

**A strategic and integrated approach to South  
African peace-building: The case of the  
Department of International Relations and  
Cooperation (DIRCO)**

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Mini-dissertation submitted in *partial* fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree *Master of Public Administration*  
at the North West University

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Graduation: October 2018

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study considers a strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building, but is limited to the South African Department of International Relations (DIRCO). South Africa's democratisation in 1994 was not only seen as a "new dawn for the oppressed" in South Africa, but also as an example of a successful negotiated outcome between diverse interests, political agendas and ethnic groups. South Africa's successes placed a moral obligation on the country to share its experiences with other countries in conflict. This study considers the South African approach to peace-building, its successes, setbacks and short-falls and the possible role of the country as a future recognised international peace-builder.

The first part of the study examines the international environment's impact on the peace-builder role of South Africa, particularly the fact that South Africa is not a traditional international powerbroker, such as the countries of the Permanent 5 in the United Nations Security Council. It, therefore, has to develop its reputation as an international peace-builder on the premise that the country will be able to contribute a unique, credible and successful peace-building approach to any peace process. This process of South Africa positioning itself in the global arena is assisted by a change in the international world order, with South Africa being a member of the BRICS formation as well as an important regional power.

South Africa's unique approach and contribution to peace processes stems from its own successful democratisation process as well as the fact that the current world peace-building approach is not always regarded as successful or credible. In this context, South Africa's Ubuntu approach to peace-building is presented as that unique offering. This approach has been applied in Burundi where the focus shifted from narrow interests towards a "people-first" approach.

The study also examines the evolution of the concepts associated with conflict resolution, peace-making, peace management and post-conflict reconstruction and development. In this regard the researcher developed a conceptual model of the so-called peace-building continuum (referring to peace- and conflict-related processes),

including conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-enforcement/peacekeeping and finally, post-conflict reconstruction and development. This conceptual understanding is depicted in a linear manner, which is then aligned with DIRCO's peace-building architecture. Although the linear depiction of the peace-building continuum directly opposes the complex nature of typical peace process, it provides a clear definition of the functions, mandates and phases, which is an important aspect of an eventual integrated approach. The challenge in DIRCO's peace-building architecture, however, lies in the fragmented nature of its organisational units such as Desks (bilateral and multilateral units), the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African Renaissance Fund (ARF). All of these units are mandated to play a particular role within a coordinated and integrated peace-building contribution. Since there is limited coordination, alignment and integration of approaches, roles and functions between these different units, however, DIRCO (and by implication, South Africa) instead makes piece-meal contributions without leveraging the strengths from each unit towards a more integrated approach. Furthermore, South Africa does not have the resources of other more endowed countries vying for more important geopolitical roles and positions. A strategic approach to peace-building is, therefore, contained in the manner in which South Africa will prioritise its areas of maximum influence and impact. This in turn will lead to a more positive international reputation. Harnessing its own history and unique approaches towards this goal will ensure that South Africa continues to build on its international reputation as a peace-builder.

Although this study only considers South Africa's peace-building approach from the DIRCO perspective, it does hint at the full South African peace-building architecture within Government, the private sector and civil society (e.g. think-tanks and academia). It is this area, beyond DIRCO, which provides ample opportunities for further study towards a better understanding and contribution to South Africa's peace-building approach.

**Key words**

Peace-building, peace-keeping, peace operations, post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and development, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), negotiations, mediation, social and economic diplomacy

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I wish to acknowledge the following for their contributions in different and unique ways towards the successful completion of the study:

- The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) for the opportunity and support throughout the study.
- Professor Gerrit van der Waldt, my study leader, for his unwavering support and guidance throughout the study. I also thank him for his encouragement throughout the study. Thank you for your professionalism and timeous provision of valuable feedback.
- My wife, Chrisna, and children (Josua, Migal and Daniel) who have supported me throughout the process. Your love, support and patience mean the world to me.

## **DECLARATION**

I, Andre Johannes Groenewald, hereby declare that this study: "A strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building: The case of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)" is my own work, that all sources used or quoted have been reported and acknowledged by means of complete references and that this thesis has not been previously submitted, either in its entirety or partially, by me or any other person for degree purposes at this or any other University.

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**A.J. Groenewald**

April 2018

**Date**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACIRC	African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises
ACSA	Airports Company South Africa
ADFL	Alliance for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Cong-Zaire
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
APP	Annual Performance Plan
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARC	African Renaissance Committee
ARF	African Renaissance Fund
ASF	African Standby Force
ASI	African Solidarity Initiative
AU	African Union
AUCEWS	African Union Early Warning System
AUC	African Union Commission
BNDES	Brazilia National Development Bank
BNC	Bilateral National Commission
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy — Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DHA	Department of Home Affairs

DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DPA	(UN) Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping Operations
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FNL	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) — National Liberation Forces
FRODEBU	Front pour la democratie au Burundi
GAIA	Global All Inclusive Agreement
GIVAS	Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICTS	International Cooperation, Trade and Security
IDASA	Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO/MONUC	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NSC	National Security Council

NSG	National School of Government
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
OSAPG	Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
PARENA	National Recovery Party
PCRD	Post conflict, Reconstruction and Development
PALAMA	Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PRF	Peace-building and Recovery Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
RCD-Goma	Rally for Congolese Democracy – Goma
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SAAF	South African Air Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANEWC	South Africa's National Early Warning Centre
SAPS	SA Police Service
SAPSD	South African Protection Service Detachment
SAWID	South African Women in Dialogue
SCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
SONA	State of the Nation Addresses
SPF	(World Bank) State and Peace-building Fund

S/CRS	(Department of State Office of the) Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation
SSA	State Security Agency
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation WFP World Food Programme

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Lederach (2005) argues that in the period between the late 1980s and early 1990s, which constituted a new post-Cold War era, more than 80 peace accords were signed, the majority of which in the developing world or the Global South. The exceptions, however included agreements signed in Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa (Lederach, 2005). The sheer number of peace processes has led Bell (2003:19) to refer to the 1990s as “the decade of the peace agreement”. Nonetheless, most of the contemporary peace processes have failed; few have led to enduring settlements (De Varennes, 2003). Indeed, according to Chester A. Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State (USA) for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989, and Fen Osler Hampson, Professor at Carleton University, only one-third of settlements that were negotiated in “identity civil wars” since 1945 have resulted in sustainable lasting peace (Lambourne, 2001). This attests not only of the resistance to resolution, but as Rasmussen (in Gawerc, 2006:437) argues, “this suggests, among other things, that the struggle for political power during the implementation of an agreement is where the battle for sustainable peace is truly waged, and there may be shortcomings associated with the manner in which official negotiations to end conflict are designed and conducted”.

States with mechanisms, policies and norms for managing conflict as well as with well-established traditions of good governance are generally better able to accommodate peaceful change. Those with weaker governance, fragile social bonds and little consensus on values or traditions are more likely to falter (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011:7). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, twelve African countries experienced armed conflict in 2014 (Uppsala University, 2014). The Economist Intelligence Unit's annual Democracy Index (2015) ranks only one African country, Mauritius, as a “full” democracy, though it uses complex criteria that count countries like much-praised Botswana as “flawed” democracies. The Mo Ibrahim Index, a quantitative measure of good governance, shows a decline of 5%

since 2007 in African political participation (Ibrahim, 2015). Similar trends are evident based on the AfroBarometer (AfroBarometer: Conflict, 2015). Freedom House, an American think-tank, indicates that the number of full “electoral democracies” among the 49 sub-Saharan countries has fallen from 24 in 2005 to only 19 currently (Freedom House, 2015; Puddington, 2015). It is furthermore evident from the statistics that the success rate for durable and sustainable peace agreements and settlements are negligible (Ibrahim, 2015).

Peace operations of the United Nations and its agencies have changed remarkably over the past 10 years. It generally transformed its more conventional peacekeeping approach, which basically addressed military involvement and the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, to a more complex multidimensional and multi-disciplinary interventions approach. In the latter, the military establishment is only one of the many role-players within a multi-party and integrated peace process. What has also become clear is that not only does each peace process differ from previous ones, the role-players and interlocutors are also case-sensitive (Santos & Esq, 2005). Each of these different role-players brings their own demands, dynamics and interests to an already complex process. Adding to this complexity, the rapid movement and fluidity of peace efforts further contributes to practitioners finding it increasingly difficult to analyse, develop and establish operational plans for conflict resolution. Additional complicating elements are the myriad of definitions, terminologies and meanings attached to the peace and development vernacular (United Nations, 2008:13).

Ambassador Grant, of the UK Mission to the United Nations Security Council (2015:2), highlights some important issues regarding the effectiveness of peace-building in the changing context of peace-building support, which is increasingly less viewed as a post-conflict endeavour and more one that starts during high-intensity conflict and with changing drivers of conflict (Grant, 2015:2). This, therefore, requires a greater analysis of conflict drivers, with sequenced and prioritised recommendations. Hutton (2014) emphasises that violence continues to be a means of ordering, i.e. creating, sustaining and changing the obligations and exercise of power and thus for peace-building to be relevant it should engage with the causes of

violence, such as the effects of inequality that are sustained through networks of obligation within political systems. The primacy of politics should be utilised to create political and policy space for peace-building activities that would align peace, security and development activities into a coherent strategy. While these issues are important it is crucial to retain the principles and concept of national ownership. Finally, peace-building requires sustained political attention and support (Leijenaar, 2015: 2).

Since democratisation in 1994, South Africa has become more involved in international conflict resolution (Southall, 2006). In this regard, the country's approach to conflict resolution has always been based on its own experience, namely a negotiated settlement, as opposed to a military solution. South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Pahad stated: "The most important contribution South Africa can make in preventative diplomacy is to employ the moral authority it has derived from its own process of national reconciliation and democratization" (South Africa, 1995:4). South Africa's own experience relates to ensuring that the processes should include elements aimed at "an all-inclusive process, long-term solutions, building of trust and that parties should take ownership of the process" (Ebrahim, 2013:5).

There is evidence that South Africa is losing some credibility as an internationally recognised peacemaker (Graham, 2006:119). The country's credibility and reputation as an international peacemaker has been built on the internationally recognised success of its own transition towards democracy as well as successful peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi (Hendricks, 2015:9-30). South Africa's credibility as an international peacemaker has waned in recent times due to the country's inability to effectively and credibly deal with its own domestic conflict situations, such as the Marikana incident and student uprisings. Internationally, South Africa seems to lack a clear leadership role and approach to conflict resolution. This may be the result of its continued fear of being perceived as a "regional or continental hegemon" (Southall, 2006:10). South Africa also lacks integrated peace-building architecture, which should include peace-building institutions within Government (and beyond in civil society and the private

sector) that could be employed to address the “full peace-building continuum” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014:9). Not only should there be a concerted effort to develop all the necessary institutions within Government to significantly contribute to peace-building efforts, particularly in Africa, but the existing institutions should be aligned to ensure coherence and attainment of strategic goals and outcomes.

South Africa’s approach to peace-building has three critical dimensions: firstly, the international framework in which South Africa and the country it is attempting to assist exists; secondly, South Africa’s own interests; and thirdly, the history, political and socio-economic context of the country experiencing conflict (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2011:2). South Africa’s approach finds resonance in the philosophy of Ubuntu, while its interaction and role in the international context can be analysed by means of theories such as Complexity Theory, Chaos Theory and World Systems Theory. According to DIRCO (2011:4), the philosophy of Ubuntu “means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others”. The lesson for peace-building from this tradition is that by adopting and internalising the principles of Ubuntu, South Africa can contribute towards creating human-centric relationships based on the recognition that within the web of humanity everyone is linked to everyone else (Murithi, 2006:10). These and other theoretical perspectives clarify and facilitate predictions regarding the current and future contexts for peace-building. Path Dependency Theory, in this regard could, for example, explain the “path” or historical trajectory a particular country took to arrive at a current state of conflict. Arthur (1994:116) states in this regard that path dependency is necessary to view the world as “messy, organic, and complicated”.

It could be argued that South Africa’s departure point to peace-building is largely based on the principle which Metz (2011:552) describes as a “moral theory” grounded in Southern African world views: one that suggests a promising new conception of human dignity. Ubuntu provides a different approach to realism (see Morgenthau, 1982) that describes the international realm as rather anarchic and consisting of independent political units, called states, with the following inherent features:

- “states are the primary actors and inherently possess some offensive military capability or power which makes them potentially dangerous to each other;
- states can never be sure about the intentions of other states;
- the basic motive driving states is survival or the maintenance of sovereignty; and
- states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.”

Whereas the Theory of Realism supports a classical understanding of state sovereignty, it seems that South Africa prefers a “people-centred sovereignty” (i.e. Ubuntu) or the sovereignty of the people as opposed to being state-centred (Pityana, 2006). This study is founded on the theory of Pragmatic Idealism, which is different from classic Realpolitik. Pragmatic Idealism can be described as an approach to foreign policies that cultivates moderation, mediation, legal and diplomatic solutions to international conflicts and authentic commitment to peacekeeping, peace-making, human rights, foreign aid and ecological rationality (Melakopides, 1998:90).

It is often said that a country’s foreign policy and international relations approach is informed by its domestic policy and its national interest (Holsti, 1996:172). Most theories of international relations are based on the idea that states generally act in accordance with their national interest. State interests often include self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity and influence over other states (Burchill, 2005:1-8). South Africa’s history has been mired in conflict during phases of colonialism and Apartheid, eventually leading to a new democratic dispensation in 1994. Given the country’s peaceful transition into democracy, there is international expectation for South Africa to contribute to peace-building in countries locked in conflict, particularly in Africa.

South Africa’s contribution to peace-building is, however, in a state of flux due to complex interaction between not only state and non-state actors, but also between a complex array of issues, interests and agendas. In this regard, Complexity Theory makes a valuable contribution to explore world politics increasingly as a group of tightly-bound actors evolving together, characterised more by context than their

innate nature. These countries are also often vulnerable to surprise from new groups, whose members decide independently to organise themselves in new ways and for new purposes (Bousguet & Curtis, 2011:44). The unpredictability of these interactions could be analysed according to the principles of Chaos Theory (Levy 1994:167).

South Africa is not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and is regarded as a middle-income (i.e. developing) country. It is, therefore, not generally expected to play leading international roles. World Systems theorists, such as Wendt (1987:335), define international systems in terms of the “fundamental organising principles of the capitalist world economy”. World Systems Theory is also useful to analyse the relative difficulty for developing countries, like South Africa, to play international roles.

To fully understand the South Africa’s peace-building orientation, it is important to define the inherent concepts, namely conflict, conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. Conflict can be regarded as an inherently and unavoidable aspect of social change. Ramsbotham *et al.* (2011:5) explain that conflict is “basically an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints”. These authors describe conflict resolution as “a more comprehensive term which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved. This implies that the behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile and the structure of the conflict has been changed”. Negotiation as concept can be regarded “as the process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflict” (Ross & Stittinger, 1991:56). Mediation, in turn, “involves the intervention of a third party. It is typically a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome, although it may include positive and negative inducements” (Fisher, 2001:78). Peace-making generally refers to a process in which parties move towards a “settlement of conflict and where parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily” (Article 33(1), Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 1945). Peacekeeping generally refers to the deployment of international armed personnel to keep fighting parties apart. This

is often “associated with civil tasks such as monitoring, policing, and supporting humanitarian intervention” (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011:6). These authors continue and explain that peace-building forms the foundation of the work associated with peace-making and peacekeeping by “addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflicted parties” (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011:6).

When Norway facilitated the Oslo Accords and other peace processes during the 1990s, it suggested the existence of a “Norwegian Model” for the promotion of peace. This “model”, however, is based on the development of strong partnerships between governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations (Egeland, 1998; Helgesen, 2004). The Norwegian approach to peace promotion is internationally accepted as best practice for peace-building (Skandland, 2008:56). This study analyses the Norwegian Model as a possible best practice contributor to an integrated South African peace-building approach.

There seems to be consensus that “a peace process is more likely to succeed and be sustainable if it is comprehensive and accompanied by multi-track diplomacy and public involvement” (Lederach, 2005). It has been argued that in the case of both Northern Ireland and South Africa that informal diplomacy, public involvement and grassroots dialogue were critical elements in their relatively successful peace processes (Gidron, Katz & Hasenfeld, 2002). If this is successfully achieved, South Africa’s peace-building approach should form the catalyst or driver of its foreign policy and international relations engagements. As such, it represents the country’s history, character, democratisation processes and developmental model, which would be consistent with a Southern African theoretical approach of Ubuntu. The result should be a new strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building.

South Africa’s peace-building dogma, approach and architecture should form the engine of the country’s foreign policy and relations as well as the country’s history (including the fight against colonialism and Apartheid), underlined by the traditional alliance with the South (through the 1955 Bandung Conference and more recently

the membership of the IBSA and BRICS groupings). These historical realities are supported by a value system that includes, especially in the context of peace-building: inclusivity (not only racial, but more inclusive roles for women and the youth), the attainment of long-term sustainable solutions, country ownership, equity and equality, social cohesion and stability, the fight against poverty, unemployment and inequality.

The purpose of the DIRCO Mediation Support Unit (MSU) is to render peace support and reconciliation efforts, strengthen capacity and institutionalise South Africa's unique peace-building experience to be achieved through the main functions of the MSU. The MSU should furthermore provide a co-ordinated response, an overall framework, political direction and unified guidelines to all departments on how to successfully align their peace-building co-operation to Government's strategic objectives. Other operational functions of MSU include:

- coordinating all relevant information and preparing briefing documents for mediation purposes;
- providing rapid response to mediation initiatives;
- developing capacity for future mediators to contribute towards developments into regional, continental and international structures;
- providing logistical and administrative support to special envoys/mediators;
- developing a reconciliation and mediation support model based on South Africa's unique history;
- documenting knowledge and lessons learnt for future mediation efforts; and
- contributing to the development and utilisation of women in mediation in the region, continent and international structures; and to manage knowledge and information resources.

However, an overarching, strategic and integrated approach to peace-building is largely absent. This study makes a contribution by proposing a new strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building. This is considered against the backdrop of an international environment of new rising powers, the development of a new world order challenging the established superpowers and forming of new power

partnerships (for example G20 and BRICS). Furthermore, by utilising Complexity Theory, Chaos Theory, Path Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, dynamics such as state failures, international terrorism, an unstable world economy and intra-state conflict are explored to contextualise the rationale for an integrated approach.

## **1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

Considering the international environment, contextual background, conceptual framework and variety of international stakeholders that impact on the study, the specific objectives identified are:

- to explore the theoretical framework of international peace-building and its place in the broader international relations context;
- to conceptualise peace-building vernacular, including conflict, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction;
- to investigate DIRCO's contribution to South Africa's peace-building architecture, including MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA and its Desks;
- to compare South African peace-building architecture with international best practice cases, namely the Norwegian peace model, Burundi and the DRC;
- to uncover challenges related to South Africa's peace-building architecture and strategic applications; and
- to design the parameters for a strategic and integrated peace-building approach for DIRCO to address the challenges uncovered.

## **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The study attempts to achieve the above-mentioned objectives by answering the following questions:

- What are the relevant theories for analysing international peace-building endeavours within the broader international relations context?

- What are the relevant and appropriate definitions and applications for the international peace-building vernacular that include conflict, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction?
- What is the current state and level of integration of South Africa's peace-building architecture, particularly within DIRCO?
- What were the main strategic, institutional and architectural challenges to South Africa's peace-building efforts, with particular reference to its efforts in the DRC and Burundi?
- What should be included in a new strategic and integrated South African peace-building approach from a DIRCO perspective?

#### **1.4 CENTRAL THEORETICAL STATEMENTS**

Zelizer (2013) is of the opinion that an integrated peace-building approach addresses the importance of interlacing peace-building methods into different sectors including development, humanitarian assistance, gender, business, media, health and the environment. Incorporating peace-building approaches in these fields is critical for transforming protracted conflicts into sustainable peace (Zelizer, 2013).

Johan Galtung (1991:67) was the first to use the term "peace-building" in the 1970s, when he proposed "the establishment of peace-building structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution" (Galtung, 1991:67). Since then, the term peace-building has covered a multidimensional exercise and tasks ranging from the disarming of warring factions to the rebuilding of political, economic, judicial and civil society institutions (United Nations, 2008). In his 1992 report, "An Agenda for Peace", former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali first used the definition of peace-building at the UN as "an action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". Since then, many commentators have tried to further describe and define this concept. The UN Secretary-General describes in a UN Report his long-term understanding for peace-building in the following three reports (A/63/881-S/2009/304, A/64/866-S/2010/386 and A/67/499-S/2012/746) on post-

conflict peace-building and one (A/65/354–S/2010/466) on women’s participation in peace-building (United Nations) (Young & Goldman, 2015:1). The Brahimi Report of 2000 defines peace-building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Durch *et al.*, 2003). The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee described peace-building in 2007 as:

“A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peace-building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”.

South Africa’s existing peace-building institutions include the DIRCO Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the DIRCO National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the DIRCO African Renaissance Fund or future DIRCO South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa’s first choice, within the context of peace-building, would be to contribute to those initiatives that aim to address the underlying causes of conflict and not simply its short-term containment. This is, however, not always possible and if military forces are required to respond to humanitarian emergency or to support an important peace process, South Africa may have to provide an appropriate contingent to supplement the international or regional effort. This involvement is consistent with South Africa’s obligations under the Charters of the UN, the OAU (AU) and the SADC Treaty that state that countries should be prepared for the contingencies and requirements of a broad range of peace mission scenarios and indicates this preparedness to the region and the international community. A considerable effort needs to be made towards coordination, cooperation and coherence as well as the development of a database of “high quality personnel who

could be made available for active participation in peace missions through the existing UN Standby Arrangements System, and through information sharing at the regional and sub-regional levels” (DIRCO, 2011).

The fact that the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) has not been established has raised questions regarding South Africa’s development partnership agenda. The mandate of the ARF is very broad, namely “to fund activities of co-operation, democracy and good governance, conflict resolution, social and economic development, humanitarian and disaster relief, technical co-operation, and capacity development” (Besharati, 2013:19).

## **1.5 METHODOLOGY**

### **1.5.1 Literature review**

Fink (2013:3) describes a literature review as a “systematic, explicit and reproducible method of identifying, evaluating and synthesising the existing body of completed and recorded work produced by researchers, scholars and practitioners”. A research review is, therefore, developed from the deductions based on the original research of scholars and researchers. According to the breakdown by Fink (2013:5), the literature review is divided into seven focus areas, namely: “selecting research questions, selecting bibliographical or article databases, web sites and other sources, choosing search terms, applying practical screening criteria, applying methodological screening criteria, performing a review and finally synthesising the results.”

This study, therefore, examines the shortcomings and deficits of the South African peace-building architecture, particularly the piecemeal and unconnected approach within DIRCO. These shortcomings and structural deficiencies are then addressed in the recommendations and conclusions of the study towards a more strategic and integrated approach to peace-building.

### **1.5.1.1 Databases consulted**

The researcher utilised books, articles, published and unpublished documents, memoranda, minutes, policy documents, reports, messages, newspaper articles, events and case studies on conflict resolution and peace-building, which all contributed to the data-collection process. Additional information related to the study was also obtained from the following databases:

- i) Catalogues of theses and dissertations of South African Universities
- ii) The catalogue of Books: Ferdinand Postma Library (North-West University)
- iii) Index to South African Periodicals
- iv) Policy documents and proposals of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
- v) Other useful information related to the topic was obtained from Internet websites and web-based publications.

There exists a substantial body of literature on peace-building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, negotiations and development. A substantial part of the scholarly input refers to case studies in conflict areas and countries or directly to the systems at the United Nations. The study is aimed at exploring South Africa's possible strategic and architectural approach to peace-building. To this end, the researcher employed a qualitative research design as basis for eventual analytical conclusions and recommendations.

## **1.5.2 Empirical Investigation**

### **1.5.2.1 Research design**

The research design is the organisation and sequencing of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure (Leedy *et al.*, 2005). The study followed a qualitative research design.

“Qualitative research is based on a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context (or real world settings) and in general; the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest” (Maree, 2007:79). It can, therefore, be explained as research conducted in natural and not simulated situations. This includes approaches that are not intrusive, observable or manipulated.

In a qualitative study “research design should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:24), the research activities of assembling, accumulating and analysing data, followed by a process of evolving and modifying theory as well as the fine-tuning process of expanding or refocusing the research questions and recognising, detecting and dispensing with validity threats should all happen at roughly the same time. It is important that the researcher remains open to changing the design or approach during the course of the study, should any new developments impact on the study. Grady and Wallston (1988:10) argue that “applied research in general requires a flexible, non-sequential approach and an entirely different model of the research process than the traditional one offered in most textbooks”.

The study design will take the format of a qualitative design taking into account an openness to flexibility, as the subject matter, it will be argued, is not only fluid, but takes the characteristics of Complexity and Chaos Theory. This necessitates a non-sequential approach and ability to fine tune interviews and the questions posed, especially to practitioners.

To further explore South Africa’s peace-building approach, two case studies, namely on Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will be included in Chapter 4. The case study approach will provide additional insights into the understanding of complex issues. This method of research for issues related to the social sciences has become more prevalent particularly with regard to education (Gulsecen & Kubat, 2006), sociology (Grassel & Schirmer, 2006) and community-based challenges (Johnson, 2006), viz., poverty, unemployment, drug addiction,

illiteracy, etc. The challenges related to intra state conflict can be regarded, as community based and are usually particularly complex.

### **1.5.2.2 Sampling**

Maree (2007:79) describe sampling as a “process used to select a portion of the population for study”. The authors continue by stating that qualitative research is generally based on non-probability and the purposive sampling rather than probability or random sampling approaches. Furthermore, purposive sampling means selecting participants because of some defining characteristic that make them the holders of the data needed for the study. Sampling decisions are as such made for the explicit purpose of obtaining the richest possible source of information to answer the research questions. Purposive sampling decisions are not only restricted to the selection of participants, but also involve the settings, incidents, events and activities to be included for data collection (Maree, 2007:79).

The target population, for the purposes of this study, included South African and international diplomats as well as specialists working in the peace-building environment. These specialists were purposively sampled from the target population and included the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), special envoys (former Minister Skweyiya and former Deputy Minister Pahad), practising South African diplomats from the DIRCO branches: Global Governance (United Nations, African Union, NOCPM and SADC) and Africa: Great Lakes Region and North Africa as well as retired envoys, such as Ambassador Nhlapo. Finally, specialists in civil society and think-tanks were engaged including the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Wits Business School, the Southern African Liaison Office (SALO) and the Royal Norwegian Embassy.

### **1.5.2.3 Instrumentation**

Instrument is the generic term that researchers use for a measurement device (survey, test, questionnaire, etc.) (Research Rundowns, 2009). To distinguish between instrument and instrumentation, consider that the instrument is the device

and instrumentation is the course of action (the process of developing, testing and using the device). Instruments fall into two broad categories, researcher-completed and subject-completed, distinguished by those instruments that researchers administer versus those that are completed by participants. Unless the measures used to collect data are dependable, the researcher would not be sure that the findings are correct (Fink, 2013:85).

#### **1.5.2.4 Data collection**

It is generally accepted that “the most common sources of data collection in qualitative research are interviews, observations, and review of documents” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Creswell, 2009; Locke, Silverman & Spirduso, 2009). The researcher employed all three methods to adhere to the principles of method and data triangulation. A literature review was utilised to uncover theoretical vantage points and international best practice by means of the review of documents, articles, books and publications. The findings emanating from the literature review were verified by means of semi-structured interviews with the purposively sampled participants. The aim of the semi-structured interviews “was to see the world through the eyes of the participant” (Maree, 2007:86), who is a valuable source of information that could assist in understanding the “participant’s construction of knowledge and social reality” (Maree, 2007:87). An interview schedule was designed for this purpose and was tested (i.e. pilot study) to determine the validity of the instrument and the clarity of the questions.

#### **1.5.2.5 Data analysis**

Qualitative data analysis is an iterative and reflexive process that begins as data are being collected rather than after data collection has ceased (Stake, 1995). As the interviews, research and other data-collection methods progressed, a clear indication towards a possible conclusion by means of deductive logic emerged. The practice of reading through the data and assessing and interpreting it remains a constant throughout the research process. The changing of the conceptual framework or changes in definitions or additional theories were factored in by the researcher over

the course of the study. This process is termed “progressive focusing” (Parlett & Hamilton, 1976:56).

#### **1.5.2.6 Limitations and delimitations**

Limitations are matters and occurrences flowing from the study that the research could not control or even anticipate. These occurrences limit the extent to which a study can go and in some cases affect the end result and conclusions that can be drawn. Every study, regardless of the quality of its construction and application, has limitations. This is one of the reasons why researchers should not use the words “prove” or “disprove” with respect to research findings, as a new study on the same topic could reach different conclusions (Simon, 2013:2). The researcher may only have access to certain people in an organisation, certain documents and certain data. These limitations are addressed in Chapter 5 of this study and include follow-up analyses.

### **1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

It is the aim of the study to contribute to the development of a South African peace-building system, architecture and approach that would include all the main government structures and institutions to effectively and productively respond to peace-building requirements on the continent and beyond. These government structures and institutions should be complemented by expertise in civil society and the private sector. Furthermore, these South African structures and institutions should cooperate and coordinate their efforts strategically and in an integrated manner to achieve a more coherent and consistent approach. This approach should be consistent with South Africa’s ethos of Ubuntu and its own democratic experience. This would again raise the view of South Africa as a serious international peace-builder and would ensure a predictable and consistent approach to peace-building that would serve South Africa’s national interest.

### **1.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Anonymity, consent and confidentiality compose the triangle of ethics in research (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:57; Van den Hoonaard, 2013:25). In promotion of these values in the proposed study, participants were provided with a consent form, to obtain their consent, prior to research being undertaken. The participants were duly informed about the purpose of the research, the procedures that will be followed as well as the potential benefits of the study. During sampling, participants were also informed of their voluntary participation and also obtained detailed clarity of the research objectives and the confidentiality and anonymity of their responses.

Prior permission from the Head of DIRCO was obtained by means of a letter in which the purpose of the research, the sampled participants, the time and duration of the research as well as the potential positive contribution of the research on DIRCO's strategic objectives and mandate were clarified. The study also obtained ethical clearance from the North-West University (Ethical Clearance Number: NWU-00117-13-S7).

## **1.8 CHAPTER LAYOUT**

The first chapter introduces the topic under investigation, contextualises the research problem, provides an overview of the methodology used and gives a structural preview of the study.

Chapter 2, titled "Theories and principles of international relations, conflict resolution, negotiations, mediation, peace-building, peace-keeping and development", provides a theoretical overview of the international environment, the political and socio economic context of countries in conflict as well as the international policy developments related to the peace-building continuum.

Chapter 3 examines the international approach to addressing conflict. The study investigates the international (UN) and regional (SADC and AU) arenas to uncover underlying principles, approaches and best practice.

Chapter 4 is titled “Peace-building models and approaches: Case studies: Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)” and considers South Africa’s peace-building experience in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Chapter 5 examines the existing role and peace-building approach of DIRCO, measured against South Africa’s people-first approach of Ubuntu within the context of a complex international environment described through theories such as Realism, Complexity Theory, Chaos Theory, Path Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory. It will, furthermore, provide a case for a more strategic and integrated South African approach to peace-building that would not only result in a considerable contribution to sustainable peace, but also enhance South Africa’s reputation as a legitimate and successful peacemaker. Interviews with senior officials at DIRCO, former South African envoys, Government experts, academics and civil society interlocutors are set out, as mentioned above, to examine the challenges of the current peace-building architecture and to identify possible interventions for a more effective approach in the future.

The final chapter draws conclusions from the previous chapters, particularly the theoretical framework of a complex international environment as well as South Africa’s architectural and institutional deficits exposed through peace-building interventions in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). An integrated approach is proposed based on the empirical investigation, case study analyses and literature survey. This approach forms the basis of the premise that South Africa should consider a new strategic and integrated approach that would provide a peace-building model that is both successful and sustainable and which could restore South Africa’s peace-making reputation and form the basis and bulwark of South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations approach.

## CHAPTER 2

# THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PEACE-BUILDING AND PEACEKEEPING

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the theoretical foundation for and a contextual orientation of the key constructs of this study, namely international relations, peace-building and peacekeeping. This orientation contends that there has always been conflict in the world, with the consequence that countries and peacekeeping institutions continuously attempt to build peace. For the purposes of this chapter, two forms of state conflict are explored, namely intra- and inter-state conflict. The dominant area of scholarly interest seems to be centred on inter-state conflict where major countries such as the so-called “Permanent 5” (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), namely the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China play a significant role in peace-building efforts in inter-state conflict. It is, however, evident that since 1945 the global impact of intra-state conflict has been growing.

A significant portion of intra-state conflict took place and is at present occurring on the African continent. Such conflicts have serious negative implications for security, stability and development in the region. These realities also have negative consequences for South Africa, resulting in a moral and practical obligation for the country to contribute to intra-state peace-building endeavours in Africa. These obligations and endeavours of South Africa are the core focus of this study.

Although various theories have explained some of the dynamics associated with international behaviour of interlocutors, classical and more contemporary theories are analysed to further gain clarity and detail. Waltz, in his book *Man, the State and War* (1979), proposes that in cases of numerous factors and role-players impacting on international relations theorists and practitioners consider dividing these into different levels of analysis, namely: individual, state and international level.

This chapter follows an amended approach to the Levels of Analysis Approach, as proposed by Waltz, and considers each theory within its appropriate level. The levels of analysis for this study are as follows:

- i) The International Relations level, which considers the international relations environment from a macro perspective
- ii) The State and the Statehood Continuum, which considers the states in conflict and the mediatory state (South Africa)
- iii) The Systemic Perspective, which considers peace-building from an institutional perspective (the United Nations system)

The common denominator or core construct, for purposes of analysis, is therefore the state. States in the international context relate in their historical and current roles in competing for dominance, influence, status and benefits. Relevant theories serve to analyse international relations between states, such as Anarchy, Realism, World Systems, Polarity, Neo-liberalism, Complexity and Chaos as well as Dependency Theory. The case is made that states have competed to remain dominant actors, to enhance their power positions and to develop systems and institutions that would perpetuate their standing. These theories support the position arguing that a new world order has developed with South Africa as an important and required contributor to peace-building, particularly within its sphere of influence.

The second part of the chapter is divided into two parts, with the first part focusing on statehood in the context of the domestic characteristics of a successful, stable and developing state. The second part of the chapter considers how countries and institutions, as peace-builders, have been involved in peace-building endeavours. Focus is placed on South Africa's ideological approach to peace-building in the context of its historical and ideological background.

The third and final part of the chapter examines various core concepts, terminology and vernacular related to the peace-building continuum, including conflict, conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and

development as well as the systems and institutions built, particularly the UN Peace-building architecture, to facilitate more successful peace-building interventions.

## **2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**


The International Relations Level section, according to the Levels of Analysis Approach, is the first area for which a theoretical exposition is considered. In this regard two areas are examined. This includes a macro level that examines international relations between the dominant states over the past 400 years and secondly, a next level of colonised African states and the reasons for intra-state conflict are considered. In both cases a graph provides a schematic illustration of the arguments and reasoning that follow.

### **2.2.1 International relations: A theoretical framework**

The theoretical exposition comprises two main approaches. The first approach is the international relations approach, which considers the states in the world that have dominated international relations. It argues that state formation forms the basis of an international state system consisting of equal states competing for power, standing, benefits and strategic advantages. This competition takes place in an anarchical system characterised by Realism continually corrected by the notion of “balance of power”, with great state powers entering and exiting the international relations environment, leading to different constellations of polarity and new formations, often referred to as the “world order”. Understanding state interaction furthermore requires theories such as Chaos and Complexity, as different actions and input at international and state level impact on international relations and statehood. This continuous change in international power relations leads the study to a conclusion of the emergence of a new group of states, including South Africa as a major contributor to peace-building in Africa.

The graph below (2.1) provides a summarised overview of the theoretical exposition of the international relations environment of the dominant states, as explained above.

**Graph 2.1 Prominent theories for an analysis of international relations**




Source: Researcher's own

The second approach considers the reasons for intra-state conflict requiring a new and integrated approach to peace-building. Developing states, particularly in Africa as locus of this study, have experienced inter-state conflict due to a number of structural deficiencies in its process of state formation. To examine these system weaknesses, the theoretical analysis regarding states is the subject of peace-building that mainly commenced with formal state formation in Europe, i.e. the emergence of “strong” European states (i.e. from feudalism to capitalism) to the expansion of territories through colonialism and imperialism. The analysis of the hierarchical state system is primarily based on the World Systems Theory, Dependency Theory and the notion of the “Iron Cage”. Furthermore, the continuation of state dependency through neo-colonialism and the further disruption of growth and development through neo-liberalism are investigated. This leads the study to argue that South Africa has a specific contribution to make with regards to peace-building that would lead to sustainable peace, equitable development and regional stability.

The graph below (2.2) sets out a summarised overview of the theoretical framework for an analysis of the progress of state development in Africa, as explained above.

**Graph 2.2 Theoretical perspectives for an analysis of state systems**



Source: Researcher's own

### 2.2.2 The international relations context

The first premise of this study is built on the concept of a state with an internal and external dimension. The external dimension relates to its definition as a legal entity (a subject of law) and the internal dimension to its being characterised by its classical Weberian properties. The initial notions of the concept “state” were mainly developed in Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which created a strong central authority, operated by a bureaucracy on the basis of a uniform set of laws, exercising of exclusive control over a well-defined and contiguous territory and enjoying a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Gilpin, 1981:121-122). Both the external and the internal aspects of a state are relevant to this study.

One of the consequences of the Peace of Westphalia was the introduction of the concept of sovereignty, which is generally understood in law as the full right and power of a governing body to govern itself without any interference from outside

sources or bodies. Waltz (1979:103) describes a government, in the context of sovereignty, as an “organised authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its own territory”. He goes on to argue that “a government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means that the public agents are organised to prevent and to counter the private use of force” (Waltz, 1979:104). Wight (1978:102) in turn describes the lack of government as “the absence of laws, the non-existence of a judiciary to enforce laws, and the absence of an executive authority to administer laws”. These characteristics are described in considerable detail by Teschke in his book, *The Myth of 1648* (2003).

