An analysis of the role of the ANC in building a political culture that is conducive to democracy in South Africa

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DECLARATION

I, Kgalalelo Mathaga Moloko, declare that the thesis entitled **"An analysis of the role of the ANC in building a political culture that is conducive to democracy in South Africa"** is my original work, that all source materials used or quoted have been appropriately cited, and that this thesis has never been submitted, in whole or in part, by myself or anyone else for degree purposes at this university or any other.

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ABSTRACT

Political culture is a fundamental aspect of all democratic states as it plays a role in democratic consolidation (Merkel, 1998:57). Due to South Africa's long history of oppression and segregation under apartheid rule, political culture is especially important in reinforcing democracy, enhancing nation-building and upholding the rule of law (Waetjen & Murray, 2001:198). Thus, the new dispensation after 1994 aimed to not only redress the socio-economic injustices of the past but also build a political culture that would play a meaningful role in strengthening the country's democracy. These objectives were meant to be achieved through the political leadership of the African National Congress (ANC)-led government, civil society and the government's socio-economic programmes.

However, since 1994, the process of democratic consolidation that the ANC embarked on has failed to build a political culture that is conducive to South Africa's democracy. Thus, despite South Africa having transitioned to democratic rule and established a constitution that upholds the principles of social justice and respecting human rights, under the leadership of the ANC these values have not significantly been practiced by the organization and in broader society. This is reflected by the citizenry's experience of democracy being characterized by poverty, unemployment and inequality, with many citizens losing trust in state institutions that are meant to reinforce democracy by improving their standard of living (Govender, 2016:238 and Masipa, 2018:2). This has produced a political culture of disengagement (from the citizenry) which is not conducive to South Africa's democracy. Furthermore, this situation can be attributed to the hegemonic position that the ANC has enjoyed since 1994 which has allowed it to dominate power at all levels of government and establish a political culture of corrupt patronage networks that is embedded within the party, in state institutions and the private sector (Filatova, 2011 and Erasmus, 2021).

In light of the above, it is important to note that "political culture does not develop in a vacuum" (Mattes, 2002:28-29). Thus, the process of building a political culture that is

conducive to democracy must take into account factors such as a country's history, its political system, its socio-economic conditions and the shared and individual experiences of the citizenry.

Considering the abovementioned factors, this research found that South Africa has a complex political culture that cannot be described as a single or uniform entity. South Africa's political culture has not remained stable through time. This has been demonstrated by the different and sometimes contradicting characteristics that make up the country's political culture.

Key words: Political culture, African National Congress, democratic consolidation, apartheid, South Africa

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative - South Africa	ASGISA
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	ACCORD
African National Congress	ANC
African People's Organisation	APO
African Union	AU
ANC Women's League	ANCWL
ANC Youth League	ANCYL
Auditor General	AG
Azanian People's Organisation	AZAPO
Azanian Students' Organisation	AZASO
Black Consciousness Movement	BCM
Black People's Convention	BPC
Colonialism of a Special Type	CST
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe	CSCE
Communist International	Comintern
Communist Party of South Africa	CPSA
Community-based organisations	CBO's
Congress of Democrats	COD
Congress of South African Students	COSAS
Congress of South African Trade Unions	COSATU
Congress of the People	COP
Convention for a Democratic South Africa	CODESA

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	CMEA
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC
Department of Women Youth and Persons with Disabilities	DWYPD
Economic Freedom Fighter	EFF
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa	EISA
Electricity Supply Commission	ESKOM
Federation of South African Women	FEDSAW
Foreign direct investment	FDI
Franchise Action Council	FRAC
Gauteng Department of Health	GDoH
German Democratic Republic	GDR
Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime	GI-TOC
Government Communication and Information System	GCIS
Government of National Unity	GNU
Gross domestic product	GDP
Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme	GEAR
Human Development Index	HDI
Independent Electoral Commission	IEC
Industrial and Commercial Workers Union	ICU
Industrial Development Cooperation	IDC
Inkatha Freedom Party	IFP
Interim Provincial Committees	IPC
International Atomic Energy Agency	IAEA
International Criminal Court	ICC

International Labour Organization	ILO
Johannesburg Stock Exchange	JSE
Medium-Term Strategic Framework	MTSF
National Democratic Revolution	NDR
National Development Agency	NDA
National Development Plan	NDP
National executive committee	NEC
National Party	NP
National Prosecuting Authority	NPA
National Prosecuting Services	NPS
National Student Financial Aid Scheme	NSFAS
National Union of South African Students	NUSAS
New Growth Path	NGP
New Partnership for Africa's Development	NEPAD
Non-Aligned Movement	NAM
Non-governmental organizations	NGO's
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	OECD
Organisation of African Unity	OAU
Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse	OUTA
Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania	PAC
Personal Protective Equipment	PPE
Policy Coordination and Advisory Services	PCAS
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act	PRECCA
Provincial executive committee	PEC

Public Affairs Research Institute	PARI
Public Finance Management Act	PFMA
Radical Economic Transformation	RET
Reconstruction and Development Programme	RDP
South African Catholic Bishops' Conference	SACBC
South African Coloured People's Organisation	SACPO
South African Communist Party	SACP
South African Congress of Trade Unions	SACTU
South African Council of Churches	SACC
South African Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project	GFIP
South African History Archive	SAHA
South African Human Rights Commission	SAHRC
South African Indian Congress	SAIC
South African Local Government Association	SALGA
South African National Defence Force	SANDF
South African National Editors' Forum	SANEF
South African National Road Agency Limited	SANRAL
South African Native Convention	SANC
South African Native National Congress	SANNC
South African Police Service	SAPS
South African Society of Psychiatrists	SASOP
South African Special Risk Insurance Association	SASRIA
South African Students Movement	SASM
South African Students Organisation	SASO

Special Compliance Unit	SCU
Special Investigative Unit	SIU
Statistics South Africa	STATSSA
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	SIPRI
Supreme Court of Appeal	SCA
Temporary Employee/Employee Relief Scheme	TERS
Treatment Action Campaign	TAC
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	TRC
Umkhonto we Sizwe	MK
United Democratic Front	UDF
United Nations - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	OHCHR
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	UNODC
Venda Building Society	VBS
World Health Organization	WHO
Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front	ZANU-PF
Zimbabwean African People’s Union	ZAPU

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 ORIENTATION AND BACKGROUND

Culture plays a fundamental role in societal development, identity and destiny (Matlosa, 2003:86). The term *culture* was initially coined and defined by Edward Burnett Tylor in his 1871 book, titled *Primitive Culture.* According to Tylor (1871:1) culture is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs or any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". In light of this, Matlosa (2003:86) argues that one of the most important determinants that have a huge influence on a political system and efforts towards democratic governance is political culture. This is because political culture has a direct and indirect impact on political and economic governance procedures and, as a result, has influenced to a significant extent the stability or instability of the political systems within the Southern African region (Matlosa, 2003:86). Within the South African context the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2005:3) states that South Africa's political culture is complex as the culture of liberation movements and the apartheid regime played a role in its formation.

According to Kynoch (2005:497), Gumede (2018a), and du Toit (1993:6-7) South Africa's political culture is characterized by violence, which is mainly due to the country's long history of colonialism and apartheid. South Africa's colonial era was a period in which many territorial disputes occurred. Africans fought one another for territory while simultaneously fighting the British and Dutch who were seizing their lands. White people also fought against one another as the Dutch and British were trying to expropriate and control as many territories as possible (Dubow, 2021). Thus, the colonial era set the tone for South Africa's political culture being characterized by white supremacy, and later by segregation through the institutionalization of apartheid in 1948 (Chibba, 2021). Despite this, it can be stated that the formation of liberation movements, like the African National Congress (ANC), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the role they played in abolishing apartheid greatly contributed to South Africa's political culture displaying democratic ideals, even if, at the time, the country was not yet a democracy (Neocosmos, Suttner & Taylor, 2002:7). In

light of this, it is important to understand the evolution of South Africa's political culture and the role that the ANC has played in its construction.

According to Mattes (2002:28-29), "A country's political culture does not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it is against a background of economic and political trends". In light of this, it can be stated that the country has transferred its segregationist socio-economic political culture of the apartheid era into democratic South Africa, and it persists due to both domestic and international factors.

According to the Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC) (2019:6-9) and The World Bank (2019) South Africa is confronted by fiscal constraints that include poor financial management, insufficient revenue collection, escalating government debt, the mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, insufficient skills development, the lack of employment opportunities and unsatisfactory global economic growth since the 2008 financial crisis. In addition, the World Bank's 2018 report on poverty and inequality in South Africa found that South Africa has high income inequality as the top 10% of households accounted for 55% of incomes, while the lowest 50% of households accounted for only 8% of incomes. It was further found that South Africa has an even higher wealth inequality as the top 10% of the populace (the majority being white) owned approximately 71% of the country's wealth while the poorest 60% collectively owned 7% of the net wealth (The World Bank, 2018:51-52). These economic, political and social trends have played a role in preventing the construction of a democratic political culture because it has meant that certain groups are exposed to certain opportunities and can participate in society, whereas others cannot.

Based on the forgone, Bratton and Mattes (2001:454-455) state that the socio-economic deprivation that originates from the apartheid regime and that continues to be prevalent in democratic South Africa is one of the key contributing factors to citizens valuing and defining democracy with reference to the socio-economic goods it can deliver. This means that there is a positive relationship between people's perception of democracy and the availability and access to socio-economic goods. Thus, South Africa's negative socio-economic status leads to the country's political culture being

based on undemocratic ideals as the citizenry no longer values and trusts democracy, and it further hampers the consolidation of democracy (Von Fintel & Ott, 2017:79).

Since 1994, South Africa embarked on a process of democratic consolidation, a process that required a ~~supportive~~ political culture that was supportive of democratic principles (Merkel, 1998:57). As a young democracy with a long history of oppressive apartheid rule, the process of democratic consolidation is essential for nation-building/building of a national identity, for ensuring that the rule of law is upheld, for building legitimate and responsive state institutions with bureaucrats that value democratic principles, and can improve the country's economy (Kearsey, 2007:6). These elements are thus important for building a democratic political culture. Thus Asiwaju (2000:4, cited by Okoli, Nebeife & Izang, 2020:151) states that democratic consolidation entails "the internalization of democratic culture and the institutionalization of democratic best process by a polity that has successfully embarked on a democratic transition". Similarly, Di Palma (1990:138) defines democratic consolidation as "the formation of both valid democratic institutions and a democratic political culture".

Based on the above conceptualizations of democratic consolidation, it can be stated that within the context of South Africa, democratic consolidation has only taken place to a certain degree. The reason for this assertion is that "Democratic consolidation is a function of socio-economic transformation" (Masipa, 2018:4) and this has not yet significantly taken place in South Africa. Hence, Hearn (2001:48) states that democracy has been successfully established, however, the democracy that has been instilled is not the one that the ANC initially promised, and it is yet to positively develop the country's political culture.

Barnard (1994:119) states that the ANC's 1994 election manifesto was a powerful tool that won over many citizens due to its explicit vision of a better life for all. As detailed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the manifesto was focused on addressing social inequality through meeting the basic needs of citizens. Some of these included water and sanitation, energy and electrification, healthcare, nutrition and social welfare (South Africa, 1994:9). The promise for a better life was

further strengthened by the promise of a growing economy that can ensure peace, security, the provision of land, jobs, housing and education as solutions to overcoming the social, economic, and political persecution and exploitation of the apartheid regime (ANC, 1994 and South Africa, 1994:9). The democracy that the ANC initially promised led to the country's political culture being that of optimism and trust. The main contributing factor for this phenomenon was due to the ANC using its primary liberation icon, Nelson Mandela, an individual who was viewed globally as possessing the principles of integrity, credibility and legitimacy (Ramukosi, 2018:35-36).

However, for many South African's the above-mentioned account of democracy is yet to be experienced. According to Hearn (2001:48), "It is clear that neither the West nor the ANC wanted to see the kind of radical, thoroughgoing reconstruction of society that would be required where the majority of South Africans were to be provided with houses, jobs and a decent income." Instead, when the ANC came into power, efforts were made to guarantee a political settlement that permitted the path from racial to non-racial capitalism in the country. Thus, democracy, as equal to a better life, over time became substituted with liberal democracy or polyarchy (Hearn, 2001:48). Robinson (1996:356) defines this as "elite minority rule and socio-economic inequalities alongside formal political freedom and elections involving universal suffrage". The better life for all messaging only sustained the ANC until the 2004 elections, as the message became less persuasive to the citizenry from 2009 onwards. Simultaneously, the ANC's credibility and notions of trust in the party were greatly reduced as the political context and internal ANC dynamics had changed (Africa, 2019:375).

Africa (2019:376) states that political events like the ascension of Jacob Zuma to the presidential position of the ANC, and later to the presidency of the Republic regardless of his fraud and corruption charges, harmed the credibility of the ANC. Furthermore, the spiral of disputes between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma regarding matters of succession and tenure which was televised to the citizens added to the loss of trust and political instability that followed the 2009 elections (Booysen, 2009:90-91 and Africa, 2019:376). After the 2009 elections, events such as the widespread protest

action that resulted from the increasing socio-economic and political challenges, the Marikana Massacre, and the disapproval by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the general public over the implementation of e-tolls on highways reflected the political instability that was prevalent in the country (Butler, 2009:69 and Africa, 2019:377). These events (and more) played a role in shaping South Africa's political culture. These events have also demonstrated that overtime, the ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture has been detrimental because politics now prioritises career and personal economic advancement over improving the lives of the populace and fostering a democratic political culture.

From the forgone, it is clear that within the context of South Africa it is not just socio-economic factors that play a role in shaping the country's political culture. Internal political party dynamics also play a role as they create certain public perceptions regarding the kind of political party that the ANC is, the extent to which issues that affect the rule of law (like corruption) are taken seriously, how it resolves internal disputes and what this means for how it will run the country.

Thus, it is important to note that the concept *political culture* is subjective and contestable, and this thesis will endeavour to provide theoretical clarity. In light of this subjectivity, various authors have endeavoured to conceptualize and define political culture, such as Almond and Verba, who have defined it as "the attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system". (Almond & Verba, 1963:13).

Matlosa (2003:86) describes political culture as "a concept that denotes a broad array of norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance. These cultural conventions, directly and indirectly, impact on the efficacy of all organs of the State (i.e., executive, legislative, judiciary, bureaucracy, security establishment etc.) and society at large in the extent to which political stability and democratic governance is assured, nurtured and consolidated." While Berezin (1997:364) views political culture as "the matrix of meanings embodied in expressive symbols, practices, and beliefs that constitute ordinary politics in a bounded collectivity".

However, for the purpose of this thesis, Lucian Pye's definition of political culture will be employed. According to Pye (1968:218, cited by Gokhale, 1979:332) political culture is:

> "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. Political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences".

This definition leads one to inquire into the ANC's contribution in shaping South Africa's political culture to being unfavourable for democracy.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

When South Africa ushered in a democratic government in 1994, it was believed that the country and its institutions would be run on the basis of social justice, the principles of democracy and fundamental human rights just as articulated in the preamble of the country's Constitution (Mkhabela, 2018:121-122). The new dispensation further brought hopes for collaborative relations between the government and the citizenry, access to opportunities like quality education, healthcare and employment for all citizens, and the general belief that, over time, South Africa would develop into a country in which factors such as the class divide and racial polarisation are improved rather than aggravated (Beall, Gelb & Hassim, 2005:682, Anciano, 2008:1 and Graham, 2020:29). It was upon these values and beliefs that South Africa's political culture was supposed to be ingrained in.

However, the establishment of a democratic South Africa has proven that the consolidation of democracy requires strong relations between the government and the citizenry (Lues, 2014:789). This means that democracy thrives when the government has open channels of communication with the populace and actively seeks actions that aim to address the socio-economic needs of citizens. However, Govender (2016:238) states

that the democratic experience of most citizens has been characterized by unemployment, poverty and exclusion. Indeed, these social ills emanate from the apartheid regime, but they have persisted and gotten worse in democratic South Africa due to the inability of the state to generate capital, end corruption and state capture, and poor policy formulation and implementation (Baissac, 2020). This has contributed to citizens not trusting the ruling party and institutions that are entrusted with the powers to improve their lives (Masipa, 2018:2). Over time, this has led to the non-existence of a culture of genuine engagement between the ANC-led government and the citizenry (Dhlamini, 2020 and Masipa, 2018:2). This expanding gap between state institutions and the citizens has been described by Skocpol (2003:11) as “diminished democracy”, which leads to “weak democracy marked by poor representation” (Carothers, 2005).

Dhlamini (2020) supports the above statement by stating, “Our political culture is one of opaque internal party politics. Mysterious decisions are made by all the major parties without any input from any of us citizens” (Dhlamini, 2020). This assertion was reflected already in 1996 when the ANC decided to abandon the socialist-inclined Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in favour of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy known as the Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) (Ballard, Habib & Valodia, 2006:402). The former (RDP) aimed to create growth and development by means of reconstruction and redistribution of socio-economic needs, while the latter (GEAR) aimed to create economic growth through privatization and reduced government spending. This resulted in the unintended consequence of exacerbating unemployment, poverty and inequality (Ballard *et al.,* 2006:402 & 416). This policy change reflected the lack of understanding by the government of the socio-economic needs of citizens and how the lack thereof affects their daily life.

The growing socio-economic deprivation of the citizenry and the growing wealth of political leaders has resulted in citizens feeling frustrated by the government to the extent that South Africa’s political culture has been characterized by many citizens choosing to communicate with the government through violent protests (Masiya, Davids & Mangai, 2019:20). This may simply be citizens exercising their democratic right to protest, however the amount of infrastructural damage that occurs, including citizens choosing to

collaborate with civil society groups (rather than state institutions) to address their needs, suggests that a significant number of South Africans no longer value the country's democracy nor its institutions (Lancaster & Mulaudzi, 2020). This was further reflected by the 2019 national elections having the lowest voter turnout since 1994 (Lancaster & Mulaudzi, 2020).

According to Kotzé (2015:249), "Political culture is learnt through the process of political socialization." Within the context of South Africa, citizens learnt the active, yet violent, political culture from the country's long history of apartheid (Bruce, 2014). Since the new dispensation, citizens have over time understood what it means to live in a democratic state and have participated in democratic processes. Hence, South Africa's political culture has been characterized by a participatory civil society that can augment government efforts, especially those relating to the provision of public goods and services (Nhlapo, 2012:18). However, these gains have been overshadowed by the actions of the country's ruling political elite which operates by a culture of corrupt patronage networks that has penetrated government institutions and the private sector (Erasmus, 2021). The one-party dominance that the ANC has enjoyed since the new dispensation has resulted in South Africa's political culture being characterized by poor governance, limited accountability and corruption. Furthermore, there is a sense of division in society's political culture whereby one segment has disengaged from the political system due to government's failures, this being something that is unsupportive to democratic rule. Simultaneously another segment of society is pro-government because the ANC-led government has reduced politics to a "get rich quick" scheme that has enticed young people.

The above situation is problematic when one considers how young South Africa's democracy is and the fundamental role that political culture plays in reinforcing democracy, enhancing nation-building and upholding the rule of law (Waetjen & Murray, 2001:198). In light of this, it is important to understand that the duty of democratic consolidation and building a political culture that is conducive to South Africa's democracy is a function of the governing party because the ANC is essentially the state. The ANC permeates all aspects of the state as all decisions that relate to South Africa are made at

Luthuli House (the ANC's headquarters in Johannesburg). Based on the forgone, the problem this thesis will address is: How did the ANC impact the construction of South Africa's political culture of post-1994? This focal problem will be translated into the following research questions that will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research questions for this thesis are:

- What are the points of departure of the theories of political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation?
- How has the ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture before 1994?
- How has the ANC contributed to South Africa's contemporary political culture of post 1994?
- What are the characteristics of South Africa's political culture?
- How did the characteristics of South Africa's political culture influence democracy in South Africa?
- How can a typology of South African political culture be developed?

These research questions symbolize the research objectives of this thesis.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this thesis are:

- To analyse the points of departure of the theories of political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation.
- To analyse the ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture before 1994.
- To analyse the ANC's contribution to South Africa's contemporary political culture of post 1994.
- To analyse the characteristics of South Africa's political culture.

- To analyse how the characteristics of South Africa's political culture have influenced democracy in South Africa.
- To determine how a typology of South Africa's political culture can be developed.

1.5 CENTRAL THEORETICAL STATEMENT

South Africa's political culture has undergone significant changes since the beginning of the colonial era. Thus, the role of the ANC in shaping the country's political culture is also significant due to its role as a liberation movement and as the dominant political party since the country's first democratic elections in 1994 (Von Fintel & Ott, 2017:81). In light of this, this thesis asserts that under the leadership of the ANC-led government, the state of South Africa's political culture has become unfavourable for the country's democracy due to the government's inability to create a conducive environment for the consolidation of democracy. With this being stated, elite theory, political culture theory and democratic consolidation theory will serve as the foundation of this thesis in order to have a deeper understanding of this phenomena.

Elite theory is important for this study as it will provide an understanding of the kind of political elite that is necessary for building a political culture that is conducive to South Africa's democracy. The work of Vilfred Pareto provides an understanding of elite theory from a psychological perspective. This is important in providing insight into the kind of political elite that was prevalent in South Africa before and after 1994 and their ideological stance on governance which ultimately led to the kind of political culture that ANC introduced. The work of Chris Wright Mills provides an understanding of elite theory from an institutional perspective. Thus, Mills' contribution is important in providing an understanding of the kind of political culture that was instilled by the political elite in the institutions of South Africa before and after 1994. Mills' work will also provide an understanding of the kind of political elites that have been prevalent in an institution such as the ANC before and after 1994, and the kind of political culture

that these political elites instilled within the ANC, which ultimately transpired in society (before 1994) and in state institutions (after 1994) due to cadre deployment.

Ultimately, the use of elite theory is to demonstrate how the democracy that the political elite has practiced since the new dispensation is different from the one that they aspired to before 1994, and how this has negatively affected the construction of a political culture that is conducive for South Africa's democracy.

Through the work of Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Daniel Elazar, political culture as a concept and theory is important in clarifying the different forms of political culture and their applicability within the context of South Africa. In this way, an understanding of the positive relationship between political culture and democratic consolidation will be brought to the fore.

In addition, the contributions by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan are important as they provide a conceptualization of democratic consolidation. Their contributions play a role in determining the extent to which South Africa's democracy has been consolidated through the provision of the "five arenas of democratic consolidation" (Linz & Stepan, 1996:7). This is ultimately important for the analysis and ultimate completion of the following chapters of this thesis. Thus, it is important to define the terms democracy and democratic consolidation. Democracy "entails, first, regular, free, and fair elections of representatives with universal and equal suffrage, second, responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament (possibly complemented by direct election of the head of the executive), and third, the freedoms of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against arbitrary state action" (Rueschmeyer, Huber Stephens & Stephens, 1992:43). According to Linz & Stapan (1996:5) democratic consolidation refers to a political situation in which "democracy has become the only game in town".

It is important to note that developing a political culture that is conducive to the country's democracy implies that the ruling party needs to understand what democracy means from the perspective of the citizenry so that their style of governance lives up to the expectations of the citizens and reinforces their position as a legitimate and credible government (Brookes, Ngwane & Runciman, 2019:18). In

light of this, Mattes (2002:29) states that “increasing policy disaffection, trust in government and satisfaction with economic and political performance are declining” and this suggests that the most worrying matter about the post-apartheid political culture is how the ANC has governed.

Since 1994, the ANC has been the governing party. However, the level of socio-economic improvement has been unsatisfactory as the country’s gains are hampered by rampant corruption and this has contributed to the disillusionment that is widespread in the country’s political culture. Thus, Mbembe (2008) states that “the hegemonic position the ANC holds in the political realm is not conducive to the deepening of a democratic culture in SA”. Furthermore, the ANC’s inability to address the socio-economic needs of the populace despite rampant protest action that breeds violence in South Africa’s political culture, suggests that it has become complacent in its role as the ruling party. Filatova (2011) reinforces this statement by identifying several characteristics of the ANC that are not conducive to building a democratic political culture; namely, “its distaste for an independent media and judiciary, its idea that it is destined to rule until the end of time ("until Jesus comes back"), its intolerance of opposition, its instinctive attraction to centralization and its urge to control, its patronage system and the resulting endemic corruption”.

According to McKinley (2006:8) the ANC views itself as the guardians of South Africa’s democracy. This perception emanates from their role as the country’s dominant liberation movement (Daniels, 2010:1). This has led to the country's political culture being characterized by widespread impunity (with the findings of the State Capture Commission being a reflection of this) and the legitimacy of state institutions being brought into question. Hence, Bauer & Taylor (2005:258, cited by Kinsell, 2009:14) argue that “the ANC has emplaced a one-party government much like the apartheid era system and have consolidated power at every level of government”.

In answering the research questions (making use of the perspectives outlined above) a number of research methods were employed, as explained in the following section on research methodology.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A qualitative research method will be employed for this study. Hennink, Hutter & Bailey (2020:10) describe qualitative research as "an approach that allows you to examine people's experiences in detail by using a specific set of research methods such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observation, content analysis visual methods, and life histories or biographies." Qualitative researchers study social phenomena in their natural environment, they pay attention to the meaning that people ascribe to things, including how they think and act about various factors that may have an impact on a particular study or phenomena (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault, 2015:7-9). Thus, qualitative research has been described as a naturalistic and interpretive approach to research (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard & Snape, 2014:3). The qualitative research approaches that researchers may use include narrative research, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenological research and case studies (Creswell, 2014:13-14).

As a result of the subjective manner of this study in understanding the role that the ANC played in building South Africa's political culture, and the implications of this on the country's democracy, it is suitable for this study to use the grounded theory research approach. Grounded theory is:

> "theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another. A researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in mind (unless his or her purpose is to elaborate and extend existing theory). Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12).

From the grounded theory research approach, deductive reasoning/logic will be employed. This means that "a hypothesis (*a central theoretical statement is used in this study*) is derived from existing theory and the empirical world is then explored, and data are collected in order to test the truth or falsity of the hypothesis" (O'Riley, 2009:104). Therefore, elite theory and theory relating to concepts like political culture and democratic consolidation will form the foundation for explaining and completing the succeeding chapters of this study. Thus, the (theoretical) conclusions that are

discovered in one chapter will serve as a blueprint for defining the path of discovery that the succeeding chapters will follow.

The qualitative method that this study will use is the review of various available literature, including ANC websites and literature, relevant newspaper articles, academic journal articles, books and government publications. This approach allows for a clearer understanding of the changes that have occurred in South Africa's political culture, the role that the ANC has played in these changes, the elements that have prevented democratic consolidation, and in turn, the construction of a political culture that is conducive for the country, and how the political culture of the country and the ANC ought to be in democratic South Africa. As a result, to comprehend the meaning of political culture and its relation to the elite in South Africa, academic literature that relates to the theory of political culture and elite theory will be outlined in the second chapter of this study. This chapter will focus on the contributions of political culture theorists which are Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Daniel Elazar, and the contributors of elite theory which are Vilfred Pareto and Charles Wright Mills. These authors were selected because they are known as the founders and main contributors of the theory of political culture and elite theory. These theorists have provided a rich understanding of political culture and elite theory by broadening its scope beyond politics, thus showing its relationship to disciplines like psychology, economics, sociology, history and public administration, and to phenomena like social movements, crime and voting behaviour.

The following section aims to explore the source material that will be included in this study.

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

The source material that will be used in this study include:

- **Records within the ANC website** – This is a primary source for this study as it can provide information that relates to South Africa's political culture before 1994 and the role that the ANC played in shaping the country's political culture before 1994. This source material can also provide information that relates to the ANC's

objectives, which in turn, relates to the kind of democracy and political culture that it saw fit for South Africa after 1994.

- **Journal articles** – Peer-reviewed journal articles are significant as they provide information on the changes that have occurred in the political culture of South Africa and the ANC before and after 1994, the elements that have played a role in weakening the country's political culture and democracy, and the reform that ought to take place in the ANC and broader society to build a political culture that is conducive to strengthening the country's democracy.

- **Scholarly books** – Scholarly books (and peer-reviewed journal articles) are significant to the study as they provide information that relates to the theory of political culture and elite theory, how they relate to democratic consolidation, and whether the democracy that the ANC is practising is having a meaningful role in strengthening the country's political culture.

- **Government documents and publications** – Government documents and publications will be incorporated in the study as they will provide significant information about the socio-economic issues that have influenced the country's political culture. This source material will also indicate what plans government has outlined to meet the socio-economic needs of the citizenry and construct a political culture conducive to South Africa's democracy.

- **Public speeches and online newspaper articles** – These sources will provide the latest information on the ANC's progress in addressing the socio-economic needs of citizens, the challenges thereof, and the factors affecting the construction of a democratic political culture. Furthermore, this source material can provide information about the resolution(s) that the ANC has taken on how to rebuild itself to run a responsive government that can contribute to building South Africa's political culture and strengthening its democracy.

Due to the multifaceted nature of this research topic, the study will include more than the above-mentioned literature/source material. Based on the forgone, the gap that has been identified in the literature relates to the relevance/role of the ANC in rebuilding the weakening political culture in South Africa and within the organization to ultimately strengthen South Africa's democracy, and the necessity to understand the characteristics of South Africa's political culture in order to develop a typology of the country's political culture.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study's contribution is to bring an understanding of how South Africa's political culture has evolved through time by demonstrating how it has become malign, individualistic and atomistic. Thus, an understanding of the role of the ANC in shaping South Africa's political culture will be brought to the fore. In this way, the study aims to demonstrate how the political culture of South Africa ought to be under the democratic dispensation by identifying the deficiencies that the ANC ought to work on to strengthen the country's political culture and democracy. The study's contribution is to also identify the characteristics of South Africa's political culture which may assist in creating a typology of the country's political culture.

1.9 ETHICS

Due to the research methodology of this study being a review of existing academic literature, the ethical considerations that this research will employ relate to the applicable acknowledgement and/or citation of the source materials that will be included in this research. As such, this research will not necessitate an ethics form as there will not be any contact with individuals or vulnerable groups to complete this research.

1.10 LIMITATIONS

As a result of this thesis being completed through the review of academic literature, the use of secondary sources may be used as literature about political culture and elite theory is old, thus finding primary sources for establishing their origins and main contributors may be a challenge. Understanding the changes that have taken place in South Africa's political culture may require the review of non-academic sources/informal sources like online opinion pieces from established academics and research organizations. This is mainly because the political culture of a country changes continuously, with every event and decision that is taken by the government/ruling party, thus source materials like online opinion pieces offer political analysis about these events and decisions which may have a bearing on South Africa's political culture. There is limited information on the ANC's website about its history (which in turn relates to South Africa's history) and recent party events and obtaining this information may also require secondary sources.

1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One

This introductory chapter has provided a brief overview of South Africa's colonial and apartheid history, and the nature of the country's political culture during these times. Information about how socio-economic factors affect the political culture of the country was provided, and how the democracy that the ANC has instilled is counter-productive to building a political culture that is conducive for democratic South Africa.

Chapter Two

The second chapter will provide a comprehensive conceptualization of the theory of political culture and elite theory. Information relating to their origins and fundamental contributors will be provided including their relation to the concept of democracy and/or democratic consolidation.

Chapter Three

This chapter will provide an understanding of how the ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture before 1994. It will cover the origins of the ANC, its objectives and activities, how it developed before 1994, and its role during the colonial and apartheid eras, which ultimately contributed to shaping the country's political culture.

Chapter Four

Chapter four will analyse the ANC's contributions to South Africa's modern political culture of post-1994. It will focus on the legislative reforms that were introduced after the 1994 general elections, analyse events such as ANC conferences and analyse how the administrations of the country's four democratically elected presidents influenced South Africa's political culture, and in turn, the ANC.

Chapter Five

Chapter five aims to analyse the characteristics of South Africa's political culture. This will be done by analysing how the theory presented in the second chapter of this thesis is linked to key political events in South Africa and the country's socio-economic conditions.

Chapter Six

Chapter five aims to determine how the characteristics of South Africa's political culture influenced the country's democracy. This will be done by analysing whether the fundamental principles of democracy and the elements that contribute to democratic consolidation (both of which will be covered in chapter two) are practised and respected. This implies that key societal events like the Covid-19 pandemic, protests, the State Capture Commission, etc., will be analysed by applying the principles of democracy and the characteristics of democratic consolidation.

Chapter Seven

Chapter seven aims to determine how a typology of South Africa's political culture can be created. This will be done by taking into account the conclusions drawn from the

previous chapters and taking into account the theoretical characteristics of political culture, the characteristics of democracy and the characteristics of South Africa's political culture, in order to create a typology of the country's political culture.

Chapter Eight

Chapter eight aims to conclude this study and provide recommendations on how the ANC can run a responsive and people-centred democratic political party that can positively rebuild its own political culture, address the socio-economic needs of the citizenry, and play a meaningful role in building a political culture that is conducive to strengthening democracy in South Africa.

CHAPTER TWO: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS OF DEPARTURE OF THE THEORIES OF POLITICAL CULTURE, ELITE THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided a brief overview of South Africa's history of colonialism and apartheid. A brief understanding of how the country's political culture was during these times was provided. Furthermore, insight into how socio-economic factors affect a country's political culture, including the positive relationship thereof was provided (Chapter 1 section 2). Ultimately, the introductory chapter provided a definition of political culture (Chapter 1 section 2) for the purpose of this thesis and highlighted how the democracy that the ANC-led government has instilled, which is characterized by negative socio-economic factors, is ineffective for building a political culture that is conducive for democratic consolidation in South Africa.

By means of a literature review, this second chapter aims to analyse the points of departure of the theory of political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation. Thus, a thorough conceptualization of these theories will be provided by identifying and discussing their origins, the main authors/contributors that are relevant to this study and how these theories relate to one another.

2.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

As a result of this second chapter focusing on the above-mentioned theories, it is fitting for this section to begin by explaining the meaning of the term *theory*. According to Kerlinger and Lee (2000:11)

> "A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena. This definition says three things: (1) a theory is a set of propositions consisting of defined and interrelated constructs, (2) a theory sets out the interrelations among a set of variables (constructs), and, in so doing, presents a systematic view of the phenomena described by the variables, and (3) a theory explains phenomena; it does so by specifying which

variables are related to which variables and how they are related, thus enabling the researcher to predict from certain variables to certain other variables."

Political culture is not a new concept or theory (Garcia-Rivero, Kotzé & Du Toit, 2002:167). The theory of political culture developed for centuries through generalizations about the various forms of power in different places and it is a theory that is as old as the exploration of politics (Gendzel, 1997:226 and Da Silva, Clark & Vieira, 2015:1). The ancestors to this theory include Emile Durkheim and his work on "collective consciousness". Durkheim (2010:25) describes collective consciousness as "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own". David Humes's (1826) work on 'manners' also contributed to the theory of political culture. For Humes, good manners are fundamental to the development of man's social virtues and the process of civilization in general (Stanek, 2009:29-30), while Max Weber's work on "authority systems" or the theory of authority provided a classification for three types of authority which he called traditional authority, charismatic authority and legal authority (Blau, 1963:308). However, it is in the contributions of Alexis de Tocqueville that the true origins of political culture theory can be found.

De Tocqueville was a French writer and philosopher whose work on political culture started in the 1830s after he observed how his country (France) moved between absolutism and radical democracy. The disorder that was in France encouraged him to leave for the United States of America in 1832 in order to observe that country's governmental system and ultimately answer the key question "Why are the Americans doing so well with democracy, while France is struggling with it?" (Pena, 2015:6). De Tocqueville detailed his findings on American political culture in a two-part book titled *Democracy in America Volume 1* and *Democracy in America Volume 2* which were published in 1835 and 1840 respectively (Marshall & Drescher, 1968:519).

It is in the second volume of his book where De Tocqueville makes political culture a central theme by stating that "in order that society should exist and, a fortiori, that society should prosper, it is necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case unless each of them

sometimes draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief already formed" (De Tocqueville, 1840:8). His investigation included an analysis of the culture that is supportive of democracy, the culture that is produced from democracy and the persistent strains between democracy and culture (Goldfarb, 2012:17,18). This analysis was done by observing and analysing various intricate relationships of religion and autonomous politics, the social consequences of freedom and equality, individualism and democratic possibility, and egalitarianism and cultural excellence; all of which having become the average field of exploration in the study of political culture (Goldfarb, 2012:18).

According to Ceaser (1985, cited by Pena, 2015:6) De Tocqueville identified four factors that enabled democracy to be successful in America. These include (1) plentiful and fertile land, (2) numerous chances for people to obtain land and earn a living, (3) minimal feudal aristocracy to block others ambitions, and (4) an autonomous spirit motivated by frontier living. This statement is made evident in De Tocqueville's work when he states: "In the United States, as soon as a man has acquired some education and pecuniary resources, either he endeavours to get rich by commerce or industry, or he buys land in the uncleared country and turns pioneer. All that he asks of the state is not to be disturbed in his toil and be secure in his earnings" (De Tocqueville, 1840:249).

In addition, the French concept of 'moeurs' (translated to English as 'mores') was fundamental to De Tocqueville's political thought (De Tocqueville, 2004:875 and De Tocqueville, 2004:356). "By mores I mean here what the Ancients meant by the term: I apply it not only to mores in the strict sense, what one might call habits of the heart, but also to the various notions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the whole range of ideas that shape habits of mind. Thus I use this word to refer to the whole moral and intellectual state of a people" (De Tocqueville, 2004:331). In light of this, De Tocqueville emphasized that in the pursuit of democratic consolidation, it is important to not ascribe too much value to laws while 'mores' are ignored. Hence, De Tocqueville (2004:356) states that "the best laws cannot maintain a constitution in spite of mores" and "What makes the Americans of the United States the only Americans capable of supporting the empire of democracy is therefore their mores";

the ‘mores’ that are fundamental to maintaining and exercising laws correctly, and to ensuring democratic consolidation.

Based on the above, De Tocqueville established five values that are crucial to America’s political culture and democracy, these include equality, liberty, individualism, civic duty, the rule of law and democracy (De Tocqueville, 2004:15, 76, 356, 581-587). It is upon this background that social scientists continued with enquiring into how the distinctive “psychological coherence” or “modal personality” of a culture may influence its politics (Gendzel, 1997:226). In light of the forgone, the following section will discuss the fundamental contributors to the theory of political culture.

2.3 FUNDAMENTAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

For the purpose of this thesis, the theory of political culture will focus on the contributions that were made by Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Daniel Elazar. These authors were selected because the existing understanding of political culture has been influenced by them. These authors provide a thorough conceptualization of political culture as they have developed a typology of the theory which demonstrates the various forms of political culture and their unique characteristics. The discussion on the main theorists of political culture will begin with the contributions made by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba.

2.3.1 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba

As stated in section 2.2, the theory of political culture has been around for centuries. However, Almond (1990:7-8) states that the sudden popularity of political culture during the late 1950s and early 1960s requires an explanation. Almond (1990:8) explains this by firstly stating that “the failure of enlightenment and liberal expectations as they related to political development and political culture set the explanatory problem to which political culture research was a response”. Secondly, the growth of social theory during the 19th and 20th centuries was important in encouraging political culture studies. Lastly, the growth of technology and survey research methodology succeeding the Second World War led to the increased practical prospective to venture into studies of political culture (Almond, 1990:8-9).

The contemporary theory of political culture came to the fore in a landmark article in 1956 in which Gabriel Almond presented the theory of political culture that encompassed his formula for classifying and comparing political systems (Gendzel, 1997:227 and Obeidi, 2013:10). In his article Almond stated, “Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture” (Almond, 1956:396). However, political scientists at the time faced the difficulty of finding, measuring and comparing the “pattern of orientations” that distinguished politics in different countries. The answer to this problem came from a post war field of political science known as psephology, which is the study of voting behaviour (Gendzel, 1997:227).

According to Chackerian and Abcarian (1983:139) political culture is important for studying political participation/voting behaviour due to its emphasis on the psychological dimensions within a political system, that is, the beliefs, attitudes, expectations and symbols that people have regarding their perceived likelihood to satisfy their needs by being involved in political processes. These psychological dimensions also relate to defining the situation wherein political action occurs. In light of this, psephologists[1] of the post-war period employed sample survey methods of opinion investigators and market researchers to find out how voters make up their minds. At that time, this approach was considered to be methodologically sophisticated, and it served as motivation for Gabriel Almond to partner with Sidney Verba to conduct surveys of attitudes of thousands of citizens in five countries (Gendzel, 1997:227).

The empirical study by Almond and Verba was conducted in the early 1960s with their findings being detailed in a book that was published in 1963 titled *The Civic Culture* (Chilton, 1988:419 and Obeidi, 2013:10). According to Chilton (1988:419) the use of the term *political culture* by Almond and Sidney was to stipulate how individuals and their political systems affect each other. Almond and Verba defined political culture as “attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role

[1] Psephology is a field of political science that focuses on the study of voting behaviour (Gendzel, 1997:228). Therefore, psephologists are individuals who study elections or voting behaviour.

of the self in the system" (Almond & Verba, 1963:13). It refers to a set of orientations regarding a particular set of social objects and processes (Almond & Verba, 1963:13).

The two fundamental components in Almond and Verba's structural-functionalist theory include (1) individual orientations which are connected to (2) political objects or classes of political objects (Almond & Verba, 1963:15). Almond and Verba follow Parsons and Shils' definition of the term *orientations* which is "the internalized aspects of political objects and relationships which predispose individuals to act in a specified manner over a period of time". In this case, an individual's orientation(s) refers to their attitude or feelings about their political system which ultimately influences their behaviour in society. (Parsons and Shils, 1962, cited by Almond & Verba, 1963:15, and Nordlinger, 1967:46). Almond and Verba identified three types of orientations that contribute to the formation of political culture, these include the cognitive orientation, affective orientation and evaluational orientation (Almond & Verba, 1963:15).

According to Almond & Verba (1963:15) the cognitive orientation refers to the level of knowledge of and belief regarding the political system, including its roles and the leaders or officials of these roles, its inputs and outputs. The affective orientation refers to feelings regarding the political system, including feelings about its roles, workforce and performance (Almond & Verba, 1963:15). The evaluational orientation refers to the judgements and opinions concerning political objects which usually involves an amalgamation of value standards and benchmark/criteria with information and feelings (Almond & Verba, 1963:15).

These orientations are linked to the political objects/or classes of political objects within the political system. Almond & Verba (1963:15) differentiate between three broad classes of political objects, namely (1) particular roles or structures, like the legislative bodies, executives or bureaucracies; (2) the officeholder's/ incumbents of roles", like specific monarchs, legislators and administrators, and (3) specific public policies, resolutions or implementation of resolutions. These structures, officials and resolutions can be broadly categorized based on their involvement in either the "political or input process or in the administrative or output process." (Almond & Verba, 1963:15). The political or input process has to do with how the citizenry's demands flow into the polity and translating

these demands into accurate and reliable policies. The structures that play a role in this input process include political parties, the media and interest groups. The administrative or output process involves the application and/or enforcement of authoritative policies; a process that usually involves structures like bureaucracies and courts (Almond & Verba, 1963:15-16).

Based on the above, Almond and Verba (1963:17) state that the political culture of a country refers to "the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as a political actor". In light of this, Almond and Verba constructed from the five countries they surveyed a typology of three political cultures that they found to be ideal-typical (Pavone, 2014:2).

2.3.1.1 Almond and Verba's three types of political cultures

The first type of political culture that Almond and Verba identified is the parochial political culture. According to Almond and Verba (1963:17-18) a parochial political culture can be found in African tribal societies and independent local communities. These societies do not have any specialized political roles, and there is very little expectation regarding changes in the political system. Their political systems tend to be more affective and normative instead of cognitive (Almond & Verba, 1963:19). Iovan (2015:29) reinforces this by stating that societies with a parochial political culture are unacquainted with the significance of national and world issues and are not interested in the values and operation of the national political system. In these societies, knowledge, feelings and judgements of value are directed at fundamental institutions like the church, the family and the school. According to Steyn Kotze (2015:250) parochial political systems tend to be characteristic of conflict societies whereby the state has lost legitimacy and control of certain territories. As such, the people begin to view traditional leadership as a legitimate authority figure and essential in organizing political and/or communal life.

The second type of political culture is the subject political culture, which is characterized by an awareness of specialized government authority, with citizens being affectively oriented towards it, possibly even priding themselves in it or disliking it and evaluating the system as either legitimate or not (Almond & Verba, 1963:19). Almond and Verba

(1963:19) further state that under this political culture, the relationship that citizens have toward the system is on a general level. It usually concerns “the output, administrative or “downward flow” side” of the polity, which ultimately means that it is a passive relationship. According to Iovan (2015:30) citizens insist, under this political culture, on remaining passive with regards to participating in political life and decision-making processes. This is because they may have the belief that the system will work to their advantage, (without articulating initiatives and needs to the state) if they abide by the decisions and regulations that correlate with an ethics of submission. Steyn Kotze (2015:250) asserts that the subject political culture is characteristic of autocratic and charismatic leadership structures.

The third type of political culture is the participant political culture. This political culture is characterized by citizens who are unambiguously oriented to the entire political system, including its political and administrative structures and processes, that is, its input and output aspects (Almond & Verba, 1963:19). Citizens who function within this form of political culture can be favourably or unfavourably oriented toward the numerous classes of political objects and they are usually oriented to an activist role within the political system. Thus, according to Iovan (2015:30), a participant political culture is consistent with a democratic system of government in which there are developed educational processes and a high level of organization. This contributes to citizens having various abilities, skills and platforms to participate in government processes and influence the making of policies that will ultimately have a positive or negative impact upon their livelihoods.

Almond and Verba (1963:19-20) further state that the threefold categorization of political cultures is not to presume that one orientation is replaced by another. These political cultures coexist in societies because through individuals they can merge and affect one another. Therefore, a citizen who is part of a participant political system is not entirely concerned with actively participating in politics as they must also comply with certain laws and authorities while also being an adherent of more diffuse primary groups (Almond & Verba, 1963:20). An individual's political orientations consist of, to certain extents, elements of parochial, subject and participant political culture, thus there is no

homogeneity of political cultures. Similarly, any political culture entails the same three kinds of elements, fused to certain proportions. This means that political systems that are dominated by a participant political culture will have subjects and parochials even in the limiting case (Almond & Verba, 1963:20).

In light of the above, Almond and Verba (1963:23) state that despite the parochial, subject and participant political cultures being the most authentic, mixed political cultures can be produced due to the merger of political cultures. Thus, Almond and Verba further identified three types of mixed political cultures, which include the parochial-subject culture, the subject-participant culture and the parochial-participant culture.

2.3.1.2 Almond and Verba's three types of mixed political cultures

According to Almond and Verba (1963:23) the parochial-subject political culture is characterized by a majority of members of society who have rejected the traditional authority in favour of a more complex political system that has proficient central government structures. The history of most countries is characterized by this kind of change from local parochialism to a specialized and central authority, however, the stability of this change may be inadequate for a completely developed subject culture. "The loosely articulated African Kingdoms and even the Ottoman Empire" are illustrations of stable, mixed subject-parochial cultures (Almond & Verba, 1963:23).

The subject-participant culture is characterized by a considerable proportion of the populace having specialized political orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, whereas the majority of the remaining populace persist in their direction toward an authoritarian government structure and possess a fairly passive set of self-orientations. Western European countries of the 19th century like France, Germany and Italy are examples of the subject-participant culture as they were characterized by structural instability with a continuous change of authoritarian and democratic governments (Almond & Verba, 1963:25). According to Almond and Verba (1963:25) the structural instability and cultural stalemate that occurs from the development of this kind of political culture (subject-participant culture) has an impact on cultural patterns themselves and citizens conduct within the political system.

Almond and Verba explain this by asserting that due to participant orientations only spreading amongst a proportion of the populace and due to their legitimacy being challenged by the continuing subject sub-culture and a moratorium being in effect during authoritarian intervals, the participant-orientated division of the populace cannot be a self-confident, capable, experienced body of citizens. They usually continue to be democratic aspirants (Almond & Verba, 1963:25). In addition, the structural instabilities and continuous inefficiency of the democratic infrastructure that is typical of the subject-participant culture tend to create alienative tendencies amongst the democratically oriented components of the populace. Taken together, this form of a political-cultural stalemate can create a condition with elements of idealist-aspiration and isolation from the political system, as well as the infrastructure of interest groups, political parties and press (Almond & Verba, 1963:25-26).

Should the subject-participant culture continue for many years, then changes in the character of the subject subculture[2] will occur. According to Almond and Verba (1963:26) throughout the democratic intervals, the authoritarian-oriented groups have to compete with the democratic ones in an officially democratic framework. This means that they must establish their own defensive political infrastructure. Whereas this may not change the subject subculture into one that is democratic, it does create significant changes to it. Hence Almond and Verba (1963:26) state: “It is not accidental that authoritarian regimes that arise in political systems with mixed subject-participant cultures tend to have populistic overtones, and in the more recent period of totalitarianism, these regimes have even adopted the democratic infrastructure in a grossly distorted form.”

The last mixed political culture that was identified by Almond and Verba is the parochial-participant culture. According to Almond and Verba (1963:26) many developing countries with a parochial-participant culture are usually faced with the contemporary issue of cultural development. In the majority of these countries, there is mainly a parochial political culture. The established structural norms are typically participant and correspondingly necessitate a participant/participatory political culture. Therefore, the

[2] Parsons (2017:65) defines subculture as “groups in society that identify and interact with each other, producing distinct clusters of culture not entirely shared by others”.

difficulty is in the simultaneous development of specialized output and input orientations (Almond & Verba, 1963:26). Many of these political systems tend to be vulnerable to parochial disintegration, leaning unstably at one moment toward authoritarianism and another toward democracy. Thus, no supporting structure exists on either side, there is neither a bureaucracy that rests upon loyal subjects nor infrastructure that emerges from a responsible and capable citizenry (Almond & Verba, 1963:26).

The following section aims to provide an understanding of Daniel Elazar's contribution to the theory of political culture.

2.3.2 Daniel Elazar's contribution to the theory of political culture

According to Gendzel (1997:230), following the contributions by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 1963, the methodical study of politics and culture emerged once more in a study of the American government. Thus, in 1966 Daniel Elazar published a book titled *American Federalism: A view from the States* (Pena, 2015:7). In his book, Elazar proposed a theoretical framework that involves studying American political culture as a whole by taking into account the various subcultures that are prevalent in every state and understanding to what degree these subcultures conform and differ from the national model's political culture (Elazar, 1980:266). Elazar (1984:109) defined political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded".

Elazar (1984:109-110) considered political culture as the fundamental feature that clarified the manner in which the state and local politics operated. The features that are maintained in a political culture are a result of the different ethnic and religious groups that came to settle in America. Over the years, these groups of people congregated in their own settlements and some of their descendants migrated to different parts of the country (but predominantly westward). This meant that these groups' ethnic and religious values, including their political patterns, were distributed throughout America with certain subcultures being strongly tied to certain sections of the country. Thus, the entrenched political cultural values were transferred from one generation to the next and migrants that were new to an area integrated into the prevailing political practices (Elazar, 1984:115 & 122).

In addition, Elazar (1984:109) asserted that political culture assists in clarifying state and local activities in a federal system and permits for an understanding of how states collaborate with the national government and adapt national strategies to their needs and interests. Elazar thus identified the three ways in which political culture can be influential in government operations. Firstly, political culture assists in shaping perceptions about politics and what to expect from the government. These elements are held by both the citizenry and politicians. Secondly, it demarcates the type of people that can participate in government and politics and the extent of public involvement that is encouraged in government processes. Thirdly, political culture influences how the art of government is put into practice by politicians, the citizenry and civil servants, bearing in mind their perceptions (Elazar, 1984:112).

According to Elazar (1984:112) America consists of a general political culture that is embedded in two contradictory conceptions of the country's political order, and they both originate from the initial settlement of the country. In the first, the country's political system is regarded as a marketplace wherein individuals and groups bargain with one another to acquire benefits for their clientele because of self-interest. With the second, the country's political system is regarded as a commonwealth wherein the citizens work together in an effort to generate and uphold the best government to achieve and implement specific shared moral principles (Elazar, 1984:112). In light of this, Elazar identified three political cultures that reflect their own combination of the marketplace and commonwealth. Elazar called these political cultures individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic (Elazar, 1984:115).

2.3.2.1 The individualistic political culture

The individualistic political culture regards the political system as a marketplace. The government is established for functional purposes, that is, to firmly manage the functions demanded by the citizenry that it is meant to serve. The government is not concerned with constructing a "good society" or advancing the common good, it is mainly focused on private concerns (Elazar, 1984:115). Generally, the role of the government is limited and it is confined mainly to areas that relate to the economic realm in order to keep the marketplace functioning and promote private initiative (Elazar, 1984:115).

According to Elazar (1984:115-116) political life in societies with an individualistic political culture is constructed on a system of reciprocal obligations that is embedded in personal relationships. In light of this, politicians' primary motivations for campaigning for public office are for material self-interest and to promote their political careers, rather than using governmental power to achieve programmatic ends. Therefore, the individualistic political culture is on the basis of strong parties constructed upon patronage and constituent service (Elazar, 1984:116). The individualistic political culture is characterized by a high tolerance for corruption, it is something that is even expected because the citizenry tends to hold the view that politics is dirty and only professionals should be involved in it.

With the individualistic political culture, politics is viewed as just another means that people can use to improve their socio-economic position. In this regard, politics is just like another business, competing for talent and gaining rewards for individuals who take it up professionally (Elazar, 1984:115). The individualistic political culture tends to have public officials who are only willing to introduce new programs or expand the areas of government activity when there is a vast demand for certain goods and services from the public (Elazar, 1984:116). Elazar (1984:116) presumes that this situation gives the impression that public officials are only willing to increase the activities of the government on the basis of a reciprocal favour system that the public should vote them into office.

In addition, the role and place of the bureaucracy are uncertain in political systems that have an individualistic political culture (Elazar, 1984:116). The bureaucratic modus operandi goes against the favour system that is fundamental for the individualistic political process. While simultaneously, the qualities of organizational efficiency seem to be important for people seeking to master the market. Ultimately, a bureaucratic organization is established within the context of the favour system; large sections of the bureaucracy can be protected from it by means of the merit system, however, the whole organization is drawn into the political domain at critical moments through political appointment at the higher levels and, quite often, the twisting of the merit system to correspond with political demands occurs (Elazar, 1984:116-117). A discussion on the moralistic political culture will follow below.

2.3.2.2 The moralistic political culture

According to Elazar (1984:117) the moralistic political culture highlights the notion of the commonwealth as the foundation for democratic government. Societies with a moralistic political culture view politics as one of the most important activities of humanity as it aims to establish a good society. The contestation for power may be prevalent, but there is also an effort to use power to improve the commonwealth. Accordingly, within the moralistic political culture, the citizenry and politicians consider politics as a public activity that is focused on the public good and is committed to the improvement of the public interest (Elazar, 1984:117). Good government/governance is determined through the extent to which it advances the public good and in respect of "the honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare of those who govern" (Elazar, 1984:117). It can be stated that the moralistic political culture is the complete opposite of the individualistic political culture.

In addition, political activities are centered on the community rather than individual enrichment. As a result, individualism is mitigated through the general commitment to using communal power (but governmental, if required) to mediate in the domain of private activities, should it be deemed compulsory for the public good and highlights the commonwealth (Elazar, 1984:117). The moralistic political culture is characterized by the strong belief that politics does not only involve individuals who have political careers but the entire citizenry. Therefore, every citizen has the duty of taking part in the political matters of his commonwealth (Elazar, 1984:117).

The moralistic political culture considers all social, economic and political matters as an important priority. Politicians try to initiate new and modify existing public policies to address societal problems despite the absence of an instant electoral pay-off (Elazar, 1984:118). Thus, politicians do not run for office for personal gain but to improve broader society. In this society, political parties do not take precedence over the public and individuals can do away with regular party ties in favour of special local parties, or non-partisan systems should they believe that such changes will lead to obtaining larger political goals. Furthermore, with the moralistic political culture holding the public good

and commonwealth in high regard, these societies prevent patronage politics and do not tolerate corruption (Elazar, 1984:117-118).

According to Elazar (1984:118) the moralistic political culture is characterized by having great difficulty in modifying bureaucracy to the political order. This is linked to the possible conflict between collectivist principles and the need for large-scale organizations to improve bureaucratic efficiency, a problem that may influence the viewpoints of moralistic culture states toward specific types of government activity. Otherwise, the idea of a politically neutral administrative system offers more advantages than disadvantages within a moralistic value system. Societies with a moralistic political culture have a habit of rigidly maintaining the established merit systems (Elazar, 1984:118). The third and final political culture that Elazar identified is the traditionalistic political culture.

2.3.2.3 The traditionalistic political culture

The traditionalistic political culture is grounded in an uncertain perspective toward the marketplace as well as a paternalistic and elitist perception of the commonwealth (Elazar, 1984:118). It is a reflection of an older, pre-commercial perception that views a significantly hierarchical society as forming part of the political system. The traditionalistic political culture corresponds to its moralistic counterpart by viewing the government as an element that has a progressive role within the community, however, this role is limited in order to protect and maintain the status quo. This is achieved by ensuring that political power is confined to the elites who have a central role in government. This relatively small and self-perpetuating group governs through their elitist perception of the common good and obtain their right to govern through family relations or social position (Elazar, 1984:118-119).

