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Abstract

This research examines the impact of poor governance on the implementation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) with Zimbabwe as case study. Qualitative method such as examination of existing literature including published books, journal articles, reports review, newspapers, in depth interviews was used to look at how poor governance can affect the implementation of NEPAD in Zimbabwe. The study focuses on how poor governance can have an impact on the socio-economic and political aspect of Zimbabwe and how that can derail the implementation of NEPAD. The study showed that the Zimbabwean government fails to adhere to the principle of democracy and good governance that have been stipulated in the Declaration of Democracy, Political and Economic Governance. Consequently, there is little done about the implementation of NEPAD in Zimbabwe. This makes it difficult for the drivers of NEPAD to secure funding, therefore the implementation of NEPAD is unsuccessful because people are concentrating more on the political climate and declining economy than NEPAD.

Based on the findings, it was concluded that poor governance impedes economic growth and leads to poverty and underdevelopment. Therefore it becomes difficult for the implementation of NEPAD. Therefore, it is recommended that African leaders have to make it clear in an assertive manner to the Mugabe Regime that they are endangering the future of NEPAD. Exercise peer pressure through constructive dialogue, offering assistance or applying appropriate measures to encourage Mugabe to join African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in order to improve governance and attract foreign investment to achieve growth and development. Southern Africa Development Committee(SADC) leaders should pursue mediation to obtain Zimbabwe African National Union –Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Movement for Democratic Change(MDC) agreement on constitutional revisions and related legislative and regulatory measures that permit free and fair elections in 2008.



ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ANZ	Associates Newspaper of Zimbabwe
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BSAC	British South African Company
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
HIV	Human Immune Virus
IPEP	Independent Panel of Eminent Persons
IT	International Transparency
MAP	Millennium Partnership for Africa
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Media Information Commission
MMPZ	Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe
MNC	Multi National Corporation
MOA	Miscellaneous Offences Act
NAI	New African Initiative
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly

NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
RISP	Regional Indicative Strategic Plan
SADC	Southern Africa Development Committee
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programme
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union -Patriotic Front
ZAPU-PF	Zimbabwe African People's Union-Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background

In recent years, governance has become an important topical issue in the context of African development. It has been perceived as vital to development, effective economic management, peace, stability and security. Much of the concern and drive for good governance was born out of widespread frustration with the poor economic performance and misplaced priorities of African countries. Africa has witnessed insecurities, military coup d'état and civil wars, mismanagement, corruption and the abuse of office and the abuse of human rights. This has resulted in underdevelopment and poverty in Africa (Gettu, 1998).

More human disasters like military coups, civil strife of different dimensions, famine, genocide, ethnic cleansing and political violence and instability continue to affect the continent. There are many explanations to all these scenes in Africa. Some blame external forces such as colonialism, neo colonialism, debt, foreign aid as well as superpower politics for under developing the continent while others blamed internal factors such as poor governance and corruption by Africans. All of these factors have contributed to the underdevelopment of the continent (Diop, 1999).

However, two decades after independence, the continent was more afflicted by armed conflicts more than any continent on the planet. For instance, Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic, Ghana and Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) were involved in armed conflict. These countries had experienced the problem of political instability and insecurity. Moreover, these armed conflicts have brought more suffering and

turmoil to the continent of Africa and had socio-economic problem. In addition Africa has become a region of refugees. More than 8 million have fled their countries and another 18 million have been displaced. These negative outcomes are partly the consequences of poor governance (Adedeji, 1992).

Colonial rule also left a legacy of authoritarian governance and tyrannical governments that plundered countries resources. The actual condition of Africa is one of deep trouble, sometimes of a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during the colonial period. In many African countries, the leaders of the newly independent states pursued a heavy centralization of political and economic power and suppressed political pluralism. This, the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan observes, "often led to corruption, nepotism, complacency, violation of human rights and the abuse of power"(Nzongola, 1995).

The demand for good governance began transforming into active political agitations. This has been manifested after 1990, whereby there has been a gradual, but concerted attempt to reverse the trend of political despair and disillusionment, which hitherto characterised political life in Africa. This attempt manifested in the demand of political pluralism and democratization. Most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa legalised opposition parties and held competitive, multiparty elections. Though multiparty presidential elections have been held many incumbent parties have exploited institutional advantages to weaken and deny the opposition any chance of winning power in the new multi-party regimes. The long years of political misrule and of course, of poor governance exemplified by personal political regimes and ruthless dictatorships left most African states politically demobilized and economically

decapacitated with population ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and disease(Adejumobi, 1996).

Consequently there has been an outcry for the implementation of good governance structures and policies for African countries to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development. Political pluralism, democracy and good governance are seen as the basic precondition for development in Africa. Good governance has since been presented as the alternative and cure of the political malaise. As a result, development frameworks now recognize the need to reform the political and economic institutions of states as well as their technical and administrative capacities in order to promote sustainable development. In this regard, development agencies have begun to emphasize higher standards of accountability and transparency in both political and economic affairs of the state as a means to promote development, introducing a dynamic into African development discourse (Akinrinade, 2000).

In response to poor developments and the eradication of poverty in Africa, several programs and efforts have been geared towards promoting development. These include; the Lagos Plan of Action; 1986-1990 Priority Programme of Economic Redressing of Africa (PPREA) adopted by the OAU in 1985 and complementary United Nations (UN) Programme for the Economic Redressing and Development of Africa; African Scope of Reference for Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Redressing and Transformation. However, these efforts to a large extent, have not been implemented. Hence the latest programme, New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) which is a comprehensive, African- led program of action, seeks to end African marginalisation and encourage development through the

promotion of good governance as a major ingredient (Ekpo, 2003). The profound sense of hope is being frustrated by the Zimbabwean crisis.

1.2.Rationale of the Study

There are many reasons which prompted the researcher to undertake this study. These include amongst others;

- NEPAD aims to promote good governance and Zimbabwe fails to adhere to the principle of democracy and good governance.
- The Zimbabwean government is frequently violating the rights of its citizens.
- Zimbabwean refugees are scattered around the region.
- Southern African Development Committee (SADC) is not doing much to address Zimbabwean problems.

1.3.Statement of the Problem

Many studies have been carried out with regard to challenges facing Africa underdevelopment. It is without doubt that a good number of investigations have been carried out and a lot has been written on this issue with a view to providing an explanation to the poor political and economic performance of African countries. However, the approach to tackling Africa's problems has taken a new look, taking into consideration NEPAD as the latest hope to lead the continent unto the path of sustainable development and providing African solutions to African problems. Therefore, NEPAD acknowledges that the missing link to take Africa out of poverty is through good governance. The study shows good governance is a precondition of development within the aspiration and implementation of NEPAD. Therefore the

study is justified on the grounds that there is a need to look at the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD particularly in Zimbabwe.

As an action plan to get Africa to the path of sustainable development, the successful implementation of NEPAD stands the risk of being hampered by the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe. For a programme whose success is based on good economic and political governance coupled with effective regional integration and economic cooperation, NEPAD could be up to a very great challenge in the face of Zimbabwe. There is violation of human rights and the rule of law, corruption and economic mismanagement, lack of transparency and accountability. NEPAD have to address the repercussion faced by this country through the APRM which focuses on bringing good governance. The great challenge is that Zimbabwe has not yet acceded to the APRM.

Consequently the problem is expressed in the following questions:

- What are the causes of poor governance in Zimbabwe?
- What is the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe on the implementation of NEPAD?
- What is the role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe?

1.4.Aim of the Study

- To investigate the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD, in Zimbabwe.

1.5.Objectives

The study will attempt to look at the following aspects

- To examine the causes of poor governance in Zimbabwe.
- To examine the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe on the implementation of NEPAD.
- To examine the role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe.

1.6. Hypotheses

- The failure of governance in Zimbabwe appears to have a major impact on the implementation of NEPAD
- Poor governance in Zimbabwe appears to have a greater impact on the socio-economic of the country.

1.7.Significance of the Study

The governance in Zimbabwe poses a challenge that cannot be ignored. This study argues that the Zimbabwean crisis has not risen out of nowhere, therefore the sustainable solution to the crisis could not be found unless the root causes is well understood. An understanding of the root causes of the Zimbabwean crisis will constitute an integrated input to the effort of those involved in mapping sustainable solution to the crisis. It will also create a conducive environment for the implementation of the development goals NEPAD. Therefore, this research is expected to benefit African policy makers, especially the proponents of NEPAD to bring the continent out of chaos and misery; and lead it to the path of sustainable development. The research analyses on the impact of governance with reference to

Zimbabwe on the development of the continent at political, economic and social spheres; and thus will pose as a guide to African development planners. The study will be of importance to Africans applying or solving Africans problems through NEPAD to ensure good governance. The research will be significant to both government and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) such as civil society in Africa regarding the importance of good governance. In addition it creates a basis for further research and intellectual development for young academics that are interested in pursuing studies in Political Science, Peace Studies, International Relations and other related fields.

1.8. Scope of the Study

The scope of the study is restricted to the Zimbabwean crisis in political, economic and social; and on its impact on the implementation of NEPAD. The Zimbabwean crisis emanated during the establishment of NEPAD and it is worth studying in relation to good governance. This is a country that was promising in relation to its economy. It was described as the breadbasket of Southern Africa. Therefore, the deterioration of the Zimbabwean crisis and the commitment by African leaders through NEPAD on bringing democracy and good governance in the continent present a challenge on the credibility of NEPAD

CHAPTER TWO

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literature regarding the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD with special reference to Zimbabwe.

2.2. The Concept of Governance

Nyong'o (2002) defines governance as the management of public affairs. Hyden (1992) also shares the same view in referring to governance as the management of the norms and rules that set the framework for the organisations and conduct of politics within a polity. These norms and rules are particularly important, for they determine the nature of the relationships between the rulers and ruled, or the governors and the governed. Hence, the mode of their management is of significance in determining the nature or form of governance that obtains in a particular state.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) describes governance as rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, participation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision in the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority. (UNDP, 2002).

Sept (1998) similarly views governance as participatory, transparent and responsible. Moreover, it guarantees that political and economic priorities are based in a broad consensus that includes vulnerable groups and minorities. It has been argued, "there is no real sustainable human development without strong, effective and participatory government.

Gettu (1998) also shares the same position that governance is a broad, complex concept that covers political, economic and social dimension. Some place emphasis on its public sector management aspects, while others have assumed strong advocacy in relation to political democracy. This diversity of views, relatively entrenched positions and their limitations, has hindered dialogue, understanding and acceptance among African countries. Most define it in terms of the basic principles related to the rule of law, openness to political competition, accountability, transparency, eliciting popular participation, respect for human and property rights as well as freedom of information and of the press.

The concept of good governance achieved prominence in donor discourse around 1990, after the end of the cold war. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), stated as its first key conclusion that democratization and good governance are central to the achievement of the development goals for the twenty-first century. The World Bank was the first major donor institution to adopt the concept of good governance as a condition for lending to developing countries.

2.3. The Causes and Consequences of Poor Governance in Africa

Africa is considered to be the richest continent in the world in terms of natural resources. The enormous amount of minerals in the continent include among others copper, platinum, chrome, asbestos, gold, diamond, chromium iron core, petroleum while agricultural resources constitutes most of the continent's economy with crops such as tobacco, cocoa, tea, coffee, corn, wheat, and other cereals. Despite this wealth, Africa remains the poorest, marginalized and grossly underdeveloped continent. There is an emerging consensus among scholars, researchers and

development practitioners that the primary cause of Africa's underdevelopment is poor governance (Ake, 1995).

Poor governance has been due to personalised rule and corruption in some African countries. The problem of some leaders was for self-enrichment and does by any means to retain power. Ake (1996) points out that the high premium of power in Africa is exceptionally higher than the concern for development. There is evidence that this type of rule has extreme consequences for development in Africa. The elite in power have merely concentrated on consuming resources needed for development Political megalomania like Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire; Samuel Doe in Liberia; and Siad Barre in Somalia created for themselves political fiefdom in their respective countries. Accumulated national wealth, devalued the lives of the people and destroyed the fabric of society. Mobutu case in Zaire is a classic example. Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) is one of the largest and richly endowed countries in Africa, yet it is a country that lay bare in ruins. Mobutu received aid from donor nations and put it on his private coffers instead of development. It has been stated that he was one of the richest man during the time of his death. His legacy to his own country was civil war. Apart from the damaging political misdemeanor of Mobutu, the living standards in Zaire under him stooped below that of the pre-independence era. Mobutu was closely followed in the list of shame by Sani Abacha of Nigeria, who took only five years - he died in office - to make off with between two and five billion dollars, according to Transparency International (Nzongola, 1995 and Sandbrook, 1993). There is ample evidence that this type of rule has had dire consequences for development in Africa (Jackson and Rosberg, 1987).

