

An evaluation of the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwean firms

CP Korera



orcid.org/0000-0002-0935-3334

Thesis accepted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree **Doctor of Philosophy** in **Accountancy** at the North-West University

Promoter: Prof DP Schutte

Co-Promoter: Prof M Oberholzer

Graduation: July 2020

Student number: 27568342

Abstract

This study evaluated the extent and determinants of disclosure and transparency in the annual reports of Zimbabwean firms by using the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) guidelines as a benchmark for developing and applying a comprehensive disclosure and transparency index.

The study aimed to: (i) contextualise corporate disclosure and transparency; (ii) develop a sustainability oriented, composite disclosure and transparency (D&T) index based on the NCCGZ; (iii) determine the current approaches to corporate reporting after the release of the NCCGZ; (iv) analyse and evaluate the level of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of firms listed in the ZSE during the recent years; (v) examine the extent to which the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in the annual reports is associated with the company specific characteristics including corporate governance mechanisms of ZSE listed firms during the recent years; (vi) correlate the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices and firm performance (measured by ROCE, ROE & ROA); (vii) analyse the connection between corporate governance and company performance; and (viii) proffer recommendations for improvements in corporate regulation, securities regulation, and corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe.

With regard to the first two objectives outlined above, a broad and up-to-date review of literature was carried out, which informed the research on the development of a disclosure and transparency index. The research used a double-step content analysis (qualitative and quantitative) of annual reports in order to achieve the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh objectives. The study applied the embedded concurrent and sequential qualitative dominant (QUAL(quant) design to integrate the mixed research designs, drawing insights from a multiple-theoretical framework of the three overarching theories (agency, legitimacy and stakeholder) of this study. The ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative analysis software was used to enhance both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Furthermore, the study also surveyed balanced panel data of 35 ZSE listed corporations from 2014 to 2016. The quantitative analysis approach enabled the generation of a total of 105 firm-year observations using SPSS and Stata statistical packages.

Overall, the study discovered that, firstly the number of firms producing an annual report incorporating a sustainability report or corporate social responsibility report has been very low but gradually increasing over the 2014 to 2016 financial years. Secondly the quality of D&T in most of the ZSE listed companies' annual reports was relatively low during the sample period. Thirdly, the constructed index (NCCGZDTI) confirmed that the launch of the NCCGZ significantly helped to improve disclosure and transparency practices among Zimbabwe listed firms. Fourthly, this study found out that director share ownership has a positive and significant impact on the degree of disclosure and transparency and conformity with the NCCGZ. The study also found out that company age and liquidity have a positive and significant link with the extent of disclosure and transparency and compliance with the NCCGZ. Fifthly, the findings from the *Model 3* imply that corporate disclosure and transparency practices, represented by the NCCGZDTI, are negatively but significantly linked to return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE). However, the findings drawn from the *Model 2* were mixed. Board size and director ownership have a negative and significant influence on firm performance as measured by ROA. Furthermore, board size has a negative and significant influence on firm performance as measured by ROE.

Keywords: *Corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T), determinants, firm performance, sustainability reporting, integrated reporting, National Code on Corporate Governance, Zimbabwe (NCCGZ), Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) listed firms, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), integrated reporting (IR) framework*

Acknowledgements

Most importantly, I am very grateful to the Almighty God, for His guidance and inspiration in carrying out this study. Much gratitude and appreciation goes to my promoters, Professor Danie Schutte and Professor Merwe Oberholzer, for their patience, enormous intellectual guidance and support for the whole of my study. Special credit goes to Prof. Merwe for his contributions and unwavering encouragement to the success of this research. Words cannot express how grateful I am to Prof. Danie, who provided constructive and thorough review of my research work. I am very appreciative for what he imparted to me during my PhD research study. Prof. Danie, your considerateness, advice, steady support and motivation made my work less complicated in this lonesome, prolonged road.

I extend my appreciation to all the members of staff at the School of Accounting Science at North West University. I would like to recognise my country Zimbabwe and the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) for affording me the opportunity to study. Additionally, I am thankful to the academic and administration staff at NUST.

I owe my parents profound gratitude; Their persistent prayers will forever be remembered. My heartfelt thanks goes to my wife Jane, whose steadfast support encouraged and uplifted me in my wearisome study journey. Words fail me to adequately narrate her role and contribution towards my PhD. Additionally, I give many thanks to my children Ruth, Patrick (Jnr) and Rebecca. I always remember their consistent question about my progress “When are you going to finish your studies, daddy?” I notice it was a period of long suffering for them when I was absorbed in my research study.

Also, I am thankful to my acquaintances Mr Batsirai Mazviona and Dr Conrad Murendo for enlightening me on ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis software, Citavi reference management software, SPSS and Stata data analysis packages. Finally, let me acknowledge everybody who supported and helped me in any way to complete my PhD studies.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Chapter 1 Introduction and Research Overview	1
1.1 Introduction and Background	1
1.2 Literature Review of the Research Area	5
1.2.1 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Index	6
1.2.2 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	7
1.2.3 Determinants of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	11
1.2.4 Firm Performance and Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	11
1.2.5 Theoretical Framework	12
1.3 Problem Statement, Research Hypotheses and Motivation.....	14
1.3.1 Research Hypotheses	18
1.3.2 Motivation of topic actuality	18
1.4 Objectives	23
1.4.1 Main Objective	23
1.4.2 Secondary Objectives.....	23
1.5 Research Methodology.....	24
1.5.1 Literature review	24
1.5.2 Empirical Research	24
Figure 1.1 Framework of this Study	26
1.5.3 Paradigmatic assumptions and perspectives.....	27
1.6 Chapter Layout	28
Chapter 2 Background of Research and Institutional Setting.....	30
2.1 Introduction	30
2.2 Historical Overview of the Zimbabwe Economy	30
2.3 Overview of the Zimbabwe's Economic Performance	33
2.4 Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe	38
2.4.1 Zimbabwe Code on Corporate Governance	41
2.4.2 Comparison of UK and Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Codes	51
2.5 Regulatory Framework for Corporate Disclosure and Transparency in Zimbabwe .	54
2.5.1 Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in Public and Private Entities.....	55

2.5.1.1	Constitution of Zimbabwe	55
2.5.1.2	Companies Act	58
2.5.1.3	The Securities Law	61
2.5.2	Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in State-Owned Entities	66
2.5.2.1	Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)	66
2.5.3	Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in Financial Institutions	67
2.5.3.1	The Banking Act and Insurance Act	67
2.6	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	69
Chapter 3 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: Conceptual Context.....		71
3.1	Introduction	71
3.2	Corporate Governance	71
3.2.1	Principles of Corporate Governance	73
3.2.2	Debates on Corporate Governance	77
3.3	Corporate sustainability.....	79
3.4	Corporate Accountability	85
3.4.1	Protocols of Corporate Accountability	86
3.4.1.1	Principles	87
3.4.1.2	Standards.....	88
3.4.1.3	Accounting Tools	89
3.4.1.4	Reporting	90
3.4.1.5	Stakeholder Engagement	90
3.4.1.6	Assurance.....	91
3.5	Corporate Disclosure.....	92
3.5.1	Mandatory Disclosure	93
3.5.2	Voluntary Disclosure	95
3.5.3	The Adequacy of Separate Financial and Sustainability Reporting	97
3.5.4	Integrated Reporting	99
3.5.4.1	Integrated Reporting (IR) Framework.....	101
3.5.4.2	Value Creation	102
3.6	Corporate Transparency	105
3.7	The IASB Conceptual Framework.....	107
3.8	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	108
Chapter 4 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: Theoretical and Empirical Overview		110
4.1	Introduction	110
4.2	The Theoretical Literature on Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	110

4.2.1	Agency Theory	112
4.2.1.1	Agency Theory in the Zimbabwean Business Setting.....	114
4.2.2	Shareholder Primacy Theory and Enlightened Shareholder Value Theory	115
4.2.3	Stakeholder Theory	117
4.2.3.1	Stakeholder Theory in the Zimbabwean Business Setting	118
4.2.4	Legitimacy Theory.....	119
4.2.4.1	Legitimacy Theory in the Zimbabwean Corporate Environment	120
4.2.5	Resource Dependence Theory.....	121
4.2.6	Capital Market Based Theories	121
4.3	Previous Empirical Work and Hypothesis Development.....	124
4.3.1	Corporate Governance Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI) ...	126
4.3.2	Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	128
4.3.3	Determinants of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	130
4.3.3.1	Corporate Governance Mechanisms	131
4.3.3.2	Company Specific Characteristics	141
4.3.4	Disclosure and Transparency practices and Corporate Performance	150
4.3.4.1	The Link between Corporate Governance Instruments and Corporate Performance.....	150
4.3.4.2	The Link between Corporate Disclosure and Transparency and Corporate Performance.....	154
4.3.5	Comparing Level of Conformity with Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Guidelines.....	157
4.3.5.1	Extent of Conformity in Developed countries	158
4.3.5.2	Extent of Conformity in Emerging countries.....	159
4.3.5.3	Level Compliance in Zimbabwe	161
4.4	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	162
Chapter 5	Research Paradigm, Methodology and Design.....	164
5.1	Introduction	164
5.2	The Research Philosophical Paradigms	165
5.2.1	Positivism	168
5.2.2	Interpretivism.....	168
5.2.3	Pragmatism.....	170
5.2.4	Paradigms and Application to the Study	171
5.3	The Research Design	173
5.4	Research Methodology.....	174
5.4.1	Qualitative Methodology.....	175
5.4.2	Quantitative Methodology.....	176

5.4.3	Mixed Methods Methodology	177
5.4.4	Content Analysis.....	180
5.5	Research Procedures	182
5.5.1	Literature Study	182
5.5.2	Construction of the NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index	182
5.5.2.1	Reliability and Validity of the Developed Scoring System (Index).....	183
5.5.3	Survey	186
5.5.3.1	Data Collection.....	186
5.5.3.2	Sample Population and Zimbabwe Listed Firms	189
5.5.3.3	Data Sources	191
5.5.3.4	Research Sample and Selected Data	192
5.5.3.5	Coding and Scoring of Annual Reports.....	193
5.5.3.6	The NCCGZDTI Scoring System and the Weighting Schemes	195
5.5.3.7	Trustworthiness and Validity of the Content Analysis.....	196
5.5.3.8	Methods of Estimating Dependent Variables	199
5.5.3.9	Operationalising the Independent Variables	201
5.5.3.10	Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Tests	205
5.5.3.11	Selection of Statistical Tests	206
5.5.3.12	Choice of Methods of Regression Tests	207
5.5.3.13	The Regression Models	207
5.6	Ethical and Confidentiality Implications.....	209
5.7	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	209
Chapter 6	Qualitative Empirical Results and Analysis	211
6.1	Introduction	211
6.2	Results: The Codes-Primary Documents Matrix.....	211
6.3	Discussion and Analysis of Key Qualitative Research Results.....	218
6.3.1	Analysis of the Current Practices in Corporate Disclosure and Transparency	218
6.3.2	The Extent of the Quality of Disclosure and Transparency in ZSE Listed Firms.....	221
6.4	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	226
Chapter 7	Quantitative Empirical Findings and Discussion.....	230
7.1	Introduction	230
7.2	Descriptive Statistics of the Developed Zimbabwe Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI)	231
7.2.1	Descriptive Statistics of the NCCGZDTI on the basis of Complete Sample ..	232
7.2.2	Descriptive Statistics of the NCCGZDTI on the basis of the Categories and Sub-Categories.....	236

7.3	Descriptive Statistics of Model 1.....	240
7.3.1	Excessive Values in Firm Performance Measures and Explanatory Variables.....	241
7.3.2	Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables	242
7.4	Descriptive Statistics of Model 2 and Model 3	245
7.4.1	Descriptive Statistics of the Firm Performance Ratios	246
7.4.2	Descriptive Statistics of the Corporate Governance Instruments	247
7.5	Bivariate Correlation and Ordinary Least Squares Assumptions	247
7.6	Multivariate Regression Analysis	252
7.6.1	Findings of Model 1	254
7.7	Integration between Qualitative and Quantitative Findings.....	259
7.6.2	Findings of Models 2 and 3.....	261
7.8	Chapter Summary and Conclusion	269
	Chapter 8 Conclusion, Contributions and Recommendations.....	271
8.1	Introduction	271
8.2	Summary of Results	271
8.3	Study Contributions and Possible Implications	278
8.3.1	Contributions of this Study.....	278
8.3.2	Study Results and Inferences to Policy-Making Institutions	280
8.4	Limitations of the Research.....	283
8.5	Propositions for Upcoming Studies	285
	References	287
	Appendix 1: Summary of Empirical Studies on Disclosure and Transparency, Determinants and Firm Performance	333
	Appendix 2 NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index or Evaluation Matrix.....	345
	Appendix 3: The level of conformity with the NCCGZ provisions amongst the sampled firms (%).....	358
	Appendix 4: The Codes-Primary Documents Matrix	363
	Appendix 5: Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Report.....	398
	Appendix 6: A Histogram of Distribution of the NCCGZDTI and Firm Performance Measures	433
	Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Disclosure and Transparency Practices	437
	Appendix 8: Regression Analysis	446
	Appendix 9: Reporting Profiles of the Analysed Companies and Their Sectors	448

List of Tables

Table 2.1 The Key Corporate Governance Provisions of the UK Code and the Zimbabwean Code.....	52
Table 3.1: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.....	74
Table 5.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms.....	165
Table 5.2 Major Mixed Method Design Types.....	178
Table 5.3 Main differences between quantitative and qualitative content analysis.....	181
Table 5.4: The Sampled Companies by Industry.....	190
Table 5.5: Operationalisation of Corporate Governance Mechanisms.....	203
Table 5.6: Operationalisation of Firm Specific Characteristics.....	204
Table 6.1 Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Matrix.....	213
Table 6.2: Number of Sampled ZSE Firms Producing Annual Report by Sector.....	219
Table 6.3: Level of overall corporate disclosure by sector in the ZSE sample.....	223
Table 6.4: Level of disclosure of sub-categories of corporate D&T in the ZSE sample.....	225
Table 7.1: Concise descriptive statistics for the National Corporate Governance Code of Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI).....	233
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of Overall NCCGZ disclosure and transparency.....	236
Table 7.2.1: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI by Four Categories.....	236
Table 7.2.2: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI by Fifteen Sub-Categories.....	237
Table 7.2.3: Hypothesis Test of the Extent of NCCGZ Disclosure & Transparency.....	238
Table 7.3: Concise descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1).....	243
Table 7.4: Concise descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate performance models (Model 2 & 3).....	246
Table 7.5: Pearson and Spearman association matrices of all factors for all 105 firm years.....	251
Table 7.6: The Ordinary Least Squares Presumptions tests.....	252

Table 7.7 _a : A summary of a Hausman Test for Model 1.....	253
Table 7.7 _b : A synopsis of all of the hypotheses and results for the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1).....	255
Table 7.8: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1).....	258
Table 7.9: A synopsis of all of the hypotheses and results for the corporate performance models (Model 2&3).....	261
Table 7.10: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROA.....	263
Table 7.11: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROCE.....	264
Table 7.12: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROE.....	265
Table 7.13: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 3 based on ROA, ROCE and ROE.....	267
Table 7.14: Comparison of the firm performance models (Model 2 & 3) utilised.....	269

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Framework of this Study.....	26
Figure 2.1: Contribution to GDP Growth by Sector.....	34
Figure 2.2: Growth Rate (2010-2015)	36
Figure 2.3: Foreign Capital Flows.....	37
Figure 2.4: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).....	58
Figure 3.1: The Value Creation Process.....	103
Figure 5.1 The Research ‘Onion’.....	166
Figure 5.2 Major Research Methods.....	174
Figure 5.3: The procedure of the research project.....	187
Figure 6.1: CBZ Group Salient Features.....	220
Figure 6.2: Number of Sampled ZSE Firms Producing Annual Report.....	222
Figure 6.3: Level of overall corporate disclosure in the ZSE sample.....	223
Figure 7.1: Disclosure and Transparency Variations between ZSE Listed Companies.....	239
Figure 7.2: An evaluation of the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ between corporations on the basis of the NCCGZDTI categories using calculated means.....	240

Chapter 1 Introduction and Research Overview

1.1 Introduction and Background

This study was conducted as a result of an increased focus on corporate disclosure and transparency practices including sustainability and integrated reporting and firm performance by diverse stakeholders (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48). Zimbabwe has recently engaged in broad-based transparency and disclosure reforms, primarily by releasing the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) in 2015. The NCCGZ recognises that the integrated report should be guided by the requirements of the Global Reporting Initiative and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) as published from time to time, and any other reputable international reporting framework. NCCGZ also recommends the preparation of an integrated report on a yearly basis, which includes adequate disclosure about the company's operations, sustainability issues pertinent to its business, its financial performance and the outcome of its operations and cash flow projections (NCCGZ, 2014:1). The Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe was instituted through the enactment of the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25) as a regulatory body for the securities and capital markets in Zimbabwe to ensure transparency (SECZ, 2008:1). The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) confirmed in its research that stock exchanges in four sub-Saharan countries are showing strong intent or have taken steps towards incorporating environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures into their listing requirements (ACCA, 2014:1). These stock exchanges include the Ghana Stock Exchange, the Stock Exchange of Mauritius, the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) (ACCA, 2014:1). The ZSE became the fourth exchange in sub-Saharan Africa to join the United Nations-backed Sustainable Stock Exchange (SSE) Initiative (ACCA, 2014). There are six sub-Saharan exchanges on the SSE list of partners and these include the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Nigerian Stock Exchange, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Nairobi Securities Exchange, Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Western Africa – BVRM (SSE, 2016:1).

In general, as documented by Filatotchev and Boyd (2009:257) and Samaha *et al.* (2012:168), such corporate governance changes are often done in order to enhance the systems wherein quoted companies are directed by promoting significant board answerability, restraint, equality, impartiality, accountability, openness and disclosure. Corporations are the

fundamental factors of the economy in a capitalist system (Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). In most countries, to a greater extent, these corporations foster the economic growth, contribute employment opportunities, supply useful products and services, and basically lead to positive social outcomes (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). Normally, corporations require diverse resources in order to produce and deliver their products and services. This therefore implies that a variety of stakeholders are affected by these corporations' operations in various ways (Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). The global financial crisis along with corporate scandals in recent years and environmental disasters, such as the BP Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, have heightened investors' awareness of the impact that unsustainable business practices can have on financial performance. The current era of a dynamic business environment has prompted news to spread as it happens through the internet and social media networks. This, has also conscientised investors, the society, and governments to increasingly demand corporations to be accountable to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and report transparently about their activities (Abeysekera, 2013:227).

Corporate transparency, corporate disclosure, corporate governance, and corporate performance have seen renewed interest by researchers, policy makers, and regulating bodies of both developed and developing countries (Albassam, 2014:1; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48). Transparency is defined as the easiness with which an outsider is capable of making important assessment of a corporation's activities, its financial basics and the non-financial attributes relevant to that enterprise (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134;; IoDSA, 2009:1; OECD, 2004:1). Moreover these governance frameworks state that transparency is a measurement of how effective the organisation is at causing essential information accessible in a truthful, precise, and timeous fashion (IoDSA, 2009:1; OECD, 2004:1). Therefore, corporate disclosure is the most important way by which corporations achieve transparency and is the most important factor of corporate responsibility (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134). According to Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012) corporate governance is all about ensuring accountability and transparency while keeping effective means for information disclosure.

Golja and Paulišić (2011:368) document that corporate disclosure of information can take several forms, one of which is through the annual report. Information in the annual report falls into two categories: mandatory (obligatory) and voluntary (optional). Obligatory information

is the information with the subject of regulation such as corporation law, accounting standards and listing rules of stock exchanges. Optional information includes all information which an entity voluntarily provides in its annual reporting package such as corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and sustainability disclosures. In their paper discussed at the 7th International Research Meeting in Business and Management, El Hajj *et al.* (2016:134), hypothesised that the more voluntary the information, the better the transparency of information. Gurvitch and Sidorova (2012:26) argued that sustainability has become one of the cornerstones of today's business activity. There is a growing concern among companies and stakeholders about sustainable business development as an integral part of successful financial performance (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102). During recent years, a large number of large public companies across the globe produce separate financial and sustainability reports (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115). However, according to Eccles (2015:1), there is some variation in this type of disclosure by region, with the proportion of European companies issuing sustainability reports being higher than that in the U.S. and Asia. The financial reports are influenced by accounting standards as opposed to the sustainability reports which often comply with voluntary reporting standards, such as those made by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Baron, 2014:1). Many companies started to integrate information on social and environmental activity into their annual reports or even issue stand-alone sustainability or CSR (corporate social responsibility) reports (Baron, 2014:1).

The term, corporate social responsibility (CSR), is used to give details about an organisation's sustainability awareness in relation to its operations' impact on economic, social, environmental, and governance issues, as well as the procedures it adopts to communicate and deal with those issues (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). There are many ways to disclose CSR activities. Some corporations disclose such information on a separate section of the annual report; some disclose in a stand-alone sustainability report and of late, some disclose in an integrated report that integrates sustainability reporting with financial reporting (Ribera, 2016:336; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). In 2014 the adoption of integrated reporting was notably increasing (Lynch *et al.*, 2014:18) and even increased further as evidenced by more participants of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) Pilot Programme (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165). However, according to Gleeson-White (2014:1) the deficiencies in the way companies account for their activities, are less well known. The emphasis was solely on disclosing to the firm's shareholders, its financial profit or loss and therefore only the

transformation in its financial capital (Baron, 2014:1). This implied the ignoring of five other sources of value that can be considered as capitals including manufactured (or man-made) capital, intellectual capital (including intellectual property such as patents), human capital (skills and experience), social and relationship capital and natural capital (environmental resources and processes) (Abeysekera, 2013:227; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). However, the presented evidence points out that the world is facing a multiple (financial, economic, environmental, social) crisis derived from the currently unsustainable global pattern of development (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165).

In recent years it has become apparent that corporate leadership is not only responsible for creating wealth for their direct shareholders, but they also need to take into account all stakeholders' interests that are affected by the company's decisions (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; Du Toit *et al.*, 2017:654). The notion of sustainability reporting implies the way in which corporations manage non-financial components including environmental, social and governance matters that can have an effect on the organisation's future performance, revenue and value (Borkowski *et al.*, 2009:1; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Li *et al.*, 2018:60). Sustainability reports are regarded as a supplement to financial disclosure (Aras and Crowther, 2009:279). The rise in the utilisation of these reports signifies an increasing requirement by stakeholders for more transparency and responsibility (Baron, 2014:1). The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) was formed in 2010 to develop a world-wide accepted framework for a financial reporting model integrating financial data and sustainability information. This reporting practice is now known as integrated reporting (IR) (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014:198). The new IR approach emerged as a response to accounting's search for alternatives to the traditional financial model (Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1; Hopwood *et al.*, 2010:1; IIRC, 2013:1; Jones, 1996:281). In efforts to combine multiple corporate reports (i.e. corporate social responsibility reports, operational and financial reports), the IR focus is on demonstrating how multiple capitals are used by the organisation in the value creation (prevention, diminution) processes across the entire value chain (Adams & Simnett, 2011:292; Eccles & Saltzman, 2011:56; IIRC, 2013:1).

The whole world witnessed the turning point of history when the agreement between all 193 United Nations member states on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was sealed (Gould, 2015:1; GRI *et al.*, 2015:1). The United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development (UNCTAD) highlights that business reporting is a key part of attaining the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 12 (target 12.6) specifically reflects this by encouraging companies, especially large and transnational corporations, to implement sustainable practices and assimilate sustainability information into their reporting cycle. The SDGs will provide a new demand on corporate reporting. Being a primary source of information on companies' performance, corporate reporting can enrich and enhance the SDG monitoring mechanisms by providing governments and society with means to assess the economic, environmental and social impact of the companies on sustainable development. The SDG Compass provides guidance on enhancing reporting on business activities that contribute to sustainable development. The SDG Compass was developed jointly by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the UN Global Compact (UNGC), and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1).

1.2 Literature Review of the Research Area

The review of relevant literature in this section was done with an aim to pinpoint researchable gaps to be fulfilled by the current research. In addition, the review of extant corporate disclosure literature unfolded theories and themes that were used in order to develop testable hypotheses for this study. Research questions related to the research objectives were developed in this study. These research questions and hypotheses sought to ascertain the impact and tendency of association amongst selected variables and the disclosure and transparency levels of the sampled corporations. This study classified these variables into business disclosure and transparency (D&T), key performance indicators (KPIs), company-specific characteristics or attributes and firm performance variables. The classification into these three components allowed the researcher to conduct a systematic review of literature and formulation of the research hypothesis. The disclosure and transparency KPIs are grouped into four categories; ownership and control structure, board of directors and management structure, governance of risk and structure and information management and disclosure. The four categories identified allowed the researcher to develop four sub-indices to formulate the composite disclosure and transparency index in line with other researchers (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Mahadeo *et al.*, 2016:238). The firm-specific characteristics are profitability, multinational corporation affiliation, company size, company age, liquidity ratio, leverage and corporate governance mechanism structure (board size, percentage of non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership, institutional investor ownership & director share

ownership). These firm-specific characteristics were selected in correspondence with previous studies (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Gamerschlag *et al.*, 2011:233; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515), in order to test their causal effect on corporate disclosure and transparency. Firm performance variables include return on capital employed (ROCE), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), in line with other studies (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Zabria & Wahc, 2016:287).

Different studies (Cheung *et al.*, 2010; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Zabria & Wahc, 2016:287) have captured diverse dimensions of corporate disclosure and transparency indices, corporate disclosure and transparency practices, extent and determinants of these practices and their impact on firm performance as discussed in sections below.

1.2.1 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Index

This study constructed a comprehensive sustainability disclosure oriented scorecard, based on the National Code of Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) which was released in 2015. Based on this scorecard, this study developed a disclosure and transparency index (referred to as NCCGZDTI) which was used to assess both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, it is important to refer to previous related literature on corporate disclosure and transparency indices in order to identify gaps in their development and implementation. Widespread studies have been conducted in the advanced and emerging countries to evaluate the corporate disclosure, transparency and governance practices in financial and non-financial corporations as revealed in *Appendix 1* of this study. For example, some former studies used self-constructed disclosure measuring instruments (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Lipunga, 2015:130; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605), some studies used transparency index (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115), some studies used corporate governance code index (Albassam, 2014:1; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:238; Panchasara & Bharadia, 2013:88) and other researchers used transparency and disclosure scores based on Standard and Poor (S&P) index (Sanan & Yadav, 2011:62).

Previous studies on corporate disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe such as Mangena and Taurigana (2007:53), Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:34), Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) and Turk *et al.* (2013:75) did not apply a sustainability oriented composite disclosure and transparency index, incorporating provisions derived from the local corporate governance framework or the NCCGZ . The index for disclosure and transparency developed in this study

may assist future research on corporate disclosure and transparency to be able to predict the direction of the sustainable business practices of corporations (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:238; Rose, 2016:202). The disclosure and transparency index developed will improve the quality and level of disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe, particularly for listed firms (UNCTAD, 2015:1; UNECA, 2002:1). The economy is therefore improved through a more efficient allocation of resources and increased growth prospects (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134). This assertion is supported by OECD (2004:1) which suggests that a strong disclosure environment enhances capital attraction in the capital markets. Moreover, this environment builds and maintain confidence in these markets (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263). On the other hand, an environment characterised by weak disclosure and non-transparent practices is susceptible to unethical behaviour (UNCTAD, 2015:1; UNECA, 2002:1). This may result in a costly loss of market integrity (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263) . The company, its shareholders and also the economy as a whole will suffer because of this loss (OECD, 2004:1, 2015:1). The empirical validity of such a standpoint has not been exhaustively tested across the world. For example, the ‘robustness’ of the disclosure and transparency regulatory regime in Zimbabwe has not yet been tested holistically. This is because, up until now, there is no standard measuring tool (in terms of a questionnaire or any other form) that has been developed from the NCCGZ framework in order to assess organisations’ disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe.

1.2.2 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

This section briefly highlights the evolution of corporate disclosure and transparency. In addition, the previous studies conducted on the extent of the different levels of disclosure and transparency were reviewed in order to identify researchable gaps. This section is important as it represents the main theme of this study. The growing importance of disclosure and transparency among firms has motivated researchers to explore these aspects. Extensive literature is available on corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) (Fernandez-Feijoo *et al.*, 2014:244; Lock & Seele, 2016:186; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Muttakin & Khan, 2014:168; Romolini *et al.*, 2014:65; De Villiers & Alexander, 2014:198). However, the main focus in corporate reporting has shifted from CSRR to sustainability reporting (SR) and currently towards integrated reporting (IR) (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Baron, 2014:1; Du Toit *et al.*, 2017:654; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115). The corporate reports, which were previously labelled as CSR reports are now labelled sustainability reports, or being repackaged as

integrated reports, as the call now is to integrate sustainability reporting into corporate annual reports for more transparency (Baron, 2014:1; Ribera, 2016:336). The growing importance of disclosure and transparency among firms has motivated researchers to explore these aspects.

Efforts to make business reporting more all-inclusive are advancing on several fronts. Their uniting attribute is the determination to broaden corporate accountability beyond shareholders to multiple stakeholders by appending considerable disclosure of non-financial value to the present emphasis on financial value (Ribera, 2016:336). To improve the usefulness and efficiency of corporate disclosure, the concept of contextual corporate disclosure including sustainability and integrated reporting has been proposed and discussed over the past two decades in academia in several countries. For instance, in the US (Borkowski *et al.*, 2009:1); in Canada (Nitkin & Brooks, 1998:1499); in the UK (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; Turner *et al.*, 2006:41); in Australia (Feng *et al.*, 2017:330; Guthrie & Farneti, 2008:114; Stubbs & Higgins, 2014:1068); in Italy (Romolini *et al.*, 2014:65); in Denmark (Rose, 2016:202; Turtorea, 2015:2161); in Norway (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207); in Greece (Skouloudis *et al.*, 2014:174); in Mexico (Price *et al.*, 2011:76); in China (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259); in India (Bhatia & Tuli, 2014:135); in South Africa (Maubane *et al.*, 2014:153; Rensburg & Botha, 2014:144); in Estonia (Gurvitch & Sidorova, 2012:26); in Bangladesh (Muttakin & Khan, 2014:168); in Zimbabwe (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53; Maune, 2015:167; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605); in Malawi (Lipunga, 2015:130); in Egypt (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134) and in Taiwan (Hu *et al.*, 2011:843). The review also included a number of cross-national similar studies (ACCA, 2014:1; Barkemeyer *et al.*, 2015:312; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Bhatia & Tuli, 2014:135; Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013:50; Faisal *et al.*, 2012:19; Fernandez-Feijoo *et al.*, 2014:244; Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:56; Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:45; Jensen & Berg, 2012:299; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Martínez-Ferrero *et al.*, 2015:45; Social Investment Forum, 2009:1; Ștefănescu, 2014:113). Similar studies involving some organisations across the world were also reviewed (Dragu & Tiron-Tudor, 2013:275; Havlová, 2015:231; Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Lozano & Huisingh, 2011:99).

