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3 TRANSLATION OF METAPHOR

3.1 The paradox

It is argued in chapter 2 that the **central** problem of translation in general is to decide upon a **translation type (method)** suitable for a specific **type of text** while also considering the various communicative elements involved in both the process of translating and the product of translation. The major argument in chapter 3 is that the **most important particular** problem in translation is **how to** deal with metaphors (Newmark, 1988:104). Fields (1981:191) reiterates the importance of being able to deal with the translation of particularly **Biblical** metaphors by making this statement: "The quality of a Bible translation may be measured by many things, but among the most telling is a translation's method of handling fixed idioms, especially live and dead metaphors and similes". It has already been said in chapter 2 that while the translator makes use of a translation type (method) to deal with the text as a whole, he has to consider the use of one of various translation procedures (equivalents) when dealing with metaphors as text elements (units). It will be argued that the major issue to be considered in deciding upon a translation procedure (equivalent) will be the type of metaphor that is dealt with. The translator will still have to consider the role played by the various elements within the communicative situation but as the **type of text** is the major issue in determining a **translation type (method)** so is the **type of metaphor** the major issue determining a **translation procedure (equivalent)**.

Despite the fact that Newmark's (1988:104) view that the translation of metaphors is the "most important particular problem in translation", and regardless of the importance attributed to metaphor as a "phenomenon which is central to all forms of language use (and particularly to creative writing, whether in verse or prose) ..." (Dagut, 1976:21), there is a relatively significant void and neglect in this area among translation theorists. The amount of space allocated to dealing with the issue of metaphor in books on translation is dismal at best. Both De Waard (1974:107) and Dagut (1976:21) go as far as to argue that there is a grotesque disproportion between the importance and frequency of metaphor in language use and the minor role awarded to it in translation

theory. To prove how neglected this field of study is Dagut (1976:21) lists various principal texts on translation which all devote either less than 3 % of their space to metaphor or none at all! He goes on to argue that the astounding proportions of this neglect become even more glaring when contrasted with the close attention paid to metaphor by literary theorists and literary critics down the ages. In defence of the random attention attributed to the pivotal issue of metaphor by translation theorists it will be fair to say that the blame can presumably be laid at the door of an "intuitively subscribed and generally accepted inadequacy of single generalisations about the translatability of metaphor " (Van den Broeck, 1981:23). Yet all this evidence on the neglect of metaphor in the field of translation, and the fact that a translator cannot afford himself the luxury of pronouncing something untranslatable suggest one thing. It has become increasingly important to initiate a more thorough and a more systematic discussion and investigation on the translation of metaphor.

But in order to deal adequately with the translation of metaphor it is essential to recognise that two separate and distinct issues are at stake, namely:

- 1 Metaphor.
- 2 Translation (Mason, 1982:140).

Van den Broeck (1981:74) supports the idea of taking into account both these separate fields of interest. He goes further to state that for a systematic discussion of the implications of metaphor in translation to take place, the theorist should have the following specifications at his disposal as a starting point:

- 1 A suitable **definition of metaphor**. (I believe that this should include an understanding of the **purpose** of metaphor and an awareness of the various **types** of metaphors.)
- 2 An exposition of possible **modes of translating** metaphors. (There are perhaps more ways in translating metaphors than there are types of metaphors.)
- 3 An outline of the different **contexts** in which metaphors can occur. (A metaphor within poetry requires a different emphasis than a metaphor within a newspaper article.)

- 4 A specification of the **constraints** (norms and principles) which can be imposed on the translation of metaphors. The first specification will subsequently be dealt with under the rubric "Metaphor" as it concerns the general nature of metaphor.

While the latter three issues will all be discussed under the rubric "Translation" as they all deal with the basic issue of the translation of metaphors, the first issue will subsequently be discussed under the rubric "metaphor".

3.2 Metaphor

3.2.1 *Growth and Importance*

There can be no doubt that any serious study of metaphor must begin with Aristotle (Ortony, 1979:3), in fact Soskice argues that "so readily did interest in metaphor obtrude itself upon even the earliest philosophical and grammatical analyses of language that one can say that the study of metaphor begins with the study of language itself" (1987:1). One might even contend that metaphor has existed since man communicated for the first time.

Authors have listed theorists interested in metaphors both in terms of historical sequence (Hawkes, 1972) and various fields of study (Verster, 1975). The names of such theorists of metaphor range from Cicero, Horace and Longinus in the classical era to Richards, Wheelwright, Ortony, Black and Ricoeur in the twentieth century. Since it is not only outside the scope of this study but also a vain undertaking to do justice to all the varieties and particularities of all, or even most of the various views on metaphor in full, I will limit myself to only refer to those views which are relevant for the purposes of this study.

Philosophers, literary critics and linguists alike have theorised about metaphor since the inception of its classic definition in the **Poetics**. Yet this definition still remains the starting point of any further discussion and investigations of the issue today as it ever has (Gräbe, 1984:6; Dagut, 1976:22; De Waard, 1974:108). This view is reaffirmed by both Verster who writes: "Die term word weliswaar die eerste by Aristoteles aangetref

..." (1975:10) and Soskice who says: "Credit is customarily given to Aristotle for the first discussion of metaphor ..." (1987:1). It is not surprising, then, that most contemporary analyses return to Aristotle's account of metaphor in an attempt to resolve any problems and ambiguities that arise from investigating this issue. It has no doubt influenced almost all subsequent discussions of metaphor. I believe Aristotle's definition of metaphor is more important than many would like to admit and that is probably why, despite Dagut's (1976:22) advocating a redefinition of the term "metaphor", he conversely warns that it does not mean that doubt is to be cast on the validity of Aristotle's definition. Bate's summation of the relevance of the material in the **Poetics** amply illustrates the profound effect of, among other things, Aristotle's discussion of metaphor, on Literary Theory today:

Many of the issues it [the Poetics] raises have a perennial importance - an importance that results from the range and penetration of Aristotle's own mind, and also from the remarkable success and fertile creativity of the Greek approach to art upon which the Poetics rests (1959:24).

Although the term "metaphor" is found in many of Aristotle's writings, the primary texts dealing with metaphor are the **Poetics** (Chapters 21-25) and the **Rhetoric** (Book III). The former text defines and systematically develops the term "metaphor" while the latter is an elaboration on the issue and also contains more explanatory examples.

As Aristotle's discussion of metaphor in the **Rhetoric** is not done with the purpose of clarifying the language of poetry, this study will only focus on Aristotle's general definition and analysis in chapter 21 of the **Poetics**:

Metaphor is the application [transferred use] of a strange term [a term that properly belongs to something else] either transferred from genus and applied to the species or the species applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy (Fyfe, 1953:81).¹

1

(Poetics 1457b,7).

πρὸν δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι.
μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐ-
φυίας τε σημείον ἔστι.

that studies metaphor". Van Gorp (1984:191-192) goes as far as to categorically state that metaphor is the most important figure of speech and form of imagery with metonymy. Park (1983:261), too, reflects on the importance of metaphor in Scripture by pointing out how even Biblical metaphors, generally, enhance both the form and the content of Scriptural narrative because although "... their worth is diminished by certain deficiencies, their strengths, more than compensate for their weaknesses ...". I wish to point out in subsequent discussions that the primary reason for the importance of metaphor lies in its being more than an expendable and cumbersome ornament. It is essential for description and successful communication in not only literary texts but also texts of a less artistic nature such as scientific texts and religious texts.

Metaphors are indeed easy to trace in texts as various as advertisements, articles, sermons, scientific as well as philosophical writings and in literary works. Mooij (1976:1-2) lists these examples to point out just how widespread metaphor is:

- 1 In the long run she **drove a wedge** between the two families.
- 2 Without any ado he **brushed** the objection **aside**.
- 3 Her behaviour was quite **transparent**.
- 4 He used the text only as a **peg** for his own ideas.
- 5 I was **flooded** with relief.
- 6 Ours is an **over-ripe** civilisation.
- 7 The **death** of art.
- 8 The **layers** of society.
- 9 The **machinery** of the state.
- 10 **Stream** of consciousness.
- 11 "A **dance** to music of **time**" (Anthony Powell).
- 12 "If error is corrected whenever it is recognised as such, the **path** of error is the **path** of truth" (Hans Reichenbach).
- 13 " ... in the beginning all the world was **America** ..." (John Locke).
- 14 "Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part of philosophy (there will still be plenty left) in the only way we ever can get rid of philosophy, by **kicking it upstairs**" (J.L. Austin).
- 15 "All the world's a **stage** and all the men and women merely **players**" (Shakespeare).
- 16 "A weed from Catholic Europe, it **took root**,"

Between the yellow mountains and the sea,
 And **bore** these gay stone houses like a fruit,
 And **grew** on China imperceptibly (W.H. Auden: Macao).

If in all these texts metaphor were to be regarded as merely being used for the purpose of "colouring" language rather than sharpening it in order to describe the life of the world or the mind more accurately, it cannot be taken all that seriously (Newmark, 1982:84). Wright formulates it this way:

Literary devices [and it is metaphor with which he is primarily concerned] are not just ornamental, imparting eloquence to an otherwise bald and unconvincing statement or narrative. They have the capability to generate new meaning by stretching language beyond its ordinary uses (1988:4).

Perhaps the use of metaphor is an admission of the limits of man's logic and man's expression as well as the contradictory nature of man's experience. Since poetry is an expression of both man's experience and the limits to his logic, metaphor is also central to poetry.

I believe metaphor can also be regarded as the most vital, lively and challenging aspect of language because it appeals to not only the intellect but also to the emotions as well as man's presuppositions and values. Consequently to reduce a metaphor to paraphrase in criticism or translation is to destroy its vitality, strength, impact and ultimately its meaning. Dagut (1976:22) attests to this fact when he writes "Every 'metaphor' ... is an individual flash of imaginative insight ... which transcends the existing semantic limits of the language and thereby enlarges the hearers 'or readers' emotional and intellectual awareness".

It is significant to note, too, that in spite of viewing metaphor as merely ornamental, Aristotle regards the successful use of metaphor as the ultimate achievement of man: "... but by far the greatest thing is the use of metaphor. That alone cannot be learnt; it is the token [mark] of a genius" (Fyfe, 1953:91).²

2 (Poetics 1459a, 16-17).

Μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ
 ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ
 γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

To sum up: Metaphors are not only widespread but also so useful as to be practically indispensable. What follows is first a discussion of the nature of metaphor which entails two aspects:

- 1 What metaphor is (an attempt at a definition).
- 2 What metaphor does (its use, purpose and function).

The latter issue includes an investigation into the various **theories of metaphor** as well as an exposition of both the different **types** of metaphors and the different **elements** that constitute a metaphor.

3.2.2 Towards a definition

Despite definitions given of metaphor as early as the 5th or the 4th century B.C. (De Waard, 1974:108), defining metaphor remains a more intricate and complicated undertaking than one might expect.

The nature and definition of metaphors has been a matter of much speculation and disagreement as so many different views have been held. Consequently metaphors have given rise to diverse unsolved problems in spite of a proliferation of writings on its nature. De Man summarises the range of this definitional dilemma in this way: "Metaphors ... have been a perennial problem and at times, a recognized source of embarrassment for philosophical discourse and, by extension, for all discursive uses of language including historiography and literary analysis" (1978:13).

