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**The Role of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation[
OPDSC] in the maintenance of Peace and Security in the Southern African
Development Community [SADC] Region : a case of Zimbabwe.**

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**A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the Master of Arts
degree in Peace Studies and International Relations at the North West
University, Mafikeng Campus.**

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Declaration

I, **Kgame Abraham Molo**, solemnly declare that the dissertation for the Master of Arts in Peace Studies and International Relations hereby submitted at the North West University has not been previously submitted by me for a degree at any university and that this is my work and all material herein used is duly acknowledged.


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Abstract

The aim of the study was to examine the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in the maintenance of peace and security in SADC with special reference to the case of Zimbabwe.

The study utilized the qualitative research methodology reliant on the use of secondary data. A wide range of sources from prominent research sites, publications, contributions by acclaimed researchers and people with credible expertise in the field, including review of documents such as published books, journals, thesis and internet sites provided invaluable information for analysis to enable inferences used to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

The research study found that the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation has an important role to play as a mechanism of the regional organization entrusted by the United Nations and the African Union to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC region. The Organ's effective role can be realized with more leverage over states, collective action by member states, objective and uniform implementation of policies and clearly defined strategies to deal with intra-state conflict in which states are at the centre.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Background

Regional integration has become a topical phenomenon with an object of creating improved relations among countries which share common goals in various areas of concern. It is believed that regional integration, promoted from narrow non-political issues to broader cooperation on sensitive political issues, provides for more strength and attractive outlook for the collective as opposed to the sum of parts. Integration, in essence, improves stability in non-political and political spheres (Mills and Siridipoulos, 2001).

The Southern African Regional Community (SADC) is one sub-regional organization which has made a considerable progress towards deeper integration. There is a huge expectation on this Sub-Saharan organization to be seen as an important factor to facilitate convergence in the region (Guma, 2002).

Miti (2002) suggests that the SADC framework does not merely encompass economic integration. Events in the region have prompted the organization to 'push regional security issues to the forefront' and thus necessitating the need for SADC to 'provide for the regional peace and security, sectoral cooperation and integrated regional economy'.

Phiri (2001) argues that a large number of African countries aspired for unity in the 1960s following a wave of independence against the 'bulwark' of colonialism and its impoverishing capitalist economic system. The call for unity was strengthened by the hostility of the newly independent states against South Africa for its policies which perpetuated the interest of the rich Western capitalist countries. In southern Africa, the need for the formation of SADC was intensified by the long-awaited political unity against South Africa's domination and intransigence. The initial nine member states of SADCC agreed on fundamentals of economic integration against the protagonist – South Africa.

SADC, borne of SADCC boasts 15 member states which include South Africa. At the core of its existence is a drive towards free trade, free movement of people, a single currency, democracy and respect for human rights.

Cilliers and Malan (1997) on the other hand, acknowledge the historical background of the formation of the SADC dating back from the Summit of the Head of States and Government which took place in Harare. It was at this gathering that the statesmen resolved to provide for the legal status culminating into the Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The signing of the treaty amidst ravaging conflicts in the region brought about conceptions of 'hope' and 'change' which would see the end of armed conflicts and confrontation. SADC was seen not only as a vehicle towards economic cooperation but also as a vehicle towards peace, security and stability.

Ramsamy (2001:33) expounds that:

Regional co-operation and integration in Southern Africa gained new dimensions early in the 1980's when a changed political atmosphere emerged with the independence of the majority of countries in the region. The Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area(PTA)/Common Market for Eastern And Southern Africa (Commesa) were then formed with the mandate of promoting and coordinating closer economic and socio-cultural integration (Ramsamy, 2001:33).

It follows from the above that SADC, which came into being after SADCC, had a broader mandate aimed at increased economic growth and sustainable development coupled with political stability and security. All these were aimed at improving the welfare of all the people in the region.

Murphy and Smith (2002) maintain that the Southern African Development Conference was founded on the success of the Southern African Customs Union

whose membership included Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. The formation of SADCC was premised on the assertion, among others, that SACU was serving the interest of South Africa. However, it retained the status of a regional arrangement because it maintained the long adopted principles of successful economic and political order among member countries. SADC became a revised attempt at regional cooperation in Africa. The organization pursued development goals, strengthening and building infrastructure to optimize the economic activities of individual member states.

McGowan (2002) also maintains that SADC originated in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The establishment coincided with the spate of independence among many African countries characterized by majority rule. The frontline states, which were opposed to the South African dominance in economic, transportation and political spheres, deemed it necessary to cease dependence and co-ordinate foreign aid and investment through the organization. SADC came into being at an international conference in Windhoek, Namibia on 17 August 1992. The formal and legal treaties of the organization contain objectives which include to:

- to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantages;
- to evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- to promote and defend peace and security;
- to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and interdependence of member states;
- to achieve complementarity between the national and regional strategies and programmes;
- to promote and maximize productive employment and the utilization of natural resources of the region; and
- to strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among all the peoples of the region.

It must be emphasised that the SADC treaty encompasses common goals which include areas of economy, environment, politics, peace and security. It is for that reason that in the interest of integration heads of states signed a Trade Protocol on August 24, 1996(SADC,1995:6).

Ramsamy (2001) adds that the rationale for a united Southern Africa is not necessarily based on the existence of a common cultural, socio-economic affinities, problems and historical backgrounds. SADC is, rather, founded on fundamental principles that include:

- the sovereign equality of all independent states;
- solidarity, peace and security, human rights, human rights and the rule of law; and
- equity, balance and mutual benefit.

It must be emphasized that the SADC treaty provides for protocols which member states enter into in line with the commitment to align themselves to the process of formulating common policies and the development of rules and regulations to conform with integration. Critical to the process is the involvement of a variety of stakeholders which encompass:

- the business community
- civil society,
- professional organizations,
- non-governmental organizations
- educational institutions, and
- cultural bodies.

The above signifies the multilateral approach adopted by SADC member states to ensure that there is collective responsibility within the regional setting.

Neethling (2002) acknowledges that the mandate of the Southern African Development Community transcends to issues of peace and security on the

basis of a principled motion to mobilize political will for multilateral action. It has become very imperative, therefore, that the sub-regional organization is not to be left behind because it has not been immune to the conflicts that has plagued the entire continent. Acknowledgement must therefore be given to states sharing the same peace and security interests and thereby organizing their security policies in conjunction with one another, noting that SADC has become a vehicle to address issues of collective security in the sub-region.

Seleti (2004) agrees that Africa experienced an increase in conflicts and as a result initiatives towards resolving the impasses have been tackled at regional and sub-regional level. In respect of the Southern African Development Community, there have been efforts, despite the reality that the sub-regional organization was not formed, to tackle conflict resolution. It was, however, imperative given the growing circumstances that SADC assumes a conflict resolution role to curb the spread of ensuing security problems in the region.

Ngubane and Solomon (2004) trace attempts of dealing with matters of security in Africa by looking back at the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention founded in 1993 on the quest for collective security in the entire continent. At sub-regional level, the Southern African Development Community Conference evolved into the Southern African Development Community so that the 'structure could tackle not only economic challenges but also deal with problems on the security front'.

Campbell (2003) acknowledges that the processes leading to the dissolution of the Front Line States (FLS) was an attempt within the SADC to bring about coherence in the realm of peace and security. In a workshop convened in Windhoek, Namibia, under the theme peace, security and democracy, efforts were made to move away from the constructs of the Interstate Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC). The rationale for the move was primarily to bring about a multilateral approach to the concept of peace and security in the region on the grounds that continued military approach was not bearing ideal fruits given the continuing spread of violence.

Miti (2002) further articulates that the Lesotho crisis which forced military intervention and the ousting of Mobutu Seseseko in the now Democratic Republic of Congo produced international pressure among prominent African states to embark on peacekeeping roles. As a result, the Southern African Development Community assumed a newly established role aimed at providing peace and security, sectoral cooperation and an integrated regional economy.

van Schalkwyk (2002) emphasizes that the developmental and integration goals of the Southern African Development Community need to be reconciled with the 'unenviable task' of peacekeeping. The notion is based on the premise that the organization is embroiled in conflict situations and demands attention. It is for that reason that the framework on peace and security of SADC recognizes the new approach to security which encompasses the involvement of people and the non-military dimensions. It is further acknowledged that a cue has been taken from the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) underpinned by processes of NEPAD and AU of a search for security in the continent.

The former state president of South Africa thwarted a motion for the establishment of an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) proposed by the US Secretary of State following a visit in Africa. Instead, a framework for the development of an organ became part of the agenda of a SADC meeting in Malawi where 'the peoples of southern Africa could respond to the issues of peace, security and defense'. In August 1995 the concept of ASAS was abandoned after lengthy discussions regarding the future of ISDSC. Following the Summit of the Heads of States on 28 June 1996 a communiqué was issued to the effect that:

...the SADC Organ of Politics, Defense and Security shall operate at the summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures. The Organ shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels. The

chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and troika basis
(Campbell, 2003:70).

