



Migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa (2008-2022)

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DECLARATION

I, Collin Olebogeng Mongale, hereby declare that the thesis entitled *Migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa (2008-2022)* is submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences with Political Studies at the North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus. I further declare that this is my own work and has not been submitted before by me to any other university. All of the sources used in this thesis have been acknowledged by means of complete referencing.

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Faith is the servant of all believers. Regardless of how it all goes down, life goes on.

Okastlhaloganye

(personal mantra)

† Romans 8:18

Abstract

Since the arrival of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the country has experienced an increased influx of international migration, making the country one of the top hosts of migrants from Africa and the rest of the world. South Africa remains a preferred destination for migrants due to its economic status in Africa, as the country is one of the continent's leading economies and relatively stable democracies compared to other African countries. Conversely, more than 30 years into democracy, the country still contends with various social ills, including poor service delivery, unemployment, a high crime rate, poverty, and inequality. Due to its status of being one of the top destinations for immigrants, this has increased xenophobia in South Africa, which manifests through three identified forms, namely, violent xenophobia, institutionalized xenophobia, and digital xenophobia. In South Africa, immigrants are often blamed, scapegoated, securitized or criminalized for the social woes being experienced in the country. The occurrence of xenophobia in South Africa is in contrast to international, continental and regional frameworks on the protection of migrants and the free movement of persons. Moreover, xenophobia violates the basic human rights, as enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Republic of South Africa's Constitution (1996). Studies have shown that due to migration to South Africa, the prevalence of immigrants in the country are believed to contribute to or are responsible for the high unemployment and crime rates, that the majority of immigrants live in the country illegally, and that their presence strains the country's social welfare and social security services. Through the use of empirical data sourced from various literature, this study sought to interpret the accusations, myths and stereotypes that immigrants pose a threat to South Africa's security. For instance, in 2020, the migrant population stood at 2 860 495, in comparison to the South African population of almost 60 million people. Thus, the migrant population in South Africa made up 4.82 percent of the population. Given this reality, one should consider the claim that migrants are flooding the country, and that they strain the social welfare and public services and also increase the unemployment and the crime rates. From the study's findings, a multi-level approach to curb xenophobia is recommended in order to preserve the human security of every person living in South Africa, including migrant communities.

Keywords: *Human Security, Migration, Securitization, Scapegoating, Relative Deprivation, Xenophobia*

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Glossary of concepts relating to the study¹

Asylum: "... refers to the grant, by a state, of protection on its territory to persons outside their country of nationality or habitual residence, who are fleeing persecution or serious harm, or for other reasons. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including non-refoulement, permission to remain on the territory of the asylum country, humane standards of treatment, and eventually a durable solution" (IOM, 2019).

Asylum seeker: "... is an individual who seeks international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. However, not every asylum seeker will be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker" (IOM, 2019b).

Boundary: "This is a line that defines a territory or divides two contiguous territories. It establishes the physical limits of a state's territory and physical authority. There are two classifications of boundary systems, which are known as fixed or general. A fixed boundary can be explained as one that has been accurately surveyed; while a general boundary is one where the precise line of the legal boundary between adjoining land portions is left undetermined. As part of its function, physical boundary markings are used to control the movement of persons and goods entering the territory of one state from another" (Gerstei et al., 2018).

¹ The following definitions listed were used as they are and not paraphrased. However, sources where they derive from were acknowledged.

Border: “A border represents the geographic boundaries of a nation and thus defines the territory where governments exercise legal authority over structures, actions, and people that reside within the boundaries. This concept is often associated with a boundary established to control, and prevent the flow of people, goods, and services into a country. Therefore, borders are usually associated with the establishment of a security perimeter for controlling entry points into the territory of a sovereign state” (Gerstei et al., 2018)

Border official: “... is an official assigned, in accordance with national law, to carry out tasks related to border management” (IOM, 2019b).

Border management: “This refers to the government function of immigration, customs, and excise, including policing, with the objective of controlling and managing the flow of people and goods across a country’s border in the national interest (predominantly peace and security, and development). This term is used to describe the control employed at the country’s borders and includes border security, aimed at preventing unauthorized crossings and the facilitation of border operations which seeks to support swift transit with minimal interference for authorized people and goods. Border management goes as far as including the maintenance of boundary beacons that mark the physical limits of the country’s territory” (Gerstei et al., 2018).

Country of origin: “In migration studies, this refers to a country of nationality or of former habitual residence of a person or group of persons who have migrated abroad, irrespective of whether they migrate regularly or irregularly” (IOM, 2019b).

Drivers of migration: “... refers to a complex set of interlinking factors that influence an individual, family or population group’s decisions relating to migration, including displacement” (IOM, 2019b).

Economic migrants: “These are foreign nationals who migrate to another country for economic reasons such as employment or business opportunities” (IOM, 2019b)

Emigration: “... the act of departing or exiting from one’s country of origin or of habitual residence, with the motive of settling in another host country” (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Family reunification migrants: “... people who migrate to join the people they share family ties with who have already entered an immigration country/host country” (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Forced migration: “This includes not only refugees and asylum seekers, but also people who are forced to move from their country of origin due to external factors such as environmental shocks or development projects” (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Irregular migrants (or undocumented/illegal migrants): "... people who enter a foreign country, usually in quest of income-generative activities, without the necessary documents and permits. In explaining foreign nationals, the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 state that a foreigner refers to someone who is neither a citizen nor a resident of a particular country. Illegal foreign national therefore refer to people in a host country other than their country of origin without official documentation" (McDonald, 2000).

Undocumented foreign nationals: "... all persons who enter South Africa without passing through formal border control procedures" (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 8). The terms are often used interchangeably with other terms such as 'irregular', 'unauthorised' or 'illegal migrants', 'foreign nationals', 'foreigner', 'foreign persons.' It is worth noting that 'illegal foreign national' is a concept that is used to describe the people who disregard the formal border-crossing procedures with a criminal offence, whereas 'undocumented foreign national' is a term used by those who perceive migration issues from a human rights perspective to describe people who enter the country through formal border-crossing procedures but without having the proper documentation. In the South African Immigration Act and Immigration Amendment Act of 2011, "illegal foreign national" is a term used to describe "a foreigner who contravenes the provisions of the country's Immigration legislation" (South Africa, 2011).

International migration/cross-border migration: "... refers to any movement by people who cross an international border despite the person's legal status; whether the movement is voluntary or forced; what motivated the movement; what is the period of the stay in a host country. There are two distinct types of international migration which can be explained through the lens of short-term and long-term. The former refers to at least three months' duration of stay in a foreign country. Long-term international migration exists when immigrants stay for at least one year in a host country" (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Migrant: "... a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The concept includes several well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students" (IOM, 2019b).

Migrant worker: "... a person who is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national" (IOM, 2019b).

Migration: "... the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state" (IOM, 2019b).

Migration governance: "... the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (subnational, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate states' approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation" (IOM, 2019b).

Migration stocks: "... the total number of persons living in a country at a particular point in time who were born in another country" (Stats SA, 2019).

Permit: "... in the context of migration, a permit refers to documentation, such as a residence or work permit, which is usually issued by a government authority, and which evidences the permission a person has to reside and/or carry out a remunerated activity" (IOM, 2019b).

Port of entry: "... a place designated by the Minister in the RSA where all persons report to an immigration officer before entering or leaving the country" (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Receiving country: "... the country of destination of a migrant. In the case of return or repatriation, also the country of origin or, in the context of resettlement, a country that has accepted to receive a certain number of migrants, including refugees, on a yearly basis by presidential, ministerial, or parliamentary decision. In the context of diplomatic or consular relations, the receiving country is the state which has consented to the establishment of consular posts or diplomatic missions of another state on its territory" (IOM, 2019a).

Refugee: "... a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. He is a person who has been granted asylum status and protection in terms of the section 24 of Refugee Act No 130 of 1998" (Refugee Act, 1998).

Reintegration: "... a process which enables individuals to re-establish the economic, social and psychosocial relationships needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity and inclusion in civic life" (IOM, 2019b).

Remittances: "... personal monetary transfers, cross border or within the same country, made by migrants to individuals or communities with whom the migrant has links" (IOM, 2019b).

Visa: "... an endorsement by the competent authorities of a state in a passport or a certificate of identity of a non-national who wishes to enter, leave, or transit through the territory of the state that indicates that the authority, at the time of issuance, considers the holder to fall within a category of non-nationals who can enter, leave or transit the state under the state's laws. A visa establishes the criteria of admission into, transit through or exit from a state" (IOM, 2019a).

Xenophobia: "... at the international level, no universally accepted definition of xenophobia exists, although it can be described as attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or migrants to the community, society or national identity" (IOM, 2019).

Chapter One: Overview of the study

I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world - Socrates

Keywords: *migration, human security perspective, securitization, South Africa, relative deprivation, xenophobic attacks*

1.1 Context/background to the study

Migration is a frequently debated issue globally. As a multifaceted phenomenon, migration has no universal definition. In a broader sense, migration is defined as the mass movement of a particular population from one territory to another. This movement is often determined by economic, social, political, and natural factors (Tataru, 2019: 13). There are different classifications of migration, including internal migration (rural-urban) and international migration (cross-border). For the purpose of this study, the emphasis will be on international (cross-border) migration. Khan (2010: 24) defines cross-border migration as a change of residency (either on a permanent or temporary basis) from one country to another. In light of this, the phenomenon of cross-border migration has been a prevalent occurrence because, traditionally, human beings have had a tendency to move from one place to another (International Organization for Migration, 2015: 1). South Africa is no exception to the global phenomenon of migration because the country has, for much of its history, been considered a migrant host-country, mostly for migrants from parts of Africa, but also for migrants from elsewhere in the world.

Cross (2000) states that migration to South Africa can be traced back to the 19th century's white settlement and territorial conquest, which saw colonial rule being established in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans permanently immigrated to the country, establishing large sugar cane fields in Natal, which attracted large numbers of immigrants from India. The turning point, as commonly identified by scholars, was the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in the late 1860s and gold in the Witwatersrand basin, in the Johannesburg area, in the 1880s (Moyo & Zanker, 2020: 4). These events led to migration streams, comprising overseas fortune hunters and settlers from England, Australia, Germany and Poland, who flocked to emerging cities, such as Johannesburg.

The development of the mining economy created a higher demand for labour, which disadvantaged local residents, due to low wages and poor working conditions; thus, it attracted workers from outside South Africa's borders. Consequently, this exacerbated the situation relating to the high number of immigrants in South Africa as large numbers of labourers from Southern African states including Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe flocked to the country to supply the labour (Kanayo, Anjofui & Stiegler, 2019: 17). However, African immigrants were not the only migrants in the country. Harrison, Moyo and Yang (2012) state that Chinese indentured labourers were also brought to the country to work in the mines around Johannesburg between 1904 and 1907. Although no reliable data exists on the exact number of immigrants in South Africa during colonialism (Ayala et al., 2013), there are at least four identified international routes linked to the country's migration history, namely, contract labourers working in the mining sector, informal immigrants for the construction sector, refugees fleeing the conflict in Mozambique, and white "asylum seekers" from neighbouring countries (Glaser, 2010).

In 1948, after the National Party (NP) gained power, the country was subjected to an imposed white-supremacist form of government called apartheid. During apartheid, immigration was monitored by the Aliens Control Act (Nyar, 2011) – a policy that restricted African immigrants from qualifying for the legal status of residency, and which prevented them from merging into the white population (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015: 29)

The arrival of democracy in South Africa in 1994 saw a change in the governance of migration patterns. By 1995, the democratic government had lifted most of the immigration restrictions, applicable during apartheid (Khan, 2007). According to Rasool, Botha and Bisschoff (2012), modern immigration trends worldwide indicate that post-apartheid South Africa swiftly became a primary destination for African immigrants. Bisrat (2014) and Segatti (2011b) state that South Africa was labelled the "new hub of Africa".

Adepoju (1998) states that most immigrants in South Africa moved from sub-Saharan African countries to find employment and other economic opportunities in the country, which is considered a regional economic superpower. Thus, since 1994 South Africa has seen an influx of immigrants from the rest of the world, with African immigrants being the dominant group (Rasool et al., 2012). Many of these immigrants entered the country

through legal channels, whereas some entered through illegal routes; this has led to anti-migrant feelings (Rasool et al., 2012).

The rising number of economic immigrants from South Africa's neighbouring countries was met with resentment and hostility from generally marginalized, poor and unemployed South Africans (Gordon, 2018). South Africans perceive immigrants as direct competitors for jobs and other economic opportunities, which are meant for South Africans (Misago, 2019). Moreover, immigrants are often blamed for the rising rate of criminal activities in the country, including drug usage in local communities (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). As Sempijja and Mongale (2022: 5) assert, the securitization and criminalization of immigrants in South Africa have triggered xenophobic sentiments against them.

Xenophobia is defined as the fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013: 1); it revolves around discriminatory attitudes and behaviours, and in most cases, it results in violence, various types of abuse, and displays of hatred between different groups of people (Mogekwa, 2005). According to Vermaak (2009), xenophobic attacks in South Africa can be attributed to ineffectual border control; this involves poor policy decisions and incompetency in border policing, which contributed to a rise in the number of illegal immigrants (Nyar, 2011: 23). Due to the absence of legal standing in the community, illegal immigrants are easy targets for xenophobic attacks (Gordon, 2014: 2).

The opposition to the influx of immigrants into South Africa can be traced back to the incidents of xenophobia that took place during the dawn of democracy (Yingi, Ncube & Benyera, 2024). For instance, between December 1994 and January 1995, in Alexandra Township in Gauteng province, a gang of armed youth ransacked the homes of suspected undocumented migrants (Kumolu, 2017). During this incident, suspected undocumented migrants were taken to the local police station where the gang demanded that foreigners should be forcibly removed with immediate effect (South African History Online, 2016). In September 1998, a Mozambican and two Senegalese were thrown from a moving train in Johannesburg (Kumolu, 2017). This act was carried out by a group of people returning from a rally that had been organised by a group blaming foreigners for the high rates of unemployment and crime, and, to a certain extent, the spread of AIDS (Kganticoe, 2021). In the Cape Flats, in August 2000, seven xenophobic killings were reported (Kumolu,

2017). Amongst the foreign nationals who were killed by South Africans were Nigerians, Kenyans, and Angolans (SAHO, 2015).

In light of the preceding, it is clear that post-apartheid South Africa has witnessed an influx of immigrants since 1994. The influx has perpetuated the attacks against foreign nationals. Migrants in the country are targeted by people who live in marginalized and disadvantaged areas, such as townships and inner-city spaces (Gordon, 2016: 5). Consequently, the occurrence of xenophobic attacks in South Africa results in human security threats such as population shifts, loss of property, death or severe injuries, loss of personal documentation such as passports and identity documents, loss of goods and items of monetary value, and the destruction of business areas (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 6).

Hence, the study will explore the effect of migration on xenophobia in South Africa from 2008 to 2022. The justification for ending the study period at 2022 was motivated by the research timeline, rather than by substantive academic rationale. In relation to xenophobic attacks in South Africa, from 2008, the country witnessed a wave of xenophobic attacks – regarded as the worst form of anti-migrant antipathy in the post-apartheid era. The 2008 xenophobic attacks were triggered by a human “tsunami”, a mass influx of immigrants, perpetuated by a breakdown in national border control during the period prior to the violence (Misago, Monson & Landau, 2009: 29). Thus, the study seeks to make recommendations on what should be done to mitigate the country’s crisis of xenophobia.

Against this background, the following section delves into the study’s problem statement.

1.2 Problem statement

More than 30 years after the transition from apartheid to democracy, South Africa is yet to deliver the much-anticipated socio-economic transformation. This is evident as the country still grapples with the social ills of unemployment, poor service delivery, high crime rates, poverty, and inequality. In addition to governance deficits, since 1994, South Africa has become a top destination for immigrants from across the world, with the majority of these immigrants coming from other African countries. This has ignited xenophobia in South Africa. Immigrants are often blamed for the woes that face the

country. These include socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, inadequate service delivery, a high crime rate, and poverty amongst South Africans.

The large numbers of immigrants have sparked anti-migrant sentiments, such as xenophobic attacks against foreigners. Instead of channelling their discontent with socio-economic and political challenges towards the government, South Africans tend to attack immigrants who are scapegoated and blamed for the socio-economic and political strain facing the country. Xenophobic attacks have resulted in human security threats, such as loss of life, malicious bodily injuries, population displacement, poverty, loss of personal documentation, and the destruction of property and the shops of immigrants, which has resulted in monetary losses and has exacerbated poverty. Although violent xenophobia has attracted the attention of academia, this study also looks into institutionalized and digital forms of xenophobia. The former explains how xenophobia manifests through state discriminatory practices or actions, such as restrictive policies of migration, arbitrary arrests, and illegal searches and seizures, including the violation of human rights, while digital xenophobia manifests through the spread of online anti-immigrant rhetoric on social media platforms such as X and Facebook. Against this background, this study seeks to analyse the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa. This is done with the aim of contributing to existing knowledge by demystifying the stereotypes, myths and accusations about immigrants in South Africa, while proposing solutions on what the South African government can do to curb xenophobia in the country.

1.3 General research question

How do migration patterns and narratives about migration shape xenophobic attitudes, practices and policies in South Africa?

Specific research questions

1.3.1.1 How do theories of migration assist in explaining the causes and perpetuation of international migration in South Africa?

1.3.1.2 How do the securitization theory, the relative deprivation theory, the scapegoat theory and the human security perspective assist in explaining the causes and impacts of xenophobia in South Africa?

1.3.1.3 What is the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa?

1.3.1 What is the nature of migration governance in South Africa?

1.4 Research objectives

- 1.4.1 To analyse how migration theories assist in explaining the causes and perpetuations of international migration
- 1.4.2 To analyse how securitization theory, relative deprivation theory, scapegoat theory, and human security perspectives assist in explaining the causes and impacts of xenophobia
- 1.4.3 To examine the impacts of migration on xenophobia in South Africa
- 1.4.4 To explore the nature of migration governance in South Africa

1.5 Central theoretical statements

The study adopted the theories that assist in explaining migration trends, patterns, and migrant types in South Africa. This includes the theories that assist in explaining the causes and impacts of xenophobia in the country. Amongst the theories adopted in an attempt to explain migration to South Africa are the following: neoclassical macro-economic theory, neoclassical micro-economic theory, dual labour market theory, world system theory, migration systems, network and cumulative causation theory, institutional theory, and new economics of migration (Massey et al., 1993). Moreover, theories that assist the study in explaining the causes and impacts of xenophobia are the following: relative deprivation theory, securitization theory, scapegoat theory, and human security perspective. The context of every theory is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The neoclassical macro-economic theory of migration posits that international migration (cross-border), along with internal migration (rural-urban), are facilitated by issues pertaining to geographic variances in the supply and demand of labour (O'Reilly, 2019: 3). In this case, the process of cross-border migration rotates around the abundance of labour and low capital accumulation, including low wages, in other countries, which lead to the movement of people to countries that have high capital, labour opportunities, and higher wages (King, 2013). In this case, these factors motivate workers in low-remuneration countries to migrate to a high-remuneration country with hopes of making a sustainable livelihood (Arango, 2000). The assertion made by scholars such as Hicks (1932), Lewis (1954), and Harris and Todaro (1970) is that migration is often driven by differences in returns to labour across markets. In essence, migration is driven by geographical differences in the supply and demand of labour, including the existence of differential wages between the labour-rich versus the capital-rich countries. As such,

differences in wages across different labour markets forms the basis of this theory (Kurekova, 2010: 3).

Supporters of the neoclassical micro-economic theory of migration, such as Sjaastad (1962), postulate that migration is dependent upon an individual's assessment of the cost and the benefits involved in migration. In this regard, the choice for people to move is motivated by the cost and benefit calculation that leads to expectations of increased wage return (Sjaastad, 1962). This theory places its focus on human capital investment. Sjaastad (1962) asserts that the human capital theory is premised on the analysis that profit maximization serves as the motivation for individuals to migrate, with the objective of maximizing his or her returns and benefits, with expectations of positive net returns, especially monetary gains (Bauer & Zimmerman, 1999). It is in this context that Olejarova (2007: 20) asserted that individuals decide to migrate whenever there exists a high possibility of higher wages in the labour market. Thus, the micro-economic theory revolves around how individuals respond to labour-related opportunities that exist in sending and receiving countries, which motivate people to pursue the maximization of increased income (Olejarova, 2007: 20).

The push-pull theory explains migration through the lens of supply and demand. This includes positive and negative factors which exist in the individual's country of origin and destination; at times migrants are challenged with prevailing factors, which include restrictive migration policies and poor socio-economic status. Lee (1966) posits that there are four factors which determine an individual's choice to migrate. These are: (i) factors that relate to individuals' place of origin, (ii) factors attributed to the country they intend to migrate to, (iii) intervening obstacles which may hinder the process of migration, and lastly (iv) personal factors (ibid.). In explaining the process of migration, Lee (1966) uses "plus" and "minus" and to some extent "zero" to explain the migration process. In his explanation, Lee (1966) defined 'plus' as factors that encourage the process of migration, while 'minus' represents factors that discourage the process of migration.

The dual labour market theory, which was introduced by Piore in 1979, avoids the perception of viewing migration as a consequence of decisions taken by individuals; thus, it argues that international migration results from the intrinsic labour demands of developed industrialised societies (Massey et al., 1993). O'Reilly (2019: 3) states that the

dual labour market theory refers to the dualistic nature of sectors of economies in the developed countries. In this case, it is assumed that the majority of work (predominantly the primary labour market) is secure, regular, and offers a good salary. However, the characteristics of these economies are that, from time to time, there are periods of temporary, insecure, and less well-paid jobs (Dzankic, 2016: 163). Often these jobs, which are found in the secondary labour market, require occupation at short notice, so the local population tends to avoid these jobs due to their insecure nature; hence, attracting temporary labour from overseas. Thus, immigrants are often appropriate candidates to occupy the jobs that exist in the secondary sector. This being the case, the secondary sector serves as a pull factor for migrants who are destitute and have limited prospects for opportunities other than in the low-paying sector (Piore, 1979).

The world system theory states that international migration is perpetuated by the forces of capitalist economies (Wallenstein, 1974). This theory argues that the flow of migration is influenced by the flow of cheap labourers, who move from sending countries, which are characterized by poor economies, to major capitalist cities, which offer better labour wages (Massey et al., 1993: 444). This theory states that labour migration is driven to benefit capitalist countries and companies as opposed to non-capitalist countries (Massey et al., 1993: 444). This theory emphasises labour and economic-orientated pull-factors for potential migrants to migrate from their less-developed countries to developed capitalist countries (O'Reilly, 2019: 5).

Migration systems theory explains that migration is influenced by the links amongst sending and receiving countries (De Haas, 2009). In this case, the movement of people is motivated by responses to relations that exist between both sending and receiving countries. Such links may be in the form of inherited colonial ties, trade relations, or investment flows (Castles & Miller, 2009). On the other hand, the network theory states that community networks serve as factors that enable international migration (Massey et al., 1993: 448). "Migrants' networks" can be explained as "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in places of origin and destination areas through ties of kingship, friendship, and shared community origin" (Massey et al., 1993: 448). In essence, migrants' networks contribute to the increase in international migration because these networks tend to reduce the cost and risk of migration.

The cumulative causation theory elucidates why migration takes place and why migration patterns begin and also why they increase (Fussell & Massey, 2004). Briefly this theory states how the number of outgoing migrants tends to increase over time; as the first migrants provide social capital to relatives, friends and others in their country of origin, these transfers encourage them to travel with ease and face fewer risks in destination countries (Jennissen, 2004). Accordingly, this motivates more people to migrate (Wimalaratana, 2017: 25).

The institutional theory of migration asserts that, once migration has begun, private institutions and voluntary organisations tend to take advantage of people who seek to join capitalist countries, which have limited migration visas on offer (Kganticoe, 2021: 24). Due to the restricted number of visas in capitalists' countries, private institutions and operations tend to offer illegal or irregular migration services to facilitate immigration processes to receiving countries. Among these services are transport, labour contracts, counterfeit documents (e.g., visas, passports, identity documents), and largely, offering illegal immigrants a place to stay in the receiving destination (Wimalaratana, 2017: 25).

The new economic theory of migration states that the migration decision is not made by isolated individuals who seek to maximize profit for personal gains; rather migration is perpetuated by families or households (O'Reilly, 2019: 6). Moreover, the decision of migrants to move from one place to another is influenced by a broad set of factors, which are modelled by conditions that exist in the home country. Thus, the new economic theory states that migration is motivated by family strategies to increase and diversify their income, and to mitigate the risks that could face the household (Wimalaratana, 2017: 25).

Drawing on the above narratives on the theories of migration, it is clear that all the theories adopt a different approach to explaining the causes of migration. These theories do not explain in detail the impact of the migration process on immigrants, especially in receiving countries or destinations. As Lee (1975:192) argued in his push and pull theory, there is always some ignorance and uncertainty regarding the treatment of migrants in a new area. For example, in South Africa, migrants are often greeted with resentment, as they are perceived as a security threat to the country, a misperception that tends to lead to anti-migrant sentiments and attitudes, such as xenophobia. Against this backdrop, as the theories of migration do not explain the reasons behind the negative reception of migrants

in host countries, the research further adopted theories that assist in explaining the causes of anti-migrant sentiments in receiving countries. Among these are the relative deprivation theory, the scapegoat theory, and the securitization theory. Furthermore, because theories that explain the causes of anti-migrant sentiments (xenophobic attacks) do not adequately address the effects of such violent acts on the individuals and communities who are exposed to it, to fill this gap in the theories, the research further adopted the human security perspective to delve into the human security threats posed by xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

The perspective on human security, in its definition, provides that the objective of human security is focussed on the principle of safeguarding all human lives from threats that are critical; this should be done in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment (Alkire, 2003: 3). Hence, the concept 'human security', as stated by Menon (2007: 8), provides that there is a need for the protection of individuals against any threats, as opposed to focusing on providing security for a territory from external invasion. Alkire (2003: 3) further states that human security originates from the protection of human life; hence, the protection of human beings serves as a key aspect of human security.

The theory of securitization states that security is socially constructed, and often, it is analysed by the examination of specific speech acts through which threats are obvious (Weaver, 1995: 55). In layman's terms, securitization is the process of representing an issue as an existential threat that requires immediate attention (McGahan, 2009: 7). As Weaver (2003) states, labelling one issue as a security threat triggers the securitization process, and equally, legitimizes the use of infrequent political actions.

Relative deprivation states that conflict in society arises due to differences between "the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction" (Sempijja & Mongale, 2024), which encourages people to engage in violence (Gurr, 1971: 23). Hence, relative deprivation explains the differences between people's aspirations, their value prospects, what they are receiving in real life situations, and the value of accruing capabilities (Saleh, 2013:165). Moreover, relative deprivation explains the significant difference between what a person achieves and their set of ambitions; it further explicates how a lack of material benefits and public goods can initiate violence as a way of seeking justice (Gurr, 1971: 23).

The scapegoat theory, as explained by Tshitereke (1999), states that during periods of hardship, people often create “a frustration scapegoat” whereby they find a target to blame for their woes, such as continual social problems. Thus, according to the scapegoat hypothesis, foreigners tend to become such a scapegoat. Further, Tshitereke (1999) states foreigners become scapegoats in that they are considered as a threat in regard to jobs, housing, education, and healthcare in their host countries.

These theories will aid the study in reaching the objectives of the research and responding to the research questions. For instance, as the objectives of the study include to explain the causes, perpetuations, and patterns of migration in South Africa, theories of migration were adopted to aid the study to reach this objective. Moreover, because the process of migration is often met with hostility, especially in receiving countries, the study with its major objective envisions exploring the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa. With this being the case, there was a need for the study to adopt theories that explain the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. Among these are the relative deprivation theory, the securitization theory, and the scapegoat theory. Although these theories differ, they all attempt to elucidate the key causes of xenophobia, a phenomenon which the study intends to investigate, with the purpose of providing recommendations on how to curb it. For one, the prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa (linked to the influx of immigrants) often results in human security challenges such as the loss of personal belongings (identification documents and travel documents), monetary losses due to the looting of businesses by local people, population displacement, and the loss of life. It is in this regard that the research further adopted the human security perspective, as it will assist in responding to the question on how the occurrence of xenophobic attacks results in human (in)security in South Africa.

1.6 Research method

This study will adopt a qualitative research methodology, as it primarily deals with sources as indicated in the literature review, which are of a primary and secondary nature; in other words, literature on the topic by a variety of other authors. Thus, attitudes and political tendencies can be analysed. More specifically, the study will provide an analysis of migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa. According to Nieuwenhuis (2016: 50), qualitative research methodology refers to the analysis of data exploring the social

characteristics as phenomena that can be interpreted from various viewpoints and thus it provides a different analysis of a given phenomenon.

Further, the study will examine the perceptions and attitudes that South Africans have towards foreign nationals. Qualitative research methodology is concerned with human behaviour, and it focuses on analysing the different phenomena that are present in the study (Nieuwenhuis, 2016: 50). Thus, the study will examine whether these perceptions and attitudes serve as a trigger for xenophobic attacks against immigrants in South Africa.

Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) assert that qualitative research is interdisciplinary, and it comprises diverse perspectives and practices, which contribute to the generation of knowledge. Hence, qualitative research does not deal with statistical data but rather explanatory data, which require extensive reading to understand (Nieuwenhuis, 2016: 50). This method of research will be used to analyse the influx of migrants and its effect on xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The qualitative research method is adopted in this research as it will assist to analyse and examine the collected data, either through secondary means or the primary context (Bhattacharjee, 2012: 113).

1.7 Literature study

A literature review is described as a comprehensive summary of previous research on a given topic. Often the purpose of a literature review is to study existing scholarly articles, books, and any other sources of information that are relevant to a particular area of research. Hence, the review of literature should enumerate, describe, summarize, objectively evaluate, and provide clarity on previous research, and every available source that relates to the current study (Jansen, 2016: 28). Machi and McEvoy (2008) state that a literature review provides a theoretical base for the conducted research and assists the author to determine the nature of his/her research. Moreover, a review of literature acknowledges the work of previous authors and researchers.

A literature review normally provides a researcher with an overview of current, and sometimes not so current yet sufficiently relevant, literature suitable for the researcher's topic and the prominent facets of the chosen topic (Khoo & Jansen, 2016: 182). It is in this regard that one can find existing gaps between what has been written on a topic, and what has not been written, including possible flaws in the existing literature (Khoo &

Jansen, 2016: 182). Moreover, Machi and McEvoy (2008) state that a literature review also assists in creating a landscape for the reader; this helps in providing him/her with a full understanding of the developments in the particular field of study.

For the purpose of this study, the researcher conducted a thorough review of literature that is associated with the topic: Migration and impacts on xenophobia in South Africa (2008 to 2022). Thus, it assisted the researcher in responding to the research questions designed for this study. In addition, the review of literature assisted the researcher in identifying gaps that exist in the current body of knowledge. Moreover, the literature review has paved the way for the researcher to interpret primary and secondary data that relates to the study, in order to strengthen the validity of the research.

In essence, the utilization of the following sources of data was made on the premise that the study takes the form of a desktop study. The study relied solely on information provided by different internet databases and primary sources, such as books and academic journals, including published reports from organisations such as The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) social attitude surveys. Also, the study will rely on published theses and dissertations which focus on the subjects of migration and xenophobia in South Africa. An exploration of other scholars' work will aid the study in identifying gaps that exist in academic literature and thus require the study to find the gaps in the existing literature on migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa. Moreover, for the purposes of this study, no active participants will be involved to provide information regarding migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa. Relevant databases such as Nexus and Sabinet were consulted in order to determine the availability of literature on xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

1.8 Published articles

- Publications on migration and xenophobic attacks on Academia.au, Research Gate, Sabinet and Nexus; and articles such as *Dynamics informing xenophobia and leadership response in South Africa* by Champion M. Masikane, Magda Hewitt and Joyce Toendepi (2020) provide an in-depth analysis of how issues of identity play a key role in perpetuating xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

- *Linking governance and xenophobic violence in contemporary South Africa* by Jean Pierre Misago (2019) – articles such as this one will assist the researcher to indicate how the government's failure to provision basic services has triggered xenophobic attacks in South Africa as the article places its focus on linking governance as a political opportunity structure for xenophobic violence in South Africa.
- An article by Alexandra Hiropoulos (2020), which discusses how migration in South Africa triggers negative perceptions amongst South Africans towards immigrants in the country, is key to this study, as it explains how the migration crisis in South Africa influences xenophobic reactions in the country. Given that this research seeks to analyse migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa, this article will assist the study to draw a link between migration and its impact on xenophobia in the country.
- “*A violent minority? A quantitative analysis of those engaged in anti-immigrant violence in South Africa*” by Steven Gordon (2019) is essential to this study as it provides an understanding on active participants in xenophobia in South Africa. This article indicates the importance of a geographical analysis of xenophobic tendencies in South Africa, including profiling anti-immigrant violence in the country.

1.9 Published books

- Published books such as *Go Home or Die, Violence, Xenophobia, and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa* by Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby (2008) will assist the researcher in providing literature on the nature and course of the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The book itself seeks to respond to fundamental questions such as ‘What profound social malaise is xenophobia?’, and ‘the form of violence that it inspires, is it a symptom of a racially divided society or what?’. It also asks questions such as, ‘Are South Africa’s economic and political exclusions some of the reasons that fuel anger and distrust?’. This book is of paramount importance, as it will assist the researcher to make sense of the perceptions and attitudes that South Africans hold towards foreign nationals, and how these attitudes influence the behaviour of South Africans towards immigrants.

- *Xenophobia in South Africa: A History* by Hashi Kenneth Tafira (2018) is key to this study as it will assist the researcher to understand what goes on inside the mind of the xenophobe; as such, this could assist the researcher to identify psychological factors that influence South Africans' perceptions towards immigrants. The book will also provide insights on the links between race, nation, nationalism, and ethnicism. This will enable the researcher to understand how issues of national identity play a pivotal role in facilitating xenophobic attacks in South Africa, which denote a form of ethnic violence.
- *War Party. How ANC's Political Killings are breaking South Africa* by Greg Ardé (2020) will assist the researcher in locating the onset of intra-party warfare that is harming the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Ardé states that due to the rewards that come with holding public office in South Africa, members of the dominant ANC are at war with themselves, as they fight for positions in both the political party and government structures. To mobilise support from members of marginalised communities, aspiring local leaders tend to organise service delivery protests with the aim of portraying themselves as legitimate leaders, as opposed to the incumbent who has failed to meet their basic needs. Protest action in South Africa is often accompanied by xenophobic attacks because local leaders indoctrinate local community, making them believe that the presence of immigrants in South Africa contributes largely to the socio-economic challenges that the country faces; thus, shifting the blame to foreign nationals who are alleged take opportunities that should be enjoyed by South African citizens.

1.10 Published policy series

- Published policy series, such as *Migrant Entrepreneurship, Collective Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa* by Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran (Migration Policy Series No. 67), will be utilised. This policy series will aid the researcher to find a link between migration and xenophobic attacks because at times, collective violence stems from collective grievances that are derived from the relative deprivation of basic services. Consequently, this violence is often aimed at foreign nationals.
- *Living with Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa* by Jonathan Crush, Godfrey Tavodzera, Abel Chikanda and Daniel Tevera (2017) (Southern African Migration Programme Policy Series No. 77) will assist in

providing the reasons for migration to South Africa, the experiences of xenophobia by immigrants, and responses to xenophobic violence. This is important to this research because part of the thesis's objectives is to evaluate the 'push' and 'pull' factors of migration. The former refers to the reasons that compel foreign nationals to leave their home countries, while the latter refers to the reasons that attract immigrants to South Africa. This includes employment opportunities, business opportunities, and a better life.

1.11 Published reports

- The thesis will rely on literature provided in published reports such as *What happened?': Narrative of the May 2008 Xenophobic violence*, by Annsilla Nyar (2011); *May 2008 violence against foreign nationals in South Africa. Understanding causes and evaluation responses* by Jean Pierre Misago, Tamlyn Monson, Tara Polzer and Loren Landau (2010); and *Xenophobia and civil society: why did it happen?* by Patrick Bond, Trevor Ngwane and Baruti Amisi (2010).

These reports will be valuable in this research, as they provide literature on the incidents during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks and the causes. They also provide literature on the responses towards the May 2008 xenophobic attacks.

1.12 Media articles

- Online newspaper articles from media houses such as *The Guardian*, *Independent Online*, *Mail & Guardian*, *TimesLive* and other online articles on migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa will be used.

1.13 Theses and dissertations

- This research will also rely on published theses and dissertations written by other students who researched the areas of migration and xenophobia in South Africa. Amongst these will be the dissertation by Anjofui Patience Anegub (2018) titled, *Investigating the push and the pull factors of international migration in South Africa; The case of Cameroonian and Congolese migrants in Cape Town*. It will support the study in identifying factors attributed to migration in South Africa.
- The research will make use of theses, including Gideon Rwanda Muchiri's (2016) titled *Xenophobia: A critical study of the phenomenon and pragmatic solutions for*

South Africa. The thesis will aid this study in terms of reflecting on the government's failure to mitigate the existing socio-economic woes, which often lead to resentment amongst South Africans, thus resulting in xenophobic attacks. Also, this thesis will assist in explaining the causes of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, including providing existing frameworks that regulate migration in South Africa.

- This thesis will further rely on the dissertation by Keitumetse Sepeng (2021) titled *Human security implications of the securitization of migration: A case study on South Africa's BMA Act 2 of 2020*. The thesis will assist in explaining the nature of migration governance through the lens of securitization of South Africa's border management, which highlights how the migration process has become a security threat to the country.

1.14 Government publications and legislative frameworks

- This thesis will also rely on government publications and legislative frameworks such as the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, and the Refugees Act 103 of 1998. These acts regulate lawful admission into and out of South Africa. They repealed the Aliens Control Amendment Act 76 of 1995. From then onwards, it was the main legislation controlling South Africa's immigration system.
- The thesis will also make use of the White Paper on International Migration (2017) by the Department of Home Affairs. This policy will assist the researcher in explaining how migration is governed by the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa. The White Paper makes it possible for the state and society to actively manage international migration in order to achieve the clear developmental goals as set out in the National Development Plan.
- Also, the research will depend on the framework document on South Africa's National Interest and its advancement in the global environment by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. This framework document will guide the study in identifying South Africa's national interests, and how the quest for the attainment of these interests has contributed to the politicised governance of migration, and how failure to cater for the interests of the citizens has sparked xenophobic attacks in the country.

1.15 Surveys

This thesis will further rely on the South African Social Attitudes Survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). This is a nationally representative, repeat cross-sectional survey that has been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. This thesis will focus primarily on data provided by the Survey on social attitudes by people living in South Africa, and their perceptions and attitudes surrounding foreign nationals living in the country. The Survey will strengthen the qualitative data provided in this study regarding xenophobic sentiments towards immigrants living in South Africa. Therefore, given that this study takes the form of a desktop study, the Survey is important in this research, as it will provide the primary responses of South Africans regarding their opinions on how they perceive immigrants living in their country.

The aforementioned sources of data serve as the basis of this research, as it is a desktop study. In addition, the sources of data will assist the researcher to identify the gaps in the existing literature on migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa. However, the study might face limitations if there is limited information available in the aforementioned sources pertaining to the focus of the study.

1.16 Gaps in the literature

Studies prior to this one have substantially discussed the reasons behind migration patterns in South Africa, and xenophobic tendencies in post-apartheid South Africa. In the country, anti-migrant's sentiments and violent xenophobic attacks are prevalent, despite the fact that, with its Constitution (1996), it is stated that South Africa belongs to all those who live in it. Although this study acknowledges that numerous studies have adequately addressed the patterns of migration and the triggers of xenophobia in South Africa, there has been a reluctance to demystify the accusations informed by the stereotypes and myths on immigrants in South Africa. For instance, in South Africa, xenophobia has been triggered by the influx of immigrants who are often scapegoated, securitized, and criminalized for existing socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, poverty, the inadequate provision of basic services, and the high crime rate. As such, the study fills the gap in the literature as it demystifies the accusations, stereotypes, and myths about migrants in South Africa through the use of empirical evidence. This study will contribute to the fields of political science, population studies, and peace and conflict studies as it seeks to provide the link that exists between migration

and xenophobic sentiments in South Africa, with the aim of contributing to the literature by proposing solutions on how to mitigate the existing crisis of xenophobia, which poses a threat to human security in the country.

1.17 Research design

A research design, states Nieuwenhuis (2016: 72), is a strategy or plan that revolves around the underlying philosophical assumptions, in order to specify the collection methods to be applied, including the data analysis to be done. Similarly, Bhattacharjee (2012: 38) states that research design can be referred to as a strategy, which is utilized to investigate an existing problem when conducting research. In essence, a research design is a design regarded as an extensive plan for how the data will be collected, and its primary aim is to assist in answering research questions (Bhattacharjee, 2012: 38). Therefore, the research design determines how the research unfolds and which method is to be followed as a means of filling the gaps in the existing body of literature.

Bhattacharjee (2012: 38) states that research design is the process of research, which focuses on processes that determine the manner in which data collections are designed, as well as how they are structured. This research is an exploratory study, as the researcher will analyse the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans towards foreign nationals, and whether these perceptions and attitudes served as the triggers for the violent xenophobic attacks in South Africa between 2008 and 2022. Exploratory research is relevant to the study, as it relies on qualitative research, which allows the researcher to explore different textual materials relating to the subject of migration and xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa. Hence, an exploratory research design assists the researcher in exploring those situations in which the interventions being evaluated have no clear, single set of outcomes (Nieuwenhuis, 2016: 82).

1.18 Data collection

Manerikar (2014: 96) states that secondary data collection refers to the navigation of already existing data in order to interpret, examine, and analyse it. This method of data collection involves the use of other authors' materials to strengthen the researcher's arguments. Secondary data is often used in order to avoid the financial costs that come with travelling when the researcher conducts primary data collection. For the purpose of this research, primary and secondary data will be employed to delve into the examination of migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

Thus, secondary data will be collected in this study as it minimises travel costs. However, other sources of data such as primary sources will also be used to strengthen the literature provided in the secondary data. Data for this study will be collected from academic journals, articles, the internet, news articles, books, the Institute for Security Studies reports, and the International Office for Migration reports. Moreover, the researcher will analyse primary sources of data such as books and reports written by institutions such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the International Organisation for Migration, and published theses and dissertation.