According to Catan and Chaffin (2003) corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. Corruption decreases public revenue and increase public spending, inequalities, whilst distorting markets, resource allocations and incentives. These latter effects result in a loss of productive infrastructure investment as funds are diverted to corruption support activities. It creates monopolies that make goods and services more expensive and may put off foreign investors. Ologbenla (2007) asserts that corruption is a symptom of poor governance which in turn impedes poverty reduction and sustainable development. Corruption takes scarce resources from the development process and has negative effect on investment and economic growth and development in general. The most damaging effect of corruption on sustainable development if unchecked is that it grows, intensifies and “become normalised” and spreads like cancer to vital centers of government with powerful influences on the public (Harris, 2000).

Ologbenla(2007) points out that corruption in Nigeria has remained a pervasive social phenomenon. Illicit misappropriation of privileges and opportunities in public and private sectors for personal aggrandizement particularly those in position of authority in a *sine qua-non*-to Nigeria. Both military and civilian governments have plundered the national treasury making the economy unattractive to both local and foreign investors. Today, the economy is bereft of any significant improvement essentially because of a booming capital flight which is a reflection of the pervasive corruption in the polity. Corruption has continued to blossom not because of the absence of relevant legislators to tackle the problem, but essentially due to the weakness of key public institutions and lack of political will. According to a survey result on corruption index, conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and

International Transparency (IT), Nigeria is constantly listed as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world by these anti-corruption agencies.

Initially, Africans saw human rights as communitarian or group based; individual human rights were regarded as Western concept. There had been widespread denial of human rights in Africa by leaders such as Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean-Bédél Bokassa of the Central African Republic (Empire), and Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (Abdullahi, 1990). For example these include the denial by the government of civil liberties such as the freedom of association, the freedom of speech and the suppression of political activity. Those who opposed the government were intimidated, harassed, tortured, jailed and some killed in these countries. A case in point during Idi Amin regime, opposition parties were abolished and those who were against the government were killed. President Jammeh of Gambia has overstayed his presidency and that has resulted in the persecution of the independent press that has attempted to challenge the atrocities he committed. Lack of the importance of civil and political rights have impeded development in Africa because citizens had limited opportunities to voice out their opinion and reluctant to speak out of fear of being jailed or maltreated (Rita, 2000).

A prominent feature of African post independence rule has been the tendency to curb any independent political activity outside an institutional network controlled by a ruling party-state. There was therefore, a reluctance to decentralise authority to independent institutions of local governance, and no marginalise civil society structures. By curbing associational life, African governments have fostered blind compliance and a lack of concern for a strong civic public realm (Venter, 2003).

In this context the struggle between civil society organisations and the state often take the form of an attempt by the state to overpower NGOs by bringing them under government control. The pretext for the attempt to bringing NGOs into sphere of the state is often given as their financial mismanagement, the lack of control with their funds. But the reality behind the attempts are linked to a fear by government of the potential NGOs have for organizing people outside the state structures, and secondly that NGOs with the change in donor policies with emphasis on building civil society institutions now receive funds which earlier would go to government projects. Thus NGOs can be seen to be in direct competition with government over donor funds. And the rural projects of the NGOs may undermine the control which government has established in the rural areas. An example of this struggle between the state and NGOs as institutions in an embryonic civil society is The Private Voluntary Organisations Act which the Zimbabwean Parliament passed in March 1995, which has the potential of stifling the development of NGOs and turning them into a form of parastatals. The Secretary -- General of the Zimbabwean Human Rights organization Zim Rights -- Osiah Tungwara -- characterised the law in this way:

... it is unfortunate that the government is introducing autocratic measures to restrict the activities of civil society when the global trend is to give it more freedom in recognition of the people's right to organise themselves for their own development and to participate in civic matters.

The concept of civil society in Africa may consequently be used in a meaningful way when it is seen as being in embryo in a rural situation, and as a struggling entity consisting partly of a variety of NGOs and more or less spontaneous social

movements and relatively weak permanent institutions and organisations in urban areas (Ronning 1996).

2.4. Approaches to Governance

The dawn of the twenty first century has witnessed Africa's leadership respond vigorously on the continent. Now there is a new push for democratic change in Africa based on the realization that there has to be a better alternative to the current reality. That alternative must have the concept of good governance as a major ingredient. There is a positive correlation between good governance and economic development but poor economic governance can certainly impede growth. Therefore, the successful scale-up of investment strategies to achieve sustainable development and United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) requires a commitment to good governance. This is the point of departure from the past. This major ingredient of good governance is coupled with the importance of African's applying and solving African problem by using African solutions is also emphasized. This commitment has been shown on NEPAD (Mathoho, 2003).

2.4.1. Historical overview of NEPAD

NEPAD's history can be traced to three parallel initiatives. In 2000 the G-8 extended an invitation to Presidents Mbeki (South Africa), Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Bouteflika (Algeria) to attend the Group's annual meeting hosted by Japan in July of the same year. The three leaders were, at the time, chairpersons of the three largest intergovernmental groups representing the developing world: the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), the G- 77 and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), respectively. The OAU used the invitation to request the three leaders to draft a

development plan for the continent. This request led to the establishment of a Steering Committee after the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, tasked to formulate the plan. The plan, which became known as the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), was unveiled by President Mbeki at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2001. At the same time, another draft plan was being formulated on the African continent. Known as the Omega Plan, this plan was crafted by Senegal president, Abdoulaye Wade, and presented to the Francophone Summit in Cameroon in January 2001. The third initiative was the Compact for African Recovery initiated by the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, K.Y. Amoako, in response to a mandate provided by African ministers of finance in late 2000. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Compact was based on ideas of enhanced partnership, mutual accountability towards development outcomes and peer review. MAP and Omega bore the same vision about redressing Africa's development challenges, but differed in focus and content. MAP was broad ranging in content and focused on enhanced partnerships as a way of addressing Africa's development challenges. Omega, on the other hand, was more specific in selecting priority sectors: regional infrastructure and education. The ECA Compact was crucial to the implementation of both development plans since it anchored them in a process of transparency and accountability related to development outcomes. Between January and May 2001, Senegal and Egypt were invited to serve on the MAP steering Committee. In May 2001, a joint conference of Africa's finance and economic planning ministers was held in Algiers and resolved that these three initiatives must be merged into a single document, which was then called the 'New African Initiative' (NAI). In July 2001, the NAI was presented to the OAU Summit in Lusaka, which mandated an implementation committee of 15 Heads of State to

manage the process. In October 2001, the implementation committee held its first meeting in Abuja, Nigeria where they renamed the plan NEPAD (Nabudere,2003).

NEPAD long term objectives are to eradicate deepening poverty; promote sustainable growth and development, integrate Africa in the world economy accelerate the empowerment of women. It is important to note that these objectives are attainable in an environment of good governance. African leaders acknowledges that the continent “faces grave challenges and the most urgent of these are in particular, the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, through democracy and good governance. Thus says that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, human rights and respect for rule of law, creating an environment conducive to private sector, mobilization and responding appropriately to the process of globalisation. Only if the state is equipped with the capacity to deliver, it can provide an unambiguous and tangible indication that good governance can bring development (Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance, 2002).

The NEPAD framework has adopted an approach to the development that is basically comprised of three –prolonged strategy;

A. Preconditions for development:

1. Peace, security, democracy, and political governance initiatives
2. Economic and Corporate governance, focusing on public finance management
3. Regional co-operation and integration

B. Priority sectors:

1. Infrastructure and development

2. Information and communications technology
3. Human development and poverty reduction, focusing on health and education
4. Agriculture
5. Promoting diversification of production and exports, focusing on market access for African exports to industrialised countries

C. Mobilising resources:

1. Increased debt relief
2. Encouraging domestic private savings
3. Increased Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and private investment flows
4. Proper management of public revenue and Expenditure

It is instructive to note that these strategies show that for development to take place, improved governance is needed across Africa in order to attract the necessary investment for economic growth. Therefore NEPAD contends that, the quality of governance is critical for poverty reduction because poor governance leads to the vicious circle of impoverishment. In addition, the magnitude of NEPAD's ambition requires large sums of money, which African states and their fledgling private sectors do not have. Thus, within this context NEPAD relies heavily on the generosity of its development partners and foreign direct investment. Financing NEPAD definitely requires aid and investment in excess of what is currently being channeled into the continent. Therefore, African governments may be compelled to accept the donors' 'dictates' by striving to improve governance and promote democracy, undertaking political reforms and market- friendly economic policies, while the donors undertakes to assist those African countries committed to good governance, the promotion of human rights, poverty eradication, and economic growth. The donor assistance takes

the form of development aid; like assistance in building institutions, improving education, health care and combating Human Immune Virus, Acquired Deficiency Syndrome, (HIV/AIDS) as well as granting access to western markets. A country shunning these virtues risks isolation and Western aid and foreign investment (Kebonang, 2005).

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a crucial foundation for good governance in Africa.

2.4.2. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The APRM is a voluntary compliance and mutual learning mechanism of NEPAD, available to all member states of the African Union (AU) who wish to submit themselves to the review process. According to the formulation of the APRM base document its primary purpose is to “foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building. Peer Review have four core areas: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003).

The APRM is a new initiative in Africa, although it has been practiced among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. For Africa, it presents fresh opportunities for empowering and strengthening institutions

of democracy to ensure that the basis of governance transcends the narrow confines of personal rule, patron-client relations or ethno-religious politics. The agreement on the APRM provides for the establishment of an Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) to be responsible for the review and assessment process (Africa Recovery, 2003).

2.4.2.1. Prospects for the APRM

There are number of good reasons why Africans can be positive about the APRM injecting some sanity into governance practices characterised by corruption and informal relations. A project in which states can voluntarily opt in or out without losing their AU membership, the APRM is premised on the belief that African leaders will be more willing to accept and implement recommendations from their peers than from international creditors, whose disfavour with discredited governance practices often translate into aid suspension. Implicit in the APRM, moreover, is the assumption that criticism from fellow African leaders will serve as a form of pressure on countries that have been reviewed and who have been adjudged to have fallen short of meeting the criteria of good governance, to reform (UNECA, 2002). In addition, through the APRM, African countries are able to learn from each other and deepen African solidarity (Hougbe, 2007).

Furthermore, Akokpari, 2004 underscores that the APRM can serve as a deterrent for potential dictators for two interrelated reasons. In the first place, the assumption that the report of the IPEP would be publicised could alert regimes to the need for good governance. The fear that a regime's appalling human rights, corruption or mismanagement record would be publicised could encourage countries to be more

responsible and make efforts to avoid being “blacklisted”. Since as a rule countries strive to maintain good international standing, this could be a powerful incentive to remain “clean”, or to back track from unacceptable governance practices. On the same view, Stultz (2007) maintains that the APRM is a new weapon in Africa’s arsenal and is regarded as an attempt to inspire under performing states to improve their governance programmes. Secondly, as the dominant objective of African post-cold war and indeed post- independence foreign policies has largely been to secure foreign aid, some moral pressure has come to bear on African leaders to pass the APRM test in order to ingratiate their states to the international creditor community as a prerequisite for securing external aid and investments.

However, one of the greatest dilemmas facing Africa is the dichotomy between theory and practice; the gap between rhetoric and reality. As a result of this gap optimism about the prospects for good governance predicated on the APRM needs to be tempered with caution. Africa has been known to be a continent of “disappointed hopes”, where elaborate and innovative proposals have either survived only on paper, have been implemented on an adhoc basis, or simply have been short-lived (Akokpari, 2003).

Obstacles for the APRM

As pointed earlier, membership in the APRM is purely voluntary. States can either sign up or stay out. Even those who initially joined can withdraw without any serious diplomatic consequences. The challenge, therefore, is how a country persisting in human rights violations can be made to reform if it withdraws from the APRM or simply refuses to sign up. In addition, the fact that the APRM is a voluntary

mechanism has led observers to ask whether it can ever possess sufficient clout to enforce the governance improvements NEPAD offers in exchange for greater integration in the global economy. (Taylor, 2003).

There is no denying that APRM is an unprecedented experiment in reform. For a continent that has jealously guarded its sovereignty, it is diplomatically exceptional for nations to throw themselves to scrutiny. Logically, APRM requires the involvement of thousands of people in assessments that cover virtually all aspects of national governance. And politically, it is unprecedented for incumbent governments to permit civil society and foreign experts a chance to write a definitive critique of national performance (Ochieng, 2006).

