To my parents, who saved my life at infancy from danger, so that I could have a chance to go to school, and to my children, who always gladly follow my example.

Unless a seed dies first, it remains alone.
Jesus the Messiah

The impact of audience world view on speaker credibility in persuasive speaking: The case of Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences

Emmanuel David Mwaluko Luhembe Mbennah
BA, Hons BA, MA

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Philosophiae Doctor in Communication of the Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys

Promoter: Dr PJ Schutte
Co-promoter: Prof dr HJ Groenewald

Potchefstroom
1999

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A doctoral thesis of any nature and scope will inevitably, and for its own good, be a product of wide-ranging input from a wide variety of sources. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the many people who contributed to the success of this study and the completion of this thesis. Specifically, I wish to thank the following:

Dr Paul J Schutte, my promoter, and Professor Dr Hennie J Groenewald, my co-promoter, for their constant support and consistent availability throughout the study.

Professor Dr Faans Steyn, of Potchefstroom University's department of statistics and applied research, for his technical advice and assistance with the data analysis and the statistical processes.

Professor Dr Arnold S de Beer (Arrie) and his wife, Professor Nicolette de Beer, for their friendship and support. Arrie played a central role regarding our coming to Potchefstroom. Working together closely with Arrie - publishing *Ecquid Novi*, research projects and making joint presentations at national and international conferences - was a most academically and socially enriching opportunity to me.

Karien van der Leeuw, then secretary of the then department of communication, for very ably facilitating our transition and settling down in Potchefstroom.

Colleagues at the School for communication and information studies, especially Anést van Rensburg, for maintaining an environment that was truly appropriate for research work.

Fellow foreign students at the then department of communication, Evert van Vlastuin and Martijn van der Wind, for the rich friendship, which added much value to my intercultural experience.

Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education for the financial support, without which it would have been difficult to pursue doctoral studies.

The family of Professor Dr Ben and Eunice Strydom, Kenneth and Valencia Iornengen, Rabson and Evelyn Wuriga, Godwin and Lucia Seleka and Ephraim Baloyi, for the warm friendship and fellowship they extended to me and my family.

Professor Dr Stephen E. Talitwala, Vice Chancellor of Daystar University, for his supportive role throughout my study leave. Sincere thanks to the Management Board of

Daystar University, colleagues at the Institute for Christian Ministries and Training and the staff at the finance department of Daystar University, for their unceasing prayer support.

Esther, my sister-in-law, who patiently shouldered much of the daily house chores while she pursued her own professional studies.

Joy, Alpha, Nyemo and Mahewa, my wonderful children, for being true friends who made me enjoy the moments of rest in the most wonderful ways.

My parents and the entire Mbennah family, for making it possible for me to pursue education and to attain the most privileged position of being the first "Mbennah" to earn a doctorate.

My wife, Ruth, for being a friend indeed, who patiently gave me true fellowship and warm company.

Finally, I thank the LORD God Almighty, for his mercy and grace that sustained me throughout the many hours of research, writing and revising amidst an extremely tight schedule, and for giving me a passion for good knowledge and the possibility to pursue it.

Emmanuel D Mbennah

Potchefstroom, South Africa

May 1999

ABSTRACT

Speaker credibility is a key concept in persuasive speaking. The aim of this study was to investigate the interaction between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking, comparing Afrocentric audiences with Eurocentric audiences. The theoretical premise of the study was that speaker credibility is a stratified construct with foundational and context-specific dimensions, and that the variation in the formation and application of speaker credibility could be accounted for by audience world view.

Persuasion was conceptualised as a speaker-managed process which occurs through the intentional use of the tools of persuasion adapted to the audience and refers to the degree of the outcome of the process relative to the speaker's intended effect. Speaker credibility was conceptualised as a construct with a hierarchically ordered stock of universal and context-specific factors of moral, relational, content-related competence and performance qualities. Subsequently, it was posited that audiences form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms that are unique to their (audiences') world view orientations. World view was conceptualised as a five-component construct, with epistemological, axiological, perceptual, chronemic and ontological dimensions. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as specific world view orientations were analysed and their possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility were proposed.

A world view questionnaire was developed and administered. Item analyses were performed on the basis of the scores on the world view questionnaire, from which a world view index was constructed. A semantic differential and a persuasive speech were developed. Two groups of students participated in the study as convenient sample audiences. Group 1 completed the world view index after which it was divided into two similar sub-groups. One sub-group listened to a black persuasive speaker, the other sub-group listened to a white persuasive speaker. The sub-groups completed the semantic differential immediately after they listened to their respective speakers. The same steps were followed for Group 2. The data were analysed, primarily utilising factor analysis.

The main contribution of this study lies in its major findings, which are as follows:

- The race of the speaker did not make any significant difference in the formation and application of speaker credibility.

- The audience with a primarily Afrocentric world view orientation formed and applied speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of a general speaker credibility criteria, encompassing subject competence; moral, relational and presentation qualities; aesthetic aspects and, possibly, age-based qualification.

- The audience with a primarily Eurocentric world view orientation formed and applied speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of moral quality, aesthetic aspects and subject competence.

- Under the same persuasive speaking conditions, the Afrocentric audience and the Eurocentric audience formed and applied different configurations of the speaker credibility dimensions.

- There are indications that there is a relationship between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility.

- Afrocentric and Eurocentric world views are not rigid differentiations; they are primary orientations, with similarities and differences that seem to transcend race.

OPSOMMING

Die geloofwaardigheid van ‘n spreker is ‘n sleutelkonsep in openbare redevoering. Die doel van die studie was om die interaksie tussen ’n gehoor se lewens- en wêreldbeskouing en die vorming en toekenning van sprekergeloofwaardigeid binne ‘n oorredingskonteks na te vors. In hierdie verband is ‘n Afrosentriese en Eurosentriese gehoor met mekaar vergelyk. Die volgende twee premisse is as teoretiese uitgangspunte geneem: Sprekergeloofwaardigheid is ‘n gestratifiseerde konstruk met fundamentele en konteks-spesifieke dimensies. Die variasie in die vorming en toekenning van geloofwaardigheid aan ‘n spreker word deur die gehoor se lewens- en wêreldbeskouing beïnvloed.

Oorreding is gekonseptualiseer as ‘n intensionele sprekerbeheerde proses wat plaasvind deur die middelle van oorreding by ‘n gehoor aan te pas. Die uitkoms verwys na die mate waarin die gehoorreaksie ooreenstem met die spreker se verlangde effek. Sprekergeloofwaardigheid is gekonseptualiseer as ‘n konstruk van hiërargies geordende moontlikhede wat universele en konteks-spesifieke faktore bevat wat uit morele, relasionele, inhoudelik kundige en aanbiedingskwaliteite bestaan. Hiervolgens word beweer dat die gehoor geloofwaardigheid aan ‘n spreker toeken in ooreenstemming met hulle lewens- en wêreldbeskouing.

Lewens- en wêreldbeskouing is gekonseptualiseer as ‘n konstruk wat uit vyf dimensies bestaan, naamlik die epistomologiese, aksiologiese, persepsuele, kronemiese en ontologiese dimensies. Afrosentrisme en Eurosentrisme is as spesifieke lewens- en wêreldbeskouings geannaliseer en die moontlike invloed wat die beskouings op die vorming en toeken van sprekergeloofwaardigheid het, is aangetoon.

‘n Lewens- en wêreldbeskouingindeks is saamgestel nadat itemanalises uitgevoer is op die data wat deur middel van ‘n vraelys oor lewens- en wêreldbeskouing ingesamel is. Twee groepe studente is as ‘n gerieflikheidsteekproef gebruik om as gehore op te tree. Eers is die lewens- en wêreldbeskouingindeks ingevul waarna die groep in twee verdeel is en ‘n wit en ‘n swart spreker dieselfde oorredingstoespraak gelewer het. Direk hierna het die respondente ‘n vraelys voltooi met betrekking tot die geloofwaardigheid van die spreker. ‘n Semantiese differensiaal is hiervoor gebruik. Dieselfde prosedures is herhaal met die tweede groep studente. Die data is geannaliseer deur hoofsaaklik van faktoranalise gebruik te maak.

Die bydrae van hierdie studie is in die volgende bevindinge geleë:

- Die ras van die spreker het geen verskil gemaak aan die vorming en toekenning van sprekergeloofwaardigheid nie.
- Die gehoor met 'n hoofsaaklik Afrosentriese lewens- en wêreldbeskouing vorm en ken sprekergeloofwaardigheidsdimensies toe wat die spreker evalueer in terme van 'n algemene kriteria wat die volgende bevat: morele, relasionele en aanbiedingskwaliteite; asook estetiese aspekte en moontlik ouderdomsgebaseerde kwaliteite.
- Die gehoor met 'n hoofsaaklik Eurosentriese lewens- en wêreldbeskouing vorm en ken sprekergeloofwaardigheidsdimensies toe wat die spreker evalueer in terme van morele kwaliteite, estetiese aspekte en kundigheid ten opsigte van die onderwerp.
- Binne dieselfde oorredingskonteks het die Afrosentriese en die Eurosentriese gehore verskillende konfigurasies van die dimensies van sprekergeloofwaardigheid gevorm en toegeken.
- Daar is aanduidings dat daar 'n verwantskap bestaan tussen 'n gehoor se lewens- en wêreldbeskouing en die vorming en toekenning van sprekergeloofwaardigheid.
- Afrosentriese en Eurosentriese lewens- en wêreldbeskouings is nie 'n rigiede onderskeiding nie, maar bestaan veeleer uit primêre oriëntasies met ooreenkomstes en verskille wat nie altyd met ras verband hou nie.

CHAPTER 3

TOWARDS A HOLISTIC THEORY OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

APPENDICES

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CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

1.1. BACKGROUND

Speaker credibility is one of the key concepts in persuasive speaking. Aristotle postulated that the instruments of persuasion were the speaker's moral character, the emotional appeals to the audience, and the logical appeals of the message itself. Although he assumed that the logical appeals were the only true constituent of the art of persuasion and placed primary emphasis on rational conduct (Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:78), he said, of the three major means of persuasion, ethos was the most significant. Subsequent developments in studies and theorising in persuasion seems to have been based on this sort of classical theory, and credibility has progressively become the contemporary analogy of what Aristotle called ethos.

Research in the twentieth century generally indicates that persuading audiences largely depends on the person of the persuasive speaker. Messages from more highly credible sources not only produce greater attitudinal change but could also be judged as more fair and unbiased (see e.g., Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Within marketing communication, the persuasive liability posed by the low credibility of the source is substantially mitigated when presented within the context of a high credibility vehicle, while the power of a high credibility source is not affected by the low credibility of the vehicles (Finch, 1987). Studies have demonstrated also that sources with high credibility would have greater immediate effects on audience's opinion change than those with low credibility (see e.g., Anderson & Clevenger, 1963; Smith, 1982). The place of speaker credibility in persuasion is well summarised by McCroskey (1997:87):

> During this twenty-four-hundred year period, Aristotle's view that ethos is the most potent means of persuasion has seldom been challenged. Plato, Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian all expressed similar views, even though their conceptions of ethos were somewhat different from Aristotle's . . . . Of all the aspects of classical rhetorical theory, the one that has received the greatest support from modern empirical research is the theoretical importance of ethos in rhetorical communication. Almost without exception, experimental studies have demonstrated the power of ethos.

The effects of the variations of credibility on persuasive results could be examined in terms of the influence on the magnitude of the persuasive impact and influence on the direction of the persuasive impact. The variation of the size of the impact is modified by the audience's level of involvement with the issue under discussion. Where there is high involvement, source credibility has less impact (Johnson & Scileppi, 1969; Petty *et al.*, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). The impact of the speaker's credibility on the magnitude of the persuasive impact also depends on whether the speaker is known before or after the audience hears the message. Research done within Western contexts suggests that the impact of credibility is minimised when the identity of the persuasive speaker is given after the speech is heard (Greenberg & Tannenbaum, 1961; Husek, 1965; Mills & Harvey, 1972; Sternthal *et al.*, 1978).

The direction of the effect of credibility on persuasive impact is not constant, as increase in credibility could bring high, small, or no increase in persuasive results of a message. Sometimes low credibility sources are significantly more persuasive than high credibility sources (Bock & Saine, 1975; Harmon & Coney, 1982; Dholakia, 1987). The critical factor in determining when the low credibility source would be more effective than a high credibility source is the position advocated by the message. With a counter-attitudinal message, the high credibility speaker is more persuasive than a low credibility speaker, progressively diminishing as the message stance approaches the audience's opinion. With a pro-attitudinal message, the low-credibility speaker apparently is more persuasive, and this is explained by the fact that audiences engage in vicarious processes, helping the speaker out in explaining the subject, thus leading to self-persuasion. These trends, however, seem to apply only under conditions of counter- or pro-attitudinal message stance, low audience-involvement, and when the speaker is identified prior to speaking (Bochner & Insko, 1966; McGinnies, 1973; Harmon & Coney, 1982). Nevertheless, extremely low speaker credibility would still have an impact in response-reinforcing (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Osgood *et al.*, 1957), although generally audiences are likely to ignore faulty argumentation and weak evidences and counter-arguing is unlikely (Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Brandt, 1976).

Various issues related to speaker credibility have been examined, such as its constitution (McCroskey, 1966; Berlo *et al.*, 1969; Whitehead, 1968); its effects on specific aspects of communication (Macrae *et al.*, 1992; Albright & Levy, 1995); its effects on persuasion in delayed identification of source (O'Keefe, 1987); and its relationship with non-verbal cues (Burgoon *et al.*, 1990). Some studies have investigated the association of credibility with information seeking in critical times such as war (Al-Makaty *et al.*, 1994); gender of the speaker (Graham, 1989; Andsaver, 1990) or the interaction between speaker credibility and argument ambiguity in producing attitude change (Chaiken & Mahaswaran, 1994).

Speaker credibility has been conceptualised in a number of ways, but Delia (1976:364) contends that there is a conceptual deficiency in the concept of ethos, arguing that a satisfactory conception of ethos can only be in process terms since the substance of ethos is essentially an outcome of constructivism. Other studies suggest that speaker credibility dimensions vary with the object of judgement and the context. Applbaum and Anatol (1972) and Liska (1978) attribute the variation of an audience's perception of underlying credibility dimensions to the situation in which the speaker communicates, while it is possible to suggest an interaction between credibility dimensions and other favourable and unfavourable speaker attributes.

Studies also demonstrate the variation of credibility dimensions with the context of speaking. Heyman (1992) found that while Australian students employed expertise and trust as credibility dimensions, their Singaporean counterparts employed one credibility dimension that seemed to combine expertise and trust. Brownlow (1992) reports that babyfaced female speakers were more believable when trustworthiness was in question while maturefaced speakers were more persuasive when expertise was questioned. An interesting study by Lui and Standing (1989) in which the significance of trustworthiness and expertise was compared, "trustworthiness defeated expertness". Studying in an African cultural orientation, Mbennah (1993) obtained seven credibility dimensions which appear to be a stock for assessing political, religious and educational speakers, but which are different in constitution and significance from those obtained in earlier studies.

However, in spite of extensive research, still not much is known about how perceptions of credibility differentially influence the way people interpret and respond to persuasive messages (Liska, 1978:85; Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:102).

Hesselgrave (1991:38) points out that the communication process is always influenced by the cultural contexts within which it takes place. Oliver (1962: cited in Hesselgrave, 1991:98) argues in his "multiple rhetorics", that the influence of culture on any two interactants may be so divergent as to necessitate different rhetorics. Hesselgrave's and Oliver's arguments imply that the application of communication principles should take into consideration cultural context within which such application is made.

Nature grants basic and therefore trans-cultural values. However, it is nurture, which is a cultural element, that takes a dominant role in shaping a person's values. In the same vein, Linton (1945:47) points out that the cultural conditions surrounding an individual significantly influence the formation of the individual's personality. These differences among cultures extend to the way speaker credibility is defined, formed and applied. As Condon and Yousef (1975:246) elaborate,

> As a general principle the ethos of a speaker may be universally the most important factor in persuasiveness. However, what constitutes good ethos is not necessarily universal. Again the value orientations will give the best guidance for

> discovering the ideal ethos of a particular culture. In many societies age will be crucial: The best ethos may accrue to one who is over sixty or under forty. Sex may be crucial: In many societies women are believed to be competent to speak only on women's matters. Family background, achievement, education, relation to the military, religion, and more are likely to be constituents of ethos.

1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

One area that has not been investigated is the relationship between the formation and application of speaker credibility and audience world view. It is clear from the sample of previous studies cited above that credibility is a significant element of persuasion theory and practice across all cultural contexts and that what constitutes credibility varies with culture. The question, however is, what are the factors that influence the formation and application of speaker credibility dimensions and what is the nature of that influence?

The aim of this study is to investigate the interaction between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking and to compare Afrocentric audiences with Eurocentric audiences to demonstrate that interaction. The theoretical premise of the study is that speaker credibility is a stratified multi-dimensional construct with foundational and context-specific dimensions, and that the variation in the formation and application of speaker credibility could be accounted for by audience world view. The phrase "formation and application" seems to imply two sequenced stages involved - the speaker credibility formation stage and the speaker credibility application stage. That implication is, however, misleading. On the other hand, using "formation" only or "application" only in the phrasing would not only be equally misleading but it would also understate and, therefore, misrepresent the phenomenon being investigated. In the context of the study, "formation and application" of speaker credibility refers to that phenomenon whereby the audience simultaneously construes the speaker in terms of credibility and perceives the speaker's persuasive propositions as a consequence of that construal.

In order to explore the aim of the study, the following hypotheses are posited:

H1. Audiences with primarily an Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of aesthetic and presentation aspects.

H2. Audiences with primarily a Eurocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of subject competence and moral aspects.

H3. Under the same persuasive speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences form and apply different speaker credibility dimensions.

H4. There is a relationship between the formation of the dimensions of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking and the world view of the audience.

In order to provide a theoretical foundation for testing these hypotheses, the following objectives were pursued:

- Discussing the nature of persuasion and developing a speaker-centred theory of persuasion.
- Discussing the speaker credibility construct and proposing a holistic theory of speaker credibility.
- Conceptualising world view as a pertinent audience factor in persuasive communication and suggesting its possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility.
- Analysing Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as specific world view orientations and proposing their possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility.

1.3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A world view index, a semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility, and a persuasive speech were developed. Experiments were then arranged, in which a black speaker and a white speaker each presented the persuasive speech on a salient social issue to a separate but similar experimental group. Credibility and world view scores were collected and factor analysed, and world view constructs and credibility constructs were compared across the groups and between speakers.

1.3.1. Sample

The study used undergraduate students in a random sample equally representing "black" and "white" females and males from a medium-size university in South Africa. The university had a multi-racial student composition, and it was chosen as a convenient sample. The study did not presume that "blackness" and "whiteness" are synonymous to, respectively, Afrocentric and Eurocentric orientations, but it assumed that with "black" and "white" respondents, the two orientations would be obtained. This sample was thus taken not as representative but instances (Westley, 1989:214) of the two world view orientations. Students, on the other hand, were chosen in view of their availability and ability to respond to the relatively complex research instruments that were to be used.

1.3.2. Research instruments

The following research instruments were developed and used in the study:

1.3.2.1. World view questionnaire (WVQ) and World view index (WVI)

Following the procedure proposed by Likert (1932) and explained further by Green (1954), a comprehensive list of possible descriptors of world view was developed from literature and expert opinion. Using these descriptors, a Likert scale-type questionnaire was constructed, pre-tested and administered to the 600 students at the university where the study was done. Upon receipt of the completed questionnaires, item validity was be determined through item analysis and construct validity was determined through factor analysis. The items that failed the test were discarded and what remained was used to construct the world view index, for which Cronbach's alpha was computed to check its reliability. For complete description of this process, see *6.2.1.1.*

1.3.2.2. Semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility (SDSC)

A semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility was developed from literature and pre-testing (West, 1994; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey & Young, 1981; McCroskey & Richmond, 1989; see Appendix 6.03). For a complete description of the process, see *6.2.1.2.*

1.3.2.3. Persuasive speech (SP)

A persuasive speech concerning a salient social issue was developed (see Appendix 6.04). For details on the PS, see *6.2.1.3.*

1.4. INTRODUCTION TO KEY CONCEPTS

To facilitate understanding of the theoretical foundation of the study and the findings and their interpretation, the following terms and concepts need to be conceptualised or operationalised

1.4.1. Persuasion

Numerous definitions of persuasion exist within various theoretical frameworks. A discussion of the concept of persuasion, the factors that mitigate its occurrence and its relation to speaker credibility is presented in chapter 2. The discussion leads to a proposition that an adequate conceptualisation, and hence definition, of persuasion, arising from the very nature of persuasion, ought to be speaker-centred. Persuasion is, therefore, to be seen as a speaker-managed process in which, through the intentional use of the tools of persuasion adapted to the audience, it refers to the degree of the outcome of the process relative to the intention of the speaker.

1.4.2. Speaker credibility

This refers to the impact of the manner, process, and qualities of an agent of persuasive discourse. Different conceptions of speaker credibility exist, and after a discussion of the concept in chapter 3, a new understanding is advanced.

1.4.3. Culture

World view is part of culture, and hence its definition arises from an understanding of culture. In its inclusive nature, the term "culture" embraces linguistic, political, economic, social, psychological, national, religious, and racial aspects (Hesselgrave, 1991:99). Taylor (1920: quoted by Langness, 1987:21) defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society".

Hesselgrave (1991) expands Taylor's definition to say that culture is technological and sociological, constituting modes of interaction and behavioural patterns between members of a society. He also says that culture is ideological, encompassing a people's beliefs, knowledge, values, world views and cognitive processes. Lastly, Hesselgrave (1991) says that culture conditions and structures perception so that people develop culturally determined perceptual sets, which in turn influence the meanings people attach to stimuli they perceive.

However, the term culture tends to so emphasise clear-cut distinctions among people groups that it often creates the impression that people in different cultural settings are exclusively different. This view seems rather questionable, since many areas of similarities among people across cultural set-ups also exist, besides the major distinctive elements of those cultural set-ups. As Cohen (1998:6) contends, individuals are part of several overlapping cultures - race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class - with "codes of meaning that range from formal and conscious systems of religious beliefs and informal and less conscious myths of a generational culture". For that reason, the term cultural orientation is preferred to the term culture and is the one, therefore, used in the study. A discussion of cultural orientation and its relationship with speaker credibility is the focus of chapter 4.

1.4.4. World view

"World view" has been variously defined. It is defined, for example, as a people's specific belief system about the nature of the world (Dodd, 1998:40), or as a part of the "totality of all the perceptions, attitudes, values, and identities a person holds" (Singer, 1987:10) about the world. "World view" is in this study used from a cultural point of view. The concept world view is discussed in chapter 4.

1.4.5. Afrocentric audiences

According to Maquet (1972), classical anthropology defined three human species, among them the Black race, which is classifiable further into various groups of racial characteristics. In Sub-Saharan Africa four distinguishable stocks are found, namely, the Negrito of the Equatorial forest, Enthropoid in the Eastern Horn, and the Black African race, found in the North of the Eastern Horn. The Afrocentric audiences refers to subjects with a typical world view of Africa South of the Sahara. What constitutes an Afrocentric world view is part of the focus of chapter 5.

1.4.6. Eurocentric audiences

This refers to those audiences that function by an Anglo-Saxon world view orientation, typified by such things as mental-rational cognitive view, a philosophical structure which exhibits dualistic thinking, and an analytical orientation that emphasises the supremacy of reason (Mbennah, 1993:34). However, the specific aspects that define a Eurocentric world view are discussed in chapter 5.

1.4.7. Theory

This study makes a number of references to the term theory. Since, even among scientists, writers and philosophers, the term "theory" is used in a variety of ways (Littlejohn, 1992:21), it seems imperative to also operationalise it. Any attempt to explain or represent something is a theory. A theory is a person's conceptualisation of an observed set of events. Chaffee and Berger (1987:101) give a general definition of a theory: "A theory is *a set of constructs that are linked together by relational statements that are internally consistent with each other*" (italics original).

Although the word theory could be used to describe the educated guesswork of lay persons, academics use the term theory to refer to a scholar's construction of what an experience is like, based on systematic observation. Kaplan (1964:295) sees theory as "a way of making sense of a disturbing situation so as to allow us most effectively to bring to bear our repertoire of habits . . . a device for interpreting, criticizing, and unifying established laws . . . guiding the enterprise of discovering new (*sic*) and more powerful generalizations".

Dance and Larson (1976:5) point out that often theory is characterised by an explanatory aspect, with the underlying presumption that an explanation of an observed phenomenon can be generalised to apply to other instances. By implication, a theory would also have a predictive quality, since the generalisation is a statement of what will occur with respect to a given phenomenon. Hence, as Littlejohn (1992:2) deduces, theory is the scholar's best representation of the state of affairs at any given time but which also indicates something bigger than a single observation.

This study takes Bormann's (1980:25) usage of the term theory, in which it is taken to refer to a careful, systematic, and self-conscious discussion and analysis of communication phenomena. Bormann (1980:4) divides the body of theories of the process of communication into special theories and general theories. Whereas special theories specialise on particular aspects of communication or deal with specific types, settings, or situations, such as persuasion, general theories deal with core processes common to all communication, such as meaning, coding and symbols. General theories aim to define and explain basic processes essential to all communication. Within this framework, this study develops special theories, on persuasion, on speaker credibility, and on the interaction between source credibility and audience world view. Meaning, attitudes, and world view and their possible role in the persuasive process are general enough to merit the label of general theories.

1.5. PLAN OF THE THESIS

Chapter 2 presents a discussion of persuasion with the view to underlining the role of speaker. It is argued that, in view of the nature of persuasion, the responsibility for the communication results are not be left to chance, to the audience or to the message. Persuasion requires to be planned and managed, and the process and the outcome of persuasion should satisfy acceptable ethical standards. It follows that a perspective of persuasion that would provide the conditions necessary for both effective and ethically acceptable persuasive practice would be one in which the persuasive speaker is centrally placed. The nature of persuasion is discussed, examining its conceptuality and the role of attitudes and attitude change in the process of persuasion. The occurrence of persuasion is examined, considering the role of meaning, argumentation and audience motivational processes. In a concluding summary, a speaker-centred understanding of persuasion is proposed.

In chapter 3, an attempt is made to develop a particular conception of speaker credibility. Speaker credibility remains the single most significant concept in persuasive communication, for both productive and responsible persuasive communication behaviour. Speaker credibility, therefore, should be reconceptualised, to constitute a holistic theory that would enhance the development of effective and ethically acceptable persuasive practice. Two sets of criteria for an acceptable credibility theory are developed, namely, the ethical and heuristic value. The speaker credibility construct is reviewed an analysed, from which three conceptual strains - the structuralist, the functionalist and the constructivist - are identified and evaluated in light of the two sets of criteria. A holistic theory of speaker credibility is then proposed and the relationship between persuasion and the credibility of the speaker is discussed.

Chapter 4 focuses on audience world view. The relationship between culture and communication is discussed. From an analysis of world view and culture, a five-dimension typology of world view is proposed. The implications of audience world view to the formation and application of speaker credibility are posited.

Chapter 5 presents an analysis of Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as specific world view orientations are analysed, following the five-dimension typology of world view proposed in chapter 4 as the framework of analysis. Forming the starting point of the discussion is an evaluation of the endeavour to distinguish between Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, whether such a distinction is possible or necessary, and what sort of areas would permit it. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are then analysed separately and the implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view characteristics of audiences for the formation and application of speaker credibility are deduced.

Chapter 6 outlines the empirical investigation process and presents the findings. The research design of the study is explained, focusing on the research instruments and the experimental work. An account of the data analysis process and the interpretation of the findings are given.

Chapter 7 presents a critical discussion of the study. The findings are discussed and integrated with theory; the implications of the findings for theory, research and practice in persuasion are identified; and recommendations for both pragmatic and heuristic purposes are made.

CHAPTER 2

PERSUASION: A SPEAKER-CENTRED THEORY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The focus of this study is the interaction between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility. However, formation and application of speaker credibility presupposes a persuasive communication situation - that speaker credibility is formed and applied in the context of persuasion. It follows that an appropriate conceptualisation of persuasion is necessary for conceptualising speaker credibility. Therefore, although the purpose of the study is not to investigate persuasion as such, a discussion of persuasion is imperative.

As a working definition, persuasion is a speaker-audience process in which the speaker develops a purpose and appropriate persuasive speaking tools for achieving it, and the audience - with its background factors and characteristics - processes the speaker's claims, perceives the speaker, and accordingly reacts to the total persuasive communication situation.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature of persuasion and develop a speaker-centred theory of persuasion. In this regard, the following aspects are addressed:

- The nature of persuasion is discussed, examining its conceptuality by looking at select viewpoints on persuasion, persuasion and speaker's intention and persuasion in a speaker-centred perspective. Attitudes and attitude change are also discussed as significant elements to the understanding of the nature of persuasion.

- The occurrence of persuasion is examined. Three main factors that account for the occurrence of persuasion are posited, namely, meaning, argumentation and certain audience's internal and external motivational processes.

- It is concluded that the most pertinent factors both in view of the nature of persuasion and in its occurrence are the speaker and the audience, in that order.

These aspects are not for empirical testing, but rather, they are to provide an essential theoretical basis for investigating the research problem.

A quantitative study like this one would necessarily include a substantial amount of literature study in order to provide direction for the study of the research hypotheses

(Creswell, 1994:22). A methodological review approach (Cooper, 1984)[1] is used, as it allows the researcher to focus on methods and definitions and could provide not only summaries of relevant studies but also a critique of the methods.

2.2. NATURE OF PERSUASION

This section articulates a basis of a theory of persuasion, utilising the contributions of rhetorical theory, communication science, and psychology. Two questions are, and need to be, addressed; the one pertaining to the persuasion concept, the other concerning the mediating variables involved in the occurrence of persuasion. In the final analysis, persuasion is an influence that occurs through the change of attitudes and values; that it takes place through messages; and that whether persuasion occurs or not is to be understood in terms of the speaker's intended outcome.

2.2.1. Persuasion concept

Campbell and Hepler (1988:1), Fisher (1978:7), and DeVito (1982:51) presume that all communication is persuasive. Habermas (1984) contends that any communicative action seeks to achieve understanding, the goal of which is to bring about agreement based on a recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness. Habermas (1984:113) argues that "those immediately involved in the communicative practice of everyday life are pursuing aims of **action** (emphasis original); their participation in co-operative processes of interpretation serves to establish a consensus on the basis of which they can coordinate their plans of action and achieve their aims". On the other hand, Marsh (1967), Brembeck and Howell (1976), Zimmerman *et al.* (1977:194) and Verderber (1991a; 1991b) among many others, categorise communication into informative, ceremonial, and persuasive. Definition of persuasion as "communication intended to influence choice" (Brembeck & Howell, 1976:19), for example, implies their categorising of persuasive communication vis-à-vis other kinds of communication.

One might also approach communication science from a phenomenological perspective (e.g., Philotta & MicKunas, 1990) as this would make room for arbitrary ascription of persuasiveness to every communication event. However, such a viewpoint is not only inadequate but it is also misleading, because it focuses on the phenomenon but not on persuasion itself, even to imply that attention should be paid only to the nature of

[1] Cooper (1984) suggests two other review approaches; the integrative review, wherein the researcher simply summaries past research, and the theoretical review, wherein the focus of the researcher is on extant theory that relates to the problem being studied. By no means this is to say that the three review approaches are mutually exclusive.

communication. Since persuasion could be the goal of a communication act, it merits full attention.

2.2.1.1. Viewpoints on persuasion

Perloff (1993:20) suggests that there is a general consensus among scholars about what persuasion is, but a review of literature indicates that such a suggestion is only too ambitious. A discussion of the essential nature of persuasion naturally should begin with a captivating survey of definitions of the concept. It would have been easy to simply say persuasion refers to the state of being persuaded. The question would still be, just what does it mean to be persuaded? A subsidiary question, nevertheless a pertinent one, would also follow: How does one get to that state of being persuaded? According to Brembeck and Howell (1952:24), persuasion is "the conscious attempt to modify thought and action by manipulating the motives of men toward predetermined ends", giving preference of change in the internal motives of the audience through the use of logic.

Focusing on the audience as the one entirely determining whether persuasion has occurred, Fotheringham (1966:7) defines persuasion as "that body of effects in receivers" caused by a message. Incidentally, Fortheringham's definition implies that even unintended messages, if they affect the hearer, constitute persuasion. Taken farther, since communication always results to an impact on the audience, and since messages can take any number of forms, Fortheringham's definition implies that every form of communication is persuasion. From another angle, although this definition could be accepted insofar as it indicates a change of state in the audience, it is simply too general to delineate persuasion from other kinds of communication.

Larson (1995:9) posits that persuasion occurs through the co-operation between the persuasive speaker and the audience, defining persuasion as "the **co-creation** (emphasis original) of a state of identification or alignment between a source and a receiver that results from the use of symbols". But this proposition does not encapsulate the essence of persuasion as much as it describes how persuasion is achieved. The implication is however clear, that when one becomes aligned with a certain set of values and a specific lifestyle then one has been persuaded and that such a change is framed on a prior indented new state.

That persuasion relies on symbolic transactions, both verbal and non-verbal, is a widely accepted proposition. The question, however, is whether all or only some symbolic transactions are persuasion. Some (e.g., Blair, 1965; Toulmin *et al.*, 1984:6) make or imply a distinction between convincing, said to be a process relying on logical proof and appeals to the audience's reason and intellect, and persuading, understood to derive its effectiveness from symbolic appeals to the emotion. Often, the distinction is based on supposedly ethical concerns about how persuasion ought to be achieved; preferring influence through rational, reasoned messages to those resulting from appeals to emotions (cf. Diggs, 1964; Nilsen, 1974). Such a distinction is positivist (Ayer, 1959; Carnap, 1935; Scriven, 1969; Hanfling, 1981), as it presumes the need for and the possibility of riding off sentiments and values from statements in order to make them meaningful, logical and persuasive.

The so-called Vienna Circle, a brand of Logical Positivists, maintained that "the meaning of a sentence consists of the latter's verifiable content. Only assertions about empirical facts admit of verification. Hence sentences about what is in principle beyond experience have no meaning" (Kraft, 1953:34). Logical Positivists further argue that since values are neither tautologies nor empirically verifiable, they are devoid of significance. Moritz Schlick, a former professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna and founder leader of the Vienna Circle argues that (Schlick, 1981:34): "There is only one way of giving meaning to a sentence, of making it a proposition: We must indicate the rules for how it shall be used, in other words: We must describe the facts which will make the proposition 'true', and we must be able to distinguish them from the facts which will make it false."

Thus, the Logical Positivists argue that tone adds nothing to the communication (Carnap, 1935) and that a value is a command in misleading grammatical form (Scriven, 1969). They even assert that questions of value lie wholly outside the domain, not only of science, but also of knowledge. Logical Positivists propose that only descriptive-symbolic meaning in language can be verified empirically and is capable of making true statements; the emotive-evaluative meaning can only express feelings and, as such, does not make any statements, not even false ones (Ogden & Richards, 1972:149). Much of communication thinking fell into the trap of Logical Positivism from which it was argued that questions of value choices should be dealt with by the same methods of validation and inquiry as in the sciences. Ehninger and Hauser (1984:723) observe that "subsequent theorizing and practice in communication operated in the cult of facticity".

But to make a distinction between persuasion and conviction is to fail to recognise that Language is Sermonic (Weaver, 1971). Burke denies the possibility of the semantic ideal, arguing in the *Rhetoric of Motives* (1969:111) that even if a given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its essence as a terminology, it must also be a selection and hence a deflection of reality. Weaver (1965:22) argues that the instrumentality of nuclear meanings is seemingly impossible; for, even with a fact-finding committee, for example, inclination through language cannot be avoided because the findings must be reported through selection and arrangement. It is therefore obvious that the distinction made between conviction and persuasion is untenable. Rather, persuasion occurs through messages that appeal to the reason and emotions of the audience, in which case persuasion is to be conceived as an alloy of logic and emotion, but particular messages may differ in the relative amount of each element.

2.2.1.2. Persuasion and speaker's intention

O'Keefe (1990:17) defines persuasion as "a successful intentional effort at influencing another's mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom". More assertively, Miller (1980:15) describes "being persuaded" as "situations where behavior has been modified by symbolic transactions (messages) which are sometimes, but not always, linked with coercive force (indirectly coercive) and which appeal to the reason and emotions of the person(s) being persuaded".

Both O'Keefe's and Miller's definitions lack clarity on such matters as the degree of success, amount of intentionality, and the kinds of behavioural modification that should result from a persuasive communication. As we shall see later, behavioural modification may not always be necessary for persuasion to be said to have occurred. Most other definitions of persuasion (e.g., Brembeck & Howell, 1952; Scheidel, 1967; Cronkhite, 1969) also imply that "being persuaded" refers to converting the audience and inducing crystallisation of attitudes or behaviours say by soliciting single-mindedness from the audience through shading off conflicting attitudes. Cronkhite (1969:15) does not specify the speaker's conscious intent to influence the audience as necessary in defining persuasion. To him, "persuasion will refer to the act of manipulating symbols so as to produce changes in the evaluative or approach-avoidance behavior of those who interpret the symbols" (emphasis deleted). However, Cronkhite's definition stresses on behaviour, rather than motives and attitudes, and with his emphasis on manipulating symbols, apparently he considers message transmission a necessary condition for persuasion to occur.

Bettinghaus and Cody (1987:3) argue that "as a minimal condition, to be labelled as persuasive, a communication situation must involve a conscious attempt by one individual to change the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message (emphasis deleted)". This is acceptable but only up to a point, because in the aspect of behavioural change this definition fails to distinguish between implementation of a resolution made at the attitudinal level and mere compliance. Thus, for example, when the citizens of a country drive slower because of the coercive powers of speeding laws, that is not being persuaded as Miller (1980:22) implies; it is mere compliance. The audience's compliance with a particular behaviour or set of behaviours without a conviction through the transmission of symbols is neither to be equated to nor interpreted as persuasion. In terms of behavioural change, being persuaded only means adopting some new behaviour(s) to replace old ones, as a consequence of the relevant understanding or attitude change or both.

Defining persuasive communication as a conscious attempt seeking behavioural change of some form (Bettinghaus, 1968:13; Brembeck & Howell, 1976:19) emphasises the intentionality of the speaker to modify the audience's behaviour. Defining persuasive speaking as consciously formulating and using arguments in a way that is designed to affect the audience's beliefs and/or move them to action (Scheidel, 1967:1; Verderber, 1991b:4) emphasises intentionality and behavioural influence. This sort of conceptualisation does well in underscoring the necessity of the speaker's intention, but it is too narrow, since it focuses only on one kind of intended effect. On the other hand, not any or every kind of speaker's intended effect should constitute a persuasive attempt. It is therefore necessary to delineate communicational intentions that would constitute persuasion. Obviously, the first criteria for a persuasive intent is whether it seeks to achieve one or some of the aspects of being persuaded as discussed above.

2.2.1.3. Persuasion in a speaker-centred perspective

One might understand the occurrence of persuasion in terms of the outcome of the process, which could be response-shaping, response-reinforcing, or response-changing (Miller, 1980) or some form of response-terminating - whether defusion or neutralising (Simons, 1986). Response-shaping appertains to cases where the audience does not initially possess a particular pattern of responses to some stimuli. In such cases, being persuaded means obtaining, through a communication, formed and conditioned responses to those stimuli. Thus, response-shaping leads to the acquisition of new beliefs or behaviours (Simons, 1986:23), but Miller (1980:17) argues that "all instances of response-shaping are not commonly thought as instances of being persuaded". This kind of being persuaded could be equated with learning and socialisation, and is in fact attitude formation, not attitude change. Since values are of greater concern than attitudes (Rokeach, 1968:124; 1971), success in shaping a response should depend on the linkages between the response desired and strongly held values. It should also depend on the extent to which the audience perceives that the maintenance of the important values dictates the adoption of the responses sought by the speaker.

Response-reinforcing, on the other hand, refers to intensifying existing convictions, activating them into actions, and deterring the weakening of support. Hence, since people are in the process of being persuaded, response-reinforcing always requires to be sustained by multiple-messages. Saltiel and Woelfel (1975) propose that the strength of an audience's attitudes depends entirely on the number of incoming messages about an attitude issue they possess. In the context of response-reinforcing, it appears that audiences are too readily open to the information presented to distort it, and that impact of speaker credibility will be less than where persuasion seeks to change attitudes or behaviour.

Preventing persuasion could also be a persuasive goal, in which case it would entail the persuading of the audience not to be persuaded. This could be achieved in several ways:

First, through a public advocacy, behavioural commitment could be obtained; an anchoring approach could be used, whereby the attitudinal position to be preserved is "tied" to some significant things for the audience.

Second, the persuasive speaker could create resistant cognitive states by, for instance, increasing the audience's self-esteem, so that they become less likely to "regret" a position that they are holding.

Third, the audience could be trained such that they acquire an ability and an inclination to think critically when listening and to recognise fallacies in the argumentation scheme of a speaker. With these qualities, the audience would not be easily persuaded.

Fourth, a lowering of the credibility of the likely counterpersuading source and an elevation of the credibility of the inducing source would increase resistance to counterpersuasion.

Fifth, designing and presenting messages according to McGuire's (1964, 1966) inoculation theory, which maintains that threat triggers receiver motivation to bolster attitudes against change. Research in both laboratory and applied settings consistently indicates the efficacy of inoculation in instilling resistance to persuasion (see e.g., Pfau *et al.*, 1990; Pfau *et al.*, 1992; Pfau, 1996). There are contentions that many of the questions inoculation theory raises about psychological processes remain unresolved, particularly concerning the pivotal role of inoculation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993:568). Addressing such contentions, Pfau *et al.* (1997) probe the relationship between threat and involvement and their role in inoculation, as well as the nature of the cognitive processes triggered via inoculation. They conclude that inoculation elicits threat, threat contributes to resistance, and resistance is most pronounced for more involved audiences and for more involving topics.

McGuire proposes four methods of achieving inoculation: Supportive message treatment, refutational message treatment, concept boosting, and assertion weakening. Burgoon and Chase (1973) posit that for linguistic pre-treatment and attack messages, the more intense the messages are, the greater the resistance to counterpersuasion there would be. This is because the inoculation messages help the audience to develop the content and language expectations of the counterpersuasive messages. This means that the audience's perceptions of the likelihood their attitudinal positions will be attacked will determine what they invest in creating defences. On the other hand, one could hypothesise that the perceived effect of imminent counterpersuasion might lead to the audience's resignation from self-defence, in which case it would also imply that forewarning of a persuasive attack could actually enhance the impact of that counterpersuasive message. Perhaps it is from this hypothesis that Burgoon *et al.* (1978) posit that in the forewarning, the attack should be made equally likely and unlikely to occur, and that the resultant uncertainty will produce a motivation to generate defences.

From this analysis, it could be concluded that being persuaded would refer to the degrees of correspondence between the intended effect and actual effect, and the intended meaning and actual meaning. As a purposeful enterprise, persuasion attempts to modify some targeted beliefs, values or behaviours of the audience to some predetermined new state. Within the context of speech communication, persuasion would refer to such an effect upon the audience - attitudinal or behavioural or both - as the speaker seeks to achieve through forming and presenting appropriate oral arguments, adapting them to the specific audience.

2.2.2. Persuasion and change of attitudes

Miller (1987:453) acknowledges that in all scientific inquiry, the attitude construct has been used most in persuasion literature and attitude change has been consistently the standard for assessing the relative impact of persuasive messages. To properly understand Miller's acknowledgement, it seems necessary to understand the various conceptions of attitudes. Cacioppo and Tassinary (1989) provide a useful conceptual history of attitudes from a postural orientation to multidimensional representations of human experience. But Sherif *et al.* (1965:252) offer a typical affective conceptualisation of the term:

> Operationally, an attitude is defined more accurately as a set of evaluative categories the individual has formed (or learned) during interaction with the persons and objects in his social world and which demarcate a latitude of acceptance (the positions he finds acceptable including the most acceptable single position) and the latitude of rejection (the positions he finds objectionable in varying degree, including the most objectionable position). Since techniques for attitude measurement developed in the present approach do not arbitrarily force

> the individual to respond to every position, there remains the possibility of noncommitment on certain positions.

This affective view of attitude, though useful, is weak, as Cacioppo and Tassinary (1989:338) observe:

> the overemphasis of the cognitive and behavioral contributions to, and consequences of, people's predisposition to respond in a particular manner toward a psychological object; discrepancies between people's cognitive evaluation of, and emotional response to, attitude objects; and differences in the stability, volatility, specificity, and simultaneity of people's emotions versus the predisposition to respond toward a psychological object.

Despite its being cumbersome, the conceptualisation of attitude as a tripartite of affect, behaviour and cognition is superior. "Attitude" then refers to orientations of the mind, as internal states that exert influence on overt behaviour.

Several questions need to be answered regarding the utility of the attitude construct in explaining persuasion. It is so commonly assumed that attitudes have a substantial impact on conduct that persuasion is identified with attitude change. Is there a relation between attitudes and behaviour? Responses to this question are found on both sides, those on the affirmative and those in the negative. On the one hand, as early as 1934, LaPiere found that behaviours were inconsistent with attitudes, and Corey (1937), for example, found that there was no relation between attitude toward cheating and actual cheating behaviour. Wicker's review of 31 studies at least questions the attitude-behaviour relation and concludes that (Wicker, 1969:65): "Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be closely related to actions. . . . Correlation coefficients relating the two kinds of responses are rarely above .30, and often are near zero."

The attitude change theory is challenged by those who, under the Rules approach, reject that either causal conditions exist or can be determined for persuasion to occur; those who reject the idea that attitudes are necessary in understanding persuasion, among them, Larson and Sanders (1975), Miller (1980) and Jaccard (1981). The criticism is also based on the implication that individuals possess neatly organised cognitive and affective maps of their overall attitude structures and that these maps constitute a master plan for guiding and directing responses to persuasive messages. But it seems that the conception of attitudes as precursors of behaviour comes from the biased view that communicative transactions are highly mindful, cognitive events.

Critics of the attitude change theory hold that people do not devote a great deal of contemplation on how they feel about certain matters. Since there is no sharp attitudinal stance, individuals examine their behaviours in light of the available evidence, thus behaviour implying attitude rather than attitude implying behaviour (Bem, 1965, 1968, 1972; Zetterberg, 1965). Bem's self-perception theory in particular posits that behaviours frequently play a powerful role in shaping attitudes.

Studies indicate that belief-discrepant behaviours such as advocacy of attitudinally discrepant positions produce more favourable attitudes towards the initially belief-discrepant position (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Miller & Burgoon, 1973:72; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Wicklund and Brehm (1976:129) report that, following a counterattitudinal behaviour, there was a greater positive attitude change among experimental subjects who received a low justification than those who received a high justification for engaging in the behaviour. Finally, the methodological value of attitude and attitude change constructs is criticised on grounds of an apparent attitude-behaviour problem (Cushman & McPhee, 1980), that verbal indicators of attitude typically correlate minimally with other attitudinally-consistent behaviours.

On the other hand, from Allport's 17 conceptual definitions, "attitude" became to be conceptually understood as "a preparation or readiness for response" (Cushman & McPhee, 1980:2). Thurstone's (1959:297) definition of attitude as "the affect for or against a psychological object" paved the way to the conception of the link between attitude and behaviour. Subsequent attitude measurement scales by such people as Thurstone (1959:225ff), Likert (1932), and Guttman (1944), gradually brought a conceptual change in which attitude was increasingly seen as internal, abstract, unidirectional, and evaluative (Cushman & McPhee, 1980:3). Ultimately, Osgood *et al.* (1958:190) conceived attitude as a learned implicit process which is potentially bipolar, varies in intensity, and linked to behaviour only as a broad dimension of internalised mediatory response.

The attitude construct remains useful in investigating persuasion, and as O'Keefe (1990:191) observes, the earlier pessimist conclusions about the attitude-behaviour relation are overdrawn. Research, though sparse, indicates several factors that moderate the relationship between attitudes and behaviour. In persuasive communication, changes in attitudes and beliefs are necessary before changes in emotions, cognitions and behaviour can occur (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:18). The accumulated empirical literature summarised by Schuman and Johnson (1976:168) show that "attitudes and behaviors are related to an extent that ranges from small to moderate in degrees". Other studies also question the scepticism surrounding the attitude-behaviour relation, indicating that sometimes attitudes do predict behaviour. Analysis of voting records in the USA between 1952-1964 carried out by Kelley and Mirer (1974:575), for example, indicated that the voting behaviour of 88% respondents could be accurately predicted on the basis of their pre-election attitudes. Goodmonson and Glaudin (1971:180) obtained a significantly high correlation (.58) between attitudes and behaviour. Also, a high correlation (.65) between attitudes and behaviour was observed between energy usage and homeowners' attitudes regarding the necessity of air conditioning in maintaining their health and comfort (Seligman *et al.*, 1979). Clearly, research findings reflect diversity, from particularly low correlations as in the case of interracial buyer-seller transactions and cheating in school, to unusually high correlations, as in voting. In view of this, the position taken by Fazio and Zanna (1981:165) is most appropriate: "Rather than asking whether attitudes relate to behavior, we have to ask "Under what conditions do what kinds of attitudes of what kinds of individuals predict what kinds of behavior?". . . . We need to treat the strength of the attitude-behavior relation as we would treat any other dependent variable and determine what factors affect it" (italicisation deleted).

However, the question that should be addressed is that since attitudes and behaviour are not always so directly related, then when are they strongly related? One such factor is that an attitude has to be perceived as relevant to a given behaviour, of course implying that audiences pay attention to this relevance. Snyder (1982:114) notes that it is only when individuals explicitly define their attitudes as relevant and appropriate guides to action that they could turn to their general attitudinal orientations for guidance in making their choices. Relevance is related to the fact that a specific behaviour is best predicted by an attitudinal question that is equivalently specific to the action called for (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994:74). A general behavioural pattern is best predicted by a general attitude measure. Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) found that whereas on average the correlation between being religious, a general behaviour, and any specific behaviour, e.g., praying before meals and donating to religious institutions, was .15, the correlation between the attitude and the general behavioural pattern, that is the number of religious actions performed, was .71. Therefore, the degree of match between the attitude and the behaviour to be predicted affects the strength of the attitude-behaviour relation to be observed.

Also, the attitude-behaviour consistency is influenced by several situational variables, such as the extent to which the person has a vested interest in the attitude issue (Sivacek & Crano, 1982) and time pressure to reach decision (Jamieson & Zanna, 1989). But also, since behaviour is regulated by social norms, as people often behave as others expect them to behave, even contrary to the attitudes they hold about the object of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the relevant norms for a particular behaviour would influence the attitude-behaviour consistency. In the same way, because every attitude is linked to other attitudes, any cues that call the audience's attention to those other attitudes that are relevant to the issue would influence the attitude-behaviour consistency.

The attitude-behaviour consistency is also influenced by the manner in which the attitude was formed (O'Keefe, 1990:193; Fazio & Zanna, 1981). This formative basis of the attitude defines its quality, which subsequently defines its influence on the individual's behaviour. Attitudes based on direct experience are more predictive of behaviour than those formed through indirect experience, and the more information people have about the attitude object, the greater the attitude-behaviour consistency there will be (Davidson *et al.*, 1985). What the formative basis of attitudes suggests is that identical attitude scores among respondents does not mean that the behaviours of such people are consistent with the attitude in the same way. It can only be so if the attitude was formed in the same or similar manner.

Lastly, attitude-behaviour consistency is influenced by the qualities of the person involved, especially self-monitoring (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994:75) and the level of moral reasoning (Rholes & Bailey, 1983). Low self-monitors are independent and thus guide their behavioural choices primarily on the basis of their internal states, while high self-monitors tend to look for external reinforcement and assurance and thus base their behavioural choices primarily on cues to situational appropriateness. That low self-monitors exhibit greater attitude-behavioural consistency than high self-monitors is fairly consistent (Ajzen *et al.*, 1982; Shepherd, 1985; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982; Kline, 1987; Zanna *et al.*, 1980).

Another question that calls our attention pertains to how attitudes guide behaviour. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980:5) argue that people consider the implications of their actions before deciding whether or not to engage in a given behaviour. Presumably, most actions of social relevance are under volitional control, and thus a person considers, weighs, and combines his attitudes towards the behaviour and the subjective norm regarding that behaviour. The subjective norm is a resultant component of what the person believes to be the wishes of significant others about what he should or should not do and his own motivation to comply with those wishes. The person's attitude and the subjective norm produce intention, which then leads to behaviour.

Also, attitudes could guide behaviour even when there is no conscious deliberation about one's attitudes and their insinuations. Fazio's (1986) attitude-to-behaviour theory posits that the precursor of behaviour is a person's definition of the event, which is constituted by the person's perceptions of the attitude object in the immediate situation and his accumulated knowledge regarding behaviours that are expected and those that are appropriate for that particular situation. The influence of attitudes on perception implies that an attitude is activated and leads to selective perception which, subsequently, produces the immediate perceptions of the attitude object. The immediate perceptions of the attitude object and the definition of the situation then jointly define the event which, finally, leads to behaviour. Also, sometimes behaviour leads to attitude change to justify it and align the attitude to it (Cooper & Scher, 1994:96).

How attitude change mediates persuasion is best explained by Katz's functional theory (1960). Katz posits that the formation and change of attitudes are to be understood in terms of the four functions attitudes fulfil. Utilitarian attitudes prompt people to strive towards maximising rewards from the external environment and minimising penalties. Since they are dependent upon comparisons of present and past perceptions of an object's utility, they can be changed by creating dissatisfaction with the object for the attitude. In the ego-defensive function, attitudes provide defence mechanisms such as withdrawal, denial, or distortion of reality, projection, and displacement. Ego-defensive attitudes can be aroused by threat to the ego, such as demagoguery, competitive situations, appeal to repressed emotions, and appeal to authority. A reversal of the arousal factors may be necessary in changing ego-defensive values, although not sufficient. Attitudes that serve as avenues of value expression, both give positive expression of a person's central values and mould the person's self-image closer to what the person desires. These types of attitudes can be changed by creating discrepancy between the values and the attitudes. The "knowledge" attitudes facilitate the search for understanding and the orderliness of perceptual organisation by providing the necessary reference frame. From this then, new information does not modify attitudes unless inconsistency exists between attitudinal structure and new perceptions. Knowledge attitudes can therefore be changed by creating ambiguity of situations, which leads the person to impose change on his cognitive structure.

A basic framework of persuading through attitudinal motivation then would be to excite some desire in the audience, make a connection between the desire and what the persuasive speaker is set to suggest and the gratification of that desire. Persuasive messages trigger the attitudes which, consequently, motivate compliance to the proposals in the messages.

2.3. OCCURRENCE OF PERSUASION

So, persuasion is change in the audience in terms of attitudes, beliefs, values or behaviour, or induced resistance to counterpersuasion, as may be intended by the persuasive speaker, through the speaker's presentation of appropriate arguments. In this section the occurrence of persuasion is examined. As it will become clear in the subsequent discussion, three premises govern the occurrence of persuasion: A set of processes involved in the creation of meaning; processes involving argumentation; processes involving audience motivation; and processes involving the role of the speaker.

2.3.1. Persuasion and meaning

Some philosophical camps imply that meaning is not necessary for persuasion to occur, but this position, we argue, is usually based on a deficient concept of either meaning or persuasion, or both.

Skinnerian behaviouralism, for instance, posits that meaning is response to a stimulus. Skinner's postulation was part of his learning theory, the basis of which was the classical conditioning studies of Ian Pavlov (1849-1936). Pavlov postulated that learning was an outcome of reinforcement on a stimulus-response pattern, thus implying that it was not by the acquisition of meaning. To Skinner and his followers, even reinforcement was not necessary in the learning process because human beings naturally seek to maximise rewards and minimise punishments (Hilgard & Bower, 1966:108; Perloff, 1993:70). This operant conditioning approach was demonstrated by Greenspoon (1955), among others.

However, although the learning theory seems coherent and has received some empirical support, it seems too mechanistic to facilitate persuasion as conceptualised in this study. As Zimbardo *et al.* (1977:21) argue, if the learning theory were valid, appropriate variations of conditions of learning should produce lasting behavioural change, which it does not.

Hull's systematic behavioural theory implies that the meaning of a symbol can only be known after it is used to communicate and the response generated seen, in which regard meaning is made at best useless, at worst unnecessary in the planning of a persuasive event. Along this line of thought, attitudes and behaviours are seen as learned (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:23) and that changes in attitudes are facilitated by learning (Littlejohn, 1978:382). Even Hull's (1930, 1934) systematic behavioural theory, a modified form of Skinnerian behaviouralism positing that habits are formed through drive-stimulus reinforcements (Hilgard & Bower, 1966:146), is inadequate. Hull (1930, 1934) held that the meaning of a stimulus resided in the relationship between that stimulus and the response it produced.

Rather, for persuasion to occur, meaning must be created; the audience's actual meaning should eventually correspond, as close as possible, with the speaker's intended meaning. As Fisher (1978:250) observes, whereas the concept of meaning is not limited to the study of human communication and that meaning may exist with or without the existence of communication, there can be no communication where there is no meaning. Since, then, no discussion of communication is complete without a consideration of meaning (Littlejohn, 1992:380), a discussion of meaning and its relation to persuasion is pertinent. In the following section, various approaches to and theories of meaning are examined, with a view to delineating the meaning of meaning that suits the purposes of the present study as well as the means by which meaning could be created and the role of meaning in the occurrence of persuasion.

2.3.1.1. Approaches to understanding meaning

Littlejohn (1992) raises pertinent questions regarding meaning in communication: Where is meaning located? How does meaning arise? What is the role of meaning in interpretation? He identifies three general approaches to these questions - the structuralist, the interactionist, and the cognitivist.

Structuralists see meaning in the arbitrary relationship between a sign and a referent. The hard version of this position posits that meaning is an enduring relationship presented through messages and, hence, the meaning is in the sign; it is in the text. Classical semiotics, classical linguistics and much of hermeneutical scholarship take this view. The soft version of structuralism acknowledges that signs come with alternative meanings, and individuals may choose from among these meanings, implying that interpretation could be a matter of conscious choice. But also, interpretation could be coloured by numerous cultural factors that are beyond immediate awareness. Much semiotics show that meaning is determined in part by signs and in part by interpreters.

In contradistinction to the structuralist views of meaning are the interactional-conventional approaches. For theorists in the symbolic-interactionist and social constructionist traditions, meaning is worked out interactionally within the social group (Littlejohn, 1992). Whereas structuralists tend to take a universalist, synchronic view, interactionists take a historical diachronic one.

The cognitivist view of meaning, on the other hand, sees meaning as an active individual interpretative process, as a result of information processing and, hence, meaning is a product of the mind. From a Kantian position, which presumes certain universal categories of mind, the cognitivist approach views meaning as a result of applying these universal categories to information. Other theorists see meaning as a result of universal mental processes such as action assembly (Greene, 1984; 1989), attribution (Kelley, 1973; Seibold & Spitzberg, 1981; Sillars, 1982), and information integration (Anderson, 1971; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Wyer, 1974). Here meaning is the result of certain kinds of mental work.

Although the conceptual differences among the three approaches could be acknowledged, the tension can be resolved temporarily by granting truth to one side or the other at given moments. For example, even the most rigid structuralist position would permit the view that meanings receive contextual colour, depending on the way signs are used within a cultural orientation and that individuals do use some kind of cognitive process in dealing with messages. At the same time, the meanings of signs that arise from symbolic interaction within the social group come to have some structural force. These meanings, therefore, do endure and do affect future interactions. The differences in individual cognitive functioning, as the cognitivists maintain, and their possible influence on the construal of meaning seem to be obvious.

This controversy of meaning seems to be dealing with the power to define. Do people define their realities individually and culturally, or do people receive a set of realities pre-defined by language? The answer to this problem of meaning, according to Littlejohn (1992:381), can only be an outcome of the interplay between the structure of the message, the use of the message in the actual situated interaction, and the mental process necessary to manage the information contained in the message and make interpretation of that information. Within symbolic interactionism, dramatism and narrative traditions, communication and meaning are unabashedly social, and meaning is created through and sustained by interaction in the social group (Littlejohn, 1992:169). Interaction establishes, maintains, and changes certain conventions - roles, norms, rules and meanings - within a social group or cultural orientation. Those conventions literally define the reality of the culture.

2.3.1.2. Meaning and its meanings

Several theoretical frameworks exist for conceptualising meaning. From philosophy of language, meaning and understanding are interrelated, since "the meaning of an expression in a language is what a competent speaker of the language understands by that expression" (Platts, 1979:43). The referential theorists (e.g., Brodbeck, 1963) posit that the meaning of the term is the object, thought, concept, or idea to which it refers, and that there is no direct relationship between a symbol and the object it symbolises. In the structuralist camp, holding generally that persons use signs to designate objects, a sign represents something other than itself and that representation is the meaning of that sign (Littlejohn, 1987:53).

Fisher (1978) discusses the meanings of meaning from four perspectives. Mechanistically, meaning is a function of the transmission and reception of the message on the channel; and such meaning is achieved through alleviating message distortion and potential misconception (Fisher, 1978:255). From this perspective, meaning varies from one point to another as the message moves along the channel. This conception of meaning might be making a contribution to the understanding of meaning, but its focus on the message and location on the channel loses sight of the role of the audience in grasping that meaning. From the interactional perspective, meaning is a commonality of social experiences, and it is shared by those communicating through "a process of mutual empathy through active role taking" (Fisher, 1978:258).

Thus, meaning is in this case the creation of a social situation, the premise of which is a set of significant symbols. Since the meaning of any symbol - word or object - is a function of its sociology, as in the interactional perspective, each social situation includes only a limited number of meanings for any symbol. This conception of meaning assumes a dialogical setting of communication and does not render itself applicable to the public persuasive speaking context. In the pragmatic perspective, meaning is not limited to just words but to patterns of behaviour that constrain the choices of people. Fisher (1978:262) deduces that:

> Meaning, then, is equivalent to choosing a repertoire of possible interpretations or meanings, and the process is a process of elimination - reducing available meanings to a manageable number, perhaps a single choice. . . . Meaning is then not in any person but in the social system, reflected by redundant patterns of interaction - performance "rules".

In this respect, meaning is a cojoined co-creation of the people who are interacting. This conception applies to dyadic situations or any others where communication is characterised by interaction, or by the possibility for interaction. In any case, meaning is still primarily a product of the audience's responsive construction of incoming stimuli.

A more appropriate conception of meaning for public persuasive communication is what Fisher (1978:256) places under the psychological perspective. Meanings are the result of an individual's perceptions through internalised conceptual filters, and those filters are the result of the individual's experiences. Therefore what is desired for communication to occur is an isomorphism of meaning between the audience and the speaker. Since meaning entails the intake and processing of stimuli, any meaning begins with symbols and symbol systems and in that regard a further discussion of meaning and symbols is called for. In this respect, meaning is the attributing of significance to perceived symbols, involving three levels. At the semantic level, meaning is the result of cognitive processing and application of rules by which symbol systems are related to the nonsymbolic world, variously called "descriptive meaning" (Stevenson, 1944:70) or "semantic meaning" (Cronkhite, 1984:111). Stevenson (1944:70) defined "descriptive meaning" of a sign as "its disposition to affect cognition, provided that the disposition is caused by an elaborate process of conditioning that has attended the sign's use in communication, and provided that the disposition is rendered fixed, at least to a considerable degree, by linguistic rules."

Cronkhite (1984:112) extends Stevenson's "semantic view" to include the existence of rules that specify the semantic meaning and give it existence that is independent of any specific act of cognition by a language user. Cronkhite argues further that an utterance would have a permissible range of meaning, and that semantic meanings are not in people but in the words and are only to be perceived.

Langer (1975) posits that symbols may be concepts in which case they have common meaning, or they may be conceptions, referring to their unique use in a particular context. Where a symbol is a concept, its meaning becomes a matter and a process of signification and that meaning is what the symbol conventionally indicates. However, even with symbols presumed to be concepts, the utility of that presumed common meaning could only be tapped through the audience's context-governed decoding. In that case, then, one would only talk of a common range of meanings of a given word in a given context, the specific aspect of which each time depends on the decoding potential of the audience as well as the context. This implies further that, where the use of a given word is found across a variety of contexts, one should even talk of common *ranges* of meanings.

In this regard Richards' (1936) Context Theorem of Meaning is more helpful. Richards (1936:11, 51) posits that misuse of language arises from the "proper meaning superstition", the belief that each word has a meaning, ideally, a single meaning, of its own, independent of and controlling its use and the purpose for which it should be used; and the "proper usage superstition", the doctrine that there is a correct way of using every word. To overcome the two superstitions, the Context Theorem of Meaning postulates that the meaning of a word is assigned by the audience to fill up the missing parts of the context. Defining context as the cluster of events that recur together in the audience's mind, Richards posits that it is from its context that a word draws its delegated efficacy.

Besides the semantic dimension, meaning is a result of cognitive effects of symbol systems on their listeners and those effects are governed by psychosocial principles. This "emotive meaning", as Stevenson (1944:59-60) describes it, is "a meaning in which the response (from the hearer's point of view) or the stimulus (from the speaker's point of view) is a range of emotions". Meaning, then, is a stimulus-initiated response internally-mediated by the components of a person's semantic space. Roelofse (1987:53) points that nothing of complexity and richness of the human experience can be communicated except at the connotative level of meaning. This connotative meaning resides in the relationship between the sign and its referent and that relationship is based on the associations, implications and feelings that arise from the denotative meaning of the sign.

Meaning may also lie in the social and psychological context within which an utterance occurs and the entire communication scene. Barlett (1950), who pioneered the study of discourse processing, found that subjects creatively paraphrased the discourse to obtain a context in which the discourse would make sense. This paraphrasing was attributed to hypothesised cognitive frameworks by which perceivers make sense of their sensations. Other studies confirm that people do in fact have schemata and that the schemata aid in interpreting discourse (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Dooling & Lachman, 1971). Meaning then is created also through comprehension of the total drama, which entails the processing of the words and sentences as well as other cues, to finally constitute a whole rhetorical scene. Speaking about interpreting communicative utterances, rather than words, Habermas (1984:115) argues that:

> . . . in the paradigm case of a speech act oriented to reaching understanding, the interpreter has to be familiar with the conditions of its validity. . . . He can understand the meaning of communicative acts only because they are embedded in contexts of action oriented to reach understanding. . . . Thus the interpreter cannot become clear about the semantic content of an expression independently of the action contexts. . . .

It would, therefore, be deduced that meaning is that product of a cognitive construction from perceived information cues which is also influenced by cultural as well as psychological and context-specific pragmatic factors. Whereas the speaker's intended meaning is a product of a pre-speaking constructual process, the audience's actual meaning is an inference to the cues and symbols transmitted by the speaker. As Berlo (1960:175) points out, meaning itself is not transferable or transmittable; only signals, cues and symbols are. These signals, cues, and symbols are construed by the audience into a meaning, which may at best be an approximation of the speaker's intended meaning. Since there is the possibility of varying degrees of correspondence of meaning between that which the speaker intends and that which the audience develops, there should be a hypothetical critical level of the audience's meaning below which it should be said that meaning creation failed.

2.3.1.3. *Creation of meaning*

If, generally, meaning is a cognitive construction, then specific meanings would be products of speaker-guided specific cognitive constructions. The speaker would guide the audience's construction of meaning through the selection and use of appropriate symbols and symbol systems. It is in this sense that one could speak of meaning creation. Now, the creation of meaning occurs through a two-level signification process, first denotation, and then connotation (Fiske, 1990:85). Denotation refers to the describing of the relationship between the signifier and the signified within the sign, and of the sign with its referent in external reality. Connotation on the other hand, describes the movement of meaning to become subjective or inter-subjective, describing the interaction that occurs when the sign meets the emotions of the users and their cultural values.

The fact that meaning is greatly determined by the context also means that the symbols used to create language are arbitrary and ambiguous, and their meanings exist only if and when interpreted. Wyer and Gruenfeld (1995:11) suggest that the interpretation of social communication occurs through semantic encoding processes. Even though the context of their discussion is the dyadic, and perhaps informal, the explanation of the process of meaning creation through interpretation seems to be valid for any situation. The implication of what Wyer and Gruenfeld (1995) suggest is that meaning comes through information processing, in particular, interpretation.

In processing information, the use of any concept to interpret a given piece of information depends on both the frequency and recency with which that concept has been used by the audience in the past. Once a piece of information is interpreted in terms of a general concept, the concept is used later as a basis for inferring attributes and behaviours that are implied by the concept though not by the original information (Wyer & Gruenfeld, 1995:13). But the accessibility of a concept in memory is likely to affect the interpretation of information only if the descriptive features of the concept can be instantiated in terms of the information (Higgins *et al.*, 1977).

One would suppose that when information is conveyed in a social context, its interpretation is guided, partly, by the audience's perception of the motivation behind its being conveyed. In particular, the audience's social norms would play a significant role in the interpretation. Since audiences would have complex filter systems made up of beliefs, values, perceptions, attitudes, motives, biases, prejudices, and experiences, these psychographics of a specific audience permit and lead to that audience's own interpretation of the incoming symbols as well as the entire communication scene. In line with this view, McLeod and Chaffee (1972:51) observe that:

> The social influence process is greatly affected by the beliefs, attitudes, and values brought to an influence situation by its participants. These intrapersonal factors help determine the amount of influence attempted and achieved, as well as the patterns of the interactions that occur in an interpersonal encounter. One's prior beliefs, attitudes, and values form a frame of reference - a kind of a cognitive map for interpreting reality that precedes and controls the exchange of information and influence.

Audiences supply elements of clarifications and interpretations from their rich store of rumours, wishful thinking, and stereotypes (Bormann, 1972:398). And since this information from their internal banks is widely varied, it contributes to the differing interpretations of a communication message. It follows that when the audience is persuaded, it is persuaded from its own meaning, which implies the necessity to select, phrase, and present the idea so that the consumer of the message can readily organise the data into a meaningful, useful perception.

It was pointed earlier that persuasion is to be understood in terms of the speaker's intended effect and that such an effect calls for a specific intended meaning (see *2.2.1*). It was stated that effectiveness in persuasion is to be defined in terms of the degree of correspondence between what the speaker intended in both meaning and effect and what actually happens in the audience after the communication, also in terms of both meaning and effect. Achieving the maximum correspondence between the speaker's intended meaning and the audience's actual meaning is one of the greatest challenges of the persuasive speaker. An understanding of how meaning is created needs a borrowing from general semantics, semiotics, and argumentation theory as well as an understanding of how audiences process messages.

Meaning creation requires precise delineation. Following the pioneering work of Alfred Korzybski (1947), the general semanticists advocate a careful and systematic study and use of language and call for precision in language use. Korzybski (1947:498) posits that:

> A language is like a map; it *is not* (italics original) the territory represented; but it may be a good map or bad map. If the map shows a different structure from the territory represented . . . then the map is worse than useless as it misinforms and leads astray. One who made use of it could never be certain of reaching his destination. The use of *el* language to represent events which operate as-a-whole, is at least, misguiding and semantically dangerous.

The conceptions that people have of other persons, objects, groups, things and ideas, are different from the real persons, objects, groups, things, and ideas. In this way the general semanticists recognise the difference between an event, object, or experience and an individual's conception of it. The general semanticists argue that presuming the map to be the territory is dangerous, not only because it is inaccurate but also because some of the maps that people have represent non-existent territories. The issue is that abstract language is a problem in communication, because the more an abstract term is the wider the range of meanings, hence the lower the degree of precision.

Thus, from general semantics, one could posit that lack of precise delineation could mean the presence of philosophical, psychological, semantic or conceptual vernacular, in which case the audience is unable to decode the speaker's communication symbols to construct the critical meaning level needed for the response sought. One could even say that in such a case there is no message, if one accepts Fisher's (1978:270) notion of message as interpretation or as commonality between the speaker and the audience. Precise delineation requires the use of extension devices for explicating emotional connotations of expressions; dating, in which the time frame of the expression is provided; and "among other things" or "and so on", to indicate that one can never tell the whole story. Precise delineation calls for the use of "quotation marks" to indicate that one is using some words in one's particular way in that particular context.

Meaning creation requires appropriate use of language. The manner in which the functional, thematic, and semantic dimensions of language are incorporated in using language (Larson, 1995:128) influences the process of creating meaning. In the functional dimension, attention is paid to the appropriate type of sentences to be used. Thematically, certain words or word groups have qualities that give them texture, and besides their semantic meaning and a syntactical function, "their most important persuasive aspect is their ability to set a mood, develop a feeling, or generate a tone or a theme for persuasion" (Larson, 1995:142). Such words would include metaphors and words tied to sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste.

Word-texture also comes through the use of what Weaver (1953) refers to as god terms, devil terms, and charismatic terms. A god term is an expression "about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and powers. Its force impacts to the others their lesser degree of force" (Weaver, 1953:211). In contrast, devil terms are negative, albeit equally forceful. Weaver (1953:48) describes charismatic terms as those whose meanings depend on whether it is accepted that their contents proceed out of a popular will that they shall mean something. Of course, god, devil and charismatic terms, like all others, change with time and place, and are quite strongly tied to the broad context of a given communication.

Meaning creation requires a textual posture. Semiotic theory posits that everything in a communication enterprise is a text; and all texts, verbal or non-verbal, convey meaning through signifiers that refer to concepts, objects, or events. Hervey (1982:2) contends that, in all its varying forms, such as inductive (Morris, 1946; Austin, 1962), and speculative (Barthes, 1967), semiotics is the study of a phenomenon that manifests itself as a particular type of correlation, that between signals and messages. In a comprehensive theory of signs integrating much of earlier semiotic thinking as well as incorporate a variety of structuralist ideas, Eco (1976) provides an extended discussion of a theory of codes. He (1976:57) argues that a single-vehicle, insofar as several codes make it become the functive of several sign-functions, can become the expression of several contents and produce a complex discourse:

> I am not saying that a single code can produce many messages, one after the other, for this is a mere truism; I am not saying that the contents of many messages can be conveyed by the same kind of sign-vehicle, according to diverse codes, for this too is a truism; I am saying that usually a single sign-vehicle conveys many intertwined contents and therefore what is commonly called a "message" is in fact a text whose context is a multilevelled discourse.

Thus, persuasive communication, and any communication event, is text to be "read" by the audience. This implies that for the creation of meaning, the entire rhetorical act should be constructed as text, with all the necessary codes and the pattern with which the appropriate meaning for achieving the intended effect will be read by the audience. The audience constructs meaning out of a story, not from merely a collection of units of the persuasive event. What this means is that, not only is one overall meaning impression needed and which will form part of the basis for the audience's response, but also that in reality persuasion does not occur on the basis of the bits and pieces of information in the persuasive presentation.

2.3.1.4. Mediatory role of meaning in persuasion

Persuasion literature appears to assume that meaning contributes to the occurrence of persuasion but is generally silent regarding the explanation of that contribution. Just how does meaning lead to the occurrence of persuasion? Audi (1991) discusses the conceptions of reason and action of Aristotle, Hume and Kant. In Aristotle's conception of reason and the structure of action, human beings are rational and are motivated by knowledge (Audi, 1991:37). In the Humean conception, human beings act "within the constraints of foundationalist psychology of motivation and an instrumentalist conception of rational action" (Audi, 1991:56). This means that human beings are predisposed to act because of as well as in order to fulfil wants, desires, and needs. Kant, on the other hand, postulates that human beings act from reason, implying that reason both motivates and sufficiently explains action (Audi, 1991:78). Such acting may even demand that one formulates a new principle, especially where moral considerations conflict. What Aristotle, Hume and Kant conceptualise as reason is not the same as meaning in the sense of the present discussion, but meaning can be seen as reason in the sense of their discussions. Action, of course, is not limited to overt behaviour but covers a broad range as to be equivalent to *response* in its various forms. The link between action and reason seems to be one of motivation.

The understanding that meaning motivates response is still incomplete if one does not understand how meaning actually effects motivation. Social psychologists understand the strength of the consistency principle in directing human action. Newcomb (1953), Festinger (1957), Heider (1958), and Tedeschi (1981) postulate that human beings desire for and seek to maintain a harmony within themselves. Tedeschi (1981) suggets that even the *desire to appear* consistent exerts influence over human behaviour. Cialdini (1994:202) suggests that to engage the power of consistency, the audience's commitment should be secured first. One would then suppose that meaning secures a commitment, which would subsequently create dissonance, which ultimately would motivate a behavioural or attitudinal valence change. Gillett (1992) suggests that linguistic meaning has sense, normativity i.e. it is determined by some rules, and normative features. He (1992:125) argues that:

> The normative constrains on meaning are such that a thinker can convey that meaning, whatever the relationship between it and the conditions of his utterance. Thus, meaning offers a thinker resources for dealing with a situation rather than causal dispositions to respond to it . . . . The implications for meaning, intention, and current experience are that there is no invariant or mechanical link between extensionally specified conditions and meaning. Of course, on occasion, the demand for a certain response might be compelling, but the compulsion is essentially normative and not causal.

It appears that generating meaning-related inconsistency would require a new or different meaning, or a different level of force of a hitherto otherwise known meaning. Because audiences have reference frames with which they see the world around them in a stable way, each time new meaning reaches an audience, it contrastively asserts itself over or against the existing frame of reference. Meaning then exerts a compulsion of a new reality, produce a certain assurance, or displaces hitherto held notions and conceptions, or some combinations thereof. Subsequently, the audience behaviourally and/or attitudinally readjusts to the new understanding.

Meaning will also interact with the audience's ego-involvement with the issue that forms the subject of persuasion. One is said to be ego-involved when the issue has much personal significance, one's stand on the issue is central to one's sense of self, one intensely holds a position about the issue, and when one is strongly committed to that position. Ego-involvement is issue-specific and although it differs from extremity of most preferred position (Sherif, 1980:36), those with extreme positions about an issue will also be highly ego-involved in it (Sherif & Hovland, 1961:138). The higher the ego-involvement, the wider the latitude of rejection; hence the smaller the latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment.

In judging about the position advocated, the audience may be subject to perceptual distortions termed assimilation and contrast effects. An assimilation effect occurs when the audience perceives the position about an issue advocated by the speaker closer to the audience's position about the issue than it actually does. It thus involves the audience minimising the differences between the position held about an issue and the position advocated by the speaker. In contrast, a contrast effect occurs when the audience perceptively exaggerates the differences between the message's position and the audience's position.

2.3.2. Persuasion and argumentation

Persuasion and argumentation are so closely-associated terms that often one implies the other. But it is not persuasion that contributes to the production of argumentation; only the converse is true. It is possible to have argumentation without persuasion, since for one thing argumentation is not the only thing through which persuasion occurs, and for another thing argumentation could simply fail to lead to persuasion. However, there can be no persuasion without some form of argumentation.

Argumentation refers to a type of a speech in which participants thematise contested claims and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through sets of reasons that are connected in a systematic way with the validity of a problematic presupposition. Argumentation concerns the use of arguments and the giving of reasons; and the process entails making claims, challenging them, backing them up by producing reasons, criticising those reasons, [and] rebuttling those criticisms (Toulmin *et al.*, 1984:14).

One could consider a number of pertinent aspects pertaining to the mediatory function of argumentation in the occurrence of persuasion. The most important of these are options in argumentation, argumentation and differential message structures, and argumentation and processing of the message. These are elaborated here below:

2.3.2.1. Options in argumentation

A number of viewpoints significantly contribute to a fuller understanding of the nature of argumentation and its role in persuasion. It is, therefore, important that the most important of these viewpoints are discussed. Aristotle (Cooper, 1932:5) proposed the use of enthymematic argumentation. An enthymeme is a deductive process in which the audience combines two premises in a way that forms the conclusion that the persuasive speaker wants. One premise is the attitude, belief, or value that the audience has, and the other is the argument that the persuasive speaker supplies. Before one can support a thesis or a claim by means of an enthymeme, it is necessary for one to grasp the facts of the case (*hyparchonta*), have a store of premises (*protaseis*) understood by and acceptable to the audience and be able to reason "logically". To reason logically requires one to distinguish between mere evidence and the sort of premises that can supply argumentative links between one's claims and the available data. Claim, evidence and protaseis form an argument only when their statements are put into the proper relationship to one another, thereby forming a *topos*. In this regard, persuasion is to be based on a common ground between the persuasive speaker and the audience, to permit the persuasive speaker to make certain assumptions about the audience and their beliefs.