Anyone who has struggled with the problem of defining metaphor will appreciate both the pragmatism of those who proceed to discuss metaphor without giving a definition at all, and the possibility of having at least 125 different definitions at one's disposal yet knowing that they represent only a small fraction of the total sum put forward so far (Soskice, 1987:15; Du Toit, 1984:64). Although for different reasons, both Hrushovski (1984:5) and Van den Broeck (1981:74) regard the creation of a definition of metaphor as a less important issue. Hrushovski argues that for "... a phenomenon as omnipresent as metaphor (especially metaphor in poetry), a definition will merely provide a label rather than enhance observation

..." (1984:5). He also points out how a metaphor, like literature, is not a well-defined class. There are as many different views of literature as there are of metaphor. Van den Broeck (1981:74) on the other hand, contends that the reason for not defining metaphor is because "it does not belong to the proper task of translation theory". He admits, however, that it is important to recognise the form in which a metaphor manifests itself. There are a few basic facts to recognise about metaphor despite its elusiveness to be moulded into a universally accepted definition. Metaphor has been described as **comparison, contrast, analogy, similarity, juxtaposition, interaction, identity, tension, collision**, and one can probably come up with a few more nouns. Arguments about the inclusion of these attributes in a definition are, however, less crucial than recognising them whenever they appear. While Soskice (1987:15) is correct in her assumption that it is perhaps not possible to devise a substantial definition of metaphor satisfactory to all, it is necessary to have a working definition suitable for one's specific purposes. In the case of this study a definition is required that can be applied to the translation of the literature and poetry of the Bible.

The word "metaphor" comes from the Greek word *metaphora* which literally means "transfer". The meaning is derived from *meta* "trans" or "over" and *pherein* "to carry". Metaphor is traditionally not only taken to be the most fundamental form of figurative language but it is also regarded by many as an abridged or implicit comparison (Hawkes, 1972:90; Caird, 1980:144; Preminger, 1986:136 and Mooij, 1976:29). Both Bekker (1983:27) and Mooij (1976:29) warn against this type of oversimplification that regards a metaphor as a comparison in a nutshell. Examples of fairly oversimplified definitions are those given by both Beekman and Callow³ (1974:127) as well as Nida and Taber (1983:203)⁴. The most satisfying definition I have found and one that avoids oversimplification is that of Soskice (1987:15): "Metaphor is that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another". This definition is more succinctly put by Loewen (1975:228) who writes that "a metaphor actually calls one thing by the

3 "A metaphor is an implicit comparison in which one item of the comparison (the 'image') carries a number of components of meaning of which usually one is contextually relevant to and shared by the second item (the 'topic')".

4 "Metaphor: a figurative expression used instead of another to make an implicit comparison between items referred to by the two expressions, often based upon supplementary components: ...".

name of another". The virtue of this definition lies in the fact that it is both simple and has broad scope. The definition is short and easily understood but it also uses the term **suggestive** rather than terms such as **similarity**, **interaction** or **contrast**. The definition deliberately avoids these terms (transfer, substitution, comparison and interaction) since there is no need for a definition to contain such a full **functional** account. Such a definition will either be cumbersome or misleading. Because a metaphor can be any - or many - of these possibilities (similarity, contrast, analogy, interaction and so on) it is better to use the term "suggestive" as it embraces all these options.

The most important advantage of this definition is possibly that it eliminates what Hrushovski (1984:6) describes as "preconceived notions which are still implicit in various definitions of metaphor". Ridding oneself of such ideas, one is left with the fact that metaphor (depending on context or circumstances) necessarily cannot be limited to the following:

- 1 One word or a name.
- 2 The boundaries of one sentence.
- 3 A discrete, static and prefabricated unit.
- 4 The level of linguistic units.

Metaphors may be any of these but not exclusively so. It may be more than a word, its boundaries may lie beyond that of a sentence, it may be a dynamic pattern and it may be a text-semantic pattern (Hrushovski, 1984:7).

These statements by Hrushovski are logical when one recognises that he is primarily concerned with extended and obscure metaphors rather than simple metaphors. Many definitions of metaphor are, unfortunately, like many theories of metaphor, based on simple examples like Max Black's "Man is a wolf" (1962:39), or John Searles's "Sally is a block of ice" (1979:92). Black does, however, also use more complex and novel metaphors to argue his case. In the same chapter in which he uses "man is a wolf", he also uses "a smokescreen of witnesses" and "Oh dear white children, casual as birds/ Playing amid the ruined languages" (Black, 1983:39). The difference in metaphor examples used by Black or Searle and Hruskovski reflects the central methodological question that any

theory of metaphor has to confront, namely what type of metaphor should serve as its paradigm case. Kronfeld (1981:14) perspicuously points out that it is usually literary critics who are concerned with "novel", "imaginative" or "poetic" metaphors whereas linguists and philosophers typically deal with "conventional", "frozen" or even "dead" metaphors. She then goes on to argue that there is a significant methodological advantage in choosing novel rather than conventional metaphors as models in setting up a theory of metaphor regardless of the discipline within which it is developed. Although the main concern of this study is not the search for a paradigm case but an investigation into the nature of metaphor *per se* - be it conventional or be it novel - it is felt that any definition or theory of metaphor should take into consideration all types of metaphor.

Finally, to successfully deal with metaphor in translation the translator should be aware of both its ambiguous and ambivalent nature. As Lane (1986:487) points out:

It [metaphor] provokes where it most delights. Metaphor is a form of playing with language. It gives language an imaginative openness and is in itself a very indeterminate phenomenon. When Jesus, for instance, says that the kingdom of God is a thief coming in the night (Matthew 24:42-44) he is certainly giving an extremely partial description of the total reality encompassed by the notion of God's kingdom.

The genius of the metaphor is not that it systematically summarises every nuance of the kingdom motif, but that it raises in the mind of the reader a cluster of images and associations. There are memories of sounds in the night, the stealthy movement of a strange presence and the wide-eyed fear of the unexpected. Lane (1986:488) argues that it is the indeterminacy of a metaphor that forces the reader to make new connections of meaning and subsequently adopt new ways of acting. Lane (1986:488) also points out how the people listening to the stories of Jesus never know exactly what he means because he is reluctant to speak with a clarity that may reduce the listener's thinking, and that is why only with chagrin he occasionally concedes to explaining the parables to his disciples.

The reaction of the disciples reflects very much our own position as readers today. The deliberate indeterminacy with which Jesus communicates truth leaves us extremely uncomfortable. We rather seek to be as thoroughly complete as possible. No room is left for the imagination to take its own flight. Yet there is a great economy to metaphor which forms a resistance in telling the reader all. Nair *et al.* (1988:20-38) confirm the obscurity central to the nature of metaphor by arguing that creative metaphors are a form of risk-taking. The creator of the metaphor takes a risk in that his metaphor may be judged too impenetrable, too bizarre and even too implausible by the reader. The metaphor maker consequently "... treads a tightrope which, if successfully traversed, rewards him with a greater intersubjective understanding but, when unsuccessfully attempted, punishes with an ignominious fall into incoherence" (Nair *et al.*, 1988:28). Sylvia Plath recognises this in a poem simply titled "Metaphors":

*I'm a riddle in nine syllables,
An elephant, a ponderous house,
A melon strolling on two tendrils.
O red fruit, ivory, fine timbers!
This loaf's big with its yeasty rising.
Money's new - minted in this fat purse.
I'm a means, a stage, a cow in calf.
I've eaten a bag of green apples,
Boarded a train there is no getting off (Benton & Benton, 1981:26).*

The poem is a construct of metaphors. Each metaphor emphasises some aspects of a pregnant woman, her size, shape, ungainliness, fecundity and the inevitability of her transformation. Yet the risk is obvious. These metaphors form a maze and a riddle that the reader may fail to solve or unravel. If the reader fails to ferret out meaning, the lack of success is not only to be attributed to the writer but to himself as the recipient too. The responsibility for understanding what is said by a metaphor is consequently a matter that is to be equally shared by writer and reader. (The role of the reader is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.) To use Lane's words: "It [metaphor] insists on a hermeneutical process that is reciprocal" (1986:490). Consequently a certain inconclusiveness is always basic to the success of a metaphor because it is finally fulfilled - if at all - in the imagination of the active or participating reader. Lane (1986:490) stresses the importance of the reader's role in this way:

*Jesus spoke in parables because he knew all language, but especially metaphor, to be a matter of **masking** as well as **revealing**. It [metaphor] forces the listener to work as well as the storyteller, not releasing its gifts until each have claimed responsibility for its completion (emphasis mine).*

Sadly we usually seek to dissolve a metaphor into a fixed meaning. But as MacCormac (1972:69) puts it: "It is **impossible** to reduce all metaphors to **paraphrases** (emphasis mine)". It is probably this elusive nature of metaphor coupled with man's tendency towards structured clarity that prompts Fraser (1979:184) to reflect on metaphors as "black holes in the universe of language". We know they are there. Innumerable individuals have examined them. They have had enormous amounts of energy poured into them and, sadly, no one knows very much about them.

The last point to be made about metaphor is that it owes much of its success to its qualities of distance, evasiveness and uncertainty because we are creatures who learn more readily by suggestion and innuendo than by exhaustive and direct explanation. As Lane puts it: "Metaphor is endemic to our created being" (1986:499). Readers are attracted by what teases their minds into drawing further conclusions. Foreign and remote images usually elicit deeper participation. An excellent example is found in II Samuel 12 where David is confronted with a metaphor applying to himself. He is "teased" into the truth by listening to the tale of the rich farmer taking away the poor farmer's little ewe lamb and then erupting in anger at such injustice David unwittingly pronounces his own sentence, so successful is the metaphor.

It is perhaps wise to close this discussion on what metaphor is, with another metaphor already mentioned in chapter 2 under 2.2.1 in relation to translation, because it is true that, "what metaphor is can never be determined with a single answer" (Booth, 1978:175). This suggestive function of metaphor and the obliqueness so central to its nature, can probably be best conceived of, and explained, by way of an iceberg image: what appears above the surface is the play with language and a juxtapositioning of intersecting images and associations, but below the surface one is confronted with a vast area open to the unconscious where

meanings are sorted and applications are made. This is the level of interpretation where a metaphor operates in its most creative way.

3.2.3 Theories of metaphor

There appears to be a lack of general agreement on the division and number of theories of metaphor. First Mooij's (1976:36-37) classification of metaphor theories is presented because of its comprehensiveness and thoroughness. It does not completely satisfy, however, since his classification reflects theories of metaphor in a way that fails to explain the function and purpose of metaphors. Mooij's scheme can diagrammatically be presented as follows:

1 Monistic theories	2 Dualistic theories
If a word is used as a metaphor, it loses its normal capacity but it may get another reference instead.	If a word is used as a metaphor it still keeps its normal referential capacity and thus retains a reference to elements of its literal extension.
1.1 Connotation theories	2.1 Comparison theories
The meaning of metaphor can be explained on the basis of part of its literal meaning Examples: RJ Matthews, A Reichling, MC BEardsley, Jean Cohen.	Example: P Heanle.
1.2 Substitution theories	2.2 Interaction theories
The meaning of a metaphor can be explained on the basis of other features of literal use.	There are two subjects in metaphor, one of which is in terms of the other. Examples: W Stählin, K Bühler, IA Richards, M Black.
1.3 Supervenience theory	
(The meaning of a metaphor cannot be explained.) Example: M Foss.	

