

**AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROLE OF HEGEMONS IN
REGIONAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA IN
THE SADC REGION.**

By

VALERY B. FERIM

17125340


*A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences in
Fulfillment for the Award of a Master of Arts Degree in International
Relations at the North West University.*



0600011109

North-West University
Mafikeng Campus Library

SUPERVISOR: MR. KALE EWUSI



DATE: NOVEMBER, 2006

DECLARATION

I, Valery B. Ferim hereby declare that, the thesis titled: An Investigation into the Role of Hegemons in Regional Politics: A Case Study of South Africa in the SADC Region, has not been submitted at this or any other university. That it is my own work in conception and design and all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

Signature
Valery Ferim

.....
Date

DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to all the members of the Ferim family for all the support they've given me throughout my stay in South Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to first of all thank the Almighty God for giving me life and strength, which made it possible for me to successfully carry out this research work.

My profound appreciation next goes to my supervisor, Mr Kale Ewusi. His demonstration of patience, guidance, friendliness and inputs in terms of ideas were an invaluable contribution in the realization of this research work.

I also wish to thank all the authors and publishers whose works I consulted during this research. Their works form the backbone of this research project.

Furthermore, I extend my sincere thanks to all the members of the Ferim family, whose financial and moral support helped me to accomplish this research project. They include my mum and dad – Helen and AB, big Brothers – Fred, Richard and Flavious, big sister – Adeline, and my cute baby sister – Yolande.

Moreover, my special thanks and love go to Bonolo D. for all that she has been to me. She contributed in an incredible way in giving me the impetus to push this research forward.

Last but definitely not the least, I acknowledge the support of all my myriad of friends whose names it is better not to mention than to omit.

ABSTRACT

This research set out to investigate the role of hegemony in regional politics, a case study of South Africa in the SADC region. A hegemon is a state with capabilities such as military prowess, international accreditation, economic viability and hence dominance. Based on the above characteristics, South Africa is a hegemon in SADC.

The research found out that South Africa plays a role in the politics of the SADC region. This role includes: sponsoring peacekeeping missions; ensuring economic stability by supporting economic blocks such as SACU and the Common Monetary Area; contributing to service delivery by exporting its businesses north of the Limpopo; and also by acting as a shelter to refugees and migrants fleeing from political persecution and economic strife in neighbouring countries.

Moreover, it was established that the performance of this role by South Africa generates perceptions from other SADC states. These perceptions range from admiration for the wealth and dominance of the Pretoria government, to suspicion and hatred, originating in vestiges of the former apartheid government's policies, and also in what is considered South Africa's xenophobic trade and immigration policies.

Based on these findings, a number of recommendations were advanced. They include: Cooperative leadership between South Africa and other SADC states; the use of South Africa's dominance to promote the region's economic and political stability under the banner of the Southern African Development Community; and efforts by the South African government to vigorously tackle aspects of latent conflicts such as poverty, xenophobia and crime in the country.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
1.1 BACKGROUND	1
1.1.1 The State of Affairs in Southern Africa.....	2
1.1.2 The Emergence of South Africa as a Hegemon.....	8
1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY	12
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	13
1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY	14
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	14
1.6 HYPOTHESIS	14
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	14
1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY	15
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	15
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW	16
2.1.1 The Concept of Hegemony.....	17
2.1.2 The Need for a Hegemon	23
2.1.3 The Conduct of Hegemons in International Relations	24
2.1.4 The Demise of a Hegemon	35
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY	39

2.2.1 Realist Theory.....	40
2.2.2 Dependency Theory.....	42
2.2.3 Theory of Hegemonic Stability.....	43
3.0 DELINEATION OF VARIABLES	45
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF HEGEMONY	45
3.2 ACTIVITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A HEGEMON.....	48
3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER SADC MEMBERS TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA’S HEGEMONY	55
3.4 CONCLUSION.....	59
4.0 METHODOLOGY.....	61
4.1 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION.....	62
4.2 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSES	63
4.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	64
5.0 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	65
5.1 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS.....	65
5.1.1 SADC Needs a Hegemon.....	65
5.1.2 South Africa is a Hegemon and Plays a Role in the SADC Region	67
5.1.3 There are Impediments to South Africa’s Hegemony.....	71
5.2 CONCLUSION.....	75
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.....	76
INTERVIEW GUIDE.....	79
BIBLIOGRAPHY	80

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND

The evolution of the international system has often created a phenomenon of powerful states and sometimes, powerful alliances. A case in point is the creation of a bipolar world after World War II with two hegemons – the United States (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist's Republic (USSR), manning the two sides of the iron curtain. Oftentimes, and at various periods in history, certain countries have emerged as powerful states in relation to their neighbours in various regions of the world. The power of states has often been as a result of the endowments with military and/or economic resources (West, Jr., 1994).

The power of states has not precluded the interdependent nature of the relationship of states. This relationship has enforced the concept of regionalism, which has led to the creation of regional organisations. However, the creation of regional organisations has not eroded the power and influence of hegemons. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) depends on the largesse of Nigeria, for it to be effective. In southern Africa, the Republic of South Africa's role is necessary for the survival of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), while Cameroon arguably stands as a powerhouse in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. Against this backdrop, this study examines the role of South Africa in Southern Africa (Ottaway, Herbst & Mills, 2004).

1.1.1 The State of Affairs in Southern Africa

The region known as southern Africa is comprised politically and for the purpose of this research, of those states that make up the Southern African Development Community. As of 2006, the SADC is comprised of, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It contains one of Africa's most well-developed infrastructure and diverse natural resource base, and has the potential to lead the rest of Africa into a more prosperous 21st century. The region comprises 14 countries spanning a geographical area the size of the continental United States, with a population of over 200 million people. Through the Southern African Development Community (SADC), established by treaty in 1992, these countries are committed (At least by virtue of being signatories to the principles enshrined in the SADC Treaty) to regional economic cooperation and integration, as well as the environmentally sustainable use of the region's natural resources, human rights, democracy and the rule of law (USAID Report on Southern Africa, 2002).

For over three decades beginning from the 1960s, the southern African sub region alongside most of Africa battled with the destabilising forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, the Cold War and political authoritarianism. The region was deeply enmeshed in rivalries and polarizations generated by the ideological divide between the United States and the former Soviet Union. This led to the formation of alliances and organisations such as the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. These organisations were both aimed at

freeing the region from colonialism, and isolating or reducing economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. (Emeh, 2004)

According to a Human Rights Watch (1999) perspective on Angola, the United States supported *inter alia* the apartheid government of South Africa and rebel movements in Mozambique and Angola. On the other hand, the former Soviet Union sponsored the then radical African National Congress and also Socialist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. With the end of the Cold War however, the international system lost the shocks of bipolarity, and is adapting to the ambiguities of an emerging multi-polar order after transcending a uni-polar era championed by the United States.

Singh (1996) argues that transformation is inexorable and possibly the key constant variable in international relations. Cataclysmic change is rare, yet it is becoming clear from changes that have taken place since 1989. In Southern Africa, the end of apartheid in South Africa marked an important change in the political dynamics of the region. The impact was a transformation of a hitherto pariah nation to an influential regional superpower, but this time for the better.

The emerging world order is very much different from that found since the Second World War and this has greatly affected inter-state interactions. In the post-Cold War era, change has come almost in a domino manner, with events such as the cascading collapse of communism; the implosion of the USSR, ending Moscow's internal and external empires; the peaceful unification of Germany; and the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic superpowers and much recently, China (Wayne, 2005). While these international events were taking place, the southern African region in

general and South Africa in particular, was grappling with the fallout of past relationships and links with the former world powers. Furthermore, the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union signalled that a shift in the Cold War paradigm had taken place. These marked the relegation of the Cold War into history, and the rise in liberal democracy (Naomi, 1999).

The rise of liberal democracy as the dominant ideology does not indicate that the uni-polar order has replaced the bipolar world order with the United States as the sole superpower. While the United States remains the world's most important actor, it is important to state that, it no longer has the wherewithal to dictate to the world as it could in the past considering the rise of other economic powers like China, Japan and the changing political atmosphere in Africa.

Hand in hand with the collapse of this bipolar world order was the demise of apartheid, which according to Honwana (1997:33) brought about a process of transformation in Southern Africa, captured in the new and unanimous discourse on democracy, respect for human rights, market economy and common security in the region's political and academic circles. Finally liberated from the ideological divisions of the past, the subcontinent has evolved from a region at war to a region at peace, where yesterday's enemies are now partners in the common project of building the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Despite differing successes in economic reform and growth, SADC member states face very similar rural development challenges. About 70% of the sub region's

population live in rural areas and the economies of a majority of member states are also dominated by the agricultural sector. The sector provides a substantial share of the region's exports and employs, on average, an estimated 70% of the rural population. In many SADC countries, poverty still remains widespread, institutional and human resource capacities are weak. Productivity of the natural resource base is declining rapidly in some states due to poor resource-use policies and cultivation practices. Food security in SADC countries is not only critical, but has worsened in recent years. To a large extent, strategies adopted by member states to promote growth and reduce poverty have been "pro rural", but implementation of these programmes has been hampered by the lack of capacity to tackle existing complex problems and emerging problems in an effective manner (IFAD SADC Situation Report, 1999)

acknowledged ✓

In Southern Africa's mining sector, there is evidence that mineral production in the region is on a downward trend. Even though this trend could be attributed to factors such as depletion of reserves, and a number of other constraining factors such as poor communication, lack of capacity to facilitate the travel of experts, financial and human resources, lack of re-investment in the industry and unfavourable international prices, it is generally recognised that the major contributing factor has been the inappropriate economic and political policies (SADC Mining Sector Report, 2001).

At the demographic level, the southern African region is the only part of the continent that experienced large-scale settler-colonialism. With that came a highly inequitable distribution of land and agricultural opportunities created under colonialism. This inequitable distribution of land was manifested by the concentration

of land in the hands of a racial and cultural minority and was most evident in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Lahiff, 2003).

In a contrary note however Reuveny (2005) maintains that settler colonialism was also evident in North and East Africa especially in Algeria and Kenya. Governments in the region tended to use the land question to assert their credentials in the political sphere, but were unwilling or unable to translate this political rhetoric into significant action in the economic sphere. The land issue, which is as a result of appropriation by the settler population, has been amplified by the inability of the succeeding governments in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa to precipitate their land restitution programmes after independence and apartheid. As a consequence the hopes and dreams brought by the end of the Cold War and apartheid in Africa, the new era could as well be described as tumultuous times on the continent (Emeh, 2004).

The above developments are partly to blame for the enduring dilemma of political, social, and economic crises in many African countries today, and the southern African region in particular. The failure to address these problems has been as a result of maladministration, political repression and electoral fraud, and instability in some southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, virulent ethnic nationalism armed conflict, proliferation of illicit arms, violent crimes, economic crunch, famine, hunger and poverty as in the DRC, religious fundamentalism in Tanzania, emerging and re-emerging diseases (AIDS, Ebola, malaria and tuberculosis), environmental degradation and underdevelopment in Africa as a whole (Waggon, 2003).

Linked to the issues of governance is the problem of human rights concerns that are identifiable throughout the region. For instance, civil society is required to operate in hostile environments in several of the nine states; the media must contend with heavy restriction (highly evident in Zimbabwe with the unpopular ‘Insult Laws’) and opposition groups are frequently repressed. Electoral processes in the region have often been conducted with alarming irregularities. Security and police forces all too often operate with a sense of immunity: if not actively abusing the rights of citizens then they often culpably omit to provide protection against violent crime. Courts in the region have also shown themselves to be sometimes frighteningly indifferent to the fate of many who appear before them. Prison conditions, particularly for awaiting-trial prisoners are, with very few exceptions, consistently appalling throughout the region (SALC Southern Africa Situation Report, 2005).

At the health sector, the Southern African region currently has the world’s highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates, a situation which is having negative impacts on social, political and economic development. It is further argued that most SADC countries are lagging behind in policy implementation and are also affected by a huge digital divide in information communication technologies which should be the commanding drives to disseminate information on diseases such as HIV and AIDS, to fight poverty and to inform public policy on measures that underpin economic development processes in the region (Singizi, 2005).

Nevertheless, Botswana, reported to be one of the highest HIV/AIDS infected countries in the world, has the most comprehensive programme for the treatment of

HIV/AIDS. It is one of the first countries in Southern Africa to actively move towards scaling up antiretroviral treatment (Lion Ore Mining International Report, 2005).

According to a USAID Report (2002) on Southern Africa, key challenges for increased regional achievement include underdeveloped democratic norms and standards, economic disparity and competing markets, as well as the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic, politico-military conflicts, and recent natural disasters. Progress to date, especially in regional market integration and sustainable, well-established democracies, has not been without setbacks given the complexity of working with and through regional organizations. This complexity and inflexibility in integrating with international organizations has necessitated the need for a regional hegemon, to oversee and timely intervene in the affairs of the region, as need be.

1.1.2 The Emergence of South Africa as a Hegemon

With an area of 472,281 square miles, South Africa came into being through the 1910 Act of Union that united two British colonies and two independent Republics (Cape Colony and Natal and the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State) into the Union of South Africa. With the attainment of independence in 1912, South Africa became a society officially divided into colonizer and native, white and non-white, citizen and subject, employed and indentured, free and slave. The result was a fragmented national identity symbolized and implemented by the white minority government's policy of racial separation. Economic status has paralleled political and social segregation and inequality, with the black African, mixed-race (Coloured), and Indian and Pakistani (Asian) population groups experiencing dispossession and a lack

of legal rights. Since the first non-racial elections in 1994, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has attempted to overcome this legacy and create unified national loyalties on the basis of equal legal status and an equitable allocation of resources (Melvin & Carol, 2006).

