

**Exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the South African Army's University Reserve Training Programme**

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## PREFACE

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## **ABSTRACT**

Reserve Force training is essential to ensure that the Regular Force is sufficiently sustained in times of national emergency. Thus far, limited research has been conducted on the experiences of learning and development practitioners (LDPs) regarding South African Reserve Force Training, specifically the University Reserve Force Training Programme (URTP). The aim of this study was to investigate South African (SA) Army LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP. A qualitative, exploratory and descriptive research design, specifically a phenomenological strategy, was used to explore LDPs' experiences. Purposeful sampling was used to select nine (9) participants to be interviewed individually regarding their experiences as LDPs of the URTP. The researcher analysed the data and a co-coder cross-checked the codes. The results pertaining to LDPs' experiences of the SA Army's URTP were framed within an interpretivist paradigm. Six (6) themes were identified after data analysis, namely insufficient planning to deliver the SA Army's URTP, stakeholder support for training, inadequate recruitment, selection and basic military training of candidates, delivering the SA Army's URTP training interventions, quality assurance of the SA Army's URTP, and lastly the recommendations for effective delivery of the SA Army's URTP. The results pertaining to planning, availability of learners to undergo training, resources to support training, and time constraints were significant in determining the LDPs' experiences. Recommendations such as extensions of the URTP over a longer period and the use of e-learning as a training delivery method were made to address the research findings and for future research.

**Keywords:** Human resource development, training and development, learning and development practitioners, training programme, University Reserve Training Programme, South African Army, South African National Defence Force, Reserve Force, qualitative research

## OPSOMMING

Reserwemag-opleiding is van kardinale belang ten einde te verseker dat die Staandemag genoegsaam onderskraag word in tye van nasionale noodsituasies. Tot dusver is beperkte navorsing onderneem oor die ondervindinge van Staandemag-leer- en Opleidingspraktisyns (SLOP's) wat betref Reserwemag-opleiding – meer spesifiek die Universiteitsreserwemag-opleidingsprogram (UROP). Die doel van die studie was om ondersoek in te stel na die ervaringe van die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër se SLOP's wat betref die UROP. 'n Kwalitatiewe, eksplorerende en beskrywende navorsingsontwerp, meer spesifiek 'n fenomenologiese strategie, is gevolg ten einde hierdie ervaringe te ondersoek. Nege (9) deelnemers, met wie individuele onderhoude rakende hul ervaringe van die UROP gevoer is, is deur middel van doelbewuste steekproefneming geselekteer. Nadat die navorser die data geanaliseer het, is die kodes deur 'n medekodeerder gekruiskontroleer. Die resultate van die ondervindinge van die SLOP's aangaande die UROP is binne 'n interpretivistiese paradigma geplaas. Die data-ontleding het ses (6) temas opgelewer, naamlik gebrekkige beplanning wat die lewering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër se UROP betref, belanghebbendes se ondersteuning van opleiding, onvoldoende werwing, keuring en basiese militêre opleiding van kandidate, die aflewering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër se UROP-opleidingsintervensies, kwaliteitsversekering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër se UROP, en laastens die aanbevelings vir die effektiewe aflewering van die SA Leër se UROP. Die resultate wat verband hou met beplanning, beskikbaarheid van leerders (kandidate) om opleiding te ondergaan, bronne ter ondersteuning van opleiding, en tydsbeperkings het 'n beduidende rol gespeel in die ondervindinge van die SLOP's. Aanbevelings, naamlik die uitbreiding van die UROP oor 'n langer tydperk en die gebruik van e-leer as 'n opleidingsmetode is gemaak in soverre dit die navorsingsbevindings betref, asook wat toekomstige navorsing aanbetref.

**Sleutelwoorde:** Mensehulpbronontwikkeling, opleiding en ontwikkeling, leer- en ontwikkelingspraktisyns, opleidingsprogram, Universiteitsreserwe-opleidingsprogram, Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag, Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag, Reserwemag, kwalitatiewe navorsing

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>PREFACE</b> .....	ii
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	iii
<b>OPSOMMING</b> .....	iv
<b>CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION, MOTIVATION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM</b> ....	<b>1</b>
1.1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.2 ORIENTATION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.....	1
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH.....	3
1.4 REVIEW OF BODY OF SCHOLARSHIP.....	6
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	7
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	7
1.7 METHOD OF STUDY.....	8
1.8 LITERATURE STUDY.....	8
1.9 PARADIGMATIC PERSPECTIVE .....	9
1.9.1 Paradigm.....	9
1.10 EXPLANATION OF CONCEPTS .....	10
1.10.1 Human resource development (HRD).....	10
1.10.2 Learning, training and development.....	11
1.10.3 Training programme.....	12
1.10.4 University Reserve Training Programme (URTP).....	13
1.10.5 South African National Defence Force (SANDF).....	13
1.10.6 Reserve Force.....	13
1.10.7 SA Army.....	14
1.10.8 Learning and development practitioner.....	14
1.10.9 Explore.....	15
1.10.10 Experience.....	15
1.11 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY.....	15
1.11.1 Contribution to training and development/human resource development literature.....	15
1.11.2 Contribution to the individual.....	16
1.11.3 Contribution to the organisation.....	16
1.12 THE COURSE OF THE STUDY .....	16
1.13 SUMMARY.....	17

<b>CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF MILITARY TRAINING, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO URTP TRAINING</b>	<b>18</b>
2.1	INTRODUCTION ..... 18
2.2.	CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK..... 18
2.2.1	Systems theory..... 18
2.2.2	Process theory..... 20
2.3	TRAINING..... 20
2.4	MILITARY TRAINING..... 21
2.5	THE NATURE AND TRAINING OF THE RESERVE FORCE..... 22
2.5.1	The Reserve Force training on an international level..... 23
2.5.2	The Reserve Force training: South Africa..... 24
2.6	THE SA ARMY’S URTP..... 24
2.6.1	Introduction and purpose..... 24
2.6.2	Selection criteria and recruitment of potential candidates..... 24
2.6.3	The components of the URTP..... 25
2.6.3.1	Steering committee..... 26
2.6.3.2	Arms of services and divisions..... 26
2.6.3.3	Military education committees..... 26
2.6.3.4	Students (members undergoing URTP training)..... 26
2.6.3.5	Universities..... 26
2.6.4	The URTP management process..... 27
2.6.5.	Command and control of the URTP..... 28
2.6.6	Stakeholders involved in the delivery of the URTP..... 29
2.6.6.1	Reserve Force units..... 29
2.6.6.2	Close-by units..... 30
2.6.6.3	Home unit..... 30
2.6.6.4	Formations..... 30
2.6.6.5	Force preparation..... 30
2.6.7	Stages of URTP training..... 30
2.7	TRAINING METHOD APPLICABLE TO DELIVER THE URTP..... 32
2.8	FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR TRAINING DELIVERY..... 34
2.8.1	Management of training..... 34
2.8.2	Management support for training..... 35
2.8.3	Availability of equipment and resources..... 36
2.8.4	Learning and development practitioners..... 37
2.8.5	Training costs..... 39
2.8.6	Geographical location and availability of learners for training..... 39

2.8.7	Training delivery method.....	40
2.8.8	Time available.....	40
2.9	QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE SA ARMY'S URTP.....	41
2.9.1	Quality planning.....	43
2.9.2	Quality control.....	44
2.9.3	Quality improvement.....	44
2.10	SUMMARY.....	45
<b>CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....</b>		<b>46</b>
3.1	INTRODUCTION.....	46
3.2	THE RESEARCH DESIGN.....	46
3.3	STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING.....	47
3.3.1	Study population.....	47
3.3.2	Sampling.....	47
3.4	QUALITATIVE STUDY.....	49
3.4.1	Methodology: Phenomenological study.....	51
3.4.2	Qualitative data collection (generation) methods.....	52
3.4.2.1	Entrée and establishing the researcher's roles.....	53
3.4.2.2	Interview.....	55
3.4.2.3	Field notes and observation.....	57
3.4.2.4	Literature study.....	57
3.4.3	Qualitative data analysis.....	58
3.4.4	Strategies employed to ensure quality data.....	59
3.4.4.1	Trustworthiness.....	60
3.4.4.2	Credibility.....	60
3.4.4.3	Transferability.....	62
3.4.4.4	Dependability.....	62
3.4.4.5	Conformability.....	62
3.4.5	Reporting of findings.....	63
3.4.6	Ethical considerations.....	63
3.5	SUMMARY.....	66
<b>CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS.....</b>		<b>67</b>
4.1	INTRODUCTION.....	67
4.2	QUALITATIVE FINDINGS RELATED TO LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS' EXPERIENCE REGARDING THE SA ARMY'S UNIVERSITY RESERVE TRAINING PROGRAMME.....	68

4.3	THEME 1: INSUFFICIENT PLANNING TO DELIVER THE SA ARMY'S URTP	69
4.3.1	Experiences related to insufficient planning	69
4.4	THEME 2: STAKEHOLDERS' SUPPORT FOR TRAINING	75
4.4.1	Experiences related to stakeholders' involvement to support training	76
4.4.2.	Experiences related to communication and liaison among stakeholders	79
4.4.3	Experiences related to command and control	82
4.5	THEME 3: INADEQUATE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND BASIC MILITARY TRAINING OF CANDIDATES	83
4.5.1	Experiences related to recruitment and selection	84
4.5.2	Experiences related to the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase	86
4.6	THEME 4: DELIVERING THE SA ARMY'S URTP TRAINING INTERVENTIONS	88
4.6.1	Experiences related to availability of learners to undergo training	88
4.6.2	Experiences related to non-availability of resources	95
4.6.3	Experiences related to the training delivery method	102
4.6.4	Experiences related to time constraints	104
4.6.5	Experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP	112
4.7	THEME 5: QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE SA ARMY'S URTP	120
4.7.1	Experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance system	120
4.8	THEME 6: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINIMISE NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE SA ARMY'S URTP	123
4.8.1	Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP	124
4.8.2	Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training	126
4.8.3	Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT	128
4.8.4	Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP	131
4.8.5	Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP	132
4.8.6	Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP	134
4.8.7	Recommendations to address LDPs' negative experiences	135
4.8.8	Recommendations directed at quality assurance of URTP	138
4.9	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS	140
4.10	SUMMARY	144

## CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

	.....	<b>145</b>
5.1	INTRODUCTION .....	145
5.2	SUMMARY .....	145
5.3	DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS .....	149
5.3.1	How is military training, with specific reference to URTP training, conceptualised in the literature? .....	149
5.3.2	How do SA Army LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP? .....	150
5.3.2.1	Insufficient planning .....	150
5.3.2.2	Stakeholders' involvement to support training .....	151
5.3.2.3	Communication and liaison among stakeholders .....	153
5.3.2.4	Command and control .....	154
5.3.2.5	Recruitment and selection .....	156
5.3.2.6	Basic Military Training (BMT) phase .....	157
5.3.2.7	Unavailability of learners to undergo training .....	158
5.3.2.8	Non-availability of equipment and resources .....	159
5.3.2.9	Training delivery method .....	160
5.3.2.10	Time constraints .....	161
5.3.2.11	Involvement of LDPs in the delivery of the URTP .....	162
5.3.2.12	Evaluation as part of the quality assurance system .....	164
5.3.3	What recommendations can you make regarding the improvement of the SA Army's URTP? .....	165
5.3.3.1	Recommendations directed at insufficient planning .....	165
5.3.3.2	Recommendations directed towards stakeholders' involvement to support training .....	165
5.3.3.3	Recommendations directed at command and control .....	165
5.3.3.4	Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT .....	166
5.3.3.5	Recommendations directed at BMT .....	166
5.3.3.6	Recommendations directed towards the non-availability of equipment and resources .....	166
5.3.3.7	Recommendations directed towards training delivery method .....	166
5.3.3.8	Recommendations directed at time constraint .....	167
5.3.3.9	Recommendations directed at LDPs' involvement with the URTP .....	167
5.3.3.10	Recommendations directed at evaluation as part of quality assurance system .....	167
5.4	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	168

5.4.1	Recommendations ensuing from research findings.....	168
5.4.2	Recommendations for future research.....	173
5.5	LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.....	174
5.6	FINAL CONCLUSION.....	174
5.7	SUMMARY.....	176
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>		<b>177</b>
<b>ANNEXURES.....</b>		<b>187</b>
<b>LAST UPDATED: OCTOBER 2019</b>		

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 4-1:	Participants' roles during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP .....	68
TABLE 4-2:	Number of training programmes (SA Army's URTP) participants engaged in .....	68
TABLE 4-3:	Experiences related to insufficient planning.....	70
TABLE 4-4:	Experiences related to stakeholders' involvement in support training.....	76
TABLE 4-5:	Experiences related to communication and liaison among stakeholders.....	80
TABLE 4-6:	Experiences related to command and control.....	82
TABLE 4-7:	Experiences related to recruitment and selection.....	84
TABLE 4-8:	Experiences related to the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase.....	86
TABLE 4-9:	Experiences related to the availability of learners to undergo training.....	89
TABLE 4-10:	Experiences related to availability of resources.....	95
TABLE 4-11:	Experiences related to the training delivery method.....	102
TABLE 4-12:	Experiences related to time constraint.....	104
TABLE 4-13:	Experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP.....	112
TABLE 4-14:	Experiences related to the evaluation aspects of quality assurance systems .....	121
TABLE 4-15:	Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP .....	124
TABLE 4-16:	Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training.....	127
TABLE 4-17:	Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT .....	129
TABLE 4-18:	Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP .....	131
TABLE 4-19:	Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP..	132
TABLE 4-20:	Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP.....	134
TABLE 4-21:	Recommendations to address LDPs' negative experiences.....	136
TABLE 4-22:	Recommendations directed at quality assurance of URTP.....	138
TABLE 5-1:	SA Army's programme flow model.....	169

**LIST OF FIGURES**

FIGURE 2-1: URTP management process.....27

## LIST OF ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE 1:	Letter requesting for permission to conduct research in the SANDF .....	187
ANNEXURE 2:	Feedback letter from the SA Defence Intelligence granting permission to conduct research in the SANDF .....	188
ANNEXURE 3:	Letter requesting permission to conduct research at SA Army Gymnasium .....	189
ANNEXURE 4:	Feedback letter from Officer Commanding SA Army Gymnasium ...	191
ANNEXURE 5:	Informed consent .....	192
ANNEXURE 6:	Ethical clearance certificate .....	195
ANNEXURE 7:	ID copy.....	196
ANNEXURE 8:	Language editing certificate .....	197

## CHAPTER 1

### ORIENTATION, MOTIVATION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this introductory chapter (Chapter 1), a background to the problem statement and motivation for this study are provided to orientate the reader. Furthermore, a review of the body of scholarship, including previous international and national research, is provided to indicate the lacuna in the literature. The research questions, research objectives, method of study, paradigmatic perspective, explanation of concepts, expected contribution of the study and chapter division are also provided.

#### 1.2 ORIENTATION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Recently, South Africa (SA), just like any other country, has realised the need to supplement its skills pool (Tshilongamulenzhe & Coetzee, 2013:50). According to Meyer (2016a:1), people development has been a major stumbling block in advancing SA's economy and ability to compete in the global economy. According to Tshilongamulenzhe and Coetzee (2013:50), the SA workforce is not keeping up with the skills that are needed to remain competitive in a rapidly changing knowledge-based economy. It is for that reason that Arnold and Randall (cited in Botha & Coetzee, 2013a:200) state that individuals need to continually learn new skills, tools and systems in order to stay abreast with the latest knowledge and information, and at the same time to keep up with the job demands. To sustain economic development and international competitiveness, SA needs human resources that are well developed to contribute significantly to the country's economy (Meyer, 2016a:2). According to Meyer (2016a:1), people (learning and development practitioners (LDPs) included) play a crucial role in an organisation or company's ability to produce products and services, and in SA's ability to improve productivity and economic growth. In that regard, Coetzee (2013:529) views LDPs as highly valued professionals supported by SA legislation, who are able to improve both human and organisational performance for the benefit of society.

According to Tshilongamulenzhe and Coetzee (2013:17), the SA labour market is characterised by an oversupply of unskilled workers and a shortage of skilled workers. Therefore, the continuous upgrading of skills in the SA workforce will help to ensure a measurable increase in the current skills pool (Tshilongamulenzhe & Coetzee, 2013:51). Therefore, an upgrade in SA's pool of intermediate skills, such as artisan skills, technician skills, and related occupational skills is necessary. According to Tshilongamulenzhe and Coetzee (2013:51), intermediate skills, as mentioned above, are too low to support national and sector development and growth. Therefore, Coetzee and Botha (2013a:283) suggest that organisations should base their training and development (T&D) interventions on the

skills demanded by employers to perform optimally as a business in a globally competitive and turbulent environment. Nonetheless, regardless of the organisation, LDPs have a pivotal strategic role to play in enhancing the country's skills repository by preparing knowledgeable and skilled workers in alignment with national and organisational objectives.

According to Salas *et al.* (2012:74), most organisations tend to invest more in learning and development (L&D) of their workforce, as the understanding is that it helps an organisation to remain competitive and to yield greater results. It is therefore understandable that Erasmus *et al.* (2015:2) and Botha and Coetzee (2013a:202) refer to learning as a way in which organisations can modify the knowledge, skills and behaviours of employees through learning experiences in order to achieve the intended organisational objectives (cf 1.10.2). Development then occurs when ongoing learning opportunities are created so that employees are able to improve and maintain high levels of performance (Meyer, 2016a:7; cf 1.10.2).

In order to ensure that SA's skills pool is upgraded, the government has taken the lead by developing legislation that supports its economic environment. Within the context of this study, *supporting* implies SA's ability to develop legislation that assists SA organisations, including the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), to speed up the process of addressing the mismatch between the demand and supply of critical and scarce skills required to address socio-economic issues, bringing a sustainable economy, and ensuring the SANDF's survivability within the strategic environment (changing international and domestic security context). Moreover, the newly established occupational learning system (OLS) requires that all workplace L&D interventions be linked to scarce and critical skills embedded in the occupations listed on the Organising Framework for Occupations (OFO), which is linked to the current labour-market skills need (Coetzee & Botha, 2013a:283). Among others, legislation such as the Skills Development Amendment Act (26 of 2011) and the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) Act 67 of 2008 were passed by Parliament, and the National Skills Development Strategy III (NSDS III) was established to influence the L&D system and to ensure that quality L&D is made accessible to all South Africans (BMTC, 2012:12). On its part, in order to supplement its skills pool, especially as far as the Reserve Force is concerned, the SANDF also saw a need to recruit soldiers with new and significantly expanded critical skills, who are able to keep up with demands set by their jobs and contribute significantly towards the SANDF's mandate (cf 1.10.8). More specifically, the SA Army is experiencing a shortage of Reserve Force junior officers who should be trained and developed into senior commanders (DoD, 2010:3).

In 2012, the SANDF prioritised its Reserve Force training by partnering with SA universities and instituted the first University Reserve Training Programme (URTP) for all Arms of Services (AoSs) as part of the its strategic goals envisaged to capacitate its Reserve Force with junior leaders of character (cf 1.10.6). Reason being, the Reserve Force is regarded as an efficient, cost-effective force-multiplier in peacetime that contributes significantly to the day-to-day running of the SANDF and that can be called upon in time of a national emergency to defend the country (DoD, 2010:3). However, this study is focused only on the SA Army as an institution where the phenomenon is observed. Notwithstanding the fact that the URTP is the SANDF's training programme implemented at a service level (cf 2.5.4; cf Figure 2-1), each Arms of Service (AoS) delivers and manages its own training programme (DoD, 2010:5). However, an AoS may opt to enter into a service-level agreement with another service to provide learning interventions on its behalf (DoD, 2010:5).

The URTP is the SANDF's strategy to recruit, train and develop students with specialist and critical skills from all the SA universities that are regarded as scarce and unique for the execution of defence tasks (DoD, 2010:5; DoD, 2015:14-12). Annually, progressing from 2012, a new SA Army's URTP intake was instituted in the SA Army for second-year-level university students and higher. Reason being, first-year students are regarded as still being under the orientation phase regarding the higher education system. The URTP runs concurrently with students' academic studies for a period of two years. The URTP is delivered by means of a blended-learning approach (distance learning and short contact sessions) (cf 2.5; 2.5.1; 2.5.2). These contact sessions afford learners the opportunity to meet with their LDPs at a selected military unit during the recess periods of their various universities within a hosting province (DoD, 2010:6). The URTP consists of three (3) phases, namely basic military training (BMT), officer formative training (OFT), and functional training (FuT) (cf 2.4.2.7). The aforementioned phases should be completed over a period of two years (DoD, 2010:7). On successful completion of the URTP, candidates are expected to occupy their roles effectively as junior leaders within their respective formations and to be able to transfer that which they have learnt to a variety of on-the-job situations (cf 2.4.2.2).

### **1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH**

The SANDF has been characterised by rapid and fundamental changes over the last couple of years, especially as far as its strategic environment (domestic and international security context) is concerned. For that reason, in 1998, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans constituted the first Defence Review committee (DRc) under the democratic government and mandated it (DRc) to look critically at SA's defence policy, given the aforementioned rapid and fundamental changes occurring within the strategic environment.

In line with the recommendations of the DRc, the SANDF had to go through a transformation process to ensure that it meets the current operational needs and stays relevant as far as present and future military operations are concerned. On top of the above-mentioned aspects, the DRc also informed the policy-makers in the SANDF that the SANDF should rather consist of a relatively small Regular Force and a sufficiently large Reserve Force. Reason being, a large Reserve Force should be an efficient, cost-effective force-multiplier in peacetime that would contribute significantly to the day-to-day running of the SANDF, and that can be called upon in time of a national emergency to defend the country (DoD, 2010:3). However, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) report indicates that the SANDF's Reserve Force (in the case of this study, the SA Army's Reserve Force) is poorly trained, equipped and staffed to be able to contribute significantly towards the SANDF's mandate (Le Roux, 2005:3). Le Roux (2005:3) and Morrison *et al.* (2002:ES-3) similarly indicated that the Reserve Force is sometimes poorly trained and equipped (with resources (physical and personnel) required to conduct training effectively and efficiently). As a result, the defence review (2015) suggested that the Reserve Force be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to execute successful operations across the spectrum of potential conflict (DoD, 2015:14-13). Therefore, the SA Army envisaged enhancing its capability by providing the SANDF with an organised, staffed, equipped, well-trained and operationally ready Reserve Force that can be called upon to deploy and multiply the Regular Force. In an international setting, Young (2005:1) also stated that, in recent times, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revealed a shortage of trained and qualified soldiers and leaders in the Reserve Force.

Before 1992, the numbers of members in the SANDF's Reserve Force were 'boosted by means of the conscription of civilians, who were 'forced' to join the SANDF for specified periods of time. However, since the cessation of conscription in 1992, the Reserve Force experienced a shortage of leaders at especially junior officer level (DoD, 2010:3; cf 1.2). The experienced shortage of leaders has lessened the efficiency of, and has impeded transformation in the SANDF. Therefore, as part of the transformation process, in 2012, the SA Army prioritised the Reserve Force training and instituted the first URTP envisaged to capacitate the SA Army Reserve Force with junior leaders of character.

Given the fact that the Regular Force and the Reserve Force share the same doctrine, commanders in the SANDF require the Reserve Force training (URTP included) to remain equally relevant to the Regular Force to produce the same results (outcome). Consequently, the methodology used to deliver and manage the Reserve Force training should be structured in such a manner that caters for Reserve Force's unique needs (DoD, 2015:14-

13). The URTP is, for example, delivered by means of distance and e-learning, while LDPs in the SA Army are not trained as distance learning or e-learning practitioners.

The Reserve Force has less training time available and fewer training support system capabilities than the Regular Force (Eisley & Viner, 1988; Metzko *et al.*, 1997; Young, 2005; Sanders & Schaefer, 2009; Douglas, 2013). Owing to time constraints, training is often done in a pressed fashion that precludes real learning to take place. Meyer (2016b:95) adds that time constraints often result therein that the learning content is compressed and subjects being presented result in mini-lectures. Less time available for Reserve Force Training may therefore create a challenge to train the Reserve Force to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts. Accordingly, Carton-Barber (2015) indicated that time available restricts the SA Army's URTP to give sufficient and quality training that would qualify graduates as effective junior leaders who are useful and operationally deployable within the SA Army (Carton-Barber, 2015).

It also seems as if commanders in the SA Army lack comprehension regarding the uniqueness of the Reserve Force as they (commanders) expect the URTP to produce similar results as the equivalent full-time-programmes over the same period. Although the DoD (2015:14-12) stated that the URTP provides a cost-effective mechanism to capacitate the SA Army for operational surge with critical and scarce skills not normally found in the defence force (DoD, 2015:14-12), senior commanders do not seem to understand how it adds value to the organisation (Unger *et al.*, cited in Wolfson & Meyer, 2016:497).

The URTP represents an expensive investment that the SANDF makes in its human resources in order to capacitate the Reserve Force (in this case URTP) with leaders who possess the required (scarce and critical) skills. This implies that the LDPs who are responsible for URTP interventions should be supported to ensure that training brings visible results that will enable the SANDF to achieve its objectives, contribute successfully towards organisational effectiveness, and stay relevant as far as the strategic environment is concerned. Regardless of which AoS is delivering the URTP interventions, they need to be professionally delivered in order to allow the SANDF to make a direct and significant contribution to national development and the future success of SA (DoD, 2015:11-2).

The major intent of this study is to explore and describe the SA Army LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP in the SANDF (cf 1.6). At present, little is known regarding how the SA Army LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP. As T&D forms an integral part of the SANDF's force preparation and combat readiness, SA Army LDPs have to be supported in order to ensure that training leverages greater results. If the Reserve Force (in this case

the URTP's junior leaders) is not trained to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts, unit commanders will not be able to take full advantage of the unique skills that these professionals (URTP trainees) possess (Olivo, 2008:2). Therefore, the training outcomes for the Reserve Force will not remain equally relevant to the Regular Force, as envisaged by the overarching defence policy (DoD, 2015:14-13).

#### **1.4 REVIEW OF BODY OF SCHOLARSHIP**

Research regarding *military training* has been undertaken *internationally* by several researchers. These international studies have focused on different aspects of military training; for example, among others, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) (Koehler, 2013; Popelka, 1984; Hooper, 1986; Cowan *et al.*, 1989; Owens-Kurtz *et al.*, 1989; Douglas, 2013; Shannon, 2013), the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) (Tormey, 1986; Pérusse, 1997; Hanser & Robyn, 2000; Walls, 2003), evaluation of training (McCracken, Jr. & Barnes, 1987; Jones *et al.*, 1991; Young, 2005; Min *et al.*, 2009; Hauenstein *et al.*, 2010; Taylor & Barnett, 2013; Holland *et al.*, 2014), training effectiveness (Bell, 1999; Noonan & Sulsky, 2001; Schreiber *et al.*, 2009; Maric´ *et al.*, 2013), distance learning (Metzko *et al.*, 1997), transfer of training (Wells & Hagnnan, 1989; Williams, 2008), planning and preparation for training (Sheridan, 1989; Morrison *et al.*, 2002), cost-effectiveness of training (Orlansky & String, 1979; Phelps *et al.*, 1991), cost analysis of training (Fisher, 1978), instructional strategies (McSlarrow *et al.*, 1983; Vogel-Walcutt *et al.*, 2013), training challenges (Eisley & Viner, 1988; Sanders & Schaefer, 2009), basic training (Sinclair, 2003), training programme design and development (Winslow & Seeger, 1985; Hoffman *et al.*, 1995), the Reserve Joint Officer Qualification System (Olivo, 2008), competency needs analysis (Newman, 2002), training and organisation (Harvey *et al.*, 1987; Sutton, 1988; Carnevale *et al.*, 1990), training readiness (Grissmer *et al.*, 1989; Sortor *et al.*, 1994), adaptive training (Spain *et al.*, 2012), post-mobilisation training (Lippiatt *et al.*, 1992), refresher training techniques (Heidt *et al.*, 1983), comparative analysis (Emow, 1999), technological training (Brown, 1991; Hahn *et al.*, 1991; Fletcher, 2009), training aids development (Bink & Cage, 2012), changes to training support (Arnold, 2003), and an overview of military training (Fletcher & Chatelier, 2002).

In most of these aforementioned international studies, common factors impacting on the Reserve Force training such as time available, training environment, dispersed units, training methodology, and availability of soldiers, among others, were identified (Eisley & Viner, 1988; Sutton, 1988; Metzko *et al.*, 1997; Young, 2005; Douglas, 2013). The study conducted by Douglas (2013) seems to be more relevant to the URTP as it focused on transforming the ROTC; however, it did not investigate *the experiences of LDPs regarding the training*

*programme* (ROTC) (cf 2.5.1). Therefore, this study will address the aforementioned international gap (lacuna) in the literature by exploring the LDPs' experiences of a Reserve Force training programme (URTP).

Previous studies undertaken in SA covered aspects such as quality management of training (Els, 2016), the role of the Military Academy (Esterhuyse, 2007), the SANDF's physical training programme (Gordon *et al.*, 1986), distance education (Esterhuyse, 2009; Khoza & van Zyl, 2015), the supervisory training course of the SANDF (McGimpsey, 2006), competency profiles of education, training and development practitioners (ETDPs) (Moorhouse, 2007), military leadership (Erasmus & Uys, 2012), and management of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (Rezelman, 2003). However, none of these above-mentioned previous *national studies* covered *Reserve Force training or something similar to the SA Army's URTP*. This is therefore also considered a literature gap (lacuna) on a national level that would be addressed in this study. Therefore, the SA Army's LDPs' experiences regarding the Reserve Force training, more specifically the URTP, will be researched to address the international and national lacunae indicated.

## **1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The following research questions will guide this study:

- 1 How is military training, with specific reference to URTP training, conceptualised in the literature?
- 2 How do the SA Army's L&D practitioners experience the SA Army's URTP?
- 3 What recommendations do the SA Army's L&D practitioners make regarding the delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP?
- 4 What recommendations can be proposed for future implementation of the SA Army's URTP?

## **1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The objectives of this research are:

- 1 To describe how military training, with specific reference to URTP training, is conceptualised in the literature.
- 2 To explore how the SA Army LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP.

- 3 To determine the recommendations that SA Army LDPs make regarding the delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP.
- 4 To provide recommendations, based on the findings, for future implementation of the SA Army's URTP.

### **1.7 METHOD OF STUDY**

The research questions will be answered as follows:

- 1 How is military training, with specific reference to URTP training, conceptualised in the literature?

In answering the above-mentioned question, a literature study in the fields of learning, training and development (T&D), human resource development (HRD), leadership, military science and security, and economic and management sciences will be undertaken.

- 2 How do the SA Army's LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP?

The LDPs' experiences will be investigated through the qualitative research method. More specifically, semi-structured individual interviews will be conducted with participants to explore their experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP to answer this question.

- 3 What recommendations do the SA Army's LDPs make regarding the delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP?

This question will be answered through the use of semi-structured individual interviews with participating LDPs.

- 4 What recommendations can be provided for future implementation of the SA Army's URTP?

Based on the findings of this study, recommendations will be provided to assist decision-makers in the SA Army to guide the SA Army's URTP efforts towards success.

### **1.8 LITERATURE STUDY**

A literature study relevant to the phenomenon under investigation, namely the LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP, will be conducted to gain a better understanding thereof. A variety of literature (starting with the most recent literature) will be reviewed in order to find useful and applicable information for use in this study (cf Chapters 1 and 2). From the literature, I will be able to identify key issues, and gain awareness of relevant research that had already transpired. Chapter 3 will serve as the literature study for

the research design and methodology that will be undertaken in this study. Although the most recent sources of information will be used for the literature study, I shall also make use of previously (old) available sources that can still provide important and relevant information for inclusion in this study and where applicable recent sources are not available.

The literature review will focus on military training, Reserve Force training and specifically the URTP, using various sources. I shall make use of academic books (Chan, 2010; Gold *et al.*, 2010; Coetzee *et al.*, 2013; Carbery & Cross, 2015; Erasmus *et al.*, 2015; Meyer *et al.*, 2016a, et cetera) and articles (Mckenzie & Healy-Morrow, 2006; Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2007; Moorhouse, 2007; Thorne & Mackey, 2007; Olivo, 2008; Hung, 2010; Khalid *et al.*, 2011; Arkaah, 2012; Kostakos, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Shannon, 2013; Due *et al.*, 2015; Henkaline, 2015; to mention but a few) in obtaining the relevant literature for this study (cf Chapter 2). In addition to academic books and articles, where possible, I shall make use of workplace documents, policies and instructions to gather sufficient information regarding the phenomenon. Where valuable and valid information exists, I shall also gather information from published monthly and quarterly military reviews to source information relevant to Reserve Force training. Where definitions are required pertaining to certain concepts, I shall make use of dictionaries for explanations thereof.

Search engines such as EBSCOhost, Google and Google Scholar, Emerald, SA e-publications, Sabinet and ERIC will be consulted to find the relevant articles (information) related to the phenomenon.

The main **keywords** that will be used to guide this study are: human resource development, training and development, learning and development practitioners, training programme, University Reserve Training Programme, South African Army, South African National Defence Force, Reserve Force, qualitative research.

## **1.9 PARADIGMATIC PERSPECTIVE**

### **1.9.1 Paradigm**

According to Le Grange (2000:194), the concept '*paradigm*' was introduced by Kuhn in the 1970s. Paradigms are regarded as frameworks that serve as maps or as guides for scientific research, as they determine the important problems and issues for its members to address and determine the acceptable theories and methods necessary to solve identified problems or issues (Le Grange, 2000:194). Furthermore, Guba and Lincoln (cited in Klopper, 2008:67) point out that paradigms contain a basic set of beliefs and assumptions that guide our inquiry. According to Babbie (2013:57), paradigms are fundamental models or frames of reference that we use to organise our observations and reasoning. Based on the above-

mentioned definitions, a conclusion can be made regarding *paradigms*, that they are a set of beliefs, assumptions, values and practices that are shared within a research community by different researchers while providing an overarching framework for conducting research.

This is a research study focusing on the experiences of the SA Army's LDPs regarding the SA Army's URTP. This study will be framed within an *interpretivist perspective*. Reason being, an interpretivist perspective assumes that the world is not simply out there to be discovered, but it is an ongoing story told by the particular individuals, groups, and cultures involved (Butin, 2010:60). According to Butin (2010:60), there is no single or authoritative *truth* from an interpretivist perspective since every group privileges the *truth* of their particular viewpoint. All that the interpretivist perspective suggests is for the researcher to accurately and thoroughly document from which perspective the phenomenon is being investigated, rather than attempting to adjudicate between the competing truths or claims in order to try and determine one best answer (Butin, 2010:60).

## **1.10 EXPLANATION OF CONCEPTS**

According to Maree (2016:32), it is necessary and advisable for the researcher to explain the concepts found in relevant literature. Without clear concepts, scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy-makers might find it difficult to distinguish between alternatives. It is for that reason that Van der Merwe and Champion (2011:61) suggest that the main concepts of the study should be clearly defined to prevent misconceptions and misunderstandings. I therefore saw it as necessary to provide the definitions and explanation of concepts referred to in this study. The concepts are defined as follows:

### **1.10.1 Human resource development (HRD)**

Swanson (cited in Werner & DeSimone, 2012:4) defines HRD as “a process for developing and unleashing human expertise through training and development in an organisation for the purpose of improving performance”. McCracken (cited in Carbery, 2015:3) regards HRD as the creation of a learning culture, within which a range of training, development and learning strategies both respond to corporate strategy and help to shape and influence it (corporate strategy). Nadler (cited in Carbery, 2015:3) defines HRD as a series of organised activities conducted within a specific time and designed to produce behavioural change. According to Erasmus *et al.* (2015:3), HRD seeks to develop people's knowledge, expertise, productivity and job satisfaction for the benefit of the organisation, community and individual.

HRD activities include learning and development (L&D), training and development (T&D), coaching, career development, team building, organisational development, leadership development and talent management (Carbery, 2015:5; Werner & DeSimone, 2012:4;

Meyer, 2016a:2), to mention but a few. Werner and DeSimone (2012:9) are of the opinion that the above-mentioned HRD activities ensure that organisational members have the skills or competencies to meet current and future job demands. HRD is therefore a broader concept than L&D or T&D, which only entails processes such as needs analysis, design, delivery and evaluation. HRD manages the entire system and environment in which T&D/L&D takes place (Meyer, 2016a:8).

Within the context of the SANDF, HRD refers to the strategic-level institution of the defence force at the defence headquarters responsible for planning and drafting education, training and development (ETD) policy, career development, performance management, accountability and quality assurance, ETD systems liaison, skills development, human resource practitioner development, foreign learning opportunities (FLO) and language services (editing, translation and language training) to mention but a few, for the whole Department of Defence (DoD). HRD, within the context of the SANDF, is responsible for strategic planning for all the defence force's HRD initiatives; URTP included under T&D initiatives. HRD ensures that the SANDF successfully achieves its objectives in a cost-effective manner.

### **1.10.2 Learning, training and development**

Mankin (cited in Carbery, 2015:6) defines *learning* as an acquisition of new knowledge and how such knowledge changes an individual in some way or another. Werner and DeSimone (cited in Botha & Coetzee, 2013a:204) define *learning* as a relatively permanent change in behaviour or potential behaviour that occurs as a result of productive contact with one's surroundings. Botha and Coetzee (2013a:204) view learning as a tool that increases job performance as it is based on experience. Learning recognises that learning is life-long and is not confined to short-term efforts. Nevertheless, education, training, learning and development are interlinked and interdependent.

Within the context of the SANDF (specifically the URTP), learning refers to the acquired knowledge mediated through the URTP that will result in a permanent change in trainees' behaviour, while developing into junior leaders of character.

According to Werner and DeSimone (2012:10), *training* involves providing employees with the knowledge and skills needed to do a particular task or job, whereas development in contrast, has a longer-term focus on preparing for future work responsibilities, while at the same time increasing the capabilities of employees to perform their current jobs. Training is referred to by Botha and Coetzee (2013a:202) as a planned, short-term effort used to modify

competencies, attitudes and beliefs, knowledge, skill or behaviour through learning experiences such as formal learning programmes.

Within the context of this study, *training* refers to activities or short-term interventions necessary to modify the competencies or change URTP learners' behaviour through the formal learning experience (the URTP).

Meyer (2016a:7) states that *development* occurs when ongoing *learning* opportunities are created to allow employees to improve and maintain a high level of performance. Botha and Coetzee (2013a:202) further define development as a long-term change effort intended to broaden individuals through experience and to give them new insight about themselves and their organisation.

Within the context of this study, *development* refers to the long-term efforts (URTP training) that are undertaken by URTP trainees to broaden their experience of becoming junior leaders within the SA Army. The URTP is therefore part of the development process to cultivate junior leaders in the Reserve Force of the SANDF.

Although there seems to be a fine distinction between training, development and learning, they all contribute to the enhancement of employees' performance. To summarise, within the context of this study, training and development include the short- and long-term HRD opportunities given to the SA Army's URTP trainees in order to enhance their knowledge, skills and abilities (through learning) to be able to function well in their roles as junior leaders of character within the SA Army's Reserve Force component.

### **1.10.3 Training programme**

Coetzee (cited in Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:168) defines a training programme as “a combination of courses, modules or units of learning, learning support materials and methodology by which students can achieve specified learning outcomes”. Erasmus *et al.* (2015:168) define a training programme as a purposeful and structured set of learning experiences designed to enable learners to achieve pre-specified exit-level outcomes.

Within the context of this study, the URTP is considered a training programme consisting of an organised set of learning experiences with the aim to equip the SA Army's URTP trainees (junior leaders) with applied competencies needed to fulfil future leadership role(s) within the Reserve Forces of the SA Army.

#### **1.10.4 University Reserve Training Programme (URTP)**

The URTP is the SANDF's training programme (curriculum developed and approved by the Chief Human Resources Development (CD HRD)) implemented at service level in accordance with the guidelines of SANDF implementation instruction number 40 of 2009 to capacitate the SANDF Reserve Force with leaders of character (DoD, 2010:5). The URTP is aligned with the unique requirements and the organisation of each of the AoS (the SA Army, SA Air Force (SAAF), SA Navy and the SA Military Health Service (SAMHS)) and tailor-made in such a way that, where a service or division elects not to conduct its own training, it may enter into a service agreement with another service/division to conduct such training on its behalf, through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the relevant role-players to facilitate the implementation of the programme (DoD, 2010:5).

Within the context of this study, the URTP can be defined as a military leadership training programme, aimed at capacitating the SA Army's Reserve Force component with leaders of quality who possess critical and specialist skills not normally found in the SA Army.

#### **1.10.5 South African National Defence Force (SANDF)**

In terms of section 200 of the Constitution (1996), the SANDF is the only lawful military force in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) that is responsible for defending the country, protecting the country, maintaining its territorial integrity and maintaining its people in accordance with the constitution and principles of international law regulating the use of force. In support, Neethling (2012:473) refers to a *defence force* as none other than a military force of a country, stating that the primary function of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is to defend and protect the South African state, its territorial integrity and its people. The SANDF is a unique organ of state with a high level of power at the disposal of the state that the state can use to pursue its national security and foreign policy priorities; consequently, that puts the SANDF at the core of SA's national security (DoD, 2015:3-6).

Within the context of this study, the SANDF is a military force that is responsible for defending the country, protecting the country and maintaining its territorial integrity and its people.

#### **1.10.6 Reserve Force**

A Reserve Force is an important component of any Defence Force (Le Roux, 2005:4). The US Army (cited in Young, 2005:9) defines a Reserve Force as a federal force, consisting of individual reinforcements and units organised to provide military training in peace time, and trained units and individual reservists who are ready to be ordered to active duty in the event

of national emergency. The DoD (1998:11-1) in its view regards the Reserve Force as an integral and essential part of the SANDF that will be required during mobilisation or times of war to provide substantial numbers towards the personnel component of the defence force. In the same vein, the defence review regards the Reserve Force as an efficient, cost-effective force-multiplier in peacetime that would contribute significantly to the day-to-day running of the SANDF and can be called upon in time of a national emergency to defend the country (DoD, 2010:3). The Reserve Force is a part-time component of the SANDF (DoD, 2010:4).

Within the context of this study, the Reserve Force is described as a part-time component utilised by the SA Army to multiply the regular force with personnel while providing the specialised defence capabilities not normally found within the SA Army. Therefore, the URTP is implemented in the SA Army to provide the Reserve Force with leaders.

#### **1.10.7 SA Army**

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:67) describes 'Army' as "part of a country's armed forces that fight on land". The SA Army is a major component of the SANDF's landward defence strategy (DoD, 2015:10-8). The Army is by far the largest AoS, and is therefore regarded as representative of the defence force's military leadership culture (Erasmus & Uys, 2012:97). According to the DoD (2015:10-8), the SA Army is required to remain balanced, robust and relevant in relation to the evolving nature of warfare. The SA Army's mandate therefore centres on the provisioning of combat-ready forces and the leading role it has to play in the development of the Army component of the landward defence capability.

This study will be conducted only within the SA Army. Therefore, within the context of this study, the SA Army can be described as the SANDF's largest AoS, consisting of both part-time and full-time components that are equipped with combat-ready soldiers who are trained to defend and protect SA on land.

#### **1.10.8 Learning and development practitioner**

According to Coetzee (2013:529), LDPs refer to highly valued professionals who are supported by policies (organisational or national) in order to improve both human and organisational performance for the benefit of society. LDPs add value to the organisation by fulfilling their roles ethically, competently and with expertise (Coetzee, 2013:529). Killen (cited in Coetzee, 2013:531) identified the following roles of LDPs: developer of skills, strategist, mediator of learning, assessor, moderator, designer of learning programmes,

researcher, evaluator, needs analyst, coach, mentor, quality assurer, evidence collector, administrator, and training manager.

Within the context of this study, LDPs refer to all the SA Army's learning and development practitioners who are responsible for delivering and managing training and development initiatives (the SA Army's URTP) in the SA Army.

#### **1.10.9 Explore**

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:526) defines '*explore*' as "to examine something completely or carefully in order to find out more about it".

Within the context of this study, to '*explore*' means that I as the researcher will carefully *examine* the LDPs' experiences in order to describe how such experiences influence the delivery and management of SA Army's URTP. The word 'examine' is not used in this study, but rather 'explore', as this is a qualitative study.

#### **1.10.10 Experience**

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:523) defines '*experience*' as "the knowledge and skills that one has gained through doing something for a period of time or the process of gaining that". Furthermore, '*experience*', in its core sense, is referred to as events or an activity that affects us in some way (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:523).

Within the context of this study, 'experience' refers to the SA Army LDPs' knowledge and skills gained through being involved with the SA Army's URTP as facilitators, assessors, moderators, designers, quality assurers, administrators or training programme coordinators.

### **1.11 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY**

#### **1.11.1 Contribution to training and development/human resource development literature**

This study will build on existing literature pertaining to HRD and hopefully new knowledge about the topic will be added to the discipline, once an understanding of the experiences of LDPs regarding the SA Army's URTP develops. Specifically, the study is anticipated to explore the LDPs' experiences regarding a blended-learning programme such as the SA Army's URTP through a formalised qualitative research study (cf 3.2; 3.4). The recommendations emanating from the results of this study are anticipated to add knowledge to the current body of scholarship within HRD by assisting those undertaking similar studies with useful information to, on their part, also add to the body of scholarship.

### **1.11.2 Contribution to the individual**

It is anticipated that the conclusions that are to emanate from this study will provide LDPs in the SA Army with knowledge they can use to optimise or direct the SA Army's URTP efforts towards success. In the same vein, LDPs may enjoy more support from managers and other relevant role-players who will have a better understanding of the SA Army's URTP.