There have been significant focus towards the corporate governance practices of organisations which have been registered over the past two decades (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006:277; Al-Malkawi *et al.*, 2014:133; Aras & Crowther, 2008:433; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; El Hajj *et al.*,

2016:1; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368; Liew, 2007:724; Rossouw, 2005:94). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently introduced a chapter called 'Disclosure and Transparency'. This together with the other main principles of corporate governance provide guidelines and enhance good corporate governance orientation. According to El Hajj *et al.* (2016:1), the new chapter is important since it identifies very important aspects of corporate disclosure and also includes the current trending issues regarding non-financial information that firms may disclose in their annual reports on a voluntary basis.

Borkowski *et al.* (2009:1) examined the evolution of Johnson & Johnson's (J&J) sustainability reporting to help provide a framework for U.S. corporations who want to begin or expand their sustainability reporting. They used a robust content analysis technique to chronicle the changes in J&J's SRs over a fifteen-year period after which they established that the company produces its reports according to GRI guidelines and that the amount and type of information reported changed significantly over the years, reflecting Johnson & Johnson's own internal struggle to determine what should be reported, and in what quantity and depth, to satisfy its responsibilities. Furthermore, the study also observed that moving sustainability into the heart of a company's strategy seemed key to effective reporting. Their findings also indicated that sustainability in the US is entirely voluntary and imposes additional costs to the firm, while the benefits may be intangible and therefore the data needs to be driven by what the company wants to measure and manage, as well as by what external stakeholders demand. An empirical study by Turturea (2015:2161) on Novo Nordisk, a Danish company which started issuing integrated reports since 2004, shows that conscious actions dedicated towards social and environmental concerns responsibly show a more visible, transparent and responsive side of a business which enhances higher performance achievement by companies. The study observed an increase in the financial performance indicators (the gross margin and EBITDA margin, asset turnover and ROE) and stock prices during the ten years of practicing integrated reporting. In a study by Frias-Aceituno *et al.* (2014:56) on examining explanatory factors of integrated sustainability and financial reporting in twenty countries, the researchers observed that company size and profitability have a positive influence on the likelihood of the integrated report being issued. They argued that opportunities for business expansion and industry type are not significant drivers of this type of report. In yet another study of twenty countries, examining 750 companies on integrated reporting and country's legal system, Frías-Aceituno *et al.* (2013:45) found out that some leading companies have begun to develop a new form of information

provision, known as integrated reporting, which provides a coherent, logically-ordered summary of the available information on a firm's strategy, governance, performance and forecasts, in a way that displays the commercial, social and environmental framework within which it functions. Frías-Aceituno *et al.* (2013:45) argue that integrated sustainability reporting design can be partially attributed to the same legal framework that brings about an isomorphism among companies located in these institutional settings, which favours their long-term survival. Faisal *et al.* (2012:19) carried out a content analysis of 125 companies from twenty four countries on legitimising sustainability reporting. Faisal *et al.* (2012:19) observed a remarkable high percentage (61.9 %) level of sustainability disclosure. Additionally, this study also revealed that high profile industries and extra assurance processes promote the disclosure of additional sustainability information.

Turk *et al.* (2013:75), in their study of eight countries' stock exchanges, including Zimbabwe, using a disclosure scoring index, discovered that the differences in SR reporting are larger between the top and bottom companies listed within developed or emerging markets, respectively, than between the two sectors. The study by Turk *et al.* (2013:75) also indicates that overall, SR is prevalent, especially among market-leading companies, and that emerging markets are not lagging too far in this respect. This is supported by the study on the extent of a shift to triple bottom line (TBL) reporting in Zimbabwe conducted by Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:34) who discovered that firms were generally making shifts towards TBL reporting. In his study on integrated reporting in developing countries, using content analysis of listed companies in Malawi, Lipunga (2015:130) also discovered an average IR index of 43%, indicating that there was some progress in the adoption of IR by companies. On the other hand, the study revealed a bigger IR gap of 57% that needs to be filled.

Therefore, the varying results of diverse researches imply that it is important to investigate corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, financial reporting is mandatory for ZSE listed companies (ZSE, 2002:1). However, sustainability reporting is still an unregulated area, to a greater extent (Mangena & Taurigana, 2007:53; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34). Companies that normally present non-financial information mostly do it voluntarily (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165). The voluntary nature of many governance and sustainability reports makes comparability difficult (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). Furthermore, abundance of rhetoric in these reports may obscure the useful information that stakeholders

need for decision making (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:166). Therefore, corporate disclosure and transparency practices are not likely to be identical across all economic sectors. The decision to voluntarily disclose information is likely to be the outcome of a combination of various factors that relate to the firm's characteristics (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:166; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165).

1.2.3 Determinants of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

Empirical studies on disclosure practices have also provided insights into the general relationship between firm characteristics and propensity to disclose relevant information mandatorily and voluntarily (Jensen & Berg, 2012:299; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:43; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Wang *et al.*, 2008:14). For example, Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) hypothesised the association of eight firm characteristics (corporation size, eminence of external audit, stock ownership structure, kind of industry, corporation age, international corporation (MNC) membership, profitability, and liquid assets) and the extent of mandatory disclosure in annual reports. The literature on corporate financial reporting and disclosure demonstrate that various corporate characteristics are linked to the degree to which listed corporations observe mandatory disclosure requisites (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605). According to Camfferman and Cooke (2002:3) and Alsaed (2006:476), firm-specific attributes are categorised into three groups including structure linked variables, market linked variables and performance linked variables. Several studies on disclosure and transparency practices have also provided insights into the general relationship between firm characteristics and the extent of D&T practices (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:257; Jiao, 2011:647; Qaiser, 2011:47; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168; Ullah & Rehman, 2016:1; Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012:260; Wallace & Naser, 1995:311). This study selected six firm-specific characteristics and seven corporate governance mechanisms (*see Section 1.2* above). Most of the above studies discovered a varying relationship between company specific characteristics and corporate disclosure and transparency, thereby giving ground for this research to be conducted.

1.2.4 Firm Performance and Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

Determining the influence of corporate disclosure and transparency on firm performance is one of the objectives of this research. The reputation of the company is likely to be increased by more disclosures the company make since it is deemed transparent (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134). The resultant higher reputational capital level offers corporations leverage to create significant business advantages (Broadstock *et al.*,

2018:48; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221). These business advantages may be in the form of relaxed company and host governments negotiations, more contracts attraction, attraction of key employees, premium pricing of company products and services and reduction of company's cost of capital.

Empirical writing on corporate disclosure and transparency, to a larger extent has been informed by the agency theory (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:257; Jiao, 2011:647; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115) and focused on linking diverse themes of corporate disclosure and transparency with firm performance (Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221; Li *et al.*, 2018:60) so as to avoid principal–agent fights and ensure shareholder value maximisation. For instance, Jiao (2011:647) hypothesised a positive association between disclosure quality and firms' market valuation. In their study, Lee and Yeo (2016:1221) using a sample of listed firms in South Africa, they examined the association between cross-sectional variation in integrated reporting disclosures and firm valuation in the period after the implementation of integrated reporting. Lee and Yeo (2016:1221) found that firm valuation is positively associated with integrated reporting disclosures.

There are several variables that could be used to measure firm performance used in corporate disclosure empirical studies (Price *et al.*, 2011:76; Zabri *et al.*, 2016:287). The accounting performance indicators include return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on investment (ROI) and return on equity (ROE), while market performance indicators include market to book value (MTB) or Tobin's Q ratio. This study used three financial performance indicators as discussed in *Section 1.2*. As discussed in this several studies discovered mixed results on the influence of firm performance on corporate disclosure and transparency, thereby justifying the need to conduct this research.

1.2.5 Theoretical Framework

The researcher intended to justify the research on the grounds of multiple theories of mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure. Coetsee (2010:1) points out that the two approaches along which the Framework of financial reporting has developed. These are; the 'clarify– envisage' system and the 'appraise–advance' system. The 'clarify– envisage' approach is comprised of various theories which aim to interpret and envisage accounting practice. For instance, the agency theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and positive accounting theory. The 'appraise–advance' approach instead, resembles a prescriptive theory. For example, the

International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (hereafter referred as the Conceptual Framework) prescribes a set of principles and guidelines which should be referred to when assessing existing accounting practices and developing new accounting rules (Coetsee, 2010:1).

The IASB Conceptual Framework is comprised of wide-ranging principles, explanations, suppositions and conceptions that (a) act as detailed guidelines for reference in the assessment of accounting practices and (b) gives a guideline in developing fresh accounting practices (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:153; Filipova, 2017:1). The main emphasis of the Conceptual Framework is therefore not to interpret or envisage accounting practice, but somewhat to act as a guideline in the assessment of prevailing practices and make it easier to develop new ones (Hendriksen, 1982:1; Wolk *et al.*, 2013:1). Nevertheless, there is no evidence that empirically support the notion that the Conceptual Framework is superior above the other theories of accounting. It is generally opined that there is no broad-based theory of financial accounting (Coetsee, 2010:1; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).

The fact that the IASB Conceptual framework is only a commonly conventional theory of financial accounting prompted the creation of alternative frameworks to address reporting on non-financial performance (e.g. intellectual capital), social performance, and environmental performance (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:153; Filipova, 2017:1). Abeysekera (2013:227) argued that although intellectual capital frameworks such as the UN Global Impact, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI-G3), and the Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity (TEEB) make great a contribution to improving disclosure quality of corporate activities outside the mandatory financial reporting framework. These frameworks dwells on at most two issues of corporate reporting only. The use of corporate reporting frameworks in isolation does not fully highlight how corporate performance in one aspect (e.g. intellectual capital) impact another (e.g. social capital). In addition, it increases the quantity of disclosure detail which may not be relevant and beneficial to various company stakeholders.

The demand for a contemporary financial reporting model have consequently prompted the unveiling of integrated reporting as a latest financial reporting model (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:153; Filipova, 2017:1). Accounting researchers believes in the possibility of the development of a broad-based accounting theory by merging the theories from the two approaches into one theory (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:153; Filipova, 2017:1) A composite

theory would integrate all the ideas from the ‘clarify– envisage’ set of philosophies and the verdict expediency tenets from the Conceptual Framework. The theories are comprised of; the agency theory, shareholder primacy theory, enlightened shareholder value theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, resource dependency theory and capital market based theories (e.g. information asymmetry, etc.) and are discussed in *Chapter 4* of this thesis. These theories were referred to in this study since they provide the framework for assessing the link between disclosure and transparency practices, company characteristics and company performance.

1.3 Problem Statement, Research Hypotheses and Motivation

As discussed in *Section 1.2*, in the past few years, much research has focused on corporate governance practices including corporate disclosure and their determinants. In addition, *Section 1.2* also discussed how several studies were conducted on the association between corporate disclosure and firm performance. It remains unclear why previous studies on corporate disclosure and transparency among firms in emerging markets, particularly in Zimbabwe did not apply a sustainability oriented composite disclosure and transparency index, incorporating provisions derived from the local corporate governance framework to measure the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency. In addition, although diverse previous studies researched on corporate disclosure and transparency tested whether firm performance influences corporate disclosure and transparency, it remains unclear whether corporate disclosure and transparency practices impact firm performance. This current study sought to fulfil a gap in literature by investigating corporate disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports and the relationship between these practices and firm-specific attributes including corporate governance factors and corporate performance in the African economy of Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has experienced a turbulent political and economic landscape for the past two decades. This leads to poor country-level governance and hence may pose challenges to good corporate governance at firm level, particularly concerning disclosure and transparency (Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013:50; Makina, 2010:99; UNECA, 2002; UNCTAD, 2015:1). For instance, UNECA (2002) argues that deficiency in transparency extents the possibility for corruption by causing information asymmetries amongst controllers and controlled entities. This dishonesty cast a shadow over public regulation in order to make the information failures seem less bad (UNECA, 2002; UNCTAD, 2015:1). There are governance mechanisms in place

to improve the quality and level of disclosure and transparency. Government regulatory bodies and accounting professionals have attempted to enforce and encourage improved disclosure through legislated requirements, professional standards and recommendations. The release of the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) in 2015 also adds to governance reforms the country is adopting to ensure good governance practices. However, the NCCGZ is not legislation though it is directly aligned with the new Constitution of Zimbabwe. Therefore, this study developed a sustainability oriented disclosure and transparency index based on the NCCGZ which may possibly enable the country to continuously measure governance practices against global benchmarks. In its broad form as NCCGZ framework, companies may find it too time consuming and impractical to identify the company's relevant disclosure and transparency performance indicators. Organisations are also not able to 'score' and compare their own performances to previous scores or with other companies' scores, by using the framework in its comprehensive format. For this reason, the NCCGZ framework was ideally suited for the development of corporate disclosure and transparency index in this study.

The review of literature shows that diverse studies have been conducted on disclosure and transparency practices in both emerging and advanced countries as outlined in Appendix 1 of this study. The findings of these studies, however reflect some degree of ambiguity and inconsistency, among those conducted on developed and developing countries. Therefore, further research is warranted. Wallace and Naser (1995:311) argued that the causes of the variations in the results of disclosure and transparency studies is due to varied statistical designs typically used and the differences in the characteristics of the descriptive variables assessed in these studies. Additionally, the diversities in the socio-economic environments of the countries examined could lead to the inconsistencies. Although these countries may be categorised as advanced or emerging, these are unique to each other. Moreover, the literature review revealed that there have been extensive studies (*see Appendix 1 of this study*) on the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency.

Inadequate attention is being given to corporate disclosure and transparency practices including sustainability and integrated reporting in Zimbabwe. This applies not only to educational institutions but also to the state. This is evidenced by the paucity in literature on disclosure and transparency practices with respect to Zimbabwe. For instance, only few studies were found i.e. Owusu-Ansah (1998:605), Mangena and Taurigana (2007:53), Mawanza and Mugumisi

(2014:34) and the fourth study by Turk *et al.* (2013:75), which was conducted in conjunction with other countries. Sustainability and integrated reporting in developing countries is a rich and interesting area of enquiry, which is becoming ever more important in sustainability theory and practice. Since it is under-researched, it also represents a tremendous opportunity for improving the knowledge and understanding of corporate sustainability. Therefore, much more attention should be paid to corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe.

Against the afore-said theoretical argument and problem statement, this research addressed the following overall research question:

“How does good corporate governance enhance the quality of corporate accountability and progress of embracing world-class corporate disclosure and transparency practices and business performance in Zimbabwean firms?” To adequately respond to this key empirical question (KEQ), this main research question was split into six secondary or sub-empirical questions (SEQ).

The first SEQ was: How could a sustainability oriented, composite D&T index be developed based on the NCCGZ and literature? This question aimed to focus the research on developing a disclosure and transparency scoring system after contextualising corporate disclosure and transparency and exploring related concepts from literature. The second SEQ was: What are the current corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency in corporate reporting in Zimbabwean firms? This research question aimed to establish whether the release of the NCCGZ has enhanced corporate disclosure and transparency in firms by adopting sustainability and integrated reporting. The third SEQ was: What is the quality of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of ZSE listed firms during the recent years. This question examined to what extent Zimbabwean listed firms transparently disclosed financial and non-financial information in compliance with the NCCGZ. After reviewing recent related studies, a sustainability oriented business governance scoring system was used to assess the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency among Zimbabwe listed firms (Lipunga, 2015:130; Mangena & Taurigana, 2007:53; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605). This question also aimed to examine whether the institution of the NCCGZ has enhanced corporate accountability practices by analysing and comparing the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency before and after the year 2015. The fourth SEQ

was: Which factors influence the degree of disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe listed corporations? In examining this question, the research sought to explore the determinants of mandatory and non-mandatory/optional disclosure in the firms' annual reports. The literature on corporate disclosure and transparency suggests that corporate governance mechanisms, company size; corporate leverage; multinational corporation affiliation; age of the firm, profitability and liquidity are the key factors influencing corporate disclosure and transparency (Albassam, 2014:1; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Osama, 2013:1; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Price *et al.*, 2011:76; Yafele, 2012:1). The key factors of corporate disclosure and transparency were selected based on the widespread literature review and were examined (*see Section 1.2 above*).

The fifth SEQ was: Is there an association between corporate governance components and company performance? This research used a second model (hereafter referred to as *Model 2*), as the conventional method to respond to this secondary research question (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006:391; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53). The sixth SEQ was: What is the association between the level of disclosure and transparency practices as recommended by the 2015 NCCGZ and firm performance? This research adopted a third model (hereafter referred to as *Model 3*) to address this sub-question. *Model 3* entail the evaluation of the association between corporate governance factors and firm performance, using the developed scoring index (Ammann *et al.*, 2013:452; Munisi & Mersland, 2016:1; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:92; Tariq & Abbas, 2013:565). These two models enabled the exploration of the differences in the research results and their implications.

This study followed similar corporate disclosure and transparency former research studies in selecting a suitable method to resolve these research questions. The mixed research methodology was adopted in this study. *Section 5.5 in Chapter 5* of this study give details about the design, methodology and data used to answer all the six research questions of this study in order to achieve all the objectives stated in *Section 1.4* below. In line with Collis and Hussey (2009:1) as well as Creswell (2009), statistical data analysis techniques were particularly employed with the aim to make sure that results were valid and reliable. This data comprised of financial and non-financial information and was mostly extricated from companies' annual reports. According to Omar and Simon (2011:156), annual reports are reliable sources of data.

1.3.1 Research Hypotheses

To scientifically investigate the research questions posed in *Section 1.3* above, the association between the variables selected for consideration should be theorised so that testable hypotheses could be formulated. The major purpose of hypothesising and empirically assessing the association between disclosure and transparency and determinants of disclosure and transparency is to propose areas of focus for improvement of the disclosure and transparency regulatory environment.

This section developed and formulated testable hypotheses regarding the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices.

H₁: There is a statistically significant improvement in the extent of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed companies' annual reports during the years from 2014 to 2016 (SEQ 2&3).

H₂: There is a statistically noteworthy connection between corporate governance instruments and the extent and quality of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed firms (SEQ 4).

H₃: There is a statistically significant connection between annual reports reflecting top-quality disclosure and transparency, and firm-specific characteristics (SEQ 4).

H₄: A statistically significant link between corporate governance mechanisms and company performance exists (SEQ 5).

H₅: There is a statistically significant and positive association between corporate disclosure and transparency practices (represented by the NCCGZDTI and corporate performance, as signified by ROA, ROCE and ROE (SEQ 6).

1.3.2 Motivation of topic actuality

The aim of this section was to signify why the theme of this research study was appropriate for. This study was motivated by the following major considerations:

This study imparts to the disclosure and transparency literature in many ways. Much of prior literature on contextual corporate disclosure has been conducted in the context of developed countries (Borkowski *et al.*, 2009:1; Faisal *et al.*, 2012:19; Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:56; Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:45; Guthrie & Farneti, 2008:114; Martínez-Ferrero *et al.*, 2015:45; Nitkin & Brooks, 1998:1499; Romolini *et al.*, 2014:65; Stubbs & Higgins, 2014:1; Turner *et al.*, 2006:41; Turturea, 2015:2161; Van Bommel, 2014:1157; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207) and in the context of world renowned organisations (Dragu & Tiron-Tudor, 2013:275;

Havlová, 2015:231; Lozano & Huisingh, 2011:99). A limited number of similar studies have also been done in developing economy settings (Bhatia & Tuli, 2014:39; Gurvitch & Sidorova, 2012:28; Hu *et al.*, 2011:843; Lipunga, 2015:130; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:55; Maubane *et al.*, 2014:155; Rensburg & Botha, 2014:146). Several research studies were also performed on emerging countries in conjunction with developed countries (Barkemeyer *et al.*, 2015:316; Bhatia & Tuli, 2014:140; Jensen & Berg, 2012:300; Social Investment Forum, 2009:1; Turk *et al.*, 2013:80).

Of all the empirical studies in corporate disclosure and transparency practices in emerging economies, little is known about Southern African countries. Specifically, there is dearth in information on the 'extent' of governance and sustainability development KPIs disclosed in annual reports by firms listed on capital markets in Southern African countries. This also applies to the 'association' between the extent of corporate (mandatory and voluntary) disclosure and transparency and firm-specific characteristics and firm performance. This study was, consequently, an effort to deal with this problem. Briefly, it has extended the research model used in several studies (Albassam, 2014:1; Lipunga, 2015:130; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:57; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:620) to the ZSE in the current context; by assessing the corporate disclosure and transparency practices of the listed firms' annual reports, and by evaluating the link between the level of these practices and firm-specific attributes and firm performance in recent years. Even though this research study was intently comparable to some of the reviewed corporate disclosure and transparency studies, it was, nonetheless, peculiar in several aspects.

Firstly, the study analysed the concept of voluntary disclosure including sustainability disclosure and integrated reporting and transparency practices in relation to securities regulation and the recently released NCCGZ. Corporate disclosure serves an 'information function' and a 'transformational function' (Eccles & Serafeim, 2014:159). The study was based on the belief that to enhance a corporate accountability and disclosure system in emerging economies, the following institutions play a critical role; the appropriate government laws and regulations, stock exchanges, investors, directors and professional accountants and auditors. The disciplinary instruments of the liberalised market system, that facilitate disclosure of specific business operations information as in advanced countries, are either not fully developed or inexistent in these emerging countries (Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013:60; Golja

& Paulišić, 2011:55; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:615; UNECA, 2002:5). In many developing countries, particularly in Zimbabwe, the mechanisms are existent but less stringent (Healy & Palepu 2001:410; Lipunga, 2015:130; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:60; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:615). In order to enhance the efficient pricing and allocation of resources by capital markets in developing economies, corporate disclosure of certain information requirements need to be regulated (Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563; OECD, 2014:1). Regulated corporate disclosure is pivotal for well-organised securities market in order to advance economic expansion and growth in developing economies (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:540; OECD, 2014:1).

Secondly, based on what this researcher knows, this research study was the earliest to offer confirmation of the connection between the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports and the determinants of these practices including firm-specific characteristics, business governance instruments and corporate performance. In particular, this research study was the first to attempt to evaluate the level of corporate disclosure and transparency in annual reports in Zimbabwe using guidelines of the NCCGZ with reference to the OECD principles, GRI and IR frameworks. There is little known about the corporate disclosure and transparency levels of Zimbabwean businesses due to lack of current empirical studies in the area. The empirical study by Owusu-Ansah (1998:610) conducted an assessment on the sufficiency of business statutory disclosure practices in developing markets, using the ZSE as a case study. The researcher's findings indicated that, to a larger extent, corporate mandatory disclosure in companies in Zimbabwe is adequate and interrelated to firm characteristics such as firm size (market capitalisation/assets), multinational affiliation, firm age, and profitability and the corporate governance component of ownership intensity including country-level governance mechanisms. Moreover, another study by Mangena and Tauringana (2007:58) examined corporate disclosure, corporate governance and overseas ownership on the ZSE. Their findings were that voluntary disclosure by firms was low in tandem with other emerging markets. Nevertheless, the economy of Zimbabwe has experienced a turbulent and tumultuous period since 2007. There is, thusly a keen interest to investigate whether the downturn in the economy for the past ten years could have impacted significantly on the corporate disclosure and transparency of companies. Even though, Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) researched on mandatory corporate disclosure, and Mangena and Tauringana (2007:55) focused on voluntary disclosure, this study comprised of transparency practices as

well as mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure variables. A few Zimbabwean firms have issued an integrated report, but many are producing sustainability or corporate social responsibility reports, which are a step in that direction. Even though substantial studies have been conducted in emerging markets during recent years, these have been biased on Asian countries and South Africa. Therefore, the discovery of these research studies may not be relevant to other African countries, because of the diverse cultural and political territories. Moreover, current literature suggests that studies on corporate sustainability and integrated reporting focus heavily on developed countries (Lipunga, 2015:130; Muttakin & Khan, 2014:167).

Thirdly, assessing the extent of corporate sustainability and governance reporting integrated in annual reports of Zimbabwean businesses provided important contribution to a discourse that is currently topical globally in many ways. Corporate disclosures and transparency are critical to Zimbabwe as the current economic and political environment in the country exposes directors of companies to ethical dilemmas. Moreover, the expected benefits of corporate sustainability and governance reporting matters much for emerging countries such as Zimbabwe in order to attract more foreign capital and direct foreign investment, in order to develop their economies.

Fourthly, the research study adds value to the existing corporate governance and disclosure literature by supplying empirical documentation on the components that are critical to adequate corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe listed firms. Apart from the institutional factors e.g. country-level governance mechanisms, firm-specific characteristics to be investigated include governance mechanism structure (board size, percentage of independent non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership, institutional ownership, and board ownership); corporation size; corporate leverage; multinational corporation affiliation; age of the firm, profitability and liquidity of the sampled firms. In spite of several African countries having released corporate governance codes (Rossouw, 2005:100; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170), empirical research studies are mostly focused on developed countries and a few developing countries (Lipunga, 2015:130). There are differences among countries relating to the effectiveness of corporate governance systems (Rossouw, 2005:105), cultural practices (García-Sánchez *et al.*, 2013:830) and legal systems (Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:50). This entails that impact corporate disclosure and transparency

practices on disclosure and the performance of firms may be varied between emerging and advanced countries. Hence, an assessment of corporate disclosure and transparency reforms in emerging economies, where there is paucity of empirical evidence, is essential in order to fully comprehend the impact of corporate governance improvements on corporate disclosure practices and performance.

Fifthly, this research study brings new discovery in the Zimbabwe corporate business context by using a self-developed composite corporate disclosure and transparency index comprising of key performance indicators drawn from the country's governance framework (the NCCGZ). Previous research studies have analysed the level of corporate disclosure compliance by employing a specific index and in most cases, referring to traditional regulatory framework provisions e.g. Companies Act, Zimbabwe Exchange Listing Act and International Accounting standards (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:55; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:625). This research study, therefore add to extant literature by developing a corporate D&T index relevant to the Zimbabwean environment for use by researchers and policy makers, and also creates several avenues for future research.

Sixthly, this research study used a balanced panel data for several firm financial years, while former studies used data over one financial year. This research could also be regarded as an addition of prior researches concerning the extent of the sample, study methodology and the balanced type of panel data drawn from several years. This can improve the possibility of generalisation of the findings for Zimbabwe listed firms.

Lastly, the information discovered by this study add to the literature still existing by evaluating corporate disclosure and transparency for those in charge of policy-making and regulatory instruments. In particular, these research findings might have practical implications to regulating authorities and policy-making institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the Security Exchange Commission and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). In particular, regarding the enhancement of the external governance mechanisms. For instance, the results depicting companies in Zimbabwe having below expected levels of corporate disclosure and transparency prompts the improvement and tightening of the regulations. Regulations that are inclined on increasing the transparency of firms will benefit common investors who depend on corporate governance and financial disclosures. This may in turn

trigger the entire economy's development. Regulators may use the research study results providing the evidence of inexistent transparency in companies in order to suggest the type of law (the hard or the soft law) which is to be chosen for the regulation of corporate governance practices. The findings are of use to company management who are striving to attract foreign investment. The growing globalisation of capital markets indicates the presence of significant market pressures for additional information about listed companies' operations and prospects. Moreover, even though Zimbabwe Stock Exchange is popularly known as the second oldest stock exchange in Africa (following South Africa), not much studies have been conducted on this market. Therefore, this study will add to the extant literature on the corporate disclosure practices and transparency extents of African economies, adding to the extant literature.

1.4 Objectives

1.4.1 Main Objective

The prime objective of this research study was to examine the annual reports of firms listed on the ZSE in order to evaluate the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in Zimbabwe, using a self-developed composite D&T index.

1.4.2 Secondary Objectives

In order to achieve the main objective, the following secondary objectives were formulated:

1. To contextualise corporate disclosure and transparency by defining, exploring and systematically analysing the concepts of corporate disclosure and transparency from the literature (SEQ 1).
2. To develop a sustainability oriented, composite D&T index based on NCCGZ (In reference to OECD principles, GRI and IR frameworks) (SEQ 1).
3. To determine the current corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency in corporate reporting in Zimbabwe (SEQ 2)
4. To analyse and assess the quality of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of firms listed in the ZSE during the recent years (SEQ 3).
5. To analyse the extent to which the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in the annual reports are associated with the firm specific characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms of ZSE listed firms during the recent years (SEQ 4).
6. To assess the association between corporate governance factors and corporate performance (SEQ 5)

7. To correlate the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices and firm performance (ROCE, ROE & ROA) (SEQ 6).
8. To provide suggestions for improvements in corporate regulation, securities regulation, and corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe.

1.5 Research Methodology

This research was partly directed at processing of literature and partly the collection and examination of empirical data as proposed by Blumberg *et al.* (2011). A literature study entails library research, comprising of reading prior research publications, journal articles and textbooks. Empirical data refers to measurement information gathered by experiment or observation (Creswell, 2009) of which this study achieved this data collection by applying the embedded concurrent and sequential qualitative dominant (QUAL(quant)) design.

1.5.1 Literature review

The researcher read and compared the annual reports, annual accounts, governance codes, sustainability reports and integrated reports of international, Southern African and Zimbabwean listed companies trying to find the connection points. Even though this research study dwells on disclosure and transparency in a developing country, the review of literature was not only confined to these corporate governance practices in developing economies. Corporate disclosure and transparency studies on developed economies were considered as well. The list and details of selected research studies are provided in *Appendix 1* of this thesis. Only the most important research studies were reviewed in more detail in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. In order to qualify for detailed review, these researches are either widely accepted or current, and also regarded by the researcher as having significantly impacted the opinion of investigators in this research field. In analysing every one of these researches, the researcher: (1) declares the primary aim and focus of the research, (2) outlines the research strategy used, (3) outlines the key findings documented, and (4) stresses any key limitations of the research.