According to Cable News Network reporter Bakhtiar (2001), it is with the discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley area (in 1869) that the whole evolution of modern industrial South Africa, as we know it today, really began. The discovery of gold came soon after in the same area, but it was the finding of the colourless gem that jump-started an economically stalled nation. Prior to the discovery of diamonds, South Africa was essentially an agricultural outback, and ships plying between Europe and the East used to stop here to replenish their supplies. So it was the uncovering of diamonds that really triggered the development of modern industrial South Africa

In Africa in the 1990s particular opportunities were to be found in the rehabilitation and modernization of the continent's outdated and/or disintegrating transport and utilities infrastructures. But with the developed world disillusioned with, and losing interest in Africa and turning instead to the potentially more lucrative eastern European market, South African capital was well placed to take advantage of these new trade and investment opportunities. Having been frozen out through sanctions of much of the global economy for the best part of a decade and a half, South African corporates had a surplus of investible capital available and were keen to take advantage of the weakness of the economies to the north of it. While on a world scale

these corporates were relatively weak, in Africa they found an arena in which they had a comparative advantage (Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu, 2003).

The South African economy dominates the southern part of the African continent. Specialized products such as wine and fruit are exported in large quantities. The industrial sector has traditionally been based on mining. The country has considerable deposits of common minerals such as coal, but also of valuable metals and ores which are in high demand but are scarce everywhere else except the Russian Federation: these include chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum. Its most valuable minerals, however, are gold and diamonds, of which South Africa has long been both the world's largest producer and exporter. Gold alone accounts for one-third of the country's entire export income. The traditional dominance of agriculture and mining has been supplanted by manufacturing and service industries. Some advanced technological industries have also emerged in recent years. In the service sector, both financial services and tourism have expanded rapidly and both are now mainstays of the South African economy (Allen & Hoy, 2006).

South Africa and Egypt have the continent's highest electrification levels at approximately 70 %, while the average for the SADC region is only 20 %, with South Africa being amongst one of the three largest net exporters of electrical power on the continent (Mbendi, 2005). What some have referred to as the 'South Africanisation' of the African economy is further exemplified by corporate South Africa's post-apartheid record of taking over, and or joining up with, existing African operations, as well as new 'greenfield' investments in the Africa market. From running the national railroad in Cameroon, controlling shares in Telecom Lesotho and being the leading provider

of cell phone services in Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Cameroon, to managing power plants in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mali, and building roads and bridges in Malawi and Mozambique, almost every sector of the South African economy is operative in the wider African market. They control banks, breweries, supermarkets, and hotels throughout the continent and provide TV programming to over half of all African states (Daniel et al, 2003).

Habib (2003:3) holds that on the one hand, South Africa has demonstrated hegemonic traits. Being one of the contenders of a permanent seat at the United Nations' Security Council, it has been instrumental in fashioning a continental vision in the notion of the African renaissance and subsequently NEPAD. With the most advanced information communication technology's accessibility, surpassing by far, the other 13 SADC members (Chanda, 2004), it has also been at the forefront of initiatives to develop the continent's institutional capacity especially around the African Union. It has on occasion, particularly in the case of Lesotho, had the political will to intervene aggressively to address hotspots that could destabilise the region. And, through both its public and private business sector, it has been at the forefront of investment and economic development in the continent.

However, the country has also demonstrated trepidation at performing its hegemonic obligations. This is most obvious in the case of Zimbabwe, where national developments have spun out of control and fostered instability in the region as a whole. Instead of developing a more aggressive intervention (and that need not involve military engagement), the Mbeki strategy involved a mix of multilateral and

bilateral initiatives governed by the imperatives of quiet diplomacy (which has nevertheless worked for the interest of South Africa).

There is also other evidence of South Africa avoiding a hegemonic role. In regional conflicts in both the DRC and Burundi, more aggressive interventions may have provided breakthroughs earlier on. And finally, South Africa has avoided regulating the economic expansion of its business sector on the continent with the result that some of its companies have been involved in activities that directly contradict and undermine the national project of continental stability, security and development. In retrospect, a review of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy has to conclude that it has been schizophrenic, displaying hegemonic behaviour patterns on some occasions, and eschewing these on others (Habib, 2003:4).

Ikome and Samasuwo (2005:15) throw some light on South Africa's exceptionalism as that of a country highly revered in Western capitals amidst the latter's general pessimism about the rest of the continent. They uphold the country's solid United Nations credentials, its role in the extension of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, its chairmanship of the United Nations' Commission's on Human rights, its opposition to the invasion of Iraq, its contribution to the Ottawa Process to ban land mines and its involvement in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The unpredictable and sometimes anarchic nature of international relations today has necessitated the existence of dominant powers, to coordinate the affairs of other lesser

states and institute by force if need be, law and order. The performance of this role by South Africa has engendered perceptions and suspicions by other states about her intentions. Far from being out of sheer curiosity, the rationale of this study is to examine this role and perceptions as positive for the development and stability of the region and the African continent as a whole.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A hegemon by virtue of its power, both political, military and economic, determines the course of international relations within its sphere of dominance. Other periphery states within the region, by virtue of the fact that they lack the capacity and / or resources to counterbalance the influence of this dominant state, will either ride by the dictates of the hegemon or seek for ways to bring about its downfall either through the formation of alliances or some other covert or overt means of opposition. This can result in suspicion, distrust and tension between the hegemon and other states in the region thus thwarting a friendly and smooth flow of international relations. Against the backdrop of the above, the problem is stated in the following research questions:

- What makes South Africa a Hegemon in the SADC region?
- What role does South Africa play in the SADC region?
- What are the perceptions of SADC members regarding South Africa's role in the region.

1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY

To investigate the role of hegemony in regional politics with special reference to South Africa in the SADC region.

1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To explore the dynamics of South Africa's hegemony in the SADC region.
- To analyse the role played by South Africa in southern Africa.
- To examine the perceptions of SADC countries with regards to South Africa's role in southern Africa.

1.6 HYPOTHESIS

South Africa as a hegemon has an important role to play in the political stability and economic development of the SADC region.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is expected to define a new role for South Africa, the hegemon, on how it could make maximum use of her economic resources and political power, for the welfare of the Southern African region in particular and the rest of the world at large.

Furthermore, this study is of utmost significance to scholars and fellow researchers in the academic field since it will provide an independent analysis on the role of hegemony in international politics. It will thus add to the existing body of knowledge in the field of human sciences.

Moreover, this study will significantly open up new avenues for other studies. This will be as a result of the themes raised and the problems highlighted in the presentation of findings.

1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of the study is limited to the Southern African region specifically to those countries that make up the Southern African Development Community.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The researcher encountered the problem of author's bias evident in a number of published materials. Furthermore, in order to increase and strengthen the validity and reliability of findings, it was advisable to carry out composite case studies. However, this could not be done due to the colossal financial costs involved.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Much has been written on hegemony by scholars and academics in the field of humanities and / or the social sciences. The purpose of this section is not merely to reinvent the wheel through repetitive exhibitions of available literature, but more importantly to analyze important variables relevant to the topic and to draw a synthesis of the divergent ideas put forward by the various researchers in the field. Against this backdrop, this section will overview concepts, highlight arguments raised by other authors and propound justifications on the role played by South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Furthermore, this section is important because it is a body of accumulated scholarship. It thus provides information on how other scholars have theorized and conceptualized on the concept of hegemony. Also, it elucidates how this phenomenon impact on the relations between states in the international polity. Thus, in this section, the most recent, credible and relevant scholarship on the role of hegemony in international politics will be overviewed. The literature review will thus set the basis for the themes raised in this research by providing meaningful context within the framework of already existing research (Mouton, 2005).

2.1.1 The Concept of Hegemony

The earliest reference to the term hegemony was used by Gramsci (1920) a leading Marxist thinker. He used the term to describe how the domination of one class over others is achieved by a combination of political and ideological means. Burke (1999) argues that by hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. This is clearly evident in contemporary issues in international relations. There is an ideological, economic and even cultural encroachment by global and regional powers such as the United States and South Africa, into the politics of lesser states. This dominance is manifested in among other things, economic exploitation and even military subjugation. This definition of the term brings out the concept of dominance, which is the key word, implied by contemporary scholars whenever reference to hegemony is made.

As indicated above, contemporary definitions and allusions to the concept of hegemony refer to dominance or leadership, especially by one nation over other nations. Mosher (2000:2) comments on the non-Western notion that the premier goal of foreign policy should be to establish absolute dominance over one's region and, by slow extension, the world. In a sense, he holds that hegemony is the natural external expression of totalitarianism, with disputes involving unabsorbed territories resolved by the threat and, if necessary, the reality of force.

Mosher (op. cit) approaches the definition from a rather realist stance. He seems to suggest that hegemony goes hand-in-glove with egocentricity and thus eliminates any possibilities of power sharing and / or decentralization of powers in international

relations insofar as hegemony exists. Some issues in international politics have proven the contrary. South Africa for instance, recognized here as a hegemon in the SADC region, has demonstrated dominance in the region through the use of force in certain moments manifested for instance in the invasion of Lesotho in 1998. Nevertheless, the country has been applauded for its initiatives to promote conflict resolution through dialogue, evident in her foreign policy of quiet diplomacy.

Clark (2002) defines hegemony as leadership or dominance, especially of one state over another. It is a term used since the last century to mean the influence of one state over others; hence hegemony, which describes the politics of those powers that cow their neighbours and dependants into submission. Hegemony in political science and international relations is generally used to describe dominance or control rather than leadership. Although political force - *coercion* - is always important, the role of ideology in winning the *consent* of dominated classes may be even more significant.

In spite of the fact that South Africa has the military potential to cow any other SADC state into submission, the government of Pretoria gives privilege to a foreign policy of quiet diplomacy. This is in recognition of the importance of consent as opposed to coercion in winning the trust of other states in the SADC region and maintaining its hegemony.

Schoeman (2004:3) defines hegemony not only on the neo-realist conception but ties it to military and political power and also on the ability to exercise unchallenged leadership. To this should be added the Gramscian notion that real power comes not so much from tangible resources as from the fact that the hegemon's ideology (its

structure of values and understandings) is acceptable and unquestioned, and forms a consensual order that determines behaviour in its sphere of influence. The essence of hegemony is the power to persuade. A hegemon is therefore a leader that follows its own enlightened interest, with positive spin-offs for others. Against the backdrop of the arguments raised, Schoeman (op. cit) seems to justify hegemony by the fact that it is beneficial to other periphery states through service delivery hence, it is not necessarily an undesirable phenomenon in international relations.

Analysts in international relations (Naidoo et al (2003) & Ikome (2005)) have observed the exportation of South Africa businesses and para-statal north of the Limpopo keenly. South Africa's corporates such as Mobile Telecommunications Network, Standard bank and Pick n Pay are generating mass profits in most other SADC host countries. In spite of this realist perspective of personal gain, these para-statals nevertheless contribute immensely to service delivery in these host states.

Elucidating on the cyclical developments of hegemony, Rihani (2004) described hegemony in the interstate system as a situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called 'great powers' is so unbalanced that one power ...can largely impose its rules and wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. This does not of necessity imply direct rule over other nations and the exercise of supreme power on an international scale. Hegemonic powers come and then eventually go. And the process of growth and decline takes a long time. Some historians and political scientists have linked the rise and fall of such powers to long-range cycles of about fifty years.

According to Keohane & McKeown (2005), hegemony requires that one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so. Military power is necessary to capture and close off important areas of world political economy. Power requires control of raw materials, sources of capital, markets and competitive advantage in the production of highly valued goods. The will of a potential hegemon rests on the internal characteristics and incentives of the country which include: domestic attitudes, political structures, expected gain, as well as the propensity for secondary powers to differ to the hegemon's rule. Given this definition, hegemony would be virtually non-practicable in the international domain given the fact that it is rather impossible for one single state to be powerful enough to control the world's source of raw materials. Moreover, even if that were possible, it would definitely face stiff opposition from secondary powers, an aspect overlooked by Keohane & Mckeown.

Rourke (2005:G-4) draws an analogy between hegemon and hegemonic power. He posits that a hegemon is a single country or alliance that is so dominant in the international system that it plays the key role in determining the rules and norms by which the system operates. It dominates the system and has a central position in both making and enforcing the norms and modes of behaviour. In a supportive note, Ikenberry (2001) holds that it is also in the natural order of things that every hegemon wishes to endure and, as a consequence, undertakes to disperse, eradicate, and remove all resistance to its aspirations, and to that end, prevent all the other competitive hegemonies from disputing its character of exclusivity.

In the same vein Veseth (2005) regards the hegemon as a rich and powerful state that undertakes to supply public goods to the international system. These public goods include stable money, security (such as freedom of the seas), and a system of free trade that can be shared by all and that, in fact, works best when widely shared. Providing these public goods is costly, of course, but the hegemon gains even if it disproportionately bears the expense alone because of its dominant position in the world system. If the world system prospers, the hegemon necessarily prospers as well. In fact, this provision of public goods may be a strategy to secure or extend the hegemon's dominant position. The provision of these public goods is manifested in amongst others the attempt by South Africa to provide a stable currency in the region in the form of the Rand Union. This union pegs the currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland to the South African Rand.

