

THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: CAUSES, EFFECTS AND PLAUSIBLE
SOLUTIONS (1996-2009)

BY

SHUPING GASEABELWE CALPHURNIA BONOLO

**The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes,
Effects and Plausible Solutions (1996-2009)**

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**A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree MA of Social Science in International
Relations**


In the

FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY

Supervisor

Prof. V. Ojakorotu




DECLARATION

I, Gaseabelwe Calphurnia Bonolo Shuping, declare that this dissertation titled: The Conflict in the Democratic Republic Congo: Causes, Effects and Plausible Solutions (1996-2009) has never been submitted by me for a degree at the North West University or any other institution of higher learning. It is work of my own design and implementation. All materials contained herein have been fully acknowledged.

Signature: 

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Signature: 

Prof. V. Ojakorotu

Date: Day.....of.....2013

Date: Day 17 of 9 2013

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to African Leaders who failed to bring better living conditions to Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to give honour and praise to God almighty for giving me the strength, power and blessings throughout my academic life.

I lack words to express my sincere gratitude for the incredible work done by Prof. Victor Ojkorotu for the selflessness guidance, mentoring, concrete and constructive criticism resulting in the best quality of this work.

Many heartfelt thanks goes out to Prof. Ngoro Vera, Mr Kgame Molope, Dr Manyane, Mr Keebine, Mr Rakgale Ngoako, Dr Kale Ewusi, Mrs Wendy Leepile, Mr Mangole and Mr Mabula for their contribution in my studies.

I also wish to dedicate my success to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Shuping and my two siblings Oatlotse and Magadi for their love and support they gave me through out and always stood by my side and understanding at all times.

ABSTRACT

The thesis looked at Conflict in the Democratic Republic Congo: Causes, Effects and Plausible Solutions (1996-2009). The DRC is a country of extraordinary natural wealth but this wealth has never been used for the benefit of the Congolese population. Instead, the country is currently emerging from one of the world's worst conflicts, which has resulted in the deaths of up to 3.5 million people. This conflict has been fuelled mainly by competition for natural resources, which has been used to fund numerous rebel groups. The conflict centered in the east of the country, it involved a range of militant groups; local militias, Congolese and Rwandan rebels and the Congolese army, that use control over the country's rich mineral deposits as a source of financing.

Qualitative Research Methodology was the choice of method. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources. A sample of one hundred participants was used to respond to open-ended questions and four interviewee.

It is evident that natural resources played a key role in prolonging the civil conflict and also being the cause of it because resources have been a source of finance to rebel groups to purchase necessary tools that were used during conflict. The country has been targeted by external interference that has divided the country in an effort to benefit from natural resources through aiding or bribing a certain powerful group in order to pursue their interests, and this has built a lot of grievances and anger in the lower group because they don't benefit from their resources and that leads to a start-up of conflict. There is a need for political will among our leaders to bring better living conditions for Africans in the country.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF-Allied Democratic Forces

AFDL- Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

ANR-National Intelligence Agency

AU- African Unity

CNDD-FDD -The Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy

CNDP- The National Congress for the Defence of the People

CPJ-Committee to Protect Journalists

CSAC-Higher Council for Broadcasting and Communication

EITI-Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

FAR- Rwandan Armed Forces

FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo

FAZ-Zairian armed forces

FDD- Forces Des Defence

FDLR- Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FP- Force Publique

GDP-Gross Domestic Product

GfE-Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie

HAM-High Authority on Media

ICC- International Criminal Court

IDP- Internally Displaced Persons

IFEX-International Freedom of Expression Exchange

IPIS-International Peace Information Service

JED-Journaliste en Danger

JMC-Joint Military Commission

LRA-Lord's Resistance Army

MIBA-Minière deBakwanga

MLC-Movement for the Liberation of Congo

MONUC-The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC

NGO- Non-governmental Organization

OAU- Organisation of African Unity

OECD-National Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

RCD-G-Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma

RCDK -The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani

RCD-K/ML-Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement

RCD-ML-Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement

RCD-Rally for Congolese Democracy

RFI-Radio France Internationale

RMG- Rebel Militia Groups

RPA-Rwandan Patriotic Army

RTNC-Congolese National Radio-Television

SADC- Southern African Development Community

SOMKIVU-Société Minière du Kivu

SSA- Sub-Saharan Africa

TNG- Transitional National Government

UN- United Nations

UNHCR- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOHCHR-UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNSC-United Nations Security Council

UPC- the Union des Patriotes Congolais

UPDF-Uganda's People Defence Force

US\$-United States Dollar

USD- United States Dollar

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

According to Tunde (2009:2), Africa is richly blessed with natural resources. It commands 50% of the global deposit of gold, diamonds and chromium, 90% of the cobalt, 40% of the potential world's hydroelectric power, 65% of the manganese, millions of acres of arable land, huge deposit of crude oil and natural gas. The continent is home to the world's biggest and longest rivers and lakes which add value to agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, commerce, power generation and households. The continent is also home to some of the most beautiful natural wonders of the world. One of the greatest concentrations of precious minerals and metals on earth can be found in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Congolese minerals have fuelled the developed world's industrialization.

The country's mines have provided the West with diamonds, metals and minerals. Niobium, tungsten, pyrochlore, coltan and germanium are some of the minerals used in the manufacture of a range of hi-tech devices, from mobile phones and laptops to spaceships. These minerals are valuable assets that many actors have been vying for in a protracted civil conflict for over a decade (Colette, 2004). Despite these remarkable levels and varieties of natural wealth, African countries and peoples rank among the world's most impoverished and humiliated.

Although it is true that colonialism and Western imperialism did not leave Africa in good shape, the condition has been made immeasurably worse by internal factors such as misguided leadership, lack of vision and imagination, rape and plunder of natural resources, systemic corruption, capital flight, economic mismanagement, senseless civil wars, political tyranny, flagrant violations of human rights and military vandalism (Tunde, 2009:2).

European exploration and administration in DRC took place from the 1870s until the 1920s. It was first led by Sir Henry Morton Stanley who undertook his explorations under the sponsorship of King Leopold II of Belgium. Leopold had designs on what was to become the Congo as a colony. In a succession of negotiations, Leopold, professing humanitarian objectives in his capacity as chairman of the Association Internationale Africaine, played one European rival against another (Keyes, 2004).

Additionally, Hochschild (1999) stated that Leopold formally acquired rights to the Congo territory at the Conference of Berlin in 1885 and made the land his private property and named it the Congo Free State. Leopold's regime began various infrastructure projects, such as construction of the railway that ran from the coast to the capital of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), which took years to complete. Nearly all such projects were aimed at increasing the capital which Leopold and his associates could extract from the colony, leading to exploitation of Africans.

He further stated that Leopold brutalized the local population to produce rubber, for which the spread of automobiles and development of rubber tires created a growing international market. The sale of rubber made a fortune for Leopold, who built several buildings in Brussels and Ostend to honour himself and his country. To enforce the rubber quotas, the army- the Force Publique (FP), was called in. The Force Publique made the practice of cutting off the limbs of the natives as a means of enforcing rubber quotas a matter of policy; this practice was widespread. During the period of 1885-1908, millions of Congolese died as a consequence of exploitation and disease.

In June 1960 the DRC became independent with Patrice Emery Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu, as prime minister and first president respectively. Following the assassination of Lumumba shortly thereafter, the country experienced a series of rebellions and secessionist movements, sometimes with the direct encouragement of external actors. Shortly after the second parliamentary general elections in 1965, Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko successfully organized a coup and assumed power with the support from United States, in the newly renamed Zaire. He remained in power for 32 years (Celine, 2009:160).

Mobutu used brutality, rigged elections, stole billions of dollars of the nation's money and steadily worsened Zaire's standard of living. Roads fell into ruin. Little health care was available for Zairians suffering from AIDS and other diseases. Other countries sent aid to ease the people's extreme poverty. However, the money went to the pockets of corrupt officials. Ethnic slaughter across the border in Rwanda in 1994 created a flood of refugees into Zaire. The influx sparked ethnic strife, which flamed into civil war in 1996 (Francesca, 2007).

In 1996-1997, an armed rebellion led by Laurent Kabila and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, managed to topple Mobutu in May 1997. In 1998, fighting ensued between the Congolese army and President Kabila's foreign backers, when foreign troops refused to leave the DRC. Kabila, backed by Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola, accused the Rwandans and Ugandans of exploiting the DRC's natural resource wealth. During the course of the conflict, Rwandan and Ugandan forces fell out with each other, resulting in an all-out war between various factions. After a failure to implement the provisions of the 1999 Lusaka Accord fully, Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila. On 2 April 2003, after a protracted Inter-Congolese Dialogue, an agreement was signed between all parties and the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. Elections were held in October 2006 and monitored by the UN who certified that they were free and fair (Celine, 2009).

By mid-1999's, the rebel movement managed to capture one-third of the DRC, thereby installing a new balance of power in a country which was now divided into certain occupation zones. The rebel movement that had formed a political party to present their demands, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), split into three main factions in June 1999, supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In particular, they differed in terms of their willingness to pursue negotiations or to continue fighting. Moreover, the rapid military gains by the rebels, especially by August 1998, prompted a series of peace initiatives, which provided the background for the signature of the Lusaka Accord (Lvno, 1999).

In particular, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad initially backed Kabila, while Rwanda and Uganda had been aiding the rebel factions. Although Sudan, Chad and Namibia have subsequently withdrawn their troops from Congolese territory, this phase of the war saw the dramatic escalation and regionalization of conflict and polarization in the central Africa region. The fighting challenged the central government. The corruption, cronyism and nepotism so typical of Mobutu's Zaire had also come to characterize Laurent Kabila's regime. Some of the discontent of the rebel leadership made up of disillusioned military officers among others also appeared to relate to Kabila's decisions regarding the promotion of key military commanders (Abiodun, 2007:5).

In addition, the relations between Kabila and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda had also begun to turn sour, as they felt that he was unable to pacify rebel movements based in the eastern Congo. Although originally denied by Rwanda and Uganda, it soon became evident that the two countries had started working with the new rebel forces with the intention to create a buffer zone in the highly volatile eastern Congo in order to contain the continuing problem of insurgencies into north-west Rwanda and north-west Uganda from the Congolese territory. In this context, the claim was made by Rwanda that Kabila was not containing the Hutu Interahamwe but was in fact, contributing to their arming and training (Celine, 2009:16).

In 1998, fighting ensued between the Congolese army and President Kabila's foreign backers, when foreign troops refused to leave the DRC. Kabila, backed by Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola, accused the Rwandans and Ugandans of exploiting the DRC's natural resource wealth. During the course of the conflict, Rwandan and Ugandan forces fell out with each other, resulting in an all-out war, which was called the Second Congo War (1998-2003), after a failure to implement the provisions of the 1999 Lusaka Accord fully (Alida, 2009:21).

In 2001 Kabila was assassinated and he was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who helped to bring relative peace to most of the country by 2003. The vicious five-year war killed almost 3.5 million people, either through fighting, disease or starvation. Lawlessness and violence continued in Congo, especially in the east where rebel militia's armed groups still fight for power and resources. In 2006 Congo held democratic elections after four decades of dictatorship and destruction. Voters chose Joseph Kabila as president, but fighting between supporters of opposing parties marred the election (Francesca, 2007:7).

On 2 April 2003, after a protracted Inter-Congolese Dialogue, an agreement was signed between all parties and the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. Elections were held in October 2006 and judged by the UN to be free and fair. In recent years, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence have been frequent, especially in the eastern Kivu regions. In August 2008, intense fighting erupted between government forces and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), then led by the Congolese Army general Laurent Nkunda, in the southern part of North Kivu province. By January 2009, after a de-facto internal coup, Nkunda was overthrown, and CNDP forces agreed to integrate into the DRC military, followed by some other rebel groups. In the same month, on the invitation of the DRC, Rwandan troops entered the DRC to eliminate the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) (Vlassenroot, 2009:385-412).

Laurent Kabila was able to build an opposition army and overthrow the Mobutu regime in 1997. In the years to come, newly formed armed groups opposing the governments of Laurent (1997–2001) and Joseph Kabila (2001–2011) would follow the same strategy, often openly supported by either Rwanda or Uganda, in their effort to gain territorial control. Years of civil war in the east of the country also triggered local conflicts over land and resource deposits between ethnically organized militia aligned to either the central government or to foreign powers (Jason, 2010).

Since independence, the DRC has been torn apart by intrastate conflicts on five occasions, the first just after independence, when two mineral-rich provinces of the Congo, Katanga and South Kasai, declared themselves sovereign. Army general Mobutu's 32-year rule was marked by extensive and endemic corruption, economic ruin, rebellions and intermittent wars. Mobutu crushed political dissent and human rights abuses were widespread, he also amassed a vast personal fortune in the process. Nevertheless, his regime was backed by Western nations until the late 1980s, as a bulwark against communist elements in Central Africa (Alida, 2009:21).

The DRC wars are mostly linked to the external exploitation of its immense natural resources initially dominated by the immense copper wealth to be found in the Katanga province in the south. The plundering of Congolese resources remains one of the constant parameters in the analysis of the various violent episodes that have molded the DRC state throughout its history from the slave trade, to the Mobutu predatory regime, from King Leopold II's exploitation of rubber for the Belgian colonial system, to copper shortly after independence and coltan in recent years. The recent disruption of the Congo predominantly affecting the eastern part of the DRC began with the exodus of some 1.2 million Hutu refugees across the border from Rwanda, following the capture of Kigali by the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front in July 1994 (Paul, 2007).

MAJOR ARMED GROUPS

Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), after May 1999 known as the RCD-Goma

The original rebel movement that attacked the Kabila regime, the RCD was put together by Rwanda and Uganda and was made up of disparate anti-Kabila elements, and former Mobutists. Initially lead by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, who was removed in May 1999, the RCD-G has very close ties with Rwanda and is based in the east of the DRC. It is a significant part of the transitional government, with one vice-president, a quarter of the ministries and three military regions.

Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)

When Wamba dia Wamba was ousted from the RCD, he and his followers moved first to Kisangani, and then to Bunia, where the RCD-ML was established, under Ugandan patronage. However, the RCD-ML never created strong internal structures, and was continually paralysed by power struggles between Wamba and his deputy Mbusa Nyamwisi. Having been a part of the abortive Congolese Liberation Front (FLC) (an umbrella group of the RCD-ML, RCD-N and the MLC) from January to June 2001, the RCD-ML started to fight the RCD-N and the MLC. Under Nyamwisi, who had gained power in November 2001, it switched allegiance from the Ugandans to the Kabila regime, but still lost most of its territory, being reduced to areas around Beni. Nevertheless it gained two ministries and one military region in the transitional government (Global Witness, 2005:9).

Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)

Formed by millionaire businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba in October 1998 and armed and trained by Uganda, the MLC established itself in the diamond-rich province of Equateur. Its lack of internal division is a marked contrast to the RCD, although it was the senior member in the FLC umbrella group. It signed a peace agreement at Sun City with the Kabila regime, and was well represented in the final transitional government, gaining one vice-presidency, a quarter of the ministries and three military regions.

Mai-Mai

Traditional self-defence groups in the Kivus allied to the Kabila regime and opposed to the RCD and the Rwandans and Ugandans. Claiming to represent the population of the Kivus, they conducted guerrilla campaigns against the rebel groups. They were represented in the transitional government, gaining two ministries and one military region.

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

Primary Rwandan Rebel Group of the Second Congolese Civil War, formed in 2000 after the merger of the Kinshasabased Hutu Command and ALiR, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; the members of the Interahamwe that carried out the Rwandan genocide now belong to the FDLR. During the war, it sided with the Congolese government, receiving extensive backing from it, and fought mainly against the Rwandan Army (RPA) and the RCD. On 31 March 2005, the FDLR announced it was abandoning its armed struggle and returning to Rwanda to form a political party.

Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC)

Army of the transitional government, formed according to the Sun City Accords of 1 April 2003. It was formed by integrating the various military parties under a unified military command; however, certain groups, such as the FAC (former Congolese army) and the RCD-G, maintain 'informal' autonomous control of their armed groups, and the Presidential Guard has not been integrated into the command. Additionally, armed units from the MLC and RCD-ML were dropped into the FARDC with little regard for integration (Global Witness, 2005:9).



(Crislaine-Medina, 2012)

The above map shows the location of DRC in the African continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) formerly known as Zaire is a nation in central Africa and the third largest country on the continent after Sudan and Algeria. It borders the Central African Republic and Sudan on the north, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania on the east, Zambia and Angola on the south and the Republic of Congo on the west. Since 1998, the country has suffered greatly from the devastating second Congo war sometimes referred to as the African World War, the world deadliest conflict since World War II (IBP, 2011:10).

According to Alida (2009) the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an average per capita annual income of about US\$ 184 in 2008. Agriculture accounted for 42.5% of GDP in 2007, although low commercial agricultural production or processing persists. Many producers are subsistence farmers. Industry accounted for 28.4%, of which 6.4% was from manufacturing, and services accounted for 29.1% of GDP in 2007.

Its formal economy is dominated, however, by the mining sector, with minerals the main export, representing the single largest source for foreign direct investment. Gecamines, a colossal state-owned mining company, controls copper and cobalt interests, but production has declined because of corruption, civil unrest, global market fluctuations and failure to reinvest. Diamonds account for about 10% of export income (around US\$ 875 million in 2008) (Barouski, 2007).

The DRC war, bred and superimposed on an already ferocious civil war, was fueled by a mad scramble for the country's vast natural resources. The devastation caused by these wars led to incalculable losses in human lives and damage to material infrastructure and environmental resources. By the end of 2004, according to several estimates, the war in the DRC alone had claimed a staggering 3 to 4 million lives (Paul, 2007).

In the eastern DRC town of Kamituga, an immense wealth of tin ore, coltan and other precious metals can be found. Here, resource wealth is a resource curse that has become synonymous with conflict and underdevelopment because of constant conflicts between powerful individuals and groups who enrich themselves at the expense of the citizens and the state. This phenomenon has plagued the country for decades. In the past, factions within the national armed forces of the DRC have been known to abuse and exploit the civilian population in an effort to gain access to and control over the trade in natural resources, rather than protecting and upholding state and national interests (Braeckman, 2004:13-16).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

According to Lord Aikins (2009), Africa has been afflicted by violent conflicts which have made her the most underdeveloped and the poorest of all the continents in the world, lagging behind all the continents in the world in terms of economic and social development and political advancement. The Democratic Republic of Congo has an abundance of natural resources but it has been marked as one of the poorest countries in the world and conflict has exacted a heavy toll on the country's development potential.

The availability of natural resources in a country is no longer solely considered a blessing and a precondition to development, but sometimes also as a major cause of conflict and prolongation of it. The abundance of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a source of conflict in the DRC; as a result there is a need for academic study to investigate the role of natural resources in the causation of civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996-2009).

1.3. Rationale of the study

Most of the African countries that are rich with natural resources have been prone to violent conflicts, especially the DRC. According to Cerianne (2008, P-3) there was a general belief that a country rich with natural resource is more likely to have fast economic growth, political advancement and high standard of living. The study is important in that it investigates natural resources as a source of conflict in Africa with special reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo, why has it been prone to conflict, and what have the Congolese leaders done so far, besides fighting for the liberation of their country towards improving the lives of their citizens and economic growth.

1.4. Aim of the Study

The study aims at investigating the extent to which natural resources can be the cause of conflict in Africa with special reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo

1.5. Objectives

- The role of natural resources in conflict
- The role of neighbouring countries in the DRC conflict
- The investigation of the effects of external competition over the exploitation of natural resources on the onset of conflict in the DRC

1.6. Research Question

Can natural resources be the cause of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

1.7. Significance of the Study

This research will be of great value because Africa has been prone to on-going conflicts, especially those conflicts motivated by natural resources. The researcher seeks to investigate whether natural resources can prolong or influence conflict in the DRC. The outcome of this research will be educating and empowering the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo, especially upcoming leaders, and Africa as a whole showing how they can improve their lives and break the resource curse by equipping them with necessary skills and training. The study will also benefit research institutions, NGO's, UN, academics contributing to knowledge development, students, policy makers, by bringing new knowledge to that existing and, most importantly, to the government in the implementation of new laws that will protect our natural resources from exploitation and be able to manufacture our very own finished goods.

1.8. Scope of the Study

The investigation will focus on the period in which the Democratic Republic of Congo got into its first Congo war in 1996-2009. The reason behind choosing this period was during this period, the 32-year-rule of Mobutu Sese Seko ended when he was removed from power, as a result most of the conflict started to escalate. A secondary goal is to find out if most of the conflicts had natural resources as a source of conflict.

1.9. Research Methodology

Methodology is a set of procedures applied in conducting a study and it describes the methods used. According to Kenneth (2006:1) it establishes a perspective for viewing the empirical world, raising research problems within that perspective, deciding on appropriate data and methods for their collection and prefiguring a framework for interpreting the findings of research. Methodology addresses these matters not by enacting them, but by developing the principles according to which they are enacted.

1.9.1. Research Approach

The approach that will be adopted for this study will be qualitative research method. Qualitative research method can produce a wealth of knowledge from a restricted number of people. The experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge of people can be captured by direct quotations and are not distorted or limited by predetermined, standardized categories. The researcher is allowed flexibility to explore unanticipated topics of importance as they are discovered. A qualitative method using primary and secondary techniques will be used (Patton, 1989:57).

According to McMillan and Schumacher (2001:395) interactive qualitative research is inquiry in which researchers collect data in face-to-face situations by interacting with selected persons in their settings. Qualitative research describes and analyzes people's individual and collective social actions, beliefs, thoughts and perspectives.

Qualitative methods are essentially descriptive and inferential in character, and for this reason are soft. But description and inference are also necessary in scientific research. Qualitative methods focus primarily on the kind of evidence that will enable the reader to understand the meaning of what is going on. Their great strength is that they can illuminate issues and turn up possible explanations, essentially a search for meaning (Bill, 2005:10). The qualitative approach will generate a comprehensive study of whether natural resources can be the causation of conflict in the DRC.

1.9.2. Research Design

The research methodology adopted for this study is the case study method. Case study method gives indications and allows further elaboration and hypothesis creation on a subject; it excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research. Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. The case study research method is defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984:23).

Case study is a multi-perspective analysis. This means that the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them. This one aspect is a salient point in the characteristic that case studies possess. They give a voice to the powerless and voiceless. When

sociological investigations present many studies of the homeless and powerless, they do so from the viewpoint of the elite. Case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed (Feagin, 1991).

Case study is also known as a triangulated research strategy. Stake (1995) asserts that triangulation can occur with data, investigators, theories and even methodologies. He stated that the protocols that are used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations are called triangulation. The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes. In case studies, this could be done by using multiple sources of data.

1.9.3. Data Collection Methods

Data Collection is an important aspect of any type of research study. Inaccurate data collection can impact the results of a study and ultimately lead to invalid results. Data will be collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are data that has been collected from first-hand-experience that has not been published yet and is more reliable, authentic and objective. Primary data has not been changed or altered by human beings; therefore its validity is greater than secondary data. Primary data will consist mainly of interviews and questionnaire.

Interview is a conversation between two people, the interviewer and the interviewee where questions are asked by the interviewer to obtain information from the interviewee. Interviews are a common approach used in social sciences to get information through well placed individuals in relevant institutions and in society.

Unstructured Interviews are designed to have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance but such prepared questions are designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned in advance but must be improvised in a careful and theorized way. As regards such unstructured interviews,

they are ones where research and planning produce a session in which most of the informant's responses can't be predicted in advance (Tom, 2004:5)

The objective of the interview will be to ascertain whether natural resources can cause conflict and in which ways can natural resources be used to their own advantage to improve the standard of living and impact positively on economic growth. telephonic and face-to-face interviews will be conducted.

Key personnel who will be involved are:-

- Mr. Ayo-he has been in the DRC for the past two years conducting ground-work research
- Mr. Guy Machel- he is a citizen of the DRC and a masters student in south Africa
- And two other individuals who prefer to be anonymous

A questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. Although they are often designed for statistical analysis of the responses, this is not always the case (Foddy, 1994).

Questionnaires contain both open and closed ended questions. Open ended questions give the respondents a chance to explain and closed ended allow respondents to answer in short i.e. Yes/No.

Secondary Data are collected from a source that has already been published in any form. Secondary data can be less valid but its importance is still there. Sometimes it is difficult to obtain primary data; in these cases getting information from secondary sources is easier and more possible. Sometimes primary data does not exist; in such situation one has to confine the research to secondary data. Sometimes primary data is present but the respondents are not willing to reveal it; in such cases too, secondary

data can suffice. Secondary data is often readily available. After the expense of electronic media and internet the availability of secondary data has become much easier. The review of literature in the research is based on secondary data, mostly from books, journals, newspaper articles, magazines and internet sources.

Sampling

The participants in the study will be fifty Congolese residing in South Africa-Mafikeng and Johannesburg, both women and men. The age of the participants are from 21 years of age and above. The researcher will use purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is done to increase the utility of information obtained from small samples. The sample is heterogeneous in terms of gender in order for the researcher to get different opinions from both men and women for the researcher not to be biased. Neumann in Malan (2001:20) states that the use of purposeful sampling procedures, of which reputational sampling is one, is typical of qualitative research. Because reputable sources represent information-rich causes, they yield sufficient data for thick, ideographic descriptions that will transport readers to the context and situations where the investigations took place.

1.9.4. Data Analysis Method

Most of data will be Qualitative; it will be obtained from the primary and secondary data. Marshall and Bossman (1995:111) view data analysis as the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of data collected. In this research, data collected will be from unstructured Interviews, questionnaires and examination of secondary data and will be analyzed through qualitative method.

Content Analysis Approach will be used, as it is a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis that identifies and summarizes message content. Content analysis is used when working with narratives such as diaries, or journals or to analyze qualitative responses to open-ended questions from surveys, interviews or focus groups. It is a

process of looking at data from different angles, with a view to identifying keys in the text that will help us to understand and interpret the raw data (Kobus, 2008:101).

Content Analysis is potentially one of the most important research techniques in the Social Sciences. The content analyst views data as representations not of physical events but of texts, images and expressions that are created to be seen, read, interpreted and acted on of their meanings and must therefore be analysed with such uses in mind. Analysing text in the contexts of their uses distinguishes content analysis from other methods of inquiry. Content analysis entails a systematic reading of a body of texts, images and symbolic matter, not necessary from an author's or user's perspective (Klaus, 2004:3).

Content Analysts must predict or infer phenomena that they cannot observe directly. The inability to observe phenomena of interest tends to be the primary motivation for using content analysis, whether the analysed source has reasons to hide what the analyst desires to know, as in the case of an enemy during wartime, or the case of someone needing to impress, or the phenomena of interest are inaccessible in principle' e.g. An individual's attitudes or state of mind or historical events (Klaus, 2004:12).

1.10. Ethical Considerations

At no stage will the participant's comments be revealed to any other source. This will be highlighted to the participants when they are being interviewed or answering the questionnaires, to guarantee their privacy. It is emphasized when requesting for the permission of answering the questions or filling the questionnaires that participation in the study will be voluntary. The anonymity of the participants will be protected at all stages of the study. The researcher ensured the confidentiality of the data obtained from both the interview and questionnaires.

1.11. Limitations of the Study

Selected participants did not want to participate because they believed that their privacy and anonymity were not guaranteed. The researcher also experienced difficulty in securing times for the interviews as the participants have other liabilities, jobs, responsibilities, therefore certain interviews had to re-scheduled. Safety and security was a problem as the researcher was not accompanied by anyone when conducting the research. Finally lack of finances prevented the researcher to go to The Democratic Republic of Congo to interview the parties in conflict and also citizens to get in-depth information as to whether natural resources have been the cause of conflict in the DRC.

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CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter comprises the literature review and theoretical framework. The purpose of literature review is to present a critical and in-depth evaluation of previous research related to the topic. It also ensures that the works of others are not copied and goes further to identify gaps in literature that the research will fill (Denscombe, 2007). A theoretical framework, on the other hand, is necessary for every research because it defines the theoretical underpinnings of a specific study. Its purpose is to identify and label the important variables that are relevant to the research problem. This will enable the researcher to connect the dependent variables with the independent variables and if possible elaborate any moderating variables.

The reviewed literature discusses the issues related to natural resources being the source of conflict in DRC but fails to emphasize the importance of natural resources in resolving conflict. Much has been written about the DRC conflict and yet conflict still looms high. The researcher seeks to fill the gap left by other researchers and authors because most of their research outcomes do not come with a fruitful conflict resolution but they write about the intensity of the conflict.

Virginia (2011) highlights that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast country located in central Africa; its capital city is Kinshasa. It is the largest country in Africa by the land area of 2,267 thousands km² and the eleventh largest in the world. With a population of over 71 million, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the eighteenth most populous nation in the world and the fourth most populous nation in Africa, as well as the most populous officially Francophone country.

