


Segregation and apartheid state-funding schemes: the establishment of the urban African township of Daveyton in the East Rand, South Africa, 1950-1990

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DECLARATION

I, Njabulo Mthembu declare that this work has not been previously submitted for the award of any degree. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Date: 23 Nov. 23

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I registered for my master's degree I had absolutely no idea what I was getting myself into. I was still feeling confident after completing the Honours degree. Although, it did not take me long to realise the challenges and fulfilment of pursuing a master's qualification. I wish to extend gratitude to the following persons for their contribution towards this study.

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ABSTRACT

Gold mining on the Witwatersrand created financial prosperity for South Africa since the late 19th century. The growth of the mining sector brought a large population of African men from the rural areas in southern Africa into the Witwatersrand, particularly during the 1940s to the East Rand. With an increasing African urban population, the local authorities had to find funding strategies to house the population. In Benoni, the local authorities used loans from the central government in the first phase of Daveyton's development but later actively sought alternative funding schemes such as funds from the local beer hall. During the late 1960s, township funding became linked with the advocacy of the homelands. This meant that funds which were previously used to fund townships were now shifted to develop the homelands. Daveyton was not immune from this shift. Therefore, strategies had to be envisioned regarding where funds would come from to continue the development of Daveyton.

To halt more African urbanisation, the apartheid government pursued and enforced influx control laws with more vigour to control Africans' freedom of movement and occupational choice. Although, land occupation and squatter camps such as Apex squatter camp continued to proliferate in the East Rand. From the onset, there was a pressing need for both the local and the central government to eradicate what was deemed as unsanitary and uncontrolled areas. The establishment of state-regulated townships such as Daveyton were the most effective solution. To establish the township, the government set up the Mentz commission to investigate how townships could be established and offer recommendations. The commission's recommendations were used as the blueprint for township establishment in many areas of the country. This includes the establishment of Daveyton as a so-called "modern model" township with ethnic zoning. On the East Rand, the Benoni authorities relied heavily on central government-sanctioned loans and state legislation to ease the financial burden of establishing Daveyton. To ensure that funding was available, the Native Services Levy Fund, enacted in 1952, proved pivotal in funding the basic amenities in the township such as the sewerage scheme, electrification, and water reticulation amongst other amenities.

To make up for the funds being directed to the homelands, beer halls became a lucrative form of income for local municipalities and the central government. In Daveyton, the Town Council of Benoni supported the beer hall as a revenue generator and invested funds to ensure it remained operational. However, even with profits from the beer halls, schooling and the transport system remained troublesome for both the authorities and the township residents. The Town Council of

Benoni received assistance from the Benoni Rotary Club in establishing the first African high school in the township. Although, for transportation, the township was only served by one railway line, which was not enough for the expanding population, and authorities were reluctant to allow for the expansion of the taxi industry.

During the 1980s the government sought to continue financing the development of Daveyton and simultaneously continue funding the homelands. Unemployment in the homelands resulted in a constant flow of jobseekers to the urban centres, and squatting rose intensely in Daveyton. The rising housing shortages in the township, forced the government to free itself of its responsibility of being the township developer and landlord. They distanced itself from the further development of Daveyton and pave the way for private entrepreneurs by selling its beer outlets and invited private enterprises to construct housing for Africans.

Key terms

Apartheid, Daveyton, East Rand, Ekurhuleni, group areas, housing provision, influx control, migrancy, segregation, state funding, township establishment, urban Africans.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Histories of place are never just a straightforward accounting of 'the facts.' Like the life histories with which they are closely intertwined, they are always multiple, contested, deeply politicised, produced in specific contexts, and made to serve the needs of the present.¹

Nearly thirty years since ascending into power, the African National Congress (ANC) government is plagued by intermittent protests and strikes in townships, mainly because of the lack of service delivery and poor housing conditions which are prevalent in most townships. Seemingly, the spirit of hope and positivity which characterised the late 1990s and the instituted programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programs (RDP) have long faded into memory. Furthermore, pessimism towards the government is prevalent. Housing backlogs have resulted in squatter camps which have mushroomed on the periphery of many of the old established townships around the country. Unfortunately, no solution has been forthcoming. For example, in Cape Town, many who are frustrated with a lack of housing, have constructed a squatter camp along the railway line.² This is by no means an exception; many other squatter camps are a common feature in the country's urban landscape. Similarly, in the 1940s, squatter camps mushroomed in, *inter alia*, the East rand. Although, unlike the 1940s, the solution to establish new townships with better housing has not been addressed. After World War two, several Africans moved to the urban areas to seek employment in the industrial and manufacturing economy as cheap labour.³ According to scholars such as Bernard Magubane, these African migrants formed the backbone of the Apartheid political economy.⁴ In contemporary South Africa, those who move to squatter camps migrate from the old established townships in search of independence or to seek employment in different urban

¹ Gillian Hart, *Disabling Globalisation, Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (University of Natal Press, Natal, 2002), 9.

² Ronald Masinda, "Cape Town railway squatters unhappy about plans to move to Phillipi wedge," *Eye witness news*, September 8, 2022, <https://ewn.co.za/2022/09/14/ct-central-rail-squatters-unhappy-about-plans-of-move-to-philippi-wedge>

³ Bernard Magubane, *The political economy of race and class in South Africa* (New York: Monthly review press, 1979), 90.

⁴ Bernard Magubane and John Yrchik, "The political economy of the city in South Africa," *International Journal of Sociology* 7, no. 2 (1977): 17.

areas. Unfortunately, finding a source of funding and the land to establish new townships to house the incoming people has been a source of contention for the central and local government. This is the central issue this study sought to address by using the establishment of Daveyton, in the East rand from 1955 as a focus area. The question is, how did the government fund the establishment of the township and how did those funding mechanisms change with the advent of time as apartheid evolved to include the establishment of Bantustans/Homelands in the 1960s.

1.1 Orientation, background, and problem statement

The East Rand is home to the Main Reef series of the gold mining conglomerate ore, which was the central reason the region catapulted into the financial hub of South Africa throughout the 19th century.⁵ The escalation of the gold mining sector brought several Africans into the area, primarily to work in the mines.⁶ According to Bonner and Nieftagodien, approximately 15 000 African workers were employed in the entire Witwatersrand gold mines by 1890.⁷ Of the 15 000, only 5 000 worked in the former East Rand itself.⁸ The area's spatial planning was engineered such that the townships were clustered next to each other and a fair distance from the city centres such as Benoni, which was deemed as a 'White area' during the Apartheid regime under the National Party government.⁹

According to a study conducted by Humphreys and Thomas, from the initial establishment of Benoni in the early 20th century, Africans moved into the area primarily for waged labour in the mines and others as domestic servants.¹⁰ It was this first group of Africans which established a settlement referred to as Kleinfontein or Chimes Location on land owned by the New Kleinfontein Gold Mining Company.¹¹ The mining company collected R1 for rent from the residents in the location but provided no amenities.¹² After the enactment of the Gold Law in 1908, which declared an uncontrolled location such as Kleinfontein on mining land as

⁵ Noor Nieftagodien and Phil Bonner, *Ekurhuleni: The making of an urban region* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), 1.

⁶ Nieftagodien and Bonner, *Ekurhuleni*, 30; Gary Kynoch, *We are fighting the world: a history of the Marashea gangs in South Africa, 1947-1999* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2005), 13.

⁷ Nieftagodien and Bonner, *Ekurhuleni*, 43.

⁸ Nieftagodien and Bonner, *Ekurhuleni*, 43.

⁹ Noor Nieftagodien, "The Making of Apartheid in Springs During the sixties: Group areas, Urban restructuring and resistance," Seminar Paper (1996), University of the Witwatersrand Institute for advanced social research, 4.

¹⁰ Deryck Humphries and David G. Thomas, *Benoni: son of my sorrow* (Benoni: Town Council of Benoni, 1968), 94.

¹¹ Humphries and Thomas, *Benoni: Son of my sorrow*, 94.

¹² Humphries and Thomas, *Benoni: Son of my sorrow*, 94.

illegal,¹³ the municipality, which had only been established in 1907, was forced to relocate the residents. This required funds to construct a government-controlled township which became a significant factor for the municipality. Similarly, in the establishment of Daveyton, the government had to relocate residents from a squatter camp to a government-controlled township.

Funding the establishment of townships was a central issue for the apartheid government, as much as it was for the segregationist government which preceded it. For any form of racial segregation to be implemented, spatial control was a required component. In Benoni, financing that spatial control proved to be a divisive issue between the local authorities and the central government. The former sought to avoid high interest loans from the latter, because it doubted that it could pay back the sums in time. Hence, certain strategies such as the establishment of beer halls became instrumental to fund the establishment and development of Daveyton. The inclusion of funding strategies such as beer halls and the extent to which the private sector impacted the establishment and development of Daveyton at different stages is something that has not been extensively researched. Thus, this study seeks to situate itself in the expanding literature on township establishment in the East Rand by highlighting the funding mechanisms the government utilised to establish Daveyton from the 1950s to the late 1980s. The central argument is that the funding mechanisms changed over time to accommodate the amendments to the wider apartheid ideology, such as the establishment of Bantustans and the resistance movements within the townships. Moreover, the study analysed the extent to which loans from the central government contributed towards the establishment of Daveyton from the 1950s to the late 1980s and how this funding mechanism was modified over-time.

1.2 Research objectives

The general research objective of this study is, to analyse the role of the apartheid state-funding schemes on the establishment of Daveyton, 1950-1990 and highlight how it changed over time. The specific research objectives are: a discussion on the literature on racial segregation and apartheid state-funding schemes in general and more specific in the East Rand township of Daveyton during 1950-1990; to examine and highlight the impact of the establishment of Bantustans on the funding of Daveyton's infrastructural development and housing from the 1960s; to determine how the state's township funding mechanisms changed over time to try and accommodate the government's changing political ideologies; to point out the workings of

¹³ Humphries and Thomas, *Benoni: Son of my sorrow*, 94.

the state, and the private sector in the form of private land developers and banks in the provision of houses in Daveyton from the late 1970s.

1.3 Central theoretical stand

To analyse the role of the racial segregation and apartheid state-funding schemes to establish Daveyton from 1950-1990, the research included a critique of race, class, and capital of the minority rule of apartheid, including the race/class analysis of Marxist of revisionist historians. This included both archival documents and how historians explained the reasons for urban segregation and separate housing in the context of black labour, and the relocation of Africans within apartheid's segregationist ideology.

1.4 Research methodology

To address the questions and objectives of this study, a qualitative research approach was adopted. Archival documents, published articles, and government documents were utilised extensively. However, the information provided from these sources was not taken at face value. Since most of the material comprised of government documents, the content was read "against the grain" and subjected to source criticism, rather than considered as ultimate truth. Due to the broad nature of State funded housing for Africans in South Africa, the research was narrowed to the East Rand area, particularly, Daveyton. This meant that the researcher could provide a more in-depth analysis on the phenomena being studied. Oral history accounts in the form of interviews were initially not considered because of the Covid-19 pandemic lock down restrictions. By the time the restrictions were completely lifted a large portion of the study had already been written. Moreover, the top-down approach of the research, that is, focusing on the role of state officials and departments in the funding of the township meant that the study could be completed without conducting any interviews. Although, they could have greatly enriched some of the chapters.

The archives which proved most useful for the purpose of this study were the National Archives in Pretoria and the Benoni Municipal Archives, which initially appeared to have no valuable material remaining. However, a visit to the municipal administrative building which is located behind the main building yielded great results as it contained a small records section where valuable documents about Daveyton from the 1980s were housed. Unfortunately, there was no archivist, and the material was not well kept. Therefore, one had to go through all the material. The exercise proved invaluable for the study because several documents became which became

central to Chapter Five was discovered. The historical papers at the University of the Witwatersrand also provided invaluable material. In addition to archival material, several secondary source materials, particularly a PhD thesis proved to be significant guides as to what one sought in the different archives. This made it easier to identify specific material for the selected study.

1.5 Limitations and significance of the study

The study commenced in 2021, a year removed from the initial outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This implied that certain restrictions such as social distancing and shorter working hours applied although the restrictions were being relaxed. This proved less of a challenge in the final months of the year and the year that followed, which provided one with an opportunity to travel to the various archives to source information for the study. In terms of the archival documents, the lack of an available and knowledgeable archivist at the Benoni municipal archives proved a great challenge. Moreover, some of the documents had either been destroyed by water or moved elsewhere. Fortunately, the administrative building at the Benoni Municipality proved a more resourceful location, especially the documents consulted to complete Chapter Five of this thesis. However, it was not without challenges because all the boxes were neither labelled nor categorised in any format. This required one to go through each box, and this proved time-consuming and multiple trips from Vanderbijlpark to Benoni had to be undertaken. Another challenge was language, because some of the documents were written in Afrikaans, and this was a challenge throughout the study as Afrikaans is not the researcher's primary language. Therefore, one relied on technology to translate the documents.

The significance of the study was to highlight the significance of state funding to establish and develop townships. Moreover, the study sought to highlight how various forms of state funding mechanisms can exacerbate the conditions they sought to ameliorate. Daveyton was utilised as a point of departure. The study revealed how the apartheid state utilised funding to shape urban space and control the movement of Africans in the urban areas. Moreover, it highlights the lack of uniformity between the central government and local authorities to fund the development of townships.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The telos of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the current literature of the development of township state funding mechanisms with specific reference to Daveyton township. There are a cacophony of books and articles written and published, which focus on the establishment of African townships in South Africa, and in particular, the East Rand. This study sought to complement those books and articles and focus on the monetary mechanisms that the central government, and the local Benoni administration utilised from the 1950s to establish and develop Daveyton township in the East Rand.

2.2 Socio-economic development of the Witwatersrand and African urbanisation

To grasp the factors that led to the establishment of Daveyton, an understanding of the history of the region and Benoni is essential. Fortunately, vast amount of research has been conducted on this topic, from the discovery of gold in 1886 in the Witwatersrand; a moment that would shape the social and the economic landscape of the region.¹⁴ Charles Van Onselen's two volumed history of the Witwatersrand highlighted that, due to the capital and labour-intensive nature of milling and recovering the conglomerate ore,¹⁵ the need for African labour in the East Rand from the reserves was exacerbated. Due to the discovery, the region's economic bedrock shifted from commercial agriculture to mining.¹⁶ According to A.J. Christopher, revenue generated by both diamond mining in Kimberly and gold mining in the Witwatersrand was invested in infrastructural development and industrialisation.¹⁷ As that industrialisation rapidly developed in the Witwatersrand, urbanisation was initiated on a large scale to satiate the demand for labour in the mines. By tracing the history of the region from this point, it became clearer that the individuals who occupied Daveyton did not appear in a vacuum during the

¹⁴ Phillip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni: The Making of an Urban Region* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), 4.

¹⁵ Charles van Onselen, *Studies in the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914: Volume 1 New Babylon* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982), 3.

¹⁶ Charles Feinstein, *An economic history of South Africa: conquest, discrimination and development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45.

¹⁷ AJ Christopher, *The atlas of changing South Africa* (London: Routledge, 1994), 23.

1890s. African labourers were recruited from places as far afield as Mozambique.¹⁸ The migrant labour system, which was central to apartheid political economy has also received in-depth scholarly attention, as Peter Delius and Laura Phillips observed, migrant labour became the heartbeat of urban South Africa's industrialisation.¹⁹ However, the oscillation of people between urban and rural was not unique to South Africa. In fact, scholars such as William Beinart argued that it is a measure of many industrialising societies, which signified the transition from agrarian to industrial work.²⁰ There has also been a focus on the exploitative nature of the migrant system, Bernard Magubane's work, particularly; *The political economy of race and class in South Africa* highlights how the political economy was dependent on cheap African migrant labour for its survival.²¹

To comprehend the housing schemes in Daveyton, it is essential to understand how Africans who moved to the urban areas in the mid to late 1800s were housed. Initially, mine owners established male only compounds in Kimberly in 1884-85.²² The work of Rob Turrell has argued that the idea of mine compounds was borrowed from Kimberly and implemented in the Rand.²³ Similar to older townships, Daveyton had its own hostel compound. Keith Breckenridge has argued that hostel compounds were utilised as a mechanism of social control.²⁴ Therefore, they became a physical symbol of segregationist laws. In the Rand, the single sex mine compounds become hotbeds for ethnic tension.²⁵ This ethnic division would later become government policy when urban African townships such as Daveyton was established. The research on ethnic grouping in Daveyton is limited. In fact, Only J.E. Mathewson in his book and Noor Nieftagodien, in his 2001 PhD thesis discussed the subject briefly.²⁶ The ramifications of ethnic division in townships such as Daveyton is yet to be

¹⁸ AJ Christopher, *The atlas*, 24. Also see, Charles van Onselen, *The night trains: moving Mozambican miners to and from South Africa, circa 1902-1955* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2019), 22; Gary Kynoch, *We are fighting the world: a history of Marashea gangs in South Africa, 1947-1999* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009), 12.

¹⁹ Peter Delius and Laura Phillips, "Highlighting Migrant Humanity," in *A Long Way Home: Migrant Worker Worlds 1800-2014*, ed. Peter Delius, Laura Phillips, and Fiona Ranking-Smith (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014), 2.

²⁰ William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 30.

²¹ Bernard Magubane, *The political economy of race and class in South Africa* (New York: Monthly review press, 1979), 90.

²² Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, 30.

²³ Rob Turrell, "Kimberly's Model Compounds," *The Journal of African History* 25, no. 1 (1984): 59.

²⁴ Keith Breckenridge, "Migrancy, Crime and Faction Fighting: The Role of the Isitshozi in the Development of Ethnic Organisations in the Compounds," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16, no. 1 (1990), 8.

²⁵ Keith Breckenridge, "The Allure of Violence: Men, Race and Masculinity on the South African Goldmines, 1900-1950," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 4 (1998): 689.

²⁶ Noor Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid on the East Rand, 1948-1973: The Role of Local Government and Local Resistance" (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), 158.

researched comprehensively. It remains unclear whether this grouping has had any prolonged consequences from when it was implemented.

2.3 Municipal beer halls as alternative funding for urban townships

One of the central arguments of this study was that funds from beer halls were instrumental and accounted for a large portion to develop Daveyton. In terms of beer halls, much scholarly attention has been dedicated to the subject matter, not only in South Africa. Maurice Hutton's PhD about the establishment of Bulawayo in Rhodesia revealed that beer halls contributed similarly as other funding strategies in terms of funds to the municipal accounts.²⁷ In the South African context, Paul La Hausse and Maynard Swanson's work respectively highlighted the significance of beer halls to the control of urban Africans, particularly males and how women utilised beer brewing as a mechanism for financial freedom.²⁸ This often placed them at loggerheads with the authorities who wanted complete monopoly over the beer brewing trade. Furthermore, La Hausse revealed that the beer hall monopoly enabled what became known as the "Durban system," a form of administrative control which enabled the control of African labour in the urban centres.²⁹ The significance of the beer hall literature towards this study is primarily due to the revenues which were recouped from the beer monopoly which went into a particular Native Administration Fund. This was utilised to fund township development and welfare provisions.³⁰ Profits from the beer hall would prove significant in the establishment of Daveyton; from its initial stages towards the township's developmental phase. Significantly, for municipalities, beer hall funds proved an alternative to the central government's loans, which implied that Africans who drank in the beer halls inadvertently contributed towards the funding of the development of townships through the purchase and consumption of municipal beer.

Literature on housing in South Africa is plentiful, therefore, only the significant state acts such as The Housing Act, Act (No. 35 of 1920), which was passed into law on 13 August 1920 as a solution to the proliferation of homeless in urban areas,³¹ was discussed due to its overarching

²⁷ Maurice Hutton, "Seeing like a second city: contested development in the African Townships of Late Colonial Bulawayo, Rhodesia, 1949-1977" (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018), 22.

²⁸ Paul la Hausse, "The struggle for the city: alcohol, the eMatsheni and popular culture in Durban, 1902-1936" (MA dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1984), 2; Maynard W Swanson, "The Asiatic Menace: Creating Segregation in Durban 1870-1900," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 16, no. 3 (1983): 401-421; Maynard W Swanson, "Urban Origins of Social Development." *Race and Class* 10, no. 1 (1968): 31-40.

²⁹ La Hausse, "The struggle for the city," 1; Hutton, "Seeing like a second city," 22.

³⁰ Hutton, "Seeing like a second city," 22.

³¹ Alan Mabin, "A Century of South African Housing Acts," *Urban Forum* 31 (2020): 451.

significance in the housing policies that followed. Moreover, the work by DM Calderwood, whose plans and suggestions essentially influenced the actual building structure of the types of houses constructed in townships was also engaged.³² Calderwood's PhD thesis highlights the strategies that were implemented when housing urban Africans.³³ In fact, he argued that the municipalities' indifference to properly house urban Africans was borne out of two reasons: firstly, the government viewed Africans as "temporary sojourners" in urban areas.³⁴ Thus, there was no need to subsidise permanent housing for them. Secondly, no state official knew who's prerogative it was to house urban Africans who were neither mine workers (housed in hostel compounds) nor domestic servants, and sheltered by their employers.³⁵ The enactment and effects of the housing act was further discussed by Alan Mabin who argued that, the 1920 Housing Act thrust the housing of the urban poor – both African and White, on the shoulders of the local municipalities.³⁶ This brought an end to the local municipalities' establishment of houses for the urban poor on a voluntary basis.³⁷

The act to bestow the responsibility of housing Africans on the shoulders of local municipalities was not unique to the Union Government. For example, Luise White argued that in Colonial Kenya, African urban housing was entirely the duty of local municipalities.³⁸ In the Union, a central housing board was established in 1920 in line with the Housing Act to provide loans from the central government to the local municipal authorities to construct houses.³⁹ However, Ivan Evans argued that the loans were extended at an "economic" rate of 3% interest – which was above what the poorest urban dwellers could afford.⁴⁰ Therefore, the loans were seldom utilised. Moreover, the local authorities were apprehensive to bear the cost and subsidise the poor urban citizens, particularly Africans.⁴¹ Although not all local municipalities shared this unwillingness, Springs and Bloemfontein proved the exception.⁴² Despite the fact that the 1920 Housing Act delineated the local municipal authorities' responsibility to house the poor urban

³² DM Calderwood, "Native housing in South Africa" (PhD thesis, The University of the Witwatersrand, 1953), 3.

³³ Calderwood, "Native housing," 3.

³⁴ Calderwood, "Native housing," 3.

³⁵ Calderwood, "Native housing," 3.

³⁶ Mabin, "Housing Acts," 1; Nkambule, "*Housing provision*," 41.

³⁷ Naomi Burnett, "Race, housing and town planning in Cape Town, c.1920-1940 with special reference to District Six" (MA dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1993), 1.

³⁸ Luise White, *The comforts of home: prostitution in colonial Nairobi* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 113.

³⁹ Charle Roux, "The question of housing for Africans in Mangaung at Bloemfontein 1945-1964," *Historia* 45, no. 2 (2000): 470.

⁴⁰ Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 158.

⁴¹ Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 159.

⁴² Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 158.

dwellers, Naomi Bennet argued that the 1920 Act only provided a mechanism to finance housing.⁴³ Thus, it was not designed to force municipalities to construct the houses.⁴⁴ Bennet's argument clarified how municipalities could avoid the utilisation of the loans offered at an exorbitant interest rate by the housing board to construct houses.⁴⁵

The 1919 housing committee, which the 1920 Housing Act flowed from, called for a consideration to enhance housing, including "coloured" and native people.⁴⁶ The 1920 Housing Act itself made only one reference to race, in section 7 (3), whereby it required the inclusion of 'coloured' and 'native' sections be considered during the provision of dwellings.⁴⁷ Prior to the 1920 Housing Act, the Tuberculosis Commission of 1914 echoed the need for the "betterment of the locations for natives and coloureds".⁴⁸ The practical application of the Act, however, as observed by Mabin conformed with the State's utilisation of public funds to divide 'groups' along with the government's racial categorizations.⁴⁹ According to Charl Le Roux, the Housing Act was amended nine times by 1949.⁵⁰ This was indicative of the slow changes in the demography of the urban areas, financial circumstances and the change in government along with policies related to the urban spaces.

2.4 State funding and township establishment

As indicated in the title, state funding was the pillar of this thesis, that is, to comprehend the state's relation to the establishment of townships, it is essential to identify its relationship with capital and African labour. The subject of the apartheid's state relation to capital and cheap African labour divided opinion even within the apartheid ideologues. Deborah Posel's work argued that there were those who advocated for "practical" apartheid, which implied that 'economic integration' for Africans was possible and not against the system,⁵¹ while the "purist" faction advocated for total segregation at every level of society.⁵² The success of the "practical" faction in the early years implied that Africans could be integrated in the economic

⁴³ Bennett, "Race, housing and town planning," 7.

⁴⁴ Bennett, "Race, housing and town planning," 7.

⁴⁵ Bennett, "Race, housing and town planning," 3.

⁴⁶ Susan Parnell, "The provision of public housing for whites in Johannesburg, 1920-1955" (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987), 19.

⁴⁷ Bennett, "Race, housing and town planning," 8.

⁴⁸ Richard Gordon Humphries, "The origins and subsequent development of administration boards" (MA dissertation, Rhodes University, 1983), 2.

⁴⁹ Humphries, "The origins and subsequent development," 45.

⁵⁰ Charl le Roux, "The question of housing for Africans in Mangaung at Bloemfontein 1945-1964," *Historia* 45, no. 2 (2000): 467.

⁵¹ Deborah Posel, "The meaning of apartheid before 1948: conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance," *Journal of Southern African studies* 14, no. 1 (1987): 130.

⁵² Posel, "The meaning of apartheid before 1948," 130.

sphere of the country, although only as cheap labour. Therefore, townships, as Martin Legassick argued, were an extension of the mine compounds in the sense that they only functioned to house cheap African labour and make it easy for a labour thirsty capitalist system to control its labour.⁵³ Thus, the government assisted in the establishment of townships with the idea that this investment would be repaid through rent and affordable labour in the urban areas which was required to industrialise the country.⁵⁴ Established in 1955, almost a decade after the Second World War, Daveyton's location meant that it provided labour for the industry in and around Benoni and ensured that there was a steady supply of labour from the latter.⁵⁵ Moreover, the establishment of the township meant that a large squatter camp (Apex) could be cleared and the residents moved into a government controlled township.

To ensure that townships were constructed, various Acts were enacted, *inter alia*, the Native Urban Areas Act, Act (No.21 of 1923) was promulgated to counter a loophole in the 1920 Housing Act, which enabled local municipalities to not fulfil their duty to supply homes and provide amenities to the urban poor.⁵⁶ In this regard, Anthony Lemon's work has argued that the Act marked an increase in centralisation.⁵⁷ It gave the Minister of Native Affairs powers to compel municipalities to act according to their mandates.⁵⁸ However, compelling municipalities did not ease their apprehension of having to shoulder large deficits borne out of the inability of location residents to pay rent.⁵⁹ One of the central arguments advanced in this study was that due to the Benoni municipalities' apprehension to utilise state provided loans to construct urban African housing, alternative funding strategies such as beer hall profits were utilised with more vigour and less apprehensively, rather than relying on state loans. The study, however, does not challenge the fact that state provided loans were utilised in the establishment of Daveyton as prevalent in the present literature. Instead, it sought to highlight that the municipality sought several alternative funding options to establish the township which did not require central government's loans and interest rates, even the utilisation of the private sector.