Furthermore, the APRM lacks enforcement mechanism. The IPEP has not clearly defined ways of obligating deviant states to reform. It does not, for example, spell out any process of subjecting states to diplomatic, economic or any form of punitive sanctions in the event of poor or non-compliance with the established principles. This rather loose set-up with seemingly no compelling strings and no internal coercive mechanisms has failed to attract African countries to the APRM. The lack of compulsion is certain to keep countries such as Libya, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, the current epicenters of human rights abuses in Africa, and those with dubious human rights records out of the APRM project for fear that it could be used by the AU as a tool for meddling in their internal affairs (Taylor, 2005).

A further source of concern is the possibility of African leaders shying away from condemning their peers even in cases where the IPEP produces damning reports. The

absence of direct condemnation of the grotesque and systematic human rights abuses under President Mugabe whose policies are becoming an unmitigated disaster for Zimbabwe, have amply demonstrated African leaders' lack of moral courage to reprove fellow peers. Already, Pretoria rejects demands by human rights groups and its own opposition parties for a tough stance on Harare. In February 2003 the Foreign Minister, Dr. Nkhosana Dlamini Zuma, stated unequivocally "we [South Africa] will never criticise Zimbabwe". The case of Zimbabwe is regularly used to demonstrate that, when push comes to shove, African leaders prefer to cover up for each other rather than subject one of their members to subjective public criticism (Bond 2003).

Since African countries are generally not a source of aid to fellow African states, verbal condemnation may have little, if any, impact on actual policy reversals in the offending country. In other words, the APRM may have minimal impact if its administration is left entirely on African leaders who lack credible instruments of sanctions. Some threats of diplomatic isolation, suspension of aid, denied membership in the AU's structures, like the AU Parliament, the AU Summit, are necessary to make the APRM an effective tool for good governance (Wangari, 1995).

2.5. Theoretical Perspective

2.5.1. Marxist theory

The theory that explains the causes of crisis in Zimbabwe is Marxist theory. Karl Marx who is the founder of Marxism believed that social change is what was needed for a better society, and to get social change there must be class conflict. Karl Marx major concern of social change was economic change, the opposition between the capitalists and the working class. The capitalist are also known as the Bourgeoisie. They are the one responsible for controlling the land, factories and others. The

working class, which is also known as the proletariat represents the workers that are being exploited by the bourgeoisies (Viotti & Kauppu, 1987).

It has been argued that the Zimbabwean political and economic problems arise from its distorted and unequal economic structures and perverse social distribution. The distribution problems cited include over the validity of existing property rights, the uneven power relations and influences based on race and class which have been accumulated from historical privileges of access of capital, infrastructure and social capital. Therefore in Zimbabwe, the white owned 80 percent of commercial farms and they represented the bourgeoisie and the Zimbabweans working in the farms represented the proletariat. As Marx would have it say a conflict is bound to arise as a result of these class differences leading to the rise of classless society where there would be existence of neither an upper nor lower class (Morgenthau, 1948).

2.5.2. Intergovernmental Theory

In its basic form, intergovernmental explains interstate cooperation and especially regional or sub regional integration (eg the AU and SADC) as a function of the alignment of state interests and preferences coupled with power. The African Union and NEPAD is a product of continuing search by African people to create intergovernmental structures which can encourage the establishment of stable democratic, and bring about social and economic transformation of the continent in a globalising world. The African Union and NEPAD seek to address challenges which the predecessor Organization of African Unity (OAU) could not address for reasons ranging from institutional incapacity to lack of political will by African leaders. As such development in the continent has been stifled by neo-colonialism, conflict,

corruption and a general failure in governance. The result has been political instability, perpetual conflict, and underdevelopment.

2.5.3. Liberalism

Liberals argue that the state is not the only main actor in the international system but they do see transitional actors, such as Multinational Corporation (MNC) and civil society as central actors in some areas of world politics. Liberalism promotes the role of good governance in the form of democracy as a way to tap on people's participation. In establishing NEPAD, African nations are being encouraged to cultivate domestic partnerships before venturing out. The more reason, governments in Africa are being asked to rope in the private sector, the civil society, religious organizations, Non Governmental Organization (NGOs) and the political class to join hands together and formulate policies that will work well for their conditions. Involving all aspects of the society in policy formulation empowers every citizen and in the process everyone owns the development process.

Baylis (2005) states that liberals seek to project values of order, liberty, justice and toleration into international relations. The theory of liberalism emphasises domestic principles such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom of movement. Therefore, this theory will help to analyse and evaluate the nature of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD with reference to Zimbabwe. The nature of political sphere in Zimbabwe is currently incompatible to democratic principles such as those listed above. According to liberalism, individuals should be free from state persecution and arbitrary state power (Burchill, 1996:29). This theory advocates for political freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights, liberty of the individual and equality before the law. This theory also argues for individual

competition such as civil society, e.g. NGO's, churches, and the allocation of scarce resources equitable to citizens. However, these liberal norms and values are not practised in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime ruled by sword and it is highly sensitive to criticism by media and civil society. Critics of the government have been jailed, assassinated and banished for their conviction and believe on liberal norms and values. Private sectors have also been attacked by the government. It can be argued that the government has presented the civic movement with a lot of challenge. The government seems to be doing everything in its power to retain political power and contain the civic movement. Laws such as Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) radically restrict and hinder progressive work from the civil society. Only a coherent and vibrant civic movement can take Zimbabwe to a better place.

2.5.4. Dependency Theory

First, dependency characterizes the international system as comprised of two sets of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, center/periphery or metropolitan/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dependent states are those states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have low *per capita* Gross National Products and which rely heavily on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings. As a result, the international political and economic system will be characterized by interdependence (Baylis 2005).

In the context of NEPAD, African countries need to embark on massive realignment development strategies so that they can be complemented by their rich and strong in

collaboration with the World Bank. If and when countries comply with principles of good governance, will they have access to loans and aid for development from the G8 and OECD countries. The G8 and nearly all bilateral donors have all joined the chorus of making good governance and the respect of human rights cardinal aid conditionalities. Thus accepting NEPAD as crucial to Africa's recovery and with the programme drawing heavily on western aid, African governments may be morally compelled to accept its dictates and thus facilitate good governance. The International had to cut its ties with Zimbabwe due to its failure to adhere to principle of democracy, good governance and human rights.

CHAPTER THREE

3. DELINEATION OF VARIABLES

3.1. Introduction

This chapter gives general background of the country under study- Zimbabwe. It also looks at the causes of poor governance in Zimbabwe, the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe, and the role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe.

3.1.1. Background of Zimbabwe



Source: CIA WORLD FACT BOOK

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered by South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Zimbabwe lies on a high plateau, and its terrain consists of primarily of grasslands bordered on the east by mountains. The central highlands are a series of fertile plateaus on which Europeans settled, built cities and towns, and established commercial farming. The total area is about 150 872 square miles. The capital city is Harare, formerly known as Salisbury. Zimbabwe is comprised of two main ethnic groups, namely Shona comprising of 74 percent of the population and the Ndebele comprising of 20 percent. Other ethnic groups and Asians make up 4 percent of the population while whites comprises of 1 percent of the population (Cheney, 1990).

Colonists arrived in the form of British mining interests led by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). The BSAC took control of the country which they called Southern Rhodesia until 1923, when it became, nominally, a British colony. This followed a referendum (for white only) on joining the Union of the South Africa. Despite attractive terms from the South African leader Jan Smuts, there was heavy vote against the merger. From 1953-1963, Southern Rhodesia formed part of the Central African Federation with neighboring Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). In 1965, to resist decolonization, the settlers with support from South Africa, issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). This triggered a bitter civil war between the minority government and fighters for African independence. In February 1980, free democratic elections were held in Rhodesia for the first time and Robert Mugabe leading Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won with the majority. On April 1980, British formally granted independence to Zimbabwe (African Affairs, May 2006).

3.2. The Root Causes of Poor Governance in Zimbabwe

3.2.1. Land Reform

The land in Zimbabwe is one of the main root causes of the current crisis. As in most African countries under colonialism, white settlers stole the vast majority of arable land, while Africans were forced eke out an existence on overcrowded communal farms in more arid regions. According to Moyo (1987), history of land seizures by whites in Zimbabwe meant that by 1980, 42% of the land, including the most fertile areas, was owned by 6 000 white commercial farmers. Much of the white-owned land was left fallow or under-utilised, while most of the black population was crowded into low-quality Native Reserves which is now Communal Areas. The issue over unfair land distribution remains a difficult problem throughout the region. Many Africans view the continued prominence of white farmers on prime real estate as a continuation of racist colonial policies and a failure of the revolution. This perception of injustice is compounded by the traditional correlation in many African societies between land and power, especially true in Zimbabwe, where agriculture continues to be the country's most significant means of production. The psychological power of the land issue remains a vital aspect of the political atmosphere in the country (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

At the Lancaster House, Great Britain had pledged to set up a multi-million dollar fund in support of land resettlement. According to Carver (2003) no such fund was ever created, a failure that President Mugabe often referred to when he relaunched the land issue in 2000. While this is no doubt genuinely rankled with Mugabe, the truth is that the continuing uneven land distribution had little or nothing to do with the crisis that developed with increasing speed from early 2000 onwards (Bower & Stoneman, 2000).

During the first decade of independence, both the government and the white commercial farmers understood that the 'sunset clauses' preventing compulsory land redistribution would end in the 1990, but neither side made significant movements towards fixing the imbalance. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 gave the government the power to obtain land, provided they fairly compensated the previous owner. A proposed land tax was never implemented, and the acquisition program actually slowed down in the 1990s. During the first decade, over 50 000 families were re-settled on approximately 3 million hectares, but in the second decade only 20 000 were re-settled on less than one million hectares of land. According to the Commercial Farmers Union, 4 500 predominantly white, commercial farmers still owned eleven million hectares of the most arable land in 1999. These farms had remained immensely profitable, despite repeated droughts in the 1990s, and sustained Zimbabwe as an exporter of maize and other agricultural products (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

According to Carver (2003) in the 1980s, the Zimbabwe government had failed to spend the donor funds available for land resettlement. Admittedly these were extremely limited by comparison with the large amounts promised before independence. Land acquisition was hampered by a provision in the Lancaster House agreement that all land transactions must be on a 'willing buyer, willing seller' basis. But the reality remains that the authorities did less than was in their power. When, in 1998, Zimbabwe hosted a donor conference on the land issue, additional money became available to finance resettlement. However, donors placed three conditions on their funding (Moyo, 2001). Resettlement should be transparent, within the law and benefit the poor. The Zimbabwe government

objected to the conditions, arguing that the issue was the restitution of Zimbabwe's control over its own land (Zimbabwe Independent, 12 May 2000). None of these conditions were met when the "fast track" resettlement programme were implemented.

When in 2000, it came to implement its own 'fast track' resettlement programme, war veterans and youth militia began squatting and occupying white commercial farmers. Acts of violence, torture, and the murder of white farmers and African farm workers have plagued the resettlement process. Farmers were forcibly displaced along with their workers; resistance resulted in brutal beatings. President Mugabe has repeatedly stated that the goal of his government is to finally rid Zimbabwe of all invaders and colonists (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

The reallocation of farms demonstrates the level of governmental corruption; as farms have been given to governmental officials, groups of war veterans, and family members of the State President, while the vast majority of Zimbabweans remain in subsistence farming. Many of the ministers and elites who seize commercial farms did not have the training or skills to cultivate the land, and hence are absentee landlord on fallow lands. Moreover when commercial were seized, the employed farm workers were chased off the land as well, so there are few farms in actual production. This has sustained Zimbabwe's already precarious economic situation and has created rampant food insecurity throughout the country (Moyo, 2001). Though land resettlement was crucial, its implementation has led to Zimbabwe's decay.

3.2.2. Massacres in Matabeleland

Another neglected reference point in the 1980s is the almost genocidal massacres of the Ndebele by the Zimbabwean army. This episode strengthens the argument of those who maintain that Mugabe's desire to retain power has been central cause of the recent crisis. Mugabe came to power on a radical Marxist- Leninist platform. Though many African countries like Zimbabwe were officially non-aligned states during the Cold War, president Mugabe made no secret of his desire for a one party state based on communist revolution. During the struggle for independence, an alliance of convenience between ZANU –PF and the Zimbabwe African People's Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF) hid the fissure between the two parties (McCullum, 2003). After the first democratic elections, however, Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU forces continued the armed struggle in Matabeleland in southern Zimbabwe. There was and continues to be a deep distrust of the government by the Ndebele people of the Matabeleland because of a commonly held view that Mugabe, who was a Shona, was bent on revenge for a nineteenth century invasion by the Ndebele King Lobengula into Shona territory (Gaba, 1997). According to Alexander,, McGregor, and Ranger, (2000) the crisis in Matabeleland was also prompted by government claims that the main opposition party, (ZAPU) was caching arms and supporting a low level insurgency by 'dissidents'. The dissidents were portrayed in the official media as surrogates of the apartheid government in South Africa.