Over 30% of the population live in urban areas, while 70% reside in rural areas. The urban annual growth rate is 3.8% and it has 360 ethnic groups with 219 languages. The DRC holds the world's largest deposits of cobalt and tantalum, as well as significant reserves of copper, gold, diamonds, zinc, iron, uranium. DRC harbours large ecosystem diversity and rich biodiversity consisting of the largest fauna and the second largest flora (after South Africa) on the African continent and the second largest tropical forest in the world after the Amazon (Simon, 2006).

Despite its abundance of natural resources, it is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2005 the GDP per capita was USD 120, down from USD 380 in 1960. After years of severe hardship and a decade of armed conflicts, in which an estimated 3.8 million citizens died, and between 1 and 3.4 million persons were internally displaced, poverty increased and access to basic services deteriorated (Abraham, 2006). Governmental institutions are extremely weak, corruption is widespread and the country is still experiencing armed conflict especially in the eastern region. Due to its wealth in natural resources DRC is the focus of vast global attention, from commercial interests as a supplier of raw material, and from conservation interests for the vast ecosystem services provided by the forest.

Celine (2009) argues that the history of the Congo is littered with problems linked to an abundance of natural resources. Despite the abundance of natural resource wealth, the DRC has remained a poor country. Seventy percent of the population live in absolute poverty, with unemployment at 85%. Parts of the country that used to grow food for export and local consumption, such as Province Orientale and the Kivus are now wracked by hunger while severe malnutrition rates among children under five have reached 30%.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was formerly, in chronological order the Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Kinshasa and Zaire. These former names are sometimes referred to as unofficial names with the exception of Mobutu's discredited Zaire, along with various abbreviations such as Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, DR Congo and DRC. Though it is located in the Central African UN sub-region, the nation is also economically and regionally affiliated with Southern Africa as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Virginia, 2011). The beginning of the Second Congo War in 1998 devastated the country involved seven foreign armies and is sometimes referred to as the African World War. Despite the signing of peace accords in 2003, fighting continues in the east of the country. In eastern Congo, the prevalence of rape and other sexual violence is described as the worst in the world and more than 5.4 million people were killed during the war.

The conflict in the DRC is associated with an endless scramble for power and resources between internal and external actors. While its resource wealth should easily support development and the proper functioning of the state apparatus, neither the population nor the state benefit from the country's natural resource endowments. In the eastern DRC town of Kamituga, for example, an immense wealth of tin ore, coltan and other precious metals can be found. Hence, resource wealth is a resource curse that has become synonymous with conflict and underdevelopment because of constant conflicts between powerful individuals and groups who enrich themselves at the expense of the citizens and the state. This phenomenon has plagued the country for decades. In the past, colonisers, or Leopold, used the DRC resources to enrich himself, not forgetting to uphold the standard of living in his home country, Belgium. Factions within the national armed forces of the DRC have been known to abuse and exploit the civilian in an effort to gain access to and control over the trade in natural resources rather than protecting and upholding state and national interests.

John (2001) believes that the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) formerly called Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko, was the widest interstate war in modern African history. The DRC became an environment in which numerous foreign players were involved, some within the immediate sub-region and some from much further afield. That only served to complicate the situation and to make peaceful resolution of the conflict that much more complex. The war centered mainly in eastern Congo involved seven African nations and directly affected the lives of 50 million Congolese (John, 2001).

Poor resource governance has been both the cause and result of conflict, instability, and poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for more than a century. Improving the governance of the country's significant natural resource base is critical to achieving greater prosperity, sustaining it and ensuring that it benefits the nearly 65 million people living there. But better resource governance is an enormous challenge, demanding vision and leadership from government leaders at all levels.

Vlassenroot (2004:385-412) points out that the collapse of the infamous regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko was intimately linked to disastrous economic policies. During the 1970s and 1980s the regime had nationalized almost all foreign and private businesses operating in the country's various natural resource sectors. Corruption and inefficient management of these semi-public companies reduced state budgets to a minimum and led to a collapse of the formal economy. On top of this the government insisted that all trade should pass through the capital, Kinshasa in the west of the country. Under these circumstances an informal resource-based economy took root in the eastern part of the country during the 1990s, oriented towards markets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Corruption became so prevalent it was given the term Zairean Sickness, which was reportedly coined by Mobutu himself. By 1984, Mobutu was said to have \$4 billion, an amount close to the country's national debt, deposited in a personal Swiss bank account. International aid, most often in the form of loans, enriched Mobutu while he allowed national infrastructure such as roads to deteriorate to as little as one-quarter of what had existed in 1960. With the embezzlement of government funds by Mobutu and his associates Zaire became a kleptocracy (Gbadolite, 1993). In 2006 Transparency International ranked the Democratic Republic of the Congo 156 out of 163 countries in the Corruption Perception Index tying Bangladesh, Chad and Sudan with a 2.0 rating (Graf, 2006).

Luong (2006:248-257) believes that the reasons that natural resource endowment can influence the economic development negatively is because it can create an increase of corruption vulnerability. The economic reasons do not influence corruption levels but the political and ownership explanations do. The DRC government does not invest the resource revenues in the economy, which makes her vulnerable to corruption. The government distributes the revenues with a political agenda not an economic one. For example, they invest in state-owned ineffective companies or in their own pockets or use the revenues for their patron-client relationships. At the same time, they try to keep the natural resources state-owned so that they can control the resource distributions. Governments therefore try not to develop strong institutions because these institutions could start to regulate the governments. The problem is that the governments often do not have different forms of export revenues to fall back on.

A UN report of (2001:9–10) found that some government actors work with local corporations to embezzle profits from diamond production, or to remove diamonds from production lines and sell these privately on the black market. Diamonds in particular from northern Kisangani provided a stable source of revenue for the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Uganda's People Defence Force (UPDF), through which they continued to contribute to conflict in the region. The United Nations Organization

Mission in the DRC (MONUC) reports that key actors driving the militarised economy in the Kivus include mining concession holders (Alida, 2009).

Although the war may be over in large parts of the DRC, both formal and informal resource sectors remain highly militarized pitting local populations against the state business alliances. The Ministry of Mining's review glosses over the issue of militarization in order to safeguard necessary foreign investment and kick start the national economy after the years of civil war. Foreign companies having already invested heavily without extraction actually happening acquiesce to the government's demand for larger stakes and responsibilities in mining operations including the provision of security arrangements (United Nations, 2007:7).

United States Department of State (2011) asserted that the DRC government law specifically prohibits the involvement of the FARDC in mining and the mineral trade, the law also prohibits non-state armed actors from engaging in mining. However, the government did not effectively enforce the law. In Kivu provinces, it appears almost every mining deposit is controlled by an armed group. The armed groups include regular FARDC units.

Criminal involvement by some FARDC units as well as by RMGs range from protection rackets including protection fees paid by mining pit managers to avoid pillage, or to facilitate smuggling, to indirect commercial control including the use of illegal tax revenues to buy and sell minerals near mining sites and direct coercive control including pillage. In addition, FARDC units and RMGs routinely forced civilians to work for them or relinquish their mineral production and extorted illegal taxes (Ibid, 2011).

The Global Witness report of December (2011) drew on data it had collected to estimate that military units and officials were receiving between \$1.1 and \$2.2 million a month from the Bisie mine in North Kivu, or \$14.4 million and \$28.8 million a year. Global Witness also estimated that illegal taxes on diggers outside the mineshafts in Bisie earned the FARDC officials and soldiers between \$45,600 and \$90,000 per month and

that they earned between \$3,300 and \$16,800 a month in illegal taxes on porters traveling to Bisie.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1952 endorsed the UNGOE's recommendations for supply chain due diligence developed for importers, processing industries, and consumers of Congolese mineral products to ensure that companies do not exacerbate the conflict by providing direct or indirect support to illegal armed groups those found to violate the asset freeze and travel ban on sanctioned individuals and entities or criminal networks and perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses including those within the national armed forces (Didier, 2011) .

The UNGOE's reporting in 2010 presented information indicating that Etablissement Namukaya, a gold exporting company based in the Kivu provinces purchased gold from traders who were linked to armed entities in eastern DRC, bought gold from a mine that provided visiting FARDC officers with gold, and worked with members of the FDLR in an attempt to sell material that they claimed was uranium. The report also presented information indicating that Geminaco, a mining company with offices in Goma, North Kivu, gained control of the gold mine at Omate in Walikale with the support of FARDC. General Amisi Kumba, the commander of FARDC land forces General Mayala and Colonel Mboneza. According to UNGOE reporting, Geminaco sought agreements with elements of the FARDC and the Mai-Mai Sheka to ensure that Geminaco could continue its operations at Omate.

During the year mining operations at Bisie mine in North Kivu reportedly supported arms transfers by FARDC elements that benefited non-governmental armed actors; there were also reports that the FARDC mining operations benefited an ICC-indicted FARDC general. According to the UNGOE's November report, ex-CNDP FARDC elements of the 212th Brigade who were led by Lieutenant Colonel Yusef Mboneza and his deputy Colonel Hassani continued to maintain a presence at the Bisie mine and maintain their own illegal tax regime which they used to extort one kilo of cassiterite from all diggers

each time they exited a mining pit and \$20 every time a digger worked at night (Global Witness, 2009).

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. However, the authorities did not implement the law and corruption remained endemic throughout the government and state security forces. The public perceived the government to be widely corrupt at all levels. According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, official corruption was a severe problem. Corruption in the judicial and penal systems continued to be severe. Reports indicated that the mining sector continued to lose millions of dollars as a result of official corruption at all levels including illegal exploitation of minerals by the FARDC and non-governmental armed entities in the east (UNHCR, 2011).

In September 2009 the Senate estimated that more than \$1.2 billion dollars of gold (approximately 40 tons) was exported fraudulently from the country every year and that in the east, 80 percent of the minerals extracted were being traded illegally. The UNGOE established that the level of fraudulent mineral exports to neighboring states has escalated significantly since 2008 and particularly since the rapprochement between Kinshasa and Kigali-Rwanda since January 2009 (United State Department of State, 2010).

In its November 2009 report to the UN Security Council, the UNGOE documented fundamental irregularities in the international gold trade between the DRC, Uganda, Burundi and the United Arab Emirates and gathered evidence of inconsistent and incomplete customs declarations and procedures as well as a lack of adequate control procedures by government customs and mining authorities. The UNGOE received strong indications of high-level protection and in some cases complicity in the illicit gold trade by government officials. It made several recommendations concerning the government, international corporations and the UN Security Council (ibid, 2010).

According to the United State Department of State (2011), during 2009 the government continued its review of 61 mining contracts negotiated from 1997 to 2002. The review had been marred by numerous delays and a lack of transparency. In 2008 the government reached new agreements with all but six of the companies under review and in November 2009 it formally announced the completion of the process. The government reached agreement on the one outstanding contract late in the year.

There continued to be an Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission but it had little effect during the year and lacked resources, independence and credibility. It last convened in 2007 without any significant results or findings. Government authorities and wealthy individuals at times used anti-defamation laws that carry criminal punishments to discourage media investigation of government corruption. The law requires the president and ministers to disclose their assets to a government committee. The law does not provide for public access to government-held information. In practice the government did not grant access to government documents for citizens or non-citizens including foreign media (Államok, 2008).

In 2008 the country was accepted as a candidate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international voluntary initiative designed to increase transparency in transactions between governments and companies in the extractive industries. Although the government took some positive steps under EITI including the establishment of a national EITI committee publication of the first report on EITI in the country and the hiring of an independent auditor to carry out validation of the EITI process, the country did not meet its March 9 2009 validation deadline. In December the EITI secretariat granted the country a six-month extension to complete validation (Virginia, 2010:53).

Since 1994, mining rights have been granted by various political regimes. In 2009, the Mining Registry Office which is CAMI, issued 138 mining rights to 36 mining companies or individuals in North Kivu. In South Kivu, 151 mining rights were issued held by 48 mining companies. Apart from economic and legal risks and any benefits they may have from the conflict's toll on the state's oversight and regulation mining companies have also had to deal with the consequences of conflict (MONUC, 2009).

In 2006, the UN Panel of Experts reported receiving full support from governments whose private actors are domiciled in the DRC, the private companies themselves and from governments who expressed an interest in establishing a natural resource control system. Most major companies and their leading industry associations participated readily in the consultations often providing extensive answers and in many cases offering continued support to any further efforts the UN Security Council or the group might undertake. There was also wide support for stronger governance measures, transparency and traceability mechanisms and even sanctions upon those who illegally exploit or benefit from the illegal exploitation of resources (UN 2006:10).

UN panels of experts documented the ways in which illegal resource exploitation fuelled war in the DRC and called for trade sanctions on the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and financial restrictions against companies involved in illegal exploitation and trade. While the reports led to multinational companies cutting ties with actors in the conflict, and to Burundi and Uganda announcing independent enquiries to investigate allegations, no commodity sanctions or company restrictions on the basis of involvement in illegal resource trade were declared. Following a second round of investigations that focused on the link between natural resource revenues and the financing of military activities in 2005 and 2006, UN experts again called for sanctions based on DRC laws regarding natural resource exploitation (United Nations Security Council, 2001).

The UN Secretary General expressed reservations about declaring such sanctions, raising the issue of legality which, if taken as a benchmark for sanctions could negatively affect artisan miners who are not the key players in the war economy. Considering the lack of enforcement capacities of the UN and the Congolese Government, the Secretary-General's report assessed that sanctions would do little to reduce the use of force in extracting minerals, diminish fraud and encourage responsible corporate behaviour (United Nations Security Council, 2006).

As a result of diverging views, no unified recommendation has been made to the UN Security Council. However, Security Council Resolution 1596 added to the 2003 arms embargo in 2005 and it was applied recently to freeze assets and ban travel of individuals and entities supporting and financing militias in the eastern DRC by means of trade in gold and weapons.

When conflict erupted in 1998, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government by deploying elements of their national armed forces to positions in DRC. At the same time Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought alongside the Congolese opposition groups, many of which they helped to create, including Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCDK), now known as Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML). National armed forces of neighbouring countries have also used DRC territory to fight against armed opposition groups from their own countries, many of which use DRC as a base and are widely believed to receive support from the DRC government. For example, Burundian armed forces were deployed in the Kivu provinces where they primarily conducted military operations against Burundian armed opposition groups operating from there.



The Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD, commonly referred to as FDD) is the primary Burundian armed opposition group operating out of DRC. Members of the former Rwandan government army, FAR and the exiled Rwandan Interahamwe some of who were responsible for acts of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and have received sanctuary in DRC, now operate from DRC territory. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan armed opposition group has also participated in violence in the north-eastern area of DRC. The Mai Mai is an umbrella term for a loose association of Congolese local defence forces often aligned with government forces but known for varied agendas and shifting political alliances. The Mai Mai and many other irregular armed groups, such as the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) also known as one of the ethnic Hema militia groups; Commander Masunzu's forces and the ethnic Lendu militias have also engaged in fighting in areas of eastern DRC (Watchlist, 2003).

Many observers have also argued that Rwanda and Uganda were motivated not only by security concerns, but also by economic interests; in other words that they sought to exploit and plunder the wealth of the Congo. Whatever their initial motivations, there is no question that Rwanda, Uganda and other states did freely loot Congo's resources. The AFDL and its supporters enjoyed rapid military success and the weakened Congolese State was unable to withstand the onslaught. Rwanda weakened the power of the militia groups and some observers contend it committed atrocities against Hutu refugees as a form of collective punishment (Kjell, 2007).

The conflict fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and power struggles is characterized as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises and the most deadly war ever documented in Africa. Over the past five years the forces of at least seven African countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in the conflict in DRC. Both foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including widespread abuses

against Congolese children and adolescents. The situation in DRC is also a result of decades of poor governance and broader regional insecurity (Anup, 2010).

In its history, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and other gross human rights abuses. The recent wars in the Congo were particularly ruinous for the country and its people. These contemporary conflicts were centred largely on the east of the country and involve several overlapping and interrelated factors including ethnic strife, a weak state, regional politics and the struggle for Congo's rich resources.

The conflict in the DRC has been described as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Over 2.5 million people have died in eastern DRC alone since the war began in 1998. Of these deaths, 350,000 were the result of direct violence and the remainder caused by malnutrition and preventable disease. An estimated eighteen million people have no access to services of any kind. There are some 2,275,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), most of who are in the eastern provinces. Of a population of 49 million, an estimated 20 million are regarded as vulnerable in the general population affected by adverse effects of the conflict and chronic insecurity (Barbara, 2010). For instance, the effects of the DRC conflict are captured by one of its citizens below:

"We are fighting and killing ourselves over what God gave to make us happy and comfortable. I sometimes wonder whether it would not be better if God takes away the endowment and by so doing, spare us the tragedy it has brought to our lives"

(Abiodun,2007:5).

These are the words that have been said by the citizen of DRC, who sought refuge in Angola. The natural resources that should be used to feed and educate people are instead being used to destroy them. Colonialism, which allowed Europeans to extract Africa's natural resources to enrich themselves and their country, left behind leaders

who exploited their gold, diamonds, timber and oil to benefit their own regional or ethnic groups or their own bank accounts.

Unfortunately the beauty of the DRC, named after the old kingdom of Congo has been marred by bloody armed struggles and plagued with rebellion and unrest. The second Congo war saw millions of casualties, placing it as the deadliest conflict since World War II. The fragility of the state has allowed continued conflict and human rights abuses. On-going clashes between the Congolese government and its opposers have seen thousands of civilians displaced from their homes. Recent efforts at peace have been tenacious at best and despite the intervention of the UN peacekeepers the threat of civil war still looms large (Jay, 2009:5).

East DR Congo's enormous mineral wealth has largely failed to transfer better living conditions to the local population; corruption, state weakness and the sheer size of the territory all present opportunities for various armed groups both state and non-state to engage in human rights abuses against civilians and plunder of natural resources. Since the outbreak of violence in DR Congo at least 4 million people are estimated to have been killed and 2.5 million forced to flee their homes. East DR Congo also hosts the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in history, MONUC (Insight on conflict, 2011).

In 2009, people in the Congo may still be dying at a rate of an estimated 45,000 per month and estimates of the number who have died from the long conflict range from 900,000 to 5,400,000. The death toll is due to widespread disease and famine; reports indicate that almost half of the individuals who have died are children under the age of five. This death rate has prevailed since efforts at rebuilding the nation began in 2004(Nicholas, 2010).

The long and brutal conflict in the DRC has caused massive suffering for civilians, with estimates of millions dead either directly or indirectly as a result of the fighting. There have been frequent reports of weapon bearers killing civilians, destroying property,

committing widespread sexual violence, causing hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes or otherwise breaching humanitarian and human rights law. An estimated 200,000 women have been raped (ICRC and Ipsos, 2009).

Few people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been unaffected by the armed conflict. A survey conducted in 2009 by the ICRC and Ipsos shows that three quarters (76%) of the people interviewed have been affected in some way either personally or due to the wider consequences of armed conflict (ICRC and Ipsos, 2009).

In all areas of the country, state security forces continued to act with impunity throughout the year, committing many serious abuses including unlawful killings, disappearances, torture, rape and engaging in arbitrary arrests and detention. Severe and life-threatening conditions in prison and detention facilities, prolonged pre-trial detention, lack of an independent and effective judiciary and arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home also remained serious problems (United States Government, 2010).

Government corruption remained pervasive and some corporations purchased minerals from suppliers who financed mining activities by armed entities that committed serious human rights abuses. Elements of the state security forces were charged in the death of one of the country's leading human rights defenders and at times beat or threatened local human rights advocates and obstructed or threatened UN human rights investigators (ReliefWeb, 2011).

Internal conflicts mainly in the east continued to significantly affect the human rights situation and challenged the government's limited ability to effectively control its territory which was particularly the case in North and South Kivu provinces. The conflicts permitted armed entities to commit violent abuses against civilians with little chance that the government would be able to hold the perpetrators accountable. These entities included RMGs such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mai-Mai which is a community-based self-defence group as well as dissident

elements of the state armed forces including former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and some regular units of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) (HCR, 2010).

During the year RMGs continued to commit numerous serious abuses, some of which may have constituted war crimes, including unlawful killings, disappearances and torture. RMGs also recruited and retained child soldiers, compelled forced labour and committed widespread crimes of sexual violence. The situation was complicated by the incomplete implementation of the March 2009 peace agreements involving the government and several RMGs that operated in North and South Kivu. In October the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) detailed allegations of serious abuses including potential war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the country by foreign militaries and other armed entities between 1993 and 2003 (United States Government, 2010).

Furthermore, U.S. Department of State (2011) highlighted that a separate conflict involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts of Orientale Province in the northeast continued to have an extremely negative effect on human rights, resulting in deaths, injuries, abductions, forced labour, looting and general insecurity.

In the similar view Anup (2010), further elaborated that the Officials from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights met with domestic NGOs and sometimes responded to their inquiries. On 2009 March 29, the minister announced the creation of a liaison organization for consultation between the government and human rights NGOs to monitor human rights and devise strategies to improve the situation. Scheduled to meet every two weeks, the first session was convened in September 2009 (Anup, 2010).

There were reports that local officials required domestic NGOs seeking to register to pay bribes. During the year several domestic NGOs were denied authorization to operate and NGOs needed authorization to hold demonstrations despite constitutional

provisions providing for freedom of peaceful assembly. Domestic human rights NGOs were particularly vulnerable to harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other abuses by state security forces when reporting on or supporting victims of abuses by the FARDC, ANR or other state security forces and when spotlighting the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the east (Ted, 2011).

In Ituri District, more than 60,000 people have been killed and others maimed or severely mutilated since June 1999. In the same time period more than 500,000 people have been displaced. Most deaths have been of civilians in the ethnic Lendu community. The UN verifies that massacres of the Hema community have also occurred. Violence in Ituri District is increasingly attributed to disputes of ethnic identity between the Lendu and Hema communities. However, power struggles over economic interests, manipulation by other armed forces and exploitation of natural resources such as gold, diamonds and timber all play a significant role in the perpetuation of violence and human rights abuses (Watchlist, 2003).

The litany of violations against children's security and rights in this district is shocking. Typical violations, most often committed with impunity include unlawful mass killings, systematic rape, abduction, sexual torture, illegal arrest and detentions, forced displacement and other extreme forms of torture and cruelty. According to reports, children are both perpetrators and victims of attacks. In February 2003, sources told Refugees International that 75 percent of the UPC's 15,000 soldiers in Ituri District are under age 16 (Ibid, 2003).

There are a lot of media channels in DR Congo: the country has dozens of TV stations, many radio stations, newspapers and several important news sites. Among these, quality reporting is hard to find. Most channels focus on the capital Kinshasa; rural areas are only served by radio. The media have to cope with corruption and with random taxes and duties imposed by the government. Journalists writing unwelcome articles are often threatened and at times arrested (Irene, 2011).

Government officials and security agents throughout the country frequently harassed critical journalists and media outlets, often via the national intelligence agency, known as the ANR. At least 23 local journalists were detained without due process in 2009 in connection with their work, according to the press freedom group Journaliste en Danger (JED). Non-state actors, including armed groups also subjected local journalists to threats and abuse. In June 2009, UN Special Rapporteur Margaret Sekaggya stated that in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), journalists who report on human rights abuses committed by state and non-state actors are killed, threatened, tortured or arbitrarily arrested and their offices raided. JED documented fewer individual cases of press freedom abuses such as assault, arbitrary arrest, threats and censorship in 2009 than in 2008; however, the organization concluded that this was attributable not to an improvement in media freedom but to self-censorship stemming from a fear of reprisals (UNHCR, 2010).

Journalists working in the east, where the military has launched a year-long offensive against rebels of Rwandan origin, were particularly vulnerable to threats and censorship. Three journalists have been murdered in the past three years in Bukavu, capital of the eastern province of South Kivu. The most recent victim, radio presenter Bruno Koko Chirambiza, was stabbed to death in August 2009 and no arrests were reported in connection with the killing. In July 2009, the government barred FM broadcasting by Radio France Internationale (RFI), though it remained accessible on shortwave; authorities accused the French station of demoralizing the Congolese armed forces and attempting to destabilize the country in connection with its reporting on the civil conflict. Several months earlier, the government had banned RFI broadcasts in the eastern cities of Bunia and Bukavu (freedom House, 2010).

The population of DRC is largely illiterate and depends on radio broadcasts for the news. Nonetheless, many private newspapers are published and although they are not always objective, they are often highly critical of the government. Private newspapers must pay a license fee of 250,000 Congolese francs (US\$280) and meet other administrative requirements before operating. There are several hundred privately

owned radio and television stations, in addition to three state-owned radio stations and a state-owned television station. The state broadcasters reportedly favour Kabila's party, though other political parties represented in the government are occasionally granted access. The UN mission in DRC (MONUC) operates the only nationwide independent radio network, Radio Okapi, which has set new standards for reporting and media objectivity in a volatile political scene. Many media outlets are reportedly owned by public figures and used for political propaganda rather than objective reporting. Journalists at major outlets are usually poorly paid and lack sufficient training, leaving them vulnerable to bribery (Joel Simon, 2009:11).

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press but these rights are limited in practice by President Joseph Kabila's government and various non-state actors. Officials used an array of regulations and laws to restrict free speech and suppress political criticism in 2009 by bringing criminal charges against journalists, shutting down broadcast operations and seizing copies of newspapers that were critical of the authorities. No progress was reported in local journalists efforts to initiate reforms of the penal code and the 1996 press law, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) while several Congolese journalists spent time in jail in 2009 (Tiego, 2010).

For example, Nsimba Embete Ponte, a Kinshasa-based newspaper director was arrested in late 2008 and sentenced to 10 months in prison for insulting the head of state in connection with reporting on Kabila's health. Local media outlets are also subject to regulation by the High Authority on Media (HAM). The agency's mandate is to ensure freedom of expression but it has the power to temporarily suspend outlets for hate speech and other serious ethical transgressions and its decisions have at times been criticized as politically biased. In October 2009, the National Assembly passed a bill establishing a new regulatory agency, the High Council for Broadcasting, though its independence has yet to be established (U.S Department of State, 2011).

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government restricted these rights in practice and freedom of the press declined during the year. The government intimidated journalists and publishers into practicing self-censorship. In September 2010, 29 members of a worldwide coalition of press freedom groups expressed concern about the constant decline in the climate for journalists and steadily shrinking space for free expression in the country in advance of the 2011 presidential election. In an open letter, the 31 members of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), including the Media Institute of Southern Africa and Congolese NGO Journalist in Danger called on President Kabila to declare a moratorium on imprisoning journalists on charges of defamation or insulting the authorities. IFEX also called for the rapid creation of the proposed Higher Council for Broadcasting and Communication (CSAC) to ensure candidates would have equitable access to state-owned media in 2010 (Freedom House, 2010).

Following an assessment visit to the country in June 2009, Margaret Sekaggya, the UN special rapporteur on human rights defenders, said journalists and other human rights defenders face illegitimate restrictions of their right to freedoms of opinion and expression and underscored that the country's defenders in particular journalists who report on human rights abuses committed by state and non-state actors are killed, threatened, tortured, or arbitrarily arrested and their offices raided (United Nations Human Rights, 2009).

Generally individuals could privately criticize the government, its officials and private citizens without being subject to official reprisals. However, public criticism of government officials and government conduct or decisions regarding issues such as conflict and insurgencies, management of natural resources or corruption sometimes resulted in harsh responses, often from the ANR, the intelligence service under the president's control. For example, on April 11, ANR officials arrested Antenne A-TV journalists Jean-Denis Bankonga and Jean-Louis Miasuekama at their office and held them in detention for three hours. Officials had wanted to arrest the station's information

director for announcing that the government had set up a commission to negotiate with the Enyele insurgents on April 8 2008 (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

A large and active private press functioned throughout the country and the government licensed a large number of daily newspapers to publish. The government required every newspaper to pay a license fee of 250,000 Congolese francs, approximately \$280 and complete several administrative requirements before publishing. Many journalists lacked professional training, received little, if any salary and were vulnerable to manipulation by wealthy individuals, government officials and politicians who provided cash or other benefits to encourage certain types of articles. Many newspapers remained critical of the government and many others showed bias toward it or supported particular political parties (Ibid, 2012).

Radio remained the most important medium of public information due to limited literacy and the relatively high cost of newspapers and television. More than 350 privately owned radio and television stations operated independently according to the transitional state media regulatory body. The state owned three radio stations and three television stations, Congolese National Radio-Television (RTNC) 1, RTNC 2 and a channel that broadcast parliament sessions live. The UN operated Radio Okapi, which was the only nationwide radio network. The president's family also owned and operated television station Digital Congo. Political parties represented in the government could generally gain access to RTNC (International Media Report, 2003).