⁵³ Martin Legassick, 'South Africa: forces labour, industrialisation, and racial differentiation,' in *The political economy of Africa*, ed. R. Harris (Boston: Schenkman, 1975), 231.

⁵⁴ Harold Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid,' *Economy and Society* 1, no. 4 (2006): 427.

⁵⁵ Nicoli Nattrass, 'Economic aspects in the construction of apartheid,' in *Apartheid's genesis 1935-1962* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001), 43.

⁵⁶ Parnell, 'Negotiating segregation: pre-parliamentary debate over the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923,' *African studies* 57, no. 2 (1998): 147.

⁵⁷ Anthony Lemon, 'From Colonial to Apartheid Cities,' in *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities*, ed. Anthony Lemon (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1991), 23.

⁵⁸ Lemon, *From Colonial to Apartheid Cities*, 23.

⁵⁹ Humphries, 'Origins and subsequent development,' 3.

Ivan Evans, in his work, holds that local authorities remained uneasy about utilising housing funds from the state, primarily due to the uncertainty of being able to pay the back the loans.⁶⁰ Therefore, to resolve the issue of costs would be to determine the issue of housing. The biggest problem for the authorities, as Calderwood observed, was that the high cost to construct a house was not concentrated on one or even two factors, instead, these were dispersed.⁶¹ Thus, a funding mechanism which did not result in debt was crucial for the municipalities. The costs ranged from planning, design, wages, material, and construction of houses. A.L. Glen, a senior research officer at the National Building Research Institute (NBRI), after conducting extensive research into the aggregate costs of African housing,⁶² concluded that “no element costs more than 41% of the prime costs of the dwelling,” and “it is obvious that costs cannot be radically reduced by reducing the costs of any single element.”⁶³ Therefore, a method was urgently required to reduce the cost of African housing structures.

The quest to solve the cost to house Africans, according to Bonner and Nieftagodien, resulted in the enactment of the Bantu Building Workers Act, (No. 27 of 1951).⁶⁴ The Act made provision for Africans to be trained as artisans in the building trade and to work as builders at a reduced wage rate.⁶⁵ Nieftagodien argued that the hiring of Africans to construct houses, immediately cut the cost to construct homes by half, because the African workers being paid much less than their white counterparts.⁶⁶ In conformance with Nieftagodien’s analysis, this study argued that Acts such as the Bantu Building Act was also a method which municipalities utilised to lessen the amount of loans they took from the central government. Although this was only utilised by municipalities; in a speech to the Union senate in 1952, the then Minister of Native Affairs Dr H.F. Verwoerd accentuated the need for different industries to contribute towards a fund to pay for their African employees’ housing and amenities.⁶⁷ Dhiru Soni argued that this speech was an alert because within a few months, the employers would be forced to assist in urban African housing.⁶⁸ Indeed, in 1952, the Native Services Levy Act (Act No. 54

⁶⁰ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 150.

⁶¹ DM Calderwood, “An approach to low-cost urban native housing in South Africa,” *The Town Planning Review* 24, no. 4 (1954): 314.

⁶² Susan Parnell, “The Provision of housing”, 19.

⁶³ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 180.

⁶⁴ Phil Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Kathorus: A History* (Cape Town: Maskew Longman, 2001), 19.

⁶⁵ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 19.

⁶⁶ Noor Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid on the East Rand, 1948 - 1973: the role of local government and local resistance” (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), 168.

⁶⁷ Dhiru V Soni, “The apartheid state and back housing struggles,” in *The Apartheid city and beyond: urbanization and social change in South Africa*, ed. by David M Smith (London: Routledge, 1992), 50.

⁶⁸ Soni, “The Apartheid State,” 52.

of 1952) was passed.⁶⁹ The Act imposed a weekly levy of 2/6d on every employer for each African they employed.⁷⁰ Nieftagodien argued that the purpose of the Act was twofold. Firstly, it reduced the cost to house Africans and simultaneously eased the pressure on local authorities to fund everything. Secondly, it became a mechanism to raise funds from the private sector for infrastructural development.⁷¹ The combination of the Building Workers Act, Act No. 27 of 1951 and the 1952 Native Services Act, as observed by Nieftagodien, reduced the cost to construct houses drastically.⁷² In fact, the cost to construct a house went from £300 and £800 pounds to a mere £178 pounds, due to the Native Service Fund and the Building Workers Act.⁷³ The 1952 Native Services Levy Act applied to urban centres where the working population exceeded twenty thousand Africans.⁷⁴ However, Evans argued that there were certain categories of employers who were exempted from paying the levy, namely employers of domestic servants and those who housed their workers for free in accommodation approved by the authorities.⁷⁵

One of the central figures in the establishment of Daveyton, J.E Mathewson revealed that the money acquired from the Levy Act was paid into the Native Services Levy Fund. This effectively formed a new subsection of the local municipalities' revenue account.⁷⁶ According to Evans, the Levy Act stipulated what the fund could be and not be used for.⁷⁷ In 1955, the Benoni Local Municipality attempted to solve its urban African homelessness and squatting problem by establishing what government authorities deemed a 'model' township.

2.5 Focus on the establishment of Daveyton

In the history of Daveyton, two texts have defined the study of the township, while several others complement them. Firstly, James Edward Mathewson, the then Director of Non-European Affairs in Benoni, published his doctoral thesis, which provides a comprehensive account of the establishment of Daveyton.⁷⁸ Mathewson's thesis focused on the layout, infrastructural development and planning of the township in which he played a pivotal role.

⁶⁹ Simangaliso Malinga, "The Development of Informal Settlements in South Africa, with Particular Reference to Informal Settlements Around Daveyton on the East Rand" (PhD thesis, Rand Afrikaans University), 34.

⁷⁰ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 18.

⁷¹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 52.

⁷² Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 165.

⁷³ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 168.

⁷⁴ Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 160.

⁷⁵ Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 165.

⁷⁶ James Edward Mathewson, "The Establishment of an Urban Bantu Township: with special reference to Daveyton," (MA dissertation, Potchefstroom University of Christian higher education, 1954), 36.

⁷⁷ Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race*, 165.

⁷⁸ Mathewson, "The Establishment," 37.

However, Mathewson's thesis omits the role of Africans and the multiple irregular expenditures incurred in construction.⁷⁹ However, it is worth noting that the gap of the role of Africans in the establishment of Daveyton and other townships in Benoni was noted by Deryck Humphries and David G. Thomas in their 1968 publication: *Benoni: Son of my sorrow*.⁸⁰ The book is an extensive account of the establishment of Benoni as a whole. During the initial research for the book, Mathewson was also involved and was accredited as one of the editors. However, it would not be until Noor Nieftagodien's 2001 PhD thesis that a broader and clearer account of the establishment of Daveyton was provided. In the thesis, Nieftagodien, not only discusses the history of the township but the political relations between the residents and the local authorities, as well as between the local authorities and the central government. The thesis has remained one of, if not the only seminal text in the writing of Daveyton. Moreover, the collaborative effort between Nieftagodien and Phil Bonner further situates the history of Daveyton in relation to the East Rand region. Their book, which was published in 2012, argued that due to its planning, Daveyton "stood out as a prime product of apartheid urban social engineering in Ekurhuleni."⁸¹ This observation was borne out of the township's ethnically divided geography and its status as a 'model township' in the region.

Furthermore, Nieftagodien also focused on the township's micro-political environment by framing the role of the local authorities such as the Urban Bantu Councils during the 1960s in relation to the central government. He argued that this relationship had been antagonistic and contradictory at best.⁸² It was fundamentally from Nieftagodien's analysis that this dissertation endeavoured to highlight the implications of the antagonistic relationship between the state and the local authorities in Daveyton from the funding perspective over a longer duration.

In addition to Nieftagodien's work, Simangaliso Samuel Malinga's Master's dissertation also sought to fill the lacuna from Mathewson's work and provides a narrative of African workers and the inhabitants' experiences of living in Daveyton since its establishment.⁸³ Through interviews, Malinga highlighted the history of social agents and their roles in the establishment of Daveyton. However, some of Malinga's arguments, particularly where he writes about the descriptive aspect of the establishment of the township are very similar to Mathewson's

⁷⁹ Noor Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 23.

⁸⁰ Humphries and Thomas, *Benoni: son of my sorrow*, 94.

⁸¹ Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni: The Making of an Urban Region* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), 95.

⁸² Noor Nieftagodien, "High apartheid and the erosion of "official" local politics in Daveyton in the 1960s," *New Contree* no. 67 (Special edition) (2013), 35.

⁸³ Simangaliso Samuel Malinga, "The Establishment of Black Township," 45.

account of how the township was established. Although, his PhD thesis on the establishment of squatter camps around Daveyton provides more insight of the township during the 1980s. Phil Bonner's work contextualised the establishment of Daveyton.

2.6 Effects of the Bantustan Policy to finance township housing

The establishment of Bantustans was a crucial turning point in the funding of townships such as Daveyton, because from that point, state funds were officially shifted to support the newly established Bantustans. Therefore, one had to understand the formation of the Bantustans and how they related to the townships. Over the years, interest in Bantustan scholarship has increased significantly. According to scholars such as Deon Geldenhuys, the enactment of the Bantu Authorities Act, Act No. 68 of 1951 was one the primary signs of the pending policy to establish Bantustans.⁸⁴ The Act, according to Dlamini, "sought to bolster chiefly authority by 'retribalizing' Africans."⁸⁵ Moreover, the 1951 Act was followed to promote the Bantu Self Governing Act, Act (No. 46 of 1959), which paved the way for the establishment of "Self-governing Bantustans,"⁸⁶ also referred to as "homelands." In her work on Leboa, Laura Phillips revealed how Bantustans were instrumental in the establishment of a growing urban African middle class.⁸⁷ Moreover, Phillips' work highlights how the Bantustans related to townships. For example, according to Phillips, by 1982, the East Rand administration board which was tasked to construct houses in the East Rand townships transferred some of its funding to Leboa to assist in the construction of homes in the homeland.⁸⁸ Phillips's point clarified the reason for alternative funding mechanisms in the East Rand townships, including Daveyton.

This shift in funding by the government has featured in the writing of several scholars, namely: Hilary Sapire, who argued that during the 1960s there was a "freeze" of State provisioned African urban housing.⁸⁹ This was a part of the drive by the government to push Africans into the homelands. The same argument was made by Owen Crankshaw, he held that the freezing

⁸⁴ Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Black Homelands: Some Alternative Political Scenarios," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 1, no. 1 (1981), 8.

⁸⁵ Jacob Dlamini, *Safari Nation: A social history of the Kruger National Park* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2020), 188.

⁸⁶ John Dugard, "South Africa's Independent Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization," *Denver Journal of International Law and Order* 10, no. 1 (1980): 13.

⁸⁷ Laura Phillips, "From Lebowa to Limpopo: differentiation, stratification and class formation in South Africa, 1972 – 2009" (PhD Thesis, New York University, 2020), 9.

⁸⁸ Phillips, "From Lebowa to Limpopo," 91.

⁸⁹ Hilary Sapire, "Politics and Protest in Shack Settlements of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Region, South Africa, 1980-1990," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 675.

of the provision of housing for Africans in urban centres was to retard African urbanisation.⁹⁰ However, by the 1970s, this resulted in chronic overcrowding in the already established council houses in urban townships.⁹¹ Their analysis on the state “freeze” of housing for urban Africans has not gone without a minor rebuff. Susan Parnell has argued against this “freeze” of the provision of urban housing for Africans. Instead, she posited that the State’s construction record from the 1960s and 1970s revealed no significant overall pattern of change regarding African urban housing.⁹² This study argues that, in fact, Sapire, Crankshaw and Parnell’s arguments are correct; there was indeed a “freeze” in state funding for townships. However, as Parnell has illustrated, the “freeze” was not an absolute shift of funding, because the government continued constructing homes in Daveyton in conjunction with the private sector. The reason for the shift in state funding was embedded in the idea to push Africans out of the urban areas and back into the Bantustans.⁹³ During the early 1970s, Parliament passed the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards Act, Act (No. 45 of 1971).⁹⁴ This Act wrested the responsibility to administer African urban townships outside the homelands, from municipalities, to the central government-controlled administration boards.⁹⁵ Thus, administration boards such as the East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) could construct houses outside the area without any rebuff from opposition-controlled municipalities.

In Daveyton, which was under the control of the East Rand administration board in the 1970s, informal settlements mushroomed effervescently.⁹⁶ Malinga’s PhD revealed that the lack of housing for Africans in the East Rand, particularly in Daveyton, was aggravated by the administration board’s indifference to urban Africans.⁹⁷ However, Parnell argued that the state remained the biggest contributor towards the construction of housing and landlord, even after the establishment of Bantu administration boards.⁹⁸ Thus, by wresting control of township administration from municipalities; and divert funds to the homelands, state officials hoped

⁹⁰ Owen Crankshaw, *Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under Apartheid* (London: Routledge, 1997), 119.

⁹¹ Crankshaw, “*Race, class*,” 199.

⁹² Susan Parnell, “State intervention in housing provision in the 1980s,” in *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London, Routledge, 1992), 55.

⁹³ Dugard, “South Africa’s independent homelands,” 18.

⁹⁴ Richard Gordon Humphries, “The origins and subsequent development of administration boards” (MA dissertation, Rhodes University, 1983), 1.

⁹⁵ Humphries, “Origins and subsequent development,” 2.

⁹⁶ Malinga, “The Development of,” 43.

⁹⁷ Malinga, “The Development of,” 43.

⁹⁸ Susan Parnell, “State intervention in housing provision in the 1980s,” in *The Apartheid city and beyond: urbanization and social change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London, Routledge, 1992), 55.

urban Africans would relocate to the homelands.⁹⁹ However, Africans resorted to squatting than move to the homelands.¹⁰⁰ Owen Crankshaw argued that one of the reasons why most Africans refused to move to the homelands was because they were legally qualified to live in the Witwatersrand.¹⁰¹ As Anne-Maria Makhulu highlights in her work on housing in Cape Town, some urban Africans did not have anything to go to in the Bantustans.¹⁰²

2.7 Intervention of the private sector on township housing

The implementation of the Bantustan policy revealed that the government could not afford to fund the development of townships such as Daveyton and the Bantustans simultaneously. Thus, innovative strategies had to be envisioned to fund the establishment of townships. The available literature does not focus specifically on Daveyton regarding what the change in the state's financing meant for the township. Although, at a national level and in terms of housing for urban Africans, Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Natrass' work highlights that low-income families qualified for reduced "sub-economic" housing.¹⁰³ According to Seekings and Natrass, from the 1950s onwards, the government set the limit for sub-economic rent at a monthly income of R30 per month (R360 annually).¹⁰⁴ This implied that despite the expanding role of the private sector to construct houses for urban Africans in townships, the government did not wholly relinquish its status as township developer and landlord. In fact, it could not do so without facing a new squatter problem because, as Bonner, Posel and Delius observed, during the mid to late 1950s, the real wages of African workers declined, meanwhile, Verwoerd's Department of Native Affairs insisted that financing of African urban housing should be on an 'economic' basis.¹⁰⁵ Thus resulted in a situation whereby urban Africans required government subsidised housing.

⁹⁹ Owen Crankshaw, "Squatting, Apartheid and Urbanisation on the Southern Witwatersrand," *African Affairs* 92, no. 366 (1993): 35.

¹⁰⁰ AW Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfield: Squatter Movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1979): 94; Hilary Sapire, "Politics and Protest in Shack Settlements of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Region, South Africa, 1980-1990," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 673.

¹⁰¹ Crankshaw, "Squatting, Apartheid and," 36.

¹⁰² Anne-Maria Makhulu, *Making freedom: apartheid, squatter politics and the struggle for home* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 19.

¹⁰³ Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Natrass, *Class, race and inequality in South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 72.

¹⁰⁴ Seekings and Natrass, *Class, race and inequality*, 72.

¹⁰⁵ Phillip Bonner, Peter Delius, Deborah Posel, "The Shaping of Apartheid Contradiction, Continuity and Popular Struggle," in *Apartheid's genesis 1935-1963*, ed. Phillip Bonner, Peter Delius and Deborah Posel (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 2017), 25.

By the 1980s, the government continued to advocate for urban Africans to relocate to the Bantustans. The government's stance to subsidise African housing, opened the door for private investors to fill the gap. The work of Patrick Bond encapsulates how the private investors moved into the township housing market in large numbers.¹⁰⁶ According to Bond, this move was welcomed and encouraged by the government. Unfortunately, Bond's work does not focus directly on Daveyton. Although, this is another aspect of Daveyton's development which Malinga highlighted in his PhD thesis. However, as Susan Parnell argued, the involvement of the private sector in urban township housing was exaggerated.¹⁰⁷ Parnell highlighted that by 1981, fewer than a tenth of all urban African houses were initiated and funded by the private sector.¹⁰⁸ Parnell did not argue that the private sector got involved in the provision of township housing, instead, she argues that the government's involvement did not decline as sharply as it initially appeared. The slow involvement of the private sector was explained by Calderwood. He postulated that there were three primary cost items to construct a township, particularly house dwellings: cost of land, dwelling, and services.¹⁰⁹ The combined costs were calculated by the National Building Research Institute (NBRI). If the cost of any of these three factors was high, then the price of the house remained high. Therefore, due to this, Bond posited that the margin for profit was very low for private investors to venture into township housing for long periods.¹¹⁰ However, this did not dissuade all private investors.¹¹¹

Developed less than a decade after the National Party ascended to power, Daveyton and the mechanisms that were used to finance its establishment highlight what Deborah Posel has argued to be lack of a "grand plan" to the idea of apartheid.¹¹² The township was established as a response to the mushrooming of a squatter camp in the region and thus, both the local authorities and the central government had not budgeted for the expense. However, both tiers of government were able to assist one another in the establishment of the township. The local authorities by submitting to some of the central government's urban African policies at the time and the central government by allocating funds for certain aspects of the township's

¹⁰⁶ Patrick Bond, *Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal: Essays on South Africa's New Urban Crisis* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2000), 177.

¹⁰⁷ Susan Parnell, "State intervention in housing provision in the 1980s," in *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1992), 60.

¹⁰⁸ Parnell, *State intervention*, 61.

¹⁰⁹ DM Calderwood, "An Approach to low-cost urban native housing in South Africa," *The Town Planning Review* 24, no 4 (1954): 314.

¹¹⁰ Patrick Bond, *Cities of Gold*, 178.

¹¹¹ Patrick Bond, *Cities of Gold*, 178.

¹¹² Deborah Posel, "The meaning of apartheid before 1984: conflicting interest and powers within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14, no 1 (1987): 139.

establishment. Although, even with the cordial relationship between the different tiers of the government, the Benoni authorities were keen not to rely too heavily on loans from the central government for Daveyton's establishment. The dissertation seeks to highlight how the apartheid state vacillated between the "practical" implementation of apartheid to the "purist" racial segregation whenever it suited its needs. In Daveyton, the government assisted to finance some of the early developments of the township, however, by the late 1960s, this stance had changed, and the central government focused on the establishment of the homelands and relocating Africans to these areas.

2.8 Conclusion

The chapter outlined the key literature on Daveyton and the central government's township funding mechanisms. The primary point, which was apparent from the literature, was the contradictory nature of the government's policies to fund the township. Furthermore, the literature illustrated a link between the State's township funding policies and the government's attempt to control urban Africans through township housing. Scholars underscored African political resistance, and descriptive accounts of the establishment of Daveyton, however, several questions remain unanswered. Firstly, how did the government's monetary policies change overtime to establish townships? Secondly, how did the beer hall profits, and legislation such as the services levy act and the Bantu builders act affect the funding of housing in Daveyton during the 1960s onwards, if at all? The dearth of literature on the State's mechanisms to finance the establishment of Daveyton resulted in one to infer that the state loans were the primary mechanisms which were utilised to fund the development of Daveyton.

Another gap in the literature on township funding, particularly in the East Rand is the link between the advocacy of the homelands system and the effect that it had on funding Daveyton by the East Rand Administration Board from the 1970s. Parnell argued that the shift of funding to the development of the homelands had little if any effect. However, Phillips, Morris and Crankshaw highlighted that the homelands drained money from the urban areas. However, before funds could be used to construct Daveyton, the Benoni authorities had to fund to the relocation of residents from the squatter camp to the township.

CHAPTER 3

FROM A SQUATTER CAMP TO A 'MODEL' TOWNSHIP

3.1 Introduction

In Benoni, the early 1940s was marked by a growth in squatter camps, which primarily resulted from the inflow of Africans into the area from the reserves to acquire work in the mines. The migration was further exacerbated by the beginning of the Second World War in Europe in the middle of the decade. In the East Rand, the war resulted in a manufacturing boom. Various industries in the region, due to its extensiveness, required labour to close the gap left by the white males who went to fight in the war. Nevertheless, to inhibit the rise in squatter camps, the authorities in Benoni contemplated the establishment of government sanctioned and controlled townships. In 1954, plans to establish a township in Benoni to alleviate a squatter settlement which had mushroomed in the area was set in motion. This chapter assesses the reasons why the Benoni authorities established a new township in the mid-1950s; followed by an outline of how the Apex squatter camp was established; how the residents in the squatter camp experienced life; and how it was eventually destroyed in 1954. It was during the same period when the central government commissioned the Mentz Commission's establishment. The significance of the latter is investigated in relation to townships in the East Rand, including Daveyton. This is followed by a discussion of how the Benoni authorities established forms of urban racial segregation in Daveyton township, the significance of the Native Levy Fund, and the housing finance schemes.

3.2 Creation and destruction of Apex emergency camp

By the early 1950s, the Benoni local authorities faced one of their worst problems of informal settlements in the region.¹ Having resolved a previous one in 1949 with the establishment of

¹ During the early 1940s, Benoni witnessed one of its worst unsanctioned land occupations by Africans; to solve this problem, the government established Wattville, and in 1949 an emergency camp was established within Wattville to shelter the incoming homeless urban Africans which were squatting between the Benoni old location and Wattville; see, National Archives of South Africa (NASA), NTS 125/313 N(2), Benoni – Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni Memorandum of Daveyton Bantu Township, 15/04/1954; Also see, Simangaliso Samuel Malinga, “The development of informal settlements in South Africa, with particular reference to informal settlements around Daveyton on the East Rand, 1970-1999” (PhD thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, 2000), 222.

Wattville,² the authorities had to resolve the second with a similar scenario as the first, that is, establish another township in the region. From the onset, funding was required to purchase land for the township, infrastructure and required amenities when the township reaches the developmental stages. However, before the first brick was laid in the new township, the Benoni authorities had to fund the removal of people from Apex (an emergency squatter camp) to the new township.

From the initial stages of the relocation of Africans from the squatter camp, funding had to be secured by the local authorities to ensure that the relocation transpired, and the people were relocated to a state-controlled ‘model township.’³ State authorities thought that they had solved the problem of squatting with the enactment of the Slums Act (No. 53 of 1934). The Act, according to Susan Parnell, “gave authorities’ power to expropriate whole areas even where not every stand was a slum”.⁴ Such forceful eradication of slums was further fuelled by European town planners such as Le Corbusier who argued that “to build on a clear site is to replace the accidental layout of the ground.”⁵ Thus, to create a “clear site” Le Corbusier prescribed a surgical knife to rebuild the city forcefully.⁶ However, the Benoni authorities learned that their situation was more difficult to solve. As the state-sanctioned locations for Africans was filled to the brim with incoming migrants, the people searched for alternative housing. One of the first breakthroughs came in the Benoni Old location under the leadership of Harry Don Mabuya.⁷

In July 1945, Mabuya founded the African Housing and Rates Board.⁸ The primary aim was to encourage lodgers in the Asiatic area to pay rent at the level fixed by the rent board rather than the increased sum.⁹ However, by the end of 1945, he encouraged tenants in the Asiatic area who served as members of the board to stop paying rent.¹⁰ The landlords applied for eviction orders against the offending tenants.¹¹ Mabuya countered the landlord’s actions by advocating for an ‘illegal’ land occupation on the outskirts of the town boundary.¹² However, Mabuya was

² Phil Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni: the making of an urban region* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), 68.

³ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 58.

⁴ Susan Parnell, “Slums, Segregation and poor whites in Johannesburg, 1920-1934,” in *White but poor*, ed. Robert Morrell (Pretoria: Unisa, 1992), 128.

⁵ Le Corbusier, *The city of tomorrow and its planning* (New York: Dover publications, 1987), 230.

⁶ Corbusier, *The city*, 230.

⁷ Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Kathorus: A History* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 2001), 20.

⁸ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 68.

⁹ JB Whitehouse, *A History of Benoni* (Benoni: Benoni Town Council), 34.

¹⁰ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 68.

¹¹ Malinga, “*The establishment of informal settlements*,” 221.

¹² Malinga, “*The establishment of informal settlements*,” 221.

not the only one to employ this strategy. In April 1944, James ‘Sofasonke’ Mpanza, a civic leader in Orlando East, led Orlando East subtenant families onto unoccupied municipal land where they established a shanty town from hessian sacks referred to as *Masakeng*; a place of sacks.¹³ In Benoni, the authorities attempted to stem Mabuya’s endeavour to occupy land. However, they found themselves in a legal and jurisdictional tussle which they could not solve. Firstly, they attempted to charge the persons who occupied land with trespassing but learned that there was no legal basis to do so.¹⁴ In search of an alternative, they sought to prosecute the squatters under the municipal by-laws. However, a tent was not classified as a structure.¹⁵ The Native Affairs Department (NAD) thwarted the final attempt when the authorities from the department argued that unless there was a place to relocate the squatters, they could not be moved. Hence, due to a lack of an area, they could not be immediately relocated.¹⁶

To compound the authorities’ frustrations, the squatters had settled adroitly in a wedge of territory belonging to Brakpan. This placed the Benoni council’s legal capacity to act on the squatters in doubt.¹⁷ Another contributory factor for the increase of squatters in Benoni was the African mine workers’ strike, which broke out in August 1946.¹⁸ On 12 August 1946, over sixty thousand African mine workers in the Witwatersrand responded to a call by the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) to stop working.¹⁹ This was followed by a call for a general strike for African workers by the Transvaal Council of Non-Europeans Trade Unions.²⁰ Bonner and Nieftagodien placed the reason for the strike on the disjuncture between the high cost of living which resulted from escalated inflation due to the Second World War and impeded an increase in wages at the mines.²¹ Due to an increase in rent for miners who lived in the township backyards and rising food prices implied that the mine workers were desperate for an increase in wages. However, the Chamber of Mines refused to implement a wage increase and argued that it could not afford it because of the profit margins which had declined in the mining sector

¹³ Phil Bonner, “African Urbanisation on the Rand between the 1930s and 1960s: Its Social Character and Political Consequences,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21, no. 1 (Mar. 1995): 120.

¹⁴ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 68.

¹⁵ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 68.

¹⁶ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 68.

¹⁷ Noor Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid on the East Rand, 1948 – 1973: The role of local government and local resistance” (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), 152.

¹⁸ Dunbar Moodie, “The moral economy of the black miner’s strike of 1946,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13, no. 1 (1986): 2; Wilmot G. James, “Grounds for a strike: South African gold mining in the 1940s,” *African economic history* 16 (1987): 2.

¹⁹ Dan O’Meara, “The 1946 African Mine workers’ strike and the political economy of South Africa,” *The Journal of commonwealth and comparative politics* 13, no. 2 (1975): 146.

²⁰ O’Meara, “The 1946 African Mine Workers,” 146.

