to generalise, we must repeat. Repetition contributes to "generality" but in every repetition something distinct occurs. No leaf is actually a precise exact copy or repetition. Rather they are all different in colour (shade), shape, and even in position. The thought of the leaf is again different, and the next time I think of the leaf it is different again. In every iteration, newness is inscribed. In every moment each repetition is something new in space and time. Each repetition has no equivalent while also resounding something from the previous repetition. Every act of nature repeats with novelty and every repetition of every thought creates something new in the mind which meditates it.

In this regard, Deleuze (1995:12) argues that exact repetition disrupts natural law and compels us to reflect on the quality of repetition. Every repetition, even if a precise replica of a previous instance, is experienced differently, because this repetition results in anticipation for the next iteration, and thus anticipation of the future. In this regard, however, Deleuze (1995:81) propounds that we transform the past, the former present, through memory and thus remembering is not "real" in a so-called objective sense and thus subjective (also see Currie, 2006:64). Through repetition, one becomes aware of the subjectivity of anticipation of the future as being influenced by present and past experiences. Remembering is therefore virtual.

Repetition in narratives often reflects on the past (but may, of course, also reference the future) by repeating scenes or by means of flashbacks (or flashforwards). The frequency in which certain events are repeated or iterated accentuates their significance in relation to the story's perspective. According to Du Plooy (2014:15), narratives such as those of war and displacement, for example, are guided by personal experiences and thus tend to be remembered differently. These types of narratives repeat memories from the present (with the implication of these being conditioned by a subjective perspective).

The category of *duration* refers to the length of time events require to tell, or the length of time that events take - even if this has to be "completed" in the mind of the reader (or viewer). Distortions of duration facilitate temporal complexity and foregrounding in a narrative. Genette (1980:86) refers to the distortion of duration as anisochrony. Four types of anisochrony exist, namely the pause, the scene, the summary, and the ellipsis (Genette, 1980:95). Each of these devices can distort (in other words, manipulate) the duration, or the felt duration of an event. For example, the ellipsis can cut away considerable amounts of time, as seen in the omitting of the fifteen years between 1989 and 2002 in *Johnny is nie dood nie*. The pause can, in turn,

suspend action for much longer than it would be in real life. Such a pause usually directs attention to the projected images to convey an emotional impact in terms of the character's experience of that moment in time. The variations in duration caused by the different types of anisochronies affect the rhythm of the timeline. Rhythm affects the flow of the film and thus, the flow of time, and the experience of "time" as subjective and existential.

The following section explores how time is narrated cinematographically. I continue the argument that the telling and experiencing of time in the consumption of narrative texts are deeply subjective, by exploring how time is conceptualised and conveyed in cinema. In this regard, I explore cinematographic strategies and narratological corollaries of narrating time.

3.4 Time narrated cinematographically

3.4.1 Cinema: cosmological and existential time

Deleuze introduced a philosophical approach to time in cinema. He problematises cinematographic time on a variety of layers, propounding that time in cinema is uniquely complex precisely because cinema has the ability to reflect life, which is complex.

Deleuze basically proposes that cinema presents time as we understand time – in one sense as empirical through movement (Deleuze proposes the term *movement-image*) and also existential through thought (*time-image*). Thus time can exist as time empirically measured (cosmological) or time felt subjectively (existential). For example, in a film, a meeting of an hour is never portrayed in that exact measurement that will take up most of the film's playtime. Instead, the meeting is portrayed as a relation to basic temporal information needed (empirical) or time experienced (existential). Cinema can then compress the actual time of the meeting by deploying various techniques. If, for instance, the meeting is an important temporal indicator in the story and nothing else, a shot will show the character entering the meeting, followed by a shot of him exiting the meeting with the title on-screen reading "an hour later". This instance gives pure temporal information about the character attending a meeting that lasted an hour. It is a representation of empirical time, thus we feel nothing through it. Although compressed, the instance or sequence only expresses an actual measurement related to cosmological time.

However, if the *experience* of time is important to the story, the sequence will maybe show the character, through slow, long shots during the meeting doing nothing, expressions of boredom on his face, while intercutting a clock that does not seem to move forward in time, or the sound

of a clock that is slowed down. Therefore, cinema can show both a sense of empirical time, compressing the time (e.g., with a cut or on-screen titles to show a temporal marker in the cosmological timeline of the storyworld) or existential time (by, e.g., juxtaposing images (or sound) to express time as subjectively felt. Such signifiers used to express time subjectively are relatable to viewers.

In a cosmological sense, cinema can show on-screen titles of dates and places, or voice-overs that mention specific times and locations (music can also suggest objective time – although, as I argue, it is likely to be experienced subjectively). Characters can also refer to dates or time of day as references to time in the storyworld. Furthermore, the ordering of shots and scenes can likewise infer time or time passing. For instance, a night-time scene that follows a day-time scene suggests that time has passed from day to night (presumably within the same 24-hours). Similarly, scenes of winter and then summer also infer the passage of time. Techniques such as time-lapse photography compress durations of days into seconds and seasons into minutes by speeding up the footage captured over hours, days or even months, thus showing the passage of time.

Time can thus be objectively or empirically suggested in film from both inside the storyworld (diegetic) and from outside the storyworld (non-diegetic). Diegetic references are, for example, times, dates and places or actual clocks and calendars inside the fictional world. In this case, transitions from day to night will also be diegetic in nature indicating the passing of time in the storyworld. Non-diegetic references to time include, for instance, voice-overs or on-screen titles that tell or show time. These are time references projected or superimposed onto the storyworld from the perspective of the narrator instead of being referenced by the characters who experience the storyworld that are likely foregrounded to be experienced first and foremost existentially.

In an existential sense, cinema's manipulation of time can express time as long or short, for example, to convey the subjectivity of time and how a character experiences time in that moment. Such subjective time makes the expressions of time in narratives relatable to us. Techniques such as long slow shots, stretched-out, freeze-frames, or rapid cuts express duration *felt* instead of actual duration measured. Bal (2011:220-221) refers to time as "sticky" when compressed or drawn out.

Discourse time manipulates the narration (the unfolding of the storyworld) that orders the past, present and future to express thought-processes such as memory/recollection/reflection or attention or expectation/anticipation. For example, the frequency in which a film presents reference to events, scenes and shots expresses their significance in relation to the characters

and story – how frequently a character "thinks" about something, for example, or even dreams about something. How frequently a character thinks about the past, in a way that may be signified by flashbacks, carries significance in terms of the narrative line. Flashbacks not only entail recollecting or remembering something, they influence the present moment of the character. Flashforwards can, likewise, anticipate events or outcomes still to come but that have a bearing on the character's existential experience of time.

Cinema therefore has the ability to represent time as subjective, much like the human experience of time, while unfolding over a cosmological timeline (much like our journey from birth to death). It is for this reason that Deleuze (1986b:125, 204, a:60–61, 1995:61) describes the cinema as a reflection of time and human thinking.

3.4.2 Cinematic story time, narrating time and discourse time

Giannetti (2013:143, 147, 155) refers to the formal features of cinema that distort the raw material to manipulate the images. Through editing the cinema started employing the narrative concepts of order, duration and frequency (proposed by Genette). This made possible the manipulation of time portraying the human experience of time as subjective and existential.

Most cinematographic diegetic and non-diegetic time signifiers relate to the story time of the narrative - thus the storyworld. These signifiers orientate the viewer in terms of the position and location of the storyworld in relation to a cosmological timeline. Cinematic signifiers define when (and where, because time and space are intrinsically connected) the storyworld is situated and the period or duration of this world. For example, in Wes Anderson's *The Grand Budapest Hotel* (2014), the story begins in the "present", with a young woman at the grave of the main character (who was an author). A flashback takes the viewer back to 1985 where the (previously deceased) author tells the story of his time at the Grand Budapest Hotel in 1968. The cinematic signifiers such as on-screen dates, voice-overs, costume and art direction and narratological signifiers such as dialogue and action create a timeline that resides inside the fictional world of the narrative, stretching from 1968 to 1985 and to the "present" time when the young woman visits the author's grave. However, the entire film is located temporally outside of any objectivity. The timeline of the storyworld, the story time, unfolds through a series of interconnected scenes (projected moments) on screen. This creates the narrating time, which is a narrative instance that acts as narrator of the storyworld (Deleyto, 1996:219).

Bordwell (1985:12) notes that film combines particular co-creative techniques to construct a narrative *instance*. Bordwell refers to co-creative techniques as the practices and crafts that are used to make a film. These include directing, cinematography, production design (set

design and art direction), editing, sound and acting. A combination of these techniques consolidates to construct an imaginative storyworld over time (Deleyto, 1996:219). Through (re-)ordering the storyworld chronology, distorting durations of events and repeating events, scenes and moments, cinema manipulates the storyworld to tell the story for a specific impact and meaning in its overall totality (Bordwell, 1985:13). This manipulation is the discourse time. Discourse time represents time as subjective, existential, human, instead of empirical, universal or cosmological.

3.4.3 The role of editing in the manipulation of cinematic time

Editing is perhaps the most significant strategy for narrating time in cinema. The earliest forms of cinema were brief moments extracted from the passage of time, such as workers leaving a factory (*La sortie de l'usine Lumière à Lyon* – Louis Lumière, 1895) or a train arriving at a station (*L'arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat* – Louis and Auguste Lumière, 1896). These early films existed as a single shot that projects a moment of movement. Although not captured and projected at accurate speeds (according to laws of physics), these films show a pure movement that gives way to a linear timeline relating to empirical or cosmological time and strictly chronological. In other words, these films represented actual empirical time because they captured a moment in time through motion. This indirect presentation of time through motion seems objective (as far as the constraint of the camera frame allows it to be) and does not relate to time as existential and subjectively experienced (Mroz, 2013:10; Bordwell & Thompson, 2008:441; Gunning, 1993:12; Elsaesser & Barker, 2019:I; Mullarkey, 2019:39–40).

Even with the advent of editing at the end of the 19th century by Robert Paul (1869-1943) and George Méliès (1861-1938), time in cinema stayed chronological as shots and scenes were connected to form an impression of continuous time and contiguous space and action. Paul's *Come Along, Do!* (1898) was the first film to feature more than one shot. The first shot is of a couple having lunch outside an art museum. The couple then follows some people into the museum through the doors. After a cut, the second shot shows them walking around inside. Although a cut separates the shots, the time-space continuum remains essentially intact because there is no temporal jump between the two shots, much like the early one-shot films (Elsaesser & Barker, 2019:293).

In the early 20th-century pursuit films, for example, will typically see a group of men run to the left as their pursuers appear to the right. This shot will continue until the frontrunners and the pursuers have moved off-screen. The camera will then pick up the frontrunners from the moment they re-enter the frame. This second shot still shows a situation that is chronologically

continuous to the previous shot. According to Elsaesser and Baker (2019:296) despite the cinematic cuts being made, these early films never discontinue or break the temporal continuity. Furthermore, these films do not present time as subjectively experienced. In other words, in these films, we do not feel the anxiety of being chased, the narrowing of time or how time (and space) closes in during the attempt to escape.

The pattern of continuous time (and contiguous space) changed from 1910 onward as *intercutting* (or cross-cutting) became a frequently used editing technique to create and increase tension (Giannetti, 2008: 143). The chase was now broken down and presented through a variety of cuts ranging from medium shots to close-ups of both pursuers and frontrunners, which created a stronger feeling of tension. Furthermore, events could now occur at the same *time* in separate spaces. Due to the option of simultaneity, time was no longer inevitably continuous (Giannetti, 2008:147). Intercutting enables the narrator to switch from one scene to another, temporarily pausing the scene to be continued at a later moment. Therefore, intercutting is the visual equivalent of the idea expressed by "meanwhile" (Elsaesser & Baker, 1997: 299). Although scenes are placed in a sequence, the cut suggests that these scenes are occurring at the same time. Cinema bends time in this moment suggesting simultaneity during a cosmological unfolding of time.

More extremely, subjectively conditioned editing techniques that are used to condense time and space are also known as *montage*. In French, the term montage simply denotes editing. In the massacre scene on the Odessa Steps, in Sergei Eisenstein's (1898 – 1948) film *Battleship Potemkin* (1917), the viewer experiences the panic, fear and carnage of the moment through montage. Cuts between various shots of people running in masses, armed militia and military forces, achieve this. The power of the sequence arises from the combination of individual shots that form a conceptual impression expressing the slaughter on the steps where hundreds of citizens find themselves trapped. However, Russian formalists[19] also explored the notion of montage as intellectual parallel editing. Images with no direct link are juxtaposed to create new meanings. For example, Eisenstein uses the intellectual montage in *Battleship Potemkin* to narrate a metaphor: that waking a sleeping lion is looking for trouble. After the battleship bombs Odessa, Eisenstein cuts to a shot of a statue of a sleeping lion and then to a shot of a statue of the lion that has risen (Eisenstein, 1925). In this case, Eisenstein invites the viewer to make a narrative link between these shots – a sleeping lion has been awakened.

[19] Eisenstein was the leading proponent of the Russian formalists.

The notion of montage as an expression of intellect in cinematic narratives led to an exploration of concepts of time in cinema such as memory. Flashbacks were first employed in Rouben Mamoulian's 1931 film *City Streets*, during cinema's sound era. Surprisingly, hereafter, the first filmmakers to explore memory by means of flashbacks in cinema were Orson Welles (*Citizen Kane* – 1941) and John Ford (*How green was my valley* - 1941). However, Akira Kurosawa was the first to explore the subjectivity of memory (and thus time) in his film *Rashōmon* (1950), which poses four perspectives on a series of events. The conflicting testimonies in Rashōmon underscore how subjective and self-serving memories can be, each one plausible in its own right.

Montage transcended the notion of a cinematic time-space continuum, allowing the juxtaposition of images to create new meanings and instances of time. This allowed time and space to no longer be constrained to continuity and thus to become discontinuous, in order to present a highly augmented view of reality. In other words, the chronology of past, present and future was no longer presented in the same linear fashion. The manipulation of time creates a mental impact or thinking processes instead of pure sensation from movement. In a conventional continuous sequence, shots add in chronological order (expressed by the formula A+B=AB). However, with an intellectual montage, the shots add up to create a new meaning (A+B=C). In this case, the meaning resides between the shots within the transition from shot to shot.

Filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock started showing the plotting of a murder (*Strangers on a train* – 1951) or the cover up of a crime (*Psycho* - 1960), moving from an image of time as movement or motion, to an image of time as subjective and a process of human thought and experience - for example, the murder scene in *Psycho* (the shower scene as it is popularly known). The entire scene from beginning to end lasts about four minutes. The actual murder in the shower lasts 45 seconds and contains 78 cuts, according to Hitchcock. The close-up shots and rapid cuts between these shots transport the viewer into the scene, letting them experience the moment in time instead of only observing this moment from a distance. This is in contrast to the older western films, for example, where a bar brawl is shown in a wide shot and the viewer observes the destruction of the space (breaking bottles and furniture, for instance) essentially without feeling/experiencing the moment.



Figure 3.4: Chart of cinematographic temporalities

The chart above shows Genette's three narrative temporalities, narrating time, story time and discourse time, and the principles of order, duration and frequency that I have placed under discourse time. The chart extends these principles to cinematographic time through filmic manifestations/deployment of order, duration and frequency.

Ordering of shots creates scenes, which are in turn ordered to structure a sequence of scenes that make up the film. However, concepts such as information and perspective are also controlled through the ordering of the timeline. Flashbacks and flashforwards order the timeline by bringing the past or future into the present thereby influencing the reveal of information and perspective relevant to the story. Ordering of information for example determines what information is revealed when in the filmic sequence. Diegetic signifiers, such as clocks and calendars, and non-diegetic signifiers, such as on-screen titles and voice-overs, keep time or the orientation of time in the (structured/ordered) storyworld timeline.

The film has a set duration, meaning that essentially the storyworld unfolds within a specified time. Duration is also observable in shot, sequence and scene lengths. Slow shots versus rapid cuts determine time as experiential and subjectively experienced. The manipulation of duration through camera and editing communicates time subjectively experienced by the characters. Similarly, shots, sequences, scenes, concepts and information may be repeated throughout the film to highlight their importance in relation to the narrative and its themes. Furthermore, the frequency of repetitions also suggests a subjectivity where time is existential.

The chart below is an illustration of the narrative temporalities of cinema extrapolated from my previous illustration – storyworld time as the circle, narrating time as the line and discourse time as the triangle. Below discourse time, another reversed triangle represents the diegetic and non-diegetic time signifiers and editing which control and manipulate cinematographic time.



Figure 3.5: Illustration of cinematographic time

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored some salient theoretical, philosophical, narratological and cinematographic perspectives on time. I demonstrated the complexity of time through a number of perspectives to develop the argument that time is first and foremost a subjective phenomenon and thus time is existential, experiential and phenomenological rather than an objective phenomenon.

I addressed relevant philosophical perspectives on time in both a cosmological and phenomenological sense. Hereafter strategies of time narrated were explored focusing on Genette's three temporalities (narrating time, story time, discourse time) and the principles of order, duration and frequency which manipulate the discourse time. I explored how time is conceptualised in narratological terms and how the *telling* and *experiencing* of time in the consumption of narrative texts (which include visual art, film, video games and so forth) are deeply subjective. To this end, salient perspectives on time narrated were explored and consolidated into a theoretical framework from where cinematographic strategies and narratological corollaries of telling time were explored.

In order to demonstrate the argument that time is first and foremost subjectively experienced, this argument was brought to bear on theories pertaining to how time is narrated and cinematographically portrayed. These narratological insights were related to cinematographic representations of time.

CHAPTER 4: DISILLUSIONMENT THROUGH TIME – LISE'S DREAM

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I interpret the character of Lise and specifically her dream in the film *Johnny is nie dood nie* using the theoretical framework pertaining to philosophical, narrative and cinematographic temporalities to explore the theme of time and disillusionment. To this end, I focus on the character of Lise because she expresses disillusionment, and her dream draws this disillusionment into sharp focus. Furthermore, she is the protagonist and main focaliser of the story, and her dream communicates the leitmotif within the context of the film. Her dream is significant for her character as a cinematographic expression of her disillusionment and alludes to Johnny as an "absent" protagonist, critical to the context, story and theme of the film. In the following chapter, I explore the character of Johnny and the prominent parallels between him and the actual persona of Johannes Kerkorrel.

Here, I explore the dream(s) that Lise had because the dream foregrounds the salient phrasing of the film's name, echoing the words she uses towards the end and climax of the film to suggest that "*Johnny is nie dood nie, ons is*" – "Johnny is not dead, we are". This is the culmination of her disillusionment, which is facilitated by a number of salient temporal, narratological and cinematographic devices present in the film.