### **1.11.3 Contribution to the organisation**

This study should provide decision-makers (policy-makers) in the SA Army with valuable information to use to transform, optimise, direct and aim the URTP towards achieving the SA Army's objectives in an efficient and effective manner. Unlike LDPs' roles, Werner and DeSimone (2012:15) affirm that decision-makers have the role to ensure that training efforts are clearly linked to the goals and strategies of the organisation. The findings and recommendations ensuing from this research are therefore anticipated to enhance organisational well-being by serving as a feedback loop between LDPs and decision-makers (policy-makers). Additionally, the aim is to serve as a self-correcting training system that will guide URTP efforts towards success, rather than establishing after-the-fact accountability. Lastly, this study will provide recommendations based on the findings that will be useful to decision-makers in determining how best the Reserve Force component should be effectively trained.

## **1.12 THE COURSE OF THE STUDY**

In Chapter 2, the nature of military training, with specific reference to URTP training, will be investigated through a literature study.

In Chapter 3, the literature study regarding the qualitative research design and methodology will be discussed, followed by the procedures to be followed to generate, analyse, interpret and quality assure the qualitative data.

In Chapter 4, the analysed data will be presented, more specifically the findings regarding SA Army LDPs' experiences of the SA Army's URTP.

In Chapter 5, a summary of the study and conclusions drawn regarding LDPs' experiences of the SA Army's URTP will be provided. The limitations and the findings will also be presented. Based on the findings, recommendations regarding the future implementation of the SA Army's URTP and future research will be made.

### **1.13 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the problem statement and motivation for the research, review of the body of scholarship, research questions, research objectives, method of study, paradigmatic perspective, explanation of concepts, expected contribution of study, and the course of the study were presented. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), the literature regarding the nature of military training, with specific reference to URTP training, will be presented.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE NATURE OF MILITARY TRAINING WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSITY RESERVE TRAINING PROGRAMME

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The theory that will be described in this chapter will serve as a theoretical framework for data analysis. The conceptual-theoretical framework is underpinned by systems and process theory, which will be described first. Thereafter, the concept training, specifically military training, will be alluded to. Different aspects related to military training, such as the nature of military training with specific reference to Reserve Force training, will be explained. Reserve Force training in an international setting as well as in South Africa (SA) will be compared with each other and discussed separately.

Aspects related to the University Reserve Training Programme (URTP) will be discussed to provide an improved understanding thereof. Factors to consider during training delivery that may also affect the effective delivery of the Reserve Force training, specifically the SA Army's URTP, will be alluded to. One of these factors includes learning and development practitioners (LDPs) and their roles during the delivery of the URTP in the SA Army. This chapter will conclude by describing the aspects of quality assurance applicable to the SA Army's URTP. Therefore, to answer the research question, namely "*How is military training, with specific reference to URTP training, conceptualised in the literature?*" The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:304) defines the verb 'conceptualise' as "to form an idea of something in your mind". Conceptualisation involves the clear *understanding* of a phenomenon. Within the context of this study, conceptualisation refers to the researcher's ability to formulate and *understand* different concepts related to military training, with specific reference to the URTP, which forms the ability of the researcher to reason, and simply facilitates meaning-giving that will be used as a conceptual framework.

#### 2.2 CONCEPTUAL-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The nature of military training, with specific reference to the URTP and findings ensuing from this (cf Chapters 4 and 5), was considered against the backdrops of systems and process theories as encompassing theories.

##### 2.2.1 Systems theory

The academic discipline of human resource development (HRD) is based on three main theories, namely systems theory, psychological theory and economic theory (Swanson, 2001:304). For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on systems theory.

Systems theory was originally developed by Von Bertalanffy (Meyer & Kirsten, 2015:183). According Meyer and Kirsten (2015:184), in the systems theory, organisations are viewed as open systems that consist of interrelated and interdependent sub-systems, and information flows between these sub-systems and the external environment. Furthermore, a change in one sub-system is anticipated to affect other sub-systems (Van Tonder & Roodt, cited in Meyer & Kirsten 2015:184). Systems theory enables one to better understand the environment, its impact on systems, complexities within systems, and how these affect the whole system (Swanson, 2001:204).

A systems theory is further described by Swanson (2001:305) as a theory that captures the complex and dynamic interactions of environments, organisations, work processes and group or individual variables operating at any point in time and over a time. Therefore, HRD believes that performance at the organisation, work process, group and individual levels is mediated through human expertise and human effort (Ruona, cited in Swanson, 2001:305). According to Swanson and Holton III (2001:98), systems theory outlines a wide range of systematic disconnects such as “not being able to clearly specify the required outcomes of the host organisation and not having a systematic defined HRD processes”. As a result, such systematic disconnects adversely affect performance.

According to Swanson and Holton III (2001:22), HRD, as a purposeful system or process, consists of inputs, processes, outputs and feedback, while not excluding contributors or external partners (Swanson & Holton III, 2001:22). Within the context of the URTP, the inputs may refer to the LDPs, necessary learning material and resources needed to implement the URTP. The implementation of the URTP is reliant on the aforementioned and the outputs are the competent young leaders who must be employed in the system to capacitate the military (Reserve Force). Internal contributors may refer to the management of the URTP, and external partners to the universities where these young leaders study.

A training intervention such as the URTP is also anticipated to affect the other subsystems in the military, namely to capacitate the Reserve Force with young leaders, but ultimately also the military. However, systems' problems in any of these sub-systems (for example factors necessary for training that are not attended to) are also anticipated to negatively affect other sub-systems. It is important to acknowledge that the consistent operation of this network (system) is essential to enable value to be added to the organisation. Often, the outputs from one process can be the inputs into other processes, and are interlinked into the overall network or system (West, 2011:57; Pope *et al.*, 2013:11).

### **2.2.2 Process theory**

The theory and findings of this study [URTP] are not only based on the systems theory, but also involves a purposeful process. LDPs usually see their work in terms of the ADDIE process (analyse, design, develop, implement and evaluate). The ADDIE process is rooted in the instructional systems development (ISD) model developed by the US Military in 1969 (United States & Campbell, cited in Swanson & Holton, 2001:211). The purpose of the ISD model was to ensure that US military training within an enormous military enterprise was conducted in a systematic and effective manner. Similar to ADDIE, the ISD model also consists of five interrelated phases, namely analysis, design, development, implement and evaluation (Swanson & Holton III, 2001:211).

According to Swanson and Holton III (2001:23), each phase (analyse, design, develop, implement and evaluate) within the training process is essential to achieve the desired outcomes of training. However, studies of HRD practice mostly reveal limitations (shortcomings) concerning the analysis and evaluation phases – the latter two phases being the most strategic. Shortcomings or limitations during the analysis phase are exacerbated in other phases, since there is a relationship between phases, and the other phases rely substantially on the analysis phase for supplying direction and substance (Swanson & Holton III, 2001:23). Within the context of this study, the analysis phase also includes the planning phase for the URTP, which is crucial for direction and for other phases (design and implementation of the URTP) to be implemented effectively. Evaluation (quality assurance within the context of the URTP (cf 2.9)) is essential to ensure return on investment and the results of the evaluation should inform future similar [URTP] training interventions.

Now that the encompassing theories of this study were explained, the main concepts related to this study, namely training and military training, will be alluded to.

### **2.3 TRAINING**

Before one can understand the concept of military training, it is significant to first understand what the broader concept of training entails. *Training* constitutes a major part of human resource development (HRD) activities (cf 1.10.1). Botha and Coetzee (2013a:202) refer to training as a planned, short-term effort used to modify competencies, attitudes and beliefs, knowledge, skill or behaviour through learning experiences such as formal learning programmes (cf 1.10.2). According to Erasmus *et al.* (2015:2), training aims to improve employee performance in an organisation or in a company usually when work standards are low because of a lack of knowledge, skills or attitudes among individual employees or groups (cf 1.10.2).

Within the context of this study, training can be viewed as a carefully planned learning intervention (in the form of URTP) that is designed to empower the SA Army's URTP trainees with the knowledge, skills and attributes necessary to fill defined junior leaders' positions within various formations (cf 1.10.2). The URTP is also used to address the shortage of junior leaders within the Reserve Force component who possess skills not normally found within the SA Army. It is for this reason that Swanson and Holton III (2009:100) assert that training develops human expertise for the purpose of improving performance.

## **2.4 MILITARY TRAINING**

'Military', according to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:952) refers to "soldiers or the armed forces", while 'training' is described as the planned acquisition of knowledge, skills and abilities that are used to carry out a specific task or job in a vocational setting (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:2; cf 2.3). Therefore, *military training* refers to training that is conducted to prepare soldiers or armed forces for armed combat engagements (cf 2.4).

According to Fletcher and Chatelier (2002:i-1), military training can easily be distinguished from other forms of training through its emphasis on discipline, just-in-case preparation, and training of collectives (crews, groups, teams and units). Military training, unlike other forms of training, prepares soldiers for armed combat engagements (Fletcher & Chatelier, 2002:ii-2). Therefore, Lushenko and Hammerschmidt (2015:53) emphasise that military training should be consistent and specifically be focused on mission-essential tasks in order to stay in line with the military training heritage. Lushenko and Hammerschmidt (2015:59) warn that military training will remain a lost art if commanders or managers in the military fail to prioritise and align it against mission-essential tasks. The Department of Defence (DoD) (2015:11-4) denotes that military training places its focus primarily on operational military functions and the skills (technical and tactical) required to execute military operations successfully.

The *purpose* of military training is to inculcate soldiers with appropriate functional and war fighting skills (DoD, 2015:11-6). Additionally, the DoD (2015:11-3) highlights the purpose of military training as to equip soldiers with appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes to advance the credibility and professionalism of the defence force. Military commanders consider military training to be effective when it is able to prepare and certify individuals as competent across a full spectrum of occupational specialties, being combat or combat support (Fletcher & Chatelier, 2002:i-1). Vogel-Walcutt *et al.* (2013:1492) regard military training as being concerned with achieving training outcomes timely and cost-effectively.

To be considered effective, military training (within the context of this study, the URTP) should make a direct and significant contribution to the SANDF and towards the national development of SA. Consequently, providing URTP learners with the knowledge, skills and attitude needed to perform extremely difficult defence tasks at high levels of proficiency under any circumstances or conditions, as individuals or collectively, while protecting and defending SA's sovereignty, territorial integrity and its people as outlined in section 200 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1996:104). One can therefore regard the focus of military training as not just putting systems to work together, but rather as managing learners' experiences in order to give them a greater potential to face real-life situations and accomplish real-life missions.

The Regular Force refers to the full-time component of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), while the Reserve Force refers to the part-time component of the SANDF. The nature and training of the Reserve Force specifically, as it relates to the URTP (which is a military training programme), will be discussed next.

## **2.5 THE NATURE AND TRAINING OF THE RESERVE FORCE**

The Reserve Force consists of various units that are under command of various formations, for example, SA Army Infantry formation, SA Air Defence Artillery formation, SA Army Artillery formation, SA Army Armour formation, to mention but a few. Holien (2002:18) regards military training as one of the most pervasive and necessary activities in preparing the Reserve Forces.

Military training is conducted to mitigate Reserve Force challenges, by enhancing in them sustainability, readiness, and responsiveness to the rapidly changing security environment. According to Lushenko and Hammerschmidt (2015:53), military training should be conducted for the Reserve Force in such a way that the Reserve Force will represent a cost-effective solution to replicate the complexity of future operations and to achieve sustained combat readiness. The DoD (2015:8-9) emphasises that a well-trained Reserve Force, with specialised skills and experience, is significant for the defence force, as it can be utilised in any task in support of the Regular Force component.

The leader development training (Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and URTP) used to train the Reserve Force, both in an international and national setting, will be discussed next (cf 2.5.1; 2.5.2).

### **2.5.1 Reserve Force training on an international level**

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) is a training programme in an international setting (United States of America (USA)) that compares to the SA Army's URTP (cf 1.4). The ROTC training programme is offered at more than two hundred and seventy-three (273) colleges and universities across the United States (US), and includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico (Douglas, 2013). The ROTC is not limited to the Reserve Force only; however, it provides qualified officers to the total force, being both Active (in the case of this study the Regular Force) and Reserves (Douglas, 2013). According to Douglas (2013), more than forty-one percent (41%) of the Army's General Officers received their commissions through the ROTC training programme. Furthermore, Douglas (2013) affirms that the ROTC successfully trained cadets for entry into the defence force since 1916. Unlike the ROTC in an international setting, in SA, the URTP is currently limited to the Reserve Force component.

Douglas (2013) indicates that the ROTC programme prepares future officers with awareness to the complex environment they are entering, as it teaches a clear understanding of ambiguous doctrine, in an adaptive learning environment that promotes critical thinking, and builds a comprehensive acceptance of mission command. The ROTC prepares junior leaders [similar to the URTP who also prepares junior leaders] who will be able to operate in a whole host of geographical locations, and in unpredictable scenarios (Douglas, 2013).

Similar to the URTP (cf 1.2), the ROTC is also delivered on a modularised basis supported by blended-learning (Henkaliné, 2015). However, the URTP focused mostly on theory during recess periods, while the ROTC training programme focuses on practical training that incorporates leadership skills.

The ROTC programme is a good example of a blended-learning programme, as with it, learners engage in military subjects (theory) simultaneously with their college classes (Henkaliné, 2015), unlike the URTP where learners only meet with their LDPs during the recess of various universities. During recess periods of various universities, learners enrolled for the ROTC undergo *practical training*, including freshman orientation, leadership lab (leadership development, land navigation, marksmanship training, squad battle drill and water survival training), physical training and field training exercises (Henkaliné, 2015), whereas learners enrolled for the URTP only undergo practical training during leadership development programmes (cf 2.6.7). According to Henkaliné (2015), the type of training (practical training) as mentioned above is necessary to 'build' a junior leader in a military environment. During training, candidates are continuously assessed by officers and NCO

instructors to identify potential officers (junior leaders) based on leadership, ability to get along with others in a team (teamwork), and several other relevant items (Koehler, 2013:24).

### **2.5.2 Reserve Force training: South Africa**

Reserve Force training is aimed at supporting every function and operation to be carried out by the SA Army's Reserve Force component and it represents a fundamental and evolutionary change to transform the SA Army's Reserve Force. Reserve Force training is believed to have the capability to optimise the readiness of the Reserve Force units by providing them with soldiers who possess the state-of-the-art training, anytime, anywhere in support of the Army's mission (landward defence) (DoD, 2015:14-13). The SA Army's URTP, which is a Reserve Force military training programme, will be discussed next.

## **2.6 THE SA ARMY'S URTP (cf 1.2)**

### **2.6.1 Introduction and purpose**

In the SANDF, there is a shortage of junior leaders (junior officer level) to be developed into senior commanders. This shortage of leaders does not only reduce the SANDF's efficiency, but also prevents transformation. Therefore, the SA Army introduced the URTP to source junior leaders of character from the "*best of the brightest*" of the undergraduate and postgraduate students within SA universities.

The URTP is a military training programme that combines with it complementary physical, social and cultural training (DoD, 2010:3). The core purpose of the SA Army's URTP is consequently to enhance the professional and intellectual capacity of the SANDF Reserve Force, as it provides selection, enlistment and training of junior leaders to be appointed as future leaders with exceptional leadership potential, academic or technical qualifications (DoD, 2010:4). The SA Army's URTP is believed to provide high quality training and standards necessary to mould trainees into being professional soldiers who should live according to Army values and military ethos. Upon successful completion of URTP training, following graduation and commissioning, URTP learners have the opportunity to be appointed in either the Reserve Force or the Regular Force (DoD, 2015:11-13).

### **2.6.2 Selection criteria and recruitment of potential candidates**

The selection of SA Army URTP candidates takes place annually at participating universities around SA. The best students with leadership potential are recruited both from undergraduate and post-graduate student bodies at these universities (DoD, 2010:7).

More specifically, the selection criteria for the URTP include:

- Applicant must be a SA citizen, aged 18 to 26,
- Be a registered full- or part-time student,
- No criminal record,
- Comply with the required standards of medical fitness as prescribed by the SANDF,
- Have the necessary attributes and qualifications,
- Obtain required security clearance,
- Comply with unique requirements of each AoS, and
- If met the entire above criteria, applicant completes an enlistment form and furnishes certified copies required as supporting documents (DoD, 2010:7).

The URTP candidates are selected following the same acquisition processes utilised by the DoD. For example, candidates are considered on the basis of academic and personal characteristics. In terms of the DoD (2010:3), the selection process involves interviews and prescribed tests (for example, paper selection, aptitude tests, health assessment or fitness evaluation) following the normal acquisition processes within the DoD.

Annually, the selection is rotated among nine provinces, namely North West, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng to make sure that all candidates from various provinces do benefit from the initiative (URTP) from which selection is to be made. The Reserve Force works closely together with the Regular Force for selection and training of URTP candidates.

The entrance into the URTP system usually occurs at the end of the student's first academic year, in order for candidates (recruits) to start with training during their second academic year. Reason being, it is assumed that first-year students are still in the orientation phase of their universities (from schooling system to higher institution). Therefore, the URTP is envisaged not to negatively affect or influence in any way the student's individual academic studies (DoD, 2010:6).

### **2.6.3 The components of the URTP**

The URTP consists of the following components (a steering committee, Arms of Service and Divisions, military education committees, students and universities). These components will be discussed next.

### 2.6.3.1 Steering committee

The steering committee directs the marketing and corporate communication, facilitates adaptation of learning pathways, and monitors the implementation and progress of the URTP (DoD, 2010:9). Furthermore, the steering committee is responsible for the following:

- Establishing and fostering a positive relationship with universities participating in the URTP through military education committees.
- Educating external role-players about the role, military ethos, values, organisation and the capabilities of the SANDF and its Arms of Services (AoSs).

### 2.6.3.2 Arms of services and divisions

AoSs and divisions are responsible for the implementation or execution of the URTP (DoD, 2010:9). Reason being, AoSs and divisions are in line with applicable policies, and have appropriate structures and capabilities that govern the utilisation of the Reserve Force members.

### 2.6.3.3 Military education committees

Military education committees represent the military interest (defence force) in negotiating with academic institutions regarding the development of officer training (URTP) for the Reserve Forces. The military education committee organises the annual defence conference, publishes occasional papers, and awards prizes to students who have demonstrated outstanding achievement in leadership through military expertise.

### 2.6.3.4 Students (members undergoing URTP training)

The DoD (2010:5) expects that URTP students are exposed to challenging military training and complementary activities, including social, cultural and adventure to broaden their outlook on life. Students are also expected to develop a sense of responsibility, which is enhanced through teamwork. It is therefore expected that students (on completion of URTP) will become part of a highly technological and exciting organisation that offers many career experiences and opportunities (DoD, 2010:5).

### 2.6.3.5 Universities

In the context of this study, 'universities' refer to institutions from which students are recruited. Military training is envisaged by the DoD (2010:6) to contribute to universities in the following ways:

- Improve the student's life skills and positive attributes, including the development of national core values and ethics.

- Enhance the sense of taking responsibility and accepting accountability, which, in turn, can aid in improving a student’s academic results.
- Ensure a group of students with a positive approach to life and citizenship. Therefore, this can multiply or have an influencing effect on the campus.
- Enhance leadership potential among the students, gained through additional military leadership and management training and development (DoD, 2010:6).

#### 2.6.4 The URTP management process

To improve understanding of the management of the URTP within the context of the SANDF, the URTP management process is illustrated next in Figure 2-1 below:




Figure 2-1: URTP management process (DoD, 2010:11)

The URTP is planned and managed at SANDF level (level 2), but implemented at service level (level 3) in accordance with the guidelines of SANDF implementation instruction number 40 of 2009 and URTP Charter dated 12 August 2010 (DoD, 2010:5; cf Figure 2-1). The SA Army force preparation group (level 2), together with formations (level 3), is responsible for the planning and implementation of the SA Army's URTP. The SA Army force preparation group is therefore accountable to the Chief of the SA Army for URTP training. The SA Army force preparation group serves as the headquarters (HQ) for the SA Army to exercise overall supervision of the URTP, is responsible for broad policy-making functions and high-level coordination with the Department of Defence (DoD), and liaises with educational institutions (cf. Figure 2-1). Formation headquarters (for example training formation) plan the implementation of URTP training together with units (level 4) under the formation's command. Therefore, a tasked unit should deliver URTP training according to prescripts set by its formation HQ. Planning for the URTP consequently happens at all levels, however, starts from top management down to low-level management (DoD, 2009).

The URTP is aligned with the unique requirements and the organisation of each AoSs (the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Military Health Service) and divisions, and tailor-made in such a way that, where a service or division elects not to conduct its own training, it may enter into a service agreement with another service/division to conduct such training on its behalf, through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the relevant role-players to facilitate the implementation of the programme (DoD, 2010:5).

### **2.6.5 Command and control of the URTP**

The URTP is guided and directed by the SANDF steering committee under the auspices of the Chief Defence Reserves (DoD, 2010:9; cf 2.6.4; cf 2.6.3.1). The Chief Defence Reserves constitute a nodal point to manage general enquiries related to the URTP (DoD, 2010:9). The liaising with and the recruitment at universities are done in conjunction with other role-players in the DoD, such as the Human Resource (HR) department, Military Psychological Institute (MPI) and formations, to mention a few. However, command and control during the delivery of the URTP should be in accordance with the policy and practice of the Service/Division/unit, which is the normal chain/channel of command and to which the members will be introduced and with which they will have to comply (DoD, 2010:10).

Most active Army units respond directly to the requirements of a single, unambiguous chain of command, though some respond indirectly to more than one headquarters (Sutton, 1988:6). The chain of command for most Reserve Force units is less uniform, as they (Reserve Force units) respond to more of its elements (Sutton, 1988:7). The command structure of the Reserve Force is also more complex and less internally inconsistent than the

Regular Force (Sutton, 1988:7). Within the context of this study, various stakeholders (Chief Defence Reserves, steering committee, Reserve Force units, Close-by units, Home unit, Force preparation, ETD systems integrity (DoD HR Division), Formations, to mention just a few) are involved, thereby making the command and control for the URTP more complex (cf 2.6.3; cf Figure 2-1).

According to Sutton (1988:7), the chain of command consequences for training may include some or all of the following:

- Senior commanders may face training management challenges.
- Increased potential to disconnect from training guidance.
- Quality control and evaluation of training are made more difficult.
- It becomes more difficult to design balanced training programmes that satisfy multiple HQs.

Leaders within the chain/channel of command may take into consideration the stakeholders involved in the delivery of the URTP when considering command and control aspects.

## **2.6.6 Stakeholders involved in the delivery of the URTP**

Cervai *et al.* (cited in Els, 2016:13) refer to stakeholders as individuals or entities who have an interest in something and the outcome thereof.

Stakeholders involved in the SA Army's URTP include the Reserve Force units, Close-by units, Home unit, Formations and Arms of Services (specifically SA Army Force Preparation) and will be discussed next.

### **2.6.6.1 Reserve Force units**

Each Reserve Force is under direct command of a specific formation. Formations comprise both Regular and Reserve Force elements. The Reserve Force units are responsible for the entire URTP, whereby the formations are accountable to the SA Army Force preparation for the effective delivery and management of the URTP. Because the URTP is rotated around provinces, a specific formation is tasked to conduct the URTP for the SA Army on an annual basis. The Reserve Forces is the one conducting the Basic Military Training (BMT) and Functional Training (FuT), whereby the Home unit will later come for Officer formative training (which is the main stage used to form officers into being leaders of character in the SA Army). Nevertheless, during each phase, the Reserve Force stays accountable for day-to-day activities, administration and payments of recruits.

#### 2.6.6.2 Close-by units

Close-by units are those identified closest to the units. Close-by units assist with accommodation, mess, and providing a conducive training environment for the URTP. During recess, the URTP learners report to close-by units for training.

#### 2.6.6.3 Home unit

The home unit is tasked by the relevant formation (within the context of this study being SA Army Training Formation) to conduct the URTP training for the SA Army. The home unit [referred to in this study as Unit X] is therefore responsible for training all junior leaders in the SA Army for the SA Army, being either for the Regular Force or the Reserve Force. The home unit therefore provides the SA Army's URTP with LDPs who are responsible for delivering the Officer Formative Training stage of the URTP.

#### 2.6.6.4 Formations

Formations serve as higher headquarters (HQs) for both the Regular Force and the Reserve Force under their command. Consequently, formations stay accountable for units under their command, for command and control purposes. For example (within the context of this study), where a home unit is involved with training, it will be accountable to Training Formation, whereas the training formation will be accountable to the SA Army Force preparation.

#### 2.6.6.5 Force preparation

Force preparation is an entity within a specific AoS that is responsible for preparing the forces to be operational. The preparation consists of T&D interventions such as the URTP and practical exercises conducted throughout SA by various units. In order to ensure quality assurance and readiness of units, force preparation is also responsible for external evaluation of training interventions. In support, Koehler (2013:19) states that the supervision of training by the higher HQ (SA Army's Force Preparation in this study) takes place in the form of occasional visits, reports and inspections.

Now that the main stakeholders involved in the URTP have been discussed, the stages of URTP training will be discussed next.

### **2.6.7 Stages of URTP training**

In order for the SA Army's URTP to conform to standard SANDF policy, the URTP is executed in three consecutive stages, namely *basic military training (BMT)*, *officer formative training (OFT)* and *functional training (FuT)*, which should be completed by all learners while

studying at own expense at universities throughout the country (DoD, 2015:11-13; cf 1.2). These three stages of the URTP training will be discussed next.

- **Stage 1: Basic military training (BMT)**

During basic military training (BMT), recruits are inducted into the defence force and are inculcated with the competencies needed for a military professional career (DoD, 2015:11-4). During BMT, recruits are introduced to the framework and vocabulary to understand and learn military culture. BMT also includes coaching in discipline, the establishment of team cohesion, and basic military skills are provided to enable them to operate within a complex military environment (DoD, 2010:7; DoD, 2015:11-4). Holien (2002:9) regards BMT as being flexible in approach, as it enables recruits to adapt to various environments.

- **Stage 2: Officer formative training (OFT)**

Officer formative training aims to equip trainees with the knowledge, skills and attributes necessary for leadership, management and officership enabling them to function as junior leaders within the military environment (DoD, 2010:7). More specifically, officer formative training is the SA Army's *leadership development training* (cf 1.2), and part of officer formative training is a practical leadership exercise referred to as a leadership development programme.

The officer formative training is presented using a blended-learning approach (both distance and short contact sessions) and consists of the same modules presented on a similar full-time-based officer formative training. Consequently, the URTP curriculum is tailored to suit the requirements of enrolled students.

- **Stage 3: Functional training (FuT)**

According to the US Army (cited in Young (2005:7), functional training is designed to qualify leaders, soldiers and civilians for assignment to duty positions that requires specific functional skills and knowledge. Functional training therefore equips learners with the necessary knowledge and skills to operate successfully within the functional area of the relevant Service (US Army, cited in Young, 2005:7; DoD, 2010:7). FuT is usually practical in nature (functional), and ensures the individual's operational ability within his or her own mastering (DoD, 2015:11-4).

The training method or approach to deliver the URTP will be discussed next.

## 2.7 TRAINING METHOD APPLICABLE TO DELIVER THE URTP

To ensure that the URTP interventions are tailored to suit the requirements of enrolled students, the SA Army's URTP follows a *blended-learning approach* (distance learning and short contact sessions) (DoD, 2010:6) that will be discussed next.

- **Blended-learning method**

*Blended-learning* combines different delivery methods (for example instructor-led training is supplemented with distance learning or e-learning) into a cohesive programme that meets the needs of different learners in different situations (Chan, 2010a:98). In the case of the URTP, *distance learning* and *residential learning* (short contact sessions) are blended in order to eradicate constraints that might be brought forth by geographical location (cf 2.8.6), time (cf 2.8.8) and space between SA Army's URTP trainees and SA Army's LDPs (DoD, 2010:6). Chan (2010b:112) suggests that with blended-learning traditional learning methods must be combined with *technology* to create a synergistic, dynamic learning structure that can propel learning to new heights.

A blended-learning approach is considered effective to address constraints that might be imposed by *geographical locations* (cf 2.8.6) of various universities and cost of facilities. In addition, blended learning (combined methods) is a *cost effective* way to address constraints while simultaneously meeting programme requirements (Chan, 2010b:112). The saving of costs is also the most obvious difference between traditional (for example classroom learning) and non-traditional approaches (for example e-learning) to training (Sinclair, 2003:5). However, the challenge when using blended-learning is to make sure that all the components work together to provide a meaningful learning experience that could help learners achieve the programme's learning objectives (Chan, 2010a:98). While distance or e-learning has cost benefits and is useful for certain aspects of training (Sinclair, 2003:12), face-to-face interaction (also referred to as classroom training or on-the-job training) increases group cohesion and identity (Sinclair, 2003:9).

The SA Army's URTP is conducted during the recess periods of various universities, where LDPs only meet with trainees during those periods at the identified close-by military units. Trainees are therefore required to manage their time effectively by putting 'equal' effort into managing both academic and military studies without losing focus or lowering performance in either one of the two.

The blended-learning methods that are used in the blended learning approach of the URTP consist of distance learning and residential/classroom learning and will be discussed next.

- Distance learning

Distance learning (DL) focuses on teaching methods and technology with the aim of delivering to students who are not physically present in a traditional classroom setting (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:96). Therefore, DL can be useful to bridge the learning-delivery gaps caused by multiple geographical locations, time constraints, and other barriers to learning. According to Erasmus *et al.* (2015:96), DL consists of the use of a package(s) of printed material that includes readings material, tests and exercises for self-evaluation with or without online assistance such as satellite delivery, CD ROMS, videos, video conferences and *the internet*, or exclusively online material.

DL has the following disadvantages, namely limited feedback, the assumption that learners understand the material, and that the amount of assistance to learners depends on the instructor or other learners (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:98). Nevertheless, according to Sinclair (2003:10), DL is an exciting concept for the military, because it is possible for individuals to attend training without sending them away from their home units, no matter how remote.

- Residential/classroom training

Classroom/residential training includes seminars, conferences, lectures and training sessions, which all are a form of direct instruction (Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:352). Classroom/residential training (or instructor-led training as it is sometimes referred to) is therefore based on the notion that training occurs in a classroom or within an instructor-controlled setting. Werner and DeSimone (2012:174) add that classroom training is conducted outside the normal work setting. In that sense, a classroom can be any training space set away from the work site. Within the context of this study, residential training can be in a simulator room, shooting range or parade ground, to mention but a few.

To date, classroom training is still regarded as a popular and fundamental training method (Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:351; Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:95). For example, the American Society for Training and Development (ASTD) (cited in Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:216) reported that classroom training is still the most popular training delivery method (59%), with e-learning second at 20%. Kiley and Coetzee (2013a:352) maintain that direct instruction has strong research support as a method for enabling learners to achieve the learning outcomes of a training programme. This is because direct instruction gives facilitators the most control over what, when and how learners learn. Classroom training is not only the most appropriate strategy for actively involving learners in developing the required foundational, practical and reflexive competencies (Killen, cited in Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:352), but when matched with

clearly defined job performance, classroom training can be a very powerful means of enhancing job performance (Aamodt, cited in Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:352).

Some disadvantages of traditional classroom training, among others, are that it dampens learner participation, inhibits interaction among learners, inhibits freedom of movement, and confines access to learning materials to those directly in the learners' possession (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:96). In addition, traditional classroom-based courses can be very expensive due to the cost involved and its associated overhead costs (accommodation costs, travelling costs or meals costs, to mention the few). Classroom training is conducted for the URTP during three stages of training (BMT, OFT and FuT); however, it is limited to availability of learners during recess, and it is referred to by DoD (2010:6) as contact sessions.

The factors that have to be considered during training delivery are discussed next.

## **2.8 FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR TRAINING DELIVERY**

There are certain factors that should be considered before and during the delivery of training and training programmes such as the URTP, *given that these factors also have an impact on effective training delivery* (cf 2.2; 2.2.1, systems theory; 2.2.2, process theory). These factors may include learning outcomes, characteristics of learners, interaction between learners, management of training (cf 2.6.4; 2.8.1), skills of LDPs (cf 2.8.4), resources (cf 2.8.4), facilities available, and the dynamics within the group of learners that have an impact on the effective delivery of training in the workplace, and such factors need to be considered during the design of learning programmes (Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:350). Various studies similarly highlight that factors related to training delivery, such as the training approach (cf 2.7), geographical location (cf 2.8.6), availability of trainees (cf 2.8.6), training costs (cf 2.8.5), time available (cf 2.8.8), equipment and resources (cf 2.8.3), management support for training (cf 2.8.2), and the chain/channel of command (cf 2.6.5) have an influence on the training (Holien, 2002; Newman, 2002; Sinclair, 2003; Sanders & Schaefer, 2009; Douglas, 2013).

The management of training as a factor that might influence training delivery and within the context of this study, the URTP, as a form of Reserve Force training, will be discussed next.

### **2.8.1 Management of training**

According to Erasmus *et al.* (2015:38), training managers provide the organisation with guidance and leadership regarding learning and development. Within the context of the URTP, training managers are referred to as commanders. In a training situation, the commander's primary responsibility is to help the organisation achieve its mission effectively

and efficiently. To make optimum use of the resources in order to achieve the organisational goals, commanders have to plan, organise, lead, staff and control the URTP and applicable resources needed for effective delivery (cf 2.8.4).

In addition to the above, Buckley and Caple (2007:268) identified training managers' [commanders within the context of the URTP] roles as:

- *Planning*: Setting of training goals, including the formulation of training policies and plans. Within the context of the URTP, this would entail the formulation of training policies, curriculums, guidelines, instructions or standard operating procedures to LDPs (cf 2.6.4). Planning is critical for the success of any training programme, including the SA Army's URTP. According to the Department of the Army (DoA) (2006:6-22), good planning boosts shared understanding and ensures that a mission is accomplished with a minimum of wasted effort and fewer casualties in combat. Chan (2010a:54) maintains that the more attention is paid to the details, the more successful the training is likely to be executed.
- *Liaising with other departments* to show them ways in which training can contribute to improving their employees' performance. Within the context of the URTP, this would entail liaising with all units (Reserve Forces, close-by units, home unit, to mention a few), formations, AoSs and universities involved to ensure successful implementation and delivery of the URTP (cf 2.6.4).
- Ensuring and *overseeing* development. Within the context of the URTP, this would entail overseeing the implementation and development of candidates as junior leaders (cf 2.6.4).
- Delivery and *evaluation* of appropriate training activities. Within the context of the URTP, this implies the continuous evaluation of the URTP (internally or externally) to ensure that the training programme leverages expected results (cf 2.9).
- *Recruiting* and developing *training personnel* (LDPs). Within the context of the URTP, this would entail the recruitment and development of LDPs responsible for URTP training interventions (cf 2.6.2).
- *Controlling of activities* against overall training plan and budget. Within the context of the URTP, this would entail the controlling of all resources (physical, financial and human resources) against the overall training plan and budget constraints (cf 2.8.3).

## **2.8.2 Management support for training**

Management support for training is crucial to ensure the effective delivery and implementation of training and training programmes such as the URTP (cf 2.8.1). According to Kahn (2005:90), training should be supported by top and senior management's

commitment and should be an integral part of the organisation's culture. Meyer (2016b:94) states that not having management support and reinforcement can completely negate the potentially positive effect of learning. It is, however, also important that managers should support learning and development practitioners. Meyer and Slowman (2012:8) found in this regard that trainers [learning and development practitioners within the context of the URTP] often lack support from managers and higher authorities. Participants in their study indicated that managers regard training as a paper exercise only used to address legal requirements (Meyer & Slowman, 2012:8).

Although military commanders require both the Reserve Force and Regular Force training to be structured, delivered and managed in the same manner to produce the same results, the Reserve Force has lesser training support system capabilities than the Regular Force (DoD, 2015:14-13). Therefore, Sanders and Schaefer (2009:9) recommend that where training is to take place, Reserve Force units should be assigned liaison officers from Regular Force units to coordinate access to Regular Force assets.

The effort managers put into training greatly influences the L&D environment in the organisation. Within the context of this study (URTP), commanders' involvement, planning and sufficient support for training may contribute to the success of the URTP (cf 2.2; 2.2.1; 2.2.2).

### **2.8.3 Availability of equipment and resources**

Effective training delivery relies on sufficient, applicable equipment and resources when needed. Resources for training refer to human resource provisioning (Tshilongamulenzhe, 2013:174). For example, LDPs, workplace mentors, supervisors and assessors are a few that must be planned for (cf 2.8.1). Within the context of the URTP, resources refer to learning material or curricula. Logistical resources, within the context of military training and the URTP, include equipment such as field equipment, chairs and tables for the classroom venue, food for trainees, and mission essential equipment refers to maps, compasses and big bags, to mention a few. According to Louw (2013:82), most Reserve Force units rely on Regular Force units for physical resources such as training location, mess, and accommodation. Within the context of the URTP, commanders are tasked to plan for the resources.

In research conducted by Sanders and Schaefer (2009:9), participants highlighted that a lack of equipment put constraints on training, and moreover outdated equipment used during training did not match the tasks during deployment. Therefore, they recommended and stressed the fact that training can be accomplished successfully through the use of

simulations, rather than using outdated equipment. According to Sanders and Schaefer (2009:4), mission essential equipment is necessary for the building of an effective training plan, as without proper equipment, training will not be successful. This is because soldiers will not be able to train effectively without mission essential equipment.

Within a South African context, Louw (2013:82) affirms that the SANDF (SA Army within the context of this study) is hamstrung by a dearth of serviceable equipment and funds (budget), which makes it almost impossible to conduct extensive on-the-job training through various training initiatives such as the URTP.

#### **2.8.4 Learning and development practitioners**

Skilful LDPs are necessary in delivering training interventions [in this case the URTP], to ensure optimal transfer of learning to the workplace (Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:350). Erasmus *et al.* (2015:38) add that LDPs must also be able to link T&D programmes to the overall organisation's business plan. While executing their duties, LDPs should develop partnerships with managers, as managers are ultimately accountable for the success of training (within the context of this study the URTP) and of the organisation (being the SANDF within the context of this study).

LDPs must be able to communicate their knowledge clearly, use a variety of instructional techniques, have good interpersonal skills, as well as the ability to motivate others to learn effectively (Werner & DeSimone, 2012:150). Werner and DeSimone (2012:150) add that the LDPs who lack the ability to implement effectively the training programmes, may rely too heavily on a single method of instruction, which might be inappropriate for the subject matter. Alternatively, LDPs who lack subject matter expertise may rely too heavily on a textbook or other training material (for example a slide show presentation) and not be able to explain important concepts and/or how they are applied to a job. The selection of LDPs to deliver the SA Army's URTP is therefore critical as it does not only need LDPs who only understand the subject, but who are also experienced with the training method to be used (cf 2.7, blended-learning method).

While ensuring that training brings about visible results, LDPs also have many *roles* to play. In SA, the roles that LDPs play are shaped by an adoption of outcomes-based framework and legislation (SA, cited in Meyer & Sloman, 2013:3). LDPs' roles include, among others, the developer of skills, strategist, mediator of learning, assessor, moderator, designer of learning programmes, researcher, evaluator, needs analyst, coach, mentor, quality assurer, evidence collector, education, training and development (ETD) administrator, and ETD manager, to mention but a few (Van Niekerk, 2012:368; Stuart, cited in Meyer & Sloman,

2013:4; Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:38). These roles are derived from the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), and are reflected in the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) as established under the SAQA Act 58 of 1995 (currently known as NQF Act), and are based on skills regulation (Meyer & Sloman, 2013:4).

More specifically, and within the context of the SA Army's URTP, LDPs fulfil the following roles:

- Facilitation: Facilitation is directed at questioning and listening skills, as well as at providing learners with feedback and positive reinforcement during the learning process (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:38). Within the context of the URTP, facilitators convey and transfer learning content to the learners while at the same time helping them (learners) manage their learning experiences.
- Assessment and moderation: Assessors plan for assessment, support and guide learners through the assessment process, conduct assessment, provide feedback to learners with regard to assessment and review assessments, while the moderator plans for moderation, conducts moderation, supports assessors, provides feedback to the assessor(s), and reviews moderation practices (Van der Merwe, 2011:37). Within the context of the URTP, both the assessor and the moderator support and evaluate the assessment environment, confirm the reliability and authenticity of assessment results and enhance the quality of assessments. They use the principles of assessment to justify the assessment.
- Quality assurance: According to Chan (2010a:10), LDPs as evaluators or quality assurers should determine whether a training programme achieved what it set out to achieve, and should identify changes that might be needed to improve future training programmes (cf 2.9). LDPs as quality assurers need to reflect on training conducted (cf 2.9).
- Programme coordination: A learning programme coordinator is a designated person with experience, carefully selected to guide training and development efforts and liaise with senior management and other stakeholders regarding training (Koehler, 2013:30-31; cf 2.6.6). Within the context of the URTP, the learning programme coordination entails managing a balance between doing the right things (effectiveness) and doing them in the right ways (efficiency) to ensure that URTP leverages greater results.

LDPs may also face various *challenges* during training. For example, Thorne and Mackey (2007:89) identified handling reluctant learners, problems with the venue or facilities, coping with the methodology used, problems with resources or equipment and target groups as basic *challenges* that LDPs might come across. In addition to the above, Meyer and Sloman (2012:8) found that shortage of training staff (human

resources), specifically assessors and moderators, leads to *employee workload*. Moreover, participants in their study (Meyer & Sloman, 2012) indicated that they are challenged with *multiple roles*, which led them to not knowing what their duties are (Meyer & Sloman, 2012:8).

### **2.8.5 Training costs**

One of the most obvious factors regarding training of the Reserve Force is the costs involved. Tshilongamulenzhe (2013:174) indicates that the cost of aspects such as time, effort and resources should be calculated before the training programme commences.

According to Sinclair (2003:6), the costs are related to training effectiveness. Reason being, organisations in the process of trying to save costs (for example cutting on training time or using other related methodologies), might as well compromise on training. Sinclair (2003:6) views the issue of costs as probably the hardest area to quantify, and yet the one that really matters most when discussing RF training. According to Sinclair (2003:3), the Reserve Force faces increased training costs that usually hinder how the Reserve Force is able to approach training.

With regard to traditional versus non-traditional approaches to training (cf 2.7; 2.8.7), the most obvious factor is also the cost involved. For example, it cost the USA 1 490.58 US dollars for six (6) weeks training (traditional approach), compared to 603.33 US dollars for the same period on the non-traditional approach (DL) to training (Sinclair, 2003:5). These training costs include, among others, travelling cost, accommodation, mess fees, daily allowances, course allowance and transport cost, to mention a few. Sinclair (2003:5) therefore suggests that a more flexible and responsive methodology should be used to produce qualified reservists. In this regard, the blended approach was already discussed (cf 2.7; cf 2.8.7).

Reserve Force members also rely heavily on call-ups. Additionally, the more time the Reserve Force members spent on active duty (traditional classroom training), the more expensive the training becomes (Sinclair, 2003:5). Despite that, it is also expensive to get all Reserve Force members to centralised points (location) ready for training (cf 2.8.6). Geographical location and the availability of learners will be discussed next.

### **2.8.6 Geographical location and availability of learners for training**

According to Holien (2002:8), the Reserve Force units are geographically dispersed in a wide variety of ways. As a result, such dispersion impacts negatively on the Reserve Force

training (Sanders & Schaefer, 2009:4). The geographical dispersion of units makes it difficult for Reserve Force members to be together at one location for training.

Furthermore, Reserve Force members are usually occupied with their civilian activities when not on active military duty (DoD, 2015:8-11). Therefore, it is not always easy to get all of them at a training location at once.

A 'learner' is described as "a person who is finding out about a subject or how to do something" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:860). Learners, within the context of the URTP, refer to those candidates or trainees who have been selected to undergo URTP training. Within the context of this study, during recess, some learners are still committed to their academic work, which causes them to be absent for quite a number of days. Moreover, some learners might have to go and write second opportunity examinations over the same period that the URTP is being scheduled (cf 2.8.7).

### **2.8.7 Training delivery method**

The training delivery method used in the URTP was discussed earlier (cf 2.7). More specifically, it was indicated that the URTP is presented by means of blended-learning where *distance learning* and *residential learning* (short contact sessions) are combined (cf 2.7). The training delivery method, specifically *residential training*, is seen by Sinclair (2003:11) as deterrent to Reserve Force members. Reason being, Reserve Force members cannot or will not always take the time required to go through all the work done by means of residential training.

Within the context of this study, the components of the training delivery method used to deliver the URTP, namely blended learning (which consists of both distance and residential/classroom training) might have a negative impact on learners' academic performance. For example, during the distance learning phase, learners might be faced with the challenge of balancing both military training and academic studies, and during the residential training phase, learners might still be engaged at their universities with their academic work (cf 2.8.6).

### **2.8.8 Time available**

Meyer and Slowman (2013:8) identified time constraints as a personal challenge that impact on training. According to Meyer and Slowman (2013:8), LDPs are challenged with less time and more work. Time constraints may lead to training being compressed while trying to make up for time. For example, one week's training may end up being compressed into three- or two-day training. In support, Wick and Leon (cited in Meyer, 2016b:94) state that

lack of time often means training is done in a pressed fashion that prevents real learning. The training content finally becomes a mini-lecture with handouts (Meyer, 2016b:95). Conversely, it also happens that a learning programme that could have been conducted over a few days gets prolonged unnecessarily, decreasing the participants' commitment to future training efforts (Meyer, 2016b:95).

According to Sanders and Schaefer (2009:4), the Reserve Force has less training time available than the Regular Force. Newman (2002:9) states that the amount of time available creates a challenging curve to train the Reserve Force to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts. According to Holien (2002:7), the Reserve Force cannot remain on active duty for extended periods of time because of the rules governing their activation and deployment, which make it difficult for them to be tasked. Additionally, most Reserve members are working, "therefore, Reserve members are mostly unable to take much time off their work to attend long training programmes" (Sinclair, 2003:4).