According to Elazar (1984:119) within a traditionalistic political culture, there tends to be very little to no political participation from citizens that are not part of the elite and there is usually low voter turnout. Only individuals who are within the privileged classes via their social status may be accepted into the political domain. Elazar (1984:119) asserts that there is very minimal importance of political parties in traditionalistic societies as they promote a level of openness that is contrary to the fundamental essence of an elite-oriented political system. Their main function is to recruit individuals to fill those

governmental offices that are undesirable to the power-holders. However, if there are political parties within a traditionalistic political culture then they are usually in the form of one-party systems that are characterized by factional alignments that are in competition for power (Elazar, 1984:119).

Elazar (1984:119) further states that good government within the traditionalistic political culture includes the continuation and promotion of traditional patterns, and if required, adjusting them to changing societal conditions with minimal upset. Political leaders usually have a conservative and custodial role instead of an initiatory one, except if they are strongly pressured from the outside (Elazar, 1984:119).

Traditionalistic political cultures are usually instinctively anti bureaucratic (Elazar, 1984:119). Intrinsically, bureaucracy obstructs the fine network of informal interpersonal relationships that are at the very foundation of the political system and have thus matured over the years through the adherence to traditional patterns. Where the bureaucracy is set up, it is usually restricted to ministerial functions under the protection and guidance of the established elite (Elazar, 1984:119).

The above discussion has demonstrated the fundamental role that the individual plays in the political system and the general construction of political culture, hence, Bouchè (2011:806) states that “the personal is political” and “the political is personal”. This has been demonstrated by political socialization research. Thus, Obeidi (2013:12) asserts that any discussion on political culture cannot be done without taking into account the concept of political socialization. As such, the study of political socialization is fundamental because it extends the range of political research from the public into the private sphere (Ishiyama & Breuning, 2011:806).

2.4 UNDERSTANDING THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The 1963 contribution by Almond and Verba, titled *The Civic Culture,* may not have defined political socialization, but the meaning of the concept can be deduced from their definition of political culture which is presented in section 2.3.1 of this study. However,

from the contributions by Herbert Hyman, who defined socialization as “learning of social patterns corresponding to societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society” (Hyman, 1959:25), Gabriel Almond developed a definition of political socialization in his work that is titled *Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics*. According to Almond (1960:27-28) political socialization is “the process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes, cognitions, value standards and feelings toward the political system, its various roles and role incumbents”. This process has been described by Almond as “cultural transmission” (Almond, 1963, cited by Obeidi, 2013:14).

In a paper titled *“The Comparative. Study of Political Socialization”*, Sidney Verba describes political socialization as “a learning process; the process by which the norms associated with the performance of political roles as well as fundamental political values and guiding standards of political behaviour are learned” (Verba, 1964, cited by Bender, 1967:391). From this definition, it is clear that understanding political socialization requires an understanding of the key terms of *social norms, social roles* and *social rules* (Steyn Kotze, 2015:251). Social norms alludes to the unwritten, yet accepted and expected rules of appropriate behaviour, while social roles allude to the norms that are related to people that occupy a particular position in society (Steyn Kotze, 2015:251).

Based on the above, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, cited by Obeidi, 2013:13) assert that political socialization is a process that is greatly influenced by the “agents of socialization”. Mbavu (2017:3) describes this as “elements”, such as groups and institutions that facilitate the development and transmission of political knowledge, values and attitudes, at both the individual and community levels, during the process of political socialization”. These agents of socialization include the family, school, church, community, peer groups, the media, political parties and even one’s socio-economic class (Almond, 1960:28 & Wiarda, 2016:1). Therefore, political socialization begins at birth (Wiarda, 2016:1).

According to Almond (1960:28) socialization can either be latent or manifest. Latent political socialization occurs through the transmission of information, feelings or values of other social systems like the family which may influence attitudes toward similar roles, the inputs and outputs of the political system (Almond, 1960:28). According to Almond

(1960:28) latent political socialization occurs first and is undeniably the most basic period in the political socialization process because it is when individuals in their first years learn about discipline, authority and the family “political process”. A significant effect occurs here because it is when individuals develop a belief system or specific attitudes, feelings and values about their families and (political) life outside the family (Almond, 1960:28).

Manifest political socialization occurs through explicit and direct transmission of information, feelings and/or values that relate to the inputs, outputs and roles of the political system (Almond, 1960:28). Mbavu (2017:59) explains this by stating that the process of manifest political socialization involves the individual learning openly about the political history within their country, the structure and functions of their political system and/or government, political parties or specific political ideology, the appropriate conduct of citizens, the respect that is bestowed upon political leaders and the appropriate means of political participation.

In the older years, manifest political socialization occurs due to factors like tertiary education, work experience, involvement in voluntary organizations or political parties and the media. During this time, manifest political socialization becomes more significant, however, latent political socialization also persists (Almond, 1960:28-29). This means that even later on in life, the belief system or the attitudes, feelings and values that were acquired during the first period of political socialization (latent political socialization) will be transferred into the individual's adult life (where mainly manifest political socialization occurs) and influence patterns of adult family life, church, work relations, etc. This will in turn ultimately influence how individuals view the modus operandi of their political systems and affect the evolution of their political orientations (Almond, 1960:29).

In light of the above, Almond and Verba (1963, cited by Mbavu, 2017:56) state that political socialization executes three functions that relate to political culture, these include maintenance, transformation and creation. Firstly, political socialization aims to maintain the political culture of a country by transferring culture from one generation to the next. Secondly, political socialization transforms the political culture of a country by leading the populace or segments of it, to perceive and experience politics in a manner that is different from the past. Thirdly, political socialization aims to create a new culture by converting

the old and forming new political structures and social orders (Almond & Verba, 1963, cited by Mbavu, 2017:56).

Based on the above discussion on political culture and political socialization, the following section aims to provide an understanding of elite theory. This is important for understanding the kind of political elite that is necessary for building a political culture conducive to South Africa's democracy, and for understanding the ideological stance of the country's political elite that contributed to the deteriorating political culture.

2.5 ELITE THEORY

2.5.1 The origins of elite theory

In order to understand the discursive term *elite*, it is important to differentiate between the two ways in which the term can be used. The first understanding of the term can be derived from the Latin word *eligere* which refers to "selection by choice" and it aims to convey a positive meaning (Rinchu, 2017:53, and Mariotti, 2020:1). The use of the term in this connotation can be attributed to the works of Vilfred Pareto. Pareto also used the term *aristocrazia* (or aristocracy) as an equivalent term to elite which in his context alluded to the "best" (Mariotti, 2020:1-2). However, authors such as Gaetano Mosca rejected the use of the term in this context and instead considered the definition of "ruling class" to be the most appropriate because elite indicates the glorification of the ruling class, that it often does not deserve. Thus, the second meaning of the term is presently the most commonly used, and it neutrally refers to every group that is located at the highest level of a political or social hierarchy: subsequent to this explanation, every organization, institution and association consists of elites in their structure (Mariotti, 2020:2).

According to Mariotti (2020:1) elite theory was first developed at the end of the 19th and the start of the 20th century. Elite theory was initially developed within the field of sociology and its objective was to clarify the behaviour of individuals in a social setting (Ceazar, 2012:1). However, it was only after the Second World War that elite theory became important within the field of political studies by addressing the significant question about "who governs" (Dahl, 2005:5-6 and Mariotti, 2020:1). In light of this, Rinchu (2017:39)

asserts that any attempts of understanding elite theory needs to take into account Karl Marx's conflict theory.

Marx's conflict theory is based on the premise that every society has an unequal distribution of political power and economic resources. As a result, society is divided between two classes: the ruling class/bourgeoisie which owns the means of production (that is, land, capital, labour, etc.) and exercises their political and economic power over the subject class/proletariat (also known as the working class) (Rinchu, 2017:39). However, this unequal distribution of power is something that Marx does not view as being permanently fixed. He argues that a political system like this one is characterized by continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat who bear the brunt of ill-treatment from the hands of the bourgeoisie. Marx asserts that the conflict between these two classes will intensify and ultimately lead to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, thus signalling a victory for the proletariat and the establishment of a classless society (Richu, 2017:39).

With reference to the above, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Vilfred Pareto, who are known as the classical elite theorists, made solid arguments to have found a scientific theory that proves that "government by a small elite over the rest of society is inevitable" (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:138). Thus, it can be stated that elite theory came as a critique of Marx's conflict theory. According to Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987:138) classical elitist theorists were first of the view that Marx's theory was a faulty and inadequate explanation of the domination that persistently occurs in human societies. Secondly, due to the liberal optimism that was prevalent during their time, classical theorists were of the view that transforming into an industrialized social order with a system of representative democracy was not going to fundamentally change the categorization of society. Social mobility and the circulation of elites may increase, and the power holders may become more diverse, but the government should continue to be oligarchic (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:138).

Based on the above, Barkley (1955:97) states that elite theory, as constructed by Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Vilfred Pareto is based on three assumptions. Firstly, "political power is the basic ingredient of all social relations, and social classes must be defined primarily in terms of their relative power vis-a-vis each other." Secondly,

“human society is necessarily and inevitably divided into two classes- the ruling class, or élite, and the masses. Thirdly, “democracy, in the sense of equal participation by all the members of society in policy formulation, is impossible” (Barkley, 1955:97).

From the classical elitist theorists, Parry (1969:45) states that “Paretor’s system is the grandest of all the classical elitist doctrines”, while Ceazar (2012:5-6) states that “Pareto’s elite can be much wider and more comprehensive than the political bosses whom Mosca or Michel’s study, sometimes wider even than Marx’s ruling class”. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, the following section will discuss the contributors to elite theory by focusing on the works of Vilfred Pareto and Charles Wright Mills.

2.6 THE MAIN CONTRIBUTORS TO ELITE THEORY

2.6.1 Vilfred Pareto

According to Guaba (2003:440) the usage of the terms *elite* and *masses* was initially by Vilfred Pareto to signify the superior and inferior groups within society. In his four-volume book that was initially published in 1935 and titled *The Mind and Society,* Pareto considers all individuals as being different and situated in diverse positions from the highest to the lowest in various political, social and/or intellectual hierarchies (Mariotti, 2020:2). Thus, according to Pareto (1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:438): “Elite consists of those successful persons who rise to top in every occupation and stratum of society; there is an elite of lawyers, an elite of mechanics and even an elite of thieves”. As such, Pareto defined an elite as “those individuals who have the highest indices of excellence in any particular activity, whether it be train-robbing, fishing, political science or big business” (Parto, 1935, cited by Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:136). These manifold elites were sub-divided into a governing elite that is made up of all leaders who have a direct or indirect role in ruling society and a non-governing elite that is made up of the rest of the elites (Pareto, 1935, cited by Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:136 and Parry, 2005:40).

According to Ceazar (2012:6), Mariotti (2020:2) and Rinchu (2017:57) Pareto’s elite theory associates the position of people and explains social activity with reference to specific important psychological factors or attributes. Hence, Pareto was of the view that

every society consists of “people who possess in a marked degree the qualities of intelligence, character, skill, capacity, of any kind” (Pareto, 1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:439). Pareto argued that the qualities or attributes possessed by the elites form the basis of their ascension to the top and he referred to these qualities as “residues”. According to Pareto (2009:6) “the residues are the major motivations of human actions”. They are a reflection of the state of mind of individuals and which Pareto views as being constant throughout history (Parry, 2005:41). The term *residue(s)* is defined as “those qualities owing to which one can come at the top” (Pareto, 1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:439-440).

Pareto identified six types of residues, namely: (1) Residue of combinations, which relates to the propensity to invent and put together ideas by employing imagination, thus arts, political coalitions, ideologies and manoeuvrings may all originate from this lively, inventive instinct; (2) Residue of persistence of aggregates, which relates to the propensity to consolidate and safeguard positions once they have been established. This residue reflects instincts for longevity, order and stability; (3) Residue of activity or expressiveness, which has to do with the tendency of making feelings obvious through symbolization; (4) Residue of integrity, which involves the habit of upholding a good self-image; (5) Residue of sociability, which relates to the tendency to associate or connect with others, and lastly (6) Residue of sex, which relates to the propensity to view social events in erotic terms (Pareto, 2009:6-7, Parry, 2005:41 and Pareto, 1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:440).

Of the above-mentioned six residues, Pareto considers the first two residues to be the most important and applicable to the question of elite control and elite replacement (Parry, 2005:41). The dissemination of these residues or their matching instincts within society are fundamental and have a close similarity to Machiavelli's description of governing groups as “foxes” and “lions” (Parry, 2005:41 and Pareto, 1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:440).

According to Pareto (1935, cited by Rinchu, 2017:58, and Parry, 2005:41) men who have a predominance of the residue of combinations display characteristics like cunningness and intelligence, they are “foxes” in Machiavelli’s terms. These individuals are usually

courageous, adventurous and are eager and prepared to take risks for maximum gains. Men who have a predominance of the residue of persistence of aggregates tend to display characteristics like integrity, stability and strength. They are “lions” in Machiavelli’s terms. These individuals love tradition, they are conservative, faithful to the church, family and nation, and consistently prefer to depend on force instead of intelligence. They are pleased with making safe investments and gaining small returns, and are keen on gambling.

According to Parry (2005:41) the sets of qualities from the residue of combinations and the residue of persistence of aggregates are mutually exclusive. However, politics is partially an issue of force and partially one of persuasion, which necessitates both the “lion” and the “fox”. Therefore, Pareto (1935, cited by Rinchu, 2017:58) states that the elite is made up of foxes or lions depending on the kind of residue that is prevalent. History has shown that there is continuously a modification between an elite of foxes and an elite of lions, which Pareto referred to as the circulation of elites (Pareto, 1935, cited by by Agarwal, 1997:440).

2.6.1.1 Pareto’s notion of the circulation of elites

Pareto’s notion of the *circulation of elites* dismisses a direct progressive evolutionary explanation of history and social change (Delican, 2000:322). For Pareto “history of men is the history of the continues replacement of certain elites as one ascends another declines, such is the real phenomenon, though to us it may often appear under another form” (Pareto, 1968:36, cited by Delican, 2000:322). According to Pareto (2009:8) the circulation of elites not only implies that new individuals of capital and power replace the old ones, but, above all, it also means that the dominant residue within the elite is changed.

According to Pareto (1935:1430, cited by Delican, 2000:324) elites and non-elites are unstable; they are subject to change as they live or take their positions during a certain time. Thus, they do not last. According to Pareto, 1935, cited by Rinchu, 2017:59) every society consists of two primary groups: the one group is involved with government matters, it generally dominates the means of production and is thus wealthy. These are the elites. The other group is made up of poor individuals who are being governed and

they are the non-elites. The non-elites can progress to the level of the elites and the elites may regress into the level of non-elites. This alteration process occurs simultaneously, and it is referred to as the law of circulation of elites (Delican, 2000:324). The progression and regression of elites may occur via two methods.

The first method is the sense of replacement of a certain kind of elite by another. This process occurs when there is a change in the composition of elite members, or when their offspring do not possess the characteristics to be elite. The second approach involves a process whereby individuals are circulating amongst the elite and non-elite. This second process occurs through the steady infiltration of external elements from lower classes and broader society, or violent revolution (Pareto, 1935:169, cited by Delican, 2000:324, and Pareto, 1935, cited by Rinchu, 2017:59). Pareto (1935, cited by Agarwal, 1997:440) provides an explanation of this in psychological terms by stating that

> "Revolutions come about through the accumulations in the higher strata of society – either because of a slowing down in class circulation, or from other causes of decadent elements no longer possessing the residue suitable for keeping them in power, or shrinking from use of force; while in the meantime in the lower strata of society elements of superior quality are coming to the fore, possessing residues suitable for exercising the functions of governing and willing enough to use force."

Therefore, when the elite no longer have the characteristics (residues) that are necessary to maintain their power, simultaneously the non-elite develop and display these characteristics (residues). This results in the regressing elite recruiting new elements from the non-elite in order to restore their power or validity. In the end, this leads to the old elite group vanishing and a new elite group (with possibly a different composition) appearing. According to Pareto (1935:1426, cited by Delican, 2000:325) the current elites make every single effort to regulate the admittance of non-elites into their group in order to prevent the corruption of the ruling class, especially considering that when a non-elite progresses, he/she also brings along their dispositions, sentiments and attitudes. Rinchu (2017:59) states that this is a never-ending process as the classes that have power start to degenerate following a certain period of time.

According to Pareto (1968:59, cited by Delican, 2000:324) there are usually two signs that indicate that the elites are regressing. The first indication is that the regressing elite

tends to become softer, gentler, more human and less suitable to protect its own power. The second indication is that the regressing elite becomes less greedy for other people's goods and instead has a tendency to increase its illegal seizures of authority, monetary resources, and national resources such as land and minerals. While on the contrary new rising elites tend to be more active, stronger and committed in character (Delican, 2000:324). According to Rinchu (2017:59) several factors play a role in the stability of elites. The stability of elite groups depends on the degree of honesty and integrity that members of the group have, their commitment to work and/or duty, approaches to their rise to power, their contacts with other ordinary citizens and the degree to which their approaches are appealing and acceptable to the masses (Rinchu, 2017:59).

As stated above, Vilfred Pareto employed a psychological approach to elite theory. However, authors such as Charles Wright Mills were of the view that this approach was insufficient and that the composition and status of the elite needs to be studied by taking into consideration the economic and social framework of society (Parry, 2005:46 and Ceazar, 2012:9). Thus, the following section will focus on the contribution by C. Wright Mills.

2.6.2 C. Wright Mills' contribution to elite theory

According to Ceazar (2012:9) and Mariotti (2020:3) American sociologist Charles Wright Mills employed an institutional approach to elite theory when he published a book in 1956, titled *The Power Elite.* This institutional approach is demonstrated by his description of the elite when he states:

> "The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society" (Mills, 2000:3-4).

For Mills, power in society does not arise from controlling the means of production, but it is instead tied to a broader set of institutions, which are the military, the political executive and large corporations (Mills, 2000:4). According to Mills (1956, cited by Parry, 2005:46 and Ceazar, 2012:9) the elite is a result of society's "institutional landscape". Within every

society, there are specific institutions that have “pivotal positions” and the highest level of the hierarchy within these institutions contain “the strategic command posts of the social structure” (Mills, 2000:4). Therefore, the power elite or political elite is made up of individuals within these institutions “who occupy the command posts” and make decisions (Mills, 2000:4 & 23).

The unity of the elite is greatly dependent on the closeness of the connection between institutional hierarchies. Thus, Mills (2000:19) states: “If these hierarchies are scattered and disjointed, then their respective elites tend to be scattered and disjointed; if they have many interconnections and points of coinciding interest, then their elites tend to form a coherent kind of grouping”. Mills further states that in order for a national power elite to be present there needs to be some contact amongst the leaders of the hierarchies (Mills, 1956:288, cited by Ceazar, 2012:10 and Parry, 2005:46). This contact can vary from conscious conspiracy to a simple agreement between the leaders concerning policies and values. This “institutional proximity” is mostly powerful where individuals “interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in another” (Mills, 1956:288, cited by Ambedkar, 1992:260). Mills mentions the many scenarios in which presidents and directors of big businesses in America who have occupied top positions in the government have later gone back to the business sector. For Mills, the simplicity that is involved in this interchange of roles demonstrates the extent of unity of the elite. This means that the greater the level of interchange and institutional proximity, the more unified the elite is (Mills, 1956, cited by Parry, 2005:46).

The above discussion on political culture and elite theory makes it important to understand the concept of democracy and democratic consolidation as they form the key concepts in the title of this thesis and are at the core of obtaining the objectives of this study in the chapters that follow.

2.7 UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The term democracy has its origins in the Greek word of *demos* and *kratos* which can be understood as “The people” and “Power” respectively (Ober, 2008:3). As such, the meaning of democracy has been understood as “power of the people” or “rule by the

people" (Ober, 2008:3). Since the establishment of the term *democracy*, many conceptualizations of the term have been developed in order to suit different democratic models of government (Anderson, 2019:7). Despite these differences, Dahl (1971:1) states that a fundamental feature of a democracy is the government's persistent responsiveness to the citizens' preferences, regarded as political equals. Dahl (1971:2) further states that in order for the government to fulfill this role, the citizens should have three "unimpaired opportunities", which are: "(1) to formulate their preferences, (2) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, and (3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference".

According to Dahl (1971:2-3) for the above-mentioned opportunities to be present, the institutions within democratic societies should provide at least eight of the following "guarantees": "(1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) right of political leaders to compete for support, (6) alternative sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences". Authors such as Masipa (2018:2) have expanded these principles and thus demonstrated that democracy is not just about electing representatives as it needs to take into account socio-economic elements. As a result, principles such as "transparency", "tolerance", "economic freedom, controlling and preventing the abuse of power", upholding the "rule of law" and the protection of "human rights" are fundamental for democracy (Masipa, 2018:2). Authors such as Ambrose (1995:16) state that democracy in the African context must be a union of the political and economic, as such for the purpose of this thesis democracy is defined as "a system of governance which allows people to freely elect their leaders and hold them accountable, and which provides opportunity for the greater number of people to use their human potential to survive in dignity" (Ambrose, 1995:16).

As stated above, the term *democracy* is highly contestable and this contributes to the many conceptualizations of the term. Therefore, the kind of definition that is used for

democracy will influence any definition of democratic consolidation (Kearsey, 2007:3). In the book titled *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* Linz & Stepan (1996:3) state that it is important for a non-democratic regime to complete its democratic transition before addressing matters that affect the survival/consolidation of the newly established democracy. As such, Linz and Stepan (1996:3) state that

> "A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*."

From the above definition, Linz and Stepan firstly acknowledge the "electoral fallacy" that views free elections as being a necessary and sufficient condition/requirement for democracy. Secondly, by stating the necessity to reach an agreement about political procedures, the definition, in turn, acknowledges that disagreements may arise in decision-making processes (for instance, about the kind of government and the electoral system) which can make consolidation difficult (Linz & Stepan, 1996:4). As a result, despite the democratic transition being completed, numerous tasks still need to be executed, conditions need to be developed, and certain attitudes and habits need to be learned prior to a democracy being regarded as consolidated (Linz & Stepan, 1996:5). Thus, democracy is consolidated and regarded as "the only game in town" when it becomes a routine and extensively "internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success (Linz & Stepan, 1996:5).

Based on the above, Linz and Stepan provide a conceptualization of democratic consolidation. They state that the consolidation of democracy occurs when democracy is internalized behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally (Linz & Stepan, 1996:6). Thus, behaviourally, democracy is consolidated "when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence, or foreign intervention to secede from the state". Attitudinally, democracy is consolidated "when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures

and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or isolated from pro-democratic forces." Constitutionally, democracy is consolidated "when governmental and non-governmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process" (Linz & Stepan, 1996:6).

From the above conceptualization, Linz and Stepan (1996:7) state that society needs to consist of five interacting arenas that are mutually reinforcing in order for democratic consolidation to be present.

The first arena is the presence and continuous development of a free and lively civil society. Civil society refers to "that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests" (Linz & Stepan, 1996:7). Civil society additionally constitutes individuals and entities emanating from the civic society, who are ordinary civilians with no affiliation to any organization. These citizens are fundamental in changing the regime/opposition balance due to their ability to mobilize and challenge the regime by expressing their interests. This makes them important for promoting democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996:8).

The second arena is the presence of an independent and valued political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996:7). In a democratic environment, political society is "the arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus" (Linz & Stepan, 1996:8). Civil society may have the ability to abolish a non-democratic government, but a complete democratic transition and particularly democratic consolidation should incorporate a political society. A political society includes the structure and reinforcement of the democratic regime. This is attained when the populace witness the growth of a normatively positive understanding of institutions and organizations within a democracy and democracy comes to be a routine. It further involves the operating of political parties

and leaders, elections, electoral rules, inter-party alliances and legislatures (Linz & Stepan, 1996:8).

The third arena relates to the rule of law. According to Linz and Stepan (1996:10) to obtain a consolidated democracy a certain degree of independence in civil and political society should be included in and underpinned by the rule of law. All important actors, particularly the democratic government and state have to respect and uphold the rule of law. With regards to the above-mentioned civil society and political society, a rule of law that reflects the spirit of constitutionalism is crucial. This spirit not only requires majority rule, but a very firm commitment to the constitution and governance procedures that need an exceptional majority to be modified. It necessitates a straightforward hierarchy of laws, that should be interpreted by an autonomous judicial system and reinforced by a powerful legal culture within civil society (Linz & Stepan, 1996:10).

The fourth arena relates to the presence of a state bureaucracy functioning by democratic leaders and an established legal economic society (Linz & Stepan (1996:10). Democracy requires that citizens' rights are also protected. To protect these rights, and provide the basic needs of citizens, the democratic government must have the ability to effectively exercise its monopoly of the legal use of force in the country. Democratic consolidation needs an operational tax system that can pay for public goods and services. To this end, a powerful normative bureaucratic presence that operates in the spirit of constitutionalism is needed (Linz & Stepan, 1996:11).

The fifth and final arena relates to the existence of an institutionalized "economic society". This phrase is used to bring focus to two claims. First, when a country is not at war, a command economy[3] has never and will never be able to consolidate democracy. Second, a modern consolidated democracy has never existed and will never exist in a pure market economy[4] (Linz & Stepan, 1996:11). The reasoning

[3] A command economy refers to a system in which decisions about the economy (that is production and consumption) are made by a central authority like a government (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2015).
[4] A pure market economy refers to a system in which decisions about the economy (like the allocation of resources, production and prices) are made by producers/businesses and consumers and there is little government involvement (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2015).

behind this can be articulated by analysing Adam Smith's major work titled *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.* In his book, Smith mentions three fundamental tasks that the state is responsible for. This firstly includes protecting society from violent attacks, secondly, the state needs to protect, as much as possible, all civilians from injustice or oppression, and thirdly, the state is responsible for establishing and upholding public institutions that should be for the benefit of society instead of a small group of individuals (Smith, 1976:551, cited by Linz & Stepan, 1996:12).

According to Linz and Smith (1996:12-13) the third task is essential as it relates to reducing inequality in society. They further state that if sectors like the health, transport and education were controlled by a market economy, then society would experience inequality. The conclusion by Linz and Stepan (1996:13) is that society would be more secure if these services were provided and controlled by the state, and this should be executed through the economic society. They further state that democratic consolidation needs an established market that is socially and politically regulated. This requires an economic society and, in turn, an effective state.

2.8 CONCLUSION

Countries have different political cultures and political socialization approaches due to their differences in history, socio-economic status, religious and cultural aspects, and the type of government that is prevalent. Hence, political socialization and political culture relate to norms and values. Furthermore, political culture and the process of political socialization are not static, it is constantly changing when there is a change in political leaders, when society is presented with different/or new socio-economic issues and when a new generation gradually enters the political system.

It must be noted that political culture is an important element in the survival of any democracy. The character/nature of a country's political culture can either reinforce or destabilize the established democracy. The former may occur by having a responsive and inclusive government that provides a conducive environment for citizens to develop, and this can build a participant/participatory political culture whereby citizens actively work to

augment the government's efforts and build a better country. While the latter may occur through the lack of adherence to rules and regulations, ineffective state institutions and deteriorating socio-economic conditions can ultimately result in citizens revolting against the system. In light of this, political culture is a theory that cannot be isolated to the field of politics as it further relates to academic disciplines such as psychology, economics, political sociology, public administration and criminology, and social phenomena like social movements and voting behaviour.

The above discussion has further demonstrated that political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation are three interrelated concepts. When a country's political culture is characterized by the spirit of constitutionalism, it means that all civilians and political leaders hold the rule of law in high regard and this, in turn, reinforces the process of democratic consolidation. Similarly, when a country's political elite runs a people-centred government and is not focused on individual interests, this too reinforces the process of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, this builds trust between the state and the populace and builds a political culture that is supportive of democracy and state institutions. Thus, it can be stated that elite theory and political culture have a relationship that is directly proportional to democracy and/or democratic consolidation.

CHAPTER THREE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANC'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE BEFORE 1994

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided an understanding of the origins of political culture, focusing on the contributions from Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Daniel Elazar. It discussed the link between political culture and political socialization to provide an understanding of how political culture develops. The chapter discussed the origins of elite theory, focusing on Vilfred Pareto and Charles Wright Mills. The inclusion of elite theory is fundamental for this study as the character and ideological stance of the (political) elite influences the existing political culture and its future development.

Furthermore, chapter two provided an understanding of democracy and democratic consolidation, referencing the work of Linz and Stepan (1996). It concluded by acknowledging that countries have different political cultures which are influenced by different factors that manifest in different ways. It also acknowledged that political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation have a directly proportional relationship, meaning that a positive change in one element leads to a corresponding positive change in the other.

By means of a literature review, this third chapter aims to provide an understanding of how the ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture before 1994. Thus, information about the ANC's origins, objectives and activities during the colonial and apartheid era will be provided.

3.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE BEFORE 1994

3.2.1 The beginning of colonialism in South Africa

According to Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012:47) several circumstances made it necessary for European nations to colonize Africa. These include the necessity for raw materials, the pursuit for new markets for urban businesses to sell surplus manufactured goods produced as a result of the Industrial Revolution; the necessity to feed an ever-increasing

urban industrial population; and the necessity to find a place to invest surplus profit in order to create more profit (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012:47 & 53).

The beginning of colonialism in South Africa occurred through the Dutch East India Company (otherwise called the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or VOC) taking possession of the Cape in 1652 with the intention of creating a midway refreshment stop on its commercial route between Europe and India (Osaghae & McGowan, 2007:209). By the 18th century, the Cape had created an agricultural economy that necessitated the importation of slave labour from Asia, Mozambique, and Madagascar, making it Africa's first colony (Osaghae & McGowan, 2007:209,210 and Fourie, 2009:1 & 9). The Dutch ruled until 1795 and then again from 1803 to 1806. However, in 1806 (roughly eight years after their initial conquest in 1795), the British regained control of the territory (Oliver & Oliver, 2017:5 and Fourie, 2009:3).

By bringing in more white immigrants from the United Kingdom (UK) and fighting a series of battles with African chiefs, and the Xhosa and Zulu people of the Eastern Cape and Natal respectively, the British colonialists expanded their territory of control and took over the African economy (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012:47-48 and SACP, 1962:13). As a consequence, British control over Mashonaland (Limpopo province), Basutholand (Lesotho), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) was established. Slavery was abolished in 1836 by the British, but the Boers (Dutch) were against this and many of them fled to the interior of the nation, where they engaged in a series of conflicts with African communities, dispossessed them, and formed territories over which they could rule (Osaghae & McGowan, 2007:210 and SACP, 1962:13).

The new-found freedom of the Boers did not endure long since the discovery of diamonds (in 1870 in Kimberly) and gold (in Johannesburg in 1886) motivated Britain to take control of both territories (which were ruled by the Boers). This led to the First Anglo-Boer War breaking out in 1881, followed by the Second Anglo-Boer War, which lasted from 1899 to 1902. The Boer republics became British colonies after the Vereeniging Peace Treaty was signed, ending the war in 1902 (Liebenberg, 2003:929, Hillestad, 2009:16, and Thom, 2013:1). Due to this, the British and the Boers came to a mutual understanding

over the dispossession, oppression and exploitation of black[5] people. The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as a result of this (SACP, 1962:14).

3.2.2 The Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa was founded mainly to eliminate economic competition and promote political cohesion amongst the British and Boers (Nattrass, 2020:137 & 140). At the National Convention of 1908-1909 which took place in each of the four provinces (Cape, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal), the British and Boers debated over the Union of South Africa's system of government with no African/black representative. According to Southall (2014:137), Osaghae and McGowan (2007:210) and Kanyane & Houston (2015:3) the merger of the four colonies was interpreted as a declaration of independence for South Africa, although one that solely pertained to whites (British and Boers). The defective method in which the Union was formed set a conducive environment for a decades-long restrictive socio-economic environment for black/African people.

Thus, the Union of South Africa quickly enacted anti-black policies, such as destroying the limited amount of African franchises in the Cape and only granting Black people and Coloureds the right to vote if they met certain salary or property requirements. According to Kanyane & Houston (2015:3) and Nattrass (2020:141) in 1903 and 1909, the African People's Organisation (APO) and the South African Native Convention (SANC) were founded in response to these abuses. APO and SANC opposed the discriminatory legislation and in 1909 deployed a delegation to the UK to express their objections to the marginalization of black people from the Union and broader society. The efforts by the delegation were futile, as Britain did not want to jeopardize the fragile truce it had made with the Boers so soon after the war.

From the above discussion, black South Africa did not have a formally established/written government system from the pre-colonial era until 1909 (just before the Union of South Africa was established in 1910) as its political administration was headed by chiefs of different tribes and territories, and the chief's council of elders (Palagashvili, 2018:284,

[5] In this dissertation black is written with a lower-case b, except when quoting a source which chose to write it with a capital B.

Bizana-Tutu, 2008:8, and Oliver & Oliver, 2017:1). This means that there was a traditional political culture in place. The beginning of colonialism brought territorial disputes and the imposition of a Eurocentric government structure that was accompanied by repressive and segregationist rules bred a political culture of violence in communities. Thus, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which eventually became the African National Congress (ANC), emerged from this background (Liebenberg, 2000:133, and Nattrass, 2020:141).

3.3 THE HISTORY OF SANNC AND ITS ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was founded in Bloemfontein on the 8th of January 1912 and is Africa's oldest liberation movement (ANC, 2022 and Ginwala, 1990:77). SANNC was restrictive of its membership as it comprised of men who were part of the black elite, some of which were educated in fields such as medicine, law and journalism, or they were of a particular tribal status (chiefs) and some were church ministers and landowners (ANC, 2022, De Jager & Steenkamp, 2015:1, Grundlingh, 1982:10, Ginwala, 1990:80, and Odendaal, 1984:231). SANNC began as a pressure group and not a political party. Its political culture was that of a non-violent, moderate organization that aimed to defend the rights of black people, their territories, and committed to establishing national unity by ensuring that black people have equal rights and opportunities (Kanyane & Houston, 2015:4, Clapham, 2012:4, and Nattrass, 2020:142). Hence De Jager & Steenkamp (2015:3) state that the three fundamental worldviews or ideologies that influenced the SANNC (and later the ANC) were "Christian Liberalism, communism and Africanism". Therefore, it was only befitting that the repeal of the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913 was one of the organization's first main objectives.

According to Terreblanche (2010:5), SACP (1962:14) and Modise and Mtshiselwa (2013:1-5) the 1913 Land Act made it illegal for black people to have ownership of or lease over 7% of the country's total land area. As a result, many black people were forced to relocate to designated regions known as "Bantustans" which were deliberately designed to be insufficient to support them. This purposefully engineered relative deprivation forced black people to become labourers in land and businesses that were

owned by white people. This became known as the migrant labour system. In 1914 and 1919 SANNC displayed its diplomatic political culture and disapproval of South Africa's racial capitalist system by deploying a delegation to the UK to oppose the Natives Land Act and stress the recognition of the rights of black people, but their efforts were unsuccessful (ANC, 2022, and Kanyane & Houston, 2015:4).

3.3.1 SANNC's contribution to South Africa's political culture

The above discussion has demonstrated that SANNC'S political culture was that of a non-violent, diplomatic and consensus-oriented organization. Despite comprising of elite men, it took great pride in unifying African people and wanted to improve their socio-economic status. Therefore, the contribution that SANNC has made to South Africa's political culture is establishing a system of democracy and this is reflected by its negotiation with the UK to abolish the Natives Land Act and have equal rights for black South Africans. SANNC reinforced the country's traditional political culture by only allowing men of a certain tribal status to be members. Furthermore, the organization also institutionalized patriarchy within its organization by limiting its membership to men only. This meant that even in broader society, the country's political culture isolated women from the realm of politics.

3.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ROLE OF THE ANC FROM THE 1920'S TO THE 1930'S

In 1923, the SANNC was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) (Moloi, 2013:168). Despite this name change, Southall (2014:296) states that the ANC "consistently thereafter reiterated its status as the embodiment of the African nation and stressed the need for national unity, even in the face of inescapable organizational weaknesses and divisions of Africans across class, ethnicity, ideology, religion and region". During this era, the ANC was against militant action such as strikes and protests. Thus, the organization was mainly inactive (ANC, 2022). However, within broader society the main form of mobilization that occurred was within the labour movement, through the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). Formed in 1919, the ICU was the most active and well-known organization in urban and rural regions. Despite its collapse in the

late 1920's, its militant actions enabled it to secure several significant victories for its members (ANC, 2022).

The above situation led to socialist organizations also mobilizing black workers and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was formed in 1921 (ANC, 2022 and Kelley, 2014:247). Its membership was mainly made up of white people who supported white employees in their fights against capitalism. However, after joining the Communist International (Comintern)[6] in 1921 and upon Moscow's directions, the CPSA moved its allegiance to black employees as legitimate proletarian representatives (Filatova, 2012:511 and Kelley, 2014:248 & 251-252). Thus, the CPSA became South Africa's first multiracial political organization (ANC, 2022).

The period of the 1920s was significant because it saw the Comintern engage in substantial ideological debates. At the Comintern's second congress in 1920, the theory of the National Democratic Revolution[7] was formulated by Vladimir Lenin. This theory was mainly from his draft theses on the national and colonial questions (Lenin, 1920). According to Lenin (1920b:136) the fundamental notion of this thesis is based on the difference between "oppressed and oppressor nations". Lenin's thesis/theory highlighted how the world is comprised of a high number of poor countries that are oppressed by a small number of industrialized ones. As a result, in order to address this power disparity, the congress agreed that the Comintern would support bourgeois-democratic movements in oppressed nations on the condition that they are truly revolutionary, and when their proponents do not obstruct them from educating and organizing the peasants and exploited masses in a revolutionary spirit (Lenin, 1920b:136-137). As a result, the congress chose to identify the movement as a "national revolutionary movement" as opposed to a bourgeois-democratic movement (Lenin, 1920b:136-137). This decision by the congress thus gave birth to the theory of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (Filatova, 2012:515-516).

[6] According to McDermott and Agnew (1996:19) the Communist International was established by Vladimir Lenin in Moscow at a congress of revolutionaries in March 1919. Its plan of action was "to build a 'world party' of communists dedicated to the armed overthrow of capitalist private property and its replacement by a system of collective ownership and production".

[7] Some sources refer to this as the National Liberation Revolution (Lenin, 1920).

The above ideological stance of the Comintern was a reflection of the CPSA's ideology of non-racialism. As a result, Josiah Gumede (who was the ANC president from 1927) viewed the CPSA as an organization that was capable of cooperating with the ANC against increasingly harsher and racist government policies (ANC, 2022). In 1927, Gumede's view was also influenced by attending the Comintern's 10th anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in Moscow with James La Guma (a member of the CPSA's leadership) and this led to his admiration of communism (Filatova, 2012:512). According to Ellis (1991:440) Gumede's visit to Moscow resulted in the collaborative relationship between the CPSA and ANC being established in 1928.

Between 1927 and 1928, the Comintern started becoming directly involved in the issues of South Africa and endorsed the alliance between the CPSA and the ANC as it would contribute to the achievement of an "Independent Native Republic" (Ellis, 1991:440 and Filatova, 2012:511). The emergence of the "Independent Native Republic", a slogan and/or thesis that was formulated by the Comintern's chairman, Nikolai Bukharin, soon resulted in the CPSA resistantly adopting it as its political goal following pressure from the Comintern (Filatova, 2012:512, and Southall, 2014:289). The Comintern's sixth congress approved the final version of the "Independent Native Republic" between July and August 1928, and it stressed that "The Communist Party of South Africa must combine the fight against all anti-native laws with the general political slogan in the fight against British domination, the slogan of an independent native South African Republic as a stage toward a workers' and peasants' republic with full rights for all races, black, coloured, and white" (Filatova & Davidson, 2017:952).

However, Gumede's attempts to work together with the CPSA in revitalizing the ANC to combat racist policies was short-lived because, in 1930, he was voted out as the president of the ANC by members who were conservative and unsupportive of communism (ANC, 2022, and Ellis, 1991:440-441). In addition, the CPSA and ANC were weakened (individually and collectively) by their disputes over the adoption of the Independent Native Republic thesis, the CPSA's commitment to cooperate with and strengthen the ANC, internal party conflict and modifications in the Comintern's line of succession increased the difficulty of concentrating on the liberation struggle (SACP, 2017:103, and

Ellis, 1991:440-441). Therefore, the ANC went through conservative leadership, the alliance between the ANC and CPSA was on a decline and the two organizations were not politically active during the 1930s (ANC, 2022, Ellis, 1991:441, Liebenberg, 2000:134, and SACP, 2017:103).

3.4.1 The ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture: 1920s and 1930s

The ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture by establishing a culture of tolerance between itself and the CPSA. This was fundamental because at the heart of South Africa's problem(s) was the issue of racial and economic oppression. Its alliance with the CPSA was also fundamental to the development of its ideology as this was important for establishing an action plan of how it was going to realize equality and democracy within society. Thus, the ANC reinforced the culture of democracy by collaborating with the CPSA and this was important for demonstrating to broader society that their respective organizations all center around the socio-economic oppression/deprivation that was taking place in South Africa.

3.5 THE ANC DURING THE 1940S AND 1950S

According to Ellis (1991:440) and SACP (2017:103) Moses Kotane (who was a student in Moscow in the early 1930s) was elected as the general secretary of the CPSA in 1939 and this provided the basis for the resuscitation of a campaigning CPSA of the 1940s. Kotane's election saw the CPSA intensifying its efforts in constructing a militant and progress-oriented trade union movement and this contributed to the significant increase in black trade union membership (O'Malley, 2021a, and SACP, 2017:103). It prioritized the struggles that black communities faced and also worked closely with coloured and Indian communities. In building what it referred to as "national movements", the CPSA maintained its long-standing practice of building internal political education capability by making use of some of its members who were in the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and 1930s to convey socialist construction. However, to solidify its alliance with the ANC and ensure that their words also carried weight, Kotane's leadership promoted dual membership by motivating CPSA members to also join the ANC (SACP, 2017:103-104).

According to MacDonald (2008:7) The ANC's evolution occurred as a result of demographic and economic developments in the 1930s and 1940s, which transferred the party's constituent base from rural to urban regions, particularly Johannesburg. Therefore, basic bread and butter issues that impacted communities (such as the cost of living, passes, rents and anti-black laws), and not women's issues can be attributed to women becoming involved in political activities (Walker, 1991:25). As a result, in 1943 women were granted full membership within the ANC and the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) was formally established. However, this occurred against a great deal of protest from some men as the women wanted greater autonomy (Ginwala 1990:77 & 90). With the ANC's constituent base being in Johannesburg, its membership grew and new members encouraged the ANC to pursue more contentious and ambitious goals (MacDonald, 2008:7). This motivated young people to become more active in politics and in 1944 the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) was established (Letlaka, 2008:165, and ANC, 2022).

According to Letlaka (2008:165) the ANCYL was established by men like Dr Ngcobo, AP Mda, Dr Njongwe and Anton Muziwakhe Lembede in response to the organization's lack of militancy which generally made them feel that the ANC had deteriorated and did not have clear direction (Fredrickson, 1995:241). Plaatjie (1994:43) states that the founders of the ANCYL "were a radicalized and militant middle class" and these characteristics can be ascribed in large part to the socio-economic and political realities of the 1940s. In addition, the Youth League members were anti-communist out of fear that the Stalinist Communist Party (in Moscow) would force its program on the ANC through officials like Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks, who had dual membership (in the ANC and CPSA). They were also conflicted by the CPSA's stance of multiracialism due to the uncertainty over the role of white people and their future in the country. Hence, the ideology of radical African nationalism or Africanism was revealed by the organization's first president, Anton Lembede (Plaatjie, 1994:43-44 and Ellis, 1991:441).

African nationalism is "a subjective feeling of kinship or affinity shared by people of African descent. It is a feeling based on shared cultural norms, traditional institutions, racial heritage, and a common historical experience ... Along with this sense of shared identity

is a collective desire to maintain one's own cultural, social, and political values independent of outside control" (Khapoya, 2015:150). Lembede (and, in turn, the ANCYL) made it clear that the liberation struggle needed to be led by the African masses through militant actions (ANC, 2022) because "the whites and Indian resident in South Africa were foreigners" (Fredrickson, 1995:280).

After the National Party (NP) ascended to power in 1948, it implemented the policy of apartheid, a policy that can be understood as separate development in order to achieve systematic and widespread racial segregation and discrimination. O'Malley (2021b) states that "apartheid was premised on discrimination, denial and segregation in every area of South African life - social, political and economic. It grossly violated human rights in numerous ways, and on different levels". It is upon this development that the ANCYL was able to persuade the ANC leadership to ultimately adopt its "Programme of Action" in 1949 that comprised of mass resistance tactics like boycotts, civil disobedience and strikes (O'Malley, 2021c). Thus, the Programme of Action can be understood as both a critique of the tactics that the ANC previously used for the liberation struggle and also a guide to the tactics that it should use in response to the oppressive laws, like the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the Separate Amenities Act of 1953 and the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 (O'Malley, 2021b).

The enforcement of the Suppression of Communism Act set a chain of events that resulted in the 1950s being a period in which the NP government faced great resistance from anti-apartheid organizations in the country. The Suppression of Communism Act (44 of 1950) "was to declare the Communist Party of South Africa to be an unlawful organization; to make provision for declaring other organizations promoting communistic activities to be unlawful and for prohibiting certain periodical or other publications; to prohibit certain communistic activities; and to make provision for other incidental matters" (South Africa, 1950:549). Thus, the CPSA was banned in 1950, but it continued with its political activities underground as members of the ANC and this strengthened their relationship even further (Fredrickson, 1995:183, and Ellis, 1991:441). With the CPSA being banned both organizations became aware that civil dialogue with the apartheid

government was unsustainable for the liberation struggle and that it was time for the newly adopted ANCYL's Programme of Action to be implemented.

Following the approval of the ANCYL's programme in 1949, the Defiance Campaign of 1952 was one of the first major movements that was initiated by a joint planning council consisting of officials from the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the Franchise Action Council (FRAC). The campaign's objective was to get unjust laws repealed (Hirson, 1988:70). Over 8 000 volunteers were physically attacked and imprisoned during the initial stage of the campaign owing to violations of pass rules, curfew regulations, and regulations that separated blacks and whites in public spaces. Irrespective of this, the campaign sparked a substantial rise in support for liberation with the ANC's membership rapidly increasing (Hirson, 1988:70, and Reddy, 1987). This strengthened ANC-SAIC ties and facilitated the formation of the South African Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO), a white democratic organization known as the Congress of Democrats (COD) (ANC, 2022). Reddy (1987) states that these developments led to the ANC being "a truly national organization of the people".

The success of the Defiance Campaign, spearheaded by the ANC prompted communists to re-examine their relations with the ANC, and with nationalism in general. As a result, the banned CPSA reorganized underground to form the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1953 (Everatt, 1992:19 & 21). According to Mager and Mulaudzi (2014:378) the aftermath of the Defiance Campaign resulted in an effort to strengthen the commitment to the principle of non-racialism and overall, to the liberation struggle. Thus, the ANC collaborated with its allies (SAIC, SACPO, COD and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which was founded in 1955), to establish the ANC-led Congress Alliance. This approach was supportive of the CPSA's position that the (black) working class should be in the vanguard of the liberation struggle and that they should be represented in politics.

The Congress Alliance hosted its inaugural national congress in Kliptown in 1955 which was known as the Congress of the People (COP). The purpose of the COP was to establish a shared vision for the congress and was a platform for all citizens to voice their desires concerning the type of nation they wished to live in (ANC, 2022, and Mager &

Mulaudzi, 2014:378). Thus, in the months leading up to the COP committees were deployed to the branches of the organizations that formed the Congress Alliance's to compile replies to the question “How would you set about making South Africa a happy place for all who live in it?”. This consultation resulted in the establishment and adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 (ANC, 2022, and Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:378). The SACP stated in 1962:

> “The Freedom Charter is not a programme for socialism. It is a common programme for a free, democratic South Africa, agreed on by socialists and non-socialists. At the same time, in order to guarantee the abolition of racial oppression and white minority domination, the Freedom Charter necessarily and realistically calls for profound economic changes: drastic agrarian reform to restore the land to the people; widespread nationalization of key industries to break the grip of white monopoly capital on the main centers of the country’s economy; radical improvements in the conditions and standards of living for the working people” (SACP, 1962:28).

Despite the adoption of the Freedom Charter, Mager and Mulaudzi (2014:379) state that a major problem that the alliance was confronted with was the lack of a clear strategy for the emancipation of women. Thus, the ANC appeared to not know what to do when Hendrik Verwoerd (who was the Minister of Native Affairs) declared that black women were to be issued with passes from 1956. Black women seemed to be politically and socially weak on the surface level due to being subjected to oppressive apartheid laws and patriarchal customary laws that were enforced by their spouses, fathers, chiefs, headmen, brothers (with regard to widows) and elder sons (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:379). However, these restrictions had failed to deter women from relocating to cities, where they took on new responsibilities that allowed them to exercise more independence of action and judgment (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:379). Thus, the pass law that was enforced against black women led to women becoming involved in politics through organizations such as the ANCWL and the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) (Meintjes, 1996:54, and Schmidt, 1983:4).

The membership of FEDSAW was based on organizational rather than individual affiliation, hence, the ANCWL was the main affiliate organization, with both organizations tending to have the same leadership (Rasool, 2016:7-8). Over and above the federation being established to attract women of different racial groups, its objectives (as stated in

its constitution) were: “To bring women of South Africa together to secure full equality of opportunity for all women, regardless of race, colour or creed; to remove social and legal and economic disabilities; to work for the protection of the women and children of our land” (Meer, 2016, and Schmidt, 1983:18). Thus, the year 1956 saw women such as Helen Joseph, Albertina Sisulu, Rahima Moosa, Lillian Ngoyi, Helen Suzman, Ruth First, Charlotte Maxeke, Sophie Williams-De Bruyn, Florence Matomela and Bertha Gxowa demonstrating against pass laws (Matshego, 2018). Approximately 50 000 women demonstrated during the first seven months of 1956 on 38 various occasions and in 30 various places (Rasool, 2016:17).

The above-mentioned events led to the historic protest of over 20 000 women at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on 9 August 1956 (Rasool, 2016:17). The women’s militancy during this historic event led to an increase in protests in other towns and cities. The African women’s struggle and the message to the apartheid government was clear as a flyer during a 1957 protest read:

> “Who knows better than any African woman what it means to have a husband who must carry a pass? ... Passes mean prison; passes mean broken homes; passes mean suffering and misery for every African family in our country; passes are just another way in which the Government makes slaves of the Africans; passes mean hunger and unemployment; passed are an insult...” (Schmidt, 1983:19).

As the liberation struggle intensified during the 1950s, a particular faction of ANC members known as Africanists opposed the ANC’s stance of non-racialism, and in turn, the Freedom Charter (ANC, 2022). In the Africanist philosophy, the phrase *African people* encompassed dark people and certain Indians (Motlhabi, 1984:73). Thus, this faction regarded non-blacks as foreign people and distrusted the foreign ideology that the communists presented. The failure to reconcile these differences led to the separation and establishment of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in 1959 (ANC, 2022, Stapleton, 2010:160, and Thompson, 2014:210).

Although the ANC’s stance of non-racialism had the unintended consequence of losing some members to the PAC, but it contributed to historical events that played a significant part in the liberation struggle. The women’s march to the Union Buildings demonstrated

that the ANCYL's Programme of Action was being implemented by all sections of society and that efforts were being made to achieve the objectives of the Freedom Charter while upholding the ANC's stance on non-racialism. Therefore, the Congress Alliance, its Congress Movement affiliates, and the ANC recognized the Freedom Charter as their political blueprint, and it became a significant element in South Africa's democratic political culture. Thus, it is important to analyse how the ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture during the 1940s and 1950s.

3.5.1 The ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture: 1940s and 1950s

The establishment of the Congress Alliance was significant because it demonstrated that a multifaceted contribution was necessary for the liberation struggle. Through the Congress Alliance merging with SACTU, workers were given a platform to become involved in the ANC and to integrate workers' issues in the liberation struggle of South Africa. This created a platform for workers to become involved in the ANC and thus, the ANC's approach contributed to South Africa's political culture being supportive of diversity (provided that it was directed at the liberation struggle), open communication that is tolerant of various viewpoints, and a high regard for firm and goal-oriented political leadership.

Goal-oriented political leadership was significant for the evolution of the ANC and this was demonstrated when the ANC decided to allow women to become full members of the organization. In this way, the organization demonstrated an element of maturity in understanding that the liberation struggle needed to occur through the joint effort of all members of society. However, the resistance that these women came across from some men within the ANC, particularly in the establishment of the ANCWL, demonstrates that the ANC is still a patriarchal organization. With the ANC-led Congress Alliance being an amalgamation of anti-apartheid organizations, its failure to have a defined policy for women's emancipation mirrored and reinforced the political culture of patriarchy that was prevalent in South Africa.

Related to the above is the fact that the culture of democracy and accountability was being instilled in South Africa through the militancy that was demonstrated by the women's march. This left an imprint on citizen's minds for future political action because

the march was multiracial but was based on a common struggle, and it was being led by people (women) who are expected to be submissive individuals. In this way, the march that was led by the ANCWL reinforced the political culture of resistance in South Africa.

However, it can be stated that the political culture of resistance, coupled with anger from the socio-economic deprivation caused by colonialism and apartheid produced a sub-culture of racism from the former Africanists members of the ANC/or PAC members. This sub-culture of racism came from a position of fear and the lack of trust in the intentions of non-black people. Thus, the simultaneous separation and establishment of the PAC demonstrated that the political culture of racism is ingrained in South Africa. It is this culture of racism and socio-economic deprivation that led to people feeling angry and resulted in the execution of the NDR and the violence of the 1960s and 1970s.

3.6 THE ANC FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1970S AND THE EXECUTION OF THE NDR

Although the PAC separated from the ANC in 1959, they did share certain short-term goals, such as repealing pass laws and increasing employees' working conditions and salaries. The PAC's long-term goals, however, did not coincide with the ANC's. In a nutshell, the PAC upheld the doctrine of a government of Africans, by Africans, and for Africans, but with the definition of "African" expanded to encompass "everybody who owes his loyalty only to Africa and accepts the democratic rule of an African majority" (Motlhabi, 1984:81).

Despite the above differences, the PAC and the ANC had the common goal of abolishing the apartheid regime and all forms of colonial rule. Thus, when the decade of the 1960s started, the PAC and ANC launched anti-pass campaigns on 21 and 31 March respectively. The PAC urged all Africans to deliberately leave their passes at home and should report to their local police station for arrest (ANC, 2022). On 21 March, large crowds assembled in Langa and Nyanga (Cape Town), and Sharpeville (Vaal/Vereeniging). Following years of peaceful protest, violence erupted in Sharpeville when an unarmed and peaceful crowd was fired upon by police. Approximately 69 people

were killed with the majority of whom being shot in the back, and approximately 186 others were injured (ANC, 2022, Thompson, 2014:210 and Fredrickson, 1995:251). The tragic event that occurred in Sharpeville became known as the Sharpeville Massacre.

Work stoppages and riots erupted across the country in the weeks that followed (Benson, 1963:270 and Thompson, 2014:210). As the unrest grew, the apartheid government retaliated fiercely and declared a state of emergency on 31 March 1960, the day the ANC's anti-pass campaign was set to start (Benson, 1963:270, and Thompson, 2014:210). Hundreds of individuals were imprisoned and kept indefinitely without charge or trial. Furthermore, on 8 April 1960, the apartheid government classified the ANC and PAC as "unlawful organizations" and a "serious threat to the safety of the public" (Benson, 1963:272, and Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:396).

The Sharpeville Massacre and the banning of the ANC and PAC were a confirmation of the government's determination to impose apartheid legislation and brutality. This further showed both organizations that their non-violent approaches have only resulted in a succession of defeats at the hands of violent government (Thompson, 2014:211). Hence, when Mandela was on trial for sabotage in 1964 after his eventual capture, he stated before the court:

> "We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any policy which might drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights ... [I]t would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force" (Mandela, 1964, cited by Thompson, 2014:211).

Therefore, the banning of the ANC and the PAC radicalized their ideological positions, and while working underground and in exile, both organizations agreed to employ the arms struggle as their modus operandi. This led to the PAC and ANC establishing their military wings in 1961. The former's military wing was known as Poqo, which means "pure" and/or "alone", and by working with the SACP, the latter's military wing was known as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which means "The Spear of the Nation" (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:396, Thompson, 2014:211, and Khwela, 2000:313).

Khwela (2000:314) states that most of the training for the arms struggle was conducted in the Eastern bloc nations[8]. Notably, the earlier Soviet Union was prepared to provide weaponry and military training to national liberation movements as well as the broader communist cause. The communist governments of the Eastern bloc, as well as Cuba, justified their aid on the doctrine of "Proletarian Internationalism"[9] and the belief that national liberation struggles were part of a global anti-imperialist revolution. Additionally, South Africa's national liberation struggle was closely linked to the SACP, a Marxist-Leninist organization, which was capable of propelling the national liberation struggle toward socialism (Khwela, 2000:314). Additional nations that offered military training comprised of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) member-states, notably Yugoslavia and sovereign states forming part of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (which was later renamed the African Union [AU]) like Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria and Zambia (Khwela, 2000:314, and Stapleton, 2010:166).

MK's military culture developed in exile as a result of a mixture of Soviet strategies relating to weapons handling, intelligence gathering and processing, mastery of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla army traditions of self-sufficiency, minimum hierarchical structure, and mission-oriented command, and, most essential, knowledge of political organization, mobilization and leadership (Stapleton, 2010:164, and Khwela, 2000:314). According to Khwela (2000:314) MK cadres were not regular troops because a political dimension was emphasized throughout their training. Thus, they can be understood as troops that had the sole mandate of overthrowing the apartheid regime and build a non-racial, democratic, and economically just South Africa, as expressed in the Freedom Charter.