Cilliers (1999) confirms that SADC was set on a course towards a formal involvement in security coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation after the resolutions and recommendations of the **SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security** held in Windhoek in 1994. In a subsequent meeting held in Harare on 3 March 1995, SADC Foreign Ministers agreed on the establishment of an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) under Chapter 7, Article 21(3)(g) of the SADC Treaty. The terms of reference of the ASAS included:

- to protect the people of the region against instability arising from internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and from external aggression;
- to cooperate fully in regional security and defense, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- to give maximum support to the organs and institutions of SADC;
- to mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflict;
- to co-ordinate and harmonize, as far as possible, policy and international issues;
- to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage member states to observe human rights as provided for in the charter and conventions of the OAU and UN;
- to promote peace and stability; and
- to promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.

The Organ was formally declared and became operational after the communiqué (14 May 1996) from President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to 'all the colleagues in the rest of SADC'.

van Schalkwyk (2005) suggests that the Southern African Development Community is inundated with political instability and conflict. It is incumbent upon the sub-regional organization to manage conflict because it is recognized as a legitimate body to align its operations with the United Nations. Reference is made to Article 2,2 (g) of the reviewed Organ which commits member states to 'promote the development of democratic institutions and practice within the territories of State Parties and to encourage the observance of universal human rights' and Article 2.2 (i) which emphasizes the need to 'promote a community base approach to domestic security'. The establishment of an *Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee(ISPDC)* in place of the *Inter-State Defense and Security Committee(ISDSC)* attests to the renewed perspective on security and conflict management in the sub-region with special reference to the need for 'political cooperation and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices'.

Matheba (2003) states that the Organ on Politics Defense and Security was suspended due to its ineffectiveness in dealing with matters of peace and security in Southern Africa. The Organs operations outside the realm of the Chairperson of SADC created discrepancies and security breaches thus rendering it ineffective. The situation called for reform of the entire SADC operations on peace and security which ushered in Protocol which incorporated new operations and structures adopted in Malawi on August 14, 2002. The Organ on Defense, Politics and Security Cooperation Protocol signified a new security regime in consultation with the Troika and Chair of Southern African Development Community.

Bam (2006) supports the notion that the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation was a culmination of efforts to revive the SADC security operations. The protocol provided for the expansion of the Organ to include ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defense, public and state security of member states. The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) were established to improve the Organ's capacity. Whilst the Organ's mandate still centers around the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in the region, its

objectives are extended to include the 'promotion of political cooperation (peacekeeping) and the enforcement of peace agreements (peace-enforcement). Article 11 (2) of the Organ provides for the organ to intercede in any 'significant' inter-state and intra-state conflict. Accordingly, guidelines for interstate intervention include:

- conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources;
- conflict in which an act of aggression or military force has been threatened; and
- conflict which threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of a state which is not party to conflict.

Guidelines for intervention in intra-state conflict include:

- large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights;
- military coup or other threats to the legitimate authority of a state
- a condition of civil war or insurgency; and
- conflict which threatens peace and security in the region

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (2007) on the other hand, asserts that the Organ on Politics Defense and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) is an ambitious security project of the Southern African Development Community. The protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation signed in 2001 aims at streamlining the 'foreign policies of SADC states and to implement peace and security initiatives that address conflict prevention, and peace-building'. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ was meant to consolidate the organization's peace and security plan by devising developmental strategies in four sectors, namely: defense; politics; state security, and public security

2. Statement of the Problem

The Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was promulgated in 1996 and provided for a tool for SADC members to deal with issues of peace and security in the region. The Organ has been reviewed and has encompassed the principle of cooperation. Despite the many years of the organ's existence and its structures to deal with matters of peace and security, the regional organization is still grappling to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe and the situation is intensifying. The statement of the problem is articulated with the following research questions.

- What are the impediments to a sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe?
- What is the importance of the OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in the crisis in Zimbabwe?
- What are the challenges facing OPDSC in maintaining peace and security for the people of Zimbabwe?

3. Rationale of the Study

The Southern African Development Community has evolved over the years from a sub-regional organization founded on a set of common principles of economic nature to include involvement in security coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation. The Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was declared in 1996 to deal with issues related to peace and security. Despite the existence of such a protocol with a clearly defined mandate founded on its principles, Southern Africa is still grappling with the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Numerous attempts have been made to tackle the crisis. These include the 'quite diplomacy' adopted by the South African government. Despite all of them, the crisis continues and the majority of Zimbabweans, the neighbouring states and the entire region feel the devastating impact. The situation prevails in the context of a declared OPDSC.

It was the intention of the study to investigate the role of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa with special reference to the crisis in Zimbabwe.

4. The aim of the study

The aim of the study was to investigate the importance of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation[OPDSC] in the maintenance of peace and security in the Southern African Development Community[SADC] region with special reference to the case of Zimbabwe.

5. Objectives of the Study

The study attempted to achieve the following specific objectives:

- to discuss the historical background of OPDSC;
- to outline the objectives and mandate of OPDSC;
- to establish the importance of OPDS in the maintenance of peace in Southern Africa; and
- to highlight the challenges and prospects of OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa with special reference to Zimbabwe.

6. Scope of Study

The proposed study focused solely on the importance of the OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in the Southern African Development Community region, with special reference to the case of Zimbabwe.



7. Theoretical framework

The study derives its theoretical basis from the regime and functionalist theoretical framework. It must be emphasized that the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC region is within the operational area of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation as an organization recognized by the United Nations and the African Union. The regime theory unravelled all matters related to the importance of the Organ in the ongoing crisis in the country in question.

8. Limitations of the study

The study was limited to the prescribed framework. Any events and processes geared to resolving the crisis did not influence the inconclusive judgment of the study.

The study relied on a larger variety of secondary data within the framework of regional arrangements and their functions with special reference to SADC.

The study projected insight into the role of OPDSC in bringing about sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe in full view of the fact that there are other processes aimed at resolving the impasse.

Chapter 2

Literature review and theoretical framework

This section encapsulates the review of literature in the context of the proposed research. It is intended to give an evaluation of research previously undertaken in relation to the investigation with the aim of deepening the theoretical framework.

2.1 Literature review

2.1.1 The Southern African Development Community (SADC): an overview

Tesha (2002) suggests that despite the riches of Africa, the continent is mainly characterized by the present, past and future marred by challenges threatening the peace and security of the collective. It is evident that the dilemma facing the continent lies solely with Africans themselves. African people and leaders have come up with efforts and initiatives to rid the continent of the continuing quagmire as indicated by the liberation struggles fought side by side to emancipate the peoples of the entire continent. Following the disbandment of the Cold War, Africa had to grapple with the new international order which gave rise to the need to attempt challenges at regional level where economic development was coupled with issues of peace and security. The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was no surprise because peace and security has become a challenge in the continent.

Mills and Siridopoulos (2001) concur with the assertion that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is no exception to the peace and security problem as it is a continental problem. It is worth noting that although the sub-regional body was founded to deal with economic development issues, peace and security became eminent domains as a result of continued conflicts with a 'cross-border contagion' impact among the neighboring states. On taking

an inward look at the Southern African Development Community, it is concluded that the sub-region has been marred by dispute, rather than distinguished by consensus on political issues.

Cilliers (1995) attests that the debate about the regional peace and security in Southern Africa gained momentum after the fall of the separatist government of South Africa. Various initiatives have been systematized around SADC to consolidate previously founded efforts, although the recent focus have been directed to dealing with the interests of all the member states. Attempts to explore the 'security, co-operation and interdependence' in the sub-region was covered by a number of policy decisions within the framework of collective action among member states. The OAU and SADC, in particular, have attempted possibilities which include the bilateral arrangements, new structures and bodies, and pacts to deal with the threat to peace and security.

The review of SADCC which operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol for a period of twelve years, culminating into the establishment of SADC with a declaration and treaty was rewarded with the dismantling of a tyranny regime in South Africa and the independence of Namibia. The resolution following the SADC workshop in Windhoek on Democracy, Peace and Security set a new tone for issues of security coordination. Despite all the efforts, it is noted with concern that African leaders have failed dismally to condemn one another.

Mills (1995) also agrees that whilst SADC adopted a number of programmes coordinated by different countries depending on their capacity, it was evident that the programme of action was not yielding sufficient progress but greater political solidarity was fostered through cooperation and activities of the political organ under the umbrella of the Front-Line States [FLS].

It must be emphasized that the FLS was founded on the premise that member countries of the Southern African Development Community were lobbying for the liberation of South Africa and Namibia. When the objective was realized,



attempts were made to reform FLS into a political and security wing of SADC. Sufficient strides were made in respect of collective action based on collective decisions in the interests of progress and development of the sub-regional grouping. It must, however, be noted that security issues at regional level have been lagging behind following the long established bilateral engagements and responses to 'crisis resolution and prevention'.

Metz (2000) is of the opinion that Africa continues to be characterized by poverty, violence and instability even at the beginning of the 21st century. As a result of these characteristics, the continent faces a serious security dilemma. At the heart of the problem is the continued lack of planning, foresight and commitment on the part of the African leaders to rid the continent of the security problem. It is evident that at national and sub-regional level security strategies do not provide for coherent paths towards protecting the interests of societies.