Although Mooij (1976:37) himself warns that his scheme should not be adhered to too strictly, because in many cases a theory of metaphor cannot be classified unambiguously, it still remains a very thorough scheme which gives a very good overview of the many theories in circulation today. It is not useful for the purposes of this study, however, because it does not shed any more light on the question: what is the purpose and function of metaphor? What does it do?

Hawkes (1972:90-91) is much more simplistic than Mooij by opting for two possibilities only, namely a "classical" and a "romantic" view. He admits that a third view is possible by stating that, "if there is a 'modern' view of metaphor, it is an extension of the romantic one". According to his division the **classical** view holds that metaphor is detachable from language and a device that may be incorporated into language to achieve specific effects. The **romantic** view, on the other hand, sees metaphor as inseparable from language since language is vitally metaphorical. This implies that the use of metaphor creates a new reality in that it enables an author to convey a message in a diversity of ways. This classification is useful to the present study as it defines the purpose of metaphor. It is regrettably limited in its scope but confirms these two purposes:

- 1 Metaphor is used for **specific effects**.
- 2 Metaphor is used to **create new reality**.

As far as the purpose of metaphor is concerned, Soskice (1987:24) presents the most useful division and explanation of theories of metaphors. She divides the theories according to their visions of achievements (purpose of metaphor) and identifies three groups. She admits, like Mooij, that some theories cannot always be categorically classified but for the most part the ensuing threefold division is both appropriate and useful as they focus on the use, purpose and function of metaphor.

3.2.3.1 Substitution theories

These theories regard metaphor as a **decorative** way of saying what could be said literally. Metaphor is an additive and not essential. It is replaceable at any time since its only virtue is alleviating boredom in literal expression as an ornamental instrument. According to this theory metaphor lacks cognitive content. Richards aptly summarises this view as follows:

Throughout the history of Rhetoric, metaphor has been treated as a sort of happy extra trick with words, an opportunity to exploit the accidents of their versatility, something in place occasionally but requiring unusual skill and caution. In brief, a grace or ornament or added power of language, not its constitutive form (1936:90).

Du Toit (1984:64) is even more succinct in his assessment of this theory: "die retoriese metafoorteorie ... sien die metafoor net as oratoriese hulpmiddel met ornamentele en oortuigingswaarde ...". This implies that it is possible to replace the metaphor with its literal equivalent (paraphrase) since it has the virtue of an attractive piece of clothing - it adorns but does not change what is essentially communicated. I believe this view is very inadequate and deficient since the assumed, ready availability of a literal substitute makes the value of a metaphor negligible (Soskice, 1987:25) and there is ample proof that metaphor is not negligible. On the contrary, it is indispensable (Mooij, 1976:12), central to all forms of language use (Dagut, 1976:21), a primary tool for the writer (MacCormac, 1972:57) and vitally important (Goodman, 1968:80). Soskice (1987:25) too, takes pains in pointing out that even a very simple metaphor like "He is a fox", must signify some metaphor more than the literal explanation "He is cunning". Even where metaphor predominantly functions as an ornament, it does so by virtue of making an addition to the significance of an utterance - even if only a little. At this point it is necessary to recognise that a metaphor does have ornamental value and may serve the additional function of decorating an expression but there is more to metaphor than its mere aesthetic qualities as the substitution theory suggests. There is also a cognitive element in metaphor of which Wright says: "Recent studies recognise the cognitive element in metaphor, which is not merely a matter of ornament, [or] 'a decorative way of saying what could be said literally'" (1988:130). Metaphor is a unique cognitive vehicle enabling us to say things that can be said in no other way. This is also

why a metaphor is always more than the "sum of its parts" (Boonstra, 1976:347).

Finally, brief mention probably needs to be made of the comparison theory as a sophisticated version of the substitution theory (Soskice, 1987:26). The comparison theory also regards the purpose of metaphor as being essentially ornamental but differs from the substitution theory in that it holds that a metaphor may be replaced by an equivalent comparison or simile rather than the literal explanation. This is why Black (1962:35) maintains that "a 'comparison view' is a special case of a 'substitution view'".

3.2.3.2 Emotive theories

The emotive theories are exactly what the rubric suggests. Metaphor is seen as a vehicle appealing to the emotions. A metaphor is viewed only in terms of the **affective impact** it has. This theory denies that metaphor has any cognitive content at all. Beardsley (1958:135) summarises the emotive theory in this way:

*... according to the Emotive theory, a word has meaning only if there is some way of confirming its applicability to a given situation - roughly, only if it has a clear designation. For example, the sharpness of a knife can be tested by various means, so that the phrase "sharp knife" is meaningful. We may also suppose that "sharp" has some negative emotive impact, deriving from our experience with sharp things. Now, when we speak of a "sharp razor" or "sharp drill" the emotive import is not active, because these phrases are **meaningful**. But when we speak of "a sharp wind", "a sharp dealer", or "a sharp tongue", the tests for sharpness cannot be applied, and therefore, though the individual words are meaningful, the combinations of them are not. In this way the emotive import of the adjective is released and **intensified** (emphasis mine).*

It is consequently clear that the emotive theory assumes that deviant word usage brings about a metaphor and since the deviance in word usage results in the loss of genuine cognitive content, the metaphor gains an unspecified emotional content. The main objection that can be raised against this theory of metaphor is that there cannot be any emotive import without some

cognitive content which elicits it. As Soskice (1987:27) puts it: "There must be some guiding cognitive features which the emotive response is the response to". Another flaw in the Emotive theory is that it is unable to account for the fact that non-standard uses of the same term can have opposing emotive import (Beardsley, 1958:135). It cannot, for example, explain why the deviant usage of "sharp" can be negative as in "sharp wind", and why at the same time it can be positive, as in "sharp wit".

Finally reference must be made to Davidson (1978:31-47) who puts forward a theory of metaphor which is similar to the Emotive theory of metaphor in that it is non-cognitivist. Although this theory is both imaginative and innovative, it remains problematic. The major flaw appears to lie in a central ambivalence in his argument. On the one hand he insists that this view should not be associated with "those who have denied that metaphor has a cognitive content in addition to the literal ..." (Davidson, 1978:32), and on the other hand he asserts: "We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning ..." (1978:45). The clarification of this ambivalence lies in the fact that Davidson argues that a metaphor has literal meaning only - "it says what it shows on its face" (1978:43). A metaphor can, like a dream or a joke, make one appreciate a fact but it cannot stand for, or express that fact because it "makes us see one thing as another by making some **literal statement** that inspires or prompts the insight" (Davidson, 1978:47) (emphasis mine). What Davidson seems to be saying is although a metaphor does not have a specific cognitive content (special meaning), it does contain literal meaning or as he puts it: "Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation mean and nothing more" (1978:32). The consequence of this thesis is that this use of "meaning" is excessively narrow and his theory lacks explanatory force. This can be illustrated by the following conversation that might take place between Davidson and an interlocutor (Soskice, 1978:30):

Davidson: *He is a jackal.*

Interlocutor: *You mean that he is a coward and a scrounger?*

Davidson: *No, I am committed to regarding him as a coward and a scrounger and although I intended by my utterance to make you see him thus, I only said and I only meant "he is a jackal".*

It is unfortunate that Davidson's theory, like the Emotive theory, is based on the idea that a metaphor is the consequence of the failure of a literal reading which results in jolting us into insight. What complicates matters more is that this insight does not represent the metaphor cognitively because it does not have a message. Although Davidson's ideas are both fruitful and revolutionary it does not satisfy as it denies the cognitive content of a metaphor. It must be kept in mind, however, that a metaphor does both **suggest** or nudge the receptor to envisage images, as well as objects and has an **affective impact** on the reader but that does not deny that it has meaning, that is, cognitive content.

3.2.3.3 Incremental theories

Incremental theories of metaphor see a metaphor as a unique cognitive vehicle which enables one to say something that can be said in no other way. Soskice (1987:31) warns that "there is, however, a variety of opinion as to how metaphor achieves its unique cognitive taste". There appear to be three major actors in the theatre of Incremental theories, namely Beardsley, Black and Richards. All agree that metaphor is not a mere substitution for literal speech and neither is it strictly emotive. It should be treated as fully cognitive, that is, capable of saying that which can be said in no other way and it usually capture two ideas into one. Boonstra explains it in this way:

Such comparisons, fresh when a poet sees them, as Eliot sees "the evening sky as a patient etherized upon a table", a bit stale in expression like "brave as a lion" or "hungry as a horse", often capture a truth or a situation or an insight more succinctly than propositional statement could do (1976:346).

Although he uses similes as his paradigm case the truth that a propositional statement cannot supplant the meaning of a metaphor remains intact. Boonstra (1976:346) argues that the reason for this unique ability in metaphor lies in the fact that figurative language is delightfully playful, creative and open. Instead of subtracting and limiting reality, as is done in scientific language, metaphor suggests and explores.

According to Soskice (1987:49) metaphor cannot be understood as Beardley suggests, as a matter of **conflict of word meaning**, or as Black suggests as an

interaction of two **subjects**. Although both are correct in their assessment that metaphor has cognitive content, both their theories contain weaknesses which makes the account of metaphor promulgated by Richards the most satisfactory. Soskice does, however, concede that "in many ways the most satisfactory contemporary philosophical account of metaphor, and certainly the most often cited, is that of Max Black" (1987:38) and that Beardsley's theory has many "strengths" along with its "weaknesses" (1987:32).

Subsequently brief mention is made of the theories of Beardsley and Black. Beardsley formulated what he called a Controversion theory of metaphor: "... a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context ..." (1958:142). An example that counters this notion is "Anchorage is a cold city". This is literally true but it may also express the lack of hospitality found among the citizens of this city. Clearly this metaphor does not produce literal absurdity and neither is it patently false. Because this theory rests on the assumption that the author of a metaphor formulates it with two intentions in mind, namely, to state something literally that is false and to state something significant (MacCormac, 1985:210), it is not acceptable for the purposes of this study. Although Beardsley captures the sense of anomaly and strangeness produced generally by metaphors, he needlessly complicates metaphor by arguing that it intentionally performs two purposes simultaneously. It is indeed quite true, as Davidson (1978:41) has so perspicaciously recognised, that most metaphors are false when taken as literal statements. The fact is, however, that few people accept them in this way. They rather recognise the analogy expressed in the metaphor and subsequently puzzle about and marvel at the disanalogy.

Black's theory of metaphor is very popular and although some, for example, Bekker (1983:23), consider it to be an improvement and refinement of the theory developed by Richards (1936:93) this is not necessarily so. On the contrary, Black has with his Interaction view significantly misunderstood Richards's account of metaphor (Soskice, 1987:39). In promulgating an Interanimative theory of metaphor, Richards contends that "when we use a metaphor we have two **thoughts** of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (1936:93) (emphasis mine). A metaphor is, then, cognitively unique by giving two **ideas** for one thing without being a mere comparison. The mistake Black (1962:40) makes is to regard his own principal and

subsidiary subjects that interact, as being the equivalent of Richards's (1936:97) well known "tenor" (underlying subject of the metaphor) and "vehicle" (way in which metaphor is expressed). Soskice (1987:46) also point out how Ricoeur mistakenly takes tenor and vehicle to be the equivalents of Black's "metaphorical focus" and "literal frame" and Bekker (1983:28) makes the same erroneous equation. This completely misses Richards's more subtle point that tenor and vehicle are not necessarily two terms or subjects within a metaphor. Consequently a metaphor does not consist of two **subjects** interacting but rather two **ideas** or **thoughts**. Instead of using the well-known example "Man is a wolf", it would be more appropriate to illustrate Richards's point with "that wolf is here again". Moreover, Black's idea in terms of two subjects cannot deal with metaphor such as "writhing script" or "angry wind". While Richards can argue that the tenor is the "wind" and the vehicle is "angriness" as well as the associations one has with anger, Black does not have two subjects or explicit terms in these metaphors. The only subject (term) is "wind". Black (1955:291-294) admits, however, that the choice of labels for his "subjects" is troublesome since he himself recognises that what Richards has in mind are "thoughts" or "ideas", rather than things. Unfortunately even this admission does not change the main thrust of this theory and the inherent weakness that goes along with it.