In political theory, sovereignty can be regarded as a substantive term designating supreme authority over some polity. Newly-formed states do not only exclude any interference from outside, but there is no authority above them (Spruyt, 1996:3). Each state rules itself within its own borders, with absolute sovereignty as the order of the day (Goodhart, 1958:951) and no interference under any circumstances. The ability to govern a state effectively is an important aspect of sovereignty. States, therefore, possess sovereignty and recognition by other states (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993:594). This recognition is the basis of a new system of equal subjects of international law in an international state system (through the Peace of Westphalia). Austin (in Anghie, 2006:739), however, notes that law and order are only explicable in a system governed by an overarching sovereign that could create and enforce the law. Austin argues for the development of rules for states (and an authority to enforce the rules or law), as he anthropomorphises the approach by likening states in the international system to people in a domestic legal system. This view of positivism connects international relations with Anarchy within broader International Relations Theory, as in neither case is there an overarching authority or “super government”. The starting point of the theoretical premise is therefore that states compete for power, but without an international government (over-arching authority) to regulate such competition. This premise, therefore, alludes to “no authority” and competition, in which the “no authority” element generally links to notions of Anarchy and the “competition” component, aligns with Realism.

Anarchy in the context of international relations generally refers to the "lack of a common government that can enforce agreements among the states or more generally among the units" (Art & Jervis, 1973). Art and Jervis (1973) further explain that "international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body". Milner (1991) concurs with this assertion and adds that "no agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes". States can, therefore, commit themselves and sign treaties without any sovereign power, ensuring compliance with these commitments and treaties. There is also the general absence of punitive measures for any deviations from them. The absence of a supreme power is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics (Powell, 1994).

There seems to be a fundamental assumption amongst theorists and practitioners that international politics is anarchical (Weber, 2009:14). Gilpin (1981:7) defines "the fundamental nature of international politics as a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy". This contention is valid for the period 1648 to 1914, as well as the great wars years from 1919 to 1945, as well as the years 1945 to 1989 (demise of the USSR) and finally the period 1990 to 2017 (with the rise of the BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

The question that arises now is that if all states are equal and there are no international over-arching government, how can the dominance of certain states be explained? In answering this question it should be noted that the argument was made that states were formed without an overarching authority. These states now operate as equals amongst each other, competing for resources and power. First, the concept of power is understood by some theorists as the "sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other capabilities at the disposal of the state" (Bangura, 2003:81). Other theorists, such as Viotti and Kauppi (1993), view power not as an absolute value determined for each state, but as capabilities relative to the capabilities of other states. If a state dominates internationally or even regionally it is often labelled a hegemon, which explains the pre-eminent position of a state. Alternatively, there is the notion to not necessarily imply dominance, but to

refer to the state as exercising leadership amongst other states in its particular region or sphere (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993:582).

Understanding state interaction, particularly the competition for military and economic ascendancy, resulted in the development of the Theory of Realism. This Theory has been the predominant school of thought in International Relations Theory, claimed by commentators from antiquity such as Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli (Fukuyama & Doyle, 1997:151). Viotti and Kauppi (1993:44) describe power as the “core construct” in the Theory of Realism. The common denominator amongst Realist thought is that world politics is ultimately a field of conflict among actors pursuing power. Classical realists, like Hobbes (Commins & Linscott, 1947), believe that it follows from human nature; neo-realists focus upon the structure of the anarchic state system, and neo-classical realists believe that it is a result of a combination of the two and certain domestic variables. To find a common understanding, Steinberg and Zasloff (2006:151) characterise Realism as “a spectrum of ideas”. Viotti and Kauppi (1993:5) make the point that regardless of which definition is used, the Theory of Realism revolves around four central propositions, including that:

- i) states are the “principal or most important actors” in international politics, rather than individuals or international organisations;
- ii) the international political system is anarchic, as there is no supranational authority that can enforce rules over the states;
- iii) actors or, in other words, the states, in the international political system are “rational” as their actions maximise their own self-interest; and
- iv) all states desire power so that they can ensure their own self-preservation.

A Realist perspective thus emphasises the importance of the state as a unit of international interaction, both as it pertains to international interaction (Waltz, 1979) and to the building of states. Therefore, the internal and the external dimensions mentioned before are highly relevant to this study.

On the international front, states accumulate power to ensure security (particularly in an anarchical world). Although states, within the context of realism, strive towards hegemony as the only way to secure security, it is in their interest to not allow another state to develop into a hegemon and this opposition is done through a balancing process. This competition for power has been evident since the early European state system, continuing through the imperial and colonial era to more modern times (i.e. post-1919). Realism provides for an understanding that sovereign states are the only actors in the international system and that international institutions, non-government organisations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having limited independent international influence (Gilpin, 1981). Although countries may have altruistic ideals to contribute to peace-building initiatives, by means of participation in international organisations, the reality is that only states with a certain standing and reputation have been included in these processes. Fetherston's (2000:2) view is that if conflict is inherent to Realism then conflict resolution is the appropriate response. Realism, furthermore, has a strong Rational Choice element. Rational Choice is generally referred to as "a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility", i.e. their ability to maximise power (Scott, 2000:1). As Morgenthau (1973:38) explains it: "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power."

The emergence of dominant states explained through Realism requires a limitation. According to the Theory of Balance of Power, imbalances and concentrations in military and material capabilities (i.e. the power elements of Realism) among the great powers are consistently evaluated and the equilibrium is restored in order to ensure the survival of the major powers or in essence the big countries in the international system (Shaw, 1996). The dominant states achieve this equilibrium by means of different mechanisms to restore the balance, including internal military build-up (where economic wealth is converted into military power), the formation of counterbalancing alliances, passing the buck of balancing to another state (proxy wars), partitioning and compensation in post-war peace settlements and simulation of best practice (Schroeder, 1989:140). This balancing of power is a central theme throughout this study with power corrections during the early European state system;

the introduction of the US as a new hegemon, followed by the introduction of the USSR to balance the power; the USA as a unipolar power and new emerging power blocks, such as BRICS.

The period after 1945 created the entrenchment of power through the system of veto in the United Nations Security Council. This generally created a “bipolar world” between the major power blocks, namely the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Later, with the demise of the USSR, a unipolar world emerged with only the US remaining. The world is now witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world, where power blocks such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) present alternative power positions. Polarity in its general sense is thus international relations in any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system (Buzan *et al.*, 2003). It describes the nature of the international system by distinguishing between “four types of systems: unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, and multipolarity for four or more centers of power” (Waltz, 2000:5-41). The type of system is mainly dependent on the distribution of power and the relative influence of a particular state in a regional and global context. It is generally accepted that “the post-Cold War international system is unipolar in nature” (Wohlforth, 1999:41). Posen (2003:5) and Deng and Moore (2004:113-156) substantiate this claim by contrasting the United States of America’s military power with other countries on the globe. They found that:

- “its defence spending is close to half of global military expenditures;
- its blue-water navy is more superior than all other countries’ combined;
- it has a favourable change to first launch a powerful nuclear strike against its main international foe, Russia;
- it has a defence research and development budget that is 80% of the total defence expenditures of its most obvious future competitor, China; and
- it has unmatched global power-projection capabilities.”

Waltz (in Jervis, 1991:39) points out that the unipolar system continuously depicts some structural weaknesses. This should, however, be understood in the context of the new demands of the international system. There exist human security concerns

across the world; environmental challenges in the form of climate change as well as recent environmental catastrophes, attributable to changing climatic patterns; cyber-crime and diseases; not to mention the security threats posed by global terrorism. Recently serious security threats in France, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany evidenced the new threats to state security. Furthermore, the rise of new economies, such as BRICS, as well as the growing economic strength of the European Union (EU) has dramatically shifted the balance of power to other centres. If this trend continues, one may be looking at a changing polarity set up in the international system characterised by multi-polarity as opposed to unipolarity or the bipolarity of the Cold War era. These rising economic stakes continue to translate into military and political ascendancy and new international and regional hegemony. It is a trend that has further complicated the state system by increasing the multiplicity of actors involved as well as the dynamic nature of issues concerned (Irungu, 2014:19). In a multipolar world, one or two countries alone would not be able to address the myriad of new and complex issues. It is in this context that countries combine their efforts and powers to provide new solutions to specific issues associated with peace-building.

The main power players in international relations from a Realist view relates to the relative importance and power of these states with regard to their military and economic capabilities. The main difference between superpowers and “regional powers is their ability to assert themselves against other competing powers, and thus ultimately their ability to engage in and win wars” (Mearsheimer, 2001:5). This stance is more conservative in nature and limits the definition only to those potentially able to mobilise greater hard power in the future, such as China, India and Russia. A different approach is associated with the English School, which focuses on “the ability, right and willingness of a state to co-manage international order” (Bull, 1977:205). The English School of thought derives largely from Bull (1977:205-6), who argues that “great power hood is more than capability”. Great powers are granted the legitimate “right to govern international order and to manage their relations with one another in the interest of international order”. In the same vein, Buzan and Wæver (2004:31) argue that the great power concept resonates with the

USA that continues to fulfil the role of great or “super power”. However, there are other countries that are emerging as super powers.

In order to include emerging powers into a system that would differentiate and establish a new system of power hierarchy, Buzan and Wæver (2004:31) distinguish emerging powers from merely regional ones. Emerging powers mainly emanate from their regions or sub-regions onto the global arena. They possess a certain set of attributes or serious potential to gain great-power status, which could upset the power relations between states on a global scale. A multipolar system with more states vying for power and playing important international roles have led to new attempts to make sense of this “anarchy”. The contribution of International Relations Theory is significant to analyse some of the interactions between states and other international actors (Jervis, 1998:20). In this regard Jervis (1991), in his book *System Effects*, argues that some social scientists do not sufficiently examine the reality that interconnected actors in a complex international system can produce consequences that seem vastly more or vastly less than the sum of the system’s parts. Walt (1998:130-134) summarises this argument in the following way:

“Because system effects are everywhere, we can never do merely one thing. Any step we take will have an infinite number of consequences, some that we intend and others that we neither intend nor foresee. A military build-up may deter a threatening adversary and help to preserve peace, for example, but it may also divert funds from other social needs, encourage one’s allies to free-ride, and cause formerly neutral states to become friendlier with one’s rivals. The more complex the system and the denser the interactions between the parts, the more difficult it is to anticipate the full effects of any action”.

It is these random acts and their consequences that need to be factored into international relations to better understand possible outcomes. This is true for high-level international relations as well as individual interactions at country level (i.e. the peace-building level).

Although Complexity and Chaos Theory provide an explanation for the non-linear international relations developments, including the behaviour, actions and outcomes of states, it is also the additional international role-players such as the private sector, civil society and individuals that contribute to a more complex system with denser interactions. In addition to the International Level of Analyses, Complexity and Chaos Theory also provide explanations for the inputs, approaches and outcomes related to peace-building. This then places the Theory also within the State Level and Systems Levels of Analysis. Different, random and even ad hoc inputs during the peace-building process could lead to totally different outcomes. It is the so-called “Butterfly Effect” coined by the American meteorologist, Edward Lorenz, to highlight the possibility that small causes may have momentous effects (Lorenz, 1963:130).

### **2.2.3 Statehood and state systems transfer**

From a theoretical perspective, the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to the development of the nation state and the international state system. It also served as the stimulus for international law and impacted on the theory and practice of the idea of balance of power (Van Vollenhoven, Carter & Steed, 1936:115; Gross, 1948:20-41).

Max Weber and Charles Tilly developed classic definitions of the state. According to Weber (1966), “[t]he state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory [...] If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be”. Tilly and Ardent (1975) in turn argue that “[a]n organisation which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a state in so far as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another” (Tilly & Ardent, 1975:156). Mann (in Hall, 1994:67) contributes additional layers to the concept of the state in his notion of “infrastructural power”, which refers to the “actual penetration of societies by state bureaucracies and state-sponsored programmes, such as public education, and the ability to enforce policy throughout the state’s entire territory” (Hall, 1994:67). A defining characteristic of the “modern” state in the

tradition of Weber, Tilly and Mann is that “political power becomes progressively de-personalised and formalised” (Chesterman, Ignatieff & Thakur, 2005:23). These factors will become increasingly important in the analysis of post-conflict peace-building.

State-making has been described by Tilly (1985) as a “social contract between rulers and subjects” or among subjects themselves to surrender their absolute freedom by which state elites, looking to secure their hold on power, guarantee security and in the process gain some form of legitimacy. This process of state formation has continued for many centuries with the three main functions of providing security, representation and welfare. Put plainly, failure to perform these functions is a failure of the state (Milliken & Krause, 2002:756).

The modern conceptions of the nation state were created in Europe to protect the interests of the capitalists (Szentes, 2005:146-158). It was, therefore, in the interest of early European capitalists to develop a world economy that would benefit them. It was a system characterised by a division of unequal labour between European states and the rest of the world. To uphold this unequal system, these early European capitalists needed strong states that had political and military power. According to Wallerstein’s World System Theory, “the differences between states lie in a so-called hierarchy” (Skocpol, 1977:1079) of dominating (e.g. colonising) and dominated states (e.g. colonised). According to the World Systems Theory, the type of political system is also directly related to each region's place and status within the world economy. As a basis for comparison, Wallerstein (1974) proposes “four different categories namely, core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external, into which all regions of the world can be placed”. These categories describe each region's relative position within a hierarchical world economy as well as certain internal political and economic characteristics (Wallerstein, 1974). From the earliest days of state formation, states’ relative international power was therefore dependent on its economic strength.

Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory holds that the core regions benefited the most from the capitalist world economy and included the greater parts of north-western

Europe (e.g. England, France and Holland). These countries developed strong central governments, extensive bureaucracies and large mercenary armies leading to an affluent middle class that obtained control over international commerce and could extract capital surpluses from this trade for their own benefit. The majority of the population, basically landless wage earners, provided labour for farms and manufacturing activities. The “demise of feudalism started the shift of economic and commercial transactions from feudal obligations towards money rents” (North & Thomas, 1971:777-803). The domestic impact for core countries was agricultural productivity increase supported by the growing predominance of the commercially oriented independent farmer, the rise of pastoralism and improved farm technology. This created greater liquidity within society, leading to an increase in consumer spending (albeit relative to the feudal period) (Szentos, 2005:146-158). This process of development is sometimes described by theorists through the Modernisation Theory, which “refers to a model of a progressive transition from a pre-modern or traditional to a modern society, including key elements such as urbanisation and industrialisation” (Bernstein, 1971:141-160).

As much as the entrenchment of power of the dominant states in 1945 was institutionalised by the veto system at the United Nations and shareholding at the Bretton Woods (World Bank and IMF), the transfer of state systems through colonialism was imbedded first through dependency and secondly, through necessity. Dependency Theory, made popular in the 1960s by Raul Prebisch, is closely related to the World System Theory of Wallerstein. Prebisch contends that “increases in the wealth of the richer nations appeared to be at the expense of the poorer ones” (Love, 1980:45-72). Dependency Theory, in its purer version, is closely linked to Marxism, which views capitalism as the exploitation of cheap labour in return for redundant technologies from the West. The majority view of theorists in this school of thought is that there is a dominant world capitalist system that relies on a division of labour between the rich “core” countries and poor “peripheral” countries. Furthermore that over time, the core countries will exploit their dominance over an increasingly marginalised periphery (Mlcoch, Machonin & Sojka, 2000). Groenewegen and Vromen (1996:365-380) emphasise that “the consequence is not

only valid in the sense that remnants of the past affect present, but also future activities”.

The structure of the World Systems Theory and the linearity of the Dependency Theory created a so-called “Iron Cage” for a society and country from which it is difficult to break free. Max Weber presents his theory of an “Iron Cage” in his work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1920). Weber (1920) explains that a strong Protestant work ethic and belief in living frugally assisted the development of the capitalist economic system in the Western world. As the influence of Protestantism diminished in the lives of people, these important values remained and impacted on the system of capitalism. It also influenced and impacted on the social structure and principles of bureaucracy that had evolved with the so-called Protestant beliefs. This bureaucratic social structure as well as the values, beliefs and world views that supported and sustained it became central to shaping social life. It was this very phenomenon that Weber conceived of as an “Iron Cage”. Furthermore, the technological and economic relationships that organised and developed out of capitalist production became itself fundamental forces in society. Thus, if one is born into a society organised in a particular way, with the division of labour and hierarchical social structure that comes with it, this organisational system is perpetuated. So, those born into the “Cage” live out its dictates and in doing so, reproduce the cage in perpetuity. It is for this reason Weber considers the “Iron Cage” a considerable burden to social and state reform.

This “Iron Cage” remained part of the system and process of African states, in the form of Neo-Colonialism, even after decolonisation in the early 1960s. Franz Fanon describes Neo-Colonialism as the continued exploitation of the African continent from outside (the influence by former colonisers) and within (the elite and the systems, processes and institutions established) (Fanon & Sartre, 1963). Fanon writes in his 1964 work titled *Toward the African Revolution* that “every former colony has a particular way of achieving independence. Every new sovereign state finds itself, practically, under the obligation of maintaining definite and deferential relations with the former oppressor” (Fanon, 1969:133). It should be noted that in the context of Africa, the period of decolonisation in the 1960s provided countries on the

continent with varying degrees of autonomy (Fieldhouse, 2012). Politically, economically, commercially and even culturally the legacy of European dominance remained evident in the national borders, political infrastructures, education systems, national languages, economies and commercial and trade links and networks of African states. The remnants of colonialism remained embedded in the form of neo-colonialism (Shaw, 1982).

Neo-liberalism was the next approach that introduced a new phase of undermining sustainable growth and development in Africa and particularly African state formation and development. Neo-liberalism is regarded as the return and spread of one specific aspect of the liberal tradition, namely economic liberalism (Thorsen & Lie, 2006). Economic liberalism is based on the premise that states should not intervene in the domestic economy, but leave it to the market forces, companies and individuals to participate in economic activities (Thorsen & Lie, 2006). Palley (2005:76) argues that a “great reversal has taken place, where neo-liberalism has replaced the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes (1936)”. Keynesianism, as it came to be known, dominated theoretical approaches in economics and economic policy-making in the period between 1945 and 1970, but was then replaced by a more “monetarist” approach inspired by the theories and research of Friedman (1962). Neo-liberalism has dominated macro-economic policy-making since 1970, as indicated by the tendency towards less severe state regulations on the economy and greater emphasis on stability in economic policy rather than “Keynesian” goals, such as full employment and the alleviation of abject poverty (Thorsen & Lie, 2006).

The institutionalisation of Western state policies was again entrenched through the World Bank and the IMF. Following the ideology of neo-liberalism and spearheaded by institutions known as the “Washington Consensus” (for being based in Washington D.C.), structural adjustment policies (SAPs) were imposed to ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring. However, it required poor countries (such as in Africa) to reduce spending on sectors such as health, education and development, while debt repayment and other economic policies were made the priority. By the mid-1980s most of the government debt in sub-Saharan Africa was owed to the World Bank and IMF. This gave these institutions the leverage they

needed to implement their newly adopted policies of deregulation and privatisation, through what were called structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These almost invariably included the following elements, explained by Martinez and Garcia (1997:2), of what is now called neo-liberalism:

“reduced government spending and greater fiscal discipline to control inflation; removing import controls and restrictions on foreign investment; privatisation of state enterprises; devaluation of the currency; allowing the market to set foreign exchange rates, interest rates and the price of commodities and making labour more flexible by reducing legal protection, food subsidies and minimum wages”.

This concludes the theoretical framework for an analysis of international relations. The next section explores the international context as well as related concepts.

## **2.3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS**

The objective of this section is to establish a common understanding of the chronological development of states and an international state system, to indicate the transfer of this state system to Africa, including the fact that it transferred specific “templates” of governance, institutions and systems as well the creation of strong linkages based on certain ideological models and deliberate dependencies.

### **2.3.1 Statehood, anarchy, realism, balance of power, polarity and a new world order**

International relations theorists, such as Mingst and Arreguin-Toft (2010:1), date the contemporary state system from 1648, the year of the Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years War. The authors continue by stating that this Peace (which included two treaties) marks the end of rule by religious authority in Europe. They furthermore explain that the Greek city-state system, the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages are each key developments leading to the Westphalian order or a state system. Although these states were now interacting with each other as equals, the system lacked overarching authority. In later years, there were attempts to address

this inadequacy, mainly through the establishment of the League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations (1945).

The emergence of strong national states in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, each competing with each other, served as the foundation for mercantilist policies designed to foster economic growth and in the process raising revenue. Mercantilism is described as the striving after political power through economic means. The economy was therefore placed in the service of the polity (Hoogvelt, 1997:3-4). Imperialism is described, in classical terms, as a position or policy of pre-eminence or dominance with respect to foreign elements, as with the Roman, Ottoman or British Empires. Imperialism from 1648 to 1919 involved the establishment of colonies, which led to the so-called colonialism (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993:583). It entailed the expansion of its geographical territory through colonialism, the development of different methods of labour control and the creation of relatively strong state institutions (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993:583).

It is important to indicate that not only the development of new political formations, but also the governance, economic, commercial and even institutional developments relating to new states, as the characteristics of states, will be transferred later from the early 17<sup>th</sup> century through Imperialism and Colonialism. This process of European state template transfer would eventually create dependencies that would have seriously negative impacts on states, particularly in Africa.

A new world economic system emerged in response to the feudal crisis. This was the first time that an economic system encompassed much of the world, with links that superseded national or political boundaries. The new world economy differed from earlier empire systems, because it was not a single political unit. Canterbury (2010:35) explains that “empires depended upon a system of government which, through commercial monopolies combined with the use of force, directed the flow of economic goods from the periphery to the centre”. The author goes on to explain that empires maintained specific geographical and political boundaries, within which they maintained control through an extensive bureaucracy and a standing army. Only the myriad of elements inherent to modern capitalism enabled the modern world

economy, unlike earlier efforts, to extend beyond the political boundaries of any one empire (Canterbury, 2010:36).

The origins of the Westphalian state system is European and required a vehicle to be transported to the rest of the world. Colonialism served as such a vehicle and the Berlin Conference (1885) institutionalised the process of states with specific boundaries (territories). The governing authority was initially the colonising country (European state). This principle of the sanctity of borders was also confirmed by African states (29 states from Africa, Asia and the Middle East) through the Bandung Conference in 1955. The core principles of the Bandung Conference were “political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality” (US Department of State, 2017).

Colonialism created an international hierarchical system. Based on Wallerstein’s (1974) World Systems Theory this hierarchical system comprised so-called “core” and “periphery” countries. Core countries included developed economies such as England, Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium as the colonisers and countries in Africa, South America and Asia as the colonised (i.e. periphery, dependent or developing countries). The developing countries or periphery supplied inexpensive minerals, agricultural commodities and low-cost labour and furthermore served as the sources of surplus capital, redundant and antiquated technologies and manufactured goods. The flow, allocation, management, supply and demand of these flows and the allocation and distribution of resources were determined by the economic interests of the dominant or developed states and not by the economic interests of the dependent or developing state. This process of capital and goods flow between core and periphery was also extended to Africa through colonialism. This relationship between coloniser and colonial dominium was entrenched and legally formalised through the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). Hobshawn (2010) explains that by 1914, after numerous colonial wars, virtually all the territories of Asia, Africa and the Pacific were controlled by the major European states, resulting in the assimilation of all these non-European peoples into a system of law that was fundamentally European. An important impact of the Berlin Conference was that it created African states with delineated borders in the same manner as the Peace of

Westphalia created European states. Of course, no Africans participated in the Berlin Conference (Anghie, 1999:2).

The vehicle of colonialism did not only export the state system to what would later become the developing world; it also exported governance, institutional, economic, financial and commercial systems from Europe to its colonies. This created, to the benefit of colonising countries in Europe, a system of dependence (Love, 1980). Baran (1967) explains the trading relationship as a veiled form of “looting and plundering” in which Europe transferred the economic excesses of pre-industrial countries back to Europe to finance the industrial revolution. The extent of European rule, by means of colonialism (including Africa and North and South America), increased from “35% (1800) to 67% (1887) of the Earth’s land surface and another 18% was added in the new wave of annexations between 1875 and 1914” (Magdoff, 1978:29-35).

The first part of this section provides an overview of the historical timeline starting from the genesis of states to the replication and institutionalisation of that system within the political, security and governance and socio-economic spheres through colonialism to states in Africa. The next subsection deals with the international interaction between states and its impact on peace-building efforts.

### **2.3.2 Statehood, colonialism, state systems transfer and neo-liberalism**

March and Olsen (1998:944) explain that the Westphalian state system differentiates distinctly between a domestic sphere “characterised by institutional density, hierarchical relationships, shared interests and strong collective identities; and an international sphere characterised by a deficit of strong institutions, few rules, conflicting interests and conflicting identities”. The domestic sphere is outlined later in this chapter. The following section addresses the international sphere.

As stated earlier, the European state system initiated by the Peace of Westphalia led to the domination in Western Europe of four main rivals: Spain, The Netherlands, France and England. Countries such as Sweden, Russia and Austria dominated

eastern and north-western Europe. Westphalia generally eliminated the ideas and beliefs of political hierarchy in Europe and initiated a new system of fundamental rules that would regulate and govern relationships in a system of legally equal sovereign states with no authority governing them (Teschke, 2003:17).

International geo-political competition between the state rivals of Europe and later the United States took the form of political, military and commercial rivalry over market monopolies, colonies and modes of exchange. Competition primarily involved piracy and retaliation, diplomacy and alliances, trade embargoes and outright armed struggle (Katz, 1993). One of the consequences of sovereignty after 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia was the right to employ military force as an instrument of foreign policy. European states' right to wage war to protect and advance its dynastic or state interests was not questioned up to the 18<sup>th</sup> century and wars between European states were a major feature of the European landscape. Not counting imperial wars, the European states conducted 89 armed conflicts against each other between 1648 and 1914, on average one war every three years (Wiener & Schirer, 2009:83). In the broader context of geo-political relations, this process of competition continued with the rise of the US as a hegemon after World War 1, the rise of the USSR into a bipolar system beyond the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 after World War 2 to the demise of the USSR and the development of a unipolar international world order (Armijo & Roberts, 2014:503). The reality of a sovereign states system, no world authority and international anarchy generally led to the development of the theories of Realism and Polarity (i.e. Bipolar and Unipolar, as explained in the previous section) (Bull, 1977).

African countries found themselves part of this struggle for power, although they were mostly the stage or proxies for political power struggles at a higher level (Fieldhouse, 2012). Shaw (1982) and Saul and Leys (1999:13) explain that "at independence the structural weaknesses of Africa's economic position were generally recognised and it was assumed on all sides that active state intervention would be necessary to overcome them". They add that Africa was, at the time, still expected to earn its way by playing its traditional role of primary-product exporter (i.e. "periphery"). If the state was to progress on developmental issues, it had to

“accumulate surpluses from the agricultural sector and apply them to the infrastructural and other requirements of import-substitution-driven industrialisation” (Saul & Leys, 1999:13). Arrighi (2002) points out that

“up to 1975, the African performance was not much worse than that of the world average and better than that of South Asia and even of the wealthiest among First World regions. It was, however, arguably the continuation of neo-colonial practices through neo-liberalism (particularly Structural Adjustment Programmes) that finally undermined any state development in Africa”.

South Africa is a major economy in Africa and has built a reputation as an international powerbroker. The emergence of a new world order, with countries previously from the periphery, provides opportunities for new approaches to be considered, particularly those related to peace-building. Although the reforms of international peacekeeping and peace-building operations are not high priorities for the emerging powers, BRICS countries have all shown commitment to international peacekeeping. These countries also recognise it as an important international resource in a rule-based international system. They seem to be less passionate about peace-building, however, as it is viewed as an area where the West has tried to transfer its own systems, institutions and values based on the neo-liberal model (De Carvalho & De Coning, 2013:4). In principle the rising powers prefer peace-making and peace-building, as long as they are not prescriptive, to peacekeeping, but in practice most of their efforts have been directed to participating in peacekeeping operations (De Carvalho & De Coning, 2013:4).

The previous section puts forth the argument that countries ranging from Europe to the USA have dominated the international relations environment, including the periphery, through colonialism, capitalism and institutional entrenchment. A new group of countries (most notably BRICS), however, have emerged to contribute to providing their own interpretation and experience towards the solving of international challenges, including those related to peace-building. NATO states indicate that based on their experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo, peace-building challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community (Defence

Strategy, 2010). This comprehensive approach should encompass a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments that fully respects international conventions.

## **2.4 STATES AND THE STATE CONTINUUM**

As argued in previous sections, the state has been the major actor on the global stage. More recently, its power and position has been questioned by non-state actors such as civil society organisations, social movements, transnational networks and multinational corporations.

### **2.4.1 Linking the international environmental with state-building**

In the first section of this chapter the argument is posed that countries of the core (in current terms, the so-called “developed” countries), according to the World Systems Theory, transferred both their political systems and governance institutions as well as their economic and commercial systems through colonialism, resulting in relationships denoted by the Dependency Theory and the “Iron Cage”. Many countries emerging from violent conflict have more recently been expected to rebuild their state according to a Western model, often described as the Washington Consensus (neo-liberal economic policies). An important contributor to the perception of the West using its influence to serve its own purposes is the insistence that aid-recipient countries adopt structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), designed to reduce the size and reach of the state (Fritz & Menocal, 2006). These countries have been expected to rely on market forces as the most efficient tool for allocating resources and promoting growth. The most important recommendations under the neo-liberal model, as mentioned before, include eliminating government controls, promoting trade liberalisation and developing a greater role for the private sector in the economy and as a result certain areas have been negatively affected, also in terms of the provision and delivery of basic social services. More recently the success of the so-called “Asian tigers” (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) has brought new emphasis to the role of the state. This thinking has been supported in international initiatives, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and more recently the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Two aspects of the state are addressed, for the purposes of this study, namely the state in conflict (or moving from conflict) and the mediatory state.

#### **2.4.2 The state in conflict: intra- and inter-state conflict**

Peace-building is considered in the context of intra-state (in states) conflict, whilst the international experience has been more focused on inter-state (between states) conflict resolution and peace-building. In fact, Holsti (1996) questions the notion of deriving any policy or intellectual relevance for peace-building purposes from inter-state wars, which dominated the European Wars and the Cold War for purposes of intra-state conflicts. Holsti bases his research on peace treaties during the period 1648 and 1945, which contributed to the development of the international peace system and included the:

- Thirty Years' War (Westphalia 1648)
- Louis XIV's Wars (Utrecht 1713)
- The Napoleonic Wars (Vienna 1815)
- The First World War (Paris 1919)
- The Second World War (1945)

As Holsti (2009:16) points out, inter-state conflict has been the dominant international form of conflict. In this analysis of inter-state conflict, the study commences from 1648, as this date denotes the genesis of the modern state and by implication the international state system. Scholars such as Grotius; Gross (1948); Bull (1977); Brownlie (1990); Krasner (1995); Anghie (1999) and Ghani, Lockhart and Callaghan (2005) confirm the concept and reality of an international state system, as created through the Peace of Westphalia.

In the context of the conflict state the first consideration is to understand what it is that will move a country or state to require intervention and secondly, by whom and how should intervention be initiated. Since the decolonialisation process of African states from the 1960s and the end of the Cold War after the late 1980s, many foreign policy decision-makers are faced with decisions over whether, when and how to

intervene in intra-state conflict (Jagers & Gurr, 1995). The Correlates of War project (Barbieri, Kesh & Pollins, 2008) indicate that the incidences of inter- versus intra-state wars have been as follows:

- 1946-1988: inter-state conflicts (30) intra-state (65); and
- 1989-2007: inter-state conflicts (9) intra-state (54).

The statistics prove the point that intra-state conflicts have proliferated and that it is this form of conflict where South Africa could play a significant role in peace-building.

Efforts to contain these new threats to regional and state stability are becoming increasingly significant at a time when little is known about the conditions under which successful intervention is most likely. This increased importance of intra-state conflict has introduced a plethora of studies on the causes of, consequences from and strategies for managing intra-state conflict on how third parties might successfully intervene to bring an end to the conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Midlarsky, 1992; Damrosch, 1993; Gottlieb, 1993; Licklider, 1993; Jagers & Gurr, 1995; Horowitz, 2001; Gurr & Harff, 2003). The former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, notes in the Agenda for Peace Report (1992) that key features of intra-state conflict include:

- “the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance;
- a breakdown of law and order; and
- general banditry and chaos.”

Boutros-Ghali (1992) adds that in the cases of intra-state conflict the duties and functions of government are often suspended, its assets destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government.

Conflict in states is a rather common phenomenon. However, violent conflict is highly problematic and should be carefully managed. Conflict is generally defined as “an interaction between interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt to achieve their goals” (Draman, 2003:4). Singer (1996:35) provides a conflict typology, which is based on the political status of parties and divides conflict into “interstate wars and extra systemic (mainly colonial) wars”. He, however, adds two further classes of non-interstate conflict, namely “civil conflicts in which one protagonist may be an insurgent or revolutionary group within the recognised territorial boundaries of the state” and the “increasingly complex intra-state wars in former colonial states, where the challenge may come from culturally defined groups whose members identify with one another and with the group on the basis of shared racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or kinship characteristics” (Singer, 1996:38-49).

States with mechanisms, policies and norms for managing conflict as well as with well-established traditions of good governance are generally better able to accommodate peaceful change. Those with weaker governance, fragile social bonds and little consensus on values or traditions are more likely to falter (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011:7). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “twelve African countries experienced armed conflict in 2014” (Uppsala University, 2014). The Economist Intelligence Unit's annual Democracy Index (2015) “ranks only one African country, Mauritius, as a ‘full’ democracy, though it uses complex criteria that count countries like much-praised Botswana as ‘flawed’ democracies”. The Mo Ibrahim Index, a quantitative measure of good governance, shows a “decline of 5% since 2007 in African political participation” (Ibrahim, 2015). Similar trends are evident based on the AfroBarometer (AfroBarometer: Conflict, 2015). Freedom House, an American think-tank, indicates that the number of full “electoral democracies among the 49 sub-Saharan countries has fallen from 24 in 2005 to only 19 in 2015” (Freedom House, 2015; Puddington, 2015). It is furthermore evident from the statistics that the success rate for durable and sustainable peace agreements and settlements are negligible (Ibrahim, 2015).

### **2.4.3 Peace-building and State-building**

There has been a growing overlap between the peace-building and the state-building agendas. Lakhdar Brahimi, a former senior UN diplomat, states that “[t]he concept of state-building is becoming increasingly more accepted within the international community and is actually far more apt as a description of exactly what it is that the world should be trying to do in post-conflict countries” (Brahimi, 2007). However, it is also important to understand that growing international support for state-building is not intended as a call to supplant peace-building (Paris & Sisk, 2008). While the two concepts have become more closely related, they remain different, both analytically and in real life. As articulated by Wyeth and Sisk (2009:156):

“[P]eace-building is a transitional enterprise...focused on processes of war termination (usually, but not always, coinciding with implementation of peace agreements) and efforts to prevent renewed violence through processes to address the immediate causes of the conflict. Strategically, a goal of peace-building is to provide incentives for protagonists to commit to peace agreements, and help steer a process of political, social, and economic transition. State-building reflects the need for a stable, legitimate, and effective state that is responsive to its citizens and capable of providing basic services, security, access to justice, and a foundation for economic development, and is connected to the political processes through, which state-society relations and power relationships among élites are negotiated”.

The resilience of the state advances the argument that the resolution of any intra-state conflict should be led to the development of a state with a government that could organise and manage activities to ensure security and economic development. This process to organise and manage a state has been termed governance, although it has evolved to the term “good governance”. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, which introduced a time of unprecedented political change, the concept of good governance emerged.

#### **2.4.4 Third-party intervention**

As mentioned earlier in this study, the third-party interventionists in inter-state conflict were mainly the dominant states, including the USA, UK, France and the USSR, all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). After 1945, the United Nations and the UNSC played important roles through Chapter VII and NATO (Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia). More recently, especially after the establishment of the African Union (following the Organisation of African Unity or OAU) in 2000, the organisation has been involved in more than 50 peace operations in 18 countries (Williams, 2013). Regional Economic Organisations in Africa have all committed to contributing to peace-building in Africa. Nationally, South Africa has contributed by means of bilateral agreements to deploy (in the DRC and Central African Republic), sub-regional deployments (in Lesotho) and regional deployments (in Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Comoros, Darfur) as it has through UN deployments (in Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Darfur, DRC, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire).

#### **2.4.5 The Mediator State**

In the process of finding a solution to a conflict situation, the only avenue is not necessarily the appointment of an outsider. A third party can play an important role, but should understand the role of a facilitator. Edward de Bono (1985:76) captures the role of an outsider very well in saying:

“In a conflict situation the two parties are unable to stand outside their own perceptions. In order to move from the argument to the design mode there is a need for a third party. The third party is not a go-between, negotiator or mediator. The third party acts as a mirror, an overview, a provider of provocation and creativity and a director of thinking”.

#### **2.4.6 The Mediator State or Third-party Approach**

Reimann (2004:8) notes that research on conflict settlement defines conflict, at its most basic level, “as a problem of political order and of the status quo”. The author

also states that “violent protracted conflict is thus deemed the result of incompatible interests and/or competition for scarce power resources, especially territory”. The conclusion to this thinking, which is in line with the principles of Game Theory, is that conflict is a zero-sum game. Conflict settlement, however, does not need to follow this same Game Theory logic. An important outcome of the fact that conflict settlement could actually follow a different logic is a non-zero sum or even positive-sum outcome. This point is adequately explained in the research into realist rational actor models by Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman (2008) who based their work on Game Theory, which has influenced the work of Fisher and Ury (1983). Reimann (2004: 8) explains that:

“Both Rational Choice and Game Theory are applied to the practice of conflict settlement, political and military leaders who function as primary actors with high visibility are viewed above all as rational actors. They will calculate their interests and will in the end work together towards a rational and mutually profitable goal. Both theories then aim to delineate an optimal strategy for use by players interacting under conditions of uncertainty”.

Inter-state conflicts are very complex and elements of bias should not form the basis of opposite approaches that could not be reconciled, but should be utilised as far as possible to complement or reinforce each other. Reiman (2004:76) makes the point that “the development of procedures for conflict management should not be regarded as static or rigid, but rather as dynamic features that must be easily adapted to the changing framework conditions”. It is therefore of the utmost importance to understand the different methods of conflict intervention, such as facilitation or conciliation on the one hand, and power mediation on the other. This becomes even more important and challenging when contemplating the multiple and diverse involvement of Track I, II and III actors in most intractable and deep-rooted conflicts. A powerful example of this approach was by former President Mandela in the Burundi peace process.