Toulmin's (1958) seminal work, different from Aristotle's enthymeme proposition, focuses on the essence and types of arguments. Toulmin posited two triads of components available in the construction and use of arguments. Constituting the first triad are the components that must always be present as part of the definition of an argument, that an argument is a movement from accepted data through a warrant to a claim. Whereas the claim is the conclusion derived from the data, the warrant is that part of the argument that authorises the link between the data and the conclusion. And, whereas the data and claim together represent the specific contention advanced by the argument, the warrant carries the accepted data to the disbelieved proposition. The components constituting the second triad are the backing, rebuttal, and the qualifier. It is possible that the audience may fail or refuse to take the warrant at its face value. In such a case, the assumptions expressed or implied in the warrant have to be certified, and this is achieved by the backing, which could be a single item or a whole argument. The rebuttal, usually appended to the claim statement, is meant to prevent certain objections that might be advanced against the claim by recognising and stating the conditions under which the claim may not be valid or will be valid in a qualified way. The qualifier, on the other hand, registers the force with which the arguer believes the claim possesses, such as an indication of the degree of probability and level of confidence.

Whereas Toulmin's work appertains to the essence of an argument and the types of arguments, it does not consider the role of arguments in the creation of meaning or the contribution of meaning to the occurrence of persuasion. Mention should therefore be made of these aspects and it seems appropriate to do so here. Not only does the number of arguments in a message influence the audience's processing of the message (cf. Calder *et al.*, 1974) but also, messages with more arguments are more persuasive than those with fewer (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).

Habermas (1984) contends that no dispute about a validity claim is beyond rational argumentation by the participants involved. Any difficulty could be surmounted by increasing the level of reasonableness. To resolve a communication breakdown, Habermas suggests, one could move to a level of discourse and argumentation to explicitly warrant the validity claims under consideration. Further, he proposes that ideally, the only force that should prevail in such a discourse is the force of the better argument. Though Habermas's thesis is tenable to some degree, its cognitivist essence substantially limits its utility, especially in persuasive speaking. As Bernstein (1985:19) points out in his evaluation of Habermas's theory, even what constitutes "better argument" could itself be open to a similar rational dispute.

Nevertheless, persuasive messages with arguments that are well-supported with evidence or reasoning are more likely to produce favourable message processing by the audience, because with such messages, audiences would generate more supportive arguments and less refutative ones than they would when the messages use weak arguments (cf. Areni & Lutz, 1988). In turn, the favourable message processing would mediate attitude change, depending on the strength of the arguments. The strength of an argument is measured in a given context by the soundness of the reasons, seen in terms of, among other things, whether or not the argument could motivate the audience to accept the validity of the claim in question.

It appears then that both the quality and quantity of arguments in persuasive communication influence the creation of meaning and, consequently, persuasion. On the other hand, a persuasive speaker can adapt the motives, attitudes, and emotional needs of the audience, but if his message fails to meet the audience's standards of reasonableness he will fail to persuade them (Brembeck & Howell, 1976:175). The persuasive speaker would need, therefore, to seek to satisfy the critical thinking requirements imposed by his audience.

One way in which argumentation mediates persuasion is through the creation of meaning. It could be taken for granted that argumentation is essential in the creation of meaning in that it is the discursive means by which an audience is led to adhere to a given thesis or by which its adherence is reinforced. One option regarding the use of arguments is to have a totally message-centred approach to logical soundness, with its assumption that if the message met all the academic criteria of soundness it would be effective with any audience. This view, however, disregards the contextual nature of reasoning and information processing. It is in this regard that Brembeck and Howell (1976:195) remark: "Much of the disillusionment with effort to persuade through reasoned discourse comes from a message or content orientation. If perceptual differences of receivers are ignored and only absolutes of logical correctness are relied upon, then it is not surprising that attempts to use reason to persuade have often failed."

Alternatively, the persuasive speaker could adapt the message to an intended audience and assume the responsibility to design it such that the particular audience is most probably able to decode in the most accurate way. In this regard, the speaker would still have to make the judgement about what would be persuasive to his audience. But this option is also inadequate because it is rather too mechanistic.

Rather, since persuasion is interactional, in the sense that both the speaker and the audience are actively involved in the process (Kraft, 1991:72), and since there is a variability in human perceptions (Gudykunst, 1994:111; Korten, 1976:133; Triandis, 1976; *see also 4.2.3.4*), a reasoned discourse should include the many contributions of the audience to the process of influence. In this case, the dominant criterion of effective reasoned discourse is the extent to which the speaker is perceived as reasonable by a particular audience. Facts and traditional logic are still useful and necessary, but they are subordinated to the reasoning procedures of the audience. Towards this understanding, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) present a most useful perspective. Dissatisfied with the neglect of practical argumentation by modern logicians and philosophers, Perelman, a former Belgian professor of philosophy, drew on classical and Renaissance sources to revive and modify the science of reasoning. He and his co-author observe that:

> Although it would scarcely occur to anyone to deny that the power of deliberation and argumentation is a distinctive sign of a reasonable being, the study of the methods of proof used to secure *adherence* [emphasis original] has been completely neglected by logicians and epistemologists for the last three centuries. . . . The very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to necessity and self-evidence, since no one deliberates where the solution is necessary or argues against what is self-evident. The domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969:200).

Therefore, rather than develop a theory of argumentation on the conception of every proof as a reduction to the self-evident, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca posit that argumentation should entail studying the discursive techniques that allow inducing or increasing the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent. They further posit that, because argumentation aims at gaining adherence of minds, by this very fact, it assumes the existence of an intellectual contact, and therefore an effective community of minds must be created at any given moment. These propositions imply that a set of several factors is required for the formation of a community of minds, an indispensable minimum of which is the existence of a common language, or a technique allowing communication to take place. The audience must also attach some importance if its mental co-operation is to be secured, because "attention is necessary for argumentation to continue, and under normal circumstances, some quality is necessary in order to speak and to be listened" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969:213).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca posit that argumentation is to be audience-oriented, and a strong argument not only satisfies the universal audience but also withstands refutation. Thus they argue that, "since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969:214). Towards this end, the persuasive speaker does make a construction of the audience, but this construction needs to be suitable for the occasion. The construction needs to take into consideration the fact that audiences are not only psychological, but also that they are sociological, influenced by their environments and the roles that they play. The audience is thus to be located in its setting.

Upon the speaker's construction of the audience, the speech is then to be adapted to it, since it is the audience that is to play the major role in determining the quality of argument and behaviour of persuasive speakers. An enthusiastic speaker whose sole concern is with what he himself considers important may have some effect on suggestible persons, but his speech will strike the audience as unreasonable (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969:219). Thus, the persuasive speaker may cause the audience to be forgotten, and create less an absence than a poor choice of good reasons.

2.3.2.2. Argumentation and differential message structures

As said earlier, among other things, in order for persuasion to occur, the audience needs to attain the meaning as desired by the persuasive speaker. It is presumed, of course, that the speaker's intended meaning is consistent with the persuasive result sought, since not any or every meaning would lead to any or every persuasive goal (see *2.2.1.3*). Also, it was established earlier that only a particular content would lead to a particular meaning (see *2.3.1.2*). But that particular content alone, being only one of the persuasive message variables, would not suffice for or guarantee achieving the particular persuasive end sought. The structural organisation of the persuasive message would also play an important role in the occurrence of persuasion. Therefore, in view of its significance in the persuasive process, the organisation of the message will also be discussed.

Classical rhetorical theory upholds the thesis that in every case there is a particular speech organisation that is most appropriate and most effective for achieving a desired persuasive end. Studies in the twentieth century show that better organised messages would produce greater comprehension among the audience (Beighley, 1952a, 1952b) and the greater the comprehension, the greater the opinion change (Eagly, 1974:776). Whereas disorganisation would have to be severe before it could affect comprehension, only slight deviations from normal organisation were sufficient to influence attitude change (Darnell, 1963). Also, studies have explored the relationship between message structure and persuasion (see e.g., Bostrom, 1983; Burgoon & Bettinghaus, 1980).

Research indicates that the organisation of the message affects retention and attitude change (Thompson, 1960) and degree and nature of attitude change through affecting the credibility of the speaker (McCroskey & Mehrley, 1969:20). The more organised the message, the higher the speaker's credibility, and subsequently, the greater the degree of attitude change. Thus, since the organisation of the persuasive message is significant to the occurrence of persuasion, a persuasive speaker would need to choose from the variety of organisation patterns the one that suits his audience. But as Bettinghaus and Cody (1987:142) note, the most general principle in relation to whether some message structures are more effective than others deals with expectations, i.e. the persuasive speaker should not violate the expectations of his audience.

2.3.2.2.1. Argumentation and the placement of arguments

Also, in arranging arguments, the persuasive speaker needs to choose between placing the most important ones at the beginning (anticlimax order) or at the end (climax order). Gilkinson *et al.* (1954), Hovland *et al.* (1953), Gulley and Berlo (1956), and Sikkink (1956) suggest that varying order of arguments makes little difference, if any. But Hass and Linder (1972:219) conclude from their findings that the audience's ability to counter-argue and the variations of the message structure which influence counter-arguing may be important determinants of persuasive effectiveness. Where significant differences were found between the anticlimax and climax placement of arguments, generally the climax order was more effective.

Further still, arguments could be placed at the middle of the message, in the pyramidal order. Gulley and Berlo (1956) found that the anticlimax and climax orders were preferable to the pyramidal organisation, and generally the pyramidal organisation is to be avoided. Audiences observe primacy and recency effects, because audiences are more likely to observe primacy effects when the topic is of interest to them, materials are familiar to them, issues are perceived as relatively unimportant, and the speech deals with a controversial topic (Rosnow & Robinson, 1967). From such persuasive situations, the audience's level of attention and interest in listening are high at the beginning but wane with time.

Hence, the audience comprehends more and retains the information more at the beginning of the speech than at the middle or the end. Recency effects, on the other hand, are more likely to be observed when the topic under discussion is uninteresting, or the audience is unfamiliar with the issues, or when the issues under discussion are seen as unimportant. The assumption here is that the audience feels drawn to attend to the whole message to make an informed choice, and hopes that eventually the speaker will give a concluding summary.

2.3.2.2.2. Argumentation and two- and one-sided presentation

Structural considerations about message organisation also appertain to choosing between a two-sided presentation and a one-sided presentation. For every viewpoint that the persuasive speaker seeks to promote, there would be arguments for and against it, and possibly the audience is divided along those lines. It should follow that in some cases, it would be necessary to construct a message that incorporates both sides of the issue under discussion, and other times, of course, it may not be necessary. Two questions arise. First, under what circumstances is the two-sided or one-sided presentation more appropriate for achieving a desired persuasive goal? And, when the two-sided approach is used, under what circumstances should the opposing arguments or supporting arguments be presented first?

Hovland *et al.* (1949) conducted the first investigation to compare the effects of one-sided and two-sided presentations on persuading audiences that are initially opposed or initially supportive of the position being advocated in the message. They found that the one-sided presentation was more effective with audiences that had lower education, while the two-sided presentation was more effective for more highly educated audiences. Lumsdaine and Janis (1953) found that audiences that were initially in agreement with the position advocated in the message were more greatly persuaded by a one-sided message whereas those initially opposed to the position advanced were more greatly persuaded by the two-sided approach. Clark (1974:331) found that there are important possible order effects. With one-sided persuasive messages, the climax order is superior to the anticlimax order in producing a positive audience evaluation of the message. On the other hand, with a two-sided persuasive message set, a climax order in the first side followed by an anticlimax order in the second side is superior to any other arrangement in producing positive audience evaluation of messages. Also, a pro-cons arrangement in a two-sided presentation produces a higher overall audience evaluation of the message than does the cons-pro arrangement.

However, the effects of the sidedness of the message would depend on the characteristics of the audience at hand, as this variable would interact with the audience's level of education, prior information about the issue, and the nature and degree of initial commitment with respect to the issue and the view proposed, as well as the predominant style of cognitive functioning.

Generally, the two-sided argument organisation is preferable for audiences with relatively high education levels or if the audience is initially in disagreement with the position presented. The two-sided argument organisation is more effective for response-reinforcing and is thus preferable for audiences that are initially in agreement with the advocacy of the message, if it is likely that the audience will be exposed to opposing arguments.

From McGuire's studies (1964) that led to his formulation of the inoculation theory, the two-sided presentation is most effective when all supporting arguments are given plus a small dose of the opposing arguments. Otherwise, if the audience is initially in agreement with the proposed position and it is unlikely to meet counterarguments, the one-sided argument organisation would be more effective.

Finally, the audience's prior commitment with respect to the position advocated interacts with, and often overrides, the effects of the sidedness of the message. Where the two-sided argument organisation is employed, the persuasive speaker has three options for a message pattern. The support-then-refute and interspersing refutative and supportive arguments patterns are generally more effective than the refute-then-support pattern (O'Keefe, 1990:162). But the arguments to be refuted should be those that are held by the audience and the obstacles addressed should be relevant to the audience's adopting of the proposal, otherwise, the two-sidedness will not add to the persuasiveness of the message, and may even be counterpersuasive (Mark & Shotland, 1983; Reeves *et al.*, 1987).

2.3.2.2.3. Argumentation and rational-affective messages

Burgoon and Bettinghaus (1980:143) posit that persuasive messages can either be rational or affective. The dichotomistic view, traced back to Plato and Aristotle, among other Greek Philosophers, stems from a fundamental difference in the starting points concerning the nature of mankind. From a strict rationalist view, it is argued that when confronted with emotional arguments versus rational ones, audiences tend to respond best to well-constructed, logical arguments. This position further maintains that human beings are fundamentally rational and respond favourably to emotional messages only when rational alternatives are not available. On the contrary, the non-rationalist position holds that human beings are essentially emotional and are swayed by cleverly constructed messages that appeal to feelings such as love, patriotism, and self-interest.

This view further holds that evidence, logical structure, and tight organisation of the message cannot be persuasive, unless they are used to make an appeal to emotions. Whereas a rational message is one that uses evidence to support the probable truth of a proposition, an emotional message is one that simply points to some desirable consequences that might follow from the proposition (Burgoon & Bettinghaus, 1980:146).

Even though these are extremes that might be in reality artificial positions, the theoretical question that must still be asked is whether the structure of persuasive messages should emphasise on the use of logic or of appeals to various emotions. It is often presumed that audiences should respond to logical patterns, recognise their validity, and then be influenced by the message. However, the use of formal logical structures within messages as proof units is not necessarily persuasive (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:150). Perhaps this is so because the tendency to accept or reject a conclusion based on a formal syllogism is related positively to the strength of the audience's attitude towards the conclusion (Feather, 1964:131) and audiences are not always able to distinguish between logical and non-logical arguments (Miller, 1969:285).

Toulmin's (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work reviewed earlier are more useful in this regard in that they focus on a "people's logic". Rather than place the diversity of humanity against the classical view of what is or is not logical, needed is a new definition of these concepts to accommodate the differences among major human orientations, which include differences in their patterns of logic. Using evidence would seem to depend on the topic and the audience. Also, the effect of arguments in a message on the persuasive outcomes depends on the audience's level of involvement in the issue under discussion. Where the audience is highly involved, fewer but strong arguments are more likely to produce persuasive results, while in situations of audience's low involvement, the appearance that the position advocated contains a lot of arguments would be more persuasive.

2.3.2.2.4. Argumentation and the nature of conclusion

Different but still related to the message structure is whether the conclusion should be explicitly stated or left for the audience to construct. One might suppose that leaving the conclusion unstated so that the audience figures it out would imply a more likely greater commitment to that conclusion as a result of self-persuasion. Obviously, the audience will be forced to figure out the implications of the message, and since lack of a conclusion might generate a dissonance, it could be hypothesised that the audience will in fact be motivated to develop one. On the other hand, one might also hypothesise that stating the conclusion will minimise the chances of misinterpretation and prevent a possible consequence of dissonance, namely, that lack of completeness of a message might lead to its being discarded altogether by the audience.

From research, the predominant evidence is that messages with explicit conclusions or recommendations are more persuasive than those without them. Such studies include those of Hovland and Mandell (1952), Weiss and Steenbock (1965), Tubbs (1968), and Cope and Richardson (1972). Some studies (e.g., Hovland & Mandell, 1952:588) suggest that the benefit of stating or not stating conclusions is moderated by the audience's intelligence, education or familiarity with the topic. O'Keefe (1990:161) is of the view that the advantage of stating the conclusion is sufficiently great for all audiences, though there is not much to lose with unstated conclusions. Our objection to O'Keefe's view lies in the fact that stating or not stating the conclusion is a rhetorical style and should therefore vary with the cultural orientation of the audience, since the cultural assumptions and value orientations of the audience influence, even define, the modes of argumentation (Mbennah, 1993:48).

2.3.2.3. Argumentation and processing of the message

The role of argumentation in mediating persuasion is closely tied to the audience's processing of the information contained in the message, but we need a satisfactory explanation, of just how audiences process such information. There is, therefore, the need for an understanding of the intervening process in the audience's processing of the message. Three models attempt to explain the mediatory role of argumentation in persuasion: The heuristic systematic model (Chaiken, 1980, 1987); the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b), and the elastic capacity model (Kahneman, 1973). In order to assess their merits and demerits in view of this study, these models are critically examined.

2.3.2.3.1. Heuristic systematic model (HSM)

Chaiken's (1980, 1987) heuristic-systematic model seeks to explain how audiences process arguments in persuasive situations, making a distinction between systematic processing, an analytic orientation in which the audience accesses and scrutinises all available information to assess its relevance to the judgement task, and heuristic processing, which entails the consideration of only a subset of the information. The model posits that when systematic processing occurs, persuasion tends to be driven by careful assessment of arguments supporting the communication source's recommendation. Heuristic processing, on the other hand, entails the use of "persuasion heuristics" or inferential rules (e.g., speakers with high social status are usually right) to form or modify attitudes regarding a recommendation. Although audiences may make numerous inferences of this kind, those corresponding to the most salient aspects of the communication are most likely to drive persuasion (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken *et al.*, 1989).

Besides these cognitive determinants of heuristic processing, the HSM also specifies numerous motivational factors (e.g., personal relevance, task importance, accountability) that influence the extent to which systematic versus heuristic processing occurs. Because systematic processing requires more cognitive capacity than does heuristic processing, stimuli that inhibit systematic processing of message content will promote the use of easily applied inferential rules (Sparks *et al.,* 1998:110). Conversely, stimuli that enhance the ease with which a communication is processed tend to foster systematic processing and, thereby, decrease reliance on simple heuristics (Chaiken, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

2.3.2.3.2. Elaboration likelihood model (ELM)

An increasingly popular theoretical viewpoint is that audiences process messages through generating cognitive responses. A cognitive response is "a unit of information pertaining to an object or issue that is the result of cognitive processing" (Cacioppo *et al.*, 1981:37). Essentially,

> the cognitive response perspective maintains that individuals are active participants in the persuasion process who attempt to relate message elements to their existing repertoires of information. In so doing, these individuals may consider materials that are not actually contained in the persuasive message. These self-generated cognitions may agree with the position advocated by the source or they may disagree. Insofar as the communication elicits favorable cognitive responses, attitudes should change in the direction advocated by the source. To the extent that the message evokes unfavorable mental reactions, attitude change in the direction advocated should be inhibited (Perloff & Brock, 1980:69).

Among the offshoots of the cognitive response perspective, particularly explaining persuasion is Petty and Cacioppo's (1986a, 1986b) ELM, positing the central and the peripheral routes to persuasion. In the central route, the audience generates cognitive responses to the information received, which involves paying careful attention to the relevant information in the message and relating that information to previous knowledge as well as generate new implications (Petty *et al.*, 1994:116). Ultimately, a conclusion is reached, whether the position advanced by the persuasive speaker has any merit and a position taken.

The ELM implies that in order for the audience to evaluate the merits of the arguments presented in a message, it needs to be both motivated and able to do so, for not all messages are interesting enough to command the audience's attention and not every situation provides the audience with sufficient opportunity for careful reflection. When the audience is capable of following the central route, it carefully appraises the extent to which the message provides information that is fundamental to the true merits of the audience, object, or issue under discussion. In such a case cognitive processing proceeds in view of such things as initial attitude and quality of argument, and one of three results are possible: Favourable thoughts predominating; unfavourable thoughts predominate; neutral thoughts predominate. In the event of the first two, a cognitive structure change occurs, with the former leading to a central positive attitude change, and the latter producing a central negative attitude change. In either case, the attitude is relatively enduring, resistant and predictive of behaviour. The new cognitions are adopted and stored in the memory, and the different responses are made more salient than previously. If not, the peripheral route is followed, and if the cognitive processing produces neutral thoughts, the audience resorts to seeking peripheral cues.

If, on the other hand, the audience is either not motivated or not able to process the information due to such things as prior knowledge and message incomprehensibility, then the peripheral route is followed straightaway. If peripheral cues such as positive or negative affect, attractive or expert speaker, and number of arguments are present, there will be a peripheral attitude shift, and the new peripheral attitude formed is relatively temporary, susceptible, and unpredictive of behaviour. In the event that peripheral cues are not present, the audience retains or regains its initial attitude. Whether the likelihood of elaborating on a persuasive communication occurs and which route the persuasion will take depends on whether the audience is both motivated and able to think about the arguments in the communication. When the elaboration likelihood is high, the central route to persuasion occurs, but as the elaboration likelihood decreases, the peripheral route becomes more powerful (Petty *et al.*, 1994:120).

As part of the cognitive response framework, the ELM has received some empirical attention, but many of the conclusions seem to be debatable. Benoit (1987), for example, investigated what he called three means of persuasion - argumentation, expertise and attractiveness - in an involving topic. Arguments perceived as strong by the audience generated more favourable cognitive responses, i.e. more supportive and less refutative responses, than did weak arguments, and generated more attitude change. While perceived source expertise and attractiveness influenced cognitive responses, they did not do so in a coherent fashion nor did they mediate attitude change. Benoit (1987:182) argues that the theory shows the audience:

> as active participants in persuasion, producing cognitions (thoughts) in response to a stimulus (the persuasive communication). These arguments can be arguments

> which support, refute, or are irrelevant to the speaker's position. Just as the concept of "attitude" is a mediating variable between persuasive communication and behavior, "cognitive response" is a mediating variable between persuasion and attitude change.

Benoit (1987:182) contends that the two fundamental avenues of persuasion are argumentation and speaker credibility, and the physical attractiveness of the source is the third means. He concludes from his study that his findings confirm a limitation on the impact of expertise, which he equates to speaker credibility, saying:

> . . . while much persuasion occurs on uninvolving topics, much persuasive communication is produced on topics of importance to the listeners, on involving ones. Expertise can be an important factor in social influence, but we must be careful not to overgeneralize the claims for persuasiveness of source credibility and we must delineate the conditions under which it is likely to be effective (Benoit, 1987:193).

Whereas the findings of Benoit's study could be taken on their own merit, this conclusion does not seem to arise from them. It is good Benoit cautions against overgeneralisation. Unfortunately, the caution itself is an overgeneralised one. Equating expertise to source credibility is highly debatable as is taking the effects of speaker expertise to represent those of speaker credibility. A similar bias towards the ELM in explaining persuasive results would be to assert that when ability to process arguments is obstructed, individuals are forced to use situational and surface cues such as speaker credibility or affect, when deciding whether to support or reject the message. This would be rather an arbitrary ascription, and even if this were a valid inference, it would apply only to audiences which, from their cultural contexts, make decisions on the basis of rhetorical structures that emphasise empiricism.

But still, one would hypothesise that even with the same audience, different kinds of topics under consideration would call for different degrees of primacy of reason over affect or vice-versa. And, indeed, Artz's (1989) study on the implications of numeric and verbal information to persuasion suggests that choice of the elaboration routes, if any, could well depend on the type of information used and the format of presentation employed. Even the mood states of the audience influence the interplay of heuristic and systematic processing of persuasive messages (Bohner *et al.*, 1994).

A critical evaluation of the ELM as an explanatory framework of audience processes in the occurrence of persuasion shows that the model fails to account for those processes adequately. Although the ELM centres around the strategies audiences use to process information, it fails to assess the cognitive processes themselves directly. As a model within the cognitive response approach, the ELM shares in that approach's weakness, and that is, it places preference on the processing of content cues over non-content cues.

Possibly this preference arises from the value judgement that theories of persuasion ought to be grounded on rationality and reflection, and not on the emotional impulses of audiences or the coercive weapons of persuasive speakers (Perloff & Brock, 1980:67). But this preference fails to recognise the culture-related strategies of processing communicational material.

The ELM presumes that in processing persuasive information, audiences are forced to choose between processing content cues and non-content cues only (such as speaker credibility); failing to recognise that the two can both be used. The ELM also presumes that the individual's involvement with the message is positively related to the processing of the content cues and negatively related to the processing of non-content cues. But such a view, contrary to the findings of work of long standing, understates the influence of the persuasive speaker as a person on both the audience's evaluation of the message on the basis of the speaker and the subsequent impact of the message on the audience.

Therefore, as Stiff (1986:77) concludes, the ELM is an inaccurate representation of the persuasion process and, like all other cognitive response models, falls considerably short of the status of a useful universal mechanism for dealing with persuasive effects (Miller, 1987:459).

2.3.2.3.3. Elastic capacity model (ECM)

Kahneman's (1973) elastic capacity model of information processing seems to better explain how audiences process incoming stimuli leading to persuasion. Kahneman posits that up to a point, human beings can and do process information cues with multiple channels simultaneously, and this parallel processing is influenced by both content and non-content persuasive cues. During exposure to persuasive messages individuals are bombarded by a variety of cues, and as they evaluate the cues they tend to focus primarily on one type of cues and secondarily on the other. Attention and processing are directed to the primary cues after which the balance of processing capacity is then allocated to the processing of the secondary cues. There are relative capacity proportions allocated to content and non-content related areas.

However, what the ECM fails to say, and therefore an addition which is proposed here is that, whether the primary cues are content or non-content related depends on the interaction between the topic and the characteristics of the audience, particularly its world view. This view is supported by the fact that the audience's processing of the content of a persuasive message is influenced by the audience's characteristics, since the persuasive success of a message depends on its relationship with the audience's existing beliefs (Infante *et al.*, 1997:164). Individuals within audiences have continuums of attitudinal positions: The latitude of acceptance, referring to the range of opinions an individual finds acceptable; latitude of rejection, referring to the range of opinions that are objectionable to the individual; latitude of non-commitment, referring to the range of opinions that the individual finds neither acceptable nor objectionable (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif *et al.,* 1965; Granberg, 1982). A persuasive message judged to be within the latitude of acceptance produces change in favour of the propositions of the message; the greater the discrepancy between the initial position of the audience and the position advocated by the message, the greater the attitude change (cf. Eagly & Telaak, 1972:394). In contrast, messages falling within the latitude of rejection could even suffer a boomerang effect.

The ECM does not provide an explanation of the actual processing of the primary and secondary cues. The question that remains, regardless of whether audience processing preference is on content or non-content stimuli is this: Just what happens in that processing? This deficiency might be complemented by O'Keefe's (1996) dual-process model. O'Keefe (1996) attempts to explain how persuasion occurs in terms of an amalgam of the ELM and the HSM. He (O'Keefe, 1996:61) presupposes that, under different conditions, audiences would vary in the degree to which they are likely to engage in systematic issue-relevant thinking - thinking about the issues and arguments relevant to the persuasive issue at hand. Thus, sometimes audiences will engage in extensive elaboration, extensive issue-relevant thinking - attend closely to a presented message, carefully scrutinise the arguments it contains, reflect on other issue-relevant considerations, such as other arguments from memory or arguments the audiences devise. But other times audiences will not undertake so much issue-relevant thinking.

2.3.3. Persuasion and audience motivational processes

The Aristotelian conception of the means of persuasion is centred around the enthymeme. However, contrary to Aristotelian rhetorical structures, differences in rhetorical effectiveness could be considered in terms of human psychology (Covino & Jolliffe, 1995:36). Placing persuasive theory in a clearly defined psychological foundation, Winans (1917) posits that ideas which arouse emotions hold attention and the most evident way to fix attention is by awakening the desire for the end sought. Winans (1917:194) argues that what holds attention determines action and, thus, defines persuasion as "the process of inducing others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to propositions". In the same vein, Minnick (1968) proposes that for persuasion to occur, the persuasive speaker has to control all the appropriate communication variables and then attempt to determine the response of the audience toward a particular choice of belief or conduct. What these propositions mean is that persuasion is most likely to occur when it is based on the most informed theories of human behaviour, particularly motivation.

Human motivational constructs consist of events occurring inside the individuals and are influenced by such things as needs, motives, and habits. These constructs are culture-specific and are not exclusive or single determiners of certain behaviours. Also, motivational constructs are multiple determinants of behaviour, since not every behaviour is determined by basic needs, and even, not all behaviour is motivated. However, two particular motivational processes lead to persuasion: What might be called internal motivation, namely, a desire to maintain cognitive harmony, and what might be called external motivation, namely, message variables and consummatory reasons.

2.3.3.1. Internal motivational processes

One of the strongest motivations for a persuasive change is the desire for cognitive consistency. The consistency theories (see Zajonc, 1960; Abelson *et al.*, 1968) are based on the premise that people need and want to be in a state of psychological consistency and therefore tend to move toward complete cognitive harmony. These theories posit that human beings feel comfortable when the world lives up to or operates consistently with their perceptions or predictions about events or situations. When this consistency is not evident, people are predisposed to change either themselves or their interpretations of the events or situations to bring the world into a balanced state.

Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (1957), one of the consistency theories, explains how human beings could adopt change due to internal psychological motivation. Festinger (1957: *In* Nuttin, 1974:93) defines cognitive dissonance as "a tension which motivates observable attitude change in the direction of the attitude discrepant behaviour". The theory states that:

> At certain times in our experience, inconsistent relations may arise among our cognitive states (attitudes, behaviors), creating a state of cognitive dissonance. Dissonance creates psychological discomfort, and we try to reduce it by achieving consonance. In addition, we avoid situations that might increase that dissonance (Festinger, 1957: *In* Applbaum *et al.*, 1973:168).

The intensity of the drive to reduce the dissonance is equal to the number of cognitions the person has, weighted by the importance of those cognitions divided by the number of the consonant cognitions the person has, also weighted by their importance. By adding consonant cognitions or reducing dissonant cognitions the value of the dissonance would be lowered. The cognition that is least resistant to change is what will be changed, and usually behaviour or memory of behaviour done is more resistant to change than attitudes. This means that whenever there is cognitive dissonance, its reduction will be through the changing of the relevant attitudes, and it is in this way that behaviour could produce attitudes.

There are particular situations in which dissonance occurs. In decision-making, the theory implies that choice between alternates will create dissonance both before and after the decision. The dissonance arising from a free choice is proportional to the rejected alternative, if it has similar characteristics to those of the chosen one; to the dissimilarity of the alternatives, and to the importance of the choice. In this regard however, Festinger modified the theory (1964), indicating that dissonance is neither unique to post-decisional processes nor an inevitable consequence of decision.

Forced compliance is another condition that produces dissonance. Festinger proposes that the less the pressure to conform, the greater the dissonance and, the less the external justification of overt behaviour, the higher the dissonance and the subsequent attitude change. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959: *In* Nuttin, 1974:1) demonstrate the effects of forced compliance. Experimental subjects were paid between $1.00 and $20.00 in order to indicate that they enjoyed doing a task considered extremely boring. The results indicate attitude change towards the task, the magnitude of which increased with decreasing pay. Festinger and Carlsmith conclude that "a person will begin to believe in what he is saying to the extent that he is offered less important reasons for saying it" (Nuttin, 1974:9). One might postulate that if the strength of arguments in a persuasive discourse should be considered an aspect of pressure to conform, arguments that are perceived to be too strong should be undesirable, especially response-shaping.

From the cognitive dissonance theory, if audiences perceive discrepancy between their existing belief or knowledge and the appeals of a message, they will change in attitude, and the direction and magnitude of the attitude change can be predicted. The cognitive dissonance theory provides a basis for understanding why and how human beings perceive, use, distort, ignore, or forget the content of communications. The amount of dissonance aroused by dissonant information is a function of the importance of the subject of communication. A person avoids dissonance-producing information except if he believes he can easily refute it, or he will avoid information supporting his position if he perceives it to be weak. The presence of dissonance due to information implies that an audience evaluates the cognitive elements involved in the communication process, namely, the message, source, and the context. In the event that the audience perceives a conflict between one and any of the others, dissonance will arise. It would follow that the interaction between the characteristics of the audience and the qualities of the source - known or perceived - would partly account for the persuasive outcome.

2.3.3.2. *External motivational processes*

The audience's external motivation factors pertain to the mood of the message, in which one finds the use of appeals and intensity of language. Even though these dimensions are processed by the audience internally, they are referred to as external because, with respect to the audience, they are incoming stimuli. In considering these so called non-logical aspects of the message and their contributions to persuasive outcomes, one pays attention to the use of emotional appeals.

The term non-logical is ambiguous and prejudicially evaluative, as it presupposes that being logical is limited to content and its organisation, particularly the use of argument, even a certain way of using arguments, namely, deductively or inductively. Since, being logical pertains to a people's way of arriving at reality, one can only speak of a people's logical way, which will not necessarily be limited to or even include the processing of content. Obviously, to think that such a way of reaching at meaning is non-logical would be incorrect. In view of this then the term non-content is preferred to non-logical.

It was indicated earlier in the chapter that motivation is one of the means by which persuasion occurs. This proposition is extended here to say that motivation is an essential condition for persuasion to occur even if it is to occur through the creation of meaning and through the speaker. It follows that some form of appeal is always necessary, and emotional appeals in persuasive speaking include fear, humour, and language use.

Among the earliest studies on the use of fear appeal, either referring to a message loaded with scaring facts or a message that simply has the potential to arouse fear in the audience, is that by Janis and Feshback (1953). This study, which compares the effects of high fear message and low fear message on attitude change among high school students, indicates that low levels of fear produces more attitude change than high level fear. This conclusion is corroborated by a few subsequent studies (e.g., Goldstein, 1959; Janis & Terwilliger, 1962; DeWolfe & Governale, 1964). It is possible that low fear enhances persuasion because it creates a tolerant amount of stress, which encourages attention and recall.

However, most studies show that low levels of fear appeal produce less audience attitude change (e.g., Miller & Hewgill, 1966; Chu, 1966). These studies show that, although it is not always possible that messages intended to induce fear in the audience do so, messages that do induce greater fear or anxiety, become from that fact, more persuasive. It is apparent that higher levels of induced fear significantly correlate with greater persuasiveness (Boster & Mongeau, 1984:345), and a reassuring speech with fear appeals yields a greater shift of opinion than does a non-reassuring speech (Cope & Richardson, 1972:150).

On the other hand, the covariance of the level of fear in the audience and the persuasiveness of the message does not necessarily indicate a causal relation, since both could be a result of the cognitive reactions to the message (O'Keefe, 1990:168). Thus, the contribution of the level of fear to the persuasiveness of the message is probably through its influence on the audience's cognitive reactions to the message.

A second non-content message variable concerns the varied effects of inclusion of humour in persuasive messages on the occurrence of persuasion. Positively, humour tends to enhance the audience's liking of the persuasive speaker (Gruner, 1967). Also, speakers with relatively high status and ethos can in their messages disparage their professional fields and thereby raise their ratings of wittiness, funniness, and a sense of humour without damaging other dimensions of their credibility (Chang & Gruner, 1981:424). Gruner and Lampton (1972:188) also could not confirm that inclusion of humorous material in a persuasive sermon would increase the persuasiveness of the sermon or the ratings of the speaker's ethos, from which they suggest that perhaps humour affects only some aspects of the ethos factor of character (Gruner & Lampton, 1972:196). On the other hand, excessive or inappropriate humour could decrease the audience's liking of the source, perceptions of his trustworthiness, and even, of his competence (see, for example, Taylor, 1974).

Non-content appeals also have to do with the use of language. The persuasive speaker has at his disposal a variety of kinds of language to use to develop persuasive appeals, and research evidence shows that language use correlates persuasive successes. One important language variable is language intensity (Bowers, 1964:420). Messages with relatively low intense language could be more persuasive than high intense language ones, possibly because people respond negatively to too intense language messages (Burgoon & King, 1974).

It is likely that the variation of such responses will also be culture-bound, especially since people develop expectations about what is appropriate communication for any given communicator (Burgoon & Stewart, 1975). Thus, for example, if, within a given cultural frame, males but not females are expected to be aggressive, a message with intense language would be persuasive if given by a male speaker, and use of forceful language by a female speaker would render her message unpersuasive, at least less persuasive. This, however, will be different if the audience is actively involved in the persuasive process or if the persuasive speaker is using the counter-attitudinal paradigm (Nuttin, 1974; McGuire, 1964), arguing strongly for something contrary to his known belief. In this case, a message of high intensity language is not only persuasive but preferable (Burgoon & Miller, 1971:251; Burgoon & King, 1974). It is also likely that for certain topics, even within the same cultural orientation, aggressiveness of the speaker during presentation will not only be more desirable, but will also be more necessary than other topics.

2.5. SUMMARY

This chapter has critiqued various viewpoints with a view to developing an appropriate conception of persuasion. The nature of persuasion and how persuasion occurs as well as the factors that mediate the process, namely those pertaining to attitudes, meaning and the audience processes, were examined. From this discussion, a number of conclusions could be drawn[2]. Figure 2.01. below encapsulates the conception of persuasion and its interrelated components presented in this chapter.



Figure 2.01 Speaker-centred theory of persuasion

[2] This is in line with Creswell's (1994:24, 73) recommendation that literature review in quantitative research should be used deductively, as a basis for advancing research questions or hypotheses (see also Kerlinger, 1973).

First, it appears that an attempt to persuade implies the presence of an intended effect and the appropriate steps to reach that effect. This means that not all kinds of communication constitute persuasion, though obviously all kinds of communication would have an impact. The speaker could aim at guiding the audience to obtain formed and conditioned responses to specific objects of the audience's attitudinal predisposition or behavioural inclination. Or, the speaker might be interested in intensifying existing convictions, activating them into actions, and deterring the weakening of support for those convictions, or simply reducing the valences of undesirable predispositions or behaviours. Still, the speaker might be in need of retaining the current conditions of the audience, by raising or preserving the respective behavioural or attitudinal commitments of the audience or by instilling resistance to counterpersuasion. Unlike Fourie (1988:18) who sees communication as need-satisfying behaviour, having a desired response goes beyond need-satisfying, to include, possibly, establishing with the audience why it must consider the case in point. This could in itself form part or all of the speaker's intended persuasive effect.

Bitzer (1986) points that persuasive discourse is invited by a situation, and that a discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions or seeks to function as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it. From Bitzer's position, persuasion is essentially a reactionary utterance. But even so, it would take the persuasive speaker's decision to make an utterance, with a particular end-result in mind. Speaker's intentionality is necessary because the speaker's means of persuasion ought to depend on his purpose and the materials in the message ought to be subservient to that desired end result. Hence, when a communication event is simply a "killing Ahab"[3] phenomenon, thus short of the speaker's intentionality, it is not persuasion.

Since information is a necessary component for persuasion, one would hypothesise that for every desired response, there would be but one appropriate meaning that the audience should attain, and for such a meaning there would be but a particular set of symbols that could trigger it in the audience's mind. It follows that a clear intended meaning would be required, towards which the persuasive speaker would have to answer the question: What sort of understanding would the audience need in order to respond as desired? This does not mean, of course, that the creation of the necessary meaning would itself alone produce the intended effect. Motivational appeals would still be necessary.

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[3] Ahab, King of Israel (874-852 BC), was at war with Aram. An Aram soldier shot at random and killed Ahab. It was a desirable thing to kill Ahab but it happened without the intention of the soldier (see 1Kings 22:31-34).

Therefore, ultimately, being persuaded would refer to the degrees of correspondence between the intended effect and actual effect, and the intended meaning and actual meaning. As a form of communication, persuasion has to have the attributes of effective communication, namely, a clearly specified purpose, use of verbal, written, or other visual symbolisation, and provision for a reciprocal interstimulation between the audience and the source.

As a purposeful enterprise, persuasion attempts to modify some targeted beliefs, values or behaviours of the audience to some predetermined new state. Within the context of speech communication, persuasion would therefore refer to such an effect upon the audience - attitudinal or behavioural or both - as the speaker seeks to achieve through forming and presenting appropriate oral arguments, adapting them to the specific audience. The implication of this conceptualisation of persuasion is that the speaker becomes the central aspect for understanding persuasion.

Secondly, the implication of defining persuasion in terms of the persuasive speaker's intended effect upon the audience is that the persuasive speaker is the manager of the process, and therefore the most pertinent player in the process. A question could be raised regarding the elements of the speaker's intention; whether the intention of the speaker is only in terms of the methods and means of persuasion he is to employ, or it is only in terms of the outcome of those methods and means. Is it not possible, it might be argued, that the speaker might achieve the effect he intends on the audience, even if he happens to use, so to speak, inefficient methods and means? That is to say, is it not possible for the speaker to secure his intended effect on the audience using methods and means that are not causally related to that effect? Well, that is like asking whether the outcome that the speaker seeks could not possibly happen by chance.

From the discussion of the psychological perspective of meaning, an appropriate meaning is necessary for triggering a persuasive outcome, first attitudinal and then behavioural. But also, as noted in that discussion, even with a highly successful creation of the appropriate meaning in the audience can only amount to an approximation of the speaker's intended meaning. The two meanings cannot possibly be exactly the same. It, therefore, seems unlikely that the effect upon the audience could be significantly similar to the speaker's intended effect without the careful contribution of the speaker to the occurrence of that effect - unless persuasion was not necessary in the first place. What this means is that the intentionality of the speaker encompasses an intended audience, an intended effect, an intended meaning and, since this would constitute a unique communication configuration, intended methods and means.

Thirdly, persuasion occurs through the creation of meaning, and in this regard, two matters ought to be noted. The one is that the creation of meaning is a dual process involving the persuasive speaker and the audience, and the other is how meaning actually mediates the occurrence of persuasion. Meaning is that product of cognitive construction from perceived information cues which is also influenced by cultural as well as psychological and context-specific pragmatic factors. Whereas the speaker's intended meaning is a product of a pre-speaking constructual process, the audience's actual meaning is an inference to the cues and symbols transmitted by the speaker. Whereas the speaker ought to define as clearly as possible the necessary meaning that would lead to the desired end-result of the persuasive endeavour, as well as determine and employ the appropriate methods and means to achieve that meaning, the audience will, of its own nature, process the incoming stimuli to construct a meaning. The audience's creative interpretation of the incoming stimuli will be guided by its motivational processes as well as aspects of its larger context. The possibility of varying degrees of correspondence of meaning between that which the speaker intends and that which the audience develops, implies a hypothetical critical level of the audience's meaning below which it would imply that meaning creation failed.

The significance of meaning in mediating persuasion is that, because audiences have reference frames with which they see the world around them in a stable way, each time new meaning reaches an audience, that meaning contrastively asserts itself over or against the existing frame of reference. Meaning then mediates persuasion by exerting a compulsion of a new reality, produce a certain assurance, or displaces hitherto held notions and conceptions, or some combinations thereof. Subsequently, the audience behaviourally and/or attitudinally readjusts to the new understanding.

Fourthly, in seeking to conceptualise the intervening process in the audience's processing of the message, neither the HSM nor the ELM provide an adequate explanatory framework of audience processes in the occurrence of persuasion. Kahneman's (1973) ECM seems best suited for explaining how audiences process incoming stimuli leading to persuasion, with the addition that whether the primary cues are content or non-content related at any given persuasive configuration will depend on the interaction between the topic and the characteristics of a given audience.

Finally, persuasion will not only be situated in a context, but also it will suffer from that fact, and the total context will override all other factors that account for the occurrence of persuasion. It follows that, an understanding of persuasion remains substantially incomplete until the nature of context and its impact on the process is incorporated. The context of persuasion would consist of three broad components; the setting, the function, and the cultural aspects. Whereas the setting refers to whether persuasion is ensuing in a dyadic, small group, public, or mediated situations, function concerns such programmes as advertising, negotiation, mediation (Miller & Simons, 1974; Miller & Burgoon, 1978), campaigning (Larson, 1995), and introduction of innovations (Rogers, 1983). Obviously, these components should be interrelated, the function and setting mutually dictating upon each other, and the cultural overruling them. What can be stated here is that whereas persuasion might mean the same thing conceptually across cultures, the means of persuasion and their effects on the process will be defined by the cultural context of the audience, in particular the world view.

Persuasion is a speaker-managed process that entails the audience's constructive responses. It was posited in this chapter that for persuasion to occur, among other things, audiences process incoming content and non-content cues, and that which kind constitutes primary or secondary cues depends on the interaction between the topic and the characteristics of a given audience. It is obvious that, from the audience's viewpoint, the persuasive speaker, together with whatever speaker factors are pertinent, also constitutes incoming cues. The level of the audience's participation implied by the nature and occurrence of persuasion implies that the audience is also a pertinent player in the persuasive process and, therefore, the processes involving the audience ought to be properly conceptualised. In what ways do audiences construe persuasive speakers? The next chapter explores this question and attempts to develop a theoretical construction that explains the significance of the person of the speaker in the persuasive process, or what is termed speaker credibility.

CHAPTER 3

TOWARDS A HOLISTIC THEORY OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Speaker credibility is one of the oldest concepts in persuasion theory and research (Perloff, 1993:137; Infante *et al.,* 1997:157). Persuasion is the degree of correspondence between the speaker's intended meaning and effect on the audience and the audience's actual meaning and effect of the speaker's persuasive attempts (see *2.2.1*). By implication, it is necessary for the speaker to pre-select and execute appropriate persuasive strategies through which the audience is guided to interpret and respond to the speaker's propositions in a manner as closely congruent to the intentions of the speaker as possible. This in turn implies that the persuasive speaker is the manager of the communication enterprise, in the sense that both the creation of meaning and the guidance in and use of the audience's motivational processes lie primarily on the speaker. Beyond this managerial level of the speaker's significance in the occurrence of persuasion, the kind of effect the message would have on the audience is largely determined by the speaker's credibility.

Theoretical and research work on persuasion and speaker credibility have been so dominated by a western approach that rhetorical theory has been defined in terms of Western history (Bormann, 1989:25). Such an approach fails to recognise that each society practices persuasion in their own peculiar forms (Blake, 1979:85) and that there are strong cultural and philosophical influences on the growth and development of rhetorical traditions (Oliver, 1971). Indeed, if persuasive communication is existent in all societies, then the philosophies peculiar to those societies would govern the rhetorical structure and practice of each (Blake, 1979:86), and this would include audience considerations of the speaker. It is, therefore, possible that in some cases audiences are relatively more logocentric than ethocentric. Obviously, such audiences would prefer content arguments in evaluating the appeals to the aspects of the persuasive source *per se*. Whether that is indeed the case only scientific investigation could provide the answer. What this means is that an appropriate conceptualisation of rhetorical constructs such as persuasion and speaker credibility ought to take into consideration possible variations across cultural orientations.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion of the speaker credibility construct and to propose a particular understanding of it. Towards this end the following matters are addressed:

- Since no conception of a construct could be said to be appropriate or inappropriate without a pre-established basis, criteria are developed to provide a basis for conceptualising the speaker credibility construct.

- Since theories ought to develop from existing knowledge, construction of a speaker credibility theory should be preceded by an evaluation of existing theoretical conceptions of speaker credibility. The need for a new theoretical construction would be justified by the inadequacy of existing knowledge of a construct under consideration. Therefore, both the evaluation of existing theories of speaker credibility and the new theory ought to be, respectively, subjected to and based on the same criteria. Through survey of literature it is shown that speaker credibility has been conceptualised in three major theories. These theories, which we have labelled structuralist, functionalist and constructivist, are distinguished by whether they confine themselves to matters of definition, formation and application, or to the efficacy of speaker credibility in persuasion. Within each of these theories, the nature, function and features of speaker credibility are identified and discussed in light of the proposed criteria.

- Upon the springboard drawn from the examination of the various perspectives on speaker credibility, a holistic theory is posited and its implications for the scientific study of speaker credibility are identified and discussed.

3.2. CRITERIA FOR A SPEAKER CREDIBILITY THEORY

Evaluating conceptions or formulating a view of speaker credibility would require at least two major criteria; the ethical and the heuristic value. With regard to the former, first it will be established that there is need for an ethical criteria in evaluating or positing any theory of speaker credibility but also show that not all ethical bases are adequate. Then, the meta-ethics of an acceptable ethical criteria are then examined and, thereafter, an ethical criteria that might be appropriate for purposes of the construction of theory is built.

3.2.1. Ethical criteria

3.2.1.1. Need for an ethical criteria

Every human action can be seen from a moral point of view (Jaksa & Pritchard, 1988:6) and ethical issues arise from human behaviour whenever that behaviour could have significant impact on other persons, when the behaviour involves conscious choice of means and ends, and when the behaviour can be judged by standards of right or wrong (Johannesen, 1990:1). Persuasion, as a human action, is a powerful instrument of social control (Perloff, 1993:19) and could therefore be immoral, since a persuasive speaker seeks to induce the audience to do something that may not necessarily be in the best interest of the audience (Nilsen, 1974).

Johannesen (1995:28) gives three reasons why the process of persuasive communication always contains potential ethical issues: First, persuasive communication involves a persuader's deliberate attempts to influence the audience by forming, sustaining or changing their attitudes or behaviours. Secondly, persuasive communication involves the persuader's conscious choices among objectives sought and the persuasive means to be used to achieve those objectives. And, thirdly, persuasive communication involves, of necessity, a potential judge - which could be the audience, the persuader or some other independent observer. Johannesen (1995) points that a persuasive speaker could be a demagogue, wielding popular or mass leadership over an extensive number of people or exerting primary influence through public speaking. Also, a persuasive speaker might rely on irrelevant emotional appeals and pseudoproof to circumvent human rational decision-making processes. He might even, hypocritically, use a social cause only as a front or persuasive leverage point, whereas the actual primary motive is selfish interest and personal gain.

Bostrom (1983:14) posits three general principles regarding the relationship between persuasion and ethics: That one can employ persuasion for ethical or non-ethical ends; that the various people who would employ persuasion, will or will not have a respect for ethics; and that persuaders, persuadees or observers are likely to differ in the way they evaluate the ethics of a specific persuasive instance. Thus, there are potential ethical issues in persuasive speaking and they pertain to the speaker's content, motives, and persuasive behaviour, including his view and treatment of the audience, and to the persuasive process.

An aspect of persuasion with a high potential for numerous ethical issues is the process of argumentation. In view of its significance, both for purposes of the present section of the chapter and of the chapter on persuasion, some discussion of argumentation and its associated ethical issues seems necessary. Basically, argumentation is the art of forming oral arguments and adapting them to specific audiences in a way that is designed to affect their beliefs and/or move them to action, in which case its effects are apparent. How then could argumentation be ethically acceptable?

McCroskey (1997:286) rejects the Machiavellian ethic of "the end justifies the means", arguing that "no matter how desirable an end may be, there are some means to achieve that end which just are not acceptable". He further rejects a means-centred or an ends-centred ethic, or their combination. Indeed, in argumentation, it is of ethical obligation for the persuasive speaker to seek to know what he is to say and how he is to say it, before commencing the presentation of the arguments, lest he argue defectively. This means that the speaker bears the ethical responsibility of evaluating beforehand his intent toward the audience and the necessary basis of his argument. The standard for evaluating intent must be residing, we argue, outside and beyond man's own possessions, and a noble arguer is one that intently seeks, to the extent that he can, the ability to honestly and critically evaluate his motivations. The persuasive speaker is obligated too to know the position he seeks to lead the audience to.

It could be argued that in terms of the effect of reasoning on audience attitudes, the persuasive speaker would be obligated to estimate as accurately as possible the magnitude of attitude change required and the appropriate force of argumentation. Without this estimation, the persuasive speaker risks either failing to be effective or using coercive language or both, all of which would be morally unacceptable. The speaker is obligated to make it possible for the audience to know his motivations, accurately and truthfully.

Weaver has made perhaps the clearest statement about the ethics of persuasion. In an interesting analysis of Plato's *The Phaedrus*, Weaver (1965:21-58) argues that the non-lover, the evil lover, and the noble lover represent three types of discourse. He points out that "non-lover" discourse is related to semantically purified speech, one approaching pure notation in the respect that it communicates abstract intelligence without impulsion. This type of discourse is, however, incapable of inducing bias on the hearer, and in fact Weaver argues against the idea that language can be far more available, without being persuasive, since speech is essentially exploitative. In any case, the persuasive speaker is not in the "non-lover" position of the dialectician who can attain understanding but who cannot add impulse to truth. The options for discourse types then are two, not three. The one, evil lover, produces undesirable influence on the hearer and uses the wrong means to do so; the other, the lover, pursues the ultimate good. Whereas the former constitutes base rhetoric, brought forth by habitual arguing from urgency rather than perspicacity; the latter constitutes noble rhetoric, encapsulated in moral idealism and "originality, condensation, definition, and force of expression" (Weaver, 1965:86).

Thus, argumentation that is acceptable calls for arguing from principles, from ideals. The ethical persuader is the honest rhetorician who "has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a reconsideration of the special circumstances of his auditors" (Weaver, 1965: *In* Covino & Jolliffe, 1995:93). Weaver posits that the speaker is to be good in his formed character and right in his ethical philosophy but that matters of the ethical position of the speaker are to precede his technical skill.

Hence, the ethical responsibilities of the persuasive speaker are immense and cannot, therefore, be ignored. In particular, there is always the danger to misuse or abuse argumentation, such as through lack of basic honesty and lack of a commitment to truth and truth telling, disregard of effects on the audience, and presence of fallacies. The contention made by Barnland (1962:198) is still valid today, that any satisfactory theory of human communication must include specification of moral standards 'that protect and promote the healthiest communication behavior'. What this means is that a theory of speaker credibility would be expected, as a minimum criterion, not to be detrimental to the pursuit of acceptable ethical standards.

3.2.1.2. An approach to ethical criteria

Persuasion is, therefore, subject to a consideration of ethics. Bostrom (1983:14) posits that the way in which people evaluate the ethics of a given persuasive endeavour will vary because people differ in terms of the ethical standards they employ and in the kind of perspective on ethical persuasion that is being referred to - whether religious, political, legal or dialogical. However, although numerous approaches to the ethics of persuasion exist, not all of them would be acceptable, because some of them do not bear the sort of theoretical or philosophical import that would make them adequate.

One of the widely considered contemporary approaches to communication ethics is postmodernism (Glassner, 1991; Bauman, 1993; Cooper, 1998). All conceptions of postmodernism share a common denominator, and that is, a sense of a deeply felt loss of faith in the human ability to represent the real. Presumably, the representations that were relied on in the past, be they aesthetic, epistemological, moral, or political in nature, can no longer be taken for granted. As Veith (1995) articulates, postmodernists argue that truth is not so much a discovery as a construction; truth is relative, depending on the individual's experience and culture.

Therefore, in postmodernism one idea is as good as another, and in the absence of any reliable means of arriving at truth, the only criterion for adopting a particular idea, if only provisionally, is the individual's desire; picking what is enjoyable from a wide range of theories, dependent solely on personal preferences and choices. For example, the only philosophies that are wrong are those in which one believes in the existence of universal truth of any kind. Morality too is relativised, whereby moral issues are not seen in terms of absolute transcendent standards. What makes an action moral or immoral, in postmodernist terms, is whether or not the person concerned made a choice, and rather than stress choosing the right course of action, for postmodernism simply choosing is enough.

What postmodernism posits is that rationality cannot ground itself, hence, nothing in the form of any principles can or need to be grounded. Also, since transcendent truth supposedly can never be reached, any aspirations to objectivity, truth telling and fairness should simply be given up. Therefore, at best, postmodernism would confess that it has nothing to offer to the persuasive speaker in terms of ethical principles, nothing more than an artificial licence for each speaker to develop his own ethical principles and norms, or even not to develop any principles at all. Postmodernism promotes the tendency toward retreating into a narrow and minimalist ethics that refuses to confront the major issues. For that reason, we do not believe that postmodernism offers a basis for good ethics in speech or other genres of communication.

Rather, one should build ethical principles upon an acceptable base or reference frame, such as Christians' (1997) proposal of sacredness of life protonorm and the subsequent call for normative ethics. According to Christians (1997:6), master norms such as justice, truth and nonmaleficence would provide a frame of reference for critiquing any conventions and codes of ethics in communication. It would then be possible to ensure that the issues addressed in communication pedagogy and theorising would be stitched into the common morality. Indeed without first principles, moral reasoning falls into an infinite regression which ends in nothing and all ethical reasoning becomes meaningless.

One might consider adopting morality from classical Western philosophy in which morality is understood to be derived from human nature with the moral customs and legislation of particular groups of human beings (Hughes, 1998:47). Within classical Western morality one finds virtue ethics (Keenan, 1998), whereby morality is not so much whether some act is right or what circumstances surround it, or what its consequences are; instead, interest is focused on the person - what should one become? Selling (1998:95) contends that,

> any system of moral reflection, including those which some people might like to label "relativistic", ultimately must have some point of reference for defining its most fundamental terms. This remains true whether one considers morality from the subjective perspective, *the goodness or badness of the moral intention*, or from the so-called objective perspective, *the rightness or wrongness of human behaviour* (italics original).

Selling (1998:97) argues that the human person is central to reasoning in virtue ethics and that "person" constitute a concept, a working hypothesis constructed through the consensus of an interpretative community. As a concept, neither is it reducible to a single individual, person is always person-in-community, nor can it be adequately described without considering the multi-dimensionality of human beings. His proposition is that the human person, adequately considered stands in relation to the whole of reality; to the material world, he is always in relation to (groups of) other persons; he stands in relation to other persons in the sense that he is relational; and ultimately, every human person is unique. The problem with framing moral principles on the bases that classical Western philosophy purports is that the human being is the source of his own standard of ethical behaviour. This seems to be as improper as a sportsman being a referee of his own game and, therefore, one needs to explore more viable options.

The argument above is that it is imperative to pay attention to ethical considerations in constructing a theory of speaker credibility and that not all ethical approaches are acceptable for such an endeavour. The question, however, is, how does one select an approach to ethics? To address this question it seems necessary to begin the discussion at the meta-ethical level: What are the options for organising or adjudicating ethical behaviour? We view ethics as that study of human behaviour that deals with what is morally right or wrong, the ought and the ought not, the virtues, and the praiseworthy, as well as the developing of normative principles in terms of these aspects. The bases for adjudicating these elements are the foundations for various ethical systems, and they range from those that consider only values - and which exclude responsibilities as bases for ethical actions - to those that ignore values altogether and look only at the outcomes of the moral actions (Kasoma, 1994:5). Approaching ethics from a teleological point of view emphasises the results of the actions. As Geisler (1971:20) shows, "a teleological approach is one which stresses the end or *result* of action and a deontological approach looks to basic *rules* by which one can determine what is due in any given case regardless of the results . . . the former is a *pragmatic* or utilitarian ethic, being concerned with whether an action will in the end work for the good of most men. . . the latter is an ethic of *principle* which is concerned with one's duty to do what is inherently right apart from the foreseeable consequences."

Teleological ethical systems, then, use the consequences of an act as the yardstick to determine whether the act will be ethically right or wrong. On the other hand, deontological approaches (Snyman, 1994) emphasise the principles and norms for actions. Deontological theories of ethics posit that the most important aspects of how human beings ought to live or function are governed by moral rules that ought not to be broken, even when breaking them might have better consequences (Davis, 1993). A persuasive speaker who adheres to deontological ethics, for instance, seeks to tell the truth because he believes that it is the right thing to do.

One finds that all reasoning in ethics falls under one of several ethical systems. But do all ethical systems qualify as ground for persuasive communication ethics? Based on subsequent analysis of the various ethical systems, our response is a firm no. Before we develop a normative ethical approach to ethics, we briefly evaluate some of the major ethical systems upon which speech communication ethics has been postulated. Among the teleological ethical systems, *hedonism*, posits that whatever brings pleasure is morally right and whatever brings pain is morally wrong (Titus & Keeton, 1973; Merrill, 1989:163; Froneman & De Beer, 1998). Hedonism is, however, difficult to apply because, for one thing, defining pleasure is problematic. The hedonist definition of "good" as that which brings the most pleasure and the least pain to the greatest number of people is also problematic. It is rather obvious that not every pleasure is good, or even every pain bad. For instance, sadism and the use of intoxicating substances such as drugs are supposed to be pleasurable, but can they ever be good? Another teleological ethical system, *eudaemonism*, holds that moral obligation should be measured against the need for personal well being (Froneman & De Beer, 1998:296). But this is a weak system, possibly not an ethical system at all, because, whereas ethics pertains to behaviour between or among people, *eudaemonism* focuses on the individual actor.

A major teleological ethical system, *utilitarianism*, advocates that the quantity of the outcome should be the basis for ethically adjudicating a behaviour. Utilitarianism is a progeny of Humean empiricism (Fink, 1988:7), itself a product of Hume's (1739, 1963) skepticism about the possibility that the good could be found through reason. Hume argues that since human activity is not rational, the utility of any behaviour is the measure of any ethical principle in determining that behaviour's place in society. John Stewart Mill's (Fink, 1988) interpretation of Humean utilitarianism was that ethical conduct should aim at the general well-being, thereby creating the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. Thus, utilitarianism defines moral rightness in terms of what ultimately brings the greatest good to the greatest number of people (Christians *et al.*, 1991:15).

At face value, utilitarianism is quite compelling. From Brockriede's (1956) synthesis of Bentham's utilitarian ethics, utilitarianism is "good reasons, supported by specific and abundant evidence, free from fallacies, expressed in clear language, and showing that the given proposal will probably promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people". According to Hearn (1971:10), the formula for reaching "the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people", "may require that one should do the *most good*, or that one should benefit the *most persons*. Depending on which version of the principle is adopted, different answers are obtained about what is to be done in certain moral situations".

The weakness of the utilitarian ethical system is that "good" is relative, and reaching agreement on the definition of good is impossible. Like other consequentialist ethical viewpoints (Pettit, 1993), the preference for a utilitarian ethics is based primarily on nothing more than its simplicity and convenience. Geisler (1989:20) disqualifies utilitarian ethics, arguing that "either right and good are defined in terms of each other, which is circular reasoning, or good must be determined by some standard beyond the utilitarian process". Its teleological nature means that in utilitarianism, results determine the rules, constitute the basis for the fact, justify the rule, and may prevail over the rule. But how far can one accurately predict consequences? Also, this view apparently places an overestimate of mankind, that human beings will always identify, seek and enjoy the true good, and that the majority will arrive closest to the truth. It also means that the majority must always prevail over the minority, making the majority the standard for what is good or right.

As for the deontological ethical systems, we examine two predominant alternatives; the one defines ethical behaviour in terms of cultural mores, and the other seeks to organise behaviour in terms of individualistic codes, perhaps borrowing its basic premise from Kant's *Categorical Imperative*.

In a cultural ethic, ethical behaviour is a matter of obeying community, societal or cultural commands or fulfilling the obligations arising from the stipulations or expectations of the community, society, or culture. Kasoma's (1994) Afroethics typifies the cultural ethical system, as he posits that ethics in Africa should be articulated in terms of Africa's collectivistic orientation. He points out that for Black Africans, for example, a good action is one that is performed for the benefit or service of other persons, either individually or collectively, and a bad or wrong action is one that arises from purely selfish motives. Therefore, in Kasoma's view, principles of ethics should arise from a communal approach, in the spirit of *likute*, a Lozi word for respect, appropriateness or good taste (Kasoma, 1994:28). In this case, on the one hand the communicator is not to compromise his dignity by doing things that are morally wrong, and on the other hand, he is to seek not only to maintain but also to promote the dignity of the audience.

No doubt Kasoma makes a significant contribution to the ethical options to be available and by all means his propositions merit the attention of communicators. But, as Moemeka (1997:186) observes, cultural values in Africa - for example, - the supremacy of the community, the value of the individual, respect for old age, the sanctity of leadership and religion as a way of life - are changing. Since these cultural values are transient, it would mean that the specific ethical norms built around them would also be changing. One might argue that there is nothing wrong with that sort of change, since the ethical principles would change correspondingly, but it could also be argued that there is everything wrong if such an approach deteriorated into relativism or what Wong (1993) calls normative relativism, rejecting the existing of any moral universal truth.

The cultural ethical system is not without weaknesses. What if the community approved some things that are not necessarily sound? Or, how could one adjudicate moral conflicts across groups, since this ethical system implies that even contradictory ethical positions held by two communities would have to be accepted as ethically right? Perhaps the greatest weakness of this ethical system is that it makes the community its own source of standards, rules and principles of ethics and the ultimate measure of what is good, right, or ought. It is a weakness because one assumption implied within this ethical system about humanity itself is debatable: Are human beings truly capable of providing a sound moral standard for themselves, let alone for everyone?

Similar to Kasoma's communitarian ethics is Brembeck and Howell's (1976) social utility approach. This approach is offered as applicable to both public and intimate communication, and for both communication within a given culture and between people of different cultures. Their proposition is that ethically commensurate communication assesses the short-range and long-range consequences of a communicative act, including the benefits to and negative effects on the group and on particular individuals.

Brembeck and Howell (1976:245) define social utility as "usefulness to the people affected", and by "usefulness" it means that the persuasive speaker needs to first define the group and develop a general understanding of its members' common objectives and interests, estimate the way in which his contemplated action will hinder or foster the audience's attainment of their objectives and interests, and whether there are likely to be favourable or adverse effects on the individual members of the audience. They argue that "because persuasion is, essentially, rearranging the lives of other people, . . . the persuader's sincere effort to abide by some social utility principles is the first, and perhaps the most important, step toward being ethical". Ethical communication should "benefit" most of the people involved with minimum 'harm' to the individuals, but standards of "benefit" and of "harm" are rooted in the ongoing value system within the culture of the specific audience. The standard is, thus, culture-specific, which means that what is useful in one culture may well be detrimental in another. "No universal formulas exist, no firm recommendations are made. But every persuader will be more ethical if he gives thoughtful consideration to factors of social utility as perceived by his community" (Brembeck & Howell, 1976:245).

On the other hand, presuming that each individual is free to act and acts rationally, Kant posits that it was the individual's responsibility to measure up to the codes of conduct. He formulates the *Categorical Imperative* as follows: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Also, act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only" (cited in Merrill *et al.*, 1990:391). The Categorical Imperative implies that what is right for one should be right for all, since he posits that for every action, the doer should check to see if he would be willing for that action to become universal law.

As Christians *et al.* (1983:11) explain, "categorical" in Kant's Categorical Imperative means "unconditional, without any question of extenuating circumstances, without any exceptions. Right is right and must be done even under the most extreme conditions. What is morally right we ought to do even if the sky should fall, that is, despite whatever consequences may follow". Kant believes there are *noumena*, that is, higher truths superior to man's limited reason and transcending the physical universe. To Kant, conscience is inborn in every person and the categorical imperatives, inherent in man, are apprehended not by reason but by conscience (Christians *et al.*, 1983:11), and that "the obligation of the good conscience is to do its duty for the sake of duty" (Kant, 1964:62). The Categorical Imperative is thus based on the rational consideration of ethical questions facing a person. For example, could it ever be ethical for a speaker to lie? According to the Categorical Imperative, the answer would be yes if the speaker making the decision would be willing to have all speakers lie.

Titus and Keeton (1973:142-143) present a useful summary of Kantian ethics. First, in ethical demands, there is an appeal to reason, which involves a claim to impartiality, objectivity and consistency, and an attempt to eliminate caprice, passion, and mere inclinations from moral judgements. Secondly, rationality applies to all human beings, hence, moral principles are universal. Thirdly, the moral person must be viewed as his own lawgiver, freely recognising and choosing his obligations. Man is responsible for his actions, since he can respond to his own call of duty. Fourthly, for the moral individual, duty has priority over inclinations, and the moral act is one in which the response to duty is sufficient to induce the act. Lastly, the moral quality of an act is a matter primarily of its motive and intent. The motive is central and the only thing that is good without qualification. Goodness is thus to be found in an inner quality of will, not in outward performance or in the consequences of the act.

Kant's ethics have an austere quality and his dictum generally encourages obedience and faithful practice. The problem with the Kantian position, however, is that what the speaker reasons that he could do is ethically acceptable for anyone else doing it. Not only does it make the individual speaker his own standard for what is right or wrong, good or bad, obligatory or non-obligatory, praiseworthy or shameful, but also it encourages him to take his feelings and even his ego-benefit as the criteria for defining (his) and other people's ethical behaviour.

3.2.1.3. Normatic principles for persuasive speaking

The foundations of the approaches discussed above seem to be faulty (of course all ethical systems are faulty, though some merit greater consideration than others). Therefore, neither Kasoma's communitarian Afroethics nor Kant's individualistic rationalism is completely acceptable for formulating an approach to ethics for the persuasive speaker. We therefore turn to building an alternative approach to ethics. That is not to say that such an approach will be perfect, since it is also a human construction, but what makes it possibly stronger than others is its emphasis on framing ethical standards outside the confines of humanity. We propose and examine the following four elements that constitute the approach.

The ultimate standard. First, an ethical system that would be adequate would need to have a valid ultimate standard, a valid *summum bonum*. It seems that such an ultimate standard can only be the will of God. Veenstra (1994:79) proposes that the creation of human beings in the image of God should form the starting point for ethical analysis of communication activity. Berg (1993) argues that without God there can be no morality and that the very meanings of "good" and "bad" stem from God's will; that only through God, can human beings come to know what is good; and that only belief in God can serve to motivate human beings to act morally. In this regard, something is good, right, or ought if it is consistent with God's will. Something is good or bad because God says so, in which case moral behaviour is seen as, ultimately, originating from God. Such a view would also hold the essentialist view of good, that is, something is good because it is good in accordance with God's own nature (Geisler, 1989:22). Within this overarching frame, the ethical system entails the principles of freedom and love, and a motivation to contribute positively to the welfare of the audience. These aspects are elaborated below.

The principle of freedom. Second, a good ethical system, we propose, would be based on the principle of freedom. In following this principle, a person exercises his freedom in making the right choices. Perhaps more than anyone else, Ellul (1976) propounds the relationship between freedom and ethical behaviour. Ellul (1976) points out that there are many determinative elements which condition all man's psycho-sociological activities: Culture not only furnishes man with a particular life-style, mode of behaviour, and morality, but it also furnishes man with the instruments of intellectual life and structures of emotional life. Analysis of motivation increasingly shows that man's voluntary acts, on which he bases his freedom, are performed for reasons which have their roots in his innermost being but which are completely outside his control. Mankind is thus captively framed in a complex grid of necessities, those forces that act on man, including political power, money, and religion.

Ellul (1976) then points out that since all ethical situations are often reduced to that of choice, the question of choosing should be addressed in portraying freedom as the condition and climate of the whole of an approach to ethics. Often it is thought, for example, that man is free when several orientations or objects are available to choose from without constraint, or that man is free in a democracy because he can elect one of several politicians or opt for one of many policies. Conceptualising freedom in terms of the existence of choices is rather superficial, Ellul argues, since human beings are conditioned by many factors that cause them to elect one or other option. The choices man makes are conditioned by his cultural setting, his up-bringing, his environment, the media, and the various psychological manipulations to which he is subject. Hence, merely making a choice is in no way akin to freedom. Rather, following the principle of freedom means functioning by choosing between what is possible and what is not, and not between what is good and what is evil. When the ethical situation is assimilated to one of choice, it always means more or less a choice between good and evil. In contrast, the decision of freedom is creative, without having to begin with a given situation.

The principle of love. Fletcher (1966) argues that ethical judgements of human behaviour, including persuasive communication, should be made in light of specific situational factors, rather than according to prescriptive or absolute standards. In his situation ethics, Fletcher prescribes love for fellow human beings in the form of genuine affection for them and concern for their welfare as the only one absolute criterion to guide situational evaluations. He argues (1966:127-128) that: "The situationist enters into every decision-making armed with the ethical maxims of his community and his heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set aside *in the situation* if love seems better served by doing so."

However, Fletcher's position is somewhat problematic. In particular, Fletcher's view of love, that love is the sole criterion and that all other aspects of behaviour ought to be subservient to it, not only too easily fosters unprincipled behaviour and unrealistically disconnects each act and situation from the broader context, but also it utilises an deficient definition of love as simply benevolence or good will. Nevertheless, to the extent that love is a necessary criterion for a good ethical system for persuasive communication, his propositions are admissible. This means, a good ethical system ought to be based on the principle of love, if love is properly conceptualised. Love by its very nature finds expression in the freedom to see and to choose what is good for others, what fits them best, what is in their interests (Ellul, 1976:201). Without acting by love, even morality becomes simply a form of new servitude, and it is therefore not sufficient to do good, whatever its definition, without love.

The principle of *persoonsbehartiging*. Finally, a sound ethical system would be based on the principle of caring for the other person through recognising, respecting and promoting his personhood, what Stoker (1967:101) calls *persoonsbehartiging*. The principle of *persoonsbehartiging* hinges on the nature of human beings as created in the image of God, which implies that the speaker's choices ought to reckon with the fact that both he and the audience bear the image of God. In their perspective on persuasion, Veenstra and Van der Kooi (1979) derive a number of principles for an ethic of persuasion. First, that human beings deserve full respect as they are reflections of the image of God. Second, that honesty should be practised in all aspects of persuasion. In this regard, the persuasive speaker ought to be open with the audience concerning his intentions and accurate concerning all the facts relevant to the ideas, policies, or products he is promoting. For Veenstra and Van der Kooi (1979), honesty necessitates careful documentation of facts, solid information, cogent reasoning, clear statistics, quoting within context, appropriate emotional appeals, use of genuine experts, etc. If the persuader fully respects the persuadee, he will not try to bypass the persuadee's ability to think, to weigh alternatives, to choose, since these abilities make up part of the image of God in that persuadee.

However, the requirement for honesty does not demand full and complete disclosure at all times. Rather, tactfulness and sensitivity is to others' feelings should guide implementation of the principle of honesty. Veenstra and Van der Kooi propose further that only the best language should be employed and that the genuine needs of the audience should be determined and attempt be made to meet those real needs. Needs are not be manufactured where they do not exist and that genuine needs should not be confused with audience preferences and wants. Finally, Veenstra and Van der Kooi propose that the persuasive speaker ought to use the persuasive techniques and appeals that are appropriate for the subject, the participants and the situation as well as relevant to the genuine needs of the audience being addressed.

In this section, it has been argued that communication entails numerous potential ethical potholes and, hence, a consideration of ethical standards is a necessary part of formulating a theory for any aspect of communication, such as speaker credibility. It has also been argued that not all ethical systems are necessarily satisfactory or suitable for formulating ethical criteria, because some of the ethical systems are based on presuppositions that deny the existence or attainability of objective truth, or base their definitive premises on human beings or other doubtful sources of authority. Yet ethical systems, such as those of teleological nature, are simply ambiguous and difficult to put into practical application. An ethical criteria is proposed, with the will of God as the ultimate standard, because without God there can be no morality, since it is only through God that human beings could possibly come to know what is good and only belief in God could sufficiently motivate human beings to act morally. Build upon the foundation of the ultimate standard, the ethical system is based on the principle of freedom, the principle of love, and *persoonsbehartiging*.

One of the implications of such a criteria is that the persuasive speaker ought to speak in a manner as, and for the reason that, the audience will have significant choice (Nilsen, 1974). Nilsen (1974:45) elaborates significant choice: "It is choice making that is voluntary, free from physical or mental coercion. It is choice based on the best information available when the decision must be made. It includes knowledge of various alternatives and the possible long- and short-term consequences of each. It includes awareness of the motivations of those who want to influence, the values they serve, the goals they seek. Voluntary choice also means an awareness of the forces operating within ourselves."

Another implication is that the selection and presentation of the information in the persuasive speech need to be taken into account. Once again Nilsen (1974:72) clarifies this point:

> The ethical issues are whether the information presented is the most relevant and is as complete as the particular circumstances make feasible. Further, since selection of material is inevitable, it must be made clear to the listeners what principles of selection are operating, what biases or special interests characterize the speaker, and what purposes are being served by the information given. Definitions must be adequate; statistical units must be defined and the assumptions underlying their use made explicit. The listeners must not be led to believe that they are getting a more complete and accurate picture than they really are. In addition, the subject must be placed in the proper perspective as far as its individual and social importance is concerned. In brief, the speaker must provide for the listener as adequate a grasp of the truth of the situation as is reasonably possible under the circumstances.

Yet another implication of these principles pertains to maintaining, rather than, betraying the trust of the rhetorical contract entered between the speaker and the audience. In his theory of communicative competence, Habermas (1984) proposes a major focus on how language functions to foster mutual trust, shared knowledge, understanding, and human relationships. According to Habermas, when human beings communicate, four things are presumed: First, when people communicate, they assume that all statements made are capable of being comprehended; that is, statements are in a grammatical and semantic form capable of being understood by others. Secondly, when people communicate, they take for granted that the statements are true representations of existing, agreed upon, factual states of affairs. Thirdly, people who are communicating assume that the statements uttered or being exchanged sincerely and accurately reflect the actual intentions of the others. Lastly, when people communicate, they assume that the statements are appropriate; that is, they are in harmony with shared social values and rules. Habermas's propositions would mean that in any given persuasive situation, for understanding to be reached and trust to be maintained, the discourse itself ought to meet the test of comprehensibility (rather than mere impressionism), truth, sincerity, and appropriateness.

Also, the ethical principles discussed above imply that persuasive speakers need to strive to be righteous, incorruptible, honourable, honest, just and whatever else that constitutes or contributes to ethical nobility, before they could possibly act in ethically acceptable ways. As Johannesen (1990:11) sums it,

> Ethical communication is not simply a series of careful and reflective decisions, instance by instance, to communicate in ethically responsible ways. Deliberate application of ethical rules sometimes is not possible. Pressure may be so great or a deadline so near for a decision that there is no adequate time for careful consideration. We may be unsure what ethical criteria are relevant or how they apply. The situation may seem so unique that applicable criteria do no readily come to mind. In such times of crisis or uncertainty, our decision concerning ethical communication stems less from deliberation than from our formed 'character'.

Finally, towards meeting the ethical criteria, a theory of speaker credibility would have to be compatible with the speaker's ethical obligations; for how would he be liable to an ethical shortfall for any given unacceptable credibility-related roles he plays, if the conception of speaker credibility either expects or requires of him to play those roles?

3.2.2. Heuristic value criteria

Besides fulfilling the ethical criteria, a theoretical construction of speaker credibility needs to meet a heuristic value criteria also. On the one hand, it ought to be compatible with the theoretical view that persuasion is a process as well as with the speaker's and audience's responsibilities and roles in the persuasive process. Even if it were presumed that the audience has a specific criteria by which it evaluates a speaker each time it is in a persuasive speaking situation, the theory would be less than adequate if it is incapable of explaining just how the audience applies that criteria to evaluate speakers.

On the other hand, a conceptualisation of speaker credibility should make it possible to investigate the construct across a variety of contexts, in particular, across cultural contexts. In developing a theory the research ought to clarify the specific function the theory is to serve, whether the theory is to describe or predict behaviour, and ensure that it meets the criteria for a good theory construction (Infante *et al.*, 1997). The present study seeks to investigate a specific set of questions, therefore, what is needed is a theory that would help organise experience but also one that would well serve a heuristic function. Like a map, a theory that would serve to organise experience, is necessarily a symbolic construction (Infante *et al.*, 1997:42), describing and bringing together only the elements that are pertinent to further purposes of the theory. Since the present investigation focuses on the formation and application of speaker credibility across audiences of various world views, such a conceptualisation needs to be capable of explaining how speaker credibility is formed and applied in the persuasive process. Closely related to this point is that, since audiences are presumably involved in the formation and application of speaker credibility, the conceptualisation also ought to incorporate valid presuppositions about the nature of audiences specifically as well as human beings generally.

In this section, it has been pointed out that positing a (new) theoretical construction of a concept such as speaker credibility must be warranted by an inadequacy of existing theoretical work on that concept. It has been argued that to determine any such inadequacy as well as posit an alternative theory of, or approach to, the concept, there ought to be a frame of reference consisting of ethical and heuristic value criteria. We now turn to discuss the theories of speaker credibility against these criteria.

Thus, persuasion entails numerous ethical potholes. The implications of this fact is that any theory of speaker credibility, as an aspect of persuasion, ought to be premised on a well-thought and an acceptable ethical basis, as proposed in this section, as well as fulfil a specified heuristic condition. Having spelt out this critical criteria, a holistic theory of speaker credibility will be developed, towards which end, first existing theories of speaker credibility are deduced from literature.

3.3. THEORIES OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

A systematic review of literature on speaker credibility as a construct can take any number of approaches. The predominant approach in the past has been a chronological tracing of the construct, giving attention to broad periodical overviews, from classical to contemporary times. This particular approach, though has provided useful information, has not yielded a sufficiently complete understanding of the construct. Consequently, certain areas that should be investigated are conceptually pocketed and overshadowed. The present analysis utilises a conceptual framework, because such an approach affords a fuller understanding of the formation and application of credibility across culturally different audiences.