²¹ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 72.

during the period.²² Dunbar Moodie termed this disjuncture the ‘moral economy’ of the mines. For Moodie, this moral economy encompassed the skewed power relations between the mining staff, the miners and between the miners themselves in the compounds as a reason to strike.²³

However, due to the force with which the police foiled the strike, by 17 August, only five days after the strike was declared, the last of the strikers were back at work although none of their demands were met.²⁴ The failure of industrial action resulted in several African mine workers to leave and seek employment elsewhere.²⁵ Nevertheless, leaving the mine also implied leaving the compounds, which resulted in more people seeking shelter in the burgeoning squatter settlements. According to one of Bonner’s research participants, the move by him and his friends to Apex squatter camp was precipitated by the belief that “the mines were moving to the Free State, so we decided to move to Apex.”²⁶ This increased mobilisation amongst the Africans into the self-administered squatter camps, which the authorities had no control. This was viewed as both a political and hygienic threat by authorities.²⁷ Although, not everyone who moved to Apex came from the mines. The squatter camp boasted an eclectic cast of individuals. One of the first significant groups to move to the camp was directed to it by a lawyer only referred to as Mr Baker by one of the residents.²⁸ Baker met the homeless residents when he represented them in court after the police had detained them for erecting shacks illegally at a small holding in Rietpan.²⁹ The small holding was owned by a Mr Botha, who found them on the land and filed a complaint with the police.³⁰ Most of those who were arrested were the wives and children of the employees at the new factories in Benoni.³¹ According to Herman Zwane, a participant in Nieftagodien and Bonner’s study, after paying the detainees release fees, Mr Baker suggested that they move to an unoccupied industrial area in Apex.³² On 16 May 1950, they followed Mr Baker’s instructions and bought tents at a timber yard and in the

²² Richard Steyn, *Seven votes: how World War Two changed South Africa forever* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2020), 200.

²³ Dunbar Moodie, “The moral economy of the black miners Strike of 1946,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13, no. 1 (Oct. 1986): 2; also see, Keith Breckenridge, “The allure of violence: men, race and masculinity on the South African gold mines, 1900-1950,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 4 (1998): 690.

²⁴ O’Meara, “The moral economy,” 146.

²⁵ Bonner. “African urbanisation,” 121.

²⁶ Bonner. “African urbanisation,” 121.

²⁷ Bonner, “African urbanisation,” 121.

²⁸ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 70.

²⁹ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 70.

³⁰ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 70.

³¹ Philip Bonner and Rob Lambert, “Batons and bare heads: the strike at Amato Textiles, February 1958,” in *The politics of race, class and nationalism in twentieth century South Africa*, ed. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (New York: Longman Inc, 1987), 339; Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 71.

³² Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 71.

cover of darkness, they moved to the unoccupied industrial area.³³ For the Benoni authorities, the new squatter camp was only “in common with the general tendency among the urban Bantu to resort to illegal squatting.”³⁴ Hence, just as the previous squatter camp had been resolved by the establishment of an emergency camp in Wattville during 1948, it became a township shortly after the incorporation of that emergency camp into Wattville Bantu township.³⁵ The new squatter camp in June 1950 was also solved by establishing a new township. An attempt was made by the NP government to inhibit any squatter movements in urban areas. In 1951, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (No. 52 of 1951) was passed.³⁶ The primary objective of the Act, which is also stated in its preamble, was the prevention and control of illegal squatting on both public and private land.³⁷ However, even with the implementation of the act, squatting persisted in the East Rand. The squatting in Benoni resulted in the local authorities to call meetings to inquire about the establishment of a new township. Meanwhile, life at Apex began taking form, and the residents settled into their new surroundings, and turned the tent shelters into shacks with families. Faced with an inactive Benoni local authority regarding housing for Africans, more families flocked to Apex squatter camp.³⁸ Thus, the trickle of families which had moved to Apex on the 23 June 1950 increased. In fact, by the end of July of that same year, 632 shacks were erected, and accommodated over 5000 people.³⁹ Much like other squatter settlements in the East Rand, women shaped the day-to-day interactions within Apex, while their husbands worked during the day.⁴⁰

In Tent Town, a squatter camp formed in Benoni in 1945 by Harry Mabuya,⁴¹ women were significant participants in the administration of the squatter settlement. This was apparent because many of them were active participants on the African Housing and Rates Board, which controlled most of the camp’s life.⁴² Apex followed the structure of Tent Town in terms of administration. Meanwhile, many men who occupied the mushrooming settlements were

³³ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 71.

³⁴ National Archives of South Africa (hereafter NASA), NTS 125/313 N (2): Town Council of Benoni’s memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/54, 7 June 1954.

³⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): Town Council of Benoni’s memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 7 June 1954.

³⁶ Gustav Muller, “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa,” *Fundamina* 19, no. 2 (2013): 382.

³⁷ Muller, “The legal-historical context,” 382.

³⁸ Deryck Humphriss and David G. Thomas, *Benoni: son of my sorrow* (Benoni: Town Council of Benoni, 1968), 121.

³⁹ Humphriss and Thomas, *Benoni*, 121.

⁴⁰ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 71.

⁴¹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation,” 50.

⁴² Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 72.

migrant or immigrant workers from the reserves. This implied that they had been socialised in their rural homes, whereby, males dominated the political arena.⁴³ Thus, several were somewhat ambivalent about women taking the political initiative and steering the political space of the squatter camps.⁴⁴ Moreover, the self-controlled nature of squatter settlements, such as Apex, became home to various criminal gangs. The most prominent of these in the settlements was Marashea.⁴⁵ The gang comprised primarily of Sotho men who had migrated from Lesotho to work in the mines on the East Rand and later in the Free State.⁴⁶ According to Kynoch, the gang was established in the East Rand mining compounds and quickly spread to dominate locations such as Newclare in the 1940s.⁴⁷ In Apex, however, Marashea were only one component of the camp's ever-increasing eclectic residence.

By 1954, the Apex population numbered 23 225 people.⁴⁸ This was contrary to what the Benoni authorities initially believed of the origins of the Africans who resided in Apex. Initially, they held that most came from the reserves. However, a survey conducted at the squatter camp revealed that 50% of the residents came from the peri-urban areas around Benoni, 25% from the town's "white areas", while 22% from the Old location and the Asiatic section.⁴⁹ Before the conclusion of the plans to establish a new township was completed in 1953, the Non-European Affairs Committee considered ways to peacefully relocate the 23 225 people resident in Apex to the new township which was being planned.⁵⁰ To ensure limited resistance from the residents who would be relocated to the new township, the Benoni authorities argued that before moving the first group of people, "an early start will have to be made by way of

⁴³ William Beinart, "A century of migrancy from Mpondoland," in *A long way home: Migrant worker worlds 1800-2014*, ed. Peter Delius, Laura Phillips and Fiona Rankin-Smith (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014), 101; Lauren Jarvis, "A chief is a chief by the women? The Nazaretha church, gender and traditional authority in Mtunzini, South Africa 1900-48," *The Journal of African History* 56, no. 1 (2015): 67; Martin Chanock, *the making of South African legal culture 1902-1936: Fear, favour and prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 18.

⁴⁴ Phil Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 71.

⁴⁵ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Non-European Affairs Committee: Planning of native townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11/09/1953.

⁴⁶ Gary Kynoch, *We are fighting the world: a history of the Marashea gangs in South Africa, 1947 – 1999* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2005), 13; Gary Kynoch, Marashea on the mines: Economic, social and criminal networks on the South African gold fields," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 1 (2000): 82; Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 65.

⁴⁷ Gary Kynoch, *We are fighting the world*, 14.

⁴⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 52.

⁴⁹ James Edward Mathewson, "The establishment of an African Bantu township: with special reference to Daveyton" (MA dissertation, Potchefstroom University for Christian higher education, 1955), 8.

⁵⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

propaganda to psychologically create a desire to live in the new native area.”⁵¹ In addition to the propaganda, the Benoni authorities had to devise a plan to ensure that the relocation logistics was as simple and attractive as possible for the residents.⁵² The first group that moved to the new township comprised of approximately 4 000 people.⁵³ Two factors stood out as possible impediments to the relocation. Firstly, transport, which was required, and the temporary shelter for the families during the night before the departure from Apex. Moreover, those who were moving had to dismantle their shacks. However, more shelters were required 48 hours after the arrival at the new area, while they re-erected shelters for themselves.⁵⁴

The Non-European Affairs committee concluded that before the move from Apex to the new township could be initiated, three temporary buildings had to be constructed: firstly, office accommodation for the staff at the new township, secondly, a beer hall, and lastly, a clinic.⁵⁵ As for shelter for those who were going to move to the new township, it was concluded that tents were preferred during the move.⁵⁶ Thus, 100 bell-tents were required, 30 of which was utilised at Apex, while the residents dismantled their shacks, and 70 at the new township site.⁵⁷ After the move, the tents were sold to other Africans in the transit camp which was going to be established within the new township, while houses were constructed.⁵⁸ The problem of logistics required a similar innovative strategy. The Benoni council concluded that four five-ton trucks, each with one trailer was required to move an average of 30 families per day. This implied that, moving at that rate would take the relocation six months to complete.⁵⁹

To ensure that the move transpired expeditiously, the Non-European Affairs committee suggested two teams of six, that is, one team to load and move the tents from Apex and the

⁵¹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

⁵⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 62.

other to off-load at the new location.⁶⁰ Like the tents, three of the trailers which were utilised for the relocation were sold, whilst the remaining one was utilised for the site and service scheme,⁶¹ as well as maintenance.⁶² The committee concluded that the disestablishment of Apex emergency camp would be financed through loans from the central government.⁶³ It was estimated that the first phases of the two projects, disestablishing apex and moving people to the new location would cost £167, 000.⁶⁴ Some funds for the relocation of Africans to the new township was drawn from the Native Services Levy Fund, which could only be accessed for construction.⁶⁵ The levy fund could only be used for what was termed as “link services” in the new township, which included, *inter alia*, the supply of water, access roads, reservoir, and main sewers. The Native Services Levy Fund could not finance the relocation itself.⁶⁶ The native services levy fund came from the Native Services Ley Act of 1952, which imposed a weekly levy of 2/6d on every employer who employed Africans.⁶⁷ Thus, the limitation of funding explained why the committee was eager to construct a beer hall, while the new township was still in its infant stages (site and service scheme). The use of beer halls to accrue funds to control and administer African urban locations officially began in 1908 when the Natal Legislative Assembly passed legislation which made provision for the establishment of municipal controlled beer monopoly.⁶⁸ In Daveyton, the committee calculated that the profits from the beer hall in the site and service scheme could fund the relocation of the remaining people at Apex and further complement loans to develop a new township.

⁶⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 63.

⁶¹ Site and service schemes were programmes whereby the government provides pieces of land in a designated location for residents to move into before the location is formally developed into a township. Other than land, in a site and service scheme, the government also provides basic amenities such as water, latrines and installs the electricity grid while houses are still under construction. The apartheid government utilised site and service schemes to clear squatter settlements. The programs were also utilised by the Chilean and Kenyan governments in the 1940s. See, Stephen K. Moyo and David J. Gross, “Sites and Services – And Subsidies: The economies of Low-Costing Housing in Developing countries,” *The World Bank Economic Review* 1, no. 2 (1987): 301; H.C Norwood, “Planning site and service housing,” *The Town Planning Review* 44, no. 4 (1973): 360.

⁶² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 63.

⁶³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 63.

⁶⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 63.

⁶⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 63.

⁶⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 (c)(1) (8): Minutes of the meeting of the Native Services Advisory Commission, held at the native commissioner’s office, Benoni, on Wednesday the 7/09/1955.

⁶⁷ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 19.

⁶⁸ Paul la Hausse, “*The struggle for the city: alcohol, the eMatsheni and popular culture in Durban, 1902-1936*” (Masters, University of Cape Town, 1984), 2.

The site and service schemes were not without controversy, as Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs indicated in a speech delivered to the Federated Chamber of Industry in 1954, in Cape Town. “The site and service scheme has been attacked as the creation of a large number of squatter areas.”⁶⁹ Certain local authorities viewed it as government-sanctioned squatting. However, Verwoerd insisted that the scheme provided those without proper housing a serviced plot of 60 by 40 feet and systematically, although gradually, also provided necessary amenities on the plot.⁷⁰ In the same speech, the minister highlighted a lack of funds, scarcity of building materials, and a lack of labour as the obstacles to construct many houses for urban Africans. Hence, the Minister stated that a site and service scheme was a better option to face the African housing problem compared to “turning our backs on it”.⁷¹ For Mathewson, just as for Verwoerd, a site and service scheme was a positive approach to alleviate overcrowding in the locations and a mechanism to eradicate squatter camps in favour of technically planned government-controlled locations.⁷² To ensure that these newly planned townships were implemented according to the state’s standards, a commission was established to plan how the townships would be planned.

3.3 Mentz Commission and the establishment of new townships

Squatter settlements such as Tent Town and Apex mushroomed, and this prompted the state authorities to seek housing solutions for the urban African population. In 1952, Verwoerd appointed the Mentz Commission to investigate the question of townships for Africans in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region.⁷³ The commission was chaired by F.E. Mentz, a National Party (NP) member of parliament for Westdene, and an ardent segregationist.⁷⁴ In 1945, Mentz requested that the government introduce legislation under which the local authorities were not only conferred power but compelled to give effect to the principle of segregation in the social, political and industrial spheres of South African life.⁷⁵ Moreover, in

⁶⁹ National Archives of South Africa, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban Bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

⁷⁰ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

⁷¹ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

⁷² NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

⁷³ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 80.

⁷⁴ Deon van Tonder, “First win the war, then clear the slums: A genesis of the Western Areas Removal Scheme, 1940-1949,” in *Apartheid’s genesis 1935-1962*, ed. Phil Bonner, Peter Delius and Deborah Posel (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001), 328.

⁷⁵ Van Tonder, “First win the war,” 328.

1949 he was one of the driving forces behind a petition which was sent to parliament to demand the removal of all Africans from the Western Areas.⁷⁶

The commission was presented as a “fact-finding body” which only investigated various proposals on the possibility of establishing townships and provided recommendations.⁷⁷ However, by 1955, the commission’s recommendations was utilised as the basis and guidelines to formulate government policy to develop African townships on the Witwatersrand, particularly in the East Rand.⁷⁸ Although, not everyone agreed with the Commission’s recommendations. On 26 November 1953, an article appeared in the northern edition of the *Advance* newspaper headlined: “NEW APARTHEID THREAT IN JO’BURG: Thousands more to be uprooted.”⁷⁹ The article highlighted the possible consequences of the pending implementation of the Mentz Commission’s recommendations in the Witwatersrand. The headline revealed that the proposed racial spatial planning which the Commission recommended was not accepted universally. However, this minor press setback did not deter the government from implementing the Commission’s recommendations. Apart from Mentz, the commission comprised of J.H. Moolman, a prominent figure in the Natural Resources and Development Council, M.C. Barker a leading figure in the Land Tenure Advisory Board, whilst C.A. Heald was influential in the Native Affairs Department.⁸⁰ The Commission formally began its work in August 1952 and completed its investigation in the same year.⁸¹ The Commission’s work coincided with the disestablishment of the Apex squatter camp and the establishment of the new township. This implied that the new township was modelled on the Mentz Commission’s recommendations. According to Mabin, the Commission’s mandate granted it powers to convene hearings in each of the Witwatersrand’s designated areas and consult with local authorities, businesses and interested parties.⁸²

However, Nieftagodien postulated that the Commission’s version of “consulting” with local authorities, businesses and other parties implied to check whether the stakeholders’ plans

⁷⁶ Van Tonder, “First win the war,” 328.

⁷⁷ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 81.

⁷⁸ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 81.

⁷⁹ University of the Witwatersrand Library, Historical Papers, Newspaper article, CULL001-2-45-01-jpeg.

⁸⁰ Historical papers research archive, the University of the Witwatersrand Library, ZA HPRA A1880-Roll 01-25, Mentz commission reports and documents (A1) (8), introduction to the Mentz committee report, 1953-1954.

⁸¹ Historical papers research archive, the University of the Witwatersrand Library, ZA HPRA A1880-Roll 01-25, Mentz commission reports and documents (A1) (8), introduction to the Mentz committee report, 1953-1954.

⁸² Alan Mabin, “Conflict, continuity and change: Locating properly planned native townships in the forties and fifties,” *South African planning history* 305, no. 308 (1993): 304.

conformed with its and Verwoerd's ideals of township planning.⁸³ If they disagreed, they were forced to abide by the Commission's plans. Moreover, consultations were inspired by the fact that during the Commission's investigations and recommendations, central government had not acquired authority and control over local municipalities to force them to adopt government policies.⁸⁴ It was not until 1972 that central government wrestled the authority to control urban townships from local municipalities and established administration boards.⁸⁵ This shifted the balance of power between the central and the local tiers of government with regard to the urban African population.

The Mentz Commission itself did not propose anything new to the African urban township establishment discourse. In fact, the Commission's recommendations had already implemented in townships such as Orlando and Kathorus.⁸⁶ However, the only novel aspect of the Commission was that its requests were official government policies, while previously, similar policies were mere conventional wisdom.⁸⁷ The Commission provided a detailed blueprint of how urban African townships from the 1950s would be laid out; the type of housing which could be constructed in the townships; which buildings could be constructed; and how basic amenities would be provided. From its recommendations, the commission inadvertently determined the monetary requirements essential to establish the townships in the PWV region. During the planning phase of the new township in Benoni, the Minister of Native Affairs decried the expense to house urban Africans whilst he simultaneously acknowledged the need.⁸⁸ Thus, the solution to the fiscal dilemma to house Africans required a multipronged approach rather than a sole mechanism to provide funds. However, before the issue of finances and housing could be discussed, the government authorities needed to determine how many urban Africans needed to be relocated and housed. Consequently, a survey was conducted.

⁸³ NASA, CAD, GGR 40, 14/1/4, Persverklaring oor Lokasie-bepanning in die Pretoria tot Vaalrivier-streek insluitende die Witwatersrand (Press release of Dr H.F. Verwoerd announcing the formation of the Mentz Committee in 1952).

⁸⁴ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 82.

⁸⁵ Richard Gordon Humphries, "The origins and subsequent development of administration boards" (PhD thesis, Rhodes University, 1983), 1.

⁸⁶ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Ekurhuleni*, 94; Philip Bonner and Lauren Segal, *Soweto: A History* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1998): 91. Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, *Alexandra: A History* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001), 17.

⁸⁷ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 83.

⁸⁸ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

3.4 Socio-economic survey and the purchase of land

By the late 1940s, most of the British African colonies experienced an economic surge, while there was a primary commodity shortage elsewhere in the world.⁸⁹ South Africa also shared in this prosperity during the time, primarily due to manufacturing and mining. During the Second World War, manufacturing overtook mining.⁹⁰ Thus, by the early 1950s, the manufacturing industry's contribution towards South Africa's GDP doubled compared to mining.⁹¹ As a result, during the mid-1950s, it appeared that the South African economy was becoming less dependent on the mining industry as its primary driver to such an extent that by 1951, the Gross National Income stood at £1 248.4 million; mining only contributed 12.3% to the (GNI); while manufacturing contributed 22.3% and industries such as agriculture and commerce contributed the balance.⁹²

Despite a decline of several African economies during the late 1950s, South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) more than doubled during the decade and grew at an annual rate of 9,2 per cent.⁹³ In effect, the central government experienced a steady and active economy from which the Benoni authorities could borrow to fund the establishment of the new township. Moreover, during 1953, when the Non-European Affairs Committee met on September 11 to discuss the disestablishment of Apex, the Native Levy Fund balance stood at £44,458.11. A sum of £36,000.0 was tied up in investments, which left a balance of £8,458.8.11 for the local authorities to utilise during the 1953/54 fiscal year.⁹⁴ Furthermore, a charge against the Services Levy Fund could only be approved for specific items and the purchase of land was not one of these. Thus, the Benoni authorities had to determine alternative approaches to raise funds to purchase land for a new township. However, before the land could be bought, the authorities had to determine the exact number of people who would be relocated from Apex and Benoni's Old location. Hence, a "socio-economic survey" was conducted in late 1953.⁹⁵

The findings would determine the land required for the new township; base number of houses; sewage system; including electricity and water supply. According to James Edward

⁸⁹ Stuart Jones, "The decline of the South African economy 1980-2000," *South African Journal of Economic History* 17, no. 1 (2010): 50.

⁹⁰ Stuart Jones and Andre Muller, *The South African economy, 1919-1990* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 129.

⁹¹ Jones and Muller, *The South African economy*, 129.

⁹² Jones and Muller, *The South African economy*, 129.

⁹³ Jones, "The decline," 51.

⁹⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 64.

⁹⁵ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban Bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

Mathewson, the director of Non-European Affairs in Benoni, a sample survey of 1700 families was utilised for the survey.⁹⁶ In total, the survey comprised of 1000 families from Apex squatter camp and 700 from the Old location.⁹⁷ The survey revealed that there were 70 childless couples at Apex squatter camp and 119 in the Old location.⁹⁸ In contrast, there were 1822 couples with children at Apex and 966 in the Old location. Furthermore, there were 1086 children under the age of 6 at Apex and 581 at the Old location, while children 7 to 16 numbered 1645 in Apex and 666 in the Old location.⁹⁹ There were only 372 children aged 17 to 20 in Apex and 136 at the Old location.¹⁰⁰ The children's statistics revealed that the new township would be a long-term solution to house future urban African generations, as much as it was a solution for the present.

The survey also determined the economic circumstances of the families from Apex and the Old location. It was determined that an average family at Apex brought in £15.5 a month, while the Old location £15.7.¹⁰¹ However, the authorities did not consider any measures to confirm the salary statistics. It was established that the wives in Apex residents accounted for 26.5% of the house's income; while those in the Old location, the salary accounted for 29% of the family's average monthly income.¹⁰² Another significant difference between the female residents in Apex and their counterparts in the Old location was that the latter were in formal employment and earned £3. 10 on average a month.¹⁰³ The women in the Apex squatter camp generally worked in the informal sector of the economy. It was also noted that these statistics were gathered from a sample size of only 1000 families in Apex and 700 in the Old location.

In terms of children aged 17 and above, the survey revealed that 69,7% of those who resided in the Apex squatter camp; and 72.1% in the Old location were employed (type of employment is unspecified).¹⁰⁴ And despite what could be deemed as a methodological flaw of the survey, for example, utilisation of a small sample size and relying only on what the residents were willing to share with the government officials, the survey revealed selected residents' ability to pay rent in the new township. Moreover, it provided insight into which of the residents could utilise the beer hall. Another significant factor of the statistics was the number of families who

⁹⁶ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 8.

⁹⁷ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 9.

⁹⁸ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 9.

⁹⁹ Humphriss and Thomas, "*Benoni*," 121.

¹⁰⁰ Humphriss and Thomas, "*Benoni*," 121.

¹⁰¹ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 9.

¹⁰² Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 9.

¹⁰³ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 9.

¹⁰⁴ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 10.

would be able to or intended to build their own homes.¹⁰⁵ According to Mathewson, only 1% of the residents from both the Old location and Apex preferred to build their own homes. The majority wanted to live in municipal houses.¹⁰⁶ However, 11.75% indicated an interest to purchase houses erected by the Benoni local authority.¹⁰⁷

After the statistics from the survey was calculated and the plans to move the squatter residents from Apex was finalised, the Benoni authorities sought to acquire appropriate land to establish the township. Thus, a “land finding committee” was appointed to acquire a possible location for the township. The committee comprised of councillor W.A. Davey, Councillor George Watt, Messrs. Wronsky and Turton from the Department of Native Affairs, Mr Ealse, the mining commissioner and Mr Spyker from the South African Railways Administration.¹⁰⁸ The committee considered two areas: one to the North of Benoni and the other to the East.¹⁰⁹ Both pieces of land was approximately the same distance from Benoni and constituted, according to the Benoni authorities, the nearest land to the town suitable for native housing.¹¹⁰ The first essential task for the committee regarding the purchase of the land was to ensure that both options complied with the Group Areas Act of 1950 (No. 41 of 1950),¹¹¹ along with Verwoerd’s vision for urban townships in the East Rand. Thus, both pieces of land had to be a distance from Benoni to allow for a “buffer zone” between the township and town.¹¹²

The area to the north proffered three advantages: firstly, it was offered to the council, however, the unwilling sellers of the land in the East had to be threatened with expropriation; secondly, it was available at half the price compared to the East; and thirdly, no inconveniences such as mining surface rights difficulties and no compensation was sought to effect enhancements.¹¹³ Despite these apparent and profitable advantages which favoured the land in the north, the Benoni authorities agreed on the land East because of an existing railway line which served

¹⁰⁵ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 124.

¹⁰⁶ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 125.

¹⁰⁷ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 126.

¹⁰⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹⁰⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹¹⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹¹¹ Alan Mabin, “Comprehensive Segregation: The Origins of the Group Areas Act and Its Planning Apparatuses,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992): 406.

¹¹² Noor Nieftagodien, “The making of apartheid in Springs: Group areas and removals” (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995), 81.

¹¹³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11.09.1953.

it.¹¹⁴ For Mathewson, a site should be selected due to its proximity to the work place and the distance from the town centre.¹¹⁵ Given Mathewson's position as the Director of Non-European Affairs in Benoni and his views on the relationship between work, travel and income of the township dwellers, it was not surprising why the land with the established mode of travel was selected, despite the many advantages of the land in the north.

After the land in the east was selected as the appropriate site for the township, the approval from the Minister of Native Affairs and the administrator was required in principle to negotiate for the purchase of the land.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the scheme to purchase land and provide housing in the township would be financed by the National Housing Funds.¹¹⁷ In that instance, additional approval was required from the National Housing and Planning Commission (NHPC).¹¹⁸ The next step was to communicate with the respective owner of the prospective land the council intended to purchase. The owner would have to determine the price for the land. The local authority appointed evaluators to evaluate and submit an evaluation of the area.¹¹⁹ The land which was selected to establish the township was initially utilised as a farm.¹²⁰ The owner proposed to sell it at £150.0.0 per acre, whilst the Benoni Council recommended to the housing commission to pay £225.0.0 per morgen.¹²¹

Due to the urgency to solve the squatting and a limitation of funds challenges, the council offered the owner £60.0.0 per morgen for 880 acres of land. When the owner was reluctant to sell, the council threatened to expropriate the land whether the seller agreed to the price or not.¹²² Expropriation proceedings could be instituted either in terms of the Housing Act (No. 35 of 1920), or the Slums Act (No. 53 of 1934).¹²³ With regard to the Housing Act, an arbitrator would be appointed to determine the price of the land; while with the latter, the land would be

¹¹⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11.09.1953. 3.

¹¹⁵ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 126.

¹¹⁶ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 27.

¹¹⁷ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 27.

¹¹⁸ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 27.

¹¹⁹ Benoni Municipal Archives (Hereafter BMA), Non-European Affairs Committee, minutes, meeting, 11/11/1949.

¹²⁰ National Archives of South Africa, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 22 November 1956.

¹²¹ NASA, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 22 November 1956.

¹²² NASA, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 22 November 1956.