According to Douglas (2013:1), due to the looming uncertainties of operations, and how quickly a unit has to respond to support of such operations, less time is available for new officers to train and gain experience before leaving their post, camps or stations. According to Sortor *et al.* (1994:xvi), it has long been recognised that the Reserve Force faces high hurdles in developing leaders and maintaining their skills, given limited time available for training. Additionally, Sortor *et al.* (1994:xvi) state that the heavy administrative demands of running Reserve Force unit training leave little time for practising leadership skills in field or tactical situations.

From the discussions above on the factors to consider during training delivery, it can be concluded that these factors are essential to ensure effective training delivery. However, these factors can also affect training negatively, if not attended to. In line with the systems and process theories, one factor such as management (lack of planning during the analysis phase of training) may also negatively affect other factors, such as insufficient time for training delivery (cf 2.8.8).

Quality assurance is essential to ensure high quality training. Quality assurance, including evaluation as the last phase in the training process (cf 2.2.2), will be discussed next.

## **2.9 QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE SA ARMY'S URTP**

Quality assurance is important in the SA Army as it is necessary to ensure that all stakeholders involved in the delivery of the URTP are committed to ensuring that the URTP leverages greater results. Quality assurance is the process of ensuring that the degree of

excellence specified is achieved (SAQA Act, cited in Coetzee & Botha, 2013b:518). It is the process of checking that the performance of certain parts of T&D system meets SAQA criteria and standards. QA is one of the most important principles of the NQF. Therefore, every standard and qualification registered on the NQF, and all training and assessment that take place are subjected to QA (Van der Merwe, 2012:4). According to Erasmus *et al.* (2015:243), the issue of accountability and “fitness for purpose” resulted in the introduction of QA policies.

Quality assurance includes training evaluation. Erasmus *et al.* (2015:223) define training evaluation as a systematic collection of descriptive and judgemental information necessary to make effective decisions related to the selection, adoption, value and modification of various instructional activities. Kiley and Coetzee (2013b:444) state that training will only add value to the organisation’s bottom-line if it is evaluated for its effectiveness (how well it works) and efficiency (how well it is designed, delivered and managed).

Quality applies at all levels in the organisation, including the SANDF, and involves a continuous process of improvement and development. It focuses on setting standards. QA in the SANDF, more specifically the URTP at unit level, should be conducted by means of internal evaluators or quality assurers (internal branch at the SA Army Gymnasium) and by external quality assurers (verifiers), namely the Education and Training Quality Assurance Body (ETQA) of the SANDF’s applicable Sector Education and Training Authority, more specifically the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). Although the ETQA is known as an external evaluator at the Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) that is responsible for all training provided by training providers affiliated with that specific SETA, the SA Army gymnasium also established a similar department called *ETQA section* within the SA Army gymnasium unit lines (cf 4.7.1). Accordingly, the ETQA referred to in this study is an internal evaluator established by and for the SA Army gymnasium. The main aim of the *ETQA section* (internal section at SA Army gymnasium), as referred to in this study, is to monitor the quality of training given by training branches (non-commissioned formative branch, ETD branch or Officer Formative branch) according to the standards and qualifications on the NQF through internal efforts. Internally, QA gives management confidence that the tasks will be carried out to the required standard. Externally, QA gives providers and learners confidence that the training is meeting the requirement of the client and required standards. Hence, within the SANDF the external evaluation is evaluation that is usually conducted by high headquarters (HQs) like the formation or delegated members from the SA Army force preparation group.

According to Coetzee and Botha (2013b:519), the elements of a quality management system that must be quality assured or evaluated are:

- Management system: Within the context of the URTP, the management system refers to the development of a strategy by decision-makers to meet set organisational objectives and goals. This is done in conjunction with chief defence reserves, SA Army force preparation, formation and units (cf 2.6.4).
- Personnel and material resources: Within the context of the URTP, personnel refers to LDPs (cf 2.8.7), and material refers to resources including field equipment, stationary, food, chairs or classrooms (cf 2.8.6).
- Administrative, physical and financial resources: Within the context of the URTP, financial resources refer to the training costs (cf 2.8.5) and resources such as learning material, logistical resources and mission essential equipment (cf 2.8.3).
- ETD records, for example learner achievements records, records of attended programmes, and training evaluation records).
- Communication system: Within the context of URTP, communication refers to the chain of command that all stakeholders and role-players should follow during planning or delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 2.6.5).

The components of QA (which is a process and cyclic) as they relate to the URTP will be discussed next.

### **2.9.1 Quality planning**

Liepina *et al.* (2014:630) refer to quality planning as an activity focused on setting quality objectives and clarifying of the requirements, necessary operational processes, and related resources in order to meet the quality objectives. Quality planning therefore allows quality improvement to be a *continuous process*. As highlighted by Moodliar *et al.* (2013:27), quality planning is necessary to ensure that adequate operating processes will yield quality results. Within the context of this study, quality planning ensures that the SA Army's needs and expectations regarding quality training (URTP training) will be met. To be specific, within the context of URTP, quality planning means setting performance expectations and goals for learning and development practitioners in order to channel their efforts towards achieving set training objectives. Quality planning outlines the process required to ensure that training will satisfy the needs for which it was undertaken. Quality planning is part of the management function discussed earlier (cf 2.8.1).

### **2.9.2 Quality control**

Juran and Gryna (cited in Liepina *et al.*, 2014:630) describe quality control as a systematic process during which the actual quality compliance measurements are completed and compared with the quality objectives, and action is taken in the event of discrepancy. Reason being, quality control makes use of monitoring and measurement activities or tools to ensure that the objectives are met. The aim of quality control is seen by van der Merwe (2012:6) as to monitor the processes in order to discover and improve the unsatisfactory performance. According to Hattingh (cited in van der Merwe, 2012:6), “the implementation of an effective and efficient quality management system requires a shared commitment by all training staff, as that should ensure quality across the whole spectrum of training provision”. Within the context of the URTP, quality control entails taking actions that will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the SA Army’s URTP, thereby adding quality to the SANDF’s T&D system. Such quality control actions include establishing specifications of parameters to be controlled, performing checks or inspections, diagnosing and taking action on the variation observed, and lastly checking that variations have been corrected. Quality control is necessary to assist the LDPs to achieve the output with or within limited resource and environmental constraints without losing focus of the end results.

### **2.9.3 Quality improvement**

Quality improvement refers to the actions steps taken to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of activities and processes once they have been evaluated (Van der Merwe, 2012:6). The improvements that are made in this process are therefore important to add quality to the organisation internally and externally. Van der Merwe (2012:6) asserts that the quality improvement must be *continuous* as that will ensure that all planned processes are followed and implemented. Within the context of this study, quality improvement is necessary to complete the T&D process, namely needs analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation (cf 2.2.2). Even though quality management policies and procedures seem not to be in place within the SA Army (Els, 2016:2), SA Army units such as SA Army gymnasium have established quality assurance sections that will specifically deal with training quality standards and improvement.

It can be concluded from the above discussions that QA, including training evaluation (as the last phase in the training process – cf 2.2.2), is important in the SA Army as it is necessary to ensure that all stakeholders involved in the delivery of the URTP are committed to ensuring that the URTP leverages greater results. Within the context of this study, QA ensures how well the URTP is designed (cf 2.2.2), delivered (cf 2.2.2) and managed, providing commanders with an assurance and confidence that the URTP will bring about the

return on investment (ROI) or return on expectation (ROE) made. Nevertheless, T&D evaluation will require proper planning and clear objectives of what needs to be evaluated. Consequently, quality assurance is an essential part of training to ensure the effectiveness of the URTP.

## **2.10 SUMMARY**

In this chapter (Chapter 2), the conceptual-theoretical framework underpinning this study, namely systems and process theories, was explained. Training, i.e. military training with specific reference to Reserve Force training, was also discussed. Both the ROTC (within an international context) and the URTP (within the South African context) as the Reserve Force leader development training programmes were explained and differences and similarities indicated where applicable. Aspects related to the SA Army's URTP were explained to provide a better understanding thereof.

The factors related to training delivery, specifically the URTP, were also discussed. In line with the systems theory, these factors, such as time available, training costs, geographical location of trainees and Reserve Force units, the training approach followed, availability of trainees to undergo training, management support for training, training costs, availability of equipment and channel of command may also affect the effectiveness of training, such as the URTP training programme. Finally, quality assurance (including evaluation as the final phase in the training process (based on the process approach – cf 2.2.2) as a means to determine training effectiveness, was discussed.

In the next chapter (Chapter 3), the research design and methodology applicable to this study will be discussed, followed by the description of sample group and a thorough explanation of how data will be collected and analysed. Validity and trustworthiness to ensure quality data as well as ethical considerations applicable to this study will also be alluded to.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, all the information regarding the qualitative research design that will be used to investigate **learning and development practitioners' (LDPs) experiences regarding the SA Army's University Reserve Training Programme (URTP)** will be discussed. The methodology, study population, sample and sampling procedure, data generation (collection) and data analysis, strategies employed to ensure quality data (trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability) and ethical considerations applicable to this study will be described. A qualitative research design, specifically a phenomenological study, will be employed to explore the experiences of the group (LDP) being studied.

#### 3.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Nieuwenhuis (2016b:72), a research design is a plan or a strategy that moves from the underlying philosophical assumptions in order to specify the selection of participants, data gathering methods to be used, and data analysis to be done. Fouché and Schurink (2011:308) regard a research design as an option available to researchers to study certain phenomena suitable for their specific research goals. Research designs are referred to by some authors as strategies or traditions of enquiry (Maree & Creswell, cited in Van der Walt & Kruger, 2010:36). Research needs to be designed in such a way that it provides answers to one's research questions. Therefore, a research design dictates how the researcher intends to conduct the study.

Nieuwenhuis (2016b:72) states that the choice of research design is based on the researcher's ontological (beliefs about the nature of reality) and epistemological (the relationship between knower and known) perspective, research skills and practices, and therefore influences the way in which researchers collect data. In support, Creswell (2014:3) also states that research designs involve an intersection of philosophical assumptions, strategies of inquiry and specific methods. Nieuwenhuis (2016a:52) regards theoretical underpinnings (philosophies, perspectives or paradigm) as a set of assumptions or beliefs about fundamental aspects of reality, which give rise to a particular worldview. According to Creswell (2014:6), the researcher's philosophical worldview determines whether a quantitative, qualitative or mixed-methods approach should be embraced.

The qualitative research process involves emerging questions and procedures, and data is usually collected in the participant's setting and analysed inductively from details to general

themes, and therefore I will approach this research from the interpretivist perspective, as it contends to multiple meanings of individual experiences (Creswell, 2014:4; cf 3.4.2).

To answer the research questions posed in this study, and to fulfil the objectives of this study, a descriptive qualitative research design, specifically a phenomenological study, will be used to explore and describe LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP (cf 3.4.1).

### **3.3 STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING**

#### **3.3.1 Study population**

Saunders *et al.* (2009:212) refer to a population as a full set of cases from which a sample is selected. In support, van der Merwe and Champion (2011:32) view a population as the entire group of persons of interest to the researcher, who meet the criteria the researcher is interested in studying. The study population for this study consists of SA Army's LDPs who have been involved with the SA Army's URTP training interventions, specifically officer formative training. All these LDPs are employed by the SANDF, specifically within the SA Army. Based on the size of the SA Army, and the geographical location of SA Army military units around SA, I opted to conduct this study only within the SA Army and specifically at SA Army Gymnasium (SA Army Gym) (cf 1.10.7; 3.4.2.1). As far as I can ascertain, the population size for this study ranges between ten (10) and twenty (20) members in total.

#### **3.3.2 Sampling**

When it is not possible to include the whole population in the study (as is the case in this research), Saunders *et al.* (2009:212) recommend that a sample be selected from the entire population to represent the population. According to Maree and Pietersen (2016:192), there are two major classes of sampling methods, namely probability (random) and non-probability (non-random) sampling. I shall use a non-probability sampling procedure, more specifically purposive sampling, to select participants for this study. Maree and Pietersen (2016:198) and Nieuwenhuis (2016b:85) state that purposive sampling involves the selection of participants with a specific purpose in mind. More specifically, purposive sampling implies selecting participants according to pre-selected criteria relevant to a particular research question (Nieuwenhuis, 2016b:85). Therefore, I shall use purposive sampling to select participants for this study based on their (participants') *experience, knowledge and participation in the URTP as LDPs*. Participants who presented both the URTP and a full-time-based leadership programme (officer formative training) in the SA Army will be selected. Reason being, these participants are envisaged to reflect wider on their experiences regarding the phenomenon.

Although Guest *et al.* (cited in Saunders *et al.*, 2009:235) provide a guideline that at least twelve (12) in-depth interviews should suffice depending on the size of the population to be studied, Nieuwenhuis (2016b:84), Patton (cited in Strydom & Delpont, 2011:391) and Saunders *et al.* (2009:233) note that there are no rules for selecting the sample size in qualitative inquiry. The sample size in a qualitative study depends on what one wants to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with the available time and resources (Patton, cited in Saunders *et al.*, 2009:233; Strydom & Delpont, 2011:391; Nieuwenhuis, 2016b:84).

Botma *et al.* (2010:200) recommend that the sample size be established once the research questions had been answered by means of sufficiency of data, and when saturation of data is reached. Additionally, Saunders *et al.* (2009:235) state that in addressing the issue of data saturation, as recommended by many text books, the researcher should continue to collect qualitative data, such as conducting additional interviews until data saturation is reached, or until the data collected provides few, if any, new insights. According to Nieuwenhuis (2016b:84), data saturation refers to that point where all the themes and categories have been saturated and no new data are generated. I shall, therefore, in this study, ask participants additional questions through the technique of probing as long as data collected provide new insights relevant to the phenomenon and will only stop when participants keep repeating the same information. In support, Romney *et al.* (cited in Nieuwenhuis, 2016b:84) found that small samples can be quite sufficient in providing complete and accurate information within a particular context, as long as participants possess a certain degree of expertise about the domain of inquiry.

Romney *et al.* (cited in Nieuwenhuis, 2016b:84) found that samples as small as four (4) individuals can render extremely accurate information with a high confidence level of .999 if they possess a high degree of competence for the domain of enquiry in question. In support, Creswell (2015:208) agrees with the notion of using a smaller number of samples than the larger one. Reason being, because of the need to report details about each individual or site, the large number of sample can become unwieldy and result in superficial perspectives. Furthermore, Creswell (2015:208) states that collecting qualitative data and analysing that data take considerable time and the addition of each individual or site only lengthens that time.

The sample for this study will consist of eight (8) officers and one (1) warrant officer from the SA Army Gym. Each participant should have been involved with the SA Army's URTP and a full-time-based leadership development programme as a facilitator, assessor, moderator, quality assurer, evaluator, training coordinator or training manager. Additionally, each

participant should have been involved with at least two (2), if not all the URTPs. Currently, there have been only three (3) URTPs presented for the SA Army, which took place in three (3) provinces (Free State, Western Cape and North West).

Because of their involvement with both Regular Force and Reserve Force leadership training programmes, I view the selected sample to be experienced and knowledgeable regarding the phenomenon under investigation. Reason being, these participants are envisaged to be able to reflect quite comprehensively regarding their experiences of the phenomenon. All these participants are expected to be currently within my reach. However, should members have been transferred from SA Army Gym to other units, I shall in writing also ask permission from the Commanding Officers of those units in order for those participants to have an equal opportunity to be included and significantly contribute to this study.

### **3.4 QUALITATIVE STUDY**

This research will follow a qualitative approach (cf 3.2). Creswell (2014:3) defines a research approach as plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis. According to Creswell (2014:4), qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social phenomenon or a human problem. Qualitative research is used to answer questions about the complex nature of a phenomenon, with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomenon from the participants' point of view (Fouché & Delpont, 2011:64). In support, Leedy and Ormrod (2014:97) postulate that qualitative research aims to examine the many gradations and complexities of a particular phenomenon. Simply, one can state that qualitative research provides in-depth information and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon by exploring the richness and complexity of information inherent thereto.

Qualitative research is useful in understanding human experiences, such as **LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP**. However, it is not limited to studying research problems involving human beings; it is also useful in studying complexities of a particular phenomenon (for example, a training programme or animal species, to mention but one) (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014:97). It is for this reason that Leedy and Ormrod (2014:142) postulate that qualitative research allows the researcher to gain new insight into a field of which little is known, or where a situation is poorly understood about the phenomenon, develop new concepts about the phenomenon, and discover problems that exist within the phenomenon.

Creswell (2014:3) notes that qualitative research uses qualifying words or descriptions rather than numbers in order to record aspects of the world and it focuses on understanding the whole sphere of life. As a result, during the qualitative data collection process, it is very easy for the researcher to be biased (Creswell, 2014:4). Therefore, Meyer (2014) and Creswell (2014:202) suggest that the researcher should declare his or her biasness (cf 3.4.2.1).

- **Philosophical underpinning: Interpretivism**

This proposed study will be framed around an interpretivist paradigm as it is deemed to understand the meanings that SA Army's LDPs ascribe to the social phenomenon, namely their experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP. The interpretivist perspective is usually associated with qualitative research as, with it, the meanings that individuals or groups assign to a social or human problem are explored in an attempt to gain understanding thereof (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014:99). Qualitative researchers therefore construct interpretive narratives from their data and try to capture the complexity of a particular phenomenon.

Interpretivist researchers believe that reality is not objectively determined, but socially constructed (Kelliher, Hesse-Biber, Leavy & Husserl, cited in Nieuwenhuis, 2016a:60) and for that reason it is assumed that by studying people within their social contexts or natural setting, there is a greater opportunity to understand the perceptions they have of their own activities (Hussey & Hussey, cited in Nieuwenhuis, 2016a:60). It is for this reason that Fouché and Schurink (2011:309) state that interpretivist researchers are more concerned about accessing and understanding individuals' perceptions because they (interpretivist researchers) view a social phenomenon as being the product of human interactions that are not always predictable, because they are the product of shared understandings and meanings. Additionally, Butin (2010:60) states that interpretivist researchers are, for better or worse, already part of the story because they (researchers) are the ones examining the truth about the story and describing it. Therefore, there is no single or authoritative 'truth' from an interpretivist perspective, since every group or culture privileges the truth of their particular view point (Butin, 2010:60).

- **Rationale: Qualitative research**

The rationale for using qualitative research is that it will allow me to collect information in the participants' setting in order to gain new insight about the phenomenon, develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives about the phenomenon, and discover problems that exist within the phenomenon, as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2014:142). While allowing participants to describe complex situations about the phenomenon (the SA Army's URTP), a phenomenological approach will allow me to 'bracket' my own experience to understand the situation better and to view social life in an unbiased and open-minded way

as suggested by Schwandt (cited in Fouché & Schurink, 2011:317). In the case of this qualitative study, I shall explore and describe the meanings that participants (LDPs) ascribe to the SA Army's URTP so as to expand knowledge and inform decision-makers regarding the complexity of the phenomenon.

- **Advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research**

According to Meyer (2014), the advantage of qualitative research is that with it, authenticity stays the key as the researcher can observe the research as it unfolds, as he or she (the researcher) is involved therein. I shall aim to interact with the participants, appreciate them and clarify the meanings that they will ascribe to their experiences of the URTP interventions in the SA Army. The less quantifiable subjective interpretations, reasoning and feelings of participants will therefore be seen in this study as a more relevant line of inquiry to understand and describe the realities of situations. One limitation about qualitative research is that the findings thereof cannot be generalised to the whole population or a large group due to the limited number of participants being studied. Nonetheless, I shall explain to participants prior to conducting the study, during a briefing session, the importance of integrity and honesty in responding to questions during a semi-structured individual interview, as information given during interviews will be regarded as being valuable to improve future URTPs. This emphasis will be done to help prevent biased responses and allow for credible data to be generated. As suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2014:144), to eliminate the weaknesses regarding generalisation, before tentative generalisations can be made, I shall await further support from other research studies – perhaps from additional phenomenological studies, other kinds of qualitative studies, or experimental research studying the same phenomenon.

### **3.4.1 Methodology: Phenomenological study**

According to Leedy and Ormrod (cited in van der Walt & Kruger, 2010:10), any chosen research methodology dictates how data is acquired, arranged in logical relationships, set up for refining and synthesising, suggests how data will be interpreted, and yields one or more conclusions that lead to the expansion of knowledge. According to Gay *et al.* (2011:7), qualitative research methods are designed for different purposes and are based on different beliefs. Qualitative methods enable researchers to investigate perspectives that are often beyond the reach of quantitative methods; for example, they explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more controlled approaches, allow researchers to get 'under the skin' of a group or organisation to find out what really happens (the informal reality that can only be perceived from the inside), and view the case from the inside out, seeing it from the perspective of those involved.

To answer the research questions posed in this study and to fulfil the objectives of this study, a qualitative research design, specifically a phenomenological study as a strategy of inquiry will be used in collecting, analysing and interpreting the qualitative data. According to Nieuwenhuis (2016b:77), phenomenological studies focus on the meanings that certain lived experiences hold for participants, that is to determine what an experience means for the persons who had the experience and are able to provide a comprehensive description of it. Additionally, according to Creswell (2015:13), phenomenological research involves the study of a small number of participants through an extensive and persistent involvement in order to develop patterns and relationships of meanings. According to Thomas (cited in Fouché & Schurink, 2011:316), with phenomenological research the researcher strives to describe the phenomenon as accurately as possible, refraining from any pre-given framework, but remaining true to the facts. Bentz and Shapiro (cited in Fouché & Schurink, 2011:316) regard the root of phenomenology as the intent to understand the phenomenon under study on their own terms and therefore to provide a description of human experiences as it is experienced by the subject. Therefore, Nieuwenhuis and Smith (2012:124) affirm that phenomenologists argue that knowledge can be derived from the descriptions of experiences of everyday life as experienced by the participants. This research will therefore be directed to investigate the LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP as they are perceived to be the most experienced with regard to the phenomenon as occurring within the military training environment.

- **Rationale: Phenomenological study**

The rationale for using a phenomenological study as a strategy of inquiry is that it will allow me to collect an in-depth description of the phenomenon, gain greater insight and understanding of the dynamics of the situation (the SA Army's LDPs' experiences), and at the same time allow me to bracket my own experiences to understand the participants' viewpoints from their perspectives regarding their own experiences with the SA Army's URTP. Therefore, an extensive and prolonged engagement with participants will assist me (the researcher) in developing patterns and relationships of meanings.

### **3.4.2 Qualitative data collection (generation) methods**

In this study, data will be generated through semi-structured individual interviews, observations during interviews and a literature study (cf 3.4.2.2; 3.4.2.3; 3.4.2.4). Reason being, through qualitative interviews (semi-structured individual interviews), researchers are able to see the world through the eyes of participants, and they can be valuable if used correctly (Nieuwenhuis, 2016b:93). According to Leedy and Ormrod (2014:141) and Nieuwenhuis (2016a:60), qualitative researchers are also considered as instruments, as they

have the ability to interpret and make sense of data gathered. Therefore, I shall also serve as an instrument to generate qualitative data, as I shall be interpreting the collected data and trying to make sense of what participants reveal as their experiences in relation to the SA Army's URTP. Moreover, I shall be encouraging the participants to respond freely to questions on the list. It is for this reason that I chose to conduct semi-structured individual interviews with participants in order to observe their (participants') non-verbal behaviours, make notes during the interviews, rephrase questions, probe and record the interview sessions in order to gather factual and straight-forward information for interpretation and analysis, as suggested by Nieuwenhuis (2016b:93). All the methods employed in this study to generate qualitative data will be discussed next.

#### 3.4.2.1 Entrée and establishing the researcher's roles

According to Fouché and Schurink (2011:325), successful execution of the design and data gathering is usually determined by the accessibility of the setting and the researcher's ability to build up and maintain relationships and agreements with gatekeepers and participants. I am currently a full-time serving member of the SANDF. I serve specifically within the SA Army as an LDP, and that will make it possible to gain access to the site (SA Army Gymnasium and relevant units) and to the learning and development practitioners (participants). I shall establish contact to convince and discuss in detail with the Officers Commanding the unit(s) and the Defence Intelligence (DI) the sincerity of the intention to collect and record data (Fouché & Schurink, 2011:325).

- **Research setting**

The SANDF is a unique organisation and an important level of power at the disposal of the country to pursue its national security and foreign policy priorities and is consequently at the core of South Africa's national security (DoD, 2015:3-6). The SANDF consists of four (4) Arms of Service (AoS), namely the South African Army (SA Army), the South African Navy (SA Navy), the South African Air Force (SAAF), and the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS). Each Arms of Service (AoS) comprises a Regular Force component and Reserve Force component. This study will be conducted in the SA Army, specifically the SA Army Gymnasium (SA Army Gym). The SA Army Gym is the only training institution in the SA Army that is responsible for training junior leaders for the SA Army. The SA Army Gym is a military training unit located at Heidelberg in the Gauteng Province. In order to cost-effectively and efficiently deliver and manage the SA Army's URTP, the SA Army Gym's responsibilities such as provision of the training venue, accommodation, and mess facilities to mention a few, get decentralised to a military unit that is close to universities within the

province in which the recruitment was concentrated. However, the SA Army Gym's learning and development practitioners still deliver and manage the URTP interventions.

The SA Army is selected based on my involvement as LDP in that organisation, and having observed how URTP interventions are being implemented and managed. As far as I can ascertain, this study will not be of a disruptive nature. I shall follow a research schedule communicated with participants based on their availability that will not tamper with their units' activities (cf 3.4.2.2). However, should there be any disturbances, I shall be obliged to make the necessary changes as far as the research schedule is concerned to accommodate the units' programmes. The results of this study will be reported back to the participants and the SA Army by means of a research report (cf 3.4.5). This study may contribute towards improving the SA Army's URTP (cf 1.10.3). Therefore, there will be no incentives or rewards for either participants or gate keepers (cf Annexure C). Ethical considerations will be adhered to throughout this study (cf 3.4.6).

- **Researcher's role**

Qualitative research is interpretive by nature. Therefore, the researcher is directly involved with the participants. According to Maree (2016:44), the researcher has the role to empower him- or herself to enter into a collaborative partnership with the participants in order to collect and analyse data with the main aim of creating understanding. In addition, the researcher will have to be a sensitive observer who records the phenomenon as faithfully as possible while at the same time raising additional questions (probing), following hunches and moving deeper into the analysis of the phenomenon (McMillan & Schumacher, cited in Maree, 2016:44).

During data generation (collection) for this study, I shall have the following obligations:

- To provide the background data so that the participants will better understand the topic, the setting and the phenomenon under investigation.
- To explain the purpose of the study, the process and how feedback will be given to the participants and all relevant parties.
- To collect, through in-depth interviews, the words/text about the central phenomenon.
- To serve as the instrument for data collection and therefore ask the participants broad, open-ended questions in order to allow them to share their views and experiences about the phenomenon.
- To record data by making notes of the interview and by using audio-recording devices.
- To transcribe the data for further analysis.
- To ensure that ethical issues that may come up are adhered to in the correct manner.
- To write up and record research findings in a research report.

In support, Joubert (cited in Maree, 2016:44) and Grosser *et al.* (2017:64) state that the researcher as a data collection instrument has the following roles to fulfil:

- Gaining ethical clearance
- Compiling the list of questions that he/she is going to put to the participants
- Preparing for, and structuring the interviews
- Conducting the interviews
- Transcribing the data
- Analysing the data
- Triangulating the data
- Writing up and recording research findings in a research report

For the clarification of researcher's bias in this qualitative study, refer to paragraph 3.4.4.2.

#### 3.4.2.2 Interview

This study will follow a qualitative research approach, involving the use of semi-structured individual interviews as the primary data generation (collection) method. According to Diccico-Bloom and Crabtree, Jarbandhan and Schutte, and May and Morse (cited in Greeff, 2011:348), semi-structured interviews are defined as interviews organised around an area of particular interest, while still allowing considerable flexibility in scope and depth. Nieuwenhuis (2016b:93) affirms that with semi-structured interviews, open-ended questions are asked and followed by further probing and clarification questions.

According to Creswell (2014:190), qualitative interviews involve face-to-face interviews with participants, telephone interviews, or focus group interviews with six (6) to eight (8) participants in each group. In the case of this study, I shall not be limited to any number of participants; however, as recommended by Botma *et al.* (2010:200), I shall conduct the interviews until such stage that *data saturation* has been reached and research questions had been answered by means of sufficiency of data.

Interviews are anticipated to last for at least 30 minutes to one (1) hour each all depending on the responses from participants. The interviews are expected to be conducted and completed within a period of one (1) month with all participants, depending on their work schedules and availability. I shall confirm with the participants their availability and thereafter draft a schedule of when interviews will be conducted with each participant. A formal briefing in a form of letter of consent will be held with the participants before they are to be interviewed and participants will be given the chance to ask questions if need be, and clarity will be given as to uncertainties.

According to Creswell (2014:190), qualitative interviews involve unstructured and generally open-ended questions that are few in number and that are intended to elicit the views and opinions of the participants. In support, Greeff (2011:352) states that when employing semi-structured individual interviews, themes and questions can be planned for in advance, but the questions and their order may differ, all depending on the course of the interview rather than being dictated by the schedule of the interview. As suggested by Greeff (2011:352), I shall use a list of predetermined questions (as listed below) to be covered with all participants. Each interview will be presented to all participants in the same manner where the same open-ended questions will be asked to generate qualitative data. The questions mentioned below were identified in advance, drafted and reviewed by the study leaders, which finally resulted in the following questions:

- How many URTP programmes did you take part in?
- In what capacity were you involved?
- How would you describe the purpose of the URTP?
- What are your experiences regarding the URTP? Explain.
  - If not mentioned, methodology used, stakeholders involved, support from management, availability of trainees for training sessions, and environment used to deliver interventions will be used as follow-up questions.
- How are the URTP interventions evaluated?
  - If not mentioned, the question pertaining to model used for evaluation will be asked as a follow-up question.
  - If not mentioned, which stakeholders evaluate the interventions will be used as follow-up question.
- What challenges, if any, do you experience with the URTP?
  - If applicable (challenges), questions regarding how the participant copes with such challenges and how would he or she like the management to deal with such challenges will be used as a follow-up question.
- What recommendations can you make regarding the improvement of the URTP?

Interviews will be conducted in English; however, if it so happens that participants use another language during interviews rather than English, I shall consult with a language expert to interpret and freely translate the language used. Prior to, during and after the interviews, I shall adhere to the ethical considerations (cf 3.4.6). To *record* the interview process, I shall make use of field notes and audio tapes as suggested by Creswell (2014:194). According to Strydom (2011b:337), the use of audio tapes contributes towards

objectivity in research. I shall therefore use two audio recorders so they can act as back-ups for each other.

#### 3.4.2.3 Field notes and observation

According to Mouton (2008:108), it is important to keep field notes of observations and other forms of data collected during qualitative research in order to capture the context of observations.

- Field notes

It is difficult to write down extensive notes during the interview and therefore, as suggested by Meyer (2014), I shall jot down the field notes that will serve as memory aid when full notes are to be constructed. According to Creswell (2014:192), field notes should be kept during the research process and interviews so as to enable the researcher to adequately capture the context of the observations (behaviours and activities of participants) made during the interviews. Furthermore, field notes are also essential as the recording equipment might fail. During the interview, I shall keep the field notes of all observations (verbal and non-verbal behaviours) to be transcribed into texts. These notes will be kept together with the tape recordings and locked up safely for seven (7) years, and will only be accessible to the researcher.

- Observation

According to Creswell (2014:190), qualitative observation occurs when the researcher takes field notes of the behaviour and activities of participants at the research site. Qualitative observation can lead to deeper understandings than interviews alone, because it provides knowledge of the context within which events occur, and may enable the researcher to see things that participants themselves are not aware of, or that they are unwilling to discuss (Meyer, 2014). During the semi-structured individual interviews, I shall observe verbal and non-verbal behaviour of participants as they share their experiences and jot such behaviours down in the form of codes in order to be revisited after the interview for data analysis as suggested by Creswell (2014:190). I shall use the observational data for the purpose of describing the setting, activities, participants, and the meanings of what is observed from the perspective of the participants.

#### 3.4.2.4 Literature study

To ensure that the empirical study is based on a sound theoretical framework about the Reserve Force training, specifically the SA Army's URTP, and to ensure literature control, a literature study will be conducted (cf Chapters 1 to 3). These imminent theoretical insights will also assist me in the formulation of appropriate interview questions that will assist me to

generate accurate and relevant qualitative data. Therefore, the literature study will serve the purpose of an extra point of reference for triangulation.

### **3.4.3 Qualitative data analysis**

According to Babbie (cited in Schurink *et al.*, 2011:399), qualitative data analysis is the non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. Data analysis in qualitative research proceeds hand-in-hand with other parts of developing the qualitative study, namely the data collection and write-up of findings (Creswell, 2014:195). Reason being, while the interviews are proceeding, researchers might as well be analysing an interview or interviews earlier conducted, and may be organising the structure of the report (Creswell, 2014:195). Data analysis in qualitative research is first and foremost a process of inductive reasoning, thinking and theorising (Schurink *et al.*, 2011:399).

I shall follow in this study *hermeneutics* as a data analysis technique. Reason being, hermeneutics analysis entails a philosophical approach to understanding participants, which provides the grounding for interpretivism (Nieuwenhuis, 2016c:111). According to Ricoeur (cited in Nieuwenhuis, 2016c:111), the aim of hermeneutic data analysis is to decipher the hidden meaning within the apparent meaning, and thereby unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the truthful meaning of the text.

I shall transcribe the data ensuing from the interviews verbatim into a password protected Word document. As suggested by Creswell (2015:242), in this study, texts will be analysed using increasing levels of abstraction; and themes will be formed from codes and combined to form broad generalisations. Creswell (2015:242) states that the objective of the coding process is to make sense out of the text data, to divide into text or image segments, to label the segments with codes and examine codes for overlapping and redundancy, and to collapse these themes into broad themes. Babbie (2013:300) sees coding as a primary process for developing themes within the raw data, as the researcher needs to recognise important moments in the data, and encode it prior to interpretation. In addition, Delpont and Fouché (2011:442) see coding as the hard work of reducing the mountain of raw data into manageable piles. That is, the researcher breaks down each item into small, manageable segments that are analysed separately (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014:151). I shall systematically code and categorise data in order to explore large amounts of existing textual information, to ascertain the trends and patterns of words, their frequency, their relationships and structures, contexts and discourse of communication. In so doing, I shall follow the six (6) steps referred to by Creswell (2014:198) to analyse the generated qualitative data:

**Step 1: Organising and preparing data for analysis:** I shall transcribe the data from tape recordings and the field notes into a Word document file and thereafter rearrange and examine the text for accuracy.

**Step 2: Reading through the data:** I shall read through the data to obtain a general sense of the information and to reflect on the overall meaning of it. While reading through the data, I shall make notes on the sides of transcriptions to suggest the possible categories.

**Step 3: Beginning detailed analysis with a coding process:** I shall start reading through the data several times to establish what it actually contains and therefore organise the material into segments of texts before bringing the meaning to information. During this step (step 3), data will be coded, summarised into themes and categories using Tesch's eight steps of coding process (Tesch, cited in Creswell, 2014:198). This process includes: *reading through transcriptions carefully to make a sense of a whole (1); picking the most interesting interview document first and going through it while underlying and putting thoughts into it (2); making a list of topics and clustering them together (3); taking the list of topics and going back to the data to see if new categories and codes do not emerge (4); finding the most descriptive wording for the topics and turning them into categories to see if there is interrelationships (5); making a final decision on the abbreviation for each category (6); assembling data material belonging to each category into one place (7); and if necessary, recoding the existing data (8)* (Tesch, cited in Creswell, 2014:198).

**Step 4: Identifying general themes (and possible sub-themes) and classifying the data accordingly:** A list of topics from all the interviews will be made and similar topics will be clustered together, and these topics will be formed into major topics; those considered unique and those considered being leftovers. I shall then take the data and abbreviate it as codes and write them next to relevant texts.

**Step 5: Integrating and summarising the data:** During this stage, I shall make sure that the discussions are put in a chronological order of events, and also present some data from participants descriptively in table formats.

**Step 6: Making an interpretation of the data or attaching meaning to the data:** I shall interpret the data and make meaning out of it and make sure that the presented data is accurate. Therefore, I will employ methods including trustworthiness, transferability, dependability and conformability in validating the interpreted data (Creswell, 2014:198).

#### **3.4.4 Strategies employed to ensure quality data**

To ensure rigor in this research, I shall pay special attention to trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data, without sacrificing the relevance of qualitative research as suggested by Guba (cited in Maree 2016:6).

#### 3.4.4.1 Trustworthiness

According to Struwig and Stead (2013:136), trustworthiness refers to concerns about the truth value of research. Meaning, to what extent is the research to be trusted and believed? Gibbs (cited in Creswell, 2014:201) indicates that the researcher's approach should be consistent across different researchers and different projects. A measure is therefore considered to be trustworthy if coders agree with one another and are consistent in this throughout the study (Creswell, 2014:203). Therefore, to increase the trustworthiness in this qualitative study, I shall apply *intercoder-agreement* and *cross-checking* of data and the results. To build trustworthiness in this research, I am going to make use of methodological experts (the study leaders) to peer review the research plan and implementation and by cross-checking the codes as suggested by Creswell (2014:203).

#### 3.4.4.2 Credibility

Creswell (2014:201) refers to credibility as one of the strengths of qualitative research as it is based on determining whether findings from the study are authentic from the perspective of the researcher, the participants and readers of a report. Simply, credibility (or qualitative validity) is based on the accuracy of findings and the truthfulness in the interpretation of data from the study. In support, Schurink *et al.* (2011:419) also state that credibility, which is also associated with authenticity, is enhanced when a researcher is able to demonstrate that the study had been conducted in such a manner that ensures that the phenomenon has been accurately identified and described.

Within the context of this study, I shall employ methods such as conducting a thorough *literature study* (Neuman, cited in Meyer, 2011:133); *clarification of the researcher's bias* (Creswell, 2014:202); *member checking* (Meyer, 2014); *triangulation of data* (Creswell, 2014:201); and *peer examination* (Meyer, 2014) to ensure credibility.

- **Thorough literature study:** I shall conduct a thorough literature study in relation to the phenomenon (cf Chapter 2). In order to increase credibility, my empirical claims will be supported by numerous pieces of diverse empirical data, and thereby recognise connections in disparate details (Neuman, cited in Meyer, 2011:133).
- **Clarification of researcher's bias** (cf 3.4.2.1, the researcher's role): Nieuwenhuis (2016b:82) maintains that qualitative studies accept a researcher's subjectivity as something that cannot be eliminated. Reason being, the researcher serves as the 'research instrument' in the data gathering process (Creswell, 2014:185). Qualitative researchers collect data themselves by examining documents, observing behaviour, or interviewing participants (cf 3.4.2.1). Creswell (2014:187) states that when dealing with

subjective information, inherent to qualitative research, the researcher is often confronted with his/her own subjectivity and personal convictions where personal values, beliefs and attitudes often influence the interpretation of the data and therefore the researcher is required to identify personal values, assumptions and biases at the start of the study. Creswell (2014:202) adds that researchers should comment about how their interpretations of findings are shaped by their backgrounds.

As recommended by Creswell (2014:187), to take precautions and to counteract the inherent subjectivity in this study, I shall now reflect my biasness, values and personal background that may shape the interpretation of the study:

My insight and interest in the SANDF have been shaped by my personal experiences in that environment. Having served in the SANDF, the SA Army specifically, I functioned in various L&D roles, including that of an instructor, facilitator, assessor, designer, moderator, programme coordinator, data-capturer, quality assurer (QA), skills development facilitator (SDF), and education, training and development (ETD) administrator. I have been involved with the SA Army's URTP since 2012 as an LDP until the time that I was transferred to the South African National Defence Force College of Educational Technology (SANDF COLET) in 2014. The time that I spent with SA Army's URTP interventions has not only enabled me to develop a deep understanding of the phenomenon, but it also gives me the advantage to convey more details about the site and people involved therein (adapted from Creswell, 2014:202; Meyer, 2011:129; cf 3.4.2.1).

I have been serving as an LDP within the SANDF, specifically the SA Army, and observed how the SA Army's URTP interventions are being delivered and managed. I commence this study with the perception that there are a variety of experiences (positive and may be negative experiences) not known that SA Army's LDPs face while delivering or managing the SA Army's URTP interventions. If not identified and addressed, such experiences might hamper the effective delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP.

- **Member checking:** I shall take the findings and themes back to the participants as they may confirm that the findings are true and accurate reflections of their experiences (Creswell, 2014:201; Meyer, 2014).

#### 3.4.4.3 Transferability

According to Elo *et al.* (2014:2), transferability refers to the potential for extrapolation as it relies on the reasoning that findings can be generalised or transferred to other settings or groups. According to Miles *et al.* (2014:314), transferability ensures that the results of the study are applicable to other populations within different contexts, and that the researcher's findings will be significant to other sites and individuals.

In order to increase transferability, I shall provide thick descriptions of the phenomenon to allow the readers to gain an understanding of the phenomenon so that they can transfer the findings of this research from a specific situation to another similar context or setting. To provide thick descriptions of data, during discussions I shall keep referring back to the original theoretical framework to show how data collection and analysis are guided by concepts or models, as suggested by Schurink *et al.* (2011:420). This will enable me to compare and apply the findings within different contexts.

#### 3.4.4.4 Dependability

Elo *et al.* (2014:2) refer to dependability as stability of data over time and under different conditions. Schurink *et al.* (2011:420) state that, when attempting to ensure dependability, the researcher should ask whether the research process is logical, well documented and audited. In the process of data generation, analysis and interpretation, I shall constantly match the participants' views with the reviewed literature. I shall also assume questioning of the research process in order to ensure that the process is logical, well documented and quality assured. To triangulate the data, I shall make use of methodological experts (study leader and co-study leader) to peer examine the research plan and implementation in order to reduce the inconsistencies and to ensure the credibility of the research (Meyer, 2014; cf 3.4.4.1).

#### 3.4.4.5 Conformability

Conformability refers to the objectivity, that is, the potential for congruence between two or more independent people about the accuracy, relevance, or meaning of the data (Elo *et al.*, 2014:2). Schurink *et al.* (2011:421) state that conformability of the data should provide the reader with enough confidence that the findings of the study were indeed the true reflection the participants' experience, which should be aided by the type of data analysed for the use in the study. This implies that conformability ensures the researcher's ability to capture the original concept of objectivity. Struwig and Stead (2013:137) suggest that the researcher should use independent researchers to analyse the data and determine whether it confirms or contradicts the coding or interpretation of the analysed data.

In this study, I shall focus on participants' views when interpreting the generated data rather than on my own point of view or perceptions. Therefore, I shall remain objective by not letting my personal inclination or biasness (cf 3.4.2.1) influence the data, but allow for the findings of the study to reflect the interpretations. I shall ask the study leader and co-study leader to provide evidence of themes and codes (Creswell, 2014:201; cf 3.4.4.1). If need be, I shall also make available the transcriptions of all the documentations (field notes and transcriptions) of the data generated for reanalysis by study leaders.

#### **3.4.5 Reporting of findings**

I shall follow a qualitative writing style in writing the report to communicate the research findings and results of the study. According to Creswell (2015:253), the primary representing and reporting of findings in qualitative research are a narrative discussion. Creswell (2015:253) emphasises that a narrative discussion is a written passage in a qualitative study in which authors (researchers) summarise in detail the findings from their data analysis. According to Delpont and Fouché (2011:426), qualitative reports are not strictly formalised in terms of structure; on the contrary, qualitative reports rarely follow a fixed format with standard sections. Delpont and Fouché (2011:426) state that those elements such as quotations, the researcher as an author, and evidence to establish credibility should be incorporated in the different sections of a qualitative report so as to add richness to the report. I shall therefore emphasise the importance of research by bringing the voice of the participants into the report through the use of quotations as suggested by Delpont and Fouché (2011:426). Themes and sub-themes will be extracted from the data collected and supported by direct quotations (rich thick descriptions) of that which is to be voiced by participants.

#### **3.4.6 Ethical considerations**

Ethics delineate what is or what is not legitimate to do, or what a moral research procedure involves. Maree (2016:44) regards essential ethical aspects as issues of protection of the participants' identities. According to Creswell (2014:92), researchers need to protect their participants, develop trust in them, promote the integrity of the research, guard against misconduct and impropriety that might reflect on their organisations or institutions, and cope with new challenging problems. Miller (cited in Creswell, 2014:208) further states that the researcher has an obligation to respect the rights, values and desires of the participants.