1.5.2 Empirical Research

The study focused on all the economic sectors of Zimbabwe. The longitudinal study for the experiential study was conducted from a selection out of the 63 ZSE listed companies' recent annual reports. Specifically, thirty-five (35) ZSE listed companies were analysed over a three-year period from 2014 to 2016. In other words, the recent financial years covered the period before and after the release of the 2015 NCCGZ. ZSE listed firms were chosen because private

business activities, investments and innovations are key drivers of productivity, broad economic growth and job creation in Zimbabwe.


This study followed a mixed (qualitative dominant) approach, which placed it within the interpretivist or phenomenological social enquiry. However, in the qualitative content analysis, quantitative indicators were generated (Breuning, 2011:1) as discussed in *Chapter 5* of this thesis.

Integrated and sustainability reporting are fairly new concepts, and the NCCGZ was released fairly recently. The two-stage design of the research study was adopted as suggested by Blumberg *et al.* (2011:1-138). Firstly, the exploratory stage focused on the interpretation of the NCCGZ, OECD, GRI and IR frameworks in order to come up with definitions of the main concepts. In addition, informal interviews were conducted with a few scholars and firms who had carried out similar studies. The information obtained in this phase assisted in developing a scoring system mainly based on the NCCGZ. Since the NCCGZ makes reference to the OECD principles, GRI and IR frameworks, the researcher also used the attributes from these frameworks as a basis of constructing the NCCGZ disclosure and transparency index.

Secondly, the official stage, was characterised by investigative empirical research questions and objectives (Blumberg *et al.*, 2011:1-138; Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006:125). Since the intention of this research was to construct a measuring instrument to assess the extent and determinants of disclosure and transparency in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations in accordance with the guidelines of the NCCGZ (in reference to the OECD principles, GRI and IR frameworks), a descriptive approach was employed (Blumberg *et al.*, 2011:1-138; Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006:125). To fulfil this purpose, annual reports, along with (if stand-alone) sustainability reports, CSR reports and other governance reports of firms were analysed. Moreover, companies' websites were analysed as well since some companies disclose extra information on their websites. The disclosures in these annual reports were examined using content analysis with the aid of ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative analysis software. Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006:120) documented that this approach has been employed in a number of former researches to examine disclosures in annual reports. Moreover, further data analysis was done by statistically analysing the information obtained from the NCCGZDTI measuring instrument. This included the use of computerised statistical programmes such as SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and Stata.

The framework of this study (*Figure 1.1*) demonstrates that disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices may be influenced by some firm attributes and that D&T practices may in turn be related to firm performance. This research also used a sequence of discrete-time data to examine the varied extents of D&T by utilising data from ZSE listed firms' recent annual reports and by applying NCCGZ self-constructed D&T criteria. The scoring process systematically assesses the D&T KPIs with scoring questions. Through utilising this data set, this study independently assessed the extent of D&T in ZSE listed firms using three indices: overall/aggregate, four categories, and fifteen subcategories, in the firms' annual reports and also examined any differences amongst firms in their disclosure and transparency practices in the firms' annual reports.

Figure 1.1 Framework of this Study



1.5.3 Paradigmatic assumptions and perspectives

A research paradigm is defined by Collis and Hussey (2009:220) as an outline that influences the way a study is performed, grounded on specific beliefs, views, mind-sets and presumptions regarding the world and the type of knowledge. Bryman (2012:300) suggested five categories of metaphysical presumptions that buttress these two paradigms namely ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological assumptions (Bryman, 2012:330; Vasilachis de Gialdino, 2011:25). According to Bryman (2012:320), two major study paradigms have surfaced including positivism and interpretivism, which are mainly applied in commercial researches. The positivistic viewpoint includes the quantifiable, objective, scientific, experimentalist and orthodox method, whereas phenomenology comprises of the qualitative, subjectivist, humanistic, interpretive and social constructionist method. In a research project such as this one, specific ontological and epistemological assumptions are made. These paradigmatic assumptions were discussed in greater detail in *Chapter 5* of this thesis.

This study was performed in the unique commercial environment and culture of Zimbabwe. This backdrop encompasses an assimilated framework comprising of legislatures, laws, business corporations and stakeholders. An important feature of this research was to reveal the disclosure and transparency practices in the Zimbabwean business environment. Since this study followed a qualitative dominant approach, embedded in the qualitative content analysis, quantitative indicators were generated (Breuning, 2011:1; Lombard *et al.*, 2002:590; Neuendorf, 2011:1-320;; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1-12). The researcher also utilised descriptive statistics to analyse the quantitative data to explain the relationship between variables. As discussed in *Chapter 5*, it can therefore be stated that an eclectic approach has been utilised in which both phenomenological and positivist methodologies informed the study.

Overall this thesis adhered to a mixed qualitative dominant methodology. Through the deductive process to a lesser extent and inductive process to a larger extent, disclosure and transparency theories: the agency theory, shareholder primacy theory, enlightened shareholder value theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, resource dependency theory and capital market based theories (e.g. information asymmetry) were tested. These theories were discussed in detail in *Chapter 4* of this thesis. The study also set hypotheses to clarify corporate disclosure and transparency practices.

1.6 Chapter Layout

The research report comprised of eight chapters and a concise synopsis of every chapter is provided in the following manner;

Chapter 1 presented the research intentions, review the setting of the research, pronounce the major motive of the study, the research questions and elaborated on the research contributions. This chapter closed with a short summary of the organisation of this thesis.

Chapter 2 presented an overview of the background of the research and institutional setting, focussing on a regulatory framework for corporate disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe. It offered a preamble and backdrop to the Zimbabwean economic industries. The corporate governance and external disclosure and transparency situation was explained in detail. These include Zimbabwe legislative framework, The Constitution of Zimbabwe, Company Law, Securities Exchange Law, Public Finance and Management Act, Banking Law, and Corporate Governance Code, Accounting and Auditing Standards in Zimbabwe. Under each of these reporting regulations, where relevant, comprehensive analysis of its background, disclosure and transparency requirements, strengths, weaknesses and challenges was provided. *Chapter 2* provided an overview of elements and guiding principles of the NCCGZ and global governance codes represented by the UK Combined Code.

Chapter 3 presented the conceptual framework and context of corporate disclosure and transparency by exploring selected disclosure and transparency-related concepts from the literature including sustainability and integrated reporting practices.

Chapter 4 presented the theoretical and empirical overview of corporate disclosure and transparency. Firstly, it reviewed key theories associated with disclosure and transparency practices, which include the agency theory, shareholder primacy theory, enlightened shareholder value theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, resource dependency theory and capital market based theories (e.g. information asymmetry), by underscoring their inferences in the Zimbabwean environment. Diverse from most former studies a manifold-theoretical viewpoint was implemented mainly centring on the agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theories. This provided a deeper knowledge of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and their expectations of the association between firm specific attributes and firm performance. Additionally, examining these theories helped in integrating them into a framework that could be utilised in clarifying and unravelling the experiential results. Secondly the study set empirical questions/objectives, and applied hypotheses to answer those

questions or achieve those objectives. Therefore, the research hypotheses and investigative questions were theoretically elaborated and set for empirical assessment in this chapter.

Chapter 5 presented the research paradigm, methodology and design used in this research. Moreover, this chapter considered the compatibility of the chosen study strategy with the study aims and questions. This chapter also addressed the complications in applying a mixed-methods study approach. Moreover, this chapter discussed the qualitative dominant study approach, methodology and numerical investigation of data utilised in this research. The validation of the selected data and research design were also provided in this chapter. Three statistical disclosure and transparency models were used: (i) the corporate disclosure and transparency model (*Model 1*), which investigated the degree of conformity to the NCCGZ and the components influencing corporate disclosure and transparency; (ii) *Model 2*, which examined the connection between corporate governance instruments and corporate specific characteristics and corporate performance; and (iii) *Model 3*, which assessed the association between the self-developed NCCGZ content index and firm performance. *Chapter 5* also reviewed the theoretical framework that inspired the qualitative study approach.

Chapter 6 presented the qualitative empirical findings and discussions. The chapter highlighted the qualitative content analysis that targeted the annual reports of ZSE listed firms using the ATLAS.ti 7.5 software.

Chapter 7 presented an evaluation of the degree of the current disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations. The descriptive statistics of the constructed NCCGZ D&T content index was presented. The chapter also presented and discussed the findings by paralleling qualitative and quantitative results. Additionally, it checked the strength of the quantitative results by balancing these against the qualitative results (Johl *et al.*, 2012:6369).

Chapter 8 summarised the thesis. This chapter reflected several aspects including a synopsis of the research results, contributions, implications, inadequacies and propositions for more studies.

Chapter 2 Background of Research and Institutional Setting

2.1 Introduction

This study is concerned with corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwean listed companies. The corporate governance of a firm is disciplined both by external as well as internal mechanisms. The objective of this chapter is to analyse the corporate governance, disclosure and transparency legislation, rules, standards and codes in Zimbabwe. The context for the empirical study was facilitated by highlighting the origins, strengths, weaknesses and challenges of these laws, rules and codes. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview of the elements and guiding principles of the NCCGZ and global frameworks e.g. OECD, GRI and IIRC. The chapter also gives a useful overview of the Zimbabwean economic situation. The rest of this chapter is arranged in this manner: *Section 2.2* discusses the historical overview of the Zimbabwean Economy; *Section 2.3* shows information regarding the Zimbabwean economic sectors performance; *Section 2.4* provides a review of corporate governance in Zimbabwe and summarises a comparison of the UK and Zimbabwe corporate governance codes. Zimbabwe's corporate disclosure and transparency regulatory framework is summarised in *Section 2.5* and *Section 2.6* provides the synopsis and conclusion of this chapter.

2.2 Historical Overview of the Zimbabwe Economy

Zimbabwe's economy has basically been broad based and diversified (Kamete, 2019:1; Makina, 2010:99). The Zimbabwean economy is comprised of the public and private sector (Dore *et al.*, 2008:1; Kamete, 2019:1; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:1; Ndhlela, 2011:1). The World Bank (2011:1) noted that the government-owned organisations (State Enterprises and parastatals or SEPs) sector is key to the economy of Zimbabwe and consists of very large business entities in the country, even larger than the largest listed companies. Dore *et al.* (2008:3) reported that in 2006, Zimbabwe had seventy six (76) public organisations and 60% of these had been inherited from the Rhodesian administration. The promulgation of parastatals in Zimbabwe differed from that of other African countries in that, after independence, new parastatal bodies were created in Zimbabwe; whereas, other countries created theirs through nationalisation and expropriation (Dore *et al.*, 2008:10; Makina, 2010:105; Tambudzai, 2003:1). The adoption and creation of these parastatals was to provide essential social services to public economic stabilisation and the equitable distribution of resources (Dore *et al.*, 2008:7; Makina, 2010:105; Tambudzai, 2003:5). State ownership of these organisations was also linked

to the government's socialist ideology and an inward looking economic strategy (Dore *et al.*, 2008:10; Makina, 2010:108; Tambudzai, 2003:8).

The self-regulation enabled by the accounting profession compel these parastatal entities to report under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) guidelines (World Bank, 2011:5). Some of these business entities have little financial reporting discipline as evidenced by their failure to meet financial reporting deadlines and failure to comply with IFRSs (OAG Zimbabwe, 2015:1; World Bank, 2011:10). More than half of these SEPs are characterised by poor accountability and transparency and report huge deficits, thereby increasing the Government burden (World Bank, 2011:10, 2017). Dore *et al.* (2008:12) wrote that, over the years, parastatals in Zimbabwe have suffered huge losses amounting to Z\$2 billion in 1993/1994, which was 4% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1997/1998 these losses reached Z\$11 billion, which accounted for 8.6% of its GDP. The major loss-makers were NOCZIM (50% of the total losses), ZESA (20%), the Cold Storage Company (8%), NRZ (6%) and ZISCO (6%). Lack of profitability by these organisations resulted in their low capacity to sustain their operations financially (OAG Zimbabwe, 2015:5; World Bank, 2011:15, 2017:1).

Tambudzai (2003:6) remarked that global trends have shown that socialism has not improved the living standards or redressed the economic injustices prevailing amongst states. This prompted the government of Zimbabwe to abandon a socialist ideology and embark on the policy of privatisation (Kawewe & Dibie, 2000:80; Makina, 2010:115; Tambudzai, 2003:10). The government of Zimbabwe embarked on a five-year Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, adopting reforms in various economic sectors through liberalisation and deregulation (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; Kawewe & Dibie, 2000:85; Makina, 2010:115; Tambudzai, 2003:10). The main argument was that the oligopolistic and monopolistic nature of the parastatals in some sectors inhibited competition among the players in addition to depriving the sector of choice and quality in service, innovation and efficiency (Makina, 2010:118; Ndhlela, 2011:10; Nyabereka, 2017:1). Ndhlela (2011) pointed out that this shift in policy was meant to pave the way for the liberalisation of the economy and to encourage a surge of domestic and foreign investment (Makina, 2010; Ndhlela, 2011). The structural reforms had a notable effect in the areas of domestic deregulation, liberalisation of current account transactions and financial sector reforms (Makina, 2010; Ndhlela, 2011). Therefore, the promotion of monopolies is in contrast with globalisation which aims to liberalise the world

economies so as to promote free markets, a private sector, fair competition, good corporate governance and professionalism (Kawewe & Dibie, 2000:90; Makina, 2010:111). The liberalisation of the economy resulted in a number of parastatals being partly and fully commercialised (Kawewe & Dibie, 2000: 90; Makina, 2010:111). According to Tambudzai (2003:10), in Zimbabwe the following parastatals were privatised during the period 1997-1999: Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited (DZL), Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTTCO), Zimbabwe Reinsurance Company (ZIMRE), Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Rainbow Tourism Group (RTG). However, progress in public enterprise reform and fiscal rationalisation was slow (Kawewe and Dibie, 2000:92; Makina, 2010:116; Ndhlela, 2011:1).

During 1998-2008, the economy declined dramatically due to incompatible macroeconomic policies, which triggered rampant emigration of skilled workers and badly reduced the country's institutional capacity (Makina, 2010:112; World Bank, 2016:1). Although Zimbabwe used to be reputed amongst Africa's topmost industrially developed countries, this reputation has faded significantly due to political instability and economic mismanagement during the past two decade since 1999 (Bartłomiej & Francis, 2013:1; (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; World Bank, 2017:5). The OECD (2004:1) revealed that there appeared to be a general agreement amongst economic analysts that the structural adjustment policies of the 1990s, together with weak aid for the agricultural transformations of 2000, impacted negatively on the economy causing a severe decline. The massive emigration of skilled young professionals further aggravated the decline and the promulgation of the controversial Indigenous policy (Bartłomiej & Francis, 2013:5; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:6; Makina, 2010:105). In the 2015 and 2016 development reports, the World Bank provided evidence that over the last five years (since 2010), Zimbabwe made significant progress in stabilising and revitalising its economy (World Bank, 2016:11, 2017:6). There was growth registered in the economy averaging six percent per year, and inflation was maintained at low level (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:7; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2017:5). A steady, albeit gradual, number of economic and institutional reforms has been adopted sequentially and gaining momentum steadily and gradually. This is reported in the World Bank's annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (World Bank, 2016:3, 2017:4). There was a notable commitment from the government, steadfastness in household investments and significant support from the donor community (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:7; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). The results were a remarkable progress towards reclaiming Zimbabwe's past performance in social outcomes, mostly in health and education.

The authorities are effecting various reforms to bolster the financial sector, particularly, and to overall recover the business environment (World Bank, 2016:2).

The implementation of a multicurrency system in early 2009 actually ‘dollarised’ the economy, restoring price stability and positioning the country for fundamental economic revival (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:7; UNECA, 2018:4; World Bank, 2017:1). Zimbabwe’s economy grew by more than 10 percent per year during 2010-12 evidenced by stable prices and extended bank credit lines (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; UNECA, 2018:5; World Bank, 2017:6). A healthy upsurge in bank deposits pushed the annual flow of net credit to the economy to almost 10 percent of GDP during 2010-11. (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:10; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2017:1). This renewed private sector buoyancy and thereby momentarily augmenting investment (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2017:3).


2.3 Overview of the Zimbabwe’s Economic Performance

The minister of Finance and Economic Development, in the 2017 Budget statement presentation, reported that the major challenge persisting is that of below average production exclusively throughout all sectors of the economy. The country still experienced economic under-performance notwithstanding the country’s considerable strengths and opportunities in agriculture, manufacturing, mining and tourism. Moreover, Zimbabwe is endowed with different natural resources, favourable climatic environment and skilled human resources (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:15; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1).

The World Bank (2016:3) observed that the flourishing economic environment that tracked the institution of the multi-currency regime in 2009 seems to have run its course and the economy was facing momentous headwinds from 2014. Economic growth slowed down after the general election of July 2013, as the primary stabilisation outcomes of dollarisation-led growth ran its course (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:12; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2017:5). Trend economic growth was now around 2-3 percent per annum following the end of the dollarisation success in the year 2012 (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:12; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2017:1). World-wide commodity prices declined, and the down-movement of the South African rand compared to the dollar removed the attractiveness of Zimbabwe’s traded goods sector (IMF, 2020:1; World Bank, 2017:1). Onerous regulations, antiquated infrastructure and fragile institutional capacity aggravated declining competitiveness (IMF, 2020:1; World Bank, 2017:1). Formal

employment prospects disappeared and the informal sector became extensive (IMF, 2020:1; World Bank, 2017:4). The drought in 2015 and the consequences of El Nino in 2016 were extremely harmful to the country, especially on agriculture, energy and water supply (IMF, 2020:1; World Bank, 2017:1). The industry continued being overwhelmed due to a tough policy environment, unstable terms of trade and limited infrastructure (Kanyenze et al., 2017:5; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). Although certain agricultural subsectors have since improved, sector value chains are ineffectual and irrigation networks are restricted (Kanyenze et al., 2017:6; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). Consequently, agricultural production is currently more vulnerable to exterior shocks, especially unfavourable weather conditions (IMF, 2020:1; World Bank, 2017:1). Figure 2.1 below shows the Zimbabwean economic sectors' contribution to the GDP trend growth since 2010.

Figure 2.1 Contribution to GDP by Sector




Source: Ministry of Finance, ZIMSTAT

Emigration of skilled workers weakened institutional capacity (Kanyenze et al., 2017:8; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). The investors' perception about insecure property rights in Zimbabwe discouraged foreign direct investment (Kanyenze et al., 2017:5; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). These all contributed to domestic capital flight (IMF, 2020:5; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). A terrible drought, for the second succeeding year, had a serious toll on agriculture production, with several crops such as maize recording merely 511 000 tons, versus the average national requirement of 1 800 000 tons. This resulted in a very huge importation bill for the country (Kanyenze et al., 2017:10; Ministry of Finance

and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:). With the exception of gold, whose price averaged US\$1 257.1 per ounce, mineral prices remained depressed during the period to end October 2016 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1). The mining sector of Zimbabwe is battling to draw capital and foster innovation due to depressed global mineral prices, weakening rand, a restraining investment environment and an indeterminate fiscal and regulatory framework (World Bank, 2016:1). The manufacturing sector have been facing sustained constraints including outdated equipment, capital, low cumulative demand, liquidity, prohibitive costs of utilities and excessive competition from imports (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:9; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). In the year 2012, an acute reduction in manufactured exports was only partly counterbalanced by improved mining and agricultural exports (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:8; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:). The exports of manufactured goods dropped to below half of their 2010-11 levels. Investment shrunk by around ten percent of GDP due to diminishing investor confidence and funding. In addition, imports started to shrink (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:4; World Bank, 2016:3, 2017:5). Food processing, textiles and clothing manufacture sprouted during 2015, as opposed to processed wood, furniture, paper and chemical industries which shrunk (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:11; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:2, 2017:3). A number of sectors, including textiles and clothing, have been partly protected by tougher import restrictions pronounced in the 2015 mid-term Fiscal Policy Review (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:12; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). The imports from COMESA countries are normally duty free, facilitating competition and more diversity. Nonetheless, an insufficient electricity supply together with unfavourable exchange-rate movements are weakening the competitiveness of Zimbabwe's conventional manufacturing industries (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:8; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:2, 2017:4). Meanwhile, the high cost of doing business in Zimbabwe, including an outdated insolvency regime, weaknesses in corporate governance and limited and costly term financing, are inhibiting the restructuring process and slowing growth across the manufacturing sector (IMF, 2020:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1). The World Bank (2016:6) reported that the services sector growth persisted, building on Zimbabwe's skilled labour force. Construction,

finance and insurance and hotels and distribution sectors recorded strong growth in the year 2015 (IMF, 2020:6; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1). Telecommunications was also predicted to continue to make significant contributions to total growth due to its customer base expansion. In the year 2015, the mobile phone access rate (active) rose to 93 percent, and internet access reached 47 percent of the population (IMF, 2020:1; UNECA, 2018:1; World Bank, 2016:1). Although, the telecommunications industry remains vital to the service sector's development, symptoms of dwindling domestic demand stifled its growth potentials (IMF, 2020:3; UNECA, 2018:7; World Bank, 2016:10). Non-tradable services such as education and public administration also experienced rapid growth, partly in response to increasing fiscal expenditures and rising public sector wages, including teachers' salaries (IMF, 2020:4; UNECA, 2018:8; World Bank, 2016:10). The rise of knowledge-intensive subsectors such as finance, transport and communications underscores the growth potential of Zimbabwe's service sector (Kanyenze et al., 2017:12; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). By contrast, sectors that tend to employ less-skilled workers expanded slowly. The tourism sector remains depressed with a paltry projected 0.8% growth for 2017 (Kanyenze et al., 2017:6; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:8, 2017:7). The rest of the other sectors have also been affected by the present economic situation and on average have estimated growth of between 0.3% and 3% on the back of low investment levels compounded by low investor confidence (Kanyenze et al., 2017:13; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). Figure 2.2 below shows a five-year growth rate trend from the year 2010 in Zimbabwe.

Figure 2.2: Growth Rate (2010-2015)




Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Zimbabwe Statistics

The enormous savings-investment gap necessitated the country to create a greatly competitive environment to invite external savings through foreign capital inflows including Foreign Direct Investment, portfolio and other offshore loans (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:9; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1) . Figure 2.3 below shows the foreign capital flows in Zimbabwe since 2009. The minister of Finance and Economic Development for Zimbabwe, in the 2016 budget, proposed that with the worsening trends and the gloomy levels of foreign capital inflows, it is important that the country accelerates the re-engagement process with the international financial institutions (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1). The minister also reported that it was vital to boost the momentum on the implementation of the current ease of doing business reform and ensuring clarity so as to enhance investor assurance (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1).

Figure 2.3: Foreign Capital Flows

Foreign Capital Flows



Source: Reserve Bank

The World Bank (2016:6) reported that even though Zimbabwe's current account deficit narrowed, somewhat between 2009 and 2015, still it was considerably higher than those of comparable countries in the region, and exports :amounted to just over half of imports. A drop in global prices for gold, platinum and other mineral commodities, together with unresolved supply-side constraints, has reduced the value of mining exports loans (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:10; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:4,

2017:6). Zimbabwe has also benefited from lower oil prices, but rising import volumes largely offset the impact on import values loans (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:15; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). Remittances gradually increased during 2010-2015 and are estimated to have reached almost 7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2015 (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:15; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2016:1; World Bank, 2016:1, 2017:1). The deficit is primarily financed by capital inflows, especially foreign borrowing, but unfavourable terms contribute to making this model unsustainable over time (World Bank, 2016:1).

2.4 Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe

The intensification of corporate governance campaign word-wide has also affected the African continent (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265; CIGI, 2010:1; Maune, 2015:170; Rossouw, 2015:100; World Bank, 2011:1). Rossouw (2005:98) commented that the most promising developments in corporate governance reform in Africa included the various initiatives to develop national codes of corporate governance. These programs are normally led by the private sector and professional bodies (CIGI, 2010:1; Maune, 2015:171; Rossouw, 2015:101; World Bank, 2011:2). Organisations such as institutes of directors or professional bodies usually take the leadership alongside other stakeholder groups to develop standards of good corporate governance (CIGI, 2010:2; Maune, 2015:171; Rossouw, 2015:102; World Bank, 2011:3). In developing such codes, recognition is taken of corporate governance developments elsewhere on the continent and in the world (CIGI, 2010:2; Maune, 2015:171; Rossouw, 2015:102; World Bank, 2011:3). These national codes of corporate governance over time tend to find their way in an evolutionary manner into listing requirements of stock exchanges, rules of professional bodies, and also into legislation (CIGI, 2010:4; Maune, 2015:172; Rossouw, 2015:103; World Bank, 2011:5). Therefore, corporate governance reform is effected from the bottom and upwards. A considerable number of such national codes of corporate governance have already been released, mainly in the Anglophone countries in Africa (Maune, 2015:175; Rossouw, 2015:105).

A number of reviewed literature on international corporate governance affirms that developing countries generally implemented Western corporate governance systems over extended periods such as Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016:738), Maune (2015:171) and Rossouw (2015:100). The corporate governance system in Zimbabwe is dominated by the Anglo-American model,

particularly highlighting on protection of shareholders' interests (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:55; Maune 2015:180). The dominant model of corporate governance that surfaces from the NCCGZ represents an inclusive model of corporate governance. It demonstrates that boards of directors are not only accountable to shareholders but also accountable to entire stakeholders of the company. The governance code supports a self-regulatory approach where companies are encouraged to embrace not only the letter but also the spirit of good corporate governance as best business practice (NCCGZ, 2014:1). The Institute of Directors, Zimbabwe (IODZ), together with Zimbabwe Leadership Forum (Zimleaf) and the Standards Association of Zimbabwe (SAZ) took the initiative to tackle, holistically, the problem of corporate failures and operational challenges (NCCGZ, 2014:1). The IODZ is committed to cultivating the skill, standing and proficiency of managers and directors of corporations in Zimbabwe by way of coaching and teaching. Furthermore, the organisation strives to reduce fraudulence and dishonesty. IODZ established a special purpose committee that formulates and publicises guides on corporate governance (IODZ, 2015:1). ZimLeaf is responsible for, amongst other things, promoting and monitoring compliance with principles of good governance through training, research and evaluation and advocacy programmes (CIGI, 2010:3). IODZ and ZimLeaf were endorsed by the government to spearhead the process of formulating and introduction of a national code on corporate governance covering all sectors of the economy (CIGI, 2010:3). Though IoDZ and Zimleaf can urge conformity, they lack the mandate to coerce any business entity to practice good corporate governance principles (CIGI, 2010:1; Maune, 2015:176).

Good corporate governance is critical for instituting transparent corporations (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:742; Maune, 2015:180; OECD, 2015:1; Rossouw; 2015:95). Companies that focus on prolonged-period value creation and reacts well to market forces (Kajanathan, 2012:63; Melloni *et al.*, 2017:220). Corporate governance is described initially in relation to the processes that resolve daily matters between owners and managers of a corporation (Kajanathan, 2012:65; Melloni *et al.*, 2017:221). Corporate governance has mostly developed in its function and impact, particularly in emerging markets, where it acts both as an device for forming well-organised corporations and as an instrument of transformations in various economic, political, and financial spheres (El Hajj *et al.*, 2016:1). Maune (2015:180) supports that from a commercial perspective, corporate governance standards are somewhat at

reasonable levels in Zimbabwe. However, the concern is that the political governance standards could overspill into the sphere of commerce (UNECA, 2018:1).

A lot of reforms are needed in the Zimbabwean economy: economic, legal, administrative and financial (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:63; World 2011:1, 2017:1). In the multicurrency period, the Government suffered from a number of challenges (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:63; Nyabereka, 2017:5). These challenges have resulted in poor mobilisation of funding by Government in both local and external financial markets. (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:65) The Government had a huge external debt, estimated at around US\$10 billion and had no reserves (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:65; Nyabereka, 2017:10). Foreign exchange reserves averaged at less than one month of import cover and the Government suffered from perceived high country risk, which has limited its access to external lines of credit (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:6; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:66; World 2011:1, 2017:1). Due to the perceived country risk, external credit has become too costly and the Government has low credit worthiness, resulting in investor reluctance to lend to Government (IMF, 2020:1; UNECA, 2018:1). Local and foreign investors have low confidence in the Government and this has resulted in under-subscriptions to Government TBs and Government guaranteed bonds (IMF, 2020:1; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:67; UNECA, 2018:1). Divergent views on the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy (IEEP) have created uncertainty, resulting in a wait-and-see attitude by most investors (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:66; World 2011:1, 2017:1). In addition, experiences of the 2000 to 2008 economic crisis, in which some individuals and corporates lost money in the financial sector eroded confidence in the Government and the Central Bank (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:67).

Several studies note that the government of Zimbabwe supports the advancement of corporate governance in several ways; (i) Transforming the public sector by commercialising and privatising the public sector entities; (ii) Supporting the public and private sector to really intensify responsibility and lessen the spread of dishonesty; (iii) Promoting foreign investment by issuing new laws and (iv) Authenticating the formulation and institution of the national governance code (CIGI, 2010:1; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:8; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:68; World 2011:1, 2017:1). The level at which a country's state and private entities abide by basic principles of good corporate governance is an increasingly critical component to source investment capital, maintaining economic stability and fostering growth (Nhavira *et al.*,

2013:68; World 2011:1, 2017:1). Zimbabwe is dealing with the challenge of restructuring for better efficiency and establishing an investment-welcoming environment (Ndhlela, 2011:5; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:68; World 2011:1, 2017:1). Hence, good corporate governance practices in public and private entities is vital for their success and overall economic growth (CIGI, 2010:1; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:10; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:68). In spite of the acceptance of the prerequisite to impose compliance with corporate governance principles, numerous countries, particularly in Zimbabwe, do not have operative institutions to compel business entities (CIGI, 2010:1; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:750; World Bank, 2011:1).

2.4.1 Zimbabwe Code on Corporate Governance

Corporate governance codes comprises of recommendations that signify best conduct practice and serve as national guidelines for publicly listed corporations, underscoring transparency as a key corporate governance matter (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:750; Rose, 2016:202):. Granted the introduction of the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) in April, 2015, boards of directors and directors of companies, public entities and non-governmental bodies now have firm corporate governance guidelines for directing their entities. The code applies to all types of business entities (IoDZ, 2015:1). It is a voluntary code whose enforcement is on an ‘apply or explain’ basis (NCCGZ, 2014:1). The code provides universal principles of sound corporate governance and suggestions to be followed by boards of directors and directors of corporations in pursuit of effective and sustainable corporate governance (IoDZ, 2015:1).