The dream is thus a salient component of the film – not least of the storyworld. Although only a total duration of one minute and thirty-three seconds of the film's playtime, which is an hour and forty-four minutes in length, the dream consumes and occupies Lise for the majority of the film's beginning, climax and ending. (If we link the memories, cinematographically shown through flashbacks, to her dream(s) as context and her recollection of the past, then the dream consumes her for the majority of the story.) Furthermore, the dream expresses Lise's inner states (or psychology) as dreadful, dejected and hopeless.

Early in the film (Scene Three), Lise mentions to Dirk that she dreamt of Johnny. The scene cuts to Scene Four - the beginning of her dream next to the riverbank, which used to be associated with joyful abandon during their student days. The dream is repeated towards the climax of the film as Lise tells the dream to Hein and Dirk, respectively. Each repetition of the dream unpacks the dream narrative and becomes more upsetting with each iteration. The

figure of Johnny leads the way through a forest towards a tree where four figures hang from the tree.

In particular, I explore a number of temporal implications related to Lise's *memory,* as a function of time and profoundly related to her experience of disillusionment, and also how the young Lise's memory of anticipating the future affects her life in the present (2002). Lise's perception of time (the past and present) is emotionally charged and, of course, entirely subjective. She is, therefore, very likely, selective in terms of remembering. As noted in the theory chapter, Bal's (2017:146, 1991:166) definition of a narrative as a temporal unfolding proposes that *causality* is a basic element of narrativity. Lise's past anticipations cause her to perceive her present reality in a cloud of disillusionment: with herself, her life, her choice of husband, and most of all, with the "death" of herself and her loved ones, as related in the poignant dream(s) she has (this recurring dream is, as I noted above, a major leitmotif in the film). Lise's perception of her present reality in 2002 and nostalgic recollection of the past (1987-1989) all have a bearing on how she emotionally and mentally navigates the difficult path of coming, towards the end of the film, into a sense of acceptance. Not without a sense of dread, however.

A dream is, in this sense, a fictionalised world; it tends to be a transmutation of the virtual and the actual (Pavel, 1986:55). Similarly, Lise's dream is a superimposition of her reality (present), memory (past) and an emergent dream "reality". Significantly, these realities as constructs of Lise's mind are entirely subjective – of course culminating in the dream, which is indicative of extreme subjectivity. Together, in Lise's story, an inner narrative of disillusionment is made manifest – both in the present and the past (past expectations of the future are pitched, in particular, against the present [non]-actualisation of those expectations).

To explore the theme of disillusionment through Lise's dream, for purposes of indicating the salience of temporalities in this regard, I use Genette's (1990, 1980) temporal conceptualisations of *order*, *duration* and *frequency* to investigate the simultaneous emergence of narratological and cinematographic aspects in the film, which together produce the temporalities suggested in the film. In the context of the film, then, Lise's dream is also a cinematographic manifestation of her experience of disillusionment.

In the cinematographic sense, **ordering** the dream sequences through flashbacks facilitates a juxtapositioning of the past and present (and the dream). Thematically speaking,

past/present juxtaposition is significant in the context of the dream because it shows Lise's past expectations in contrast to her present reality.

The **repetition** (frequency) of the dream is a way to narrate Lise's subjectivity (cf. Deleuze, 1995a:81). Furthermore, the rhythm and tension of the timeline concerning juxtaposed past, present and dream convey time cinematographically as subjective and existential. These subjective and existential notions of time relate to Lise's nostalgia for a past that she selectively remembers as a subjective temporality and her dream as a newly composed subjective reality in which she processes her disillusionment.

For example, the use of parallel editing of the dream sequence with Lise's emotional breakdown in 2002 creates a montage that conveys meaning through the various intertexts (of context, music, and other references) together with the juxtaposition of past and present throughout the film.

Finally, the dream creates an ontological overlap as regards character: a parallel between Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel is made through their suicide narratives, their similar appearance/style and demeanour, which I allude to in this chapter when interpreting Lise's dream, but explore further in the next chapter.

4.2 Lise (and a synopsis of her story)

In this film's narrative configuration, flashbacks of 1987 to 1989 frequently interrupt the present 2002 to present an amalgamation of present and past hopes and dreams that are crushed while engaging with painful memories and realities. Additionally, the deixis of the film brings the music of Voëlvry, although mostly perceived as non-diegetic sound, into the storyworld as contextual background and intertextual layering of showing and telling. The music of Voëlvry supports storyworld time in the film by anchoring the 1980s and the context in which the characters lived (loved, experienced, protested, rebelled). Moreover, the music also supports the discourse time of the film by bringing the intertext of the lyrics and emotions of the music into the story, thus, manipulating the timeline through *order* and *duration*. Songs are selected, "cropped", using only the part of the song that signifies meaning in the storyworld context, and placed at specific instances.

The music – very often that of members of Voëlvry with lyrics that reverberate meaningfully through sequences – creates a sense of the past casting a persistent shadow over the present, and comments on "filmic" contexts much like an omniscient narrator. Music also informs the

mood/internal dialogue, creates contextual space and emotionally charges the perception of time by selecting what to focus on. The music, along with the non-diegetic voice-over of factual names, dates and places, superimposes the actual and fictional worlds through the film's timeline.

Figure 4.1: Lise's expression, scene one

The film begins as Lise wakes up next to her husband Dirk in what seems to be a rather ordinary white middle-class home situated in the present. It is still dark outside, and she has a despondent expression of dread and dejection. She stares into the camera as the shot recedes backwards out of the room and through the house. A voice-over reports on Ralph Rabie's (Johannes Kerkorrel) suicide on that day, 12 November 2002. The scene then cuts (Scene Two) to 13 May 1989 as the five friends return from the Voëlvry concert at Stellenbosch. *Sit dit af* by Johannes Kerkorrel and the Gereformeerde Blues Band starts to play. It is a live recording of the song, where Kerkorrel introduces the band as an introduction to the song. The song stops before Kerkorrel starts to sing, and the non-diegetic voice-over introduces the story and the characters: five friends navigating life in the 1980s and dealing with the realities of their lives thirteen years later (in 2002). As is the case here, much narrative content and context are determined in the film's overall unfolding by the non-diegetic voice-over, who frequently heralds this information at the beginning (order) of certain flashback scenes to the past (1987-1989).

Figure 4.2: Scene Two, Johnny, Lise, Hein, Anja in the back, Dirk driving (Flashback)

This scene (Scene Two) is a flashback (and thus a memory) to the day in 1989 when Johnny, the film character, committed suicide, which is revealed by this particular flashback repeated later in the film (in conjunction with Lise's dream and her telling of her dream to Dirk). This later repetition is not an exact replica of the first one, with the change that Johnny is standing next to the river. However, the frequency (memory, dream, dream, memory) with which this scene is iterated and shown confers importance on the scene in the film. The various alterations during each iteration of this scene suggest that information is only periodically revealed to the viewer (but also to Lise) in order to make sense of the 1989 memory and Johnny's suicide, and in the end, Lise's dream.

Here, the conflation between the character of Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel is established through 1) the names of the characters (Johannes Kerkorrel was also Johnny K) and 2) through the repetition of the suicide narratives so closely together during the linear unfolding of the film. While these two suicides are temporally unrelated, they are conceptually connected in Lise's mind. Her dreams not only reveal how her disillusionment is fragmented by means of temporalities, as I demonstrate below, but also how she conflated these two characters. Her mental and conceptual conflation is facilitated by the insertion of the suicide narrative (Ralph Rabie alias Johannes Kerkorrel) in 2002, which is followed, very shortly, by the Johnny suicide narrative from 1989. This also demonstrates the subjective mind's ability to conflate temporalities into existential experiences. The years 2002 and 1989 thus merge, ontologically, as does the line(s) between Johnny as a fictive character and Johannes Kerkorrel, the actual character whose spectre haunts the film (this is unpacked in the subsequent chapter).

The flashback reflects the roistered and joyful times the five friends had at (also insinuated during) the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch and their student years in general. This was a time of parties, fun, being in love, experimentation, exploration and anticipation of a happy future. At this point (the film's beginning), the viewer seems ill-informed and unaware of the pain that

the 1980s amounted to and that the group of friends started to grow apart in 1989. This notion of the group growing apart echoes Voëlvry's demise (through infighting) in 1989.

As revealed later in the film, at this moment in 1989, Johnny has been conscripted (although it is suggested that he deserted the army to attend the Voëlvry concert), and Lise has broken up with Hein. The non-diegetic voice-over ends by "factually" saying:

> "*Hierdie is hulle storie, dis nie sonder hartseer. Dit is 'n storie oor Rock en Roll*" ("This is their story it is not without sadness. It is a story about Rock 'n Roll")

The scene transitions with the date 2002 displayed on the screen. *Sit dit Af*[20] starts again to play from the chorus where Kerkorrel sings:

> *Sit dit af, Sit dit af*
> *Sit dit af, Sit dit af*
> *Sit dit af, Sit dit af*
> *Want dis 'n helse straf*
>
> (*Put it off, Put it off*
> *Put it off, Put it off*
> *Put it off, Put it off*
> *Because it is a hellish punishment*)

Dirk walks into the house and switches the music off. Here is an overlap between non-diegetic and diegetic time as the music transitions from non-diegetic (audible only to the viewer) to diegetic (within the storyworld). The past and present overlap through the music, becoming timeless but different: as echoed by Kerkorrel's repetition of the lines "*sit dit af, sit dit af…*". The repetition foregrounds the subjectivity of the present (in this case, 2002) influenced by past experiences (in 1987-1989) (Deleuze, 1995:81). The narratives of conscription, protest, and displacement, guided by personal experiences, are repeated, conditioned by a subjective perspective (existential time) and a collective memory (objective-subjective time).

It is 17 November 2002, the storyworld present, and there is a picture on the front page of the *Rapport* Sunday newspaper of the tree at Kleinmond where Ralph Rabie hanged himself. The voice-over communicates this information layered non-diegetically over the diegetic image of Lise reading the paper. She reads about Ralph Rabie's suicide and tells Dirk that she dreamt of Johnny last night. Dirk comments on Rabie's tragic death, but Lise corrects him by stating

[20] The song is about then state president PW Botha's television speeches and appearances. He was especially mocked for waving his finger while speaking.

irritably that she's referring to *their* Johnny. This is ironic, since the conflation of the Johnny/Johannes Kerkorrel character takes place in her mind – but makes perfect sense to her and, perhaps, to the viewer. An insert scene reveals the beginning of Lise's dream (the rest of the dream is revealed towards the film's ending).

Figure 4.3: The first part of Lise's dream

The dream sequence that takes place in 2002 starts by the side of the river as a continuation of Scene Two, the flashback to 1989 (where the voice-over introduced the characters and the story). However, in this instance, while Anja, Dirk and Hein swim, Lise gets dressed next to the riverbed while Johnny puts on his jacket and walks off into the distance. Lise follows him as he walks away, calling out to him, but he walks on as if leading her somewhere to show her something. In her dream, Johnny appears as a guide that will reveal the dream's horrific ending to her. (This moment may also allude to Johnny's choice and self-determination (the psychological term used in relation to suicide) to take his own life, which I discuss in the next chapter).

The scene cuts back to 2002; Lise and Dirk cease the conversation about her dream; they skip to mundane, middle-class topics, talking about the children, groceries, and the barbecue they are having later that day. Lise seems upset, troubled, irritated, sad and depressed, to which Dirk suggests that she should maybe see "daai ou" ("that guy") (suggesting a therapist/psychologist) again, which implies that Lise has previously seen someone for (psychological) counselling. The scene proceeds to Anja arriving at the barbecue, interrupting their conversation.



Figure 4.4: Lise prepares for the barbecue (2002)

A strange instance occurs here as Lise gets ready (when Dirk goes to open the door for Anja). She switches on the television and stumbles onto a blurred segment of PW Botha, the then state president of South Africa, calling a state of emergency[21] in 1986. It is almost like a lucid dream or an overlap between the past and the present. This overlap in time brings the 1980s reality (anxiety, paranoia) into the storyworld, which helps to contextualise the flashbacks to the 1980s and the 2002 conversations. Cinematographically, this superimposed instance communicates a subjective lens through which Lise views her present (2002) reality. There is a conflict between the dismal past and the nostalgia in terms of how Lise (wants) to remember the past. The segment relates to the 1985 state of emergency, which portrays the social and economic conditions of late 1980s South Africa as dismal. However, Lise seems to remember that time with a measure of nostalgia, although she was against the NP government and the

21 The context of the 1986 state of emergency were encapsulated in a variety of factors including the border war and internal violence within the country.

Afrikaner cultural dogmas of the time. It was as if the young believed they were called to criticise and to help bring about change - for an idealised future.

Figure 4.5: Lise and Anja; Lise, Anja and Johnny (1987)

A flashback (two years earlier than the previous flashback sequence of their student days) interrupts the scene: it shows the day Lise met Anja and later Johnny in Anja's dorm room in 1987. This scene relays important information about Lise's troubled relationship with her parents and her struggle to find a place to belong in the oppressive Afrikaner culture of the time. Through Anja and Johnny, Lise finds a group of friends to whom she feels she belongs, and together they explore the outer parameters of an alternative Afrikaner identity.

This is Lise's first disillusionment during her university years, as she tries to make sense of the realities of her status as an Afrikaner and all the concomitant dogma associated with this nomenclature, oppression and stifling conventions it entails for her. Lise is disillusioned here as her presumed "childhood" innocence and ignorance dissolve, and she realises she cannot escape the realities of South African life at the time. Ironically, she forgets this in 2002 as nostalgia fills the old disillusionment, which layers on top of the disillusionment of young Lise. The ordering of this scene or sequence of scenes is significant. At the end of the previous scene, Lise's "lucid dream", the television segment creates a platform through which the flashbacks can be anchored in reality, relaying the mood, anxiety and paranoia of the late 1980s. The dream obliterates the disillusionment of 1989, foregrounding the 2002 disillusionment.

Back in 2002, the scene cuts: Lise, Dirk, and Anja converse for a brief moment until Hein arrives at the barbecue. In a moment when Lise and Anja are alone, Anja asks Lise if she and Dirk are still "having problems". This moment provides insight into Lise's unhappiness with her relationship. Hein arrives at the barbecue, and Dirk makes a toast to "*'n wonderlike tyd, wat God dank verby is"* ("a wonderful time, that thank God is over"). They are saying goodbye to the 1980s thirteen years later, in 2002, signifying time and disillusionment and correlating

Kerkorrel's death with the end of an era (of pain/misconception). A flashback shows the day in 1987 when Anja moved into Johnny, Hein and Dirk's student house.

Figure 4.6: Anja moving into the student house with Johnny, Hein and Dirk (1987): "Huis van Terreur" (House of Terror/Terrorism)

Anja was kicked out of the female residence because she was caught drinking with Johnny in her room, which was prohibited. The guys welcomed her into the house, celebrating her anarchism (calling her "*Anja anargis*") as they threw her a housewarming party. While Lise wanders through the house (looking for the bathroom), *Ontug*[22] *in die lug* (*fornication in the air*) by André Letoit plays diegetically and then becomes non-diegetic.

My meisie dra 'n pasboek
In neëntien vier en tagtig[23]

22 Denotatively, "ontug" means fornication, but connotatively in this context, the term refers to "immoral actions" predominantly based on racial lines.. The 1927 Immorality Act and the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, forbade the interaction and conjugal relations between black and white South Africans. The 1950 Population Registration Act classified all South Africans by race and provided the basic framework to standardise segregation policies into apartheid. This law made it possible for the government to enforce laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act. During the 1960s, writers such as Adam Small (famously, among others, in his 1962 poem *De lô*) and Alan Paton (with his 1953 novel *Too late the phalarope*), among others reference the Immorality Act and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act in their works, commenting on the restrictions, intrusions, consequences and punishment for persons who defied these laws.

23 A reference to George Orwell's dystopic novel *1984* – a parallel is drawn between authoritarian state control in the novel and the situation in South Africa.

Sy sê vir my "jou askoek"
Ek sê vir haar "jy's pragtig"

Op die stasies in lokasies
Skep ons wrywingsituasies
En daar is ontug in die lug
Ontug onder die brug
Ontug oral waar jy kyk, ja
Dis ontugtyd vir jou en my

(My girlfriend carries a passbook
In nineteen eighty-four
She tells me "you tramp"
I tell her, "you're beautiful"

On the stations in squatter camps
We create friction situations
And there is fornication in the air
Fornication under the bridge
Fornication everywhere you look, yes
It's fornication time for you and me)

The song underpins the blurred PW Botha segment earlier through the intertext the lyrics provide, specifically the lines referring to "lokasies" ("settlements for black people") and "wrywingsituasies" ("friction situations") that refer to the violence imposed by the government in the informal settlements. The song, furthermore, relays intertext on the taboos of interracial relationships, intercourse before wedlock, open-air fornication and the nuances of youth and sexual exploration.

Figure 4.7: Anja's housewarming (1987)

The scene ends with the five friends dancing to Bernoldus Niemand's *Reggae vibes is cool* (most of the song's lyrics are in English):

> *(…) What must I do in this*
> *Oh, strange place?*
> *I could be having daydreams*
> *Oh, but who could tell me?*
> *If there is a better place?*
> *Is there a better place?*
> *Oh Mama, tell me*
> *Oh Mama, oh Mama*

The song implies the notion of a "strange place" (and a search for Utopia?) as a surreal experience, linking this perception to the characters' experience. And so Niemand asks if there

is perhaps a better place, alluding to South Africa (at that time) as a surreal experience. Through daydreams, he muses whether it is possible to imagine a better place, yearning for a better future. These longings relate to nostalgia as a subjective yearning for a "better" past. The lyrics anticipate the characters' expectations of a better future by bringing this intertext into the (manipulated) discourse time of the film. Although the song is diegetically linked to the storyworld time (because the characters are dancing to it in 1987), the intertext the lyrics provide is manipulated by discourse time, specifically *order* (by placing this song at this moment in this scene). The scene transitions with the camera spinning into a blur – cinematographically simulating the surreal daydream notion of the characters' experience but also technically supporting the concept that the "good times" passed too quickly.