1.19 Data analysis

Data analysis, states Bhattacharjee (2012: 38), is the process of research that involves the engagement of data that was collected previously in areas that are aligned with the researcher's interest. It familiarises the researcher with existing written materials that revolve around his/her interests. Data analysis makes it convenient for those conducting research to engage with various literature that is based on what they seek to find data on (Johnston, 2014: 619). As such, there is no need for researchers to consult primary sources in person to search for information.

It is in this regard that secondary data analysis involves the in-depth review of literature. The availability of secondary data makes it convenient for researchers to make use of it as most of it is easily accessible, while it saves the costs and resources of consulting primary sources directly in the quest to source information (Johnston, 2014: 620). For the purpose of this research, the researcher will employ content analysis when analysing the data.

Content analysis is known as a flexible method for analysing written data, as well as verbal and visual information. In most cases, content analysis can be used by a researcher for either quantitative or qualitative data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2012: 108). Based on the flexibility of this method, the researcher decided to adopt it as the data collected will be interpreted and analysed in an attempt to provide new knowledge on how the influx of migrants serves as a trigger for xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The research will also assess gaps in the immediate interventions made by the South African government to

assist immigrants during xenophobic attacks, and thus provide recommendations on what can be done to mitigate the challenge of xenophobia in South Africa.

Elo and Kyngäs (2012: 108) state that content analysis can be applied for both inductive and deductive data. The former is an approach that can be chosen if there is not enough information about the research topic. Thus, the study adopted the latter approach as it does not seek to add any new theory to the study but rather to make use of already-existing data and to interpret it to fill the gaps in the existing body of literature.

1.20 Ethical considerations

As indicated in the methodology section, the research will be based on a qualitative method of study; thus, it will rely upon the utilisation of secondary sources of data. Moreover, the form of data that will be used for this research does not signify the researcher as the primary owner of such data. In this regard the study will rely on the use of other people's published materials and sources. All copyright laws will be met, and citations will be made in full. As there will be no active participants involved in the study, no active participants can be harmed or coerced to share any information.

By its nature, the study will be a desktop study, as the researcher will rely on existing data. There will be no plagiarism, and every author whose work is used for this research will be acknowledged. The research will make use of referencing in every paraphrased paragraph, especially those that are intricately linked to the text. All the regulations provided for by the North-West University's policy on plagiarism will be followed and adhered to (NWU, 2013: 2).

1.21 Limitations of the study

Bearing in mind that the study will be a desktop study, the researcher will not travel to Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Mpumalanga to source information, although this may serve as a limitation. Data pertaining to the existing problem and the research questions will be sourced through secondary data collection in order to assist the researcher to fill the gaps regarding migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa. As such, the limitation of travelling to source data will be overcome by exploring the existing sufficient literature on the subject of migration and xenophobia in South Africa. The focus of the study is on migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa (from 2008 to 2022).

1.22 Significance of the study

Through re-visiting xenophobic events that occurred from May 2008 to 2022, this study aims to examine migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The findings of this study could be used as a guide on how to remedy the dynamics of the ensuing influx of migrants and the xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

The study is significant, as it will attempt to indicate the patterns of migration in South Africa, and elaborate on how the influx of migrants perpetuates xenophobic attacks in the country because without identification of the main drivers of migration patterns and xenophobic actions and attitudes, it will be a challenge to resolve the crisis of xenophobia in urban areas. Regarding an academic and scholarly perspective, the study will add to the existing scholarly and academic knowledge and insights regarding the impact of migration on xenophobic attacks in South Africa, but the study will also bring a different perspective by providing recommendations on how to mitigate the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa. In essence, the study will contribute to the areas of politics, conflict studies and migration discourse.

1.23 Chapter layout

The thesis is arranged into six chapters. Chapter One serves as the chapter that sets the tone for the thesis. It commences by providing an overview discussion on the history of patterns of migration in South Africa. This is followed by a discussion on the series of violent xenophobic attacks that occurred during the early years of democracy in South Africa. The chapter also provides the research questions and objectives of the study, the forms of literature to be consulted, including the gap in the existing literature, the statement of the research problem, the research methodology and the research design, and the limitations and the significance of the study, including the ethical considerations applicable to this study.

Chapter Two of the thesis focuses on the application of the theories that have been adopted to assist in explaining the causes and patterns of migration in South Africa. Among these are the neoclassical macro-economic theory, neoclassical micro-economic theory, dual labour market theory, world system theory, migration systems, network and cumulative causation theory, institutional theory, and the new economics of migration. These theories are justified through the literature that relates to the causes of migration.

Chapter Three of the thesis delves into the theories that assist in explaining the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. Amongst these are the securitization theory, relative deprivation theory and scapegoat theory. Also, Chapter three will focus on the human security perspective, which aids in explaining the impact of xenophobia on human security.

Chapter Four provides an analysis of migration and its impact on xenophobic attacks in South Africa. This chapter delves into the historical development of migration trends and patterns in South Africa, factors attributed to the rise of xenophobia, and the human security impacts of xenophobia in the country. This chapter applies the theories adopted in Chapter two and Chapter three in order to explain the causes of migration, including the causes and impacts of xenophobia on human security in South Africa. This is to provide empirical analysis through linking theoretical propositions to the praxis of migration and xenophobia in South Africa. Chapter Four also responds to the title of the thesis through examining how migration to South Africa has triggered the xenophobic attacks which pose a threat to human (in)security in South Africa.

Chapter Five focuses on the nature of migration governance in South Africa. This chapter expands on the international, continental, and regional conventions on international migration. The Chapter further discusses the immigration policies and strategies adopted to combat migration in South Africa. This was done with the intention to highlight how the country's migration governance and its restrictive policies have perpetuated institutionalized xenophobia, which often feeds into other forms of xenophobia, such as violent or digital xenophobia.

Chapter Six of the study synthesizes an analysis on the nexus between migration and xenophobia in South Africa. This chapter seeks to respond to the question whether immigrants pose a threat to the country's national security. This question is informed by the realities in South Africa, which indicates that there is a widely accepted public perception that immigrants are responsible for or contribute to increasing crime, unemployment, and declining social welfare and public services, and that most immigrants live in the country illegally. All these forms of accusations, informed by stereotypes and myths, have largely contributed to xenophobia in South Africa. As such, there is a need to demystify these accusations, stereotypes, and myths about immigrants

through empirical data. This is important, as the data presented can shape public opinions about immigrants, who are scapegoated for the social ills in South Africa.

Chapter Seven of the thesis provides a conclusion and a problem-solving dimension, by presenting recommendations on what can be done to mitigate the challenges surrounding xenophobia which results in human (in)security in South Africa, as failure to propose solutions how to mitigate xenophobia could result in a perpetual cycle of hostile treatment of migrants, actions that violate human rights. Also, the chapter summarizes the key findings derived from Chapters one to six in order to correlate the arguments surrounding migration and its influence on xenophobia in South Africa.

Chapter Two: Theoretical review on the causes and perpetuation of international migration in South Africa

Migration is an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety, and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family ~ Ban Ki-moon.

We can't deter people fleeing for their lives. They will come. The choice we have is how well we manage their arrival, and how humanely. ~ Antonio Guterres

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter, which set the tone for the thesis, explored the background of the nature and patterns of migration from a historical point of view up to contemporary South Africa. This was done with the intention to provide key arguments surrounding the nexus between migration and xenophobia in South Africa. For one, Nyar (2011) is of the view that the influx of immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa has often sparked xenophobic sentiments against immigrants living in the country. These anti-immigrant sentiments were driven by perceptions that foreign nationals (especially African immigrants) in the country “steal” opportunities that should be enjoyed by South Africans; this includes jobs, business opportunities, and education (Misago, 2011). Consequently, these perceptions lead to attacks against foreign nationals, who are heavily blamed for the woes that the country is facing, such as high unemployment, poverty, inequality (in terms of distribution of resources), and poor basic service provision such as housing, healthcare, and education.

Moreover, Chapter one indicated how the research is structured and divided. This included a brief analysis of the literature to be consulted throughout this research, also the research methodology and research design adopted for this study. The previous chapter also highlighted the problem statement relating to this study, including the main research question and research sub-questions, the objectives of the study, and the gaps in literature that the study seeks to fill, and lastly, the ethical considerations to be followed while conducting this study.

The goal of this chapter, however, is to explore the theories that guide this research. Essentially, this section is known as the theoretical framework chapter. It is in this chapter where theories that support the causes and perpetuations of migration in South Africa will

be explored. For one, there are multiple factors that inform the movement of people from one destination to another; thus, the study delves into the theories of migration as they assist in explaining migration patterns. The theories of migration to be reviewed in this chapter include the neoclassical macro-economic theory and the neoclassical micro-economic theory, dual labour theory, world system theory, migration systems, network and cumulative causation theory, institutional theory, and new economics of migration theory (De Haas, 2021: 2).

This chapter of the thesis seeks to respond to the first research question of the study, which is:

- *How do theories of migration assist in explaining the causes and perpetuation of international migration?*

Migration theories are adopted in this thesis as they seek to provide reasons and understanding behind individuals' and households' motivations to migrate from one country or region to another or even move domestically. These theories go as far as providing factors that explain the maintenance of migration streams, including factors that serve as hindrances for people to migrate. However, provided the distinctiveness of these theories, different theories use different concepts and assumptions; thus, framing their reference depending on their origins in terms of discipline, including the time in which they were constructed (Bueno & Prieto-Rosas, 2019: 1).

The chapter begins by providing a review of literature by observing the different levels of analysis before delving into a deeper analysis of theories. In the following section, the most important theories of domestic (internal) and cross-border (international) migration will be discussed. However, it is key to highlight that emphasis will be placed on economic theories, although some of them are strongly associated with sociological, geographical, and anthropological theories (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 6).

2.2 Classification of migration theories by levels of analysis

In this section, migration theories will be classified according to the different levels on which they focus. For instance, macro-economic theories of migration focus on aggregate migration trends and thus seek to explain these trends with macro-level explanations (Hager-Zanker, 2008: 6). Conversely, micro-economic theories of migration focus on the

individual and his/her informed decision to migrate (Yengde, 2016: 56). The meso-level stands between the micro- and macro-levels. In Table 1 below, an overview of migration theories is provided along with the levels of analysis, and an overview of migration theories in terms of their causes and perpetuation are also provided and classified. It is worth noting that some of the theories fit into different categories based on their nature.

Table 1. Migration theories classified by levels of analysis

<i>Micro-level</i>	<i>Meso-level</i>	<i>Macro-level</i>
<i>Causes of migration:</i> Individual values/desires/expectations/better living conditions, e.g. wealth and prospects of survival	<i>Causes and perpetuations of migration:</i> Social networks/collectives e.g. social ties/family networks	<i>Causes and perpetuations of migration:</i> Macro-level opportunity structure, e.g. economic incentives (differences in income and employment opportunities)
<i>Main theories:</i> - Neoclassical micro-economic theories of migration. - Ernest Ravenstein and Everett Lee's push and pull theory	<i>Main theories:</i> - Networks and cumulative causation theories - New economics of migration theory - Institutional theory	<i>Main theories:</i> - Neoclassical macro-economic theories of migration - Migration systems - Dual labour theory - World system theory

Source: Faist (2000), Hager-Zanker (2008), author's own compilation

In the following section, the research delves into a review of theories that explain the causes and perpetuations of international migration. These theories assist the study in providing empirical evidence on the reasons why South Africa continues to experience an influx of immigrants from African countries and the rest of the world. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the country is known as a top host of foreign nationals among African countries.

2.3 Neoclassical macro-economic theory

The neoclassical macro-economic theory is known as the earliest theoretical framework developed to explain the phenomenon of international and labour migration (Aidara, 2021: 20). According to neoclassical macro-economic theory, migration emerges because of geographical differences between the demand for labour and the supply of labour (Todaro, 1969). These differences can be witnessed at both the international and domestic levels. From the neoclassical macro-economic point of view, the key argument of the theory is that movements of people are influenced primarily by the situation of wage differences (Rahman, 2017: 29), especially between migrants' countries of origin and those they migrate to (Stark, 1991). Further, the theory posits that international migration (cross-border) is perpetuated by the differences in wage levels between countries and different labour markets (Todaro, 1969). Hence, according to this theory, if wage differences were to be removed from the equation, then labour migration would cease (Todaro, 1969). In this regard, neoclassical macro-economic theory suggests that high numbers of migrants move from capital poor/labour force-rich countries to those which are capital rich/labour force-poor (Sjaastad, 1962).

The neoclassical macro-economic theory clarifies the process of migration through geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour (Kurekova, 2011: 5). The existence of differentials in wages causes workers to migrate from low-wage, labour-surplus areas, countries or regions to areas, countries or regions characterised by high-paying jobs and shortages in the labour force. Thus, it means that migration results in an abundance of labour in the receiving countries, while it leads to a labour scarcity in sending countries.

The neoclassical macro-economic theory states that migration is prompted by the levels of inequality in wages, which signifies different rates of productivity in each region (Todaro, 1973). Moreover, Pritchett and Hani (2019) assert that the differences in income, wages and socio-economic opportunities, which contribute to the progress of an individual, between the host country and the place of origin remain the key drivers of international migration. Thus, migrants are primarily motivated by prospects of better wages associated with higher rates of productivity in the places they migrate to (Sjaastad, 1962). However, individual motivations, personal circumstances and the economic output of migration differ, as this is dependent upon the degree of migration selectivity, including

the portability and recognition of the skills and qualifications possessed by the migrants, and the premium on wages in the host community. On the other hand, Alejandro (2020: 25) has broadened the theory and pointed out that, in the case of qualified workers, the key variable that carries the most weight is no longer the disparity in wages, but rather the differences in return; it goes as far as including opportunities that are available for an individual (including the family), which guarantee long-term benefits such as good working conditions and quality of life.

In reaction to the flow of workers, who migrate from labour-abundant to labour-scarce areas or countries, is the flow of investment capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries (Massey et al., 1993: 433). Hence, the movement of capital is entangled with human capital, which is seen in highly skilled workers migrating from capital-rich to capital-poor countries with the intention of reaping high returns on their skills in a human capital-scarce environment; thus, leading to a parallel migration of managers, technicians, and other skilled workers (Todaro, 1965). Alejandro (2020: 36) asserts that migrants are often motivated by better wages, associated with the higher productivity rates, in the places they migrate to. Thus, in macroeconomic terms, there would be a net gain, for what is gained in terms of productivity in the host areas or countries, is more than what is lost in the areas or countries of origin (Alejandro, 2020: 36).

The neoclassical macro-economic theory provides a simplistic explanation of international migration through several inherent propositions and assumptions, as expounded by Massey et al. (1993: 433):

- “The international migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries;
- The elimination of wage differentials will end movement of labour, and migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials;
- International flow of human capital – that is, highly skilled workers – responds to differences in the rate of human capital, which may be different from the overall wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be opposite to that of unskilled workers;
- Labour markets are the primary mechanism by which international flows of labour are induced; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on international migration; and

- The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence labour markets in the sending and/or receiving countries.”

Considering the assumptions on the causes of migration, as advocated by neoclassical macro-economic theory scholars such as Massey et al. (1993:433), it is clear that the dominant argument of the theory is that migration is driven by differences in migration returns in relation to labour throughout different markets. In the assertions by Hicks (1932), Lewis (1954), and Harris and Todaro (1970), the process of migration stems from actual wage differentials in labour markets in regions or countries that come from the inflexibility of the market, characterized by the diverse gradations of the labour market. Thus, the standpoint of neoclassical macro-economic theory concentrates on disparities in wages across various markets. In relation to the assumption on realising full employment by migrants in host countries, Bauer and Zimmerman (1999) and Massey et al. (1993) assert that neoclassical macroeconomic theory predicts a linear relationship between differentials in wages and migration flows. In this view, migration is determined by wage expectations rather than actual earnings; in addition, the key variable is income, which is slanted by the prospects of employment across different markets (Kurekova, 2011: 5).

The neoclassical macro-economic theory has been criticised. Arango (2000) states that the theory grounds migration choice exclusively on wage differences between various countries or regions. As such, the theory does not take into consideration other measures, such as legal restrictions, family-orientated issues, and cultural differences (Arango, 2000). Moreover, Arango (2004) argues that the neoclassical macro-economic theory falls short in explaining why some countries experience high rates of emigration, whereas others, with similar economic structures and conditions, experience low rates of emigration.

Moreover, the neoclassical macro-economic theory of migration does not consider migration causes and perpetuation from a cultural and family point of view; it neglects to consider how migration can be influenced by different linkages and relationships that exist between different countries, relationships which often serve as the reasons for and the perpetuation of international migration (Arango, 2004). Scholars such as Alejandro (2020:36) also point to the fact that the neoclassical macro-economic theory does not

consider issues such as a good quality of life and better working conditions as the causes for and the perpetuation of international migration. In this regard, the research will investigate other theories related to the causes for and the perpetuation of international migration, with the intention to expand upon what the neoclassical macro-economic theory has offered, including addressing some of the deficits of this theory of migration.

2.4 Neoclassical micro-economic theories

The neoclassical micro-economic theory in its nature corresponds with the macro-economic theory of migration. Neoclassical macro-economic theory and its assumption posits that labour migration occurs not only because of factors such as wage differentials, but also due to migrants making a rational cost-benefit decision (Harris & Todaro, 1970). In this perspective, an individual's rational choice to migrate is based on the cost and benefits that come with migration; thus, leading them to expect positive returns, which often includes monetary gains (Sjaastad, 1962). It is in this sense that the neoclassical micro-economic theory conceptualizes international migration as a form of human capital investment (Massey et al., 1993: 434). Sjaastad (1962) explains that the process of migration can be seen as an individual investment to increase the productivity of human capital; hence, placing focus on the labour market, while simultaneously explaining the selectivity of heterogeneous migrants.

Todaro and Maruszko (1986) assert that before individuals decide whether to migrate or not, they first assess the money they can expect to earn by working domestically, while comparing their earnings with what they anticipate receiving in various destinations, be these locally or internationally. The neoclassical micro-economic theory states that people migrate to locations that offer the highest lifetime returns (revenue and improved lifestyle) in exchange for their labour. Alejandro (2020: 38) states that in neoclassical micro-economic terms, for migration to materialise, the differences between the costs and benefits of migration should be weighed based on the possibilities that guarantee the success of migration (Borjas, 1990). For instance, individuals must assess whether they will arrive safely at their intended destinations, including the chances of obtaining employment that pays more than they earn in their place of origin, especially for the same set of jobs (Todaro, 1969). It goes as far as analysing differences in the employment rates, which can be used as a variable to determine the chances of finding a job in the

international labour market, and the economic cost of moving from one country to another (Stark, 1984).

The neoclassical micro-economic theory states that, based on the skills that people have, they tend to move to places or regions where their skills will be valued in terms of productivity. However, before gaining access to a higher wage associated with greater productivity, individuals must undertake certain investments while moving and looking for a job (Yengde, 2016: 21). These investments include the material costs of travelling and the costs of maintenance while on the move, the effort to learn diverse languages and different cultures, including the difficulty in adapting to a new labour market, and lastly, the psychological costs of leaving social networks (friends and family) while forging new networks in the host countries or regions (Todaro, 1969).

In its theorization, the neoclassical micro-economic theory posits that a potential migrant tends to move to places where net returns on migration are the greatest (Arango, 2000); this action leads to key conclusions that differ from the ones previously provided in the macro-economic formulations. The important conclusions expounded by neoclassical micro-economic theory, as compiled by Massey et al. (1993), are as follows:

- “International migration stems from international differentials in both earnings and employment rates, whose product determines expected earnings (the prior model, by contrast, assumed full employment),
- Individual human capital characteristics that increase the likely rate of remuneration or the probability of employment in the destination relative to the sending country (e.g. education, experience, training, language skills) will increase the likelihood of international movement of people,
- Individual characteristics, social conditions, or technologies that lessen the cost of migration tend to increase the net returns on migration, hence increasing the probability of international movement of people,
- Individuals within the same country can display very different proclivities to move from one area to another,
- Aggregate migration flows between countries are a simple sum of individual moves undertaken on the basis of individual cost-benefit calculations,
- International migration does not occur in the absence of differences in earnings and/or employment rates between different countries. The process of migration

occurs until expected earnings (the product of earnings and employment rates) have been equalized internationally (net of the costs of movement), and movement does not stop until this product has been equalized,

- The size of the differential in expected returns determines the size of the international flow of migrants between countries,
- Migration decisions derive from disequilibria or discontinuities between labour markets; other markets do not directly influence the decision to migrate,
- If conditions in receiving countries are psychologically attractive to prospective migrants, migration costs may be negative. In this case, a negative earnings differential may be necessary to halt migration between countries, and
- Governments regulate immigration primarily through enacting policies that affect expected earnings in sending and/or receiving countries, for instance, those that attempt to lower the likelihood of employment or raise the risk of underemployment in the destination area (through employer sanctions)".

Despite the above-mentioned conclusions made by micro-economic theorists, to some extent, the neoclassical micro-economic theory of migration shares similar qualities with macro-economic theories in the sense that the neoclassical micro-economic theory also focuses on the motives of individuals to migrate, instead of group migration (Arango, 2000). It is in this regard that scholars such as Massey et al. (1993) and De Haas (2008) opine that neo-classical micro-economic theory shows the limitations in terms of explaining differential migration. The neo-classical theory of migration does not state the reasons why some people do not migrate (Arango, 2000). Lastly, this theory fails to provide the restrictions to the migration process because migration is not only about moving from the sending country to the destination; it also concerns what it requires for a person to be able to migrate from their place of origin to a host country. For instance, the micro-economic theory of migration does not explain intervening obstacles such as a government's migration policies, which might impact or deter people from migrating (Massey et al., 1993; Arango, 2000; De Haas, 2008). In order to fill this vacuum, in the next section the thesis will delve into the push-pull theory, which explains migration from the perspective of supply and demand, while looking into dominant hindrances that might hinder the migration process.

2.5 Push/Pull theory

The argument presented by Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) is that what determines the cost-benefit estimations relates to the individual's intentions and their personal characteristics such as age, gender, and educational level. These factors play a key role in determining whether an individual should migrate or not. Apart from wage differences and employment opportunities, for migration to successfully take place there is a need to consider hindrances, such as travelling costs and legal restrictions, which might increase the costs of migration. In his theorization on the causes of migration, Ravenstein (1885) concluded that the existing favourable and unfavourable economic conditions serve as push and pull factors, which compel people to migrate towards a particular destination. Kline (2003) asserts that the push factors exist in the migrant's place of origin, while the pull factors are found within the host destination. In this context, related to the neoclassical theories of migration (macro and micro), is the push-pull framework which emphasises the economic context of the flow of workers (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999).

The existence of push (negative) and pull (positive) factors serve as necessary factors that enable migration to occur (see Figure 1). In furthering the push and pull framework, Zimmermann (1996) states that demand (pull) factors attract individuals to move from their place of origin to a particular geographical location, which has prospects for improved and better working conditions, social and political security, and positive economic growth. On the other hand, supply (push) factors include high unemployment rates, poverty, political instability, climate change and insecurity, all of which serve as factors that trigger the movement of people from their place of origin to the host destination.

The push-pull theory of migration, as modelled by Ravenstein, was revised by Everett Lee (1966), who looked at the migration process through the lens of supply and demand. This includes the positive and negative factors that exist in the individual's country of origin and destination; at times migration is hindered by intervening factors that include migration policies and socio-economic status. Lee (1966) states that four factors determine an individual's choice to migrate: (i) factors that relate to an individual's place of origin, (ii) factors attributed to the country they intend to migrate to, (iii) intervening hindrances which may prevent the process of migration, and, (iv) personal factors. In explaining the process of migration, Lee (1966) uses 'plus' and 'minus' and 'zero' to

explain migration processes. Lee (1966) defined ‘plus’ as factors that encourage the process of migration; while ‘minus’ represents factors that discourage the process of migration (see Figure 1 below); and ‘zero’ refers to cases where the migrant is indifferent, for example, about how he/she perceives the ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors (Lee, 1966).

Figure 1: Lee’s Push/Pull Model



Source: Lee (1975: 191)

De Haas (2010) states that there are numerous factors that sociologists refer to as push and pull factors. The former include natural disasters, civil war, conflict, poverty, and unemployment; while, pull factors include prospects of improved living conditions, better employment opportunities, a good educational system, and a war-free zone. All these pull factors attract people to migrate from their place of origin to the host destination in search of better economic opportunities. Table 2 below provides a classification of factors that encourage migration by the type of migrant.

Table 2. Categorisation of factors that influence migration by the type of migrant

Type of Migrant	Demand (Pull) (positive)	Supply (Push) (negative)	Network/Other
Economic	Labour recruitment, good working conditions, higher wages	Unemployment, low wages, poor working conditions	The flow of information on jobs and wages
Non-economic	Family unification, asylum seekers, refugees	Seeking family reunion, fleeing war or conflict	Desire for better life experiences

Source: Martin and Zurcher (2008), Ogujiuba (2019), author’s own compilation

There are multiple factors that motivate people to migrate. Often people migrate to other countries in the hope of better living conditions, access to the labour market, and economic opportunities (Ogujiuba, 2019). In this thesis, the destination country is South Africa, which has attracted African migrants whose decision to migrate to the country has been influenced by high levels of economic development, education opportunities, healthcare services, and social services (Yengde, 2016: 21). Lee (1966) argues that before people embark on the migration process, they consider the advantages and disadvantages of different destinations, based on their personal preferences, education level, and the accuracy of the information they have collected about the place they intend to migrate to. In certain instances, after migrating, they realise that they have overvalued their host country (Lee, 1966), as they did not consider the negative elements of the country.

The push-pull model remains unique, as it incorporates factors that influence people's decisions to migrate. Thus, the theory remains relevant to this study as it uses labour as a determinant factor of migration (De Haas, 2008). However, the theory has been criticised for not paying attention to the tendency of a person to migrate (Butler, 2016), mainly the migrant's aspirations (De Haas, 2016). In addition, the push and pull theory does not address the impact of migration and how it can become a securitised process. One of the deficits of this theory is the fact that it assumes that everyone's needs are the same, failing to consider how individuals have different aspirations and needs (De Haas, 2016). Although the push-pull theory explains some features of migration like the concurrent occurrence of migration, return migration, and emigration from and to the same destination (Butler, 2016), it does not explain the effects of migration and how it can either advance or confine both the host and sending countries (De Haas, 2016).

Lastly, the push-pull model does not explain migration from a family or household perspective as it only focuses on factors that drive people to leave their place of origin to move to a receiving country, the factors that attract migrants to host countries, and the prevailing factors that might hinder the process of migrating from the place of origin to a host destination (De Haas, 2016). In order to explain migration from a family or household point of view, the thesis in the next section will delve into the new economics of labour migration theory. This theory looks at migration from a different angle. Instead of looking

at migration as an individual's decision, the theory posits that an individual's decision to migrate tends to be influenced by family or household members.

2.6 The New Economics of Labour Migration theory

The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory stems from the neoclassical perspective, and it is regarded as a refined version of it (Stark & Bloom, 1985). According to the theory, a decision to migrate is often influenced by household members collectively for the general good of the family (Stark, 1991). The key feature of this approach is that migration is regarded as a family or household decision, as opposed to an individual decision (O'Reilly, 2019), although a family or household do not migrate together; they rather send one or more household members as migrants.

Massey et al. (1993) argue that migration allows for the diversification of household resources in the event of the failure or risks regarding local income sources. Hence, those who remain in the place of origin, such as older family members or other kin, can rely on migration remittances, which assist in ensuring the wellbeing of older people (Massey et al., 1993). This is especially the case in developing countries, where state institutions do not always have the means nor the measures to provide welfare support for destitute members of the community (O'Reilly, 2019).

The NELM theory has its roots in the works of Oded Stark in the 1980s, in cooperation with David Bloom, Eliakim Katz, David Levhari, Robert Lucas, Mark Rosenweig, and Edward Taylor. The theory is the only migration theory that explicitly draws the link between decisions to migrate alongside the impacts of migration, with remittances being at the core of this link (Taylor & Fletcher, 2001). Furthermore, migrants' decisions are informed by a comprehensive set of factors which shape the conditions in the place of origin. Hence, unlike in neoclassical theories (macro and micro) where an individual's decision to migrate is influenced by personal benefits, NELM sees migration as a household response to income risk and to the failure of a variety of markets, which include labour markets, credit market, and the insurance market (Massey et al., 1993).

Theorists of NELM such as Massey et al. (1998) and Nkau (2003) further state that governments initiate international migration through policies that exert relative deprivation of a particular group within the population. Thus, families or households emigrate from

their country of origin to host countries to maximise their income, simultaneously reducing the risks that come with labour and other markets (Samers, 2010: 63-64). The theory states that some family or household members tend to remain behind in the country of origin, whereas other family members migrate to destination countries. Hence, a family adopts such strategies so that when economic conditions deteriorate in the country of origin, the members of the family or households who have migrated and live in other countries are then able to deal with the loss of income or livelihood through the transfer of remittances.

Migration remittances refers to money or goods sent to members of the family who reside in the country of origin, and this money or goods is sent by those who migrated and live in foreign countries (Samers, 2010). For instance, a family is likely to send the physically able members of their households abroad to work and thus invest in higher education for the other members. If the higher education within the country does not pay off, they can rely on the remittances from those who work in other countries (Cassarino, 2004). In contrast to neoclassical theories of migration (Cassarino, 2004), where return migration is considered as a failure factor, NELM considers the returnees as “a success factor”, as those who achieved maximum benefit from his/her migration behaviour is likely to return home with accumulated savings or knowledge (Cassarino, 2004).

The NELM theory states that a potentially higher income is a key factor for potential migrants (Stark, 1991). The relative income (or accordingly, relative deprivation) of the household is also an important factor (Stark, 1991). Stark (1991) states, “In real life it is likely that migration decisions are influenced by both absolute and relative income considerations”. According to NELM, relative income can be regarded as a social status which can be assessed in comparison to the reference group of a particular household. Moreover, the reference group can include the local community, village, and town. Status does not only refer to intrinsic value, but it can also translate into monetary benefits (Hacker, 2011: 7).

Some scholarly literature considers migration in a wider decision-making framework. This is seen for instance in the works of Harbison (1981), who acknowledged that families could influence the individual migrant’s decision. Moreover, when analysing migration from a gender perspective, family structure can play a pivotal role in influencing the

migration decisions, particularly those of women. In furthering the argument, Morokvasic (1984) asserts that women's decision to migrate is not only influenced by economic motives but also by the social constraints, low rights and lack of protection against domestic violence in their country of origin (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 12).

NELM theorists also faced criticism as they fail to explain the survival strategies that exist in a migrant's place of origin, especially in cases where migrants decide to return to their home countries or place of origin. At its core, NELM focuses its argument on the pivotal role played by migration remittances as a mechanism for the survival of family or household members (Morokvasic, 1984). Although the theory assists in explaining the determinants of migration, Kurekova (2011) argues the theory has been criticised for overly locating its emphasis on the sending country or place of origin.

Moreover, NELM is criticised for focusing heavily on the push factors in the place of origin, as it explicates migration as a survival mechanism employed by families or households. NELM also shies away from explaining the pull factors that may attract migrants to move to host countries, and also the dominant hindrances that might hinder the movement of people (Kurekova, 2011). Like most of the theories of migration, NELM is also ambiguous in terms of explaining how migrants choose where to go, as it does not make a distinction between preferred and non-preferred destinations (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 13). Although NELM incorporates the consequences for sending countries, Piore (1970) argues that the dual labour market focuses on the pull factors in host countries. In the next section the thesis will discuss the dual labour market theory of migration.

2.7 Dual labour market theory

The dual labour market is a theory that links migration to structural changes in the economy (Massey et al., 1993), while explaining migration patterns with the demand side. This theory, developed by Piore (1979), states that migration is driven by conditions of demand for labour as opposed to supply of labour. In this context, the characteristics of economies in advanced countries tend to create a demand for low-skilled labour opportunities, which domestic workers and local residents refuse to accept, for example, due to status (De Haas, 2021: 3). Warnes and Williams (2006) assert that the ageing process in developed countries also serves as a factor prolonging the labour demand for

second segment jobs; for example, in personal care and health services for older adults, which are often occupied by foreign workers.

The dual labour market theory of migration shifts its focus away from decisions to migrate by individuals, arguing that international migration derives from the intrinsic labour demands of contemporary industrial societies (Massey et al., 1993: 441). Hence, Piore (1979), as a pioneer of the theory, stated that a cause of international migration is the perpetual demand for immigrant labour that is integral in the economic structure of developed countries. Thus, Piore (1979) asserted that immigration is not a product of push factors in sending countries (e.g. low wages or high unemployment) (Letsiri, 2012: 21). Instead, international migration is caused by pull factors in receiving countries, for instance, the rising and inevitable need for foreign workers (Piore, 1979).

In explaining the causes and perpetuation of migration, the dual labour market theory states that economic dualism exists in the labour market of the developing world, and in the wages that symbolise status and prestige (Hagen-Zacker, 2020: 10). According to the arguments presented by Piore (1979), two sectors provide job opportunities in the labour market – the primary and the secondary sector. The primary sector provides well-paid jobs, and the secondary sector provides unskilled job opportunities, for example in manufacturing and construction (Piore, 1979). Furthermore, the need for migrant labour derives from different factors, such as structural inflation, where there are constant wage rises in the primary sector (Smith, 2020: 29).

The proportional wage increases in the secondary sector tend to be too high; in this sense, the lower income makes the secondary sector unattractive to the native labour force (Smith, 2020: 29); thus, creating a vacuum that is often filled by migrant workers. Migrants are more motivated to accept the low-status jobs in the secondary sector as they do not consider themselves as part of an immigrant-receiving country (De Haas, 2021: 4). Within the secondary sector labour market, most migrants begin as target earners, who are in pursuit of income for a specific goal, such as to improve their socio-economic status or well-being at home, to build a house, to pay for their children's school fees, to buy land, or to purchase consumer goods (Massey et al., 1993: 442).

The nature of secondary sector employment is that it fluctuates according to the economic cycle; thus, making it unstable and unreliable work. Due to this, the secondary sector remains unattractive to native workers; hence, immigrants become desirable candidates to occupy jobs in the secondary sector (Letsiri, 2012: 21). Therefore, the secondary sector remains a critical pull factor for migrants with limited job opportunities (O'Reilly, 2019).

The dual labour market theory posits that international migration is not influenced by push factors in the place of origin but is motivated by pull factors in migrant-receiving countries (Ullah, 2016). In this perspective, international migration occurs because of labour demand conditions as opposed to labour supply (Kurekova, 2011: 9).

O'Reilly (2019) states that jobs in the secondary sector often need filling at short notice, and they tend to be avoided by locals due to their insecure nature; hence, they attract a temporary workforce from other countries. In an argument presented by Massey et al. (1993: 442), wages do not only echo the conditions of supply and demand of labour, but they also confer status and prestige, social qualities that stick to the occupation to which the wages are attached. Generally, individuals are of the view that wages reflect social status; hence, they hold a particular view about the link between occupational status and income or wages (Massey et al., 1993: 442).

Although the dual labour market theory logically explains the co-existence of chronic labour demand for an immigrant workforce, together with structural unemployment in migrant-receiving countries, the theory has been criticized for failing to include the role of push factors in the migrant's country of origin (Arango, 2000). Some criticism is based on the fact that the theory excludes sending countries when explaining the drivers of international migration; thus, overemphasizes formal recruitment practices, which are elucidated as pull factors that attract international labour (Massey et al., 1993: 443). Also, the theory has limitations in explaining differential immigration rates in countries that include the same economic structures with no huge wage differences (Arango, 2000).

2.8 World systems theory

The world systems theory states that the permanent demand for foreign low-skilled labour is a factor that initiates and perpetuates migration (Kurekova, 2011: 8). The theory perceives the world as a capitalist system in which developing nations (poorer countries),

who are on the margins, constantly supply cheap labour to support developed nations (wealthy countries), who at the core of the system (O'Reilly, 2019: 4). In their explanation of the word 'system' in the theory, Boyd (1989) and Fawcett (1989) state that the word refers to the exchange of goods, services, capital, people, and information from one country to another. World systems theory is entrenched in the idea of a world market economy, whereby the system of capitalism practised in developed countries extends its reach to non-capitalist societies who are on the periphery (Kurekova, 2011: 8); hence, creating migration flows from poorer countries to developed countries whose economies are systematically capitalistic.

This theory explains migration from the context of previous relationships between countries and how these ties foster the movement of people from one country to another. This is evident in those countries that have historical relationships which strengthen labour treaties that result in a greater migration of people moving from countries on the periphery to economically viable countries (Kurekova, 2011: 8). In his theorisation, Wallenstein (1974) stresses the key role played by capitalism and the colonialist expansion of neo-colonialist governments and multinationals, which tend to disrupt and dislocate those peripheral states' economies. This leads people to migrate from their country whose economy is not viable to countries where economic returns are higher. Over time, the initial migrant becomes the conveyor of vital information concerning migration networks, which in turn prompts other migrants to migrate to countries where economic opportunities are more abundant compared to their country of origin (Massey et al., 1993).

The high demand for immigrant labour in global cities serves as a pull factor of migration (Smith, 2020: 29). According to the world systems theory, migration follows the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the global economy (Hagen-Zanker, 2010: 12). International firms and corporations from core capitalist countries also penetrate developing countries' markets and establish remote plants that exploit low wage rates in foreign markets (Massey et al., 1999: 445). Actions are often created by governments (usually at the periphery) that are sympathetic and dependent on countries that are at the core. Consequently, the addition of foreign-owned firms and companies to peripheral countries tends to compete with goods produced locally, competition which undermines

the local economy, as these foreign-owned companies often enjoy popular support at the expense of locally-produced goods or services rendered (Massey et al., 1993: 446).

Of grave concern is that these foreign-owned firms do not provide high wages in the peripheral markets, creating a population that is socially and economically uprooted, and vulnerable to migration in search of better life opportunities. In addition, the same capitalistic economies, which create vulnerabilities in the peripheral regions, simultaneously entice these deprived individuals to developed countries (Massey et al., 1993: 446). These developed countries have a wealthy and highly educated labour force; thus, there is a strong demand for services rendered by unskilled workers, for example, gardeners, waiters, hotel workers, domestic workers, and construction workers (Massey et al., 1993: 447). Often these unskilled and low-ranking jobs are filled by an immigrant labour force. This is because relatively educated nationals of migrant-host countries resist accepting low-paying and low-ranking jobs, which are at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Conversely, jobs in the upper tier of the occupational hierarchy are often dominated by well-educated nationals of the migrant host country and a skilled migrant labour force.

In explaining the causes and perpetuation of migration, the World System Theory argues that international migration results from the political and economic organisation of the widening global market – arguments which are expounded in six distinct hypotheses provided by Massey et al. (1993: 447):

- “International migration is a natural consequence of capitalist market formation in the developing world; the penetration of the global economy into peripheral regions is the catalyst for international movement;
- The international flow of labour follows the international flow of goods and capital, but in the opposite direction. Capitalist investment foments changes that create an uprooted, mobile population in peripheral countries while simultaneously forging strong material and cultural links with core countries, leading to transnational movement;
- International migration is especially likely between past colonial powers and their former colonies, because cultural, linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation, and communication links were established early and were allowed

to develop free from outside competition during the colonial era, leading to the formation of specific transnational markets and cultural systems;

- Since international migration stems from the globalization of the market economy, the way for governments to influence immigration rates is by regulating the overseas investment activities of corporations and controlling international flows of capital and goods. Such policies, however, are unlikely to be implemented because they are difficult to enforce, tend to incite international trade disputes, risk world economic recession, and antagonize multinational firms who have substantial political resources that can be mobilized to block them;
- When the political and military interventions by governments of capitalist countries to protect investments abroad and to support foreign governments sympathetic to the expansion of the global market fail, it produces refugee movements directed to particular core countries, constituting another form of international migration; and
- “International migration ultimately has little to do with wage rates or employment differentials between countries; it follows from the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the global economy” (ibid.).

The world systems theory, as expounded by De Haas (2010), helps us to understand how migration evolves over time and varies in its magnitude, destination, and selectivity. Further, the theory explains the drivers of migration within the context of developed cities, whereby countries that are at the core are likely to host immigrants from countries that are at the peripheral level (Kurekova, 2011: 10). This is exacerbated by capitalist expansion, which has had a profound impact on migration issues; for example, a strong demand for immigrant labour in global cities serves as a pull factor which attracts a foreign labour force (Kurekova, 2011). In this sense, migration is explained within the confines of pull factors, while neglecting other factors that may motivate migration, such as individual motivations and family networks, which also serve as some of the causes of migration. In an attempt to fill the void, the following section of the thesis delves into migration networks, systems, and cumulative causation theories.

2.9 Migration networks, systems and cumulative causation theories

The process of international migration, as explained in the previous section, can be informed by various reasons including an individual's desire for a higher income, the quest for risk diversification and household income, a programme of recruitment to satisfy

employers' need for low-wage workers, and the desire for a better life (Massey et al., 1993). Thus, the theories of migration discussed previously do not explain the causes of migration resulting factors such as the availability of social networks, institutions, and cultural and historical factors. Hence this section will examine these aspects. In an argument presented by Arango (2000), migration networks can be defined as "a set of interpersonal ties that connects migrants with relatives, friends, or fellow countrymen at home who convey information, provide financial backups, and facilitate employment opportunities and accommodation in various supportive ways". The existence of these networks, Massey et al. (1993) state, increases the likelihood of emigration as it lowers the costs associated with migration, increases benefits, and reduces the risks associated with international migration.

The role played by social networks is key in perpetuating migration. This is argued by Hagen-Zanker (2012: 17), who said that, after the first migrant (pioneer migrant) had successfully moved from his or her place of origin to a host country, this first migrant will then make it easier for other potential migrants in the place of origin to travel to similar host destinations without facing the prevailing obstacles and risks. Massey et al. (1993) explained that, for the pioneer migrant, the process of migration is usually associated with risks and high costs because the pioneer migrant does not have any networks in place in the envisioned destination. Following their first successful migration, pioneer migrants can arrange for those left behind to join them and assist them with travel arrangements and accommodation.

Moreover, Goss and Lindquist (1995) state that through these networks of migration, new channels of communication are formed, with the development of migrant communities in host destinations. To a larger extent, these networks serve as knowledge transmitters from experienced migrants to potential migrants in host destinations (ibid.). In terms of explaining migration networks, Arango (2000) pioneered the concept of "chain migration" whereby new migrants move to host destinations with the benefit of facing lower risks and costs associated with the migration. This is made possible by the assistance provided by the pioneer migrants who have knowledge about host destinations. Hence, these networks help future migrants to find jobs or secure economic gains in receiving countries.