¹²³ NASA, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 22 November 1956.

summarily expropriated and its value determined by an order from the court.¹²⁴ In a letter to the Town Clerk of Benoni in 1956, the Holfontein farm owners, complained that to avoid expropriation of their land, they would sell it at £100.0,0. However, their representative lamented “we are not willing sellers’ even at the new proposed price.¹²⁵ For the Benoni council, however, it did not matter whether the owners were willing to sell or not. The council was set on establishing the township on Holfontein farm. A portion of the farm was purchased in May 1953 for a total of £122, 500.0,0, the transfer cost a further £4, 054.16.0. In total a sum of £126, 554.16.0 was paid.¹²⁶ After the price of the land price was negotiated and purchased, the area had to be proclaimed as a native township in terms of the Urban Areas Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945).¹²⁷ After the proclamation, the layout of the township commenced. Of significance during the planning phase of the township was funding. Mathewson asserted that the “the key to planning must be to keep constructional costs low, thereby saving high rentals and allowing more dwellings to be constructed”.¹²⁸

In terms of the potential aesthetic design of the houses, a blueprint had already been drawn up by the National Building Research Institute (NBRI) engineers in 1951. They also designed homes for KwaThema.¹²⁹ However, as the work of Rebecca Ginsburg in Soweto during the late 1950s revealed, the several Africans who inhabited these homes invested money for alterations. Some plastered the walls, laid floors, and installed interior doors.¹³⁰ The residents undertook these endeavours despite the ever-looming possibility of eviction. The planning of the township also included social control of the African residents which was considered very important. Hence, the township was designed such that there was only one main access road to and from the township.¹³¹ After the land was purchased; townships plans drawn and accepted by the Minister of Native Affairs, the residents from Apex emergency camp were moved to the site and service scheme. However, due to delayed access to funding, the move was gradual. The Native Services Levy Fund could be utilised after the township layout was completed and

¹²⁴ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 27.

¹²⁵ NASA, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 22 November 1956.

¹²⁶ NASA, NTS, 4987, 125/313 (C)(1)(8), Benoni, Rooieskema: Daveyton, Sewage Scheme Daveyton, Project 9, 15 October 1956.

¹²⁷ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 30.

¹²⁸ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 34.

¹²⁹ Hannah Le Roux, “Designing KwaThema: cultural inscriptions in the model township,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 45, no. 2 (2019): 274.

¹³⁰ Rebecca Ginsburg, “Now I stay in a house: Renovating the matchbox in apartheid era Soweto,” *African Studies* 52, no. 2 (2019): 128.

¹³¹ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 34.

approved. During the layout phase, the central government, along with Mathewson, organised the township along ethnic lines.

3.5 Ethnic zoning a ‘modern model’ township

On September 1953, the *Benoni Bantu Bulletin*, a state-issued newspaper headlined: “DAVEYTON: the B.B.B is proud to announce that your future model township has been given a name...”.¹³² According to the newspaper, the name was selected by the African population in the area and paid homage to W.A. Davey, the mayor of Benoni at the time.¹³³ Furthermore, the newspaper highlighted the plenitude of advantages the residents who moved from Apex emergency camp to Daveyton would now enjoy. The allocation of residents in the site and service scheme was not haphazard. Instead, the residents were allocated housing according to ethnic groups.¹³⁴ Although, by 1955, the ethnic grouping policy had already been rejected outright by two township advisory boards in the Witwatersrand.¹³⁵ Thus, to inhibit any further rejection, it was applied during the layout phase of the township. This gave the Benoni authorities time to manipulate the allocation of housing according to the policy.¹³⁶ The ethnic grouping policy was not applied with the same enthusiasm and determination as the Group Areas Act. Hence, townships in, for example, East London were established on an ethnic blind basis.¹³⁷

The government signalled its intention to promote and politicise ethnicity in 1951 when it promulgated the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951),¹³⁸ which aimed to elevate the status of the chiefs in the reserves.¹³⁹ Initially, this Act did not apply to urban areas. However, it was

¹³² National Archives of South Africa, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native Township, Benoni Bantu Bulletin, September 1953.

¹³³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native Township, Benoni Bantu Bulletin, September 1953.

¹³⁴ Gordon Pirie, “Ethno-Linguistic zoning in south African black townships,” *The Royal Geographical Society* 16, no. 4 (1984): 291; Paula Morris, “A History of Black Housing in South Africa (South Africa Foundation, 1981), 50.

¹³⁵ Pirie, “Ethno-Linguistic zoning,” 291.

¹³⁶ AJ Christopher, *The atlas of changing South Africa* (London: Routledge, 1994), 123.

¹³⁷ Christopher, *The atlas*, 123.

¹³⁸ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 158.

¹³⁹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 158; for a more in-depth analysis of the formation and politicization of ethnicity, see, Sekibakiba Lekgoathi, “Ethnicity and identity: struggle and contestation in the making of the northern Transvaal Ndebele, ca. 1860-2005” (PhD thesis, University of Minnesota, 2006), 5; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001), 23; Adam Heribert, “The politics of ethnic identity: comparing South Africa,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 3 (2010): 36; Allen Isaacman and Derek Peterson, “Making the Chikunda: Military slavery and ethnicity in Southern Africa, 1750-1900,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no. 2 (2003): 34; Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (Boston Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1969); Leroy Vail, “Preface,” in *The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa*, ed.

an indication of the direction the government was heading regarding ethnicity. The aim of ethnic grouping was to impose chiefs or “tribal authorities” in urban areas and simultaneously cause tension between the various ethnic groups in the township.¹⁴⁰ However, to initiate and execute the policy of ethnic zoning in Daveyton, the local Benoni authorities had to establish the ethnic composition of the people who moved into the new township. This goal was achieved through the socio-economic survey which was held at Apex squatter and the Old location.¹⁴¹ According to the survey, the Nguni, comprised of the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele, and totalled 57.15% of the 6127 families who would move to Daveyton.¹⁴² While the Sotho, which comprised of Northern, Southern and Western Sotho, totalled 35.69% and the Tsonga, Venda and others 7.16%.¹⁴³ Before Daveyton, this three-fold style to divide African ethnic groups was the norm. However, in 1955, Daveyton became the first township in which the Nguni, Sotho and Tsonga was divided further.¹⁴⁴

The Swazi and the Ndebele were allocated a single ward although both groups were culturally different (see Fig. 1).¹⁴⁵ Moreover, Lekgoathi’s work explains that there are specific minor differences within the Ndebele, for example, lineage, chiefs and language.¹⁴⁶ However, such nuances were not considered when the township residents were grouped. Mathewson provided three reasons or “advantages” for ethnical grouping in Daveyton: firstly, administration. According to Mathewson, the “best representation of any particular group of individuals was by one from that group.”¹⁴⁷ Therefore, in each of Daveyton’s planned ethnic group areas (see Fig. 2), a committee would be elected and referred to as a ward committee. The latter would comprise of several members, each elected to represent a block of houses.¹⁴⁸ The central

Leroy Vail (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 2-18; Enocent Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012), 4-30.

¹⁴⁰ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 158; and Pirie, “Ethno-Linguistic zoning,” 291.

¹⁴¹ Christopher, *The atlas*, 123.

¹⁴² University of London, SAOS Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955; Also see, Bonner and Lambert, “*Batons and bare head*,” 343.

¹⁴³ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁴⁴ Christopher, *The atlas*, 123.

¹⁴⁵ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban Bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 124.

¹⁴⁶ Sekibakiba Lekgoathi, “Chiefs, migrants and North Ndebele ethnicity in the context of surrounding homeland politics, 1965-1978,” *African Studies* 62, no. 1 (2003): 56; Sekibakiba Lekgoathi, “From homeboy networks to broader ethnic affiliations: Migrants from Zebediela and shifting identities on the Rand, 1930s – 1970s,” *African studies* 73, no. 3 (2014): 446.

¹⁴⁷ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁴⁸ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

function of the ward committees was to settle disputes within the township according to the “law and customs used among that particular group.”¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, they would also alert their township advisory board on any matters which affected their ward through an advisory board member.¹⁵⁰ The ward committee members served as an umbilical cord, and connected the main township advisory board and a particular block of houses. To ensure that the ward committees were legitimate and had authority, Mathewson said that native law and custom (no clarity was provided between what differentiates native law and custom but stated that these two were distinct types of rules to govern Africans’ behaviour) applied to the Africans in the urban areas.¹⁵¹ However, native law or custom was void in instances where it contradicted government public policy and natural justice.¹⁵²




Figure 1: Ethnic wards in Daveyton, 1955¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵⁰ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵¹ University of London, SAOS Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵² SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵³ Christopher, *The atlas*, 123.

The second advantage according to Mathewson was mother-tongue education at schools in various ethnic wards. To fulfil this end objective, it was attempted to construct a school in each of the major ethnic group areas.¹⁵⁴ The final justification by Mathewson was the preservation of culture.¹⁵⁵ The authorities argued that through ethnic grouping in the urban areas, kinship bonds between the Africans in the township and their counterparts in the reserves would be strengthened.¹⁵⁶ When Oliver Tambo, the acting secretary general of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1955 was made aware of ethnic grouping in the townships, he condemned the policy and described it as an attempt by the government to implement divide and rule between the “unified African populace”.¹⁵⁷




Figure 2: Population distribution according to ethnic group¹⁵⁸

The Benoni administration and the central government were not the first state functionaries to divide urban spaces ethnically in Africa.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ National Archives of South Africa, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native Township, Topographical map of Daveyton township, September 1954.

¹⁵⁵ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson's address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵⁶ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson's address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

¹⁵⁷ Wits Historical Papers, ZA HPR AD1812-E-Ea-Ea1, "Ethnic Grouping" by Walter Sisulu, 27/09/1955.

¹⁵⁸ Christopher, *The atlas*, 149.

¹⁵⁹ Roza Ismagilova, "Ethnicity and federalism: The case of Ethiopia," *Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente* 59, no. 2 (2004), 183.

In Daveyton, the policy of ethnic grouping was criticised by the ANC as well as the Benoni branch of the Congress of Democrats who argued that ethnic grouping would produce an environment for ethnic conflict between the various African groups in the area.¹⁶⁰ The criticism against the policy was justified and confirmed when in 1956, a few months after the residents moved into the township, so-called “tribal clashes” occurred.¹⁶¹ Between December 1956 and March 1957, intermittent clashes occurred between youth from the Xhosa section and the Swazi/Ndebele (grouped in one area).¹⁶² The clashes were sparked by an attack on a party in the Xhosa section by Swazi youth.¹⁶³ This was followed by retaliatory attacks, which exacerbated the situation further.¹⁶⁴ By the time the dust settled and the situation calmed, there were eight reported deaths and multiple injuries, which was partially due to certain adults who also joined in the clashes.¹⁶⁵

The township manager claimed that the reports of the clashes was exaggerated; and reiterated that “ethnic grouping was not even a contributory cause of the trouble”.¹⁶⁶ Mathewson pinned the reason for the clashes on what he described as “unsatisfactory living conditions” in the township.¹⁶⁷ As an ardent advocate for ethnic grouping in Daveyton, Mathewson had to blame the reason for the clashes on something other than ethnic grouping. In fact, a year before, he argued and accentuated that the idea of ethnic grouping would not result in ethnic conflict.¹⁶⁸ Thus, he could not go back on his conviction, although approximately two hundred houses were damaged during the conflicts (97 houses from the Xhosa section and 100 in the Swazi/Ndebele area).¹⁶⁹ Instead of acknowledging the ethnic element during the clashes, Mathewson argued that the solution and inhibition of any other similar incidents was to provide

¹⁶⁰ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶¹ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶² NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶³ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 160.

¹⁶⁴ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶⁵ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶⁶ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁶⁷ NASA, MAT 352.75, Biblioteek: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 140.

¹⁶⁸ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29/03/1955.

¹⁶⁹ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

adequate housing, proper organised leisure activities, and space for churches to exercise their influence.¹⁷⁰

Whatever the underlying reasons for the conflicts, once these started, the residents from both areas mobilised along ethnic lines to attack and defend their respective areas. Despite these incidents, other towns in the East Rand followed suit and implemented ethnic grouping, while others implemented the policy in tandem with Benoni. In 1954, for example, the Brakpan council concluded that it would stratify Tsakane into eight ethnic sections.¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, the policy did not meet with success in every area. In Vosloorus, the council initially planned to divide the township into seven sections: Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, Tswana, Swazi, Ndebele and North Sotho, however, it only succeeded in creating two sections, Nguni and Sotho.¹⁷² The reason for this failure was the pressure to remove Africans hastily from Stirtonville. Hence, there was no time to manipulate housing placements.¹⁷³ However, after the residents settled, the council attempted to reshuffle them into the seven ethnic reserves within the township but had to acknowledge that “a further removal into tribal groupings would cause dissatisfaction amongst the settled residents”.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, township construction had to progress to eradicate and inhibit further squatter camps. To ensure the Benoni authorities could construct the houses hastily, the levy fund had to be utilised.

3.6 Significance of the Native Levy Fund in Daveyton

By 1954/55, Daveyton comprised of site and service stands.¹⁷⁵ Internal roads had to be graded, water reticulation laid on standpipes, install electricity, and construct a sewage system.¹⁷⁶ All these services required funds. Although, Mathewson deemed purified water as one of the most essential amenities required by the residents for drinking, but it was also integral in the construction of homes.¹⁷⁷ Thus, a £140, 000 was withdrawn from the Native Revenue Account

¹⁷⁰ NASA, BAO, 24, 436/332, files of the department of native administration and development, Benoni Town Council to The Native Commissioner, ‘Disturbances: Daveyton Bantu Township’, 18/03/1957.

¹⁷¹ NASA, MBP, 2/2/859, 14/6/25, Municipality of Brakpan, Minutes of the Non-European Affairs Department, 27/09/1954.

¹⁷² NASA, BAO, 1048, A14/ 1077, Boksburg Bantu affairs Commissioner to the secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 25/06/1965.

¹⁷³ NASA, BAO, 1048, A14/ 1077, Boksburg Bantu affairs Commissioner to the secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 25/06/1965.

¹⁷⁴ NASA, BAO, 1048, A14/ 1077, Boksburg Bantu affairs Commissioner to the secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 25/06/1965.

¹⁷⁵ NASA, MB, 1/4/22, Minutes of the Benoni native committee, 12/08/1954.

¹⁷⁶ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 161.

¹⁷⁷ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 167.

to fund the external water supply, along with the internal water reticulation.¹⁷⁸ The Benoni council proclaimed in 1954 that during the early stages of the development of Daveyton, a large portion of the funding would be drawn from the Native Revenue Account; particularly for services such as administration, health, water supply and general maintenance.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, during the same fiscal year, the Minister for Native Affairs approved £30, 000 from the Native Services Levy Account to supply the initial water to Daveyton.¹⁸⁰ It was only after the Minister of Native Affairs' approval that tenders was called for piping, valves and special fittings for the main water pump.¹⁸¹

A total of £56, 000 was approved by the Minister of Native Affairs for the provision of access roads, including a railway subway, which was charged against the Native Services Levy Fund.¹⁸² However, the supply of electricity to the township proved a daunting task. According to an electrical engineer hired by the Benoni Town Council, the first requirement to electrify Daveyton was to acquire a supply allocation from the supply commission.¹⁸³ However, due to the restrictive supply conditions which was experienced in Benoni, the engineer cautioned that difficulty would be experienced to acquire an allocation for Daveyton.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, the engineer suggested that the council apply for a power supply in proportion. However, before submitting an application, the council was advised to consider the loading which they expected in the following five to ten years.¹⁸⁵ The engineer estimated the cost of the electrifying project at approximately £82, 000.¹⁸⁶ The capacity to supply was 10, 000 KW to install the cable and 5, 000 KW for the transformer capacity.¹⁸⁷ The residents would be charged according to the readings on the meters which would be installed in each house. The engineer also recommended the utilisation of overhead mains and underground service connection cables as

¹⁷⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹⁷⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹⁸⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/5, 11/09/1953.

¹⁸¹ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Meeting of the Daveyton Committee, 24/02/1954.

¹⁸² NASA, NTS, 125/313 c (1) (6), Letter from the native Commissioner to the Secretary of native Affairs, 14 July 1954.

¹⁸³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁸⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁸⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁸⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁸⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

in Wattville or consider underground mains and service connection cables.¹⁸⁸ Regarding the overhead mains, the approximate cost to reticulate an area with 2, 000 houses would be approximately £36, 000, while for the underground mains, the approximate cost to reticulate an area with the same number of houses would cost £53, 000.¹⁸⁹ The choice for a cash-strapped Benoni council was obvious. However, the engineer cautioned that experience had proved that the maintenance costs of an overhead distribution scheme in native townships was high. The primary reason, argued the engineer, was the “inability of the native to refrain from throwing pieces of wire across the overhead lines”.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, the engineer recommended that the more costly underground mains scheme be installed in Daveyton. In terms of finances, the underground electrification mains scheme in an area which comprised of 13 000 houses would cost approximately £344, 500.¹⁹¹ In light of these recommendations, the council applied for a loan of £106, 000 which was charged against the Native Revenue Account.¹⁹² The council only requested a loan of £106, 000 because the first group to move to Daveyton comprised of 4, 000 residents. The remainder of the electrification project was financed through funds from the beer hall, which was utilised by the 4, 000 residents who had already settled in the township.

3.7 Financing housing development in Daveyton

The most daunting task for the central government and the local Benoni authorities was the construction of houses for the expanding urban African population. According to Nieftagodien, “the rapid increase in the black urban population was not matched by a programme of housing provision by the state”.¹⁹³ The disparity between an increasing population and the state’s inability to house them was not unique to the Union South Africa. In post-World War 2, Rhodesia, the rapid war-time industrial growth resulted in more Africans immigrating to the urban areas without concomitant expansion of housing and services by the state.¹⁹⁴ This resulted in rampant squatting.¹⁹⁵ In the late 1940s, it was estimated that a staggering 15,000

¹⁸⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁸⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁹⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁹¹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁹² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2): The establishment of Daveyton Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee, Planning of Native Townships: Daveyton (NE. 21/10), 11.09.1953.

¹⁹³ Noor Nieftagodien, “The making of apartheid in Springs: group areas and forced removals” (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995), 22.

¹⁹⁴ Hutton, “Seeing like a second city,” 2.

¹⁹⁴ Hutton, “Seeing like a second city,” 2.

¹⁹⁵ Hutton, “Seeing like a second city,” 2.

Africans lived in overcrowded and unsanitary municipal locations, hostels, cottages and rudimentary shacks on the outskirts of Salisbury, Rhodesia.¹⁹⁶ A similar situation troubled Belgian authorities during the 1950s in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi cities, which were under its authority.¹⁹⁷

The peri-urban areas of urban cities such as Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani all experienced an increase in *Bidonvilles* or slums during the two years post-World War.¹⁹⁸ In Kenya, the British colonial government forced employers to house their employees. However, the demand for housing far surpassed the supply in urban spaces.¹⁹⁹ By the 1950s, the Union government enacted the Housing Act (Act No. 10 of 1957), and established a Bantu Housing Board to manage urban African housing.²⁰⁰ The board's functions were similar to those of the National Housing Commission, which provided housing for people classified as white, coloured and Indian.²⁰¹ However, as Parnell argues, the financing of houses for whites during the early 19th century was also disproportionate. While it was initially established to assist the poorest, the housing loans were only granted to those who complied with the loan conditions.²⁰² One of the conditions was that the individual must have regular employment, which disqualified the majority of the newly arrived poor whites in Johannesburg and other urban areas.²⁰³ The National Housing Commission was established to correct such discrepancies. Therefore, by 1957, when the Bantu Housing Board was established, an example of how it should operate already existed. The board, which comprised of six members was appointed by the Department of Administration and Development and met once a quarter.²⁰⁴ The executive committee of the Bantu Housing Board comprised of five members who met every fortnight to fulfil the objectives prescribed by the board.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁶ Hutton, "Seeing like a second city," 2.

¹⁹⁷ Sofie Boonen and Johan Lagae, "Ruashi, a Pessac in Congo? On the Design, Inhabitation, and Transformation of a 1950s Neighbourhood in Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo," in *The politics of housing in (post) colonial Africa*, ed. Martina Barker-Ciganikova, Kirsten R  ther, Daniela Waldburger, Carl-Philipp Bodenstein (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020), 67.

¹⁹⁸ Boonen and Lagae, *Ruashi, a Pessac in Congo*, 67.

¹⁹⁹ Alison Hay and Richard Harris, "Shauri ya Sera Kali': the colonial regime of urban housing in Kenya to 1939," *Urban History* 34, no. 3(2007): 512.

²⁰⁰ Paula Morris, *Black housing*, 44.

²⁰¹ Paula Morris, *Black housing*, 45.

²⁰² Susan Parnell, "Council housing provision whites in Johannesburg: 1920-1955" (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987), 50.

²⁰³ Parnell, "Council provision," 51.

²⁰⁴ Morris, *Black housing*, 36.

²⁰⁵ Morris, *Black housing*, 36.

Moreover, the board was established to consider local authorities applications for loans which applied to the acquisition of land, maintenance and administration of housing schemes, and formulation of policies to grant the loans.²⁰⁶ Just as the basic amenities was financed through the Native Services Levy Fund, housing was financed through the National Housing Fund. All expenditures incurred by the National Housing Commission and the Bantu Housing Board for urban Africans was defrayed from the National Housing Fund.²⁰⁷ The fund comprised of capital from loan funds voted by parliament.²⁰⁸ As Morris postulated, the National Housing Fund was designed as a “revolving fund”.²⁰⁹ This implied that the annual capital voted by parliament was not to be repaid to the treasury; instead, it was added to the capital of the fund.²¹⁰ Mathewson argued that, in Daveyton, to enhance the housing project, it was wise to collaborate between a departmental building section and private contractors.²¹¹

By 1955, the Minister of Native Affairs decided that the cost of a house constructed with state finances should not exceed £250.²¹² This directive compromised the structural durability and longevity of the constructed houses because local authorities had to purchase cheap material for the construction. The initial target for the local authorities was to construct 8 000 houses within the first two years.²¹³ The Benoni authorities concluded that through the collaborative efforts of private contractors and the department, a minimum output of 20 houses per working day could be sustained. Within two years and a few months, 8184 houses were erected in Daveyton, which was partially due to the private contractor’s construction ability to construct 17 houses per day.²¹⁴ Furthermore, the speed and efficiency with which the houses were constructed was facilitated by the Building Workers Act (No.27 of 1951). The legislation legalised Africans to be trained as builders and work for half the wages compared to their white counterparts and thus, increased the number of labours constructing a house.²¹⁵

²⁰⁶ Morris, *Black housing*, 37.

²⁰⁷ DM Calderwood, “Native housing in South Africa” (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1953), 6.

²⁰⁸ Calderwood, “Native housing,” 7.

²⁰⁹ Morris, *Black housing*, 37.

²¹⁰ Morris, *Black housing*, 37.

²¹¹ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 82.

²¹² NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 97.

²¹³ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 111.

²¹⁴ . NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 110.

²¹⁵ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 14.

The effects of the Building Workers Act were immediate. For example, employment of African builders instead of their white counterparts reduced the cost to construct a house in Daveyton from approximately £300 to as little as £178.²¹⁶ This conformed with the Minister of Native Affairs £250 per house directive.²¹⁷ The Services Levy Fund was also instrumental to establish and develop townships in the Union. Between 1952 and 1960, expenditure of over £15 million was approved from the Services Levy Fund nationally.²¹⁸ Due to its significant squatter problem, Benoni received the fifth largest spend in the country of £968 634.²¹⁹ However, not all the money was utilised for its intended purpose. In 1958, the Provincial Auditor of the Transvaal reported that the Benoni Town Council had incurred wasteful expenditure of £65, 679 related to its house and latrine projects in Daveyton.²²⁰ These facilities were erected with funds from the Native Revenue Account.²²¹ The Council initially reduced the number of houses and latrines to 216 and the work was undertaken departmentally at a cost of £6,161,11 for the latrines and £37, 342,6 for the houses respectively. This resulted in an outlay more than the contract price of £65,679,10.²²²

The Benoni authority appointed a sub-committee to investigate the loss. The investigation revealed that progress payments were made to the contracted company, Woolmark Ltd, based on certificates it had presented by its representatives.²²³ Apparently, the Non-European Affairs Department did not check whether the certificates were correct and valid before approving.²²⁴ This oversight by the department, according to the investigating officer, “left the way open for abuse.”²²⁵ The department’s neglect extended beyond failing to check the contracts it awarded. Evidence hereof relates from 4 October 1956, when 2000 latrines were paid for (which were supposed to have been completed by the payment date) until 6 August 1957, no inspection was

²¹⁶ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 14.

²¹⁷ NASA, MAT 352.75, Library: JE Mathewson: The establishment of an urban bantu township (Daveyton), 1957, 98.

²¹⁸ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 168.

²¹⁹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 168.

²²⁰ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²¹ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²² NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²³ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²⁴ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²⁵ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

conducted to ensure whether the construction had been completed.²²⁶ The lack of inspection was apparent on 6 August 1957, when only 862 of 2000 latrines had been completed.²²⁷ After the investigation, the National Housing Authority requested that the £65,679,10 be paid back as soon as possible.²²⁸ Mathewson reported that £5000 was paid back and the Benoni town treasurer undertook to advance the balance of £60,000 to the Native Revenue Account interest-free for 20 years so that the council could repay the National Housing Fund.²²⁹ The conclusion of the investigation of the latrines and housing projects prompted the Bantu Housing Board executive to launch an investigation into its contracts. It was revealed that the Benoni Council had “overpaid” the housing contracts. The Bantu Housing Board tried to establish why “the costs of the two-roomed dwellings are higher than those of the three-roomed dwellings”.²³⁰ Unfortunately, the wasteful expenditure of funds designated for African urban housing further lengthened the waiting list.

The houses erected at Daveyton comprised of two bedrooms, that is, a living room, kitchen and a bathroom. Certain homes could not be extended.²³¹ The cost of a single house in Daveyton was divided as follows: materials £160.13.11; individual assigned to the stand had to look after the materials themselves after delivery to the site; cost of labour was set at £43.9.6; provision of latrine superstructure and the pit at £20.0.0; fencing site at £11.0.0; transport and supervision at £3.0.0; and contingencies at £16.7. If executed correctly, everything would cost £238.0.0.²³² To generate revenue from housing, the government phased out the state-subsidy or sub-economic housing in favour of economic housing for Africans in the townships.²³³ This implied that the residents had to pay a much higher rent than at the Apex squatter camp or the old Benoni location. For some residents, the rent soared from 15s to £3 a month.²³⁴ To justify that

²²⁶ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²⁷ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²⁸ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²²⁹ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Benoni, Memo, Town Council of Benoni: Wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of contracts in connection with erection of houses and latrines EX national Housing Fund, 17/11/1958.

²³⁰ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Letter from the National Housing office to the executive committee of the Bantu housing board, Benoni: Daveyton: Economic Housing scheme for natives: advance of £2,020, 943, 27 April 1959.

²³¹ Owen Crankshaw, “Class, race and residence in black Johannesburg, 1923-1970,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 18, no. 4(2005): 385.

²³² NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Letter from the National Housing office to the executive committee of the Bantu housing board, Benoni: Daveyton: Economic Housing scheme for natives: advance of £2,020, 943, 27 April 1959.

²³³ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 161.