Figure 4.8: 2002 Barbecue conversations

As the barbecue in 2002 progresses, the four friends reminisce about their university days at Stellenbosch and the Voëlvry movement. Anja and Hein remember that time with pain and guilt, while Lise (ironically) and Dirk paint a more sentimental and nostalgic picture. Hein reflects on his involvement with the End Conscription Campaign[24], his anger towards the National Party, conscription and being forced to go to war. He remembers rebelling against the government and now (in 2002) blames himself because it is why the secret police recruited Johnny to spy on his friends. Anja, in turn, remembers the struggle against conformity and the dogmas of Afrikaner culture, which she desperately did not want to be part of: "*ek luister nie Afrikaanse musiek nie"* ("I don't listen to Afrikaans music") she tells Johnny in 1987. She refers to the women's residence as "*die Christelike nasionale koekblik*[25]" ("the Christian national cake

24 This took place in the context of the Border War.

25 The word "koek", in rather crude or Afrikaans slang terms, refers to female genitalia, but more often to describe an overly proper young woman.

tin"), suggesting being boxed in by a (rather dangerous) mixture of religion and patriotism as a basis of control.

Dirk, on the other hand, remembers the victories, such as protests and actions against the university council and National Party. He gets upset during the 2002 barbecue when Hein says that Voëlvry had no impact, "*boetie en sussie gebruik pappa se geld om teen hom te rebelleer*" ("brother and sister using daddy's money to rebel against him"), "*wat die struggle verslaap het omdat hulle hangovers gehad het*" ("who slept through the struggle because they were hungover"). Hein suggests that Voëlvry did not hold together as a movement making any impact on the fall of the NP government. Also, he claims, most of the Voëlvry supporters were only Afrikaners there for the party, not the politics. He implies that Voëlvry and their supporters were too privileged as being white or perhaps scared of losing their privilege in the name of a revolution. Disillusioned, they were expressing guilt and anger against the conditions in South Africa and Afrikaans cultural dogmas, but they were also not changing the system.

Dirk, in turn, remembers the liberatory dimension of Voëlvry and their impact. He argues that Voëlvry was "*die klippie wat vir Goliat teen die kop getref het*" ("the pebble that hit Goliath in the head"). Furthermore, Dirk suggests that Voëlvry's impact was on the white Afrikaner youth who became disillusioned and wanted to voice their anger against the system. He implies that the voices of the Afrikaner youth of the 1980s mattered in the fall of the NP. To Dirk, who, during their student days (1987 – 1989), often sang and played Voëlvry songs on his guitar[26], Voëlvry artists were heroes who stood up against the oppressive system.

Lise also remembers their student days with nostalgia – "*ek mis dit*" ("I miss it"), she says on occasion. She remembers being in love, having fun, the escapism, exploring her identity and *anticipating a future* where they might be free of oppression, and cultural dogmas and all living happily ever after (is she perhaps remembering a "utopia"?). However, in 2002, Lise seems unsettled, making snide remarks at Dirk's comments and expressing her unhappiness with her current life and circumstances. She muses nostalgically about days long gone.

(Not salient for the current discussion, but relevant in the timeline: A flashback to a party in 1987 shows the freedom they experienced while also showing the escapism they sought through alcohol, drugs, sex and music. The voice-over tells of the first Afrikaner rock concert in 1988, aligning the escapism of the characters to the context of Voëlvry.)

[26] Ironically, Dirk gets upset at Hein, however, in the 1980s he did not want to participate in any politically slanted action. On occasion, in 1987, he tells Johnny that Hein should stop working with the ECC, because he cannot afford to get raided by the police (Dirk dealt with marijuana in the 1980s to pay for his studies - this can be related to the name of the Voëlvry member Dagga-Dirk Uys).

Figure 4.9: Lise - 1987 party scene

On various occasions during the barbecue in the “present”, in 2002, Anja tries to talk to Lise about information she has discovered about Johnny being a spy for the security police. However, a drunken Lise dismisses Anja, saying that she does not want to talk about it. (Not salient for the current discussion, but relevant in the timeline: A flashback to 1987 shows Lise and Hein’s love interest, and later on, an intimate encounter in 1987 that is *paralleled* with a scene at the 2002 barbecue where Lise and Hein are kissing in the bathroom. However, Hein ends up rejecting Lise’s advances in 2002. Anja then confronts Lise about her behaviour and, in a final attempt, tries to tell Lise that Johnny was a spy for the security police. The scene cuts to a flashback of Johnny’s birthday party in 1988. After the party, which is inferred and not shown, Hein and Lise argue. The scene ends with Hein kissing Johnny while Lise watches from the window. She then turns to Dirk for comfort.)

In 2002, during the barbecue, Lise is again shown being over-emotional, and she tells Hein that she dreamt of Johnny.

Figure 4.10: Lise tells Hein about her dream (2002)

Figure 4.11: Lise's dream sequence

As she tells Hein about her dream, visuals of her following Johnny through a forest are shown. The visuals do not match her recollection. Lise says she dreamt that Johnny was a famous rock star and that they were at one of his shows, as “everyone was there”. She then corrects herself, saying only she was there. She called out to Johnny, but he did not hear her.

Hein seems lost in thought and does not respond. Lise begs him to say something, to which he replies that Abby Hoffman[27] also committed suicide. As a side note here, when Lise first met Hein in 1987, she approached him by complimenting him on a rebellious article he wrote for *Die Matie* (the Stellenbosch student newspaper). She quoted a line from the article (“I believe in compulsory cannibalism; if people were forced to eat what they killed, there would be no more wars”), to which Hein perhaps bluntly replied that it was a quote by Abby Hoffman, a “hippy hero of mine”. In 2002, Hein’s remark perhaps alludes to a parallel between Hoffman and Kerkorrel through Johnny, suggesting that Kerkorrel was a “hero” who openly voiced his anger against the system and inspired like-minded, disillusioned young Afrikaners to stand up against oppression, conformity and control – to hope, and to anticipate a better future.

Figure 4.12: Johnny and Hein before the Voëlvry concert at Drie Gewels 1989

A flashback reveals Hein and Johnny in the van before the Voëlvry concert in 1989. Implied by the dialogue (Johnny: “*het jy gedink ek gaan Voëlvry mis vir PW, bra?”*; “did you think I will

[27] Abbie Hoffman (30 November 1936 – 12 April 1989) was an American socio-political activist and leading supporter of the Flower Power movement, a slogan used during the 1960s and 1970s as a symbol of non-violence and passive resistance (Hall, 2007:155).

miss Voëlvry for PW, man?") and the deictic significance of Johnny taking off an army jacket, is that Johnny has deserted the army to attend the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch. In the military context, desertion is the abandonment of a duty without authorisation with the intention of not returning. This notion is not the same as unauthorised absence or absence without leave (AWOL), which are temporary forms of absence that usually involves punishment upon returning to duty (Tzeng *et al.*, 2016; cf. Edmonson, 1971; cf. Feldman & Maleski, 1948).

A live recording of Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band (during the Voëlvry tour) plays in the background. Kerkorrel sarcastically talks to the crowd about how *nice* it is living in South Africa, "*dis mos lekker, lekker, lekker*" ("it is nice, nice, nice").

Figure 4.13: Lise's breakdown at the climax of the film

In a return to the main narrative in 2002, the barbecue is still going; Lise is now extremely drunk and can barely stand up. She stumbles into the living room, Dirk following her. She puts on *Onder in my whiskeyglas* (*At the bottom of my whiskey glass*) by Johannes Kerkorrel, a song of lost love and drunkenness. She dances and drinks, calling out to Anja and Hein that the party is inside. Dirk asks her to go to bed, but she ignores him. Throughout the entire evening, Lise has been behaving terribly towards Dirk, calling him belittling names, such as "*drollie*" (which the English subtitles translate to "dicky"; it could also be a slightly downward talking term of affection meaning "little turd"), dismissing his opinions and openly flirting with Hein. Dirk finally confronts her, asking what he has done wrong, "*hoekom is jy so kwaad vir*

my?" ("why are you so mad at me?"). Lise begins to cry, again expressing her upset about her dream to Dirk.

Figure 4.14: Lise's dream

Video 4.1: Lise's dream

She relates how she was following Johnny in her dream, with images corroborating her narrative. She follows Johnny under a bridge into a forest, still calling out to him, but he keeps walking forward, looking back now and then to see if she is still following him. After a while, they reach a tree, at which moment Lise freezes, looking up into the tree. She tells Dirk that it is the same tree where "*ek hom daai dag gekry het*" ("I found him that day"). In the dream, Johnny walks over a small wooden bridge and then stops and turns. The camera shows four pairs of feet hanging from the tree branches. Lise tells Dirk that "*dit is ons*" ("it is us") - Lise, Anja, Dirk and Hein hanging from the tree. It is a horrific scene leaving Lise in shock, with an expression of distress on her face. In this moment her painful disillusionment is felt.

Figure 4.15: Lise's dream (2002) - Lise, Anja, Hein, Dirk hanging from the tree

When Dirk reassures her that it is only a dream, she accuses him of not understanding. He asks her to explain it to him, and then she says: "*Johnny is nie dood nie, ons is"* ("Johnny is not dead; we are,"); as a shot over Johnny's shoulder shows Lise standing by the four pairs of feet hanging from the tree. Lise sees her own death and the deaths of Dirk, Hein and Anja. Here, the Kombuis' 2008 song "Johnny is nie dood nie" ("net uitgepaas" – only passed out) hang heavily over events. Johnny committed suicide in "real life", and they are still alive. In Lise's dream, the reverse accentuates her internal tension between death and life. It also points to the inability to accept the horror of Johnny's death, where Kerkorrel and Johnny become the same persona. Juxtaposing life and death in this way makes one think of the

cycles of life and death and rebirth, such as the seasons – a cosmological reference to time and the impermanence of life and the evanescence of death (fading from memory). Perhaps Lise can be mentally "reborn" through her dream experience, or the pain of her disillusionment is related to the painful experience of bereavement (death). Johnny leads the way to show her their dead bodies. Lise, she realises, feels dead while still living – signifying that for her (them), life has become death and that they are the living dead. Life for them is elsewhere, to paraphrase Milan Kundera's (2000) novel.

The scene cuts to Anja and Hein sitting outside by the swimming pool (in 2002) now almost banal, "ordinary" in stark contrast to the horror of Lise's dream. Anja starts to sing *Hillbrow*[28] by Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band. She sings: "*Gee, gee, gee, gee jou hart vir Hillbrow*" ("give, give, give, give your heart to Hillbrow"). While she sings, a cut reveals Johnny in 1989, getting dressed next to the river as the rest are still swimming. It is essentially the same flashback (memory) shown at the film's beginning (Scene Two) repeated and altered with Johnny next to the river. It is also essentially the same scene as the first one in Lise's dream (Scene Four), except Lise is not next to the river and does not follow Johnny. He walks off into the distance (rising sun) as the camera pans upward towards the sky. Cinematographically, the sky may suggest Johnny's freedom (through his suicide) and the rising sun signifies the start of a new day alluding to the notion of *a new beginning*. The order, duration and frequency (Genettian terms) of these memories and dreams (and also intertext of the music) in the discourse time augment events creating an ontological overlap between reality, dream and memory where meaning is expressed (I discuss meanings of the dream below).

[28] *Hillbrow* is an important song that has endured over time. Kerkorrel performed this song well after Voëlvry up to his death in 2002. It is a song about hopes, dreams and aspirations that is foreshadowed by a pressing guilt and painful disillusionment about life in South Africa during the 1980s (but also relevant in current times).

Figure 4.16: Johnny walks off into the distance

Figure 4.17: Lise's final stare

The next morning, after the barbecue in 2002, Lise wakes up. Once again, she stares into the camera as it recedes. Lise looking into the camera invites the viewer in – the eyes as a metaphor for the “windows into the soul”. The receding camera, in conjunction with Lise’s stare, cinematographically “stalls” time, drawing it subjectively out, making time “sticky” as Bal (2017; see also Chapter Two) proposes. This cinematographic construction portrays the subjectivity of time, supporting Lise’s subjective perspective and the dream’s subjective temporality. Getting up and walking through the house, she sees on the television a segment

playing of Evita Bezuidenhout[29] interviewing Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band in 1986. Evita asks the band to play a song that would "move" her. Kerkorrel says that they would play *Donker Donker Land*, to which Evita asks why such a dark and sombre title ("*o, my liewe aarde kinders, wat is positief omtrent 'n donker donker land? Daar's mos nie lig in die donker nie?*"; "oh, my dear children, what is positive about a dark dark land? There isn't light in the dark?"). He replies saying "*maar tannie Evita, daar is darem altyd hoop en daar is darem altyd lig na die donker; en daar sal altyd musiek ook wees*" ("but aunty Evita, at least there is always hope and at least there is always light after the dark; and there will always be music too").

The hope of the past, and the anticipation of a better future, are brought into the present in 2002, cinematographically supported by the diegetic television segment and the song *Donker Donker Land* that starts diegetically and transitions to non-diegetic. While *Donker Donker Land* plays, she goes outside, finding Dirk with a sledgehammer by the wall (the wall has been a point of conversation throughout the evening of the barbecue). Towards the end of the film, the non-diegetic voice-over mentions the fall of the Berlin wall in the context of 1989. This notion refers to a wall as an object that separates and divides people.

Already at the beginning of the film, the wall is mentioned as something new at Dirk and Lise's house. During the conversations at the 2002 barbecue, Dirk makes various comments on the wall while Lise openly expresses her disliking of the wall. Dirk, however, wants to further fortify the wall by adding security spikes. Now at the end of the film, Dirk swings at the wall, knocking a hole into the wall. Dirk's disillusionment, perhaps through understanding Lise's dream, becomes manifest in this moment. Dirk breaking the wall is his expression of hopelessness and coming to terms with the crime-ridden reality of life in 2002. In a gentle gesture, as if to calm and acknowledge Dirk, Lise embraces him from behind. The scene cuts to black, and the credits begin to roll.

[29] Evita Bezuidenhout is a persona created by Pieter-Dirk Uys, a South African performer, author, satirist, and social activist.

Figure 4.18: Final frame

4.3 Why is Lise dreaming?

A dream in any narrative is special because it conveys the dreaming character's inner state or psychology. In Lise's case, the dream is important because it foregrounds her disillusionment and alludes to her inner state and feeling of dread and rejection. The dream is open-ended, leaving the viewer with questions. I first briefly reflect on dreaming in general before exploring the "why's" of Lise's dreaming.

From religion to psychology, theories and attempts to answer the question: why do we dream? Freud ([1900] 1976; cf. Zhang & Guo, 2018; also see Zhang, 2016; also see Hartmann, 2010) suggests that when dreaming, we work through mental processes or project our needs or desires. Projecting, in this sense, entails time because it suggests temporal dislodging of event/person to regard in the dreamworld likely to view event/person through the lens of subjectivity, memory, emotion and the unconscious. This may result in any form of augmentation, whether temporal, ontological, spatial or in terms of the identity of the "reality" recalled while dreaming.

As noted in the theoretical framework, Rovelli (2018:66) suggests that time is a complex network of events onto which we project sequences of past, present and future. The concept of "forward in time" suggests the direction in which we wish to gain information. "Back in time" refers to how we reassemble the past and interpret information (Coëgnarts & Kravanja, 2012:86–87). These are all subjective processes. Dreams can thus be seen as subjective

narratives back in time after finding source material in memory to interpret information or forward in time to anticipate the future. Dreams are their own special type of conceptual "truths" and often bring to bear existential questions.

The medium of dream narrative is the mind's cognitive-perceptual apparatus (Foulkes, 2002; Hobson, 2003). Dream narrative is thus a cognitive sensemaking capability that progresses in representational terms from the onset. This means that dream narratives are processes of meaning-making that occur in a figurative or representational mode. The basic cognitive facilitation of dreaming is not the transmission of a pre-encoded meaning. There is thus no preconceived or predetermined meaning or signification to dreaming. Instead, it is the expression of meaning that is the process of signification (Walsh, 2010). For example, a dream of a shadow might be a metaphor for personal anxiety. Walsh (2010) argues that if the cognitive-perceptual apparatus of dreams itself is indeed representational, then narrative cognition must have rational usefulness within a given context. This notion supports the idea that the dream is a cognitive expression of meaning. Thus, the shadow chasing you in the dream may be interpreted in various ways depending on the current context in which you dream. For instance, a shadow in a dream may also assume the identity of an overbearing boss or an expression of a haunting trauma.

Cinematographically speaking, the significance of the dream often entails foregrounding the dreamer's experience. This can be highlighted through transitions such as fades or blurs, temporal strategies like flashforwards, drawn-out or suspended sequences, and pauses or stillness. Most often, when a character dreams, the dream usually signifies something important associated with the character's psychology or inner state of being, such as searching for something (like inspiration) or working through something (like emotional trauma), or coming to terms with something (like one's reality).

An example is the film *8 ½* (1963) by Federico Fellini, in which the story is told of a film director who struggles to conceive an idea for his new film and then decides to look inward to his dreams for inspiration. His inward journey is cinematographically supported by intercutting his dream as a surreal sequence while he dreams/broods/contemplates. In *Nobody's Daughter Haewon* (2013) by Hong Sang-Soo, a young Korean woman whose mother is moving to Canada deals with the trauma of the experience by having conversations (with herself and others) in her dreams. Similarly, *Wild Strawberries* (1957) by Ingmar Bergman is about an old professor who has to take a road trip with his daughter-in-law. During the long trip, he is troubled by his dreams, cinematically supported by dream sequences, as he explores his past and is forced to confront his cold demeanour and how it has spread throughout his family.

In Stanley Kubrick's *Eyes wide shut* (1999), the transition-devices (different types of cuts) give insight into the fact that Dr Holford's (the protagonist) nightly excursions are figments of his imagination or his dreams. Every time he dreams the transition is marked by a dissolve instead of a "clean" cinematic cut. Dr Holford dreams because he becomes jealous after his wife admits to him the love affairs she has been having in her dreams.

Figure 4.19: Film poster - 8 ½
Figure 4.20: Nobody's Daughter Haewon
Figure 4.21: Film poster - Wild Strawberries
Figure 4.22: Film poster - Eyes Wide Shut

Lise's dream is interwoven with other narrative lines in the film and is presented in various places in the film. When speaking of dreams the salient issue at hand is that a dream in itself is a subjectively tailored narrative, which is experienced rather than told. Lise's dream, therefore, communicates more than basic story information; it communicates her deeper sense of dread, an internal narrative of present disillusionment. The dream gives insight into Lise's psychology and we identify with her.

When confronted thus with Lise's dream, we assume that the dream has great meaning or significance. Throughout the film, we see that Lise struggles with accepting the reality of life in 2002 South Africa. She had certain expectations about the future (back in the 1980s), which have not been actualised as she expected. During the 2002 conversations, Lise expresses an anticipated future where she was supposed to be happily married (perhaps to Hein), living among free-thinking people, and being more socially integrated ("having black friends"). During the 1980s, Lise also hoped for a future in South Africa free of problems. However, the reality is that crime was high, and other realities, such as poverty and inequality, were on the

increase. Lise is experiencing an inner conflict (related to disillusionment) between her memories of an anticipated future and the actualised reality in which she lives. Lise lives a suburban Afrikaner life as a housewife with two children, a swimming pool, insurance and security around the house. And thus, this notion might be a possible reason for her to dream: to figure out or come to terms with her reality in the end. Although the dream is like a nightmare that drives her to the edge where she confronts her delusion, becoming disillusioned.