The Incremental theory of metaphor to be applied within this study is illustrated by Soskice (1987:49) who uses the following example:

The unmentionable odour of death
Offends the September night.

She explains how W.H. Auden does not use this metaphor to speak about smell, but he is rather speaking about 1 September 1939 and the forebodings of war in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another, namely, odour. This example also elucidates the definition given of metaphor under 3.2.2. Consequently metaphor can be seen to have not two **subjects**, but rather two different **networks** of **association**. In the metaphorical statement "Man is a wolf", the associations are with "man", and with "wolf", while in the metaphor "angry wind", the associations lie with "anger" and with "wind" which are not two **subjects** but rather two **ideas**. To explain a metaphor as speaking (or being an expression) about one thing (or state of affairs) in terms which are suggestive of another, is to clarify what Max Black (1979:142)

considers to be yet unsolved when he writes: "In my opinion, the chief weakness of the 'interaction' theory, which I still regard as better than its alternatives, is the lack of clarification of what it means to say that in a metaphor one thing is thought of (or viewed) as another thing".

3.2.4 Purpose of metaphor

From the discussion on the theories of metaphor it has already become clear that metaphors have many and diverse purposes. In keeping with the ambiguous nature of metaphors which necessitates the reader's having to puzzle over the metaphor and seek an explanation for their meaning, it is difficult to pin down the main purposes of metaphor in general. This difficulty stems mainly from two sources: The one is that metaphors at times may have multiple purposes and another is that the function of metaphors may differ from text to text, from language to language and from culture to culture (Van den Broeck, 1976:77).

The threefold purpose that metaphor serves has emerged from the previous section, 3.2.3 and that is to decorate, to have emotive impact and to communicate uniquely. The latter is indeed the most important purpose and function of a metaphor. It is vital to realise that the first purpose of metaphor is to communicate (Nair *et al.* 1988:28). Newmark (1982:84), MacCormac (1972:64), Mooij (1976:14) and Long (1974:335) agree on this issue by writing that the purpose of metaphor is to describe, qualify particularise and elucidate an entity, an event or a quality more comprehensively, concisely, and in a more complex way than is possible by using literal language. Newmark (1988:104) refers to this as the referential or cognitive purpose, of metaphor. This is the quality of a metaphor to communicate something that can be done in no other way.

One must be careful to keep in mind that metaphors do not only clarify and elucidate that which was hitherto unknown, undigested or unnamed. They invariably also contribute to an insight in what is already all too well-known (Mooij, 1976:16). This happens when everyday types of situations or events are described in striking metaphorical terms and are consequently emblazoned in a new light. This brings one to the peculiar conclusion that metaphors are conducive not only to the development of new views, but also to the demolition of old ones.

Original metaphors are, however, usually used by good writers to help the reader to gain a more accurate insight **physically**, **emotionally** and **aesthetically**. This fact underlines the two other and less important purposes of metaphor, namely, its emotive purpose and its aesthetic purpose. Consequently Chryssides (1985:147) is correct with his assessment that to use metaphor is to "arouse feelings" and "to inspire action". Despite its referential purpose, metaphor is also there to please or to sadden the reader. In short: metaphor has an emotive effect also on the reader.

Finally metaphor also has a pragmatic purpose (Newmark, 1988:104). This is to recognise that the purpose of metaphor is also to appeal aesthetically to the reader's senses in that it is a decorative and ornamental device. It is vital to note that this aesthetic or decorative purpose and function of metaphor is a secondary, and even a tertiary one. This particular purpose of metaphor has in fact become so suspect that these words of Tracy (1978:97) should come as no surprise: "there follows a widespread distrust, therefore, of traditional ... interpretations of metaphor understood on the rhetorical model of decorative device ...". To fully appreciate the purpose of metaphor then, one needs to recognise that it is threefold, namely **referential** (cognitive), **emotive** (impact on feeling) and **aesthetic** (decorative) of which the referential is the most important. This is why Wright (1988:40) argues that metaphor achieves **semantic innovation** without sacrificing referentiality. It describes reality that can be described in no other way and offers new ways of perception into issues and physical entities that cannot be substituted successfully by any amount of literal explanation. An interesting fact to note, with regards to the threefold purpose of metaphors, is that the referential purpose is likely to dominate in an informative text (textbook), the emotive purpose in a vocative text (advertisement) and the aesthetic purpose in an expressive text (poem) (Newmark, 1988:104). In conclusion I would like to expand Dagut's (1976:22) definition of metaphor in view of its threefold purpose: Metaphor is an individual flash of imaginative insight which transcends the exciting semantic limits of the language and thereby enlarges the reader's **intellectual**, **emotional** and **aesthetic** awareness.

3.2.5 Elements of metaphor

In order to adequately deal with metaphor in translation one has to take cognizance of the elements which make up a metaphor. Recognising these

different elements and knowing what they represent also enhances one's understanding of metaphor as an elusive phenomenon. Theorists assign various names to the different elements and some attempt to be more thorough than others. Probably the first person to attempt such a breakdown in the elements of a metaphor was Richards (1936:96) with his introduction of the terms **tenor** and **vehicle**. A more thorough and explicit breakdown, however, is given by Loewen (1975:228) and De Waard (1974:110). They propose that a metaphor consists of the following three parts:

- 1 The **object** of comparison.
- 2 The **image** of comparison.
- 3 The **ground** of the comparison.

In view of these three elements the Biblical metaphor "Benjamin is a ravenous wolf" (Genesis, 49:27) can be set out and explained as follows:

- 1 Object - Benjamin.
- 2 Image - wolf.
- 3 Ground - ravenous.

A metaphor might not always explicitly mention the ground of the comparison as, for example, in the metaphor "Christ is a rock". The ground, namely "steadfastness", "trustworthy", and so on is implied.

Beekman and Callow (1974:127) opt for a different terminology, but basically agree with the idea of an object, image and ground of comparison. They list the three elements of a metaphor as follows:

- 1 The topic.
- 2 The image.
- 3 The point of similarity.

The **topic** is the item or event under discussion and is illustrated by the image. The **image** is the metaphoric part of the figure. It is that part of the metaphor which is intended to illustrate the subject under discussion. The **point of similarity** explains in which particular aspect the image and topic are similar and, as has been pointed out, can be left implicit in the metaphor. Using the

same example of "Benjamin is a ravenous wolf", the three elements can be elucidated as follows:

- 1 Topic - Benjamin.
- 2 Image - wolf.
- 3 Point of similarity - ravenous.

It is clear then that although Beekman and Callow (1974:127) use different terminology than De Waard (1974:110) and Loewen (1975:228), except with regards to **image**, the terms designate the same aspects. Larson (1984:247) opts for a more comprehensive breakdown of metaphor but sticks to the terminology of Beekman and Callow (1974:127). Larson also agrees that a metaphor has a topic, an image and a point of similarity but adds a **nonfigurative equivalent** as a fourth element (1984:247). She defines this latter element as being the comment on the topic when it is an "event proposition". The example she uses is "The righteous judge will give you the crown of life". The four elements are then set out as follows:

- 1 Topic - God, who judges righteously.
- 2 Image - officials.
- 3 Point of similarity - receiving a reward for doing well.
- 4 Nonfigurative meaning - will give you eternal life.

She warns that not all metaphors can be divided into four parts but only those in which the metaphor consists of a sentence which is encoding an event proposition. I disagree with Larsons' division in that I believe that the example, "The righteous judge will give you the crown of life" actually contains two metaphors which each has only three elements. The one metaphor can be set out as follows:

- 1 Topic - God.
- 2 Image - judge.
- 3 Point of similarity - righteousness and justice.

The other metaphor can be explicated as follows:

- 1 Topic - eternal life.
- 2 Image - victor's crown.

3 Point of similarity - reward of doing good.

Consequently this study will recognise metaphors as consisting of three elements only but will favour the terminology of Newmark (1988:105; 1982:85) and Richardson (1936:96). These terms can be set out as follows:

- 1 Object - which is the item described by the metaphor. Although De Waard (1974:110) and Loew (1975:228) also employ this term ("object"), Beekman and Callow (1974:110) refer to it as "topic". This is what Richards (1936:96) considers to be "tenor" (referent).
- 2 Image - which is the item in terms of which the object is described. It is referred to by Richards (1936:93) as "vehicle", while Beekman and Callow (1974:127), De Waard (1974:110), Loewen (1975:228) and Larson (1984:247) refer to it as "image" also.
- 3 Sense - which are the terms (particular aspects or associations) in which the object are suggestive of the image. The term "point of similarity" is deliberately avoided since metaphor has been shown under 3.2.2 to be defined also in terms of contrast, collision and tension, and not only in terms of comparison and similarity. But where there is comparison and similarity, which is true of most metaphors, it is correct of Beekman and Callow (1974:127) and Larson (1984:247) to talk of "point of similarity". In the same way De Waard (1974:110) and Loewen (1975:288) are justified in using "ground of comparison".

3.2.6 *Types of metaphor*

Since - for the purpose of translation - it is important to distinguish the different forms in which metaphors manifest themselves, the need arises to discuss the different types of metaphors. The first distinction I would like to refer to is that made by Wheelwright (1962:72) where he distinguishes between **epiphor** and **diaphor**. A brief explanation of these two types of metaphor is given by MacCormac (1985:38). An epiphor is a metaphor whose primary function is to **express** while a diaphor is a metaphor whose primary function is to **suggest**. An epiphor then, which is expressive of experience, usually produces in the reader an instant recognition of analogy as in "the time flies". It also expresses a new insight of which the reader is

usually previously unaware. As this insight becomes commonplace, however, the metaphor (epiphor) fades and dies and becomes part of ordinary language. A diaphor, on the other hand, suggest new possible meanings by emphasising the dissimilarities between referents rather than expressing the similarities.

MacCormac (1985:39) suggests that no pure diaphors exist because if there were no similarities between the parts of a metaphor, the reader would not be able to understand it as intelligible at all. The converse is also true. There can be no pure epiphor because if a metaphor had no suggestive equality, it would not only not shock the reader, but would also be an explicit comparison rather than a metaphor (MacCormac, 1979:407). It is interesting to note that some metaphors might begin as diaphors, become epiphors when evidence or experience confirms their suggestion as plausible, and finally become part of ordinary language as dead metaphors. Yet not all metaphors follow this route (MacCormac, 1985:42; 1979:408). Since all metaphors are to some degree both expressive and suggestive, this distinction of metaphor types made by Wheelwright (1962:72) is not useful for the purposes of translation.