Security has always been viewed in the realm of protecting the regime or the rule of law as determined by the ruling political party. The evolution of the security environment, on the other hand, indicates a shift from the national concern of security as indicated by the spill-over effects of conflicts in Lesotho, in the case of the Southern African Development Community. Internal instability and violence have invariably had spillover effect and dramatically endangered neighboring states. It is emphasized that the challenge lies with sub-regional organizations and structures such as the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security to ensure that 'effective strategic planning' takes into account the realities of individual countries.

Chazan *et al.* (1999) argues that the African continent has continuously been characterized by conflict. The end of the Cold War promised to usher the dawn of a less turbulent Africa but the contrary has proved to be the case. Despite new forms of governments – post independence African governments – facing new challenges of self governance, instability continued to be a challenge.

Numerous attempts have been made to develop mechanisms to deal with the challenges. These include sub-regional arrangements such as the Southern African Development Coordinating Council composed of arrangements such as Front line States (FLS) and the Association of southern African States. At the core of the sub-regional arrangement was the perceived security threat posed by the white South African government entrenched by the economic dominance in the region. The common adversary, therefore, was the apartheid government of South Africa and that required policymakers to focus on issues of security, among others. It was, however, evident from the conduct of states that leaders were obscured by pursuing dissimilar policy imperatives despite having a common goal.

2.1.2 Zimbabwe: an overview

du Toit(1995) argues that Zimbabwe attained its independence following the Lancaster Agreement in 1980. Despite the success, the country does not have a good record of wholly democratic practices for its populace. It is worth noting that the objective of the first generation of post independence leaders was to free the country from oppressive shackles of domination and exploitation by the dominant colonial regime. The Zimbabwean African National Union [ZANU(PF)], after having won elections by a clear majority, adopted a socialist agenda to delineate itself from Rhodesian order and promised a prospectively 'new, better and qualitatively different Zimbabwean state'.

Despite the clearly outlined ideological principles, the ruling party could not provide a 'blueprint' according to which it planned to transform the country and its population. The post-independence constitution was based on the 'Westminster type constitution' which was superior to the parliament and provided for the maximum term of parliament set at five years.

Lee (2000) asserts that Zimbabwe is continuously grappling with 'unresolved political and economic issues'. As a result, the country is characterized by increased unemployment and poverty. The once rich Southern African state faces political instability as a result of the interventionist approach which the government adopted. Instead of providing leadership in the ensuing crisis, the

government took 'action against protesters and rioters' in a manner that resembled 'a police state'. Furthermore, political parties critical of government policies in response to worsening situations, were silenced and thus brewing political suppression and intolerance.

Commenting on the 'socialist' policy of the Mugabe government following the outright victory which reflected the tenuous statehood in Zimbabwe, Brickhill (1998) argues that:

What lies ahead of Zimbabwe is undoubtedly a greater civil strife and disorder, a worsening economic crisis and greater repression – if the post-riot clampdown on the state media following some critical reporting is anything to go by. 'They are likely to go the repressive route – they are closing down the press and it's a significant step to actually put the army on the street'.

Luckham (2003) proposes that Zimbabwe is characteristic of a state 'regressing toward authoritarian governance behind a shell of formal democracy'. Cognizant of the varying degrees of democratic governance in world politics, and the varying degrees of political contest, Zimbabwe suffers from 'democratic deficits' due to its disregard for democratic institutions and 'the absence of democratic politics'. The country is condemned for its 'entrenchment of military and ex-military men in politics, administration and business, military and security impunities for the past and present human rights abuses, . . . secrecy and the insulation of military and security issues from the public debate'. Although the Zimbabwean democracy is said to be characterized by 'civilian control' pursuant to the holding of 'democratic elections', the regime is a recent example of 'politicization of the *de facto* political and business partner and electoral enforcer of the contested 'democratic regime'.

Schwab (2001) asserts that the white controlled Rhodesia passed into history with the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. It was at this time that Robert Mugabe ascended the throne as a prime minister of the newly independent Zimbabwe. Being the most prominent black African freedom fighter in the former colony, Robert Mugabe made it clear to the people of Zimbabwe that he

intended 'turning swords into plowshares to rebuild the war-torn nation' and of 'reconciliation and not recrimination', thus making the country a home to all who belonged. Things, however, changed when the renowned leader superseded the basic parliamentary system with his presidential structure which would not subject him to parliamentary endorsement for presidential elections. A one - party was officially born and there was abundant evidence of intolerance to domestic criticism. Regarded as the 'kleptocratic' ruler and 'hard to control and harder to oust', Mugabe had brought his country to the brink of economic ruin as a result of the continued rampage of white owned farms and a bid to 'politically emasculate his domestic political opposition'. In 1990 unemployment in Zimbabwe had plummeted to 50 percent with inflation close to 100 percent. About 70 percent of the population was reported living below poverty line. Evidently, 'people in Zimbabwe are one third poorer than they were at independence'.

Bond (2003) concurs that the newly independent Zimbabwe was touted to be a people centred state based on socialist policies meant to promote the will of the people as proclaimed by the overwhelming majority victory of ZANU-PF. In the period 1980 to 1987, a total of 94 000 loans were granted to support the Zimbabwean agricultural markets. Due to resistance to change borrowers defaulted and the strategy floundered. The Zimbabwean economic policies and structure was clearly not aligned to the liberalized markets and thus resulting in a back-slide indicated by the 'extremely high inflation rates'. The situation worsened over time thus putting more pressure on the currency. In 1997 the value of the Zimbabwean dollar shrunk from \$0.09 to \$0.025 in the same year. The adverse effects of the policies were subsequently felt by the locals who were faced with rising maize and fuel hikes. The subsequent riots and demonstrations were a clear indication that the government was no longer accountable to the public.

Knapp (2004) argues that Zimbabwe portrays characteristics of a 'failing state, if not already 'failed' state'. The assertion is based on the notion that the current strategies of the state to address the continuing collapse of the 'economy, political legitimacy and governance of the rule of law' are worsening

the crisis. The Zimbabwean economy is seen to have taken a downward spiral since 1980 after its independence. The 2003 budget attest to the reversal of economic gains and the social service expansion indicated by the shrinking economy at 11 % in 2002. Despite the harsh realities of the ailing Zimbabwean economy, the government has failed to implement corrective measures in the interest of its citizenry. Instead, increasingly strict limitations on international aid agencies providing food aid and supplementary feeding have been imposed without providing for alternatives in its budgetary allocations. The majority of the population is the hardest hit resulting in massive displacements in search of better living conditions. Corruption in Zimbabwe is prevalent in state institutions to an extent that in the justice system, for instance, the state is 'unable to maintain the rule of law, defend human rights, provide basic services or accountable democratic governance or even guarantee due process of the court system'.

Hill (2005) conceives that the once prosperous and major exporting Zimbabwe has been plunged into poverty due to repression and misrule. Evidently, the agricultural sector, mining and tourism sectors have collapsed resulting in massive displacement of the population seeking opportunities in neighboring countries such as South Africa wherein, as reported in 2004, approximately 3 million Zimbabweans have become refugee seekers and 'more crossing the border everyday. The situation is in view of the following circumstances:

- law and order has broken down and the police are politicized;
- inflation is the highest in the world;
- nine out of ten adults are unemployed;
- the state-run militia has set up terror networks across the nation;
- commercial farming has collapsed, and food agencies estimate that 75% of the population does not have enough to eat;
- there is virtually no public health system; and
- between 25 and 33 per cent of the population is in exile.

Rankhumise (2003) suggests that the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe is a result of the government's failure to meet the needs of its people as a result of misconstrued policies. The crisis is characterized by continued failure to address the longstanding political differences which have turned the government against its people. In order to cling on to the state control, the ZANU-PF led government has resorted to repressive laws not only on its citizens, but also on state organs and institution which are currently seen to be serving the interest of the 'elite'. At the center of the crisis is the land redistribution policy used by the ruling party to garner support for electoral purposes. The implementation thereof has trampled on the 'human rights and property rights' of the citizens and has also led to mass killings and displacements.

In response to the growing outcry of its population, the government has, through the state security service, 'continued to arrest members of the opposition' for threatening the internal peace and security as well as for undermining the constitution. The media has also come under strict government control as indicated by the banning of those perceived to be 'spreading anti-state propaganda'. Elections in Zimbabwe have been characterized by rigging, according unfair advantage to the ruling party as well as repressive measures against the opposition. It is for that reason that the Commonwealth suspended the country and barred its officials from attending the December 2003 Abuja Summit.

Sevenzo (2008) agrees that the economic situation in Zimbabwe has been worsened by the prevailing political instability. As a result, the majority of the population has resorted to practical measures following continuous power cuts, water shortages, food shortages coupled with price hikes. The government implemented massive cut on its social spending and thus denying the poorest of its population access to services. Commenting on the post March 29, 2008 elections environment, it is noted that:

. . . thousands of countrymen and women were displaced from their villages as militias conducted 'operation how did you vote?'. In reality this

was a form of corrective measure by elements of what was once ruling ZANU-PF, to correct the way people cast their vote. Its premise is simple. All votes for any party that was not President Robert Mugabe's party needed correcting (Sevenzo,2008:28).