In analyzing this concept of hegemony, some authors (Ikenberry, 2001; Rourke, 2005; & Veseth, 2005) bring to the limelight certain salient themes. Allied to the subject matter of dominance, is that of affluence, generosity and omnipotence. They all agree that hegemony requires wealth, prosperity, control and the will power to maintain its status quo. In order to do so, the hegemon must open up its markets so as to strengthen its currency, gain more allies, and secure its possessions. They however fail to look at how short-lived this situation is. They seem to hold that inasmuch as these factors prevail, hegemony will last *infinitum*. They fail to highlight the suspicion and jealousies that other periphery states harbour with respect to the prosperity and dominance of the hegemon, and the prospects for the formation of allies to counterbalance the growing power and influence of the hegemon

Hegemony represents 'imperialism with better manners' in which the hegemon represents the ability to influence, but not totally control, the foreign policy of third states. According to Gardner (2005), it is clear that even gentlemen may decide to use more forceful measures, at different times, and they may not always abide by generally accepted international norms and standards. In this light, the term hegemony as a general conceptualization, appears wide enough to cover regions that are under the strict or formal dominance of a predominant power or empire, as well as those regions that are influenced by a more indirect primacy, involving patterns of political-economic and media behaviour, including what has come to be called 'globalization'.

Ferguson (2003) questions what hegemony really is. Is it a euphemism for empire, or, does it describe the role of a *primus inter pares*, a country that leads its allies but does not rule subject peoples? And what are the motives of a hegemon? Does it exert power beyond its borders for its own self-interested purposes? Or is it engaged altruistically in the provision of international public goods? By contrast, according to the 'world-system theory' of Immanuel Wallerstein, hegemony means more than mere leadership but less than outright empire. A hegemonic power is 'a state ... able to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order.' The hegemon also offers certain extra advantages for enterprises located within it or protected by it, advantages not accorded by the 'market' but obtained through political pressure. He recognizes the ambiguity surrounding the definition and objectives of the concept 'hegemony'. Though he speculates from across a wide spectrum of options from empire to an altruistic state, he seems to settle on a hegemon being a dominant state, offering political incentives to its affiliates.

2.1.2 The Need for a Hegemon

According to Habib (2003:3), every hegemon has to be a pivotal state. But it has to be more. Hegemons not only aspire to leadership and are not only endowed with military, economic and other resources. They have political and socio-economic visions about their trans-national environments, and a political willingness to implement those visions. If that vision is one of security, stability and development, as is often the case, then the hegemon undertakes to underwrite the implementation of these goals. Again, that does not mean that it does not have partners in this enterprise. It often does. But it takes responsibility in the last instance to ensure that the features of its vision are operationalised in the region its sees as its sphere of influence.

Alao (2001) is of the opinion that regional hegemons have become necessary evils in many regions. On the one hand, the smaller nations resist the bigger and better-endowed ones for fear that they will always seek to dominate their region. Yet, on the other hand, these big countries are relied upon in times of conflict, to provide the resources to maintain the vital lifeline of peace operations. Thus, countries like Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States and South African in SADC have found themselves taking a leading role in their regions in times of crisis. Where these hegemons have been willing and able to initiate and participate in regional conflict resolution efforts, they have made the difference in preventing collapse and complete destruction, human suffering and anarchy. Those sub-regions without such leading nations (particularly within Africa) are the ones likely to suffer more in times of crisis, especially where no external power outside is willing and able to intervene. A considerable level of carnage might have been prevented in Rwanda,

if there was a readily willing actor, available and able to act quickly to meet the situation with an effective response.

Furthermore, the political and economic costs of constant intervention to meet crises are simply too high. The time needed to lobby for international support, rally troops and generate finance is usually too time-consuming. Daniel et al (2003) are of the opinion that, a regional power, or powers, could be counted on to maintain local stability with its own diplomacy, prestige, and military power if necessary. In times of regional turmoil, a need for peacekeeping and peacemaking forces might arise, a need that would ideally be fulfilled by the hegemon - as has been the case in Liberia in recent years, where Nigeria has shouldered the financial and military burden of the lengthy peacemaking mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Regional hegemons also have an incentive to control local arms flows and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. South Africa was instrumental in destroying illicit arms in Mozambique in a series of operations codenamed 'Rachel' which were completed in 2001.

2.1.3 The Conduct of Hegemons in International Relations

All animals are equal but some are more equal than others.

(Orwell, 1945)

This sarcastic analogy drawn from Orwell's (1945) masterpiece *Animal Farm* is an apt representation of the nature of actors in the international political system. In sharp contrast to the United Nations' Charter, which emphasizes the equality of all member states, issues in international politics have by and large proven the contrary.

According to Ikome and Samasuwo (2005:13), beneath the ideal spirit of entente between states, lies the realities and verities of interstate power politics – national interest.

Commenting on the nature of the international system, Huntington (1999) is of the opinion that there is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues. Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states.

Despite the existence of an anarchical international state system, there is a clear hierarchy of states with roles and functions being adopted by, or thrust upon states, depending on their position within the hierarchy (Schoeman, 2003:366). A country attains the status of a hegemon when it acquires military, political and economic power that exceeds those of other leading countries combined. The process takes a

long time to come to fruition, the country enjoys several decades at the top, and then it begins a slow process of decline. This decline is generally caused by the overcommittedness of the hegemon in international relations issues leading to a drain in her resources. This decline is also caused by distrust for the hegemon by other periphery states leading to the formation of alliances to serve as a bulwark against the hegemon's influence.

The benefits of hegemony, however, last a long time after hegemony has been surrendered. This is because whatever its past policies might have been, a hegemonic power favours openness in international trade. It advocates, particularly to other nations, low or no tariffs on trade and no subsidies to domestic industries. Clearly, such a strategy would be to the hegemon's benefit. Also a hegemon still attains international recognition in spite of its decline. Russia is a case in point. However hatred for the hegemonic power of the day is not unusual. The intensity of the hate nowadays is impressive. The exercise of hegemonic power has shifted from a recognised state and is exercised today by an amorphous group of vast corporations and few corporate giants who dominate not only the economic arena but also most aspects of political life (Rihani, 2003).

Schoeman (op. cit.) recognizes here the inevitability in the decline of hegemonic power. In spite of the colossal power (both political, military and economic) amassed by the hegemon, its demise and eventual collapse is unavoidable. He however fails to elaborate on the reasons why decline is an inevitable process in the life cycle of hegemons especially given the fact that its policies are beneficial to other states in the international community. He however seems to suggest that hatred for hegemonic

power by other periphery states is a factor which should not be underestimated, and thus plays no small role in contributing to the collapse of the hegemon. Rihani (op. cit.) observes that hegemony has moved from a single dominant state to an association of states or corporations, probably to either delay the predictable collapse or hegemonic power, or avoid it completely.

On a critical analysis on hegemons, Knutsen (1999:15-16) posits that in this conception of hegemony lies a key to the rise of world orders and to the unopposed preeminence of one distinct great Power. This Power is military strong -- stronger than the others -- materially wealthy, and it is normatively influential. He questions why one power has such normative influence? Why it sets the tone for the political discourse of its age? Why it articulates the political sentiment of the times? He maintains that it is partly because it is strong and wealthy. By being Number One. By being the best, the strongest, the wealthiest. It is seen by others as possessing a keen knowledge about the creation of wealth and power. Its military techniques, its economic processes, its political structures are emulated by others who see in its institutions a blueprint for development of their own power and prestige. But also -- and this is a simple answer which has been much neglected in recent debates -- a Power exerts a unique normative influence because it stresses the universal application of its values. It represents good values and norms -- virtues like freedom, decency, honesty, and equality. It articulates these values with great sincerity.

Knutsen seems to portray a rather positive liberal view of great powers in international relations. He is of the opinion that the values represented by the

hegemon are cherished and admired by other periphery states, thus accounting for the strength and prominence of the hegemon.

According to Thompson (2003), hegemony in international terms without some kind of competing force, such as the Soviets, can clearly lead to the abuse of power and a unilateralist flaunting of international institutions that do not serve at the imperium's whim. But this should not mean that hegemony itself is a negative concept. Although empire is something rightfully reviled, hegemony may not be as bad as everyone thinks. We need to advocate not an anti-hegemonic stance in form, but an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist stance in content, one that advocates the particular interests of capital of the market in more broad terms rather than the universal political interests of others. Western hegemony will not be seen as problematic once the values of the western political tradition and specifically those of the Enlightenment, from the liberal rule of law, the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power and the value of political and social equality, are set in a cosmopolitan global framework.

He further posits that Western hegemony will not be seen as problematic once the values of the western political tradition and specifically those of the Enlightenment, from the liberal rule of law, the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power and the value of political and social equality, are set in a cosmopolitan global framework. Thompson seems to recognize the importance of the issue of unchecked power in international politics. He posits the need for a balance of power, that is, another dominant state or other states acting as checks and balances against the arbitrary exercise of power by a single hegemon.

Referring to Hegemons as pivotal states within the international system, Kennedy, Chase & Hill (1996: 33 – 51) summarise that a pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary mayhem ... A pivotal state's economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its region's economic vitality and political soundness. Defined as such, the importance of an emerging power as a regional great power to maintain regional security becomes clear – regional security is, of course, in itself a form of international security. It could be said that it does not really matter whether the regional power voluntarily assumes this role, or whether it is thrust upon it, or expected of it – what is important is that this power should fulfill this role in support of international stability. Events in the former Soviet Union go to corroborate this view. Its disintegration saw the emergence of several small states, which till date are still facing security issues. This goes to prove the devastating effects to international relations that accompany the collapse of a hegemon.

Moreover, Taylor (2003) holds that hegemons are the 'ultimate makers' in our story – they make nothing less than new social worlds – but the takers remain a threat. Thus the process of world hegemony cannot be entirely economic. Warrior tendencies remain strong in the modern world-system and hegemons have to earn their world status on the battlefield. Near the centre of each cycle there is repulse of a political-military challenge in a world war (in the sense that its outcome determines the nature of the post-war world-system). Hegemony is the opposite of imperium, the political practice of expansion by coercion to dominate the modern world-system, ultimately to convert it back into a world-empire. Hegemons lead the anti-imperium coalition to prevent such 'regression': the Dutch against the Hapsburg Empire in the Thirty Years War (1618-48), the British against the French in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic

Wars (1792-1815), and the Americans against Germany in the two twentieth century 'world wars' (1914-1945). In each case, defeat for the imperium power confirmed the reproduction of the modern world-system.

Added to the above, Mearsheimer (2001) contends that regional hegemons act as offshore balancers in other areas of the world, although they prefer to be the balancer of last resort. States have a will to power - a limitless lust for power - hardwired into them because of the ambitions of their leaders. They constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states. Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival. Potential hegemonic great power almost naturally creates fear and loathing in other great powers. Because a state's intentions are difficult to discern, and because they can change quickly, rival great powers will be inclined to assume the worst about the potential hegemon's intentions, further reinforcing the threatened states' incentive to contain it and maybe even weaken it if the opportunity presents itself.

In a rather condemnatory note, a Chinese White Paper publication as cited by Xinhua (1998) posits that hegemonism and power politics remains the main source of threats to world peace and stability. It says that the cold war mentality and its influence still have a certain currency, and the enlargement of military blocs and the strengthening of military alliances have added factors of instability to international security. The White Paper says some countries, by relying on their military advantages, pose military threats to other countries, even resorting to armed intervention. The old unfair and irrational international economic order still damages the interests of developing

countries. It stresses that security should be based on mutual trust and common interests. All the countries should promote trust through dialogue, seek security through cooperation, respect each other's sovereignty, solve disputes through peaceful means and strive for common development. It says, to obtain lasting peace, it is imperative to abandon the cold war mentality, cultivate a new concept of security and seek a new way to safeguard peace.

Moreover, in a diatribe against unilateralism, Lt. Gen. Masood (2004) holds that Unilateralism goes against the grain and spirit of democracy. He seems to suggest that hegemons however omnipotent they seem to be cannot possibly address and resolve the vast range of threats and challenges the world faces today given their complexity. He maintains that military action cannot form the basis of a long-term sustainable policy that can achieve global stability. Military success does not necessarily translate into political victory and as military thinkers have repeatedly emphasized that winning battles does not imply that the war has been won. The neo-conservatives strategy of using massive military power alone to shape the world has proved to be very destabilizing. A new policy paradigm based on cooperative strategies should be the road ahead. This view was pinpointed by Dag Hammarskjold (1956) the former United Nations Secretary General when he said,

We are on dangerous grounds if we believe that any individual, any nation, or any ideology has a monopoly on rightness, liberty and human dignity.

This goes without saying that consent is an important aspect in hegemony. No state should seek to impose its whims and caprices on another. Mutual cooperation and interdependence should be the guiding principles in international relations.

In a similar haranguing condemnation, Muzaffar (2004) put forward that occupation of territory is the starkest expression of hegemonic power. He holds that it is within global civil society that there is greatest awareness of, and the strongest determination to act against, hegemonic power. According to him, there are scores of activists and intellectuals all over the world who realize that hegemony is inimical to inter-religious and inter-civilisational amity and accord. For hegemony breeds imperial hubris which in turn induces the hegemon to adopt a condescending, often supercilious, attitude towards those who are the victims of its dominance and control. Besides, there is always a tendency on the part of the hegemon to use its dominant power to coerce others to submit to its might. Though the victims of hegemonic power often surrender to the will and the wish of the hegemon, it creates resentment, anger and hatred among them. What this means is that if the hegemon has no respect for its victims since they are subservient to its will, neither do the victims have any regard for the hegemon whom they view as a bully and even as a tyrant.

Closely linked to that is Levy's (2003:7) realist balance of power view of the international system. He posits that the avoidance of hegemony is the primary goal of states and the maintenance of equilibrium of power in the system is the primary instrumental goal. He further contends that states and particularly great powers will build up their arms and form alliances to balance against the primary threats to their interests and particularly against any states that threatens to secure a hegemonic

position over the system. Balance of power theorists argue that the balancing mechanism almost always works successfully to avoid hegemony, either because potential hegemonies are deterred by their anticipation of a military coalition forming against them or because they are defeated in war after deterrence fails. After all, no single state has an uncontested monopoly on violence.