Both Larson (1984:249) and Fields (1981:194) distinguish between **live** and **dead** metaphors only. Although this is a step in the right direction in terms of translating metaphors this oversimplification of the types of metaphors is inadequate for the purpose of this study. A description of what **live** and **dead** metaphors entail is done fully when a more complete division of the types of metaphors is discussed. Dagut (1976:23) and Van den Broeck (1981:75) both give a more complete division of the types of metaphor. Dagut (1976:23) distinguishes between **forgotten**, **stock** and **embalmed** metaphors, while Van den Broeck (1981:75) distinguishes between **lexicalised**, **conventional** and **private** metaphors. Although their terminologies differ, they mean the same thing. A "forgotten" metaphor is a "lexicalised" one, a "stock" metaphor is a "conventional" one, and an "embalmed" metaphor is a "private" one. Paradoxically Dagut (1976:22) insists that no distinctions should be made between types of metaphors on the one hand, but on the other hand he elaborates on the fact that metaphor can be divided into three categories (Dagut, 1976:23). I agree with Van den Broeck (1981:75) on the necessity of distinguishing between the major types of metaphors.

In order to give an explanation of each different kind of metaphor I turn to the classification made by Newmark (1988:106-113; 1980:93) which I find to be the most satisfactory on two accounts, namely, that it is complete yet not over-exhaustive. There are five types of metaphors: dead, cliché, stock, recent and original. Newmark does add a sixth category, namely "adapted metaphor" (1988:106) in a later published work, but since it is basically an adaptation of a "stock" metaphor, this study will work with the five above-mentioned types only. Mason (1982:141) also adds a sixth type of metaphor which she terms **permanent** metaphor. In her explanation of what she means by permanent metaphor, however, it becomes clear that this type of metaphor is very limited. In fact, I personally would categorise this type of metaphor under **dead** metaphor. Mason (1982:148) suggests that our "time and space" talk constitutes a case of permanently original metaphor, in so far we cannot avoid using metaphors to discuss it. Take for example "a **long** time", "a **short** while" and "the **distant** past". Yet it is erroneous to claim that these examples are "original" since they are dead, cliché or stock, rather than unique and innovating creations.

Before discussing the types of metaphors it might also be useful to take cognizance of the fact that the various poets of the OT express metaphorical perceptions by means of various techniques. Although there are many ways in which metaphorical techniques can be analysed Good (1970:81) suggests four useful techniques. All of these techniques are analysed in terms of the types of relations between tenor (object) and vehicle (image). As a result of this analysis he comes up with four types of metaphors:

- 1 Metaphors in which vehicle dominates.
- 2 Metaphors in which the tenor dominates.
- 3 Metaphors in which the vehicle is used selectively to bring out aspects of the tenor.
- 4 Metaphors in which the tenor is implicit.

Since this classification is useful in analysing the techniques used in constructing metaphor in terms of its respective elements (tenor and vehicle) and not in identifying a class or type of metaphor as a whole (regardless the relationship of its elements), it is not as useful as the

classification this study works with. The types of relationships between the elements of a metaphor do play their role in creating difficulties for the translator and their problems are discussed under 3.3.1.

3.2.6.1 Dead Metaphors (Forgotten, Lexical)

Van den Broeck (1981:75) points out that despite various objections which can be raised against the use of the term "dead", the idea of "deadness" gives insight to the idea that this is a metaphor that has gradually lost its uniqueness and originality. A dead metaphor is indeed part of the forgotten metaphors of literature and journalism. The reader is usually hardly conscious of the image, for example "to **harbour** evil thoughts", "in the **field** of human knowledge" or "in the **face** of adversity". Consequently Larson (1984:249) defines a dead metaphor as being part of the idiomatic constructions of the lexicon of a language. Many dead metaphors are indeed idioms but not exclusively so.

3.2.6.2 Cliché metaphors

Newmark (1988:107) defines cliché metaphors as "metaphors that have perhaps temporarily outlived their usefulness, that are used as a substitute for clear thought, often emotively, but without corresponding to the facts of the matter". An example of cliché metaphors is: "The County School will in effect become not a **backwater** but a **breakthrough** in educational development ..." (Newmark, 1988:107). It appears as if the phenomenon generally viewed as a cliché is seen as a cliché metaphor. Cliché metaphors are those metaphors which lie in the shady area between dead and stock metaphors. Newmark (1980:94) is a little more helpful in explaining that a cliché metaphor usually consists of two kinds of stereotype combinations:

- 1 Figurative adjective plus a literal noun - "filthy lucre".
- 2 Figurative verb plus a figurative noun - "leave no stone unturned".

Before continuing with the discussion of stock metaphors (the next type) one must take care to note that there is a very fine line between cliché and stock metaphors. The distinction is in fact at times so fine that Newmark

(1988:108) warns that "cliché and stock metaphors overlap, and it is up to you [the translator] to distinguish them ...".

3.2.6.3 Stock metaphors (Standard, Conventional)

This is probably the largest and most important group of metaphors. These are the metaphors which have moved from being an individual and an innovating creation to a routine and a collective repetition, or as Van den Broeck (1981:75) puts it: "[they] are more or less institutionalised in that they are common to a literary school or generation". Newmark (1988:108) goes further to define a stock metaphor "as an established metaphor which in an informed context is an efficient and concise method of covering a physical and/or mental situation both referentially and pragmatically which is not deadened by overuse". Interestingly enough Newmark (1980:95; 1982:87-91) uses stock or standard metaphor as his paradigm case to explain the various ways in which he would go about in translating metaphor.

3.2.6.4 Recent metaphors (Neologisms)

A recent metaphor is usually a neologism which is fashionable and has spread rapidly in the SL. Examples of neologisms are "the name of the game", "head-hunters" and "flak". Otherwise, a recent metaphor can also be one in which one of a number of prototypical qualities is renewed, as in "with it" for being fashionably, "groovy" for being enjoyable or "spasmoid" for being stupid or unintelligent.

3.2.6.5 Original metaphors (Embalmed, Private)

According to Dagut (1976:23) these types of metaphors are "unique semantic creations". They are the so-called bold and innovating creations of particularly poets and journalists (Van den Broeck, 1981:75). Newmark (1988:112) places under this category also the bizarre metaphors in anonymous non-literary texts such as "Good Faith amid the Frothings", "a ton of enforced silence was duped on Mr Eaton" and "Kinnock scrambles out from under ...". Other examples of original metaphor are of course rampant in literature in general, for example: "His mind bred vermin. His thoughts were lice born of the sweat of

sloth" (Joyce, 1982:211), "O Lear, Lear, Lear! (**Strikes his Head**)/Beat at this gate that let thy folly in./And thy dear judgement out" (King Lear, Act I, Scene 4, lines 240-242) and the whole sonnet "On First Looking into Chapman's Homer" by Keats. Thus we may consider the types of metaphors as lying on a continuum, from the mundane to the literary of which the following three are the most important and useful to recognise:

- 1 Dead metaphor (Lexical, Forgotten).
- 2 Stock metaphor (Standard, Conventional).
- 3 Original metaphor (Private, Embalmed).

Finally it is important for the sake of being complete to refer to other ways of classifying types of metaphor too. Newmark (1982:85) further distinguishes between one-word or simple metaphors, as in "a sunny girl", and complex metaphors which range from two words or more to complete poems. In a later work Newmark (1988:106) also distinguishes between universal, cultural and personal metaphors. He argues that some metaphors are bound to the individual, others are bound to the culture and others are universally applicable. While searching in for a translational equivalent for a metaphor, the translator has to identify whether the metaphor is simple or complex, universal, cultural or personal and dead, cliché, stock, recent or original.

3.3 Translation

3.3.1 *Complications, difficulties and problems*

Metaphors are word images in the language of literature, and, more specifically, poetry. The translator should also remember that the language of poetry is a highly complicated sign structure and that this complex nature of a poem enables it to communicate more information *that* a non-poetic text can provide. It is only natural then to expect more problems and complications in the translation of metaphor that perhaps any other phenomenon. In fact Amir Coffin (1982:104) deliberately chooses the field of metaphors in order to elaborate on examples of difficult points in translation as "metaphors themselves comprise a field of exceptional language ...". Ilek (1975:135-136) mentions two issues and

situations that complicate the translation of a word image such as metaphors:

1 There is a close connection between an image and a specific language

The poet usually finds his images in the material of his own language and the culture of which it is a part. This close connection between the image and the structure of a specific language has brought many investigators to deny the possibility of poetic translation.

2 A poetic image is incorporated into a complex fabric of specific literary and aesthetic traditions and conventions

During the long development of a national culture, certain images become standard symbols which may be very different in another. For instance, in most European languages the leech is a negative symbol, while in Tatar the expression "smooth as a leech" is meant as a term of approval and praise for a good-looking man (Ilek, 1975:136). Consequently it would be wise to look for different ways of furnishing an equivalent expression in English. Another example of an incongruous image for the English reader given by Ilek (1975:137), is that of Kazakh poet saying to his sweetheart that she has the eyes of a young camel.

Amir Coffin (1982:104) agrees with Ilek on the issue that all metaphors tend to be language-specific and culture-specific. With regards to the purpose of this study which is the translation of metaphors from Hebrew into English, De Waard (1974:111) specifically points out that there is an almost complete incongruity between the two sets of figurative extensions in these two languages. While Amir Coffin (1982:104) argues that this fact defies a literal translation of metaphors, Ilek (1975:137) laments some of the ways used by translations to avoid literal translation. Ilek (1975:137) refers to three unfortunate ways of dealing with metaphors in translation:

1 The image is invariably left out

For example, in a translation of a poem by Luttsün, "An Autumn Night", where the expression "the laugh of the midnight silence was to be heard" is replaced simply with "somebody laughed".

2 The image is often destroyed by explication

For instance, when Nezval says in one of his poems "He listens to a lay played on a flute by a child hidden behind the echo of the cliffs" and it is rendered "He listens to a lay echoed by the cliffs".

3 A worn and banal image is given in the place of fresh and new one

For example Nezval's forceful image "In each of us slumbers an ape" which is translated less expressively as "In each of us there is a ravenous savage".

This does not imply that the right of translators to employ techniques of substitution and compensation is to be denied, but to use complicating situations as well as the difficulties and problems in translating metaphors as an excuse to dismiss outright the possibility of a literal translation, is possibly falling prey to a little premature arguing.

It is felt that Loewen (1982:238-240) argues along these lines when he issues four examples of possible misinterpretations that may follow the literal translation of a figure of speech:

1 The translation will sound like nonsense

The people will understand the separate words but the message as a whole will be lost. For example, when Hosea 4:19 ("a wind has wrapped them in its wing") was translated literally in a certain language the mother-tongue speaker of that language found it to be nonsense because the wind did not have wings! The image flatly contradicted their view of reality because either the image used is unknown in their language or theirs is language that does not easily incorporate new metaphors (Larson, 1984:250-251).

2 The translation will confuse the reader

This will have the effect, of course, that the Bible will lose much of its power. This happened, for instance, when Hosea 6:11 ("for you also, o Judah, a harvest is appointed") was translated literally and with the same word order. The native readers did not grasp the harvest metaphors to signify God's judgement and when asked to explain what the verse meant, they offered: "It seems like there was someone who needed some people to harvest his crop, and so he called this person named Judah to be one of his workers". This had robbed the readers of the real message: "people of Judah's tribe, remember that God will judge and punish you for all the evil things you are doing".