In response to the continued insurrection, Mugabe sent the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade of the National Army into Matabeleland in the 1980. Investigations by human rights groups have found that at least 20 000 civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces died at the hands of the army's Fifth Brigade. A detailed investigation by two

Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) give a clear picture of the nature of the killings. These were targeted on ethnic and political grounds, with many of those who died being older people. Almost all were peasants .The massacres of the 1980s remain an open wound in the Ndebele community, and Matabeleland continues to be a center of opposition to ZANU-PF and the site of serious human rights violation (Catholic Commission for Human Rights and Legal Resources Foundation, 1997).

3.2.3.Structural Adjustment Policies

It is noteworthy to highlight that Zimbabwe made significant strides in social provision and economic development in the period after independence. Between 1980 and 1990, real spending on health more than doubled, on primary education it nearly tripled, infant mortality fell from 88 to 61 per 1000 and literacy levels increased dramatically. These were great achievements for independent Zimbabwe (Juhasz, 2004). In 1990 the government was obliged to impose a World Bank authored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The impact of SAP in Zimbabwe was unemployment, the rising price of basic goods and the cuts in government social spending. SAP had a negative impact on the country. This has been acknowledged by the World Bank in 1999 that structural adjustment has failed to achieve macroeconomics stability in Zimbabwe and has resulted in falling standard of living for many, particularly members of urban households. The percentage of those households classified as poor rose from 40 percent in 1991 to 60 percent in 1995, and average consumption level dropped by 25 percent (Zimbabwe Opening National SAPRI Forum, 1999). According to the Bank, cut backs in public expenditures have also negated achievements in health and education that were made during the first decade of independence.

In response to growing protests, the Zimbabwean Government appeared to waver in its acceptance of the Structural Adjustment Programme, but it decided to continue and met opposition with growing restrictions. The government clampdown seemed to re-awaken civil society in a country where there had been limited organized criticism of ZANU-PF for much of the post-independence period, either inside or outside Parliament. Many also noted the negative social consequences of Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) which the World Bank contends is intended to benefit the poor and marginalized (Juhasz, 2004). According to Moyo (2000), even though the Zimbabwean conflict has its roots from the Lancaster House, the precipitating factor was ESAP into a political rupture between 1996 and 1999. It then exploded between 2000 and 2002 over two elections and struggles over land repossession.

3.2.4. The Emergence of Opposition

In 1990s there was growing emergence of opposition in the country. Small opposition parties acquired support in a few constituencies in the general elections of 1990 and 1995, but the effective monopoly of ZANU-PF was seriously challenged. The level of popular apathy towards conventional politics was extraordinary. In the 1999 local elections, only months before the dramatic government defeat in the constitutional referendum, voter turnout was a mere three percent (Kibble, 2000).

The growing unpopularity of the government was strongly articulated by trade unions movement. Most important among these was the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which was seen as an addition of the ruling party. By early 1990 this has changed. Morgan Tsvangirira, an official of the powerful miners' union, became general secretary of the ZCTU in the late 1980s. The ZCTU immediately provoked the

government by criticizing economic policies. In the early 1990s, the ZCTU assumed the leadership of a broader popular movement of protest at increased austerity (Mkalipi, 2003).

Correspondingly, a variety of civil society organizations began protesting about governance issues. At independence for example, there had been only one human rights organization- the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe. This was followed by Human Rights Association, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Legal Resource Foundation and others. Many of these and other organizations joined together in the National Constitution Assembly to campaign for constitutional reform. In 1989, the government controlled Chronicle newspaper uncovered corruption scandal involving illicit resale of cars from the Willowgate car assembly plant in Harare –inevitably dubbed ‘Willowgate’. The scandal led to the dismissal of a number of government ministers and the suicide of one. Willowgate unlocked the potential of independent journalism as a means of scrutinizing the government actions. A variety of privately owned newspaper and magazines emerged such as Financial Gazette, Zimbabwe Independent, Daily News and the government Herald. However the government maintained its monopoly on the strategically crucial broadcasting media (Carver, 2003).

More generally, human rights and civic groups began to articulate disquiet at the highly centralized and authoritarian style of government. In the absence of any organized political opposition, these various strands of dissatisfaction coalesced around the demand for a new constitution. The constitution agreed at the Lancaster House was weak to start with. It was a standard British post- colonial document, with limited protection of human

rights. Protection of human rights had been weakened further by successive amendments (Carver, 2003).

3.2.5. Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The spending of Zimbabwe on the DRC exercise has had a more substantial impact. The Zimbabwe state, military, financial complex has gambled heavily and time alone will tell if the shares in the DRC 's mines will bear much revenue. The government presented military involvement in the DRC as part of its obligation to the SADC. In fact this was a unilateral action, opposed by South Africa among others. In reality, Zimbabwe's DRC entanglement is more likely to be explained by extensive business interests in the country, both personal and institutional. Moore highlighted that while the economy bears the costs, some of the generals and their kin who own transport and textile companies, are the immediate beneficiaries (Moore, 2001).

The complications of the DRC were well ill understood in Zimbabwe, but the involvement was unpopular for several reasons. First and foremost, the DRC involvement was correctly seen as placing immense strain on the Zimbabwe economy. The vast expense of maintaining a military force of 10 000 to 13 000 led to an acute shortage of foreign currency. The official cost was US\$1 million a day. It may be of importance to note that the first 'sanction' on Zimbabwe was IMF 's refusal to continue operations when there was lack of transparency in government accounting on war expenditure (The Guardian, 7 October 1999).

There was widespread perception that government figures were deriving illicit benefits from the Zimbabwean presence in the DRC. The other reason was that the war in DRC

seemed to strengthen the hand of the military leadership in domestic politics. The militarization of political life was a trend that was increasingly causing concern to some observers, especially in the independent press and civil society groups. It can be of importance to note that the impact of Zimbabwe involvement on the DRC war was the most important of the present crisis in Zimbabwe.

3.2.6. Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) and the Constitutional Referendum

The Movement Democratic Change emerged in 1999 from the trade union and other human rights and civil society activists. That was a period there was growing unpopularity of government. The leader party is Morgan Tsvangaria of the ZCTU. Before the official launch of the MDC in 1999, Mugabe established a commission to draft a new constitution, in an attempt to diminish the emerging opposition. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the key coalition of the civic groups on the constitutional issue, boycotted the work of the commission. It is argued that the process was truly independent, being subject to presidential appointment and not obliged to take account of public testimony to the commission. However, the crucial provision in the new draft was inserted not by the constitutional commission but by the government itself after the draft has been committed. Article 57 of the proposed constitution required the British government to compensate commercial farmers for land expropriated by the Zimbabwe authorities. If it failed to do so, land would be taken without compensation (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, 2000).

Approval of the new constitution dependent on a referendum in February 2000. It has been reported that a glossy and propaganda campaign portrayed opponents of the new

draft constitution as wanting a return to colonial rule. The new constitution was seen as the instrument whereby Zimbabweans would complete their national revolution and seize control of the land. Nevertheless, and despite its voice being submerged in the pre-referendum campaigning the NCA and its allies in the 'NO' camp comfortably won the referendum, with 55.9 percent voting against, and the draft was defeated. On that note, the government was genuinely stunned since this was the first time since independence that it has suffered electoral defeat on a national level. A parliamentary election was only a few months away, with every likelihood that the MDC would capitalize on the 'NO' vote, perhaps increasing it as electorate realized that a vote for the opposition was not wasted (Johnson, 2000).

President Mugabe promised that he would accept the referendum result and agreed to abide by it. Within days an amendment to the Land Acquisition Act was tabled in parliament, reproducing precisely the provisions of the article 57 of the rejected draft. Carver (2003) describes this, as was a matter of urgency, since Mugabe could no longer be confident of pushing such a measure through the new post election parliament. However, it was indicative of the rush and confusion in government ranks that entirely forgot that parliament also needed to amend the constitution to allow expropriation of land without compensation. However, this could be achieved by presidential decree. An opinion survey on the eve of the referendum found that only nine percent of the population saw land as priority political issue. For most Zimbabweans, unemployment, inflation and the DRC war overshadowed it.

Masipula (2001) states that since the defeat of the constitutional referendum in 2000, politics in Zimbabwe have been marked by slow regression away from the norms of

democratic governance, such as democratic elections, the independence of the judiciary, the existence of independent media, civil society and academia. This has been emphasized by Norma (2003) that ensuing elections have been marked by political violence and intimidation, along with politicization of the judiciary, military, police force and public service. Statements by the president and government politicians have referred to a state of war, or *Chimurenga*, against the opposition parties in particular the MDC.

Independent newspaper have been bombed and closed down, members of the judiciary have been arrested and threatened. Repressive laws aimed at preventing freedoms of speech, assembly and association have been implemented and subjectively enforced. The opposition, MDC, has repeatedly attempted to use legal system to challenge ruling ZANU- PF, but the courts rulings, often in favour of MDC, have regularly been ignored (International Crisis Group, 2005).

NEPAD is supposed to ensure that African countries follow the principles of democracy and good governance. The applicability of NEPAD in Zimbabwe is faced with the issue of poor governance which can hinder the implementation and success of NEPAD. Therefore it is of great importance the Zimbabwe crisis to be deeply addressed.

3.3. The Impact of Poor Governance on the Implementation of NEPAD

African leaders acknowledge that the continent faces great challenges and the most urgent of these are in particular the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development through democracy and good governance. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa noted that the goal of good governance in Africa is to end

political and economic mismanagement, violent conflicts, instability, denied of democracy and human rights, deepening poverty and global marginalization. As mentioned earlier, for sustainable development to be achieved, there is a need for good governance. It is important to emphasize that, economic growth and development cannot be achieved in the absence of good governance. Therefore poor governance is a challenge to the successful implementation of NEPAD. This leads the study to examine Zimbabwe governance with adherence to the Declaration of Democracy, Political and Economic Governance. For the sake of convenience it will be discussed under political, social and economic aspect.

3.3.1. Impact of Zimbabwe's Poor Governance on Politics

3.3.1(a) Rule of Law

The Zimbabwean Constitution stipulates a democratic system of government with three branches; the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The head of the executive is the president, which serves as both head of state and government. In principle, the three branches serve as mechanisms for checks and balances in government operations characterised by democracy, the rule of law, freedom of information and popular participation in development (Barclay, 1998).

An independent judiciary is vital to enforcing the law and ensuring accountability. Robert Mugabe has destroyed the independence of the judiciary which its constitution provides for an independent judiciary. It is noted that the constitution is the supreme law of the country. It contains a declaration of fundamental rights, stipulates freedoms of the individuals and also lays down rules on how the state has to be governed. The Supreme Court, consisting of a chief justice and four judges, has jurisdiction in all

matters in which an infringement of the constitution fundamental rights is alleged. On paper, the Zimbabwean judiciary system and constitution is thus in line with and in support of NEPAD principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights, and promotion of the rule of law. However, the government has repeatedly refused to abide by judicial decisions with which it disagrees (Lymann, 2005)

For instance, some years Zimbabwe's courts, especially the country's highest court, the Supreme Court, had a deserved reputation for upholding human rights and the rule of law. This brought the courts frequently into conflict with the government. For example, the court struck down provisions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act that restricted the holding of public meetings and prohibited the publication of false news thereby upholding freedom of assembly and press freedom. The Supreme Court also insisted that commercial farmland could be compulsorily acquired only in accordance with the law. This culminated in a landmark judgment given in December 2000 in which the Court declared that the government could acquire land resettlement only after proper programme of land reform, as required by section 16(a) of the Constitution and interdicted the government from acquiring more land until it has prepared such a programme. On that note, the government's criticism on the judiciary grew increasingly violent (Mkalipi, Herzenberg, Mbana & Mzwakali, 2003).

Judges and lawyers have been subjected to harassment and assault, and several independent judges have resigned or retired as consequences. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the independence of Judges and Lawyers has repeatedly expressed very grave concern over the deterioration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe,

and what he has described as “systematic attacks on the independence of judges and lawyer by the Government and its agencies”(Carver, 2003).

3.3.1(b) Human Rights Abuses

The credibility of NEPAD is further challenged by the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe. There are numerous, credible reports of human rights abuses being committed. Such abuses include torture and political violence, severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association, the deliberate denial of access to food to those perceived as supporters of the political association, abductions and arbitrary detentions. The human rights abuses contradict the objective of NEPAD of respect of human rights (Venter, 2003).