In the past attention has focused primarily on the differences in substance and emphasis between Track I, as conflict settlement strategies, and Track II, as conflict resolution strategies. Fisher (2001:14) explains in the *Berghof Handbook* that

“while Track I was mainly reserved for the official and formal activities of diplomatic and governmental actors, Track II referred largely to more informal and unofficial efforts by other non-governmental parties. Track I activities range from official and non-coercive measures, such as good offices, fact-finding missions, facilitation, negotiation/mediation and peacekeeping, to more coercive measures, such as power-mediation, sanctions, peace-enforcement and arbitration”.

In contrast to Track I, “Track II refers to all non-official and non-coercive activities, illustrated by facilitation or consultation (occasionally, one comes across the more general term mediation in reference either to facilitation or to consultation)” (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011:24). Generally, these are conducted in the form of problem-solving workshops or roundtable discussions. Although, the strategies are different in emphasis, it seems clear that in most third-party interventions, Track I and II strategies go hand-in-hand and, in many instances, will be purposely combined. Reiman (2004:4) describes the most recent conceptual development as the creation of an additional specific track – Track III. This is taken to refer to “all process and structure oriented initiatives undertaken by actors involved in grassroots training, capacity building and empowerment, trauma work, human rights and development work and humanitarian assistance” (Reiman, 2004).

## **2.5 AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE**

In this third level, peace-building is considered from an institutional perspective and the study endeavours to construct a peace-building continuum from the pre-conflict and conflict phases to the developmental phase (i.e. statehood). Understanding the peace-building continuum enables the reader to understand the various phases, processes, systems and institutions involved in this continuum. This continuum is then compared to international models available at regional, continental and

international level. This affords the reader a better perspective of what a best practice model could constitute. For the purposes of a South African peace-building approach, the country will have to focus on specific areas where a considerable and credible contribution to peace-building could be made. The study, therefore, examines the statement a strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building: The case of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).


This section of the study relates to the second Level of Analysis, namely *The State and the Statehood Continuum*, examining the concept of state-building – a necessity since state-building should be regarded as the foundation for the peace-building process. The following section focus is placed on peace-building, with the understanding that it forms part of the continuum towards state-building. The application of the peace-building continuum by the United Nations is considered, as it would provide the most encompassing framework. Once a full peace-building continuum or spectrum has been established, a South African approach could be contextualised within that continuum. Brief mention is made of peace-building efforts at regional and continental levels.

### **2.5.1 The Peace-building Continuum**

The term "peace-building" is first used in the 1970s by Johan Galtung, who called for the establishment of peace-building structures to promote lasting peace by addressing the "root causes of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution" (Galtung, 1991:67). The term peace-building has since gained wider recognition and has continued to evolve. The process can be both formal and informal, involving a variety of actors. Building peace means to facilitate development at physical (infrastructural), political, economic and social levels of post-war societies (Zelizer, 2013). All four dimensions of the peace-building process are interdependent and overlapping (refer to figure 2.1 below). Integrated peace-building addresses the importance of inter-linking peace-building methods into different sectors, including: development, humanitarian assistance, gender, business, media, health and the environment. Incorporating peace-building

approaches in these fields is critical for transforming intractable conflicts into lasting peace arrangements (Zelizer, 2013).

**Figure 2.1: Peace-building and state-building interfaces**



*(NB: this is a representative, not an exhaustive, list and depicts common tasks in peace-building and state-building as currently practiced)*

Source: Adapted from Wyeth and Sisk (2009:16)

Successful peace-building activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconciliation of opponents; prevention of conflict from restarting; integration of civil society; creation of the rule of law mechanisms; and addressing underlying structural and societal issues. To accomplish these goals, peace-building must address functional structures, emotional conditions and social psychology, social stability, rule of law and ethics and cultural sensitivities.

## 2.5.2 Peace-building and the United Nations

The United Nations definition of peace-building, as depicted in figure 2.1 above, has evolved over time from activities “on the far side of conflict” (Brahimi Report, 2000:4) to include a wider range of peace and security activities. Former UN Secretary-

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduces in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of peace-building to the UN as “action to identify and support structures (the construction of a new environment – par. 57) (for the institutionalisation of peace – par. 49), which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Over the years, various efforts have been made to elaborate on this definition. The UN Secretary-General has set out his vision for peace-building in the following three reports (A/63/881–S/2009/304, A/64/866–S/2010/386 and A/67/499-S/2012/746) on post-conflict peace-building and one (A/65/354–S/2010/466) on women’s participation in peace-building (United Nations) (Young & Goldman, 2015:1). The Brahimi Report from 2000 defines peace-building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Durch, Earle & Shanahan, 2003). The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee described peace-building in 2007 as:

“a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peace-building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”.

Below is a brief overview of key United Nations peace-building initiatives and foci, as described in *UN Peace-building: an Orientation* (2010:47).

<b>Date</b>	<b>Peace-building initiative(s)</b>	<b>Main focus</b>
<b>1992</b>	An Agenda for Peace	Introduced “peace-building” as a UN tool
<b>1995</b>	Supplement to An Agenda for Peace	Emphasised the need for the institutionalisation of peace
<b>1994</b>	An Agenda for Development UNDP Human Development Report	Contributed to linking the security, development, democratisation and human rights agendas

<b>1995</b>	An Agenda for Democratisation	
<b>1996</b>	Inventory of Peace-building Activities	Highlighted the building blocks of post-conflict peace-building
<b>2000</b>	Brahimi Report	Defined peace-building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war”
<b>2001</b>	No Exit without Strategy	Underlined three key peace-building objectives
<b>2003</b>	Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations	Sought greater coordination in peace-building across the UN system
<b>2004</b>	A More Secure World	Called for creating Peace-building Architecture
<b>2005</b>	In Larger Freedom World Summit Outcome	Elaborated and formalised Peace-building Architecture concept consisting of the Peace-building Commission, Peace-building Fund and Peace-building Support Office
<b>2006</b>	UN Peace-building Capacity Inventory	Provided a snapshot of the wide range of peace-building activities undertaken by 31 UN agencies
<b>2006</b>	Policy Committee decision, September 2006	In determining strategies and operational plans, peace-building entails efforts to support...country’s transition from conflict to sustainable peace, with a stable political order and basic institutions in place, the risk of relapse into conflict substantially reduced, and the country


		able to move to more normal development processes.
<b>2007</b>	Policy Committee decision (May 2007)	Provided a “conceptual basis” for peace-building
<b>2008</b>	Capstone Doctrine	Situated peace-building within the UN’s comprehensive approach to addressing violent conflict
<b>2009</b>	Report of the Secretary-General on Peace-building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	Set out basic principles and features which have proven relevant across different contexts Focussed on peace-building in the first 12-24 months after conflict

Source: UN Peace-building: An Orientation (2010:47)

The Capstone Doctrine (2008:18), however, provides a graph with the concept of peace-building incorporating other peace and security concepts such as “peace-making”, “peace-enforcement” and “peacekeeping”. Conflict prevention does not form part of peace-building in this definition, but it should be noted that conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

It is posited that the political process of the conflict, post-conflict, reconstruction and development continuum will follow the concepts: conflict prevention, conflict resolution/peace-making, peace-enforcement/peacekeeping and peace-building (figure 2.2 below).

**Figure 2.2: Conflict continuum**



Source: Researcher's own

Although peace-building is situated at the end of the continuum, it also performs peace-building functions within the other concepts and could be described as the phase related to Post-conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). A sequential or linear approach to the transition from war to peace, which had been the general character of inter-state conflicts, is not replicable in the complex civil or intra-state conflicts (McAskie, 2010). These conflicts tend not to end in a clear-cut or decisive military victory and post-conflict reconstruction and development phase, but rather, often culminate in fragile states trapped in cycles of conflict with complex causes fuelling new cycles of conflict.

Brahimi (2007:26) made it clear that “although capacity building, state building, institution building and development all demand considerable technical expertise, peace-building must be understood as an inherently political process” (A/70/95-S/2015/446, UN Security Council Report, 2015: par. 75). The peace-building continuum (fig. 2.2), therefore, is not a perfectly linear process, as many of the concepts repeat themselves throughout or are returned in cases of peace regression. These concepts will be discussed in more detail, as each concept has sub-concepts that are important in an eventual peace-building process. The study also provides greater detail on the various actions under each peace-building phase,

as these indicate the necessity for better coordination, coherence and cooperation between not only the four peace-building phases, but also between the sub-phases and the various projects and actions related to a particular peace-building process.

### **2.5.2.1      *Conflict prevention***

Conflict prevention is a fundamental part and feature of the United Nations Charter (1945), authorising the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in Chapters VI and VII to settle disputes peacefully and to prevent the outbreak of wars and other forms of armed confrontation. Chapter VI (United Nations, 1945) contains a series of preventative devices such as fact-finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration. Structural and procedural arrangements such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the creation of common European institutions were all preventative mechanisms against, not only the USSR, but also amongst states in Western Europe (Ackermann, 1994:229-250).

Preventive diplomacy was first used by former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Dag Hammerskjold, in 1960 and again in 1992 by UNSG Boutros-Ghali who referred to preventive diplomacy as those policies aimed at preventing conflicts from emerging and also from escalating into violence. Boutros-Ghali listed five specific measures: confidence-building, fact-finding missions, early-warning networks, preventive deployment and demilitarised zones. He also maintained that the underlying causes of violent conflict needed to be addressed through economic and social development, a theme also emphasised by former UNSG, Kofi Annan. In the case of the United Nations, conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General's "good offices," preventive deployment or confidence-building measures. The importance of preventive action as an international policy is also underscored by other UN-related agencies, such as the World Bank as well as regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and the European Commission. In Africa it is also supported by Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) (World Bank, 1998). The idea is

furthermore supported by development agencies, non-governmental organisations (Griffin, 2001:481-496).

There seems to be consensus amongst commentators that conflict prevention has two important dimensions, namely the operational and structural dimensions. The operational dimension of conflict prevention is explicitly aimed at imminent crises and includes measures such as fact-finding and monitoring missions, negotiation, mediation, the creation of channels for dialogue among contending groups, preventive deployments and confidence-building measures (Ackermann, 1994). The structural dimension of conflict prevention is more long term in nature and incorporates measures that facilitate governance, adherence to human rights and economic, political and societal stability as well as civil society building (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999).

#### 2.5.2.1.1 *International support for conflict prevention*

The 2005 World Summit was a defining moment in that United Nations Member States committed to building a “culture of prevention”, strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to that end and taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (United Nations, 2011:3). The Security Council moved in its Resolution 1325 (2000) for greater participation of women in conflict prevention and recognised the importance of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. These normative developments at the United Nations were echoed internationally and given effect at regional level. Mwanasali (2008:41) uses the example, at the African Union (AU), where the “doctrine of non-interference has been replaced by the principle of non-indifference to imminent threats to peace, security and populations, including unconstitutional changes of government”. Bryar (2014) offers another example in the Pacific region, where the “Biketawa Declaration of the Pacific Island Forum (2000) provided a contextual structure for early diplomatic response to emerging security concerns”. These examples have been followed with the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, the 2005 Charter of the Francophonie, the 2007 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 2008 Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

all following a trend that emerging crises should be addressed in a timely manner by the appropriate regional or international forums.

#### 2.5.2.1.2 *The United Nations and conflict prevention*

The United Nations as the closest entity to being an international government and indeed peace-maker is confronting virulent conflict, a fractious global order and no real answers to address threats against international peace and stability. Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) provides that:

“the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.

The Charter envisages roles for the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly, among others, in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, UN resolutions and practice have contributed to the development of the peace-making functions of the Organisation (United Nations, 1945).

Antonio Guterres, the newly appointed UN Secretary-General, addressed the UN Security Council on 10 January 2017 and presented his vision to use the UN's vast normative and policy potential to address these threats. One of the fundamental challenges is that the UN and its agencies have been reactionary as opposed to preventative. He underlined the need for new, strengthened efforts to build and sustain peace ranging from prevention, conflict resolution and peace-keeping to peace-building and sustainable development. In his address to the UNSC, Mr. Guterres reiterated his commitment to a “surge in diplomacy for peace” and outlined its main components as:

- “partnering with regional organisations, mobilising the entire range of those with influence from religious authorities to civil society and the business community;
- enhancing the mediation capacity of the UN, including in support to regional and national mediation efforts; and
- making greater use of the pacific settlement of disputes options laid out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter” (United Nations News Centre, 2017:15).

An important factor driving this approach is cost. Mr Guterres confirmed this upon saying: “We spend far more time and resources responding to crises rather than preventing them. People are paying too high a price [...] We need a whole new approach...” (United Nations News Centre, 2017) The key to the UN’s new approach of a reinvigorated diplomacy is the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 2282 on “sustaining peace” and the 2030 agenda for sustainable development as well as a trusting relationship between and among member states and the UNSC and the Secretary-General.

#### 2.5.2.1.3 *The United Nations and early-warning*

Harff (1998:71) makes the point that “at present, early warnings are rarely ‘early’, seldom accurate, and moreover lack the capacity to distinguish among different kinds of conflict or crises”. Holl (1997:xiii) describes early-warning as “effective preventive strategies rest on three principles: early reaction to signs of trouble; a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate the pressures, or risk factors, that trigger violent conflict; and an extended effort to resolve the underlying root causes of violence”.

Earlier in the study an overview was provided on different sets of indicators, including conflict and violence, peace-building, stability and justice indicators. The *Beyond Intractability website* (Eric, 2005), however, provides an overview of factors that have been identified as potential early-warning signs. These include:

- “sudden demographic changes and population displacement;

- rising unemployment rates;
- economic shocks or financial crises;
- destruction or desecration of religious sites;
- discrimination or legislation favouring one group over another;
- government "clamp-downs";
- destabilising referenda or elections;
- a rise in "societal" intolerance and prejudice;
- an increase in numbers of demonstrations or rallies;
- foreign intervention;
- contagion; and
- an influx of refugees.”

Determining the prevalence of these conflict indicators could lead to the political prioritisation of conflict prevention intervention and to build sustainable peace.

The challenge with early-warning systems, according to former the UN Secretary-General, Banki Moon, is not the availability of information, but the evaluation and analysis of the information. The test for early-warning is whether it leads to early action. The Secretary-General describes this as “the warning-to-action-continuum” (United Nations, 2011:19). The early-warning system in the United Nations is fractured although the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has “primary responsibility” within the UN Secretariat for preventative action and peace-making. Early-warning and assessment is the foundation of country-based programmes and contingency planning in the seven UN bodies and ad hoc initiatives that either have or are making progress toward developing, early-warning systems. These include the Department of Political Affairs, UN Development Programme (UNDP), Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Programme (WFP), Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCHR), Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) and the Global Pulse (formerly known as the Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System or GIVAS). It also includes agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health

Organisation (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank (Dorn, 2004). Both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) have designed and implemented similar early-warning systems.

#### 2.5.2.1.4 *Good Offices, Resident Political Missions and Envoys*

In terms of Article 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) serves as the main operational arm for the conduct of the UN Secretary-General's Good Offices (United Nations, 2011). The DPA further has the responsibility to monitor and assess global political developments and advising and assisting the UN Secretary-General and his envoys in the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflict around the world (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2017).

The UN's Resident Political Missions are smaller political missions, which are increasingly relied upon to deliver on a range of complicated peace-making and peace-building mandates. "Working with host or partner governments and other actors, these missions routinely assist with national initiatives to foster dialogue, build capacity, ease tension and prevent violence" (UN: Report of the Secretary-General, 2011:12).

Envoys bring a personal prestige that in addition to their experience can encourage the parties to enter serious negotiations. The UN Secretary-General has appointed envoys on a wide range of issues to defuse tensions and resolve challenges, including: border disputes, territorial questions, regional conflicts, constitutional and electoral crises, reunification negotiations and peace talks (United Nations, 2011:12).

### **2.5.3 Conflict resolution and peace-making**

For purposes of this study, conflict resolution is discussed within its classical understanding as an entry into the conflict itself and with the means to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011). In its purest form conflict resolution can be defined as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution (Lederach, 2005:67).

The United Nations describes peace-making generally as measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). As mentioned above, the UN Secretary-General may exercise his or her “Good Offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peace-makers could be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organisations or the United Nations. Peace-making efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups or by a prominent personality working independently.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter (1945) sets forth a comprehensive list of means for the resolution of conflict. The provisions in Chapter VI have been further supported and strengthened through various declarations adopted by the General Assembly, including the Manila Declaration of 1982 on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field. They have also been the subject of various resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolution 44/21 of 15 November 1989 on enhancing international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. More recently the following decisions have been made with regard to peace-making:

- Secretary-General’s Reports (S/2015/730)

- Report on “The UN and Conflict Prevention: a Collective Recommitment” (A/70/328)
- Report on “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations on mediation” (A/66/811)
- Report on “Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution” (S/2011/552)
- Report on “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results” (S/2009/189)
- Report on “Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities”
- UN Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/2171)
- Security Council Resolution on the use of system-wide approach to conflict prevention” (S/RES/2106)
- “Security Council Resolution on sexual violence in conflict” (S/RES/1960)
- “Security Council Resolution on women and peace and security” (S/RES/1889, S/RES/1888, S/RES/1820, S/RES/1325)
- “Security Council Presidential Statements” (S/PRST/2009/8)
- Statement on the Agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security: mediation and settlement of disputes” (S/PRST/2008/36);
- General Assembly Resolutions (A/RES/70/304)
- “Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution” (A/RES/68/303, A/RES/66/291, A/RES/65/283, A/RES/60/1)
- World Summit Outcome (2005)(A/RES/37/10)
- Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
- “United Nations Guidance on Contacts with Persons Subject of Arrest Warrants or Summonses Issued by the ICC”

### **2.5.3.2 UN peace-making methods**

In Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes of the UN Charter (1945) a number of methods towards peace resolution of conflict are described as follows:

*Article 1:* The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of

all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

*Article 2:* The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

The Charter of the United Nations (1945) defines mediation as an important means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts and it has proven to be an effective instrument to address both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Honeyman and Yawanarajah (2003:78) explain that in mediation a mediator assists the parties to develop a solution themselves. Although mediators sometimes provide ideas, suggestions or even formal proposals for settlement, the mediator is primarily a "process person" helping the parties define the agenda, identify and reframe the issues, communicate more effectively, find areas of common ground, negotiate fairly, and hopefully reach an agreement. A successful mediation effort has an outcome that is accepted and owned by the parties themselves (Honeyman & Yawanarajah, 2003:79).

The aim of this part of the study is to develop a common understanding of the conflict to development phases of peace-building. Mediation can form part of any of the following phases:

- Pre-conflict through preventive diplomacy
- At the time of conflict through peace-making actions
- Post-conflict to promote implementation modalities and agreements
- At the time of peace-building: implementing efforts to consolidate peace and lay the foundation for sustainable development

A United Nations mediation mandate, however, is more specifically defined. When the United Nations is called upon to mediate a resolution to a conflict, the parties accept what is called a mediation mandate. *The United Nations Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States* (1992) further developed an understanding of mediation of disputes between States and remains a useful

resource (United Nations Peace-maker, 2012). The UN established a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in 2006 as a central hub for mediation support within the UN system.

#### **2.5.4 Peace-enforcement and peacekeeping**

The boundaries between conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, peace-building and peace-enforcement have become increasingly unclear. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. According to the United Nations' (United Nations, 2008:18) own definitions, peace-enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. Furthermore, it is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Council may utilise, where appropriate, regional organisations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter. The term's origins are found in the UN Charter under Chapter VII and Articles 39, 41 and 42. Article 47 continues to outline the procedures for managing "breaches of peace and acts of aggression" (Oliver, 2002:101).

According to Durch *et al.* (2003), peacekeeping is a much clearer function of the United Nations than peace-enforcement. United Nations peacekeeping missions serve as an important first line of crisis response and represent assets for preventive diplomacy across the conflict spectrum. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations have been playing this role for many years. The South Sudan self-determination referendum in January 2011 presents a recent example of how a peacekeeping mission can assist in steering complex peace processes through delicate transitions.

The UN Peacekeeping website (2017) explains that peacekeeping takes place within a changing real-time, socio-economic and political milieu. The key challenges are not always the same and can include the following:

- i) “Military: The peacekeeping force of the UN totals more than 100,000 UN uniformed personnel coming from over 120 countries. The peace-keepers operate alongside the UN Police and civilian officials to promote stability, security, and peace processes; to protect personnel and property; to work with the local community, the local military personnel, and other military entities in the area to promote lasting peace. The UN has been deploying military personnel for service in peace operations since 1948 when the Security Council authorised the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. UN military personnel can be called upon to protect civilians and UN personnel, monitor a disputed border or peace processes in post-conflict areas, provide security across a conflict zone, and assist in-country military personnel with training and support.
- ii) Police: UN police are called upon to provide expert assistance; conduct operational assessments; train and develop host-state policing capacity; develop and review technical guidance; and assist domestic police services with strategic planning and provide technical support.”
- iii) Security Sector Reform (SSR): The SSR is a core element of multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-building, essential for addressing the roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term peace and development. UN Security Council Resolution 2151 was unanimously adopted on 28 April 2014 and is the first stand-alone resolution on SSR. The UN considers that security sectors usually include structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security. These could include defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies.
- iv) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR): DDR has become an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation, featuring prominently in the mandates of peace-keeping operations over the last twenty years. These include disarmament of combatants, demobilisation of active combatants from armed forces and groups and reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian population.

- v) Electoral Assistance: UN Peacekeeping assists election processes in many ways including through the provision of security, technical advice and logistical support.
- vi) Gender and Peace-keeping: One of the most important is the policy of gender mainstreaming. This ensures that gender perspectives are integrated into all elements of policy development in all sections (e.g. Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Police, Military, Elections) from initial planning through to evaluation. This process is supported in extensive literature, including the landmark UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000).
- vii) Civilian components of peace-keeping: De Coning (2006:19) explains that the bulk of literature on “civil-military coordination” (CIMIC) has been directed at the connection between humanitarian actors and their military counterparts. The United Nations, however, deals with this aspect in a more formal and established arrangement within the peace operations context. The humanitarian/military relationship is only one of several civil/military relationships.

Other key challenges include: civil affairs, rule of law, mine action, conduct and discipline, legal frameworks, protection of civilians, environment and sustainability, human rights and children in conflict.

### **2.5.5 Peace-building (post-conflict reconstruction and development)**

This section of the study explores the UN peace-building (post-conflict reconstruction and development) to analyse peace-building instruments associated with peace-making. Secondly, the dimensions of peace-building with their objectives and its own institutions are scrutinised. Peace-building can be regarded as the post-conflict reconstruction and development phase. It generally entails security, rule of law, politics and governance, socio-economic recovery and human rights. Most of these aspects have been dealt with within the context of the peacekeeping. The complete peace-building continuum, however, as explained earlier is not an absolute linear process. Concepts and elements in the Continuum repeat itself in different phases.

As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted, roughly half of all countries that emerge from war relapse into violence within five years.

The final phase of peace-building could repeat many of the elements in the previous phases (e.g. conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building), but relate mainly to the entrenchment of short-term goals of peace progress and the longer-term objectives related to good governance (e.g. state-building and nation-building). The start-stop, repeat nature of the peace process as well as the significant number of states, international organisations and civil society involved requires major cooperation, coordination and coherence to attain the eventual objectives of a sustainable state and nation (UN General Assembly, 2005).

De Coning (2008:46) argues that although there is no single common definition, approach or model to peace-building that is universally recognised, there are common characteristics. Firstly, peace-building is primarily concerned with securing or consolidating the peace. Secondly, peace-building is a multidimensional or system-wide undertaking. Within the UN system it has been titled a *No Exit without Strategy*; The World Bank refers to security, governance and development; the Canadian 3-D model is the whole-of-Government Approach; and the African Union (AU) has its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (with its six components). It should be noted that humanitarian assistance is treated separately in most models (De Coning, 2008). The third characteristic relates to the challenges that exist between independence and interdependence, within a fractured system characterised by different stakeholders and actors operating each with their own mandates. The fourth characteristic relates to timeframes. There seems to be a common understanding that peace-building is a long-term approach, although there should be short-term gains that solidify peace. Barnett *et al.* (2007) confirm these four characteristics in practice by stating the three dimensions as: stability creation, restoration of state institutions and finally socio-economic recovery.

De Coning (2008:89) summarises post-conflict peace-building in the following matrix:

<b>The Dimensions of Peace-building (PCRD)</b>	
<b>Security and Rule of Law</b>	Providing a Safe and Secure Environment
	Protection of Civilians
	Security Sector Reform
	Disarmament and Demobilisation
	Control of Weapons
	Police, Corrections and Judicial Reform (Rule of Law)
<b>Politics and Governance</b>	Supporting the Peace Process and overseeing the Political Transition
	Political Participation, National Dialogue and Reconciliation
	Transitional Justice
	Government Institutions and Civil Service Capacity Building (Governance)
	Extending State Authority throughout the Territory
	Building conflict management capacity
<b>Socio-Economic Recovery</b>	Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports, Electricity; Telecommunications
	Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration, Civil Society
	Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth
	Strengthening Civil Society
<b>Human Rights</b>	Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring

Source: De Coning (2008:89)

#### **2.5.4.1      *The UN Peace-building Architecture***

The United Nations and its member states, in developing a better understanding of the linkages between political, security and development processes, have attempted to build a United Nations Peace-building Architecture. This Architecture as peace-building instruments include: the Peace-building Commission (PBC), the Peace-building Fund (PBF) and the Peace-building Support Office (PBSO). It is generally accepted that these instruments are not the only organisations within the UN that work on peace-building issues, but the full spectrum of UN institutions, member states and regional organisations (Hearn, Bujones & Kugel, 2014:2). On 27 April 2016, the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282) adopted the most comprehensive resolutions on peace-building in the history of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council, 2017). The resolutions reflect the far-reaching content of the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the United Nations Peace-building Architecture. The Resolutions highlight and accentuate the fact that any response that fails to address the root causes of conflict will not break the vicious cycle of conflict and response (United Nations Security Council, 2017).

### **2.6      CONCLUSION**

This chapter provides an overview and understanding of the theoretical, contextual and conceptual framework of the study. The conclusion reached is based on the above-mentioned framework, which includes the fact that South Africa is in a position based on its standing in Africa and its membership in BRICS and other international power groupings to contribute to international peace-building initiatives, particularly in Africa. The second conclusion is that states in conflict are experiencing intra-state conflict, which can be traced back to structural deficiencies based on its history of state formation (i.e. colonialism, neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism) and that there should be appetite for a new approach, which South Africa as an African and developing country could provide.

The third conclusion that could be drawn from this chapter is that peace-building concepts remain contested. The study proposes the continuum of conflict prevention, conflict resolution/peace-making, peace-enforcement/peacekeeping and peace-building (or post-conflict peace-building). In view of the factitiousness of the peace-building continuum, greater coordination, cooperation and coherence is required between the different phases. This need is further enhanced by the possibility of regression back into previous stages.

It is further evident that the United Nations has the most complete peace-building architecture. As such, it serves as benchmark against which South Africa's possible approach will be measured. South Africa will not be in a position to develop a full UN peace-building system, but should utilise its own strengths and comparative advantages to ensure a strategic and integrated peace-building approach. Further on in the study, South Africa's peace-building efforts in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are examined to define the country's peace-building strengths and weaknesses.

In the next chapter, the researcher examines the peace-building concepts and architecture at sub-regional (SADC), regional (AU) and international level (UN). The study also considers the national approaches by the United States of America (US), Brazil, China, Turkey and Norway. In each case the countries' strengths and focus areas are considered for comparison with possible South African approaches.

## CHAPTER 3

### PEACE-BUILDING MODELS AND APPROACHES: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter it is argued that peace-building concepts remain contested notions. This chapter first attempts to design a conceptual framework for peace-building and then assesses the nature of different peace-building approaches as applied in the international arena. In this regard, international, continental and regional approaches are assessed. In the next chapter the international, continental and regional institutional approaches are followed by an analysis of country-specific approaches.

Internationally, the United Nations, with its almost universal legitimacy as peace-broker, is probably the most appropriate international organisation to address conflict and manage the full peace continuum due to its mandate and scope of its involvement in peace initiatives. Its peace-making and law-making powers have expanded to include sanctions, preventive action, global counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation regulations (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2011:33). On a continental level, the inception of the African Union in 2002 and its peace and security architecture is a consequence of Africa's need to respond to the continent's complex security challenges and develop its own peace management processes and forms part of the phrase "African solutions to African problems" (United Nations, 2005). On 14 September 2005, Rwandan President Kagame spoke of the 1994 genocide in his country when he said: "Never again should the international community's response be left wanting. Let us resolve to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner" (United Nations, 2005:18).

On a regional level, organisations such as the Southern African Developing Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) play critical roles in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace

management. These organisations have been conceived as “building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture” (APSA) (African Union, 2012:143).

In Chapter 2 the point was made that the conflict that was of international concern changed from intra- (between states) to intra-state (Holsti, 1996). The complication inherent in the changing of the nature of conflict relevant to international intervention and, therefore, a possible peace-building contribution is the fact that the international experience is mainly in intra-state situations. In this chapter the researcher examines the changing nature of the institutional response at different international levels, including international (The United Nations), continental (The African Union) and regional (The Southern African Development Community). The approaches of each of these institutions not only form the basis for possible examples and templates for a proposed South African approach, it is also important to understand these structures to ensure future complementarity, cooperation and coordination.

The assessment of international peace-building continues with the assessment of the role of countries in specific peace-building approaches. The United States is the first country to be examined, as it has been one of the main country contributors in the international peace management process and it has generally bridged the approach from a more traditional role in the context of inter-state conflict to the current system of intra-state conflict. If the United States represents the power dynamics during the Cold War and the bipolar realities of those days, the BRICS countries and their approaches to peace-building represent a new era of a multipolar or pluripolar approach (Armijo & Roberts, 2014). In this regard, the BRICS countries do not represent a monolith of policies and/or approach, but each have their own particularly entry points and foci. China and Brazil, as members of BRICS, are assessed as countries with different peace-building approaches. Finally, outside the BRICS peace-building paradigm, Turkey and Norway are examined to understand their particular approach to peace-building. Turkey was selected as case study based on the fact that the country finds itself in a volatile geo-political area. Norway was selected because of its contribution to high profile conflict situations (Palestine and Israel) and institutions, such as the United Nations.

## **3.2 PEACE-BUILDING AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL**

This section addresses the following aspects: Firstly, the concept peace-building is examined to derive at a conceptual framework and operational definition for the purposes of this study. Secondly, the section continues with the overview of the peace-building architecture of the United Nations followed by that of the African Union and the Southern African Development Community.

In the previous chapter the argument was made that the United Nations has the most extensive institutional framework and approach to peace-building. In fact, over the past 70 years, peace operations have developed exponentially to become the United Nations' most visible and most expensive activity (Boutellis & Connolly, 2016:2). UN peace operations, according to Boutellis and Connolly, range from small ceasefire monitoring and political missions to complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. There are currently more UN peacekeepers operating than ever before, with 120 000 UN personnel (military, police and civilians) deployed in 16 peacekeeping missions across four continents with an annual budget exceeding \$8 billion. An additional 3 700 personnel are serving in 11 field-based special political missions, including country-specific missions and regional offices (Boutellis & Connolly, 2016:2).

### **3.2.1 Peace-building: Towards a conceptual framework**

To emphasise the meaning of the concept peace-building, Konishi and McClean (2011:2) confirm that peace-building is closely associated with the United Nations and is described as an "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". These structures mostly refer to the Peace-building Commission, which will be explained later. Although there has been serious attempts (An Agenda for Peace, Brahimi Report, Capstone Doctrine and others), as indicated in Chapter 2 to evolve the concept of peace-building into an all-encompassing term to describe all the phases (conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building) of peace operations, all these phases are not included in the definition. The first phase,

namely conflict prevention is most regularly omitted from the concept peace-building. This does not make sense, as many of the aspects, actions and approaches in peace-building (post-conflict, reconstruction and development) are the same as conflict prevention.

Konishi and McClean (2011:2) explain the approach in the last phase of PCRDR, as defined by the UN, to emphasise

“integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence in a country and to assist in restoring order and resuscitating governing institutions, the rule of law and the provision of public goods and services. It also encapsulates conflict prevention. The overarching task of all this coordinated humanitarian assistance, developmental and financial aid, technical assistance, security support and training, political dialogue and other measures is to build up three key pillars of the nation-state, namely security, capacity and legitimacy”.

### **3.2.2 The United Nations Peace-building Model**

Despite the coining of the term peace-building by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, the international community did not succeed in avoiding or successfully addressing the most entrenched conflicts in the 1990s, namely Rwanda and Bosnia (Sazak, 2016:70; Sucuoğlu & Sazak, 2016). The term only came to the fore again with the 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), which articulates the essential peace-building obligations of the UN and the possible inclusive transformation of institutions to address and prevent conflict (Durch *et al.*, 2003). The Brahimi Report mentions different broad themes, including “national ownership, including, the importance of institutions, the relationship between conflict prevention and development, and tailored approaches”. This last point was elaborated on in 2007, in the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee indicating “the necessity to tailor peace-building to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership” (United Nations Peace-building Fund, 2016).

A more detailed understanding of the term was provided by the UN Secretary General's Policy Committee in 2007, which described peace-building as "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development" (UNIC, 2006). The Secretary-General's Report of 2009 identifies five recurring priority areas for international assistance. First, is the support to basic safety and security; the second refers to political processes; the third to the provision of basic services; the fourth to the restoration of core government functions; and the fifth identifies economic revitalisation, as a priority area. Although the idea of *peace-building* has been well received, it has faced many challenges over the years. Thus, the Policy Committee's aforementioned statement in 2007 also enunciated the way in which peace-building strategies need to be developed and implemented. It states that –

"Peace-building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives" (2007:12).

The 2009, 2010, 2012 progress reports of the UN Secretary-General on peace-building identify "support to basic safety and security", inclusive political processes, "provision of basic services", "restoration of core government functions" and "economic revitalisation" as the five pillars of peace-building (United Nations Security Council, 2010(a)). The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report emphasises that building strong, inclusive and accountable institutions, promoting livelihoods, justice and security and moving towards inclusive practices would contribute to address internal stresses that led to conflict (The World Bank, 2011(a):145-174). To that end, the most important needs include: "safety and security, including rule of law support to political processes and reconciliation; the development of basic services such as water, health and primary education; institution building and public administration and economic revitalisation, including jobs and livelihoods" (United

Nations, 2010). To achieve the above-mentioned needs, the United Nations (2010:23) views the essential features of peace-building as:

- “an early start where peace-building starts when violent conflict ends, or even before (the risk of relapse means the first two years are crucial for long-term success);
- national ownership where peace-building is primarily a national challenge and responsibility (developing national capacity is therefore a priority from the first instance); and
- a common strategy: The process, plan, strategy and implementation should be nationally owned and based on a country’s needs with a common strategy that sets the priorities for action.”

More recent reviews and processes at the UN, including the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) (United Nations, 2016), the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN’s Peace-building Architecture (2015), the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security (2015) and the Secretary-General’s Report on the World Humanitarian Summit (2015) all emphasise more attention on conflict prevention and lasting peace by addressing factors that led to regressions back to conflict (Sucuoğlu & Sazak, 2016:71.) It is mentioned in the previous chapter that the new UN Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. Antonio Guterres, has emphasised the importance of conflict prevention. He, however, goes further by stating that “the root causes of conflict, poverty, inequality, human rights violations and even environmental destruction are interlinked” and attaches “core importance” to the role of prevention (Guterres, 2016:8). The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda includes standalone sustainable development goals (SDG) on “peaceful, inclusive and just societies” (Goal 16), with seven of the other 17 SDGs including an aspect of peace, inclusion or justice (Whaites, 2016). It is therefore fair to conclude that peace-building, which includes the full peace-building continuum, is an all-inclusive, complex activity of a political nature that can only be addressed in partnership with different stakeholders contributing to a sustainable solution. The changing nature of conflict and its persistence, the devastating humanitarian impact and the cumulative burden on the international system and community and its limited

resources have necessitated a fresh consideration of possible actors and stakeholders with new and innovative approaches.

The United Nations and its member states, in developing a better understanding of the linkages between political, security and development processes at the heart of state formation, have attempted to build a United Nations Peace-building Architecture with the following institutions: the Peace-building Commission (PBC), the Peace-building Fund (PBF) and the Peace-building Support Office (PBSO). It is generally accepted that these are not the only organisations within the UN that work on peace-building issues, but the full spectrum of UN institutions, member states and regional organisations (Hearn, Bujones & Kugel, 2014:2). On 27 April 2016, the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282) adopted the most comprehensive resolutions on peace-building in the history of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council, 2017). The resolutions reflect the far-reaching content of the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the United Nations Peace-building Architecture. The Resolutions highlight and accentuate the fact that any response that fails to address the root causes of conflict will not break the vicious cycle of conflict and response (United Nations Security Council, 2017).

An important aspect of the international approach to peace and security is that conflicts do not only take place within states, but within communities. The root causes often include poverty, the struggle for scarce resources and violations of human rights (Rwamatwara, 2005). These root causes usually have another tragic feature in common: women and girls suffer their impact disproportionately (Ward & Marsh, 2006). In war-torn and conflict societies women and girls endure the same trauma as the rest of the population, such as bombings, famines, epidemics, mass executions, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, forced migration, ethnic cleansing, threats and intimidation. They are also targets of specific forms of violence and abuse, including sexual violence and exploitation. Growing consensus is that these efforts to resolve conflicts and address their root causes will not succeed unless peace-builders empower all those who have suffered from them, including and especially women (Lyman, 2013:87). If women play a full and equal part, peace-

builders can build the foundations for enduring peace, development, good governance, human rights and justice.

The approach to involve more women in the full peace-building process has become part of the international policy frameworks through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 that formally acknowledged in 2000 the changing nature of warfare, where civilians are increasingly targeted and women continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes. UNSCR 1325 addresses the inordinate impact of war on women, but also the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution and sustainable peace. Resolution 1325 calls for “increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in national, regional, and international institutions; in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; in peace negotiations; in peace operations, as soldiers, police, and civilians; and as Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General”.