Incidents of political intolerance were evident in the widespread violence against all supposed ZANU-PF opponents who were believed to have voted for the opposition parties. The opposition leader vanished from Zimbabwe for six weeks for fear of his life.

Africa Today (2005) asserts that prior to the 31 March 2005 elections, reports indicated that Zimbabwe was marred with 'torture, abuse of food aid, and brutal repression by the state'. The election result indicated flaws as 'no observers were present' when the National Logistics Committee received the first report, and the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission could not account for the discrepancy regarding the number votes per candidate and the total number of votes cast at closing time. It followed then that there was 'massive electoral fraud' ignored by the observers.

Despite the observers declaring the elections as 'representative of the will of the Zimbabwean people', the South African government team did not qualify the verdict that elections were free but not fair. In addition to this, the African Union could not accord full endorsement because of the massive irregularities. Despite all the irregularities, the Southern African Development Community 'validated the results merely because there was very little violence and the polling day was peaceful'. The deployment of heavily armed forces following the announcement of the elections was testimony to the repressive stance taken by the Zimbabwean government.

Africa Today (2007) suggests that the effort by Thabo Mbeki, the former South African president, signifies the deep crisis existent in Zimbabwe. The move follows a widespread pressure for neighbouring countries and the international community following acts of human rights abuse and absolute lack of democratic governance in the SADC member state. The South African sponsored talks were triggered by the widely publicized assault of the

opposition leader on March 11 which resulted in a regional fall-out that led to a resolution calling for a fact finding mission to Zimbabwe. Security reports in the country suggested a planned coupe which resulted in several army officials being detained though not charged, a massive pay rise to the armed forces, 'arrests and beatings of prominent human rights lawyers'. Interference by the state in the judicial system led to forced leave on the attorney-general. It is for all these that it was concluded that 'Zimbabwe poses a threat to regional peace and stability'.

Smith (2003) agrees that the political situation prevalent in Zimbabwe is repressive and represents a move towards blocking the 'strong and independent social and political institutions'. He further suggests that:

In its determination to hold on to power the government of President Mugabe has undermined the independence of the judiciary, taken sweeping new security powers, brought an end to free press, encouraged illegal occupations of farms and the murder of their owners, politicized the police, and incited ZANU-PF war veterans to violence and intimidation against the opposition supporters which has ended in political murders, disappearances, unlawful detentions and assaults. The military has warned it would not serve a president with policies different to those of President Mugabe. The result has been to reduce the sections of the population to starvation level, create nearly 100 percent inflation, and increase unemployment (Smith, 2003:241).

Moyo (2008) concurs that the political situation in Zimbabwe is characterized by intolerance, violence and uncertainty. Prior to the March elections, the Southern African Development Community exerted pressure on the government to work on 'electoral reform' with indications of 'more reforms on the country's security and press laws' which would allow opposition parties to campaign freely even though it would be in a short space of time. The prevailing press laws have been an impediment to the opposition campaigns thus creating uneven political playing fields in the country.

Africa Today (2008:08) reports that:

A predictable pattern of state-sponsored post-election violence in Zimbabwe has left tens of thousands of opposition supporters displaced, thousands injured, and scores killed even as Zimbabwe prepares for a presidential elections . . . three months after the March 29 disputed presidential and parliamentary elections. While similar violence has followed the elections – with the authorities using the election results to target retribution more accurately – the latest campaign of terror is said to be the worst in 20 years.

Pike (2008) on the other hand suggests that the previously prosperous Zimbabwe is experiencing an 'economic meltdown' in the hands of the ZANU-PF led 'elite' who are determined to protect their interests at the expense of the majority of the population. The rural schools are a clear indication of the squalor in which learning and teaching cannot effectively take place. Children in the primary schools are characteristic of malnutrition due to the inability of the state to provide for children who were previously fed by NGOs which were forced to stop their operations as a result of government interference.

In essence, food is used as a political tool despite the adverse effects it has on the needy population. A similar situation exists in state hospitals, local clinics and hospices which have run out of supplies thus making the country ineffective and inefficient in the provision of health services. Price controls imposed by government on local businesses forced shops to close down.

Soyinka (2008) regards Robert Mugabe as one of the tyrants in the history of African politics. Worth noting that the renowned freedom fighter has turned what promised to be a flourishing state into turmoil-marred independent state. He is one among the many 'dictators' who allows the holding of elections but ensures that he 'tinkers' with the processes so that he retains political power. The rural part of the country where the president enjoys much of his support is 'suffering severely from lack of basic amenities'. The March 2008 elections have been marked as the most controversial polls in the Zimbabwean history where neither of the opposition parties attained outright majority. Although results

took very long to be released, contestants prepared for a presidential run-off which was preceded by vote recounting whilst awaiting the results.

In view of the stalemate, the ruling ZANU-PF supporters 'inflicted violence against the opposition leaders' thus creating tension between the two adversaries. The human rights violation witnessed in the country have caught the international community's attention which thus called for intervention. Many Zimbabweans have become refugees in neighbouring countries with South Africa carrying the bulk of the baggage.

Smith and Cullinan (2008) on the other hand suggest that the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission announced a 47 % victory of the Movement for Democratic Change in the March 29, 2008 elections thus bringing about a nine ministerial seats loss of ZANU-PF. Amidst the electoral controversy, the crisis torn Zimbabwe grappled with the receipt of Chinese arms consignment which the current SADC chair, Levy Mwanawasa, condemned. This was against the background of long-standing political tension and the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. The economic crisis has seen the introduction of the Z\$50m bill in response to the inflation rate running at over 150 000 % a year.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004) asserts that the ZANU-PF led government of Zimbabwe has 'failed the broad masses of the people with human security and social peace'. The period from the early days of independence has seen the country plunged in political turmoil, economic and social downward spiral leading to insecurity. The state of governance and economic management has reportedly reached breaking point, thus qualifying to be regarded as the 'Zimbabwean crisis' characterized by questionable legitimacy of government, governance, economic decadency and humanitarian crisis.

It has become abundantly clear that the government has continuously focused on state security in the interest of the 'elite' at the expense of the masses. As a result the government has turned against its people who are crying for protection from poverty, hunger, starvation and disease. State violence unleashed against the masses since the state adopted the nationalist agenda

has not silenced the opposition, labour organizations, NGO and civil society in the face of bankruptcy of the government.

Theoretical framework

The object of a theoretical perspective is to provide a framework for research undertaken. A theory is a fundamental building block of an investigation as it 'defines terms and concepts used to describe, explain, or predict in a study' (Woods,1996:10). It is important to note that the framework provides for conceptual separation and allows for a specific goal oriented approach which allows a scholar to limit his / her scope of work. It allows one to ignore the many facets of a topic and focus on one.

Ewusi (2007) purports that the most important aspect of a theoretical framework is to attempt to explain or account for a particular phenomenon and limit an argument to a specific theory or thinking. Theory is used to guide defining levels of analysis and captures or carves a distinct logic of thinking. It therefore provides for the beginning and maps out the route taken to get to a specific understanding.

For the purpose of this study two theories, namely, the regime and functional theories provide a perspective by which an account of importance of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe is clarified.

2.2.1 Regime theory

Regime theory presupposes that the international political arena / system is a combination of states representing the interests of their respective citizenry. States, in their interactions, adhere to the established norms thus making the international system less of an anarchic system. In essence, the established norm restrain the actions of individual states to the benefit of a collective to which they belong. The system provides for the establishment of regimes described as 'sets of principles, norms rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area' (Woods,1996:17).

The premise of the theory is that states cooperate at various levels and thus expanding to more complex forms of interdependence. Derived from the noun regime, the perspective encapsulates a complex of norms, rules, processes and organizations that, in sum, have evolved to help the behaviour of states and other international actors in an arena of international concerns' (Rourke,2003:231). The regime theory presupposes the high level of institutionalized arrangement of states poised to pool resources and programmes together in the interest of all in a collective manner. The defining elements of the institution encompass the **principles** which serve as basis for cooperation, the **norms** which specify the general standards of behaviour, the **rules** set by the collective operating at a lower level of principles, and **decision making procedures** which principally identify the specific prescriptions for behavior (Krasner, 1985).

The United Nations (UN) as a security regime was formulated on the principle of the maintenance of peace and security in the international political world. Chapter VIII, Article 1 makes provision for regional organizations operating in line with its purpose and principles of the UN (UN Charter). The Southern African Development Community, through its Organ is one such regional arrangement dealing with issues of peace and security in the Southern African region. The Protocol on the Organ sets out principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures governing/constraining states so that they act in a manner consistent with the regime. SADC, therefore, claims the responsibility to map out parameters of the security equation and the processes 'to ensure that regional security issues are effectively addressed' (Williams, 2001).

In practice, the SADC Organ is required to intervene in the crisis on issues affecting peace and security within its jurisdiction. With the crisis in Zimbabwe, all relevant policies, structures, and procedures are readily available to determine the course of action to be taken. Scholars have argued about how the country has deteriorated over a period of time thus compounding the economic crisis with the legitimacy of the government following the 2002 and 2008 disputed elections which has resorted to unorthodox practice contrary to the norms of the regional regime. SADC provides for the Tribunal where citizens

can call intervention when facing intra-state conflict to which the government is party, the Elections Forum Monitoring Commission; all attached to the Organ which deals with issues of peace and security threatened by human rights abuses in Zimbabwe (Knapp:2004).