Cases of torture that has been documented by Human Rights Watch include the arrest and torture of 15 trade unionists from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions on September 13, 2006. All pleas by human rights organization, such as Zimbabwe Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and the World Organization Against Torture, for Mugabe to take steps to stop violence and human rights abuses have been ignored. Numerous reports have also indicated that ZANU-PF supporters, consisting mainly of war veterans and the youth brigades, took part in the large-scale intimidation of MDC supporters. There was a lot of violence, attacks on opposition rallies and arrests. At one point a couple of years ago, the head of MDC-Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested for treason and charged with plotting to kill Mugabe. He was later found not guilty. The fact that the police were mostly silent onlookers during such incidents of intimidation is an indication of a strong possibility that ZANU-PF and Mugabe were actually promoting these acts of violence and intimidation. At a rally on March 11, 2007, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara were arrested,

along with 50 others, and Tsvangirai severely beaten while in police custody. Nine other activists were reportedly badly beaten in custody and opposition arrests and raids on party offices continued throughout the month (Human Rights Watch,2007).

3.3.1(c). Freedom of Association and Assembly

Freedom of association and assembly are the vital to the existence of a democratic society, respect to human dignity and indispensable for the formation of public opinion. The Zimbabweans are routinely arrested for peacefully and publicly expressing their opinions. In the past years the government of Zimbabwe has introduced a range of legislations which undermines the basic freedoms of expression, association and assembly; rights which are guaranteed to all under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' rights. These legislations include Public Order and Security Act (POSA) enacted in January 2002, in advance of the presidential election. It introduced a range of criminal offences, including criticism of the person or office of the President (up to one year's imprisonment); publication of a false statement that prejudices or is intended to prejudice the country's defense or economic interests, or which undermines or is intended to undermine public confidence in a law enforcement agency (up to 5 years imprisonment); and the holding of a public gathering without giving the police four days' notice. The Act also gives the police extensive powers to regulate and control any public gatherings, including banning or breaking up meetings that are deemed to endanger public order (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Since 2002 laws such as POSA and the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA) have been consistently used by the Mugabe government to deny access to the opposition

and civil society activists to freely assemble, and associate, and express political opinions. Non Governmental Organization (NGOs) such as Women Of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) have been regularly victimized by these laws. In the past seven years, hundreds of members of both organisations have been arbitrarily arrested and detained under the criminal law (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

3.3.1(d). Freedom of Expression and Information

Johnson (2002) commented that no genuine democracy could exist without good service by the media. The statement shows that media plays a vital role in the society. Therefore a free press is essential to democracy. There continue to be serious limits to freedom of expression and democracy in Zimbabwe particularly in the form of threats of closure of independent media organisations, as well as the intimidation, arbitrary arrests, and criminal prosecution of journalists. The government's actions seem primarily designed to inhibit criticism of government officials and institutions, and to silence independent reporting and commentary on the political situation in the country.

In the past years the government passed draconian media laws as well as legislation that restricts the freedom of expression of the population to suppress. Under the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which was passed in the run-up to the March 2002 presidential election, all news organizations and journalists were required to apply to the government-appointed Media and Information Commission (MIC) for licenses to operate. Large numbers of Zimbabwean journalists were refused registration and were thus unable to work legally, while many others lost their jobs because of enforced newspaper closures.

Foreign correspondents were banned from living in Zimbabwe and could visit the country only for limited periods, subject to accreditation. In February 2002 the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression stated in a communication to the Zimbabwe Government that the provisions of the Act infringed the right to freedom of opinion and expression as guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN News Service, 2002).

Mugabe continued to amend legislation to restrict the freedom of expression and media in order to remain in power. For instance in January 2005 Parliament passed an amendment to AIPPA. This provided for a sentence of up to two years in prison or a fine for any journalist who tried to work without accreditation from the MIC, thus reinforcing the Commission's power over journalists and the news media.. According to the Media and Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ), up to 400 journalists were reported to have been arrested under POSA in 2004, and more than one hundred journalists have reportedly been arrested under AIPPA in the past two years (Amnesty International, 2005).

Zimbabwe's only independent daily newspaper, the Daily News, was closed down by the MIC in September 2003, after the Supreme Court ruled that it was publishing illegally because it had not registered with the Commission. When the MIC refused to register the paper, the courts ruled on several occasions that it should be allowed to publish. It went to press briefly on more than one occasion, whereupon the police intervened. In January 2004 a High Court judge ordered the police to stop interfering with its publication; but publication ceased on 6 February 2004, when the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of AIPPA, stating that it was a crime to publish a

newspaper or work as a journalist without a license. The Daily News had been Zimbabwe's most popular newspaper, with a readership of one million, and it was the only daily paper that gave a voice to the Opposition and civic society (Amnesty International, 2003).

Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) were refused to be granted an operating license to resume publication of the Daily News and its sister paper, the Daily News on Sunday. The MIC is reported to have accused ANZ of failing to register the paper, employing unaccredited journalists and not depositing copies of the paper with the Commission. The MIC also refused to allow the independent weekly, The Tribune, to resume publishing. In June 2004 publication of The Tribune, which had a reputation for condemning human rights abuses and government corruption, was suspended for alleged violations of AIPPA (International Press Institute Press Release, 2005).

3.3.2. Impact of Zimbabwe's Poor Governance on Society

3.3.2(a). Poverty and Unemployment

Poverty and unemployment are both endemic in Zimbabwe, driven by the shrinking economy and hyper-inflation. Both unemployment and poverty rates run near 80%. As of January 2006, the poverty line was ZWD 17,200 per month. As of June 2007 this had risen to ZWD 5.5 million per month (US \$14.00). The average farm worker's monthly wage was under ZWD 100,000 per month (US \$0.25) and the average worker's monthly wage was \$500,000 (US \$1.25). The lowest 10% of Zimbabwe's population consume only 1.97% of the economy, while the highest 10% consume 40.42%. (1995). The current account balance of the country is negative, standing at

around US -\$517 million. This high poverty rate stems mainly from the general deterioration in the economy, which has led to high unemployment and escalating prices for basic commodities. Unemployment rate figures in Zimbabwe are placed just above eighty percent (Table 3.1). Zimbabwe workers are among the poorly paid civil servants in the global economy where they cannot even afford to pay school fees for their children even if their salaries are doubled according to the present rate (The Economist, July 12, 2007).

Table 3.1

Year	Unemployment Rate	Rank	Percent Change	Date of Information
2003	70.00%	2		2002est
2004	70.00%	3	0.00%	2002est
2005	70.00%	192	0.00%	2002est
2006	80,00%	198	14.29%	2005est
2007	80.00%	195	0.00%	2005est

Source: CIA World Factbook - accurate as of April 17, 2007

3.3.2(b).Migration

It is unarguable that one of the social problems undermining the development of Africa is the illegal immigration. The media estimates suggest between 3 000 and 5 000 Zimbabweans cross the border into South Africa everyday. According to South African Department of Home Affairs, estimates of daily illegal border –crossers vary, but 100 000 Zimbabweans were officially deported between January and end of July. The Zambian immigration has also reported that the number of Zimbabweans crossing into southern town of Livingstone in search of basic goods has risen from 60 to 1000 people daily (Mail and Guardian, 13 August, 2007). The Minister of Home Affairs described most Zimbabweans who illegally enter the country are as

“economic migrants”. Zimbabwe is in an economic freefall that has already forced more than a million of its people to migrate to neighbouring countries in search of jobs or as economic refugees due to food shortages, lack of jobs, and the government’s hard ball tactics against its political opponents. As thousands of people flock their unstable country to neighbouring countries, they tend to disrupt the development process in these countries as a result of extra demands on their resources. For example, South Africa and Botswana governments have been transporting Zimbabwean illegal immigrants every week and many were flooded in refugee camps. According to Sanote(2005), it costs the government of Botswana a lot of money to feed and transport them . The situation back home forces them to come back again after. Woods(2005) added that Zimbabwe has become a drain on the region. According to Moller the situation will affect the whole region because poor governance in one country affects others negatively (Moller, 2004:)

3.3.2(c). HIV/AIDS

The Zimbabwean government response to HIV and AIDS has ultimately been compromised by numerous other political and social crises that have dominated political attention and overshadowed the implementation of the national AIDS policy. HIV/AIDS has taken a terrible toll in human terms. Approximately 1.3 million children have been orphaned and over 2 million people live with HIV out of a population of 12.9 million. Life expectancy of Zimbabweans has fallen from 62 years in 1990 to 37 years at present with 3000 deaths from AIDS every week. Up to 70% of hospital beds are taken by patients suffering from AIDS related illnesses. Since 2000 the government has imposed a controversial AIDS levy on everyone who earns an income. Despite this, anti-retroviral drugs are currently priced beyond the reach of

average citizens and only 40,000 receive treatment out of an estimated 600,000 in need. Human rights groups and activists, such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Women Action Support Network, petitioned President Mugabe in early 2006 to press his government into taking HIV more seriously (World Health Organisation, 2006).

3.3.3. Impact of Zimbabwe's Poor Governance on Economy

Zimbabwe, once a vibrant and diversified economy had been the hope for Africa's future. It had a thriving tourist industry, a strong manufacturing sector and a strong agricultural sector. At the time of its independence it had an excellent infrastructure and had a reasonably better education system. The country faces an economic crisis marked by the world's highest inflation rate of more than 4 500 percent, severe food shortage, gasoline shortage and foreign currency shortage. The crisis is seen to be as a result of inappropriate economic policies, the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate and increased regulations and government intervention. These conditions have made conducting business very difficult (Chanaka, 2007).

3.3.3(a). Gross Domestic Products (GDP) growth-down

Real GDP is in a continuous decline. Real GDP declined by 6.5 percent in 2005, which was the 7th consecutive year of negative GDP growth since 1997. Over the period 1997-2005, GDP declined by more than 30 percent. Nearly all sectors of the economy have experienced a sharp downturn, agriculture in particular because of the land reform. The Zimbabwe dollar has been grossly overvalued, which has led to the emergence of a large parallel exchange market. Donor support and capital inflows have come to a halt and there is an acute shortage of foreign exchange. (World Bank, 2006).

3.3.3(b). Decline of Savings and Investment

Savings in Zimbabwe have been declining as a share of GDP since 1996. This marked decline in savings can be attributed to the high inflation, shrinking real incomes, and high government consumption. Capital formation has been declining since 1995. The decline was initially attributed to the drought in the 1994/95 agricultural years, which led to more funds being channeled to consumption spending rather than investment. In addition, the gloomy economic environment has made the country unattractive to investors. The good rainy season between 1996 and 1997 brought prospects of stronger growth in capital formation but these hopes were quickly dissipated by the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar against major currencies in 1997 and also continuing economic instability, the low savings rate along with the increasing isolation from international partners.

The Government of Zimbabwe's misgovernance has severely crippled the local economy, making it unlikely to attract or absorb significant foreign direct investment in 2006. Investment prospects in Zimbabwe are bound to remain dismal due to the country's unstable economic and political environment. Government policies and recent constitutional amendments have eroded rule-of-law and put private property rights at grave risk.

Foreign investors will find few if any sectors appealing at this time. The government's Export Processing Zones Authority reported that within a six-month period in 2005, 33 agro-based companies closed down. The World Bank/International Finance Corporation's & Doing Business in 2006⁸ surveys ranked Zimbabwe 126 out of 155 countries considered and one of the worst in southern Africa. Further illustrative of

the deteriorating investment climate, Zimbabwe fell to last deteriorating investment climate, Zimbabwe fell to last place out of 64 regions and countries surveyed in the Vancouver-based Fraser Institutes, 2004-2005 report on mineral policy investor friendliness (US Embassy, 2006).

3.3.3(c). Monetary and Fiscal Policy

Zimbabwe has been unable to maintain a sound fiscal policy as a result of both internal and external political pressures: the demand for higher social spending for war veterans and the military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The growth in government spending has outstripped growth in revenue, leading to increasing reliance on the Reserve Bank to fund the deficit and thus to harmful growth in the monetary supply.

Inconsistency in fiscal and monetary policy, especially the continued bank financing of the budget deficit, has undermined the effort by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to pursue a tight monetary policy. The money supply has grown continually since 1998. The rapid growth in the money supply in Zimbabwe has been the main cause of inflation since 1998. Inflation, as officially reported, topped 4 500 percent last year with some unofficial reports putting the country's inflation rate even higher. Prices are doubling every month. Inflation of this magnitude renders the government-issued money virtually worthless, wrecking trade and financial institutions in the process (Macroblog, July 26, 2007).

The immediate “solution” to the Zimbabwe inflation has been the imposition of price controls. Predictably, the problem seems to have gotten worse, now there are even fewer goods for the Zimbabwe dollar to chase.

3.3.3(d). Corruption

Growing corruption and poor governance have undermined confidence in the economy of Zimbabwe. Corruption blocks growth and bars the private sector from playing the dynamic role in development. It can also be argued that it contributes a negative image of the country and thus scares off foreign direct investment. As such, is a major constraint to economic development.