This study will also be done within the scope of the principles set in the ethical code of practice of the North-West University (NWU, 2016), and therefore, before commencement, approval from the NWU ethics committee will be obtained. The following ethical considerations will be adhered to:

- **Permission to conduct research:** According to McMillian and Schumacher (cited in Maree, 2016:36), it is essential that the researcher selects a research site that is suitable and feasible, and therefore it is also crucial to obtain permission to access the site to conduct research among the participants. I shall, in writing, prior to conducting research, ask permission from the Department of Defence Intelligence to conduct the research in the SANDF and relevant Officer Commanding to conduct the research in the unit (cf 3.4.2.1; cf Annexure A; cf Annexure B).
- **Informed consent:** I shall also prior to conducting the study (before data-generation/collection), inform the participants of the study and invite them to participate. A written consent form will be drafted for this purpose (Struwig & Stead, 2013:69; Strydom, 2011a:117). Participants will be asked to provide informed written consent (cf Annexure C).
- **Voluntary participation:** According to Rubin and Babbie (cited in Strydom, 2011a:116), and Struwig and Stead (2013:69), participation should at all times be voluntary and no one should be forced to participate in a research project. As suggested by Struwig and Stead (2013:69), I shall therefore, prior to data generation, explain the aim and purpose of the study and also explain to the participants that participation is voluntarily and that they (participants) may terminate their participation at any time or if they feel that their rights have been violated or for any other reason they know of.
- **Anonymity:** Strydom (2011a:120) states that information given anonymously by participants should remain private and confidential. Participants' identity will remain anonymous in relation to participation in the research and will not be divulged without the participants' consent. Participants will only be identified by numbers and not their names (first participant as number 1, second participant as number 2, to mention but a few) in the research report. However, due to the uniqueness of the SANDF, during interviews, participants will be called by their military ranks (for example, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Major, to mention but a few) without divulging their names. Furthermore, institutions implicated during interviews will be referred to by fictitious names. For example, Reserve Force units as RF1, RF2 or RF3, close-by units as CB1, CB2 or CB3, home unit as Unit X, Arms of Services as AoS1, AoS2, AoS3 or AoS4 in order to hide their identity, and therefore to ensure anonymity (cf 4.1).
- **Confidentiality:** According to Strydom (2011a:119), confidentiality indicates handling of information in a confidential manner and limiting of access to private information. Struwig and Stead (2013:71) state that confidential information given or shared by participants

should be stored in a locked cabinet and not made available to people to examine without the participant's permission. As suggested by Struwig and Stead (2013:71), information shared by participants in this study will be treated and kept confidential at all times and will not be made known to the public without the consent of the participants. Where publishing is to be made for the advancement of the study, consent will be obtained from the organisation involved in order to include the institution's name on the report. I shall also ask participants' permission to tape-record the interviews. As stipulated in the NWU's ethical policy, I shall keep clear and accurate records of research conducted in a manner that will allow verification and replication by others, if applicable (NWU, 2016). Therefore, to avoid the potential loss or theft of the shared confidential information, I shall ensure that transcriptions of data and audio recordings are locked and stored in an indoor safe for at least seven years. These transcriptions of data and audio recordings will be password-protected before being stored to enhance their confidentiality.

- **Privacy:** According to Strydom (2011a:119), privacy implies the element of personal privacy. As a result, Strydom (2011a:119) states that every participant has the right to privacy and a participant has the "right to decide when, where, to whom and to what extent his or her attitudes, beliefs and behaviour will be revealed". In every unit identified, the research will be conducted in a private office or conference room where only I (the researcher) shall hear responses from the participant. Interviews will also be scheduled when convenient for the participants.
- **Avoidance of harm:** According to Babbie (cited in Strydom, 2011a:115), the fundamental ethical rule for research is that it must bring no harm in any form (emotionally or physically) to participants, and therefore Creswell (cited in Strydom, 2011a:115) states that the researcher has an ethical obligation to protect participants within all possible reasonable limits from any form of physical discomfort that may emerge from the research project. I shall ensure that the participants are protected from physical or emotional harm and if it happens that any harmful situations occur, I shall be ethically obliged to change the research project or to cancel it, rather than to subject participants to harmful influences (Strydom, 2011a:115).

### **3.5 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the qualitative research design and methodology that will be used in this study were explained and discussed. The qualitative data generation and analysis techniques that will be employed in this study to investigate the phenomenon, namely the LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP, were described. Strategies to ensure quality data (trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability) and ethical considerations applicable to this study were also described. Next, in Chapter 4, the research findings of this study will be presented (cf Chapter 4).

## CHAPTER 4

### EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter (Chapter 4), the analysed data ensuing from the transcribed qualitative interviews will be presented. More specifically, this chapter contains the analysed data from nine (9) semi-structured individual interviews (cf 3.4.2.2) that were used to collect/generate data. The data will be analysed and corroborated against the literature for the purpose of literature control. Conclusions will further be made in relation to the research questions (cf 1.5).

The nine (9) participants who participated in the semi-structured individual interviews' profiles were described in Chapter 3 (cf 3.3.2). The interviews were conducted in English for all participants. Six (6) themes, twenty (20) main categories and fifty-nine (59) subcategories were identified from transcriptions and are presented in tables (cf Table 4-3 - 4-22) with specific quotes cited below each category (cf 4.3.1-4.8.8).

To prevent the identity of participants from being divulged, participants were allocated with the numbers 1 to 9 as their identification numbers, which followed the same order in which they were interviewed (cf 3.4.6). These numbers ascribed to participants will also be indicated next to the participants' quotations (cf 3.4.6). To conceal the identity of institutions implicated in this study, *fictitious names* were allocated to each institution involved (cf 3.4.6). Reserve Force units as RF1, RF2 or RF3, close-by units as CB1, CB2 or CB3, home unit as Unit X, Arms of Services as AoS1, AoS2, AoS3 or AoS4 in order to hide their identities, thereby ensuring anonymity (cf 3.4.6). This chapter will end with a summary of the qualitative findings.

The following research questions will be answered in this section:

- How do LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP? (cf 4.3.1 - 4.7.1)
- What recommendations do LDPs make regarding the delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP? (cf 4.8.1 - 4.8.8)

In order to ensure literature control and triangulation, data from Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are cross-referenced, where applicable, next to the findings of this study. Since LDPs were exposed to different roles during the delivery of the URTP, the following information was also captured during semi-structured individual interviews (cf Table 4-1):

**Table 4-1: Participants' roles during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP**

Participant N=9	Roles					
	Facilitator	Assessor	Moderator	Quality assurer	Programme coordinator	Programme administration
1	√	√				√
2	√	√	√			√
3	√		√			
4					√	√
5	√	√				
6	√	√				√
7	√	√	√	√		√
8	√					
9	√	√				√

The one criterion to select LDPs for this study was that each selected LDP should have participated or presented both the SA Army's URTP and an equivalent full-time officer formative training programme. Participants were also asked to indicate the number of URTP programmes (SA Army's URTPs) they took part in. The numbers of URTP programmes each participant engaged in are presented below (cf Table 4-2). From closer analysis, it is clear that all participants met the required criteria (cf Table 4-2), including their involvement with the full-time officer formative training (cf 2.6.7), which enabled them to provide rich and thick information:

**Table 4-2: Number of training programmes (SA Army's URTP) participants engaged in**

Participant N=9	Number of Programmes
1	1
2	2
3	1
4	2
5	1
6	2
7	2
8	1
9	1

## **4.2 QUALITATIVE FINDINGS RELATED TO LDPS' EXPERIENCES REGARDING THE SA ARMY'S URTP**

The participants related their experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP. Both negative and positive experiences from the SA Army's URTP emerged (cf 4.3.1 - 4.7.1), and main and subcategories will be illustrated in tables (cf Table 4-3 - 4-14). The themes and categories are further elaborated on by means of specific quotes cited next to applicable participants.

### 4.3 THEME 1: INSUFFICIENT PLANNING TO DELIVER THE SA ARMY'S URTP

Planning of training interventions constitutes one of the training manager's [commanders in the case of the URTP] managerial tasks (cf 2.8.1). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1135) defines 'planning' as "the act or process of making plans for something". 'Insufficient' is defined as being "not large, strong or important enough for a particular purpose (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:792). Planning is the means by which a commander within a military context envisions a desired outcome and lays out effective ways of achieving it. Therefore, during planning, commanders should communicate their vision, intent and decisions, and thereby direct their subordinates towards the results to be achieved. In doing so, despite the surrounding chaos, subordinates will be more willing to accomplish the mission. It became evident from the experiences related by participants (LDPs) that planning for the URTP was insufficient.

The first main category, namely experiences related to poor planning, will be discussed next.

#### 4.3.1 Experiences related to insufficient planning (cf 2.8.1)

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:524) refers to "experience" as "an event or activity that affects you in some way". The words 'insufficient' and 'planning' have been described above (cf 4.3).

It transpired that participants experienced planning as being poor in relation to the SA Army's URTP and that it did not meet expected requirements. This was verbalised by one participant as: "*And then the programme that we did delivered to them of officer formative, it was not well planned, and i... it did not meet any requirements*".

One LDP, who presented the URTP, indicated his/her negative experiences as a result of insufficient planning as:

- (7) "*Uhhh...once you must take into consideration, and this this is where I found, that the planning for this, for this programme, for this uhhh...types of programmes was not done properly, because we were expected to present.... this training within the...the recess periods... of of these members, because this members were full time students at the university, and then during recess, then we must now present, and or as we know, the re...the recess periods the longest are the July one. I think its three weeks. The others are two or one week or uhhh.... but there is not enough time. So, and uhhh...and....and some of the the learners will will say that he still has assignments, and and and and and things he must do.*"

**Table 4-3: Experiences related to insufficient planning**

Main category 1	Sub-categories	n=9
4.3.1 Experiences related to insufficient planning	No curriculum or a guiding document made available	3
	No pre-briefing took place or guidelines given	5
	LDPs not being involved or consulted during planning	2
	Learning delivery and resources not adequately planned for	4

The category ‘experiences related to insufficient planning’ is furthermore based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **No curriculum or a guiding document made available** (cf 2.8.1; 2.8.3)

According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:366), ‘curriculum’ refers to “the subjects that are included in a course of study or taught in a school, college, to mention a few”. The word ‘guiding’ refers to “giving advice and help” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:677); whereas a ‘document’ refers to “an official paper or book that gives information about something, or that can be used as evidence or proof of something”. Within the context of the URTP, a curriculum refers to the subjects included in the URTP, and a guiding document refers to an official book containing advice and information about the URTP, such as instructions and standard operating procedures (SOPs). LDPs need information such as a curriculum or guiding document in order to plan for and effectively deliver the URTP. If the curriculum and design elements are not planned for (cf 2.2.2: process approach), it may influence the other phases of the L&D process negatively, for example the delivery and implementation of the URTP (cf 2.2.2; 2.6.1; 2.7).

Participants indicated that there was no curriculum or guiding document available for them (LDPs) to use as a guideline while implementing the SA Army’s URTP. Consequently, participants indicated that they had to figure out by themselves or use their previously acquired knowledge or experience to deliver the URTP interventions. The following verbatim quotations attest to participants’ responses in this regard:

- (2) *“I’ve never seen that curriculum. I am not sure if it exists in any case... If you give a person a certain period of time, I think there must be a guiding document to say ok you need to go and focus on this. Ok, so I think that’s the role of the curriculum in training. ... Now in the absence of curriculum it means [participant laughing] one man for himself, you’ll see how you swim out.”*

- (3) *“No, there was no curriculum. There were no guidelines. ... Ya. So we had to use the knowledge that we have when we deliver the normal officer formative to actually train those members.”*
- (4) *“There is no uhhh... uhhh... uhhh... curriculum. There was also no guiding document. In the two instances that I coordinated the programme, there was no guiding document... that was given to me. I asked around, uhhhm... I couldn't get such a document. So, basically for me, especially the first one was a case of... seeing how the... the... the... programme runs, and then just adapt as as as uhhh... time goes along. But definitely there was no no no curriculum ... or guiding document... So, basically for me, especially the first one was a case of... seeing how the... the... the... programme runs, and then just adapt as as as uhhhm... time goes along.”*

- **No pre-briefing took place or guidelines given**

A 'briefing' refers to "a meeting in which people are given instructions or information" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:179), whereas 'guidelines' refer to "a set of rules or instructions that are given by an official organisation telling you how to do something, especially something difficult" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:677). Therefore, 'pre-briefing' refers to a meeting conducted with people to give them instructions or information prior to commencement of an activity. In the case of the URTP, a 'pre-briefing' refers to an official coordinating meeting(s) where a commander briefs or gives instructions to LDPs prior to the commencement of the SA Army's URTP in terms of the expectations for the training programme or how the training programme should be rolled out.

Participants indicated that no pre-brief sessions were done with them prior to them delivering the SA Army's URTP and that no guidelines were provided in terms of how they should roll out or deliver the URTP. The following statements attest to this:

- (3) *“There were no guidelines. ... Ya. So we had to use the knowledge that we have when we deliver the normal officer formative to actually train those members.”*

It furthermore transpired that the Reserve Force might have not been briefed properly regarding the URTP and no role clarification took place. One participant verbalised his/her concern that the Reserve Force was not briefed properly as follows:

- (4) *“... with URTP... and and you see, there I also got a sense that even the Reserve Force units were not properly briefed as to what is required....And then also in terms of role clarification, ... what is your role versus the role of...uhhhm... uhhhm... [Unit*

X] [institution name omitted]. *Uhhh... in the sense that... Ok, for me, [Unit X] [institution name omitted] was... [Unit X] [institution name omitted] was there to provide the subject matter experts. ...present the subjects.*"

Within the military context, commanders are designated to exercise authority (command and control) and to give direction over forces in accomplishment of a mission (cf 2.6.5). However, it transpired that the Reserve Force Commanding Officers were mostly absent to provide guidelines and direction to sub-unit commanders (within the context of the URTP, the training programme coordinator) responsible for the URTP. Consequently, the training programme coordinator (sub-unit commander) of the SA Army's URTP had to liaise with a 'private' in order to get things done. According to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1184), the noun 'private' refers to "a soldier of the lowest rank in the Army". However, within a military context, it is inappropriate for a commander to liaise with a subordinate, more so someone with the rank of 'private'. The notion in the military is that commanders speak to other commanders. Participants voiced their negative experiences in this regard as follows:

- (8) *"So, I will say that, also the management side, they handed over the whole programme to officers'..., uhhh...that is [Unit X] [institution name omitted] officer's formative. ... We only saw the the OC [Officer commanding] once, and that was it. ... private, that was in charge of of the unit while the commanders were not there."*
- (2) *"...because to a certain extent you'll find that in that unit you you struggle to get the officer commanding; remember it is a reserve force unit, ... the officer commanding will come once after two weeks. He is not around. So, obviously if you have... they are challenges. I believe that is so... you don't have the OC [officer commanding], there is no 2IC [second in command], it's only the staff. You see?"*

Participants also indicated that they did not know what the purpose of the URTP was or in their words the 'end state':

- (5) *"Uhhh... the challenges there, that I've... I've observed; ... may be uhhh... the training was uhhh... was rolled out by people who do not have the end state of the URTP. Meaning us. ... We did not have... the... We did not know the end state of the URTP. ... It's one thing. If we had known the end state of the URTP, maybe, the students were not going to have challenges based on the questions that, or the*

*leadership of the [RF2] [institution name omitted], ... were not going to have challenges based to the questions they had. ... You understand?"*

As such, one participant also pointed out that he/she had to figure out what the purpose of the URTP was and verbalised it as follows:

(4) *"I was given the programme, or said no, these guys must be trained in officers' formative. Uhhhm... but I never attended any official briefing, higher headquarters in terms of training formation, where myself and others was briefed as to the purpose of of URTP. I had to uhhhm... figure the the the purpose of this programme out by my... by myself."*

- **LDPs not being involved or consulted during planning** (cf 2.8.4)

'Planning' (cf 4.3) and LDPs (cf 1.10.8) have been described earlier. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:806) describes 'involved' as "taking part in something" or "being part of something or connected with something". 'Consult' is also referred to as "to go to somebody for information or advice" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:318).

Participants (LDPs) indicated that they were not involved or consulted during the planning for the URTP. As a matter of fact, they indicated that the planning was done in their absence, though they are the ones that have to implement the URTP. In this regard, Coetzee (2013:529) indicated that if LDPs are consulted during planning, they are able to add value to the organisation by fulfilling their roles ethically, competently and with expertise. Additionally, Meyer (2007:224) affirms that SAQA regulations make it clear that stakeholders [including LDPs] should be consulted before learning programmes are implemented. Reason being, their involvement ensures that the National Qualification Framework (NQF) requirements of credibility, relevance of learning and legitimacy will be adhered to. Participants verbalised their concerns as follows:

(2) *"There is no use something is planned on you absence, but you have to execute it."*

(7) *"So, the problem is here, when discussions are taken place, they did not consider, what's happening on the ground. ... uhhh....and there is where we sometimes break, this, how can I put it, break the communication lines, or the the this chain. Because as much as we can plan and discuss, we must as also consider, how this programme is going to rollout; and that is what what created the biggest problem uhhh... on the ground."*

- **Learning delivery and resources not adequately planned for** (cf 2.8.1, planning & training managers' (commanders') roles; 2.8.3, availability of equipment and resources)

Participants also indicated that the resources necessary to support or deliver the URTP interventions were not adequately planned for. According to the Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary (2015:496), the adjective 'enough' means "to the necessary degree". 'Resource' refers to "a supply of something that a country, an organisation or a person has and can use, especially to increase their wealth" (Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary, 2015:1277). It became apparent during delivery of the URTP that the resources were not enough. As a result, during the delivery of training, participants had to use their own resources. For example, participants had to use their own vehicles to transport learners; participants had to use their own data or airtime to email or call the learners (cf 2.2.2, systems theory – in this case insufficient planning also resulted in inadequate resources to deliver the URTP). The following verbatim quotations attest to participants' experiences in this regard:

- (1) *"And if you look uhhh... we had to use our own resources for subjects like the research where they had to submit plans and reports... so that they e-mailed us, and then as you know into the defence force are facilities, e-mail is limited."*
- (6) *"... there was not buses probably for them to go from point A to point B, uhhh...we had to utilise our own vehicles to take them, especially to the sickbays, uhhh...make our own arrangements, ... to take them."*

Furthermore, learning materials had to be brought from their (learners') home unit, since it was not budgeted for. One participant highlighted that the Reserve Force units, as budget holders for the URTP, were supposed to supply the training programme with enough learning material and make resources available to support training.

- (7) *"Uhhh...in the different formations, they had to, uhh... in conjunction with the reserve force unit, had to budget for the programme, ... and provide the resources for the programme. And then the unit hosting the programme, was uhhh...was responsible for for for for for for handling the resources and providing the resources physically to us and to the learners on the ground."*

It furthermore emerged that while moving learning material from a home unit to a close-by unit, participants found that the learning material was not equivalent to the number of learners at the training venue (close-by units). Two participants expressed their concerns as follows:

- (8) *“Also resources... Yes. ...Uhhh... move, trying to move... all study material from...as far as a town in Gauteng [name of town omitted] here in [Unit X] [institution name omitted], and then taking it to Cape Town, and then, when you are that side, you find that it is not... actually uhhh...equivalent, or should I say... proportional to the number of learners that are that side.”*
- (7) *“...because [Unit X] [institution name omitted] did not budget for these uhhh... learning programmes, that’s why they had to provide, but at the end of the day we had now to to sometimes take the stationary from [Unit X] [institution name omitted]...printing paper from [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. As an additional, because of of of of the fact that we did not get what we required for.”*

Planning should have been conducted thoroughly prior to the commencement of the URTP. It, however, becomes evident from the verbalised quotations of participants (LDPs) that planning for the URTP was experienced as problematic (insufficient), which also affected training delivery negatively since aspects such as poor planning of resources resulted in insufficient resources during training delivery (that will be elaborated on underneath theme 3, cf 2.8.3; 2.8.4). This is in line with the systems theory (cf 2.2.1), where disturbances in one subsystem (for example planning) may also negatively affect other subsystems (training delivery and implementation) (cf 2.8.3). Additionally, in line with the process approach to learning and development (cf 2.2.2), a proper analysis, which includes planning, is essential for the effective implementation of training delivery and the implementation thereof. Therefore (in line with systems theory (cf 2.2.1)), insufficient planning for the URTP also had a negative effect on the delivery of the URTP (cf 2.8.1; cf 4.6).

#### **4.4 THEME 2: STAKEHOLDERS’ SUPPORT FOR TRAINING** (cf 2.6.6; 2.8.2)

‘Stakeholders’ refers to “a person or company that is involved in a particular organisation, project or system, to mention just a few, especially because they have invested money in it” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1470). The word ‘support’ is defined as “to help or encourage somebody or something by saying or showing that you agree with them or it” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1520). Three stakeholders were involved in the effective delivery and management of the SA Army’s URTP, namely the Reserve Force unit (RF1, RF2 and RF3), the close-by unit (CB1, CB2 and CB3) and home unit (Unit X) (cf 2.6.6.1; 2.6.6.2; 2.6.6.3). According to Meyer (2016c:94), not having management support and reinforcement can completely negate the potentially positive effect of learning (cf 2.8.2). The support from stakeholders, specifically managers, should ensure that training leverages better results.

#### 4.4.1 Experiences related to stakeholders' involvement to support training (cf 2.8.2)

To ensure effective implementation of the SA Army's URTP, the Reserve Force units were responsible for day-to-day activities; close-by units were responsible for making the venue or training environment available to conduct training; and the home unit was responsible for providing support to the LDPs involved in the URTP. However, the Reserve Forces were the main role-players in managing the SA Army's URTP (cf 2.8.1; 2.6.4, 2.6.6). It transpired from the verbalised quotations that the involvement and the support for training by various stakeholders differed.

**Table 4-4: Experiences related to stakeholders' involvement in support training**

Main category 2	Sub-categories	n=9
4.4.1 Experiences related to stakeholders' involvement in support training	Lack/adequate support from home unit	4
	Lack/adequate involvement and support from the Reserve Forces	5
	Lack/adequate involvement and support from close-by units	5

The category 'experiences related to stakeholders' involvement to support training' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Lack/adequate support from home unit** (cf 2.6.6.3; 2.8.2)

On the one hand, some of the participants (LDPs) experienced adequate involvement and support from the home unit, while other participants experienced support from the home unit as inadequate. Some participants, for example, indicated that the home unit supported them (LDPs) well in terms of resources, equipment, and additionally uplifting the morale that was done through visits and telephone conversations by management. As a result, one participant stated the following: *"Time and again our SO1 training will pitch up, just to come and discuss certain issues and also uhhh... give us may be supplementary guidelines regarding the training itself"*.

Some of these positive experiences regarding adequate support from the home unit were verbalised as follows:

- (2) *"But yes, there was support from the unit, uhhh... even emotional support, remember we were... more in uhhh... in uhhh...deployment area ... or detach from the unit. So yes, ... we did receive uhhh.... support."*
- (5) *"Uhhh... from our side I will say we did get the required support. ... Although not everything will be according to the way we planned.... but we did get the required support. I remember at one stage we had the bus that we were supposed to come*

*back with, it broke down, ... then they arrange for us to sleep somewhere else, and book bus tickets the next morning.”*

- (7) *“...the only support that were really got was the financially support, to to go and stay were we need to stay per...for the the the money side of it.”*

On the other hand, some participants did not experience adequate support from the home unit. Participants also indicated that management from the home unit did not have the knowledge about the URTP themselves. The following verbatim statement attests to this:

- (3) *“Uhhh... it was difficult to get the support from the managers since they were also... they didn't have knowledge about this... this programme, so they just give us a tasking, go and deliver and uhhm... they could not give us any support. ... Yes. You just have to execute. For them it was just to execute the the wha... what comes from the higher uhhh... level. ... Although they could see that it's actually not feasible.”*

- **Lack/adequate involvement and support from Reserve Forces** (cf 2.6.6.1)

The word ‘involvement’ is defined as “the act of taking part in something” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:806). The word ‘support’ has been described earlier (cf 4.4). It transpired that the support from the Reserve Force was not forthcoming (cf 2.2.1). For example, commanders from the Reserve Forces were not always available and they (Reserve Force) could not support the day-to-day activities of the day as it was expected. This includes command and control of the learners or providing necessary resources, to mention just a few. Participants indicated that they had to arrange certain things themselves, which actually were supposed to be the sole responsibility of the Reserve Force. The following verbatim quotations attest to participants’ negative experiences:

- (5) *“... they had no definite answers for certain things that we were looking for. ... For example, we had to arrange the field phase for ourselves, because they could not.”*
- (7) *“...the reserve force unit, [RF3] [institution name omitted] was res...responsible for the rest of the resources, in terms of of of uhhh...they were supposed to give us printing paper, stationary, all that staff. ... Which at the end of the day..., and because [Unit X] [institution name omitted] did not budget for these uhhh...learning programmes, that's why they had to provide, but at the end of the day we had now to to sometimes take the stationary from [Unit X] [institution name omitted], ... printing paper from [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. ... As an additional, because of of of the fact that we did not get what we required for.”*

(8) *“We only saw the the OC [officer commanding] once, and that was it. In terms of support, .... some other uhhh... Private, that was in charge of of the unit while the commanders were not there. So that on its own, I would say that, the support from the unit lacked.”*

(9) *“... no one assisted us ... Ya, they will come now and then for other things.”*

Apart from negative experiences, it also emerged that the Reserve Force could supply in some instances the basic resources necessary to support training. For example, photocopy papers, cleaning material, to mention but a few. One participant verbalised this as follows:

(6) *“...uhhh...equipment wise the... they did provide like especially uhhh....the...uhhhh...normal things like uhhh...photo copy papers, the uhh...equipment for the students for the cleaning material and staff, ok, those things were in place.”*

- **Lack/adequate involvement and support from close-by units** (cf 2.6.6)

Participants reported that even though the SA Army's URTP was not the core responsibility of the close-by units, they were able to provide, as far as possible, the required support, being either the training venue, learning material, to mention a few (cf 2.2.2, systems theory – in this case inadequate involvement and support from close-by units resulted in inadequate resources to support URTP training). Participants felt that close-by units were accommodating and willing to help with the delivery of the SA Army's URTP. Participants articulated their positive responses towards the positive contribution of the close-by units as follows:

(1) *“Uhhhm... even uhhh... the OC [CB3] [institution name omitted] really... he was very accommodating, especially with the meal times... uhhh.... he gave us accommodation... Ya.”*

(2) *“Ya, you see [CB2] [institution name omitted] of log they provided us with uhhh... uhhh...conducive learning environment in terms of the classroom. ... Yes. uhhh....it it it was conducive for training.” “And also in, [CB3] [institution name omitted] they gave us a conducive lecture room with all the materials and necessities for conducting training.”*

(5) *“Uhhh... in the... they manage to support the training with the mess, rations, as well as fuels.”*

- (9) “At [CB3] [institution name omitted] if I can recall we were using their facilities for photocopying, ... the précis or whatever we needed photocopy for the learners. ... So, we... “i” i” [the the] [CB3] [institution name omitted] was assisting us with the media... side photocopy.” “... but with any other things, if you can talk about Log, ... ne, then they were assisting us. ... Things like “i fuel” [the fuel], things like “i media” [the media]. ... “O ya bona?” [You see?], they were assisting us with that.

Regardless thereof that most participants reported adequate support from home units, one participant, however, felt that the LDPs’ needs at the close-by units were not fully looked after, specifically in terms of accommodation and meals for LDPs. The following verbatim statement attests to this:

- (3) “The... the support of the staff members... the they were not really... uhhh... looked after. ... Because you’ll find that their accommodation is not, is not organised, the meals also is not organised; so, those kind of things I think is is is what the commanders do, they can organise prior.”

The aforementioned participant also indicated that the commanders could have organised (planned) for these needs prior to the implementation and delivery of the URTP (cf 4.3: Theme 1, insufficient planning).

#### **4.4.2 Experiences related to communication and liaison among stakeholders (cf 2.6.6)**

According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:295), ‘communication’ refers to “the activity or process of expressing ideas and feelings or of giving people information”, whereas ‘liaison’ refers to “a relationship between two organisations or different departments in an organisation, involving the exchange of information or ideas” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:869). Within the context of this study, ‘liaison’ refers to that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces (units, formations, divisions or AoSs, to mention but a few) or other agencies (for example, the universities) to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. ‘Stakeholders’ have been described earlier (cf 4.4).

It transpired that there were no proper liaisons and communication among various stakeholders responsible for the successful delivery and management of the SA Army’s URTP (cf 4.3.1).

**Table 4-5: Experiences related to communication and liaison among stakeholders**

Main category 3	Sub-categories	n=9
4.4.2 Experiences related to liaison and communication among stakeholders	Reserve Force commanders or authorities not readily available for assistance and unwilling to approach the Regular Force for assistance	3
	Training being influenced by lack of appropriate liaison with universities	2

The category ‘experiences related to liaison or communication among stakeholders’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Reserve Force commanders or authorities not readily available for assistance and unwilling to approach the Regular Force for assistance** (cf 2.6.6.1)

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:292) describes a ‘commander’ as “a person who is in charge of something, especially an officer in charge of a particular group of soldiers or a military operation”. Participants indicated that the officer commanding (OC) and the second in command (2IC) of the Reserve Force units were often not available when required. As a result, the commander in charge (a training programme coordinator) of the SA Army’s URTP had to do his own liaisons. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

- (2) *“... to a certain extent you’ll find that in that unit you you struggle to get the officer commanding; remember it is a reserve force unit, ... the officer commanding will come once after two weeks. He is not around. So, obviously if you have... they are challenges. I believe that is so... you don’t have the OC, there is no 2IC, it’s only the staff. You see?”*
- (4) *“You know, if you should draw the comparison with... with with with with with with [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. And the obviously the challenge... the challenges that you get, there at that particular unit; uhhh... your hand is is is cut off, because you are not the one that is doing the liaison in terms of uhhhm... challenges that you experience there and then.”*
- (4) *“... my experience with the first... URTP was a problem. You know, uhhh... because we... I think we reported at that unit a week prior to the programme had to start. That is now to finalise, reproofing, and... and... and... get some of our staff in place. And... and during that week, I could not get any assistance... from the reserve force units. So, I had to go on my own and do some [participant laughing] liaison with the units to... to get uhhm... assistant... assistance.”*

(5) *“... most of the things we had to arrange by ourselves, when we get that side.”*

The participant also indicated that the Reserve Forces were unwilling to approach the Regular Force for assistance. This was expressed as follows:

(4) *“And I also had a sense that you know, Reserve Force units, they are very unwilling to approach regular serve... uhhh.... regular uhhh... uhhh... units, for for assistance. So, at times I had to go and do my own liaison.”*

- **Training being influenced by lack of appropriate liaison with universities**

‘Influence’ refers to “the effect that somebody or something has on the way a person thinks or behaves on the way that something works or develops” (Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, 2015:782). ‘Liaison’ refers to “a relationship between two organizations or different departments in an organisation, involving the exchange of information or ideas” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:869).

Even though the DoD (2010:10) states that the liaison with, and the recruitment at universities, is done in conjunction with other role-players in the DoD, it transpired that there was a lack of proper liaison with universities, which influenced the effective delivery of the SA Army’s URTP. It appeared that lack of proper knowledge regarding the URTP from the university side resulted in universities not releasing learners to attend military training when so required during recess. Therefore, in some instances, learners were writing examinations over the same period that they should undergo military training (cf 2.2.2). The following verbatim quotations attest to participants’ experiences regarding the liaison with universities:

(4) *“Communication even with the universities; I was not sure [participant laughing], whether they... were properly briefed as to... what is this process all about.”*

(4) *“So, I don’t know in terms of... And the thing is... I...I am not privilege to that information; to know what liaisons... has has has takes place outside, outside the programme itself. And you know, ultimately it... it influences uhhh... the... the... the programme... uhhhm..., ya.”*

(7) *“...we had on ourself with the learners to organise for a fac... classroom at the university, or a facility where we can now uhhhm...get hold of them, so that we can do corrections”.*

#### 4.4.3 Experiences related to command and control (cf 2.6.5)

‘Command and control’ refers to “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission” (DoD, 2014:44). Within the context of this study, ‘*command and control*’ refers to the exercising of authority by Reserve Force commanders over the trainees during the SA Army’s URTP training interventions (cf 2.6.5).

Participants experienced that there was a lack of command and control over the SA Army’s URTP learners. Reason being, no efforts were made to address issues pertaining to learners such as discipline and payments. Some learners also failed to report as requested, though nothing happened to them.

**Table 4-6: Experiences related to command and control**

Main category 4	Sub-categories	n=9
4.4.3 Experiences related to command and control	Learners not being disciplined	2
	Poor administration of Reserve Force	3

The category ‘experiences related to command and control or poor administration’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Learners not being disciplined**

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:423) refers to the verb ‘discipline’ as “to punish somebody for something they have done”. Participants revealed that learners who attended the training of the URTP were not monitored. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

(5) *“...the students who comes for the training, are not monitored per se. We had the name list of so many students, only so many reported. ... And, no extra effort was put in place to get those others who did not report.”*

The same participant indicated that in the military when you do not report as expected, disciplinary measures should be taken against you:

(5) *“... when you are called up in the military, you are supposed to report. ... When you did not report, there should be an explanation why you did not report. That will be understood. So, they were no explanations for those learners who did not report. ... They were called up, but they did not report.”*

(10) *“So that we do not have to fix discipline... things whilst we are doing officer formative.”*

- **Poor administration of Reserve Force**

It was revealed that LDPs experienced maladministration over learner issues. The participants specifically indicated that the Reserve Force units did not handle learner issues appropriately. It appeared that some learners did not get paid on time, some did not receive equipment they bought, such as track suits or T-shirts. The following verbatim quotation attests to that:

- (2) *“Yes. uhhh... one of the major challenges that we encountered here it’s poor administration; you will excuse me for my language, poor administration ... I mean from the Reserve Force unit that conducted the URTP. You know to a certain extent we had to deal with issues that I would say they were not necessarily for us, issues of learners not getting paid when they had to, you see. Uhhh... learners having to pay money but do not get... I mean the product that they paid money for. You see? So, we had to deal with such issues. I can quote quite a number of incidents, more in particular with the payments. The [AoS4] [institution name omitted] members, those learners who were...uhhh... recruited to go to [AoS4] [institution name omitted], they struggled with their payment; ok. Now... [participant coughing] you see?, the liaison people, when it comes to administration, it is the units themselves, The institution where we presented ... uhhh... training. But instead, they could not assist those learners, to such an extent that we had to get involved. You see?”*

As a result of the Reserve Force not handling learner issues, participants had to deal with administration issues not related to training *per se*:

- (10) *“I also assisted with admin there and there”.*
- (4) *“The rest of the administration was supposed to be run by... the the the... the administrative units. Which is the uhhh... reserve force units. But the times we had to deal with administration that is totally unrelated to... to... to the training itself.”*

#### **4.5 THEME 3: INADEQUATE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND BASIC MILITARY TRAINING OF CANDIDATES** (cf 2.6.2; 2.6.7, Basic Military Training)

Aspects such as recruitment, selection and basic military training of candidates for the URTP were experienced as inadequate by participants (LDPs). The word ‘inadequate’ is defined as “not enough or not good enough” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:769). The negative experiences concerning the recruitment, selection and BMT of candidates for the SA Army’s URTP also had an influence on the effective delivery of the training programme (cf 2.8; cf 4.6). From a system’s perspective, problems in one subsystem (in this case

inadequate recruitment and selection of candidates) also resulted in problems in another subsystem, thereby also negatively affecting training delivery of the URTP (cf 2.2.1). Participants (LDPs) also felt that the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase was not conducted properly; therefore, they (participants) had to concentrate on issues that should have already been addressed during BMT.

**4.5.1 Experiences related to recruitment and selection** (cf 2.6.2)

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:1250) defines ‘recruitment’ as “finding new people to join a company, organisation or the armed forces, to mention just a few”, whereas ‘selection’ refers to “the process of choosing somebody or something from a group of people or thing, usually according to a system” (Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, 2015:1358; cf 2.6.2).

Participants (LDPs) expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the process that was followed to recruit and select candidates for the SA Army’s URTP (cf 2.6.2). They indicated that very young people were recruited straight from Basic Military Training (BMT) to undergo junior leader training (officer formative training), without having the necessary military background or experience. On the contrary, some participants felt that the candidates should have gone through the same normal selection process as the Regular Force members (with applicable military background). Participants added that some of the individuals selected for the SA Army’s URTP did not even possess any leadership qualities required in the military.

Furthermore, it transpired that candidates were taken straight from basic training to officer formative training and were made officers without first accumulating experience. The DoD (2010:3) states in this regard that the URTP recruitment and selection process should follow the same process used for regular force within the SANDF. Accordingly, candidates recruited for the Regular Force first have to serve in the military as privates or other ranks and thereafter potential candidates get selected to undergo an officers’ selection followed by attending a full-time officer formative training, upon compliance with the required criteria.

**Table 4-7: Experiences related to recruitment and selection**

Main category 5	Sub-categories	n=9
4.5.1 Experiences related to recruitment and selection	Inadequate selection process	4

The category ‘experiences related to recruitment and selection’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Inadequate selection process**

The words 'inadequate' and 'selection' have been described earlier (cf 4.5; cf 2.6.2).

Participants verbalised their concerns as follows:

- (1) *"I think they must just look into the selection criteria for the... for the selection of the people that go there.... because really now they took very junior people, straight from basics to officers' formative; for me "mh mh" [no no]"*
- (4) *"I am wondering how the recruitment... was done there. Because you can see man... you know... For me there was certain individuals, that I feel... should definitely not be... in the line of of... you know... officer... officer. So, I don't know how the recruitment... But I think that is one of the things... And then they don't go through the same recruitment process ... as a regular force... regular force member. So, so that that also, ya, I agree, it might be... it might be a gap ... that also needs to be... addressed, ya"*
- (5) *"The second thing is; uhhh... when it comes to the... target group, those students are very young. For me, I would have like it more if those students were... uhhh... uhhh... uhhh... sort of done a background check, and then groomed while they are there; after that they come directly to the military and do basic training."*

In addition to the above-mentioned statements, one participant indicated that candidates (learners) selected for the URTP were only there for the job security and not to make a career out of the military and as soon as they get a better offer, they will leave. The following statement attests to that:

- (3) *"Uhhh... if we stick to the way we recruit members from may be from grade twelve, and we develop them ourselves, then then we are sure what we are imparting what we require in the... in our organisation. But just... this one is like you you you are trying to bridge a... a gap in in a wrong way. ... Because you you... we are perceiving that those learners they will come with their qualifications and cater for us, and that is not how they are orientated... For them it's about job security... For them is about security. So, if is about job security, any offer you will give them, they will accept, but as soon, as soon as they get a better offer they just gonna leave us; so we'll be left with the same gap we were trying to fill"*

**4.5.2 Experiences related to the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase** (cf 2.6.7)

‘BMT’ has been described earlier (cf 2.6.7). It emerged that the manner in which (or how) BMT was conducted had a negative effect on the SA Army’s URTP, specifically on the officer formative training phase. Participants also indicated that instead of LDPs concentrating on delivering the officer formative training, they had to fix things that were supposed to have been addressed through or dealt with during BMT; for example, learners’ knowledge of military aspects and drilling skills. Based on the process theory, the problems experienced during BMT refer to the implementation phase of training (cf 2.2.2). In line with the system’s theory (cf 2.2.1), ineffective training during BMT negatively influenced further training phases (during the implementation phase), namely officer formative training (OFT).

**Table 4-8: Experiences related to the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase**

Main category 6	Sub-categories	n=9
4.5.2 Experiences related to the Basic Military Training phase	Learners lacked knowledge of basic military aspects	4
	Inadequate time allocated for Basic Military Training	2

The category ‘experiences related to BMT phase’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Learners’ lacked knowledge of basic military aspects** (cf 2.6.7)

The verb ‘lack’ refers to “the state of not having something or not having enough of something” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:844), whereas the Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:841) refers to ‘knowledge’ as “the information, understanding and skills that you gain through education or experience”. Learners, within the context of the URTP, were already described in Chapter 2 (cf 2.8.6).

Participants indicated that those learners who finished the URTP had no knowledge of basic military aspects such as drilling when compared to Regular Force members:

- (1) *“This, it does not only go about the subjects that presented, uh... we look at the the person; and developing him; all aspects, regimental included. For instance now those people finished the URTP they were made officers; they couldn’t even drill yet. The normal drills, ya that’s what I mean; they had a big gap and their knowledge and experience and the... and the, the defence force.”*
- (2) *“You could see that even when they graduated that there still missing links, things that need to be done to in order get them on the same “path” with the regular force officers.”*

- (3) *“Ok, with the group of learners that we got at URTP..., they have no idea what the military is all about. Uhhhm... the basic training that they got, did not serve any purpose, because they had no basic military uhhh... knowledge.”*
- (4) *“These guys, they did their basic military training, mm, but to be honest, even there I feel there was a lack. Because you could see that they are not yet formed into uhhh... soldiers. They [participant laughing] were still civilians. We still had to look at regimental aspects... uhhhm... uhhhm... for example. And also their... their understanding of the military, uhhhm... was very little. So, even for them or for them to relate uhhhm... the subject matter, how does it link to the military, how does it... were does it fit in to the military was uhhhm... another problem.”*

- **Inadequate time allocated for Basic Military Training** (cf 2.6.7, BMT; 2.8.8, Time available)

‘BMT’ has being explained earlier (cf 2.6.7). ‘Inadequate’ refers to “not enough; not good enough (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:769).

Since learners did not master basic military aspects during the BMT phase conducted for the SA Army’s URTP, issues that should have been addressed by BMT still had to be addressed during officer formative training. One participant (LDP) also indicated that the time learners received during the [university] recess was insufficient for them to master BMT. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:1245), ‘recess’ refers to “a period of time during the year when the members of a parliament, committee, to mention just a few, do not meet”. Within the context of the URTP, a recess refers to a short period during the year when learners are having a break at the university and during those breaks (recess) had to attend the URTP training. The following statement attests to this:

- (5) *“Uhhh... when I say time, you know, time required to completely master basic training, for this students it was too limited to such extent that they had to do their basic training in a short space of time. Because they are in universities and then only when they get breaks they come and continue with military training.... So, only those breaks. Now, it does not give them a complete set of the package of training that is required.”*

One participant also indicated that even during graduations (within the context of military training including the URTP, a passing out parade), one could see that there are still missing links (gaps) or things that should have been addressed so as to get learners to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts. The following statement attests to that:

- (2) *“Yes we can produce quantity, but now what about quality; Ok, for us we are experienced members, we are working in this institution; we know what calibre an officer should be of. You see? Now, it’s not necessarily what we got there. Even though we produce officers, but, when it comes to qual...You could see that even when they graduated that there still missing links, things that need to be done to... in order get them on the same “path” with the Regular Force officers.”*

In addition to the statements made above, one participant indicated that learners did not experience the necessary ‘exhaustion’ from training that is required in the military and specifically for full-time soldiers. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:520) defines ‘exhaustion’ as “the state of being very tired”. Exhaustion, within the context of military, refers to a necessary stage during basic training whereby a learner should feel very tired and that he or she cannot do it anymore. The participant verbalised this as follows:

- (5) *“Uhhh... for a driver to be perfect, you need to take him... to give him driving lessons. The same driving lessons u... until the person get exhausted, and see how he performs when he is exhausted on the same driving lessons. So, for the university students, basic training... the exhaustion part, was not there. They just had to understand the principles. We don’t know how they can perform if they were exhausted, under those conditions. So, the conditions are not the same for a full-time uhhh... soldier as well as the URTP.”*

#### **4.6 THEME 4: DELIVERING THE SA ARMY’S URTP TRAINING INTERVENTIONS (cf 2.8)**

According to Kiley and Coetzee (2013a:351), the effective delivery of training depends on a number of factors, including the design of the learning programme, outcomes to be achieved, characteristics of the target group, the dynamics of the learning facilitation process, the emotional climate in the classroom, resources and facilities available (cf 2.8.3), application of the principles of learning by LDPs, and the skills of LDPs (cf 2.8.4). Effective training delivery does not only depend on the selection of an appropriate training delivery method (cf 2.7), but it also depends on the expertise, techniques and learning material used to support learning activities (Kiley & Coetzee, 2013a:349; cf 2.8.3; 2.8.4).

##### **4.6.1 Experiences related to availability of learners to undergo training (cf 2.8.6)**

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:86) refers to ‘availability’ as “free to see or talk to people”.

Participants indicated that learners could not attend scheduled military training at the identified close-by military units during recess periods of their various universities.

Participants also indicated that learners’ absenteeism emanated as a result of different commitments (being either at the university or outside the university) or unknown reasons, thereby making it impossible to have all learners at the same time at identified venue (close-by unit) to attend the URTP training (cf 2.8.6). Such commitments included, among others, job interviews, writing of first opportunity examinations, writing of re-examinations, or doing practicals at either the university or at the potential employer. Similarly, DoD (2015:8-11) stated that Reserve Force members are usually occupied with their civilian activities when not on active military duty, and therefore it is not always easy to get all of them at a training location at once (cf 2.8.6, geographical location and availability of learners for training).

One participant highlighted that, during recess periods, learners are supposed to rest; however, that opportunity did not exist because they (learners) had to attend military training. As a result, some of learners, while busy with URTP, requested to be released to go home and attend to other commitments. Nevertheless, the learners’ absence for training impacted negatively on the delivery of the URTP (cf 2.2.1, systems theory), as well as on LDPs’ commitment to execute their duties effectively as they had to work until late at night (during weekdays and weekends) while trying to bring learners who were absent to the same standard as the rest. Within the military context, learners who could not be available or be present to attend training for a quite longer period of time, are regarded as being “*out of phase*” and will most probably have to be removed from the training programme. This is often done when reasons made are considered to be invalid to substantiate the reason for absenteeism. Participants (LDPs) highlighted, however, that this was not the case with URTP learners as nothing was done with learners who were absent several times.

The main category *experiences related to the availability of learners to attend training* was formulated based on the following subcategories:

**Table 4-9: Experiences related to the availability of learners to undergo training**  
(URTP) (cf 2.8.6)

Main category 7	Sub-categories	n=9
4.6.1 Experiences related to the availability of learners to undergo training	Learners absent from training due to other commitments	4
	Learners arriving late or not at all	3
	Learners quitting in the middle of the URTP	3
	Learners’ attitudes towards the URTP	2
	Learners not being subjected to the Military Disciplinary Code	2

The category ‘experiences related to availability of learners to undergo training’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Learners absent from training due to other commitments**

According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:4), the word 'absent' means "not in place because of illness". In the case of this study, 'absent' refers to learners who could not be present to attend training at a close-by unit on scheduled dates, due to reasons such as attending study periods prior to writing exams, rewriting exams, attending practicals or attending to other commitments known to them.