Ngoma (2004) agrees that the SADC the organ is a phenomenon premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces and a dense of normative environments in 'which states evolve a sense of security through peaceful and democratic means' through the signing of the Mutual Defense Pact which takes cognizance of the SIPO. With this in mind, it must be emphasized that SADC 'lies at the heart of law and collective security perspective, perceived as a way to draw states and peoples of the region into a community of peace and cooperation for a collective mutual gain' (Woods,1996:17).

2.2.2. Functionalist theory

The Functionalist theory, on the other hand, is premised on the development of functional organizations established to effectively deal with various sectoral areas of interest to membership seeking to engage in programmes of mutual benefit. In the long run, it is through such initiatives that the political system, for instance, signify an increased degree of cooperation among participating states (Austin, 1987:81).

Lieber (2001) asserts that the functionalist theory is founded on the assumption that a peaceful world could be achieved by different means as opposed to, among others, the federalist thinking which was superceded by nationalism. Functionalists argue that international cooperation in specific functional necessities can bring about peace among member states despite not having an overarching political authority. The continued harmonious relations among the individual members, harnessed by the shared activities, are bound to foster peaceful relations. At the ultimate end, the functional integration would promote the attainment of wider political understanding thus seeking to 'attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interest' (Haas,1964).

Rourke (2003) agrees that the functionalist perspective is a representative of an ideology founded on the formation of organizations poised at key issues of interest at a smaller scale with a provision for growth to more complex political issues. In essence the evolutionary approach assumes a limited, pragmatic cooperation on narrow non-political issues to achieve broader cooperation on more and more politically sensitive issues.

The establishment of the Southern African Development Community (**SADC**) is relevant to this approach in that it was founded on economic benefits for member states opposed to the influence of South Africa and its political agenda which was deemed irrelevant to the development of all neighbouring countries. In order to counteract the advances of the repressive regime at the time, states established an economic community which transcended to other issues of common interest and benefit on the basis of progress made in the initial areas of interest.

It is on this basis that the theory provides for success in the realm of security because other issues have proved the functionality of the organization. Security, with all its complexities which include issues of sovereignty and punitive action against a defaulting member state like Zimbabwe calls for the organ to function on these sensitive issues. The region 'possess a loose but profound collective identity that had been forged by common political struggles that stretched from, in some cases, back in the early 20th century' (Williams, 2002:106).

Graham (2008) confirms that it is no coincidence that the Southern African Development Community established the organ to deal with issues of collective peace and security within its jurisdiction. Whilst noting that the sub-regional arrangement is well recognized by the United Nations and operates within the confines of the security regime, SADC and its organ is in line with the functions of regional organizations poised at more sensitive political issues which are by no means easy to deal with. What is required in order to deal decisively with the Zimbabwe crisis is a principle driven approach to enable the organ to disburse its function.

Chapter 3

Delineation of research variables

This chapter is dedicated to unraveling the key variables of the research. These are articulated in the form of questions designed to provide the framework for discussion. The specific variables are:

- What are the impediments to a sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe?
- What is the importance of the OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in the crisis in Zimbabwe?
- What are challenges facing the OPDSC in maintaining peace and security for the people of Zimbabwe?

3.1.What are the impediments to a sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe?

Neethling (2004) suggest that although the post World War II has not seen major warfare, conflicts and violence have not diminished. As a result, where such conditions prevail, regional groupings and international organizations are required to act or play an active role in order to promote peace and security. Worth noting that Southern Africa is also plagued with conflict and violence, the Southern African Development Community must act in accordance with resolutions to curb problems which transcend national borders. It is, however, very imperative that states organize their policies to act on behalf of their citizens for peace, prosperity and security.

Hubert (1999) conceives that the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe was and still remains the cornerstone of nationalist agenda. The post independence period maintained the agenda with the view to project government policies and programmes to address the national aspirations – putting the Zimbabwean people first. Cognizant of the fact that the nationalist proponents of the agenda

are still in government and thus steering policies and programmes, one can thus proclaim that it is the same nationalists of the post independence era who chart and influence the character of Zimbabwe. It is, however, evident that the nationalist agenda has turned out to be despotic, authoritarian, violent and a cult of personality (Bhebe and Ranger, 2003:02).

Ngubane and Hussein (2004) argue that Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which espouses democratic values and practices. Despite this, the country has been in a downward spiral towards economic decay and political crisis due to the failure by the state to foster political relations with the opposition and the masses. The ZANU-PF government has continuously maintained repressive laws amidst growing tensions within its borders.

Chung (2006) suggests that at the dawn of independence, the Zimbabwean people started a new struggle in which the liberation movements were meant to form a government. The period of transition was marked by robust changes in policies and the former colonial bureaucracy. The rise of black middle class in key government positions ushered in a period of ethnic tussle for power coupled with the threat of a politicized military. On the other, the socio-economic and political conditions in the ZANLA, ZIPRA and ZAPU camps led to divisions which threatened political stability in the newly independent Zimbabwe.

Pressure from the war veterans and the ensuing intolerance leading to conflict and killings forced the government to bleed billions of dollars to avert political instability. The 'acquired life' of the war veterans and youth militia threw the government in disarray over its political legitimacy and control of state. The resultant violence of those considered dissidents by the army and the militia became a political tool to repress even the ordinary citizenry as it became a political tool to coerce the people and sustain the ZANU-PF led government.

Stiff (2000) agrees that the ZANU-PF led government is characterized by utter neglect of its constitutional responsibility to protect its citizens and provide for

safety and security for all. Instead, it has become evident that the war veterans have become a stabilizing force acting outside the constitutional mandate of the state yet being seen as protecting the interests of the Zimbabwean people in the quest to transform the economy of the country by unleashing an 'economic war' against those opposed to the government.

The violence directed at the opposition and dissidents is seen as a strategy by the government to maintain repression to the benefit of the war veterans thus losing control of the political leadership. Clearly, the 'new life' provides for an opportunity for the ruling party to cling to state control using the will of the people of Zimbabwe as indicated by violent acts which are meant to intensify the 'second liberation'. In this way the government is seen to be ignoring anarchy orchestrated by the Zimbabwean guard because it keeps the ruling party at bay.

Hill (2003) retorts that Zimbabwe is characteristic of a pariah state. It is asserted that the ZANU-PF government has deliberately resorted to the isolationist approach to cling to power using tactics such as veterans as the vanguard and also spearheading the expropriation of farms as a means to reclaim half of the 12 million hectares of white owned land. In response to this, the government has continuously pointed a finger at Britain and the United States of America claiming external interference. President Robert Mugabe proclaims that all is well and the Zimbabwean people simply ensure 'self-reliance and sovereign independence'.

Campbell (2003), on the other hand, suggests that the crisis in Zimbabwe has taken a snowball effect from the period ushering in the country's independence with unresolved issues of governance and security emanating from the climate which dominated the Lancaster House Conference. Although the country attained independence and declared a sovereign state, the authoritative, commandist and repressive nature of the government turned a blind eye to internal stability thus providing for a divisive second 'liberation struggle'. Despite holding a number of questionable elections, the ZANU-PF led

government failed to provide political leadership 'to win the ideological battle' and instead 'turned to lawlessness to achieve its political objectives'. As a result, militarism, patriarchy, homophobia, gender violence and general oppression of the working poor cast away pre-independence promises of a socially transformed state. The 'legitimate' use of the War Veterans Association (WSA) to deal with dissidents and to 'fast track land redistribution' served as a catalyst for a more robust divisive element. The land question still remains the core of Zimbabwean political landscape. It must also be noted that the state's silence on the WSA programme and other related activities, provides for a continued reliance on clandestine methods where the state fails. As a result, the state has become indebted to such 'security' forces.

du Toit (1995:147) agrees that, in line with political legitimacy, the Zimbabwean government has plunged the country into economic crisis and thus questioning its credibility. This has, thus added to the political woes facing the ZANU-PF government. It is suggested that:

The political cost of these combative economic policies has been the decline in legitimacy, that vital component of social control and indicator of state strength. Because of the closeness between the state and the ruling ZANU-PF, opposition to party policies has impact on the state as well.

Robertson (1992:89) on the other hand, asserts that:

The political inheritance of the Zimbabweans was a state weakened by war, international isolation, and domestic illegitimacy, and an internal governmental infrastructure greatly damaged at the local level by civil war and attempts by the rival militia and political formations to gain control over the rural populations. But transition to the Zimbabwean state did not, however, smash the institutional framework.

The greatest challenge which the ZANU-PF led government faces is truly legitimacy emanating from failure to exercise social control and provide for

security. At the heart of this is the government's inability to carve the state's economic destiny.

van Wyk (2002:95) agrees that the ZANU-PF led government of Zimbabwe has failed to take control of the people's ideal destiny but rather plunged the country into crisis. It is stressed that the previously flourishing country has turned out to be characterized by 'crisis' due to:

- lack of good governance;
- mismanagement of the country's economic resources in favor of the ZANU-PF faithful;
- failure to address racial and ethnic diversity in a meaningful way;
- failure to maintain law and order; and
- failure to embark on sound economic policies to benefit the majority of the citizenry (van Wyk,2002:95).