²³⁴ Bonner and Lambert, *Batons, and bear heads*, 359.

housing was constructed at an economical rate in Daveyton, Mathewson argued during his speech at a conference on Non-European Affairs and Urban Social Work at the University of the Witwatersrand that it was only after Africans had learned the virtue of paying for themselves that they would appreciate their possessions.²³⁵

In light of the financial burden on the already cash strapped Daveyton residents, the Benoni Chamber of Commerce in 1959, pleaded with the government to allow residents who earned less than £20 to pay a lower rent and to convert Daveyton into a sub-economic township.²³⁶ However, the government remained undeterred. The state officials argued that if townships such as Daveyton became self-sufficient, it could provide economical housing loans to the municipalities.²³⁷ Moreover, the officials argued that the thirty-year loan agreement with the government implied that income from the rent was primarily to pay off the loan.²³⁸ During the planning phase of Daveyton, provision was made for single accommodation for 4256 African males in a ninety-five single-storied hostel.²³⁹ A thirty four-acre site was reserved to construct the hostel. The Benoni authorities envisioned that the hostel would have its own administrative office, recreation halls, restaurant, and other buildings.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, it was estimated that the hostel project would cost £46.13.0.²⁴¹ However, the construction of the hostel in Daveyton only commenced in 1969; 14 years after the first families moved to Daveyton from Apex squatter camp and eight years after the Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa.²⁴²

3.8 Conclusion

During the 1940s, there was movement from rural to urban areas. The primary reason for the exodus was to secure better wages. However, the increasing number of Africans in urban areas implied that more housing had to be constructed by the state. Thus, influx control was pursued with more vigour to control the Africans' freedom of movement and choice of occupation.

²³⁵ North-West University Potchefstroom campus library, 362,8 MAT, Mathewson. JE: an aspect on "self-help" in non-European urban social work, 22/07/1995.

²³⁶ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 161.

²³⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313, Town Council of Benoni to the Secretary of Native Affairs, interview with various ministers of the state, 7/06/1954.

²³⁸ NASA, MB, 1/4/27, Minutes of the Daveyton Advisory Board, 23/04/1957.

²³⁹ BMA, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting minutes, 18/07/1955.

²⁴⁰ NASA, NTS, 125/313 (H)(2), Letter from the National Housing office to the executive committee of the Bantu housing board, Benoni: Daveyton: Economic Housing scheme for natives: advance of £2,020, 943, 27 April 1959.

²⁴¹ NASA, MB, 2/3/48, Town treasures department: Daveyton housing scheme, Circular minutes of the Chief executive officer of all local authorities in the republic of South Africa, 05/11/1965.

²⁴² NASA, MB, 2/3/48, extracts from meeting of the council meeting: defining of Daveyton hostel site, 05/11/1965.

Moreover, the 1940s marked a year of great squatter movements in the East Rand and places such as Soweto, these land occupations by Africans gave birth to areas such as Tent Town and Apex squatter camp. From the onset, there was a pressing need for both local and central government to dispose of these areas, much of which was self-regulatory. The authorities viewed the establishment of state-regulated townships as the most effective and advanced solution to remove what they deemed to be unsanitary and uncontrolled squatter camps. Nonetheless, the financial implication on local and central government apparatus proved a challenge. The Benoni authorities relied heavily on central government-sanctioned loans and state legislation to ease the financial burden to establish Daveyton. A survey conducted at Apex and the Benoni Old Location revealed that the residents who would move to Daveyton comprised of various socio-economic conditions, for example, some moved from tent shelters while others relocated from four-roomed houses. To ensure that the townships such as Daveyton was established correctly, the Mentz committee was commissioned in the early 1950s. The committee's recommendations served as the blueprint to establish townships in many areas of the country.

Another significant factor in the establishment of Daveyton was the ethnic group policy albeit, it was not the first township that had been grouped ethnically in the Union. The policy was enforced in Daveyton more than any other township before it. To ensure that funding was available, various mechanisms were utilised. The Native Services Levy Fund, which was initially enacted in 1952, proved pivotal to fund basic amenities in the township. This chapter also outlined the first stages of the establishment of Daveyton and the financial implications on central government and the local Benoni authorities with reference to the native levy fund, as well as funds for the sewerage scheme and the housing project. However, by the end of the 1950s, the government advocated the establishment of Bantustans, which was a mechanism to remove Africans from the urban areas into "self-administered" locations where they would govern themselves. Furthermore, the Bantustan policy implied that the government was no longer liable to house Africans in urban areas.

The following chapter investigates the advantages of the apartheid regime's state-funding schemes with specific reference to the effects of the establishment of Bantustans on the development of Daveyton from the 1960s to the 1980s.

CHAPTER 4

BEER HALL PROFITS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE BANTUSTAN POLICY

4.1 Introduction

By the mid-1960s, Daveyton was in its developmental phase, and many of the first building structures had been constructed in the 1950s and only required maintenance. However, the rapid construction during the early years of the township began to wane in the 1960s. This was due to the shift by the government from townships towards the establishment and development of the homelands. Henceforth, new avenues were required to acquire funds to develop the township and the beer hall proved to be a lucrative complement to the Levy Fund. In Daveyton, the beer hall was amongst the very first buildings erected. The local Benoni authorities marked it as “revenue generating,” thus it was prioritised over other buildings in the township. The significance of beer halls to generate funds for local authority’s date back to 1909.¹ This chapter focuses on the capacity of the local Daveyton beer hall to generate funding for the development of the township. Moreover, the chapter will highlight how the beer hall was constructed and where funding to establish the halls will be expounded upon.

Additionally, in order to solidify Daveyton’s status as a ‘model’ township, several schools were established. This aspect is discussed in the second section of the chapter. Nevertheless, educational facilities in Daveyton, or the lack thereof proved to be a sore topic between the local authorities, Urban Bantu Councils, and the residents. The tension is also analysed. The role of Urban Bantu Councils will also be analysed to determine Daveyton’s political climate as well as the role of the Daveyton UBC as a link between the residents and the authorities. Finally, the chapter focuses on how the implementation the Bantustan/Homeland policy from the late 1960s affected the state’s and the local Benoni Council’s Daveyton budget in its developmental phase and funding the establishment of the hostel.

4.2 Establishment of the beer hall in Daveyton

The Urban Areas Act stipulated how and where profits from the beer halls should be utilised. Furthermore, the Act prescribed how local municipalities should record these. Firstly, the Act

¹ Maurice Hutton, “Seeing like a second city: contested development in the African Townships of Late Colonial Bulawayo, Rhodesia, 1949-1977” (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018), 76.

made it obligatory for local authorities to record all funds utilised to administer African townships under a separate Native Revenue Account. Thus, all funds gathered from fines, rent, and profits from the sale of African beer was deposited into this account.² Moreover, any surplus generated under this account had to be recorded under a sub-account referred to as the “Kaffir Beer Account”. This could not be transferred to the city’s general account.³

On 11 September 1953, the Non-European Affairs Committee met to discuss the plans for Daveyton. During that meeting, it was determined that a beer hall be constructed speedily, as well as a brewery, and a plant.⁴ All three were identified as “revenue generating.” Thus, to establish the three buildings, the committee estimated that the brewery and plant would cost approximately £40,000, while the beer hall itself would only cost £20,000.⁵ To finance the erection of the three buildings, the Committee concluded that funds in the Native Revenue Account would be inadequate to finance the entire project. Thus, a loan had to be required.⁶ A few months later, when the Benoni Town Council convened, it was determined that the expenditure towards erecting the three buildings would be more than previously estimated. The brewery and plant would cost £60,00, while the beer hall and beer garden £40,000.⁷ Both figures almost doubled from the Committee’s initial estimates.

The construction of the beer hall commenced in 1954. J.E. Mathewson reported that the beer hall was designed by a team of architects. According to Mathewson, the architects investigated the difficulties encountered by other beer halls throughout the union of South Africa and utilised this information as a blueprint in Daveyton.⁸ The Benoni Council adhered to the Bantu Builders Workers Act (Act No. 27 of 1951), and only utilised African builders to build the beer hall.⁹ After completion, the Daveyton beer hall could accommodate 1,000 patrons.¹⁰ However, as Mathewson observed, the male patrons objected to the provision of drinking facilities for

² Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy, and race: native administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 40.

³ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 40.

⁴ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Non-European Affairs Committee (Planning of native township: Daveyton NE. 21/10, 11/09/1953.

⁵ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Non-European Affairs Committee (Planning of native township: Daveyton NE. 21/10, 11/09/1953.

⁶ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Non-European Affairs Committee (Planning of native township: Daveyton NE. 21/10, 11/09/1953

⁷ NASA, 125/313 N (2), Benoni, Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/54, 13/12/1953. 13.

⁸ NASA, 125/313 N (2), Benoni, Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, record 4/54, 13/12/1953. 13.

⁹ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 146.

¹⁰ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 146.

females. Therefore, “only off-sale facilities are provided for them.”¹¹ As if in an attempt to keep up with its title as a ‘modern’ township, Daveyton’s beer hall was equipped with an “automatic change machine” because according to Mathewson, this would inhibit squabbles about change.¹² Moreover, Mathewson underscored the need for speedy beer service in the beer hall to ensure order, easy surveillance of the patrons and total control. This could only be achieved if the patrons did not stand in a queue for too long.¹³

Despite the Benoni Council and other state officials’ affinity for the beer hall and its ability to generate funds, which could assist townships to develop without much monetary assistance from the central government, these were often a double-edged sword. By monopolising the brewing of African beer, all other African beer production was considered illegal by the government. This aggrieved the African women who had utilised brewing beer as their primary source of income.¹⁴ As a result, African women in townships adopted a rebellious and militant stance towards the municipal beer halls.¹⁵ Outside the beer brewing arena, African women in townships had minimal opportunities for employment in the formal economic sector. In fact, the only viable option they had was to work as domestics, which some considered exploitative at best.¹⁶ When the “illegal” beer brewing continued to proliferate in the townships, government officials constantly had to deploy police raids in townships. This resulted in many brewers adopting creative measures to circumvent the police raids. Some hid barrels of African beer in holes dug in their backyards or they placed a young boy as a spotter at the street corner to alert them when the police approached.¹⁷

In 1937, the Springs municipality, a close neighbour of the Benoni Municipality, established a beer hall to accrue funds from the residents in its township.¹⁸ At the time, the general amounts which various municipalities gathered from the sale of “kaffir beer” in the beer halls was immense. This made beer halls a lucrative source of income for the municipalities.¹⁹ In an attempt to open a similar stream for funds, the Springs municipality established its beer hall.

¹¹ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 146.

¹² Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 147.

¹³ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 145.

¹⁴ Radhie Pillay, “Rural women’s protest in Natal in 1959” (MA dissertation, University of KwaZulu Natal, 1999). 16.

¹⁵ Pillay, “Rural women’s protest,” 16.

¹⁶ Pillay, “Rural women’s protest,” 16.

¹⁷ Iain Lulach Edwards, “Mkhumbane our home African shantytown society in Cato Manor farm, 1946-1960” (PhD Thesis, University of Natal, 1989,” 241.

¹⁸ Noor Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid on the East Rand, 1948-1973: The role of local government and local resistance” (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), 46.

¹⁹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 46.

However, it immediately became an object of contempt in the township and provoked the residents who called for the closure of the establishment.²⁰ As the prominent brewers of beer in the township, women were particularly vocal and spearheaded the struggle to close the beer hall.²¹ From the onset, beer halls aroused conflict between the authorities, and particularly women in the townships. The worst incident occurred in Cato Manor.²² On 17 June 1959, a group of women who protested against beer halls in Cato Manor forced their way into the hall; destroyed the African beer, and drinking utensils and physically beat some of the men.²³ What began as a protest escalated and in combination with the planned removal of people from Cato Manor, it eventually led to the demise of nine policemen.²⁴ Despite the conflict caused by beer halls, the Benoni authorities invested more funds to establish the brewery and the beer garden.

In Daveyton, Mathewson took the lead to erect the brewery and the beer garden. According to him, “it is always advisable to have a brewery adjacent to one of the main beer halls” because this would ensure easy conveyance of the beer from the brewery to the hall and eventually the patrons much quicker.²⁵ At the brewery, a malting plant was also established to ensure the “high standard of quality required for the ingredients in the production of good and wholesome beer.”²⁶ Mathewson estimated that the brewery, including a plant in both the brewing and malting houses, would cost £105,500.²⁷ After completion, the brewery could produce four million gallons of beer annually, which would result in a gross turnover of £400 000 annually.²⁸ Indeed, by May 1960, the Daveyton beer hall had 120,470 gallons of beer which could be sold; a surplus of 73.4 gallons. These statistics decreased marginally in June when the brew only produced 119,189 gallons for sale and an extra 23,2 gallons.²⁹ Although the most productive month in terms of beer production per gallon was September 1960, when the brewery produced 132,920 gallons for sale and a surplus of 20,0 gallons, such turnover in a single month

²⁰ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 46.

²¹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 46.

²² Iain Edwards, “Queens: Illicit liquor and the social structure of drinking dens in Cato Manor,” *Agenda: Empowering women for gender equity*, no. 3 (1988): 76; for more in depth analysis on the clashes in Cato Manor between liquor raid police and women, see, Sibongiseni Mkhize, “Crowds, protest politics and women’s struggles: a case study of women’s demonstrations in Pietermaritzburg, August 1959,” *Natal Museum Journal of Humanities* 11, no. 1 (1999): 76; Pillay, “Rural women,” 5; Edwards, “Mkhubane our home,” 12.

²³ LK Ladlau, “The Cato Manor riots” (MA dissertation, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 1975), 24.

²⁴ Ladlau, “The Cato Manor riots,” 24.

²⁵ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 148.

²⁶ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 149.

²⁷ Mathewson, “The establishment of an urban Bantu township,” 149.

²⁸ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), town treasurer’s department AN. 4 Native Revenue Account: Kaffir beer accounts, The director of Non-European Affairs to the town treasurer, 10/11/1960.

²⁹ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), town treasurer’s department AN. 4 Native Revenue Account: Kaffir beer accounts, The director of Non-European Affairs to the town treasurer, 10/11/1960.

encouraged Mathewson that the brewery would indeed be able to reach the projected four million gallons per annum quota.³⁰ Beer production in the Daveyton beer hall merged with a good turnover in revenue. By November of 1960, the balance of the beer account from the Daveyton beer hall amounted to £84798,2,3.³¹

Thus, the monetary turnover justified the expensive construction of the beer hall, provided that in addition to the building costs, more funds were required for the ingredients and other necessities in the production of beer.

The following is an indication of
the cost of the main items of plant as well as the
required buildings:

Grain cleaner	£ 850
Mechanical stacker	700
Four pneumatic conveyors	4,970
Malt house and drying kiln	10,250
Malting plant (semi-automatic bin-malting system)	11,885
Two hammer mills	400
Storage bins - in stainless steel	1,200
Electric hoist	475
Overhead truck scale	455
Four souring vessels	2,244
Three stainless steel cooking vessels	3,978
Two mash pumps and strainers	1,155
Ten water seals for storage tanks	2,500
Two refrigeration units	1,272
Air compressor	85
Acid proof floor tiles	1,250
Three electrode boilers	4,359
Maintenance tools	800
Weigh bridge	2,000
Electric installations and sub-stations	9,200

Figure 3: Funds required for African beer production: Daveyton brewery³²

Despite the expenditure by 1962 (see Fig 3), the Daveyton beer hall proved to be an astute investment. On 18 August 1964, the office of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner sent a letter to the town clerk and applauded the success of the Daveyton beer hall in terms of generating

³⁰ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), town treasurer's department AN. 4 Native Revenue Account: Kaffir beer accounts, The director of Non-European Affairs to the town treasurer, 10/11/1960.

³¹ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (2), town treasurer's department AN. 4 Native Revenue Account: kaffir beer accounts, Letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner to the Director of Non-European Affairs, 24/11/1960.

³² Mathewson, "Establishment of urban Bantu township," 250.

revenue.³³ Since the beer hall generated revenue, it was the Benoni Council's prerogative to utilise the funds to develop Daveyton township.

4.3 Reaping the rewards from beer profits and developing Daveyton

Initially, revenue collected through the Native Services Levy Act, which authorised municipal authorities to tax employers for every African who worked for them, exceeded revenue from the sale of African beer. Despite this scenario, Mathewson was adamant that "the beer account forms an essential part in the economics" of local urban authorities.³⁴ Fortuitously, Daveyton township and the beer hall were established a year after H.F. Verwoerd permitted municipalities to utilise the revenue generated from African beer sales for any purpose in African townships.³⁵ From 1924 until 1954, revenue from the "kaffir beer account" could only be spent to construct houses in urban townships. However, this was amended in 1955.³⁶ Thereafter, funds in the "Kaffir beer account" could be utilised for any purpose to administer African urban areas. For example, Hillary Sapire asserted that, in Brakpan, the local authorities utilised some of the revenue from the beer hall to clean and tar the township's streets.³⁷

Before local municipalities implemented the African beer monopoly, there was an expectation that the Native Revenue Accounts would be subsidised from the general revenue. However, this implied that white ratepayers would have to bear the burden and contribute towards township amenities. Selected municipal authorities were willing to contribute.³⁸ In fact, by 1971, it was officially stated that only 21 out of the more than 450 local municipalities in the country subsidised the Bantu Revenue Accounts.³⁹ However, due to African beer profits, Daveyton did not require subsidisation of this nature. As soon as the township was constructed, the Benoni authorities quickly got to work and utilised the funds from the beer profits. In early 1956, £333,6,5 was utilised from the beer account to maintain buildings; £204,6,9 to maintain French drainpipes; and £643,10 to preserve the local cemetery.⁴⁰ However, not every shilling that the beer hall produced went towards the development of Daveyton. Like any other

³³ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer's department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, Letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner to the Town clerk. 18/08/1964.

³⁴ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 156.

³⁵ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 156.

³⁶ Evans, *Bureaucracy and race*, 156.

³⁷ Hilary Sapire, "Apartheid's 'testing ground': Urban native policy and African politics in Brakpan, South Africa 1943-1948," *The Journal of African History* 35, no. 1 (1994): 118.

³⁸ David Welsh, "Urbanisation in South Africa: 1929-1979," in *Race relations in South Africa 1929-1979*, ed. Ellen Hellman and Henry Lever (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980), 144.

³⁹ Welsh, "Urbanisation in South Africa," 144.

⁴⁰ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 2, extracts from the Town Council of Benoni minutes, 10/3/1960.

business, it incurred expenses, which were divided into three categories: first, salaries, wages, and allowances; second, miscellaneous expenses; and third, repairs, maintenance and renewals.⁴¹ During the 1959-1960 fiscal year, £2,020 was utilised for salaries in the beer hall, while £870 for “cost of living expense.” A total of £115 went to pension funds; and £20 was utilised for staff uniforms.⁴² Miscellaneous expenses incorporated the price of electricity at £1,960; insurance £60; locomotion allowance £60; stationary £20; sanitation and sewage £65; water £180; and telephone £45.⁴³ The most significant expense under this category was the manufacture of beer, which cost £13,795.⁴⁴ The final category comprised the maintenance of the beer hall building for £1,000; the plant £1,200; and the provision for renewals and loan charges of £2,010.⁴⁵ All these expenses changed with time. For example, salaries increased to £3,830 in 1963.⁴⁶

By the mid-1960s, beer hall profits were central towards the development and maintenance of Daveyton’s infrastructure. In August 1964, £18,058,88 was spent from the beer account for amenities, for example, sewage works disposals, office furniture, roads, street lighting, loan payments and other required infrastructure.⁴⁷ With such large amounts of money flowing from one department to the other, Mr Badenhorst, the production manager of the Daveyton beer hall, called for much stricter controls of the records of the sale of beer.⁴⁸ Badenhorst’s plea came after the authorities at the Wattville beer hall came under suspicion of syphoning beer for personal sales.⁴⁹ The apprehension was due to the production of beer which did not correspond

⁴¹ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, Estimates: Manufacture of beer – Daveyton, 11/3/1961.

⁴² NASA, TPB 409, Benoni: Loans and Overdrafts – Daveyton Bantu Township, Estimates of income and expenditure on the Native Revenue Account: summary of the beer account, 3/5/1964.

⁴³ NASA, TPB 409, Benoni: Loans and Overdrafts – Daveyton Bantu Township, Estimates of income and expenditure on the Native Revenue Account: summary of the beer account, 3/5/1964.

⁴⁴ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, Estimates: Manufacture of beer – Daveyton, 11/3/1961.

⁴⁵ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, Estimates: Manufacture of beer – Daveyton, 11/3/1961.

⁴⁶ NASA, TPB 409, Benoni: Loans and Overdrafts – Daveyton Bantu Township, Estimates of income and expenditure on the Native Revenue Account: summary of the beer account, 3/5/1964.

⁴⁷ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, memorandum: items chargeable on the beer account, 18/8/1964.

⁴⁸ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, letter by Mr Badenhorst to the Director of Non-European Affairs, 28/7/1965.

⁴⁹ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, letter by Mr Badenhorst to the Director of Non-European Affairs, 28/7/1965.

with the surplus in the beer hall.⁵⁰ In this instance, the Town Treasurer came to the rescue with an explanation. It was explained that the reason for the discrepancy was primarily due to the “nature of beer presenting certain difficulties in measuring accurately.”⁵¹ Furthermore, the Town Treasurer pointed towards the following factors: age of the beer, speed of sale, temperature, and handling as contributory towards the discrepancy.⁵²

Daveyton, like any other township in the country, did not operate in a silo but instead was beholden to the central government’s objectives. By the late 1960s, during Daveyton’s developmental phase, the central government pursued the Bantustan/Homeland policy with more vigour. This shift in state politics would have an impact on the monetary as well as the social tapestry of the township. Education was one of the institutions which was significantly affected by shifting funds from townships such as Daveyton to the homelands. This forced the Benoni authorities to seek alternative streams of funding for schools.

4.4 Price of education in Daveyton during the 1960s

The provision of schools in Daveyton had to follow the social makeup of the township, which implied that each ethnic area required a designated school to cater for each group.⁵³ In total, 15 sites were reserved for schools, and each ethnic group was provided with at least one school.

According to the Benoni Town Council, the primary reason for allocating schools (see Fig. 4) was to “enable tuition to be given through the medium of the mother tongue.”⁵⁴ During a meeting in 1954, the Benoni Town Council pleaded to the Minister of Native Affairs, whose department controlled Bantu Education, to consider the erection of schools in Daveyton as a matter of urgency.⁵⁵ Thus, during the developmental phase of Daveyton, eighteen schools were built in the township of which eleven were lower primary, and six higher primary.⁵⁶ Initially,

⁵⁰ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, correspondence from the Director of Non-European Affairs to the Town treasurer, 10/11/1963.

⁵¹ NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, correspondence from the Director of Non-European Affairs to the Town treasurer, 10/11/1963.

⁵² NASA, MB 2/3/92 AN 3, Town treasurer’s department: Native Revenue Account and Kaffir beer accounts: Correspondence from 20/09/1953 to 30/9/1968, Letter from the Town Treasurer to the Director of Non-European Affairs, 24/11/1963.

⁵³ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Bantu education, 15/04/1954.

⁵⁴ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Bantu education, 15/04/1954.

⁵⁵ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Establishment of Daveyton Native Township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Bantu education, 15/04/1954.

⁵⁶ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban Bantu township*,” 54.

the government did not consider a high school as a necessity in the township. This conformed with H.F. Verwoerd’s assertion that African education should not create any “expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled.”⁵⁷ Nevertheless, a high school was constructed in 1963, primarily due to the efforts of the Benoni Rotary Club, which also assisted to raise funds for its construction. The involvement of the Benoni Rotary Club in the construction of the high school was one of the first instances where a private organisation assisted in the development of Daveyton. In 1955, when Daveyton was still in its infant phase, the Benoni Rotary Club invited J.E. Mathewson, who was the Manager of Non-European Affairs in Benoni, to a luncheon on 29 March.⁵⁸ The aim of the luncheon was for Mathewson to explain why ethnic grouping was necessary for Daveyton.⁵⁹ Indeed, Mathewson attended the luncheon and delivered a speech. Although, the Benoni Rotary Club was already aware that schools were constructed along the ethnic basis.




Figure 4: Location of primary schools in Daveyton along ethnic lines⁶⁰

A high school became necessary primarily because of the increasing number of children who completed the lower grades in the 1960s.⁶¹ In fact, in 1965, there were 10369 pupils in the

⁵⁷ Christopher, *Atlas of*, 149.

⁵⁸ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

⁵⁹ SOAS, Special Collections, MS380134, James Edward Mathewson’s address to the Benoni Rotary Club on Tuesday, 29 March, 1955.

⁶⁰ Christopher, *The atlas of*, 149.

⁶¹ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 225.

schools in Daveyton, of which 6927 were in the lower primary, and 3272 in the higher primary.⁶² To construct the 10-class roomed high school, the Benoni Rotary Club provided R20,230-14.⁶³ From the total amount received, R77,91, R135, and R91,30 respectively was spent on European workers' salaries in two months, that is, from May 1963 to 18 June 1963.⁶⁴ In that same period, R107,28 was allocated to African salaries; However, a large portion of the funds was spent on African labour: R1,440,71; building material: R1,535-57; and Daveyton artisans R3,035-53.⁶⁵ The rest of the money was spent on the installation of electricity, which cost R1,165; water R4,10; and sundries amounted to R11.35.⁶⁶ To avoid any irregular expenditure, the Benoni Rotary Club requested weekly updates of the expenditure to construct the high school.⁶⁷ Furthermore, an additional R475,44 was provided for ceiling boards and R180,16 for timber towards the initial funds provided by the Rotary Club. On 25 July 1963, C.J. Hicks, the president of the Benoni Rotary Club sent a letter to all those who contributed towards the construction of the school. In the letter, Hicks alluded to a conversation with J.E. Mathewson, in which the latter proclaimed that the school would be complete in late 1963 and operational during the first school term of 1964.⁶⁸

In the older township of Wattville, instead of constructing a school, authorities chose to purchase a school building which had been built in 1951 by the Methodist church.⁶⁹ After opening the school in early 1964, it became apparent that the high school could not accommodate all the learners who progressed through the lower grades. This resulted in Lerutle, a Councillor in Daveyton, to request the Benoni Town Council to construct another high school.⁷⁰ However, since the state authorities had not even constructed the single high school in the township, it was going to be a while before another high school would be built in Daveyton to accommodate more children. A significant contributory factor towards the slow

⁶² Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 225.

⁶³ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund from 13/06/1962 to 25/02/1969.

⁶⁴ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund from 13/06/1962 to 25/02/1969.

⁶⁵ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund from 13/06/1962 to 25/02/1969.

⁶⁶ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund from 13/06/1962 to 25/02/1969.

⁶⁷ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund, letter from the Benoni town treasurer to the acting Director of Non-European Affairs, 10/07/1963.

⁶⁸ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund, Circular letter from C.J Hicks to all the contributors to the construction of the Daveyton High school, 25/07/1963.

⁶⁹ MB 2/3/92 AN 4 (1), Town treasurer's department: AN 4: Native revenue account's school fund, Extracts from minutes of the management committee meeting, 10/09/1963.

⁷⁰ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 225.

construction of the high schools in Daveyton was the government's promotion of the homeland policy during the late 1960s. Councillor Lerutle, however, was not the only person who advocated for another school in the township. Other significant voices emanated from the township's Urban Bantu Council. In addition to schools, transportation was another significant matter of contention in the township.

4.5 Daveyton's transportation system and its woes

From its planning phase, the site to establish the township was selected due to its proximity to a railway line. Mathewson asserted, "In native township development, one of the essentials is to provide suitable access from the township to areas requiring native labour."⁷¹ In addition to access roads, Mathewson underscored the saliency of a robust and efficient railway facility to serve the township.⁷² Moreover, Mathewson was not the only person who realised the primordial nature of a proper railway service to the township. When the Benoni Town Council set up its "land finding committee" to find suitable land to establish Daveyton, they invited a South African Railways representative to allocate land which could also accommodate railway services and stations.⁷³ The Benoni Town Council determined the internal transport requirements from Daveyton to Alliance station as a feeder service for the railways.⁷⁴ After drawing up the plans for a transportation system, the Benoni Town Council estimated that it would cost £40,000 to construct access roads.⁷⁵ Since the roads were declared as a "link service", the entire project was funded through a loan from the Native Services Levy Fund.⁷⁶ After determining the method to finance the transport project, the matter of fares was considered. At the time, a third-class monthly ticket cost £1 4s 11d.⁷⁷ However, compared to townships such as Natalspruit and Orlando, where it only costs 13s 4d to travel to the urban industrial towns of Germiston and Johannesburg, respectively.⁷⁸ The price to travel from Daveyton to Benoni proved too steep for residents.⁷⁹ In contrast, the internal feeder bus service

⁷¹ Mathewson, "Establishment of an urban Bantu township," 82.