[8] The Eastern bloc countries refers to those countries that formed part of the of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as well as the Soviet Union (Steiner, 2014:165). The German Democratic Republic (GDR), Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary were among these nations (Steiner, 2014:169-170).

[9] Proletarian internationalism can be understood as a key element of communist ideology. Lenin (1975:12-13) states that "proletarian internationalism demands, firstly, that the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country be subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a world scale, and, secondly, that a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie be able and willing to make the greatest national 12 sacrifices for the sake of overthrowing international capital". For communists, it symbolized the unbreakable unity of the proletarians from all nations against capitalism, which is their common enemy (Bozinovski, 2008:1).

According to the ANC (2019), Stapleton (2010:160) and Thompson (2014:211) MK had already undertaken over 200 bomb attacks within the first 18 months of its existence as part of its campaign of sabotage against the apartheid government. The majority of these bomb attacks were targeted at post offices/pass offices, government buildings and police stations, as well as railroad and power pylons near large industrial centers and in all major towns and cities. A significant coup was accomplished by the apartheid police forces on 11 July 1963, when seventeen MK leaders were arrested at the underground MK headquarters on Liliesleaf Farm that was located in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia (Gerhart, 2007:1, Stapleton, 2010:160, and Thompson, 2014:211). As a result, the Rivonia Trial began on 9 October 1963 in which the arrested MK leaders were prosecuted for offences punishable by the death penalty under the 1962 Sabotage Act (Davis, 1990:310, and Gerhart, 2007:1). The Rivonia Trial ended on 11 June 1964 and the MK leaders (Andrew Mlangeni, Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Dennis Goldberg, Govan Mbeki and Elias Motsoaledi) were sentenced to life imprisonment, which was to be served on Robben Island (Gerhart, 2007:1-2 and Stapleton, 2010:160).

According to the ANC (2019) the ending of the Rivonia Trial led to the breakdown of the ANC's underground structures in South Africa. This was in part also due to other top ANC officials, like Oliver Tambo and Joe Slovo, escaping the country to avoid imprisonment, while others went for military training and thousands of ANC members imprisoned, kept under police monitoring, intimidated or otherwise silenced (Ellis, 1991:443, and Stapleton, 2010:160). With neighboring countries like Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe) being under colonial rule that supported the apartheid government, the ANC thus had to devise a way to get trained soldiers to pass through those countries and return to South Africa so that the liberation struggle could continue (ANC, 2022). In light of this, in 1967, MK soldiers launched a combined Wankie Campaign with the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), a Zimbabwean people's army fighting for independence. Although the soldiers learned important skills for combat, it was apparent that other methods to enter the country needed to be established. In 1969 the ANC held a consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania, to resolve this problem (Stapleton, 2010:164, and ANC, 2022).

According to the ANC (2022) the conference in Morogoro resulted in the ANC advocating for an “all-round struggle” to overcome the apartheid regime, requiring four components. Firstly, the “all-round struggle” needed to be executed through the armed struggle, secondly, it required mass political struggle, thirdly, the rebuilding of the organization’s underground structures in the country was needed and the last component involved a campaign to get support and aid from the international community. In establishing a new political strategy, the Morogoro Conference served as an opportunity to convince the ANC to undertake a more overt socialist position and by allowing non-black members to join the organization’s external mission. However, only black people were permitted to serve on the national executive committee (NEC) (Hart, 2014:176). This consequently solidified the commitment initially highlighted in the 1955 Freedom Charter to a class analysis/understanding of the country’s situation, and not a racial one (Ellis, 1991:444). According to the ANC (1969:1), Lodge (2011:427), Ellis (1991:444) and Ranchod (2012:108) the Morogoro conference also saw the ANC adopting a document called the *Strategy and Tactics of the ANC*.

In providing an understanding of what the *Strategy and Tactics* document is, the ANC (2017) states that “The notion of *‘strategy’* is used to denote the long-term objectives that the ANC has set for itself. *‘Tactics’* refer to the immediate and medium-term tasks to attain those long-term objectives.” The *Strategy and Tactics* document “analyses the history of the movement, the forces at work in Southern Africa as a whole and the future perspectives of our struggle” (ANC, 1969:1). In light of this, the document clearly acknowledged that the armed struggle was the only method to obtain freedom and this process needed to be directed by a comprehensive political strategy to make certain that revolutionary battles were undertaken on all conceivable fronts, encompassing the entire masses of oppressed people and not only the (MK) army (ANC, 1969:12 & 13-15).

In addition to adopting the *Strategy and Tactics* document, the ANC simultaneously embedded the theory of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)[10] at the heart of its effective operational and ideological framework (Ranchod, 2012:82, Hart, 2014:176 and Filatova, 2012:531). The NDR is a significant component in the history of South Africa

[10] This theory has its roots in the Comintern’s second congress in 1920. Refer to section 3.4

and the ANC. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2005:107) reinforces this by stating that “the National Democratic Revolution has had far reaching impact upon our political culture”. Thus, this thesis needs to provide a thorough understanding of the NDR to understand its role in shaping South Africa’s (and the ANC’s) political culture.

3.6.1 An understanding of the theory of the NDR

“The notion of 'National Democratic Revolution' is an ideological linchpin within national liberation discourse in South Africa” (Satgar, 2008:41). The origins of the ideology of the NDR can be traced back to the SACP, a Marxist-Leninist party. Thus, throughout the apartheid era, the core of the NDR was articulated in a traditional Marxist-Leninist approach, which was to “overthrow the colonialist state of White supremacy and establish an independent state of National Democracy in South Africa” (Ranchod, 2012:81 and SACP, 1962:25 & 27). NDR was brought into ANC rhetoric by communist intellectuals attempting to understand the connection between their broad objective of building (international) socialism with the more urgent anti-colonial mission of national liberation (Butler, 2005:725). As such, the ideology of the NDR developed throughout the history of the ANC and SACP.

According to Everatt (1992:19) and SACP (2017:44) when the anti-apartheid struggle was intensifying in the early 1950s, the SACP simultaneously developed an understanding which characterized apartheid South Africa and provided an explanation for South Africa’s “special” circumstances by introducing the concept of “Colonialism of a Special Type” (CST). Everatt (1992:19) states that Colonialism of a Special Type served as the “ideological glue” that kept the ANC-SACP partnership together. The SACP (1962:27) further states that Colonialism of a Special Type is rooted in the intrinsic contradictions in South Africa’s society: “between the oppressed people and their rulers; between South African colonialism and the worldwide movement against colonialism and imperialism; between the working class and the rural masses, together with the middle classes, on the one side, and the handful of monopoly capitalists on the other.”

According to Khwela (2000:312) Colonialism of a Special Type describes South Africa’s unique case of colonialism, which differs from that of other African colonies because it involved two nations, the colonizer and the colonized, coexisting within the same territorial

boundaries. The 1962 SACP programme, titled *The Road to South African Freedom,* defines Colonialism of a Special Type as follows:

> "South Africa is not a colony but an independent state. Yet masses of our people enjoy neither independence nor freedom. The conceding of independence to South Africa by Britain, in 1910, was not a victory over the forces of colonialism and imperialism. It was designed in the interests of imperialism. Power was transferred not into the hands of the masses of people of South Africa, but into the hands of the White minority alone. The evils of colonialism, insofar as the non-White majority was concerned, were perpetuated and reinforced. A new type of colonialism was developed, in which the oppressing White nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side by side with them" (SACP, 1962:15).

In light of the above, the SACP, ANC and its allies viewed the NDR as the solution to resolving the problem of this "Colonialism of a Special Type" and associated socio-economic problems it had produced. Thus, the Freedom Charter was the nucleus of the NDR because it defined the fundamental goals and objectives of the South African democratic struggle/NDR (SACP, 1962:28, and O'Malley, 2021d). These goals include overthrowing the apartheid regime and establishing an autonomous, democratic state for all South Africans (SACP, 1962:27). Simultaneously, to secure the end of racial discrimination and white minority dominance, the Freedom Charter necessitated and practically demanded fundamental economic transformation. This fundamental economic transformation needed to occur through "drastic agrarian reform to restore the land to the people; widespread nationalization of key industries to break the grip of White monopoly capital on the main centers of the country's economy; radical improvements in the conditions and standards of living for the working people" (SACP, 1962:28).

According to the SACP (1962:28) the above-mentioned process of political and socio-economic liberation should be the fundamental mission of all persecuted and democratic people of South Africa, under the leadership of the (black) working class and the SACP. Hence, Everatt (1992:38) states that "'colonialism of a special type' was a means of marrying class struggle to national liberation". According to Hart (2014:175-176) and Filatova (2012:512) the NDR's (and, by extension, the Freedom Charter's) objectives were to be achieved through a two-stage revolution, an approach that dates back to the Third Comintern in the 1920s (section 3.4). Filatova (2012:6) asserts that the first stage

of the revolution was centered on the liberation of African people. O'Malley (2021d) and Khwela (2000:312) assert that the first stage was a process that featured coordinated mass action (that is, defiance campaigns, stay-aways and boycotts) to destabilize repressive state institutions and ensure the apartheid government's isolation by revealing its brutalities to the international community, whilst the liberation movement simultaneously sought international assistance.

The second stage of the revolution is often referred to as the socialist revolution as it entails a process in which monopoly capital is transferred to the working class and a fully democratic society is established (O'Malley, 2021d; Beresford, 2016:11, and Filatova, 2012:512 & 516). According to O'Malley (2021d) this socialist revolution entails the working-class abolishing "exploitation by achieving public ownership and democratic control of the means of production". The second stage of the revolution aims to promote "the free and allround development of all individuals in society" by constructing a socialist society in which "society's wealth is used to raise the living standards of the people by ensuring housing, low rents and transport fares, free education and health care, and other benefits" (O'Malley, 2021d).

Based on the above conceptualization, the NDR is thus defined as "A process of struggle that seeks to transfer power to the people and transform society into a non-racial, non-sexist, united democratic one, and changes the manner in which wealth is shared, in order to benefit all the people" (ANC, 2012a:70).

For the first stage of the revolution to be executed successfully, a strong political culture of resistance needed to exist in society. According to Thompson (2014:211-212) three major events strengthened the resistance spirit until it erupted in enormous conflicts in 1976. Firstly, there was a robust movement in the arts. The Johannesburg magazine *Drum* served as a medium for black opposition to the apartheid government in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Books produced outside of South Africa evaded censorship throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, bringing a powerful liberationist message and ideology to the townships (Thompson, 2014:212).

Secondly, notwithstanding its exclusion from the official negotiating process, fast economic expansion resulted in the development of class consciousness among semi-

skilled and skilled black workers and the formation of a strong black trade union movement. The year 1973 saw the start of a wave of strikes in which workers demanded higher wages and better working conditions (Thompson, 2014:212).

Thirdly, the government's efforts to shape the mindsets of young black people by highly controlling, and in turn, restricting their access to education backfired. Black students were extremely frustrated by the conditions in their schools and colleges (Thompson, 2014:212). Thus, in 1968, black student leaders broke away from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), a predominantly white English liberal student organization, in order to address the unique circumstances of black students and issues on black campuses (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:405).

As a result, the era of the late 1960s saw the emergence of black student organizations as the former student leaders of NUSAS (amongst them being Steve Biko) established the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in 1968 at teacher-training colleges and universities, and the South African Student's Movement (SASM) in schools (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:405). SASO later contributed to the formation of the Black People's Convention (BPC) in 1972 (Badat, 1999:2 & 158-159). According to Biko (1987:15) SASO was a black student organization that enabled black students to leave the sidelines and take charge of their own lives. This, in turn, contributed to the development of a culture of black pride and independence. It is upon this ideological perspective that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) came into existence in 1968, hence Badat (1992:2) states that "SASO gave birth to the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa".

The BCM played a meaningful role in South Africa's liberation struggle during the 1970s. It was an anti-white and anti-government organization/movement that drew its strength from Black Theology (Historical Papers Research Archive, 2009:117-118). According to Biko (1987:49),

> "Black Consciousness is, in essence, the realization by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression - the blackness of their skin - and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the lie that black is an aberration from the "normal" which is white".

In light of this, SASO presented a definition of black consciousness in its Policy Manifesto of 1972, stating that black consciousness is “an attitude of mind, a way of life whose basic tenet is that the Black must reject all value systems that seek to make him a foreigner in the country of birth and reduce his basic human dignity” (Nengwekhulu, 2012:1).

Through SASO students and general events in Soweto, black consciousness was able to spread. This process was further aided by SASO leader Onkgopotse Abraham Tiro and other SASO members becoming teachers at Soweto high schools (Hadfield, 2017:3). With the help of student organizations in Soweto, the SASM, which was established in 1972, managed to organize the Soweto student uprisings of 1976, which was fueled by the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) (Hadfield, 2017:3).

Thousands of black pupils protested in Soweto on 16 June 1976 against the government’s demand of Afrikaans being the medium of teaching in half of the learner’s school subjects, even though Afrikaans was seen by learners as the oppressors’ language (Thompson, 2014:212, and Lodge, 2011:419). The brutality of the apartheid regime was revealed through an official commission of inquiry in February 1977, which stated that at least 575 individuals were killed, with 494 Africans, 75 coloureds, 5 whites, and 1 Indian among them. There were 134 victims under the age of eighteen. During that year (1977), SASO was banned, including its affiliated organizations, many black leaders were jailed, and Steve Biko was arrested and brutally killed by the apartheid police (Mager & Mulaudzi, 2014:405, and Thompson, 2014:213).

In the midst of the student protests spreading to other parts of the country after 16 June, thousands of young black South African’s fled the country to obtain military training in MK bases in Tanzania and Angola (ANC, 2022, Thompson, 2014:213, and Lodge, 2011:420, 421). The above-mentioned events also saw the apartheid regime facing the consequences of its violent and brutal actions as the government’s international standing deteriorated from 1977. This was reflected by the United Nations (U.N.) imposing a strict arms embargo[11] upon South Africa in 1977 (Magubane, 2004:8). According to Crawford

[11] According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2021) an arms embargo is a type of sanction that is used to compel governments and non-state actors to abstain from violent behaviour in the interests of world peace and security.

& Klotz (1999:284) South Africa was also subjected to several sanctions, including expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) governing board, and exclusion from overseas sporting events. Furthermore, the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid urged countries and international firms to discontinue all support and collaboration that facilitated South Africa in obtaining nuclear capability.

The era of the 1960s and 1970s played a significant role in the direction in which the liberation struggle would move forward. It was an emotive era in which South Africans first experienced the brutality of the apartheid government through the Sharpeville Massacre. As a result of this, it was an important time in which the ANC had to establish mechanisms for ensuring that their plea for freedom was being heard and understood by the apartheid regime. Hence, the ANC adopted a solid action plan (that is, the NDR) for liberating all South Africans from the apartheid regime and building a democratic socialist country. This action plan had a significant influence on shaping South Africa's political culture.

3.6.2 The ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture: 1960s and 1970s

The beginning of the 1960's was a time in which the ANC's political culture was not aggressive, with citizens still willing to have an open dialogue with the apartheid government regarding their plea for equality and freedom. This was reflected by the anti-pass campaigns that they embarked on even though they knew that they would be arrested. However, the political culture of South Africa and that of the ANC became radicalized after the Sharpeville Massacre because the state was not remorseful for the brutal way in which people had died despite riots having erupted across the country. Instead, the ANC was banned. A radical political culture became evident when the ANC established a military wing (MK) that would fight the apartheid government with the same violence that it imposed upon citizens.

Establishing MK was an important step for the liberation struggle because it enabled the ANC to build relations with other African countries that have experienced colonial oppression, countries that would assist the ANC in fighting the oppressive NP government. The magnitude of attacks from MK in its short period of existence demonstrated that the ANC had established strong relations with other African countries,

that they were very angry and would no longer cooperate with the apartheid government through the political culture of diplomacy.

Although the arrest and ultimate imprisonment of MK leaders broke down the underground structures of the ANC in South Africa, this can be seen as a significant time in history because it led to important dialogue taking place at the Morogoro conference. This dialogue ultimately resulted in the ANC accepting the arms struggle as its modus operandi and formally adopting the NDR. Thus, the armed struggle was an important pillar of the NDR, and due to the NDR's strong support for legitimizing the use of violence to fight apartheid, it has had a significant influence in shaping South Africa's political culture from the 1970s.

When the ANC started implementing the first stage of the NDR it led to a stronger political culture of resistance coming to the fore which was from broader sectors of society. This was reflected by the high number of workers' strikes in 1973 (as stated above) and the 1976 Soweto student uprisings. The former, was important because it showed South Africans that aligned to the liberation struggle was also a struggle for a better livelihood and economic emancipation/improved economic status. Thus, it can be stated that this highlighted South Africa's seemingly meagre political culture of economic and civic dignity.

The latter was important because it demonstrated that political socialization was taking place in scholars/pupil's homes and in their schools. Thus, the political culture of resistance was able to be strong because it was being sparked by core institutions of most young people's lives (that is, the family and the school) and this made it easier for them to understand and accept black consciousness because it came from these institutions.

Furthermore, the role that student organizations played in the liberation struggle was significant because it broadened the scope of the liberation struggle by inducting young people and it led to their complete psychological liberation. In this way, politics was no longer the realm of adults only as young people had shown the fundamental role that they can play in the liberation struggle. This, in turn, gave the ANC access to a defiant youth and this further developed a militant political culture within the ANC and society.

Although the ideology of the BCM has its power base in the education fraternity, the spreading of protests after the 1976 Soweto uprisings demonstrates that the ideology had permeated across the country and impacted the uneducated and oppressed groups. Furthermore, the pain and anger that was associated with parents (who were the working class) losing their children, teachers losing their pupils and colleagues, and of pupils losing their teachers (for some this being their parents) and peers strengthened the political culture of communitarianism[12]. This simultaneously created justifications for the use of violence. It enabled citizens to relate more with the ANC and understand why they resorted to violence. This, therefore, reinforced the political culture of violence in society.

The violence of the 1970s and the established ideology of black consciousness set the tone of how life in South Africa would be during the 1980's including the kind of political culture that is required to ensure that the first stage of the NDR (this being the liberation of all oppressed South Africans) is obtained.

3.7 THE ROLE OF THE ANC FROM THE 1980S TO 1994

According to Maharaj (2008:14) the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was a time in which some cracks in apartheid's granite wall started to show across the country. One of the first two signs of this was that the apartheid administration welcomed the Wiehahn Commission's recommendation that black trade unions be legalized in 1979. This decision was made after a series of worker's protests (which began in 1973) and an evaluation of the economy's condition under apartheid (Norval, 1996:229 and Maharaj, 2008:14). This decision also unintentionally created an opportunity for the black unions to advance to the forefront of the liberation struggle. The second sign can be found in the fact that the 1976 Soweto uprisings had the unintended consequence of dividing the Afrikaner community and the National Party (NP). Some whites called for reform or the

[12] Ansah and Mensah (2018:63) describe this by stating: "Communitarianism is a theory that emphasizes the moral supremacy of the common good - the good of the community as a whole. A communitarian, thus, is someone who considers the community to be of central importance. The rationale for this is that the individual is a social being and can only flourish in the community."

eventual abolition of apartheid, while others implored the state to take tougher actions to safeguard white supremacy (South African History Online, 2019a, and Maharaj, 2008:15).

Despite the above, the government was firm on its decision to continue with apartheid policies and the beginning of the 1980s was marked by the continuation of a protest culture that had begun after the 1976 Soweto uprisings (Thompson, 2014:228). According to Maharaj (2008:14) throughout the 1980s, South Africa had a period of recurrent declarations of emergency designed to suppress the country's mass protests that were mainly in black townships. Efforts by the government to reduce and bring an end to violence in the townships were failing as "students and workers, children and adults, men and women, the educated and the uneducated became involved in efforts to liberate the country from apartheid" (Thompson, 2014:228). Therefore, when P.W. Botha ascended to the position of Prime Minister in 1978, he was confronted with the mammoth tasks of having to minimize the growing critique from the international community about the apartheid regime, please white South Africans, establish links with other African states and ultimately minimize the internal black resistance (South African History Online, 2019a).

To execute the above-mentioned tasks, the Botha administration devised a new technique of dividing the populace and maintaining white domination. This technique is comprised of two major components. According to Callinicos (1994:2356) and South African History Online (2019a) the first component involved admitting a small number of cautiously selected and regulated black individuals into the middle class. This was to be done through the adoption of various socio-economic measures like the legalization of black trade unions, the abolishment of job reservation and reinstating black people's right to procure leaseholds (rent property) and then freeholds (own property) in cities (Callinicos, 1994:2356). The idea was that the creation of a richer, black middle class that had a share/investment in the status quo would result in more support for the apartheid government (due to black people wanting to maintain their higher positions), and ultimately black resistance would be reduced (South African History Online, 2019a, and Callinicos, 1994:2356).

The second component involved the adoption of a new Constitution in 1983 which established Black Local Authorities in African townships and a tri-cameral Parliament to broaden and define the gap between Indians, coloureds and black people (ANC, 2022, South African History Online, 2019a, and Callinicos, 1994:2356). According to Maharaj (2008:15) The purpose of establishing a distinct jurisdiction for the Indian and coloured populations was to create tension and conflict amongst black people. The new Parliament consisted of three chambers, a House of Delegates (45 seats), a House of Representatives (85 seats) and a House of Assembly (178 seats) for Indians, coloureds, and whites respectively (Maharaj, 2008:15, and Ngcokovane, 1989:128). The inclusion of coloureds and Indians in the tri-cameral Parliament only served as a façade of the groups sharing power because all major decision-making still lied with the House of Assembly (Callinicos, 1994:2356).

As a result of the above, the NP government dismally failed to get the coloureds and Indians on their side as they rejected their operating terms. This was partly due to the fact that despite the relaxation of certain laws relating to separate amenities, for most people these reforms were merely superficial because while they modified apartheid's external appearance, the system remained the same and the circumstances for the average black person on the street worsened rather than improved (South African History Online, 2019a). Thus, the coloureds and Indians decided to join the liberation movement with black people (ANC, 2022, and Maharaj, 2008:15). This resulted in the anti-apartheid movement becoming more cohesive, active and violent, while simultaneously moving the country towards change. This led to the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 to oppose the tri-cameral Parliament, black local authorities in townships and apartheid in general (Lodge, 2011:437).

According to ANC (2019) and Maharaj (2008:14) the UDF's ability to bring together diverse groups, cultures, religions, political organizations, women's structures, and students and youth organizations enabled it to create mass mobilization against the apartheid system. The multidimensional nature of the UDF enabled it to grow into a national force, capable of incorporating local township frustrations into a broader anti-

apartheid discourse (Norval, 1996:238-239). In its declaration that was adopted by its allied organizations, the UDF (1983:1) stated:

> "We the freedom loving people of South Africa say with one voice to the whole world that we cherish the vision of a united democratic South Africa based on the will of the people. We will strive for unity of all people through united action against the evils of apartheid, economic and all other forms of exploitation ... We commit ourselves to uniting all our people wherever they may be in the cities and countryside, the factories and mines, schools, colleges and universities, housing and sports fields, churches, mosques and temples to fight for our freedom …"

In light of the forgone, Louise le Grange (the Minister of Law and Order at the time) identified a number of telling equivalences (Norval, 1996:252). Le Grange acknowledged that although the UDF did not have direct links with the ANC, it did embrace the Freedom Charter in the same way that the ANC did. This was mirrored in the fact that former members of the banned ANC and SACP made up over 90% of the UDF's membership. Publications like *The African Communist* and *Umkhonto we Sizwe,* an ANC journal, were banned but yet promoted the UDF as an ally in the liberation struggle. Furthermore, even though it proclaimed to be against violence, the UDF, like the ANC, was devoted to "non-parliamentary methods" for bringing about change. The UDF was also significantly involved in planning demonstrations amidst the coloured and Indian elections to the Tri-cameral Parliament; demonstrations that resulted in mass violence and over 200 UDF activists being arrested (Norval, 1996:252).

Thus, Fredrickson (1995:311) states that the UDF clearly secured the allegiance of the majority of black people (and a significant proportion of individuals from the Indian and coloured groups) as it led the series of boycotts, strikes, and protests that defined the mid-1980s, which created more violence and ushered in the last significant crisis of apartheid. The establishment of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, a labour federation that is closely associated with the ANC and UDF, created coordinated industrial and political action against the government that exceeded any previous black challenge to the apartheid system and could only be constrained by an unprecedented (and globally unacceptable) degree of repression (Fredrickson, 1995:311).

According to ANC (2019) and Higginbottom (2016:14) COSATU was established by the merger of several independent unions that were growing during the 1970's, and its membership rose to the region of 600 000. COSATU was a labour federation that was dedicated to advancing the needs of employees in the workplace. This was reflected in its second national congress resolution of 1987 which declared that in any engagement with other members of "a united front alliance", COSATU must "promote the leading role of the working class" (COSATU, 1987, cited by Lodge, 2011:455).

According to Arnold (2009:348), within its first year, COSATU had established itself as a voice for reform. It called for Nelson Mandela's release, the repealing of pass laws and the discontinuing of foreign investment. COSATU also spearheaded two of South Africa's largest strikes in its first eight months of existence. It was mobilizing against the government's repressive Labour Bill in the short term, as well as to end apartheid in the longer term (Higginbottom, 2016:14). According to ANC (2019) the year 1987 was marked by the largest number of workers strikes in the history of South Africa.

According to Arnold (2009:348) township violence was also at an all-time high during the mid-1980s because this was a period that was characterized by the revitalization of youth politics and resistance. This revitalization process was mainly done from school bases and by establishing youth organizations like the Congress of South African Students (COSAS)[13] and the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO)[14] which was a by-product of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). These organizations were both established in 1979 (South African History Archive (SAHA), 2021a, and Hemson, 2008:78).

According to SAHA (2021a) The revival of youth politics and resistance in the 1980s was largely influenced by COSAS and AZASO. These organizations adopted the Freedom Charter and played a significant role in the school boycotts of 1980 and 1983. These boycotts were not only a result of the 1976 uprisings, but also of the lack of resources in schools, overcrowding in classes, and the resignation of many teachers in 1977, which led to the major decline in standards (SAHA, 2021a). The boycotts started at coloured

[13] Students in schools and universities were represented by COSAS (SAHA, 2021a).
[14] University students were represented by AZASO (SAHA, 2021a).

schools in Cape Town and quickly spread across the country. “Liberation before education” became the motto, and received support across several townships (SAHA, 2021a).

The school boycotts of the early 1980s triggered resistance in broader society. According to SAHA (2021b) rent boycotts in the Vaal Triangle ignited a fresh wave of spontaneous, widespread resistance in South Africa in 1984, with young people playing a key part in the subsequent unrest. This led to more youth organizations being established to motivate young people to take action. The ANC recognized the great potential of young people and tried to rally them to its cause at the start of 1985 (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992:144, SAHA, 2020b, and Roberts, 1993:109-110). This was firstly done by O.R. Tambo delivering a message in Lusaka (Zambia) on 8 January 1985, in which he stated: “In saluting our students and working youth, we can truly say that they have earned for themselves the honour of being called the Young Lions.” (Tambo, 1985:5). This was followed by Thabo Mbeki’s message on Radio Frequency in 1985 in which he urged young people to “make the townships ungovernable” (SAHA, 2020b and Roberts, 1993:109-110), and was later reinforced by Tambo on January 8, 1986, when he stated: “Our strategic goal must be to shift the balance of strength decisively in favour of our struggle, through the further ripening of the revolutionary situation beyond the point where the regime is not able to rule in the old way to the stage where it is in fact unable to govern. Thus, we must continue to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable” (Tambo, 1986:2).

With the ANC clearly supporting the actions of the youth, the motto “Liberation before education” (SAHA, 2021a) was reinforced. This contributed to the establishment of the comrades’ movement which became fully operational because, from 1985, the country was immersed in a black youth revolt (Sitas, 1992:631). According to Roberts (1993:110) the word *comrade* originally meant youth and was therefore applied to youth militants or “a radical young black activist” (Tucker, 1993:121). Hemson (2008:78) further states: “The comrades’ movement arose as the political generation of youth who, in the period after 1976, and particularly in the early 1980s, were labelled, and defined themselves as, ‘comrades’; a generation born to struggle, dedicated to building the ANC inside the country, the soldiers of the revolution.”

Therefore, the comrade's movement was at the forefront of the township resistance following Mbeki and Tambo's messages and causing havoc (SAHA, 2021b). They dismantled black local authorities and targeted municipal councillors who were suspected of being accomplices of the apartheid administration (ANC, 2022). They also targeted individuals suspected of being informers and residents that did not take part in political campaigns (SAHA, 2021b). The comrades were frequently harsh in their treatment of these residents as SAHA (2021b) states that residents were reportedly forced by militant youth to ingest washing powder or cooking oil as a penalty for their refusal to participate. Thus, residents were frequently estranged from the youth as it can be stated that comrades operated by instilling fear amongst them. Tucker (1993:121) explains this by stating: "One example had to do with our policy on stay-aways. We say we recognize that sometimes people don't come to work because they have a headache or whatever. But if you've got a "comrade" [i.e., a radical young black activist] standing outside your door in the township saying, "We've declared a stay-away; no one is to go to work today", that is a significantly greater restraint on coming to work than a headache."

The above situation contributed to the increase of black on black violence with municipal infrastructure being destroyed, black council members being assassinated, and the necklacing ("the practice of putting an old tire filled with kerosene around the neck of a victim and setting it on fire.") of accomplices and informers (Arnold, 2009:348, and ANC, 2022). People created their own democratic mechanisms to manage the community once the administrative system collapsed, such as street committees and people's courts (ANC, 2022). Related to this was Winnie Mandela establishing the Mandela United Football Club (MUFC) which swiftly gained a reputation as a vigilante mafia that operated with impunity, similar to the comrades' movement. Stories about abductions, assaults, and torture allegedly carried out by the MUFC emerged (South African History Online, 2011). A prominent story is one surrounding Stompie Seipei, a fourteen-year-old activist, who came into conflict with the MUFC which led to his disappearance, beating and murder in 1988. Kenneth Kgase, one of the boys who was with Stompie at Winnie's house managed to escape and was able to disclose the abductions and assaults that the MUFC perpetrated to Geoff Budlender, a lawyer (South African History Online, 2011).

The comrade's movement had a significant impact on life in South African townships and on how other organizations operated. According to Sitas (1992:637) some of the comrade's "politico-cultural framework" was defined by certain ideological components, which indicate a border of feelings. Some of these ideological components firstly included that comrades viewed themselves as "home defenders" (Sitas, 1992:637). They perceive their violence as a response to the blatant violence of the "other", that is, the apartheid system (Sitas, 1992:637).

Secondly, comrades believed that they were assessed by their actions and that their social worth was determined by their actions. Additionally, their behaviour was valued even while they were fleeing or retreating. In retreating, a romantic sense of being "hunted" gained control; they were hunted for the pursuit of justice and for being freedom fighters. Their actions in protecting and assisting other comrades in flight were indicative of their character (Sitas, 1992:638).

Thirdly, being a comrade was marked by poverty and a complete lack of resources due to being the offspring of the persecuted and impoverished. This powerful sense of "having nothing" emphasized their connections (Sitas, 1992:634). Food, water, sustenance and medicines were all important. Outside of homesteads, living a warrior life necessitated new support structures as well as respect for common property. Thus, what was achieved was divided and distributed based on need and a fierce and militant egalitarianism (Sitas, 1992:639). This being socialism (Hemson, 2008:79).

Fourthly, comrades not only included fighters and lions but also thinkers and resource people. Thinkers included those with experience, were well connected, popular and charismatic. These individuals could range from former Robben Island people, many unemployed youths, university graduates and student militants (Sitas, 1992:639). The resource people included individuals who supplied goods, weaponry, fuel, food, cash, vehicles, brochures and information (Sitas, 1992:639).

Fifthly, the term *struggle* was not validated in the abstract through a larger movement that was all round and nowhere, but also practically. Two links were important here: the counterparts who left the country to join MK to fight for liberation, and those who returned,

died, or were imprisoned. Every death and act of brutality strengthened the comrades' "political economy of martyrdom" (Sitas, 1992:640).

The above ideological components contributed to the mounting violence and resistance of the mid-1980s which resulted in the apartheid government enforcing stricter measures for reducing violence in townships and regulating society. This led to the banning of the UDF in 1987, the media was prohibited from broadcasting all unrests on television and radio, COSATU was barred from engaging in any political activities and the regime imposed a state of emergency in June 1986 which lasted until 1990 and resulted in the arrest of hundreds of anti-apartheid supporters (ANC, 2022, Pillay, 2011:61, and Thompson, 2014:235). According to Thompson (2014:235), "The government had resorted to legalized tyranny."

South African's became more committed to the liberation struggle after the enforcement of the 1986 state of emergency. Societal resistance was at a point where the government was no longer able to control it. This was reflected by the non-violent Defiance Campaign of 1989, which was featured by the continuous displaying of the illegal ANC and SACP flags at political funerals; young people using paint brushes to rename and rebrand public spaces in honor of exiled or imprisoned liberation heroes; the clergy violating the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act by marrying couples of mixed races; pre-schools and some state primary schools started accepting non-white children in defiance of segregation rules; white liberals began boycotting businesses that refused to serve individuals of other racial groups and the detention of anti-apartheid activists without charge or trial started becoming ineffective as they went on hunger strikes which resulted in their release from custody (Zunes, 1999:195).

Zunes (1999:161) states that the non-violent Defiance Campaign of 1989 proved to be successful as it motivated more people to openly disobey the authorities and fostered an environment of resistance to government repression. This led to banned organizations like the UDF and ANC, alongside a bunch of other restricted activities, openly "unbanning" themselves in a public march in Cape Town, in August 1989 (Zunes, 1999:161). During this period, there was significant dissatisfaction with the manner in which the country was being governed. P.W. Botha had transformed the administrative structure, which meant

that the NP had less power, homeland leaders had grown stronger, violence was out of control and corruption was rife. Furthermore, the NP lost a significant amount of support to the right-wing Conservative Party, which meant that reform would be easier to implement (South African History Online, 2019a).

As a result of the above circumstances, Botha's stroke and ultimate resignation in August 1989, F.W. de Klerk rose to the presidential position in September 1989 following a general election (Arnold, 2009:146, and Callinicos, 1994:2357). He stated at that time that he was devoted to reform but did not elaborate on what he meant. His first significant step toward reform was releasing seven leading ANC leaders from prison, amongst them being Walter Sisulu. The ANC and thirty-two additional anti-apartheid organizations were then unbanned after De Klerk delivered a speech on 2 February 1990, and Mandela was released unconditionally from Victor Verster Prison (Arnold, 2009:146 & 224, and ANC, 2022). Callinicos (1994:2357) states that three significant factors contributed to De Klerk making these decisions.

The first factor related to the regime's objective constraints. These not only included the internal political standstill, but the country's economy was also deteriorating. A major contributing factor to the bad state of the economy was the violent protests of the mid-1980s that led to the loss of trust in the South African economy (Callinicos, 1994:2357).

The second factor was significantly more intangible, but it was emphasized by De Klerk and other NP ministers, which included Roelf Meyer, in public appearances during the April 1994 election. They stopped believing that apartheid was morally acceptable (Callinicos, 1994:2357-2358). Callinicos (1994:2358) argues that it is not necessary to accept these declarations of faith at face value to realize that one of the prerequisites of dramatic political reforms is for the dominant group to begin to question the legitimacy of its authority. Furthermore, the elements that contributed to this second factor were that the Afrikaner corporate elite was more amalgamated with their English equivalents and more culturally diverse. There was also a divergence between Afrikaans professionals and the innate NP tradition which can be attributed to worldwide travel, sophisticated education, and the development of a rational and mature consumer society (Callinicos, 1994:2358).

The third and final factor that led to De Klerk's decision-making was that he was hoping to manage the transition, including the conditions upon which the new democracy would be established by taking the lead and acting before more demonstrations eroded the state's coercive resources (Callinicos, 1994:2358).

De Klerk's decision to unban anti-apartheid movements led to the ANC electing Mandela as the president of the organization at its 1991 National Conference. By 1994, the ANC had established regional and branch structures, as well as electing its regional and national membership (ANC, 2022). In their quest for the NDR, COSATU was formally admitted to the Tripartite Alliance[15] by the ANC (Pillay, 2011:62). The contentious negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) ultimately led to South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, with Mandela emerging as the country's first black president after the ANC secured 62,6% of the votes (Arnold, 2009:146, ANC, 2022, and Thompson, 2014:241 & 259).

Since the historic elections of 1994, the ANC has continued to be the ruling party in the country. The role of the ANC (together with other political and civic groups) and its execution of the NDR played an important in this liberation and shaped the political culture of South Africa from the 1980s to 1994.

3.7.1 The ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture: 1980's to 1994

The beginning of the 1980's was characterized by the continuation of a violent political culture and protest culture in South Africa. This was reflected by the continuous state of emergencies that the government imposed in order to control the widespread violence in society. The establishment and exclusion of black people from the tri-cameral Parliament created more anger in society as it served as an insult to them and an overt confirmation that they lacked the skills and mental capacity to be involved at the nucleus of the government. Hence, the apartheid government established black local authorities; it was to give black people the false impression that they had some form of authority/control.

[15] The Tripartite Alliance refers to an alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU (Tshoaedi & Hlela, 2006:103). Smith (2013:58) further states that it is an alliance that is centred on "a shared notion that an all-class alliance of progressive forces in South Africa was necessary to achieve 'national liberation' from the Apartheid state and establish 'normal' bourgeois or capitalist democracy, where black and white would be treated as equals."

For coloureds and Indians, it served as an epiphany of the fact that they will never be on the same level as white people. Furthermore, the admission of some black people into the middle class also increased black people's anger because the government was showing them that it is not incapable of giving them opportunities for a better life, but that it was purposefully confining them to poverty and overtly showing them that they will never be equal to white people. This anger led to the development of a more militant political culture that was underpinned by the NDR.

This militant political culture led to the establishment of the UDF, and it simultaneously developed the sub-culture of unity because the UDF was an amalgamation of various political, religious, women's and cultural groups, and sporting, student and youth organizations. This militant political culture was reinforced by the fact that members of the banned ANC who formed the majority of the UDF's membership imparted significant political education within the UDF. As a result, in its operations, the UDF employed the same modus operandi as the ANC and has thus been viewed as a descendant of the ANC.

The establishment of COSATU and its role in the liberation struggle was important to the construction of South Africa's political culture. Through the modus operandi of the ANC, COSATU (together with the UDF) reinforced the united and collaborative political culture that the UDF and ANC were premised on. This was important because it was the beginning of South Africa creating a proactive civil society which is a fundamental element in the construction of a democratic political culture.

The Defiance Campaign of 1989 reflected the united and collaborative political culture mentioned above. It was a campaign that saw people of different racial groups openly defying apartheid laws. The NP had lost significant power and ultimately resorted to unbanning liberation movements like the ANC and SACP. These events demonstrated for the first time that society could transform and that the strategy of the NDR was effective as it brought a spirit of hope for South Africans who were frustrated, fearful and apathetic. This being fundamental to the construction of a democratic society and political culture that is conducive to a democratic South Africa.

3.8 CONCLUSION

From the forgone, it can be stated that before colonialism South Africa mainly had a traditional political culture as communities were under the administration of chiefs, and this also meant that there was a culture of patriarchy. South Africa's long history of oppression and socio-economic exclusion against primarily the African majority began through the enforcement of the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913. This legislation greatly contributed to shaping the country's political culture as it created a breeding ground for more repressive laws against black people, and for a political culture of violence and democracy to come to the fore. The former (political culture of violence) is reflected by the conflicts that occurred when black people were being dispossessed of land by the white people settlers. While the latter (political culture of democracy) is demonstrated by the establishment of SANNC, which employed non-violent approaches by sending a delegation to the UK to oppose the Natives Land Act and to stress the acknowledgment of black people's rights.

The Natives Land Act and the increased repression that black people experienced led to South Africa establishing a collaborative relationship and culture with international countries (Russia, Moscow) through the CPSA. These relations were important as they served as a guide for the CPSA and the ANC establishing a collaborative culture within South Africa, and for an action plan to be established in order to fight colonialism and apartheid. This action plan being the NDR.

The main objectives of the NDR were to firstly put an end to the apartheid regime and secondly, to construct a democratic and socialist South Africa. With the NDR being the ANC's blueprint to realizing a democratic country, it must also be stated that the NDR played a significant role in shaping South Africa's political culture before 1994. This is because the adoption of the NDR (in 1969) simultaneously signalled the formal acceptance of the ANC employing violent measures to convey their dissatisfaction with the apartheid system, even though MK had already been established in 1961. Thus, violence became an important means of fighting apartheid and, in turn, a central component of the NDR. Thus, the NDR is a fundamental factor in the history of South Africa and the ANC as it contributed to the political culture of resistance which manifested

through protests, boycotts and civil disobedience. This led to the formation of defiant organizations outside of the ANC such as COSATU, the Comrades Movement, student organizations and the UDF.

Although South Africa has a violent and painful history, the formation of the above-mentioned organizations (and others) towards the common cause of fighting apartheid can be viewed as a form of exercising democracy, although it was done in an undemocratic country. From the above, it can also be stated that the NDR contributed to forming one of the important building blocks of democracy (and a democratic political culture) which is South Africa's active and vibrant civil society that worked towards fighting apartheid by also sensitizing and mobilizing the international community against the atrocities of the apartheid government. Due to the NDR's significant contribution to the realization of South Africa's democracy, the ANC has continued to include it in its main guiding document(s) for governance which is, the *Strategy and Tactics*. In this way, serving as a blueprint for forming government policy, governing democratic South Africa and rebooting the country's political culture to make it more conducive for democratic South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANC'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CULTURE OF POST 1994

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided an understanding of South Africa's political culture before 1994. This was done by providing an understanding of the country's colonial history, how the ANC (previously known as SANNC) came to be, the institutionalization of apartheid and its respective legislations, how the intensification of apartheid contributed to the ANC evolving by establishing structures like the ANCWL and ANCYL and the role of the ANC and its main ally, the Communist Party in establishing an action plan (NDR) and using to mobilize the populace to fight the apartheid regime. In this way, a timeline of South Africa and the ANC's history was established and an analysis of South Africa's political culture during those periods was provided.

By means of a literature review, this fourth chapter aims to provide an understanding of how the ANC contributed to South Africa's political culture after 1994. This will be done by providing and analysing information about general political developments in the public domain, events like ANC conferences and a discussion of the administrations of the four democratically elected presidents.

4.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER 1994: THE MANDELA ADMINISTRATION (1994-1999)

President Nelson Mandela and his two Deputy presidents, Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de Klerk were inaugurated on 10 May 1994, paving the way for discussion and negotiations about the new constitution which was signed into law in 1996 (Thompson, 2014:268-269). According to Kearsey (2007:76) the ascension of Mandela in 1994 signalled the beginning of South Africa's nation-building project and an era that became closely associated with reconciliation. This reconciliation process was complex as it entailed social, political and economic reconciliation that was to be implemented through the newly established Government of National Unity (GNU). Mandela's good will, that he built during his imprisonment and his presidency, delivered stability to a volatile national settlement and

raised the issue of the significance of strong leadership attributes for a South African president (Kondlo, 2017:6). The leadership quality of this standard was critical for developing institutional capacity to conduct the mandate of nation-building, transformation, and reconciliation (Kondlo, 2017:6).

Thus, the Mandela administration introduced laws and institutions which were directed at achieving equality and eliminating society's socio-economic deprivation. These notions are included in the Constitution's Bill of Rights (Chapter 2), and include the right to human dignity, life, education, health care, food, water and social security, etc. (South Africa, 1996:6, 11-12). While the country's most important autonomous institutions, like the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Public Protector, are found in Chapter 9 of the Constitution (South Africa, 1996:92-98). The Mandela administration also marked the beginning of the second stage, which entailed a socialist revolution that would result in the transfer of monopoly capital to the working class and the construction of a fully democratic society (O'Malley, 2021d; Beresford, 2016:11**,** and Filatova, 2012:512, 516). Thus, the new dispensation (1994) saw the NDR continuing to be the ANC's ideological compass, serving as a blueprint for governance and policy setting in democratic South Africa. The ANC's dedication to achieving the goals of the second stage of the NDR, and in turn, the Freedom Charter, was expressed by the implementation of the socialist macroeconomic policy known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

The RDP was first introduced as part of the ANC's election manifesto in the run-up to the 1994 elections and it went on to become the official government policy following the elections (Thompson, 2014:278-279). On paper, the RDP was a fundamental programme for democratic South Africa as the Mandela administration inherited a highly unequal society, which was on the verge of bankruptcy and arguably criminalized (STATSSA[16], 2018:43, Davies, 2013 and Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2017). Therefore, Thompson (2014:279-280) states that apart from reconciliation, the Mandela administration was confronted with the two main objectives of having to promote economic growth and enhancing the quality of life of the majority of black South Africans who were the primary

[16] Statistics South Africa

victims of apartheid. In this sense, the RDP was to be the first significant policy aimed at tackling South Africa's socio-economic challenges and encouraging fundamental structural changes "towards a high-wage, high-productive economy" (Kearsey, 2007:58).

The goal of the RDP was to implement five main programmes: (1) meeting basic needs, (2) developing the country's human resources, (3) building the economy, (4) democratizing the state and economy, and (5) implementing the RDP (ANC, 1994:11). However, of top priority was the provision of citizens basic needs, which were identified as "jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare" (ANC, 1994:11). More specifically, through the collaboration between the government and the private sector the policy aimed to generate 2,5 million jobs over ten years through the public works programme (Nattrass & Seekings, 2001:487, and ANC, 1994:22), construct over one million homes, supply all citizens with clean water and sanitation, provide 2,5 million households with electricity, provide all citizens with inexpensive health care and telecommunications, and ensure the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land to black people within the policy's first five years (ANC, 1994:11-12 & 26). The ANC's ambitious policy instilled high expectations for "A Better Life for All", just as its 1994 election campaign slogan stated (Nattrass & Seekings, 2001:487).

In the process of the above-mentioned socio-economic reform, Kearsey (2007:77) states that Mandela's "nationalist" and/or "Freedom Charterist" principles led to Archbishop Desmond Tutu coining the term *Rainbow Nation* (which refers to racial inclusivity). This nation-building project was important because the Mandela administration inherited a fractured and racially and ethnically based government. This brought into question the role of provinces in constructing a socially unified South Africa and highlighted the need to transform all levels of government into a system that could provide for all South Africans through efficient and effective intergovernmental relations (Kondlo, 2017:7).

Furthermore, the nation-building project was reinforced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was created to investigate human rights violations that happened during the apartheid era to achieve forgiveness, reconciliation and restorative justice through truth, and it can be seen as a significant symbolic institution (Kondlo,

2017:6). According to Kondlo (2017:6-7) Archbishop Desmond Tutu's symbolic presence "formed a glue to hold together the puzzles of the "rainbow nation" in the making" because of his "willingness to listen, understand and show compassion for both the victims and perpetrators".

Due to the necessity to couple nation-building with socio-economic transformation, Mandela's administration was successful in that the RDP was able to provide electricity connections to over 300 000 new households annually through the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom). Water supply improved significantly by the end of 1995, with roughly 300 projects aimed at providing water to 4 million people scheduled to be completed within 18 months (Ratuva, 2013:22). The government also set up a large-scale welfare system that provided for the elderly, disabled, orphaned children, foster parents and those who were unable to meet their fundamental social needs. Free health care programs for pregnant women and young children were launched including free meals for 3,5 to 5 million school children (South African History Online, 2019b).

However, Thompson (2014:281) states that by 1996 it became clear that the country's economy was not developing fast enough to support the RDP program. According to the South African Survey (1997:611-615, cited by Thompson 2014:281) following the decreases of 1990-93, GDP per capita[17] increased by just 0,6%, 1,2%, and 1% in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively. The rand depreciated to 21% against the United States dollar in 1996, bringing gold production to its lowest level in forty years and the unemployment rate hit a record high with the African majority being the most affected by this. According to Ratuva (2013:226-227) other challenges that confronted the RDP included the deficiency of institutional capacity for the management and allocation of funds, as indicated by monies totaling R1,7 billion being left unused in the 1994-95 fiscal year and transferred to the 1995-96 fiscal year. Basic services, including healthcare, education and housing were also delayed, with roughly 15 000 homes being built between 1994 and 1996, compared to the projected 400 000. The RDP did not have commitment nor support from the state bureaucracy, civil society organizations and the private

[17] According to the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) (2014:72) GDP per capita is defined as "the sum of marketed goods and services produced within the national boundary, averaged across everyone who lives within this territory".

financial sector. The RDP was also costly to implement, especially because public infrastructure spending had to be boosted by at least 21% annually, and ongoing corruption allegations caused some social and physical infrastructure projects to fail (Ratuva, 2013:226-227).

Therefore, the RDP was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy after two years of operation (Thompson, 2014:281). According to Narsiah (2002:32) GEAR's adoption reflected the ANC's neoliberal transition in its entirety, as the policy's primary concern was economic growth instead of redistribution. According to Sebake (2017:4), Ratuva (2013:227) and Schneider (2003:43) GEAR suggested a categorization of medium-term policies to speedily address South Africa;s macro-economic problems, including the easing of exchange controls, privatization, advancement of trade liberalization, major deficit reduction, mitigation of relative deprivation through the creation of almost 1,5 million employment opportunities over five years, enhancing labour market flexibility, and adopting monetary policies to steady the rand using market interest rates.

According to Gelb (2004:36) in mid-1996, the GEAR policy set a goal of bringing the government deficit under the 3% Maastricht criteria[18] by 1999, which was achieved. Inflation figures also declined from 8,63%, 6,98% and 5,08% in 1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively (O'Neill, 2021). These improvements have resulted in GEAR being praised for promoting macroeconomic stability, enhancing financial discipline, transparency and accountability (South Africa, 2019:23). However, towards the end of the Mandela administration some members of COSATU and the SACP became unhappy with several of the negative outcomes resulting from the GEAR policy (Lehloesa, 2000:6).

The concerns were valid as many of the objectives that GEAR projected were not achieved (Narsiah, 2002:32). From 1996 to 1998 South Africa's gross domestic product

[18] The Maastricht criteria "are criteria, based on economic indicators, that European Union (EU) member states must fulfil to enter the euro zone and that they must continue to respect once entered. They impose control over inflation, public debt and public deficit, exchange rate stability and the convergence of interest rates" (National Statistics Institute, 2021).

(GDP)[19] declined to 3,2%, 1,7% and 0,1%, correspondingly, in 1996, 1997, and 1998. GEAR had forecasted figures of 3,5%, 2,9% and 3,7% for these years. Additionally, private sector investment declined sharply between 1996 and 1998, from 6,1%, 3,1% and -0,7%, instead of growing to the expected values of 9,3%, 9,1% and 9.3% (Narsiah, 2002:32). In terms of unemployment, GEAR unintentionally worsened relative deprivation, particularly for black people. From 1995 to 1999, the number of unemployed black households rose from 32% to 39% (Department of Social Development, 2002:28, cited by Streak, 2004:275).

In addition, COSATU and the SACP were unhappy with how GEAR was formulated and ultimately adopted (Lehloesa, 2000:6). This sentiment is reinforced by Adelzadeh (1996:67), who stated that "the proposed framework and policy scenarios represent an adoption of the essential tenets and policy recommendations of the neo-liberal framework advocated by the IMF[20] in its structural adjustment programmes"[21] (Adelzadeh, 1996:67). Hence, Lehloesa (2000:57) states that in contrast to the RDP, GEAR did not emerge from the ANC, members of the Tripartite Alliance nor public debate. It was designed by a team of seventeen "experts", several of whom came from previously white universities, as well as foreign financial institutions, the central bank of South Africa and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (Lehloesa, 2000:57,58). As a result, one crucial aspect was overlooked by the architects of GEAR, namely, the goal of restructuring a racially skewed economy (Shopsteward, 1997: 64, cited by Lehloesa, 2000:6).

COSATU and the SACP further argued that due to GEAR being primarily focused on macro-economic transformation, the goal of service delivery was lost in the process. (Lehloesa, 2000:59). GEAR was criticized for its narrow concentration on growth without development. They highlighted the policy's inability to protect the existing workforce while

[19] Brezina (2011:9-10) describes GDP as follows: "A country's GDP is the broadest measure of its economic output. It is defined as the monetary value of all goods and services produced in a nation during a given time period, usually one year."

[20] International Monetary Fund.

[21] Structural adjustment programmes are described as "an economic reform package suggested by the multilateral agencies (IMF and World Bank) for developing countries. Its core aims were to fuel local productivity, expand the economic base, realize viability in balance of payments, cause reduction in government expenditure, improve economic competence and boost the growth potential of the economy." (Pooyi, 2006) (cited by Sulaiman, Migiro & Aluko, 2014:41).

simultaneously growing the workforce, and that as a result, GEAR was incapable of addressing the issue of rising poverty in South Africa (The Shopsteward, 1998: 7.1) (cited by Lehloesa, 2000:6 & 59). COSATU's former President, John Gomomo expressed his dissatisfaction at the second NEDLAC[22] summit in 1997 by stating:

> "As Labour we remain opposed to the basic thrust of the GEAR strategy. We reject its approach to fiscal and monetary policies which continue to see major cuts in government spending on social security and basic infrastructure as well as continued rising interest rates. The effect of these policies is to choke the much needed economic growth and employment creation. It will also perpetuate the gap in wealth and incomes between the rich and the poor." (ANC, 1997a).

According to Lodge (1998b) some SACP and COSATU delegates expressed their opposition to GEAR in the run-up to the ANC's 50th national conference that was hosted in Mafikeng in 1997 and during the conference. Despite the above-mentioned issues by the SACP and COSATU, the lack of contentious challenge of GEAR at the conference resulted in the policy being officially endorsed as the ANC's macro-economic framework along with other conference resolutions. As such, Lehloesa (2000:63) states that "changes in ANC economic policy are essentially the result of shifts in the balance of forces within the liberation movement itself". The end of the Mafikeng conference resulted in Thabo Mbeki becoming the president of the ANC as Mandela did not contest the presidential position for a second term. As such, Mandela's first and only presidential term as the president of the Republic came to an end in 1999.

South Africa experienced significant changes during the Mandela administration. It is, therefore, important to analyse how this administration contributed to South Africa's political culture.

4.2.1 The Mandela administration's contribution to South Africa's political culture

From the above, it can be stated that the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) was an important step in that it employed an inclusive leadership style in order to integrate society at institutional level. This was important for the country's democracy because Mandela's first presidential term was a time in which all South Africans were still learning to coexist under a democratic administration, with the country

[22] National Economic Development and Labour Council.

still being susceptible to violence and possibly attempts to revert to the previous regime. Establishing the GNU was also important as it resembled a strategic move of the ANC creating a mental transformation for all South Africans. This mental transformation was essential for reforming people's struggle-oriented mindset to a unifying and consensus-oriented mindset in order to realize the second stage of the NDR, in which people of all races could coexist harmoniously and build a democratic political culture.

What is as equally important as the aforementioned, is the establishment of the TRC as it provided a forum for victims to relate their experiences, be heard, and witness a regime that was concerned about their pain and aimed to do something about it. This notion of *a caring state* was important for building trust between the government and the citizenry. It demonstrated that taking accountability for past transgressions was essential if the country had any prospects of moving forward after apartheid. Furthermore, it contributed to dismantling the political culture of impunity that was characteristic of the apartheid regime and building a political culture that is supportive of democracy by displaying the values of empathy, tolerance and respect for other people's rights and boundaries. This, together with Mandela's inclusive style of governance, was important for building South Africa's civil society, which is an important element of any democratic political culture.

As a macroeconomic policy, the RDP displayed an understanding of the fact that building a political culture that is supportive of democracy is dependent on significantly improving the socio-economic conditions of the populace. Although a contributing factor to the RDP's failure was the state not having sustainable sources of revenue collection to keep the economy afloat, another important factor is that the ethos of ethical leadership that Mandela employed did not flow to all levels of government. Corruption was already a factor in the early years of the ANC-led government. This was problematic because it meant that some local and provincial administrations maintained corrupt public service cultures which hindered service delivery. Thus, the Mandela administration was unsuccessful in eliminating the corrupt public service culture that some local and provincial administrations carried over to democratic South Africa. This demonstrated that the process of blending public service cultures would be difficult (in addition to racially transforming the public service) because the political culture of impunity was deeply

embedded in the modus operandi of the apartheid public service which mainly served white communities, while democratic South Africa demands of the public service to be centered on the values of transparency and accountability.

The adoption of GEAR signalled a significant shift from the NDR. Furthermore, the way GEAR was adopted (without consultation from the SACP and COSATU) suggests that the ANC knew the potential socio-economic risk of its adoption. To an extent, this gave the impression that it was under pressure to adopt the policy. Although this did not create significant cracks within the Tripartite Alliance's culture of loyalty, which is characteristic of the liberation struggle, it did demonstrate that the ANC's culture of unquestioning devotion was blinding it to the reality that GEAR was not conducive for addressing South Africa's socio-economic problems. The ANC's failure to listen to the grievances that the SACP and COSATU expressed over GEAR's negative results, demonstrates that a sense of hierarchy within the Tripartite Alliance developed at the Mafikeng conference with the ANC being at the top.

Mandela's administration played an important role in reforming the citizenry's relationship with the state by becoming more diplomatic and consensus-oriented, rather than aggressive and violent — given that the government was no longer the enemy. This was essential for cultivating a democratic political culture that would see South Africa moving forward under the Mbeki administration.