The above have seen the downward spiral of the country's economy and political legitimacy. The ruling party has therefore embarked on retaining power despite the cost to the entire population and the neighbouring countries.

Hill (2005) agrees that Zimbabwe is in a state of decay characterized by violence against those opposed to ZANU-PF rule. Bands of war veterans taking charge of rural areas and the intervention of police in violence unleashed by civilians against those not in possession of the ruling party membership cards attest to the state of anarchy and the 'legitimate order' upheld by the war veterans. In another round of elections still marred with violence and intimidation at the hands of war veterans, the army, the police and the CIO, the opposition parties, especially the MDC became a casualty of the 'right to defend' the country's sovereignty and re-colonization. Although the results of the 2002 elections accorded ZANU-PF victory at the polls, General Abdulasalam Abubakar of Nigeria ruled that it was 'impossible to results' as they were also marked by violence, rapes and torture in youth militia camps set up by the state, and utter

human rights abuses throughout the country thus making a vast number of settlements 'no go areas' for the opposition.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) concurs with the notion that the current situation in Zimbabwe is characteristic of a crisis borne of the political landscape in the country. The situation has deteriorated to the extent that Morgan Tsvangarai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change, tried to sort intervention from the United Nations, the African Union and the SADC through an open letter to President Robert Mugabe in which he alleges that:

- ZANU-PF has transformed the defense force and the police into combative party political units;
- the president has violated the country constitution by politicizing the security forces; and
- the ruling party has militarized politics (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,2006:12).

At the center of the assertions is the fact that the government derives its legitimacy from the support accorded by the national security forces which are openly partisan in favour of the ruling party to an extent that the military declared an intend of a coup if ZANU-PF led government loses power to any party at the polls. This poses great danger to democracy and the constitution as a governing instrument of Zimbabwe.

3.2. What is the importance of OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe?

Osei-Hwedie (2002) acknowledges that Southern African Development Community is striving, with various initiatives which include the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation, to deal with issues of political instability and civil wars which have long been characteristic of the region. At the core of the initiatives is the necessity to maintain collective regional security. The Organ must therefore be seen as a 'co-operative mechanism for the collective security and peace in the region', and noting that

its objective is to 'coordinate the efforts and influences the behaviour of members states to resolve common problems of peace and security'. It is important to note that the renewed Organ takes cognizance of the dynamics of security, thus incorporating human security among its founding principles. It is indeed a fact that many of the conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are more intra-state in nature. It is for this reason that, in its quests for peace and security, the Organ also focuses on 'the pursuit of democracy . . . and social justice'. The notion emanates from the reality that the realization of the 'pursuit for peace, security and development are intertwined and can only be achieved if member states share common political orientation through adopting and implementing democratic principles'.

Meyns (2002) stresses that Article 2 of the protocol of the Organ covers a comprehensive spectrum of areas ranging from political cooperation, peace enforcement; public security; state security; to defense cooperation, capacity building, among others. Article 2.2(a) of the protocol, in particular, covers objectives in the realms of defense and security and thus provides for the Organ to 'protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breaking of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression' (SADC:2001:Article 2, 2(a)). The establishment of Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Inter-state Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) the Organ was capacitated with structures to direct the policy imperatives giving rise to the relevant programmes to meet the objectives of the regional body.

Among the activities of the structures is the Forum for Election Monitoring poised to ensure that member countries adhere to well established standards and practices of free and fair elections. With all this in mind, the Organ is equipped with the necessary tools to deal with the downward spiraling crisis situation in Zimbabwe. However, the contested elections in 2002 signaled the organ's inefficiency to intervene when required to put pressure on the Zimbabwean government. Instead, the Forum for Election Observation Mission in Zimbabwe reported that the climate of insecurity in Zimbabwe since the 2000

parliamentary elections was such that the electoral process could not be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region. The SADC Organ was meant to advance the interests of the regional mandate by disclosing an objective judgment on the 2000 and 2002 elections instead of suggesting that there were problems in the election process which needed to be attended to through 'dialogue and reconciliation'.

Hammerstad (2003) also agrees that Article 2(a) and 2(g) set out clearly defined objectives of 'protecting the people of the region against human rights abuses and the breakdown of law and order and internal conflict despite the affirmation of sovereignty and non-interference as contained in the preamble of the SADC treaty. Article 11.1(b) runs short of committing the Organ to take action against states acting against the required standards as it suggests that it 'may' seek to resolve conflicts resulting from non-adherence to the norms. What is important is that the Organ, as an instrument of the regional organization [SADC] recognized by the United Nations and the African Union had an important role to play in making a stern pronouncement on the crisis situation in Zimbabwe.

The use of less dramatic enforcement tools such as official criticism, condemnation, fact finding missions, including mediation efforts would atypical of the organ's stance on the problem. The choice of action in line with these would put pressure on the government as opposed to 3rd session of the April 3, 2003 Ministerial Committee in Harare which 'refrained from criticizing the Zimbabwe government' and instead 'took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core of the issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues' (SADC, 2003).

Knapp (2004) asserts that SADC, through its Organ, is expected to meet its obligations of maintaining peace and security in the region. Whilst other African countries advocate for 'African solutions by Africans', it becomes even more imperative that the established mechanism of the Organ take center stage. Southern Africa must, therefore, be mindful of the divisive elements in dealing

decisively with the crisis in Zimbabwe. The Organ must take a common stance to address the many dimensions of the crisis noting the multifaceted nature and the impact on neighbouring states. What is required is a 'collective agreement' invoked in a concrete manner.

Ngoma (2004) posits that whilst the issue of sovereignty continued to be of critical consideration in the establishment of a Mutual Defense Pact within the ambit of the SADC Organ, huge strides were made during the 23rd SADC in Dar es Salam, 2003. With the pact firm on the agenda and viewed as 'having the ability to prevent member states from promoting hostile activities in each other's territories' thus maintaining the non-interference in the affairs of another state, Article 7(2) stipulates that the SADC Summit would act differently should it consider it necessary to intervene.

Read in conjunction with Article 11(c) and 11 (3)(c) with the former, providing for the Organ's chairperson to 'act(ing) on the advice of the Ministerial Committee, recommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken against one or more of the disputant parties' where peaceful means of resolving conflict are unsuccessful (SADC:2003, Article 11(3)(c). Moreover, the pact emphasizes the availability of the SADC Tribunal as a 'mechanism for citizens to appeal to other states in the region to intervene to protect their liberties and human rights' (van Schalkwyk, 2003).

3.3. What are the impediments of the OPDSC in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe?

Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, of which the African Union is a fully recognized regional organization is meant to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Union, in its endeavour to deal with matters of international peace and security must 'make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes'. The newly established AU Peace and Security Council is an institutional mechanism

to deal with issues of peace and security. Among the new ideas coming from the Unions Constitutive Act is the provision to intervene when there is:

Internal instability that has regional or continental consequences

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union is therefore seen as a means to establish a 'sustainable regime of peace, security and stability under the AU framework which guides sub-regional arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community and its Organ on Peace, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) (Muchie:2005).

Makoa (2004) suggests that the Southern African Development Community made a huge stride in the quest to promote peace and security in the region when the majority of the member states agreed to subject their respective states to the ideals of the organization. Despite the prerogative of collective security and defense among the states, the protocol on the Organ provides for the respect for individual member's sovereignty. As a result, any form of sanction requires the approval of the state in question. In terms of internal disputes, the Organ does not make provision for any form of appeal by opposition parties against a government which contravenes the ideals of democracy which include human rights abuse.

Osei-Hwedie (2002:168) agrees that:

The principle of sovereignty severely weakened the ability of the organ as a guarantor of regional security. Whereas sovereignty provides a framework for co-equal states to facilitate co-operation, it also hinders international co-operation when member states invoke it to protect their national interest or the leader's ambitions regardless of the consequences for regional peace and security.

Williams (2005) on the other hand, suggests that the SADC region is not an isolated case in the existing security problems in Africa. Cognizance is,

however, given to the initiatives of this sub-regional organization to deal with issues of security among its member states. It is noted that the SADC model has been viewed as exemplary for other African sub-regional arrangements. The security architecture of Southern Africa is informed by the commitment towards peace and security; as well as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the SADC Treaty. Notwithstanding the elaborate principles of the Organ, the protocol on peace and security lacks clarity on the 'organizational processes that would bring about the desired end-state' and the 'overarching strategy whereby SADC can manage its regional security processes'. The shortfalls mentioned above provides for a loophole in the Organ's operations in dealing with matters of peace and security. It is due to this that the Organ falls short of being decisive in the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (2004) suggests that the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as a sub-regional member organization of the African Union confronts the governance and security issues. The OPDSC is a mechanism that seeks to provide co-operation and an overarching framework within SADC and the emerging regional elements of the AU's Peace and Security Council and the common African defense and security policy. It, furthermore, deals with inter-state conflicts and intra-state eruptions with emphasis on the use of preventative diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation and arbitration and the use of force as a last resort.