Harries (2003) maintains that unchecked power creates its own motives and sets its own agenda. What are crucial are not the avowed intentions of the prospective hegemon, for these can change over time; what is crucial is its power. That is why states have, again and again, made common cause to resist the emergence of a dominant power. As is often the case in politics, the availability of means tend to determine ends, and power sets its own agenda. For as Madeleine Albright once famously put it to an astonished Colin Powell, 'what was the use of having such a powerful military force if one didn't use it?' In a similar note, Lord Acton as cited by Jackson and Jackson (1997:9) points out that

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Addressing this issue of unchecked power, Bailin (2001) elucidates on a model of institutionalized hegemony, which holds that great powers may collaborate, given a certain institutional agreement, to mitigate global crises. These countries collectively have necessary hegemonic traits, such as power capabilities and global interests, to act as the global stabilizer. These characteristics are necessary, but not sufficient for a small group of powerful countries to be a 'group hegemon.' In addition to hegemonic traits, group hegemony requires an institutional arrangement that shapes the behaviour

of its members and makes collaboration possible. Institutionalized hegemony specifies the necessary hegemonic and institutional features that enable a group of powerful countries to collaborate and resolve global crises. He proposes that the Group of Seven (G7) (now G8) is the global stabilizer. This institution is made up of, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United States (and Russia).

Xiaoping (2004) notes that to establish a new world order, all countries should jointly oppose hegemonism and any interferences in the internal affairs of others, strengthen and expand international economic cooperation based on equality and abandon all discriminatory policies and practices. The core of a new political order is mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in others' internal affairs. He posits the establishment of a new model of international relations for common development and foster a climate in which each member of the international community, big or small, can independently choose their development paths and carry out cooperation in harmony through expanding common grounds and setting aside differences. He holds that different civilizations can coexist for and pursue common development by learning from each other. The thinking of not accepting and respecting the diversity of the world and attempting to force personal social systems, development methods or values on others are actions of hegemonism which go opposite to the laws of history.

In a rather conclusive standpoint, the words of Gary LaMoshi (2005) are of utmost importance.

Even an unrivalled superpower can't solve all of the world's problems or respond to every challenge. It can't do it alone. It needs

to make friends, compromise, and show patience to get its way in the world.

This shows that even a hegemon needs friends and allies to maintain its dominance. This again brings in the theme of consent in the exercise of hegemonic power. It needs to earn the trust of states and not just get it by force. The US-led unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the disastrous consequences leading to a call by the US government for more international participation goes to buttress this view. This shows how impossible for one state however strong, to tackle a region's problems all alone.

2.1.4 The Demise of a Hegemon

According to the infallible law of gravity, what goes up must come down.

(Newton, 1687)

A good number of authors and scholars such as Knutsen (1999); Ping (2003); & Taylor (2003) are of the opinion that, the collapse of a hegemon is an unavoidable phenomenon in international relations. They maintain that hegemonic power is a cyclical process and revolves amongst states. It starts from the emergence of a state usually through economic dominance, to a wider form of domination usually in aspects such as political, military and even cultural. Then the overcommittedness of the hegemon is the harbinger of its downfall and eventual collapse. This cycle nevertheless may sometimes take hundreds of years. Events in history have proven this view. Hegemons have risen and fallen – The Great Empires of the Western

Sudan, Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany, and the former Soviet Union amongst others.

According to Wright (2001:81–89) the nature of the international system would seem to have changed—and given the supposed failure of neorealism to predict this change, theory itself needs to change; hence the dizzying proliferation of radical, alternative, critical, post-whatever styles of theorizing. The state is changing, security is changing, and so are identities, subjectivities, the nature of war, and the nature of politics itself. Globalization, we are led to believe, is changing everything. Change seems to be the leitmotif of the new millennium, although this undoubtedly also will be susceptible to change. The destructive power of nuclear weapons, the increase in interdependence among national economies, and the development of unprecedented scales of cosmopolitan interaction—may facilitate a break in the cycle of rise and decline of world orders.

According to Knutsen (1999), the rise and fall of world orders is tightly related to waves of global warfare and to the rise and fall of great powers. The world order may be described as a global process consisting of three successive phases – Hegemony, Challenge and Decline. These phases represent an evolution from a hegemonic constellation to a balance of power. These phases describe an evolution from hierarchy to anarchy – or, perhaps, better: from relative order based on hierarchy in the initial phase of hegemony, to a relative order based on equality of power in the concluding phase of decline. He establishes that there is a distinction between great power based on force and great power rooted in consent. Only the latter qualifies as

'hegemony'. Once the hegemon's military arsenal lags, and once its material wealth declines, it will also lose moral power.

Moreover, Ping (2001) condemning the conduct of the United States in world affairs, posits that because of its relative economic, military and scientific and technological advantages, the United States has grown a mindset of hegemony after the radical change in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union. He maintains that in its external ties, it often exhibits a unique arrogant and overbearing manner, clings obstinately to its own course and attempts to lord it over various countries and even the international organization. Regarding any rule, treaty and agreement, the United States wants that it alone have the final say. He maintains that hegemony has encountered boycott and opposition from more and more countries. It declines from its zenith; this is dialectics of historical development. The wheel of history has sped through the ruins of the empire overbearing for a time. History has proved and will continue to prove one truth: hegemony-short-lived; justice-evergreen. Given the world's multi-polarization trend, he advised that, it can be said without hesitation that this planet will absolutely not be ruled by one single political centre, no matter how large its military strength is.

In an analogous view, Kupchan (2003:41) conceives that today's great powers will become tomorrows has – beens as nodes of innovation and efficiency move from the core to the periphery of the international system. Hegemony is based upon power asymmetry between the hegemon, which is the core state, and a surrounding periphery of states. Thus, reigning hegemons threaten rising secondary states and thereby

provoke the formation of countervailing coalitions. Taken together, these dynamics drive the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of great powers.

Tracing the life cycle of hegemons, Taylor (2003) is of the opinion that hegemons define new modern worlds for other countries to copy thus periodically restructuring the whole modern world-system. This restructuring is fundamentally an economic process: the hegemon has pre-eminence first in production, then in commerce and finally in finance. The peak of hegemonic power occurs when these three superiorities are in place together, leading to a period of world economic prominence, which he terms, 'high hegemony'. But the process of emulation means that each of these superiorities is inevitably lost. They disappear in the same order that they arise so that having the world financial centre is the final vestige of each hegemony. According to him, this rise and demise of hegemonic economic power defines a hegemonic cycle.

In a parallel opinion, Levy (2003:8) posits that the power transition theory is a form of hegemonic theory that shares realist assumptions but that emphasizes the existence of order within a nominally anarchic system. Hegemons commonly arise and use their strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behaviour that advance their own security. Differential rates of growth lead to the rise and fall of hegemons however, and the probability of a major war grows as the hegemon loses its dominant position and reaches a maximum at the point when the declining leader is overtaken by the rising challenger. In the power transition theory, it is the combination of equality of power and change in power that is destabilizing. When the static component is separated, which posits that at the dyadic level, war is least likely when one state has a preponderance of power over another and most likely when there

is an equality of power. This is the power preponderance hypothesis, which is based on the logic that under conditions of preponderance, the strong (hegemons) are satisfied and do not have incentives for war and the weak, though dissatisfied, lack the capability for war.

Habib & Selinyane (2004) argue that hegemony is a self-limiting, self-defeating, and therefore temporary condition. The argument is that while the hegemonic state bears the burdens of organizing the international system and supplying public goods, free-rider states prosper, expand, and increase the burdens on the hegemon. At some point the hegemon finds itself over-committed and unable to bear the costs of the system it has created. Either the hegemon begins to put domestic interests over its international obligations or it becomes too weak to honour its widespread commitments. Either way, hegemony collapses in on itself, the story goes, and chaos reigns until another hegemonic state arises to restore (temporary) order. Habib & Selinyane recognize how cyclical hegemony is, as it collapses on state and rises on another. They suggest that the omnipotence of the hegemon translates to omnipresence, which is the very factor that perpetuates its collapse, at the benefit of another state.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The nature of the interaction of states within the international political system can be comprehended within the framework of certain theories. Scholars of international relations generate a wide range of theories to solve the problems and puzzles of state behaviour. All of these theories are like the blind men examining the elephant. They

are correct - but only about the part of the problem they concentrate on (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Each theory offers a causal account of a particular outcome or pattern of behaviour in inter-state relations in a form that isolates independent and dependent variables sufficiently precisely to generate testable hypotheses. These theories help to simplify and make sense of reality. Though several schools of thought are relevant to this study, the most fundamental theories relevant to this study are Realism, Hegemonic Stability and Dependency theories. Each approach gives rise to a distinct 'mental map' of the international system, specifying the principal actors within it, the preferences (or motives) driving those actors, and the constraints imposed on those actors by the nature of the system itself (Slaughter, 2003:4 -5).

2.2.1 Realist Theory

Dominating the study of international relations for the past centuries has been the theory of realism. This school of thought, which stands out as one of the oldest for understanding and explaining international politics, has its roots extending as far back as 2500 years ago. Among other things, realist theorists are identified and distinguished by their obsession with power and are largely pessimistic of human nature, arguing that political struggles among humans and states is probably inevitable because people have an inherently dark side. In addition to focusing their analyses on the struggle for power among states in an anarchic international system, proponents of this school of thought also contend that states are the core actors in the international

system and that their main goal is to project and defend their self interest by use of their power capabilities (Genest, 2004:41).

It could be argued through both the state and system level of analyses by observers and analysts of the international system that the fundamental principles and implications of realism as inspired by the writings of great scholars such as the Italian Renaissance political philosopher, Niccolo Machiavelli and the 17th Century English political and legal writer, Thomas Hobbes (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003:70), have greatly influenced the nature of South African interaction within the international political system. They seem to suggest that in the pursuit of their national interest, states must be prepared to sacrifice their international obligations on the alter of their own self-interest if the two come into conflict. This assumption makes treaties and all other agreements, conventions, customs, rules and laws between states merely expedient arrangements which and must be set aside if they conflict with the vital security interests of states.

According to Ikome & Samasuwo (2005:13), the attractiveness of securing a permanent seat in the United Nations' Security Council, even one devoid of the undemocratic but strategic veto power privilege, might be sufficient incentive to bring about a divorce between Africa's leading states particularly by Nigeria and South Africa. Moreover, Adebajo & Landsberg (2001) are of the opinion that, South Africa's intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was not launched out of sheer altruism. They maintain that it was motivated by crude self interest According to them, Pretoria naturally wanted to prevent an implosion of land-locked Lesotho, lodged in the belly of South Africa, stave off an influx of refugees and arms to its own country. Pretoria

was also determined to defend and protect the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a major source of water supply to South Africa. This shows the extent to which power politics as seen through the eye of the realist, is an inextricable component of international relations.

2.2.2 Dependency Theory

In assessing the role of a dominant state (known as a hegemon) in regional politics, the dependency theory is of importance. Dependency theory is a part of the class system paradigm concerned with explaining the uneven development in wealth between poor and rich countries. Relations between states in the international system can be classified as part of a system of dependency and exploitation. To support and sustain their dominant position, core nations depend on the raw materials, cheap labour and markets for excess production and investment capital of periphery, or poor, states. Like the underclass or the proletariat in a capitalist society, periphery states depend on the orders and work provided by core countries for their survival. (Genest, 2004: 195 – 196).

According to Daniel et al (2003) a distinction needs to be drawn between the behaviour of South Africa's corporates and its government. Like business anywhere, the South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests - profits, market share, elimination of competition, and the urge to dominate and to monopolise. As Absa Bank's Roger Pardoe has noted, Absa is 'not investing in Africa for altruism. We're investing in Africa to make some money'. And in pursuit of profit South African corporates have not always acted like angels. The opposite has been

sometimes the case - witness the dubious and questionable practices of the 12 South African companies operating in the DRC accused, in a 2002 UN report, of looting mineral resources during the recent civil war in that country. This is not just due to the sometimes arrogance of South Africa's corporates but also because South African capital represents a real threat to the ownership and property rights of Africa's political elites.

2.2.3 Theory of Hegemonic Stability

This theory was arguably International Political Economy's most important contribution to Cold War international relations theory. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that the world system is most prosperous when a hegemon exists to organize the international political and economic system and coordinate the provision of international public goods. It holds that the international system achieves growth and stability only when one state acts as a hegemon, dominating the others but also paying the costs associated with counteracting problems in the international system (Balaam, 2001: 461).

The South African military invasion of Lesotho in 1998 codenamed 'Operation Boleas' could be ascribed to a need by the hegemon to maintain peace and stability in the region. Nthakeng (2006:78) holds that the South African intervention in Lesotho was successful in creating stability and peace, and holds important lessons for a future South African continental strategy. Intervention in foreign conflict is fraught with uncertainties. However, Lesotho was a success for South Africa. The qualification of this outcome as 'an unlikely success' by Southall (2003) merits serious consideration,

as does the contention that this was a bully's ride over a weaker neighbour. Habib and Selinyane (2004) have observed that this case shows the way into the future of hegemonic intervention to create peace and stability throughout the continent on the part of South Africa. To be a quintessential hegemon, South Africa needs to pull together all these strands in its relations with the region and the continent.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 DELINEATION OF VARIABLES

In order to gain an insight of the role played by South Africa in the SADC region, some variables need to be elucidated. These variables will be discussed under three categories, stemming from the research questions. They include:

- What are the characteristics of hegemony and how does South Africa fulfil those characteristics?
- What are the activities of South Africa as a hegemon? And,
- What are the perceptions of other SADC members towards South Africa's hegemonic behaviour?