### 3.2.2.1 *The United Nations role as international peacemaker*

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter (1945) clearly indicates that the main purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain international peace and prevent any threats to security, suppress aggression, develop friendly relations and promote cooperation”. In this regard the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, contends: “Building peace is about much more than ending war. It is about putting in place the institutions and trust that will carry people forward into a peaceful future. We often have a limited window of opportunity in which to do this” (United Nations, 2010:3). The peace process should include a holistic approach in the continuum of the conflict cycle. This approach should therefore not only apply in all the spheres of governance, security and development, but also in an integrated manner. It should include addressing the root causes of conflict, escalation, continuation or recurrence of conflict and pursue preventative methods. It should also identify existing and potential conflict areas where peace-building engagements could be applied to lower and possibly reverse the threat of conflict and combat violence, while promoting and protecting human rights and further good governance and democracy. The collective

goal should, therefore, be to assist countries to contribute to the achievement of lasting peace, which will address the factors that cause a regress back into conflict.

The UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (United Nations, 2015:4) has a unique position as the political adviser and arm of the Secretary-General and a wide range of tools. These include:

- “supporting the use of any of the diverse mechanisms outlined in Article 33 of the UN Charter (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement), and preventive diplomacy, mediation and peace-making in particular;
- providing dedicated support to the exercise of the Good Offices of the Secretary-General (under Article 99 of the Charter);
- deploying and supporting Special Political Missions (SPMs) at both national and regional levels, as well as UN envoys or Special Advisors; providing technical advice and support to the growing role of regional organizations in conflict prevention;
- providing advice and support to the Peace-building Commission;
- maintaining a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) with a Standby Team of Mediation Experts; and
- cooperating with UNDP, PBSO and other actors from the broader UN system to support UN Resident Coordinators, UN Country Teams and Peace and Development Advisors to undertake long term, structural prevention and peace-building.”

The Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the UN Peace-building Architecture (A/70/95- S/2015/446, 2015) notes that “peace-building, must be the principle that flows through all the UN’s engagements informing all the Organisation’s activities, before, during and after violent conflict, rather than being marginalised”. The Report also emphasises nine strategic areas: “(1) prevention and sustaining peace; (2) the primary of politics; (3) capabilities and performance; (4) partnerships; (5) leadership and accountability; (6) field support; (7) finances and

restructuring; (8) a people-centred approach; and (9) women, peace, and security” (HIPPO, 2015:1).

Although most of the UN's bodies play an important role in peace-building, a cluster of three new bodies was added in 2005-6 to the system to strengthen UN's efforts to assist countries to establish lasting peace, which will address the factors that cause a regress back into conflict. The UN Peace-building Architecture consists of the Peace-building Commission (PBC), the Peace-building Support Office (PBSO) and the Peace-building Fund (PBF).

### 3.2.2.2 *The UN Peace-building Commission (PBC)*

The first leg (of three) of the UN Peace-building Architecture is the Peace-building Commission (PBC), which is an intergovernmental advisory body of the Security Council and the General Assembly and ensures sustained international attention to countries emerging from conflict, including to the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict (United Nations, 2010). The PBC members are drawn from different parts of the United Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as the major troop and financial contributors. In addition, the European Union, the IMF, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the World Bank participate in all meetings. The PBC is a cornerstone of the UN's peace-building architecture.

In the resolutions establishing the Peace-building Commission, resolution 60/180 and resolution 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council mandate it to:

- “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery;
- focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

- provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices; and
- help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery.”

Resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 of the General Assembly and Security Council (Security Council Report, 2016) also stress the importance of the Peace-building Commission to fulfil the functions in this regard to:

- “bring sustained international attention to sustaining peace, and to provide political accompaniment and advocacy to countries affected by conflict, with their consent;
- promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peace-building, noting that security, development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing;
- serve a bridging role among the principal organs and relevant entities of the United Nations by sharing advice on peace-building needs and priorities, in line with the respective competencies and responsibilities of these bodies; and
- “serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, including from Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions and country teams, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, women’s groups, youth organisations and, where relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and information to improve their coordination, to develop and share good practices in peace-building, including on institution-building, and to ensure predictable financing to peace-building.”

The 2005 World Summit Outcome document (Hearn, Bujones & Kugel, 2014:3) lists the PBC’s core peace-building functions, namely to:

- “promote coordination and coherence;
- support resource mobilisation;
- serve as a knowledge hub; and
- conduct advocacy for peace-building and for countries’ needs.”

### 3.2.2.3 *The Peace-building Fund (PBF)*

Parallel to the PBC, the UN established a multi-donor Peace-building Fund (PBF) to address the deficits, explore and encourage longer-term funding (United Nations, 2010). The four priorities of the PBF are to:

- “respond to imminent threat to the peace process and support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- build or strengthen national capacities that would promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- initiate economic revitalisation and generate peace dividends for the population at large; and
- to re-establish essential administrative services.”

The PBF relies on voluntary contributions from member states, organisations and the private sector. The PBF’s objectives are to deliver

“fast and flexible funding through: i) The Immediate Response Facility is aimed at providing the stimulus for peace initiatives that can be expanded into longer-term programmes. ii) The Peace-building and Recovery Facility (PRF), which is a country programme driven by national stakeholders. Other sources of funding for peace-building includes: The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), The World Bank State and Peace-building Fund (SPF), The UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crises Prevention and Recovery, UN Multi-donor Trust Funds, The European Commission Instrument for Stability; The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security; The DPA Trust

Funds and The UN Trust Fund in Support of Ending Violence Against Women”.

#### 3.2.2.4 *The Peace-building Support Office (PBSO)*

The UN also established the Peace-building Support Office (PBSO) that is entrusted with administering the PBF, advising the PBC and coordinating peace-building strategy and policy learning within the UN (United Nations, 2010). It does not directly implement peace-building efforts and initiatives, but provides support in the form of:

- training and capacity building;
- knowledge management (networking of peace practitioners, workshops, newsletters, community of practice); and
- research.


### **3.2.3 The African Union**

The African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was developed to address the full cycle of conflict or the peace-building continuum (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2011:125). The following 5 APSA pillars were created to enable Africa to leverage its strengths through effective structures (African Union, 2012):

- “Peace and Security Council;
- Panel of the Wise;
- Continental Early Warning System;
- African Standby Force; and
- African Peace Fund.

Figure 3.1 below illustrates the structure of the African Peace Architecture

**Figure 3.1: Structure of the African Peace Architecture**



Source: Researcher's own

The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the standing organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (African Union Commission, 2015). It was established to be a collective security and “early warning” arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations. The PSC’s core functions are to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace support operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in member states to promote peace, security and stability. The PSC also works in support of post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster management. The PSC's authority derives from article 20 of the Constitutive Act (as inserted by Article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act 2003), together with Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (African Union, 2002). Under Article 7 of the Protocol, the PSC’s key powers include to:

- “anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies, which may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;
- undertake peace-making, peace-building and peace-support missions;

- recommend intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
- institute sanctions;
- implement the AU's common defence policy;
- ensure implementation of key conventions and instruments to combat international terrorism;
- promote coordination between regional mechanisms and the AU regarding peace, security and stability in Africa;
- follow-up promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law;
- promote and encourage the implementation of conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament; and
- examine and take action in situations where the national independence and sovereignty of a Member State is threatened by acts of aggression, including by mercenaries.”

One of the most important institutions of the APSA is the Panel of the Wise (PoW). This institution forms part of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and was established under Article 11. The PoW is made up of five members, nominated by the AU Commission and appointed through a decision of the AU Assembly for a three-year term from each of the five regions. Included in the PoW are past panel members, who are referred to as “Friends of the Panel”. The past panel members can be used when the five members are engaged or not available. The small membership structure of the PoW ensures that it can more rapidly address issues related to peace and security. The appointment of the PoW members is based on their reputation as people who have made valuable contributions to conflict resolution and development initiatives. This reputational aspect ensures credibility to the PoW and the individual members of the institution. An important task of the PoW is to support the activities of the AUC chairperson and the PSC in conflict prevention. It cooperates closely with regional institutions, such as the Council of the Wise of ECOWAS; the Committee of Elders of the Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa; the ad hoc mediators of SADC; and the AUC's Continental Early Warning System.

The AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was established in 2002 under Article 12 of the protocol creating the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC). The CEWS was envisioned to play a major role in the PSC's mission to prevent, manage and resolve African conflicts by anticipating conflict situations across the continent. Under the protocol, CEWS is tasked with providing the Chairperson of the AU Commission early warning information to enable the Chair to advise the PSC on "potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action" (African Union, 2002). Article 12 calls for the establishment of a monitoring unit at the AU, the Situation Room, as well as monitoring and observation units based at the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that will feed directly into the Situation Room. The protocol also mandated that the AU Commission liaise with the UN, relevant research centres and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to "facilitate the effective functioning" of CEWS (African Union, 2002).

Africa has made progress towards the establishment of an African peacekeeping force, namely the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), as a temporary measure while the proposed African Standby Force (is being established), which is the rapid deployment force with the objective to address crises on the continent (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015). It is also part of the broader notion of Africa finding and responding to its own solutions, driving towards the AU being more responsive through the ACIRC as a "coalition of the willing". It is a short-term solution while the intricate details of the African Standby Force is being developed. Countries that signed on included "Angola, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Chad and Uganda" (DefenceWeb, 2013).

The AU's involvement in PCRDR dates back to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in December 2003. The PSC protocol situates PCRDR and peace-building at the core of its activities, which include the "restoration of the rule of

law, establishment and development of democratic institutions and the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in the member states” (African Union, 2006). For countries that are in the midst of violent conflict, the mandate is more comprehensive and includes events and initiatives such as the consolidation of peace agreements and establishing conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of society and government institutions. The PCRDR framework was adopted to satisfy this mandate (African Union, 2006).

The African Union PCRDR framework (2006:12) defines PCRDR as:

“a comprehensive set of measures that seek to: address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict, and consolidate sustainable peace. PCRDR is conceived within the African vision of renewal and sustainable development and, while its activities are integrated and many must be pursued simultaneously, they are envisaged in emergency (short-term), transition (medium-term) and development (long-term) phases” (African Union, 2006).

The PCRDR framework is underpinned by five core principles, namely: “African leadership, the promotion of national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability” (African Union, 2006). It comprises six pillars on which PCRDR efforts should be concentrated, namely: “security, political governance and transition, human rights, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and socio-economic development, and gender” (African Union, 2006).

Turning to the financial aspects, the Peace Fund was established under Article 21 of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU to finance the AU’s peace and security operations. The Peace Fund covers operational activities: mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity and peace support operations. The July 2016 Assembly decided that the Peace Fund would be endowed with \$325 million in 2017, rising to a total of \$400 million by 2020 from the

0.2% levy. The endowment represents a maximum amount that will be replenished annually, as needed. The Peace Fund covers more than just the peace support operations. This endowment will enable the AU to fully finance mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, institutional readiness and capacity, maintain a crisis reserve facility as well as meet its commitment to finance 25% of its peace operations budget.

Often a great deal of the work in peace-building depends on funding (Bertram, 1995) and to that end, the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) is the African Union's vehicle to provide impetus to the work and objectives of the PCRDR Framework. It was launched at the 19<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 2012, with the important objective to raise funds in Africa to support PCRDR efforts to make Africa more financially independent. Lucey and Gida (2014:16) articulated the objectives as follows:

- the creation of a financial vehicle to source contributions;
- to procure funds and other financial resources, as well as in-kind contributions from African countries, civil society and the private sector;
- developing systems and networks in Africa for the exchange of knowledge, expertise and even training;
- African countries, organisations and institutions to assist each other; and
- To create conditions that would facilitate support from international partners.

This concludes the overview of peace-building at the international institutional level. It has been established that international peace-building efforts remain high on the international agenda, with new peace-building architecture being created at the United Nations as well as the African Union. This section makes it clear that the peace-building continuum should be an all-inclusive process, which starts from a thorough understanding of conflict (and its main roots and causes), through conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development. The point the author is making is that peace-building continues to be understood only in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and development,

whilst the author is arguing that it actually speaks and is valid for the entire process from conflict to post-conflict reconstruction and development.

In the next section, the focus shifts to the role of regional organisation in peace-building. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is used, as it is also the regional organisation relevant to South Africa.

### **3.2.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

Under Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, regional mechanisms, such as those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS are part of the overall security architecture of the African Union, which has the primary responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (Ayangafac & Cilliers, 2011:130).

SADC (Heads of State Summit) already decided in 2004 that it would establish an institution that would address its mediation requirements. It was only in 2008 when this decision gained momentum after the conflict in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. The SADC Secretariat, representatives from member states, mediation experts from the region and officials from the UN Mediation Standing Unit, the SADC Executive and the UN Department of Political Affairs Africa 1 desk developed a concept for Mediation, Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy in SADC between 2008 and 2010.

Article (4)(e) of the SADC Treaty provides one of the Principles as “peaceful settlement of disputes” (SADC, 2001). Article 2(2)(e) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation lists one of its specific objectives as being “to prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means”.

Hartmann (2012) describes the evolution of the concept of a mediation structure in the SADC Secretariat as follows:

- Panel of Elders to provide leadership in mediation missions

The Panel of Elders consists of five senior and high-profile figures from politics, law, military, diplomacy, civil society, religion, academia or business. Their main tasks are to lead or support SADC mediation missions and assist in confidence building, dialogue, negotiation or mediation initiatives with the permission of the parties involved. Panel members also coordinate closely with the Chairperson of the SADC Organ and the Executive Secretary to ensure that mediation missions are pursued in line with SADC Summit directives.

- Mediation Reference Group to deliver expertise in conflict resolution

The Mediation Reference Group consists of nine individuals, three of whom are to be drawn from civil society. These members are required to enrich the expertise of the organisation in the areas of “conflict resolution, mediation and preventative diplomacy”. The Mediation Reference Group’s main objectives relate to guidance to political policy-makers (Nathan, 2007).

- Mediation Support Unit for logistical support and technical backstopping

The Mediation Support Unit is the only permanent institution of the proposed mediation construct, located within the SADC Secretariat. It provides preparatory work and technical support to mediation missions, monitor potential crises and respond to early warning signs, document lessons learnt and collaborate with other international bodies.

The main approach and mandate of the SADC MSU is to service the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation. This mandate is multipronged and includes the following: supporting Mediation Missions to countries in conflict; formulating the SADC Regional Mediation Training Curriculum and training mediation stakeholders; developing a database for mediation experts to be deployed on related Missions and finally, contributing towards strengthening infrastructures for peace (institutions involved with peace-building activities) in Member States. The

SADC MSU is funded by International Cooperating Partners under the Regional Political Cooperation (RPC) Programme, which will expire in March 2018.


### **3.3 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PEACE-BUILDING MODELS AND APPROACHES**

This part of the chapter examines the approaches to peace-building of the United States, China, Brazil, Turkey and Norway. Each of these countries has a particular approach and focuses on a different phase of the peace-building continuum. These areas of focus are most often based on a country's history, experience, regional and international reputation as well as leadership role and resources.

#### **3.3.1 The United States (US) approach to peace-building: A Whole-of-Government approach**

The Changing Character of War Centre (2017) explains that there have been serious changes in international conflict during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, beginning with the 9/11 attacks on the US, which placed counter-terrorism high on the agenda. Military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan reasserted the role of counter-insurgency in defence and more recently the Arab Spring, newly failing states and the rise of China have shifted power balances. The fuelling of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, the emergence of the Islamic State, Russian operations in the Baltic, the use of autonomous weapons systems and cyber-attacks add complexity to the world's security landscape. In Chapter 2 the point was made that there has been a marked change in the manner of conflict internationally. Research for the 2005 Human Security Report (Human Security Centre, 2005) indicates that intrastate conflicts have been the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the period 1950 to 2005. The change in all these variables of conflict and also new areas such as changes in the (a) actors, (b) methods, (b) environments and (d) wider context that shape war and armed conflict today have necessitated new approaches by the US in its military, but also its peace-building approach.

Figure 3.2: Armed conflicts by type (1946-2009)



Source: UCDP (2010)

The changing nature of international conflict has impacted dramatically on the US approach to not only security issues, but peace-building. This has influenced the US response to security in the form of considering changes in its peace-building. A further complicating factor for the US is its military-centric approach to conflict, as illustrated by the following statement: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Bush, 2002). Robert Gates (Secretary of Defence during the Bush Administration) confirmed this when he said: “Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time” (Buzan & Wæver, 2004:79). A significant factor in the US approach to peace-building has been a military-led approach. Taking into account the US’ significant reliance on the military and the fact that the entry point for involvement has been military, it should not be a surprise that the country’s peace-building approach stems from its military environment. The US typically brings its military dominance to any discussion about conflict resolution, but that is not the only resource at its disposal. The US has political influence that can be employed in conflict situations, as it has done in intervening between Turkey and Greece in the Imia/Kardak affair in 1996, between Morocco and Spain in the 2002 Persil Islet dispute and between India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2002 when these two countries were close to going to war (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2011:32).

With regard to war and conflict, the first step in the US conflict resolution process has been stabilisation processes aimed at achieving a basic degree of security in fragile states where possible conflict parties would threaten peace. Although stabilisation is an important part of the peace-building continuum, including conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-enforcement, it should be accompanied by a full range of development measures in order to create sustainable conditions for post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The US approach to peace-building has evolved over the last 15 years based on the reality of growing threats and frequency of instances with serious security downsides that could result in the destabilisation of already fragile states, with Iraq and Afghanistan being prime examples (Konishi & McClean, 2011:4). Before the 9/11 attacks, the US viewed fragile states as humanitarian concerns and not necessarily potential security risks to the US or to international peace and security (Sanger & Baker, 2010). Patrick (2007:33) explains that

“US Administrations were often reluctant to contribute to armed intervention for humanitarian purposes, with the exception being the evacuation of American civilians or to stabilise a situation. This approach meant, the US avoided deeper involvement in long-term challenges such as mediating civil wars and state-building. For the US policy community, vulnerable or failed states were of low geopolitical importance and, at best remote and third-tier security concerns”.

Developing a new approach for dealing with weak and failed states as potentially significant threats to US and global security interests by the US was necessitated by Al Queda’s ability to attack the US from the safe haven of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Failed states were not only viewed as simply a potential humanitarian crisis, but also as a complex security concern. The elevation of failed and weak states to a higher national priority allowed for greater attention and resources to be applied to state-building and reconstruction operations (Konishi & McClean, 2011).

Stewart and Brown (2007:50) explain that “the military-centric approach to state-building has been very prominent in Afghanistan and Iraq mainly due to the combat-orientated nature of the initial interventions in those states combined with an already heavy presence of military personnel and agencies”. It, however, became clear that the civilian and humanitarian dimensions of these missions, particularly in Iraq, necessitated broader participation by civilian components (often referred to as a “civilian surge”), as the limits of military expertise and resources were stretched beyond their capabilities. This realisation was further strengthened by the great emphasis placed on “promoting democratic institution building and the creation of strong centralised governments in post conflict states” (Stewart & Brown, 2007:50-51) during the second term of the Bush Administration.

Krasner and Pascual (2005:153) explain that to address the need for a more integrated civilian-military approach to stabilisation and reconstruction operations, “the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation (S/CRS) was established by Congress in July 2004”. The White House reported in December 2005 that President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which formally tasked S/CRS with the duty to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and consult stabilisation and reconstruction activities” (United States of America, 2005:4). The S/CRS initiated important initiatives, such as the establishment of a rapidly deployable civilian force known as the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) that has nearly 1200 members operating internationally and has been the catalyst for training and capacitating multi-agency personnel in “whole-of-government” approaches to stabilisation and reconstruction initiatives (Price, 2011:18). According to Price (2011:8), “the S/CRS is a promising example of efforts to establish a civilian-surge component to peace-building that can quickly respond to conflicts, even in situations where combat has not necessarily ended and has been able to make concrete contributions to operations in challenging failed states such as Chad, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)”.

Power explains (2010:35) that

“the Obama Administration also committed to the ‘whole-of-government’ approach with the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) of the State Department in later 2010, proposing that the S/CRS be incorporated under a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilisation Operation (CSO), which would not only build upon but go beyond the mandate and capabilities of S/CRS and serve as the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crises, conflict and instability”.

More recently, a number of experts have proposed that a dedicated director for peace-building be established in the National Security Council (NSC). This location (which has not materialised) would provide the Office with more authority to “effectively coordinate and implement inter-agency policies, plans and strategies” (Konishi & McClean, 2011:4).

The absence of a robust organisation that could take share of the US peace-building contributions remains an important institutional challenge for the US as it progresses towards a “whole-of-government” approach to stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the Obama Administration, the focus has also moved to “using existing human resources, bolstering local procurement and building capacity, while mitigating corruption and promoting governance at the local and provincial levels” (Baker, 2010:80). As much as the peace-building approach of the US has been altered through the “whole-of-government” method, serious changes has also been affected in the military policy environment. There has been a shift in military doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan from counter-terrorist operations to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that requires an approach that is also closer to the traditional peace-building activities, including outreach, dialogue and winning the trust of local civilian populations and tribal leaders.

### 3.3.2 BRICS and peace-building

Call and Abdnur (2017:1) explain that a number of “rising powers” have been positioning themselves towards positions of influence that would reflect their economic status and regional standing. These countries include the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia that have all become more active in attempting to change the international order toward greater multi-polarity (Stuenkel, 2016:5). The authors make the point that it is not necessarily the size of their economies that drives these countries to be more active at the international level, but their dynamism. Their involvement in peace-building is furthermore connected to their international and domestic ambitions and norms, regional security interests, contributions to peacekeeping, positioning in the UNSC, history of state-society relations and development. Each of these members of BRICS has its own approach to peace-building and concentrate on different phases. The peace-building approaches of all these countries of the South are all, however, influenced by the Bandung Principles, particularly

“respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country and the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations” (Compton, 1955).

The next part of this chapter is dedicated to examining the peace-building approaches of China and Brazil. Not all the BRICS countries are discussed for the sake of brevity. China and Brazil are highlighted due to their unique circumstances and approaches: China, because of its extensive approach to peace-building and the fact that it is both a developing country and a member of the United Nations Security Permanent Five (P5), which in itself presents certain policy contradictions and Brazil,

because of its approach that focuses, as a developing country, on areas that reflect its own domestic successes as well as to promote its international profile.

Table 3.1 below provides an overview of BRICS country contributions (troop and financial) to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

**Table 3.1: BRICS Country UN Peacekeeping Contribution (Troop and Finance)**

<b>BRICS Country UN Peacekeeping Contribution (Troop and Finance)</b>		
<b>Country</b>	<b>Troop Contributing (Rank and No. of Troops)</b>	<b>Financial Contribution</b>
Brazil	21-1,303	0.76%
Russia	68-98	7-4.01%
India	2-7,471	0.15%
China	12-2,639	2-10.29%
South Africa	20-1,427	0.073%

Source: Researcher's own

### **3.3.2.1 China**

In 2005, President Hu of China publicly and officially announced a “comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction” (Stähle, 2008:650). The author further quotes President Hu when he contends that “the UN should not prescribe a predetermined model of governance, but also that China and Western countries have different understanding of peace-building” (Stähle, 2008:650). Lei (2010:3) adds as follows:

“The main thought of the Western countries’ involvement in peace-building is liberal democracy...under special conditions; the international community can use active humanitarian interventions to promote democratic systems. After the end of conflicts, those measures include the amendment of the constitution, holding a general election, establishing a multi-party system,

fostering the opposition party and developing civil society. These are always the panacea used by Western countries to heal conflicts. However, China believes every country has its own priorities and to promote democratic system immediately after the end of conflicts is not necessarily a must choice. Instead, measures such as reducing poverty and resolving unemployment are usually the most important tasks”.

Peace-building has become more important for China’s foreign policy agenda with its peace engagement agenda forming part of its overall strategy and “cultivation of China’s status and influence as a responsible great power in global politics” (Wang & Rosenau, 2009:29). The authors continue by stating that Beijing “maintains the view that national governments alone should focus on and respond to issues related to domestic political, economic or social affairs, including internal conflict”. In addition to the influence of the Bandung Principles (and South-South solidarity), this stance is also informed by China’s sensitivity to issues such as Taiwan and Tibet. This stance has also played itself out in Africa, evidenced in its response to coups in the “Central African Republic (2003), Mauritania (2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009) and Niger (2010)” (Wheeler, 2012:10). There has been criticism against this stance, particularly from the West, claiming that the “non-interference principle undermined good governance, democratisation and human rights. The countries noted in this regard included Burma/Myanmar and Zimbabwe” (Naím, 2007:96). Chinese academics and policy drafters defended this stance by stating that human rights is “first and foremost a right to subsistence” (Zhaoxing, 2011), with socio-economic rights taking precedence over abstract political rights.

There are some signs that China’s approach to security and stability is shifting, albeit incrementally and cautiously. Johnston *et al.* (2014) make the point that China continues to be a vocal supporter of the non-interference principle. There, however, should be imitations to this concept, particularly as it pertains to the rights of people. This possible change in approach is necessitated by “a complex amalgam” of factors: a growing recognition in Beijing of the value of aligning its national interests with international norms and making tangible contributions to international security, but also by China’s increasing interaction with the international community. There

seems to be a growing appetite within government for China to get involved in conflict resolution initiatives through negotiations in, for example, stating that China “calls for settling disputes and conflicts through talks and consultation and by seeking common ground while putting aside differences” (Buzan, 2014). Saferworld (2011) claims that China may have played the role of mediator to move regimes into talks in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Wheeler, 2011).

China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development makes it clear that “it is important to support the UN’s role in maintaining world peace and security and establish a fair and effective mechanism for upholding common security” (State Council Information Office of China, 2006). Most of China’s diplomatic engagement on peace and security takes place at the UNSC, where the country continues to insist that international intervention in a state’s internal affairs, especially through the use of force under Chapter IV of the UN Charter, is only legitimate if it has both the UNSC authorisation and host country consent. Chinese officials have continued to claim that many internal crises fall outside the UNSC mandate.

A phase of the peace-building continuum that China has been active in is UN peacekeeping operations. “China’s position on peacekeeping has evolved from complete rejection in the 1970, through a gradual change in attitude in the 1980’s and 1990’s to active engagement and participation from 1999” (Huang, 2011:258). According to the UN, China ranks as the twelfth largest troop contributing country in the world, the largest troop contributor among the Permanent Members of the UNSC, and ranks second amongst the top providers of financial contributions to UN peace-keeping operations (United Nations, 2017). China’s stance on the use of force has become “more flexible and less conservative with officials arguing that peacekeepers need to intervene earlier, faster and more forcefully” (Gill & Huang, 2009:11). Wheeler (2012:9) reports that the Chinese peace-keeping contributions have typically included “engineering personnel, medical units and have also been involved in policing and the training of local police forces”.

The areas within the peacekeeping phase where China has not played a major role pertain to issues related to security, the civilian component, administrative, political,

humanitarian, human rights and economic tools to contribute to the laying of the groundwork for longer term peace in countries emerging from conflict. Again the non-involvement in these areas is reflective of the Chinese position of non-interference (Stahle, 2008:631-655). Indications from speeches, pronouncements and financial contributions are that China will play an increasingly greater role in UN peacekeeping operations. Chinese support for the strengthening of the UN's peace-building capacity and "better coordination and integration of all UN peace-building endeavours are testament to this claim, as well as China's contribution from 2006 to 2011 of US \$4 million to the UN Peace-building Fund" (Zhao, 2010).

Shen Guofang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, made the point that "because poverty leads to instability, the longer term objectives of peace-building must be eradication of poverty, the development of the economy, as well as a peaceful and rewarding life for people in post conflict countries and regions" (Zhao, 2011:344-362). Chinese approaches focus on a heavily state-centric model, namely "enhancing the concerned country's capacity building instead of weakening its leadership" (Zhao, 2010:3). This involves direct government-to-government support to strengthen the state, which is not different from the traditional Western approach of focusing on economic growth and a strong state. There needs to be further alignment between the efforts of China and other countries at the UN, particularly the major powers. Areas where alignment might be required include where the government in a country forms part of a dispute and the government employs strong-arm tactics.

### **3.2.2 Brazil**

Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva made the point in 2009 that although "the BRICS' GDP accounted for only 15% of global GDP, Brazil was responsible for 65% of the growth of that GDP" (Cooper & Flemes, 2013:952). While growing its economy to the extent mentioned above, Brazil made considerable efforts to elevate its international strategic and political profile and influence. It used peace-related initiatives and particularly peace-building as an important vehicle to enhance its international standing and profile, particularly during the administration of President

Lula da Silva (2003-2010). An important detractor in such endeavours, as it is for Turkey and South Africa, is the country's own domestic political turmoil (Rouseff's presidential impeachment) and economic malaise, especially after the international financial crises in 2009, which impacted negatively on the sustainability of these countries' expansion of their global ambitions (Call & Abdnur, 2017:2).

During this period of seeking greater influence and prominence, Brazil pushed changes in the international multilateral system, which included leadership and the development of fora such as the G20, the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil and South Africa) as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa). These efforts were also directed at gaining greater influence in the multilateral system by lobbying for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Director-Generalship of the World Trade Organisation. In its own region it also enhanced its role in organisations, such as the Union of South American States (UNASUR) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). During President Lula's term (2003-2010), "Brazil nearly tripled its development cooperation to \$923 million). Of this amount, 66.3% were channelled through multilateral cooperation, while the remainder was allocated to bilateral efforts focusing on Latin America and Africa" (Call & Abdnur, 2017:2).

Brazil does not have a policy document or statement, such as a White Paper, outlining the country's approach to peace-building. Its approach has to be deduced and contextualised from "official speeches, statements, national security documents and diplomats' understanding and actions along the full peace-building continuum" (Call & Abdnur, 2017:5). These documents and pronouncements seem to indicate a specific Brazilian approach to promoting peace, security and stability. This Brazilian approach, it is argued, is derived from "Brazil's unique historical trajectory and experiences with peace and development". An important aspect, for example, is that Brazil's engagement to peace-building entails more "equitable relations of power among stakeholders" (Call & Abdnur, 2017:5).

With regard to Brazil's historical trajectory its view has been anti-imperialist, non-militaristic and heavily multilateralist in nature. Call and Abdnur (2017:5) explain that

the factors that has substantively influenced Brazil's approach to peace-building include its former "status as a colony of Portugal that shrugged off the empire and assumed independence with minimal inter-state violence; its legacy as the largest slave importing state in the Americas, as well as the last nation in the western world to abolish the practice and finally; its position as a regional power that harbours ambitions to become a global power player (yet remaining sensitive in this approach due to the sensitivities of countries in the region)".

Brazil's regional standing has been elevated by the country's enormous geographical size ("world's fifth largest country by territory and accounts for 48% of South America's territory") as well as being the largest economy (Worldsmostawesome, 2016). Brazil's sensitivity to a perception of regional hegemony is deeply ingrained in a "culture of pacifism", which has been an important part of the country's approach to its neighbours since independence in 1822 (Malamud, 2011). The 1934 Constitution (that only lasted three years) that has played an important role in successive constitutions, states that "Brazil would never engage in a war of conquest" and stipulates further that "war shall not be launched until arbitration is exhausted" (Call & Abdnur, 2017:6). Despite such institutional guarantees, Brazil's peace-building contributions and ambitions have been undermined by the country's domestic politics. The colonial state, before independence in 1822, exterminated and marginalised indigenous people and introduced "whitening" immigration policies that favoured Europeans (Dos Santos, 2002). Over almost 200 hundred years "institutional denial of racial and ethnic differences has resulted in unacknowledged inequalities and discrimination that are most visible in the country's contemporary high rates of violence" (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Brazil has had a difficult history with democracy following phases of military rule (1964 to 1985) and incidents of presidential coups and coup attempts. This domestic reality has undermined Brazil's legitimacy as an international peace-builder.

The "Brazilian Way" of peace-building therefore has its "historically-rooted principles of solidarity, demand driven cooperation, non-conditionality and non-interference, as well as national ownership of development cooperation projects abroad as part of the country's respect for sovereignty" (Call & Abdnur, 2017:10). The criticism against

Brazil's approach is that the country should not confuse national ownership with government decision-making and in the process limit broader participation, which would include broader involvement by civil society in like-minded countries (Abdenur & Marcondes, 2016:1-19). Other characteristics that may fall under the term the "Brazilian Way" include the country's ability, derived from its experience of working closely with local communities, abroad (particularly Brazilian peacekeepers). This often results in the development of economic initiatives and projects leading to an appetite for community economic development, as opposed to aid.

Considering the "Brazilian Way" in the context of the peace-building continuum, discussed in Chapter 2, namely conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building (post-conflict reconstruction and development) reflects that the country does focus on some phases of the continuum more than others. With regard to conflict mediation, which falls within phase 2 of peace-making, Brazil has attempted to develop its role in international mediation, historically limited to South America, including facilitating some intervention in a brief border war (Cenepa War) between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Brazil expanded their reach beyond South America in the 2000s, when in 2007 it was invited to attend the Middle East peace conference on the Palestine/Israel peace process held in Annapolis, US. According to Call and Abdnur (2017:20), the most controversial "attempt involved collaboration with Turkey and the US to temper growing tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear programme". The result of the participation by Brazil in these discussions did lead to a 2010 agreement signed by Iran, Brazil and Turkey, which included an agreement that Iran would provide Turkey with low-enriched uranium in "exchange for enriched fuel for Iran's nuclear research reactor" (Call & De Coning, 2017). Subsequently, Brazil (under President Rousseff) did attempt in August 2011 to mediate, through the IBSA, the conflict in Syria. The IBSA countries of India, Brazil and South Africa dispatched ministerial delegations to Syria, where they were hosted by President Bashar Assad who made the commitment that his Government would not contribute to any escalation of violence, but failed to really deliver on this promise (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Brazil pursued new avenues to contribute to the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC during 2015 and 2016,

mostly through facilitation. This was done without being directly involved with the negotiations.

The website, *Providing for Peacekeeping* (2017), reports that

“Brazil has contributed to UN peace operations since 1947 and that the country’s participation can be clearly divided into two eras: before and after the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti from 2004. Prior to MINUSTAH, Brazil strictly participated only in Chapter VI missions (often not participating in more robust follow-on missions) in the Western Hemisphere and in Lusophone states”.

Brazil’s contributions, however was never large. There were, however, four notable exceptions. “A battalion-size (600-800 strong) force was integrated into UNEF I (1956-67); 200 troops deployed with ONUMOZ (1992-94); 800 infantry troops, 200 engineers and two field hospitals were sent to Angola with the UNAVEM missions; and over 50 police participated in Timor-Leste beginning with INTERFET in 1999” (Kai Michael Kenkel, 2013). Overall, Brazil participated in 23 peacekeeping operations from 1957 to 1999 as well as several Organization of American States (OAS) missions and operations under the auspices of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). With regard to the peacekeeping phase of the peace-building continuum, Brazil assumed leadership of the military component of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, which represented a serious step-up in the country’s commitment to peacekeeping.

This step-up in contributions was accompanied by an alternative approach to UN peacekeeping, involving a peace-building orientated focus. Interviews with Brazilian diplomats, conducted by Call and Abdenur (2017), brought forth the assessment that the US efforts in the 1990’s was “a failure because it invested too much in the military and not enough in the development and capacities aspects” of peacekeeping. Brazil moved (in both the Security Council and the Fifth Committee budget) for authorisation to use UN peacekeeping resources, usually limited to financing the projects-related peacekeepers, including their operational needs, for

development and peace-building-oriented programmes in Haiti. The developmental projects within the broader scope of peacekeeping are said to be based on some of the successful work done domestically by Brazilian soldiers in remote and border areas. These projects include the drilling of wells, the building of bridges and dams as well as slope stabilisation in landslide prone areas. The peace-building approach was not only confined to building infrastructure, the Brazilian Government also used strong relations with Brazilian civil society to coordinate a reconciliation programme in Haiti as well as provide direct bilateral technical cooperation in social policy areas where Brazil had some expertise to share, such as public health, agriculture, energy and capacity building. The “Brazilian Way” interpretation was that these projects added to the role that the military has played through MINUSTAH. It also enriched the initiatives that could form the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives and social development and stability in the longer term. These initial contributions in the areas mentioned above strengthened Brazil’s post-conflict reconstruction and development impact. Call and Abdenur (2017) explain that Brazil’s extended PCRD efforts have been consistent with ideological alignments to South-South solidarity. This process reflects a more pragmatic approach with Brazil seeking international support, especially amongst developing countries for its own international ambitions.

The extent of Brazilian official development assistance is not large by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards. Burges (2014:7) reports that the

“total expenditure of US\$1.426 billion between 2005 and 2009 were directed to four main areas: US\$1,082.2 million for international organisations; US\$138.8 million for scholarship programs; US\$79.1 million for humanitarian relief; and US\$125.6 million for technical cooperation. Significantly, the technical cooperation expenditure line had been growing rapidly in Brazil, moving from US\$11.4 million per annum in 2005 to US\$48.9 million in 2009, encompassing over 400 projects in 58 different countries”.

Most of the projects, labelled as “structuring projects”, have been based on Brazilian policy models, which focus on host country approaches as opposed to the model

presented by the West that has not always provided much involvement by the host government. Brazil's peace-building has also included programmes that focus on economic cooperation, including trade and investment (particularly in infrastructure), which the country views as necessary for the start of economic growth in countries where it is implemented, particularly for post-conflict reconstruction. During the President Lula years, Brazilian investments were facilitated through public institutions, such as the Brazilia National Development Bank (BNDES), which utilised financing to promote exports and included investment by Brazilian companies (for example Petrobras, Embraer and Odebrecht). This again indicates a more pragmatic approach.

### **3.3.3 The Turkish Peace-building Approach**

Turkey's position as an emerging international power stems from its political and economic development, particularly in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. During this time, regional leaders with relative stability within its political, security and economic environments have been able to reposition themselves in the international World Order, especially after the Cold War. Turkey has been using its religious, ethnic and cultural strengths and linkages to promote its soft power approaches both regionally and internationally (Woods, 2016:1).