The introduction of the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) is deemed by various stakeholders to be a major factor in executing sound corporate governance practices amongst business entities in Zimbabwe (CIGI, 2010:1; Maune, 2015:175). As outlined in *Chapter 5*, the NCCGZ is the major source for developing the NCCGZDDTI employed in this research study. Hence, this subsection examines the NCCGZ and gives its detailed stipulations. The NCCGZ is comprised of nine chapters: (i) application of the code and its derivatives; (ii) ownership and control structures; (iii) board of directors and directors; (iv) governance of risk (v) information management and disclosure; (vi) corporate conflict prevention and resolution; (vii) compliance and enforcement; (viii) stakeholder relationships and (ix) role of government in corporate governance.

The first chapter presents the application of the code and its derivatives and the link between the NCCGZ and other pieces of legislation. Paragraph 1 states that the code concerns all business entities notwithstanding the type and method of their establishment. For instance, whether the business corporation is in the public or private sector or it is non-profit making. The governance code permits specified organisations which need a sector based approach to corporate governance to develop codes which originate from the major principles of this code.

The second chapter of the NCCGZ considers stockholders' rights and general meeting requirements. In particular, the major concern regarding the rights of stockholders is enabling the use of their rights and admittance to information. Paragraph 27 affirms that the shareholders' meeting need to be convened at a place and on a date and at a time which makes it practicable for all shareholders to attend the meeting. The date, venue and schedule of the general meeting should be proclaimed at least twenty-one days before to the date of the meeting or such other period as may be stipulated by law. Additionally, the code recommends better use of electronic devices or other facilitative instruments, such as web casting, email, electronic and print media and proxy voting. Paragraph 30 requires the meetings of shareholders must be conducted in a modest and economical manner. The shareholders must be given sufficient time to prepare adequately for the meeting and to participate in the deliberations. In addition, shareholders must be allowed to entreat for adjournment or postponement of the meeting if extremely complex matters are under consideration. the code recommends applying a one-share-one-vote policy so as to foster the contribution of minority stockholders in making vital decisions including the nomination of board members, (Paragraph 10). The code also recommends in Paragraph 44, the development of processes and systems which make it possible for a majority of minority shareholders to oppose a majority decision and which allow them to refer conflicts between them and controlling shareholders to arbitration. To lower asymmetric information, Paragraph 32 highlights on the need for management to make available essential documents including corporation's strategic plan, reports on the corporation's performance indicators and growth prospects, management practices and policies pursued by the board and reports on analyst briefings, including positive and negative media reports. In doing so, the corporation should utilise the most applicable ways of conversing with their shareholders (Paragraph 29).

The third chapter of the NCCGZ centres on corporate governance requirements concerning the board and directors. The prime function of a board of directors is to epitomise the interests of stockholders (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009:260; Golja and Paulisic, 2010:368). Consequently, the code comprehensively considers the function of the board of directors in twelve subsections: (i) major roles of the board; (ii) conduct and accountabilities; (iii) duties of directors; (iv) qualities, membership criteria and qualifications of board members; (v) director selection and appointment; (vi) board composition, structure, number and independence; (vii) officers of the board; (viii) board practices and procedures; (ix) remuneration of board members and senior management (x) board member evaluation and (xii) director development.

Firstly, the code explains that a corporation acts through natural persons, mostly the Board of Directors which is the governing and controlling body of a corporation. The Board of directors must offer effective corporate and entrepreneurial leadership (Paragraph 53), based on ethics, professionalism and good morality, complete compliance with, and respect for, applicable laws, especially the Bill of Rights as set out in the Constitution and adherence to non-binding rules, codes and best practice standards (Paragraph 54a & d). Paragraph 56 compels the board to have a charter setting out its role and functions including: (i) defining the corporation's purpose, vision, mission and; (ii) setting strategies for achieving the corporation's purpose; (iii) setting parameters for exercising leadership, enterprise, integrity and good judgement; (iv) ensuring that procedures, policies and practices are established and implemented; (v) approving, monitoring and evaluating the implementation of strategies, policies, procedures and business plans; (vi) identifying key risk areas and KPIs of the corporation; (vii) ensuring that technology and systems employed by the company are sufficient to operate viably; (viii) establishing proper succession plans for Board members, the chairperson, executive directors, and senior members of management; (ix) regularly assessing the company's performance and effectiveness and that of individual directors and the chief executive officer; (x) accounting to the shareholders through the annual report for the directors' collective and individual performance at least once a year; and (xi) monitoring on a continuous basis the company's solvency and ability to settle its obligations when due for payment and making necessary and reasonable interventions in this regard.

Secondly, the code has defined the conduct and accountabilities of the board of directors. Paragraph 57 endorses that in the execution of its role and functions every board should behave

itself with uprightness and honour and, in particular, it must continuously act in the best interests of the company. It specifies that board members should make an effort to accomplish everything needed to safeguard the overall interests of stakeholders, not merely the interests of a few of advantaged stockholders.

Thirdly the code underscores that the directors have legal duties of honesty, faithfulness, care, ability and assiduousness in the execution of their functions. They also have responsibilities which are ethically-based and signal their culture and values (Paragraph 61). Furthermore, the moral responsibility of integrity requires that directors should act with intellectual uprightness and impartiality of mind in the best interests of the corporation and in harmony with the principle of wide-ranging stakeholder approach to corporate governance (Paragraph 65). Paragraph 75 summarises the moral duties outlined in Paragraph 65-74 to reflect the concept of Ubuntu (Hunhu), Ngumuntu and Ngabantu meaning “I am because you are, and you are because we are”.

Fourthly the code, on Paragraph 79 maintains that the board should be made up of persons with suitable leadership attributes and core capabilities required by the corporation including accounting or financial proficiency, legal aptitudes, business and managerial knowledge, industry acquaintance and strategic planning knowledge.

Fifthly the code necessitates that all directors should be chosen through an official, energetic and transparent process that consider largely the variety of the shareholders (Paragraph 81). It is the board’s duty to recommend directors for selection and the shareholders’ duty to nominate and employ them (Paragraph 82). In addition, the code stresses that no appointment or removal of any director should be left to the desires of the dominating shareholder (Paragraph 83). The code recommends that a charter as referred to in Paragraph 56 should set out policies and procedures for the nomination and appointment of directors (Paragraph 85).

Sixthly, the NCCGZ centres on the board composition, structure, number and independence. In Paragraph 86, the code declares the principle that the board should be suitably composed and structured so as to ensure that power is squarely balanced and that it is exercised in the best interest of the corporation. Besides, the board should preferably have a majority of non-executive members, the majority of whom should be autonomous (Paragraph 87). In Paragraph 90, the code states that a board should not be controlled by a single person or a group of persons.

Instead, the board should have a suitable balance between executive and non-executive directors and not less than sixty percent members should be non-executive directors and the majority of non-executive directors should be autonomous. Chairperson of the board should be validated yearly by the board. To improve the role of the board in checking the performance of a company, the NCCGZ suggests splitting of the functions of CEO and chairperson. In Paragraph 92, the code recommends that the board should operate, where applicable, through committees comprised only of independent non-executive members or in which such members are in the majority. For the board of directors to be able to execute its duties effectively, properly formulated terms of reference should be in place including the latitude of authority, composition, functions, accountabilities and duties of the committees. The code recommends the board to establish the audit, nomination, risk and compliance, dispute resolve and remuneration committees.

Seventhly, the code highlights the principle that there should be apparently acknowledged and defined division of duties at leadership levels of the corporation to make sure that a good balance of power and authority subsists and that no single person has sovereign powers of decision making (Paragraph 111). In Paragraph 116, the code advocates that the chairperson's roles and functions should be ratified. In Paragraph 119, the code proposes that the chairperson of the board should among others; (i) not be a member of the audit committee or its chairperson; (ii) not chair the risk or remuneration committee but may be a member of it; (iii) be a member of and may chair the nomination committee; (iv) decide the ethical tone for the board; (v) devise together with the chief executive officer and the corporation secretary, the annual plan of work of the board on the basis of agreed objectives and play an active part in setting the agenda of board meetings; (vi) ensure that complete, timely, pertinent, correct, truthful and accessible information is presented before the board to allow the board to make knowledgeable decision; and (vii) develop and uphold the trust and assurance of all stakeholders in the corporation. Likewise, in Paragraph 120, the code advises that the chairperson should, inter alia; (i) ensure that excellent relationships are upheld with the corporation's major shareowners and its strategic stakeholders; and (ii) ensure that chairpersons of committees be present and energetically contribute at the annual and extraordinary general meetings and stakeholder interface meetings. In Paragraph 121 and 122, the code highlights the principle that the chief executive officer or managing director is responsible of the daily operating of the corporation. The shared accountability of management vests in the chief executive officer who shoulders

the greatest responsibility for all decisions and management functions. Paragraph 123 of the code suggests that the chief executive officer and other senior executives of the corporation should be chosen by the board and answerable to it and in Paragraph 130, the code recommends that the chief executive and senior managers should ensure that; (a) the daily business of the corporation is well managed within the approved framework of entrusted authority, corporation strategies, policies, budgets and that business plans are timeously developed and placed to the board for its deliberation and endorsement and the board decisions are effectually applied; (b) the corporation has a corporate culture that upholds sustainable moral practices, promotes individual integrity and satisfies the societal accountability objectives and obligations of the corporation; (c) the corporation observes all related laws; (d) the corporation implements all recommended best practice standards, failing which they should clarify the failure to the board and stakeholders. In Paragraph 131, the chief executive officer should, among other duties; (i) develop the company's strategy for consideration and approval by the board; and (ii) monitor and report to the board on the performance of the corporation and its conformity to the compliance obligations.

Eighthly, the NCCGZ also focuses on board practices and procedures. In Paragraph 138, the code supports the principle that board members, jointly and independently, should have plainly outlined methods of executing their roles, accountabilities and duties so as to attain the corporation's objectives. The board should meet as often as is workable and, anyhow, it should meet at least once every quarter of the corporation's financial year (Paragraph 142).

Ninthly, the NCCGZ provides guidelines on the compensation of board members and senior management. The compensation of board members and members of senior management should be reasonable so as to augment their incentive, steadfastness, dedication and efficacy, foster the creation of value for the corporation and further its short and long term interest. In Paragraph 166, a considerable part of non-executive directors' compensation should be related to corporate and specific performance and selected to foster long term achievement of the corporation.

Tenthly, the code focuses on board member assessment principles that the board should, inter alia, frequently evaluate its performance and efficacy as a full board and the performance and efficacy of board committees, specific directors and the chief executive officer (paragraph

169a). The code proposes that the annual report of the corporation should mirror the performances of the assessment of the board and its committees (Paragraph 176).

Finally, the NCCGZ offers procedures on director advancement, stressing the principle that the induction and constant coaching and advancement of directors must be accomplished through an official and sufficiently resourced procedures for them to produce the expected outcomes. In Paragraph 184, the code suggests that continuing director advancement should be promoted in the same manner that on-going professional advancement is promoted for other professionals. Directors should receive frequent updates on issues pertinent to the business of the corporation, changes and risks, laws relevant to the business of the corporation, accounting standards, policies and the setting in which the corporation functions.

The fourth chapter of the NCCGZ discusses governance of risk in five sections: (i) risk management; (ii) independent external audit, methodology and mandate; (iii) internal audit function, methodology and mandate; (iv) audit committee; and (v) whistle-blower policy. Firstly, the code emphasises the risk management principle that the board should ensure that principal risks are timeously found or discovered and managed in order to lessen or alleviate harm and losses to the corporation (Paragraph 188). In Paragraph 195, the code states that the board should ensure that procedures are developed to promote the full, timeous, applicable, correct and accessible risk disclosures to the shareowners. The risk management committee should, at least once annually, fix the levels and confines of the corporation's risk acceptance and risk inclination and more frequently reconsider these levels or confines during periods of deepened improbability or unfavourable changes in the business environment (Paragraph 201). Secondly, the code compels a corporation's financial statements to be audited by independent external auditors who should appraise whether the financial statements sufficiently mirror the corporation's financial position utilising the results based and risk based approach (Paragraph 207). The external auditors' report should reveal whether the financial statements provides a true and fair picture of the financial position of the corporation and the outcomes of its operations for the period in question. Thirdly, the code holds that the board, through the audit committee, must be aided by a capable internal audit unit to deliver assurance on internal controls, risk management and governance processes in harmony with the standards of the Professional Practice of Internal Audit (Paragraph 223). Fourthly, in Paragraph 234 & 235, the board should entrust to the audit committee its duty of overall surveillance and reporting of the

corporation's sustainability issues. The financial statements should be utilised to release comprehensive disclosures on the corporation's governance and the board assessment exercise. In Paragraph 245, the audit committee must make sure that a combined assurance model is implemented to deliver a harmonised system to all assurance actions and that the assurance includes all the important functions within the company. Fifthly, the code affirms that there is a strong connection between corporate governance and whistle-blowing (Paragraph 257). A whistle-blowing technique that is independent, confidential and anonymous is key to the effective application of a moral corporate culture and fraud risk management strategy (Paragraph 255).

The fifth chapter of the NCCGZ focuses on information management and disclosure. The code gives guidance particularly on improving corporate transparency and disclosure in two subsections: (i) information and management and (ii) integrated and sustainability reporting. In Paragraph 262, the board should establish systems for, among other things; (i) managing the corporation's knowledge assets and the performance of its data functions; (ii) ensuring timely accessibility of information through effectual management programme; and (iii) managing all the risks linked to information and information systems. The board should ensure that frequent, correct, full, timeous, dependable, ease to comprehend and applicable material is made obtainable by all shareholders and directors without conceding privacy and commercial sensitivity of such material (Paragraph 263). In Paragraph 264, the code proposes that the data and information released should allow the corporation, its shareowners and other stakeholders: (a) to make knowledgeable decisions concerning their contribution in the corporation or its business operations; (b) to assess the corporation's position and its business operations; (c) to test and question the corporation's observance of the law and best practice codes on corporate disclosures; (d) to be well-versed and then observe and then assess the discharge of decisions and resolves made by the board or at other levels of the corporation; and (e) to be well-versed about the degree to which corporate leadership is answerable. Paragraph 265 requisites key reporting to be made to all the corporation's stakeholders and the reporting should be complete, influenced by the triple bottom line methodology of profit, people and planet (Paragraph 266). Information to be released must be ready, audited and made accessible in harmony with the quality accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure standards (Paragraph 279). Paragraph 291 to 298 of the code provides specifics of material information that should be released by business organisations.

The NCCGZ suggests that integrated reporting assimilates a corporation's strategy, governance, financial performance and future prospects in one report. The report should also include environmental, social and governance matters which are influenced by or influence the corporation's undertakings. The integrated report should be shaped by the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the International Integrated Reporting Council frameworks and any other respectable international reporting framework (Paragraph 316). In Paragraph 319, the code provide particulars of the attributes and features of the integrated report, consisting of, among others; the integrated report should (i) be prepared annually and includes sufficient information about the corporation's activities, sustainability matters relevant to its business, its financial performances and the outcomes of its businesses and cash flow forecasts; and (ii) reveal the connections among the company's strategy, governance and financial performance and the social, environmental and economic setting within which it functions as well as the corporation's capability to create and sustain value currently and in the future.

The sixth chapter of the NCCGZ highlights on the corporate conflict deterrence and resolution. In Paragraph 325, the code proposes that avoidance and resolve of corporate conflict makes it achievable to protect the rights of shareowners and the property and business standing of the corporation. The board is accountable for corporate conflict prevention, resolution and review and may formulate a corporate conflict resolution committee to help (Paragraph 328). The code advises that the individual interests of corporation directors, officers or employees or individuals closely related to the corporation should not be prioritised over those of the corporation and its stakeholders (Paragraph 340).

Chapter seven of the NCCGZ considers the observance and implementation of principles and recommendations. In Paragraph 369, the code underscores that the nature and level of adherence or application of corporate governance principles rely on whether they are obligatory by law or by best practice. If it is the law, then observance with corporate governance principles is obligatory. If it is best practice, observance and implementation matters are established by the principles of subsidiarity and soft regulation. Code recommendations supplement and compliment the obligatory requirements of the law, including listing rules. Paragraph 372 states that this code adopted the 'apply or explain' principle because it is prejudiced towards indirect compulsion. Hence, the code depends on disclosure principles to foster observance through

association with membership to sector associations, professional bodies and to support the legal license to be and remain in business. It utilises the disclosure principles as a means of promoting the application of particular corporate governance practices without requiring actual practices. It accepts that disclosure alone has a substantial coercive impact. The NCCGZ affirms that the board is accountable for the corporation's conformity with applicable rules and non-binding guidelines, codes and standards and it should ensure that the corporation, its officers, employees and agents conform with and observe them (Paragraph 374). Information released by the board about conformity with the relevant laws, rules codes and standards should allow investors and other stakeholders to evaluate the governance of the corporation when generating investment decisions (Paragraph 378). The code urges, in Paragraph 379, that the board should make sufficient and rational disclosure about the degree to which the corporation conforms with laws, regulations, non-binding rules, codes and standards and give sufficient and provable justifications for the degree of any non-conformity.

The eighth chapter of the NCCGZ covers stakeholder affiliation principles and recommendations. Paragraph 395 provides that the legal rights and rightful expectancies of the corporation's stakeholders should be detected, acknowledged, valued and encouraged in the course of creating wealth and jobs and sustaining a financially healthy business entity. In Paragraph 404, corporate transparency should be reflected with reference to the corporation's stakeholder policies, applicable legal prescriptions, and the upholding of the corporation's competitive advantage such as the need to safeguard the corporation's intellectual property and preserve the corporation's commercially confidential information. Interaction between the board and stakeholders should be transparent and effective in order to develop and uphold stakeholder trust and confidence in the corporation (Paragraph 405). The code acclaims, in Paragraph 410, that the board should not only release issues compelled by law, but should also release those issues which are of material significance to decision making by stakeholders. The board must release in its integrated report the type of its relations with its stakeholders and the results of those relations (Paragraph 429).

The ninth chapter of the NCCGZ considers the role of government in corporate governance. In Paragraph 436, government performs both an administrative role and a coordination role through its agencies at every level. Paragraph 437-449 highlights on the facilitative and participating role of governments. It is a vital role of government as the biggest employer in

the economy to conform with corporate governance principles in government ministries, parastatals and state-owned corporations Paragraph 439). Government should reflect and apply the most effectual legislative measures to impose good corporate governance (Paragraph 447). Legislation is essential to ensure justice and transparency in business transactions and is one of the precepts of sound corporate governance (Paragraph 442).

Zimbabwe has mostly depended on self-regulatory environment to advance corporate governance since there is not yet an Act of Parliament to enforce fundamental requirements of corporate governance. Consequently, this rendered enforcement of compliance ineffective to yield anticipated outcomes in the country as evidenced by the recurring cases of corporate scandals and collapses (Ndhlela, 2011). After considering the corporate governance framework from Zimbabwe's perspective, *section 2.4.2* discusses the similarities and differences between the Zimbabwean corporate governance code and those of the UK corporate governance code. The aim was to ascertain the level of Zimbabwe's corporate governance standards compared to those of other countries.

2.4.2 Comparison of UK and Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Codes

Sub-Saharan African countries have weak institutional environments with the difficult enforcement of the laws and regulations (Munisi & Mersland, 2016:1; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:92; Rossouw, 2005:94). These weak institutions increase the managers' degrees of freedom and call for effective board governance from directors that fulfil their fiduciary duties. With increased globalisation and international trade, an increasing number of investors are investing worldwide (CIGI, 2010:1; Maune, 2015:174; Ramly, 2012:1733). Countries have to observe certain international standards in order to attract and retain investors. Therefore, upon making decision to legislate or ratify regulatory systems, countries should ensure that they are consistent with international best practice (CIGI, 2010:2; Maune, 2015:175; Ramly, 2012:1734). Hence, it is appropriate that Zimbabwe should synchronise its legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance with other nations to lower the cost of doing business and boost confidence both from international companies and investors (CIGI, 2010:4; Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:69; UNECA, 2018:1). This is also beneficial to local companies participating in international trade and investment (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:70). A comparative analysis between Zimbabwe and UK's corporate governance codes was done to determine the magnitude of harmonisation of governance systems Zimbabwe has achieved with other countries (*see Table*

2.1). Additionally, the objective was to ascertain how Zimbabwe has achieved in urging boards to uphold good corporate governance in business entities, in comparison with other nations across the globe. The UK Code was chosen to signify corporate governance codes implemented in developed countries. This comparative overview confirms how Western corporate governance systems have been implemented in Zimbabwe and how Britain as a former colony of Zimbabwe have had significant influence on Zimbabwe's corporate disclosure and transparency practices.

Table 2.1 shows that Zimbabwe and UK have developed comparatively similar corporate governance codes that upholds corporate disclosure and transparency. Both countries have endeavoured to foster transparency and accountability by stipulating principles and provisions

Table 2.1: The Main Corporate Governance Requisites of the UK Code and the Zimbabwean Code

Corporate Governance Provisions	2014 UK Code	2014 Zimbabwe Code
<i>Board of Directors</i>		
Structure of the Board	One-tier system	One-tier system
Size of the Board	Not specified (sufficient size)	Not specified
Composition of the Board (classification)	Executive and non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors	Executive and non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors
Duality of Role	Separate chairperson and CEO required	Separate chairperson and CEO required
Chairperson	Non-executive director	Non-executive director
Non-executive	A majority of directors	A majority of directors
Independent	At least half the board	A majority of directors
Information accessibility	Ensure equal accessibility between members	Ensure equal accessibility between members
Directors' training	Provide induction for newly-appointed directors and ongoing training and development of directors	Provide induction for newly-appointed directors and ongoing training and development of directors

Corporate Governance Provisions	2014 UK Code	2014 Zimbabwe Code
Directors' evaluation	Undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation	Undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation
Frequency (number) of board meetings	Not specified (sufficiently regularly)	Not specified (recommends at least once every quarter of financial year)
Recommended committees	Audit, remuneration, and nomination committees	Audit, remuneration, risk and compliance, dispute resolution and nomination committees
Audit committee composition	Formed by a minimum of three (all independent non-executive directors)	Not specified (all non-executive directors)
Remuneration committee composition	Formed by a minimum of three (all independent non-executive directors)	Not specified (all non-executive directors)
Nomination committee composition	A majority of independent non-executive directors	Not specified (recommended all non-executive directors)
<i>Ownership and control structure and Transparency</i>		
Transparency of ownership structure	Not covered	Covered
Concentration of ownership	Not covered	Covered
Voting and shareholder meeting procedures	Not covered	Covered
<i>Information management and Disclosure</i>		
Economic and financial information	Covered	Covered
Sustainability reporting	Covered, but limited scope	Covered
Integrated reporting	Covered	Covered
Board and management compensation	Recommended to be released	Recommended to be released
Board performance evaluation	Recommended to be released	Recommended to be released
Dividends policy	Not covered	Recommended to be disclosed

Corporate Governance Provisions	2014 UK Code	2014 Zimbabwe Code
Stakeholder relationships	Not Covered (emphasis on shareholders)	Covered-Recommended to be disclosed
Narrative on Conformity/Non-Conformity	Recommended to be released	Recommended to be released
Frequency of disclosure	Half yearly and annually	At least half yearly or more frequently
<i>Governance of Risk and Internal Control</i>		
Risk management	Covered	Covered
Effectiveness of control system	Provide a statement in annual report	Covered but annual report statement requirement not provided
Role of audit committee	Provide a statement in annual report	Covered but annual report statement requirement not provided
Compliance or regulation	Voluntary or self-regulation	Voluntary or self-regulation

Source: *UK and Zimbabwe Codes of Corporate Governance (2018 & 2015 respectively)*

as opposed to unbending set of rules. International corporate governance codes including the OECD *Principles of Corporate Governance* and Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CAGG) *Guidelines* have had an influence on corporate governance development in both countries. The only significant variation is that the corporate governance in the UK follows the ‘comply or explain’ approach (FRC, 2014:1) whereas the Zimbabwe code adopted the ‘apply or explain’ principle because it has a bias towards indirect coercion (NCCGZ, 2014). There is need to ascertain effectiveness of the application of these corporate governance measures and how they have aided boards of ZSE listed entities to attain set objectives.

2.5 Regulatory Framework for Corporate Disclosure and Transparency in Zimbabwe

The legal setting takes a primary position in corporate governance. El Hajj *et al.* (2016:1) argued that disclosure and transparency do not only constitute the conceptual framework of governance. Governance also fundamentally is influenced by the laws of a country. Since companies will be safeguarded from uniformed decisions, they can rely on the law to free governance from corruption and narrow private interest groups. There are several regulations

and acts in place that governs the activities of companies in Zimbabwe to promote the economy (Maune, 2015). This study will focus on the following laws that will be presented and discussed in this section: 1) Acts and laws that govern disclosure and transparency of both public entities and private entities, 2) Acts that govern disclosure and transparency of state and public entities and 3) Acts that govern disclosure and transparency of financial institutions.

2.5.1 Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in Public and Private Entities

2.5.1.1 Constitution of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe revoked the 1980 Constitution after developing and implementing a new Constitution in 2013 (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2013). The Constitution of Zimbabwe advances the high quality of governance needed by the Zimbabwean people and aligns corporate governance as a naturally imperative part of a healthy and flourishing country. Section 3 (1) (h) and (2) (g) of the Constitution states that Zimbabwe is instituted on respect for internationally recognised principles of sound corporate governance. Sections 9 of the Constitution stipulates the provisions for good governance. It declares that the government must embrace and apply policies and legislation “to develop efficiency, competence, accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity” in all institutions. In addition, this section asserts that public office bearers must be appointed based on merit. The section also stipulates that procedures should be put in place to “expose, combat and eradicate all forms of corruption” by these officers. In addition, section 195 of the Constitution stipulates that corporations and other commercial entities owned or entirely controlled by the state should manage their operations in order to uphold commercial sustainability and implement generally accepted standards of sound corporate governance including transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness, among others. There are several other sections of the Constitution that endorse good corporate governance including sections 56(2), 165 (1) and (2), 194-198, 265(1), 298(1). Section 56 (2) of the Constitution urges equality and non-discrimination and demands that all persons should have the right to be protected and benefit from the law. The Constitution directs the government to establish legislative and other instruments to encourage the realisation of equality and protection of all people. Section 165 compliments section 56 by specifying that justice must be afforded to all people, irrespective of standing. Sections 194-198 declare how public entities ought to be governed to accomplish good corporate governance practices. In particular, section 194 states that public entities must have a high level of professional ethics, transparency and economical and efficiently utilise

resources. Section 265(1) states that provincial, metropolitan councils and local authorities should guarantee good governance by becoming “effective, transparent, accountable and institutionally coherent”. Section 298 raises the principles of public financial management and demands transparency, prudence and accountability in public finance management.

The Constitution also compliments the UN SDGs Guiding Principles regarding the generally accepted principles in relation to human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. These are factors which affect good corporate governance (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1). Between the year 2000 and 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) offered a significant development framework and attained accomplishment in various areas including reducing poverty and improving health and education in emerging countries. The SDGs supersede the MDGs, broadening the challenges that should be addressed to eradicate poverty and encompassing a wide-ranging inter-related topics throughout the economic, social and environmental spheres of sustainable development. The SDGs were formed out of what is possibly the most inclusive process in the history of the United Nations, considering considerable input from all sectors of society and all parts of the world. Through the UN Global Compact alone, more than one thousand five hundred (1,500) corporations offered input and guidance. The goals are generally relevant in emerging and advanced countries alike. Governments are anticipated to transform them into national action plans, policies and initiatives while considering the diverse realities and capabilities their countries have. While they mainly target governments, the SDGs are intended to support a broad spectrum of organisations and influence priorities and aspirations for sustainable development determinations around a shared framework. Most outstandingly, the SDGs recognise the central role that businesses could and should play in attaining them (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1).

As considered in *Chapter 1*, the SDG Compass offers guidance on enhancing reporting on business activities that contribute to sustainable development. Built upon the Millennium Development Goals a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has been launched and the WBCSD is intending to build a new reporting framework behind each of the targets. SDG 12 (target 12.6) specifically reflects this by encouraging corporations, particularly big and multinational corporations, to implement sustainable practices and assimilate sustainability information into their reporting cycle. Companies should report against the SDGs and scale up through innovation for solutions, collaboration and improvement of business case. The purpose

of the SDG Compass is to guide corporations on how they can align their strategies as well as evaluate and manage their contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals. The guide offers five steps that help corporations in maximising their contribution to the SDGs. Corporations could implement the five steps to set or align their course, dependent upon the stage they are of the journey of ensuring that sustainability is an outcome of core business strategy. The five steps of the SDG Compass emphasises on the acknowledgement of the responsibility by all corporations to observe all applicable legislation, respect international minimum standards and address with urgency all negative human rights effects (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1).

Gould (2015) argues that although enhanced corporate reporting is a critical part of transparency, in itself it has limited impact on whether business is truly sustainable. But it is the integrated thinking that underpins integrated reporting or narrative reporting more broadly, and that ultimately leads to resilient and sustainable organisations. While it can be fostered by improved reporting practices and processes, reporting alone cannot solve sustainable development challenges, and often does not lead to the purpose-based committed leadership that is needed for responsible business. He further charges that embracing the SDGs fundamentally requires companies to be responsible for their actions. These are actions that are based on: (i) the decisions that could have an influence on the long term direction of the company; and (ii) being aware of, and responding to, the organisation's positive and negative impacts and aptitude to create value over time for providers of financial capital and other stakeholders. Figure 2.4 below shows SDGs set by the United Nations in 2015. The SDGs offer an opportunity for business initiated solutions and technologies to be established and applied to address the world's biggest sustainable development challenges. As the SDGs form the global agenda for the development of our societies, they will enable leading corporations to display how their business assists in the advancement of sustainable development, both by minimising negative effects and maximising positive effects on people and the planet (GRI *et al.*, 2015). As the SDGs form the global agenda for the development of our societies, they will enable leading corporations to display how their business assists in the advancement of sustainable development, both by minimising negative effects and maximising positive effects on people and the planet (GRI *et al.*, 2015). The private sector's contribution to the SDGs can, and should, be facilitated by the arrangements for corporate governance as implemented by governance codes and reinforced by companies' law and stock market listing rules.