Although the migration network theory assists in providing the context of family reunification processes, Vertovec (2002) adds that social networks could influence potential migrants when selecting their migration destination. Thus, many migrants decide to move because others with whom they are associated had successfully migrated before them (Arango, 2000). Hence, migration networks serve as mechanisms that make the process of migration a self-perpetuating phenomenon (Arango, 2000). These networks snowball (Arango, 2000), and they tend to grow larger and denser. This is because every individual's move creates a source of knowledge for those who are left behind in the place of origin. As such, this tends to widen the range of networks that may perpetuate the further expansion and movement of people (Massey et al., 1993). Essentially, the creation of social networks assist in providing the context of how migration recurs; however, these networks explain migration separately from the real causes that lead to the migration of individuals (Arango, 2000).

The theory of migration networks is strongly associated with migration systems theory. This theory, as pioneered by Magobunje (1970), asserts that migration tends to interfere with the social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions in both the sending and receiving countries. Migration systems theory can be clustered into micro- and macro-levels (Fawcett & Arnold, 1987). The former links migration to factors such as kinship and friendship systems, whereas the macro-level includes factors such as the economy, dominance, political systems, national policies of immigration, and cultural and social systems (Arango, 2000: 292). The migration system theory stresses the important link between migration and development (De Haas, 2010). Hence, this theoretical framework remains key, as it looks at migration from a wider development spectrum.

The core assumption of this theory, as expounded by Hagen-Zanker (2018: 18), is that “the more migration there is, the more migration there may be in the future”. In further arguments, the theorists of cumulative causation theory explain migration from the context of the role played by labour demands in developed economies, which attracts labour from poorer or less developed countries. In this perspective, this theory adds to Ravenstein and Lee's theories of push/pull factors when explaining the causes of migration. For instance, cumulative causation theory explains that higher wages in developed countries serve as pull factors, whereas structural challenges such as poverty,

unemployment, and political fragility in places of origin serve as push factors (Arango, 2000).

The theory with its proposition goes further, explaining that causation is cumulative, in the sense that every individual's act of migration changes the social context within which decisions to migrate are made (Arango, 2000). For example, due to the experience acquired through living and working abroad in advanced economies, these migrants are exposed to more consumer goods and better lifestyles, therefore increasing their aspirations for improved socio-economic conditions; hence, their decision to migrate is influenced by these experiences and new aspirations, which will motivate those who had migrated before to do it again (Massey et al., 1993). Cumulative causation affects migration in different ways, such as the extension of networks, income distribution, organisational agriculture, land distribution, culture, human capital distribution, and the structure of production (Arango, 2000). In explaining the effects of networks on migration, Hagen-Zacker (2018) stated that the expansion of networks results in migration becoming a local culture; thus, making migration available to any potential migrants in sending countries. However, at some point, these social networks become saturated, while labour scarcity increases in the sending countries, which now face low levels of migration as most of the remaining population is older people and children (Hagen-Zacker, 2018).

2.10 Institutional theory

The institutional theory of migration explains how profit-seeking and non-profit organizations play a key role in perpetuating the process of migration. In its proposition, the theory expounds how profit-seeking organisations (i.e. smuggling networks) and non-profit organizations (i.e. humanitarian agencies) act as agents between potential migrants and host destination's governments (Beuno & Prieto-Rosas, 2019). These organizations act as mediators by take advantage of the discrepancies that exist between potential migrants and the restrictive policies in the preferred destination countries (ibid.). Apart from profit-seeking organizations, there are also humanitarian organizations which are established to ensure the prevention of migrant exploitation and victimization (Massey et al., 1993). These humanitarian organizations target vulnerable groups such as women, children, and elderly people to ensure the protection of their human rights; thus, advocating for the improvement of their living conditions upon their arrival at host destinations, or while in transit (Massey et al., 1993).

When restrictive measures are hard to avoid, this serves as a breeding ground for private organizations to resort to clandestine and criminal measures to facilitate international migration (Massey et al., 1993: 450). Further, these private organizations are established in the underground market, and they offer some services in exchange for fees, including human smuggling, an arranged marriage between a migrant and a citizen in a destination country, counterfeit documents (i.e. visas, passports, or labour contracts), and transportation and accommodation in the host countries. Although profit-seeking organizations rely heavily on criminal activities to facilitate migration, non-profit organizations such as humanitarian agencies render services to destitute and vulnerable migrants through counselling, social services, advice on how to obtain legal documents, and awareness of migration laws (Arango, 2000). For instance, there are refugee organizations at established entry points to different countries. Such organizations in host countries may negotiate for refugee status to be granted to vulnerable migrants.

Despite its contribution to explaining migration from an institutional point of view, institutional theory focuses heavily on the illegal and clandestine mechanisms of facilitating migration. Also, the theory focuses its arguments on explaining how refugee migration is eased through the third parties' involvement.

2.11 Chapter summary

Chapter two provided an analysis of the theories that explain the causes and perpetuation of migration. In so doing, the study categorised the theories of migration according to their levels of analysis, which are micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Although these theories were categorised into different levels of analysis, this was done in a complementary fashion, as these theories are not necessarily contradictory, but rather they complement each other in explaining the causes and perpetuation of migration. Among the theories that explain the causes of migration are those of the neoclassical micro- and macro-economic theories, Lee's push/pull theory, the dual labour market theory, the world systems theory, and the new economics of labour migration theory. Complementing these theories are those that are regarded as theories that perpetuate the process of migration. These include migration networks, systems, and cumulative causation theories, including institutional theories. These theories were all analysed in different sub-sections of this chapter, with the summarized criticism and the limitations of each theory discussed.

In the next chapter the thesis will focus on the theories that assist in explaining the causes and impact of xenophobia in South Africa. Theories that will be discussed are the relative deprivation theory, the securitization theory, the migration scapegoating theory, and the human security perspective. These theories are adopted in this thesis as they will assist in providing empirical evidence for the causes and impact of xenophobia in South Africa.

Chapter Three: Theoretical assessment on the causes and impacts of xenophobia in South Africa

*Collective fear stimulates herd instinct and tends to produce ferocity
toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd.*

Bertrand Russell

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed theories of migration, such as the neoclassical macro-economic theory, the neoclassical micro-economic theory, the push/pull theory, the dual labour theory, the world system theory, migration systems, the network and cumulative causation theory, the institutional theory, and the new economics of labour migration theory. All these theories explained the phenomenon of migration from different perspectives, given the fact that migration is a multifaceted issue, which cannot be explained through one theory.

Theories of migration were adopted in this thesis as they provide the reasons to understand individuals' and households' motivations to migrate from one country or region to another, or to move domestically. These theories also explained the perpetuation of migration streams, including factors that serve as obstacles for people to migrate. Considering the distinctiveness of these theories, the different theories used different concepts and assumptions; thus, framing their reference depended on their origins in terms of discipline, including the time in which they were constructed (Bueno & Prieto-Rosas, 2019: 1).

Although the theories of migration were helpful in explaining the causes and perpetuations of migration, these theories did not explain the causes and impact of xenophobia. In an attempt to fill this void, this chapter looks into the theories that assist in explaining the causes and impact of xenophobia in South Africa. For one, since the arrival of democracy in South Africa, the country has been prone to an influx of migrants. The presence of immigrants in the country has often led to xenophobic attacks and anti-immigrant sentiments, which are triggered by the relative deprivation of access to basic services, unemployment, crime, and inequality. These socio-economic challenges tend to scapegoat immigrants who are blamed for the presence of these challenges. To a large

extent, immigrants are securitized, as their status has been reduced to those who steal jobs, the perpetrators of crimes, and a danger to the demographic composition of host communities. Thus, immigrants are attacked by frustrated members of host communities, who act out their resentments towards immigrants through xenophobic attacks. The prevalence of xenophobic attacks poses a threat to human security in the communities exposed to such violence. Hence, in order to understand the causes and impacts of xenophobic sentiments, the chapter will address one of the research questions of the study, which is:

- *How do the relative deprivation theory, securitization theory, scapegoat theory and human security perspectives assist in explaining the causes and impacts of xenophobia?*

Theories, such as relative deprivation, securitization and scapegoat, will assist in providing empirical evidence on the causes of xenophobic sentiments in South Africa, while the human security perspective will assist in explaining the impacts of xenophobic attacks on security.

3.2 Relative deprivation theory

The theory of relative deprivation remains one of the schools of thought that has assisted in explaining the causes of political violence. In classical political theory, Aristotle perceived relative deprivation as the ultimate driver of a revolution (Richardson, 2011: 1), as he held the view that deprivation came as a result of “inequality” (Mongale, 2022: 3). In this regard the theory of relative deprivation remains relevant in explaining the causes of conflict through the lens of economic inequalities. This theory emphasises the socio-psychological characteristics of individuals. For instance, the discrepancy between people’s expectations and their reality tends to cause frustration, especially if there seems to be little or no improvement in their present conditions. Dollard et al. (1939) assert that frustration is a key driver of violence; also, if people feel deprived from achieving certain goals, it results in a disturbed psychological balance and tension that can be expressed through aggression directed towards the group in society that is accused of causing the frustration (Dollard et al., 1939).

This theory is intricately linked to the work of Ted Gurr, whose famous relative deprivation theory revolved around political violence (in this context, xenophobic attacks), which he

alternatively referred to as “civil strife” (Gurr, 1961). Civil strife is defined by Gurr (1968: 1107) as “all collective, non-governmental attacks on persons or property” in a defined location. Further, political violence or “civil strife” is seen in a multiplicity of violent and non-violent “symbolic demonstrative attacks on political persons or policies, e.g. political demonstrations” (Gurr, 1968: 1107).

This form of violence can unfold at three levels, as categorized by Gurr (1968: 1107); at the lowest level of civil strife are riots, strikes, and local revolts, such as protest action. At the next level, Gurr (1968: 1107) lists conspiracies that translate into assassinations, small-scale wars and coups d'états. Lastly, at the highest level of civil strife is internal war, mass revolts, and terrorism (ibid.). For the purpose of this thesis, only the lowest level of civil strife will be given extensive attention, as it constitutes riots, protest action, local revolts and strikes, which are all related to xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Social scientists have used the theory of relative deprivation to predict and measure people's behaviours and attitudes – this includes significant outcome variables such as collective action, individual achievement and deviance, intergroup attitudes, and physical and mental health (Smith, Pettigrew, Pipping & Bialosiewicz, n.d.: 1).

The core argument presented by Gurr (1968: 1104) is that of psychological explanation, which seeks to explain why there is civil strife, and this he refers to as “relative deprivation”. According to Pettigrew (1991), relative deprivation is a psychological concept which postulates a subjective state that “shapes people's emotions, cognitions, and behaviour”. As such, relative deprivation connects an individual with the interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis (Smith et al., n.d.: 3). Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 7) state that relative deprivation forms the basis of various grievance explanations of conflicts and civil wars; hence, conflicts can be linked to grievances originating from the lack of political, economic, or social interests (Mongale, 2022: 3). In explaining the group versus individual phenomenon, Gurr (1970) said the following:

Deprivation is relevant to the disposition to collective violence to the extent that many people feel disconnected about the same things. Unexpected personal deprivations such as failure to obtain an expected promotion or the infidelity of a spouse ordinarily affect a few people at any given time and are therefore narrow in scope. Events and patterns of conditions like suppression of a political party,

drastic inflation, or the decline of a group's status relative to its reference group are likely to precipitate feelings of relative deprivation amongst whole groups or categories of people (Gurr, 1970: 29).

Relative deprivation is explained by Gurr (1976) as the tension between a person's state of mind and what an individual feels they are capable of achieving. As Gurr (1976: 29) puts it, the "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities". Murshed and Tadjoeeddin (2009: 15) provide an example of how the achievement of educational qualifications by the youth raise their hopes and aspirations of finding employment. However, unemployment may breed disappointment and resentment against their government, which will translate into the formation of social movements (Mongale, 2022: 4). Also, the severity and scope of relative deprivation serves as a determining factor in the potential for collective violence (Gurr, 1976). For example, the more relative deprivation there is, the higher the possibility of a greater scope of violence influenced by frustration and aggression, which are the "primary sources of human capacity for violence" (Gurr, 1976).

Janse (2020) supports the assertions made by Gurr (1976), by arguing that relative deprivation is a subjective dissatisfaction that tends to trouble many people (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 5). The cause of this sense of dissatisfaction is when comparing one individual's situation to that of another. Hence, the people exposed to relative deprivation are those who feel that they deserve to receive the same as others (Gurr, 1971). When arguing on the basis of ethnicity, Gurr asserts this "is the obvious basis for mobilizing opposition against the state" (Saleh, 2013: 165). Gurr (1976) further postulates that the increased levels of frustration worsen the propensity for political instability.

Crosby (1976: 86) asserts that people are likely to feel unfairly treated or insufficiently compensated when they compare their current situation to some standard of reference (Mongale, 2022: 6). Crosby (1976: 86) listed five preconditions that explain a person who is in a state of relative deprivation, namely, "when an individual sees others possess a desirable X; wants X; feels entitled to X; thinks it is feasible to attain and accumulate X; and does not blame himself/herself for not having access to X" (Walker & Pettigrew, 2011: 304). In a model proposed by Folger (1987), it is stated that a person's present situation allows them to decide whether they get that which they deserve, and if the outcomes are

negative, they tend to develop resentments and become angry if they can imagine better alternative outcomes, more legitimate procedures that could produce better outcomes, and the current situation seems unlikely to improve in the near future (Folger, 1987).

Consequently, if all these preconditions, as outlined by Crosby (1976) and Folger (1987), are unmet, what is likely to emerge is emotions such as disappointment, indignation, or jealousy (Crosby, 1976: 86). Mongale (2022: 5) refers to Useem (1978: 53), who quoted Karl Marx (1847/1935):

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But, let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut (Useem, 1978: 53).

Marx (1847/1935) states that relative deprivation is an description of social behaviour, especially when an individual compares themselves with other people, to groups in society, or even self-comparison of individuals who use their previous conditions to decide if they are better or worse off than in the past. If people start to feel that their circumstances are stagnant, they tend to get angry and become defiant (Gurr, 1961). In its typology, relative deprivation can unfold in three ways, namely, decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation, and progressive deprivation (ibid.).

The first pattern of relative deprivation, decremental deprivation, occurs in situations where people's expectations remain constant, whereas they have less and less (Gurr, 1970: 47). In other words, value expectations remain stable whereas capabilities decline, for instance in cases where migrants hold unskilled jobs; hence, lowering the conditions for unskilled labour (Gurr, 1970: 47). As a result of an increase in the differences in power resources among different actors, decremental deprivation will exist. In the arguments by Gonzalez-Intal (1991:24) and Gurr (1971: 46), decremental relative deprivation occurs when segments of a given group lose some value abilities to another group in society. According to these authors, this goes as far as when they feel as if they have lost the freedom and privileges that they used to enjoy. The latter can be seen when one group feels deprived of privileges such as basic services and employment opportunities, which may be reduced due to the influx of immigrants who increase the population in a given society, while increasing competition for economic opportunities. Hence, Gurr (1971: 47)

stated that decremental deprivation unfolds when one group in society sees a drop in opportunities that used to be theirs for the taking; this could include employment opportunities for unskilled forms of labour in capital rich countries (i.e. the core countries). As Gurr (1971: 47) states, "Men are likely to be more intensely angered when they lose what they have than when they lose hope of attaining what they do not have".

In relation to the loss of resources due to uprisings, decremental deprivation stresses that the decline of educational opportunities and employment symbolize relative deprivation. Factors such as access to education and employment remain key, especially in determining resource accumulation in society (Džuverović, 2013). Hence, decremental deprivation simply refers to conditions whereby life conditions deteriorate, while opportunities for a better life become limited. These situations lead people to rebel in a quest for better and improved life conditions; resulting in conflict (Džuverović, 2013: 121). Examples of decremental deprivation include the loss of influence by a group of elites, or the deteriorating status of middle-class groups relative to the working classes (Sekul, 1976: 24).

In justifying the incidence of political violence and rebellions, Gurr (1971: 46) argument is based on decremental deprivation. Gurr (1971:46) states that when people start to lose what they used to have, without any chance of re-acquiring that which they have lost, they tend to get frustrated and become involved in revolt. Thus, decremental deprivation occurs when individuals compare their past conditions to their present situations. Moreover, due to a mismatch in power resources, one group may feel as if their power resource is slipping; hence, the collectives losing power may instigate conflict as they feel deprived (Gurr, 1971). This leads to aspirational deprivation, as one group aspires to obtain the power that is equal to that of their opposite group.

Aspirational deprivation, according to Korpi (1974: 1575), is seen when people's value capabilities remain stagnant, whereas their value expectation increases. This means, if people's conditions are not improving and their expectations keep increasing, contrary to their achievements, aspirational deprivation unfolds (ibid.). This pattern of relative deprivation occurs when an individual is exposed to a better way of life; hence, they aspire to improved living conditions, even if they cannot afford to accumulate that which they aspire to at the present time.

In the assertions made by Džuverović (2013: 121), aspirational deprivation can be used as a relevant framework to justify the emergence of conflict in developing countries, where structural inequalities exist. Often, as a result of the inequality in society, people tend to have higher expectations, influenced by the overall progress that is being achieved; one in which the deprived do not have the ability to fulfil these expectations, as these are only enjoyed by a small group in society. In contrast to decremental deprivation, where people get frustrated over losing that which they have been exposed to, with those with aspirational deprivation are frustrated by the conditions in which they feel they have no means to achieve new value or materials; this perpetuates the feeling of aspiring to accumulate that which people aspire to (Gurr, 1971: 50).

The denial of one group from attaining value capabilities creates aspirational deprivation, as Gurr (1971: 52) states, to “setting one’s value expectations by reference to the higher value position of some other individual or group”. In essence, the improvement of one group’s socio-economic status increases expectations among the deprived group. As such, individuals’ expectations are heightened by the improvement of the other groups’ status, whereas the first groups’ status remains unchanged. In reference to that, Sekul (1976: 35) explains that the two general conditions that give rise to aspirational deprivation are “the value gains of certain groups” and the “promise of new opportunities to other groups”, whose circumstances remain unimproved.

The third pattern of relative deprivation is progressive deprivation, which explains the idea of political revolutions as something that is instigated by a feeling of “frustrated expectations” (Brush, 1996: 528). Progressive deprivation is seen in conditions where steady, upward improvement in people’s socio-economic status exists; hence, creating expectations for continued improvements (Sekul, 1976); in this context, improved life conditions bring growing expectations. This pattern of relative deprivation is strongly associated with the works of James Davies’s model of the J-curve. In his theorization of relative deprivation, Davies (1965) argues on the basis of progressive deprivation, which occurs in situations where the difference between power resources and the attainment of public goods in society is decreasing. Such a decline in power resources amongst different groups increases the likelihood of conflict (Korpi, 1974: 1575).

Taylor (1982: 24) argues that in situations where there is a sharp setback after a prolonged series of improvements, then revolution is likely to erupt. This is informed by people's exposure to past successes, which breeds extra expectations, but "actual need satisfaction" declines, and creates a gap between 'us' and 'them', leading to an intolerable condition which will result in revolt (Davies, 1969: 6). When distinguishing between in-group members and out-group members, Davies (1960) expanded on the notion of 'haves' and 'have nots' – he argued that when a person (P) compares themselves to their standard of reference, which is a person (O), who belongs to the same group – in such a scenario, if P is a 'have not' whereas O is a 'have', then relative deprivation is experienced (Crosby, 1979: 105).

Venter and Bain (2015: 6) further assert that societies that find themselves being exposed to a rising gap between what they are receiving, and that which they wish they were receiving, an intolerable gap develops; such a society is likely to stand up and revolt. According to Davies (1971:135),

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs – which continue to rise – and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future.

In this perspective, progressive deprivation comes as a result of a reduction in value capabilities following a period of satisfaction; hence, the more capabilities decline, the more people will feel deprived (Gurr, 1975: 454). As explained by progressive deprivation, capabilities may decline due to several factors such as modernization, an economic depression in a growing country, or lack of political (Sekul, 1976: 24). Some of the examples of progressive deprivation can be found in societies that have witnessed ideological and systemic changes (Džuverović, 2013: 121). Further, this pattern of relative deprivation contributes to theories of revolution as it explains that political violence is the result of inconsistencies in the distribution of resources, where the probability of conflict

is likely to increase due to imbalance in power resources between two groups in society (Džuverović, 2013). Conversely, the likelihood of conflict is decreased when the new balance of power between two parties stabilises, especially between those parties who previously experienced major differences (Korpi, 1974: 1547).

When comparing and contrasting these three patterns of relative deprivation, especially in the context of politically driven conflict, it is apparent that decremental and progressive deprivation reveals a wider pertinency as opposed to aspirational deprivation. For one, when it comes to economically induced conflict, aspirational deprivation becomes a pertinent pattern in illuminating the core of most conflicts. Moreover, progressive deprivation does not explain economic deprivation (unlike politically motivated conflict). Džuverović (2013: 123) states this is due to the nature of economic values, which seldom imply a constant rise in capabilities, and even less so with a matching rising expectation.

Despite the distinct characteristics in the three patterns of relative deprivation, the key issue is that these theories share likenesses as they are psychological theories that resonate around anger and dissatisfaction (Crosby, 1976: 89). Moreover, Adams (1965) states that relative deprivation theories share similarities, as they all theorize on social equity, where people discontent stems from comparing their situations to those in their surroundings, or to their previous successes (Davies, 1963). Thus, they become angry when they feel that their conditions are not improving, especially if they cannot attain certain goods or opportunities (Crosby, 1976:8 9).

Although relative deprivation assists in explaining the reasons behind people's anger and discontent, which compel them to embark on a rebellion, the theory does not explain how grievance factors, which lead to inconsistencies between two parties, can result in one group (usually the minority group) being blamed for the woes that the majority face. Hence, to fill this void, the following section will delve into the scapegoat theory.

3.3 Scapegoat theory

One of the theories that assists in contextualizing contemporary intergroup conflict, such as xenophobia, especially within the South African context, is the scapegoat theory (Glick, 2002; 2005). According to Poppe (2001), the scapegoat theory of intergroup conflict seeks to explain why financial economic hardship tends to trigger an increase in prejudice

and violence. This theory is linked to relative deprivation, which was discussed in the previous section. Runciman (1966) explained that in situations where people lack the necessary resources to maintain their daily lifestyles and activities, and to mitigate their immediate trials, such people are likely to become frustrated about their conditions, especially when they compare themselves with some standard of reference in the population (Gurr, 1977). In such conditions, when one group in society feels as if they are relatively deprived from that which they feel they deserve, this deprived group will then look for the source of their deprivation (Calcott, 2021: 5). Often, deprived individuals tend to blame others for their woes and thus act out their frustrations on them. Glick (2005) explains group-level scapegoat as when a group as a whole takes out their frustrations on a specific target group, which is blamed for their misfortune. Stephan (1933) described scapegoating as:

.. a process by which other individuals or groups are held to be the cause of one's own problems. Typically, it involves members of a higher-status group blaming a less-powerful group for a particular problem.... In this defensive manoeuvre the individual avoids blaming himself and redirects the blame towards others. To the extent that he blames these groups for his problems, he is likely to be prejudiced towards them (Stephan, 1933: 425).

In the classical frustration-aggression hypothesis, which is one of the stages of the scapegoat theory, Allport (1954) explains that frustration causes aggression and prejudice, and in general terms, frustrated people often select a set of out-groups as the 'scapegoat', who are blamed for the in-group's misfortunes. In support of this, Glick (2005: 244) explains scapegoating as "an extreme form of prejudice in which an out-group is unfairly blamed for having intentionally caused an in-group's misfortunes". Kessler and Mummendey (2001) state that the feelings of prejudice (e.g. hostile attitudes against foreigners or xenophobia), social discrimination (e.g. unfair treatment of others), and collective action (e.g. public protests) usually increase when the in-group is of the view that the out-group is a referent source of their discontent (Demo, 2005).

The scapegoat theory further states that conflict directed towards an out-group arises, especially when there seems to be competition for scarce resources between the in-group and the minority out-group (Stowe, 2012: 189). In the theoretical frameworks of social

identity and self-categorization, the Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that a key determinant for prejudice and discrimination between groups is the “level of self-categorization”, which signifies which individuals are perceived as similar to the self, ‘us’, against those who are excluded as being others, ‘them’ (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001: 1090).

This theory is associated with the notion of conflict theory, which also explains that competition for scarce resources often serve as a trigger for conflict between the in-group and out-group members (Stowe, 2012: 189). Esses, Jackson and Armstrong (1998) state that both of these theories posit that hostility directed towards members of the out-group will occur in situations whereby the in-group considers the out-group as competitors for the realisation of scarce resources, such as employment, business opportunities, or educational opportunities. In their instrumental model of group conflict, Esses et al. (1998) suggest that out-group derogation, prejudice, and discrimination are strategies used to remove the source of competition to the in-group.

Scapegoating of a particular group in society does not occur in a vacuum; certain key determinants lead to such scapegoating (Glick, 2002). For one, groups that are scapegoated are mostly weaker groups that lacks means of self-defence, groups that form part of the minority, and those who have different physical qualities such as skin colour or speak a different language (Demirtas-Madran, 2020: 6). “When there is tension and social problems seem insurmountable, find an innocent, weak, and distinctive group to blame and victimize,” state Babad, Birnbaum and Benne (1983: 103).

The theory of scapegoating has long been used to explain the onset of intolerance and the repression of minority groups in society (Nyathi, 2021: 94). Gregory (2004: 144) asserts that “scapegoating is the process by which one finds a substitute victim on which to vent anger”. In Biblical terms, the word ‘scapegoat’ stems from the Old Testament [Leviticus 16:8, 10, 20] and refers to the goat that was driven into the desert on the Day of Atonement and was used to carry away the sins of the Israelites (Nyathi, 2021). In doing so, it was believed that the sins of the Israelites were “wiped off the books” (Nyathi, 2021). In other words, a scapegoat can simply refer to any form of substitute which is at the receiving end of anger and rejection (Gibson & Howard, 2007), stemming from the frustrated and relatively deprived in-group members.

According to Stowe (2012: 189-190), the hostility and frustration emanating from the majority (in-group) are projected upon the minority (out-group) in six ways:

- “Indirect Hostility – This is a roundabout way of projecting aggression, usually by devious means. Common indirect tactics have been shown to include practical jokes and malicious gossip.”
- “Irritability – This is a readiness to project negative attitudes with the slightest bit of provocation. This includes the projection of rudeness and exasperation.”
- “Negativism – Direct opposition that is most often projected towards authority. This is most commonly seen as a refusal to cooperate that may span from direct to indirect non-compliance.”
- “Resentment – This is known as any sort of projected jealousy or hatred toward others. These feelings of anger usually refer to either a real or fantasized mistreatment.”
- “Suspicion – This sort of projection of hostility upon others usually varies from a simple feeling of distrust to a more direct belief of others planning harm.”
- “Verbal Hostility – Negative feelings that are expressed in either the style or the content of speech. The style of speech would include such vocalic strategies such as a control over the tonality of voice. The content of speech would include everything from direct threats of harm to simply being overcritical.”

Stuab (2004) states that scapegoating can be experienced in situations whereby a particular group in society has been exposed to prolonged negative experiences, ones which impede their abilities to improve their daily socio-economic challenges such as poverty and unemployment. Thus, the relatively deprived group may develop a convincing, widely shared set of ideologies that lead to the most fatal scapegoating, genocide, especially if the shared ideology is combined with political and socio-economic dissatisfaction (Forsyth, 2010: 420). As Zawadzki (1948: 129) argued, despite the cause of the frustration, the exposure to frustrating experiences produces aggression.

A reflection of this can be seen in people’s daily experiences; when people are disappointed with their conditions, they are likely to become angry and being angry leads individuals to vent their anger by behaving aggressively (Zawadzki, 1948: 129). Thus, people who are angry often want to strike out and destroy what is at their disposal. In this sense, the theory postulates that when people are frustrated, they become aggressive

and direct their anger towards their source of frustration, especially if it is not considered dangerous to attack such an opponent (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001: 1090).

In addition to frustration and aggression, which is one of the stages of the scapegoat theory, another stage of the theory is hostility displacement. According to Zawadzki (1948: 130), the hostility, which is free-floating (without any specific direction), is often directed towards a suitable target. At times, this target may not be an individual but a group of a minority out-group living amongst the majority in-group. This is referred to as displacement of hostility, as the hostility is shifted from the real cause of frustration to an innocent victim – a scapegoat (Zawadzki, 1948 :130). However, hostility and aggression are condemned actions, which can only be accepted through justification; for instance, by providing reasons for directing frustration on the minority group, in this context immigrants.

Due to the fact that the process of displacement is often unconscious, the persons find themselves hating the minority without having constructive reasons as to why they hate them, and why they shift the blame from the original source, and direct their frustration towards innocent victims. These individuals often find their actions to be irrational and thus unfair, and in order to protect their pride and moral sense (ego and super ego), including the fear of condemnation, they are likely to come up with premeditated excuses that would be used to justify their aggression (Zawadzki, 1948: 130). This was termed by Allport (1954) as “direct projection”, which unfolds when an individual’s own unacceptable impulses are directed onto others, allowing them to deny their own faulty actions (Glick, 2002: 246). This is done under the grounds of making their behaviour to be considered as “rational and morally acceptable” by bystanders (Zawadzki, 1948: 131). In this context, this leads to a process of “rationalization”. which is seen when people adopt “good reasoning” to justify their immoral and irrational actions, such as displacing their frustration onto innocent, weak and vulnerable group of people (Nyathi, 2021: 96). The rationalization of prejudice means to blame the minority groups in society, finding fault with their presence, and to blame them for the woes experienced by the in-group (Zawadzki, 1948). This minority group is often accused of committing all forms of crimes and vices (Zawadzki, 1948: 131). The process of rationalization of an individual’s hatred towards an entire group instead of expressing hatred for a single individual can be perpetuated by stereotypical thinking (ibid.).

The concept of 'stereotype' refers to a particular image that comes to people's mind when they think about a certain social group (Lippmann, 1922). Although there is no satisfactory definition for the word, Zawadzki (1948: 132) stated that stereotypes arise when someone realises that a few members of a particular group share similar characteristics, which are distinct from members of the opposite group. Stereotypes can be based on race, ethnicity, age, gender, or sexual orientation, and almost any characteristics can be ascribed to subordinate groups or members of the out-group (Adeke, n.d.). Hilton and Von Hippel (1996) explain a stereotype as a generalization that is biased, as it does not take individuals' differences into account. Thus, stereotypes are cognitive schemas utilized by social perceivers to construct narratives about a particular group (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996).

McGarty, Yzerbyt and Spears (2002) defined stereotypes as the psychological representation of characteristics, which symbolize the belonging of a people to particular groups. Fedor (2014: 323) states that this representation may constitute three characteristics: they are shared group beliefs shaped by the opinions or norms that are accepted by social groups, who make judgements about other persons' belonging through perceived characteristics attached to another group; they are energy-savers, as they reduce the energy of the perceivers; and they are meaningful, helping the observer give a meaning to the situation (McGarty et al., 2002).

Zawadzki (1948) states that stereotypes do not rely on rational decision-making based on individual observations, analysis, and constructive decisions about a particular group member. Rather, stereotypes are merely products of faulty thinking, which perpetuate the original thinking error, which will form the basis of a given community's image about a particular group (Zawadzki, 1948: 133). Hence, one of the dangers of stereotypes is that they apply a blanket approach, whereby they paint the same image of any member of an out-group. In so doing, a person relying on stereotypes tend to look at the members of the minority or out-group with expectations of finding the same characteristics, which symbolize the identity of that particular group (Zawadzki, 1948: 132). This is informed by the shared adopted stereotypes by the in-group, which signifies a sense of widely held group-level perceptions and shared social beliefs, as opposed to individual expectations (Bar-Tal, 2000). Therefore, instead of being realistic and providing honest judgements, stereotypes are unreasonable beliefs which are expressed through misconceptions about

a particular group. Allport (1954: 8) stated that “Prejudgements becomes prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge”.

In addition to the above-mentioned definitions of stereotypes, Fedor (2014: 323) refers to Fiske (1988) and Hogg and Vaughan (2010), who provided a list of the five main characteristics of stereotypes:

- “Stereotypes are simplified images of members of a group, based most often on the clearly visible differences between the groups (for instance, the physical aspect), often being pejorative when applied to the out-group.”
- “Stereotypes are adaptive cognitive shortcuts that enable quick impressions about people, by which large groups of people are easily described using small characteristics; also, stereotypes serve to give a meaning to some particular relations between groups.”
- “Stereotypes are stable because of their function of cognitive adaptation, and what we see when we notice their change is the result of adapting to the great economic, political or social changes; however, the stereotypes of a group can vary from one context to another, as they are selected to fit the situational requirements and own goals and motives of the person who uses them.”
- “Stereotypes are acquired, some of them at a young age, and others crystallize in childhood.”
- “Stereotypes become more acute and more hostile when social tensions and conflicts appear between the groups, and when they are extremely difficult to change.”

Zawadzki (1948: 131) presented a summary of the scapegoat theory of prejudice, and stated that the scapegoat presents its formation through the following stages:

- Frustration generates aggression (hostility),
- Hostility becomes displaced from the sources of frustration to the defenceless group (minority or out-group),
- The displaced hostility becomes rationalized by:
- Blaming the innocent minority for some frustrations, failures, and misfortunes,
- Projecting one’s own feelings of guilt, anxiety, and unacceptable traits and wishes on the minority, and
- Stereotyping, for instance, by treating all members of a minority alike.

The choices of scapegoat can be explained by cultural tradition. Throughout an individual's upbringing, people are fed with ready-made rationalizations through the process of indoctrination. For example, the spread of formal and informal teachings by an older generation, who teach children that a certain minority group in society is 'bad' (Zawadzki, 1948: 134). The theory further states that a minority group is targeted and falls victim to hostility from members of the majority group because being part of the minority often translates to being powerless (Fedor, 2014: 323).

In the literature provided by Lippmann (1922) and Zawadzki (1948), stereotype refers to a certain image that comes to people's mind whenever they think about a particular social group; this image tends to represent the characteristics attached to a particular group. For instance, there is a predetermined image attached to out-group members, as they are often associated with forms of bad behaviours, such as criminal activities (McGarty et al., 2002). As such, instead of treating each person according to their own traits and morals, a stereotype tends to treat members of the out-group or minority using a blanket approach, where every member of a specific group is believed to possess the same qualities and traits as members of their group (McGarty et al., 2002).

Complementary to the scapegoat hypothesis is the securitization theory, which is explained by Buzan, Weaver and Wilde (1998: 26) as a process through which an issue is presented to the public as a threat, which requires priority action, as is the case with the scapegoat hypothesis, where members of the out-group are often blamed for the challenges faced by members of the in-group. In the securitization theory, members of the out-group who migrate to foreign countries are often perceived as security threats, who are in foreign countries to commit crimes, and steal jobs and business opportunities, including social welfare. In the following section, the theory of securitization will be explored as one of the theories that assists in explaining the causes of xenophobia in South Africa.

3.4 Securitization theory

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s presented new debates surrounding the notion of security between 'narrowers' and 'wideners'. The narrowers explained security from a traditional approach, as they emphasised the protection of a state's sovereignty against

any external threats (Fjader, 2014: 119). For instance, they focused on analyzing the level of military and political stability between the United States and the Soviet Union (Nkala & Monyae, 2024). However, with the changing nature of wars and civil wars, wideners explained security beyond a traditional state-centric approach by including concepts such as human security and regional security, alongside issues of identity (Roukhmanoff, 2018: 2).

Kaldor (1999, 2001, 2005) presented new arguments surrounding old and new wars. Kaldor (1999) argued that the changing roles of actors in the international system necessitated a change in the approach to conflict. For instance, when looking at security from the old wars perspective, states had to protect their borders through the use of military force to guard against any external invasion, whereas in the context of new wars, actors evolved to include non-state actors who often challenged a state's monopoly over the use of force to control any violent acts (ibid.). Hence, there was a need to focus on threats that emanated within the state, such as insurgents, mercenary forces, bandits and organized criminal groups, and terrorist organizations (Kaldor, 2001).

The discourse on new threats to contemporary states was also examined by the Copenhagen School, which constituted Bary Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, who jointly wrote *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). This school of thought developed a theory of securitization, where they explained securitization as a process in which an issue was labelled as a 'security' threat by the political elite (actor), who moved the issue beyond the political domain to the security spectrum (Waiver, 1995: 55). By proclaiming that something is a security issue, this makes securitization "a speech act" (Waiver, 1995: 55). The Copenhagen School of Security Studies challenged the traditional realist approach of security which analyzed security from the political and military sectors (Mbanyele, 2024). Therefore, Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) introduced new sectors of analysis in the agenda of security, such as the economic, environmental and societal, alongside the military and political areas (Buzan, 1998: 1).

In this thesis, attention will be paid to societal security, as the thesis examines migration and xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Migration is a social phenomenon, as it focuses on the social ties and relocation of individuals or groups from one place to another; while xenophobia focuses on issues of identity. Thus, this falls in the realm of the societal

sector. Societal security has presented a whole range of new threats that were neglected by the realist state-centric approach, which focuses on military-centric security (Anderson, 2011). The concept of identity forms part of the security discourse because it is often used as a survival line for a particular society (Weaver, 2003: 15). For instance, Weaver (2003: 15) explains that in a given society, if one community can distinguish itself as 'us' or 'we', then it can survive. On the flip side, if that community's identity is threatened in any way, then the survival of such a community is at risk (ibid.).

The securitization theory focuses on the rhetorical structures of decision-makers, such as the political elite, who frame issues as existential threats and thus attempt to convince the audience to raise the issue beyond politics (Tareck, 2006). According to Buzan et al. (1998: 26), this is called a speech act, where linguistic features are intertwined with political action. These authors (1998) are of the view that by talking about security, an actor can present any issue as an emergency which requires an immediate response; hence, making that issue worth handling by extraordinary measures. Conceptualizing securitization as a speech act remains key, as it highlights that spoken words not only resemble reality, but they constitute reality (Buzan et al., 1998: 26), which in turn prompts a particular response.

McGlinchey, Waters and Scheinpflug (2021) state that the securitization theory indicates that national security policy is not a natural given; rather it is designed by politicians and decision-makers. In this regard, political issues are constituted as extreme security issues which need to be dealt with promptly, especially when they are regarded as "threatening, dangerous, alarming" by a securitizing actor who possesses institutional power to frame issues beyond the political spectrum (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). Therefore, it can be argued that security is socially constructed through language by labelling issues as "threats"; thus, threats are not merely threats by nature (McGlinchey et al., 2021). For example, labelling immigration as a "threat to national security" moves immigration from a normal issue to be dealt with to a high priority issue, which requires a quick response, such as securing state borders to guard against unregulated immigration (McGlinchey et al., 2021).

Eroukhmanoff (2018: 2) states that to convince an audience to subscribe to the adoption of extraordinary measures, the actor responsible for presenting an issue as a threat must

draw the attention of the audience by exaggerating about the urgency to tackle such a crisis. For example, the securitizing actor may label an issue as a threat by asserting that “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018: 2). Thus, the securitizing actor makes a certain issue an emergency which should be prioritized above all other existential issues (ibid.).

As explained by the Copenhagen approach, migration is often referred to as the most common issue to be perceived as a threat to social security; hence, the need to rapidly respond to it (Barry et al., 1998: 120). Securitization of migration unfolds when a threat is constructed by members of the host community who perceive migrants from a different community as a group who is strong enough to supersede or interfere with the identity of the host community (Hirschauer, 2014). In this regard, an issue can be securitized, mainly if it is seen as a threat that can meddle with the social fabric of a particular community, such as identity, language, or culture (Panic, 2009: 36).

For securitization to unfold, the rhetoric made by securitizing actors should be accepted by the collective audience (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Therefore, if the audience rejects the securitizing actor’s speech act, this indicates a securitizing move, and the securitization has failed in this regard (Eroukhmanoff, 2018: 2). As Barry et al. (1998: 26) argued, the determining factor of securitization is the act of intercession between the actor (securitizer) and the audience (general host population). In the framework of “speech act”, Weaver (1995: 55) states that language itself becomes a security issue expressed through a written or spoken context. Further, Weaver (1995: 55) states that “the utterance itself is the act ... by uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means to block it”.

The theory of securitization has become a common phenomenon in most liberal democratic states. This is evident in numerous states’ approach to immigrants and asylum seekers (Watson, 2006: 6). McDonald (2008: 26) concurs, by stating that since 2001, there has been an increase in the incidence of the securitization of immigrants and asylum seekers, who have been constantly accused of threatening the sovereignty and identity of host states. Furthermore, Watson (2006: 6) is of the view that the securitization of migration is not only constructed on the ideal that cultural differences result in social

breakdown; instead, it is a concept that is built on the claim that uncontrolled migration leads to social breakdown. Watson (2006: 6) further explains that cultural differences and the admittance of the working class and the poor do not directly breed social breakdown, or else political elites and policy developers would not be able to justify immense permanent migration programmes that allow migrants of different cultural backgrounds, or permit the entry of relatively deprived and poor migrants who are employed in certain industries (Watson, 2006: 8).

The tendency to securitize immigrants and asylum-seekers serve as a testament to the relevance of securitization theory in the post-Cold War era, because this theory goes beyond explaining security from a traditional perspective. This is said because this theory does not explain security from the state-centric, as advocated by realists. However, it revolves around the use of language to protect the internal composition of sovereign states, which is done through characterizing immigrants and asylum-seekers as threats; thus leading to protectionist mechanisms such as the deployment of state military forces to guard borders, or tightening countries' border control management (McDonald, 2008: 26). Given that many countries are signatories to international conventions on human migration, this has required political elites to securitize their immigration policies under the guise of defending their countries' sovereignty (Watson, 2006: 8-9). This being the case, to securitize migration is a choice; hence, political elites tend to characterize immigrants as threats through utterances when communicating national challenges to their constituents. In doing so, they are finding ways to justify the adoption of emergency measures and suspend the normal rules of the game, such as a respect for human rights (Berry et al., 1998: 29). Thus, securitization assists in clarifying the political responses to the movement of people in Africa, Europe, and America.