The Organ is, however, seen as ineffective in discharging its duties and promise because member states are reluctant to cede their sovereignty although there are indications of the need for intervention in conflict situations particularly where there is gross human rights abuse, a threat to democracy and constitutional legitimacy of governance. The Organ has, instead made huge strides on issues of military approaches to deal with conflict as opposed to human security which is currently a thorn in the flesh in the case of Zimbabwe. It is evident from the vast number of displaced citizens across the region, the failure by the state to provide security for its citizens and the economic melt-

down, among others, that the crisis has reached a stage which requires intervention.

Murithi (2007) concurs that the operations of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), as aligned to the UN and the AU provides for intervention upon assessing a potential internal crisis situation. The Constitutive Act of the African Union has enshrined the 'responsibility to protect' as a key defining feature of its Peace and Security Council to avert or deal with the longstanding issue emanating from the right to sovereignty among member states. It is noted that this right interferes with the AU and sub-regional organizations and arrangements in the quest to deal with internal security matters of states in humanitarian crisis. Article 7(e) of the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council provides for intervention on behalf of the Union in Member states in respect of grave circumstances, and thus complements Article 4(e) which provides for intervention pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances which include: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Notwithstanding this provisions, the Organ, as a SADC mechanism dealing with matters of peace and security, has not yet established strategies to implement this policy imperatives due to the 'non-interference in the internal affairs' of the SADC member states.

Solomon (2004:190) vividly captures the notion that:

Article 8(c) of the Protocol stipulates that the decision of the ministerial committee shall be taken by consensus. This is problematic. . . . a SADC member state engages in gross human rights violations and hangs on to power by means of elections. Should other member state on the Ministerial Committee believe that intervention is needed in this country, then, this country would simply vote against such a decision. In this way, one recalcitrant member holds the SADC Organ hostage.

Field (2002) suggests that the SADC Organ has failed to deal amicably with the Zimbabwean situation despite the country having violated most of the

organization's Norms and Standards for Elections. Evidently, the introduction of repressive laws, orchestration of land evasions, violence and intimidation of opposition, torture and the killing of civilians opposed to the government and the clear politicization of the country military and police forces should have been condemned. Instead, member states criticized the ruling party's tactics to cling to power behind closed doors and thus exposing a divided organization with member states condoning the ill-acts of one state which are completely opposed to the founding principles of the Organ.

The Mutual Defense Pact signed by Zimbabwe, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Namibia in April 1999 indicated how divided the organization is and thus creating a problem to deal objectively with problems of security as states pledge solidarity to one another despite the divergence from the common objectives of the regional arrangement. The military interventions in both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho led by Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively accounts for the divergent views of SADC member states on operational issues on matters of peace and security. As a result, the Organ lacks cohesion with regard to the interpretation and implementation of policy. It must be noted that both interventions did not qualify to be recognized as SADC initiatives nor supported by the African Union and the United Nations. The continuing efforts by members states to forge relations and sign the pacts exclusive of others deepens the possibility of having a multilateral defense pact for the SADC region.

Hammerstad (2003) stresses that although the affirmation of sovereignty in international treaties is a contract between the states governments not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other's internal affairs, the clause has become a 'bulwark' against reform in the case of Zimbabwe and thus becoming a major impediment to the Organ to find lasting peace and security in the crisis ridden country. Despite having the majority of the SADC member states ratify the protocol and thus providing for the implementation of such, all initiatives under the spell of the Organ, particularly measures to deal with intransigent regimes, lose their importance on the basis that they do not clearly outlines the

the provisions for overriding the clause. As a result, 'it is fair to argue that the conservative norm of sovereignty and non-interference – defined strictly – has the upper hand on the radical and activist norm of human security norm in the Organ's handling of the Zimbabwe crisis'.

Malan and Cilliers (1997) defend the notion that SADC, through the protocol on the Organ, projects itself as capable of achieving the 'ambitious' objectives to mitigate problems of peace and security in the region. Following on the progress made by the Inter-state Defense and Security Committee set by the Front Line States, the Organ explicitly sets out objectives in the realm of political values as reflected in the SADC treaty. The challenge for the Organ, and the entire SADC membership, is the reality which 'relates to the absence of integrated systems, processes and methods to deal with issues of human security and the advancement of democracy and good governance'.

Chapter 4

Research methodology

This chapter is dedicated to the methodology used in collecting data for use by the stuffed to analyze the importance of the Southern African Development Community's Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation with special reference to Zimbabwe. It includes a description of the method of research used for the study, acknowledgement and description of relevant research sites, methods of data collection and how data is analyzed.

4.1 Qualitative research

The overall method of research used in the case study is the qualitative method which provides for an opportunity to collect numerous kinds of data and examine them from a variety of angles. In this way, the researcher is able to construct a rich and meaningful picture of complex and multifaceted situations. Furthermore, the researcher is able to 'recognize that the issue he / she is studying has many dimensions and layers, and so he / she tries to portray the issue' in its multiplicity (Leedy and Ormrod,2005).

Whilst taking into account the essence of a qualitative research, it must be taken into account that the study used a case study approach. In relation to a case study, Moore (1983) states that:

Case studies are usually used when research is attempting to understand complex organization problems, or diffuse the causes and effects of change. In essence it allows a researcher to focus on something which is sufficiently manageable to be understood in all its complexities (Moore, 1983:45)

In the case of the study on the importance of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in the SADC region, a case study was relevant in that its

application uncovered the complexities around the use of established principles and policy provision to deal decisively with the crisis in Zimbabwe.

4.2 Research sites

Data was collected from a variety of sources with the aim of covering a providing a comprehensive framework to conceptualize the research problem. At the heart of the sources was those closely associated with research publications on the subject matter. These include:

Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) which is a non-profit research organization established in 1960. It produces some of the finest research on contemporary African affairs with dedicated researchers conducting field research every year throughout the continent thus providing research output based on first hand empirical evidence. AISA has provided invaluable primary data contained in publications focusing on the SADC and its Organ.

African Centre of Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a South African based civil society organization working throughout Africa to bring about creative African solutions to challenges posed by conflict in the continent. **Conflict Trends**, the Centre's publication produces well researched articles on topical issues of conflict throughout the continent. Based in the SADC region, the center has covered elections in the region to highlight them as the crucial ingredient of democracy and foundation for peace.

Africa Today is a monthly publication which covers the latest events and issues around the African continent. It provides primary data on current news and affairs based on commendable research for the study of Africa.

Africa Insight is a quarterly journal of the Africa Institute of South Africa providing primary data on important topics by renowned academics and other specialist in specific focus areas. The journal contains valuable data on SADC and the Organ, in particular.

Centre for Conflict Resolution is a research institute based at the University of Cape Town. The center provides primary and secondary data on academic and policy research on the African continent. Scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and civil society contribute to research and analysis on Pan-African issues relating but not limited to the African Union and its institutions, and the United Nations and its institutions which all cover regional organizations.

Institute of global dialogue is an independent South African non-governmental organization concerned, broadly, with the key international issues and how these issues affect South Africa, southern Africa and the entire African continent. Through one of its publications, **Global Dialogue**, the institute provides current and topical issues within its area of operation. It has covered the downward spiral of the Zimbabwean economy and its political implications in the region.

4.3 Instrumentation

The research study, in its investigation, centered around secondary data from research sites indicated above together with other sources such as books, newspaper articles and journals which are primarily characteristic of qualitative research methodology. In the context of the investigation in which a challenge lies in the implementation of strategies based on outline principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, secondary data based on research and analysis provides ground for making informed observations. In the context of the SADC Organ, resources which include the Protocol on the Organ and subsequent communiqués containing the regional organization's decisions and policy stance on key issues provides vital information on the object of the study.

Schram (2003) suggests that secondary data collection method in a qualitative research, together with other strategies, may have limitations but it must be

borne in mind that when used or directed to an obtainable goal of getting the task right, it must fulfill the objective.

4.4. Data analysis

Secondary data was subjected to rigorous sifting on the basis of its significance to the topic of the study. On the grounds of data available to the researcher, with all efforts made to gather as much relevant and meaningful data, the complex process unfolded with due attention to detail (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). Furthermore, data was 'broken up' in manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships so as to understand the various constitutive elements through inspection of the relationship 'between concepts, constructs or variables, and to see whether there are any patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated' (Mouton, 2001). From these processes of analyzing general principle(s) a conclusion(s) about the object of the study can be drawn (du Plooy, 1998)

The uniform nature of data collection provided a pragmatic approach to collate information and make necessary inferences. Research findings and analysis of the concepts, trends and variables provided a clear picture of the focus of the study.

4.4. Ethical considerations

In the process of undertaking the study in the form of a qualitative research reliant on secondary data, ethical considerations were given to the reasonable acknowledgement of any kind of sources used and due consideration given to the nature and context of such sources. As a result, information and views contained in the study were presented and analyzed in accordance with the objectives of the study.

Chapter 5

Research Findings

This chapter focuses on the analysis and interpretation of collected data on the importance of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security in the Southern African Development Community. Findings are in line with the variables derived from the objective of the study.