⁷² Mathewson, "Establishment of an urban Bantu township," 82.

⁷³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁷⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁷⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁷⁶ NASA, NTS 4987, 125/313 (1) 8, Benoni Riolskema. Daveyton Ontwerp No 9, Applications for loans: Native services levy fund, 7/09/1955.

⁷⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁷⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁷⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

would cost the Daveyton residents 13s per month for 26 day working days. However, when combined with the railway price of £1. 18s, which the workers would have to utilise to get to their places of employment in Dunswart; transportation was too costly for many Daveyton residents.

An inspection by the Railway Administration of the railway services in Daveyton revealed that the railway line between Alliance station, in Daveyton and Dunswart, where a large contingent of residents worked only comprised of a single railway line.⁸⁰ Moreover, the line was designated primarily for slow goods traffic and not passenger transportation.⁸¹ Since the railway needed to be electrified, its capacity to serve Daveyton residents was extremely low. Therefore, the Benoni Town Council had to apply for another loan to convert the railway into a double line, electrify it and instal colour light signalling throughout.⁸² The upgrading of the transportation system had to be done urgently because the railway line would have to convey 1,800 passengers daily during peak hours in the mornings and evenings. This number was estimated to increase to 20,000 by the mid-1960s.⁸³

The Benoni Town Council was quick to dismiss the Railway Administration's recommendations. Instead, it argued that since the Minister of Native Affairs disapproved of the establishment of a transit camp for unhoused Africans in Daveyton, the population would stabilise. Furthermore, the Council argued that the Railway Administration did not consider those residents who would utilise private vehicles and bicycles.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Benoni Town Council ordered a survey of the families in Daveyton. The survey was conducted on a Tuesday morning till the evening to acquire the exact number of commuters and the mode of transport they used during a workday.⁸⁵

According to the Benoni authorities, the survey conducted on a single day (see Fig. 5) proved that there was no need to improve the railway line in Daveyton because many residents utilised alternative transportation. However, the inadequate transportation facilities and the Benoni

⁸⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁸¹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁸² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁸³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁸⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, Transport facilities, 15/4/1954.

⁸⁵ Mathewson, "*The establishment of an urban township*," 98.

authorities' unwillingness to heed any advice to improve these, set the stage for a confrontation between the residents and the local authorities. Within only two months of the residents moving into Daveyton, tempers flared due to transportation difficulties. In early 1955, the commuters attacked buses.⁸⁶ Three weeks later, they did it again, and argued that the buses were inadequate and often arrived late.⁸⁷ Soon after the civil unrest, the Benoni Town Council urged the General manager of railways to improve the railway system in Daveyton. Soon thereafter, the railway General manager announced that £1,3 million would be spent to electrify the railway system which connected Daveyton and the industrial towns.⁸⁸

Mode of Travelling.	Daveyton to Benoni.		Benoni to Daveyton.		Percentage of Total.
	Number.	Percentage.	Number.	Percentage.	
Cycles	3026	30.41	2859	34.24	32.32
Train	3110	31.26	2252	27.04	29.15
Motor Cars	1586	15.93	1257	15.09	15.51
Buses	1225	12.30	1140	13.80	13.05
Trucks	783	7.86	665	7.98	7.90
Pedestrians	193	1.96	138	1.64	1.83
Motor Cycles	28	.28	17	.21	.24
Total	9951	100.00	9328	100.00	100.00

Figure 5: Survey findings: type of transportation utilised by Daveyton residents⁸⁹

In the mid-1960s, the government moved more residents from the Old Location into Daveyton, which was extended at the time. The transport problems came to a head and prompted the UBC to request an extension of the railway system. However, the South African Railways responded that it would be too expensive.⁹⁰ The substantial increase in the population increased the congestion further at the railway station, so much so that by August 1966, it was estimated that

⁸⁶ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁸⁷ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁸⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁸⁹ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban township," 98.

⁹⁰ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

10 990 commuters utilised the single train station.⁹¹ This implied that more than half a million commuters utilised the station in a single month.⁹² The UBC cautioned the authorities of the chaos during peak hours in the mornings and evenings on the station's single pedestrian bridge. In July 1967, the UBC's concerns about the safety of the station proved correct when seven commuters were trampled to death as they rushed to board a train.⁹³ In the aftermath of the tragedy, the Benoni authorities tried to quell the UBC's and the commuter's fury by establishing a commission of inquiry to investigate what had occurred. The UBC was assured that its request to improve the railway station had been granted. However, it was still under investigation.⁹⁴

Despite the apparent lack of transportation in Daveyton and the increased demand for taxis, the authorities opposed the expansion of the taxi industry.⁹⁵ By the late 1960s, the taxi industry expanded steadily from Sedans which were restricted to carrying five passengers, to the advent of the Kombi, which could carry eight passengers.⁹⁶ However, state authorities controlled who could acquire a taxi operating license. During the period, the government was reluctant to enhance African entrepreneurial success in the townships. Hence, very few licenses were granted to Africans during the 1960s.⁹⁷ Moreover, in Daveyton, taxi operators had another competitor in the form of the railway service. To retain their stronghold on the transportation system in Daveyton, officials from the railways attended the Road Transportation Board meetings specifically to oppose taxi license applications in Daveyton.⁹⁸ Although they were reluctant to expand the taxi industry, the Benoni Management Committee acknowledged that the best alternative to serve the transportation needs of the Daveyton residents properly was through taxis.⁹⁹ Other than transportation, the government had to acquire funds to construct administrative buildings which were required for the day-to-day operations of the township.

⁹¹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁹² NASA, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Extracts from Benoni Management Committee minutes, 21/09/1967.

⁹³ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 226.

⁹⁴ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 15/04/1965, Minutes of the UBC, 23/03/1965.

⁹⁵ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 228.

⁹⁶ Meshack M Khosa, "Routes, ranks and rebels: feuding in the taxi revolution," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (March 1992): 234; Londeka Princess Ngubane, "From political wars to taxi wars: investigating the transition of taxi violence in a low-income urban community in the Mpumalanga township, South Africa" (MA dissertation, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 2016), 15.

⁹⁷ Jeffrey McCarthy and Mark Swilling, "The apartheid city and the politics of bus transportation," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 25, 99(1985): 389.

⁹⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 228.

⁹⁹ NASA, MB 2/3/24 Ab3 (1), Benoni Management Committee minutes, 13/10/1965.

4.6 Funding construction of administrative buildings

During the design of Daveyton, J.E. Mathewson accentuated the significance of investing funds to establish administrative offices in the township. When planning the Daveyton administrative offices, J.E. Mathewson cautioned against the local authority's tendency to earmark a certain amount of funds to construct buildings and design these thereafter. For J.E. Mathewson, this imposed a limitation of how big and efficient the administrative building would be.¹⁰⁰ Instead, in Daveyton, J.E. Mathewson proposed that administrative buildings be planned and then a loan be requested for its construction after. He further argued that this had to be done to avoid the pitfall of acquiring funds to establish a building and find out later that the building cost more. Consequently, they would be forced to construct a smaller and inadequate structure. By late 1954, a block of administrative offices was constructed at a cost of £34, 000, which was acquired from a loan.¹⁰¹ To secure the loan, J.E. Mathewson validated the cost of the administrative building in a meeting with the with a number of officials; the financial chairperson; Chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee; Town treasurer and manager; several ministers, which included amongst them; Minister of Native affairs, Minister of Health; and the Minister of Finance.¹⁰²

The expensive nature of the endeavour emanated from administrative buildings and included a post office and a police station. J.E. Mathewson proposed that for convenience, it would be "advisable to have all these buildings near each other."¹⁰³ However, an additional loan of £20, 000 from the Native Revenue account was made by the Benoni authorities to finance the erection of the police station.¹⁰⁴ The significance of the erection of a police station in Daveyton was highlighted by the Benoni Town Council in 1954. The Council posited that the erection of the police station merely conformed to the state's policy which revealed that urban Africans in townships should be served in their own areas as far as possible.¹⁰⁵ Thus, government offices which were central to the maintenance of law and order, along with sound administration of

¹⁰⁰ Mathewson, "*The establishment of an urban township*," 140.

¹⁰¹ NASA, MB AN (3) (1), Town treasurer's department An 3: Native revenue account: correspondence from 29 May 1953 to 20 December 1958, 18/08/1954.

¹⁰² NTS, 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Letter from F.S Taylor, a Town clerk to the private secretary of the minister of native affairs, 12/04/1954.

¹⁰³ Mathewson, *The establishment of a native township*," 141.

¹⁰⁴ NASA, NTS, 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Letter from F.S Taylor, a Town clerk to the secretary of native affairs, 14/10/1954.

¹⁰⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

Daveyton was an efficient police station, a Magistrate's court and a post office.¹⁰⁶ To ensure that these buildings were constructed accordingly, a meeting was held between the Benoni Town Council representatives; Department of Justice officials; South African Police; Post and Telegraphs; and Native Affairs officials. Members of the National Housing and Planning Commission were also invited to the meeting on 1 December 1953.¹⁰⁷ During the meeting, each department stated its own requirements. The Department of Justice stated that it required one large courtroom, an office for the magistrate and one for the clerk of the court, *corpus delicti* room, record and strong room, and an office for the public protector including a piece of land for future extension.¹⁰⁸ The South African Police station required a large charge office, office for the station commander, three offices for Crime and Intelligence Division C.I.D, a parade room, office for officers, two offices for clerks, two storerooms, a *corpus delicti* room, two large cells and two large garages. The myriad of requirements resulted in the Benoni Town Council to spend £20,000 for the police station, instead of the estimated £10,000.¹⁰⁹ Contrary to the Department of Justice and the South African Police station, the post office only required a large room for the postmaster and an African clerk. To save funds, the Benoni Town Council suggested that all these requirements should be incorporated into one building.¹¹⁰

To save funds, the Benoni Town Council decided to join the Creche for kids and the old age home. The reason was that both the buildings could share certain facilities which both the Creche and the old age home would require. By similar facilities, the council alluded to the staff quarters, administrative offices, medical and isolation rooms, kitchen, laundry room, boiler, a pantry, and a storeroom.¹¹¹ The Council concluded that if both the Creche and old age home required multiple similar facilities, they could easily share one building structure and the essential facilities could be utilised effectively by both.¹¹² However, the Benoni Town Council added that should the experiment to combine the two fail, the building could be utilised for

¹⁰⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹⁰⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹⁰⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹⁰⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹¹⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹¹¹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹¹² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

either the Creche or the Old age home only. To construct the building, it was estimated that the Creche would cost £27,000 and the Old age people's home £10,000.¹¹³ Both these facilities were classified as social amenities, along with the social centre and library which cost £22,000, two cinemas £20,000 (£10,000) which was also considered as revenue generating, a swimming bath £20,000 and sports and recreation grounds which cost £24,000.¹¹⁴ Since these facilities were classified as social amenities, it implied that they could not be funded through the Native Services Levy Act. The Benoni Town Council chose to construct the revenue generating facilities first to help supplement funds from the Native Revenue Account.¹¹⁵

Apart from the required administrative buildings, the most essential ones which were constructed in Daveyton included a block of shops. J.E Mathewson held that these blocks were constructed to "provide facilities under hygienic conditions and comply with public health requirements."¹¹⁶ To construct the shops, provision was made for 18 sites which measured 50 x 140 ft, on which the Benoni Town Council proposed the erection of the shops.¹¹⁷ It was estimated that the shops would cost £20,000 to construct.¹¹⁸ After the completion of the block of shops, J.E. Mathewson and his colleagues vacillated whether the building should be owned by the municipality and rented only to African traders or whether business sites should be allocated to Africans on which they could erect their own businesses.¹¹⁹ J.E. Mathewson, however, leaned more on the prospect of the provision of municipal businesses, due to funds from which they could accumulate funds to the revenue account. J.E. Mathewson suggested that the African traders should concentrate on one large block of businesses in the civic centre.¹²⁰ In Daveyton, the first portion of the central block of shops included two general dealers, a barbershop, undertaker, butchery, dairy and two consulting rooms for African

¹¹³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 14.

¹¹⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 14.

¹¹⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 14.

¹¹⁶ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban African township," 141.

¹¹⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni, Letter from F.S Taylor, the Town Clerk to the Secretary for native Affairs, 12/06/1954.

¹¹⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni, Letter from F.S Taylor, the Town Clerk to the Secretary for native Affairs, 12/06/1954.

¹¹⁹ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban African township," 141.

¹²⁰ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban African township," 141.

medical doctors.¹²¹ The Benoni Town Council suggested that space should be reserved for more businesses in the centre to encourage healthy competition.¹²²

Renting space to businesses in Daveyton was not only limited to African traders; in fact, in 1956, the Benoni Town Council initiated a process for a loan of £1,500 to build a bank.¹²³ The loan, which was scheduled to be repayable over a period of 20 years at an interest rate of five percent per annum was promptly approved.¹²⁴ In the application for the loan, the Benoni Town Council revealed that the bank would be erected with the idea to lease it to Barclays bank D.C.O to “conduct a banking business.”¹²⁵ After the approval of the loan, the Benoni Town Council received six tenders to erect the bank. The first tender from Messrs. H.J. Donaldson (Pty) for £11,46.0.0; the second from Messrs. Victor and Degaanar, the cost was estimated at £11,580.0.0; the third from Mr D. Pickering for £11,375.3.7; fourth Messrs. O.W. Robins and Son (Pty) for £11,950.0.0; while Mr H.F. Clark proved the most expensive of the six with £11,963.0.0; and the final tender from Messrs. De Klerk and Hewett (Pty) for £11,458.0.0.¹²⁶ With six to choose from, the Benoni Town council selected the cheapest, which was Mr D. Pickering for the total sum of £11,375.3.7. However, further approvals were needed from the administrator to borrow funds to acquire an additional £1,375.3.7. To ensure that the building project commenced without any delay, the Benoni Town Council applied to finance the rest of the project from its own internal funds until such time the loans were approved.¹²⁷ On 18 June 1956, a report from the finance committee was handed to the Benoni Town Council to accept the lowest tender and begin the construction of the bank, which would be leased to Barclays bank D.C.O for £10,000.¹²⁸ The construction of the block of shops to rent to businesses, along with the construction of the bank to lease to Barclays bank highlighted the multiple ways the Benoni Town Council supplemented its native revenue account in an attempt to avoid reliance on the “kafir beer” funds in the beer account which was one of its primary sources of revenue.

¹²¹ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban African township*,” 141.

¹²² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni, Letter from F.S Taylor, the Town Clerk to the Secretary for native Affairs, 12/06/1954.

¹²³ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, letter from F.S Taylor the Town Clerk to the Provincial Secretary, local government branch, 11/07/1956.

¹²⁴ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, letter from F.S Taylor the Town Clerk to the Provincial Secretary, local government branch, 11/07/1956.

¹²⁵ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, letter from F.S Taylor the Town Clerk to the Provincial Secretary, local government branch, 11/07/1956.

¹²⁶ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, letter from F.S Taylor the Town Clerk to the Provincial Secretary, local government branch, 11/07/1956.

¹²⁷ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, letter from F.S Taylor the Town Clerk to the Provincial Secretary, local government branch, 11/07/1956.

¹²⁸ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, minutes of the special council meeting, report of the finance committee, 11/06/1956.

Initiatives such as leasing buildings ensured that the Benoni Town Council's income from the 1955-1956 to 1959-1960 financial year grew exponentially from £58,745 in 1955-1956 to £1,231,292 in 1960.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, the growth in income was also accompanied those in loan charges, which grew at approximately the same pace as the generated income. This resulted in limited accumulated surplus funds during the first five financial years of Daveyton's existence.¹³⁰

Not every aspect of Daveyton's establishment and development required funding. For example, the recreational playgrounds were inexpensive to construct. According to J.E. Mathewson, "in every modern township provision is made for open spaces which are laid out as parks, gardens, playgrounds, open air baths and sports grounds."¹³¹ To construct recreational grounds, the most salient resource for the Benoni Town Council was space to erect the facilities. To account for the shortage of land for recreational grounds, it was proposed that these for adults and adolescents should be concentrated in one large area and, if possible, the ground area be planned such that the same ground could be utilised for multiple sports during the various seasons.¹³² In Daveyton, nine spots or recreational activities were catered for which included: grounds for athletic, which comprised of a running and cycling track, cricket, soccer and rugby hockey pitch, basketball and tennis court, swimming pool and a "tribal" dancing area.¹³³ Opposite the creche and old age home, a polyclinic, which faced the park was erected. The primary feature of the clinic was the entrance which led to a public hall and from there, all the departments were accessible.¹³⁴ The clinic comprised of a general and a records office, doctor's and examination rooms, urine testing facility, dispensary, including a sterilising and dressing room. Furthermore, a dental section and offices segregated for African and European health inspectors and staff was available.¹³⁵ Unlike the recreational grounds which only required open land and limited funds for equipment, the clinic cost £25,000 to construct, of which £5,000 was provided by the Department of Health while the balance of the costs was charged against the

¹²⁹ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, Estimates of income and expenditure on native revenue account, Town Council of Benoni – five-year plan showing income and expenditure of the revenue account, 30/06/1960.

¹³⁰ TALG 16/1155 vol 1, Benoni – loans and overdrafts for Daveyton Bantu township, Estimates of income and expenditure on native revenue account, Town Council of Benoni – five-year plan showing income and expenditure of the revenue account, 30/06/1960.

¹³¹ J.E Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban township," 163.

¹³² NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, record 4/54, 15/04/1954. 16.

¹³³ J.E Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban township," 163.

¹³⁴ J.E Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban township," 173.

¹³⁵ J.E Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban township," 163.

beer account.¹³⁶ To ensure that the cost of the building did not exceed the available funds, only African builders were utilised to construct the polyclinic.¹³⁷ Funding government and administrative buildings in the township had one advantage, especially for a cash strapped government; they only had to build once and thereafter maintain. However, housing in the township differed. The influx of people into Daveyton required additional housing. The housing backlog was further exacerbated in the late 1960s when the government reverted funds towards the establishment of homelands.

4.7 Redirecting funds from townships to the Bantustans

In the late 1960s, the African populace of Daveyton was still settling into the township. Certain members of the urban elite (clerks and teachers) increasingly demanded homeownership.¹³⁸ This led the UBC to suggest that the Town Council formulate a scheme to raise loans to assist residents to construct their own homes.¹³⁹ The Benoni council argued that loans could only be considered if at least three hundred housing applications were received. Alternatively, individuals could apply for state loans of R250 if the house did not exceed R450.¹⁴⁰ Thus, anyone who wanted to construct a house that exceeded the R450 threshold had to be wealthy enough to bear the cost alone.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the residents could not utilise the loans from building societies, because these required a person to hold a title deed of the land. Unfortunately, this effectively excluded all the Daveyton residents.¹⁴² These restrictions frustrated the residents who came from the Old location, because they were previously homeowners and wanted to purchase houses in Daveyton. However, the government was not interested in granting urban African's homeownership in the late 1960s.

In 1969, the Daveyton UBC was under pressure from those who lamented the lack of housing to address the natural growth of the population.¹⁴³ In a letter to the Benoni municipal authorities, Councillor Ratale stated that "when a son got married, the family grew," thus it only made sense to avail housing for the new family. Ratale further posited that "it was not

¹³⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2), Benoni – The establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni, Letter from F.S Taylor, the Town Clerk to the Secretary for native Affairs, 12/06/1954.

¹³⁷ Mathewson, "*The establishment of an urban township*," 174.

¹³⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 210.

¹³⁹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 210.

¹⁴⁰ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 210.

¹⁴¹ NASA, MB, 2/3/48, Town treasurer's department: Daveyton housing scheme, correspondence from 1968 to 1969, Town Council of Benoni's Circular minutes No. A20/2. 5 November 1969.

¹⁴² NASA, MB, 2/3/48, Town treasurer's department: Daveyton housing scheme, correspondence from 1968 to 1969, Town Council of Benoni's Circular minutes No. A20/2. 5 November 1969.

¹⁴³ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 15.04.65, Minutes of the UBC, 23/03/1965.

unusual to find young couples living with their parents in a three-roomed house.”¹⁴⁴ What complicated matters even further in Daveyton was that by 1969, there was an inflow of people because government had demolished the Benoni Bantu township.¹⁴⁵ The Benoni council intended to cater for the new arrivals in terms of housing before those who were already residing in the township.¹⁴⁶ This decision further frustrated the people who were residents of Daveyton. In 1971, the Daveyton UBC urged the authorities to construct new houses in Daveyton to cater for the growing township population and those who were moving from the Benoni Bantu township.¹⁴⁷

The Daveyton UBC was not an anomaly in its bid to construct more homes in the township. The lack of housing affected all urban townships in the Witwatersrand. The primary reason for the housing backlog was the homeland policy in the 1970s and funds which were drained from the townships.¹⁴⁸ To navigate the entire establishment of the Bantustans, the government sacrificed the development of urban African townships. This was felt in the early 1970s as the government slowly limited its spending on urban townships. According to Bonner and Nieftagodien, the government reduced its spending on urban Africans by 80% between 1968 and 1975.¹⁴⁹ During 1967, which was the height of state spending on urban housing in Daveyton and other urban townships in the East Rand, the government spent above R14 million on townships.¹⁵⁰ However, by 1971 this figure was lowered to R7,7 million, and by 1977 it was cut further to a mere R2,6 million.¹⁵¹

In 1976, before the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana received R37 million from Pretoria’s coffers; KwaZulu R70 million; and Transkei over R110 million.¹⁵² Monetary assistance to the Transkei from Pretoria slowly increased from the late 1960s, and by 1978, more than R400 million was spent on Transkei alone.¹⁵³ These funds equated to 80% of the

¹⁴⁴ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 15/04/1965, Minutes of the Urban Bantu Council, 23/03/1965.

¹⁴⁵ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 15/04/1965, Minutes of the UBC, 21/04/1965.

¹⁴⁶ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical Papers, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 15/04/1965, Minutes of the Urban Bantu Council, 23.03.65.

¹⁴⁷ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical Papers, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 15/04/1965, Minutes of the Urban Bantu Council, 22/10/1965.

¹⁴⁸ Evans, “*South Africa’s Bantustans*,” 124.

¹⁴⁹ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 4.

¹⁵⁰ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 221.

¹⁵¹ Paul Hendler, *Politics on the home front* (South African Institute of race relations, 1989), 55.

¹⁵² Beinart, *Twentieth Century South Africa*, 224.

¹⁵³ Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela’s Kinsmen: nationalist elites and apartheid’s first Bantustan* (Auckland Park: Jacana media, 2014), 59.

homelands' aggregate budgets.¹⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the South African government did not have an infinite purse to provide these funds, therefore, money had to be redirected from township development to Bantustan development. Thus, during this period, the government invested more in hostels in urban areas to foster the idea of the impermanent status of Africans in urban areas. In Natalspruit, the government constructed Khuthala, Lindela and Mokoena hostels, which by 1969 housed approximately 7544 men.¹⁵⁵ These hostels were built very close to the township and much like the townships, were also zoned ethnically.¹⁵⁶ Similar to other townships, in 1964, plans to construct a hostel in Daveyton was approved.

4.8 Funding the Daveyton hostel

In 1964, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development approved the establishment of a hostel in Daveyton. This approval coincided with the calls of the UBC and residents for the government to construct more housing for Africans to alleviate the overcrowding in Daveyton. Nevertheless, plans to build the hostel date back to Daveyton's initial planning. On 15 April 1954, the Town Council of Benoni concluded that "at the entrance of the township, 7.3 acres have been reserved for hostel purposes." The Council further highlighted that an animal paddock which constituted 5 acres adjacent to the planned hostel would be converted into sports grounds to serve the hostel occupants.¹⁵⁷ Initially, the hostel was planned to cater for 1330 single males whose only purpose in the East Rand was to serve the increased demand for labour.¹⁵⁸ Although only constructed in 1964, the financial planning for the construction of the hostel began in the 1957-58 fiscal budget when R18,627 was set aside to construct the hostel; this figure increased the following year to R24,605.¹⁵⁹

The Bantu Housing Board financed most of the construction in several loans to the Town Council of Benoni. On the 23 January 1967, the Bantu Housing Board advanced R181,850 towards the Daveyton hostel scheme.¹⁶⁰ The loan was divided and allocated to 5 sections of the hostel construction. Firstly, R109,809 was utilised to construct 83 hostel units, each with 16 beds. Simultaneously, R2,629 was allocated for man-proof walls and gates; R18,170 for

¹⁵⁴ Beinart, *Twentieth Century South Africa*, 224.

¹⁵⁵ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 54.

¹⁵⁶ Bonner and Nieftagodien, *Kathorus*, 54.

¹⁵⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N (2) 2, Benoni – establishment of Daveyton native township, Town Council of Benoni memorandum on Daveyton Bantu township, Record 4/54, 15/4/1954.

¹⁵⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban Apartheid," 221.

¹⁵⁹ NASA, TALG 16/1155 vol. 1, Town Council of Benoni estimates of income and expenditure on Native Revenue Account, hostel, 5/12/1955.

¹⁶⁰ NASA, MB 2/3/48 ad 3, Town treasurer's department: Daveyton hostel scheme from 1968 to 1969, extracts from minutes of the town council meeting, 25/01/1967.

showers, latrines, washrooms, ironing room, cooking and recreational areas. These were provided for each hostel unit at R3,634 per unit.¹⁶¹ The third section of the loan was utilised for what the authorities termed as “appurtenances,” that is, 4 boilers for hot water supply in the showers at R600 per boiler, which added up to R2,400. Secondly, the hostel buildings in terms of expenditure, that is, the administration blocks cost R8,820.¹⁶²

According to the hired chief engineer, the hostel would be 12.8 acres in area and located west of Eiselen street, which is the main road to Daveyton.¹⁶³ Due to its proximity to Daveyton, amenities such as sewage works and water supply to the hostel was connected to the township system. Consequently, the council requested several loans from the Bantu Housing Boards. The first loan was for R450 to connect the hostel’s sewage system to the one in Daveyton; the second loan was for R1000, which would be utilised for the stormwater drainage; R3000 was borrowed to purchase seven electric stoves; and the Town Council borrowed R179,401 for dwellings and fencing. This totalled R178,89.¹⁶⁴ On 26 March 1969, the Bantu Housing Board, which had advanced the Benoni Town Council R178,891 towards the completion of the hostel, resolved that the proposed R2.50 rent per bed each month be approved. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development quickly obliged and approved the rental fee.¹⁶⁵ Rent fees in the hostel varied according to how many people occupied each room and the length of stay; for example, the R2.50 rent fee applied to fewer than five occupants for an entire month, while rooms which accommodated five or more occupants cost R2.00 per month.