3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF HEGEMONY

As pinpointed in the literature review, different scholars have advanced a variety of definitions to the concept of hegemony. Hand in hand with the realist paradigm, Wallerstein as cited by Rihani (2004) are of the opinion that a dominant characteristics of hegemony is a situation of asymmetry between the great powers, resulting in a situation whereby one power (in this case the hegemon) can largely impose its rules and wishes (at the very least by effective veto or military power) in the economic, political, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. Even though coercion is sometimes necessary to boost the hegemon's leverage, consent is nevertheless very necessary.

All in all, hegemony is based upon power asymmetry between the hegemon, which is the core state, and a surrounding periphery of states. The ability to dominate these periphery states within the region is based upon the power capabilities of the hegemon in question. These capabilities or elements of power according to Goldstein (2005) are gross domestic product, military capability, population, critical land mass, natural resources and national cohesion or internal stability.

South Africa no doubt possesses these power capabilities. It stands out distinctively as the economic powerhouse of Africa. As at 2005, it had a purchasing power parity of about 534.6 billion dollars, a figure more than that of Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho combined. The country leads the continent in industrial output (40% of total output) and mineral production (45%) and generates most of Africa's electricity (over 50%). With a population of over 44 million inhabitants, the Republic of South Africa takes up a total surface area of 1,221,037 square kilometres, approximate to the combined landmass of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The country is endowed with natural resources such as gold, chromium, antimony, coal, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin, uranium, gem diamonds, platinum, copper, vanadium, salt and natural gas. The country has a sophisticated, robust and well-regulated financial and banking system. Foreign banks are well represented and electronic banking facilities are extensive, with internet banking an ever-growing feature of the sector. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited is the 18th largest exchange in the world by market capitalisation (some R3.3 trillion as of September 2005) (SouthAfrica.info Report, 2006).

Moreover, the assumption by Cilliers (1992) that a conventional military offensive against South Africa either by any one, or any combination of its neighbours, will remain highly improbable, at least until the year 2000 and most probably for some time thereafter, still remains true. With a fully effective national defence force, navy, air force, joint operations, joint support, military intelligence and military health service, South Africa's military operates on an average expenditure of 3.55 billion dollars as at 2005, a figure about two times that of all other SADC countries combined (World Fact Book, 2005).

Due to its sophisticated infrastructure, advanced road network system and advanced technology, the country has played host to most international sporting events such as the rugby World Cup (1995), the cricket World Cup (2003), the women's World Cup in golf (2005 & 2006) and the only street race in the inaugural Formula A1 GP World Cup of Motorsport (2006) in Africa. The country is scheduled to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, one of the world's biggest sporting events, expected to inject about R20 billion into the economy. Between now and 2010, South Africa will spend about R5-billion on building and renovating 10 World Cup stadiums, R5.2 billion on upgrades to the country's airports, and R3.5 billion on improvements to the country's road and rail network (South Africainfo, 2006).

The country will also be working to tight deadlines to ensure that the Gautrain, a high-speed rail link between Johannesburg, Pretoria and Johannesburg International Airport, is up and running on time. The 80-kilometre Gautrain travelling at 160km/h. will consist of four underground stations and eight surface stations, and some 14 kilometres of underground track (in some places, 80 metres down) (Davie, 2003).

3.2 ACTIVITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A HEGEMON

Contrary to the Article 2 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations which stresses the sovereign equality of all member states, states in practice occupy roles in a hierarchical structure as far as their interactions in international politics is concerned. The theory of realism is definitely a mainstay of interstate politics hence, concepts such as hegemonism still have a stronghold in international relations. South Africa has and still is no doubt perpetuating this domineering phenomenon. Backed by its power capabilities, this country has been playing the role of a hegemon in the SADC region and even beyond, for well over two decades now. It has been instrumental in negotiating in peace talks, has actively participated in the deployment of peacekeeping troops, humanitarian efforts and has also championed the cause for the African Union.

The early 1990s witnessed the end of apartheid and institutional racism in South Africa. An era of democratic governance was ushered in following a return to black majority rule from 1994. The South African government sought for national unity through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. There was also reconstruction in the political, economic and social domains, based on a new democratic constitution. The country's principal foreign policy objective is to promote the economic, political, and cultural regeneration of Africa, through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD); to promote the peaceful resolution of conflict in Africa; and to use multilateral bodies to ensure that developing countries' voices are heard on international issues.

As Robert Greenleaf aptly puts it,

The only test of leadership is that someone follows.

South Africa has surely led the SADC region in fostering the principles of democracy, stability, peace and unity, and also in ensuring that the region in particular and the African continent as a whole develop economically. According to Adebajo (2005: 2) all diplomatic roads in Africa are currently leading to Pretoria. Thabo Mbeki has acted as the ‘pied piper of Pretoria’, playing the diplomatic tunes to which politicians, warlords, and rebels have danced.

Politically, South Africa is playing a key role in trying to consolidate peace, security and unity within the sub region in particular and in Africa at large. Being the first country to deliberately give up nuclear weapons, South Africa has stood at the forefront of propagating the principles of the African Union. It has also signed and ratified many international conventions amongst which are: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (all ratified on 10th Dec 1998) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (ratified on 15th Dec 1995) (OHCHR Publication, 2006).

Furthermore, the South African government has agreed to submit itself to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a self-monitoring organization comprised of African Union member states. The purpose of the peer review panel, which will have

between five and seven members, is to promote the implementation of policies and standards that will lead to political stability, economic growth, development, and integration on a regional and continent-wide level. It also launched a self-monitoring, voluntary mechanism Government Implementation Committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development to review the country's practice of democracy, governance and social and economic development in September. The APRM country review team will consider this report when it visits South Africa in 2006 (Masson & Milkiewicz, 2003).

In addition, South African business dominance on the continent goes hand-in-hand with an agenda of political dominance. The country won the bid to permanently host the Pan African Parliament (PAP). The PAP, as an institution, will provide oversight on governance and transparency of the African Union (AU) member states. The AU wants the parliament to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers. The establishment of the AU required negotiations and agreement on the Constitutive Act - an act that contains provisions that limit sovereignty of the 53 member states. What this could mean is that whoever hosts the PAP will have political leverage in the assembly of the AU. It is safe to conclude that, strategically, South Africa is aiming for political hegemony (Majavu, 2004).

Besides, the country is currently chairing the G77 and China. This is a Non-Aligned Movement comprised of 114 member States. It is the largest grouping of countries outside of the United Nations itself, making it an important lobby in global affairs. The G77 exists to articulate and promote the interests of developing countries and the pursuit of world peace and the search for a more equitable and just global order. After

pioneering the chairmanship of the African Union the country is also looking forward to assuming a two-year non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, starting January 2007. In spite of this, it is still one of the favourite African contenders for the debatable permanent seat with veto powers in the Body (Ikome & Samasuwo, 2005:15).

Added to the above, it has been instrumental in championing mediation efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, the inaugural chairperson of the African Union, talks were brokered aimed at a peace agreement between the former Kinshasa government and Rwanda. The talks culminated in the Pretoria Peace Accords of 2002. The country then hosted the lengthy inter-Congolese dialogue that paved the way for an eventual government of national unity. Thabo Mbeki also played a major role in facilitating the signing of the Burundi ceasefire agreement in Tanzania (AFP Report, 2006).

Moreover, Kent and Malan (2003) are of the opinion that South Africa has acknowledged the value of providing military, police and civilian assistance for common international efforts to keep the peace when properly authorized by international and domestic authorities to do so. Having its genesis in operation Boleas in Lesotho in 1998, the post apartheid South African government has been instrumental in sponsoring peacekeeping missions within the region. South Africa further provided a substantial military contribution to the U.N. peace operation in the DRC, placing some 1,500 South African troops in a forward base in the volatile east. It then helped in the preparation for a return to peace and stability in the country by

sending members of its Independent Electoral Commission to monitor elections. (Nowrojee, 2004).

As Akec (2006) aptly puts it,

*No one knows the language of oppressor better than those
who have experienced it.*

This idiom coupled with the hegemonic stability theory, at least offers an explanation to the reasons for the participation of South Africa in mediation efforts in Africa. Recognizing the importance of South Africa as the centre for reconciliation in South Africa, South African business tycoon Tokyo Sexwale proudly maintained on an SABC 2 interview, on 8th of September 2006 that, efforts are underway for football stars Zinedine Zidane and Marco Materazzi to be invited to the country for a reconciliation session. This is after a confrontation between the two players in the 2006 world cup finals in Germany in which Zidane head-butted Materazzi after the latter allegedly insulted racists' comments at the former.

One of the characteristics of hegemony as outlined by Rourke (2005: G-4) is that of a state that dominates a region or system, and has a central position in both making and enforcing the norms and modes of behaviour of other states within that system. The hegemon is an influential state and in a bid to maintain its dominant position, seeks to provide public goods such as stable money and free trade, to other usually loyal states within its sphere of influence. The hegemon opens up its markets so as to strengthen its currency, gain more allies, and secure its possessions. It is thus a dominant state

offering political incentives to its affiliates (Ferguson (2003); Ikenberry (2001); Veseth (2005)).

Economically, the country is seeking to consolidate its hegemony by providing a stable currency to and engaging in trade with other states within the region. This is manifested in initiatives such as the South African Customs' Union and the Rand Union, which pegs the currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland to the Rand. South Africa is also playing a leading role in negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between SACU and the United States. South Africa and its SACU partners (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia) regard the proposed agreement as a significant step towards integrating SACU economies into the global economic system and promoting development in the region. Though these initiatives are partly perpetuated by the liberal model of globalisation and free trade, it nevertheless is beneficial to the region as a whole (SouthAfrica Info Report, 2006).

Furthermore, a key feature of the investment drive into Africa has been the fact that the six primary sectors of South Africa's economy (mining, retail, construction / manufacturing, financial services, telecommunications, tourism/leisure) have worked hand in hand in securing South African investment throughout the continent. For example, the expansion of major retailers such as Shoprite, Metro Cash and Carry and Pep Stores as well as food chains such as Nandos and Steers across the continent has been mirrored by an accompanying movement of South African property developers who are building shopping centers to house these chains. In addition, burgeoning business travel stemming from trade and investment from South African groups like MTN, M-NET, Shoprite, Absa and the mining conglomerates, coupled with the

growth of regional tourism, has created new opportunities for hotel interests like the Protea group which has expanded a line of hotels from the east coast including Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Swaziland to the west coast of Africa including Ghana, Nigeria and Angola (Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu, 2003).

In the humanitarian domain, the South Africa plays host to a multitude of refugees fleeing from political persecution, economic strife and war which plagues most African countries. South Africa is a signatory to the United Nations' and Organization of African Unity's Conventions on Refugees. A Refugee Act governing the admission of asylum seekers was passed in 1998, and became effective in 2000. For many, post-apartheid South Africa has become both an imagined Mecca of economic opportunity, or a haven from war-torn or troubled homelands. The number of applications for asylum-seekers pending at the end of 2004 stood at 115,220. The country has several institutions and organizations that can help refugees. They include: Home Affairs, Southern African Migratory Project, Lawyers for Human Rights, Paralegal Advice and the UN High Commission for Refugees in South Africa (UNHCR Report, 2005).

Also, following the floods disaster in Mozambique at the beginning of the century, South Africa provided two cargo helicopters to help rescue people stranded by rising floodwaters. The team of South Africans assisting with rescue operations, airlifted about 400 people to safety providing various non-food items such as tents, blankets and kitchen utensils (IRIN, 2001).

Nevertheless, these activities carried out by South Africa have generated perceptions from other SADC members with respect to her intentions in the region. These

perceptions range from trust and mutual co-operation at best, to overt mistrust, suspicion and outright rejection at worst.

3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER SADC MEMBERS TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA'S HEGEMONY

Harries (2003) analyses how other states react to would-be hegemon, and why. He is of the opinion that there have been two kinds of reactions. The stronger states have tended to join together against the prospective hegemon. On the other hand, weaker and more vulnerable states, or those that share some cultural or ideological affinity; or a history of past friendly association, have hopes that they may receive favourable treatment at the hands of the ambitious state, may opt to become its associates or accomplices. In the study of international politics, this is referred to as jumping on the hegemon's bandwagon. Balancing or bandwagoning – that is basically the choice for all those caught in the scope of the hegemon's ambition.

'Bandwagoning' is characteristic of most states within the SADC region as far as their relations with South Africa are concerned. This is due to the general backwardness of these periphery states on the one hand, and the sophistication and advanced economy of South Africa on the other. By being the strongest and wealthiest in the region, the country is perceived by others as possessing a keen knowledge about the creation of wealth and power. Other SADC countries ally with South Africa because they stand to benefit in the economic, humanitarian and even security domains. This could be seen in the numerous diplomatic missions and foreign emissaries that exist in the

country, and also in the economic relations between the country and other countries in the region.

This perception of admiration and subservience to South Africa is manifested in amongst other things the Rand Union, which pegs the currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland to that of the South African Rand. Moreover, the Rand serves as legal tender in Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. However, the currencies of these countries are not recognized as legal tender in South Africa. This is in recognition of the strength and dominance of the South African economy. The Mbeki government has also established diplomatic and economic ties with all the countries in the SADC region. It has stood at the forefront of initiatives such as the South African Customs Union and is playing host to institutions such as the Pan African Parliament. This shows the degree of mutual cooperation and interdependence between South Africa and the other SADC countries.