4.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER 1994: THE MBEKI ADMINISTRATION (1999-2008)

Thabo Mbeki ascended to the position of state president in June 1999 (Thompson, 2014:288). Kondlo (2017:7) describes the Mbeki administration as the period "when South Africans got down to the actual business of transformation". This transformation was expressed in the *Strategy and Tactics* document that was endorsed at the ANC's Mafikeng conference (1997) which stated: "important motive factors of transformation" included the growth of the African middle class and the African bourgeoisie, and thus did not mention the Freedom Charter, nationalization, or the state's control of resources (ANC, 1997b, and Filatova 2012:534-535).

To achieve this, the Mbeki administration restructured the Presidency to reform and transform the public service. (Kondlo, 2017:8). The Presidency's role was at the center of policymaking and overseeing the intricacies of governance, hence, the establishment of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS)[23]. (Kondlo, 2017:7). Mbeki promoted Essop Pahad (his close friend) as a cabinet minister to his presidential office and became in charge of coordinating the work of ministries, thus reducing the importance of the Deputy President's office. Mbeki, thus, had complete control over the cabinet and would make all significant policy decisions (Berat, 2014:312).

In addition, Berat (2014:313) states that Mbeki stressed the implementation of the affirmative action policy to diminish the socio-economic dominance of the white minority because there was no longer any threat of a white counter-revolution. This policy was to be executed through the GEAR macroeconomic policy. It entailed the government and corporate interests forming an alliance centered on the privatization of assets and the granting of state contracts to firms operated by black people or in cooperation with black entrepreneurs. As such, the black bourgeoisie were the greatest immediate beneficiaries (Schneider, 2003:43). Ratuva (2013:232) states that, while other members of the Black bourgeoisie were entrepreneurs, many others worked as Black fronts for White corporations. As a result, the White and Black middle classes' entrepreneurial ties were unified. To enable White-run companies to gain privatized assets, Black individuals were employed as "token representatives", making it mutually beneficial for White companies to hire Black people in managerial roles (Ratuva, 2013:232).

Against this backdrop, Gevisser (1997:25, cited by Schneider, 2003:43) disclosed that GEAR constructed a black bourgeoisie that comprised of leaders of the government, because "Almost every COSATU-affiliated union, and even the Communist Party itself, has set up an investment company". Southall (2008:293) supports this assertion by stating that "it is of no surprise that today 40 per cent of ANC MPs (including some cabinet ministers) are directors of companies, many owning companies outright". This situation

[23] Pooe and Gumede (2019) state that PCAS was in charge of policy development, analysis, policy coordination and providing policy advise, and also "conducting medium-to-long-range planning", and extensive monitoring and evaluation within government.

goes against the NDR and the Freedom Charter as it does not promote the equal redistribution of the country's wealth. Ratuva (2013:232) argues that neoliberal policies have led to the expansion of a powerful and wealthy black middle class. They have done nothing to help the black majority because they have maintained the status quo, with socio-economic ills like unemployment and growing poverty affecting the black majority disproportionately (Schneider, 2003:45). Thus, it's critical to understand why the ANC shifted from a socialist to a neoliberal agenda.

The IMF and World Bank established a strong presence in South Africa in the early 1990s, sending delegations to disseminate a neoliberal message to the ANC's top brass (Padayachee, 2007:591-594, and Williams & Taylor, 2000:27). Additionally, Narsiah (2002:30) states that training concerning neoliberalism was given to ANC leaders at the World Bank head office. This suggests that some ANC leaders may have already adopted hegemonic neoliberal ideals before 1994. This assertion is supported by Gilbert (2002:1924) who states that "they had accepted the neo-liberal thing when they went with RDP for the election". Thus, according to Williams & Taylor (2000:36), Satgar (2012:43) and Padayachee (2007:593) the ANC was compelled to forsake the socialist RDP due to the arrears it acquired from the apartheid administration, together with the necessity to retain its relations with the World Bank in order to secure (future) loans.

Waldmeir (1998:78-79) and Padayachee (2013:835-836) state that the peace talks between ANC leaders and Afrikaner political elites in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a strong relationship with international corporations, which hosted them in affluent locations like Mells Park House[24], Compleat Angler Hotel and Eastwell Manor Hotel in England. These discussions helped to ensure that international corporations' profits would be safeguarded long before and after the country's democratic transition and that the ANC's strategic direction would embrace neoliberalism. Narsiah (2002:31) further states that apart from being inexperienced (in comparison to major apartheid

[24] According to Waldmeir (1998:78-79) Mells Park House was a sophisticated mansion that was owned by Consolidated Goldfields, a British mining corporation operating in South Africa. At these premises, private discussions concerning the country's peace-making procedures were conducted amongst ANC officials who were led by Mbeki, as well as Afrikaner political elites such as Attie du Plessis who was the brother to P.W. Botha's Finance Minister, Barend du Plessis, Wimpie de Klerk (the brother to F.W. de Klerk), and Mof Terreblache (a long-time friend of F.W. de Klerk).

corporations and officials) in defining policies that would result in economic justice, the ANC's research department was small, and this limited its ability to formulate and communicate firm policy positions.

Considering the forgone, Berat (2014:312) states that the relations between the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance partners (the SACP and COSATU) became complex. This was mainly due to GEAR which contributed to many communist politicians leaving the SACP and becoming loyal capitalists. The government's relationship with COSATU also gradually weakened, however, COSATU maintained its support of the ANC on the premise of solidarity (Booysen, 2011:408). As such, Mbeki was re-elected for a second term as the ANC's president at the Stellenbosch conference in December 2002 (Booysen, 2011:408).

According to Barber (2005:1087) Mbeki played an important role in foreign policy during Mandela's administration, becoming dominant as the administration drew to a close. Mbeki worked hard to establish positive relations with Western leaders, particularly former President Clinton of the USA and former Prime Minister of the UK Tony Blair, and built relationships with other African countries (Berat, 2014:319). This contributed to his quest for an "African renaissance" (Barber, 2005:1088, and Berat, 2014:319), in which he "encouraged South Africans to embrace an African identity and sought to promote the continent's political, economic and social renewal. He also sought to reintegrate Africa into the global economy". (Adebajo, 2016). Mbeki played a key role in the establishment of the AU and the formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)[25], giving substance to the vision of an African renaissance (Berat, 2014:319, and Barber, 2005:1090). He worked with the UN to deploy peacekeeping missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, participated in peace discussions, and signed peace treaties between DRC and Rwanda in 2002 (Berat, 2014:319, and Mutisi, 2016).

In South Africa, Mbeki's second term as the ANC president was off to a rocky start due to service delivery issues, with the country having the world's highest HIV infections, estimated at 5 million infections (Fassin & Schneider, 2003:495). According to Heywood

[25] The fundamental goals of NEPAD included poverty eradication, long-term growth, and Africa's incorporation into the world economy (Barber, 2005:1089).

(2010:129) and TAC[26] (2016) Mbeki's administration became infamous for its support of AIDS denial, which permeated the government and the ANC to the point where his attitude resulted in an "unofficial anti-AIDS policy" that remained despite international criticism and over 300 000 people dying.

The inaction from the state concerning the HIV/AIDS epidemic resulted in the TAC (founded in 1998) pressuring multinational drug firms to import affordable generic drugs and mobilized citizens to pressure the state to respond to the epidemic (Robins & von Lieres 2004:577). Mbeki challenged scientific evidence that HIV was the source of AIDS, while the Minister of Health at the time Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang claimed the state was unable to provide treatment due to financial constraints (Robins & von Lieres 2004:578). The matter was finally settled after the TAC pursued a legal action that ended in the Constitutional Court ordering the state to provide medication to expectant mothers and the public in 2002 (Fassin & Schneider, 2003:495).

In addition, Mbeki was confronted with challenges like the expanded unemployment rate reaching 41,8% (Alexander, 2010:33), and the government's October 2003 review of the nation's economic development revealing that South Africa's economic progress has fallen behind other developing countries (Herbst, 2005:97). Despite these challenges, the ANC was re-elected with a 69,7% majority, giving Mbeki a second term as President of South Africa in April 2004 (EISA[27], 2011).

According to Berat (2014:319) during his second presidential term, Mbeki continued to dedicate his time and efforts to foreign affairs with South Africa becoming the primary home of the Pan African Parliament, and the media calling him "the president who most frequently visited South Africa" (Berat, 2014:319, and Barber, 2005:1089). During this time, Mbeki's Deputy President, Jacob Zuma was implicated in a corruption scandal when his financial advisor, Schabir Shaik, was being prosecuted for fraud and corruption relating to receiving bribes on behalf of Zuma during a multibillion-rand arms contract with French company Thales in the late 1990s (Vasagar, 2005).

[26] Treatment Action Campaign.
[27] Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa.

Shaik was found guilty of the charges in June 2005, with Judge Hillary Squires mentioning that there was “convincing” and “overwhelming” proof of a corrupt relationship between Zuma and Schaik (Vasagar, 2005, and Grobler, 2020). Thus, Mbeki released Zuma from his duties, and he was replaced by Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Herbst, 2005:96, Berat, 2014:315, and Vasagar, 2005). In October 2005, Zuma was charged with corruption by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and in September 2006, the case was removed from the court list for procedural purposes. However, the result meant that Zuma may be charged again in the future (Harding, 2020, and Berat, 2014:315).

According to Berat (2014:315) the friction between Zuma and Mbeki intensified after the dismissal of Zuma’s case. This situation was also worsened by the weakened relationship/irreconcilable differences between Mbeki and the Tripartite Alliance partners which was caused by his firm stance on GEAR that was supported by his stronghold on power and government regulation throughout all sectors of the economy (Kondlo, 2017:8-9, EISA, 2011, and Filatova, 2012:535). Another issue included the inaction from Mbeki over the Zimbabwe crisis. According to EISA (2011) Mbeki was widely criticized (by COSATU, the SACP, civil society organizations and the international community) for his failure to confront Robert Mugabe (former President of Zimbabwe) for his illegal actions and their harmful socio-economic consequences for South Africa. Furthermore, his decision to run for a third term as the president of the ANC gave the impression that he “schemed to keep Zuma from becoming his successor – and he was scorned” (Booysen, 2011:408, and Southall, 2017).

Thus, Kondlo (2017:9) Zuma believed Mbeki was victimizing him and attempted to sabotage his political future when he removed him as Deputy President in 2005. He was also playing the “Zulu card” by making sure that the first public event that he attended after his dismissal was alongside his king (Goodwill Zwlithini at the time), and overtly utilized his Zulu credentials (Africa Confidential, 2006:6, cited by Kearsey, 2007:80). This fuelled an anti-Mbeki sentiment within the ANC, particularly in the ANCYL, which was under the leadership of Julius Malema at the time (Kondlo, 2017:9). This situation generated a breeding ground for the evolution of a strongly factionalized ANC and NDR,

which was counterproductive to the construction of a political culture that is conducive for South Africa's democracy.

In the run-up to and at the ANC's Polokwane National Conference in 2007, the split between the Mbeki and Zuma allies revealed the organization's factionalism "between the neoliberal economic moderation of Mbeki and the populist, left-wing, pro-CPSA and pro-COSATU politics of Zuma" (Berat, 2014:317). It further revealed the split amongst the Xhosa, as exemplified by Mbeki, and the Zulu, as exemplified by Zuma (Berat, 2014:317). Zuma defeated Mbeki and was elected president of the ANC after receiving 60% of the approximately 4 000 ballots cast at the party's Polokwane national conference (McGreal, 2007). Although Zuma was recharged with corruption, tax evasion and racketeering after becoming the ANC president, Judge Chris Nicholsen dismissed the charges in September 2008, as he believed that the NPA's autonomy was obstructed when it recharged him (Southall, 2016, Berat, 2014:317, and Harding, 2020). The ANC's NEC recalled Mbeki and requested his resignation from the position of state president, replacing him with Kgalema Motlanthe, who served until 2009 as Zuma chose to occupy the presidential position following the 2009 election (Berat, 2014:317, EISA, 2011, Southall, 2016).

Considering the forgone, it is important to understand how the Mbeki administration contributed to South Africa's political culture.

4.3.1 The Mbeki administration's contribution to South Africa's political culture

Mbeki's administration began with optimism about South Africa's democracy and the opportunities it would bring. The establishment of PCAS was an important step in realizing the second stage of the NDR. Through research and expertise of individuals from different academic disciplines, this policy unit was important for developing and implementing policy solutions to South Africa's complex and interconnected socio-economic problems. The establishment of PCAS reflects the presidency's understanding that socio-economic factors are linked to democracy and contribute to a political culture that supports state institutions and regulations.

However, the above was not reflected in the implementation of the affirmative action policy because the ANC elite monopolized many opportunities that policy presented. Furthermore, the development of a black, powerful and affluent middle class meant that

socio-economic power relations from the apartheid regime would remain, as individuals became more detached from their local political base and less inclined to advocate for impoverished black people. This situation leads to a factionalized NDR because for one group the second stage of the NDR means becoming more connected and wealthier, while for the other it means having political freedom while challenging the new political order to obtain economic emancipation.

Mbeki's involvement in establishing human rights and economic development institutions in Africa and his assertion of an African renaissance created a sense of ownership in society, resulting in citizens feeling a sense of personal stake in their country and an obligation to improve it. Although Mbeki was elected for a second term, his administration was already in a downward spiral due to his perceived lack of compassion in dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis. This suggests that formerly exiled individuals (like Mbeki) have a different understanding of the second stage of the NDR than those who fought apartheid in South Africa. This not only reflects a factionalized ANC, but it also goes against the notion of *a caring state* (section 4.2.1) that Mandela aimed to build. This was certainly not the NDR that many aspired for in democratic South Africa as it was not supportive of building a democratic political culture.

However, Mbeki's administration can be applauded for the decision to take a strong stance against corruption by releasing Zuma from his duties as Deputy President. By appointing Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as Deputy President, his administration also highlighted the necessity of having women in key leadership positions and has contributed to significant dialogue taking place in the ANC and society (even today) concerning the role of women in politics.

Mbeki's administration can be criticized for seeming arrogant and aloof, failing to resolve differences (about GEAR) with the alliance members through dialogue, and instead operating with the mindset that he was the only president of the ANC and the country. Furthermore, his decision to contest the presidential position gave the impression that Mbeki thought he was indispensable and that the only person fitting for the presidential position should be from the Xhosa cultural group (like him). Although this statement is mentioned cautiously, authors such as Adebajo (2016), Hemer (2012:120) and Johnson

(2015:52) have presented work that supports it by making use of the term *Xhosa Nostra*. Adebajo (2016, cited by Yates, 2020:433-434) stated that “Mbeki was a Coriolanus undermined by his own character, who was forced out of office in 2008 along with his ‘Xhosa Nostra’ of insiders (members of his ethnic group who were overrepresented on his cabinet)”. Johnson (2015:52) states that “Mbeki's rule has led many to talk of the ‘Xhosa Nostra’ – and indeed, his cabinets had become increasingly dominated by Xhosas”, while Hemer (2012:120) states that “The government is accused of “black betrayal”- in order to please the (white) international community- and of having Xhosa interests (“Xhosa Nostra”).”

Considering the above, it can be stated that the Polokwane national conference revealed the beginning of the ANC’s moral degeneracy. This assertion lies in the fact that, although Mbeki’s lack of support from many of the Tripartite Alliance members at the conference was a signal of the party rejecting moral degradation as a result of his desire and abuse of power, it was done in a contradictory manner because the party voted for someone who was implicated in corruption (Zuma) and who could be recharged. Thus, the events of the conference (unintentionally) reinforced the political culture of corruption, demonstrating the Tripartite Alliance’s focus on internal power struggles rather than achieving a socialist society (in terms of the NDR). Therefore, it can be stated that Zuma exploited the tensions between Mbeki and the alliance partners, and mobilized and intensified the anti-Mbeki groups in order to ensure his rise to the ANC’s and the country’s presidential position.

4.4 SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER 1994: THE ZUMA ADMINISTRATION (2009-2018)

Jacob Zuma’s first administration began in May 2009 after the ANC won 65,9% of the votes in the April 2009 elections (Berat, 2014:334). According to Filatova (2021:537) Zuma’s allies in the SACP and COSATU leadership structures were compensated with cabinet positions. The Zuma administration commenced by establishing a Planning Commission that was responsible for redefining South Africa’s economic policy. Taking this step was important because public’s growing frustration and the complexity of

society's socio-economic problems had grown (Kondlo, 2017:9). Therefore, his administration was viewed by South Africans as "the delivery administration" and it was anticipated that it would deliver "now" (Kondlo, 2017:10). This expectation from society is not too surprising because poverty has been people's reality before 1994. Furthermore, unlike Mbeki, Zuma's ascension to the presidential post represented the election of an individual who could comprehend the kind of relative deprivation that citizens faced, given that his mother worked as a domestic worker and that compelled him to take odd jobs from 15 years old to add to his mother's salary (Venter & Duvenhage, 2008:637). Thus, Jacobs and Fogel (2018) assert that Zuma's adherents believed he could reverse neoliberalism and its associated deprivation.

According to Berat (2014:338) Zuma inherited a country that made considerable progress in overcoming its apartheid history. This is reflected by the Mbeki administration's five-year streak of economic growth, SARS surpassing its revenue collection goals and the growth in government spending/investment on infrastructure and social services (Kondlo, 2017:9, Steytler & Powell, 2010:150, and Duba, 2021). Despite this, Zuma's first term in office had a rocky start because of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2010:1) and Steytler and Powell (2010:151) South Africa's economy experienced its first recession since 1994 with GDP declining by 7,4% and 2,8% during the first two quarters of 2009, respectively. Foreign direct investment (FDI) also declined significantly from 2008 to 2009, dropping from 4,4% to 1,4% (STATSSA, 2010:10). As such, Zuma's administration was under tremendous pressure to stop the increasing job losses, which totalled approximately a million in 2009 and mainly affecting the youth, semi-skilled and unskilled segments of the labour force (ILO, 2010:1, and Steytler & Powell, 2010:149). With these conditions, the culture of protest had already taken hold just "a fortnight before" Zuma's inaugural ceremony and continued well into the rest of his presidency (Kondlo, 2017:10). Protests have been held by both employed individuals and residents of shack settlements and impoverished sections of townships, complaining about the lack of housing and basic services that democracy was failing to address (Alexander, 2010:26 & 31-32, and Smith, 2009).

In addition, it must be noted that Zuma's first presidential term was tainted by scandals. Some of these included his admission in 2009 to fathering a child outside of marriage with the daughter of Irvin Khoza, one of South Africa's notable soccer executives and businessman (South African History Online, 2018 and Schwikowski, 2018). Zuma sued for millions in a defamation lawsuit in 2010 for a 2008 political cartoon in which the cartoonist Zapiro (real name Jonathan Shapiro) depicted him raping a woman representing justice (Berat, 2014:228, and Schwikowski, 2018). In that same year, Zuma also failed to disclose his assets as per the legal timeframe of 60 days after starting office (South African History Online, 2018). However, the Marikana Massacre was the main scandal that tarnished Zuma's first term and the ANC-led government (Kondlo, 2017:10). On 16 August 2012, 34 miners were shot and killed by the police at Lonmin's Marikana Mine in the North West Province following a week-long strike in which the miners were demanding a minimum monthly income of R12 500 (Kondlo, 2017:10, Montsho, 2018, and Mahlati, 2021).

The Zuma administration's perceived lack of concern for human rights displayed above was also reflected in foreign affairs. Zuma, who took over Mbeki's duties as regional mediator was also critiqued for maintaining Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach to Zimbabwe. From 13-14 July 2013, Zimbabwe had special voting for police and military personnel who will be working on election day, and civil society groups and international observers stated that violence and fraud were the order of the day (Shaw, 2013). Thus, when Lindiwe Zulu (Zuma's foreign affairs advisor at the time) challenged Zimbabwe's capability to hold free and fair elections, Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe's president at the time) lambasted her as "a stupid, idiotic street woman". Rather than critiquing Mugabe for his remarks, the violence and fraud that was reported, Zuma claimed that his officials expressed "unauthorized" statements "which are regrettable and unfortunate" (Shaw, 2013).

Concerning his role within the ANC, Steytler and Powell (2010:151) state that during his first term, Zuma faced the challenge of leading a wounded and divided ANC following the events of the Polokwane conference. Furthermore, after overcoming the negative media attention related to the alleged rape and arms deal corruption cases, and the barriers to

his ANC presidency in Polokwane, Zuma, unlike Mbeki, demonstrated a higher intolerance for opposition from broader society and within the ANC (Berat, 2014:338). The latter was reflected by the breaking down of relations between Zuma and the ANCYL.

According to Filatova (2012:537) and Booysen (2011:50-51) during Zuma's first term, the ANCYL president (Julius Malema at the time) who fearlessly supported Zuma during the months leading up to the Polokwane national conference, became Zuma's rival. Malema kept bringing up the objectives of the Freedom Charter, demanding for the ruling party to nationalize banks, mining companies and the land. Owing to the SACP and COSATU's unwillingness and inability to act, he strived for the ANCYL to spearhead the NDR. Malema's conduct mirrored the NDR's abrupt shift to its goal-oriented, revolutionary and militant stance of the 1970s and 1980s. These remarks, including the overt display of blatant racism which was destructive for both the country and the party, were the reasons for his expulsion from the ANC in 2012 (Filatova, 2012:537, and Berat, 2014:338).

Although Malema's expulsion was justifiable to a certain degree, his remarks about the Freedom Charter and achieving a socialist society (as per the NDR) should have reminded the ANC of the promises it made to the electorate, and the party should have worked harder to fulfil them. However, this did not occur as Filatova (2012:537) states that "four years after the left's epochal victory at Polokwane, there was no real sign of dramatic change - and certainly not of a new, socialist NDR. Zuma had stressed that he just wanted business as usual - and thus it was".

Maintaining "business as usual" in South Africa is problematic because the rising poverty, unemployment and inequality in society is proof that there needs to be a major change in the ANC-led government's approach to governance, leadership and the overall political culture in state institutions. Thus, Zuma's notion of "business as usual" was to the socio-economic detriment of ordinary South Africans because Euromonitor International (2012) reported that globally South Africa had the largest income inequality by 2012, with a Gini coefficient of 63,6% (figures close to 0% represent perfect equality, while those closer to 100% represents perfect inequality). Furthermore, from 2000 to 2011 the income disparity between the poorest and wealthiest 10% of households grew. Throughout this period, Euromonitor International (2012) found that the median household disposable income of

the poorest 10% and the wealthiest 10% of homes grew by 14,4% and 26,8% respectively. According to Euromonitor International (2012) between 2006 and 2011, the middle class increased by 6,5% to 4,7 million people. However, this was still less than 10% of the population (Berat, 2014:352). Allright (2013, cited by Faul, 2013) states that a corruption epidemic assisted in the creation of these large wealth discrepancies with no governmental department, whether national, provincial, or local, being spared.

Considering the above, Kgalema Motlanthe (Zuma's Deputy President at the time) criticized the ANC, along with Zuma and his supporters over Zuma's network of political patronage and rising corruption (Berat, 2014:338). As a result, Motlanthe competed against Zuma for the position of ANC president (Bauer, 2012b, and Smith, 2012). During the run-up to the Mangaung conference in 2012, "the ANC began to show fissures even more pronounced than those that had led to Mbeki's removal" (Berat, 2014:338). The conference resulted in Zuma being re-elected for a second term as the president of the ANC with Cyril Ramaphosa being his deputy (Munusamy, 2012).

An important resolution from the Mangaung conference was to "instill discipline across all levels of the organization without fear or favour" and that "members who are found guilty of wrongdoing in other institutions of society should also be subjected to internal disciplinary processes in line with the ANC Code of Conduct" (ANC, 2012b). However, instilling discipline by Zuma and the new leadership meant making dictatorial amendments to the ANC constitution that appeared to be aimed at stopping even moderate criticism (Berat, 2014:342, and Lubisi, 2018). This was reflected by the ANC NEC disbanding the Limpopo provincial executive committee (PEC), dismissing its premier, and disbanding the ANCYL NEC in March 2013, for not supporting Zuma's presidential candidacy (Munusamy, 2013). Berat (2014:342) states that the decision to disband these structures could have been due to fear that history would repeat itself seeing that it was the younger generations of Sisulu, Tambo and Mandela who once assumed control of the organization after becoming dissatisfied with their elders' tactics.

The Mangaung conference resolutions acknowledged that political freedom was achieved despite socio-economic issues, and that economic freedom must be prioritized (ANC, 2013:3), which led to the term *radical economic transformation* (RET) coming to the fore.

RET initially appeared in the government's Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014-2019, which was established to lead the work of the Zuma administration (South Africa, 2014:4, and Ramaphosa, 2017).

According to Ramaphosa (2017) RET is developed from the National Development Plan (NDP) [28] , and indicated "an intensification and acceleration of the economic transformation process." At the 2017 State of the Nation Address, Zuma defined RET as: "fundamental change in the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female. Our main objective remains the liberation of Blacks in general and Africans in particular. Its components include the creation of jobs, accelerating shared and inclusive growth, transforming the structure of production and ownership of means of production and enabling the talents and productive potential of our people to flourish. At the heart of radical socio-economic transformation is an effective state that is decisive in its pursuit of structural change" (ANC, 2017, cited by Steyn Kotze, 2018:15, and South Africa, 2017).

From the above, it seems the ANC-led government was serious about improving its moral fibre and the livelihoods of citizens. However, Zuma's second term as the ANC president was still marked by a high number of protests as Municipal IQ (2020, cited by Tswanya (2019) and Stoddard, (2020)), revealed that South Africa's service delivery related protests reached annual figures of 173, 155 and 191 in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. As a result of the persistent and sometimes violent protests in the country, Professor Peter Alexander, a researcher from the University of Johannesburg, has named South Africa the "protest capital of the world" (Hlongwane, 2012). Despite this, the ANC won the 2014 elections with a reduced majority of 62,15% (IEC, 2014), re-electing Zuma as President of the Republic for a second term despite the uproar surrounding the landing of a civilian plane (by the Gupta family) at the Waterkloof Military Airbase in 2013 and the

[28] Formulated by the National Planning Commision in 2010, the NDP is the strategic framework of ensuring South Africa's future by eliminating poverty and lowering inequality by 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011:14-15).

release of the Public Protector's report on Nkandla[29] in 2014 (February, 2014, Evans, 2014, and Polgreen, 2013).

Zuma's second term began with more scandals, including the failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2015 (who was wanted for genocide and war crimes) even though an arrest warrant was issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The international condemnation was challenged by the Zuma administration threatening to retract its membership from the ICC (Pizzi, 2015, and Hunter, Mataboge & De Wet, 2015).

Zuma's poor and controversial political decisions were becoming a defining feature of his presidency and they started to have a knock-on effect on the economy. According to Nkosi (2015) Zuma surprised many when he decided to dismiss Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene and replaced him with David van Rooyen in December 2015. Four days later, following public outcry and condemnation from the ruling party, Zuma dismissed van Rooyen and replaced him with former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan (Nkosi, 2015). Zuma sparked a sharp depreciation of the rand which plummeted "from R15,25 per euro to R17,42 and even R18,36 in January 2016" (Engel, 2016:105). The ANC leadership had not been consulted about the abrupt dismissals and it appeared that they learned about them through media reports (Nkosi, 2015). According to Toyana (2015) and Hogg (2015) Zuma's decision-making came just days after credit rating agency Fitch relegated the country just one score above junk status and stating that Nene's dismissal "raised more negative than positive questions". Thus, this situation raised speculations that Nene was dismissed because he was critical of how state-owned firms were operated and this led to ANC leaders like Barbara Hogan and Mavuso Msimang appealing to the ANC to recall Zuma (Nkosi, 2015).

Calls about the need to remove Zuma from office started mounting after the Constitutional Court ordered him to reimburse the state R7,8 million in March 2016 after he disobeyed a state order to pay some of the funds used for non-security features at his Nkandla home (Elgot, 2016 and Toyana & Macharia, 2016). This judgement came just months before

[29] The Nkandla report gives details on how former President Zuma benefited excessively through millions of public funds that were inefficiently spent on security improvements at his Nkandla property (Evans, 2014).

the 2016 local government elections. Thus, in addition to the above, Engel (2016:104-105), Everatt (2017) and Shubin (2018:56-57) argue that the Constitutional Court judgement on the Nkandla scandal, the Pretoria High Court's dismissal of Zuma's appeal to have the 783 corruption cases against him permanently struck off the court roll, violent service delivery protests and the continuous power cuts (load shedding) from power utility Eskom, were major contributing factors to the ANC's underperformance in the August 2016 local government elections.

In comparison to the 2011 local government elections, the ANC suffered significant losses throughout all the provinces except KwaZulu-Natal. On aggregate, the party lost 8,06% with the most losses being from the North West, Limpopo and Gauteng with figures showing losses of -14,65%, -11,84% and -13,81% respectively (Laterza & Van Wyk, 2016 and Engel, 2016:107). However, the ANC was mainly punished by the electorate in three metros, losing its majorities in the Tshwane (Pretoria), Johannesburg and the Nelson Mandela Bay (Gqeberha) metropolitan municipalities (Engel, 2016:110 and Paret, 2017:182).

According to Paret (2017:182) and Kaaf (2017) the above contributed to the Tripartite Alliance members, particularly the SACP, becoming increasingly critical of Zuma's leadership especially after the release of the State of Capture Report by the Public Protector in November 2016. Kaaf (2017) states that the SACP came out furiously against Zuma's corrupt dealings with the Gupta family and advised him to stop all relations with them, coming close to demanding his resignation. However, one of the pinnacles of all surprises was in March 2017 at the funeral of anti-apartheid activist Ahmed Kathrada and the political events that took place during that time (Shubin, 2018:57).

According to Shubin (2018:57) nearly all ANC top officials were present at Kathrada's funeral, except for Zuma, who was supposedly not welcomed by the family. In his funeral speech, Kgalema Motlanthe reiterated Kathrada's letter to Zuma which included a plea to resign (Poplak, 2017). The situation was intensified just the day before the funeral when Zuma abruptly summoned Pravin Gordhan (the Finance Minister at the time), and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, back from an international investor roadshow trip and reshuffled

the cabinet, thus dismissing the two from office in a statement issued around midnight on 31 March 2017 (Shubin, 2018:57, Paret, 2017:182, and Chutel, 2017).

According to Chutel (2017) Gordan was at odds with the Gupta family and Zuma as his financial prudence was “an obstacle to Zuma’s plans for the national treasury and the ambitions of the president’s friends”. Zuma’s decisions resulted in the rand depreciated from R12,80 to R13,41 and eventually to R13,60 against the United States dollar (Hogg, 2017). He also triggered widespread protests from civil society and political parties. Thousands of citizens protested in Pretoria on April 7 and April 12 to demand Zuma’s dismissal. The Economic Freedom Fighter (EFF) led the larger of the two protests, which were organized by a partnership of opposition parties. Zuma’s resignation was also demanded by COSATU and the SACP, yet both organizations maintained solidarity with the ANC (Paret, 2017:182, and Kaaf, 2017). This can be reflected by Zuma surviving a no-confidence vote by secret ballot in parliament (by 21 votes), which was suggestive of the fact that 26 ANC members voted against him (Schwikowski, 2018, and Tolsi, 2017).

Zuma’s lack of consultation when making decisions was not the only reason for the alliance partners demanding his resignation. In July 2017, more allegations of high-level corruption came to the fore following a massive leak of confidential emails suggesting that the Gupta family used their power to choose cabinet ministers and profit from government contracts (Schwikowski, 2018). Factors like the removal of three important SACP central committee members from the cabinet following the 2014 elections strained ANC-SACP relations, which was further exacerbated by the dismissal of SACP members Gordan, Jonas and Blade Nzimande in a cabinet reshuffle in October 2017 (Kaaf, 2017, and Essa, 2017). Furthermore, the growing supremacy of the so-called Premier League within the Zuma faction was a contributing factor to the SACP’s isolation from the Zuma inner circle (Kaaf, 2017).

According to Lediga (2018) the Premier League encompassed three ANC chairpersons and premiers, namely David Mabuza, Ace Magashule and Supra Mahumapelo, who were from Mpumalanga, the Free State and the North West Province, respectively. These individuals united to form a powerful force that captured the Women’s League, the MK Veterans League and Youth League to support Zuma, “who himself was captured by the

Gupta brothers" (Lediga, 2018). Martin and Solomon (2016:24) further state that the Premier League was supported by certain ministers and top executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Through the support of Jacob Zuma, the trio exemplified corrupt patronage lines that aimed to take ownership of the main levers of the economy under the pretence of RET. The Premier League preached about RET (and white monopoly capital) when campaigning for Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, thus challenging Ramaphosa for the party's presidential position during the run-up to the ANC's Nasrec conference of December 2017 (Masemola, 2020:213-214, Manyane, 2021, Desai, 2018:507, and Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, Mondi, Peter, Qobo, Swilling & Friedenstein, 2017:3-5). RET was, therefore, the key resource in the ANC's presidential campaign of Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, which many viewed as a continuation of Zuma's administration (Masemola, 2020:213).

Considering the above, the ANC's Nasrec conference revealed the party had degenerated into a factional battle for power (Booysen, 2018:7). The two main factions were the "Zumaists" (advocates of RET) that were linked with the outgoing president at the time, Jacob Zuma, and his ex-wife Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (NDZ), and the Cyril Ramaphosa's faction (also known as the CR17 group/campaign) (Booysen, 2018:7). According to Booysen (2018:8) the fundamental difference amongst these two groups was that the CR17 faction emphasized a corrupt-free government, while the "Zumaists"/NDZ faction concealed corruption beneath radical rhetoric. Ramaphosa was associated with national and international capital but also with social democracy and various ANC radicalisms; Zuma was associated with a personalized system of "arriviste capital" (Booysen, 2018:8).

The factional battle for the ANC's presidential position resulted in Ramaphosa's narrow victory over Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Booysen, 2018:7, and Terblanche, 2021:3). This was accomplished through the support of COSATU, ANC formations, a sizable financial war fund, and most importantly former Mpumalanga premier David Mabuza (later to become the ANC's deputy president). Mabuza renounced the Premier League by switching allegiance to the Ramaphosa faction along with the Mpumalanga voting delegates at the eleventh hour (Terblanche, 2021:3, and Manyane, 2021).

In January 2018, just weeks after the Nasrec Conference and following much delay, Zuma authorized the establishment of the Judicial Commision of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State (Schwikowski, 2018 and Gerber, 2018). According to Desai (2018:508) and Schwikowski (2018) the following month, just days ahead of the annual State of the Nation speech, opposition parties filed a new motion of no confidence against Zuma. This led to the end of the Zuma administration on Valentine's Day, 14 February 2018, when he announced his resignation on national television. Zuma's resignation came after the ANC confirmed its support for the motion of no confidence against Zuma (Desai, 2018:508, and Schwikowski, 2018).

Although Zuma's administration was overshadowed by many scandals relating to corruption and corruption allegations, the moral decay of the ANC, violent protesting, and public frustration, it has been successful in certain aspects. These include South Africa joining the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) bloc of emerging economies in 2010. This changed geopolitics and the international political economy, which had been skewed for decades in favour of the affluent western countries. Related to this was the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre in 2017, based in Johannesburg. The bank was aimed at providing infrastructure and development assistance to states in their respective currencies (South Africa, 2018).

With regards to the health sector, the Zuma administration's HIV prevention of mother-to-child transmission programme had resulted in a 66% reduction in the number of children born HIV positive by 2011. This improved the average life expectancy from 58,8 years in 2007 to 64,3 years by 2015, with South Africa having the largest treatment programme globally (South Africa, 2018). In the field of education, the Zuma administration constructed two new universities, in the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga province, namely the Sol Plaatje University and the University of Mpumalanga, respectively. Furthermore, the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) improved from R2,4 billion in 2008 to R15 billion in 2017, thus furthering the goal of expanding children's educational opportunities.

The following section will analyse the role that Jacob Zuma's tenure played in constructing South Africa's political culture.

4.4.1 The Zuma administration's contribution to South Africa's political culture

Zuma inherited a country that made considerable socio-economic improvements since the end of apartheid. Although inheriting a country with a protest culture, he also inherited a citizenry that was optimistic that he would bring the necessary socio-economic reforms given that he grew up in poverty. This optimism, together with Zuma's upbringing and the "victim card" he played when he was ousted by Mbeki, contributed to the general public and the Tripartite Alliance members not being mindful of the calibre of individual they are putting in office, seeing that Zuma was associated with corrupt activities while he was still the Deputy President. This lack of analysis on the ANC's part already created the building blocks of a political culture of unethical behaviour and impunity. This statement is reinforced by one of the first "red flags" of Zuma's first term, which is when he failed to disclose his assets as per the legal timeframe after taking the presidential position. Thus, it can be stated that Zuma's first term commenced with signs that he and his administration were resistant to rules and did not take kindly to being held accountable, this being one of the contributing factors to the various scandals surrounding his first administration, with the Marikana Massacre being the worst.

Zuma's stance on foreign policy, particularly in the case of Zimbabwe, was problematic because he continued with the quiet diplomacy approach just like Mbeki. Although it can be stated that a seemingly militant political culture of unquestioning devotion characterized the relations between the ANC and the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) due to fighting white colonialism in their respective countries, this assertion falls short when one considers that the ANC (and Africa in general) has a political culture of governing by silence. This was reflected in the Zuma administration's inability to criticize or arrest Omar Al-Bashir when he was in South Africa and the Mbeki and the Zuma administration's inability to critique Mugabe's undemocratic and violent style of governance (chapter 4 section 4.4). Thus, it can be stated that the application of quiet diplomacy was not necessarily a show of loyalty to Zimbabwe, but rather a defence mechanism and a way of living up to the political culture of governing by

silence in which African leaders and liberation movements do not identify and act against each other's wrongdoings. Thus, if the ANC (South Africa) does not express dissatisfaction with Mugabe's governance, then ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) will not turn around and critique the ANC or South Africa later.

In the context of South Africa, the above analysis showed that the ANC's decisions were superior to the constitution and that the notion of a *caring state* that Mandela constructed (chapter 3 section 3.9.1.1) was no more because the ANC's comfortability took precedence over its constitutional obligation of protecting citizens (both South African and Zimbabwean) who were endangered by violent xenophobic attacks. Within the ANC and the country, Zuma did not operate through quiet diplomacy. This was reflected by the expulsion of Julius Malema from the ANC. Although Malema was rightfully expelled for being divisive, especially along racial lines, his expulsion also demonstrated the Zuma administration's intention to stop any attempts of opposition. This situation demonstrated that the vision of realizing the second stage of the NDR was slowly diminishing because it can be stated that for the most part, Malema was expelled for mentioning redistribution measures that were going to fundamentally change existing power relations in South Africa — changes that were uncomfortable to the white elite (whom the ANC elite benefits from through the affirmative action policy), and that the ANC was just not ready to implement.

In maintaining this strict approach to governance, the end of the Mangaung conference (2012) resulted in the ANC being on a mission to "instill discipline" as per the ANC's Code of Conduct (section 4.4). However, the disciplinary processes that the ANC undertook did not fulfil the mandate of being exemplary to the public by showing that wrong deeds are punished. Instead, the message that was sent was of dictatorship. Hence, the Limpopo provincial executive committee (PEC), its premier, and the ANCYL NEC were disbanded for not supporting Zuma's presidential candidacy (section 4.4). Furthermore, disciplinary measures were also applied selectively in that the ANC did not apply them to Zuma, despite his various scandals.

The ANC's inability to hold all people responsible for their actions played out in broader society as municipalities were performing poorly. This contributed to rising service

delivery protests in the run-up to the 2014 general elections. Although Zuma secured a second term in office as the President of the Republic, his administration had to meet the promises it made to the electorate in the run-up to the 2014 general elections. It also faced the difficulty of establishing ways of making the government more competent and responsive to the needs and expectations of the citizenry. This did not go hand in glove with nonaccountability. However, these reforms did not take place as the country continued to face a series of scandals which demonstrated that the ANC had blurred the lines between the party and the state, as reflected by Zuma having three Finance Ministers in one week (Nhlanhla Nene, David van Rooyen and Pravin Gordan) and the Constitutional Court ordering him to reimburse the state following the Public Protector's Nkandla report.

The above situation has had negative implications for the economy and livelihoods of citizens. It reflects the factional struggle within the party and its loss of credibility which had contributed to the ANC losing three metropolitan municipalities in the 2016 local government elections. However, this loss needed to take place so that the Tripartite Alliance could undergo intense introspection. By this time, the country's political culture was characterized by frustration, anger, confusion and distrust of the government. This was not too surprising, considering that the release of the State Capture Report in November 2016 shed some light on why Zuma was making certain political decisions, and why the citizenry was becoming increasingly confused, frustrated and distrustful of the ANC-led government. This, including the outcome of the 2016 local government elections were important factors in getting the Tripartite Alliance members to hold Zuma and his allies accountable. The State of Capture Report revealed details of the presidency's and the Gupta family's unethical dealings involving the operations of state institutions. This report discredited Zuma's administration and revealed how corruption was legalized by the presidency. This, in turn, contributed to lawlessness being justifiable by ordinary citizens and this plays a role in increasing incidents of corruption, vigilantism or mob justice and violent protesting that results in looting and infrastructural damage.

Therefore, it must be noted that state capture has not only degenerated the efficiency of state institutions which negatively affects society at large, but it has also significantly

contributed to a factionalized Tripartite Alliance. This was overtly confirmed by Zuma's failure to attend the funeral of key struggle icon and dual member of the SACP and ANC, Ahmed Kathrada, firing Pravin Gordan (a key member of the SACP and ANC) soon after this and the SACP and COSATU participating in the April 2017 national protests which called for Zuma's dismissal. Therefore, the events surrounding Kathrada's funeral contributed to destabilizing the sense of apathy that Zuma tried to enforce by disbanding the Limpopo PEC and the ANCYL after the Mangaung Conference in 2012. It also demonstrated that the continuous protests that occur in South Africa should not merely be regarded as service delivery protests, because in essence, citizens are also protesting against broader issues that affect their livelihoods like corruption, unemployment, low salaries and widespread crime. With this being stated, the protests which called for Zuma's dismissal reinforced communitarianism and thus strengthened South Africa's democracy. Within the Tripartite Alliance, the protests were a clear sign that Zuma's administration had discontinued with internal democratic processes and consultation that the movement is known for, and a behaviour of dictatorship was in effect.

This dictatorship like behaviour was demonstrated by Zuma surviving several motions of no confidence in Parliament, with the final one being conducted through a secret ballot. Although this can be suggestive of the ANC still being rooted on internal party loyalty, the small margin that Zuma won by is also suggestive of the fact that there was a sense of individualism and conformity within the ANC. The former (individualism) can be attributed to ANC members failing to vote by their conscience and instead their vote was determined by the affluent lifestyle which they lived, and the removal of Zuma would have meant that this lifestyle is jeopardized. Closely related to this was the latter (conformity) which can be attributed to the Zuma administration being on a mission to "instill discipline across all levels of the organization…" following the 2012 Mangaung conference (ANC, 2012b) (section 4.4). This mission contributed to developing a divisive system of "us versus them" with the "us" being the Zuma supporters and the "them" being the non-Zuma supporters. This situation revealed that state institutions are ineffective because they are politicized. However, it can also be stated that this situation played a role in strengthening democracy by fostering a dynamic and confrontational society, with civil society and the public using measures like litigation to hold the Zuma administration accountable.

The run-up to the ANC's Nasrec conference in 2017 saw the intense discourse about RET, which demonstrated that the ANC abandoned the NDR as this was not even mentioned in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework, and instead endorsed RET. Even though RET is viewed as a façade to take control over state resources, its definition (section 4.4) provides an accurate account of the changes that ought to take place in South Africa in order to remedy the country's engineered socio-economic deprivation, caused by colonialism, apartheid and state capture. However, when one pays attention to the full definition of RET, it merely looks like a rewording of the NDR and the Freedom Charter. This raises doubts about the ANC-led government's ability to create reform, because since 1994, its quest to realize the second stage of the NDR has resulted in corruption and state capture, which does not generate confidence in their ability to successfully implement RET.

Thus, the Zuma administration has fragmented the sense of integrity that the Mandela and Mbeki administrations aimed to cultivate within the ANC and society. This was also demonstrated by Zuma promoting Zulu populism or playing the Zulu card (section 4.3) when Mbeki dismissed him as Deputy President in 2005 after the courts implicated him (Zuma) in Schabir Shaik's corruption case. Considering this, Zuma's decision to support (or rather impose) Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the position of ANC president (rather than his deputy, Ramaphosa) has been viewed as his (last) attempt at controlling the levers of the economy.

The Zuma administration has had a significant impact on South Africa's political culture and democracy, leading to an apathetic society and a factionalized ANC under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.

4.5 THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION (2019-PRESENT)

Ramaphosa was elected president of the ANC in December 2017 and later President of the Republic in February 2018, following Zuma's resignation. Ramaphosa entered the presidency already being disconnected from the public because at the time of the Marikana Massacre he was a shareholder and a non-executive director of the Lonmin Mine (Myeni, 2022) (chapter 4 section 4.4). His administration commenced with a

disintegrated and essentially destroyed NDR, he also took over a party that had lost its direction and a government that would require years to restore due to rampant corruption (Osha, 2018:54, and Booysen, 2021b). Hence, Landman (2019) states that Ramaphosa "set himself two tasks: rebuild the ethical foundations of the state (reclaim it from state capture) and revitalize the economy". For South Africans, Ramaphosa's rise to power resulted in "ramaphoria" — the sense of hope amongst citizens that the new administration would bring a "new dawn" with economic growth that would lead to citizens having better opportunities, the end of patronage politics and the realization of a corrupt-free government (De Klerk & Solomon, 2019:64-65, and Kamanzi, 2019).

However, the 2019 general elections, which secured Ramaphosa's first term as President of the country and the ANC another term as the ruling party, demonstrated that the Zuma administration had a substantial impact on the country's political culture and belief in democracy (Booysen, 2021b:66). The ANC won the 2019 general elections achieving 57%, compared to a 62% win in 2014 (IEC, 2019, and IEC, 2014). This outcome speaks volumes over the alienation that citizens experienced towards the government during the Zuma years which can be attributed to widespread corruption, ineffective policies, extensive institutional failures and the lack of political will to address these problems (Booysen, 2021b:66). In essence, this was what the country's political culture had deteriorated into, with citizens being less distrustful of the government's weak character and the country's democracy. Hence Booysen (2021b:66) states: "Evidence of the changes in political culture was all round. Cynicism, discontent, and at best a poorly substantiated belief that Election 2019 'would help make things better' had replaced starry-eyed trust in leaders and political parties, the multiparty system and competitive elections."

The above has resulted in Ramaphosa's "new dawn" being tarnished by a worsening economic and political crisis, exemplified by the deterioration of Eskom, leading to months of load-shedding across the country due to the failure to maintain infrastructure, years of poor financial prudence and corruption (Kamanzi, 2019). Similar to this is the case of South African Airways (SAA), which had deteriorated to the extent that the government

resorted to selling a 51% stake to Takatso Consortium after it was placed under business rescue following a series of bailouts (Mkhwananzi, 2021).

Thus, the rhetoric of “unity” that the ANC was preaching following its 2017 Nasrec conference will not materialize until Ramaphosa has dealt decisively with the perpetrators and beneficiaries of state capture and corruption. This argument is further reinforced by Osha (2018:54) who states: “it has become clear that these culprits *(of state capture and corruption)* have their tentacles spread across the entire ranks of the ANC and government establishments. Effectively tackling the twin scourge of corruption and state capture might entail dismantling the mammoth the ANC has become.” This was demonstrated a year into Ramaphosa’s tenure as the country’s president when the global Covid-19 pandemic reached South Africa and the country went into a lockdown in March 2020.

The advent of the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdowns has revealed the inadequacies of the ANC-led government which are manifested in numerous kinds of inequality in education, gender, health, the urban-rural gap, and race (Davids, 2021). For instance, thousands of students who rely on their schools’ feeding schemes for survival were left hungry when schools were closed during the lockdown. The closure of schools meant that only children from educated and high-income households had access to home-schooling or online classes, while the majority of children from low-income families were left behind (Maistry, 2021:11, and Muvunyi, 2020). The lack of basic services like water in rural municipalities in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Northern Cape and Kwa-Zulu-Natal has caused citizens to not be able to wash their hands as per Covid-19 protocols (Matseke, 2020:92-94). These inequalities were worsened by the corruption that occurred during the pandemic in both the private and the public sectors.

According to Corruption Watch (2020), some of the emergency measures that the government introduced included the R500 million relief package which was aimed at delivering food parcels for the impoverished, the interim social grants increment for more than 16 million recipients and the Temporary Employee/Employee Relief Scheme (TERS) for those whose incomes were affected. However, private corporations partially aided the misuse of the TERS by claiming benefits on behalf of unsuspecting employees or

deceased individuals and thereafter by taking the money or using the benefits for their own benefit (Corruption Watch, 2020). Similarly, the private sector's cooperation in manipulating the procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) has led to the theft of billions of rands, funds that should have gone to the critical response plan (Corruption Watch, 2020). Corruption Watch (2020) further states that in South Africa, it is illegal for public employees to be in business with the government, yet since Covid-19, TERS has been manipulated and food parcels have been stolen to influence political favour. The emergency procurement regulations mostly served to allow state officials to generate millions of rands through unethical dealings with opportunistic companies that abruptly expanded into the personal protective equipment (PPE) industry.

The above situation has worsened existing inequalities in the health sector as public hospitals had a shortage of PPEs (in addition to other shortages like medical staff and oxygen tanks), while other hospitals settled for poor-quality PPEs which were often insufficient quantities due to officials wanting to save money (Singh, 2020, and Lloyd, 2021). According to Macupe (2021) and Mahlati (2020) a similar situation also transpired in public schools where there was a lack of PPEs and water, leading teacher unions to encourage teachers not to return to work until the situation improved. This situation demonstrated how fractured the country's democracy is (Davids, 2021). It proves that the Ramaphosa administration has the mammoth task of destroying the system of corruption and individualism if it is to establish a "new dawn" by improving society's socio-economic conditions. However, doing this will be difficult as Desai (2018:508) states that "the highest decision-making body of the ANC, the NEC, still includes a fair amount of Zuma supporters and Ramaphosa has had to accommodate some of them in his cabinet." As such, Ramaphosa's implementation of the party's anti-corruption resolutions have been met with resistance (Corruption Watch, 2020, and Booysen, 2021a).

One of the key resolutions during the Nasrec conference and the last NEC meeting of December 2020 was for members accused of major offenses like corruption to "step aside" (Corruption Watch, 2020 and Madia, 2021). The subject of *step aside* has sparked heated debate, particularly because it has a direct impact on Ace Magashule, the organization's then secretary-general. This has intensified the divide between two ANC

factions: the Ramaphosa faction (who maintains the restoration label) and the Jacob Zuma faction (with whom Magashule is associated), which is associated with corruption and state capture (Booysen, 2021a, Corruption Watch, 2020 and Madia, 2021). Following the virtual NEC meeting of March 2021, the Ramaphosa administration ordered Magashule and 30 other ANC members to step aside within 30 days or face suspension and disciplinary procedures. Magashule is facing 21 corruption charges related to an asbestos project from his time as the Free State's premier (Haffajee, 2021, Booysen, 2021a, and Madia, 2021). On 5 May 2021, Magashule was suspended by the ANC for failing to step aside and challenged the constitutionality of his suspension (Ferreira, 2021). Subsequently he was suspended from the party.

While the above was taking place, in broader society there was another battle between former president Jacob Zuma and the State of Capture Commission. This battle emanated from Zuma's refusal to comply with all summonses and orders issued by the commission to appear and testify on the set dates. Furthermore, Zuma launched a campaign to discredit the Constitutional Court, its judges, the commission and the judiciary in its totality (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2021). The commission filed an application with the Constitutional Court to declare Zuma guilty of contempt of court and imprison him for two years for his unlawful violation of the court's order (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2021).

Thus, on 29 June 2021, Zuma was found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to a 15-month prison term. Zuma's incarceration sparked violent protests in Gauteng and his home province of KZN in July 2021. These "pro-Zuma" protests resulted in the looting and destruction of malls, factories and big businesses, and the torching of trucks, cars and Brookside Mall in Pietermaritzburg (Gilili, 2021, and Marriah-Maharaj, 2021). The severity of the violence resulted in private security forces augmenting the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African Defence Force (SANDF) in their security roles. Furthermore, the inability of the state to restore law and order resulted in civilians taking up arms to defend their neighbourhoods and properties, thus acting as vigilante groups that inflicted physical harm to those suspected of being looters (Christensen, 2021, and Burke, 2021).

Although calm was eventually restored, the protests revealed that South Africa is still plagued by inequality and that there is no firm and ethical leadership in society to address this. This was reflected by the Special Investigations Unit's (SIU) report implicating Zweli Mkhize (the former Minister of Health) in corruption linked to Digital Vibes, which was awarded a contract worth R150 million for Covid-19 communications. It was found that the tender and bidding procedures violated the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Mkhize lied when he told the country and Ramaphosa that he and his family did not profit from the contract, and he failed to perform his oversight duties due to the irregular appointment of his close friends by Digital Vibes (Lindeque & Fisher, 2021, Bhengu, 2021, Davis, 2021, and Felix, 2021). The scandal resulted in Ramaphosa putting Mkhize on special leave, but in August 2021 Mkhize resigned from his ministerial post (Pillay, 2021).

The ANC's persistence with corruption, even during a pandemic, together with factors like rising unemployment, lack of local economic development, and lack of access to quality basic services are some of the reasons for the party's dismal performance in the November 2021 local government elections. According to the IEC (2021) the ANC failed to reclaim the metropolitan municipalities it lost in the 2016 local government elections, notably Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg. In these metros, the ANC received 34,63%, 39,43% and 33,6% of votes respectively, compared to 41,25%, 40,92% and 44,5% in 2016 (IEC, 2021). The ANC's performance in these metros was clearly worse in 2021 compared to 2016. In KZN, the party lost its majority in eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality by obtaining only 42,14% of votes compared to the 56,01% in 2016 (IEC, 2021). In provinces like North West, Northern Cape and Mpumalanga, the ANC's votes stood at 55,43%, 50,55% and 59,3% respectively, compared to its 2016 figures of 59,36%, 58,26% and 70,74% (IEC, 2021). The decline in ANC support in the Limpopo province was marginal as the party received 68,27% of votes compared to its 2016 figure of 68,75% (IEC, 2021). Therefore, the ANC is losing support across the country.

The following section will analyse how the Ramaphosa administration has contributed to South Africa's political culture.

4.5.1 The Ramaphosa administration's contribution to South Africa's political culture

Ramaphosa's administration brought hope that South Africans' socio-economic conditions would improve. However, his time in office has revealed the depth of state capture's roots by exposing the dire situation of parastatals and by extension, the depth of moral decay within the ANC. The latter (moral decay) is demonstrated by the corruption of PPE tenders during the Covid-19 pandemic; a system that has also become the modus operandi within the private sector (see section 4.5).

Given that Ramaphosa did not leave the Nasrec conference with an outright majority, he is not currently in charge of the organization as his decisions are based on accommodating the Zuma and Ramaphosa supporters to maintain the party's fragile stability. Thus, the decision to make ANC members charged with corruption to step aside was a legitimate approach to solidify his position (Ramaphosa) in the party and it demonstrated the ANC's commitment to making corruption intolerable.

Furthermore, although Ramaphosa's administration is contributing to restoring the legitimacy of the state by fighting corruption, this task (including his ability to govern South Africa) is being overshadowed by the ANC's internal resistance and issues in broader society that are essentially an extension of the ANC, such as Jacob Zuma's conviction for contempt of court, his imprisonment and the violent protests that followed. Jacob Zuma's arrest was important in reinforcing the country's democracy as it demonstrated that the law should be applied to all South Africans irrespective of their position or credentials. Failing to do this would have led to a constitutional crisis in South Africa, with the legitimacy of the state being questioned.

However, the violent protests and looting showed the socio-economic disparity and deprivation in the country, especially along racial lines. It showed the frustration that citizens experience daily due to their ailing socio-economic conditions and that crime, impunity and lawlessness is a norm because of the example that officials have set. Furthermore, the number of days it took the ANC-led government to restore law and order suggests that it has lost credibility and the ability to deter citizens from breaking the law. Thus, Ramaphosa's "new dawn" needs to cultivate a political culture that sees people

taking pride and responsibility for their communities and actions. Furthermore, it can be stated that the Ramaphosa administration has contributed to constructing a sense of unity based on democratic principles by using ANC laws (and conference resolutions) to destabilize the corrupt patronage network within the ruling party. Hence, it can be stated that the “pro-Zuma” protests reflected the divisions within the ANC playing out in broader society, and to an extent, resembled a change in the levers of power that were in favour of the Ramaphosa faction. It can further be stated that due to other provinces not participating in the “pro-Zuma” protests indicated that Ramaphosa’s administration had support of other provinces or PECs.

However, the declining voter turnout in South Africa is a sign of the Ramaphosa administration’s need to address corruption and individualism. It is also important to restore citizens’ trust in the system, as the 2021 local government elections have revealed a sense of apathy developing towards the system. This can be demonstrated by citizens not voting or spoiling votes. This is worrying because the consolidation of democracy and establishing and reinforcing a democratic political culture requires a citizenry that can hold the sitting government accountable and if necessary, punish them at the polls.