Lise's first disillusionment was felt during the late 1980s at university when she was young and naïve. This is cinematographically supported by *ordering* the *sujet* with flashbacks and the juxtaposition between the past and present. Discourse time manipulates the unfolding of the narrating time to signify meaning in the storyworld. Lise was disillusioned, in the 1980s, with her friends, about the government, society and the homogeneous Afrikaner culture of the time. Lise realised there was much wrong with Afrikaner society, apartheid and mandatory conscription. She found a place to belong among fellow disillusioned Afrikaner youth. Then, thirteen years later, Lise again experiences disillusionment as she realises that her expectations of the future have collapsed. Her life as a suburban Afrikaner housewife was not what she wanted or anticipated as a "future" back in the 1980s. Lise is now more mature (and a mother with children) and has to accept that life is more complex than the idealistic dreams or anticipations of the past. This is a distressing process for her, and it is cinematically expressed through the fragmentations and order of her dreams.

The dreamer's internal dialogue as both the dream's author and reader highlights the intertextual nature of the narrative discourse. The dream "author" is sometimes haplessly not fully in control of the narrative – a dreamer, for example, may feel unwanted in a dream or have a nightmare. However, the internal author/reader tension creates an intertextual and charged dialogue that may be interpreted to gain insight. The particular narrative line of the dream being developed here is a spontaneous collaboration between the current dream state and the cognitive context of the dreamer's narrative imagination (Walsh, 2010). The dream's meaning is not preconceived and transmitted in narrative form (that hinges on narrative coherence but fails to provide reassurance) to a viewer who attempts to decode it. The "meaning(s)" may arise as the dream narrative unfolds instead of being predetermined or encoded beforehand. Greater significance emerges, upon reflection on the dream later, precisely because all the meaning(s) are not immediately clear, and some may be perpetually evasive.

While Lise is working through her despair, anguish and disillusionment, there is a tension between her "reality" and her inner reality, which is based on nostalgia: memories, resistance against conformity and Afrikaner dogma, emotions such as dejection, hopelessness and

dread. Dreams are subjective temporalities that can merge, stall or fast forward time. In cinematographic terms, this is the overlap of the 1989 memory next to the river and Lise's dream presented through the Genettian principles of *frequency* and *order*, where the same scene is repeated each time with alterations subjectively tailored to the memory or the dream respectively. Lise is dreaming because she is working through her inner states. The juxtaposition between the dream and reality and the fragmented presentation of the dream suggest the recurrence of her mental processes of despair and disillusionment, to a certain degree, as if Lise struggles to work through her emotions – recurring until she has figured out the dream's meaning.

Recurrence or repetition, according to Deleuze ([1968] 2014:94), makes us look for resemblances (and of course differences) between instances of repetition. While echoing something from the previous repetition, each new iteration has no equivalent, thereby creating something new in the mind which mediates it. Every repetition is experienced differently because this repetition results in anticipation for the next iteration and thus anticipation of the future (Deleuze, 1995b:12). In this regard, however, Deleuze (1995b:81; also see Currie, 2006:64; cf. Curry, 1974) propounds that we transform the past, the former, present, through memory and thus remembering is not "real" in a so-called objective sense and thus subjective. Through repetition, one becomes aware of the subjectivity of anticipation of the future as being influenced by present and past experiences. Remembering is, therefore, virtual.

Repetition in narratives often reflects on the past (but may, of course, also reference the future) by repeating scenes or through flashbacks or flashforwards. The frequency in which certain events are repeated or iterated accentuates their significance concerning the story's perspective. Lise's dream gains importance early in the film as it is juxtaposed with the memory next to the river in 1989. However, the dream becomes more surreal although it stems from a memory.

4.4 Lise's dream: The familiar and the strange (story and discourse)

Dreaming in itself is both familiar and strange: the dream is anchored in the familiar, but the dreamer makes the experience strange, which is cinematographically supported in Lise's dream when she finds them (Lise, Dirk, Anja and Hein) dead. The virtuality of a dream experience, as well as the processing and even anticipating of reality, is an instance of immersion in a hallucinatory/unreal experience and a fabrication of fiction.

Walsh (2010:2) argues that there are three components of dreaming. The **first** is an unconscious process of composition, where a person's unconscious mind creates/composes the dream. In narratological time terms, this moment will be in the time of the author or the time of creation. This notion relates to the idea of authorship and the dreamer being the creator or author of the dream. Although, in this instance, the author (Lise) (as a dreamer who is also a "victim" of memory and of the unconscious) does not have intent or control.

The **second** is the presentation of the dream to the experiencing mind while dreaming. This is the moment of the dream experience where the dreamer is immersed in the dream. This moment is in the storyworld time, although the presentation of this moment is manipulated in the discourse time. In filmic terms, this is when and how the dream experience is shown to the viewer. The viewer sees what the dreaming character experiences. Lise's dream is shown in this film, fragmented and intercut (parallel editing) towards the climax of the film as she explains her dream to Dirk, with only a brief display of the dream at the beginning of the film when she follows Johnny along the riverbank into the distance. The fragmentation of the dream in cinematographic terms signifies Lise's attempt to recollect and make sense of her dream.

The first presentation (*frequency* in Genettan terms) of Lise's dream is *ordered* towards the film's beginning. However, it is of short *duration* and thus only signifies that Lise dreamt and that the dream stems from memory. Also, this is the first presentation of the dream, almost adjacent to the memory (Lise and Dirk's domestic conversation scene in 2002 separates the two), making this moment ambiguous. The repetition of this scene later, when Lise tells Hein about her dream, dissolves this ambiguity confirming the earlier presentation of the scene as part of the dream. Furthermore, the fragmentation gives a sense of montage, where the meaning is not extrapolated through the dream sequence as such but rather through the transitions and the meaning of the images in juxtaposition to other diegetic images (such as happy times in the 1980s versus dejection and hopelessness in 2002) and non-diegetic images (such as the tableau, which I discuss later), the diegetic dialogue and the various non-diegetic intertextual references (such as Voëlvry's music and the voice-over).

Finally, and **thirdly**, there is the component of recording the dream in memory for recollection and perhaps to tell later. Lise tells Hein and Dirk on separate occasions about her dream. However, she corrects herself when telling Hein about the dream, " (…) *en almal was daar*" ("and everyone was there"), "*nee, net ek was daar*" ("no, only I was there"). She struggles to remember the precise dream and to establish the line between reality and dream because dream and memory are augmented by her subjectivity. The dream has "defective" logic because of the frequent hiatuses in the 2002 narrative in the form of dreams and flashbacks

and telling of the dream. In her dream, Lise constructs a new reality that arguably reflects a "truer reality" of how she feels inside. According to Foulkes (2002:111), these properties are all cognitive processes associated with dreaming. The hallucinatory and emotional effects of brain activation are synthesised into a more or less coherent, novel, and personally meaningful way (Hobson, 2003:47). Lise's dream thus has meaning subjectively poignant to her.

I draw and build here on Walsh's (2010) model of the three components of dreaming (1: the unconscious process of composition; 2: the presentation of the dream to the experiencing mind while dreaming; 3: recording the dream in memory) by adding a **fourth** layer, the *insight* gained from the dream report, confused and confusing as the telling of the dream may be. Lise is attempting to find the meaning of her dream as she is telling her dream to Hein and Dirk, respectively. She is grappling with the tension between what she dreams versus how she interprets her dream report.

In the case of dreams, in narratological terms, the distinction between story and discourse (fabula/sujet) does not rely only on a difference between material and mental meaning. In dreams, the story does not "ground" discourse; rather, the discourse arises from the story and even augments it as an ongoing narrative interpretant (Curry, 1974; cf. Walsh, 2013). The dream is the *sujet*, the story unfolding as experienced by the dreamer. The reporting can be likened to the *fabula*, where the dreamer attempts to reconstruct the chronology of the events and find meaning in the overall dream.

For example, as Lise wakes up and stares into the camera in the opening scene of the film, she seems puzzled. This moment reflects confusion as she tries to make sense of what she has just now experienced in her dream. When she tells the dream report to Hein, she corrects herself, suggesting she is still processing and attempting to make sense of her dream and its significance. When she reports the dream to Dirk, she has reached a point where she seemingly has made sense of her dream, found its significance and interpreted its meaning. The dream signifies that although living, she is dead. Lise realises through her dream the lie she told herself. A significant disillusionment makes itself felt when she realises the meaning of her dream through her process or revision of her dream report, which is that her expectation of the future has collapsed.

All dreams are, in this sense, post-cognitive productions; they happen "after" a fact but may also anticipate a future or suggest conflated subjective temporalities. Dreams can also change and recur, influenced by memory and repetition. They can repeat and augment, signifying that inner struggles are still (re)occurring. We are or should be, in principle, capable of recalling all dreams. They are directly comparable to memories, which draw upon the same resources of

mental imagery. The evanescence of memory is pitched against the perceptual temporary intensity of dreams.

The qualitative difference in the experiential characteristics of dreams and memory can be seen as a difference of degree, not kind: the mental imagery of most dreams is more vivid than that of most memories because any inhibiting awareness of our actual somatic sensory environment is radically attenuated in sleep (Foulkes, 2002; Hobson, 2003; cf. also Walsh, 2010). Lise's dream takes place at Johnny's suicide site, where the experience of the event is signified and inferred to convey meaning on metaphorical levels. The dream communicates Lise's delusion and her reflection on her dream; her telling of the dream drives her to disillusionment. The climax of Lise's dream provides answers as to how Johnny died (because Lise found his body), as well as the symbolic notion that he is free from the pain and the pain the future holds while they (Lise and the group) have to live with this pain. Disillusionment is a painful experience. This is cinematographically supported by intercutting between Lise's breakdown and the dream to foreground the infringement of dream recall on the dreamer's lived reality. The *ordering* of these images in fragmented cuts conveys Lise's inner disconnection and turmoil.

4.5 Some context

The dream should be read in the context of Voëlvry and particularly Johannes Kerkorrel's rise to fame and also his demise and death, and the transition to a new political dispensation. The context of the dream matters because it is where the significance stems from or upon which meaning is based or situated. Lise wants her dream to carry significance and meaning, to give her the answer to her feelings. In the dream, Johnny is leading her somewhere to show her something. She wants the dream to mean something so that she can use it as a way to make sense of her reality. The dream is intrusive and forces her to make sense of the dream and her life and circumstances. In this sense, Johnny becomes her internal guide showing her the way.

When dreaming, one is not immediately aware of the dream state and only come to realise it later. For a moment, it is thus difficult to determine whether an event or experience occurs during a waking state or if it is part of a dream. This is a moment of dream-reality confusion (Skrzypińska & Szmigielska, 2015) and, later perhaps insight. Lise's dream is cinematographically presented in a similar way, continuing from Scene Two, where the five friends are swimming in a lake in the early morning hours after the Voëlvry concert the

previous night at Drie Gewels, Stellenbosch. This presentation of dream-reality confusion makes the moment relatable – an association with something we are familiar with. Also, the fragmentation of the dream signifies dream-reality confusion, thereby exposing the threshold between her memory and dream.

This is achieved by the *ordering* and *frequency* (Genette's temporal functionaries) of the dream sequence. Upon first viewing, this moment seems like a memory; however, a few minutes later (Scene Four), it seems ambiguous – it may also be part of a dream. It is a fleeting moment/*duration* (less than a minute of playtime in the film), an insight into the overlap between memory and dream. Perhaps even the dream that awoke Lise at the beginning of the film, where she stares into the camera with an expression of dread on her face. This moment alludes to the dream temporality as a unique instance of narration that holds meaning or significance in its totality. While the entire dream is only completed towards the end and climax of the film, this brief moment indicates that Lise's dream may hold importance in terms of the story because it is highlighted early in the film's sequential *order*.

There is thus anticipation that the remainder of the memory/dream will still come and that the memory/dream will carry significance. However, this moment is not solely concerned with dream-reality confusion. Rather, cinematographically, this moment forms an anchor in the storyworld time through which the context of the dream is also embedded.

This anchor is similar to the blurred PW Botha television segment that anchors the storyworld time cinematographically in reality, bringing the context of the 1980s into the storyworld. The first time this 1989 riverside scene appears, it is read as a flashback or memory of the morning after the Voëlvry concert. Moments later, in 2002, Lise tells Dirk that she dreamt of Johnny. The scene then cuts to the 1989 flashback where the five friends are swimming and the camera pans to the riverbank to reveal Lise getting dressed and then following Johnny into the distance. This instance is in Lise's dream, but continued from an already established flashback or memory, which is translated cinematographically by first showing the flashback and then repeating the flashback augmented (as a dream). The dream's link to the memory of the day next to the river in 1989 (after the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch) brings the context of that time and specifically of that day into the dream narrative. This context includes, on a macro-level, Voëlvry, the end of the NP and the change about to occur in the country and the world. On a micro level it refers to the demise of Johannes Kerkorrel and of Voëlvry, which they attended as friends, Johnny's suicide, Lise is with Dirk (she and Hein broke up after Johnny's birthday party in 1988).

Figure 4.23: Reality

Figure 4.24: Dream

Lise's dream seems like a recurring or even lucid experience because she seems aware of the dream and the contrast between the dream and reality. Deleuze (1986), however, reminds us that films reflect human time and, in that sense, also human thought. Furthermore, in the sense of Pavel's (1986) fictional worlds, Lise's dream is superimposed on her virtual dreamworld and actual (subjective) memory. She is, therefore, immersed in a participatory dream environment in the sense that she is bringing actual context, gleaned from "reality", into her dream. Furthermore, the strange moment (at the beginning of the film) when Lise puts on

the segment of PW Botha as she prepares for the barbecue invites the notion of a lucid experience. It is as if she is blurring the temporalities of the past and present through subjective dream temporalities.

The recurring dream is likened to the notion of a lucid dream because both forms of dreams consist of 1) reflective consciousness, 2) a framework in which the dream operates (a context), and 3) an agenda or goal the dreamer aims to achieve (Curry, 1974; also see Hobson, 2003; also see Skrzypińska & Szmigielska, 2015; cf. Walsh, 2010). The self-reflective consciousness wants to make sense of something in reality by expressing significations (connotations/denotation) through a framework of references subjectively relatable to the dreamer. In the case of recurring dreams, the argument can be made that these dreams are recurring because the dreamer has not yet figured out the meaning or significance of the dream. The premise is thus that the dream would stop recurring as soon as the dreamer has gained insight into the dream's meaning (through interpreting the dream report). Lise's reflective consciousness is questioning: what was it all for? Why did Johnny have to die? Why could life not continue with the same freedom and escapism as it did in the 1980s? Her context is life in the 1980s (both as objective reality and her subjective, nostalgic memory of it), Voëlvry and the anticipation of a better future. Her agenda or goal is to find meaning or purpose and possibly resolve her inner conflict, which is to come to terms with and accept her reality.

The reflective consciousness is the metacognitive context (thus, implying an attempt to understand one's own thought processes) of the dreamer. In lucid dreams, the metacognitive context includes waking contexts as well, providing for awareness of contrasts between the two modes (Walsh, 2010). Such is the case with the PW Botha television segment – the NP was not in power in 2002, yet Lise carries the past vividly in her mind. In the case of dreams, the metacognitive awareness of the dream state is arguably associated with detachment from the cognitive experience (Hobson, 2003). It seems as if Lise is in a "trance" when getting ready as the television segment plays. The notion of detachment furthermore reverberates with Lise standing by, watching the four of them (Lise, Anja, Dirk and Hein) hanging from the tree. She seems strangely detached but also immersed – she is dead and alive simultaneously in her dream.

Lucidity, in dream terms, correlates with immersion in a participatory involvement in the dream environment rather than a detached observation of it (Walsh, 2013). Walsh (2013) refers to this notion, in narratological terms, as homodiegetic rather than heterodiegetic in nature because the lucid dream is a subjective "first-person" experience and not the (third person) observation of a narrative.

Lise's dream experience is homodiegetic because she is immersed as a participant in a simulation, although also an "immersed" observer of her and her friends' deaths. Cinematographically, her homodiegetic dream experience is supported by the point-of-view camera angle and her report to Dirk and Hein of her vivid and immersed experience. Immersion in a simulation is an experiential and existential matter that provides for agency, action and reaction within limits defined by the parameters of the simulation (whether a physical or virtual environment), in this case, the dream. However, Lise does not seem to be in control of her dream; she seems helpless. Her friends and she herself are already dead, hanging from the tree instead of Johnny, who is alive, standing by, although Lise is also alive, observing her dead body. Her reaction is thus limited, predicated on this dream "reality" where Lise is confronted with the unbearable (flight, fight, freeze). She cannot save herself or the others as they are all dead. She cannot join them – she is already there. She is both dead and alive, and so experiencing an ultimate disillusionment. She cannot join Johnny as he is dead in reality (symbolically signified by the bridge that divides them). Thus, Lise is alone in her dream. All she can really do is reflect on and interpret the meaning of this image within her context and accept her reality.

To this extent, the viewer must also make sense of Lise's dream through the contextual clues cinematographically provided in the storyworld. Such clues are non-diegetic signification through Voëlvry's music and the voice-over, and diegetic signification through the dialogue and Lise's expressions and actions in the mise-en-scène like dejection, dread, hopelessness, dismissal, frustrations and irritation.

4.6 The dream's narrative and temporal significance

In 2002, Lise is going through an existential crisis leading to her (second and more mature, rather more dread-infused experience of) disillusionment. She is processing her inner states, past memories and the future anticipations she had then, becoming nostalgic and believing the past was better than it is. For this process to be signified and become meaningful in the story, her inner mental processes and self-reflection are symbolised and communicated through audio-visual and sequential (because it's a film) means. Her dream is the time-space in which she is processing her inner state, which she shares with the viewer.

Lise's dream alludes to her delusion and facilitates her later disillusionment. In her dream, she walks through a forest, following Johnny as if he is leading her to the four of them hanging from the tree. She is not necessarily searching but rather following where Johnny is leading

her. It may symbolise an “automatic mode”, a mode where Lise just blindly followed a path pre-defined by Afrikaner culture – Dirk and Lise are the suburban Afrikaner family. As they reach the tree, Lise sees herself hanging from it and becomes disillusioned as she realises her life is dead – she is following a pre-defined Afrikaner “path”.