3 The translation will be understood easily and quickly, but with a different meaning

Sometimes even a very wrong meaning may be derived. This can be seen in the way Hosea 4:12 ("they left God to play harlot"), was misunderstood in one African translation. All the people understood the literal translation to be saying "the people backslid and left the church and began to commit sexual sins". No-one understood the real message: "These people turned their back on God and returned to idol worship". They missed the point that worshipping idols is being compared to being unfaithful to marriage partners.

4 The local culture will tend to give the literal translation a very wrong meaning

An example of this is Hosea 1:5 ("I will break the bow of Israel"). When it was translated literally in one African culture, in which "bow" was seen as a hunting weapon only and not a weapon of war, the readers got the message that God had destroyed Israel's means of finding food. What God is really saying is that "I will destroy Israel's military strength".

Although everything argued by Loewen (1982:238-240) is correct, a translator must keep three things in mind:

- 1 In all the above-mentioned cases the reader belongs to a culture that does not have a long and rich literary history or a rich heritage of written literature. In fact most of those ethnic groups are illiterate and they have to be taught to read and write while the Bible is translated into their language.
- 2 No distinction is made between the types of metaphors in question. Choosing a translation procedure (equivalent) depends in the first place on the type of metaphor the translator is dealing with.
- 3 No mention is made of the type of text (Informative, Vocative, Expressive) in which these metaphors occur. The translator has to realise, for example, that metaphors play a more pivotal role in Expressive and Vocative texts than in Informative texts, which implies that more care should be taken to retain an image in an Expressive or Vocative text than in an Informative text. Van den Broeck (1981:78) explicitly writes that metaphors, particularly daringly private ones, are more functional in an Expressive (artistic) text than in an Informative text.

Beekman and Callow (1974:137-143) as well as Larson (1984:250-252) mention an extra number of problematic issues that complicate both the translation and the interpretation of metaphors. The difficulties that arise can be related to the three parts of the metaphor (the image, the object and the sense) as well as to the peculiarities of the TL in question. These problems in translating metaphors can be listed as follows:

1 The image may be unknown in the TL

Obviously, the original author usually draws on his own culture for the images he uses and those images may be strange in the TL which represents a different culture. For example, a metaphor based on snow would be meaningless to people who live in some parts of the South Pacific where snow is unknown. Likewise a metaphor based on sheep would be meaningless in Greenland where this animal is unknown. To translate a metaphor in terms of the unknown image is to let it implode unless the phenomenon is explained in a footnote.

2 The object (topic) of the metaphor is implicit

An example of such a metaphor is Mark 14:27 ("... and the sheep will be scattered"). **Sheep** is the image while the object (topic), **disciples**, is left out. One more significant example is II Timothy 2:4 ("No one serving as a soldier gets involved in civilian affairs ..."). The object is the Christian or the child of God, which means that if the reader of the TL fails to recognise this point, he may interpret the metaphors literally, that is, as a principle laid down for soldiers.

3 The sense (point of similarity) is implicit

The metaphor "He is a pig" does not include the **sense** but the statement implies that the person can be dirty, rude or gluttonous. Another culture may, however, attach positive connotations to the image of a pig. A telling example of the effect of different cultures in the interpretation of an image can be seen in Luke 13:32 where Jews call Herod a "fox". To the Xapotecs this means someone who cries a lot, for the Cuicatecs it refers to a good hunter and for the Otomi it is someone who steals (Beekman & Callow, 1974:138). Until the reader knows the sense (point of similarity) then, the message is incomplete and so the reader seeks to complete the meaning by looking for a point of similarity. Naturally he tends to look for something in harmony with his own religious and cultural background. If this culture attaches a different sense to the object used in a Biblical metaphor, the translator has to deal with this problem effectively or successful communication will be impeded.

4 The ideas associated have no plausible resemblance in the TL

This means there is sometimes the possibility that the TL does not make comparisons or associations of the type which occur in the SL. For example there might be a sentence which says "there was a storm in parliament yesterday" in the SL while the TL does not speak about a heated debate in terms which are suggestive of a storm. Beekman and Callow (1974:140) discuss the metaphor in Mark 1:17 where Jesus tells His disciples that He will make them "fishers of men" as a point in case. This metaphor caused many translators difficulties as they sought for a word of expression to explain the relationship between the object and the

image. One approach was to come up with "you have been working catching fish, now I will give you a new working making disciples for Me". However, in some languages even this solution will cause some problems, as "work" in those languages refers to manual work only and not to preaching and teaching.

5 A different emphasis on metaphoric use in the TL

The first problem is that a language may not incorporate metaphors at all. Larson (1984:251) points out how the Pijin of the Solomon Islands tend to reject a statement as false when it says one thing is something else. Other languages seldom or never accept the creation of new metaphors although some might exist already. As Beekman and Callow put it:

Cultures vary considerably in this matter. Many of the cultures of mesoamerica are intolerant of new and unfamiliar collocations; other welcome them and take delight in deciphering them. Of course it should be clear that this has nothing to do with intelligence at all; it is simply a matter of the current practice in a given culture (1974:141).

Finally, even if the TL uses metaphors, and has no resistance to new ones, certain types of metaphors may fail to communicate metaphorical sense. For example, in Mayo animal names simply refer to the last name of the individual. Hence if Jesus calls Herod a "fox" in Luke 13:32, they interpret it to mean that Herod belongs to the family called "fox".

In an attempt to deal with the translation of metaphors I believe De Waard (1974:112) is prudent in his assessment of the issue when on the one hand he writes that "a literal translation of metaphors should not be attempted too easily, for the simple reason that one is dealing with non-literal meanings", and on the other hand that "rendering the metaphors of the source text by non-metaphors is also a procedure which presents problems". In the case of demetaphorising the ST one would find that it implies a considerable loss of impact of the message in the TT. De Blois (1985:208) argues that dropping the figure of speech altogether and expressing the meaning directly has too easily been done in dynamic equivalent translations of particularly poetic texts, which resulted

sometimes in a translation that does not quite express the vividness and impact to which the use of imagery in any language largely contributes.

Indiscriminate literal renderings of all types of metaphors by some translators seem to have been countered by equally indiscriminate demetaphorising of the ST by other translators (specifically the exponents of dynamic equivalence working among readers who have a very short (limited) or no literary heritage). This is one of the major problems which needs to be addressed in a discussion on the translation of metaphors. Fortunately it does appear as if translators are seriously dealing with the issue, since "there now seems to be a tendency among translators to make more effort in searching for more natural figures in their own languages whenever Hebrew figures [in the case of the OT] cannot be transferred meaningfully or without distorting the meaning" (De Blois, 1985:208). Martindale (1984:64-65) also cautions that the translator should not opt for either one of the extremes exclusively. He urges the translator to avoid smoothing out oddities in the original such as, for example, rhetorical figures (among which I want to emphasise metaphors). Conversely, he also admits that there are certain occasions when finding a cultural equivalent is appropriate. His final preference, however, is that the translator should give a literal rendering so that the reader can do his own culture-bridging himself.

This dilemma in which the translator of metaphors in particular, finds himself is expounded as follows in Martindale's article: "He who translates literally is a falsifier, while he who adds anything by way of a paraphrase is a blasphemer" (1984:65). De Waard (1974:114) elaborates on the same dilemma when he writes "between the Scylla of extreme cultural adjustments and the charybdis of translationese [absolute literal translation], the translator has to go his dangerous and - alas! - often lonely way". The consequence of this situation is eloquently voiced by Dagut in an article about the grossly inadequate material on the translation of metaphors:

"In the all too meagre discussion of the subject, we can discern, through the terminological confusion, two diametrically opposed views on the problem of translating metaphors: at the one extreme it is held that there is no solution (i.e. metaphors is untranslatable);

and at the other, that there is no problem (i.e. metaphors can be quite 'simply' translated word for word)" (1976:25).

I believe that the situation is not necessarily as critical as it usually is made out to be since the translator always has a few pointers (situational constraints) to guide him. The first pointer (situational constraint) is to determine the type of metaphor at hand. A second important situational constraint is the type of text the metaphor is situated in. Finally, the translator must take into account all the other elements within the communicative situation as is outlined in chapter 2, which implies the consideration of factors such as the **reader, culture and the purpose of the translation**. These elements constitute the situational framework which in its turn aids the translator to set up a translation framework (deciding upon a translation procedure or equivalent).

One last problem with regard to the identification of types of metaphor is one of historicity. Beekman and Callow (1974:133) rightly assert that although a native speaker of a living language can generally tell which metaphors are live and which metaphors are dead, it is another matter when it comes to identifying types of metaphors occurring in documents written in a language approximately 2000 years old. This is the case with the classical Hebrew of the OT which is extinct in its classical form. Since no native speaker of the classical Hebrew is alive today it may well be that what might have been a dead metaphor for the original author, may strike the translator as a live one today or vice versa. Apart from the history and background information of the Hebrews and their language to assist the translator, Beekman and Callow (1974:133) suggest looking at the following contextual factors to determine with reasonable certainty whether a metaphor is dead or alive:

1 The number of images used in the metaphors

When a metaphor consists of several related images it is a clear indication that the author is using these images to convey his message in the form of a live metaphor. The example referred to by Beekman and Callow (1974:133) is that of Mark 3:21-22 where Jesus uses a series of interrelated images to convey the same object, namely sewing a new piece of cloth on an old garment and the new one tearing loose as well as

pouring new wine into old wineskins which results in the old wineskins bursting.

2 The order of the images

If the order for the images is chronological or logical this also indicates that they are live metaphors. The example used by Beekman and Callow (1974:134) to illustrate this point are these four lines from the poem "Bereft" of Robert Frost:

*Where had I heard this wind before
Change like this to a deeper roar?
Leaves got up in a coil and hissed,
Blindly struck at my knee and missed.*

There are four metaphorical items, namely "coil", "hissed", "struck" and "missed" which are all appropriate to or suggestive of a snake although the object that is used is that of leaves. Because the sequence of these words are the logical and chronological sequence a snake would follow, this is alive metaphor.

3 The nonfigurative items in the context closely related to the metaphors

The last thing that is indicative of a live metaphor is when in a particular context there are non-figurative items which stand in a close relationship to the metaphorical image being used. An example given by Beekman and Callow (1974:134) is when the writer deliberately calls the reader's attention to an image chosen from a setting of non-figurative items as in Mark 1:17: "I will make you fishers of men". The immediate context or setting refers to the sea, fishermen, nets, ships and fishes. Since the whole setting is indicative of fishing one can conclude that a metaphor such as "fishers of men" is a live one.

Although these guidelines given by Beekman and Callow (1974:133-134) are useful they not only fail to give guidelines concerning the other types of metaphors, namely stock, cliché and recent but they also neglect to mention the necessity of closely considering historical clues and

background information in this regard. Acquainting oneself with the foreign culture and historical setting of the language in which one wants to translate metaphors in particular is of vital importance.