In recent years, Europe has experienced high volumes of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a situation that has become a burning topic that has sparked debates throughout Europe (Bendix, 2017). According to many Europeans, they feel threatened by this extreme influx of migrants in their region, especially in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which have refused to host further asylum-seekers, despite the EU's official announcement of the implementation of a quota system for the relocation of migrants (Bendix, 2017). Amongst the reasons for Europeans feeling threatened by immigrants from the MENA region was due to government officials using the security

rhetoric to justify their unwillingness to consider opening their borders (Miholjcic, 2017). For example, immigrants from the MENA region are securitized, as there is a perception that these immigrants pose the threat of a violent extremist agenda (Miholjcic, 2017: 61). Traynor (2015) quoted the utterances by Donald Tusk (the EU president), “Today everything is migration; we live in sobering, shocking times”.

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, responded to the migration influx in Europe in a negative and hostile manner (Traynor, 2015), arguing that the high number of immigrants brings volatile repercussions for Europe. Orban classified immigrants as a hazardous threat, who are responsible for the “current European madness” (Traynor, 2015). Through these statements, political elites create security issues, by portraying refugees and asylum-seekers as a threat to Europe. Thus, such situations offer them the legitimacy to adopt restrictive political measures, as a means of resolving the migration problem (Miholjcic, 2017: 62).

In summing up the securitization theory, the advocates of the Copenhagen school, such as Buzan et al. (1998), presented some valuable insights in the constructive study of the migration issue as a modern-day security threat. According to Weaver (2003: 14), for securitization to be successful, it needs to meet three conditions. First, as explained by Weaver (2003: 14), it is about making utterances about an issue which is exaggerated as an existential threat; and in responding to such a threat, the securitizing actor uses extraordinary measures to tackle the securitized issue, thus, making their actions legitimate. The second condition emphasises the role of authority that has the capacity to convince the general public to accept such an issue as a threat; through this process “the actor has claimed the right to handle issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Thirdly, is the use of the historical background, which explains that for an issue to be securitized, it must have some connotation of historical incidents posing a threat, danger, or harm to society (ibid.). In this regard, an historical background in security is presented with the intention of activating feelings of insecurity and fear (Miholjcic, 2017: 61).

The theory of securitization is relevant to this research as it assists in explaining security threats using contemporary challenges, which differ from traditional security threats. This theory explains security issues as socially constructed existential threats, expressed

through spoken words or written texts. In so doing, a particular sect of an out-group is perceived as a threat that interferes with the social fabric of a given community. This being the case, securitizing actors (political elites) use such issues to persuade the masses to receive such issues as a threat which should be responded to through fast actions, such as restrictive migration policies and strict border control. Although this theory assisted in providing insights, it does not extensively address contemporary components and threats to human security outside the scope of speech acts, and it does not address possible solutions to preserve human security. Hence, to fill this void, in the next section will discuss the human security perspective as the last conceptual framework that clarifies the impact of xenophobia on human (in)security.

3.5 Human security perspective

In the previous section, which discussed the securitization theory, it was argued that the post-Cold War era presented a change in security studies. Unlike traditional security, which advocated for the protection of states' borders against external threats, the notion of security has expanded beyond the state to include humans as referents of security. In this sense, there is a need for states to centre their policies on the protection of human lives. In this regard, human security remains relevant to this study as it locates its focus on the movement of people and the extent to which this human movement has necessitated a policy shift to cater for the protection of human rights and freedoms.

The human security perspective explains that there is no safe and secure state, if there are insecure inhabitants living in it. This is seen in modern states that face challenges that are different than traditional security threats. For instance, contemporary states are characterized by rising intra-state challenges, such as insurgency, violent protests, ethnic conflict, and illicit activities (Kaldor, 1999). The changing nature of threats, which are brought about by globalization, has presented new debates surrounding contemporary threats to security (Kaldor, 1999).

Globalization has brought the involvement of non-state actors, who tend to influence states' policies and responses; hence, modern security cannot be viewed through the traditional security lens only, but it also needs to include the threats of the 21st century, which affect human lives in many different ways. For example, the United Nations Development Plan (1994: 23) highlights that human welfare is by far the best indicator of

security (Nzibo, 2015), as it refers to security as safety from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease, and repression (Iroanya, 2015). It also advocates for protection from unexpected and damaging disturbances in the patterns of people's daily lives, either in their homes, workplaces, or in local communities (UNDP, 1994: 23).

The Commission on Human Security (2003: 203) explains that human security focuses on protection from the threats of unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards. In furthering the conceptualization of human security, Bajpai (2003: 203) explains human security as follows:

... a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons, it is a concern with human life and dignity ... it is concerned with how people live and breathe in society, how they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to markets and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace (Bajpai, 2003: 203).

The focal point of the human security framework revolves around “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”; thus, human security can be evaluated through threats derived from the dangers posed by failed or weak states, which necessitates policy direction to be framed in the security-development nexus (Newman, 2001: 243). This means that sovereign states have a responsibility to focus on the relationship between human rights protection, the reduction of poverty, good governance, and state capacity-building (Chandler, 2008: 435). Kaldor (1999) states that the concept of human security is based upon common values, as opposed to focusing solely on the national interest; thus, human security foregrounds the safety of people and communities, the quality of their lives, and their dignity.

In 1990, Mahbub ul-Haq launched the United Nations Human Development Report. In this report (1990), it was stated that development should be more focused on humans (even through clustering by country) rather than only focusing on the security of their national boundaries against external threats. Moreover, the report emphasized that governments should advance the provision of healthcare services, education, political

freedom, and the economic wellbeing of constituents (UNDP, 1990). Furthermore, as a means of measuring human development per country, the UNDP published the Human Development Index. Although it is at times perceived to be narrower, the Index remains a broad composite to measure income per capita, life expectancy at birth, and educational attainment and socio-economic development (King & Murray, 2001-2002).

In a further conceptualization of human security, ul-Haq (1994) argued that a cause of contemporary threats to human security is the unequal world order, which is characterized by certain sovereign states and elites being dominant, while the vast mass of humanity is subjected to marginalization and relative deprivation (UNDP, 1994). Moreover, this world order is embodied in the reliance on arms for the sake of security (hard power), including the division between the Global North and the Global South, with the increase of non-governmental organizations who perpetuate these threats through advancing dominant states' interests in the international system (e.g. the United Nations and the Bretton Woods arrangements) (Bajpai, 2003: 26).

The concept of human security is founded on a multi-sectorial understanding of threats that results in insecurities (Acharya, 2007: 8). In Table 3 below, the thesis provides possible threats to human security, as stated by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2016: 7).

Table 3: Possible Threats to Human Security

Types of Security	Examples of Main Threats
Economic Security	Persistent poverty, unemployment
Food Security	Hunger, famine
Health Security	Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care
Personal Security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and child labour
Community Security	Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions
Political Security	Political repression, human rights abuses

Source: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2016:7)

The existence of these threats to contemporary security has led to questions such as, What is to be done to resolve these threats? How can human security be attained? According to al-Huq (1994), human security will be achieved through “development, not... through arms”. In this regard, al-Huq (1994) presented a list of far-reaching proposals for the advancement of global security:

- “Developmentally: Sustainability; equity of opportunities (better distribution of productive assets, including land and credit; open access to market opportunities; job creation; social safety nets); and global justice via ‘a major restructuring’ of the world’s income, consumption and lifestyle patterns.”
- “Militarily: Reducing arms expenditures; closing all military bases; converting military aid to economic aid; stopping arms transfers; eliminating arms export subsidies; and retraining workers in defense industries.”
- “North-South restructuring: Equitable access to global markets for poor countries built on the removal of trade barriers (especially in textiles and agriculture); financial compensation from rich countries in return for immigration controls and for overuse of global environmental resources; and global payment mechanisms for various services rendered (for example, environmental services, control of narcotics and of disease) for ‘damage’ in cases of economic injury and for bad economic conduct (for example,

encouraging brain drain, restricting migration of low-skill labour, and export restrictions).”

- “Institutionally: The resuscitation and restructuring of the IMF, World Bank and UN to focus more on human development; economic adjustments that target the rich more than the poor; new governance patterns everywhere that empower the poor; and new institutions such as a world central bank, a global taxation system, a world trade organization, an international investment trust, a world treasury and, above all, a representative and veto-less Economic Security Council in the UN, which would be the ‘highest decision-making forum’ to deal with ‘all issues confronting humanity’ including food and environmental security, poverty and job creation, migration and drug trafficking.”
- “The evolution of a global civil society: All of the above would require grassroots participation and a change from authoritarian to democratic government” (UI-Huq, 1994: 3-17).

In addition to the proposed solutions on how to advance human security, the United Nations Trust Fund on Human Security (2016:15) stated that strategies can be adopted by states to prevent the recurrence of human security threats. In Table 4 below, the thesis provides examples of strategies and capacities needed to address human insecurities.

Table 4: Examples of strategies and capacities needed for addressing human insecurities

Components of human security	Possible strategies for enhancement of protection and empowerment	Required capacities
Economic security	• Assured access to basic income • Public and private sector employment, wage employment, self-employment • When necessary, government-financed social safety nets	• Economic capital • Human capital • Public finance • Financial reserves • Diversified agriculture and economy

	• Diversify agriculture and economy	
Food Security	• Entitlement to food, by growing it themselves, having the ability to purchase it, or through a public food distribution system	• Diversified agriculture and economy • Local and national distribution systems
Health Security	• Access to basic health care and healthcare services • Risk-sharing arrangements that pool membership funds and promote community-based insurance schemes • Interconnected surveillance system to identify disease outbreaks at all levels	• Universal basic education and knowledge on health-related matters • Indigenous traditional health practices • Access to information and community-based knowledge creation
Environmental Security	• Sustainable practices that consider natural resources and environmental degradation (deforestation or desertification) • Early warning and response mechanisms for natural hazards and/or man-made disasters at all levels	• Natural resource capital • Natural barriers to storm action (e.g., coral reefs) • Natural environmental recovery process (e.g., forests recovering from fires) • Biodiversity

		• Indigenous/traditional practices that respect the environment
Personal Security	• Rule of law • Explicit and enforced protection of human rights and civil liberties	• Coping mechanisms • Adoptive strategies • Memory of past disasters
Community Security	• Explicit and enforced protection of ethnic groups and community identity • Protection from oppressive traditional practices, harsh treatment towards women, or discrimination against ethnic/indigenous/refugee groups	• Social capital • Coping mechanisms • Adaptive strategies • Memory of past disasters • Local non-governmental organizations or traditional organizations
Political Security	• Protection of human rights • Protection from military dictatorships and abuse • Protection from political or state repression, torture, ill treatment, unlawful detention, and imprisonment	• Good governance • Ethical standards • Local leadership • Accountability mechanisms

Source: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2016: 16)

In summing up the human security perspective, it can be said that the notion of human security is founded on numerous components. Thus, there is a need to adopt different approaches and strategies to curb the threats to human security. As Bajpai (2003: 203) stated, there is a need for states to protect the security of people from any existential

threats. In its central focus, human security places people at the centre of security. Hence, unlike traditional security which was state-centric, the human security perspective focuses on human beings as the main referents of security. Therefore, in the modern world, there is a need for states to protect the lives of the people who live in their territory. The perspective on human security highlights the great need for governments to safeguard their territories. This can be achieved when governments provide and promote human security by identification (of any challenging critical pervasive threats); prevention (in order to ensure that risks do not occur); mitigation (so that if any risks occur the damage is minimized); and response (for victims or the chronic poor to survive with dignity and preserve their livelihoods) (Alkire, 2003: 38). Failure by governments to protect all these challenges will translate into insecurity, which subsequently curtails human development.

3.6 Chapter summary

In summary, this chapter provided a theoretical assessment on the causes and impact of xenophobia in South Africa. Hence, the chapter discussed broadly the theories of relative deprivation, the scapegoat theory, the securitization theory, and the human security perspective. The theory of relative deprivation sought to indicate the tension that stems from inequality between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction. Moreover, the theory explained the difference between people's expectations, including what they want, what they receive, and the accrual of value capabilities. Furthermore, the section on relative deprivation clarified the differences between what people achieve and their set of ambitions. The theory of relative deprivation explained how the relatively deprived were likely to take part in a rebellion, especially if their material gains were dwarfed by their value expectations. Although the theory of relative deprivation assisted in explaining the motives behind people's anger and discontent, the theory does not explain how grievance factors that lead to discrepancies between two parties could lead to one party (usually the minority group) being blamed for the present dissatisfaction and relative deprivation. In filling this gap, the thesis discussed the proponents of the scapegoat theory, which is complementary to relative deprivation.

According to the scapegoat theory, in hard times, people tend to create a so-called 'frustration scapegoat'. This is done through creating targets to be blamed for the woes that they face, such as persisting socio-economic and political challenges. Usually, these

scapegoat targets are members of the minority (out-group) who are targeted by in-group members. In the context of this thesis, scapegoats in South Africa refer to immigrants who are allegedly responsible for the challenges faced by South Africans, such as unemployment, poverty, and the high crime rate. The rationale behind attacking members of the minority group is often based on their weakness as they lack the means of self-protection from the majority in-group members. Thus, instead of treating members of the out-group based on their individual characteristics, the scapegoat theory says that members of the out-group are often treated using a blanket approach, whereby every member of the out-group is believed to have the same qualities and attributes as members of their group.

Complementary to the scapegoat theory is the securitization theory, which argues that, unlike the traditional notion of security which was state-centric, modern international security has widened to include humans as the main referents of security. In the proposition of the securitization theory, security is a socially constructed phenomenon which can be analyzed through speech acts. Securitization refers to the process in which an issue is presented as an observational threat to the wider public, who should accept such a real threat. Thus, securitization can only take place when the audience accepts an issue as a threat; failure to do so means securitization has failed. As argued, labelling an issue as a security threat initiates the securitization process and equally legitimizes the application of extraordinary measures, such as adopting policies that are deemed as remedial action to deter such securitized threat. This is often done through the adoption of legislative frameworks which allow governments to deal with such presented threats.

The discussed relative deprivation, scapegoat, and securitization theories are useful in explaining the causes of xenophobia. In terms of explaining the effects of xenophobia, the thesis adopted the human security perspective. The human security perspective, like the securitization theory, is founded on the premise that human beings serve as the main referents of modern security. Thus, the human security perspective expounds that states should prioritize the protection of people's lives from threats that are severe, and this should be done consistently with human fulfillment. The section on human security not only provided the threats to human lives but also provided the solutions on how to dissuade human security threats, including ways in which the security of people can be preserved.

Chapter Four: Examining the impacts of migration on xenophobia in South Africa

Millions of people from troubled African countries have moved to South Africa, fleeing political and economic hardships back home, to the resentment of some locals who accuse them of taking their jobs – Herman Mashaba

... [t]he word xenophobia means deep hatred, antipathy or hatred of foreigners. When I heard some accuse my people of xenophobia ... I wondered what the accusers knew about my people, which I did not know. – Thabo Mbeki

4.1 Introduction

South Africa has a long history of migration which dates to the years of colonization, apartheid, and the early years of democracy. There are multiple factors associated with international migration, and these were analyzed through the theories of migration in Chapter 2. In the previous chapter, the thesis explored theories that assist in explaining the causes of xenophobia in South Africa – the relative deprivation theory, scapegoat theory, and securitization theory. These theories remain relevant, as they assist in explaining the reasons behind the hostile attitudes aimed at immigrants in South Africa. Given the fact that xenophobia poses a threat to human security, the thesis further adopted the human security perspective, which explains the tenets of modern security.

The goal of Chapter Four is to respond to the third research question of the study which is:

- *What is the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa?*

This chapter is associated with the title of this thesis, *The impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa*. This chapter is key as it seeks to provide the interconnectedness between migration and the anti-immigrant sentiments and violent attacks against foreign nationals in South Africa. In so doing, the chapter starts off by explaining the nature of migration to South Africa, through looking at the push and pull factors associated with cross-border migration. Also, the chapter will reflect on the causes of xenophobia in the country, while indicating the human security impacts of xenophobia. This chapter uses the theories adopted in Chapters 2 and 3 to explain the causes of

international migration and xenophobia in South Africa. This is done to provide potential pathways towards migration governance and preventing xenophobia in South Africa.

4.2 Migration trends and migrant types in South Africa

As explained in Chapter 1, Section 1, which reflected on the background of the study, the history of migration to South Africa can be traced back to the discovery of natural resources, such as gold, in Johannesburg in 1886. The early migration streams into South Africa were dominated by overseas fortune hunters from England, Australia, Germany, and Poland (Moyo & Zanker, 2020: 12). Even though white settlers dominated the spectrum of migration to South Africa during the colonial period, there were also Indian indentured labourers who migrated to the British colony of Natal between 1860 and 1911 to work in the sugar plantations (Vahed, 2019). With the discovery of gold in Johannesburg, the need for workers in the mining sector increased, and Chinese indentured labourers were brought in to work in the mines between 1904 and 1907 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007).

In addition, the recruitment of black African labourers was dominant in South Africa's migration streams during the colonial period. Black African labourers from South Africa's neighbouring countries were formally recruited to work in the mines in Johannesburg, whereas others entered the country through illegal means and were called "border jumpers" (Musoni, 2020). When looking at the number of black African immigrants working in South Africa in 1970, Budlender (2013: 23) states that 81% of the 434 000 workers worked in the mining sector, 9% in agriculture, 4% in manufacturing and construction, and the remaining 6% worked in other sectors (Kganticoe, 2021).

The demand for workers resulted in South Africa being the main destination country in Africa, a history which continues to haunt the country's present migration dynamics. From 1940 to 1980, an estimated 1.5 million migrants from neighbouring countries were contracted to work as miners and farm workers (Maunganidze, 2021: 7). Between 1990 and 2000, another 1.7 million workers were recruited from Botswana, Mozambique, and Eswatini (previously known as Swaziland) (Moyo, 2024). This recruitment was carried out through the Employment Bureau of Africa (Carciotto & Agyeman, 2017). South Africa's quest for foreign labourers had undertones of labour exploitation as foreign labourers were willing to accept the minimal wages for which South Africans refused to work,

including dangerous working conditions (see Chapter 1, Section 1) (Crush, 2011). As the dual labour market theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7) states two sectors provide job opportunities in the labour market: the primary and the secondary labour markets (Piore, 1979).

The primary sector provides well-paid jobs, and the secondary sector provides unskilled job opportunities, for example, in manufacturing and construction (Piore, 1979). Also, the secondary sector is unattractive to the native labour force, thus creating a gap that is often filled by migrant workers. Hence, migrants are more motivated to accept low-status jobs in the secondary sector because they do not see themselves as part of an immigrant-receiving country. Within the secondary sector labour market, Sagynbekova (2016) states, most migrants begin as target earners, who want to earn an income for a specific goal, such as to improve their socio-economic status or well-being at home, build a house, pay for children's schooling, buy land, or accumulate consumer goods (Massey et al., 1993: 44) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7).

The challenge of illegal or irregular migration forms part of South Africa's migration patterns, as illegal migration is a common occurrence. As a result of the political, financial, and social problems confronted by the SADC region, South Africa experiences illegal migration, primarily from neighbouring SADC countries (Kganticoe, 2021). Therefore, illegal migration to South Africa is also a consequence of poverty, economic insecurity, environmental devastation, and the lack of political stability and conflict within SADC member states (Kganticoe, 2021). In the 1980s, economic hardships in Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe triggered illegal migration, while socio-economic, environmental, and political issues in Lesotho led to the illegal inflow of forced migrants to South Africa (Boynton, 2015: 16).

Although they fled the challenges in their countries, immigrants also used South Africa as a destination of choice for an improved quality of life and greener pastures (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015). Thus it shows how migration is an inevitable process, which occurs due to the search for a better life.

The notion of illegal/irregular migration is a topic which has sparked debate in South Africa, but its scope remains unclear. For instance, reliable data that quantifies the number

of illegal migrants is scarce, leading many people to speculate about the number of illegal/irregular migrants in South Africa (Kganticoe, 2021). Moyo (2024) states that official estimates on the number of illegal/irregular migrants vary widely, from 500 000 to over 2.2 million people living in South Africa irregularly. In comparison to South Africa's population of around 60 million people (Moyo, 2024), undocumented migrants are estimated to account for between less than 1% to around 4% of the country's total population (Makou, 2018).


The contemporary migration trends and patterns to South Africa point to the fact that it is the top host country for migrants from the SADC region (see Figure 2). This is supported by Mutava (2023), who states that South Africa has the largest number of migrants of all African countries, although the percentage of migrants in the total population is the second highest in Africa (Nyandeni, 2018). Figure 2 shows that South Africa remains a top destination for immigrants from Africa, as compared to being the top migrant sending country. For example, during 2020, the total number of emigrants from South Africa was 914 901, of which 92 845 (10 percent) of the emigrants migrated to Africa, while 822 056 (90 percent) migrated to the rest of the world (see Figure 3) (Degila & Valle, 2022).

These statistics thus highlight that South African emigrants prefer to go to other countries (mainly to Europe and America), rather than migrating to African countries (see Figure 3). According to Figure 2, the total number of migrants in South Africa stands at 2 860 495, a figure that is higher than that of South Africa's emigrants to other countries. When compared to South Africa's population in 2020, which was 59 308 690, the share of migrant population made up 4.82% of South Africa's population (see Figure 2).

Between 1990 and 2020, South Africa's population increased by 61%, a growth which is slower than the average for the continent and the SADC region (Figure 2). Within the same period, the immigrants rose by 146%, while the emigrants increased by 197% (Mutava, 2023: 33). The general upward trend for immigrant stock declined in 2020, a downward trajectory that was influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic, which saw countries imposing strict lockdowns and the closure of ports of entry. During the Covid-19 pandemic, South Africa adopted restrictive travel measures to curb international and domestic migration (Dratwa, 2024). This had an effect on the decline of immigrant stock in South Africa in 2020. In 2015, South Africa's immigrant population stood at 3.2 million

people, an increase of 176% since 1990. The migrant density increased from 3.2% in 1990, to a peak of 5.83% in 2015, while it declined to 4.82% in 2020 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: South Africa's Population and Migrant Population Percentages



Source: Mutava (2023)

Figure 3 below shows that most South African emigrants who migrate within the African continent prefer neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eswatini, and Namibia (see Figure 3). This being the case, it shows that South Africa emigrants prefer to migrate within the SADC region, as compared to other regions in Africa (see Figure 3), as the top host countries for South African emigrants are member states of the SADC region, and in 2020, the SADC region constituted 94% of the regional destination for South African emigrants (see Figure 3 below).


Figure 3: South Africa as a migrant sending country



Source: Mutava (2023)

In 2020, South Africa as immigrant destination constituted a total of 2 860 495 migrants. A breakdown of this number can be made through comparing the total of African immigrants and immigrants from the rest of the world. African immigrants comprised 1 850 417 (65% of migrant population), while 1 010 078 immigrants came from the rest of the world (35% of migrant population) (see Figure 4). In terms of regional distribution of countries of origins, most African immigrants came from the SADC region, with 87%, followed by the rest of the world with 8%, then ECOWAS and EAC, which constituted 3% each (see Figure 4). Among the top migrant sending countries to South Africa is Zimbabwe (690 243), followed by Mozambique (350 463), Lesotho (192 008), Malawi (92 199), and the DRC, with 63 892 migrants in South Africa (Hirsch, 2024: 9).

Figure 4: South Africa as a destination for migrants



Source: Mutava (2023)

The high number of migrants from Zimbabwe (see Figure 4) can be attributed to the political instability in 2008. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) unleashed a campaign of violence and repression against members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) following contested 2008 elections (Mongale, Molope & Tomodi, 2020). In explaining the nature of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which peaked between 2008 and 2009, Uchoa (2018) stated that Zimbabwe's inflation rate was estimated to be 79 000 000 000 percent per month. Due to socio-economic and political disparities in Zimbabwe, many fled to neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

According to Crush and Tevera (2010), between 2004 and 2008, the annual number of Zimbabweans who entered South Africa legally, allegedly on holiday, rose from 558 095 to 1 248 043. Migration trends and patterns to South Africa can be justified through the world system theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.8). The theory explains migration using the context of previous relationships between countries and how these ties foster the movement of people from one country to another. This is evident in those countries that have historical relationships that strengthen labour treaties that result in a greater migration of people moving from countries in the periphery to economically viable countries (Kurekova, 2011: 8). In the context of historical relationships, South Africa has

a long historical relationship with its neighbouring countries, which dates back to the period of apartheid, as many South Africans fled to neighbouring countries such as Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, especially those who were active in leading the struggle against apartheid. Following South Africa's democracy in 1994, nationals of neighbouring Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho and the DRC (see Figure 4) migrated to South Africa due to political instability, economic decline, poverty, and unemployment in their countries of origin. The decision to migrate to South Africa is motivated by the fact that it is a leading economy within the SADC region. Hence, prospects of an improved livelihood are higher in South Africa as compared to its neighbouring countries.

Another theory that explains migration trends and patterns to South Africa is the migration networks, systems, and cumulative causation theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.9). According to Arango (2000), migration networks can be defined as “a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants with relatives, friends, or fellow countrymen at home who convey information, provide financial backup, and facilitate employment opportunities and accommodation in various supportive ways”. The existence of these networks, as stated by Massey et al. (1993), increases the likelihood of emigration as it lowers the costs associated with migration, increased benefits, and lowers the risks associated with international migration. The increase of migrants in South Africa can be explained by this theory as most migrants who come to South Africa already have contacts or networks of individuals living in the country. This assists those migrating to South Africa to have a low risk cost of migration because of their knowledge on cross-border migration to the country.

Having examined migration trends and patterns in South Africa, it is key to also investigate the type of migrants entering South Africa. Kok and Collinson (2006) defined migrants who enter South Africa in four categories, focusing on the duration of stay, reasons for migration, and legal status. These are permanent migrants, labour migrants, refugee/asylum seeking, and illegal/irregular migrants (Kganticoe, 2021). Distinguishing between these types of migrants helps to explain how xenophobia in South Africa affects migrant communities (especially African and Asian migrants), despite their legal status in South Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

4.2.1 Permanent migrants

A category of migrants in South Africa is permanent migrants. These are individuals who become permanent residents, or citizens of another nation, through the immigration process (Kok & Collinson, 2006). According to Kganticoe (2021), in the context of South Africa, during the early 1980s, 30 000 foreign nationals on average were granted permanent residency in the country annually (Kganticoe, 2021). However, since the democratic dispensation in 1994, the annual number of foreign nationals granted legal residence has stood at or less than 5000, with just 1000 permits issued in 2012 (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 36).

Unlike during the colonial and apartheid period, when the number of European permanent migrants peaked compared to the permanent residency of African immigrants in South Africa (see Section 4.1), Johnson (2015) stated that the post-1994 period saw a decline in European permanent migrants, while the number of permanent migrants from African states increased. This could be attributed to the demise of apartheid, which had restrictive laws towards African immigrants; some of these were amended to cater for a more comprehensive approach towards international migration under the new ANC-led government.

In its approach towards international migration, the ANC government adopted policies such as the South African Citizenship Act 1995, which permitted foreign nationals to be granted permanent residency in South Africa (see Chapter 2, Section 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1995). This contributed to an increase in applications for permanent residency from African migrants. According to Gordon (2016), African immigrants accounted for 67% of all permanent residents, with 46% coming from neighbouring SADC member states. Amongst the countries that received the most permanent residence visas in South Africa were Zimbabwe, the DRC, India, Nigeria, and China (Weda & De Villiers, 2019). Johnson (2015) asserted that the number of Chinese and Indian immigrants granted temporary visas was increasing, as well as for foreign nationals from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

4.2.2 Labour migrants

The challenges faced by many African states to grow their economies have led to increased levels of migration (see Section 4.2). Most migrants to South Africa are economic migrants in search of jobs (Kganticoe, 2021). The high levels of unemployment

in Southern African countries have led to the high number of migrants to South Africa. For instance, in 2012, Botswana had a 17% unemployment rate, Lesotho had a 28.3% unemployment rate and Namibia had a 37.5% unemployment rate (Kganticoe, 2021; Boynton, 2015: 20; Statistics South African Survey, 2012: 267). This increase of labour migrants in South Africa can also be attributed to the country's economic power in the SADC region, as South Africa is the economic giant of the region (Rouhani, 2007). In addition, the country's liberal policies attracted foreign skilled labourers (Kok & Collinson, 2006). From 1994 to 2010, Statistics South Africa (2012: 37) reported that the number of people visiting the country with the intention to work here increased from 70 000 in 1994 to 179 000 in 2010 (Kganticoe, 2021).

Labour migration can be explained through the macro-economic theory of migration (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4), which states that the process of cross-border migration revolves around an abundance of labour and low capital accrual (Machinya, 2019), including low wages in other countries, which lead to the movement of people to countries that have high capital, labour opportunities, and increased wages (King, 2013). This motivates workers in low-remuneration countries to migrate to high-remuneration country to make a sustainable livelihood (Arango, 2000).

The post-1994 democratic South Africa saw an increase of African and Asian nationals working in South Africa receiving more work permits compared to the period prior to 1994. According to Williams (2015), nationals from Zimbabwe are the largest recipients of work permits, representing 24% of all work permits issued by South Africa. The country also remains a primary destination for attracting highly trained labour in the financial service sector (African Union, 2017), the education sector, and the health sector. On the other hand, low-skilled migrants in South Africa find jobs in commercial agriculture, construction, domestic work, and security services (UNCTAD, 2018: 85).

Labour migration can also be described through the micro-economic theory of migration, which states that individuals decide to migrate if there is a good likelihood of higher wages in the labour market. This theory of migration revolves around how people respond to labour related opportunities in sending and receiving countries, which motivate people to pursue the dream of higher wages (Olejarova, 2007: 20) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4).

According to Statistics South Africa (2025), a breakdown of South Africa's labour market through specific sectors shows how employment patterns vary by migration status and gender. In terms of immigrant statistics and sector-specific breakdown, men are concentrated in the wholesale and retail trade (24.2%) and in construction (14.8%), while women are mostly concentrated in private households (9.4%) (StatsSA, 2025: 15). These trends provide insight into how migration influences workforce distribution across different industries in South Africa. The prevalence of economic opportunities, such as the employment of migrants, can be regarded as a pull factor, which prompts migrants from across Africa and the rest of the world to migrate to South Africa. This is justified by the push and pull theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5), which explains that the existing favourable and unfavourable economic conditions serve as push and pull factors which induce people to migrate to a particular destination (Ravenstein, 1885). According to Kline (2003), push factors prevail in the migrant's place of origin; while pull factors are found within the host destination. In this setting, pull factors for migration to South Africa can be ascribed to the employment opportunities available in the country.

Labour migration can also be viewed through the lens of the New Economics Labour Migration (NELM) theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6). NELM states that some family or household members remain in the country of origin when other family members migrate to destination countries. Hence, families adopt such strategies so that when economic conditions deteriorate in the country of origin, the family members or households who have migrated and live in other countries are then able to compensate for the loss of income or livelihood through the transfer of remittances (O'Reilly, 2019). In the context of South Africa, income is paid to migrant labourers and shared with family members who are left in the place of origin.

4.2.3 Refugee/asylum seeking

A cause of migration to South Africa is the incidence of conflict across the African continent (Johnson, 2015). Many African states are characterized by civil unrest, political violence, lacklustre economies, lack of development, human rights abuses, and ethnic conflicts, which all play a key role in the increase of African refugees and asylum seekers (Mutava, 2023: 1). These challenges are considered push factors under the push and pull theory of migration as they force people to migrate to foreign countries (Kline, 2002) in pursuit of better living conditions and livelihoods. In 2014, the country had 65 000

refugees, many of whom had been in South Africa for many years (Budlender, 2013: 41). As stipulated in Section 4.2, South Africa is the preferred destination for many refugees and asylum seekers; thus, these numbers keep increasing (Kganyago, 2020).

According to Boynton (2015: 22), between 1998 and 2009, the number of refugee applications rose from 11 000 to 340 000. Most refugees in South Africa arrive from neighbouring SADC countries, but there are also asylum seekers who hail from other regions of Africa and from South-central Asia (Johnson, 2015). However, despite the country's high number of asylum applications, only a small percentage are accepted, leaving many asylum seekers vulnerable to detention and deportation, while exposing many to xenophobic attacks, as they are labelled as undocumented migrants.

Boynton (2015: 23) states that in 2013 South Africa received 68 000 asylum applications, while only 7 000 were granted asylum (Department of Home Affairs Asylum Statistics, 2013: 8). The low acceptance rate of asylum applications can be attributed to the backlog faced by the South African immigration system. The system faces a backlog of applications which could take up to 68 years to resolve (Moyo, 2020). However, the number of asylum applications declined from 2009 to 2018; in 2018, 18 104 applications were recorded (World Bank, 2018).

The Refugee Act of 1998 allowed asylum seekers to move freely, work, and study in South Africa while waiting for the adjudication process for their applications. This inclusive policy has led to concerns that the asylum system in South Africa is used by people without the fear of persecution (Moyo, 2021). This led to the amendments of the Refugee Act in 2008, 2011 and 2017, in an effort to curtail the rights granted to asylum seekers. On the other hand, criticism has been levelled against the South African asylum system, which faces bureaucratic inefficiency and lengthy appeals, including disproportionate backlogs. Often the challenges faced by immigrants to enter the country through legal ports of entry tend to result in illegal/irregular migration into South Africa.

4.2.4 Illegal/irregular migrants

Irregular (often termed as illegal) migration is a migration pattern that remains a challenge in South Africa. The process of irregular migration can be attributed to the country's porous borders, where immigrants can cross the borders with limited or no deterrents

(Letlape, 2021). The statistics of illegal migrants to South Africa have increased (Crush, 2017), but there are not “floods” as usually described by public officials and the media (Kupakuwana, 2017). Although there are estimates regarding the number of illegal migrants in South Africa, there are no real statistics that confirm the precise number of illegal migrants in the country due to a lack of documentation (Adepoju, 2003).

Based on the estimates made by StatsSA (2021), the number of migrants in South Africa is approximately 3.95 million, inclusive of legal and illegal migrants. The estimated number of illegal migrants increased by over 100% between 2011 and 2015 to between 500 000 and one million people (Van Leenap, n.d.). A step taken by the South African government to deal with illegal migrants is to detain and deport them. Therefore, between January 2012 and December 2016, 396 726 migrants were deported; immigrants from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho made up 88% of the deportations (Van Leenap, n.d.).

Government officials and political parties have exploited the issue of illegal migration, as they tend to exaggerate the number of illegal migrants in the country for strategic purposes and for other reasons, for example, using anti-immigrant rhetoric as a tool for electioneering, especially during election campaigns (Moyo, 2020: 18). Crush (1999: 5) asserted that government officials make public the statistics of large numbers of illegal migrants in order to sell a narrative of “floods and waves of undocumented aliens” who are portrayed as a threat to the country’s socio-economic interests. Moreover, the prevalence of illegal/irregular migrants in South Africa has left room for exploitation as employers show a clear preference for illegal/irregular migrants in terms of job allocation (Crush, 2011: 16). This is because employers can easily evade labour rules, pay lower salaries, and withhold benefits when they hire illegal workers over native South Africans (Dana, 2007). In this regard, illegal/irregular migration is perpetuated by employers who rather hire undocumented migrants in order to maximize their profits, while reducing their company costs for paying decent salaries and providing benefits to their workers.

In the theoretical perspective, the increasing number of illegal migrants is explained through the institutional theory of migration (see Chapter 2, Section 2.10). This theory states that international migration presents the opportunity for NGOs and private organizations to attract and keep foreign migrants in capital-rich countries. Part of the

modus operandi employed by these organizations is to establish a black market for the falsification of immigration documents, and arranged marriages between migrants and citizens of the host country (Kapetan & Andersson, 2013).

In South Africa Chapter 2 of the Citizenship Act 1998 Section 5 (5) of the chapter stipulates that:

The Minister may, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), upon application in the prescribed manner, grant a certificate of naturalisation as a South African citizen to a foreigner who satisfies the Minister that he or she is the spouse or surviving spouse of a South African citizen and that he or she has been—

- (a) admitted to the Republic for permanent residence;
- (b) ordinarily resident in the Republic for a prescribed period; and
- (c) married to such citizen during the period contemplated in paragraph (b).

Given the above, the institutional theory of migration remains relevant to this study as it explains how legislation, such as the South African Citizenship Act, can be exploited by private and non-government organizations to facilitate illegal migration. In South Africa, what has become apparent is the use of marriages of convenience for the purpose of obtaining citizenship in the country. According to Kavuro (2021: 525), since 1998, South Africa has raised concerns of an increase in applications for permanent residency based on spousal or relative grounds, so as to engage in marriages of convenience. On May 2001, the former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, made a presentation in Parliament and defined a marriage of convenience as a situation "where illegal [foreigners] enter into marriages with South African partners, either by fraudulent means or by arrangement with South African accomplices ... in their attempts to legalize their stay in the country" (Kavuro, 2021: 525).

Foreign nationals, mostly economic migrants and asylum seekers, use marriages of convenience to evade immigration regulations in South Africa. Once they have married a South Africa citizen and are granted citizenship, they migrants can exercise their citizenship benefits, such as seeking employment, or engaging in trade and business. Also, marriages of convenience in South Africa are used by immigrants for the purpose of seeking human security and state protection. Because, in South Africa every citizen is

entitled to the enjoyment of basic human rights, as enshrined under Chapter 2 (The Bill of Rights) of the Constitution (1996). Therefore, migrants who gain South African citizenship through a marriage of convenience are also entitled to receive state support and assistance (Kavuro, 2021: 525). A result of this is the competition for access to resources such as basic services, employment, and business opportunities, all of which triggers xenophobic attitudes and xenophobic violence. In the following section, the causes of xenophobia in South Africa are discussed.

4.3 The causes of xenophobia in South Africa

Since the arrival of democracy in 1994, South Africa has seen an increase in international migration, with mostly black Africans entering the country due to issues in their country of origin, such as political instability, deteriorating economies, human rights suppression, conflict, and war. This led people to migrate to foreign countries to seek a better life. South Africa is a top destination for international migrants from Africa and the rest of the world (see Section 4.2.).

The rise in African, Asian and Indian immigrants in South Africa has been met with anger and hostility. This is because these immigrants, mostly those from neighbouring African countries, are perceived as a threat to national security, as they commit crime and compete for scarce resources such as jobs and business opportunities, including access to basic services (Jansen van Rensburg, 2024: 1). For example, in the 2001 national survey of South African citizens conducted by the Southern African Migration Project, more than half of the respondents opined that migrants were “a criminal threat” (Misago, Landau & Monson, 2009). A total of 37 percent were of the view that migrants were a threat to jobs and the economy, and 29 percent regarded migrants as a risk to the health system (Crush & Williams, 2002). In support of this, an analysis from the 2021 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey conducted by the HSRC indicated that most South Africans perceived foreign nationals as a threat (Gordon, 2022). Such perceptions fuel xenophobic violence, which has been present in South African townships since the 1990s. In this regard, the causes of xenophobia in the country are explained in the following sub-sections.

4.3.1 South Africa’s triple threat *vis à vis* relative deprivation

South Africa wrestles with the challenges of unemployment, poverty, and inequality – these are called the triple threat (Muthambi, 2014). The presence of these issues often results in xenophobic attacks, particularly in marginalized communities (Gumede, Oloruntoba & Kamga, 2020). South Africa's inability to tackle the triple threat is considered to contribute to xenophobia, as Mmusi Maimane, the then parliamentary leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) stated, "The root of this problem lies in our inability to bring about economic growth and decrease the inequality that plagues our nation" (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 6).

The country has been called the most unequal society in the world. This was said in a World Bank report, which stated, "South Africa... is the most unequal country in the world, ranking first amongst 164 countries" (Aljazeera, 2022). Inequality in South Africa is seen along racial lines, whereby 10 percent of the population (white South Africans) own more than 80 percent of the country's wealth (Aljazeera, 2022). According to Zondi (2008: 28), the economic hardships faced by South Africans resemble the roles played by the different eras (colonialism, apartheid, and post-apartheid) with every political dispensation contributing to the history and current struggles of inequality (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 7).

In furthering the argument, Zondi (2008: 29) states that the characteristics of most poor settlements situated on the verge of major cities house overcrowded and poverty-stricken populations who are socially and economically marginalized. The dominant group among the poorest is the black youth, who vie ferociously for limited resources such as jobs, business opportunities, and access to higher education (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 8). According to StatsSA (2020), the rate of unemployment in the country stood at 29.1 percent in 2020, with the higher rates found among the youth (Graham & Patel, 2020). The high unemployment rate among South Africans is often blamed on migrants and refugees, who are accused of stealing jobs from locals (Banda & Mawadza, 2014); this is underscored by the fact that unemployment among foreign nationals is below the national unemployment rate (Maunganidze, 2021: 9).

The lack of the provision of public goods by the post-1994 ANC-led government has produced social discontent (Mongale, 2022: 12). This translates into anger against immigrants and ethnic minorities in South Africa, who have become soft targets for

xenophobic violence, as they are accused of creating the social ills in the country (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 218). The lack of legal standing makes migrants vulnerable to xenophobic attacks in South Africa, because, due to the lack of proper documentation, migrants are regarded as 'aliens'; thus, they are treated with hostility and subjected to xenophobic attacks.

In South Africa, foreign nationals have tended to aggravate unemployment by providing a pool of cheap labour, which results in many immigrants being widely employed in different sectors (see Section 4.2.2) (Nyar, 2011: 5). Due to the ready supply of cheap labour, foreigners tend to out-compete poor black South Africans when competing for jobs (Everatt, 2011: 3).

Moreover, foreigners with formal qualifications stand a better chance of being employed than poor black South Africans (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 8). This is because it is believed that foreign nationals excel in every job or business that they operate (Bearak & Dugger, 2008: 2). Solomon (2019: 160) argues that immigrants in South Africa have always been ready to accept any job, even if they are treated as cheap labour, making them stand a better chance of being employed when compared to native South Africans, who have expectations of higher-paying jobs (Solomon, 2019: 160).

Often frustration arises among deprived poor black South Africans, not only because some black elites live lavish lifestyle, but because the foreigners who live among them are far better off than they are (Pillay, 2008: 100). This justifies the arguments presented under the relative deprivation theory, which state that one person's position is compared to those close to them. Once people feel dissatisfied with their immediate situation (experiences), when compared to what they expected, this triggers frustration and violence, including xenophobic attacks (Gurr, 1970) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2).