According to Steekomp (2003) some of Zimbabweans have grown rich through corruption. While land reform was ostensibly aimed at wider distribution of an important economic resource, the implementation was not beneficial to the majority of the people. The ostensible reason for the land resettlement programme was to benefit landless peasants, but under the so called ‘A2’ commercial farmer resettlement scheme farms have been allocated to ruling party supporters, ruling elites and some officials. They got more favourable access to land, and in some instances resulting in ownership of multiple farms by individuals. This scramble for land was another indication of the predatory tendencies of the elite, some of whose members were already tainted by corruption scandal. The process benefited the few who got rich and the majority of the population remained poorer.

The United Nations(UN) accused heads of security forces of corruptly enriching themselves during Zimbabwe’s participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).It has been stated by the UN report that Zimbabwe involvement in the

DRC has cost the country approximately 30 billion Zimbabwean Dollar since 1998. The deployment has been a huge contributing factor to the decline of the Zimbabwean economy and has resulted in the widespread deprivation and poverty amongst the population. Financial gains from Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC, received in the form of diamonds and forestry concession, have in the past also not been ploughed back in the economy, but were used to enrich a small number of politicians, senior defense force officers and businessmen close to Mugabe (Taylor, 2003).

3.3.3(e). Food Security

Bread, sugar, and cornmeal, staples food of every Zimbabwean's diet, have vanished. The United States-based Famine Early Warning System (FEWSNET) says a government crackdown on prices that began in June has worsened the food security in the country. In its latest assessment report, FEWSNET said the Zimbabwean government's controversial price controls was further worsening household food security in a country where the majority of the people can barely make ends meet. It warned that the poor have been left vulnerable to food insecurity following the disappearance of basic commodities from the Zimbabwean shelves after President Mugabe ordered a freeze on prices of goods and services in June. The run of commodities is having the biggest impact on the poor, who are forced to make frequent purchases in smaller amounts and are not able to buy in bulk when commodities become available (Zim Online, 12 August 2007).

3.4. The Challenges encountered by NEPAD in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe opted not to join the APRM despite its crisis which has left the country with extremely political, economic and social instability. Kaufman (2002) ranked Zimbabwean political governance as -1.50 and economic governance as -1.20. It is evident that the country both exhibits poor governance quality, both politically and economically. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has remained uncommitted to the APRM. The following reasons are why Zimbabwe did not accede to APRM.

3.4.1. The reasons behind Zimbabwe refusal to accept APRM

Zimbabwe government has not yet signed to the APRM process. Countries are usually faced with a dilemma whether or not join the APRM. In making this choice, the government is forced to weigh up the benefits and cost of its decision. In signing to the APRM, a state might potentially be looking for improved economic growth which is stimulated by factors such as improved governance quality and investor confidence. The other factors can be debt relief and donor aid (Masterson, 2004).

Aning (2002) said in making a decision about joining the APRM, a government has to decide whether the costs of joining outweigh the benefits or vice versa. Apparently the Zimbabwean government has to wait to examine whether the APRM will indeed benefit the participating countries. The country is faced with severe economic crisis that will take time to recover. The cost of joining APRM for the moment will be high. Short terms goals by APRM to foster economic growth will not be easily achieved.

One of the analysts of South African Institute of International Affairs, Kajee cited some reasons why countries may be holding back in signing to the APRM. He said some African leaders still view the APRM with suspicion. A case in point is Zimbabwe which is not yet certain about the process. Some leaders still think that ties are tied with the West. For Zimbabwe, it becomes difficult to trust the intentions of APRM because the country does not have good relations with the United States and European Union. For the fact that they have been enquiring that there has to be regime change in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has been described as a dictator, tyrant and a punitive leader. With that regard, Zimbabwe has to wait and see if the APRM will not target their leader (Kajee, 2004)

Aning (2001) commented that some African countries view the APRM with fear that will lead to an erosion of national sovereignty. In ensuring good governance, national sovereignty is being challenged. The APRM functions on the basis of collective action which means that African states will have to cede part of their sovereignty for the process to work and be credible. Thus Zimbabwe is not willing to give up part of its sovereignty.

Zimbabwe has proven its unwillingness to allow outside scrutiny of either political or economic affairs. The government has to restrain from certain international and regional initiatives where they might infringe on national sovereignty. Zimbabwe has a history of placing sovereignty above. For example the historical factors revolving around liberation and independence struggles play an important part on emphasis on national sovereignty in Zimbabwe. Liberation movement in Zimbabwe, priorities

national unity above all. The emphasis on unity, pitching the freedom fighters against one common enemy.

Kanje (2003) further maintains that some countries prefer to get their house in order before acceding to the process. For example countries such as Somalia have been destabilized by war. This reason may also be a case with Zimbabwe. The impact of land reform has been huge. The country needs to reconstruct its economy that has collapsed and deal with the issue of alleviating poverty.

Masterson (2004) concluded that most governments with poor governance quality are nevertheless joining the APRM in spite of the cost of doing so.

3.5. The Role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe

3.5.1. Relationship between NEPAD and SADC

Since the inception of NEPAD, it has been broadly accepted as an important vehicle towards the achievement of development goals and objectives of the continent. The achievement of these goals, however, requires both national and regional efforts and SADC has taken NEPAD as an integral part of its policy development in the region in order to contribute to the continental objectives. Synergies exist between SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and NEPAD in a number of areas including democracy, peace, security and governance; agriculture; food security and environment; education and health; science and technology; and infrastructure development and tourism. SADC and NEPAD have elaborated an implementation strategy with clear responsibilities, activities and timeframes in these areas (SADC Today, 2004).

In an effort to ensure good governance in the region, NEPAD and SADC appointed the South African president Thabo Mbeki to facilitate a negotiated political solution in Zimbabwe

3.5.2. Mediation

President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa has been appointed by SADC on March 29, to facilitate talks between the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition party MDC leading to elections next year in March. In the five months there have been only two substantive sessions between President Mugabe negotiators; Labour Minister Nicholas Goche and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, and the two secretary-generals of the two divided MDC. At the start of the negotiations the two sides engaged on draft constitution they negotiated in secret in Harare in 2004. It was used as foundation to try to solve the disagreements. However, on the eve of the second round of talks in July President Mugabe made it clear he would never agree to new constitution before elections next March. The two sides have been discussing reforms of electoral laws. Any reforms could be facilitated through another amendment to Zimbabwe constitution (Pretoria News, 13 August, 2007).

President Mugabe already wants the 18th constitutional amendment which has already been gazetted to allow presidential and parliamentary elections to be held simultaneously, expand parliamentary seats. He also wants the constitution amended so that if he retires or dies in office, parliament would choose his successor not the electorate. As it stands now, President Mugabe would be the ZANU-PF candidate for the presidential elections due next March, and time is running out for any serious

changes to Zimbabwe's electoral laws and processes, which the opposition claims were created to assist ZANU-PF at the polls (Pretoria News, 13 August, 2007).

In the five months since SADC asked President Thabo Mbeki to mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis, President Robert Mugabe has pushed through legislation entrenching his rule, widened rifts with his opponents and made policy decisions that have deepened his country's economic crisis. A report on the progress presented by Mbeki on his mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, shows that there are no visible signs that Mugabe has cooperated as much as SADC had hoped. There is a question of how much of the recommended reforms Mugabe will be prepared to accept. Political sources close to the negotiations are not optimistic Mugabe will agree to substantial changes (Mail and Guardian, 12 August 2007).

ZANU-PF seems to feel it is under no pressure; as it has missed meetings at will and stalled the talks on constitutional reform. His two negotiators, failed to turn up for scheduled talks on July 7 and 8. In a belated attempt to involve civil society, which had been in the forefront of anti- Mugabe demonstrations and campaigns for a new constitution, Mbeki invited civic leaders for discussions (Pretoria News, 13 August, 2007).

3.5.3. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit –18th August 2007

Southern African leaders meeting in summit in Lusaka, Zambia, have told Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe they'll organize a bailout package for his country but that he must first institute political and economic reforms. The summit communiqué said South African President Thabo Mbeki assured leaders that talks

between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC were "progressing smoothly." But SADC leaders urged Mbeki and the principals to speed up the process so that the general and presidential elections slated to be held in March 2008 "are held in a free and fair environment that encourages for a democratic outcome."

Eldred Masungunure, a political scientist at the University of Zimbabwe, said that most people in Zimbabwe had 'exhausted their sense of optimism about the process'. He did not expect the summit to come up with 'something spectacular' arguing that the meeting will likely 'come up with more of the same. Masungunure said some of the leaders 'may garner sufficient courage to chastise Mugabe in private' but the summit won't bring about the change that is needed in Zimbabwe. Jonathan Moyo a former Mugabe minister, who is now an independent Member of Parliament, concurs that there are no regional summits that come up with something new. He elaborated that since the extraordinary session of March 29, the process has been notable more for its setbacks than its achievement, pointing to the divided opposition and the incidents of no-shows by ZANU-PF negotiators. He said ZANU-PF still does not feel it needs to negotiate, as it is cushioned by a two-thirds majority in parliament, which allows it to amend the constitution.

3.5.4. From President Thabo Mbeki to President Levy Mwanawasa

Thabo Mbeki might have been chosen by SADC to spearhead dialogue but it is Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa who could be the key to resolving the crisis in the embattled country. In February, at a time most African leaders, including Mbeki, were advocating quite diplomacy, Mwanawasa came out with one of the strongest statements on Zimbabwe, an analogy of Zimbabwe crisis to the sinking of the Titanic

and saying that the country's economic difficulties are forcing its citizens to leave like passengers jumping from the sinking ship (NewZimbabwe ,18 August 2007).

Mwanawasa's comments were among the strongest by any of the Zimbabwe's neighbours since the start of the country's economic turmoil and political confrontation. Against that backdrop, there was some hope that, when Mwanawasa takes over the rotational SADC chair, the Zimbabwe crisis will receive closer attention. There was hope that African leaders have started seeing the need to be honest with each other and "fix things". But hardly ten days before the summit started in Lusaka it was reported that 'Zambian President Mwanawasa has dispatched a special envoy to Harare to repair relations with President Mugabe.

It will not be fair to conclude that the efforts of SADC are a failure and have not brought any significant achievements. The issue of Zimbabwe is so critical that there cannot be put exclusively on the shoulders of President Thabo Mbeki. As Thokozani Khupe, deputy president of the MDC alluded that they have confidence in Thabo Mbeki but they want SADC to involve more than one country. Jonathan Moyo concurred that the mediation should be broadened to include other players in the region so that ZANU-PF can't wrangle out the process by saying; we can't have our constitution decided in Pretoria. According to Moyo, it can't be said that the mediation is a SADC process when it is entirely led and composed by negotiators from one country.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. Methodology

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe procedures that were used to collect data used by the study to look at the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD using Zimbabwe as a case study. It comprises of the study sample and sample selection procedures, the method of data collection and data analysis technique.

A case study approach was used to look at the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD with a special reference to Zimbabwe. A case study focuses on one unit of analysis, but simultaneously takes account of the context, and so encompasses many variables and qualities. A case study might be selected purposefully or analytically, because it is for instance, information- rich, critical, unique and extreme. Therefore, a case study method provided the researcher with a wealth of detail, description and an in-depth understanding of the problem (Stake 1995, Patton 1990).

The case study method is important because it has the ability to open a way for new discoveries (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1990). It is good particularly when the research context is too complex and when the research is interested in the outcome of a single unit and studies a typical case. In this instance, Zimbabwe is the case study of this research. Also the ability of African institutions and programmes to confront the challenges of this century were analyzed. This will assist in the future programme

formulation and implementation. Furthermore, the case study approach can easily serve as a breeding ground for insights and even hypotheses that may be pursued in subsequent studies.

This study adopts the qualitative method as its major research approach methodology. It was chosen because this study required an in-depth understanding of the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD. Therefore qualitative methodology was mainly used to quantify the extent of the problem (Lincoln 1994, Mouton and Marais, 1998). Qualitative research methods such as key informants interviews and focus group discussions and examination of secondary data formed the core of the data collection, while a questionnaire was administered to the research sample in an effort to collect supportive quantitative data. The qualitative methods exemplify a common belief that can provide a deeper understanding of social phenomenon.

4.1. 1. Study Sample and Selection

The key informants were interviewed at all levels of the research project as a means to gain in-depth qualitative information and to have a comprehensive and critical understanding of the research problem.

- The South African Department of Foreign Affairs –This department is important in mediation process in Zimbabwe.
- NEPAD offices in Midrand –South Africa, this where the Secretariat of NEPAD is located - they are well versed with the operations and aspirations of

NEPAD, and therefore were in the best position to provide information to this effect.