It emerged that in some instances learners were absent for a quite number of days to attend military training at close-by units due to commitments such as attending study periods, going to rewrite exams that they could not pass at their various universities, attending practicals, or other commitments at the universities known to them. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:514) refers to 'exam' as "a formal written, spoken or practical test, especially at school or college, to see how much you know about a subject or what you can do", whereas 'practicals' refer to "a lesson or an exam in science or technology in which students have to do or make things, not just read or write about them" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1166). One participant reported that there were instances where learners were absent for the entire scheduled URTP contact session because they had to write exams at the university over the entire period.

It emerged that learners were also absent while busy with the SA Army's URTP to attend job interviews and practicals at their potential employers. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:801), an 'interview' is defined as "a formal meeting at which somebody is asked questions to see if they are suitable for a particular job or for a course of study at college, university". Participants indicated that the learners sought other jobs because they were uncertain whether the defence force will recruit them or not after the URTP training. Therefore, one participant made the following statement: "*Then the reser... the reserve components what does it do, it is limited to a certain number that they can collect due to the budgetary constraints; those learners get employed to certain fields, and there is on the... space in South Africa right now. Once you are employed somewhere, you are even afraid to take leave because the job opportunities are not always available*".

Participants verbalised their frustrations regarding learner absenteeism as follows:

- (2) "*So, in in some instances some of them were not able even to pitch up for training, ok, for certain days based on the fact that they were busy with their practicals.*"... "*Ya, the university practicals. So, that also became the challenge. You you you will find now that you strength fluctuates, ok. In in in one contact session you are going to have more, the other one you are going to have less.*"

- (2) *“It’s either they were with their c.... other companies in terms of prac... I mean practicals.... Yes, or some of them they were busy with supplementary assessments where it stands. You see?”*
- (3) *“Then in the second session there are those who were still uhhh... busy with studies at the universities and there are those who just withdraw voluntarily and there are those who got uhhh... job offer at other companies.”*
- (4) *“Yes, yes. I... I... I had challenges. In terms of... learners that... ok. In terms of late reporting didn’t have a lot of that. The challenge was always learners that must leave, to go and write exams. But I think that is the case may be were a learner fail a subject at university then... they must go. I think in Potchefstroom I had incidences were... were learners had write over the period that... the contact session was... was... was scheduled. Now that learner... I think there was couple of learners they arrived a week later. That was one of our longer sessions.”*

It further emerged that learners did not get rest, as they had to attend military training during the recess of the university. Therefore, most of the learners requested to be released from training (URTP) to go home. The following statement attests to that:

- (7) *So, and uhhh...and....and some of the the learners will will say that he still has assignments, and and and and and things he must do, he must go home, he never, he was never at home, because recess it’s time where students must go home, but they uhhh...they came to the military base because they had to receive training.*

- **Learners arriving late or not at all**

To ‘arrive’ means “to get to a place, especially at the end of a journey” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:68). According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:852), ‘late’ means “after the expected, arranged or usual time”. Within the context of this study, ‘late arrival’ refers to learners who do not arrive in time as expected or arranged at close-by units to attend training (SA Army’s URTP) during recess periods. Participants indicated that some learners did not arrive for training during recess periods at close-by units. Therefore, participants felt that it was not fair for those learners who indeed arrived early, as there were no consequences for those learners who arrived late or did not attend the training (URTP). Participants further highlighted that even though there were not many late arrivals, those who arrived late had an influence on the training programme as the time allocated for the programme was already limited for LDPs to conduct training effectively (cf 2.8.8, time available). Participants articulated their experiences as follows:

- (3) *“No, you don’t get the whole group. In the first cons... contact sessions the others never uhhh... even pitched; they never came for the first session.”*
- (4) *“Now imagine to... [participant laughing] You already have a very shortened period; now learners still arrives... late. So, now you must assist them, and then obviously, you don’t have additional instructors that can, that that that uhhhm... can assist. Basically, I had one two three classes, and then I brought an instructor per class. Because some of these instructors they were also committed on the other side. So, so, it was... it was... it was... it was another burden. Because now, after hours, those learners that are late, must be taken uhhhm... to be assisted. So, now [participant laughing] you compromise, even more uhhhm... on the standards.”*
- (5) *“The second thing is the target group. Meaning the students who comes for the training, are not monitored per se. We had the name list of so many students, only so many reported. And, no extra effort was put in place to get those others who did not report.”*

- **Learners quitting in the middle of the URTP**

To ‘quit’ means “to leave your job, school, to mention just but a few” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1222). Participants (LDPs) indicated that quite a number of learners quit in the middle of the URTP. One participant felt that that the space allocated for that specific learner who quit could have been used by another learner: “...*someone should have used that space to be able to do the training*”.

As indicated earlier (cf subcategory- learners arriving late or not at all), most learners quit because they received job offers from other potential employers, either in South Africa (SA) or from overseas companies. Participants believed job security is one issue that made learners quit the URTP. One participant verbalised this as follows: “*Once you are employed somewhere, you are even afraid to take leave because the job opportunities are not always available*”; “*For them it’s about job security, so if is about job security any offer you will give them they will accept*”.

Participants also felt that for URTP learners, military training is just a means to making money while still waiting patiently to be called by a potential employer. Therefore, to secure their job offers, learners who were awarded jobs somewhere else, voluntarily quit in the middle of the URTP when called for either practicals or to start working. This was verbalised as:

- (3) *“It... it’s quite demoralising because like you... you are you are just wasting the resources that you could have used effective... effectively to develop the people that you already have in the d... in the system that are willing to ap... assume uhhh... leadership leadership uhhh... positions. You develop those learners and because they have qualifications that they actually studied that they love..., as as as soon as they get the... uhhh... an offer, they left the defence force and they go their sided, so we are losing.”*
- (3) *“...there are those who just withdraw voluntarily and there are those who got uhhh... job offer at other companies.”*
- (3) *“...there are those who just give up.”*
- (8) *“Ya, so, the the the learners as I look at them, they are available, but the the the the the once were actually uhhh... progressed from uhhh... basic training towards uhhh... the the officers, formative, not all of them actually are there. Ya. Because they they start, but somewhere in the middle some of them they quit. You understand? ... and then others they are not, they just not there because they decided to quit in the middle o...of the programme.”*

Furthermore, one participant highlighted that, due to a limited number of members who can be recruited by the Reserve Force, it was not clear whether all learners were going to be recruited into the system (military) or not. The following verbatim quotation attests to that:

- (5) *“Then the reser... the reserve components what does it do, it is limited to a certain number that they can collect due to the budgetary constraints; those learners get employed to certain fields, and there is on the... space in South Africa right now. Once you are employed somewhere, you are even afraid to take leave because the job opportunities are not always available. Those learners were supposed to come to the military and f... and and and capacitate the military. If they go to the reserve force, they go to the reserve force in uhhh... normal reserve force that we... will know we will recall them. But for now, some of them they are employed oversees, we wasted the resources.”*

- **Learners’ attitudes towards the URTF**

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:82) defines ‘attitude’ as “the way that you think and feel about somebody or something”.

Participants experienced that some learners did not show any commitment towards military training (the SA Army's URTP, specifically). Reason being, some learners could not report when asked to, or some could not complete the work or assignments given to them while back at their universities. It was further highlighted that some learners began to behave in an unacceptable manner after receiving job offers from other potential employers. The following verbatim quotations attest to this:

- (3) *“So even if you give them work to do it during the period when they are going back to the university, the work is normally not completed.”*
- (4) *“... it it was rare that we will send them with... with... with uhhh... with homework. ... With homework. ... For example. And that, would've been uhhhm... a good thing. I think in one of the contact sessions we tried it and [participant laughing] we had a problem, ... with learners coming back with either they have lost their workbooks or they couldn't attend to that workbook, then they use the excuse of uhhhm...of uhhhm... What is this? ... Ya, their academic work uhhh... gets priority ... over... over... over uhhhm... Ya.”*

- **Learners not being subjected to the Military Disciplinary Code (MDC)**

In terms of the DoD (2010:8), while undergoing military training or service, members should be subjected to the Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) and members transgressing the code should be charged. However, participants felt that some learners lacked discipline. Participants attributed the lack of discipline to the fact that authorities did not require any explanations from learners who did not arrive for training or nothing was done to these learners. The following verbatim quotation attests to that:

- (5) *“... when you are called up in the military, you are supposed to report. ... When you did not report, there should be an explanation why you did not report. That will be understood. So, they were no explanations for those learners who did not report.... They were called up, but they did not report.”*

Participants also revealed that the learners' behaviour gradually changed after some of them were promised a job somewhere. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

- (3) *“And and when you check the the the the the behaviour of those learners, for them this programme is about a financial support, is not really about the love of what the military is doing; they just need a financial support.”*

- (5) *“The other thing is; some of them had disciplinary issues, because they were more rest on their last year of training. ... Based on what? Based on the fact that they have got now being promised somewhere somehow. So they were taking it as a camping adventure for them. ... Or an adventure field to come to the military.”*

#### 4.6.2 Experiences related to non-availability of resources (cf 2.8.3; 2.8.4)

The word ‘availability’ has been described earlier (cf 4.6.1). Resources as an aspect that may impact training delivery and within the context of the URTP were already described in Chapter 2 (cf 2.8.3; 2.8.4). The successful implementation of training may be complicated without the necessary resources (cf 2.8.3). Therefore, as LDPs, you do not only need to prepare yourself in terms of the learning content, but also the logistical requirements that go with it.

To deliver the URTP interventions successfully, three main stakeholders are involved, namely the Reserve Force unit, close-by unit and home unit (cf 2.6.6). Each of these stakeholders gets allocated a responsibility to support training. For example, the home unit will provide the LDPs, the close-by unit will provide the resources or equipment, for example classrooms and facilities such as mess and accommodation. The Reserve Force is responsible for day-to-day activities, command and control, and the overall training programme (URTP) as they hold the budget for training (cf 2.6.6.1).

**Table 4-10: Experiences related to non-availability of resources**

Main category 8	Sub-categories	n=9
4.6.2 Experiences related to non-availability of resources	Not enough LDPs to deliver the URTP	3
	Insufficient medical support	3
	Inadequate meals for learners and LDPs	3
	Challenges with printing resources	3
	No tables and desks allocated in classrooms and at learner accommodation	3
	Insufficient field equipment for field exercises	2
	Learning material not suitable for training	2

The category ‘experiences related to non-availability of resources’ is based on the following subcategories and verbatim quotations contained in it:

- **Not enough LDPs to deliver the URTP** (cf 2.8.4)

‘LDPs’ and ‘URTP’ have been described earlier (cf 1.10.8; 1.10.4). The adverb ‘enough’ refers to “the necessary degree” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:496). Therefore, within the context of the URTP, this subcategory implies that there were not enough or sufficient LDPs to deliver the URTP.

Participants indicated that there were not enough LDPs to deliver the SA Army's URTP interventions, and one participant (LDP) indicated this lack of LDPs as that they were "outnumbered". It also transpired that due to limited manpower, LDPs were forced to fulfil multiple roles, including facilitation, assessment, moderation and administration (also of 2.8.4). The following verbatim statements attest to that:

- (1) *"I think for us...uhhh... it was the lack of manpower, it was... that time I think were we three uhhh... facilitators, which mean that you were either facilitating or assessing or doing admin, on the specific date, so there were no time off for the facilitators."*
- (2) *"uhhh... the number of personnel, that net... need to be involved, uhhh... need to be more than what we were at that time, ok. Because we were out numbers [outnumbered], we had more learners, less, facilitators, and remember we were given short period of time to complete the programme. So, really task versus personnel they did not correlate."*
- (7) *"...Now proportional to the... to the learners, the number of learners, as well as the instructors that were... taken to go and present officer's formative, it was not actually sufficient. ...Ya, because you find that in in a class, there is over forty learners, with only one instructor. ... Yes. ...The ratio was not good, Yes."*

- **Insufficient medical support**

'Insufficient' has been described earlier (cf 4.3). According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:938), 'medical' is "connected with ways of treating illness that do not involve cutting the body", whereas 'support' is seen as "to give or be ready to give help to somebody if they need it" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1520). Therefore, within the context of this study, '*medical support*' refers to that support given to members of the armed forces (SA Army's URTP) while busy with military training, military practical exercises or military operations. Medical support within the military context may be provided by means of a sickbay, field hospital, or an ambulance during an exercise or operation.

Participants (LDPs) indicated that medical support was inadequate and that learners and LDPs had to rely on military units around Cape Town to assist them with medical support. The following statements attest to that:

- (3) *"uhhhm... medical support also... it was not sufficient."*
- (5) *"The other evidence was medical resources. ...Yes. We had to always rely on the... units around Cape Town, for medical resources."*

(6) *“uhhh...because we had some challenges in..uhh Cape Town. Whereby uhh... member was..uhhh.. taken... uhh..was ill...and then...we had to... take him to...uhh 2mil [2 military hospital]. ...Ya 2mil. uhhh... because we...it was inside the...the field...and the problem was...or the challenge was there...uhh...in an emergency the ambulance and the distance, where the training area was, it's was quite uhh... distance.”*

- **Inadequate meals for learners and LDPs** (cf 2.8.3)

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:769) refers to 'inadequate' as “not enough or not good enough”, whereas 'meals' refer to “the food that is eaten at a meal” (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:934). It became evident that meals were inadequate and not up to participants' perceived standard. As a result, learners and LDPs had to just accept the meals that were available. One participant believed the mess (a kitchen responsible to serve armed forces with meals) was not able to serve LDPs and learners involved in a training course (URTP) of that magnitude. It also transpired that learners with restrictions or food preferences, for example those learners not eating certain kinds of food, sometimes had to go a day without any food. That is made evident through the following statements:

(3) *“...even the the the issue of meals it was a responsibility of the [RF2] [institution name omitted]. And that was not really... uhhh... it was not performed in in a good manner, because most of the time learners did not have actually... enough meals. ... They just had to eat what is available. Those with restrictions, you find that, that day they have food at all, because they could not be catered for.”*

(6) *“...the meals also is not organised; Uhhh... Ya, meals. ...Uhhh...we had to chop and change, because uhhh...sometimes we are in classes, we had to... alternative arrangements for meals,...You understand? and those things.”*

(8) *“..., in terms of the mess. ... Mmmm, us as instructors we we stayed in the guest houses, but we we we were using their...their mess, for for for for breakfast, lunch and supper. ... So, I felt like the the mess also, was not ready...for uhhh....for that uhhh...a course of that magnitude. ... Yes. ... They were not prepared, yes, in terms of serving that magnitude, because I...I...I could see that uhhh...the food, the standard was uhhh...actually, the one that we are used to.”*

- **Challenges with printing resources** (cf 2.8.3)

A 'challenge' refers to "a new or difficult task that tests somebody's ability and skill" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:235). 'Printing' is described as "the act of printing a number of copies of a book at one time" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1183). Within the context of this study, '*printing resources*' refer to photocopy machines and photocopy papers, among other.

Participants (LDPs) experienced that they had to struggle with basic resources such as printing resources. Consequently, participants had to rely on neighbouring military units to make copies. It further emerged that participants (LDPs) had to travel as far as one hundred (100) kilometres (km) to go and make those copies, which resulted in training being put on halt until such a stage that learning material could arrive (also cf 2.2.2). Participants verbalised their frustrations in this regard as follows:

- (5) *"For printing resources, it was very challenging, because we had to rely on Fort-Ikapa or Wynberg itself, and sometimes they are... they were having challenges with the printing resources; we had also challenges."*
  
- (6) *"uhhh...some places we had a challenges with the copy machine, especially in uhhh...Cape Town. ... because the uhh...the amount of work or photo copy we had to do, was not uhhh...uhhh...in line with what we had to do on the other side, so we had to make arrangements from other units. ... yes, ... especially like in uhhh...Cape Town we had to use uhh...Simons Town, uhhh...publications department. ... to assist us. and it's just about another 100...100km from where we are. ... You understand? ... Like photocopy machines they must have in place, cartridges, uhhh...computers, laptops, those are equipment that we, we had to take from the units, to to now provide for the uhhh....that after hours students uhhh...they don't come with the the...uhhh...laptops and staff, they had to use computers the printers, so we have to have uhhh...cartridges for them, photocopy papers, to do the...complete the POEs [Portfolio of Evidences]."*
  
- (8) *"...each and every time we wanted to print something, it had to take the whole day, and that had a negative impact on what, on classes. Because, if ever learners do not have uhhh...study material, you cannot carry on."*

- **No tables and desks allocated in classrooms and at learner accommodation** (cf 2.8.3)

A 'table' refers to "a piece of furniture that consists of a flat top supported by legs" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1537), whereas a 'desk' refers to "a piece of furniture like a table, usually with drawers in it, that you sit at to read, write or work, to mention just a few" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:405). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:38) defines 'allocate' as "to give something officially to somebody or something for a particular purpose". Within the context of the URTP, tables and chairs had to be supplied for learners in classrooms. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:125) refers to a 'classroom' as "a room where a class of children or students is taught", whereas 'accommodation' refers to "a place to live, work or stay in" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:8). Within the context of URTP, 'accommodation' refers to a place where learners stay and sleep for the duration of training, for example a bungalow.

One participant indicated that learners did not have desks in their living rooms as required for a learner busy with officer formative training:

- (4) *"Uhhh... as I said, accommodation I feel was... was a challenge... uhhh... in terms of the learner not having... a... a desk for example. And and and again you know, Officers' formative is pen and paper heavy. You see? [participant laughing] So, at least the learner must have, that... that little bit of comfort, where he can go and complete uhhh... uhhh... his... his... his... You know? his assignments. Uhhh... What else?... Ya, so so so that... one thing for me, accommodation it was fine, is just that... for example a desk. So that he [participant laughing] can do his basic thing, complete his workbook. You see. You don't want... you already overload this learner and then now he must go back to his room and sit on his bed. How long can you sit on a bed and and and and and write?"*

As an accredited training provider (the SANDF), and due to the amount of work that learners might be doing after hours, it is the requirement of the relevant Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) that learners doing officer formative training be allocated a chair and a table in their living quarters.

Participants also indicated that in one of the close-by units, classrooms were only allocated with benches without desks or tables, making it difficult and uncomfortable for learners to do their work and that they had to use their legs to write on. It was further reported that during

long lectures, learners start to become drowsy and fell asleep. The following verbatim quotations attest to participants' frustrations in that regard:

- (7) *"uhhh... in in in in in [CB2] [institution name omitted] we had only chairs, at one stage. You understand? So... no tables, ... they had to use their laps, the their legs to write, to to to stabilise the the the the book and....so it was a difficult situation."*
- (6) *"Uhhh...some the uhhh...uhhh...uhhh classrooms or the lecture rooms, uhhh...could not accommodate uhh...all the students because of uhhh...the equipment in the uhh...classes, especially like uhhh...the tables uhhh...the chairs uhh...because if you look at it we were using benches, and is not comfortable for for students to sit on benches, especially with a long uhhh...lectures that we...or facilitate a long lectures in the classes, with the, with the programme, then they start to, get drowsy, starts sleeping, because of the time, and the...time allocation. ... You see? ... and the facility. If you are seating on a bench, there is no v-cline of uhhh...back thing, you understand? So how are the guys...they are gonna be unsalted, so he must doze on. ... at some stage."*

- **Insufficient field equipment for field exercises** (cf 2.8.3)

The concept 'field' refers to "an area of land in the country used for growing crops, keeping animals in, usually surrounded by a fence, et cetera" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:558). Within the context of this study, a field refers to a restricted area, usually used by the military for practical training exercises. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:504) defines 'equipment' as "the things that are needed for a particular purpose or activity".

Part of the SA Army's URTP officer formative training phase is a practical leadership exercise referred to as leadership development programme that forms a practical part of the leadership module (cf 2.6.7). During practical exercise, learners are assessed on aspects such as their endurance, practical leadership skills including presentation of orders and map reading skills. To successfully conduct this exercise (leadership development programme), logistical requirements, including maps or big-bags (military bag used to carry equipment), among others, are needed (cf 2.8.3). Participants revealed that there were no big-bags and maps to conduct the practical exercise, and therefore they had to go and borrow equipment from other military units and some from their home unit (cf 2.8.3). Therefore, it is not possible to conduct training without this mission essential equipment (cf 2.8.3). The following verbatim quotations attest to the participants' negative experiences:

- (2) *“... things like maps, so obvious we struggled to get them, but finally we managed to get them from the neighbouring units.”*
- (6) *“We had to make prior uhhh...make arrangements, from other units, to give us equipment, because uhh...the URTP couldn't supply uhhh...all the equipment. ... For instance at one stance from uhhh... Potchefstroom, we had to go to [Unit X] [institution name omitted], to borrow big-bags uhh...all those uhhh... equipment for the field.”*

Sanders and Schaefer (2009:4) similarly found that soldiers are not able to do training effectively without mission essential equipment (cf 2.8.3).

- **Learning material not suitable for training** (cf 2.8.3)

'Learning' refers to "the process of learning something" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:860), whereas 'material' refers to "things that are needed in order to do a particular activity" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:930). Therefore, 'learning material', within the context of this study, refers to material needed in the process of learning (URTP) in order to enhance learning. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1515) refers to the word 'suitable' as "right or appropriate for a particular purpose or occasion". Within the context of this study, '*learning material*' refers to materials required to support the SA Army's URTP learning interventions, for example manuals and posters.

It transpired from the verbatim quotations that the learning materials used for the SA Army's URTP were not suitable for training, specifically for the blended-learning programme, but rather for full-time officer formative training (cf 2.7). One participant felt that the aforementioned resulted therein that they (LDPs) actually had to present '*non-credited training*' with credited training material (the training material that was designed for the Regular Force and adapted to the Regular Force's needs, was used as is for the Reserve Force members (URTP learners) irrespective thereof that the URTP is delivered over a shorter period of time. Two participants verbalised their concerns as follows:

- (4) *“...the the matter... the learning material was not tailor made or the programme I would say, was not tailor made for for a shortened period. So, all of the information that we give the regulars,... the re... the the UR...[University Reserve...] the reserve force uhhh... students, they were required to assimilate all... the same amount of of of information. So, in in that sense I think it was a bit... unfair towards them, and and and ya, to expect them to to to to uhhh... Ya, ya.”*

- (5) *“So, we presented non credited training to the students with material of credited training.”*

#### 4.6.3 Experiences related to the training delivery method (cf 2.8.7)

‘Training’ has been described earlier (cf 2.3), whereas a ‘method’ refers to “a particular way of doing something” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:947). Within the context of the URTP, the *training delivery method* refers to a blended-learning method as cited in DoD (2010:6), being a suitable training method to deliver the SA Army’s URTP (also cf 2.7).

Participants had mixed feelings regarding the method used to deliver the SA Army’s URTP training interventions. Even though the URTP Charter highlights blended learning as a method used to deliver the URTP interventions (DoD, 2010:6), participants found it very difficult to conduct a blended-learning method as the sole method used to deliver the SA Army’s URTP training interventions.

**Table 4-11: Experiences related to the training delivery method (cf 2.7; 2.8.7)**

Main category 9	Sub-categories	n=9
4.6.3 Experiences related to the training delivery method	Blended learning was not implemented	3
	Training method resulted in stress for LDPs	1

The category ‘experiences related to training delivery method’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Blended learning was not implemented (cf 2.7)**

Participants indicated that the SA Army’s URTP interventions were conducted mostly on-site and not by means of blended learning. The following verbal quotations attest to that:

- (1) *“We we were practically there presenting the classes and then we assessed them with POEs... Mmmm. On the s... on-site.”*
- (4) *“So, the approach... the approach was not that of blended-learning. It was contact session; we complete all of the objectives, within that con... contact session. ... And then from there we break, until we meet for the next contact session, new objective, carry on. So, the once that is... has been dealt with, is is is is is uhhh... is seen finalised. Is finalised. Ya.”*

It became evident from the aforementioned quotations that distance learning did not really take place (except to some extent for the research module), which is in conflict with what is stated by DoD (2010:6), that the URTP should follow a blended-learning approach (cf 2.7; cf

2.8.7). When asked if training does take place during a distance learning (DL) phase, one participant answered: *“It is... It is not possible because they [learners] are attending their classes in a university”*. This finding concurs with what has been found by the American Society for Training and Development (ASTD) (cited in Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:216), that residential training is still the most preferred and popular training delivery method to date (cf 2.7).

It further emerged that participants tried to put DL into practice with a research module, though found it challenging since LDPs could not effectively monitor learners' progress or provide sufficient guidance during distance learning. As a result, participants (LDPs) had to repeat the same training that should have been done through distance learning during the contact sessions. Participants verbalised their experiences as follows:

- (2) *“Ok, to be realistic, the only thing that we manage to conduct in a form of distance learning it was only research. Ok, because it's something that they had to email; we mark and send it back to them. But the rest of the other unit standard uhhh... it was presented uhhh... at the institution were we conducted URTP, even the marking, the assessment was done there.”*
- (4) *“I think in one of the contact sessions we tried it and [Participant laughing] we had a problem, with learners coming back with either they have lost their workbooks or they couldn't attend to that workbook, then they use the excuse of uhhhm... of uhhhm...”*

- **Training method resulted in stress for LDPs**

'Distance learning' and 'blended learning' have been described earlier (cf 2.7). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1497) refers to the word 'strenuous' as “needing a great effort and energy”, whereas 'facilitator' refers to “a person who helps somebody do something more easily by discussing problems or giving advice, to mention just a few, rather than telling them what to do” (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:534; cf. 2.8.4).

Participants indicated that the training delivery method (blended-learning method) used to deliver the SA Army's URTP was strenuous for them (LDPs).

One participant also highlighted that LDPs did not have experience to deliver training that follows a blended-learning approach. He/she made statements such as: *“... they don't have experience, in terms of of of blended learning”*. Thus, the method used became strenuous to them as facilitators (facilitating is part of the LDPs tasks'- cf 2.8.4). One participant verbally expressed his/her opinion regarding the training delivery method as follows:

- (1) *“With the one that we used it was very strenuous for us as the facilitators, meaning we had to start at six and then you present till uhhh... night time every day.”*

#### 4.6.4 Experiences related to time constraints (cf 2.8.8)

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:1584) refers to ‘time’ as “a period of time, either long or short, during which you do something or something happens”. The word ‘constraint’ is defined as “a thing that limits or restrict something, or your freedom to do something” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:318). Therefore, within the context of this study, ‘*time constraint*’ refers to things that limit the available period of time required to conduct URTP interventions successfully.

It transpired that time allocated for URTP was not enough for LDPs to complete their work. Therefore, time constraint became the most contributing factor that negatively influenced the efficiency and effectiveness of the SA Army’s URTP. As a result, one participant started the interview session by making the statement: *“Ok...I don’t want to sound negative now; [participant laughing] but yes, uhhh... it it it was more of... negative experiences than the positive once. Uhhh... Yes. I can say it was less positive. I mean on the instructors’ perspective now. ... Based on uhhh... certain issues, like the time was a v... uhhh... very contributing factor”*.

Meyer and Sloman (2013:8) similarly identified time constraint as a challenge that affects training negatively (cf 2.8.8; cf 2.2.1). Newman (2002:9) also stated that the amount of time available for training is a challenge in order to train the Reserve Force to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts (cf 2.8.8).

**Table 4-12: Experiences related to time constraints (cf 2.8.8)**

<b>Main category 10</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.6.4 Experiences related to time constraints	Insufficient and incorrect time allocated for the URTP	3
	Standards compromised due to insufficient time	3
	Time allocated for URTP less than for Regular Force members	4
	URTP not in line with required notional hours	3
	Skimping on content due to insufficient time allocated	3
	Insufficient time to conduct practical or physical training	2
	Insufficient time for the learners to rest and assimilate information	2
	Going over the allocated time to complete or finalise the work	3
	Uncertain whether learners are fit to become Officers	2

The category 'experiences related to time constraint' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Insufficient and incorrect time allocated for the URTP**

'Insufficient' has been defined earlier (cf 4.3). 'Incorrect' refers to "not accurate or true" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:773), whereas 'allocation' refers to "an amount of money and space". Within the context of this study, '*allocation*' refers to assigning appropriately the time to the SA Army's URTP, including specific modules or subjects.

It transpired that the time allocated to deliver the SA Army's URTP, including the time allocated per module or subject, was not sufficient. Participants (LDPs) verbalised this as follows:

- (1) *"I think here... uhhh... if I can remember was just one of the subject was wellbeing presented in a day... and here in [Unit X] [institution name omitted] presented over a week."*
- (2) *"Hence, we had to make use of a qualification, remember Officer's formative now it's not curriculum based, it is qualification, so we had to present the same qualification that we present here for six months, I mean for those...for that given short period of time."*
- (5) *"Uhhh... however..., the negative part, I think the timeframe given to the students to conduct training is too limited. ... Ya, the timeframe is too limited."*

- **Standards compromised due to insufficient time allocated**

Due to insufficient time, LDPs had to compromise on the standard (quality) by compressing modules to suit the time available:

- (1) *"Like like I said the quality of that... presentations is not the same as we would have been here, were for... for instance you could explain something and give a practical example ... or how is it applied; there you just went through the slideshows."*
- (2) *"Because remember we only working on the recession... of of the universities. ...Ya... really it was not sufficient time for the entire programme, and considering that we had to compile same portfolios of the same standard, that is presented on the officer's formative of six months."*
- (2) *"Ok...I don't want to sound negative now; [participant laughing] but yes, uhhhm... it it was more of... negative experiences than the positive once. Uhhh...Yes. I can say*

*it was less positive. I mean on the instructors' perspective now. ... Based on uhhh... certain issues, like the time was a v... uhhhm... very contributing factor; contributed negatively. Ok. I believe that we did not have sufficient time. Because remember when we went there we had to present the entire formative that is presented here for six months, but we had to do it... if I am not mistaken, if you calculate the number of weeks plus the weekends that we went, it can be in a scale of a month. ... Ya. So it's actually, it was a lot of work that had to be done in a short period of time."*

- (8) *"uhhh... the experiences that I have or the challenges that I faced, it's the time that is allocated in order to present officer's formative.... that is actually uhhh... designed to be twenty-two weeks, and then we try to compress it, to be presented in three weeks. It's one of the challenges that I have experienced. ... There was a time constraint. Yes."*

- **Time allocated for URTP less than for Regular Force members**

Participants also indicated that the time allocated for the URTP training (Reserve Force training) was less compared to the same training provided for Regular Force members, which resulted therein that they never had time to instil knowledge and to complete assessments on time:

- (4) *"Ok. Firstly, the time was a problem for me, because they had less time to complete exactly the same modules. So, basically the the mat... the learning material was not tailor made or the programme I would say, was not tailor made for for a shortened period. So, all of the information that we give the regulars, ... the re... the the UR... the reserve force uhhh... students, they were required to assimilate all... the same amount of of of of information. So, in in that sense I think it was a bit... unfair towards them, and and and ya, to expect them to to to to uhhh... Ya, ya. That is obviously the other thing."*
- (5) *"The... the principle of training, is the same, however, the time spend on each learner to make that learner competent in a certain category, is less."*
- (6) *"Especially the ...uhhh.....uhhh....the programme is...it was too too short to complete uhh...the...the task that was allocated, especially like... with the... management...and management is uhh...is uhh...it takes almost uhh...three months, ... three months to complete management...but we had to in that short space to time, to push management, and and it's a lot of slide, and for a member now to...to uhh...ga...gain the knowledge that. it was too too too short...uhhh...time constriction."*

*And because the learner...after the... his, after that subject has completed, then he writes an assessment, now what empowerment is that? do you understand? to that learner. ...and what knowledge is he gained?"*

- (9) *"But assessment wise, when it come to assessing now, we we did not have enough time. It it... made us to work even twenty-four hours; at night you are busy in your room, you are busy assessing pass to pass three in the morning until when you are done. ... Because you cannot assess the next module without having found this person competent on the previous one. "O ya bona" [You see?]."*

- **URTP not in line with required notional hours**

According to Van der Merwe (2012:11), '*notional hours*' refer to the learning time it would take an average learner to meet the prescribed outcomes. That includes contact time, structured learning, workplace learning and self-study. Therefore, the credits allocated for unit standards or qualifications are used to measure the notional hours. The rule is that one (1) credit equals ten (10) notional hours (1:10). When scheduling a training programme or deciding on a training programme, the number of hours required for learners to complete the learning programme, in this case the URTP, successfully, should be taken into consideration. The notional hours allocated for the URTP were 1 330 notional hours (*133 credits for officer forming qualification equals 1 330 notional hours*); however, it became apparent from participants' verbalised experiences that the notional hours allocated for the URTP were not adhered to.

Participants indicated that the insufficient time allocated for the URTP led to subjects being compressed, which violated the notional hours allocated for each unit standard (module). One participant expressed his/her frustrations as follows:

- (2) *"Uhhhm... we had to present seventeen unit standards to the learners, which a normal programme they are presented over a period of six months. But there it was cut into three four weeks first session, three four weeks se...second session; which means probably two months. So it is impossible to, to present a work that is normally of six months in a two months' period."*

- (4) *"And the obviously you see, the thing that al... always uhhh... worried me is this thing of... [Participant laughing] because you know it is uhhh... the SAQA [South African Qualifications Authority] regulations and and... whatever those things... ETD [Education, Training, Development] things, of... of... from... What is these hours? ... No... Ya, notional hour, notion... is it notional hours ne? ... That is not uhhh..."*

*uhhh... uhhh... that is not in line with URTP. ... Yes, you see? Because if if notional hours says thirty four hours, then, [Participant laughing] in reality for for URTP; six hours.... Just to make uhhh... uhhh... uhhh... an example. So, even in terms of that... policy, there was some uhhh... uhhh... uhhh... compromise. Mmm."*

(7) *"...we presented a six months, six to eight months learning programme, in... barely a month and half if, if I can be honest, barely a month and half, half these programme was was pushed, uhhh....so that these members can be qualified or can be commissioned as officers."*

(7) *"Uhhh...and that, it nearly took the...took us almost two years, after f., after the fact, just to to to declare the members competent, which was, if you look at the timeframe SASSETA set for us, which we, we did not even meet."*

- **Skimming on content due to insufficient time allocated**

LDPs also highlighted that due to insufficient time, they had to present only content that they think is important for the learners to know. This was verbalised as:

(1) *"Ya, URTP was very congested in terms of time... at the end, which means uhhh.... we could not go into the subjects uhhh... with a lot of details."*

(2) *"So it is impossible to, to present a work that is normally of six months in a two months' period, ... as a result uhhh... the the material that we used had to be adjusted. The periods, the the time allocated to the unit standard also had to be adjusted. So it was just uhhh... uhhh... something like just running through the programme. Not not actually imparting any knowledge to the learners. ...The the time factor it was very serious, so we couldn't impart any knowledge to the learners."*

One participant (LDP) indicated that due to the limited time, he had to omit some of the 'principles' and this resulted therein that he/she did not feel proud of the training that was provided:

(3) *"Because now, when you design, you design looking at at what have you delivered to the learner at the period allocated. And then also uhhh... some of the principles you you you'll omit. ... You cannot cover all of them in that short space of time. ... So, you also not proud of of what you are producing."*

Similarly, Wick and Leon (cited in Meyer, 2016c:94) stated that lack of time often means training is done in a pressed fashion that prevents real learning. Meyer (2016c:95) also indicated that the training content finally becomes a mini-lecture with handouts.

- **Insufficient time to conduct practical or physical training**

According to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1166), the word 'practical' is "connected with real situations rather than with ideas or theories", whereas 'training' has been described earlier (cf 2.3). According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1202), 'PT' refers to physical training (sport and physical exercise that is taught in schools, or in this case, in the SA Army). Even though the DoD (2010:3) regards the SA Army's URTP as a military training programme that provides with it a challenging programme of leadership, *physical training*, social and cultural activities (cf 2.6.1), it appeared that limited opportunities for physical training were made available. This was verbalised by one participant (LDP) as:

- (1) *And with the time that we had we didn't have time to look into the practical part of what we are presenting. ... So, basically what we did is we went through the presentation; it was assessment, the next subject start. ... Ya. So all I can say is that the knowledge was given to them, but now to demonstrate is to... to have that knowledge, there wasn't enough time."*
- (1) *"Yes. It was it was also supposed to be PT in the morning to them, that was never done because classes starts early. So, there was no physical development for them up until the point where they went to the field."*

Nevertheless, in terms of the DoA (2006:5-2), '*physical training*' supports cognitive functioning and emotional stability, which are essential for sound leadership. Physical training (PT) also results therein that soldiers feel more competent and confident, being able to handle stress better, working longer and harder, and recovering faster.

Due to time constraints, LDPs were unable to conduct practical training resulting therein that one participant referred to the SA Army's URTP as a 'paper exercise' (cf 2.2.1). The following statement attests to this:

- (4) *"And again you know... everything goes back to time... Everything goes back to time. ... Because, you don't have time for practical. Uhhh... for... for... or to address the practical... parts of... of... uhhhm... uhhhm... "dingese" [that thing]. You know? ok. We had a field phase, we had a field phase, and that is the... that is the biggest practical part. I... I... can't really complain there. But, you see, it goes back to time*

*man; time is the enemy of... of... of... of... of URTP. ... You know, it... it becomes a paper exercise.”*

- **Insufficient time for learners to rest and assimilate information**

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:1278) defines the word ‘rest’ as “a period of relaxing, sleeping or doing nothing after a period of activity”, whereas to ‘assimilate’ is referred to as “to fully understand an idea or some information so that you are able to use it yourself” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:76).

Participants (LDPs) felt that due to time constraints, learners did not get enough time to rest. Learners had to attend lessons until the late hours, including Saturdays and Sundays, and were also expected to complete assignments after hours or study for assessments. It was further stated that on completion of a specific subject, prior to assessment, learners never had enough time to assimilate information as there was no time available to do that. This was seen by LDPs as being unfair to the learners as the Regular Force learners undergoing similar training programme receive two weeks to assimilate information on a subject being presented prior to assessment. Participants verbalised their concerns as follows:

- (4) *Because let’s talk in terms of assessments quickly. Were... a regular force students for officers’ formative will get two weeks during which he can assimilate information on a subject is being presented, uhhhm... ya, obviously is where the instructor is. They had three days ... to assimilate information, and then you expect with the fourth day or the fifth they must write. So it was very difficult even to to... to manage the programme in terms so time. And and you know, that didn’t allow me at the end to to consider the learners, because I got objectives that I must reach. ... I must for this phase; I must present the following subjects. Learners, once I’m done with that uhhh... phase, they must be assessed, found competent or not yet competent. ... So, even on our side we were under pressure, ... in terms of achieving that objective, and it was difficult in balancing this thing, to give that necessary support uhhhm... uhhhm... to the learners. So, so, we had to compromise on...on... on.... Ya, we had to compromise on certain things.”*
- (6) *“Then uhhh...over the weekends, they don’t have enough time to to complete whatever we have given to them, because Saturdays, Sundays we had to put in time. and then it’s after hours it’s time. then...the the learner has to also do his own tasking. that we have give to him. He must complete the POEs. the time allocation for the POEs, is too short. because it overlaps, ... at stages. because if you start the subject, the subject got to be completed in a week. in that week he write an*

*assessment. then the other subject start on a Saturday or a Sunday. ... and then how much time is allocated there? ... you understand? I understand. Then he doesn't got enough time for him to relax. But yet he still has to study, complete the POE, and still write the assessment. So, the time factor is very very, had a lot of constraints on...the learner himself."*

- **Going over the allocated time to complete or finalise the work**

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1063) refers to the word 'over' as being "more, or above"; for example, the marking of learners' portfolios, assessments or moderation to mention just but a few. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:300) refers to the verb 'complete' as "to finish making or doing something", whereas it refers to 'finalise' as "to complete the last part of a plan, trip project, to mention just but a few" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:563).

Participants also indicated that they (LDPs) had to go over the time allocated for the training programme in order to complete and finalise their work and that they (participants/LDPs) had to complete some of the tasks at their premises (home unit), and in some instances had to go back and visit the learners at their universities after the completion of the training programme. Participants also indicated that they did not meet the Safety and Security Sector Education Training Authority (SASSETA) target date to finalise the training programme.

The following verbatim quotations attest to participants' experiences in this regard:

- (2) *"Remember when the schools opened, learners had to go back to the school, but I can just be honest with you, some of the work we had to complete in our premises in the unit after the presentation has taken placed. ...that was based on time. The only thing that we could complete, it's obviously the presentation, because we had to do it with the learners. Ok, facilitation was completed. Right, a portion of assessments was not completed, but moderation we had to do it in their absence."*
- (5) *"The timeframe we had to complete the job, extends beyond that because of the learners who cannot manage to finalise certain things; ... then we had to communicate after the... the... the date has been closed,... to ensure that the learner gets to a certain competency level."*
- (7) *"uhhh...if I look back, we had... to ask for extra, the first programme for extra time to go and visit the members again for them to complete certain portions within the portfolios, we had to uhhh...go, uhhh... actually, uhhh...even after the programme, we had to call those members, to...certain members to our unit, for ...to to make, to*

*to complete uhhh... outstanding tasks. ... Uhhh...and that, it nearly took the...took us almost two years, after f., after the fact, just to to to declare the members competent, which was, if you look at the timeframe SASSETA set for us, which we, we did not even meet. And uhh...at the end of the day we had to to to to stall the verification of that programme, two years after the fact, the programme have have have finished basically.”*

- **Uncertain whether learners are fit to become officers**

Some participants also reported that they feel very uncertain as whether learners are able to grasp the content being presented to them over such available short period of time:

(4) *“... Because for me... the guys that has went through the process now..., ahhh... I am not so certain whether they grasped all the content ... that was given to to them, ... You know, within all that reduced time.”*

Consequently, one participant indicated that one cannot be guaranteed that learners who received training through the SA Army’s URTP are really fit to be officers. The following verbatim quotation attests to that:

(9) *“So, within the time allocated, even though we facilitate to them and we assess them and we find them competent, because they write assess... assessments, ... still for me it’s not guaranteed that this people are really fit enough to be Officers.”*

#### **4.6.5 Negative experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP (cf 2.8.4)**

LDPs were already defined in Chapter 1 (cf 1.10.8). LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP had various experiences pertaining to the delivery of the URTP. This includes how they (LDPs) were selected, including their exposure to the URTP. It transpired that LDPs were multi-tasked, which created work pressure for them as they (LDPs) had to shift between the home unit and close-by units without having to rest.

**Table 4-13: Negative experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP**

<b>Main category 11</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.6.5 Negative experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP	Unknown selection criteria to select LDPs	4
	LDPs taken from other branches to present URTP	2
	Experiencing excessive pressure and workload	5
	Experiencing being multi-tasked	4
	Working overtime and after-hours	4
	Experiencing more learners in one classroom than usual	2
	Expected to compile portfolios of the same standard as that compiled for full-time Officer	3

Main category 11	Sub-categories	n=9
	formative training	

The category 'negative experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Unknown criteria to selection criteria to select LDPs**

According to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1651), the word 'unknown' refers to "not known or identified". 'Criteria' refer to "a standard or principle by which something is judged, or with the help of which a decision is made" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:355). 'Selection' has been described earlier (cf 4.5.1). 'LDPs' and 'URTP' have also been described earlier (cf 1.10.8; cf 1.10.4).

As suggested by Koehler (2013:37), the selection criteria for LDPs for a training programme should be based solely on their experience, interest and background regarding the curriculum. According to Werner and DeSimone (2012:150), to train in high demand areas, selecting LDPs should be based on competencies and subject matter expertise, which seems not to be the case in this study (cf 2.8.7). Using inexperienced LDPs is seen by Thorne and Mackey (2007:89) as a dangerous and risky decision. Reason being, regardless of how prepared an LDP can be, one might find him- or herself having to deal with the unexpected, prior, during or after training, which needs experience and a good background.

Owing to participants' experiences, it is clear that no set criterion was used to select LDPs to deliver the SA Army's URTP. Therefore, participants voiced out different '*opinions*' with regard to the criterion used to deliver the URTP. In answering the question posed: "What criteria were used to select LDPs for the SA Army's URTP?", participants responded by using words such as: "*From what I saw...*"; "*Honestly I... I don't know, but...*"; "*I believe it was just assumed...*"; "*they just... took people who are...*"; "*For me I had one criteria*"; "*I I think the reason they opted for...*"; "*So, so the criteria for me was...*"; "*Uhhh... that one, I don't know how they were selected*"; "*I found that...uhh...there is not really a criteria used...*"; "*what actually commanders they do...*" and "*from my take...*" et cetera.

It also transpired during semi-structured individual interviews that the criteria used to select LDPs who should deliver the SA Army's URTP were unknown to LDPs. Participants articulated this as follows:

- (1) "*Honestly I, I don't know, but I know f... one criteria that was used is that the member must have that unit standard that is uhhh... facilitating; he must be registered in that unit standard.*"

- (5) *“Uhhh... that one, I don't know how they were selected. ... Let me give you an example about myself. I arrived I was from course. I found my name that I am on the list going to Cape Town; to present the following subjects. Which I am... not not to say I am a specialist on, but which I was uhhh... above average presenter on them. ... Military law uhhh... is my food, ... Law of Armed Conflict is my food, and at that time I was the one presenting them at Officer's formative in the [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. ... Therefore, hence I was the one, my name was there because those modules were going to be presented that side; ... I had to go. ...So as to how the... people were selected to go that side, I don't know. But the least of personnel that we worked with were the competent personnel.”*
- (7) *“...Uhhh...well I found that...uhh...there is not really a criteria used. It was based on the availability of members, which it can also be of the negative influence, because if you are having an instructor that is just available but is not experience in presenting, uhhh...this nature, because you can present residential, but this nature, the nature of of the programme itself, and then you have found you have presented at... uhhh...then you create another...other problems within the problem itself... because of the pressure that the instructors are put under, with regards to the...type, this type of a learning programme.”*
- (9) *“Ok. I wouldn't know all... hence I am also selected ne. ... But with the num... people that were there, ... from my take, its people that are instructor qualified ... and ETD practitioners as well. ... And people that have been working at officers' formative for a long time, and have facilitated and assessed, and thereto assessor qualified. ... From the... now full-time officer formative that we are, facilitating here in the unit.”*

- **LDPs taken from other branches to present URTP**

A 'branch' refers to “a local office or shop/store belonging to a large company or organisation” (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:171). Within the context of this study, a 'branch' refers to a smaller part or section of the unit responsible to deliver or support training.