Since the arrival of democracy in 1994, the levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa have showed a significant increase. In 2010, the poverty level was reported to have increased by 57.2%, while it declined in 2011 by 45.5% (StatsSA, 2014). In its link to xenophobia in South Africa, poverty remains a contributing factor, as poor people are blamed for orchestrating xenophobic attacks to express their frustrations about unemployment, poverty, and inequality (Mamabolo, 2015: 145). The triple threat in South

Africa is a key trigger for how people behave. As argued in the relative theory, due to discrepancies between people's expectations and their reality, this often causes frustration, especially if their present situation seems unchanged (in terms of unemployment, poverty, and inequality) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Dollard et al. (1939) argued that frustration is a key driver of violence. In addition, if people cannot achieve their goals, it results in a disturbed psychological balance and tension that can be expressed through aggression directed towards a given group in society who is accused of causing the frustration (Dollard et al., 1939). In the context of South Africa, the groups accused of causing frustration are mostly black African immigrants, who are accused of stealing jobs, being involved in criminal activities, and straining the social welfare system (Gordon, 2022). The prevailing reality is that South Africans do not address their grievances through political channels; instead, they resort to violent protest action and xenophobic attacks (Misago, 2016: 457).

The theory of relative deprivation has proved applicable in explaining the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. The theory formed the foundation of explaining conflict and civil war through the lens of grievances. In South Africa, grievances such as poverty, unemployment and inequality exist, all of which result in conflict between immigrants and native South Africans, due to competition for scarce resources. Hence, conflict can be linked to grievances deriving from the relative deprivation of socio-economic benefits (Mongale, 2022: 3).

4.3.2 Shifting the blame: migration scapegoating and anti-migrant rhetoric

In times of observed challenges such as unemployment, poverty, inequality, crime and infectious diseases, an emerging global trend in migration issues is that governments, political parties, vigilante groups, and civil society tend to shift the blame and scapegoat immigrants for the presence of such socio-economic ills (Kaziboni, Lancaster, Machabaphala & Mulaudzi, 2022: 3). Although this is the current trend in South Africa, it is also a frequent occurrence worldwide. For example, in the United Kingdom, migrants have become government scapegoats for many issues, such as an increase in crime, the depletion of precious NHS resources, limited job opportunities, and the lack of housing (Moran & McMahon, 2023). It is the same in the United States of America, as the Donald Trump presidency scapegoats immigrants (mostly Mexican immigrants) for the high crime rate (Delgado, 2024). Similarly, the Tunisian president, Kais Saide, has called for urgent

measures against the illegal immigration of sub-Saharan African nationals. The president accused black African immigrants of being the cause of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts” (The Conversation, 2023). The irony behind the scapegoating of immigrants for social ills is often exaggerated by politicians without any concrete evidence. For instance, in the USA, immigrants commit fewer crimes than native citizens, even though the president of the USA has constructed the myth that immigrants are more likely to conduct criminal activities (Delgado, 2023). Furthermore, Trump has claimed that migrants are smuggling illegal fentanyl across the USA borders; however, 91 percent of seizures were from USA citizens, as presented in Border Patrol data (Delgado, 2023). The result of migration scapegoating is that it produces xenophobia, which can be defined as “attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-nationals in a given population” (Kaziboni et al., 2023: 3).

In South Africa, political leaders and public officials frequently scapegoat migrants; thus, framing the issue of migration as a crisis to gain political support (Hiropoulos, 2020: 115). This is also done to shift the blame from the government, which has failed to improve the quality of people’s lives, which is evident in the rising rates of inequality, poverty, and unemployment (see Section 4.3.1). The spokesperson of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa, Phakamile Hlubi-Majola, said, “We believe the root causes of the problem is that the ANC government has implemented macro-economic policies which have failed to transform the lives of our people” (Dewa, 2022). Hlubi-Majola added, “Under their reign, South Africa has become the most unequal society on earth, with crippling poverty and extremely high unemployment” (Dewa, 2022). Unlike Hlubi-Majola, who blamed the ANC-led government for the problems facing South Africa, many politicians and public officials fail to do so as most of them use their positions and authority of power to redirect the citizenry’s anger away from themselves as the cause of the country’s socio-economic problems. This is done through scapegoating foreign nationals for the socio-economic ills in South Africa. The result of migration scapegoating is that it often drives xenophobia. As Crush and Ramachandran (2009: 47) stated:

Scapegoating tendencies and public rhetoric of fear and loathing collectively shape and define the contours of the symbolic threat posed by immigrants. That is, they transform diverse immigrant groups in the public imagination as an undifferentiated

mass, representing a menace and threat to the well-being and security of host populations.

Black African and Asian migrants have been negatively stereotyped as “illegal” and “job stealers” who actively participate in criminal activities and are carriers of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 5). However, it is worth mentioning that migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini are tolerated; this could be attributed to the fact that citizens from these countries share ethnic characteristics with South Africans (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 5). Although some Zimbabweans share ethnic characteristics with South Africans, especially those located in the Limpopo province, citizens from Zimbabwe and Mozambique are treated with aversion and referred to as ‘makwerekwere²’ (Everatt, 2011: 12). One may argue that Zimbabweans are treated with hostility because they constitute a high proportion of immigrants in South Africa (see Figure 4 in Section 4.2).

The rising number of migrants from neighbouring SADC counties in South Africa has been labelled by politicians and public officials as a crisis. For example, in 2019, the then Johannesburg mayor, Herman Mashaba (a former member of the Democratic Alliance) stated at a public gathering that “both the department and the city agreed that the challenge of illegal immigration in Johannesburg has reached crisis level” (Africa News Agency, 2018b). Mashaba accused the ANC-led government of failing to process the immigrants entering the country and to timeously provide them with relevant documentation (Hiropoulos, 2019: 109):

Millions of people from troubled African countries have moved to South Africa, fleeing political and economic hardships back home, to the resentment of some locals who accuse them of taking their jobs (African News Agency, 2018).

² The term denotes that locals consider other black Africans strange, with peculiar-sounding dialects, thus, condoning violence against them (Everatt, 2011: 12).

African immigrants in South Africa are labelled by other derogatory names such as “*makhalangas*” or “*magrigambas*”, while in other parts of the country they are characterised as “*Mekgaritswana*”, “*Makula*”, “*Mapafo*” and “*Makgaretein*” (Buthelezi, 2009: 14).

According to Solomon and Kosaka (2014), derogatory names such as *Mekgaritswana*, *Mapafo* and *Makgaretein* are linked to the business foreign nationals operate in local communities. Their business operations involve door-to-door selling of goods such as curtains, comforters and zinc objects. Apparently these names signify hatred of African foreign nationals (Solomon & Kosaka, 2014).

Although Mashaba's statement points to the failure by the ANC-led government to facilitate international migration through its system, which is riddled by heavy backlogs, corrupt officials and bureaucratic inefficiencies, such statements fuel hostility towards immigrants as they are regarded as illegal (because they are not documented) and thus they are forced to return to their country of origin.

A study conducted by Chikohomero (2023), which investigated the attitudes towards migrants in two urban settlements in Gauteng province (the economic hub of South Africa), focused on Atteridgeville, an established black township situated in Pretoria, and also on Diepsloot, a large settlement in the north of Johannesburg, a community that originated from spontaneous informal settlements (Hirsh, 2024: 27). One of the commonalities between these two settlements is that both represent a good cross-section of poor and middle-class black South Africans residing in black urban settlements. Chikohomero (2023) engaged with 12 focus groups and 14 key informant interviews for 160 participants. This study presents valuable qualitative research on the two settlements, representing urban society in predominantly black townships located in the economic hub of the country. Data gathered in the study by Chikohomero (2023) is relevant to this study as it provides local voices and perspectives on migrants living in South Africa. In relation to the challenge of unemployment as a driver of hostility towards immigrants, Chikohomero (2023: 14) found:

Most of the local participants said that foreign-born migrants must leave the country. This is not because they don't like them but because they feel squeezed out of the job market by foreign-born migrants, as they steal jobs meant for locals.

These assertions justified the point argued in the previous section (4.3.1), where competition for resources such as job opportunities serves as one of the reasons behind xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants. This is further supported by the scapegoat theory (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3) which explains that conflict directed towards the out-group will arise, especially where there is competition for scarce resources between the in-group and the minority out-group (Stowe, 2012: 189). The scarcity of employment, especially amongst South Africans, has triggered the scapegoating of immigrants. Hence, to avoid such situations, there is a need for the government to implement policies that create employment opportunities for South Africans. This could be a key step towards the

promotion of xenophilia³ in South Africa. This is supported by participants in the study by Chikohomero (2023), who held the view that if most people were employed, they would not turn against each other despite their nationality. This is complementary to the earlier study by Tewolde (2021) who conducted a study on xenophilia and xenophobia in South Africa and found that in Sunnyside (a suburb of Pretoria) a cohesive relationship exists between migrants and South Africans. Part of the reason for this co-existence is attributed to the improved socio-economic status of the residents of Sunnyside. Due to adequate infrastructure, services and amenities in Sunnyside, there is a relative absence of scapegoating, competition for scarce resources, and xenophobic attitudes and violence against immigrants (Tewolde, 2021: 286). In comparing the two concepts, xenophobia can be explained as hostile attitudes towards immigrants that sparks xenophobic violence, which contrasts with xenophilic individuals who are inclined to help, accommodate, and tolerate the presence of migrants living among them.

The lack of access to basic services, such as health facilities and housing, for South Africans is a factor often blamed on immigrants; thus, it is called a crisis by public officials. For example, in March 2018, Herman Mashaba stated:

Within the context of the city of Johannesburg, illegal immigration compounds serious challenges in the provision of basic services to residents. We are faced with a housing backlog of an estimated 300 000 units (Africa News Agency, 2018b).

Anti-immigrant rhetoric such as that by Mashaba has become a mechanism used by public officials to divert attention from their failure to provide public goods to constituents; thus, constructing migration as a threat to the social welfare system of the country. In South Africa, there is also a common xenophobic stereotype that public hospitals and clinics are flooded by foreign nationals (Hiropoulos, 2020: 111).

The Southern African Migration Project national attitudinal survey (2008) found that most South Africans have hostile attitudes towards migrants. The survey found that two-thirds

³ The concept of xenophilia can be conceptualized as a positive attitude towards individuals perceived as culturally different, in fact, xenophilic individuals show interest and curiosity towards foreigners, they tend to accept cultural differences and implement welcoming behaviours towards immigrants and actively seeking contacts with different cultures (Stürmer et al., 2013).

of South Africans believed migrants used resources, committed crimes, and ‘stole’ jobs, and 49% believed that migrants were the carriers of diseases (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 216). In relation to access to health services, most South Africans opined that the right to access to health services should only be available to citizens; however, 50% believed that documented or legal migrants should also enjoy the right to access to health services as they were official residents (Crush & Tawodzera, 2011). In this context, migrants in South Africa are seen as burden on the social welfare of the country, as they put strain on it and thus deny citizens their right to access basic services. Hence, migrants are often exposed to xenophobia and violence, which violates their basic human rights and poses a risk to their human security.

In a theoretical perspective, the scapegoat theory remains relevant in explaining hostilities directed at members of the out-group as this theory explains that competition for scarce resources often serves as a trigger for conflict between in- and out-group members (Stowe, 2012: 189). Esses et al. (1998) stated that hostility against members of the out-group will erupt in situations where the in-group perceives the out-group as competitors for scarce resources, such as jobs, and business and educational opportunities.

4.3.3 The media and the emergence of anti-immigrant online movements

The media, as a primary agent of political socialization (Ethridge & Handleman, 2015: 61) wields the power to select who is interviewed, what is reported on, and how it is reported on (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018: 146). Fine and Bird (2002: 10) state that the media “shapes and influences social issues in the ways in which news is chosen, highlighted and converted”. In relation to xenophobia in South Africa, the media has influenced xenophobic attitudes through constructing securitized headlines, which reinforce scapegoat predispositions, including that foreigners pose a threat to the country’s security. This is evident in the following anti-immigrant headlines in South African print media, as highlighted by Chiumbu and Moyo (2018: 146):

- “Illegal aliens cost us dearly” – *The Sunday Times*, 1 September 2009
- “They come here to compete with our people for jobs” – *The Sunday Times*, 8 June 2009
- “Foreigners stripping us of our livelihood” – *City Press*, 22 May 2011
- “They’re taking over our country” – *City Press*, 31 May 2011

The issues affecting refugees and migrants have become popular discourse in the mainstream media; however, in their reporting, various media houses have not done enough to correct the distorted messages from political leaders who scapegoat and blame foreign nationals for the existential problems facing South Africa (Moyo, 2020: 35). One of the respondents in the study by Moyo (2020: 35) said, “You still have a lot of bad journalism where they write down everything the mayor or politician says without contextualization” (Interview researcher, February 2020). Often, “the utterances in the media are so irresponsible and they hold so much power, they can just say that economic migrants contribute to the South African economy, they have a power to say that and get into people’s living rooms with that fact” (Interview Human Rights Organization, Johannesburg, March 2020; see Moyo, 2020: 35). An NGO representative interviewed by Moyo (2020) added the following:

When it bleeds, it sells. A lot of the media, they're businesspeople. So, for them when it bleeds, it sells... we don't care about the damage we are doing” (Interview Advocacy Organization, Johannesburg, February 2020; see Moyo, 2020: 35).

Considering the above statement, it could be suggested that the media sometimes prioritizes sales over the safety and security of immigrants in South Africa. The scapegoating of foreign nationals for the existing socio-economic woes in South Africa has been reported on in different media, for instance, in films that capture xenophobic violence such as *Affectionately known as Alex* (2008) by Danny Turken, and *Man on Ground* (2011) by Akin Omotoso. These films show harrowing scenes where South Africans who gathered at community meetings were threatening to kill ‘foreigners’ who were accused of taking over resources that belonged to native South Africans (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018: 146).

Moreover, there is a rise in the use of social media platforms such as X, Facebook and Telegram, where public officials, politicians, civil society organizations, civilians, and media houses post hashtags on the issue of migrants in South Africa. The use of social media platforms to disseminate messages relating to migration issues often result in online hostilities between South Africans and foreign nationals; thus, sparking anti-immigrant sentiments. See Figure 5 below:

Figure 5: Post on X by PatriotMarc



Source: X

Figure 5 above shows a post from an account on X, called PatriotMarc, which contains a negative comment on the presence of nationals from Zimbabwe and Nigeria living in South Africa. The post says, “South Africa belongs to South Africans! Zimbabwe belongs to Zimbabweans! Nigeria belongs to Nigerians! If you are NOT a South African then you are a foreigner. Illegals must stop claiming SA. #PutSouthAfricaFirst”. Taking the statement, “South African belongs to South Africans!”, it is an anti-Constitutional stance because, according to the Constitution (1996), “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” (Centre for Analytics & Behavioral Change, 2024: 15). Such social media posts are not only in opposition to the Constitution, but also to the aspirations of the African Renaissance, the philosophy of Ubuntu, and Pan-Africanism. Given this reality, social media platforms play a key role in instigating xenophobic attitudes; thus, there is a need for improved governance policies that restrict posts that contain hate speech.

4.3.4 Political capitalization of xenophobic rhetoric: the criminalization of immigrants

The arrival of democracy in South Africa in 1994 saw an increase in violent and organized crime, which has continued unabated over the years. In 2016, as recorded by the South

African Police Service (SAPS), murder rates increased by 4.6%, aggravated robbery by 8.5%, house robberies by 5%, and vehicle hijackings by 14% (Hiropoulos, 2020: 115). In relation to violent crimes, Bheki Cele (the former Minister of Police), at a briefing on the quarterly crime statistics (July to September 2021) said that almost 10 000 people were brutalized and sexually violated in just three months (Mafolo, 2021). Of grave concern is the increase in crimes against women and children, as in the first quarter of the 2022/2023 financial year, 855 women and 243 children were killed (Naidoo, 2022). During the same period, 9 516 rape cases were opened with SAPS. According to Cele, 3 780 rape cases took places in the homes of either the perpetrator or the victim, whereas 1 546 people were raped in public spaces (Naidoo, 2022). As such, the high levels of crime in South Africa signifies that the country is at war with itself, although there is no actual warfare taking place between the military and combatants. The level of insecurity in South Africa, as reflected in the high crime rates, portrays the country as a dangerous place to live in. The increase in violent and organized crimes in South Africa also highlights the ineffectiveness of the SAPS leadership to put effective strategies in place to reduce crime (Hiropoulos, 2020: 112). Instead of calling on SAPS to effectively perform its duties of safeguarding communities, public officials increasingly blame the rising crime rates on migrants. By so doing, migrants are criminalized as they are seen as the perpetrators of crime; this also leads to the securitization of immigrants, which occurs when immigrants are perceived as security threats by public officials and the media, thus framing migration as a crisis through speech or rhetoric.

Immigrants in South Africa have become scapegoats for the social ills that face the country. For instance, in June 2018, Bheki Cele (the former Minister of Police) blamed the increase in cash-in-transit heists on foreign nationals, as he stated that foreigners were among the criminals responsible for the cash-in-transit heists that had become a common occurrence (Ndlazi, 2018). Foreign nationals who came from neighbouring SADC countries were listed among those carrying out crimes in South Africa, as Cele stated that they had arrested men who came from Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Ndlazi, 2018). One of the compounding factors perpetuating cash-in-transit heists is the involvement of law enforcement agencies who work together with criminals to earn private incentives. Burger (2018) states that interviews with armed and cash-in-transit robbers revealed that members of SAPS often became involved in the robberies, or accepted bribes in exchange for help, providing access to the information contained in

police cases, the disappearance of important evidence, providing safe houses, and transporting stolen money (Burger, 2018).

In 2015, following the release of crime statistics, both the Minister of Police and the National Police Commissioner blamed South Africa's soaring crime rates on foreign nationals in their statements made to parliament (Hiropoulos & Landau, 2015). In the following year, in December 2016, during his first 100 days in office statement, the then Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba said the following in relation to migration and crime:

They're holding our country to ransom and I'm going to be the last South African to allow it. I've got constraints as local government, because the national government has opened our borders to criminality (Pather, 2016).

Mashaba expressed his determination to target those who were living in the city illegally and who were involved in criminal activities (Kekana, 2016). According to Pather (2016), in a follow-up interview Mashaba said that illegal foreign nationals who lived in Johannesburg without documentation were linked to the crimes occurring in the city. These claims were made without evidence or data to support them. In this case, the criminalization of migrants in South Africa is done casually, with blatant disregard of the consequences. Because public officials are perceived by society as legitimate sources to provide credible information on migration issues, if they express negative sentiments about the activities of migrants this often triggers grassroots violence, such as xenophobic attacks, and it provides fertile ground for the establishment of vigilante groups.

In South Africa, vigilante groups are established under the pretext of battling rising crime rates and illegal migration in communities. Although they claim to protect the rights of South Africans by policing illegal activities, vigilante groups tend to trigger xenophobic sentiments (Dratwa, 2024). Foreigners are harassed and violated by members of vigilante groups, who often act outside the precepts of the law (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 8). A case in point is the vigilante group called Operation Dudula (currently registered as a political party), which has conducted illegal search-and-seizures of undocumented migrants (Mulaudzi, Lancaster & Machabaphala, 2022). The consequences of such actions are that they leave victims (migrants) vulnerable to a continuous cycle of criminal acts, such as intimidation, trespassing, malicious damage to property, arson, robbery, assault, and

death (Mulaudzi et al., 2022). Despite these illegal activities, vigilantes are rarely arrested; instead, the police target immigrants instead of acting against the criminal actions of Operation Dudula (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 8-9).

4.3.5 The rise of populism in migration discourse: anti-immigrant rhetoric as a form of electioneering

In the lead up to the 2019 elections, migration remained a key issue in the election campaign. This was evident in many political parties making calls for stricter measures to be adopted to manage migration effectively. By playing the migration card, this showed that the 2019 election campaigns were rooted in populism and fear, and thus were adopting the tactics used in other election campaigns, such as the Brexit and Trump anti-migrant rhetoric (see Section 4.3.2).

Over the past few years, several political leaders have raised concerns about South Africa's failure to govern international migration effectively, to stop 'illegal' migrants from entering the country. For example, in 2018, the leader of the Congress of the People, Mosiuoa Lekota, was quoted in the media saying, "Government, at national [level], is allowing people to flood South Africa" (Madia, 2018). The Deputy Minister of Police, Bongani Mkgongi, in a media briefing in July 2017 following his visit to Hillbrow Police Station to discuss issues of crime and illegal trading, also adopted a typical populist stance (Madia, 2018). In his statement, which had elements of xenophobic toxicity, he said:

How can a city in South Africa be 80% foreign nationals? That is dangerous; that in Hillbrow ... South Africans have surrendered their own city to the foreign nationals. The nation should be debating that issue ... if we do not debate that, that necessarily means the whole of South Africa could be 80% dominated by foreign nationals, and the future president of South Africa could be a foreign national. We are surrendering our land, and it is not xenophobia to talk truth (Eyewitness News, 2017).

The above statements by Lekota and Mkgongi resemble the populist agenda, and they are not based on facts, such as the claim that South Africa is being flooded by foreign nationals and that the country in the future will be 80% dominated by foreign nationals

(Hiropoulos, 2020: 109). These claims contrast with the 2011 Census of StatsSA, which indicated that there were about 2.2 million immigrants in 2011, which equates to 4.2% of the total population of the country (StatsSA, 2015). Also, the statement by Mkgongi clearly adds another dimension to xenophobia in South Africa, as it is rooted in the “the politics of belonging and contestation for citizenship”, which unfolds when immigrants are held up as threats to the national identity and citizenship (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018: 145), as there is the belief that they are depriving citizens and residents of the basic services to which they are entitled (Mosselton, 2009: 20).

In 2018, both the Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, and the National Police Commissioner, Khehla Sithole, stated that there were 11 million undocumented migrants in South Africa (Hiropoulos, 2020: 109). This number contrasts with the 2018 statistics of foreign nationals in South Africa, which was approximately four million (Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town, 2019: 6). In this regard, it is obvious that politicians tend to over-exaggerate the number of migrants entering the country, as they are usually described as “pouring in” or “flooding”, which results in a feeling that it is a threat or crisis so that the issue can be raised into the mainstream political agenda. Once in the political realm, migration is constructed as a threat which requires an immediate response from the government. This can be viewed through the securitization theory, which focuses on the rhetorical structures of decision-makers, such as political elites, who frame issues as existential threats; thus, attempting to convince the audience to raise the issue beyond politics (Taureck, 2006). This is referred to as a speech act by Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998: 26), whereby linguistic features are intertwined in political action. In their arguments, these authors (1998) are of the view that by talking about security, an actor can present any issue as an emergency that requires an immediate response; thus, making the issue worthy of being handled using extraordinary measures.

In South Africa, the securitization of immigrants through political rhetoric was also seen in 2017 when the Gauteng MEC for Safety and Security, Faith Mazibuko, addressed officers and community members from Vanderbijlpark (Hiropoulos, 2021: 111). The purpose of the gathering was to address a crowd that was marching against crime, following a video depicting Nigerian nationals attacking police officers in the area a week before. Mazibuko was recorded saying, “We can’t co-govern [our country] with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless banana republic”

(Daniel, 2019). Further, the MEC urged attendees to “squeeze the drug out of criminals” and said “If your life is in danger don’t hesitate to use that gun. Don’t hesitate to use it. Because why would you be beaten up with a gun on your hip?” (Hiropoulos, 2021: 111). The mayor, Simon Mofokeng, said that he was confident that the situation would not trigger xenophobic attacks in the area, stating, “This place has been hijacked. It’s even called Lagos, meaning that it is a capital of Nigerian nationals. Those who are in our country for illegal activities must pack and leave; we will not tolerate such behaviour” (Masweneng, 2017).

In Section 4.3.3, Herman Mashaba, the leader of Action SA, was also quoted using anti-immigrant rhetoric in his public statements. As a result, his office received human rights training from the South African Human Rights Commission following his online tweets, where he blamed foreign nationals who live in Johannesburg for the rise in crime. Mashaba frequently made use of the hashtag #PutSouthAfricansFirst (Moyo, 2020: 16).

The Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, also made unfounded claims that migrants were straining the health system of the country. In a nursing summit that was convened by the National Health Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union, Dr Motsoaledi asserted that when migrants “get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, [and] infection control starts failing” (Mbhele, 2018). Such statements indicate a populist discourse in South Africa’s migration governance, especially during times in which political parties are preparing for elections. Leading up to the 2019 elections, anti-migration rhetoric was a common discourse used by public officials.

The sole exception to the anti-migration rhetoric came from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who adopted a class-based populism, which sought to include migrants from other countries and the facilitation of free movement through dismantling the colonial inheritance such as artificial borders. The party also spoke out against xenophobic attacks in South Africa (Moyo & Zanker, 2020) (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6: Migration rhetoric and securitization in election manifestos

 African National Congress (ANC) • “Undocumented immigration has an impact on national security” (p. 52). • “... tough measures against undocumented immigrants involved in criminal activities” (p. 52). • “Ensure that our policing of regional integration and cooperation includes resolution of immigration matters” (p. 65).	 Democratic Alliance (DA) • “Strengthening border security in the relevant provinces, with specific focus on combatting cross-border crime, crime syndicates and undocumented migration” (p. 36). • “Our plan for creating the capable state contains the following- Immigration: securing our borders” (p. 73). • “Ensuring effective, efficient and coordinated border security and border control through increased policing capacity at our border posts and along our borders” (p. 73).	 Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) • “All immigrants shall be registered and have their fingerprints captured by the new Department of Home Affairs and Internal Security” (p. 52). • “EFF government will fight for a borderless Africa and a single currency in the medium to long term” (p. 168).
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In September 2019, EFF leader Julius Malema said, “Xenophobic violence will never resolve the problems our country face because they were never caused by foreign nationals in the first place” (Chigumadzi, 2019). During the 2019 pre-election campaign,

Malema visited restaurants in Gauteng to monitor the employment ratio between South African citizens and foreign nationals. His visit was prompted by the allegations that foreign nationals were prioritized in the employment sector. Malema said that employers should refrain from prioritizing immigrants to the detriment of South Africans (Dratwa, 2024).

Drawing from the statements made by Malema, it is evident that one of the persisting problems in South Africa is that employers tend to prioritize foreign workers since they can exploit them. Hence, before blaming migrants for taking jobs away from South Africans, there is a need for South Africans to monitor employment patterns by corporations and institutions. As Malema said, “Do not hate the foreigners, hate the owner of the restaurants, because those foreigners did not hire themselves” (Dratwa, 2024). The arguments by Malema are relatable to what was argued in Section 4.2.4, where it was mentioned that employers in South Africa prioritize the employment of foreigners for exploitative purposes to minimize their company’s costs while maximizing their profits. This is because hiring foreign nationals, especially those who are regarded as irregular migrants, enables employers to minimize their company costs by not paying decent salaries and providing their workers with benefits.

In Figure 6 above, the major political parties’ manifestos (in the lead up to the 2019 elections) on issues related to migration were summarized. According to the party manifestos in Figure 6, both the ANC and the DA advocated stricter immigration laws and a securitized approach to migration governance. This included securing the borders and deporting those who entered the country illegally because they posed a threat to South Africa’s security. However, the EFF appears to be the party that advocates for the inclusion of immigrants in the country through a formal documentation process, including the creation of a borderless Africa, to ensure a United Africa where Africans live among each other in peace and harmony.

The securitization of migration through anti-migrant rhetoric propagated by public officials and in election manifestos can be linked to the weakening in the ANC’s absolute majority. Therefore, populist statements are made based on what the citizens would like to hear, which will result in them voting for a certain party that seeks to address social ills based on the citizens’ expectations. At the core of political parties’ campaigns ahead of the 2019

elections were issues of migration, as most political parties and public officials made statements on how to resolve the challenges of migration in South Africa, especially irregular/illegal migration, once they were voted into power (see Figure 5 above).

Public officials generally denounced foreign nationals as a threat to the country's security, as they committed crimes and entered the country illegally. Migrants were also accused of exhausting the social welfare system, such as health services, and access to housing, which deprived the majority of South Africans of access to housing.

The socio-economic challenges in the country are scapegoated on immigrants, who are treated with resentment, hostility, and other behaviours that manifest through xenophobia. In the following section, the nature and context of xenophobia in the post-1994 era is discussed.

4.3.6 The context of xenophobia in post-1994 South Africa

The post-1994 democratic South Africa has experienced periodic incidents of anti-immigrant sentiment prior to the xenophobic attacks that occurred in 2008, which remains the worst xenophobic violence to take place in post-apartheid South Africa. There have been incidents of xenophobia since the earliest days of democracy in the country. For instance, in 1994, community organizations in Alexandra accused migrants who came from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi of instigating crime, sexual attacks and worsening unemployment (Steenkamp, 2009: 441). According to Simpson (2021: 398), in January 1995, armed gangs of residents frog-marched hundreds of people to the Alexandra police station to demand their arrest and deportation. The instigators of this xenophobic incident called it Operation Buyelekhaya (Go Back Home), but what transpired was that many of the so-called 'foreigners' were Shangaan-speakers, or other South Africans with a dark complexion (Steenkamp, 2009: 441).

The attacks on individuals based on the colour of their skin and physical characteristics have made many native South Africans vulnerable to xenophobic attacks, as they share common traits with foreign nationals coming from neighbouring African countries. Other incidents of xenophobia occurred in central Johannesburg in 1997, where local hawkers attacked their foreign counterparts while competing for local markets (Steenkamp, 2009: 441). In the following year, in September 1998, a Mozambican and two Senegalese

asylum seekers, who were selling sweets to passengers on a train between Pretoria and Johannesburg, were killed by a mob (Steenkamp, 2009: 441). In the Free State, in 2005, Zimbabwean and Somali refugees were attacked and beaten following service delivery protests in the local municipality (SAHO, 2015). In Cape Town in 2006, mobs in the townships around the city robbed and looted shops owned by foreign nationals from Somalia, and in the same year, 29 Somalis were killed between July and September (Le Roux, 2006).

The manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa takes multiple forms; it can either be violent or institutional (Vanyoro & Ncube, 2018: 78). However, a new form of xenophobia has arisen, referred to as digital xenophobia (ibid.). Many studies have focused on violent xenophobia, including the media, which has paid specific attention to violent xenophobia as opposed to institutional xenophobia or digital xenophobia. It is due to this reason that in Chapter 5, this thesis interrogates the nature of migration governance in South Africa to assess immigration policies, which were found to be selective and restrictive, and thus have elements of institutionalized xenophobia.

Building on the previously discussed violent xenophobic attacks that occurred since 1994, in 2008, South Africa experienced the deadliest violent xenophobic attacks ever recorded. On 8 January 2008, in the Eastern Cape towns of Jeffreys Bay and East London, two Somali shop owners were murdered. In Atteridgeville near Pretoria, seven people were killed, including Zimbabweans, Pakistanis, and a Somali following the attack and looting of their shops, and the torching of their shacks (South African History Online, 2015). On 11 May 2008, in Alexandra township outside Johannesburg, workers in Alexandra's Madala Hostel called a meeting with township residents to discuss the issues relating to crime. On the same day, residents of Alexandra vented their anger at foreigners who were accused of stealing houses (Simpson, 2021: 399). At 22:00, they returned and evicted foreigners from their homes, shouting *Khipha ikwerekwere* (kick out the foreigners) (Simpson, 2021: 399). The respondents cited in the study by Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau (2010: 52) reported that the attacks were orchestrated by Zulu-speakers from Madala Hostel. Alex FM's news editor shared the experiences of what the reporters had witnessed:

Violence started on 11 May evening at Madala Hostel. People were assaulted, others killed. Attacks were planned by Zulus from the hostel; they formed a group and went house to house identifying foreigners. Some people were killed, women were raped. They were running around during the day identifying houses that were going to be attacked at night. Attacks took place late in the night, from 1 am. We got news on Monday morning that foreigners were fleeing to the police and the injured were taken to the clinic for treatment. Things were getting really serious. Before Wednesday, six people had already been killed; some were South Africans. Forty-two people died, many of them were not identified (Misago et al., 2010: 52).

Migration to South Africa has an impact on xenophobic attacks as immigrants living in the country have become easy targets for citizens wanting to vent their frustrations about poverty, unemployment, crime, and the lack of service delivery on migrants. Violent xenophobic attacks on immigrants in South Africa can be explained through the scapegoat theory. In the literature by Stuab (2004), scapegoating can be experienced in situations where one particular group in society has been exposed to difficult and prolonged negative experiences (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5), which affects their ability to improve their daily socio-economic challenges, such as poverty and unemployment. Hence, the relatively deprived group may develop a convincing, widely-shared set of ideologies that lead to the most fatal type of scapegoating, genocide, particularly if the shared ideology is combined with political and socio-economic discontent (Forsyth, 2010: 420).

In relation to the 2008 xenophobic violence, it is believed that the violence was triggered by a human 'tsunami': a mass influx of foreign nationals into South Africa during the period preceding the violence, including lack of border controls that allegedly contributed to the high volumes of irregular migrants (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 7). When putting this into context, the perspective from an *induna* (chief) and the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in Madala Hostel in Alexandra (Gauteng), the influx of foreign nationals in South Africa caused high levels of unemployment and poverty (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022: 7). In the assertions made by the leader of the IFP in Madala hostel in Alexandra

The government is now pampering them and taking care of them nicely; as long as the foreigners are here we will always have unemployment and poverty here in

South Africa [. . .] there was no poverty and unemployment in South Africa before the influx of foreigners [. . .] there is too much of them now, if the government does not do something people will see what to do to solve the problem because it means it's not the government's problem, it is our problem (Misago et al., 2009: 29).

Given the above statement, it is clear that poverty and unemployment remain the key drivers of xenophobic violence in South Africa. Due to the high rate poverty and unemployment in South Africa, xenophobic violence has spread across the country's nine provinces and into rural areas. The most affected provinces are Gauteng, the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and the Eastern Cape (South African History Online, 2015). However, xenophobic violence mostly prevails (but not exclusively) in most poor and economically marginalized informal settlements where citizens, many of internal migrants themselves, and migrants congregate in poor living conditions and they compete for scarce resources, such as jobs and business opportunities, and access to basic services (Misago, 2016: 446).

The 2008 xenophobic violence spread to East Rand townships, inner city Johannesburg and Soweto, and KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, before reaching Cape Town and neighbouring communities (Steenkamp, 2009: 448). The May 2008 violent xenophobic attacks led to the arrest of 1384 people, the looting of 342 foreign-owned shops, while 213 shops were set alight, and the death toll reached 62 (*Mail & Guardian*, 2008). Even though the violence was directed at immigrants, Landau (2011) stated that a third of those who were killed were South African citizens "who had married foreigners, refused to participate in the violent orgy, or had the misfortune of belonging to groups that were evidently not South African enough to claim their patch of urban space". Moreover, due to the intensity of the violence, 100 000 people were displaced, while 670 were wounded, and many women were raped (Polzer, Igglesden & Monson, 2009).

After the 2008 xenophobic violence, South Africa continued to experience xenophobic attacks (Yingi, Ncube & Benyera, 2024). It was reported by the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) (2011), that in most months since mid-2008, there had been at least one attack on groups of foreigners living in the country. South African History Online (2015) stated that between mid-2009 and late 2010, there were at least 20 recorded deaths, more than 40 grievous injuries, some 200 foreign-owned shops

were looted, while over 4 000 people were displaced due to violence directed at immigrants (Misago, 2016: 448). During 2011, more than 120 deaths of foreign nationals (five of them burnt alive) were reported, while 100 were seriously injured, some 1 000 were displaced, and 120 shops owned by foreign nationals were closed due to violence or the enforcement of municipal by-laws (UNHCR ROSA, 2014).

In 2012, the reported incidents of xenophobic violence increased; UNHCR ROSA reported at least 250 incidents of xenophobic attacks, resulting in 140 deaths and 250 seriously injuries (South African History Online, 2015). By March 2014, an estimated 300 incidents of xenophobic violence had taken place against immigrants, an estimated 200 shops were looted, and 900 people were displaced between January and March (UNCHR ROSA, 2014).

Applying the human security perspective, it can be said that xenophobic violence in South Africa poses a threat to the human security of foreigners and native South Africans. The aforementioned incidents of xenophobic violence have negatively affected economic, food, personal, community, political, and health security (see Chapter 3, Table 3). The core of the human security framework revolves around ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’; thus, human security can be assessed through the threats originating from the dangers posed by failed or weak states – all of which prompt policy direction to be framed in the security-development nexus (Newman, 2001: 243).

Sovereign states have an obligation to concentrate on the connection between human rights protection, the reduction of poverty, good governance, and state capacity-building (Chandler, 2008: 435). The concept of human security is based upon common values, instead of focusing exclusively on national interest (Kaldor, 1999). Hence, human security prioritizes the safety of people and communities, the quality of their lives, and their dignity (ibid.). The lack of protection from xenophobia in South Africa has posed a threat to the safety of migrants and local communities, including a lack of respect for human dignity. This can be seen in the labelling of migrants using disparaging terms, such as *Makwerwere*; such treatment places migrants in a powerless situation as they are treated with prejudice in South Africa, which spreads inequality.

The increase in xenophobic violence overwhelmed the South African Police Service (SAPS). This resulted in SAPS needing support from relevant government departments, such as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which assisted in mitigating violent xenophobic attacks, especially during the deadliest May 2008 attacks (Simpson, 2021: 399).

During 2015, South Africa experienced yet another xenophobic attack, mostly against Zimbabweans living in South Africa. The attacks were triggered by the words of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, who said that migrants should “pack their bags and leave” (Longinus & Mbagwu, 2021: 71). In the 2015 xenophobic attacks, as of 20 April, seven people died, while more than 2 000 foreigners were displaced. Another widely documented series of xenophobic attacks occurred in South Africa in 2019. From 25 March to 2 April 2019, violence by South Africans against foreign nationals exploded in South Africa. Xenophobic attacks were directed at foreign truck drivers (Human Rights Watch, 2019), and since March 2019, it was estimated that there were more than 75 attacks on foreign truck drivers and their cargo. According to Human Rights Watch (2019), the attacks occurred mostly on the N3 highway, which connects Durban to Johannesburg. The attacks against foreign truck drivers led to some 200 deaths since March 2018.

The perpetrators of the xenophobic attacks broadly targeted foreign truck drivers, or trucks owned by companies known to employ foreign nationals (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The issued statement by the All Truck Drivers Association (ATDF), whose slogan was “foreign drivers must fall”, called for all foreign truck drivers to resign from their duties by 2 June. Part of the statement read as follows:

To all foreigners who are driving in South Africa, as from 2 June 2019 we no longer want to see you in trucks. We [are] only giving you this month to sort everything and resign [from] the job. If we see any foreign [driver] still driving a South African [registered] truck we don't know what will happen because we are sick of you now, and we are not going to let you take our job (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Based on these remarks from the ATDF, part of the trigger of the 2019 xenophobic violence against foreign truck drivers could be attributed to competition for resources such as jobs. Because the perpetrators of the attacks argued that foreign truck drivers were

taking their jobs, thus, unemployment and poverty cannot be overlooked, as unemployment feeds on poverty. South Africa's high unemployment rates, very high poverty rate and inequality has led to the scapegoating of migrants who are in the country as they are often targeted as a result of the socio-economic woes facing the country. The phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa can be explained through the classical frustration-aggression hypothesis, which is one of the stages of the scapegoat theory (Allport, 1954). Allport (1954) explains that frustration causes aggression and prejudice, and generally, frustrated people select a section of the out-group as "scapegoats" who are blamed for the in-group's woes. In the context of South Africa, the scapegoats are foreigners.

Evans (2009) argues that the negative impact of apartheid, which did not support the development of the human capabilities of black South Africans, did not prepare people to venture into certain work sectors as black South Africans were used as unskilled labour during apartheid. Consequently, this impeded the capacity of black South Africans to be absorbed into certain sectors of work, a situation which resulted in foreigners being considered as more suitable for employment than native South Africans.

This resulted in the agitation and frustration of South Africans who resorted to violence to express their displeasure, and on the periphery, migrants have become easy targets for xenophobic attacks. Although xenophobia continues to be a common occurrence in South Africa, the government has done little to address the situation, apart from adopting the National Action Plan to combat xenophobia in March 2019. However, the Plan has yet to be implemented. Thus, the government is required to assess previous intervention mechanisms during xenophobic violence to determine the failures of their interventions to prevent future xenophobic attacks.

When examining the responses of politicians (especially ANC officials) it is clear that there is a sense of denialism and minimalism about xenophobic attacks (Skota, 2020). For example, following the 2008 xenophobic attacks, the then president, Thabo Mbeki, dismissed the fact that violence was considered xenophobic, but rather argued that the attacks were criminal (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 221). In the assertions by Mbeki:

... [t]he word xenophobia means deep hatred antipathy or hatred of foreigners. When I heard some accuse my people of xenophobia... I wondered what the accusers knew about my people, which I did not know (Simpson, 2021: 400).

The denialism of xenophobia in South Africa by Mbeki could be attributed to the fact that he is a proponent of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance (Nkala & Monyae, 2024). Hence, he denied the existence of xenophobia as it is an embarrassment for an advocate of Pan-Africanism (ibid.).

Denialism of xenophobia by the South African government, together with a weak judicial system in regards prosecuting acts of xenophobia, has led to a culture of latitude and lack of accountability for those responsible for inciting violent attacks (Misago, 2016: 452). Since the earliest xenophobic attacks in South Africa, only a few perpetrators, some of them local government representatives have been charged, while few have been convicted; however, most of those who participated in violent xenophobic attacks are yet to be brought to book and held accountable for their brutal actions (ibid.). Lastly, few efforts have been made to hold mandated institutions, such as SAPS and the intelligence cluster, accountable for their inadequacies to prevent and end xenophobic violence, despite early warning signs (Misago, 2016: 452).

Violent xenophobic attacks have gained attention in popular discourse in the South African context. There is also institutionalized xenophobia, which feeds into violent xenophobic attacks. When considering institutional xenophobia, it manifests through unashamedly xenophobic rhetoric by top-ranking officials (Vanyoro & Ncube, 2018: 79). This was evident in the remarks made by King Goodwill Zwelithini, Herman Mashaba (the former mayor of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality), Bheki Cele, Mosiuoa Lekota, and Bongani Mkgongi (see Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). Landau (2010) states that institutional xenophobia is visible in South Africa through the exclusion of and discrimination against migrants in institutions such as banks, hospitals, the Department of Home Affairs, SAPS, and social service providers.

Harris (2002: 169) stated that “the shift in political power has brought about a range of discriminatory practices and victims, and the ‘foreigner’ is one such victim”. Institutional xenophobia can also be reflected through government and state actions, stated the

SAHRC (2022). Institutionalized xenophobia is seen in the actions of so-called 'street-level bureaucrats', such as health care providers, immigration officers, police officers and policymakers, as they share the common view that foreigners are a threat to South Africa's security. For example, the praxis of state sponsored xenophobia discussed in Sections 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4; and 4.3.5 reflected on the anti-migrant rhetoric using the lenses of relative deprivation, scapegoat, and securitization.