Theorising about persuasion goes back to pre-Aristotelian times and, beginning with rudimentary forms and articulations, it has developed into a vibrant tradition (Thomas & Webb, 1994). The earliest history of the art of speaking is attributed to the study of social organisation that made persuasive speaking one of the first necessities of a society. The Greeks were the first to accord oratorical expression a place of distinction among the cultivated arts. In the Homeric works, *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*, for example, the characters inhabit a significant oratory stature as, through their speeches, they issue exhortations or supplications to a single pursuit (Kennedy, 1980). The ninth book of the Iliad contains speeches that display the speakers' concern for both language style and their roles as persuaders (Infante *et al.*, 1990:94). Subsequent to these earliest conceptions of rhetorical practice, a number of theories emerged, along with them various conceptions of speaker credibility. As a critical examination of these theories will indicate, none of these bases of conceptualising speaker credibility adequately meets the criteria above. It is on the basis of that critical examination that a holistic theory is posited.

One of the perspectives of persuasion is what might be called the dialectical, essentially a Platonic view (see Kennedy, 1980:46). In his philosophical rhetoric, Plato (429-347 BC) argues, especially in *The Phaedrus* that good rhetoric requires the speaker to be logically resourceful and to know the truth. Plato would argue that, in order to be persuasive, all what the speaker needs is to know the truth, apply the principles dealing with the arrangement of the arguments, and adapt the arguments to the psychological data of human nature. In subsequent centuries, dialectic was held as superior to and a super-ordinate of persuasive speaking. Even Wilson's (1553: In Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:127) restatement of classical doctrines in his *Arte of Rhetorique* conceived a dialectical rhetoric.

Contemporary disciples of the dialectic view include Richards, Burke, and Toulmin as well as the whole camp of information theory. Richards' definition of rhetoric as "a study of misunderstandings and its remedies" (in Covino & Jolliffe, 1995:80) and his concept of "interinanimation of words" (Richards, 1972) imply his view that persuasive inducement comes primarily, perhaps solely, through the effective use of language.

Burke (1969) sees persuasion as occurring through identification, whereby the audience is moved to remake the substance of its identity into a state of consubstantiality with the speaker. Burke goes further to say that, to understand the true human nature, it is necessary to examine how words, as vehicles of artistic and social appeal, facilitate the introduction of attitude and value. This would suggest, and indeed it is argued so, that it is necessary to understand terms and their functions, in order to be able to find the grounds of agreement and disagreement among social beings. From this Burkenian viewpoint, the task of persuasive speaking then is to examine the totality of modes by which identification operates, essential to which is what Burke (1969:43) calls of *rhetorica utens*, "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols".

The dialectic theory is, therefore, a message-centred conception of the communication process and, therefore, one that does not take into consideration the personal influence of the speaker upon the outcome of the communication. The dialectic theory focuses on the content and its presentation through argument. We turn to discuss three major theories in which speaker credibility has been conceptualised.

3.3.1. Structuralist theory: Credibility is being

The origin of the structuralist theory could be attributed to Isocrates, a former student of Tisias, and possibly of Gorgias, who made the most significant contributions to expression, at the time when civil eloquence had reached maturity (Thomas & Webb, 1994:18). Isocrates, the founder of structured training in public speaking and proponent of its importance for citizens in a free society, linked oratory with citizenship, oratorical ability and statesmanship and recognised speech making as an indispensable skill in any culture (see Conley, 1990:17-20). According to this theory, speaker credibility is being, referring to at least three senses: (a) a good person, (b) ability to speak well, and (c) a general speaking reputation.

Credibility as being a good person refers to the character and morality of the speaker, as Isocrates argues:

> The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character . . . for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words. Therefore, the stronger a man's desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honourable and to have esteem of his fellow-citizens (*In* Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:54).

Therefore, the ideal orator should not be wanting in his ethical behaviour. Since the speaker's ethical qualities influence his success in speaking and the lives of the audience, his morals, principles and conduct should be such as to merit esteem. Quintilian (1856) posited that the perfect orator cannot exist unless as a good man and the true persuasive speaker is the good man speaking well (see Murphy & Meador, 1995:200). Linking excellence of presentation to noble character as well as emphasising that link, Quintilian (1856:1) argues: "Since an orator, then is a good man, and a good man cannot be conceived to exist without virtuous inclinations, and virtue, though it receives certain impulses from nature, requires notwithstanding to be brought to maturity by instruction, the orator must above all things study morality and must obtain a thorough knowledge of all that is just and honourable, without which no one can either be a good man or an able speaker."

A good person is wise and loves wisdom, which in turn, brings about good speaking. In this case, the responsibility and noble purposes of the would-be credible speaker, regardless of the aspirations of the audience, is to know the truth and to present it effectively. But also, the good person is the communicator befitting the situation. He is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* (Conley, 1990:37). According to Cicero, rhetoric can justify itself in political reality only if practised by the "good man", the "vir bonus". But "vir" is not simply "man" but something rather stronger, bearing a similar connotation to virile, of which it is the root. "Bonus" on the other hand is "good" in the sense that refers to more than the inner state of grace, but also to the exterior sort of virtue, someone "befitting" for the purpose.

Credibility as being able to speak well refers to matters of style, argumentation skills and behaviour, and good speech-making. Possessing an ability to speak well is to be capable of applying the appropriate style that Cicero (Ochs, 1995:167) proposed, namely plain, moderate, and the grand, arising from the speaker's attempts to prove, to please, or to move. Speaking well also concerns skilful, effective, and acceptable argumentation. Specifically, two elements are to be maintained, namely, a link between moral responsibility to mastery of rhetorical technique, and the *kairos*, or the ability to perceive the demands of the occasion and exploit them. Part of speaking well is the ability to argue in *ultramque partem*, that is, the speaker argues from both sides of an issue (Conley, 1990:37). The persuasive speaker is to be able to argue *controversia*, from a *multiplex ratio disputandi*. Arguing *controversia* refers to situating practical or philosophical formulations in divergent frames of reference, presenting both sides of an issue under discussion, but each according to its appropriate frame of reference. This creates the necessary conditions for arriving at a decision, and negotiating differences in a reasonable way. This is centrifugal argumentation, emphasising on eloquence, wisdom, and speaking copiously in which the argument of the speech is to be found not in any underlying scheme but precisely in the development of the loci, their amplification, and the graceful connections made in it among the particulars of the case (Conley, 1990:81).

Speaking well means, on the other hand, good speech-making, and this entails the determination of the character of a case (status), the states of conjecture, of definition, and of quality, as well as a sensible word choice, composition, and the various ornaments of the speech.

In this regard, good speech-making is an objective quality to be possessed by the ideal speaker. To make good speeches, Quintilian recommends that expression must be given the greatest attention possible, and the words used "must make a speech both worthy of admiration and productive of pleasure" (Quintilian, 1856:32-33). St. Augustine (1995) points that, upon the determination of the truth, the speaker's expression should display, as far as possible, the merits of beauty and persuasiveness. Accordingly, the diction should be appropriate for the subject matter, adapted to the occasion, and sufficiently varied to avoid monotony. For a subdued style, adequate words should be used, for temperate style, elegant words, and for majestic style, forcible words. On the other hand, the speech is to be so spoken as to make the audience hear the truth and understand what they hear. This calls for a so careful choice and use of words, logical reasoning and definitions as to keep meanings straight, but at the same time, adapting the entire process to the audience.

Speaker credibility as **a speaking reputation** is being the *Orator perfectus* in the Ciceronian sense. The ideal persuasive speaker is to be known for his proper concern for the language of power and eloquence accommodated to the teachings and understandings of mankind. In any case, the credible speaker would operate above the rules, from his possession of the potential to adjust, on the basis of the rules of oratory, to a variety of situations, yet remain good and speak well. The general speaking reputation pertains to the speaker's genuine concern for the audience, a kind of an Augustinian "*caritas*", in which beyond communicating the truth effectively, and beyond teaching, delighting, and moving, its ends are summed up in "*communitas*" (Conley, 1990:77). This should form the speaker's personality, especially his public character, and in particular what he is thought to be.

3.3.1.1. Structuralist meaning of speaker credibility

Thus from the structuralist theory, to be a credible persuasive speaker *is to be* the ideal orator. This means being a good person - in moral character, in pursuing wisdom and absolute truth - and in befitting speaking situations. It also means speaking well, in style, in argumentation, and in good speech-making. Finally, it means possessing a reputable general speaking ability. The implication of the significance of the speaker's reputation is that the speaker might become credible through his (previously known) esteem for other people, honourableness, good repute and fame. This further implies the significance of the known character of the speaker or the audience's desire to know about the speaker's past. Also, mastery of rhetorical technique, ability to speak well, love of honour, love of wisdom, and moral responsibility are, from the analysis above, definite qualities which the would-be credible speaker should possess.

Then, since credibility entails the possession of particular speaker factors, it is to be acquired, perhaps through structured training. Prospective speakers wishing to form their credibility are, therefore, to conceive an ambition to speak well, seek to master the knowledge of the subject matter, and become versed in the use and application of speech craft. Corbett (1965:538) reports Isocrates' contention that "it behoved the aspiring orator to be broadly trained in the liberal arts and securely grounded in good moral habits". The seventeenth century British rhetoric theoretician, Hobbes (*in* Corbett, 1965:556), argues that true and natural expression required knowing well and knowing much, as these had important psychological effects: "A signe of the first is perspicuity, propriety, and decency, which delight all sorts of men, either by instructing the ignorant or soothing the learned in their knowledge. A signe of the latter is novelty of expression, and pleaseth by excitation of the minde; for novelty causeth admiration, and admiration curiosity, which is delightful appetite of knowledge."

From what speaker credibility is and how it comes about within the structuralist theory, it could be destroyed by character suicide, or the failure to maintain a wholesome character. One could thus hypothesise a credibility health as well as talk of credibility hazards to reflect the varying conditions of credibility status and the factors that could harm it. Character suicide could be committed through poor performance, poor in the sense of being below the audience's expectations, and lack of consistency. But also, character assassination, that is, personal attacks by other people, especially those respected by the audience, could cause an erosion of a speaker's credibility.

Consistent with the structuralist theory, Simons (1986) describes credibility as a complex notion consisting of respect variables, such as perceived intelligence and knowledge of subject matter; trust variables, such as perceived objectivity and fairness; and attraction variables, such as perceived warmth, dynamism, and interest in the audience. It is seen as an image to be managed to achieve and maintain respect, trust and attraction variables. De Wet (1991:46) argues that credibility is something to be shown by the verbal message, as the message reflects good taste, common sense, and sincerity. This implies that it is the over all estimate the audience makes of a speaker's possessed qualifications.

To sum up, the structuralist theory proposes that the credible speaker is the ideal orator, and such possesses specific sets of qualities that are meant to be desirable transsituationally and transhistorically. As Infante *et al.* (1997:157) put it, speaker credibility is represented by how favourably the audience judges the speaker on each of these qualities. The credible speaker is one who is good, skilled in speaking and speaks purposefully. Speaker credibility is, from this theory, a centripetal concept, as its conception is based on a focus on the speaker, rather than on the speech or on the audience. From the structuralist theory, then, speaker credibility refers to that stock of speaker qualifications that embody his knowledge, moral, ethical, performance, and relational attributes that forms the scale by which the audience estimates the degree of his believability.

3.3.1.2. Evaluation of structuralist view of speaker credibility

It would seem that the structuralist theory holds the speaker squarely responsible, both morally and persuasively. The speaker is to maintain high ideals of pursuing and presenting the absolute truth and thus both the speaker and the audience are partners in the search for and understanding and application of that truth. The combination of moral character and technical skill is another strength of this view, after all, audiences of all places and times desire that combination. Also, the structuralist theory allows for the conception of fundamental speaker credibility aspects while it leaves the door open for any relatively context-specific qualities. Particularly strong an aspect of this theory is its ability to form a basis for both explaining and predicting persuasive effects, for example that, certain speaker qualities increase or decrease persuasive impact. The structuralist theory also calls for a personal development process for the person who aspires to influence society as a persuasive communicator. It also relates coherently with other aspects of persuasive communication such as the management of counterpersuasion through lowering the credibility of the opponent speakers or elevating that of the inducing speakers.

However, this theory has weaknesses. First, not only does it seem to underwrite the differences across cultures that would and do affect the appraising of persuasive speakers; but it also implies the questionable assumption that all audiences universally value standard speaker qualifications across all speaking situations, or standard sets of qualifications for every speaker, speaking situation, or both. Secondly, viewing speaker credibility as a formed image disregards the audience's consideration of credibility in assessing and responding to the persuasive content. And, thirdly, this theory fails to take into account the audience's involvement in the communication process and the effects of that involvement. To this extent, the structuralist theory does not undertake to promote effective persuasive communication behaviour.

3.3.2. Functionalist theory: Credibility is doing

Out of the context of the Athenian democracy in the fifth century BC, when in the popular assembly every male citizen had to make a contribution on issues to be decided upon by the Committee of the 500 and individuals needed legal defence, the process of persuasive speaking increasingly became important. Subsequently, responsibility of public statements was urgently called for, and this resulted to a system of scrutinising orators such that unworthy citizens would not speak in the assembly and only able speakers would engage in judicial pleading. The appreciation of desirable oratory during this time is crisped in Pericles' graceful persuasion. His deep reflection on and clear perception of what was needful for the people gave his speeches power and solidity, and consequently, moved his audience. The loftiness of thought and perfect mastery over every subject of this first recorded Greek orator suggests that desirable speaker aspects were thought, content mastery, and powerful presentation.

Subsequently, functionalist thinking emerged as the Greek society increasingly realised that men could govern themselves through persuasive speaking. This realisation led to the development of the first rules of oratory by Sicilian rhetoricians, Corax and his student Tisias. The rules were developed in response to a special demand for oratory to help exile returnees whose property had been confiscated by tyrants, and so Corax and his pupil produced guidelines for pragmatic purposes. Defining rhetoric as seeking to elicit a desired response, Corax provided the first formal consideration of the arrangement of speech material, with five parts, namely, proem, narration, argument, subsidiary remarks, and peroration (McCroskey, 1997:5). He also included the application of probability to rhetorical invention, that likelihood of truth must always be present in order for the truth to be convincing. Thus, this focused on the purposefulness of the orator to elicit a response, from a more dialectic view of persuasion.

Following these beginnings was a rhetorical tradition holding that the speaker has a function to perform and to do so in a particular way, and a purpose to achieve. Possibly a desire for a simple, utilitarian style and a reaction to the Ciceronian ornate high style as Corbett (1965:554) suggests, as well as the growth of the prevailing scientific spirit could have been the contributing factors to the functionalist conception of speaker credibility. But during the second century AD, when rhetoric was rekindled, persuasive speaking and writing became a functional profession, with some Greek rhetoricians becoming itinerant speakers. This functional view escalated so much that during the second-fourth centuries AD when the Second Sophistic prevailed, persuasive speaking as a profession was separated from everyday life, stipulated emphasis on the past or pure fiction, and style was developed for its own sake. This trend continued till the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The works of the most influential elocutionists, Thomas Sheridan and John Walker, reflect the conception of the purpose of public speaking and the function of the speaker in the speaking process. Sheridan (1763: *In* Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:138) argues that: "When we reflect that the end of public speaking is persuasion . . . and that in order to persuade others to the belief of any point, it must first appear, that the person who attempts it is firmly persuaded of the truth of it himself; how can we suppose it possible that he delivers himself in the manner which is always used by persons who speak in earnest? How shall his words pass for the words of truth, when they bear not its stamp?"

The purpose of speaking forms an important element of the functionalist theory of credibility, so much so that Blair (1965) defined eloquence as the art of speaking in such a manner as to attain the end for which we speak. In the case of speaking in a popular assembly, Blair posited that a speaker would be eloquent if and when he is earnest and utter his own sentiments in a language of passion and vehemence. He contends that delivery before popular groups should be firm and determined, as he argues:

> An arrogant and overbearing manner is indeed always disagreeable; and the least appearance of it ought to be shunned; but there is a certain decisive tone, which may be assumed even by a modest man, who is thoroughly persuaded of the sentiments he utters; and which is best calculated for making a general impression. A feeble and hesitating manner bespeaks always some distrust of a man's own opinion; which is by no means, a favourable circumstance for inducing others to embrace it (*In* Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:229).

3.3.2.1. Functionalist meaning of speaker credibility

From a functionalist theory of credibility, the credible speaker is one that knows and employs the combination of techniques that would bring the desired results on the audience. Characteristically, the persuasive speaker weaves words to create style that is to be energetic, virile, daring, and to entail unusual expression. This school of pragmatism became closely associated with Gorgias, whom Thonssen *et al.* (1970:45) describe thus: "He very properly directed Attic prose into the path of nobility, precision, and oratorical harmony; but he could not follow along the path, because he had the appearance of the force necessary [but] had nothing serious to say."

The credible speaker in the functionalist theory follows pragmatic standards, with a notable borrowing from the sophistic rhetorical theory. The sophistic rhetorical theory encouraged indifference to truth, anxiety for persuasion rather than knowledge, appearance rather than fundamental reality, jingling of words, and aversiveness rather than sincere search (Infante *et al.*, 1997:504). The functionalist conception of speaker credibility would acquire an additional set of pragmatic tools from the declamatory principles, the essence of which could be seen from Fronto (1919: *In* Thonssen *et al.*, 1970:109) who, writing to Caesar, said: "Herein lies that supreme excellence of an orator, and one not easily attainable, that he should please his hearers without any great sacrifice of right eloquence, and should let his blandishments, meant to tickle the ears of the people, be coloured indeed, but not along with any great or wholesale sacrifice of dignity: Rather that in its composition and fabric there should be a lapse into certain softness but no wantonness of thought."

Also, forming an aspect of pragmatism is Longinus' (1930) concept of sublimity of eloquence, supposedly indispensable for any fruitful speaking. To achieve sublimity the speaker is to boldly express his sentiments, possess a vehement and enthusiastic passion, and through a judicious selection of words, elaborate choice of diction and a dignified composition, afford majesty of expression. The objective is to embrace the essential elements of noble and impressive style, particularly emphasising the speaker's enthusiasm. Thus the persuasive speaker is to function from a presumed all-sufficiency of style as the standard and definition of persuasive excellence. This pragmatic conception of the credible speaker implies that judgement on style could be a thing of taste and less a thing of the rule.

Thus, from this theory, a persuasive speaker is credible because he performs his functions as the audience perceives or expects, and these functions are based first on the Canon of the Attic Orators (see Worthington, 1994). The Attic orators pioneered a technique for speaking that emphasised on adapting the speech to the demands of the causes, occasions, and character of the audience. Having established patterns of style in oratory such as the florid expression, a style that gloried in graphic description, they promoted the ability to stir feeling rather than character. The package of the style includes the choice of the most dignified and majestic rhythms, rising above the common idiom, seeking ornament of every kind, and using anything striking. In this case, the responsibility of the speaker is to adapt to the audience and display excellent, even if empty, style. From this viewpoint, the functions of public speakers would be always to speak in order and in a manner that, first, makes them beloved, influential and esteemed. Further, the persuasive speaker is to ensure that his admonitions to the audience endure, and for that to occur, the admonitions should come from a speaker whose speech delights the audience.

From contemporary communication theory, in functionalist terms speaker credibility is conceived as the degree to which a persuasive source satisfies the audience's needs (Cronkhite & Liska, 1980; Infante *et al.*, 1997:158). The chief proponents of the functionalist approach to speaker credibility, Cronkhite and Liska (1980), note that the credibility construct was peculiar to communication, not borrowed from such other disciplines as social psychology and sociology. They contend that "people choose in the process of persuasion with others who are most likely to satisfy needs and achieve goals which are most salient and important at the moment of choice" (italics deleted) (Cronkhite & Liska, 1980:103) and that the construct of credibility simply fails to cover all that is important about the participants in the process of persuasion. They broaden the concept, positing that three simultaneous processes occur in a persuasive situation: The audience becomes aware of the speaker's characteristics, some of which are observable, such as height and voice quality, and others inferred, such as education and social status. Then, the audience determines the criteria for judging the speaker in the context of the persuasive situation, that is, the audience becomes aware of the functions that the speaker could serve for the audience, such as providing recent information or entertaining. And, thirdly, the audience compares the characteristics with the functional criteria, such that the more audience's needs are fulfilled, the more credible the speaker would be.

The functionalist theory suggests, therefore, that audiences both use different criteria and use their criteria differently depending on the functions and purposes they expect speakers to perform in a specific topic-situation. Supposedly, studies in this line show substantial variation in the factors of speaker credibility (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976; 1980; King, 1976). This, however, is to be taken with caution since methodological differences, such as in rating scales, instructions, sets of sources used, and factor-analytic procedures could have contributed to the factor variations. Anyhow, within the functionalist theory, persuasive speaking is seen as eloquence; and eloquence, seen in pragmatist and functionalist terms, is to inspire fear, win love, spur to effort, put shame to silence, exhort to virtue, expose vices, urge, soothe, teach, or console. The credible speaker is to align himself with this understanding of the art.

From this theory, then, speaker credibility refers to those performance standards of the speaker and the associated audience evaluations on the basis of the functions the speaker is supposed to fulfil or achieve through the speech. This is a conception built around the speaking process. Its implication is that *there may not be specific a priori* sets of speaking elements that the persuasive speaker should bear for all cases. Rather, in every situation the speaker is supposed to understand his function in terms of the audience's expectations, define his purpose accordingly, and make persuasive presentations that are consistent with the whole process. In this regard, there is an appropriate way from the point of view of the audience, in each case, in which the persuasive speaker may use symbolic inducements to persuade the audience to perceive him more positively.

3.3.2.2. Evaluation of functionalist view of speaker credibility

On the positive side, the functionalist conception of speaker credibility is strong in aspects of performance, at least in emphasising good presentation. Also, the functionalist theory could aid in understanding how the persuasive speaker could achieve a high credibility rating. Credibility research that could be categorised as premised within the functionalist conception of speaker credibility indicate, for example, that certain verbal and non-verbal elements affect credibility assessments (Baker, 1965; Giles & Powesland, 1975; Giles & Street, 1994) or that there is a relationship between the speaker's style and judgements of his credibility (Giles & Street, 1994; Norton, 1983). A speaker could understand what artistic elements would lead the audience to accord him a high credibility rating and employ or avoid them, as the case may be, for that purpose. Heuristically speaking, Miller and Burgoon (1978:34) observe that "with few exceptions . . . credibility has been treated as antecedent, independent variable which influences subsequent persuasive outcomes, rather than a persuasive outcome worthy of studying in its own right". On the contrary, rather than viewing credibility as a means to an end, the functionalist view conceptualises credibility as an important persuasive end in itself.

However, a major weakness of the functionalist theory of speaker credibility is that it places the persuasive speaker in the serious temptation to accord choice of words priority over subject matter. As Corbett (1965:555) observes, this theory would seem to encourage the speaker's preference of elegance of phraseology, sweet falling of clauses, and variation of words with tropes and figures, to the weight of the matter, worth of the subject, validity of argument, life of invention, or depth of argument. This means that the functionalist conception of speaker credibility might give prominence to the presentation instead of the subject matter being presented. Like sophistry of ancient time, a functionalist conception of speaker credibility could breed barren oratory, removed from urgency of subject matter, in which case, persuasive speaking would turn away from cogency of movement to the cultivation of style, tending toward decoration and virtuosity. This performance-based view of speaker credibility could, therefore, lead persuasive speaking to degenerate into mere exhibitionism and become an end in itself.

Subsequently, persuasive speaking would degenerate into inflated extravagant word-spinning, removed from the world of reality.

3.3.3. Constructivist theory: Credibility is contemporaneous speaker image

The constructivist theory of speaker credibility has its origins from Kelly's (1955) constructive alternativism, though its application to communication processes also borrows from symbolic interactionism. Kelly (1955:8) proposed that "man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templets [*sic*] which he creates and then attempts to fit over realities of which the world is composed". Following this proposition, Delia and O'Keefe (1979:161) deduce that constructivism is a communication approach that assumes that individuals "never directly apprehend another's intentions, inner qualities, or attitudes" and, instead, individuals "see" the world through a set of acquired meanings or cognitive constructs (Perloff, 1993:276). Thus, constructivism rests on the assertion that all human beings are naive scientists, trying to understand what happens around them and that they come to understand events only through the application of constructs (Infante *et al.*, 1997:81; see also Littlejohn, 1992:119-122; Burleson, 1989:29-46). The idiosyncratic templates through which an individual looks at his world and attempts to fit over the realities of which that world is composed constitute numerous personal bipolar continua, sets of which form culturally-determined cognitive construct systems. The implication here is that, as active social actors, individuals construct reality, create meaning of their experiences and form impressions of people from their actions, qualities or attitudes through interpreting aspects of their appearance and behaviour.

Constructivism comes from the Human Action Perspective (Infante *et al.*, 1997:159), which came about as a reaction against the extreme followers of the theoretical world view that borrows heavily from the behavioural sciences. Constructivism rejects the position that people communicate or respond to communication only on the basis of conditions of if and when. Instead, constructivism posits that because human beings are qualitatively different from natural events, their behaviour cannot be understood in terms of physical science laws, and that the true nature of reality among human beings is subjective. Constructivism further posits that the way to know things is by understanding those subjective experiences of the people communicating. The assumption of course is that individuals are always intentional and purposeful, and not mere reactors to stimuli (Infante *et al.*, 1997:76).

The principle behind constructivism is the development of specific cognitive and behavioural dimensions from a state of relative globality to a state of integration. The development of various processes employed by individuals to give meaning and to direct behaviour is organised around distinctions between interpretation, action, interaction, and communication. The interpretation occurs through the development and use of cognitive schemes that categorise all social phenomena into domains of experience. The domains in turn are organised to create relatively differentiated and hierarchically integrated schematic structures within and across them. From the individuals' interaction with the environment, emerge schemes of a variety of forms; spatial, temporal, balance, linear causal, or bipolar templates.

3.3.3.1. Constructivist meaning of speaker credibility

The constructivist view of speaker credibility has received substantial attention in recent times. Delia (1976) notes that the dimensions of speaker credibility as postulated by Aristotle and utilised by Hovland *et al.* (1953) change with the object or context of judgement. Delia (1976:364) argues that: "approaching credibility largely within psychometric considerations has had two important effects. First, while ethos and communicator credibility originally were relatively well defined concepts, their meaning has eroded slowly . . . as they have come progressively to refer to more global and diffuse notions of communicator image and effective value".

It is argued that treating credibility concept as a qualitative image possessed by the speaker fails to explain it in process terms. Instead, it is argued, speaker credibility should be understood as a dynamic speaker variable. In this case it is necessary to inquire on the means and perceptual or judgmental processes by which the audience comes to a particular credibility evaluation of the speaker, explicate the set of processes by which the audience comes to hold a particular credibility estimate of the speaker, and to account for how that credibility estimate is created, sustained and changed (Delia, 1976; Infante *et al.*, 1997:157). This is of course a rejection of the conception of credibility as a constant speaker factor, somewhat similar to the functionalist view of speaker credibility.

The constructivist theory further posits that since perceivers differ widely on the number and content of the dimensions they develop for construing their social world, they would also apply through selective and interpretative perception, only part of the constructs spontaneously as the context may deem appropriate or necessary. Consequently, any given construct is used to interpret a finite number of events. Organised subsystems of constructs make schemata, thereby subsuming into clusters some particular kinds of events, objects, or situations. The organisation and use of these schemes may and does vary across and within particular domains of experience across and within cultures (Applegate & Sypher, 1989). To allow for explaining any cultural specificity of constructs, Delia (1976:369) argues that while constructs are individual, among perceivers socialised within a common cultural ecology, there ought to be similarities in the content and range of convenience of many constructs. It is within this understanding that factor analysis is often applied as a reduction process of ratings along numerous judgmental continua to determine the dimensions.

Aristotle made the earliest comprehensive attempts to articulate rhetorical theory and practice. Because of the immense influence that Aristotle has exerted on the conception of ethos (see Carey, 1994), a discussion of his ideas is necessary, especially as we propose that his conception of ethical appeal is constructivist. Defining rhetoric as the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in any subject, Aristotle argues that truth could be brought out and people made to know what is true and fitting, through two major kinds of proof; inartistic and artistic proofs. Whereas the inartistic proofs are simply to be employed, the artistic proofs are to be discovered and used. Towards persuading an audience through the artistic proofs, three major means were required; the character of the speaker (ethos), the emotional appeals to the audience (pathos), and the objective facts of the speech and their logical strength (logos). With regard to ethos, Aristotle argues that (Roberts, 1954:24, 25):

> Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker. . . . We believe good men more fully, and more readily than others; this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. . . . It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.

Thus in Aristotle's view, ethos is constituted by the audience's *perceptions* of the speaker's good will, good sense, and good character. As Corbett (1965:80) clarifies, ethical appeal in Aristotelian terms is exerted "when the speech itself impresses the audience that the speaker is a man of sound sense (*phrone'sis*), high moral character (*arete'*), and benevolence (*eunoia*)". To that extent the Aristotelian conception of ethos is constructivist, differing from the structuralist position in that it emphasises the listeners' perception of the speaker. Perloff (1993) notes that, contrary to Aristotle's argument, such people as Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein were neither good nor did they possess noble character, yet they wielded enormous persuasive power. The successes of these individuals apparently contradict Aristotle's views. Also, it is not clear what Aristotle means by character, or what it is about good men that makes them more believable than others. Aristotle did not provide any empirical evidence that audiences actually believe "good men" more than others. It follows that, although Aristotle stipulates specific precepts of speaker ethos, they are a description of what has been observed in the rhetorical practice of his day, rather than a prescribed standard to be followed always everywhere.

The implications of the constructivist conception of speaker credibility are apparent. The first implication is that the primary factor contributing to the process of credibility formation and application is the speech; its contents, the topic under discussion, the position advocated by the speaker relative to the audience's opinion about the issue under discussion, clues about the audience-speaker relationship, and presentation elements. Certain aspects are to come alive in the persuasive speech in order to lead to the audience's formation and application of the credibility of the speaker. It is the speech and its presentation that would generate the audience's impression about the speaker, in which case, ethos is seen to centre chiefly on the audience's sympathy towards the speaker. It would follow also that even where the speaker has behind him a good reputation, and although such a reputation would have an added advantage initially, ultimately, it is the discourse that is to establish or sustain his ethical appeal, and what the speaker says at a given moment could weaken, even destroy, his reputation.

The second implication is that the constituents that Aristotle (Cooper, 1932) articulated regarding how the audience gauges the character of the speaker, such as dealing with justice, courage, temperance, gentleness, prudence, wisdom, virtue, and sagacity are to be seen as means to guiding the audience to a desirable speaker image-construction, and not as standard precepts for universal application.

A third implication of the constructivist view of speaker credibility is that whatever weakens the sympathy of the audience toward the speaker militates against the likelihood of his achieving an end that is consistent with his purpose. The constructivist view would, however, fail to explain what might lead to that loss of audience's sympathy towards the speaker.

The audience-speaker relationship as projected by the speech is also part of the process of the credibility formation. Ethos from the rhetorical act is achieved through the speaker's identification in terms of certain characteristics and similarities with the audience, since "only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within" (Burke, 1950:39). Speaker credibility is speaker identification and consubstantiality with the audience, both the fact and the method. Another aspect of audience-speaker relationship that influences credibility perceptions is the audience's liking for the speaker (O'Keefe, 1990).

Besides the speech elements, the constructive formation and application of speaker credibility would be facilitated by a number of other factors. The audience reacts to and interprets the total rhetorical act, which is not limited to the speech and speaking only. Among these other factors are those associated with the speaker, and those associated with the audience. With regard to speaker factors, speaker credibility can also be seen along a spatial dimension (Jensen, 1981) or the speaking process (Brooks & Scheidel, 1968) in which the dynamic nature of the audience's perceptions of the speaker is accounted for. The phenomenal change of speaker image may come through such speaker characteristics as attractiveness, neatness, mode of dress, physical stature, gender, race, fluency of delivery, and use of dialect. But these perceptions that the audience develops from the cues of the speaker are what Jensen (1981) refers to as extrinsic credibility, not ethos.

Audience factors such as credibility proneness, ego-involvement, speaker-audience identification, stress, and observed audience response, and occasion characteristics such as attractiveness of the setting, temperature, colour, and space contribute to the defining of process credibility (Hart *et al.*, 1975) or the extrinsic credibility (Jensen, 1981). Process credibility interacts with the audience's stereotypes about the speaker's past as well as the activities of the speaker's occupation (Mbennah, 1993:136). Leading to the temporal dimension of viewing credibility, under which we can have initial credibility, audiences do possess preconceived impressions of the speaker. These impressions are often based on the speaker's personal appearance and actions and such facts as the speaker's group memberships and associated stereotypes that the audience has about those groups. From and with such audience characteristics then, it appears that through the speech and the other factors, the audience develops or consolidates a public delineation of the speaker.

It could, therefore, be hypothesised that in constructivist conception, speaker credibility contributes to persuasive impact in terms of its terminal credibility. This is a composite speaker image that the audience forms from the interaction between process credibility and initial credibility, though it is difficult to tell what relative contribution each makes. The development of credibility from initial to terminal credibility is a product of the interaction between four images: The real person of the speaker, the speaker's self-image from introspection, audience's image of the speaker, and the speaker's perception of the audience's image of the speaker (Jensen, 1981).

It could also be hypothesised that for some audiences and some occasions, the initial credibility might contribute more significantly to the terminal credibility than process credibility, and vice versa, depending on the intensity of the initial feelings of the audience towards the speaker. The question that can be raised here is whether audiences generally wish to know more about the speaker before, and whether such a desire varies across world views.

Credibility studies done within the constructivist view, imply that several factors affect credibility judgements. Supposedly, audiences construct such dimensions as trustworthiness and subject competence define speaker credibility. Along this presupposition, empirical studies (e.g., Haiman, 1949; Hewgill & Miller, 1965; Ostermeier, 1967; Swenson *et al.*, 1984) indicate that audience's judgements on these dimensions are significantly influenced by information about the communicator's training, experience and occupation. Speaker credibility judgements are also susceptible to variations in nonfluencies in speech delivery (Pearce, 1971; Pearce & Brommel, 1972; Pearce & Conklin, 1971). Audiences rate speakers significantly as low in competence with increasing number of nonfluencies, though trustworthiness is not affected (McCroskey & Mehrley, 1969; Sereno & Hawkins, 1967; Schliesser, 1968).

Research on speaker credibility from within constructivism also indicate that in using referent facts, opinions, and information to support claims for persuasive purposes, generally, citation of sources of evidence enhance communicator competence and trustworthiness, though could be small (Fleshler *et al.*, 1974; McCroskey, 1967; 1970; Ostermeier, 1967). Citations from low credibility speakers will not increase speaker credibility nor will irrelevant or poor evidence (Luchok & McCroskey, 1978).

From the constructivist theory, then, speaker credibility refers to the elements of the speech presumed to generate believability. It is that portion of the speech in which the speaker associates himself and what he proposes with that which is good, right, and praiseworthy, as Juleus (1966:40-41) points, "when the audience believes the speaker to be competent, sincere, a man of integrity and good will, his *ethos* is established". Brembeck and Howell (1976:259) posit that credibility can be initial, artistic, and terminal, implying that credibility is an image, a contemporaneous sum of the perceived variables about the speaker. Oliver (1971:91) has summed it that: "Ethos, a word selected by Aristotle and used throughout the 2500 years since then, is used to designate the effect upon listeners and observers resulting from the character, wisdom, reputation, and personality of the speaker. It involves everything that results in the listeners having a reaction to the speaker as a person - Ethos is 'the total effects exercised upon your audience by yourself as self rather than by your message'."

The constructive process leads to credibility dimensions, in which case a credibility dimension is a cluster of constructs used in functionally equivalent ways by a group of perceivers in the construction of a particular speaker or range of speakers in a persuasive speaking situation. This means that a constructivist view of speaker credibility rejects wholesale utilisation of Aristotle's conception of rhetoric in all situations, for the very reason that Aristotle's conception was itself constructivist. The contention is that modern application of an Aristotelian approach should not be to copy the descriptions and precepts that Aristotle finds to be useful in fourth century BC Greek society. For one thing, the argument goes, and rightly so, the approach was developed by Aristotle in response to needs and circumstances that were limited to his relatively much less sophisticated culture (Brockriede, 1971:43). Aristotle's classification was an attempt to cover the existing fields of oratory of his day and could, therefore, only be defended from those circumstances (Johanson, 1987:40). This means that Aristotle's conceptions of ethos must be seen as appertaining to the forensic and deliberative speaking within, respectively, the judicial and political rhetorical contexts of his time. With regard to epideictic speaking, the generality of the audience of this genre and its varying celebrative contexts (such as funerals, festivals, sophistic exercises) led to divergence and confusion among subsequent theorists, and ultimately, it became a repository for all types of speeches and other literary forms that could not be subsumed under the other two (Kennedy, 1984:73-77).

But also, the Greek culture of Aristotle's day would have had a particular interest on the speech, and responded aesthetically to the techniques of speech presentation and suasively to the decision or action called for by the speaker. Thus, Aristotle conceived ethos as a speaker-managed discourse-oriented product developed by the listener on the basis of the speech, which also means that his conception of ethos was restrictively within what the speaker does in the speech itself. Obviously, one should see the irrelevance of the specifics that Aristotle suggested as universal transcultural constituents of speaker credibility. Even if it were granted that Aristotle assumed that the speaker should posses a moral nobility and human virtues and a favourable disposition, ethos is seen strictly as a product of the speaking process.

Also, contemporary credibility research carried within the constructivist framework leads to the conception of speaker credibility as pertaining to the audience's reaction to speaker's knowledge and reporting biases (Eagly *et al.*, 1978). Whereas knowledge bias is associated with the audience's belief on the soundness of the speaker's knowledge about an external reality, reporting bias has to do with the audience's belief about the speaker's willingness to convey an accurate version of external reality (Perloff, 1993:143, 144). This is to say that if the audience construes the speaker as not having knowledge and reporting biases, then the speaker is accorded complete credibility. It follows that a combination of competence and trustworthiness makes a credible speaker.

It has often been found that the speech should evince authoritativeness, trustworthiness, and dynamism. Whereas authoritativeness refers to the perceptions of being informed, expert, qualified, intelligent, and reliable, trustworthiness entails perceptions of being honest, friendly, pleasant, and self-less. Dynamism, said to function less predictably and less uniformly across situations and contexts (Campbell, 1982), refers to perceptions of being emphatic, aggressive, forceful, bold, active, and energetic. But these findings first by Hovland *et al.* (1953) were presumed and verified rather than investigated (Mbennah, 1993:3). Otherwise they contradict the constructivist notion itself, to the extent that it appears that constructivism simply explains the structuralist notion of speaker credibility - explains how the audience comes to use the qualities that the speaker must possess. In any case, since constructivist research has concerned the cognitive structures of message sources (e.g., O'Keefe & Delia, 1982) rather than audiences and how audiences form impressions of speakers, there is very little research specifically examining credibility from a constructivist theory. But it seems that, in constructivist terms, speaker credibility is that dynamic, contemporaneous, and context-specific set of perceptions held by the audience about the speaker as a product of the entire rhetorical situation, but primarily through the speech.

From the foregoing analysis, several implications can be drawn. First, the speaker has no choice whether or not his ethos will influence the audience since, consciously or not, the audience forms an opinion about the speaker as a person. The persuasive speaker is, therefore, supposed to choose and do whatever would enhance his ethos and his main task is to create a favourable impression of himself before the audience, and not necessarily to actually possess those characteristics. The speaker is to create ethos in the speech and not simply depend on his reputation or publicity, and that the possession of highly desirable qualities cannot influence the argumentative situation unless they are revealed in the speech. Freeley (1993) makes a list of what the speaker should do to create ethos, such as evidence of thorough preparation, avoiding arousing suspicion, moderation, reflection of common ground with the audience, conveying appropriate seriousness with both the audience and subject matter, and striking appropriate physical appearance. This is impression management. Apparently, Freeley makes a distinction between possessing the factors and having the ability to project them.

Secondly, credibility is a matter of speaker-audience image negotiation. Though this comes from the co-ordinated management of meaning (CMM) theory (Pearce & Cronen, 1980; Cronen *et al.*, 1982), where there is greater focus on the social nature of communication than in constructivism, it holds that when people communicate, they develop an evolving intuition of one another's credibility, and that speaker credibility is a holistic reaction rather than an analytic response. Speaker credibility is therefore a caused response, as it is developed through the speaker's choices of inclusion and exclusion in his speech. Since the speaker wants to get a reputation for good reasoning and prudent judgement, he so to speak, negotiates with the audience regarding how best to demonstrate appropriate mental, moral, and emotional habits through the types of appeals he is to use.

Thirdly, the context-specific nature of speaker credibility implies that each rhetorical community, such as a cultural group, would have unique construct systems along which speakers are construed, interpreted and given meaning. The constructivist view implies that speaker credibility is time-bound, confined to the configuration of the speaker, speech, and audience in a given case. Subsequently, this means that it would be necessary to determine those constructs for each community as well as the variations across specific types of communicators such as preachers, politicians, teachers, media professionals, or social workers. Since speaker credibility is construed by the audience, within essentially a humanistic view to communication, multiple context variables should be expected to influence what constituents should define it in every case.

3.3.3.2. Evaluation of constructivist view of speaker credibility

The constructivist theory is useful in that it takes into consideration the valid assumption that audiences are active choice-makers and interpreters (see Kraft, 1991:72), in which case the constructivist view of speaker credibility might promote the speaker's audience-orientedness and, thereby enhance effectiveness. Also, since individual and group differences in the cognitive and behavioural processes underlie the emergent quality of communication in different contexts (Applegate & Sypher, 1989:65), the constructivist theory is also useful in explaining why communication takes place the way it does.

However, the constructivist view of speaker credibility could also promote unmoral, even immoral persuasive behaviour, since the speaker's concern and task is to create a desired impression, through language and topicalities that respective audiences deem appropriate; and not necessarily possessing sound personal virtuous qualities. The constructivist conception of speaker credibility might not be capable of functioning as a basis for prediction, since it can only explain what has happened in a persuasive process. It also suffers a severe limitation in that it requires an extensive knowledge of the individuals and groups constituting a particular audience in every rhetorical community and of every context, before one could know how that audience defines speaker credibility, which means that the speaker is not helped to prepare accordingly. The question is, even if it were presumed that the persuasive speaker would know what the audience wants, to what extent should the audience provide the yardstick for what is appropriate or necessary, even for them? To that extent the constructivist conception of speaker credibility seems to be too open-ended to promote ethically appropriate persuasive communication.

Since the constructs by which audiences would evaluate speakers are presumed to be hierarchical, cultural, personal and dynamic, how are the levels of the constructs to be applied by the speaker? A high degree of idiosyncrasy of the credibility dimensions according to this conception of speaker credibility could also mean that the constructivist theory requires person-specific theories, and this would render it further less useful, since it would, to that extent, disallow any generalisations.

3.4. A HOLISTIC THEORY OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

The discussion of the three theories of speaker credibility (*see 3.3*) above leads to the conclusion that a more satisfactory conceptualisation of the construct is needed. Such a conceptualisation ought to better meet the ethical and heuristic value criteria proposed earlier in the chapter. It seems that such an alternative conceptualisation calls for an incorporation of certain key elements of the persuasion process, and it is for this reason that it is called a holistic theory. In this section, first the key elements of the persuasion process that are significant in defining the speaker credibility are identified. From these elements, a conceptual understanding of speaker credibility is proposed and its possible constituent dimensions presented. Finally, an evaluation of the holistic theory is done, to see the extent to which it meets the criteria of an acceptable theory in persuasion (see *3.2*).

3.4.1. Persuasion elements and the definition of speaker credibility

Conceptualising speaker credibility, a concept within persuasion, would obviously proceed within the context of the persuasion process. In turn, this would mean that speaker credibility would have to be understood in terms of its relation to other elements in the persuasion process. Three elements of the persuasive process would be significant in conceptualising and defining speaker credibility, namely, the nature of the audience, the context of persuasive speaking, and the nature of the persuasive speaking process. These elements would provide a framework for positing a theoretical understanding of the speaker credibility construct. It seems, therefore, important to understand what these elements are and how they relate to speaker credibility. It is from such an understanding that an appropriate conceptualisation of speaker credibility would be deduced.

3.4.1.1. Audience

Audiences could be analysed in any number of ways. They could be analysed, for example, in terms of their stable characteristics, prior attitudes and beliefs and their means of resistance to persuasion (Cronkhite, 1969), or they could be analysed in terms of their dynamics and types, their persuasibility, or in terms of some other situational factors (Ross, 1994). But insofar as audiences are a factor in defining speaker credibility, a rhetorical concept, they are rhetorical entities, sufficiently explained by the symbolic convergence theory (Bormann, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1985).

The proposition of the symbolic convergence theory is that through interaction, people converge into entities, defined in that respect by shared rhetorical visions and bound into rhetorical communities. The symbolic convergence theory explains the process by which shared meanings begin, develop, continue, and motivate people to action. For example, following a series of studies on this presupposition, Bormann (1985) finds that a number of communities of voters possess differing configurations or dramatisations and thus possess statistically different visions of a presidential campaign, and that the visions of the campaign were later found to be reliable predictors of voter behaviour. Thus, within given cultural orientations, audiences would be communities that share the same meanings for basic values.

Basic to the symbolic convergence theory is the view that reality is socially construed and socially based. Because people in the same cultural orientation share inputs and interpretations from the environment, they come to hold those inputs and interpretations more strongly than if they had experienced them separately. People develop "creative and imaginative interpretations of events that fulfill a psychological or rhetorical need" (Bormann, 1985:5). When these creative imaginative interpretations, in Bormann's terminology, fantasies, are shared fully, a symbolic convergence of the meaning occurs, as a result of a "unified putting together of the various scripts which gives the participant a broader view of things" (Bormann, 1985:8). Cultural groups, therefore, create and share specific messages which contain reality, reality that differs from the mere existence of phenomena. Elsewhere Bormann (1977:130) suggests that there may be "significant rhetorical forms that cut across rhetorical visions", universal rhetorical forms which may exist across cultures and across time and that "recurring patterns of mythic dimensions common to a given culture's rhetoric" may be found (Bormann, 1977:131).

As part of the symbolic interactionism tradition (see Charon, 1995; Littlejohn, 1992), the symbolic convergence theory shares the weakness of that tradition but also benefits from its strength. According to Charon (1995), four main ideas summarise the symbolic interactionism perspective. First, this perspective focuses on the social interaction, that is, the dynamic social activities taking place among persons, rather than focusing on the individual and his personality. To this end, symbolic interactionism takes into account the active nature of human beings and rejects a projecting of human beings as passive, determined organisms. To the credit of this perspective, individuals interact and societies are made up of interacting individuals. Accordingly, as the individuals interact society changes and vice-versa, and interaction here means that individuals are not simply influenced by others but that as actors, individuals influence one another as they go along.

Secondly, symbolic interactionism purports that human action not only is caused by social interaction but also results from interaction within the individual. This means that individuals act primarily as a consequence of their cognitive functioning such that, although an individual may be influenced in defining and responding to a situation, the individual's definition of the situation is to a great extent also personal and internal as well as besides his attitudes or values.

Thirdly, symbolic interactionism focuses on the present, not the past. This means that when an individual acts in a particular way, the individual is not simply displaying personality traits he developed in his early years in his life. Rather, the person's action is influenced by social interaction and his definition in the present situation. If the past should come into play at any given moment, it will be in terms of its relevance and applicability to the present situation.

Lastly, symbolic interactionism describes human beings as more unpredictable and active in their world than other perspectives. Symbolic interactionism views the human being as "actor rather than as a being, treats [his] acts as symbolic in character rather than primarily physical, and views interaction as the basic social and psychological process from which personalities and societies emerge, through which they are expressed, and by which they are maintained as communities".

Mohrmann (1982:115) criticises the symbolic convergence theory that there is "no basis for arguing a concatenation, no basis for suggesting a dramatistic linking between chains in small groups and in any "corresponding phenomenon" appearing "in society at large". He claims that, although Bales (1970) - on whose ideas symbolic convergence theory develops - recognises a fantasy element in phenomena ranging from plays through fashions to social movements, Bales treats them as parallels, and does not suggest that any configurational determinism is obtained or that all forms of group fantasy are shaped by, and linked to, fantasies in small groups. Therefore, the argument that there would be a necessary connection between or among various forms of group fantasy or to expect that the dramatistic content of one will share features with another, Mohrmann deduces, is unavailable to Bales and inaccessible to those who would project Bales' theories, such as Bormann in his symbolic convergence theory.

Of course, as with all perspectives, symbolic interactionism is incomplete. The focus on interaction means that both personality presuppositions and social structure are not examined at depth. As the perspective emphasises that humans are dynamic, that they are rational problem solvers, and that society is in a process of "individuals in interaction" means also that unconscious reactions are de-emphasised. Another criticism that one could raise relates to symbolic interactionism's view of reality. Within this perspective, reality is social, and that one "out there" as well as within oneself is developed in interaction with others. That is to say, one interprets the world around one according to social definitions, which could imply the presupposition that either there is no objective reality out there and that, as Berger and Luckmann (1984) posit, reality is nothing more than a social construction. Were this to be the case, symbolic interactionism would have been less than desirable.

However, social scientists, including symbolic interactionists, operate from the assumption that a physical objective reality does indeed exist independent of individuals' social definitions. As Charon (1995:36) argues, "social definitions do develop, at least in part, in relation to something 'real' or physical . . . . The point, however, is that we do not respond to this reality directly". That means, individuals define the "situation as it exists" out there or interpret a "real act" but the definition is highly influenced by their social life. In addition to the physical objective reality and a social reality, individuals, as they see the world idiosyncratically, have individual, personal reality. Objects are, as part of the reality out there, socially defined and interpreted, and to that extent objects are social objects. In symbolic interactionism terms, for the human being, objects "are pointed out, isolated, cataloged, interpreted and given meaning through social interaction" (Charon, 1995:38).

Notwithstanding the criticisms against symbolic interactionism generally and the symbolic convergence theory particularly, the symbolic convergence theory is useful in understanding social processes. Littlejohn (1992) recognises the value of this perspective in clarifying the active role of audiences, understanding how messages appeal to and are used differently by various audiences, and in analysing the deep meaning structures beneath surface enactments of the actors in rhetorical and social situations. In terms of speaker credibility, what the symbolic convergence theory implies is that audiences in different cultural orientations, with their own rhetorical visions, constitute rhetorical communities along with corresponding symbolic systems.

It follows that audiences would have their own themes about, as well as theories of, speaker. It would follow that when a speaker communicates, his audience forms an impression, intended or unintended, of what the speaker is (Andrews, 1990:35) but as guided by their sense of reality. As situations change, what the speaker and the audience think is most important about the speaker, and what is most relevant to the situation, would also change. If the speaker projects these individual human circumstances into the public speaking setting, one sees that speakers and audiences interact in such a way as to define the speaker.

This definition of the speaker, hence speaker credibility, would therefore be the composite perception that the audience comes to possess of the speaker. This perception is what the audience thinks about the speaker at any given time. It would be formed by a variety of factors, chief of which are the context out of which the speech arises and into which it introduces itself; the speaker's prior reputation; the audience's needs, expectations, and priorities; the content and rhetorical characteristics of the speech itself; and the manner in which the speech is given.

3.4.1.2. Context

Persuasive speaking at any given time is also constrained by contextual factors, since in any rhetorical situation, the audience would have a rhetorical history and, in which case, particular rhetorical behaviours and patterns would characterise the audience's social and cultural context. The audience, for example, might be accustomed to speakers who might have attempted to be persuasive by, say, making the message meaningful or appealing to some particular needs of the audience. In any case, the audience would have a history of particular rhetorical methods of achieving salience and hierarchical patterns of audience appeals, all together fitting into a mosaic of the audience's cultural orientation.

Part of the context is the argumentation history of the audience, which would partly be the ways in which particular issues have been argued, the kinds of evidence employed, and the kinds of appeals to traditional values as well as the relationships between ideas offered in the past. Within such a rhetorical history, audiences at any given time and place would have prevalent and preferred rhetorical conventions and communication styles (Andrews, 1990:21). Perhaps one of the most difficult elements contributing to a full understanding of context is the ethical one. Of utmost importance is what Andrews (1990:23) calls the ethical tenor of the time, the feelings that most people have concerning what is right or wrong behaviour. The ethical tenor of the audience might have an influence on what is appropriate content as well as style of persuasive speaking.

The various contextual and audience factors could be viewed from the standpoint of their potential to influence an audience's process of perceiving a given persuasive speaker. In this case, the formation of the speaker's credibility is, by implication, circumscribed by the relevant events and relevant audience variables. Social and cultural elements within a context could also bear on speaker credibility formation and application. Even in a situation where the audience knows not the speaker beforehand, the audience might associate him with a group or cause that suggests a network of values. For example, if an audience gathers for a speech favouring the passing of a law on redistribution of land in South Africa, the members of that audience might identify the speaker as an activist of the PAC or even as a Communist. To some audiences this label might suggest an interwoven fabric of positive values, for example, that the speaker is in favour of redressing the imbalances of the country's past. For other audiences, the speaker might appear to represent negative values such as being too aggressive or revengeful. Obviously, neither set of perceptions is likely to be entirely true in any objective sense. What is important, however, is that the audience's social and cultural set would predispose the audience to view any speaker in a particular way, and, accordingly, influence the speaker's credibility.

Thus, the context within which the persuasive speaking occurs and the audience to whom the message is directed presents a situation which delineates the boundaries within which a speaker operates and the audience views the speaker.

3.4.2.3. Persuasive speaking process

A construction of a theory of speaker credibility also ought to take into consideration the persuasive speaking process itself. The discussion in 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2. focuses on what the speaker brings to the persuasive speaking situation, his existing ethos. But a speaker could create favourable ethos within the speech through such tactics as associating himself with the audience's values; refuting or minimising unfavourable aspects of his personality; demonstrating a grasp of the issues that are important to the audience as well as a command of the facts, information, and interpretation of those issues; convincing the audience that he understands its problems and shares its aspirations and concerns; or revealing his motivations with the view to counter impressions of self-interest. In any case, the speaker who is actually giving a speech is intimately bound up with the persuasive message itself, and the potential impact of how a speaker says what he says is inevitably present.

Audiences form impressions of a speaker that have the potential to influence a speaker's ethos on the basis of that speaker's delivery. Empirical observations confirm the conclusion that non-verbal messages are considered as persuasive (Burgoon *et al.*, 1990). What a speaker does in front of an audience almost always has some effect on that audience. Speaking with a dialect might lead to an immediate forming of opinions of his intelligence, energy, and educational level (cf. Delia, 1975). Speakers whose monotonous voices bore audiences seem to have the added disadvantage of being less credible, as well. Thus, correctly or incorrectly, speaker's vocal qualities may suggest corresponding personality traits to audiences. A "little girl" voice of a speaker, for example, might be associated with immaturity, and thereby tarnish the credibility of the speaker. The way a persuasive speaker looks and how he moves could also contribute to the formation of audience perceptions. In some contexts, a speaker's smile might project his warmth and sincerity which might, subsequently, influence speaker credibility perceptions.

Rosenthal makes an interesting argument regarding the formation and application of speaker credibility during the persuasive speaking process. Rosenthal (1966:115) contends that the classical means of persuasion are not discrete and distinguishable and that the "triadic association of logic, emotion, and ethos as presented in the classical view of rhetorical theory has fostered unwarranted implication that these concepts are coordinate and elemental in nature" (Rosenthal, 1966:120). Presuming persuasion to involve physiological bases, he proposes that persuasive responses are afforded by the central nervous system, which controls the intellectual processes of thinking, learning and reasoning.

On the one hand, persuasive responses are stimulated by certain combinations of visual and aural symbols issued by the speaker, thereby constituting the logical element of the communication. In this case, the arrangement of words in a persuasive speech is meant to facilitate a sensible process, hence logic. This logical element, Rosenthal argues, achieves two purposes: Advancing systematically the audience's thought processes towards the value or emotional base of a given proposition, and activating a value response sufficient to achieve a desired effect. On the other hand, there is an emotional response, involving the acceleration of numerous other mechanisms of bodily response, constituting the emotional element of the persuasive process.

What Rosenthal implies is that the logical and emotional elements occur simultaneously in a fusion of unitary physiological reaction, though still distinguishable. He points out that, unlike the logical and emotional elements, there is no type of response that could be applied to ethos. He (1966:117) argues that "ethos, properly considered, is not a basic element of the persuasive process but an end product of the combined logical and emotional responses - that is, a specific type of persuasion, *in toto*" (italics original).

Following this view, Rosenthal deduces that persuasion produces the development in the audience of values and disvalues regarding things, conditions or ideas. Therefore, in a persuasive speaking situation, the speaker presents the content, which is intentional, but also his total personality, which is simply unavoidable. Depending on the configuration of the communication, such as the interrelationships between speaker-audience, speaker-situation, and audience-message, the audience might respond to the content or to the total personality of the speaker. In the latter case, the audience is responding to ethos, which refers to a communication in which the persuasive effect is dominated by the value response activated by the total personality of the speaker, or to the audience's perception of the speaker's personality derived from and conveyed by the whole rhetoric - "the man speaking".

3.4.2. Speaker credibility: A stratified multi-dimensional construct

Taking into account the implications of the elements of persuasion process, speaker credibility is to be defined as the audience's assessment of approval or disapproval of a combination of qualities that the speaker possesses and projects, and what the audience forms about the speaker's wholesome contemporaneous image, thereby responding to the communication accordingly. From the determinants of the definition of speaker credibility, it seems that speaker credibility is a stratified and multi-dimensional construct. Generally, audiences would have as part of their philosophical software, moral, aesthetic, competence, and relational dimensions along which they would infer credibility on speakers. Whereas the moral dimension appertains to the objectivity and morals; the aesthetic refer to speaking skill, vitality in presentation, and appropriateness in physical appearance; relational qualities refers to the speaker's orientation towards the audience.

It is further proposed that, whereas some of the credibility elements are elements to be possessed by the speaker, though they may still have to be demonstrated by the speaker and inferred by the audience, and that such would be universally applicable, other elements are contextually defined. Therefore, audiences possess a stock of credibility dimensions, which they selectively apply in each given speaking situation. This would mean that audiences in different cultural orientations share the tendency to assess speakers but they do so using a somewhat varying scale.

Within this understanding, speaker credibility consists of a hierarchically ordered stock of universal and context-specific factors of moral, relational, content-related competence, and performance qualities. The specific definition of each of the factors as well as their application would depend on the audience's world view and the position of the topic of communication with respect to that world view. A discussion of these factors further clarifies this proposition.

3.4.2.1. *Moral dimension*

Constituting the moral dimension are trustworthiness and the speaker's reputation. The former could refer to the perceived communicator's intent to make only valid arguments, the communicator being a valid source of valid information, or the communicator seen to possess good will for the audience and devoid of self interest. Again it is conceivable that audiences in some world view orientations would raise trustworthiness or any of its constituent elements as a critical criteria against a persuasive speaker while audiences in other orientations might not.

It is also possible that audiences might differ in applying trustworthiness as credibility criteria - some employing it in terms of each specific speaking situation, while for other audiences it might be the general character of the speaker that counts most significantly, not just the appearance of the moment. In the latter case, it would be the history behind the person that seems to be more encompassing and not the perceptions of the immediate moment, though they may be impressive. The audience's awareness of anything that has occurred in a speaker's past could affect their pre-judgement of the speaker. With regard to the speaker's reputation, from other speeches, political actions, written works, or reports of positions the speaker has taken before, the audience might be aware of the speaker's opinion on the topic under consideration.

The speaker might also bring to the speaking situation a public character. His past actions, not only those associated with the specific issue being discussed, might contribute to the audience's impressions of the speaker's qualities such as sincerity, trustworthiness, judgement, ethical behaviour, or whatever else that the audience might consider to be relevant or significant. The speaker's public life and, possibly, private life might be even more significant to the audience's considerations than the speaker's identifiable stand on the topic of his speech.

3.4.2.2. *Relational dimension*

The relational dimension pertains to the speaker's personal orientation with respect to the audience, and could be constituted first and foremost by the speaker's concern for the audience's welfare. But also, the relational dimension could be in terms of his perceived degree of sympathy, friendliness and sociability for an audience of one world view orientation, or refer to the speaker's harmlessness to the audience, as in McCroskey's (1966) safety factor, for an audience of another world view orientation.

An audience's perception of the depth and genuineness of the speaker's interest in them and their problems could also contribute to the speaker's reputation. Such qualities as consistency could influence the audience's views of a speaker's sincerity. Experience might relate not only to a speaker's expertise but also to his perceived interest in, and identification with, the audience. Audiences could be gullible; their yearnings for solutions to their problems could lead them to believe what and whom they want to believe (Andrews, 1990:39). But audiences might be suspicious too. They could question the motivations of speakers who appear to have something to gain by soliciting their support.

A speaker's reputation, then, is made up of an audience's various perceptions of the speaker, based on what it knows or believes about that speaker. What the audience believes it knows about a speaker's motivations could form part of the relational factor that the speaker brings to the persuasive speaking situation.

3.4.2.3. Content-related competence

Competence could refer to mastery of content (McCroskey, 1966) or to public speaking ability, similar to Quintilian's "speaking well" concept (Mbennah, 1997). Competence might refer to possessing the specific knowledge or relevant authority required to deliver a given content. For some audiences, for example, a good speaker would be seen as someone who knows what he is talking about. Aspects of the speaker's past could have established him as an authority on the question at hand. Simply being identified in an audience's mind as possessing a desirable quality such as being an expert would enhance speaker credibility.

However, it should be expected that certain speaker aspects would be competence variables in one world view orientation and not in another. For example, in one world view context, competence may refer to possessing knowledge about a specific subject matter, in another, competence could be defined in terms of artistic ability in presenting content. Or, perhaps the general characteristics that evoke attitudes related to competence might be different, for example including age, leadership position, training, and similarity with audience in terms of such variables as values, interests, and needs. In this case, there would be a difference in the basis of competence across audiences of different world view orientations. The point is, competence might not only be one of several dimensions of speaker credibility; it would itself have multiple dimensions, some emphasised among audiences of one world view orientation and others among audiences of another world view orientation.

Research generally corroborates speaker competence as a factor of speaker credibility, especially in terms of the speaker's qualification. Qualifications is in this case defined, depending on the audience, by such aspects as age, maturity, training and sanity, as a dimension of speaker credibility. It corresponds somewhat to Dodd's (1998:222) authority, though the basis or source of authority would vary from one context to another. Whereas, in some contexts, speaker qualification might refer to the speaker's training relevant to the subject of communication, signified by credentials, or being informed about the topic and skilful in presenting it, in other contexts it might refer to such things as age, maturity, or appropriateness of the speaker in discussing that topic.

3.4.2.4. Performance qualities

The elements constituting the aesthetic or performance dimension seem to be vitality in the presentation of the speech and the physical appearance of the speaker. Vitality entails the speaker's potency exhibited during delivery and is related to such elements as aggressiveness, boldness, timidity, passiveness, tiredness, and emphasis. Vitality, equivalent to dynamism (McCroskey, 1966; Whitehead, 1968) is composed of performance elements such as forcefulness, emphasis, pace, tonal level, loudness or softness, and masculinity, and is thus a paralinguistic factor.

The efficacy of vitality on persuasive communication, however, depends on whether or not expressiveness is a modal character of the audience. Where, for example, expressive capabilities are preferred or in cultural orientations where style is particularly self-conscious, assertive, colourful, intense and aggressive (see Kochman, 1988), it would be expected that audiences in those orientations would view vitality as a critical standard against a persuasive speaker.

Research findings show that physical appearance, as an aspect of speaker, is significant to the persuasive process, and to that end, it is a dimension of speaker credibility. Early studies (e.g., Horai *et al.,* 1974; Patzer, 1983) employed a simple procedures to study the effects of source attractiveness on persuasion and found that such appearance elements as speaker's body weight, height, fatness, stature and shape were credibility-relevant. Within laboratory contexts, subjects were asked to read a persuasive message on a relatively low involving issue, such as lowering the speed limit by 16-24 Kilometres per hour and these early researchers manipulated attractiveness by means of photographs of individuals presumably of different attractiveness.

These early studies could be judged as rather simplistic, nevertheless, subsequent studies corroborated these earlier findings, that good-looking speakers would be likable, friendly and interesting (Berscheid & Walster, 1974) and that physical attractiveness influences audiences, because they desire to identify themselves with an attractive speaker (Chaiken, 1979, 1986; Kahle & Homer, 1985). What constitutes desirable appearance and whether or not stature and shape belong to the same factor as facial good-looks is an item of future inquiry, but it is possible that audiences in confine themselves to aspects of physical appearance that are within the control of the speaker (Mbennah, 1997:57).

3.4.2.5. Holistic view of the credibility dimensions

But what is the relationship among these credibility dimensions and how are they applied? Because the art of speaking is universally human, there would be certain elements for appraising persuasive speakers as well as certain processes that are universally common. The obvious one seems to be the very tendency for audiences to appraise persuasive speakers.

Regarding the existence of a general stock of a credibility dimensions, Mbennah (1993) posits that audiences could be more prone to raise moral questions with regard to certain persuasive purposes, such as political advocacy than they are with others, such as teaching or preaching. Should this be the case, it would suggest that although audiences - universally or within given world view orientations - have a general credibility scale, the application of the different dimensions against any one communication source is a function of the general public attribution to the profession from which the source comes.

That means, audiences in different world view orientations would have different images of various professions or occupations, and hence would differ in terms of their criteria for evaluating communication sources from those professions or sources. The implication here is that discretionarily, audiences would waive some standards and use certain other dimensions more prominently in judging speakers, depending on the audiences' preconceived images of the professions or occupations of those speakers. Since audiences would avoid dissonance arousing situations (Festinger, 1957; Nuttin, 1974), it would be expected that they would to refrain from evaluating specific speakers using part of the general credibility scale that is seemingly irrelevant to the specific case.

On the other hand, within each credibility dimension, there are sets of elements that form a varied definition and application of that dimension across varied audiences. It follows that due to the differences among audiences of various world view orientations, which define such audiences as distinct rhetorical communities; and differences in contexts, which define rhetorical conventions, audiences across world views would have and would apply different aspects of specific credibility dimensions. In this respect, whereas the structuralist theory provides the foundational elements of speaker credibility, the other theories provide the means by which or explains how the variable aspects of credibility are to be achieved and sustained. Therefore, if the functionalist propositions were subsumed in the structuralist view of speaker credibility, then all that would remain are structuralist elements but which audiences infer constructivistly.

3.4.3. Evaluation of the holistic theory in terms of the critical criteria

Earlier on in this chapter (*see 3.1*), it was pointed out that positing a (new) theoretical construction of a concept such as speaker credibility must be warranted by an inadequacy of existing theoretical work on that concept. It has been argued that to determine any such inadequacy as well as posit an alternative theory of or approach to the concept, there ought to be a frame of reference consisting of ethical and heuristic value criteria (*see 3.2*). The conception of speaker credibility proposed (*see 3.4*) is compatible with the speaker's ethical obligations and meets the heuristic value test, therefore, meets the critical criteria.

In terms of the ethical criteria, this theoretical proposition takes the audience into consideration - audience characteristics, context, and processes. The persuasive speaker ought to speak in a manner as, and for the reason that, the audience will have significant choice. The theoretical construction encourages the persuasive speaker to maintain, rather than betray, the trust of the rhetorical contract between the speaker and the audience. This construction also meets the critical criteria in that, since the speaker is expected to possess some specific qualities, over and above any that the audience construes, it means that persuasive speakers need to strive to be righteous, incorruptible, honourable, honest, just and whatever else that constitutes or contributes to ethical nobility.

In terms of the heuristic value gauge, the theory is compatible with the theoretical view that persuasion is a process as well as with the speaker's and audience's responsibilities and roles in that process. In view of the audiences' involvement in forming and applying speaker credibility, the theory incorporates, as it should, valid presuppositions about the nature of audiences. In this respect, the theory is consonant with other theories of persuasion, those that posit that audiences are actively, rather than passively, involved in the persuasive process.

Also, this theoretical proposition makes it possible to investigate the construct across a variety of contexts. This is made possible by the fact that although there could be a general stock of speaker credibility dimensions, the specific contents of those dimensions for various contexts, as well as their application in assessing speakers could form a focus of investigation. Also, the theory allows for exploring context-specific aspects of speaker credibility.

In terms of the heuristic function, this theoretical proposition would perform an explanatory function. Since the study focuses on the formation and application of speaker credibility across various world views, the present conceptualisation of speaker credibility would explain how speaker credibility is formed and applied in the persuasive process. Implied to this explanation is a predictive function, in which one could, on the basis of this understanding of speaker credibility, hypothesise what sort of credibility dimensions would be formed or utilised in a given context.

3.5. SPEAKER CREDIBILITY AND PERSUASION

It was noted earlier in the chapter that speaker credibility is positively correlated with persuasion, and research-based support was given for the efficacy of speaker credibility and persuasion (*see 3.1*). Given that this study concerns the credibility formation and application in persuasion, it is also pertinent to explore ways in which speaker credibility would influence persuasion. From the conceptualisation of both persuasion and speaker credibility, what could one deduce as the relationship between the two concepts? The discussion that follows in this section endeavours to address this question.

3.5.1. Speaker credibility and the evaluation of arguments

Mertz (1966:12) proposes that speaker credibility should be conceptualised in a multi-directional approach in which the speaker's influence potential is a joint function of the audience's evaluation of the speaker and the audience's self-evaluations. In this case the audience compares itself with the speaker along each credibility dimension as it may apply. For example, if one of the credibility dimensions is speaking ability, the audience evaluates the speaker along this variable against the audience's own speaking ability. In Mertz's proposition, the audience would accept the speaker's influence attempts to the extent that the audience rates the speaker higher than itself. Conversely, to the extent that the audience judges the speaker lower than itself, it would reject the source's influence attempts. Therefore, the speaker's credibility and its subsequent influence potential depend, not on his absolute rating, but on his evaluative standing relative to the audience's self-evaluation.

But Mertz's view of the audience's dissecting of the credibility aspects is a debatable theoretical convenience, because, ultimately the audience responds to the speaker, not the speaker's individual qualities. If Mertz's conceptualisation has merit at all, it would be in the sense that finally the audience compares itself in toto with the speaker's summed estimation of the perceived and known qualities. To that extent, it could be deduced that in this sense, speaker credibility functions as a special motivation of the arguments.

Speaker credibility's role as a motivation in the audience's evaluation of the speaker's argument is more fully explained by the image theory (Boulding, 1965). Boulding (1965) proposes that people have various images in their mind, and these images encompass their total past experiences - beliefs and values from the corpus of their past knowledge. Communication behaviours follow essentially the underlying images of the people engaged in a given communicating situation. On the other hand, images develop within cultural and subcultural settings, derived from old elements or old dominant cultures of the groups concerned. As it were, images serve as screens for the selection, perception and interpretation of incoming messages and are, therefore, the instruments of abstracting concepts from the stream of actual impressions.

Therefore, according to Boulding's theory, the way people behave depends on the images they have, and persuasion is basically changing these images. The image theory further suggests that the meaning of the message is the change it produces in the audience. A message perceived by the audience as unfavourable would be resisted by the audience, but the force with which it reaches the audience, or the authority from which it comes could make it penetrate the resistance to alter the audience's images (Campbell & Hepler, 1970:33).

However, the valence and degree of relational orientation of the audience would influence the outcome of both Mertz's and Boulding's propositions. Valence and degree of relational orientation refer to the assumption that people in some cultural orientations are more attuned to having and maintaining relationships among themselves than people in other cultural orientations. It should be expected that highly relational audiences or topics requiring a relational aspect would call for the audience to attend more to the "person's message" than merely to the message. In providing a special motivation to the audience to attend to the arguments, high speaker credibility would broaden the audience's latitude of acceptance and/or non-commitment and narrow the latitude of rejection for the topic or position advocated.

Kelman's (1958) typology of three social influences - compliance, identification, and internalisation - also implies a speaker's motivational input in a persuasive situation. This typology is useful for understanding the difference between compliance-gaining and persuasion. These influences are directed outward to the types of social relationships that occur. In compliance, the audience accepts influence instrumentally. Typically, the use of threat, food-for-work programmes, and reward-punishment strategies are "compliance" approaches. Compliance involves change in the audience resulting from a powerful source motivating the audience to alter their behaviours. Compliance is not, of course, an opinion change process since adoption of the proposed behaviour is based on the change agent's control of the means.

In identification, the audience actually adopts the opinions of the source because those opinions satisfactorily define the audience's self-image and establish and maintain a desired source-audience relationship. Whether the relationship is reciprocal or patronising, identification depends on the attractiveness of the source to the audience, which subsequently determines the salience of the relationship between them. Source attractiveness is defined as when the audience derives satisfaction from a self-definition based on the source (Sereno & Mortensen, 1970:275).

The most fundamental social influence process in Kelman's typology is internalisation, and it occurs when the audience accepts influence by a source because the content of the induced behaviour is consistent with the audience's value system. Through internalisation, then the speaker's personal influence mediates persuasion, since persuasion per se concerns change in belief, opinion or behaviour that is intended to be of greater duration (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997b:33; Burgoon & Miller, 1990). But internalisation would occur in view of the credibility of the source.

3.5.2. Speaker credibility and the evaluation of appeals and claims

As pointed out earlier, arguments are necessary for any form of persuasion to occur and appeals are part of the persuasive process (*see 2.3.2*). Audiences accrue certain expectations, deriving them from whether they perceive the speaker as knowledgeable; whether the kind of predisposition they perceive the speaker to have towards them is favourable; and whether they perceive in the speaker a commitment to communicating sincerely. Also, the audience accords the value and weight of the claims, appeals and arguments in view of the speaker's personality, since the position advocated by the persuasive source might confirm or disconfirm the audience's premessage expectations about him.

However, there is also a sense in which arguments and appeals receive their force from the person of the speaker. Dodd (1987:266-7) points that, "when a credible communicator provides a frame of evidence of a set of verbal and behavioral experiences with which the listeners can identify, then individual and group belief systems are changed. Put another way, belief systems are protected by norms and other defenses, but a highly credible communicator opens a 'crack in the door' through which further altering experiences can enter and change the belief system".

Any persuasive communication behaviour is influenced by the power of the communication source relative to that of the audience. This power could be defined as the ability that one individual has to influence the behaviour of another individual (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:98).

On the other hand, in each society as well as in each communication setting, there could be a particular concept of power. Concept of power here means that individuals in each context define the value of power and possess a conception as to what prestige, if any, is attached to power. It would be expected that in a highly religious, monarchical, or a gerontocratic context, power would be adored. On the contrary, in the so-called democratic egalitarian contexts the conception of power would be almost in terms of public trust, which could be withdrawn from a custodian, if necessary.

Where there is a particularly high value for power, hero worshipping and uncritical yielding to power might be common. It also goes without saying, that appeals especially threats and fear appeals would receive the audience's attention, not only in view of the power the persuasive speaker has but also in view of what a speaker bestowed with power could do and what the context prescribes to be the speaker's possible use of that power.

3.5.3. Speaker credibility and aesthetic appeal

Speaking, including persuasive speaking, is an art and would, therefore, entail several aesthetic elements. The beauty, grandeur of presentation, style, and speaker appearance could be variables of the persuasive speaker's personal influence on the impact of his message on the audience.

In general, physically attractive sources are more persuasive than less attractive sources (*see also 3.4.2.4*). Although the effects of physical attractiveness could be inferior to those of trustworthiness and subject competence, some aspects of the speaker's physical appearance would be part of the definition of credibility.

Perhaps there is no greater sense of art in persuasive speaking as in presentation and style. Often, discussion of presentation and style in persuasion is viewed apprehensively, and the motive behind it is often the ill-memories of the sophistry, especially the Second Sophistic of the second-fourth centuries AD. Presentation and style are viewed with reservations also as a result of our knowledge of the seventeenth and eighteenth century stylistic rhetoric, which emphasised on embellishment and "proper" movements during delivery.

Although care must be taken not to admit mere exhibitionism in persuasive speaking, a total rejection of paying attention to presentation and style is an extreme that does not stand on sufficient ground. In some rhetorical theory circles, presentation style is taken as so important that persuasion is itself defined in terms of presentation style. Blair, for example, defines persuasion as "the art that encompasses all that relates to the beauty, harmony, grandeur and elegance; all that can soothe the mind, gratify the fancy, or move the affections" (cited in Covino & Jolliffe, 1995:47-48). Blair's view perhaps overstates the role of style, and certainly limiting persuasion to style is too narrow a view.

Nevertheless, a consideration of style is indispensable to the occurrence of persuasion, as it determines the audience's attention. Style might even have a certain delineating function in the construction of meaning by the audience.

Of particular significance to the present discussion is that style influences speaker credibility and affects argumentation. Gibbons *et al.* (1991) conclude in their study that the power of speech (POS) exerts considerable influence on perceptions of the speaker, implying that a fluent and articulate speaker, apparently confident and in command of his thoughts, would seem better able to persuade an audience than a speaker who pauses, hedges and hesitates in the delivery of the same arguments. Also, this conclusion implies that fluent and skilful articulation of a message should improve comprehension and, thus, enhance persuasion (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Eagly, 1974). But also audiences' perceptions of the source of communication influences persuasion (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a).

On the other hand, the basic hypothesis that a speaker's language affects how the speaker is perceived by the audience has received consistent empirical support (Munch & Swasy, 1988; Newcombe & Arnkoff, 1979). O'Barr (1982) was perhaps the first to give research attention to POS when he examined courtroom transcripts and noted that individuals with similar levels of social power exhibited similar patterns of speech. The patterns of speech that define powerful versus powerless language style are described by Bradac and Mulac (1984a:307):

> . . . persons using the powerless style exhibited a relatively large number of hedges ("I sort of did"), intensifiers ("We really did"), hesitations ("I . . . uh . . . like this"), deictic phrases ("That man over there . . ."), tag questions ("It is, isn't it?) or declarative sentences with rising intonation and polite forms ("Yes sir . . ."). Conversely, persons using the powerful style exhibited a relatively small number of these forms; their speech was generally fluent, terse and direct.

Studies in various communication settings reveal that speakers exhibiting powerful styles of speech are evaluated more favourably with respect to social power, sociability, credibility, competence, attractiveness, and intelligence that are speakers using powerless styles (Bradac & Mulac, 1984a, 1984b; Gibbons *et al.*, 1991). Studies on the influence of the variations in delivery on the credibility judgements made about a speaker (Pearce & Brommel, 1972; Pearce & Conklin, 1971) show that, generally, increasing number of nonfluencies such as vocalised pauses, superfluous repetition of words or sounds, corrections of slips of the tongue, and articulation difficulties lead to significantly lower rating in speaker competence. Trustworthiness might, however, not be affected (McCroskey & Mehrley, 1969; Sereno & Hawkins, 1967; Schliesser, 1968).

Also, since there is a substantial range of normal speaking rates, there is also question regarding the way in which variation within the range of speaking rates affects judgements of communicator credibility. Apparently, increased speaking rate could lead to significantly greater perceived knowledgeability, intelligence, and objectivity (Addington, 1971; Gundersen & Hopper, 1976; Woodall & Burgoon, 1983). Street and Brady (1982:304) also report strong or fairly strong support for the hypotheses that listener's speech stereotypes and the extent to which the speaker's and listener's speech rates were similar would mediate impressions of speaker competence and attractiveness.

Sparks *et al.* (1998) investigate the conditions under which POS may affect the audience's attitudes toward the speaker's recommendations. Using the HSM as a theoretical basis, they investigate the extent to which communication modality moderates the effects of powerful versus powerless language styles on the audience's evaluations of the speaker and the audience's attitudes toward the speaker's recommendation. Their study supports the hypothesis that modality moderates the effects of POS on the latter but not the former. Additionally, the results indicate that systematic information processing is used to form attitudes toward a recommendation when arguments are presented in writing, whereas audio and audio-visual modes appear to encourage the use of speaker-related heuristics to form opinions about the speaker's recommendations.

Sparks *et al.* (1998:117) conclude that the influence of language style on the audience's attitudes toward the persuasive speaker's recommendation depends on the mode in which the message is presented. Whereas POS did not have effect on persuasion when a written stimuli was used, POS exerted significant effect on attitude recommendation when an audio stimuli was used, and this relationship would approach significance when an audio-visual mode is used. They (1998:121) suggest that the effect of POS on source-related perceptions and the use of source-related heuristics in persuasion involve largely distinct processes relevant to the audience's goals - whether forming an opinion about a proposal or evaluating the source.

Also, argument quality influences the audience's perceptions of the speaker's power and credibility, which might mean that the audience's diligent consideration of the relevant arguments could influence its perceptions of the speaker, and that a speaker with weak arguments would likely be perceived as less credible than one with strong arguments (Sparks *et al.*, 1998:121).

3.5.4. Speaker credibility and speaker relational qualities

Certain relational aspects between the speaker and the audience would moderate the personal impact of the speaker on the effect of his message on the audience. Generally, liked speakers are more effective than disliked ones (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Giffen & Ehrlich, 1963; Sampson & Insko, 1964). The effects of liking on speaker persuasiveness could be overridden by the speaker's credibility (Simons *et al.*, 1970). When the audience's judgements concerning the trustworthiness and subject competence of the speaker conflict with the audience's liking of the speaker, the effects of credibility aspects would prevail (Wachtler & Counselman, 1981). Some disliked persuaders could be more persuasive than liked ones, when the audience freely chooses to listen (Cooper *et al.*, 1974; Himmelfarb & Arazi, 1974).