3.3.2 *Translation procedures (equivalents)*

It has become clear from the previous section that translating metaphors is no simple matter. The translator cannot simply opt for translating every metaphor literally (word for word) (Dagut, 1976:32), and neither can he entirely dismiss the idea of using a literal translation at all (Loewen, 1975:437). In this regard Martindale (1984:47) warns that the argument that literal translations are useful primarily as props "... is seriously misleading". This suggests that literal translation has a serious role to play in the rendering of TL equivalents for SL elements although not exclusively so. Although it is true that not all metaphors can be dealt with in terms of literal translations, Newmark (1988:68) is unequivocal in his support of this phenomenon as a legitimate translation procedure (equivalent). In fact, he goes as far as to write that since an original metaphor has both an **expressive** and an **aesthetic** component, it has to be preserved literally in translation (Newmark, 1988:43). The converse is also true. Because many metaphors are culturally bound and may be misinterpreted by the TL readers when transferred literally, other translation procedures, such as cultural equivalents, should be considered. The first task of the translator is naturally to determine a situational framework. He has to analyse the conditions and circumstances in which the metaphors occur (Van den Broeck, 1981:77; Newmark, 1988:81) and then choose a suitable translation procedure (equivalent) in order to deal with the metaphor successfully. Newmark (1988:81-93) discusses quite a number of translation procedures (equivalents) in general which range from **literal transference**, **synonymy** and **cultural equivalents** to **modulation**, **paraphrase** and **glosses**. All of these are not necessarily applicable to the translation of metaphors and consequently an investigation into the opinions of various theorists and how they deal with the translation of metaphor is undertaken for the establishment of a translational framework for metaphors.

3.3.2.1 Van den Broeck

When Van den Broeck (1981:77) gives a tentative scheme of procedures in dealing with the translation of metaphors, he argues that his list seems complete despite its giving the obvious impression that it oversimplifies a range of phenomena which actually reveal a much greater complexity and variety. The list is as follows:

1 Translating "sensu stricto"

A metaphor is translated "sensu stricto" if the metaphor is literally transferred from SL to TL. For dead metaphors this procedure of translating may give rise to two different situations:

- * If the images (vehicles) in the SL and the TL correspond, the resulting TL metaphors will be idiomatic.
- * If the images (vehicles) in the SL and the TL differ, the resulting TL metaphors may either be a semantic anomaly or a daring innovation. This suggests that the translator should be wary of using literal translation or transference where dead metaphors are concerned.

2 Substitution

This procedure applies to the cases where the SL image (vehicle) is replaced by a different TL image (vehicle) with more or less the same object (tenor). In this case the SL and TL images (vehicles) may be considered equivalent in the sense that they share a common object (tenor). A relatively good example would probably be to translate a metaphor such as "snowy hair" with "seashell hair" for a culture in which the phenomenon of snow is unknown, as in the case of people living on islands in the South Pacific.

3 Paraphrase

This happens when a SL metaphor is rendered by a non-metaphorical expression in the TL. The procedure consequently involves the demetaphorisation of expressions since a metaphor is changed to plain

speech. Although the advantage may be that the metaphor is clearly explained there is also a disadvantage involved. The dangers are that the resulting TL expression rises to the level of commentary rather than translation, and that the paraphrase may not only lack the full suggestive and explorative nuances of the original metaphors, but will definitely also lack its impact and vigour. Finally it is felt that Van den Broeck's (1981:77) scheme of possible procedures in the translation of metaphors is fairly adequate as it covers the most basic and general possibilities. There are more possible procedures, however, as will be seen in the discussion of Newmark under 3.3.2.6 in particular.

3.3.2.2 Fields

Fields (1981:197) opts for a hierarchy of principles which is simply a number of procedures placed in order of importance. His principles are set out as follows:

1 Formal equivalence

If a metaphor in the SL causes no idiomatic anomaly in the TL then its formal equivalent should be used. If there is no formal equivalent (word for word translation) then the second option must be taken. An example of when an idiomatic formal equivalent is available is taken from James 1:6 where James writes that a doubter is "like an ocean wave, blown and tossed". Although this is a literal rendering of the original Greek, it is understood by most English speakers who are familiar with the fickle nature of the sea. This procedure (equivalent) is the one labelled "sensu stricto" by Van den Broeck (1981:77).

2 Substitute with simile

It may be necessary to replace the SL metaphor with a simile in the TL to ensure that the reader understands the meaning. The example referred to is that of Acts 2:20 quoted from Joel 2:31 and it reads: "The sun will be turned to darkness and the moon to blood ...". Fields (1981:197) argues that the examples "the sun will become like darkness" and particularly "the moon will become like blood" are better renderings of the original Hebrew. Because much of the translator's choice depends on the situation

- of which the TL of the reader is one factor - I disagree that the two alternatives posed by Fields are necessarily better options. Yet Fields seems to realise this fact as he makes this qualifying statement about his two choices: "This may be more necessary in languages other than English ..." (1981:198). So perhaps without readily admitting it, Fields himself generally favours a literal rendering when faced with a metaphor. His major weakness seems to lie in the fact that his translating principles relate to dead metaphors only and he appears not to realise that translating into the TL with a long and rich literary and translation heritage requires different procedures (equivalents) than translating into a TL with a limited or no such heritage at all.

3 Recasting

This means that a SL metaphor is translated by a different TL metaphor which conveys the same meaning or message. Although this might appear to be a risky undertaking, Fields (1981:199) comes up with worthwhile suggestions. He argues, for example, that to translate Luke 24:32 as "Were not our hearts burning within us ..." is certainly not idiomatic English. Moreover, it can be regarded as a poor or unsuccessful translation since it unconsciously evokes another English idiom which has an entirely different meaning namely, "heartburn" which of course is a description of the burning sensation in the oesophagus and stomach caused by excess stomach acidity. He then continues to give four alternative suggestions: "Didn't a tingle go up our spine?", "Didn't it almost take our breath away", "Didn't our heart almost stop?" and "Wasn't it like a fire burning in us?" (Fields, 1981:199). I feel that using the metaphor "Were our hearts not on fire?" would not only retain the object and image of the original metaphor but also the sense in spite of its being forged a little differently. Moreover, the allusion to "heartburn" is also removed! This translation procedure (equivalent) is labelled "substitution" by Van den Broeck (1981:77).

4 Potpourri

This term (potpourri) implies that it may be necessary to combine any or all of the above-mentioned procedures in order to arrive at a successful translation. Although Fields (1981:199) does not elaborate on this point

with examples he does have this to say about the translation of live metaphors: "In general it is easier to translate live metaphors and similies directly into English, but each case must be considered on its own merits". This strongly suggests that the type of metaphor very much determines which translation procedure (equivalent) should be applied and confirms the fact that live (original, private, embalmed) metaphors should be translated literally ("sensu stricto").

3.3.2.3 De Waard

De Waard (1974:114-116) suggests that there are five procedures in dealing with the translation of metaphors and he too places them in order of priority. There are two basic principles which form the basis of these procedures and they counterbalance each other. The first principle is that in spite of historical and cultural differences between the SL and TL, the Biblical form should be respected and retained without modification wherever possible. Modification should only be allowed in rare and special cases. The second basic principle is that no translation into the TL should read in such a way that it is different from anything the TL speaker would spontaneously say or write. These principles simply reiterate what is said about a successful or qualitative translation in chapter 2 under 2.2.4.

1 Retention of form

First of all an attempt should be made to retain the form of the SL metaphor in the translation. This is only possible if there is a certain identity in form and meaning between a SL metaphor and a TL metaphor. Probably the two best-known examples are Psalm 23:1, "The Lord is my Shepherd" and John 6:48, "I am the Bread of Life". A metaphor that might defy such a retention of form is the one that appears in Genesis 49:14: "Issachar is a rawboned donkey". The Hebrew word *hamor* indicates "bony" or "rawboned" in the sense of "strong-limbed" or "strong". Whether the reader of English would experience the same sense and impact as was originally intended is doubtful since neither "bony" nor "donkey" should strike the average English or Afrikaans reader as representative of a pillar of strength!

2 Making explicit the implicit constituents

If the form of the SL metaphor cannot be retained an effort should be made to explain that which is implicit. This partly coincides with Van den Broeck's (1981:77) idea of "paraphrase". An example would be to make, explicit the sense of the metaphor in Psalm 23:5. This means that it would be changed from "You anoint my head with oil" to "you welcome me by pouring ointment on my head". The risks involved in this procedure are mentioned in the discussion under 3.3.2.1.

3 Replace with a simile

This procedure is second on the priority list of procedures furnished by Fields (1981:197). The advantage of this procedure lies in the fact that it retains the elements of the metaphor although much of its effectiveness might be lost. Linguistic signals such as "like" and "as" in English warn the reader immediately that the expression is to be understood in a special sense. One of the examples De Waard (1974:115) gives in this regard is to change the metaphor in James 3:6, "the tongue is a fire", to "the tongue is like a fire". Although it is felt that the effect of the metaphor is dulled, at least the ideas of "tongue" and "fire" remain.

4 Replace with a different metaphor

If the metaphor cannot be retained, either with or without modification as were suggested with the first three procedures, then the translator should try to replace the SL metaphor with a TL metaphor (metaphor from the figurative stock of the TL). This is particularly important if the metaphor is found in a poetic (artistic, expressive) text. De Waard (1974:115) warns that "care should, of course, be taken that with the new metaphor no semantic distortion in the form of negative or unwanted components is introduced". The examples of culturally equivalent metaphors that have been implemented in many cases are given by De Waard (1974:115): "the **mouth** of death" in stead of "the **gates** of death" (Psalm 9:13), "he **spits** on all his adversaries" instead of "he **sneers** at all his enemies" (Psalm 10:5) and "I will throw **ashes** at your back" in stead of "I will pelt you with **filth**" (Nahum 3:6). All these substitute metaphors (cultural

equivalents) were done in the translation of the Bible into Bamiléké. This procedure (equivalent) is labelled "recasting" by Fields (1981:199).

5 Replacing the metaphor with a non-figurative expression

This is to be the last resort taken by the translator and only when there are no other alternatives left. Only in the case of dead metaphors is this procedure not a last resort. An example of such a procedure is when "The spirit of man is the Lord's lamp" (Proverbs 20:27) is rendered in the TEV as "The Lord gave us mind and conscience". De Waard (1974:116) also implicitly recognises the importance of considering the type of metaphor being worked with when he argues that dead metaphors or idioms should be translated as non-figures (paraphrased) if no TL equivalents can be found. Thus far it would appear then, that the first option for original metaphors is literal **transference (sensu stricto)** while for dead metaphors it is **paraphrase (prose explanation)** if no cultural equivalent is available.

3.3.2.4 Larson

Larson (1984:252) commences her discussion on the translating of metaphors by identifying the necessity to determine whether a metaphor is **live** or **dead** in the SL. This fact reiterates the vital role played by the **type of metaphor** in the translation of this phenomenon. The second important issue Larson (1984:252) mentions is that the translator should recognise that the SL metaphor should be analysed to determine its three parts (elements); object, image and sense since such an analysis facilitates the interpretation of the metaphor. The aim of interpreting the metaphor is also to prevent a wrong or ambiguous message from getting conveyed to the TL reader. Larson (1984:254) consequently identifies five procedures (equivalents) in the translation of metaphors and takes the *metaphor* "no man is an island" as an illustrative example in each case.

- 1 The metaphor may be kept if the TL permits it. This implies that the directly and literally transferred metaphor will be natural to the TL readers and understood correctly by the TL readers. In this case the example: "No man is an island" will remain intact.