State security forces did not generally arrest or harass foreign journalists; however, in 2009 government authorities imposed an indefinite suspension on broadcasts by Radio France Internationale (RFI). RFI's broadcasting signal was restored across the country on October 12 and was allowed to open a local office and appointed a foreign journalist. Government authorities informed foreign journalists that the military code of justice criminal penalties including imprisonment would be applied to any foreign journalists who committed press offenses, causing international journalists to express concern over

their ability to report on sensitive subjects such as the conflict in the east and corruption (Ibid, 2003).

State security forces beat, arbitrarily arrested, harassed and intimidated local journalists because of their reporting. For example, in April 2009, Jullson Eninga, publishing director of Le Journal was arrested in Kinshasa for publishing an FDLR newsletter but was acquitted of all charges on September 6 (Ecoi.net, 2010).

According to JED's annual report on press freedom released in May, there was a 16 percent increase in press freedom abuses such as murder, assault, arbitrary arrest and detention, threats and illegal sanctions or censorship during the year compared with 2009. JED underscored that following a series of killings of journalists since 2005, journalists have become afraid to address sensitive topics, such as the war in the east and corruption. JED emphasized that economic and political pressure restricted press freedom and expressed concern about the continuing trend of politicians and government officials hiring journalists as advisors (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2010).

During the year radio journalists, particularly those in Bukavu, South Kivu, continued to fear for their safety. Journalists often received anonymous death threats from callers and many journalists continued to be concerned by the lack of serious investigation and judicial action by authorities against the perpetrators responsible for multiple journalist killings in the country since 2005 (State Government, 2009).

Until the flurry of recent peace initiatives, most importantly the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that ended inconclusively in Sun City, South Africa and the July 2002 agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, the DRC was in the midst of one of the most sweeping and wide-ranging conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Despite these agreements and the engagement of the United Nations through a monitoring mission (MONUC), peace is not yet secure in this vast country. At the height of the war the conflict developed an international character bringing in many regional

actors, defying regional and international mediation. The DRC now ranks 152nd in the UNDP Human Development index of 174 countries, despite the existence of considerable natural resources such as diamonds, hydroelectric power, wood and strategic minerals (ISS, 2004).

In particular, coltan a combination of Columbium-tantalite is among the strategic minerals found in the Congo and forms the basis of a high-tech global commodity chain. With 80% of global coltan reserves located in Africa, most of it in the DRC, a number of analysts have argued that international demand for the metal has become one of the driving forces behind the war in the DRC and the presence of rival militias (Vesperini, 2001).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement attempted to end the Second Congo War through a ceasefire, release of prisoners of war and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations. The heads of state of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe signed the agreement in Lusaka, Zambia on July 10, 1999 (Laurent, 2003).

Representatives from the Southern African Development Community, Organization of African Unity and the United Nations met in Lusaka and drafted the ceasefire agreement from June 21-27, 1999. Defence and Foreign Ministers of the parties to the conflict then met from June 29 to July 7 to discuss the agreement (Ibid, 2003).

Zambian President Frederick Chiluba played a major role in the signing of the agreement in his role as Chairman of the Regional Initiative for Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reliefweb, 2008).

The parties agreed to halt all military operations within 24 hours of signing the agreement, in Article I, clause 2, section c. Article I prohibited further military movement or the transfer of armaments to the battlefield and called on all nations to respect human rights and protect civilians. Article III released all prisoners of war in clause 8 and gave the International Red Cross the task of assisting the wounded in clause 9. Clause 11 requested the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The document also requested that the OAU establish a temporary peacekeeping force to combat militant groups until the UN force arrived (UN, 2008).

The rapid military gains of the rebels in August 1998 prompted a variety of peace initiatives at the very outset of the fighting with the primary aim to establish a ceasefire. None of these initiatives came directly from central Africa but rather emerged from such diverse actors as the OAU, Libya or the NGO Sant'Egidio. Most importantly was the active and sustained involvement of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) which feared that the conflict could spill over into a region-wide war. This is not to say that SADC's mediation process was a smooth enterprise. Different approaches were indeed in contention among different SADC member states while reflecting their respective national interests and allies (Lund, 1999:12).

Eventually Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba was appointed principal mediator and a first series of meetings were organized in 1998, without much success, as either Kabila or the rebels alternately refused to attend. SADC persisted and eventually in July 1999, the Lusaka Accords were signed by the Congolese government, rebel groups and the states which had been supporting the various Congolese sides namely Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda. The agreement focused on the following building blocks:

- Establishment of a cease-fire;
- freezing of the territorial control of all conflict parties and subsequent withdrawal of all armed groups operating in the territory of the DRC;
- deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC;
- establishment of a joint military commission made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement as well as the disarmament of the Interahamwe militia; and
- initiation and setting up of the Inter Congolese National Dialogue aimed to bring about a new political order in Congo and based on the participation of the Congolese armed groups, the non-armed political opposition to Kabila's government and representatives from civil society or so-called Forces vives de la Nation (Oxfam, 2001).

Although the signature of the agreement in the summer of 1999 constituted the first real prospect for peace in the DRC, the Accord was only the first step toward the settlement of the conflict, both regionally and domestically. The signature of the Lusaka agreement was followed by some 18 months of deadlocks and continued armed engagements between its signatories, all of which came to a sudden end with the assassination of President Laurent Desiré Kabila on 16 January, 2001. The late president had indeed systematically obstructed the implementation of every feature of the Lusaka agreement, which he came to see as unfavorable. In this sense, his replacement by his 29-year-old son, Joseph Kabila, gave new hope to the peace process, both from a national and regional perspective. The emergence of a new window of opportunity for peace was reflected in a number of positive signs from both the DRC's government and the international community. For instance, the international community immediately recognized the new president, primarily in order to invite him to break with the policies of his father and to implement the Lusaka Accords (Havermans, 2002:238).

Moreover, Joseph Kabila agreed to join the Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitated by Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana and welcomed the quick deployment of the UN military observer mission for the DRC (MONUC). The UN Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001 confirmed the above, as it adopted a new concept of operations for MONUC and confirmed its commitment to disarming the remaining negative forces. Finally, the appointment of Brigadier General Mjuki Mwanyiki of Kenya at the head of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) revived hopes for effective plans for disengagement and disarmament (Lund, 1999:187).

Although MONUC subsequently made sterling progress, the main stumbling block was lack of progress with the Dialogue. Painstaking preparations eventually led to extended talks in Sun City in South Africa during the first months of 2002 but the results were a disappointing partial agreement between Kabila and the majority of the participants but excluding the RCD-Goma and key internal parties. Amidst continued fighting in the east, South African president Thabo Mbeki eventually secured an agreement on 20 July 2002 between Kabila and Rwandan leader Paul Kagame that appeared to reinvigorate the Lusaka Accords and pave the way for an inclusive settlement. Many challenges still face the Lusaka ceasefire signatories and the international community in implementing the Congolese peace agreement namely:

- The effort to disarm the non-Congolese armed groups which destabilize the region from their Congolese bases. A successful strategy of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration or resettlement of these armed groups remains critical to the effective implementation of the Lusaka agreement, as well as the establishment of lasting peace in the DRC. These groups continue to provide a rationale for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations by neighboring countries and for the occupation of the Congolese territory while undermining regional stability. Although not the root cause of violent conflict in the DRC, their presence act's as a major conflict-sustaining factor and the primary source of much of the continuing violence and suffering within the Congolese territory.

- The complete withdrawal from the DRC of Rwanda and Uganda, as well as the government allies, Angola and Zimbabwe who, after having invested heavily in the war, will not leave unless their individual interests are accommodated. These countries indeed hope to maintain their political influence on future developments in the DRC, as well as economic access to its natural resources. This is particularly the case for Zimbabwe which has thus far shown no willingness to abandon the direct or indirect exploitation of natural resources as developed over the last few years (Lund, 1999:12).

Finally, another challenge facing the successful implementation of the Lusaka agreement and the establishment of peace and stability in the region as a whole pertains to the ongoing war on terrorism launched by the US and its coalition partners, as a result of the 11 September attacks on New York and Washington. While there is no doubt that a sustainable resolution of the conflict in the DRC as well as the central African region will primarily lie with the parties concerned, the current campaign against terrorism has nonetheless produced a major policy attention and priority shift at the international level, with potentially counterproductive impact in maintaining momentum with the continuation of the implementation of the Lusaka agreement and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It remains to be seen the extent to which the war on terrorism by the US will impact on current efforts to bring about peace to the DRC and the region (UNIC, 2009).

2.2. Theoretical Framework

It is a process of identifying a core set of connectors within a topic and showing how they fit together or are related in some way to the subject. The theoretical framework is a foundation for the parameters, or boundaries of a study. Once these themes are established, researchers can seek answers to the topical questions they have developed on broad subjects. The main benefit of a theoretical framework is that it can help a researcher or writers determine problem areas, content considerations, research

questions that need to be addressed and the methodology or way in which the researcher plans to go about finding an answer to the research question. It can be used to make notes on findings so that at a later time the writer can quickly recall this information (Michelle, 2005).

The study operates within the theory of Frustration-Aggression Theory and Resource Curse. It will enable the researcher to follow specific framework based on the proposed theories below. Theoretical Framework tends to guide what you notice or don't notice within your framework.

2.2.1. The Frustration-Aggression Theory is particularly prominent, deals almost exclusively with acts of violence. The idea that frustration produces an aggressive response was first formulated in 1939 by John Dollard, Neal Miller and their associates. Frustration was defined as an interference with the occurrence of an integrated goal-response at its proper time in the behavioural sequence. More simply put, the theorists said that a person become frustrated if he or she is kept from attaining the satisfaction expected at the time the person thought it would be achieved. Such frustration arouses aggression against the source inflicting it or, perhaps, against a more convenient object (Arnold, 2003:123).

The expression of aggression alleviates the frustration and allows the person to return to a more comfortable state. One study, for instance, showed that male subjects displayed a sharp increase in systolic blood pressure when angered and had a more rapid return to their regular blood pressure if they could punish the person who had insulted them than if they could behave only in a nonaggressive manner (Phillip, 2000:34).

The theory suggests that it is not a particularly good idea to frustrate a person needlessly if that person does not have a legal means to respond to such frustration. Frustration can also be enabling, though, in the sense that it can propel persons to seek ways to solve their dilemmas. Frustration is inevitable because none of us is going to be able to have everything we want when we want it, no matter how effectively we manipulate the world and keep our desires in check. Therefore, one needs to learn how to deal with frustration, which is usually and understandably an easier task if we have many ways to compensate for the frustrations we experience (Arnold, 2003:124).

This theory views prejudice as an outcome of scape-goating a weaker group by a stronger group or a result of transferred aggressions caused by frustrations. For example: when members of an ethnic group fail to achieve their desired goals such as better jobs, good schools, political power, they become frustrated. Frustration tends to express itself as aggression or hostility (Philip, 2000:89).

When people perceive that they are being prevented from achieving a goal, their frustration is likely to turn to aggression. The closer you get to a goal, the greater the excitement and expectation of the pleasure. Thus the closer you are, the more frustrated you get by being held back. Unexpected occurrence of the frustration also increases the likelihood of aggression (Wilhelm, 2005).

Civil war is caused either by frustration or greed. Natural resources extraction in the DRC has exacerbated aggression, by increased income inequality and creating revenues for people other than the people extracting them. Natural resources can also create funding for rebel groups to start civil war; they can furthermore function as the cause of the conflict with more parties fighting over control over a profitable source. The combination of frustration and aggression can create the start-up of a civil war.

2.2.2. Resource Curse Theory- this theory is influenced by its explanation of how abundant resources turn to hinder development in resource rich countries. This theory proves to be more relevant to the study as it explains the curse caused by abundant resources that are not properly used in order to profit the citizens.

The resource curse theorists claim that natural resource-rich developing countries have performed very poorly in terms of economic growth leading to industrialisation and improvement in social welfare compared to resource-poor developing countries at similar stage of development such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. The resource curse theorists argue that, contrary to the assumption of modernisation theory of the 1940s and 1950s that natural resources abundance would lead to rapid capital accumulation that would then lead to rapid industrialisation and usher in a stage of sustained economic growth, resource-rich developing countries have experienced regressive economic growth trends, systemic corruption, civil wars, political instability and general decline in the standard of living and social wellbeing (Kuwimb, 2010).

Favourable natural resources endowment may be less beneficial to countries at low and mid-income levels of development than the conventional wisdom. Two important pieces of this evidence are the developing countries post war industrialization efforts and the performance of the mineral-rich developing countries since the 1960s. The new evidence suggests that not only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they may actually perform worse than less well-endowed countries. This counter-intuitive outcome is the basis of the resource curse thesis (Auty, 2001:1). Resource rich countries tend to have a more unequal income distribution, less democratic regimes, and more corruption (Palley, 2003).

A major puzzle in economic development is the existence of a negative correlation between economic growth and large natural resources. Some of the fastest growing economies over the last few decades are countries with very little natural wealth such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, whereas some of the poorest economic performers like Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are countries with enormous resources. A number of recent studies have concluded that the negative relationship between resource abundance and growth also holds for large samples of countries after controlling for other relevant characteristics. This relationship, called resource curse, has become widely accepted as one of the stylized facts of our times (Anne, 2005:2).

Natural resources have been a curse in the Democratic Republic of Congo because of the weak economic performance yet it is a resource rich nation and it has also displayed very slow growth over the last decades and is poor in terms of GDP per capital. In other words, it has not been successful in lifting the population out of poverty despite their wealth of resources and it has been afflicted by violent conflict and conflict over the control of natural resources.

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
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CHAPTER THREE

Data Presentation, Analysis and Findings

This chapter deals with Delineation of Research Variables. The researcher will uncover the role of natural resources in conflict, the role of neighbouring countries in the DRC conflict and she will also investigate the effects of external competition over the exploitation of natural resources on the onset of conflict in the DRC.



(Global Witness, 2005)

The map of the Democratic Republic of Congo above shows the location of different mineral resources in the country and most of those resources are situated close to the border which made neighbouring countries also interested in the DRC resources and smuggling easy, because resources are not far from the border. As the result, there is a high influx of immigrants in those regions who have interest in the resources and that leads to the start-up of conflict between the DRC citizens and the immigrants from neighbouring countries fighting for the common interest which is natural resources. The eastern part of DRC which an enormous amount of natural resources has been the battle field of many violent conflicts.

3.1. The role of natural resources in conflict

Conflict is generally defined as an interaction between interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt to achieve their goal. According to Galtung (1996) conflict could be viewed as a triangle with structure, attitudes and behaviour as its vertices. By structure, he means the conflict situation, the parties and the conflict of interest among them. Conflict arises where the parties come to have incompatible interests, values or goals. He uses the term attitudes to refer to the tendency for the parties to see conflict from their own point of view to identify with their own side and to diminish the concerns of others. Behaviour includes gestures and communications which can convey either a hostile or a conciliatory intent.