Figure 2.4: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)



Source: GRI, UNCTAD & WBCSD 2015-SDG Compass

A few jurisdictions have already made changes to their corporate governance arrangements to extend the role of the board to focus on the sustainable success of the entity over the longer term (Gould, 2015:1).

2.5.1.2 Companies Act

Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Mangena and Taurigana (2007) established that the legal system administering business entities in Zimbabwe was derived from the one operational in the Cape Province of South Africa in 1891. This was drawn from the Roman-Dutch law and borrowed from English Common Law where applicable. Accordingly, the current law in Zimbabwe is widely comprised of English commercial, corporation, and insolvency laws. The statutory framework was bolstered by the influential authority of English and South African judicial precedents to a greater extent. The Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), 2003 orders the pre-incorporation, incorporation, activities and responsibilities of a corporation and its directors.

The Companies Act stipulates several ways which enables directors to apply good corporate governance and measures to discourage directors from contravening the provisions of the Act. To oblige observance, the Companies Act attributes liability to directors for any offence perpetrated in violation of the provisions of the Act. In particular, section 147 of Companies Act compels directors to present a balance sheet before a company at a general meeting,

attaching a report with respect to the state of the corporation's affairs. If the directors fail to comply with this provision, they will be culpable of a crime and liable to a fine. Additional offences for which directors may be liable include making, circulating and publishing false statements in relation to any property or affair of the company, falsification of company books (e.g. minute books, registers or accounts) (Section 345) and failure to submit company returns to Registrar as required by the Act Section 346). The Act also permits the removal of directors from office as one of the penal provisions for failing to properly carry out one's duties (Section 175). Further measures to restrain directors are disqualification (Section 173) and penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment.

The Companies Act specifies fundamental requirements for accounting and financial reporting (including consolidated financial statements) pertinent to all registered companies. For instance, every corporation is expected to preserve, in the English language, suitable accounting records concerning its assets and liabilities, sales and purchases, total amounts collected and spent and the transactions relating to the respective receipts and expenses (s.140 (1)). The Act also stipulates general requirements of the contents and format of the financial statements (s.142). There are four general categories of these; income statement requirements, statement of financial position requirements, comparative figures, and supplementary requirements for holding corporations. Parent corporations are obliged to produce consolidated group financial statements, together with corporation income statement and statement of financial position. However, there are certain exceptional circumstances which may lead to exoneration (s.144). There are some requirements of the Act which oblige particular information to be disclosed, such as directors' remunerations (s.184) and advances to directors (s.185). Companies are expected to prepare financial statements at the end of the financial year. These financial statements should reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company (and its subsidiaries – if a group), reflected on the income statement and statement of financial position. In addition, the financial statements should be signed in the best interest of board by two of the directors of the company and be presented before the company at a general meeting for shareholders' consent. The Act states that the format and contents of all companies' financial statements should be based on standards approved by Zimbabwe Public Accountants and Auditors Board (ZPAAB) and stipulated in the regulations. The Act also sets the company directors responsibility to keep proper books of accounts to facilitate the provision of the corporation's financial statements and orders all public companies to be audited.

Limited coverage and detail in the Zimbabwean Companies Act makes it insufficient to warrant a reasonable standard of corporate financial reporting (CIGI, 2010; Owusu-Ansah, 1998,). The Companies Act basically and plainly prescribes for the preparation and presentation of the income statement, balance sheet, relevant explanations of company's operations and transactions, directors' report and auditor's report (s.140 (1)). The provisions in the Act requiring the preparation of sustainability reporting and integrated reporting are non-existent. Even though requirement for corporations to attach a directors' report in their publicised annual report and accounts, the Act does not provide for the format for the directors' report (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Therefore, it can be argued that currently the Zimbabwean Companies Act does not effectively promote corporate disclosure and transparency practices in the country (Lipunga, 2015).

The Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) of 2003 obliges companies to prepare financial statements based on international standards as adopted by the ZPAAB (s.140 (1)). ZPAAB is the national accounting and auditing standards setter for Zimbabwe (CIGI, 2010:1; World Bank, 2011:1). It is comprised of representatives of users, preparers and auditors of financial statements. It is the legitimate national standard-setting body with statutory recognition under the laws of Zimbabwe. The Companies Act recognises it as an adopter of international accounting standards (s.140 (1)). It participates in the international standard-setting process by providing input comments to the IASB on exposure drafts of proposed standards. Once the standards are issued by IASB, the ZPAAB adopts them without amendment (World Bank, 2011:5).

The Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) which has been undergoing a review for a long time, was finally gazetted on 15 November 2019. The Companies and Other Business Entities Act (Chapter 24:31) (hereinafter "the New Act" came into force on 13 February 2020 and repeals the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) (hereinafter "the old Act"). The New Act of 2020, has introduced a number of vital new concepts and significant transformation to company law in Zimbabwe. The New Act, together with other related laws and procedures have been amended and streamlined to conform to the needs of the Zimbabwean business climate and contemporary best practices (Ndhlukula, 2017). The World Bank (2011:10) had recommended the amendment of the Zimbabwean Companies Act and related company regulations after conducting a 'Report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC)' review exercise. The review focussed on institutional framework strengths and weaknesses relating to the accounting

and auditing environment and recommended the following; (i) The law must require companies to conform with applicable accounting standards as published by the standard setter and such standards should be in line with International Financial Reporting Standards; (ii) The Act should provide for the reporting provision of accounting and auditing and for different types of companies classified in the Companies Act and (iii) To boost governance in companies, the Companies Act must require the audit committees to be constituted in certain types of companies. For instance, those with public interest and specify functions of such a committee (World Bank, 2011:15).

2.5.1.3 The Securities Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe was instituted in 2008 through the enactment of the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25) as a regulatory body for the securities and capital markets in Zimbabwe to ensure transparency (SECZ, 2008:1). It governs the regulation of securities services in Zimbabwe to include securities exchanges, Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) and the respective members, misuse of inside information, and improper trading practices. Its main objectives are to:

- requires high levels of investor security
- lower systemic risk
- foster market integrity and investor assurance
- Avert market misuse, fraudulence and economic offence
- ensure openness in capital and securities markets and
- support investor education.

The Stock Exchange Act (Chapter 24:18) of 1980 specifies the legal base for the institution of the Exchange and governs its operations. The Exchange is a statutory corporate body which is able to litigate and being litigated in its own right. In addition, it has the right to possess assets and liabilities. The Exchange makes its own revenue from various income streams consisting of listing and membership fees, annual sustaining and review fees, and the sale of information services. Its undertakings are run and regulated by the Committee of the Exchange. The Committee is the executive authority that stipulates the guidelines and policies of the Exchange. It is the responsibility of the Committee to ensure that public interest is always safeguarded in the transactions of the members of the Exchange. It is the policy-making body of the Exchange. The Committee is accountable to the Minister of Finance through the

Registrar. It is comprised of elected members from the stockbroking companies of the Exchange whose number must not be less than five or more than seven, the Registrar, and two government officials. The government officials are appointed by the Minister of Finance according to the Stock Exchange Act (Chapter 24:18) of 1980.

The SECZ has been striving to institute and develop corporate governance regulations since its creation in 2008. The 2002 ZSE's Listing Rules signified a crucial step towards upgrading corporate governance regulations in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, as clarified earlier on, the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZTI) applied to assess the extent of conformity to the corporate governance standards referred extensively on these listing rules. Section 3 of the Exchange regulations, entitled 'Continuing Obligations', contains a number of paragraphs focussing on the significance of disclosure and transparency in corporate annual reports.

The listing guidelines promote disclosure and transparency so as to lower asymmetric information. Paragraph 3.3 requires that listed firms, after approval by the Committee of the ZSE, must issue a press statement immediately about the main changes in their operations. The intention is to enlighten stakeholders of any possible impact on the company's assets, liabilities or ordinary running of company, leading to material movements in the prevailing share prices of the listed firms. Information that is required to be published according to paragraph 3.3 must not be given to a third party before it has been published except as permitted by paragraph 3.5 to 3.8. Regarding interim and preliminary reports, paragraph 3.19 details that the company should publish its interim reports in the press and be distributed to shareholders as early as possible following the expiry of the first six-month term of an accounting year, but not later than three months after that date. In paragraph 3.20, if a listed company has not distributed annual financial statements to every stockholder within three months of its financial year, it must publish in the press and distribute to all shareholders a preliminary report even if information is unaudited at that time.

Paragraph 3.23 requires every listed firm to distribute to all shareholders and the ZSE, within six months after the end of each financial year at least twenty-one clear days before the date of the annual general meeting; (a) a notice of annual general meeting; and (b) the audited annual financial statements for the relevant year. However, there are no requirements regarding the topics of the annual report. Specific provisions requiring listed corporations to appraise the

corporation's operations during the last financial year are non-existent. Additionally, the current listing rules does not state the requirement to include relevant factors that influence the corporation's business, which can enhance the investors' evaluation of the corporation's future outlook. The listing rules do not provide for the board of directors' report contents which should comprise the following details, among others: (i) an account of the major operations of the corporation; (ii) a report of the corporation's major strategies, judgements, impending outlook and any threats challenging the corporation; (iii) a synopsis of the corporation's assets, liabilities and corporate performance for the last five financial years illustrated by a table or a chart ; (iv) details of any noteworthy variations between the operating performance of the current financial year and the prior financial year; (v) a narrative of the corporation's dividend policy; and (vi) a comprehensive report of the corporation's loans and debt obligations.

Given that ownership and control structure is important and strongly linked to the agency problem, paragraph 8.52 (f) expressly oblige firms to disclose in the annual financial statements, the ownership structure, names of shareholders owning 5% or more of the corporation's shares. Paragraph 8.52 (d) of the ZSE listing requirements states that the combination of the direct and indirect interests of the directors in and the direct and indirect interest of each director in the stock capital of the listed firm should be disclosed, distinguishing between beneficial and non-beneficial interests. The rules explicitly require the board of directors to communicate with shareholders of any fluctuations of such interests and rights during the last financial year. Paragraph 3.45 directs listed firms to ensure that all essential facilities and information are accessible to allow holders of securities to exercise their rights. Specifically, the firms must: (a) notify holders of securities of the holding of meetings which they are entitled to attend; (b) allow them to exercise their rights to vote, where necessary; and (c) publish notices in the press or distribute circulars in terms of the listings requirements. However, The ZSE listing rules omits provisions that state that the board statement must be appended by assertions that: (i) a good accounting system has been put in place; (ii) the internal control system design is unblemished and has been successfully effected; (iii) there are no considerable doubt regarding the corporation's capability to endure as a continuing business; and (iv) where the board of directors propose a change of external auditors, the reasons for such a proposal are given.

Corresponding with the managerial signalling theory, managers (agents) are privy to inside information more than ordinary shareholders who are the principals (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2009). Thusly, ZSE listing rules forbids trading by agents within a reporting window. Particularly, paragraph 3.69 (i) states that directors must not deal in shares during the period one month prior to the end of the reporting period and the preliminary announcement of the company's interim and year-end results. Directors may not deal in their listed securities when in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information. Directors should advise the Chairman and receive his clearance before trading in the shares. The Chairman should receive the board's approval for any trading in its listed corporation's shares. Where a director is a trustee he must seek board approval for trading in the shares. In cases including trading by senior employees, board approval is encouraged during the periods prior to publication of results and price-sensitive periods. All purchases and sale of shares by directors, directly or indirectly, as beneficial owners to be notified to the ZSE within 72 hours of the completion of the transactions.

An analysis of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) listing conditions revealed that reference to sustainability or integrated report is non-existent, although they mostly promote good corporate governance practices in the listed companies in accordance with Cadbury and King Reports (ZSE, 2002). The listing rules stipulate that as well as abiding by the Companies Act, listed companies should disclose a corporate governance report along with their annual financial statements. The companies should detail their code of corporate practices and conduct and also stating on the extent of their observance or non-observance with the Cadbury or King Reports on Corporate Governance. The ZSE listing requirements further stipulates that this statement may be contained in a separate section of the annual report and need not be audited. Lipunga (2015) documented that the Cadbury report does not make provisions for Integrated Reporting. In contrast, the King Code of corporate governance for South Africa 2009 extensively provide for on integrated reporting. The King Code advocates the preparation and presentation of integrated report by the companies. The integrated report must provide adequate information on the impact that the company has on general stakeholders and the community wherein it conducted business operations during the reporting year. The information disclosed in the integrated report is usually classified into environmental, social and governance disclosures. Additionally, the King Code expects the board of directors to make an assertion in the integrated report as to the means by which the board judges that in the coming year it can

enhance the positive impacts and eliminate or amend the adverse facets. It consigns to the board of directors the duty of ensuring the reliability of the corporation's integrated report to be produced on a yearly basis (IoDSA, 2009:1).

According to ZSE (2014:1) the ZSE Listings Rules were last updated in February 2002. Since the last update, there have been several changes in the local and foreign capital markets which have not been accommodated by the current rules. The listing rules currently in use are in conflict with other laws governing publicly listed companies. Zimbabwe experienced a hyperinflationary era in the last decade which had an impact on the listed corporations' financial reporting. The Zimbabwean Government announced changes in reporting and functional currency in Zimbabwe in February 2009 and further affirmed the use of multiple currencies in policy pronouncements issued in early 2014. The current ZSE Listings Rules refer to the ZWD in certain parts thus making them redundant in light of the policy pronouncements. The new Constitution of Zimbabwe was signed into law in 2013 and there is a need for alignment of the ZSE Listings Rules with the new constitution to eliminate inherent conflicts that may exist. The current Listings Rules were issued before the promulgation of the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25) and the Securities Amendment Act in 2013 thus there is also need for alignment. Furthermore, the ZSE issuers are also affected by other industry-specific Acts which may have either been promulgated or amended after 2002 and are not captured by the current listings rules. These include Banking, Mining and Insurance Acts amongst others and thus there is need for alignment. Lessons from the recent local and global capital markets failures and scandals form good precedents and highlight loopholes in our rules but these are not captured in the current rules. New international best practices in corporate governance since 2003 have not been included. New international best practices in terms of disclosure of information since the last time the rules were revised have not been captured. The use of the Financial Reporting Monitoring Panel in reviewing reports of listed companies had been implemented by the ZSE but is not captured in the current rules. This is a self-regulation initiative by ZSE and the accounting profession to review and enforce listed companies' compliance with IFRS (World Bank, 2011:10).

A review of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) listing rules revealed that they do not make mention of corporate disclosure and transparency requirements of sustainability and integrated reporting as per the NCCGZ. However, the listing rules generally encourage sound corporate

governance practices in the listed corporations along the lines of Cadbury and King reports on governance (ZSE, 2002). The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Limited, recently advised all stakeholders on the gazetting of the ZSE Listing Requirements under Statutory Instrument 134 of 2019 on 14 June 2019 (ZSE, 2019). The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) revealed in its recent research that stock exchanges in four sub-Saharan countries are showing strong intent or have taken steps towards incorporating environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures into their listing requirements. These are: the Ghana Stock Exchange, the Stock Exchange of Mauritius, the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) (ACCA, 2014:1). Progress is more advanced in Zimbabwe, where the Zimbabwe Stock Exchanges (ZSE) began consulting with stakeholders in 2013. The ZSE had proposed amending listing requirements to include a requirement to report on environment, social and governance (ESG) practices and performance, encouraging listed companies to apply the reporting framework developed by the GRI sustainability reporting framework (ACCA, 2014). The new ZSE listing rules, now includes Part XXI which compels corporates on Sustainability Information and Disclosure (ZSE, 2019:1).

2.5.2 Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in State-Owned Entities

Government-owned entities are administered by different acts of Parliament, under which the state-run entities are incorporated. The distinct Act stipulates the major purpose of forming the public entity, its governance structures, the functions, powers and duties of the entity.

2.5.2.1 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)

The Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) of 2009 to require for; the effective control and management of national resources and the safeguarding and reclamation of these; the appointment, powers and duties of the Accountant-General and of his or her staff; to provide for the national budget; to provide for the preparation of financial statements; to provide for the regulation and control of public entities. Section 50 of the PFMA obliges every government-run organisation or parastatal to apply the principles of sound corporate governance policies, procedures and practices. In section 91 of the PFMA, the legislation specifies the penalties for nonconformity with the principles of good corporate governance policies, procedures and practices. The PFMA relates to all the state-run entities and obliges them to have an accounting authority. The accounting authority should be the board or, in the absence of a board, the chief executive officer or equivalent in title. The authority is responsible

for the upkeep of proper records and establishment of systems of financial management and internal control and safeguarding assets of the entity. The accounting authority should also cause financial statements of the entity to be produced in line with GAAP. However, the Act does not specify the GAAP or specific GAAP framework/standards. The state-run enterprises are presently reporting under IFRS because of self-regulation by the accounting profession (World Bank, 2011). These entities are obliged to present financial statements for external audit within two months of year-end. These audits should be finalised within five months of year-end. The Act requires each entity to have an audit committee whose responsibilities are specified in the Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) of 2009.

2.5.3 Disclosure and Transparency Regulatory Framework in Financial Institutions

Nhavira *et al.* (2013:75) observed that international trends post 2007-2009 financial crisis indicates a move toward the twin-peak model. For instance, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and South Africa, after the global financial crisis, are moving toward a twin-peak model. Twin-peak refers to the existence of two regulators. That is one will be a regulator for prudential regulation (usually the central bank) and a regulator for market conduct. Each regulator specialises in its area and supervises, banks, insurance, pension funds and securities firms falling under its purview. It is regarded as the optimal means of giving sufficient priority to transparency, market integrity and consumer protection (Botha & Makina, 2011:27). Prudential regulations are mainly concerned with consumer protection. Under the twin-peak model, this falls under the central bank. It envisages the monitoring and supervision of financial institutions with particular attention paid to asset quality and capital adequacy. Nhavira *et al.* (2013:75) claim that financial specialists concur that the current turbulence in the financial sector was caused by a let-down in corporate governance by the directors of these financial organisations and partly by the Bank Regulator's lack of on-site supervision capacity as it could have detected the signs of failure before it was too late. The other reason that explains bank failure is poor economic performance. Banks wanted to survive and so engaged in illicit deals such as creation of shelf companies that would borrow money from the financial institutions but failing to settle their debts (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:75).

2.5.3.1 The Banking Act and Insurance Act

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) is the primary institution responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks. The RBZ undertakes prudential regulation in Zimbabwe and it aims

to ensure that the financial institutions under its supervision are financially sound. This includes specifying standards covering risk management and other related requirements. Under the RBZ Act (Chapter 24:20) of 2004, the RBZ is empowered to supervise the operations of all banks in the country. Its Bank Supervision and Surveillance department scrutinises periodic returns under its risk-based-supervision (off-site examination) and undertakes regular examinations of the books and records of the bank through on-site examinations in order to ensure conformity with statutory regulations as well as with RBZ Prudential Guidelines. Nhavira and Pindiriri (2011) posits that RBZ is not an independent Central Bank and its objectives are, inter alia, not narrowly focused on price and financial stability. Moreover, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is responsible for ensuring that Zimbabwe's financial system remains up-to-date with International Standards that are set by the Bank for International Settlements. However, Zimbabwe is yet to fully implement the Basel II Accord. Implementation has been hampered by the 2000-2008 economic crisis and more recently by the liquidity problems bedevilling the financial sector (Nhavira *et al.*, 2013:80).

The RBZ controls the financial reporting of banks and similar financial organisations. The bank licensing, supervision, and surveillance division of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe executes this function by carrying out prudential supervision and reviews conformity with the relevant financial reporting requirements. The division has released two regulatory guidelines applicable for IFRS, audit supervision and conformity follow-up. The first one is titled "Minimum Disclosure Requirements for Financial Institutions," and the second one is entitled "Framework on the Relationship between Bank Supervisors and Bank's External Auditors". The first one is meant to provide guidelines on disclosures by banking institutions. However, it does not exhaust all disclosures required by IFRS for banking institutions.

The Insurance and Pensions Commission (IPEC) was formed with the objective of regulating and monitoring the insurance and pension industries in Zimbabwe. The Insurance and Pensions Commission Act (Chapter 24:21) of 2002 checks on prudential, regulatory, and financial reporting compliance for all companies under its jurisdiction. There are two separate units under which one checks prudential and regulatory compliance, and the other checks on financial reporting conformity. The regulatory report prepared by the insurance companies and pension funds is not fully aligned with general purpose financial statements. Therefore, there is need for the entity to prepare reconciliation between the figures in the financial statements

and the regulatory report. The auditor is expected by the Insurance and Pensions Commission to verify the reconciliation process and certify the regulatory report.

The Insurance Act and Banking Act does not stipulate any accounting or auditing standards to be used in financial reporting by insurance companies and banking institutions. The requisites, obliged by regulators, are a result of self-regulation by the accounting profession and regulators (World Bank, 2011:1). The Banking Act compels financial statements of banking institutions to be produced in harmony with “such accounting standards as may be prescribed” and audited by an auditor registered with the Zimbabwe Public Accountants and Auditors Board (ZPAAB). The Insurance Act obliges insurance companies to produce a statement of financial position and income statement “in appropriate forms prescribed”. The Act does not make reference to any accounting standards.

2.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed pertinent backdrop knowledge for this research. Firstly, it has provided a succinct setting regarding the Zimbabwean economic sectors. This chapter shows that even though Zimbabwe was once categorised as one of Africa’s highly and variedly industrialised countries. However, this standing has faded noticeably over the last two decades. The prolonged present economic turmoil in Zimbabwe poses challenges to corporate governance generally and particularly transparency. For instance, weakness of law legislation and regulations; outdated listing rules and company law which has often led Zimbabwean companies to have poor governance practices. Second, the chapter discussed the regulatory framework for corporate disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe. The chapter investigated the disclosure and regulatory framework governing both public and private entities in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean corporate governance framework has been categorised as self-regulatory. Even though Zimbabwe has depended on a self-regulatory environment to promote corporate governance, Various statutory institutions and instruments, including the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Companies Act, Securities Law, Banking Act, Insurance Act, Indigenisation Act and the Public Finance Management Act, make it obligatory that particular entities conform and subscribe to the recommendations of certain corporate governance codes. Various complications and difficulties encountered by regulating authorities in their bid to improve corporate governance practices in Zimbabwean corporations were also considered in this chapter. Thirdly, the chapter detailed the corporate governance framework in Zimbabwe.

In particular, it focussed on the regulations concerning internal corporate governance practices. Corporate governance instruments provided in the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) were reviewed in detail. This section mainly focussed on the Zimbabwean corporate governance code, as it was the key source used for constructing the comprehensive National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI), which then was employed to examine the level of conformity with the NCCGZ by Zimbabwean listed corporations. Finally, the chapter discussed the similarity and contrast of UK and Zimbabwe corporate governance codes.

Zimbabwe requires numerous reforms including political, economic, legal, administrative and financial. A fundamental factor of a valuable corporate governance framework is the legal system. The reason being that the legal system specifies the obligations of the parties and also facilitates implementation (Maune, 2015:171; Osama, 2013:1). As with numerous other emerging economies, Zimbabwe is making efforts to advance its economy by participating in the global economy. This procedure demands the government of Zimbabwe to mend its political and economic situation by enabling applicable enforcement of a thoroughly reviewed legal system (CIGI, 2010:1, Maune, 2015:171, World Bank, 2011:1).

The next chapter will present an overview of the related concepts that are most relevant in terms of shaping and driving the corporate disclosure and transparency agenda.

Chapter 3 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: Conceptual Context

3.1 Introduction

The field of corporate disclosure and transparency is particularly extensive as it involves dealing with broad ranging and often diverse subjects, such as business accountability practices; the impacts of an organisation's sustainability practices on the environment, society and economy; the engagement of organisations with their different stakeholder groups; as well as issues related to an organisation's internal board structure and executive practices, integrated reporting, and so forth. In line with the first objective as indicated in *Chapter 1*, the purpose of this chapter is to present the reader with a summary of some of the disclosure and transparency concepts, namely *Corporate Governance (CG)*, *Corporate Accountability (CA)* and *Corporate Sustainability (CS)*. In doing so, the conceptual context or framework of this study will be revealed. These particular concepts were chosen by this study because they are independently very prominent themes in business and academic literature and because they seem to be the main factors influencing and influenced by the *Corporate Disclosure and Transparency (CDT)* discourse.

The first concept of paramount importance to corporate disclosure and transparency refers to the overall management of organisations in responsible and sustainable manners, namely *Corporate Governance (CG)*.

3.2 Corporate Governance

Throughout the past decade, there has been significant interest on the corporate governance practices of business enterprises. According to Aras and Crowther (2008:435) sound governance is imperative in each realm of the society, irrespective of whether it be the corporate world or socio-political world. The word governance implies directing and is crucial in every firm especially listed firms. The emphasis of this research is good corporate governance and comprises the mechanism needed to oversee the corporation operating in the correct direction (Aras & Crowther, 2008:435; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368; Price *et al.*, 2011:80). Corporate governance can be thought of as an atmosphere of trust, morals and assurance. This sphere is enabled by a collaborative effort of all the stakeholders consisting of the state, the society, professional/service suppliers and the business sector (Aras & Crowther, 2008:436, Price *et al.*, 2011:80; Rose, 2016:205).

El Hajj *et al.* (2016:1) affirmed that there is no one all-inclusive description of corporate governance, although it is a commonly used term. The United Nations Global Compact & IFC (2009:1) described corporate governance as to how the boards oversee the running of companies by their managers, and how board members are held accountable to shareholders and the companies. Consequently, this influences company behaviour and its stakeholders including stockholders, workers, consumers, investors and the communities within which the corporation operates. In other words, corporate governance is a practice of organising, running and monitoring a corporation in order to achieve planned objectives to reassure its stakeholders. Corporate governance is the subset of a firm's agreements that help align the activities and choices of managers with the interests of stockholders (Armstrong *et al.*, 2010:179, Rose, 2016:210). Developed on principles, offering standards, sound practices, in addition to guidance on application, governance is based on transparency, accurate and applicable information on a timeous basis, so as to assist the board members' decision-making (OECD, 2015:1).

Corporate governance can further be described as instruments that cause managers of the corporation to operate in harmony with the interest of the owners and other stakeholders, thus optimising the value for all the stakeholders. The governance instruments concerned can generally be split into two categories namely external and internal governance instruments. According to Denis and McConnell (2003:1), external governance instruments comprises of, for instance the legal scheme. Internal governance instruments of governance, which are the emphasis of this thesis, comprises of board of directors and management structure variables, information management and disclosure procedure, the governance of risk process, and the ownership and control structure variables. According to Hawkins (2006:1), CG implies a robust scheme by which corporations are directed and controlled across four key areas: The first of these is *financial accounting*; followed by the *configuration and competence* of the executive board; along with *recognition of the stakeholders* in the business; the fourth and last element is *transparency*. As a result of practicable limits, corporations frequently implement internal disciplining expedients. The internal mechanisms including financial and non-financial disclosures assist investors and other stakeholders to monitor corporate performance by reducing information asymmetries (Armstrong *et al.*, 2010:180, Hawkins, 2006:1, Rose, 2016:202). The corporate governance structure varies across firms and countries, and is shaped by the firms' diverse stakeholders including institutional investors, shareholders, managers and

debt holders (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265). It is generally believed that well-governed firms disclose extra information to external parties and are more transparent due to better monitoring (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:266; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:135). We would therefore expect better-governed firms to be associated with more frequent and more timely disclosures, other things being equal (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:267).

3.2.1 Principles of Corporate Governance

The OECD principles uphold that companies should present material information on their financial and operating performance statements. For instance, information relating to the corporation goals, the majority stockholders and voting rights, board of directors' membership and crucial executive members and their emoluments, related party transactions, any significant issues regarding foreseeable risk components, substantial matters regarding all stakeholders and governance structures and policies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004 provides for the guidelines and practices that administer the connection between the managers and corporate investors including the other stakeholders. For instance, the workers and lenders who aid the expansion and economic strength by promoting market buoyancy, financial market veracity and economic efficacy. The purpose of this research was to ascertain disclosure and transparency practices. These are some of the principles of corporate governance meant to moderate the agency dilemma and information disproportionateness among management and corporate stockholders, including those between other stakeholders. Consequently, this advances the financial market buoyance, thereby enhancing corporate performance and lowering the agency cost by curtailing the required rate of return (OECD, 2004:1, 2015:1).

Robertson *et al.* (2013:315) commented that one of the most fundamental differences across borders that managers of multinational firms faces is the disparity in corporate governance standards. Undertaking business operations in new foreign markets can be very complex and tough because of individual country specific norms and laws that are usually relatively diverse from what managers are familiarised at home. The OECD devised a working document in 1999 of fundamental governance principles, in a bid to simplify various best practices linked to corporate governance around the world. These principles were subsequently approved by the thirty OECD member states, leading to the instituting of several basic guidelines connected to

governance across the member states (OECD, 2004:1, 2015:). The OECD Principles give the best practice recommendations in six categories as shown in *Table 3.1*.

Table 3.1: OECD Principles of Corporate

	Principles	Details
1.	Ensure the basis of an effectual corporate governance framework	The corporate governance framework must encourage openness and well-organised markets, be in agreement with the rule of law and plainly articulate the separation of duties amongst diverse supervisory, regulating and enforcement authorities.
2.	The rights of stockholders and key ownership roles	The corporate governance framework must protect and allow the exercise of stockholders' rights. Basic stockholder rights must include the right to: 1. Secure ways of ownership registration; 2. Transmit or transfer stocks; 3. Get applicable and significant information on the company on a timeous and consistent basis; 4. Contribute and vote in general stockholder meetings; 5. Select and remove members of the board; and 6. Share in the profits of the company.
3.	The fair treatment of stockholders	The corporate governance framework must ensure the fair treatment of all stockholders, including minority and foreign stockholders. All stockholders must have the chance to get effective recompense for infringement of their rights. The principles also state that: • All stockholders of the same series of a class must be treated similarly • Insider trading and abusive self-dealing must be forbidden • Members of the board and key executives must be compelled to disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a considerable interest in any transaction or matter directly influencing the company.
4.	The role of stakeholders in corporate governance	The corporate governance framework must recognise the rights of stakeholders instituted by law or through common agreements and promote active co-operation between companies and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially health firms.