Furthermore, within the basic tenets of the hegemonic stability theory, and given South Africa's modern and well-equipped military the country is perceived as the guarantor of peace and stability in the region. This probably explains why it took proactive action in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is being condemned for not sanctioning the oppressive regime and addressing the civil strife in Zimbabwe.

In spite of this admiration and what is seemingly a positive perception of South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region, the attitudes of some other SADC states towards South Africa are not always generally accommodating.

These negative perceptions and suspicions of South Africa originate in the oppressive foreign policies of the former apartheid government. Vestiges of Pretoria's past still haunts Africa and states continue to wonder whether South Africa's ultimate role in post-apartheid Africa will be that of messiah or mercantilist. More than 500.000 people died as a result of Pretoria's destabilizing policies, and its economic sabotage cost the region an estimated 600 billion dollars from 1980 – 1988. The country carried out raids on the Benguala dam in Angola, supported opposition movements in Mozambique and militarily intervened in Lesotho in 1998. Apartheid leaders defined the country as a European outpost. Today, South Africa is still struggling to shake off its image of a western Trojan horse in Africa (Adebajo, 2005:2).

Against this backdrop, this suspicion has resulted in stiff opposition from the governments of some states with regards to South African - led initiatives. South Africa's efforts at promoting democracy and human rights in countries like Lesotho and Zimbabwe have been met with fierce opposition from other African countries. In mid-2001, Mbeki told the British television show *Hard Talk* that he had tried persuading Mugabe to reform, but that the Zimbabwean ruler 'wouldn't listen to me.' This was following efforts by the Pretoria government to prevent conflict in neighbouring Zimbabwe over the controversial land expropriation campaign (Landsberg & Adebajo, 2001).

In the economic domain, South Africa's efforts at promoting the vision of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) abroad have strengthened perceptions of the country as the face of NEPAD. These perceptions entrenches suspicions amongst other African states that South Africa is trying to set itself up as a

continental hegemon. The expansion up northwards of the country's businesses and parastatals such as Eskom, Shoprite Checkers, Standard Bank and MTN, and the country's trade surplus with Africa has reinforced this perception. This suspicion was partly manifested in Botswana's lukewarm attitude towards NEPAD, most evident in the country's refusal to sign the African Peer Review Mechanism (Ngubentombi, 2004:2002).

Furthermore, many African governments and peoples have expressed unease about what they perceive to be Pretoria's protectionist trade and xenophobic immigration policies, and accuse its leaders of ingratitude after three decades of support for the ANC at enormous cost to their own countries. Africans also complain about the aggressive drive by South Africa's mostly white-dominated corporations to capture new markets north of the Limpopo. The fact that South Africa accounts for about 75% of SADC's economy and has a 9-1 favourable trade balance with its smaller neighbours continues to breed envy and resentment. The end of the Cold War diverted western investment to Eastern Europe and Asia, leaving South Africa with surplus capital that has made it Africa's largest investor (Adebayo, 2005:1-3).

Moreover Ikome (2006) is of the opinion that some people are already talking about South African imperialists. He maintains with regards to South African corporations that there is a perception by other states within the region that these companies are abrasive and exploitative. These corporations have an air of arrogance, as though they are doing the rest of the continent a favour. Host countries also accuse South African companies of procuring goods from home instead of from local suppliers, undermining the local manufacturing base. Studies by South African research

institutes found that South African companies were still perceived as bullies on the continent (Reuters, 2006).

Besides, Fakir (2003) is of the opinion that South Africa's neighbours are wary and fearful of how it dominates the regional economy. The country insists it should receive the bulk of the money that would be generated from a proposed 'Peace Parks' project, which will consist of 475,000 sq km of land across 15 countries, stretching from Lake Victoria in the North to South Africa. Peace parks are a way for neighbouring countries to cooperate on a common concern – protecting biological diversity – by pulling down frontier fences in ecologically rich spots that straddle their shared border. The immediate and most visible goal is to allow both tourists and wildlife to roam freely over immense tracts of land without compromising national sovereignty. There are already disputes between Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa over how the revenue should be shared. South Africa argues that since Kruger is already a huge draw for international tourism, it should receive the bulk of the money.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Commenting on the activities of South Africa's within the SADC region, Nowrojee (2004) is of the opinion that while crediting the willingness of South Africa to take a leading role in trying to resolve the conflict in the DRC, critics remarked that its leaders failed to denounce numerous human rights violations by all parties to the war. Some questioned South Africa's neutrality, accusing it of having economic ambitions in DRC and a close partnership with Rwanda. He also holds that South Africa was

ineffective in its role as a neutral observer for the Third Party Verification Mission (TPVM), a mechanism for implementing the accords that was finally dissolved in late 2003. Eyebrows were also raised concerning the country's peacekeeping mandate over the invasion of Lesotho codenamed, Operation Boleas.

In a rather condemnatory standpoint Kent & Malan (2003) are of the opinion that like any regional heavyweight, South Africa will be damned if it does act and damned if it doesn't act to resolve regional conflicts. Whilst South Africa is playing a more robust role in the region, it is also true that many conflicts are just not amenable to resolution through peacemaking or peacekeeping interventions. Some conflicts simply have to run their course until war fatigue makes mediation and compliance with the terms of peace agreements a more rational option than the continued prosecution of political aims by violent means.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 METHODOLOGY

The Case Study research method was used. Creswell (1998) defines a case study as an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context. According to Creswell, the bounded system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being studied – a program, an event, an activity, or individuals. The data collection was extensive, drawing on multiple sources of information such as observations, documents, and audio-visual materials.

The case study research entailed analysis of historical events, conditions or progressions; deductive reasoning based on the facts of evidence, and assessment of qualitative data. Thus, the researcher made use of specific events, sets of circumstances, over a period of time to introduce and/or exemplify the key concepts of the highlighted theories. The research was based mainly on both a state and a system level of analyses and dealt on how the distribution of military and economic power amongst states impact on the course of international relations within the Southern Africa sub region.

Tellis (1997) maintains that a case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed since they are exploratory, explanatory and descriptive. According to Yin (1984: 23) this research method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which

multiple sources of evidence are used. This research thus entailed elucidating, through the exploration of the role of South Africa in the SADC and also explained how the hegemon is perceived by other SADC states.

4.1 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Data was collected both from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources of data provided firsthand information of the problem under study. It consisted mainly of interviews. This approach is a traditional method used by social scientists in extracting information through well-placed individuals in institutions and in the society. It is part of the ethnographic approach, often used in situations where access to official records or data is weak or non-existent. Where official records exist, it is used as a means to gain further insight by questioning key people about specific social, political and economic problems. South Africa plays host to numerous institutes, and embassies of Southern African states. They include: Africa Institute of South Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, South African Institute of International Affairs, the Botswana and DRC embassies.

Against this backdrop, 12 interviews were conducted with key persons in these research institutes and embassies. Furthermore, a random sample of 44 individuals in the Pretoria, Johannesburg and Mafikeng localities were also interviewed. 16 of those interviewed were South African citizens and 28 were foreigners from Mozambique, DRC, Botswana and Malawi. The interviews were comprised of different questions, conducted with South African citizens and foreign nationals.

Moreover, secondary sources were also used to back these primary sources. Stewart (1984:11-12) is of the opinion that secondary information offers relatively quick and inexpensive answers to many questions and is almost always the point of departure for primary research. He further posits that an investigation of secondary sources helps define the agenda for subsequent primary research by suggesting which questions require answers that have not been obtained in previous research. It thus targets gaps and oversights in knowledge by providing the possibility of combining the information from several different sources to reach conclusions that are not suggested by any one source. Moreover, it is much less expensive to use secondary data than to conduct a primary investigation.

These secondary sources included the review of documented sources such as textbooks, journal articles, newspaper reports, interpretation of laws and internet publications. Since the potential for over-reliance on documents as evidence in case studies is high (Tellis, 1997), the researcher ensured the validity of documents by corroborating evidence gathered from other sources so as to ensure incorrect data from being included in the data base. This authentication from other sources did not only certify the validity and reliable of data, but also led to a successful research.

4.2 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSES

With the constantly changing and ever-evolving nature of human science research (Lydia, 2000), the researcher was committed and engaged in the time-consuming process of data analyses and writing of long passages. Taking into consideration the historical narrative overviewed in the background of the study, the literature review,

and both primary and secondary sources of information, the data was engaged through conceptual and policy analyses, critical criticism, semantic studies and content analyses.

4.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Given the fact that data was collected through both primary and secondary sources, and given the sensitivity of the questions in the interviews, the main ethical issues taken into consideration here was confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents, and acknowledgement in the publication of results. Thus, the researcher avoided all forms of research misconduct, fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism, including misrepresentation of credentials, in proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research. The researcher also pointed out the limitations of the findings and acknowledged all assistance, collaboration of others, or sources from which information was borrowed.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter focuses on the analysis and interpretation of data acquired on the role of South Africa as a hegemonic power in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It highlights on the need for a hegemon in the SADC region and the indispensability of South Africa in the SADC region. Conclusions are drawn from the research findings and recommendations for policy options are also advanced.

5.1 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1.1 SADC Needs a Hegemon

As highlighted in the background to the study, the SADC region is comprised of 14 countries, with a total population estimated at about 200 million people. The region is endowed with mineral resources such as diamonds, uranium, petroleum and copper. In spite of these, SADC countries face more or less similar developmental challenges. These include: tackling poverty in countries such as Zambia and Malawi; armed conflict in the DRC; income disparity in South Africa; economic slums in Zimbabwe and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, which has infected over 12.3 million people throughout the region. Given the ever-increasing encroachment of globalization, most of these countries are lagging behind in socio-economic development. This is due to

these ills, which have become a cancer worm impeding on the socio-political and economic development of the region (Chewe, 2006).

Given these developmental challenges and societal ills, some respondents were of the opinion that there are calls by SADC states for Western nations to help relieve their countries from this plight. Against this backdrop, Adebajo & Landsberg (2004) posit that most western countries have lost their passion for the region in particular and Africa as a whole. This is partly due to the underdeveloped status of the region and even as a result of the prolonged nature of African conflicts both violent and non-violent. There are violent political clashes in the DRC, financial crises in the obstinate Mugabe government, authoritarian regimes in Lesotho and Swaziland, natural hazards such as floods and cyclones in Mozambique and Madagascar, and an overall backwardness of most countries within the region. This partly explains the reluctance of western powers to intervene in conflicts in the region, and Africa as a whole. Against this backdrop, the words of Dr. Ahmed Salim (1997) to African states are of relevance. He is of the opinion that,

' . . . States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the international community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today, is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily to prevent conflict from getting out of control.'

This goes without saying that given the reluctance of states to lend a helping hand to underdeveloped nations, and given the complexities involved in international interventions in terms of deployment of peacekeeping troops and even the conditionalities that go with foreign aid, SADC states must take up the challenge and seek for solutions to their problems. As maintained by a respondent, Western nations are under no obligation to help African countries, SADC states inclusive. Moreover, given the spill over effect in African conflicts, manifested in the flow of refugees and rebels moving across borders, a regional hegemon like South Africa needs to take proactive action to tackle these developmental and societal challenges facing the region.

5.1.2 South Africa is a Hegemon and Plays a Role in the SADC Region

There are varying opinions by various authors (Hussein, 1997; Habib, 2003; Schoeman, 2004) concerning the role played by South Africa in the SADC region. These opinions range from South Africa being regarded as a benign middle power to that of it being viewed as a voracious hegemon. These perceptions notwithstanding, South Africa still plays an important role in the politics and economy of the region. The country by all means possesses the economic potency, technical know-how, military capability and international recognition to act as a hegemon in the region. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2006) puts it,

The world marvels on three things about South Africa: The peaceful transition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Mandela.

This means that what makes South Africa great is the fact that the nation was able to acknowledge the existence of a problem, reconcile its racial differences and had the determination to move forward under the auspices of a revered statesman, Mandela.

Furthermore, South Africa stands out distinctly as a leading power within the SADC region. Little to state its dominance in terms of her population and landmass, which is that of several other SADC countries combined, the country's military and economy is unrivalled in the region. According to one respondent, in the Mandela era, South Africa had a globally respected statesman and one of the most representative political systems on the continent. Today, the country has the most sophisticated forms of technology and infrastructure in the SADC region and its efforts at propagating peace, stability and continental unity have been applauded worldwide. Referring to the extent of development in the country, Hussein (1997) questions if South Africa is indeed a 'Northern state' on a 'Southern continent'.

Indeed, South Africa has proven its potential as a 'northern state' on the 'southern continent' in the economic domain. With a purchasing power parity more than that of five average SADC states combined, the country accounts for over 40% of the continent's industrial output. As maintained by one interviewee at the Africa Institute of South Africa, however pertinent South Africa's policies might be to the realist paradigm, the country plays a great role in influencing the flow of economic goods and services in the SADC region. It is the stronghold of both the Common Monetary Area and the South African Customs Union. Through its multinationals such as Shoprite, Pick n' Pay, MTN, Nandos and Standard Bank, the country in no small way, contributes significantly to service delivery in a variety of host states within the

SADC region. Some of these states include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius and Namibia. This role has gone a long way to boost the dominance of South Africa within the region.

Moreover, as Allen and Holley (2006) reiterate, South Africa is eminently placed to lead the whole southern African region to the next level in international trade and commercial opportunities. They are of the opinion that South Africa's economic position is reflected in its role in Africa. Accessing the South African market is a cost-effective means of gaining entry to the SACU as well as SADC markets. With its financial, management and transportation infrastructure, South Africa is the logical conduit for most commercial activities in the region. Retailing, channels of distribution, after sales service, as well as continent-wide strategic planning and project management are logically maintained from South Africa. The country has the largest and most diversified economy in the region and on the African continent. South Africa's geographic position offers access to markets, not only in Africa, but also throughout the Southern Hemisphere. This asymmetry in the levels of economic development between South Africa and other states in the SADC region is characteristic of the dependency theory.