Thus, one could say that the audience's liking for the persuasive communicator would influence the audience's judgements about the speaker's trustworthiness; at least it could be said that there is a co-variation between the audience's liking of the persuasive source and the audience's judgement about the source's trustworthiness.

Similarity between the speaker and the audience would influences persuasion indirectly through influencing the audience's liking of the speaker (O'Keefe, 1990:150, 151). Notwithstanding the fact that persuasive effects are enhanced by similarity, there is no indication that similarity produces persuasive effects (Infante, 1978; Leavitt & Kaigler-Evans, 1975). Other studies indicate that similarity does not affect persuasive results (Wagner, 1984).

However, similarity in attitudes engenders liking (Byrne, 1969; Berscheid, 1985), and the greater attitudinal similarity the greater would be the liking, which may or may not enhance speaker persuasiveness. Perceived similarity or dissimilarity influences the audience's judgement of the speaker's subject competence, but the similarity or dissimilarity must be relevant to the influence attempt. Even so, not all relevant similarities will enhance perceived subject competence, and not all relevant dissimilarities will hurt perceived subject competence (Delia, 1975; Houck & Bowers, 1969; Schenck-Hanlin, 1978). Similar others are seen as more (Mills & Kimble, 1973) or less (Delia, 1975) subject competent or they are not different (Swartz, 1984; Atkinson *et al.*, 1985) than dissimilar others. Only some speaker-audience similarities are relevant to each particular persuasive attempt and these are more effective in persuasion than the irrelevant similarities, but also relevant dissimilarities would cause changes contrary to the speaker's intentions, whereas irrelevant dissimilarities would have no harm (Berscheid, 1966).

3.6. SUMMARY

The construct speaker credibility has been examined in terms of structuralist, functionalist, and constructivist conceptions. A critical analysis of these conceptions of speaker credibility indicates that none of them affords the level of understanding that promotes both effectiveness and ethical responsibility in persuasive speaking. Benefiting from these theoretical frameworks, a holistic theory has been proposed in which speaker credibility is understood as a stratified multi-dimensional concept, with structuralist elements. These particular elements are called for, or inferred by, the audience involuntarily in a constructivist process.

Within this holistic conception of speaker credibility, some of the credibility elements are elements to be possessed by the speaker. These elements may still have to be demonstrated by the speaker and be inferred by the audience. Other elements are contextually defined. This means that audiences in various orientations possess a stock of credibility dimensions, which they apply in each speaking situation as would be appropriate. This further means that audiences in different cultural orientations share the tendency to assess speakers but they do so using varying credibility criteria. Hence, speaker credibility consists of a hierarchically ordered stock of universal and context-specific factors of moral, relational, content-related competence, and performance qualities. The specific definition and use of each of the factors depend on the audience's world view and the position of the topic of communication relative to that world view.

Constituting the moral dimension are trustworthiness and the speaker's reputation. The implication of this dimension is that audiences are concerned about whether they perceive the speaker as intending to make only valid arguments, and whether the audiences perceive the communicator as possessing good will for the audience and is devoid of self interest. Audiences could differ in their application of trustworthiness as credibility criteria. Audiences in some world view orientations might raise trustworthiness or any of its constituent elements as critical criteria against a persuasive speaker while audiences in other orientations might not. Also, some audiences could employ trustworthiness uniquely in each specific speaking situation, while other audiences might apply trustworthiness as the general character of the speaker. Therefore, audiences could also differ in terms of the value they place on the speaker's public character.

The relational dimension pertains to the speaker's personal orientation with respect to the audience, particularly the audience's value for the speaker's concern about the audience's welfare. This dimension could also be in terms of the speaker's perceived degree of sympathy, friendliness and sociability for an audience of one world view orientation, or refer to the speaker's harmlessness to the audience, as in McCroskey's (1966) safety factor, for an audience of another world view orientation. Therefore, the audience's perception of the depth and genuineness of the speaker's interest in them and their problems would contribute to the speaker's reputation. Is the speaker ***known to have*** qualities such as consistency and sincerity? Since audiences might question the motivations of speakers who attempt to solicit the audiences' support, what the audience believes it knows about a speaker's motivations could form part of the relational factor.

The competence dimension might refer to the speaker's possession of the specific knowledge, the qualifications, or the authority required to deliver a given content to that particular audience. However, certain speaker aspects would be competence variables in one world view orientation and not in another. What constitutes competence and the general characteristics that evince attitudes related to competence might be different across world view orientations, for example age, leadership position, training, and similarity with audience. This means that there would be a difference in the basis for competence across audiences of different world view orientations, implying that competence would itself have multiple dimensions that would be emphasised differently across audiences of different world view orientations. Even the very concept of qualification as an aspect of competence could be defined in a variety of ways. For example, in one context, speaker qualification might refer to the speaker's training relevant to the subject of communication, signified by credentials; to being informed about the topic; or to being skilful in presenting the topic. In other contexts, speaker qualification might refer to such things as age, biological maturity, and appropriateness of the speaker in discussing a particular topic.

Constituting the aesthetic dimension are vitality in the presentation of the speech and the physical appearance of the speaker. Vitality entails the speaker's potency exhibited during delivery and is composed of performance elements such as forcefulness, emphasis, pace, tonal level, loudness or softness, and masculinity. However, whether vitality is efficacious in persuasive communication would depend on whether or not expressiveness is a modal character of the audience.

Physical appearance, the other aspect of the aesthetic dimension, pertains to the speaker's stature, facial looks and, possibly, dressing. In terms of stature, the aesthetic dimension suggests that such elements as speaker's body weight, height, fatness, and shape are credibility-relevant. Since good-looking speakers would be likeable, friendly and interesting (Brownlow, 1990) and audiences desire to identify themselves with an attractive speaker (Chaiken, 1979, 1986; Kahle & Homer, 1985), it means that these facial aspects are also credibility-relevant. What constitutes desirable appearance would likely depend on the cultural context of the audience, since beauty is a value orientation.

It seems obvious that the tendency for audiences to appraise persuasive speakers could be universal. There could be a general stock of credibility dimensions. Some audiences could be more prone to raise moral questions with regard to certain persuasive purposes, such as political advocacy than they are with others, such as teaching or preaching. Although audiences have a general credibility scale, the application of the different dimensions against any one communication source would vary. Discretionarily, audiences do waive some standards and use certain other dimensions more prominently in judging speakers, depending on the audiences' preconceived images of the professions or occupations of those speakers, refraining from evaluating specific speakers using part of the general credibility scale that is seemingly irrelevant to the specific case.

Whereas the structuralist theory provides the foundational dimensions of speaker credibility, the functionalist and constructivist theories explain how the variable aspects of credibility are achieved and sustained by the audience. The functionalist proposition is that speaker credibility refers to the speaker's performance quality as evaluated by the audience on the basis of the functions the speaker is supposed to fulfil through the speech. If this functionalist proposition were subsumed in the structuralist view of speaker credibility, one would then find that there are only structuralist elements of speaker credibility but which audiences infer constructivistly.

A theoretical construction of a concept must be warranted by an inadequacy of existing theoretical work on that concept. To determine any such inadequacy as well as posit an alternative theory of, or approach to, the concept, there ought to be a frame of reference consisting of ethical and heuristic value criteria. The holistic conception of speaker credibility proposed here is compatible with both the speaker's ethical obligations and the researcher's heuristic requirements.

This theoretical proposition takes the audience into consideration - audience characteristics, context, and processes. The persuasive speaker ought to speak in a manner as, and for the reason that, the audience will have significant choice. Theoretical construction encourages the persuasive speaker to maintain the trust of the rhetorical contract entered between him and the audience. Since the speaker is expected to possess some specific qualities, over and above any of the audience's constructed ones, it means that persuasive speakers need to strive to be ethically noble.

Persuasion, viewed as a process, entails certain speaker's and audience's responsibilities and roles in that process, and audiences, understood as active, are involved in forming and applying speaker credibility. To that extent this theoretical framework incorporates valid presuppositions about the nature of audiences as well as remains consonant with other theories of persuasion, those that posit that audiences are actively, rather than passively, involved in the persuasive process.

Although there could be a general stock of speaker credibility dimensions, the specific contents of those dimensions for various contexts as well as their application in assessing speakers could form a focus of investigation. Therefore, the holistic theory of speaker credibility makes it possible to investigate the construct across a variety of contexts. Also, the theory allows for exploring context-specific aspects of speaker credibility. In terms of the heuristic function, these theoretical propositions would perform an explanatory function. Since the study focuses on the formation and application of speaker credibility across various world views, the present conceptualisation of speaker credibility would explain how speaker credibility is formed and applied in the persuasive process. By implication, this explanation is a predictive function, in which one could, on the basis of this understanding of speaker credibility, hypothesise what sort of credibility dimensions would be formed or utilised in a given context. What must be explored next is the nature and influence of audience world view on speaker credibility.

CHAPTER 4

AUDIENCE WORLD VIEW

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This study posits that the world view of an audience would have an impact on the audience's formation and application of speaker credibility. It was proposed in chapter 3 that speaker credibility formation and application involves the audience, which implies the existence of audience variables that would influence that involvement. Audience world view is one such variable. In order to understand the interaction between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility, a conceptualisation of world view, therefore, seems necessary. World view has to be articulated so as to provide constructs of analysis that could be used to compare the impact of any given world views on speaker credibility.

The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualise world view as a pertinent audience factor in persuasive communication and to subsequently construct a frame for analysing world view orientations, and to identify its possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility. The following aspects form the focus of the chapter:

- Attempt is made to articulate an anthropology of persuasion, making the point that culture influences communication in general and persuasion in particular. Selected theories of culture regarding its nature, its relationship with persuasive communication, and its variability are examined.

- World view and culture are discussed. From a discussion of the nature of culture and its relationship with world view, culture is conceptualised as a complex of behavioural patterns, conceptual, and philosophical outlook. It is posited that world view is that part of culture constituted by the conceptual and the philosophical outlook.

- Subsequent to the conceptualisation of world view, a five-dimension typology of world view is proposed, thereby forming a frame for analysing world view orientations.

- The ways in which world view would influence both the persuasive communication process and the formation and application of speaker credibility are hypothesised, thereby laying the foundation for the empirical investigation on the interaction between world view and speaker credibility.

4.2. CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

Several theories concern the relationship between culture and communication but they seem to fall under three broad categories. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the influence of world view on source credibility formation and application, a comprehensive review of theories concerning the link between culture and communication is rather unnecessary. Whereas, the present discussion requires a sharp focus on world view, a comprehensive discussion of culture would inevitably go beyond the scope of the study. The influence of culture on persuasive communication does not necessarily proportionately correspond with, or even necessarily indicate, the interaction between world view and communication.

What is necessary, however, is an elucidation that culture influences persuasive communication. Therefore, the primary concern should be with world view and speaker credibility, not culture and communication. It is for these reasons that only mention and some brief discussion is made of some select theories of culture and communication. The point made through the mention of these theories is, however, clear: Since there is a relationship between culture and communication and, as it will become evident, world view is part of culture, it would be expected that world view would also have a relationship with communication generally, and persuasive speaking particularly.

4.2.1. Social constructionist theories

One category of theories of communication and culture, the social constructionist perspective (Gergen, 1985), holds that reality is socially constructed. Within this theoretical framework, emphasis is placed on how individuals account for and explain their behaviour in particular cases (Harré, 1979).

The social construction of reality category of theories has, however, been effectively criticised by Cherwitz and Hikins (1986) who argue that although rhetoric is important in the construction and demonstration of truth, reality itself is independent from human subjectivity. They point out that any assessment of human experience requires objective reality as a baseline, without which there would be no way to test the validity or quality of socially constructed knowledge. The fact that "cross-cultural understanding can and does occur" (Cherwitz & Hikins, 1986:121) despite the human cultural variability implies much commonality across cultures which, in turn, implies some objective reality. Lastly, Cherwitz and Hikins argue that the social constructionism thesis is untenable because even communication itself, which supposedly constructs reality, occurs in an undeniably objective world of discourse, speakers, audiences, and responses.

4.2.2. Rules approach theories

In terms of the relationship between culture and persuasive communication, the rules approach to communication proposes that people make choices following individual or social rules for decisions (Infante *et al.*, 1997:81). The rules approach posits that the meaning of language depends on the context in which the language is used. Accordingly, the approach posits that language, as used in ordinary life, constitutes a language game, as people follow rules for accomplishing verbal acts.

Smith's (1982) contingency rules theory is an application of the rules-using approach to persuasion. The assumptions in Smith's (1982:7) theory are that (1) people act with purpose and are influenced in their actions by what they believe the outcome will be; (2) persuasion is controlled more by people's personal choices than by the influence of others; and that (3) external threats and rewards are meaningful only within the context of one's personal goals and standards. This means that in persuasive communication situations, people both select compliance-gaining message strategies and decide how to respond to the messages of others. But in either case, people make choices under the influence of rules that they believe apply to those respective situations.

Likewise, the co-ordinated management of meaning theory is a rules approach. According to Cronen *et al.* (1982:67f), the CMM is based on five propositions about human action, that: (1) human beings have a tendency to create systems of meaning and order, even where there are none; (2) human beings organise meanings into inter hierarchies; (3) human beings organise meanings temporarily; (4) the systems of meanings of individuals are somewhat idiosyncratic; and (5) the behaviour of individuals cannot be interpreted except in the context of larger systems.

However, as Littlejohn (1989:127) and Delia (1977:54) argue, the rules approach lacks conceptual coherence, and the terrain covered by the rules is too broad, diffuse, imprecisely articulated, and without specific theoretical substance.

4.2.3. Relationship between communication and culture

The weakness in the theoretical constructions above means that the constructions are inadequate in explaining, rather than invalidate the possibility of, the relationship between culture and communication. The relationship between communication and culture is well supported and the mutual influence between culture and communication seems to enjoy a wide scholarly support. Hall (1959:169), for example, believes that "culture is communication and communication is culture". Prosser (1976:417) writes that "communication and culture are so closely bound together that virtually all communication engaged in by humans is culturally linked. Even when we engage in intrapersonal communication, that communication which takes place unconscious or consciously within each of us, our own cultural background affects all of our actions and reactions".

Brislin (1993) posits that culture and communication are inextricably linked and Dodd (1998:36) goes further to say that the influence of culture on human behaviour includes its influence on communication. Orbe (1998) demonstrates in the context of co-cultures[1] that particular communication orientations are adopted within such cultures.

Classical rhetoric, to which persuasive communication is closely associated (Carey, 1994; Gagarin, 1994; Cohen, 1994), took into consideration the whole pattern of influences which converged on the act of persuasive speaking. Aristotle (Cooper, 1932) suggested that a persuasive speaker should focus on specific aspects of the audience. But Aristotle's analysis was provincial and did not take into account the fact that audiences across cultures differ. Indeed, rhetoric grew out of a cultural context, namely, that of Ancient Greece and Rome, and culturally-relevant exigencies. One should therefore realise that, due to the influence of culture on communication, it is incorrect to think "of rhetoric in singular as though the principles of western rhetoric, whether ancient or modern, were always and everywhere applicable" (Hesselgrave, 1991:38).

Therefore, all constituents of the process of persuasion would be influenced, subtly or obviously, by their cultural environment, since the roles played in persuasion by those constituents vary across cultures. As persuasion requires the creation of meaning (*see 2.3.1*), and meanings are implied or inferred, the influence of culture on the process of creating meaning is apparent. Indeed, without a cultural dimension, a theory of persuasion is incomplete. However, it is that component of culture called world view that defines, primarily, the link between communication and culture. A number of questions could be raised regarding world view: How does it relate to culture? What is world view? In what ways is world view a distinguishing criterion for cultures? Why and in what ways would world view influence persuasive speaking generally, and the formation and application of speaker credibility, specifically? The remainder of this chapter attempts to address these questions.

[1] Orbe (1998:2) uses the term "co-culture" instead of the traditional terms such as "subculture", "nondominant culture" and "minority groups", which often carry the negative or inferior connotations, to signify the notion that no one culture is inherently superior over another.

4.3. WORLD VIEW AND CULTURE

This section endeavours to locate the concept world view within the broader concept culture. The view that is taken by the present study is that world view is not only the core part of culture but also that the concept itself cannot be fully grasped without an adequate understanding of culture. Therefore, first a discussion of culture is pursued, to lay the foundation for a fuller analysis of world view. Then, upon an analysis of world view, a componential view of world view is posited and its implications for the study of speaker credibility deduced.

4.3.1. Culture

Conceptualising culture proves to be rather difficult and quite diverse. Tylor (1920:1), the "father of anthropology", defined culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society". More than thirty-five years ago Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963:3) identified at least 200 definitions of culture. Nida (1984:28) sees culture as an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns, ideas and products characterising a people in their socio-historical and political process.

From another viewpoint, culture is seen inclusively as entailing linguistic, political, economic, social, psychological, national, religious, and racial aspects (Hesselgrave, 1991:99) or as entailing all learned, symbolic, patterned and shared behaviour (Kottak, 1997:36). Along a similar line of thinking, Samovar and Porter (1995:48) define culture as "the deposit of knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving".

These sample viewpoints imply that culture *entails* specific observable aspects, to which extent the respective contributors merit commendation. The problem, however, is that on the one hand, these definitions lump anything that has something to do with human life in a wild assortment basket called culture, and on the other hand, one sees a projection of culture as simply an aggregating of cultural characteristics.

On the other hand, at a general level, most notions of culture are based on assumptions rooted either in the humanities such as sociology, or in the social sciences, especially anthropology (Griswold, 1994:3). From an anthropological point of departure, the conceptualisation of culture has had an influence from either the American cultural anthropology school of thought, which holds the view that social patterns are one realm of culture, or the British social anthropology school, which posits that cultural patterns develop within social structure.[2]

However, to regard culture as wholly derivative from forms of social organisation or forms of organisation as behavioural embodiments of cultural patterns is not without problems. One problem with such a dichotomistic approach is that it loses sight of the fact that cultural patterns do not always fit perfectly with forms of social organisation. It becomes impossible to formulate the dynamic elements of social change that arise as a result of the failure of cultural patterns to be perfectly congruent to forms of social organisation. This then calls for a more holistic view conception of culture within which one would situate world view.

4.3.1.1. Perspectives on culture

To further delineate an appropriate conceptualisation of culture it is important to examine existing viewpoints, both to learn from them and to identify inadequacies. In view of this presupposition, the key perspectives on culture are discussed. Williams (1994) identifies three perspectives on culture, namely, the "ideal", the documentary, and the social.

From the **ideal perspective**, culture is a state, albeit in transition, of human perfection and of certain absolute or universal values. Culture is, thus, to be understood by discovering and describing those values which are seen to compose a timeless order or to have permanent reference to the universal human condition.

The **documentary perspective** of culture, on the other hand, posits that culture is the body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which in a detailed way, human thought and experience are variously recorded. From this viewpoint, Keesing (1974:89) emphasises that culture provides its members with a system of knowledge that enables them to *know how* to communicate with people of other cultures and interpret their behaviours.

Similarly, Spradley and McCurdy (1975:2) define culture as "the acquired knowledge that people use to interpret experience and to generate behavior". They identify several universal characteristics of culture, for example, that culture is composed of categories and that it is a symbolic code expressed in an arbitrary system, further holding that

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[2] The British social anthropology school defines social structure as "standardized modes of behavior and thought whose norms and forms are socially recognized in the explicit or implicit rules to which members of a society tend to conform" (Singer, 1968:532).

culture is learned, is a tool for accomplishing human purposes, and exists in different levels of awareness (Spradley & McCurdy, 1975:6-9).

A basic aspect of the documentary view of culture is that culture consists of conceptual structures that create the central reality of a people and these structures are differentiated in a particular society as representing the total reality of life (Shweider, 1976:206; see also Shuter, 1990:252-262). Thus, viewing culture as a "shared organization of ideas that includes the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the meanings of communicative actions" (LeVine, 1984:67) places culture in the documentary view.

The documentary view further posits that culture is not just shared, but inter-subjectively shared, so that everyone assumes others see the same things he sees. This *collective* nature means that culture is a supraindividual phenomena that represents a consensus on a wide variety of meanings of symbols and behaviours as well as rules of language among members of an interacting community. It is through this consensus that people of a given culture possess the capacity for mutual understanding.

From the **social perspective**, culture is a description of a particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. Within this perspective, Ayisi (1979:2) describes culture as encompassing "everything which contributes to the survival of man, and this will comprise not only physical factors but also sociological factors".

As a particular way of life, culture consists of clusters of norms and institutions and patterns of life. These clusters and patterns constitute meaning systems which are only communicable by means of language and are capable of creating cultural entities and particular senses of reality (D'Andrade, 1984:116). Sharing this view of culture, Schneider (1972:38) clarifies what these systems of symbols and meanings are:

> By symbols and meanings I mean the basic premises which a culture posits for life: What its units consist in; how those units are defined and differentiated; how they form an integrated order or classification; how the world is structured; in what parts it consists and on what premises it is conceived to exist, the categories and classifications of the various domains of the world of man and how they relate to one with another, and the world that man sees himself living in.

The social perspective views culture as an integrated adaptive system of socially transmitted behavioural patterns (Nanda, 1994:50), driven by a society's response to the problems of survival and reproduction. In contrast to this adaptationist view but also within the social perspective, cultures are ideational or cognitive systems. Culture is seen not as a material phenomenon, not consisting of things, people, behavior, or emotions, but an organisation of these things. Culture is seen as the form of things that people have in mind, their theories for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As ideational systems, cultures are also structural[3] systems (cf. Levi-Strauss, 1963, 1979; see also Jackson, 1991), entailing systems of shared symbols and meanings (Boon, 1972). These ideational designs for living - systems of knowledge and belief, structured cultural domains and patterns of shared symbols and meanings incorporate interconnected ecological, demographic, ideational, and other subsystems (Keesing, 1974:82). In this regard, Keesing (1974:89) proposes his conception of culture:

> It is his [the individual's] *theory of what his fellows know, believe, and mean,* [italics original] his theory of the code being followed, the game being played, in the society into which he was born . . . . It is a theory to which a native actor *refers* [italics original] in interpreting the unfamiliar or the ambiguous, in interacting with strangers (or supernaturals), and in other settings peripheral to the familiarity of mundane everyday life space; and with which he creates the stage on which the games of life are played.

Keesing's view implies that culture is more than just an ordered collection of symbols constituting a system of knowledge that is shaped by the way the human brain acquires, organises, and processes information to create internal modes of reality. He sees culture as an idealised body of competence differentially distributed in a population, yet partially realised in the minds of individuals. From this social perspective, then, culture is ***organised***, consisting of a large organisation of beliefs, norms, values, or social action.

A fourth perspective of culture is that suggested by Dodd (1998:37), in which he views culture as a **suit case** - with numerous elements that individuals pick and apply as they interact in various situations. He posits that externally culture consists of educational systems, religious systems, political systems, health systems, kinship systems, and economic and work systems. At a middle level culture entails technology, food and dress; roles and relationships; rituals, rules, and recognition; space and time; attitudes; language and interaction; artistic aspects; changeability; and the non-verbal aspects of livings. At the innermost level, culture entails cultural history; identity; beliefs; values; and world view.

Dodd (1998) contends that, true to a general systems theory, these components of culture function as an organised, holistic set to define a system and that the components are mutually interactive; each part influences the whole, and although each element has

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[3] Keesing (1974:78) clarifies the structuralist notion, saying that the shared symbolic systems that constitute culture are cumulative creations of the mind, and culture itself seeks to discover the structuring of cultural domains - myth, art, kinship, language - the principles of mind that generate these elaborations.

its own attributes, they each contribute to the whole. As a system, culture serves to define invisible lines that differentiate one cultural orientation from another. Even though the components mutually interact, Dodd (1998) posits a hierarchy that begins at the core level with cultural history, cultural identity, world view, and beliefs and values. Cultural history generates insight into norms of groups and individual behaviour explains many attitudes that are shared by members of a culture. Thus a cultures' past and the people's appreciation of that past is crucial. Members of every culture have a sense of social identification - who they are and why - thus cultures provide a group personality. Through folklore, a culture identifies itself with archetypal figures, such as heroes, and that these ideals become theories to measure personal and group success. This would imply that people in different cultures have a history of public speaking, their culture of speech, and pride in and value for speaking.

According to Dodd's (1998) theory, each culture has an interpretation of reality, or perceptual window through which its people see self and others. Cultures hold assumed truths (beliefs), concepts deemed as holding ultimate significance and of long-term importance (values), and world views. World view is a specific belief system about the nature of the universe. For Dodd (1998), more than just a philosophy of life, world view functions as a central construct related to how much control one believes is available.

Dodd's (1998) conceptualisation of world view and its relation to culture is fuzzy because he places world view at the same level with beliefs, values and modes of information processing. Although this theory acknowledges the interaction between the various components of culture, it fails to isolate any clear relationships between world view and beliefs, values and ways of processing information.

As Williams (1994:57) observes, each of the perspectives discussed above make some contribution to our understanding of culture, as they all present the essential elements of culture. However, these perspectives lack an integrated view of the concept culture and, in their fragmentary view of culture, fail to provide a clear understanding of the relationship between culture and world view. Ember and Ember (1996:196) infer a more holistic view, that culture includes the learned behaviours as well as the beliefs, attitudes, values, and ideals that are characteristics of a particular society or population, but they too do not present a fully developed concept of culture nor discuss world view or the relationship between the two concepts.

4.3.1.2. A perspective of culture

An aspect of culture that should also be examined appertains to cultural variability. It is easy for one to fall in the trap of either subscribing to the view that cultures are essentially the same, or that cultures have nothing in common. These positions should therefore be considered critically. On the one hand, one might propose that there are uniformities of structure and content in human life, culture, and motivation. Such a proposition minimises cultural variability and leads to an interpretation of evidence of variations across cultural orientations as possible concealment of the deeper uniformities that, presumably, exist. Chomsky (1978), for example, holds that language structures are universal and that cultural differences in languages are only superficial. He further believes that certain language universals are innate and that language is acquired by an interaction between experience and these innate structures. Osgood *et al.* (1957) conclude from extensive comparative research that the dimensions of meaning are universal.

On the other hand, cultural phenomenologists (Shepperson, 1995; Guambe & Shepperson, 1997) emphasise the uniqueness of each culture and endow each aspect of human life that appears universal to a unique pattern of meanings. Guambe and Shepperson (1997:26), for example, imply that cultures are unique because they refer to "those linguistic, behavioural and customary practices absorbed, imposed, and even chosen by persons as members of cultural communities". Thus phenomenologists reject transcultural categories and similarities as superficial, holding the view that such categories and similarities fail to account for the diversity in the meanings that define culture.

However, to see cultures as either universally the same or virtually and exclusively different is itself an artificial dichotomy, it seems. Obviously, there would be many cross-cultural universals, but that is not to say that there are no fundamental cultural differences across peoples. Similarly, the propositions of the phenomenologists would be admissible to the extent that they acknowledge the existence of cultural diversity, but to posit that there are no fundamental similarities across peoples is to deny an aspect of the *very essence of humanity*.

Rather, since the elements by which a culture is constituted are a selection "from infinite possibilities only, which must be congruent with each other, [to] constitute a configuration, a consistent integrated whole" (Langness, 1987:107), one would expect modal personalities of ethnicities or clusters of ethnicities, as the individual selection leads to a cultural convergence of the individuals living in a particular ecology. This leads to the tendency of cultures to function and operate according to various local and historically specific assumptions (Guambe & Shepperson, 1997:23). Typically these patterns would concern economic, organisational, and communicative aspects, as well as cultural standards of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic judgement. Along such dimensions, cultures would not only differ but would also display a tendency to remain different (LeVine, 1984:40).

It seems that culture is constituted by elements that are to be found at three basic levels: The behavioural, the conceptual, and the philosophical. At the behavioural level one observes such things as overt behaviour, possessions, settlement patterns, means of livelihood, dressing modes, technology levels, patterns of interaction, and modes of communicating as well as matters associated with sexual behaviour, role distinctions, and social organisation.

At the conceptual level one finds the general knowledge and accumulated information and experience of a people, norms and specific values, legal systems, patterns of logic, attitudes, rules, self-concept and ethnic identity. It is at this level that culture also provides yardsticks for evaluation, thereby availing standards for matters like vice and virtue; aesthetics, beauty and good; and legal issues.

At the philosophical level one would find systems of values and beliefs, basic assumptions, myths, record of history, view of man, nature, universe and the supernatural, volitional commitments, language and meaning systems, notion of time, and meaning of life (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:46). When Keesing (1974:89) suggests that culture provides its members with an implicit personality about how to behave in different situations and how to interpret the behaviour of other people in these situations, he is implying the philosophical level of culture. It is the conceptual and philosophical levels of culture that constitute world view which, in turn, defines the behavioural level.

Kraft (1979:53) defines world view as "the central systematization of conceptions of reality to which the members of the culture assent (largely unconsciously) and from which stems their value system. . . the very heart of culture, touching, interacting with, and strongly influencing every other aspect of culture". World view could also be seen as that central governing set of concepts and presuppositions that people in a cultural orientation live by (Kraft, 1978:4) and that a people's world view provides them with their basic assumptions about reality (Hiebert, 1976:371).

Therefore, world view is not only the centre of culture but also it is the hub of a cultural orientation, operating and maintaining the behavioural level of the culture. Kraft (1974) identifies five functions of world view, which further indicate the central role of world view in human life:

- Through its explanatory function, a people's world view guides them to seek to understand why and how things got to be as they are and how and why they continue to be so. In its validating function, world view sanctions the goals, institutions, and values of a society and provides them with a means for evaluating outside influences as well as activities and attitudes within the society. In this respect, world view provides a perspective to life.

- World view serves a validating function, as the basic institutions, values and goals of a society find their sanctions in it.

- World view fulfils a reinforcement function, in which it provides psychological reinforcement for the group at points of anxiety or crisis in life, producing security and support for the behaviour of the group. In this case, world view prescribes the form of action to take for such cases as sickness, death and initiation.

- Through its integrating function, world view systematises and orders the people's perceptions of reality into an overall design with everything fitting into place. This system makes it possible for a people to conceptualise what reality should be like and to understand and interpret all that happens day to day by this framework.

- World view fulfils an adaptation function, in which case world view is not only resilient but also reconciles differences between old understandings and the new ones, in order to maintain a state of homeostasis, and this could mean reinterpreting values, adjusting old myths, or altering beliefs.

In support of the view that world view is centrally significant to human experience, Holmes (1983:5) points that human beings need a world view so that they could function in four essential but also overarching areas: To unify thought and action, define the good life and find meaning in it, guide thought, and to guide action. Holmes goes on to say that the quest for a world view is also a quest for a guiding principle for something better in life. Holmes (1983:4) notes that in this regard world views differ: "Some [world views] are more optimistic and some more pessimistic, some are more deeply ethical and others are only incidentally so. Not all satisfy the longing equally, nor in the same way; but all express a deeply rooted human need. Aristotle also asked about man's highest good, a *summum bonum* (italics original) that gives everything else its value and purpose. The need for a unifying *summum bonum* is the need for a world view."

It is clear that Kraft (1974), Hiebert (1976), Kraft (1978) and Holmes (1983) underscore the centrality and function of world view in human existence. What is needed, however, is an analysis of world view that would not only be researchable but also which would facilitate an understanding of world view's influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility. To lay the foundation for such an analysis, it seems imperative first to discuss the concept world view itself.

4.3.2. World view

Conceptualisations of world view seemingly are found at various theoretical levels. Foster (1965) conceptualises world view as the "image of limited good", proposing that a peasant world view is an ideology that everything - land, wealth, health, love, friendship, honour, respect, status, power, influence, and safety - is finite. He claims that peasants believe that individuals can excel only by taking more than their own share from a common pool.

A similar conception is Lewis' (1959) "culture of poverty" notion, in which he posits that economically, a culture with such a world view is marked by low incomes, unemployment, and unskilled occupations. Socially, Lewis proposes that the culture of poverty is characterised by crowded living quarters, alcoholism, early sex, lack of privacy, informal and unstable marriages and mother-centred households. Psychologically, he asserts that the culture of poverty has its own set of values, including marginality, fatalism, insecurity, desperation, aggression, sensuality, impulsiveness, spontaneity, absence of planning and distrust of government.

The problem with both Foster's "image of limited good" and Lewis' "culture of poverty" conceptions is that the elements of world view are both arbitrary and tentative. On the one hand, defining world view in terms of beliefs and perceptions, as Foster does, incorporates only limited elements to constitute such a pervasive quality as world view. On the other hand, Lewis' economic-social-psychological theory of world view is too tentative because, whereas world view is a far more stable and enduring human aspect, the three ways of understanding and describing human experience that he suggests are relatively much more dynamic and contemporaneous.

Both Foster's and Lewis' conceptions are descriptions of what they see among specific people within those peoples' socio-historical contexts. Consequently, whether such conceptions would be considered to be world views is debatable, because even if their frameworks were to be valid and applicable, they would be so in those specific contexts. These conceptions are, therefore, unsatisfactory.

There are, however, more useful, albeit incomplete, postulations of world view. Busia (1972) understands world view as pertaining to the way people in different cultures relate to and view the cosmos. Busia (1972:77) explains: "When we think of a people's world-view, we consider their concept of the supernatural, of nature, of man, and society, and of the way in which these concepts form a system that gives meaning to men's lives and actions". Hesselgrave (1991:197) and Kottak (1997:364) see world view as a differentiating dimension of people groups; a culture's characteristic way of perceiving, interpreting, and explaining the world.

Studies treating world view in terms of specific categories include those of Redfield (1953) who suggests that any world view must contain notions about self, the other, time, space, the natural and supernatural, and the sacred and profane (cf. Boulding, 1965; Mendelson, 1968). Werner (1970), in his *Cultural knowledge, language, and world view*, advances the notion that a people's lexicon has implications for their world view, that cultural information, knowledge or *world view resides* largely, or even exclusively, in the organisation of the lexicon (Werner, 1970:159). Distinguishing between language dependent and language independent parts of world view, Werner (1970:163) conceptualises the language dependent parts as some system dealing with some part of the knowledge about the sociophysical universe.

These propositions are useful insofar as they bring to light conceptual understanding of world view but they are too general to be used for a comparative investigation of world view and its effect, if any, on persuasive speaking. A further step is, therefore, required, to categorise the diverse items that constitute world view into dimensions that would permit a comparative investigation.

4.3.3. Dimensions of world view

Various conceptual labels are used to depict the concept world view. For example, world view is also referred to as ultimate cosmology or pattern (Benedict, 1971) or cognitive maps (Tolman, 1932). In these conceptual labels the assumption is that something fundamental about culture is missed when one looks at it only as a set of observable practices and institutions. What is missed is precisely the dynamics of the culture - the complex of motivations, perceptions and sets that animate all of these various practices and institutions, thereby making them one culture.

Dundes (1972) points out that anthropologists seldom speak of world view of individuals, but rather, they are concerned with culture-wide phenomena. In the anthropological sense, "earlier world view was taken as a synonym of cosmology and for descriptions of the other world (e.g., Wagley, 1940) - one finds in these essays discussions of cosmological myths, the spirit world, life after death, and the like. On the other hand, Malinowski's use of the original term *Weltanschauung* differed from the narrow cosmological/mythological conception of world view" (Dundes, 1972:92).

Early conceptions of world view (mis)present world view as tied to some level of civilisation. Malinowski (1922:517), for example, understands *Weltanschauung* as a native's outlook on things, presupposing that every human culture gives its members a definitive vision of the world. The weakness of Malinowski's conceptualisation is that it makes the individual a passive victim of the cultural process of which world view is subsequent.

In contrast, Redfield's (1953) view that world view is the "way people characteristically look outward upon the universe", tends to make the individual both less passive and more active. Redfield (1953:86) also stresses the patterned nature of world view, when he observes that: "'world view' may be used to include the forms of thought and the most comprehensive attitudes towards life . . . . But if there is an emphasized meaning in the phrase 'world view' I think it is in the suggestion it carries of the structure of things as man is aware of them. It is in the way we see ourselves in relation to all else".

In the footsteps of Redfield (1953), Mendelson (1968:576), among other disciples of Redfield, conceptualises world view as a cultural anthropological concept used in the holistic characterisation and comparison of cultures and that it deals with the same ideas which an individual within a group and/or that group has of the universe in and around them. To Mendelson, like Redfield, world view means unsophisticated cosmology which is an outsider's construction of a people under study. Dundes (1972:92) criticises the Redfieldian view for the error in dichotomising and distinguishing the so called civilised world views from the so called primitive world views.

However, the inadequacies of the componential views of the thinkers above do not necessarily mean that there are no adequate ways of looking at world view in terms of components. Jones (1972), Galdston (1972), and Kearney (1975, 1981) conceptualise world view in componential terms in a somewhat useful manner. As this study seeks to posit a componential typology of world view, the ideas of these thinkers not only command attention but also offer themselves for critique. On the other hand, although Jones (1972), Galdston (1972), and Kearney (1975, 1981) have in common the componential perspective in conceptualising world view, they actually proceed from different angles, and therefore, all of them will be critiqued. The main tenets of the positions are summarised first after which an evaluation of them all together is done.

Jones (1972), seeking to provide a definition of world view in relatively operational and verifiable terms, presents a typology of world view in the manner of the Cartesian co-ordinate system, defining "belief space" with linear, bipolar continua arranged between wide-range vectors such as simplicity-complexity, static-dynamic, and soft focus-sharp focus. Because his work is influential in conceptualising world view, it seems important to review it in some detail.

Jones (1972:79) notes that one should not plunge at once into the identification and description of particular world views without taking care to define the concept by fixing its place within a general theory of behaviour. For Jones, a world view consists of a set of beliefs - "beliefs" not limited to refer to instances of sentential or propositional formulation, but rather in the sense of a hypothesis introduced by an observer to explain somebody else's behaviour. He posits "messages and latent meaning" as the second index of world view, in which he proposes that behavioural responses have latent meanings, for both the senders and the receivers.

It is through reading "off" and reading "back from", and often reading "into", observable behaviour that meanings are extracted from behavioural responses. How much or how little latent meaning a behaviour carries, Jones hypothesises, depends on two main variables - the strength of the beliefs, other than the prescriptions that are operative when the behaviour is produced, and the degree of specificity of the prescription (Jones, 1972:81). Other things being equal, the less specific the prescription, the easier it is for the behaviour to carry latent meanings.

Jones (1972) also posits that world view consists of belief space. He makes a distinction between an observable behaviour and the configuration of unobserved but inferred beliefs that generated this behaviour. He describes a belief space - with a number of vectors and each vector with a direction - as a disposition or tendency to act in a certain way, and he explains that belief space corresponds to what he calls background structure that functions as the premise of behaviour. Positing that every behaviour is a product of several beliefs, he suggests that any particular behaviour could be analysed into a specific configuration of vectors, each of which has a direction of its own, although some of the vectors could have directions different from the direction of the event behaviour, except that such "opposite" vectors are not predominant at the time of the behaviour.

As a vector, a belief is not an ideal content, with "something" believed "in", but rather, an orientation - a direction in the belief space, a disposition to do this, rather than something else (Jones, 1972:82). The length of the vector represents the strength of the impulse to act in the direction of the vector, so that the longer the arrow the greater the influence of this vector on behaviour that is generated by a particular configuration of vectors operative at that particular time. Each vector could be thought of as living a trace as it moves through belief space and that this trace is that vector's feeling, the tone, or affect.

A distinction is often made between belief and attitude (Baron & Byrne, 1991:510; Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:18ff; Rokeach, 1979). If a mental state is thought to be either true or false, such is called a belief; otherwise, the mental state is characterised as an attitude, an emotion or a feeling which is neither true nor false. In a further elaboration of belief space, Jones discounts this kind of distinction. He (Jones, 1972:83), instead, distinguishes between what he calls narrow-range and wide-range vectors, contending that the difference between attitude and belief is one of degree, not of kind. On the basis of this meta-theoretical model, Jones (1972:83) presents his definition of world view: "The world view of any individual is a set of very wide-range vectors in that individual's belief space (a) that he learned early in life and that are not readily changed and (b) that have a determinate influence on much of his observable behavior, both verbal and nonverbal, but (c) that he seldom or never verbalises in the referential mode, though (d) they are constantly conveyed by him in the expressive mode and as latent meanings".

From a human psychology perspective, Galdston (1972) conceptualises world view as the end result of a process whereby man imposes a pattern of relatedness, order, and meaning upon the primary chaotic miscellany of experience and impressions to which he is subjected throughout his life (Galdston, 1972:95). Man is not only a maker of symbols, but also a systematiser. Galdston contends that, in his propensity and with his unique competence, man does not willingly tolerate the amorphous and, instead, tends to see or form patterns even where patterns are initially non-existent. World view is to be distinguished from knowledge per se in that world view is normative while knowledge per se is simply factual. World view intends value, meaning, judgement, interpretation.

An interesting element of Galdston's scheme is his attempt to explain the origins of world view. In a figurative sense, the origins of world view may be traced to the first man to ask questions: Is there death, and if so, what is it? What happens to those who die? In relation to death and what happens to those who die, what is the meaning of living? How does living relate to dying, and vice versa? The answers given to these questions over the generations have determined the form and substance of the varieties of world views expressed by different peoples at different times in different parts of the world (Galdston, 1972:90). In the course of one's life, then, one is likely to have several differing world views, each deriving from the changing spectrum of experience. The components of experience are structured by man in a meaningful, or at least interpretable, pattern. That pattern, Galdston suggests, is the raw stuff from which one's world view is derived. Thus, world view reflects a mastery of a repertoire of forms and meanings, neglecting the way culture is shaped in everyday practices below the threshold of awareness (cf. Hill & Mannheim, 1992:381).

Kearney (1975, 1981) seeks to develop a world view theory that would be both cross-culturally open-ended and serve as a scheme for cross-cultural comparison. Towards this end, he selects a minimal set of universal cognitive categories that could be taken as the necessary dimensions of any functional world view. Following the Kantian, Durkheimian, and Piagetian route, he obtains self, other, relationship, classification, space, time, and causality as the dimensions of world view.

Although Jones', Galdston's and Kearney's proposals are good, they need further development so that they could be used in the present study. To begin with, Jones's approach is to investigate world view as consisting of a set of beliefs as these are seen in verbal and overt behaviour, which according to him carries messages and often has latent meanings that could be read off and back. On the one hand, it is clear that Jones intends neither a final, airtight definition of world view nor an isolated model protected by intellectual trench around its own perimeter. On the other hand, the exactitude of his articulation seems to overshadow those parts of his proposal that should be tentative. For example, his definition wants world view to cover everything about human experience, and at the same time to assign to world view a particular role in explaining human experience.

Also, Jones's construction of vectors implies a highly complex and difficult problem of any consideration of world views. As he shows that his wide-scale vectors are all, necessarily, sliding scales with many possible combinations, it becomes clear that much of survey-in-depth would be necessary before one could arrive at a satisfactory world view profile of any individual, let alone a cultural orientation. Jones' scheme both reduces all elements of world view to belief, all to be found in the "belief space". It might be valid to say that beliefs are among the constituents of world view, but that is not to say that all world view is belief.

A review of the relevant literature would lead to a five-dimension typology of world view, with the epistemological, the axiological, the ontological, the perceptual, and the chronemic as the dimensions. These dimensions will be discussed, examining both what they are and how they might influence the process of persuasion.

A word of caution should be given here, that this componential proposition is not intended to suggest distinct and unoverlapping constructs which additively constitute world view. Rather, the components are points of higher concentrations of sets of tendencies within a broad general view of the world "out there" that people in a given cultural orientation would have. It should also be pointed out here that these components are not contents of specific world views; they are meta-theoretical components, along which the contents of world views could be described.

4.3.3.1. Epistemological dimension

Derived from Greek words, the term "epistemology" means the study of knowledge, and it examines the nature of knowledge and the ways in which knowledge is obtained (Kok, 1996:5). As a dimension of world view, epistemology is a cultural orientation's theory of knowledge, methods of knowing, and concept of truth. It has to do with the value for, and sources of, wisdom and authenticity, as well as the structure of logical reasoning. The epistemological dimension thus concerns the metaphysics of a people and entails a people's characteristic cognitive structure, thought processes and ways of knowing.

Cognitive structure. The fields of anthropology, linguistics, and psychology have had a common question to attack: How do people's thought processes relate to the culture in which they grow? Tylor, a chief architect of anthropology, considered the study of culture as the study of human thought and viewed differences in cultures as evidence of fundamental differences in thought processes (Cole *et al.*, 1971:5). Boas's (1911) psychic unity of man posits that the functions of the human mind are common to all humanity. Boas argues that the existence of the mind is not independent of the conditions of life (Cole *et al.*, 1971:9). In linguistics, Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956) posit that language shapes thought. And in psychology, Piaget (1955) suggests that some cultural conditions accelerate cognitive growth, and therefore cognitive function, and that lack of certain critical experiences may delay or preclude cognitive development.

Generally, one element is found common in the three disciplines, that people of different cultures would differ in their cognitive structures. Thinking involves conceptual behaviour and logical relations, both of which mature during a person's growth process. It refers to what is reasonable, real and logical. Whereas what is reasonable relates to what is familiar and to the appropriate authority for reasonableness and both are inseparable from cultural assumptions, what is seen as reality is part of the perception of the environment, and logic system is a learned system, based on such things as a culture's assumptions about human nature, and the natural and supernatural worlds (Condon & Yousef, 1975:211).

The cognitive structure could be explained in terms of the schema concept. Kelly (1955) posits that individuals strive to make their worlds predictable, and for that reason, they develop constructs to interpret reality. Schema can be seen as a cognitive structure that represents organised knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus. The schemata form the basis for interpreting social environments and, consequently, refract reality, but also they form the basis for organising a people's behavioural level.

Four types of schemata have been identified (Reardon, 1991:20). Whereas personal schemata refer to people's understanding of the psychology of typical or specific individuals, self-schemata focus on one's own appearance, personality and behaviour. Role schemata include information about broad social categories, such as age, sex, race and occupation, while event schemata include information about what typically happens on certain occasions. Casson (1983:429) describes schemata as the knowledge structures that constitute the building blocks of cognition. Schemata are conceptual abstractions that mediate between stimuli received by the sensory organs and the behavioural responses.

Although schemata theory was developed as a reaction against associationistic theories, which posited that mental representations directly reflected the external world (Hastie, 1981), certain propositions are useful and apparently valid. Three of these propositions are particularly noteworthy. First, schemata are structured clusters of experiences that influence current functioning. In this regard Barlett (1950:197) argues that "the past operates as an ***organized mass*** (emphasis added) rather than as a group of elements each of which retains its specific character".

Secondly, it is through schemata that the structure of knowledge of the external world is not simply comprehended but rather organised (Tyler, 1978:98), since schemata are "data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory" (Minsky, 1975:212). These schemata would, therefore, represent people's knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, events, sequences of events, situations, actions and sequences of actions.

Thirdly, schemata occur at differing levels of abstraction and that, unlike associations, schemata are organic wholes comprised of parts that are oriented both to the whole and to the other parts (Casson, 1983:430). At the highest levels, schemata are fixed and represent invariant aspects of concepts, whereas those at lower levels have terminals that must be filled by specific instances of data (Casson, 1983:431; Minsky, 1975:212). This means that the lower level schemata are bound to elements in the environment in particular instantiations of the schema. The schemata underlying commercial events, for example, could have, depending on the culture of the people concerned, the variables buyer, seller, money, goods and exchange. In this case, an event would be understood as a commercial transaction when persons, objects, and sub-events in the environmental situation are bound to appropriate schema variables.

Schemata also function as framing mechanisms, in which case lexical items and grammatical categories and rules are associated in memory with schemata and parts of schemata. Schemata are also prototypes, stereotypic, or generic representations of concepts that serve as standards for evaluating the goodness-of-fit between schema variables and elements in the environment (Casson, 1983:434). Schemata are organised hierarchical structures in which those at the higher levels represent the most general concepts, and those at successively lower levels represent more and more specific concepts (Casson, 1983:437).

Schemata are not only organised into complex hierarchical structures; they are also interlinked with other schemata to form still larger structures. Ultimately, the related linkages form scenes, which in turn collectively constitute scripts. As data processors, constituting both patterns of action and patterns for action (Neisser, 1976:56), schemata construct the interpretation of experience.

Cultural schemata differ in their distribution in populations: Some are universal, some idiosyncratic, and some cultural (Casson, 1983:440). Whereas universal schemata are uniform in human species, idiosyncratic schemata are unique to particular individuals as a result of personal histories and experiences. However, cultural schemata are neither unique to individuals nor shared by all humanity but are shared by members of a particular society. Kottak (1997:355) clarifies this when he writes:

> Diversity among the world's cultures reflects the fact that babies have malleable neural networks, permitting varied learning paths during enculturation. However, as individuals grow, their schemata harden. They make new experiences fit the established pattern more than they change with new experience. One reason why schemata are shared by people in the same culture is the tendency to rely on modal mental images. . . . Cognition and emotions develop together as part of schema formation.

Cultural schemata would, therefore, have a bearing on understanding how systems of knowledge are constrained and shaped by the brain. The assumption is that with the regular transmission of cultural knowledge from generation to generation that knowledge becomes organised in such a way that it fits the capacities and constraints of the human mind (D'Andrade, 1981:182). But this would also mean that people in different cultural orientations would differ in their matrices of cultural schemata, hence their cognitive structures. Among the aspects of cultural schemata are object schemata, which underlie a wide range of object classification system such as Berlin's (1972, 1978) anthropological taxonomies. The orientation schemata, on the other hand, represent knowledge about spatial orientations, referred to as cognitive maps (Kuipers, 1978:132).

Ways of knowing. Kearney (1975) notes that the most enduring and fundamental problem in anthropology concerns the nature of human nature, especially the nature of the human mind and the ways its working is affected by culture, society, and language. One view is that human ways of knowing vary cross-culturally in very important ways (e.g., Van der Walt, 1997; Levy-Bruhls, 1926). A contrasting view is that ways of knowing are essentially in the same way across cultures, as Wallace (1968:538), for example, posits, that invariable logical principles underlie all logics, maintaining that presumed different logics are but variants.

The view that seems to have stronger scholarly support is that ways of knowing vary across cultural orientations. Unfortunately, some of the arguments with which this view is supported reflect the usual Eurocentric ethnocentrism, whereby the differences in the thought processes are used to categorise cultural orientations as either logical or pre-logical, or, either scientific or pre-scientific. For example, in an introduction to a collection of papers on ***Rationality***, Wilson (1970) develops the arguments that the so called advanced societies are advanced because of the explicit incorporation of "rational and empirical orientations" into technology and social organisation. He explains that although the underlying thought processes, which he leaves unspecified, are not necessarily different from those of pre-scientific peoples, the impress of this instrumental rationality does result in a more controlled environment. Wilson suggests that a measure of rationality is the internal consistency of such super-empirical assumptions and the consistency of these assumptions with regard to secular and scientific assumptions of a given society. One would agree to the notion that there is a difference in style and form of rationality across cultures, but to say that this necessarily implies a stage of one cultural group behind another cultural group along a linear progression is to overstretch that notion.

The point is valid, however, that internal logic systems differ and that although they differ from one individual to another within a culture, they differ more from one culture to another, primarily according to the emphasis they place on intuition, rationalism, and empiricism as means of gaining knowledge (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:40). One should realise, of course, that these labels too could have stereotypical connotations.

Any how, those culture-based differences in cognitive processes could be conceptualised in a number of ways. In the bisystemic approaches to understanding differences in cognitive processes across cultures developed by Gulick (1962) and Northrop (1953), thinking styles are divided in terms of West and East. Gulick's scheme proposes that on the one end of the continuum is the occidental thinking, characterised by a sustained mental attention and described as intellectualistic, scientific and aggressive. On the other end of the continuum is the oriental thinking, described as mythological, emotional, and artistic. This thinking style proceeds through meditative introspection and contemplation rather than through Aristotelian logic and induction from observed phenomena. In this thinking style one waits to *feel* that one has taken hold of the inner significance of the object of contemplation. Hence the knowledge thus gained is not so much that of the objective world as it is of the subjective state of consciousness.

Northrop in his book *The meeting of East and West* (1953), proposes that both western and eastern modes of thought begin with sensory experiences such as colours, sounds, odours, flavours, pains and pleasure, in what he calls the differentiated aesthetic continuum. Northrop goes on to elaborate that in the East, to know is to have investigated things in their immediately apprehended *aesthetic* component and to have grasped the reality behind them. In contrast, in the West, to know is to have gone on to an investigation of the *theoretic* component.

Smith's (*In* Hesselgrave, 1991:301) trisystemic approach goes beyond the East-West distinction, hence, it is a more complete representation of the thought processes and ways of knowing. Smith's view is that, while one or other of these three ways of thinking is predominant in a given cultural orientation, the other two will also be operative. The difference is in the priority preference given to one approach over the other. This view is more useful, as it takes into consideration the effects of both nature and nurture.

Smith (In Hesselgrave, 1991) posits three major thinking patterns, depending on the relative predominant thinking level in the thinking process - whether psychical experience, contextual outlook, or concepts.

Psychical. Where the thinking pattern is primarily psychical, there is an emphasis on intuition, in which case the knowledge emanates from inner experience and vision. In such a context, the contextual level is next in significance and the conceptual level of thinking is least pronounced. Within this thinking pattern, nature, mankind and history are linked to the supernatural, generally transcending the secular-sacred distinction, and instead, bringing the secular and the sacred together. Attention is given to the involvement of gods, spirits, and ghosts. Typically there would be an admiration, awe and exaltation of power and the display of power.

This is a mythological structure, dwelling in the idea of faith and inspiration, and would, therefore, be characterised by two polar dimensions - the psyche and past orientation - drawing motivation from the dead for what they did, in which case one defines one's sense of being in terms being like someone important in the past.

The basic assumption in the psychical thinking mode is that people are not essentially rational. The truth cannot be found by searching it through Aristotelian approaches, at least these approaches are not the only means to arriving at truth. Rather, one could wait, and if truth is to be known it will make itself apparent, implying that truth is seen as an active agent, which would be known through its own assertion.

The implication of this view is that people would (and would want to) be recognised in terms of what they have done in the past, rather than the potential they have. The knowledge implication of this typology is that to know is not always to experience, since strong beliefs and convictions could be the source of knowledge, and ambiguity is not necessarily irrationality. Ontologically speaking, the view is that "I feel therefore I am".

In terms of persuasive communication, the implication is that for psychical thinking audiences, good communication would be defined and secured by avoiding overintellectualising and oversimplifying the message. Communication is to proceed in a sense of awe and mystery, inviting or accommodating dialogue, and is to be authority-centred, in which case the communication source is to elicit the audience's perceptions of his being authoritative.

Contextual. Characteristic to the contextual thought processes is the view that the world of man and the world of nature are inseparable and interdependent, and that beyond and within the mysterious system operation of the universe in its relation to human destiny lies an external order of law, truth, and doctrine.

This is a magical structure, an orientation whereby, people are identified with objects, as there is a high sense of tangibility. There is only one dimension - event, space, time - all happening at a given point. Accordingly, there is a fascination about power, defining power in terms of making things happen.

In such a thinking mode, simulation games would be commonly used to lead to the discovery of meaning and riddles would be used to connect items with concepts, or to link objects with ideas. Rituals, including celebrations, would be considered capable of making things to happen.

Where the audience thinks predominantly contextually, good communication would be defined and achieved through speculating and theorising, then checking up on the speculation by finding out what has happened in the past and subordinating the mind and spirit to the generally accepted notions. To be effective, the communication would have to utilise concrete forms such as stories, metaphors, similes, symbols, allegories, emblems, and drama, and use accepted truth or ordinances.

Conceptual. Finally, in the conceptual mode, thinking is primarily theoretical or postulational, and where this thinking pattern is predominant, concrete relationships would be next in significance, and psychical experience would be least significant. With an emphasis on the supremacy of reason, conceptual thinking also holds such a high sense of naturalism that the supernatural is dismissed as the vestigial notion of some less developed stage of man's evolution. Nature is there simply to provide a generally hospitable habitat for mankind, although man himself is viewed as basically a random collection of atoms on a small planet in a remote corner of a vast expanding universe. In a typical Darwinian view, man is a developing product of nature and a continuation of the rest of nature.

Holding to the so-called scientific method, the view is that there are prospects of yielding an ethic that will free men, who are good, from habitats, which are bad, and guide men into a new and hopeful future. So this is a mechanistic structure and with the orientation "I think therefore I am", it is characterised by linear and analytical operation.

Within this structure, man and the world are understood to be dualities, existing independent of each other, not polarities on the same continuum. With a set of horizontal co-ordinates of reality, the view within conceptual thinking is that all things ought to be at the perceiver's level, anything else is primitive. All things are to be viewed from an either-or orientation, and from its antithetical disposition, people and things that do not meet the standards of the conceptual perceiver are "primitive", wrong, deficient, inferior, or defective.

Behind the conceptual thought pattern is the belief that truth is out there to be discovered by following the "correct" logical sequences. It is further believed that human activity is paramount and will lead ultimately to the discovery of truth. It would appear then that good communication to conceptual thinkers is one that is logically sound, in Aristotelian terms, since it assumes that there is a direct relationship between mental concepts and the concrete world of reality and places great stock in logical considerations and rationality. The implication of differences in thinking styles is that there would be differences in the use of evidence, for example, and consequently, the most useful communication styles.

Beliefs. Besides the primary ways of thinking, the epistemological dimension of world view would also consist of a "knowledge stock" which would vary across cultural orientations. "Knowledge stock", here refers to both the specific contents of understanding and the categories of such understanding that are unique to a given people. Obviously, there would be areas, and possibly levels, of knowledge that overlap across people in different cultural orientations. However, one area of knowledge stock whereby people in different cultural orientations would differ is belief.

Beliefs, generally, could be viewed as uniquely held subjective probabilities that some object or event is related to some other object or event or to some value, concept, or attribute. "Whenever individuals profess to see some relationship between two events or objects or people, or between some event and a characteristic of the event, it is said that they hold a *belief*" (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1987:19). Any belief involves a link between the belief object and the characteristics that distinguish it. The degree to which one believes that an event or object possesses certain characteristics reflects subjective probability and, consequently, the depth or intensity of one's belief.

Beliefs could be organised along a central-peripheral dimension (Rokeach, 1968; Bem, 1970). Highly central beliefs form the core of any individual's belief structure. Central beliefs are acquired very early in life and are strengthened and continuously validated from experience. Samovar *et al.* (1981:39) note that these experience-based beliefs usually are held with the highest degree of probability because of the direct sensory experience in their acquisition.

A second layer of beliefs is one of those connected with authority. These beliefs lead people, for example, to characterise other people as either positive or negative authorities. These beliefs are strongly held, though less so than central beliefs. These informational-based beliefs are formed from the information provided by an outside source, which people choose to believe, and the level in which they are depends on the belief about who or what institution in a given cultural orientation is an authority on various topics. At the third layer, the peripheral, the beliefs are inferential and are typified by the observation of a behaviour and the inference that the behaviour is generated or caused by a particular emotion.

The beliefs people have constitute, partly, the construction of their own frames of reference, as well as constitute part of the knowledge stock as well as dispositions towards knowledge and truth among cultural orientations. Because individuals have different sets of experiences, each individual has frames of reference at least slightly different from the frames of reference of all other people. However, since beliefs do not develop in a completely random fashion, the frames of reference formed can be used to predict the effects of persuasion.

4.3.3.2. Axiological dimension

This dimension has to do with value orientations and value systems and their influence on human behaviour. In *The Rhetoric*, Aristotle proposed that to be effective, a communicator must analyse and adapt the audience's values. According to Rokeach

(1979:133), values have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence. To have a value is to have

> an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and others' actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others (Rokeach, 1973:160).

Indeed, values constitute organised hierarchical structures and substructures in which they appear in a rank-order of importance. These hierarchical structures are referred to as value systems and they "represent what is expected or hoped for, required or forbidden. It is not a report of actual conduct but is the system of criteria by which conduct is judged and sanctions applied" (Albert, 1968:288).

Although personality factors may lead to individual values and therefore individual variations, similarities in culture, social system, sex, occupation, education, religious up-bringing, and political orientation are likely to shape in more or less similar ways the value systems of a large number of people (Rokeach, 1973:161). Rokeach (1968:124) considered

> a value to be a type of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are thus abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to specific attitude object or situation, representing a person's beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals. . . . A person's values, like all beliefs, may be consciously conceived or unconsciously held, and must be inferred from what a person says or does.

Values vary with individuals and cultures and define the behavioural patterns and attitudes that should be promoted as well as characterise the scope, functions and patterns of communication (Mbennah, 1997:45). Values are views to which individual attitudes and opinions are related. Rokeach (1973), through a series of factor analytic studies, has identified two sets of values - instrumental and terminal.

Indeed, there could be variations of values among individuals in each society, but there would also be values that are dominant to the extent that they are identified with particular societies. These values that tend to permeate a cultural orientation, or cultural values. Cultural values would usually be derived from the larger philosophical issues that are part of a culture's milieu and it is the cultural values that constitute the axiological dimension of world view. These values are usually normative, in that they inform a member of a culture on what is good or bad, right or wrong, true or false, and positive or negative.

Cultural values, therefore, define what is worthwhile to die for, what is worth protecting, what frightens people and their social systems, and what types of events lead individuals to group solidarity. Cultural values also specify what behaviours are of importance and which ones should be avoided. A society's view of age is one of the values that differs across cultures. The value placed on privacy is another example of value variation across cultures. Whereas in Japan and China, for example, privacy is so highly valued that openness is not encouraged, in Israel and Italy, openness is so highly regarded that solitude is shunned (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:41).

As values develop standards and guidelines that establish appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in a society, they determine how people ought to behave. Consequently, people in different cultural orientations exhibit and expect behaviours according to their value systems. Cultural values may be identified as primary, secondary or tertiary, depending on the location a particular value in a culture's hierarchy of values (Sitaram & Codgell, 1976:164).

Some values are instrumental, representing or guiding the selection of means to an end, and others are terminal, representing or guiding the selection of an end state to strive for. Samovar and Porter (1995:83) link values to culture, when they write:

> Values, then, are social guideposts that disclose to us the cultural norms of our society and that specify in a large measure the ways in which we should behave. They furnish the standards that permit us to make individual decisions about our relationships with self, society, nature, and God. In short, they provide us with a set of rules for making choices and reducing ambiguity. Values also possess a normative dimension. They specify, for instance, what is good, bad, right, or wrong, what ought to be or ought not to be, what is useful, useless, appropriate, or inappropriate.

There are also absolute values, which are culturally derived notions of right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, true and false, positive and negative. These absolute values lead to certain judgements about social reality. Values direct humans to aspects of the environment to which they should pay attention and to the goals they should reach; they provide standards for evaluating behaviours. According to Samovar *et al.* (1981), values are the evaluative aspects of belief and attitude systems. Evaluative dimensions include qualities such as usefulness, goodness, aesthetics, need satisfaction ability, and pleasure production.

Since attitudes are components of values, and therefore, values are fewer and more fundamental than attitudes, Rokeach (1973:157) suggests that the value concept provides a more economical analytic tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations and cultures. Condon and Yousef (1975) and Hofstede (1980, 1983) attempt to systematise the major axiological orientations. It is therefore useful to review these principal works on the topic.

Condon and Yousef (1975) scheme. Condon and Yousef (1975) observe that studying values entails seeking underlying principles both for distinguishing cultures and for finding common places among cultures. One is to look for the "deep structure", not just the surface meaning of apparent cultural manifestation and this, they maintain, requires one to move inductively, rather than deductively, from the observable specifics to the more general principle (Condon & Yousef, 1975:48).

A useful point they make is that in speaking of values or value orientations, focus must always be on cultures, not nations, since a nation may have many cultures, and a political boundary of a nation could politically distinguish areas that are culturally identical (Condon & Yousef, 1975:48). Condon and Yousef then conceptualise a range of values in three spheres of self, society and nature, and their intersections providing additional categories of family, human nature, and the supernatural (1975:59).

However, Condon and Yousef's scheme, as comprehensive as it is, seemingly lamps all human phenomena into the big basket of values and value orientations. They make values and value orientations the main principle around which all of human experience is to be organised, explained, described and compared across people groups. This is, rather, an inadequate view, because not all of human experience could be categorised in terms of values and orientations.

Hofstede's scheme. A more extended scheme of values is one proposed by Hofstede (1980, 1983). After research that covered 40 countries, he found that cultures differ along four dimensions: Individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity-femininity.

It should be noted, however, that Hofstede (1980:313) acknowledges that the four dimensions are not necessarily exhaustive. The terminology that Hofstede is using should be clarified. Whereas individualism denotes a social order in which the individual takes precedence over the community, what Hofstede calls collectivism, he means to say communalism, which is a social order in which individuals are primarily considered part of the "masses" rather than members of a community.

Since, in our view, collectivism refers to a social order in which collective rights are upheld but the ultimate goal is the safeguarding of the individuals' freedoms, we will substitute Hofstede's term, "collectivism" with "communalism", as the latter better embodies the sense in which he employs the former.

Terminologies apart, Hofstede's value dimensions suffer from inadequacy of his sample of nations, since they are based on one specific set of 40 nations, excluding socialist countries (Hofstede, 1980:314). Schwartz (1994:90) raises some other questions on Hofstede's values: To what extent were the dimensions obtained dependent upon the fact that the data were collected among employees of a single multinational corporation? If the methodological convenience were forfeited, would samples of other types yield comparable findings? The data were collected between 1967 and 1973 but were analysed in 1980. Given the cultural changes that would have taken place since 1980, let alone 1967, to what extent would Hofstede's value dimensions still be applicable at the time of analysing the data, to say nothing about the present time?

Triandis (1994a) observes that the ecological factor analyses used by Hofstede provide bipolar factors, implying that individualism and collectivism are opposite poles of the same continuum. This, however, is not necessarily the case, since individual level analyses suggest that individualism and collectivism could coexist.

Nevertheless, as Schwartz (1994) notes, Hofstede's studies (1980, 1983, 1991) are among the most influential studies that have sought to uncover dimensions of cultural variability involving a large number of cultures. Hofstede's dimensions are widely used to compare cultural groups (see e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984). Triandis (1994b:42) proposes that all people carry individualist and communalist tendencies, except that in some cultures the probability that individualist selves, attitudes, norms, values, and behaviours will be sampled or used is higher than in others. It is within this delineation that Hofstede's typology is to be understood and used.

Hofstede (1983:337) defines individualism-communalism, considered the major dimension of cultural variability (Hofstede, 1980; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988:40), as "a preference for a loosely knit social framework in society in which individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only as opposed to . . . a preference for a tightly knit social framework in which individuals can expect their relatives, clan or other in-group to look after them, in exchange for unquestioning loyalty".

Kagitcibasi (1990) points that the most important distinction between communalists and individualists is the emphasis placed on the feelings and opinions of group members and the psychological closeness between a person and others. Indeed, in understanding the nature of culture and cultural differences, the distinction between individualism and communalism is one of the most important projects (Brislin, 1994:76). In individualist cultural orientations, emphasis is placed on the individuals' goals. Consequently, each person is viewed as having a unique set of talents and potentials and the translations of these potentials into actuality is considered the highest purpose to which one can devote one's life.

Brislin (1994:78) describes people from individualist orientations as socialised to be self-reliant and to have more of a sense of separation from family members and from their community, not expecting or accepting major support from family or community on choice of employment of career. Such people are expected to stand on their own and to develop a set of personal skills that they could call upon throughout their career development.

Individualists are, therefore, more likely to be utilitarian in their thinking about how they use their time and what projects they should undertake. In turn, they are less likely to invest time and energy if the benefits would accrue to the group, rather than to them personally. As they have discomfort with authority and more distrusting of people in power, individualists are less likely to accept authority-based opinions unquestioningly.

In contrast, communalist cultural orientations not only prescribe that communal goals precede individuals' goals but also require individuals to fit into the group. Communalists are more willing to downplay their own goals in favour of those of the group and are more likely to be concerned about how their decisions will affect others in their valued groups. Whether, for example, one will accept a bursary to study in another country, depends on such considerations made by the group as: Will the recipient of the bursary be able to fulfil his duties to the group? Will the group and/or family be able to provide patronage over the person? Will the honour of the person extend to the entire family so that more people in the group can take pride in the accomplishment?

Communalists share more material and non-material resources including time, information and new skills, and are more likely to conform to the views of others in the group and keep their own opinions to themselves. There is an interest in and a concern about keeping the group's approval and people avoid embarrassing encounters that might cause others in the collective to feel they have lost status, affection, or respect.

Thus, generally speaking, the emphasis in individualist societies is on individuals' initiative and achievement, whereas in communalist societies it is more important for the individual to belong to groups than to pursue individual advancement. In individualist societies, the same standards are generally applied to all, whereas in communalist societies, status differentiation leads to tendencies of being particularistic in applying value standards for members of their ingroups and outgroups. From a communication point of view, Dodd (1998:92) suggests that individualists emphasise concern for clarity and directness, truth telling and straight talk, meeting personal goals rather than group goals, and self-referent messages with more "I" than "we". Communalist cultural orientations emphasise goals, needs, and views of the ingroup over those of the individual; the social norms of the ingroup, rather than individual pleasure; shared ingroup beliefs, rather than unique individual beliefs; and a value on co-operation with ingroup members, rather than maximising individual outcomes.

The way people view themselves tends to differ across individualist and communalists orientations (Gudykunst, 1994:42). Markus and Kitayama (1991) refer to these different self-conceptions as independent construal of self and interdependent construal of self. On the basis of the independent construal of self, people possess a high sense of individuality, see themselves as unique individuals and do not have to take others into consideration when deciding how to behave. This would predominate in individualist orientations.

On the other hand, where interdependent construal of self predominates, individuals see themselves as interlinked with other people in their social relationship, not totally separate from them. As a norm, individuals do not decide how they should behave without taking into consideration those people that are involved in the individuals' self-conceptions. The sense of self-conception that accompanies an interdependent construal of self focuses on an

> attentiveness and responsiveness to others that one either explicitly or implicitly assumes will be reciprocated by these others, as well as the wilful management of one's other-focused feelings and desires so as to maintain and further the reciprocal interpersonal relationship. One is conscious of where one belongs with respect to others and assumes a receptive stance toward these others, continually adjusting and accommodating to these others in many aspects of behavior (Markus & Kitayama, 1991:246).

In terms of communication style, communalists emphasise indirect communication, concern for others' feelings with which they tend to avoid hurting or embarrassing others, avoiding negative evaluations from the audience, less goal direction, and greater group orientation (Dodd, 1998:93).

Hofstede's second cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance, has to do with the differential tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. He defines uncertainty avoidance as "the degree to which members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, which leads them to support beliefs promising certainty and to maintain institutions protecting conformity" (Hofstede, 1983:336).

Hofstede (1979:395) posits that people from high uncertainty avoidance cultures have a low tolerance "for uncertainty and ambiguity, which expresses itself in higher levels of anxiety and energy release, greater need for formal rules and absolute truth, and less tolerance for people or groups with deviant ideas or behaviors". The strong sense of consensus in high uncertainty avoidance cultural orientations means that deviant behaviour is not acceptable. Generally, people in this orientation display emotions more than people in low uncertainty avoidance cultural orientations. In contrast, people in low uncertainty avoidance cultures have lower stress levels and softer super-egos. Accordingly, they accept dissent and taking of risks more readily than people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. Typically, "people in such cultures look for a structure in their organizations, institutions, and relationships which makes events clearly interpretable and predictable. Paradoxically, they are often prepared to engage in risky behavior to reduce ambiguities, like starting a fight with a potential opponent rather than sitting back and waiting" (Hofstede, 1991:116).

In seeking to avoid ambiguity, people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures develop rules and rituals for virtually every possible situation in which they might find themselves. Communication with such people may therefore be highly ritualistic or polite.

Hofstede's third dimension, power distance, pertains to the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations accept that power is distributed unequally. Individuals from high power distance accept power as part of society, and consequently, superiors and subordinates consider themselves to be different from each other. Also, people from high power distance cultures see power as a basic fact of life in society and emphasise coercive or referent power.

Generally, people in high power distance cultures will, for example, not only expect to be told what to do but do not question their superiors' orders. In contrast, people in low power distance cultures believe power should be used only when it is legitimate and prefer expert or legitimate power. They, therefore, do not necessarily accept their superiors' orders at face value; instead, they want to know why they should follow those orders. Hofstede (1991:27) points out that:

> In small power distance countries there is limited dependence of subordinates on bosses, and a preference for consultation, that is *interdependence* between boss and subordinate. The emotional distance between them is relatively small: Subordinates will quite readily approach and contradict their bosses. In large power distance countries there is considerable dependence of subordinates on bosses. Subordinates respond by either *preferring* such dependence (in form of autocratic or paternalistic boss), or rejecting it entirely, which in psychology is known as *counterdependence*: That is dependence, but with a negative sign.

The fourth dimension, masculinity-femininity continuum, is defined as "a preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success as opposed to . . . a preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the quality of life"

(Hofstede, 1983:337). Hofstede's masculine cultural orientations are those that exhibit work as more central to their lives, strength, material success, assertiveness, and competitiveness. Masculine cultural orientations are also inclined towards gender-based role differentiation. Feminine cultural orientations, on the other hand, are those that embrace traits of affection, compassion, nurturing, and interpersonal relationships. Feminine cultural orientations tend to function by fluid gender roles.

From Hofstede's propositions that are supported by other studies and theoretical work, it appears that the major components of the axiological dimension of world view are community orientation, uncertainty avoidance, femininity-masculinity, and power-distance.

4.3.3.3. Perceptual dimension

The perceptual dimension concerns that internal process by which people select, evaluate and organise stimuli from the external surrounding. Samovar and Porter (1995) observe that the physical mechanism of perception is much the same in all people, involving sensory activity and the central nervous system in a two-stage process; recognition or identification, and interpretation and evaluation of that which has been recognised. But the result of this process is not the same for all people because, while perception takes place inside each individual, it is culture that primarily determines the meanings applied to the stimuli that reach the individual (Samovar & Porter, 1995:80).

Structure of perception. Major dichotomistic views about the nature and operation of perception have been raised by Klein (1970:3): Whether perception is an inbuilt co-ordinating force interpreting the environment, or whether it reflects the perceiver's intentions. Klein (1970:66) argues that perception is a function of a person's intentionality, "an outcome of a constructive process". This means that what one senses from the environment does not carry any inherent experience; rather, experience is each person's making sense of the environment through the development of structures, stability, and meaning for the person's perceptions. This development involves internal operations that the person performs by converting the impinging energy (light, sound, smell, feel, taste) into electrochemical, neurophysiological impulses that are routed through the nervous system to the brains, where they are converted into meaningful experiences. These internal perceptual operations are learned, as Samovar *et al.* (1981:107) observe: "Our image of our environment is the outcome of our selves being actively engaged in information processing, which includes the selection and categorization of inputs. We give structure to the stimuli of our external world by translating raw stimulus energies into structured experience. We develop this structure-forming capacity by learning categories into which we force the external stimulation."

Perception does not only bring about a structured world; it also gives the structured world stability. There is a tendency to smoothen perceived stimuli such that the world appears to be constant, except for wide variations and their associated gross differences. The notion of meaning has to do with the fact that people's structured and stable perceptions are not isolated from one another - but are related over time. Meaning develops from past learning and experience within a framework of purposive activity. People develop rules, which they use to operate as active stimuli processors, categorising events and relating them to previous and present events (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:108). Eventually, people learn to give meaning to their perceptions that makes sense in relation to their past experiences, to their present actions and purposes, and to their anticipation about the future.

The perceptual process would be conditioned by the ecology in which a person learns to perceive such that the person perceives everything else in reference to what he has always perceived, implying that the environment gives the person both the tendency to classify and classificatory categories to use. This is to say that perception is truncated by both an individual's particular personality and the individual's cultural ecology. Since, then, perceptual categories are largely dependent upon the environment, not all people in all cultural orientations would use the same categories for classifying their environment.

Perception tends to be stable, so that it can provide a frame of reference for the person. This has been demonstrated by Korten (1976:124), for example, who found that the perceptual categories of Ethiopians and Americans differed. While Ethiopians emphasised interpersonal interactions, opinions and beliefs, the Americans emphasised abilities and knowledge, and cognitive-emotional and interpersonal styles.

Korten hypothesises the basis for the perceptual categories to include the source of status in a culture, the view of the need to get along with other people, and the orientation toward the more enduring attributes of the other person. In the course of perceptual learning, a person develops an allusive behaviour so that everything he perceives is assigned meaning. Perceptual responses are influenced by the perceiver's expectations. These expectations endow meaning to the visual dimensions of perception such as the qualities of colour, shape and brightness so that persons, trees, animals, and landscapes are perceived accordingly.

On the other hand, because people within the same cultural orientation go through basically the same experiences, cultural orientations would be characterised by modal perceptual frameworks, so that they would differ in the categories through which their members perceive. For example, people who have grown in a cultural orientation that values kindness above all else would perceive acts of violence differently from those who have grown in a cultural orientation that stresses a survival-of-the-fittest philosophy of life.

It is this similarity in perceptual categories among people in a given cultural orientation that would make the sharing of meaning among them possible. These perceptual sets would not only influence which stimuli reach a person's awareness, but more importantly, they would greatly influence the judgmental aspect of perception - the attachment of meaning to incoming stimuli (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:32). Thus, whether it is an aesthetic judgement or a description of a phenomenon, people would respond to stimuli primarily as they have learnt within their cultural orientations.

It would follow that in each world view, there would be unique and important perceptual categories. This would imply that in persuasive communication, the audience's perceptual frames of reference would influence the audience's interpretation of the message symbols, the elements of persuasion, the person persuading them, and the total rhetorical drama.

To understand how human beings develop structure, stability, and meaning for external energies, one should consider two fundamental dimensions of perception. The one, the organising dimension describes the acquisition of information about the outside world, which includes stimulation, the nature and function of the human receptor mechanisms, and the transmission of sense data through the nervous system to the brain. This physical phase of perception begins to convert the physical stimuli into electrochemical neurophysiological form. Since all people have the same anatomical and biological mechanisms that connect them with their environments, the physical phase of perception would essentially be the same across the human race.

The other, the interpretation dimension of perception is, however, influenced by individual make-up aspects such as personality, intelligence, education, emotions, beliefs, personal values, attitudes and motives. This dimension would have much more impact on how an individual perceives. It is during this phase of the perceptual process that individuals create structure, stability and meaning, putting their interpretation on the outside world.

Perception and language. One of the key factors that influence perception is language. The relationship between language and culture has a long history of association with linguistics, and a number of theoretical departure points have ensued. Levi-Strauss's (1945, 1953a, 1953b, 1955, 1979) structuralism contends that people cannot have access to an objective understanding of any real world, since all human thoughts are structured by language. The implication of this point of view is that people "create" the world they inhabit by employing their linguistic and cultural categories that structuralists insist can, by their nature, only refer to their relations with other signs and categories. Thus, things cannot in themselves be known because perceivers are locked within a closed circuit of signs or texts. In this regard, Turner (1993:219) asserts that: "Understood this way, language does not describe reality, it actually constitutes it. Our language system determines, delimits and shapes the way in which we understand the world. Therefore, to examine the structures of our language is to examine the structures of culture in general".

In his view of the power of language, Nietzsche (1979) posits that language is rhetoric; it is not a transparent, neutral medium for communication of timeless truths or the reflections of things themselves. It would follow then that, since through language human beings impose their own order of the world, one should not think that language reflects reality, or that the words people use correspond in some direct sense to objects in the world outside. Nietzschean poststructuralists Foucault (1972, 1988) and Derrida (1976) go as far as claiming that the autonomy of the human subject is an illusion and that the individual is not a free agent who uses his conscious mind to decide what to do, but merely the vehicle of language and culture which operate through his unconscious level.

There has been also a wide divergence of opinion on the relationship between perception and language. Chomsky (1965:8) points out that every speaker of a language has mastered and internalised a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of that language. On the other hand, other linguists and anthropologists take a different approach to the relationship between thought and language, proposing that the lexicons and grammars of particular languages can and do lead speakers to perceive and think in particular ways (Kottak, 1997:389; Lucy, 1997:291). In particular, the Linguistic relativity hypothesis proposes a relationship between language and perception. Whorf (1956:212) summarises the central argument of the hypothesis thus:

> . . . the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of mental stock and trade.
>
> Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs . . . between grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate in the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic system in our minds.

The linguistic relativity hypothesis[4] is a progeny of the works of Boas (1911), Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1941, 1956). Boas (1911) criticises the grammarians for their tendency to see the system of categories of Indo-European in native American languages, and argues that it is critical to identify grammatical patterns by criteria internal to the language. He observes that grammatical meaning could only be understood in terms of the system of which they are part, and Boasian ethnography is essentially cosmography as he writes that "in each language only part of the complete concept that we have in mind is expressed" (Boas, 1911:43). In this regard, Boas recognises that there is a domain of conceptual organisation that pre-exists language.