On a more associative level related to the storyworld time, Lise’s dream, in conjunction with the 1989 memory next to the river, reveals details surrounding Johnny’s suicide. Cinematographically, this connection occurs because the dream uses memory as a basis, and Lise tells Dirk that “*alles was dieselfde soos daai oggend toe ek hom daar gekry het*” (“everything was the same like that morning I found him there”), insinuating that she found Johnny after he died. At the end of the film, the same memory repeats, altered, with Johnny walking off alone into the distance. Thus the inference is that Lise found Johnny’s body and that, according to the memory, Johnny committed suicide the morning after the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch 1989. (The film seems to suggest that Lise noticed Johnny was gone while they were swimming, went looking for him, and then found his body.)

On an intertextual level (and here also facilitating the significant ontological overlap between the character of Johnny and the actual persona of Johannes Kerkorrel), Lise’s dream additionally establishes a parallel between Johnny’s suicide and the end of an era, the end of a movement (Voëlvry) and the end of a persona (Johannes Kerkorrel). There are, as noted, parallels between Johnny and Kerkorrel, which I explore in the next chapter. However, relevant here is that Johnny dies in a manner similar to Ralph Rabie, which may signify the death of Rabie’s *Kerkorrel protest artist persona* in 1989 when the Voëlvry movement dissolved. At the beginning of the film, Dirk proposes a toast to the *end of an era*, which is strengthened by Johnny’s suicide and Lise’s dream (of Johnny’s suicide).

Lise’s dream stems from a memory but becomes more expansive and dreadful than reality. Her dream is a symbolic reflection or signification of a narrative event from memory. The dream report attempts to rationalise the dream to find significance in its overall entirety. In this sense, dreams themselves are experienced more like films. They contain multiple semiotic channels, which may include an interwoven mesh of events, characters, times and space - real or fictitious.

Although Lise’s dream builds from memory and, in terms of the film’s storyworld, anticipates the news of Johannes Kerkorrel’s death, dreaming is not reducible to a stimulus-response phenomenon because it is a profoundly creative process. Dreaming is a function of our “reflective ability to think in images” (Foulkes, 2002:15). There is, in this sense, a cognitive equivalence between dreams and memories (Foulkes, 2002:145). However, in a special way,

dreams may reinterpret or augment memories. Lise's dream uses the mental and visual resources from her memory of Johnny's suicide to construct a new instance to convey meaning subjectively. There is an ontological overlap between the dream and the memory. Her mind subjectively selects images from her past (memories) related to emotions she experiences now (in 2002) and superimposes to it new images that express her feelings of dread in 2002 to construct the dream instance.

4.7 Why a dream?

Narrative creativity without practical or "logical" constraints, such as is the case with dreams, enhances our capacity to understand or digest significant phenomena. Lise's disillusionment is expressed through the dream. A complex and abstract theme is communicated through the interplay and overlap between the dream and reality. The reality of the filmic storyworld is based on the context of Voëlvry and the 1980s reality, which informs the dream context to convey Lise's disillusionment, but also draws a parallel between the suicides of Johnny and Ralph Rabie.

It is impossible to define the creativity of dreaming through the pre-encoded parameters of a simulation because dreams are "irrational" to a certain degree. For example, in a dream, one may see the face of one's mother, but her face looks like the face of another woman, yet one knows it is one's mother. Thus, dreams may be disorientating but make sense in the dream itself. Dreams unfold within the terms of some situational premise that give them a sense of "coherence or stability". This coherence facilitates meaning from reality. In other words, the consistency of a dream is rooted in reality. There is thus an ontological overlap between the dream, memory and reality. A certain situation or event usually forms the basis of the dream. In Lise's dream, a memory from 1989 forms this basis. Yet, dreams are remarkable because of the fluidity with which these parameters can change in the ongoing dream to tailor the experience subjectively.

The dream's parameters adjust as the dream progresses to maintain the semblance of coherence, what can be called dream logic. This notion is especially applicable to recurring dreams – which relate to repetition (Deleuze, 1995b). However, this coherence is more abstract and thematic in nature, which is perhaps why dreams may direct into surreal and strange narratives. Lise sees the four of them (Lise, Dirk, Anja, Hein) dead and Johnny alive. With dreams, the principle of significance is a measure of accountability within the discourse (Curry, 1974). This is accountability towards the expressive and cognitive needs of the

dreamer as they emerge and evolve in terms of the narrative process. As the dreamer experiences the dream, the dreamer's needs and desires (and also fears) direct and drive the experience forward.

The fulfilment of needs, desires and processes form part of the unconscious process of composition (the first of Walsh's components of dreaming). In particular, dreams may foreground the sense of narrative representation as a process of configuration (Walsh, 2010; Ricœur, 2012:267). This configuration is manipulation or distortion of reality. The self-reflective unconscious configures the dream as a way to process thought, which is then presented to the dreamer as an immersive multi-semiotic experience that is recorded into the dreamer's memory for later recollection. By reflecting on the dream report and the signification processes unfolding during the dream experience, the dreamer gains insight into the dream's meaning. Lise is unconsciously constructing her dream as a way to process her disillusionment, triggered by the news of Kerkorrel's suicide. She composes a dream where she communicates her sense of hopelessness and dread. In her dream report, she recognises the meaning of her feelings; she becomes disillusioned, realising why she feels hopeless and dreadful – she cannot anticipate a better future.

Dreams communicate the inner struggles of a character's needs and desires. Dreams are abstract, random and yet meaningful; they are fluid and flexible. In this regard, the tableau, randomly appearing towards the film's climax, can also be part of Lise's dreams. She also stares directly into the camera (as she does at the beginning of the film when she wakes up from her dream) right after the tableau is shown and the adjacent scene in 2002 begins. The tableau is the recreation of Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band's *Eet Kreef!* (1986) album cover. In the image, the characters dine on expensive food and drink, referring to their privilege as white South Africans both in the 1980s and now in 2002. However, the tableau is juxtaposed in the *order* of the timeline with the adjacent shot of Lise at the 2002 barbecue sitting alone at the table. This instance suggests Lise's loneliness and the notion that the group of friends dispersed after their university years and Johnny's suicide. At the end of the film, there is a scene where Anja confronts Hein about why he disappeared and left them to deal with the pain of Johnny's death. This moment insinuates that Johnny's death also signifies the end of the group and their friendship.

Figure 4.25: Eet Kreef! – album cover (1989)

Figure 4.26: Eet Kreef Film Tableau

Figure 4.27: Lise's second stare into the camera

In Lise's memories of the past, she projects a "fabricated" time when things were good or even better than they are now. Her nostalgia is paving a road toward her later disillusionment. She is projecting her memories subjectively, tailored to the good times she remembers and the aspects of those times that she yearns for now, in the present, such as friendship and togetherness. Confabulation is the psychological term for fabricating imaginary events as compensation for memory deficiency or, in more extreme psychiatric terms, memory loss (Skrzypińska & Szmigielska, 2015).

This notion is relevant in terms of projecting nostalgia, which is subjective. Reality and memory or anticipation are disjointed. The brain activity associated with dreaming is adaptive (Foulkes, 2002:78). For example, incorporating a ringing alarm into a dream experience. However, this adaptive capability also serves to reorder and update the memory systems, irrespective of recalling the dream (ibid. 2002). Updating the memory system may result from the circumstantial intrusion of this process into consciousness.

Lise is remembering those times as nostalgic because her memories are updated to the point where she has subjectively selected the events that reflect happiness (in contrast to the dread she feels now). Her dream brings her to the realisation that her memories of the 1980s as the "good old days" (fun, love, parties and escape) and her expectations of the future as free, open and liberated are deluded. Lise feels that she is living a lie, a false truth. The country and circumstances are not as good as expected, with crime, poverty, wealth inequality,

corruption and mismanagement. It is all falling apart, but as it all fails, she is hanging onto the hope that things might still actualise as anticipated (Lise wants to hook up with Hein in 2002 at the barbecue for “oulaas” (“old times’ sake”)). And thus, she thinks back to her student days between 1987 and 1989 with nostalgia, remembering the good times and how happy she was then. She remembers meeting Anja and Johnny, who introduced her to Hein and Dirk. She fell in love with Hein, and they were in a relationship from 1987 to 1988. Lise remembers the parties, ideological conversations and fun they had during that time. Cinematographically, this is supported by showing the 1980s as nostalgic and subjective, as Lise remembers it, but in the 2002 conversation, the dialogue paints a more realistic “objective” image of the past. For example, in the first flashback, to 1989, the five friends drive along the river, laughing and having fun.

The reality was, however, that Hein and Lise broke up, and Johnny was conscripted and then deserted the military to attend the Voëlvry concert. The past was not as good as the flashback (subjectively remembered) portrays it to be. However, perhaps they were also high on the energy of anarchy, temporarily forgetting their realities and escaping into the moment – a final moment of togetherness and friendship, which is cinematographically supported by the nostalgic flashback.

4.8 What the dream signifies

Lise says, “*Johnny is nie dood nie, ons is*” (“Johnny is not dead; we are”). She thus extends the words from the Koos Kombuis song – not only is Johnny not dead (only passed out) – they are the dead ones.

Some dreams are narrated by a self within the dream; thus, one can speak of first-person homodiegetic narration. The dreamer does not make sense of the dream (in process or retrospectively) as the report of a distinct heterodiegetic narrator. Dreams are fictionalised and experienced subjectively. Thus, dreams are not framed (or manipulated) as the discourse of a specific agent who experiences events. Rather, dreams do not need to be redeemed by a dissociative framework providing for suspension of disbelief. Dreams may be lucid to various degrees and still be dreams that require us to think of fictional narration. This narration is an act of the creative imagination that is directly owned without being conflated with delusion or (self) deception (Walsh, 2010).

Therefore, in her dream, Lise sees herself hanging, lifeless, from the tree, and the dream becomes the ultimate unreal temporality where Lise came to the realisation that she was dead

although alive. Her disillusionment is complex. Through the dream report, especially as she tells Dirk of her dream, she realises the extent of disillusionment. Past expectations created in the 1980s have collapsed and failed to actualise as anticipated. Over the past thirteen years, Lise's life has seemingly "automatically" progressed forward, while she appears to be mentally stuck in the past through nostalgia.

Lise's dream report thus provides her with the insight to unravel the meaning of her dream. In her dream, she experiences loneliness because all her friends are dead, and she is separated from Johnny, who is dead in reality. Since 1989 the group of friends had gone their separate ways, and their relationships have grown apart. She feels disconnected from her friends and also from her husband, Dirk. In her memories, she remembers the happy times and their intertwined lives, which she anticipated would continue into the future. However, in her dream, she is not conflated with delusion and realises the estrangement and loneliness she experiences in the present (2002).

In terms of her relationship in 2002, Lise shifts from positive affect and perception of Dirk as her comfort at the end of the 1980s, to a negative affect and view of Dirk and her situation over time. The idealised version of the partner or situation in the past is compared to the reality of the present, resulting in the anticipation of dread regarding the future. Lise idealised a relationship with Hein (back in the 1980s), projecting this idealised relationship onto Dirk. Her disillusionment may thus refer to a sense of hopelessness that emanates from a disruption of her expectations and idealisation of people and places[30]. However, towards the very end of the film, Lise seems to have made peace with Dirk on a profound level, when she tenderly embraces him. Whether this indeed marks an acceptance or a darker chapter in their lives is left to the imagination of the interpreter.

4.9 En résumé

On a political level, a series of hopes and aspirations in the 1980s created utopias of the future. The disillusionment results from dealing with aspirations of future utopias of freedom and equality that have collapsed. Challenges surrounding social fragmentation, individuality and the uncertainty of the future turn these utopias into disillusionment. As noted in the section on disillusionment (1.3) in the introduction chapter (Chapter One), the problem of having a utopic vision driven by desire and the concomitant imagining of a desirable future is that it is

[30] Through the dialogue Lise infers that she preferred living in Cape Town to Stellenbosch, where they now live in 2002.

an idealised perspective of the future because it anticipates a better life. These anticipations are based on skewed perceptions of both the present and the past. An idealised perspective does not necessarily prepare individuals for possible setbacks on the path to change. There is thus a disjunction between the ideal and the reality as the future actualises (Meaney, 2018:358).

Lise's statement concludes the death of the past as a happy and hopeful time. She infers the death of her nostalgia and the realisation of reality. Lise is disappointed with how life turned out. She perhaps expected that they would all live on happily as friends, seeing each other regularly or perhaps having their children grow up and play together in a socially integrated, equal and open society where the safety of the 1980s prevailed throughout the country to everyone's benefit and issues of social integrations and the scars of the past do not exist.

Much like the examples in the disillusionment section/Chapter One[31], Lise experiences painful revelations and comes to terms with uncomfortable truths that lead to her disillusionment, exploring the subjective perspectives reflecting the complexities of Afrikaner history and politics and the dread of the future. Lise's disillusionment is a negative state of being that emerges from the disruption of her anticipations, which results in dejection, confusion, disappointment and a loss of hope. The viewer is compelled to witness Lise's disillusionment, which is revealed through her dream. Her character looks back at an idealised past in relation to the present "now" and in anticipation of the future. Lise's disillusionment means that she has to acknowledge the truth and come to terms with the deceptive utopia she believed would actualise.

[31] Chen Guofu's *Guozhong nüsheng* (Schoolgirl, 1989) and Cai Mingliang's *Qingsaonian Nuozha* (Rebel of the Neon God, 1992).

Figure 4.28: Lise stares into the camera in the opening scene

4.10 Lise's disillusionment/dream as a process of bereavement

Considering dreaming as a function of disillusionment and time allows for reflecting on this process as one of bereavement and loss. The process of grief entails five stages that a person undergoes when dealing with loss, death or mourning (Tyrrell *et al.*, 2022; Gregory, 2022). These are denial, anger, negotiation, depression and acceptance. Lise's process of disillusionment is, to a degree, a process of bereavement where in the end, she has to accept her reality in order to move on in life. Similarly, both disillusionment and bereavement are painful processes a person has to undergo alone. In Lise's disillusionment, she deals with the death of herself as a metaphor for the loss of her hopes and aspirations for the future.

In the opening of the film, Lise seems to go through the first stage of bereavement, denial. Her expression is *numb* or in *shock* (*confused*) even. She is *shut down* and *avoids* talking to Dirk, *telling* him *she is fine*: "*eks fine, steek die vuur aan"; "eks fine, kry die glase*" ("I'm fine, light the fire"; "I'm fine, get the glasses").

Then, during the barbecue, she seems frustrated, irritable and impatient with Dirk. She resents him and acts passive-aggressively towards him in front of Hein and Anja. She *drinks a lot* at the barbecue and gets extremely drunk. Furthermore, she is *pessimistic* and *sarcastic* in her comments, especially towards Dirk. Lise is clearly *angry*, a question Dirk asks her at the end: "*hoekom is jy so kwaad vir my*?" ("why are you so angry at me?").

Lise's negotiation phase occurs in blurbs when she expresses *guilt*, *shame* and *insecurity*. She *ruminates* on the past and predicts the worst for the future.

Lise is depressed. Besides expressing *sadness* and *hopelessness,* she seems *overwhelmed* by her dream especially. She is *disappointed* in her reality and *consumes more alcohol*. At the beginning of the film, Dirk asks Lise if she should perhaps see the therapist/psychologist again, which suggests not only that she previously saw a psychologist but also that she might be dealing with some sort of emotional issue or *depression*.

Finally, towards the end of the film, Lise *engages with reality* as she *responds* to her disillusionment. She has *accepted* her reality. Although not necessarily perfect or what she has dreamed for, she has come to terms with her reality, albeit sad. Lise perhaps realises she has to *adapt* as she *validates* that *this is good enough*. This is not directly communicated per se but could be inferred through the moment Lise embraces Dirk when he breaks a hole in the wall.

CHAPTER 5: TEMPORALITIES SHAPING THE CHARACTER OF JOHNNY (AND KERKORREL)

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I continue my exploration of time and disillusionment in *Johnny is nie dood nie* by investigating Johnny's persona and narrative, which is told mostly through flashbacks and references to his suicide, the latter haunting Lise's dream in disconcerting ways.

I begin by exploring Johnny's narrative to examine his suicide and the conflation of his suicide with that of Rabie's. The theme of disillusionment is cinematographically manifested in Johnny's death. The conflation of Johnny and Kerkorrel (mostly through Lise's dream) draws a salient parallel between these two characters. I therefore investigate the suicide and possible parallels between Johnny and Kerkorrel related to disillusionment as a function of time.

I conclude by investigating the narratological motivations surrounding Johnny's suicide and how these motivations relate to the cinematographic manifestation of disillusionment through his death. The words of the Kombuis song (from the album *Bloedrivier,* specifically "Johnny is nie dood nie […] net uitgepaas") that I have reiterated during the course of the present study inform the Johnny narrative: he *is* dead, as is Kerkorrel/Rabie, and yet the insurmountability of this reality is, indeed, like a dead weight casting its shadow of disillusionment over the character of Johnny and the parallels with Kerkorrel/Rabie drawn in the film.

5.2 Johnny's story

Figure 5.1: Title screen

In this section, I explore Johnny's narrative to investigate his suicide in the context of the film and also to investigate what the film communicates with Johnny's suicide and the conflation of his suicide with that of Rabie's. Johnny's suicide narrative is not explicitly told but rather revealed through fragmented recollections (subjective memories) of his life in the 1980s and Lise's dream in 2002. His life story is told through flashbacks and the characters' (Lise, Anja, Dirk, Hein) recollections of that time (1987-1989). Johnny's story is told/shown only from 1987 to 1989. He committed suicide on 13 May 1989 and is obviously physically absent during the 2002 barbecue. Paradoxically in terms of the film's title, Johnny is dead.

There is an overlap between the character of Johnny and the actual character of Johannes Kerkorrel (Ralph Rabie's stage persona). The blur between Johnny and Kerkorrel's personas represents a commentary on Rabie's death through Johnny and also brings the actual into the fictional, which results in Kerkorrel's spectre/presence haunting the film. Narratologically this occurs through the conflation of the suicides through Lise's dream and the names Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel (also later known as Johnny K, JK and Johannes). Cinematographically, the overlap is supported by showing Johnny's band (in 1987) and through similarities in the demeanour and style (sunglasses on stage, rebellious clothing that mocked the Afrikaner culture) of Johnny and Kerkorrel.