- The Southern African Development Committee (SADC) in Gaborone. This is where the Secretariat of SADC is located. The office assigned to make recommendations on how to address the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe by SADC leaders. The researcher was able to obtain information on their role in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe.
- Zimbabwean Embassy in Botswana provided information on the root causes of Zimbabwe crisis and the reasons for not yet joined the African Review Mechanism (APRM).
- Two journalists from Botswana Guardian and Botswana Gazette, since they are independent and are well versed with the situation in Zimbabwe. In addition they provided further information that the researcher could not obtain from the government officials. Since they are independent they gave some information from a different point of view since they represent the communication media.
- Relevant academics on the field of Politics, International Relations, Peace Studies, History, Law and Public Administration.

4.1.2. Methods of Data Collection

The primary data collection instruments for this study were library study, in-depth interviews, observation, and focus group.

Examination of Literature

A researcher compiled reading on textbooks on the causes of underdevelopment and poverty in Africa, books on the history of Zimbabwe, journal articles, academic publication and documents with reference on NEPAD, NEPAD and Zimbabwe.

In-depth Interviews

Key informants from SADC, NEPAD offices, Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwean embassy were interviewed. The questions were structured and open-ended questions.

Observations

The researcher also obtained information by observing the situation in the case study area in Bulawayo and Harare.

Focus Group discussion

This brought groups of relevant people to the study together to gather information at one. The questions here were unstructured and closed ended.

4.1.3. The Data Collection Process

In-depth interviews.

An in-depth interview was used to collect data in this study. Lofland (1995) defines in-depth interview as a dialogue between a skilled interviewer and an interviewee. Its goal is to elicit rich, detailed material that can be used in analysis. Such interviews are best conducted face to face, although in some situations telephone interviewing can be successful. In-depth interviews are characterized by extensive probing and open-ended questions.

In-depth interview was considered for the following reasons;

- Usually yield richest data, details, and new insights
- Permit face-to-face contact with respondents

- Provide opportunity to explore topics in depth
- Afford ability to experience the affective as well as cognitive aspects of responses
- Allow interviewer to explain or help clarify questions, increasing the likelihood of useful responses
- Allow interviewer to be flexible in administering interview to particular individuals or circumstances

Focus Group Discussion

Another approach used in this study to collect data, was focus group discussion with randomly selected groups of 8-10 Zimbabwe immigrants in Gaborone, Botswana. A focus group discussion is a very important qualitative research technique used to extract data from targeted group of individuals having common interest characteristics brought together by a moderator who uses the group and its interaction as a way to gain information about a specific or focused issue. The hallmark of focus group discussion is to produce qualitative data to provide insights into the attitudes, perceptions and opinions of participants that would be unlikely to emerge without the interaction found in a group.

A focus group is typically people who are unfamiliar with each other. The people to be included are known to have been involved in a particular situation or experience related to the research problem. The discussant knows in advance the topics to be covered. Focus group participants are typically asked to reflect on the questions asked by the researcher. Participants are permitted to hear each other's responses and to make additional comments beyond their own original responses as they hear what

other people have to say. It is not necessary for the group to reach any kind of consensus, nor it is necessary for people to disagree. The researcher must keep the discussion flowing and make sure that one or two persons do not dominate the discussion.

The main objective of a focus group is to get high-quality data in a social context where people can consider their own views in the context of the views of others, and where new ideas and perspectives can be introduced.

4.1.4.Data Analysis Technique

The methodology adopted in this study was based on qualitative research methods. This method served to gather information on the opinion reactions, and the observation of the dynamics, processes and behaviors of actors and people in the study sample. The data was therefore analyzed through the use of content analysis.

Content analysis enabled the researcher to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. Using this method, inferences were made which was corroborated with information from other method of data collection such as focus group discussion.

Advantages of Content Analysis

Content analysis offers several advantages to researchers who consider using it. In particular, content analysis:

- looks directly at communication via texts or transcripts, and hence gets at the central aspect of social interaction
- can allow for both quantitative and qualitative operations

- can provide valuable historical/cultural insights over time through analysis of texts allows a closeness to text which can alternate between specific categories and relationships and also statistically analyzes the coded form of the text
- can be used to interpret texts for purposes such as the development of expert systems (since knowledge and rules can both be coded in terms of explicit statements about the relationships among concepts)
- is an unobtrusive means of analyzing interactions
- provides insight into complex models of human thought and language use
- when done well, is considered as a relatively "exact" research method (based on hard facts, as opposed to Discourse Analysis).

4.1.5. Ethical Consideration

- This research took social science ethics into consideration throughout the process of this investigation
- Efforts were made to guarantee the confidentiality and anonymity of primary sources, where necessary.
- The respondents were informed prior, that participation in the study is be voluntarily.
- The information extracted from books, journals and other articles were acknowledged. This is in line with the ethics of social science research, which forbid plagiarism.

4.1.6. Limitation of the Study

- The major limitation of the study will be the difficulty in having access to some the information which will be critical to the study.

- Some key Zimbabwean government employees whom I intended to interview will want to protect the interest of their governments. Due to the nature of information involved, efforts were made to guarantee the confidentiality and anonymity of these people.
- Since most of the data constitutes opinions and documented information, they may be unreliable or inaccurate.
- The limited time frame allocated for this research posed a challenge since the researcher is a full time doing course work. Therefore, there was insufficient time to adequately follow all the components of the research process.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. Research Findings and Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to give research findings and analysis, regarding the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD in Zimbabwe. The analysis is guided by the objectives of the study that are; what are the root causes of poor governance in Zimbabwe; the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe on the implementation of NEPAD; and the role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe.

5. 1.The Root causes of poor governance in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is on the seventh year experiencing political turmoil and economic crisis. Attempts have been taken by SADC, South Africa using “quite diplomacy” and sanctions by some Western countries to the crisis thus have not found the sustainable solution. This study argues that the Zimbabwean crisis has not risen out of nowhere, therefore the sustainable solution to the crisis could not be found unless the root causes is well understood. An understanding of the root causes of the Zimbabwean crisis will constitute an integrated input to the effort of those involved in mapping sustainable solution to the crisis. It will also create a conducive environment for the implementation of the development goals NEPAD.

There are many reasons that can be pointed out that caused the Zimbabwean crisis but land reform stand at the heart of the crisis. The study revealed that there was unfair equal distribution of land during colonialism. The minority whites owned vast arable land than the majority blacks who were overcrowded in communal farms. Karl Marx

predicted that conflict is bound to happen if there is class struggle in a society. In Zimbabwean case, the white farmers were the bourgeois and the black majority were the peasants. The respondents agreed that land redistribution was necessary in order to correct the injustices of the past that seems to be the extension of colonial policies. It is important to note that the issue of land redistribution is a critical issue in Southern Africa especially in South Africa and Namibia. The study further revealed that though land distribution was crucial, its implementation which was guided by corruption led to decay of the economy. There is an indication that the rural poor have not benefited accordingly to land redistribution. It has been carried out in a manner that disproportionately benefited high-ranking members of ZANU-PF instead of agricultural workers and small black farmers. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002 reports shows that the process is unsustainable in terms of lack of commitment of finances, skills and other resources by government to areas that have been resettled.

Though the MDC agree that land redistribution was to happen they blamed the President Mugabe for governance problems in Zimbabwe. They pointed out that land was used as a strategy essential to the process of legitimizing his project by using force to those who opposed to his rule. It has been pointed out that the government has politicized the land reform process. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the introduction of a land reform process allowed for heightened populist and militia action to ensure a favorable electoral outcome for ZANU-PF government. It served as an electioneering tool with slogans like “The Land is the Economy, the Economy is the Land”.

President Mugabe has constructed an alternative discourse around redress for colonial injustices. The land occupation project was located within the language of historical redress, and it was hoped that it would find support within a wider colonial experience on the African continent. The psychological power of the land issue remains a vital aspect of the political atmosphere in the country. Moreover, ZANU-PF has linked Zimbabwe's wider political and economic problems to an inherited colonial legacy. The land question became the symbol that ZANU-PF could attempt to conceal all its governance failures.

Some of the respondents in a focus group mentioned that the issue of Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s could be one of the issues that President Mugabe refuse to relinquish power. It is believed that once he step down he will be trailed for what can be termed genocidal massacres. Though the case seems to be neglected those who come from Matabeleland bears the pain of it. Carver (2003) points out that there is still mistrust between the Ndebele people that Mugabe who is a Shona wants to revenge on the invasion of Ndebele King Lobengula on the Shona. It was discovered that there is hatred between the Shona and the Ndebele.

As in most of African countries, Zimbabwe has bared the negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programme. Instead of helping the poor, the situation became worse. Juhaz (2003) argues that before the introduction of SAPS, the country had great improvement in social and economic development. The country experienced the impact of SAPS which were unemployment and price increases in basic goods. The government met opposition for the first time and stirred up civil society in a country where there had been limited organized criticism of ZANU-PF for much of the post-

independence period. Moyo (2003) concluded that though the Zimbabwean crisis has its roots in the Lancaster Agreement, the introduction of SAPs has greatly contributed to the decline of social and economic development.

The study further revealed that in the 1990s, the political landscape of Zimbabwe has changed extensively. Since 1980, the government has not been challenged by any opposition. The democratic mechanisms such as checks and balances, rule of law has been undermined. In parliament, the president's decision was not challenged. However in the 1990s, there was emerging opposition coming from outside ZANU-PF in the form of trade unionists, civil society and the public sector. Dissent converged around the issue of poor governance and the problematic economic environment. The manner in which President Mugabe has sought to manage growing domestic dissension has taken a number of forms and characterizes the current authoritarian landscape. The ZANU -PF government has both supported and perpetuated state sponsored political violence and human rights abuses. ZANU-PF's obsession with the use of liberation rhetoric found resonance amongst many Zimbabweans during the labor strikes of the 1990's. When the rhetoric of liberation could no longer conceal the failures of government it began resorting to authoritarian measures to secure political power. Authoritarianism led to poor governance and it resulted to political and economic crisis.

5.2.3. The Impact of Poor Governance in Zimbabwe on the implementation of NEPAD

The study revealed that the impact of poor governance in Zimbabwe has left the country to be in a state of free fall. It is embroiled in the worst political, economic and social crisis of its twenty-seventh year history as an independent state. The crisis has negatively affected virtually every aspect of the country and every segment of the population. It has severely torn the country's social fabric. The level of unemployment and poverty is beyond measure. Food shortages, especially basic foods have created a new surge of economic refugees. The crisis has also caused fundamental damage to its once-strong economy, dramatically increased the suffering of Zimbabwe's people, accelerated a damaging brain drain, and increased the use of state-sponsored violence, the perpetrators of which operate with impunity. An HIV/AIDS epidemic only adds to the catastrophe. Significant post-independence achievements in economic growth, and development of state institutions have already been severely eroded. Zimbabwe, which after independence was one of Africa's best hopes for establishing a healthy democracy and prosperous economy, is now descending into a cycle of poverty and repression.

The study also revealed that the government of Zimbabwe has failed to ensure a favorable business environment for the private sector. Businesses cannot buy inputs or sell their products internationally when the local currency is unstable against other currencies and if the country is experiencing high inflation with constant readjustment of prices and loss of confidence abroad. The government has failed to establish the framework and enabling environment for economic growth by setting sound

macroeconomic policies. These involve a rational balance of responsibilities between the private and public sector to secure sustained and widespread economic progress. African leaders acknowledges that the private sector is the engine growth in production and the failure of Zimbabwean government to provide a favorable environment has led to the collapse of the economy. Therefore the goals of NEPAD will be difficult to be achieved in such an environment.

The weak democratic institutions and mechanisms in Zimbabwe had an impact on the implementation of NEPAD in the country. A case in point if there was a free press, it could inform the public, analyse and critique government policies, monitor government performances and service delivery. Laws with wide ranging and repressive power such as POSA and AIPPA have been used to curb opposition. With separation of power being undermined the important checks and balances on government no longer exists. The government of Zimbabwe has failed to work actively with the civil society. Strong civil society engagement and participation are crucial for effective governance because they bring important actors to the fore, ensure the relevance of public investments, lead to the decisions that best address the people needs as they perceive them, and serve as watchdogs for the development and implementation of government policies. It can also design plans and strategies to supplement government implementation channels, to monitor, evaluate and review progress on the goals of NEPAD and to ensure that the strategies are sustainable.

The study also revealed that there is lack of accountability and transparency in Zimbabwe. This contributes directly to poverty and economic stagnation or recession by facilitating corruption. Corruption directly contributes to poverty by diverting

resources away from programs and services meant to ameliorate the plight of the poor, such as education, health care, and even infrastructure expansion. Corruption creates instability and unpredictability in governance, undermining a nation's overall economic health because individuals and corporations are hesitant to invest under such conditions. This kind of private investment is essential for sustainable economic growth. The study shows that the level of foreign investment in Zimbabwe has gone down. The instability and lack of transparency that corruption fosters not only deter foreign investors, but also prompt domestic investors to put their capital in foreign countries.