Sapir (1921) warns against the temptation to treat language as a set of labels on a pre-existing, non-cultural, so-called objective, world. Such a lead would inevitably mean that linguistic and cultural forms would be treated as reflexes of timeless, universal meanings, which would only prevent the understanding of formal patterns in another cultural orientation or language. His (Sapir, 1921:2) view is that "speech [i.e. language] is a human activity that varies without assignable limit as we pass from social group to social group, because it is a purely historical heritage of the group, the process of language-centred social usage".

Friedrich (1986:11) and Silverstein (1986:87) observe that Sapir regards culture as a shared gestalt of patterns, and sought the mechanisms by which individuals appropriate and configure such patterns and that in the absence of cognitive psychology, he turned to the personality psychological theory of his day. Whorf (e.g., in Schultz, 1990:27-28; Chatterjee, 1985:51), on the other hand, suggested that a pre-linguistic stratum organises linguistic and cultural experience, "a universal . . . way of linking experiences which shows upon laboratory experiments and appears to be independent of languages - basically alike for all persons".

Hill and Mannheim (1992) take issue with linguistic relativity. The stance of linguistic relativity, a term coined for the cross-cultural epistemology of the Boasian tradition by Sapir, is often taken to be a "hypothesis" that linguistic patterning at every level exhibits unconstrained variation such that each language must be approached entirely on its own terms.

Hill and Mannheim (1992:383) maintain that linguistic relativity as proposed by Boas, Sapir, and Whorf is not a hypothesis in the traditional sense, but an axiom that inevitably formed part of the initial epistemology and methodology of the linguistic anthropologist at that time. They contend that when one considers the linguistic relativity

[4] For a discussion of existing empirical approaches to the relationship between language and thought, as well as the mechanisms by which language might influence thought, see Lucy (1997).

notion in the writings of Boas, Sapir and Whorf in its historical context, as one should, one finds that the three were not typical relativists. In agreement with the view held by Friedrich (1986) and Silverstein (1986) they propose that Boas, Sapir and Whorf assumed a limited position of relativism, only to recognise that linguistic and cultural particulars intersect with universals. Hill and Mannheim (1992) attribute Boas' reaction to a naive racist universalism in grammar and an equally vulgar evolutionism in anthropology and history, which were lively contemporary intellectual forces in those days.

Hill and Mannheim (1992:384) contend that Boas, Sapir and Whorf united their claims about the power language has over thought to specific, highly habituated, forms. While Boas focuses on "selective power" of obligatory categories of grammar (see also Jakobson, 1990), Sapir emphasises unreflective, idiomatic expression, and Whorf restricts the linguistic phenomenon of relevance to what he calls the habitual fashions of speaking.

However, while Hill and Mannheim's (1992) contention would be acceptable, their new interpretation of linguistic relativity is itself not to be interpreted as disputing that language has an influence on how people come to perceive reality. Cultural orientations consist of many organised semantic domains in great numbers of meaning features and no two of them share semantic domains, meaning systems, or methods of organising meanings (Tyler, 1969:11).

Languages possess particular philosophies intrinsic in their structures, that is why it would be possible, as Pettersen (1976:2) argues, to understand a society's values, politics, religion, art, and communication through analysing their language. Language is a collection of signs, symbols, codes, and rules which are used to construct and convey messages (Infante *et al.*, 1997:190), which would also be culturally defined. Signs often exist as conventional human-made, artificial phenomena, called symbols. These artificially created symbols provide meaning as the user society agrees upon. But there are also sign behaviours that are simply rituals, that is, they are partly natural and partly arbitrary (Infante *et al.*, 1997:191).

Language thus entails the production, use and interpretation of both verbal and non-verbal symbols and signs and, therefore, it constitutes part of the meaning system of a given cultural orientation. It is in this sense of its role in the meaning system that language would also be part of the world view of a people.

In terms of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, meanings are "not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon it, because of the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our orientation in the world" (Sapir, 1931:578). Echoing Sapir's sentiments in this regard, Hoijer (1976:116) writes:

> Language plays a large and significant role in the stability of a culture. Far from being a technique of communication, it is itself a way of directing the perceptions of its speakers and it provides for them habitual modes of analyzing experience into significant categories. And to the extent that languages differ markedly from each other, so should we expect to find significant and formidable barriers to cross-cultural communication and understanding.

Granting Sapir's viewpoint that language shapes perception of reality, it would mean that the language habits of people in a given cultural orientation help to select and to define that people's world. Dodd (1998:119) draws an implication of Sapir's viewpoint saying that "since languages differ, linguistic communities differ in their perceptual experiences of the world around them. Language acts like a filter, modifying perception". One could add that because speakers use language to classify reality, speakers of the same language would share the same perceptual categories, although that is not to mean that a common language is the only basis for having common perceptual categories.

Because perception deals with developing both objective and subjective meanings for people, events, and objects, the hierarchy of values of a given cultural orientation would influence the perceptions of the people in that cultural orientation. In cultural orientations where age and the wisdom and maturity of thought that accompany age are valued, for example, the people would be respecting and venerating their elderly.

Or, since cultural value systems determine, for example, how women are perceived and prescribes behaviour for women, femininity in a particular cultural orientation would be perceived positively as long as women behave within the limits as defined by that cultural orientation. Likewise, a member of a cultural orientation that does not value language might not be aware of the nuances of language patterns and vocabulary, while a cultural orientation that deems language to be significant will produce individuals who are keenly cognisant of even the most subtle differences in speech, vocabulary, and pronunciation. In short, what people in a given cultural orientation believe to be important (or unimportant) will affect their perception - both what they perceive and how they perceive it.

Perception and stereotypes and prejudices. In the process of developing perceptual categories, people learn stereotypes and prejudices. Stereotypes are overgeneralised, oversimplified or exaggerated beliefs associated with a category or group of people. The people who hold such beliefs are relatively rigid in the adherence of the beliefs and the beliefs are often emotionally coloured. A stereotype is a fixed idea that accompany a category, though the two are not identical. For example, one group could describe or hold a view about another group as musical, lazy, and superstitions, or as rational and objective. On the other hand, a prejudice, defined as "*a rigid attitude toward a group, based upon erroneous beliefs or perceptions*" (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:123), is an advance categorical judgement, a pre-judgement that is not easily reversible when exposed to new knowledge.

4.3.3.4. Chronemic dimension

Spengler (1926:130) once said, "it is the meaning that it intuitively attaches to Time that one culture is differentiated from another". Hall (1983) posits that time is a core system around which people across cultural orientations build their picture of the world and Mbiti (1970) suggests that time is a key concept in understanding the traditional religion, world view (in his definition) and the cultural orientation of the African. But also, contemporary scholars are generally in agreement regarding the varied conception and use of time across cultural orientations. For example, Munn (1992:94) in her *The cultural anthropology of time: A critical essay* contends that the spatial and temporal dimensions so commingle in various ways that they cannot be disentangled.

Thus, it could be taken that the conception and use of time is an important aspect of describing cultural orientations. We shall, therefore, look at some specific aspects in which time is not only a dimension of world view, but also how it constitutes a category of comparison across cultural orientations.

Scholarly interest on the anthropology of time emerged when there was a complex polemic in Western thought regarding notions of temporal diversity and heterogeneity vis-à-vis temporal singularity and homogeneity. Darkheim (1915) and many others after him (e.g., Maxwell, 1971) founded time in the image of social diversity, qualitative heterogeneity and conceptual segmentation. Time was considered as consisting of collective representations that derive from and reflect the groupings and varied rhythms of social life. Darkheim divided time into "personal" time, which is the undifferentiated flow of duration, and the collective social time, which has a morphology of cognisable units and imposes itself on all minds.

Schutz's (1962:220) communication-based theory grounds social time in consociative processes in which people actively create inter-subjectivity and a sense of co-ordinated life times in their daily interaction. Munn (1992:112) argues that because anthropologists (e.g., Rigby, 1983:437) treat historical time as a separate dimension of time, Western study of history and culture have led to a focus on cultural concepts of successive ages, examining categories and modes of temporal distance that construct the past-present horizon of a society. One concern of studies on time has been the notion of multiple pasts and how these are brought into the "here and now" of the on-going social world (Munn, 1992:114). One could say that the expectancies and immediate past-references entailed in ordinary activities such as means of survival, involve people in temporalisations which go on in a landscape invested with remembered ancestral events (Polanyi, 1964:55).

Several writers have described the conception or use of time among people in various cultural orientations (Edlund, 1987; Murungi, 1980; Gurevich, 1976). Gurevich (1976:229) notes that "representations of time are essential components of social consciousness, whose structure reflects the rhythms and cadences which mark the evolution of society and culture". Researchers have focused on variables that influence temporal concepts and experiences, though only a few have systematically studied related differences across cultural orientations (Block, 1994). Research on these variables that influence temporal concepts and experiences could be categorised in terms of the major dimensions of psychological time.

Cross-cultural research on time has focused on differences in beliefs concerning the importance of the past, present, and future (Jones, 1988, Zaleski, 1994). Using American students, Ibrahim and Kahn (1987) developed and tested a scale to assess world views based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) proposition that five existential categories characterise value orientations and their relative emphases in different cultural orientations, of which time orientation is one. Sodowsky *et al.* (1994) use Ibrahim and Kahn's scale to compare the relative focus on the present, past and future among White American students, mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, and African students at the University of Nebraska. One of their findings is that, compared to White American students, African students focused more on the past and the present but not significantly more on the future.

Cross-cultural research on time has also focused on pace of life and punctuality, which using various measures of tempo, punctuality and time-keeping, Levine (1988, 1990; Levine & Bartlett, 1984) found substantial differences across people of different cultural orientation. Pace of life was generally faster in industrial than in non-industrial cultural orientations and tended to be faster in larger than in smaller cities.

Focusing on the patterns of similarities and differences in time, Block *et al.* (1996) assessed beliefs about time and temporal experience among college students in Japan, Malawi and the US, using the Temporal Inventory on Meaning Experience (TIME), a 65-item questionnaire containing statements about physical time, personal time, duration in passing (experienced duration), and duration in retrospect (remembered duration).

These researchers found that the respondents shared many beliefs and belief structures concerning time, but they also differed in several ways (Block, *et al.*, 1996:15). Belief structures and beliefs concerning physical time and personal time were somewhat different across the three groups, suggesting cultural influences. However, belief structures and beliefs about experienced duration and remembered duration were similar across the cultural orientations.

Generally, people in different cultural orientations have diverse conceptualisations of time and the multi-featured spaces people live in are saturated with varied temporal meanings (Hanks, 1990:390), including different kinds of pasts (Peel, 1984). As Munn (1992:116) suggests, time is a symbolic process continually being produced in everyday practices, as "people are 'in' a sociocultural time of multiple dimensions (sequencing, timing, past-present-future relations, etc.) that they are farming in their 'projects'. In any given instance, particular temporal dimensions may be foci of attention or only tacitly known. Either way, these dimensions are lived or apprehended concretely via the various meaningful connectivities among persons, objects, and space continually being made in and through the everyday world".

Hall's *Beyond culture* (1976) expresses an important theory about the way people across cultural orientations process time, proposing the monochronic and polychronic orientations. In the monochronic time orientation, people are urged to do one thing at a time and, characteristically, monochronics have high need to see things completed and are dissatisfied with loose ends. With their high degree of time-orientedness, monochronics would be concerned with schedules, orderliness and a short punctuality range. Punctuality range here refers to the time limits within which lateness is defined. As they have a low tolerance for ambiguity, when uncertainty arises, monochronics would tend to articulate solutions quickly. Monochronic audiences usually think in a linear fashion, that is, they internally process information in a sequential, segmented "ordered" fashion.

In the polychronic time orientation, in contrast, the configuration pattern of thought follows a non-linear order of attention to stimulus. Typically, polychronics would think about and attempt to do a number of things simultaneously. In their event-orientedness they would be concerned with the quality of the happening, including what happens and who takes part. Polychronics could experience high degrees of information overload and, as they seem to be highly visually-oriented, they would tend to struggle harder to articulate concepts or situations without visualisations.

Dodd (1998:88) reports of his finding that 50% of Anglo-Saxon respondents at St Abilene Christian University reported extreme or moderate levels of polychronic processing. In a comparison between bilingual and monolingual Anglo-Saxon subjects, Phipps (1987: In Dodd, 1998:89) found that the monolinguals were about half (51%) monochronic and half (49%) polychronic. In contrast, two-thirds (66%) of the bilingual respondents were polychronic and 34% were monochronic. It appears then that most people describe a basic style, or an overriding tendency, to function within either monochronic or polychronic style, but as Dodd (1998:89) suggests, people display tendencies of monochronic or polychronic functioning depending on the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence that how people process time as suggested by the monochronic-polychronic continuum would have a significant influence on communication behaviour.

What these studies suggest is that there are various conceptions of time such as social time and quantitative time; various orientations with respect to time, whether past, present or future; and variations in the use of time, whether polychronic or monochronic, and a differentiated punctuality range.

4.3.3.5. Ontological dimension

The ontological dimension of world view has to do with the concept of being that people in particular cultural orientation have. Each cultural orientation would have its own self-concept, which would manifest in the sociological, psychological, and practical aspects of the people in that cultural orientation, as well as in their place and relationship with nature and the universe. In the challenge of conceptualising the ontological dimension, the question that has to be addressed initially is this: How are we to conceptualise this dimension within the concept of world view?

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) assume that there are universal problems and conditions which human beings in all societies face and only a limited number of solutions to those problems. They call each one of those possible solutions a value orientation[5], and propose that these orientations could be empirically tested and hierarchically ordered into dominant and minority value orientations. Their approach might afford a structure and a vocabulary that could be used as a standard for comparing cultural orientations and describing variations within a single society.

[5] This "value orientation" is not the same as the value orientations and value systems discussed under the axiological dimension. As our critique of the scheme in the next paragraph shows, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck misuse terms. Their scheme focuses on people's orientations with respect to their relationship to the universe and nature, with respect to time, with respect to progress and change, with respect to activity, and with respect to concept of truth. This means that the concern of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is one of ontology.

However, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) scheme suffers from the limitations of deductivism, as it arises from abstract notions of basic problems with a fixed number of solutions, not out of specific situations. A practical question arising from the nature of deductivism pertains to how the researcher is to decide which problems and how many solutions to take. Another problem would be that, testing values through surveys would risk picking up lists that are irrelevant, since such lists would normally be picked arbitrarily and have to be adapted each time. A further weakness of the approach proposed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is that they view time and ontological matters as also value orientations. This is a reductionism that leads to seeing everything that describes or represents human experience as values. Such a view embodies a misuse of terms.

Nevertheless, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's work is useful, if the correct terms are used. It seems that they are addressing questions of ontology, and it is in this light that their work is reviewed and insight from it drawn.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961:4) describe ontological orientations as complex but definitely patterned principles which give order and direction to the ever flowing stream of fundamental human activity and thoughts in pursuit of the solution of human problems. They argue that the existential beliefs regarding five problems shared in all sociocultural systems influence the choices that people make in their every day interactions.

One aspect of the ontological dimension appertains to the nature of relationship between mankind and the universe. The ontologies of some cultural orientations hold that human beings can, do, or should exercise control over nature for their own benefit. Or, people in a given cultural orientation could hold that human beings and nature are or should be in harmony, promoting a respect for the environment. Such people would also presume that nature is God's creation and, therefore, nature and all living things in it are sacred. Or, the relationship between human beings and nature could be one of subjugation, in which case the people with such an ontological disposition feel, understand, and live helplessly, presumably at the mercy of nature. Those who hold the nature-over-man subjugation view would see everyday life as an on-going struggle for survival. Unfavourable climatic conditions, scarcity of food and water, and a limited level of technological development would make them perceive nature as an active, capricious force beyond human control. These differences in conceptualising the relationship between mankind and nature would result in different frames of reference for perceiving and understanding messages and communication intentions.

The second aspect of the ontological dimension concerns orientations with respect to time. This is not exactly the same sense of time as in the case of the chronemic dimension (*see 4.3.3.4*), the focus of which is the conception and use of time, although there would obviously be overlapping aspects. In ontological terms, the past orientation places a high value on tradition; the present orientation places a relatively little attention to both what has gone on in the past and what might happen in the future; and the future orientation highly values change.

The third ontological aspect concerns how people define their relationships with fellow humans - whether individualistic, lineal or collateral. While individualism is characterised by autonomy of the individual, lineality focuses on the continuity of the group through time (the family), and collaterality focuses on the laterally extended group.

The fourth aspect of the ontological dimension concerns activity orientation, describing the self-expression of human beings in activity; as ***doing***, ***being***, or ***being-in-becoming*** (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961:16). Whereas ***doing*** focuses on activities that have outcomes outside the individual, ***being*** involves a spontaneous expression of what is conceived to be given to the human personality, and ***being-in-becoming*** concerns who humans are, not what they have accomplished. The being orientation refers to the kind of activity that is a spontaneous expression and non-developmental conception of the human personality. The being-in-becoming orientation stresses the idea of development or growth and emphasises the kind of activity that contributes to the development of all aspects of the self as an integral whole. The doing orientation describes the kind of activity that results in accomplishments measurable by standards external to the acting individual. As would be expected, the doing orientation impinges upon other beliefs and values, including activity and work and progress and change.

Regarding activity and work, in some cultural orientations people would seek to subdue and exploit the physical world around them, following the Protestant ethic as the guiding principle. Work, seen as directed and disciplined activity in a regular occupation, is seen to represent a cluster of moral and affective conditions of great attractiveness and involuntary idleness is seen to constitute highly threatening and severely damaging social conditions. From a belief in the causality of work, people with a doing orientation seek goal attainment through activity and work. Along this same line of thinking, truth, for example, is to be pursued, as opposed to being awaited to assert itself.

In other cultural orientations, however, there is a willingness to wait for things to happen, rather than cause their rapid occurrence. Thus, unlike the Aristotelian postulation, whereby truth is seen needing to be demonstrated through argument, in these cultural orientations, truth is seen to have a tendency to thrive, such that if it is there, it will assert itself. Cultural orientations that are not doing oriented are also characterised by passiveness and co-operativeness. In these cultural orientations, work and play are not dichotomised, instead, they are interwoven, and thereby afford relaxed attitudes towards work.

With regard to progress and change, the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck scheme posits a progressivism-contentment continuum. At the one end, some cultural orientations emphasise progressivism. For such cultural orientations, to exist or to be is to progress. Typical traits of cultural orientations are optimism, receptivity to change, emphasis on the future rather than the past or present, faith in the ability to control the environment, and faith in the perfectibility of the person. Progress often means acquisition of material, physical comfort, "high" standards of living; thus, belief in materialism. At the other end, other cultural orientations value the ways of the past relatively much more highly than progressivism. These cultural orientations are non-materialist and, as such, their view is that one ought to be contented by being alive and having the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Thus, the orientation of a culture with respect to materialism forms part of that culture's conception of being.

Fifth, the ontological dimension of world view also has to do with the different conceptions of human nature. People in different cultural orientations hold different beliefs about the character of human nature, what it means to be human, and what characterises being human. Samovar *et al.* (1981) provide a useful exposition of this aspect of the ontological dimension of world view. Samovar *et al.* (1981:23) identify three major dimensions of human nature as could be understood by people in various cultural orientations: Goodness of human nature, rationality of human nature, and mutability of human nature. With regard to goodness of human nature, in some cultural orientations, human nature is seen as essentially good; in others it is seen as a mixture of good and evil, and still in other orientations human nature is seen as evil. In some cases, human nature is seen as essentially evil but that it could be perfected through constant control and discipline.

Understood to be an intricate part of the universe, itself seen as a system of elements and forces in a balanced dynamic interaction, humanity is in some orientations seen as sharing the essential characteristics of the universe. In particular, the two forces understood to be present in the universe, namely, good and evil, are also both understood to be present in humankind. The Eastern Taoist tradition (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:96), for example, tells of the interrelated forces of *Yang* and *Yin* - parallel to good and evil. Yang and Yin are present and are cyclic - going through natural periods of balanced increase and decrease. Presumably, periodic increases in Yang are accompanied by corresponding decreases in Yin, followed by an opposite cycle. The implication of this view is that evil cannot, and should not, be eliminated since, by this understanding, it is a natural and necessary part of the universe. Also, by implication, the elimination of evil is not desirable, because without evil, the view maintains, human beings could not recognise the good.

In relation to human nature also the question of essential rationality arises. Presumably, there are those who "feel" their way to truth and those who pursue "rational" analysis. On the other hand, there are those who see that people are basically rational. In yet another category, there are also those who subscribe to mystical and occult approaches to knowledge. What could be said here is that, although in every cultural orientation people would like to believe that they follow rational processes and that human nature at least possesses a rational dimension, the concept of being rational is subject to cultural variation. Samovar *et al.* (1981:97) state that, "being rational in the Eurocentric sense refers to reaching logical and valid conclusions from the information at hand and from the metaphysical assumptions prevalent in a culture. To understand the rationality in any culture, we must understand the premises upon which it is based. People from other cultures who do not really grasp Eurocentric line of reasoning are not necessarily being irrational".

Also related to the conceptions of human nature as an ontological dimension is the perception of self, particularly in relation to social organisation. Social organisation refers to cultural patterns concerning social relationships among the members of a society. From the various hierarchical systems and the varying degrees of the value for status differentiation, some cultural orientations place emphasis on equality in social relationships. In these so called egalitarian societies, generally each individual is viewed as unique, worthy of respect and capable of making autonomous decisions. At least in theory, even where persons are from different hierarchical levels there is an implicit tendency to establish an atmosphere of equality. This is, however, debatable when one considers the racially-based ill-treatment of some sections of the population in such countries as the USA, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, and until recently, South Africa. In contrast to egalitarian societies, other societies are, presumably, hierarchical, placing rather a high value on hierarchical social structures.

Part of the social organisation is the differential tendency to conformity across cultural orientations. Cultural orientations would differ in the content or type of conformity, such that while some cultural orientations would emphasise conformity to past-oriented social norms, others would emphasise conformity to future-oriented ones. Whichever may be the case, an orientation towards conformity means that people could judge each other and regulate their behaviour along commonly accepted standards.

4.4. WORLD VIEW AND CREDIBILITY FORMATION AND APPLICATION

A pertinent aspect that should be addressed now pertains to the significance of all this discussion to the present study. Specifically, what is the interaction between audience world view and speaker credibility in the context of persuasive speaking? From the nature of world view as well as that of persuasion, there would be an interaction between the audience world view and both persuasion and speaker credibility, as the discussion in the following subsections show.

A note to be taken with regard to the dimensions of world view proposed in this chapter is that, although these are posited as separate, extractable dimensions, it is only so in theory, for they constitute an integrated solid whole. It should not be supposed, for example, that these dimensions are to obey any mathematical operations such as summation and subtraction. The reason is that these dimensions would, without doubt, interact in multiple ways. For example, the ontological dimension could also be a question of values, knowledge, beliefs and perception.

The chronemic dimension would also be a matter of ontology, in the sense that it also concerns what the past means to present and future existence, and whether or not there is, or should be, such a connection. The perceptual dimension is an issue of epistemology since beliefs and knowledge as well as knowledge schemata, all of which are elements of epistemology, would inevitably influence what one perceives. Perception seems to be an overlapping dimension, cutting across the other dimensions. Since values would influence what one perceives, the perceptual dimension also interacts with the axiological dimension.

4.4.1. World view and credibility formation and application

It was noted earlier (*see 2.3.1*) that the occurrence of persuasion is mediated by the creation of meaning, and that meaning is created through the processing of information and interpretation of symbols, among other things. The process of creating meaning seems to involve a number of components of world view. On the one hand, the incoming message symbols and the total context within which the persuasive process takes place is to be seen as a specific case of reality. The construction and interpretation of this reality is the very heart of the influence of world view. As Roskos-Ewoldsen (1997b) reports, audiences would have implicit theories concerning persuasive strategy choice. In processing information, the stored knowledge, beliefs and values of the audience would lead audiences to arrive at certain meanings. In particular, their cultural schemata would filter out incoming stimuli into certain packages of meaning.

4.4.2. World view and speaker credibility

How people characteristically communicate is influenced by their value systems (Sitaram & Haapanen, 1979:154) but would also be influenced by other world view dimensions. A number of areas of interaction between persuasive communication and the axiological dimension of world view could be identified, and these are: Similarity between the audience and the persuasive speaker; rhetorical forms, styles (e.g., whether high-context or low-context) and strategies; and preferences in argumentation systems.

One of the classic findings in persuasion research is that communicators are more likely to change the attitudes of audiences if they are believed to be similar to rather than dissimilar to those audiences they seek to influence and that similarity between the persuasive source and the audience enhances persuasion (Perloff, 1993:145), especially if they are similar in their axiological orientations (Precker, 1953; Newcomb, 1963). McCroskey *et al.* (1975) propose attitude, morality, background and appearance as the critical dimensions of perceived similarity.

Within persuasive communication, audiences tend to accord higher credibility to persuasive sources whose *values* are perceived as being similar to their own (Hovland *et al.*, 1953). One's speech style is subjected to the value judgements of others, and the speech style influences source credibility (Giles & Powesland, 1975). Values would lead the audience to prefer certain sources and channels of communication that symbolise that audience's values or provide information useful in attaining their values (cf. Doob, 1961; Starck, 1973). It is in this respect that the ethos of the speaker implies the ethos of the audience, which Cohen (1998:159) suggests.

On the other hand, each society would practice persuasive communication in their peculiar forms (Blake, 1979) and one finds strong cultural and philosophical influences on the growth and development of rhetorical forms, styles and strategies (Oliver, 1971). For example, in order to persuade audiences in Western cultural orientations, it is necessary to use argumentation and discussion as the primary persuasive strategies. In this regard, it is necessary to understand such aspects as the workings of classical logic, the use of warrants, the identification and use of evidence, the identification and use of "credible" sources, and the identification and application of appropriate amplification devices (Cohen, 1998). These aspects form part of the rhetorical structure and pattern of Western societies.

This implies that communicating parties in different cultural orientations would apply persuasive communication patterns, strategies, and vehicles peculiar to their respective axiological orientations. Therefore, the Aristotelian conception of ethos that Western rhetorical theory takes for granted - seeing ethos as constituted by the speaker's competence, character and dynamism (see Lucas, 1998; DeVito, 1997) - is obviously influenced by Western values. Hence, not only would the world view of the audience influence the persuasive process generally, but also, the credibility criteria in a given cultural orientation would be, broadly speaking, audience-specific, hence world view-specific.

An important aspect within the influence of axiological dimension on speaker credibility is how audiences in individualistic and communalistic orientations differ in terms of how they define preferred communication styles differently, whether high-context or low-context (Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996).[6] A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalised in the person while little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. In contrast, a low-context (LC) communication is one wherein the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code (Hall, 1976:79).

Okabe (1983:22) points: ". . . persuasive communication employs argumentation, which depends for both the premises and its entire development, on which is accepted; that which is acknowledged as true, as normal and probable, as valid". But, the cultural assumptions and values of the interactants characterise the scope, functions, and patterns of communication. Deducing from this argument, one finds that the value system of an audience could render the methodical nature of communication more important than its content nature. But more importantly, one deduces that the axiological orientation of the audience would also influence the modes of argumentation. To that extent, they would also perceive the persuasive speaker, among other things, against the quality of his argumentation relative to the audience's axiological and epistemological orientations.

4.4.3. World view and the means of persuasion

The issues associated with world view are timeless and represent the most fundamental basis of a cultural orientation. It would follow that persuasive communication would be

[6] Hall (1966, 1976) makes a distinction between high- and low-context cultures on the basis of their communication patterns. This scheme has been used by some scholars in the intercultural communication field to describe communication-relevant differences across cultural orientations (see e.g., Gudykunst, 1987, 1994; Gudykunst *et al.*, 1987). However, this paradigm is too fluid and rather too subjective to constitute an adequate, researchable dimension. It is for this reason that it was not considered central enough for the present study to be included in the discussion of culture and world view. Nevertheless, it offers some useful insights for the present section of the study.

influenced by world view. In the first place, since the occurrence of persuasion involves, among other things, the perception of message and other symbols (see *2.3.1.3* and *4.3.3.3*), the process of persuasive communication would be influenced by world view through the perception and interpretation of the various aspects that are associated with the process of the creation of meaning.

World view would also influence the means of persuasion through the epistemological dimension. Granted, the meaning at which the audience arrives is a function of the actual message transmitted, the channel used, the environment in which the message is transmitted, and the audience, among other things (Gudykunst, 1994:10). However, the interpretation of the message will be truncated by the knowledge store of the audience as well as its ways of looking at reality. The audience's ways of knowing might influence its preferences with regard to the persuasive speaker's use of evidence. What kind of appeals and how they should be presented by the speaker to the audience would depend on the audience's forms of requesting and challenging, as preference for forms of requesting (Kim & Wilson, 1994) and re-requesting (Kim *et al.*, 1998) could also be influenced by the cultural orientation of the people interacting.

It would be expected that the processing of arguments and assessment of argumentation schemes would be influenced by world view because these processes imply the work of the cognitive processes as well as the role of values. For example, in some cultural orientations, more indirect and inclusive language and arguments might be preferred, or that holistic and value-spiced argumentation would not only be preferred but also that they are likely to be more effective. Whereas some audiences might value the speaker's identification with the message and the audience, to other orientations such identification might not be all that important.

4.5. SUMMARY

World view is a pertinent audience factor in persuasive communication. Culture influences communication in general and persuasion in particular. Cultural orientation entails three components theoretically in hierarchical levels: On the surface, the behavioural level; at the middle level, the conceptual; and at the core level, the philosophical outlook.

It is the conceptual and philosophical levels of cultural orientation that constitute the cultural level that determines a people's general outlook, and one that influences every other facet of life, including communication behaviour, and thus including the formation and application of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking. It is this resultant composite of the conceptual and philosophical levels that has been termed world view.

In a five-dimension typology, world view consists of the epistemological, axiological, perceptual, chronemic and ontological dimension. Ultimately, world view is a complex weave of interacting and interrelated systems of epistemology, values, concept of being and existence, conception and use of time, and perceptual behaviour.

It is difficult to see hierarchical relationships among these dimensions, because one could hypothesise that the dimensions are themselves multidimensional in character, with their individual elements in varying levels of significance. For example, a constitutive element in the perceptual dimension might be more significant in the overall definition of the world view of a given cultural orientation than a constitutive element in the ontological dimension, while, yet another constitutive element in the perceptual dimension might be less so than another constitutive element in the ontological dimension.

A number of ways in which world view would influence both the persuasive communication process and the formation and application of speaker credibility were identified and discussed.

The conceptualisation of world view in this chapter was done at the meta-theoretical level, to provide primarily a framework for analysing the contents of specific world views. Another step is needed, therefore, to explicate Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, as cases of world view orientation. The questions, then, to be addressed are: what are the contents of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, as world view orientations, and specifically, how does each of them influence the formation and application of speaker credibility. Using the theoretical framework developed in this chapter, the next chapter presents analyses of the Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view orientations.

CHAPTER 5

AFROCENTRIC AND EUROCENTRIC AUDIENCES

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This study investigates how Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences form and apply speaker credibility in persuasive situations. Persuasive communication needs to take the audience into consideration (Larson, 1995) and this requires audience analysis and adaptation (DeVito, 1997; Lucas, 1998). Audience analysis entails obtaining such information as the demographics and psychographics of the audience (Cohen, 1998:19). As suggested in chapter 4, in general, audience world view is an important aspect in persuasive communication, with a significant influence on both the occurrence of persuasion and the formation and application of speaker credibility. Therefore, as part of audience analysis, audiences should also be described in terms of world view.

As elucidated in chapter 4, world view is a multi-dimensional construct with axiological, epistemological, chronemic, ontological and perceptual dimensions as its components. As dimensions, it means that their respective contents would vary from one world view orientation to another. Conversely, different world view orientations would be constituted by different constellations of axiological, epistemological, chronemic, ontological and perceptual elements. Thus, to describe a world view orientation is nothing but to identify its peculiar traits in these dimensions.

The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as specific world view orientations and to propose their possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility. The following aspects are addressed:

- The question of distinguishing the Afrocentric and Eurocentric orientations is examined, looking at the need for, and utility of, distinguishing these orientations, but also looking at the dangers of such an endeavour.

- Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are analysed using the five world view dimensions posited in chapter 4 as a frame of analysis, looking at what constitutes each of them and, therefore, what would characterise Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences in terms of world view.

- The implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view characteristics of audiences for the formation and application of speaker credibility are proposed.

5.2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFROCENTRISM AND EUROCENTRISM

Analysis of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism presupposes that a distinction between the two orientations is both significant and possible. However, this presupposition itself needs to be examined.

5.2.1. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as world view orientations

Van der Walt, in his *Afrocentric or Eurocentric: Our task in a multicultural South Africa* (PU for CHE, 1997) makes a rare attempt to differentiate Afrocentrics and Eurocentrics on the basis of world view. What he calls culture, with such dimensions as use of time, thinking, community orientation, and religious orientation, is part of what this study defines as world view. As an evaluation of his ideas will indicate, his contentions leave much to be desired. However, in view of the influence the work is likely to have, it seems useful to summarise and evaluate the most pertinent points in this work.

Van der Walt (1997:18) proposes that interpretation of reality by Africa and the West is to be differentiated along God-versus-nature ontological foci. He posits that African culture is more geared toward God, and from its community orientation, Africa culture sees the person as a reflection of the community, relationship to God as communal, and nature as a reflection of the community. He proposes that Western culture is more geared towards nature, and with its individualist orientation, Western culture sees the community as an expression of the individual will, relationship to God as individual, and that nature is to be used for personal purposes. Van der Walt (1997:29) contends thus: "Africa and the West are different. Their ontologies (understanding of reality), their anthropologies (view of man), views of society, theories of knowing (how knowledge of reality is obtained) and axiologies (norms and values) are often diametrically opposed."

Van der Walt identifies communalism-individualism, enjoying-using time; and pre-scientific-scientific thinking modes as the dimensions of cultural variation between Whites (whom he labels Eurocentrics) and Blacks (whom he labels Afrocentrics). In comparing African communalism and Western individualism, he sees the view of man as the basis, seen as a communal being in the African culture, and an individual in the Western culture.

From an axiological comparison, Van der Walt (1997:36) says that the African has his own idea of the ideal person, and that this is determined by the importance the person allocates to interpersonal relationships. For Van der Walt, Eurocentrics are individualistic, displaying any number of individualistic values: Independence and self-sufficiency; perseverance, initiative, efficiency and hard work for the sake of self-made self; being impersonal, hard and powerful; competitiveness and individual achievement; high value for success, which is defined in terms of material possession; cash, consumption and convenience; and a strong faith in progress, because the future is far more important than the past and the present.

Kotze (1990, 1993) speaks of a pervasive collective consciousness overriding the differences in language, tradition, occupation and creed amongst black people in South Africa. Van der Walt (1997:41) agrees with Kotze's postulation that this collective consciousness is derived from a common experience, namely, the general and total derivation in the form of low income, unemployment, lack of social stability, lack of residential stability, malnutrition, poor health, and little or no education, leading to individuals' total dependence on the rest of the community. In agreement with this reasoning, Van der Walt (1997:42) goes on to say: "Collective consciousness is therefore the result of poverty and not something inherent in, for instance, black people only. If poverty would be replaced by widespread affluence, a different (individualist) perceptual style would develop simply because collective consciousness was not designed for affluence."

Van der Walt's second dimension differentiating Afrocentrics and Eurocentrics is the conception of time. He points that, whereas Afrocentrics make time for people rather than pursue programmes that result to ignoring people, Eurocentrics are directed to things, tasks, schedules and procedures. Van der Walt (1997:64, 65) contends that, for Afrocentrics, "the original, that which lies in the past, is regarded as much more powerful than the present. By way of all kinds of myths and rituals primordial time therefore has to be revived in the present-day to make people healthier and stronger. That which is good therefore lies in the past and not, as Westerners believe, in the future".

Van der Walt concludes his discussion of the conception and use of time by saying that while in Africa the future and the present are pulled back and used to interpret the past, in the West the past and the present are taken up or even sacrificed and used to interpret the future. Disagreeing with Mbiti's (1970) and Kagame's (1996) explanation of the difference in the conception of time, that Africans do not have a notion of the future, Van der Walt (1997:65) argues that "Westerners are more strongly focused upon the future and less directed at the past, while Africans' primary attention is directed at the past and not so strongly focused upon the future".

A third dimension along which Westerners and Africans differ as proposed by Van der Walt suggests is thinking mode: To him, Westerners think scientifically, and Africans pre-scientifically. He presents thirty contrasting factors for the two worlds of thought (1997:81, 82; cf. Adeyemo, 1999:380, 381). He argues that whereas Westerners are engrossed in a dichotomy between faith and science, and distinguishing between the supernatural and the natural, in each case preferring the latter, Afrocentric ontology is concerned with the spiritual world and the forces which play a role in it.

Van der Walt (1997:85) agrees with Du Preez's (1978:77) view that the African's way of thinking "is determined by traditions, beliefs, rituals which affect the individual from the days of childhood through community contact . . . . This is true to such an extent that even individual perceptions and understanding are influenced by group attitudes and beliefs". He maintains that, whereas the African way of thinking is human-social, the Western mode of thinking is so non-human that the person doing an investigation does it impersonally, mechanistically and neutrally. For Van der Walt, Western thinking style is abstract in nature, while the African way of thinking is concrete. Western science characteristically engages in abstracting, theorising, analysing, and systematising, and seeks the universal, typical facets of things and the general laws that govern them. In contrast, the African is more closely involved with the object of knowledge, with a focus on face to face interaction with concrete reality.

Africa's thinking mode is described as more emotionally-synthetic while Western thinking style is described as more intellectually-analytical. Contrasting Western science, Van der Walt (1997:89) approvingly quotes Du Preez (1978:78) that: "In contrast to modern man, whose approach to life is objectively analytical and whose spirit is accordingly also divided into value, thought and feeling systems, blacks have a different approach. They do not face the world objectively and at a distance, but live in it. No object exists outside reality. They touch and are attuned to things and the earth. They experience everything intensely and are part of everything."

That is to say, whereas the Western pattern of thought is more analytical, and thus offers fragmented knowledge, the African thought pattern is more synthetic and seeks to lead to holistic, integral knowledge of the totality. The two thought patterns function through different logical systems, an *and-and* logic for Africa, and an *either-or* logic for the West (Van der Walt, 1997:90).

By way of evaluation, Van der Walt is not clear whether African communalism is the cause of, or reason for, people with this orientation to be more geared to God or whether there is a mutual influence, and if so, how that is to be explained. He does not spell out the link between the individualism of Western culture and its being more geared to nature either. It is possible that there is a co-existence, rather than a causal relationship, between communalism and religious orientation among people of Afrocentric cultural orientation. Similarly, there might be a co-existence between individualism and a gearing towards nature among people of Eurocentric orientation, and not necessarily a causal relationship.

Van der Walt (1997:77, 78) is careful enough to point out that his comparison is between the modern West and traditional Africa and that the comparison itself is not 100% in line with reality. However, the motive for choosing to compare traditional Africa and modern West is at best a doubtful methodological convenience; at worst an erroneous assumption that "African culture" or Afrocentrism is only traditional. Regarding his view of Western science, it may be valid that science is characterised by the four-step process of abstracting, theorising, analysing and systematising but to say that this is Western or that it is not African cannot be taken at face value. Busia (1972:77, 78) contends, and rightly, so that:

> All peoples have beliefs regarding the supernatural. But what is considered as falling within the natural, what can be explained in terms of a people's experience and empirical knowledge, differs from one country to another. Europeans in Africa, for example, will find that many things are ascribed to supernatural causes, which they will ascribe to natural causes, on the basis of their scientific knowledge. This does not mean, as some Europeans have, I think erroneously concluded, that the African has no concept of causality, but only that the sphere of the supernatural for the European is narrower.

Therefore, from Busia's point, there are varying degrees of scientific or naturalistic orientation.

Some of Van der Walt's explanations for the differences among Afrocentric and Eurocentric aspects are troublesome and misleading, to say the least. He (Van der Walt, 1997:65), for example, accepts Kotze's (1993:15, 16) explanation for the Africans' conception of time:

> Africans define time socially in terms of the immediate future. Individualists are usually very punctual (at least in contrast with persons with collective consciousness), whilst collectivists regard punctuality as some kind of lunacy. For people with surplus material assets the present is part of history, life is projected into the future, and time is of the utmost importance. To people who possess no, or insignificant, surplus material assets, survival is a serious matter of the here and now. To them life holds very little predictability. To be concerned with the future in terms of material considerations would therefore be neither sensible nor practical. Predictability is consequently sought in social relationships which are constantly maintained and reinforced for the sake of long-term security. Social relationships, though, demand a lot of time.

This explanation is rather unacceptable as it implies both a rejection of the legitimate and fundamental difference in the conception of time between the two orientations and projects an antithetical mindset. It sounds as if Kotze, and therefore Van der Walt, is saying that Africans would not be different if they were not poor, or that as long as they are poor they will not only be different but will also conceptualise time that way. Or that, whenever an African became affluent he would not only abandon this conception of time, but also that he would embrace the Western conception of time. This is an evolutionary viewpoint, holding that all people and all things are busy evolving to become Western. Isn't that a projection of the superiority complex and intellectual arrogance of the Western world?

Van der Walt's discussion provides a general description of what has been observed in the orientations, rather than a firm scientific conclusion of the correlation between communalism and religiosity, and Eurocentrism and naturalism. Since these are rather general observations, what Van der Walt is presenting is no more than documented speculation, scientifically speaking. One of his assertions, for example, is that black students so think in the magical-symbolic way of Afrocentrism that they often have difficulty coping with statistics in science (Van der Walt, 1997:85). Wouldn't that imply that in countries where the population is nearly 100% black there are few or no mathematicians, statisticians, and scientists, which is obviously not the case? Besides the fact that far too many examples indicate the contrary, the assertion itself is simply sweeping.

Perhaps the most serious flaw of Van der Walt's framework for comparing Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism pertains to his definitions of these concepts, which he takes to be synonymous to black people and white people, respectively. Such synonymity reflects colour-based stereotypes which could in no way be regarded as scientifically or otherwise adequate. One finds no basis for supposing that Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are inherently racial. The notion that the Afrocentric world view is necessarily associated with blackness, or that the Eurocentric world view is necessarily associated with whiteness, is questionable. Associations between world view with skin pigmentation often glides world view, a fundamental and wide-encompassing phenomenon, into a mere set of stereotypes.

One should not speak of an African world view, but rather an Afrocentric world view, which retains the essential aspect of its being an orientation, without fixing it on a particular racial grouping. Similarly, one should not speak of European or Western world view, but rather a Eurocentric orientation. It would then be possible to find audiences of both orientations across races. It should be theoretically possible to find people from the black race steadily reflecting Eurocentric world view tendencies, or Caucasians steadily reflecting Afrocentric tendencies.

Nevertheless, to the extent that Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are presented as distinct orientations, Van der Walt makes a notable contribution. As world view orientations, Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism have their respective logical systems, conceptions and use of time, and degrees of individualism and communalism. It would, however, require explicating what variables constitute each of those dimensions.

In differentiating between Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, certain dangers should be noted and avoided. One of these dangers is to fail to make an essential distinction between what is cultural and what is simply modern principles of operating. Another danger is to base the distinction on stereotypic attributions, instead of an accurate factual description. Unfortunately, stereotypes and prejudices are often used to allocate various people groups where they (should) "belong". It becomes a question of fixing identities for everyone, in which case, camps are hypothetically designed, perhaps with a goal in mind to maximise differences, and then separating the sheep from the goats, and wheat from the chuff. There is, also, the danger of imposing differences, instead of acknowledging them. And, where differences are acknowledged, one would also have to realise that the differences do not mean that one side is to be the standard for the others, nor do they imply that no substantial similarities exist between Afrocentrics and Eurocentrics.

5.2.2. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as paradigms

Asante (1998) distinguishes Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism at a paradigmatic level. Asante (1998) criticises the "objectivity" assumed by many scholars as a collective European subjectivity and challenges it as the standard by which the world marches. He critiques the Eurocentric ideology that masquerades as a universal view in the fields of intercultural communication, rhetoric, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, education, anthropology and history. He asserts that there are other ways in which to experience phenomena than viewing them from a Eurocentric vantage point and proposes the Afrocentric perspective as an alternative. He calls the crystallisation of this critical perspective Afrocentricity, which means placing African ideals at the centre of any analysis that involves African culture and behaviour. From an Afrocentric perspective, defining speech, for example, as an uninterrupted spoken discourse, indicates disregard of the African tradition of speech (Asante, 1998:2).

Asante (1998) argues that many a scholarly endeavour are, consciously or unconsciously, Eurocentric. He notes that many a scholar today find it difficult to stop viewing the European/American cultural orientation as the centre of the social universe, thus the works they produce seldom consider the possibilities of other realities or, indeed, shared realities. Baldwin (1986) also challenges such a narrow view of the arts and the social sciences, speaking to the abiding problem of Western formulations based on parochial observations.

Asante (1998:8) argues that the Afrocentric perspective would be beneficial, at least to Afrocentric people:

> If we [Afrocentric people] have lost anything, it is our cultural centerdness; that is, we have been moved off our own platforms. This means that we cannot truly be ourselves or know our potential since we exist in a borrowed space. But all space is a matter of point of view or interpretation. Our existential relationship to the culture that we have borrowed defines what and who we are at any given moment. By regaining our own platforms, standing in our own cultural spaces, and believing that our way of viewing the universe is just as valid as any, we will achieve the kind of transformation that we need to participate fully in a multicultural society. However, without this kind of centeredness, we bring almost nothing to the multicultural table but a darker version of whiteness.

The Eurocentric formulations recognise neither African classical thought nor the African classical past, and to that extent, there remains a discontinuous history and an uncertain future for Afrocentrics. By contrast, the Afrocentric analysis re-establishes the centrality of the ancient Kemetic (Egyptian) civilisation and the Nile Valley cultural complex as points of reference for an Afrocentric perspective in much the same way that Greece and Rome serve as reference points for the European world (Asante, 1998:11).

The Afrocentric-Eurocentric paradigmatic distinction is imperative in view of the weakness of over-reliance on the scientific method. While the contributions of Eurocentric philosophers and scientists have been important and valuable, neither have they been fully expressive of the extent and the power of human ways of knowing nor have the arguments advanced for the Western formulation of science been convincing.

Adoption of the Afrocentric perspective could contribute to the minimising of intercultural misunderstanding. A classic example of how misunderstanding might be propagated by different world views is the case of Cecil John Rhodes' encounter with the Ndebele King Lobengula. Rhodes seeks to gain control of a large territory of Southern Africa that is ruled by King Lobengula and so he sends his emissaries to the king to secure his consent. After many days of discussion, the emissaries return to Rhodes with the king's signature on a piece of paper, and tell Rhodes that the king has given him all of his territory. Rhodes sends soldiers into the area with the instruction to shoot any black on sight. Thus began the country of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe.

Rhodes may have believed that King Lobengula has given him title to the land, but Lobengula never believes that he has. Their two views clash and the Europeans automatically assume the correctness of their view. An Afrocentric analysis would indicate that Lobengula could have never given the land away, since he knows it belonged not to him but to the ancestors and to the community. He can only permit Rhodes to hunt, to farm, and even to build a house, but not to own it. It takes a hundred years, two revolts, and a seven-year war to correct the situation. A rigid Eurocentrism makes Rhodes believe that Lobengula has signed his country over to him.

Afrocentricity as a meta-theory, Asante (1998) proposes, allows the development of better interpretations, fuller understandings, and more effective articulations of the meaning of human goals and interactions. A meta-theory suggests the character and content of theories by prescribing what a theory should explain and what analytical methodologies are required for revealing and establishing concepts such as symbolic engineering and expressive artefact. He (1998:47) proposes frame of mind, scope of context, structure of code, and delivery of message as the constituents of his meta-theory.

It is, therefore, important and useful to differentiate between Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism. The components that constitute any world view orientation could be, and indeed would be, upheld by people all over, regardless their colour of skin. The complex nature of world view is such that a person or group of people could be Afrocentric with respect to an aspect or issue, and be quite Eurocentric with respect to another issue, or with respect to the same issue at another time, and vice-versa. It is in this regard that Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are orientations, and not fixed and rigid frameworks in which a person would belong either to the one or to the other. One realises that this could well be a reasoning and an interpretation framed in one of the orientations and, therefore, someone else could argue differently. But there has to be a starting point. Each of these world view orientations are examined in the following two subsections.

5.3. AFROCENTRISM

The question that should be asked at the outset concerns whether in fact there is such a thing as an Afrocentric world view. Some thinkers question whether it is valid to speak of an Afrocentric world view, given the fact that the continent of Africa has over 51 countries and numerous ethnicities of varying racial stocks in each of those countries.

Busia (1972:77), for example, registers greater cognisance of the diversity across African communities than the similarities among them: "Though there are religious ideas and social values that are widespread in Africa, there are also diversities. For there are many and not one African community. There are numerous communities on the vast continent of Africa which have lived on self-contained isolation, under varying conditions of life and experience."

However, some recent thinkers hold the view that despite the ethnic differences on the continent, Sub-Saharan Africans share fundamentally the same or similar world view (Asante, 1988, 1990; Riesman, 1986; Sodowsky *et al.*, 1994). Other thinkers (e.g., Sanda, 1979) even suggest that a denial of this sameness of a fundamental world view amounts to an undermining of the self-image of Africans.

Gyekye (1987:191) proposes that the common features that could be discerned in the cultures and thought systems of Sub-Saharan Africa suggest the existence of an African world view, pointing out that "in many areas of thought we can discern features of the traditional life and thought of African peoples sufficiently common to constitute a legitimate and reasonable basis for the construction (or reconstruction) of a philosophical system that may be properly called African". Gyekye (1987:192) goes on to argue that "a painstaking comparative study of African cultures leaves one in no doubt that despite the undoubted cultural diversity arising from Africa's ethnic pluralism, threads of underlying affinity do run through the beliefs, customs, value systems, and sociopolitical institutions and practices of the various African societies". Thus, besides the diversity across African societies, and although some changes have taken or are taking place (Moemeka, 1997), there is an inner ontological energy that makes an African, African and not anybody else (Adeyemo, 1999).

Afrocentricity developed as a paradigm based on works since the 1960s. However, the most important contribution to Afrocentric theory comes through the major works of Asante, namely, *Afrocentricity* (1988), *The Afrocentric idea* (1998), and *Kemet, Afrocentricity and knowledge* (1990). Afrocentrism has been advanced as a theory of social change (Asante, 1980), an approach to social work (Oliver, 1989), as a methodology (Asante, 1998; Akbar, 1984; Baldwin & Bell, 1985; Baldwin & Hopkins, 1990), and a paradigm for organisational theory (Schiele, 1990).

As a distinguishing paradigm among cultural orientations, Afrocentrism has been utilised in analysing the diversifications of racial characteristics of students and teaching staff (Carter & Wilson, 1994; Pettigrew, 1991), developing particular philosophical foundations of education (Schiele, 1991, 1994), and in developing a model of optimal psychology (Myers, 1985, 1993).

Although Afrocentrism is, in part, associated with African history and could be said to reflect Black nationalist movement (Schiele, 1991), it seems to be more of a philosophical model based on traditional African philosophical assumptions (Abarry, 1990; Akbar, 1984; Asante, 1988, 1990; Baldwin & Hopkins, 1990; Bell *et al.*, 1990; Dixon, 1976; Nobles, 1980; Schiele, 1990).

But what, then, constitutes the Afrocentric world view? Often times scholars, both Western and continental Africans alike, speak of Afrocentrism, while in fact they refer to such things as African traditional life or even African Traditional Religious practices. Some presume that the Afrocentric world view is primarily religious (e.g., Shutte, 1993, 1996; Horton, 1993, 1996).

Horton (1993, 1996) compares Western science and African traditional religion. He first examines the similarities that underlie them and then the features which distinguish them. His view is that, in effect, the similarities are more significant than the differences. Horton (1993:211) is one of those who view African patterns of thought as only traditional and socio-religious, as he says: "Once again, we find parallels to all this in many traditional African religious systems. It is typical of such systems that they include, on the one hand, ideas about a multiplicity of spirits, and on the other hand, ideas about a single supreme being." As Hallen (1996:217) points out, Horton presumes a single, over-arching world view of traditional Africa, characterised, in terms of thought, as a religious system.

But Afrocentrism as conceptualised by Asante (1988, 1991, 1998) is the centring of one's analysis and perceptions from the groundedness of the African person. Asante presents Afrocentrism as a critical theory and method which serves as a generative concept. First introduced in his book, *Afrocentricity* (Africa World Press, 1988), the theory has gained prominence in all academic circles (Okur, 1993:88). The Afrocentric orientation is based on values of classical African civilisations, values that emphasise mankind's oneness with nature, spirituality, and collectivism (Oliver, 1989:24).

In developing the Afrocentric idea, Asante (1998) brings the consciousness of the rhetorical structure to the study of African communication, particularly discourse. He sets out a conceptual field for exploring the Afrocentric perspective on discourse, first explaining the rhetorical condition as a phenomenon with an implicit structure and establishing the position of a meta-theory for African communication.

As a philosophical model, Afrocentrism is viewed as being distinct from, and oppositional to, Eurocentrism (Asante, 1988; Baldwin, 1985; Diop, 1978). Afrocentrism has a distinct set of cosmological, ontological, epistemological, and axiological attributes (Schiele, 1994:152) and is, therefore, examined further in terms of the world view dimensions posited in the preceding chapter.

5.3.1. Afrocentric epistemology

Senghor (1965) posits that viewing reality and attaining personhood through participation in the community does not mean that knowledge is reduced to emotion or denying the role of reason. Senghor (1965:74) explains that the vital force of the African is animated by reason, but "it is not the reasoning-eye of Europe, it is the reason of touch, better still, the reasoning embrace, the sympathetic reason, more closely related to the Greek *logos* than to the Latin *ratio* . . . . European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization, Negro African reasoning is intuitive by participation".

Senghor is often criticised in his theory of Negritude, for seemingly suggesting that Afrocentrism does not emphasise the value of clarity, relevance, validity, and consistency as much as does typically Eurocentric thinking. But Senghor (1965) seeks to make a comparative one, one that also recognises the shortcomings of the Eurocentric approach. He is also criticised for suggesting that subjective Negritude is a biological and unique part of one's being Afrocentric, supposedly, because Senghor's study was based on black West Indians and Americans in Paris, all of whom agreed on the basics of Negritude. He concluded that such an agreement must have sprang out of something in common - and race seemed the most important shared feature. A typical Senghorian response to this kind of criticism is that "the permanence of style in black artistic and literary expression is for Senghor the sign of permanence of the values or spirit of race as he defines. Black African culture transplanted to the Americas has remained intact in its style if not in its 'ergological elements'" (Ba, 1973:164).

But even with this response, one should realise that the style of Negritude might be learned from one's role models and history rather than inherited biologically. What this means is that the racial essentialism of Senghor is unnecessary for explaining the foundation of Afrocentrism. That is to say, though Senghor's propositions regarding Afrocentric logic may be admissible, his attribution of that logic to race and biological inherence may not.

Afrocentrism places considerable emphasis on an affective way of obtaining knowledge (Akbar, 1984; Asante, 1988; Dixon, 1976; Schiele, 1990), which means that understanding events and reality through emotion and feeling is considered both valid and critical. The focus on affect does not prevent recognition and use of rationality, but rather, affect, as a means of knowing, is viewed as offsetting the use of rationality (Schiele, 1994:153).

Afrocentric role schemata include information about broad social categories, such as age, sex, race and occupation, which would mean that Afrocentric audiences would have expectations of and stipulations for roles based on these social categories. In terms of internal logic systems Afrocentric audiences are said to be primarily contextual thinkers, or holistic thinkers.

5.3.2. Afrocentric axiology

Afrocentric axiology significantly underscores the value of interpersonal relationships (Dixon, 1976; Hale-Benson, 1982) and the maintenance and enhancement of harmonious interpersonal relationships are considered the most important cultural values in Afrocentrism (Schiele, 1990, 1991). This focus on interpersonal relationships fosters a human-centred perspective towards life, in which the value in maintaining and strengthening interpersonal bonds overrides the concern over acquiring material objects and accumulating wealth. Tempels (1959:71) argues that "for the Bantu, man never appears in fact as an isolated individual, as an independent entity. Every man, every individual, forms a link in the chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below him the line of his descendants". Similar to Tempels' finding, Kraft (1978:13) found among the Kamwe people of Northeast Nigeria that a person has no identity outside his family, which he reflects, is obliged to and upon which he depends.

Shutte (1993:46) discusses two Xhosa concepts, *ubuntu* and *seriti*, presuming them to be universal in the Afrocentric world view. Both concepts embody a conception of human persons that is neither dualist nor materialist. The conception of person might be enshrined in the proverb *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, meaning a person is a person through other persons (see also Mbigi & Maree, 1995:2). There is a peculiar interdependence of persons on others for exercise, development and fulfilment of their powers that is recognised in Afrocentric thought. Steyn (1997:70) notes that the conception of personhood is reflected in *ubuntu*.

5.3.2.1. Community and individual

But there is also a peculiar understanding of what it is to be a person that underlies the interdependence philosophy. In the Afrocentric orientation, it is the community which defines the person; and personhood itself is achieved through participation in the community. Because personhood is something to be achieved, one could fail to attain it (Menkiti, 1979:159). Mulago (1971:145) explains that "participation is the element of connection which unites different beings as beings, as substances, without confusing them. It is the first of relationships between members of the same community, the link which binds together individuals and groups".

Thus, a person is a being-in-community, though he belongs primarily to his immediate - his relative, his clan, his tribe and his ancestral community - and secondarily, to the larger community of humanity. Life that has a meaning is that which is lived in the community and which contributes to the betterment of the community in some way. In this regard Busia (1972:79, 80) writes that "the African view of man in society in general lays more emphasis on his membership of a group than on his individuality. The membership of the group continues beyond death into the life beyond. The dead, the living, and the yet unborn form an unbroken family, and this concept is given emphasis in institutions and ritual".

The Afrocentric conception of community is so universally embodied in customs and institutions, that a proper treatment could only be possible with much anthropological detail. But Afrocentric axiology could also be described as communalistic, characterised by particular aspects (Moemeka, 1996, 1997; Gudykunst, 1994). In this regard, Gyekye (1987:208) writes: "Communalism is the doctrine that the group constitutes the main focus of the lives of the individual members of that group, and that the extent of the individual's involvement in the interests, aspirations, and welfare of the group is the measure of that individual's worth. This philosophy is given institutional expression in the social structures of African societies."

Menkiti (1979:166) makes perhaps the clearest statement on the Afrocentric idea of community. He describes the community as "an organic dimension to the relationship between the component individuals. Individuals develop within this organization; it is not formed by the Association of individuals".

It should be noted, however, that authentic communalistic values are now being challenged, mainly by young people, in the name of personal freedom. They tend to claim freedom as a personal right rather than recognise it as a communal right from which each person derives his or her rights to act or interact. But there are communities, especially in the rural areas in historically Afrocentric contexts, where individuals willingly and proudly submit to the supremacy of the community, where actions and omissions have both sociocultural and religious connotations, where obedience to authority, self-respect, love of and respect for others, and service to the community are seen as mandatory for social order. In these areas, freedom to act individually takes into account the ways that an action would affect others. In these areas, freedom is exercised only when one recognises how one's own rights in search of self-satisfaction might affect other people's exercise of their own rights (Moemeka, 1997:186).

The principles of the value of the individual and respect for old age underscore the need to respect human life and individuals as persons, as Moemeka (1997:173, 174) points out: "The ultimate goal of these overarching human values is to give an unswerving credence to the supremacy of the community. They also underscore the all-important cultural need for members of the community . . . to always strive for and maintain self-respect by not damaging the community's reputation and creating a negative image of its people."

One of the most fundamental differences between communalist and individualist cultural orientations is their completely opposite views regarding the individual's status vis-à-vis the community. As communalists, people in the Afrocentric orientation give to the community pride of place as a supreme power over its individual members. Individuals exist first to serve the community and second to benefit from such communal service.

The value of the guiding dictum "I am because we are", which characterise Afrocentrics, lies in the unity that it sustains, the selfless service it generates, and the honour that it inspires, the community's welfare takes precedence over the individual's, though individual needs and aspirations are not ignored but are rather seen as extensions of community needs and aspirations. The rationale is the cultural belief that communal welfare immediately or eventually benefits all members of the community. This unspoken belief that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Moemeka, 1997:174) helps keep alive the ties that bind individuals to the community. Subtly but firmly it would strengthen the feeling of oneness among people, underscoring the bonds of a common purpose and of a common destiny.

Afrocentrics take tangible and intangible sacrifices for one another, through direct and indirect contributions to the community: What individuals have done for themselves that has a salutary effect on the community, what they have done for their neighbours in the name of common destiny, and what they have done to directly improve the community's socio-cultural and economic condition. Manual labour and financial and educational services from those living in urban settings are common demands. There could also be demands for sacrifices of time, money or energy to provide, for example, for the widow and children of a deceased member of the community.

Whatever the service requested, community members from whom it is demanded are required to accept the responsibility as a binding duty. Urgent personal matters could even be set aside if they conflict with community needs, individual grievances could be played down or ignored if they contradict the community's interest, and the community could forbid individuals from saying what is not in the community's best interest though it may be important to them personally (Moemeka, 1997:175). Making positive contributions to the community would earn one respect and the blessings of the elderly and community leaders.

No one, except those chronically ill and the disabled as well as those officially excused, could fail to participate in community service without facing sanctions. And, not only do defaulters suffer public scorn, but also their close relatives would often be subjected to humiliation. For example, parents could be castigated if their children consistently fail to take part in community service; sarcastic remarks are made before friends and relatives about those family members who fail to meet this demand, and wives are sneered at if their husbands default on their cultural debt to the community. The principle of the community's supremacy demand a selfless service to it and self-enhancing activities on its behalf. As Moemeka (1997:176) sums it up, for Afrocentrics, "being in the community means being with the community".

5.3.2.2. Sanctity of life and value of the individual

In the Afrocentric orientation, the sanctity of life is an absolute value. Within the context of a community, suicide and murder are seen as abominations and would be visited with serious legal and social punishments, though the punishments would be muted under the principal of impartiality, to stress the values of justice and fairness. The body of a person found guilty of suicide would be "carelessly buried" far out in the forest to ostracise that person's spirit. The convicted murderer would usually be banished from the community forever and relatives of murderers become targets of direct or indirect scorn, sarcastic remarks, and public and private repulsion through, for example, songs and proverbs, even long after the offenders have been duly punished (see Moemeka, 1997).

Afrocentrics place a high value on life because they see people as the greatest form of wealth and in many places, people's wealth is even measured in terms of the quality and quantity of their children. Likewise, the community's wealth is measured in terms of the quantity and quality of its individuals, who are children of the community. Individuals are useful not only to the community but also to other individual members in the community.

Therefore, the individual's value finds expression not only in the community service but also through honesty and trust in interpersonal and group relationships and charity. In typical Afrocentric communities, "a person without food is fed by a neighbor; widows depend on the generosity of the community; farmers who suddenly fall sick midway in the farming season have their farm work completed by the community; children who misbehave know that they will be punished, not just at home by their parents, but on the spot, by the first adult to find out what they did" (Moemeka, 1997:177). Communal acts have had such an indelible influence that their praises are sung in adages and proverbs, as the Fante of Ghana express their communal ethos, saying "the poor kinsman does not lack a resting place" and the Zulu of South Africa would say, "hands wash each other to keep the fingers clean".

The worth of individuals also involves the community by being fair, truthful, honest, and trustworthy with one's neighbours. If members of a community do not trust one another, a false sense of social order is created at best; at worst, disorder sets in. Both of these possible outcomes have a negative impact on the community. To ensure appropriate social order in any community, its members must be able to depend on and trust each other. This is true for any society - Afrocentric or Eurocentric.

There are differences, however, in the way each society reacts to individual actions that threaten or disrupt social order. For Afrocentrics, to the extent that they are truly communalistic, antisocial behaviours such as dishonesty, cheating, stealing, false accusations, and lying, are serious social crimes in truly communalistic communities (Moemeka, 1997:178). The principle of the value of the individual demands that members of the community be considerate, show positive concern for the underprivileged, abhor selfishness, love one another, respect life, and be committed to community service. The value of one's own community would be acknowledged by one helping others and treating them as fellow humans like members of one's own community.

5.3.2.3. Respect for leadership and authority

All societies accord to their leaders the authority to lead, but the form of and the extent to which authority is exercised differs from one society to another (Moemeka, 1997:179). In general, communalistic societies have two culturally recognised levels of leadership - formal and non-formal. The formal is composed of the officially appointed or selected leader of the community and all subordinate socio-cultural and political leaders that govern with him and to whom they are responsible; and parents and guardians who are responsible for those under their care. The non-formal leadership is predicated on one of the major characteristics of communalism, that is, the fluid type of leadership structure that derives from the philosophy of gerontology.

The community leader in communalist societies is the first citizen. Once appointed or selected, the leader would be bestowed with honour and prestige befitting that position and would be treated with respect and dignity. Often, the leader would be both the temporal and spiritual head and would, therefore, be seen as representing divine authority. For the Yoruba of Nigeria, for example, the leader is "the King, the

Commander and the Wielder of Authority, next only to the Almighty" (Okediji, 1970:205).

The higher honour and respect reserved for the community leader, however, must be deserved. Leaders are expected to be above reproach and communities would require of them no less than what their status demands. They must live exemplary lives; otherwise they fall into disrepute. The demand of the community's supremacy are in force even for the leader. They lead but are not above the community, since "if the mouth that speaks does not have the cooperation of the rest of the body, it would lose its power of speech" (Moemeka, 1997:180).

Next in authority to the community leader are the parents and guardians, who in fact, occupy the first leadership role in the lives of individuals. They have the primary responsibility of bringing up children. Communalist societies recognise their unlimited right of supervision and control. Parents and guardians, too, are required to lead not only by what they say but more importantly by what they do. Any dereliction of their parental duties makes them unworthy of the dignity of parenthood and guilty of disservice to the community, and both these negative outcomes result into social sanctions.

Children are expected to carry their own duties, to obey and respect their parents according to the laws of the cultural orientation and to personally and fully take care of the parents in old age. Children who disobey, quarrel with, or disregard their parents are looked at with disdain and contempt. Neglect of aged parents is culturally repugnant and socially despicable, and it is treated as a violation of the sanctity of parenthood and, hence, a disservice to the community.

Gerontocracy, one of the major characteristics of communalist and hence of Afrocentrism, emphasises that the responsibility of ensuring of existence and maintenance of social order lies with everyone old enough to make a contribution. Those who find themselves in situations in which they are the oldest persons around are expected to assume the leadership position in that situation and to dutifully represent the community. Those over whom these individuals exercise this normative on-the-spot leadership are also expected to recognise and respect the authority of these "impromptu" leaders.

5.3.2.4. Veneration of old age

The respect for the aged required of all in the Afrocentric orientation is closely related to the sanctity of authority on the non-formal level. In this respect, old age is honourable and old men and women are to be treated with dignity. The elderly are seen as the true repositories of wisdom and knowledge and, therefore, as assets of great value to the community.

Among Afrocentrics, the future of the community, though not placed in the hands of the aged, is seen as intrinsically linked with the type and quality of advice they give. Living to a ripe age is believed to be a providential reward for living by the mores of the community such as justice, fairplay, integrity, honesty, respect, and charity. Therefore, the old aged are good examples for the youth to emulate.

The exalted position bestowed on old age in communalistic societies requires a high degree of service and exemplary behaviour from the aged. Old age alone, without appropriate ability for guidance and without a reservoir of goodwill deriving from appropriate ability, does not earn honour and respect. To be seen as useful to the community, and to earn the prestige reserved for them, the elderly are required not only to guide the community by advising the community leaders but also to educate, admonish, and guide the inexperienced and the young.

Just as the communalist orientation demands that the younger generation must respect, listen to, and learn from the elders, so it demands from the elders appropriate action to provide conducive learning experiences for the younger generation. The fundamental values of respect for old age and sanctity of authority are not a "dominance-submission" (Moemeka, 1997:185) interaction pattern as Western communication theorists would infer. Rather, they are an appropriate environment in which "water seeks its own level" for the benefit of all (Moemeka, 1997:185). The collective impact of the Afrocentric values strengthens the bonds that sustain the societies. These bonds are the shared symbols, rituals, values, and beliefs of the members of the community; and it is in these aspects that the meaning of community is obtained.

5.3.3. Afrocentric chronemics

For Afrocentrics, time is not linear but tends toward a cyclical pattern (Wilson, 1990:26). In terms of their relative focus on the present, past and future, Afrocentrics are supposed to be inclined towards the past orientation. Cross-cultural research on time focusing on pace of life and punctuality, measuring such variables as tempo, punctuality and time-keeping suggests that Afrocentrics would, in Eurocentric terms, be rated as slower, with a relatively flexible punctuality range, although many of the beliefs and belief structures concerning time are also shared with Eurocentrics and Orientals (see Block *et al.*, 1996).

Afrocentrics are probably more polychronic than monochronic in their processing of time, capable of thinking about and dealing with several things concurrently as well as having a relatively high degree of event-orientedness. If Dodd's (1998) study is taken as a beacon, it could be suggested that having a polychronic orientation for the Afrocentrics might be due to the fact that many of them are bilingual, even multilingual.

5.3.4. Afrocentric ontology

In the Afrocentric orientation the sacredness of nature and humanity is a living reality and is experienced as a vital life-force (Shutte, 1996). Shutte (1993:52) points out that in Afrocentric ontology, the universe is a field of force, a notion that supplies the metaphysical foundation and framework for the conceptions of persons and community.

Cosmologically, the Afrocentric model views the structure of reality from a perspective of interdependency, that is, all elements of the universe - people, animals, inanimate objects - are viewed as interconnected (Baldwin & Hopkins, 1990; Mbiti, 1970; Nobles, 1980) and reality is viewed as being "both spiritual and material at once" (Myers, 1985:34).

Central to the Afrocentric world view is the conception that everything is a unified, interdependent, and integrated whole. There is an order inherent in the unity of this holistic orientation that can be seen at all levels of nature, and provides the impetus for an integrated reality. The supreme reality that is the essence of humankind and nature binds and orders the universe (Myers, 1993:47). Within this understanding, Adeyemo (1999) explains that the cosmology of the Afrocentric orientation has three main components; the world of man, the world of the spirits, and maintaining of the cosmological balance.

In Adeyemo's (1999) scheme, the Afrocentric world of man is the visible world; the tangible world peopled by beings and things, both animate and inanimate. The basic motivation for societal existence is the preservation of life. With adaptation to the environment, self-conscious pursuit of development, and expansion in the quality of life as the most urgent survival requirement, one finds man's efforts invested in the direction of obtaining food, shelter, and clothing.

The ontology of Afrocentrism puts man right at the centre of the environmental stimuli. Although one has to be cautious in making reference to Mbiti's works generally, Mbiti (1970) provides a pointer to a basic fact regarding Afrocentric ontology. In a study of over two hundred and seventy tribes of Africa, Mbiti (1970:20) observes that "Africans have their own ontology which is an extremely anthropocentric ontology in the sense that everything is seen in terms of its relation to man . . . . Man the center of this ontology; the Animals, Plants and natural phenomena and objects constitute the environment in which man lives, provide a means of existence and, if need be, man establishes a mystical relationship with them".

The visible world of nature of the Afrocentric man is not alone; it is enveloped in the invisible spirit world. Constant natural disasters and social calamities impress upon him the existence of forces regarded fatalistically as beyond human control. From the shaky and tenuous existence within the context of nature emerges the overriding feelings of awe, respect, wonder, and fear of such natural phenomena as rivers, trees, rocks, earthquakes, thunder, moon, sun, stars, hills, and certain animal species with which clans ritualistically identify themselves through totemism.

Mbiti (1970) posits that for Afrocentrics, behind the visible lies the invisible; behind the material lies the spiritual; behind the tangible lies the intangible and behind the living lies the dead.

One is not surprised to find that the hierarchical sociological pattern operative in the visible world is transferred into the spirit world. Nearest to man are the spirit-charged entities including the earth, rivers, mountains, trees, wind, and the luminaries. Next in the cosmic hierarchy are the ancestors who, by virtue of their seniority, are believed to mediate between the gods and man. These are followed up in the hierarchy by the divinities, who are recognised for being the recipients of man's worship and sacrifices. At the top of the pantheon is the Supreme Deity, variously but prominently addressed as the Creator of all things.

Mankind is the central figure in the Afrocentric orientation. His basic motivation for societal existence is preservation and affirmation of life. Everything exists for him and for his use. To maintain a cosmological equilibrium, man develops three attitudes: Submission, through religion; subservience, through the practice of magic in attempt to tap and control supernatural resources of the universe for his own benefit; and counteraction.

Counteraction relates to traditional understanding that calamities such as sickness, barrenness, famine, death, plagues, and infantile mortality do not just happen, but that there is always an unseen cause. In such moments of abnormality - psychological, physical, or spiritual - the immediate response is to think of the ritual antidote to drive away the evil entity, and engage in such practices as spirit mediumship, possession, magic, witchcraft and sorcery. Consequently, there is generally a fascination for power and the display of power and majesty. Because of this the Afrocentrics accept power and use of power, but they also seek to acquire power through such practices as divination, mastery of macrocosm or by allying with ancestral powers by which one not only can manipulate elemental forces but also ward off contrary spirits.

Of highest value in African mentality is the sacredness and sanctity of life. As life is believed to be the property of the Supreme Deity, no human being has the right to terminate. Instead, from a life-affirmation viewpoint, things are to be made to contribute to a good, full and fulfilled life. As the Yoruba of Nigeria would say in a proverb, "*Bi mo ba b'oju wehin ti mo raso mi, enia laso mi*", meaning, "all I care for as I look at my surrounding are people; they are my clothes" (Adeyemo, 1999:373). Generally speaking, all that affirms life in Afrocentric judgement is regarded as moral while all that dehumanises man is immoral.

Religion is an all-important part of the social order of communalistic societies (Moemeka, 1997:182) - religion here refers to any organised way of worship through which a people express and manifest their spiritual relationship to the Almighty. Religion pervades life in communalistic Africa. It gives force to the fundamental principles discussed earlier, and it is the ultimate justification for whatever is culturally acceptable.

Religion is used for the safeguarding of social order and protecting social norms, communication rules, and ethical standards (Moemeka, 1996). For Afrocentrics, religion is not just a gloss on actions and behaviour but an inseparable part of the rationale for anything done or not done. As a result, there is not formal distinction between sacred acts and secular behaviour, or between the spiritual and the material areas of life and communalism demands that people's lives reflect a solid blend of the secular and the religious.

The religious symbols, through which most communalist societies seek favours from the Almighty, are physically near and their presence is felt in the home, in the village square, in the market place, along the footpaths, and in the streets (Moemeka, 1997:183).

Each of these philosophical foundations underscore traditional African cultural orientation and reflect in general the basis of the type of social order that obtains in strictly communalist societies (Moemeka, 1996). Senghor (1963:16) describes the Afrocentric orientation as "a community based society . . . . Communal . . . . We are concerned here not with a mere collection of individuals, but with people conspiring together, *con-spiring* in the basic Latin sense, united among themselves even to the very centre of their being, community through their ancestors with God, who is the Centre of all centres".

Thus, ontologically, audiences with an Afrocentric orientation assume that all elements of the universe, including people, are spiritual, created from a similar universe substance (Akbar, 1984; Nobles, 1980; Mbiti, 1970). Spirituality here implies the non-material or invisible substance that connects all elements of the universe. The focus on spirituality within Afrocentrism supports and encourages the cosmological view of interdependency.

In terms of the conception of human beings, Afrocentric orientation places considerable emphasis on harmony and collectivity. Rather than a fragmented and restricted view of human beings, Afrocentrism offers a more holistic conception of human beings. Although Afrocentrism recognises individual uniqueness (Akbar, 1984), it conceives individual identity as collective identity. Therefore, among Afrocentric audiences similarities or commonalties among people would take precedence over individual differences. The Afrocentric orientation emphasises "contact-awareness" of the self with the environment and others within it. Such an orientation suggests that "I am because we are and because we are, therefore I am . . . . [It] makes no real distinction between the self and the others in the environment . . ." (Nobles, 1973:23, 24).

The concept "soul" is fundamental to the understanding of the phenomenon of Afrocentric experience, as it signifies the moral and emotional fibre of the Afrocentric man and the potency of its quality makes it a force which demonstrates strength, power, intense effort and will to live. Okur (1993:99) insists that it is that ability of the human being to feel, which is, in Afrocentric terms, essentially human. At the same time, ability to feel and thought are not set in contradistinction; rather, they are understood to be inextricable and are necessary for an accurate perception of reality (Richards, 1985:225). Richards (1980:210) also contends that:

> The essence of the African cosmos is spiritual reality; that is fundamental nature, it primary essence. But realities are not conceived as being irreconcilable opposition, as they are in the West, and spirit it not separate from matter. Both spiritual and material being are necessary in order for there to be a meaningful reality. While spiritual being gives force and energy to matter, material being gives form to spirit. Enlightenment and the acquisition of wisdom and knowledge depends to a significant degree on being able to apprehend spirit in matter.

Certain aspects of Afrocentric ontology would have implications on persuasive communication and speaker credibility formation and application. The metaphysical foundation and framework for the conceptions of persons supplied by the understanding that the universe is a field of force, means that speaker perceptions of possessing, or being subjected to, power, as the case may be, would constitute a credibility category.

The interdependency perspective of reality, from which reality is viewed as being both spiritual and material at once, implies that Afrocentric audiences might pay attention to the physical, social and spiritual qualities of the speaker. It is even possible that Afrocentric audiences might include the according of due respect to the members of the cosmology - man, spirits, and God - in their formation and application of speaker credibility. The "extremely anthropocentric ontology" that Mbiti (1970) speaks about could imply that Afrocentric audience would react to the speaker in view of whether or not his persuasive speech - both content and presentation - is humane, and that the speaker appears or is known to be humane - concerned about the welfare and promotion of humanity.

The overriding feelings of awe, respect, wonder, and fear of such natural phenomena as earthquakes, thunder, and stars, as well as totemism, that emerge from the shaky and tenuous existence, might imply that the speaker's ability to instil a sense of awe and wonder might accord the speaker perceptions of being credible.

The general Afrocentric response to calamities and psychological, physical, or spiritual abnormality such as turning to the ritual antidote to drive away the evil entity and engaging in spirit mediumship, possession, magic, witchcraft and sorcery implies a general fascination for power and the display of power and majesty. A speaker perceived to possess power or to be in a position to help them might be accorded credibility.

Since religion is an all-important part of the social order of Afrocentric audiences, whether or not the speaker is a religious person might be part of a credibility scale. In particular, the role of religion in influencing behaviour, social norms and ethical standards, and the speaker's life must reflect a solid blend of the secular and the religious.

The emphasis placed by people who are characterised by the Afrocentric world view orientation on harmony and collectivity, despite recognising individual uniqueness, similarities between an Afrocentric audience and a persuasive speaker takes precedence over differences.

The moral and emotional fibre of Afrocentrism and the potency of its quality would make exhibition of strength, power, intense effort and enthusiasm important elements in perceiving speakers.

5.4. EUROCENTRISM

The European philosophical outlook since Plato and Aristotle, as Lovejoy (1964:24) writes in *The great chain of being*, "The most fundamental of the group of ideas of which we are to review the history appears first in Plato; and nearly all that follows might therefore serve as an illustration of a celebrated remark of Professor Whitehead's, that 'the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato'." Eurocentrism could be taken to refer to a European-oriented Western perspective.

Okur (1993:92) emphasises that "although neither the Eurocentric view nor the Afrocentric view represents the overall view of reality (because each can perceive only part of reality), Eurocentric aspirations often tend to be promoted as 'universal' and 'world-defining'". Aristotle, often described by Westerners as "the master of all who know" (Asante, 1998:15), is known to have an enormous impact on the development of Western science and literature, at least until seventeenth-century Europe. Aristotle's position was revered in such fields as drama and philosophy (Okur, 1993:95). In philosophy, he always occupied a privileged position as the major philosophical authority behind European cultural outlook from the thirteenth century until Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century. Even despite the impact of rising scientific knowledge, industrialism, and Darwinism in the nineteenth century, Aristotle's influence persisted.

The Eurocentric orientation is a segmented world view, and as it considers difference as deficit, causes its proponents to act out of a sense of insecurity and threat, and utilises the values of materialism, competition, and individualism. Aggressive attempt to control, and overpowerment are the behavioural consequences (Myers, 1993:52). Considerable emphasis is placed on dominion, conflict and fragmentation within the Eurocentric perspective (Burgest, 1981, 1982; Schiele, 1994). Because of its focus on fragmentation and domination, Eurocentrism tends to engender an individualistic and materialistic orientation towards life. People are conceived primarily as individuals separate from other people and nature (Akbar, 1984; Dixon, 1976) who aggressively and competitively seek control over nature, material items and other people.