There are also temporal overlaps created through memory, nostalgia, the present 2002 and dreams. In the film, such overlapping temporalities are: 1) Lise's dream where her subjective memory of the past and the present 2002 merge; 2) Lise's lucid dream where the 1986 PW Botha segment brings the 1980s experiential anxiety and paranoia into the present 2002; 3) Hein's nightmare in 1988 (which I discuss later) overlaps his subjective experience of the past (before the story begins in 1987) over a collective experience of the past (actual footage of the border war) and an anticipated future time where his friends (Johnny, Lise, Anja and Dirk) are all dead; 4) the strange tableau re-enacting the *Eet Kreef* album cover which becomes a temporality exclusive to the discourse time of the film.

Johnny and Kerkorrel's conflated presence and absence dominate the film. The entire film is, in many ways, about coming to grips with the actualised reality and failed expectations in life, and how loss and memory haunt the present and the future. Lise only manages to separate the past and present in order to come to terms with them at the end of the film, thereby entering a final stage of her mourning process. On the other hand, Johnny's acceptance of reality and a dreadful anticipated future result in his suicide.

Johnny's suicide is alluded to early in the film, but only at the climax of the film does the viewer realise how (similar to Kerkorrel – he hanged himself) and when (13 May 1989) Johnny died. Through her dream, Lise entangled and conflated the characters of Johnny and Kerkorrel, merging the two characters "through time". Because Johnny dies in 1989 and Kerkorrel in 2002, the conflation of the characters through the dream, where 1989 and 2002 overlaps, alludes to the question: What about those left behind? The thirteen years between 1989 and 2002 became an "automatic lull" in which Lise lived through the passing of time. For her, it seems as if she was left behind in 1989, while time progressed forward.

Figure 5.2: Johnny – Girls' dormitory 1987

Johnny's story begins in 1987 when he sneaks into Anja's dorm room, where he meets Lise for the first time. It is inferred through the dialogue that Anja and Johnny already know each other. While he sneaks into the female residence, *Snor City* by Bernoldus Niemand plays. It is a song about Pretoria in the 1980s, the political capital of South Africa, and the conformity of the Afrikaner people in the city wearing moustaches - which was associated with Afrikaner dogmas. Bernoldus draws a parallel between the government and conformity as a way to control, using the moustache as an analogy to joke about this conformity: *"ons is op soek vir net een skoon bolip, in Pretoria"* ("We are looking for just one clean upper lip, in Pretoria"), "*dit lyk vir my 'n snor is meer nodig as a tjor, in Pretoria*" ("it seems to me a moustache is more necessary than a jalopy"). This intertextual overlap supports the prevailing compliance (and rebellion among some) in the 1980s and Voëlvry's rebellion against this conformity.

Furthermore, the intertext of the song supports Lise and Anja's conversation about their disliking of the Afrikaner cultural dogmas and conventions underscored by the notion of Afrikaner traditionalism and conformity. The voice-over non-diegetically tells of the first time André Letoit heard the music of Bernoldus Niemand in 1984, which inspired him to create his own Afrikaans songs (Kombuis, 2002). The voice-over implies that these were the first moments of Afrikaans rock and what would turn into the Voëlvry movement.

Johnny climbs through the window into Anja's room, and diegetically plays Anja and Lise, *Die Boksburg Bommer* by Bernoldus Niemand, a song about aggression, rebellion and terrorism. Through the dialogue, we learn that Johnny works in a record shop and wants to be a famous

musician – an Afrikaans rock star, as he feels inspired by the music of Bernoldus (much like André Letoit). Johnny is here associated/paralleled with the Voëlvry movement for the first time. Moreover, by means of diegetic layering of the music and dialogue this instance brings the actual time of the 1980s into the storyworld time as an anchor in reality.

Figure 5.3: Johnny en die Lefties 1987

In 1987, Johnny is in a relationship with Anja, even though he later comes out as gay. They show their rebellious attitudes against conformity by expressing their love by saying "*ek haat jou*" ("I hate you") and "*ek haat jou meer*" ("I hate you more") to each other. Although expressing love and affection, their words convey an intertext (aimed at the government of the 1980s) of hate and revolt. Anja and Johnny are in a band called *Johnny en die Lefties* (*Johnny and the "Left-handed"*), which we see during the 1987 party scene. In this scene, Johnny sings[32]:

[32] The lyrics are set to the music of *Wandellied*. *Wandellied* (strolling song) is a song from the FAK (Federation of Afrikaans Culture Associations) songbook of 1937. Eitemal (Wilhelm Jacobus du Plooy Erlank) wrote the words. Chris Lamprecht reworked the words to the music of "*Lippe Detmold, eine wunderschöne Stadt",* a German folk song.
The lyrics original lyrics are:
As ek moeg word vir die lewe in die stad, lok my die wandelpad; As ek moeg word vir die lewe in die stad, lok my die wandelpad; In die veld pluk ek 'n wandelstaf van die naaste doringboompie af, en sing my wandellied, en sing my wandellied.
(When I grow tired of city life, the walking path lures me; When I grow tired of city life, the walking path lures me; In the field I pluck a walking stick from the nearest thorn tree, and sing my strolling song, and sing my strolling song.)

As ons moeg word vir die fokop van PW, en gatvol raak vir Vlok,
dan roep ons al die kamerades op, om nou die kak te stop.
In die veld pluk ek 'n sweep, en slaan die fokker disnis.
En ons sing ons vryheidslied, en ons sing ons vryheidslied.

If we grow tired for the fuck up that is PW, and sick and tired of Vlok [the minister of law and order, 1986-1991) , then we call all our comrades up to stop this damn shit. Out in the field, I pick a walking stick, and beat that finger-waving prick, and sing our freedom song, and sing our freedom song. (Extracted from the film's English subtitles)

They (Johnny and the group) actively rebel against the NP government through music – a strong correlation to Johannes Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band and, to a larger extent, Voëlvry, as cinematographically supported by the dorm room flashback to 1987, which included non-diegetically and diegetically the music of Bernoldus Niemand and non-diegetically the voice-over's context about André Letoit. The word "*lefties*" in the band name *Johnny en die Lefties* may allude connotatively to the notions of 1) "left" (wing) as an ideological political grouping, which is generally characterised by ideas such as freedom, equality, union, human rights, progress and reform[33] (Heywood, 2015:119; Knapp & Wright, 2001:10; cf. Bobbio, 2016); and 2) interestingly, left-handed people were often viewed as "different" and were discriminated against[34].

33 " Right" (wing) is characterised by ideas such as authority, tradition, order, hierarchy, obligation and nationalism.

34 The word "sinister" comes from Latin meaning "on the left side". In older times, left-handed people were considered evil or bad because most of the population was/is right-handed. In many educational contexts in South Africa during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (ironically also in the Soviet Union), left-handed children were forced to convert to writing with their right hands.

Figure 5.4: Johnny is caught by the security police and spies on his friends (1988)

In 1988, Johnny is caught by the security police having intercourse with a coloured man. Two issues arise from this incident in the context of 1980s South Africa and the 1957 Immorality Act, which was amended in 1969 to the Sexual Offences Act. In addition to proscribing relationships between races, this law prohibited men from engaging in sexual intercourse with other men and also in any erotic conduct when there were more than two people present, which was deemed as “unnatural sexual offences”. Accordingly, the NP enforced an approach where a legal relationship was classified between a man and a woman, and sexual intercourse was only allowed in wedlock (Naik, 2021). Homosexuality was a crime punishable by up to seven years in prison (Naik, 2021). Public displays of affection by same-sex couples were considered offensive, and homosexuals were frequently pressured and coerced by the (security) police.

In Johnny’s case, the government gives him three options: imprisonment, military service, and being an informant for the security police (or leaving the country, an option Hein gives him). He chooses to be an informant, creating inner conflict between his loyalty towards his friends, especially Hein, who is involved with the ECC (End Conscription Campaign), and

his fear of “incarceration” in either prison or the military and war (I discuss this notion further in the next section on the suicide). Anja reveals this fact (to Hein) about Johnny in 2002 toward the end of the barbecue.

Johnny’s choice to be an informant is his attempt to preserve the freedom of the group and, to a degree, himself. He reasons that this is the best option that will “protect” their aspirations and expectations of a better future and the “good times” they are having in the 1980s as rebellious students. In 2002 Hein says: “*wat ook maar net daar was vir die jol”* (“that was only there for the party”). Johnny hides the fact from his friends that he is a spy for the security police in an attempt to preserve the group's ideals and anticipations of a better (perhaps utopian) future. Either one of the other options (imprisonment, military service or escaping the country) would remove him from his friends and relationships, which would arguably result in greater personal pain. Johnny has to choose between the semblance of preserving their present time (in 1988) and the anticipation of a better future or dealing and coming to terms with reality, which entails the painful process of disillusionment. Johnny is hoping against hope that his decision to spy on his friends will inflict the least amount of disruption to their lives.

He seems to be projecting a sort of “present nostalgia” onto their 1980s present time, rendering their present in the 1980s a “utopia” where life is felt to be good. This notion is narratologically supported by Lise’s nostalgia. He is, however, living a lie – thinking (or hoping) that his choice to spy as a way to preserve the group is sustainable. However, inner turmoil intensifies as he grapples with betraying his friends, especially Hein, whom he loves and has a relationship with, as inferred by their kiss (and second kiss later before Voëlvry).

Figure 5.5: Johnny's birthday in 1988

In an interesting turn of events, Hein kisses Johnny after his birthday in 1988, while Lise watches through a window (this thread is not explored further in the film, but suggests the complex layers of relationships among characters). During this time, Johnny started to change his mind about his conscription: not wanting to spy on his friends anymore, and instead decides to join the SANDF, which he anticipates with dread. This is mostly due to witnessing Hein's struggles from going to war, and because Hein constantly tells Johnny that he would not be able to bear it and that going to the army would impose extreme trauma on him.

Figure 5.6: Hein's dream (1988)

In 1988, Hein has a nightmare about the border war. This nightmare is cinematographically presented with (actual) images of the border war superimposed over Hein as he wakes up and finds all of his friends shot *dead* in the student house. Hein's dream in 1988 anticipates and resonates with Lise's dream in 2002, where she also dreams that everyone has died. His dream is not cinematographically presented fragmented but as a whole before the entirety of Lise's dream is shown or pieced together. Hein's dream reveals his inner struggle and trauma from his time in the war, predating the beginning of the storyworld time (in 1987). As with Lise's dream, Hein's dream is also predicated on the memory of his experience, which subjectively influences his perception of the 1980s as a painful and dejected time. He also remembers the 1980s in this way in 2002. The images (actual footage) of the border war superimposed over the visual of Hein searching for his friends cinematographically supports the notion that Hein's dream is based on memory. However, the footage of the border war also brings a collective memory of that time into the story world.

Collectively, many Afrikaners remember the time their husbands, sons and brothers went to war and how it was a miserable experience for many; for some, it seems to be an honour and duty to be fulfilled. There is thus an overlap of the subjective past experience (subjective memory), a collective (more "objective") past memory and an anticipated future of a "deathly" life, disconnected and without meaning, that all align to convey disillusionment as a function of time through juxtaposed past and present or present and future.

Hein's nightmare is supported by Lise's 2002 lucid dream (the PW Botha 1986 *state of emergency* segment) and the non-diegetic voice-over that conveys the 1980s as a time of confusion, struggle and pain. His nightmare is the cinematographic manifestation of his disillusionment with conscription and the border war (Hein to Johnny: "*… en toe ek weer sien, sit ek in 'n Buffel (military vehicle) met 'n R1 en skiet op mense wat ek nie kan sien nie, in 'n oorlog wat ek nie verstaan nie. Ek gaan nie dat hulle jou ook opfok nie* "; "and then, I was sitting in a Buffalo with an R1 and shooting at people I couldn't see, in a war I didn't understand.

I'm not going to let them fuck you up either"). Through Hein, Johnny experiences the same disillusionment with the war and the situation inside the country.

Figure 5.7: Hein and Johnny before Voëlvry (1989)

Before the Voëlvry concert in 1989, Hein and Johnny discussed going to Amsterdam. At this point, Johnny has been conscripted. It is inferred (and later confirmed by Anja's account of the story to Hein) that he decided to stop spying on his friends and join the army instead. However, he defiantly abandoned the military in 1989 (presumably only being there for a few months) to attend the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch with his friends. This is an irreversible moment as the only other alternatives for Johnny remain to flee the country or stay and go to prison for defying authority and abandoning his duty to his country.

Figure 5.8: Johnny, Voëlvry 1989

Johnny admits to Hein that he "did something bad" ("*ek't kak aan gejaag bra*"), referring to his informant activities, but never tells Hein exactly what because Hein interrupts him hyped up about Voëlvry, "*vergeet nou daarvan bra, dis Voëlvry*!" ("forget about it, man, it's Voëlvry!"). Johnny admits his love for Hein before Hein joins the concert, leaving Johnny to contemplate for a brief moment. This moment narratologically supports the notion that Johnny is contemplating his fate and his decision to take his own life after the Voëlvry concert. In 2002 Hein admits to Anja that he found out about Johnny's informant activities shortly after his death. In the background, an actual recording of Johannes Kerkorrel talking to the crowd at the Voëlvry concert at Stellenbosch plays. Johnny walks along the train tracks towards the concert to join his friends. While the music diegetically plays at the concert, the scene cuts to the tableau where the five characters re-enact the *Eet Kreef!* album cover (more on this below) while Kerkorrel sings: "*gee my meer, meer, meer, meer; gee my meer, meer, meer, meer*" ("give me more, more, more, more; give me more, more, more, more"). This instance creates an ontological overlap between Johnny, Johannes Kerkorrel, the *Eet Kreef* tableau and, to an extent, the events and personae of Lise's dream.

Kerkorrel is, significantly, an unseen "presence" and thus a character in the story. An unseen character in a film (or literature) is a character that is not directly shown to the viewer but mentioned, referred to or inferred (Mahfouz, 2012). Such an unseen character may advance the action of the story in a significant way through their absence (Gray, 1914). Unseen characters are either offstage characters (off-screen in filmic terms) that occupy space beyond the *visible* storyworld, such as the unseen characters of Johannes Kerkorrel, André Le Toit and Bernoldus Niemand in *Johnny is nie dood nie*, or invisible characters that act unseen within the storyworld spaces, like the character Debbie (Howard Wolowitz's mother) in the television series *The Big Bang Theory*, who is often heard or inferred in the same space the characters occupy but never seen.

The ontological overlap this moment creates draws a further connotative parallel between Kerkorrel and Johnny through the transition from Johnny to the tableau while Kerkorrel sings. Kerkorrel's voice is diegetically inferred because although the concert is not shown, it is diegetically heard. Nevertheless, because Kerkorrel is an unseen off-screen character in the story, his voice is non-diegetic, cinematographically supported by the cut to the tableau. However, Voëlvry's music and Kerkorrel's voice bleed through from non-diegetic to diegetic at various instances throughout the film, cinematographically supporting this notion of unseen off-screen characters. The transitions from diegetic to non-diegetic sound (and vice versa) bring the characters of Voëlvry into the filmic storyworld as off-screen characters who influence the story and its characters. These transitions and the role of Voëlvry's music, in

general, support the discourse time of the film through *order*, *duration* and *frequency*. *Ordering* of specific moments, lyrics and emotions related to Voëlvry's music manipulates (through intertextual references) the unfolding of the story – narrative time manipulated by discourse time. The music subjectively influences the perceived *duration* of events by emotionally charging memories and the characters' perceptions of reality. The *frequency* of the music correlates with the flashbacks (memories), which cinematographically supports the emotional subjectivity of these flashbacks.



Figure 5.9: Eet Kreef (1986), front and back covers

Also, this instance (the cut to the tableau) may have been Johnny's (1989) dream and, in that case, an overlap between Johnny's and Lise's dreams as it might also be one of Lise's dreams motivated by the cinematic cut to the next scene where Lise stares into the camera (alone at the table during the 2002 barbecue). The original *Eet Kreef* album cover depicts a scene where five characters, who represent the political and social elite of Afrikaner society in the 1980s, feast on crayfish, an ironically grisly scene. The back of the album cover depicts Kerkorrel and the band, after the feast, looking at the aftermath, where everything is eaten and empty. The juxtaposition of the front and back metaphorically conveys that "the crayfish" (wealth) in the country are not distributed evenly among all people of South Africa. While some have everything (wealth, privilege, social status), others have nothing, not even a voice.

Figure 5.10: Eet Kreef! Tableau

Figure 5.11: Lise stares into the camera (2002) after the tableau

In the re-enacted tableau, the film's characters replace the five feasting characters and not Kerkorrel and the band who witness the aftermath (at the back). Anja, Johnny, Lise, Hein and Dirk feast on crayfish at the table. However, they express dejection and unhappiness in this scene. The tableau expresses their privilege and guilt as white South Africans in the 1980s while also anticipating the future guilt, gloominess and privilege of Lise, Dirk, Anja and Hein in 2002. Furthermore, the tableau expresses the group's disillusionment in the 1980s – their

realisation that they are privileged but also exhausted and frustrated with the system. In 2002, their disillusionment emanates from the realisation that expressing themselves as Afrikaners without being associated with the Afrikaner dogmas and conventions of the 1980s did not actualise the change they hoped for. Through the tableau, the 1980s and 2002 present overlap, supporting cinematographically the theme of disillusionment by alluding to disillusionment as *lost time* – an anticipated future that never happens. Instead of witnessing the aftermath, the characters now eat at the table. The film suggests that Kerkorrel and the band got their "time" to eat crayfish at the table, but it came at a cost – a pressing guilt because the crayfish is still not equally divided among all the people of South Africa.

Figure 5.12: Johnny walking into the distance (1989)

On the morning of 13 May 1989, the five friends returned from the Voëlvry concert they attended the previous night. High on the energy of anarchy, they stop next to a lake and take a swim. While Lise, Anja, Hein and Dirk still swim, Johnny walks off into the forest, where he hangs himself. Later, Lise discovers his body, which is inferred/revealed through Lise's dream in 2002.

5.3 The suicide

Johnny's suicide is the cinematographical manifestation of the theme of disillusionment in the film. His realisation of a hopeless future gave rise to his suicide. He realises that none of the options before him (imprisonment, military service, spying or fleeing the country) would result in a contented future for him. He takes his own life on 13 May 1989, the morning after the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch, by hanging himself from a tree in a forest near the river lake where his friends Lise, Anja, Dirk and Hein are still swimming.

Psychologists have identified a number of common elements that are often present in suicide cases. Some of the most prominent characteristics is a lack of social or interpersonal connections to the extent that people perceive themselves as unwanted or even a burden on others (Chu *et al.*, 2015; Galynker *et al.*, 2018; Van Orden *et al.*, 2010)[35]. Psychologist Thomas Joiner (2002) uses the term "perceived burdensomeness" to describe the sense of being a burden on others. The mediate cause of suicide might be the disruption of a social relationship, a loss of a job, financial distress, or some humiliation. However, generally, these are associated with a loss of connectedness as well (Van Orden *et al.*, 2010).