	Principles	Details
5.	Disclosure and transparency	The corporate governance framework must ensure that timeous and correct disclosure is made on all significant matters concerning the company, such as the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the corporation.
	Content of Disclosures	The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance suggest that disclosures include, but must not be restricted to, material information on the following: <i>The financial and operating results of the corporation</i> Audited financial statements showing the financial performance and the financial situation of the corporation must usually include: • The statement of financial position • Income statement • Cash flow statement • Notes to the financial statement <i>Corporation objectives</i> Besides business statements and objectives, public companies must ideally disclose policies linking to business ethics, the backdrop and other public policy commitments. <i>Major stock ownership and voting rights</i> An investor has the right to know the ownership structure of the corporation in which he or she has a stake. He or she must also be conscientised of his or her rights in connection with the rights of other owners. These disclosures make the objectives, nature and structure of ownership and stockholder composition transparent. Some countries require corporations to release ownership data once a certain ownership threshold is crossed. <i>Remuneration policy</i> The remuneration policy for board and key executive members must be released. Executive pay is becoming an increasingly controversial topic across the world and some governments are in the process on introducing laws that may restrict the amount of remuneration executives are entitled to. Information about board members, their qualifications, selection procedure, other corporation directorships and

	Principles	Details
		whether they have independent status on the board must also be released. <i>Related party transactions</i> The corporation must release fully any considerable related party transactions to the market, either individually, or on a grouped basis, including whether they have been executed at arms-length and on normal market terms. This is necessary as the market must know whether a corporation is being run in the best interests of all its investors. <i>Foreseeable risk components</i> Stakeholders and the market at large need to know the risk factors taken into account while preparing financial statements and operational reports. These risk components or material risks may include: • Risks specific to the industry or geographies in which the company operates • Dependence on commodities • Financial market risks including interest rate or currency risk • Risk linked to derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions • Risks linked to environmental liabilities <i>Issues regarding employees/stakeholders</i> In some countries, corporations are required by law to release information on key matters applicable to employees and other stakeholders who may be influenced by the corporation's performance. This information may include: • Management-employee relations • Relations with stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers and local communities <i>Governance structure and policies</i> Corporations must release information on their governance structure and any corporate governance policy or code such as an ethics code. The process by which this code or policy is adopted must also be released.
6.	The accountabilities of the board	The corporate governance framework must ensure the strategic guidance of the corporation, the effective

	Principles	Details
		monitoring of management by the board, and the board's responsibility to the corporation and the stockholders.

Source: Compiled from the 2015 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

The centrepiece of this research is the construction of a disclosure and transparency Index, devised to evaluate the degree of disclosure and transparency practices of Zimbabwe listed corporations. Most of the provisions incorporated in the NCCGZDTI developed in this study were borrowed from the OECD framework since the NCCGZ adopted the OECD principles.

Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005:127) wrote that the OECD corporate governance principles offer detailed guidelines for policy-making organs, regulators and market players for enhancing the legal, institutional and regulating framework promoting corporate governance, with particular focus on the publicly listed corporations. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development principles are not limited to financial disclosure since they visualise the entire corporation. Disclosure and transparency must be the basis of corporate governance laws and codes. Corporations must release their financial and operating performance, making sure that their stockholders and other stakeholders appreciate the type of the company's activities, present situation and impending direction regarding expansions.

3.2.2 Debates on Corporate Governance

Ho (2009:1) reasoned that the aspect of how companies must be governed to improve corporate and economic performance has been broadly considered in both the academic and practical world. Current debates about corporate governance are partly triggered by the realisation by economists of the critical role that business corporations play in allocating resources in the economy (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263, Ho, 2009:1). To address the issue of resource allocation, economists strive to find answers to questions such as, 'How these resource allocation decisions must be made? Who must make these decisions? How can those who are responsible for making these decisions be encouraged to make the right decisions? How are they to know what and how much information to acquire before making the decisions? How can the separate decisions of the millions of actors in the economy be controlled?' As mentioned earlier, corporate governance is concerned with the institutions controls how businesses allot resources and returns (Ho, 2009:1, Kajanathan, 2012:63). Specifically, a system of corporate governance outlines the investment decision makers in business organisations, the investment

types, and how investments returns are distributed. There are two schools of thought when it comes to the corporate governance debate, the shareholder theory and stakeholder theory (Ho, 2009:50).

Advocates of the shareholder view contend that shareholders are the "principals" in whose interests the corporation should be run even though they rely on others for the actual running of the corporation. When corporations are run to maximise shareholder value, it is argued, the performance of the economic system as a whole, not just the interests of shareholders can be enhanced (Aras & Crowther, 2008:440, Ho, 2009:100). In making this claim, advocates of shareholder theory portray residuals as rewards for critical economic functions that shareholders perform. In other words, shareholder returns are regarded as incentives for risk-bearing and waiting (Aras & Crowther:441, 2008, Ho, 2009:100). In contrast, the theory of stakeholders is proposed to clarify and give guidance of the structure and undertaking of the instituted corporation. It perceives the firm as a structural entity by which many and varied participants achieve multiple, and not always totally corresponding intentions (Li *et al.*, 2018:65). The stakeholder theory has been presented and used in a number of ways that involve different methodologies, evidence and criteria of appraisal (Ho, 2009:120; Li *et al.*, 2018:65; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102).

The OECD affirms that corporate governance comprises internal aspects of corporate governance as well as other stakeholders and how they are affected by the company. It also requires a company, represented by its directors to conform to the provisions of relevant statutes, societal norms, standards and codes of best practices and the reliable management of the company (OECD, 2015:1). The effect of governance structures failure can be damaging to the investors, employees and the economy (Ramly, 2012:1740). Modern corporate scandals and the near-collapse of the global financial system prove the significance of upholding an effective corporate governance system (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265). Deduction can be made that good corporate governance will enhance corporate sustainability and sustainability reporting (Aras & Crowther, 2008:441).

The second concept to be explored by this study relates to the practice of Corporate Sustainability (CS).

3.3 Corporate sustainability

Modern firms are under strict public scrutiny for their operations (Chen and Roberts, 2010:651; Stacchezzini et al., 2016:105). There is a growing pressure from various stakeholder groups to reduce negative impacts of corporation on environment and society (Li *et al.*, 2018:60:). Similarly, companies are facing increased pressures from internal and external stakeholders to be transparent and accountable (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005:391) and sustainability reporting is the main tool to meet these emerging challenges (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:106). Firms, all over the world, are increasingly engaging in sustainability initiatives and reporting their activities in annual reports, websites or on other media of communication. Sustainable development is now on top of the international agenda (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1).

Borkowski *et al.* (2009:1) wrote that the phrase “sustainable business” can be associated with a wide range of corporate initiatives related to issues such as a company’s impact on the environment, programs to help employees live healthier lives, community development programs, customer safety programs, and fair trade practices. In turn, information about these initiatives is of interest to multiple stakeholders, including investors who are interested in socially responsible investing, consumers who want to buy “green” products, and community groups concerned about the environmental impact of neighbouring businesses. The GRI (2008:1) describes sustainability as the practice evaluating performance on economic, environmental, and social effects to inside and outside stakeholders.

Clikeman (2004:22) provided a working definition of sustainability as a philosophy that weighs the current economic benefits of activities against the effects of those activities on future generations. Several empirical studies concur to this definition (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:45; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102). This implies that sustainable oriented companies consider the short and long term economic implications of their current activities, as well as the long term environmental and societal consequences of their current actions (Hassan *et al.*, 2009:79). This is known as the triple bottom line approach of reporting environmental, social, and economic performance (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:20; Borkowski *et al.*, 2009:5; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:50). Landrum and Daily (2012:50) remarked that sustainability is another common term that is often used. The Brundtland Report defined the term sustainability as sustainable development is advancement that fulfil the necessities of the present-day minus conceding the capability of upcoming generations to fulfil their own

necessities (Brundtland Commission, 1987:1). This implies that current advancement of the world should not jeopardise the livelihoods of future generations (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50, Brundtland Commission, 1987:1). From a business perspective, the sustainability concept compels a business to extend its operational focus beyond economic and profit driven activities (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:22; Borkowski *et al.*, 2009:4; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:55). This also necessitates measures of success which guarantee viability for future generations (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50).

According to King III sustainability of a corporation means operating in a way that satisfies current necessities without surrendering the capability of the coming generations to fulfil their necessities (IoDSA, 2009:1). It implies showing concern for the effects of the corporation activities on the economic life of the society in which it functions (IoDSA, 2009:1). Sustainability comprises of environmental, social, and governance matters (IoDSA, 2009:1). In the opinion of Van Zyl (2014:19) this definition still reflect ambiguity to precisely identify whether companies are sustainable or not. Van Zyl (2014:19) asserts that the ability to describe sustainability should go beyond just a linguistic or philosophical exercise but should be shaped by the challenge of changing the current business paradigm. Gray and Bebbington (2007:1) noted that the real tragedy is that if sustainable business organisations are ever to be attained, then civilisations, individually and communally, need to know the level to which companies, with the very best will in the world, are not able to deliver sustainability. It is this accountability for the extent to which a corporation cannot be sustainable, socially responsible and/or environmental benign that signifies the real potential of corporate reporting.

According to Du Plessis and Rühmkorf (2015:51) it is clear that the debate regarding the role and potential impact of companies is getting wider, moving away from narrower corporate *social* responsibilities issues to the wider issue of corporate responsibility generally. It seems as though the business environment has truly and inevitably moved away from the view that the primary aim of corporations is ‘to make a profit’ or ‘to make money’, without consideration of how it makes its money and the impacts of its product, to one of having ‘responsibility for the public good’ – sustainable value creation. According to the comments by Judge Professor Mervyn King on governance, integrated thinking and integrated reporting, he stated that inclusive capital is about making capitalism more inclusive (King, 2014:1). That is, to be sustainable in the long run, businesses need to be governed and managed in a manner that

actively makes their approach to resource accumulation, deployment and redistribution that we know as capitalism, more responsive to the needs of all (King, 2014:1). Only in this way, driven by this wider view, can corporate world deliver sustainable capitalism. A model of capitalism that can survive, regenerate and thrive into the future (King, 2014:1).

The question of sustainable development and performance of business organisations became topical barely before the social and environmental disclosure practices were adopted as practice (Lai *et al.*, 2016:170). This occurred after the realisation that entities were ignoring some matters including climate change, empowerment of disadvantaged societies and environmental devastation in their operations (Martínez-Ferrero *et al.*, 2015:45). Eccles *et al.* (2014:4) document that this was the instant when sustainability disclosure and numerous valuable non-financial reporting projects including Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) and AccountAbility surfaced.

Kiyanga (2014:1) remarks that firms subsequently realised that sustainability reporting can enhance their operations on different aspects including their image, internal processes, stakeholder engagement and investors attraction. Consequently, sustainability reporting became an essential practice (Lai *et al.*, 2016:170). In spite of being in existence for a long time, there appears to be no particular generally accepted meaning of sustainability disclosure (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:170; Stubbs & Higgins, 2012:1). For instance, KPMG International (2008:1) considered sustainability disclosure as a general terminology utilised to explain a corporation's disclosure on its economic, environmental and social performance. However, the GRI-G4 (2013:1) describes sustainability reporting, from a practical perspective as the ability of evaluating, releasing and being answerable to inside and outside stakeholders for entity performance against the sustainable development goal.

Although there is an absence of a generally welcomed definition, sustainability disclosure persistently attracted the attention of researchers in several facets comprising of measurement, reporting, standardisation, assurance and theoretical issues (Kiyanga, 2014:1; Kolk, 2008:1, Lewis, 2011:197, Li *et al.*, 2018:60). One example is that of Kolk (2008:12) who discovered a connection between corporate governance and sustainability disclosure. Additionally, it was proposed that stakeholders may benefit more if the corporate governance reporting and sustainability reporting are assimilated (Lai *et al.*, 2016:170; Li *et al.*, 2018:70). The integrated

reporting framework has been released already (IIRC, 2013:1) and is covered in *Section 3.5.3* of this study.

Kolk (2008:10) documented that the number of corporations going beyond financial disclosure and now disclosing social and/or environmental practices and/or effects has improved considerably. This assertion is supported by recent studies (Li *et al.*, 2018:74; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:545; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:180). However, Gould (2015:1) criticises the leadership on sustainability as stagnant although he acknowledges that over the last 15 to 20 years, the number of companies reporting on a wider range of non-financial matters has increased substantially. In his article “Corporations, Sustainability, and Innovation: Early Results a Mixed Bag” Professor Robert Eccles reported on the sobering results of how companies are currently dealing with sustainability (Eccles, 2015:1). Eccles *et al.* (2014:4), highlighted how “high-sustainability” companies dramatically outperformed a matched set of “low-sustainability” companies in both stock market and accounting measures over an 18-year period. This superior performance is a result of very different behaviour on the part of the high-sustainability group in terms of corporate governance, incentives for top management, internal performance measurement, external performance reporting, and stakeholder engagement (Eccles *et al.*, 2014:5). However, a published report based on the sixth annual global survey of sustainability practices done by MIT Sloan Management Review (SMR), in collaboration with the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and the UN Global Compact titled “Joining Forces: Collaboration and Leadership for Sustainability,” points out that many companies are not embracing the practices that will result in more sustainable corporations (Kiron *et al.*, 2017:1). The results of the survey also show that only 42% felt that their company’s board played a strong role in sustainability (it also showed a four-year downward trend in strong CEO commitment to sustainability) (Kiron *et al.*, 2017:15).

Many developing countries, including Zimbabwe’s stances on sustainable development challenges their leadership to manage resources better (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:50; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:136; Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:50; Li *et al.*, 2018:68). According to Gould (2015:1), one of the vexing questions on sustainable development is how to foster more responsible business and purpose-driven leadership. Although enhanced corporate reporting is a critical part of transparency, in itself it has limited impact on whether business is truly sustainable (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:169; Gould, 2015:1, Lai *et al.*, 2016:170). Placing explicit expectations

on corporate leaders to foster a responsible business with a long-term perspective needs to be the centrepiece of all governance requirements (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:50; Gould, 2015:1, Lai *et al.*, 2016:170). This can lead to real change in business actions that enhance an overall positive impact of the organisation (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:52; Gould, 2015:1, Lai *et al.*, 2016:171). Too few companies have directed their purpose, strategy, and actions toward achieving sustainability outcomes related to the SDGs (Gould, 2015:1; Ribera, 2016:340).

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) highlighted that reporting is a key part of attaining the SDGs (GRI *et al.*, 2015:1). SDG 12 (target 12.6) specifically reflects this by encouraging companies, especially large and transnational corporations, to implement sustainable practices and assimilate sustainability information into their reporting cycle (UNCTAD, 2015:1). The SDGs will provide a new demand on corporate reporting. Being a primary source of information on companies' performance, corporate reporting can enrich and enhance the SDG monitoring mechanisms by providing governments and society with means to evaluate the economic, environmental and social impact of the companies on sustainable development (UNCTAD, 2015:1). However, to ensure that corporate reporting efficiently contributes towards this objective; efforts need to be made to ensure its coherence with existing reporting frameworks and practices, as well as comparability of information and data provided by companies (UNCTAD, 2015:1). This new goal has led to a new demand on reporting, which should be channelled toward better quality and smarter reporting, particularly through the integrated reporting movement, and reporting that allows users to benchmark performance (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:540; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:170). According to Gould (2015:1), the SDG Compass provides guidance on enhancing reporting on business activities that contribute to sustainable development. The SDG Compass was developed jointly by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the UN Global Compact (UNGC), and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).

From the above discussion, evidence exists that contributions to make business disclosure more inclusive are progressing on many fronts. The unifying feature is the effort to ensure corporate accountability encompass shareholders and a broad spectrum of stakeholders by appending to the present emphasis on financial value more reporting of non-financial value. According to KPMG (2011:1), globally, many of the largest listed corporation issue a sustainability report, frequently combining both social and environmental features of the operations. Financial

disclosure is obligatory for listed corporations in Zimbabwe, whereas non-financial disclosure remains largely not regulated (Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:40, World Bank, 2011:1). Corporations releasing information beyond rigidly financial in most cases do it voluntarily (Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:40). In spite of taking great strides in global reporting, sustainability reporting is seen by many as falling well short of what is necessary to provide an accurate account of organisational performance, or to redress the significant social and environmental effects of contemporary business (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:170; Lai *et al.*, 2016:169). Rather than discharging accountability, the content and quality of disclosures sought to present the organisation in a favourable light, and possibly manipulate stakeholder perceptions (Stubbs & Higgins, 2012:1).

The increase in sustainability reporting could be clarified by referring to a range of market-centred, societal, political, regulatory and ethical drivers of non-financial disclosure (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:173; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:210). The rise of global standard-setting institutions for corporate responsibility, sustainability reporting and environmental management systems has also encouraged the intensification of non-financial disclosures (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:105; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:215). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) symbolises possibly the main causative factor in this sense. The objective of the GRI has been to prompt a process of standardisation and harmonisation for disclosures by issuing a universally accepted framework for sustainability reporting (GRI-G4, 2013:1). The GRI framework proffers an invaluable supplement to national social and environmental regulations, and is part of an emerging system of ‘soft law’ for sustainability reporting (Gilbert, 2002:18; Li *et al.*, 2018:65).

It is interesting to note that the intensified call for transparency originates from two diverse perspectives (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:172; Lai *et al.*, 2016:171). However, lately these viewpoints have begun to show some commonality (Lai *et al.*, 2016:174). The first viewpoint is where accountability prerequisites in the context of corporate governance have developed (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265; Li *et al.*, 2018:70). Additionally, these requirements have started to occasionally impact staff-related and ethical aspects such as codes (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:518). The second viewpoint is where sustainability reporting developed separately from the more traditional governance framework (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:50). At its advent, corporate sustainability was centred mainly on the environment (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:170). However, the scope has widened to commonly also include ethical and social issues (Muttakin & Khan,

2014:170). For instance, employee and community matters and the organisational structure in place to control all this (Li *et al.*, 2018:70; Muttakin & Khan, 2014:171, Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). This means that these two rather distinct channels of accountability not only show some (potential) convergence in terms of topics, but also in targeting broader audiences (Martínez-Ferrero *et al.*, 2015:50). The critical issue of *Corporate Accountability* will subsequently be discussed.

3.4 Corporate Accountability

Landrum and Daily (2012:50) noted that stakeholders are increasingly putting pressure on businesses to be more sustainable by adopting a triple bottom line approach and to be more responsible for their activities. To be reactive to stakeholder pressures and demands, business organisations have been pursuing ways to increase accountability and transparency (Li *et al.*, 2018:61). One of the challenges for corporations that are beginning to discover the accountability landscape lies in its wide-ranging names, terms, and definitions used, which may be misunderstood between different stakeholders and company managers (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:58). For instance, from business perspective, responsibility is frequently referred to as corporate citizenship, sustainability, triple bottom line, or corporate social responsibility (CSR) and so on. The same term can be used by various people (e.g. corporate social responsibility (CSR)). However, Globescan (2008:1) claimed that CSR being a general term represent diverse things to diverse stakeholders and can be used in various ways, depending on culture, geographical region or stakeholder. Staubus (2010:1) defines accountability as “the obligation of a person entrusted with a duty to others to explain his/her performance of that duty.” Karthik (2013:1) adopted the definition of accountability that yields two axioms that can serve as a basis for a framework for corporate responsibility reporting: (1) that delegation necessitates accountability; and (2) that accountability involves reporting. Cooper and Owen (2007:649) accepts that “Accountability” can be defined as “the duty to provide an account or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible.” Central to this concept are two questions: 1) to whom are companies accountable? and 2) for what are they responsible? (Cooper & Owen, 2007:649; Gray, 2010:47).

The growing recognition of emerging socio-economic and environmental crises confronting humanity has prompted wide-spread calls for all branches of society, including business, to participate in securing a sustainable future (Brundtland Commission, 1987:1). From a business

perspective, these calls have led to the evolution of corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship and various related concepts. According to Vandekerckhove (2012:1) these concepts call on businesses, as juristic persons, to behave in the same manner as any good citizen in working towards the betterment of their communities through participation in efforts to improve the life of all fellow citizens.

Landrum and Daily (2012:52) used the term accountability when referring to a corporate's link to, and influence on, social, environmental and economic structures. A distinct guideline should direct business enterprises to become responsible in their operations in order to promote global sustainable development (Landrum & Daily, 2012:52). A triple bottom line approach enables corporations to focus beyond the financial influence in the business and apply a broader viewpoint of the economic, social and environmental influence on stakeholders and the environment. Research studies including KPMG International (2008:1) and Sustainable Investment Research Analyst Network (2007:1), reveal that corporations are gradually applying sustainability programs by establishing objectives, measuring effects, and reporting performance in all three sustainable areas.

Landrum (2008:79) reveals numerous corporations have been defining social impact from an internal perspective. These include variety in employing, offering benefits and equal chances to workers, and so forth. However, sustainability frameworks encourage the measurement of economic and social impacts to comprise external economic and social effects such as the public, the society, and the wider world to guarantee lowest adverse impact and highest constructive effect on social schemes. Consequently, according to KPMG (2008:1) and Sustainable Investment Research Analyst Network (2007:1), these socio-economic effects are gradually being evaluated and reported by corporations (KPMG, 2008:1; Sustainable Investment Research Analyst Network, 2007:1). Measurement instruments have been designed to evaluate environmental effects, including carbon footprint evaluation, life cycle evaluation, full cost accounting, carbon accounting, and material flow evaluation (Wal-Mart, 2008:1). This study will establish whether companies across diverse economic sectors in Zimbabwe have made assurances to effect changes that will minimise their adverse effects.

3.4.1 Protocols of Corporate Accountability

According to Landrum and Daily (2012:50) there are wide-ranging competing protocols devised to aid companies to improve accountability. These were categorised into six distinct

parts of protocols including principles, standards, accounting tools, reporting frameworks, stakeholder engagement, and assurance. However, these competing protocols can be difficult to comprehend and implement by businesses trying to steer its way toward improved accountability (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50).

3.4.1.1 Principles

In their paper, Landrum and Daily (2012:51) discussed only those advanced principles which influence general corporate behaviour, even though principles can influence company performance on various levels. The commonly known principles which are meant to focus on the three pillars of sustainability (i.e. social, environmental, and economic) are introduced in the United Nations (U.N.) Global Compact (2004) report. The U.N. Global Compact covers ten principles for responsible and sustainable business activity including the matters of human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-corruption. Although the principles are detailed in expansive terms, business organisations are supplied with supplementary information comprising the rationale behind certain principles, examples of the principles at work, and instruments for application of the principles. This research study established whether as per the Global Compact, companies are embracing, supporting and enacting, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the spheres of human rights, labour standards, the environment, and anti-corruption (United Nations Global Compact, 2004:1). Additionally, companies were recommended to identify their contribution to the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which were backed by the U.N. Global Compact. The MDG covered eight goals endorsed by 192 UN member states and more than 23 transnational organisations with the goal of achievement by 2015 (United Nations, 2010:1). The MDGs were superseded by the SDGs which are also related to poverty, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, disease, the environment, and global partnerships. Another familiar set of principles for corporate conduct is the AA1000 Framework, established by AccountAbility, an international, not for profit making organisation (AccountAbility, 1999:1). These principles expect mainly that organisations keenly engage with all stakeholders to get their input in order to plan and apply reactions to those matters that are important to its own vision of sustainability. Furthermore, the AA1000 Framework is designed to supplement the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Framework, which is discussed later in this thesis. This research study referred to the U.N. Global Compact framework's principles as a guide to responsible corporate behaviour since they seem to be the most extensively

recognised and utilised. The literature review shows that though there are numerous contending principles which are present to influence accountable corporate behaviour, the U.N. Global Compact and the AA1000 framework seem to be the most extensively known and utilised.

3.4.1.2 Standards

In the opinion of Landrum and Daily (2012:53), standards comprise detailed measures, performances, or activities required of businesses. Different organisations established standards over decades. Certain standards are in the format of broad guidelines, whereas others are in the form of certifiable standards. Broad guidelines include detailed or wide-ranging sustainability matters and support businesses in the identification of significant issues. For example, Social Venture Network (SVN) Standards of Corporate Responsibility (Social Venture Network, 1996-1999), Certified B Corporations, the Corporate Responsibility Index, and the Sustainability-Integrated Guidelines for Management Guidelines, or SIGMA Project (SIGMA Project, 2003). Generally, the certifying standards focus on a specific issue, product or management system, rather than a wide-ranging sustainability issues (Landrum & Daily, 2012:54). Corporations can apply standards to enhance managements systems, to obtain business operations certificate connected to labour matters or health and safety matters, and to conform with fair trade practices and diligent sourcing (AccountAbility, 1999:1, 2005:1). Business organisations concerned by having ‘green’ buildings can consult the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design certifications, while entities operating in the forestry sector can refer to the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Landrum & Daily, 2012:55). Additionally, business entities obtaining products from developing countries can brand these with a Fair Trade trademark (Gray, 2010:50; Landrum & Daily, 2012:55). Companies could decide to adopt various standards concurrently. For instance, LEED certification for the building, ISO 14000 certification for environmental systems, SA8000 or OHSAS 18001 occupational health and safety certification for subsidiaries, while marketing FCS and Fair Trade products (Landrum & Daily, 2012:55). There are noteworthy criticisms of standards from various stakeholders (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007:755; Gray, 2010:50; Kolk, 2008:5; Landrum & Daily, 2012:55). For instance, according to Gilbert and Rasche (2007:755), some standards lack sufficient reason for being universal, some standards do not specify guidance on how stakeholder engagement should be conducted, and some standards do not signify optional involvement. Additionally, there are instances where corporate executives encounter challenges in selecting amongst diverse standards, choosing

how to implement them, performing their costs-benefits analysis, and comprehending their interrelationships (Ligteringen & Zadak, 2005:1). The application guidelines of these standards are sometimes ambiguous and when implementing different standards concurrently (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007:756; Ligteringen & Zadak, 2005:1). This is because there are no guidelines to handle incompatible requirements of the standards or among the standards and the regulating framework of a country in which the business organisation endeavours to implement the standard (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007:756; Ligteringen & Zadak, 2005:1).

3.4.1.3 Accounting Tools

Landrum and Daily (2012:55) defined accounting tools as different formulae, calculators, or additional tools that enables quantification of the concept being evaluated. Measurement instruments, calculators, and formulas enables the corporation to gauge its present behaviour to form a baseline, to establish enhancement goals, and to evaluate impending behaviour in order to establish progress (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007:758; Landrum & Daily, 2012:55; Ligteringen & Zadak, 2005:1). The accounting tools overall require no comparative threshold, benchmark, or measurable standard. The WBCSD Measuring Impact framework support businesses in quantifying governance, (environmental) sustainability, assets, people, and financial flows (WBCSD, 2008:1). In addition, this framework is intended to complement the reporting format of the Global Reporting Initiative (Gray, 2010:48; Kolk, 2008:8; Landrum & Daily, 2012:56). There are however, challenges in the application of accounting tools. Instead of quantifying progress on standards, some corporations may opt for a narrative approach where subjective evidence of performance explained (Gray, 2010:49; Kolk, 2008:8; Landrum & Daily, 2012:57). Additionally, some impacts caused by corporations may not be instantly quantified. For instance, secondary impacts endure for years before they are quantifiable and measurable (e.g. changes in eco-systems) (Landrum & Daily, 2012:57).

Frías-Aceituno *et al.* (2014:50) documented that the shift to additional reporting of qualitative information has been complemented by various standards, principles and guidelines. Similar to this enhancement, the regulations concerning financial information have stiffened and turned out to be extra complicated. Eccles and Krzus (2010:1) claimed that modern day accounting standards are frequently tough to construe and corporations are forced to consume a great deal of time and resources to prepare their financial statements. One main cause of the more complicated accounting standards is the expanding financial market, resulting in innovative

financial instruments comprising of derivatives, hedges, swaps, securitisations and share options. Consequently, there would be increased volume of information included in the annual reports which may be complex to use and understand (Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1).

3.4.1.4 Reporting

Corporate reporting has been transformed over the years both in quality and content (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175). Traditional corporate reporting comprised of historical financial information, mainly reporting about financial performance and position (Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1). Being driven by sustainability, the long-term health and survival of economic, social, and environmental systems, corporations are gradually shifting toward measuring the triple bottom line. According to GRI *et al.* (2015:1) corporations can be responsive to the requirement of good corporate citizenship without ignoring financial performance. The new global agenda has brought with it a call to businesses to contribute significantly to the achievement of SDGs. Within the provisions of Article 67 accepted by all 193 UN Member States is the recognition that private business activity, investment and innovation are key drivers of productivity, broad economic growth and job creation (UNCTAD, 2015:1). This realisation therefore brings an opportunity for businesses around the world to rise up to the challenge of ensuring that SDGs are successfully achieved (UNCTAD, 2015:). According to Gould (2015), embracing the SDGs fundamentally requires companies to be responsible for their actions. These actions are based on; (i) The decisions that can have an influence on the sustained direction of the corporation; and (ii) Being aware of, and responding to, the organisation's positive and negative impacts and ability to create value over time for financial capital suppliers and other stakeholders.

3.4.1.5 Stakeholder Engagement

Stakeholder engagement is both an informal and formal procedure established by a business organisation to work supportively with its stakeholders (Aras and Crowther, 2009:279; Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:48). These are comprised of workers, consumers, suppliers, stockholders, the public, interest groups, and any others with a lawful stake or interest in the business activities (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:208). In addition, stakeholders ordinarily have a mutual affiliation with the corporation. In other words, according to AccountAbility (2005:1) stakeholders are influenced by and can impact the business operations, its products or services, and related performance. Even though there is stakeholder engagement keenly performed by companies, uniform, Roloff (2008:233) claimed that a universal approach still lacks. The

existing standards require stakeholder discourse as part of the application process. However, they provide inadequate guidance on how the engagement must be planned (Gilbert & Rasche, 2008:755). Although the AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard draft version was issued, details about its usage by corporation and when it will be released formally are yet to be known (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50). However, corporations need guidance can refer to this draft standard and stakeholder engagement guide books designed by many organisations, such as the International Finance Corporation (2007:1), Accountability (2005:1) and Stakeholder Research Associates Canada, Inc (2005:1). Gilbert and Rasche (2008:758) argue that business organisations are still unsure of who to include, how to include them, and how to manage expense and time limits regarding stakeholder engagement. Additional challenge encountered during stakeholder engagement is that of conflicting stakeholder requirements with short-term benefits of shareholders. This situation is further worsened by the present legislative framework which is biased towards shareholders' interests protection as opposed to the other stakeholders' interests (GRI, 2008:1).