5.1. The impediments to sustainable peace in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, like any other African country which attained independence from a colonial regime, inherited a political administration perceived not to be in the interest of the majority of the masses of its populace. Whilst noting that independence was attained through liberation struggle led by 'struggle icons' with theoretical ideological perspective of governance based on 'power to the people', the incumbent government failed to maintain the economic stature of the country due to ill-defined economic policies meant to benefit the black majority. As a result, the country experienced a downward economic spiral which resulted in a melt-down.

Failure by the Zimbabwean government to improve the economic situation characterized by hyperinflation resulted in political unrest met by repression, torture and death of those openly criticizing the state. The situation exacerbated political intolerance and implementation of unorthodox strategies opposed to principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – the first responsibility of government. Whilst the ruling party's legitimacy to govern the country after questionable elections in 2002 and 2008 came under attack, reliance on war veterans to fast track land redistribution led not only to increased political tension but to partisanship on ethnic grounds. The ruling ZANU-PF continued to strengthen its grip on the government by politicizing the state's security forces including the army which

proclaimed its allegiance to a ZANU-PF led government. As a result, the internal political situation led to many of the Zimbabwean displaced and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. At the centre of the Zimbabwean crisis is the ZANU-PF led government with the state apparatus used to fulfill the needs of the political elite at the expense of the masses and not willing to relinquish power despite.

5.2 The importance of the Organ in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe

The Protocol of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation provides for the legitimate existence of the Organ as a SADC mechanism to deal with issues of inter-state and intra-state security among the regional organization's member state. Article 52 of the United Nations provides for regional organizations to deal with such matters relating to peace and security within their jurisdiction, thus giving the Organ with its established principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures leverage over this function.

Interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho, despite being questionable, are an indication that the SADC and its Organ is a functional regional arrangement to deal with matters related to peace and security. It is important to note that the role of the SADC member countries and signatories to the protocol on the Organ defended the ideals of peace, security, democracy and stability in the region.

The evolution of the Organ to date provides for an improved and functional mechanism with renewed vigor as indicated by the newly established structures and correlation with the SADC programmes. The Interstate Defense and Security Committee, among the sub-structures of the Organ is at the center of the functions of the Organ to achieve the objectives relating to defense, diplomacy, security, and politics as a function of the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee guided by the Organ's obligation under international law

which requires every government to observe the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as its first responsibility.

The Southern African Development Community, in line with the African Union's Guidelines for Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions declared in 2003, has adopted the Principles on and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in 2004. The process followed the adoption of Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region in 2001. This provides for a means to ensure that member states consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability within their territories.

The Mutual Defense Pact and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ are the latest mechanisms to support the Organ's quest for peace and security in the region. Whilst it can be argued that more focus is on inter-state conflict, the two are derived from the broader objectives of SADC and the Protocol on the Organ as they address the issue of people's security which covers human rights and fundamental freedoms. With all the policy provision, principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes, including established structures and sub-structures, the Organ is a driving force behind efforts to pursue the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

5.3. The impediments of the Organ in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe

Whereas SADC complies with the requirement of the United Nations and the African Union as a sub-regional arrangement, and having made efforts to establish structures and substructures, treaties and protocols to meet its obligations and objectives of the maintenance of peace and security through its Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, the sub-region's track record in this regard leaves much to be desired.

At the heart of the shortcomings in the case of Zimbabwe, is continued reference to respect for state sovereignty, political independence and non-

interference in the affairs of other states. This is despite the fact the ZANU-PF government has failed to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms as its key responsibility. The government has resorted to repression, torture, intimidation, gross human rights abuses and failure to ensure the safety of citizens who continue to seek refuge and means of survival in neighboring states.

The atmosphere during the 2002 and 2008 elections was plagued with related conflicts as a result of the enactment of Public Order and Security Act of 2002, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002, the Miscellaneous Offence Act and the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001 which were contrary to the provisions of the SADC principles for conducting democratic elections aimed at defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security and stability. Despite this, elections were held with contested outcomes. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, in 2002, could not pronounce the elections as free and fair yet the government upheld the outcome and inaugurated the ZANU-PF government. This was due to lack of collective agreement due to internal divisions within the sub-regional body which restrain public condemnation of fellow leaders. Mutual protectionism reigns over regional interests thus creating a leeway for lack of political will to enforce treaties.

Despite the Organ and all its substructures and strategies, including the Norms and Standards for Elections in SADC adopted in 2001 to guide the Electoral Commissioner Forum on how the Organ failed to condemn the Zimbabwean government on acts of gross violation of the norms thus fuelling repression and fundamental human rights due to the divisions alluded to.

Whereas the protocol of the Organ provides for mediation as a means of resolving conflict and failure of such calls for alternatives which include punitive measures, the nature of the conflict in Zimbabwe – economic and political crisis not yet characterized by genocide, ethnic cleansing and large scale violence between sections of the population is the first of its kind for the

Organ to deal with. Quite diplomacy, an interventionist strategy adopted by the President Mbeki of South Africa has not borne desired fruits because the status quo remains despite having started the process in 2006. To compound the problem, SADC member states and thus the Organ cannot make a pronouncement condemning the Zimbabwean government in line with the South African mediation which shies away from pronouncing the existing crisis.

To date, the Organ is unable to enact alternative measures or seek external intervention because of the continued support of the South African mediation perpetuating African solutions for African problems cajoled by the respect for sovereignty and the complexities of division within SADC. The Organ is thus ineffective in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6

Conclusion and recommendations

This chapter encompasses conclusions and recommendations of the research study. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis of research findings whereas recommendations provide an attempt to address the shortfalls of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC region with special reference to the case of Zimbabwe.

6.1. Conclusion

The Southern African Development Community has embraced the challenge of the maintenance of peace and security as one among the many impediments to development. In the era of increased inter-state conflicts prevalent in Africa, the SADC developed mechanism taken from the Front Line States which successfully rid the region of repression in South Africa and Namibia. Interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho exemplified the challenges faced by the Organ amid efforts to attain regional security through the maintenance of peace and stability within conflict-experiencing states.

The Organ is of more significance in the interest of not only peace and security in region, but also its role in development as contained in the SADC framework. The Protocol on the Organ provides a framework to work within the framework of the United Nations, the African Union and SADC in the quest to maintain peace and security for stability and development.

The South African mediation in the crisis in Zimbabwe is informed by the provisions of the Organ in line with the objective of pacific settlements to conflict situations – peaceful means, and enforcing finding Africa's solutions for African problems. It is however, problematic to resolve the crisis when the Organ faces numerous challenges emanating from within the regional body which is required to support all efforts and strategies towards such a

resolution. What is significant at this stage is how the Organ implements its strategies to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe.

6.2. Recommendations

The evolution of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation shows considerable strides in efforts to maintain peace and security in the SADC region. However, the mechanism reflects shortfalls which require stringent attention to ensure its effectiveness to attain its objectives in the case of Zimbabwe.

The analysis and conclusions of the study inform the following recommendations:

Firstly, SADC has maintained cooperation among member states on various issues ranging from narrow non-political to more pragmatic political issues such as the formation of the security community championed by the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. Respect for state sovereignty is however the key impediment among provisions of the protocol which lessens the importance of the Organ as indicated by the Zimbabwean president's continued reference to this clause in any attempt to condemn his state actions. As a result, regional interests must supercede sovereignty in matters of peace and security in the region particularly when the state fails to perform its key responsibility – protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Intra-state conflict exemplified by the case of Zimbabwe is outside the realm of state security thus denying appropriate intervention for the security of the people of Zimbabwe (Ngoma:2004)

Secondly, SADC member countries must accept that the crisis in Zimbabwe threatens regional security and should thus make a collective pronouncement on the issue to allow for objective intervention spearheaded by the provisions of the Organ without fear or favour. Knapp (2004) asserts that a collective statement recognizing the existence of conflict will inform the need for a

collective fact-finding and research based assessment of the conflict and its impact on the region. In this way, the Organ's structures and sub-structures such as the Elections Forum Commission would collectively provide objective assessment and pronouncement on elections and their outcomes. If a country fails to adhere to set standards, such a commission must recommend the suspension of the process until the standards are met, noting that peace, security and stability are founded on promotion of democracy. Ogunsanya (2006) stresses that in promoting democracy to attain peace, security and stability, states must enshrine clear, unambiguous legal electoral framework acceptable to all stakeholders and subject to scrutiny by the substructure of the Organ dealing with election monitoring.

Thirdly, the Organ must clearly define strategies for dealing decisively with intra-state conflict in which the government is at the center of the conflict. Furthermore, whilst peaceful means such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration remain the principal measures to resolve conflict, the protocol must provide for enactment of alternative measures to curb the perpetuation of human rights abuses and fundamental freedoms as in the case of Zimbabwe.

Finally, the Organ must ensure as a matter of urgency, the realignment of the political agenda of SADC member states to provide for a uniform policy founded on the common interest of the regional body. What must be borne in mind is that the political divisions in SADC exacerbate the state decay and member states will bear the consequences of rebuilding the state. The rebuilding of Zimbabwe will most certainly require external financial assistance whereas African leaders proclaim the notion of African solutions for African problems.

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