5.4.1. Eurocentric epistemology

People in the Eurocentric orientation primarily exhibit conceptual or abstract thinking, which is theoretical or postulational in nature. On philosophical level, Eurocentric conception of human nature in the rationalistic epistemology of the Western metaphysics that maintains the essence of man's being "thought" in isolation from other functions, sensations, and responses. Indeed, rationalisation, objectification, and the conception of nature as a mechanism, every part of which follows exact logical formulas, endured in Western intellectual tradition for quite a long time.

Descartes (1596-1650), who included one of the most famous statements into philosophy, "*cogito, ergo sum*" (I think, therefore I am"), explains that man is distinguished from other animals by possessing an immortal soul. Descartes (see Brownowski & Mazliah, 1960:228) established a sharp distinction between mind and matter, rejecting man's passions as irrational intrusions, and distrusted the imagination as a source of delusions. The Descartes' scientific world view and his introduction of rationalism - of "logically" deriving effects from causes - into philosophy could not wholly explain the intellectual and aesthetic traditions that highly values human response, emotional involvement, and identification in human beings' relationship to the universe. The Eurocentric orientation also suggests that knowledge not only stems from others but also "from the proposition that I feel, therefore I think therefore I am" (Foster, 1971:18).

The Western conception of knowledge thus suggests that external sources are the basis of knowledge. Such is the foundation of objectivism and a positivist, empirical approach to science (Myers, 1993:47). The presumption of a spiritual essence taking on form (material appearance), however, encourages the restructuring of knowledge around that essence. Learning more about his environment is the purpose of life, and leads to a mode of knowing the world that relies on the multiple meanings of symbols and rhythm. Rather than control nature, the search to understand and function consistently with nature's laws is aided by the belief that each aspect of nature has a special, unique role to play in the larger scheme of things. Within Eurocentric epistemology, each of these aspects of nature is valued and studied with emphasis on integration and interdependence.

After Bacon, the pursuit of science became morally self-justifying. It became morality itself. The scientist of Western Europe is simply acting zealous loyalty to the Baconian-Western creed. Descartes, becoming committed to this creed, took on the task of contributing to an "invulnerable method" to the edifice which was being constructed. One notices a high intensity with which he worked at severing mind from body in the *Meditations*. All such metaphysical manipulations contributed to the success of the progress ideology and the scientific world view.

Both the Baconian attitude and Cartesian the epistemology were intensification and developments of possibilities already present in the matrix of the Western European cultural orientation. Ultimately, science and technology are valued highly, taken as the tools for understanding and improving life, nature, and even human nature. The assumption is that reality could be rationally ordered and that, with the scientific method, such ordering would allow prediction and control of much of life. This rationalistic tradition also believes that all questions can be answered through science, thus prizes objectivity, empirical evidence, and concreteness.

A number of implications of Eurocentric epistemology for speaker credibility formation and application could be deduced. The conceptual thinking, and their orientation towards rationalism imply that Eurocentric audiences would subject a persuasive speaker to criteria of following exact logical formulas, within limited contexts of speaking.

From the Cartesian sharp distinction between mind and matter and rejection of man's passions as irrational intrusions, Eurocentric audiences would perceive persuasive speakers who display emotional overtones in their speaking, in particular vibrant styles with such paralanguage as high pitch and loud voices and dramatic movements.

The objectivism and positivist approach mean that Eurocentric audiences would tend to address issues from a distanced stance, on the basis of the consistency of those issues with nature's laws, from the larger scheme of things. This would imply that in the Eurocentric orientation, presentation of facts and factual accuracy as well an Aristotelian organisation and presentation of arguments would be important credibility elements.

From the orientation towards, and high value for, science and technology, the "scientific method", which prizes objectivity, empirical evidence, and concreteness, would be part of the critical evaluation by which Eurocentric audiences would perceive persuasive speakers.

From the implications of Eurocentric epistemology, speaker credibility for Eurocentrics would be strongly logocentric.

5.4.2. Eurocentric axiology

The Eurocentric axiology could be described primarily as individualistic. Therefore, individuals are supreme and first in importance and the community is second. Anything not directly serving the individual's interest is regarded with suspicion (Moemeka, 1997:174).

Certain value systems characterise the Eurocentric orientation. In the value for individualism, the individual is seen as the most important unit in any social setting, regardless of the size of the unit, and the uniqueness of the individual is of paramount importance. It is claimed that in the Eurocentric orientation, people's personal goals take priority over their allegiance to groups like the family or the employer, and not only is their loyalty to any given group weak, but also they feel they belong to many groups and are apt to change their membership as it suits them. For an orientation where individualism predominates, Samovar and Porter (1995:89) note that "an 'I' consciousness prevails: Competition rather than cooperation is encouraged; personal goals take precedent over group goals; people tend not to be emotionally dependent on organizations and institutions; and every individual has the right to his or her private property, thoughts, and opinions".

Broadly speaking, as individualists, Eurocentrics would subscribe to the doctrine that the interests of the individual ought to be paramount, and that all values, rights, and duties originate in individuals. Individualism emphasises individual initiative, independence, individual expression, and privacy. As Samovar and Porter (1995:85) observe, individualism transcends all spheres of life, from literature to art and history, the message is the same: "Individual achievement, sovereignty, and freedom are virtues most glorified and canonized". Heroes, being independent agents, accomplish their goals with little or no assistance. Consequently, there is the belief that each individual has his or her separate identity, which should be recognised and reinforced.

5.4.3. Eurocentric chronemics

The way time is conceptualised and used by people from the Eurocentric orientation has been discussed in the review of Van der Walt's work. Suffice it to say here that Eurocentrics tend to conceptualise time in lineal-spatial terms, meaning that they are aware of a past, present and a future. Time is something that can be manipulated, wasted, saved, made up, or spent.

For Eurocentrics, the space-time orientation is more linear: "Time is not considered to be repetitive. Once the moment is experienced, it is gone forever, you cannot go home again, and no man ever steps in the same river twice" (White, 1984:12). According to Tuan (1974), it was on the flatter landscape of the north-western Europe between 1500 and 1700 that the urge for linear extension of space found its most extravagant expression. In this regard, Porteous (1977:113) says that "European gardens have traditionally emphasised straight lines, long vistas, and natural vegetation cut to shapes which provide symmetry and permit perspective views of the whole garden from a single point".

In terms of the relative focus on the present, past and future, Eurocentric are supposed to be inclined to a present and future orientation (Sodowsky *et al.*, 1994), and pace of life and punctuality range of Eurocentrics are relatively faster and shorter, respectively (Levine, 1988, 1990). In terms of Hall's (1976) scheme, Eurocentrics are supposed to be primarily monochronic in their way of processing time. Eurocentrics would have an urge to do one thing at a time and would have a pronounced sense of the need to see things completed. With a high degree of time-orientedness, Eurocentrics are characteristically concerned with schedules, orderliness and a short punctuality range. Being monochronics also means that they would have a low tolerance for ambiguity and would therefore tend to quickly seek solutions to incumbent or impending circumstances.

5.4.4. Eurocentric ontology

A number of things characterise the Eurocentric ontology. According to Taylor (1963:41), in European philosophy in general, the self is always envisaged as something "inside" a person, or at least as a kind of container of member properties and powers. It is to be envisaged as "a centrifugal selfhood . . . intermeaning other selves in a relationship in which subject and object are no longer distinguishable". The family in Eurocentric sense is an assembly of individuals. Eurocentric society inevitably places the emphasis on the individual, on his origin, activity and needs (Senghor, 1965:93). People with a Eurocentric orientation tend to view the world as a vast space that can be used to carry out human desires. They build what they wish, control nature as they can, and whenever they are displeased they tear it down and start all over again.

The equality value is closely related to individualism and it is emphasised from political systems to social relationships. Even within the family and similar primary relationships, equality rather than hierarchy is advanced. Friendships, co-worker relationships, and all other secondary relationships are characterised by equality.

Materialism is an integral part of life in the Eurocentric orientation. It refers to the desire for, and pursuit of, wealth and being well off, and being comfortable, and these are considered almost as a right. A materialist orientation even judges people in terms of their possessions. Materialism projects itself in the ethnocentric attitude that other cultural orientations should try to duplicate a materialist living standard. The materialistic view of reality seems to have its roots in Greek philosophy. Aristotle defines the soul as the function of the body and argues that body functions are the individual's behaviours that are observable and therefore should be measurable. Aristotle's view of humans is, in the final analysis, a reductionist, deterministic, operationalist, positivistic view that motivated the modern behaviouristic school to call for real science, free from mentalistic concepts and subjective methods. Fundamental to the materialist idea is the separation of mind and body, a dichotomy that persists in

Western philosophy to the present day. Western materialism culminates in the modern physicist's examination and conclusion that the material world constitutes the world of appearance (Myers, 1993:34). Despite the allusion of the spiritual/material, a fragmented mechanistic world view remains. Myers (1993:44) explains that "In Western culture difference is treated with what I call a deficit orientation. When a difference is perceived an evaluative judgment (usually hierarchical) is made: The less familiar typically receives the lower evaluation, or status. This Western mode of difference handling is the natural consequence of the dichotomous two-valued logic that characterizes so much of Western thinking."

Materialist existence is the primary basis of such a definition of reality, and the constant valuation of things creates an illusory sense of worth, meaning, and order. The Cartesian notion that *I exist; therefore, I am* compounds with the materialist values to make identity tantamount to what one does occupationally, how one appears physically, and/or what social roles one plays (Myers, 1993:45).

Richards' (1980) discussion of the Eurocentric idea of progress is helpful in our discussion, though some of his contentions in that discussion are unwarranted. For example, Richards' rejection of Christianity because it was misused by the Europeans to suppress other peoples, particularly the black race, and his view that Christianity is the European man's religion misses the mark. Indeed, it could be valid that in their entrepreneurship and greed for political control Europeans may have capitalised on the propagation of Christianity, but it would be illogical, on that basis, either to reject Christianity or to conclude that Christianity is bad or wrong. He also alleges that the Christians divided the world into "Christians" and "heathens", "Christians" and "pagans". He argues that the Christian-Western interprets humans as beings who derive meaning from their ability to move toward a universal goal - at once progressive and rational (Richards, 1980:73) and that it provides images of Westerners and non-Westerners which mandate unlimited expansion of white, Western political control. "The essence of the Judeo-Christian tradition is its assumption of theological and moral evolution leading to the superior and humanly proper conception of one God as the ultimate abstraction. The Christian mandate to impose this conception on other peoples represents the epitome of the Western ethos" (Richards, 1980:74). But such ascription of Christianity as European, it seems to me, lacks validity.

But Richards explains that the Eurocentric represents the sequence of time as a line going to the infinite, and that is the description of the idea of progress. Richards goes on to argue, uniform and undisturbed flow of time can only be imagined as a line. If other concepts of time are admitted as plausible or operative, the idea of progress does not work. In order for it to work, what must be assumed is a single, infinite, and infinitely divisible time.

As the idea of purpose permeates Western life, so the idea of progress gives the impression of purpose in change. It was during the appearance of Francis Bacon and others in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries that "science" triumphed and the idea of progress concomitantly became the unchallenged cultural philosophy of the West. The significance of the Baconian attitude was the formal demise of the tension between Western arrogance and the Western sense of the supernatural. The scientific pursuit became a religion, and Western-Europeans were no longer embarrassed by their own lack of humility (Richards, 1980:69).

In his examination of the critical relationship between Christian thought in its Western form and the pattern of European ecological behaviour, Richards (1980:69) is of the view that, to a great extent, European Christianity itself is predicated on a world view which supports the exploitation of nature. The image which is usually presented is that of the life-and-death struggle between religion and science as representing two antithetical frames of mind. Christian thought provides a view of man, nature, and the universe which supports not only the ascendancy of science, but of the technical order, individualism, and relentless progress.

Emphasis within this world view is placed on humanity's dominance over all other beings, which become objects in an objectified universe. There is no emphasis on an awe-inspiring God or cosmos. Being made in the image of God, given the European ethos, translates into acting as God, recreating the universe. Humanity is separated from nature, which becomes fodder to be used in whatever way humanity sees fit. It is a concept of control and dominance, not of harmony, equilibrium, and respect. World views in which spirit is recognised in all natural beings are considered to be superstitious, ignorant, and are derogatorily labelled animistic. With the idea of progress the tone is set for a rampant exploitation of nature as well as of other people and their cultures. Richards (1980:70) observes that "progress determined what was meaningful to the European and what lacked value - what was ethical and what was not. It became a frame of reference, and ideological base out of which other concepts were created and by which they were judged. It was a paramount criterion of suitability. It became linked totally with the scientific-technical and with the power relationships their development suggested. Progress became identified with scientific knowledge."

In a detailed psycho-historic analysis of Eurocentric behaviours, Myers (1993:48) concludes that the various historical processes and stages of European people from the Hellenic civilisation in the Greek Peninsula around 2000 BC culminating in the

Protestant Reformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries formed the ground work for the commercial revolution of 1400-1700. Capitalism achieved an exclusive status as a system of production, distribution, and exchange, in which accumulated wealth could be invested by private owners for their gain. Subsequent to this was the emergence of a world view that cherished material possession as a fundamental principle of personhood.

In the Eurocentric orientation, progress and change are given much importance, leading to a sense of optimism, openness to change, emphasis upon the future rather than the past or present, faith in an ability to control all phases of life, and confidence in the perceptual ability of the common person. Forming part of the quest for progress work, which is not only desired but also an avenue for getting recognition, money and power as well as material possession represent a cluster of moral and affective conditions of great attractiveness. Richards (1980) describes the Eurocentric notion of progress as a European mythology, an ideology, and that a philosophical and critical analysis of the same reveals it to be a value, in spite of the universalistic, scientific, and humanistic rhetoric with which, as part of the Eurocentric orientation, it is often projected.

In Eurocentric ontology, the world is perceived as a natural order which inexorably goes on its ordained way according to a natural law, a typical mechanistic world view. Busia (1972:78, 79) clarifies this Eurocentric metaphysics "The known world is divided into two, mind and matter, and a human being into soul and body. Some say that matter alone is real and mind is an illusion, while some now hold that both mind and matter are structures composed of more primitive stuff which is neither mental or material."

Via the Western-European idea of progress, one could see how the ontological and epistemological definitions of culture translate into its ideological (value and behaviour) aspects. The assumptions of cause, of lineality, and the sense of *telos* (purpose) in Western metaphysics, as well as a dependence on abstraction, are all necessary conceptual ingredients of the progress ideology. Its assimilation depends on the mental habits encouraged by these forms of thought, and its acceptance as a predominant molder of group activity is dependent on a frame of mind already or simultaneously conditioned by "lineal codification" (Lee, 1959) and causality epistemology. In this respect, phenomena must relate to one another within a lineally defined whole, where "causes" precede "effects", and growth implies the incorporation and surpassing of that which has come before in a way that precludes repetition. Progress does not recur; it is triumph over the past. The need for and feeling of triumph is an essential ingredient of the idea of progress.

In the Eurocentric view, life is a continuous struggle, based on competition, and meaning is derived from "winning". Hidden behind the so-called universalism and humanism of the concept are the exigencies of an ethos that feeds on subjugation - surpassing, conquering, winning. The enemy, vaguely felt, not conceived, to be not only nature, but also other people, ideas, other ways, forces and beings. The enemy against which the Eurocentric man competes is everything that he is not. Progress in staying ahead; it is defeating the present.

The way in which history and time are perceived is critical to the Eurocentric understanding of the meaning of human experience. The idea of progress both creates Western history and simultaneously stands outside history, becoming an absolute in Eurocentric thought. The assumption of lineal time is an ontological prerequisite to the idea of progress. Evolutionary development, an ingredient of the idea, necessitates that points be connected; this is the conceptual function of the line. The written word is the medium of the line, and it provides evidence to the Western mind of progress, because words accumulate. In this way "more" becomes "better". Progress is an argument for the discarding of the past. The concept of newness does not mean new in the sense that a new-born is new; it means different from that which has been seen before, whereas newness in the Afrocentric sense, even a new-born baby is not really new as it is a timeless recreation of man.

5.5. IMPLICATIONS OF AFROCENTRISM AND EUROCENTRISM TO SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

Specific areas in which speaker credibility would interact with the Afrocentric and Eurocentric world views are proposed and examined. It should be noted, however, that not all the dimensions of world view have implications for speaker credibility applying equally both in Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism. It is likely that the use of language will be influenced particularly by the axiological part of world view. Language could be expressive and direct or soft and indirect. Individualist audiences prefer precise, direct and even overstated and exaggerated linguistic forms. In contrast, communalist audiences prefer less self-assertive, direct, hard or plain language. Thus, the preferred word-textures for Eurocentric audiences would be different from the preferred word-textures for Afrocentric audiences.

5.5.1. Implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric epistemology

Since, cultural schemata differ in their distribution in populations, Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences would have their respective matrices of cultural schemata. As framing mechanisms, schemata would likely provide lexical items and grammatical categories and rules for Afrocentric audiences, and as prototypic, stereotypic, or generic representations of concepts, they would serve as standards for evaluating the goodness-of-fit of the persuasive speaker.

From their role schemata include information about broad social categories, such as age, sex, race and occupation, Afrocentric audiences would have expectations of a persuasive speaker not uninfluenced by these social categories. These categories would possibly define the appropriateness of the speaker for the topic and the occasion, or simply the general appropriateness of the speaker.

The internal logic systems differ from one cultural orientation to another, primarily according to the emphasis they place on intuition, rationalism, and empiricism as means of gaining knowledge (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:40). Afrocentric audiences are said to be primarily contextual thinkers, or holistic thinkers. Since, in contextual thinking, the world of man and the world of nature are inseparable and interdependent, and that external order of law, truth, and doctrine lie beyond and within the mysterious system operation of the universe, there is generally a fascination about power. This fascination about power could imply that Afrocentric audiences would perceive as credible a speaker who appears to possess power. This means that for Afrocentric audiences, power would be an element of speaker credibility.

The predominant contextual thinking mode for Afrocentric audiences means that for these audiences, good speaking would require linking what has happened in the past and subordinating the mind and spirit to the generally accepted notions and utilising concrete forms. This seems to be a performance-based definition of good communication, in which case, it could be hypothesised that speaker credibility would then be defined in artistic terms. This suggests that, for Afrocentric audiences, the persuasive speaking context could, perhaps should, be dramatised, and should have a wide inclusion of a variety of factors.

In contrast, the mechanistic thinking style of audiences with Eurocentric orientation implies that only what is directly and immediately relevant to the point of argument would be considered significant. Since, for Eurocentric audiences, what is important is the clarity of a bare "logical" conclusion only in terms of the points that are immediately "relevant" for consideration at that material time, the persuasive situation would not have to, or even should not, be dramatised.

Rather, for Eurocentric audiences, the use of linear argument style, such as one found in typical Western-styled courts of law, would constitute a credibility criterion. Eurocentric audiences would be persuaded by a point-by-point Toulminian calm argument presentation. As Infante *et al.* (1997:527) observe, "Western theories of argumentation suggest that opinions of others on controversial issues should be verbally attacked with data, warrants, and claims if we disagree with them. These theories explain how to construct arguments and counterarguments during conflict situations." With its emphasis on the supremacy of reason, Eurocentric ontology holds to the so-called scientific method. The belief that truth is out there awaiting to be discovered, means that the quality of the means to the discovery of the truth, that is, the use of the "correct" logical sequences would constitute an element of speaker credibility for Eurocentric audiences.

Audiences with an Afrocentric orientation, on the other hand, would prefer dynamic presentations, both as a sign of the speaker's competence and sincerity in what he is speaking about and as a dramatic context. In this case, dynamism is a credibility element for both Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences, for the former a desired quality for the speaker to exercise, and for the latter an undesirable speaking quality.

Cognitive dissonance assumes high uncertainty avoidance. For Afrocentric audiences, with a high power distance index, one would expect authority-based credibility assessment to be more pronounced than for low power distance index. Both perceived vicarious relationship between the audience and speaker's personal orientation towards the audience would be important for high power distance index audiences. The formation and application of speaker credibility by audiences with an Afrocentric orientation would, therefore, be in terms of the development of those perceptions. In this case, the speaker's concern should include the development of such perceptions, before the speaking event, preferably to characterise his public standing. This would appear to undermine any chances of peer-peer persuasion. However, peer-peer persuasion could still take place but perhaps in terms other than the sources of speaker credibility.

For Eurocentric audiences there would still be some authority-based credibility, but possibly more on the authority of competence than authority of position. In this regard, credibility formation would proceed from the demonstration of competence in the subject matter at the moment of speaking.

The emphasis on, and concern for, clarity and directness, truth telling and straight talk of Eurocentric audiences would likely be part of their definition of speaker credibility. Where people in a given orientation "feel" their way to truth, a "nonlogical" demonstration of the truth may not jeopardise perceptions of being credible. The orientation towards "rational" analysis of Eurocentric audiences would have the quality of argumentation as an element of speaker credibility. Since persuading Eurocentric audiences requires the use of argumentation and discussion, the use of warrants, the identification and use of evidence, the identification and use of reliable sources, and the identification and application of appropriate amplification devices, would be elements of credibility. To this end, Eurocentric audiences are strongly logocentric.

5.5.2. Implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric axiology

Afrocentric axiology would have implications for both persuasive communication and speaker credibility formation and application, particularly through its communalism aspect. Communication would be a matter of human interrelationships, engaged principally to confirm, solidify, and promote communal social order and secondarily to maintain or improve interpersonal relationships. The conventions of communicating are constrained through normative, practical or logical force (or some combination of these) sanctioned by cultural ethos. With regard to the role of axiological orientations in influencing the persuasive process, one might find differences among Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences in terms of the value for value-similarity between the audience and the speaker. For the Afrocentric audience, similar others would naturally be preferred and listened to. Obviously, the message would have to be seen as a message for the people and not the people for the message.

The incoming message symbols and the total context within which the persuasive process takes place is a specific case of reality. The construction and interpretation of this reality is the very heart of the influence of world view. A number of areas of interaction between persuasive communication and the axiological dimension of world view could be identified, and these are: Similarity between the audience and the persuasive speaker; rhetorical forms, styles (e.g., whether high-context or low-context) and strategies; and preferences in argumentation systems.

One of the classic findings in persuasion research is that communicators are more likely to change the attitudes of audiences if they are believed to be similar, rather than dissimilar, to those audiences they seek to influence and that similarity between the persuasive source and the audience enhances persuasion, especially if they are similar in their axiological orientations. Within persuasive communication, audiences will tend to accord higher credibility to persuasive sources whose *values* are perceived as being similar to their own. It would be expected, for example, that Afrocentric audiences would expect the speaker to be similar to them, personally interested in the welfare of the audience, and displaying an orientation towards community life. An inclusive, "we", perspective would be expected of the speaker. These expectations would then constitute the critical standard for which Afrocentric audiences would judge a persuasive speaker.

For Afrocentric audiences, communication competence would be seen in terms of the extent to which communication functions by the supremacy of the community, the value of the individual, the sanctity of authority, and respect for old age.

The value of belonging to the community, and the unity that it sustains, the selfless service it generates, and the honour that it inspires, means that Afrocentric audiences might consider the persuasive speaker in light of his public image in terms of his co-orientation with the community and his contribution to the unity and sustenance of the community. The selfless service that should characterise community belongingness could mean that, for Afrocentric audiences, the vicarious qualities of the speaker might be part of their speaker credibility scale.

The importance of a person's contribution to the community through various forms of direct and indirect contributions to promote or to improve the community's socio-cultural and economic condition could constitute a credibility yardstick, one of the public image of a speaker. A favourable public delineation of the speaker along these lines would give him a "licence" to influence the audience, and conversely, an unfavourable public view in terms of a person's contribution to the well being of the community would "deny" him that licence to influence the community as a persuasive speaker.

Failure in upholding and standing for the virtues of the sanctity of life would mean that a person's public image is destroyed permanently. Being related to a murderer, for example, and consequently being a target of scorn, sarcasm, and social repulsion would mean that a person with such a background would not be considered credible by Afrocentric audiences.

As the individual's value finds expression through honesty and trust in interpersonal and group relationships and charity, it means that a person who is known, or is seen, to possess these qualities would be a credible speaker before an Afrocentric audience.

Since the worth of individuals involves the community by being fair, truthful, honest, and trustworthy with one's neighbours, and since antisocial behaviours such as dishonesty, cheating, stealing, false accusations, and lying, are serious social crimes, Afrocentric audiences would rate speakers with such qualities as noncredible. The converse is also true: A person who is known to be considerate, to show positive concern for the underprivileged, to abhor selfishness, to love others, to respect life, and not to be connected to any antisocial behaviour, would be considered credible.

A person's leadership position - whether parental, formal, or opinion - would accord him credibility, so long as such a person is known to conduct himself in manner worthy of his role in the community. The authority that goes hand in hand with the leadership position would also earn one a favourable credibility rating, especially as leadership is often associated with divine will and seen as divine representation.

The expectation that whenever a situation arises that calls for co-ordinated group action the oldest person around would assume the leadership position in that situation and to dutifully represent the community, means that there is a sense in which age-based speaker appropriateness would be credibility element.

Since the elderly are seen as the true repositories of wisdom and knowledge, and age is normally accorded authority, Afrocentric audiences would consider an elderly speaker generally more credible. This, however, would depend on other factors, in particular, on whether the topic calls for elderly (and perhaps traditional) wisdom. The case might be different if, for example, technical expertise is required, and the audience perceives the elderly speaker as not having such expertise. But, if a speaker is known or perceived to be highly wise, that speaker would be rated as more credible than another elderly person who is known or perceived not to possess wisdom.

The Afrocentric orientation towards sharing material and non-material resources such as time, information and new skills, and the tendency towards avoiding embarrassing encounters that might cause others to feel they have lost status, affection, or respect could be part of the audience's expectations of a speaker. These humane attributes that the persuasive speaker is to have are foundational qualities that may not necessarily have to be demonstrated through the speech or the speaking process. As communalists, Afrocentric audiences' preference for indirect communication would contribute to the evaluative criteria for the persuasive speaker in terms of the speaking style.

For Eurocentric audiences, speaking with a dialect or with poor grammar or expression would result to a low rating of the speaker credibility. These would, therefore, be important credibility elements for Eurocentric audiences.

Since "persuasive communication employs argumentation, which depends for both the premises and its entire development, on which is accepted; that which is acknowledged as true, as normal and probable, as valid" (Okabe, 1983:22) and value assumptions influence the instruments of rhetoric that the speaker uses for eliciting the intended response from the listeners, the axiological orientation of the audience would also influence the modes of argumentation.

5.5.3. Implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric chronemics

In the monochronic time orientation, people are urged to do one thing at a time and, characteristically, monochronics have high need to see things completed and are dissatisfied with loose ends. With their high degree of time-orientedness, monochronics would be concerned with schedules, orderliness and a short punctuality range. The possession of these qualities by the speaker might, therefore, contribute to his being perceived as credible. The short punctuality range and the orientation towards precise keeping of time means that monochronic audiences might use the speaker's value for, and use of, time as credibility criteria. The value for, and orientation towards, planned use of time would mean that non-planned use of time could result to unfavourable perceptions, and could lead to a low credibility rating.

Since polychronic audiences are event-oriented and are concerned primarily with the quality of the event, including what happens and who takes part, the quality of speaking is likely to be a speaker credibility criterion.

5.5.4. Implications of perception for speaker credibility

Culture's influence on perception would extend to such appeals as the perception and judgement of beauty. In some cultural orientations beauty or handsomeness would mean being slender, muscular, well-groomed, neat, and without unusually obvious features. In contrast, people in other cultural orientations might perceive plump people as beautiful and slender people as sickly and unhealthy. This proposition could be extended here to say that cultural orientations would have notions, schema, or perceptual categories of the public speaker, public speaking, and images of good speaking or good speakers.

Thus, the influence of the perceptual dimension of world view on persuasive communication would extend to the perception of paralanguage. Dodd (1998:148) describes paralanguage as "that set of audible sounds that accompany oral language to augment its meaning. In other words, speech carries symbolic cues, not only through verbal and nonverbal cues, but also through vocal qualities to which various linguistic systems ascribe meaning".

These paralinguistic cues include pitch, loudness, rate, intonation, tone and dialect, and are crucial in the creation of meaning. Through pitch, for example, the speaker would lead the audience to create varying shades of meaning to his words. Since pitch moderates the audience's creation of meaning, a speech without inflections is like writing without punctuation, and, as such, deprives the audience of important clues to the meaning of the speaker's words (Samovar *et al.*, 1981:178). The paralinguistic cues provide information with which the audience makes judgements about the speaker's personality, emotional state, and rhetorical activity. Whether the speaker pleads, commands, or pacifies, the intensity level of his voice provides the audience with important clues to the speaker's intent. However, what aspects of paralanguage are perceived by an audience and in what way they are perceived would depend on the cultural orientation of the audience at hand.

The perceptual dimension would also influence judgements people make about others on the basis of, among other things, personal appearance. Perception of appearance leads to inferences, albeit faulty ones, about the other's intelligence, or social status, or profession. In ways that are both rational and irrational, people react to other people's appearance. However, judgements about appearance are culturally-determined, since interpretative schema for non-verbal behaviour vary across cultural orientations (Dodd, 1998:134) and, consequently, cultural orientations would have different standards for the judgement of beauty or appropriate appearance. One could thus hypothesise the existence of various perceptual categories of paralanguage.

5.5.5. Implications of Afrocentric and Eurocentric ontology

The typical Eurocentric traits of optimism, receptivity to change, emphasis on the future rather than the past or present, faith in the ability to control the environment, and faith in the perfectibility of the person would be part of the credibility criteria for Eurocentric audiences. The belief in the perfectibility of the human nature would also mean that Eurocentric audiences might rate the speaker along a conceptual "imperfect-perfect" continuum. This could mean that personal weaknesses could come in the limelight and would, therefore, constitute a (negative) credibility element. It seems that Eurocentric audiences would subject the speaker to moral and subject competence criteria - since the speaker ought to be changing for the better.

5.6. SUMMARY

An important way to understand audiences is world view orientation. In this chapter, after evaluating attempts to differentiate Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, the two world view orientations were elucidated and ways in which they each might influence speaker credibility formation and application were deduced.

The work of Van der Walt (1997) was reviewed and, as informative as it was, substantial flaws were identified. These flaws include his comparison between traditional Africa and modern West as samples of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, respectively; presuming synonymity between Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism and black people and white people, respectively; and his implied evolutionary notion in which it seems to him that all people and all things are in the process of evolving to become Western. It is posited that the notion that Afrocentric world view is necessarily associated with blackness, or that Eurocentric world view necessarily associated with whiteness, is untenable.

Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism were contrasted, using the epistemological, axiological, chronemic and ontological dimensions of world view as the frame of analysis. The analysis indicated that, although some thinkers reflect reservations about the validity of an Afrocentric world view, there seems strong affirmation for the existence of what could be regarded as an Afrocentric world view. Afrocentrism is the centring of one's analysis and perceptions based on values of classical African civilisations - values that emphasise mankind's oneness with nature, spirituality, and communalism. A distinct set of cosmological, ontological, epistemological, and axiological attributes of the Afrocentric world view were identified. Eurocentrism refers to a European-oriented perspective, which is premised on classical Greek civilisations. The Eurocentric orientation is segmented, materialist, and individualistic, as well as cherishes competition. Eurocentrism also has its peculiar contents for the epistemological, axiological, chronemic and ontological dimensions.

The perceptual dimension was not used in the analysis because it seemed to overlap with the other four dimensions, and that literature is lean in terms of specific perceptual categories for the Afrocentric and the Eurocentric world views. Nevertheless, the perceptual categories would contribute to the formation of speaker credibility at two levels. The first level is at the perceptual categories that Afrocentric and Eurocentric audience use to perceive speakers, whether, for example, along interpersonal interactions, opinions and beliefs, abilities, knowledge, and cognitive-emotional and interpersonal styles. The second level is the level of application of the perceptual categories against the speaker, in which, also influenced by the specific expectations of the audience, meaning is endowed to the visual dimensions of perception such as the qualities of colour, shape and brightness. Significance is then given to the various aspects of the speaker that the audience perceives.

The unique and important perceptual categories of Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences imply that an audience's perceptual frames of reference would influence the audience's interpretation of the message symbols, the elements of persuasion, the person persuading them, and the total rhetorical drama. On the perception and judgement of beauty, Eurocentric audiences might be keen regarding beauty or handsomeness, which would probably mean being slender, muscular, well-groomed, neat, and without unusually obvious features. Afrocentric audiences will perhaps perceive slender people as sickly and unhealthy and, therefore, unattractive, hence not credible.

Values develop standards and guidelines that establish appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in a society, values determine how people ought to behave. Consequently, Afrocentric and Eurocentric axiology would have expectations and demands for a persuasive speaker. The respective Afrocentric and Eurocentric notions of right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, true and false, positive and negative would be part of what constitutes the respective judgement scales for a persuasive speaker for the two orientations. They would lead to certain judgements about social reality, seen in terms of qualities such as usefulness, goodness, aesthetics, need satisfaction ability, and the production of pleasure.

In processing arguments and assessing argumentation schemes, Afrocentric audiences would more likely prefer more indirect and inclusive language and arguments as well as holistic and value-spiced argumentation. Afrocentric audiences might credit the speaker for his identification with the message. In processing arguments and assessing argumentation schemes, Eurocentric audiences would more likely prefer direct and exclusive language and arguments, especially "value-free" argumentation. Eurocentric would credit the speaker for appearing to be detached from, rather than identifying with, the message.

The next chapter presents empirical data on how Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism interact with the formation and application of speaker credibility in a persuasive speaking situation.

CHAPTER 6

AUDIENCE WORLD VIEW AND SPEAKER CREDIBILITY

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This study is about the impact of audience world view on speaker credibility formation and application in persuasive communication. Having articulated a speaker-centred theory of persuasion and a holistic conception of speaker credibility, having proposed a componential model of audience world view, and having elucidated the contents of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as world view orientations, the interaction between audience world view and credibility formation was empirically investigated.

The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the process and the findings of the empirical investigation. The following aspects are addressed:

- the research design used in the study is described, together with the research instruments, the sample and the procedure of the experimental process.
- the data analysis process is described and the interpretation of the findings is presented.
- a summary of the findings is given.

6.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

A scientific investigation would follow some research design. A research design defines the number and type of variables being studied and their relationship to one another (Spector, 1981:7). Research designs are either experimental or non-experimental, depending on the degree to which the researcher controls that which is being studied. Whereas non-experimental designs utilise observational methods and involve the collection of data with far less manipulation of the conditions or the subjects, the experimental design occurs when the subjects and conditions being studied are manipulated by the researcher (Spector, 1981:8, 9).

In this study, data were collected through experimentation. To provide some theoretical context to the data collection, analysis and interpretation, the experimental research design is discussed. Brown and Melamed (1990:5) suggest that an experimental design chosen ought to be structurally congruent with the research questions and compatible with the available resources.

An experiment is the primary means by which cause-effect relationships can be established between certain events in the environment and the occurrence of particular forms of behaviour (Keppel & Saufley, 1980:3; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:62; Keppel, 1991) and it constitutes the highest level of empirical investigation (Wright, 1976:42). When carried out properly, the controlled experiment is possibly the most powerful design for seeking answers to research questions available to the behavioural scientist (Westley, 1989:200). A true experiment consists of a set of hypotheses, the treatment conditions, the dependent variable and subjects (Keppel & Saufley, 1980:4). The requirement is that the particular treatment conditions chosen should be capable of testing the research hypotheses.

The experiment is then conducted and data are collected. The outcomes of the experiment are summarised by means of statistical indices and procedures and evaluating the status of the research hypotheses. The hypotheses are set out on the basis of the findings of previous studies, previous observations, or deductions from theory, to prove that a certain line of reasoning is correct or incorrect. The treatment conditions refer to the manipulation(s) specified by the hypotheses, or the independent variable(s), and the behaviour observed in conjunction with the manipulation of the independent variable(s) constitutes the dependent variable.

When the hypotheses have been specified and the independent and dependent variable(s) identified, the design and subjects of the experiment are worked out and followed in the experimentation process[1]. A classic experimental manipulation of an independent variable is to divide the subjects (Ss) into two different experimental conditions, one receiving the treatment and the other being a control group, but one could also manipulate an independent variable by exposing it to the experimental groups at varying levels or in varying forms (Frey *et al.*, 1991:157).

The outcomes of the statistical tests of the research hypotheses are either assimilated in the theory that generated the hypotheses originally or the creation of a theoretical explanation if none is available in the literature. In this reconstructive phase, the facts that were not known before the experiment was conducted are now integrated into the research literature. If the experiment was conducted to test a theory and the outcome of the experiment is favourable to the theory, new tests for the theory may be proposed. If the outcome is negative, the adequacy of the experiment and the possible influence on the outcome are first discussed. If it appears that the experimental procedures were

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[1] For a useful elaboration on experimental designs and the ways in which they differ, see Keppel and Saufley (1980:6, 7).

generally valid, further tests for the theory could then be suggested, the theory discussed and, possibly, a revision of the theory suggested.

Experiments could be laboratory, taking place in a setting created by the researcher, or field, taking place in the subjects' natural environment. In the laboratory situation, the researcher is able to manipulate the independent variables relatively easily, assign Ss randomly to experimental conditions, control for the influence of extraneous variables, and measure subjects' behaviour (Westley, 1989:202; Frey *et al.*, 1991:163).

Laboratory experiments would, however, minimise external validity, since Ss might respond differently than they would in natural settings. Field experiments, on the other hand, are often conducted to take advantage of particular situations or events, such as campaigns. Frey *et al.* (1991:164) point out that the quality of experimental research is determined not by whether it takes place in the laboratory or in the field, but by the amount of control the researcher exercises and that, typically, while laboratory experiments maximise internal validity, field experiments maximise external validity.

An experimental researcher has at his disposal a number of experimental research designs, which could be categorised under true experimental designs, quasi-experimental designs, and pre-experimental designs (see e.g., Kerlinger, 1973, 1986; Dooley, 1984; Frey *et al.*, 1991). These categories are distinguished according to whether the independent variable is manipulated or observed, whether random assignment is used, and the types of experimental groups created. Full experiments are most controlled, with the independent variable manipulated and the Ss randomly assigned to experimental conditions; pre-experimental designs are least controlled, with no attempt to establish equivalence between the treatment group and any comparison group. Pre-experimental designs are pseudo-experimental designs, as they do not allow the researcher to rule out competing explanations for changes in the dependent variables (Huck *et al.,* 1974:227).

Quasi-experimental designs, on the other hand, are often a suitable substitute for full experimental designs, as the latter are often unsuitable or undesirable, especially in natural settings (Frey *et al.*, 1991:168). A quasi-experimental design resembles an experimental design but there are factors operating that would make a true experiment impossible (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Since the present study was not assessing a causality situation, that is, either an attitudinal shift in the audience caused by the speech, or the rating of the speaking, nor did it have control groups, to that extent, it used a quasi-experimental design. As Huck *et al.* (1974:301, 302) observe, "generally, true experimental designs can have greater control over internal threats than over external threats, while quasi-experimental designs have greater control over external threats to validity". In quasi-experimental designs, a treatment may or may not be manipulated, different experimental conditions may or may not be created, and random assignment of Ss is not used when there are multiple experimental groups.

Experimental research accomplishes a number of functions (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:72). Generally, besides its capacity to reveal (to some extent) how things get to be the way they are, experimental research is used in the context of verification and hypothesis testing as well as in the context of discovery (Henshel, 1980). But in a typical one-shot experiment, experimental research also could be used to test causal patterns in which changes in one variable lead relatively quickly to changes in another as well as establish which one variable precedes which other variable. Experimental research could provide empirical reference points to help pinpoint a theoretical relationship at a moment in time.

Against this theoretical background, the data collection process is described, presenting the research instruments, the sample and sub-groups, the experimentation procedures and the interpretation of the findings.

6.2.1. Research instruments

Four research instruments were developed and used; a world view questionnaire (WVQ), a world view index (WVI), a semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility (SDSC) and a persuasive speech (PS). The process through which each of these instruments was developed and the ultimate content and structure of each one of them are discussed.

6.2.1.1. World view questionnaire (WVQ) and World view index (WVI)

Following the conceptual definition of world view advanced in chapter 4, and the subsequent delineation of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as world view orientations, a battery of possible scales for measuring the epistemological, axiological, chronemic and ontological dimensions[2] was compiled from the characteristics of each of these world view dimensions. A total of 106 statements were obtained and used to construct the WVQ (see Appendix 6.01). The WVQ made provision for the Ss to indicate their year of study, qualification for which they were studying, their age category, the primary language spoken at home, and their country of citizenship. To measure the different dimensions of a multi-dimensional construct such as world view, separate instruments for each dimension are required (Smith, 1988:60), however, for easy administration,

[2] The perceptual dimension concerns that internal process by which people select, evaluate and organise stimuli from external surroundings. The perceptual dimension overlaps with the other four dimensions, and literature is lean in terms of specific perceptual categories for the Afrocentric and the Eurocentric world views. This dimension was, therefore, not investigated.

these instruments were combined to make one larger instrument, the WVQ. The scales were arranged in a five-point scale such that for positive statements, the "strongly disagree" option would be scored as a 1 and the "strongly agree" option as a 5. Likewise, to reduce the probability of response bias, the WVQ contained approximately an equal number of positively phrased and negatively phrased statements (Smith, 1988:60).

The WVQ was administered to about 600 students in hostels and classes selected at random from the student population at the university. From these, 467 duly completed questionnaires were returned. Of the 467 respondents to the WVQ[3], 40.5% were first year students, 14.3% second years students, and 13.9%, 12.6%, and 8.8% were third, fourth and fifth year students, respectively. The rest 9.9% comprised of sixth year, seventh year, masters and doctoral students, as well as those who did not indicate their year of study.

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (64.5%) were bachelors degree students; 19.3% and 8.8% were HED and honours degree students, respectively. The smallest number (3%) was that of masters and doctoral students.

Nearly a half (47.5%) of the respondents were between 18-20 years of age and about half as many (24.8%) between 21-23 years of age. About 14% were in the 24-29 years age bracket, and much fewer (about 8%) were 30 years or older. Less than 1% of the respondents were below 18 years.

The largest and second largest numbers of the respondents were Afrikaans (44.5%) and Tswana (12.4%) speaking and almost 11% of the respondents were English speaking. Other language groups represented in the sample were Southern Sotho (9.0%), Sotho (7.1%), Xhosa (3.9%), Zulu (2.8%), Venda (1.9%), and Swati (0.2%). The "others" category (3.4%) comprised of primarily non-South African languages, namely, Chewa, French, Gogo, Italian, Ndebele, Polish, Portuguese, Shona, Spanish and Swahili.

As expected, the vast majority (96.1%) were South Africans. Other respondents came from Namibia (4), Democratic Republic of Congo (3), Zimbabwe (3), Poland (2), Tanzania (2), Kenya (1), Lesotho (1), Italy (1) and Malawi (1).

The scores of the WVQ were keyed in a computer programme. A series of item analyses were done using the Statistica programme (StatSoft, 1996; Cohen, 1977, 1988). Box and Whisker plots (Steyn *et al.*, 1994:155) for the items in each world view dimension were examined as well as the final communality estimates from a factor analysis. Lower cut-

[3] For a summary of the demographics of the respondents to the WVQ, see Appendix 6.05.

off points for communalities were set as follows: 0.53 for the axiological dimension, 0.48 for the chronemic and ontological dimensions, and 0.35 for the epistemological dimension. Items with communality estimates lower than the criteria in the respective dimensions were dropped. Item-total correlations were checked in the first run and it was decided to drop items that had $r < 0.024$, including $r < 0$.

A second run of item analyses was executed with the remaining items. Items with negative item-total correlation values were excluded. From this process, a 48-item WVI was obtained (see Appendix 6.02), with a high reliability (Cronbach, 1951; Kerlinger, 1973), of $\alpha = 0.82$ for the WVI, and $\alpha = 0.72$, $\alpha = 0.57$, $\alpha = 0.62$, and $\alpha = 0.52$ for, respectively, the axiological, ontological, chronemic and the epistemological dimension. For the individual dimensions, the Cronbach α values were, as expected, low, on account of the relatively small numbers of the items for each dimension, and not necessarily to suggest that the reliability of the instrument to measure the construct was correspondingly low, since the more items on the test, the more reliable it is (Dooley, 1984:61). Strong construct validity implies that the instrument would actually measure the proposed dimensions of world view and that these dimensions would be measured accurately (West, 1994:162; Bailey, 1989:69; Smith, 1988:48; Carmine & Zeller, 1979:12). Provision was made for the Ss to indicate their year of study, qualification for which they were studying, their age category, their gender, the primary language spoken at home, and their country of citizenship.

6.2.1.2. Semantic differential for assessing speaker credibility (SDSC)

Since understanding of the research procedures of the present study could be dependent upon some understanding of the rather complex SD technique, a brief discussion of the technique seems necessary. The SD was developed by Osgood and his co-workers (1957) to measure the connotative meaning of any stimulus. As it will become clear in the discussion, although Osgood *et al.* (1957) proposed specific scales for using to constitute SDs, the value of their work is more on the technique itself, not in those specific rating scales. Granting the utility[4] of the SD technique and the suitability of

[4] Cronkhite and Liska (1976; 1980) are critical of the factor analytic approach to source credibility research. They claim that the rating scales used in factor analytic studies were generally selected haphazardly, sometimes from the researchers' own imaginations, but more frequently from previous studies, and that the factor analytic research paradigm severely alienates the construct of credibility from the process in which it participates. From a functionalist view of communication, they contend that "people choose in the process of persuasion with others who are most likely to satisfy needs and achieve goals which are most salient and important at the moment of choice" (italicisation deleted), (1980:103) and that the construct of credibility simply fails to cover all that is important about the participants in the process of persuasion. The basic thrust of their argument is that if factor analysis research were done correctly, true dimensions of source credibility would be found. Discounting the claims made by Cronkhite and Liska, McCroskey and Young (1981:29) argue that much of the factor analytic work has been done properly, except that often the problem is the distortion of the construct prior to the collection

factor analytic procedures, a theoretical context of the technique and the procedures is provided[5].

Since 1949, extensive attention has been directed towards the measurement of source credibility. Haiman's (1949) study on the effect of credibility on persuasion views source credibility as being composed of the dimensions of reputation and competence. Following Haiman's rather crude measurement of the credibility construct, subsequent efforts to measure source credibility, with attention to both the construct and its measurement, lag for over a decade, during which time the work of Osgood *et al.* (1957) on the measurement of meaning appears. Since source credibility is then conceived as a perception held by the audience about the speaker, and since theory and definition suggest multi-dimensionality, Osgood's work is naturally extended via factor analysis to empirically determine the components of source credibility (McCroskey & Young, 1981:25).

Following these earliest attempts to measure source credibility, the SD technique and factor analytic procedures increasingly assume prominence in the study and measurement of the credibility construct. In a doctoral dissertation at the University of Wisconsin entitled "An experimental study on the interaction of artistic and non-artistic ethos in persuasion", Andersen (1961) develops SD scales designed to measure source credibility. Purportedly, the SD scales tap the perceived authoritativeness and dynamism of the speaker. McCroskey (1966; see also McCroskey & Young, 1981:34) report that both Likert-type and SD-type scales for measuring source credibility prove to be useful for measuring the speaker's competence and character, particularly in assessing public figures. Berlo *et al.* (1969) provides scales in SD format to measure safety, qualification and dynamism, as source credibility dimensions.

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of data. McCroskey and Young (1981:30) contend that the problem, if any, would be in terms of operationalisation, since "if a concept is not clearly defined, and a research does not closely adhere to that definition, massive amounts of data and sophisticated computer resources cannot lead to the conclusion that one dimension or another exists" (cf. Infante *et al.*, 1983). Tucker (1971:300) in a theoretical essay, maintains that the utility of factor analytic procedures for isolating underlying dimensions of constructs such as speaker credibility is supported. Bailey (1989:359) explains that the strength of the SD is in its ability to obtain an indirect or underlying measure of a concept, without biasing the Ss's answers through questioning. Its strength also lies in its ability to measure the underlying, even subconscious, feelings of the Ss about a particular concept or word. McCroskey and Richmond (1989:165) mention two major advantages of using measures based on bipolar scales: these scales tend to be highly reliable and valid, if properly developed; and they consume little Ss's time so that more items can be measured at one sitting.

[5] Numerous sources provide comprehensive treatment on the theory and method of semantic differential as well as on factor analysis, to which the reader is referred, e.g., Snider & Osgood, 1969; Kerlinger, 1973:566-581; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:144-147.

The SD typically consists of a set of 7-point scales which are anchored at each end by adjectival pairs. The particular adjectives are chosen on the basis of the underlying dimensions of meaning that are of interest to the researcher. Some researchers employ the adjectival pairs used by Osgood *et al.* (1957) representing the evaluative, potency and activity dimensions. The use of SD would require a researcher to identify the particular adjectives on the basis of those which best represent statistically determined dimensions that underlie the domain of interest to the researcher (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:145). This, however, applies where the researcher presupposes such dimensions and wishes to investigate the interaction of these dimensions with some other social aspect. Where the researcher seeks to explore the existence of dimensions pertaining to a particular concept in a particular socio-cultural context, it would obviously be necessary to develop a long and conceptually broad list of adjectival pairs, from which, after the factor analysis, both the existing dimensions and the pairs that define them are identified.

The development of an SD presupposes a semantic space, a hypothetical frame of reference consisting of numerous theoretical axes. Any point in the semantic space is defined by the ordinates of all the axes. Whereas the point of origin in the semantic space represents complete meaninglessness, the meaningfulness of any concept is defined in terms of its position relative to the origin. The farther a concept is from the origin, the more meaningful it is, and the proximity of any two concepts defines their similarity or dissimilarity. Also, semantic differentiation is related to direction and distance from the origin; direction depending on the alternative polar terms and distance depending on the extremity of scale positions checked.

Within this conceptual framework, as many adjectives as possible and their connotative opposites are identified, and each pair is assumed to represent a straight line function through the origin. To define the semantic space with maximum efficiency, a minimum number of orthogonal axes which exhaust its dimensionality has to be obtained, and this would be through factor analysis (Snider & Osgood, 1969:64; Kerlinger, 1986). The subject places scores for the concept against a set of alternatives, localising the concept in his semantic space.

The SD technique assumes similarity of the respondents, that thinking in opposites is natural and common, and that adjectival pairs are used because the root meanings of polar terms determine judgements. Finally, the polar terms are used under the view that they are equidistant and pass through the origin.

Although the SD might be seen as a general technique, there is in fact no one SD that is applicable everywhere and, therefore, a SD has to be established for each case, situation or purpose. Kerlinger (1973:566) notes that any concept has a common cultural meaning since, "people must to a great extent share behavioural and verbal definitions of things" and it is these definitions of things that an SD is used to make explicit. Since "meanings vary in some unknown number of dimensions" (Osgood, 1957: *In* Snider & Osgood, 1969:26), different people would possess different dimensions that describe persuasive sources, and these dimensions could be determined using the SD technique.

It is within this theoretical context in using the SD technique that the SDSC was constructed. Scales for measuring ethos, credibility and prestige were identified from literature and sifted. From Mbennah (1993:147, 148), 54 bipolar scales were selected, eight bipolar scales were selected from those in the McCroskey (1966) study to measure character and competence as these are taken to be adequate (McCroskey & Young, 1981:34), and six bipolar scales were selected from those used in the Applbaum and Anatol (1972) study. These 68 items constituted an SD which was pre-tested among 20 Ss from the population, who for purposes of facilitating useful feedback, were purposively chosen. Ambiguous or unclear items were dropped and a 56-item SD scale was obtained (see Appendix 6.03). To control response bias and order effects, the SD items were arranged such that some of them began with the positive adjective, and about an equal number of the items began with the negative adjective (Kerlinger, 1973:572; Smith, 1988:65), both orders were scattered throughout the scale. The Ss were asked to rank speaker's knowledge of the subject matter, personal appearance, ability to present the speech very well and moral character, scoring a 1 for the most important of these and a 4 for the least important of them. However, most Ss gave the same rating for more than one aspect. The scores from this section were thus considered invalid and were, therefore, excluded from the data analysis and interpretation. Provision was made for the Ss to indicate their year of study, qualification for which they were studying, their age category, primary language spoken at home, and their country of citizenship.

6.2.1.3. Persuasive speech (PS)

A persuasive speech (PS) on an issue that would be salient to the respondents was developed and used. At the time of the experimental work, there was a debate going on in the South African legislation system, in the media, and among various organisations in the country as well as in the general South African public, on whether or not smoking in public places should be restricted and tobacco advertising banned in South Africa. In view of the currency of that debate, it was assumed that the issue would be both familiar and pertinent to the listeners.

A PS was written essentially supporting the bill to ban tobacco advertising and to restrict the use of tobacco; appealing to the listeners to support that viewpoint, giving reasons why they should and suggestions how they could actively support the bill (see Appendix 6.04). Arguments were also included in the PS why the listener needed to consider the matter seriously, appealing to their feeling as well as citing authoritative sources.

Since the objective of the study was not to investigate the impact of the message or to find the role of audience-involvement in a topic in credibility formation, no scores on the message or topic involvement were collected. The speech was meant to trigger the audience's reaction to the speaker - in order to assess the subsequent credibility evaluations and the impact of the audience's world view on that audience's formation and application of speaker credibility.

6.2.2. Experiments

6.2.2.1. Sample

The sample comprised of students of a middle-sized university in South Africa. This sample was divided into Group 1 (N = 100), the composition of which was primarily black students attending an HED (Higher Education Diploma) class session and Group 2 (N = 97), which consisted primarily of white second and third year communication students. The study utilised the class sessions as a convenience sample[6]. Although it was not presumed that skin colour of the Ss necessarily represented one or other world view orientation, it was assumed that both Afrocentric and Eurocentric orientations would be found within the student population. The university was also chosen as a convenience sample. This sample was thus taken not as representative but as possible instances (Westley, 1989:214) of the two world view orientations. Students, on the other hand, were chosen in view of their availability and ability to respond to the relatively complex research instruments.

For the WVI sample[7] (N = 197), there was a large practically significant difference (Cohen, 1988) between experimental Group 1 (N = 100) and experimental Group 2 (N = 97) in terms of overall data, with Phi = 0.921 (see Appendix 6.06). There was also a large practically significant difference in terms of programme of study (bachelors degree, HED and honours) between the Group 1 and Group 2 (Phi = 0.94). There was,

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[6] Creswell (1994:127) indicates that the use of convenience samples is an acceptable research practice. He says that although random selection might be more desirable for generalising the results of a study to a population, a researcher may need to settle for a convenience sample if the researcher finds an entire group of individuals such as a class, an organisation or a family unit, is available to participate in the study. Also, a convenience sample could consist of volunteers who enlist to participate in a study.

[7] For a tabular summary of the demographics of respondents to the WVI, see Appendix 6.06. This WVI sample is essentially the same sample that completed the SDSC, but apparently 22 Ss walked out of the study after completing the WVI and, therefore, did not complete the SDSC. For a tabular summary of the demographics of the respondents to the SDSC, see Appendix 6.07.

however, a low (and negative) Phi-coefficient, suggesting that the gender category did not make a practical difference between the two sub-groups. In terms of language, there was a large practically significant difference between the sub-groups (Phi = 0.93). The large Phi-values tell one that the two sub-groups were quite different as far the biographical aspects are concerned. This might somewhat influence the results. However, the world view construct is so fundamental to human experience that it is quite possible, and rather likely, that the biographical characteristics of people would not significantly affect their world view orientation.

6.2.2.2. Procedure

This was a controlled study, using quasi-experimental procedures (Westley, 1989; Brown & Melamed, 1990; Keppel, 1991). Creswell (1994:135) proposes that in a research where the experimental design is used, the procedure of the experiment should be described in detail. The steps typically followed in experimental work as outlined by Borg and Gall (1989:679) were followed and are, therefore, used here as the framework for the description of the procedure. The quasi-experimental procedures were identical for Group 1 and Group 2, except that they were executed on different days within the same week.

For each group, a research supervisor explained to the Ss that there was a questionnaire to be completed as part of an on-going research in the School for communication and information studies at the university and asked for their co-operation. The WVI was administered to the Ss in each group and after completing the index, the group was randomly divided into two sub-groups, more or less balancing the distribution of females and males in each sub-group.

The sub-groups then listened, in separate classrooms, to the PS presented by a white speaker to the one sub-group and by a black speaker to the other. To collect the scores on the formation of speaker credibility, the SDSC was then administered to the sub-groups separately immediately after listening to the PS. The scores on the WVI and the SDSC were analysed by factor analyses and descriptive statistics and comparisons between the groups were made. The purpose of having a black speaker and a white speaker was to see whether the credibility dimensions by the groups were likely to be influenced by the skin-colour of the speaker and to balance this potential source of bias (if it were), since both speakers were rated by both groups. Multiple correlations between world view constructs and credibility constructs (Smith, 1988) planned initially could not be done because the two sets of data could not be merged[8]. Comparisons between the groups were done by comparing the means for both the world view dimensions and the speaker credibility dimensions, and effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) were computed.

6.3. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Factor analysis[9] performing a principal-component solution[10] (Kim & Mueller, 1978a, 1978b; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984; Dunteman, 1989) and a varimax orthogonal rotation[11] of the factor matrix (Kaiser, 1958) were selected and used throughout the analysis. The MINEIGEN default criterion, which was an eigenvalue equal 1.0, was kept as the cut-off for retaining factors. The scores on the pairs that began with the

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[8] The WVI and SDSC should have constituted a single scale in the first place. However, combining the two scales would have made the scale too long and could have resulted to lack of perceptual separation - the two scales should not appear to be related (Nuttin, 1974).

[9] In factor analysis of the scores on the adjectival pairs, every pair is correlated with every other pair. Factor analysis generally uses as input data a table containing correlationcoefficients, r, showing the correlations among all pairs or variables to be analysed (Bailey, 1989:353). The correlation coefficients, or loadings, establish items that could be clustered together because they apparently describe a particular underlying dimension. Factor analysis proceeds progressively, each time dropping pairs that have low loadings or load strongly on more than one factor, as that means that the pairs are, respectively, irrelevant or ambiguous in defining the concept under consideration. Mbennah (1993:139) explains that each pair defines a particular factor only to an extent, which implies that there is in each pair a part of its meaning domain that does not define a factor and is trimmed off in the process of differentiation. Thus, for instance, if at some stage a pair that is not relevant to the definition of any factor were introduced into the pairs being factor analysed, that pair would load strongly on a non-defining factor, or a trash basket.

[10] In interpreting these findings based on factor analytic procedures, one should bear in mind that principal component analysis rewrites the original set of variables into a new set of components that have a number of properties (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:415). The first principal component rewrites the original variables into a linear combination that accounts for the largest percentage of the total variance. It is, therefore, the single super-variable that accounts for the maximum possible variance in all the original variables. The second principal component would normally be essentially the same type of super-variable as the first, except that it operates on the variance in the data that remains after the removal of the variance attributable to the first principal component. Thus, the components are orthogonal, since there is no overlap between them. After the second principal component has been extracted, the third is computed from any remaining variables. The logic of the method is such that the first few components computed tend to account for much more of the total variance among Ss on the full set of variables than would be the case for an equal number of the original variables, chosen at random. The process of principal components analysis begins with the inter-correlation of all the variables. Then the components are computed, and the factor loadings of each variable on each component is computed. These loadings are the correlation between each variable and the new computed components. Each component is understood or interpreted in terms of the pattern of loadings. Typically, however, the components as first extracted from the correlations among the variables are not very interpretable. They are typically made interpretable by the process of rotation, orthogonally or obliquely, if the hypothesised super-variables (also called factors) are thought to be somewhat correlated in real life (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:419).

[11] One could use an oblique factor solution (cf. Tuppen, 1974) but an oblique solution is not desirable because, rather than refine the loadings, it provides the maximum number of dimensions at the expense of the clarity of the dimensions (Kerlinger, 1986:582). A varimax orthogonal rotation produces relatively higher loadings on fewer, hence clearer, dimensions and it was preferred for that reason.

negative adjective were reversed[12]. For a solution to be acceptable, it was required of each factor to have a minimum of two bipolar scales with their primary loadings on that factor. Where a factor had only one pair loading strongly on it, a cue pair, one that had a relatively strong second highest loading on the factor was considered. The results of the factor analyses and their implications to the hypotheses of the study are presented below under the respective data sets, namely, the world view dimensions of Group 1 (*see 6.3.1*), world view dimensions of Group 2 (*see 6.3.2*), speaker credibility dimensions formed by Group 1 (*see 6.3.3*), and speaker credibility dimensions formed by Group 2 (*see 6.3.4*).

6.3.1. World view dimensions of Group 1

In order to obtain the world view dimensions of Group 1, the group's scores on the WVI had to be factor analysed. The factors that were to be obtained from the factor analysis would be the world view dimensions of the group.

In a preliminary step, the scores on the 48 items were factor analysed, from which a 12-factor solution was obtained, accounting for 67% of the total variance. The dimensions were, however, not clear yet and 12 factors were considered too many (see Appendix 6.08). More importantly, it was decided to use the most discriminating items for both groups, with the hope that the best compromise for the greatest possible clarity of the factor structures for the two groups would be obtained. In view of these aspects, the 26 items obtained from the stepwise discriminant analysis (Appendix 6.12a, 6.12b) were factor analysed and eight (8) factors were retained (see Table 6.01 and Table 6.02; also see Appendix 6.08). Although this factor structure accounted for a smaller percentage of the variance (nearly 62%) and in some cases the loadings were lower, the factor structure itself was clearer.

Factor 1 is defined by (Q16) *I agree with the saying that "Hands wash each other", which means that people should help each other*, (Q14) *Making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and the blessings of the elderly and leaders*, (Q15) *Being in the community means being part of the community* and (Q11) *It is important to have harmony in my relations with other people*. This factor is communalism, hence an Afrocentric axiological orientation.

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[12] Factor analysis proceeds with the assumption that all the adjectival pairs through which the scores were obtained begin with the positive adjectives. Therefore, without this reversal the results of the factor analysis will be invalid. In order to obtain the scores as would be on the pairs when the pairs are arranged to begin with the positive adjective, these pairs are identified and the computer is programmed to read their scores, t, as 8-t (since it is on a 7-point scale).

Factor 2 is defined by (Q39) *Unknown forces control nature*, (Q41) *Everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival* and (Q40) *Although man tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature*. This factor might be called pessimism. It is supposedly an Afrocentric ontological dimension.

Factor 3 is defined by (Q1) *Obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary* and (Q5) *A person should be on his own and be self-reliant*. This factor is, therefore, individualism, hence, a Eurocentric axiological dimension.

Factor 4 is defined by items (Q37) *Basically man controls nature*, (Q47) *When something is true, I will see the reasons or its condition and actually prove that it is true* and (Q38) *Nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit*. This is a Eurocentric ontological dimension.

Table 6.01 Rotated factor pattern of world view dimensions of Group 1

Rotation Method: Varimax

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
Q16	0.77680	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q14	0.71419	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q15	0.70608	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q11	0.68512	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q19	0.50869	-0.43037	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	0.72215	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q41	.	0.65828	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q40	.	0.64575	.	.	.	.	0.32222	.
Q1	.	.	0.75444	.	.	.	.	.
Q5	.	.	0.68451	.	.	.	.	.
Q37	.	.	0.32405	0.69120	.	.	.	.
Q47	.	.	.	0.65917	.	.	.	.
Q38	.	.	.	0.64860	.	-0.40765	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	.	0.75596	.	.	.
Q44	.	.	0.32869	.	0.64159	.	.	.
Q29	.	0.35052	0.39441	.	0.54583	.	.	.
Q20	0.40690	.	.	.	-0.60065	.	.	.
Q43	.	.	.	.	.	0.75912	.	.
Q18	.	.	.	.	.	0.59736	.	0.35840
Q7	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.78433	.
Q4	0.30378	.	.	.	.	.	0.51285	0.44110
Q33	.	.	.	0.40082	.	0.42267	0.42550	.
Q46	.	0.40759	.	.	.	0.31880	-0.42817	.
Q3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.73420
Q2	.	.	0.44390	.	.	.	0.32551	0.49658
Q42	.	.	.	0.35035	0.31727	0.33587	.	0.36004

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
3.055335	2.164747	1.987891	1.976637	1.864017	1.811694	1.624113	1.502770

Table 6.02 Final communality estimates of factor pattern of world view dimensions of Group 1

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 15.987204

Q15	Q19	Q38	Q4	Q39	Q20	Q44	Q1	Q40
0.631533	0.643134	0.677631	0.578382	0.610300	0.628095	0.639898	0.646904	0.646899
Q7	**Q2**	**Q11**	**Q29**	**Q30**	**Q5**	**Q33**	**Q46**	**Q42**
0.647448	0.602554	0.545204	0.653165	0.655078	0.545392	0.581981	0.522262	0.527493
Q18	**Q3**	**Q14**	**Q47**	**Q37**	**Q16**	**Q41**	**Q43**	
0.626091	0.660392	0.583394	0.550286	0.621331	0.654030	0.653658	0.654670	

Factor 5 is defined by (Q30) *Nature and all living things in it are sacred*, (Q44) *People should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community*, (Q29) *Basically nature controls mankind* and (Q20) *Neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable* (with a negative loading value). This factor is not clear in that while the first (Q30) and third (Q29) items reflect an ontological dimension and, supposedly, an Afrocentric one, the second (Q44) and fourth (Q20) items reflect an axiological dimension, but whereas the second item reflects individualism, which is a Eurocentric axiological aspect, the fourth item reflects a reverse of communalism (because of the negative loading), hence individualism, which is a Eurocentric axiological aspect. This factor is, therefore, a mixture of Afrocentric ontology and Eurocentric axiological tendencies.

Factor 6 is defined by (Q43) *I would basically be contented with life as long as I have food, clothing and shelter* and (Q18) *Children ought to obey their parents according to their culture*. These items reflect ontological and axiological dimensions, respectively. However, both dimensions are within the Afrocentric orientation.

Factor 7 is defined by (Q7) *It is more important for me to promote communal social order than to promote my personal life* and (Q4) *The general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals*. This factor clearly reflects communalism, hence, an axiological dimension within the Afrocentric orientation.

Factor 8 is defined by (Q3) *A person must strive to live a comfortable life*, (Q2) *A person should be independent in thought and action* and (Q42) *I always feel frustrated if I fail to follow schedules in what I do*. These items suggest that factor 8 is an axiological dimension, and in the conceptual terms used in the study, an individualist, hence a Eurocentric orientation.

From the foregoing analysis and description of the factors, the world view dimensions for Group 1 could be summarised as follows:

- Communalism, which is an aspect of the Afrocentric axiological dimension (factor 1 and factor 7).
- Pessimism, which is an aspect of the Afrocentric ontological dimension (factor 2).
- Individualism, which is an aspect of the Eurocentric axiological dimension (factor 3 and factor 8).
- Eurocentric ontological dimension (factor 4).
- Mixture of Afrocentric ontology and axiology, with Eurocentric axiological tendencies (factor 5).
- Mixture of Afrocentric ontology and axiology (factor 6).

A synthesis of these world view dimensions shows that *the world view orientation of Group 1 is characterised primarily by communalism and a "nature-over-man" view, hence, an Afrocentric axiology and ontology. But the group also manifests some Eurocentric tendencies, namely, individualism, and a "man-over-nature" and "nature-for-man" views.*

6.3.2. World view dimensions of Group 2

In order to obtain the world view dimensions of Group 2, the group's scores on the WVI had to be factor analysed. The factors that were to be obtained from the factor analysis would be the world view dimensions of the group.

In a preliminary step, the scores on the 48 items were factor analysed, from which a 15-factor solution was obtained, accounting for 70% of the total variance in a fairly clear structure. However, although a desirably high percentage of the variance was accounted for, not only were these factors too many, but also many of the items were ambiguous. In an attempt to refine the factor structure, a stepwise discriminant analysis (Maxwell, 1977; Everitt, 1977; Klecka, 1980; Kerlinger, 1986:562) was executed at significance level 0.4 in order to obtain the group of items which maximally discriminated between the two groups (see Appendix 6.12a, 6.12b), and the 26 items that remained were factor analysed, retaining ten (10) factors (see Table 6.03 and Table 6.04; also Appendix 6.09).

This factor structure was somewhat similar to that obtained from the factor analysis of the 48 items, except that it accounted for a slightly smaller percentage of the variance (67%) and had lower loadings in some cases. Nevertheless, this factor structure was much clearer and was therefore used in the subsequent interpretation steps.

Factor 1 is defined by (Q47) *When something is true, I will see the reasons or its condition and actually prove that it is true*, (Q3) *A person must strive to live a comfortable life*, (Q33) *I always try to think about one thing at a time*, and (Q41) *Everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival*. These items represent diverse aspects of world view or world view orientation. The first two represent the Eurocentric world view orientation; the former reflecting the epistemological world view dimension, while the latter reflects the ontological world view dimension. The third and fourth items represent the chronemic and ontological dimensions, respectively. While the chronemic item is typically monochronic and therefore suggesting a Eurocentric orientation, the ontological dimension suggests a supposedly Afrocentric orientation.

Table 6.03. Rotated factor pattern of world view dimensions of Group 2

Rotation Method: Varimax

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q47	0.75547	.	.	.	.
Q3	0.55456	.	.	.	.
Q33	0.46857	.	.	.	.
Q41	0.40035	0.35732	.	-0.30522	.
Q20	.	0.75828	.	.	.
Q19	.	0.69648	.	.	.
Q16	.	0.59113	.	.	.
Q30	.	.	0.70064	.	.
Q40	.	.	0.63584	.	.
Q29	.	.	0.49442	.	0.31943
Q38	.	.	-0.66640	.	.
Q4	.	.	.	0.77267	.
Q7	.	.	.	0.69364	.
Q43	.	.	.	.	0.84618
Q15	0.36921	.	.	0.31446	0.45706
Q44	.	.	.	-0.36158	0.39475
Q2	.	.	.	.	.
Q37	0.46642	.	-0.36513	.	.
Q14	.	.	.	.	.
Q18	.	0.40455	.	.	.
Q5	.	.	.	0.38853	0.31063
Q11	.	.	.	.	.
Q46	.	.	.	.	.
Q42	.	.	.	.	.
Q1	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	.	.	.	.

(Table 6.03 continued)

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9	FACTOR10
Q47	.	.	.	.	.
Q3	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	-0.34801	.	.	.	.
Q41	.	-0.33592	.	.	.
Q20	.	.	.	.	.
Q19	.	.	.	.	.
Q16	.	.	0.33680	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	.	.
Q40	.	.	.	.	.
Q29	0.35775	.	.	0.40989	.
Q38	.	.	.	.	.
Q4	.	.	.	.	.
Q7	.	.	.	.	.

Table 6.03 continued

Q43	.	.	.	.	.
Q15	.	.	.	.	.
Q44	.	.	.	.	.
Q2	0.77076	.	.	.	.
Q37	0.51429	.	.	.	.
Q14	.	0.75068	.	.	.
Q18	.	0.56603	.	.	.
Q5	.	-0.49084	.	.	.
Q11	.	.	0.81886	.	.
Q46	.	.	0.63348	.	0.47792
Q42	.	.	.	0.75210	.
Q1	.	.	.	0.62101	.
Q39	.	.	.	.	0.85877

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
2.060200	1.981531	1.975086	1.890384	1.780866

FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9	FACTOR10
1.699581	1.557216	1.547976	1.498727	1.466963

Table 6.04 Final communality estimates of factor pattern of world view dimensions of Group 2

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 17.458529

Q15	Q19	Q38	Q4	Q39	Q20	Q44	Q1	Q40
0.636707	0.651542	0.643782	0.716098	0.788002	0.738637	0.493819	0.546823	0.672173

Q7	Q2	Q11	Q29	Q30	Q5	Q33	Q46	Q42
0.633792	0.671117	0.750643	0.739074	0.631751	0.653441	0.539472	0.709771	0.777603

Q18	Q3	Q14	Q47	Q37	Q16	Q41	Q43
0.616003	0.629054	0.726050	0.677632	0.672779	0.663484	0.691127	0.788153

Factor 2 is defined by (Q20) *Neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable*, (Q19) *A person should personally take full care of his parents if they are old*, and (Q16) *I agree with the saying that "Hands wash each other", which means that people should help each other*. This factor seems to be communalism.

Factor 3 is defined by (Q30) *Nature and all living things in it are sacred*, (Q40) *Although mankind tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature*, (Q29) *Basically nature controls mankind*, and (Q38) *Nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit*. This is apparently an ontological factor, but rather a mixture of Afrocentric and Eurocentric ontological predispositions.

Factor 4 is defined by (Q4) *The general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals* and (Q7) *It is more important for me to promote communal social order than to promote my personal life*. This factor is communalism, hence, it is an axiological dimension within the Afrocentric orientation.

Factor 5 is defined by (Q43) *I would basically be contented with life as long as I have food, clothing and shelter*, (Q15) *Being in the community means being part of the community*, and (Q44) *People should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community*. Whereas item Q43 reflects a non-materialist ontological orientation, items Q15 and Q44 reflect the axiological dimension, but the former a communalist, hence, an Afrocentric orientation, and the latter an individualist, hence a Eurocentric orientation. This factor might suggest that the Ss in this group are primarily Afrocentric but with some Eurocentric tendencies.

Factor 6 is defined by (Q2) *A person should be independent in thought and action* and (Q37) *Basically man controls nature*. Whereas the first item falls under the axiological dimension, the second falls under the ontological dimension. However, they both reflect a Eurocentric orientation.

Factor 7 is defined by (Q14) *Making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and the blessings of the elderly and leaders*, (Q18) *Children ought to obey their parents according to their culture*, and (Q5) *A person should be on his own and be self-reliant*. The appearance of item Q5 in this factor poses a problem in that it is itself an individualist orientation. However, if the negative value of its loading on this factor could be interpreted as indicating consonance of this item with the other two, then factor 7 would clearly be communalism, hence an Afrocentric axiological dimension.

Factor 8 is defined by (Q11) *It is important to have harmony in relations with other people* and (Q46) *The universe is inhabited by two forces, namely, good and evil*. This factor is, therefore, an Afrocentric ontology.

Factor 9 is unclear. The first item defining this factor, (Q42) *I always feel frustrated if I fail to follow schedules in what I do*, reflects that the respondents are characterised by a Eurocentric chronemic dimension. The only other item loading strongly on this factor, (Q1) *Obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary*, is also a Eurocentric orientation but of the ontological dimension. This might suggest that, to the extent that factor 9 is a world view orientation, it clearly indicates Eurocentrism, but seemingly it is not a single world view dimension.

Factor 10 is defined by (Q39) *Unknown forces control nature*. As this is a single-item factor, what label should be assigned to it is not obvious, but taking the item that loads second most strongly on factor 10, that is, (Q46) *The universe is inhabited by two forces, namely, good and evil*, as a cue, it becomes clear that this factor is an ontological dimension of the Afrocentric world view orientation.

From the foregoing analysis and descriptions of the factors, the world view dimensions of Group 2 could be summarised as follows:

- A mixture of Eurocentric epistemology, chronemics and Afrocentric ontology (factor 1, factor 9).
- Communalism, which is an Afrocentric axiological dimension (factor 2, factor 4, factor 7).
- Afrocentric ontology, with some Eurocentric ontological predispositions (factor 3, factor 8, factor 10).
- A mixture of non-materialism, which is an aspect of Afrocentric ontology, and communalism, wich is an aspect of Afrocentric axiology, with individualism, which is an aspect of Eurocentric axiology (factor 5).
- A mixture of aspects of Eurocentric axiology and aspects of Eurocentric ontology (factor 6).

A synthesis of these factors shows that *the world view orientation of Group 2 is characterised by primarily a Eurocentric world view orientation; with generally Eurocentric chronemics; generally Eurocentric axiology but also with quite strong communalistic tendencies; and a strong Afrocentric ontology with some Eurocentric ontological elements.*

A comparison of the means based on the 26 most discriminating items showed practically significant differences[13] between Group 1 and Group 2 along the axiological (effect size = 0.87), ontological (effect size = 0.75), and chronemic (effect size = 0.65) dimensions. There was a small-to-large effect size (0.36) on the differences in the epistemological dimension. Since audience world view would influence speaker credibility, it should follow that Group 1 and Group 2 would differ in the credibility evaluations of speakers in similar persuasive situations. Should this be the case, H1 would be supported, but that remains to be determined, which must await analysis of the speaker credibility dimensions formed by each group.

6.3.3. Credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1

In order to obtain the speaker credibility dimensions of Group 1, the group's scores on the SDSC were factor analysed. The factors from the factor analysis would be the speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by the group. The factor structure of

[13] For a discussion of categories of effects sizes, see Cohen (1988).

the 28 most discriminating items consisted of 8 factors, which accounted for about 69% of variance (see Table 6.05 and Appendix, 6.10).

Factor 1[14] is defined by (Q47) *Informed-uninformed*, (Q43) *Sincere-insincere*, (Q20) *Flexible-rigid*, (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful* and (Q12) *Energetic-weak*, (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful*, and (Q54) *Pleasant-unpleasant*. This is a general factor encompassing mastery of subject matter, moral and personality qualities, and presentation aspects.

Factor 2 is defined by (Q16) *Dishonest-honest*, (Q13) *Dull-lively*, (Q32) *Untrained-trained*, (Q28) *Unfriendly-friendly*, (Q33) *Bad-good*, (Q36) *Doubting-convinced*, (Q42) *Poor-rich*, and (Q8) *Ugly-handsome*. This factor, which substantially overlapped with factor 1, also seems to be a broad general dimension, including moral, presentation, mastery of subject, orientation towards the audience, and appearance or stereotypic aspects.

Factor 3 is defined by (Q1) *Analytical-emotional*, (Q27) *Masculine-feminine* and (Q7) *Experienced-inexperienced*. The combination of these items makes the factor somewhat unclear, but it could suggest presentation aspects.

Factor 4 is defined by (Q2) *Humorous-serious* and (Q3) *Unclear-clear* (negative loading value) and, is therefore, a presentation dimension.

Factor 5 is defined by basically one pair, (Q22) *Sad-happy*, hence difficult to suggest a construct label. The cue pair (Q39) *Attractive-unattractive* (negative loading value) does not clarify this factor either. This factor is, therefore, left out of consideration.

Factor 6 is defined by (Q18) *Objective-subjective* and (Q23) *Heavy-light* (negative loading value). As this factor is rather unclear, it might be a trash basket (see Mbennah, 1993:139), and for that reason, it is left out of consideration in subsequent discussion of the study.

Factor 7 is defined by (Q37) *Tall-short* and (Q21) *Fast-slow*. This factor is not all that clear, but it seems to be a combination of physical appearance and presentation aspects.

Factor 8 is defined by a single pair, (Q30) *Young-old*. The cue pair, (Q3) *Unclear-clear*, does not shed any more light than could be found in the single pair situation. Nevertheless, it is possible that age is significant to speaker credibility.

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[14] Item (Q55) *Wrong-right* seems to load equally on both factor 1 and factor 2. This means that this adjectival pair is ambiguous and, therefore, it is not taken into consideration in the discussion of this factor.

Table 6.05 Rotated factor matrix of analysis of SD scores on most discriminating items for Group 1

Rotation method: Varimax

Rotated Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
Q47	0.86599	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q43	0.77313	.	.	0.33798	.	.	.	.
Q20	0.73817	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q19	0.70517	0.30073	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q12	0.68871	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q50	0.67705	0.41322	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q54	0.61666	0.35849	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q55	0.47419	0.44562	.	.	0.42150	.	.	.
Q16	.	0.81501	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q13	.	0.80250	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q32	.	0.76456	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q28	.	0.72268	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	0.31675	0.71086	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q36	.	0.62119	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q42	.	0.58954	.	0.36844	.	.	.	.
Q8	.	0.57367	.	.	.	.	.	0.39592
Q1	.	.	0.79088	.	.	.	.	.
Q27	0.43324	.	0.60120	.	.	.	.	.
Q7	0.49644	.	0.50739	.	.	.	.	.
Q3	.	.	.	0.66870	.	.	.	0.32487
Q2	.	.	0.31976	-0.71325	.	.	.	.
Q22	.	.	.	.	0.83227	.	.	.
Q39	0.43722	0.34489	.	.	-0.43931	0.35459	.	.
Q18	.	.	.	.	.	0.68716	.	.
Q23	.	.	.	.	.	-0.68021	.	.
Q37	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.81169	.
Q21	0.36653	.	.	.	.	.	0.69830	.
Q30	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.88239

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
5.072383	4.882218	1.901581	1.650879	1.590860	1.485374	1.421732	1.367169

Table 6.06 Final communality estimates of factor pattern of speaker credibility dimensions of Group 1

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.372196

Q8	Q23	Q20	Q54	Q27	Q39	Q18
0.616241	0.699011	0.612709	0.631190	0.614022	0.732931	0.598959
Q12	**Q7**	**Q22**	**Q33**	**Q42**	**Q47**	**Q16**
0.650579	0.604872	0.825927	0.787914	0.556505	0.772786	0.737983
Q50	**Q55**	**Q28**	**Q1**	**Q21**	**Q37**	**Q3**
0.699484	0.715883	0.688481	0.696560	0.721584	0.722633	0.704265
Q30	**Q43**	**Q32**	**Q13**	**Q36**	**Q19**	**Q2**
0.826122	0.784602	0.673625	0.759338	0.576555	0.723010	0.638424

These factors, hence speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1, could be summarised as follows:

- *general speaker credibility criteria* (the elements of which are *subject mastery*, *moral qualities, dynamism, and personality qualities*);
- *general credibility criteria consisting of moral quality, presentation quality, subject competence, orientation towards the audience and physical appearance*;
- *presentation aspects;*
- *physical appearance;* and
- Possibly, *age-based qualification.*

A synthesis of these factors indicate that Group 1 formed the following speaker credibility dimensions: *General speaker quality, presentation aspects, physical appearance and age-based qualification.*

6.3.4. Credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 2

In order to obtain the speaker credibility dimensions of Group 2, the group's scores on the SDSC were factor analysed. The factors obtained from the factor analysis would be the speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by the group.