Johnny is part of a group that accepts him. His *perceived burdensomeness* may be because of his informant activities, spying on his friends. His guilt may be what causes a loss of connection (perceived burdensomeness); perhaps he feels ashamed and embarrassed (humiliated) for spying on his friends, causing a disruption of his social relationships (he has a fight with Anja in 1988; he disappeared for a week), and an internal conflict (wrestling between loyalty to his friends and ideologies and betrayal of his principles and friends to avoid punishment). He pretends everything is fine while the guilt of his betrayal consumes him over time. This notion of passing time is narratologically supported by telling Johnny's suicide narrative through Lise's 2002 dream. The long *duration* from his actual death (in 1989) to the telling of his death (in 2002) accentuates time's function in guilt and disillusionment. Johnny's pretence is cinematographically supported by *not* showing his suicide or talking about it directly but revealing the suicide information indirectly through Lise's dream in 2002, where she conflates Johnny's and Kerkorrel's suicide narratives. Through this conflation and the parallel with Kerkorrel's suicide, Johnny's death is highlighted in 2002 as a way to signify Lise's disillusionment and also the lost time of their future anticipations. The thirteen years between

[35] Research by Megan Rogers (2017), Thomas Joiner (2002), and Igor Galynker (2018) on the suicide crisis indicates that what happens immediately before a person attempts suicide. In these immediate psychological states that people have before a suicide attempt, common things occur such as agitation, insomnia, irritability, a sense of entrapment, and humiliation.

1989 and 2002 are lost time for Johnny but also lost time for Lise, Dirk, Anja and Hein as Lise's dream reveals through her disillusionment the deathly life they have been living.

According to Joiner (2002), suicide is in brief made possible by 1) a desire to die and 2) the capability to kill oneself. The desire to die is usually associated with disillusionment belongingness, not being part of a valued social group or perceived burdensomeness. Although, in the case of Johnny, he does belong to a social group that values him, thus his disillusioned belongingness may be related to his place as a gay Afrikaner man in the 1980s society. The film comments here on Kerkorrel's possible disillusioned belongingness as a gay Afrikaner (although not openly during the 1980s) protest musician through suggesting a parallel between Johnny and Kerkorrel. Much of who Kerkorrel was (in terms of identity) and stood for (political and societal commentary through his music) was prohibited, banned and prosecuted by the NP state. Johannes Kerkorrel was harassed, pressured and bullied by the government and, therefore, may have experienced disillusioned belongingness during the 1980s. After the political transition of the country, Kerkorrel may have continued to experience disillusioned belongingness as he is now rejected by his Voëlvry fans because he is making music for the general Afrikanerdom. Lise says at the 2002 barbecue: "*Kerkorrel se laaste konserte was sad. Fok, al die selfone en Chardonnay, en tannies met pêrel oorbelle, en daar parade my hero soos 'n fokken sirkusdier voor die suburbs"* ("Kerkorrel's last concerts were sad. Fuck, all the cell phones and Chardonnay, and ladies with pearl earrings, and there my hero parades like a fucking circus animal in front of the suburbs"). These shows were in stark contrast to his highly energetic and provocative performances during the 1980s. The film alludes to Kerkorrel losing his purpose as social activist, performing for money as a way to make a living through music. Although he attempted to retain his rebellious and provocative nature after Voëlvry, he was instead labelled as eccentric or strange.

Secondly, for suicide to take place is the acquired capability, which means a person has overcome the normal orientation and inhibitions against self-harm. People have naturally strong self-preservation instincts. When a person has adapted to pain and suffering and loses their fear of death, they can overcome their self-preservation instincts, which may lead to suicide (Chu *et al.*, 2015; Galynker *et al.*, 2018). Johnny is disillusioned, realising the truth by experiencing first-hand the state's oppression and control as he is captured and coerced. Again, in the case of Johnny, this may be through guilt and the pain he feels through the guilt. Also, the notion that he has become accustomed to the pain around him in the context of 1980s South Africa – conscription and war, the internal conflicts and the police violence in the townships. There is a traumatic impact from living in 1980s South Africa and realising the truth that things are far from the pretentious perfect. At this moment, his freedom and free will are

taken away by the authoritarian system. Johnny feels distressed, pressured, humiliated and disillusioned by the realities of life under a despotic regime. He is undergoing a painful and traumatic experience related to belongingness and freedom.

Furthermore, knowing someone who has died from suicide may increase a person's risk of dying from suicide himself (Van Orden *et al.*, 2010; cf. Krause *et al.*, 2007). This concept is associated with social network theory which states that many of our traits are similar to those close to us (up to three degrees of separation) (Hansen, 2009; Krause *et al.*, 2007). Psychologists refer to this as a cluster effect (Liu *et al.*, 2017; cf. Chu *et al.*, 2015; also see Hansen, 2009). This notion could relate to Rabie's suicide, bearing in mind that Rabie himself also lost one of his close friends (Carel Steenkamp) through suicide (this is related in Koos Prinsloo's *Slagplaas*, 1992). Rabie committed suicide in a similar way to that of his friend.

Although Johnny's character alludes to Kerkorrel (to reiterate, from the sunglasses he wears when he performs, the band and music, the similarities in their suicides, the name "Johnny", and his sexual orientation), Johnny is a fictional character. Johnny is thus bound by the storyworld parameters. Furthermore, not much "backstory" is given about him, and thus, we cannot determine Johnny's suicide cause through psychoanalysis, which examines a multitude of variables to establish a possible suicide cause. Even then, the exact cause may never be known, as the only person who could explain their action is the suicide victim. Although psychology can provide some basic insights, Johnny's suicide must, therefore, be interpreted through a narratological lens. Also, we complete Johnny as Johannes Kerkorrel through Kerkorrel's story (overlap). The viewer fills the "gaps" with contextual knowledge of Johannes Kerkorrel.

5.4 Suicide, disillusionment and tragic narratives

Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel were both tragic characters who lived under external pressures that influenced their inner states. Both voice their anger and frustration against the system, however, they are bullied by the system and forced into uncomfortable situations. Johannes Kerkorrel was fictionalised through Johnny in the film. Likewise, Johnny was made more "real" through Johannes Kerkorrel. Time overlaps between memory and actuality in that subjective memory are overlaid with "objective" reality. This instance cinematographically mimics human time as a complex network of projections that amalgamate existential and cosmological time. It is a moment revealed through the discourse time of the film, which manifests through an interplay between the functionaries of *order*, *duration*, and *frequency*. Johnny's suicide is a narratological manifestation of the disillusionment of lost time, time that can never be regained. His suicide is tragic, because he had future aspirations and dreams in

the 1980s (freedom and one day to be a famous musician) that would never actualise. Furthermore, Johnny's suicide foregrounds the tragic death of Johannes Kerkorrel (Ralph Rabie).

Freud ((1920) 2014:33) contends that the "organism wishes to die in its own fashion". The relevance here is that Freud suggests that humans do not want an end imposed by others "from without" but that we want to die "for internal reasons". In other words, we do not wish to die through accident or external intent (murderous or otherwise). Instead, we wish to die "naturally" when we are ready to or choose to die (Faber, 1970). Thus, humans are ready for death when they have given enough expression to their being and can no longer grow (Slochower, 1975; also see Sanderson, 1992; cf. Velasco, 2022). Goethe said (Falk: Jan. 25, 1813) that to die one's "own" death makes for an independent end (in Slochower, 1975). Johnny's suicide is motivated by an inner state of being related to freedom, disillusionment and hopeless anticipation of the future relevant to the context of the film. Narratologically, his decision to desert the military to join his friends for the Voëlvry concert in Stellenbosch supports this motivation. His decision is cinematographically supported when he takes off his army jacket before the concert. Johnny chooses his death and the time and conditions of his death. Humans are a species which knows that death is inevitable, making it possible to plan consciously the taking of one's own life.

Psychoanalyst K. R. Eissler (1955:66) writes that "when actively performed, suicide becomes a triumph as if the ego had proved itself to be almighty when it is strong enough to cast its life aside (…), (and) preserves the illusion of independence". Instead of submissively suffering a "deadly" type of life, suicide feels that at least the decision of how and when to die is now exercised in autonomy. Therefore in the narratological context, suicide may be a rebellion against death, an act of defiance. Johnny is defying death, choosing to die his "own" death. Johnny, disillusioned, is anticipating a dreaded future and so rather chooses to die than live a life of hopelessness. Instead of military service and possible death in warfare or imprisonment and the possible psychological death of disconnectedness or the future and a life of dread and hopelessness, Johnny decides to take his own life. Johnny's suicide is also a defiance of the system that wants to use him to drive its agenda. War, prison or spy – for Johnny, all of these seem to be some form of incarceration, which anticipates a dreadful and hopeless future for him. Even the idea of fleeing the country and being separated from his friends is too much to bear for Johnny.

Suicide is often condemned as an expression of weakness and, from a Marxist perspective, an anti-revolutionary act (Slochower, 1975; c.f. also Sanderson, 1992; also see Wasiolek, 1971). The National Party and PW Botha's "fight against communism" constitute an intertext

in the film. However, often in stories, characters who commit suicide may grapple with the tension between affirming their integrity and compromising their ideals. For example, in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, where the characters die rather than compromise their ideal of freedom. Johnny is defying the authorities, refusing to continue spying on his friends or go to prison or to war or to further live by the system's authority. He refuses to compromise his ideals of freedom, friendship and inequality.

Slochower (1975) draws parallels between the tragic hero and the suicidal character. The tragic hero confronts superior powers knowing that he will go down in defeat (Faber, 1970; cf. also Velasco, 2022). The hero's downfall is depicted as having an inner need that stems from the hero's deepest inner states.

In Goethe's *The Sorrows of Werther* (1822), young Werther reflects the life of an individual who must adapt himself and his intrinsic and intuitive sense of freedom to the tedious restrictions of an unfashionable world. Overcome by images of inertia, meaninglessness, and separation from the larger currents of life, humans are most capable of wishing for death when they feel themselves emblematically dying (Joiner *et al.*, 2002; Hansen, 2009; Lifton, 1971; Van Orden *et al.*, 2010; Eissler, 1955; Galynker *et al.*, 2018). Young Werther rejects adapting his freedom and the world's imposed restrictions, and so commits suicide. His suicide is a manifestation of his disillusionment where he refuses to accept an imposed anticipated dreadful future of "imprisonment".

This notion aligns with the anger of youth rebellion, which fluctuates between exhaustion and rage (Rosen, 1972; also see Lifton, 1971). In anguish over the pointlessness of stopping the forward motion that fuels their anger, they turn to defiance. And, when they feel that defiance is also pointless, they burn themselves in preference to being burned. Johnny (and his friends) rebelled against the system through music (and Hein through the ECC). However, Johnny is captured and coerced by the security police, and thus Johnny realises his rebellion is futile. And thus he turns to defiance, firstly by stopping spying on his friends (and joining the army), and secondly by then deserting the army. This moment is irreversible because the government will find him and punish him for his defiance. Hein promises to help Johnny flee the country, but Johnny would rather burn himself than give up the fight and defiance against the controlling and oppressive system. Johnny would rather die than live a "deadly" life where he sacrifices his ideals.

In 1987, Lise has to present a seminar on Neo-Marxism, which Hein helped her with. Here, Abby Hoffman, one of Herbert Marcuse's students, is mentioned as having had a major influence on the Hippy Movement. Herbert Marcuse (in Rosen, 1972:90, 96) points out that

the youth revolts of the 1970s have a moral basis not generated by poverty and misery alone but rather by the greater *expectations* of better living conditions. He distinguishes between "a violence of suppression and a violence of liberation" and speaks of "socially useful aggression".

In 1980s South Africa, the violent struggles for liberation stemmed from the violence of state suppression. The aggression of the suppressed became a useful instrument in the fight for freedom, as it brought disillusioned individuals together, such as in the case of Voëlvry.

Emile Dürkheim ("Le Suicide", Paris: F. Alcan, 1930) distinguishes between "altruistic" suicide, which is carried out for the group, from "anomic" suicide, carried out against the group (in Slochower, 1975). For example, when people burn themselves as a statement for a cause versus when someone kills themselves as an act of defiance or terrorism. In Johnny's case, his suicide is significant as a personal act of deviance and suicide for the group regarding their future expectations. This means that Johnny's death (as interpreted by Lise's dream) signifies that their future hopes died that day with Johnny in 1989. Johnny's death is a statement against the system as an oppressive regime that kills the future (hopes and dreams of its people).

In this context, suicide is described as the great refusal to say "yes" to an existence which is a living death for the soul (Velasco, 2022). Suicide is also a reflexive act in a narrative context. It exhibits the contradiction in which the primaeval drive "to be" is overcome by a similarly primaeval drive "not to be" (Slochower, 1975; cf. also Sanderson, 1992; also see Eissler, 1955). Suicide is a rejection of the cards dealt. However, there is no second round. The "why" of suicide can never be communicated by the person who kills himself[36]. Suicide contains a mystery which we can never fully understand. This mystery consumes Lise and becomes symbolic through her dream. Although suicide can be an act of surrender, it can also be an act of final defiance.

In *Johnny is nie dood nie* time and disillusionment are expressed through Lise's dream and Johnny's suicide. Lise's disillusionment, which is cinematographically supported by her dream, results in her acceptance of reality in 2002. Johnny's disillusionment (in 1989) results in his refusal to accept an anticipated dreadful future, which is narratologically supported by his suicide. The film expresses, through the discourse time, a manipulated subjective experience of time that juxtaposes the past, present and anticipated future, by intercutting various

[36] This may of course be partially attempted through a suicide note

temporalities (story time memory, story time reality, actual “real-world” context, story time future anticipation, virtual dream temporalities) to convey disillusionment as a function of time.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

This study investigated how temporalities, on various levels, work to construct the theme of disillusionment in the film *Johnny is nie dood nie*. I structure this chapter by reflecting on the problem statement and research questions presented in Chapter One and exploring the ways in which I answered each. I conclude by reflecting on insights gleaned throughout the course of the study and, finally, I offer suggestions for future research.

Problem statement

This study is concerned with how temporal suggestions and strategies (objective, but mostly existential) function to construct the theme of disillusionment in Johnny is nie dood nie.

The following research questions direct the aim of the study:

1. How are time and temporalities – philosophically, narratologically and cinematographically speaking – conceptualised by the literature in the field, and how are these relatable to one another? *I answer this question through a literature study to demonstrate existential, subjective notions of time foregrounded.*

2. In which ways does the Voëlvry movement echo disillusionment through temporalities made manifest in different dimensions of the film? *I answer this by investigating the characters Lise and Johnny and specifically focusing on Lise's dream(s) and Johnny's suicide narrative with a view to exploring the ways in which both dream and suicide are predicated on complex imaginings, memories and shattered hopes, as these are predicated on subjective experiences of time and temporalities.*

3. How do temporalities related to the film speak to this experience of disillusionment? *I explore the role of temporalities (in philosophical, narratological and cinematographic terms) in the film as functions of the portrayal of disillusionment in order to demonstrate how the film represents a complex play of temporally driven storytelling interwoven with real-life material also to reflect broader anxieties in South Africa*.

I address these with reference to the research questions and emanating objectives.

6.2 How are time and temporalities – philosophically, narratologically and cinematographically speaking – conceptualised in the literature in the field, and how are these relatable to one another?

I explored how the literature philosophically, narratologically and cinematographically conceptualises time and temporalities and how these relate to one another in Chapter Three. Through the literature study, I demonstrated that the existential and subjective notions of time tend to be foregrounded in narratives to portray the subjective experience of time from a character's perspective rather than an objective observation of the measurement or passing of time (from a viewing/reading perspective). In a narrative/story, the passing of time carries significance related to the inner lives of characters and also as regards salient thematic concerns of a story.

Time is observable and measurable as cosmological, but more significantly for the present study, also existential and subjectively experienced. Rovelli (2018:66) describes time as projections of the past, present and future, which may infer a series of "nows" (to use Heidegger's terminology) controlled by the conscious mind (comp. Heidegger, 1996:424; Ricœur, 2012:12; Rovelli *et al.*, 2018:52–54; Tsao *et al.*, 2018:57). These are subjective processes as we go "back in time" to reassemble the past and interpret information and "forward in time" to anticipate the future as part of a timeline or sequence of events (Coëgnarts & Kravanja, 2012:86–87). Similarly, we also interpret the duration of events subjectively as long or short, depending on our existential interpretation of time passing in that moment (Augustine, 1960:136, 255; Holford-Strevens, 2005:109). This is a subjective process that entails the functions of expectation, attention and memory – the expectation of the future, attention to the present, and memory of the past.

Narratologists conceptualise time according to categories related to the *time of making*, the *time of the storyworld* (the time narrated) and the *time of reading (or viewing)* (Bal, 2019:142). Genette (1980, 1990) suggests three temporalities or temporal levels, *storytime, narrating time* and *discourse time*, which are present in all narratives (including films). In terms of narratives, subjective, existential time is salient because this is how characters experience time in the story, which influences how and why they react and act the way they do in certain circumstances.

Genette (1980, 1990) further proposes a temporal model consisting of the concepts of *order, duration* and *frequency* as the structuring principles of how time is narrated. These principles structure filmic narrative simultaneously on narratological (memories, attention, expectations, duration of events, importance of events) and technical levels (cinematography and editing:

flashbacks, flashforwards, duration of shots and linkage within the scene, repetition of shots or scenes, and the like). I adapted Genette's structuring principles by positioning them under discourse time as functionaries that manipulate the telling of subjective, *existential time.*

I relate this notion of subjective, existential time to Deleuze's (1986) time-image, which argues for the subjective perspective of time in filmic narratives. The representation of time in cinematic stories as subjective and experiential are foregrounded because it relates to characters' experiences of time rather than their observation of time. The foregrounding of experience over observation creates stronger relatability to the characters and what they are going through.

Cinema narrates time through techniques such as flashbacks (memories), reflections and dreams, which portray existential time in order to gain insight into thematic concerns of the film, as well as an understanding of the inner lives of characters. The communication of subjective existential time is achieved by means of *discourse time*, which is manipulated cinematically by *order*, *duration* and *frequency*.

6.3 In which ways does the Voëlvry movement echo disillusionment through temporalities made manifest in different dimensions of the film?