4.6 CONCLUSION

Political leaders contribute to shaping the political culture of a society by determining how the government operates and how citizens relate to the government. Thus, the administrations of Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa have had a major impact on South Africa’s post-1994 political culture. South Africa has changed from having a sense of unity, consultation, and constitutionalism to having a sense of individualism, leading to impunity, violence, non-participation and a lack of morality. This demonstrates the various components in South Africa’s political culture. These changes demonstrate that South Africa’s democracy is deteriorating due to socio-economic deprivation and a political elite that ignores constitutionalism and the conditions of the social contract they entered with the citizenry.

Thus, part of the reason for this situation is that South Africa is characterized by political leaders who operate by individualism and conformity because we have an electorate that

has never significantly punished the ANC-led government at the polls for failing to do right by them. Ramaphosa's first term as the president of the ANC has revealed that improving socio-economic deprivation in South Africa and building an ethical/credible ANC requires a more aggressive stance against corruption and lawlessness. This will be a difficult task to execute considering that this misconduct (corruption and lawlessness) has been the modus operandi of some ANC leaders for some time and they may be resistant to reform.

CHAPTER FIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter aimed to provide an understanding of South Africa's modern political culture. This was done by taking the events from April 1994 (after South Africa's first general elections) to December 2022 and evaluating these events with reference to the theoretic discussion in chapter 2. In this way, the chapter provides an understanding of the changes that have taken place in South Africa's political culture since the new dispensation beginning in 1994 and also describes the implications of these changes to the country's democracy.

By means of a literature review, this fifth chapter aims to provide an understanding of the characteristics of South Africa's political culture. This will require an explanation of the meaning of the concept *characteristics*. This chapter will also require a theoretical linkage to the second chapter of this thesis to determine how the (characteristics) in the theory match the characteristics of South Africa's political culture.

5.2 AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT 'CHARACTERISTICS'

The general definition of the term *characteristics* is: "a feature or quality belonging typically to a person, place, or thing and serving to identify them" (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010:292). The term *characteristic(s)* is defined by the American Psychological Association (2020) as: "a particular feature or quality of a person, animal, or other unit of interest, especially any of the enduring qualities or traits that define an individual's nature or personality in relation to others." In biology, the term 'characteristic(s)' is defined as: "qualities or features that describe the distinctive nature or features of an individual organism or of a group. Characteristics may aid in identifying a particular group that shares common distinctive features or they may help set an individual or a group apart from the others. The common synonyms for characteristics are attributes, qualities, features, and traits" (Biology Online, 2021). This means that in political science, characteristics may refer to the qualities and attributes that describe a country's political

system, including the overall nature or character of its institutions, political leaders and how the citizenry relates to its political system. These characteristics are what make one country unique from another and may even provide insight into why certain actions are taken by the state and what influences certain reforms in policy.

5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

From the above description, the process of identifying the characteristics of South Africa's political culture will take place from a theoretical perspective by using the theory/characteristics from chapter two of this thesis. The first set of characteristics will be based on the contributions of Almond and Verba who identified three political cultures, namely the parochial, subject and participant political culture (see chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1).

5.3.1 The parochial political culture in relation to South Africa

Almond and Verba firstly identified the parochial political culture which they found typical of African tribal societies and independent local communities. They described this political culture as lacking specialized political roles with the general public being unaware of the importance of national and international affairs, and uninterested in the principles and administration of the national political system (Almond & Verba, 1963:17-18). Societies with a parochial political culture also consider fundamental institutions such as the church, the family and the school as the focus of knowledge, feelings, and value judgments, with traditional leadership regarded as the legitimate authority figure and necessary for structuring political and/or community life (Almond & Verba, 1963:17-18, Iovan, 2015:29 and Steyn Kotze, 2015:250).

In light of the above description, it can be stated that South Africa's seemingly parochial political culture is not strong given that South Africa has specialized political roles and a systematic political system that is underpinned by its Constitution. These roles and the make-up of the political system are viewed as essential to the effective functioning of the state and the delivery of public goods. Furthermore, the country consists of an active

citizenry that is well informed of the kind of social contract[30] that should exist in society. This is demonstrated by the active role that South Africans had in mobilizing the international community and establishing domestic civil society groups (like the UDF and COSATU) to fight the apartheid regime (O'Malley, 2021d, Khwela, 2000:312, ANC, 2019, Maharaj, 2008:14, and Fredrickson, 1995:311).

Even after the new dispensation, citizens continued on this path. The South African public has not been shy to communicate with the government (whether it's peacefully or not), especially over issues that have a direct bearing on their livelihoods. This is demonstrated by the rise in civil society organizations and social movements that have both augmented the government's efforts in addressing social ills, as well as holding the government accountable for its failure to do this (Nhlapo, 2012:18 and Gumede, 2018). Prominent examples include the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Section 27, the Right to Know Campaign, Equal Education, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Landless Peoples Movement and the #FeesMustFall Movement (Weideman, 2015:5 & 15, Smalley, 2014:1 and Kgatle, 2018:4).

Institutions like the church, the family and the school are of value within the South African political culture. The church has played an essential role in South Africa's political culture, as it was at the center of the liberation struggle, advocating justice, freedom and non-racialism, specifically when liberation movements were banned and political leaders were exiled or jailed (Kgatle, 2018:1-2 and Mahokoto, 2019). In the post-apartheid era, religious leaders have been a unifying factor by contributing to the process of South Africa's nation-building by promoting restorative justice during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and to the ANC government's reconstruction and development project (Mahokoto, 2019, and Allais, 2011:331).

The family and the school are also important sources of political socialization and of shaping the people that are going to enter mainstream society and emulate a particular

[30] The philosophy behind the social contract theory is based on the notion that members of a society enter into an unwritten/hypothetical contract with the state in order to live an improved and protected life together. A contract like this defines how everyone contributes to and benefits from society, and defines citizens' and the state's rights and responsibilities. The social contract is a system of thought that improves our understanding of how the world works, and it can be traced back to political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant (Huntjens, 2021:27-28).

political culture. Despite this value being afforded to these institutions, the South African political culture is also characterized by an understanding of the fact that the country is diverse and forms part of a globalizing international community and that knowledge, feelings and value judgements cannot only be centred around the church, the family and the school. This is demonstrated by liberal developments in South Africa like the legalization of gay marriages in 2006, the state being allowed to enter the family space and regulate parenting to some extent by criminalizing corporal punishment in 2019, and, more recently, by allowing adolescents (12-17 years old) to get Covid-19 vaccinations without their parents' consent (De Rue, 2013:222, Kohn, 2019, and Jamieson, Skelton & Magaya, 2021).

It must be noted though that South Africa's political culture displays elements of a parochial political culture in the sense that traditional leaders are given recognition in section 211 of the country's Constitution (Traditional Authorities Research Group, 1999:295). This means that traditional leaders are allowed to exercise authority to regulate political and/or communal life in their respective territories and deal with customary matters through their respective provincial House(s) of Traditional Leaders, (with the provincial representatives forming the National House of Traditional Leaders) (South Africa, 2022b). The provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders can be found in Limpopo, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, North West and Free State provinces (South Africa, 2021b, and South African History Online, 2019c).

Although traditional leadership and law is viewed as legitimate authority in South Africa, it is not the sole source of legitimate authority because Chapter 12, section 211-212 of the constitution states that "The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution." (South Africa, 1996:109). Hence, it is not uncommon in South Africa to have a customary issue being contested in a civil court of law. This has occurred in cases of widows wanting the land or property they shared with their deceased spouses after their in-laws have denied them access to it (Maunatlala & Maimela, 2020:36-38 & 45). More recently proclaimed Princess Masindi Mphephu Ramabulana (daughter of the late VhaVenda King Tshimangadzo Ramabulana) was proclaimed the legal successor to the Venda monarchy by the

Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) after her uncle attempted to deny her of her customary leadership role due to her gender (Tau, 2019 and Mothombeni, 2020).

Thus, traditional authority or law is valued in South Africa and even encouraged, indicating that the country still partially has a parochial political culture. However, traditional authority is not central to the overall functioning of communal and political life in the country (despite being recognised by the constitution), instead, the South African Constitution takes precedence.

The second political culture that Almond and Verba identified is the subject political culture.

5.3.2 The subject political culture in relation to South Africa

Almond and Verba identified the second political culture as the subject political culture (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1). The subject political culture is defined by the recognition of and emotive orientation toward specialized government authority. This means that citizens may have feelings of devotion, alienation or disenchantment about their political system, assessing its legitimacy or lack of (Almond & Verba, 1963:19). This assessment can be based on the issues that arise within the political system and the approaches to resolution. Hence, Almond and Verba (1963:19) argue that under this political culture citizens are typically concerned about "the output, administrative or "downward flow" side" of the state and there is a passive relationship toward the political system.

As stated above, from the apartheid era to the new dispensation the political culture in South Africa has been characterized by a citizenry that is keen on being involved in government decision-making. It can further be stated that South Africans have had a strong emotional attachment toward the political system both before and after 1994. This emotional attachment can be attributed to the fact that during the apartheid era the white minority was allowed to participate in political processes and decision-making. Therefore, the need and desire to be involved in the political system was strongly felt by black, Indian and coloured people who were excluded, and this intensified the liberation struggle, ultimately leading to South Africa achieving democracy in 1994.

After 1994, public participation mechanisms were established to ensure that the citizenry is involved in government processes and decision-making. This was done because there was an understanding of the fact that certain groups were purposefully marginalized from the political system, and the intensity of the liberation struggle was demonstrative of citizens' emotional attachment toward South Africa's political system and, in turn, their country. These public participation mechanisms go beyond citizens just going to the polls every five years to elect a president or local government. They include mechanisms that are predominantly at the local government level such as ward committees which aim to express the needs of the public to the government, thus enhancing communication between local residents and the municipal council (Van der Waldt, 2007:37, and Lesia, 2011:25). There are also civil society groups like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) which play a role in constructing strong institutions at the local level to ensure that there is community development, informed participation in democratic processes and that government is accountable to citizens (Van der Waldt, 2007:35-36, and Lesia, 2011:27). Traditional leaders also serve as a participation mechanism by facilitating the traditional community's involvement in creating local government's integrated development plan and to ensure that the practicing of customs (and their transformation) is in line with the constitution (Van der Waldt, 2007:37 and Lesia, 2011:26).

However, it can be stated that a subject political culture has been developing in recent years. This is not only demonstrated by the declining voter turnout during elections but by grievances from the general public that government actions do not reflect their interests since government decisions are sometimes imposed on them without consultation. An example of this would be South Africa's electronic tolling (or e-toll) system which was implemented in 2013 following the South African Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP). This project resulted in a number of freeways in Gauteng being upgraded from 2008, with certain parts being classified as toll roads in order to generate funds to pay off the debt incurred as a result of the upgrades (OUTA[31], 2021). However, there was a massive public outcry when citizens realized how much they were being electronically

[31] Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse.

billed by the South African National Road Agency Limited (SANRAL[32]) for using the newly improved freeways (OUTA, 2021).

In addition to sending road users threatening messages to pay their e-toll bills, SANRAL imposed an "unwritten policy" which allowed car owners to renew their car license discs but prevented them from receiving the disc itself until their outstanding e-toll bills have been settled (Labuschagne, 2021). A legal battle has since ensued between the state and civil society groups over the termination of e-tolls in Gauteng (Naidoo, 2013:108, OUTA, 2021, and Clarke, 2014).

Although the decision to impose e-tolls was not a direct violation of human rights, it does have implications in view of the Bill of Rights. Professor Marinus Weichers, who assisted in drafting South Africa's Constitution, and Naidoo (2013:109) expressed their dissatisfaction by arguing that e-tolls prevent citizen's from exercising their right to free movement. Weichers further argued that "Users of the system were never given the opportunity to express their prior, free and informed consent to the limitation of that right at the outset. Neither were they afforded more cost effective alternatives" (Clarke, 2014).

It can therefore be stated that the issue of non-payment from the public emanates from the lack of public consultation and transparency about the e-toll system, with the Justice and Peace Department of the South African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) describing the e-toll system as the "extortion" of motorists' money (Clarke, 2014). Naidoo (2013:108) states that protests against tolling have included drive-slow demonstrations on the designated freeways as well as various forms of civil disobedience.

Thus, South Africa's seemingly subject political culture is concerning as it works against the consolidation of democracy, and it has potential to create a breeding ground for undemocratic conduct and lawlessness to flourish because citizens will not feel that they have a stake in society.

[32] SANRAL is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in charge of the funding, construction, maintenance, and refurbishment of the country's 161 kilometer national road network. Non-toll and toll operations are among its activities (Naidoo, 2013:108).

The third political culture that Almond and Verba identified is the participant political culture.

5.3.3 The participant political culture in relation to South Africa

The participant political culture (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1) is defined by a citizenry that is overtly committed to the whole political system, including the political and administrative institutions and procedures. Citizens may also be positively or negatively concerned with a range of political objects. As such, they typically take on an activist/active role in the political system. A democratic government with sophisticated educational procedures and a considerable degree of organization is associated with a participant political culture. As a result, citizens have a wider range of skills, abilities and channels to engage in government processes and impact policymaking which will eventually have a bearing on their lives (Almond & Verba, 1963:19, and Iovan, 2015:30).

Based on the above, it can be stated that South Africa has a seemingly participant political culture. Although the support for democracy has declined in recent years, overall, there is a high regard for the political system, its political and administrative institutions, and concern about the procedures and/or functioning of these institutions (Dryding, 2020:2, and Hlela, 2022). This is demonstrated by a citizenry that is committed to upholding the principles of democracy and the institutions entrusted with enforcing democracy. This statement is reinforced by a survey conducted by Afrobarometer which revealed that the majority of citizens in South Africa still embrace the characteristics of democratic governance (for example, free and fair elections and a diverse range of political parties), with 54% of citizens opposing non-democratic forms of government and a greater amount of citizens (74%) opposed apartheid as a preferable political system (Dryding, 2020:3-5).

In light of the above, it can be stated that since the new dispensation South Africans have not been shy to rely on and use democratic institutions in the country to resolve matters or disputes. The high volume of cases that the judiciary and Chapter 9 institutions, such as the Public Protector and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), have to deal with demonstrates the public's commitment to democratic principles. Annual reports of the 2018-2019 financial year revealed that there was a caseload of 7 700 and 10 448 from the Public Protectors office and the SAHRC respectively. This caseload

increased to 9 200 and 11 803 during the 2019-2020 financial year and it excluded cases that were brought forward from the previous financial year (2018-2019) (Public Protector South Africa, 2020:62 and SAHRC, 2020:27). The judiciary's 2020/2021 annual report revealed that only the Electoral Court and the Competition Appeal Court finalized all their matters, while the other courts finalized between 52% and 85% of their matters. This backlog demonstrates that annually courts are confronted with large caseloads (The South African Judiciary, 2021:24 & 27).

Related to the above is that the establishment and continuous involvement of various civil society groups in development projects and litigations aimed at holding the government accountable for wrongdoings (such as inability to deliver services, situations involving human rights violations, etc.) serves as another demonstration of South Africa's seemingly participant political culture and the low level of support for non-democratic alternatives. The above demonstrates an awareness from the public of conduct that is constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable and shows a reluctance to revert to a non-democratic regime.

Therefore, South Africans do take on an activist role when coming to political and socio-economic issues of the country which further demonstrates the nation's seemingly participant political culture. A positive activist role was indicated by the written public submissions on the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation. According to the chairman of the Constitutional Review Committee, Vincent Smith, over 722 000 submissions were made to Parliament in 2018 concerning the land issue. This, together with the submissions made when the country's constitution was drafted in the 1990's was the highest number of submissions ever received by Parliament on a single subject (Mkhwanazi, 2018).

Furthermore, the activist role that South Africans undertake has over time become unsettling both for civilians and the state because it has often resulted in (unintentional) negative consequences (although this does not nullify the society's seemingly participant political culture). This has manifested not just in protests that end in infrastructure damage, theft or looting, but also in the loss of life that has been associated with South Africa's seemingly participant political culture over time. Painful and unforgettable

illustrations of this include the Marikana Massacre of August 2012, which resulted in 34 miners being shot and killed by the police while protesting at Lonmin platinum mine in Marikana (North West province) over a wage increase (Montsho, 2018 and Mahlati, 2021). Another illustration is of Mthokozisi Ntumba, an innocent bystander, who was shot and killed in Johannesburg by police at close range using rubber bullets during the 2021 Wits University student protest against financial exclusion (which originated from the nationwide Fees Must Fall student protests of 2015 and 2016) (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Incidents like the ones mentioned above have put a dent in South Africa's seemingly participant and democratic political culture because they inhibit people from exercising their right to demonstration. It can also be stated that the above has contributed to disintegrating the relationship between citizens and the police. The police's freedom to shoot and kill the public leads to citizens losing trust in them. It leads to citizens also losing trust in the state because the police are by extension the state. This creates a breeding ground for an angry society because the conduct of police officers in democratic South Africa resembles that of oppressive apartheid police officers and reminds citizens of painful incidents like the Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto youth uprisings (section 3.7).

Thus, despite South Africa having a seemingly participant political culture, the country's apartheid history and incidents of police brutality like the ones mentioned above have created two contradicting political sub-cultures that are linked to the participant political culture. These include a political subculture of avoidance and/or passiveness or apathy (due to either fear of being active and participatory or the lack of trust that any reform will take place) and a defiant, stubborn, and persistent political subculture (due to obstruction to being active and participatory) that is mainly growing amongst young people. The former is demonstrated by the high number of political killings in the run-up to elections which may deter the electorate from going to the polls, and the country recording the lowest voter turnout in history during the 2021 local government elections (chapter 5 section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). The latter is demonstrated by the violent protesting and looting that occurred in KZN in July 2021 following the imprisonment of former President Jacob

Zuma (chapter 4 section 4.4). These contradicting political cultures are unsupportive in reinforcing South Africa's democracy (or building a democratic political culture) and are also eroding the country's existing participant political culture.

The analysis of the characteristics of South Africa's political culture continues by taking into account the political cultures that Daniel Elazar identified and how they are linked to South Africa. Elazar identified the individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic political cultures.

5.4 POLITICAL CULTURES IDENTIFIED BY DANIEL ELAZAR

5.4.1 Daniel Elazar's individualistic political culture in relation to South Africa

When South Africa's democratic government was established in 1994 one of its main responsibilities was to advance the common good by bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, and providing public goods and services to all citizens, especially the previously marginalized. Based on Daniel Elazar's description of what characterizes the individualistic political culture (chapter 2 section 2.3.2.1), it can be stated that South Africa has a seemingly individualistic political culture.

Despite the ANC-led government stating its commitment to delivering public goods, services, and opportunities to all citizens, it has been underperforming in this functional purpose. This is reflected by Statistics South Africa's (STATSSA) 2019 General Household Survey showing that despite significant improvements, access to water has been declining particularly in five provinces. In 2013 Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Free State, North West and Eastern Cape had access of 86,8%, 77,5%, 95,9%, 88,4% and 80,7% respectively. In 2019, these figures stood at 85,2%, 70%, 91,9%, 82,1% and 73,9% respectively (STATSSA, 2019:37). Employment opportunities are also declining as the unemployment rate has increased from 25% in 2011 to 34,9% in 2021 (Maluleke, 2021). Concerning housing, The World Bank (2022) reported that 25% of the South African

population was living in slums[33] in 2018, with the country facing a housing backlog of approximately 2,6 million (Department of Human Settlements, 2020).

The above situation is consistent with Elazar's (1984:115) assertion that advancing the common good is not a priority in a society with an individualistic political culture, as it demonstrates that the ANC-led government is not prioritizing the common good and is instead promoting an individualistic political culture.

Additionally, and consistent with Elazar's (1984:115) assertion, South Africa's political system has become increasingly market-oriented and/or concentrated on the economy throughout time, particularly with the promotion of private interests. This situation can be seen as far back as Mbeki's first administration (from 1999) when GEAR was implemented as South Africa's macroeconomic policy and its affirmative action policy. GEAR perpetuated an individualistic political culture by privatizing assets and its affirmative action approach only created a small, affluent black middle class to upper-middle-class, with the majority of them being political leaders from the ANC, SACP and COSATU (Gevisser, 1997:25, cited by Schneider, 2003:43 and Southall,2008:293).

In light of the above, it can be stated that the number of politicians, their relatives, friends and public representatives/servants that got into business with the government has grown. This situation persisted under the Zuma and Ramaphosa governments, with the former exemplified by the Gupta family (who were family friends of the former President) receiving tender contracts worth millions of rands from SOEs like Eskom and Transnet (Southall, 2019:201-202 and Public Protector South Africa, 2016:85-87), and the latter being exemplified by Khusela Diko's (presidential spokesperson) late husband using his wife's close proximity to the presidency to obtain a R125 million Covid-19 tender from the Gauteng Department of Health. Similarly, Ace Magashule's son received a R2,7 million Covid-19 tender from the Free State provincial government (Mavuso, 2021).

Although in 2014 public representatives were legally prohibited from conducting business with the state through the Public Administration Management Act, 2014, politicians and

[33] "A slum household is defined as a group of individuals living under the same roof lacking one or more of the following conditions: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living-area, durability of housing and security of tenure" (World Health Organization (WHO), 2022).

their relatives have continued to enrich themselves and even created justifications for this (GCIS[34], 2020). For instance, the suspended secretary-general of the ANC, Ace Magashule, has argued in a series of interviews that "no single law exists to prohibit relatives of politicians, including ANC leaders, in government from doing business with the state" (Merten, 2020). Despite Magashule's assertion being correct, as a political leader he failed to acknowledge that allowing politicians, their families and friends to do business with the state is incorrect in terms of principle because politicians are by extension public representatives. They were elected to office after securing the majority of the votes during elections to serve the public and are therefore accountable to the public. This kind of mentality and/or conduct erodes political integrity[35] because it shows that politicians do not feel obligated to commit to the moral and ethical principles that are consistent with good governance and/or that other public representatives adhere to. It also leads to the development of a political subculture of impunity and elitism.

The aforementioned reinforces Elazar's (1984:115-116) assertion that societies with an individualistic political culture are constructed on a system of reciprocal obligations rooted in personal relationships, with politicians campaigning for public office for material self-interest and to promote their political careers, rather than achieve programmatic targets. It further shows the failure of political officials (including their connected elite associates, family and friends) to recognize when they have accumulated enough and the degree of comfortability, they have in perpetuating a seemingly individualistic political culture.

This seemingly individualistic political culture is also perpetuated by the role that ministers play in the appointment of senior officials like heads of departments (HODs) and director generals which can jeopardize the merit principle (Muthien, 2014:5 and Ndletyana, 2021). According to Ndletyana (2021), this situation has resulted in state institutions becoming politicized, leaving civil servants unable to perform their duties as some of them are either strongly controlled by political deployees, or they become immersed in the cycle of

[34] Government Communication and Information System.
[35] "Political integrity means that politicians act in the public interest, rather than serving private interests." (Transparency International, 2019).

patronage and corruption (Ndletyana, 2021). This situation has blurred the lines between the state (South Africa) and the party (ANC).

In light of the above, Elazar (1984:116-117) states that the role and place of the bureaucracy are uncertain in political systems that have an individualistic political culture because the bureaucratic modus operandi goes against the favour system that is fundamental for the individualistic political process. Ultimately, a bureaucratic organization is established within the context of the favour system. This leads to the bureaucracy being drawn into the political domain at critical moments through political appointment at the higher levels and quite often, involving the twisting of the merit system to correspond with political demands (Elazar, 116-117).

Furthermore, the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) (2014:47) argues that the country faces the challenge of being an “open bureaucracy”, although it can be stated that the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture is sufficient proof that this has already occurred. According to PARI (2014:47) “Open bureaucracies are those where politicians retain substantial lawful discretion over the appointment, promotion and, in extreme cases, dismissal of public servants. This can enable politicians to go beyond formal and impartial rules in imposing their will upon public administrations. Politicians with power over appointments and promotion can place close associates into key positions and collude with them in non-compliant behaviour. By threatening, even implicitly, loss of career-progression or even dismissal they can coerce public servants into breaking the rules”.

The following section will discuss the moralistic political culture as identified by Daniel Elazar.

5.4.2 Daniel Elazar’s moralistic political culture in relation to South Africa

The term *moralistic* comes from the word morality. According to McLemore (2003:1-2), the word *morality* is derived from the Latin word *mores* which relates to “habits, customs, and behavior”. As stated in chapter 2 section 2.2 of this thesis, De Tocqueville described the term *mores* as follows:

> "By mores I mean here what the Ancients meant by the term: I apply it not only to mores in the strict sense, what one might call habits of the heart, but also to the various notions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the whole range of ideas that shape habits of mind. Thus, I use this word to refer to the whole moral and intellectual state of a people" (De Tocqueville, 2004:331).

In light of this, Bernard and Gert (2020:1) define morality in a descriptive and normative form. Descriptively, morality alludes to "codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion) or accepted by an individual for her own behaviour" (Bernard & Gert, 2020:1). In a normative sense, morality alludes to "a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people" (Bernard & Gert, 2020:1).

As a result, when it comes to the conduct of members of society, morality can be classified as either right or wrong. From the above description, it can be stated that currently, South Africa has a seemingly moralistic political culture on paper, but not in practice. However, this has not always been the case. According to Elazar (1984:117) a society with a moralistic political culture emphasizes the notion of the commonwealth as the foundation for democratic government; where politics is viewed as one of the most important activities of humanity as it aims to establish a good society for the citizen's interests and the contestation and use of power is directed at improving the commonwealth.

Since 1994, the notion of the commonwealth has been stressed, as has the construction of a just society that benefits all South Africans under the leadership of competent political representatives and civil servants. This is reflected in the country's Constitution, which states:

> "We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to - Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person …" (South Africa, 1996:1).

These constitutional objectives were further expressed in key government policies, like the country's first socio-economic policy framework, known as the Reconstruction and

Development Programme (RDP)[36] and other socio-economic policies that followed it like GEAR, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative - South Africa (ASGISA) the New Growth Path (NGP) and the National Development Plan-2030 (NDP) (South African History Online, 2019b).

The above-mentioned policies have improved the socio-economic conditions of South Africans. The 2020 Human Development Report that contains data on the status of human development prior to the COVID-19 pandemic supports this assertion. The report showed that South Africa's Human Development Index (HDI)[37] rose from a value of 0.627 to 0.709 between 1990 and 2019, thus showing an improvement of 13,1% (UNDP[38], 2020:2). Life expectancy improved marginally from 63,3 to 64,1 (UNDP, 2020:3). Other marginal improvements included the average number of years spent in school growing by 3,8 years, while the predicted number of years spent in school rose by 2,4 years. From 1990 and 2019, South Africa's GNI[39] per capita rose by approximately 21,6% (UNDP, 2020:2).

Although the above-mentioned data can permit Middleton (2014:23-24 & 26) to state that South Africa's legislation and policies are comprehensive and progressive, thus resembling the country's progressive constitution, these (and other) improvements have been overshadowed by GEAR's unintended consequences (that is, worsening inequality, unemployment, poverty and rising corruption), which when combined with factors like the 2008 recession, has made it difficult for the state to meet citizens' needs, and prevented it from translating policy objectives into more tangible results in society (chapter 4 section

[36] The RDP was the blueprint for "the fundamental transformation of South Africa" because it was directed at "developing strong and stable democratic institutions, ensuring representivity and participation, ensuring that our country becomes a fully democratic, non-racial and non-sexist society creating a sustainable and environmentally friendly growth and development path" (South Africa, 1994:7).

[37] According to UNDP (2019:2), "The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. A long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge level is measured by mean years of schooling among the adult population. Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita."

[38] United Nations Development Programme.

[39] According to Atkinson and Mabey (2019:5) "The GNI per capita is the US dollar value of a country's final income in a year, divided by its population. It reflects the average income of a country's citizens.

4.2 and 4.4). These developments have had lasting negative implications for the public good and for constructing a moralistic political culture in South Africa.

Therefore, it is upon this background that it is important to quote Elazar on what entails a moralistic political culture as he states, good government/governance is determined through the extent to which it advances the public good and in respect of "the honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare of those who govern" (Elazar, 1984:117). Elazar's assertion resonates with the Bill of Rights under Chapter 2 of South Africa's Constitution, which enshrines the values of "human dignity, equality and freedom" (South Africa, 1996:5). Despite the continuous reference to these values in the Constitution and policy documents, their application in broader society has not been inadequate due to human rights abuses by political representatives and government officials, which has reflected South Africa's seemingly lack of a moralistic political culture. This assertion is reinforced by incidents such as the TAC having to seek a court order to compel the state to provide ARVs to HIV-positive patients during the Mbeki administration (chapter 4 section 4.3), and more recently the Life Esidimeni tragedy.

According to Ferlito and Dhai (2018:157) the Life Esidimeni tragedy emerged due to the rushed implementation of the Gauteng Mental Health Marathon Project, soon after the Gauteng Department of Health (GDoH) abruptly ended its contract with Life Esidimeni, a medical center that offered exceptionally specialized chronic psychiatric treatment. After ignoring continuous warnings from civil society and the South African Society of Psychiatrists (SASOP), during March and August 2016, nearly 2 000 mentally ill patients, some with underlying diseases, were hastily sent to poorly equipped and unregistered NGOs in an effort by the department to cut expenses. The patients' families were also not notified of their loved ones' whereabouts and had to search for them on their own (Section 27, 2022, and Ferlito & Dhai, 2018:157).

According to the Health Ombudsman's inquiry, multiple human rights were violated throughout this process (e.g., the rights to dignity, life, and health) and in the aftereffects. The tremendous injustice inflicted upon society's most vulnerable population led to the loading of some patients onto the back of trucks, resulting in chaos, the loss of private

health information and the deaths of more than 140 patients (and counting) (Section 27, 2022, Ferlito & Dhai, 2018:157, and Nicolson, 2018).

The Life Esidimeni tragedy reflects the severity of South Africa's moral depravity and the absence of a moralistic political culture because to date, nobody has taken accountability for the deaths of those patients.

Additionally, Elazar (1984:117) states that the moralistic political culture is characterized by the strong belief that politics does not only involve individuals who have political careers but the entire citizenry. Therefore, every citizen has the duty of taking part in the political matters of his commonwealth. Elazar's assertion resonates with Aristotle's view when he declared that "man is by nature a political animal", implying that humanity can only enjoy the good life in a political society. Based on this perspective, politics is, therefore, an ethical endeavour aimed at establishing a just society, and this is what Aristotle referred to as the "master science" (Heywood, 2019:40). Indeed, political participation is constitutionally encouraged especially for the improvement of society, hence, public participation mechanisms were established after 1994 (section 5.3.2), with the inclusion of civil society groups in the policy-making process and even citizens having the right to run for elections as independent candidates.

However, within the context of South Africa, political participation is not generally for the improvement of society because politics has too often been reduced to an arena that is known to be the quickest method of upward mobility. This view is related to Weber's 1958 essay titled *Politics as a Vocation* wherein he differentiates between individuals who join politics with a source of income apart from politics and those who depend solely on politics (Weber, 1958, cited by Reddy, 2010:200). Thus, Shirley (2010, cited by Reddy, 2010:200) argues that due to the history of apartheid, many ANC leaders could not have a career outside of politics and this influenced them to view the political arena post-1994 as "a means to an end". This situation led to numerous ANC officials rising to political and economic power despite having no independent source of income, high qualifications, or prior exposure in government or administration. Additionally, this situation also served as justification for the party to move forward with its cadre deployment policy, hence, its membership grew significantly after 1994 (SACBC, 2018:2-3 and van Onselen, 2017).

The development of careerism[40] is not only reflected by the existence of factionalism within the ANC, but also by political killings that occur in the run-up to elections. Politics as "a means to an end" has been reflected through political leaders like Julius Malema. The elitist and self-serving characteristics that have defined the ANC is something that Julius Malema was socialized into when he was still the ANC Youth League president (ANCYL). This assertion is supported by the fact that Malema has been in trouble with the South African Revenue Services (SARS) on charges of tax evasion, fraud and corruption while he was still the president of the ANCYL (Bauer, 2012a). This unethical behaviour persisted even within his own political party (the Economic Freedom Fighters [EFF]), which failed to declare its funders to the IEC as mandated under the Political Party Funding Act (De Klerk, 2022 and Felix & Khumalo, 2021). Malema's reluctance to be transparent raised eyebrows due to the party's large election campaigns in 2021, their ability to gift a Mercedes-Benz SUV to AbaThembu king Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, building houses for the elderly in different parts of the country, and the completion of the party's headquarters (Winnie Mandela House) (Amashabalala, 2022).

Furthermore, after the release of a 2018 report (titled *The Great Bank Heist*) by advocate Terry Motau and Werksmans Attorneys exposing the fraud and corruption at the now-liquidated Venda Building Society (VBS) Mutual Bank, and follow-up investigations by Scorpion journalist Pauli van Wyk revealed a pattern of VBS funds being directed to the EFF leader and his deputy, Floyd Shivambu. These funds amounted to approximately R18,76 million and to date, these individuals have not been charged or convicted (Van Wyk, 2020).

It is upon this background that it can be stated that South Africa has a seemingly weak moralistic political culture. Malema's decision to start a new political party (the EFF) after being expelled from the ANC and to continue on the same unethical and/or law-resistant trajectory has shown that at times, politics in South Africa is not about the common good,

[40] Feldman and Weitz (1991:237 & 238) defined careerism as "the propensity to pursue career advancement through nonperformance-based means". In their article, Feldman & Weitz (1991:238) state that individuals with careerist dispositions give the impression that they are successful even though they are not, utilize their social relationships with colleagues or superiors as a tool for career progress, and engage in various professional-related misbehaviours to ensure career advancement.

but about obtaining and maintaining an elite lifestyle. The above has also shown that some people in South Africa who run for public office lack credibility and individuals who join politics to improve society are usually met with scepticism from the general public because it has become a norm for political representatives to pursue self-serving interests.

The presence or absence of credibility in political leaders determines the depth of the moralistic political culture in society and it ultimately impacts the state's bureaucracy. In light of this, Elazar (1984:118) considers societies with a moralistic political culture as being characterized by having great difficulty in modifying bureaucracy to the political order. This is linked to the possible conflict between collectivist principles and the need for large-scale organizations to improve bureaucratic efficiency. Societies with a moralistic political culture have a habit of rigidly maintaining the established merit systems (Elazar, 1984:118).

Within the context of South Africa, it can be stated that modifications to the bureaucracy to suit the (ideal democratic) political order are not difficult due to collectivist principles or corporations' need to improve bureaucratic efficiency. However, they are difficult because the ANC inherited a bureaucracy that operated on a system of patronage networks along racial lines. This assertion is supported by Lodge (1998:181) who states that "Corruption was very extensive in the old regime, both in central government and in homeland administrations". In his article titled *Political Corruption in South Africa*, Lodge (1998:167) illustrates this by referring to a 1991 inquiry that revealed rampant dishonesty and abuse in the Department of Development Aid with particular irregularities including "fictitious tenders and the subsequent award of contracts to spouses, the receipt of gifts by officials in return for contracts, and payments to firms for imaginary work materials". Lodge (1998:171) further states that "Secret budgets allowed senior security officials to misuse funds for private gain and by removing procurement from public scrutiny they created ample opportunities for bribery".

The bureaucratic modus operandi described above has persisted in democratic South Africa. This is not only due to the lack of resources, research and skills to modify the bureaucracy, but it is essentially due to the ever-growing web of corrupt patronage

networks between the bureaucracy and political representatives which is facilitated by the ANC's cadre deployment policy (Shava & Chamisa, 2018:4-5 and Twala, 2014:164-165). Hence, SACBC (2018:3) argues that "even if cadre deployment was a necessary step (in South Africa's equitable redistribution and transformation process), it remains a species of state capture, albeit in the guise of 'state rescue'."

On paper, reforming South Africa's racially skewed bureaucracy after 1994 was to ensure the equitable distribution of public goods and services to all citizens. Hence the Batho Pele Principles[41] were established, which are aligned with the moralistic political culture. However, based on the above, the ANC-led government's ability to implement the Batho Pele Principles has been unsatisfactory.

It can further be stated that the racial modifications that were introduced in South Africa's bureaucracy did an insignificant job in cultivating a moralistic political culture. This may be attributed to a sense of entitlement among certain liberation leaders and members of the new bureaucracy who saw their government posts as a reward for struggling to fight the apartheid regime. This situation or mentality contributed to the state's modus operandi and political culture being consistent with the title of Michela Wrong's book[42], *It's Our Turn to Eat*. Thus, a merit system that meets the requirements of a moralistic political culture and that won't be destroyed by political representatives or infiltrated by unethical large-scale corporations is yet to be established and rigidly maintained by the South African bureaucracy and, in turn, the broader society. This status quo has raised this fundamental question: Where is the church or clergy in post-apartheid South Africa, and what is its role?

According to Masuku and Niemandt (2012:6), since apartheid's inception in 1948, religious leaders and/or the church have been the most powerful opponents of the regime. Resane (2017:2) supports this assertion by stating that "During the liberation struggle, the

[41] According to McQuoid-Mason and Dada (2011:30) "Batho pele means 'people first' and consists of eight principles introduced by the public service." These include consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money. These principles are not law, but they serve as a blueprint of the political culture and the people first approach that should be followed by public officials to enhance service delivery (Ngidi, 2012:18-19).

[42] Wrong's book aimed to reveal the corruption and looting that occurred during Kenyan president, Mwai Kibaki's administration (Msomi, 2019).

prophetic voice[43] of the Church was loud and clear. The oppressive regime was not worried about inter-political opposition. Its main worry was the voice of the Church through the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and other faith formations." During this era, the church had a vocal, audible "confrontational, critical and authentic voice" (Resane, 2017:2, and Katle, 2018:1).

However, Masuku and Niemandt (2012:6) argue that the moral depravity that is evident in society can be attributed to the fact that the prophetic voice of the church in democratic South Africa has weakened because the church is now a component of the system it previously critiqued. Masuku and Niemandt (2012:6) explain this by stating that the strong link that exists between individual religious leaders and the democratic government has muted the church, preventing it from properly ministering to oppressed people. Religious leaders who practiced prophetic ministry throughout apartheid are now employed by the democratic government and hold important positions. As a result of this, they were effectively silenced and became recipients of requests from oppressed people during protests. The church in effect has taken the side of the state and opposes oppressed people (Masuku & Niemandt, 2012:6). Thus, the church in democratic South Africa has developed a reputation for having a "weak prophetic voice", which translates to "a voice that only responds to the media and issues statements in national challenges but does not necessarily confront such situations" (Kgatle, 2018:2).

The following section will discuss the traditionalistic political culture as identified by Daniel Elazar.

5.4.3 Daniel Elazar's traditionalistic political culture in relation to South Africa

According to Elazar (1984:118-119) the traditionalistic political culture (chapter 2 section 2.3.2.3) corresponds to its moralistic counterpart by viewing the government as an element that has a progressive role within the community, however, this role is limited in order to protect and maintain the status quo. This is accomplished by limiting political power to the elites who have a central role in government. This relatively small and self-

[43] In making reference to the SACC, Kgatle (2018:1) describes the "prophetic voice" as "the voice of the church that rose during apartheid in South Africa and spoke to the national challenges of that time."

perpetuating group governs through their elitist perception of the common good and obtains their right to govern through family relations or social position.

South Africa's democratic system of government partially corresponds with Elazar's above description of a traditionalistic political culture. South Africa's democratic system of government consists of a duality of elected representatives and traditional leaders (Bennett & Murray, 2005:2). The former is made up of a multitude of political parties that are elected by the citizenry. The representatives of these parties occupy seats in parliament based on the system of proportional representation and by being elected by the citizenry, they have a mandate to act, make decisions and pass laws that are in the best interests of South Africans. Thus, these political representatives are in essence meant to be accountable to the citizenry (De Villiers, 2001, and South Africa, 2022). The latter (traditional leaders) obtain their positions through family relations and have supporting staff like senior traditional leaders, the headmen and headwomen who are appointed by the royal family and/or chief/queen (although these individuals may or may not be blood-related) (South Africa, 2009:20).

Therefore, elected representatives and traditional leaders both have the responsibility of exercising legitimate authority in a manner that leads to reinforcing and consolidating South Africa's democracy and promoting the common good. Although political power mainly lies with elected representatives while traditional leaders' political power is restricted to their local communities, they are both subject to the constitution. Furthermore, although traditional authority can be viewed as an elitist rule due to the limited government intervention in traditional matters, it must be noted that this limited role by the state becomes null and void once local community members' rights become infringed upon. This was evidenced by the prosecution and imprisonment of AbaThembu King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo in 2015 for abusing his power by 'disciplining' some of his subjects through torching their houses, inflicting corporal punishment and kidnapping those who failed to appear before his traditional court (Weeks, 2015).

Elazar (1984:119) argues that societies with a traditionalistic political culture tend to have very little to no political participation from citizens that are not part of the elite and usually have a low voter turnout. Furthermore, Elazar (1984:119) asserts that there is very

minimal importance of political parties in traditionalistic societies as they promote a level of openness that is contrary to the fundamental essence of an elite-oriented political system. However, if there are political parties within a traditionalistic political culture then they are usually in the form of one-party systems that are characterized by factional alignments that are in competition for power (Elazar, 1984:119).

In light of South Africa's dual system of government (with elected representatives and traditional leaders), it can be stated that Elazar's above-mentioned description of a traditionalistic political culture is not consistent with South Africa's political culture. South Africa's political culture is characterized by extensive political participation which is not only evidenced by the above discussion concerning the growth in social movements and civil society groups and protests, but also by the high number of political parties that contest elections. According to IEC (2014) and IEC (2019b) 45 political parties participated in the 2014 general elections while the 2019 general elections saw the IEC registering a total of 285 political parties. The 2021 local government elections also saw widespread political participation as there were 325 registered political parties, with approximately 95 000 candidates, with over 1 500 of them being independent candidates (South Africa, 2021c). Therefore, it can be stated that a multiparty system is valued and considered important for South Africa's democracy.

Elazar (1984:119) views low voter turnout as a characteristic of societies with a traditionalistic political culture. Indeed, voter turnout has been declining in South Africa. The general elections of 2014 and 2019 showed that voter turnout declined from 73,48% to 65,99% respectively, and from 57,94% to 45,86% during the 2016 and 2021 local government elections respectively, with 2021 figures being the lowest in the country's history (Morais, 2019, IEC, 2016 and IEC, 2021b). These declining figures are not attributed to the electorate trying to establish a more traditionalistic political culture, but Narnia Bohler-Muller, an executive director at the Human Research Council, attributes it to the deteriorating trust in democracy, democratic institutions and processes (Bohler-Muller, 2021, cited by Nganga, 2021). By relating her argument to issues of relative deprivation, Muller (2021, cited by Nganga, 2021) continues by stating: "This disillusionment and distrust, mixed with a fear of Covid-19, dissatisfaction with service

delivery and anger about corruption, has led to a muted local government election turnout, especially amongst the youth."

5.5 CONCLUSION

Based on the forgone, it must be noted that South Africa has a complex political culture (the term *complex* will be clarified in chapter six of this thesis). South Africa's political culture consists of a combination of each of the political cultures identified by Almond and Verba and by Daniel Elazar in different proportions. One of the reasons for the absence of a homogeneous political culture is not only due to the country's complex history of apartheid, but it is also due to many of the country's socio-economic ills that change the relationship between the state and the citizenry, and in the process lead to other political subcultures being produced.

In addition, it can be stated that South Africa's socio-economic inequalities, including the factors that contribute to them (like low economic growth and corruption) are greatly contributing to the insignificant progress that the country is making in developing a democratic political culture. It must be noted that these disparities and their contributing factors have played a role in the country's political culture failing to develop to be more conducive for democracy and instead have resulted in this development being stagnant. This stagnation occurs because when positive elements of the country's political culture (participation, growing civil society, etc.) continue to improve, simultaneously negative actions occur that feed into the individualistic political culture, destroying the moralistic political culture and leading to the development of political subcultures that are not conducive to democracy (the subcultures can include of passivity/apathy, defiance, stubbornness, impunity and elitism) (chapter 5 section 5.3.3 and 5.4.1). Therefore, although it can be stated that South Africa's (democratic) political culture has improved since the new dispensation (1994) it is difficult to recognize this improvement as it is characterized by volatility and inconsistencies. This, therefore, gives the sense that efforts toward building a democratic political culture have remained stagnant because some positive action is accompanied or overshadowed by negative actions.

There is a vision and desire to create a political culture that is conducive to democracy as evidenced by the above-mentioned policy documents, their objectives and constitutional objectives. However, translating these into tangible results will require firm political leadership and the restoration of the citizenry's lost trust (due to incidents like the Marikana Massacre, Life Esidimeni and rising corruption). This is because a country's political culture can only be conducive to democracy to the extent that citizens trust and value democracy and state institutions. As a result, the ANC-led government's main challenge is more emotive and moralistic in nature.

CHAPTER SIX: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE HAS INFLUENCED DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided an understanding of the characteristics of South Africa's political culture. This was done by firstly explaining the meaning of the concept characteristics. This was followed by demonstrating how the characteristics in the theory match those of South Africa's political culture. This was done by establishing a theoretical connection to the second chapter of this thesis and analysing the theory in light of particular political developments that are relevant to the theory. The analysis of the characteristics of South Africa's political culture also led to an explanation of how certain political subcultures developed.

By means of a literature review, this sixth chapter aims to analyse how the political cultures identified in chapters 4 and 5 of have impacted South Africa's democracy. This will be done by first conceptualizing the concept of democracy and the fundamental characteristics/components of democracy. This will be followed by analysing certain important events that occurred after South Africa's first democratic elections (April 1994) until December 2022.

6.2 A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL CULTURES IDENTIFIED FROM CHAPTERS FOUR AND FIVE

The analysis from chapters four and five has revealed that South Africa has a diverse and complex political culture that has continued to go through many changes since the country's democracy (April 1994). In addition to the country's apartheid history being a contributing factor to its complex political culture, the Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa administrations have also significantly contributed to this. According to Alvira (2014:1) the term *complex* was adopted into the English language from the French word *complexe*, which in turn adopted it from the Latin word *complexus*. In defining the term complex, Alvira (2014:2) states, "The term complexus *(complex)* refers therefore to the idea of different elements that come together composing a bigger entity without losing

their individuality." This therefore means that South Africa does not have a homogeneous political culture. South Africa's political culture is made up of various political cultures that are unique in their own way, but influence one another and at times, lead to the development of new political cultures. These political cultures collectively form a complex political culture that fits the South African context.

Despite inheriting from the apartheid system a political culture of violence and impunity, the early years of democracy in South Africa were characterized by the commitment to construct a progressive political culture of unity (both within the ANC and tripartite alliance and in broader society), as well as a strong desire for socio-economic redistribution under the Mandela administration (chapter 4 section 4.2.1). Although the political culture of unity was an essential component in reinforcing South Africa's young democracy it was in a political landscape that was susceptible to violence and co-existing with the political culture of impunity. This was problematic because, within the ANC, the political culture of impunity originates from the apartheid regime as the organization did not account to any higher institution during the liberation struggle except the ANC. Thus, when it got into government, it still had that militant and authoritative political culture and mentality. Hence, a neoliberal redistributive policy (GEAR) was adopted without accounting to the public or the Tripartite Alliance members (chapter 4 sections 4.2 and 4.2.1).

As the ruling party was reinforcing its standing in South Africa's newly found democracy, the political cultures of militancy, authoritativeness and impunity started developing and becoming ingrained in South Africa's political system towards the end of Mandela's first and only term in office, while the political culture of unity became less of a priority for the ANC. Although South Africa's political landscape has been characterized by these political cultures that are unsupportive of democracy and the construction of a democratic political culture, the country was simultaneously characterized by the reinforcement of democracy that came from the development of an active civil society. An example of this was the role that the TAC played in securing medication for patients that were infected with HIV against strong resistance from the Mbeki administration (chapter 4 section 4.3).

In light of the above, the unraveling of democracy during Mbeki's second term had a positive impact on South Africa's seemingly participatory political culture in that citizens

became more vocal and participatory, and it harmed the ANC's political culture. This is demonstrated by the growth of a political culture of entitlement as the presidency viewed civilian/or civil society's exercise of democracy as being against the state, and within the ANC factionalism started developing not only due to the presidency's stance on the TAC's litigation against the state but also due to the persistence of GEAR (chapter 4 section 4.3.1). This situation contributed to the development of an individualistic and clientelistic political culture (chapter 4 section 4.3.1).

Chapter four of this thesis further identified that during Mbeki's second term, a political culture of democracy was growing within the ANC in that the party and its alliance members were trying to elect a leader (Jacob Zuma) who was less entitled and more consultative, while an anti-democratic political culture of immorality and patriarchy was simultaneously being reinforced. The former (political culture of immorality) is demonstrated by the ANC supporting a leader who was implicated in corruption (Jacob Zuma) and whose name was tainted due to undergoing a rape trial. The latter (patriarchy) is demonstrated by the inability of the organization (including the ANCWL) to support Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka for the position of ANC president (chapter 4 sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1).

South Africa's diverse, complex and sometimes contradictory political cultures continued into the Zuma administration. This is demonstrated by the growth of a protesting political culture which can be viewed as reinforcing democracy and improving communitarianism while, simultaneously, the political culture of violence was also intensifying because protestors were destroying infrastructure (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). The violent political culture can be attributed to citizens feeling frustrated by the lack of service delivery and local economic development as Zuma's administration was characterized by the government operating through the political cultures of corruption, individualism, impunity and nonaccountability (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). The desire to perpetuate these political cultures saw the expulsion of Julius Malema from the ANCYL, who consistently advocated for the necessity of fundamental redistributive reforms (i.e., land expropriation) in the country. This indicated that the political culture of dialogue from the Mbeki era will

continue to disintegrate and eventually come to an end during Zuma's administration (chapter 4 section 4.3.1).

Chapter four of this thesis found that the above situation led to the political culture of restraint developing in the ANC during Zuma's second term in office (chapter 4 sections 4.4 and 4.4.1) and it simultaneously greatly contributed to the development of state capture in South Africa. This has not only factionalized the ANC but has also bred a political culture of distrust in society, as state institutions have become machines for fighting the ANC's factional battles rather than improving citizens' lives and broader society (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). Thus, the moral depravity within the ANC has to some extent spilled over into broader society, it has greatly contributed to the nation's moral consciousness eroding and has provided justifications for the political culture of lawlessness to also be practiced by some citizens (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). This was reflected during President Ramaphosa's first term in office, which saw violent protesting and looting taking place in KZN and Gauteng in July 2021 (chapter 4 section 4.5).

South Africa's democracy under the Ramaphosa administration has confirmed that the political cultures of corruption and individualism have been firmly established both in the ANC and in broader society. This is evidenced by the continuation of state capture (which is still facilitated by the private sector) and corruption during the Covid-19 pandemic, which benefited the private sector and senior political representatives (chapter 4 sections 4.5). This has led to South Africa's seemingly participatory political culture deteriorating, as demonstrated by the 2021 local government elections recording the lowest voter turnout in history (chapter 5 section 5.3.3). Thus, it can be stated that the political subculture of disengagement is becoming stronger.

Linked to the above is the fact that the current ANC is still characterized by a militant political culture. This is demonstrated by the intense resistance that the party faced when the "step aside" rule had to be enforced against the party's now suspended secretary-general, Ace Magashule (chapter 4 section 4.5). Thus, if the ANC has difficulty exercising internal democracy by enforcing a rule that was established democratically by the branches at the Nasrec elective conference, then their ability to build democracy and

contribute to constructing a democratic political culture in broader society is highly questionable.

As a developing democracy, South Africa's diverse and atomistic political cultures require a mature democracy capable of addressing society's social, economic and even psychological problems in order to consolidate the country's democracy.

The following section will provide a thorough conceptualization of democracy.

6.3 A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a widely used term that is derived from the Greek word *demokratia* which means "rule of the people" and it was formed from the words *demos*' (which means people) and *kratein* or *kratos* (which means the act of governing or to rule) (Nwogu, 2015:131, and Becker & Raveloson, 2008:4). According to Becker & Raveloson (2008:4) the most frequently used definition of democracy is "the government of the people, by the people and for the people", which means that the government is formed by the citizenry and is exercised by the citizenry to fulfill and protect the citizenry's interests. The definition of democracy by Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens (1992:43), which was presented in chapter 1 section 1.5 of this dissertation, will continue to be employed as it provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept.

According to Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens & Stephens (1992:43) democracy

> "entails, first, regular, free, and fair elections of representatives with universal and equal suffrage, second, responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament (possibly complemented by direct election of the head of the executive), and third, the freedoms of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against arbitrary state action" (Rueschmeyer, Huber Stephens & Stephens, 1992:43).

Larry Diamond (2004, cited by Nwogu, 2015:131) views democracy as a system of government that should consist of and be defined by four essential elements: "i) A system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; ii) Active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; iii) Protection of the human

rights of all citizens, and iv) A rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens."

Although democracy has been defined above, it is important to note that having a full understanding of the concept will require an explanation of its key characteristics which will be discussed in the following section.

6.4 THE CHARACTERISTICS/OR COMPONENTS OF DEMOCRACY

6.4.1 Respect for human and political rights

According to Becker and Raveloson (2008:4) human rights are non-negotiable conditions for a democratic system to function effectively. These are rights that are not provided by any government and that individuals have simply because they are human beings irrespective of their race, nationality, ethnic group, religion or any other status (OHCHR[44], 2022). Political rights "refer to an individual's ability to participate in the civil and political life of the society and state without fear of discrimination or repression, and is tied closely to citizenship status" (CSCE[45], 2016). It is the responsibility of the state to "respect, protect and promote" these rights, as stated in Chapter Two (the Bill of Rights) of the South African Constitution, 1996. Human rights include the right to human dignity, life, housing, healthcare, water, food, security, education, etc. (South Africa, 1996:5-12), while political rights include the right to vote in free, fair, and regular elections, the right to join and establish a political party and the right to run for and hold public office (South Africa, 1996:8). It must be noted that the access to and application of human and political rights do not exist in a vacuum; these rights must be exercised in accordance with the principles of tolerance and cooperation.

Respect for political rights ensures that citizens can keep well informed when coming to government activities and can contribute to policy decisions. It also ensures that citizens can effectively participate through various forms in the conduct of public affairs, especially those pertaining to elections (Meyer-Resende, 2011:15).

[44] United Nations - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
[45] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

6.4.2 Regular, free and fair elections

Although political rights have been mentioned above, it is important to have regular, free and fair elections in a separate subheading as they are the foundation of democracy. Elections are a fundamental component of contemporary democracies as they give citizens the ability to remove incompetent leaders and elect a leader and/or political party that they believe will best serve their interests (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:5). Elections are considered the main avenue in which citizens have power and can influence policy depending on the outcome of the election (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:5). Free and fair elections not only mean that elections should be public and transparent, but also that no person should be put in a position where they are not free to vote, either through coercion from public officials or certain individuals or groups in society (Oppenheim, 1971:32, and Becker & Raveloson, 2008:6).

For the validity of the above-mentioned political and civil rights to be reinforced, they must be enforced and governed by a legitimate system of the rule of law.

6.4.3 The rule of law

Harrison & Boyd (2018:59) define the rule of law as “The principle that everyone, even the ruler, is under the authority of the law (and those who administer the law in the courts)”. This means that in a democratic country, no one should be above the law and that all citizens and entities of a state must comply with state laws and/or the constitution. Furthermore, the rule of law must also be enforced equally, fairly and consistently. This ensures the protection of law and order and allows for citizens to responsibly enjoy their rights (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:6). Becker and Raveloson (2008:9) further state that within democratic countries, the equal, fair and consistent interpretation and application of the rule of law needs to be anchored by a well-rooted independent judiciary.

6.4.4 Judicial independence

Judicial independence consists of two factors, namely, individual and institutional independence (Gordon & Bruce, 2016:7). According to Gordon and Bruce (2016:7) Institutional independence denotes “structures and guarantees to protect courts and judicial officers from interference by other branches of government”. This definition demonstrates that the principle of judicial independence is interlinked with the application

of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. Individual independence means that judicial officers must exercise independence and impartiality when executing their duties (Gordon & Bruce, 2016:7). Thus, an independent judiciary means that the judicial authority of a state is vested in the courts. Within the context of South Africa these provisions are contained in Chapter 8 section 165 of the constitution (South Africa, 1996:82-91). In addition to judicial independence entailing that judges/and or the courts should be fair, neutral and have the ability to make decisions without any interference from the other spheres of government or any other entity (political parties or organizations) (South Africa, 1996:82), Meyer-Resende (2011:10) states that judicial independence entails that citizens should be entitled to a fair and public trial before a "competent, independent and impartial court established by law". Therefore, the judiciary is only subject to the Constitution (South Africa, 1996:82) and it is only through applying the principle of judicial independence and the separation of powers that judges can execute their duties without fear of being pressured or influenced in any way (Becker & Raveloson, 2008:9). According to Ramjathan-Keogh (2017:10) "Judicial independence is also a key component of social transformation and democratic consolidation".

6.4.5 The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances

According to Klein, Kiranda and Bafaki (2011:5-6) any government that does not have a system of checks and balances on its powers is prone to violate those powers. Limiting these violations can be accomplished by separating the powers of the three branches of government. Understanding the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances requires an understanding of the functions of the three branches of government. These include the legislative branch, which is responsible for making and adopting legislation, the executive branch which is responsible for implementing laws and government policies and the judicial branch which is responsible for interpreting the law (Becker & Raveloson, 2008:10).

The contributions of John Locke and Charles de Montesquieu are linked to the principle of the separation of powers. The operational principle is based on the notion that legitimate political authority is too extensive to be vested in a single individual or institution

in a state, and that protective measures are necessary to avoid abuse of power and ensure checks and balances in decision-making (Hicks, Myeni & Buccus, 2016:62). Thus, the principle states that “powers should be entrusted to three separate, autonomous institutions (*the legislative, executive and judicial arm of government)* in order to avoid tyranny and defend liberty (autonomous means there should be minimal interference in the functions of the three institutions)” (Hicks, Myeni & Buccus, 2016:62).