This study is informed by the stakeholder theory which explain the background factors which influences the progress towards increased non-financial disclosures (Freeman *et al.*, 2010:1). Therefore, this study established the level of all-inclusive stakeholder consideration by businesses in Zimbabwe, an increasing consciousness and an escalating requirement for information amongst these stakeholders.

3.4.1.6 Assurance

Finally, the auditing and assurance (i.e. social audit, an ethical audit, or monitoring) of claims made in sustainability reports is discussed in this section. Related to financial statements audit, sustainability audits appraise the report and the essential systems that generate the information in the report. The observations of the audit are evaluated against standards or a set of conditions or reporting (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50). The objective of the assurance is not to appraise the strategies of the organisation, but to ascertain whether the sustainability report fairly reflects the business operations. Landrum and Daily (2012:50) identified two assurance guidelines in their paper, those given by AccountAbility (AA1000 Assurance Standard 2008) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (the International Standard for Assurance Engagements, or ISAE 3000 revised). Even though the KPMG 2008 survey discovered a variation in the usage of the guidelines by corporations, these two standards are

the predominate assurance standards (KPMG, 2008:1). There is still a lot of disparity in assurance standards, as well as the providers of the assurance. Apart from the broad corporate guidelines provided by the AA1000 AS 2008 and the ISAE 3000, numerous organisations stipulate assurance guidance specialised to its own unique measurement standard. For instance, SustainAbility International provides SAAS SA8000 certification for entities to offer assurance particularly on the application and reporting of SA8000 standards. The KPMG 2008 survey noted that 70% of the G250 and 65% of the N100 corporations examined used a key accountancy organisation to offer assurance (KPMG, 2008:1). Nevertheless, not only accounting organisations conduct assurance engagements. For instance, certain corporations have decided to set up in-house assurance teams or external committees to give stakeholder assurance. In addition, engineering firms and specialised assurance businesses also offer external assurance for stakeholders (Landrum & Daily, 2012:50).

All the three the above concepts, *CG* (discussed in *section 3.2*); *CS* (discussed in *section 3.3*) and *CA* (discussed in *section 3.4*), are notions and systems which are motivated by one overarching themes, namely *Corporate Disclosure and Transparency (CDT)*. The meaning of these broad concepts will subsequently be explored in *section 3.5* and *3.6* below.

3.5 Corporate Disclosure

Corporate disclosure has been the prime procedure through which corporations turn out to be transparent and has remained known as the principle of corporation responsibility (Baron, 2014:1; Hassan *et al.*, 2009:80). Failure to furnish complete, timely, and accurate disclosure will cause market participants to have challenges in making comparison of the financial performance of various corporations (Baron, 2014:1; Hassan *et al.*, 2009:80) . Additionally, these market participants might make wrong investment decisions on the basis of interpretations around the unrepresented information. The annual report is among the numerous methods of corporate release of information (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:174). The annual report is valuable to the shareholders and the other users in evaluating the stewardship of management over resources entrusted to them. Corporate reporting entails regular release of firm-specific information voluntarily or mandatorily (Baron, 2014:1; Bushman *et al.*, 2004:167; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:174). Theory indicates that timely and transparent information released to the firm's shareholders frequently lowers information asymmetry (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:2; Bushman *et al.*, 2004:167; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:140; Jensen & Meckling, 1976:305) and enhances the shareholders' ability to scrutinise management's activities

(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012:195). Business disclosure can offer assurance to investors, leading to gains such as a decreased cost of equity capital (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:140; Sengupta & Zhang, 2015:1073) or reduced cost of debt (El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:140; Sengupta, 1998:459). Additionally, corporations disclosing more information may register a rise in analyst following as a result of reduced information processing costs (Hassan *et al.*, 2009:80). Consequently, this may lead to an upsurge in the stock's liquidity (Healy & Palepu, 2001:406, Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221). Hence, corporations are incentivised to disclose information regardless of any market regulation providing for it, although there are limitations. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012:195) revealed that more disclosure is not always ideal for a corporation as this may result in additional agency problems. In particular, while more disclosures make monitoring by shareholders possible, this may be associated with extra benefits to managers where management has greater negotiating power (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115). In addition, disclosure can be damaging to the corporation if it reveals sensitive information which could be disadvantageous to the company's competitive position (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Verrecchia, 1983:179) or managers may disclose some restricted information they prefer for their opportunistic reasons to keep private (Kothari *et al.*, 2009:241). Adequate corporate disclosure is beneficial to the corporation, its stakeholders and also the entire economy (Hassan *et al.*, 2009:80). Nevertheless, since corporate disclosure attract costs, corporations tend to disclose their business affairs fully after applying the costs and benefits analysis (Coetsee, 2010:10). Consequently, this tendency has rendered corporate disclosure a persistently topical issue among regulators, the academia and even the politicians. Golja and Paulišić (2011:51) confirm that disclosure by firms can be categorised as mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure and these will be discussed in *sub-sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2* respectively.

3.5.1 Mandatory Disclosure

Statutory business reporting is portrayed in this research as that disclosure which conforms to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and regulatory statutory instruments (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175). In other words, mandatory disclosure of corporate information can be described as those details of business operations required to be reported by law or stipulated by accounting standards and IFRSs (Baron, 2014:1, Owusu-Ansah, 1998:610). Mandatory disclosure guidelines are prescribed in order to safeguard fair accessibility to essential information (Lev, 1992:10, Sanan & Yadav, 2011:62). Osama (2013:150) observed that

numerous countries have intensified their mandatory business disclosure requisites by way of new laws enactment and regulations.

The advent of non-owner managed business organisations resulted in the call for corporate financial information (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:180). These managers were required to regularly present financial statements to their owners in order to communicate about their corporation's performance (Lewis & Pendrill, 1985:1). The corporate financial disclosure routine triggered the growth of the accounting vocation followed by the advent of regulated business reporting. Healy and Palepu (2001:410) claimed that the statutory required business financial disclosure has progressed to be the main method of corporate disclosure. However, this claim has been overtaken by events as demand for non-financial reporting has steeply increased (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:20; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:180). This is because the statutory historical corporation financial disclosure is characterised by numerous flaws such as; presenting historical information and non-forward-thinking, not presenting non-financial information, presenting information biased on short-term performance, unable to portray the determinants of corporation's value, and concern about the output quality generated from the accounting system package instead of being worried about the inputs and procedures that generate the output (Baron, 2014:1; Bernardi & Stark, 2018:21; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:181). Consequently, these shortfalls have triggered demands for an innovative business reporting model (IIRC, 2013:1) and the advent of IR (Melloni *et al.*, 2017:225).

In the opinion of Millar *et al.* (2005:164) the inadequacy in the legal infrastructure implies that obligatory disclosure requirements and guidelines might not require sufficient protection to minority shareholders' rights. Therefore, corporate governance constitutions must certify that the minority stockholders obtain transparent and trustworthy information regarding the wealth of the corporation (Osama, 2013:150; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:100). As a result of failure by businesses to report exclusively as anticipated by various stakeholders, business disclosure is subjected to rules and persistent debates on the regulations (Clarke, 2004:1; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:120; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:182). Although there are weaknesses related to regulated corporate financial disclosure, it remains the key source of major information about corporations (Turturea, 201:2165).

3.5.2 Voluntary Disclosure

Voluntary or optional disclosure entails publicising unregulated financial and non-financial information pertaining to a business enterprise (Baron, 2014:1; Botosan, 1997:324; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134). Voluntary disclosure, also defined as information exceeding obligatory disclosure, has been experiencing escalating attention in current corporate governance and disclosure studies (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102). Because of the inadequacy of mandatory disclosure by firms, the proactive action by firms supplementing with optional disclosure present investors with the essential information to reach more clued-up judgements (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263). The 21st century saw the term ‘contextual disclosure’ being used interchangeably with voluntary corporate disclosure and is becoming generally accepted (Kiyanga, 2014:1). According to Gouws and Cronje (2008:108) and Myburg (2001:199), contextual disclosure is described as information presented at the option of a corporation without referring to any GAAP. Several terminologies can be utilised to explain voluntary disclosure which consists of social and environmental disclosure, social accountability disclosure, sustainability disclosure, governance disclosure and qualitative disclosure (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:173; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:103).

The business information that could be released voluntarily is varied (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Kiyanga, 2014:1). Voluntary disclosure can be described as information that is comprised of economic, environmental and social matters of the businesses’ operations (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48). Optional disclosure also includes details about wealth creation, forward-thinking orientation, corporate setting, and strategy of the business corporation (Gouws & Cronje, 2008:108; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:120). The production and disclosure of circumstantial information is said to be attributable to the modern scientific model of the 21st century (Kiyanga, 2014:1). Some literature summarised the characteristics of the innovative science model like a non-linear rational method wherein linkages and environment impact operations and wherein dealings and actions cannot be envisaged accurately (Cronje, 2007:1). Meek *et al.* (1995:555) wrote that voluntary disclosure has progressed gradually ultimately in three key types including non-mandatory reporting of financial information, reporting of non-financial information and reporting of strategic and onward thinking information. Several current studies concur to this sentiment (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:174). This progression is said to be incremental because each fresh form of voluntary disclosure enhances the existing voluntary disclosure as opposed to replacing it (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; Kiyanga, 2014:80).

Voluntary disclosure of financial information is directly influenced by the share value maximisation model and hence is considered to be the initial form of contextual disclosure (Kiyanga, 2014:90). The shareholder value view suggests that the major duty of management is to increase share wealth (Correa-ruiz & Moneva-abadía, 2011:187; Friedman & Friedman, 1982:1). Abeysekera (2013:227) suggests that initial studies on optional disclosure corroborate a connection between voluntary disclosure of financial information and share value maximisation. Voluntary disclosure driven by the shareholder value perspective is supplementary to the mandatory disclosure (Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:49; Kiyanga, 2014:90). In particular, reporting influenced by the shareholder value maximisation viewpoint comprises of the chairman's statement, the management and discussion analysis (MDA) and the operations and financial review (OFR). All these are mainly reported in the corporation's annual reports (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:167; Gouws & Cronje, 2008:109).

As discussed in *Section 3.1*, there are diverse definitions of corporate governance. Marshall *et al.* (2007:1) documented that corporate governance comprises of ethical business, social responsibility, impartial management of stakeholders, complete and fair reporting and accountability of the board of directors and its several committees. Although there is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance, there is a consensus with regard to its objective (Kiyanga, 2014:90). Early corporate governance instruments relate to internal monitoring systems including managerial controls, reporting of the directors' emoluments, audit charges, directors' advances and related party trades. These were mostly released as summaries to financial statements (Clarke, 2004:1). Coffee (2005:198) and Kolk (2008:5) document that this form of governance mechanisms predominated over several years until the period 2000 to 2002 when the world experienced an upsurge in business scandals and corporation collapses. This caused stockholders and regulating agencies to doubt the effectiveness of the method companies were led and organised (Terry, 2008:1). This prompted the arrival of the second system of corporate governance that concentrated entirely on ethical aspects including an operational board, recompense agreements that promote stockholder emphasis, concerted shareholding that prompted dynamic monitoring, risk management and internal controls, internal audit, accounting and auditing, in addition to the relationship with corporation shareowners (Kiyanga, 2014:80; Li & Tang, 2007:1). Consequently, various domestic and global codes of corporate governance were released (Cromme, 2005:362; Hegazy & Hegazy, 2010:32, Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005:127; Krambia-Kapardis & Psaros,

2006:126). These codes were mostly centred on observing how corporations are administered such as the OECD code, the King I code and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Kiyanga, 2014:80). The generality of the codes were voluntary, except a few which were obligatory (Kiyanga, 2014:80). This, therefore confirms the consideration by Gouws and Cronje (2008:50) that certain voluntary disclosures could subsequently change into obligatory disclosures. According to Clarke (2004:1), many determinants triggered the third type of corporate governance. These comprises of shareholders' degree of enlightenment, the advent of information based corporations and an increasing awareness of the significance of the stakeholder affiliations including worker, consumer and supplier and the public (Aras & Crowther, 2009:280; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265). In addition, the consciousness that stockholders hold equity instead of the assets of the corporation and also an awareness that the business corporation is an open system as opposed to a closed one triggered this third type of corporate governance (Kiyanga, 2014:80). The business corporation was therefore redefined as an organised procedure for managing links between parties that provide company-specific assets including the stockholders, workers, consumers, suppliers and the society or company stakeholders (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265). Grandori (2004:1) reasoned that the purpose of the corporation changed to optimisation of the value of the stakeholders, thereby rendering the business corporation answerable to its stakeholders and together transforming the management role from management of the assets to management relations. The corporate governance instruments that were crafted to handle these adaptations were included outside scrutinising instruments concentrating on environmental and societal accountability disclosure (Aras & Crowther, 2008:433). Grandori (2004:1) wrote that the prominent institutions including the OECD, GRI and IoDSA and so forth, were the international pioneers in the advancement of this form of voluntary disclosure.

3.5.3 The Adequacy of Separate Financial and Sustainability Reporting

In most capitalist based economies, the means of production are controlled by private owners as opposed to the State and are distinguished by a large number of market transactions (Golja & Paulišić, 2011:52). Everything significant that is happening in corporations involves communications, but communication is often interrupted by hierarchical structures, power and status differences, rules, etc (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263). Annual reports are the main basis for disseminating corporate information to various stakeholders, particularly to shareholders and investors, but they have recently been supplemented with several social and environmental

issues or ‘stand-alone’ full coverage sustainability reports (Golja & Paulišić, 2011:52; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172).

Eccles *et al.* (2014:4) reported that numerous big public corporations around the world publish separate financial and sustainability reports. This publication method is varied by the regions of the world (Eccles *et al.*, 2014:4; Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1). For instance, the number of European corporations publishing sustainability reports is higher than that of the U.S. and Asian countries. The financial reports are influenced by accounting standards as opposed to the sustainability reports which are not (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:45). However, sustainability reports often conform to the voluntary reporting standards, such as those developed by the GRI (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). In addition, financial reporting is inclined towards investors but sustainability reporting is inclined towards stakeholders such as workers, consumers, suppliers, local societies, and so forth. According to Baron (2014:1) the state of corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure is multi-faceted. On the one hand an increasing homogenisation through the prevalent application of GRI guidelines, and on the other corporate reports that are hard to compare, provide ever-increasing information, and are not always satisfactory as to the quality of information presented (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:116).

In order to enhance the valuableness and efficacy of business reporting, the idea of IR has been suggested and debated fairly for the past decade in academic circles (Abeysekera, 2013:227; Bernardi & Stark, 2018:17; Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1; Jensen & Berg, 2012:300) and in practice (Deloitte, 2011:1; Kiron *et al.*, 2017:1; KPMG, 2011:1). Gareth (2013:340) wrote that IR is not exclusively an original reporting method since a more integrated and fair approach to corporate reporting was proposed around the 1970s. The ‘Corporate Report’ implied that the board of directors represent the agents and are responsible to a wide-ranging stakeholders representing the principals. Shareholders are no longer the only stakeholder who were traditionally the main focus under the narrower stewardship perspective as envisaged under the agency perspective considered by Adam Smith (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:45). Integrated reporting revolves around these recommendations from this corporate report (Gareth, 2013:340).

According to Stubbs and Higgins (2012:1) whether a new type of reporting regime is required is debatable. For example, Lewis’ (2011:197) research into BP’s “misleading” sustainability reporting, highlights the danger that more is required than just more reporting. The research by Lewis (2011:199) suggests that combining BP’s “flawed” sustainability reports with its

financial reports would not have produced a useful integrated report as there were material omissions from its sustainability reports (safety and maintenance issues) prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

3.5.4 Integrated Reporting

Mandatory corporate disclosure and contextual disclosure discussed in *Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2* correspondingly represent what is referred to as conventional business reporting (Baron, 2014:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). This method of disclosure is also termed a stand-alone reports style, which entails the separate presentation in the corporate annual report of mandatory disclosures and voluntary disclosures (Kiyanga, 2014:80; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). Business information provided this way requires users to possess the know-how to integrate the two different types of disclosures and extrapolate useful information for decision making (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175). Traditional disclosure was prevalent over decades until recently when it was became apparent that it has fallen short of the stakeholders expectations (Kiyanga, 2014:80).

The IIRC Framework defines its vision as the IIRC's long term vision is a world in which integrated thinking is embedded within mainstream business practice in the public and private sectors, facilitated by Integrated Reporting (IR) as the corporate reporting norm. The cycle of integrated thinking and reporting, resulting in efficient and productive capital allocation, will act as a force for financial stability and sustainability (IIRC, 2013:1; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:173). The vision thus goes beyond preparing an "Integrated Report (Ribera, 2016:336). Its premise is that to create an integrated report a corporation must have "integrated thinking" or it will not be able to articulate clearly the value it creates over the long term (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; Feng *et al.*, 2017:330; IIRC, 2013:1). The assumption of integrated thinking is that through investing financial capital the other capitals value stocks can be created. Financial capital buys human capital, manufactured capital, intellectual capital, relational capital and, in most cases, when well spent, prevents further damage of natural capital (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Gittins, 2014:1).

Diverse viewpoints of the idea integrated reporting have been proposed and documented (Dumay *et al.*, 2019:166; Eccles *et al.*, 2014:4; KPMG, 2011:1; Melloni *et al.*, 2017:220; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536). Eccles *et al.* (2014:4) viewed integrated reporting as comprising details about a corporation's financial and non-financial, environmental, societal and governance information in one report. Nevertheless, a one report viewpoint makes an

assumption that entire stakeholders' information needs are satisfied by a single report (KPMG, 2011:1). However, this assumption does not always apply. The argument there is that a single report is not a precondition of IR excluding corporations that would like to utilise the integrated report to meet regulating requirements (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:537).

IR is a disclosure approach that offers capital markets pertinent information including the corporation's strategy and its all-inclusive past performance, other pertinent information that facilitate varied users' assessment of the corporate pressure and risks in achieving its corporate goals over the short, medium and long term (KPMG, 2011:1; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221). In addition, this information should be presented succinctly and showing the interrelationship between business strategy, performance drivers and performance (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165). Therefore, the usefulness of integrated reporting begins with value delivery which is embedded in the viewpoint that performance springs from a corporation strategy and agreed objectives (Feng *et al.*, 2017:330). Consequently, with integrated reporting it is possible to use various reports and reporting media may be used as long as they are effective in sharing information to the intended users (KPMG, 2008:1, 2011:1). Additionally, IR marks a change from disclosing financial and non-financial information in twofold detached reports to disclosing the effect of a corporation on its stakeholders (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:174). It comprises comprehensive disclosure of relevant information kinds to enable the assessment and evaluation of a corporation's quality, performance, value and impact (Deloitte, 2011:1).

In addition to the aforementioned viewpoints concerning IR, King III (IoDSA, 2009:1) describes IR as an all-inclusive and cohesive depiction of the corporation's financial and sustainability performance. The Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa (IRC, 2011:1) further clarified the concept by differentiating IR from an integrated report. IR is viewed as a procedure and an integrated report is the output from the procedure (Feng *et al.*, 2017:335). The King (III) code and the Integrated Reporting Council consider the integrated report as the business corporation's main report (IoDSA, 2009:1; IRC, 2011:1). The characteristics of IR include improving openness, accounting for all types of capital, emphasising on both the historic and the outlook, being linked and strategic, considers the short, medium and long term, it is succinct and is technologically supportable (KPMG, 2011:1; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221). These characteristics enables IR to better fulfil stakeholders' information requirements than conventional disclosure (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:117). This

implies that IR has replaced conventional corporate reporting (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). Nevertheless, since these characteristics are not attainable in the initial phases of integrated reporting, it may not be practicable for certain features of conventional corporate reporting to be superseded by integrated reporting over the short term (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102).

IR is a new phenomenon that is fast gaining popularity among countries and organisations in both the developed and developing world (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Du Toit *et al.*, 2017:654; Feng *et al.*, 2017:330; Suttipun, 2017:133). IR is predominantly done by multinational firms as it is argued that it leads to a good reputation and creation of value for the stakeholders (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175). Some organisations are preparing IR in response to existing compliance requirements while some organisations are voluntarily preparing such reports as they perceive benefits from adopting such a practice (Gould, 2015:1).

3.5.4.1 Integrated Reporting (IR) Framework

The International Integrated Reporting Framework was released by the the IIRC in December of 2013. It was a culmination of three years' work attempting to find a more effective and meaningful way for organisation to communicate with providers of financial capital and other stakeholders (IIRC, 2013:1). It is a principles-based document and does not purport to set standards for integrated reporting and integrated thinking (IIRC, 2013:1). The business corporations are not obliged by regulation to comply with the Integrated Reporting framework but to refer to it as a guideline in the adoption of integrated reporting (IIRC, 2013:1). This entails improved disclosure efficiency which concentrate on wealth creation, achieving enhanced reader comprehension, enhanced capital allotment and a better maintainable economy (IIRC, 2013:1). The IR framework comprises of seven guiding principles including: Strategic focus and future orientation; Connectivity of information; Stakeholder relationship; Materiality; Conciseness; Reliability and Completeness; and Consistency and Comparability. These must be embedded in the preparation and publication of the integrated report. In addition, eight content elements should be included in the report namely: Organizational overview and External environment; Governance; Business model; Risks and Opportunities; Strategy and Resource allocation; Performance; Outlook; and Basis of preparation and presentation. Every content element starts by a highlighted question and all these questions must be addressed for the report to be termed an integrated report in accordance with IR framework (IIRC, 2013:1).

Integrated reporting brings together the six capitals (financial capital; manufacturing capital; human capital; social and relationship capital; intellectual capital and, natural capital) onto a common platform (Abeysekera, 2013:227; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102). The various dimensions of business performance are integrated under the corporate vision and corporation's values (Suttipun, 2017:134). The resources rooted in each capital dimension can interact with each other in various permutations and combinations to generate financial performance, non-financial performance, environmental performance, and social performance (Abeysekera, 2013:228).


3.5.4.2 Value Creation

In view of the stewardship capital concept, the resources that a corporation utilises consists of six types of capital (Eccles *et al.*, 2011; IIRC, 2011:1; KPMG, 2011:1). The assumption of integrated thinking is that through investing financial capital the other capitals value stocks can be created (Feng *et al.*, 2017:335). Financial capital buys human capital, manufactured capital, intellectual capital, relational capital and, in most cases, when well spent, prevents further damage of natural capital (Ribera, 2016:336). The focus of the conventional corporate disclosure has been mainly on the information requirements of the financial capital providers, hence disregarding the information requirements of other stakeholders (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). For instance, sustainability issues, environmental dereliction, impacts of climate alteration and poverty have not been sufficiently covered by conventional business reporting (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:105).

IR is thought to bring societal advantages and investor advantages, such as greater transparency (Villiers *et al.*, 2017:937). The Fundamental Concepts section of the IIRC integrated reporting framework states a similar idea that the integrated report, clarifies the way a business entity creates wealth after a while (IIRC, 2013:1; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:538). This value has two interrelated aspects, shown through value added information: (1) value created for the organisation itself, which gives financial profits to the suppliers of financial capital, and (2) value generated for others (i.e. stakeholders and the community in general). Even though the significance of value conventionally has been linked to adjustment of financial capital as an outcome of financial performance, the IIRC (2013:1) pointed out that value and value creation depend on wide-ranging tangible and intangible factors. The definition of value itself is inconclusive since its meaning is diverse for diverse people in diverse contexts (IIRC, 2013:1).

Nevertheless, the process of *value creation* can be defined although there is no generally established definition and how it should be publicised. IIRC (2013:1) describes the procedure of value creation in its background paper as follows: “*Value is created through an organization’s business model, which takes inputs from the capitals and transforms them through business activities and interactions to produce outputs and outcomes that, over the short, medium and long term, create or destroy value for the organization, its stakeholders, society and the environment.*” Figure 3.1 below diagrammatically show a value creation process.

Figure 3.1: The Value Creation Process



Since the 1960’s, there has been several research on the concept of value added (Lenssen *et al.*, 2012:485; Oshika & Saka, 2017:625; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1999:1). Value added has also been used in corporate reporting worldwide (Lenssen *et al.*, 2012:485; Oshika and Saka, 2017:625). Although profits are an essential part of any market economy, profit is only part of value added (Oshika and Saka, 2017:625). Value added is the simple and most immediate way of putting enterprise profit into proper perspective as a collective effort by various stakeholders (Oshika & Saka, 2017:625).

The notion of value added considers the main stakeholders’ legitimate requirements and interests, integrating the interests of stockholders and additional stakeholders (Oshika and

Saka, 2017:627). Consequently, this overcomes the challenge of simply combining financial and non-financial reporting (Gürtürk, 2016:1; Oshika & Saka, 2017:627). A well thought out production of the conventional measure of value added is practical, effective, efficient, and reliable. Hence, it is a valuable reporting mechanism that harmonises and embodies the idea of integrated reporting (Gürtürk, 2016:1).

Conventional corporate reporting has also failed to handle the ostensible twenty first century-dealings which includes intangible assets, intellectual capital and derivatives (Rupley *et al.*, 2017:172). Additionally, conventional corporate disclosure has been unable to disclose the business corporation plan and other determinants of corporate worthiness and performance to the users (Melloni *et al.*, 2017:225). Consequently, corporation strategy and key performance indicators have remained classified as inside information (Baron, 2014:1). Therefore, information asymmetry has been perpetuated as opposed to its elimination against the very objective of corporate reporting (ICAEW, 2009:1). Over the last few decades, the business world has had to face up to significant resource constraints beyond access to capital (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:18). This is being felt in the increasingly damaging effects of climate change and the diminishing availability of natural resources that are being drawn upon as never before (Lai *et al.*, 2016:167). This caused a rise in the need for openness as companies seek to tell their stakeholders that they are not part of the problem (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:105). According to Gleeson-White (2014:1) there is an increasing acknowledgement of the failure of the current measures to account sufficiently for all the factors affecting the general wellbeing of communities globally. This is evidenced in the accounting at the levels of both the nation and the individual corporation (Gleeson-White, 2014:1). Gross domestic product is treated as a single quarterly measurement of changes in our welfare (Gleeson-White, 2014:1). Economists know theoretically that this is not the case and was never intended to be the case but ignore it in practice (Gittins, 2014:1; Gleeson-White, 2014:1). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the change in our combined incomes, but in the process disregarding all human cost associated with the generation and spending of that income as well as the overwork, traffic congestion, stress and so forth and also the cost to the natural environment (Gittins, 2014:1).

The flaws in the way corporations account for their operations are less well known (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:105), due to the bias in reporting to the corporation's shareholders

and the tax authorities using the corporation's financial statements. These financial statements only reveal the change in its financial capital, disregarding five other sources of value that can be considered as capitals namely manufactured (or man-made) capital, intellectual capital, human capital (skills and experience), social and relationship capital, and natural capital (environmental resources and processes) (Gittins, 2014:1). According to Paragraph 392 of the NCCGZ; 'A company is a multi-interest enterprise. It binds itself to contracts and can be held legitimately answerable for its actions. The company has manifold stakeholders with important interests in its operations and performances. These operations have impacts beyond the company as they usually affect, in one form or the other, the community in which the business functions, the national economy and public in general. Hence, in the governance of a corporation a balance has to be upheld between the maximisation of shareholder value and interests and the safeguarding and preferment of the interests of other stakeholders'. In paragraph 404, the NCCGZ upholds the principle that interaction between the board of directors and stakeholders must be transparent and effective so as to develop and uphold stakeholder faith and assurance in the corporation (NCCGZ, 2014:1).

3.6 Corporate Transparency

Francis *et al.* (2009:943) used the term *corporate transparency* to describe the country's information environment, which includes accounting disclosures. Corporate transparency is a product of the corporate information environment, which is made up of many interrelated information mechanisms (Bushman *et al.*, 2004:167). This study attempts to capture these mechanisms within the context of a framework developed for the Zimbabwe market. A possible benefit to the markets, and to firms, of increased corporate transparency is a reduction in information asymmetry (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265; Bushman *et al.*, 2004:168). Transparency must be reinforced by a governance culture that leads to company directors being responsible for the way a corporation is managed and regulated, explicitly covering the long-term direction of the company (Francis *et al.*, 2009:944). Transparency can be defined as "easy to understand or recognise, balanced, complete, obvious, candid, open, frank, relevant and accessible to stakeholders" (IoDSA, 2009:1). King III recommends that a company describes how it made its money and that the board ensures that the report is a balanced representation of both positive and negative impacts caused by their operations (IoDSA, 2009:1).

Corporate transparency or openness is the general accessibility of applicable and trustworthy information about regular performance, financial performance, investment prospects, governance, value, and risk of publicly listed companies (Bushman *et al.*, 2004:168; Francis *et al.*, 2009:944). Corporate openness, then, should be defined in terms of whether information about the firm is widely available, relevant, and reliable, and whether truth appears through the information output produced by the various information mechanisms comprising the corporate transparency system (DeBoskey, 2006:50). According to DeBoskey (2006:50) the information dissemination begins at the firm level and trickles down through the complete information system. This assumes that corporate transparency is a property of the firm (Francis *et al.*, 2009:945). As with the study by DeBoskey (2006:50) this study approaches corporate transparency as an output of information systems that include corporate disclosure, private information acquisition and information propagation. Investors, managers, creditors, suppliers, regulators, analysts, media, employees and other information intermediaries interact to satisfy their specific information and operating objectives (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:265; Francis *et al.*, 2009:945). Corporate transparency and its various outputs supply critical information, both quantitative and qualitative, that supports a wide range of contractual relationships. Corporate transparency, then, creates an environment where market participants can adequately assess the risks and opportunities of a given industry or firm (DeBoskey, 2006:50). Webster's New World Dictionary (2014:1) defines transparency as "having the property of transmitting light without appreciable scattering so that bodies lying beyond it are seen clearly". Etymologically, the word comes from the Latin: trans + parere: "to appear through." As in the study by DeBoskey (2006:50), central to the concept of corporate transparency adopted in this study is the notion of allowing unadulterated truth to reach information users. Put another way, corporate transparency does not allow anything to come between the truth and the user (DeBoskey, 2006:50; Ullah & Rehman, 2016:1). Moreover, corporate transparency provides relevant and reliable information that is decision useful. Corporate transparency is concerned with providing information that is truthful and free of bias. This allows information mechanisms such as analysts, the media and so forth operating in the corporate transparency information system to receive and transmit unambiguous information (DeBoskey, 2006:50; Ullah & Rehman, 2016:1). Kochetygova (2004:1) offered yet another definition of transparency as a combination of disclosure requirements, strong enforcement mechanisms (investigative power of regulators, and relevant initiation procedures), legal culture (strong judiciary system), economic incentives and security.