- 2 A metaphor may be translated as a simile. This procedure is also second on the list given by Fields (1981:197). An example of this procedure is to translate the illustration metaphor as "No man is like an island".
- 3 A SL metaphor may be substituted by a TL metaphor as long as it has the same meaning. The use of such cultural equivalents is highly regarded by Van den Broeck (1981:177), Fields (1981:197) and De Waard (1974:114). An example of this procedure is to translate the illustration metaphor as "No man is a mountain peak".
- 4 The metaphor is kept intact but its meaning is explained. This means that not only the object but also the image and the sense must be explicated. An example of this procedure is to translate the illustration example as "No man is an island. An island is by itself, but no person is isolated from others". This is a procedure that is referred to under **Fields** (3.3.2.2) as **potpourri** (a combination of literal transference and paraphrase).
- 5 The meaning of the SL metaphor may be translated without the metaphorical imagery. This means that the metaphor is demetaphorised as it is paraphrased. An example of this procedure is to translate the illustration example as "No man is isolated from all other people". Of all the propositions made by Larson (1954:252-254) the most useful is perhaps to distinguish between a live and dead metaphor. When the metaphor is dead it may be demetaphorised but when it is a live metaphor the first procedure is to attempt to retain the image and transfer it directly. When this is not possible owing to certain situational elements (the reader may belong to a language and culture with no literary heritage) then one of the other five procedures may be chosen in their order of priority (Larson, 1984:252).

3.3.2.5 Beekman and Callow

Beekman and Callow (1974:143-147) also generally favour the retention of the SL metaphor in the TL as the translator's first option when considering a particular translation procedure (equivalent). The only instance when it appears to be appropriate not to translate a metaphor by literal transfer is when such a procedure communicates a wrong or ambiguous meaning for the TL reader. When the metaphor is ambiguous

in the ST, however, the same ambiguity must be retained in the TT (Beekman and Callow, 1974:144). Beekman and Callow (1974:144) also place emphasis on the importance of distinguishing between dead and live metaphors and analysing a metaphor according to its elements: object, image and sense. Analysing the metaphor enables the translator to determine where a possible breakdown in successful communication with the TL reader may occur, while identifying the type of metaphor, largely determines the translator's choice of translation procedures. If it is a live metaphor, literal transference is to be favoured and if it is a dead metaphor, the figure may be dropped. A range of four possibilities are suggested to cope with SL metaphors (Beekman and Callow, 1974:145-150).

1 Retaining the metaphorical form

This procedure is also first on the list of all the other theorists mentioned so far. Beekman and Callow (1974:145) explore another aspect of this procedure by indicating how the metaphor can be retained in three ways, namely making only the image explicit, making the image and the object explicit or making all three elements explicit: object, image and sense. In the latter case the result will be more than a metaphor since the sense will be explicitly stated (paraphrased). When the translator is confronted with a dead metaphor or idiom the only metaphor that can be justified in the TL is a culturally equivalent one, if it is available. An example of such a translation is: "Your hearts are hard" (Matthew 19:8) as "Your ears are hard" or "Your stomach is hard" (Beekman and Callow, (1984:147).

2 Using the form of a simile

This procedure is also furnished by Fields (1981:197), De Waard (1974:115) and Larson (1984:252) but regarded as of secondary importance. Beekman and Callow (1974:147) argue that this procedure is one of the simplest adjustments that can be made to the form of a metaphor as it makes the implicit comparison explicit. The weakness in this argument is that a metaphor does of course not necessarily always contain an element of comparison or analogy. Dissimilarities and contrasts too, are central to the nature of metaphor. (See discussion under 3.2.) An example of this procedure given by Beekman and Callow

(1973:147) is to translate "He shall receive the crown of life" (James 1:12) as "He will receive life as people receive a crown".

3 Using a nonfigurative form

This is also a procedure mentioned by all the theorists mentioned so far. The example given by Beekman and Callow (1974:149) is to translate "Tell that fox" (Luke 13:22) as "Tell that sly man". Although the disadvantages of this procedure is mentioned under 3.3.2.1, it must be kept in mind that this is probably the best translation procedure (equivalent) for dead metaphors or idioms especially when no cultural equivalent is available.

4 Combination

Like Field (1981:197), Beekman and Callow (1974:149) too, give a procedure which can be regarded as a combination of any two or three of the previously mentioned procedures. Since this is not really an independent and new procedure (equivalent), the only advantage there really is in mentioning it, is the fact that it highlights the flexibility and sensitivity of the translator's task with regards to the translation of metaphor.

3.3.2.6 Newmark

Not only is Newmark (1988:104) the only one of the translation theorists discussed so far to explicitly point out the illusory and deceptive nature of metaphor (as is mentioned under 3.2.2), his suggestions of possible translation procedures (equivalents) are also the most exhaustive. Since metaphor is often used to conceal (and not only explicate) all attempts at total illumination in the translation of metaphor might as well be summarily abandoned. In view of the fact that cliché metaphors belong to the shady area between dead and stock metaphors, and a neologism is more a phenomenon of the twentieth century than of the Biblical era, I will only consider the translation procedures related to dead, stock and original metaphors.

Although Newmark (1988:106) argues that a dead metaphor defies literal transference, he does not quite give a clear indication of how to treat it in translation, other than using a TL cultural equivalent if it is available, deleting it if it is unimportant enough or translating its sense (paraphrase). It is essential to note, however, that his view is still consistent with the notion that literal transference is to be reserved for original metaphors.

In Newmark's (1982:82) discussion of original metaphors which, incidentally, he considers to be "the name of the game", he is generally immovable in his stance that they should be translated by literal transference. This view is firmly reiterated in a later publication (Newmark, 1988:112), where he goes as far as to say that if an original metaphor appears in an expressive (artistic) text then it most definitely has to be transferred literally and it does not matter if it is a universal, a cultural or a personal ("obscurely subjective") metaphor. He takes this view because he considers an original metaphor to have the following characteristics (Newmark, 1988:112):

- 1 Although it contains cultural elements it also contains the core of an important writer's message, namely his personality and his comment on life.
- 2 It is a source of enrichment for the TL and the many original Shakespearean expressions which have enriched German because they were transferred literally, are excellent examples of this fact.

But Newmark (1982:92) admits that there are several factors which may influence the translator in the translating of an original metaphor. The three major factors are: the text in which the metaphor is used, the cultural factor in the metaphor, and the reader (his knowledge and the extent of his commitment to poetry). The cultural factor is perhaps of lesser importance since an original metaphor is likely to have fewer cultural associations than a dead metaphor or idiom (Newmark, 1988:93). It is consequently safe to assume that when the translator is confronted with an original metaphor that appears in an expressive (artistic) text, of a personal (subjective) nature, and is to be translated for a reader that is fairly intelligent and educated and belongs to a TL with a rich literary heritage, then there is no other option than to transfer it literally (*sensu stricto*). This implies that for the purposes of this study, it can then be

expected that probably all the original metaphors are to be transferred literally because the text (Song of Songs) is poetry (expressive or artistic), and the intended reader is the adolescent in Afrikaans and English. (Both languages have a rich literary heritage and the reader is also fairly intelligent and informed with regards to poetry and imagery.) The only other type of metaphor that must still be considered is that of stock (standard) metaphor. Newmark (1982:88-91; 1988:108-111) discusses seven possible translation procedures when stock (standard) metaphor is involved.

1 Reproducing the same image

Newmark (1988:108) argues that this is the most satisfying procedure if the metaphor has "a comparable frequency and currency in the appropriate TL register". This is easier with simple metaphors of a universal nature. The moment that it becomes extended and culturally specific this procedure is an unfortunate one to use.

2 Replace SL metaphor with TL metaphor

This is a popular procedure and Newmark (1982:89) differs from Fields (1981:197), De Waard (1974:115), Larson (1984:252), and Beekman and Callow (1974:148) in that he places it second on his list of priority as Van den Broeck (1981:77) does. I feel that this should be the translator's second option too. The other theorists opt for translating a SL metaphor by a TL simile as their second choice. Owing to the illusory and complex nature of a metaphor and owing to the differences there are between a simile and a metaphor, it is felt that translating by cultural equivalents should take precedence over translating a metaphor with a simile.

3 Translation of metaphor by simile

Although the image is retained much of the impact of the metaphor will be lost. This is a procedure to be considered particularly if the metaphor appears in a communicative or vocative text and if the TL reader has not been exposed enough to figurative language.

4 Same metaphor combined with sense

Using this procedure is to suggest a lack of confidence in the metaphor's power and clarity but it is instructive and may be useful if the metaphor is repeated. More of this procedure is mentioned in the discussion of the next procedure.

5 Translation by simile plus sense

This is a compromise procedure mentioned by most of the other theorists. Newmark (1982:90) says that this procedure has the advantage of addressing both the uninformed reader and the expert reader, particularly if the metaphor is transferred literally plus the sense (previous procedure) rather than a simile plus the sense. He writes: "[The procedure] has the advantages of fulfilling Mozart's classical formula for the piano concerto, pleasing both the connoisseur and the less learned" (Newmark, 1982:90).

6 Conversion of metaphor to sense

Although this procedure is sometimes necessary for the uninformed reader the translator should rather try to find a cultural equivalent that is not too far removed from the SL metaphor. When it is reduced to sense a careful analysis of its different elements must first be made to ensure that the sense is fairly accurate. The disadvantages of this are pointed out in 3.3.2.1.

7 Deletion

When the text is not expressive (artistic) and the metaphor appears to be redundant or otiose, then it may be deleted. Generally the translator must be careful before resorting to this procedure.

Finally, it is vitally important to realise that any single generalisation about the translation of metaphor "must fail to do justice to the great complexity of the factors determining the ontology of metaphors" (Dagut, 1976:32). Each occurrence of metaphor must therefore be treated in isolation (Mason, 1982:149). Tentative hypotheses can, however, be put

forward on the basis of what has been said by the above-mentioned theorists. First the status of the metaphor has to be assessed. This implies that the situational framework has to be determined. The major situational constraints are basically similar to those applicable to texts and can be listed as follows:

- 1 Type of metaphor.
- 2 The reader.
- 3 The context (particularly the type of text).
- 4 The function of translation.

The most important issue determining the **translation procedure (equivalent)** is the **type of metaphor**. When it is a **dead metaphor** the translator should almost in all cases translate the sense non-figuratively (paraphrase). Depending on the other situational constraints he may use a TL (cultural) equivalent if such is available but rarely ever is it to be transferred literally (**sensu stricto**). When it is an **original metaphor** the translator should in almost all cases transfer it literally, particularly if it appears in an expressive (artistic) text. If it does not appear in an expressive text then the translator may consider any of the other translation procedures except paraphrase. Explaining the sense of an original metaphor in non-figurative language is a procedure the translator should try to avoid at all costs. Finally, a **stock (standard) metaphor** is perhaps the most difficult case as it spans the middle ground between dead metaphors and original metaphors. Any of the seven translation procedures discussed above can be used in their order of priority. At this point it is perhaps important to issue a cautionary note. Because metaphor does not necessarily express resemblance, it is felt that Van Biesen and Pelsmaekers (1988:145) are correct in their assessment that the use of simile for the translation of metaphor does not deserve "the privileged status translation theory has given it up till now". The rest of the situational constraints mentioned above are the factors which will enable the translator to establish the right order of priority. Despite its being a loose framework I consider it to be fairly reliable. The translator should always be alert to the occasional exception but generally it is felt that as the **type of text** determines the **translation type (method)** to be adopted, and the **type of metaphor** determines the **translation procedure (equivalent)** to be chosen.