According to Mojapelo (2013:40) checks and balances help guarantee that the three branches of government have internal control over each other (checks) and act as a counterbalance to the power held by the other branches (balances). The judiciary, for example, has the authority to review executive actions and ordinary laws to verify that they are constitutionally sound and aligned with the Bill of Rights. Therefore, judicial review in this sense is not an executive nor judicial role but is merely a check on the exercise of executive and legislative authority. It is a power that the judiciary exercises to guarantee constitutional conformity rather than to exert control over another authority (Mojapelo, 2013:40). Therefore, the principle of the separation and balance of powers and checks and balances contributes to improving accountability and transparency in democratic states.

6.4.6 Accountability and transparency

According to Meyer-Resende (2011:13) the term *accountability* can be understood as both answerability and enforcement. The former relates to the duty of providing information and clarification and having the right to ask questions and expect reasonable responses. The latter relates to the ability to hold wrongdoers accountable for their conduct and subject them to punishment. Political and government officials may be held accountable using processes and institutions like elections, legislative bodies, the judiciary or court system and other independent monitoring institutions (Meyer-Resende, 2011:13). Meye-Resende (2011:13) further stresses another important aspect of accountability that relates to the relationship between governmental institutions. In light of this, Meye-Resende (2011:13) highlights the principle of separation of powers and its necessity in ensuring that accountability operates effectively.

For accountability to exist, there needs to be transparency. Transparency entails elected government officials providing relevant and accurate information to the media and public regarding issues that have a direct impact on citizens, such as the government's budget. Transparency also means that leaders must enable the public to scrutinize their actions while in power and that citizens should be free to attend public meetings and acquire information on what goes on in government departments or offices, including who makes decisions and why (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:5).

6.4.7 Pluralist system of political parties and organizations

According to Goodwin (2014:309) pluralism can be defined as a society where there is a multiplicity of interest groups and associations and a variety of political doctrines. Hallmarks of a plural society include respect, acceptance, tolerance, cooperation and acknowledgement of different points of view (Becker & Raveloson, 2008:12). Therefore, states should not obstruct, but should rather encourage the development of political parties or organizations. Moreover, these political groups should also reflect meaningful policy alternatives. Active civil society organizations such as trade unions, religious groups, business associations, and student associations are important for democratic states as they help in organizing and facilitating political, economic, social and other interests concerning the state and government (Meyer-Resende, 2011:11). An important component that promotes a plural and open society is a free and independent media.

6.4.8 Freedom of the media

According to Klein, Kiranda and Bafaki (2011:9) in a democracy, free and independent media is critical since it serves as a communication channel for the public. The media has controlled the platform for communication and public discourse as contemporary societies have expanded and become more complex. Radio broadcasting, television, newsprint, magazines, books and, the most commonly used, if not the most influential, the internet and social media platforms, all fall under the umbrella of the media (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:9). As stated above, a free and independent media strengthens democracy in that it promotes a plural and open society, but more than this, it promotes accountability, transparency in government systems and protects fundamental human rights, like freedom of expression and information which is crucial in facilitating effective public

participation in democratic processes (Meyer-Resende, 2011:14). In light of this, it can be stated that the four core functions of a free and independent media in democratic states are to educate the public, advocate, be a watchdog over government and powerful organizations, set the agenda by influencing public opinion and determining the most important issues (Klein, Kiranda & Bafaki, 2011:9-10).

By analysing the key events that occurred from April 1994 to December 2022, the following section will describe the effects of some characteristics of South Africa's political culture (identified in chapters 4 and 5) on the country's democracy.

6.5 THE EFFECTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE ON DEMOCRACY

6.5.1 Noble liberation movement to the factionalist government of today

According to Wallerstein (1996:2695) the concept national liberation signifies two additional concepts, namely, nation and liberation. In a global context, these two concepts demonstrate that no two nations are the same and equally so, different countries have had different experiences in their aim to liberate their people and establish democratic states, which is why Wallerstein (1996:2695) states that liberation movements come in various forms. Despite their differences, Wallerstein (1996:2695) argues that liberation movements are united by their understanding of "who the 'people' were and what 'freedom' meant for the people", there was also the collective view that people did not have power nor freedom and that there were specific groups of individuals to blame for this unjust and morally unacceptable situation.

In light of the above, Montiel and Rodriguez (2009:157) define liberation movements as "social movements that move in a synchronized manner in the political arena, with collective action frames largely influenced by Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thoughts." However, this definition cannot be employed for this thesis as colonialism and the modus operandi of liberation movements occurred differently in various states and it also excludes other components of liberation movements. In light of this, Southall (2003:31) states that Southern Africa's liberation struggle occurred in two waves. The first wave involved "nationalist movements fighting against colonialism and *gaining* relatively easy

successes" (Southall, 2003:31). This first wave transpired in "non-settler territories" of low economic significance, where the metropolis power felt certain of reaping sustained advantages through strategic investments, primarily in the mining and agricultural sectors. The second wave involved the liberation struggle being directed at colonizers who were unwilling to leave and settler-dominated political economies that assumed political independence (Southall, 2003:32). The phenomenon in the second wave is characteristic of Southern African countries like Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa where more determination and tactics were necessary to obtain liberation (Southall, 2003:32), with the latter's (South Africa) colonization experience being described as colonialism of a special type (chapter 3 section 3.7.1).

In light of the above, this thesis will employ Mashingaidze's (1981:29) definition of liberation movements. Mashingaidze (1981:29) defines liberation movements as:

> "(an) uncompromisingly anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist; (b) they are guided by clearly defined and articulated emancipatory ideological positions, seeking to bring about a complete break with the colonial political, economic and social systems and structures; (c) they are mass movements whose efforts and policies are deliberately designed to involve all sections of society, especially the working people and the peasantry, who are rightly regarded as potential revolutionary material in the liberation processes; (d) scientific socialism has been accepted as the guiding philosophy by all liberation movements in Southern Africa; and (e) a protracted armed struggle has been fully accepted as an important and necessary instrument of revolutionary change."

In light of the above definition, the ANC's initial objective was to unite all Africans as a people and to protect their liberties and rights (ANC, 2019). However, as colonialism progressed and the apartheid regime took hold, the ANC's objectives broadened to include the liberation of marginalized black people, and their territories and ultimately ensuring freedom and equality by establishing a democratic state (ANC, 2022a and Clapham, 2012:4). The ANC had a clear action plan for liberating South Africa and its people, which was the two-stage national democratic revolution (NDR) (chapter 3 section 3.7.1). Although the ANC was successful in realizing the first stage of the NDR, namely, overthrowing the apartheid regime by adopting the arms struggle as its modus operandi (chapter 3 sections 3.7 and 3.8), the exercise of this decision has had a lasting impact on South Africa's political culture.

Firstly, the execution of the arms struggle provided the building blocks for South Africa having a seemingly participatory political culture. This is demonstrated by the widespread protesting and demonstrations that occurred particularly after the 1976 Soweto uprisings, and the establishment of civil society groups such as COSATU, UDF and COSAS which augmented the ANC's efforts after it was banned (chapter 3 section 3.8). This demonstrated that the ANC still had a significant influence in apartheid South Africa, even though it was banned. After the 1976 Soweto uprisings the seemingly "illegal" participatory political culture reinforced society's need to have democratic principles like respect for human and political rights, accountability and transparency, and a pluralist system of political parties and organizations. This seemingly participatory political culture was carried over into democratic South Africa with various civil society organizations being able to hold the government accountable through litigation, participate in policy formulation processes and initiatives that aim to alleviate the country's socio-economic ills, and also serve an educational role in society (Gastrow, 2017 and Gumede, 2018b). This has reinforced democratic principles like accountability and transparency, the rule of law, respect and protection for human and political rights, and freedom of the media.

Secondly, the execution of the arms struggle meant that the ANC as a liberation movement (and society) developed a militant political culture (chapter 3 section 3.8.1). Despite this approach being necessary for liberation, the militant political culture associated with it has carried over into the new dispensation and is proving to not contribute to democratic South Africa. This militant political culture has created a sub-culture of resistance (in the movement and society) that undermines democratic principles, like respect for human rights, accountability and transparency, the inability to effectively practice the separation and balance of powers and the upholding of the rule of law.

These principles are being undermined because the ANC entered the government of democratic South Africa in 1994 still having the same militant political culture and radical mentality, which has had implications for the country's governance. This has been demonstrated by incidents such as the TAC, the Marikana Massacre and the Life Esidimeni tragedy. In all these incidents, human rights, like the right to life, dignity and

healthcare, were severely violated. There was no accountability for the lives that were lost. Furthermore, Andrews (2022) and Gasnolar (2019) argue that the commission into the Marikana Massacre and the Inquest into the Life Esidimeni tragedy can be viewed as not being significantly fruitful as there is poor transparency concerning how citizens ended up dying. These tragic incidents are demonstrative of the weak intergovernmental relations within the state and that the ANC-led government is yet to master matters relating to public administration and governance.

Part of the reason for its weakness in governance is that the ANC lacks experience in exercising democracy due to being former MK soldiers. This makes it easy for the political culture of nonaccountability and militant political culture of unquestioning devotion to your comrade to persist in democratic South Africa. This assertion is reinforced by Gumede (2007:135) who stats:

> "The problem for most liberation movements is how to establish a democratic culture. During a liberation struggle, decision-making is necessarily left in the hands of a few. Dissent and criticism are not allowed lest they expose divisions within the movement which could be exploited by the colonial enemy. But if non-criticism continues during the first crucial years of power, it becomes entrenched, part of a political culture".

Matebesi & Botes (2017:86) concur by stating that "the ANC has a long history of anti-democratic conduct of its own internal affairs and in relation to South African society as a whole."

Thirdly, it can be argued that to a certain extent, the ANC's militant political culture contributed to it gaining respect as it demonstrated to South Africans that it was a strong-willed and resourceful movement (both in terms of arms and in diplomatic relations related to the struggle) that will do anything to ensure the liberation of South Africans. Hence, South Africans grew to trust it. However, this militant political culture produced a political culture of violence in apartheid South Africa that has unintentionally been carried over into democratic South Africa. This is not only demonstrated by the violent service delivery protests that occur but by the country's high crime statistics particularly relating to crimes such as murder, rape, assault and gender-based violence (World Population Review, 2022b).

According to World Population Review (2022a) South Africa was among the top 10 countries in the world with the highest rates of violent crimes in 2018. According to the World Population Review (2022a), South Africa has data for murder, rape, and robbery of 36.40, 72.10, and 331.7 incidences per 100 000 people, respectively. Therefore, World Population Review (2022b) states that “South Africa has the third-highest crime rate in the world. This has been attributed to several factors, including high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment, and social exclusion, and the normalization of violence”. Nationally, the South African Police Services (SAPS) 2021/2022 fourth quarterly report (January to March 2022) on crime statistics found that violent crimes like murder, attempted murder and rape increased by 22% (from 4 976 to 6 083), 24,8% (from 4 582 to 5 717), and 13,7% (from 9 518 to 10 818) respectively. The majority of the victims were women and children (SAPS, 2022:3 and South Africa, 2022a). This situation further demonstrates that South Africa has a seemingly patriarchal political culture.

Violence is not only a problem in South Africa’s communities, but it’s also an increasing source of concern within the ANC. This has been demonstrated by the Moerane Commission of Inquiry which was established in 2016 to investigate the reasons for political killings in Kwa-Zulu-Natal (KZN). The 2018 report from the commission discovered “overwhelming evidence that access to resources through the tender system is the main root cause of the murder of politicians” (Mbanjwa, 2018). According to Evans (2020) some of the victims were councillors and officials of integrity as they wanted to expose corruption while others were rivals who competed for power and the perks it can buy. In his testimony to the commission, Nqaba Mkhwananzi, an ANC councillor at a municipality in Pongola stated that “There will also be more killings in the 2021 local government elections because of the factions” (Mngadi, 2017).

The above situation demonstrates that the ANC has deteriorated from the once revered liberation movement to a factionalized organization that lacks moral consciousness as there is no political will to tackle the scourge of corruption. The ANC’s (and South Africa’s) seemingly militant and violent political culture has not contributed to the country’s democracy. Instead, it has conditioned citizens to normalize violence and criminality. It has significantly contributed to democratic principles like respect for human rights

(particularly the right to life and freedom of association) and the rule of law being disregarded. Furthermore, the ANC's inability to mentally reform after 1994 and learn to separate party and state matters has crippled the country's democracy and this has negatively affected the delivery of services.

6.5.2 Service delivery and service delivery protests

"Service delivery" and "service delivery protests" have become frequently used concepts in South Africa's public discourse since the new dispensation, with the latter (service delivery protests) growing since 2004 and intensifying notably during former President Jacob Zuma's second term in office (Ngcamu, 2019:3, and Langa & Kiguwa, 2013:20). Service delivery is a concept emanating from the terms, 'service' and 'delivery'. Kotler (1988:477, cited by Walker, 2010:5) describes the former as "any activity or benefit that one party can offer to another that is essentially intangible and does not result in the ownership of anything. Its production may or may not be tied to a physical product." "Delivery" is defined as "The formal or legal handing over of goods to another person" or "The act of providing or imparting something, especially something that is promised or expected" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2022). In light of these definitions, Mukhari (2019:83) states that within the context of South Africa, the concept "service delivery" is typically connected with the uninterrupted supply of essential services that the state must provide to the citizens and or the electorate, as stipulated in the country's Constitution.

Thus, Fox and Meyer (1995:118) define service delivery as "the provision of public activities, benefits or satisfactions to the citizens. Services relate both to the provision of tangible public goods and intangible services themselves." Tangible public goods refer to the delivery of housing, water, roads, sanitation systems, etc. These are goods that can be seen and physically touched. Intangible services are also public goods, although they are not always visible or palpable. These intangible services and/or intangible public goods include the provision of security, sewage and stormwater drainage systems, education, etc. (Mukhari, 2019:83-84, and Reddy, 2016:2).

In light of the above conceptualizations, Allan & Heese (2011:1) state that service delivery protests are a product of poor and/or delayed service delivery. This means that service delivery protests are not only linked to administrative inefficiencies and the lack of firm,

ethical leadership, but also the absence of local economic development. Hence, Allan and Heese (2011:1) further state that “relative deprivation, and inequality within an urban context, is key to understanding why protests take place.” This assertion is further reinforced by Alexander (2010:26) who states that the majority of the protests arise and occur in impoverished areas such as townships and informal settlements, instead of suburban areas. Matebesi and Botes (2017:82) describe service delivery protests as the “collective action by a group of community members against a local municipality because of poor or inadequate provision of basic services, as well as a wider spectrum of concerns including government corruption, rampant crime and unemployment.”

Service delivery protests are not a new phenomenon, as Reddy (2016:3) states that they can be traced back to apartheid South Africa; they were mechanisms for citizens to convey their disgruntlement over limited and poor services and to challenge racially-based organizations. However, it must be stated that a concerning factor is the growing intensity of violence that is characteristic of these protests, which has eroded the credibility of local government, and, in the process, destroyed existing services and public goods (Matebesi & Botes, 2017:82, and Molefe & Manamela, 2021:60). This reinforces the above assertion (section 6.5.1), that the violent political culture of apartheid South Africa has unintentionally been carried over into democratic South Africa and does not contribute to democracy as it undermines the rule of law.

The problem with South Africa’s violent political culture that manifests through violent service delivery protests is that these protests occur despite several mechanisms being adopted after 1994 to ensure efficient, effective and equitable service delivery. These mechanisms not only include the Constitution, but also the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997), White Paper on Local Government (1998), Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 0f 2003 (Van der Waldt, 2014:46 and Van der Waldt, 2016:164). Therefore, despite the use of violence being an undemocratic method of conveying communities’ grievances, it is important to question whether these protesting South Africans’ strategy is justified given the systems in place.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, figures for the annual violent service delivery protests in the country were at 137, 173, 237 and 218 from the years 2016 to 2019 respectively (Municipal IQ[46], 2021). By obtaining data from the South African Special Risk Insurance Association (SASRIA[47]), the South African Local Government Association (SALGA[48]) found that between 2013 and 2018, the extent of protest-related damage to municipal infrastructure amounted to over R221 million (Ndaliso, 2020), while the 2018-2019 financial year saw SASRIA recording claims that were over R1,7 billion (Talevi, 2019 and Ntsaluba, 2019). However, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic contributed to service delivery protests decreasing significantly in 2020. Part of this can be ascribed to the country's lockdown period during which citizens movement was restricted, public meetings were prohibited, and policing was reinforced to implement the rules and regulations of the national state of disaster (Municipal IQ, 2021). Municipal IQ recorded 102 service delivery-related protests in 2020 (Municipal IQ, 2021), and by 2022, protests increased and returned to their pre-covid numbers (Municipal IQ, 2023).

Despite the improvement in the number of service delivery protests, the above is demonstrative of the reality that the lack of service delivery from local government and the persisting violent service delivery protests are not only a socio-economic problem in that local economic development is jeopardized, but also that there is no political will from the government to effectively address these issues (Reddy, 2016:4). The latter (lack of political will) is not only due to the ANC-led government's lack of expertise in running the government (chapter 4 section 4.3), as evidenced by CoGTA's[49] failure to ensure the

[46] Municipal IQ is an intelligence organization that specializes in collecting local government data relating to service delivery protests held against municipalities (Municipal IQ, 2021).

[47] SASRIA is South Africa's non-life insurer offering special risk insurance to every person and business with assets in the country, also government bodies. SASRIA provides one-of-a-kind insurance policies that protects against risks like civil unrest, public disorder, protests, rioting, and terrorism, thus making South Africa among the few nations in the globe to offer this type of insurance (SASRIA, 2022).

[48] SALGA is the legally authorized institution responsible for overseeing local government. Its two strategic functions firstly include to protect and vigorously enforce local government rights, and secondly, to obstruct areas of current systems that create difficulties for local government to carry out its mandate (South Africa, 2022c).

[49] The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. This department is responsible for developing national policies and laws affecting provinces and local government, as well as monitoring and supporting municipalities in implementing local government legislation (Van der Waldt, 2016:164 and van der Waldt,2014:19).

implementation of local government policies, but also the ANC's militant political culture that has shown signs of adamancy and has rendered it out of touch with the needs of the citizenry. In this context, the militant political culture (and lack of political will) is demonstrated by the ruling party's lack of introspection as the number of municipalities that are being placed under administration (section 139[50] of the Constitution) increases annually (Mokoena, 2019).

The above situation and the complex political culture that surrounds it, do not contribute to South Africa's democracy as they violate the social contract that the citizenry consented to in 1994, and this has resulted in diminished democracy[51] (chapter 1 section 1.2). Heller (2009:3) argues that this anti-democratic situation persists because the citizenry has little to no power on political society as municipal authorities are of the view that being elected to political office is a "political blank cheque" that allows them to isolate the citizenry from decision-making processes impacting their development (Ballard, 2008:17, cited by Mchunu & Theron, 2013:107) and (Christmas, 2007:7).

Furthermore, this distorted communication channel thus forces citizens to also disengage from democracy/or democratic means of communication and resort to the apartheid inherited political culture of violent and resistant protesting to convey their message (Christmas, 2007:7). Although South Africa's protesting culture may be seen as reinforcing democracy, it is particularly concerning because the torching and damage to infrastructure demonstrate that South Africans are gradually losing the sense of ownership (chapter 4 section 4.3.1) that Mbeki instilled through the principle of the African renaissance. Additionally, there is little to no sense of pride or ownership over the existing public goods and services and also over their country as a whole. This is evidenced by the findings of the report on the July 2021 civil unrest, which stated that "approximately

[50] Chapter 6, section 139 of the Constitution is "invoked as a last resort" (Van der Waldt, 2014:19). It involves the provincial government intervening in the operations of a municipality within its jurisdiction after obtaining negative results from assessing the municipality's governance, financial and service delivery status, and finding it to be in need of improvement (Van der Waldt, 2014:19 and South Africa 1996:67).

[51] Diminished democracy refers to the growing gap between state institutions and the citizenry (Skocpol, 2003:11).

R50 billion was wiped off the South African economy" by the end of the week-long protesting, looting, and torching of infrastructure (South Africa, 2021b).

This situation is detrimental to democracy because it undermines citizens' trust in the system, rendering democracy insignificant and meaningless. This results in the process of democratic consolidation in South Africa being delayed as society has become characterized by a citizenry and political leadership that undermines the rule of law and the principles of transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, while South Africa's protesting culture has previously contributed to the country's seemingly participatory political culture, as evidenced by the TAC's efforts (chapter 4 section 4.3), it can also be stated that it is detrimental to the country's seemingly participatory political culture because it encourages resistance and political participation outside of the system, or even no political participation at all. Both these situations are detrimental to society since they don't encourage reform. This is evidenced by the fact that South Africans are not voting as voter turnout has been declining (chapter 5 section 5.3.3). This means that citizens do not identify with or form part of any political party, and yet they are protesting. Part of the reason for this complexity is that the ANC of post-1994 is moving away from the social contract that it agreed to after winning the 1994 general elections.

Early into the new dispensation, the ANC-led government was committed to providing free basic services to the public (that is, water, refuse removal, sanitation, electricity and housing) (Tissington, 2013:9). This commitment was further demonstrated in the party's 2004 national elections manifesto (ANC, 2004) and the 2021 local government elections manifesto (ANC, 2021:22). However, this commitment is only on paper because the ANC's rhetoric started changing during former President Zuma's second term in office. The Minister of CoGTA in 2015, Pravin Gordan, started emphasizing the need for citizens to start paying for basic services rendered by municipalities (South African Government News Agency, 2015), and this assertion was reiterated by the former Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni during the 2021 budget speech where he stated that "well-functioning municipalities require that residents pay for services rendered" (South Africa, 2021a).

In light of the above, it must be stated that in addition to factors like the lack of communication channels between the public and local government, poor financial prudence and skills to manage municipal finances, maladministration, and lack of infrastructural maintenance and provision (Mphehle, 2012:222-224, and Powell, O'Donovan & De Visser (2015, cited by Msenge & Nzewi, 2020:7), service delivery protests occur firstly because there is a culture of non-payment that originates from apartheid South Africa. This makes it difficult for municipalities to accumulate revenue to render services (Fjeldstad, 2004:540).

Secondly, the same political culture of entitlement that is present in the ANC (chapter 4 section 4.3.1) has established itself in society in the sense that citizens feel entitled to the services they are receiving because they have fought the apartheid regime which left them impoverished, and the ANC promised these services free of charge. This assertion is supported by Ruiters (1996:121, cited by Fjeldstad, 2004:546) who argues that "The liberation promises by the ANC, and the fact that township residents themselves directly fought for their own political liberation, weigh heavily in favour of a culture of rights and entitlement". Thus, it must be stated that the political cultures of entitlement and non-payment do not contribute to South Africa's democracy. They have proven to be a breeding ground for anger and resentment. They contribute to undermining the rule of law and harm the successful implementation of regular, free and fair elections.

According to Reddy (2016:7) "The South African local governance system, if judged according to the legislative and policy framework, can be described as 'world class' internationally; however, to complement that framework, there has to be the requisite human and financial resources committed to the municipal structures and ensuring that the system works." Therefore, it can be stated that the inability to obtain and maintain these resources can be attributed to ANC factional battles that harm the effective application of the cadre deployment policy[52] and lead to corruption by politicizing service delivery (Mphehle, 2012:223).

[52] Twala (2014:159) states that within the context of South Africa cadre deployment is a policy of the ruling ANC and can be understood as an "avowed intention to have loyal party hands on all the levers of power in government".

6.5.3 Corruption

Corruption is a systemic problem in South Africa that can be traced back to the apartheid regime (Lodge, 1998:181). Fox and Meyer (1995:29) define corruption as "the unlawful or unethical abuse of authority in order to gain personal or group advantages", while Kunaka & Matsheza (2001:14) state that it encompasses fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, extortion, nepotism, and other activities that result in individuals obtaining economic benefits without following legal procedures. According to Masuku and Jili (2019:2) and Mubangizi (2020) corruption in South Africa is rampant in all three spheres of government, indicating that it is the modus operandi of all state institutions.

According to Transparency International (2019), for political integrity to be effectively exercised, it is important to keep the private and the public sectors separate. Although this separation may not always be executed completely as some level of interdependence is necessary for society's developmental purposes. This assertion is made with the acknowledgment that political representatives do not consistently come to resolutions that are in citizens' best interests in the short term due to their inability to follow moral or ethical values and standards (Transparency International, 2019). This has thus resulted in political corruption. Transparency International (2019) describes political corruption as:

> "the manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure by political decision-makers who abuse their position for private gain. This takes the form of gross conflicts of interest, where elected politicians and their families or cronies hold substantial business interests. It takes the form of abuse of state resources, such as investing in unnecessary projects right before election campaigns. It takes the form of businesses bankrolling political candidates to turn them into their clients. What all these factors have in common is the spilling over of private interests into the public sphere and decision-making".

In light of the above description, it must be stated that within the context of South Africa political corruption has resulted in systemic corruption that is both in the public and the private sectors (Imiera, 2020:76). The former is demonstrated by the lack of financial prudence in public procurement[53] processes, particularly at the local government level.

[53] According to Moetie (2014:141, cited by Mathiba, 2020:648) public procurement is defined as "the process of acquiring goods and services by the government in pursuit of its service delivery mandate and other functions".

Tsakane Maluleke, the Auditor General (AG), released the local government audit report for the 2019–2020 financial year which revealed that 86% of municipalities did not follow public finance and procurement regulations, leading to R26 billion in irregular spending (Auditor-General South Africa, 2020:9). In the same year, only 27 out 257 municipalities received clean audits and only 28% of municipalities could provide quality financial records for audit purposes, indicating that they are yet to master the fundamentals of financial reporting (Auditor-General South Africa, 2020:8 & 9).

The AG's report for the 2020-2021 financial year revealed a small improvement in the number of clean audits as 14 municipalities received clean audits for the first time. This meant that 41 out of 257 municipalities received clean audits (Auditor-General South Africa, 2021:9). Despite an improvement of approximately R5 billion, irregular expenditure remained significantly high at R21 billion (Auditor-General South Africa, 2021:47). Maluleke expressed that these minor improvements are overshadowed by the increasing number of municipalities that are being placed under administration (23 municipalities in June 2021 and 33 by February 2022) as well as municipalities' increased reliance on consultants which harms their financial health. The 2020-2021 report found that municipalities appointed consultants annually as they were unable to provide reliable financial reporting. These consultants came with a hefty price tag of R1,26 billion and they "have become permanent features in municipalities' financial reporting processes" as municipalities do not set up mechanisms to guarantee the transfer of skills to municipal employees (Auditor-General South Africa, 2021:16). Therefore, the temporary solution that was implemented persists indefinitely while the country's municipalities are already spending R10,41 billion on internal finance units (Auditor-General South Africa, 2021:16 & 18). The outsourcing of skills that should already be present within municipalities allows for private sector individuals to extort money from the state.

Private sector corruption has previously been demonstrated by a series of leaked Gupta emails from 2017 indicating that the Free State Provincial Government spent R30 million on the Gupta wedding in Sun City. The Gupta's Linkway Trading (Pty) Ltd had KPMG as auditors at the time. This firm was instrumental in laundering money allocated for the Free State's Vrede Dairy Project to cover the majority of the wedding costs. Furthermore, by

assisting the Guptas to declare the wedding costs as “business costs”, KPMG aided the Gupta family in tax evasion (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017, and Madonsela, 2019:122-123). The Vrede Dairy Project was aimed at empowering black farmers and improving agriculture in the province (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017).

The above situation demonstrates that South Africa’s corruption pandemic is rooted in a political culture of individualism and impunity that has become characteristic of state leaders. These political cultures threaten South Africa’s democracy and its development prospects in that socio-economic issues like poverty, unemployment, inequality and the lack of local economic development and service delivery protests persist because public funds are not channelled to their intended purposes or beneficiaries. Due to violations of democratic principles, like respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation and balance of powers, the system of checks and balances, transparency and accountability, citizens lose trust in the system and question the legitimacy of state institutions. This ultimately delays the process of democratic consolidation.

From the foregone, it can be stated that South Africa has characteristics of a corrupt political culture. Its high tolerance in society is demonstrated by the citizenry having normalized corruption and even expecting it from civil servants and political representatives. This view is supported by results from an Afrobarometer survey on perceptions of corruption in South Africa. According to Afrobarometer researchers Patel and Govindasamy (2021:2), “Half or more of citizens say “most” or “all” officials are involved in corruption in the police (56%), the President’s office (53%), local government councils (51%), and Parliament (50%). Non-governmental organizations, traditional leaders, and religious leaders are less commonly seen as corrupt.” Furthermore, Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index scored South Africa 44 out of 100 points, with a score of 100 signifying corrupt-free countries and a score of 0 signifying very corrupt countries (Transparency International, 2021:2). Thus, South Africa’s score indicates that it is closer to the category of “very corrupt countries” than that of “corrupt-free countries”.

Corruption in South Africa is such a norm that when KZN was hit by floods in April 2022 which destroyed 4 000 houses, displaced approximately 40 000 residents, and resulted

in the death of 489 people (Engelbrecht, Le Roux, Vogel & Mbiyozo, 2022), the public discourse was less focused on how to restore and rebuild people's lives and damaged property but on how corruption would occur once the relief funds amounting to billions of rands are disbursed and how this can be prevented (Davis, 2022, and Makinana, 2022b). This public discourse was informed by the Covid-19 relief funds that were tarnished by corruption, as revealed by the final Special Investigative Unit (SIU) report, which exposed over R7,8 billion in Covid procurement corruption (Pijoos, 2022, and Koko, 2022) (chapter 4 section 4.5). The severity of corruption in South Africa and the lack of trust from citizens were further demonstrated when institutions such as Standard Bank Group, the University of Johannesburg, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Impala Platinum Holdings, and 60 other companies donated large sums of money to the non-governmental organization Gift of the Givers so that it can play a leading role in rebuilding the affected areas and citizens' in KZN. This demonstrates that society has a significant lack of trust in the national government, and the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality's ability to respond to the crisis in KZN without misappropriating funds (Pijoos, 2022, Naidoo, 2022b, and Van den Heever, 2022).

Irrespective of the negative situation presented above, it must be stated that the above situation demonstrates an important element in SA's political culture, which is that when required, we can come together as a people for the common good, that we want to see this country move forward and to an extent still value democracy, and that we have an active civil society that is contributing to this country's seemingly participatory political culture. This is very important to consolidating South Africa's democracy because it gives society a sense of hope and it contributes to reinforcing democratic principles such as respect for human rights, accountability and transparency, and a pluralist system of political parties and organizations.

However, due to the ANC-led government having become the image of corruption, the lack of trust mentioned above is justified particularly because the ANC has continuously displayed its seemingly lack of a moralistic political culture and political culture of entitlement. These political cultures were demonstrated when corruption, fraud, and money-laundering accused Zandile Gumede was re-elected as the regional chairperson

at the eThekwini ANC regional conference in April 2022 (Erasmus, 2022b, and Makhaye, 2022). This election came after Gumede (former mayor of eThekwini) was forced to step aside from all party activities pending the outcome of her criminal case. Her re-election demonstrates the lack of a moralistic political culture as it does not build the credibility of the party or the province. Hence, private institutions resorted to donating the KZN relief funds to Gift of the Givers. Her re-election further demonstrates the political culture of entitlement and even resistance in the sense that the step-aside rule originating from the ANC's Nasrec elective conference was deliberately ignored, proving that she and her faction have no regard for democratic principles like the rule of law and they are still in charge despite being forced to step aside. Thus, it is evident that outrooting the culture of corruption and its associated political cultures (that is, impunity, entitlement, resistance, militancy) within the ANC and the government will be a long process because individuals within the party who are associated with corruption have shown that they will not be removed from the ANC and government without a fight.

The above situation does not build the ANC's credibility as an organization that is capable of governing a democratic country, and by extension, it does not build South Africa's credibility in the international community. Instead, it demonstrates the seemingly lack of moralistic political culture. The political culture of individualism and entitlement have become so embedded amongst leaders within the ANC and private sector individuals who have facilitated corruption, that they have chosen to ignore all understanding of the sufficiency principle.

The sufficiency principle is a philosophical and socio-economic principle that relates to justice and ethical leadership, and also resonates with a moralistic and democratic political culture. In conceptualizing the sufficiency principle, Warner and DeCosse (2009) state that:

> "The principle of sufficiency mandates that all forms of life are entitled to enough goods to live on and flourish. The principle also means no one should waste or hoard resources intended for the sufficiency of all. Upholding the norm of sufficiency makes demands upon individuals - to share, to live more simply, to think creatively - and on human communities: to ensure that everyone has access to the goods that they need to live a life of dignity."

Considering the above conceptualization, it can be stated that the failure of individuals in the private and public sectors to understand the meaning of *enough*, contributes to criminality in society in the sense that the political culture of violent protesting is worsened by the impoverished actually seeing the extent of inequality by simply comparing their lives to those of the lowest member of local government, that is, their councillors. Therefore, the process of democratic consolidation has been delayed as the mammoth socio-economic problem of corruption together with factionalism within the ANC have created a breeding ground for the emergence of an even more serious political and socio-economic problem in South Africa, namely state capture (Ensor, 2021, and Bhorat *et al.,* 2017:4).

6.5.4 The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State capture/ or Zondo Commission

According to Meirotti (2018:1) and Dossah (2018:2) state capture was initially coined by political and socio-economic researchers Geraint Jones, Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufman and defined it as “the capacity to influence the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e., laws, rules, decrees and regulation) through private payments to public officials” (Hellman, Jones & Kaufman, 2000:2). However, in this thesis, the definition by Godinho and Hermanus (2018:3) will be employed as it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the concept. They define state capture as “a political-economic project whereby public and private actors collude in establishing clandestine networks that cluster around state institutions in order to accumulate unchecked power, subverting the constitutional state and social contract by operating outside of the realm of public accountability”.

The State Capture Commission was established in 2018 as part of the remedial actions following the release of the 2016 State of Capture Report by former Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela. The State of Capture Report emerged as a result of Phase 1 of an inquiry she carried out after receiving grievances related to specific claims of unethical behaviour from the President of the country, at the time, Jacob Zuma, and some individuals within the Gupta family (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022a:1). State capture is a phenomenon that is meticulously constructed over years and the ultimate establishment

of the State Capture Commission and the revelations thereof is demonstrative of the fact that the ANC-led government has long moved away from their democratic vision of "giving all South Africans the opportunity to share in the country's wealth, to contribute to its development and to improve their own lives" (ANC, 1994). The exact figure of the financial losses resulting from state capture is unknown, however, researchers have estimated that the country has lost approximately R1,6 trillion during former President Zuma's second term in office (Merten, 2019, and Alence & Pitcher, 2019:14). Hence, his time in office has been referred to as "nine wasted years" (Alence & Pitcher, 2019:6).

The reports from the State Capture Commission included testimonies from individuals from the private sector, ministers, public sector employees, and ANC officials. Some of the testimonies and conclusions from the chairperson of the commission, Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, demonstrated how in some instances, acts of coercion were used to develop "a symbiotic relationship between the constitutional state and shadow state", and how the maintenance of this relationship resulted in significant power gradually moving into the structures that make up the shadow state (Bhorat *et al.,* 2017:3). According to Bhorat, *et al.,* (2017:2) this symbiotic relationship is successful only when the shadow state is strategically constructed, that is, when certain individuals are strategically placed at the core of state power to determine what takes place in the constitutional state.

Therefore, the Commission's report discovered that the shadow state was constructed through the Gupta brothers buying (through bribery) the silence and compliance of ministers and deputy ministers to gain access to state funds and, ultimately, power over the constitutional state. Ministers who refused the bribes and/or refused to toe the line and obey the Gupta brothers' demands were soon relieved of their duties by former President Jacob Zuma and were replaced by more compliant individuals (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022b: 70-71, 109-110, 115-117 and 170-172). This was particularly evident in the case of the former Deputy Minister of Finance, Mcebisi Jonas, who rejected a R600 million offer to accept the position of the minister of finance. Furthermore, Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan, the former finance ministers, were fired; Nene was replaced by Douglas van Rooyen in 2015, while Gordhan was replaced by Malusi Gigaba in 2017 with Zuma basing his decision on an intelligence report that

‘proved’ that Gordhan and Jonas were conspiring against the state and its economy (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022b:57-63, 109-110, 158-159, 166-167, 170).

Through the directive of former President Zuma, the modus operandi presented above was also applied in SOEs (like Denel, Eskom and Transnet) through the then Public Enterprises Minister, Lynn Brown. Brown was involved in the selection, suspensions, and dismissal of board members who resisted Gupta interests, as well as the actions taken by important employees, such as Mr. Brian Molefe (group chief executive officer of Eskom), and Mr. Anoj Singh, (group chief financial officer at Eskom) to further Gupta interests (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022c:608 and 611-615). Hence, the report from the commission (2022c:619) states, “President Zuma’s interference in the affairs of the Board marked the beginning of the implementation of the Gupta’s plan to capture Eskom and President Zuma was a critical player in that plan”. The reason for this and the above-mentioned unprincipled conduct was “to get National Treasury to approve transactions or projects or measures that were not in the interests of the country”, but of the shadow state (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022b:113). This has resulted in SOEs like SAA and Eskom experiencing economic failure, with the former being placed under business rescue (chapter 4 section 4.5).

The forgone demonstrates that state capture is far worse than corruption in the sense that it takes away the citizenry’s right to satisfy their socio-economic needs and opportunities because they unknowingly entered into a social contract with individuals who control ANC leaders, rather than the ANC-led government itself. This has proven to be detrimental to the country’s democracy in the sense that it eroded trust between the state and the citizenry. Furthermore, the fact that the “nine wasted years” of state capture persisted for this duration demonstrates a political culture of entitlement in the sense that ANC leaders expect to be re-elected into office even when performing poorly. It demonstrates the complete disregard for the citizenry as the democratic principles of

transparency, accountability and respect for human rights were continuously violated as more citizens fell into poverty and lived below the poverty line[54].

The fact that the “nine wasted years” of state capture occurred for so long while the country was under the leadership of the ANC demonstrates the party’s high tolerance for the political cultures of corruption and lawlessness. It confirms the lack of moralistic political culture because the duration of state capture shows that more ANC officials knew what was going on but chose to be silent or turn a blind eye, either to protect their pockets (as they benefitted from state capture) or their jobs. After all, the “nine wasted years” created a political culture of “us versus them” within the ANC, “us” being the compliers of state capture (Zuma supporters) and “them” being the non-compliers (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). Additionally, the party’s inability to act collectively against state capture, despite criticism from various sectors of society is reflective of its moral depravity and political culture of entitlement because there was a strong belief that ANC deployees could do no wrong and the ANC-led government should be respected. This is informative of the reality that the inability of the ANC officials to act against state capture was also because, over time, unethical behaviour became normalized to the extent that there was no longer a distinction between the party and the state and/or between the interests of party individuals and the state. The inability to make this distinction created a breeding ground for violating the constitution and the rule of law.

The negative effects of state capture are not only visible from an economic perspective but also a socio-political perspective. State capture has twisted the mindsets of the political elite in the sense that lawlessness was made legal and as a result, there is a political culture of impunity amongst the political elite which has eroded the quality of South Africa’s democracy. A major contributing factor to this is the fact that law

[54] The assessment of the poverty line in South Africa takes both food and non-food items into account. According to STATSSA (2021:4) The country’s food poverty line, lower-bound poverty line and upper-bound poverty line are at R624, R890 and R1 335 respectively. The food poverty line refers to the amount of money necessary for a person to purchase the required daily minimal amount of energy intake (STATSSA, 2021b:4). The lower-bound poverty line is a poverty threshold that permits for the purchase of necessities like clothes but only with certain nutritional expenses sacrificed, while the upper-bound poverty line is a poverty threshold that allows for enough money for basic dietary needs and other necessities like clothing (Hall, 2022).

enforcement agencies were weakened during the years of state capture to prevent corrupt activities from being investigated and eventually prosecuted. This assertion is supported by the fact that the Commission found that the SARS[55] Special Compliance Unit (SCU) was authorized to support law enforcement agencies (Marine Coastal Management Asset Forfeiture Unit, NPA, SAPS, NIA, SASS)[56] in controlling organized crime emanating out of a revenue and customs viewpoint. By working collaboratively and closely with these law enforcement agencies, it had a significantly positive effect on curbing organized crime resulting from a tax, customs and excise viewpoint (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022a:665-666).

This means that SARS' capability for investigation and prosecution served as a barrier to organized crime and it was deliberately targeted by those who were involved in state capture (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022a:711). Thus, the Commission found that over time, through the private sector colluding with the executive arm of government, as well as former President Zuma, "SARS was systemically and deliberately weakened, chiefly through the restructuring of its institutional capacity, strategic appointments and dismissals of key individuals, and a pervasive culture of fear and bullying" (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022a:712). The deliberate weakening of SARS meant that by extension, other law enforcement agencies were also weakened through the same modus operandi.

In light of the above, the political cultures of entitlement, lawlessness and impunity have become strongly ingrained amongst the participants of state capture and it has caused a significant mental shift in how these individuals view and act toward the state's authority. This was evidenced when former president Zuma disregarded the commission and by extension the judiciary by refusing to appear and testify at the commission which ultimately resulted in him being imprisoned for contempt of court (chapter 4 section 4.5). The above description of how law enforcement agencies were deliberately weakened, including Zuma's conduct, has significantly harmed the country's democracy and the process of democratic consolidation in the sense that it has planted a perception in society

[55] South African Revenue Services.
[56] National Prosecuting Authority, South African Police Services, National Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service.

that there should be tolerance for violating democratic principles like the separation and balance of powers and/or the system of checks and balances, the rule of law, accountability and transparency. Hence, the protesting and looting that occurred in KZN following Zuma's imprisonment.

From an international perspective, it has jeopardized the country's reputation in the sense that it has contributed to deterring investors and the possibility of deepening relations with other states because the participation of the executive in state capture has given the impression that the country and/or political representatives and the private sector have no regard for the constitution and the citizenry. The severity of the situation is demonstrated by the British government banning international management consulting firm Bain & Company for three years and preventing it from working with the British government due to the company generating corrupt reports for SARS that were intended to assist Zuma's associates during the apex of the state capture years (Dludla, 2022, and Timmins, 2022). It was only following the British government's ban that the South African government later enforced a ten-year ban against Bain & Company (Faku, 2022, and Mahlaka, 2022).

Zuma's actions reflect the severity of the moral depravity within the ANC. They demonstrate a political culture that is characterized by impunity and militancy due to the blatant disregard for the principle of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and, most importantly, transparency and accountability that the citizenry he used to lead so desperately required from him. His desire to protect himself and individuals who facilitated and participated in state capture reinforces the assertion by Bhorat *et al.,* (2017:4) that "state capture is a far greater, systemic threat. It is akin to a silent coup and must, therefore, be understood as a political project that is given a cover of legitimacy". State capture and the Zuma administration have robbed South Africans of their livelihoods. The inability to do right by the citizenry has harmed the process of democratic consolidation in that it has given rise to an angry society (and understandably so) that significantly lacks social cohesion. This is particularly concerning because social cohesion is a necessary factor in a young democracy like South Africa's, where continuous negotiations need to take place to undo the damage caused by the apartheid regime, and now state capture.

The absence of this social cohesion puts the country in a dangerous position in that it may perpetuate a political culture of violence and entitlement in society where the citizenry will be more inclined to disengage from democracy and resort to illegal means to obtain what they believe is rightfully due to them.

Given the above, it must be stated that state capture has drastically and negatively changed both the culture of the government and the way that citizens view and relate to authority. Therefore, if there is any hope of reconstructing South Africa's democracy, bringing value to the principles of democracy, cultivating a democratic political culture, and building trust between the state and the citizenry, then citizens deserve and need to see people being held accountable, receiving severe punishment and reimbursing the state. This reconstruction and rectification process needs to take place with the support of firm and credible leadership which needs to be obtained at the ANC's 2022 elective conference.

6.5.5 The ANC's 55th elective conference of 2022

The run-up to the ANC's 55th elective conference was characterized by contestation and a lack of preparations. This is evidenced by the continuous postponements of the party's provincial elective conferences, particularly in the North West, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and the Free State (Masungwini, 2022a). This was mainly due to internal party disputes relating to branches allegedly being rigged, factional battles, disputes over membership legitimacy resulting in the inability to form a quorum and branch meetings being disrupted (Masungwini, 2022a, and Njilo, 2022), as well as legal action relating to the disbandment of and preventing interim provincial committees (IPC) from having voting rights at provincial elective conferences (Khumalo, 2022, and Nkuyane, 2022).

Furthermore, the ANC's "Rules for Nomination and Election of NEC Members 2022" state that

> "No-one may contest ANC elections for leadership if: They have been found guilty of, or have been charged with unethical or immoral conduct, or any serious crime, or corruption. A serious crime is defined by the EC *(electoral committee)* as a crime that could result in a prison sentence of longer than 6 months. A charge is defined as being charged in a court of law" (ANC, 2022b:2-3).

Despite this, the organization was confronted by party members who had been convicted of crimes wanting to run for positions in the national executive committee (NEC). This was particularly the case with Bathabile Dlamini and Tony Yengeni (who had been convicted of purgery and fraud respectively) who internally challenged the ANC's electoral committee's decision to disqualify them for contesting for NEC positions, whereas other party members resorted to legal action against the electoral committee (Masungwini, 2022b).

The run-up to the ANC's elective conference also saw President Ramaphosa facing backlash as members of the RET faction (Jacob Zuma supporters) wanted him to step aside following the release of the Phala Phala Report by the Section 89 independent panel, led by former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo (Mavuso, 2022a). The report found that Ramaphosa may have violated the Constitution by "acting in a way that is inconsistent with his office", putting himself in jeopardy of a situation where his public duties and his personal affairs conflict, and violating certain sections of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA) (South Africa, 2022d:82, and Sadike, 2022). Despite the Phala Phala debacle, Ramaphosa managed to secure 2 037 nominations from ANC branches for a second term as the ANC's president, while Zweli Mkhize obtained 916 nominations for the same position (ANC, 2022c). Ramaphosa was also spared from impeachment proceedings as 214 members of parliament voted against the adoption of the Phala Phala report (Cotterell, 2022). However, the parliamentary voting demonstrated that retaining his position as the ANC president will be challenged by the RET faction and/or Zuma supporters at the party's elective conference as some parliamentary members (like Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Supra Mahumapelo, Mosebenzi Zwane and Thandiwe Zungu) voted for the adoption of the Phala Phala report, while others, like Zweli Mkhize, Lindiwe Sisulu and Bongani Bongo, were not in parliament for the voting (Cotterell, 2022).

The start of the ANC's 55th elective conference on 16 December 2022 was marked by delays due to factors like power outages or load shedding, and technical problems relating to the party's new system for registering and accrediting voting delegates. This resulted in late registrations, as well as disruptions in the conference hall caused by the

late arrival of Jacob Zuma, and some ANC delegates from KZN who were chanting pro-Zuma songs, while others chanted pro-Ramaphosa songs when president Ramaphosa was delivering the party's political report 7 hours after the scheduled time of 9am (Matiwane & Mbolekwa, 2022, Matiwane, 2022, and Du Plessis, 2022).

The party's political report highlighted several problems affecting the socio-economic stability of the country, which included corruption, the country's energy crisis, youth unemployment, low economic growth, gender-based violence, etc. (ANC, 2022d). However, despite the report highlighting these and other issues, the proceedings of the conference did not result in the outcomes of commission reports being communicated with the public as is normally done in ANC conferences, due to the conference running behind schedule (Chetty, 2022). Instead, the party's media briefings were focused on discussing the conference's upcoming proceedings and contentious issues within the party like the step-aside rule, the Phala Phala debacle, and what possible implications could be there for the conference and president Ramaphosa given that his predecessor, Jacob Zuma, filed a private prosecution case against him the day before the ANC's elective conference was set to begin (see chapter 7 section 7.3.8). The latter (the private prosecution case) is based on the argument that Ramaphosa was an accomplice in advocate Billy Downer's alleged crimes that violated the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act in Zuma's arms deal corruption case (Venter, 2022, and White, 2022).

In addition, the run-up to the ANC's elective conference was characterized by some uncertainty and/or fear about whether the conference will turn violent, or collapse given the violence that occurred in branch general meetings which lead up to the party's provincial conferences and ultimately its 55th national conference (Madia, 2022 and Dintwa, 2022). At the conference, this uncertainty and/or fear was also prevalent. This was due to the presence and/or role of former president Jacob Zuma and suspended secretary general Ace Magashule. The former (Zuma) came as a voting delegate from KZN and in addition to having hopes that his private prosecution case against Ramaphosa would result in the step-aside rule being enforced against him, Zuma also caused deliberate disruption when Ramaphosa delivered the party's political report and when Deputy President David Mabuza delivered the organisational report (Macupe, 2022

and Nyathi, 2022). The latter (Ace Magashule) was prohibited from entering the conference venue, and instead, rallied supporters at the perimeters of Nasrec (the conference venue) in an attempt to influence the voting delegates' votes (Du Plessis, 2022, Macupe, 2022, and Nyathi, 2022).

The presence of these individuals at the conference can be regarded as a last attempt to get supporters of the Zuma/RET faction into the presidential position and key positions in the top seven[57] of the ANC so that they have control over the ANC and by extension, key government institutions. According to Macupe (2022) this assertion is supported by an NEC member who was interviewed at the conference and stated, "He *(Zuma)* can see now that he can no longer run away from his sins and is hoping that someone who is weak – a thief – will be elected so that he can gain control of the law enforcement agencies to not go after him. It is not going to happen". In light of this, the ANC's 55th elective conference saw Zweli Mkhize being the preferred candidate of the Zuma/RET faction despite Zuma supporting Dr Nkosazani Dlamini-Zuma for the ANC presidential position (Steward, 2023).

The battle between Phala Phala (Ramaphosa) and Digital Vibes (Mkhize) (see chapter 4 section 4.5) ultimately came to an end when Ramaphosa was re-elected as the ANC president by securing 2 476 votes, while Mkhize obtained 1 897 votes (Tabane, Macupe, Masungwini & Leshoro, 2022). In addition to securing 56,62% of the votes (Stewards, 2023) and the party making history by electing three women to the ANC's top seven (Tabane, Macupe, Masungwini & Leshoro, 2022), it can be stated that Ramaphosa is in a better position compared to the ANC's 54th elective conference of 2017 in that 57 out of the 80 newly elected NEC members are Ramaphosa supporters (Davis, 2022), and four of his close allies were elected into the ANC's top seven. These allies included Gwede Mantashe (ANC chairperson), Fikile Mbalula (ANC secretary-general), Gwen Ramokgopa (ANC treasurer-general), and Maropene Ramokgopa (ANC's second secretary-general) (Tabane, Macupe, Masungwini & Leshoro, 2022). According to Cronjé

[57] The ANC constitutional amendment to have a top seven rather than a top 6 in its leadership structure was first introduced at its policy conference in 2022. By adopting the constitutional amendment, the ANC thus introduced the position of second deputy secretary-general to make up the top seven. The justification for adding this new position was that the secretary-general's office had a large workload and required three employees to handle it efficiently (Mavuso, 2022b).

(2022), the markets responded positively to Ramaphosa's re-election as evidenced by the rand appreciating by over 2% against the United States dollar and by over 1% against the pound and euro.

The voting outcome presented above between Ramaphosa and Mkhize suggests that the ANC's 55th elective conference was characterized by the "politics of reciprocity" (Khumalo, Felix & Hunter, 2022) especially given the wide gap of branch nominations that Ramaphosa and Mkhize obtained before the conference (2037 and 916 nominations respectively) (ANC, 2022c). This assertion is reinforced by the fact that during a final head-counting event held by the RET/Mkhize faction in Nasrec, the Limpopo chairperson, Stanley Mathabatha, joined the RET faction when he openly renounced his support for Ramaphosa and endorsed Zweli Mkhize for the ANC presidential position in exchange for having the RET/Mkhize faction support him for the position of ANC chairperson (Khumalo, Felix & Hunter, 2022 and Naki, 2022). Thus, according to Madisa (2022a), Mathabatha plotted to have the voting delegates from Limpopo vote against Ramaphosa.

The above situation is detrimental to the ANC's internal democratic processes in that it goes against the mandate that the branches have given to voting delegates, thus, weakening the ANC at the branch level. What is concerning is that this situation brings into question the caliber of voting delegates that branches send to the elective conference. The voting outcome between Mkhize and Ramaphosa demonstrates that some of the voting delegates were either unethical in that they sold their votes, or they lacked political education as some delegates abstained or spoilt their votes, thus giving the impression that there is a sense of ignorance concerning the importance of their votes to their branches, the leadership of the ANC and its policy direction. This situation also weakens PECs in that it creates factionalism and political instability within provinces which ultimately harms the delivery of basic services, it creates a situation in which the party's interim provincial committees (IPCs) become permanent structures in provinces as evidenced by the Free State, North West and Western Cape's IPC's exceeding their term of office (Majola, 2022, Khumalo, 2022, and Nkuyane, 2022), and it creates tensions in that the long period which the IPC's have been in office result in their responsibilities becoming blurred, thus creating conflict with the disbanded PEC. Hence, in the North

West, ANC members had to go the legal route to prevent members of the IPC from voting in the provincial conference (Madisa, 2022b, and Majola, 2022).

Although the ANC's 55th elective conference resulted in improved gender parity and a greater proportion of young people in the NEC (Davis, 2022), it can be stated that the conference demonstrated that the ANC is more disorganized than it's ever been. The ANC has failed to honour its principle of non-racialism as there is no racial diversity in its top seven and NEC (Davis, 2022). In addition, the ANC in the Western Cape, Free State, the ANC Women's League and the ANC Youth League did not have leadership structures as they failed to host their respective elective conferences in the run-up to the party's national elective conference. Thus, the ANC's Womens League and Youth League went into the 55th national conference at the weakest, given that they operated by interim structures of the national women's league task team and national youth league task team respectively (Maliti, 2022, Feketha, 2022, and Makinana, 2022). This demonstrates that the ANC is in a leadership crisis. The disorganization in the ANC is also reinforced by the fact that it failed to conclude the business of the conference within the stipulated time, and instead, the conference reconvened on 5 January 2023, shortly before the party's birthday celebrations on 8 January, to discuss policy issues, vote on policy resolutions, and present the outcomes of commission reports and/or policy resolutions (Davis, 2023).

Furthermore, tribalism has continued to persist in the ANC with the politics of provincialism being a feature of the party's 55th elective conference. Concerning the former (tribalism) the ANC in KZN reinforced their already existing tribalist image in 2017 by supporting Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the position of ANC president despite Ramaphosa (a Venda) having deputized under Jacob Zuma. Thus, Dlamini-Zuma's non-election to the presidential position and the non-representation of KZN in the top seven of the ANC "seemed like a major indictment on the leadership of the Provincial Executive Council (PEC) of KZN" (Zondi, 2022), especially given that the ANC in KZN "had representation in the Top 6 since 2002 *(and)* had created expectations that the KZN province would continue to have its people in the Top 6" (Zondi, 2022). The ANC in KZN's decision to support Zweli Mkhize for party president despite Ramaphosa being the incumbent and also mobilizing other provinces to support Mkhize resulted in "an

impression that KZN was simply forcing a “Zulu” onto others” once again (Zondi, 2022). Furthermore, the celebration and disruption that KZN delegates made when Jacob Zuma arrived while Ramaphosa was delivering the party’s political report also reinforced that KZN was engaging in politics of (Zulu) tribalism (Zondi, 2022).

The above situation has contributed to the ANC’s 55th elective conference being characterized by politics of provincialism in that every province wanted to have representation in the party’s top seven. This is not only reflected by the above situation, but also by the Limpopo chairperson, Stanley Mathabatha, switching allegiance to the RET/Mkhize faction in exchange for receiving votes for the position of national chairperson (Khumalo, Felix & Hunter, 2022, and Naki, 2022), and also by Tina-Joemat Pettersson being nominated from the floor by the ANC in Northern Cape for the position of deputy secretary-general (Dentlinger, 2022). Furthermore, the fact that six out of the seven members of the ANC’s newly elected top seven are from Gauteng ANC branches (Mbolekwa, 2022) reinforces the assertion that the politics of provincialism is gaining traction within the ANC.

Given the forgone, it must be stated that the newly elected leadership of the ANC has the mammoth task of strengthening leadership across all structures. This is a task that will require a common vision concerning how the ANC wants to be viewed by the public and the type of country and people that it wants to build and govern.

6.6 CONCLUSION

South Africa went through extreme forms of violence and oppression before attaining democracy. These negative characteristics continue to have an impact on post-apartheid South Africa’s political culture. In terms of the ANC, it can be stated that the party’s political culture of pre-1994 has not significantly changed since the new dispensation (1994) as some of its members still employ violence to secure political power (i.e., political killings). Thus, governing a democratic country while still employing such tactics, is problematic because it demonstrates that since the 1994 the ANC has been operating from an individualistic and self-serving standpoint with the interests of the country being secondary. This has greatly contributed to socio-economic ills such as inefficient service

delivery which leads to service delivery protests, corruption and state capture. These, and other rising socio-economic problems like crime, poverty, inequality, unemployment, etc., including infighting within the ANC, demonstrate that South Africa has a leadership crisis that worsened during the Zuma administration. Thus, the newly elected leadership of the ANC's 55th national elective conference has the huge task of improving social cohesion by employing a participatory, ethical and moralistic approach to resolving the country's socio-economic problems (unemployment, poverty and inequality), and building trust between the state and the citizenry.