Conflict is the opposing action of incompatible or divergent ideas, interests, or persons. Typically emerging from a complex mix of causal factors, conflicts are caused by insecure or inequitable access to resources by competition between social groups for political power or by incompatibilities between groups with distinct value systems. Throughout history, conflict has played a vital transformative role as an opportunity for the redistribution of resources, the redefinition of political rights and the resolution of competing value-systems (Merriam, 2001).

Armed groups may seek revenue or individual wealth through exploitation and sale of natural resources, and through extortion of protection funds from companies in the region. The World Bank hypothesizes that in many cases rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation or are critically dependent on natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives (Collier, 2002:21). The violence in DRC has been sustained by this country's readily accessible natural resources wealth, which rebel groups have sold to international brokers to purchase arms and supplies.

The conflict is driven by open competition for minerals and other easily looted resources. As a special assessment mission of the United Nations Security Council (2001:9-10), reported that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources. Business has superseded security concerns. The only loser in this huge business venture is the Congolese people. Mineral production can reduce the likelihood of conflict through economic development. On the other hand, large-scale mining may contribute to conflict by creating grievances over inequitable distribution of impacts and benefits that contribute to violent uprising. Moreover, it may provide a source of funds to sustain the oppression, fuel corruption or to attract armed bandits seeking easy riches.

3.1.1. Linkages Between Natural Resources and Conflict

Natural Resources can cause conflict over:

- Control of the resource or resource-area
- Right to participate in decision-making and benefit-sharing
- Social and Environmental Impacts
- Means used to secure Natural Resources assets and personnel

Mining can also:

- Finance conflict
- Benefit from conflict
- Be targeted by conflict
- Be a supplier to those who profit from conflict (World Commission on Dams, 2001:p8).

The role of natural resources as a factor for fuelling conflicts has become one of the most controversial issues in post-Cold War Africa, especially through the increase in the number of armed groups exploiting natural resources to advance their desire for self-determination or pursue other centrifugal tendencies. Armed groups in DRC have exploited the natural resources inside their territories to prosecute wars against their government (Abiodun, 2007:5).

Natural resources are closely linked to conflict in the eastern Congo. All armed actors, including units and commanders of the Congolese army, profit from mineral trade either through taxation rackets or dealing directly in minerals. The militarization of the mining sector fuels the conflict and prevents effective security sector reform, undermining sustainable peace building efforts (Jason, 2010).

Natural resources can have an influence on civil war in three ways; it can influence the onset of war, the duration and intensity of war and the type of war. Each of these subcategories will be discussed below. The connection will be made between civil conflict and natural resources (Brunnschweiler, 2008:616).

3.1.2. The onset of civil war

Civil war is caused by either grievance or greed. Natural resources extraction can exacerbate grievance, by increased income inequality, by labour migration, by causing the environment to deteriorate or by creating revenues for other people than the people extracting them. Natural resources can increase greed as well; they can create funding for rebels to start a civil war, they can furthermore function as the cause of the conflict

with more parties fighting over control over a profitable source. The combination of grievance and greed can create the startup of a civil war (Rosser, 2006:17-18).

The onset of civil war is neither caused by grievance or greed, but by foreign intervention, when other nations decide to support the rebels. But this does not mean that natural resources do not play a role. Natural resources can function as a reason for foreign intervention. Foreign intervention can furthermore be bought through the booty futures mechanism, when rebels get foreign support with the condition that these foreign nations get a part of the natural resource revenue once the rebels come to power. Natural resources do have an influence on separatist civil wars if the resources are non-lootable and are located in the periphery or in an area with a concentration of an ethnic minority (Brunnschweiler, 2008:616).

3.1.3. The Duration and Intensity of Civil war

Natural resources can cause several situations wherein the duration and intensity of civil war can be influenced. There are four situations. First, natural resources can enable the weaker side to raise funding through looting and resource extraction and therefore have the funds to continue the conflict, although they are weaker. Second, natural resources can give combatants a dis-incentive to agree to a peace deal because the peace deal will end their control over a natural resource. Third, if it is a separatist conflict, the government will not stick to a peace deal that gives a region fiscal autonomy. Fourth, natural resources can enable the weaker side to raise money not by extracting the resources but by selling future exploitation rights, the booty future mechanism (Cerianne, 2008).

Natural resources have an influence on the duration of civil war. This does not mean that these wars lasted longer; it could be that natural resources were used to strengthen the already stronger side, instead of the weaker side resulting in a shorter war. Natural resources could have an influence on the intensity measured in number of deaths in war (Ross, 2003).

3.2. The role of neighbouring countries in the DRC conflict

While natural resource wealth has fuelled conflict among factions within the DRC, some neighbouring actors have also been eager to obtain a share of the country's vast resources. Since the 1998 conflict commenced in the DRC, competition between neighbouring states over the extraction of mineral wealth quickly served to fuel the conflict in the eastern DRC and broader instability in the Great Lakes region (Celine, 2009).

The 2001 UN Panel of Experts reported that the governments of Rwanda and Tanzania had been involved in illegal coltan trade in the eastern DRC. Burundi was also named in the report as a destination or transit point for gold extracted in the DRC. It was reported that gold was smuggled by way of Bukavu, Fizi Baraka and Uvira through the porous borders of Burundi. In Bujumbura, gold dealers from Senegal, Pakistan and Greece are reported to purchase the smuggled gold which is then personally transported to Europe and other regions (UN, 2001:7-8).

The military officers and politicians in some states in the region have exploited the conflict in the eastern DRC to profit personally from the country's mineral wealth. The UN Panel of Experts report further highlights gold mining activities carried out by the Ugandan army in the Kivus, in Maniema and in Ituri. The sharp rise in Ugandan gold exports since the conflict, which curiously exceeded national production levels, provided further speculation that the Ugandan armed forces illegally transported gold to Kampala from where it was exported (Alao and Olonisakin, 2000:31-32).

Apart from neighbouring governments, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-AFDL) was identified as appropriating and exploiting the DRC's resources apart from attempting to overthrow the government. The Rwandese armed forces are reported to have formed partnerships with Congolese operators to run the coltan trade and handlers were relocated from towns such as Bukavu and Goma to towns on the border with Rwanda, such as Cyangugu and Gsenyi (Braeckman, 2004:14).

Almost no revenues are allocated to public services such as utilities, health services and schools. Local and foreign actors including foreign armies, foreign armed opposition groups, Congolese armed opposition groups and Mai Mai militias are implicated in the exploitation of natural resources in DRC. For example, Rwanda is alleged to export millions of dollars of coltan annually; Uganda is alleged to export huge quantities of gold and diamonds; Zimbabwe has rights to export Congolese tropical timber and Angola has control of a large segment of the Congolese petrol industry. The panel of independent experts has also named 85 international business enterprises based in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East and North America that are considered to be in violation of the guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Watchlist, 2003).

Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe are named as key transit routes for commodities from DRC. The panel of independent experts also reports that links to individuals, companies, governments and criminal networks in the trafficking of natural resources are well established.

In 1999, a few months after coming to power, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila thanked all the foreign military forces that helped him to overthrow Mobutu and asked them to return back to their countries because he was very fearful and concerned that the Rwandan military officers who were running his army were plotting a coup d'état against him in order to give the presidency to a Tutsi, who would report directly to the President

of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. This move was not well received by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, who wanted to control their big neighbour (Clark, 2004).

Consequently, Rwandan troops in DRC retreated to Goma and launched a new militia group or rebel movement called the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), led by Tutsis to fight against their former ally President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. To counterbalance the power and influence of Rwanda in DRC, the Ugandan troops instigated the creation of another rebel movement called the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), led by the Congolese warlord Jean-Pierre Bemba, son of Congolese billionaire Bemba Saolona. The two rebel movements started the second war by attacking the DRC's still fragile army in 1998, backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia became involved militarily on the side of the government to defend a fellow SADC member (Triposo, 2002).

Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was succeeded by his son Joseph, who upon taking office called for multilateral peace talks to end the war. In February 2001 a peace deal was brokered between Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda, leading to the apparent withdrawal of foreign troops. UN peacekeepers, MONUC, arrived in April 2001. The conflict was reignited in January 2002 by ethnic clashes in the northeast, and both Uganda and Rwanda then halted their withdrawal and sent in more troops. Talks between Kabila and the rebel leaders led to the signing of a peace accord in which Kabila would share power with former rebels. By June 2003 all foreign armies except those of Rwanda had pulled out of Congo. Much of the conflict was focused on gaining control of substantial natural resources in the country, including diamonds, copper, zinc and coltan (Nicholas, 2010).

DR Congo had a transitional government until the election was over. A constitution was approved by voters and on 30 July 2006 the Congo held its first multi-party elections since independence in 1960. After this Joseph Kabila took 45% of the votes and his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba took 20%. The disputed results of this election turned into an all-out battle between the supporters of the two parties in the streets of the

capital, Kinshasa from 20-22 August 2006. Sixteen people died before police and the UN mission MONUC took control of the city. A new election was held on 29 October 2006 which Kabila won with 70% of the vote. Bemba made multiple public statements saying the election had irregularities, despite the fact that every neutral observer praised the elections. On 6 December 2006 the Transitional Government came to an end as Joseph Kabila was sworn in as President (Polgreen, 2008).

3.3. The effects of external competition over the illegal exploitation of natural resources

Central governments and armed factions have exploited natural resources to advance their respective agendas in conflicts that have their roots in ethnic, socio-economic and political differences. The management and control of abundant resources have also underlined conflicts in their bid to maximize opportunities coming from the natural resource endowment of their communities (Abiodun, 2007).

While the central government has effectively brought the northern and central provinces back under control, several parts of Kivu function as strongholds of rebel groups that refuse to integrate into the national army, prolonging civil war. Two mining sites seem particularly important to these non-integrated groups. The cassiterite (tin oxide) mine of Bisie in Walikale district, North Kivu is the most lucrative, contested and controlled by the non-integrated 85th Brigade, formerly of the Congolese Army. If it were reintegrated into the national army, the 85th Brigade would be dissolved and lose access to profits from a trade estimated to be worth \$800 000 per month to the local economy (United Nations, 2007:7).

While the government suspended all cassiterite production in the district in 2008, mineral trading companies continue to transport ores to processing facilities in the DRC and Rwanda, where it is mixed with ores from other parts of the country and then legally transported to South Africa and Belgium for further processing (Barouski, 2007).

In addition to the rebel groups and non-integrated army brigades, Rwandese Hutu militia and remnant Mai-Mai groups continue to be involved in illegal resource extraction and taxation of minor deposits of cassiterite, coltan and gold in North and South Kivu provinces. Although their positions are linked to the presence of natural resources, these resources form no key military objectives. The survival of Hutu militia, however, does give Nkunda's group a political reason to keep these men under arms. It is of little surprise therefore that the most recent Goma Agreement signed on 23 January 2008 by major armed factions in North and South Kivu, but excluding Rwandese Hutu militias, has not led to an end of hostilities (United Nations, 2008).

According to the UNGOE interim report of 2010, in the Kivu provinces, it appears, almost every mining deposit is controlled by an armed group. UNGOE published a report examining measures it deemed necessary to end the conflict minerals trade in eastern DRC. According to the report, the export records of the DRC government's Division of Mines showed that two Chinese companies and one Hong Kong company purchased 100 percent of the 41.4 tons of columbite-tantalite or coltan, (a metallic ore which when refined yields tantalum), exported from conflict-affected North Kivu Province in May 2010.

According to Global Witness (2010), the three companies were Fogang Jiata Metals, which was the top importer of coltan from the Kivu provinces in 2009 according to DRC government statistics, Star 2000 Services, and Hong Kong-based Unilink Trading Hong Kong. The Global Witness identified Chinese state-owned company CNMC Ningxia Orient Nonferrous Metal Group as one of the top three tantalum smelting and producing companies in the world and reported that the company declined to identify for Global Witness the origin of the tantalum ore that it used.

In the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, the illegal exploitation of natural resources continued to contribute to conflict. Many armed entities in the east, including some FARDC units, engaged in the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and some RMGs, have cooperated with criminal networks within the FARDC that have

militarized the mineral trade and continued to compete for control over mineral-rich areas. In September, President Joseph Kabila imposed an indefinite suspension of all mining activity in North and South Kivu and Maniema provinces, which remained in effect at year's end.

There were reports that following the suspension, the military's control of the mines intensified and that some FARDC elements increased their use of forced labour in the mines since mine activity had dropped following the suspension (Abiodun, 2007:36).

In North and South Kivu, the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources by armed actors, including criminal elements of the FARDC, continued to prolong the conflict in which natural resources facilitated the purchase of small arms to commit abuses, and reduced government revenues needed for increasing security and rebuilding the country. Generating direct and indirect financing for armed actors and conflict, the exploitation of natural resources continued to include minerals such as cassiterite (a tin oxide), the rare mineral tantalum and wolframite, all of which are key components in electronic products, as well as gold, timber, charcoal, fishing and land (United States Department of State, 2011).

The illegal trade in minerals continued to be both a symptom and a cause of the conflict in the Kivu provinces. While FARDC military operations during the year and in 2009 drove many RMGs, such as the FDLR, out of the principal mining areas in the Kivus, the RMGs continued to control hundreds of more remote mining deposits, increasingly pillaged mineral traders and transporters, and employed intermediaries to purchase minerals in mines they could no longer access. Ex-CNDP FARDC elements remained loyal to and in some cases shared mining profits with General Ntaganda, who remained the subject of an outstanding ICC arrest warrant as they continued to gain control over large areas rich in natural resources in North and South Kivu provinces, including Walikale Territory, the part of North Kivu that is richest in cassiterite (Jay, 2009:131).

Diamonds in particular from northern Kisangani provided a stable source of revenue for the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Uganda's People Defence Force (UPDF), through which they continued to contribute to conflict in the region (UN, 2001, P-11). The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) reports that key actors driving the militarised economy in the Kivus include mining concession holders, transport companies, banks, comptoirs (syndicates), trading companies of raw materials, and economic bodies, including customs (MONUC, 2009).

Diamonds contributed to funding the conflict between 1998 and 2003. The control over territory was the key factor enabling armed groups to profit from the exploitation of natural resources. Currently the links between the activities of armed groups and natural resource exploitation involves state actors, criminality, corruption and other illicit armed activity. Mining of gold is one of the main sources of income for armed groups, directly as well as from taxation, theft and abuses of small-scale miners and local communities (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009).