Members of SAPS have been accused of committing acts of state-sponsored xenophobia in South Africa. According to Nyambuya (cited in SAHRC, 2022) "Women risk sexual harassment and violence every time they sell goods on the streets or flea markets, go to work, or take public transportation, and they have little recourse or protection from this violence". In relation to women's experiences of sexual abuse by SAPS, Nyambuya said, "They report that police are indifferent to their claims or ask for bribes or sex in exchange for services" (SAHRC, 2022). What perpetuates this cycle of sexual abuse towards female migrants is the fact that they fear going to the police, as they will be judged on their nationality. Further, in relation to health care services, Nyambuya (2022) stated:

Migrant women in SA faces numerous challenges in accessing public services. They often face difficulties in accessing healthcare services, mistreatment by public health providers, and daily medical xenophobia. These issues are prevalent in clinics and hospitals, highlighting the challenges faced by these women in their daily lives (Nyambuya, 2022 in SAHRC, 2023).

The above statements derived from the findings by Nyambuya (2022) are complementary to what Dr Aaron Motsoaledi (see Section 4.3.5) said that migrants are overcrowding South Africa's healthcare facilities, such as hospitals and clinics; thus, migrants experience xenophobic attitudes in many public healthcare facilities. This shows how xenophobia is institutionalized in South Africa, as highlighted through the restrictive access to basic services and the lack of applying basic human rights by state officials (Abdikirin, 2024).

The outbreak of the Coronavirus-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic exacerbated endemic state-sponsored xenophobia in South Africa (Sekeramayi, 2021). This was evident when migrants were overlooked by the government during the Covid-19 pandemic, and they

were denied access to government relief schemes such as food parcels and vouchers under the Social Relief of Distress Grant (Dratwa, 2024). Moreover, given the stereotypes, such as that migrants are carriers of disease, South Africa's first measure to contain COVID-19 was to build a 40km fence worth 37 million rand on the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa to prevent any "infected or undocumented person" from entering South Africa (Dratwa, 2024). The move by the South African government to build a 40km fence on the Zimbabwean border indicates a securitized approach towards migration. Securitization theory states that national security policy is a well-designed policy by politicians and decision-makers. For instance, labelling immigration a "threat to national security" moves immigration from a normal issue to a high priority issue that requires a rapid response, such as securing state borders to guard against unregulated immigration (McGlinchey et al., 2021).

When looking at statistics of COVID-19 infections in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the former had 1 845 confirmed cases, which was the highest number of infections in Africa, whereas Zimbabwe had only 11 confirmed cases of COVID-19 infections. Therefore, South Africa's measure of constructing a 40km fence cultivated the myth of migrants as dangerous carriers of disease. Even though Zimbabwe had reported a lower number of cases of COVID-19 infections, migrants from the country were still perceived as a threat to South Africa's health security, which shows how migration has become securitized in the country.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, yet another form of xenophobia surfaced in South Africa – digital xenophobia. This form of xenophobia is seen using online xenophobic mentions on social media platforms, such as Facebook and X (Dratwa, 2024). For example, anti-immigrant hashtags such as 'All foreigners must leave', 'We want our country back', or 'Clean Up SA' were widely popular on Twitter (currently known as X) to campaign against the incidence of immigrants in South Africa (Dratwa, 2024). These were used with the hashtag 'Put South Africa First' (see Section 4.3.3), which first emerged on 27 April 2020, and was used over 16 000 times in a single day (Krige, 2020). The impact of these social media hashtags cannot be overlooked, as they are strongly influential in terms of mobilizing support for actions to be taken against migrants living in the country. This was the case with the September 2020 public march to the Nigerian and Zimbabwean embassies, demanding the deportation of their nationals (Dratwa, 2024). This public

march was organized through hashtags on Twitter, such as #23SeptemberCleanSA and the #ForeignersMustGo.

The method in which anti-immigrant movements, such as Put South Africa First and Operation Dudula, operate is that they lobby for the mass deportation of foreigners to restore the self-respect of South Africans, as these groups fear that immigrants from other African countries could sideline South Africans in their own country. These groups also believe that South Africans must claim the jobs, housing, education, and healthcare that legally are theirs (Dratwa, 2024).

The birth of online social movements has led to a change in thinking in the way in which anti-immigrant campaigns are organized in South Africa. Unlike former anti-immigrant protests, which occurred naturally to respond to migrant issues in the country, these organizations mobilize support through online movements, which typically cut across townships and have the power to influence people countrywide.

Due to the high numbers of social media users, easy access to Facebook and X, and the ease of use, this has led to social media platforms being used as propaganda machines for pushing nationalistic and xenophobic views (Krige, 2020). Social media platforms make it easy for citizens to organize and take part in mass xenophobia, including marches and violent attacks. This is because platforms such as Facebook and X are user-friendly; hence, they are used as propaganda tools as they connect a broad audience.

4.4 Chapter summary

South Africa has a long history of international migration that dates to colonization and apartheid. The discovery of natural resources such as gold in the 1800s saw a major expansion of the mining industry, which attracted foreign labour. Chinese, Indian, and African immigrants migrated to South Africa to work in the mines and on the sugar plantations in Natal. With the arrival of democracy in 1994, the number of migrants to South Africa rose, and in the early 2000s, the country recorded a high number of migrants from the African continent.

Among the triggers of international migration, as discussed in this chapter, are political instability, declining economies, conflict and war, political repression, poverty and

unemployment, which are experienced in migrants' country of origin. Migrants to South Africa vary; there are permanent migrants, labour migrants, asylum/refugee seekers, and irregular/illegal migrants. Although these migrants differ based on their reasons for migrating to South Africa, the study found that during xenophobic attacks, a blanket approach applies, as all migrants are painted with the same brush; thus, they are accused of being responsible for the social ills in the country. South Africa grapples with social ills such as high unemployment, poverty, and inequality levels, which are dubbed the triple threat. The triple threat symbolizes relative deprivation, which exists when there is a disconnect in the delivery of resources; thus, causing the poor or marginalized group to revolt. During the incidents of xenophobic violence in South Africa, the triple threat challenges were named as the trigger of xenophobic violence.

Most perpetrators of the xenophobic attacks said that migrants competed for scarce resources such as jobs, business opportunities, houses, and access to basic services. In the 2008 xenophobic attacks, there was a common belief among South Africans that the country was in the midst of a 'human tsunami' from elsewhere in Africa and Asia. This could explain why the attacks were aimed at migrants from Africa and Asia, especially those who owned or ran businesses in the townships. The fact that migrants are blamed for South Africa's triple threat challenges shows that migrants are scapegoated. This validates the rationale behind utilising the scapegoat theory in this study as the theory explains that, in times of observed threats such as poverty, unemployment and inequality, members of the in-group search for a scapegoat to blame for their woes, and normally the scapegoat is members of the out-group.

Migrants living in South Africa are securitized and criminalized, as they are accused of committing all forms of crime. This was seen in statements made by public officials, government departments, the media, anti-immigrant movements, and politicians and civilians. Hate speech is elucidated through the securitization theory, which states that public officials tend to frame issues as security threats and elevate such issues into the political realm to gain wider support. Moreover, populism increases in South Africa, particularly before and during elections. This is seen in certain political parties' manifestos and campaigns, which place migration at the heart of their campaigns. This was also obvious in the period leading up to the 2019 elections, and in 2024, where most political parties' campaigns and manifestos focussed on the governance of migration in South

Africa. This clearly shows how migration has become an important topic of public debate in South Africa and thus it confirms the need to study this phenomenon.

Xenophobia in South Africa manifests in various forms, including violent xenophobia, institutional xenophobia, and digital xenophobia. Although studies conducted prior to this have extensively explored violent xenophobia, there is a dearth of research on institutional and digital xenophobia. Thus, this study has responded to this gap by examining these forms of xenophobia. Institutional xenophobia reveals itself through states' discriminatory practices, such as a lack of protection of migrant rights. This has frequently manifested in South Africa, where migrants suffered human rights abuses at the hands of state officials. Also, with the rise of digital platforms and social media platforms, such as Facebook and X, South Africans have used these platforms to post xenophobic messages. Anti-immigrant online movements have also arisen, such as Put South Africa First and Operation Dudula, both of which advocate for the extradition of foreigners living in South Africa.

Although Operation Dudula was established as a vigilante group to address police criminality in South Africa's townships, it has been accused of violating migrants' rights through illegal search and seizures, which are outside the precepts of the rule of law. It was further argued in this chapter that what allows the actions of organizations such as Operation Dudula and violent xenophobic attacks to continue is the culture of impunity, because those who violate migrant rights often do not feel the might of the law. Lastly, the incidence of xenophobia in South Africa has resulted in human security impacts, such as the loss of life, population displacement, grievous bodily harm, financial losses due to the looting of shops, the loss of personal documents, poverty, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Chapter Five: The nature of migration governance in South Africa

Migration is a fact of life and a force for good. It promotes the exchange of knowledge and ideas and contributes to economic growth. It enables millions of people to pursue opportunities and improve their lives. At the same time, poorly governed migration is a cause of great suffering. It forces people into the cruel realm of traffickers, where they face exploitation, abuse, and even death. It undermines trust in governance and institutions, inflames social tensions, and corrodes our common humanity.

António Guterres, United Nations General Secretary (2023)

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focussed on the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa, using theories adopted in Chapter 2 (theories of migration) and Chapter 3 (theories that explain the causes and impact of xenophobia). The previous chapter explored migration trends and patterns in South Africa. This was done as South Africa is one of the top destinations for migrants from Africa and the rest of the world. As such, it is important to look at which foreign nationals are likely to travel to South Africa, and for what reasons. Given context, the previous chapter elaborated on the various types of migrants in South Africa. In relation to xenophobia, the previous chapter explored what causes xenophobia and how xenophobia threatens the human security of migrants. Xenophobia in South Africa takes many forms, and among the forms discussed in the previous section were violent xenophobia, institutional xenophobia, and digital xenophobia.

In this present chapter, the fourth research question is investigated, namely:

- *What is the nature of migration governance in South Africa?*

This chapter is key to this thesis, as it elaborates on the nature and context of migration governance in an international, continental, regional, and local context. This is done through a critical analysis of the legislative frameworks and policies that control migration in South Africa, although there are numerous frameworks regulating migration in South Africa from the international, continental, regional, and national level. International conventions that are discussed are the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Tau, 2020). The continental framework that is discussed in this chapter is the African Union Protocol on Free Movement of Persons

2018. Within the regional framework, the chapter focuses on the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons 2005.

These instruments were chosen, not only because South Africa is a signatory to them, but because they closely relate to this study, as they provide principles that encourage the protection of refugees and migrant rights. National legislation, such as the 1998 Refugee Act, the 2002 Immigration Act, the White Paper on International Migration 2017, and the Border Management Authority Act 2020 will also be discussed. This legislation is adopted in the study to assist in interrogating immigration and refugee laws, and the nature of the immigration system in South Africa.

5.2 International conventions relating to migration governance

The United Nations (UN), which is a global institution, aimed at ensuring global governance, peace and security worldwide, has developed various international legal instruments to provide sovereign states with a universal framework regulating international migration. These frameworks seek to address issues relating to legal and illegal/irregular migration, the rights of migrants, and the protection of fundamental human rights. For the purpose of this thesis, instruments that will be explored are the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, and the United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 1967 (Tau, 2020).

5.2.1 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) contains a set of articles that advocates for the protection of individual's basic human rights. Given the nature of this study, which focuses on international migration and its impact on xenophobia, the study will look primarily at Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the UDHR, which are concerned with the rights of migrants (Ntuli, 2018: 47). According to Article 13 of the UDHR, "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". The Article states that people are free to move from their place of origin and gain residence in a foreign land (United Nations, 1948). Thus, no form of discrimination should be forced on such people because they are not natives of the host country (Ntuli, 2018: 47).

Further, Article 14 focuses on the rights of asylum seekers, as it states, “Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution; this right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” (Matthew, 2006: 419). Article 15 states, “Everyone has the right to a nationality; no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” (United Nations, 1948).

Articles 13 and 14 advocate for the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers, especially on being recognised in foreign countries (Ramcharan, Magazzeni, M'Bikay & French, 2023). In contrast, all states reserve their right to sovereignty, which grant them the autonomy to either give or deny individuals (particularly immigrants) nationality. The principle of sovereignty is advocated in the concept of political independence; therefore, no state has control over the affairs of another (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). In this regard, although the UDHR was developed for states to observe, the reality is that any sovereign state can adopt migration policies that benefit them; thus, they have the power to decide who should be regarded as a citizen and who should not.

5.2.2 The United Nations Refugee Convention 1951

This legislative framework provides the definition of a refugee and the rights of refugees, including the manner in which refugees should be treated in host countries (Stone, 2020). According to the Convention, a refugee is someone “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin’ due to fear of being persecuted for reasons of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (Ntuli, 2018: 37). The Convention is both a status and rights-based instrument, and it is underpinned by a number of principles. Thus, states need to apply the provisions of the Convention without any form of discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulement (Kapindu, 2014). The provisions of the Convention should be applied without discrimination against race, religion, or country of origin. Considering international human rights law, it reinforces the principle that the Convention needs to be applied without discrimination against sex, age, disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination. Thus, no person should be discriminated against in a manner that impedes their basic human rights and freedoms, stipulated under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948).

The United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951) also stipulates that refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay in host countries, subject to specific exceptions (Eberechi, 2020). According to the Convention, seeking asylum could require refugees to evade immigration rules. Hence, penalties could include being charged with immigration or criminal offences relating to the seeking of asylum or being arbitrarily detained on the basis of seeking asylum (Zimmermann, Dörschner & Macht, 2011). The principle of non-refoulement remains key as it concedes that no reservations or derogations may be made to it. Therefore, no state should expel or return a refugee against their will to a territory that poses a threat to his/her life or freedom (United Nations, 1951).

Lastly, the Convention offers standards on how to treat refugees to guarantee the protection of their basic human rights (Eberechi, 2020). This includes the right to access to the primary healthcare, education, courts, work and the provision of documentation, including refugee travel documents such as a passport (Moyo & Botha, 2022: 80). To benefit from the Convention, asylum seekers should be able to persuade the host country that they need refugee status because their lives will be endangered in their country of origin (Ntuli, 2018: 46). Such dangers can arise from political instability, which often causes people to migrate to other countries because of the impact of violence on their personal safety and security (Tau, 2020), including the inability for children to go to school, poor health systems, and unfair evictions (Human Rights Watch, 2008). For an immigrant officer to decide whether an applicant can or cannot return to their country of origin, the following should be considered: the nature of risks in the country of origin that might pose a threat to the applicant if they return to their country; and what activities the applicant will take on when they return to their country of origin (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Hence, no person should be denied refugee status, especially if they meet such requirements in the host country, and receiving countries should not deny immigrants refugee status by returning them to their countries, especially if they are to be exposed to risks that deprive them of their basic human rights (Ntuli, 2018: 47).

However, it should be stated that there has been a decline in the engagement on the human rights of asylum seekers (Tau, 2020). This signifies the flaws and challenges of the UN Convention on Refugees to accommodate the contemporary and ever-changing state of migration in the world (Kapindu, 2014). For one, there is growing concern among

asylum seekers and refugees, as they are no longer considered as people seeking protection from risks such as political instability in their country of origin; rather asylum seekers and refugees are seen as threats to the security of receiving countries where they seek protection (Ntuli, 2018: 48). Although countries such as South Africa tend to endorse the Convention through many of its immigration policies, such as the Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998, the White Paper on International Migration of 2017, and the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002, the country often fails to uphold the principles of the Convention. For example, as an asylum seeker in South Africa to prove the risks associated with the country of origin often shows up the many complications in the status determination process (Ntuli, 2018: 48).

South Africa as a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention has adopted the Refugees Act (103 of 1998) and the Immigration Act (13 of 2002) to foster the principles of the Convention (Kapindu, 2014). However, these frameworks fall short in ensuring the protection of asylum seekers. As Ngwato (2017: 16) stated, “From the beginning, even when the number of asylum seekers were relatively small, this included access challenges to Refugee Reception Officers, corruption, large backlogs in the processing of asylum applications and appeals, and low-quality refugee status decision-making”. The Refugees Act and the Immigration Act are also restrictive and selective regarding asylum seekers and refugees as they advocate for the consideration of asylum seekers who will be independent when it comes to the individual's status determination and relocation in South Africa's communities. The nature and context of the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act are explained in-depth in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.

The principle of non-refoulement states that no person should be deported to their country where their lives might be endangered through political instability, war, or persecution (Kapindu, 2020). It stipulates that asylum seekers should not be rejected at borders and refugee reception centres, as “all asylum seekers must be granted access to fair and effective procedures for determining their protection needs” (Ngwato, 2017: 20). In the context of South Africa, due to administrative challenges in terms of the processing of residency permits, this often results in non-issuance of the Section 23 permit (Ntuli, 2018: 49). Hence, this has increased the push for the deportation of asylum seekers to their country of origin that they have fled to save their lives (Kapindu, 2020). The approach of the detention and deportation of undocumented migrants in South Africa compromises

the human rights and human security of asylum seekers because when they are deported to their home country, from where they fled, they are likely to experience human rights violations and human security threats such as poverty, unemployment, political violence, or death.

5.3 Continental and regional instruments relating to migration governance

To govern migration process within the African continent, sets of legislative frameworks have been adopted by continental and regional bodies. The former includes the African Union (AU), which was previously known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), whereas the latter includes Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which represent Africa's regions. Given the focus of this study, which uses South Africa as a case study, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which is the REC for Southern African states, will be the key focus. Both the AU and SADC have developed legal instruments that govern the movement of persons (migration) from one country to another. The aim of these frameworks is primarily to complement the international instruments that were discussed in the previous section, which laid out the rights and protection of immigrants and asylum seekers, especially in host countries. The AU and SADC frameworks on migration seek to ensure the free movement of persons within the continent and regions so as to ensure African unity.

5.3.1 The African Union legal frameworks on migration

At a continental level, the AU is a body vested with the responsibility of governing the affairs of African states. As part of its efforts to ensure the safer movement of persons throughout the continent, the AU has adopted legislative frameworks and policies on migration. One of the frameworks adopted at the continental level is the 1969 OAU Convention governing the Specific Aspect of Refugee Problems in Africa (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). Among the objective of the 1969 OAU Convention was to foster cooperation between African states on issues of refugees, and the challenges of refugees in Africa (Tau, 2018: 30). The Convention stipulates that all African states are expected to accept and assist foreign nationals seeking asylum in their respective countries.

African states are bound by the 1969 OAU Convention to assist asylum seekers in obtaining refugee status, settling in the host country, and finding accommodation/shelter, including access to basic services such as water, health, and education (Tau, 2018: 30). Host countries should also aid those who want to return to their country of origin with

transportation and travel documents. The deportation of refugees against their will is prohibited by the 1969 OAU Convention; this includes depriving refugees full access to basic human rights, especially if they conduct themselves within the confines of the laws and the regulations of the receiving/host countries (Majodina, 2002).

What has unfolded in South Africa's immigration system, however, points to something different. The country has adopted policies that promote the detention of "illegal foreigners" for the purpose of deportation (Maunganidze, 2021: 13); thus, this is evident in the 2018 Immigration Act Amendment Bill (which contains the proposed amendments to the 2002 Immigration Act) (see Section 5.4.2). The detention and deportation policy arose from South Africa's response to an inundated immigration system, which faced major backlogs.

In order to foster the free movement of people within Africa, the African Economic Community Treaty, known as the Abuja Treaty, came into effect in 1994 (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). Article 4 of the Abuja Treaty, paragraph 2 (i) stipulates, "the gradual removal, among member states, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment" by Africans across the borders of AU member states. The Article commits African countries to unify by creating opportunities that permit the movement of persons, goods, services, and capital throughout Africa. In 2001, the Constitutive Act of the AU carried over the mandate from the Organization of African Unity⁴ (OAU), and as a result, in 2006 in Bangui, a Migration Policy Framework for Africa was endorsed by AU member states (Hirsch, 2021). The Framework included the right of African citizens to gain employment opportunities in African countries. In January 2018, the AU Free Movement of Persons (AU-FMP) Protocol was adopted at the annual summit of the AU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Hirsch, 2021). Although 32 African states of the AU signed the FMP protocol, in the years since it was adopted, only four member states have endorsed the treaty (Hirsh, 2021).

⁴ The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963, when delegates from 32 African countries convened in the Ethiopian capital city of Addis Ababa, between 22 and 25 May 1963. The OAU sought to establish a United States of Africa. Thus, in the OAU Charter, the objectives of the OAU are to: (a) "Promote unity and solidarity of the African state"; (b) "To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa"; (c) "To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence"; (d) "To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa", and (e) "To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (SA History Online, 2011) <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau>

The adopted AU frameworks and policy on the movement of persons include the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD) of 2006, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa of 2006, and the Plan of Action (2018-2023), the AU Agenda 2063, and the African Passport Initiative (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024).

Although these frameworks and policies explain migration in Africa through different approaches, they all have objectives that oblige African states to progressively remove hurdles to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital, including the right to grant entry permission to immigrants (Amadi, 2023). This is to build a united Africa, where people of the continent can be recognised as one, as they share common historical experiences of European colonialism⁵. As a result of European colonization, Africa was divided through artificial boundaries, following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which prolonged the division of African societies⁶. In order to address the legacies of colonialism in Africa, Article 6 of the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons promote the right of entry, such as the right for African citizens to travel on the continent without visas (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). Article 16 of the Protocol provides for the rights of establishment, which endeavours to empower immigrants in foreign countries, such as granting immigrants the right to have businesses or be employed in any African county; including the right of residence, which promotes the right to become a resident in any African country (African Union, 2018).

Despite the adoption of the frameworks that seek to unify Africa through the free movement of people, goods, services and capital, challenges prevent Africa from achieving these objectives. Among these are the fragmentation of African societies as a

⁵ European colonization in Africa, known as the scramble for Africa, came about because of the Berlin Conference held in 1884, where Bismarck and Jules Ferry, the premier of France, called an international conference of the Great Powers in Berlin. The objective of the conference was to lay ground rules for the development of Africa south of the Sahara (Perry, 2023: 388). During the Berlin Conference, it was decided that a European country had to occupy a territory to claim control over it. This led to a mad race to the interior of Africa, as Europeans rushed to claim territory. The result of the scramble for Africa is a partitioned Africa, which is shown in the map of Africa, which shows many straight (artificial) boundary lines, instead of the irregular lines of natural boundaries like rivers and mountains (Perry, 2013: 388).

⁶ Although Africa was colonized, it worth noting that the Empire of Ethiopia and the territory of Liberia (a country established for slaves freed from the USA) were exempted from European colonization. According to Thompson (2016: 11), European colonization unfolded in this manner: France occupied the North, West and Central Africa, while Britain claimed great portions of West, East, Central and Southern Africa, Portugal took the territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, whereas Belgium was awarded Congo, Italy established control in Libya, Eritrea and part of Somalia, Spain gained control of Morocco, the Spanish Sahara, and Spanish Guinea, and Germany gained territories in the south-west and the east of the continent, including Cameroon and Togoland (Thompson, 2016: 11).

result of colonialism and political instability, which breeds inequality and a lack of development of African states, which leads to countries sending migrants as opposed to receiving immigrants. Such disparities often prompt states that receive high volumes of immigrants to adopt restrictive migration policies in order to secure their national interests. Challenges that prevent the free movement of people include fear of the impact of migrants on the national identities and culture in host communities, epidemics, security, and the fear of being swamped by irregular migrant foreign workers (Nkurunziza, 2015). This results in African states adopting restrictive and selective immigration policies and strict border control (Nkurunziza, 2015). Thus, for the free movement of people to succeed, states should deal with the challenges of migration; if not, Africa's dream of a unified continent, by allowing the free movement of Africans, will not become a reality.

Regarding the AUF-MP Protocol, South Africa was opposed to its ratification. Its position was in line with the SADC stance, which argued that the Protocol would only be implemented when certain pre-existing conditions were met:


- (a) the existence of peace, security and stability in the continent,
- (b) convergence amongst countries with a view to reducing economic imbalances between Member States,
- (c) a phased approach to free movement of persons,
- (d) an effective civil registration systems,
- (e) a reliable movement control systems,
- (f) machine-readable passports compliant with international standards.
- (g) bilateral return agreements,
- (h) African Union legal instruments on extradition,
- (i) An African Union legal instrument on legal mutual assistance,
- (j) An African Union framework on an African Passport and its relationship with the free movement of persons,
- (k) An interface of Movement Control systems with INTERPOL (red notice system) and individual Member States' prohibition/undesirable person's lists and the UN warning lists, and
- (l) the compatibility of ICT systems at ports of entry to facilitate the exchange of information (Hirsh, 2021: 13).

In line with these preconditions, South Africa submitted a *Note Verbale* proposing the inclusion of "preconditions" in phase one of the implementation plan (Hirsh, 2021: 13).

The memorandum stated that Egypt and Algeria supported South Africa in arguing that “it was imperative to enhance civil registration, establish integrated border management systems, enter into bilateral return agreements and strengthen law enforcement at the national level before the right of entry and abolition of visa could be implemented” (Department of Home Affairs of South Africa, 2017: 7a).

The stance taken by South Africa together with SADC member states shows support for the implementation of the AU-FMP Protocol. The free movement of persons in Africa seeks to integrate the African continent and thus accelerate economic development. However, considering the existing challenges and preconditions, the implementation of the free movement of people in Africa and the African Passport “should come into effect through a phased approach in agreement with the principle to protect the sovereignty of member states” (Department of Home Affairs of South Africa, 2017b: 4). Considering the notion of sovereignty, it means that countries can adopt migration policies based on their interests and security considerations; thus, some countries could adopt selective or restrictive migration policies, which restrict the free movement of people in Africa.

Figure 7: Diagram of African Union Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (AU-FMP) to unify African States through free movement of persons



Source: Author’s construct (Mongale, 2025)

5.3.2 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Policy and Legislative Framework on Free Movement of People

SADC was formed in 1992. SADC's formation resembled an anti-colonialism alliance, which sought to decolonize Southern African communities from the 1980s, through the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference. As a REC, SADC remains a building block, which was created to foster the enhancement of the Abuja Treaty through SADC policy and legal frameworks that seek to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, services and capital, which is aligned to the objectives of the AU's policy and frameworks (see Section 5.3.1).

The SADC region comprises 16-member states. In 1995, it adopted a Draft Protocol ⁷ on the free movement of people in the region over a ten-year period (Hirsch, 2021). According to the Protocol, SADC citizens have a right to free entry, residence, and establishment of oneself in any SADC member state (Hirsh, 2024: 22). In 2005, the SADC Protocol was counterposed with a Protocol on the Facilitation in the Movement of People, which was signed by 13 SADC member states, but only six ratified it⁸ (Udensi, 2024). The protocol on the facilitation of free movement progressively aims to remove hurdles to the movement of people within SADC countries (Udensi, 2024).

In its nature, the Facilitation of Movement Protocol made possible visa-free travel, for lawful purposes and for a maximum of 90 days, while residence and establishment rights were referred to domestic legislation (Udensi, 2024), while it encouraged member states to develop bilateral agreements for the free movement of people (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 60). The Protocol seeks to promote sovereign rights by allowing member states to

⁷ Despite the principles of the SADC draft protocol, in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana (which are the richest per capita in the region) the protocol was never implemented due to the resistance of these wealthy countries (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). This position was made based on the premise that different countries are exposed to different challenges, therefore those who are perceived as economic giants of the SADC region will experience high volumes of immigrants from relatively poor countries. For instance, South Africa's position was frankly stated by Mangosuthu Buthelezi (the former minister of Home Affairs) who said, "South Africa is faced with another threat and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live and work. Free movement of people spells disaster" (Amadi, 2019: 111).

⁸ Countries that ratified the SADC protocol on the facilitation of free movement of persons include Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Mozambique, Eswatini, and Zambia (Hirsh, 2021: 12). Given this reality, the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Free Movement of People is ineffective, as it has not reached the required SADC minimum of two-thirds ratification (Amadi, 2019: 142).

decide on the governance of migration through bilateral agreements and national legislation (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024).

The SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons (FMP) obliges member states to facilitate temporary and permanent residency, establishment, and working (Hirsh, 2021). Article 7 of the SADC Protocol on FMP advocates for the coordination of states' national laws, statutory rules, regulations and immigration practices that facilitate the free movement of people in the region (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). The conditions attached to the entry of persons into foreign countries within the SADC region, which are outlined under Article 14(2) of the SADC Protocol-FMP, include “the possession of valid legal and travel documents, the presentation of evidence of sufficient funds to support oneself for the duration of the visit, entry through official ports of entry, and that entry is only granted to persons who are not prohibited immigrants” (Vhumbunu, Adetiba & Mawire, 2023: 18).


To critically evaluate the conditions outlined in Article 14(2) of the SADC Protocol-FMP, although they seek to promote the free movement of persons, they are out of touch with the realities faced by immigrants. For instance, people who are fleeing war-torn countries remain subject to forceful displacements and migration. Hence, it is unrealistic to expect them to meet all the conditions outlined under Article 14(2) of the SADC Protocol-FMP. This is mostly the case with refugees and asylum seekers, who are often compelled to migrate without proper documentation and a lack of finance to support themselves in a foreign country. This means that the free movement of people in SADC can only be allowed if an individual has an authentic reason for migrating from one SADC country to another (Check, 2022: 134). Therefore, intra-region immigrants are subject to the immigration laws of each sovereign state within the SADC region. This clearly indicates that the vision of the free movement of persons in SADC remains a pipe dream. To expand more on to the realities of the former statement, the following section provides an empirical analysis on the state of the free movement of persons in the SADC region.

5.3.3 Empirical analysis on the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Free Movement of People

The Southern African region has a long history of cross-border migration (see Chapter 1, Section 1). Main drivers of migration in Southern Africa include the search for better

economic opportunities, family reunification, education opportunities, and trade. Conversely, international migration in the SADC region is prompted by citizens escaping countries exposed to political instability, and those vulnerable to environmental threats and climate change shocks (Maunganidze, 2024). Although cross-border migration remains widespread in the SADC region, there is a need to critically compare the status of free movement in SADC with other regions in Africa. This comparison is done to assess the progress SADC has made in terms of the implementation of the free movement of people compared to other regions. Figure 8 below shows that the RECs of ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD and CEN-SAD perform better than SADC in terms of the implementation of measures that facilitate the free movement of people within their regions.

Figure 8: The state of the implementation of free movement of people in SADC and other RECs



Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)/African Union (AU)/African Development Bank (AfDB, 2022)

Although these high-performing RECs have not fully implemented the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, they appear to be making progress in facilitating the free movement of people within their regions (see Figure 8 above). They have adopted several mechanisms in facilitating the free movement of persons (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). For instance, the EAC introduced the East Africa Passport (with diplomatic, service and ordinary categories) in January 2018 (Vhumbunu, Adetiba & Mawire, 2023: 20) as a travel document to ease intra-EAC travel for citizens of the EAC.

The East African Passport has a six month's multiple entry validity, and it is valid for a period of ten years (East African Community, 2017). The progress made by EAC in facilitating the free movement of people can be seen in the adoption of the East African Tourist Visa (EATV) by some EAC member states (Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda). The EATV is a single-entry travel permit for tourists from these member states to travel across the three countries using a single document (Ngoza et al., 2021).

The progress made by EAC in managing and facilitating the free movement of people serves as a key lesson for other RECs (Amadi, 2022) (see Figure 8) that perform poorly in implementing the free movement of people within their regions. In December 2000, ECOWAS introduced the ECOWAS passport, which enabled visa-free movement by ECOWAS citizens (Vhumbunu, Adetiba & Mawire, 2023: 20). Hence, there are no visa requirements for citizens of ECOWAS member states who want to travel within the ECOWAS region (Liwaaddine, 2015). The status of the facilitation of the free movement of people in ECOWAS (see Figure 8) reflects the success of the region's implementation of the free movement of people (Zanker, Arhin-Sam, Bisong & Jegen, 2020), as the region scored higher between 2016 and 2019⁹ (see Figure 8).

In this regard, ECOWAS remains a key region that serves as a good exemplar, especially in terms of governing the process of migration holistically. Instead of securitizing migration, the ECOWAS community has harmonized migration governance, leading up to common consensus among all member states on the rights of entry, residence, and establishment (Zanker et al., 2020). This key step promoted the implementation of the free movement of people in their region. When considering the status of the free movement of persons in the SADC region (see Figure 8), out of eight RECs recognized by the AU, the SADC region performed better than only three RECs – ECCAS, AMU, and COMESA (Vhumbunu, Adetiba & Mawire, 2023:20).

In the following analysis, the thesis explores the nature and status of the implementation of the free movement of persons in the SADC region. This region is given special attention because of its significance to the South African case study. Thus, to understand the

⁹ Figure 8 shows that ECOWAS and EAC are the two regions with high scores in terms of facilitation of the free movement of people in their regions; hence, these two regions were given special attention.

dynamics of South Africa's response to cross-border migration, it is important to also reflect on the regional approach towards the facilitation of cross-border migration.

The SADC region adopted the protocol on the facilitation of free movement of people in SADC. However, despite the adoption of the SADC Protocol on FMP in 2005, the Protocol remains ineffective because it has not been ratified by the required two-thirds of the SADC member states, as prescribed by Article 36 of the SADC Protocol on FMP (Hirsh, 2021). Although the ratification of the SADC Protocol is progressing slowly, progress has been made through bilateral and (smaller) multilateral agreements amongst SADC member states for the facilitation of free movement (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). For instance, even though there is no single adopted and effective policy of free movement in the SADC region, citizens of SADC countries can move within the region fairly freely, at least for a short stay (Udensi, 2024). For instance, citizens of SADC member states do not require visas when travelling to Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia have also eased the requirement for visas for other SADC member states (Maunganidze, 2024).

Some of the provisions of the Protocol make it difficult to implement the facilitation of the free movement of people in SADC (Hirsh, 2021) (see Section 5.3.2). Due to the challenges in meeting legal provisions and conditions attached to the free movement of people in the SADC region, this has led to the illegal entry of immigrants into other SADC countries (Tau, 2020). As indicated in Section 5.3.2, the provision that admission of entry is subject to the presentation of evidence of sufficient funds to maintain themselves for the duration they will spend in a host country, including the 90-day maximum visa-free entry per year provision, remains as an obstacle to many migrants in the SADC region (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024). Thus, to evade the legal provisions and conditions of migration, SADC region citizens have participated in illegal migrations within the region.

In order to combat challenges, including illegal border crossings within the SADC region, in 2000 SADC together with International Organization for Migration (IOM) established the Migration Dialogue Process for Southern Africa (MIDSA). This is a non-binding regional review process that allows SADC member states to participate in issues of migration and ways to improve inter-state cooperation on the governance of migration in the region. This platform enables SADC member states to share their experiences and

the challenges faced by migration governance; it also allows SADC member states to jointly find ways to improve the governance of migration in the region (Maunganidze, 2024). Broader issues outlined during MIDSA were issues of border management, combating irregular migration (including smuggling and human trafficking), migrant health, development, migration governance, and data exchange (Maunganidze, 2024). In this regard, the MIDSA platform creates a space where SADC member states can jointly deliberate appropriate instruments to ensure the suitable management of migration. The main intended outcome of MIDSA is to ensure the development of regional institutional capacities to improve migration governance and thus strengthen the capability of governments to be able to ease the challenges associated with migration.

Regarding human development in the SADC region, most SADC migrants are so impoverished that they are unable to provide evidence of sufficient funds to immigration officials at the port of entry (Vhumbunu et al., 2023: 21). In cases where they can produce this evidence of sufficient funds to sustain themselves in host countries, most of them struggle to meet the visa extension requirements or application requirements for other visas/work permits that would enable them to extend their stay and work in host countries (Vhumbunu et al., 2023: 21). Hence, these tribulations often lead SADC migrants to live in their host countries as undocumented immigrants, which makes them susceptible to exploitation, corruption by law enforcement agencies, hostile attitudes, and violent attacks such as xenophobia, including discrimination in accessing basic services.

The strict conditions of entry and the stringent visa requirements in SADC has led to a surge in the use of illegal border crossing points within SADC migration streams and cross-border trade (Vhumbunu, 2020). Beitbridge Border Post in Limpopo, South Africa, serves as a good example (Tau, 2020). There have been reports that migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and cross-border traders from the SADC countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and the DRC use irregular and illegal border crossing points using “paid escorts” (Ncube, 2017). The escorts use canoes and floaters after the rainy season to transport illegal or irregular migrants across the Limpopo River, and then connect them to Musina Town, in Limpopo Province, South Africa (Mabeba, 2021). Irregular and illegal cross-border migration is well-coordinated within the Limpopo River area; this is evident from the use of commuter omnibus drivers/cross-border drivers (known as *Omalayitsha*) (Tshivhashe, 2020).

The challenge of illegal migration in SADC is perpetuated by the high cost of obtaining visas and passports (Tau, 2020), while it is a lengthy process to obtain these travel documents. This leads to an increase in illegal migration as they tend to resort to alternative ways to enter capital-rich countries such as South Africa (Tsheola, 2008). Thus, socio-economic factors are closely linked to irregular migration, as they drive irregular migration because people are often forced to migrate to neighbouring countries in search of a better life, job opportunities, and social security (Tsheola, 2008).

The process of illegal/irregular migration in the SADC region is aggravated by corrupt border control officials, as they demand bribes to grant illegal migrants a safe passage to their destination (Tshivhashe, 2020). This method is used by irregular/illegal migrants to avoid official exit/entry points at the Beitbridge Border Post, given the reality that immigrants might have either entered South Africa illegally or would have overstayed their visa period in the country. Overstaying is a serious offence that attracts a hefty fine, including a ban from entering South Africa for a specific period based on the duration of the overstay (Vhumbunu et al., 2022). Moreover, if illegal/irregular migrants stay in South Africa after their visa period has expired, they could be imprisoned, particularly those who cannot afford to pay the required fine¹⁰ (Vhumbunu et al., 2022: 22).

Apart from the discussed challenges associated with the strict conditions of entry and stay imposed on migrants in some SADC member states, another challenge faces immigrants in foreign countries. The emergence of anti-migrant sentiments in certain SADC countries, directed at other SADC citizens, is a hurdle to the free movement of people in the region. In South Africa, xenophobia manifests as a collective form of violence. Xenowatch¹¹ recorded 942 incidents of xenophobic violence in South Africa

¹⁰ According to the Immigration Act Number 13 of 2002, “a South African visa overstay of less than 30 days attracts a ban of a period of 12 months during which one is given the status of an ‘undesirable person’, and if a traveler overstays their visa for over 30 days, the effective ban will be for at least five years, and one is also given the status of an ‘undesirable person’. In both instances, visa overstay attracts imprisonment if one is not able to pay a fine” (Immigration Act Number 13 of 2002).

¹¹ Xenowatch is a tool used to monitor xenophobic discrimination across South Africa. The statistics it has calibrated indicate that between 1994 and October 2024, there have been an average of “1125 + recorded incidents of xenophobic discrimination”. Drawing from these incidents, research indicates that an estimated 659 people have lost their lives as a result, with a number of 128 458 displaced persons, and an average of 5428 shops that have been looted or targeted as a result of the xenophobic incidences in the past 30 years of South Africa’s democracy.

since 1994, resulting in 642 deaths, 123 760 people were displaced, and 4849 shops were looted during xenophobic attacks (Xenowatch, 2022).

The next section focusses on the nature of migration governance in a South African context; thus, key legal frameworks and policies governing migration are discussed.

5.4 Migration governance discourse in post-apartheid South Africa

South Africa is generally considered as one of the most advanced and diversified country in Africa and the rest of the world (Oluwaseun & Olusola, 2017: 42). As one of the economically better-off countries in Africa, it continually attracts immigrants from Africa and the rest of the world (Seda, 2015). In response to this, the post-1994 government adopted legal frameworks and policies that regulate migration. Moreover, by espousing a liberal democracy, the South African government committed itself to respect the constitutional and international duties that consider the rights of everyone who lives in the country (Albertyn, 2019: 752). This includes the commitment to enhance regional integration through the free movement of people within Southern Africa (SADC, 2005). Despite this, the country has fallen short in upholding these commitments (Ntlama, 2018: 40), as shown in the previous section (5.3.3). These discrepancies regarding the commitment to protecting human rights, and Africa's integration through the free movement of people, will be explored in this section to determine the extent to which South Africa's migration governance contrasts with its obligations to protect human rights and to ensure the free movement of persons through its legislation.

Since 1994 the country undertook lengthy processes to champion migration policies and legislation. This included the 1997 Green Paper on International Migration, the 1999 White Paper on International Migration (Mphepo, 2021: 102) and a related Draft Immigration Bill, and the adoption of the first broad Immigration Act in 2002, which has since been amended (Mphepo, 2021: 102; DHA White Paper, 2017: 10). Some processes of the development of migration legislation and policies include the 2017 White Paper on International Migration, which stemmed from consultations, conferences and workshops with stakeholders, including parliamentary proceedings (Mphepo, 2021: 102). In 2020, the National Assembly enacted the Border Management Authority (BMA) Act 2 of 2020 to create a single authority that oversees the movements of people and goods,

and to expand the mandate of the DHA¹² to “incorporate all aspects of the governance of international migration”, performed by other state departments such as defence, policing, and customs administration (Sepeng, 2021: 5). The BMA Act aims to strengthen South Africa’s national security bodies’ existing powers and responsibilities (Sepeng, 2021: 5).

5.4.1 Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998

The post-1994 democratic government in South Africa adopted the Refugee Act (No. 130 of 1998) as legislation that governs international migration, with a specific focus on regulating the process of seeking asylum. This was done in alignment with the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol on Refugee Law¹³, and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention¹⁴. The 1998 Refugees Act included:

progressive legislation for refugees and asylum seekers, extending the right to freedom of movement, basic human rights and security and self-sufficiency including education, employment, and other basic services such as healthcare, and rejected the practice of encampment... The Act of 1998 contained the guiding principles protecting refugees and asylum seekers against refoulment, prosecution for irregular entry into the country, or deportation unless there was a threat to national security or ‘public order’ (Moyo & Botha, 2022: 80).