Considering the above, it must be stated that, if the ANC has any aspirations of being the ruling party after the 2024 general elections, then it must implement the recommendations of the Zondo Commission and give space to the country's law enforcement agencies to pursue those who acted illegally during the years of state capture. Doing this will, hopefully, assist the ANC in its renewal process because as a party it needs to be aware that the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture was essentially a commission into the ANC. Furthermore, the ANC also needs to be aware of the fact that events like violent protesting, the various corruption scandals of ANC politicians, the weak economic state of SOEs and even the Zondo Commission have played a role in reinforcing democracy in that society has a more informed (and younger) electorate. They may not be as tolerant as the older generations have been to their inefficiencies and may punish the ANC at the ballots during the 2024 general elections.

Therefore, with the outcome of the 55th national elective conference resulting in Ramaphosa having significant support within the ANC and having a more rigid stance as the party's president, it can be stated that he no longer has excuses for inaction. With this being his second term as the ANC's president, Ramaphosa must enforce a political culture of accountability and transparency both in the ANC and in government. He must professionalize the public service to ensure that public goods and services and employment opportunities are available to the citizenry. Most importantly, should the ANC receive the majority of the votes in the 2024 general elections, as the President of the Republic, Ramaphosa must punish cabinet members who are not performing by dismissing them. This approach should be employed at a provincial and local government

level. The severe damage that South Africa went through during the years of state capture necessitates Ramaphosa's leadership style to be firm, undiplomatic, and unapologetic about fixing and strengthening the ANC and state institutions for the interests of South Africa's democracy and constructing its democratic political culture.

CHAPTER SEVEN: A POSSIBLE TYPOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of the previous chapter was to provide an analysis of how the political cultures identified in chapters 4 and 5 influenced South Africa's democracy. This was done by describing the term democracy and its various characteristics or components. Chapter six also analysed some of the critical developments and events that occurred in South Africa from 1994 to December 2022. These include the ANC's transformation from a noble liberation movement to the factionalized government of today, service delivery and service delivery protests, widespread corruption, the State Capture Commission and the ANC's 2022 elective conference.

By means of a literature review, this seventh chapter aims to determine how a possible typology of South Africa's political culture can be created. This will be done by considering the theoretical characteristics of political culture (from chapter 2), the characteristics of South Africa's political culture (from chapters 4 and 5) and the characteristics of democracy (chapter 6). These characteristics will first be tabulated and briefly explained. This will be followed by a second tabulation that shows how the characteristics identified in chapters 4 and 5 relate to the theoretical and democratic characteristics.

7.2 A TYPOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

A typology is defined as an "organized system of types" that is viewed as a "well established analytical tool in the social sciences" (Collier, LaPorte, Seawright, 2012:217). Considering the contributions by Collier *et al.,* (2012), Downs, Ahmed, Fanzo and Herforth (2020:8) conceptualize typology by stating that it relates to "the study of different concepts/items through classifying phenomena based on commonalities or differences. The goal of creating and examining typologies is to better understand the conditions and factors of a given phenomenon and how they relate to each other". Table 1 below serves as a basic or unrefined instrument to start

the process of constructing a typology of South Africa's political culture. It only provides a brief explanation of the characteristics identified in chapters 4 and 5 and the theoretical and democratic characteristics. Thus, it does demonstrate that there is a correlation between the aligned characteristics but is for illustrative purposes. For an analytical organization of this table, refer to table 2 below.

Table 1: Developing a conceptualization of South Africa's political culture.

Characteristics of South Africa's political culture (Chapters 4 and 5)	**Theoretical characteristics of political culture (Chapter 2)**	**Characteristics of democracy (Chapter 6)**
Characteristics of unity and communitarianism: Society/or citizens having the same mindset and goals for the country's socio-economic development that is intended to benefit society, build a caring society where citizens can prosper within it and add value to it (chapter 4 sections 4.2.1 and 4.5.1).	Parochial characteristics: A traditionalistic society without specialized political roles or government structure because it is more concerned with domestic rather than global issues, and its citizenry finds value in traditional norms and institutions like the church and the family (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1).	Respect for human and political rights: A society in which the government, various institutions and citizens uphold and defend the basic human rights and socio-economic needs required for citizens to live with dignity, especially vulnerable groups. Citizens should also participate freely in political processes which the state encourages and protects (chapter 6 section 6.4.1).
Characteristics of impunity: The lack of or absence of punishment against public and private representatives for unethical behaviour (chapter 4 sections 4.2.1, 4.4.1, 4.5.1 and chapter 6 sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4).	Subject characteristics: A society in which the citizenry is aware of the existing specialized government authority, they take pride in it and believe in maintaining a passive or submissive relationship towards the system so that it works to their advantage (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1).	Regular, free and fair elections: A society in which citizens can freely vote for a leader/political party of their choice without fear or coercion and following electoral integrity in that the electoral process should be transparent, impartial, ethical and orderly from start to end (chapter 6 section 6.4.2).
Characteristics of corruption: A society marked by widespread abuse of power by political and/or private representatives to obtain financial, materialistic or other resources to secure upward mobility and influence, including the use of this power to prevent institutions from holding guilty parties accountable (chapter 4 sections 4.5, 4.5.1 and chapter 6 section 6.5.3).	Participant characteristics: A society in which the citizenry is overtly involved in the political system. Citizens take up an activist role as there is a specialized democratic regime that supports diverse views, and civic institutions that contribute to citizens' development and continuous involvement in the political system (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.1).	The rule of law: The equitable and consistent application of a country's constitutional laws to all institutions and members of society irrespective of race, gender, political affiliation, or socio-economic class (chapter 6 section 6.4.3).

Characteristics of unquestioning devotion: Political representatives' commitment to their political party and fellow comrades, while the citizenry remains committed to a certain political party despite wrongdoing (chapter 4 section 4.2.1 and chapter 6 section 6.5.1).	Mixed political culture – Parochial-subject characteristics: A society in which most citizens prefer a central, sophisticated government system that regulates relations in society rather than traditional authority structures. Despite this preference, society still has some parochial characteristics (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.2).	Judicial independence: The existence of structures and provisions to protect and ensure that the judiciary makes unbiased decisions, free from any interference by other arms of government, and that citizens have a fair trial before a legally established and capable judiciary (chapter 6 section 6.4.4).
Clientelist characteristics: Like patronage politics, it is defined by society having reciprocal ties between political and private representatives, who provide one another with resources and privileges in exchange for favours that either party fulfils. This usually comes at the expense of broader society (chapter 4 section 4.3.1).	Mixed political culture - Subject-participant characteristics: A society in which a relatively large proportion of the citizenry has advanced political viewpoints and an activist identity, while most of the remaining citizenry continues in their alignment toward an authoritarian government structure and retains a passive identity (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.2).	The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances: A society in which the powers and functions of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government are separated, to avoid the abuse of power and dictatorship, with a system of checks and balances in place to maintain internal control over each branch and serve as a check on the authority of the other branches (chapter 6 section 6.4.5).
Characteristics of entitlement: The assumption from citizens and political representatives that they are worthy of certain opportunities, rights and special consideration (chapter 4 section 4.3.1 and chapter 6 sections 6.5.2, 6.5.3 and 6.5.4).	Mixed political culture - Parochial-participant characteristics: A society in which most citizens still respect traditional authority, yet the social structure typically reflects a vibrant, active citizenry that needs specialized political roles and government authority (chapter 2 section 2.3.1.2).	Accountability and transparency: The ability of a society to hold guilty parties responsible and punish them for their actions, as well as ensuring that political and/or private individuals provide clear, relevant and truthful information, especially upon request from the authorities (chapter 6 section 6.4.6).
Characteristics of classism: A society that places more value on individuals who are of a higher socio-economic class and may illtreat or discriminate against individuals of a lower socio-economic class/or status which may lead to these individuals not having a sense of belonging in the democratic political system (chapter 4 section 4.4.1).	Individualistic characteristics: A society with a market-oriented government that prioritizes private interests and not the common good. Thus, a patronage network of relations exists between political and business leaders who aim to maximize their riches rather than achieve policy goals and socio-economic development (chapter 2 section 2.3.2. and chapter 5 section 5.4.1).	Pluralist system of political parties and organizations: A society consisting of diverse interest groups and political doctrines representing the socio-economic interests and advocating policy alternatives affecting the state and citizenry. This society upholds values like respect, acceptance, tolerance and cooperation (chapter 6 section 6.4.7).

Characteristics of tribalism: A toxic dynamic that exists in society and its institutions that is marked by individuals expressing intense allegiance to people within their own tribe, sometimes even viewing their tribe as superior to others, while harbouring negative views about individuals of other tribes (chapter 4 sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1).	Moralistic characteristics: A society that prioritizes the nation's welfare and uses politics to improve society rather than maximize individual riches. Politics of patronage are prevented through the entire citizenry being part of the political system (not just politicians) with policies being initiated to resolve societal problems (chapter 2 section 2.3.2.2 and chapter 5 section 5.4.2).	Freedom of the media: The ability of various media channels to promote democracy by transparently, impartially and freely communicating information relating to governments decisions, holding it accountable, expressing the various views of the citizenry, and educating the public to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights and effective public participation in democratic processes (chapter 6 section 6.4.8).
Militant characteristics: A society with political representatives (and citizens) who are highly loyal to their comrades and strong-willed about the transformation cause that their party is trying to bring. It relates to political representatives who can also be unwilling or stubborn to reform, even when society is suffering, and together with the citizenry, may resort to undemocratic means like violence to achieve their objectives (chapter 4 section 4.4.1 and chapter 6 sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2).	Traditionalistic characteristics: A society with an elite-only government that promotes a developmental agenda that serves citizen's interests and perpetuates traditional patterns of life. Citizens have minimal participation in politics, political parties have minimal importance and society is antibureaucratic to preserve the network of informal interpersonal relations that form the political system and have matured due to traditional patterns (chapter 2 section 2.3.2.3 and chapter 5 section 5.4.3).	
Characteristics of patriarchy: Relations in society that are marked by men's dominance over women in the socio-economic and political spheres, as well as in the family structure (chapter 4 sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, chapter 6 section 6.5.1).		

Characteristics of protest: A society with a high rate of demonstrations (whether peaceful or not) and that employs or views demonstrations as a means of communicating their grievances to the authorities or relevant institutions to resolve them (chapter 4 section 4.4.1 and chapter 6 section 6.5.2).		
Characteristics of violence: The widespread use of violence in society to oppress and cause harm to vulnerable groups (i.e., women, children, or the disabled), to obtain public goods from the authorities, or to further political objectives (chapter 4 section 4.5.1 and chapter 6 section 6.5.1).		
Characteristics of apathy: A society that is marked by political representatives that do not express dissatisfaction with weak political leadership due to the lack of concern or motivation to create reform, or fail to make firm decisions, especially against unethical conduct (chapter 4 sections 4.4.1).		
Characteristics of non-accountability: The widespread disregard of rules and regulations, with individuals and institutions facing little to no responsibility for violating laws and the absence of political will to remedy this (chapter 4 section 4.4.1).		

Characteristics of lawlessness: A society with extensive criminality, the disregard of the state's laws, and the abuse of power by political representatives, public and private institutions and the citizenry (chapter 4 section 4.4.1).		
Characteristics of integrity and accountability: A society in which there is transparency and ethical conduct in government administration, with political and government officials taking responsibility for their actions and institutions' performance (chapter 4 section 4.4.1)		
Dynamic and confrontational characteristics: A society with an active citizenry and civil society that promotes democracy, socio-economic justice and uses state institutions (i.e., the judiciary) to ensure that the government is held accountable if required (chapter 4 section 4.4.1).		
Characteristics of collaboration: A society whereby various institutions and sectors are in partnership and collectively work towards eradicating socio-economic and governance challenges that ultimately affect citizen's livelihoods and the country's development (chapter 4 section 4.5.1).		
Characteristics of non-participation and/ or disengagement: A society where a growing proportion of the citizenry does not get involved in democratic processes like voting and resorts to undemocratic means, like violence and criminality, to convey their message to the government (chapter 4 section 4.5.1).		

Characteristics of 'us versus them': A divided society in which political representatives and citizens place themselves in a particular group that they view as superior/better ('us'), while other individuals that are viewed as the enemy are placed in a different group ('them') (chapter 4 section 4.4.1 and chapter 6 section 6.5.4).		

Table 2 below demonstrates how the characteristics of South Africa's political culture **(A)** (from chapters 4 and 5) are linked to the theoretical characteristics identified in chapter 2 **(B)** and which characteristics of democracy **(C)** are being influenced by them.

Table 2: A possible theoretical analysis of South Africa's political culture

(A) Characteristics of South Africa's political culture	**(B) Theoretical characteristics of political culture**	**(C) Characteristics of democracy**
Characteristics of unity and communitarianism	1. Parochial characteristics 2. Moralistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. Accountability and transparency 5. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations
Characteristics of impunity	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. Judicial independence 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of corruption	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 4. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of unquestioning devotion	1. Subject-participant characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. Regular, free and fair elections 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency

Clientelist characteristics	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 4. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of entitlement	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of classism	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of tribalism	1. Individualistic characteristics 2. Traditionalistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. Judicial independence 5. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 6. Accountability and transparency
Militant characteristics	1. Participant characteristics 2. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency 6. Freedom of the media
Characteristics of patriarchy	1. Parochial-subject characteristics 2. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Judicial independence 3. The rule of law
Characteristics of protest	1. Participant characteristics 2. Moralistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. Accountability and transparency 4. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations 5. Freedom of the media
Characteristics of violence	1. Participant characteristics 2. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. Judicial independence 5. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 6. Accountability and transparency 7. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations

		8. Freedom of the media
Characteristics of apathy	1. Subject-participant characteristics 2. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of non-accountability	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 4. Accountability and transparency
Characteristics of lawlessness	1. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. Judicial independence 5. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 6. Accountability and transparency 7. freedom of the media
Characteristics of integrity and accountability	1. Participant characteristics 2. Moralistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency
Dynamic and confrontational characteristics	1. Participant characteristics 2. Moralistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 4. Accountability and transparency 5. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations 6. Freedom of the media
Characteristics of collaboration	1. Participant characteristics 2. Moralistic characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. The rule of law 3. Accountability and transparency 4. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations 5. Freedom of the media
Characteristics of non-participation and/ or disengagement	1. Subject-participant characteristics	1. Respect for human and political rights 2. Regular, free and fair elections 3. The rule of law 4. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 5. Accountability and transparency

		6. Pluralist system of political parties and organizations
Characteristics of 'us versus them'	1. Participant characteristics 2. Individualistic characteristics	1. Respect for human rights 2. The rule of law 3. Regular, free and fair elections 4. Judicial independence 5. The separation and balance of powers and the system of checks and balances 6. Accountability and transparency

7.3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS PRESENTED IN TABLE 2

7.3.1 Characteristics of unity and communitarianism

Table two presents the first characteristic of South Africa's political culture as unity and communitarianism. South Africa was characterized in this manner at the beginning of the new dispensation (1994) because it displayed parochial characteristics with institutions like the family, the church, the school and traditional leaders being viewed as fundamental for socializing citizens into democratic South Africa. This was because the state was relatively new and there was some uncertainty of whether the newly established democracy will be sustainable, given that the country just transitioned from the violent apartheid regime (chapter 4 section 4.2.1 and chapter 5 section 5.3.1). It also displayed moralistic characteristics in that citizens were united in constructing a caring, morally superior, unified and non-racial South Africa, which sees the country's resources benefiting society as a whole and not just a select few (chapter 4 section 4.2). This status quo influenced democratic principles in that the long years of the oppressive apartheid regime united citizens in upholding and protecting human and political rights.

Nelson Mandela's leadership instilled a sense of morality in society. This was important for a young democracy like South Africa as it contributed to the continued realization of regular, free and fair elections that were open to all citizens with no political violence. The moral fiber that Mandela instilled reinforced democratic principles like the rule of law, accountability and transparency, especially since his administration established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to account for apartheid crimes. The TRC's role in fostering understanding of the pain that marginalized groups went through, including South Africa hosting and winning the

1995 Rugby World Cup (Mitchell, 2015), contributed to racial tensions being eased, and communitarian and moralistic characteristics being reinforced.

Furthermore, because citizens had a renewed sense of belonging, the establishment of a pluralist system of political parties and organizations in communities was promoted as evidenced by the establishment of the TAC (chapter 4 section 4.3), various small and sometimes unregistered community-based organizations, stokvels and cooperatives directed at poverty alleviation (National Development Agency [NDA], 2008:16). This description further aligns with elite theory (chapter 2 section 2.6.1) in that it demonstrates that political leaders' style of leadership plays a significant role in shaping societal relations, how institutions operate and the characteristics that determine the country's political culture.

7.3.2 Characteristics of integrity and accountability

Integrity refers to "the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles" (Oxford Learners Dictionaries, 2022). In terms of governance and politics, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) makes use of the term "public integrity" which is defined as "the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritizing the public interest over private interests in the public sector." (OECD, 2022).

Related to the previous heading is that South Africa's political culture was characterized by integrity and accountability after 1994. This can be attributed to South Africa displaying participant characteristics as evidenced above, but also to the change in state institutions' operating procedures. These institutions became multiracial and operationally diverse, providing services to townships (chapter 4 sections 4.2 and 4.2.1). Both of which were necessary for understanding the structural and complex nature of poverty in the country. This reinforced the moralistic characteristics in society in that the growing multiracial nature of state and non-state institutions, and the rise in civil society groups encouraged dialogue, which was important in understanding the experiences of others.

Considering the above, it can be stated that South Africa's democracy was reinforced in that there was greater respect for human and political rights with the establishment of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to curb violations. The characteristics of integrity and accountability in society and its institutions have been exemplified through the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) continuously ensuring regular, free and fair elections take place, thus respecting the political rights and views of the citizenry. Similarly, the office of the Public Protector was established in 1995 and it has played an important role in reinforcing South Africa's democracy by ensuring that the roles of the three arms of government do not violate the constitution and that wrongdoers are held accountable (South Africa, 2016:1-2). This is evidenced by the Public Protector's Nkandla Report which required former president Zuma to reimburse the state for money that was unduly spent at his Nkandla home (Elgot, 2016, Toyana & Macharia, 2016, and Evans, 2014). Hence, Corruption Watch (2016) states that "the Public Protector is not considered a branch of government. Instead, it is an independent, impartial institution that is meant to provide a check on the powers of other branches of government and increase their accountability and responsibility."

The Mandela to Mbeki administrations reinforced democratic principles such as the rule of law, accountability and transparency through Chapter 9 institutions like the SAHRC and Public Protector, and crime-fighting institutions like the Directorate of Special Operations (formerly known as the Scorpions). This institution was tasked with fighting corruption and organized crime, with a conviction rate ranging from 82% to 94% (Corruption Watch, 2018). The Scorpions' efficiency and effectiveness can be attributed to their ability to work without political interference (Corruption Watch, 2018). Thus, when state institutions operate with morality, integrity and accountability, they are in turn, respecting the rule of law and reinforcing the legitimacy of the state which contributes to the broader citizenry emulating this ethical conduct. This is important in encouraging society to work collaboratively toward addressing social ills.

7.3.3 Characteristics of collaboration

According to Camarihna-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2008:311-312), collaboration is “A process in which entities share information, resources, and responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a program of activities to achieve a common goal… Collaboration involves mutual engagement of participants to solve a problem together, which implies mutual trust and thus takes time, effort, and dedication”. Similar to the above, collaborative characteristics are closely related to the participant and moralistic characteristics in that they aim to promote the common good rather than individual interests. Within the context of South Africa, this collaborative characteristic has had a positive influence in promoting local democracy and respect for human and political rights. Thus, the growing number of civil society groups and/or community-based organizations have played an important role in educating the public about the social contract that they entered into with the ANC-led government and how to hold the state accountable for failing to honour this contract. This awareness is evidenced by the many service delivery protests and lawsuits brought against the government that have cost approximately R147 billion (Municipal IQ, 2021 and Maughan, 2022). This has contributed to reinforcing the rule of law and the principle of freedom of the media as it demonstrates that citizens have become more inclined to publicize personal and community injustices without fear.

The above situation has also reinforced the principle of a pluralist system of political parties and organizations, accountability and transparency, as well as the respect for human rights, particularly the right to quality education, human dignity, life and safety. This is evidenced by institutions such as Section 27, Equal Education and the SAHRC pursuing litigation against the provincial education departments in KZN, North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and Eastern Cape, for failing to honour its 2014 deadline on providing a detailed implementation plan on the eradication of pit latrine toilets in South Africa’s public schools. The basic education minister even went to the extent of proposing the removal of timeframes for the government to phase out pit latrines (McCain, 2021, McCain, 2022, and Makgeru, 2022). This litigation procedure comes

after the death of Michael Komape, who died in 2014 after falling into a pit latrine toilet while at school in Limpopo (McCain, 2021).

However, the characteristics of collaboration have not significantly led to improvements in the system of checks and balances. The death of Michael Komape and other children should have encouraged collaboration between the Department of National Treasury and Public Works to resolve the problem of pit latrine toilets speedily, and should have encouraged better oversight from Treasury to ensure that money that was allocated for infrastructure at the Department of Basic Education is used for this purpose. However, intergovernmental relations and checks and balances remain weak. This is evidenced by Amnesty International (2022) and the 2020/2021 annual report of the Department of Basic Education (2021:198) revealing that approximately 5 167 still use pit latrine toilets. According to the SAHRC (2021b:12), more than a million teachers and learners are affected by this situation, with the worst performing provinces being the Eastern Cape and KZN where 44% and 83% of schools respectively rely on pit latrines and ventilated pit latrines (SAHRC, 2021b:3 & 6).

The following section will discuss clientelist and classist characteristics.

7.3.4 Clientelist and classist characteristics

Clientelist and classist characteristics started becoming more visible from the end of the Mandela administration and into the Mbeki administration (chapter 4 sections 4.2 and 4.3). The development of clientelist characteristics can be attributed to events like the Mbeki administration persisting with the neoliberal macroeconomic policy known as GEAR, which resulted in the growth of a small, powerful, and wealthy black middle class, while the remaining black majority was facing rising poverty, unemployment, and inequality (chapter 4 sections 4.2). The development of classist characteristics was made evident by the Mbeki administration's failure to treat HIV-positive people leading to the deaths of many citizens and the TAC pursuing litigation to force the state to act in the public's best interest (chapter 4 section 4.3).

In light of the above, it can be stated that clientelist and classist characteristics are mutually reinforcing, contributing to the development of each other. Taking into account the descriptions of classism and clientelism that are stated in table 1, it can be stated that clientelist societies exist because the political elite runs government institutions for their benefit and not society's benefit, while classist societies exist because less affluent individuals are excluded by affluent private and public representatives from political processes to prevent reform. Therefore, clientelist and classist characteristics are embedded in individualistic characteristics.

Considering the forgone, it can be stated that clientelist and classist characteristics have eroded South Africa's democracy in that they have led to human rights violations like the right to healthcare, life and dignity and citizen's political rights being undermined by a government that does not honour the commitment/or promises that it made. The legal route that the TAC took reinforces the assertion that citizens have started to lose trust in democratic processes' ability to bring reform to society and their lives. This, in turn, has eroded the value that can be ascribed to having regular, fair and free elections in that citizens find non-state institutions like civil society groups as an alternative, thus contributing to their lack of participation in processes like voting.

These clientelist, classist and individualist characteristics have eroded South Africa's democracy. In this context, Gumede (2022) refers to the fact that in October 2016, the ANC used its parliamentary majority to force the currently suspended Public Protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, into the job over other candidates who were more qualified, capable and credible. Over time, the Public Protectors office has become politicized, with Gumede (2022) stating that Mkhwebane's "appalling decisions, actions and behaviour have tarnished the credibility of this important constitutional office, plunged it into disarray and undermined its operations and effectiveness."

In light of the above, the democratic principles of the rule of law, accountability, transparency and the system of checks and balances have eroded as the political elite and private businesses/individuals have unofficially changed the mandate of this

government institution (Public Protector's office) to be less people-centered, and more focused on fighting political battles. This is evidenced by the fact that since Mkhwebane assumed the Public Protector's role in 2016 until 2022 her office has spent approximately R147 million of taxpayer's money on legal costs defending multiple objections to her reports (Thamm, 2022). The parliamentary proceedings into Mkhwebane's ability to hold office found that these legal costs were mainly for political cases and reports which were set aside by the courts, rather than cases or reports involving complaints from ordinary South Africans (Thamm, 2022). This, in turn, reflects the classist and clientelist position that the Public Protector's office has assumed as the parliamentary proceedings also revealed that she was more concerned with protecting politicians over the citizenry as she altered the findings in the Estina Dairy Report to protect Ace Magashule (former Free State premier) and Mosebenzi Zwane (former MEC for Agriculture and Rural Development in the free State) (Gerber, 2022). Situations of this nature thus contribute to South Africa's political culture developing characteristics of entitlement.

7.3.5 Characteristics of entitlement

South Africa's political culture has been characterized by entitlement from its leaders and citizens since the early years of democracy. The ANC and its affiliated movements had fought the apartheid regime in South Africa and abroad, leading to a sense of entitlement among political representatives of post-1994. This was evidenced by the fact that many of these individuals (some who were former MK soldiers) had no formal training or qualifications to run government affairs, yet they received government positions in democratic South Africa merely because they fought apartheid (chapter 5 section 5.4.2 and SACBC, 2018:2-3 and van Onselen, 2017). Related to this is the fact that a toxic sense of entitlement had developed in the ANC between individuals who fought apartheid domestically and those who "ran" to fight apartheid abroad (chapter 4 section 4.3.1). This situation was a form of toxic entitlement in that local political leaders viewed themselves as being entitled to make core decisions and take top positions because they did not "run away abroad" while political leaders abroad

saw themselves as having the right to lead and take top positions because of the exposure, skills and extent of education they obtained abroad.

Therefore, the characteristics of entitlement are closely linked to the characteristics of individualism. The characteristics of entitlement have not reinforced South Africa's democracy in that they have resulted in human rights violations and political rights being undermined. This has been demonstrated by the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture revealing that the favour system was employed in the hiring and dismissal of ministers in key departments (De Klerk & Solomon, 2019:69-73). The ANC-led government has been implementing its cadre deployment policy since the new dispensation. However, cadre deployment has over time turned into a strategy in which members of the ruling party can gain access to the state coffers, together with the elites from the private sector (Swanepoel, 2021:450-451). Thus, irrespective of this situation, including critique from various sectors of society, the ANC has repeatedly chosen to not be impartial and continued with this policy. This display of blatant entitlement has hurt the citizenry the most because unqualified and unethical political leadership has crippled municipalities and government department's financial health (Mlambo, Zubane & Thusi, 2022:15). This, has in turn, violated citizen's right to quality infrastructure and basic services like healthcare, water and sanitation, which are linked to the right to dignity and safety.

Furthermore, the unquestioning devotion that cadres have to one another has eroded the separation and balance of powers, the system of checks and balances, and accountability and transparency because there is no effective monitoring and evaluation taking place due to the lines between administration and politics being blurred (Mlambo, Zubane & Thusi, 2022:12-13). This situation undermines citizens' political rights as it gives the citizenry the impression that voting is only a formality, that political elites do not value the votes that citizens have cast for them, and that they are free to act in any way they like.

South Africa's entitlement characteristics are not limited to the political elite as the country has developed a citizenry that feels entitled to not pay for public services/or their municipal rates and taxes (chapter 6 section 6.5.2) (chapter 5 section 5.3.2). This violates and erodes the rule of law and taking into account the above discussion, it can be stated that the inability of political representatives to respect the law contributes to citizens also feeling entitled to violate the law. This can result in services being cut for non-paying citizens. With South Africa being described as the "protest capital of the world" (Hlongwane, 2012), this situation can result in an angry citizenry which may harm the delivery of regular, fair and free elections. This assertion is reinforced by Bruce (2021) who states that the run-up to the 2021 local government elections was characterized by harassment and intimidation, particularly in KZN and Gauteng with members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Congress of the People (COPE) stating that they had faced death threats, and their posters were continuously torn down. While protests caused disruptions on election day in the Eastern Cape, KZN and Gauteng as they prevented entrée into polling stations through intimidation and "In some of these incidents, residents dug trenches in the roads in order to prevent access" (Bruce, 2021).

7.3.6 Characteristics of tribalism

According to Lonsdale (2014:2), "scholars believed that precolonial Africa had been a land of tribes, each united by language, modes of subsistence, kingship and religious and cultural practices which separated each tribe from its neighbours". In South Africa, forceful removals that were directed at creating Bantustans[58] in the late 1960s contributed to the development of organized tribalism (Baloyi, 2018:2-3). Thus, the colonizer's main goal was to exacerbate the divisions among the Zulus and Xhosas,

[58] Bantustans or homelands were created by the apartheid regime, and they were areas where most of the Black population had to relocate to in order to prevent them from residing in South Africa's metropolitan centres. The Bantustans were a significant administrative instrument for excluding Black people from the country's political system. The plan was to segregate Blacks from Whites, giving them control over governing their own independent governments, depriving them of protection and whatever residual rights a Black person in South Africa might have. Thus, he establishment of Bantustans served to remove Black people from White South Africa permanently (South African History Online, 2019).

Tswana and Qwaqwa, Ndebele and Vendas, and other groups. Mixed-race people were also divided from the white groups according to their culture, place of residence, employment and status. The elite (colonizers) used these distinctions to pit communities against one another. This was a strategy to prevent these populations from uniting against the colonizers (Baloyi, 2018:3 and Gumede, 2019). In this regard, The New York Times (1992:A2, cited by Irobi, 2005) refers to the conflict between the Zulus and Xhosas who supported the ANC in the KZN homeland, and further states that "there was a high level of violent conflict between black ethnic groups in the homelands. In Natal alone, well-over 1 147 people were killed during the first months of 1992".

The above discussion thus makes it necessary to define the concept of tribalism. Nothwehr (2008:5) defines tribalism as "the attitude and practice of harbouring such a strong feeling of loyalty or bonds to one's tribe that one excludes or even demonises other tribes that do not belong to that group." Tribalism is closely linked to individualistic characteristics in that it aims to benefit the interests of a particular group. It perpetuates traditionalistic characteristics in that the system of government and bureaucracy may be structured in a way that does not reflect the composition of broader society and thus perpetuates a certain group's norms. Tribalism is something that the ANC has never viewed as being part of its character (ANC, 2017:5, 7 & 23), in fact, it has always distanced itself from it and this is explicitly stated in rule 3.4 of the party's constitution, which reads: "The ANC shall, in its composition and functioning, be democratic, non-racial and non-sexist and combat any form of racial, tribalistic or ethnic exclusivism or chauvinism" (ANC, 2017:5). Tribalist characteristics have become evident in the post-apartheid era, and it has eroded South Africa's democracy.

Tribalist characteristics have led to human rights being violated in the 2013-2015 period in the Limpopo province's Malamulele region. Residents of Malamulele protested against the Thulamela municipality, which favoured Venda-speaking areas over Tsonga-speaking areas and wanted their own independent municipality to

provide services to the Tsonga people (Nkuna & Shai, 2018:425-426 and Musitha & Mafukata, 2020:3). The protests resulted in looting and torching of government buildings, cars and schools (Nkuna & Shai, 2018:426), thus undermining the rule of law and violating citizens right to education and access to basic services.

Tribalist characteristics reinforce a system of government that is based on favoritism rather than merit, and this has negative implications for socio-economic development. Considering the Zuma administration, this assertion is reinforced by Gumede (2019) who stated, “the Jacob Zuma presidency is only looking after his “own” and is not using the talents of all the talent within the ANC, let alone all South Africans, which is absolutely necessary to create wealth for all, rather than the few.” This situation resulted in the concept *Zulufication* being coined because Zuma was seen as appointing individuals from his home province, KZN, to key positions within government (particularly directors-general and their deputies) and the ANC (Gumede, 2019). University of Cape Town researcher Anthony Butler (cited by Gumede, 2019) argued that this situation displays “a big shift in the control of resources and power towards people of AmaZulu descent”.

Thus, it can be stated that the characteristics of tribalism encourage corruption. The perpetuation of tribalistic characteristics in this regard can be traced back to Zuma’s campaign to remove Mbeki from the ANC’s presidency in the run-up to the party’s 2007 Polokwane conference. During this time, many of Zuma’s supporters were wearing “100% Zulu” T-shirts and his (Zuma’s) inability to reprimand this conduct created the perception that he was promoting politics of ethnic patronage (Gumede, 2019). This is supported by the fact that during his presidency, Zuma’s blood relatives controlled key positions in the government and provincial structures of the ANC in KZN, which was expected to continue if Dlamini-Zuma defeated Ramaphosa at the ANC's 2017 elective conference in Nasrec (Olifant, 2016). This reflects traditional characteristics (chapter 7, section 7.2 table 1) and it has contributed to laws being biasedly applied to favour individuals who either supported Zuma or were Zulu-speaking (chapter 4 section 4.4.1).

The above situation is dangerous in that the separation of powers, the system of checks and balances, transparency and accountability were poorly enforced due to the inability of colleagues and/or tribal members to question or reprimand bad governance from their tribal members due to the unquestioning loyalty to one another (Goetz, 2015:5, cited by Baloyi,2018:4). This is referred to as the “homeboy” phenomenon by Thabo Mbeki and it is also prevalent in the private sector (Sacks, 2014, and Gumede, 2019). This had negative implications on service delivery as resembled by the many service delivery protests, there was poor policy implementation and coordination which can also be attributed to the disbanding of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) (Gumede, 2017:14, chapter 4 section 4.3 and 4.3.1), and the numerous cabinet reshuffles are evidence of the lack of oversight and coherence during the Zuma era (Gumede, 2017:14).

The characteristics of tribalism have contributed to the notion of regular, fair and free elections being eroded. Democracy is about representation, in terms of race, gender and tribal background. However, characteristics of tribalism may undermine individuals’ political rights and having fair and free elections in that some political representatives may be prevented from campaigning in a certain region due to their tribal origin. This was evident in the run-up to the 2016 local government elections which saw Tshwane residents protesting against the ANC’s mayoral candidate, Thoko Didiza, because she was Zulu and from KZN (News24Wire, 2016). One of the residents was quoted stating: “The ANC cannot bring a Zulu person from KwaZulu-Natal to rule Pedis, Xitsongas and TshiVendas. If you are saying that she [Didiza] is from Pretoria, then tell us where in Pretoria she is from” (News24Wire, 2016). Furthermore, it must be stated that tribalism is potentially harmful to judicial independence and may rob citizens of a fair trial due to judges having a (personal) bias against individuals of a particular tribal group.

In light of the forgone, it must be stated that the characteristics of tribalism hamper socio-economic development and social cohesion by promoting distrust, fear (which

may result in violence), and intolerance in society, with especially the latter (intolerance) being a contributing factor to patriarchal characteristics.

7.3.7 Patriarchy

Patriarchy can be understood as a societal structure that supports hierarchies by giving the father or males control over women in many spheres of life, including the economic, social and political spheres (Plaatjies Van Huffel, 2011:2). The system of patriarchy is made up of the six primary patriarchal structures, namely: “a patriarchal mode of production in which women’s labour is expropriated by their husbands; patriarchal relations within waged labour; the patriarchal state; male violence; patriarchal relations in sexuality; and patriarchal culture” (Walby, 1989:214 & 220).

Patriarchal characteristics are closely related to parochial-subject characteristics as they are centered on perpetuating traditional patterns of life where the private and public sectors, as well as family structures, are under the leadership of men which gives women a subject and passive role. This patriarchal setting reinforces men’s power over women, and in turn, reflects how patriarchal characteristics are embedded in characteristics of individualism by only favouring men. Patriarchy is not new in South Africa, as evidenced by the fact that women were prevented from full membership in the ANC from 1912 to 1942. However, they participated in ANC campaigns, negotiations and decision-making, except for leadership (Walker, 1991:25-26 and Ginwala 1990:77). Patriarchy is pervasive and persists in democratic South Africa due to its new forms, which require it to coexist with a system of legal equality and respect for human rights, unlike during the apartheid era (Bentley, 2004:247). The most effective of these new forms is the assertion that gender disparity is an attribute of culture and tradition and that, as a result, any attempt to address it would damage society’s fabric and infringe on various groups’ right to self-determination. In actuality, these assertions only serve to maintain women’s subordinate status in the home and mainstream economy (Bentley, 2004:247).

Characteristics of patriarchy (like those of tribalism) are discriminatory and do not reinforce South Africa's democracy. Patriarchal characteristics have contributed to the violation of human rights, the rule of law and the undermining of political rights. The former (human rights violations) is demonstrated by the brutal and widespread incidents of rape and killings of women and children in South Africa (SAPS, 2022:3 and South Africa, 2022), and the lack of support and unequal access that women have to employment and education. This situation forces women into poverty and by extension also violates their right to equality, human dignity, health care, food, water and social security (South Africa, 1996:5,6 &11). This phenomenon is known as the 'feminisation of poverty'[59] (Veeran, 2000:2).

A report by STASSA, which is titled *Gender Series Volume IX: Women Empowerment, 2017–2022,* found that in terms of income, a higher number of female-headed households relied on social grants as a source of income, with figures being 62,7% in 2017 and 61,3% in 2021, while in the same period, social grants only accounted for 37,3% and 38,7% of income in male-headed households (STATSSA, 2022:46). However, male-headed households revealed income from a business as the main source of income with figures being at 71,6% and 75,8% in 2017 and 2021 respectively. The second source of income was from salaries, wages, or commissions accounting for 66,4% and 66% of total income in 2017 and 2022 respectively (STATSSA, 2022:46). This has revealed that there are more males employed in the formal economy, there are more female-headed households with particularly black and coloured women being the worst off (STATSSA, 2022b:13-14). Thus, "Gender-based discrimination and segregation in the labour market, as well as the weak regulation of those markets, have served to confine women to jobs that are low paid

[59] According to Pearce (1978, cited by Veeran 2000:2-3) the feminization of poverty refers to the argument that due to economic recessions and governments decreased public spending, women are more frequently found among the world's poor. Bloxham (2021) describes it as "the phenomenon that women and children are disproportionately represented among the world's poor and are more likely than men to live below the poverty line. The concept is relatively simple, but the reasons for it are complex and many."

and of poor quality in terms of working conditions and access to social protection" (DWYPD[60], 2019:17).

STATSSA (2022:25) further found that in terms of education, physics, commerce or engineering graduates made up almost two-thirds of employed males with university degrees, with figures being at 74.5% and 73.2% in 2017 and 2022 respectively. However, employed people with degrees in the arts, education, or hospitality were mostly women, with figures being 67.8% and 84.7% in 2017 and 2022 respectively. According to DWYPD (2019:14), more women obtain higher certificates, diplomas, bachelor's degrees and honours degrees than males do, however, the pattern shifts at masters and doctorate levels as more men obtain these qualifications. Women's inability to hold specialized top management positions is due to childbearing, unaffordable childcare, and gendered household and family responsibilities (STATSSA, 2022:21). Morgan & Martin (2006, cited by Moodly, 2021:188-189), further state that strong networks and networking spaces are usually populated by men, resulting in homosocial reproduction. This phenomenon affects the hiring and promotion process, as individuals like hiring workers similar to them. Additionally, due to the hiring process being typically led by males, it sustains organizations' gendered cultures and affects the extent to which women are involved in and recognized for leadership (Shinbrot *et al.,* 2019, 122–123, cited by Moodly, 2021;189).

Patriarchal characteristics also undermine political rights as they influence women's representation and participation in mainstream politics. In South Africa, women have increased from 33% to 46%, representing the highest percentage of female parliamentary members since 1994 (STATSSA, 2022:73). In 2019, the Cabinet, demonstrated parity by having 50% of women for the first time. However, the proportion of women in deputy ministerial positions declined from 60% in 2004 to 46% in 2019, while in the NCOP[61] women constituted 41% and 36% in 2004 and 2019 respectively. This demonstrates a departure from the 50% objective. At the local

[60] Department of Women Youth and Persons with Disabilities.
[61] National Council of Provinces.

government level, STATSSA (2022:73-74) found that following the 2021 local government elections, the proportion of men occupying mayoral positions was at 68%, while women only occupied 32% of these positions, and male municipal councillors ranged from 56%-64%, while female councillors ranged from 44%-36%. In light of these figures, STATSSA (2022:73) argues that “males continue to dominate in government decision-making positions in the country”.

Although women’s representation has been improving at the national level, their representation remains low at the local government level. This is problematic because the local government level is where service delivery is meant to take place. Thus, the local council (and even provincial legislatures) needs to include women so that these institutions resemble the make-up of society. This also suggests that government policies will better respond to society’s socio-economic problems (i.e., the feminisation of poverty) since solutions to these problems will originate from those who are most affected by them, namely women. Thus, eradicating patriarchal characteristics will require strong political will from both men and women within and outside the political space.

According to Wall (2020), South Africa’s customary law has been a source of prejudice, often violating the right to equality and marginalizing women, who are seen as outsiders rather than full members of society. This situation has eroded judicial independence and the rule of law as women are losing trust in the country’s judiciary (Makutoane, 2017), because the judiciary perpetuates patriarchal characteristics due to its lack of female representation, and lack of prosecutions and tangible punishment of men who violate women. This has contributed to women being denied justice and, at times, even a fair trial, especially when their cases relate to customary or family matters (UNODC[62] 2020, and Makutoane, 2017). According to Malik (2022), women in the judiciary are important for incorporating the gender perspective and providing equal representation, as they offer a unique set of experiences and influences that shape their judgements. Integrating multiple viewpoints and arguments to the bench

[62] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

is important for ensuring the judiciary reflects society and fosters improved public trust and confidence, which reinforces the rule of law and democracy. This assertion is reinforced by Ruiz (2022) who states that “By their mere presence, women judges enhance the legitimacy of courts, sending a powerful signal that they are open and accessible to those who seek recourse to justice”.

Although it may be argued that the independence of South Africa’s courts has not been significantly brought into question, the lack of female representation in South Africa’s judiciary after 29 years of democracy reinforces patriarchy as women constitute 51,1% of the population (STATSSA, 2021:6). According to the 2020-2021 Judiciary Annual Report women made up 44% of all superior court judges (The Judiciary, Republic of South Africa, 2021:47), and it was only in 2012, that South Africa appointed Mashangu Monica Leeuw as the first female judge president and in 2014 the second one was appointed (Institute for African Women in Law, 2022, and Addadzi-Koom, 2022).

Thus, it is crucial to prioritize equitable representation of women in top positions within the judiciary. With this being stated, it was particularly disturbing to see patriarchal characteristics and the undermining of this important objective from Advocate Dali Mpofu when he used sexual innuendo[63] while interviewing the former Judge President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Mandisa Maya, for the position of Chief Justice in February 2022 (Pikoli, 2022). According to Pikoli (2022), “Men have been known to use sexual innuendo to subdue or throw off-balance women who seem too confident and threatening to them”. This situation resembles how patriarchal characteristics are rooted in individualistic characteristics that promote women’s participation in society, but in a passive manner, which in turn reflects parochial-subject characteristics. Furthermore, Mpofu’s tactic resembled the comfortability that society has in violating

[63] In describing the meaning of sexual innuendo, law firm Harris Grombchevsky (2022) states: “One form of sexual harassment is sexual innuendo. This is using language in a more suggestive, indirect manner rather than directly make sexual remarks”. “The language hints, or subtly suggests, sexual content without coming right out and saying it. When someone uses this technique and the recipient feels uncomfortable or threatened by it, it can certainly come under the heading of sexual harassment” (Grombchevsky, 2022).

women's dignity and it can further be viewed as an assault on the constitution which enshrines the democratic principles of equality and dignity.

The following section will discuss the characteristics of lawlessness.

7.3.8 Characteristics of lawlessness

Lawlessness is a common term in South Africa due to the widespread criminality in society and the institutions of the state. Lawlessness is closely linked to individualistic characteristics, as acts of criminality or disregard of the law are often done for personal or group interests. This is evidenced by corruption. Characteristics of lawlessness are also closely related to participant characteristics in that acts of criminality in South Africa like violent service delivery protests demonstrate a participatory element due to their regular occurrence, (which in turn may reflect that citizens are becoming more knowledgeable about what is due to them from the state), the high number of people that these protests attract and sometimes even the support that these protests receive from non-state actors (Langa & Von Holdt, 2012, and Steyn, 2012, cited by Matebesi & Botes, 2017:90).

Characteristics of lawlessness have eroded South Africa's democracy as they have continuously led to human and political rights violations. The former is reflected by Gun Free South Africa (2022:1) stating that South Africa has a gun violence epidemic. This assertion is reinforced by the SAPS' crime statistics quarterly report of 1 April to 30 June 2022 revealing that in 72% of the murders in the country, the instrument that was used was a firearm which resulted in 2 766 murders (Gun Free South Africa, 2022:1 and SAPS, 2022b:20). This has led to people's right to life being violated with many citizens living in fear. In addition, kidnappings and ransom requests have sharply increased as the April to June 2022 period saw over 1 000 kidnappings being recorded by the SAPS, while in the same period in 2021, there was an average of 700 kidnappings (SAPS, 2022b:37).

The characteristics of lawlessness are also prevalent in state institutions, and this was mainly facilitated by state capture which particularly legalized corruption (Rapanyane, 2021:257). This situation has eroded the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances as the legalization of corruption meant that systems of oversight were not followed in order to perpetuate lawlessness (Rapanyane, 2021:257). This situation has had negative implications on the notion of regular, fair and free elections in that the credibility of the state has been eroded due to the lack of political will to address lawlessness in society and government institutions. Thus, citizens have lost trust and value in going to the polls to vote, with Malinga (2021) particularly stating: "Let's face it, the ANC has killed South Africa's trust in the electoral system". This, in turn, delays the process of democratic consolidation. The extent of lawlessness in South Africa is severe to the extent that it is harming judicial independence and the attainment of transparency and accountability. This was evidenced by the necessity of Chief Justice, Raymond Zondo and some staff members of the commission needing security protection due to the work they were conducting at the commission. Zondo, some of the commission's staff members and their families received death threats that were related to the July 2021 unrest following Jacob Zuma's imprisonment for contempt of court (Mabuza, 2022, and Africanews, 2022).

Furthermore, the characteristics of lawlessness have eroded the democratic principle of the rule of law, as lawlessness is done by both the government and its citizens, thus reinforcing Volker's (2022) assertion that "One of the many problems facing us is the fact that far too many South Africans believe that they are entitled to get away with being lawless". This assertion is exemplified through Jacob Zuma pursuing a private prosecution case against journalist Karyn Maughn (and senior state advocate Billy Downer). Former president Zuma argues that the case relates to Downer leaking his private medical note to Maughn, a medical note that was presented to the court when Zuma applied for the postponement of his arms deal corruption case, and that this leakage was a violation of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act (Nxumalo, 2022, and Wicks, 2022). This case comes after the NPA refused to prosecute as Zuma's medical note did not include anything particularly sensitive and viewed the

charges as baseless (Wicks, 2022). Considering this, it must be stated that the characteristics of lawlessness also have negative implications on journalistic freedom and integrity, particularly when it involves the elite who have the means to use coercion and fear to prevent media freedom, accountability and transparency. Therefore, media freedom needs to be defended because it is in the interests of justice.

The following section, which also relates to the characteristics of lawlessness, will discuss the characteristics of militancy and violence.

7.3.9 Characteristics of militancy and violence

Post-apartheid South Africa's political culture has been characterized by militancy and violence, which have their roots in apartheid South Africa (chapter 6 section 6.5.1). Militant and violent characteristics are mutually reinforcing and, to an extent, a replica of each other. These characteristics are linked to participatory characteristics in that the former (militant) may operate through a large, sophisticated network of individuals who collectively work toward a common goal, and, if necessary, may recruit individuals and institutions who believe in this goal. This being the same modus operandi of MK soldiers during the apartheid era. The latter (violent characteristics) is also linked to participatory characteristics in that apartheid and democratic South Africa have shown how events like the July 2021 unrest in KZN and various service delivery protests which often turn violent can attract large numbers of people, and how these can spread to other parts of the country, including their associated crimes. However, the participatory nature of violent characteristics tends to be less organized or as thorough as the militant characteristics.

Within democratic South Africa, militant and violent characteristics can be linked to individualistic characteristics in that acts of criminality may be done to further the interests of a particular group at that point in time. These acts do not reflect the interests of the common good. For instance, the Tembisa protests of August 2022, which occurred at the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in Gauteng, resulted in the torching of municipal vehicles, buildings and the Ekurhuleni customer care centre. This

may have given citizens short-term satisfaction as they may have viewed their actions as inflicting harm to the state to get it to respond to their needs, however, this ended up leaving the broader citizenry in a worse situation as they may need to travel to other towns/or parts of the province to access services (Makhaza, 2022).

Considering the forgone, militant and violent characteristics will be discussed in conjunction as they are mutually reinforcing. These characteristics have not reinforced South Africa's democracy as they have proven to undermine human and political rights. This was evidenced by MKMVA members holding hostage Defence Minister Thandi Modise, her deputy minister, Thabang Makwetla, and Minister in the Presidency Mondli Gungubele. This situation occurred after members of MKMVA, and the respective ministers failed to reach an agreement concerning the compensation of former MK soldiers, resulting in MKMVA members blocking the doors of the meeting venue and preventing everyone from leaving (Savids, 2021).

According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2022) violence is defined as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation." Considering this definition, it can be stated that violence occurs in different forms and can occur overtly or covertly. Thus, considering the above situation, individuals' right to freedom, security and movement was violated, and by extension, this led to their right to dignity being violated because they were not treated with respect and courtesy. Additionally, it showed how strongly the MKMVA members felt they should be compensated and that every option was going to be exhausted to achieve this objective. This, in turn, demonstrates militant characteristics of aggression and persistence. The above situation may also be viewed as violent in that the blocking of doors resembled an act of intimidation which, by extension, led to the psychological abuse of the hostages.

Therefore, it can be stated that MKMVA is a potential threat to South Africa's democracy as it does not reflect or reinforce the interests of the country. This was demonstrated by their role in inciting violence when they camped outside former President Zuma's home in KZN while waiting for the police to arrest him for contempt of court, with Carl Niehaus, the MKMVA spokesperson at the time, making militant and threatening remarks that efforts to apprehend Zuma "will lead to massive instability, that will not be in the interest of our country" (Maree, 2021). Even though it was amalgamated with the SANDF after 1994, MKMVA continues to act like an independent army from the SANDF, thus reflecting that democratic South Africa is a country with two armies serving different interests. According to Maree (2021), although it is generally believed that the organization lacks the support needed from the military to carry out a full-fledged coup, they are nevertheless capable of causing significant disruption. Maree (2021) refers to the fact that some MKMVA members have resorted to crime to generate an income and are employing their military experience to establish or join syndicates that commit violent robberies comprising cash-in-transit vehicles. Thus, violating the rule of law.

Within broader society, the characteristics of violence and militancy have resulted in a more resistant society, and this leads to human rights also being violated. Legislation such as the Bantu education system and the ANC-led government's inability to provide an enabling environment for young people to have access to quality employment opportunities, has caused the youth to become more militant, resistant, and violent due to frustration and the system being covertly violent towards them (Clark, 2012:81). This assertion is supported by the fact that South Africa's youth (age 15-34) unemployment rate during the second quarter of 2022 was at 46,5% (STATSSA, 2022). Furthermore, the SAPS (2020:12) recorded 21 325 murders between April 2019 and March 2020, 779 of which were committed by children aged 10-17, and the Department of Correctional Services reported to have 42 000 young offenders in prisons nationwide with many of them citing socio-economic challenges for committing crimes like armed robberies and theft (Maine, 2022). The severity of this situation resulted in the government deploying the SANDF in 2019, particularly to the Western

Cape where violence and gangsterism are rife, in order to curb violent crimes and gangsterism (Heinecken, 2019). This decision thus demonstrates the militancy and violence of South Africa's society.

Militant and violent characteristics have negatively affected the realization of regular fair and free elections, both within the ANC and in society. According to Cilliers (2022:4), "There is likely to be considerable political turmoil in the run-up to the December 2022 elective conference, possibly accompanied by assassinations/murders and instances of disrupted meetings and crowd violence". This assertion is supported by the rising political killings of particularly municipal councillors in the eThekwini, Moses Mabhida and eMalahleni regions of KZN, resulting in municipalities spending money on security companies and bodyguards rather than on service delivery (Mboto, 2022). There have been 418 political assassinations in the country between 2000 and 2021, with 213 occurring in the previous seven years, with 118 in KZN (GI-TOC[64], 2022). This situation weakens democracy by contributing to the ANC and society being robbed of credible leadership, leading to regular, fair and free elections being undervalued. It also deters voters from going to the polls out of fear of intimidation, and prevents reform by deterring individuals from participating in democratic processes. This argument further demonstrates that militant and violent characteristics result in the rule of law being undermined, as the failure of mental reform from political representatives and society at large results in the apartheid modus operandi of the arms struggle becoming the standard of politics in democratic South Africa.

Considering the above, it can be stated that militant and violent characteristics have also eroded the system of separation of powers, checks and balances, accountability and transparency as the administration of government has become based on the use of coercion and intimidation to achieve personal and political objectives. This assertion is reinforced by Corruption Watch & Institute of Security Studies (2019:49) stating that intelligence agencies have been used "to support control of the ANC by the Jacob

[64] Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime.

Zuma faction and providing tools for the harassment and intimidation of opponents". This demonstrates that militant and violent characteristics are across all spheres of government. These characteristics are also increasingly hampering the democratic principle of media freedom. According to the South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF, 2022), at least fifty-nine distinct incidents of attack or verbal and physical harassment of field journalists have occurred in the last five years, prohibiting them from performing their duties. These attacks have mainly been from criminals, neighbourhoods where reporting takes place, political parties and even the SAPS (SANEF, 2022). The lack of urgency in addressing this issue may result in the killing of journalists to ensure silence and the persistence of criminality in various sectors of society.

The following section will discuss the characteristics of unquestioning devotion.

7.3.10 Characteristics of unquestioning devotion

The term unquestioning refers to the acceptance of a situation or actions without any hesitation or criticism (Collins Dictionaries, 2022a), while devotion denotes a deep sense of love or loyalty to a cause, individual(s), or God (Macmillan Dictionary, 2022). Considering these descriptions, within the context of politics unquestioning devotion can be described as political representatives' strong sense of loyalty to their political parties and comrades, as well as their strong sense of support for the actions/objectives that they pursue. Considering this, it can be stated that within the context of South Africa, the characteristics of unquestioning devotion originate from the country's liberation struggle during which time strong bonds/attachments were established between freedom fighters and the movements they were affiliated to.

In South Africa, the characteristics of unquestioning devotion have proven to be linked to subject-participant characteristics as the country has a political elite that holds politically liberal views but has previously displayed a subject/passive demeanour toward their political leaders. This form of subject-participant characteristics developed particularly during former President Zuma's second term in office. During this era,

Zuma's cabinet consisted of some politically enlightened ministers but some of them were rarely able to make decisions independently relating to their ministries without authorization from Zuma, and this can be attributed to their unquestionable devotion to Zuma, the ANC, or the strong sense of authoritarianism that Zuma instilled which created fear (or the need for ministers to protect their livelihoods/jobs). This assertion is reinforced by president Ramaphosa's testimony at the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture. Ramaphosa stated that even though he had openly expressed his disapproval of some of Zuma's choices, like the removal of Pravin Gordan and Mcebisi Jonas as Finance Minister and Deputy Finance Minister respectively, there was a certain limit to this because, "A more confrontational approach would most likely have led to my removal from office, with the same consequences as a resignation, in that my ability to effect change would have been greatly constrained, if not brought to an end" (Ramaphosa, 2021).

The characteristics of unquestioning devotion are also linked to individualistic characteristics in that this act of devotion from political representatives can at times be directed at advancing their political careers and their socio-economic status, rather than being toward the principles of South Africa's constitution. This unquestioning devotion and individualistic characteristics were demonstrated by Zuma's twelve cabinet reshuffles, in which he removed certain ministers who criticized his government and kept those who were loyal to him, even if they lacked competence (van Onselen, 2017b, and Gallens & Basson, 2017). In demonstrating this, Gallens and Basson (2017) stated that "Zuma has replaced Gordhan *(former finance minister)* with Malusi Gigaba, the former home affairs minister, ANC Youth League leader and known Zuma loyalist", and that Zuma retained Bathabile Dlamini (former Social Development Minister) despite "a scathing Constitutional Court judgment against her for her role in failing to find a new service provider to distribute social grants to 17 million beneficiaries".

Considering the above, it can be stated that the characteristics of unquestioning devotion (and a cabinet that lacks cohesion and stability) are detrimental to South

Africa's democracy as they lead to the erosion of respect for human rights because government administration is not focused on citizens interest, but rather on individual and party interests. By extension, this has harmed the government's ability to establish coherent and purposeful policies that address the socio-economic conditions of society (Schreiber, 2016). This is a human rights violation because it has harmed the delivery of public goods and services, human development, and, by extension, has violated citizen's right to human dignity as the country's poor economic performance, originating from this distorted unquestioning devotion has compromised citizen's ability to generate a sustainable income/or have quality jobs (Sadie & Patel, 2020:4). This violation to human dignity is evidenced by the fact that over 17 million South Africans were receiving social grants by the year 2017 and over 25% of citizens were living below the food poverty line (Sadie & Patel, 2020:4).