It transpired that those participants who are not allocated to present during the full-time officer forming programme were the ones selected to present the SA Army's URTP and that LDPs were taken from other branches to deliver the URTP. Two participants verbalised their concerns as follows:

- (2) *“Nor... here at [Unit X] [institution name omitted] they just... took people who are...who were working at officers’ formative branch, as instructors there. ... Mmmm, ya they just took few members, then they went to evaluation, took someone who was going to be responsible for the design of the assessments, ok; then like I said earlier, ETQA [Education, Training, and Quality Assurance] was not permanently there for evaluating the programme, but they came on certain... phases ... of the programme. Ya. So, the selec... the selection in terms of the criteria it was the fact that you are working at officers’ formative branch.”*
- (8) *“... Uhhh...at at at officers’ formative, normally what actually it’s done, uhhh... it’s like this; remember now the the the the the, at the same time when URTP is uhhh... is presented, officers’ formative is also presented here in the unit. So what actually commanders they do, they look at uhhh... the instructors, uhhh... with...with...with...the instructors now that...that includes the assessors and the facilitators. Moderation can take place uhhh... uhhh...uhhh... uhhh... the time later. They look at the the amount of instructors that are, are here to present uhhh... officers’ formative. And after that, when everything actually it’s in place for officers’ formative, and then those that are not allocated like uhhh... with any uhhh... modules, then they are the one that are are selected to be taken there, because like I said; officers’ formative cannot stop, because our, ...our pool of instructors are also not enough.”*

- **Experiencing excessive pressure and workload** (cf 2.8.4; 2.8.8)

The Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary (2015:517) refers to the word ‘excessive’ as “greater than what seems reasonable or appropriate”. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:1736) defines ‘workload’ as “the amount of work that has to be done by a particular person or organisation”, whereas ‘pressure’ refers to “difficulties and feelings of anxiety that are caused by the need to achieve or to behave in a particular way” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1177).

Participants (LDPs) indicated that they had experienced excessive pressure and workload while trying to successfully deliver the SA Army’s URTP. This led to LDPs not getting time to relax themselves as they are also engaged with a full-time officer forming programme at the home unit (also cf previous subcategory – taken from other branches). As a result, participants (LDPs) were exposed to the same amount of work as required for the full-time officer forming programme. It was also expected from participants to complete the URTP within a shortened period of time (more or less two months), while the OFT is usually completed within six months. This was expressed as:

- (1) *“what we did is we went through the presentation; it was assessment, the next subject start... Like like I said the quality of that... presentations is not the same as we would have been here, were for... for instance you could explain something and give a practical example ... or how is it applied; there you just went through the slideshows.”*
- (2) *“... if I am not mistaken, if you calculate the number of weeks plus the weekends that we went, it can be in a scale of a month. ... Ya. So it's it's actually, it was a lot of work that had to be done in a short period of time.”*
- (3) *“Uhhhm... we had to present seventeen unit standards to the learners, which a normal programme they are presented over a period of six months. But there it was cut into three four weeks first session, three four weeks se...second session; which means probably two months. So it is impossible to, to present a work that is normally of six months in a two months period.”*

Participants also again mentioned time constraints (cf 2.8.8), which contributed to their experiences of excessive pressure (also cf 2.2.1, systems theory).

- (7) *“... normally you will have two three weeks for for one subject, or a week for a subject, you have to present it now in one two or three days, so time constraints was already a problem.... now the number of learners is already a problem; So you were just pushing so that you can finish with the presentation so that learners can go and complete the portfolios.”*

Participants (LDPs) also indicated that they could not provide learners with the necessary support due to the immense pressure (including time pressure) they were placed under (cf 2.8.8). This resulted therein that LDPs had to make compromises:

- (4) *“... let's talk in terms of assessments quickly. Where... a regular force students for officers' formative will get two weeks during which he can assimilate information on a subject is being presented, uhhhm... ya, obviously is where the instructor is. They had three days ... to assimilate information, and then you expect with the fourth day or the fifth they must write. So it was very difficult even to to... to manage the programme in terms of time. And and you know, that didn't allow me at the end to to consider the learners, because I got objectives that I must reach. ... I must for this phase; I must present the following subjects. Learners, once I'm done with that uhhh... phase, they must be assessed, found competent or not yet competent. ... So,*

*even on our side we were under pressure, ... in terms of achieving that objective, and it was difficult in balancing this thing, to give that necessary support uhhh... uhhh... to the learners. So, so, we had to compromise on...on... on... Ya, we had to compromise on certain things.”*

Meyer and Sloman (2012:8) similarly found that shortage of training staff (specifically assessors and moderators) leads to employee workload.

- **Experiencing being multi-tasked** (cf 2.8.4)

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:987) refers to ‘multi-task’ as “to do several things at the same time”. Participants (LDPs) had to assume multiple roles such as facilitating, assessing and moderating, while trying to ensure successful delivery of the SA Army’s URTP. This was expressed as:

- (1) *“... you were either facilitating or assessing or doing admin, on the specific date, so there were no time off for the facilitators.”*
- (2) *“uhhh... remember we were there as only facilitators, assessors and moderators; administration we were not necessarily uhhh... part of it. But we had to intervene on many occasions. You find that learners were said that they need to pay certain amount of money they will get t-shirts; t-shirts never arrived, ... until the course had to end, you see, so administration... it’s ... we had to... multi task.”*

Nonetheless, apart from training-related roles, participants had to do administrative functions as well, which were not part of their primary tasks. One participant expressed this as:

- (4) *“The rest of the administration was supposed to be run by... the the the... the administrative units. Which is the uhhh... reserve force units. But the times we had to deal with administration that is totally unrelated to... to... to the training itself.”*

Furthermore, participants (LDPs) indicated that they were tasked with both the SA Army’s URTP as well as the full-time officer forming programme presented at the home unit (also of previous subcategories – LDPs taken from other branches and experiencing excessive pressure and workload). Therefore, when participants (LDPs) returned to their home unit, they were required to continue with full-time Officer forming training interventions. The following statements attest to that:

- (4) *“... being committed on the one side uhhh... uhhh... with the Officers’ formative regular, that is also a bit... intensive... in terms of administrative and and then also in class.”*

- (4) *“some of these instructors they were also committed on the other side. So, so, it was... it was... it was... it was another burden.”*
- (8) *“Ya, actually the the actions they happen simultaneously. When you finish with URTP, in th...I mean, you you, with the uhhh.... uhhh... the URTP that side, and then now you come back, you carry on as an instructor at at, of the officers’ formative, while in the mean time you are still in contact with the learners of URTP, ... in order for you to finish up with these portfolios. Remember that the same portfolios that were there, we... wer...were with at Cape Town, you take them with, so that we can be able to complete them while we are busy presenting officers’ formative.”*

Meyer and Sloman, (2012:8) similarly found that LDPs within a South African context are challenged with multiple roles, resulting in them being uncertain about what their roles are.

- **Working overtime and after-hours**

‘Overtime’ refers to “time that you spend working at your job after you have worked the normal hours” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1068). Participants (LDPs) reported that they had to work overtime while trying to complete their work. For example, participants had to work until late after hours, and on weekends (Saturdays and Sundays) while trying to successfully deliver the SA Army’s URTP. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

- (1) *“... we had to start at six and then you present till uhhh... night time every day.”*
- (6) *“Saturdays, Sundays we had to put in time. and then it’s after hours it’s time.”*
- (6) *“... after hours we had to put in now more effort, ... to cover for the days.”*
- (8) *“we work from Monday to Monday. Saturday Sundays we are working... And we work the whole day. We do not leave a day until... I remember the time we were there, the will be times that may be will have to present for example, a certain uhhh... unit standards for two days or three days; ... That means we must work early in the morning until late. You do not finish..., u... u... you do not leave until you are finished, so you will work until past eight.”*

It further emerged that the late arrival of learners exerted more pressure on LDPs (also cf previous subcategory 4.6.1, availability of learners; cf 2.8.4). Reason being, they (participants/LDPs) had to work afterhours and over weekends while trying to get all learners to the same standard and to finish their work within the time available. One participant voiced his/her concerns as follows:

(4) *“Now imagine to... [participant laughing] You already have a very shortened period; now learners still arrives... late. So, now you must assist them, and then obviously, you don't have additional instructors that can, that that that uhhh... can assist.”*

- **Experiencing more learners in one classroom than usual**

Participants (LDPs) also indicated that they had more learners in one classroom than they were supposed to have; meaning the ratio of instructor versus learner was inappropriate. Consequently, one participant indicated that *the tasks versus personnel did not match*. The following are some of the statements to that effect:

(2) *“... we had more learners, les, facilitators, and remember we were given short period of time to complete the programme. So, really task versus personnel they did not collarate.”*

(6) *“...if you look at the ratio, its uhhh...like in a class, it's sometimes fifty learners in a class or with uhhh... one facilitator.”*

- **Expected to compile portfolios of the same standard as that compiled for full-time OFT (cf 2.8.8)**

A 'portfolio' refers to “a collection of photographs, drawing, etcetera, that you use as an example of your work, especially when applying for a job” (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1156). Within the context of this study, a *portfolio* refers to a collection of evidence produced by the learner over a specific time for him or her to be found competent on a certain subject or module within the URTP. Therefore, such evidence gets stored in a file to be audited or verified when needed. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1473), the word 'standard' refers to “a level of quality, especially one that people think is acceptable”.

Participants (LDPs) reported that managers expected the same portfolio that is compiled for a full-time officer formative training to be compiled for the URTP (the URTP has less instruction time allocated (also cf previous subcategory 4.6.4, experiences related to time constraints). As a result, participants (LDPs) had to pressurise learners to compile a portfolio of the same standard as the full-time OFT. The following statements attest to that:

(2) *“... we had to compile same portfolios of the same standard, that is presented on the officers' formative of six months.”*

(7) *“...we...we were required to...f present, I won't call it facilitate, because we were required to present, those modules and those subjects, ... to the members in a in a*

*period, short period of time, uhhhm... then they had to go and complete the portfolio and submit it to us, ... before we go back to our unit”.*

- (9) *Remember that the same portfolios that were there, we... wer...were with at Cape Town, you take them with, so that we can be able to complete them while we are busy presenting officers' formative.*

#### **4.7 THEME 5: QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE SA ARMY'S URTP (cf 2.9)**

Quality assurance has been described earlier (cf 2.9). Quality assurance is a crucial aspect of all training and development programmes, not only for providers of training and development, but also for organisations that finance such training programmes (Erasmus *et al.*, 2015:263). *Training evaluation (cf 2.9) as an aspect of quality assurance* serves as a vital tool for all stakeholders in the learning process (within the context of this study, the SA Army's URTP) that can be used to hold training and development (T&D) accountable for meeting the needs of the learners and the organisation. Within the context of this study, evaluation should provide evidence in terms of *how well the URTP works* and *how it can be made to work better*. One can therefore conclude that without evaluation, there will be no mechanism for establishing the changes to be made to a training programme (the SA Army's URTP), the degree of learning attained by the participants, and the effectiveness of the URTP training, including both financial and non-financial metrics. Training evaluation was earlier in this study referred to as a systematic collection of descriptive and judgemental information necessary to make effective decisions related to the selection, adoption, value and modification of various training activities (cf 2.9). Evaluation of training (URTP specifically) is necessary for decision-makers to identify the existing value, the quality, or contribution of the training programme for the SA Army's Reserve Force component, and therefore for them to make sound training-related decisions pertaining to investment made and improvement of the future training programmes.

Participants' experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance of the URTP are presented next.

##### **4.7.1 Experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance system (cf 2.8.4, quality assurance; 2.9)**

When asked about their experiences pertaining to training evaluation, some participants indicated that internal evaluation did take place, but to a limited extent. Participants indicated that although the Education Training and Quality Assurance (ETQA) branch from the home

unit came to visit them (LDPs), that this evaluation was ineffective, reason being they sympathised with them rather than evaluating the URTP training (Note that the ETQA section referred to here is not part of the external SETAs ETQA, but an ETQA section established internally by the SANDF – cf 2.9). Therefore, other participants indicated that no **evaluation** took place. Verbatim statements such as, “*It was not*”, “*I don’t know of any evaluations*”, “*I have never heard of any evaluation that took place*”, “*I don’t know about them*”, “*there was no evaluation*”, “*Evaluation wise I would not say... it was evaluation*”, were made in this regard.

**Table 4-14: Experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance system**  
(cf 2.9)

Main category 12	Sub-categories	n=9
4.7.1 Experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance system	Inadequate internal evaluation conducted on the URTP	5

The category ‘experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality system’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Inadequate internal evaluation conducted on the URTP** (cf 2.9)

It was reported that inadequate internal evaluation was conducted regarding the URTP. Participants indicated that no feedback was required from them regarding the training conducted. However, from their side (participants/LDPs), they conducted a form of debrief and submitted a report to higher authorities. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

- (1) “*uhhh... we did our debrief from our side and that was the only thing I remember of... uhghm evaluating the programme.*”
- (3) “*It was not. It was just... it was not evaluated according to the ETD processes because at that, a completion of the programme a report was only written to the authorities to take further actions.*”
- (4) “*Ok. The two... the two programmes that I conducted... I don’t know of any evaluations. You mean post... post... post... post... ok. ... Ok, but even post and and... No, for... there was none. ... There was none as far as I can remember. What I did was, I obviously after each contact session, I generated a report to... report on the progress, on the challenges that was uhghm... experienced, uhghm... on the programme.*”

It also transpired that the commander in charge (a programme coordinator within the context of this study) was supposed to assume the role of being a training evaluator as well, while at the same time coordinating the training programme and overseeing challenges experienced by LDPs. It was furthermore reported that members from the training evaluation section were only responsible for the design of assessments rather than evaluating the training programme. The following verbatim quotations attest to that:

- (6) *“We did not have uhhh...evaluators as such. We had a commander in charge, and he did uhhh...the actual e... actual evaluation, to seeing how facilitators are doing, he was there in class most of the time when presentations were done, ... to see what was our challenges. ... He was supervising ... evaluating the programme, and also overseeing our our challenges in terms of uhhh...if we are in line with the curriculum of the officers’ formative, uhhh... assessments, uhhh...setting of the assessments. ... uhhh...and uhhh...if you look at it, with the...setting of the assessments, you cannot uhhh...push the standards to the normal uhhh....officers’ formative course; you have to cut into certain stages. ... So he has to be in the class to evaluate see, how much can...contents can we put in the...assessment. ... You understand?”*
- (2) *“Mmmm.. they only had...they only had... ok, with evaluation as a section, ... we had a permanent member there, ... who was responsible for the designing of the assessments, ... obvious. Uhhh... but remember he is, his duty was just to design assessment. ... Ya, no... not to evaluate.”*

In some instances, the internal Education, Training and Quality Assurance (ETQA) branch from [Unit X] [institution name omitted] came to evaluate the programme (URTP) and to see if things are going well. One participant indicated that although there were visits by some of the higher authorities (internal), those visits were never intended for evaluation or the training programme, but rather only to observe how LDPs are doing:

- (2) *“But I will also indicate that ya, the representatives from the force prep, that they ca... Directorate Army Force Preparation, they came to observe how was, how we were delivering the training. Because in CB3 [Name of unit omitted] ... is when we were... had an end course function, even [participant’s name omitted] was there. Ok. From the Army force prep.*

Therefore, participants believed that the ETQA’s evaluation did not take place. Reason being, rather than properly evaluating the training programme, they had to sympathise with participants (LDPs) due to challenges experienced on-site by participants (LDPs). One

participant highlighted that the ETQA branch could not even sort out the challenges pertaining to the learning programme *per se*. One participant verbalised his/her experiences regarding inadequate external evaluation of the URTP as follows:

- (2) *Officer, ... ETQA. So, it, when when it came to evaluation, that we adhering to the guidelines, they are the... major role-players there. Even though they were not there with us on permanent bases, but they did come and visit.... But [participant coughing] honesty speaking, I I wouldn't say that their evaluation was that effective, ok, considering that they were not there permanently with us, that's the first thing, and some of the things they they could not even sort them out themselves. You see? Ok."*

The same participant furthermore indicated that even if training evaluation was going to be conducted, it was not going to be effective, considering the number of challenges that they had to go through to make the training programme a success:

- (2) *"...But however, even that evaluation is not going to be successful considering all the factors that I mentioned. You cannot expect me to deliver a good product based on the guidelines, but the timeframe is different. Because remember you gave me the guideline of six months' course, but you are giving a one month. So, it becomes a problem now, I mean I cannot deliver the same quality that you'll expect me to deliver when it becomes to a six months' course. ... So, that's why their [ETQA] evaluation also became ineffective. They [ETQA] ended up sympathising [participant laughing] with us instead of evaluating [participant laughing] the programme."*

It can be concluded from the aforementioned section that no internal evaluation of the URTP was inadequate and no external evaluation took place. With regard to internal evaluation in the SANDF (and in contrast to this study), Els (2016:102) indicated that all people (trainers, commanders and administration personnel) should provide feedback concerning quality of training and improvements, in order for these to be implemented for quality improvement.

#### **4.8 THEME 6: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINIMISE NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE SA ARMY'S URTP**

The word 'recommendation' refers to "an official suggestion about the best thing to do" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:1247). Within the context of this study, 'recommendations' are described as proposals perceived to contribute to the effective delivery of the URTP and future URTP's. Participants' recommendations were also categorised. Recommendations were specifically made concerning aspects that participants

found problematic as evident from the applicable findings already presented in this chapter and specifically their negative experiences regarding insufficient planning (cf 4.3.1), insufficient stakeholder support for URTP training (cf 4.4.1), inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT (cf 4.5.1-4.5.2), inappropriate training delivery of SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.3), time constraints (cf 4.6.4), lack of sufficient equipment and resources (cf 4.6.2), LDPs' negative experiences towards URTP (cf 4.6.5), and quality assurance of the URTP (cf 4.7.1). It is contended that recommendations made will contribute significantly towards addressing challenges encountered while delivering the SA Army's URTP and concerns raised by participants during the individual interviews. The recommendations to ensure efficient and effective delivery of the SA Army's URTP are encapsulated below and will also contribute to the general recommendations of this study (cf 5.5.1).

Participants' recommendations are presented next (cf 4.8.1-4.8.8, sub-categories).

#### **4.8.1 Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.3.1)**

The word '*insufficient*' and the word '*planning*' have been defined earlier (cf 4.3). Participants indicated planning in relation to SA Army's URTP was insufficient. Consequently, participants experienced many challenges that could have been avoided if planning was done properly.

**Table 4-15: Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.3.1)**

<b>Main category 13</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.8.1 Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP	Provision of a guiding document	1
	LDPs should be pre-briefed prior to URTP training	2
	Consult and obtain feedback from LDPs prior to URTP training	1
	Establish a central dedicated unit to oversee the URTP	2

The category 'recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Provision of a guiding document** (cf 2.8.1; cf 4.3.1)

A 'guiding document' has been described earlier (cf 4.3.1). Participants found it problematic that they did not have a *guiding document* to use in order to deliver the URTP (cf 4.3.1). Consequently, participants recommended that there should be a guiding document (for example a curriculum or an SWP) guiding them on how to roll out the URTP interventions. The following two recommendations attest to this:

(4) *“And then, whether we are going to call it a curriculum and SWP [Standard Working Procedure], but a guiding document as to the describes... ok, this is how URT... T... URTP must be... rolled... rolled out.” .... “Ya, you see, but I think uhhh... a great lack,... is a curriculum, or guiding document....Ya. To explain how to roll out; what is the pros going to be in terms of... Because you know...to be... to... to... to just to be handed this task. Go and it’s within two months you will stack. You don’t even really get chance ... to... to... to plan how you are going to deal with this thing.”*

- **LDPs should be pre-briefed prior to URTP training** (cf 4.3.1)

The word ‘pre-brief’ has been described earlier (cf 4.3.1). Participants (LDPs) found it problematic that they were not pre-briefed prior to the URTP and therefore recommended that they should be pre-warned and *pre-briefed* prior to commencement of the URTP (cf 4.3.1).

(1) *“Ya... [participant took a deep breath] is just, prior warning that you are gonna present this here, this time, uhhh... tell us about the people that are gonna be there; just a normal straight forward briefing before you start doing something. ... that will really, that will be appreciated.”*

(4) *“Firstly, is for whoever is coordinating this programme,... to be officially briefed, as to what is URTP all about.”*

- **Consult and obtain feedback from LDPs prior to URTP training** (cf 4.3.1)

The word ‘consult’ has been described earlier (cf 4.3.1), whereas ‘feedback’ is described as “advice, criticism or information about how good or useful something or somebody’s work is” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:552). Participants indicated that they (participants who are LDPs) were not *involved or consulted* during planning (cf 4.3.1). It was suggested that, prior to conducting URTP training, a work session with commanders should be conducted to discuss the issues pertaining to the training at hand. Reason being, through LDPs’ feedback, commanders should be able to make informed decisions. Therefore, one participant recommended that they be consulted during planning as their inputs or feedback might contribute immensely towards the effective delivery of the URTP. The following verbatim statement attests to this:

(6) *“The they should have work session and sit and...talk to the uhhh...commanders uhhh.... who are in charge of the URTP, and then from these that we have given to you, uhhh...the commanders can come down to us and say ok, this is one two three, and get more input from us, ... prior to making their own*

*decision. You understand? ... Because if you sit around the table, you'll get more from the facilitators who are on the ground, ... than being the commander himself making the decision, ... with the management. ... Then the management gives him the... feedback, and he has to plough what uhhh...feedback what uhhh...feedback is given to her, ... but then he doesn't cover everything."*

- **Establish a central dedicated unit to oversee the URTP** (cf 4.4.1)

To 'establish' is defined as "to start something or create an organisation or a system that is meant to last for a long time" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:507), whereas the word 'dedicated' refers to "working hard at something because it is very important to you" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:389). Participants recommended that a central dedicated unit be established with the aim to oversee implementation of the URTP. The following recommendations are directed towards the *establishment of a central unit* for the URTP, which also handles the budget thereof:

(1) *"And I and I think that uhhh... the URTP did... must be given to a unit, and the budget must also be done by that unit they have given to."*

(7) *"... set up a ... or structure a a branch, at [Unit X] [institution name omitted], that will be responsible for URTP. Uhhh...get the necessary skills or skills set within that branch."*

#### **4.8.2 Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training** (cf 4.4; 4.4.1)

'Stakeholders' and 'support' have been described earlier (cf 4.4). Participants experienced the *support and involvement* of stakeholders in the delivery of the SA Army's URTP negatively (cf 4.4.1). As a result, participants recommend that prior to the delivery of URTP, stakeholders (for example, the Reserve Forces) should be pre-briefed in terms of the training programme and regarding their (stakeholders) role in the URTP. Participants further recommended that formation headquarters, the SA Army force preparation group and the Reserve Forces should be fully involved in supporting the URTP. Participants also indicated that they (LDPs) also need to be involved during planning as their inputs that they will make can be beneficial towards the effective implementation of the URTP, as discussed (cf previous subcategory consult and obtain feedback from LDPs prior to URTP training).

**Table 4-16: Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training** (cf 4.4; 4.4.1)

Main category 14	Sub-categories	n=9
4.8.2 Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training	Involve all stakeholders, including learners during planning and delivery of the URTP	3

The category ‘recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Involve all stakeholders, including learners during planning and delivery of the URTP**

The word ‘involve’ is defined as “to make somebody take part in something” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:806), whereas ‘stakeholders’ have been described earlier (cf 4.4). One participant felt that more staff should be involved in the URTP:

- (2) *“uhhh... the number of personnel, that net... need to be involved, uhhh.... need to be more than what we were at that time, ok, because we were out numbers, we had more learners, less, facilitators, and remember we were given short period of time to complete the programme. So, really task versus personnel they did not correlate.”*

The same participant also indicated that staff members from all levels as well as the learners should be involved from the beginning in the URTP:

- (2) *“Firstly, uhhhm...the responsible... institution, now I am not talking about the institution where we are presenting now, I am talking about level, the different levels, from level one. I...I think they need be more involved, ... ok, with regards to the planning as well as the deliverance, ok, and... when the planning of URTP takes place, I...I...I would like the people on the tactical level, people who are working uhhh.... with what has to be delivered to the learners, also to be involved, so that they can have their inputs. ... You see? There is no use some thing is planned on you absence, but you have to execute it. ... It’s it’s it’s becomes a problem. Ok, that is number one. So, if...if the different levels mmm...that are responsible for strategic as well as operational planning can be involved, it will sort a lot of problems for us and we must actually have some line of communication with them. Alright.”*
- (2) *“Hence, I say that other levels need to be involved. Different formations ok, more in particular after the learners have been allocated to different formations, to sort out*

*the administration of the learners because it becomes our challenge, and to a certain extent we do not have lines to sort some of their problems or capabilities to do so.”*

One participant added that all the stakeholders were not involved since the start of the programme, and that a proper study should be conducted prior to enrolling in a programme such as the URTP, including a feasibility study, pitfalls concerning previous similar problems and how to improve. This was verbalised as:

- (7) *“I... I... I would say that, before starting such a programme, get all the role-players, because that was one on the issues, all the role-players, stakeholders was not involved from the start of this programme. Get all of them together. Do a proper study, on feasibility study. ... On who is doing, who is rolling out such type of programmes. Find out, what was the pit falls, how did they improve, ... Go through that process, that feasibility, and then... start small.”*

Another participant also alluded to the involvement of all stakeholders, specifically the reserve unit.

- (8) *“I will like the the management or all the stakeholders that are involved in making sure that this URTP is coming to pass, to... be involved... and to speak directly with us as the instructors on the ground what we see, and to also speak directly with uhhh...the learners. I am talking about these university learners.”*
- (8) *“Uhhh... the the other recommendations that I am looking at, if ever there is uhhh... uhhh... reserve unit, ... that is been actually allocated in order to host this URTP, ... they must know that, their.... part does not end after basic training. ... Yes.... [Unit X] [institution name omitted] is there to support them. Because remember they are the hosts, and then we are there to give uhhh... to...uhhh.... service delivery. ... So they must try by all means to own this URTP, because if ever they own it, and then we also we will also be able to do our job without any interference. ... From start to finish. Definitely. ... Yes.”*

#### **4.8.3 Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT (cf 2.6.2; 4.5)**

The words ‘recruitment’ (cf 4.5.1), ‘selection’ (cf 4.5.1), and ‘BMT’ (cf 2.6.7) have been described earlier. It emerged that participants negatively experienced the recruitment and selection process embarked upon to select candidates for the URTP. Therefore, participants recommended that the selection criteria should be refined as it currently allows for very young candidates to be recruited, which they (participants) found problematic. What follows

after the recruitment and selection process is the BMT; the participants also felt that the BMT was not appropriate as learners could still not do what is expected of a recruit who just completed BMT. For example, it is expected from a soldier to drill properly and to have discipline and knowledge of basic military aspects such as regimental aspects.

**Table 4-17: Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT**  
(cf 2.6.2; 4.5)

Main category 15	Sub-categories	n=9
4.8.3 Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT	Refine the recruitment and selection criteria for candidates	4
	Make more time for BMT and roll out all phases of URTP training in one area	2

The category ‘recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Refine the recruitment and selection criteria for candidates** (cf 4.5.1)

The words ‘recruitment’ and ‘selection’ have been described earlier (cf 4.5.1). Participants experienced the *recruitment and selection* criteria followed by the SA Army to select candidates for the URTP negatively (also cf 4.5.1-4.5.2; cf 2.6.2). Therefore, participants urged decision-makers to refine the recruitment and selection criteria. Participants highlighted that, among URTP learners, there were those learners who really wanted to be in the military. As a result, they (participants) recommended that such learners should be identified in the process and be given priority to be part of the SANDF. The following verbatim statements attest to this:

- (1) *“I think they must just look into the selection criteria for the... for the selection of the people that go there.... because really now they took very junior people, straight from basics to officers’ formative; for me, “mh...mh” [no no].”...“Ya, I think the.... if you look at, the the people that were there, they were going straight to be platoon commanders... on deployments,... so for me we should really look into the practical application of their leadership and as well as their physical skills on the ground, shooting and those things.”*
- (4) *“You know, uhhh... there is amongst these URTP learners. You know. You can sep... you can see who is... there’s there’s people that are really interested. ... You know. Uhhh... they... they... they were exited. They felt proud to to to... to wear uhhhm... the uniform. So, if we can also have a process of identifying those individuals. You know. Identifying those individuals.”*

One participant recommended that the university learners should first complete their academic studies and thereafter be recruited into the military, as that will ensure that such learners have enough time to receive proper military training. Learners will have enough time to go through basic military training, followed by officers' formative training without having to be distracted. Additionally, the same participant recommended that authorities should start by recruiting a small group of learners as that will ensure quality is maintained and appropriate skills are instilled. The following recommendation attests to this:

(7) *“ uhhh...you cannot take...you cannot expect... someone in his first, second and third year, to to to whilst he is busy with his studies, also now...uhhh...is busy with the URTP programme. Or rather wait for the student, recruit him, but rather wait for, to them, finalise his studies, and then, send him through a year programme, programme of the year, where he can do basic training properly, officer's formative properly, and then be integrated into the system. ... Then you know you have a quality soldier, first of all, and you got the skills, that you wanted.”*

(7) *“Do not just take a huge group and then you want to roll. Start this with a small group. and then uhhh...the look at, look at the university students.”*

One participant recommended that URTP learners should be recruited the same way as permanent force members. Therefore, anyone with grade 12 qualifies and has the opportunity to be selected. The same participant stated that by following the same recruitment and selection process, the SANDF will assure that appropriate candidates are selected:

(3) *“Uhhh... for me, I will not even recommend it to be improved. ... Any one should join the defence force the same way. ... Ya. ... It is not working, it is not working. Uhhh... if we stick to the way we recruit members from may be from grade twelve, and we develop them ourselves, then then we are sure what we are imparting what we require in the... in our organisation.”*

- **Make more time for BMT and roll out all phases of URTP training in one area (cf 4.5.2)**

The 'BMT' has been described earlier (cf 2.6.7). One participant suggested that all phases of the URTP, including BMT, should be rolled out in one designated area. This was articulated as:

(5) *“I will recommend that uhhh... students are gathered in one area.... And then students from all over this universities... comes to that one environment, and training*

*is conducted there. From basic training and... until the all phases are rolled out. ... Then after that, when the... students are now qualified... to be in the military, a selection process... from... the various departments is take... takes place, to select members, from those uhhh... institu.... from those universities, to be part of theirs, on permanent basis or reserve force basis, after they complete their degrees and diplomas. Then after that, these students can then now go and do what? officers' formative courses. ... Then they go and do what? officers' formative courses, in their various institutions. That will have been a much better uhhh... uhhh... better project, the way I foresee it."*

One participant added that more time should be provided for BMT:

- (9) *"... we need to make time to introduce them to "i basic training" [a basic training]. ... Then we carry over to "i URTP" [the URTP]. ... So that we do not have to fix discipline... things whilst we are doing officer formative. We do not still have to fix people that this is how you are doing saluting and complements, and and and. We need to be focused that, ok now, we are dealing with people that are going to be candidate Officers. ... Not that we must do two things at the time because, we were even asking... they were even asking us questions that you will see that this people have no clue ... about the Army. "O ya bona?" [You see?]."*

#### **4.8.4 Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP**

(cf 2.6.2; cf 4.6.3)

'Training' has been described earlier (cf 2.3), whereas 'delivery' refers to "the act of taking goods, letters, and many more to the people they have sent to" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:395). Within the context of this study, 'delivery' refers to the effective means of providing training to URTP learners. The 'URTP' has been described earlier (cf 1.10.4). Participants experienced the *training delivery method used to deliver* the SA Army's URTP (blended-learning) negatively (cf 4.6.3; 2.6.2). Therefore, participants recommended that a training delivery method such as e-learning or distance learning should be used to deliver the URTP training interventions.

**Table 4-18: Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP** (cf 2.6.2; cf 4.6.3)

<b>Main category 16</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.8.4 Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP	Utilise e-learning or distance learning as training delivery method for the URTP	2

The category ‘recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army’s URTP’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Utilise e-learning or distance learning as training delivery method for the URTP**  
(cf 4.6.3)

‘E-learning’ and ‘distance’ learning have been described earlier (cf 2.7). E-learning or distance learning are regarded by participants as training delivery methods appropriate to close the distance barrier between learners and LDPs. The following recommendations were proposed to address issues pertaining to training delivery method:

- (1) *“Ya, definitely is that one of the e-learning.”*
- (2) *“And I think also if we can establish some sort of e-learning. ... Uhhh... something that we do when we do company commanders, I am talking now in an infantry environment; ... Ya, distance learning. I think that can also assist us. These learners must not only receive training when we meet them during recession. ... Training must be continuous. ... Ya. So if it is continuous we can, we go to close a lot of uhhh... uhhh... negative gaps, you see, that has a negative impact obviously on the training. Uhhh... we bu...I can say if there is some sort of distance learning that takes place, ... then we...we can expect that at the end of the programme we produce quality officers; ok.”*

#### **4.8.5 Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP** (cf 4.6.4)

‘Time constraint’ has been described earlier (cf 4.6.4). Participants regard time as one of the most contributing factor that hampers the effective delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.4). Participants experienced the *time available* to present and prepare for the URTP as insufficient (cf 4.6.4). Most participants felt that the duration of the URTP should be extended.

**Table 4-19: Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP**  
(cf 4.6.4)

<b>Main category 17</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.8.5 Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP	Extend the duration of the URTP	2
	The time allocation for the URTP should be adjusted in line with the university programme, SAQA regulations and to the benefit of the learners	5

The category 'recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Extend the duration of the URTP** (cf 4.6.4)

The word 'duration' refers to "the length of time that something lasts or continues (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:466). Participants found the duration of the URTP problematic and too short (cf 4.6.4). Consequently, participants recommended that the URTP's duration should be extended over a period of six months or two years, to ensure effective training, and since participants have to produce officers by means of the URTP training. This was expressed as:

- (1) *"... they can make the duration six months, but then split up into groupings, ... when the learners are available."*
- (2) *"Secondly, the issue of time needs to be considered; even if we had to extend URTP. I I don't see a problem in that, because really in this short period of time that we are given, and we are expected to achieve uhhh....uhhh... I mean such an objective like producing an officer, a junior officer, uhhh... it's somehow it becomes a problem. Yes we can produce quantity, but now what about quality."*

- **The time allocation for the URTP should be adjusted in line with the university programme, SAQA regulations and to the benefit of the learners** (cf 4.6.4)

'Time' and 'allocation' have been described earlier (cf 4.6.4). Participants felt that the time that is allocated for the URTP should be adjusted in line with the university's programme and SAQA regulations (must adhere to recommended notional hours) so that it can benefit the learner and allow for effective learning. Participants expressed their recommendations in this regard as follows:

- (1) *"... if they can look at the people's time tables and then we can fit in their programme, as long as we can present the whole duration, not like this one that was only three or four months. It should be a six months course."*
- (2) *"Now my suggestion uhhh... really will be an increase in terms of the duration. ... Why do I recommend that; if the learner x did not pitch up for this period, with an increase duration, then the learner can be available I mean on the next session. ... Just to take back on what we had to do. ... Some of the learners were not assessed in theory in some of the subjects; now we had to book uhhh... time from their universities. Time including the venue, ok, ... where they had to write there, just to cover up from... I mean for their absence when those assessments were written,*

*because they were committed. It's either they were with their c.... other companies in terms of prac... I mean practicals ... yes, or some of them they were busy with supplementary assessments where it stands. ... You see?"*

- (4) *"If it's [Unit X] [institution name omitted] that is continuing with the programme, definitely extend the programme over two years. ... Don't condense this thing within one year, or we must at least go and sit, and do staff test. And see what will be the realistic period to conduct this training ... with with within. Definitely do something about the time. Both in terms of... is it now SAQA regulations in terms of notional hours and those things; thinking about the welfare of the learners and then also the availability of instructors from [Unit X] [institution name omitted] I think if we could extend the programme, it would address many of the challenges uhhh... that we've set with, with uhhh... previous programme. That is now if we continue ... with it in its current uhhh... in its uhhh... current form."*
- (6) *"Uhhh...uhhh...the most important thing is uhhh...time allocation, ... programmes, uhhh...certain subjects, have uhhh...lot of time needed to to complete certain programmes."*
- (9) *"... if you can just allocate more time."*

**4.8.6 Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.2)**

'Equipment' (cf 4.6.2) and 'resources' (cf 4.3.1) have been described earlier. On various occasions during the delivery of SA Army's URTP, LDPs experienced a *lack of equipment and resources* required to deliver the URTP effectively (also cf 4.6.2). As a result, participants recommended that commanders should provide them (participants) with the necessary resources and equipment to effectively deliver the URTP.

**Table 4-20: Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.2)**

Main category 18	Sub-categories	n=9
4.8.6 Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP	Provide necessary and sufficient resources and equipment to effectively deliver the URTP	3

The category 'recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Provide necessary and sufficient resources and equipment to effectively deliver the URTP** (cf 4.6.2)

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1493) refers to 'sufficient' as "enough for a particular purpose". The words 'equipment' (cf 4.6.2) and 'resources' (cf 4.3.1) have been described earlier. Participants recommended that resources such as printing, stationery, laptops, vehicles and financial resources be made available to them (LDPs) so that they can deliver the URTP to the same standard as the full-time officers' formative training. Participants also recommended that authorities should make sure that they (LDPs) have access to the internet in order to conduct research.

- (1) *"Uhhhm... and then ya, we we shouldn't be able...or have to struggle with with getting material, like uhhh... papers for printing, et cetera et cetera."*
- (6) *Ya, the...transport wise, they should have more... vehicles uhhh...for the students because we were using uhhh.... [eish there goes electricity– participant commented on electricity going off] we was using uhhh...ss...samils,...there was not buses probably for them to go from point A to point B, uhhh...we had to utilise our own vehicles to take them, especially to the sickbays, uhhh...make our own arrangements, ... to take them. .... Now that's all time consuming and it were personal to us.*
- (7) *"They must be provided with the necessary resources. ... Financial, uhhh...may be stationary, all those type of resources, ... Vehicles, uhhh...uhhh...resources in terms of uhhh...of uhhh...uhhh... the to be able to do research in terms of internet capability, ... Laptops, those types of resources. ... They must be given those those things. In order to to do uhhh...successful and competent job, on the ground."*

#### **4.8.7 Recommendations to address LDPs' negative experiences** (cf 4.6.5)

'LDPs' have been described earlier (cf 1.10.8). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:524) refers to 'experience' as "an event or activity that affects you in some way". Within the context of this study, experiences refer to events or activities that affect LDPs to deliver effectively the URTP. Participants experienced the dedication of some of the LDPs during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP negatively (cf 4.6.5). As a result, participants recommended that a pool of dedicated and committed LDPs should be selected to deliver the URTP.

**Table 4-21: Recommendations to address LDPs’ negative experiences** (cf 4.6.5)

Main category 19	Sub-categories	n=9
4.8.7 Recommendations to address LDPs’ negative experiences	Recruit only dedicated and best instructors to deliver the URTP	3
	Allocate a pool of LDPs to deal specifically and only with the URTP	2

The category ‘recommendations to address LDPs’ negative experiences’ is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Recruit only dedicated and the best instructors to deliver the URTP training** (cf 4.5.1)

The word ‘dedicated’ has been described earlier (cf 4.8.1). The Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2015:791) defines ‘instructor’ as “a person whose job is to teach somebody a practical skill or sport”. Within the context of this study, ‘instructor’ refers to ‘LDPs’ responsible to deliver the URTP. Participants recommended that only dedicated or committed LDPs should be selected to deliver the URTP.

- (4) *“And... and... and I think, to get dedicated... dedicated... facilitators or instructors... that is... for... for... for... for uhhm... ya, that is dedicated to... to... to... URTP.”*
- (5) *“I first... ok the first thing is, uhhh... select dedicated team members ... for instructures... uhhh... instructional purposes; have a team that is dedicated to training the URTP. That’s what I mean.”*
- (7) *“... if if we are given the tasking, let’s say for instance, next year there is a URTP, then we must be given the opportunity, to...uhhh....the best instructors first of all must be selected.... Uhhh...those instructors must be released to....or or given the opportunity to prepare for that learning programme.”*

- **Allocate a pool of LDPs to deal specifically and only with the URTP** (cf 4.6.5)

The word ‘pool’ refers to “a group of people that can be used when needed” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2015:1153), whereas LDPs have been described earlier (cf 1.10.8). Participants recommend that a pool of LDPs be selected to focus specifically on URTP. However, for the sake of gatekeeping, one participant recommended that a training coordinator (a sub-unit commander) be selected from Unit X. Reason being, Unit X is regarded as a main role-player in delivering leadership development programmes in the SA Army. The following verbatim quotations attest to this:

- (2) *“So... obviously there must be people, specific people allocated for just to deal with the URTP. Ok, I think that also is going to help us a lot.” ... “When it comes to the unit, I believe that there must be allocated personnel only for the URTP; ok. Not people that are going to be involved in other unit tasks and activities. ok. I am saying this... basing it on the introduction of distance learning.”*
- (2) *“URTP has to has its own instructors; ... Ok. You see. More particular if you say e-learning must be included, you see? Those are the people that are going to check that the learners submitted on daily basis, or whenever, based on the agreement that was... will be made with the learners. ...Do the marking, do the corrections; I mean the entire learning process, in order for him to take I mean smooth uhhh... kind process. ... yes, do assessment, confirmation, assessment... the only thing that you are supposed to go there for, in my view, it should be practicals.... Yes. When we have to make sure that whatever what was learned or they had to learn through distance it can be applied, ya.”*
- (4) *“And then may be also... if that can't be done, why not develop a pool of instructors from the reserve forces themselves to attend the [Unit X] [institution name omitted] officers' formative, where they can be there for the whole six month. ... Get... get the real deal. [participant laughing] Get trained there, and from there make sure you qualify that, those members in the necessary ETD subjects, and then we have a pool that can be availed ... from the reserve forces. You know. And then maybe you can have a supervisory team. ... Mm. The coordinator for example, can come from... from [Unit X] [institution name omitted]... from [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. You know? To oversee... to over... oversee... uhhh... the... the... the process. Uhhh... you know, and then... Yes, yes. Then you don't uhhh...uhhh...disable the... the... the capability of... of...of... of [Unit X] [institution name omitted]... [Unit X] [institution name omitted] Uhhh... you see... yerrrr.”*

One participant also felt that LDPs for the URTP should include both Regular Force as well as the Reserve Force members. This was articulated as follows:

- (4) *“It will link to what I've just said. Develop a pool of reserve force ... facilitators or establish a structure that only deals with with with URTP. So, get your... your... your curriculum, Let me use that word. Get your curriculum in place as to the approach... I'm thi... I'm thinking idealistic now ne. Get your curriculum in place, have a separate structure that only deals with URTP. Definitely develop a pool of subjects matter experts within the the the reserve community, then attends the the*

*the full officers' formative .... You see. Because for me... the guys that has went through the process now..., ahhh... I am not so certain whether they grasped all the content ... that was given to to them, ... You know, within all that reduced time. So, I would say, new pool, trained by [Unit X] [institution name omitted]. You see? To be available also, to to to uhhm... to assist. And then you know know... then obviously, [participant laughing] You know, there's now two parts. When I think recommending, there's two parts."*

#### **4.8.8 Recommendations directed at quality assurance of URTP (cf 2.9; cf 4.7)**

'Quality assurance' has been described earlier (cf 2.9). Participants (LDPs) experienced inadequate *internal evaluation* from various stakeholders responsible for URTP training (for example, SA Army force preparation, formation and home unit) (cf 4.7.1; cf 2.9). Participants recommended in this regard that the URTP should be properly planned, piloted and evaluated.

**Table 4-22: Recommendations directed at quality assurance of URTP (cf 2.9; cf 4.7)**

<b>Main category 20</b>	<b>Sub-categories</b>	<b>n=9</b>
4.8.8 Recommendations directed at quality assurance	Pre-inspections should be conducted prior to the commencement of the URTP	1
	The URTP should be properly planned, piloted and continuously monitored and evaluated	2

The category 'recommendations directed at quality assurance' is based on the following verbatim quotations:

- **Pre-inspections should be conducted prior to the commencement of the URTP**  
(cf 4.7.1)

'Inspection' refers to "the act of looking closely at something or somebody, especially to check if everything is as it should be" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2015:790). Therefore, within the context of this study, 'pre-inspection' refers to a form of inspection conducted prior to the delivery of a training programme to ensure that everything is in place and there is minimal influence on training to be conducted. Participants recommended that there should be a pre-inspection prior to the commencement of the URTP.