However, accommodation for a specific period of the month for each week cost R0.50 per person, while accommodation for less than a week cost R0.20 per person.¹⁶⁶ A month after the rent approval, the town treasurer estimated that the hostel would cost R1,904 to maintain. During its first year, the number of occupants at the Daveyton hostel numbered fewer than a

¹⁶¹ NASA, MB 2/3/48 ad 3, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton hostel scheme from 1968 to 1969, extracts from minutes of the town council meeting, 25/01/1967.

¹⁶² NASA, MB 2/3/48 ad 3, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton hostel scheme from 1968 to 1969, extracts from minutes of the town council meeting, 25/01/1967.

¹⁶³ NASA, MB 2/3/48 ad 3, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton hostel scheme from 1968 to 1969, extracts from minutes of the town council meeting, 25/10/1968.

¹⁶⁴ NASA, Application for payment of a portion of an approved advance in terms of section 11 of the housing Act No. 10 of 1957, 26/07/1968.

¹⁶⁵ NASA, Application for payment of a portion of an approved advance in terms of section 11 of the housing Act No. 10 of 1957, 26/07/1968.

¹⁶⁶ NASA, MB 2/3/48 ad 3, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton hostel scheme from 1968 to 1969, The Bantu affairs commissioner, Benoni, 12/03/1969; for an in-depth analysis of the lived experiences of urban Africans in state hostels see, Mamphela Ramphele, *A bed called home: life in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town* (Claremont: David Phillip Publishers, 1994); Mamphela Ramphele, “The dynamics of gender politics in the hostels of Cape Town: another legacy of the South African migrant labour system,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1989): 394.

hundred. However, by 1970, the hostel housed 1328 African males.¹⁶⁷ Although the hostel operated at total capacity, overcrowding in the township persisted. With more funding shifting towards the homelands, there were less funds to construct more houses in the township compared to the 1950s when it was established.

4.9 Conclusion

From the initial seizure of the beer monopoly in Durban in 1906, beer halls became a lucrative form of income for local municipalities and the central government. This implied that funding could be directed at other items other than the establishment of townships. In Daveyton, the Benoni Town Council had to fund the establishment of the Daveyton beer hall with funding acquired from government loans. The categorisation of the beer hall and its other associated structures as generators of revenue, the Town Council was eager to ensure that the beer hall was completed as quickly as possible. Indeed, by 1956, a few months after the establishment of Daveyton, the beer hall was operational, and profits therefrom were utilised to develop various areas of the township.

However, even with profits from the beer hall, schooling and Daveyton's transport system remained troublesome for the authorities and the township residents. In terms of schools, the Town Council of Benoni received assistance from the Benoni Rotary Club to establish the first African high school in the township. Although this was inadequate, it was better than the township's transportation system. The township was served by only one railway line, which was inadequate for the increasing population. Moreover, the authorities were reluctant expand the taxi industry in the township. Even after a tragic incident at the township's train station, the authorities failed to serve their growing needs of transportation. One of the reasons for the lack of funding to fund of the township's transportation system was the state's shift towards the development of homelands in the 1960s. The latter, however, did not alleviate the dense population in townships such as Daveyton. However, it drained the funding from these townships. In Daveyton, this led to a sharp decline in the funds being directed towards housing. Instead, a hostel was constructed for males who came to the township. With Daveyton showing early signs of decline in the early 1970s, its UBC vehemently demanded housing and better amenities for Africans in the township. The following chapter discusses the role of the private sector's involvement in the provision of housing for Africans in Daveyton

¹⁶⁷ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 221.

CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPMENT AND PRIVATISATION IN DAVEYTON DURING THE 1980s

5.1 Introduction

By the late 1980s, the effects of shifting funds to the homelands became more apparent in townships such as Daveyton.¹ As the quality of housing declined rapidly in the township, the government struggled to stabilise the economy due to the growing internal and external discontent against apartheid.² Internal resistance against the political system in urban areas increased with the Durban strikes of 1973,³ and reached its crescendo with the student protest a few years later in Soweto. All the while, the South African economy, moreover mining, deteriorated as gold prices plunged in the 1980s.⁴ The myriad of township changes also included the government's shift from local municipalities as the principal organs of the state responsible for the administration of townships to the establishment of administration boards in 1972.⁵ The government's inability to sustain the homeland economies and simultaneously develop townships such as Daveyton became more apparent. Thus, private home ownership for Africans, which was only discussed during the initial establishment of Daveyton, was revisited with more vigour. By late 1980, the private sector, in the form of banks and building societies, were included to construct housing. This was a significant divergence from the ideas espoused within the 1920 Housing Act (No. 35 of 1920), which placed the responsibility of housing urban residents on the shoulders of the state.⁶

The central focus of this chapter is the shift of the provision of housing from the government's control to partnerships with the private sector. The early 1980s marked a period of growth in

¹ Simangaliso Malinga, "The development of informal settlements in South Africa, with particular reference to informal settlements around Daveyton on the East Rands, 1970-1999" (PhD thesis, Rand Afrikaans University), 84.

² Harold Wolpe, "The uneven transition from apartheid in South Africa," *Transformation: critical perspectives on South Africa* 27 (1995), 93.

³ Saul Dubow, *Apartheid 1948-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 172; Noor Nieftagodien, "Migrants: vanguard of the worker's struggles?" in *A long way home: migrant worker worlds 1800-2014*, ed Peter Delius, Laura Phillips, and Fiona Rankin-Smith (Johannesburg, Wits University press, 2014), 362.

⁴ Charles H Feinstein, *An economic history of South Africa: conquest, discrimination, and development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 202.

⁵ Richard Gordon Humphris, "The origins and subsequent development of administration boards" (MA dissertation, Rhodes University, 1983), 2.

⁶ Paula Morris, *A history of black housing in South Africa* (South Africa foundation, 1981), 16.

private housing stock in townships as the government sought to finance the homelands and keep its finances afloat. Thus, issues such as land tenure for Africans was amended, and ownership of homes for Africans in urban areas was considered to ensure the participation of the private sector. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on how the residents of Daveyton adapted to the shift in housing legislation and the introduction of its privatisation. Moreover, the initial plans to construct private housing in Daveyton from the late 1960s and the role of organisations such as Urban Foundation in the construction of housing, is also discussed. Lastly, the chapter also examines the effects of the re-emergence of squatter camps as well as the privatisation of beer outlet points along with the bus service in Daveyton and how this impacted on the authority's ability to participate monetarily in the development of the township.

5.2 “Home ownership” (Site and service scheme) in Daveyton

From Daveyton's initial layout in 1953, the idea of certain residents constructing their own houses was considered. In fact, an area was set aside where “natives can build their own houses under a “site and service” or “home ownership scheme.”⁷ The practical application of the scheme implied that various site and service schemes were implemented in Daveyton to cater for those who intended to construct their own homes and those which would depend on government and municipal-provided houses. To establish which residents required a site and service scheme, the Welfare Branch of the Department of Non-European Affairs conducted a socio-economic survey.⁸ According to the survey, approximately 30 per cent of the population which had moved to Daveyton desired to build their own homes.⁹ However, of that 30 per cent, certain residents required assistance to construct their homes.¹⁰ Thus, the families who wished to and could construct their own homes were relocated to a site where they could build.¹¹ The Non-European Affairs Committee concluded that several home plans be availed to families who could afford to construct their homes. The house plans ranged from one to any number of rooms the family could afford, that is, per the approved plans.¹² To ensure uniformity in

⁷ National Archives of South Africa (hereafter, NASA), NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

⁸ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

⁹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹¹ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹² NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

appearance, the Maintenance Section of the Department of Non-European Affairs erected fences and trees around all the houses.¹³

To help fund those who wanted to be placed in the “home ownership” site and service scheme but required assistance to purchase building material; the Non-European Affairs Committee concluded that each family with a designated site should be granted a loan in the form of materials, including fencing and the loan should amount to £100.¹⁴ To repay the loan, the Non-European Affairs Committee arranged for the loan to be repaid within a decade at five per cent interest, per annum.¹⁵ However, the loan repayment by the African families had to be paid in monthly instalments of £1.5.0, which, together with the promulgated site rental of 15/, would amount to a repayment of £2.0.0 per month.¹⁶ For families in this scheme in Daveyton, the Department of Native Affairs concluded that they should be granted a leasehold tenure for 30 years.¹⁷ The 30 year leasehold tenure which was offered to the families in Daveyton was similar to the one offered to families in other townships, for example, Dube in 1946, where the Johannesburg City Council proposed a homeownership scheme primarily to save money and entice the African middle-class families who could construct their own houses away from their homes in Sophiatown.¹⁸

Nevertheless, in Daveyton, under the same scheme as the one in Dube (see Fig. 6), the occupants were provided with a range of choices of who would construct the house. The options ranged from the family hiring a contractor to build the house, building it themselves, or only constructing the foundation of the house themselves and only complete one room; this was referred to as “stage housing.”¹⁹ In Daveyton, the various sites and service schemes resulted in various styles of houses, each with a different number of rooms. However, despite this difference, only two types of accommodation were provided: accommodation for married

¹³ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁴ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁵ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁶ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁷ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

¹⁸ Owen Crankshaw, “Class, race and residents in black Johannesburg, 1923-1970,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 18, no. 4 (2005): 385.

¹⁹ Mathewson, “*The establishment of an urban township*,” 119.

couples and for single people.²⁰ The latter was only constructed in the 1960s, referred to as the Daveyton hostel. In addition to constructing housing, administrative buildings also required urgent attention in the township. However, the Bantustans remained a priority for the government in the 1960s.



Figure 6: A self-built house in Dube under the 30-year leasehold tenure²¹

5.3 Government's validation to finance Bantustan housing

In 1960, Mathewson addressed the Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (IANA) conference. In the speech, he made his intentions of using the administration of Daveyton as a training mechanism to familiarise the Africans in the township with the government's 'Homeland policy'.²² For Mathewson, four elements were needed for a township to be conducive to life and create "urbanised and productive Africans." Firstly, it must maintain the health of the occupants; secondly, the environment must be designed to discourage social malpractices; thirdly, a permanence with minimal supervision; and lastly, the township must encourage self-sufficiency.²³ Thus, he was easily persuaded by H.F. Verwoerd's declaration that homelands would have their own urban spaces "where self-rule will apply in the towns,

²⁰ NASA, NTS 125/313 N. (2), Establishment of Daveyton. Native township, Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, 11/09/1953.

²¹ Owen Crankshaw, "Class, race and residents in black Johannesburg, 1923-1970," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 18, no. 4 (2005): 385.

²² Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 194.

²³ Mathewson, "The establishment of an urban Bantu township," 1.

with the management entirely in the hands of the Bantu.”²⁴ This resonated with Mathewson’s advocacy to control African urbanisation.

The promotion and development of the homelands commenced with the enactment and passing of the Bantu Authorities Act (Act No. 68 of 1951). The Act gave chiefs in the reserves more power over the individuals who lived in their territory.²⁵ Nevertheless, the question of what to do with the reserves predates the enactment of the Bantu Authorities Act. In 1949, the government assembled the Tomlinson Commission to investigate the economic, social, and political viability of the reserves in the long-term.²⁶ The commission’s findings were published in 1956 and recommended that a large injection of monetary resources and land expansion would be required for the reserves to be sustainable.²⁷ H.F Verwoerd promptly rejected these recommendations. Instead, in 1959, the government passed the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (Act No. 46 of 1959), which paved the way for the establishment of homelands.²⁸ As Laura Evans highlights, the homeland policy was the NP government’s response to the decolonisation processes which was ensuing throughout the continent.²⁹ Therefore, from the enactment of the homelands policy, the NP government associated African political aspirations with various ethnic homelands.

In 1963, Transkei was granted self-governing status.³⁰ This move signalled the government’s increasing coercive powers, which it utilised to control urban Africans. For example, in 1967, the government passed the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (Act No. 88 of 1967), which placed restrictions on the use of African labour in the industry.³¹ Furthermore, the Act encouraged industrial and commercial firms to decentralise by establishing branches next to homelands, which at the time were still being established.³² Thus, in the late 1960s, the government made overt attempts to control urban townships such as Daveyton by limiting their growth in terms of population. However, the government did not entirely stop funding the

²⁴ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 194.

²⁵ Laura Phillips, “The History of South Africa’s Bantustans,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, ed. Ally and Lissoni (New Histories of South Africa’s Apartheid-Era Bantustans, 2017), 4.

²⁶ Laura Phillips, “The history of South Africa’s Bantustans,” 3.

²⁷ Dubow, *Apartheid*, 108.

²⁸ Jacob Dlamini, *Safari nation: A social history of the Kruger National Park* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2020), 188.

²⁹ Laura Evans, “South Africa’s Bantustans and the dynamics of ‘decolonization’: Reflections on writing histories of the homelands,” *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (March 2012): 119.

³⁰ Laura Phillips, “The history of South Africa’s Bantustans,” 5.

³¹ Phil Eidelberg, “South African Apartheid: The Homeland-Township nexus, 1948-1986,” *South African Historical Journal* 36, no. 1 (2009): 98.

³² Phil Eidelberg, “South African Apartheid,” 98.

development of urban townships.³³ In 1969, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) indicated its intentions to collaborate with the Department of Community Development (DCD) to “investigate the possibilities to provide cheaper housing for Bantu in the urban Bantu residential areas of the smaller white towns”.³⁴ Such initiatives by BAD were meant to consolidate what Phil Eidelberg described as the “township-homeland axis”.³⁵ Moreover, the department of BAD instructed all the local municipalities with families “which cannot, on account of distance, be provided housing in a homeland” to be calculated, to determine how many required three-roomed semi-detached housing.³⁶ BAD’s initiative to provide housing to poor Africans was contradicted by M.C. Nel, the then Minister of BAD. In 1968, Nel appealed to local authorities to unite behind the government’s initiative to reverse the tide of African urbanisation and called for the local authorities to become “national builders instead of township builders”.³⁷ However, a few months later, his department supported the construction of cheap housing for poor Africans in urban areas. The promotion of Bantustans amended the political rights the government was willing to offer Africans in townships such as Daveyton. Moreover, the homeland policy placed a heavy burden on the government’s coffers. Hence, alternative methods to housing construction in townships such as Daveyton had to be pursued, for example, the introduction of the private sector into township housing construction.

5.4 Private sector involvement in housing construction

The 1980s brought a period extensive privatization in the broader South African economy. The decline of gold prices coupled with high military spending to quell the unrest in the townships resulted in a crisis for state finances.³⁸ Additionally, in 1985, certain US-based banks placed a moratorium on more loans to South Africa. This move, as Ballim argues, ushered in a period of neo-liberal economic policies in South Africa.³⁹ Neo-liberal economic orthodoxy was fiercely advanced by the Mont Pelerin Society, which was a group of academic economists such as Milton Friedman and Austrian philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek amongst others.⁴⁰ The group advocated for free markets and a *laissez-faire* approach to economic planning. This

³³ Eidelberg, “South African Apartheid,” 98.

³⁴ NASA, MB, 2/3/48, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton housing scheme, correspondence from 1968 to 1969, Town Council of Benoni’s Circular minutes No. A20/2. 5 November 1969.

³⁵ Eidelberg, “South African Apartheid,” 99.

³⁶ NASA, MB, 2/3/48, Town treasurer’s department: Daveyton housing scheme, correspondence from 1968 to 1969, Town Council of Benoni’s Circular minutes No. A20/2. 5/11/1969.

³⁷ University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 21/11/1968.

³⁸ Faeza Ballim, *Power, politics, (post) apartheid state* (Auckland Park, Jacana, 2023), 73.

³⁹ Ballim, “Power, politics,” 73.

⁴⁰ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20.

approach contracted the Keynesian style of state involvement in economic structuring which had dominated as an antidote to the ills of the great depression and the Second World War. In South Africa, the debt crisis by 1985 had made economic reform an urgent matter, particularly since the 1973 oil crisis had led to international creditors curtailing their loans.⁴¹ To investigate the feasibility of adopting neo-liberal economic policies and privatization in the country, a ministerial committee for privatization and deregulation was created.⁴² The committee was headed by Wim de Villiers, a critic of the state driven corporation model. De Villiers' report on the privatization of state corporations, Eskom in particular, were published in 1984 and garnered no opposition, mainly because they called for no significant alterations.⁴³ However, prior to the establishment of de Villiers' committee, in 1987, the government issued a white paper on privatization and deregulation, the paper decried the high levels of public spending in the country during the earlier decades.⁴⁴ These initiatives by the government highlight the broad nature of privatization in the country and how it trickled down to townships such as Daveyton. However, even with privatization of the housing market in townships, women were still at a disadvantage and did not greatly benefit. For instance, women who wanted to purchase publicly released property during the 1980s encountered difficulty accessing state sponsored subsidies to finance home ownership because they earned less than men.⁴⁵

According to Owen Crankshaw, the early 1970s marked a period during which the government vigorously sought to curtail African urbanisation. To achieve this goal, the government "froze" the provision of housing to the Africans in the major urban centres.⁴⁶ In places such as the Cape Peninsula, the freeze on urban African housing began in the early 1960s,⁴⁷ laying the groundwork for an acute housing shortage in the preceding decades and an increase in severe overcrowding in the already established townships. This type of housing policy was the precursor of the housing policies following the 1978 Riekert and 1982 Viljoen Commissions. Both commissions underscored the state's abdication from its role as the provider of housing and the landlord in the townships.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, in Daveyton, rather than "freeze" state-

⁴¹ Ballim, "Power, politics," 73.

⁴² Ballim, "Power, politics," 77.

⁴³ Ballim, "Power, politics," 77.

⁴⁴ Ballim, "Power, politics," 76.

⁴⁵ Rebekah Lee, *African Women and apartheid: Migration and settlement in urban South Africa* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009), 87.

⁴⁶ Owen Crankshaw, *Race, class and the changing division of labour under apartheid* (London: Routledge, 1997), 119.

⁴⁷ Lee, "African Women and apartheid," 86.

⁴⁸ Susan Parnell, "State intervention in housing provision in the 1980s," in *The apartheid city and beyond: urbanisation and social change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1992), 54.

provisioned housing, the authorities began cutting costs and constructing houses of poorer quality than those in the previous years.⁴⁹ The cost-cutting measures included, for example, the most basic facilities such as the internal doors in the home.⁵⁰ In addition to excluding internal doors, the lack of air ventilation was another irksome matter for the residents of Daveyton. The Council's chief engineer, Mr Cuthbert explained that the houses did not have proper ventilation due to the high costs of airbricks.⁵¹ The continued decline in the quality of housing in Daveyton was reflected in the maintenance and repairs to houses in the township's monthly reports. The decline in the quality of housing was so rapid that by September 1960, a minimum of 115 complaints had to be attended to in Daveyton, which included 106 cracked walls which had to be repaired.⁵² Moreover, the malfunction of 214 streetlights resulted in further complaints by residents and more repairs.⁵³

A significant factor in the unavailability of funding to construct better housing in Daveyton was due to funds which were redirected to the homelands.⁵⁴ According to Paul Hendler, between 1960 and 1969, the government invested R31,41 million in the construction of 67 009 houses in the homelands.⁵⁵ This investment yielded the acceleration of houses in the homelands while a lack thereof for Africans in the urban areas.⁵⁶ In Daveyton, this resulted in the mushrooming of informal settlements similar to those of the late 1940s.⁵⁷ Moreover, by the mid-1970s, approximately four thousand families had been on the official housing waiting list in Daveyton. Moreover, most were on the housing list for nearly four years.⁵⁸ Thus, the housing backlog resulted in, for example, local politician Shadrack Sinaba to openly criticise the East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) and the national government for failing to provide Africans in Daveyton with proper housing.⁵⁹ Sinaba proved to be a thorn in the flesh of the ERAB, especially when he organised opposition groups in Daveyton under the banner of his

⁴⁹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 222.

⁵⁰ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 222.

⁵¹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 223.

⁵² University of the Witwatersrand, Historical Papers, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22/10/70.

⁵³ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 223.

⁵⁴ Nicoli Nattrass and Jill Nattrass, "South Africa, the homelands and rural development," *Development Southern Africa*, 7, no. 1 (2008), 519.

⁵⁵ Paul Hendler, "Capital accumulation and the allocation of residential buildings in African townships on the Witwatersrand, 1980-1985," *University of the Witwatersrand African studies institute*, African studies seminar paper, 30/09/1985.

⁵⁶ Paul handler, "Capital accumulation," 6.

⁵⁷ Simangaliso Samuel Malinga, "The development of informal settlements in South Africa, with particular reference to informal settlements around Daveyton on the East Rand, 1970-1999" (PhD thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, 2000), 6.

⁵⁸ Malinga, "The development of," 163.

⁵⁹ Malinga, "The development of," 163.

newly formed Sinaba Party.⁶⁰ He advised homeless families in the township to erect shacks in the backyards of township houses or on the boundary of Daveyton.⁶¹ Sinaba's actions resulted in the erection of shacks on land that belonged to the Daveyton Council. As a result, during the late 1970s, the government availed more funds towards the development of housing in Daveyton.⁶² In fact, between 1977 and 1982, 31 507 houses were constructed by the government for Africans in the Witwatersrand townships, including Daveyton; This was done at a total cost of R214,89 million.⁶³

To ensure that urban Africans only purchased housing in the homelands, in 1968, the granting of leasehold tenure in urban townships was terminated immediately.⁶⁴ Significantly, the cessation of leasehold tenure effectively barred township residents from access to homeownership from this period.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, in 1975, a thirty-year lease scheme was reintroduced which only applied to Africans who, according to influx control laws, qualified to live in urban townships.⁶⁶ Moreover, in 1978, following the Viljoen Committee report, the thirty-year lease was amended to a ninety-nine-year leasehold. This allowed urban Africans in principle, access to private sector housing finance.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the operation of private developer companies in the townships, along with the implementation of self-help housing schemes were welcomed and encouraged by the government.⁶⁸ Hereafter, the government announced its intentions to sell large proportions of its township housing stock to residents in 1982.⁶⁹ A new tenure dispensation was formulated to pave the way for more substantive private sector involvement in the provision of urban housing in townships.⁷⁰ For alternative funding, the Financial Institutions Act (Act No. 80 of 1978) was amended to empower building societies to advance loans directly to urban African leaseholders.⁷¹

The lack of housing for urban Africans also affected private businesses. The Cillie Commission Report, which was established to investigate the reasons for the 1976 protest in Soweto and

⁶⁰ Malinga, "The development of," 163.

⁶¹ Malinga, "The development of," 163.

⁶² Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 2.

⁶³ Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 2.

⁶⁴ Malinga, "The development of," 146.

⁶⁵ Malinga, "The development of," 146.

⁶⁶ Malinga, "The development of," 146.

⁶⁷ Malinga, "The development of," 146; Maxim Bolt, "Homeownership, legal administration and the uncertainties of legal inheritance in South Africa's townships: apartheid's legal shadows," *African Affairs* 120, no. 479 (2021): 226.

⁶⁸ Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 2.

⁶⁹ Parnell, "*State intervention in the provision of houses*," 61.

⁷⁰ Parnell, "*State intervention in the provision of houses*," 61.

⁷¹ Paul Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 2.

other townships, highlighted the lack of housing as a significant source of grievances among Africans during the protests.⁷² As a result of protest and social unrest, no businesses could function properly. To solve the housing problems in urban townships and keep most of the African labour working. From its inception, the Urban Foundation promoted freehold tenure for Africans as a way of stabilising the workforce.⁷³ To construct homes in the townships, such as Daveyton, the government channelled funding through specific organisational structures. For example, until 1979, a Black Housing Board, under the auspices of the Department of Co-operation and Development, were empowered to develop several housing schemes in urban townships.⁷⁴ However, according to Hendler, after 1979, this role was assumed by the Department of Community Development through the National Housing Commission.⁷⁵ The government's struggles to provide housing allowed further private sector involvement. Thus, private housing developers filled the housing gap for their own profit. Furthermore, the private sector was further encouraged by the 1983 announcement that the provision of public housing would be privatised fully.⁷⁶ This announcement was promptly followed by a warning that no new government housing would be erected other than for welfare families which earned less than R150 per month.⁷⁷ Moreover, by the early 1980s, the government was still financing housing in the homelands. For example, in 1982, ERAB had erected and thus controlled sixty-six per cent of the houses in Lebowakgomo, in the Leboa homeland, whilst the Leboa government departments only controlled thirty-four per cent of all the government-built houses in its township.⁷⁸

In 1983, the government embarked on a campaign to sell state-owned houses to the occupants. This "great sale campaign" resulted in the sale of 750 000 state-owned houses at discounted prices.⁷⁹ Of the houses up for sale, seventy-five per cent were in urban townships, while twenty-nine per cent were in the homelands.⁸⁰ The ninety-year lease and the sale of houses by the government enticed the Daveyton residents to enquire about potentially purchasing their

⁷² Dhiru V Soni, "The apartheid state and black housing struggles," in *The apartheid city and beyond: urbanisation and social change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1992), 45.

⁷³ Marie Huchzermeyer, "Consent and contradiction: scholarly responses to the capital subsidy model for informal settlement intervention in South Africa," *Urban forum* 12, no. 1 (2001), 72.

⁷⁴ Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 6.

⁷⁵ Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 6.

⁷⁶ Parnell, "State intervention in housing," 55.

⁷⁷ Parnell, "State intervention in housing," 55.

⁷⁸ Lauren Phillips, "From Lebowa to Limpopo: differentiation, stratification and class formation in South Africa 1972-2009" (PhD thesis, New York University, 2020), 91.

⁷⁹ Erica Emdon, "Privatisation of state housing with special focus on the greater Soweto area," *Urban forum* 4, no 2 (1993): 2.

⁸⁰ Emdon, "Privatisation of state housing," 2.

homes. In Daveyton alone, there were 10 841 stands which amounted to R4,95 million.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the government did not sell the houses to encourage urban African property ownership; instead, it was forced to sell due to its growing inability to raise revenue required to maintain the properties as its assets.⁸² Thus, urban African residents with the financial means, took advantage of the situation and purchased their homes. On 8 March 1984, a Daveyton resident, Mr Simon Mashele received a response from the Daveyton City Council regarding the leasehold registration fees.⁸³ The Council informed him that he would have to pay R220,00 if no bond was involved.⁸⁴ However, for the old Daveyton houses, that is, houses constructed during the township's initial establishment in 1955, a particular leasehold scheme was formulated whereby the first 1000 people who registered a leasehold for such houses were required to only pay R80,00.⁸⁵ By the late 1980s, 2 620 houses were sold in March alone in Daveyton.⁸⁶

By the late 1980s, the government had significantly slowed down financing housing and township development. However, it did not terminate undertaking other projects in the townships. For example, in 1988, the city engineer's department was tasked with finding a suitable company to take aerial photographs of Daveyton.⁸⁷ The survey was conducted on an area which measured 1 100 hectares of land, and it was estimated that each aerial photographed hectare cost R75.00.⁸⁸ The aim of the project was to measure how much land was available for the further extension of Daveyton. As for the municipal houses which were controlled by the Daveyton Town Council, Shadrack Sinaba ensured that the Council would encounter resistance when trying to implement any policy on the residents.⁸⁹ For example, in October 1989, the Sowetan newspaper ran the following headline: "Mayor says new rent hike illegal".⁹⁰ This was

⁸¹ Hendler, "Capital accumulation," 3.

⁸² Emdon, "Privatisation of state housing," 2.

⁸³ Benoni Municipal Administration Records Archive (Hereafter, BMARA), Records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: Special meeting, leasehold registration fees: various areas, Daveyton City Council to Simon Mashele, 8/03/1984.

⁸⁴ BMARA, Records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: Special meeting, leasehold registration fees: various areas, Daveyton City Council to Simon Mashele, 8/03/1984.