The scores on the SD were keyed in a NE programme. The adjectival pairs beginning with the negative adjective were reversed and a cluster analysis (Everitt, 1977; Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984) of the scores was done by group, by speaker and by group and speaker. Cluster analysis was used instead of factor analysis, because it was realised that in order to do a valid factor analysis, the ratio of the number of respondents to the number of items in the SD ought to be no less that 4:1 (see Hensley, 1974:293).

Anyhow, the cluster structure was unclear[15]. The SD had been prepared in view of factor analysis, in which case items that would have been duplicates would have loaded weakly or would have been ambiguous and would therefore have been dropped in the semantic differentiation process. This was, however, not possible with a cluster analysis, hence the lack of clarity of the structure. It was therefore necessary to do a factor analysis, in which case either the number of respondents had to be increased, which was not possible as the data had already been collected, or the number of items had to be reduced in a statistically valid way, which is what was done. A stepwise discriminant analysis was

[15] In order to keep the thesis to a readable volume, only the out put of the data analysis process considered absolutely essential for the understanding and evaluation of the discussion and conclusions were included. Because of their limited direct significance to the discussion and conclusions of the study, the details of the cluster analysis process were not included in this final report of the study. Print outs of the cluster analysis process are, however, available from the researcher.

done at significance level 0.30 (see Appendix 6.13a, 6.13b), and 28 adjectival pairs that were retained were factor analysed for Group 1 and Group 2 (see the factor matrices for Group 1 and Group 2 appearing as Tables 6.05 and 6.07, respectively; see also Appendix 6.10 and Appendix 6.11, respectively).

For group 2, the factor structure of the 28 most discriminating items produced 9 factors, which accounted for nearly 70% of the variance (see Table 6.07, Table 6.08 and Appendix 6.11).

Table 6.07 Rotated factor matrix of analysis of SD scores on most discriminating items for Group 2

Rotation Method: Varimax

Rotated Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q43	0.80009	.	.	.	.
Q27	0.67093	.	.	.	0.40854
Q19	0.67060	.	0.33501	.	.
Q55	0.50725	.	0.46660	.	.
Q13	.	0.87056	.	.	.
Q12	.	0.84417	.	.	.
Q21	.	0.68897	.	.	.
Q3	.	.	0.76922	.	.
Q47	0.32280	.	0.73079	.	.
Q32	.	.	0.61321	.	.
Q7	0.39692	.	0.44268	.	.
Q2	.	0.32411	.	0.73347	.
Q1	.	.	.	0.69542	.
Q22	.	.	.	0.62822	.
Q28	0.46732	0.40074	-0.32582	0.48751	.
Q23	.	.	.	-0.76220	.
Q30	.	.	.	0.32861	0.69242
Q39	0.35730	.	.	.	0.69007
Q8	.	.	.	.	0.61488
Q36	.	.	0.50352	.	0.52297
Q37	.	.	.	.	.
Q16	0.46196	.	.	.	.
Q50	.	.	.	.	0.35337
Q54	.	0.38943	.	.	.
Q18	.	.	.	.	.
Q42	.	.	0.36746	.	.
Q20	.	0.32908	.	0.31225	.
Q33	.	.	.	.	.

(Table 6.07 continued)

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
Q43	.	.	.	.
Q27	.	.	.	.
Q19	.	.	.	0.38074
Q55	.	.	.	.
Q13	.	.	.	.
Q12	.	.	.	.
Q21	.	.	.	.
Q3	.	.	.	.
Q47	.	.	.	.
Q32	.	.	.	0.41865
Q7	.	-0.43223	.	.
Q2	.	.	.	.
Q1	.	.	.	.

Table 6.07 continued

Q22	.	.	.	0.41051
Q28	.	.	.	.
Q23	.	.	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	.	0.38261	.
Q8	0.45293	.	.	.
Q36	.	.	.	.
Q37	0.77101	.	.	.
Q16	0.53951	0.33870	.	.
Q50	0.46962	-0.45341	.	.
Q54	0.39939	.	.	.
Q18	.	0.77238	.	.
Q42	.	.	0.69348	.
Q20	.	.	-0.61458	.
Q33	.	.	.	0.80851

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
2.951922	2.913421	2.868560	2.733403	2.177252	1.703922	1.502410	1.400279	1.385653

Table 6.08 Final communality estimates of factor pattern of speaker credibility dimensions of Group 2

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.636821

Q8	Q23	Q20	Q54	Q27	Q39	Q18
0.666041	0.622113	0.730312	0.516814	0.656632	0.829308	0.742203
Q12	**Q7**	**Q22**	**Q33**	**Q42**	**Q47**	**Q16**
0.782252	0.701688	0.767612	0.799665	0.739573	0.695336	0.718128
Q50	**Q55**	**Q28**	**Q1**	**Q21**	**Q37**	**Q3**
0.619426	0.595046	0.757766	0.655398	0.605611	0.632106	0.704970
Q30	**Q43**	**Q32**	**Q13**	**Q36**	**Q19**	**Q2**
0.727414	0.696544	0.674746	0.889031	0.659418	0.744887	0.706779

Factor 1 is defined by (Q43) *Sincere-insincere*, (Q27) *Masculine-feminine*, (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful* and (Q55) *Wrong-right*. The masculinity-femininity pair introduces an ambiguity to the otherwise clearly moral quality dimension.

Factor 2 is defined by (Q13) *Dull-lively*, (Q12) *Energetic-weak* and (Q21) *Fast-slow*, and it is, therefore, dynamism.

Factor 3 is defined by (Q3) *Unclear-clear*, (Q47) *Informed-uninformed*, (Q32) *Untrained-trained* and (Q7) *Experienced-inexperienced*. This seems to be a subject mastery dimension.

Factor 4 is defined by (Q2) *Humorous-serious*, (Q1) *Analytical-emotional*, (Q22) *Sad-happy*, (Q28) *Unfriendly-friendly* and (Q23) *Heavy-light* (negative loading value). These could be presentation aspects, or general personality aspects inferred by the Ss on the basis of their prior knowledge of the speaker. However, their appearance together to define a single factor seem to be based more on the presentation of the speech than on reputation. A suitable label for it might be sociability.

Factor 5 is defined by (Q30) *Young-old*, (Q39) *Attractive-unattractive*, (Q8) *Ugly-handsome* and (Q36) *Doubting-convinced*. This is a physical appearance aspect.

Factor 6 is defined by a physical aspect pair, (Q37) *Tall-short*, and two moral quality pairs, (Q16) *Dishonest-honest* and (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful*. The mixture of height and the two pairs reflecting moral qualities makes this factor unclear. It is possible that for Group 2, height and integrity are associated, in which case this would probably be a stereotype, since there is no basis for such an association. In addition, the *virtuous-sinful* pair also loads strongly on factor 3, which means that this pair is ambiguous. It might be that at this stage, pairs are combining in ways that they do not represent specific credibility dimensions, but this is no more than speculation. This factor is not clear and it is, therefore, excluded from subsequent discussion.

Factor 7 is defined by a single pair, (Q18) *Objective-subjective*. Taking (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful* as a cue, this could be a moral quality dimension. Objectivity might be another option.

Factor 8 is defined by (Q42) *Poor-rich* and (Q20) *Flexible-rigid* (negative loading value). It might be suggested that this is a general attribution dimension, hence a reputation dimension. It is also possible that this factor is simply a stereotype. But it is not clear what dimension this factor represents and the factor is not, therefore, considered in further discussion in the study.

Factor 9 is defined by a single pair, (Q33) *Bad-good*, which makes it difficult to suggest a construct label. The cue pairs (Q22) *Sad-happy*, (Q32) *Untrained-trained* and (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful* suggest that factor 9 could be an evaluative overall quality dimension.

These factors could be summarised as follows:

- moral quality
- dynamic presentation
- subject mastery
- sociability
- physical appearance

- personality
- possibly, subjectivity
- possibly, reputation
- overall quality

Some of these factors are similar and simply reflect different shades of essentially the same thing. These factors represent the dimensions of speaker credibility that Group 2 formed and applied. When these factors are synthesised, the following speaker credibility dimensions emerge for Group 2: ***moral quality; dynamism; mastery of subject; sociability***; ***physical appearance; reputation;*** and ***general quality,*** in that order of significance.

6.3.5. Speaker credibility dimensions based on white speaker and black speaker on most discriminating SDSC items

The SD scores on the most discriminating items were factor analysed for white speaker and black speaker. This analysis was done to see if there were any colour-based stereotypic credibility dimensions formed and applied by the Ss. Table 6.09 and Table 6.10 present the findings of the credibility dimensions formed by the Ss for the white speaker (see also Appendix 6.14), and Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 present the credibility dimensions formed by the Ss for the black speaker (see also Appendix 6.15).

6.3.5.1. Credibility dimensions formed and applied for white speaker

From Table 6.09 and Table 6.10, the credibility dimensions formed and applied for the white speaker were as follows:

Factor 1 is defined by (Q12) *Energetic-weak*, (Q47) *Informed-uninformed*, (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful*, (Q43) *Sincere-insincere*, (Q20) *Flexible-rigid*, (Q21) *Fast-slow*, (Q7) *Experienced-inexperienced*, (Q27) *Masculine-feminine*, (Q54) *Pleasant-unpleasant* and (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful*. This is an overall credibility criteria, entailing virile presentation, knowledgeability, moral qualities, and pleasantness.

Factor 2 is defined by (Q28) *Unfriendly-friendly,* (Q13) *Dull-lively* and (Q16) *Dishonest-honest*. This is primarily a presentation dimension, emphasising relational, dynamic and honesty aspects.

Factor 3, defined by (Q55) *Wrong-right*, (Q33) *Good-bad* and (Q32) *Untrained-trained*. This seems to be an overall evaluation dimension, encompassing aspects of accuracy and, perhaps, the ability and propensity to be accurate.

Factor 4 is defined by (Q30) *Young-old*, (Q3) *Unclear-clear* and (Q36) *Doubting-convinced*. This factor is rather unclear.

Factor 5 is defined by (Q1) *Analytical-emotional* and (Q2) *Humorous-serious*. This is apparently a presentation dimension, specifically, presentation tone.

Factor 6 is defined by (Q18) *Objective-subjective* only. It is, therefore, difficulty to provide a label. The cue pair, (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful* (with a negative loading value), does not help resolve the problem.

Factor 7 is defined by (Q23) *Heavy-light*. The cue pair, (Q37) *Tall-short*, might suggest that this dimension is associated with physical appearance.

Factor 8 is defined by (Q22) *Sad-happy* and (Q39) *Attractive-unattractive* (with negative loading value). This factor is an aspect of the physical appearance dimension, combining mood and attractiveness.

Table 6.09 Rotated factor matrix of analysis of SD scores on the most discriminating items for assessing white speaker

Rotation Method: Varimax

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q12	0.83128	.	.	.	.
Q47	0.74060	-0.30939	.	.	.
Q19	0.71234	.	.	0.31927	.
Q43	0.71057	.	0.32287	.	.
Q20	0.64906	.	.	.	.
Q21	0.60986	.	.	.	-0.50279
Q7	0.58631	.	.	.	0.30362
Q27	0.58533	.	.	.	.
Q54	0.54291	.	0.30058	.	.
Q50	0.52958	.	.	.	.
Q28	.	0.79561	.	.	.
Q13	.	0.77460	.	.	.
Q16	.	0.69646	0.36443	.	.
Q42	.	0.37618	0.31238	0.31145	.
Q55	.	.	0.80488	.	.
Q33	.	0.39360	0.56032	.	.
Q32	.	0.44322	0.47701	.	.
Q30	.	.	-0.30161	0.80087	.
Q3	.	.	0.35678	0.63119	.
Q36	.	0.44772	.	0.50045	.
Q1	.	.	.	.	0.81994
Q2	0.32947	.	-0.31169	.	0.53178
Q18	.	.	.	.	.
Q23	.	.	.	.	.
Q22	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	0.39397	0.36187	.	0.38156	.
Q37	.	.	.	.	.

(Table 6.09 continued)

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
Q12	.	.	.	.
Q47	.	.	-0.30050	.
Q19	.	.	.	.
Q43	.	.	.	.
Q20	.	.	.	.
Q21	.	.	0.30042	.
Q7	.	.	.	.
Q27	0.31543	.	.	.
Q54	.	-0.34980	.	.
Q50	-0.41199	.	-0.34400	.
Q28	.	.	.	.
Q13	.	.	.	.
Q16	.	.	-0.31790	.
Q42	.	.	.	.
Q55	.	.	.	.
Q33	.	.	.	.
Q32	-0.37787	0.37812	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	.
Q3	0.33703	.	.	.
Q36	.	.	.	.
Q1	.	.	.	.
Q2	.	.	.	.
Q18	0.77819	.	.	.
Q23	.	0.82106	.	.
Q22	.	-0.32147	0.70998	.
Q39	.	.	-0.43528	.
Q37	.	.	.	0.89509

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
4.776595	2.965880	2.184352	1.839794	1.730415	1.525925	1.483915	1.467747	1.158469

Table 6.10 Final communality estimates of speaker credibility dimensions of white speaker

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.133091

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q7	Q12	Q13	Q16	Q18	Q19
0.756828	0.696643	0.707266	0.501473	0.768213	0.783746	0.757124	0.666649	0.736169

Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q27	Q28	Q30	Q32	Q33
0.487834	0.781471	0.751663	0.751728	0.571458	0.741987	0.796073	0.739080	0.670063

Q36	Q37	Q39	Q42	Q43	Q47	Q50	Q54	Q55
0.651485	0.864653	0.753752	0.516804	0.716419	0.812406	0.671760	0.723918	0.756427

Factor 9 is defined by (Q37) *Tall-short*. It might suggest that height is a dimension of speaker credibility, but as this factor is a one-pair situation, it is not obvious which construct it represents, if any.

It seems that factor 7, factor 8 and factor 9 constitute an aesthetics dimension, combining various aspects of physical appearance.

6.3.5.2. Credibility dimensions formed and applied for black speaker

From Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 above, the credibility dimensions formed and applied for the black speaker were as follows:

Factor 1 is defined by (Q33) *Good-bad*, (Q32) *Untrained-trained*, (Q16) *Dishonest-honest*, (Q28) *Unfriendly-friendly*, (Q54) *Pleasant-unpleasant*, (Q42) *Poor-rich*, (Q50) *Virtuous-sinful*, (Q36) *Doubting-convinced*, (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful*, (Q12) *Energetic-weak* and (Q7) *Experienced-inexperienced*. This is a general credibility criteria, encompassing subject competence, moral qualities, and dynamic presentation aspects.

Factor 2 is defined by (Q47) *Informed-uninformed*, (Q55) *Wrong-right*, (Q43) *Sincere-insincere* and (Q20) *Flexible-rigid*. This dimension seems to focus on the speaker's relationship to the message; in particular, the speaker's propensity to be accurate.

Table 6.11 Rotated factor matrix of analysis of SD scores on the most discriminating items for assessing black speaker

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7
Q33	0.78977	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q32	0.77334	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q16	0.73045	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q28	0.67139	0.35548	.	0.37691	.	.	.
Q54	0.66036	0.38519	.	.	.	.	.
Q42	0.64034	.	.	.	.	-0.35259	.
Q50	0.61958	0.42813	.	.	.	.	0.32089
Q36	0.58854	0.32197	.	.	.	.	.
Q19	0.54138	0.46913	.	.	0.34747	.	.
Q12	0.52218	.	0.46348	.	.	.	.
Q7	0.50334	.	0.33948	.	0.50055	.	.
Q47	.	0.81682	.	.	.	.	.
Q55	0.39552	0.69149	.	.	.	.	.
Q43	0.30143	0.64685	.	.	.	-0.38933	.
Q20	.	0.58452	0.32834	.	.	.	.
Q30	.	.	0.81138	.	.	.	.
Q3	0.34901	.	0.70902	.	.	.	.
Q13	0.55506	.	0.63866	.	.	.	.
Q39	0.45910	.	0.46808	.	.	.	.
Q22	.	.	.	0.79685	.	.	.
Q18	.	.	.	-0.51435	0.41543	.	.
Q23	.	.	.	-0.65220	.	-0.33648	.
Q27	.	.	.	-0.31461	0.78172	.	.
Q1	.	.	.	.	0.66981	.	.
Q2	.	.	.	.	.	0.80001	.
Q37	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.74737
Q21	.	.	.	0.38248	.	.	0.70282

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7
5.762016	3.162585	2.491723	2.287768	2.021544	1.554080	1.440951

Table 6.12 Final communality estimates of speaker credibility dimensions of black speaker

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 18.720667

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q7	Q12	Q13	Q16	Q18	Q19
0.566547	0.688081	0.744392	0.671652	0.619031	0.801706	0.632550	0.496653	0.711942
Q20	**Q21**	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q30**	**Q32**	**Q33**
0.692655	0.711331	0.737946	0.618558	0.777685	0.786488	0.752651	0.762841	0.753920
Q36	**Q37**	**Q39**	**Q42**	**Q43**	**Q47**	**Q50**	**Q54**	**Q55**
0.521555	0.693658	0.500609	0.675030	0.828231	0.758034	0.745577	0.707504	0.763840

Factor 3 is defined by (Q30) *Young-old*, (Q3) *Unclear-clear*, (Q13) *Dull-lively* and (Q39) *Attractive-unattractive*. It seems to be a physical appearance/aesthetic dimension, but it is somewhat mixed with clarity in presentation.

Factor 4 is defined by (Q22) *Sad-happy*, (Q18) *Objective-subjective* and (Q23) *Heavy-light* (negative loading value). This factor is a mixture of physical appearance and subjectivity.

Factor 5 is defined by (Q27) *Masculine-feminine* and (Q1) *Analytical-emotional*. This factor seems to be emotionalism. What is interesting to note here is that masculinity co-varies with the analytical orientation, and femininity co-varies with emotional tendencies.

Factor 6 is defined by (Q2) *Humorous-serious*. As this is a single-item dimension, it is difficult to suggest a label for it.

Factor 7 is defined by (Q37) *Tall-short* and (Q21) *Fast-slow*. This seems to be a physical appearance dimension.

A comparison of the factor structures of the credibility dimensions formed and applied for the white speaker and the black speaker, as summarised in Table 6.13 below, shows that the factor structures are essentially similar. A comparison of the means of the SDSC scores on white speaker and black speaker showed that there was no practically significant difference (effect size = 0.24), which means that there were no differences in forming and applying credibility dimensions on the two speakers based on their colour of skin. It may be concluded that the credibility dimensions formed and applied by Ss in Group 1 and Group 2 were not racially based stereotypes.

Table 6.13. Comparison of the focus of evaluations on white speaker and black speaker

Credibility dimensions for white speaker	Credibility dimensions for black speaker
• Overall criteria - dynamic presentation, knowledgeability, moral qualities, pleasantness. • Presentation - relational, dynamic, honesty, tone. • Overall evaluation on accuracy • Physical appearance - stature, mood, attractiveness, height	• Overall criteria - subject competence, moral qualities, dynamic presentation. • Overall evaluation in terms of the possibility of being accurate. • Primarily physical appearance - attractiveness, mood, height, pace. • Masculinity-emotionality.

6.4. SUMMARY

To investigate the impact of audience world view on speaker credibility formation and application, a world view questionnaire was developed and administered. The scores on the world view questionnaire were analysed from which a world view index was constructed. A semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility (SDSC) and a persuasive speech (PS) were also developed and administered appropriately. Group 1 completed the WVI. The group was then divided into two similar sub-groups. One sub-group listened to a black persuasive speaker, the other sub-group listened to a white persuasive speaker. The sub-groups completed the SDSC immediately after they listened to their respective speakers. Similarly, Group 2 completed the WVI, after which it was divided into two similar sub-groups. One sub-group listened to a black persuasive speaker, and the other sub-group listened to a white persuasive speaker. Group 1 and Group 2 were about equal in size. Therefore, all sub-groups completed the WVI before listening to the speaker, listened to the same speech, and completed the SDSC immediately after listening to the speaker. The scores on both the WVI and the SDSC were then analysed. The results of the analysis of the data could be summarised as follows:

6.4.1. World view dimensions of Group 1

The factors obtained from the factor analysis of the WVI scores of Group 1 are the world view dimensions of the group. Analysis of world view scores shows that Group 1 is primarily Afrocentric, with Afrocentric axiology and ontology, embodied in factors 1 and 2, respectively. Other factors reflect a mixture of Afrocentric and Eurocentric axiology, a mixture of Afrocentric and Eurocentric chronemics and an Afrocentric ontology. This is particularly reflected in factor 1 which, with all these dimensions included, seems to be a general world view orientation.

Therefore, in terms of the conceptualisation of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism world view orientations, these world view dimensions suggest that Group 1 is characterised by primarily communalism and "nature-over-man" views, hence, Afrocentric axiology and Afrocentric ontology. But the group also manifests some Eurocentric axiological and ontological tendencies, namely, individualism and "man-over-nature" views, respectively.

6.4.2. World view dimensions of Group 2

The factors obtained from the factor analysis of the WVI scores of Group 2 are the world view dimensions of the group.

Group 2 is primarily Eurocentric, with Eurocentric epistemology, axiology, and chronemic. This is particularly reflected in factor 1, which, with all these dimensions included, seems to be a general world view orientation. Subsequent factors, based on the variance in the remaining data after factor 1 is extracted, have some Afrocentric elements, in particular, communalism. It is, however, significant to note that ontologically Group 2 is consistently Afrocentric, since, wherever a factor reflected an ontological aspect (factors 1, 3, 8, 10), it is an Afrocentric ontology.

Therefore, in terms of the conceptualisation of Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism world view orientations, these world view dimensions suggest that Group 2 is characterised by primarily a Eurocentric world view orientation; with generally Eurocentric chronemics; generally Eurocentric axiology but also with quite strong communalistic tendencies; and strongly an Afrocentric ontology with some Eurocentric ontological elements.

A comparison of the means confirmed that in terms of the general world view orientation, there is a practically significant difference (effect size = 0.98) between Group 1 and Group 2. A comparison of the means based on the 26 most discriminating items showed practically significant differences between Group 1 and Group 2 along the axiological, ontological, and chronemic dimensions. Therefore, since audience world view would influence the formation and application of speaker credibility, these groups would differ in the credibility evaluations of speakers in similar persuasive situations.

It is interesting to note that Group 1, which was primarily black, is quite strongly Eurocentric in terms of axiology and chronemics. It is also interesting to note that the world view dimensions of Group 2, which consisted of primarily white Ss, are not *wholly* consistent with the general belief that people of Caucasian origin are characterised primarily by a particularly Eurocentric framework of understanding reality. The findings of the present study reflect strong Afrocentric ontology qualities, in addition to the primary Eurocentric orientation.

6.4.3. Credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1

The factors obtained from the factor analysis of Group 1's scores on the SDSC represent the speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1. A synthesis of the dimensions obtained shows that Group 1 formed and applied the following speaker credibility dimensions: General speaker quality, presentation aspects, physical appearance and, possibly, age-based qualification.

6.4.4. Credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 2

The factors obtained from the factor analysis of Group 2's scores on the SDSC represent the speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 2. A synthesis of the dimensions obtained show that Group 2 formed and applied the following speaker credibility dimensions: moral quality, dynamism, subject competence, sociability, physical appearance, objectivity and general quality.

The findings presented in this chapter are discussed and integrated with theory in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility, comparing Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences. It was posited that speaker credibility is a stratified multi-dimensional construct with foundational and context-specific dimensions and that the variation in the formation and application of credibility dimensions could be accounted for by the audience world view. Four hypotheses were posited, that;

H1. Audiences with primarily an Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of aesthetic and presentation aspects.

H2. Audiences with primarily a Eurocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of subject competence and moral aspects.

H3. Under the same persuasive speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences form and apply different speaker credibility dimensions.

H4. There is a relationship between the formation of the dimensions of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking and the world view of the audience.

Investigating these hypotheses needed a theoretical foundation, in which regard, the following were established:

- The nature of persuasion was discussed and a speaker-centred theory of persuasion was developed;
- The speaker credibility construct was discussed and a holistic theory of speaker credibility was proposed;
- World view was conceptualised as a pertinent audience factor in persuasive communication and its possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility was suggested; and

- Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism as specific world view orientations were analysed and their possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility was proposed.

Following this theoretical foundation, an experimental research design was arranged and executed, from which data were collected, analysed and interpreted. The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion of the findings of the study. The following elements are dealt with:

- A recap of the theoretical framework;
- A discussion of the findings of the study in view of the theoretical framework and the study hypotheses;
- Presentation of the implications of the findings for persuasion theory, research and persuasive practice;
- Identification and explanation of possible limitations to the study; and
- Identification and presentation of unresolved questions as recommendations for further study.

7.2. PERSUASION, SPEAKER CREDIBILITY AND AUDIENCE WORLD VIEW

Four aspects constituted the theoretical framework of the study - persuasion, speaker credibility, audience world view, and Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view orientations. The discussion of persuasion was necessary not for the empirical testing as such, but for conceptualising speaker credibility. As these aspects form the springboard for discussing the findings of the study a brief recap is necessary.

An attempt to persuade implies the presence of an intended effect and the appropriate steps to reach that effect. The speaker's aim could be to guide the audience to obtain formed and conditioned responses to specific objects of the audience's attitudinal predisposition or behavioural inclination; intensify existing convictions; or retain current conditions of the audience. For every desired response, there would be but one appropriate meaning that the audience should attain, and for such a meaning there would be but a particular set of symbols that could trigger it in the audience's mind. Therefore, being persuaded refers to the degrees of correspondence between the intended effect and actual effect, and the intended meaning and actual meaning. Within the context of speech communication, persuasion, therefore, refers to such an effect upon the audience

- attitudinal or behavioural or both - as the speaker seeks to achieve through forming and presenting appropriate oral arguments, adapting them to the specific audience.

In order to persuade, the speaker exercises intentionality in terms of both the persuasive outcome and the methods and means of attaining that outcome. The intentionality of the speaker encompasses an intended audience, an intended effect, an intended meaning and, consequently, intended methods and means. The creation of the intended meaning is a dual process involving the persuasive speaker and the audience's cognitive construction processes, the speaker's intended meaning is a product of a pre-speaking constructual process, and the audience's actual meaning is an inference to the cues and symbols transmitted by the speaker. The audience's creative interpretation of the incoming stimuli is guided by its motivational processes as well as aspects of its larger context. In mediating persuasion, meaning contrastively asserts itself over or against the audience's existing frame of reference, thereby exerting a compulsion of a new reality, produce a certain assurance, or displace hitherto held notions and conceptions, or some combinations thereof.

It is in this respect of the necessity of the intentionality of the speaker that the speaker becomes the central element in the persuasion process. Because the persuasive speaker is the manager of the persuasive process, and because speaker construal by the audiences is part of the audience processes that are pertinent to the occurrence of persuasion, speaker credibility is a central component of the persuasive process.

Persuasion is situated in a context and the total context overrides all other factors that account for the occurrence of persuasion. The means of persuasion and their effects on the process are defined by the cultural context of the audience, in particular the world view. But also, as a speaker-managed process, persuasion entails the audience's processing of incoming content and non-content cues, of which the persuasive speaker and whatever speaker factors are pertinent, are part. Audiences process messages, focusing on the primary cues first, then on the secondary cues. However, whether the primary cues are content or non-content related at any given persuasive configuration will depend on the interaction between the topic and the characteristics of a given audience.

7.3. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The proposition that the world view orientation of the audience would have an impact on the formation and application of speaker credibility implies that world view orientations are not only different but also distinguishable. The fact that the Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view orientations are theoretically different invites a discussion of the results to see whether, indeed, these world view orientations are distinct. Whether the two orientations are distinguishable or not might well be a matter of the efficiency of the research tools used. It is possible, for instance, that one might fail to distinguish the two orientations because the research instruments are simply inadequate, or not equally adequate for groups with different world view orientations. It is also possible to fail to isolate the two orientations for the reason that although they are distinct, they are not exclusive and they are not linearly overlapping.

This section presents a discussion of the findings on the dimensions of world view for Group 1 and Group 2, the findings of the speaker credibility dimensions for Group 1 and Group 2, and the possible influence of world view orientation on the formation and application of speaker credibility. The discussion should be understood in light of the propositions made regarding the nature and dimensions of speaker credibility (see chapter 3), the nature and dimensions of world view orientations (see chapter 4) and the nature and characteristics of the Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view orientations (see chapter 5).

Speaker credibility is a stratified multi-dimensional concept and speaker credibility criteria are understood to be a hierarchically ordered stock of universal and context-specific factors of moral, relational, content-related competence, and performance qualities (*see 3.4.2*).

- The moral dimension entails trustworthiness and the speaker's reputation. Audiences could differ in their application of trustworthiness as credibility criteria. Some audiences could employ trustworthiness uniquely in each specific speaking situation, while others might apply trustworthiness as the general character of the speaker. Audiences could also differ in terms of the value they place on the speaker's public character (*see 3.4.2.1*).

- The relational dimension pertains to the speaker's personal orientation with respect to the audience, particularly with regard to the audience's value for the speaker's concern about the audience's welfare, the speaker's perceived degree of sympathy, friendliness and sociability, or refer to the speaker's harmlessness to the audience (*see 3.4.2.2*).

- The content-related competence might refer to the speaker's possession of the specific knowledge, the qualifications, or the authority required to deliver a given content to a particular audience. There would be differences in the basis for competence across world view orientations, such as age, leadership position, training, and speaker-audience similarity (*see 3.4.2.3*).

- The aesthetic dimension comprises vitality and speaker's physical appearance. Vitality entails performance elements such as forcefulness, emphasis, pace, tonal level, loudness or softness, and masculinity. Physical appearance pertains to the stature, facial looks and dressing (*see 3.4.2.4*).

The specific definition and use of each of the speaker credibility sets depend on the audience's world view orientation, but all together constitute an audience's credibility scale in a holistic sense (*see 3.4.2.5*). Generally, audiences exercise discretion in applying credibility criteria against persuasive speakers, waiving some standards and using certain other dimensions more prominently, refraining from using credibility criteria that are irrelevant to the speaking situation. The tendency for audiences to appraise persuasive speakers could be universal. However, audiences in some world view orientations would be more prone, for example, to raise moral questions regarding persuasive speakers than audiences in other world view orientations. Thus, audiences in certain world view orientations would characteristically form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise evaluation of persuasive speakers along some credibility sets more than other credibility sets.

World view is also a multi-dimensional construct (*see 4.3.2*) with epistemological, axiological, perceptual, chronemic and ontological dimensions.

- The epistemological dimension pertains to a cultural orientation's theory of knowledge, methods of knowing and concept of truth. It concerns the metaphysics of people in agiven cultural orientation and it entails their cognitive structure, thought processes and ways of knowing (*see 4.3.2.1*).

- The axiological dimension has to do with the value orientations and value systems and their influence on human behaviour (*see 4.3.2.2*).

- Perceptual dimension concerns that internal process by which people select, evaluate and organise stimuli from external surroundings. The perceptual dimension overlaps with the other four dimensions. Also, literature is lean in terms of specific perceptual categories for the Afrocentric and the Eurocentric world views. This dimension was, therefore, not investigated. Nevertheless, the perceptual categories would contribute to the formation of speaker credibility (*see 4.3.2.3*).

- The chronemic dimension pertains to the conception and use of time in a given cultural orientation, for example, whether attaching primary importance to the past, present or future; whether the punctuality range is long or short; or whether it is a monochronic or polychronic orientation (*see 4.3.2.4*).

- The ontological dimension has to do with the concept of being held by people in a given cultural orientation. It concerns the people's view of the relationship between mankind and the universe and their orientation with regard to time. It also concerns the people's relationship with fellow human beings, their activity orientation, and their conceptions about human nature (*see 4.3.2.5*).

Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are world view orientations and would, therefore, influence speaker credibility formation and application. Afrocentrism is the centring of one's analysis and perceptions based on values of classical African civilisations - values that emphasise mankind's oneness with nature, spirituality, and communalism - with their own set of epistemological, axiological, perceptual, chronemic and ontological attributes (*see 5.3.3*). Eurocentrism refers to a European-oriented perspective, which is premised on classical Greco-Roman civilisations. The Eurocentric orientation is segmented, materialist, and individualistic and has its peculiar epistemology, axiology, perceptual categories, chronemics and ontology (*see 5.3.4*).

7.3.1. World view orientation of Group 1

With regard to the world view orientation of Group 1, the findings show the following dimensions (*see 6.3.1*) in order of significance:

- Communalism, which is an aspect of the Afrocentric axiological dimension (factor 1, factor 7).
- Pessimism, which is an aspect of the Afrocentric ontological dimension (factor 2).
- Individualism, which is an aspect of the Eurocentric axiological dimension (3, 8).
- Eurocentric ontological dimension (factor 4).
- Mixture of Afrocentric ontology and axiology, with some Eurocentric axiology tendencies (factor 5).
- Mixture of Afrocentric ontology and axiology (factor 6).

7.3.1.1. The strongest world view dimension

The strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 is the communalist aspect, as reflected by factor 1 (but also factor 7, *see 6.3.1*). This communalist aspect is defined by the belief that people should help each other and that making a positive contribution to the society earns one respect and blessings. It is also defined by the view that being in the community means being part of the community, participating in the affairs of the community and that it is import to live in harmony with others in the community (*see Table 6.01* for loadings). Factor 1 is similar to factor 7, which is defined by the belief that it is more important for the individual to promote communal social order than to promote personal life and that the general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals (*see 6.3.1*). Therefore, factor 7 also refers to a communalist orientation.

On the other hand, if factor 1 and factor 7 are similar, why are they widely separated? The aspects that define both factors are communalist aspects (*see 4.3.2, 4.3.2.1*). It is possible that the communalist orientation has clusters of aspects, some of which would define the communalist orientation of Group 1 more than others would. This would mean that factor 1 and factor 7 represent different clusters of communalist aspects. The cluster of communalist aspects in factor 1 seems to emphasise the direct input of the individual to the community as it focuses more on the practical individual-community interaction and implies specific responsibility of the individual to and/or in the community. This cluster, therefore, seems to pertain to the individual's allegiance to, and participation in, the community. In contrast, factor 7 seems to focus more on the general conditions of the community, perhaps, emphasising the individual's preference of the general welfare of the community over the general conditions of the individual.

In this respect, Group 1 is, in terms of axiology, strongly Afrocentric, since communalism is an axiological aspect of the Afrocentric orientation (*see 4.3.3.2, 5.3.2.1*).

7.3.1.2. The second strongest world view dimension

The second strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 is pessimism (factor 2, *see 6.3.1*). This factor reflects the belief that unknown forces control nature, everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival, and that human beings live at the mercy of nature (*see Table 6.01* for loadings).

Ontology has to do with existential beliefs regarding the nature of the relationship between mankind and the universe, orientation with respect to time, relationships among human beings (whether individualist, lineal or collateral), concerning the nature of the self-expression of human beings in activity, and the different conceptions about human nature (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, *see 4.3.3.5*).

Therefore, factor 2 reflects an ontological dimension. But this particular ontological dimension suggests that the universe is a field of force (Shutte, 1993:52). The views that every day life is a constant struggle for survival and that mankind lives helplessly at the mercy of nature (*see factor 2, 6.3.1*) are akin to the view that constant disasters and social calamities impress the existence of forces regarded fatalistically as beyond human control (Mbiti, 1970:20). These elements characterise Afrocentric ontology (*see 5.3.4*). This factor, therefore, suggests that, ontologically, Group 1 is strongly Afrocentric.

7.3.1.3. The third strongest world view dimension

The third strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 (factor 3, *see 6.3.1*) is defined by the belief that obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary and that a person should be on his own and be self-reliant. Brislin (1994:78) says that people who are socialised to be self-reliant and to have a sense of separation from their families and communities are individualist in orientation (*see 4.3.3.2*).

A similar orientation is reflected by factor 8, which is defined by the belief that a person must strive to live a comfortable life, and that a person should be independent in thought and action. Factor 8 also suggests that individuals in Group 1 always feel frustrated if they fail to keep schedules in what they do. Therefore, factor 8 too reflects an individualist orientation, which means that factor 3 and factor 8 are forms of individualism. The question that must be addressed is this: If both factor 3 and factor 8 are indications of the individualist aspect of axiology of Group 1, why are they so widely separated that they even seem to be opposites?

One proposition could be that this is simply due to the imperfection of the world view index and scoring process. Indeed, measuring instruments could affect the outcome of a study, but this is highly unlikely in this particular case, since the same instrument was used from which clear factors, such as factor 1 and factor 2, are obtained. It seems more plausible to suggest that the individualist aspect itself has elements which do not characterise the group equally, so that Group 1 is individualist more in some elements than in other elements. If this is true, then, it could be said that Group 1 is individualist more in terms of obtaining uninhibited pleasure (factor 3) than in terms of "painfully" struggling to live a comfortable life (factor 8). The individualist aspect of striving to live a comfortable life might be a contradiction of the notion of obtaining pleasure. Similarly, Group 1 would be individualist more in terms of the views that a person should be self-reliant and a person should be on his own, (perhaps) so as not to be a burden to anyone else or suffer discomfort (factor 3), and less in terms of the view that a person should be independent in thought and action (factor 8), which might "contradict" the belief in helping each other (factor 1).

It is, therefore, possible that factor 3 and factor 8 reflect different degrees of individualism. But this raises another fundamental question: How can a group be characterised by both the communalist aspect (factor 1) and the individualist aspect (factor 3, factor 8), which seem to be opposites?

Individualism is an axiological aspect that is associated with the Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.2*, see also Moemeka, 1997:174). What this means is that, although axiologically Group 1 is primarily communalist (factor 1), the group is also individualist. It is also possible that since the Ss were students at a largely Eurocentric university, they would have come into contact with people of Eurocentric orientation, from which, through acculturation[1] (Kim, 1977:66-77; Berry, 1984:11-27; Berry & Kim, 1988:207-236; Berry *et al.*, 1987:62-89; Jandt, 1995:277-294; Ward, 1996:124-147; see also Infante *et al.*, 1997:418), they would have learned to accept tendencies of individualism. Also, the pursuit of university level education may have contributed to the development of new self-affirming self-construals (*see 4.3.3.2*, cf. Markus & Kitayama, 1991) among the Ss, hence the presence of individualist tendencies. This sense of individuality does not necessarily mean that the Ss have lost their communalist orientation.

Since Group 1 is primarily communalist, the degree of individualism reflected in factor 3 is closer to communalism (factor 1) than the degree of individualism reflected in factor 8. This would mean that the higher the degree of individualism, the less it is a characteristic of Group 1.

7.3.1.4. The fourth strongest world view dimension

The fourth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 (factor 4) reflects the belief that basically man controls nature, the orientation towards seeing reasons for, or proving, for something to be true, and the view that nature should be used for mankind's benefit (*see 6.3.1*). This is a reflection of an ontological dimension of world view (*see 4.3.3.5*) and since it is a "man-over-nature" and "nature-for-man" (materialist) viewpoint, it seems to be a Eurocentric ontology (*see 5.4.4*).

This Eurocentric ontology (factor 4) should be seen from the standpoint that factor 2 shows that Group 1 is characterised by an Afrocentric ontology. This seems to be a contradiction which requires explanation. It could be said that, although the group has

[1] Jandt (1995:292) defines acculturation, or cultural adaptation, as the learning and adopting the norms and values of the new host culture, within the (limited) context of the immigrant, but acculturation need not be limited to an immigrant's experience. Acculturation refers to changes that occur as a result of continuous firsthand contact between individuals of differing cultural origins (Ward, 1996:124). It may occur in a range of sociocultural contexts among a variety of groups, including ethnic groups in multi-cultural societies (cf. Berry & Kim, 1988). Acculturation would entail integration of aspects of the "other" cultural orientation into one's cultural orientation (cf. Berry *et al.*, 1987).

primarily an Afrocentric ontology, it is also in some respects ontologically Eurocentric. It might be that there are two clusters of ontological aspects, the one reflecting a passive, "no human control" view (factor 2), the other reflecting an active "man in control" view (factor 4). The two clusters seem to be polar ends of a continuum, with "no human control" at the one end and "man in control" at the other. If this be the case, it would mean that Group 1 is closer to the "no human control" end (since factor 2 represents a more significant dimension than factor 4 does) but not to the extreme end, so that the group is also somewhat Eurocentric in its ontology.

7.3.1.5. The fifth strongest world view dimension

The fifth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 (factor 5) is defined by the belief that nature and all things in it are sacred, the view that people should be respected because of their individual achievements rather than their contribution to the community, the view that nature controls mankind, and the view that neglect of ageing parents is shameful and unacceptable (*see 6.3.1*).

The belief in the sacredness of nature and all things in it and the view that nature controls mankind are ontological items (*see 4.3.5*) within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.5*). The views regarding the basis for being respected and neglect of ageing parents are axiological items (*see 4.3.2*). The former is clearly an individualist item (*see 4.3.2*) and the latter, with a negative loading value (*see Table 6.01*), is a reverse of the communalist aspect, hence, also an individualist item. Therefore, these two items are both Eurocentric (*see 5.4.2*), which implies that this factor is a mixture of Afrocentric ontology and Eurocentric axiology. The mixed nature of this factor suggests that the ontological and axiological dimensions could overlap in some respects, although it remains difficult to tell whether this overlapping applies only to Group 1 or it is a general case.

7.3.1.6. The sixth strongest world view dimension

The sixth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 1 (factor 6) is defined by the view that the respondent would be basically contented with life as long as the respondent has food, clothing and shelter, and that children ought to obey their parents according to their culture (*see 6.3.1*).

On the one hand, the view on being contented with life for having the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter is a non-materialist orientation (*see 4.3.3.5*) and, as such, it is supposed to be an Afrocentric ontology (*see 5.3.4, cf. 5.4.4*).

On the other hand, determining what orientation factor 6 represents depends on the interpretation of the view that children ought to obey their parents according to their culture, for which there are several possibilities. The view that children should obey their parents according to their culture could be an indication that Group 1 is oriented towards the past, since obeying parents could mean following cultural prescriptions or stipulations. Or, this view could suggest that Group 1 is reflecting a specific area of orientation towards the community and to order and harmony in the community, namely, that of children-parents relations, roles and responsibilities (*see 4.3.3.5*). Whichever view of these two is taken, it would be concluded that factor 6 is a clear Afrocentric ontology.

However, if factor 6 were a clear Afrocentric ontological dimension, it should have come up earlier in the factor structure, perhaps immediately after factor 2. This is because factor 1 and factor 2 are clear axiological and ontological dimensions, respectively. The factors that come after factor 2 are either clear Eurocentric orientations (factor 3, factor 4), or some kind of a mixture (factor 5), or clear factors that are similar to (though not necessarily the same as) some earlier factors (factor 7 similar to factor 1, factor 8 similar to factor 3). We conclude that it is unlikely that factor 6 would be a clear Afrocentric ontological dimension.

It seems more likely that the view that children ought to obey their parents according to their culture is an axiological aspect (*see 5.3.2.3*). Should this be the case, then, factor 6 is a mixture of Afrocentric ontology and Afrocentric axiology.

7.3.1.7. Deduction and synthesis of the world view orientation

From this discussion, the following can be deduced:

- In terms of world view orientation, Group 1 is characterised by two main dimensions, Afrocentric axiology and Afrocentric ontology.

- Since the axiological dimension comes in factor 1 and the ontological dimension comes in factor 2, Group 1 is more axiologically Afrocentric that it is ontologically Afrocentric.

- Axiologically, Group 1 is primarily Afrocentric, possibly along an Afroaxiology-Euroaxiology continuum.

- Ontologically, Group 1 is primarily Afrocentric, possibly along an Afro-ontology-Euro-ontology continuum.

- For Group 1, some Afrocentric axiological aspects overlap with some Afrocentric ontological aspects.

- It is difficult to propose that these elements are linear continuums, especially in view of the overlapping of some of axiological and ontological aspects. It might be proposed that these world view elements are in scattered clusters, but this proposition would fail to explain the fact that people's world views are particular and integrated. It leaves the possibility that world view elements are in a complex weave, some in linear connections, possibly varying "lengths" of the connections, and others in inter-linked clusters spread across the world view space (*see 4.5*).

- Group 1's world view orientation does not entail all the world view dimensions conceptualised in this study (*see 4.3.3*). This general observation does not include the perceptual dimension, since this dimension was excluded from the empirical work (*see 4.3.3.3, 6.2.1.1*). The epistemological and chronemic dimensions of world view posited in the study (*see 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.4*) do not feature in the factors representing the world view orientation of Group 1. It is not clear why this is the case.

  One explanation could be that epistemology and chronemics are, indeed, not dimensions of world view. This deduction is, however, doubtful, because it is based on the data from Group 1 only, which is too small a group to base a conclusion on a universal human phenomenon. Also, in view of the extensive literature and research support for epistemology and chronemics (see Hall, 1976; Sodowsky *et al.*, 1994; Block *et al.*, 1996; see also Dodd, 1998:88) as fundamental criteria for distinguishing people, this viewpoint would have to be rejected until further research confirms otherwise.

  Another proposition could be that, although epistemology and chronemics are dimensions of the world view construct, not all groups are characterised by all the dimensions of world view. The problem with this proposition is that if groups in different cultural orientations could have different structures of world view, it would imply that "world view orientations" would mean different things to different groups. This does not only demolish the concept of world view, but also it runs contrary to work of long standing on world views (see e.g., Jones, 1972; Keesing, 1974).

  In the case of the chronemics dimension, one could also hypothesise that Group 1 is, indeed, characterised by Afrocentric chronemics but the Ss in the group have undergone acculturation with regard to time, which may have had a cancellation effect. This means that, the Afrocentric conception and use of time has been cancelled by an increasing adoption of the Eurocentric conception and use of time. This explanation is quite plausible, possibly because, studying at a university which is largely Eurocentric in its conception and use of time and the deadline-oriented university student life could have contributed to adjustments in the Ss's conception and use of time. This explanation is, however, not without its own problems. One problem is that, if the Ss have adjusted to the Eurocentric way of conceptualising and using time, why doesn't it show in the data? If elements of Eurocentric axiology (factor 3) and Eurocentric ontology (factor 4) were reflected by the data, why wasn't the elements of the Eurocentric chronemic orientation also reflected? Another problem with this viewpoint is that it implies a linearity along either an Afrocentrism-Eurocentrism continuum or an Afrochronemics-Eurochronemics continuum. Whereas such linearity is possible, the proposition overlooks the fact that there are other possible conceptions of time that might not fit on this continuum (*see 4.3.3.4*) that could have characterised Group 1.

Also, the absence of chronemics as a dimension of world view from Group 1 could be attributed to the fact that the frequent remarks about the so-called "African time", which are often derogatory, could have confounded the responses of the Ss in Group 1 to the time-measuring items of the world view index. It is even possible that the Ss in Group 1 possess different conceptions of time (*see 4.3.3.4*) according to which they function differently, for example, on campus, at home, when dealing with academic work, or when dealing with voluntary activities such as being a respondent in a research project.

A more coherent and, therefore, acceptable explanation of the absence of the epistemological and chronemic dimensions from the world view dimensions of Group 1 is that the discriminant analysis would have thrown out most of the items that defined these dimensions (*see 6.3.1*). The discriminant analysis was done to obtain the items of the world view index that would most discriminate Group 1 and Group 2. As such, if Group 1 and Group 2 did not particularly differ along the epistemological and chronemic dimensions, then the items for these dimensions would have been left out. But this explanation too remains a possibility, nothing more.

- The data show that, apart from the fifth dimension, which is a mixture of Afrocentric axiology and Eurocentric ontology, all other dimensions are either Afrocentric axiology aspects, Afrocentric ontology aspects or a mixture of Afrocentric axiology and Afrocentric ontology aspects. Therefore, Group 1 is characterised largely by an Afrocentric world view orientation which is primarily in terms of the axiological and ontological dimensions.

7.3.2. World view orientation of Group 2

With regard to the world view orientation of Group 2, the findings show the following dimensions (*see 6.3.2*) in order of significance:

- A mixture of Eurocentric epistemology, chronemics and Afrocentric ontology (factor 1, factor 9).
- Communalism, which is an Afrocentric axiological dimension (factor 2, factor 4, factor 7).
- Afrocentric ontology, with some Eurocentric ontological predispositions (factor 3, factor 8, factor 10).
- A mixture of non-materialism, which is an aspect of Afrocentric ontology, and communalism, which is an aspect of Afrocentric axiology, with individualism, which is an aspect of Eurocentric axiology (factor 5).
- A mixture of aspects of Eurocentric axiology and aspects of Eurocentric ontology (factor 6).

7.3.2.1. The strongest world view dimension

The strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is a mixture of Eurocentric epistemology, ontology and chronemics, with an Afrocentric ontological aspect, as reflected by factor 1 (but also factor 9, *see 6.3.2*).

This factor is defined by the belief that when something is true, the reasons for it and its condition will be seen or proved, the view that a person must strive to live a comfortable life, a self projection of always thinking about one thing at time, and the view that everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival. The items that define this factor are, therefore, diverse.

The belief that something will be true if it can be proved through giving reasons for its truthfulness, or by seeing its condition, is within the conceptual mode of knowing, since it projects the view that truth is out there to be discovered by following the "correct" way (*see 4.3.3.1*). Since it is an aspect of the ways of knowing, it is an aspect of epistemology (*see 4.3.3.1*) and it is within the Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.1*).

The view that a person must strive to live a comfortable life reflects a desire for comfort, perhaps through the acquisition of material. If this is so, this view might also suggest an orientation towards progress, in which case it would be an ontological aspect (*see 4.3.3.5*). The implied orientation towards material possession and the apparent importance given to progress and change suggest that this view is within the Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.1*, cf. Myers, 1993; Richards, 1980).

The self projection of always thinking about one thing at a time reflects a monochronic conception and use of time (*see 4.3.3.4,* cf. Hall, 1976). In Hall's (1976) scheme, the monochronic conception and use of time is a characteristic of the Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.3*, cf. Sodowsky *et al.*, 1994; Levine, 1988, 1990).

The view that everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival (*see 6.3.2*) is akin to the view that constant disasters and social calamities impress the existence of forces regarded fatalistically as beyond human control (Mbiti, 1970:20). Hence, it characterises the Afrocentric ontology (*see 5.3.4*).

Factor 1 is similar to factor 9 (*see 6.3.2*), which is also defined by diverse items. The self projection that there is always a feeling of frustration when there is a failure to follow schedules reflects that the Ss are characterised by a Eurocentric chronemic dimension (*see 4.3.3.4, 5.4.3*). The view that obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary reflects an ontological dimension (*see 4.3.3.4*) within the Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.4*).

The foregoing analysis shows that both factor 1 and factor 9 reflect a Eurocentric orientation, but the aspects that define these factors come from various world view dimensions. In factor 1, the first two aspects represent the Eurocentric world view orientation; the former reflecting the epistemological world view dimension, while the latter reflects the ontological world view dimension. The third and fourth items represent the chronemic and ontological dimensions, respectively. While the chronemic item reflects the monochronic conception and use of time and, therefore, suggesting a Eurocentric orientation, the ontological dimension suggests a supposedly Afrocentric orientation. The ontological dimension in both factor 1 and factor 9 seems to be reflected by the quality of life (striving towards a comfortable life, the understanding that life is a constant struggle, and the view that pleasure is always necessary). It seems that the quality of life is an important component of Group 2's world view orientation but this component has different levels of significance. For example, it is more important to strive towards a comfortable life (factor 1) than to ensure that there is always pleasure (factor 9).

It could be concluded that, to the extent that factor 1 and factor 9 represent a world view orientation, it is generally clear that they represent a Eurocentric world view orientation. There is an Afrocentric ontological aspect in factor 1, which poses a problem in this generalisation and will, therefore, have to be discussed. It is also clear that a composite, not a single, world view dimension is reflected.

Two questions arise from the data: How can the situation in which the general world view orientation of the group is clear but it is not a specific world view dimension be explained? How can the presence of the Afrocentric ontological item in a clearly Afrocentric orientation be explained?

Regarding the first question, it could be proposed that for Group 2, this strongest factor suggests that there is an integrated world view orientation consisting of a weave of certain elements of the world view dimensions. This integrated world view encompasses some aspects of the epistemological dimension (*see 4.3.1*), the ontological dimension (*see 4.3.5*) and the chronemic dimension (*see 4.3.4*), as this integrated world view structure does not reflect the axiological dimension (*see 6.3.2*). Since axiology is one of the dimensions of world view (*see 4.3.3.2*), why are there no aspects of axiology in the integrated world view structure reflected by factor 1? This absence of the axiological dimension from factor 1 might be explained that certain dimensions of world view are more greatly linked and knit together than others, which would mean that in this case, epistemology, ontology and chronemics are more inter-linked to each other, and axiology is less inter-linked to the others.

Interpreting factor 1 as an integrated world view structure implies that certain aspects of the world view orientations are more central in defining those dimensions than other aspects. This means that wanting to know the reasons for the truthfulness of something in order to regard it as true or wanting to physically experience something as the proof of its truthfulness, is the most central aspect in the epistemological dimension of Group 2's world view orientation. Similarly, the view that one must strive to live a comfortable life and that the belief that everyday life is an on-going struggle would be the most central aspects of the ontological dimensions of Group 2's world view orientation. It also means that the monochronic tendency of always thinking about one thing at a time is the most central aspect of the chronemic dimension of Group 2's world view orientation. The chronemic aspect of feeling frustrated when there is a failure to follow schedules and the ontological aspect of seeing pleasure as always necessary, are both important in defining the world view orientation of Group 2, but they are less significant than the chronemic and ontological aspects appearing in factor 1, hence they appear in factor 9. It could be inferred that because they are less significant, these aspects are peripheral with respect to the core of the integrated world view dimension and, hence, they are separated from the integrated world view dimension reflected by factor 1.

On the other hand, it might be suggested that the items appearing in factor 1 are not necessarily unique or specific but that they are representing the epistemological, chronemic and ontological dimensions generally. This would imply that the exclusion of other items defining these dimensions is a matter of chance. To prove whether this is the case or not would require a level of statistical processing that is outside the scope of this study and, therefore, this possible view is left open.

The second question is even more difficult to answer. The view that everyday life is an on-going struggle, which is supposed to be an Afrocentric ontological aspect (*see 5.3.5*), features in factor 1. It could be argued that this item appears as the last item defining the factor and, hence, it is not all that important (*see Table 6.03* for loadings). But why is there an item that should define the ontological dimension of the Afrocentric orientation in a factor that reflects an otherwise integrated overall world view dimension of the Eurocentric orientation? It is possible that this particular item reflects the Ss's perception of the contemporary situation in the New South Africa, where it is increasingly difficult to find jobs for both whites and blacks. In turn, this explanation would imply that the item represents a contemporaneous perception and, therefore, it is not an indicator of the world view of the audience. Should this be the case, the item would simply be left out of consideration. However, since the item is stated in a general way (i.e., it does not say "everyday life *in South Africa* is a struggle for survival"), and since the Ss have not actually struggled to look for jobs, it is rather likely that the Ss responded to this item as a general statement. The presence of this item in factor 1 would, rather, be explained by the fact that it qualifies the Eurocentricity of Group 2 reflected by factor 1. Therefore, whereas Group 2 is Eurocentric in terms of its epistemology and chronemics, it is ontologically Afrocentric. This view receives additional support from the low placement of the view that pleasure is always necessary (*see 6.3.2* and *Table 6.03*), which is supposed to be an aspect of Eurocentric ontology (*see 5.4.5*).

This view has a significant implication for conceptualising the world view construct. It means that people from different cultural orientations (*see 4.3.1*) could be characterised by a mixture of world view dimensions from different world view orientations. This further implies that, not only could a group in a given cultural orientation have hybrid world view dimensions, but also it is possible for the group to have a hybrid world view orientation.

To explain this phenomenon, we introduce the concept of world view similarity, which we define as the degree of correspondence between two or more groups in their aspects of world view dimensions and/or their dimensions of world view orientations. The extent to which two or more groups from different cultural orientations share common aspects of world view dimensions and/or common dimensions of world view orientation they are, in that regard, similar. This, however, is no more than a proposition that requires further theoretical and empirical work to elaborate and confirm the extent to which it is valid.

7.3.2.2. The second strongest world view dimension

The second strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is the communalist aspect, reflected by factor 2 (*see 6.3.2*). This communalist aspect is defined by the belief that neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable, the view that a person should personally take full care of his parents if they are old, and the view that people should help each other (*see Table 6.03* for loadings).

This factor is an aspect of the axiological dimension (*see 4.3.3.2*) within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.2.1*). Interesting to note in the two communalist aspects that define factor 2 most strongly (the third item reflects the view that people should help each other) is that they both relate to the responsibility to parents and the feelings about children's abrogation of that responsibility.

Factor 2 could be taken to be a dimension characterising Group 2 specifically with regard to the responsibility of taking care of parents. This would be supported by the fact that the two items that define it most strongly are both closely related and pertain to the responsibility to care for parents (*see Table 6.03 for loadings*). The factor is itself a strong one, accounting for 24.3% of the variance (the 10 factors account for 67% of the variance (*see 6.3.2, Appendix 6.09*). This means that Group 2's world view orientation includes strong values for the care of parents. However, this view disregards the third item, which reflects a general helping inclination.

Alternatively, factor 2 could be regarded as a general communalist case, concerning an inclination towards helping each other but with greater emphasis on ageing parents. This view would accommodate the aspect of communalism reflected by the third item without losing sight of the emphasis of the factor on the responsibility to take care of parents. Regarding factor 2 as a general communalist aspect of the axiological dimension would imply a "contradiction" of the characteristic reflected by factor 1, since communalism is not supposed to be a characteristic of the Eurocentric orientation (*see 4.3.2, 5.4.2*) and the axiological dimension is not reflected in factor 1. But this apparent contradiction could be explained by the fact that a group could be characterised by a hybrid world view orientation (*see 7.3.2.1*). This would mean that the existence of a primary world view dimension does not rule out the possibility of items and dimensions of other world view orientations to also characterise a given group.

Factor 2 is similar to factor 4 (*see 6.3.2*), which is defined by the views that the general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals and that it is more important for an individual to promote communal social order than to promote his personal life. Therefore, factor 4 is a communalist aspect of axiology (*see 4.3.3.2*), which is within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.2*).

Factor 2 is also similar to factor 7 (*see 6.3.2*), which is defined by the views that making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and blessings, that children ought to obey their parents according to their culture, and that a person should be on his own and be self-reliant. The view that a person should be on his own and be self-reliant poses a problem in that it is itself an individualist aspect (*see 4.3.2*). However, if the negative value of its loading on this factor could be interpreted as indicating consonance of this item with the other two, then factor 7 is a communalist aspect, hence an Afrocentric axiological dimension (*see 4.3.3.2, 5.3.2, 5.3.2.3*).

On the other hand, if factor 1, factor 4 and factor 7 are similar, why are they scattered? The aspects that define the three factors are communalist aspects (*see 4.3.2, 4.3.2.1*). It is possible that the communalist aspect has clusters of elements that define it, some of which would define the communalist aspect of Group 2 more than others would. This would mean that the three factors represent different clusters of communalist aspects. The cluster of communalist aspects in factor 1 seems to emphasise helping each other, especially caring for ageing parents. As for factor 4, the cluster seems to focus more on the individual's priority preference of the general welfare of the community over the welfare of individuals. The cluster represented by factor 7 seems to focus more on the individual's belonging to the community, which includes obeying parents according to their culture (*cf. discussion of factor 1 and factor 7 under 7.3.1.1*).

It could be concluded that factor 2, factor 4 and factor 7 are various elements of the communalist aspect. The fact that these factors are wide apart could be explained by the fact that the three elements of the communalist aspect represented by each of these factors do not weigh equally in defining communalism (*see 4.5*). Communalism is an aspect of the axiological dimension (*see 4.3.3.2*) of the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.2*). Therefore, axiologically, Group 2 is characterised by an Afrocentric world view orientation. This would, perhaps, explain why the axiological dimension is not reflected in factor 1, which represents an overall world view orientation which is primarily Eurocentric (*see 7.3.1*).

7.3.2.3. The third strongest world view dimension

The third strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is reflected by factor 3 (*see 6.3.2*). This factor is defined by the belief that nature and all living things in it are sacred and the view that although mankind tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature. It is also defined by the belief that basically nature controls mankind and the view that nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit. All these items are aspects of the ontological dimension of world view (*see 4.3.3.5*). But, whereas the belief in the sacredness of nature and all things in it (first item) and the nature-over-man view (second and third items) reflect an Afrocentric orientation (*see 5.3.4*), the nature-for-man belief (fourth item) reflects a Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.4*).

Factor 3 is similar to factor 8 (*see 6.3.2*), which is defined by the view that it is important to have harmony in relations with other people and the belief that the universe is inhabited by two forces, good and evil. This factor seems to emphasise the necessity to make effort to be in harmony with other people, possibly because a choice has to be made between being controlled by good and being controlled by evil. Both items defining this factor are ontological (*see 4.3.3.4*) and are supposedly within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.4*).

Factor 3 is also similar to factor 10 (*see 6.3.2*), which is defined by the beliefs that unknown forces control nature and that the universe is inhabited by two forces, good and evil (cf. factor 8, *see Table 6.03 for the loadings*) loading second highest on factor 10. The item defining factor 10 is an ontological aspect (see 4.3.3.4), also supposedly within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.4*).

It could be concluded that factor 3, factor 8 and factor 10 represent various aspects of the Afrocentric ontology. The presence of the Eurocentric ontological item in factor 3 probably reflects the Eurocentric ontology aspect found in factor 1. Why these factors are wide apart could be attributed to the fact that the ontological dimension consists of various aspects but which do not define Group 2's ontological dimension equally. This means that each of these factors represents a separate cluster of aspects of the ontological dimension. For Group 2, the belief in the sacredness of things and the nature-over-man view (factor 3) are more pertinent elements of ontology than the notions that it is important to exist in harmony with others (factor 8), or that the universe is inhabited by good and evil (factor 8), or that unknown forces control nature (factor 10).

Although factor 3, factor 8 and factor 10 suggest that ontologically Group 2 is Afrocentric, it must be remembered that ontology is an integral component of the

Group's general dimension of world view (*see factor 1*), which means that Group 2 is still ontologically more Eurocentric than Afrocentric. Therefore, what the third strongest factor suggests is that ontologically Group 2 is significantly Afrocentric, but not strongly Afrocentric.

7.3.2.4. *The fourth strongest world view dimension*

The fourth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is reflected by factor 5 (*see 6.3.2*). Factor 5 is defined by the views that one would basically be contented with life as long as one has food, clothing and shelter; that being in the community means being part of the community; and that people should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community. The view that one would be contented with life provided that one has food, clothing and shelter reflects a non-materialist projection, which is an aspect of Afrocentric ontology (*see 4.3.3.2, 5.3.2*). The view that being in the community means being part of the community reflects a communalism, which is an aspect of the axiological dimension of world view (*see 4.3.3.2*) within the Afrocentric world view orientation (*see 5.3.2*). The view that people should be respected because of their individual achievements, rather than because of their contribution to the community, reflects individualism, which is an aspect of the axiological dimension (*see 4.3.3.2*) within the Eurocentric world view orientation (*see 5.4.2*).

It should be noted that the aspects of ontology and axiology appearing in this factor are also reflected in factor 1 and factor 2, respectively. It should also be noted (*see Table 6.03 for loadings*) that the first item loads (*loading is 0.846*) almost as much as the other two items (*loadings are 0.457 and 0.394*) combined, which means that although this is a mixed factor, it reflects primarily a non-materialist predisposition, which implies that the factor represents primarily an Afrocentric ontology. The question is, why are the ontological and axiological items in factor 5 not distributed among factor 1 and factor 2? It is difficult to come up with a straight answer; only possibilities could be suggested.

The mixture of aspects from different world view dimensions to constitute a single factor (dimension) seems to agree with our proposition that there could be hybrid world view dimensions. That remains a possible explanation, but there are two other possibilities. Perhaps, items whose importance in the definition of the world view orientation is below some threshold level combine in ways that do not reflect clear-cut patterns. One problem with this explanation is that it is difficult to determine the threshold level of significance of items, let alone being rather speculative. But also, this possibility is rather remote, because from factor analysis theory (*see 6.3, footnote 17*), items that are too low in significance would be trimmed off in the process of semantic differentiation, and those that are irrelevant may load strongly but in a trash basket factor. This is not the case with factor 5.

A more plausible explanation is that different combinations of aspects of different world view dimensions constitute hybrid dimensions (*see 7.3.2.1*) that have different levels of importance in the definition of the world view orientation; the lower in significance they are, the more they appear as later factors in the factor structure.

Whatever the explanation, what is available from the data is that the fourth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is primarily an Afrocentric ontology (non-materialism) with an Afrocentric axiology (communalism) and a Eurocentric axiology (individualism).

7.3.2.5. The fifth strongest world view dimension

The fifth strongest world view dimension characterising Group 2 is reflected by factor 6 (*see 6.3.2*). Factor 6 is defined by the view that a person should be independent in thought and action and the belief that basically man controls nature. Whereas the first item reflects an individualist aspect, hence, within the axiological world view dimension (*see 4.3.2*), the second item reflects a man-over-nature view, hence, within the ontological dimension (see 4.3.5). However, they both reflect a Eurocentric orientation (*see 5.4.2, 5.4.4*). Therefore, this dimension is a mixture of aspects of Eurocentric axiology and aspects of Eurocentric ontology. If the explanation of the mixed nature of the fourth strongest dimension is valid, it would be in agreement with the inference that this factor is lower in significance than the fourth dimension.

7.3.2.6. Deduction and synthesis of the world view orientation

From this discussion, the following can be deduced:

- In terms of world view orientation, Group 2 is characterised by a general integrated world view dimension, consisting of Eurocentric epistemology, Eurocentric ontology and Eurocentric chronemics and Afrocentric ontology. On the overall, this is a Eurocentric holistic dimension; epistemologically pertaining to knowing the truth through reason and proof; ontologically, pertaining more to living a comfortable life and knowing that life is an on-going struggle than holding the view that pleasure is always necessary; and, chronemically, pertaining more to always thinking about one thing at a time than always feeling frustrated when there is a failure in following own schedule.

- Group 2 is primarily Caucasian; it is actually primarily Afrikaans speaking people. This group is significantly oriented towards family values such as respect for parents and the elderly, respect for parental authority, helping each and a general sense of brotherhood or community orientation.

- Axiologically, Group 2 is characterised by an Afrocentric world view orientation. Contrary to the view that people with primarily a Eurocentric world view orientation are individualist (see e.g. Van der Walt, 1998:44; Moemeka, 1997:174; *see also 5.4.2*), Group 2, though primarily Eurocentric, it is almost consistently communalist.

- Generally, where the ontological dimension appears as a separate dimension, it consistently reflects Group 2 as significantly, though not primarily, ontologically Afrocentric. Since it presence in factor 1 is generally weak (*lowest loading, see Table 6.03*), it seems that on overall, Group 2 is ontologically Afrocentric.

- For Group 2, cross-world view orientation and cross-world view dimension overlappings are found. The implications of these overlappings lead to the suggestion that one could find hybrid world view orientations. If this be the case with Group 2, then, one would have to think of a term for the specific kind of world view orientation found.

- The data show that the world view orientation characterising Group 2 does not neatly fit either of the two orientations. The possibility of a brand of world view orientation for Group 2 remains open. Group 2's world view orientation has an interesting structure. After what could be a foundational dimension, consisting of aspects of Eurocentric epistemology, Eurocentric chronemics and Afrocentric ontology, the rest are primarily Afrocentric axiology or primarily Afrocentric ontology, or some mixture of axiological and ontological aspects.

But in terms of the Afrocentric-Eurocentric distinction, Group 2 is more Eurocentric than it is Afrocentric.

A comment should be made regarding the nature of world view, in view of the data, although this comment should be interpreted in view of the fact that the sample is not representative and, therefore, the conclusions arrived at cannot be generalised.

The data suggest that Afrocentric and Eurocentric orientations are not linearly exclusive; they overlap in a number of areas both along dimensions and along aspects of dimensions. This is consistent with the definition of world view in general (*see 4.5*). The data also suggest that the characteristics of the Afrocentrism and Eurocentric world view orientations are found in both Group 1, which consists of primarily black people, and Group 2, which consists primarily of Caucasian Afrikaans speaking people. This finding is consistent with the proposition made earlier, that Afrocentric and Eurocentric orientations are not necessarily based on skin colour (*see 5.2.1*). This means that, the components that constitute any world view orientation could be, and indeed would be, upheld by people, regardless their colour of skin. The complex nature of world view is such that a person or group of people could be Afrocentric with respect to one aspect or issue, such as communalism, and be quite Eurocentric with respect to another issue, such as an aspect of ontology. It is in this regard that Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism are orientations, and not fixed and rigid frameworks in which a person would belong either to the one or to the other. Therefore, in using the componential typology of world view proposed in the study as a research framework, one should keep in mind that world view orientations are orientations, not sharply exclusive ways of categorising people groups.

7.3.3. Speaker credibility and Afrocentric world view orientation

To investigate the interaction between speaker credibility formation and application and the Afrocentric world view orientation, it was hypothesised as follows:

H1. Audiences with primarily an Afrocentric world view form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of aesthetic and presentation aspects.

In order to draw a conclusion regarding this hypothesis, the credibility dimensions formed and applied by an audience charaterised by an Afrocentric world view orientation should be analysed. The best we have in this study is Group 1, which is primarily (but not wholly) Afrocentric in orientation (*see 7.3.1.7*). Only the clear dimensions of speaker credibility for Group 1 are considered, namely, those represented by factor 1, factor 2, factor 3, factor 4, factor 7 and factor 8 (*see 6.3.3, also Table 6.05*). These credibility dimensions are discussed below.

7.3.3.1. The most important speaker credibility dimension

The most important speaker credibility dimension formed by and applied by Group 1 (*see 6.3.3*) is represented by factor 1 and it is defined most strongly by the perception regarding the speaker being informed about the topic (loading > 0.85) and second most strongly regarding the speaker being sincere in the presentation of the content (loading > 0.75). Also forming part of the credibility dimension represented by factor 1 are perceptions regarding the speaker being flexible, faithful, energetic, virtuous and pleasant. This credibility dimension represented by factor 1 seems to reflect the speaker's potential to handle the topic (whether informed or not, whether sincere or not, whether rigid or flexible), and his personal character in terms of faithfulness. The perception regarding the speaker being energetic or weak seems to constitute another element of this credibility dimension, and that is, pertaining to vitality in delivery. The perception regarding the speaker being virtuous or sinful suggests a third element of this credibility dimension, namely, the moral quality. The perception of the speaker with regard to being pleasant or unpleasant suggests the Ss's taste of the speaker as the fourth element of this credibility dimension.

Therefore, for Group 1, the most important speaker credibility dimension is a general dimension, encompassing subject competence, moral and personality qualities, dynamism, and pleasantness.

7.3.3.2. The second most important speaker credibility dimension

The second most important speaker credibility for Group 1 (*see 6.3.3*) is represented by factor 2, which is defined most strongly by perceptions regarding the speaker being honest (loading > 0.81) and lively (loading > 0.80). This credibility dimension includes perceptions regarding whether the speaker is trained or not (loading > 0.76), which is an element concerning the speaker's potential to talk about the topic. The third element apparently entailed in this credibility dimension pertains to the perception regarding the speaker's friendliness to the audience (loading > 0.72). The other elements of this speaker credibility dimension are perceptions regarding the speaker being bad or good, being doubting or convinced, being poor or rich and being ugly or handsome (*see 6.05 for loadings*). This factor substantially overlaps with factor 1 and it also seems to be a general dimension, including moral, presentation aspects, subject competence, orientation towards the audience, and physical appearance.

7.3.3.3. The third most important speaker credibility dimension

The third most important speaker credibility dimension is represented by factor 3 (*see 6.3.3*), which is defined by perceptions regarding the speaker being analytical or emotional (loading > 0.79), masculine or feminine and with regard to being experienced. The combination of these items makes factor 3 somewhat unclear, but this dimension could be a cluster of presentation aspects.

7.3.3.4. The fourth most important speaker credibility dimension

The fourth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 1 is represented by factor 4 (*see 6.3.3*), which is defined by perceptions regarding the speaker being humorous or serious and regarding the speaker being unclear or clear. The negative loading value on the *unclear-clear* pair suggests that the particular speaker, upon whom the formation and application of this speaker credibility dimension is based, is evaluated as unclear (since during the factor analysis the score of this pair was reversed in order to begin with the positive adjective, *see 6.3, footnote 20*). This seems to be a presentation dimension.

7.3.3.5. The fifth most important speaker credibility dimension

The fifth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 1 is represented by factor 7 (*see 6.3.3*), which is defined by perceptions regarding the speaker being tall or short and being fast or slow. This factor is not all that clear, but it seems to be a combination of physical appearance and presentation aspects.

Factor 3, factor 4 and factor 7 seem to represent various aspects of delivery of the speech. It is not clear why they are separated, but it is possible that the presentation aspects represented by these factors appear distinct because they define the significance of the quality of presentation differently. But for all practical purposes, these factors could be seen together as constituting a presentation dimension.

7.3.3.6. The sixth most important speaker credibility dimension

The sixth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 1 is represented by factor 8 (*see 6.3.3*), which is defined by the perception regarding the speaker being young or old. Interesting to note is that this pair has one of the highest loadings (0.88) of all the pairs used in the study. The cue pair, *unclear-clear*, does not shed any more light than could be found in the single pair situation. Since Afrocentric audiences venerate age (*see 5.3.2.4*), it is possible that the age of the speaker is significant to speaker credibility, and that there simply was no other rating pair that would fall under the same dimension. But in view of the criterion that there has to be at least two pairs loading strongly on a factor, or there has to be at least one clear cue pair, in order for the factor to be considered a dimension (*see 6.3*), inference of factor 8 would have to be rather limited. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that for Group 1, age is associated with clarity (cf. *7.3.4.3*).

The speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1 could be summarised as follows:

- general speaker credibility criteria consisting of subject competence, moral quality, dynamism, and personality qualities;

- general speaker credibility criteria consisting of moral quality, presentation quality, subject competence, orientation towards the audience and physical appearance;
- presentation aspects;
- physical appearance; and
- Possibly, age-based qualification.

7.3.3.7. Hypothesis 1

In view of H1, the question that must be answered is this: To what extent do these credibility dimensions suggest that audiences with primarily Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of aesthetic and presentation aspects?

The findings of the present study suggest that Afrocentric audiences form speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speaker in terms of subject competence, moral aspects as well as aesthetic and presentation aspects and, possibly, age.

Therefore, H1 is not supported in its present formulation. Although the elements posited in the hypothesis are confirmed by the data, the most important speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 1 contain more elements than what is posited in the hypothesis. The first two speaker credibility dimensions, which overlap substantially and are both integrated, constitute a general credibility criterion which encompasses subject competence, moral quality, orientation towards the audience, presentation aspects and physical appearance. Since the orientation towards the audience is akin to the relational dimension in our conceptualisation of the speaker credibility construct (see 3.4.2), this criterion seems to encompass all the four credibility sets, namely, the moral, relational, content-related competence and aesthetic dimensions. The next dimensions in the factor structure are various aesthetic aspects, such as humorous presentation, analytical and masculine orientation in presentation and physical appearance. The third level is age, which might suggest age-based qualification as a credibility dimension. H1 could be reformulated to say that audiences with primarily an Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of a general speaker credibility criteria, encompassing subject competence; moral, relational and presentation qualities; aesthetic aspects and, possibly, age-based qualification.

This conclusion must, however, be seen in the light that Group 1 is not a sample of Afrocentric audiences, but an instance of an Afrocentric group (*see 6.2.2.1*). Nevertheless, the implication of this conclusion is that speakers seeking to persuade comparable Afrocentric audiences should (and be perceived to) be competent in the topic of their discussion, be known for acceptable moral standing, and should speak well in good physical appearance. Some thinkers (e.g., Senghor, 1965) suggest that Afrocentric audiences are simply expressive and do not care for depth of substance. The findings of the present study contradict this kind of thinking. If this is true, a further implication is that Afrocentric audiences impose a much comprehensive and, therefore, high critical standard on persuasive speakers.

7.3.4. Speaker credibility and Eurocentric world view orientation

To investigate the interaction between speaker credibility formation and application and the Eurocentric world view orientation, it was hypothesised as follows:

H2. Audiences with primarily an Eurocentric world view form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of subject competence and moral aspects.

In order to draw a conclusion regarding this hypothesis, the credibility dimensions formed and applied by an audience characterised a Eurocentric world view orientation should be analysed. The best we have in this study is Group 2, which is not totally Eurocentric, but it has strong Eurocentric elements (*see 7.3.2.6*). Only the clear dimensions of speaker credibility for Group 2 are considered, namely, those represented by factor 1, factor 2, factor 3, factor 4, factor 5 and factor 7 (*see 6.3.4, also Table 6.07*). These credibility dimensions are analysed and presented below.

7.3.4.1. The most important speaker credibility dimension

The most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 1 (*see 6.3.4*), which is defined by perceptions whether the speaker is sincere or insincere, whether the speaker is perceived as masculine orientated or feminine orientated, whether the speaker is faithful or unfaithful and whether the speaker is wrong or right.

The masculinity-femininity pair introduces an ambiguity to the otherwise clearly moral quality dimension. It is possible that the group has a stereotypic association between moral quality and masculinity-femininity, possibly because credibility dimensions are linked to non-credibility aspects of the speaker. Alternatively, if the masculine-feminine perceptions that Group 2 has of the speaker are considered to be an index of the speaker's faithfulness or unfaithfulness and wrongness or rightness, then this dimension would be a moral quality dimension (*see 3.4.2.1*).

7.3.4.2. The second most important speaker credibility dimension

The second most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 2 (*see 6.3.4*), which is defined by perceptions regarding the speaker being dull or lively, energetic or weak and fast or slow. This is a presentation dimension, to be specific, a notable emphasis on dynamic presentation (*see 3.4.2.4*).

7.3.4.3. The third most important speaker credibility dimension

The third most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 3 (*see 6.3.4*), which is defined in terms of whether the speaker is clear or unclear, informed or uninformed, trained or untrained and experienced or inexperienced. This seems to be a subject competence dimension (*see 3.4.2.3*). This subject competence seems to emphasise a speaker-message relationship, but more in terms of how the speaker affects the message than how he is affected by the message. It is subject competence in the sense of an ability to "tackle" a topic.

7.3.4.4. The fourth most important speaker credibility dimension

The fourth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 4 (*see 6.3.4*). This dimension is defined by perceptions of the speaker in terms of being humorous or serious, analytical or emotional, sad or happy, friendly or unfriendly and heavy or light (negative loading value). Although these aspects could be general personality aspects inferred by the Ss on the basis of their prior knowledge of the speaker, their combination seem to be based on the presentation of the speech than on reputation. Therefore, this is possibly a presentation dimension, particularly emphasising the mood and tone of the speaker during the presentation of the persuasive speech (*see 3.4.2.2*). A suitable label for it seems to be sociability, which reflects a relational dimension (*see 3.4.2.2*).

7.3.4.5. The fifth most important speaker credibility dimension

The fifth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 5 (*see 6.3.4*). Factor 5 pertains to perceptions regarding the speaker being young or old, attractive or unattractive, ugly or handsome and doubting or convinced. It is interesting to note that age is associated with attractiveness and handsomeness. It is not clear why perceptions of whether the speaker is doubting or convinced during presentation appears with aspects of physical attractiveness. This could be suggesting that when the audience evaluates a persuasive speaker in terms of physical appearance, it will tend also to associate the speaker and the message being presented (cf. *7.3.3.6*). In any case, this is a physical appearance dimension (*see 3.4.2.4*).