Turkey's domestic and foreign policies approaches have been heavily influenced by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Danforth, 2008:87). A number of Ataturk's speeches, particularly the phrase "Peace at home, peace in the world" have formed the foundation of Turkey's international engagement, from its first steps into peacekeeping with the United Nations in the 1950-1953 Korean war to current peace-building activities. This approach has been continued by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (key advisor and foreign minister from 2009-14) who has articulated the Ataturk principle as a proactive Turkish foreign policy based on peace and stability at home (Davutoglu, 2012:3). Foreign policy has been slanted towards a more multilateral approach, seeking to find a balance between proactive engagement and crises management. Turkey does not totally discount "hard security", as a strategic priority, but it is no longer the determining factor with

Davutoglu stating that “stability cannot be built on the basis of force alone” (Davutoglu, 2012:3).

Sazak and Woods (2015:4) make the point that Turkish leaders have increasingly emphasised the need for preventive diplomacy, which should be intricately linked to any conflict management strategies, particularly peacekeeping or peace-building activities. In identifying mediation and dialogue as essential tools in this preventive diplomacy, officials have indicated that “peace mediation and facilitation efforts are the most cost-effective way of preventing and resolving conflicts” (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Turkey has headed a number of initiatives to demonstrate this commitment. The Alliance of Civilizations, which promotes interreligious and intercultural dialogue, was launched in 2005 by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey (Alliance of Civilizations, 2005). Turkey and Finland created a “Group of Friends of Mediation” in 2010 that supports efforts by the UN, regional organisations and over 40 countries. Parallel to these efforts, Turkey launched a process on peace-building during its time on the Security Council from 2009-2010, which included these initiatives and brought together the Council for thematic meetings in Istanbul from 2010 to 2013 (United Nations, 2010).

In conflict affected countries such as Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya and Afghanistan peace-building contributions have centred on mediation activities, security sector reform and institution building as well as contributions to peacekeeping efforts (Sucuoglu & Stearns, 2016). Turkey does not have a specific definition of peace-building, but participates in a broad range of activities along the peace-building continuum, which include development projects from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations to private sector investments. It can be understood as a two-fold process, encompassing both state-building and peace-making in society. This reflects a structural approach to peace-building with good governance at the centre, with strong responsive institutions, and the rule of law for building an effective state and thus a stable and peaceful society (Davutoglu, 2013). Activities related to these goals include infrastructure projects, technical assistance and capacity building programmes for state institutions and personnel. Support has entailed training programmes for judges and prosecutors from Kosovo and medical

training programmes for the Somali Ministry of Health (TIKA, 2014:51-64) and technical assistance to the Governorship of Sar-e Pol for vocational training programmes for women and the Agricultural Development Project in East Bosnia to support the return of families after the war from 1992 to 1995 (TIKA, 2014:203;37-38). Education has been an important peace-building activity for Turkey, such as the education programmes provided by the Education Ministry and Diyanet (the Ministry of Religious Affairs) in Somalia. In other countries the programmes have been provided through civil society, such as Hizmet or Gulen linked schools.

Economic interests are inherent to both Turkey's foreign policy and peace-building activities. This pragmatic approach has led to economic dividends and the promotion of peace. Many of Turkey's peace-building, particularly the contributions related to post-conflict reconstruction and development are channelled through Turkish development aid and assistance. According to the OECD (2017):

- "Turkey's net official development assistance (ODA), in 2015, amounted to USD 3.9 billion, representing an increase of 26% in real terms over 2014. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.45% in 2014 to 0.50% in 2015. As in 2013 and 2014, the increase in Turkey's ODA mostly related to its response to the refugee crisis in its neighbouring country, Syria. The share of Turkey's total ODA allocated to Syria increased to 70% in 2015, compared to 65% in 2014 and 52% in 2013.
- Turkey's development co-operation is provided according to the Statutory Decree on the Organization and Duties of the Turkish Co-operation and Co-ordination Agency (TIKA), adopted in 2011. The agency designs and co-ordinates Turkey's bilateral development co-operation activities and implement projects in collaboration with other ministries, NGOs and the private sector. TIKA is an autonomous institution attached to the Prime Minister's Office. Other public institutions, NGOs and the private sector also implement projects and programmes funded through Turkey's ODA.
- In 2015, Turkey provided the largest share of its bilateral development co-operation to Syria, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania and Afghanistan. The main sectors for Turkey's bilateral development co-operation were

humanitarian aid and refugee support, governance and civil society, and education, health and population.

- Multilateral ODA accounted for 2% of Turkey's total ODA in 2015, provided through the United Nations (accounting for 25% of its multilateral ODA), as well as through regional development banks (33%), the International Development Association (8%) and other multilateral organisations."

### **3.3.4 The Norwegian Peace-building "Model"**

Norway has developed a solid international reputation as an international peace facilitator, a new narrative developed in the period 1997 to 2003 with Norway as a "peace nation" (Skånland, 2014). Fabra-Mata explains that this anecdotal background was again confirmed in 2000 when Kjell Magne Bondevik (Prime Minister at the time) described in his New Year speech the vision of Norway as a "peace nation" (Bondevik, 2000). Although Norway will always be associated with the Vikings, its peace contributing reputation derived from the 1890s (Leira, 2005; Leira *et al.*, 2007), particularly the country's peaceful independence from Sweden and the absence of a colonial past as well as the role of national legends, such as Fridtjof Nansen. Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts are seen as sincere, in that they are not motivated by political or economic self-interest. Norway, furthermore, focuses on peace facilitation rather than "mediation with muscle" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016) and will assist the parties to a conflict in their efforts to find a peaceful solution, but the responsibility for this lies with the parties themselves. The country's historical profile has been enhanced by contemporary events and contributions, which have received global recognition, including one-time events such as the Oslo Accords or annual events such as the internationally recognised Nobel Peace Prize (Fabra-Mata, 2014:2). Other factors contributing to Norway's reputation as a peace facilitator is built on the country's "generous development assistance, active engagement in the UN and global leadership in promoting international standards and norms" (Fabra-Mata, 2014:2).

As mentioned previously, peace-building, including conflict prevention and resolution during the Cold War period was mostly within the context of inter-state conflict. After

the demise of the Cold War, intra-state conflict rose with the concomitant rise of opportunities for countries outside the Permanent 5 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to contribute or facilitate peace processes. Norway has built its peace facilitation reputation in this post-Cold War period, based on its history and the successes of its recent contributions. While South Africa would not be able to build its own peace-building contribution on the examples of the Permanent 5, it could learn from Norway in building its own South African peace-building model. The question, therefore, is: What does the Norwegian Peace facilitation model entail and what best practice can be observed from it?

Early Norwegian peace facilitation approaches, including those that led to the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, creates the impression that there is a specific “Norwegian model” for the promotion of sustainable peace, which is largely based on strong partnerships between governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations (Egeland, 1998; Matlary, 2002; Helgesen, 2004).

Norwegian peace mediation can furthermore be characterised by a specific set of quantities, including: “non-coercive, impartial, disinterested, built on trust, respectful of local ownership, rich in resources, linked to Norwegian civil society and committed to long-term” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Although there is a definite and strong emphasises on particular streams of approaches such as cooperation with civil society, strong resources and a long-term commitments, researchers such as Fabra-Mata (2014:3) and Norwegian diplomats (Allers, 2015) argue that there is no real Norwegian Model, as a model would presuppose the existence of certain variables and rules that would combine into a template of sorts that are used to achieve certain results and outcomes. In addition, even if a model existed and for it to be regarded as unique, it has to be proven that it is essentially different from the peace facilitation habits of other international peace-builders. Lastly, from a principles point of view, if there was a Norwegian Model or template, Norwegian would be criticised for “embracing a one-size-fits-all approach, amounting to a denial of the principle of national ownership and context sensitive peace-making” (Fabra-Mata, 2004:3).

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains on its website (2016) that the Norwegian long-term willingness to remain involved and contribute to a peace process is supported through a stable, predictable policy in the areas of development assistance and peace work. This policy is based on a spirit of solidarity and a long-term perspective, and has been maintained by successive Norwegian governments. This long-term support is not only for negotiation processes, but also to help secure sustainable peace settlements by contributing to monitoring mechanisms and peace-building. The wide range of activities carried out by Norwegian NGOs all over the world has allowed Norway access to places where it has had little or no official presence. Norway has a stable and close relationship with international peace-building actors, including the US and enjoys good relations with other major global actors, such as the EU, Russia and India. Norway's position as a major contributor to the UN and significant aid donor enhances its credibility in the international community.

Støre (2010:15) makes the point that congruent with Norway's "role as a non-coercive third party, it considers dialogue as an important foundation of successful conflict transformation". The author continues with this line of reasoning by saying that dialogue is the starting point and that conflict cannot be resolved by force or the use of a military, but only through "brave and broad-based dialogue and a willingness to compromise...the essence of [Norway's] contribution to conflict resolution will always be dialogue". Brende (2013) continues this narrative by stating dialogue is critical and without it the other party's viewpoints, perceptions and positions will not be understood. The approach taken by Norway is to understand that dialogue should be driven by the stakeholders or parties to the conflict and not an outsider or third-party contributors. This will ensure that the core issues are addressed and discussions result in successful solutions where all concerns are raised and addressed.

In addition to a non-coercive, dialogue-based approach, Norway also believes that the process should be "all-inclusive; embracing not only armed actors, but also civil society actors and society at large". In this regard, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) states that "participants in the peace processes should refrain from

acts of terrorism and express real determination to participate in the dialogue in order to find political solutions to the conflict”. Tryggestad (2009) makes the point that a holistic approach to the needs and views of the conflict-affected society should be taken, including women-related and gender issues. “Norway encourages the participation of women in peace negotiations and the integration of a gender perspective into peace dialogues and peace agreements, in the letter and spirit of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2122” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

When there are an emphasis on and the achievement of full inclusivity of all possible multiple actors, it leads to the development of a more comprehensive peace agreement that provides better possibilities and probabilities of success during the implementation and the resultant transformational phase. Brende (2013:233) explains that “in return for greater inclusion, you are likely to see agreements that last longer and pave the way for greater stability and economic development”. The Norwegian Government (2016) insists that peace-building is a long-term process that also requires assistance and support during the implementation phase (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Despite these arguments against the existence of a Norwegian Model for peace facilitation, it is fair to say that Norway focuses on three streams of peace facilitation and that these three reflects the country’s strengths, resources, history and national characteristics.

### **3.4 CONCLUSION**

Despite the numerous efforts, particularly at the United Nations to develop a holistic understanding of peace operations that would encompass all phases thereof, it remains contested as a concept and in its application. The phase that remains outside the continuum is conflict prevention. It is the researcher’s view that conflict prevention (phase 1) has the same dimensions (note Chapter 2), goals and objectives as peace-building (post-conflict reconstruction and development), phase 4, and should therefore form part of the peace-building continuum, definition and concept.

The United Nations employs its full system to contribute to a peace-building process, including all UN agencies, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and its affiliated departments, the UN Peace-building Architecture (PBC, PBSO, PBF) as well as partners such as the World Bank, the IMF and many more. The African Union and SADC form part of this international peace architecture with its own institutions. Each of these institutions has its own mandates within the broader international peace architecture.

On a country level, countries have played important roles within the broader peace-building continuum. A country such as the US has traditionally contributed, particularly after 1945 and as one of the two powers in the bipolar international system, as a peace facilitator in inter-state conflict. This role has fundamentally been based on the US' political, economic and military supremacy. The US peace-building approach, due to the dominance of the military as the traditional entry point (or continuation), has necessitated renewed consideration of the most appropriate implementers of a peace-building framework. In that regard, expertise from different government agencies and departments as well as the civil and private sectors has been incorporated towards a "whole-of-government" approach. The US as an international peace-builder will remain important, particularly due to the country's international profile (as a P5 member of the UN Security Council), as well as its political, economic and military might.

China as an emerging international power with international political standing linked to a P5 position at the UN Security Council, an economy that in the next 13 years (by 2030) will rival the US, land size (4<sup>th</sup> after the US' 3<sup>rd</sup>) and a population more than four times the size of the US is starting to present an international alternative in the context of peace-building to the US. The next category of countries, including Brazil (BRICS) and Turkey, are all in the process of positioning themselves as regional leaders with ambitions to advance their international standing. Their credibility as international peace-builders are not only derived from a position of regional leadership, but also, in the case of Brazil, from a reputation of a "culture of pacifism" and in the case of Turkey from the slogan: "Peace at home, peace in the world".

Both countries have been active at the international level, with Brazil promoting its own approaches (the Brazilian Way) at the multilateral level and Turkey utilising plurilateral initiatives, such as Friends of Mediation and International Mediation Conferences. Brazil and Turkey focus their PCRDR contributions at the regional level. They have unique post-conflict reconstruction and development approaches based on their economic and developmental strengths and models. Norway has been one of the first countries to develop their peace-building approach. This approach is a low key, non-intrusive or non-invasive approach that also draws heavily on the country's image as a peaceful nation. It uses its strong civil society to promote peace-building efforts in countries where they are involved. Norway provides strong financial support to post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives and projects.

The lessons learnt in Chapter 3 towards a South African peace-building approach will focus in Chapter 5 on what the country can contribute as a fresh perspective and approach, possibly in the form of the Ubuntu approach (as compared to Brazil's culture of pacifism and Turkey's "peace at home, peace in the world"). Furthermore, South Africa utilisation of all government structures, as in the US "all-of-Government approach" should be examined as well as possibly utilisation and closer coordination and cooperation with civil society (such as Norway).

Chapter 4 examines South Africa's application of its peace-building approach, with special reference to the two case studies of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **PEACE-BUILDING MODELS AND APPROACHES: CASE STUDIES: BURUNDI AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the peace-building approach of different international, regional, sub-regional and country approaches in the context of the ever-changing nature of conflict, particularly the notion that conflict has changed from inter-state to intra-state. The changing nature of conflict necessitates a change in response by different stakeholders. In this regard, the chapter focused on the United Nations, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community on international, regional and sub-regional level. At the country level, the United States model was explored, as it represents a particular perspective and epoch (bipolarity) as well as an approach that is closer to the earlier approaches related to inter-state conflict. China and Brazil were examined as BRICS members, with their own approaches to peace-building, as well as representing new power players in a multipolar world. Finally, the Norwegian and Turkish peace-building models were examined, as two examples of different approaches based on the countries' history, region and resources.

This chapter considers South Africa's peace-building experience in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The leadership of former President Mandela played an important role in South Africa's contribution to the peace process in Burundi, but a further contribution by South Africa was that the Arusha Agreement moved away from "narrow interests to also include broader human security concerns" (Hendricks, 2015:17). Although there is general consensus that the Agreement was inclusive and comprehensive, civil society and women's organisations were not included during the negotiations. South African women supported their Burundian counterparts later to ensure more participation by women.

South Africa's peace-building contributions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo consisted of investment of funds and human resources. South Africa was involved in the full spectrum of peace-building, delivered through projects and activities by a myriad of government and civil society entities and actors.

## **4.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S INITIAL PEACE-BUILDING EXPERIENCE**

Since the fall of Apartheid and South Africa's reintegration with Africa in 1994, the country has been a significant contributor in peace-building initiatives and processes on the continent in general as well as to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). Initially, the ANC-led Government concentrated mostly on its domestic agenda and priorities and was not particularly ready to engage in what was perceived as expensive and complex. This reluctance was further exacerbated in the early years of South Africa's democracy when South Africa took strong positions against Nigeria and in Lesotho, resulting in fierce criticism particularly from countries in Africa. It could be argued that South Africa did fare better later with contributions to peace-building in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, the initial interventions and the resultant criticism still has an impact on a country that struggles to rid itself of the perception of an African country that is not truly African, including the notion that its policies and actions should never be confused with so-called strong-arm approaches of the Apartheid Regime and finally, South Africa as a hegemon (Webb, 1999:351-366).

South Africa's main focus and contribution to African peace and security, especially through the efforts of President Mbeki, were the replacement of the OAU with the AU, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the adoption of the APSA (Tjonneland, 2014:5). Expectations, particularly in the early years, for South Africa to significantly contribute to peace, security and development on the continent were based on the important reforms of the continental institutions as well as the peace efforts in DRC, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe (Louw-Vaudran, 2016:3). It was furthermore hoped that South Africa's well-developed infrastructure, successful transition to a

democracy and its model of reconciliation could be a driving force for economic development and stability in Africa.

### **4.3 CONSIDERING SOUTH AFRICA'S PEACE-BUILDING CONTRIBUTIONS: CASE STUDIES**

Two case studies have been selected to understand South Africa's peace-building approach. South Africa's peace-building contribution in Burundi has been regarded as a success story, particularly the leadership of former President Mandela. In recent times, South Africa has been criticised for not being more involved in the peace processes in Burundi. The contribution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been a longer process with considerable successes including the Sun City talks in 2002 and the peace support and enforcement operations. Recently, South Africa has found it difficult to positively impact on the stability and development process of the DRC.

#### **4.3.1 South Africa in Burundi**

South Africa's peace-building effort in Burundi was the first time that the country could claim some success in this area of its international relations engagement, particularly after the Lesotho intervention.

##### **4.3.1.1 *Background to Conflict in Burundi***

The conflict in Burundi has been fuelled by conditions and events that go back to pre-independence in 1962. An important tool of the Belgian colonial government was emphasising the ethnic differences between the majority Hutu (85%) and the dominant Tutsi (14%) and the Batwa or Twa (1%). Hendricks (2015) describes state formation based on exclusionary politics, ethnicity, patronage, authoritarianism, militarism (with vestiges in colonial rule) account for its bloodied past.

Sixty years of colonial rule deeply affected relationships between the different Burundian ethnic groups (Ndayizigiye, 2005:5). Burundi initially formed part of

German East Africa, followed by Belgian control in 1916. Both the Germans and the Belgians favoured and identified with the ruling group, the Tutsi. Ndayizigiye adds that during the colonial period, the Hutu, in general, and the Twa were progressively denied political rights and participation. They were also denied equitable access to economic resources or opportunity. Harsh economic conditions deprived the Hutu, the majority, of a reasonable means to a sustainable livelihood and personal and property security. Colonialism and the Belgian's indirect rule legalised these social identities into ethnic identities.

There are therefore a number of similarities between the process of state formation in Europe, the Westphalia Process and that in Africa, through the Berlin Conference and the imposition of state and governance structures through colonialism. These imposed and institutionalised structures and mechanisms formed the basis of the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. From independence in 1962 until 1992, when President Buyoya managed the adoption and implementation of a new constitution, Burundi went through a number of painful instances of political turmoil. These included "assassinations of successive prime ministers (1962-1965), an attempted coup (1965), successful military coups resulting in military rule in 1966 (Micombero), 1976 (Bagaza), and 1987 (Buyoya)" (Curtis, 2012:78). The fault-lines caused by the previous political upheavals laid the groundwork for the genocide of 1972, resulting in the death of approximately 250 000 people (Lemarchand, 2008). The killing was done by the minority, the Tutsi (15% of the population) who killed the Hutu (at about 80% of the population). This event formed the basis of much of the challenges Burundi would face in future, as it was immediately "followed by increased repression and purges of Hutu from political, military and economic structures" (Curtis 2012:79). President Melchior, from the *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU), won the elections in 1993. However, the country erupted into violence upon the assassination of the first democratically elected and first President of the Hutu ethnic group, leading to the death of some 20 000 people (predominantly Tutsi).

Mason (2009:22) argues that "what distinguished the violent conflict in Burundi from others is the extent to which elite-led politico-ethnic rivalry for power became

entwined with mass killing and fears of group extinction". Ethnic violence is the result not of ancient tribal hatreds, but of divisive colonial policies and the post-independence struggle for power among politico-ethnic elites in a polarised country. De Coning (2008) makes the point that complexity theory provides new insights into how complex systems self-organise. Self-organisation in the peace-building context refers to the various processes and mechanisms a society uses to manage its own peace consolidation process. If a society is fragile, it means that the social institutions that govern its politics, security, justice and economy lack resilience.

In an effort to address the conflict, the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) dispatched an advance team to Burundi in November 1993, led by Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritanian Foreign Minister). "He was able to secure an agreement in January 1994 in which President Cyprien Ntaryamira, a representative of the Hutu, heading a multi-party cabinet government was selected and in which the Tutsi were able to gain 40% of the seats" (Khadiagala, 2007:53). The agreement did not decrease the conflict, it intensified, particularly after the death of President Ntaryamira of Burundi and President Habyaramana from Rwanda who died in a plane crash, which sparked the genocide in Rwanda.

Khadiagala (2007:52) reports that in "September 1994 another Convention was negotiated and signed, which presented 55% of cabinet positions to those of Hutu descent and 45 per cent to Tutsi representatives". This "division of power, however, was seen by some Hutus as an erosion of their democratic gains" (Khadiagala (2007:53). It eventually led to a split in the *Front for Democracy Party in Burundi* (FRODEBU) and the founding of the National Council of the Defence of Democracy (CNDD). "Party members of the Burundi National Recovery Party (PARENA), of former President Bagaza, also refused to sign the Convention and share power with those they believed were responsible for the massacres of Tutsis" (Curtis, 2012:81). The Regional Peace Initiative (consisting of Heads of State in the Great Lakes Region) came together to solve the crises and in November 1995 they appointed President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to mediate a power-sharing agreement between the two sides. Khadiagala (2007) indicates that the appointment of Nyerere led to the trend of elder statesmen mediating conflicts in Africa. Former President

Nyerere acted as the facilitator in the Arusha negotiations, until his death in 1999. The conflict was primarily construed as being "political with ethnic overtones and had therefore to be resolved by an ethnically based power-sharing arrangement" (Ayebare, 2010:82). Nyerere attempted from 1993 to gather parties who took part in the elections for negotiations, but he only managed to succeed in 1998. This delay created the challenge that a number of new parties had meanwhile formed and were absent from the discussions. These included the *National Council for the Defense of Democracy — Forces for the Defense of Democracy* (CNDD-FDD) and the *Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People* (Palipehutu) — *National Liberation Forces* (FNL) (a predominantly refugee group formed in 1983), who continued with their violent incursions (Ayebare, 2010:84).

The colonial system imposed on Burundi therefore institutionalised the inequalities in society, but did not create a system to deal with ethnic, political, economic and social questions. These inadequate systems are well described in Dependency Theory and the experience of Burundi in not being able to address issues of security, political unrest and social upheaval. The country's inability to break out of this stranglehold or "iron cage" furthermore raises the need for alternative strategies.

#### **4.3.1.2      *Enter South Africa: Burundi***

After the death of President Nyerere, South Africa's President Nelson Mandela was mandated to serve as the facilitator in the peace process. He was selected not only because of the role he played in South Africa, but because of his reputation as a statesman. Mandela and his mediating team completed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (signed in 2000) by the Government of Burundi, the National Assembly and 17 political parties, which was made up of the G7 (Hutu-based parties) and G10 (Tutsi-based parties). It also included the CNDD and Palipehutu (although their armed wings were excluded), which caused difficulties later on as it required the need for ceasefire agreements in 2002, 2003 and 2006. The ceasefire agreements were led by Jacob Zuma and then later by Charles Nqakula. President Zuma was appointed at the time due his role in ending conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and the then PWV region.

In Burundi the purpose of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord was to -

put an end to the root causes underlying the recurrent state of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability, genocide and exclusion, which is inflicting severe hardship and suffering on the people of Burundi, and seriously hampers the prospects of economic development and attainment of equality and social justice...and to shape a political order and system of governance...founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, mutual understanding, tolerance and cooperation amongst the different ethnic groups (United Nations Peacemaker, 2000).

Hendricks (2015:17) explains that “the conflict in Burundi was described as a conflict essentially between political elites for access to state power and resources, mobilising ethnicity to achieve their aims. These elites were assembled towards a resolution to the conflict”. An important failing was that although civil society and women's organisations were present at the signing of the document, they were not part of the negotiations. Burundian and South African women together with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) lobbied for representation, but were eventually only provided with observer status. Consequently, the general consensus is that the Arusha Agreement was regarded as inclusive and comprehensive in terms of whom it addressed (the citizens of Burundi), the issues it covered and its set principles that needed to be part of a new constitution.

The Arusha Agreement addressed the important issues of the core aspects of human dignity, social justice and human security. It also attended to the crucial areas related to ethnicity and gender (although it did not develop criteria or a quota for gender participation). The negotiations and the subsequent Arusha Agreement differed from other peace processes in that it was seriously attempting to move away from myopic and limited self-interest towards a more holistic approach that would benefit the people. This approach was heavily influenced by South Africa and is regarded as a major contribution within the broader peace process. The Agreement

formed the foundation for the development of a new constitution and also ensured power sharing arrangement in which the "G7 parties would have more than half, but less than three-fifths of the ministerial portfolios, and 60% of the seats in the National Assembly. Senate would be divided equally between the G7 and G10 members but the president of the Senate would come from the G10" (Curtis, 2012:84). It also stipulated that "a high majority was necessary to pass legislation and amend the constitution, thus preventing the domination of a single ethnic group" (Bouka, 2014:3). In addition, "the Agreement called for the reform of the army through integration of the different armed factions into a single army and a stipulation that the army could not comprise of more than 50% of a single ethnic group" (Bouka, 2014:3). Pierre Buyoya, of the Union pour le Progrès national (UPRONA), became President and Domitien Ndayizeye (FRODEBU) the Vice-president of a new transitional government, which was inaugurated in November 2001. The idea was that the President and Vice-president would alternate positions. South Africa played an important role in creating an enabling environment for the functioning of the transitional government.

Southall (2006:2) is of the opinion that the Arusha process was not without its challenges, particularly because it failed to secure the adherence of all the various (fragmented) rebel groups resulting in continuous conflict (on the ground). Although certain and various difficulties meant that the original timetable was not adhered to, the Accord eventually provided a framework for peace. South Africa's successful contribution included additional support from important regional and international actors as well as the persuasion of the fractious Burundian political parties and armed groups into adhering to the Accord. This led to a sufficient framework that would later ease the process towards the military's demilitarisation and demobilisation.

Southall (2006:5) ascribes South Africa's success to four major factors, including "forceful and resolute African diplomacy; the critical role of South Africa serving as a determined and neutral broker, supported by the country's provision of troops from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); the confluence of a political transition (and de-escalation of civil war) in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of

the Congo (DRC); and war weariness on the part of principal political actors and the population in Burundi". To address the violent conflict in Burundi, the regional leaders in East Africa first appointed former President Nyerere and later South Africa's former President Mandela to facilitate negotiations, which eventually culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord on 28 August 2000. The main aim of the Accord was to develop agreement on a "roadmap" for a transitional settlement that would lead to national elections. It also provided the necessary framework for the deployment of international peacekeepers in Burundi, including support to assist the safe return of political leaders to Burundi. The United Nations could not agree on terms to deliver on a request for peacekeepers until a ceasefire agreement had been signed.

The South African think-tank Accord (2007:25) explains in a paper that South Africa's involvement in Burundi as a troop contributing country (TCC) hinged on two critical aspects, the first of which was former President Mandela's (as the facilitator in the Burundi peace process) requested African leaders to contribute troops to Burundi. African countries at that stage either did not have the capacity to deploy troops or in the cases of Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana indicated (like the UN) that it would not be able to participate in the absence of a ceasefire agreement. Former President Mandela then persuaded President Mbeki, who saw the peace process in Burundi as essential to concurrent initiatives in the DRC. There is general agreement that peace and security in Burundi would seriously contribute to peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region.

In Operation Fibre, South African peacekeepers were the first to deploy in Burundi and the last to leave. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000 led to 701 South African peacekeepers being deployed on 29 October 2001. Their main "initial objective was to safeguard Burundi's politicians returning from exile" (Department of Defence, 2003). The "protection of political leaders or bodyguard function falls, strictly speaking, outside the definitions of peacekeeping, as the South African White Paper on Peace Missions (South Africa, 2014) defines military resources in the strict sense of monitoring and assisting with the implementation of agreements, providing logistical support, electoral assistance,

medical assistance, de-mining tasks and humanitarian assistance”. The White Paper (South African Government, 2014), however, does state that:

“South Africa would obviously prefer to contribute to those initiatives that aim to address the underlying causes of conflict and not simply its short term containment. However, it is not always possible to be selective in this regard. In the event that military forces are required to respond to a humanitarian emergency, or to support an important peace process, South Africa may have to provide an appropriate contingent to supplement the international and regional effort”.

The peacekeeping was successful, as later two ceasefire agreements were signed on 7 October and 2 December 2002 respectively. By this time the African Union (AU) had been successfully established and the idea of a multinational African peacekeeping force was being revived. South Africa took on the role of lead nation in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, which became South Africa's first fully fledged AU peacekeeping mission (Neethling, 2008). Ethiopia assisted with support from the US and Mozambique assisted with support from the United Kingdom (UK). AMIB was mandated to monitor and verify the ceasefire and support further progress. The mandate specifically included “maintaining contact between the rival parties, identifying and securing assembly and disengagement areas, providing continued VIP protection, and facilitating humanitarian aid delivery, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the Burundi police and military forces” (SA Soldier, 2003:14). The mission was a partial success for which South Africa paid US\$130 million to sustain its troops and provide logistical support (Department of Defence, 2003:14). Further success was achieved after the arrival of a larger UN force in June 2004. South Africa began to withdraw after Burundi's democratic elections in 2005, with The South African Air Force (SAAF) withdrawing in April 2006 and the South African Navy in October 2006. A VIP protection unit was still in Burundi the following year (DefenceWeb, 2010).

#### **4.3.1.3 South Africa in Burundi: Successes and areas of concern**

Former President Nelson Mandela played an important part in shaping negotiations through his personality, international standing and reputation. Mason (2009:21) furthermore explains that unlike the Western notion of a “neutral” mediator, Mandela introduced a new approach to the role of a moral chief mediator or “facilitator”, as he referred to himself. Mandela worked for mutually acceptable solutions that included a very outspoken manner, where he would sometimes criticise the Government (particularly how Government held political prisoners). He also compared the internally displaced people (IDP) camps to concentration camps and was equally vocal in his criticism of the opposition rebel groups, who he took to task for ignoring a declared ceasefire and attacking civilians. He did not spare regional leaders either, who together with the belligerents failed to reach an agreement to end ongoing violence. On his first visit to Burundi in January 2000 he said that “the daily slaughter of men, women and children was an indictment on everyone”. This form of “moral pressure” cannot be wielded by anyone, but when exercised by Nelson Mandela, with his personal reputation as the “Father of Africa”, it was very effective.

The involvement of former President Mandela had the positive effect of aligning not only the various Burundian parties, but also the international, regional and continental stakeholders. His credibility and approach ameliorated, although not fully addressed the complexity and chaotic nature of the peace-building process in Burundi. The Arusha talks included all political parties, but not all of the armed groups. The parties increased from 17 to 19 towards the end of the process, leading to a very inclusive process. It should, however, be noted that some splinter armed groups did not sign and called for separate ceasefire agreements. On the less successful side, the inclusiveness did not extend to the inclusion of civil society. Hendricks (2015:14) argues that these forms of negotiations (inclusiveness) inadvertently created modern routes to political power via excessive violence perpetrated on citizens predominantly in rural areas: access to power through the coup phenomenon was replaced by access to power via rebels negotiating and legitimising themselves.

Former President Mandela deliberately built extensive international support for the peace process in order to provide it with legitimacy, backing and resources. When former President Mandela first met with all the Burundian parties and delegates in Arusha in January 1999, he explained to them that he had invited "King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Presidents Chirac of France, Obasanjo of Nigeria and Clinton of the US to attend the next plenary in February, as well as Presidents Mkapa of Tanzania and Museveni of Uganda (as Chair of the Regional Summit) and Salim as Secretary General of the organisation of African Unity (OAU)" (Bentley & Southall, 2005:74). The authors continue by stating that former President Mandela also addressed the United Nations Security Council in New York, which led to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1286 that was designed to "create the kind of positive international environment in which the Arusha process would be able to flourish" (Bentley & Southall, 2005:74).

All important parties should be included and engaged in successful political negotiations. It does, however, get more complicated, as more parties present additional mandates, requirements and requests. According to Mason (2009:24), there is also the risk that parties are formed in order to enhance the weight of one's position at the table (or to get paid for attending). An important approach to address these challenges was taken at the Arusha talks in which the mediators would work towards a "sufficient consensus" between the large parties in an attempt to draw the smaller parties along with these decisions and positions. Mandela emphasised that the peace process had to be underpinned by the necessary international financial assistance to address immediate humanitarian and longer-term development needs.

It often raises questions when a mediator presents a draft to start or to move negotiations when there is a deadlock. Depending on the language in the draft, mediators could be accused of being biased. There is, therefore, a risk to this approach. During the Arusha negotiations this approach was successfully employed mostly because the parties had ample opportunity to adapt and familiarise themselves with the draft.

The South African peacekeeping process in Burundi, as explained above, went through four stages from a) South African peacekeepers to b) AU peacekeepers, to c) UN peacekeepers and eventually d) part of the African Union Standby Force. This placed serious pressure on the SANDF that had to each time reconfigure its own administrative and reporting structures, the extensive logistical coordination functions, and align standards and policy requirements for each of the mandated organisations.

The deployment of troops by South Africa, however, made a significant contribution to peace-keeping processes in Burundi, particularly at a time when other African countries as well as the United Nations were not willing to take this step or the OAU was not able to perform this task. South Africa was also flexible enough to provide peacekeeping forces for a task that was not strictly speaking within the narrow definition of peacekeeping, but regarding as VIP protection. Importantly it showed South Africa's willingness to "walk the talk". Mandela did remind participants in the Burundi peace process that "the daily slaughter of men, women and children was an indictment on everyone" (Bentley & Southall, 2005:74). South Africa contributing troops, initially without support from regional, continental and/or international institutional support provided the peace process with a bridge between the progress made under the conflict resolution phase and the peacekeeping phase of the peace-building continuum.

The changes in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) specifically and the architecture in general continentally, regionally and sub-regionally requires South Africa in its dealings with all these organisations and institutions to consistently change its own structures, decision-making ability and most important its interaction approach.

On a continental level, AMID was the AU's first peacekeeping mission and it reflected Africa's intention to contribute in conflict scenarios where the UN does not have the appetite to get involved. It also requires the AU, SADC and countries like South Africa to be sure about its intervention models. Accord (2007:30) reports that "high-level meetings continued to be held in Bujumbura and a final break-through

was achieved in October 2003". The United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) was created in May 2004 under a Chapter VII mandate and was mandated to contribute to the implementation efforts by Burundians to return to a peaceful dispensation and implement national reconciliation foreseen in the Arusha Accord (Jackson, 2006). At this stage the "AU Peace and Security Council (November 2004) still recognised the important role of the SAPDS as indispensable to the promotion of a climate of security and confidence, particularly in the context of the April 2005 elections, which marked the end of the transition period" (ACCORD, 2007:30).

One challenge for South Africa in the peacekeeping process in Burundi was that although the South African Protection Service Detachment (SAPSD) "was successful in completing its assigned functions, it was limited in playing a broader role in the peace process" (ACCORD, 2007:29). It could not provide some of the other important functions that are part of the classical definition such as "monitoring and assisting with the implementation of agreements, providing logistical support, electoral assistance, and medical assistance, de-mining tasks, humanitarian assistance and providing protection to civilians, as its deployment was primarily Bujumbura based" (ACCORD, 2007:26).

Although South Africa's troop deployment could be regarded as relatively rapidly, there were some questions regarding the following of correct bureaucratic procedures. The Memorandum of Understanding between South Africa and Burundi, which mandated that South African troops could be dispatched and complement the security aspects of the Arusha Accord. President Mbeki approved and signed the Presidential Minutes 654/2001 the same day, authorising that troops could be the deployed according to the Constitution. Former President Mandela, as the Burundi facilitator at the time, secured the UN Security Council Resolution (SCR 1375/2001) that endorsed the entry of South African troops into Burundi on 29 October 2001, the same day as the deployment of the troops. The Constitution (1996) stipulates in section 201(3) the process for the deployment of troops (South Africa, 1996). This inadequate bureaucratic process impacted on different possible stakeholders, decision-makers (including Parliament) and partner Departments in South Africa and their possible roles and contributions. For example the process was supposed to

have an extensive media campaign to ensure wide-ranging and accepted and support at all levels for the operations, but this was never designed and implemented. Due to short timeframes there was not time for pre-deployment training. This raises questions regarding “just in time training” or “just in case training”.

The above-mentioned complications speaks of an inherently complex peace-building environment characterised by chaos, which is further exasperated by the lack of an integrated, coordinated and coherent South African peace-building process. Closer cooperation, at least between the Department of Foreign Affairs (at the time and now International Relations and Cooperation) and the National Defence Force would have made the process easier as well as ensure confidence and credibility.

An adequate Early Warning System would have provided the SANDF with enough time to ensure that all arrangements were made. In hindsight there were challenges regarding logistical support and maintenance in Burundi. All issues related to procurement management were problematic, affecting deadlines and the quality and quantity of goods and services. This had a serious impact on financial support as the UN is unable to finance projects where the quality of equipment is questionable. Equipment was not always functioning. This indicates the main challenges for AU peacekeeping, as the organisation was unable to finance such missions through its own budget. It should also be noted that the expenditure for AMIB was US\$110 million in 2003, while the entire budget of the AU Commission in the same year was US\$32 million. AMIB, with SA as the lead country, made some significant progress, including on the cease-fire process. It was also restrained by financial, logistical and technical capacities since the rest of the world is reluctant to fund these initiatives.

#### **4.3.2 South Africa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**

Tjiurimo (2017:1) confirms that South Africa’s most penetrating peace-building involvement was with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This intervention provides an ideal opportunity to assess South Africa’s peace-building approach.

#### **4.3.2.1      *Background to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)***

The Democratic Republic of the Congo's history, as it relates to colonialism, starts with the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which in many cases is a contributor to conflict in Africa. It not only initiated the drawing of arbitrary borders in Africa, but started the process of European domination in Africa as well as the transfer of political, government and economic systems, processes and dependencies on African countries and its peoples. The fact that the Berlin Conference was arranged by Belgium and the Congo was the main area of interest for Belgium makes the DRC the ideal country example to examine colonialism, neo-colonialism and the Dependency Theory.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Dependency Theory focuses on the economic relationship between developed and less-developed countries, also defined as dominant states/core countries/metropolises and dependent states/periphery countries/satellites. The relation is characterised by an extraction of wealth, for example of natural resources, from periphery to core, which also explains the underdevelopment of the poor countries and the development of the rich ones.