⁸⁵ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: special meeting, leasehold registration fees: various areas, old Daveyton houses (directs – East Rand Administration Board), 8/03/1984.

⁸⁶ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, executive committee, And department: community and health services, houses sold under the 99-year leasehold scheme during March, 02/05/1989.

⁸⁷ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: special meeting, department: city engineer, aerial photography of existing Daveyton, 18/10/1988.

⁸⁸ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: special meeting, department: city engineer, aerial photography of existing Daveyton, 18/10/1988.

⁸⁹ Malinga, "The development of," 224.

⁹⁰ Malinga, "The development of," 224.

in response to the rent hike the Daveyton Town Council implemented in February 1989.⁹¹ Sinaba told the reporter, Mzikayise Edom that the council had decided to increase the rent from R16,95 to R59,90 for houses; rent for shacks increased from R7,50 to R25; while the hostel rents increased from R17,50 to R21.⁹² Sinaba claimed that the reason for the excessive increase was a mystery even to him; although, he was one of the councillors who had resolved to increase rent in the township.⁹³ In his defence, Sinaba claimed that despite agreeing to the rent increase, he only advocated for an increase of R55, and not R59,90 which the Council had implemented.⁹⁴ Moreover, the increase was implemented during an economic recession in mid-1981.⁹⁵ The recession resulted in an increase in unemployment in most urban areas. However, the worst hit by the recession were areas which were dependent on heavy manufacturing, including the East Rand.⁹⁶ In response to the rent increase, the Daveyton residents wrote a petition to the Daveyton Council and indicated that “we do not object to the tariff increases as a principle but rather to the timing and percentage.”⁹⁷ Furthermore, the residents argued that “rocketing interest rates, and the reality of inflation and unemployment” were still factors.⁹⁸ Thus, they would not be able to afford the new rent and tariff hikes.⁹⁹ A few months after the first petition, another was written. The second was more assertive than the first. In the second petition, which more than a hundred residents signed, they argued that in other much larger areas around the PWV, the residents no longer paid rent. However, they were expected to purchase their homes, pay rent, and contend with tariff increases.¹⁰⁰ The residents asserted that, the cost of living and unemployment were also extremely high. Moreover, they complained that they were not consulted by the councillors regarding the increases.¹⁰¹ Therefore, they “object and do not agree to the mooted tariff increases.” This stance implied that the Council had to amend its plans.

⁹¹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Sowetan newspaper, 25/10/1989.

⁹² BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Sowetan newspaper, 25/10/1989.

⁹³ BMABR, records, Daveyton City Council, Sowetan newspaper, 25/10/1989.

⁹⁴ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Sowetan newspaper, 25/10/1989.

⁹⁵ Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, *Class, race and inequality in South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 109.

⁹⁶ Seeking and Nattrass, *Class, race, and inequality*, 109.

⁹⁷ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, Daveyton residents petition letter, 23/05/1989.

⁹⁸ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, Daveyton residents petition letter, 23/05/1989.

⁹⁹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, Daveyton resident's petition letter, 23/05/1989.

¹⁰⁰ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, Daveyton resident's petition letter, 23/08/1989.

¹⁰¹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, Daveyton resident's petition letter, 23/08/1989.

The resident's resistance regarding the tariff increases implied that the Council could not sustain financing and retaining the homes as its property. Therefore, to ensure that the private sector, that is, banks and building societies, constructed homes in Daveyton, the Council agreed to act as a surety for the residents who required housing.¹⁰² Therefore, by August 1987, the Daveyton City Council had entered into housing scheme surety agreements with the United Building Society, the Natal Building Society, Allied Building Society, the South African Permanent Building Society and Standard Bank of South Africa.¹⁰³ The surety agreements implied that the council tied itself as surety and "co-principal debtor" for the due payments by persons who purchased a house from any of the private institution with which it had a surety agreement. Moreover, the initiatives to secure private sector assistance in the provision of housing aligned with the government's drive to limit its involvement in townships.

5.5 Re-emergence of squatter camps and self-help housing in Daveyton

The 1980s was a period of change for urban Africans in Daveyton and the entire country. Although the government still attempted to inhibit African urbanisation, it became clear that influx control mechanisms were economically and politically no longer viable. Thus, in 1986, influx control legislation was formally abolished.¹⁰⁴ This implied that Africans could move more freely. This resulted in more people moving to townships such as Daveyton, which, by the 1980s, were overcrowded. To try and inhibit informal settlements from mushrooming around Daveyton, the Daveyton City Council appointed Messer's, Van Zyl, Attwell and De Kock; a firm of town and regional planners to assess the housing needs of the people in Daveyton, as well as compile a housing strategy for the Council to establish a realistic policy for the development of the township.¹⁰⁵ In February 1987, the firm of town and regional planners presented the Daveyton City Council with a report,¹⁰⁶ which proposed further development of Daveyton and an extension to alleviate the increasing population in the township. The firm's proposal included various projects and development processes which the Daveyton City Council could consider. These included upgrading services such as sewage systems and connect these to the Daveyton extension and Etwatwa West and East.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: city secretary, housing scheme agreement with SAAMBOU national society, 14/02/1989.

¹⁰³ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: city secretary, housing scheme agreement with SAAMBOU national society, 14/02/1989.

¹⁰⁴ Ceridwen Oliver-Evans, "The implications of the abolition of influx control legislation in the Western Cape" (MA dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1991), 1.

¹⁰⁵ Malinga, "The development of," 171.

¹⁰⁶ Malinga, "The development of," 171.

¹⁰⁷ Malinga, "The development of," 171.

The accommodation of new residents in the Daveyton extension was a response to a request that began in the mid-1960s when the existing residents complained to the UBC that due to overcrowding and the lack of housing, new arrivals should be allocated housing in Daveyton extension.¹⁰⁸ Plans to establish the Daveyton extension began in the 1960s,¹⁰⁹ which implied that the Benoni authorities were aware of the possibility of overcrowding. In response, the Daveyton City Council adopted the firm's recommendations. Subsequently, it formed a Steering Committee to coordinate the required projects, finalise loans from the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), among other financial institutions, and oversee the completion of the planned project.¹¹⁰ To begin the planned projects, the assigned committee applied for R12 million from DBSA, which was granted on 29 October 1987.¹¹¹ The construction work to further extend Daveyton and Etwatwa began in November 1987.¹¹² As a measure to create employment for urban Africans during an economic downturn in the 1980s, DBSA incorporated a condition with the loan. It forced the authorities to hire local Africans to construct the planned projects.¹¹³ The participation of private entrepreneurs in Daveyton extended beyond the development of housing. For example, on 6 December 1988, the Daveyton City Council received a letter from Kevin Greig, an entrepreneur from Benoni, who proposed the establishment of container shops in the township.¹¹⁴ Greig proposed that the container shops should be placed on the east side of the railway line, where a self-help housing scheme was underway.¹¹⁵ Other private cooperation's, for example, Asea Electric, entered the fray and tendered R120 191 to produce electric transformers for the Daveyton electrification scheme.¹¹⁶

The squatting problem, which the Daveyton Council endeavoured to solve, rapidly increased due to the economic recession during the early 1980s. For example, after 1982, the government imposed stricter control over the entry of African workers who were deemed not to adhere to section 10 rights of the Urban Areas Act.¹¹⁷ The focus now shifted to hire Africans who were

¹⁰⁸ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 219.

¹⁰⁹ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 321.

¹¹⁰ Malinga, "The development of," 173.

¹¹¹ Malinga, "The development of," 174.

¹¹² Malinga, "The development of," 174.

¹¹³ Malinga, "The development of," 174.

¹¹⁴ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: Letter from Kevin Greig to Mr Joubert, container shops 06/12/1988.

¹¹⁵ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: Letter from Kevin Greig to Mr Joubert, container shops 06/12/1988.

¹¹⁶ Hendler, "Capital and accumulation," 7.

¹¹⁷ Anthony Lemon, "The apartheid city," in *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities*, ed. Anthony Lemon (Indianapolis: Indiana University press, 1991), 31.

residents in urban areas, particularly, in the townships. This hampered the labour market, and resulted in surplus labour, particularly in the homelands.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Africans from the homelands found ways to enter urban centres and access the urban economies. This resulted in them living in backyard shacks in townships such as Daveyton.¹¹⁹ Thus, by 1989, there was a high number of informal settlements in and around urban centres across the country.¹²⁰ Therefore, site and service schemes or what Doug Hindson referred to as “ordered informal settlements” were introduced to alleviate the proliferation of informal settlements.¹²¹ In 1982, the government outlined its policy for housing and in terms thereof, its role would only be restricted to the provision of infrastructure and services.¹²² This implied that the private sector and individuals would carry the responsibility to construct homes. For individuals, this was referred to as self-help housing.¹²³ Certain persons viewed the self-help initiative by the government as a way to distance itself from the lack of housing in the urban areas.

Nevertheless, the government’s involvement in housing continued during this time, despite its announcement to distance itself therefrom.¹²⁴ For example, in 1988, a house in Daveyton which was allocated to a couple, Mr Duncan and Mrs Augustine Twala, who could no longer raise the necessary amount or acquire a loan to purchase the house, was transferred to another resident, Mr Raymond Msimango.¹²⁵ When he could also not raise funds for the bond, the Daveyton City Council granted him a loan of R15 000.¹²⁶ Thus, he became the bondholder for the house.¹²⁷ The need for such interventions was deemed necessary because of events such as the December sleep in. In December 1984, a group of women and children slept outside the township’s administrative offices to protest against the lack of housing in the township.¹²⁸ One of the issues of contention between the community, the Daveyton City Council and ERAB was

¹¹⁸ Lemon, *The apartheid city*, 31.

¹¹⁹ Lemon, *The apartheid city*, 31.

¹²⁰ Lemon, *The apartheid city*, 31.

¹²¹ Doug Hindson, “Alternative urbanisation strategies in South Africa: a critical evaluation,” *Third world quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1987): 591.

¹²² Malinga, “The development of,” 175.

¹²³ Hindson, “Alternative urbanisation,” 591.

¹²⁴ Parnell, “*State intervention in the provision of houses*,” 61.

¹²⁵ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: Community and health services, application for grant of loan in respect of house 20034 Daveyton: Mr Raymond Msimango, 22/2/1988.

¹²⁶ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: Community and health services, application for grant of loan in respect of house 20034 Daveyton: Mr Raymond Msimango, 22/2/1988.

¹²⁷ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: Community and health services, application for grant of loan in respect of house 20034 Daveyton: Mr Raymond Msimango, 22/2/1988.

¹²⁸ Malinga, “The development of,” 175.

the policy to demolish shacks in informal settlements around the township without providing the self-help site and service scheme or the promised four-roomed Council-built homes.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, these protests subsided when the Daveyton City Council, which was inaugurated on 25 May 1978 to represent the local tier of government, and ERAB adopted a lenient approach towards squatting.¹³⁰ Another defusing factor was the prospect of squatters acquiring homes in the new Daveyton extension. The residents referred hereto as *Phumlamqashi* (where lodgers rest).¹³¹ Private organisations such as the Urban Foundation and other financial institutions could have utilised site-and-service schemes to construct homes for Africans. However, the private sector's ability to construct housing in an orderly and speedy manner was impeded.¹³² For example, in 1982, Concor Homes, Long Homes, Dzinga and Nzama and Associates, and LB Mahlangu Builders all wrote to the Daveyton Community Council to requesting sites where they could construct houses.¹³³ The building societies blamed the Councillors' illiteracy and lack of understanding of the procedure to provide sites to build houses as the primary obstacle which impeded the allocation of land.¹³⁴ One of the significant private institutions in township development was the Urban Foundation (UF). The UF was established in 1976 as a think tank on urban development.¹³⁵ UF was central in introducing the late apartheid neo-liberal housing policy. The privately funded think tank and housing developer was set up by Anglo-American Corporation and numerous South African private companies which ranged from mining, construction, retail and banking.¹³⁶ The foundation sought to stabilise the urban African workforce and increase the consumer market and skilled workforce.¹³⁷ Since its establishment, the UF advocated for freehold tenure for urban Africans.¹³⁸ Private developers encountered several problems in Daveyton, for example, they found that although the government served as a surety, several people in the new squatter camps could not afford to pay for loans.¹³⁹ Ironically, the government's attempt to eschew itself from providing housing for Africans in urban areas necessitated greater involvement to ensure that

¹²⁹ Malinga, "The development of," 163.

¹³⁰ Malinga, "The development of," 164.

¹³¹ Malinga, "The development of," 164.

¹³² Roddy Fox and Claudia Reintges, "East London," in *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities*, ed. Anthony Lemon (Indianapolis: Indiana University press, 1991), 99.

¹³³ Hendler, "Capital and accumulation," 7.

¹³⁴ Hendler, "Capital and accumulation," 7.

¹³⁵ Marie Huchzermeyer, "Consent and contradiction: scholarly responses to the capital subsidy model for informal settlement intervention in South Africa," *Urban forum* 12, no. 1 (2001): 72.

¹³⁶ Patrick Bond, *Elite transition: From apartheid to neo-liberalism in South Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 98; Huchzermeyer, "Consent and contradiction," 72.

¹³⁷ Huchzermeyer, "Consent and contradiction," 72.

¹³⁸ Huchzermeyer, "Consent and contradiction," 72.

¹³⁹ Hendler, "Capital and accumulation," 8.

the private sector was on board.¹⁴⁰ In addition to trying to privatise housing construction in Daveyton, the government also distanced itself from the beer monopoly in the township.

5.6 Privatisation of beer stalls and bus services in Daveyton

On 4 April 1989, the Executive Committee of the City Council of Daveyton convened in the Council chamber in Daveyton at 14:00, and R. Coetzee, the then-acting town clerk chaired the ordinary meeting.¹⁴¹ One of the items on the agenda, item 93, related to the “privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer.”¹⁴² Once a central cog in the state’s machinery to finance township establishment and development, by the late 1980s, the Daveyton City Council was discussing privatising its outlet points of sorghum beer. A drastic change from the previous decades. The item was added to the Daveyton’s City Council’s meeting because of a letter from the Transvaal Provincial Administration Regional Director of the East Rand, which was received on 15 March 1989.¹⁴³ The director’s letter informed the Council that “it is the intention of this administration to privatise all the outlet points of Sorghum beer”. The Council only discussed how the transition should transpire rather than whether it was feasible, because it had already been decided for them. Privatising any aspect of beer halls was a deviation even from the neighbouring countries. In Rhodesia, for instance, rather than privatise beer halls, they chose to add kiosks to such buildings and lease these to Africans.¹⁴⁴ When the Rhodesian government viewed beer halls as somewhat becoming obsolete, they constructed smaller beer gardens where African patrons could be controlled easily, while they continued to yield the profits from beer.¹⁴⁵ However, in Daveyton, the Council decided to lease the entire Daveyton Brewery to Randtoria Breweries at a monthly rate of R7 223.88, whilst the sorghum beer outlet located at the Daveyton Civic Centre was also leased to Randtoria Breweries at a monthly rate of R1 500.00.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Susan Parnell, “State intervention in housing provision in the 1980s,” in *The apartheid city and beyond: urbanisation and social change in South Africa*, ed. David M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1992), 60.

¹⁴¹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

¹⁴² BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

¹⁴³ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

¹⁴⁴ Hutton, “Seeing like a second city,” 223.

¹⁴⁵ Hutton, “Seeing like a second city,” 223; Nathaniel Chimhete, “African nationalism, municipal beer outlets and shebeens in Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1960s-1980,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 44, no.5 (2018): 821.

¹⁴⁶ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

The Daveyton Council, however, was not willing to completely relinquish its beer halls. Consequently, instead of selling to Randtoria Breweries, the Daveyton Council chose to lease its buildings, equipment, and fittings along with the business rights and goodwill and thereby retaining the properties as permanent possessions of the Council.¹⁴⁷ The Daveyton town clerk was empowered to sign the lease agreement. However, before any agreement of the sorghum beer outlets in Daveyton could be finalised, the Council requested to address the Regional Director to elaborate on any future plans to privatise the beer halls and outlets.¹⁴⁸ The Daveyton City Council was not the only body told to lease its beer or sorghum beer outlets. In 1989, fourteen tenders were invited to purchase various sorghum beer outlets on the East Rand. Three were located in Katlehong: Cyril Victor, Ulidefe in Kwesine hostel, and Kampong beer hall; two in Tembisa, Kubeni and Ehlanzeni-biersaal.¹⁴⁹ The remaining tenders were in Wattville, Kwathema, Delmas, Tokoza, Vosloorus and Duduza.¹⁵⁰ The sale of beer outlets in Daveyton and other townships, which hitherto provided the government with substantial funds to develop the township, further illustrated the government's attempt to distance itself as a township developer. Nevertheless, it continued constructing homes in Daveyton with the private developers.

The winds of privatisation in Daveyton blew further than the sorghum beer sector. In 1988, the city treasurer proposed that the Daveyton Council privatise the bus service in the township.¹⁵¹ The Daveyton City Council had assumed control of the bus service in 1983 from the former Development Board.¹⁵² Since the initial establishment of Daveyton in 1955, the bus service had been an inadequate form of public transportation. In 1964, only five buses serviced the entirety of Daveyton.¹⁵³ According to Nieftagodien, approximately 365 bus passengers were left stranded at bus stops due to the lack of space and seats.¹⁵⁴ It was not until August 1966 that the Daveyton Management Committee admitted to the inadequate number of busses and bought

¹⁴⁷ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

¹⁴⁸ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Agenda: ordinary meeting, Daveyton City Council, department: community and health services, privatisation of outlet points of sorghum beer, 23/02/1989.

¹⁴⁹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Tenders are hereby invited for the purchase of the Sorghum beer outlets, 26/02/1989.

¹⁵⁰ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Tenders are hereby invited for the purchase of the Sorghum beer outlets, 26/02/1989.

¹⁵¹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁵² BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁵³ Noor Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid in the East Rand, 1948 – 1973: the role of local government and local resistance" (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), 228.

¹⁵⁴ Nieftagodien, "The implementation of urban apartheid," 229.

four new ones to add to the fleet in Daveyton.¹⁵⁵ Thus, by the end of 1966, the fleet increased to eleven.¹⁵⁶ In 1980, the town treasurer complained that the bus service was run on a small annual deficit. Consequently, the old busses could not be replaced because the Council experienced increased operating costs.¹⁵⁷ The city treasurer bemoaned that, since the establishment of the Council in 1983, the bus service in Daveyton accumulated deficits with no indication of a surplus. In 1986, the deficit was R708 775; 1987 it increased to R1 471 824; while in 1988, it ballooned to R2 469 028.¹⁵⁸ The City treasurer argued that, “the ordinary man in Daveyton cannot afford to subsidise a service that runs at a loss and still accumulates more from year to year with no solution.”¹⁵⁹ Thus, for the City treasurer, the only plausible solution was to privatise the bus service and negotiate on behalf of its employees with the new company.¹⁶⁰

To test whether privatisation would yield any positive results, in September 1989, The Daveyton City Council appointed Scottrans, a private company to assume control of the management of the transport department to ensure a viable operation.¹⁶¹ The company assumed responsibility at the end of September and at the end of the following month, October, a comparison was calculated between the two months in a report by the city secretary. According to the report, the total revenue accrued from the bus service in Daveyton between the two months varied significantly; in September, the revenue from the regular weekday cash revenue was R184 711. 33, while in September, R202 405. 79.¹⁶² The revenue to hire busses during the weekends also increased from R20 000. 95 in September to R47 631. 00 in October during Scottrans control.¹⁶³ Three reasons were provided for the differences in revenue between the two months: firstly, the decrease in the theft of bus parts between the two months; amendment of the allocation of private hire funds for the busses from the transport department under the

¹⁵⁵ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 228.

¹⁵⁶ Nieftagodien, “The implementation of urban apartheid,” 229.

¹⁵⁷ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁵⁸ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁵⁹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁶⁰ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Privatisation of the bus service, 12/01/1988.

¹⁶¹ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

¹⁶² BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

¹⁶³ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

control of the treasury department.¹⁶⁴ After amending the administrative control, private hire allocations were enhanced, and the funds were controlled to a large extent.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the hire of new bus drivers resulted in an efficient operation of the bus service. The city treasurer's recommendations to privatise the bus services in Daveyton were further advanced when the Transvaal Provincial Administration accentuated to the Daveyton Council to ensure that an economical bus service was viable, because there would be no subsidisation of an unfeasible service which operated at a loss.¹⁶⁶ Consequently, the Council made a concerted effort to privatise the bus service.

5.7 Conclusion

The 1980s was a turbulent period for the government. Economically, the slide in gold prices impeded sustainable growth, and the economic recession that started in the earlier years of the decade heightened the social and political tension in the country. With the economic downturn, unemployment rose slightly, particularly in the homelands, which depended on the South African economy for subsistence. As more people made their way to the urban centres, squatting increased intensely. The City Council and the administration board in Daveyton was antagonistic and indifferent to the squatters around the township, which resulted in protests. Faced with the increased lack of housing in townships, for example, in Daveyton, the government sought to free itself of being the township developer and landlord and invited private enterprises to construct housing for the Africans. Nevertheless, the government did not entirely abandon the township housing provision.

With the government's blessing, private building societies, banks, and organisations such as the urban foundation began constructing homes in government-provided land on the periphery of Daveyton. Another programme to help in the provision of housing was the self-help initiatives, which placed the individuals at the centre to provide their own homes, while the government would only assist where required. The involvement of the private sector was not without its problems. A major impediment was the release of land by the Daveyton committee for private developers to construct houses. Often, the process was lengthy, and squatting continued to increase precipitously. To highlight the government's loosening grip on

¹⁶⁴ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

¹⁶⁵ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure. Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

¹⁶⁶ BMARA, records, Daveyton City Council, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Department: City treasure, Department: City secretary, Monthly report: October 1989: Daveyton Bus service, 12/01/1989.

Daveyton's administration, it sold all the African beer outlets; a source of income the government had monopolised from the 1950s when the township was established.

The chapter sought to highlight how the government continued to finance the development of Daveyton during the 1980s and simultaneously fund the homelands. It focused particularly on the provision of housing and how the introduction of the private sector impacted the development of Daveyton. The chapter also highlighted how certain residents in Daveyton responded to the government's inability to provide adequate housing and increased the rates and rent for those houses it managed to construct. Moreover, it revealed how the government sought to distance itself further from the development of Daveyton and pave the way for private entrepreneurs by selling the beer outlets in Daveyton.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The study aimed to investigate the segregation and apartheid state township funding schemes, with the focus on the establishment of the urban African township of Daveyton, in the East Rand, South Africa, between 1950 and 1990. This dissertation investigated and explored the mechanisms and methods utilised by the National Party (NP) government to finance the construction and development of Daveyton. The latter was established in 1955 as a response to the proliferating squatter camps near Benoni, particularly, Apex squatter camp. Daveyton was designed to systemically control the urban African population in the area and simultaneously abide by the racial spatial segregation of the NP government. Consequently, the latter shaped and reshaped the urban spaces, and was determined not to be dissuaded by monetary issues to implement social segregation.

Chapter 1 presented the reader with the background to this study, and includes the problem statement, research objectives, theoretical context, and research methodology. Chapter 2 explored the first objective with a discussion on scholarly literature with reference to racial segregation and apartheid state-funding schemes in general and more specific in the township of Daveyton. Chapter 3 involved a detailed exploration on the impact of urbanisation, uncontrolled squatting, as well as the establishment of Bantustans on the funding of Daveyton's infrastructural development and housing from the 1960s to meet the second objective. Chapter 4 discussed the third objective and began with the establishment of the beer halls and their profits, followed by the state's township funding mechanisms. Chapter 5 points out how funding of the townships' development changed over time to try and accommodate the re-emergence of squatter camps, and the government's consequent changing political ideologies, in particular, the creation of Bantustans. The involvement of the private sector in housing, upgrading the infrastructure, building a school, and improving the transport in Daveyton during the 1970s is also explored.

6.2 Findings

It was argued that, whilst loans from the central government were a significant method to finance the establishment of Daveyton, alternative methods were also utilised to cheapen the

establishment process and ensure that the Benoni authorities incurred limited financial strain. For example, the utilisation of African labour as builders. Furthermore, the study also sought to highlight the significance of beer funds to finance various aspects of the township. Indeed, profits from the sale of beer was such a significant aspect to finance the township that a beer hall was always amongst the very first buildings which were constructed. From the onset of the establishment of a township, the local Benoni authorities were wary not to depend entirely on the central government's coffers to fund the township.

One of the central factors that influenced the establishment of Daveyton was the government's attempt to control and socially engineer the region's population at the time, particularly the African population. The enactment of, for example, *inter alia*, Group Areas Act, significantly influenced how Daveyton would be established. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Three, in addition to racial spatial segregation, another form of segregation, that is, ethnic, was implemented in the township. Although the authorities in Benoni denied that ethnic grouping was implemented to foster conflict between the residents, several did arise, which made control of the township much simpler for the government. The third chapter also traced the township's first residents from Apex squatter camp to the site and service scheme in Daveyton until it became an entirely housed township. It was argued that control of the African population was central to establishing the township and funding was sought from various sources to ensure that the township was established.

The Benoni authorities encountered several hurdles in trying to finance Daveyton; for example, the misappropriation of funds designated for the construction of housing in the township. Chapter Four revealed that the implementation of the Bantustan policy had a detrimental effect on the development of the township from the late 1960s onwards. The establishment of Bantustans was not only an attempt to create independent and self-governing states for Africans, but it also entailed a drastic shift of funds from developing townships such as Daveyton towards the construction of housing in the Bantustans. In the case of Daveyton, the greatest benefactor of the shift of funds from the township was the Leboa Bantustan, which received large injections of funding from the East Rand Administration Board to construct homes. However, as argued in Chapter Four, the severe shortage of housing in the township during this period only resulted in the proliferation of squatter camps. Furthermore, apart from shifting funds from the townships, the political climate in the country during the latter half of the 1970s forced the oppressive apartheid regime to seek alternative methods to fund the construction of housing and other amenities.

This study sought to highlight the change over time of the methods utilised to fund the establishment and development of Daveyton. The change in funding strategies was extreme from the early 1980s onwards. As argued in the fifth chapter, the government distanced itself from providing homes in the township. The enacted legislation allowed the private sector to play a more active role. Several factors influenced the advancement of the housing market: high inflation from the early 1980s; and the decrease in the demand for gold. The Daveyton residents seized the opportunity to purchase housing through private-sector initiatives. Some people openly defied the local authorities by drawing up partitions and protested the increase of tariffs. Moreover, due several defiance campaigns by the residents including the lack of funds, the government privatised several African beer outlets. It implemented, inter alia, several strategies of which one was to stand surety for those who wanted to approach the private sector to purchase a house in the township. Thus, the late 1970s proved to be a turning point in strategies the government utilised in the previous decades to fund Daveyton.

6.3 Further research and recommendations

Black urban establishment has already received attention in apartheid scholarship. However, the policy of ethnic grouping in the townships, in particular in Daveyton, has received little attention, or in some cases were only mentioned in literature on urban apartheid policies. There is a need to investigate whether segregation in townships is a legacy of apartheid township planning and development in particular if the ethnic grouping, was forced or was a natural division that flowed from pre-colonial times to the present.

Squatting and housing for the native Africans is still a problem and pressing issue in 21 century South Africa. Learning from the past apartheid township planning, development, and mistakes, the ANC government may provide better plans to secure safe living spaces for the poor and unemployed South Africans.

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