7.3.4.6. The sixth most important speaker credibility dimension

The sixth most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 7 (*see 6.3.4*). This factor is defined by the perception regarding the speaker being objective or subjective, hence, a single pair situation. When the cue pair, *virtuous-sinful* is taken into account, it becomes apparent that factor 7 represents a moral quality dimension. But since the moral quality dimension has been reflected in factor 1, it is more likely that factor 7 represents an objectivity dimension. Should this be true, the cue pair would suggest that Group 2 perceives lack of objectivity almost as a moral issue.

7.3.4.7. The seventh most important speaker credibility dimension

The seventh most important speaker credibility dimension formed and applied by Group 2 is represented by factor 9. This factor is defined by perceptions regarding the speaker being good or bad, hence it is a single pair situation. But *sad-happy*, *untrained-trained* and *faithful-unfaithful* load second highest on this factor (*see Table 6.07 for loadings*). When these cue pairs are taken as additional indicators, it becomes apparent that factor 9 is an evaluative overall *quality* dimension of speaker credibility.

These factors could be summarised as follows:

- moral quality
- dynamic presentation
- subject competence
- sociability
- physical appearance
- objectivity
- overall quality

7.3.4.8. Hypothesis 2

In view of H2, the question that must be answered is this: To what extent do these credibility dimensions suggest that audiences with primarily Eurocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of moral and subject competence aspects?

The findings of the present study suggest that Eurocentric audiences form speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speaker in terms of moral quality, dynamism, subject competence, sociability, physical appearance, objectivity and general quality.

Therefore, it would appear as if in its present formulation, H2 is not supported, since for Group 2, the most significant factor is the moral quality of the speaker, followed by dynamic presentation and, then, subject competence. The least significant dimensions in Group 2's criteria for evaluating persuasive speakers are sociability, the aesthetic aspect of physical appearance and objectivity. However, Group 2 is characterised by aspects that are not typically Eurocentric (*see 7.3.2.6*). This means that the data obtained from the group cannot form a complete basis for drawing a firm conclusion regarding H1.

Nevertheless, the data seem to suggest that, to the extent that Group 2 is characterised by a Eurocentric world view orientation, it forms and applies credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of moral, aesthetic and subject competence aspects. On the basis of the three most significant speaker credibility dimensions formed and applied by Group 2, H2 could be reformulated to say that, to the extent that an audience is characterised by a Eurocentric world view orientation, the audience will form and apply speaker credibility dimensions that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of moral quality, aesthetic aspects and subject competence.

It might be hypothesised that the presence of the specific aesthetic aspect of dynamism as the second most significant dimension is due to the strong Afrocentric axiology that characters Group 2. Therefore, like Afrocentric audiences, dynamism is an element of speaker credibility, coming second and taking priority over subject competence. Obviously, what Eurocentric audiences understand and desire in terms of dynamism is not necessarily the same as the dynamism that Afrocentric audiences understand and require of a persuasive speaker. Dynamism is generally understood in terms of the vibrant presentation with such elements as pitch, tone, pace and, especially, body movements. But it is also possible to view dynamism in terms of vocabulary and use of what Weaver (1965) calls charismatic language. Clearly, dynamism is a credibility dimension for both Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences. However, further theoretical and research work is needed to clearly define dynamism, perhaps establish the elements of dynamism.

7.3.5. Speaker credibility: Afrocentric vs. Eurocentric world view orientations

In order to compare Group 1 and Group 2 in terms of the speaker credibility dimensions they each formed and applied, it was hypothesised that under the same persuasive speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences form and apply different speaker credibility dimensions. For the sake of clarity on this part of the discussion, the dimensions of speaker credibility formed and applied by Group 1 and Group 2 are juxtaposed in Table 7.01 (*see section 6.3.3.* and *section 6.3.4*). It should be noted at this stage that the credibility dimensions formed and applied for the white and black speakers were not statistically different (*see 6.3.5.1 and 6.3.5.2*), which means that the race of the speaker did not make any practically significant difference in terms of the credibility dimensions formed and applied for the speakers. A comparison and contrast of the world view dimensions of Group 1 and Group 2 and a comparison and contrast of the speaker credibility dimensions for Group 1 and Group 2 show some similarities and differences, as follows:

7.3.5.1. Similarities between Afrocentric and Eurocentric credibility dimensions

The physical appearance dimension appears as the fifth most significant credibility dimension for both Group 1 and Group 2. The two most significant credibility dimensions for Group 1 are equivalent to the four most significant credibility dimensions for Group 2, to which extent the groups could be said to be similar. The first dimension for Group 2 reflects a moral quality emphasis. The first dimension for Group 1 contains two of the defining pairs which also appear in the first dimension of Group 2, namely, (Q43) *Sincere-insincere* and (Q19) *Faithful-unfaithful*. This could suggest that the first dimensions for the two groups are comparable.

7.3.5.2. Differences between Afrocentric and Eurocentric credibility dimensions

However, the objectivity dimension and overall quality dimension are unique to Group 2, whereas the possibility of an age-based qualification dimension is unique to Group 1. Furthermore, whereas in Group 1 age is associated with clarity in speaking, in Group 2 age is associated with physical appearance, in particular, physical attractiveness. These are relatively less significant differences between Group 1 and Group 2.

Table 7.01 Speaker credibility dimensions for Group 1 and Group 2

Speaker credibility formed and applied by Group 1	Speaker credibility formed and applied by Group 2
• General speaker quality, with elements of subject competence, moral quality, dynamism, and personal qualities. • Presentation quality and physical appearance. • Presentation skill. • Possibly, age-based qualification.	• Moral quality • Dynamism • Subject competence • Sociability • Physical appearance • Objectivity • Overall quality

What seems to be a more fundamental difference is in the factor structures of the credibility dimensions. Whereas the credibility factor structure of Group 1 shows credibility to be more integrated and holistic, the credibility factor structure of Group 2 shows credibility to be more segmented and clear-cut. This means that the credibility stock is more or less the same (*see 3.4.2*) but audiences form and apply different configurations of the credibility stock. This would imply that audiences exercise discretion in applying credibility criteria against persuasive speakers, waiving some standards and using certain other dimensions more prominently, refraining from using credibility criteria that are irrelevant to the speaking situation. Hence, audiences characterised by certain world view orientations would characteristically form and apply credibility dimensions that emphasise evaluation of persuasive speakers along some credibility sets more than other credibility sets.

On the basis of this comparative analysis, the thesis that speaker credibility is a stratified construct is plausible, although that does not mean that the strata of the construct are fixed and the same for all audiences. This means that the first dimension formed and applied by each group is the most significant dimension of speaker credibility for that group. The next dimension would be the next most significant, and so on, hence, the stratified nature of the credibility construct.

On the other hand, whether the stratified nature of the speaker credibility construct means that there are, indeed, foundational dimensions, remains to be confirmed by further research. It is possible that the first dimension in each group represents the foundation dimension, but that is not a sufficient basis to affirm the conclusion that speaker credibility is a stratified multi-dimensional construct. Even if it were granted that the first dimension for Group 2 is the foundational dimension for each group, it would be necessary to do similar studies among groups with the same world view orientation as Group 2, to see if moral quality would still be the first dimension. Similarly, even if the first dimension of speaker credibility formed and applied by Group 1 were taken as the foundational dimension for that group, further research among audiences with the same world view orientation as Group 1 would be necessary, before it could be deduced that the general speaker quality would be found consistently the first dimension.

Group 1 emphasises the overall quality of the speaking situation combining elements of the speaker and speaking process. The pattern of emphasis seems to be a movement from the general dimension to the specific dimensions. Hence, this is a more holistic, rather than a segmented, formation and application of speaker credibility. This is expected for an audience that was characterised by a primarily Afrocentric world view orientation (see *section 4.3.3.1, section 5.3.1, section 6.3.2*). Also, should the age-based qualification be a dimension of speaker credibility, as it seems to be, it would be unique to Group 1. This would also be expected for an audience in whose world view orientation old age is venerated (*see section 5.3.2.4*).

The dimensions formed and applied by Group 2 are "clear-cut" single dimensions. Group 2 emphasises overall personality of the speaker, (moral quality, dynamism, subject competence, sociability, physical appearance and objectivity) and then overall evaluation of the speaking process (overall quality). Hence, the pattern of emphasis seems to be a movement from specific dimensions to the general dimensions. The formation and application of the objectivity dimension seems to be unique to Group 2. This would be expected for an audience that was characterised by a Eurocentric epistemology (see *section 4.3.3.1, section 5.4.1, section 6.3.1*).

In addition to the fact that this conclusion cannot be generalised, since the sample was not representative, the similarities and differences should be understood in the light of the comparison of the world view orientations of Group 1 and Group 2.

7.3.5.3. Hypothesis 3

H3: Under the same persuasive speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences form and apply different speaker credibility dimensions.

The validity of this hypothesis does not depend on the validity of H1 and H2. However, its validity has implications for H4. The analysis shows that, in terms of general orientations, Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences form and apply loosely different speaker credibility dimensions. Since both world views and speaker credibility dimensions are general, rather than strict and rigid, orientations, the differences observed would quite meet the expected outcomes. Therefore, H3 is not supported in its present formulation. In view of the data of the present study, this hypothesis could be reformulated as follows:

Under the same persuasive speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences and Eurocentric audiences form and apply different configurations of the speaker credibility dimensions.

7.3.6. Audience world view and speaker credibility formation and application: Hypotheses 4

H4. There is a relationship between the formation of the dimensions of speaker credibility in persuasive speaking and the world view of the audience.

In order to posit a causal association between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility, there has to be evidence that audiences with different world view orientations should form and apply different speaker credibility dimensions. Incidentally, the world view orientations of Group 1 and (especially) Group 2, were not purely one or other world view orientations. The empirical findings of this study are, therefore, inconclusive about H4.

If audiences characterised primarily by an Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply unique speaker credibility dimensions, it might be suggested that there is a relationship between the Afrocentric orientation and credibility formation and application. The data available show that Group 1, which is characterised primarily by an Afrocentric world view orientation, form and apply credibility dimensions that are unique in configuration.

Similarly, if audiences characterised primarily by a Eurocentric world view orientation form and apply unique speaker credibility dimensions, it might be inferred that there is a relationship between the Eurocentric orientation and the formation and application of speaker credibility. The data available show that Group 2 formed and applied speaker credibility dimensions that were unique in configuration. However, although it was primarily Eurocentric in orientation, Group 2 was also characterised by strong Afrocentric aspects. This would have caused a spurious relationship between credibility formation and application and Group 2's world view orientation.

If H3 is valid, that under the same speaking conditions, Afrocentric audiences form and apply credibility dimensions that are different from those formed and applied by Eurocentric audiences, it would imply that there is a causal influence of world view on speaker credibility.

What this means is that, if H1, H2 and H3 are true, H4 would be true, although not necessarily vice-versa. From the available data, the three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) are tentatively supported. This implies that H4 too could go as far as being tentatively supported. But because of the lack of a sharp distinction between the Afrocentric and Eurocentric sub-samples, a firm empirical basis is lacking regarding H4.

7.4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR PERSUASION THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Speaker credibility would interact with a number of aspects of Afrocentric and Eurocentric world view orientations, although that does not mean that all the dimensions of world view have implications for speaker credibility applying equally both in Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism. It is quite possible that the similarities in world view for the study population are due to the fact that the Ss were all at comparably the same level of educational development. Being at the same university and being exposed to generally the same mass media output could have contributed to a world view homogenisation process. Both groups reflected both Afrocentric and Eurocentric elements, which would imply the following:

- One should not simply assume wholesome exclusive differences between groups of people on the basis of race.
- One should neither blow the differences between black people and white people out of proportion nor ignore the important and useful similarities in designing programmes employing persuasive communication.
- The areas of world view similarities could be utilised in building speaker credibility-based persuasion models.
- It is likely that if the study had been done among rural communities, sharper differences in world views would have been found. Should that be the case, it would mean, more strictly, that persuasive projects in such communities should pay closer attention to the demands and expectations of Afrocentric and Eurocentric world views on speaker credibility. This, however, awaits to be empirically established.

7.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

As in any empirical study, this study is likely to have suffered a number of limitations. Knowledge of such limitations and their likely influence in the study would be useful in understanding and applying the findings and conclusions arising therefrom. The limitations of this study would include the following:

7.5.1. Possible differences in linguistic competence of the Ss

The study was conducted in English (the questionnaires, the speech and any instructions to the Ss were given in English. It is possible that some of the Ss, to whom English is a second or third language, had difficult understanding the questionnaires, following instructions and completing the questionnaire. It is also possible that the Ss were at different levels of English language proficiency. This would mean that the Ss would be responding technically to different questionnaires, which means the data would not be based totally on the same gauge.

7.5.2. Length of world view index and semantic differential

The world view index and the semantic differential for assessing speaker credibility were supposed to constitute a single instrument. A single instrument would, however, been too long, but it would have permitted multiple correlation, which would have indicated whether a *causal* relation exist between audience world view and the formation and application of speaker credibility.

7.5.3. Limitations due to sampling

For this study, a convenient sample was used. The implication of using such a sample is that the findings and conclusions could be limited to that particular sample. Therefore, even if one applied the conclusions of the study to an audience similar to the sample, one would have to do so bearing in mind that they were not based on a random sample.

7.6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A number of issues come to the fore from this study that require investigation. These elements emerge from the findings, the discussion and the theoretical argumentation of the study. The following are the key areas where further researcher is needed:

- Since perception is conceived as a dimension of world view, there is need to identify the perceptual categories of Afrocentric and Eurocentric audiences and their possible influence on the formation and application of speaker credibility.

- There seems to be a significant role of audience-speaker similarity in the occurrence of persuasion. It is generally taken axiomatically that communicators are more likely to change the attitudes of audiences if they are believed to be similar, rather than dissimilar, to those audiences they seek to influence and that similarity between the persuasive source and the audience enhances persuasion, especially if they are similar in their axiological orientations. Within persuasive communication, audiences will tend to accord higher credibility to persuasive sources whose *values* are perceived as being similar to their own. It would be expected that Afrocentric audiences would expect the speaker to be similar to them, personally interested in the welfare of the audience, and displaying an orientation towards community life. However, research is needed to establish whether, indeed, value similarity between an audience and a speaker for Afrocentric audiences means higher speaker credibility and vice-versa.

- Speaker credibility among Afrocentric audiences has been studied using a comparative measurement with Eurocentric audiences. A comparative study is in itself contra-Afrocentric, since, the tendency in theorising has been to look at various social phenomena from the point of view of Western civilisation. Also, a comparative study methodologically presumes that the basis for comparison applies *equi-adequately* across the people groups under study. Such a methodological presupposition is subject to criticism. Therefore, extended research is needed to investigate the credibility sets for Afrocentric audiences.

- This study has contributed significantly to the development of a theoretical basis of, and an instrument for measuring, world view generally and Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism specifically. However, more research work and more sophisticated statistical analyses are required in order to refine the world view index.

- The findings of the present study and the subsequent conclusions and theoretical implications could be applicable to similar populations, and could even be limited to the period characterising present-day South Africa. Although they provide useful pointers for practical purposes, more sustained research is needed to establish the extent to which the these pointers are more global and more permanent.

- The findings of this study reflect similarities between Afrocentric Ss and Eurocentric Ss. It was hypothesised that these similarities could be due to the fact that the Ss were all university students and that the experience of advanced education has had a westernising effect on them. However, further research could show if this hypothesis is, indeed, valid. Further research could involve more divergent, but socially comparable, groups, say rural black Ss in South Africa and rural white Ss in, say, the Netherlands.

- The proposition that the speaker credibility construct is stratified offers much promise for further research in this area. Could that stratified nature get empirical support?

7.7. CONCLUSION

The nature of persuasion, speaker credibility and world view suggests that there would be an interaction between the audience world view and both persuasion and speaker credibility. Cultural orientation entails the behavioural level; the cognitive repertoire; and the philosophical outlook. The cognitive repertoire and philosophical levels constitute the cultural level that determines a people's general outlook, and one that influences every other facet of life, including communication behaviour, and thus including the formation and application of speaker credibility. This resultant composite of the cognitive repertoire and philosophical levels that constitutes world view, and thus, world view is defined as a complex weave of interacting and interrelated systems of epistemology, axiology, ontology, chronemics, and perceptual behaviour.

Speaker credibility is a key concept in persuasive speaking across audiences of various world view orientations. On the one hand, persuasion by its nature requires the intentional efforts of the speaker. On the other, the audience infers upon the speaker a level of credibility on the basis of the audience's perception of foundational, as well as context-specific, speaker credibility sets. The present study indicates, at least tentatively, that audiences of Afrocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility sets that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of a general criteria encompassing subject competence, moral qualities and aesthetic qualities. Audiences of Eurocentric world view orientation form and apply credibility sets that emphasise the evaluation of persuasive speakers in terms of moral aspects, dynamism and subject competence aspects. However, data do not confirm that the audience's construal of the speaker is influenced by the audience's world view.

APPENDICES

Appendix 6.01. World view questionnaire (WVQ)

QUESTIONNAIRE 1

I would like to know your personal views on the following statements. For each statement, please show whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with it by circling the appropriate number (between 1 and 5) on the scale. N means you neither agree nor disagree with the statement. Your response simply reflects your personal view and therefore you do not need to discuss the statement with anyone. Please return this questionnaire as soon as you complete it to the person who gave it to you. ***Thank you.***

Statements	SA	A	N	D	SD
1. Obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary.	1	2	3	4	5
2. A person should be independent in thought and action.	1	2	3	4	5
3. To arrive within 30 minutes after the appointment is not being very late.	1	2	3	4	5
4. It is not necessary to obtain high social status.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Individuals exist primarily to serve the society.	1	2	3	4	5
6. It is important to have a challenging personal life.	1	2	3	4	5
7. It is not important for me to be recognised for my individual work.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I must avoid violating social norms.	1	2	3	4	5
9. A person must aim to live a comfortable life.	1	2	3	4	5
10. The general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals.	1	2	3	4	5
11. It is of utmost importance for me to respect other people.	1	2	3	4	5
12. It is necessary to refrain doing what one wants, if doing it will spoil one's future relations with others.	1	2	3	4	5

13. It is important to enhance the welfare of others.	1	2	3	4	5
14. Human nature is basically good.	1	2	3	4	5
15. A person should be on his own and be self-reliant.	1	2	3	4	5
16. If my personal preferences are in conflict with the rules and traditions of the community, I should do what I like rather than follow the community's rules or expectations.	1	2	3	4	5
17. The more possessions I have the more I am complete as a human being.	1	2	3	4	5
18. I must keep my time precisely.	1	2	3	4	5
19. Competition among individuals in the society is bad.	1	2	3	4	5
20. It is not necessary for one to be self-controlled.	1	2	3	4	5
21. It is not of utmost importance for me to be respected by others.	1	2	3	4	5
22. It is more important for me to promote communal social order than to promote my personal life.	1	2	3	4	5
23. It is more important for the individual to respect and follow the rules and traditions of the community than for the individual to be respected.	1	2	3	4	5
24. I would rather share with others what I have than have my own things only for myself.	1	2	3	4	5
25. Other people should always respect my interests.	1	2	3	4	5
26. People should be respected because of their contribution to the welfare of others, not because of their individual achievements.	1	2	3	4	5
27. Individuals should contribute their energy, time and even money to the service of others.	1	2	3	4	5
28. People should not strive to accumulate material wealth for themselves.	1	2	3	4	5

29. The society is more important than the individual.	1 2 3 4 5
30. It is important to have harmony in my relations with other people.	1 2 3 4 5
31. Societies exist primarily to benefit the individuals.	1 2 3 4 5
32. In reality, people's wealth is measured in terms of the quality and number of their children.	1 2 3 4 5
33. The welfare of individuals is more important than the general welfare of the society.	1 2 3 4 5
34. Slow pace irritates me.	1 2 3 4 5
35. Old age is honourable.	1 2 3 4 5
36. Making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and the blessings of the elderly and leaders.	1 2 3 4 5
37. Being in the community means being part of the community.	1 2 3 4 5
38. Time should be made as much as it is needed.	1 2 3 4 5
39. It is not the responsibility of elderly people to admonish and guide the young people.	1 2 3 4 5
40. I agree with the saying that "Hands wash each other", which means that people should help each other.	1 2 3 4 5
41. Leaders are bestowed with honour and should be treated with utmost respect.	1 2 3 4 5
42. It is the responsibility of parents to supervise and control their children.	1 2 3 4 5
43. Children ought to obey their parents according to their culture.	1 2 3 4 5
44. A person should personally take full care of his parents if they are old.	1 2 3 4 5
45. Neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable.	1 2 3 4 5
46. Old people deserve to be treated with dignity.	1 2 3 4 5

47. It is right for the community to play down my interests, if they conflict with those of the community.	1	2	3	4	5
48. Ensuring the maintenance of social order is the responsibility of everyone old enough to make a contribution.	1	2	3	4	5
49. It is the responsibility of elderly people to advise the community leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
50. In reality, a community's wealth is measured in terms of the number and quality of its individuals.	1	2	3	4	5
51. True knowledge comes from inner experience and vision.	1	2	3	4	5
52. The great people of the past inspire me.	1	2	3	4	5
53. Other people should recognise me because of what I might do in future, not because of what I have done in the past.	1	2	3	4	5
54. If one has not experienced something, one cannot know it.	1	2	3	4	5
55. A person should master his time.	1	2	3	4	5
56. I can know that something is true by "listening" carefully to my inner feelings.	1	2	3	4	5
57. Rituals and celebrations never make things to happen.	1	2	3	4	5
58. The supernatural is just a notion of some less developed stage of man's evolution.	1	2	3	4	5
59. In using time, one should realise that relationships among people are more important than tasks.	1	2	3	4	5
60. I get tense when something is unclear or uncertain to me.	1	2	3	4	5
61. Truth cannot be found through analysis of things.	1	2	3	4	5
62. Time regulates one's life.	1	2	3	4	5
63. Basically nature controls mankind.	1	2	3	4	5

64. Slow pace is important, therefore a person should not feel bad if he has to wait before being given attention.	1	2	3	4	5
65. It is important for one to be in a hurry, therefore one should never have to wait.	1	2	3	4	5
66. It is not necessary for me to plan my time to the minute detail.	1	2	3	4	5
67. Tight time schedules are necessary for one to accomplish things.	1	2	3	4	5
68. Individuals are more important than the society.	1	2	3	4	5
69. Stability for the society is always necessary.	1	2	3	4	5
70. We all have rights as individuals and should not be told by others what to do.	1	2	3	4	5
71. Nature and all living things in it are sacred.	1	2	3	4	5
72. I prefer doing one thing at a time.	1	2	3	4	5
73. Effort pays off, anyone can make it to the top if he or she only tries hard enough.	1	2	3	4	5
74. Whenever a problem arises one should try as much as possible to deal with it immediately.	1	2	3	4	5
75. In using time, one should follow the principle that the task determines time.	1	2	3	4	5
76. I always try to think about one thing at time.	1	2	3	4	5
77. I often give attention to several things simultaneously.	1	2	3	4	5
78. It is more important how well something is done than how timely it is done.	1	2	3	4	5
79. I seem to enjoy trying to figure out things visually.	1	2	3	4	5
80. It is important to recognise the continued influence of relatives who have died, especially ancestors.	1	2	3	4	5
81. Flexible time schedules are preferable.	1	2	3	4	5
82. Basically man controls nature.	1	2	3	4	5

83. Unfavourable conditions such as bad weather indicate that nature is an active force beyond human control.	1	2	3	4	5
84. Nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit.	1	2	3	4	5
85. Unknown forces control nature.	1	2	3	4	5
86. Fast pace irritates me.	1	2	3	4	5
87. Although mankind tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature.	1	2	3	4	5
88. Everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival.	1	2	3	4	5
89. What is meant to happen will happen anyway.	1	2	3	4	5
90. I always feel frustrated if I fail to follow schedules in what I do.	1	2	3	4	5
91. I would be very frustrated if I didn't have something meaningful to do all the time.	1	2	3	4	5
92. Instead of pushing things to happen rapidly, one should wait for things to happen naturally.	1	2	3	4	5
93. I exist in order to progress.	1	2	3	4	5
94. I would basically be contented with life as long as I have food, clothing and shelter.	1	2	3	4	5
95. People should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community.	1	2	3	4	5
96. Human nature is both good and evil.	1	2	3	4	5
97. All people are equal.	1	2	3	4	5
98. The universe is inhabited by two forces, namely, good and evil.	1	2	3	4	5
99. When something is true, I will see the reasons or its condition and actually prove that it is true.	1	2	3	4	5
100.People should be treated primarily according to their status in the society.	1	2	3	4	5

101. What is not meant to happen cannot be made to happen by human beings.	1	2	3	4	5
102. Human nature is essentially evil but could be perfected through constant control and discipline.	1	2	3	4	5
103. People should conform to the social norms that have been followed in the past.	1	2	3	4	5
104. Solidarity among people in a society should be maintained.	1	2	3	4	5
105. The world and the forces in it can be controlled by human beings.	1	2	3	4	5
106. All people should be treated according to their roles and responsibilities.	1	2	3	4	5

Please provide the following biographical information

1. Year of study (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*).
   _1st _2nd _3rd _4th _5th _6th _7th _Not applicable

2. Qualification for which you are studying (***Please mark with an X as appropriate***)
   _Diploma _Bachelors _HED _Honours _Masters _Doctorate

3. Your age category (***Please mark with an X as appropriate***)
   _Below 18 years _Between 18-20 years _Between 21-23 years
   _Between 24-26 years _Between 27-29 years
   _30 years and above

4. Primary language spoken at home (Mother tongue) (***Please mention***).

5. Country of which you are a citizen, if not South Africa (***Please mention***).

Appendix 6.02. World view index (WVI)

QUESTIONNAIRE 2

I would like to know your personal views on the following statements. For each statement, please show whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with it by circling the appropriate number (between 1 and 5) on the scale. N means you neither agree nor disagree with the statement. Your response simply reflects your personal view and therefore you do not need to discuss the statement with anyone. Please return this questionnaire as soon as you complete it to the person who gave it to you. *Thank you.*

Statements	SA	A	N	D	SD
1. Obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary.	1	2	3	4	5
2. A person should be independent in thought and action.	1	2	3	4	5
3. A person must strive to live a comfortable life.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals.	1	2	3	4	5
5. A person should be on his own and be self-reliant.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I must keep my time precisely.	1	2	3	4	5
7. It is more important for me to promote communal social order than to promote my personal life.	1	2	3	4	5
8. It is more important for the individual to respect and follow the rules and traditions of the community than for the individual to be respected.	1	2	3	4	5
9. People should be respected because of their contribution to the welfare of others, not because of their individual achievements.	1	2	3	4	5
10. The society is more important than the individual.	1	2	3	4	5
11. It is important to have harmony in my relations with other people.	1	2	3	4	5

12. Societies exist primarily to benefit the individuals.	1	2	3	4	5
13. Old age is honourable.	1	2	3	4	5
14. Making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and the blessings of the elderly and leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
15. Being in the community means being part of the community.	1	2	3	4	5
16. I agree with the saying that "Hands wash each other", which means that people should help each other.	1	2	3	4	5
17. It is the responsibility of parents to supervise and control their children.	1	2	3	4	5
18. Children ought to obey their parents according to their culture.	1	2	3	4	5
19. A person should personally take full care of his parents if they are old.	1	2	3	4	5
20. Neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable.	1	2	3	4	5
21. Old people deserve to be treated with dignity.	1	2	3	4	5
22. Ensuring the maintenance of social order is the responsibility of everyone old enough to make a contribution.	1	2	3	4	5
23. True knowledge comes from inner experience and vision.	1	2	3	4	5
24. Other people should recognise me because of what I might do in future, not because of what I have done in the past.	1	2	3	4	5
25. A person should master his time.	1	2	3	4	5
26. I can know that something is true by "listening" carefully to my inner feelings.	1	2	3	4	5
27. In using time, one should realise that relationships among people are more important than tasks.	1	2	3	4	5
28. Time regulates one's life.	1	2	3	4	5

29. Basically nature controls mankind.	1	2	3	4	5
30. Nature and all living things in it are sacred.	1	2	3	4	5
31. I prefer doing one thing at a time.	1	2	3	4	5
32. In using time, one should follow the principle that the task determines time.	1	2	3	4	5
33. I always try to think about one thing at time.	1	2	3	4	5
34. I seem to enjoy trying to figure out things visually.	1	2	3	4	5
35. It is important to recognise the continued influence of relatives who have died, especially ancestors.	1	2	3	4	5
36. Flexible time schedules are preferable.	1	2	3	4	5
37. Basically man controls nature.	1	2	3	4	5
38. Nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit.	1	2	3	4	5
39. Unknown forces control nature.	1	2	3	4	5
40. Although mankind tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature.	1	2	3	4	5
41. Everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival.	1	2	3	4	5
42. I always feel frustrated if I fail to follow schedules in what I do.	1	2	3	4	5
43. I would basically be contented with life as long as I have food, clothing and shelter.	1	2	3	4	5
44. People should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community.	1	2	3	4	5
45. Human nature is both good and evil.	1	2	3	4	5
46. The universe is inhabited by two forces, namely, good and evil.	1	2	3	4	5
47. When something is true, I will see the reasons or its condition and actually prove that it is true.	1	2	3	4	5

48. People should conform to the social norms that have been followed in the past.	1 2 3 4 5

Please provide the following biographical information

1. Year of study (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*).
_1st _2nd _3rd _4th _5th _6th _7th _Not applicable

2. Qualification for which you are currently studying (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*)
_Diploma _Bachelors _HED _Honours _Masters
_Doctorate

3. Your age category (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*)
_ Below 18 years _ Between 18-20 years _ Between 21-23 years
_ Between 24-26 years _ Between 27-29 years _30 years and above

4. What is your gender? (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*).
_ Male _ Female

5. Primary language spoken at home (Mother tongue) - (*Please mention in the space below*).

6. Country of which you are a citizen, if not South Africa (*Please mention in the space below*).

Appendix 6.03 Semantic differential for measuring speaker credibility (SDSC)

A. Please evaluate the speaker you have just listened to using the following scale. Please CIRCLE the appropriate place, between 1 and 7, along each pair of adjectives that reflects your best opinion about which end of the scale this speaker seemed to be during his presentation. PLEASE READ AND CONSIDER EACH PAIR CAREFULLY. Thank you very much!

Analytical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Emotional
Humorous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Serious
Unclear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Clear
Ignorant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Knowledgeable
Boring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Interesting
Organised	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Disorganised
Experienced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inexperienced
Ugly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Handsome
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inaccurate
Patient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Impatient
Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Moral
Energetic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak
Dull	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Lively
Despised	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honourable
Educated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Uneducated
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
Rough	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Gentle
Objective	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Subjective
Faithful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unfaithful
Flexible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Rigid
Fast	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Slow
Sad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Happy
Heavy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Light
Loud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Soft
Unconcerned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concerned
Mature	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Immature
Masculine	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Feminine
Unfriendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Friendly
Naive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Broad-minded
Young	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Old
Reliable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unreliable
Untrained	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Trained
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
Neat	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Untidy
Sensitive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Insensitive
Doubting	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Convinced
Tall	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Short
Confident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Shy
Attractive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unattractive
Untruthful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Truthful
Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
Poor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Rich
Sincere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Insincere
Sympathetic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsympathetic
Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unintelligent

Expert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inexpert
Informed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Uninformed
Stupid	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Clever
Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Untrustworthy
Virtuous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sinful
Active	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Passive
Sociable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsociable
Cheerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Gloomy
Pleasant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unpleasant
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right
Just	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unjust

B. Please RANK the following statements by assigning numbers from 1 to 4 in order of your preference, giving a 1 besides the statement that reflects your most preferred opinion and a 4 against the statement that reflects your least preferred position and 2 and 3 for those in between.

o The most important aspect of a persuasive speaker is his knowledge of the topic or subject matter about which he is speaking.

o The most important aspect of a persuasive speaker is his personal appearance when he is delivering his speech.

o The most important aspect of a persuasive speaker is his ability to present the speech very well.

o The most important aspect of a persuasive speaker is his moral character.

Please provide the following biographical information

1. Year of study (Please indicate).
   _ 1st _ 2nd _ 3rd _ 4th _ 5th _ 6th _ 7th _Not applicable.
2. Qualification for which you are currently studying (***Please mark with an X as appropriate***)
   _Diploma _Bachelors _HED _Honours _Masters _Doctorate.
3. Your age category (*Please mark with an X as appropriate*)
   _Below 18 years _Between 18-20 years _Between 21-23 years _Between 24-26 years _Between 27-29 years _30 years and above.
4. Primary language spoken at home (Mother tongue) (***Please mention***).
5. Country of which you are a citizen, if not South Africa (***Please mention***).

Appendix 6.04. Persuasive speech (PS)[1]

THE NEED TO FIGHT THE USE OF TOBACCO IN SOUTH AFRICA

On March 30, Thabo, a twenty-three-year-old man from the Eastern Cape Province, went for a dental check-up. As far as he could tell, there were no real problems except may be the one or two usual cavities that the dentist always seems to find. The dentist began poking around at Thabo's teeth, but soon became more interested in Thabo's lower lip and gums. The dentist noticed an unusual growth on Thabo's lower lip and asked if Thabo was a regular user of tobacco. Thabo answered yes.

After a series of tests, Thabo was diagnosed as having a deadly type of oral cancer. Just one week after Thabo's dental check-up, he had surgery to remove the cancer. A large portion of Thabo's lower lip was removed and the area was drawn together by stitches. The surgery left Thabo disfigured and looking quite grotesque, but it was not the worst part. Thabo died just one month later. The use of tobacco caused Thabo's death.

Currently, the South African parliament is debating a proposal to restrict tobacco use. Many of us are perhaps unsure about what position to take. Today I would like to persuade each one of you to feel as strongly as I do about the dangers of tobacco use and to join hands in the fight against this practice, even if preventing it from taking root in the South African society.

In my speech, I'd like to show you the many problems that can result from using tobacco. Then I'd like to persuade each of you to take action in support of stringent laws that would efficiently control the use of tobacco in South Africa. Let's begin by looking at how widespread the problem of using tobacco really is.

There is a widespread tobacco use in South Africa. According to the South African Institute for Medical Research, one in every twelve people in the North West Province, for example, is a regular user of tobacco. The average age of first use is just ten years old, which means that many children are using tobacco when they are in grade four. The South African Institute for Medical Research also reports that 40 percent of high-school pupils have tried using tobacco - and, what's worse, 21 percent of kindergarteners have tried it. Children are using tobacco before they are even able to read the warning labels!

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[1] The facts or references given in this speech are not necessarily authentic. However, this fact was not disclosed to the respondents.

Now you know that tobacco use is widespread, but you wonder what could possibly happen when a person uses tobacco. Well, smokeless tobacco has multiple dangers according to the South African Institute for Medical Research. First, tooth decay and tooth loss can occur.

Another effect of tobacco is gum disease. Regular use of tobacco causes visual gum damage in less than two to three months. According to the South African Institute for Medical Research, about half of all teenage users have some type of gum problem. But what's wrong with gum disease? Well, it causes the gums to pull away from the teeth, which further increases the risk of tooth decay and loss.

Gum disease and tooth loss are serious enough, but as we saw at the beginning in the story of Thabo, using tobacco can have most serious consequences. According to the South African Institute for Medical Research, those who use tobacco just once in a while have four times the risk of developing oral cancer than do nonusers. And as if that isn't bad enough, those who use tobacco three or more times a week for over a year have fifty times the risk of developing cancer than do nonusers. In the case of smoking cigarettes, cancer develops so slowly over time that by the time one realises, it is often too late to stop smoking or to save one's life.

For example, Marinus van der Walt, a nineteen-year-old high school pupil from Mpumalanga, was one of the most well-liked pupils in his matric class. Marinus used tobacco from age twelve to age eighteen, when he was diagnosed as having oral cancer during his matric year. As a result, Marinus had to have a series of disfiguring operations. First, three-fourths of his tongue was removed. Then all the muscles and lymph nodes on the right side of Marinus's face and neck were removed as well as a major portion of his jawbone. As you can imagine, Marinus was left looking quite grotesque. But this was not the worst part. As extreme as the surgery was, it could not stop Marinus's cancer from spreading, and he died just one year later. There can be no doubt that tobacco caused Marinus's death.

I know this is a terrible thought, but the point I am trying to make is an important one. You must be aware of the terrible consequences of using tobacco because next time it could happen to you or to someone you love.

Let's look, then, at what can be done to diminish the use of tobacco in our country and in our generation. First, the laws in South Africa pertaining to the age at which tobacco use can be bought must be strengthened. The law in South Africa states that tobacco can be purchased at age eighteen, but according to the Department of Justice, the laws on using tobacco have been ineffective. To be effective, the laws must be enforced and must have adequate penalties.

In some other countries, for example the US, the fine for selling tobacco to minors is as high as $1,500 for the first offence and $ 6,000 for the second offence. It is reported that these laws with their high penalties have cut the use of tobacco by minors by almost 60 percent. I would like you to join the current debate and support the proposal to burn smoking of any kind in public places and tobacco advertising. You must help stop people from selling cancer to our children. You can make a difference. You can write to our members of parliament urging them to support Dr Zuma's bill on smoking.

Second, we should all support the proposal that use of tobacco during all professional sporting events should be banned. According to the South African Institute for Medical Research, the primary reason children develop an interest in tobacco is because they see their role models doing it. These role models include parents, relatives, and friends, but more importantly, they include sports stars. Children see athletes as role models. Children think "if it's all right for athletes to use tobacco, it must be all right for me to do it too". If these role models would stand up and say tobacco use is wrong and dangerous, many of our children would change their minds about the drug.

What we need, then, is a ban on tobacco use during professional sporting events. You may think this is impractical, but already some of the soccer teams have taken a stand. They have switched from using tobacco to chewing gum. You can help influence many more teams to do the same. I urge you to write to your favourite team or to your favourite sportsman or sportswoman urging them, individually or as a team, to also take a stand against use of tobacco, as others have done.

In conclusion, then, I am pleading with each of you to take action against the use of tobacco. When you think of this subject, remember the problems of using tobacco. Remember Thabo - and remember Marinus. By adopting the measures I have proposed today, you can help stop what happened to Thabo and Marinus from happening to others.

I thank you.

Appendix 6.05. Frequency tables of demographic information of respondents to the WVQ

YEAR	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
Missing data	26	5.6	26	5.6
1st year	189	40.5	215	46.0
2nd year	67	14.3	282	60.4
3rd year	65	13.9	347	74.3
4th year	59	12.6	406	86.9
5th year	41	8.8	447	95.7
6th year	6	1.3	453	97.0
7th year	4	0.9	457	97.9
Not applicable	10	2.1	467	100.0

QUALIFICATION	Frequency	Percent
Missing data	21	4.5
Diploma	55	11.8
Bachelors	301	64.5
HED	35	7.5
Honours	41	8.8
Masters	11	2.4
Doctorate	3	0.6

AGE CATEGORY	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
Missing data	20	4.3	20	4.3
Below 18 year	4	0.9	24	5.1
Between 18-20 years	222	47.5	246	52.7
Between 21-23 years	116	24.8	362	77.5
Between 24-26 years	41	8.8	403	86.3
Between 27-29 years	27	5.8	430	92.1
30 years and above	37	7.9	467	100.0

LANGUAGE	Frequency	Percent
Missing data	18	4.3
Afrikaans	208	50.0
Southern Sotho	42	10.1
Sotho	33	7.9
Tswana	58	13.9
Venda	9	2.2
Xhosa	18	4.3
Other	16	3.8
Zulu	13	3.1
Swati	1	0.2

Frequency Missing = 51

COUNTRY	Frequency	Percent
Missing data/South Africa	449	96.1
Lesotho	1	0.2
Tanzania	2	0.4
Zimbabwe	3	0.6
Democratic Republic of Congo	3	0.6
Kenya	1	0.2
Namibia	4	0.9
Italy	1	0.2
Poland	2	0.4
..........Malawi	1	0.2

Appendix 6.06. Frequency tables of demographic information of respondents to the WVI

TABLE OF STUDY YEAR BY GROUP

STUDY YEAR GROUP

Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	Total
Missing data	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
1st year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
2nd year	59 29.95 96.72 60.82	2 1.02 3.28 2.00	61 30.96
3rd year	35 17.77 92.11 36.08	3 1.52 7.89 3.00	38 19.29
4th year	2 1.02 2.22 2.06	88 44.67 97.78 88.00	90 45.69
5th year	1 0.51 20.00 1.03	4 2.03 80.00 4.00	5 2.54
7th year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF STUDY YEAR BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	6	167.181	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	6	210.273	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	112.253	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.921	
Contingency Coefficient		0.678	
Cramer's V		0.921	

Sample Size = 197
WARNING: 57% of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF QUALIFICATION BY GROUP

QUALIFICATION / GROUP Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	Total
Bachelors	96 48.73 95.05 98.97	5 2.54 4.95 5.00	101 51.27
HED	1 0.51 1.06 1.03	93 47.21 98.94 93.00	94 47.72
Honours	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.02 100.00 2.00	2 1.02
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF QUALIFICATION BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	2	174.027	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	2	222.173	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	166.923	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.940	
Contingency Coefficient		0.685	
Cramer's V		0.940	

Sample Size = 197
WARNING: 33% of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF AGE CATEGORY BY GROUP

AGE CATEGORY / Frequency / Percent / Row Pct / Col Pct	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	Total
Below 18 year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
Between 18-20 years	48 24.37 96.00 49.48	2 1.02 4.00 2.00	50 25.38
Between 21-23 years	44 22.34 64.71 45.36	24 12.18 35.29 24.00	68 34.52
Between 24-26 years	3 1.52 7.14 3.09	39 19.80 92.86 39.00	42 21.32
Between 27-29 years	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	17 8.63 100.00 17.00	17 8.63
30 years and above	2 1.02 10.53 2.06	17 8.63 89.47 17.00	19 9.64
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF AGE CATEGORY BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	5	108.881	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	5	133.561	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	82.102	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.743	
Contingency Coefficient		0.597	
Cramer's V		0.743	

Sample Size = 197

TABLE OF GENDER BY GROUP

GENDER / Frequency / Percent / Row Pct / Col Pct	GROUP 1	2	Total
Male	14 7.11 28.57 14.43	35 17.77 71.43 35.00	49 24.87
Female	83 42.13 56.08 85.57	65 32.99 43.92 65.00	148 75.13
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF GENDER BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	1	11.146	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	1	11.447	0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square	1	10.073	0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	11.090	0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)			6.68E-04
(Right)			1.000
(2-Tail)			9.44E-04
Phi Coefficient		-0.238	
Contingency Coefficient		0.231	
Cramer's V		-0.238	

Sample Size = 197

TABLE OF LANGUAGE BY GROUP

LANGUAGE — GROUP

Frequency / Percent / Row Pct / Col Pct	1	2	Total
Afrikaans	89 45.18 95.70 91.75	4 2.03 4.30 4.00	93 47.21
English	6 3.05 85.71 6.19	1 0.51 14.29 1.00	7 3.55
Southern Sotho	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	10 5.08 100.00 10.00	10 5.08
Sotho	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	4 2.03 100.00 4.00	4 2.03
Tswana	2 1.02 2.78 2.06	70 35.53 97.22 70.00	72 36.55
Venda	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
Xhosa	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	4 2.03 100.00 4.00	4 2.03
Zulu	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	3 1.52 100.00 3.00	3 1.52
Other	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	3 1.52 100.00 3.00	3 1.52
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF LANGUAGE BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	8	170.476	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	8	216.039	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	152.748	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.930	
Contingency Coefficient		0.681	
Cramer's V		0.930	

Sample Size = 197
WARNING: 72% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF COUNTRY BY GROUP

COUNTRY GROUP

Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	Total
Missing data/ South Africa	96 48.73 49.74 98.97	97 49.24 50.26 97.00	193 97.97
Tanzania	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51 100.00 1.00	1 0.51
Zimbabwe	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.02 100.00 2.00	2 1.02
Namibia	1 0.51 100.00 1.03	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.51
Total	97 49.24	100 50.76	197 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF COUNTRY BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	3	3.960	0.266
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	3	5.505	0.138
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	0.056	0.813
Phi Coefficient		0.142	
Contingency Coefficient		0.140	
Cramer's V		0.142	

Sample Size = 197
WARNING: 75% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

Appendix 6.07 Frequency tables of demographic information of respondents to the SDSC

TABLE OF YEAR OF STUDY BY GROUP

STUDY YEAR GROUP

Frequency / Percent / Row Pct / Col Pct	1	2	Total
1st year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.14 100.00 2.00	2 1.14
2nd year	35 20.00 97.22 46.67	1 0.57 2.78 1.00	36 20.57
3rd year	36 20.57 58.06 48.00	26 14.86 41.94 26.00	62 35.43
4th year	4 2.29 5.97 5.33	63 36.00 94.03 63.00	67 38.29
5th year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	5 2.86 100.00 5.00	5 2.86
7th year	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57 100.00 1.00	1 0.57
Not applicable	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.14 100.00 2.00	2 1.14
Total	75 42.86	100 57.14	175 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF YEAR OF STUDY BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	6	94.027	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	6	115.245	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	62.278	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.733	
Contingency Coefficient		0.591	
Cramer's V		0.733	

Sample Size = 175
WARNING: 57% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF STUDY QUALIFICATION BY GROUP

QUALIFICATION GROUP

Frequency / Percent / Row Pct / Col Pct	1	2	Total
Missing data	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57 100.00 1.00	1 0.57
Bachelors	72 41.14 92.31 96.00	6 3.43 7.69 6.00	78 44.57
HED	3 1.71 3.23 4.00	90 51.43 96.77 90.00	93 53.14
Honours	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57 100.00 1.00	1 0.57
Masters	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.14 100.00 2.00	2 1.14
Total	75 42.86	100 57.14	175 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF QUALIFICATION BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	4	140.530	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	4	170.206	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	100.195	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.896	
Contingency Coefficient		0.667	
Cramer's V		0.896	

Sample Size = 175
WARNING: 60% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF AGE CATEGORY BY GROUP

AGE CATEGORY GROUP

Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	Total
Between 18-20 years	33 18.86 94.29 44.00	2 1.14 5.71 2.00	35 20.00
Between 21-23 years	38 21.71 62.30 50.67	23 13.14 37.70 23.00	61 34.86
Between 24-26 years	1 0.57 2.56 1.33	38 21.71 97.44 38.00	39 22.29
Between 27-29 years	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	19 10.86 100.00 19.00	19 10.86
30 years and above	3 1.71 14.29 4.00	18 10.29 85.71 18.00	21 12.00
Total	75 42.86	100 57.14	175 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF AGE CATEGORY BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	4	94.316	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	4	116.322	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	68.020	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.734	
Contingency Coefficient		0.592	
Cramer's V		0.734	

Sample Size = 175

TABLE OF LANGUAGE BY GROUP

LANGUAGE / GROUP Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	Total
Afrikaans	67 38.29 94.37 89.33	4 2.29 5.63 4.00	71 40.57
English	5 2.86 100.00 6.67	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	5 2.86
Southern Sotho	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	8 4.57 100.00 8.00	8 4.57
Sotho	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	5 2.86 100.00 5.00	5 2.86
Tswana	3 1.71 4.00 4.00	72 41.14 96.00 72.00	75 42.86
Venda	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57 100.00 1.00	1 0.57
Xhosa	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	4 2.29 100.00 4.00	4 2.29
Other	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	3 1.71 100.00 3.00	3 1.71
Zulu	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	3 1.71 100.00 3.00	3 1.71
Total	75 42.86	100 57.14	175 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF LANGUAGE BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	8	147.827	0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	8	183.045	0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	130.811	0.001
Phi Coefficient		0.919	
Contingency Coefficient		0.677	
Cramer's V		0.919	

Sample Size = 175
WARNING: 78% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

TABLE OF COUNTRY BY GROUP

COUNTRY Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	GROUP 1	2	Total
Missing data/ South Africa	74 42.29 43.27 98.67	97 55.43 56.73 97.00	171 97.71
Tanzania	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57 100.00 1.00	1 0.57
Zimbabwe	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 1.14 100.00 2.00	2 1.14
Namibia	1 0.57 100.00 1.33	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.57
Total	75 42.86	100 57.14	175 100.00

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF COUNTRY BY GROUP

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob
Chi-Square	3	3.596	0.309
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	3	5.064	0.167
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	1	0.000	1.000
Phi Coefficient		0.143	
Contingency Coefficient		0.142	
Cramer's V		0.143	

Sample Size = 175
WARNING: 75% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.

Appendix 6.08. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of Group 1 scores on most discriminating WVI items[2]

Prior Communality Estimates: ONE

Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 26 Average = 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eigenvalue	4.5187	2.6435	2.0718	1.5212	1.4838	1.3643
Difference	1.8752	0.5717	0.5506	0.0374	0.1195	0.0828
Proportion	0.1738	0.1017	0.0797	0.0585	0.0571	0.0525
Cumulative	0.1738	0.2755	0.3552	0.4137	0.4707	0.5232

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Eigenvalue	1.2815	1.1024	0.9396	0.8739	0.8008	0.7791
Difference	0.1790	0.1629	0.0657	0.0731	0.0217	0.0166
Proportion	0.0493	0.0424	0.0361	0.0336	0.0308	0.0300
Cumulative	0.5725	0.6149	0.6510	0.6846	0.7154	0.7454

	13	14	15	16	17	18
Eigenvalue	0.7626	0.6723	0.6623	0.6128	0.5970	0.5378
Difference	0.0903	0.0099	0.0496	0.0158	0.0592	0.0522
Proportion	0.0293	0.0259	0.0255	0.0236	0.0230	0.0207
Cumulative	0.7747	0.8006	0.8261	0.8496	0.8726	0.8933

	19	20	21	22	23	24
Eigenvalue	0.4857	0.4602	0.3969	0.3751	0.3272	0.2902
Difference	0.0255	0.0633	0.0218	0.0479	0.0370	0.0409
Proportion	0.0187	0.0177	0.0153	0.0144	0.0126	0.0112
Cumulative	0.9120	0.9297	0.9449	0.9594	0.9719	0.9831

	25	26
Eigenvalue	0.2493	0.1899
Difference	0.0594	
Proportion	0.0096	0.0073
Cumulative	0.9927	1.0000

8 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion.

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
Q29	0.58269	0.33118	.	.	.	.	.	0.32341
Q14	0.55266	-0.49147	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q47	0.54891	.	.	.	.	.	0.32003	.
Q37	0.51826	.	.	.	-0.45825	.	.	.
Q15	0.48686	-0.48286	0.32541	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	0.47186	.	.	0.34051	.	.	0.38347	.
Q3	0.44110	.	.	.	.	.	-0.43928	-0.39284
Q5	0.42715	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q42	0.42419	.	.	.	.	.	.	-0.40376
Q4	0.41927	.	.	0.37662	0.38989	.	.	.
Q44	.	0.55246	.	.	.	-0.34117	.	0.31728
Q40	.	0.44356	0.39348	0.42829	.	.	.	.
Q19	0.38459	-0.41282	-0.31778	.	.	.	.	.
Q11	0.43844	-0.50235	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q20	.	-0.51391	.	.	.	0.47183	.	.
Q16	0.48591	-0.53808	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q41	0.44461	.	0.61150	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	0.36857	0.43261	.	.	.	.	.
Q18	0.44068	.	-0.44717	.	.	.	.	.

[2] The remainder of the results are given in Table 6.01 and Table 6.02.

Q2	0.45655	.	-0.46370	.	.	.	-0.32744	.
Q7	.	.	.	0.69996	.	.	.	.
Q46	.	.	0.33453	-0.41660	.	0.32234	.	.
Q43	0.38353	.	.	.	0.44129	.	0.35127	.
Q38	0.31330	.	0.42464	.	-0.53853	.	.	.
Q30	0.42057	.	.	-0.30521	.	-0.56019	.	.
Q1	0.37147	.	.	.	-0.30807	.	-0.39049	.

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
4.518734	2.643496	2.071767	1.521210	1.483769	1.364307	1.281476	1.102445

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 15.987204

Q15	Q19	Q38	Q4	Q39	Q20	Q44	Q1	Q40
0.631533	0.643134	0.677631	0.578382	0.610300	0.628095	0.639898	0.646904	0.646899

Q7	Q2	Q11	Q29	Q30	Q5	Q33	Q46	Q42
0.647448	0.602554	0.545204	0.653165	0.655078	0.545392	0.581981	0.522262	0.527493

Q18	Q3	Q14	Q47	Q37	Q16	Q41	Q43
0.626091	0.660392	0.583394	0.550286	0.621331	0.654030	0.653658	0.654670

Appendix 6.09. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of Group 2 scores on most discriminating WVI items[3]

Prior Communality Estimates: ONE

Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 26 Average = 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eigenvalue	3.7958	2.4301	1.9473	1.6144	1.5332	1.4291
Difference	1.3657	0.4829	0.3329	0.0812	0.1041	0.1116
Proportion	0.1460	0.0935	0.0749	0.0621	0.0590	0.0550
Cumulative	0.1460	0.2395	0.3144	0.3764	0.4354	0.4904

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Eigenvalue	1.3175	1.2305	1.1288	1.0318	0.9631	0.8546
Difference	0.0870	0.1017	0.0970	0.0687	0.1085	0.0599
Proportion	0.0507	0.0473	0.0434	0.0397	0.0370	0.0329
Cumulative	0.5411	0.5884	0.6318	0.6715	0.7085	0.7414

	13	14	15	16	17	18
Eigenvalue	0.7947	0.7868	0.6995	0.6288	0.5976	0.5701
Difference	0.0079	0.0872	0.0707	0.0312	0.0276	0.1121
Proportion	0.0306	0.0303	0.0269	0.0242	0.0230	0.0219
Cumulative	0.7720	0.8022	0.8291	0.8533	0.8763	0.8982

	19	20	21	22	23	24
Eigenvalue	0.4580	0.4109	0.3728	0.3427	0.3279	0.3055
Difference	0.0471	0.0381	0.0300	0.0148	0.0224	0.0784
Proportion	0.0176	0.0158	0.0143	0.0132	0.0126	0.0118
Cumulative	0.9158	0.9316	0.9460	0.9592	0.9718	0.9835

	25	26
Eigenvalue	0.2271	0.2014
Difference	0.0257	
Proportion	0.0087	0.0077
Cumulative	0.9923	1.0000

10 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion.

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q3	0.57195	.	.	.	-0.37695
Q18	0.53390	0.40662	.	.	.
Q19	0.48304	.	.	.	.
Q16	0.48071	.	.	.	.
Q1	0.44603	.	.	.	.
Q29	0.43755	-0.30985	.	-0.38048	.
Q4	0.36197	0.48768	.	.	.
Q7	0.33688	0.40675	-0.31121	.	.
Q14	0.30847	0.38869	.	.	.
Q41	0.38918	-0.51065	.	0.34237	.
Q40	0.46081	-0.51826	.	.	.
Q37	.	.	0.58292	.	.
Q38	.	.	0.57466	.	.
Q2	.	.	0.50738	.	.
Q44	.	-0.35404	0.45789	.	.
Q33	0.30502	.	-0.35102	0.50159	.
Q30	0.30469	.	.	-0.61089	.
Q39	.	-0.31109	.	.	0.62410
Q43	0.38412	-0.30571	.	.	0.41806
Q47	0.51176	.	.	.	-0.55482
Q15	0.44698	.	.	.	.

[3] The remainder of the results are given in Table 6.03 and Table 6.04.

Q20	0.46379	.	.	.	.
Q5	0.39545	.	.	.	.
Q11	.	0.35030	0.34777	.	.
Q46	0.34852	.	0.36171	.	.
Q42	.	-0.31915	.	0.39236	.

Factor Pattern *(continued)*

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9	FACTOR10
Q3	.	.	.	.	.
Q18	.	.	.	.	.
Q19	.	.	0.31779	-0.41854	.
Q16	.	0.37257	.	.	.
Q1	.	.	.	.	0.34976
Q29	.	-0.37197	.	.	.
Q4	.	-0.36468	.	.	.
Q7	.	.	.	.	.
Q14	0.30870	.	0.35815	.	.
Q41	.	.	.	.	.
Q40	.	.	.	.	.
Q37	.	.	.	.	.
Q38	.	.	.	.	.
Q2	.	-0.37134	.	.	.
Q44	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	.	.	.	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	.	.	0.45689	.
Q43	0.36323	.	.	.	.
Q47	.	.	.	.	.
Q15	0.46131	.	.	.	.
Q20	-0.59909	.	.	.	.
Q5	.	-0.40292	.	.	-0.34386
Q11	-0.30556	.	-0.47317	.	.
Q46	.	.	.	0.47796	.
Q42	-0.36270	.	.	.	0.50531

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.'(and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
3.795842	2.430142	1.947272	1.614357	1.533198

FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9	FACTOR10
1.429134	1.317486	1.230534	1.128795	1.031769

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 17.458529

Q15	Q19	Q38	Q4	Q39	Q20	Q44	Q1	Q40
0.636707	0.651542	0.643782	0.716098	0.788002	0.738637	0.493819	0.546823	0.672173

Q7	Q2	Q11	Q29	Q30	Q5	Q33	Q46	Q42
0.633792	0.671117	0.750643	0.739074	0.631751	0.653441	0.539472	0.709771	0.777603

Q18	Q3	Q14	Q47	Q37	Q16	Q41	Q43
0.616003	0.629054	0.726050	0.677632	0.672779	0.663484	0.691127	0.788153

Appendix 6.10. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of Group 1 scores on most discriminating SDSC[4] items

Prior Communality Estimates: ONE

Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 28 Average = 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eigenvalue	7.7334	2.9802	1.8915	1.7807	1.5038	1.2559
Difference	4.7533	1.0887	0.1108	0.2769	0.2479	0.0962
Proportion	0.2762	0.1064	0.0676	0.0636	0.0537	0.0449
Cumulative	0.2762	0.3826	0.4502	0.5138	0.5675	0.6123

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Eigenvalue	1.1597	1.0670	0.8635	0.7857	0.7495	0.6659
Difference	0.0927	0.2036	0.0777	0.0362	0.0836	0.0269
Proportion	0.0414	0.0381	0.0308	0.0281	0.0268	0.0238
Cumulative	0.6538	0.6919	0.7227	0.7508	0.7775	0.8013

	13	14	15	16	17	18
Eigenvalue	0.6390	0.5741	0.4982	0.4840	0.4593	0.4403
Difference	0.0649	0.0759	0.0142	0.0247	0.0190	0.0666
Proportion	0.0228	0.0205	0.0178	0.0173	0.0164	0.0157
Cumulative	0.8241	0.8446	0.8624	0.8797	0.8961	0.9118

	19	20	21	22	23	24
Eigenvalue	0.3737	0.3656	0.3165	0.2874	0.2329	0.2230
Difference	0.0081	0.0492	0.0291	0.0545	0.0099	0.0137
Proportion	0.0133	0.0131	0.0113	0.0103	0.0083	0.0080
Cumulative	0.9252	0.9382	0.9496	0.9598	0.9681	0.9761

	25	26	27	28
Eigenvalue	0.2093	0.1861	0.1619	0.1121
Difference	0.0233	0.0242	0.0498	
Proportion	0.0075	0.0066	0.0058	0.0040
Cumulative	0.9836	0.9902	0.9960	1.0000

8 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion.

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
Q19	0.74510	0.32300	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q54	0.73336	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q50	0.72568	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	0.71927	-0.35148	.	.	.	.	-0.33166	.
Q16	0.69870	-0.38049	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q12	0.68810	0.35684	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q43	0.67346	0.34555	.	.	.	-0.35858	.	.
Q20	0.66351	0.36885	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q13	0.65148	-0.44065	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q28	0.64128	-0.40594	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q39	0.61232	.	.	0.31553	.	.	.	-0.45111
Q32	0.60632	-0.43501	.	.	-0.30328	.	.	.
Q55	0.60344	.	.	-0.39919	.	.	.	.
Q47	0.58315	0.46828	.	-0.33778	.	.	.	.
Q36	0.58307	-0.31637	-0.34410	.	.	.	.	.
Q7	0.54474	0.43628	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q27	0.33104	0.59261	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q8	0.41070	-0.41119	.	.	.	.	0.39899	.
Q42	0.43074	-0.43114	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q1	.	.	0.54030	.	.	.	.	0.36939
Q2	.	.	0.51833	.	-0.44787	.	.	.
Q18	.	.	0.42216	.	0.38857	.	.	-0.33914

[4] The remainder of the results are given in Table 6.05 and Table 6.06.

Q3	0.34779	.	-0.37036	0.50631	0.36264	.	.	.
Q23	.	.	-0.39048	0.42231	-0.36530	.	.	0.40883
Q21	.	.	-0.36870	-0.49298	0.30169	0.31700	.	.
Q22	.	-0.32923	0.50147	.	0.52789	.	.	0.35241
Q37	.	.	.	.	.	0.73457	.	.
Q30	.	.	.	0.40734	0.30601	.	0.68479	.

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8
7.733419	2.980159	1.891501	1.780743	1.503816	1.255871	1.159669	1.067017

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.372196

Q8	Q23	Q20	Q54	Q27	Q39	Q18
0.616241	0.699011	0.612709	0.631190	0.614022	0.732931	0.598959
Q12	**Q7**	**Q22**	**Q33**	**Q42**	**Q47**	**Q16**
0.650579	0.604872	0.825927	0.787914	0.556505	0.772786	0.737983
Q50	**Q55**	**Q28**	**Q1**	**Q21**	**Q37**	**Q3**
0.699484	0.715883	0.688481	0.696560	0.721584	0.722633	0.704265
Q30	**Q43**	**Q32**	**Q13**	**Q36**	**Q19**	**Q2**
0.826122	0.784602	0.673625	0.759338	0.576555	0.723010	0.638424

Appendix 6.11. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of Group 2 scores on most discriminating SDSC[5] items

Prior Communality Estimates: ONE

Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 28 Average = 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eigenvalue	6.4587	2.9458	2.1724	1.6563	1.5369	1.4136
Difference	3.5130	0.7734	0.5161	0.1195	0.1233	0.1282
Proportion	0.2307	0.1052	0.0776	0.0592	0.0549	0.0505
Cumulative	0.2307	0.3359	0.4135	0.4726	0.5275	0.5780

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Eigenvalue	1.2854	1.1283	1.0395	0.9553	0.9064	0.7853
Difference	0.1570	0.0888	0.0842	0.0489	0.1211	0.0450
Proportion	0.0459	0.0403	0.0371	0.0341	0.0324	0.0280
Cumulative	0.6239	0.6642	0.7013	0.7354	0.7678	0.7959

	13	14	15	16	17	18
Eigenvalue	0.7403	0.6915	0.5981	0.5088	0.4716	0.3853
Difference	0.0488	0.0934	0.0893	0.0372	0.0863	0.0303
Proportion	0.0264	0.0247	0.0214	0.0182	0.0168	0.0138
Cumulative	0.8223	0.8470	0.8683	0.8865	0.9034	0.9171

	19	20	21	22	23	24
Eigenvalue	0.3550	0.3480	0.3100	0.2889	0.2525	0.2410
Difference	0.0070	0.0380	0.0211	0.0363	0.0116	0.0551
Proportion	0.0127	0.0124	0.0111	0.0103	0.0090	0.0086
Cumulative	0.9298	0.9422	0.9533	0.9636	0.9726	0.9812

	25	26	27	28
Eigenvalue	0.1858	0.1499	0.1211	0.0683
Difference	0.0359	0.0288	0.0529	
Proportion	0.0066	0.0054	0.0043	0.0024
Cumulative	0.9879	0.9932	0.9976	1.0000

9 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion.

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q19	0.69705	.	.	.	.
Q13	0.60581	-0.30877	-0.54730	.	.
Q55	0.56698	0.34943	.	.	.
Q43	0.55721	.	.	.	-0.49819
Q32	0.55651	.	.	.	0.35414
Q27	0.54577	0.31678	.	.	-0.31344
Q20	0.54005	.	.	.	.
Q39	0.53397	.	0.45062	.	.
Q47	0.52664	0.48458	.	.	.
Q12	0.52086	-0.35440	-0.47442	.	.
Q3	0.51773	0.36684	.	.	0.49303
Q30	0.51227	-0.32291	.	.	.
Q28	0.51154	-0.46353	.	.	-0.41395
Q54	0.49919	.	.	.	.
Q7	0.49018	.	.	.	.
Q8	0.45250	.	0.42707	0.40622	.
Q36	0.44593	0.30998	.	.	.
Q18	0.40945	.	.	-0.40285	-0.32717
Q23	-0.32885	0.54277	-0.34987	.	.
Q16	0.39070	0.43284	.	.	-0.30046
Q22	0.45969	-0.54075	.	.	.

[5] The remainder of the results are given in Table 6.07 and Table 6.08.

Q2	0.36563	-0.61743	.	.	.
Q1	0.32660	.	0.47800	-0.46336	.
Q21	0.41539	.	-0.53515	.	.
Q50	0.35281	.	.	0.59091	.
Q37	.	.	0.38184	0.35357	.
Q42	0.32372	.	0.37254	.	.
Q33	0.50629	.	.	.	.

Factor Pattern *(continued)*

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
Q19	.	-0.32596	.	.
Q13	.	.	.	.
Q55	.	.	.	.
Q43	.	.	.	.
Q32	.	-0.30006	.	.
Q27	.	.	.	.
Q20	.	.	0.46760	.
Q39	.	0.35993	-0.37563	.
Q47	.	.	.	.
Q12	.	.	.	.
Q3	.	.	.	.
Q30	-0.43041	.	.	.
Q28	.	.	.	.
Q54	.	.	.	.
Q7	.	.	-0.34175	0.40095
Q8	.	.	.	.
Q36	-0.33034	0.39202	.	.
Q18	0.35198	0.35036	.	.
Q23	.	.	.	.
Q16	0.37176	.	.	.
Q22	.	.	.	-0.30587
Q2	.	.	.	0.32007
Q1	.	.	.	.
Q21	.	.	-0.30271	.
Q50	.	.	.	.
Q37	0.45918	.	0.30038	.
Q42	0.43516	.	-0.31752	.
Q33	.	-0.40996	.	-0.55532

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
6.458735	2.945759	2.172401	1.656310	1.536853	1.413559	1.285355	1.128327	1.039522

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.636821

Q8	Q23	Q20	Q54	Q27	Q39	Q18
0.666041	0.622113	0.730312	0.516814	0.656632	0.829308	0.742203

Q12	Q7	Q22	Q33	Q42	Q47	Q16
0.782252	0.701688	0.767612	0.799665	0.739573	0.695336	0.718128

Q50	Q55	Q28	Q1	Q21	Q37	Q3
0.619426	0.595046	0.757766	0.655398	0.605611	0.632106	0.704970

Q30	Q43	Q32	Q13	Q36	Q19	Q2
0.727414	0.696544	0.674746	0.889031	0.659418	0.744887	0.706779

Appendix 6.12a. The most discriminating WVI items

```
197 Observations         63 Variable(s) in the Analysis
  2 Class Levels          0 Variable(s) will be included

 The Method for Selecting Variables will be: STEPWISE

 Significance Level to Enter =  0.4000
 Significance Level to Stay  =  0.4000
```

Class Level Information

GROUP	Frequency	Weight	Proportion
1	97	97.0000	0.492386
2	100	100.0000	0.507614

Stepwise Selection: Summary

Step	Variable Entered	Variable Removed	Number In	Average Squared Canonical Correlation	Prob > ASCC
1	Q15		1	0.28855619	0.0001
2	Q19		2	0.37884152	0.0001
3	Q38		3	0.44574489	0.0001
4	Q34		4	0.48320990	0.0001
5	Q4		5	0.51344249	0.0001
6	Q39		6	0.53449251	0.0001
7	Q20		7	0.55116496	0.0001
8	Q44		8	0.56614698	0.0001
9	Q1		9	0.57695099	0.0001
10	Q40		10	0.58767761	0.0001
11	Q7		11	0.59816794	0.0001
12	Q2		12	0.60771355	0.0001
13	Q11		13	0.61557306	0.0001
14	Q29		14	0.62171717	0.0001
15	Q30		15	0.62755837	0.0001
16	Q5		16	0.63320621	0.0001
17	Q33		17	0.63898661	0.0001
18	Q46		18	0.64450052	0.0001
19	Q42		19	0.64767400	0.0001
20		Q34	18	0.64640198	0.0001
21	Q18		19	0.64964088	0.0001
22	Q3		20	0.65214196	0.0001
23	Q14		21	0.65421977	0.0001
24	Q47		22	0.65681750	0.0001
25	Q37		23	0.65878048	0.0001
26	Q16		24	0.66037404	0.0001
27	Q41		25	0.66234667	0.0001
28	Q43		26	0.66386568	0.0001

Appendix 6.12b. Key to the most discriminating WVI items

Q15 Being in the community means being part of the community

Q19 A person should personally take full care of his parents if they are old

Q38 Nature is to be used by mankind for mankind's benefit

Q4 The general welfare of the society is more important than the welfare of individuals

Q39 Unknown forces control nature

Q20 Neglect of aged parents is shameful and unacceptable

Q44 People should be respected because of their individual achievements, not because of their contribution to the community

Q1 Obtaining personal pleasure is always necessary

Q40 Although mankind tries to tamper with nature, in reality human beings live at the mercy of nature

Q7 It is more important for me to promote communal social order than to promote my personal life

Q2 A person should be independent in thought and action

Q11 It is important to have harmony in my relations with other people

Q29 Basically nature controls mankind

Q30 Nature and all living things in it are sacred

Q5 A person should be on his own and be self-reliant

Q33 I always try to think about one thing at a time

Q46 The universe is inhabited by two forces, namely, good and evil

Q42 I always feel frustrated if I fail to follow schedules in what I do

Q18 Children ought to obey their parents according to their culture

Q3 A person must strive to live a comfortable life

Q14 Making positive contributions to the society earns one respect and the blessings of the elderly and leaders

Q47 When something is true, I will see the reasons or its condition and actually prove that it is true

Q37 Basically man controls nature

Q16 I agree with the saying that ‖Hands wash each other=, which means that people should help each other

Q41 Everyday life is an on-going struggle for survival

Q43 I would basically be contented with life as long as I have food, clothing and shelter

Appendix 6.13a. The most discriminating SDSC items

```
175 Observations          56 Variable(s) in the Analysis
  2 Class Levels           0 Variable(s) will be included

The Method for Selecting Variables will be: STEPWISE

Significance Level to Enter =  0.3000
Significance Level to Stay  =  0.3000
```

Class Level Information

GROUP	Frequency	Weight	Proportion
1	75	75.0000	0.428571
2	100	100.0000	0.571429

Stepwise Selection: Summary

Step	Variable Entered	Variable Removed	Number In	Average Squared Canonical Correlation	Prob > ASCC
1	Q8		1	0.12231304	0.0001
2	Q23		2	0.19173134	0.0001
3	Q24		3	0.22675947	0.0001
4	Q20		4	0.28309379	0.0001
5	Q54		5	0.32767322	0.0001
6	Q27		6	0.35657205	0.0001
7	Q39		7	0.38452171	0.0001
8	Q35		8	0.41114837	0.0001
9	Q18		9	0.42784784	0.0001
10	Q12		10	0.44489074	0.0001
11	Q7		11	0.46499566	0.0001
12	Q22		12	0.48248757	0.0001
13	Q33		13	0.49631919	0.0001
14	Q42		14	0.50691568	0.0001
15	Q47		15	0.51609936	0.0001
16	Q16		16	0.52431808	0.0001
17	Q5		17	0.53272361	0.0001
18	Q50		18	0.53956059	0.0001
19		Q24	17	0.53666740	0.0001
20	Q55		18	0.54281756	0.0001
21	Q28		19	0.54892824	0.0001
22	Q1		20	0.55679577	0.0001
23	Q21		21	0.56218072	0.0001
24	Q37		22	0.56645651	0.0001
25	Q56		23	0.57046443	0.0001
26	Q3		24	0.57394069	0.0001
27	Q30		25	0.57857040	0.0001
28	Q43		26	0.58240495	0.0001
29		Q56	25	0.58008757	0.0001
30		Q5	24	0.57782913	0.0001
31	Q32		25	0.58248608	0.0001
32	Q13		26	0.58634771	0.0001
33		Q35	25	0.58438601	0.0001
34	Q36		26	0.58986767	0.0001
35	Q19		27	0.59565784	0.0001
36	Q2		28	0.60035381	0.0001

Appendix 6.13b. Key to the most discriminating WVI items

Q1 Analytical-emotional

Q2 Humorous-serious

Q3 Unclear-clear

Q5 Boring-interesting

Q7 Experienced-inexperienced

Q8 Ugly-handsome

Q12 Energetic-weak

Q13 Dull-lively

Q16 Dishonest-honest

Q18 Objective-subjective

Q19 Faithful-unfaithful

Q20 Flexible-rigid

Q21 Fast-slow

Q22 Sad-happy

Q23 Heavy-light

Q24 Loud-soft

Q27 Masculine-feminine

Q28 Unfriendly-friendly

Q30 Young-old

Q32 Untrained-trained

Q33 Bad-good

Q35 Sensitive-insensitive

Q36 Doubting-convinced

Q37 Tall-short

Q39 Attractive-unattractive

Q42 Poor-rich

Q43 Sincere-insincere

Q47 Informed-uninformed

Q50 Virtuous-sinful

Q54 Pleasant-unpleasant

Q55 Wrong-right

Q56 Just-unjust

Appendix 6.14. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of scores on most discriminating SDSC items for white speaker

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5
Q19	0.77990	.	.	.	.
Q43	0.73206	.	.	.	.
Q12	0.70410	-0.32203	.	.	.
Q47	0.64614	-0.50465	.	.	.
Q39	0.64612	.	.	.	.
Q50	0.62709	.	.	.	.
Q20	0.61672	.	.	.	.
Q27	0.54196	-0.34046	.	.	.
Q54	0.53649	.	.	.	.
Q7	0.48409	-0.36587	.	.	.
Q21	0.40683	-0.30188	-0.31978	.	0.36250
Q13	0.37525	0.66460	.	.	.
Q28	.	0.59643	.	-0.35973	.
Q16	0.44147	0.59131	.	.	.
Q32	0.30418	0.52405	.	.	.
Q42	.	0.52196	.	0.30679	.
Q33	0.38783	0.51164	.	.	0.30891
Q1	.	.	0.60551	.	.
Q22	.	.	0.59747	.	0.32013
Q18	.	.	0.45812	0.34517	.
Q23	.	.	-0.49927	.	.
Q3	.	.	0.40928	0.59929	.
Q36	0.42683	0.45849	.	0.46315	.
Q2	.	.	0.47068	-0.54787	.
Q55	0.44134	0.40588	.	.	0.55810
Q30	.	.	0.34400	0.37349	-0.48609
Q37	.	.	.	.	.

Factor Pattern (*Continued*)

	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
Q19	.	.	.	.
Q43	.	.	.	.
Q12	.	.	.	.
Q47	.	.	.	.
Q39	.	.	.	.
Q50	.	.	-0.34271	.
Q20	.	.	.	.
Q27	.	.	.	.
Q54	.	-0.39928	-0.31679	.
Q7	.	.	.	.
Q21	-0.33344	.	.	.
Q13	.	.	.	.
Q28	.	.	.	.
Q16	0.30268	.	.	.
Q32	0.40931	.	.	.
Q42	.	.	.	.
Q33	.	.	.	.
Q1	0.55154	.	.	.
Q22	.	.	.	0.32188
Q18	.	.	0.32456	-0.30088
Q23	0.34539	.	0.34688	.
Q3	.	.	.	.
Q36	.	.	.	.
Q2	.	.	.	.
Q55	.	.	.	.
Q30	-0.32806	.	.	0.32389
Q37	0.33020	0.68091	-0.30625	0.30923

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7	FACTOR8	FACTOR9
5.483369	3.390544	2.263322	1.924823	1.589789	1.257260	1.140851	1.066790	1.016342

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 19.133091

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q7	Q12	Q13	Q16	Q18	Q19
0.756828	0.696643	0.707266	0.501473	0.768213	0.783746	0.757124	0.666649	0.736169
Q20	**Q21**	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q30**	**Q32**	**Q33**
0.487834	0.781471	0.751663	0.751728	0.571458	0.741987	0.796073	0.739080	0.670063
Q36	**Q37**	**Q39**	**Q42**	**Q43**	**Q47**	**Q50**	**Q54**	**Q55**
0.651485	0.864653	0.753752	0.516804	0.716419	0.812406	0.671760	0.723918	0.756427

Appendix 6.15. Eigenvalues, initial factors and final communality estimates of initial factors from factor analysis of scores on most discriminating SDSC items for black speaker

Prior Communality Estimates: ONE

Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 27 Average = 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eigenvalue	9.3583	2.1548	1.7665	1.5931	1.4281	1.2675
Difference	7.2035	0.3883	0.1734	0.1650	0.1606	0.1150
Proportion	0.3466	0.0798	0.0654	0.0590	0.0529	0.0469
Cumulative	0.3466	0.4264	0.4918	0.5508	0.6037	0.6507
	7	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
Eigenvalue	1.1525	0.9840	0.8276	0.7409	0.6414	0.6213
Difference	0.1685	0.1564	0.0866	0.0995	0.0201	0.0231
Proportion	0.0427	0.0364	0.0307	0.0274	0.0238	0.0230
Cumulative	0.6934	0.7298	0.7605	0.7879	0.8117	0.8347
	13	**14**	**15**	**16**	**17**	**18**
Eigenvalue	0.5982	0.5582	0.4654	0.4156	0.3761	0.3344
Difference	0.0400	0.0928	0.0498	0.0395	0.0418	0.0328
Proportion	0.0222	0.0207	0.0172	0.0154	0.0139	0.0124
Cumulative	0.8568	0.8775	0.8947	0.9101	0.9241	0.9364
	19	**20**	**21**	**22**	**23**	**24**
Eigenvalue	0.3016	0.2636	0.2330	0.2170	0.1955	0.1616
Difference	0.0380	0.0306	0.0160	0.0215	0.0339	0.0239
Proportion	0.0112	0.0098	0.0086	0.0080	0.0072	0.0060
Cumulative	0.9476	0.9574	0.9660	0.9740	0.9813	0.9873
	25	**26**	**27**			
Eigenvalue	0.1377	0.1131	0.0931			
Difference	0.0247	0.0199				
Proportion	0.0051	0.0042	0.0034			
Cumulative	0.9924	0.9966	1.0000			

7 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion.

Factor Pattern

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7
Q28	0.83856	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q33	0.81513	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q32	0.78882	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q54	0.77950	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q13	0.77469	.	.	.	-0.32158	.	.
Q19	0.75480	.	.	.	.	.	.

Q16	0.71458	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q50	0.70845	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q12	0.70019	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q20	0.68970	.	.	-0.33130	.	.	.
Q55	0.67743	-0.31355	.	-0.33899	.	.	.
Q7	0.67334	0.30602	0.33428	.	.	.	.
Q43	0.62724	0.34764	.	.	.	.	0.41138
Q47	0.59709	.	-0.39730	-0.43291	.	.	.
Q36	0.59028	.	-0.35142	.	.	.	.
Q39	0.55780	.	.	.	.	.	.
Q3	0.50590	0.49143	.	.	-0.38732	.	.
Q42	0.49851	.	.	0.49829	.	-0.35251	.
Q18	0.44456	.	0.30827	.	.	.	.
Q23	.	0.70075	.	.	.	.	.
Q27	.	0.56083	.	.	0.45222	0.35280	.
Q2	.	.	0.55871	-0.40531	.	.	-0.34938
Q1	.	.	0.49181	.	0.45005	.	.
Q37	.	.	-0.40771	0.48620	.	0.46929	.
Q30	0.36084	.	.	.	-0.58163	0.32100	.
Q21	0.30755	-0.42640	.	.	.	0.55839	.
Q22	0.40774	-0.47678	.	.	.	.	0.50254

NOTE: Absolute values less than 0.3 have been printed as '.' (and can be assumed to be non-significant).

Variance explained by each factor

FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4	FACTOR5	FACTOR6	FACTOR7
9.358252	2.154760	1.766495	1.593108	1.428076	1.267511	1.152465

Final Communality Estimates: Total = 18.720667

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q7	Q12	Q13	Q16	Q18	Q19
0.566547	0.688081	0.744392	0.671652	0.619031	0.801706	0.632550	0.496653	0.711942
Q20	**Q21**	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q30**	**Q32**	**Q33**
0.692655	0.711331	0.737946	0.618558	0.777685	0.786488	0.752651	0.762841	0.753920
Q36	**Q37**	**Q39**	**Q42**	**Q43**	**Q47**	**Q50**	**Q54**	**Q55**
0.521555	0.693658	0.500609	0.675030	0.828231	0.758034	0.745577	0.707504	0.763840

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