- (2) *"Now like I said, when it comes to the institutions in which URTP is presented, uhuh... really I believe there must be pre-inspection that is conducted there. Those people must be informed with the business at hand, what has to happen, and how are they expected to support, I mean ... the whole programme. Yes, because you will find that not necessarily that they are clueless, but they do not understand. Ok, it's*

*more like they were not briefed, that they is some sort of training that is going to take place and its demands are the following; yes it's it's it's like it was never listed to them. Alright. That will also help the administration issue,... which is a problem, as I indicated. Ok, but when... i...if it's beyond the institutions themselves, where the URTP is presented."*

- (2) *"There must be a delegate that go on conduct inspection."*
- (2) *"So, I think there must be pre-inspection in terms of...I mean the delegation must confirm that there is uhhh... sufficient personnel now, who are going to deal with all the needs, now the the needs from us as facilitators as well as of the learners. Ok. I I believe that is one thing that needs to be done."*
- **The URTP should be properly planned, piloted and continuously monitored and evaluated** (cf 4.7.1)

The word 'planning' has been described earlier (cf 4.3). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:1125) describes 'pilot' as "to test a new product or idea with a few people or in a small area before it is introduced everywhere". The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2015:972) defines 'monitor' as "to watch and check something over a period of time in order to see how it develops, so that you can make any necessary changes", whereas 'evaluation' has been described earlier (cf 2.9). Participants indicated that the URTP should be well planned and thereafter piloted with a small group of learners and during the training process be continuously monitored and evaluated so as to ensure proper implementation thereof. The following verbatim statements attest to recommendations made by participants in this regard:

- (5) *"That is how I would like management to do. ... Do you get it? They must not just roll out the programmes, or plan and roll out the programmes. They must plan, pilot those programmes. ...Thereafter, evaluate the programmes and implement the recommendations of those evaluations."*
- (7) *"uhhhm....make sure wher...wher...wherever you are going to present, the facility, or the institution you are going to present, is hundred percent on board. ... So that you can get uhhh....proper facilities in terms of classrooms, in terms of resources, to assist the members going there to present these programme... And then continuously monitor and evaluate the programme, so that we can do improvements."*

#### 4.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

In order to enhance trustworthiness, I made an attempt to present the research findings as factually and objectively as possible. Therefore, direct verbatim quotations were used. Each theme identified gave rise to main categories and sub-categories, and these main and sub-categories were discussed (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1). Relevant quotes from participants' transcribed responses were presented and this was principally aimed at presenting a coherent, disciplined, defensible and scientifically sound argument. Literature control was done in respect of some themes, main categories and sub-categories identified where necessary and applicable so as to establish whether the findings are in agreement with what other researchers have or have not established.

The findings of this study revealed that most participants (LDPs) experienced the SA Army's URTP negatively. These findings corroborate research literature in terms of factors affecting the effective delivery of training, specifically the reserve force training (cf 2.8; 2.8.1-2.8.8). More specifically, it emerged from the experiences related by participants that aspects such as poor planning, insufficient resources, time constraints, the methodology (blended learning) used, to mention just a few, had a negative effect on the delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1). Time was found by all participants to be contributing negatively towards the delivery of the training programme (SA Army's URTP) (cf 4.6.4). This is in line with the systems theory that disturbances in one sub-system (for example, poor planning as mentioned above) may negatively affect the other sub-system(s) (implementation of URTP) (cf 2.2.1). Therefore, in line with the process approach to learning and development (cf 2.2.2), a proper analysis, which includes planning, is essential for the effective implementation of the delivery and implementation of the URTP.

During interviews, the researcher could observe the frustrations of participants when answering most of the questions (cf 3.4.2.2), which strengthens the conclusions that the URTP needs to be modified in such a way that the challenges encountered will be addressed (cf 2.9; cf 2.2.1-2.2.2; 4.3.1-4.7.1). For example, one participant verbalised this as follows: *"Ok...I don't want to sound negative now; [participant laughing] but yes, uh-hm... it it it was more of... negative experiences than the positive once. Uh-hm...Yes. I can say it was less positive. I mean on the instructors' perspective now...Based on uh-hm... certain issues, like the time was a v... uh-hm... very contributing factor; contributed negatively."* Furthermore, one participant, when asked what recommendation he/she can make regarding the URTP, expressed his/her frustration regarding URTP by making statements such as: *"Uh-hm... for me, I will not even recommend it to be improved. ... Any one should join the defence force the same way. ... Ya... It is not working, it is not working. Uh-hm... if we stick to*

*the way we recruit members from may be from grade twelve, and we develop them ourselves, then then we are sure what we are imparting what we require in the... in our organisation.... But just... this one is like you you you are trying to bridge a... a gap in in a wrong way”.*

From the findings, participants made recommendations that are necessary to effectively deliver future SA Army’s URTP, and therefore to minimise challenges or negative effects impacting on the URTP training (cf 4.8.1-4.8.8). Among other recommendations made, the most important recommendations made by participants are that the URTP be extended over a period of two years, including BMT (cf 4.8.5), and either e-learning or distance learning (cf 4.8.4) as a training delivery method should be used to deliver the URTP as that will allow for continuity. Reason being, time was seen by participants as the most contributing factor that hampered the effective delivery of URTP (cf 4.6.4).

To ensure comprehensiveness, the themes, main categories and subcategories that emanated from interviews are summarised as follows:

**A      THEME 1: INSUFFICIENT PLANNING TO DELIVER THE SA ARMY’S URTP**

**1.      Experiences related to insufficient planning**

- 1.1      No curriculum or a guiding document made available
- 1.2      No pre-briefing took place or guidelines given
- 1.3      LDPs not being involved or consulted during planning
- 1.4      Learning delivery and resources not adequately planned for

**B      THEME 2: STAKEHOLDERS’ SUPPORT FOR TRAINING**

**2.      Experiences related to stakeholders’ involvement to support training**

- 2.1      Lack/adequate support from home unit
- 2.2      Lack/adequate involvement and support from the Reserve Forces
- 2.3      Lack/adequate involvement and support from close-by units

**3.      Experiences related to communication and liaison among stakeholders**

- 3.1      Reserve Force commanders or authorities not readily available for assistance and unwilling to approach the Regular Force for assistance
- 3.2      Training being influenced by lack of appropriate liaison with universities

**4.      Experiences related to command and control**

- 4.1      Learners not being disciplined
- 4.2      Poor administration of Reserve Force

**C      **THEME 3: INADEQUATE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND BASIC MILITARY TRAINING OF CANDIDATES****

**5.      **Experiences related to recruitment and selection****

5.1      Inadequate selection process

**6.      **Experiences related to the Basic Military Training (BMT) phase****

6.1      Learners lacked knowledge of basic military aspects

6.2      Inadequate time allocated for BMT

**D      **THEME 4: DELIVERING THE SA ARMY'S URTP TRAINING INTERVENTIONS****

**7.      **Experiences related to availability of learners to undergo training****

7.1      Learners absent from training due to other commitments

7.2      Learners arriving late or not at all

7.3      Learners quitting in the middle of the URTP

7.4      Learners' attitudes towards the URTP

7.5      Learners not being subjected to the Military Disciplinary Code

**8.      **Experiences related to non-availability of resources****

8.1      Not enough LDPs to deliver the URTP

8.2      Insufficient medical support

8.3      Inadequate meals for learners and LDPs

8.4      Challenges with printing resources

8.5      No tables and desks allocated in classrooms and at learner accommodation

8.6      Insufficient field equipment for field exercises

8.7      Learning material not suitable for training

**9.      **Experiences related to the training delivery method****

9.1      Blended-learning was not implemented

9.2      Training method resulted in stress for LDPs

**10.     **Experiences related to time constraints****

10.1     Insufficient and incorrect time allocated for the URTP

10.2     Standards compromised due to insufficient time

10.3     Time allocated for URTP less than for Regular Force members

10.4     URTP not in line with required notional hours

10.5     Skimping on content due to insufficient time allocated

10.6     Insufficient time to conduct practical or physical training

10.7     Insufficient time for the learners to rest and assimilate information

10.8     Going over the time allocated to complete or finalise the work

10.9     Uncertain whether learners are fit to become officers

- 11. Negative experiences of LDPs involved in the delivery of the URTP**
- 11.1 Unknown selection criteria to select LDPs
  - 11.2 LDPs taken from other branches to present URTP
  - 11.3 Experiencing excessive pressure and workload
  - 11.4 Experiencing being multi-tasked
  - 11.5 Experiencing more learners in one classroom than usual
  - 11.6 Expected to compile portfolios of the same standard as that compiled for full-time officer formative training

**E THEME 5: QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE SA ARMY'S URTP**

**12. Experiences related to evaluation as part of the quality assurance system**

- 12.1 Inadequate internal evaluation conducted on the URTP

**F THEME 6: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINIMISE NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE SA ARMY'S URTP**

**13. Recommendations directed towards insufficient planning of the SA Army's URTP**

- 13.1 Provision of a guiding document
- 13.2 LDPs should be pre-briefed prior to URTP training
- 13.3 Consult and obtain feedback from LDPs prior to URTP training
- 13.4 Establish a central dedicated unit to oversee the URTP

**14. Recommendations directed towards stakeholder support for training**

- 14.1 Involve all stakeholders, including learners during planning and delivery of the URTP

**15. Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT**

- 15.1 Refine the recruitment and selection criteria for candidates
- 15.2 Make more time for BMT and roll out all phases of URTP training in one area

**16. Recommendations directed towards the training delivery of SA Army's URTP**

- 16.1 Utilise e-learning or distance learning as training delivery method for the URTP

**17. Recommendations directed towards time constraints to deliver the URTP**

- 17.1 Extend the duration of the URTP
- 17.2 The time allocation for the URTP should be adjusted in line with the university programme, SAQA regulations and to the benefit of the learners

- 18. Recommendations directed towards the lack of equipment and resources during delivery of the SA Army's URTP**
  - 18.1 Provide necessary and sufficient resources and equipment to effectively deliver the URTP
  
- 19. Recommendations to address LDPs' negative experiences**
  - 19.1 Recruit only dedicated and best instructors to deliver the URTP
  - 19.2 Allocate a pool of LDPs to deal specifically and only with the URTP
  
- 20. Recommendations directed at quality assurance of URTP**
  - 20.1 Pre-inspections should be conducted prior to the commencement of the URTP
  - 20.2 The URTP should be properly planned, piloted and continuously monitored and evaluated

#### **4.10 SUMMARY**

In this chapter (Chapter 4), qualitative data from the nine (9) semi-structured individual interviews were analysed, interpreted and synthesised. Six (6) themes, twenty (20) main categories and fifty-nine (59) sub-categories were identified and presented in tables (cf Tables 4.3-4.22) and verbatim quotations (cf 4.3.1-4.8.8). The findings from this research revealed that participants experienced many aspects of the SA Army's URTP more negatively than positively (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1). Regardless of all participants' frustrations regarding SA Army URTP and challenges encountered, it became evident throughout the whole study that, *'time available'* for LDPs to deliver the URTP was found to be inappropriate and led to escalation of most challenges participants referred to in this study (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1). The findings of this study mandated a number of recommendations (including those of participants) that will be proposed in Chapter 5 to address the experienced challenges and to improve the future URTPs in the SA Army.

## CHAPTER 5

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter (Chapter 5), a summary of the research conducted will be provided (cf 5.2). The interpretation of the findings will be discussed (cf 5.3). The limitations of the study (cf 5.5) and the recommendations ensuing from the findings pertaining to the research/future research (cf 5.4.1; 5.4.2) will be provided and discussed. This chapter (Chapter 5) will conclude by providing final conclusions that are drawn from the study (cf 5.6).

#### 5.2 SUMMARY

In **Chapter 1**, the reader was oriented towards the study (cf 1.1). A review of the body of scholarship (cf 1.4) and a literature study (cf 1.8) were done to gain a better understanding of the topic under investigation, namely learning and development practitioners' (LDPs') experiences of the South African (SA) Army's University Reserve Force training (URTP). The main intent of the study, being to explore and describe the SA Army LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), was provided and motivated.

It was indicated that, although the SANDF has been characterised by rapid and fundamental changes over the last couple of years, especially as far as its strategic environment (domestic and international security context) is concerned, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that the SANDF's Reserve Force is poorly trained, equipped and staffed to be able to contribute significantly towards the SANDF's mandate. Therefore, the defence review (2015) suggests that the Reserve Force be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to execute successful operations across the spectrum of potential conflict (DoD, 2015:14-13) and by means of Reserve Force Training, namely the URTP (cf 1.3). I (the researcher) also observed that the Reserve Force members struggled to marry-up with the Regular Force members during military exercises, due to the lack of continuous training on prime mission equipment. Therefore, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) report cited in Le Roux (2005:3) affirms that the SA Army's Reserve Force component is poorly trained, equipped and staffed to be able to support the Regular Force in defending and protecting SA, its territorial integrity, its national interest and its people (cf 1.3).

Previous international studies (cf 1.4) indicated that there are many factors impacting on Reserve Force training. Such factors include time available to train the Reserve Force, training environment, dispersed Reserve Force units, training methodology, and availability of soldiers to attend training as the most common factors impacting negatively on Reserve

Force training (cf 1.4). The review of the body of scholarship (cf 1.4) also revealed that although several military studies had been conducted within an international context on Reserve Force training, including the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) (which is similar to the South African URTP), none of the previous international studies focused on LDPs' experiences of Reserve Force training, which is considered a gap in the international military literature. Although several previous national (South African) studies have been conducted within a military context, none of these studies focused on Reserve Force training, which is considered a national gap in the body of scholarship. Both the aforementioned gaps were addressed in this study. The gaps in the review of the body of scholarship (cf 1.4), the literature study (cf 1.5) as well as the practical problems identified (cf 1.3) assisted in the development of the problem statement and formulation of the research questions (cf 1.5).

In **Chapter 2**, a brief outline of the conceptual-theoretical framework was provided (cf 2.2; 2.2.1; 2.2.2). To answer the first research question, the Reserve Force training was considered and discussed against the backdrop of *systems* and *process theories* (cf 2.2.1; 2.2.2). A discussion of Reserve Force training, which included an exposition of *military training, the ROTC* and *URTP* in terms of their definition (range of meanings), purpose and benefits (cf 2.4) was conducted. The ROTC (Reserve Force training in an international setting) was compared to the URTP (cf 2.5.1) in order to find out the commonalities in factors impacting on Reserve Force training. Furthermore, Reserve Force training within the SA context, namely the SA Army's URTP, was discussed in terms of the URTP's purpose (cf 2.6.1), the recruitment and selection criteria used (cf 2.6.2), the components of the URTP (cf 2.6.3), the URTP management process (cf 2.6.4), command and control (cf 2.6.5), stakeholders' involvement in the delivery of the URTP (cf 2.6.6), stages of URTP training (cf 2.6.7) and the training delivery method (distance and residential) (cf 2.7).

The factors that may negatively influence Reserve Force training, specifically the URTP, were also discussed, and included management of training, management support for training, availability of equipment and resources, the LDPs, training costs, geographical location and availability of learners to undergo training, training delivery method, and time available (cf 2.8; 2.8.1-2.8.8). It became apparent in most cases that the literature conducted (cf Chapter 2) concurred with the *systems theory* (cf 2.2.1), which indicated that *one sub-system* affects the *other sub-system*. For example, the unavailability of resources possibly will affect the outcome of training. Chapter 2 concluded with a discussion of the quality assurance of the URTP (cf 2.9).

In **Chapter 3**, the research design and methodology that were selected and used for this study (cf Chapter 3) were discussed. The qualitative research design, more specifically *phenomenology*, was selected, described and the rationale for the use thereof was provided (cf 3.4.1). The philosophical worldview underpinning this qualitative study, namely interpretivism, was also described (cf 3.4). The study population for this study (the SA Army's LDPs), the sampling procedure (non-probability sampling, more specifically purposive sampling) and a sample (participants not exceeding nine (9) participants) were identified and described (cf 3.3.1; 3.3.2). The qualitative data generation methods, namely a literature review, semi-structured individual interviews, field notes and observations that were used to investigate the phenomenon were described and presented separately (cf 3.4.2.2 to 3.4.2.3). More specifically, the literature review preceded the empirical research and was conducted to ensure that the empirical study is based on a sound theoretical framework about Reserve Force training, specifically the SA Army's URTP, and to ensure literature control (cf Chapters 1 & 2). The interviews (semi-structured individual interviews) were conducted to elicit the views and opinions of the participants regarding the investigated phenomenon (cf 4.3.1-4.8.8). The field notes were taken during interviews in order to adequately capture the context of the observations (behaviours and activities of participants) made by participants. The observations made during interviews led to a deeper understanding of how the participants viewed the phenomenon, and enabled me (the researcher) to see things that participants themselves were not aware of, or were unwilling to discuss, such as their frustrations when expressing what transpired during the delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.1; 4.6.2; 4.6.3; 4.6.4; 4.9).

The data analysis technique (*hermeneutics*) (cf 3.4.3) was used to analyse generated qualitative data and the rationale for use was described. To ensure the quality of data generated, I (the researcher) employed strategies, including trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability, and described these mentioned strategies for use and relevance in this study (cf 3.4.4.1-3.4.4.5). In order to protect the participants, develop trust, promote integrity of the research, guard against misconduct and impropriety that might reflect on the participants' organisation, I (the researcher) identified ethical considerations (cf 3.4.6), discussed them in terms of their applicability to this study, and ensured their applicability throughout the various stages of the study (cf Chapters 1 to 4).

In **Chapter 4**, the data ensuing from the transcribed semi-structured individual interviews of nine (9) LDPs from the SA Army was analysed and interpreted. The analysed qualitative data resulted in six (6) themes, twenty (20) main categories and fifty-nine (59) sub-categories (cf 4.3-4.8; 4.3.1-4.8.8). The main categories and sub-categories were clustered

according to their degree of relevance to each theme and discussed individually (cf 4.3.1-4.8.1). To ensure literature control, each identified theme, main category and sub-category was discussed with the support of relevant literature and pertinent quotes from the participants (cf 4.3-4.8; 4.3.1-4.8.1). In gaining a complete understanding of the phenomenon and its impact on the LDPs, data generated was triangulated, member checked and peer examined (cf 3.4.4.1-3.4.4.5).

The LDPs reported a considerable amount of experiences pertaining to the SA Army's URTP, of which most experiences were found to be negative (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1; 5.3.2.1-5.3.2.12). In some instances, the LDPs appreciated certain aspects such as the involvement and support from close-by units and the home unit (Unit X) as being positive towards the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.4.1). In line with the literature (cf 1.4; 2.8; 2.8.1-2.8.8), it became evident that factors including insufficient planning (cf 4.3.1; 5.3.2.1), stakeholders' involvement to support training (cf 4.4.1; 5.3.2.2), communication and liaising among stakeholders (cf 4.4.2; 5.3.2.3), command and control (cf 4.4.3; 5.3.2.4), recruitment and selection (cf 4.5.1; 5.3.2.5), basic military training (BMT) phase (cf 4.5.2; 5.3.2.6), availability of learners to undergo training (cf 4.6.1; 5.3.2.7), non-availability of equipment and resources (cf 4.6.2; 5.3.2.8), training delivery method (cf 4.6.3; 5.3.2.9), time constraints (cf 4.6.4; 5.3.2.10), involvement of LDPs in the delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.5; 5.3.2.11), and evaluation as part of quality assurance (cf 4.7.1; 5.3.2.12) negatively affected the delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1; also cf 2.2.1, systems theory and 2.2.2, process theory).

Through the research conducted (cf Chapter 4), it was highlighted by the LDP's that *time constraint* mostly contributed negatively to the effective delivery and management of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.4). The LDPs therefore indicated that, in order to eliminate most of the perceived challenges, they (LDPs) should be consulted or involved during planning as that should provide commanders with information or inputs necessary to guide the URTP efforts towards success (cf 4.3.1). In line with the process theory, the URTP's planning phase had a negative effect on its implementation phase. Reason being, planning is a crucial phase that gives direction to other phases following thereafter. Therefore, any shortcomings or limitations during planning are assumed to worsen during the implementation phase.

The findings of this study will be discussed next:

### **5.3 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

The aim of this study was to explore the LDPs' experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP. Therefore, in this section, the findings of this study from which the recommendations will be made, are presented, interpreted and discussed. Where applicable, the findings will be compared with the literature on the Reserve Force training. The conclusions from the research are presented by answering each of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 (cf 1.5) in this section:

#### **5.3.1 How is military training, with specific reference to URTP training, conceptualised in the literature?**

There is a common understanding of the concept of military training among different authors in literature, specifically Reserve Force training (cf 1.4; 2.4). Based on the literature reviewed (cf Chapter 2), Reserve Force training is training that is conducted to mitigate the Reserve Force challenges, by enhancing in them (the Reserve Force) sustainability, readiness and responsiveness to assist the Regular Force (cf 2.4). Therefore, military training is training that is conducted with a purpose (cf 2.4). Based on the literature, the Reserve Force (specifically, SA Reserve Force) is regarded as being poorly trained to support the Regular Force during emergencies (Le Roux, 2005:3; cf 1.3). Consequently, it became clear from literature that the SA Army's vision with the URTP was to close the gap that exists between Reserve Force training and the Regular Force as outlined by Le Roux (2005:3). The SA Army envisaged through the URTP, to shape and develop junior leaders who should develop into senior commanders in the future; therefore, to enhance the Reserve Force capability (DoD, 2015:11-1). Such junior leaders are believed to possess skills not normally found within the SA Army, as they are from various SA universities.

Lushenko and Hammerschmidt (2015:59) warned in literature that military training will remain a lost art if commanders heartlessly fail to prioritise and align it (within the context of this study the URTP) against mission-essential tasks (cf 2.4). Similarly, in order to transform the URTP into a more dynamic and responsive force, commanders at all levels, from unit level to HQs, need to support the implementation of the URTP by providing LDPs with necessary resources required to support or enhance training. Moreover, they also need to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of the URTP. This finding is in line with the systems theory that the results from training evaluation are essential to inform future training interventions (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Therefore, the results from training evaluation, as part of a quality assurance system, should be used to align the URTP to achieve the training outcomes.

In line with systems theory, it was found that the URTP did not have any curriculum or a training model captured that needed to be followed during implementation, which may be regarded as a gap that needs to be addressed. Furthermore, the URTP should be able to capture the complex and dynamic interactions of environments, individuals and work processes operating at any point in time and over a period of time (cf 2.2.1). Therefore, by means of a literature review (cf 2.5.2; 2.6; 2.6.1), it became clear that the SA Army wanted to transform the SA Army Reserve Force into a more dynamic and responsive force. The URTP provided the opportunity to recruit undergraduate and post-graduate students from various universities within SA who possess scarce skills not normally found within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (cf 2.4).

It can be concluded through the findings that the SA Army's URTP, if well implemented, could yield greater results and therefore provide learners with greater potential to face real-life situations and who should accomplish real-life missions effectively and timeously.

### **5.3.2 How do SA Army LDPs experience the SA Army's URTP?**

It emerged that the LDPs mostly experienced the SA Army's URTP negatively, rather than positively. More specifically, the LDPs experienced the SA Army's URTP as follows (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1):

#### **5.3.2.1 Insufficient planning** (cf 4.3.1; also cf 2.8.1)

It became evident from the findings that no pre-brief meetings were conducted prior commencement of the URTP training interventions (cf 4.3.1). On the contrary, like in any other new training programme, guidelines were supposed to have been given to how the URTP should be rolled out, what the intended outcome of the URTP is and what the expected contribution of LDPs towards successful implementation of the URTP is (cf 4.3.1). Based on the *systems theory*, this study proved the existence of systematic disconnects in successfully implementing the URTP. It became evident that management were unable to clearly specify the intended outcomes of the URTP (cf 4.3.1; 4.4.1; 4.4.3), and do not have a systematically defined processes that needed to be followed by the LDPs when delivering the URTP training interventions (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Furthermore, the LDPs indicated that no curriculum or a guiding document was made available to LDPs, so that the LDPs can make use of such documents (curriculum or a guiding document) to guide the URTP towards success (cf 4.3.1). As a result, based on LDPs' prior experience in training, they (LDPs) had to figure out how the URTP should be delivered and managed. It became apparent that with the unavailability of some sort of any guiding document, it was still going to be difficult for the LDPs to deliver the URTP, as LDPs indicated that they never presented any programme that follows a blended learning approach (cf 4.6.3).

According to Swanson and Holton III (2001:22), HRD as a purposeful system or process, consists of, for example, inputs, processes, outputs and feedback, while not excluding contributors or external partners (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Based on *systems theory*, it became again apparent that LDPs were never consulted or involved during planning (cf 4.3.1), resulting therein that the LDPs could not provide useful inputs or feedback during the planning phase of the URTP. The LDPs' involvement during planning could have eliminated many challenges encountered during the implementation of the URTP, and just make it easy for LDPs to implement the URTP successfully with minimum challenges (cf 4.3.1; 4.4.1-4.7.1).

It also emerged that insufficient planning resulted in learners not having the opportunity to do physical training due to the planned, and compressed URTP schedule (also known in the military as a block programme) that could not make provision for physical training to form part of URTP training (cf 4.3.1). Moreover, insufficient planning resulted in learning material used not being proportional to the number of learners at some close-by military units (cf 4.3.1), whereby the LDPs had to travel in some instances more than 100 kilometre (km) to geographically distanced units while trying to make needed resources available (cf 4.6.2). This impacted negatively on training as, in some instances, training had to stop until the learning material was made available to continue (cf 4.6.2). In some instances, the LDPs also had to use their own resources (for example, data for internet or vehicles for transport) to help learners or deliver the URTP interventions (cf 4.3.1). These findings also prove, according to the systems and process theory, that the planning phase, which is crucial for providing direction for implementation of the URTP, impacted negatively on the implementation phase of the URTP (cf 2.2.2, process theory). It also emerged that planning for each URTP was done in isolation of other URTPs, because the LDPs indicated that lessons learned from the previous URTPs were never incorporated in the planning of the URTP. Only if planning was done properly, all challenges experienced might have been avoided (also cf 2.2.2, process theory).

It is concluded through the findings of this study that planning for the URTP was insufficient and was negatively experienced by the LDPs, as it affected their work during the implementation of the URTP.

#### **5.3.2.2 Stakeholders' involvement to support training** (also cf 2.8.2)

LDPs revealed that they (LDPs) experienced the stakeholders' involvement to support the delivery of the SA Army's URTP negatively (cf 4.4.1). However, it became evident from the findings that the LDPs referred most of their negative experience towards the Reserve Force's involvement in supporting URTP training (cf 4.4.1). The LDPs felt that the Reserve

Force distanced themselves totally from the URTP, thereby, most of the time, leaving the LDPs to struggle alone with the implementation of the URTP. As a result, the LDPs reported that LDPs had to deal with the day-to-day activities directed at the Reserve Force rather than concentrating on training (core business). For example, daily roll call of learners, organising of printing resources or any other relevant equipment, handling of accommodation as well as mess challenges, transporting of learners to sickbays and learner administration were challenges experienced. Therefore, in line with the systems theory, the effectiveness of the URTP and performance of the LDPs to do their work were mediated by the Reserve Force's expertise and effort to do their work effectively and appropriately (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Nevertheless, the LDPs reported that, in some instances, the Reserve Force assisted with basic resources, such as photocopying papers and providing cleaning material (cf 4.4.1).

The LDPs appreciated the support received from *close-by units*, even though the URTP training was not their (close-by units) main responsibility (cf 4.4.1). The LDPs referred in this regard to the close-by units' responsibility as only to make the training venue or training environment available for LDPs to deliver the delivery the URTP (cf 4.4.1). It emerged from the findings that even though in some instances the equipment and resources were insufficient (cf 4.6.2), the close-by units' involvement and support were noticeable and therefore led to the successful implementation of the URTP. Even though the LDPs appreciated the involvement and support from close-by units, it also emerged that, in some instances, close-by units could not fully take care of the LDPs needs' (cf 4.4.1). For example, the findings revealed that the accommodation and the meals provided by the close-by units were not up to standard, especially for officers in the military (cf 4.4.1).

It emerged that commanders from Unit X lacked knowledge regarding the URTP; however, they (commanders from Unit X) took care of resources such as financial (allowances), physical (learning support materials), as well as human resources (LDPs) required to deliver the URTP (cf 4.4.1). The LDPs confirmed that the *home unit* was always available to provide the LDPs with support needed to deliver the URTP. The LDPs reported that the *home unit* had to use its own resources to support the URTP, as it was stated earlier that some equipment and resources had to be brought with from the home unit (Unit X) (cf 4.6.2). The LDPs, through their (LDPs) frustration during interviews, made statements such as "the home unit did not even budget for such resources"; however, made them (resources) available to support the URTP (cf 4.4.1). Furthermore, the home unit (Unit X) arranged the administration for the LDPs to ensure that the subsistence and travel allowances (SNTs) are in place. It transpired during the interviews that the LDPs placed at these various training institutions (close-by units) were regularly and telephonically checked on concerning their

(LDPs') wellbeing (cf 4.4.1). Following up on these LDPs from time-to-time by commanders from the home unit (Unit X) also boosted the LDPs' morale and made LDPs feel appreciated for the hard work and uncondusive tasks they (LDPs) are exposed to.

It can be concluded through the findings of this study that the LDPs negatively experienced the involvement and support from the Reserve Force, and the involvement and support from the home unit and close-by units positively.

### **5.3.2.3 Communication and liaison among stakeholders (cf 2.6.6)**

It emerged that the LDPs experienced *lack of communication* and *liaising* among various stakeholders and role-players involved in the delivery and management of the URTP (cf 4.4.2). The LDPs reported that commanders of the Reserve Force units tasked with the implementation of the URTP were not readily available when needed. As a result, the LDPs and the sub-commander in charge of the URTP (the training programme coordinator) had to arrange things (for example, equipment, resources and learning support material) themselves on arrival at the close-by units (cf 4.4.2; 4.6.2).

Where some equipment or resources could not be found, the training coordinator had to borrow such equipment or resources from other units, additionally being as far as Heidelberg within the Gauteng Province, regardless of where they (units) were situated in the country (cf 4.6.2). Considering the distance travelled (for example, from Cape Town to Gauteng or Potchefstroom to Gauteng), this highlighted a waste of resources (fuel in this case), while trying to do their (LDP's) own liaising and arrangements. Furthermore, instead of the Reserve Force's involvement to engage in the learners' affairs themselves, in some instances the LDPs had to call the learners and find out about their whereabouts, or even assist with their challenges, which were not the duties of the LDPs (for example, payment challenge and track suits) (cf 4.4.1; 4.4.3; 4.6.1).

A disturbing finding was that during the implementation of the URTP, the LDPs had to liaise with a private (pte) (a soldier of the lowest rank in the Army) (cf 4.3.1; 4.4.1). Furthermore, this private was left to be in command of a unit in the absence of the officer in command (OC) (cf 4.4.1; 4.4.2). This highlights a lack of responsibility from some of the Reserve Force commanders, because these commanders (unit) knew very well that a private cannot be in charge of a unit. Moreover, the commander/s should know that a private cannot take decisions on the commander's behalf, especially where the commander could not be found, and immediate decisions are required. In some instances, very critical decisions are required by higher headquarters (HQs); therefore, a private cannot take such decisions.

It further emerged that, when needed, other key role-players, being staff members within some Reserve Force units, were unavailable to assist the LDPs with whatever information or resources are needed to proceed with the URTP. For example, when away from one's own unit, one requires a person to assist or direct him/her with directions regarding the execution of duties. To make things happen, it was revealed that the sub-commander (training coordinator) in charge of the URTP had to do his/her own liaising with other stakeholders in order to ensure that the outcome of URTP will be achieved (cf 4.4.2).

In addition to the communication and liaison challenges experienced among military units, LDPs reported that a lack of liaising and communication between the military and the universities involved was also experienced (cf 4.4.2). This was because the universities could not release learners on time to undergo URTP training (cf 4.4.2; 4.6.1). If proper liaising and communication existed, universities would have understood that learners needed to attend military training over a certain period. However, universities scheduled practicals, study periods and examinations over the same period that learners had to attend military training (cf 4.6.1). Furthermore, learners had to make sure that they (learners) do not become outdated (cf 4.6.1; 4.6.4).

These findings are in line with the systems theory, which indicates that shortcomings or limitations during the analysis/planning phase are intensified in other phases, since there is a relationship between phases (cf 2.2.1; Swanson & Holton III, 2001:23). Within the context of this study, a lack of communication and prior liaising among stakeholders intensified during the implementation phase of the URTP, as the LDPs needed clarification of certain issues related to their work. Additionally, they (LDPs) relied heavily on the availability of learners as well as the resources required to deliver the URTP training. Therefore, if there were proper communication and liaising among stakeholders, many of the challenges experienced by LDPs might have been eliminated.

It can be concluded from the findings that the LDPs negatively experienced a lack of communication and liaising among stakeholders (military units and universities) during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP.

#### **5.3.2.4 Command and control** (also cf 2.6.5)

The LDPs confirmed that the *command and control* over learners during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP were not appropriate (cf 4.4.3). Reason being, commanders of the Reserve Force units failed to exercise authority over the learners and provide direction where learners needed to be disciplined (cf 4.4.3). For example, learners who did not report when they (learners) were asked to report for training were never disciplined (brought on

office orders or charged) for that matter (cf 4.4.3). This frustrated some of the LDPs as they (LDPs) indicated that, in the military, when you do not report where you are called to report, you are supposed to be disciplined (cf 4.4.3). It became apparent that commanders of the Reserve Force in charge of URTP training became too lenient towards the learners, which, in turn, became a discipline problem. It can be concluded that the learners saw a gap in command and control and therefore used it to skip training whenever it suited them.

Lack of command and control over the learners was also in line with the *process theory* that confirmed that shortcomings in a phase increased in the next phase, since there is a relationship between the different phases (cf 2.2.2, process theory). Consequently, lack of command and control by Reserve Force on the URTP learners negatively influenced LDPs' work, as LDPs had to engage themselves in activities irrelevant to their mandate (training), making it difficult for them to finish their work on time.

Furthermore, the LDPs highlighted that when learners were asked the reasons for their (learners) absence, or for not completing the assignments in time, learners will always point out that their university work took preference over military training (cf 4.6.1). Therefore, learners forget that as a leader in the military you are expected to adapt to changing environments; learners on leadership development training should be assessed on this. It also highlighted that when being reported, nothing gets done to those learners who did not submit their (learners) assignments or who did not attend training when ordered to (cf 4.4.3). The military is one organisation with good policies and procedures in place, ready to guide commanders in their practices. However, with the URTP learners, it was clear that policies and procedures were not used to the commander's advantages. Therefore, the LDPs reported, in the military, if you do not report to a place where you are called to, you should face disciplinary action, and accept those consequences for your action(s) (cf 4.4.3).

The LDPs also reported that learner administration, which was the Reserve Force's responsibility, was not handled properly (cf 4.4.3). This was as a result that the learners struggled in most cases with their payment (cf 4.4.3). On the other hand, it was revealed that the learners purchased course tracksuits; however, these were never delivered or received (cf 4.4.3). The LDPs had to attend to all learners' challenges and tried by all means to assist learners to get what they (learners) deserve (cf 4.4.3). The payment problem is seen as one problem that can easily affect learning, as it deals with learners' morale and concentration.

It also emerged that the learners felt insecure with their (learners') job in the military, experiencing not receiving information, especially from HQ pertaining to their (learners') careers (cf 4.4.3; 4.6.1). This might have brought an element of fear to most of the learners,

and resulted in the learners starting to look for a job outside the military. On the other hand, learners' discipline started to drop, and began to exhibit negative attitudes towards the URTP and the military, concurrently (cf 4.4.3). Therefore, learners with poor attitude towards the training are more likely to perform to the required standard. Through this finding, it is clear that learners of the URTP started to not take their work seriously. Reason being, the LDPs reported that, in some instances, the learners could not submit the work given to them (learners) (cf 4.6.1). This finding is in line with the process theory that indicates that limitations in a phase are exacerbated in the process during the execution of other phases (cf 2.2.2, process theory). Consequently, the challenge with job insecurity resulted in learners being negative towards the URTP and the military, which, in turn, impacted negatively on the LDPs to do their work effectively.

It can therefore be concluded through the findings that the LDPs negatively experienced the command and control over the learners by the Reserve Force during the delivery of the SA Army's URTP.

#### **5.3.2.5 Recruitment and selection** (also cf 2.6.2)

It was found that the LDPs were dissatisfied with the recruitment and selection process used to recruit and select the learners for the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.5.1). It emerged through the findings that learners selected to undergo the URTP, however, did not meet the requirements of being selected as officers (cf 4.5.1). The LDPs highlighted that the learners recruited and selected to undergo the URTP training were too young to be officers (cf 4.5.1). On the other hand, they (learners) lacked essential leadership qualities required of one to become potential officers in the military (cf 4.5.1).

Usually, during the selection process for any military leadership training, the Military Psychological Institute (MPI) from the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) gets invited to come and conduct a diagnostic assessment (psychometric test) with the aim of identifying potential candidates who meet the requirements of becoming officers, and who are able to adapt easily to changing environments. However, when the URTPs' learners were recruited and selected, it was never the case. It became evident through the LDPs' verbatim statements (cf 4.5.1) that learners were not properly assessed during the selection process, and therefore learners who do not possess the required leadership qualities emerged on the URTP programme. This finding concurs with *systems theory* that outlines that if the required outcomes and processes are not clearly defined, a wide range of systematic disconnects surfaces (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Therefore, within the context of this study, it appeared that the recruitment and selection process was not sufficiently outlined and aligned with the outcomes of the URTP.

The LDPs were of the opinion that the recruited candidates should first acquire military experience, and thereafter a selection process should be rendered to select the potential candidates who possess essential leadership qualities to undergo officers' formative training (within the context of this study, the URTP) (cf 4.5.1). Such a process is the same process that is followed by the Regular Force to select potential candidates for leader development training.

It can be concluded through the findings that the LDPs negatively experienced the recruitment and selection process followed to recruit and select candidates (recruits) to undergo the URTP training.

#### **5.3.2.6 Basic Military Training (BMT) phase** (also cf 2.6.7)

The LDPs experienced loose ends from the BMT phase conducted prior to the officers' formative training phase that hampered the effective delivery of the URTP (cf 4.5.2). It only became visible during officers' formative training that learners lacked knowledge and skills regarding aspects of the military that needed to be mastered during BMT and that are deemed necessary to shape a recruit (learner) into being a better soldier (cf 4.5.2). It is understood that a soldier who just completed BMT must be able to drill, salute and compliment his or her seniors, and be knowledgeable regarding most ceremonial aspects (for example, understanding the execution of different parades), understanding how to handle themselves in the mess and understanding various dress codes. However, with the URTP learners, it was never the case.

The LDPs indicated that during the delivery of officers' formative training, LDPs still had to teach learners aspects that were supposed to have been taught during BMT (cf 4.5.2). For example, the LDPs had to concentrate on learners' personal drills prior to teaching learners their (learners') role as inspecting officers or as a company second in command (2IC) on a parade. One must first acquire knowledge and skills of drilling prior to executing parades, as that should enhance his/her performance when learning additional skills on a parade ground. It is apparent that the lack of knowledge and skills of military aspects interfered with the LDPs' work to advance to the next stage of officers' formative training, as it consumed more time that could have been utilised efficiently for other aspects. These findings are in line with the *process theory* that confirmed that the shortcoming or limitation in one phase gets exacerbated in other phases, since there is a relationship between phases in a training process (cf 2.2.2, process theory). The shortcomings during BMT phase negatively influenced the effective delivery of the officers' formative phase.

It can be concluded through the findings that the LDPs experienced the BMT phase that was conducted for the SA Army's URTP negatively.

### **5.3.2.7 Unavailability of learners to undergo training** (also cf 2.8.6)

It emerged that most of the time during the delivery of the URTP the learners became absent and in some instances totally unavailable to attend military training (cf 4.6.1). The LDPs reported that learners presented various reasons for their absence. For example, some of the learners indicated that they first had to attend job interviews, visit home, attend the practicals at their respective universities or with potential employers, attend study periods at their universities, write examinations, and some who did not make it during the first opportunity examinations had to go and rewrite the examinations at their respective universities (cf 4.6.1). Furthermore, the LDPs revealed that there were those learners who never even bothered to attend training at all.

This study further revealed that the unavailability of learners to attend the URTP training emerged as a result of lack of communication among different stakeholders (cf 4.6.1). Therefore, this finding attests to the *process theory* that it indicates that other phases of training rely substantially on the planning phase for supplying direction and substance (cf 2.2.2, process theory). Within the context of this study, it can be concluded that the unavailability of the learners to attend the URTP training happened as a result of a lack of communication and proper liaising between different stakeholders or as a result of management's failure to sufficiently plan. It can therefore be concluded that, should there have been proper collaborative planning, communication and liaising between management and universities, many challenges pertaining to availability of learners would have been eliminated.

It transpired again from the findings that there were those learners who just decided to quit in the middle of URTP training (cf 4.6.1). The reason for this might be that some learners already have developed a negative attitude towards the URTP or the military due to a lack of information regarding their (learners') employment status (cf 4.6.1). This is always possible when one feels insecure or feels that his/her time has been wasted. Again, this finding is in line with the process theory, as it confirms that learners' inconsistency in attending military training negatively influenced the LDPs' ability to do their (LDPs) work effectively (cf 2.2.1). For example, unavailability of learners to undergo the URTP training consumed more time that might have been used for other purposes, such as availing time available for other critical modules that needed more time than others (cf 4.6.4; 2.2.2, process theory).

It can be concluded through the findings that LDPs negatively experienced the unavailability of learners to attend military training (the SA Army's URTP).

#### **5.3.2.8 Non-availability of equipment and resources** (also cf 2.8.3; 2.8.4)

Equipment and resources are necessary to ensure that training yields greater results. Within the context of this study, resources may refer to financial, physical or human resources. It emerged through the findings that the LDPs experienced shortage of *equipment and resources* that were required to support and deliver the URTP training (cf 4.6.2). As a result, the LDPs indicated that they (LDPs) had to borrow equipment from other units by themselves or even bring some equipment from the home unit (Unit X) to ensure that training takes place as planned (cf 4.3.1; 4.6.2). The LDPs reported that equipment was sometimes borrowed or either brought from the home unit (Unit X). Furthermore, when equipment reached the training venue, it was found to be unproportional to the number of learners or in some instances irrelevant (not correct equipment) (cf 4.3.1; 4.6.2). This links with *process theory* that indicates that the weaknesses in one phase of training get exacerbated in other phases, since there is a relationship between various phases in the training process (cf 2.2.2, process theory). Therefore, failure to plan accordingly for resources and equipment impacted on the effective delivery of the URTP. It can therefore be argued that commanders failed to plan accordingly for the equipment and resources that were required to sustain the URTP training. As a result, many challenges were encountered by LDPs in delivering the URTP training to make it leverage greater results.

This study also found that some close-by units did not have enough or relevant equipment and resources to support training. This resulted in the learners having to use benches instead of proper chairs in classrooms, or having to use their (learners) legs to write on due to the unavailability of desks or tables (cf 4.6.2). This finding confirms a lack of sufficient planning (cf 4.3.1), as, if proper planning were done, many challenges with equipment and resources encountered while delivering the URTP training might have been eliminated well in advance prior to the commencement of URTP training interventions. Furthermore, it emerged that the LDPs experienced a lack of medical support, field equipment, internet facilities, and shortage of equipment inside learners' living quarters that negatively impacted on URTP training (cf 4.6.2). As a result of that, the LDPs had to transport the learners from point A to point B (for example from the close-by unit to the sickbay) using their own vehicles (cf 4.6.2). Consequently, the LDPs had to use their (LDPs) own data to establish email communication with the learners (cf 4.3.1). This happened where LDPs had to provide the learners with the feedback on tasks completed (for example their assignments). The above findings are also in line with the systems and process theories that indicate that other

phases of training rely substantially on the analysis/planning phase for supplying direction and substance, and that challenges in one system are anticipated to negatively affect the other sub-system (cf 2.2.1; 2.2.2). It can further be argued that if planning for resources was done appropriately and sufficiently, many challenges encountered with equipment and resources might have been eliminated. Additionally, the LDPs revealed that the meals for the learners as well as for the LDPs were inadequate, and in some instances those members (learners or LDPs) having food preferences had to skip a day without food (cf 4.6.2). It is apparent that the challenge pertaining to unavailability of food, especially for the learners, might have negatively affected learning, as it is difficult for one to learn effectively or even concentrate during learning when one is hungry.

It can therefore be concluded through the findings that the LDPs negatively experienced the non-availability of equipment and resources as they (equipment and resources) are deemed necessary to deliver or support training.

#### **5.3.2.9 Training delivery method** (also cf 2.7; 2.8.7)

In terms of the Department of Defence (DoD) (2010:6), the URTP should be delivered using a blended learning approach (cf 2.7; 4.6.3). The aim thereof was to address the distance gap (geographical location) between learners and the LDPs. Moreover, the aim was also to ensure continuous learning. In terms of DoD (2010:6), blended learning will ensure that learners' academic studies are not affected negatively in any way as learners will study at their own pace, any time and anywhere (cf 2.7). Within the context of this study, blended learning should eliminate the challenge of learners only meeting with LDPs during recesses of various universities.

It was found that the LDPs could not deliver the URTP using a blended learning approach; reason being, they (LDPs) found the blended learning approach to learning to be unfamiliar to them (LDPs) (cf 4.6.3). However, the LDPs indicated that, in some instances, especially for the research module, they (LDPs) did try to implement blended learning, however, they failed in their efforts (cf 4.6.3). Reason being, learners returned back to training for recess without completing assignments given to them (learners) (cf 4.6.3). Additionally, the LDPs indicated that they (LDPs) had to use their (LDPs) own resources such as data for electronic mailing (email) purposes, which they (LDPs) never get reimbursement for (cf 4.3.1). This finding is therefore in line with the *systems theory* that believes that the performance of the organisation, work process, group or individual level is mediated through human expertise (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Meaning, it was dependent on the LDPs' expertise to make blended learning work. Lack of training during the distance learning phase of the URTP resulted in excessive pressure, workload and time constraints during recess, due to the

amount of work still to be completed over a short period of time (contact session) by LDPs (cf 4.6.4; 4.6.5; also cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Nevertheless, the LDPs' lack of training on blended learning might as well have contributed negatively to the end results of the URTP, as learners could not be continuously assisted.

It can therefore be concluded that the LDPs negatively experienced the blended learning method, as suggested by the DoD (2010) to deliver the SA Army's URTP.