In July 2001, the UN Security Council received reports from a panel of independent experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC. A 2002 report states that armed combatants are driven by a desire to control resources and finance their operations by riches gained from the exploitation of key mineral resources: cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds and gold. The use of children as forced labourers is a key component in the illicit exploitation of natural resources. Forced displacement, killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for economic gain are directly linked to military force's control of resource extraction sites, or their presence in the vicinity.

By 1996, tensions from the neighbouring Rwandan Civil War and Rwandan Genocide had spilled over to Zaire. Rwandan Hutu militia forces (Interahamwe), who had fled Rwanda following the accession of a Tutsi-led government had been using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as a basis for incursion against Rwanda. These Hutu militia forces soon allied with the Zairian armed forces (FAZ) to launch a campaign against Congolese ethnic Tutsis in eastern Zaire (Thom, 1999).

In turn, a coalition of Rwandan and Ugandan armies invaded Zaire under the cover of a small group of Tutsi militia to fight the Hutu militia, overthrow the government of Mobutu, and ultimately control the mineral resources of Zaire. They were soon joined by various Zairean politicians, who had been unsuccessfully opposing the dictatorship of Mobutu for many years and now saw an opportunity for them in the invasion of Zaire by two of the region's strongest military forces (Clark, 2004).

This new expanded coalition of two foreign armies and some long-time opposition figures led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, became known as the Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). They were seeking the broader goal of ousting Mobutu and controlling his country's wealth. In May 1997, Mobutu fled the country and Kabila marched into Kinshasa, naming himself president and changing the name of the country back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Fessy, 2008).

The response of the international community has been incommensurate with the scale of the disaster resulting from the war in the Congo. Its support for political and diplomatic efforts to end the war has been relatively consistent, but it has taken no effective steps to abide by repeated pledges to demand accountability for the war crimes and crimes against humanity that were routinely committed in Congo. The United Nations Security Council and the U.N. Secretary-General have frequently denounced human rights abuses and the humanitarian disaster that the war unleashed on the local population. But they had shown little will to tackle the responsibility of occupying powers for the atrocities taking place in areas under their control, areas where the worst violence in the country took place. Hence Rwanda, like Uganda has escaped any significant sanction for its role (Ludwig, 2002).

The global growth in demand for scarce raw materials and the industrial surges in China, India, Russia, Brazil and other developing countries require that developed countries employ new, integrated and responsive strategies for identifying and ensuring on a continual basis, an adequate supply of strategic and critical materials required for

their security needs. Highlighting the DR Congo's importance to US national security, the effort to establish an elite Congolese unit is the latest push by the U.S. to professionalize armed forces in this strategically important region (Camaj, 2007:20).

There are economic and strategic incentives to bringing more security to the Congo, which is rich in natural resources such as cobalt. Cobalt is a strategic and critical metal used in many diverse industrial and military applications. The largest use of cobalt is in super-alloys, which are used to make jet engine parts. Cobalt is also used in magnetic alloys and in cutting and wear-resistant materials such as cemented carbides. The chemical industry consumes significant quantities of cobalt in a variety of applications including catalysts for petroleum and chemical processing; drying agents for paints and inks; ground coats for porcelain enamels; decolorizers for ceramics and glass, and pigments for ceramics, paints, and plastics. The country contains 80 percent of the world's cobalt reserves (John, 2009).

Although citizens of the DRC are among the poorest in the world, having the second lowest nominal GDP per capita, the Democratic Republic of Congo is widely considered to be the richest country in the world regarding natural resources; its untapped deposits of raw minerals are estimated to be worth in excess of US\$ 24 trillion.

The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a nation endowed with resources of vast potential wealth, has declined drastically since the mid-1980's. At the time of its independence in 1960, DRC was the second most industrialized country in Africa after South Africa, it boasted a thriving mining sector and its agricultural sector was relatively productive. The two recent conflicts, the First and Second Congo Wars, which began in 1996, have dramatically reduced national output and government revenue, have increased external debt and have resulted in deaths of more than five million people from war, and associated famine and disease. Malnutrition affects approximately two thirds of the country's population (Tobaccosa, 2009).

Foreign businesses have curtailed operations due to uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, lack of infrastructure and the difficult operating environment. The war has intensified the impact of such basic problems as an uncertain legal framework, corruption, inflation and lack of openness in government economic policy and financial operations (Relocating Africa, 2012).

Conditions improved in late 2002 with the withdrawal of a large portion of the invading foreign troops. A number of International Monetary Fund and World Bank missions have met with the government to help it develop a coherent economic plan and President Joseph Kabila has begun implementing reforms. Much economic activity lies outside the GDP data. A United Nations Human Development Index report shows human development to be one of the worst in decades (Andreas, 2007).

Nationally, DRC is interested in developing its resources, which provides a clear opportunity for stability, economic growth and poverty reduction. This, however, depends on how successfully natural resources are managed and it requires firm political will and a delicate balance between short-term gains and long-term sustainable development (Yager, 2005).

The DRC holds roughly 34 per cent of the world's cobalt reserves, which are critically important to high-technology industries, as well as 10 per cent of the world's copper reserves. Extraction, refining and distribution of these resources require huge investment and the involvement of foreign corporations. The pull-out of these corporations during the civil war decimated output and the price for cobalt on the world market rose fivefold during the 1998-2003 Congolese War (Mbendi, 2005).

In 2006 the Congolese Government began reviving its core copper and cobalt mining sectors in Katanga province. Major international corporations, which control the rest of the world's supplies, as well as new competitors are now eager to secure access to Congolese mines and commit to high output targets in the very short term in order to cash in on high prices. To clean up and stabilize the mining sector, the government, rather than executing recommendations made by the Lutundula Commission, embarked on a new mining review, which was completed in March 2008. Despite re-negotiations and clarifications of 60 mining contracts announced to contract-holders, all foreign, the Ministry of Mining stated that it intends to minimize confrontation and solve matters quickly so that the review would have the least possible impact on operations and revenues (Olivier, 2008).

The government has used findings of outdated and irregularly acquired contracts to put pressure on foreign companies to accept joint ventures in which state-owned companies receive a larger share of revenues than negotiated before. In turn, Western governments guarding their companies interests have not pressed hard for scrutiny of concession awards (Le scandale géologique, 2007:6-7).

Present concessionary reforms are purely a legal exercise to judge the validity of contracts negotiated between companies and the state and take no consideration of the actual situation on the ground in evaluating the company's business practices. In the mineral-rich Kasai and Katanga provinces, the revived extractive industries have in recent years contributed to political rivalry and violence. Katanga's mining industry is controlled by non-Katangan administrators, many of whom are from northern regions of the country and are tied to President Joseph Kabila. This generates resentment among Katangans who feel that they do not equally share in the resource wealth of the province (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2008).

The thorniest security issues in Kasai and Katanga provinces relate to conflicts between state and private security personnel, who protect formal industrial mining concessions and the 50 000-75 000 artisan producers who enter formal concession areas each day to dig for alluvial cobalt and copper ores (NIZA and IPIS, 2006),

In diamond concession areas around the town of Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai, which are operated by the national diamond mining company Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), clashes between MIBA security guards and trespassers are intensifying (Misser, 2007). In Katanga security personnel are reported to be involved in illegal smuggling, extortion and violent eviction of artisan miners (Kisangani, 2008).

Although the war may be over in large parts of the DRC, both formal and informal resource sectors remain highly militarized, pitting local populations against the state business alliances. The Ministry of Mining's review glosses over the issue of militarization in order to safeguard necessary foreign investment and kick start the national economy after the years of civil war. Foreign companies, having already invested heavily without extraction actually happening, acquiesce to the government's demand for larger stakes and responsibilities in mining operations, including the provision of security arrangements (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2008).

The mineral pyrochlore is a source of niobium, a rare earth metal that became important within the last twenty years because of its enlarged range of applications in aerospace industries. Apart from the pyrochlore mine in Leushe in North Kivu, there are only two other places in the world where the material is found in significant quantities: one in Brazil and one in Canada. Up to 2003 the mine was exploited by the Congolese company, Société Minière du Kivu (SOMKIVU) and its main German shareholder, Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie (GfE). Both operated under a 20-year mining convention signed in 1982 between the German company's US based owner, Metalurg and the Zairean Government. From 2000 to 2003 the exploiting companies negotiated their access with the RCD rebels controlling the area. This arrangement, and,

consequently, mining activities stopped in 2003 after the transitional government took office and rebel dominated administrations were dismantled (Ibid, 2008).

In 2004 the mine was captured by General Nkunda who lost it to regular Congolese armed forces in 2006. Although battles over the mine continue, it is unlikely that the mine has been operative since 2003. Potential marketing opportunities are limited because of poor accessibility, decayed infrastructure and the reluctance of international buyers to be associated with the easily traceable niobium. The strategic importance of pyrochlore is more complex than the concept of conflict resources suggest. An independent researcher argues that Nkunda's military presence in the area helps SOMKIVU to fend off Krall Investment Uganda, a Congolese subsidiary of a Ugandan company which claims to have bought the legal rights from the government in 1999. Rather than exploit the mine, as SOMKIVU stated as its intent, the company would prevent others to do so in order to maintain the monopoly position of Metalurg, which controls all of the world's significant pyrochlore mines (Johnson, 2007).

By January 2008 withdrawal by major armed factions in North and South Kivu, excluding Rwandese Hutu militias, has not led to an end of hostilities. Violent skirmishes and human rights violations continued, and armed groups retained control over their territories, making no effort to demobilize as agreed in Goma (Human Rights Watch, 2008). However, Malaysia was the top destination for official tin-ore exports from the two provinces in eastern Congo most affected by conflict, North and South Kivu, in the first half of 2010. Almost all the tantalum ore officially exported from the Kivus in the first half of 2010 went to Chinese companies (Global Witness, 2010).

The second biggest export destination for Congolese tin ore, according to official statistics, is Rwanda. The Rwandan government appears content to let its territory be used as a transit point for conflict minerals, despite the enormous human cost this imposes on the population of eastern Congo. Rigorous due diligence by companies in Rwanda on the ores they are buying would go a long way towards stopping the conflict minerals trade in its tracks (U.K. Border Agency, 2012).

Global Witness (2010) wrote to six of the biggest electronics companies (Apple, Intel, HP, Dell, Research In Motion and Hewlett Packard) asking them to comment on the tin industry traceability scheme and notably its failure to tackle the issue of the national army. None of the companies directly addressed their concerns over the illegal involvement of the army in the minerals sector.

On the basis of the most recent data available, Global Witness estimates that military units and officials were getting between \$14 million and \$29 million a year from the Bisie mine in early 2010. Those profiting from the mine include former rebels, who used to belong to the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP). The CNDP forces formally became part of the national army after an early 2009 peace deal.

The FDLR rebel group (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda) also control many mines in eastern Congo. A UN investigation has found that the FDLR and allied rebel groups were responsible for at least 303 rapes in a cluster of villages from 30 July to 2 August in eastern Congo. The attacks were a stark reminder of the threat posed by the FDLR. UN investigators have linked the attacks to competition over the minerals trade (Daniel, 2010).

The UN Group of Experts report of 29 November 2010 says that there is an operational coalition between the FDLR and the ex-CNDP army units and describes further examples of collaboration between other rebel groups and army units. These alliances are aimed at sharing the spoils of the minerals trade. There is a serious risk that armed groups, including the ex-CNDP are using the money from the minerals trade to buy weapons. The ex-CNDP is largely controlled by former rebel commander General Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes. The loyalty of his troops to the state is very much in question and there is a serious risk they could return to war against the government (IPIS, 2012).

The Congolese government banned mining in eastern Congo from September 2010. However, NGOs and journalists in Congo say that national army units have ignored the ban and even tightened their grip on the mines since it was imposed. In the DRC, the recent history of mining is mired by allegations of corrupt politicians awarding illegal tax exemptions to mining companies in return for private benefits. These allegations have been well documented (Global Witness, 2010).

The World Bank has funded a number of studies and audits into the financial terms of the mining contracts signed since 1996. Amongst these, an audit in 2004 by Ernst and Young found that Gécamines did not receive any share from the profits made by its joint ventures with private mining companies, due to the terms of the mining contracts it had negotiated with private mining companies. The president and senior officials in the ministry of mining were responsible for signing these contracts (Intel, 2009:p9).

In 2005, the Lutundula Commission, a parliamentary team appointed by the government to investigate the country's mining contracts signed between 1996 and 2003, denounced the interference of high level politicians in these deals. It found that most contracts were disproportionately advantageous to mining companies. In response to these findings, an Inter-ministerial Commission was tasked in April 2007 to review all the mining contracts signed between the government and mining companies between 1996 and 2006. The report found that none of the mining contracts complied with the law. It recommended that out of 61 contracts examined, 39 be re-negotiated and 22 cancelled as they were too far out of line with the Mining Code. The taskforce appointed to take forward these recommendations decided that 14 contracts could go ahead with the submission of new feasibility studies, but 25 have to be modified by 2010.

At the worst end of the spectrum of contracts, companies were entitled to complete exemption from any income tax and royalty payments. Many companies received much reduced tax rates or deferral of tax payments for at least five years (Kato, 2009).

In 2005, Oryx Natural Resources, incorporated in the Cayman Islands, signed an agreement with MIBA, the government owned diamond company, to purchase an 80% share in Sengamines, a US\$2bn diamond concession south of Mbuji-Mai. First African Diamonds, a South African company, bought the entire Oryx share in 2006. The contract stipulates that the company is exempt from paying income tax, royalties and most of the other taxes specified in DRC tax law. The only taxes it would pay were a professional contribution tax but only six years after production started; internal turnover tax (tax on national transactions) but only due six years after the start of production; expatriate salary tax only due seven years after the start of production and withholding tax on dividends only due five years after the start of production.

According to Belgian-based International Peace Information Service (IPIS) (2003), Sengamines exported an average of 80,000 carats of diamonds a month between 2001 and 2003, as reported by its Antwerp dealers, at a very low price of US\$15 a carat, amounting to US\$14.4m a year. If the company had paid the very low 2.5% royalty on gross value stipulated in the law, the government would have earned a minimum of US\$360,000 a year from royalties alone. The figure would double if the government charged the 5% royalty paid by companies in most other diamond-rich African countries. This figure, however, is only a very small fraction of the massive revenue foregone by the DRC government due to companies seeking tax exemptions in their mining contracts. This is illustrated by the miniscule income earned by the DRC from mining.

3.4. Findings

A set of one hundred questionnaires with open-ended questions was distributed to the Democratic Republic of Congo community in South Africa based in Mafikeng, Potchefstroom and Pretoria. The sample comprised thirty-five women and sixty-five men from DRC, and four interviewee's also took part in this research.