The history of the DRC, "similar to its neighbour Burundi, is one of conflict fuelled by the politics of exclusion, neo-patrimonialism, authoritarian rule, militarism and underdevelopment" (Hendricks, 2007:20). The author continues by explaining that "after a week of independence from Belgium in 1960, the province of Katanga threatened to secede, leading to a civil war. High-level power struggles between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasa-Vubu led to the assassination of Lumumba in 1961". Mobutu Sese Seko's state over-throw in 1965 translated into the cessation of some political instability, but started a new era of political upheaval right to the demise of Mobutu.

Political and economic instability became rife when international and domestic pressure to open up the economy towards a free-market economy and the creation

of political space towards multi-party politics started. The massacres in Rwanda in 1994 was the source of much of the instability in the DRC. Many Rwandese of Hutu origin, including the *Interhamwe*, escaped to the Eastern DRC. The *Banyamulenge*, Rwandese of Tutsi descent, had already established themselves in the Eastern DRC leading to further conflict. The *Banyamulenge* had already been in struggle with the local authorities and the people living in the areas, mostly on issues related to citizenship and land.

The instability in many countries in the Great Lakes region led to a considerable migration of people. It also meant support by countries such as Rwanda and Uganda to displaced people in the “DRC creating an interdependent and regionalised conflict in the sub-region” (Hendricks, 2007:21). The Alliance for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Cong-Zaire (ADFL), headed by Laurent Kabila and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, is an example of the regional impact of political competition and support. Kabila took control over the DRC in May 1997, but the DRC remained unstable, particularly after he lost the support of Rwanda and Uganda.

By 1998, the DRC was back in civil war. President Chiluba of Zambia was mandated by SADC in September 1998 to mediate the conflict. “The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement was brokered in 1999 calling for the end of hostilities and an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) that was intended to lead to a negotiated settlement and to democratisation” (Solomon & Swart, 2004:52). Rogier (2004:27) explains that the Agreement called for an “inclusive” transitional administration that would include the Government, the main rebel groups (RCD and the MLC, at the time) as well as the opposition political parties (the so-called “non-armed” opposition) and civil society. Parties were supposed to participate with equal status. The idea of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (IDC) was to attempt to restart a national dialogue, but was undone by both Mobuto and Kabila. Real negotiations could only truly take place after the assassination of Kabila in 2001, when his son Joseph Kabila took control.

#### **4.3.2.2      *Enter South Africa (SA): The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)***

South Africa's intervention in the crisis in Zaire (as the DRC was then called) was the country's first major diplomatic initiative on the continent. This intervention was during the First Congo War (1996-1997) when Laurent Kabila and the ADFL attempted to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko. The aim of President Mandela, at the time, was to persuade Mobutu to quietly leave Kinshasa to avoid further bloodshed "while pushing Kabila to come to terms with other elements of the Zairian opposition" (Landsberg, 2002:172). The discussion never took place, as Kabila refused the invitation and did not turn up for the scheduled meeting.

The complex and chaotic nature of the conflict in the DRC was more than an intra-state conflict with people from Burundi and Rwanda migrating into Uganda and the DRC, creating the continuation of conflict from their origins. This migration of people and politics also gave rise to the development of alliances. Laurent Kabila and the ADFL, for example, were initially supported by Rwanda and Uganda against President Mobutu, but Kabila turned his back on the two countries less than a year into power, which led to the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Due to the conflict with its neighbours, the DRC turned to Southern Africa and became a member of the SADC. In the mean-time the conflict in the DRC had Uganda and Rwanda (against Kabila) and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola (on the side of Kabila) involved. Following South Africa's reluctance to support the DRC against what was viewed as aggressors, its impartiality and thus also its capability of being a peace moderator was strongly questioned by Kabila and his allies (Tonnheim & Swart, 2015:2). Between 1998 and 2000, South Africa was accused of siding with the anti-government rebels (Mangu, 2003; Curtis, 2007). Not only did South Africa refuse to send military troops, the country was also selling arms to Rwanda and Uganda. Human Rights Watch (2000) reported at the time: "these arms sales run counter to South Africa's policy". The country, in other words, would not sell arms or weapons to countries involved in armed conflicts. South Africa's military involvement in Lesotho was also quoted as a contradiction or double standard in South Africa's

approach. The Mandela Administration, however, did cease the selling of arms to Rwanda and Uganda (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

When President Mbeki took office in 1999, he acknowledged that “South Africa’s policy towards the DRC was in need of an overhaul” (Landsberg, 2002:177). President Mbeki proposed a peace plan, urging all foreign forces to withdraw from the DRC. He also ensured that South Africa would contribute troops to the UN peace-keeping forces in the DRC. The argument was that “South Africa cannot be seen to be making peace while showing a disinclination to keep the very peace that it so eagerly brokers” (Landsberg, 2002:178). This argument was further supported and evidenced in the political pressure from international and regional bodies, including SADC, the African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN (Weiss, 2000) leading to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. This Agreement was the first step towards the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) and eventually the election in 2006.

As with previous agreements, the Lusaka Agreement was repeatedly violated with many critics claiming that the reasons for its slow implementation were its complexity and the fact that it was basically imposed on belligerents and signatories by external actors (Weiss, 2000). Progress was only made after the assassination of Laurent Kabila, when his son Joseph Kabila took power and he agreed to take part in the ICD. After unsuccessful preliminary sessions in 2001, first in Gaborone and then in Addis Ababa, a new attempt to start the dialogue was made at Sun City, South Africa from 25 February to 19 April 2002. South Africa was committed in this peace process through the investment of funds and human resources (Curtis, 2007:264).

Tonnheim and Swart (2015:3) explain that although South Africa was now fully involved, it did not make progress easy, as the conflict remained complex with a multitude of belligerents (360 delegates) combined with the “easy” and minimalistic approach of the ICD facilitator, former President of Botswana Masire. When progress seemed to have stalled, President Mbeki presented two power-sharing plans: “Mbeki-1 and Mbeki-2”. The first was rejected by the rebel group Rally for Congolese Democracy – Goma (RCD-Goma) and the Congolese party of Etienne Tshisekedi for

being too pro-Kabila and Mbeki-2 was rejected by Kabila as too pro-RCD-Goma. Kabila unilaterally entered into an agreement with Jean-Pierre Bemba and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), the Ugandan backed rebels and left the negotiating table. The Rwandan supported rebels the RCD-Goma was left out of the deal. This move diminished some of South Africa's negotiating power, but its relationship with Rwanda was used in a new round to convince the RCD-Goma to reach a deal (Khadiagala, 2007) and to restart talks.

Former President Masire acted as mediator and was supported by Mr. Moustapha Niasse, a Senegalese politician appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to be his special envoy to the DR Cunder the UN flag. The Sun City talks was hosted from October 2002 to December 2002, resulting in the *Global and All Inclusive Peace Accord* that was signed into effect in 2003. South Africa was not mandated as the official mediator, but played an important role in providing resources for discussions and in lobbying parties to sign and implement an agreement.

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) reports on its website (South Africa, 2014(a) that South Africa became one of the first African countries to deploy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1999. This deployment occurred at a time of increased conflict in 1998, further complicated by the involvement of a number of countries from the region (Great Lakes) that even contributed troops. The death of President Kabila further complicated the situation with additional troops being dispatched under the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). These troop numbers were bolstered in 2001 when MONUC requested that personnel from the SANDF's Aero Medical Evacuation as well as its Command and Support Unit join the contingent. This military configuration in the context of a peacekeeping mission was a first for South Africa. The numbers and range of peacekeeping contributions were further bolstered with the addition of 48 members of the SANDF military police to assist with the establishment of the MONUC Military Police Unit. Although South Africa started making contributions in 1999, it only provided large-scale forces in 2003. The SANDF website (2014) reports that "group of 1000 consisted of just over 100 soldiers in Kindu, about 600 in Goma, 250 in Beni and the remainder in Kirumba". Requests from the United Nations' Department of

Peacekeeping Operation increased with South Africa contributing a task force of about 1500 troops, which consisted of the infantry battalion group and an aviation regiment. The “SANDF's Engineering Corps, a headquarters' support unit, a medical facility, a Well Drill and ferry units were later added to Operation Mistral” (SANDF, 2014). According to the SANDF (2014), “the ferry service was used for a peace monitoring base on Lake Albert, which borders Uganda and north-eastern DRC. When MONUC developed its Eastern Division in 2005, the South African contribution was reduced with the repatriation of the Task Force Headquarters and the Headquarters Support Unit”.

The Department of Defence (SANDF, 2014) reported in 2006 that the configuration of their personnel contribution changed when, during Operation Mistral, the Aviation Unit was introduced, whilst the Well Drill and Ferry Units were removed. This did lead to the DRC announcing the first elections, with MONUC providing peace support. The election was won by Joseph Kabila who, as President, specifically recognized South Africa's support and contribution (SANDF, 2014). Although the above relates to peacekeeping, South Africa did engage in a peace-enforcement incident when the Intervention Brigade (FIB), a joint South African, Tanzanian and Malawian “peace enforcement” operation, contributed along with Congolese forces to the 2013 destruction of M23, the largest and best-armed of the rebel groups. The victory over this group has been mainly ascribed to the heavy weapons, including two tanks the South African state-of-the-art Rooivalk attack helicopters based in Goma. The mandate of UN Resolution 2098, which created the FIB, is to neutralise, disarm and prevent expansion of all armed groups in the eastern parts of the Congo.

Hendricks and Lucey (2013:3) explain that “South Africa has worked with the DRC on post-conflict development and peace-building since 2002, when the Peace Accord was signed”. Furthermore “in 2004, South Africa and the DRC signed a General Cooperation Agreement and formalised and institutionalised bilateral relations through the Bilateral National Commission (BNC), which has a strong focus on post-conflict restructuring and development (PCRD)”. South Africa and the DRC signed a further 32 memorandums of understanding (MoUs) in the period from 2004 to 2005. Hendricks and Lucey (2013:4) indicate that “South Africa has broadly

clustered its assistance to the DRC into three key areas, namely (i) SSR, (ii) institutional capacity building and (iii) economic development”. The activities are congruent with the three peace-building areas described in Chapter 2 of this study. The areas include: “governance, human resource development, implementation support, economic development, and infrastructure development, information sharing and humanitarian assistance” (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013:5). These activities have been delivered by a diverse range of government and non-government actors, such as the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), South African National Defence Force (SANDF), South African Police Service (SAPS), Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA); companies such as Vodacom and Shoprite; and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as IDASA, ACCORD and SAWID (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013:5).

#### **4.3.2.3 South African Successes and Failures**

Hendricks (2015:24) makes the point that South Africa (SA) did not draw from its own experience when supporting women of the DRC in negotiating sufficient and meaningful participation (Meintjies *et al.*, 2002).

South Africa’s main objective was to ensure that conflict groups sign an agreement that would pave the way for a provisional power sharing arrangement that could lead to elections. Rogier (2009:35) explains that “the Global All Inclusive Agreement reflected a deal between the principal warlords as to how they would share power at the government level during the 24 month transition period, at the end of which elections should be held”. South Africa again made the mistake, made elsewhere internationally, of providing smaller groups marginally involved in conflict with access to the negotiations and, therefore, power that would not reflect their national profile. Hendricks (2015:24) describes this as “the politics of the belly, as opposed to an ideologically driven social movement accessing power to bring about social change”. It also explains the factitious elements of the post-conflict milieu.

A serious consequence of allowing small rebel groups into the process was their integration into the national defence force through “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes” (Hendricks, 2015:24). Although this led to stabilisation, it had seriously negative effects on peace with continued conflict fuelled by a process of rebels turned soldier, turned rebel with violence against the society it is supposed to protect. Hendricks (2015:24) states that “although the DRC was able to have elections in 2006 and 2011, post the *Global All Inclusive Peace Initiative*, it never enjoyed human security. Both the *Cease-fire Agreement* and the *All Inclusive Agreement* did not deal with issues related to citizenship and land”, key issues at the local level. There was no promotion of local dialogues that would resolve conflict issues that were being generated. The Agreements also failed to adequately deal with regional fears, needs (such as access to resources) and incursions or to estimate what it would take to restore governance and security beyond that afforded to previous warlords, especially in the east. Autesserre (2009) explains that “local, national and regional dimensions of violence remained interlinked”.

**Examples of SA's post-conflict development and peace-building activities in the DRC**

Governance	Assistance with the development of a master plan for the reform of the armed forces
	Needs assessment for the army, navy, air force and military health (proposed)
	SA Police Services (SAPS) development of a five-year plan (not fully implemented)
	Interpol (SA representative stationed at National Congolese Police (PNC) to assist with planning)
	Development of an organic law for decentralisation of government and public administration as well as a vision and strategy document for the public service
	Anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework
	Establishment of the diplomatic academy
	Supporting the legislative drafting and development of a legal and constitutional framework
	Trade policy formulation; quality control; competition policy; intellectual property; micro-finance
Human Resource Development	Training of army (three battalions; rapid reaction force; new recruits)
	Training of PNC to police elections; VIP protection training; professionalisation of PNC; office administration training/ human resource and project management for police; arms control proliferation training
	Training of civil society for engagement in community policing forums and SSR
	Training of prosecutors, investigators, auditors, civil society and business to develop and implement integrity initiatives
	Training of immigration officials
	Training of senior DRC public servants and public management
	Training of diplomats; foreign language training
	Training on conflict resolution and negotiation, SA foreign policy, management and leadership and mission administration; training on anti-corruption

	Training of DRC magistrates
	Building capacity for infrastructure development (i.e. job inspection, licensing of civil construction agents, setting up of information systems, financing, infrastructure development)
	Administrative assistance for CENI
	Training of DRC revenue authorities”
Infrastructure Development	“Rehabilitation of the Mura base; rehabilitation of Maluku police training centre; renovation of ENA (school of public administration); refurbishment of foreign ministry building to set up diplomatic academy
	Bas Congo Corridor (deep-water port at Banana, rehabilitation of Matadi Port, rehabilitation of the railway line, Matadi to Kinshasa); Zambia copper belt spatial initiative
	ACSA undertook financial needs assessment (airport construction)”
Implementation Support	“DDR; identification and registration of FARDC personnel; destroyed illegal and redundant weapons and ammunition
	Security patrols
	Transportation of ballot papers for elections; air support for elections; deployment of SAPS members for elections; donation of 4x4 vehicles and communication equipment and desks, tents and computers
	Institutional development of national ministries, provincial legislature and municipal local councils
	Census of public service personnel; pilot project – asset register for immovable assets in relation to infrastructure sector
	Feasibility study for Bas Congo Corridor and Zambia Copper Belt; technical expertise by Telkom to Congolese telecoms network; Eskom feasibility study for electrification of Kimbanseke area; financial needs assessment of state-owned enterprises
	Preparation of funding applications; organising investor conferences to raise funds for PCRD projects”
Economic Development and Trade	“Support for the development of trade and industry in DRC
	Mining of bauxite, aluminium smelter, hydro-electricity (as part of the Bas Congo Corridor)
	SAA flights, retail sector (Shoprite), telecommunications (MTN, Vodacom), Western Power Corridor Project; Standard Bank”
Information	“Workshops by e.g. IDASA (democratisation and establishment of

Sharing	sustainable policing in the DRC); SAWID (gender mainstreaming); ACCORD (workshops on peace-building); IGD (dialogue on PCRD and elections); ISS (gender mainstreaming in the security sector); IJR (information sharing on transitional justice) Information sharing between provincial and local councils in SA and DRC”
Humanitarian	“Gift of the Givers – humanitarian assistance”

Source: Hendricks and Lucey (2013:4)

South Africa as a peace-builder is regarded in a positive manner, viewed as “neutral” and “African”. This confirms the approach that South Africa provides an African solution, which is different from the interventions provided by the West. Earlier in the chapter, it was mentioned that South Africa will consider its own national interest in terms of its peacekeeping contribution. This could easily be extrapolated to the full peace-building continuum. It is, however, problematic when South Africa’s involvement is based on requests from the DRC and not on its own plan and approach. This is explained by the varied nature of South Africa’s activities. Hendricks and Lucey (2013) argue that should “South Africa form partnerships, it has to respond to requests for assistance, but the country should also develop an overarching post conflict development strategy that will define the areas of highest impact and where each party would make the biggest contribution”. Understanding its own role would also provide the basis for better inputs and coherence. In addition, South Africa’s funding is limited. The majority of South Africa’s interventions to date can be characterised as short-term and uncoordinated programmes that have lacked sustainable impact. There is also little evidence of follow-up or of monitoring and evaluation to [re]address issues as they arise. South Africa, therefore, needs to understand its strengths and weaknesses better and therefore have a more strategic approach.

South Africa has concentrated on state-building, rather than peace-building, and consequently neglected working on issues of national cohesion, truth and justice and strengthening civil society organisations. Nathan (2009) notes that “deep rooted conflict cannot be solved quickly or easily”. South Africa should, therefore, invest the necessary time and resources if it is to develop alternative and more sustainable

conflict management approaches on the continent. South Africa provided diplomatic training, through the International School of the DIRCO Diplomatic Academy, to more than 700 DRC diplomats per year in the period 2005 to 2011. The training focused on conflict resolution, negotiation skills, mediation, state and nation-building, foreign policy, management and leadership, mission administration, foreign languages, information technology and protocol and etiquette as well as Congolese history and foreign policy by Congolese trainers. The challenge with the training was that the DRC diplomatic placement process could not absorb this stream of diplomats in need of practical experience to build further capacity. DIRCO also built a Diplomatic Academy for the DRC, which was named after Nelson Mandela. Different South African departments trained and provided capacity building programmes in the DRC to ensure a functioning government. South Africa, however, did not have a training approach that would support an integrated process of state-building. For example, if DPSA and PALAMA provided training on the civil service and public administration, then the DIRCO programmes, as specialised public servants, should have built on that process.

#### **4.4 CONCLUSION**

South Africa embarked on a process to assist countries in conflict situations after 1994, particularly in Africa to resolve the conflict and move towards a process of sustainable peace. South Africa's successful contribution in Burundi included the participation of President Mandela (who brought serious credibility to the inter-Congolese talks, but also to discussions and negotiations with leaders of the region and the international community); arranging additional support from important regional and international actors as well as the persuasion of the fractious Burundian political parties and armed groups into adhering to the Accord. This led to a sufficient framework that would later ease the process towards the military's demilitarisation and demobilisation. A new approach by President Mandela, at the time, shifted the agreement away from "narrow interests to address broader human security concerns" (Hendricks, 2015:17). This was one of South Africa's most important contributions to the peace process. The Agreement paved the way for the development of a new constitution and provided the foundation for a power sharing

arrangement. South Africa's success in Burundi has been ascribed to four major factors, including forceful and resolute African diplomacy; the critical role of South Africa serving as a determined and neutral broker, supported by the country's provision of troops from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); the confluence of a political transition (and de-escalation of civil war) in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and war weariness on the part of principal political actors and the population in Burundi.

South Africa's commitment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been part of an overall strategy to "Create a Better South Africa and Contribute to a Safer Africa and a Better World" (DIRCO, 2011). Not only has South Africa's peace-building contribution in the DRC been a long-standing engagement, it has also been across the full spectrum of the peace-building continuum with contributions at all the stages, including conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping (and peace-enforcement) as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The historical background to the conflict in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) makes it clear that both countries in its current format have been established through a form of state formation, namely the Berlin Conference, which included decisions made by European leaders in 1884/5 based on similar state characteristics as the much earlier Westphalia Conference in 1648. This process of state formation led to the establishment of states along a predetermined template that would place the countries within a broader international state system (a hierarchy within the World Systems Theory) and retain them there; Dependency Theory, the Iron Cage, neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism (structural adjustment). It is difficult to move these two countries from this predetermined pathway, but it will become clear in the next chapter that there are alternatives that might prove a better and more successful approach.

This chapter shows that South Africa has engaged in a somewhat uncoordinated manner in its peace-building approach. This has impacted on the effectiveness, as well as the strategic impact of its contributions. Chapter 5 examines the institutional structure and role of DIRCO and the possible contribution it could make in ensuring a

more coordinated and strategic approach to South Africa's peace-building interventions.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **TOWARDS A STRATEGIC AND INTEGRATED APPROACH TO PEACE-BUILDING: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter 4 analyses South Africa's peace-building approach and experience by means of two case studies, namely Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). South Africa registered successes in each of these cases, but it also became evident that there are major areas for improvement. On the positive side the strong leadership roles of former Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma brought conflicting parties in the region together. Another important contribution was that South Africa steered the process, particularly in Burundi, away from narrow interests to a more humanitarian approach. On the less positive side, it is evident that South Africa does not fully contribute to the peace-building continuum. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that South Africa is keen to hand ownership of the peace-building process back to host countries, particularly during the post-conflict, reconstruction and development phase.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to analyse the case study of the research, namely the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), as main vehicle through which South Africa becomes involved in peace-building endeavours; and to report on the findings of an empirical investigation regarding the perceptions and opinions of key role-players and stakeholders involved in South Africa's peace-building efforts. This includes an analysis of various units of analysis within the case, namely the units in DIRCO dealing directly or indirectly with peace-building, including Desks/Missions, the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African Renaissance Fund (ARF).

## **5.2 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: DIRCO, SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACE-BUILDING**

Although it is evident that South Africa has a holistic and all-encompassing approach to peace-building, with recognition of the peace-development nexus, it should be reiterated that South Africa simply does not have the capacity to be an active contributor in all peace-building phases in very conflict situation in the region. This section explores the case of this study and will consider South Africa's peace-building initiatives as well as its existing peace-building infrastructure in the broader peace-building continuum. In this respect, it is also imperative to evaluate the ideological approach and policy framework for the country's peace-building interventions. The case study approach will provide additional insights into the understanding of complex issues not only within the conflict situation (including community-based issues, as mentioned in Chapter 1), but also the complexity within the Peace Continuum. The case study approach will also provide additional insights into the South African approach with regard to the Peace Continuum, particularly the effectiveness of the response.

### **5.2.1 DIRCO's orientation and mandate**

The argument is made in Chapter 2 that Realism is a school of International Relations Theory that "prioritises national interests, competition, security and state power, as central in shaping the way in which states interact with each other" (Olivier, Neethling & Vrey, 2015:43). The Apartheid Government was set on protecting the state and its narrow interests and made efforts to dominate its neighbouring countries. The government thus embarked on security enhancement initiatives, resulting in protracted engagements. Such initiatives are in line with the more traditionalist realism approach. Since democratisation in 1994, however, there are clear signs that this approach gradually shifted in line with the "broadening and deepening of the post-Cold War understanding of security and new conceptualisations such as human rights and civil protection" (Schoeman, 2013:209). This shift away from pure, traditional realism is best described by former President Mandela as follows: "human rights would be the light that guides our foreign affairs" (Mandela, 1993:86). The policy intention was, therefore, to defend

and promote human rights whenever and wherever threatened and to be aligned with domestic aspirations to remove inequalities in society towards a “new” South Africa. This approach is congruent with a more liberal position and a more deliberate “alignment between South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy approaches” (Welsh & Spence, 2010:98). This argument is strengthened by former Minister Nkoana-Mashabane (2012), who confirmed that South Africa’s foreign policy is based on the “values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, notably human dignity, the achievement of equity, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, democracy and respect for the rule of law”. When addressing Parliament on 9 September 2015, then Deputy President Ramaphosa stated the following:

“As a beneficiary of many acts of selfless solidarity in the past, South Africa believes strongly that what it wishes for its people should be what it wishes for the citizens of the world. In pursuing our national interests, our decisions are informed by a desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice. We are an African country, whose fortunes are inextricably connected to those of our sister countries in the region and the continent. Our foreign policy engagements are therefore anchored on the African Agenda” (Ramaphosa, 2015).

In his 2017 Parliamentary address, former President Zuma quoted former ANC President O.R. Tambo’s 1977 address at the first Congress of the Angolan ruling party MPLA when he said: “We seek to live in peace with our neighbours and the peoples of the world in conditions of equality, mutual respect and equal advantage”. President Zuma went further by stating that South Africa would “continue with our involvement in our mediation efforts, peacekeeping operations, and peace-making initiatives in Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Mozambique, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya” (Zuma, 2017). These statements clearly point to a peace-building approach in South Africa’s foreign policy and the strengthening of international relations. As such, it is more aligned to the theories of Idealism and Liberalism.

The collective principles underpinning South Africa's conflict management activities was first articulated in former President Nelson Mandela's 1993 Foreign Affairs article (Mandela, 1993). This has since been elaborated and expanded in Government's foreign policy, the National Development Plan (NDP) as well as in the conference resolutions and statements of the ruling party (Mantashe, 2012). According to Mngqibisa (2016), post-Apartheid South African interventions have also been justified by the sense of a moral obligation to support Africa since most African countries supported the struggle against the system of Apartheid. Furthermore, the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) of government identified 12 priorities that are based on the electoral mandate. Each of the 12 outcomes has a delivery agreement that in most cases involve all spheres of Government and a range of partners outside government. Combined, these agreements reflect Government's delivery and implementation plans for its foremost priorities. Outcome 11 relates to the work and objectives of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and is stated as "creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world" (South Africa, 2011(b)). The NDP describes Outcomes 11 in more detail:

"In 2030, South Africa, informed by its national interests, is a globally competitive economy, and an influential and leading member of the international community. South Africa promotes and contributes to sustainable development, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Region and Africa, as well as a fair and just world" (South Africa, 2011).

The wording in the NDP points to a strong national-interest approach as well as the positioning of South Africa as an international leader and also indicates a strong realist approach in South Africa's foreign policy. It is evident that South Africa is willing to exercise a leadership role in a multinational context in the framework of liberalism, specifically neo-liberal institutionalism, which concentrates on the role of international institutions and actors in mitigating conflict (Olivier, Neethling & Vrey, 2015:49).

It is evident that South Africa has placed Africa at the centre of its foreign policy, making it clear that South Africa's "own peace, security and development is firmly rooted to that of the African continent and has labelled its policies as 'pan-Africanist' and Afro-centric" (Hendricks, 2015:12). Landsberg (2009:2) and Hendricks (2015:12) continue to argue that "South Africa regards it as an important responsibility to transform the global system of governance from power-based to rules-based, ending the marginalisation of the poor throughout the world, promoting the African Agenda and being the voice of the continent, internationally". The Draft White Paper (South Africa, 2011:7) emphasises that "South Africa, with the foreign policy vision of a better South Africa in a better world will continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction" operating through multilateral forums like the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Hendricks (2015:13) notes that the "South African Government views itself as a progressive agent for change", while Landsberg and Kondlo (2007:1) emphasise the country's "peace-broker" and "bridge-builder" role. Casoo (2012:43) also confirmed that South Africa can be regarded "as a partner that has a unique history, position and advantage to play a major role in Africa's development through establishing different relations of engagement (based on mutual respect and equality) and through innovative approaches that will contribute to the desired human security in Africa". The country's central role again suggests a realist orientation by projecting itself as a regional leader.

Despite these efforts to position itself as a leader, there has been a definite shift in policy orientation from realism to a more liberal approach, as mentioned above. This gradual shift is most notable in the South African Defence Reviews with realist leanings evident in the 2014 South African Defence Review (Department of Defence, 2014:2/6-2/7):

"Conflict and war has mostly been the result of states pursuing their interests to the detriment and insecurity of others. Although political and economic integration has made progress in recent years, states jealously guard their

national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will continue to secure and protect these through the maintenance of powerful military capabilities. Significantly, military power continues to be exercised alongside both economic and political power. While most states in the post-cold war era have reduced their military spending, some have strengthened and expanded their conventional capacity, allowing traditional major powers to sustain their military dominance. Accordingly, military strength continues to provide powerful states with the means to embark on unilateral acts of force and even armed aggression in pursuit of their own national interests”.

Although there is a move away from pure realism to a more liberal approach, there remain elements of this theory in the country’s defence and military approach. For example, although Section 200(2) of the Constitution (1996) emphasises the role of the defence force as primarily in defence of the national security of the country, section 201, against the background of the Preamble, which underlies the core principles of the country’s foreign policy, it also allows for involvement in international peace missions as part of South Africa’s international obligations (Olivier, Neethling & Vrey, 2015:46).

South Africa’s foreign policy orientation can be characterised as a “foreign policy of peace” (Schoeman, 2013:209), which is primarily associated with the theoretical approach of Idealism-Liberalism. This approach is further supported by the fundamental principles guiding the country’s contributions in the peace-building environment, which are “clear mandate, consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, credibility, legitimacy, national and local ownership, entry, transition and exit strategy, adequate means, transparency and unity of effort” (South Africa, 2014). It is, therefore, clear that South Africa is finding itself caught between the characteristics of a realist approach in its drive to accomplish its own national interests as well as an Idealist-Liberalist approach in its need to rectify its own domestic policy, legal, political, economic and social environment after the scourge of Apartheid. These domestic realities are duplicated in South Africa’s international approach in building strong economic and trade relations with international markets, but also promoting its peace and equality stance. It is probably easier to describe

this theoretical contradiction in terms of the betterment of human conditions or, as the South African Government refers to it: “Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world” (South Africa, 2011(a)). This approach finds extensive alignment in the concept of Ubuntu.

Ubuntu can be described as the recognition of the interconnectedness and interdependency of countries and peoples (Swanson, 2008:55). This approach aligns with what is called the “Kantian tradition of the universal community and the idea that it is in all our interests to resolve conflict in cooperation with the belligerents, taking their interests into account” (Last, 2003:2). According to Walker (1999:149), the philosophy of Ubuntu is of ancient origins and embraces the concept of the entire human race forming a single society. The principles of Ubuntu were revived through the works of the early writers of international law, notably those of Victoria, Suarez and Gentili (Barker, 1930:62).

The ethos of Ubuntu, which DIRCO defines as “humanity” and is reflected in the idea that “we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others”, is also a guiding tenet of the institution’s peace-building approach (DIRCO, 2011a:4). The lesson for peace-building from this tradition is that by adopting and internalising the principles of Ubuntu, South Africa can contribute towards creating human-centric relationships based on the recognition that within the web of humanity everyone is linked to everyone else (Murithi, 2006:10).

There is a growing realisation internationally that conflict prevention should be at the forefront of global responses to conflict and efforts should therefore become more proactive, inclusive and ultimately more effective (De Carvalho & Nganje, 2016:2). Reviews of the international institutions and systems reinforce this point that conflict prevention should be placed at the forefront of United Nations initiatives and also for the African Union (UA), in its efforts to achieve its vision for Africa in 2063 and the aspiration of “Silencing the guns by 2020”. The next section briefly explores DIRCO’s participation and contribution in peace-building operations towards an assessment of possible shortcomings, challenges and deficiencies.

### **5.2.2 DIRCO's contribution to the peace-building continuum**

The previous chapters provide an overview of the peace-building continuum provided, including i) conflict prevention, ii) conflict resolution/peace-making, iii) peace-enforcement/peacekeeping, iv) peace-building (post conflict reconstruction and development). This section briefly highlights DIRCO's contribution to this continuum.

DIRCO's conflict prevention activities have mostly been within the operational dimension (as opposed to structural dimension) to conflict prevention, having implemented various activities aimed at directly stopping existing violence. The operational dimension falls within the definition provided in Chapter 2 and includes mediation, good offices and dialogue. Utilising the offices of South Africa, particularly through the involvement of the South African President or his appointed representatives, have included roles for DIRCO in:

- Burundi (former President Mandela, former Deputy Minister Zuma, former Minister Ngakula and Ambassador Nhlapo);
- the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (former President Mbeki);
- Zimbabwe (former Presidents Mbeki and Zuma, former Minister Mufamadi and Ambassador Zulu);
- Cote d'Ivoire (former President Mbeki);
- South Sudan (former President Mbeki);
- Lesotho (former Deputy President Ramaphosa);
- Ireland (former Deputy President Ramaphosa and former Minister Meyer);
- the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP: Palestine and Israel with former Minister Skweyiya and former Deputy Minister Pahad);
- Libya (former President Zuma);
- Madagascar (former Deputy Minister Fransman); and
- Mozambique (Ambassadors Johannes, Memela and Chiliza).

These peace-builders have had various levels of success, starting with Burundi, which was promoted as a success story and the positioning of South Africa as a

serious peace-builder on the African continent, particularly based on its own history, experience and unique approaches. The challenge has been that these interventions did not leave behind an experience or consolidated, complementary, strategic system or approach. In fact, it has almost institutionalised a silo or fractured approach to South Africa's peace-building contribution. It has furthermore included an active role in deploying peacekeepers, including in the Force Intervention Brigade to fight the M23 group in the DRC. In addition, DIRCO has been active in supporting the development of early response initiatives, like the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). Like the rest of the continent, however, it has faced challenges in ensuring effective and timely implementation (De Carvalho & Nganje, 2016).

DIRCO's initial attempts at conflict prevention was not received well and it left a lasting "wound" that still prevents the country from playing its rightful peace-building role (De Carvalho & Nganje, 2016). This rather negative perception regarding DIRCO's role commenced when former President Mandela took a strong position at the Commonwealth Conference in 1995 against Mr. Sani Abacha of Nigeria for the execution of writer and activist Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa. At the time, the leaders of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) criticised South Africa for promoting sanctions against Nigeria. Louw-Vaudran (2016:3) argues that part of the backlash against South Africa by African states was the sentiment that South Africa was a young democracy that should not lecture to the rest of the continent about freedom and human rights.

South Africa's confidence in leading peace-building efforts was further eroded when it military intervened in Lesotho in 1998 (Solomon, 2002:147). Siyothula (2006:54) explains that since 1966 there have been ongoing struggles between the Lesotho military, the monarch and political parties. These struggles have led to military intervention by South Africa in 1998, after the opposition parties accused the Lesotho government of rigging the elections. South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC. This intervention also took place based on the assumption that the democratically elected government, which was about to be ousted, needed to be protected. In addition, South Africa and Botswana intervened

to honour the troika agreement made with Zimbabwe. This led to protest outside the Lesotho royal house and a coup was eminent. South Africa was strongly criticised for its intervention, which resulted in the looting of businesses in Maseru. The blame was placed on South Africa's poor intelligence that underestimated the crisis in Lesotho.

Ayangafac and Cilliers (2011:116) explain that although Africa's security threats are constantly evolving, state weakness continues to be the principal source of insecurity in Africa. They furthermore claim that the reason for the structural weakness of African states is a developmental and governance crisis that dates back to the colonial era and that was perpetuated during the Cold War. South Africa's most successful contributions to peace-building have been in the context of conflict resolution. Two important contributions are assessed to understand the shortcomings in South Africa's peace-building approach.

It was established in Chapter 2 that peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council and, therefore, falls under the decisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945). Furthermore, it is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Peacekeeping, however, has evolved into multidimensional operations that are called upon to not only maintain peace and security, but also, amongst other actions, to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; support the organisation of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. Peacekeeping decisions fall under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (1945).

DIRCO's contributions to international peacekeeping were foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1994) in its provision for the SANDF to act both in defence of the Republic and in fulfilment of international obligations. Schedule 6, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution provides that the following "Functions of the National Defence Force", as originally established in Section 227 of

the 1993 Interim Constitution, “continue in force as if the previous Constitution had not been repealed”. Sub-section b. declares that: “For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states”. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), therefore, contributes to foreign policy priorities of the South African Government. For example, the Draft Defence Review 2013 states that “the promotion of peace and stability in the region and on the continent is a key component of South Africa’s foreign policy”.

DIRCO’s peacekeeping missions since 1994 include the following:

- Operations Mistral, Sunray and Teutonic in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Operation Espresso on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border
- Operation Fibre in Burundi; Operation Triton in the Comoros (five times)
- Operation Montego in Liberia
- Operation Cordite in Darfur
- Operation Pristine in Cote D’Ivoire
- Operation Vimbizela in the Central African Republic
- Operation Bongane in Uganda
- Operation Rachel in Mozambique
- Operation Manguzi in Angola, Lesotho and Namibia

An analysis of DIRCO’s role in these peacekeeping missions is guided by the White Paper (1999), which states that “[i]n principle, the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for [South African] contributions...” As mentioned in previous chapters, “post-conflict development and peace-building are broad concepts that address the security, economic, political and social challenges present in the aftermath of conflict with the aim of creating sustainable peace” (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013:1). DIRCO has also made important contributions to the conceptualisation, development and execution of international, African and SADC peace, security and development architectures. It has also assisted African countries across the conflict or peace-building continuum, through bilateral, multilateral and trilateral arrangements. These initiatives have in most


cases been financed through the African Renaissance Fund. DIRCO is assessing the broadening and deepening of its commitment as a development partner, through the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Casoo (2012) explains that “SADPA will serve as the coordinating vehicle that would develop partnerships that drive innovation around development cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create self-sufficient societies...[through] co-crafting the policy focus; sharpening the delivery mechanisms and broadening the instruments for development cooperation” (Casoo, 2012:67).

### **5.3 DIRCO’S PEACE-BUILDING ARCHITECTURE**

In Chapter 2 the point is made that although the peace-building continuum can be described in a linear manner, as indicated in the graph below (the blue part), the reality is more in line with the principles of Complexity and Chaos Theory. The DIRCO peace-building architecture was never consciously developed to support South African peace-building efforts in a coordinated, coherent and cooperative manner towards a broader strategic approach. In fact, different organisational entities were established in isolation from each other with mandates that all relate to the peace-building continuum. These mandates that directly relate to the peace-building continuum and the traditional mandate of different Desks and Missions of DIRCO, provide opportunities to align these different entities towards a more strategic and coordinated DIRCO peace-building approach.

The units in DIRCO dealing directly or indirectly with peace-building include Desks/Missions, the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African Renaissance Fund (ARF). The units can loosely be aligned to the peace-building continuum, as illustrated in the graph below.

**Figure 5.1: Peace-building Continuum and DIRCO Architecture**



Source: Researcher's own

To understand a possible enhanced strategic role for South Africa in the peace-building continuum, it is important to examine some of the concerns of challenges DIRCO may encounter at different phases of the peace-building continuum or even areas or fora of peace-building interaction.