According to Majavu (2004), South Africa's agenda of economic dominance cannot be disentangled from that of political dominance. In the Political landscape, several authors (Masson & Milkiewicz, 2003; Nowrojee, 2004; Ikome & Samasuwo, 2005:15) have applauded initiatives by South Africa in fostering the struggle for African Unity and in conflict resolution. The country is regarded as being one of the brains behind the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),

considered to be a vision and strategic framework aimed at addressing the current challenges facing the African continent.

Furthermore, South Africa has played a significant role in the peace processes of a number of SADC states. A case in point was the role the country played at successfully reinstating peace in Lesotho in 1998, following post-elections violence. Moreover, the country is playing a leading role in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, both by sending South African peacekeepers and also in contributing in the financing of the electoral process.

In addition to South Africa's economic and political roles in the SADC region, the country's importance cannot be underestimated in the humanitarian domain. By being the most advanced country within the region, most respondents especially those from Mozambique, DRC and Zimbabwe consider South Africa as a safe haven in the Southern African region. The country is host to millions of refugees and immigrants seeking to better their political and economic conditions. These immigrants migrate into South Africa to take advantage of both the infrastructural, educational and economic opportunities in the country. Against this backdrop, the country serves not only as a melting point of cultures, but also as avenue for individuals to realize their full potential (Crush, 2003).

These roles played by South Africa have gone a long way to boost the country's image as a hegemon in the SADC region. In spite of this, Pretoria has rejected any hegemonic ambition and has pushed on with its sense of multilateralism in its deliberation with the continent. In spite of possessing all the capabilities, the country

lacks the will power to fully assume the functions of a hegemon. Such sentiments are reflected in the government's own policy directives, which eschew the realist paradigm of power relations in favour of a non-coercive, non-hegemonic policy towards Africa. This has constituted an impediment to South Africa's hegemony in the SADC region (Ngubentombi (2004:209).

5.1.3 There are Impediments to South Africa's Hegemony

Mills (1997:101) maintains that since democratic changes in South Africa, hailed worldwide as a 'political miracle', there are great expectations of the role South Africa can and must play in helping to achieve peace and stability in Africa and elsewhere. The issue is widely debated in South Africa. There are those who argue that South Africa has its own problems and must solve these and not become involved outside its borders. Others argue that the country must be involved within the context of SADC. Since the transformation of South Africa's global status from pariah to participant, so the calls for and expectations of South Africa's continental role incrementally increased.

Commenting on this leadership status of South Africa, (Kornegay & Chesterman, 2000:13) questions if South Africa has the means to become a genuine constructive hegemon in SADC? Does it have the ability and determination to win over the confidence of a majority of African states and to convince these states to entrust them with a leadership role in the region? Is the country prepared to accept the full burden of hegemony?

According to Majavu (2004) considering South Africa's position of relative strength on the continent and in the international affairs, the country has a responsibility to play a leadership role in Africa's socio-economic development agenda in terms of developing policy, correctly channeling resources, supporting implementation and directing the NEPAD process. South Africa has nevertheless not always assumed this role. There is a lack of will power by the South African government to fully assume the functions of hegemony. South Africa's coercive diplomacy, which was characteristic of the apartheid government's foreign policy, has been replaced by one of quiet diplomacy. This probably explains why president Thabo Mbeki maintained on a speech to the South African Parliament on 18th February 2003 that, I

'... Assure our neighbours that the government we lead has no great power pretensions. We claim no right to impose our will on any independent country. We will not force anything on anybody...'

This shows the extent of the reluctance of the Pretoria government to assume predatory hegemonic functions. In spite of this apparent lack of political will, there are structural and institutional impediments to South Africa's hegemony.

One of these impediments is HIV/AIDS. This has become a major health problem in South Africa and has significant implications for business and the economy. Various studies (Noble, 2006; UNAIDS, 2006) have shown increases in the percentage of the population with HIV/AIDS and it is estimated that approximately one out of every nine South Africans has HIV/AIDS. Southern Africa has one of the world's highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates, a figure currently estimated at 12.3 million people.

This situation according to Singizi (2005) is having negative impacts on social, political and economic development of the SADC region.

Furthermore, xenophobia is taking a heavy toll on South Africans' attitudes towards foreigners. Given the relative stability and opportunities that exists in the country, South Africa is a target for most African asylum seekers and migrants alike. Most of South Africa's refugees come from countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Angola. In some instances the increase in the number of refugees in the country has created tensions with South African citizens, many of whom are blaming escalating crime on illegal immigrants and refugees. Most South Africans interviewed, felt insecure with foreigners as far as their jobs are concerned. Xenophobia has thus become a problem in some areas of the country. This has resulted in a negative perception of South Africans by most foreigners interviewed. It was observed that, there is an overwhelming impression by foreigners that South Africans are xenophobic. This perception has impeded on the ability of South Africa to impose itself as a hegemon in the SADC region (IRIN, 2006).

To add to the above, income disparity is widespread in the country. South Africa on the basis of its gross domestic product is the most advanced country in the SADC region, and it certainly qualifies for middle power leadership. However, it is also true that this aggregate figure hides wide discrepancies between rich and poor within the country. According to Ellen Sirleaf (2006) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), South Africa is two nations in one: a minority of the population with a *per capita* income far in excess of US \$3 000 a year, and a majority with US \$300 a figure much like the rest of Africa. This income disparity is creating tensions

within the society, as segments of the population living in abject poverty feel neglected. This is a feature of latent conflict, which is thwarting the credentials of South Africa's hegemony in the SADC region.

Moreover, crime is a vice taking a heavy toll on the lives of residents in the country. According to official South African Police Service (2006) statistics, over 18.000 people are murdered each year in South Africa. According to an interviewee, South Africa is bedevilled by individuals who do not understand the virtue of humanity. Crime is related partly to the failure of South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and partly to the massive increases in population. This situation is exacerbated by immigration into South Africa, with a veritable flood of immigrants which is leading to a xenophobic reaction by some who see their jobs and opportunities at risk, and consequently posing serious problems for the police force and politicians who attempt to balance regional and domestic sensitivities (Van Marsh, 2006).

To crown it all, South Africa's activities in the SADC region has generated perceptions and even suspicions with regards to her intentions. This originates in the oppressive policies of the apartheid regime, and is perpetuated by the vibrant role the country is playing in the field of diplomacy, and also in the expansion of the country's businesses north of the Limpopo. Ikome (2006) is of the opinion that South African companies are perceived by other SADC states as having an 'air of arrogance, are abrasive and oppressive'. To make matters worse, the country's peacekeepers in the DRC are accused of misconduct, rape, murder and torture. These activities and perceptions have negative impacts on the country's credibility as a regional

peacekeeper and hegemon in the SADC region. This is given the fact that hegemony can best be accomplished through consent rather than coercion.

5.2 CONCLUSION

It has been established that South Africa is without doubt the most advanced country within the SADC region. Its gross domestic product, military and technological levels by far surpasses that of any other SADC country and in certain sectors, many times over. This makes the country the most dominant within the region and hence, a hegemon.

As a hegemon, South Africa carries out certain activities that perpetuate her leadership status. They include sponsoring peace missions within the sub-region such as in the DRC, chairing multilateral bodies such as the Pan-African parliament and the G77, propagating the tenets of the African Union under the auspices of NEPAD, acting as a bulwark in regional economic blocks such as the Southern African Customs Union and the Common Monetary Area, assisting countries affected by civil strife and humanitarian disasters, and contributing to service delivery through the expansion of its businesses north of the Limpopo.

These activities by South Africa have generated perceptions from other states within the Southern African Development community. These perceptions range from trust and admiration for the wealth, progress and dominance of the Pretoria government at best, to suspicion, resentment and open rejection and condemnation of the country's policies and what is considered encroachment up North. Against this backdrop, there

is a love – hate relationship for the Pretoria government. It is tricky to account for this ambiguity in the perceptions of SADC states towards South Africa. South Africa's level of development, the stature of its leadership and its relative military and economic strength are being called upon to aid the continent. At the same time, there are real fears about South Africa assuming regional hegemony.

The relative strength of South Africa is a fact that has to be recognized by the political leaders when planning regional integration and also a fact that has to be taken into account when analysing the possibilities of regional integration in Southern Africa. With a dominant position within the region and at the same time integrated in the regional system, South Africa will most likely take some kind of hegemonic role in the region. Perhaps this role will be facilitated if the country addresses those aspects of latent conflicts within the country. Societal vices such as crime and insecurity, ethnicity and xenophobia, income disparity and poverty need to be tackled. Analyzing these issues however, is an avenue for further research. Given this scenario, what kind of hegemonic role the Pretoria government will assume can vary considerably.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings presented, the following recommendations are made:

Cooperative leadership should be sort for, under the banner of regional and continental blocks such as the Southern African Development Community. This will eradicate perceptions of the fear of South Africa's dominance over other SADC states. This would be a prudent move considering for instance the negative effects of

the United States' sponsored experiment on international retribution in Iraq, and the recent upsurge of terrorism. Any unilateral violations of state sovereignty or coercive hegemony without consent might prove disastrous. Thus, South Africa should use its dominance to promote economic and political stability and regional cooperation as propounded by hegemonic stability theorists. This would be beneficial both to itself and to its regional partners. No hegemon however powerful can act alone.

Furthermore, as maintained by Jing (2001:1),

To govern a large state is like cooking a small fish. Stir as little as possible.

This means the Pretoria government should be prudent in dealing with SADC countries. Any moves by the South African government at imposing its whims and caprices on other SADC states might escalate into a stalemate. This will definitely face still opposition from regional contenders like Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Peace operations for instance should be collective, under the banner of regional organizations such as the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This is to ensure transparency in peace operations and also to guard against suspicions regarding South Africa's intentions. This would put to rest for instance the recent allegations that have arisen over the peace mission in the DRC concerning misconduct of South African troops (Franke, 2006).

Furthermore, the construction of a new regional order should be a collective endeavour of all the free peoples of Southern Africa and should not be imposed either by extra-regional forces or any self-appointed regional power. A democratic South

Africa should therefore explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region. It should resist all pressure to become a regional power at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent. Instead it should seek to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on the principles of mutual benefit and interdependence. It can only achieve global status if it is accepted as a leader on its own continent (Adebajo, 2005).

Moreover, South Africa is still plagued with aspects of latent conflict. In this context, South Africa should take proactive action in addressing these issues. It should be recognised that SADC states played an active role in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. Thus, xenophobic policies should be eschewed and issues related to crime and poverty should be adequately tackled.

INTERVIEW GUIDE

- 1) According to you, is South Africa a hegemon in SADC and why?
- 2) What role do you think South Africa plays in the SADC region?
- 3) What is your perception towards this role?
- 4) What role should South Africa play in the SADC region?
- 5) According to you, how important is South Africa in the SADC region and how?
- 6) In your opinion, what do you think of the expansion of South Africa's businesses and parastatals such as MTN, Standard Bank and Telkom, beyond South Africa's boundaries?
- 7) What is your impression concerning South Africans' attitude towards foreigners?
- 8) What is your opinion about foreigners resident in South Africa?
- 9) What do you think about the crime wave in South Africa?
- 10) How could the problems that plague the SADC region be resolved?



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

- Balaam, D. (2001), *Introduction to International Political Economy*. 2nd Edn. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Bochner, S. (1982) 'Cultures in Contact' *Studies in Cross-Cultural Interaction*: UK: Pergamon Press.
- Genest, M. (2004), *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*. Belmont: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning.
- Goldstein, S. (2002) *International Relations*. London: Longman Press.
- Habid, A. & Seliyane, N. (2004), 'South Africa and a Realistic Vision of the African Century', in, Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.), *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future – South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994 – 2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Hussein, S. (2006) 'Ten Principles of Best Practice Engagement for Africa and South Africa.' Southall, E. (ed), *South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Jackson, R. & Jackson, D. (1997), *A Comparative Introduction to Political Science*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2003), *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levy, J. (2003), 'Theories of Interstate and Intrastate Wars: A levels – of – Analysis Approach.' In, Chester et al (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- Kupchan, C. (2003), 'Empires & Geopolitical Competition: Gone for Good?' In, Chester et al (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Knutsen, T. (1999), *The Rise and Fall of World Orders*. Manchester, U.K: Manchester University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: WW Norton & Company.
- Mosher, S. (2000), *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World*. USA: Encounter Books.
- Mouton, J. (2005) *How to Succeed in your Masters and Doctoral Studies: A South African Guide and Resource Book*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.
- Nthakeng, S. (2006), 'Lost Between Stability and Democracy: South Africa and Lesotho's Constitutional Crises of the 1990s' in, Southall, R. *South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa*. Cape town: HSRC Press.
- Orwell, G. (1945) *Animal Farm*. London: Secker and Warburg.
- Rourke, J. (2005), *International Politics on the World Stage*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Schoeman, M. (2003), 'South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power' in, Daniel, J., Habib, A. & Southall, R. *State of the Nation South Africa. 2003 – 2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Stelwart, D. (1984) *Secondary Research*. SAGE Publications: California.
- Yin, R. K. (1984) *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

JOURNALS AND PUBLICATIONS

- Adebajo, A. 'The Pied Piper of Pretoria.' *Global Dialogue* vol. 10.1 South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue. February, 2005:1-3
- Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu, 'Post-Apartheid South Africa's Corporate Expansion into Africa.' *Traders: African Business Journal*. Issue: 15, August – November 2003.
- Ikenberry, G. 'Getting Hegemony Right.' *The National Interest*, No. 63, Spring 2001
- Ikome, F. & Samasuwo, N. 'UN Reform: Towards a More [In] Secure World?' *Global Insight: a Focus on Current issues*. Issue No. 48, April 2005. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Kennedy, P. Chase, R. & Hill, E. 'Pivotal States and US Strategy' *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1). 1996:33-51.
- Southall, R. 'An Unlikely Success: South Africa and Lesotho's Election of 2002.' *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 41: 217 – 245, 2003. U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Tellis, W. 'Application of a Case Study Methodology.' *The Qualitative Report*. Vol. 3, Number 3, September 1997.
- Wright, C. 'The Continuity of Change, or a Change in Continuity?' *International Studies Review* Vol. 3, Issue 1, Page 81 – 89, 2001. U.K.: Blackwell Publishing.