¹² In South Africa, multiple actors are involved in shaping migration policy and debates. At the national level, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is responsible for leading matters relating to migration. The department is vested with the responsibility to oversee civic and immigration matters, including the management and regulation of inbound and outbound migration of the country. Amongst other entities that perform the duties relating to migration and migrants’ presence are the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the Department of Social Development (DSD), Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), the Department of Human Settlement (DHS), the Department of Health (DoH), the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) (Maunganidze, 2021:12).

¹³ The 1967 Protocol broadens the applicability of the 1951 Convention. The 1967 Protocol removes the geographical and time limits that were part of the 1951 Convention. These limits initially restricted the Convention to persons who became refugees due to events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951. Article 1A, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Convention applies the term “refugee”, first, to any person considered a refugee under earlier international arrangements. Article 1A, paragraph 2, read now together with the 1967 Protocol and without the time limit, then offers a general definition of the refugee as including any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political opinion (Goodwin-Gill, 2008).

¹⁴ The OAU convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa is often applauded for its inclusive and accommodating definition for refugees, going beyond the definition provided in the 1951 UN Refugees Convention (see footnote 10). “The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of foreign nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside this country of origin” (OAU, 1969).

The Refugee Act of 1998 was adopted to assist the South African government in regulating an asylum seeker's entry into the country. Thus, asylum seekers should follow the principles in this legislation without contradicting the aforementioned international laws, such as "the non-refoulment principle found in international law, which holds that individuals may not be returned to countries where they may face risk to life or liberty" (Kapindu, 2020; Amit, 2012: 17). In its governance of migration, the South African government established Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) to avoid establishing refugee camps for refugees and asylum seekers (Muchiri, 2016). According to Section 22 (1) of the Refugees Act, "The Refugee Reception Officer must, pending the outcome of an application in terms of Section 21 (1), issue to the applicant an asylum permit in the prescribed form, allowing the applicant to sojourn in the Republic temporarily, subject to any conditions determined by the Standing Committee, which are not in conflict with the Constitution or International law, and are endorsed by the Refugee Reception Officer on the permit" (Republic of South Africa Government Gazette, 1998: 14).

The choice by the South African government to avoid encampment, combined with a lack of integration or accommodation strategies for refugees, has fostered the perception among poor South Africans that immigrants living among them were "undocumented and compete for social and economic resources" (Crush, Skinner & Stulgaitis, 2017: 10b). This perception could trigger hostile attitudes towards immigrants, which takes the form of violent xenophobic attitudes (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1).

When looking at the praxis in terms of the governance of asylum seekers, post-apartheid South Africa has made efforts to allow asylum seekers to work, study, and move around the country freely (Moyo, 2020). Thus, South Africa has become attractive to refugees from all over Africa and it remains one of the top hosts of refugees on the continent, but also for refugees from other parts of the world, such as from Bangladesh and Pakistan (Moyo, 2020). Despite the progress made by post-1994 South Africa, there seems to be a disconnect between what exists on paper and emerging practice (Dodson & Crush, 2015). In South Africa, asylum seekers are granted a transit visa on arrival, upon which they must present themselves to the Refugee Reception Office (RRO), which is the authority falling under the DHA. Although the processing of transit visas for asylum seekers has to be done in accordance with international and domestic laws, what is apparent in South Africa is that the RROs have faced criticism for capacity problems,

corruption, and the purposeful rejection of initial asylum applications (Moyo, 2020). According to findings from an earlier study of Vigneswaran et al. (2010), “Many [DHA] officials simply assume that it is their obligation to shore up South Africa’s porous borders, by deterring, undermining, and denying applications for asylum status in South Africa”. Moreover, Amnesty International (2019) said that there has been a rejection rate of around 90% for initial applications for asylum status in South Africa (Moyo, 2020). This indicates the lack of protection of refugees’ rights to be granted refuge in South Africa, actions which contrast with international, regional, and domestic conventions on refugees.

The South African government has opened RROs in Durban, Musina, Tshwane, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. However, since 2011, only three out of the six offices were fully functional (Durban, Musina and Tshwane), whereas the Port Elizabeth office was partially reopened in 2018.

Given this situation, asylum seekers battle to renew their permits, because they have to travel long distances and wait in long queues, which could take up to years (Chiyangwa, 2022). According to the UN Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) (2016), in 2015, South Africa experienced a backlog of over a million asylum claims at numerous stages of the process, which was the highest backlog worldwide. In 2019, the UNHCR reported 188 296 pending asylum cases (UNHCR, 2020). Due to the high volumes of pending cases for asylum, a 2019 audit of the immigration process at the DHA stated that it would take 68 years to resolve the backlog (Moyo, 2020). Hence, the issues with processing asylum applications have exacerbated the vulnerability of immigrants in South Africa. This was evident in the previously discussed illegal searches and seizures of undocumented migrants by anti-immigrant movements, such as Operation Dudula, including members of SAPS, with the aim of deportations. Hence, this indicates how xenophobia in South Africa is not only violent, but takes the form of institutionalized xenophobia (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5).

Tying up with the aforementioned, Moyo (2020) stated that many asylum seekers were stuck in Musina (Limpopo) as they waited for their initial Section 22 permits, which often took a few months to process. Thus, left without government’s humanitarian assistance, many of them were dependent on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) for their basic

survival. According to responses from interviews and Focus Group Discussions conducted by Moyo (2020), a Musina resident interviewed concluded that “the government is not protecting refugees because if we look at the places where refugees stay, you can tell it’s not safe, not protected” (Focus Group with Youth, Musina, March 2020, see Moyo 2020). In addition, a human rights lawyer interviewed telephonically reflected on the “layers of trauma” that asylum seekers experienced, including the “administrative violence inflicted by our asylum system’s dysfunction” (Interview Advocacy Organization, Telephone, March 2020; see Moyo, 2020). The violent treatment of asylum seekers at the hands of state officials denotes elements of state-sponsored xenophobia, which was explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2).

The conditions that refugees are exposed to thus reflect negligence by the South African government to adhere to international, continental, and regional conventions, and a framework that seeks to protect the human rights of migrants in host communities (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). One may argue that the lack of the will by the government to protect refugees’ human rights could be attributed to the perception that refugees are in South Africa to exploit the asylum system and the country’s economic opportunities (at the expense of citizens). This is despite the fact that refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa are often people who have left their country due to challenges such as fleeing conflict, poverty, political instability, and persecution. Hence, most refugees are economically marginalized and unskilled migrants, who are deemed a burden rather than a benefit to South Africa’s economy.

Although the Refugee Act of 1998 used a rights-based approach that gave migrants a right to work, education, and freedom of movement, this has changed due to several amendments of the act over the years (2008 to 2020) – a situation that indicates inconsistencies in migration governance in South Africa (Sepeng, 2019: 40). Similarly, Moyo (2020: 9) states that the Refugee Act of 1998 has been amended three times (2008, 2011, and 2017), although the amendment acts became effective in January 2020. These amendments were done in the hope of reducing the backlog of asylum claims and thus serve a purpose of “filling the gaps in the policy” especially those related to the high volume of asylum claims (Interview ANC Politician, Johannesburg, February 2020, see Moyo 2020: 9). Contrary to the reducing the backlog of asylum claims, the reality is that seeking refuge in South Africa has become increasingly hard. The amendments made in

the Refugee Act signify a restrictive regime, for instance, Section 22 (12 and 13) of the Refugee Amendment Act 2017 states that permits are considered “to be abandoned 30 days” after they have failed to be renewed. This leaves asylum seekers vulnerable to arrest and deportation, which are in violation of the principle of non-refoulment.

The amendment of the Refugee Act of 2017 included other changes, which increases the restriction of the right to work (Amnesty International, 2019). This is reflected in Section 12 (5) of the Refugee Regulations and 2017 Amendment Act, which states that “asylum seekers should declare their financial status on arrival”, and if deemed to be able to sustain themselves for at least four months – or have access to UNHCR provisions – are “*not* granted the right to work” (Sawa, 2016). In addition, Article 5 (3) of the Refugee Regulations states that the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs is tasked to determine “the sectors within which an asylum seeker is not permitted to work or study” (Sawa, 2016). Restrictions that go beyond working rights include the time between obtaining a transit visa and having to report to an RRO, which has been reduced to five days, according to the 2017 Amendment Act. Failure by refugees to apply for a transit visa leads to in severe penalties. A human rights activist interviewed in the study by Moyo (2020) stated, “What they are doing is using the current system to make it impossible to access the asylum system, that’s what these regulations are doing” (Interview Human Rights Organisation, Johannesburg, February 2020, see Moyo 2020: 10). Conversely, narrowing access and increasing penalties has led to the bribery of Home Affairs officials to allow applicants to jump queues and obtain certification (Hirsh, 2024: 13).

The South African government has been proposing to exit key international conventions and then re-enter them with reservations pertaining to the areas of education, employment, social services, and the principle of non-refoulment. In the draft White Paper on International Migration 2017, it is argued that South Africa committed a “serious mistake” by entering the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, disregarding the reservations in the previously mentioned areas (Hirsh, 2024: 14). The proposition by South Africa to exit international conventions relating to the status of refugees indicates its shift from a human-rights approach towards international migration, towards applying a restrictive and selective attitude when it comes to choosing who should enter the country, and which benefits or opportunities they should enjoy.

5.4.2 Immigration Act of 2002

The Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (hereafter referred to as the Immigration Act) was adopted to regulate immigration to South Africa. It provides for the different available “categories of permits and visas, the process for exemption from the available mechanisms, and the processes that relate to detention and deportation” (South African Human Rights Commission, 2020: 10).

The Immigration Act has also created a category of class and professionalism that caters for a particular group of migrants into the country (Sepeng, 2019: 39). The primary function of the Act is to prevent irregular migration and to promote the migration of skilled labour. Thus, the Immigration Act is restrictive as it renders no migratory pathway for low-skilled workers or so-called “economic migrants” (South African Human Rights Commission, 2020: 10). The Act further established community measures that provide citizens with the responsibility to report sightings of foreigners, while enhancing border monitoring (Segatti, 2011). Moreover, the Immigration Act indicates that the South African approach to migration revolves around favouring ‘high skilled’ migrants who are welcome to apply for different visas available through the Immigration Act of 2002¹⁵.

The Immigration Act of 2002 has been amended several times, such as the Amendment Acts of 2007 and 2011, which came into power with the publishing of the Immigration Regulations of 2014. These amendments differentiate between the visas for temporary residence and permits for permanent residence (Moyo & Zanker, 2020: 11). Under the Immigration Act of 2002, foreign migrants can apply for a critical skills work visa, even if they do not have a job, and they are given 12 months to search for employment. When critically evaluating the nature of the Act, it is biased towards people who have high level skills or capital; thus, the legislation is rooted in restrictions. This leads to low- and mid-skilled workers being exploited, working on farms, mines and in domestic work, as they are required to migrate under temporary Corporate Work Visas (promoted by Bilateral Labour Agreements) (Department of Home Affairs, 2017: 4).

¹⁵ The Immigration Act of 2002 has replaced the Aliens Control of 1991 (as amended through the Aliens Control Act of 1995).

Although South Africa has made key developments in easing international migration (Udensi, 2024), the Immigration Act of 2002 signifies a protectionist measure by the government, as it limits legal labour immigration (Ellis & Segatti, 2011). In addition, Ellis and Segatti (2011) suggest that the Immigration Act has made it difficult for employers to recruit foreign workers on work permits because of onerous and lengthy procedures and certificates. The Immigration Act has created an exclusionary immigration regime in South Africa, as the legislation fails to address the reality of most low-skilled migrants coming into the country (Peberdy, 2009). For one, migrants who are eligible for critical skills and business visas accounts are a fraction of migrants entering South Africa, while most migrants are low- and semi-skilled workers (Peberdy, 2009). Further, the Immigration Act is exclusionary in terms of gender, with the male bias towards access to property, resources, and education discriminating against female migrants (Vanyoro, 2019).

Under the Immigration Act of 2002, the DHA gained powers to “apprehend”, detain, and deport any person considered an illegal foreigner, who is not a South African citizen, and who entered the country in a manner that contravenes the Immigration Act (Immigration Act, 2002; Section 3(1) (g)). The Immigration Act further sets out the categories of persons who are prohibited from entering the country: “those who are carrying infectious or communicable diseases, persons wanted for the commission of serious crimes likes genocide or terrorism”; also, people who were previously deported and not rehabilitated, a member of a group who advocates for racial hatred or for the use of crime and terrorism, and any person found with a fraudulent visa, passport permit, or identification document (Handmaker & Nalude, 2021: 17).

The number of deportations of persons regarded as ‘illegal foreigners’ or ‘undocumented persons’ peaked in 2013 at 113 079. However, in the 2018/2019 reporting cycle, a total of 24 266 deportations were recorded. This showed a drop in the number of deportations compared to those in 2013. Although the South African government has been regulating irregular migration by deporting those who are deemed to be in the country illegally, as prescribed by the Immigration Act, this appeared to be ineffective. For example, Allais (2013) states that most deportees return to South Africa through unlawful migration routes and re-enter the country shortly after deportation; this is called “the revolving door syndrome”.

The practice of deportation contrasts with international conventions on the status of refugees (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2), such as the principle of non-refoulment. Through detentions, the DHA has been violating the Refugee Act 130 of 1998 and the Constitution (1996). Cases were reported where immigrants were held beyond 48 hours before they could determine their immigration status, including the detention of persons who are protected under the Refugees Act (Amit, 2012: 29). This situation was summed up in an open letter to the President of South Africa on World Refugee Day 2018, by Lawyers for Human Rights, which stated:

... it appears that the immigration system does not now operate as it should. It has come to the attention of the public that people are wrongfully and unlawfully detained under the current immigration legislation; that the process of arrest and detention of would-be immigrants is arbitrary and, therefore, violates the rights of citizens and other residents; that corruption and bribery are rife; that those detained in cells in South Africa's main awaiting-repatriation detention facility are often subjected to inhumane treatment and indignity; [i]f the composition of the population at the Lindela repatriation facility is anything to go by, it would suggest that only people of African origin are arrested and deported as illegal aliens (LHR, 2018).

This commentary by the Lawyers for Human Rights (2018) highlights that African immigrants in South Africa are exposed to arbitrary arrest and deportation, actions which places migrants' lives in danger, because those detained are often subjected to inhumane treatment. As such, this indicates the disregard for the protection of human rights in executing immigration laws in South Africa, which perpetuates the human (in)security of the migrant community.

5.4.3 White Paper on International Migration 2017

One of the policies that were adopted to regulate international migration is the White Paper on International Migration of 2017. This policy stresses the importance of knowing a person's identity and their civil status for national security and the safety of the public (SAHRC, 2024: 11). The White Paper is a more security-oriented policy, which emphasises the security of South Africa, as the policy asserts that the country has "become an attractive destination for irregular migrants (undocumented migrants, border

jumpers, over-stayers, smuggled and trafficked persons) who pose a threat to the economic stability and sovereignty of the country” (White Paper on International Migration, 2017: 35).

The White Paper on International Migration (WPIM) 2017 presents six key approaches (Maunganidze, 2021: 13). First, the policy sets out a risk-based and securitization approach to migration to secure South Africa’s sovereignty and the protection of citizens. Second, the policy seeks to eradicate a system that perpetuates irregular (illegal) migration, which in turn “leads to unacceptable levels of corruption, human rights abuses and national security risks” (Maunganidze, 2021: 13). Third, the WPIM reflects on the challenge of national attitudes towards the migration process; fourth, the policy probes the gaps between South African legislation and the SADC objectives; and fifth, the policy aims to do away with the system that perpetuates “colonial patterns of labour production and trade” by reversing the right to migrate for those who have high skill levels, including capital (WPIM, 2017). Lastly, the WPIM aims to expand high-skilled immigration, considering the national preference for employment (WPIM, 2017).

Given these six approaches, the WPIM (2017) indicates a protectionist and securitized approach towards migration. The policy shows that the ANC-led government prioritizes national security in its approach towards migration, which is done through selective migration policies that restricts who should enter the country and who is restricted (WPIM, 2017). The White Paper has also produced restriction measures, such as removing the automatic right to work and study for asylum seekers (WPIM, 2017: 61).

The White Paper further promotes the liberalization of the visa system for some economic migrants from South Africa’s neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration into the country (Ugwu, 2019). The challenge of irregular migration is informed by the immigration system in South Africa, which tends to be laborious in processing permits for asylum seekers, such as Section 22 permits (RRA, 1998). As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, South Africa’s refugee processing system is characterized by heavy backlogs. Many asylum seekers wait for years while their asylum applications are being processed, which results in the burgeoning of the number of asylum seekers (Charles, 2012).

In addition, South Africa has the highest rejection rate – 90 per cent – of asylum seekers. This high number of rejections of asylum seekers is often used by the government to justify its restrictive and selective measures in its migration policies (White Paper on International Migration, 2017), even though the DHA has adopted restrictive measures to regulate immigration by reducing the incentives for migrants to apply for asylum, hoping to decrease the number of claims and thus pave the way for a more transparent and responsive system. The DHA is reluctant to acknowledge that the asylum system not only battles high volumes of applications, but also a defective processing system, which exacerbates the high number of pending applications (Maunganidze, 2021: 13).

Although the DHA faces a backlog in terms of processing asylum seekers applications, there seems to be a prejudice against African migrants, especially when compared to migrants from Europe and other parts of the world. This is supported by a business leader interviewed by Hirsh (2024: 11) who said, “There seems to be a differing view between immigration from Africa as against immigrants from Europe and elsewhere ... when businesses talk to us, they seem to be having more progress in dealing with blockages ... for people coming from parts of the world outside of Africa, not for those from Africa”. Thus, it can be said that the backlogs in terms of processing asylum seekers’ applications is socially constructed as it appears to work well when it comes to processing visa applications for immigrants from Europe and other parts of the world, whereas the system appears challenged when it comes to processing visa applications for African immigrants.

In this regard, South Africa’s immigration system is biased, and takes an exclusionary and restrictive approach towards selecting immigrants from Africa. This approach is securitized as immigrants from Europe are perceived as contributors to the country’s economy and development, whereas African immigrants are seen as security threats who compete for jobs with local communities, participate in crime, and exploit the country’s public institutions, such as healthcare facilities, schools, and Home Affairs.

The DHA has faced litigation regarding its restrictive governance of migration, as between 2016 and 2017, over 1200 immigration and 1900 asylum litigation cases were brought against the DHA (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2020). As a reflection on the asylum system, the statements made by the judges who overturned rejections pointed to the fact that the system is “incompetent” and “deplorable” and they further accused DHA officials

of “showing blatant disregard for the law, dereliction of duty and bad faith” (African News Agency, 2018).

The creation of asylum-processing centres (APCs), as proposed in the White Paper 2017, further show that the approach taken by the DHA is moving towards a process of encampment. In creating APCs, asylum seekers would remain there for the duration of the determination process (Maunganidze, 2021). Even though the DHA does not label these processing centres as detention facilities, the practice mirrors detention facilities. Like any other encampment facility, these APCs are a fertile breeding ground for human rights violation. The establishment of APCs also has financial implications for the government as building a single APC costs about R298 million, excluding operational costs (White Paper on International Migration, 2017). Inspired by the European-style centres, the creation of APCs was based on the idea that every asylum claim would be processed before an asylum seeker could relocate to anywhere in South Africa (WPIM, 2017:61). Therefore, the government take care of the basic needs of asylum seekers who were kept in APCs while their applications were being processed (WPIM, 2017: 61).

In this regard, the establishment of APCs reflects a stricter regulation of freedom of movement as through previous legislation, such as the Refugee Act 1998, asylum seekers and refugees were allowed to live in local communities while their asylum claims and refugee status were being processed. The establishment of APCs shows South Africa’s move from human rights protection to a securitized approach towards migration. Hence, instead of integrating immigrants into local communities while they wait for their immigration documents, the DHA has adopted an encampment approach through APCs.

Moreover, APCs share similarities with detention centres. For example, the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 authorizes the DHA to detain undocumented migrants at Lindela Repatriation Centre for the process of deportation. On the other hand, the creation of APCs was based on the idea that every asylum claim would be processed before an asylum seeker could relocate to any place within South Africa. Therefore, detention centres and APCs house immigrants who are either awaiting deportation from South Africa back to their countries, while APCs house immigrants waiting to enter the country. Herein lies the problem: when looking at the DHA’s track record on detention centres, the department seems to lack the capacity to promote human rights in its established

detention centres; a case in point is the notorious Lindela Detention Centre¹⁶ (Landau, 2008: 41). There have been reports of human rights violations of detainees at Lindela, as the place has been labelled unfit for human habitation, given that human beings were treated like “animals”, beaten, and not properly cared for (Kaziboni, 2018: 45).

According to Sibanda, a Zimbabwean national who was detained at Lindela, “Lindela, it’s not a place meant for human survival” (Kaziboni, 2018: 45). These sentiments were supported by another Zimbabwean detainee, Andy Duffy, who stated that “[t]he problem is that we are not treated like human beings... Yesterday guys were beaten severely. One guy was 13 years old. He was severely beaten with a baton stick” (Kaziboni, 2018: 45). Cases of sexual abuse were also documented at Lindela; for instance, women detainees were promised freedom in exchange for sex with staff at Lindela, a promise which never materialized, according to Mendi Mnyathi, a female detainee from Zimbabwe, who said, “I have endured unbridled insults and have had food thrown on my face because I refused to have sex with him [a male Lindela staff member]” (Kaziboni, 2018: 45). Sinikiwe Msimang, another Zimbabwean woman detained at Lindela, explained: “[t]he guard asked me for sex in return for my early release, an offer which I steadily refused. Afterwards, his general conduct towards me was, to put it mildly, appalling” (Kaziboni, 2018: 45).

People from Congo and Ethiopia also expressed their dissatisfaction and frustration regarding the situation at Lindela, and they accused the DHA of failing them (Kaziboni, 2018: 42). One of the inmates at Lindela said, the “guards treat us like animals and assault us as they wish and they [Home Affairs officials] do not care what happens to us. They do not even want to listen to our complaints” (Kaziboni, 2018: 42). Detainees at Lindela lived in horrendous conditions and were not properly fed, as they received two meals a day, and the food made them ill (Kaziboni, 2018: 48). Health-related cases were also reported at Lindela, where detainees experienced poor medical attention, which at times resulted in death (ibid.). The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) also filed a case on behalf of 40 undocumented migrants, many of whom were detained at

¹⁶ In South Africa, undocumented migrants awaiting deportation are detained in what have been termed repatriation centres, deportation centres, and detention centres. Although there is no clear distinction between the three facilities, they all serve the same purpose of housing undocumented migrants who are awaiting deportation from South Africa. This came as a result of the South African Immigration Act (Act 13 of 2002) which authorises the DHA to detain undocumented migrants at Lindela Repatriation Centre for the process of deportation.

Lindela for between 60 and 150 days. Some of the detainees were held at the repatriation centre for more than 120 days, which is in contravention of the law. For instance, in 2012 an inmate at Lindela reported:

In the past two weeks to three weeks, most of us who had spent more than the maximum 120 days in this place were given release letters. We were told that we were free to go. Instead of the promised freedom, we found immigration officials waiting for us outside, saying they were taking us to Home Affairs in Pretoria to have our documents fixed ... Instead they took us to different police stations, including Mamelodi East and Atteridgeville, where we spent two weeks and others a week ... From the police station we were driven back to Lindela, where we have been provided with new cards with new dates of arrest, because we refused to be repatriated to our countries for fear of being killed or incarcerated (Kaziboni, 2018: 45).

The above shows that there were violations of rights at Lindela because, according to Section 34 of the Immigration Act 19 of 2002, an undocumented migrant may not be detained in a detention centre for a period exceeding 30 calendar days without a court warrant. Given justifiable and reasonable grounds, the period of detention can be extended for an adequate period not exceeding three months (90 calendar days). Drawing from the above statement, the detaining of immigrants for more than 120 days at Lindela was in contravention of Section 34 of the Immigration Act 19 of 2002.

Amongst the challenges facing the DHA is that of poor record-keeping, which has direct implications for the verification of the immigration status of a migrant (Kaziboni, 2018: 43), especially those who have lost their permits. For instance, there have been reports pointing out incidents where documented migrants were detained at Lindela as a result of errors on the part of the DHA (Van Leenap, 2019), errors which symbolize “bureaucratic failures, incompetence, and corruption” on the part of DHA officials (Kaziboni, 2018: 43). For the DHA to effectively manage migration issues, the recording of applications by asylum seekers should be improved, including the fast processing of their immigration status because failure to do so results in a backlog within the immigration system. Hence, this results in a hostile relationship between South Africans and those deemed as illegal foreigners who live in the country without legal documents (Hirsh, 2024).

The data on Lindela indicates that detainees lived in horrendous conditions where they had limited access to healthcare, food, and social security (Van Leenap, 2019). Thus, the conditions immigrants were exposed to at Lindela were in violation of Section 10 (the right to human dignity) and Section 27 (the right to healthcare, food, water, and social security) of the Constitution (Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights). The detention approach also contrasts with the Common African Position on Global Compact for Migration issued by the AU (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo, 2024) which specifically calls on all member states to abolish the use of migrant detention centres (Maunganidze, 2021: 14). This should be done regardless of the migrant's legal status given the risks associated with the abuse of human rights in detention facilities. According to Sampson (2015), the existing evidence shows that detention does not necessarily deter migration. Instead, it compels migrants to take greater risks, such as resorting to illegal or irregular migration (Sibanda, 2022).

South Africa, as a constitutional democracy that has signed international conventions on human rights and the protection of refugees, should be advocating for a human rights-based approach towards migration. However, the country is doing the opposite, including violating immigrants' rights through unlawful detention, torture, sexual offences, and poor living conditions in detention centres. The case of Lindela has highlighted the challenges relating to South Africa's detention centres. The use of Lindela as an example was needed because the APCs adopted later share similar attributes to the encampment of immigrants. The idea behind the adoption of APCs is that asylum seekers will be housed in APCs while their applications are being processed (WPIM, 2017: 61). Although the government has pledged to cater for the basic needs of asylum seekers who are kept in APCs, the reality is that APCs will be managed by DHA (the same department that has a poor track record of managing detention centres) and this breeds scepticism regarding the successful administration of APCs without human rights violations.

In the White Paper on International Migration (2017), the Border Management Authority (BMA) was proposed, with the rationale "to create an operational balance between security, trade facilitation, tourism promotion and socio-economic development, both within South Africa and the SADC region. It was intended to provide an integrated border control, with officials having a common identity under a single command structure" (WPIM, 2017: 40). This proposal was endorsed through legal backing with the enactment

of the Border Management Authority Act (BMAA 2020). In the following section, the thesis will delve into the nature and context of the Border Management Authority Act (2020).

5.4.4 Border Management Authority Act 2 of 2020

Prior to the establishment of the BMA, South Africa's border management was coordinated by the Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC), which had earlier been part of the South African Revenue Services (SARS). However, this changed in December 2014, after the Cabinet passed a resolution that the BCOCC's responsibilities be relocated from SARS to the DHA. The BCOCC is understood to have failed to govern South Africa's borders by preventing illegal migration, illicit trade, and cross-border criminality (Van Lennep, 2019).

Considering the structural arrangement of South Africa's border management, it has been riddled with the fragmentation and overlapping of official functions (Handmaker & Nalule, 2021:31). According to Van Lennep (2019),

The South African borders are managed by seven different departments applying 58 different laws that were passed by the National Assembly (parliament). Amongst these departments are the Department of Home Affairs (Immigration Division), South African Police Service (SAPS), South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the Department of Agriculture, Land and Rural Development, Department of Health (DoH), and the South African Revenue Services (SARS) which performs Customs and Excise. One of the challenges facing such an arrangement is that these departments contain different command structures with different laws, work ethics, and mandates.

The roles of the aforementioned institutions responsible for border control in South Africa are summarized below, deriving from the study by Hennop, Jefferson and McLean (2001):

- “The Department of Home Affairs, which controls the entry and departure of people;
- A Customs and Excise division of the South African Revenue Services (SARS), which controls the import and export of goods;
- Police, responsible for policing South Africa's international borders. The South African Police also performs functions for Home Affairs with regards to immigration and for SARS in the roles of Customs and Excise;

- The paramount duty of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans is to defend the borders and the people of South Africa. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is responsible for border protection, which is defined as ‘the protection of the international borders of the RSA against hostile attacks and actions’. Securing territorial integrity is at the centre of the mandate of the Defence Force. Meaningful safeguarding involves not only the deployment of soldiers, but border-fence construction and maintenance across the perimeter of the country. Borderline control is the responsibility of the SANDF and involves the application of border control on the borderline between identified ports of entry. It also includes air space and maritime control. Strategically, the SANDF must guarantee the border of the country through the effective monitoring of the border, control over illegal border crossings, and the prevention of the violation of territorial integrity;
- The Department of State Security, which focuses on assessing security threats related to cross-border movement, such as terrorist threats;
- The Department of Health, which provides emergency medical support to people using a port of entry, and Port Health Services monitors and evaluates all foodstuffs, cosmetics, disinfectants, hazardous substances, and medicines entering the Western Cape through ports, and controls and monitors the possible entering of all serious contagious diseases into South Africa;
- The Department of Agriculture, which examines animals or plants and other natural aspects that may affect agriculture in this country. In cases where animals or plants are being imported or exported, this department looks at the impact of the exportation or importation of the item at hand;
- The Department of Environmental Affairs, which focuses on nature conservation matters, such as the import or export of indigenous animals or plantations. It then decides on whether to allow or reject the entry or exit of specific animals or plants; and
- The Department of Transport, which focuses on regulating the cross-border movement of vessels, craft, and vehicles” (Hennop et al., 2001).

The various departments within the border management of South Africa, which include different command structures, laws and work ethics, could pose a threat to the effective management of the border posts to secure the country’s sovereignty. An example of the fragmentation of border management in South Africa under the BCOCC is that, at some

border posts, departments were housed in different buildings. Thus, there is a lack of institutional mechanisms that ensure the accountability of various departments, including their agencies; there is also no platform that connects the different department's information or IT systems (Van Leenap, 2019).

In an effort to mitigate the challenges faced by the BCOCC, the country adopted the Border Management Authority Act 2 of 2020 (BMAA 2 of 2020). The BMAA 2 of 2020 provides a border authority that is uniform and coordinated, and that will effectively guard the country's borders. The Border Management Authority (BMA) is a national public entity that seeks to enhance the country's territorial integrity through secure borders (Udensi, 2024). The BMA is also an armed service established in terms of Section 199(3) of the Constitution¹⁷ (BMAA, 2020: 10). As part of its mandate, the BMA operates within the border law enforcement area and at South Africa's ports of entry, duties that are bound to be performed exclusively by an officer of the authority. Chapter 2 of the BMAA stipulates the functions of the authority, which are to (a) "facilitate and manage the legitimate movement of persons within the border law enforcement area and at ports of entry"; (b) "facilitate and manage the legitimate movement of goods within the border law enforcement areas at ports of entry"; and (c) "co-operate and co-ordinate its border law enforcement functions with other organs of state, border communities, or any other persons" (BMAA, 2020: 10).

The BMAA 2 of 2020 seeks to ensure that South Africa's borders and ports of entry are secure, which is a required step towards the development of the country's socio-economic status, and to contribute to the safe and secure facilitation of trade (Vermaak, 2009). This is done in order to prevent human trafficking and the smuggling of goods to protect South Africa's environment and natural resources (Sepeng, 2021), including protection from the spread of infectious diseases, pests, and substances (DHA, 2020). The BMA is mandated to enforce South Africa's immigration laws, the protection of borders, and ensuring the protection and effective management of all the country's points of entry (Longinus, 2024: 394).

¹⁷ Chapter 11 of the Constitution (1996), in Section 199 (3) stipulates, "Other than the security services established in terms of the Constitution, armed organizations or services may be established only in terms of national legislation".

As the product of Malusi Gigaba's term as Minister of Home Affairs, the BMA aroused scepticism amongst the public, academics, and think tank organizations, including some of South Africa's political parties (Van Leenap, 2019). This is because the DHA as a leading institution of the BMA has neither the capacity nor the trust of society to "warrant expanded authority" because the DHA has been "regarded as an ineffective department" grappling with "corruption and inefficiency" (Van Leenap, 2019). The ineffectiveness of the DHA in governing migration (see Section 5.4.1) points to the fact that it is the custodian of an asylum system, with an appeal backlog that would take more than 68 years to resolve. Thus, the DHA, as a leading department of the implementation of the BMA, has been met with criticism and scepticism (Sepeng, 2021: 36).


As Van Wyk (2020:5) has said, how could the BMA be assumed to bring change to South Africa's border management when it is headed by a department that has yet to rectify its poor reputation in the management of its affairs? (Sepeng, 2021: 36). Other concerns have been raised by other government authorities such as SAPS, the SANDF and SARS, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), questioning the capacity of the DHA to lead the BMA initiative, and on the securitization of borders and the threat of endemic corruption and human rights abuses (Van Leenap, 2019) because the establishment of the BMA perpetuates South Africa's longstanding "detain and deport" policy, which is also known for its high human and financial costs, leading to questions surrounding its effectiveness (Moyo, 2020).

When looking at the financial costs of the BMA, in 2019 when the BMA Bill was tabled before the National Council of Province (NCOP), it was reported that it would cost R6.5 billion per annum to run the agency (Van Leenap, 2019). The BMA Project Manager, Elroy Africa, said in February 2020 that the estimated cost for the implementation of the BMA was an initial R3.8 billion, with a future anticipation of R10.3 billion per annum. When looking at the employment costs of the DHA in 2019, it stood at 3.5 billion, so the implementation costs of the BMA effectively tripled the personnel budget of the DHA (Van Leenap, 2019). In this regard, the fact was that the DHA faced the challenge of a budget deficit, which contributed largely to its ineffectiveness in governance of migration. The reality is that one of the key steps in achieving the successful implementation of the BMA relies more on financial resources, as the absence of such will render the authority ineffective. This is indicated in the BMA Annual Report for the 2023/2024 financial year,

which states that the biggest challenge the BMA was facing was an inadequate budget allocation, which has had a negative impact on recruiting sufficient critical human capital to reinforce the capacity of the authority (BMA Annual Report 2023/2024: 24). Also listed amongst the challenges facing the BMA was the lack of resources, such as technological equipment, the necessary border law enforcement equipment, and other security measures (BMA Annual Report 2023/2024: 24). Thus, although the BMA is a critical step towards the establishment of a single authority overseeing all aspects of South Africa's border environment, the extent to which this authority is able to defend and protect South Africa's border posts is heavily dependent upon financial support (Maunganidze, 2021), which would enable the authority to mitigate its challenges.


Although the challenges faced by the BMA have been discussed, the progress made by the authority cannot be overlooked. In the BMA Annual Report 2023/2024, it was reported that the BMA had detected 7773 illegal travellers at ports of entry, all of which were processed for deportation. This proves the BMA's commitment to securing South Africa's borders by ensuring that all detected illegal travellers were processed for deportation and restricted from entering the country (BMA Annual Report 2023/2024: 37). However, the BMA acknowledged that some of the people who entered the country illegally entered through some parts of the border where at the time of their passing through, there was no border officials deployed at those points. The process of detecting and deporting illegal travellers in South Africa contributes towards the fight against corruption, while in support of economic development, as most of these illegal migrants contribute towards illicit trading (BMA Annual Report 2023/24: 36). Illegal migration also promotes corruption amongst officials who provide fraudulent documentation to receive private incentives (BMA Annual Report 2023/24: 36). To ensure success in managing South Africa's border posts, the BMA plans to have monitoring meetings with relevant stakeholders to monitor the implementation of the BMA protocols (BMA Annual Report 2023/24: 37). The BMA has convened and conducted monitoring meetings on a quarterly basis with the SANDF, SAPS and SARS to foster collaboration with stakeholders for the improved management of South Africa's borders (BMA Annual Report 2023/2024: 37).

Figure 9: An overview of South Africa's Migration Policy Framework



Source: Author's Construct (Mongale, 2025)

Figure 10: Chapter 5 presented in diagram format



Source: Author's construction (2025)

5.5 Chapter summary

South Africa's migration policies are inspired by international, continental and regional conventions. The country is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Hence, the country is bound by the principles of these frameworks in its approach towards international migration. The premise is that South Africa has to protect the rights of refugees who fled their countries due to human security-related challenges. This was seen in the adoption of the Refugee Act 30 of 1998 and the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Both of these policies took a human rights-based approach as they sought to protect the rights of immigrants in

South Africa. The Refugee Act 30 of 1998 and the Immigration Act of 2002 were praised as being progressive, as they rendered the protection of refugees' and asylum seekers' human rights. This was done in accordance with the inclusive Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) of the 1996 Constitution, which is in support of the protection of the rights of everyone living in South Africa, despite their race, sex, gender, language, or birth. Among the rights enjoyed by immigrants in South Africa include freedom of movement, access to basic services (such as primary healthcare, social welfare), and the right to work and study in the country.

However, what has become apparent is that over the years South Africa has adopted measures that contrast with these international, continental and regional conventions, especially the lack of protection of African immigrants' human rights. For instance, the inconsistencies in migration policies have been amended over the years (e.g. the Refugee Act and the Immigration Act). Also, the White Paper on International Migration 2017 advocates for the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants in South Africa. This practice contrasts with the principle of non-refoulment, which states that no country should deport refugees to the countries which they fled, especially when they are at risk of experiencing the challenges that forced them to migrate. The nature of the detention of undocumented migrants is not only in violation of the UN Conventions on Refugees but also the human rights of immigrants, as espoused in Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution (1996).

This indicates that South Africa's migration system is anti-human rights, pro-security, and nationalistic. As discussed, the South African government has been proposing an exit from key international conventions, and then to re-enter them with reservations pertaining to the areas of education, employment, social services, and the principle of non-refoulment. In the Draft White Paper on International Migration 2017, it is argued that South Africa committed a "serious mistake" by entering the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which disregarded the reservations in the previously mentioned areas. In this context, the suggestion by South Africa to exit international conventions relating to the status of refugees symbolizes the country's shift from a human-rights approach towards a securitized approach to international migration; thus, adopting a restrictive and selective

approach when it comes to choosing who should enter the country, and which benefits or opportunities they should enjoy.

The securitized approach towards migration in South Africa was further justified through the establishment of the BMA in 2020, which seeks to strengthen South Africa's border security. One of the reasons for the establishment of the BMA is to safeguard South Africa's porous borders in order to mitigate the challenges of illegal/irregular migration, cross-border crimes, and illicit trade. Although this is a key step towards ensuring border security and development, the BMA's success depends on resource allocation and an increased budget, as the absence of these will make it difficult for the authority to perform its duties as per expectations. Nonetheless, the BMA resembles a securitized and militarized approach to migration. This approach creates the perception that South Africa is under threat from an influx of undocumented migrants who enter the country illegally. Consequently, this feeds into xenophobic attacks towards immigrants living in South Africa's townships.

The prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa obstructs the AU and SADC aspirations on the Free Movement of Persons because, due to the fear stemming from attacks, this makes migration a difficult issue to consider. As such, immigration policies in South Africa deviate from the free movement policies of the AU and SADC, to which the country is a signatory. To achieve the goals of the AU and SADC Protocols on the Free Movement of Persons, there is a need for South Africa to champion immigration policies that are inclusive and less restrictive, while improving its immigration systems in order to rapidly process asylum applications, while keeping updated records of immigrants and asylum seekers.

Chapter Six: The nexus of migration and xenophobia in South Africa: are immigrants a threat to South Africa's national security?

The weight that foreign nationals are bringing to the country has got nothing to do with xenophobia ... it's a reality. Our hospitals are full, we can't control them. – Dr Aaron Motsoaledi

South Africans don't have jobs. White business (in South Africa) has found new slaves in foreigners. – Gayton McKenzie (Leader of the PA)

Xenophobic violence will never resolve the problems our country face because they were never caused by foreign nationals in the first place. – Julius Malema (Commander in Chief of the EFF)

6.1 Introduction

2024 was a momentous one, as South Africa celebrated 30 years of democracy. Drawing from the problem statement presented in this study (see Chapter 1, Section 2), which points to the fact more than 30 since the dawn of democracy, South Africa is yet to deliver the much-anticipated socio-economic transformation that was promised by the newly elected ANC government in 1994. Although the country is one of Africa's leading economies and relatively stable democracies, compared to other countries on the continent, due to its strong judicial system anchored in the rule of law and respect for human rights (Kaziboni, 2022), it grapples with challenges of unemployment, poor service delivery, a high crime and poverty rate, and inequality (Mongale, 2022: 2).

As has been explained in different chapters of this study, since the advent of democracy, South Africa has been a top destination for both African migrants and migrants from the rest of the world. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2, Figure 4), 65% of migrants in South Africa come from Africa, with the majority of them coming from neighbouring SADC countries, while 35% of the migrant population is from the rest of the world (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Figure 4). The fact that South Africa is a top destination for immigrants has also resulted in xenophobic attitudes and violence directed at migrants, predominantly African and Asian migrants.

The causes of xenophobia were explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3); these are associated with the existence of the socio-economic challenges mentioned above because the existence of such socio-economic ills is often blamed on migrants. Thus, this section interrogates what the evidence presents about some of the most common stereotypes and accusations made against immigrants living in South Africa. A study by Kaziboni et al. (2022) reinforced the 2008 research findings by CoRMSA, which identified the stereotypes and the myths about immigrants in South Africa. These are complementary to the findings of the study, as presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2). The dominant stereotypes, myths and accusations levelled against immigrants in South Africa include the following:

- South Africa is experiencing a so-called 'human tsunami', as there are millions of immigrants in the country, and in the Johannesburg CBD, for example, more than 80% of the population consists of immigrants. Also, because of the high number of foreigners in South Africa, the country could be ruled by a foreign-born national in the future.
- Foreign nationals are the cause of, or contribute to, the high rates of crime, unemployment, and poverty in South Africa.
- Non-South Africans are burdening South Africa's public services, such as healthcare and social welfare, which hampers the government's ability to provide basic services to South Africans.
- Most immigrants in South Africa are illegals and do not want to be documented.

These stereotypes, myths, and assumptions related to migrants are often the key drivers of xenophobia in South Africa. However, they are rarely interrogated to determine whether immigrants are responsible for or contribute to the existence of the socio-economic ills in South Africa. As such, failure to critically interrogate the accusations made about migrants will contribute to the perpetual cycle of migration scapegoating, securitization, and criminalization. It is in this regard that this chapter fills this gap by challenging the accusations levelled against migrants, using existing data to assess if the accusations made about migrants are valid or just myths.