### 5.3.1 The Multilateral Desks

DIRCO's Multilateral Desks are responsible for facilitating South Africa's peace-building efforts in different fora and scenarios including multilateral, continental, regional and bilateral. The White Paper on Foreign Policy (DIRCO, 2011:7) endorses multilateralism, viewing multilateral forums as key spaces for the implementation of

the country's international engagements, hence the mandate of these Desks. The White Paper (2011) further makes it clear that South Africa is strongly oriented towards Africa and has strongly promoted cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, including SADC and the AU. It is claimed that two thirds of the UN SC Agenda focuses on African issues (DIRCO, 2014).

### **5.3.2 Bilateral Desks and Missions**

The mandate of Bilateral Desks and Missions of DIRCO is to strengthen various diplomatic missions around the world. It is the responsibility of Missions to represent the country and to protect and promote its national interests. This includes a wide range of issues, including the initiation and facilitation of strategic agreements, treaties and conventions as well as the promotion of information, trade and commerce, technology and friendly relations. The role of Desks is to support the Mission and its diplomatic representatives. The approach in the host country is dictated by the DIRCO Strategic Plan and the more specific application through the Annual Performance Plan (APP) of Branches, Chief Directorates and Directorates and the individual Performance Agreements of DIRCO officials. The high-level indicators that Desks are responsible for are contained in the DIRCO Annual Performance Plan (DIRCO, 2016) and include for example:

- “high-level engagements coordinated to promote National Priorities, the African Agenda and the Agenda of the South;
- economic diplomacy initiatives to contribute to economic growth;
- support to UN, AU and SADC structures and processes to promote peace and stability, socio-economic development and good governance, democracy and regional integration;
- contribution to SADC elections observer missions; establishing and maintaining a database of trained civilian (peace-building); contributing to and advancing common positions of the South (developing countries), including through BRICS, IBSA, G20; and
- promoting a positive projection of SA, foreign policy positions to domestic and foreign audiences”.

The role of the Mission in a peace process is not always predictable, as each process differs reflecting the Complexity and Chaos Theory nature of these processes. Boshoff *et al.* (2010:36) explain the difficult role of a South African Mission was played out during 2001 when South Africa, through its facilitators former President Mandela and Zuma, attempted to assist the Burundi peace process. At the time, South Africa did not have a Mission in Burundi and work was done through the Missions, first in Uganda and later Rwanda. Due to the need for support to the facilitator, a proposal was written by officials from the Office of the President, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), Department of Foreign Affairs (at the time) and State Security Agency (SSA) for the establishment of a direct office of representation in Bujumbura, Burundi.

DIRCO officials at Desks and Missions related to conflict situations, negotiations and even mediation in countries such as Burundi, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Lesotho, etc. share the same frustration of a disconnectedness between facilitators, officials from other partner departments and each other in situations where South Africa is attempting to provide support to peace processes.

### **5.3.3 The Centre for Early Warning (CFEW)**

The Centre for Early Warning (CFEW) was established in DIRCO to provide essential early warning services to the executive, management and other key stakeholders in the field of risk assessment. The CFEW is, furthermore, aimed at supporting DIRCO's international relations engagements by making use of open-source data-collection methods, with sharp focus on South Africa's foreign policy mandate. The functions of the CFEW also complement the current work of South Africa's National Early Warning Centre (SANEWC) and the African Union Continental Early Warning System (AU CEWS) to prevent conflict and mitigate potential crises in Africa through proactive alerts.

The mandate of the CFEW, among others, include monitoring of media reports from open sources using both manual and automated data-collection methods and

analyses and ensuring general efficiency and enhancement of the department's early warning communications system. "Early warning" is loosely defined as "before the fact" and by its anticipatory nature requires instant access to events and real-time information around the clock. Early warning depends on open sources and the sharing of information. Consistent with DIRCO's strategic objectives, in particular the principal strategic objective of prioritising the African Agenda, the centre will focus on crisis situations on the African continent as well as developments in other regions around the world crucial to South Africa's foreign policy mandate. Such a responsibility demands access to skilled human resources, exceptional sources of information and the innovative use of technology, including a collaborative approach to the provision of such a service working together with both internal and external stakeholders.

In an interview with DIRCO officials it was explained that the Directorate: Early Warning Services has the role and responsibility to:

- coordinate early warning inputs and information received on domestic, regional and international developments and events;
- coordinate and manage analytical reports derived from outside sources, including the quality assessment of reports being distributed;
- coordinate, manage and distribute early warning information to and from Head Office and South Africa's missions abroad;
- manage inter-action, coordination and possible cooperation between the CEWS and the relevant and appropriate government institutions and agencies, including international non-governmental and other organisations;
- media to be monitored on a 24-hour basis, resulting in the compilation of media reports, which are distributed to missions and Head Office; and
- provision of a 24-hour DIRCO Call Centre.

In the conduct of South Africa's international relations engagements and the fulfilment of the overall mandate of DIRCO, the CFEW delivers on the following:

- Provide CEWS reports;

- Provide media strategies and advice;
- Contextualise media speculation, as well as media reports pertaining to SA foreign policy positions and international developments involving or impacting on South Africa; and
- Develop relations with media contacts and commentators to proactively involve the CEWS with regard to issues related to South Africa.

To fulfil this mandate and deliver on the strategic objective of producing early warning products, CFEW requires access to and support of all DIRCO's business units as well as South Africa's embassies all over the world. This form of collaboration is essential, since CFEW's mandate is derived from the overarching mandate of the department to create a better South Africa and contribute to a better and safer Africa in a better world. Among other stakeholders, CFEW interacts with national and international state and non-state organisations such as the Southern African Development Community Regional Early Warning Centre, AU CEWS, the International Red Cross and the Gift of the Givers Foundation.

#### **5.3.4 The Mediation Support Unit (MSU)**

The establishment of the MSU in DIRCO followed a process of individual meetings with officials from partner Departments of the ICTS Cluster, briefings to the African Renaissance Committee (ARC) in July 2014 and finally presentations in November 2014 as well as at meetings of the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster in March 2015. The ICTS Cluster approved DIRCO's proposal and the proposal was subsequently signed off by both the Director-General as well as Minister.

The mandate for the establishment of the MSU in DIRCO derives from a number of guidelines provided by leadership and high-level policy directions. These guidelines include State of the Nation Addresses (SONA) in Parliament, which emphasised South Africa's continued support to peace and security in the continent. Furthermore, the mandate derives from and is guided by the first high-level foreign policy objective described in DIRCO's Strategic Plan 2013-2018 namely: the

“Enhanced African Agenda and Sustainable Development” as well as the first element of this priority namely: the “Deepened Contribution to Regional and Continental Security, Stability and Sustainable Development”. The Strategic Plan further commits South Africa to prioritise the institutional development of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) capacity for mediation as well as reinforcing and complementing African Union (AU) mechanisms and preventative diplomatic tools.

The National Development Plan (NDP) furthermore mandated DIRCO to increasingly focus on training diplomats in specialist areas such as mediation, conflict resolution, peace-making, human security as well as economic diplomacy, trade negotiations and climate change. In addition, the mandate of the MSU is guided by the White Paper on SA’s participation in International Peace Missions, documentation and interactions regarding South Africa’s Peace-building Approach and the DIRCO (MSU) Cluster Proposal document on this matter. As a result DIRCO established the MSU as part of the execution of the NDP. It is also seen as the vehicle to entrench and strengthen South Africa’s experience as mediator in the region, the continent and globally. This goes hand-in-hand with the fact that successful conflict mediation requires a support system which provides envoys with adequate assistance and knowledgeable advice - provided by professional staff. In addition, the staff will ensure that envoys have the required logistical and financial resources.

The MSU is mandated to distribute information such as briefing documents, analyses and opinion pieces from national and international think-tanks and academia to DIRCO officials (including the Executive, senior management, Heads of Missions and Desks). This will ensure that Desks, Missions, DIRCO management and principals are provided with a broad spectrum of information and intelligence and remain current on political developments.

The main aim of capacity building within the peace-building continuum is to strengthen diplomats and government officials’ peace management capacities and to develop tools to anticipate and respond to conflict and crisis. They would need to work effectively in conflict environments and enrich their development practice with

conflict resolution tools, techniques and planning mechanisms. The training and capacity-building programmes are directed at building the full spectrum of international mediation expertise, which includes topics such as:

- constitutional support;
- gender;
- natural resources;
- power-sharing;
- transitional justice;
- mediation-process design; and
- security arrangements.

The training and capacity building are aimed at ensuring that participants could work effectively and contribute sufficiently in conflict environments. The target audience of the training and capacity building programmes are diplomats and government officials. The MSU, through close cooperation with the International School, aims to ensure complementarity between capacity building and the requirements of skilled and knowledgeable peace-builders in South African and other societies.

### **5.3.5 The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM)**

The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) is located within DIRCO and is mandated to coordinate South Africa's multilateral engagements vis-à-vis peace missions, managing South Africa's engagement in international peace operations and maintaining political oversight over such missions. The NOCPM is furthermore tasked to lead South Africa's approach to international peace operations; cooperating with the Department of Defence (DoD), the Department of Safety and Security and the National Treasury (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2014).

The mandate(s) for South Africa's participation in international peace missions are derived from four levels, including the United Nations, the African Union, the

Southern African Development Community and national levels. South Africa's approach to peace and security is guided by the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter (1945). These principles include:

- “Consent: Entails commitment by parties to the conflict to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping mandate that supports the process;
- Impartiality: refers to implementation of the UN mandate without favour or prejudice to any party to the conflict; and
- The non-use of force except in self-defence, which suggests that Peace Missions are mandated to use force only as a measure of last resort and only when all other methods of persuasion have been exhausted.”

The UN, as the primary organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, is also responsible for mandating peace missions. The responsibility for the conduct of a peace mission lies with the UN Security Council, while the UN General Assembly maintains the responsibility to provide direction and supervision for peace missions. Whilst the authority to establish a peace mission rests with the UN Security Council, the authority to deploy is partly derived from the consent of the host country. The principle of consent and request by the host country is essential for the establishment of a peace mission in any sovereign territory.

South Africa is obligated by the White Paper (South Africa, 2014) on South Africa's Participation in International Peace Missions to contribute the following components to the UN Standby Arrangement System, AU Standby Force and the SADC Brigade:

- “Civilian Component: refers to all government officials who are employed under the Public Service Act of 1994 and Correctional Service Act 111 of 1998, with the exclusion of the officials employed under the Defence Act No 42 of 2002 and the South African Police Service Act No. 68 of 1995. This also includes civilians outside government who volunteer to participate in peace missions as part of the government contingent;

- Military Component: refers to the defence forces whose role (amongst others) is to support the political intent in establishing conditions of safety, security and stability in the most appropriate manner; and the
- Police Component: refers to individual police and formed police units whose main role includes monitoring and providing assistance with law enforcement functions carried out by national or local police forces in order to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were protected.”

The level, size and deployment of the South African contribution will depend on the mandate of the peace mission and the extent to which the mission fits with South Africa’s foreign policy objectives:

- “South Africa’s participation in peace missions is informed by the following principles: Clear mandate: the mandate for a peace mission must be clear and achievable. It must also be agreed to amongst the UN, continental and regional bodies, the host country, parties to the conflict and contributing countries;
- Consent: entails commitment by parties to the conflict to a political process and their acceptance of a peace mission mandate that supports the process;
- Impartiality: refers to implementation of the mandate without favour or prejudice to any party to the conflict;
- Minimum use of force: refers to the use of force as a measure of last resort, when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted;
- Credibility: this is a direct reflection of the international and local communities’ belief in the mission’s ability to achieve its mandate;
- Legitimacy: this is premised on the basis of the UN, AU and SADC mandate for purposes of an understanding amongst the parties to the conflict and the population that the peace mission is not only justified, but also seen to be representative of the determination and aspirations of the international community;

- Promotion of national and local ownership: every effort should be made to promote national and local (host country) ownership and to foster trust and co-operation between national and international actors;
- Entry, transition and exit strategy: entrance into the mission area of any multinational peace mission should be preceded by an assessment of the situation and objectives of the mission within which the peace mission will be deployed. There should be clear transition and exit strategy before committing a national contingent to any peace mission;
- Adequate means: the commitment of adequate resources to peace missions shall be informed by a clear and achievable mandate to attain the stated goals and objectives;
- Transparency: Communication is key in the success of a peace operation. The parties to the conflict, as well as the local population must be fully aware of the mandate of the peace mission, its functions and responsibilities, and how the different components will be conducting their duties; and
- Unity of effort and multilateral and regional cooperation: the various components of the peace mission must cooperate towards the achievement of the mandate.”

### **5.3.6 The African Renaissance Fund (ARF) and the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)**

There has been serious attempts to position South Africa as a recognised development partner, particularly through the process of establishing its first development aid agency: the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). The institution will be regarded as a partnership and cooperation agency and will endeavour to elevate South Africa’s status as a significant global development partner (Lotze, De Coning & Neethling, 2015). This function was, in the past, played by the African Renaissance Fund (ARF), which was established in 2000 in order to replace the previous apartheid-era Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund. The “ARF has been used as an important instrument for the South African government to equip and support the country’s conflict management

initiatives in Africa and will eventually be replaced by SADPA” (Kent & Malan, 2003:1).

The “ARF is located within DIRCO, which is controlled and accounted for by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs. Its main focus is on the provision of finances for activities that deal with cooperation; democracy and good governance; conflict resolution; social and economic development; humanitarian and disaster relief; technical cooperation; and capacity development” (Besharati, 2013:359). This initiative is aligned to South Africa’s African Agenda, which places Africa at the centre of the country’s foreign policy and international relations policy framework and aims to support African development through partnerships. Due to the growing nature of South Africa’s diverse development partnerships and the trend towards trilateral cooperation, a new agency with better coordination than the ARF was needed (Besharati, 2013). The establishment of SADPA was first announced in the 2009 State of the Nation Address and supported as an important initiative to renew the country development support architecture. The institution was also regarded as a form of soft power that would bolster the country’s international standing (Lucey & O’Riordan, 2014). The development of the SADPA was also aimed at combining all the country’s international aid and assistance efforts within one organisation. It should also be understood that there is a serious disjuncture between the coordination of funds and collaboration with different financial vehicles. SADPA is therefore rather regarded as a development partner and not a donor, but will play a bigger role than ARF. The main SADPA tasks will relate to coordination of South Africa’s international development cooperation, including development assistance projects, as well as bilateral, trilateral, plurilateral and multilateral partnerships. Besharati (2013:340) explains that “SADPA will enable South Africa to become a more active and effective participant in regional development initiatives, in support of regional integration and in the implementation of robust and innovative approaches to development cooperation on the continent”. Current programmes include: the African Renaissance Fund, programmes at national, provincial and local level, IBSA Poverty Alleviation Fund, Multilateral programmes through concessional lending institutions such as African Development Bank and World Bank and SACU Agreements on revenue sharing.

In research done by Lucey *et al.* (2014:4) respondents stated that “South Africa is an important international contributor to peace-building and that much is expected of South Africa in this field”. There seems to be a number of areas where South Africa could not only enhance its impact on peace-building issues at the UN, but also make more strategic interventions. In general, South Africa’s diplomats are regarded as efficient, competent and professional although often lacking decisiveness with decisions referred back to Pretoria more often than not. Although these diplomats understand the issues with sufficient experience on substantive matter, they often lack knowledge of UN languages.

An important strategic approach to influencing the UN is to place a country’s nationals in important positions. Although there are a number of South Africans in the UN system, even at higher levels, it seems that South Africa lacks a strategic and systematic approach for placing officials and enabling them. This is particularly true at the junior level and in comparison with BRICS countries, which have been aggressive in its placement of juniors within the UN system. Lucey *et al.* (2005:1) reports that countries such as Turkey have attempted to develop rosters and pools of experts that can assist the UN and post-conflict countries. South Africa’s own experience in this regard, for example the development of a civilian component database of experts that could support peace-building efforts, has stalled since 2014. South Africa has, however, trained more than 300 women on conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation since 2013. These women have all been included in the database that will contribute to the eventual civilian component database mentioned earlier. DIRCO also established the Gertrude Shope Annual Dialogue Forum on Conflict Resolution and Peace-making in Africa in 2015. This forum will provide a platform that all women can use to share their experiences, reflect on existing policies and challenges and thereafter make recommendations to national, regional and international institutions. The forum will be an annual institution of women discussing issues related to African security, peace-building and development. The Forum is also an important outreach vehicle with international institutes, organisations and experts working on issues related to peace and security and the contribution of and the role women play in peace-building processes. The

establishment of the Gertrude Shope Forum led to the Nordic countries establishing their own Nordic Women Mediators Network, the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network and the Commonwealth Women's Mediators Network.

South Africa's engagements on post-conflict reconstruction and development issues are seen as less visible, as opposed to its work in the UNSC. South Africa is regarded as a potentially indispensable partner in peace-building efforts, due to its own particular history and experience in reconciliation, mediation and institution building as well as security sector reform. The role of South African business is also mentioned by Lucey *et al.* (2014:5) as part of the development of a country.

There seems to be the notion that although South Africa has played important conflict resolution, peace-making and peacekeeping roles in different African countries, the country should incorporate peace-building aspects. South Africa, furthermore, has the potential to provide technical assistance. The development of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) has been welcomed as an important vehicle to address the shortcomings in South Africa's peace-building approach and activities. It is, however, suggested in the Lucey and O'Riordan (2014) report that the SADPA should be used to develop international relationships and build regional consensus. Although South Africa does not want to be viewed as a donor or as part of the OECD, it often misses out on a seat at the table where decisions are made.

This concludes an overview of the case, DIRCO, for purposes of operationalising the second last research objective, namely to uncover challenges related to South Africa's peace-building architecture and strategic applications. The next section is aimed at addressing the second purpose of this chapter, namely to report on findings of an empirical investigation into DIRCO's peace-building approach and endeavours.

#### **5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Bazeley (2013:1) emphasises the fact that it is important to review the research goals before considering the data. The primary objective of this study is captured in

the title, namely *A strategic and integrated approach to South African peace building: The case of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)*. Although the eventual aim is to contribute to the development of a South African peace-building system, architecture and approach that would include all the main government structures and institutions to effectively and productively respond to peace-building requirements on the continent and beyond, the process should start at DIRCO, as the government department with primary responsibility for engaging internationally and implementing foreign policy. DIRCO's approach is not only dependent on its own policies, but is informed by appropriate responses to global political and security dynamics. It is, therefore, important that different DIRCO elements cooperate and coordinate better towards a more coherent and consistent peace-building approach, which would be consistent with South Africa's ethos of Ubuntu and its own democratic experience. This would again raise the view of South Africa as a serious international peacemaker and would ensure a predictable and consistent approach to peace building that would serve South Africa's national interest.

The secondary questions highlighted throughout the research are:

- to explore the theoretical framework of international peace building and its place in the broader International Relations Theoretical context;
- to examine definitions, practice and application of peace building vernacular, including the range from conflict, through conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace building and reconstruction to development;
- to examine the Norwegian peace building approach;
- to investigate the DIRCO contribution to South Africa's peace building architecture, including DIRCO (MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA, Desks); and
- to explore through two case studies Burundi and DRC, the impact South Africa has made in peace building with the current peace building architecture.

The theoretical objectives considered international theories related to the international environment, the political and socio economic context of countries in

conflict, the main aspects of the peace building continuum and South Africa's peace building approach. To operationalise the research objectives, including the theory and application of international relations, the researcher designed a comprehensive interview schedule (i.e. questionnaire). The primary and secondary objectives were integrated into the design of open-ended and closed questions.

An empirical investigation generally describes the process of information gained by experience, observation or experiment (Simon, 2017). One of the central tenets of the scientific method is that evidence must be empirical, i.e. based on evidence observable to the senses. Simon (2017) furthermore argues that underlying all empirical research is the attempt to make observations and then answer well-defined questions via the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis, according to those observations. The study utilised an interview schedule to collect data from sampled participants.

According to Hyde (2000), qualitative research, as the design opted for this study, is a type of social science research that collects and works with non-numerical data and that seeks to interpret meaning from such data that assist the researcher in understanding social life through the study of targeted populations or places. Struwig and Stead (2001:25) maintain that a qualitative research design does not describe a single-research method, but constitute different research methods and can be viewed as an interdisciplinary, multi-paradigmatic and multi-faceted method. To this end, the study instruments included a literature survey, document analysis of official Government and DIRCO documents and semi-structured interviews. This constituted method and source triangulation to validate the research findings.

#### **5.4.1 Sampling**

Chapter 1 describes sampling as a process used to select a portion of the population for the study. In this case, the unit of analysis refers to a person from which data will be collected and conclusions be drawn (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006:26). The individuals purposively sampled are representative of the different organisational entities within DIRCO, both at Head Office and in Missions (embassies and high

commissions), former special envoys and representatives, foreign diplomats and experts in academia and civil society. The sampled target population was, therefore, divided into five groups, namely:

- Group 1: Middle Managers of DIRCO (Assistant and Deputy Directors) ( $n=23$ )
- Group 2: DIRCO Senior Management: Directors and Chef Directors (Ambassadors) ( $n=13$ )
- Group 3: Researchers and Academics Researchers (Think Tanks in Peace-building Continuum) ( $n=7$ )
- Group 4: Foreign Diplomats ( $n=2$ )
- Group 5: Other relevant stakeholders ( $n=57$ )

The use of different groups made data triangulation as well as a comparative analysis possible to obtain “thick” data, i.e. participants’ responses to the research questions.

#### **5.4.2 Data-collection instrumentation**

Weller and Romney (1988) explain that accurate and systematic data collection is critical to conducting scientific research. Data collection allows the researcher to collect the required information related to the study objects. Depending on research type, methods of data collection include: documents review, observation, questioning, measuring or a combination of different methods (Johnson & Turner, 2003). A questionnaire is a data-collection instrument consistent of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. “A questionnaire design is a multi-step process, which allows the collection of both subjective and objective data in a large sample of the study population in order to obtain results that are statistically significant. It is a good tool for the protection of the privacy of the participants” (Merriam, 1998:70). The questionnaires can measure both qualitative and quantitative data, but is it more appropriate for quantitative data collection. The validity of data and information depends on the honesty of the respondent.

An interview schedule was designed to conduct semi-structured interviews. The researcher developed a sequence of relevant questions guided by the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the international experience contained in the peace-building models and approaches explored in Chapter 3 and the case studies in Chapter 4. However, some members of some of the selected target groups could not be reached for interviews and the interview schedule was thus adjusted and utilised as a questionnaire to obtain written responses from participants. The questionnaire and some additional follow-up questions were forwarded to DIRCO officials (at Head Office and in Missions), foreign diplomats stationed in South Africa and academics and civil society members working and publishing on topics related to peace-building.

To adhere to the guidelines for ethical research at the North West University, the researcher obtained official approval from the Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation to conduct the survey. The approval letter from the DIRCO DG was attached to the letter to all participants at DIRCO. The researcher explained the research problem, the purpose of the study and the nature of the investigation in the letter sent to each of the participants (diplomats stationed in South Africa, academia and civil society). The letter furthermore explained the value that the research could add to South Africa's peace-building efforts in general and DIRCO's approach in particular. Participants were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and that the results will be used for research purposes only. The questionnaire was distributed to 235 possible participants. In total 51 officials responded, which represents a response rate of 21%.

The questionnaire (attached as Annexure A) contains open and close-ended questions. Statements 1 to 11 are placed on a Five-point Likert scale, while questions 13 to 18 provide simple options from which to choose. Questions 2.1, 12 and 19 provide respondents with the opportunity to further explain responses to earlier questions.

### 5.4.3 Research challenges

The challenges associated with the interviews and questionnaire, amongst others, include the following:

- The distribution of the questionnaire was made easier by utilising the DIRCO Internet mailing system. However, the researcher also had to distribute some of the questionnaires by hand, due to the busy schedule of some of the DIRCO officials. The researcher had to constantly follow-up and remind participants that a response was due. Conducting interviews with senior former mediators, South African representatives and former Ministers and Deputy Ministers were difficult to arrange, given their busy schedules.
- Although the interview schedule was pre-tested (piloted), some of the questions had to be explained particularly to officials who do not necessarily work on issues related directly to the peace-building continuum.
- Some of the questions relate to the areas of responsibility for many of the DIRCO officials. They were thus rather reluctant to provide clear indications or an objective view, as they are already part of the system and wish to protect “turf issues”. In these cases it was explained that an objective set of data would provide the researcher with a better opportunity to arrive at a workable outcome for a DIRCO peace-building architecture. This alleviated the reluctance and officials were more willing to respond.
- The nature and reality of the work and posting cycle of a diplomat or an official of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) result in officials generally spending over the course of their careers four years at SA Mission abroad and two years back at Head Office. The consequence of this rotation policy is that officials have relative short time spans (i.e. experience) in their current positions, although they have extensive experience in the DIRCO in general. The majority of the officials who participated in the survey have spent a significant portion of their careers in

specialised functional areas in the DIRCO, including the peace-building continuum, while others have been rotated between different specialist areas and that is the reason the researcher made use of different target groups. For example, Group 1 could provide specialised insight into the South African Peace-building Model, while the other groups added value by imparting knowledge of the broader peace-building approach of South Africa, specifically as far as international engagements are concerned.

#### **5.4.4 Data analysis**

Marshall and Rossman (1999:150) describe data analysis as “the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data”. Milliken (1999) states that a qualitative study involves an inseparable relationship between data collection and data analysis in order to build a coherent interpretation of data.

“Qualitative data analysis can be described as the process of making sense from research participants views and opinions of situations, corresponding patterns, themes, categories and regular similarities” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013:76). Berg (2004) captures the essence of data analysis well, when he provides the following definition of qualitative data analysis that serves as a good working definition: “qualitative data analysis tends to be an ongoing and iterative process, implying that data collection, processing, analysis and reporting are intertwined, and not necessarily a successive process. In short, as Gibbs (2007:1) so aptly points out, “qualitative data analysis is a process of transformation of collected qualitative data, done by means of analytic procedures, into a clear, understandable, insightful, trustworthy and even original analysis”.

Responses from participants (interviews) and respondents (questionnaires) were coded and categorised in themes. This enabled a thematic analysis of responses and also made it possible for the researcher to quantify the frequency of certain responses.

## 5.5 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

The data is presented in two sections: Section A, which presents an overview of the biographical details of the participants and Section B, which presents the responses to statements and questions.

### 5.5.1 Biographical Information

The biographical data of participants comprise three categories:

- i) Officials from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), including officials at Head Office (Pretoria) and at South African Missions abroad
  - a. Middle Managers (Group 1)
  - b. Senior Managers (Group 2)
- ii) Academia and civil society (Group 3)
- iii) Foreign diplomats (Group 4)
- iv) Other stakeholders (Group 5)

In total there were 74 participants (interviews) and 51 respondents (questionnaire).

**Table 5.1: Summary of the biographical data of the survey participants**

Sample size (n=)	Participant groups	Total years of experience
23	Group 1: Middle Managers of DIRCO (Assistant and Deputy Directors)	50.6
13	Group 2: DIRCO Senior Management: Directors and Chief Directors (Ambassadors)	51.4
7	Group 3: Researchers and Academics Researchers (think-tanks in peace-building continuum)	49.6
2	Group 4: Foreign Diplomats	7
57	Group 5: Other relevant stakeholders	184.4

## 5.5.2 Analysis of findings

Responses to the questions and an analysis thereof are reflected below. Since the interview schedule and the questionnaire are the same instrument applied in different data-collection modes, the responses are grouped together for purposes of data analyses and findings (“Q” refers to Question).

*Q1: South Africa has a strategic and integrated approach to peace building.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
%	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5
2.22%	1	24.44%	11	53.33%	24	11.11%	5	8.89%	4
26.66%			53.33%			20%			

The responses to this question sets the tone for subsequent questions as it speaks directly to the focus of this study. The majority of participants (53.33%) indicated “partial agreement” to the question with 26.66% agreeing. It would, therefore, seem that South African and international (diplomatic practitioners), civil society (think tanks) and academics are mostly partial and positive about South Africa having a strategic and integrated approach to peace-building. This ambiguity underscores the need for this study.

The responses also illustrate the fact that although South Africa has been substantively involved in peace-building efforts, particularly in Africa, a strategic and integrated approach is still largely absent. This supports the premise of this study and the intended contribution it would like to make in this regard. Furthermore, not only has peace-building efforts been waning, but the country seems to be at a crossroads in defining its foreign policy priorities; particularly in terms of its peace and security engagements in Africa. The responses of participants and respondents are in line with the arguments of De Carvalho and Nganje (2016) who state that the country still places peace and security engagements at the core of its priorities on the continent. South Africa’s approaches to peace and security are increasingly

being questioned. This assumption by the two authors comes at a time when there is a growing drive to bring prevention to the core of global responses to conflict; the result of an increasing realisation that such responses need to become more proactive, inclusive and ultimately more effective.

*Q2: The Ubuntu philosophy presents a unique model to peace-building (i.e. “people first”, as opposed to state-centric).*

The majority of the participants and respondents agreed (55.55%) that Ubuntu presents a unique approach to peace-building. Earlier the point was made that the Apartheid Government was set on protecting the state and its narrow interests from the majority in the country, as well as launching efforts to dominate its surroundings (neighbouring countries) and embarked on competition, security enhancement and hegemonic war resulting in protracted engagements. This constituted a state-centric approach where protecting the interests of the state was paramount. This more traditionalist realism approach changed after 1994 to a more people-first approach, explained in more depth through the concept of Ubuntu. The Ubuntu philosophy thus became embedded in South Africa’s peace-building model and presents a unique approach that could be shared with countries emerging from conflict.

A participant from Group 2 contended that South Africa has and keeps on investing heavily in peace building on the continent, but there is no visible follow-through or on-going engagement in post-conflict conditions. Examples of this include Burundi and the DRC. There are also no visible South African private sector engagements that followed South Africa’s sterling efforts at peace-building in these countries. Participants from Group 2 generally concurred that a “people first” approach is most suitable for conflict resolution. However, it should be noted that some participants lamented the fact that South Africa tends to only talk about Ubuntu rather than practicing it. Ubuntu has almost become a slogan with which the country appeases its own conscience rather than really practising it. Most peace-building models purport to focus on peoples’ needs and interests, but the needs and interests of the general population are normally undermined by commercial and political interests of the political and commercial elite (participant from Group 1). Participants from Group

1 argued that people- versus state-centric approaches are not mutually exclusive, as each requires the other to work towards building sustainable peace. An Ubuntu approach could allow for a more sustainable model of peace-building that also adequately caters for social justice (participant from Group 2). This argument is supported by a participant from Group 1 who stated that the South African approach focuses on indigenous dialogue and resolution of conflict rather than the imposing of externally influenced (“foreign”) solutions that often ignore the complexities of national dynamics.

It should be noted that the emphasis placed on sovereignty in Africa makes the pursuit of an Ubuntu/People First model problematic, as it can easily be perceived as “meddling in internal affairs”. It also bears the almost inevitable risk of mission creep. Participants from Group 1 noted in this respect that peace-building processes, with its unavoidable strong political and state content as well as its emphasis on the promotion of long-term security, freedom and welfare of the people, should be the focal point. “Quick fixes”, through political agreements or the short-term accommodation of political elites, do not yield the desired results. A participant from Group 2 made the point that South Africa’s Foreign Policy is one of non- alignment, non-interference, human rights and respect for nations and their sovereignty. A people-centric approach to peace-building provides insight into the incorporation of all stakeholders within a conflict area or zone. Traditionally, conflict negotiation is a state-driven process, with third party mediators always taking the form of another state or international government organisation or regional government formation. The ideal behind the Ubuntu approach is to be more inclusive and incorporative to finding solutions to complex political, social and economic or security challenges; these include the incorporation of civil society groups, NGOs, religious communities, traditional tribal or ethnic leaders.

A participant from Group 1 proposed that South Africa could use continental funding models and development funds, such as the African Renaissance Fund, to focus its foreign policy strategy in the direction of development of people in areas prone to violent extremism and terrorism. Peace and security is a prerequisite for social development. However, most funding goes to development and not peace-building.

Even though the country is first and foremost committed to contribute directly to the efforts for peace and security in the SADC region, the goal of regional and continental integration should allow a certain portion of development funding to go to peace and security on the continent, regardless of the region.

The Western model of traditional one-dimensional peace-keeping has proven to not be sustainable. A combination of diplomatic, military, humanitarian, development and rule-of-law approaches has proven to be more successful. Participants from Group 2 and 3 make the point that if Ubuntu is used as part of a holistic approach it would have greater value. Ubuntu-focused peace-building on its own is too vague and idealistic. It should be used in combination with other approaches. Cognisance of the security-development nexus to South Africa’s engagement in peace and security presents, at least on paper, the existence of a comprehensive approach to harmonisation of South Africa’s foreign, security and economic objectives in pursuit of sustainable peace, security and development regionally and continentally. Respondents from Group 4 also concur that if South Africa has an integrated approach to peace-building, it is hard to tell, since most efforts are veiled in secrecy to the point where outsiders do not know the true state of affairs.


*Q3: South Africa currently coordinates its peace-building efforts sufficiently.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
0.00%	0	17.78%	8	46.67%	21	24.44%	11	11.11%	5
<b>17.78%</b>				<b>46.67%</b>		<b>35.55%</b>			

This question served as cross-reference for the responses to question 1. It thus ties into the strategic and integrated approach to peace-building. The findings from question 1 are further supported by this question in that 46.67% of participants indicated “partial agreement”, which is exactly the same response as in question 1. There is thus a strong correlation between the findings in question 1 and 3 of participants being sceptical about a strategic, integrated and coordinated approach in South Africa’s peace-building approach.

*Q4: DIRCO coordinates its peace-building efforts successfully.*

This question further aligns with questions 1 and 3 and the findings also confirm the previous responses. The majority of participants and respondents partially agreed or disagreed (73.33%) with the statement that DIRCO is successful in its efforts to coordinate its peace-building imperatives.



*Q5: There is sufficient policy coherence in South Africa's peace-building approach.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
0.00%	0	22.22%	10	31.11%	14	40.00%	18	6.67%	3
<b>22.22%</b>				<b>31.11%</b>		<b>46.67%</b>			

There is a strong indication by participants that there is not sufficient policy coherence in South Africa's peace-building approach. This is reflected in the 46.67% of participants indicating that they are strongly of the opinion that there is not sufficient policy coherence. This is the highest percentage of doubt in the questions testing the level of coordination, cooperation and coherence. It thus indicates that

significant attention should be devoted to policy alignment issues in South Africa’s peace-building approach.

*Q6: South Africa has the necessary peace-building architecture to effectively contribute to international peace-building efforts.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
8.89%	4	28.89%	13	31.11%	14	24.44%	11	6.67%	3
<b>37.78%</b>				<b>31.11%</b>		<b>31.11%</b>			

The response to this question is equally spread across all three areas of response, with “partial” at 31.11% dropping off to “agree” at 24.89%, “disagree” at 24.44%, strongly agree at 8.89% and “strongly disagree” at 6.67%. There is, therefore, not only a strong partiality, but also an equal balance in the opinions between agreement and disagreement.

*Q7: South Africa can still be regarded as an “international peacemaker”.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
11.11%	5	46.67%	21	31.11%	14	8.89%	4	2.22%	1
<b>57.78%</b>				<b>31.11%</b>		<b>11.11%</b>			

There is a definite leaning towards the fact that South Africa could still be regarded as an “international peacemaker”, with 57.78% confirming this notion. This perception was cross-referenced with the next question (Q8).


*Q8: Socio-political dynamics in South African society undermines the country’s ability and standing as an international peacemaker.*

Earlier in the study it was contended that South Africa’s credibility as an international peacemaker may have waned due to the country’s general inability to successfully

and credibly deal with its own domestic conflict situations, such as the Marikana incident and student uprisings (i.e. “Fees-Must-Fall” campaign). Neither the respondent nor participant groups, however, fully share this notion and a percentage of 62.22% disagreed.

*Q9: South Africa has adequate senior and experienced peace-makers to mediate and negotiate in conflict situations.*

Respondents agreed that South Africa has adequate senior and experienced peace-makers at 66.66% (24.44% “strongly agree” and 42.22% “agree”). This is a positive reflection of the capacity of South Africa in general and DIRCO in particular to respond to conflict situations.



This response was cross-referenced with Question 10, in which participant and respondent groups were asked whether South Africa can contribute sufficiently to address the lack of women in peace processes, in line with the United Nations Security Council resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed (73.34%) that South Africa can indeed contribute by ensuring that more senior female peacemakers are appointed as mediators and negotiators in conflict situations.

Q11: *South Africa should embark on a process of peace-building in African countries emerging from conflict.*

Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Agree	Partial	Partial	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
24.44%	11	44.44%	20	15.56%	7	13.33%	6	2.22%	1
<b>68.88%</b>				<b>15.56%</b>		<b>15.55%</b>			

On the question whether South Africa should embark on a process of peace-building in African countries emerging from conflict, respondents agreed with the statement at 68.88% (“Agree” at 44.44% and “Strongly Agree” at 24.44%). It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that South Africa does not only embark on peace-building processes in Africa due to its own national interests (addressing conflict in the region and contributing to sustainable development), but also because African countries in general supported the struggle against Apartheid. There are, therefore, national interest and “good neighbourly” reasons for South Africa to contribute to peace-building processes in Africa.

Q12: *What, in your expert opinion, can be regarded as South Africa’s most successful peace-building contribution(s) in the region and internationally?*

Participants from Group 3 argued that the 1990 negotiation process in South Africa, including lessons learned in terms of inclusive versus exclusive approaches, offers some useful regional heft when engaging with various actors. However, some of the lessons learned from the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Multi-party Negotiating Process (MPNP) are sometimes misrepresented, e.g. that it was all-inclusive consensus process, when in fact major parties dominated throughout. Perhaps a tweaking of these negotiation lessons with a “spoiler” model may offer some greater validity in terms of elite cooperation and process to ensure long-term inclusive agreements. The spoiler model was proposed by Stephen Stedman in his seminal work *Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts* (1992). This model could form the basis of a more proactive and coordinated foreign policy approach.