The study further revealed that the situation in Zimbabwe has caused instability in the whole region. The level of illegal immigrants in Botswana and South Africa is alarming and thus cost the economy of these countries by deporting them every week. In addition, neighbouring Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi have also been hurt economically by the drop in investor interest. As Zimbabwe's troubles intensify, they increasingly will destabilise the entire southern African region. And the high profile nature of the assault on what has been an internationally linked private sector is having negative repercussions on perceptions of the investment potential for the entire continent.

5.2.4.Challenges encountered by NEPAD in ensuring governance in Zimbabwe

The study revealed that Zimbabwe is not willing to adhere to the principles of good governance and democracy as outlined on the Declaration on Democracy and Political Governance, and Economic and Corporate Governance. Mugabe regime continues

abusing human rights, not upholding to the rule of law and the separation of power has been undermined. The macro-economic policies have devastated the already distressed economy. With this backdrop, it is necessary for Zimbabwe governance to be reviewed.

Through the APRM, countries are being reviewed and then are in position to qualify for loans and trade. The review is being done by fellow Africans. The study discovered that the greatest challenge facing NEPAD is that despite its governance problem Zimbabwe is not willing to sign up for APRM. It is understandable that it is voluntary but its signing up will have helped the country to achieve objectives of NEPAD.

The challenge of NEPAD in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe is the issue of sovereignty. Mugabe has shown unwillingness to be scrutinized by any outsider on his political and economic affairs. On that note African leaders have failed to intervene in solving the Zimbabwean crisis, as is an independent state.

5.2.5. The Role of SADC in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe

Since 2000, SADC has pursued strategies to facilitate a solution to the Zimbabwe crisis. The concept of “African solutions to African problems” espoused by the African governments in NEPAD has been applied but has not produced satisfactory results. The South African government which is regarded as a regional power has used “quite diplomacy” to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis and so far it has not been successful.

In March 2007, the economic crisis, high rate of economic refugees and the beating of the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangaria and colleagues by the police propelled SADC

leaders to intervene in Zimbabwe. President Mbeki was appointed by SADC heads of state and government to lead efforts to resolve Zimbabwe's eight-year political and economic crisis by facilitating dialogue between Mugabe's government and the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The hope is that talks between the political groupings will enable Zimbabwe to address a political and economic crisis that has led to repeated human rights abuses, as well as soaring inflation and unemployment, and shortages of basic goods.

The study revealed that the mediation process has not been transparent. For the mediation to be effective and achieve results it must be done transparently and SADC should set benchmarks that Mugabe must comply with and say what will happen if he doesn't comply. There is an indication that ZANU-PF has not taken the mediation seriously as its negotiators have missed some of the meetings. This lack of willingness indicates that Mugabe is not willing to solve the Zimbabwe crisis. Another indication that Mugabe was disregarding Mbeki's mediation effort was that Mugabe had not stopped the political violence in Zimbabwe. There are still reports that the MDC supporters were being attacked and some killed by Mugabe's agents. All in all, these will jeopardize all the efforts of SADC.

In addition, it is acknowledged that President Thabo Mbeki is doing a commendable job reconciling the Zimbabwean warring parties but has done very little to inspire confidence. Some reasons why he was chosen are because he has far greater leverage and South Africa plays a greater role in promoting NEPAD which promotes good governance and democracy. Many Zimbabweans are frustrated with regard to the role being played by South Africa. However, the reality remains that the South African

government is an important player in the developing situation, at a political level, and is likely to remain so.

The study also reveals that there is lack of assertive action towards Zimbabwe. African leaders are not putting more pressure on President Mugabe to negotiate with his political opponents to end their deadlock. There is still a tendency with African leaders to treat each other with kids' gloves. This has been shown with the manner they deal with President Mugabe as they fail to make it clear in an assertive manner that he is endangering the future NEPAD by not adhering to the principle of good governance.

The welcome given to Mugabe and the lack of criticism in the closing communiqué at the SADC summit, showed that whether they love him or not, Southern leaders have to acknowledge that he is firmly in power, enjoying crucial support from the military as well as his party. Mugabe has the status of elderstatesman among the gathered leaders, a reminder of the liberation struggles that only recently ended throughout the region, and most are reluctant to criticize him openly. Patrick Rankhumise, a researcher at the African Institute of South Africa said the ruling parties in most of these countries used to be part of liberation movements and they have ties. Unfortunately, historical bonds are stronger than the realities of post colonial states.

It will not be fair to conclude that the efforts of SADC are a failure and have not brought any significant achievements. The issue of Zimbabwe is so critical that there cannot be put exclusively on the shoulders of President Thabo Mbeki. As Thokozani Khupe, deputy president of the MDC alluded that they have confidence in Thabo

Mbeki but they want SADC to involve more than one country. Jonathan Moyo concurred that the mediation should be broadened to include other players in the region so that ZANU-PF can't wrangle the process and say, "our constitution will not be decided in Pretoria". According to Moyo, it cannot be said that the mediation is a process of SADC whereas it is composed and led by one country.

Some analysts has pointed out that Thabo Mbeki cannot be a good mediator in Zimbabwe because he is too close to Mugabe and sees him as a father figure according to a new biography. Being impartial is one of the qualities of a good mediator. Therefore it seems that is going to difficult for Mbeki to run this task of mediation. As one of the last independence leaders still running the country, the Zimbabwean leader enjoys elder statesman status among many African. According to Gevisser, author of Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred, Mugabe relationship with Mbeki is personal, and is "undoubtedly" affecting the talks between ZANU-PF and MDC. Mr. Gevisser told the Daily Telegraph that eventhough Mbeki believes Mugabe needs to go, he has proven he is not the right person to facilitate Mugabe's departure because of the history of relationship its not just a father but a father who sees some allegiance to. Mbeki has been unable to put more pressure to bear on Mugabe to force him to some sort of resolution. Gevisser argues that the opposition doesn't have trust on him and the government doesn't fear him enough to listen to his hard words.

There had been no consensus among SADC members as to what should be done regarding Zimbabwe crisis. The SADC member states are in dilemma on which approach to take on Zimbabwe. On that note they have remained silent on fear of

being divided. The situation in Zimbabwe poses a challenge not only on the political and economic stability of Southern African region, but also to the relations between SADC countries and the foreign investors. Foreign investors will be scared to invest in an environment where there is political and economic instability.

With calls for speedy end to Zimbabwe's current political and economic crisis, it shows that Zimbabwe leaders will not reach a consensus for the common good of the country and its people. This has been made clear by Mugabe that his regime would continue with its own programmes, regardless of what the SADC leaders say.

CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter focuses on conclusion and recommendation of research findings.

6. 1. Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of poor governance on the implementation of NEPAD using a case study of Zimbabwe. This has been done against the assumption in the literature that the failure of governance has left Africa in poverty and underdeveloped. The continent has experienced wars, conflicts, corruption and economic mismanagement. The attainment of independence had little benefits to the development of the country. On the other hand poor leadership and one party regime dominated Africa's political landscape. This led to disastrous consequences for sustainable socio-economic development. The major challenge was authoritarian and personal rule whereby the issue of development was not of high concern but their interest was to manipulate institutions in order to remain in power. Corruption has incapacitated the continent and few people used their time in office to enrich themselves personally as fast as possible. Corruption and economic mismanagement became endemic and many economies have collapsed as inflation rise. The abuse of human rights has been frequent especially for opposition. Opposition leaders and followers were intimidated, tortured and sometimes killed. The followers were threatened or penalized if they support the opposition. On this backdrop, there has been a need for the implementation of good governance in Africa to take it out of poverty and to achieve sustainable development. Of all the programmes, NEPAD has been the latest model to reverse Africa's under development and combat poverty. It is generally agreed that NEPAD is a new process that represent a remarkable break from the past. There are grounds to believe that this

initiative is qualitatively different from previous programmes. First, NEPAD was formulated by African leaders and represents the commitment of the continent to revitalise its image. Furthermore, NEPAD have placed governance on the continental agenda and seek to achieve their goals through the African Peer Review Mechanism. The APRM is a remarkable innovation that sets NEPAD governance architecture apart from previous initiatives.

It is important to stress that there have been other initiatives before NEPAD to tackle the issue of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. The question that arises is why these initiatives not implemented? The African leaders lacked political will and commitment. Are the present crop of leaders committed to the implementation of NEPAD? The study shows that the government of Zimbabwe has shown its unwillingness to adhere to the principle of democracy and good governance. Therefore, there is little to tell about the implementation of NEPAD. Zimbabwe is seen as an anti-NEPAD country because of its lack of democracy and poor governance. This makes it difficult for the drivers of NEPAD to secure funding, so there is little that has been done to achieve the goals of NEPAD. People are concentrating more on the political climate and declining economy than NEPAD. Therefore, there is very little participation of civil society and the people at large. There is a tense relationship between government and civil society, so even if NEPAD were implemented, effective participation would be unlikely. Currently trade unions are seen as the opposition, so it is difficult to represent the people.

The doctrine of Africans solutions to African problems has not borne much fruit in ensuring good governance in Zimbabwe. SADC leaders are still failing to publicly tell Mugabe that he is endangering the goals of NEPAD. Therefore it paints the whole

region that they are in support of Mugabe. This general image of poor governance in one country will hamper opportunities for those countries that do improve governance. It creates instability and unpredictability thus undermining a nation's overall economic health because foreign investors will not invest under such conditions. It can be noted that the instability in Africa shows that is not a destination of foreign investment. The fact remains that private investment is essential for sustainable growth. Today, poor governance and economic instability fosters not only deter foreign investors, but also prompt domestic investors to put their capital into foreign economies.

6.2.Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study the following are recommended;

The following are recommended:

- In order to encourage good governance, democratic practices and sustainable development in Africa, its leaders has to relinquish power upon expiry of their terms of office. This lead to recommend that President Robert Mugabe has to step down since twenty-seven years of his rule.
- Opposition parties should be strengthened and covered by the African Union.
- The Zimbabwe government needs to give civil society groups freedom to express their views, organize and participate in the development process. Civil society should be allowed to voice divergent views through media and other public channels in an atmosphere free from fear or threats.
- African leaders have to make it clear in an assertive manner to the Mugabe regime that they are endangering the future of NEPAD.

- Exercise peer pressure through constructive dialogue, offering assistance or applying appropriate measures to encourage Mugabe to join APRM in order to improve governance and attract foreign investment to achieve sustainable growth and development.
- SADC should broaden and involve other players to mediate between ZANU-PF and MDC and actively engage civil society.
- SADC leaders should pursue mediation to obtain ZANU-PF and MDC agreement on constitutional revisions and related legislative and regulatory measures that permit free and fair elections in 2008 consistent with the August 2004 SADC principles and guidelines, including by creating a level playing field for all parties, an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), a comprehensive review of the voter roll, and independent adjudication of any electoral disputes that arise.
- SADC leaders should inform President Mugabe, the ZANU-PF delegation at the mediated talks that unless constitutional and related legal reforms as listed above are adopted and implemented, SADC will at the very least not endorse the elections as free and fair and will refuse to extend economic assistance.
- Intervention of retired African heads of state such as Sir Ketumile Masire, Nelson Mandela, Sam Nujoma and Joaquim Chissano to discuss with the ZANU-PF leadership and President Mugabe the terms and conditions for his retirement in 2008 and the guarantees necessary to accept democratic institutional reforms. The former leaders have to share their individual and collective experiences, knowledge and commitment to the promotion of good governance and development in Africa. This can help Mugabe to be committed to the promotion of good governance.

- Extend economic assistance to Zimbabwe and call for the lifting of targeted Western sanctions on establishment figures only if ZANU-PF and President Mugabe cooperate fully with the mediation process and implement the agreed reforms so as to allow free and fair elections in 2008.
- President Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe should engage without reservation in the South African-led SADC initiative and support the above reforms in order to provide Zimbabweans with free and fair elections in 2008 and to end the political and economic crisis.
- The international community should support the SADC initiative by publicly clarifying commitments to assist Zimbabwe's economic recovery once democratic reforms are implemented and a democratically elected government is in place and by refraining from statements undermining that initiative.
- In the event that the SADC initiative fails, the international community should consider taking further action including expanding existing limited sanctions, referring the situation in Zimbabwe for discussion before the United Nations Security Council, and further tightening aid controls.
- The Commonwealth secretariat should establish a working committee or an eminent persons group, with predominant African membership and including former senior officials and technical experts, to explore land reform options that are acceptable to key stakeholders and would allow donors to reengage on the issue.

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