INTERNET SOURCES

- Adebajo, A. & Landsberg, C. (2001), 'The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Investments.' http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_africa.htm
- Adebajo, A and Landsberg, C. (2004) 'Obasanjo, Mbeki as Thick as Thieves.' http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/index.php?id=58&type=98&backPID=58&begin_at=40&tx_press_release=10
- Agence France-Presse (2006) 'Burundi, Rebels to Hold final Talks Ahead of Ceasefire.' <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6TB7BA?OpenDocument>
- Akec, J. (2006) 'Can South Africa help dismantle Ugandan apartheid?' <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article17184>
- Alao, A. (2001) 'The role of African regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution.' www.jha.ac/articles/u023.htm
- Allen, C. & Holley, T (2006) 'South Africa at a Glance - A Stepping Stone Into Sub-Saharan Africa.' <http://www.buyusa.gov/southafrica/en/southafricaataglance.html>
- Bakhtiar, R. (2001) 'Diamonds Lure Wealth, Conflict to African nations.' <http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/11/22/diamond.history/index.html>
- Burke, B. (1999), 'Antonio Gramsci and informal education.' *The Encyclopedia of Informal Education*. <http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm>.
- Bochner, S. (1982,100) 'South Africa -Diverse in Culture but Could be Unified in Language.' <http://www.planetpapers.com/Assets/3447.php>
- Bailin, A. (2001), 'From Traditional to Institutionalised Hegemony.'

<http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:FZcErNUb8mgJ:www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/bailin/bailin2000.pdf+demise+of+hegemons&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=7>

Chanda, A. 'Digital Divide Hampers Fight Against Poverty by Amos Chanda.' SADC Today, Vol.7 No.2 June 2004. <http://www.sardc.net/Editorial/sadctoday/v7-2-6-04/poverty.htm>

Chewe, J. (2006) 'Addressing Poverty by Using Poverty Maps.'
<http://www.sastat.org.za/off06.htm>

Cilliers, J. (2002) 'The Military in a Changing Africa.'
<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/SADR1/Cilliers.html>

Clark, G. (2002). 'Hegemony and the Hidden Persuaders of the Power of un-Common Sense.' <http://www.caledonia.org.uk/hegemony.htm>

Crush, J. (2003) 'South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy?' Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=131>

Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu 'Post-Apartheid South Africa's Corporate Expansion into Africa.' Copyright: Traders: African Business Journal, Issue: 15, August – November 2003. <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000556/index.php>

Davie, L. (2003) 'Gautrain Given Initial go-Ahead.'
http://www.joburg.org.za/2003/apr/apr23_gautrain.stm

Emeh, O. (2004) 'Africa and Crisis of Instability.'
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2004/0330crisis.htm>

Ferguson, N. (2003) 'Hegemony or Empire?'
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901fareviewessay82512/niall-ferguson/hegemony-or-empire.html>

<http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:FZcErNUb8mgJ:www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/bailin/bailin2000.pdf+demise+of+hegemons&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=7>

Chanda, A. 'Digital Divide Hampers Fight Against Poverty by Amos Chanda.' SADC Today, Vol.7 No.2 June 2004. <http://www.sardc.net/Editorial/sadctoday/v7-2-6-04/poverty.htm>

Chewe, J. (2006) 'Addressing Poverty by Using Poverty Maps.'
<http://www.sastat.org.za/off06.htm>

Cilliers, J. (2002) 'The Military in a Changing Africa.'
<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/SADR1/Cilliers.html>

Clark, G. (2002). 'Hegemony and the Hidden Persuaders of the Power of un-Common Sense.' <http://www.caledonia.org.uk/hegemony.htm>

Crush, J. (2003) 'South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy?' Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=131>

Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu 'Post-Apartheid South Africa's Corporate Expansion into Africa.' Copyright: Traders: African Business Journal, Issue: 15, August – November 2003. <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000556/index.php>

Davie, L. (2003) 'Gautrain Given Initial go-Ahead.'
http://www.joburg.org.za/2003/apr/apr23_gautrain.stm

Emeh, O. (2004) 'Africa and Crisis of Instability.'
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2004/0330crisis.htm>

Ferguson, N. (2003) 'Hegemony or Empire?'
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901fareviewessay82512/niall-ferguson/hegemony-or-empire.html>

Franke, B. (2006) 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa.'

<http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:2Dnn0e2b2qIJ:www.jha.ac/articles/a185.pdf+constrained+by+several+factors.+Pax+Pretoriana+has+had+to+contend+with+%E2%80%9Cbargainers&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2>

Gardner, H. (2005), 'World hegemony and its Aftermath.' http://www.sens-public.org/article.php3?id_article=119

Habib, A. (2003) 'Hegemon or Pivot?: Debating South Africa's role in Africa.'
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000620/P611-Pivotalstate.pdf>.

Harries, O. (2003) 'And then there was One.'

<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers/stories/s987423.htm>

Huntington, S. (1999), 'The Lonely Superpower.'

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990301faessay966/samuel-p-huntington/the-lonely-superpower.html>

Human Rights Watch (1999) 'Angola.'

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-03.htm>

Human Rights Overview South Africa (2006) 'South Africa.'

<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/safric12309.htm>

Hussein, S. (1997) 'South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership.

Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner?' Institute for Security Studies. May.

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No13/Solomon.html>

iExplore (2005) 'South Africa History & Culture.'

<http://www.africa.com/dmap/South+Africa/History>

IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) Report (1999)

<http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:Qm9QV3Em2c0J:www.ifad.org/gbdocs/>

[eb/68/e/EB-99-68-R-](#)

[31.pdf+poverty+in+SADC&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=5](#)

IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks) (2006) 'SOUTH AFRICA: Xenophobia has an economic cost.'

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=54914&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa

Kent V. & Malan, M. (2003) Decisions, Decisions South Africa's Foray into Regional Peace Operations.' <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/72/Paper72.html>

Keohane & McKeown (2005) 'Political Economy of International Trade: International Influences'.

<http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:O5cMwV8inxcJ:falcon.arts.cornell.edu/Govt/courses/F05/685/Week%25205%2520Keohane%2520and%2520McKeown.pdf+political,+military+and+economic+hegemony&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=7>

Kornegay, F. & Chesterman, S. (2000:13) 'Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects.'

http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/PDF_REPORT_S_%20AFRICA.pdf

Lahiff, E. (2003) 'The Regional Implications of the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Rationale and principles of Regional Support for Land.'

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No87/Chap5.htm>

LaMoshi, G. (2005), 'Unilateralism Fails Global Tests.'

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GD02Aa01.html

LionOre Mining International (2005) 'LionOre's HIV/AIDS Intervention Strategy at Tati Nickel, Botswana.'

<http://www.lionore.com/sustainabledevelopment/aids.asp>

Lydia (2000) 'Qualitative Research methods'.

<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/tutorial/Mensah/default.htm>

Majavu, M. (2004). 'Business as Usual.'

<http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/Content/2004-12/15majavu.cfm>

Masood, T. (2004), 'The Emerging Regional Situation and the Global Context: Global and Regional Security.' <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/sept2004/paper-masood.htm>

Masson, P. & Milkiewicz, H. (2003) 'Africa's Economic Morass--Will a Common Currency help?' <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb121.htm>

Mbendi (2005) 'Africa: Electrical Power – Electrical Power in Africa.'

www.mbendi.com/indy/powr/af/p0005.htm

Melvin, E. & Carol, E. (eds.) (2006) 'EveryCulture: South Africa.'

<http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/South-Africa.html>

Mines and Communities Charter (2003) 'African Civil Society Position on World Bank Group Investments in Mining, Oil and Gas at the Africa Consultation of the Extractives Industries Review (EIR) in Maputo, Mozambique.'

<http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/eirposit1.htm>

Mining Sector Report. 'Southern African Development Community Mining Sector Five Year Strategy 1997-2001.'

http://www.sadc.int/english/tifi/mining/about/publications_strategy.php

Muzaffar, C. (2004), 'Hegemony and Civilisational Interaction.'

<http://www.just-international.org/article.cfm?newsid=20000801>

Naim, M. (2001). 'Even a Hegemon Needs Friends and Allies.'

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=827>

- Ngubentombi, N. (2004) 'An Overview of Bilateral and Regional Relations' in, Sidiropoulos, E. (ed) *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004. Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of Internal Affairs
- Noble, R. (2006) 'South Africa – HIV and AIDS statistics.' <http://www.avert.org/safricastats.htm>
- Nowrojee, B. (2004) 'Africa on its Own: Regional Intervention and Human Rights.' <http://hrw.org/wr2k4/4.htm>
- Odén, B. (1999) 'Regionalization in Southern Africa.' <http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:id0xWCyRT3QJ:www.valt.helsinki.fi/kmi/Julkais/HannunWP.pdf+dominance+in+Southern+Africa+hegemon&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=5>
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006) 'Human Rights in the World: Ratifications and Reservations.' <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm>
- Ottaway, M., Herbst, J. & Mills, G. (2004) 'Africa's Big States: Towards a New Realism'. <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/PolicyOutlookOttaway.pdf>
- Ping, G. (2001), 'Peace Benefits, and Undermining Peace Hurts, Both Sides.' http://english.people.com.cn/english/200106/01/eng20010601_71545.html
- Reuveny, R. (2005) 'The Binational State and the Colonial Imperative: Israeli – Palestinian Conflict in Historical Perspective.' <http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:w9SbtdolBHwJ:users.fmg.uva.nl/vmamadouh/awg/forum2005/AWG83Reuveny.pdf+settler+colonialism+in+Algeria+and+Kenya&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=6>

Rihani, S. (2003), 'Hate of the USA.'

<http://www.globalcomplexity.org/Hate%20of%20the%20USA.htm>

Rihani, S. (2004) 'America's Turbulent Decline.'

<http://www.globalcomplexity.org/USA%20in%20Decline.htm>

Schoeman, M. (2004:3) 'South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner or Just another Kid on the Block?'

<http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:3MlnSQYbP0J:general.rau.ac.za/sociology/Schoeman.pdf+South+Africa+in+Africa:+Behemoth,+Hegemon,+Partner+or+Just+another+Kid+on+the+Block&hl=en&gl=za&ct=clnk&cd=1>

Singh, B. (1996) 'Tripartite Dynamics: Great Power Interactions'

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/bluhrz/blupt2.html>

Singizi, T. 'HIV and AIDS, Challenge for Regional Integration.' SADC Today, Volume 8, No. 3, August 2005.

<http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/view.asp?vol=191&pubno=v8n3>

Slaughter, A. (2003) 'International Law in a World of Liberal States'.

<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No4/art1.pdf>

SouthAfrica.info Report (2006) 'South Africa: economy overview.'

http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/economy/econoverview.htm

http://www.southafrica.info/public_services/foreigners/immigration/refugees_asylum.htm

Southern African Litigation Centre (2005) 'About the Centre.'

<http://www.southernafricalawcenter.org/salc/about/overview.aspx>

Taylor, P. (2003), '*Homo Geographicus*: A Geohistorical Manifesto for Cities.'

<http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/gy/gawc/rb/rb107.html>

The World Fact Book (2006) 'South Africa.'

<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/sf.html>

Thompson, M. (2003) 'Iraq, Hegemony and the Question of American Empire.'

http://www.logosjournal.com/thompson_iraq.htm

United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Service (2001) 'Cyclone threatens Flood-Stricken Mozambique.'

http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=2443&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa

United States Agency for International Development, (2002) 'Initiative for Southern Africa.' <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/isa/>

Uniting the World Against AIDS Report (2006) 'South Africa.' *Country Situation Analysis*.

http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/south_africa.asp

Van Marsh, A (2006) 'Government minister criticized as dismissing real concerns.'

<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/07/02/safrica.crime/index.html>

Veseth, M. (2004) 'What is International Political Economy?'

<http://www2.ups.edu/ipe/whatisipe.htm>

Waggon, E. (2003) 'AIDS and Poverty in Africa.'

<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010521/stillwaggon>

Wayne (2005) 'China's Emergence as an Economic Superpower and Its Implications for U.S. Business.' <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2005/46950.htm>

West, Jr., T. (1994) 'America's Power Today.' <http://www.army.mil/aps/97/ch1.htm>

Wikipedia (2006) 'History of South Africa.'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_South_Africa

Xinhua (1998) 'Hegemonism Remains Main Source of Threats to World Peace'.

<http://www.fas.org/news/china/1998/980727-2-prc.htm>

Yuanying, P. (2004), 'Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on the current world, world order, security and civilization: Fountain of China's Diplomatic Policy.'

[http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200432/Cover-200432\(B\).htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200432/Cover-200432(B).htm)