A participant from Group 1 argued that the initial South African involvement in Burundi in the late 1990s and early 2000s can be seen as probably the most successful intervention, despite the recent political situation in the country. The Arusha Accords, for its time, and by extension South Africa's role in the Great Lakes received significant international support and recognition. There seems to be general consensus amongst participants that South Africa should have contributed longer, particularly with post-conflict reconstruction and development. A participant from Group 3 explained that South Africa's engagement in the DRC constitutes one of its more comprehensive peace-building engagements given the scale and nature of the country's involvement in the mediation and negotiations to broker a peace accord, contribution to UN peacekeeping (MONUSCO and FIB) and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives.

The engagements of South Africa in Burundi and the DRC in the 2000s are two key contributions from the country to peace-building in general. These contributions are centred around the fact that there was an integrated approach to the peace processes and that there was clear strategic direction. The integrated approach and strategic direction had a cascading effect to align the efforts of different government departments, civil society organisations and experts. Peace-building efforts in these two countries thus provided important lessons for South Africa (and the rest of the continent as well) in aligning multiple approaches. Secondary lessons learned include:

- the significance of political support and leadership in mediation processes;
- follow up through deployment of peacekeepers; and
- support to PCRD initiatives, both governmentally (e.g. support to development of civil service in DRC) and by non-governmental actors (e.g. several civil society initiatives from 2003 being developed in Burundi).


These lessons illustrate the benefits of the integration of a wide range of activities. In a follow-up question (Q13), respondents overwhelmingly indicated that South Africa made its most significant contribution to peace-building in Burundi (55.56%),

followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at 22.22%, Lesotho at 17.78% and both Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire at 2.22%. This confirms the choice of utilising Burundi and the DRC as international cases studies for the purposes of this study.

*Q14: Which of the following countries provide the best examples of a peace-building approach for South Africa? Brazil, Norway, India, the United States, Turkey*

The countries selected to form part of the survey included the United States as a country that has been, as a major power and a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, involved in traditional inter-state conflict resolution and would enter a conflict resolution with the background of its political, military and economic power as important factors. India and Brazil were selected because of their unique peace-building approach as well as their membership in the BRICS and leadership and developing country status. This last factor is also the reason for selecting Turkey. Brazil, India and Turkey have played important roles in their respective regions. Norway was selected because of its international standing as a peace-builder, but also its unique and considerable role and approach. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that between the countries selected, Norway (91.11%) provided the best example of a peace-building approach for South Africa. Only Brazil (2.22%) and India (6.67%) received votes. One respondent from DRCO did point out that Switzerland should also have been considered as an option in the equation.


*Q15: What were the main strategic, institutional and architectural challenges to South Africa's peace-building efforts in the DRC and Burundi?*



The respondents and participants were asked what type of strategic, institutional and architectural challenges hampered South Africa's peace-building efforts in the DRC and Burundi. They reported the four key factors of limited resources (48.89%), the general absence of political will (33.33%), the lack of coordination (13.33%) and the general absence of expertise (4.44%). These findings indicate which areas in the peace-building endeavours should receive more attention in future.

*Q16: Where in the DIRCO architecture is the best potential to build a strategic and coordinated peace-building approach?*

This question probed the most ideal organisational placement of peace-building efforts in DIRCO. The findings are reflected below.




Participants indicated that the sections in DIRCO with the best potential to build a strategic and coordinated peace-building approach would be National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) at 42.22% and the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) at 55.56%. Other units indicated, which received less support, were the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW) at 4.44% and the Mission at 4.44% and Desk at 2.22%. These units were selected as strong stakeholders in the full peace-building continuum.

*Q17: According to the UN definition of peace-building there are four phases, namely conflict resolution, peace-making, peacekeeping/enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction and development. In which phase of peace-building does SA have the best experience?*

Participants showed a clear preference in the first two phases in the peace-building continuum for South Africa's best experience, namely Conflict Prevention at 42.22% and Peace-making at 42.22%.

Q18: *What is DIRCO's biggest challenge with regard to peace-building?*



Participants indicated that DIRCO's greatest challenge with regard to peace-building is at the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) (40%) and Conflict Resolution (35.56%) phase. The responses are in line with findings emanating from earlier questions.

Q19: *Is there anything that you would like to add regarding South Africa's strategic and integrated approach to peace-building?*

This was an open-ended question to invite any response related to the investigation. A participant from Group 1 explained that in his experience as a junior diplomat there are two primary tools or foundations required for an effective strategic and integrated approach to peace-building. These are leadership (clarity of vision), and coordination (action with purpose). If South Africa can harness these two tools effectively within its strategic and integrated approach to peace-building, it could produce the desired outcomes by securing national interest and foreign policy priorities. It could also facilitate long-term peace, stability, security, development and prosperity on the African continent. Another participant from Group 2 contended that South Africa's strategic and integrated approach to peace-building needs to deliver tangible advantages for the country and cannot merely be done because "it is the right thing

to do". The resources invested need to produce dividends, since it is not sustainable to invest human and financial capital without any meaningful return on these investments for the country.

Other responses indicated that South Africa should focus more on the root causes of conflict and should follow through in its engagement, especially during the post-conflict reconstruction and development phase. In this regard, a participant from Group 1 made the point that much more attention needs to be given to Early Warning, Preventative Diplomacy, Mediation and Conflict Prevention. These elements should be approached with the same seriousness and similar resources allocated as Peace-making and Peacekeeping. Unless this is done, South Africa's role will remain rather ineffective. The former are essentially political processes and require strong political will and strategic thinking. DIRCO officials also indicated that South Africa is seen as "harbouring an inability to be critical of sitting Presidents/Governments, to the lasting detriment of its national interest and the interest of the continent". The current approach to the Kabila Regime in the DRC was cited as an example.

The point was also made that South Africa's practical cooperation with international organisations in peace-building processes is at times negatively impacted by concerns about perceptions of it being aligned with Western/non-African interests. While South Africa would, for example, accept a high profile role in Peace-making and Peacekeeping within the context of an international peace-keeping or stabilisation mission, it would steer away from any visible role related to, for example, the protection of human rights, actively promoting democracy or applying pressure on non-cooperative governments. This can cause considerable frustration among local political opposition forces and international actors.

Some of the respondents (Groups 1 and 2) argued that the "poorly written" Chapter 7 on foreign policy of the National Development Plan (NDP) makes policy coherence difficult. Furthermore, the diffusion of leadership is problematic. For example, the fact that the International Cooperation Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster was chaired during the Zuma Administration by the Minister of Telecommunications and Postal

Services and that DIRCO officials are tasked with promoting economic diplomacy, caused leadership challenges since the mandate for trade promotion rests with the Department of Trade and Industry (dti). A participant from Group 3 argued that South Africa's approach is not very clear-cut and not articulated in the public domain. There might indeed be an internal approach, but it is not known in the public arena. It is obviously circumscribed by its involvement in the SADC Organ and AU PSC. Often it appears as if the main role-player is the Presidency and not DIRCO. It results in an uncoordinated and haphazard approach. Furthermore, National Defence is directly involved in peace-keeping missions, but their efforts are seldom coordinated and aligned with civilian PCRDR initiatives. The withdrawal from Darfur was cited as a good example of the problems experienced due to the lack of an integrated approach.

A participant from Group 1 explained that South Africa needs to have a clear understanding what "peace-building" entails. It seems that all the different stakeholders and role-players attach different meanings to it. It is also important that experts that are called upon to participate in the different peace-building processes, are familiar with the international political protocols pertaining to peacekeeping and that they have sufficient funding to participate in these processes. This includes adequate financial resources for travel costs, accommodation, daily allowances and, where needed, for security. Clear contracts for services to be rendered need to be concluded, signed and lodged with the different parties involved in peacekeeping.

A Group 2 participant contended that South Africa should play a more significant role in Conflict Prevention and Reconciliation, Negotiating Settlements as well as a more prominent role for deploying peace-keeping troops. Given the country's unemployment rate, it should use peacekeeping to achieve and enhance South Africa's peace-making role and the dividends for doing so. In practice it could mean that South Africa deploy more troops for peacekeeping and earning foreign currency for the economy. South Africa has to position itself as a world leader in peacekeeping and reconciliation. This was further echoed by participants from Group 5 who indicated that South Africa has key advantages for being a player in the peace-building field. Some of the advantages cited are that:

- it is a country that has its own national peace-building experience, highly regarded as an ideal model;
- it has high levels of expertise within and outside of government; and
- it has a sense of prioritising the African continent.

However, the participants were of the opinion that it is important that such an understanding of comparative advantages is tied to a more direct and clear sense of how its objectives can be met. As such, it is important that there is a direct effort to ensure that national priorities and its implementation capacity are better integrated, and that different government departments are empowered (both in terms of decision making capacity, but also through their own budgets) to implement the objectives of the country. It is also imperative that there is further interaction between the different levels of expertise that exist in the country, as a tool to sustain and support the country's foreign policy.

A participant from Group 3 proposed that South Africa needs to formulate a peace-building and stabilisation strategy that imbues its peace-building goals with its development goals. With the delayed operationalisation of SADPA, such a framework could form the basis for a more systematic mechanism to harmonise the objectives, principles and activities of mediation and peace processes (short-term) with peace-building, state-building and development goals (long-term). Such a strategy should (i) be based on a conceptual and institutional framework; (ii) embrace a holistic view of peace-building; (iii) aim for strategic complementarity with key local, regional and international partners in the area of peace and security; and (iv) identify viable sources of funding through partnerships of necessity and beneficial modes of development cooperation, such as South-South cooperation and trilateral development cooperation (participant from Group 3).

A number of foreign diplomats (Group 4) posted in South Africa indicated that South Africa sometimes seems reluctant to realise its own actual and potential weight in international affairs, both taking it as a given that South Africa should aspire to one of the potential two African permanent Security Council seats, while not being very

clear about which policies it would pursue or even if it should pursue any. As far as a strategic and integrated approach to peace-building is concerned it is not entirely clear what such an approach should consist of and how it should be designed and implemented. Two civil society commentators (Group 3) also indicated that there is significant potential for South Africa to develop more cooperative partnerships with a wider range of civil society actors and expertise that could form part of a broader strategic planning and coordination process. Greater engagement with civil society could add capacity to DIRCO efforts and counter the tendency for efforts from different actors becoming disparate instead of complementary. DIRCO could also play a stronger leading role when engaged in PCRDR processes to ensure that conflict sensitive principles inform the developmental effort, and to enable economic development efforts to align themselves more clearly behind a peace-building agenda.

## **5.6 CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this chapter is to, firstly, outline DIRCO's orientation, mandate, architecture and role in peace-building initiatives as case for the purposes of this study and secondly, to report on the findings of the survey undertaken to reflect on the perceptions of key role-players and stakeholders regarding DIRCO's role. The chapter thus first provides an overview of the policy, orientation and mandate of South Africa's peace-building experience, indicating the major ideological shift from the Apartheid Government to the new democratically elected Government in 1994. This shift is not only reflected in an ideological and philosophical transition from Realism to Liberalism, but also constitutes a shift from a state-centric approach to a more people-first approach. This shift is also reflected in South Africa's Ubuntu approach to domestic and foreign policy as well as in international relations and cooperation. Whereas the state-centric approach fixates on the sanctity of the state, the people-first approach is more concerned about human rights and needs. This difference is evident in peace-building with the Liberal Peace-building Model aimed at establishing stable and democratic states based on the building blocks of democratic elections, market liberalism, humanitarian assistance and rule of law. Many of these foundational blocks have proven to be the root of conflict.

DIRCO has significant peace-building infrastructure in the form of Desks/Missions, the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) to develop adequate and successful peace-building responses to conflict situations in Africa. These individual units, however, operate in isolation of each other and deliver on direct mandates or projects without leveraging the expertise, knowledge and access of the other units. The mandates of each of the units can be loosely associated with different phases of the peace-building continuum. South Africa's approach to peace-building is, therefore, not only an approach from a specific unit in its DIRCO architecture, but it is also confined to a specific phase in the peace-building continuum.

The second part of the chapter outlines the empirical investigation of the primary and secondary questions of the study. In general, respondents and participants agreed that South Africa does not have a strategic and integrated approach to peace-building. There is also limited policy coherence to bind units and efforts in an overall strategic approach as well as limited alignment of efforts of different stakeholders. The absence of an integrated approach is further compromised by especially limited resources and political will. It was found that the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) are two units in DIRCO with the highest potential to serve as coordinating mechanism for peace-building.

The next and final chapter of this study provides the conclusions reached and recommendations for an integrated approach to peace-building.

## **CHAPTER 6**

# **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A STRATEGIC AND INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICAN PEACE-BUILDING**

### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the units in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) currently contributing to issues related to peace-building, including Desks (both geographical and multilateral), the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) and South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). The aim was to assess the scope of responsibilities of each unit, through its mandate and application, as well as examine the deficiencies in the system as it relates to strategic and integrated approaches to peace-building. The second part of Chapter 5 sets out the findings from the empirical investigation amongst DIRCO officials (South African diplomats), foreign representatives based in South Africa (foreign diplomats), civil society experts from think tanks and academia regarding the state and nature of DIRCO's peace-building approach.

The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions from the findings obtained from method and data triangulations, including the literature review and empirical findings. The chapter is divided into two parts to facilitate this process. Part one provides a summary and overview of the study by articulating the scope and extent to which the research findings produced answers to the research questions and operationalised the research objectives. Part two concludes the main purpose of the study by assessing the main findings and recommending possible actions to address the shortcomings outlined in the study. A final section offers suggestions on the broadening of the scope for further research.

## **6.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER OUTCOMES**

Chapter 1 introduces the theme under study, explains the research problem, provides an overview of the methodology used and gives a structural preview of the study. Furthermore, the researcher outlines the concepts of peace building, peacekeeping, peace operations, peace missions, post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and development, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), negotiations, mediation, social and economic diplomacy. The ethical considerations and the contributions of this study are also made clear in Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview of the international environment, the political and socio economic context of countries in conflict, the main aspects of the Peace-building Continuum and an international institutional perspective on the peace building approach. The concepts related to peace-building are also clarified as well as the international policy developments related to the peace-building continuum.

Chapter 3 consists of two main areas. In the first part the researcher examines the international approach to addressing conflict, including the mandates, role and architecture of institutions in the spheres of international (UN) and regional (SADC and AU) arenas. The second part of the chapter comprises an examination of the country-specific peace building models and approaches including an assessment of the following countries: the United States of America (US), BRICS (only China and Brazil), Turkey and Norway.

Chapter 4 considers South Africa's peace-building approach in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), providing a third data set of information pertaining to international experiences and possible best practice.

Chapter 5 examines the mandate, policy environment, architecture, existing role and peace-building approach of DIRCO, measured against South Africa's people-first approach of Ubuntu within the context of a complex international environment

described through theories such as Realism, Complexity Theory, Chaos Theory, Path Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory. The chapter also includes an empirical assessment of the perceptions and opinions of key role-players, stakeholders and policy drafters involved in South Africa's peace-building efforts. It provides a case for a more strategic and integrated South African approach to peace building that would not only result in a considerable contribution to sustainable peace, but also enhance South Africa's reputation as a legitimate and successful peacemaker.

### **6.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS**

In order to operationalise the study a number of specific objectives and questions were formulated. The following specific objectives have been identified:

- To explore the theoretical framework of international peace building and its place in the broader International Relations Theoretical context
- To examine definitions, practice and application of peace building vernacular, including the range from conflict, through conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace building and reconstruction to development
- To examine the Norwegian peace-building approach
- To investigate the DIRCO contribution to South Africa's peace-building architecture, including DIRCO (MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA, Desks)
- To explore, through two case studies Burundi and DRC, the impact South Africa has made in peace building with the current peace building architecture
- To design the parameters for a strategic and integrated approach for DIRCO to address the challenges related to South Africa's peace building architecture and strategic application

The above-mentioned objectives have been addressed through the following questions:

- What are the relevant International Relations theories that would form the basis for South Africa's particular peace-building model?

- What are the relevant and appropriate definitions and applications for the international peace-building vernacular?
- What is sustainable peace?
- What are the challenges to the United Nations peace-building architecture?
- What is the current Norwegian peace-building structure and approach?
- What is the current state and level of integration of South Africa's peace-building architecture, particularly within DIRCO?
- What were the main strategic, institutional and architectural challenges to South Africa's peace-building efforts in the DRC and Burundi?
- What recommendations could be made towards a new strategic and integrated South African peace-building approach from a DIRCO perspective?

**Table 6.1: Research questions linked to research objectives**

<b>Research objectives (RO)</b>	<b>Research questions (RQ)</b>	<b>Chapter(s)</b>
<b>RO1.</b> To explore the theoretical framework of international peace-building and its place in the broader International Relations Theoretical context	<b>RQ1.</b> What are the relevant International Relations theories that would form the basis for South Africa's particular peace-building model?	<b>Chapter 2</b>
<b>RO2.</b> To examine definitions, practice and application of peace-building vernacular, including the range from conflict, through conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction to development	<b>RQ2.</b> What are the relevant and appropriate definitions and applications for the international peace-building vernacular? What is sustainable peace? What are the challenges to the United Nations-peace building architecture?	<b>Chapter 2, 3 and 4</b>
<b>RO3.</b> To examine the Norwegian peace-building approach	<b>RQ3.</b> What is the current Norwegian peace-building structure and approach?	<b>Chapter 3 and 5</b>
<b>RO4.</b> To investigate the DIRCO contribution to South Africa's peace-building architecture, including DIRCO (MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA, Desks)	<b>RQ4.</b> What is the current state and level of integration of South Africa's peace-building architecture, particularly within DIRCO?	<b>Chapter 4 and 5</b>
<b>RO5.</b> To explore, through the	<b>RQ5.</b> What were the main	<b>Chapter 4</b>

two case studies of Burundi and DRC, the impact South Africa has made in peace-building with the current peace-building architecture	strategic, institutional and architectural challenges to South Africa's peace-building efforts in the DRC and Burundi?	
<b>RO6.</b> To design the parameters for a strategic and integrated approach for DIRCO to address the challenges related to South Africa's peace-building architecture and strategic application	<b>RQ6.</b> What recommendations could be made towards a new strategic and integrated South African peace-building approach from a DIRCO perspective?	<b>Chapter 2 and 5</b>

The following specific objectives and questions served to operationalise the study:

### **6.3.1 To explore the theoretical framework of international peace building and its place in the broader International Relations Theoretical context**

The specific objective mentioned above and the accompanying question namely, *What are the relevant International Relations theories that would form the basis for South Africa's particular peace building model?* were mainly addressed in Chapter 2. An overall theoretical framework was developed following an emended approach to Waltz' Levels of Analysis Approach, which divided the theoretical framework into three levels of analysis, including: The International Relations level, The State and the Statehood Continuum and The Systemic Perspective.

At the International Relations Level international relations theories included state formation, sovereignty, Anarchy, Realism, Balance of Power, Polarity, Complexity and Chaos Theory and a New World Order. The main aim to this level was to explain the power dynamics between states in the international system and South Africa's position and place within this system, particularly if the country was to be regarded and position itself as an international contributor to a peace-building mission.

At the State and Statehood Continuum Level relevant theories related to state formation (Feudalism, Capitalism, Modernisation), Colonialism, Imperialism, Mercantilism, World Systems Theory, Dependency Theory (the "Iron Cage"), Neo-

colonialism to Neo-liberalism (Structural Adjustment). The main aim to this level was to explain the formation of states and the internal and external factors impacting on many of these states, as they progressed towards conflict situations. A clear difference was also made between inter- and intra-state conflict, including statistics indicating the proliferation of intra-state conflict, as opposed to inter-state conflict. The fact that many of the factors were imposed on states provided the study with the opportunity to develop a case for South Africa to present and provided an alternative approach to peace-building and in fact state-building.

At the Systemic Perspective Level the researcher constructed a peace-building continuum and indicated the linkages between peace-building and state-building, with the latter forming the foundation for the peace-building process. The main aim was to establish a peace-building continuum and to understand and define the relevant concepts mentioned in Chapter 1 in each of the phases. Furthermore to have this basic understanding presented in a linear manner, although it is understood that the management of the conflict/peace continuum is closer to Complexity and Chaos Theory.

### **6.3.2 To examine definitions, practice and application of peace building vernacular, including the range from conflict, through conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction to development**

To address this specific objective, the researcher started in Chapter 2 with an overview of the policy, mandate (particularly Chapters VI, VII and VIII) and architectural environment of the United Nations with its international mandate of peace and security. This included a historical timeline of the UN peace-building definitions and related concepts. The researcher developed a linear peace-building model on the experience of the United Nations, which consisted of four phases, namely: i) Conflict Prevention, ii) Peace-making/Conflict Resolution, iii) Peace-enforcement/keeping and iv) Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). In addition to the development of a peace-building continuum, the researcher provided explanations and the general position within the continuum and practical

UN applications of terms such as Early Warning, Good Offices, Resident Political Missions and Envoys, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Gender and Peacekeeping and Civilian Components of Peacekeeping. From Chapter 2 it seems that sustainable peace can be described as a peace where the risk of lapsing and relapsing into conflict has been reduced by addressing the root causes of conflict through a peace-building strategy comprising a carefully prioritised, sequenced and narrow set of activities that addresses the root causes and is coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country in conflict, based on national ownership.

The assessment of the challenges to the United Nations peace-building architecture in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 made it clear that coordination amongst the different Departments and Units responsible for issues related to the peace-building was extremely difficult. The coordination was further complicated by competition regarding “turf”. This challenge was also experienced by “mediation support units” at national level.

In Chapter 3 a broad range of peace-building approaches were considered from the international and regional level, including the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to the national level, including countries such as the United States, China, Brazil, Turkey and Norway.

### **6.3.3 To examine the Norwegian peace building approach**

Important premises in the study were that South Africa is not a P5 UN Security Council Member and does not have the resources of developed countries (or even other richer developing countries), but that it has a moral and rational obligation to contribute to peace missions. If this is the case, from which country could it take some lessons to develop South Africa’s own peace-building approach? Again the hypothesis was that Norway would be an example, as a country that has developed an international reputation as a peace-builder. It is also regarded as a “like-minded” country with an important history of support to South Africa’s anti-Apartheid movements. The premise that Norway would serve as a good example for South

Africa's peace-building approach was confirmed in the empirical findings in Chapter 5, when respondents overwhelmingly agreed that between the countries selected (Norway, Brazil, India, the United States and Turkey, Norway (91.11%) provided the best example of a peace-building approach for South Africa.

Chapter 3 concluded that Norway does provide important lessons for South Africa as a peace-building example. This included aspects such as: non-coercive, impartial, disinterested, built on trust, respectful of local ownership, rich in resources, linked to Norwegian civil society and committed to long-term involvement. Norway also provides assurances that it would contribute to a peace process through a stable, predictable policy in the areas of development assistance and peace work. Historically, the Norwegian reputation was built on the country's peace tradition dating back to the 1890's (Leira, 2005; Leira *et al.*, 2007), with specific references to historical events (the country's peaceful independence from Sweden and the absence of a colonial past) and national legends (Fridtjof Nansen). South Africa may not have the resources of Norway, but can identify with most of the characteristics that Norway utilises to continue to build a positive reputation as an international peace-builder.

#### **6.3.4 To investigate the DIRCO contribution to South Africa's peace-building architecture, including DIRCO (MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA, Desks)**

In Chapter 4, the researcher examined South Africa's (including DIRCO) peace-building experience in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It was abundantly evident that the coordination and cooperation was inadequate between different South African stakeholders involved in the Burundi and DRC peace processes, including the different DIRCO units (particularly the Missions and the Desks).

In Chapter 5 a more thorough assessment was made of the current DIRCO peace-building architecture, including the Desks (Geographical and Multilateral)/Missions, the Centre for Early Warning (CFEW), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the African

Renaissance Fund (ARF)/South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). An important aspect was raised in the empirical study with participants indicating that the lack of sufficient resources, political will and coordination would hamper South Africa and DIRCO's peace-building contributions. There seems to be sufficient consensus that South Africa and DIRCO have sufficient peace-making expertise. DIRCO, furthermore, has invested extensively in capacitating women and youth to play an increasingly important role in peace-building missions, which fulfils important international obligations posed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2250.

### **6.3.5 To explore through two case studies Burundi and DRC, the impact South Africa has made in peace building with the current peace-building architecture**

Participants in the survey overwhelmingly indicated that South Africa made its most significant contribution to peace-building in Burundi, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). An important conclusion from the two cases studies was that the quality of the leadership of the special envoy or facilitator plays a crucial role, not only in bringing parties together in country, but also the regional and international leadership. Furthermore, the facilitator needs to have sufficient credibility to be able to criticise and even reprimand participants breaking certain peace conditions. Another important issue raised by survey participants was the importance of understanding the root causes of conflict in each peace-building mission South Africa undertakes.

The Burundi case study provided evidence that better coordination and cooperation between DIRCO Desks and the Mission was required. Furthermore, DIRCO needed to be specifically authorised and mandated in its role. Although different Departments and Agencies played their specific roles, the full processes needed to be integrated to ensure that timelines were met according to the linear process agreed upon. For example, once approval for troop deployment was granted by the UN Security Council, the national deployment and financial authorisation needed to be granted by the SA Parliament. Should South Africa decide to deploy troops, it is important that sufficient equipment be provided to troops. A further contribution by

South Africa was that the Arusha Agreement moved away from “narrow interests to also include broader human security concerns” (Hendricks, 2015:17). Although there is general consensus that the Agreement was inclusive and comprehensive, non-governmental organisations, individuals, including women’s organisations were not included during the negotiations. South African women supported their Burundian counterparts later to ensure more participation by women.

Extensive contributions by different South African partner Departments were made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) case, which led to major breakdowns in coordination and cooperation that in turn led to duplication and increased costs. There should be tangible advantages to South Africa’s contributions in peace-building operations.

**6.2.1.6      *To design the parameters for a strategic and integrated approach for DIRCO to address the challenges related to South Africa’s peace-building architecture and strategic application***

In Chapter 2, the researcher designed a peace-building continuum that reflects the four phases consisting of i) Conflict Prevention, ii) Peace-making/Conflict Resolution, iii) Peace-enforcement/keeping and iv) Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). In Chapter 5, the peace-building continuum was enhanced with the linking to each phase of the individual units in DIRCO directly or indirectly responsible for issues related to the respective peace-building continuum phases. It was evident that an important aspect towards a strategic and integrated peace-building approach is political will, as this would provide authorisation and a specific mandate. South Africa already has its own history and peace-building experience as well as a unique outlook in the form of Ubuntu around which a strategic approach can be developed.

## **6.4      RECOMMENDATIONS**

The main purpose of the study was to assess the current state of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s (DIRCO) strategic and integrated

approach to peace-building and to develop recommendations that would address some of the challenges and shortcomings. The recommendations in this section of Chapter 6 are divided into two parts, namely: strategic and integrated. The recommendations are prefaced with a quote from one of the survey participants, who said:

“Two primary tools or foundations are required for an effective strategic and integrated approach to peace-building. These are leadership (clarity of vision), and coordination (action with purpose). If South Africa can harness these two tools effectively within its strategic and integrated approach to peace-building, it could produce the desired outcomes by securing national interest and foreign policy priorities. It could also facilitate long-term peace, stability, security, development and prosperity on the African continent”.

#### **6.4.1 A strategic approach to South African peace-building**

- The study confirmed that the world is characterised by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and that state and non-actors are all vying for their own issues, interests and agendas. It is within this context that South Africa needs to find its own strategic approach to peace-building that will define the country and its contributions. The approach does not have to be altruistic or fundamentally based in Realism, but can address South Africa’s own national interests. This approach should reflect South Africa’s own domestic realities, based on the principle of “a better South Africa, contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world”. This people-first approach not only represents a distinct difference in approach between the Apartheid Government’s and the post-1994 democratic Government’s approaches, but also provides a unique approach to peace-building. This was seen in the Burundi peace process when South Africa guided the process away from “narrow interests to also include broader human security concerns” (Hendricks, 2015:17).
- South Africa’s Ubuntu philosophy reflects the above-mentioned people-first approach that is applied domestically, as well as in its own foreign policy and

international relations engagements. The Ubuntu approach should form the basis of a strategic South African peace-building approach. This not only reflects the domestic realities, but also finds application in issues related to inclusivity, reconciliation and gender and youth representation. There cannot be a difference between South Africa's domestic approaches, which have been described as remedial in relation to addressing the wrongs of the past (including policy, equity, redress, access and many of the practical and policy approaches of the Apartheid era) and its peace-building approach. It is often said that South Africa wants for other countries and peoples what it wants for its own. This needs to be consistently applied.

- South Africa's strategic approach to peace-building needs to deliver tangible advantages for the country and cannot merely be done because "it is the right thing to do". The resources invested need to produce dividends, since it is not sustainable to invest human and financial capital without securing any meaningful return on these investments for the country. The benefits do not have to be measured only in monetary terms, but could also be a contribution towards secure and stable communities that could gradually develop and form sustainable economic and commercial links with South Africa. The issue, however, is that good political relations strengthened by a South Africa peace-building contribution should translate to good economic relations, including good people-to-people and business-to-business relations. South Africa cannot make peace-building contributions to be rewarded, but predictable, transparent and fair processes should provide opportunities for South Africa to compete.
- South Africa does not have the resources that developed or even some developing countries do. It also does not have former President Nelson Mandela anymore. An important approach would, therefore, be for South Africa to strategically select the issues it would wish to address. This new approach of selecting its contributions should furthermore constitute a more strategic approach. The selection can be made according to issues related to national interest, such as proximity. South Africa's foreign policy approach is

based on concentric circles, with domestic issues the most important and as such the heart of the concentric circles. Countries in the region, such as SADC, forms the second circle, Africa the third circle and developing countries (developing South) the fourth circle. This logic could guide the prioritising of the country's peace-building approach. Conflicts in the immediate region (such as Lesotho, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) should, therefore, be the focus of South Africa's peace-building approach. This approach can be adopted to address reduced resources and provide credibility, as South Africa would first focus on its "own backyard". Success in South Africa's immediate sphere of influence will create international appetite for the country to make peace-building contributions further afield.

- South Africa has to provide a unique, professional and predictable contribution to peace-building. This contribution should reach across the peace-building continuum, where decisions in the Peace-making Phase take into account possible contributions by the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) or the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) in the Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development Phase.
- South Africa's unique approach to peace-building should be captured in the form of a body of knowledge. Such a body of knowledge would consist of capable and functional resources including experts, open source think tanks and articles on topical issues. It would collate information from the South African experience, which forms part of the country's unique footprint on peace-building and mediation and has been practised on the continent and beyond. To provide a credible body of knowledge a collection of international organisations and countries' approaches to peace-building and mediation would also be available to ascertain best and worst practises within the peace-building arena.
- The nexus between peace-building and state-building has been adequately explained in previous chapters. The case study regarding the Democratic


Republic of the Congo (DRC) provided a full view of the extent to which different South African partner departments, agencies, civil society and the private sector were involved, particularly in the Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development Phase. Coordination between these stakeholders and contributors was almost non-existent leading to duplication and unnecessary expenditure. A coordinating policy mechanism (possibly the ARF, but more likely the SADPA) should be developed to ensure that the state-building contributions follow a holistic and predictable process that is not only consistent with South Africa's unique approach, but also consistently branded as a South Africa contribution. For example, if South Africa trains diplomats from a specific country emerging from conflict, it should be understood that diplomats are civil servants and public administration forms part of the training. Again the public administration aspect should be anchored in the Ubuntu principle as well as the *Batho Pele* (people-first) principles. This last part is usually provided by the National School of Government and the diplomacy part by DIRCO. There should be a seamless link between these processes.

- Understanding South Africa's strengths and limitations across the peace-building continuum also provides an understanding of possible other international contributors that would be a better partner in that particular phase. It would provide better coordination and cooperation between international peace-building partners. It would also provide models that would eliminate duplication and unnecessary expenditure.

#### **6.4.2 An integrated approach to South African peace-building**

- The integration of South Africa's peace-building approach should be based on a better understanding of the constitutive parts of the current system, including the issues and the architecture. The below-mentioned graph is proposed as a model.

**Figure 6.1: Peace-building Continuum and DIRCO Architecture**



Source: Researcher’s own

- Although the peace-building continuum (illustrated in the figure above) constitutes a linear depiction of the peace-building continuum, it is recognised that the different phases do not always follow a nice and neat linear process. It is, however, important that there is a clear understanding of the linear process and that the architecture and the process design follow a linear process. In the inevitable case of peace regressing back to conflict, this will be dealt with as it occurs. The advantage of dealing with a linear process is that base documents can be developed regarding conflict indicators, conflict actors and historical factors.
- The peace-building architecture in DIRCO is fragmented and there is a strong case to be made that the lack of coordination also stems from the fact that units protect their areas of work (“turf wars”). There is a strong need for the

DIRCO peace-building contribution to the peace process to be coordinated. This will not only bring the different units or actors in the DIRCO peace-building architecture together into a more coherent and cohesive process, but will also ensure policy coherence and consistency and will ensure a holistic approach throughout the peace process, despite regression between phases. There was a strong preference amongst survey participants that either the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) or the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) provides overall coordination of a DIRCO peace-building mission. This question would not be an issue if special envoys were appointed for specific peace processes, as they would be the nodal point. It is, therefore, recommended that in view of a more selective process (recommended above) South Africa would be involved in fewer peace-building processes where special envoys are appointed. Should the latter, however, be appointed, their connection with the MSU as support would ensure policy coherence and better coordination amongst DIRCO units.

- It is recommended that when special envoys are appointed it is accompanied by specific mandates and authorisation, as this would assist in the development of a clear peace-building pathway. It is important that they are directly linked in their appointment to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, with the MSU as the support mechanism. This would enable the MSU to coordinate inputs in DIRCO, but also in government and civil society towards a Whole-of-Government approach and Whole-of-Country approach.
- There seems to be sufficient consensus that South Africa has the expertise to make considerable contributions in the peace-making phase. DIRCO has developed and hosted a number of capacity building programmes on conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation for South African women and youth. These women and youth have contributed to conflict resolution and peace-building efforts in their communities (local communities, including the “fees-must-fall” process) and could be used in regional peace-building missions to

share their experience of best and not so good practice. Their participation in peace-building missions will also build strong people-to-people dynamics.

- South Africa has considerable civilian expertise and experience in areas that may be fundamental to the success of a peace mission. In certain geographic and socio-economic contexts, South African civilian expertise may be even more appropriate than that offered by other out-of-area contributors. The Department will facilitate and support the selection of civilian experts for specific peace missions, through units like the NOCPM and the MSU, through the creation of a suitable readiness system or resource bank of competent personnel residing in South Africa who are available for international assignments that promote democracy, human rights and peace-building. It would be necessary to identify South Africans who meet the profiles, such as civil servants and private persons with expertise in foreign relations and diplomacy, democracy, good governance, safety and security, justice transportation, communications and health. These South African experts could form the basis of the civilian component database.
- Survey participants proposed a better understanding of the conflict indicators for individual countries and that a range of documents be developed across the peace-building continuum to service special envoys and DIRCO Principals and Management. This would enable South Africa to make more considerable contributions at multilateral level in the conflict prevention phase, as called for by the Secretary-General of the UN.

## **6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

Based on the limited scope of this study, as purely focused on the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and associated issues, the following aspects deserve further scrutiny:


- The recommendations part of the study proposes a linear understanding of the Peace-building Continuum (i) Conflict Prevention, ii) Peace-

making/Conflict Resolution, iii) Peace-enforcement/keeping and iv) Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) with accompanying detail on the current DIRCO peace-building architecture (MSU, NOCPM, ARF/SADPA, Desks). Further research should complete the South African picture by adding partner departments, civil society and the private sector into the figure (6.2).

- The case study regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Chapter 4, made it clear that South Africa's peace-building approach in the DRC was not only extensive, but covered the full spectrum of the peace-building continuum. This study could only address the issues related to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). There are, however, a number of partner departments, agencies, civil society and private sector actors who participated in the South Africa peace-building process, including the Presidency, SANDF, SAPS, SSA, Justice and Constitutional Development, Water Affairs, Rural Development, Education, DPSA, National School of Government (NSG), DIRCO, DTI, Treasury and ACSA. Civil society included the following: IDASA (democratisation and establishment of sustainable policing in the DRC); SAWID (gender mainstreaming); ACCORD (workshops on peace-building); IGD (dialogue on PCRD and elections); ISS (gender mainstreaming in the security sector); IJR (information sharing on transitional justice). Each of the peace-building continuum phases needs to be disaggregated with the roles and contributions of each department, agency, think tank and company assessed to measure the full South African peace-building contribution.
- The case study on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provided a clear distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. It also provided a practical example of South Africa being involved in peace enforcement through the Intervention Brigade (FIB) destruction of M23. Although South Africa would prefer to register its victories in the conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and the PCRD phases of the peace-building continuum, this show of force was an important "hard power"

element that is sometimes required for effective negotiations. A study could be conducted that assesses this important aspect in the South African peace-building approach.

**Figure 6.2: Peace-building Continuum, DIRCO, partner departments and the UN System**



Peace-building continuum	DIRCO
SA Government	United Nations (not all agencies)
Private Sector and Civil Society	

Source: Researcher's own

## 6.6 CONCLUSION

The main purpose of the study was to assess and ultimately make certain recommendations towards *A strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building: The case of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)*. Chapter 1 addressed the aim, the orientation outlining the problem statement, the research objectives and the methodology to be utilised in collecting appropriate and relevant data. Chapter 2 provided a theoretical overview of the international environment, the history and background to state formation, particularly for countries in conflict (in Africa) as well as an outline of the international institutional peace-building approach. In Chapter 3, the researcher investigated the international approach to addressing conflict, including the regional, continental and international approaches. The national peace-building approaches by the United States, China, Brazil, Turkey and Norway were also examined. Chapter 4 consisted of two case studies, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi and South Africa's peace-building approach in each country, respectively. Chapter 5 were divided into two parts. Part one assessed the current DIRCO units dealing with issues related to peace-building, whilst the second part of the chapter was an empirical assessment of the perceptions and opinions of key role-players, stakeholders and policy drafters involved in or commenting on South African peace-building contributions.

Chapter 6 presented the main findings posed by the research objectives and the accompanying research questions and proffered recommendations towards *A strategic and integrated approach to South African peace-building: The case of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)*. Finally Chapter 6 contained a number of suggestions for further research mainly relating to expanding the scope of the research beyond DIRCO to South African partner departments, civil

society and the private sector. This would culminate in a better understanding of South Africa as an international peace-builder.

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