Characteristics of unquestioning devotion have also eroded the rule of law in that incompetence rather than meritocracy has become the state's standard operating procedure. According to Van Vuuren (2021), the rewards that usually accompany unquestioning devotion impede the socio-economic prospects of the country and its citizens as they include,

> "sweeping ethical lapses under the carpet, often labelling such transgressions as victimless crimes; access to capital and tenders; shareholding; lucrative directorships and managerial positions; access to information such as tender processes; favourable outcomes of tender decisions; and other forms of exclusivity. Upon retirement or other forms of departure, loyalists are rewarded with a golden parachute. In more serious cases there may even be the promise of non-prosecution for crimes and other misdemeanours".

Considering the above, the erosion of the rule of law in South Africa has been demonstrated by top officials in the NPA and SAPS demonstrating unquestionable devotion to politicians in South Africa. Advocates Nomgcobo Jiba and Lawrence Mrwebi who served as the head of the National Prosecuting Services (NPS) and head of the Specialised Commercial Crimes unit respectively, lost their jobs at the NPA in 2019 and were almost disbarred when it was revealed that they had used their

positions to protect a number of people who were the subject of serious criminal accusations rather than for the good of the public (Burger, 2016 and The Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2019). Jiba and Mrwebi failed to prosecute high-profile individuals, including former President Jacob Zuma for fraud and corruption and unlawfully withdrawing the murder and corruption charges against the former director of the Crime Intelligence Division of the SAPS, Richard Mdluli (Burger, 2016 and Corruption Watch & Institute of Security Studies, 2019:22-23 & 27). According to Burger (2016) Mdluli, who was "dedicated to protecting Zuma" was appointed two months after Zuma became President in 2009 without being subjected to the required screening or evaluation and without input from senior SAPS personnel.

The above situation demonstrates that Jiba and Mrwebi's violation of the rule of law, in turn, resulted in the principles of accountability and transparency also being violated, which collectively goes against the interest of justice. The characteristics of unquestioning devotion are also prevalent in broader society and have eroded the principle of regular, fair and free elections. This assertion is reinforced by the fact that South Africans have continued to vote for the ANC at the polls (even if their majority is declining), despite the above-mentioned situation (and others) that demonstrate the blatant disregard for the rule of law, accountability and transparency. Thus, the unquestioning devotion that citizens have toward the ANC contributes to the retention of unethical leaders. This has eroded democracy as citizens have taken on more passive/subject characteristics within the political system by seemingly being under the impression that the ANC is the only feasible option for them, forgetting that it is not the only organization that liberated South Africans from apartheid as there were organizations like the SACP, PAC, UDM, AZAPO, etc. (Mlambo, 2019:214).

Furthermore, this unquestioning devotion from the citizenry has resulted in the process of voting not creating any tangible reform and has contributed to the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances being compromised because unethical leaders are retained and allowed to continue disregarding the oversight systems that are in place due to the (sometimes blind) unquestioning devotion that

they have towards their colleagues/comrades. This situation has contributed to the characteristics of apathy and “us versus them” being established.

7.3.11 Characteristics of apathy and ‘us versus them’

Considering the above discussion, it can be stated that the characteristics of “us versus them” have their roots in the characteristics of unquestionable devotion. The characteristics of “us versus them” can also be viewed as a by-product of the characteristics of apathy, which is why both these characteristics will be discussed together. According to the American Psychological Association (2022), the “us versus them” effect or ideology refers to “the tendency of individuals to view the social world in terms of an ingroup (“us”) and an outgroup (“them”). Consequently, people prefer to associate with those who are similar over those who are different, preferentially allocate resources to similar others, and hold more positive beliefs about similar others”. This means that characteristics of “us versus them” can be viewed as a form of discrimination, with Powell (2017) stating that it is a “process of othering” and “It is based on the conscious or unconscious assumption that a certain identified group poses a threat to the favoured group”. This means that the unfavoured or outgroup is tantamount to being classified as the enemy.

Apathy refers to “behaviour that shows no interest or energy and shows that someone is unwilling to take action, especially over something important” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). It includes the lack of emotion or feeling (Collins Dictionary, 2022b), and it may result from psychological, medical, or environmental factors (Mast, Ertle, Kolanowski, Mountain, Moniz-Cook & Halek, 2022:16).

Considering the above descriptions, it can be stated that the characteristics of “us versus them” are reflective of participant characteristics because they relate to the recruitment and/or establishment of allies with a similar ideology to achieve certain (political) objectives. They are also linked to individualistic characteristics in that they are directed at satisfying a certain group’s interests rather than those of society at large. In this light, the characteristics of “us versus them” have been evidenced by the

increasing incidents of racism in society, which in turn, reflects society's lack of social cohesion.

Racism in South Africa can be found across the majority of sectors of society, and it is exacerbated by inequality (SAHRC, 2021). Recent examples include Stellenbosch University student Theuns du Toit urinating on the property of black student Babalo Ndwayana at the campus residence in 2022 (Zulu, 2022). and Kobus Classen, Johan Nel and Stephanus van der Westhuizen assaulting two black teenage boys in December 2022 at the Maselspoort Resort in Bloemfontein after the boys attempted to use a communal swimming pool which the men (Classen, Nel and van der Westhuizen) argued was reserved for white individuals (Mntambo, 2023). During the 2020/2021 financial year, the SAHRC reportedly received 5 464 complaints relating to individuals' right to equality being violated due to race and race-based hate speech (Daniels, 2022). Racism in South Africa is a clear reflection of "us versus them" characteristics and it hinders the country's efforts at consolidating democracy.

The characteristics of apathy are closely linked to subject-participant characteristics as it can be stated since the new dispensation, South Africans of the post-apartheid era (especially young people) are more politically informed and/or educated, they have progressive views on how the country can improve and this is in part due to social media platforms which have provided an alternative and conducive platforms for political organizing (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 2019, and Patel & Graham, 2019). This is vastly different from the citizenry of pre-1994 when some groups were denied all forms of political participation. However, due to factors like corruption, poor communication between the state and the citizenry, lack of socio-economic development, etc., (which can be attributed to the characteristics of "us versus them") citizens have tended to feel powerless and have taken on a more subject/passive role by participating less in the political system (Sebola, 2017:28, Accord, 2019, and Patel & Graham, 2019).

Furthermore, due to the characteristics of “us versus them” generating “fear, factionalism and selfishness” (Schreiber, 2016), apathy within the ANC can be reflected by political representatives not criticizing or challenging authority due to the need to secure one’s political career or livelihood. In this light, Blow (2014, cited by Sein, 2019:26) states that “those in power (particularly those to the right of the political spectrum) often obfuscate the truth and purposefully disenfranchise those who may otherwise oppose them”. Within society, apathy can be seen along the class divide whereby more impoverished groups and communities tend to be more apathetic. These apathetic characteristics have been resembled through citizens resorting to crime for socio-economic stability as a result of government failures (Bici, 2022). This situation further reflects how apathetic characteristics are closely linked to individualistic characteristics.

The characteristics of apathy and “us versus them” have had negative implications for democracy in South Africa. These characteristics have eroded the respect for human rights and the rule of law in that the latter (“us versus them”) has resulted in rampant corruption across all three spheres of government, thus violating citizens’ right to dignity and safety as their access to education and basic services are compromised. This inhibits them from being financially stable through employment and from living in safe environments as crime is heightened by the lack of local economic development (Roberts, 2019:39-41). This situation has contributed to the characteristics of apathy which have also eroded the respect for human rights. For instance, the growing housing backlog in the country and the reluctancy of government officials and bureaucrats to address this is tantamount to citizens’ right to housing being violated. This situation has led to increasing apathy among the citizenry and it has contributed to the rising incidents of land invasions which in turn, violate other citizen’s right to have access to their properties (South African Housing & Infrastructure Fund [SAHIF], 2021:1, 2 & 5).

Considering the above discussion, it can also be stated that the characteristics of apathy and “us versus them” have eroded the principle of regular, fair and free

elections. According to Roberts (2019:41), “corruption and self-enrichment by politicians and state officials have left many young people feeling cynical”. This assertion relates to the characteristics of “us versus them” which have contributed to reducing politics from a noble profession to a profession that is viewed by the electorate as perpetuating self-enrichment and the abuse of power. This has led to apathetic characteristics also increasing as citizens feel distrustful of the ruling party and even opposition parties’ ability to bring tangible reform should they run the government. Bici (2022) supports this assertion by stating,

> “The opposition parties offer no alternative plan. Their narrow obsession with the death of the ANC impedes their ability to think beyond that point. This leads to the apathy of the population during elections, the majority of whom are not prepared to vote for a corrupt ANC but then refuse to vote for any other party.”

This situation has contributed to many citizens, especially the youth disengaging from democratic processes like voting, not because they do not trust the electoral system/the IEC (Roberts, 2019:41), but because voting has yielded the same, if not worse results, that is, rampant corruption, rising poverty, lack of economic growth and unemployment.

The characteristics of apathy and “us versus them” have also eroded the system of checks and balances, accountability and transparency. Like with the characteristics of unquestioning devotion, the characteristics of “us versus them” has led to the establishment of a political elite whose standard operating procedure is based on “cronyism and nepotism that is often even defended as being morally acceptable” (Van Vuuren, 2021). Individuals who do not form part of the ingroup (“us”) and who refuse to toe the line or adapt to the standards can face severe punishment like the “total exclusion from privileges, ostracisation, malicious badmouthing and even death” (Van Vuuren, 2021). This situation creates a working environment in which rules are ignored and oversight is not conducted to ensure the abuse of power for personal gain and prevent accountability. It also creates another group of political elites who operate on apathy and fear (“them”) and do not pursue transparency or accountability by reporting

unethical conduct to other state organs like the chapter nine institutions in the country. This assertion is reinforced by President Ramaphosa's testimony at the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, whereby he mentioned that, among the alternatives available to him, "The third option was to acquiesce and thereby abet the committing of misdeeds" (Ramaphosa, 2021). This was something he was incapable of doing as he viewed it as a violation of his principles (Ramaphosa, 2021). Ramaphosa further stated that "The fourth option available to me was to remain in my position as Deputy President and keep silent" (Ramaphosa, 2021).

The characteristics of "us versus them" have the potential to erode judicial independence. This is evidenced by the many criticisms that the judiciary and Chief Justice Raymond Zondo has faced following the release of the state of capture reports, with former President Zuma and his supporters labelling the reports as "unlawful and filled with gossip" (Mbhele, 2022). This situation demonstrates that the judiciary has now become the "them" as the Zondo reports were a critique of Zuma and his administration, which is equivalent to being the "us"/ingroup. For democracy to function effectively, all state institutions need to be able to be criticized as this can improve society. However, it becomes problematic when critiques turn into blatant attacks and insults from political leaders or the executive arm of government to the judicial arm of government without any factual evidence and instead for political ends.

This situation has been reflected by former Tourism Minister Lindiwe Sisulu who wrote an article where she described the judges as "mentally colonised Africans" and "House Negroes" (Sisulu, 2022). The fact that these assertions came from a former senior member of the executive and parliament, who has a long history in government, is problematic because this can reduce public trust in the judiciary, with some citizens resorting to violence, which would be detrimental to democracy (Ferreira, 2022). Her assertions also have the ability to erode judicial independence with Raymond Zondo stating that "She is creating a situation where some sectors of society may well say, we are not taking our disputes to the courts, and in fact they might have less respect for courts and their orders because she says these black judges are basically puppets

of their masters." Sisulu's utterances were made just after mentioning that she would be running for the ANC presidential position in December 2022 and her tactic of attacking the judiciary demonstrates that she was after the support of individuals within the Zuma faction (i.e., the RET faction) (Lekabe, 2022, and Erasmus, 2022a).

Considering the above discussion that demonstrated how the characteristics of "us versus them" feed into the characteristics of apathy, the following section needs to discuss the characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement.

7.3.12 Characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement

The characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement have been growing in South Africa and this is due to a range of economic, social and political factors. This situation is particularly evident among the youth who have expressed their lack of trust in South Africa's democracy as they feel that "political parties do not have their concerns and interests at heart" (ACCORD, 2019). The characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement are linked to subject-participant characteristics. South Africa's apartheid history, particularly the 1976 Soweto uprisings, SASO and the BCM (chapter 3 section 3.7.1), including post-apartheid events like the various service delivery, labour, and student-related protests have demonstrated that South Africa has participant/participatory characteristics. Although some conventional demonstrations still occur, citizens, have taken on a more passive and subject stance which is reflected by the declining voter turnout (45,86% during the 2021 local government elections) (IEC, 2021b). This in turn demonstrates South Africa's subject-participant characteristics that are linked to the characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement.

The characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement have harmed South Africa's democracy, particularly regarding respecting human and political rights. The non-participation and disengagement of South Africans has often meant that some form of engagement does take place which is undemocratic. This was the case when taxi operators in Pretoria went on strike in 2020 (which quickly spread to other

provinces) to demand the unpaid taxi industry's R1,1 billion in Covid-19 relief funds. This occurred after several delays and the lack of communication by the Department of Transport concerning the disbursement of the relief funds (Mkentane, 2022, Mabaso, 2021, and Sizani, 2021). These protests turned violent, with other drivers and commuters being intimidated and assaulted, bus drivers were prevented from operating, and some passengers were forced to get out of the busses (Tlhabye, Ndlazi & Ntuli, 2020).

The above situation is a demonstration of how non-participation and/or disengagement from democratic means of doing things can result in human rights violations like the right to freedom and security, free movement and free trade/occupation. Furthermore, forcing passengers who were from all walks of life out of the busses could have further meant that these individuals' right to education, healthcare, and access to other government services were violated. When non-participation and/or disengagement occurs and it takes a violent turn, it also has negative implications for citizen's political rights. In provinces such as the Eastern Cape, KZN and Gauteng it resulted in citizens being denied the right to vote, campaign or engage in any political activity in the run-up to and during the 2021 local government elections (Bruce, 2021). Thus, South Africa's characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement have eroded the rule of law and the delivery of regular, fair and free elections.

Furthermore, the characteristics of non-participation and/or disengagement are detrimental to the growth of a pluralist system of political parties and organizations. According to the IEC (2019b), 285 political parties contested the 2019 general elections, proving that the number of political parties has been growing since 1994. However, due to political parties' dominance, community-based organizations and non-profit organizations, particularly those concerned with service delivery, are prone to disengaging from politics, which results in very low levels of public involvement in these groups (Piper & Nadvi, 2010, cited by Nwauche & Flanigan, 2022:124). This situation is dangerous because the growth of civil society groups is jeopardized by the

absence of public engagement. Additionally, the absence of public participation further means that these organizations have very little ability to perform their watchdog and monitoring functions of government and public sector officers because part of their mandate comes from engaging with the citizenry (De Wet, 2010, cited by Nwauche & Flanigan 2022:121). This has contributed to the system of checks and balances and accountability, and transparency deteriorating, particularly at the local government level where corruption is rampant (Corruption Watch, 2021:2, and Mkentane,2022b).

Considering the above, it can be stated that South Africans' declining levels of democratic means of participation not only harm efforts that are directed at constructing the legitimacy of the state and consolidating democracy, but also reflect the low level of trust that citizens have in state institutions. This has contributed to the country's political culture having dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics.

7.3.13 Dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics

Considering the above discussion on the characteristics of lawlessness (section 7.3.8), it can further be stated that South Africa has displayed dynamic and confrontational characteristics which feed into its existing protest characteristics, both having been evident before and after 1994. As such, dynamic and confrontational characteristics need to be discussed in conjunction with the protest characteristics. Dynamic and confrontational characteristics are linked to both participant and moralistic characteristics. In democratic South Africa, this has been evidenced by events like the #FeesMustFall Movement and the #ZumaMustFall Movement. These events displayed the country's protest characteristics and participant characteristics in that they were able to attract many supporters from different racial and socio-economic classes/backgrounds, resulting in protest action across the country and immense media attention from the international community (Mavunga, 2019:82 and Khubeka, 2017).

The #FeesMustFall Movement was initially about tertiary students protesting the government's decision to increase tuition fees, especially since other students were

already academically excluded due to incurring debt. But soon, the protests became about broader issues like the decolonization of universities, language of instruction, student accommodation and outsourcing of services (Mavunga, 2019:81-82), with students ultimately calling for free higher education. This reflects the moralistic characteristics of the #FeesMustFall Movement. The #ZumaMustFall Movement also displayed moralistic characteristics as it was not only about the removal of former President Zuma, but protestors were also highlighting their dissatisfaction with issues like poor leadership, rising inequality, high cost of living, and deterioration of South Africa's democracy and institutions (Satgar, 2016).

Considering the above discussion, it can be stated that South Africa's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics have played a role in promoting respect for human rights like the right to education, demonstration and human dignity. Furthermore, political rights and the right to free, regular and fair elections are principles that over 50 civil society organizations are currently promoting by establishing a nationwide campaign against Parliament passing the Electoral Amendment Bill (My Vote Counts, 2022, Duma, 2022, and Sithole, 2022).

Civil society organizations, including the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, Defend our Democracy, the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation and Rivonia Circle argue that the present Electoral Amendment Bill could jeopardize the general elections of 2024 if it is not reformed. These organizations further state that the bill is undemocratic as it requires independent candidates to obtain approximately 8 000 signatures before running for elections, whereas political parties only need 1 000 signatures. Thus, they are threatening Parliament with litigation and have planned protest action for the upcoming months (My Vote Counts, 2022, Duma, 2022, and Sithole, 2022). The campaign against the Electoral Amendment Bill further reinforces the principle of a pluralist system of political parties and organizations.

In addition, South Africa's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics have contributed to reinforcing freedom of the media as unconventional forms of political

participation/or engagement are increasingly becoming a norm in society. Due to the internet and social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook being available to everyone irrespective of their location, South Africans, especially the youth, have managed to use it as a tool to discuss issues and mobilize large and different audiences towards a specific goal (Olagunju, Frankish & Wade, 2022:4-5). Thus, in today's era, citizen's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics tend to start through social media platforms before they physically materialize in broader society through protest and demonstrations (Olagunju, Frankish & Wade, 2022:4). This in turn reinforces the necessity of free media as a tool to educate and create reform.

South Africa's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics have both reinforced and eroded the rule of law. South Africa's re-entry into the international community after 1994 meant that the country would be exposed to not only the possibility of international investment opportunities and trade, but also the exposure of people from different countries. The latter has been a problem in South Africa since there has been a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly relating to people from the African continent. This has resulted in the country having increasingly violent xenophobic incidents towards the end of the Mbeki administration (2008) (Ukwandu, 2017:51 & 56).

Operation Dudula (Dulula which means "knock down" or "force out" in the Zulu language) was established in 2021 in Soweto following the July 2021 unrest in KZN, and is an anti-illegal immigration and anti-foreigner group (Peralta, 2022, and Myeni, 2022b). Operation Dudula rose to popularity almost instantly, leading to the emergence of several anti-immigrant organizations in working-class neighbourhoods around Gauteng and KZN, either with the same name or close versions, like the Alexandra Dudula Movement. The group focused on drug traffickers and businesses that employed illegal foreign workers. With the Minister of Home Affairs not having records of the nearly 3,95 million foreigners living in the country, the group initiated protest action (Myeni, 2022b). Although Operation Dudula was promoting the rule of law by sensitizing the government of the need for stricter border controls, the protests

undermined the rule of law as they resulted in the murder of Elvis Nyathi, a Zimbabwean national, many civilians being injured, and foreign businesses being destroyed as their owners refused to shut them down (Molyneaux, 2022, and Simelane, 2022).

South Africa's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics have in the past resulted in an improved system of checks and balances, accountability and transparency, as evidenced by the efforts of the TAC in obtaining medication for HIV-positive patients. However, it can be stated that South Africa's increasingly dynamic, confrontational and violent protest characteristics reflect the deteriorating standards of checks and balances, accountability and transparency. These characteristics are mainly evident at the local government level, the sphere of government that is the closest to the people as it is responsible for building local democracy and providing basic services to the citizenry (Mashamaite & Lethoko, 2018:119). This assertion is reinforced by a Corruption Watch report titled *South Africa Needs Clean Hands*, which found that the majority of corruption at the local government level happens at the municipal manager's office. Bribery, procurement irregularities, employment irregularities, abuse of power and embezzlement were the most prevalent forms of corruption, accounting for 28%, 24%, 11%, 9%, and 8% of all local government corruption, respectively (Corruption Watch, 2021:2).

Thus, considering the above information from Corruption Watch and Municipal IQ's data presented in chapter 6 section 6.5.2 on the annual violent service delivery protests, it can be stated that there is a direct relationship between South Africa's dynamic, confrontational and protest characteristics, and poor governance at local government level. This, in turn, links to the characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption.

7.3.14 Characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption

Amnesty International (1993:2) conceptualizes impunity by stating:

> "impunity means exemption from punishment. More broadly, the term conveys a sense of wrongdoers escaping justice or any serious form of accountability for their deeds. Impunity can arise at any stage before, during, or after the judicial process: in not investigating the crimes; in not bringing the suspected culprits to trial; in not reaching a verdict or convicting them, despite the existence of convincing evidence which would establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in not sentencing those convicted, or sentencing them to derisory punishments out of all proportion to the gravity of their crimes; in not enforcing sentences."

Considering this conceptualization, it must be stated that impunity essentially means the lack of or absence of accountability (i.e., non-accountability) (accountability is defined in chapter 6 section 6.4.6). Thus, the term impunity cannot be discussed separately from the term non-accountability.

South Africa's characteristics of impunity and non-accountability have greatly contributed to the characteristics of corruption (defined in chapter 6 section 6.5.3) persisting and becoming ingrained in society. The characteristics of impunity, non-accountability, and corruption are detrimental to the sustainability of South Africa's democracy as they are linked to individualistic characteristics. This is evidenced by the weak financial conditions of the country's SOEs, which have rendered them on the verge of collapse. The final reports of the State Capture Commission found that Transnet lost R41 billion due to procurement contracts being irregularly awarded to organizations connected to the Gupta family (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022d:9), Eskom lost R14,7 billion due to state capture and associated corruption from its employees and private consulting firms (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2022e:990), and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) contributed approximately R63 million to the Gupta family's pockets during Hlaudi Motsoeneng's administration. By the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the SABC was losing R1 billion annually and was pleading for a bailout from Parliament by 2019 (Mahlaka, Davis & Payne, 2021).

The financial losses over several years demonstrate the individualistic characteristics of the private and public sectors, and that the executive arm of government has

abandoned its constitutional principles and obligations for individual gain. Furthermore, although the Constitution gives parliament authority to conduct oversight of all state organs (South Africa, 1996:29-30), Parliament, and particularly the Portfolio Committee on State Enterprises, have repeatedly failed to conduct oversight and hold the executive accountable. This has allowed corruption and state capture to persist. Thus, the characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption have eroded the system of checks and balances and Parliament's inaction reinforces the assertion that these characteristics have become a norm, starting at the highest office of law-making.

According to Chitiga-Mabugu, Maisonnave, Henseler and Mabugu (2021) when functioning effectively and efficiently, SOEs play a crucial role in the country's revenue-generating capacity and the provision of public goods and services. However, these objectives cannot be realized due to the characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption being part of the standard operating procedures in SOEs and other government institutions. This situation has resulted in a lack of respect for human rights which has mainly affected the middle class and the poor. This is evidenced by the fact that Denel, the country's state-owned aerospace and military technology company, has lost approximately R250 million due to corruption and state capture (Mahlaka, Davis & Payne, 2021). This SOE was, at the time of writing, unable to pay workers' salaries (with some only receiving 20% of their salaries), thus resulting in some workers losing their homes and cars, and due to medical aids lapsing workers had to obtain their chronic medication by cash, while others were surviving by requesting food parcels (Opperman, 2021). Mawonga Madolo, a metal industry coordinator at the National Union of Mineworkers, which represents employees at Denel Land Systems, states that the situation has affected worker's mental health with at least two workers committing suicide due to financial stress (Mahlaka, Davis & Payne, 2021, and Opperman, 2021). Thus, citizen's rights to fair labour practices, human dignity, life, access to housing, education, healthcare and food have been violated.

The characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption have eroded accountability and transparency because even after the completion of the Zondo Commission, Parliament is still struggling to perform its oversight duties and hold the executive accountable. This is evidenced by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Tourism issuing summons to the former Minister of Tourism, Lindiwe Sisulu, after she failed to attend important meetings to account for her ministry and provide reasons for her absence (Ndenze, 2022, and Mahlati, 2022). Sisulu dishonoured the summons by being absent and instead sent her legal counsel (Mahlati, 2022). This situation is worrying and demonstrates that the characteristics of impunity and nonaccountability have become a norm for some senior members of the executive who should know and act better. This situation feeds into the characteristics of corruption and shows how Parliament, the Constitution and the citizenry are blatantly undermined.

The characteristics of impunity, non-accountability and corruption have led to the erosion of the rule of law. Pillay (2022) argues that government and private sector individuals prioritize projects that offer chances for bribes and kickbacks over those that have a favourable influence on social welfare. This leads to poor quality of infrastructure and public services, denying citizens the right to dignity and quality public goods and services. Thus, Pillay (2022) argues that in effect “the poor must pay an additional tax in the form of bribes for access to overpriced and inefficient State services”. The severity of these characteristics has been evidenced by the assassination of Babita Deokaran, who was the chief director of financial accounting at the Gauteng Department of Health (Cruywagen & Heywood, 2021). She was an important witness in a fraud investigation involving unlawful and irregular COVID-19 personal protection equipment tenders. She exposed corrupt colleagues, including powerful politicians who had reportedly rigged tenders for personal gain (Global Initiative, 2021).

Furthermore, Eskom has been plagued by acts of criminality and sabotage, which the public enterprises minister has described as being attributed to “mafia’ groups (Naidoo, 2022). The acts of sabotage range from petty criminals to complex and

specialized syndicates found in large fossil-fuel-burning power plants like those in Mpumalanga. According to Gordan (2022, cited by Naidoo, 2022) the “coal mafia” identified in Mpumalanga “has infiltrated the structures of legitimate companies and set up parallel operations in illegal mining and coal supplies that have thrived. That’s resulted in Eskom receiving sub-standard loads of the fuel, including pieces of metal and rubble that damage its plants”. Eskom must also deal with being charged for thousands of litres of fuel that was not delivered, and employees colluding with companies to facilitate diesel and cable theft (Illidge, 2023, and Naidoo, 2022). This disrupts plant operations, allowing contractors to have a continuous flow of work (Naidoo, 2022). This has caused continuous load shedding that harms business operations, revenue collection and food security.

According to Illidge (2023), Eskom managers have attributed the increasing acts of sabotage to being either politically motivated or perpetrated by angry employees who were overlooked for promotions or other incentives. The severity of the situation has resulted in André de Ruyter, Eskom’s then-CEO surviving an attack on his life after having a cup of coffee at work that was spiked with cyanide (Wiener, 2023). The SANDF has been deployed to some power stations in December 2022 to protect workers from criminal elements, as some managers are forced to wear bullet proof vests to work, and their children and spouses being escorted to school and work (Illidge, 2023). Considering this, including the arguments made on the characteristics of lawlessness, militancy, violence, unquestioning devotion, us versus them, entitlement, etc., it can be stated that democratic South Africa has been deteriorating into a mafia state.

In defining a mafia state, McCarthy-Jones and Turner (2021:1198) state that

> “the mafia state is run as a criminal organization in which the country’s political leader presides over a network of family and friends who make private gains from state action. The focus is on the mode of state management and its purpose. However, in one variation, the mafia state can be engaged in cooperation with organized crime groups outside of the state. This relationship

involves state personnel from the top leadership down participating in, possibly even taking over, illicit activities normally associated with organized crime".

Considering this definition, it should be stated that impunity, non-accountability and corruption persist due to a lack of political will and strong leadership to hold wrongdoers accountable. This has had a corrosive impact on socio-economic transformation, institutional integrity and citizens' trust in exercising political rights in democratic processes.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This seventh chapter aimed to develop a typology of South Africa's political culture. In doing this, the characteristics of South Africa's political culture (column A) (from chapters 4 and 5), the theoretical characteristics of political culture and the characteristics of democracy were tabulated and briefly explained in table 1 section 7.2. Table 1 was followed by table 2 which aimed to show the link between the three characteristics in column A, B and C, and in turn demonstrate the influence that these characteristics have on South Africa's political culture. By discussing the characteristics of South Africa's political culture (column A) (from chapters 4 and 5), chapter seven thus demonstrated the changes that have occurred in South Africa's political culture since the new dispensation (1994) and within the ANC as the ruling party.

By tabulating the characteristics of South Africa's political culture (column A), with the corresponding theoretical and democratic characteristics (columns B and C respectively), table 2 thus demonstrated the link that columns A, B and C have with one another, and the influence that this link has on South Africa's democracy and constructing a democratic political culture. In discussing the linkages that are in table 2, the chapter also demonstrated how the characteristics of South Africa's political culture (column A) and the theoretical characteristics of political culture (column B) have contributed to certain events in society that reinforced and deteriorated the country's democracy and/or democratic political culture. This has, in turn,

demonstrated what the government ought to do to reinforce South Africa's unbalanced /fluctuating democracy and democratic political culture.

Thus, the next chapter (chapter 8) will provide a conclusion of the state of South Africa's political culture and possible recommendations to improve the status quo given the findings of chapter seven's typology and the previous chapters.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Political culture is a concept that manifests in unique ways in every nation. This is no different in South Africa as the country's political culture went through tremendous changes from the pre-apartheid era, the apartheid era, and the current post-apartheid era. Throughout these eras, South Africa's political culture has had a great influence on the relations between the state and the citizenry, and the country's style of governance by the political elite. However, South Africa's political culture in post-apartheid South Africa, which is the focus of this study, has resulted in the roles of the political elite and the citizenry in the political system being brought into question. This is due to the concern surrounding the unmatched or ailing relationship between political culture and democracy that has resulted in poor governance and weak political leadership, with citizens expressing a high degree of dissatisfaction toward the ANC-led government. As a result, the problem statement of this thesis is: 'Has the ANC built a political culture that is conducive to South Africa's democracy?'

In light of the above problem statement, this thesis will conclude by presenting an overview of the key points and arguments made from chapters one to seven, as well as the findings derived from the research objectives stated in chapter one. It will also provide recommendations for further research.

8.2 A SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ONE TO SEVEN

8.2.1 Chapter one's summary

Chapter one provided a brief description and origins of the term *culture*, explaining the importance or value of the concept of *political culture* to a country's political system. It highlighted how democratic characteristics started to develop in South Africa's political culture during the apartheid era due to the formation of various liberation movements aimed at fighting the apartheid regime to establish a democratic state.

However, despite these democratic characteristics being established in South Africa's political culture, the positive results they were supposed to produce in post-apartheid South Africa were not completely realized. The democratic characteristics in South Africa's political culture were not evident at the ground level as, over time, democracy under the ANC-led government did not result in a more socio-economically equal or inclusive society. Instead, the political culture of democratic South Africa reflected undemocratic and less people-centred characteristics as there was low economic growth that pushed ordinary citizens into poverty, there was a decay of moral standards that led to an unethical political elite, and, in turn, an unethical government with weak political leadership. This deterioration of South Africa's political culture and democracy has delayed the process of democratic consolidation.

8.2.2 Chapter two's summary

Chapter two aimed to analyse the points of departure of the theories of political culture, elite theory and democratic consolidation by providing a broad conceptualization of these theories. Therefore, the chapter began by conceptualizing the term *theory* and although it identified Emile Durkheim, David Humes, Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville as the ancestors of the theory of political culture, it considered mainly the contributions by Alexis de Tocqueville as being the true origins of the theory of political culture. From the work of De Tocqueville, political culture theory developed during the late 1950s and 1960s due to the contributions of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. Almond and Verba identified three types of political cultures, namely, parochial, subject, and participant political culture and three types of mixed political cultures, namely, parochial-subject culture, the subject-participant culture and the parochial-participant culture. The chapter discussed the relationship between political culture and political socialization.

Chapter two also provided the contributions by Daniel Elazar of the mid-1960's, who identified three political cultures, namely, the individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic political cultures. The chapter provided an understanding of the origins of elite theory from the perspectives of Vilfred Pareto and Charles Wright Mills. Chapter two concluded by conceptualizing the term democracy and its key characteristics and conceptualizing the term democratic consolidation.

8.2.3 Chapter three's summary

Chapter three aimed to analyse the ANC's contribution to South Africa's political culture before 1994. The chapter began by describing South Africa's pre-apartheid era and this in turn, gave insight into how the country's political culture was during that time. It described how colonialism occurred in South Africa, the establishment of anti-colonial organizations and how the apartheid regime came to be established. The chapter also outlined the growth of the ANC as the party developed relations with other organizations, and it established the ANCYL (1944) and the ANCWL (1943). These organizations (ANCYL and ANCWL) played a key role following the adoption of the ANCYL Programme of Action in 1949 as they contributed to the Defiance Campaign (1952), the adoption of the Freedom Charter (1955) and the women's march (1956).

Chapter three outlined the role of the Communist Party in establishing international ties with the Comintern in Moscow, Russia, and adopting its ideology of the NDR, which was later adopted (1969) by the ANC after forging an alliance with the Communist Party. This ideology became a driving force behind the ANC employing the arms struggle for defeating the apartheid regime. Thus, violence became the order of the day in South Africa between the 1970s and 1980s and in the process, contributed to the establishment of the Black Consciousness Movement which organized the Soweto student uprisings and protests of 1976. This event contributed to weakening the apartheid regime as the international community sanctioned it.

The UDF and COSATU were established in the mid-1980s, with the banned ANC making calls to make townships and the country ungovernable. During this period, many banned organizations like the ANC and UDF started unbanning themselves, the NP lost support to the right-wing Conservative Party and violence and corruption were rife. Thus, when F.W. de Klerk came to power in 1989, the ending of apartheid became more imminent, and he soon released ANC leaders from prison and unbanned liberation movements. This paved the way for dialogue concerning South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy and resulted in the country's first democratic elections of 1994 with the ANC securing a victory.

8.2.4 Chapter four's summary

Chapter four's objective was to analyse the ANC's contribution to South Africa's contemporary political culture of post-1994. This was done by discussing the administrations of South Africa's four democratically elected presidents (Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa) and the key events during these administrations. The chapter highlighted how the Mandela administration (chapter 4 sections 4.2 and 4.2.1) focused on nation-building and redistribution. Mbeki's administration (chapter 4 sections 4.3 and 4.3.1) focused on professionalizing the public sector and/or public institutions, ensuring that South Africa becomes a key player in African and international affairs and building a strong economy. The Zuma administration (chapter 4 sections 4.4 and 4.4.1) focused on improving access to basic services (i.e., healthcare and HIV treatment) and improving infrastructural development and South Africa's international ties with non-western countries through the BRICS partnership. The Ramaphosa administration (chapter 4 sections 4.5 and 4.5.1) is focused on building an accountable, transparent and corrupt-free government, with competent citizens to run the public service to improve the delivery of basic services and ease the process of business to grow the country's economy. The chapter also provided an understanding of how certain characteristics developed that defined South Africa's political culture.

8.2.5 Chapter five's summary

Chapter five aimed to analyse the characteristics of South Africa's political culture. In doing so, the chapter commenced by conceptualizing the term 'characteristics' from a psychological and biological perspective. From these explanations, a political conceptualization of the term was then provided. This was followed by a discussion of the political cultures that were discussed in chapter two of this thesis from a South African context. Thus, Almond and Verba's identification of parochial, subject and participant political cultures (including Daniel Elazar's individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic political cultures) were discussed and South African political examples were used to demonstrate how these theoretical political cultures manifest in South Africa's political culture. Therefore, this discussion led to chapter five demonstrating how certain political (sub)cultures developed in the country (i.e., impunity, apathy, etc.).

8.2.6 Chapter six's summary

Chapter six aimed to provide an analysis of how South Africa's political culture has influenced the country's democracy. From the conclusion drawn from chapter five, chapter six commenced by conceptualizing the term 'complex' and demonstrated how the unravelling of democracy after 1994 contributed to the development of both positive and negative characteristics in South Africa's political culture, which ultimately influenced the country's democracy. Chapter six conceptualized the term 'democracy' and provided an understanding of the key components that are essential for the sustainability of democratic states (chapter 6 sections 6.3 and 6.4).

By considering the characteristics of South Africa's political culture, as identified in chapters 4 and 5, chapter six further analysed some of the key events that occurred in South Africa from April 1994 to December 2022 and their impact on the country's democracy (chapter 6 section 6.5). Some of these events relate to how the ANC has shifted from a noble liberation movement to the factionalized political party and government of today, service delivery and service delivery protests, corruption, the state capture (or Zondo commission) and the ANC's 55th elective conference which was hosted in December 2022. By discussing the ANC's 55th elective conference, chapter six highlighted the challenges that the Ramaphosa administration was facing towards the end of his first term as the ANC president, and also the contestations that occurred at the party's elective conference, which ultimately resulted in Ramaphosa securing a second term as the party's president by defeating Zweli Mkhize.

8.2.7 Chapter seven's summary

The objective of chapter seven was to analyse how a typology of South Africa's political culture can be developed. The chapter began by defining or conceptualizing the term *typology* and this was followed by a tabulation of the characteristics of political culture and democracy that were identified in chapters two, four, five and six. This was labelled as table one and it provided a brief explanation of the characteristics of democracy and the distinctive characteristics of political culture that were previously identified (chapters 4 and 5). This was then followed by table two. Table two aimed to show the relationship/or link between the distinctive characteristics of South Africa's political culture (column A),

the theoretical characteristics (column B) and the democratic characteristics (column C). This was done by aligning the characteristics of South Africa's democracy (column A) with their linking/corresponding theoretical (column B) and democratic (column C) characteristics. The relationship between these aligned/or linked characteristics was thoroughly discussed.

8.3 KEY FINDINGS FROM CHAPTERS ONE TO SEVEN

8.3.1 Key findings from chapter one

In chapter one, it was established that dispossession and the resultant inequality are factors that have greatly contributed to the battles that have taken place in South Africa before and during the apartheid era which have resulted in the country's political culture being characterized by violence and being less traditional. This inequality and violence have continued into democratic South Africa and are strong features in the country's political culture. As a result, chapter one has demonstrated that political culture is a phenomenon that does not develop in a vacuum as it is shaped by political and economic factors, as well as ideological perspectives that end up manifesting in society. Furthermore, South Africa's history of apartheid and its engineered deprivation has resulted in the citizenry associating democracy, democratic consolidation and a democratic political culture with socio-economic emancipation and political leadership that is not divisive.

8.3.2 Key findings from chapter two

Chapter two reinforces the findings of chapter one by highlighting the contributions of Alexis de Tocqueville (chapter 2 section 2.2) who considered economic freedom and moeurs/mores to be essential for democratic consolidation and political culture, however with a stronger emphasis on moeurs/mores. This chapter established that irrespective of whether a democratic country is economically thriving, democratic consolidation and building a political culture that is conducive to democracy is highly dependent on whether citizens channel their moeurs/mores towards supporting the kind of democracy that is constructed by political leaders.

Chapter two found that it is possible for the political cultures that Almond and Verba identified to coexist and for new political (sub)cultures to develop which is particularly relevant within the context of South Africa and this thesis. This is demonstrated by the coexistence of the participant political culture as evidenced by the growing involvement of civil society groups in the country's development and the legal actions they pursue to hold the government accountable (chapter 5 section 5.3.3), and the parochial political culture as evidenced by the existence of traditional authorities in society (chapter 5 section 5.3.1). The discussion on what Elazar calls individualistic political culture (in chapter 5 section 5.4.1), revealed that new political (sub)cultures can develop as evidenced by the widespread development of the cultures of corruption, impunity and elitism, which are, in turn, supportive of developing and reinforcing the political culture of violence (chapter 6 section 6.5.1) and tribalism (chapter 4 section 4.3.1).

In addition, taking into account the culture of corruption and impunity that existed during apartheid South Africa, which was inherited and continues to characterize democratic South Africa (chapter 5 section 5.4.2), it is evident that transforming a society's political culture is not an easy process because reforming the socialization process means reforming the values that people have developed over a significant period.

8.3.3 Key findings from chapter three

South Africa's political culture has largely been influenced by the NDR and the decision by the ANC to employ the arms struggle to fight the apartheid regime. South Africa's political culture evolved during the apartheid era to include characteristics of protest, militancy, violence, impunity, lawlessness, corruption, resistance and confrontation. These characteristics were not only fuelled by the anger concerning the oppression and dispossession that people experienced but also, by the sense of self-pride that developed in society through the Black Consciousness Movement, which brought the realization that oppressed groups were deserving of better treatment and democracy (chapter 3 section 3.7.1).

As a result, simultaneously, chapter three found that it was during the apartheid era, an undemocratic environment, when South Africa's political culture also started to develop characteristics that were conducive to democracy and these included collaborative and

participant/participatory characteristics. These characteristics also developed because citizens became more strategic by uniting despite their racial differences to establish organizations (i.e., UDF and COSATU) to fight the apartheid regime (chapter 3 section 3.8). As a collective, these characteristics were carried over into democratic South Africa and affected the country's style of governance as the ANC-led government needed to realize the second stage of the NDR.

8.3.4 Key findings from chapter four

Chapter four found that the Mandela administration contributed to constructing a democratic political culture that was characterized by unity accountability and integrity. This is evidenced through the GNU, the establishment of the TRC, the redistributive macroeconomic policy of the RDP and the coining of South Africa as the 'Rainbow Nation'.

The Mbeki administration established PCAS and through its monitoring and evaluation role, it played an important role in developing a political culture that was characterized by accountability and out-rooting the political culture of corruption (from all state institutions) that democratic South Africa inherited from the apartheid regime. Although Mbeki's administration aimed to professionalize the public service, grow the economy and the black middle class, chapter four demonstrated that the execution of these objectives resulted in the unintended consequence of building a political culture that would be characterized by individualism, clientelism and classism, while redistribution and service delivery were not prioritized. Although Mbeki was reinforcing South Africa's political culture of self-pride, participation and collaboration through the African renaissance and his activities in the African and international community, his efforts were being overshadowed by the fact that back home his administration was harming the process of democratic consolidation and reinforcing a political culture that was characterized by entitlement, individualism and classism.

Mbeki's decision to dismiss Zuma from office not only contributed to dismantling the political culture of corruption inherited from the apartheid regime (chapter 4 sections 4.3 and 4.3.1), but it contributed to South Africa's political culture in two contradicting ways. The first is that it created the foundation for dismantling the political culture of patriarchy

within society, particularly within the ANC, as he appointed Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka to the position of Deputy President. This was contradicted by the political culture of tribalism emerging and becoming more intense within the ANC as Zuma was using tribalist politics to justify his “victimization” and dismissal from office, as well as to gain support to become president. Furthermore, a political culture that was characterized by individualism and entitlement developed and was demonstrated by Mbeki’s administration persisting with GEAR, despite the policy pushing citizens deeper into poverty and inequality, while the political culture of tribalism was heightened by some of the support, he (Mbeki) received after deciding to run for a third term as the party president (chapter 4 section 4.3).

Zuma’s first administration as the ANC and State President commenced with a continuation of the clientelist political culture that was from the Mbeki era. This was demonstrated by his supporters from the Tripartite Alliance being rewarded with Cabinet positions (chapter 4 section 4.4). South Africa’s protest culture was also strong as citizens were dissatisfied by the economic gains that GEAR was supposed to bring to their lives, but also by the many job losses that occurred due to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (chapter 4 section 4.4). However, the workers’ protest at Lonmin Mine that resulted in the Marikana Massacre of August 2012 can be viewed as one of the extreme displays of South Africa’s protest and violent political cultures (chapter 4 section 4.4). It also reinforced the country’s classist political culture and political culture of impunity in the sense that the “legal” use of violence was tolerated towards black collar workers (who were black individuals), and yet the likelihood is that the same amount of violence was never going to be used against white-collar workers (the majority of whom being white individuals) and in an area such as Sandton where the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Exchange (JSE) is. This is because black-collar work is associated with the lack of money while white-collar work is associated with money, as such, Marikana was never going to happen in a white-collar type of profession because in South Africa money can be a tool for getting justice and holding people accountable, this being something that ordinary miners at Marikana did not have.

Furthermore, Zuma's inability to reprimand Mugabe after verbally attacking Lindiwe Zulu (Zuma's foreign affairs advisor at the time) (chapter 4 section 4.4) reinforced the patriarchal political culture in South Africa, Zimbabwe and the continent at large. Within the ANC, a militant political culture that was directed at silencing opposition against ANC leadership was developing. This militant political culture became part of the ANC's style of governance as it contributed to individuals who were against Zuma or the party's decisions being silenced, such as the expulsion of Julius Malema in 2012 (the former ANCYL president) (chapter 4 section 4.4). This situation bred an apathetic political culture that became typical of the ANC once Zuma's second term as the party's president began.

When Zuma secured a second term as the ANC president at the Mangaung conference in 2012, he maintained his stance of silencing opposition. This reinforced the party's seemingly militant political culture as it contributed to disciplinary measures being enforced and ultimately leading to the disbanding of the NEC of the ANCYL and the Limpopo PEC (chapter 4 section 4.4), which, in turn, hampered the party's internal democracy. This situation was problematic as the ANC did not observe disciplinary measures especially when concerning Zuma's scandals and the various allegations of corruption and state capture that were levelled against him. His administration thus legitimized a political culture that was of non-accountability within the ANC, and this became the modus operandi of state institutions. Within broader society, the ANC-led government's inability to grow the middle class and the rising income inequality were issues that were attributed to the rising corruption in all three spheres of government. This compromised service delivery and created a breeding ground for South Africa's political culture to be characterized by non-accountability. It worsened the country's protest culture as more protests were becoming violent and destructive (chapter 4 section 4.4).

Furthermore, the scandals surrounding Zuma's administration (i.e., the Public Protector's Nkandla Report, the country's three finance ministers in one week, the State Capture Report and the continuous reports concerning the corrupt dealings between Zuma and the Gupta family) (chapter 4 section 4.4) are all demonstrative of the fact that the Zuma administration significantly contributed to developing a political culture that was of lawlessness, corruption, impunity, violent protesting and non-accountability. This situation

crippled the performance of state institutions and although it created an apathetic political culture within the ANC and broader society as the hope for better political leadership and socio-economic improvement to citizens lives was diminishing, it also reinforced the country's democracy and participant, communitarian and protest political cultures as calls and protests for Zuma's resignation were mounting from citizens and political leaders.

Zuma's second term in office further contributed to building a "us versus them" political culture within the ANC (chapter 4 section 4.4.1). This created a sense of conformity because if an individual found themselves on the wrong side (which is being against the Zuma supporters), they would soon lose their job, possibly through another cabinet reshuffle. This political culture was symbolized and reinforced by the intensification of the radical economic transformation discourse in the run-up to the ANC's Nasrec conference in 2017 (chapter 4 section 4.4). Furthermore, this "us versus them" political culture became instrumental as through structures of the ANC (i.e., Veterans League, ANCWL and ANCYL) Zuma was able to mobilize support for his ex-wife Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the position of ANC president, rather than his deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa. This situation simultaneously reinforced a tribalist political culture in that Ramaphosa would have been the first ANC president from the Venda ethnic group, while all the other presidents of the ANC have primarily come from the Xhosa or the Zulu ethnic groups. The tribalist political culture is something that the movement has been against since its inception and which Zuma has promoted since 2005 (chapter 4 section 4.3). However, Cyril Ramaphosa was successful by narrowly defeating Dlamini-Zuma for the position of ANC president and became the State President after the 2019 general elections.

In his first term of office, Ramaphosa was committed to building a corrupt-free and accountable government. This was important as the corruption surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic revealed that he inherited a country with a corrupt and individualistic political culture (chapter 4 section 4.5). This would not be an easy task given that the implementation of the step aside rule (chapter 4 section 4.5) was strongly resisted by some ANC members. This was suggestive of the fact that there was a political culture that was of corruption, non-accountability and impunity. Thus, it can further be stated that these negative characteristics in the ANC's political culture have also manifested in

broader society as the resulting violent protests and destruction to property following Zuma's imprisonment for contempt of court (chapter 4 section 4.5) suggests that South Africa has a political culture that is of lawlessness, violence, non-accountability and of no sense of ownership. This situation further reflects that citizens do not trust democratic processes for communicating with the government and this assertion is reinforced by the fact that the low voter turnout during the 2021 local government elections demonstrates that South Africa's political culture is of apathy and non-participation/disengagement.

8.3.5 Key findings from chapter five

Chapter five discussed the characteristics of South Africa's political culture with reference to the political cultures identified by Almond and Verba (chapter 2 section 2.3.1) and Daniel Elazar (chapter 2 section 2.3.2). Regarding Almond and Verba's parochial political culture (chapter 5 section 5.3.1), it can be stated that although South Africa has some characteristics of a parochial political culture like traditional leadership structures which are valued, South Africa does not entirely have a parochial political culture. This is because traditional authority is subject to the country's Constitution. Although South Africans may practise and believe in certain cultural customs and traditions, these are still regulated by the Constitution (i.e., initiation schools), and traditional authority is practised in certain jurisdictions of the country.

In terms of the subject political culture (chapter 5 section 5.3.2) it can be stated that South Africa does not have a subject political culture. Citizens do not have a passive relationship with the state as it can be stated that unresolved issues relating to corruption, service delivery and inequality which directly impact citizen's livelihoods have forced them to be concerned about the administration of their government.

In terms of the participant political culture (chapter 5 section 5.3.3), it can be stated that South Africa has a participant political culture; however, this political culture goes through continuous phases of decline and upsurge. During the Mandela administration, South Africa had an active and rapidly growing civil society that was involved in the nation-building project, whereas during the Mbeki era, civil society became more restrained unless it was tied to the business sector. During Jacob Zuma's first term in office, civil society became more dormant, but in his second term it became more active and

confrontational. This status quo has continued into the Ramaphosa administration. Therefore, it can be stated that South Africa has developed a divided citizenry where one segment chooses to engage in democracy and the system while the other one disengages. This in and out motion is mainly informed by citizens' psychological, emotional and socio-economic position in relation to society's changing socio-political events.

Regarding the individualistic political culture (chapter 5 section 5.4.1) as identified by Elazar, it can be stated that South Africa has an individualistic political culture. This is evidenced by the fact that corruption in South Africa became so rampant that it was legalized by political leaders through state capture, thus demonstrating that it occurs in the private and public sectors. In this way, politics has been reduced to a "get rich quick" profession rather than a noble one, and the power struggles within the ANC across all levels, including resistance against actions like the step-aside rule and the reports from the state capture/or Zondo commission reports reinforces the assertion that South Africa has an individualistic political culture.

Taking the above into account, including Elazar's conceptualization of a moralistic political culture and the discussion in chapter five (section 5.4.2), it must be noted that a moralistic and individualistic political culture cannot coexist in society. Thus, it can be stated that South Africa does not have a moralistic political culture. South Africa has a long history of human rights violations, and these have persisted since the new dispensation (1994). This is not only evidenced by the never-ending corruption and rising crime levels especially against women and children or the lack of political will to improve the economy and unbalanced power relations but also, by events like the TAC taking legal action against the state, the Marikana Massacre, the Life Esidimeni tragedy, the death of children in pit latrine toilets while at school, service delivery protests, fees must fall protests, political killings, deteriorating social cohesion evidenced by growing incidents of racism in the country, etc. Considering this, it can be stated that a moralistic political culture is defined by or is a function of citizen's ability to access economic resources because, from some of these illustrations, the human rights of impoverished and vulnerable groups were violated.

The last political culture that Elazar identified is the traditionalistic political culture (chapter 5 section 5.4.3). South Africa may display elements of a country with a traditionalistic political culture due to the role that traditional leaders play in local communities and the state still holding them in high regard. However, on a holistic level, it can be stated that it does not have a traditionalistic political culture. The South African political system is characterized by an active civil society which is even encouraged by the state and the number of political parties in the country has been on the rise since the new dispensation (1994), with the citizenry participating in the political system through participatory mechanisms established by the state and particularly young people participating through institutions of higher learning and non-conventional means like various social media platforms.

8.3.6 Key findings from chapter six

Chapter six analysed how South Africa's political culture has influenced its democracy. In this chapter, it was discovered that there is a mismatch between the democracy that South Africans fought for and the democracy that citizens are currently experiencing. Part of the reason for this is that South Africa's transition process was mismanaged in that the ANC continued to operate like the liberation movement of apartheid South Africa as it governed the country from Luthuli House and had very little consideration of the necessity to account to the public. Thus, the lack of mental reform, including the ANC's inability to modernize with national and global politics has harmed South Africa's efforts to improve democracy and build a democratic political culture. It can be stated that this lack of mental reform demonstrates that the ANC governs the country in terms of a political culture characterized by entitlement.

As a result, there is a sense of complacency from the government that citizens should be satisfied with the ineffective and inefficient delivery of public goods and services that government provides because, at least, they are receiving something unlike during the apartheid era when they didn't receive quality basic public goods and services. For instance, a service like education that all citizens had access to during the apartheid era varied in quality. The Bantu education system confined black people to poverty, it was the bare minimum of service/education that was given in townships. The inaction from the

ANC-led government also demonstrates that there is the deliberate “misunderstanding” that democracy means having an inclusive and humanistic constitution, and not socio-economic freedom for citizens. As a result, there is a lack of political will and leadership to govern the country in a way that would result in the eradication of socio-economic ills like inefficient service delivery, corruption, crime, poverty, inequality and unemployment.

8.3.7 Key findings from chapter seven

In chapter seven it was confirmed that South Africa has a complex political culture as it consists of various complex and contradicting characteristics. These characteristics include corruption, integrity and accountability, impunity, unity and communitarianism, an “us versus them” mindset, collaboration, unquestioning devotion, clientelist, entitlement, classism, tribalism, militant, patriarchy, protest, violence, apathy, non-accountability, lawlessness, dynamic and confrontational, and non-participation and/or disengagement (see chapter 7, table 2 section 7.3). Furthermore, table two in chapter seven, including its respective discussion demonstrated how different social, economic and political events have contributed to the country’s political culture being characterized by these contradicting characteristics, and how they influence the theoretical characteristics (column B) and democratic characteristics/principles (column C).

8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

South Africa’s political culture has gone through many changes, and it has become complex as it is made up of various characteristics that are informed by different social, economic and political events and circumstances. Given the role that the ANC has played in the liberation struggle and post-apartheid South Africa as the ruling party, it can be stated that the ANC (in addition to the NDR) has significantly contributed to the type of political culture that is prevalent in society. Thus, South Africa’s weak democratic political culture can be attributed to the cultural erosion that has occurred within the ANC that can be attributed to poor political leadership that is in all levels of the party.

Thus, given the events of the 2022 elective conference (i.e., politics of reciprocity in chapter 6 section 6.5.5) and the fact that convicted criminals were elected to become members of the ANC NEC, it must be noted that the party needs to prioritize strengthening

political education at branch level to ensure that credible and competent individuals are elected to develop, reinforce and lead the movement from the lowest to the highest office and/or structures. For this to be effective, the ANC must also create a meritocracy system, given that it is sorely lacking, that specifies the credentials that party members must have in order to be considered for positions and that should be relevant to post-apartheid South Africa. This is aligned with the fact that the ANC needs to be firm and decisive when implementing or enforcing its rules because too often the party finds itself having to show unwarranted loyalty/leniency to individuals who are undeserving of it. This gives the impression that the leadership is disorderly or is afraid to take charge out of fear or uncertainty of whether they are making the correct decision or fear of appearing to victimize or shun certain individuals or a certain faction. This was the case when the step aside rule needed to be enforced against certain party members. The deliberate misinterpretation among party members over this rule further demonstrated the need for the ANC to develop rules that are clear, non-contradictory and without grey areas. Thus, the ANC ultimately needs to decide whether it wants to be a liberal, modern and progressive party of democratic South Africa or a political party of thugs.

Furthermore, given the changing nature of global politics with young people entering the political landscape, it is important for the ANC to develop a framework of rules relating to how long party members should be active and serve the party and broader society, and by what age should they vacate office. Doing this ensures that young people in the ANC can serve the party and society at large through a smooth transition from older to younger generations, and it curbs infighting within the ANC that is caused by age-limitless politics, and individuals feeling entitled to positions because of the role they have played during South Africa's liberation struggle and their length of service in previous government positions. This means that the ANC needs to be a party that is representative of the demographics of the electorate.

Considering the above, it can be stated that the ANC in its current state does not strongly encourage the necessary reform of the party. Furthermore, considering the status quo in the country, it is important for political leaders, civil society and the citizenry as a whole to ask (and answer) this important question: What kind of South Africa do we/you want to

live in? This is because the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the ANC-led government, and the lack of representation of opposition parties suggest that a feasible solution or alternative to South Africa's socio-economic and leadership challenges may come from men and women in civil society given the extent of trust that citizens have developed in institutions outside the conventional structures of the state.

Considering the above, it must be stated that South Africa's democracy is yet to be consolidated. Furthermore, in responding to the problem statement of this thesis, it can be stated that based on the evidence presented, South Africa's political culture has deteriorated and has not been conducive to democracy/or encouraged the construction of a democratic political culture. Thus, it must be stated that democracy is consolidated and a political culture that is conducive to democracy is established and reinforced when the ruling elite actively works towards building the kind of democracy that citizens want to live in. This means that the ANC-led government will not only have to demonstrate empathy and understanding by working diligently to satisfy the socio-economic needs of the citizenry but also reform its own political culture and that of state institutions in order to promote South Africa's democracy. Considering this, it can be stated that there is a direct relationship between political leadership and the strength of democracy and political culture. The stronger the quality of political leadership, the stronger the quality of democracy, and the more likely that citizens will buy into or become invested in and emulate the country's political culture.

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