### **5.3.2.10 Time constraints** (also cf 2.8.8)

It was found that the time available or allocated for the URTP became the most contributing factor that negatively influenced the effective delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.4). This finding is in line with the findings of the study conducted by Newman (2002), which found that the time available creates a challenging curve to train the Reserve Force to the same standard as the Regular Force (Newman, 2002:9). The LDPs revealed that the time allocated for the URTP was never enough, and it negatively impacted on LDPs' work of completing successfully all the tasks given during the implementation of the URTP (cf 4.6.4). On the other hand, the time allocated to complete the URTP was found not to be in line with the notional hours required, as stipulated by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) (*133 credits for URTP equals 1 330 notional hours*) (cf 4.6.4).

Because of limited time available, the LDPs indicated that they (LDPs) had to compress modules or subjects into mini-lectures, and also skimp between the learning content in order to get the job done, which turned to compromise the standard of training and stirred the perception that the Reserve Force is not trained to the same level as their Regular Force counterparts (cf 4.6.4). Similarly, Wick and Leon (cited in Meyer, 2016c:94) affirmed that the lack of time often means that training will be done in a constrained fashion, preventing real learning to occur, as it is within the context of this study. This finding is in line with the *process theory* that affirmed that the initial phase of training is crucial to give direction; therefore, to ensure that the implementation is smooth (cf 2.2.2, process theory). Within the context of this study, it implies that the challenge regarding time available should have been dealt with during planning, thereby ensuring enough time is available to deliver the URTP training interventions successfully.

It emerged that, due to time available, the LDPs were unable to complete all their (LDPs') tasks (for example assessments and moderation had to be completed when back at the home unit) (cf 4.6.4). The lack of time resulted in the LDPs requesting a time slot from universities in order to try and complete the outstanding work, which resulted in an interference with learners' academic work, as learners were suddenly multi-tasked with the

military as well as university's work (cf 4.6.4). This finding contradicted the literature, which indicated that the URTP is designed in such a way that learners' academic work will not be negatively affected in any way (DoD, 2010:6). This finding was again in line with the *process theory* that indicates that any shortcomings that transpired during initial/planning phase in most cases exacerbated in other phases. Therefore, other phases rely heavily on the initial/planning phase, as it provides direction. It can therefore be argued that insufficient planning pertaining to the allocation of sufficient time for the URTP resulted in LDPs having limited time to complete their work. It was further revealed that, as a result of the time constraint, the LDPs could not meet the target date set by the relevant Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) (Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA)) (cf 4.5.6).

It was apparent through the findings that learners did not get enough time to relax and assimilate information due to less time available for training (cf 4.6.4). Furthermore, due to time available, learners only had to meet with LDPs during recess, and time for training became limited resulting in pressure and workload for the LDPs to do and complete their (LDPs) work successfully (cf 4.6.4). Even though the DoD regards the SA Army's URTP as a military training programme, which encompasses physical training, leadership, social and cultural activities (DoD, 2010:3), it became evident that time was insufficient to conduct physical as well as practical training (cf 2.6.1; 4.6.4). As a result, this finding contradicts the statement made by DoD (2010:3), which highlighted the URTP as a training programme that encompasses physical training (cf 2.6.1). On the other hand, this finding left the LDPs with an uncertainty whether learners trained through the URTP system are fit to become officers or not; and this finding also confirms the statement made by Le Roux (2005) that the Reserve Force is not well trained to support the Regular Force component (Le Roux, 2005; cf 1.3; 4.6.4).

It can, therefore, be concluded through the findings that the LDPs negatively experienced the time allocated to deliver effective the URTP in the SA Army. If time is not available to train the Reserve Force to the same standard as their (Reserve Force) Regular Force counterparts, the training outcomes for the Reserve Force will not remain equally equivalent to that of the Regular Force (cf 4.6.4).

#### **5.3.2.11 Involvement of LDPs in the delivery of the URTP (also cf 2.8.4)**

It emerged that the LDPs experienced excessive pressure and workload while trying to effectively deliver the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.5). This happened due to limited time available to complete the work, as well as the amount of work that the LDPs were exposed

to during the implementation of the URTP (cf 4.6.5). The LDPs indicated that they (LDPs) had to complete the same amount of work as that which is completed for a full-time officer's formative training (cf 4.6.5). As earlier alluded to in this study, the LDPs could only meet with learners during recess (cf 4.6.3), and that during the distance learning phase of the URTP, no training took place (cf 4.6.3), and therefore it was evident that the LDPs could not complete their (LDPs) work on time, unless they (LDPs) had to compromise on certain standards or eliminate certain parts of training/content that are deemed not crucial (cf 4.6.4). The findings further revealed that the LDPs had to work late after hours, Saturdays and Sundays in order to complete the work (cf 4.6.5). However, the work pressure and workload led to the LDPs having to compress the subjects presented into mini-lectures so that they (LDPs) can finish on time (cf 4.6.5).

Furthermore, the LDPs highlighted that they (LDPs) were exposed to *multiple tasks/roles (multi-tasks)* during the implementation of the URTP, which, in turn, led to LDPs not completing their (LDPs) work on time (cf 4.6.5). It was obvious that some work had to be completed when back at the home unit. The incomplete work also led to the LDPs having to go back to universities to get learners to complete the outstanding work (cf 4.6.5) during military training at close-by units. This indirectly affected learners' academic work, reason being learners had to shift their (learners') focus to military work together with their (learners') academic work. These findings are in line with *systems theory* that confirms that problems in any of the sub-systems are anticipated to negatively affect the other sub-systems. It is therefore clear that, being exposed to multiple tasks/roles results in a negative effect on the learners' academic work.

It was also found that there were no criteria set to select the LDPs who are able to go and deliver the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.6.5). It is for the same reason that LDPs raised their (LDPs) own personal opinions of how they (LDPs) expect the criteria to be, rather than saying what the real criteria were (cf 4.6.5). The LDPs were therefore of the opinion that the criteria to select the LDPs for the URTP should be based on aspects such as being disciplined, being familiar with the unit standard to present, being available to do more than expected, being qualified in a certain job, being available to assume certain responsibilities other than your normal work as an LDP, or being registered on most unit standards (cf 4.6.5). This finding concurs with *systems theory* that outlines that if processes are not clearly defined, a wide range of systematic disconnects surfaces (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). Within the context of this study, it was clear that lack of criteria to select the LDPs resulted in the URTP training interventions being conducted by any member, either experienced or not experienced, with delivering the leader development training or not.

It can therefore be concluded through the findings that no criteria existed to select the LDPs to go and deliver the URTP interventions. As a result, the LDPs expressed varying reasons on how they (LDPs) were selected to deliver the URTP. Additionally, having being multi-tasked, the LDPs experienced pressure and workload. It can therefore be argued further that if planning was sufficiently done, the LDPs would not have been exposed to all the challenges earlier alluded to.

#### **5.3.2.12 Evaluation as part of the quality assurance system (also cf 2.9)**

It emerged from the findings that no *external* training evaluation was conducted for the URTP, but only the *internal* training evaluation, which was also considered as inadequate by the LDPs (cf 4.7.1). Reason being, the internal evaluators from Unit X (Education, Training and Quality Assurance (ETQA) branch from Unit X specifically) ended up sympathising with them (LDPs) instead of evaluating the URTP (cf 4.7.1). With the above statement in mind, it can be concluded that the external evaluation, even though it did not take place, was necessary to eliminate bias experienced by LDPs (cf 4.7.1; 2.9). Both internal and external evaluation are important elements of quality assurance (cf 2.9), as both ensure that training yields greater results.

Furthermore, the LDPs revealed that there was no pre-inspection conducted for the URTP (cf 4.7.1). Pre-inspection is an element of training evaluation and it is conducted prior to commencement of training, with the aim of ensuring that things such as accommodation, training venue and mess facilities, to mention a few, are in place. The results thereof are necessary to provide the LDPs with an opportunity to address and rectify any shortcomings or limitations prior to training taking place. This finding is in line with the *process theory* that indicates that a limitation in another phase aggravates the process during the execution of other phases (cf 2.2.2, process theory), and the systems theory confirms that the output from one process can be the input into other processes. Therefore, failure to conduct pre-inspection as part of training evaluation hampered the effectiveness and efficiency of the URTP.

To make sure that the results from URTP are visible, the LDPs indicated that the training programme coordinator used his/her initiative, and internally and continuously evaluated the URTP efforts with the aim to eliminate challenges that might occur (cf 4.7.1). Therefore, through the internal evaluation conducted, the LDPs managed to guide the URTP towards success.

It can be concluded through the findings that training evaluation conducted was not effective, and therefore negatively experienced by the LDPs.

### **5.3.3 What recommendations can you make regarding the improvement of the SA Army's URTP? (cf 4.8.8)**

LDPs concluded this study by making recommendations (cf 4.8.1-4.8.8) that are deemed necessary to address the findings in Chapter 4 (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1). The following recommendations were made:

#### **5.3.3.1 Recommendations directed at insufficient planning (also cf 4.8.1)**

The LDPs recommended that they (LDPs) should be consulted whenever commanders plan for the URTP. Based on their (LDPs') experience of training, the LDPs believe that their (LDPs') involvement during planning can provide commanders with valuable information (inputs) that commanders can use to make informed decisions (cf 4.8.1). The LDPs also recommended that the commanders should provide them (LDPs) with a guiding document that can be used to roll out the URTP (cf 4.8.1). Such documents can either be in a form of a curriculum or a standard working procedure (SWP) (cf 4.8.1). This confirms the LDPs' need to deliver the URTP in a well-structured manner, and not according to certain individuals' wishes.

#### **5.3.3.2 Recommendations directed towards stakeholders' involvement to support training (also cf 4.8.2)**

The LDPs recommended that the commanders should gather all stakeholders who will be involved with the URTP and brief them (stakeholders) prior to the commencement of the URTP, including the support required from them (stakeholders) (cf 4.8.2). The briefing session should take place prior to commencement of the URTP so that each stakeholder can have enough time to plan or make equipment or resources available to support the URTP.

#### **5.3.3.3 Recommendations directed at command and control (cf 4.4.3; 4.8.3)**

The LDPs recommended that an established centralised training branch should oversee or solely deliver the URTP interventions. Therefore, such a branch should be given full responsibility of URTP, including the budget thereof. Furthermore, for command and control purposes, the LDPs further recommended that all phases of the URTP, namely BMT, officers' formative training and functional training be rolled out in one area and under one branch that should take full responsibility for training conducted, including command and control of all members (LDPs and support staff) under the branch, including the learners (cf 4.8.3).

#### 5.3.3.4 Recommendations directed at inadequate recruitment, selection and BMT (cf 4.8.3)

The LDPs recommended that the criteria used to recruit and select candidates for the URTP should be revised (cf 4.8.3). Reason being, the current process allows for very young candidates to be recruited into the system and selected to be officers without having acquired any military experience (cf 4.8.3). To eliminate this, the LDPs recommended that the same recruitment and selection process currently used for the Regular Force be adopted for the URTP learners. More specifically, the URTP learners should firstly complete their academic studies, then go through a selection process to join the military, and thereafter be selected to attend a full-time officers' formative training. This recommended process will allow for experienced soldiers to lead other inexperienced soldiers while providing direction based on experience. The LDPs further indicated that among the URTP learners there were those learners who showed interest and willingness to extend their career as well disciplined and committed soldiers and therefore recommends that, after the URTP training, such learners be earmarked and recruited into the permanent force.

#### 5.3.3.5 Recommendations directed at BMT (cf 4.8.3)

It was apparent that the learners who have completed BMT could not drill, and lacked understanding of military aspects and discipline (cf 4.5.2). Therefore, the LDPs recommended that the BMT phase in the URTP should be extended to allow learners to gain more knowledge, develop new skills and acquire changed attitudes or develop new behaviours expected of a soldier who just completed BMT (cf 4.8.3).

#### 5.3.3.6 Recommendations directed towards the non-availability of equipment and resources (cf 4.8.6)

The LDPs recommended that commanders should allocate sufficient resources to all hosting units (close-by units). This will eliminate the challenge of travelling long distances while trying to organise or borrow equipment for delivery of the URTP. Consequently, eliminate the time wasted while waiting for training equipment or learning support material to arrive. Furthermore, the LDPs recommended that the URTP should be provided with its own vehicles and financial resources (budget) (cf 4.8.6). Reason being, the LDPs had to use their own vehicles to execute the day-to-day activities such as transporting of learners to sickbay or hospital, including the use of their (LDPs') own data for internet, while electronically (via e-mail) communicating with the learners (cf 4.8.6).

#### 5.3.3.7 Recommendations directed towards training delivery method (also cf 4.8.4)

The LDPs recommended that training should not only be offered during recess periods of the universities, but that e-learning or distance learning approaches should also be introduced to

deliver the URTP as it will allow for continuous learning (cf 4.8.4). E-learning or distance learning will also allow the LDPs to have more time during residential training, and to concentrate on assessment or practical training during recess training.

#### 5.3.3.8 Recommendations directed at time constraint (cf 4.8.5)

The time available was seen as the most contributing factor that negatively influenced the effective delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.4). The LDPs recommended that the URTP be extended and delivered over a period of six months (in the case of officers' formative training phase only) or two years (all phases together (BMT, officer formative training and functional training)) (cf 4.8.5). This will allow the LDPs to produce quality rather than quantity officers. The LDPs also recommended that the time allocated for the URTP should be adjusted to be in line with the university's schedule and South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) regulations (stipulated notional hours – *133 credits for officer forming qualification equals 1 330 notional hours*) (cf 4.8.5). Therefore, the URTP schedule should move along with learners' timetable for various universities to eliminate the challenge of learners having to be absent for military training when called to attend (cf 4.8.5).

#### 5.3.3.9 Recommendations directed at LDPs' involvement with the URTP (cf 4.8.7)

The LDPs recommended that the URTP should be allocated with its own LDPs who will deliver all the URTP interventions (cf 4.8.7). Therefore, a pool of Reserve Force members should be trained as LDPs who can deliver the URTP on their (LDPs) own, and for the sake of gatekeeping, a Regular Force member should be appointed as a sub-unit commander (training coordinator) (cf 4.8.7).

#### 5.3.3.10 Recommendations directed at evaluation as part of quality assurance system (cf 4.8.8)

The LDPs recommended that, prior to commencement of the URTP, a delegated team from the home unit (Unit X) should be sent to a hoisting unit (close-by unit) to conduct a pre-inspection in order to determine the hosting unit's readiness to host the URTP (cf 4.8.8). Furthermore, in order to ensure effectiveness (how well it works) and efficiency (how well it is managed) of the real training programme, the LDPs recommended that the URTP should be piloted with a small group of learners before commencement, so that all anticipated challenges could be addressed accordingly, prior to implementation of the real training programme (cf 4.8.8).

## 5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.4.1 Recommendations ensuing from research findings

The following recommendations are suggested to address the research findings:

- Insufficient planning


It became evident through the findings of this study that insufficient planning hindered the effective delivery of the URTP and negatively affected other phases in the training cycle (cf 4.3.1). It is therefore recommended that the LDPs be consulted and involved during planning in order to provide commanders with valuable inputs to use when making decisions regarding the implementation of the URTP. The participative relation between various role-players and stakeholders in training is necessary for training to be effective.

The LDPs revealed that there was no curriculum for the URTP (cf 4.3.1). It is therefore recommended that a specific curriculum be developed to incorporate the blended-learning model for the URTP (cf 5.4.1, programme flow model). The same curriculum should be able to direct planners, decision-makers and the LDPs to plan accordingly and to make informed decisions that will not tamper with learners' academic studies.

The curriculum should be designed and developed in partnership with the defence force and SA universities involved in order to ensure that all stakeholders buy into the initiative and support the implementation of the URTP. As a result, it is recommended that the curriculum outlines the roles and parameters within which each responsible stakeholder understands his/her role.

It is further recommended that, as part of new curriculum development recommended, a *programme flow model* as adopted from Bersin (2004:56) be introduced to roll out the SA Army's URTP. The reason being, a *programme flow model* is regarded as a *blended-learning model* from which one develops a step-by-step curriculum that integrates several media into a chronological programme (Bersin, 2004:56).

Each step in a programme flow model is therefore orchestrated to build on the one before. A programme flow model has a strict outline and it requires that learners go step-by-step through the learning content in a linear fashion, whereby, in the end (during the final step), the learners' overall performance can be assessed either through exercises or a final summative assessment (Bersin, 2004:56). Table 5.1 below outlines the programme flow model as follows:

<b>SA ARMY'S URTP PROGRAMME FLOW MODEL</b>					
<b>(Reserve Force junior leader development training programme)</b>					
<b>Kickoff event</b>	<b>Initial learning activity</b> <i>(Boot camp)</i>	<b>First, second or third learning activity</b> <i>(Boot camp)</i>	<b>Check-in event</b> <i>(After every learning activity)</i> <i>(Boot camp)</i>	<b>Final assessment</b>	<b>Final feedback and conclusion</b>
1. Pre-brief session <i>(Managers &amp; LDPs)</i>  2. Call-ups <i>(Learners)</i>	1. Learner registration <i>(clearing in)</i>  2. Programme Administration  3. Induction training/ orientation session <i>(Introducing learners to the programme)</i>  4. Discussion of submission dates  5. Military Psychological Institute (MPI) evaluation <i>(Potential leader identification)</i>	1. Handing out or loading of first, second, third, etc. set of distance or e-learning modules on system <i>(Learning manuals, assignments/ formative assessment or exercises)</i>  2. Active learning takes place through e-learning or distance learning  3. Continuous feedback on progress is carried out by LDPs  4. Visits by LDPs where necessary	1. Summative Assessment <i>(Practical exercises/ fitness training/ drill/ inspections/ shooting etc.)</i>  2. Feedback on performance	1. Integrated Assessment <i>(Leadership Development Programme exercise)</i>  2. External evaluation by SA Army Force preparation and MPI	1. Feedback to the selection panel on individual learner performance by MPI and LDPs  2. Selection process by various corps  3. Placement of learners to various corps
 <p>This process may be repeated several times</p>					
Quality assurance <i>(Training evaluation: continuous)</i>					

**Table 5-1: SA Army's URTP programme flow model** (adapted from Bersin, 2004)

- Stakeholders' involvement in support training

The stakeholders' involvement and support for training are crucial to ensure training success (cf 4.4.1). Therefore, all stakeholders (the Reserve Force units, home unit and close-by units) referred to in this study should work collaboratively with one another in order to ensure that the URTP yields greater results. It is therefore recommended that policies and

procedures (for example, a standard working procedure (SWP) or Department of Defence Instructions (DODIs)), be developed to give direction to all role-players of their (role-players') involvement and support during the implementation of the URTP.

- Communication and liaising among stakeholders

The communication and liaising among various stakeholders were found to be slack. It was found that the LDPs experienced a breakdown in communication between the Reserve Force, close-by units or universities (cf 4.4.2). For example, the LDPs struggled with resources that should have been readily made available to conduct training, and in some instances, universities scheduled examinations, study periods or practicals over the same period that the URTP training was supposed to proceed. It is therefore recommended that liaison officers be appointed from every stakeholder (universities, relevant units or headquarters) for the entire duration that the URTP will be delivered in order to liaise among each other and to guide the URTP efforts towards a success. This is seen as an effective measure as there will be one person that is accountable on behalf of the unit, knowing the business of such unit.

- Command and control

The command and control were found to be a serious challenge during the implementation of the URTP (cf 4.4.3). It was revealed that the Reserve Force commanders failed to exercise authority and to provide direction over the URTP learners (cf 4.4.3). Reason being, even if a learner was absent, nothing was done to discipline such a learner (cf 4.4.3). It was also reported that, when needed, the Reserve Force commanders were nowhere to be found; however, left the unit with a private, whom they knew very well that he/she cannot take decisions should decisions be required in the absence of the commander (cf 4.4.3). It is therefore recommended that for command and control purposes, a specialised external training branch should be established at Unit X. The aim thereof is to deliver and manage the URTP training interventions from one centralised unit. This will further ensure that all the LDPs as well as learner activities are centralised at one place under one command, and consequently ensure that the budget as well as other resources and equipment needed to deliver the URTP are controlled and maintained in one central unit.

- Recruitment and selection

The recruitment and selection process conducted to select candidates for the URTP was seen by the LDPs as problematic (cf 4.5.1). It appeared that learners who were selected were too young to be commanders and that they did not possess any leadership qualities (cf 4.5.1). It is therefore recommended that, immediately after BMT, learners should undergo

junior leader training programmes at their specific corps, whereby a selection can be made who should undergo officers' formative training or non-commissioned officer training. The Military Psychological Institute (MPI) should come on board during the selection process and the delivery of the URTP. During the selection process, the MPI should diagnose the long-term adaptation of learners as military leaders, and during the implementation phase, especially during the leadership development programme, again assess learners in order to verify their (MPIs') findings during the diagnosis phase. The feedback from MPI should be compared to the continuous evaluation conducted by LDPs on the learner group and a decision made by decision-makers based on feedback provided by all role-players involved.

- Basic Military Training (BMT) phase

The LDPs indicated that the BMT phase was inadequate as it could not fully prepare or certify the URTP learners as knowledgeable and skilful soldiers (cf 4.5.2). It is therefore recommended that the BMT should be allocated enough time to allow recruits to assimilate information and practise the skills learned. Just like officers' formative training phase, the BMT should follow a blended learning approach, where, during recess, learners can concentrate on physical and practical training.

- Unavailability of learners to undergo training

LDPs reported a high level of inconsistency in learners' attendance of the URTP training (cf 4.6.1). It became apparent that learners had varying reasons that led to them being absent from training. It is therefore recommended that the suggested liaison officers (cf 5.4.1, communication and liaison) or the commander in charge of the suggested specialised training branch (cf 5.4.1, command and control) should be given authority to liaise directly with the universities regarding the URTP in order to discuss the URTP schedule against the university programme to ensure maximum attendance or availability of learners to attend the URTP. Nevertheless, learners still need time off to go visit home. Therefore, it is recommended that, during recess, learners should also be awarded the opportunity to visit home by means of long weekends.

- Non-availability of equipment and resources

Non-availability of equipment and resources impacted negatively on the delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.2). The LDPs reported that they (LDPs) had to travel long distances while trying to organise or borrow equipment from other military units. Consequently, during such time, training had to stop until such a stage that the equipment or resources could be available. It is therefore recommended that resources and equipment should form part of the initial planning of the URTP, as it is not feasible to conduct training without the necessary

resources and equipment. Therefore, if one branch (suggested specialised training branch at unit X – cf 5.4.1, command and control) is allocated the sole responsibility of the URTP training, such a branch could budget for resources or even have required and relevant resources and equipment readily available to conduct all the URTPs.

- Training delivery method

It was found that the planned training delivery method (blended learning) for the URTP was never implemented to deliver the URTP (cf 4.6.3). The blended learning method was seen by the LDPs as alien to them as they never before delivered any training programme using such a method (blended learning) (cf 4.6.3). It is therefore recommended that the LDPs be trained on how to train using the blended-learning method, specifically during the distance learning (DL) part of the blended learning (cf 2.7), as it requires knowledge and skills to continuously support and manage learners. The contact session part is seen as being similar to residential learning (cf 2.7), as learners are on site with the LDPs. Proper establishment of blended learning should eradicate the distance barrier between the learners and the LDPs (address the geographical location and time constraint issue), and allow for a cost-effective URTP.

- Time constraints

Time constraint was found to be the one aspect that mostly contributed negatively towards the effective delivery of the URTP (cf 4.6.4). Due to limited time available, the LDPs had to work under pressure, compress modules or subjects into mini-lectures and were also subjected to unmanageable workloads (cf 4.6.4). It is therefore recommended that the decision-makers (for example, force preparation group, reserve force council and director of education training and development (ETD)) extend the URTP to be delivered over the period of two years in order for it (the URTP) to leverage greater results and ensure that learners' academic studies are not negatively affected. Moreover, by extending the URTP over a longer timeframe, it is anticipated that the workload and pressure that the LDPs encountered would also be reduced. Furthermore, delivering the URTP over a longer period might also allow enough time for the Reserve Force to be trained to the same standard as their Regular Force counterparts, thereby eliminating the perception that the Reserve Force is not well trained and operationally ready to be deployed to augment the Regular Force. The point of departure or idea for extending the URTP is to create a flexible and responsive training programme that should provide the Reserve Force with qualified junior leaders, who are at the same level of competence as those of the Regular Force component.

- Involvement of LDPs in the delivery of the URTP

The involvement of highly trained and committed LDPs is necessary to ensure that the URTP yields better results (cf 4.6.5). It is therefore recommended that a pool of LDPs who will be able to deliver a URTP that uses a blended learning approach be selected and staffed at the recommended specialised training branch (cf 5.4.1, command and control). This will eliminate the issue of the LDPs being multi-tasked with the URTP and full-time officers' formative training. It is further recommended that decision-makers develop criteria to be used to select qualifying LDPs who will work specifically with Reserve Force training. The selected and most experienced LDPs should be mixed together with the less experienced LDPs as that should ensure a succession plan and ensure continuity where rotation is to be made for LDPs' further development.

- Evaluation as part of the quality assurance system

The LDPs indicated that no external evaluation was conducted, and that the internal evaluation conducted was ineffective, considering that evaluators (quality assurers) from the home unit (Unit X) had to sympathise with them (LDPs), seeing all challenges beyond the LDPs' control that should have been addressed by effective planning (cf 4.7.1). It is therefore recommended that the URTP should be continuously evaluated (pre-, during and post-) in order to ensure that it leverages greater results. This will ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the SA Army's URTP. It is further recommended that external evaluation by external stakeholders, namely formations or force preparation, be initiated, as that should eliminate the issue of being biased during evaluation, rendering the results invalid. Results from that internal evaluation can therefore be compared to the results ensuing from external evaluation, thereby ensuring concrete and trustworthy results that will help improve future URTPs.

#### **5.4.2 Recommendations for future research**

The following suggestions are relevant for future research pertaining to the URTP:

- To supplement the current study research, a quantitative study, specifically a survey research strategy, can be conducted to measure transfer of learning in the workplace. This will allow commanders to measure the degree to which learners apply to their jobs the knowledge, skills and behaviours learned during training, and how they (learners) have developed since attending the URTP.
- Action research could be undertaken to help develop an effective blended learning training programme (URTP) for the SA Army that should follow an e-learning approach during the distance phase of the URTP (cf Figure 5-1, SA Army's URTP

programme flow). This is believed to enhance the effectiveness of the URTP as it will ensure continuous URTP training. Consequently, learners will not have to wait for the recess period of various universities to meet their LDPs.

## 5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The following factors had a limiting effect on this study:

- As a result of the size of the SANDF and the geographical location of various units around SA, the study was only focused on the SA Army. The inclusion of other Arms of Services (AoSs) might have strengthened the findings of the study by allowing the findings to be generalised to the entire SANDF. Therefore, if generalisation has to be done, it should be done with caution.
- The study was only qualitative, for practical purposes in terms of funds, time and distance. A mixed-method study, which could have included a quantitative component, may have strengthened the findings of this study.
- This study only focused on the LDPs who present officers' formative training phase experiences. The inclusion of the LDPs who delivered other phases of the URTP (BMT and functional training) might have added more value to the study.
- It was difficult to get all participants at the same time at a venue, due to some participants being transferred to other geographically located units; some being on leave in other provinces; and some having resigned from the military. Therefore, not all participants could be included to contribute towards the results of this study.

## 5.6 FINAL CONCLUSION

Considering all the major findings of this study (cf 5.3.2.1-5.3.2.12), it became evident that the LDPs experienced many challenges that negatively influenced the effective delivery of the SA Army's URTP (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1; 5.3.2.1-5.3.2.12). Among all the challenges experienced (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1), *time constraint* (cf 4.6.4) enormously influenced the effective delivery of the URTP, and therefore requires decision-makers' immediate attention. Considering all the challenges encountered during the implementation of the URTP, it can further be concluded that the major hindrance regarding the successful implementation of the SA Army's URTP was as a result of commanders' failure to plan appropriately and effectively for the URTP training interventions (poor/insufficient planning) (cf 4.3.1-4.7.1).

As highlighted by the LDPs – that LDPs were never involved during planning (cf 4.3.1) – it became evident that the LDPs' involvement during planning for the URTP interventions

should have provided the decision-makers with valuable information to guide the URTP's efforts towards a success. Therefore, the *process theory* also indicated that the shortcomings or limitations during the planning phase of training is exacerbated later in other phases (in the case of this study the implementation of the URTP), since there is a close relationship between phases, and therefore other phases rely substantially on the other (within the context of this study being a planning phase) for supplying direction and substance (cf 2.2.2). It can therefore be concluded that most challenges experienced by the LDPs in this study resulted from poor/insufficient planning, which later during the implementation process of the URTP brought forth other challenges such as incorrect time allocation (cf 4.6.4), non-availability of learners to attend the URTP training (cf 4.6.1) and insufficient equipment and resources (cf 4.6.2), which hindered the effective delivery and management of the URTP to allow it (URTP) to yield greater results. These findings were also in line with the *systems theory*, which confirmed that problems in any of the training sub-systems (namely training and development needs analysis, learning programme design, training delivery, assessment and moderation of learner achievements, or evaluation of programme evaluation) are anticipated to negatively affect the other sub-systems (cf 2.2.1). Despite the limited resources that was at the LDPs' disposal (cf 4.6.2), the findings revealed that the LDPs' intense experience in training (cf 4.3.1) helped them (LDPs) to persevere throughout all challenges encountered and effectively direct the URTP efforts towards success at that point in time.

While the literature reviewed (cf Chapter 2) highlighted military training as an effective means of training the Reserve Force, military training is known by its emphasis on discipline, just-in-case preparation, and training of collectives to prepare soldiers for armed combat engagements (cf 2.4). The results of this study indicated that the URTP in its current format (during the time of the study) is an ineffective training programme to capacitate the SA Army with quality junior leaders. Based on the numerous challenges encountered during the delivery of the URTP, especially insufficient time available to train the URTP learners, the LDPs questioned the credibility of the SA Army's URTP in its current format as an effective training programme to equip the SA Army's Reserve Force with competent junior leaders of character (cf 4.6.4).

*Systems theory* was used to capture the complex and dynamic interactions of the URTP training interventions; the SA Army Reserve Force units that were responsible for implementation of the URTP; the work processes as well as group and individual variables operating at any point in time and over a time (cf 2.2.1, systems theory). The *process theory* indicated the shortcomings or limitations encountered during the planning phase of the

URTP having worsened in other phases (implementation of the URTP and evaluation phase). Since there was a relationship between the above-mentioned phases, it became evident that other phases (for example the implementation of the URTP and evaluation thereof) relied substantially on the planning phase, which was crucial for supplying direction and substance (cf 2.2.2, process theory). It is for the same reason that this research can only be regarded as a major breakthrough if the results thereof can be used effectively by decision-makers to improve the SA Army's URTP.

Based on evidence presented, it is recommended that the URTP training be presented over a longer period of time in order to allow it (URTP) to yield better results. This can be done by designing and developing the URTP curriculum that will strictly follow a blended-learning approach. With such a training programme, a *programme flow model* (cf Table 5.1) should be introduced to roll out the URTP training interventions, where, during a distance learning phase, *e-learning* can be introduced to effectively deliver learning interventions throughout the distance phase and to close the distance barrier that allows the learners and the LDPs to meet only during recess. Furthermore, if all recommendations suggested in this study (cf 4.8.1-4.8.8; 5.5.1-5.5.2) could be implemented, it should assist decision-makers (commanders at various levels) and LDPs to guide the URTP efforts towards a success as both (decision-makers and the LDPs) are keen to make informed decisions regarding the planning process.

## **5.7 SUMMARY**

In this chapter (Chapter 5), a summary of previous chapters (Chapters 1 to 4) was provided (cf 5.2). The research findings (cf 5.3.2.1-5.3.2.12) were interpreted and discussed. The findings (cf 5.3.2.1-5.3.2.12) mandated general recommendations (cf 4.8.1-4.8.8; 5.5.1) that were deemed necessary to address the challenges experienced by the LDPs during the implementation of the SA Army's URTP as well as recommendations for future research (cf 5.5.2). The limitations of this study were also discussed (cf 5.5). The final conclusions were provided in order to conclude the study (cf 5.6), i.e. to provide a better understanding of what transpired during the implementation of the URTP and why it happened. Military training, which includes the URTP, is an important and integral part of any organisation to ensure its success. Furthermore, to ensure its success requires proper planning and execution from all levels (tactical, operational and strategic level). Therefore, the DoD/SA Army should ensure that the URTP and its equivalent programme (officers' formative) are effectively used to create excellent officers who are able to plan and execute extremely difficult tasks with a high level of proficiency. The recommendations ensuing from this study are anticipated to contribute immensely to the improvement of future URTPs.

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**ANNEXURE 1: LETTER REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE SANDF**



**hr division**

Department:  
Defence  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SANDF COLET/R/97291082MC

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SANDF College of  
Educational Technology  
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October 2016

Director: Counter-Intelligence  
Maj Gen GS Sizani  
816 0802

**RESEARCH PROPOSAL: LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS' EXPERIENCES REGARDING THE SA ARMY'S UNIVERSITY RESERVE TRAINING PROGRAMME**

Enclosure: Research proposal  
Ethical Training Letter of Attendance

1. I, 97291082MC SSgt M.A. Moloi (the researcher) solicit permission to conduct research within the SANDF, specifically the SA Army and relevant units (SA Army Gymnasium and other units where participants might be transferred to, to be specific).
2. I am currently a student at the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus) studying towards a master's degree in Education, Training and Development within the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. This research forms part of my examination (OPLN 871).
3. The aim of this research is to investigate how learning and development practitioners (ETD practitioners) in the SA Army (specifically SA Army Gymnasium) experience the SA Army's University Reserve Training Programme (URTP).
4. Information regarding the contribution of this study, and the ethical aspects that should be adhered to, are addressed within the research proposal (cf 3.4 & 5.3.10).
5. I (the researcher) have also attended training regarding the ethical aspects to consider in research when dealing with human participants (attached is the letter of attendance).
6. Information regarding the timeframes (specifically the data generation/collection) has been provided under paragraph 6 of the attached research proposal.
7. I am under the supervision of Dr Helen Meyer and Mr Renier Els.
8. Your careful consideration and approval of this request will highly be appreciated

**(MA MOLOI)**  
**MILITARY INSTRUCTOR SANDF COLET: SSGT**

**ANNEXURE 2: FEEDBACK LETTER FROM THE SA DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE  
GRANTING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE SANDF**

RESTRICTED



**defence intelligence**

Department:  
Defence  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DI/R/202/3/7

Telephone: (012) 315-0216  
Fax: (012) 326-3246  
Enquiries: Brig Gen M. Sizani

Defence Intelligence  
Private Bag X367  
Pretoria  
0001  
10 February 2017

**AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DOD ON "EXPLORING LEARNING  
AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS' EXPERIENCES REGARDING THE SA  
ARMY'S UNIVERSITY RESERVE TRAINING: SSGT M.A. MOLOI**

1. Your letter SANDF COLET/R/97291082MC dd 31 October 2016 as well as the attached proposal has reference.
2. Permission is hereby granted from a security perspective to SSgt M.A. Moloi to conduct research in the DOD on "Exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the SA Army's university reserve training" as requested.
3. Yours faithfully.

**(G.S. SIZANI)**  
**CHIEF DIRECTOR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE: MAJ GEN**  
WWM/WWM (SSgt M.A. Moloi)

**DISTR**

For Action

Officer Commanding Colet

(Attention: SSgt M.A. Moloi)

Internal

File: DI/R/202/3/7



Lefapha la Boiphemelo Umyango wezokuVikela - Kgoro ya Tshireletso - Sebe lezoKhuselo Department of Defence - Muziso wa Tshefiso  
Umyango WezokuVikela - Ndawulo ya sva Musapheli - Lefapha la Tshireletso - Departement van Verdediging - LiTiko la Tekuvikela

RESTRICTED

## **ANNEXURE 3: LETTER REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT SA ARMY GYMNASIUM**



**hr division**

Department:  
Defence  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SANDF COLET/R/97291082MC

Telephone: 012 654 4050  
Enquiries: WO2 M.A. Moloji  
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Department of Defence  
Human Resource Division  
Training Command  
South African National Defence  
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August 2017

Officer Commanding  
SA Army Gymnasium  
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Col M.B. Masinda

### **PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT SA ARMY GYMNASIUM**

Enclosure: Defence Intelligence research approval letter

1. Defence Intelligence letter granting permission to conduct research within the DoD regarding the University Reserve Training Programme (URTP) dated *10 Feb 2017* has reference.
2. I, 97291082MC WO2 M.A. Moloji (the Researcher) ask permission to conduct research among instructors (LDPs) at the **SA Army Gymnasium** who were involved with the delivery of the URTP since it has been piloted.
3. All necessary documents have been submitted to Defence Intelligence (DI) and permission has already been granted. However, it is ethically correct for me as a researcher to extend the permission further to the Officer Commanding SA Army Gymnasium. Reason being, the SA Army Gymnasium is an institution where members who are envisaged to participate in research are located.
4. The aim of this research is to explore instructors' (LDPs') experiences regarding the URTP.
5. The research will also contribute significantly towards the improvement of URTP, as the results thereof will be made available to SA Army Force Preparation and Defence Intelligence by means of a research report.



6. After permission has been granted, I shall confirm the availability of instructors and schedule interviews accordingly (preferably between 4 and 15 September 2017).
7. I am currently a student at the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), studying towards a master's degree in Education, Training and Development within the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences and this research also forms part of my final examination for research module (OPLN 871). This research study is strictly under the supervision of Dr Helen Meyer and Mr Renier Els, who are both from the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus).
8. Your favourable consideration and approval of this request will be highly appreciated.

**(MA MOLOI)**  
**INSTRUCTOR SANDF COLLEGE OF EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: WO2**

MAM/MAM

**ANNEXURE 4: FEEDBACK LETER FROM OFFICER COMMANDING SA ARMY GYMNASIUM**



**sa army**  
 Department  
 Defence  
 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

RESTRICTED

OFFICER COMMANDING EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
2017 -09- 05
PRIVATE BAG X1 SA ARMY GYM/R/1032/21

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 Fax: (016) 340-2268  
 Enquiries: Lt Col R. Mathipa

SA Army Gymnasium  
 Private Bag H613  
 Heidelberg  
 1441  
 0/ September 2017

DOD HR Division  
 Training Command  
 SANDF COLET  
 Private Bag X 1  
 Valhalla  
 0137

**AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT SA ARMY GYMNASIUM ON  
 "EXPLORING LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS'  
 EXPERIENCES REGARDING ARMY'S UNIVERSITY RESERVE TRAINING:  
 WO2 M.A. MOLOI**

1. Your letter SANDF COLET/R/97291082MC dd 25 August 2017 has reference.
2. Permission is hereby granted to WO2 M.A. Moloi to conduct research at SA Army Gymnasium on "Exploring learning and development practitioners" experience regarding the SA Army's University reserve training as requested.
3. Yours Faithfully

**(M.B. MASINDA)  
 OFFICER COMMANDING SA ARMY GYMNASIUM: COL**

*LT Col Krunder*  
 1. Approved.  
 2. Please take note  
 09/09/17

**DISTR**

**For Action**

**Officer Commanding COLET**

For Action	For Info
TB	

(Attention: WO2 M.A. Moloi)



Lefapha la Boiphemelo. Umnyango wezoku Vikela. Kgoro ya Tshireletso. Isebe lezoKhuselo. Department of Defence. Muvhaso wa Tsriledzo UmNyango WezokuVikela. Ndzawau ya swa Busireheleri. Lepapha la Tshireletso. Departement van Verdediging. Litiko le Tekuvike



RESTRICTED

## **ANNEXURE 5: INFORMED CONSENT**

### **INFORMED CONSENT**

**Name of researcher:** Moloisane April Moloji

**Telephone number:** 073 843 9078

**E-mail address:** moloisanemoloji@gmail.com

**Supervisor:** Dr HW Meyer and Mr Renier Els

**Institution and faculty:** North-West University (Economic and Management Sciences)

**Title of the research project:** Exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the SA Army's University Reserve Training Programme

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#### **Introduction**

You are being invited to participate in this research study that is about exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the SA Army's University Reserve Training Programme. The SA Army's URTP is SA Army's leader development programme, delivered using a blended-learning approach envisaged to capacitate the RF with *junior leaders of character*. The SA Army uses the URTP to source junior leaders of character from so-called "*the best and the brightest*" undergraduate and postgraduate student bodies from all SA universities. The URTP is envisaged to provide the reserve force with leaders of character who possess specialised skills not normally found within the SANDF (in the case of this study the SA Army).

#### **Purpose of the study**

The purpose of this qualitative study is to explore learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the SA Army's University Reserve Training Programme (URTP) by means of a quantitative case study.

#### **Research procedures**

You will be asked to be involved in an approximately 30- to 40-minute interview with the researcher, whereby you will be required to describe your experiences regarding the SA Army's URTP. A formal briefing will be held with all participants and the researcher will lead the participants with seven (7) questions through the interview. You will be asked questions regarding your experiences with the URTP and you are expected to explore your experiences in-depth. The interview will be recorded on a tape recorder and the researcher will take field notes during the interview, of which copies will be available on request for the participants.

### **Risks and potential benefits if you participate**

There are no anticipated risks or discomforts related to this research. A confidential and private office will be chosen for the interview to ensure that confidentiality and privacy are maintained for each participant. All the transcripts will be handled confidentially and will be locked in a safe for seven years before it can be destroyed. You will stay anonymous at all times as neither your identity nor the organisation's identity will be divulged throughout the study.

The researcher is unaware of any other research investigations that have specifically examined LDPs' experiences regarding URTP in the military before, and therefore your participation in this research will benefit the organisation in understanding the phenomenon and to aid decision-makers to improve on the current training programme. There is no compensation attached to this research and therefore your participation is purely voluntarily.

### **Participation and withdrawal**

Participation in this research is completely voluntary. There will not be any compensation by any means. Therefore, you may withdraw from the study at any time for any reason and if you discontinue your participation, the information provided by you will be discarded immediately and not included in any form for data analysis.

Only the researcher, the participant and the study leaders will have access to hear and see the questions provided during the interviews. The file copies will be locked in a home file safe and retained for seven years.

### **Signatures**

Your signatures on this form indicates that you understand to your satisfaction the information provided to you about the participation in this research project and therefore you agree to voluntarily participate as a participant.

Participant's name (please print): \_\_\_\_\_

Participant's signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher's name (please print): \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher's signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

If you have any further questions or need clarity regarding this research, your participation or rights, you may contact me on the contact details given above.

If you have any concerns about your treatment as a participant, you may contact the supervisors on the following email addresses:

**Supervisor: Dr HW Meyer: *[helen.meyer@nwu.ac.za](mailto:helen.meyer@nwu.ac.za)***

**Co-supervisor: Mr Renier Els: *[Renier.Els@nwu.ac.za](mailto:Renier.Els@nwu.ac.za)***

## **ANNEXURE 6: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE**



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POTCHEFSTROOM CAMPUS

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Mr MA Moloi  
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2539

**WorkWell Research Unit**  
Tel: 018 299-1347  
Fax: 087 231-5396  
Email: [11930497@nwu.ac.za](mailto:11930497@nwu.ac.za)

23 May 2017

### **ETHICAL CLEARANCE**

This letter serves to confirm that the research project of Moloisane April Moloi, with the title **“Exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the South African Army's University Reserve Training Programme”** has undergone ethical review. The proposal was presented at a Faculty Research Meeting and accepted. The Faculty Research Meeting assigned the project number **EMSMHW16/10/27-01/03**. This acceptance deems the proposed research as being of minimal risk, granted that all requirements of anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent are met. This letter should form part of your dissertation manuscript submitted for examination purposes.

Yours sincerely

**Louise  
Jansen van  
Rensburg**

Digitally signed by Louise Jansen  
van Rensburg  
DN: cn=Louise Jansen van  
Rensburg, o=North-West  
University, ou=WorkWell Research  
Unit, email=11930497@nwu.ac.za,  
c=ZA  
Date: 2017.05.23 13:44:15 +02'00'


Administrative officer: WorkWell Research Unit

Current details: Louise Jansen van Rensburg(11930497) C:\Users\NWUSER\Documents\2. BESTUUR\2.2.20\_FEMS-WorkWell\_Voorleggingsvergaderings\2016\Mensehulpbronbestuur\2016-10-27\Moloi, MA 22521305\_Ethical clearance.docm  
23 May 2017


**ANNEXURE 7: COPY OF IDENTITY DOCUMENT (ID)**

I CERTIFY THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS A TRUE REPRODUCTION (COPY) OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WHICH WAS HANDED TO ME FOR AUTHENTICATION. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT FROM OBSERVATION, NO AMENDMENT OR CHANGE WERE MADE TO THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.

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NAME IN PRINT: MR WABENA  
SIGNATURE: [Signature] DATE: 04/9/2019

 **REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**  
**NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD**

Surname: **MOLOI**  
Names: **MOLOISANE APRIL**  
Sex: **M**  
Nationality: **RSA**  
Identity Number: **7709045241069**  
Date of Birth: **04 SEP 1977**  
Country of Birth: **RSA**  
Status: **CITIZEN**

  
Signature: [Signature]



## **ANNEXURE 8: LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE**

To whom it may concern

Cecile van Zyl  
Language editing and translation  
Cell: 072 389 3450  
Email: Cecile.vanZyl@nwu.ac.za

30 September 2019

Dear Mr / Ms

Re: Language editing of dissertation (Exploring learning and development practitioners' experiences regarding the South African Army's University Reserve Training Programme)

I hereby declare that I language edited the above-mentioned dissertation by Mr Moloisane April Moloji (student number: 22521305).

Please feel free to contact me should you have any enquiries.

Kind regards



Cecile van Zyl  
Language practitioner  
BA (PU for CHE); BA honours (NWU); MA (NWU)  
SATI number: 1002391