What has become apparent in South Africa is that, instead of acknowledging their failure to implement transformational policies, many public officials and politicians use their positions of power to shift the citizenry's anger away from them. They do this by

scapegoating and blaming immigrants as the source of the social ills in South Africa. Immigrants are labelled by public officials and politicians as a threat to South Africa's national security.

The result of migration scapegoating, securitization, and criminalization is that if repeated often enough, they are likely to result in xenophobia in South Africa (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5). Given this reality, there is a need to interrogate these narratives to present findings on whether immigrants are a threat to South Africa's national security. This is important because, by showing whether immigrants pose a threat to national security in South Africa or not, this can shape public perceptions about immigrants, while also seeking to contribute to policymaking within South African migration discourse.

Based on the aforementioned stereotypes, myths and accusations made about migrants in South Africa, the following themes were generated: (a) floods of immigrants; (b) crime; (c) job stealing; (d) undocumented/illegal migrants; and (e) a burden on social welfare and public service. Based on these five themes generated from the findings of the study, the following questions were developed that will be answered throughout this section:

- Is South Africa flooded by immigrants?
- Are immigrants stealing jobs from South Africans?
- Are immigrants responsible for the rising crime rate in South Africa?
- Are most of the immigrants who live in South Africa illegal?
- Do foreign nationals strain the social welfare and public services in South Africa?

6.2 Is South Africa flooded by immigrants?

Since 1994, the country has experienced a rising flow of international migration, with most migrants coming from Africa (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). One of the troubling trends in South Africa is that all immigrants, despite their status of residency, or gender, are perceived using a blanket approach, as they are typically referred to as "aliens, illegals" and "foreigners" (Mawadza & Crush, 2010). As indicated in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4; and 4.3.5), public officials, politicians, the media and vigilante groups tend to exaggerate the number of immigrants in South Africa. This is often done with the intention of portraying immigrants as a security threat to the country, as many immigrants are made scapegoats for South Africa's social ills. For example, in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.5), the study reflected on the 2018 statements made by the leader of the Congress of the People

(COPE), Mosiuoa Lekota, who said, “Government, at national [level], is allowing people to flood South Africa” (Madia, 2018). In 2017, the Deputy Police Commissioner, Bongani Mkgongi, said that the population of the City of Johannesburg consisted of 80% foreign nationals. In furthering his statement, he said that the high number of immigrants living in Johannesburg puts South Africa at risk of having a foreign-born citizen as the president of the country (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5).

In 2018, both the Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, and the National Police Commissioner, Khehla Sithole, stated that there were 11 million undocumented migrants in South Africa. However, the estimated number of immigrants provided by Cele and Sithole contrast with the 2018 statistics of foreign nationals in South Africa, which was approximately four million (Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town, 2019: 6). The exaggeration of the number of immigrants in South Africa has contributed to a public perception that the country is flooded with immigrants. This was supported by findings from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) for 2021, conducted by the HSRC, which stated that almost half (48%) of South Africans believed that there were between 17 and 40 million immigrants in the country (HSRC, 2021). These estimates are false, as they contrast with statistical data presented in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Figure 4, which indicated that by 2020 there were 2 860 500 immigrants in South Africa, of which about 1 850 400 (65% of the migrant population) came from Africa; 1 010 100 (35% of the migrant population) came from the rest of the world.

When comparing these statistics to the South African population of almost 60 million people, the migrant population in South Africa made up 4.82 percent of the country's population in 2020 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Figure 4). Therefore, the claims that South Africa is flooded by immigrants is a fallacy, which could be dangerous if it is ignored, as it could endanger the lives of immigrants in the country. These false estimates of the number of immigrants in South Africa triggers xenophobia, as migrants are accused of stealing opportunities and benefits at the expense of native South Africans. This brings the study to the next accusation – that immigrants are stealing jobs in South Africa.

6.3 Are immigrants stealing jobs from South Africans?

Since 1994, South Africa has faced the challenge of unemployment, which has continued to grow over the years. For instance, in 2020, Stats SA reported that the rate of

unemployment in South Africa stood at 29.1 percent, with higher rates amongst the youth. The high unemployment rate amongst South Africans is often blamed on migrants who are accused of stealing jobs from locals (Banda & Mawadza, 2014). This is perpetuated by the reality that unemployment among foreign nationals is lower than the national unemployment rate (Maunganidze, 2021: 9). However, considering the fact that immigrants comprise almost 5% of the country's population, it is unlikely for unemployment amongst immigrants to surpass that of South African citizens, due to the fact that only a small fraction of the population are immigrants.

Despite the statistical data of the migrant community, there is a common belief that immigrants in South Africa are stealing jobs from citizens (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1). This persistent fallacy about immigrants has been propagated by politicians, public officials, and anti-immigrant organizations. For instance, the former energy minister, Jeff Radebe, said the following:

Foreign nationals are dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in informal settlements which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low-skilled South Africans (Ramachandran et al., 2017).

The leader of the Patriotic Alliance, Gayton McKenzie, also attributed the scourge of unemployment in South Africa to immigrants. This was evident in his electoral campaign in 2021, where he said:

South Africans don't have jobs. White businesses (in South Africa) have found new slaves in foreigners (Isilow, 2021).

As stated in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.1), foreign nationals in South Africa provide a pool of cheap labour, which results in many immigrants being widely employed in different sectors (see Section 4.2.2) (Nyar, 2011: 5). Owing to the supply of cheap labour to employers, foreigners tend to out-compete poor black South Africans when competing for jobs (Everatt, 2011: 3). In addition, Solomon (2019: 160) stated that immigrants in South Africa have always been ready to accept any job, even if they are expected to be cheap labour, which makes them stand a better chance of finding employment, compared to native South Africans who expect higher-paying jobs. The employment of foreign

nationals who provide cheap labour cannot be blamed on migrants but rather on employers. As was argued in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.5), one of the persistent problems facing South Africa is that employers tend to prioritize foreign workers because they can easily exploit them.

This relates to what was argued in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4), whereby South African employers tend to prioritize the employment of foreigners for exploitative reasons to minimize their companies' costs while maximizing their profits. Hence, before blaming migrants from taking jobs from South Africans, there is a need to monitor employment patterns by corporations and institutions. In so doing, South Africans will be exposed to the reality that points to something different from what they believed – that immigrants are stealing their jobs. The truth is that South African corporations, businesses and institutions have shifted their employment labour force to migrant workers at the expense of the local labour force.

Although South Africa has been experiencing a shrinking job market, which has been reported in quarterly labour force surveys (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 7), there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that immigrants steal jobs from South Africans. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2018), the existing evidence points to the fact that immigrants are often self-reliant, as many of them run businesses that create employment for South Africans. Drawing from data collected between 1996 and 2011 in South Africa, a 2018 World Bank study shows that “one immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for locals” (Sarkar, Ogude & Baum, 2018). In this regard, migrants are doing the opposite of what they are accused of doing; instead of stealing jobs from locals, they often employ local citizens. This should be reported on in the mainstream media, as this will play a role in promoting xenophilia as opposed to xenophobia. Instead of stealing jobs from locals, migrants contribute an estimated 9% to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (OECD & ILO, 2018).

6.4 Are immigrants responsible for the rising crime rate in South Africa?

Another challenge hampering national security in South Africa is the rising crime rate. As explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.4), the post-1994 democracy saw an increase in violent crimes, which ranged from murder, house robbery, vehicle hijacking, aggravated

robbery, and crimes against women and children, to cash-in-transit robberies. The increase in the crime rate has led to South Africa to being considered as one of the most dangerous places to live in. On the other hand, it shows that SAPS is unable to combat crime; this has led to a decline of public trust in the police (Roberts & Gordon, 2022). Instead of holding SAPS top officials accountable for their inability to combat crime, public officials, politicians, vigilante groups, and the media have resorted to scapegoating immigrants for the increase in crime. Even though some immigrants do commit crimes in the country, the ongoing scapegoating of immigrants has fueled the widely held public perception that immigrants contribute to the rising crime rate in South Africa; this is boosted by the populist rhetoric of public officials (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4). Considering this, it is important to examine whether immigrants are the primary cause of the rising crime rate in the country. Based on findings derived from Kaziboni et al. (2022), there is a lack of evidence to indicate that immigrants are responsible for or contribute to rising crime in South Africa.

In 2015, following xenophobic attacks against immigrants, Operation Fiela (to sweep out immigrants) was initiated. It was a response to the xenophobic attacks on immigrants in the provinces of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. However, instead of being protected from violent attacks, immigrants fell victim to harassment and deportation at the hands of SAPS (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 9). As a result of Operation Fiela, 15 396 people were arrested and deported between April and July 2015. Despite the deportation of many immigrants, the crime rate rose in the same year. For example, crime statistics for that year showed an increase in violent crime, with a 4.9% increase in murder and a 2.7% increase in armed robberies (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 9). Given this, it is disingenuous to associate increased violent crimes with migration because statistical data points to the opposite of the widely accepted view that immigrants contribute to or cause an increase in the crime rate in South Africa.

Furthermore, given that SAPS targeted immigrants in various operations to determine the status of migrants living in South Africa, with the aim of detaining and deporting those living in the country 'illegally', it would be expected that immigrants would form the dominant group in terms of the number of people who are arrested and sentenced for committing various crimes in the country. It is worth stating that SAPS do collect data on the demographics (sex, age, race, nationality, etc.) of those suspected of and arrested

for different crimes, but this data is not shared with the public. Kaziboni et al. (2022) used of the next best source of data available on the nationality of people incarcerated in South African prisons (see Figure 11 below).

Figure 11: The number of ‘illegal foreigners’ arrested per year and their proportion of total inmates (2017-2021)

Years of recording	Number of ‘illegal foreigners’ incarcerated			Total number of inmates incarcerated			Proportion of illegal to total inmates
Period	Unsentenced	Sentenced	Total	Unsentenced	Sentenced	Total	Percentage of total
2017	1 325	1 670	2 995	31 604	145 995	177 599	1.7
2018	1 609	2 137	3 746	44 020	133 692	177 712	2.1
2019	2 254	2 219	4 473	46 308	116 017	162 325	2.8
2020	1 707	1 550	3 257	47 842	90 871	138 533	2.4
2021 (up to 15 Nov.)	1 780	1 743	3 523	51 727	83 749	135 476	2.6
Average over five years	1 735	1 864	3 599	44 300	114 065	158 329	2.3

Source: Department of Justice and Correctional Services (Kaziboni et al., 2022).

According to Figure 11 above, between 2017 and 15 November 2021, an annual average of 3599 undocumented foreign nationals were incarcerated, out of a total of 158 329 inmates in South Africa’s prisons (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 10). Therefore, the proportion of foreign nationals imprisoned in South Africa forms an average of 2.3% of the total prison population, an average which is far lower than the widely held view that immigrants contribute to or are responsible for the high crime rate in South Africa. If that were the case, high volumes of immigrants would have been arrested; thus, boosting the number of prison inmates. Therefore, the low proportion of migrants incarcerated indicates that migrants are not key contributors to the increasing crime rate in the country.

6.5 Are most immigrants living in South Africa illegally?

In South Africa, there is a general belief that immigrants live illegally in the country. By using the term “illegal”, it is signified that migrants are criminals who may not hold the status that qualifies them as “legal” (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 10). A derogatory term such as ‘illegal’ could provoke xenophobic attitudes and violence towards immigrants, as a term

such as ‘illegal’ creates the misperception that immigrants should be treated with resentment and prejudice/bias. Yet, the labeling of immigrants as ‘illegal’ appears to be done nonchalantly, without any thought about its implications, by certain politicians and public officials, and certain media houses and anti-immigrant movements. As explained in Chapter 4, this casual labeling of migrants has been identified as a cause of xenophobia in South Africa (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). However, in a situation where an immigrant has suspended or expired immigration documents, such as a permit or a visa, they are regarded as “irregular” and not as “illegal” (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 10).

In relation to South Africa’s immigration system, which is responsible for determining the status of migrants in the country, the system has been facing administrative and bureaucratic challenges which have impeded the effectiveness of the DHA to govern migration. This was explained extensively in Chapter 5, especially in Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.3, whereby the issues facing the DHA were discussed.

In Chapter 5, Section 5.4 (including subsequent sub-sections) it was stated that although South Africa is battling the issue of irregular cross-border migration, not all migrants enter the country through clandestine or unregulated channels. Some immigrants enter the country with “a regular status” but end up falling into “an irregular status” because of poor immigration policy management (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 11). As explained in Chapter 5.2 (and subsequent sub-sections), in 2015, South Africa experienced a backlog of over a million asylum claims at numerous stages of the process, which was the largest backlog worldwide. In 2019, UNHCR reported that there were 188 296 pending asylum cases (UNHCR, 2020). Due to high volumes of pending asylum cases, a 2019 audit of the DHA’s immigration process showed that it would take 68 years to resolve the backlog (Auditor-General of South Africa, 2019). Hence, the challenges relating to the processing of asylum applications in South Africa have heightened the vulnerability of immigrants in the country; thus, resulting in their compromised immigration status, which often leads to migrants to be labelled as illegal, despite their efforts to ensure that they are documented.

Corruption was also highlighted as a challenge facing the DHA in the bribes that are paid to DHA officials. In addition, South Africa has the highest rejection rate of asylum seekers in the world – 90 per cent. This high number of rejections is used by the South African government to justify the restrictive and selective measures in its migration policies (White

Paper on International Migration, 2017). Of grave concern is the reluctance by the DHA to acknowledge that the asylum system in South Africa not only battles a high volume of applications, but also flawed processing, which amplifies the high number of pending applications (Maunganidze, 2021: 13).

Therefore, before blaming immigrants for being in the country illegally, attention should be directed towards those responsible for governing international migration, as they should account for how immigrants enter the country and why they are not documented. By claiming that immigrants who live in the country are illegal will not resolve the reality facing the DHA, which are the challenges of corruption, poor governance, bureaucratic failures, and heavy backlogs. These woes hinder permit outcomes from being finalised, which continually compromise immigrants' status (Kaziboni et al., 2022: 11).

6.6 Do foreign nationals strain the social welfare and public services in South Africa?

The lack of access to basic services, such as health facilities and housing, for native South Africans is an issue that is often scapegoated and blamed on immigrants in South Africa (See Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2 and 4.3.4). For example, in March 2018, Herman Mashaba said:

Within the context of the city of Johannesburg, illegal immigration compounds serious challenges in the provision of basic services to residents. We are faced with a housing backlog of an estimated 300 000 units (Africa News Agency, 2018a).

Moreover, in the lead up to the 2019 elections, in which the rhetoric about migration often surfaced (see Chapter 4, Section 5.3.5), the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, stated:

The weight that foreign nationals are bringing to the country has got nothing to do with xenophobia ... it's a reality. Our hospitals are full, we can't control them (Mabuza, 2018).

The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric, such as that by Herman Mashaba and Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, has become a tool used by public officials to divert attention from their failure to provide public services to South Africans. Hence, they scapegoat and blame migrants for burdening the social welfare and public systems of the country because in South Africa, there is a common xenophobic stereotype that public hospitals and clinics are flooded by foreign nationals (Hiropoulos, 2020: 111). Taking the total population of immigrants in South Africa in 2020, as indicated in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2, Figure 2), immigrants accounted for a 4.82% share of the population in the country. Therefore, in comparison to the population, which stood at almost 60 million in 2020, it is statistically impossible for a migrant population of 2 860 495 to strain South Africa's social welfare and public services.

Kaziboni et al. (2022: 12) states that many foreign nationals come to South Africa to access private facilities for medical operations that are either cheaper in the country or cannot be done in their countries of origin. Thus, migrants are spending money that broadly contributes to South Africa's revenue, because not only do migrants pay their medical bills, they also book hotels and buy food and goods in the country.

In Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) and subsequent sub-sections, it was stated that another service that immigrants are accused of 'stealing' at the expense of South Africans is access to state subsidized Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing. RDP housing forms part of a post-1994 democratic government's initiative that sought to address the injustices of apartheid by providing houses to formerly disadvantaged communities. However, the RDP policy, like other post-1994 policies of the ANC-led government, has been plagued by mismanagement and corruption (Marutlulle, 2021).

In communities where migrants live in RDP houses, it often ignites xenophobic attitudes among South Africans, especially those who have not received RDP houses. This was evident in the case of Alexandra during xenophobic attacks there (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2), where forced illegal evictions of migrants living in RDP houses occurred, thus leaving many migrants destitute as they were displaced. These incidents indicate that xenophobia is a threat to human security. The assertion that immigrants are 'stealing' public goods, such as RDP houses, is misleading as only South African citizens and permanent migrants may apply for these houses in South Africa. Hence, refugees, asylum

seekers, and temporary residents are not eligible to receive RDP houses (Constitution, 1996). In cases where a non-citizen without permanent residency status occupies an RDP house, it has been sub-let or sold to them by the owner who is a registered South African national (Clark, 2019). In legal terms, both the lessor and lessee (in the context of renting out property), or buyer and seller (in the context of selling property) are both acting illegally, regardless of their nationality, because the Constitution prohibits the sale of RDP houses. The Department of Human Settlement (DHS) is the one vested with the responsibility to govern issues of housing through the RDP policy. According to Section 3 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the owner of an RDP house is prohibited from selling the house before the lapse of an eight-year occupancy period. Failure to adhere to the Section 3 of the Housing Act of 1997, such as selling or leasing an RDP house without the DHS's permission, can result in forfeiture of the house by the owner, and it can further lead to criminal prosecution. In this regard, it is evident that access to RDP houses is strictly regulated to benefit South African citizens. Thus, the allegations that migrants are a burden on South Africa's public services and welfare system is a fallacy, as evidence points to the opposite of the popular belief that migrants are a threat to South Africa's national security.

6.7 Chapter summary

This chapter provided only the tip of an iceberg regarding the nexus between migration and xenophobia in South Africa. This was done through demystifying the accusations leveled at migrants, as they are often blamed and scapegoated for the social ills that plague South Africa. Among the accusations made about immigrants are that there are over 10 million immigrants living in South Africa, that immigrants are responsible for or contribute to the rising unemployment and crime rate and the lack of access to basic services by South Africans, and that immigrants who live in the country are illegal and refuse to be documented. However, as shown in this chapter, existing statistical data indicates that the immigrant population is far fewer than the estimated 10 million; in 2020, the total migrant population in South Africa stood at 2 860 495. In proportion to South Africa's population of almost 60 million people, migrants comprise 4.2% of the population. Thus, it is a fabrication and a myth to allege that the migrant population is responsible for or contributes to the lack of access to social welfare and public services, such as healthcare and housing. Regarding crime, between 2017 and 15 November 2021, an annual average of 3599 undocumented foreign nationals were incarcerated, out of a total

of 158 329 inmates incarcerated in South Africa's prisons. The proportion of undocumented migrants imprisoned in South Africa comprises an average of 2.3% of the total population of inmates in South Africa's prisons. This average which is far lower than the widely held misconception that immigrants contribute to or are responsible for the high crime rate in South Africa. Lastly, instead of holding the DHA responsible for its inability to govern international migration, certain politicians and vigilantes resort to scapegoating, securitizing, and criminalizing immigrants as they are accused of living in the country illegally. This is done with little regard for the fact that the DHA faces a backlog that could take more than 68 years to process the pending applications for immigration documents.

Thus, based on the presented data in this chapter, it can be argued that even though some immigrants might contribute to the social ills confronting South Africa, the reality is that the allegation that immigrants are the primary contributors to the increase in the country's socio-economic and political ills is a misconception and a myth. In this regard, South Africans should apply an integrated approach when making judgements about immigrants, as failure to do so will result in certain public officials and politicians continually scapegoating immigrants for the challenges besetting the country. One can argue that the key issue contributing to South Africa's social ills are the politicians and government officials who have failed to implement transformational policies to ensure inclusive development. With the rising gap between the rich and the poor, feelings of prejudice and resentment often bubble to the surface. This leads to xenophobic attacks and attitudes that are directed at members of the out-group, including migrants, who are scapegoated for the socio-economic and political ills in South Africa. This often occurs when anti-immigrant rhetoric by public officials and politicians is reported on in the mainstream media, as the media help to shape public opinion and perceptions generally, but also about immigrants.

Chapter Seven: Findings, recommendations and conclusion

7.1 Introduction

The thesis aimed to respond to the following question: What is the impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa?. This question led the study to provide a wide-ranging academic discourse on the manifestation of xenophobia in the country. This was done through linking migration to the prevalence of increased xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. In so doing, the thesis explored the theories that assist in explaining international migration, theories that explain the causes of xenophobia, including the viewpoint on human security that was adopted to assist in explaining the impacts of xenophobia on human security in South Africa. Furthermore, given the intricacies of the phenomenon of xenophobia, the study examined the factors that trigger xenophobia in the country, the different forms of xenophobia, including historical incidents of xenophobia, and how xenophobia manifests itself in contemporary South Africa.

The study further interrogated the allegations, myths, and stereotypes about migrants in South Africa, as these have contributed to xenophobia in the country. Demystifying the accusations, stereotypes and myths about immigrants formed the basis of shaping a narrative about immigrants and thus necessitating a comprehensive approach in observing migration. Furthermore, by identifying the causes of xenophobia, this aided the study in making a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge by providing recommendations on how to mitigate the manifestation of different forms of xenophobia in South Africa. As such, the study not only investigated the causes of xenophobia, but proposed solutions on how to alleviate xenophobia in South Africa.

7.2 Findings and summary of chapters

The goal of the current chapter is to provide a summary of the findings stemming from Chapters one to six. This chapter will also reflect on the contribution the study has made to the existing body of knowledge, including areas for possible future research, and recommendations on how to lessen xenophobia in South Africa.

Chapter One of the study was dedicated to setting the tone, as it provided the background on migration to South Africa and the earliest incidents of xenophobia. From the beginning of the study, it was stated that South Africa has a long history of

international migration, dating back to the days of colonialism and apartheid, with increased migration flows in post-1994. Chapter one also indicated that the increase of immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa was generally greeted by resentment, especially migrants from Africa and Asia. Due to South Africa's long-standing socioeconomic and political challenges, this triggered xenophobia. Immigrants living in South Africa have always been blamed for the country's socioeconomic ills, and thus calls were made for the migrants to "go home or die here" during the 2008 xenophobic attacks.

Chapter One further reflected on the problem statement of the study; the central theoretical statement; the research questions; the research objectives; the research methodology and research design; an overview of databases that would be consulted for the literature review on the subject of migration and xenophobia; the gap in the literature; the significance of the study; the limitations of the study; the ethical considerations; and the chapter outline.

Chapter Two of the thesis provided a discussion on the theories that support international migration. Due to the complexity of the phenomenon of cross-border migration, there is no single theory that can assist in explaining the causes of international migration. Thus, the study focussed on neoclassical macro-economic, neoclassical micro-economic, and meso-level theories. These theories were applied interchangeably with the praxis on the trends and patterns of migration to South Africa; this was done in Chapter 4 under Section 4.2 and subsequent Sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4.

Chapter Three of the study discussed the theories that assist in explaining the causes and effects of xenophobia in South Africa. Xenophobia is triggered by multiple factors, which diverge or complement each other; hence, the need to explore the phenomenon using different theoretical frameworks that aid in explaining its causes. Amongst the theories that justify the manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa, as discussed in Chapter 3, are the relative deprivation theory, the scapegoat theory, and the securitization theory. Also, Chapter 3 provided an analysis of the human security perspective and its relevance in explaining the impacts of xenophobia on human (in)security. Theories that explain the causes of xenophobia in South Africa were applied in Chapter 4 (sub-sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4); these theories were used interchangeably with the identified causes of xenophobia to show their relevance and contribution to literature.

Chapter Four was linked to the title of this thesis, *The impact of migration on xenophobia in South Africa*. This chapter was key as it provided the interconnection between migration and anti-immigrant sentiments and violent attacks aimed at foreign nationals in South Africa. Hence, it started by explaining migration trends and the types of migrants in South Africa. A vital takeaway from this section is that the history of migration to South Africa has revolved around the allure of cheap foreign labour, especially in the mining sector during colonial times and apartheid. The secondary labour sector within contemporary migration dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa was also highlighted.

In the subsequent sub-sections (4.2.1-4.2.4), Chapter Four discussed migrant types in South Africa: permanent migrants; labour migrants; refugees and asylum seekers; and illegal/irregular migrants. This was done to grasp the types of people who are likely to migrate to South Africa, and which group is the most prevalent. Based on the findings of the study, although migrants differ based on their immigration status, what is apparent is that all groups of migrants are vulnerable to xenophobic attacks despite their legal status. This is because xenophobia is triggered by the stereotype that migrants living in South Africa are undocumented and put a strain on the country's social welfare and public services. This is however a myth as the reality is that not all migrants who live in South Africa are illegal or undocumented, as there are migrants who hold citizenship.

The following section focused on the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. This section began by laying a foundation of the historical context of xenophobic incidents and the triggers for such acts. The findings in this section highlighted that since the advent of democracy in South Africa, foreign nationals have been vulnerable to violent xenophobic attacks. Xenophobia was caused by the misperception that migrants in South Africa commit crime, spread infectious diseases, and steal jobs and business opportunities from locals, including RDP houses. As the study further argued, the post-1994 government's failure to radically transform the economy and create sustainable jobs has exacerbated the crisis of inequality, poverty and unemployment in South Africa. Thus, the crisis of inequality, poverty and unemployment (known as the triple threat) was discussed as a trigger for xenophobia in South Africa, and it was justified through relative deprivation. The existence of the triple threat is often blamed and scapegoated on members of the out-group (immigrants), who are often securitized for South Africa's social ills, such as rising poverty, unemployment and crime, and the declining provision of basic services.

Another contributory factor to xenophobia is the rise of anti-immigrant online movements such as Operation Dudula and Put South Africa First. The emergence of these anti-immigrant online movements signifies that xenophobia is on the rise; but, this can also be attributed to a culture of impunity, as many perpetrators of xenophobia are not legally prosecuted. Further, there is also increasing xenophobic rhetoric, enmeshed with the rise of populism in migration discourse. For example, in South Africa, in the lead-up to the 2019 general elections, migration rhetoric was used as a form of electioneering. Thus, the majority (and other) political parties' election campaigns and manifestos revolved around the issue of migration governance and immigrants in South Africa. Due to snowballing socioeconomic and political challenges, politicians used the migration card to gain support.

Migration remains a pivotal issue in South Africa as the public broadly consider immigrants as responsible for the country's woes; hence, politicians make anti-immigrant statements in the hope of gaining votes. Hence, the findings presented in Chapter Four indicated that, instead of owning up to their underperformance in job creation and in bringing down the rate of poverty and inequality, and in providing basic services, including in crime prevention, certain public officials and politicians have shifted the blame by scapegoating immigrants for the social ills in the country.

Lastly, Chapter Four provided findings on the different forms of xenophobia, namely, violent xenophobia, institutionalized xenophobia, and digital xenophobia. The key findings were that, while violent xenophobia has attracted popular attention in the media and scholarly debates, only a few studies have focussed on the institutional and digital forms of xenophobia. Chapter Four filled this gap in the literature by presenting the nature and context of institutionalized and digital xenophobia.

The manifestation of new forms of xenophobia indicates that the government is reluctant to address this crisis. An example of this is the denialism of xenophobia by certain politicians, who would rather label attacks against foreign nationals as criminality. The findings in Chapter Four also explicated the interrelation of these three forms of xenophobia. For instance, due to the widely held misconception among South Africans that immigrants pose a threat to country's national security, the government has adopted restrictive migration policies, which are uncontested by the public. Moreover, anti-

immigrant posts on digital platforms, such as Facebook and X, shape public perceptions about the migrant population in South Africa and they have triggered violent xenophobia in the country.

Chapter Five of the study focused on the discourse of migration governance in South Africa. This was done in order to examine South Africa's policies that govern migration. The chapter began by reflecting on the international conventions on refugees and human rights. Among the international conventions that were discussed were the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951. Both these frameworks promote the protection of refugee rights, especially in host countries. South Africa is a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention. Based on the findings presented in Chapter Five it was argued that South Africa has contravened this framework. This is apparent in the migration policies that have been adopted by the country that promote the arrest and deportation of migrants who are considered as undocumented.

The deportation of migrants by South Africa violates the principle of non-refoulment. Chapter Five further focused on continental and regional instruments relating to migration governance. The key findings indicated that the AU championed legal instruments that sought to encourage the free movement of people, goods, and services within Africa. This was done against the background of integrating Africa to achieve the dream of a united Africa. Regardless of these efforts, the free movement of persons remains an implausible reality in the SADC region, due to the unwillingness of some states in the region to ratify the AU and SADC protocols on the free movement of persons, although SADC members adopted the protocol on the facilitation of free movement of people in SADC. The SADC protocol remains ineffective because it has not been ratified by the required two-thirds of SADC member states, as prescribed by Article 36 of the SADC Protocol on FMP. Despite this, progress has been made through bilateral and (smaller) multilateral agreements among SADC member states to facilitate free movement.

South Africa's migration policies are inspired by international, continental and regional conventions. The core idea behind the policies is that the country has to protect the rights of refugees who fled their countries due to human security-related challenges. In its migration governance, South Africa adopted the Refugee Act 130 of 1998 and the

Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Both policies adopted a human-rights based approach in their efforts to protect the rights of immigrants in South Africa. The Refugee Act 30 of 1998 and the Immigration Act of 2002 were commended for being progressive, as they concentrated on the protection of the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers. This accorded with Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution (1996), which provides for the protection of the rights of everyone living in South Africa, despite their race, sex, gender, language or birth. Amongst the rights enjoyed by immigrants in the country are freedom of movement, access to basic services (such as primary healthcare and social welfare), and the right to work and study in South Africa.

South Africa's migration policies have been clouded by inconsistencies, as they were amended over the years (e.g. the Refugee Act and the Immigration Act). These amendments were made to move from a human-rights-based approach to a securitized approach to international migration. The securitized approach to international migration was further engrained by the adoption of the White Paper on International Migration of 2017, which promotes the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants. The detention of undocumented migrants not only violates the UN Conventions on Refugees but also the human rights of immigrants, as espoused in Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution (1996). This is clear evidence that South Africa's migration system is anti-human rights, and pro-security and nationalistic. Moreover, the government has proposed exiting key international conventions, and then later re-entering them with provisos relating to the areas of education, employment, social services, and the principle of non-refoulment.

In the Draft White Paper on International Migration 2017, it is stated that South Africa made a "serious mistake" by entering the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. South Africa's position regarding exiting international conventions relating to the status of refugees signifies the country's shift from a human rights approach to a securitized approach to international migration.

South Africa's securitized approach towards migration was further strengthened by it establishing the Border Management Authority (BMA) in 2020, which seeks to strengthen the country's border security. The BMA is to safeguard South Africa's porous borders in

order to ease the challenges of illegal/irregular migration, cross-border crimes, and illicit trade. Although this is an important step towards ensuring border security and development, the study argued that the BMA's success depends on resource allocation and a larger budget. The absence of such will affect the ability of the BMA to fulfil its mandate and objectives; it will also be hard for the authority to perform its duties as per expectations. Nonetheless, the BMA resembles a securitized and militarized approach to migration as the over-guarding of South Africa's borders creates the perception that the country is under a threat from an influx of undocumented illegal migrants.

In summing up the findings presented in Chapter Five, South Africa is one of the leading economies in the SADC region and the rest of Africa. Its economic success and relatively stable political landscape has attracted migrants from Africa and the rest of the world. In the early days of democracy, South Africa governed international migration using a human rights approach; since then the country has shifted to a securitized approach. This approach was strengthened by the misconception that migrants were flooding South Africa; thus, they had to be restricted. By adopting restrictive and selective policies, South Africa's migration governance holds traces of institutionalized xenophobia, which reveals itself in its discriminatory practices, such as the lack of protection of migrant rights and discrimination. This has become a common occurrence in South Africa where migrants suffer human rights violations and discriminatory practices at the hands of state officials.

Chapter Six of the study is key, as it demystifies the accusations made about migrants, who are often blamed and scapegoated for South Africa's social ills. Among the allegations levelled against immigrants, as presented in this study, are that there are more than 10 million immigrants living in South Africa, that immigrants are responsible for or contribute to the rising unemployment rate and crime rates, and the lack of access to basic services by South Africans, and that immigrants living in the country are illegal and refuse to be documented. However, statistical data show that the immigrant population is far lower than the estimated ten million; in 2020, the total migrant population in South Africa stood at 2 860 495. Compared to South Africa's population of almost 60 million people, migrants comprise 4.2% of the population.

Hence, it is one-sided to allege that the migrant population is responsible for or contribute to the lack of access to social welfare and public services such as healthcare and housing.

In response to the allegation that migrants are responsible for the escalating crime rate, the findings in Chapter six showed that, between 2017 and 15 November 2021, an annual average of 3 600 undocumented foreign nationals were incarcerated out of the total of 158 329 inmates in South Africa's prisons. The proportion of undocumented migrants imprisoned comprise an average of 2.3% of the total population of inmates in South Africa's prisons, a figure that contradicts the widely held view that immigrants contribute to or are responsible for the country's high crime rate.

Based on the data presented in Chapter Six, it was argued that even though there are immigrants that contribute to the social ills in the country, the reality is that claims that immigrants are the primary contributors to the rise in socioeconomic and political woes is a misconception and a myth. Hence, South Africans should apply an informed approach when making judgement calls about immigrants, as failure to do so will result in certain public officials and politicians always scapegoating immigrants for the challenges facing the country.

Chapter Seven of the study presents a summary of the findings derived from the previous chapters, discussing the contribution the study makes to the current literature, areas for future research, and policy recommendations on how to curb xenophobia in South Africa. Recommendations were made based on the different forms of xenophobia, which was informed by the fact that they are triggered by different factors; hence, the need for a multi-layered approach to mechanisms that could be adopted to curb xenophobia in South Africa.

7.3 Contribution to existing body of knowledge

This study has contributed to the social scientific knowledge by providing a comprehensive analysis of migration and its impact on xenophobia in South Africa. It shed new light on the conventional understanding that immigrants pose a threat to South Africa's security, while orthodox studies have explained that due to migration to the country, the presence of immigrants contributes to or is responsible for the high rate of unemployment and crime, that most immigrants live in South Africa illegally, and that they strain the country's social welfare and social security services. This study has shown that this is not necessarily the case; thus, it provided empirical data to demystify the stereotypes, myths, and allegations relating to immigrants in South Africa. For example,

in 2020, the migrant population stood at 2 860 495; when comparing this statistic to the South African population of almost 60 million people, the migrant population in South Africa made up 4.82 percent of the country's population. Given this reality, it is not justified to allege that migrants are flooding South Africa, and that they strain the social welfare and public services and that they increase the crime rate.

Social ills have often triggered anti-immigrant sentiments and violent xenophobic attacks in South Africa's local communities, which consist mainly of marginalized groups. The occurrence of xenophobia was explained through the theories of relative deprivation, scapegoat and securitization, while the human security perspective was used to describe the effects of xenophobia on human security. Although violent xenophobia is the most visible and dangerous form of xenophobia, the study critically analyzed institutional xenophobia, which is seen in the state's restrictive policies and discriminatory attitude towards immigrants. By its very nature, institutionalized xenophobia feeds into violent xenophobia, which occurs at grassroots level.

The study further contributed to the body of knowledge as it shed light on an emerging form of xenophobia, called digital xenophobia. This form of xenophobia manifests through anti-immigrant statements circulated on social media platforms such as X and Facebook. This is usually circulated by certain politicians, government officials, and anti-immigrant movements (such as Operation Dudula and Put South Africa First) who share anti-migrant statements to influence public opinion on immigrants in South Africa. Often, anti-immigrant rhetoric is made without empirical data to substantiate it; thus, it creates a risk to the human security of immigrants. The emergence of new patterns of xenophobia also indicates the reluctance of the South African government to curb xenophobia.

Even though South Africa adopted the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2019, xenophobia continues to happen in South Africa. The study further provided a link between elections and anti-immigrant rhetoric (xenophobic populism), whereby certain political parties use migration as an electioneering tool during political campaigns. This was evident in the 2019 elections, where migration dominated most political parties' manifestos.

Essentially, the study provided the new patterns in which xenophobia occurs in South Africa. This being the case, the study can be used to enhance the policy direction of the security cluster in South Africa, such as the DHA, which is responsible for migration governance, and the SAHRC, which is responsible for the protection of human rights; there are other key state institutions that could also use the findings of this study.

7.4 Themes for further research

The study makes the following recommendations for future research:

- Future research can further explore the link between xenophobia and its impact on the successful implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area and examine the mechanisms that can promote intra-African trade to enhance regional economic growth in the SADC region.
- Future studies can further explore the contribution of the phenomenon of xenophilia within the context of improved relations between members of the in-group and the out-group; scholarly contributions on xenophilia will encourage social cohesion among members of different groups, unlike xenophobia, which is based on fear and the hatred of members of the out-group.
- Future research can focus on collecting fieldwork data from local people by interviewing them on their understanding of international migration policies; using empirical data, it could explain the reasons why laymen classify migrants in South Africa using a blanket approach, especially African migrants, who are often classified as refugees or asylum seekers despite their immigration status, as the blanket approach of classifying all immigrants as vulnerable people has contributed to increased violent xenophobia at the local level in South Africa.
- Further studies can be conducted into the relevance of relocating the RROs to each capital city of South Africa's nine provinces, as the location of the RROs in six major cities has led to access challenges, as most of them are far from where migrants live.

7.5 Final thoughts - policy recommendations on what can be done to mitigate xenophobia in South Africa

The challenge of xenophobia continues to undermine South Africa's post-apartheid dream of an inclusive and non-racial democracy. Although the problem persists, there are no quick fixes to address the problem of xenophobia in South Africa. There is a need for a multi-level approach in interventions to mitigate the challenge of xenophobia because

xenophobia manifests in different forms and is triggered by multiple factors. Hence, xenophobia cannot be addressed through a single-layered approach, given its complexity. As such, the study makes the following recommendations in relation to the identified forms of xenophobia presented in the findings.

7.5.1 Violent xenophobia

Violent xenophobia is the most commonly explored and reported type of xenophobia. Not only is it common but it often endangers the human security of people exposed to it, such as loss of life, severe injuries, loss of shelter and personal documents, and population displacement and poverty. This form of xenophobia is normally triggered by different factors, such as competition for limited resources such as jobs, business opportunities, housing, social welfare, and public services. In South Africa, the failure by the post-1994 government to improve the quality of people's lives through transformational policies has resulted in increased social discontent. Given the interplay between the relative deprivation of public goods and violent xenophobic attacks, there is a need for the government to address the causes of the lack of the provision of public goods to its citizens.

Moreover, policies should be adopted that create employment for the pool of unemployed people (predominantly the youth) who remains marginalized and relatively deprived. The government needs to take deliberate action against those who loot or squander the state's resources for personal benefit as this results in a lack of providing basic services, a problem which is often blamed on immigrants as they are usually accused of straining the country's social welfare and public services.

A radically transformative agenda could also contribute to the eradication of xenophobia in South Africa, considering the case study of Sunnyside in Pretoria where xenophobic attacks have never been recorded due to co-existence between locals and immigrants. The peaceful co-existence between locals and immigrants can be ascribed to improved services in the area, which creates a better life for everybody. This proves that violent xenophobia can be addressed through the implementation of policies that improve people's livelihoods and access to public goods.

7.5.2 Institutionalized xenophobia

Based on the findings of the study, it was indicated that South Africa has adopted and amended its immigration policies over the years in an effort to curb the increased number of migrants entering the country. These discrepancies in migration policies have rendered the immigration system ineffective; thus, there is a need to be consistent with the implementation of policies relating to international migration. Apart from the inconsistencies in migration policies, there has been a shift towards a securitized approach.

Moreover, a pressing issue facing the DHA is the widespread corruption in the asylum and migration system. This has aggravated the vulnerability of immigrants in South Africa to being exposed to xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, there is a need to prosecute those who are involved in corruption within the DHA, including members of SAPS and the SANDF who take bribes to facilitate irregular migration.

South Africa's securitized approach towards international migration has proven to be costly, and often ineffective. For instance, as presented in the findings, most migrants who have been arrested and deported find their way back into the country through illegal networks. This costs the government money as it spends heavily on deportations, an action that puts further strain on the ailing economy. It is thus important for the government to recognize that not only is the arrest and deportation policy costly, it contrasts with the international conventions on refugees and human rights, and the Constitution (1996), which stipulates that people's rights be protected despite their origin. Thus, a human rights-based approach towards international migration governance should be adopted by the South African government to safeguard the rights of every person, as enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (1996).

Furthermore, members of the security cluster, such as SAPS, the SANDF and the DHA, who work directly with immigrants at border posts, should wear body cameras, which might limit bribes and the illegal enabling of the movement of persons. This might further prevent so-called 'sextortion', which is an emerging form of corruption in the migration system, as it affects women negatively; it also has features of gender-based violence. In its manifestation, sextortion occurs when immigration officials (including SAPS members) demand sexual favours from women seeking immigration services. The significance of

this form of corruption is that it causes physical and emotional harm, and thus negatively affects human security.

7.5.3 Digital xenophobia

The findings presented in this chapter highlight that there is interplay between public perceptions of migration, official discourse, and migration policies in South Africa. Firstly, the persistent securitization, scapegoating and criminalization of migrants in the country is seen in politicians making anti-immigrant sentiments to shape the public perceptions of local populations. Once the allegations, stereotypes and myths about immigrants are accepted by the public, this often triggers xenophobic violence and online hate speech relating to immigrants. In addition, the public's perception that immigrants are responsible for their own misfortune has allowed the state to adopt restrictive policies of international migration (which feeds into "state-sponsored xenophobia").

Digital xenophobia was identified as an emerging form of xenophobia in South Africa, and it was most popular during the 2019 elections, when politicians used the migration issue electioneering tool. In order to alleviate this form of xenophobia, there is a need for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to enact legislation that prevents politicians from using hate speech and making conjectures about members of the out-group (migrants). This is recommended to prevent digital harassment and the spread of disinformation, the perpetuation of lies and myths, and blaming (scapegoating) migrants for South Africa's social ills. As this research has shown, politicians and government officials often make allegations about immigrants without empirical data, actions that place migrants in vulnerable situations. Anti-immigrant rhetoric is inclined to mislead voters, and it also undermines the integrity of the IEC, while instigating violent xenophobia against migrants. Digital xenophobia can be mitigated through the prosecution of perpetrators, as this will end the culture of impunity regarding online hate speech. Failure to prosecute the perpetrators of cyberhate will perpetuate digital xenophobia, taking precedence from both violent and institutional xenophobia, which persist due to a lack of prosecution.

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