Context on Voëlvry and Johannes Kerkorrel provided a reflection on complex real and fictional overlaps in the film's narrative in order to relate contextual matters to experiences of disillusionment. Disillusionment is predicated on the temporal aspect of disappointed (past) hopes and/or the disintegration of future aspirations. Crucially, disillusionment is felt in the present, but is tied to the past and future with individual and collective memories and anticipations. To demonstrate how the film *Johnny is nie dood nie* constructs the theme of disillusionment, I first explored temporalities embedded and narrated in Lise's dream, and how these temporalities have a bearing on the main narrative. The dream is regarded as central to the thematic thrust of the film.

Dreams are "ultimate" subjective temporalities capable of conflation, merging, abstracting and adaptability – recurring until "solved". The dream is a temporality where Lise conflates the suicide narratives of Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel/Ralph Rabie and experiences a conflation of the past, present and imagined to express (cinematographically) the painful experience of disillusionment. Dreams may also be intrusive, sometimes forcing the characters to confront realities that they want to avoid. Therefore, dreams may communicate ideas in abstract ways based on the same resource pool of imagery as memory. In this sense,

the dream is tailored subjectively to the dreamer based on the mental and internal processes they are working through. Dreams give insight into the character's inner states. Disillusionment is an internal process and, thus, an inner state. Lise's dream is utterly undesired and thus intrusive and deeply upsetting to her, but it does provide her with a space for reflecting on how she imagined the past, makes peace with the present (it appears towards the end of the film) and leaves open expectations of the future.

Lise's dream takes place in the context of her present (2002) disillusionment with herself and her life. Her dream is an ontological overlap and conflation between temporalities of the past, present and anticipated future, but also the conflation of the characters of Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel. This conflation is a function of the subjective mind where the memories of the past (which are subjective), the contexts and circumstances of the present (which are subjectively interpreted in the now) and the anticipation of the future (which is also subjective in its projection) overlap within the internal logic of the dream narrative. This dream narrative is subjectively tailored to the dreamer as a means of inner reflection.

Hein's nightmare, as another instance of a dream, occurs during the 1980s and foregrounds the effects of conscription on the mind of a young soldier who is disillusioned. The superimposed real footage of war highlights the effects of PTSD as a constant replay or "reliving of trauma" as an experience that haunts a person and greatly influences their inner life (psychology) as well as their interpersonal relationships and social interactions. Hein's disillusionment is felt through his nightmare when he shockingly discovers that all his friends are dead. This moment shows his dreadful anticipation of a dejected future. This is another instance of a dream in the film that demonstrates very different processing of life situations, even though both dreams are predicated on the experience of disillusionment.

The tableau, on the other hand, although dreamlike, takes place in "reality" in the film, not as a dream. It presents a very bizarre mise-en-scène that alludes to Voëlvry's album cover of the album *Eet Kreef* (1989) – thus cementing the ontological overlap between the film's characters and the context and individuals of Voëlvry. Indeed, the non-diegetic voice-over notes at the beginning of the film that they (the group of friends) were supporters of Voëlvry. The tableau highlights the theme of disillusionment as a parallel between the characters and Voëlvry.

The members of Voëlvry dealt with their disillusionment during the 1980s in a fairly similar manner, namely through music that spoke of their rebellion. Years later, as individuals, they took different paths. André Letoit becomes Koos Kombuis, and Bernoldus Niemand went back to being James Phillips, but Johannes Kerkorrel struggled to shake his persona – although he attempted to with new *noms de plumes* such as Johnny K, Johannes and JK. These names

all still reflect and reverberate what the public knew as Johannes Kerkorrel; indeed, people still refer to Kerkorrel when speaking of Rabie.

***

In Lise's dream, a conflation between Rabie as Kerkorrel and the filmic character of Johnny brings Johannes Kerkorrel into the story as an absent character looming over the film. The unseen character of Kerkorrel supports the theme of disillusionment narratologically by anchoring this theme to contextual realities, especially his suicide. Suicide in narratives serves as a metaphor for self-determination, a self-assertive act of defiance: "*'n groot vet middelvinger vir PW Botha se regering*"; "a big fuck you to PW Botha's regime" (non-diegetic voice-over at the beginning of the film).

Johnny's suicide and his character as tragic foreground 1) the painful disillusionment of a group of young Afrikaners during the 1980s and 2) allude to Kerkorrel as a tragic character, one who is overlooked and forgotten, through the notion of suicide in a narrative as an act of defiance (and that Kerkorrel's suicide was an act of self-determined defiance against being boxed in and perhaps overlooked as victorious against the fight against the NP system and Afrikanerdom in the 1980s). Narratologically, this is supported by Lise's comment about Kerkorrel's last concerts – it seems like people forgot his revolt – now he performs to the people who supported what he stood against.

6.4 How do temporalities related to the film speak to this experience of disillusionment?

Disillusionment is a time-related phenomenon. One must have a projected future expectation or anticipation of something as good or better that can collapse or fail, and this infers the passing of time. Thus, only through the passing of time can disillusionment be manifest. Augustine (2002:255; cf. also Carter, 2011:311) reminds us that duration is the measurement of time, implying cosmological, "objective" clock-time, but also relating to memory and anticipation regarding duration felt instead of duration measured (cf. Augustine's recital, Chapter Three, section 3.1.2). Duration is the measurement of time passing, making a concept such as disillusionment assessable.

Lise's disillusionment is extremely painful because of the long duration (thirteen years) that has passed before she comes to the realisation of the falseness or lies she has told herself and terms with her reality. She asks the inward question: was it all futile? In the past (1987-

1989), her future expectations were projected long into the future. The long duration makes the experience more painful – as she realises she has *lost time*, more than a decade spent living a lie, not living her actualised past expectations. However, the duration of time passing (thirteen years) in the experience (and manifestation) of disillusionment is furthermore layered with the subjective experience of time and the excruciating process of disillusionment.

The theoretical framework of this study informs this interpretation by foregrounding time as a subjective, existential and experiential notion of the human experience. Through Genette's narrative temporalities (*story time*, *narrating time*, and *discourse time*), I explored the notion of subjective time in narratives, from where I could argue that *discourse time* is the manipulated subjective temporality in narratives. I related Genette's structuring principles of *order*, *duration* and *frequency* to discourse time as the narrative functionaries that shape the discourse time of the story.

To promote subjective time, cinema manipulates the order of events through devices such as flashbacks (memories) that juxtapose the past and present, showing how an instance or event from the past influences the present *now* of the character(s). The *duration* spent on these memories, as well as the way these moments are presented as long ago, anxious yet happy and free, points to the characters' subjective existential experience of time. Also, the *frequency* at which events (such as Lise's dream) are iterated, highlighting their importance to the story, also conveys subjectivity as these repetitions drive similarity and difference. Through these functions, the discourse time becomes *thickened*, "sticky" (Bal's [1991, 2017] term) – it is thus emotionally charged, malleable, and impacting the unfolding of the story. Also, discourse time foregrounds characters' subjective experience of time in the storyworld rather than foregrounding an objective observation of time (the story time).

Although all the central characters (Lise, Johnny, Anja, Dirk and Hein) experience disillusionment at some stage in the story, the most prominent narratological and cinematographical presentation (or manifestation) of disillusionment in the film is Lise's dream and Johnny's suicide, which is revealed through Lise's dream. Furthermore, the conflation of Johnny and Johannes Kerkorrel (also mostly through Lise's dream) draws a parallel between the theme of disillusionment and the suicide of Ralph Rabie.

Through the discourse time (manipulated by order, duration and frequency), intertexts of Voëlvry and the context of South Africa in the 1980s, specifically focused on conscription and Afrikaner dogmas of that time, are superimposed, overlayed and juxtaposed by the non-diegetic voice-over, music and dreams. The music of the members of Voëlvry moves between

diegetic and non-diegetic becoming off-screen characters, of which Johannes Kerkorrel is the most prominent as a character parallel with Johnny.

6.5 Insights and contribution of the study

Theoretically, and thus also methodologically, the present study reflected on and presented a refinement of Genette's (1980) temporal structuring principles in narrative: *order*, *duration* and *frequency.* These were implemented as functions of *discourse time*. In other words, order, duration and frequency structure the discourse time by manipulating the telling of the story. Through this manipulation, time is conveyed as existential, experiential and subjective rather than cosmological. The discourse time indeed results in a measurable duration – the film is 106 minutes long – however, the cosmological time (duration) of the film's unfolding (or narrating time) is less important than the subjective experience of time conveyed through the discourse time. To paraphrase Bordwell (1985): a film constructs a narrative instance with a specific effect or meaning in its overall totality – the discourse time is thus salient in the representation of time as an experience.

In terms of theme, it emerged during the course of the study that dreams may be one of the best tools or strategies for conveying subjective, existential time and characters' inner states. Dreams can express abstract notions because they have their own "internal logic" tailored to the dream's context. Dreams present narrative possibilities that expose a character's inner state. The way in which dreams are told or portrayed in cinema further holds significance. Comparing the fragmented (frequency) *telling* of Lise's dream to the singular *telling* of Hein's nightmare reveals the type of impact the dream content has on the dreaming characters. Lise's dream is confusing to her, taking time to unfold and resolve, finally finding significance through a process of reflecting via a dream report (which she tells Hein and Dirk, respectively).

The fragmentation of the dream over the entire film's linear temporal duration gives the impression or feeling that Lise's dream took time to resolve and that her disillusionment has been building up for over thirteen years. Hein's nightmare, on the other hand, although also confusing to him, has a stronger immediate impact that creates a sustained "lingering" effect on him instead of a recurring one (such as in Lise's case) that "resolves" over time. In Hein's case, his lasting trauma can be observed during the present (2002) as he seems angry, dejected, and depressed, which manifests (narratologically) in his drug use – cinematographically supported by showing Hein alone in 2002 taking cocaine at the barbecue

in the bathroom. The lasting impact of his past trauma is here conveyed through the conceptual link between Hein's 2002 demeanour and actions, and his 1988 nightmare.

The film is predicated on the notion that Voëlvry was the voice of a generation of disillusioned Afrikaners (in the 1980s) who anticipated a better future and again experienced disillusionment years later as their expectations of the future collapsed and failed to deliver. The *time* (duration) between their first and second disillusionment is thus time spent in anticipation – a suspended time of hopes and dreams that would never actualise and thus is *lost*.

In this sense, *Johnny is nie dood nie* is a type of cinematic "Bildungsroman"[37], dealing with the formative years of people representing an alternative Afrikaner psyche. It is a glimpse into the lives of young, disillusioned Afrikaners, and can therefore be seen as part of a larger thrust during the present century to explore new definitions of "Afrikanerness".

6.6 Suggestions for further research

Through the course of this study, two prominent notions linked to the concept of time emerged as possibilities for further investigation. The first possibility relates to time's intrinsic relationship to space (mentioned in Chapter Three). Here the concept of the chronotope may be explored as a function of meaning-making by means of positioned time-space. The second evolves from the notion of time and space and transitional "pathways" or spaces of liminality where characters experience growth, self-reflection and inner processes such as (the projection of) hope and desire. I briefly consider these avenues for further study as a final word.

Chronotopes in Johnny is nie dood nie

Time is the focus of this study, and although distinguishable from space for discussion purposes, time and space are intrinsically connected (as noted in Chapter Three, argued by Einstein). The *chronotope*, as envisioned by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895 – 1975), leads to exploring the synthesis of time and space in narrative contexts. Bakhtin (1981:84-85) explains that the chronotope "expresses the inseparability of space and time, time as the fourth dimension of

[37] A Bildungsroman is a novel dealing with the progress of a young person's transformation (a coming-of-age narrative trope) Graham, 2019). The genre was defined as essentially German.

space […] time, as it were, *thickens*, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history". Space makes time tangible, which is observable in narrative and especially cinema, where environments and the storyworld spaces are not left to the imagination of the viewer, but rather positioned and designed through sets, décor, props, costumes and even sound and music.

Understanding the chronotope, the interconnected time and space, facilitates understanding of a film's storyworld, which holds the inner logic and "psychology" of the narrative. For example, student days in the 1980s in Stellenbosch, South Africa, are understood as having been safer than present-day South Africa because of less crime, signified through the absence of burglar bars, for instance. The burglar bars are thus a spatial element with temporal implications. Burglar bars suggest not only a certain period in South Africa but also a different psychology and environment or space.

Chronotope literally means time-space. The chronotope makes possible the portrayal of a narrative's historical and cultural contexts by giving form to the time and space of a narrative's events. For Bakhtin (1981:84), the significance of the chronotope lies in the effect it has on a narrative. Chronotopes are organisational epicentres for fundamental events in the narrative (Bakhtin, 1981:84). The chronotope is never a neutral background but an influential aspect of the story it houses (Burton, 1996:44-45). The chronotope is a centre from which themes, situations, and characters appear and is useful for understanding the traditional and established settings of individual genres. Burton (1996:41) argues that the chronotope is a tool for synthetic analysis. It identifies and reasserts the impact and information of concrete space on the temporal structure of the narrative. The chronotope is also used for comprehending the phenomenological and historical connection between the text and the context. Knowledge of the history of a setting influences a viewer's perception of that setting.

In *Johnny is nie dood nie,* some observable chronotopes are the 1980s Afrikaans women's dormitory, the 1980s student commune, and the Afrikaner 2000s suburban home. Each of these chronotopes is identified in cultural terms and located in *time* according to their individual spatial and temporal signifiers. For example, the isolated versus open feelings (existential time) of the different spaces of the 1980s and that of 2002 in *Johnny is nie dood nie*, and of the wall in 2002 that becomes more than just a spatial divide or metaphor, but becomes a temporal representation as well.

It is in the chronotope that the spatialisation of time and the temporalisation of space become observable. Spaces are differently coded to indicate time passing. In the film, time becomes visible in the various spaces of the 1980s and 2002, while space becomes temporal by the

structuring of the narrative world into a sequence. This sequence allows the viewer to juxtapose chronotopes and compare them. Viewers deduce that the feelings of the characters in 2002 originate from occurrences in the 1980s. These occurrences and outcomes cannot be associated with isolated events in the fabula. In other words, the whole storyworld is considered to make such a comparison. The juxtaposed chronotopes of the 2002 Afrikaner suburban home and 1980s Stellenbosch student house repeatedly bring past and present into a conversation. The story of *Johnny is nie dood nie* is not told chronologically but rather as a sequence of segments of time and space or chronotopes that facilitate meaning.

Time and liminality in the film *Johnny is nie dood nie*

William Harmon (2000:291) defines liminality in literature as a "state of being on a threshold in space or time". In stories, the notion of liminality is salient when characters reflect (learning about themselves and their world), change or mentally grow. One might think of liminality using the analogy of the threshold; however, this description regards liminality as somehow static. Instead, as an illustration of liminality, Harmon (2000:291) offers the impression of the sea and seashore. The sea stretches from the shore into the distance, forming a barrier between land and sky. Thus, setting forth into the sea is to disappear eventually beyond the horizon.

In *Johnny is nie dood nie*, the riverbed constitutes such a liminal threshold; it could be seen as a *lieu de mémoire* (Pierre Nora's [1989] term) and also a time-space of transition. Likewise, the lake and forest are the liminal spaces of Lise's dream through which she transitions in her inner state through the painful process of disillusionment to a place of acceptance (albeit a sad reality). Johnny walking into the distance also translates to this notion of liminality as a transitional time-space. Subsequently, Johnny's suicide is related to death as a liminal transition and, perhaps, hopefully, final insight.

Liminality represents an exploration of the self through a pathway to becoming (Viljoen & van der Merwe, 2007; also see Wels *et al.*, 2011). Liminal spaces are spaces through which characters journey to discover something "new". The transition is generally distinct and noticeable but is the point where expectations collapse. Lise's dream is a liminal time-space where she processes her emotions and desires through mental progressions, where her expectations collapse, where her delusion crumbles and her disillusionment is felt.

Liminality is where existing anticipations change, or new expectations are formed. It is a place of uncertainty, a place of "inner demons". Lise's horrific dream reflects her inner demons. Likewise, Hein's nightmare also reflects his inner demons and struggles with PTSD and post-

war trauma. Similarly, the lucid dream becomes a liminal space that cinematographically transitions or rather opens a pathway through which the past can enter and influence the present. Finally, the surreal tableau is liminality that transcends the storyworld time, becoming the time-space where story time, narrating time and discourse time intersect with the real world of the viewer giving commentary on privilege and guilt.

Although, liminality itself allows for speculation and anticipation (mostly in suspense), Lise's dream anticipates a hopeless future where she has to live with her failed expectations. A character in a story rarely ventures into liminality purposefully; they are pushed into a liminal space, perhaps forced or tricked. This notion resonates with the idea that dreams are sometimes experienced involuntarily. Yet liminal spaces play an essential role in character growth as a space where decisions must be made. This is the time-space where she decides to accept or deny her reality. Lise chooses acceptance, although sad and not perfect.

In anthropology, liminality identifies the importance of "in-between periods" and understanding the human reactions to liminal experiences (Turner, 1969). This means exploring "how personality was shaped by liminality, the sudden foregrounding of agency, and the sometimes dramatic tying together of *thought* and *experience*" (Thomassen, 2009:14).

This tying together of thought and experience shifts the concept of liminality from threshold to pathway, from a simple transition to a multi-layered notion. As noted in the theory chapter, memory and anticipation are existential subjective temporalities. Through personal timelines, we remember events. In the case of memory, liminality does not create a threshold between external and physical states but is an internal state of being, connecting moments in a personal timeline. The memory exists outside (collective memory and context) and inside (subjective memory and experience) of the timeline, and when presented in the story, the memory often becomes the story (Dass, 2013; Gadoin & Ramel, 2013). Such is the case with the dream: becoming a narrative of the process of disillusionment.

Flashbacks in stories are fictional characters remembering something that is not happening to them currently while the story's timeline progresses. The moment is not a part of the character's *now* but influences and shapes the *present*. The transitions are thus liminal time-space, and entering this liminality allows us to understand the current motivations in the character's timeline. Sociologically, liminality is a "period and area of ambiguity" (Turner, 1969:57; cf. Wels *et al.*, 2011), and the function of memory within the text allows an area of ambiguity within a character. Cinematographically, this notion is supported by the ambiguity of the memory/dream at the beginning of the film – a moment of dream-reality confusion.

Memory and dream are experiences without words, but we use words to define them. Lise uses her dream report to define her dream and find its significance. Her words are the symbols that bring memories and dreams to consciousness, and so when consciousness changes, the words should too. Memory makes time liminal, and liminality turns time into memory.

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ANNEXURES

Link to online viewing of film:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1azPxKpjERQmHBmap1mqqFkLFpMhv3QAU/view?usp=share_link

Link to clips of scenes discussed:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1QsUvARB6YAGZ6LGZiksy_94TNaYEx3wk?usp=share_link

Visual transcript:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EFJq6_KOdU6scrWK8hmPiUK1xyn-JpQD/view?usp=share_link

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