The majority of respondents and interviewee's were aged between 30 and 49 years. The respondents suggested that they left DRC because of the ongoing civil conflict that has robbed them of their lives and freedom. 89% of them have been in South Africa for the past 8-15 years while 11% have been in other African countries seeking refugee status.

A majority of the respondents believed that natural resources played a key role in prolonging the civil conflict and also being the cause of it because resources have been a source of finance to rebel groups to purchase necessary tools that will be used during conflict. They opined that natural resources have been a curse because the country has been targeted by external interference which has divided the country in an effort to benefit from natural resources through aiding or bribing certain powerful groups in order to pursue their own interests. This has caused a lot of grievance and anger to the Congolese people because they don't benefit from their own resources and that leads to a start-up of conflict.

However, 85% of the respondents opined that there is no direct association between the government and the community, and the government lacks the capacity to monitor natural resources exports and enforce regulations and penalties against illegal exploitation. The remoteness of the resource becomes a major issue of concern due to the inability of government to monitor its resources. Illicit diggers and their associates therefore capitalize on ineffective government monitoring to satisfy their economic agenda maximizing proceeds from winnings by evading official fees. A majority of respondents (95 %) said that illicit exploitation of natural resource was high during the civil war while 5% believed it was moderate.

The DRC is a country of extraordinary natural wealth but this wealth has never been used for the benefit of the Congolese population. Instead, the country is currently emerging from one of the world's worst conflicts, which has resulted in the deaths of up to 3.5 million people. This conflict has been fuelled mainly by the illicit trade in natural resources. During the war, numerous rebel groups funded their occupation of eastern DRC through the exploitation of minerals, such as diamonds, coltan and cassiterite (tin ore).

Despite reunification of the country, much of North Kivu still remains under the control of the pro-Rwandan group, RCD-G. Over the past year, fighting has broken out around key mining towns, with the RCD-G, the FARDC (national army) and Mai-Mai militias vying for control of these areas. Battlefield enemies have been cooperating to share the spoils of war between them.

South Kivu is supposedly under the control of the transitional government and the FARDC army. However, with the army receiving low and erratic pay, many of the soldiers illegally tax the miners to supplement their income. The soldiers are doing what has always been done in this region: turning to natural resources and the control of mines to support themselves. The FDLR (Rwandan Hutu rebels) also, illegally control mines and mining revenues.

Smuggling across the border into Rwanda means that large quantities of cassiterite and coltan are leaving the DRC unrecorded and untaxed, presenting a loss to the Congolese economy. With all processing occurring outside the country, no value is being added inside the DRC.

The Interviewee opined that Rwanda is currently exporting five times more cassiterite than it produces. Cassiterite from conflict areas in eastern DRC is being purchased by foreign companies and ending up on the international market. There are no international mechanisms in place to regulate this trade, thereby allowing various armed factions,

many with appalling human rights records, unfettered access to world markets, in order to generate funds.

The Kinshasa government does not record cassiterite exports from eastern DRC and does not receive tax revenues from the trade. Meanwhile Rwanda, which is the main conduit for cassiterite exports, is reaping major benefits. Thus the stabilization of Rwanda is being achieved at the expense of the DRC's peace and security, and its treasury.

Much of the fighting that is still occurring in the east of the country is driven by the desire to control natural resources. This violence in eastern DRC is one of the main factors that has led to the postponement of the country's first elections for 45 years and has stalled the reunification and reconstruction of the country.

Meanwhile, artisanal miners are working in hazardous conditions for very low pay, in mines that are often controlled by the military. Fighting around mining areas for the control of lucrative mining revenues is common. Consumers have no way of knowing whether items they buy fuel conflict or not. Tin is used in a wide variety of consumer goods, most obviously in tin cans. (Global Witness, 2005:4).

An endowment of natural resources should foster socio-economic development yet there are instances in which it has obstructed development. The association between resource endowment and negative socio-economic and political outcomes is referred to as a resource curse. The resource curse has been manifested in a number of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries where resource endowment has resulted in conflict-ridden underdevelopment. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are amongst those countries that are endowed with natural resources amidst social inequality, a high prevalence of poverty and conflict.

While armed conflict is a major manifestation of the resource curse, SSA countries that are endowed with alluvial deposits of minerals like gold, coltan and diamonds are also faced with the problem of illicit mining and smuggling (Hilson, 2002).

Illicit mineral exploitation has resulted in lower mineral revenues for governments. This can have serious developmental implications for SSA countries heavily reliant on proceeds from alluvial mineral exploitation. Reduced mineral revenue of an already cash trapped government can forestall the implementation of national development projects. Efforts to control the illicit extraction and smuggling of coltan, gold and diamonds in alluvial mining areas in most places in SSA are hindered by a large influx of miners, the presence of foreign mining agents, and porous borders (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000).

A large inflow of miners in extensive mining locales monitored by only a few mine monitoring officials has impeded government's effort to thwart illicit extraction. Some foreign diamond-mining agents capitalize on this weakness by sponsoring illicit mining, buying diamonds and smuggling them. A regional trading platform in West Africa and in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa also facilitates smuggling of precious minerals, especially diamonds (Dietrich, 2004). While growth in corporate mining can lead to increasing revenues for national governments, it has resulted in disputes between transnational companies and mining communities (Bebbington, 2008).

The resource governance should form an intrinsic part of peacemaking and peace-building in Africa. Various national and international efforts have been implemented to this end, both during and after conflict but relative peace has been not achieved.

Examples include resource-specific export bans, possibly supported by peacekeepers on the ground; private-public certification schemes, such as the Kimberley Process for diamonds; negotiated revenue-sharing agreements with belligerents, and more long-term legal reforms to clarify property rights and root out illicit resource extraction and trade. Although there is a growing repertoire of resource-related policy instruments and

initiatives to end war, their success in achieving long-term peace is disputed for a number of reasons. Strategies to impede the trade in so called conflict commodities are criticized for overemphasizing the economic dimensions of war and neglecting belligerent's political grievances.

The Kimberley Process is a negotiating process involving states and non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and the diamond industry to establish and monitor minimum acceptable international standards for national certification schemes of import and export of rough diamonds. The standards are laid out in the 2002 Interlaken Declaration. This voluntary declaration has been signed by 48 states, including most diamond exporting and importing countries. The Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Mining has been responsible for much of these countries post-colonial growth, but also for their downfall during the 1990s. The DRC harbors a variety of valuable resources, among which its metals contribute most to official foreign export earnings. The mining sectors have been subjected to international interventions to defuse the war economy and to help reconstruction. The government of DRC as well as the international community express satisfaction with their respective approaches, but the mining sectors in both countries remain highly volatile to conflict (Clive, 2004:699-700).

The resource-fuelled violence does not stop overnight. Time is needed to create the capacity and political will among government agencies and within the international community to implement interventions and execute reforms. However, a more complete understanding of the link between resources and conflict may also point to issues that are being overlooked in current policy responses. Bad political governance has made for a dysfunctional economy. The illegal or inappropriate actions of state actors are the major driver for traders to evade regulation or trade fraudulently. A significant amount of economic activity is informal. Most exports are unprocessed; most imports are goods manufactured abroad. Local added value has been minimal.

The lack of governance associated with the trade severely undermines the likelihood that the population will benefit from mineral wealth in any sustainable way. A recent study by Collier (2002) emphasises that the resource curse is most strongly linked with bad governance at the individual level but also at the government and institutional levels, whereby governments misuse revenues raised from taxes and charges on the minerals sector. The weak governance surrounding natural resources exploitation in DRC also means that long term damage to the environment and the resource base itself, especially for non-renewable minerals, is almost inevitable.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter is divided into two sections namely, conclusion and recommendations. The conclusion is drawn from an analysis of relations between natural resources and conflict in DRC. The recommendations are geared towards dealing with the effects, causes and plausible solutions to end the resources conflict in the DRC.

4.1. Conclusion

Natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been seen as a dead animal that attracts lots of flies because the country's extraordinary abundance of natural resources has never been used for the benefit of the Congolese population, instead, it has attracted a clash of interests for the plunder of the natural resources within the country which resulted in on-going conflict and interference of neighbouring and western countries that want to benefit from the country's natural endowment.

The cause of conflict might be political or ethnic with the common interest to pursue their economic needs by plundering the country's rich natural resources. Areas in the DRC where conflict is prevalent are mostly areas that are rich with natural resources. The DRC abundant natural resources can be more of a curse than a blessing, posing a significant threat to the entire peace process and the country's reconstruction.

Numerous NGO and UN Expert Panel reports have documented how high coltan prices created a coltan boom in the DRC in 2000, enabling the RCD-G and other rebel groups to fund their occupation of the Kivu provinces through coltan exploitation. No substantial action was taken to address the situation, despite the clear interference of neighbouring countries and the interdependence between arms and resource trafficking in the east, not to mention the demand of the western and Chinese markets for the resources. The

international community remains reluctant to recognise this interdependence and, as such, the stretched MONUC forces in the east do not have a mandate to take any action to tackle the problem of resource exploitation. In South Kivu, mining activities are equally militarised, with soldiers from the FARDC (national army), FDLR (Rwandan Hutu rebels) and Mai-Mai groups controlling mines, illegally taxing the artisanal miners and committing massive human rights violations in these areas (Global Witness research 2004:8).

Bad political and economic governance have dogged the country for many years and left its people with little benefit from its wealth. There is no intrinsic reason why this should not be reversed to make the DRC a vibrant economy with a government that serves the interests of its people. The DRC is potentially a huge market for imports as well as a major exporter. It is a significant player in external trade which has managed to remain active and vital even through the most difficult political times in what has traditionally been an open economy, could and should become the engine for a rapidly re-energised drive for growth and become a major element in the reduction of poverty and the improvement in the quality of life for its people and those of the region.

Mining activities in eastern DRC have been and remain highly militarised. In some areas, military groups are actually in control of the mines and are carrying out their own digging, whilst in other areas military personnel are illegally taxing the artisanal miners, either on site or when the miners carry the minerals to the nearest town or trading point (International Crisis Group, 2005:23).

History is repeating itself before our very eyes. In some respects Africans are now more vulnerable to theories of black inferiority than they were during colonialism. Under colonialism they could dream that with liberation would come the opportunity to prove their worth. But actions of the African leaders have made the theory of African dependency persistent (Yaw Sappor, 2007).

Lack of political will has been the other root of the DRC problems because it has suffered greatly from lack of effective leadership and it has long been saddled with poor, malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates and puffed-up posturers. It has been run into the ground despite its abundant natural resources. The past DRC leaders used power as an end in itself rather than for the public good; they were indifferent to the progress of their citizens.

Under the stewardship of these leaders, infrastructure has fallen into disrepair, currencies have depreciated and real prices have inflated dramatically, while job availability, health care, education standards and life expectancy have declined. Ordinary life has become beleaguered: general security has deteriorated, crime and corruption have increased, and much-needed public funds have flowed into private bank accounts of powerful individuals resulting in civil war which has become prevalent.

The mining areas of North and South Kivu are violent places. Violations against international human rights and humanitarian law are colossal. Abuses on the part of government soldiers and other armed combatants target non-combatants and include killing, rape, torture, arbitrary arrests, intimidation, mutilation, and the destruction or pillage of private property. This also causes mass displacement and all the effects that come with this as people are forced to live in subhuman and dangerous conditions within the reach of armed combatants. There is evidence to show that all armed groups are involved in these abuses against civilians. The abuses are integrally linked to natural resources, particularly in the eastern provinces, as they are employed as methods to gain control either over resource rich areas, or over the ability to tax resources (International Crisis Group, 2005:23).

4.2. Recommendation

There is a window of opportunity for improving democratic governance and transparent and legal natural resources exploitation, with relative peace in the area, successful elections and constitutional reform, and buoyant markets for export products. Colonialism has left a dark cloud in Africa; the Belgians used the endowment of natural resources to enrich themselves and their country but African leaders fail to do the same for their country. Political will among our leaders will uphold the democratic standard in DRC because political conflicts can affect the economy and the development of the country.

Inga Dam is the world biggest hydroelectric power station, this plant could supply almost half of Africa with electricity and as a result it would boost the DRC economy and make DRC part of the globalised world. The electricity will be an advantage as DRC would be able to manufacture its own finished goods. But the DRC government or leaders seem reluctant to take advantage of Inga Dam

African unity will solve many African conflicts without the interference of external countries. External forces have lead to more division among Africans with the main goal to capitalise on the natural wealth by aiding the more powerful group. Africans need to solve their own problems amongst themselves.

Active community participation in decisions regarding mining of natural resources would serve as oversight so that revenues can be utilized not only for national development but also to enhance community development. The communities bear the social and environmental consequences and therefore they need to benefit immensely from the proceeds. Investment of mineral revenues in human capacity building, especially for the youth will foster economic development and empowerment.

DRC is traditionally a relatively open and vibrant trading economy and it has played a significant role in external trade even through troubled times but insecurity and bad governance have held it back. Trade could grow rapidly with better accessibility to large markets inside Congo and ever increasing demand.

The DRC Government should:

- Extend its administrative control into the mining areas of the Kivus to ensure that essential controls over the mining industry are in place, including the accurate reporting of production and export statistics and the collection of appropriate fiscal revenues. This information should be made widely available to the public.
- Ensure that all production and export that does not fall under government control is declared illegal and investigated.
- Establish agricultural projects in the Kivu provinces, including development of road building projects, to regenerate the agricultural sector. This will improve food security as agricultural production has collapsed in the Kivus because farmers have taken more lucrative employment as miners.
- Ensure that all the FARDC (national army) soldiers receive regular and adequate pay.

Government efforts will only be successful at reducing the conflict if they are supported by local economic development and capacity-building work that increases opportunities for local populations to benefit from mining, and at the same time reduces corruption and supports legitimate government authority. Action in all of these areas, and alignment and coordination among them, are needed to support real improvement in the DRC conflict regions and produce a genuinely stable, conflict-free country.

MONUC should pro-actively monitor border crossings and airfields to prevent resource smuggling and arms trafficking.

Trade is largely informal, often outside illegal boundaries and with extensive opportunities for fraud. More often than not it is the state actors who behave outside the law or regulations, forcing the traders to evade them. A more regulated and formalised trading regime would benefit the government at national and provincial level by greater revenue collection. It would also benefit the people at large, both from these revenues being used for service delivery but also in the creation of wealth through growth. It would benefit the traders who would fall victim less often to the rent-seeking opportunities given to a multiplicity of state actors in a system in which impunity is the norm and the law is ineffective.

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