The level of corporate transparency varies from firm to firm, leading to different degrees of corporate transparency throughout the global market. Corporate transparency is an output of the information mechanisms within firms (DeBoskey, 2006:60; Ștefănescu, 2014:113) . Managers do not always provide the entire truth, and when they hide or cloud the truth the information that reaches the user is not entirely decision useful. Obfuscation can occur when managers possess more private information, and may be less forthcoming with their overall disclosure (such as basic accounting and other voluntary disclosures made to the press or other information intermediaries) (DeBoskey, 2006:60; Ullah & Rehman, 2016:1). Opacity and obfuscation add tension to the corporate transparency framework, as the information environment is constantly struggling with figuring out what is and is not the truth. DeBoskey (2006:60) alleges that many corporations are guilty of providing opaque disclosures, especially those dealing with special purpose entities, stock option expensing, intangible assets and research and development . The “opacity of transparency,” although a play on words, does highlight that information can be seemingly transparent yet still opaque. Overall, this tension makes measuring corporate transparency considerably more difficult because of the varying degrees of corporate transparency that can evolve (DeBoskey, 2006:60).

Corporate transparency and full-reporting of information are core characteristics of the corporate governance mechanism (OECD, 2015:1) and are considered as an extremely important factor in the quality of corporate governance.

3.7 The IASB Conceptual Framework

The providing of a comprehensible collection of principles for assessing accounting practices and establishing novel accounting practices as the very significant purpose of accounting theory (Belkaoui, 2004:1; Coetsee, 2010:5; Hendriksen, 1982:1). This is the reason why the Conceptual Framework is steadfast in establishing financial reporting standards which are developed on the basis of principles instead of rules (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:153; Filipova, 2017:1; Kiyanga, 2014:90).

The revision of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IAS/IFRS), which should, by its very nature, be anticipated to revise the conceptual basis of financial accounting itself, has raised a broad range of debates and expressions of views from accounting specialists (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:154; Filipova, 2017:1). The evolutionary approach to revising the conceptual framework of IAS/IFRS was anticipated, given to the traditional accounting

conservatism, as well as chronologically tracking the entire process launched in 2004 (Filipova, 2017:1). The complex and dynamic global economy in recent years have motivated the IASB not to pursue its intention to improve and update the IAS/IFRS Conceptual Framework (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:154; Filipova, 2017:1). The aim is to develop a more complete, clear and modern system of concepts and principles for the preparation of general purpose financial statements (Filipova, 2017:1). However, there are numerous explanations as to why the Conceptual Framework is not a universally accepted theory of accounting. The first explanation is that the Conceptual Framework assess accounting conventions as opposed to clarifying and envisaging them (Kiyanga, 2014:90). In addition, while the Framework states that accrual accounting is a better basis for evaluating past and future performance than cash-based accounting, it does not explain why (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:155). In order to clarify this assertion, there is need for a conceptualisation of how entities' business models are adopted to create value, and of the advantages and shortfalls of accounting data in improving investors' awareness of that value-creation (Barker & Teixeira, 2018:155).

3.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

The ever evolving field of corporate disclosure and transparency is filled with a broad variety of overlapping and interrelated concepts. Most of these concepts serve either as the driving forces behind, or as manifestations of the sustainability agenda. The concept descriptions and clarifications provided in this chapter, have shown that the main ideas promulgated by each of these concepts (corporate governance, corporate accountability, corporate sustainability, corporate transparency and corporate disclosure), are often much the same and at times indivisible. Although they are self-determining and powerful ideas in their own right, these disclosure and transparency related concepts are usually reciprocally interdependent on one another within business and academic arenas. As a result, concepts such as corporate governance, corporate accountability, corporate sustainability, corporate transparency and corporate disclosure all have important roles to play in shaping the contractual relationship between business and society and enhancing the quality of all human life on the planet. These ideas will continue to help form an understanding of the directions that society will compel business to head into, so as to ensure a balance between the needs of: (1) corporations and their stakeholder groups; as well as between (2) current and future generations.

In terms of this chapter's contribution to the overall objective of this research, the explorations of these concepts (in particular the theoretical dimensions of corporate disclosure and transparency) have been specifically valuable for the development of the different 'variables'- that can be identified with the use of the disclosure and transparency index, developed by this study.

Now that some of the most important concepts related to corporate disclosure and transparency have been discussed, the following chapter will be focused on providing a theoretical and empirical overview of corporate disclosure and transparency. The next chapter will draw on the review of literature as a source of hypotheses formulation and establish the study framework and methodology for this research. In particular, this chapter addresses three major issues. Firstly, applicable corporate governance theories concentrating on corporate disclosure and transparency principles are examined. Secondly, empirical literature regarding the determinants of mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure in relation to corporate transparency is discussed, and hypotheses are formulated. Thirdly, empirical literature concerning the connection between corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance is discussed and the subsequent formulation of the hypotheses there from.

Chapter 4 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: Theoretical and Empirical Overview

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides important theoretical and empirical background concerning corporate disclosure and transparency matters in both emerging and advanced countries. Manifold theories are particularly assumed to describe the role of disclosure and transparency in good corporate governance and accountability. Precisely, the chapter endeavours to accomplish the following main objectives. Firstly, this chapter considers the major theories linked to corporate disclosure and transparency. The chapter will emphasis on the necessity of corporate governance, disclosure and transparency as well as the theories supported by researchers to explain the phenomena. Secondly, this chapter offers an assessment of the important empirical literature comprising the key issues regarding corporate governance and particularly disclosure and transparency. Additionally, it highlights the factors shaping voluntary corporate reporting practices. The motivation was to discover gaps in the experiential literature linked to the likely factors of disclosure and transparency that can be attended by this study. The conclusions in this chapter regarding the identified gaps in the current bulk of studies would give the foundation for a notionally established theoretical framework that was explicated in *Chapter 5*. Thirdly, this chapter examines experiential researches evaluating the association among business disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance. Particularly, it trails the current literature involving corporate governance, corporate reporting and firm performance. The link between corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance is evaluated by employing both *Model 2* and *Model 3* as discussed in *Chapter 1* of this thesis. *Model 2* encompasses an analysis of the relationship between specific corporate disclosure and transparency variables and firm performance. The *Model 3* comprises an examination of the connection between a merged corporate disclosure and transparency scoring system and corporate performance. The assessment assisted in establishing an appreciation of the experiential approaches, sources of data and results, in addition to discovering gaps in the current literature that a research study in the Zimbabwean context can address.

4.2 The Theoretical Literature on Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

The current section analyses corporate disclosure and transparency theories associated with both mandatory and optional corporate reporting. As examined in *Chapter 1*, Zimbabwe has been for the past few decades, undergoing corporate governance transformations, with the

objective of enhancing corporate governance practices, corporate disclosure, corporate transparency and safeguarding stockholder interests and stakeholders (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53; Maune, 2015:167; NCCGZ, 2014:1). Corporate transparency and disclosure are both important principles of corporate governance (Robertson *et al.*, 2013:315). According to Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010:939) and Solomon (2010:1) corporate governance is interconnected to diverse specialities comprising of law, economics, accounting and finance, administrative behaviour, administration, morals and politics. Consequently, it may be challenging to depend on a single theory. For example, as argued by (Chen & Roberts, 2010:651; Sharma, 2013:183), using the agency theory only in inferring and clarifying corporate disclosure and transparency behaviour, may be insufficient.

Numerous meta-analyses have discovered that many studies have assumed viewpoints based on several theories to explain the determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:5; Albassam, 2014:50; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:257; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:119; Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Price *et al.*, 2011:76; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:104; Ștefănescu, 2014:113; Suttipun, 2017:134; De Villiers *et al.*, 2017:937; Vormedal and Ruud, 2009:208; Zattoni *et al.*, 2013:119). These studies have suggested that corporate disclosure and transparency studies cannot be linked to the theory of agency only but other theoretic frameworks such as the stakeholder theory, signalling theory, information asymmetry theory and so forth. Accordingly, in agreement with these former studies (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:3; Albassam, 2014:50; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118; Price *et al.*, 2011:76; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168; Ștefănescu, 2014:113), a multiple-theoretical framework is implemented to assess the associations between corporation disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance in the annual reports. These annual reports are assessed to better appreciate the way firm attributes and corporate governance factors describe sustainability disclosure employing a legitimacy theory framework. In agreement with the stakeholder theory, the expectancy is that the quality and extent of disclosure are linked to the degree of public (stakeholder) pressure on corporation to publicise information on their social and environmental performance. In addition, the use of the agency theoretical framework is essential in corporate governance and transparency practices in the context of Zimbabwe. These three overarching (agency, legitimacy and stakeholder) theories will primarily inform this study. However, the other theories including the shareholder primacy theory, enlightened

shareholder value theory, resource dependency theory and capital market based theories, discussed in this chapter are also relevant to this study.

The theories considered in this chapter are applicable to this research study because they give the framework for reference in evaluating the quality and extent of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in ZSE listed firms. These theories are succinctly reviewed in the subsequent sections.

4.2.1 Agency Theory

The agency theory is amongst the main theories of corporate governance and numerous studies on corporate disclosure and transparency practices are centred on this theory as documented by several authors (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:3; Albassam, 2014:50; De Villiers *et al.*, 2017:937; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:258; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118; Li *et al.*, 2018:62; Price *et al.*, 2011:77; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:104; Ștefănescu, 2014:113; Suttipun, 2017:133; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207; Zattoni *et al.*, 2013:119). Filatotchev and Boyd (2009:258). These studies concur with the explanation of the agency theory given by Jensen and Meckling (1976:306). The agency treaty has been explained as an arrangement binding owners who are the principals and managers who are the agents. The managers are anticipated to manage the corporation in the interest of shareholders. Although the aim of both parties in the agency affiliation is to operate so as to achieve the objectives of the principal, information asymmetry and materialism tempt management into chasing own objectives conflicting to those of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976:306). These conflicting interests between management and the stockholders is termed as the agency problem (Clarke, 2004:1; Zattoni *et al.*, 2013:119).

Jensen and Meckling (1976:306) initially developed the agency theory and suggested the probability of agency clashes between business corporation owners and managers. It is only fair to acknowledge the fact that the legendary economist Adam Smith had long discovered the presence of such potential agency disputes, usually rooted in the separation of ownership (stockholding) and control (management) in present-day businesses (Albassam, 2014:50). In particular, Smith (1776:1) explained the agency problem in these words: “*The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnership frequently watch over their*

own.... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company”.

In principle, the agency theory advocates the reduction of agency dilemmas between shareowners and managers by uniting the interests of managers (representatives) with those of stockholders (owners) (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:3; Albassam, 2014:50). Likewise, it advocates the prevention of the wanton deprivation of shareowners' wealth (Suttipun, 2017:134). The literature on corporate governance presents examples of these excessive wealth expropriation: (i) executive directors could manipulate privileged knowledge for their individual gain (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306); (ii) executive directors granting exorbitant salaries and bonuses to themselves (Bebchuk *et al.*, 2009:783; Berle & Means, 1932:1; Zattoni *et al.*, 2013:119); and (iii) as Jensen and Meckling (1976:306) documented, managers can squander business resources through expanded spending of benefits including having grander workplaces and more clerical assistance.

In order to abate conflicting interests, principals should utilise various inducements to oversee their agents (Suttipun, 2017:134). For instance, institutional investors, with their significant share ownerships, are eager to observe the performance of their investee corporations. Therefore, businesses have a firm incentive to release non-obligatory information to communicate to their big shareowners who examine and monitor their investments (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012:515; Suttipun, 2017:134). Previous research studies report a positive relationship between huge institutional ownership and improved corporate disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001:406). According to Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012:515), an additional method to alleviate the agency problem is to lower the information asymmetry between shareowners and management. Hence, corporate governance systems and voluntary disclosure are influential in facilitating the protection of shareowners' interests and reduce agency conflicts. However, business corporations may discriminate the information to be disclosed since managers determine the disclosures (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515).

Solomon (2010:1) affirms that the agency theory proposes that corporate governance instruments can be established to allay managerial opportunism, thus reducing agency costs. In particular, agency theory bids for the formation of an institution of governance structures by establishing a set of legal agreements by stockholders to scrutinise managers. Firstly, the agency theory suggests a decrease in the total number of executive board members in order to

boost the board's independence (Berle & Means, 1932:1; Solomon, 2010:1). Additionally, this may aid shareowners to hold board members accountable (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010:939). According to Allegrini and Greco (2013:187) Board of directors' sub-committees including audit, nomination and remuneration committees, are vital mechanisms to observe managerial practices. Secondly, the setting up of an internal control system can facilitate the control of wealth deprivation by a company's management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306). Thirdly, devising a managerial benefits and incentive scheme that is related to corporate performance could boost the managers' performance (Kiyanga, 2014:40; Sengupta & Zhang, 2015:1073; Suttipun, 2017:133). Jensen & Meckling (1976:306) argued that this scheme, consequently, may reduce the misuse of the business corporation's resources by managers for their own interest.

Finally, the former studies have proposed that sound governance by the institution of operational corporate governance instruments, including more transparent disclosures could result in a net decline in agency costs (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Suttipun, 2017:133). Additionally, as alluded to by Siddiqui *et al.* (2013:103), it would lessen checking and relating expenses, hence enhancing general transparency practices, corporate disclosure and corporate performance. This is the main justification highlighted in the suggestions by numerous corporate governance codes in several countries (FRC, 2014:1; IoDSA, 2009:1; NCCGZ, 2014:1).

4.2.1.1 Agency Theory in the Zimbabwean Business Setting

The government of Zimbabwe has assumed numerous actions for many years to improve the corporate governance practices. The release of the 2015 National Code of Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) constitutes a cornerstone of the reforms (IoDZ, 2015:1; Maune, 2015:167; Rossouw, 2005:94). In line with some corporate governance codes, the NCCGZ aims to lower agency tensions concerning managers and shareowners through the improvement in transparency, accountability and responsibility of corporate boards of directors (Al-Malkawi *et al.*, 2014:133; Price *et al.*, 2011:76; World Bank, 2011:1).

Essentially, the agency theory is crucial within the Zimbabwe setting characterised by a mixture of high ownership concentration in some listed firms and fairly dispersed ownership in some Zimbabwe listed firms (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:54; Maune, 2015:167). According to Owusu-Ansah (1998) institutional investors including insurance companies, and

provident funds are prevalent on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Furthermore, there is rampant use of locally registered nominee companies. Ownership concentration might negatively impact the rights of minority stockholders (Qaiser, 2011:47). This, therefore may create conflicting interests concerning minority shareholders and majority shareholders. For instance, majority shareowners can influence the appointment of their friends and relatives. These appointments may lead to a bias towards looking after the interests of major shareowners, while neglecting the interests of minority shareholders (Albassam, 2014:50). Additionally, politically well-linked persons might be selected to leading positions minus consideration their competencies to execute those positions (Qaiser, 2011:47). Such malpractices could negatively affect the voluntary disclosure of information and corporate performance (Albassam, 2014:50).

Zimbabwe critically needs foreign direct investment (Ndhlukula, 2017:1). Foreign investors normally depend on operational corporate governance structures (Al-Malkawi *et al.*, 2014:133; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005:127; Liew, 2007:724; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:54)). According to Mangena and Tauringana (2007:54) the reasoning behind this claim is that foreign investors are ordinarily small shareholders and encounter greater risks of expropriation by corporation managers and/or majority shareowners. This challenge is further aggravated by geographical distance (Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168). In other words, although local minority stockholders are capacitated (though restricted) to monitor corporation managers straightforwardly, scrutinising expenses for foreign investors may be significantly excessive (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:54). Effectual corporate governance systems could lower foreign investors' risks and enhance their assurance and motivation to invest in certain listed corporations. Additionally, these governance mechanisms could aid in ensuring that minority shareowners get dependable information about the performance of the business and that the value of their investment has not been consumed by managers and major shareowners (Bushman *et al.*, 2004:167). Hence, the usage of an agency theoretical framework is of greater significance in the Zimbabwean environment.

4.2.2 Shareholder Primacy Theory and Enlightened Shareholder Value Theory

The debate on corporate governance, in particular disclosure and transparency, became more important when the fundamental perception of the corporation changed (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:264; Ho, 2009:60). Initially, the single real objective of a business corporation was the maximisation of profits for the shareholders (Clarke, 2004:1). Accordingly, this viewpoint

implies that the shareholders are the ‘owners of the corporation’, the prime stakeholders and most significant providers of capital who empower the company to perform business operations. This is termed the shareholder primacy theory (Berle & Means, 1932:1). Conventional wisdom concerning shareholder primacy was challenged vehemently (Millon, 1993:1373). This was highlighted by statements such as ‘managerial accountability to shareowners is corporate law’s main problem’ and, most recently, that ‘shareholder primacy theory is suffering a crisis of confidence’ (Stout, 2013:1). Millon (1993:1373) documented that a slightly variant theory surfaced, moving away from the narrow ‘shareholder primacy’ theory to what is called an ‘enlightened shareholder value’ theory. In general, the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ theory proposes that productive relations (multiple stakeholder’s relationships) could be realised within the framework of existing corporate law and corporate governance concepts. In other words, maintaining ‘shareholder supremacy’ notion, but ensuring that directors chase shareholders’ interests in an enlightened and inclusive way (Millon, 1993:1374).

According to Stout (2013:1), the ‘shareholder supremacy’ view progressively transformed. There was a new perspective about business corporations, particularly large public corporations. It was noticed legally that the corporation have other stakeholders besides its shareholders (Stout, 2013:1). Therefore, if the only purpose of a business is ‘the maximisation of profits for the shareholders’, other stakeholders could suffer immensely (Stout, 2013:1). For example, poor working conditions for workers, exploitation of natural assets, pollution and so on. Society and natural assets would be subsidising the corporation and its ‘owners’. The concept of ‘managing the company’ was then expressed in terms of these additional interests along with the company’s responsibilities to workers as members of the business corporation, to consumers of the goods and services it provides, and to the community of which it is a citizen (Millon, 1993:1373).

The ‘enlightened shareholder value’ theory may be explained as the interim step and transitional time to consider more on the shortfalls of the ‘shareholder primacy’ theory and the strengths of a modest ‘all-inclusive stakeholder’ theory, which was later formulated (Tricker, 2012:1). Professor Mervyn King disputed this viewpoint by arguing that the shareholder primacy theory was promoted by economists and not by lawyers or accountants (King, 2014:1). Professor Mervyn King in 2014, described his viewpoint in the following statement; ‘It should

also be noted that the company is a legal entity and a person in its own right. Slavery was abolished a long time ago. A person cannot be owned. Shareholders have a conglomeration of very important incorporeal rights which entitle them to influence the objectives of the corporation, vote for the appointment of directors, remove directors, institute action against directors for contravention of fiduciary duties (if the company does not agree to do so) and to receive a dividend if the board has declared one, but it is not correct to say that they ‘own’ the company.’

4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory

Tricker (2012) pointed out that there was demand for a rethink of the conventional Anglo-American notion of the corporation which still relies on the 18th and 19th century principles, concepts and notions. Progressively, for the past few decades, the conception of corporate governance begun adopting a new articulation of ‘managing the corporation’, mainly focussing on the interrelationship between internal groups and persons such as the board of directors, the shareholders in general meeting, employees, chief executive officers (CEOs), managing directors, executive directors, non-executive directors, managers, audit committees and other committees of the board (Du Plessis & Rühmkorf, 2015:52). Nonetheless, the identification of additional ‘stakeholders’ began to be noticeable, including creditors, customers, ‘the community’, ‘the environment’ and ‘the government (Du Plessis *et al.*, 2010:275).

There are various presumptions motivating the stakeholder theory. Firstly, business entities must be managed for the economic advantage of their owners and also for the interests of the related wider society (Chen and Roberts, 2010:652). Secondly, executive directors are equitably responsible to all stakeholders including the corporation’s owners, creditors, workforce, state, local society, consumers and traders (Clarke, 2004:1). Thirdly, stakeholder theory is intensely linked to philosophies of ethics in business and corporate social accountability (Kolk, 2008:2; Landrum & Daily, 2012:52).

The theory of stakeholders has been broadly rooted in governance codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:376; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738). Nevertheless, this theory was critiqued based on two viewpoints (Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102; Sternberg, 1997:113): (i) the presumptions of stakeholder theory does not agree with the main purpose of the corporation to maximise the shareholders’ value; and (ii) it also clashes with the agent-principal association, which proposes that managers are mainly answerable to shareowners. Therefore, stakeholder

theory is questionably discordant against the fundamental principles of corporate governance. However, stakeholder theory continues to be an important corporate governance theory (Chen & Roberts, 2010:652; Solomon, 2010:1). According to Suttipun (2017:133) the key principles of the stakeholder theory are thusly that corporations are answerable to their stakeholders and that the appropriate aim of managing is to equalise the stakeholders' differing interests.

As discussed in *Chapter 1* a variety of stakeholders are affected by corporations' operations in various ways (Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). It could be observed that businesses endeavour to satisfy the desires of their diverse information users by disclosures in annual reports. Since there are numerous stakeholders, it is assumed that corporations disclose a diversified information in an attempt to fulfil the desires of these diverse stakeholders as considered in more detail in *Chapter 3*. Business corporations in their annual reports release information comprising numerous issues including social disclosures, environmental disclosures, financial reporting, governance reporting and sustainability reporting. The disclosures by companies enables stakeholders in the assessment of different facets about the corporation comprising of effectiveness and efficiency of the management, corporate citizenship, compliance with law, company performance, position and outlook projections of the company and so forth.

4.2.3.1 Stakeholder Theory in the Zimbabwean Business Setting

The code of corporate governance enacted in Zimbabwe takes an explicitly stakeholder focus (NCCGZ, 2014). The 2014 NCCGZ's chapter 8 does include provisions related to the stakeholder relationships, referring to a company as a multi- interest enterprise (Paragraph 392). Paragraph 394 states that stakeholders are the *raison d'être* for corporate governance and the prime constituency of the company. It further explains that the association between a corporation and its stakeholders is regulated by law and by best practice codes. Business corporations in Zimbabwe are supposed to chase the interests of stockholders and also enhance the interests of additional stakeholders including employees, local communities and governments. Additionally, the African value of 'Ubuntu' inspires generosity to society, thusly it could be rationally assumed that companies are socially responsible oriented. Nevertheless, there could be various barriers hindering the effective use of stakeholder theory in the Zimbabwean business setting. Firstly, as discussed in earlier chapters, conformity to the governance requirements of the NCCGZ is optional or voluntary (i.e., a 'apply or explain' system), which works efficiently in a business environment in which ownership of companies

is comparatively broadly or dispersedly held. However, ownership in Zimbabwe listed companies is occasionally very concentrated, mainly through high government and institutional share ownerships, which is inclined on prioritising major shareholders, thereby ignoring the interests of other stakeholders. Secondly, the notion of sound corporate governance from a wider viewpoint is undergoing its early development phase in the Zimbabwe business environment. Specifically, as was explained in the analysis chapters, the overall consciousness and comprehension of good corporate disclosure and transparency practices is still comparatively low among ZSE listed corporations, which can unfavourably influence the relevance of stakeholder theory within the Zimbabwe corporate environment.

4.2.4 Legitimacy Theory

The impetus for corporate disclosure and transparency practices can be explained by the legitimacy theory. This theory infers that corporate reporting respond to economic, social and political components (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207). Tilling and Tilt (2010:56) remarked that these corporate disclosures are seemingly a reaction to legitimise their activities. The legitimacy theory also describe the effort made by business corporations to combat perceived threats to their legitimacy (Deegan 2002:283; Deegan & Blomquist 2006:344; Kiyanga, 2014:50; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207).

The legitimacy theory is established on the principle that there is an inferred social agreement concerning a business corporation and the society (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207). In addition, the conditions of the social agreement state the societal expectancies from the business corporations but simultaneously outlining the business's activities, its growth and existence (Guthrie & Parker, 1989:243; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207). These social contracts compel the business corporation to implement its goals in a socially desired way and reciprocally secure an endorsement in the achievement of its programs to eventually guarantee its continued business status (Jensen and Berg, 2012; Turturea, 2015b). The legitimacy theory then proposes that a legitimacy gap occurs when a business corporation is alleged to be neglecting the society expectancies (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:207; Sethi, 1977:1)). Additionally, Sethi (1977:1) states that if the legitimacy gap is not reduced then the business corporation starts to forfeit its legitimacy. According to Tilling (2008:1) the proof of forfeiture of legitimacy may take diverse ways comprising withdrawal of the social agreement and diverse sanctions such as restriction of admission to certain resources and even diminished

need for the business corporation's products. In extra ordinary scenarios, the very survival of the business corporation could be jeopardised. Khor (2003:1) documents that there are three strategies to reduce the legitimacy gap including the legitimacy instituting strategy, the reactive strategy and legitimacy sustaining strategy.

In Tilling & Tilt (2010:56)'s view, the legitimacy theory describes and envisages business reporting from a preparer's perception, as a means by which businesses publicise their legitimising plans. The legitimacy theory proposes that a business corporation's disclosure policies are guided by its legitimising strategy. Therefore, with a corporation's legitimising strategy, the type of corporate disclosure to achieve this strategy could be deduced (Tilling & Tilt, 2010:56; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:208).

The rationality of the legitimacy theory has been validated by research of business corporation endurance strategy throughout threatening periods (Deegan 2002; Deegan & Blomquist 2006; Tilling & Tilt, 2010:56; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:208). According to Ashford and Gibbs (1990:177) it has been noted that when rules, laws, standards or perception change, the business corporation that endure are those which acclimatise their performance to correspond with the new environment. Businesses that do not reduce their legitimacy gaps concede to sanctions and subsequently compromise their long term survival. Tilling (2008:1) affirmed that the legitimacy theory appears to be among the mostly quoted theories in financial reporting and disclosure. The legitimacy theory is applicable to several areas including the financial reporting framework, social and environment accounting, sustainability disclosure and the disclosure of contingencies (Tilling, 2008:1). In particular, the legitimacy theory backs the Financial Reporting Framework by explaining that stakeholders shape financial reporting. Corporations making disclosures including sustainability KPIs, CSR and environmental disclosures could help in guaranteeing the continual existence of the reporting business corporation (Tilling, 2008; Tilling & Tilt, 2010:56; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009:208).

4.2.4.1 Legitimacy Theory in the Zimbabwean Corporate Environment

Legitimacy theory aims to cause an appreciation of the factors that may trigger variability in sustainability disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005:391). Corporate disclosure is best described as an instrument for upholding legitimacy (Deegan, 2002:282; Islam & Deegan, 2008:850). Legitimacy theory infers that voluntary non-financial disclosures are a function of the need for business corporations to legitimise behaviours and justify their existence (Lai *et al.*, 2016:165).

Therefore, disclosure of information becomes a vital element in maintaining a good standing and an operational licence from the society (Turturea, 2015:2161). At the international business environment, the formation of standard-setting institutions for corporate responsibility, sustainability reporting and environmental reporting has also promoted the increase in non-financial disclosures. According to Faisal *et al.* (2012:19) the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) represents perhaps the most important driver on non-financial disclosures. The intention of the GRI is to encourage a procedure of standardisation and harmonisation for disclosures by establishing a generally accepted framework for sustainability reporting. Gilbert (2002:18) affirmed that the framework provides a useful complement to national social and environmental regulations, and is part of an emerging system of 'soft law' for sustainability reporting. The NCCGZ recommends business corporations in Zimbabwe to apply the GRI framework for sustainability reporting (NCCGZ, 2014:1).

4.2.5 Resource Dependence Theory

The resource dependence theory proposes that the board of directors act as an important linkage between the corporation and the financial and non-financial resources that are vital for the corporation's growth (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972). Business organisations are not self-reliant as they depend on their environment for survival (Chen & Roberts, (2010a). Fundamentally, the resource dependence theory centres on the means that business organisations secure admittance on to critical resources for existence and expansion. Hence, the resource dependence theory depends on two key suppositions (Albassam, 2014). Firstly, the board of directors plays an overseeing function and also offers needed crucial resources including business contacts and agreements, knowledge, experience and know-how (Chen, 2011; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). In the opinion of Pearce and Zahra (1992) this could increase financial performance and maximise shareholders' wealth. Secondly, the board of directors is capable of representing the interests of various stakeholders including local communities, government, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, regulators and policy-makers (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Therefore, as suggested by (Chen & Roberts, 2010), the board of directors could assist the business corporation to attain competitive benefit by working as a close link between the business corporation and the environs wherein it functions.

4.2.6 Capital Market Based Theories

The annual report disclosures prepared by finance directors are shaped by financial analysts to a certain extent (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Syed & Bajwa,

2018:416). In particular, equity investors and analysts are mainly concerned with capital market information to assist them in making investment decisions (Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16). This confirms the argument by Gray *et al.* (1995:43), who wrote that in most cases financial statements presentation serves as a means of resolving conflicts between diverse stakeholders for both specific and implicit agreements (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35; Fu *et al.*, 2012:2). For instance, between stockholders and bondholders, and also between the company and the public (Aman & Nguyen, 2008:647; Stacchezzini *et al.*, 2016:102). On the basis of these foregoing facts, it is rationale to expect business corporations to release market linked information (Balakrishnan *et al.*, 2014:2; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536; Sponholtz, 2008:5; Yafele, 2012:55).

Some claims have been made previously proposing that listed firms possibly release market linked information (Gamerschlag *et al.*, 2011:233; Iatridis, 2008:219; Sponholtz, 2008:5; Wang *et al.*, 2008:14). Iatridis (2008:219) agreed with Sponholtz (2008:219)'s view that managers would release market linked information if they consider that it will improve the prosperity of the disclosing company's stockholders. Market linked information will signify useful news about the business corporation (Horton & Serafeim, 2010:725). If dealers were to encounter reduced charges for obtaining business information, risk allocation is enhanced by rendering dealers' attitudes more similar (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35; Diamond, 1985:1071; Van Buskirk, 2011:411). This claim had long been made by Diamond (1985:1071) and was investigated by Barry and Brown (1986:65) and Merton (1987:483) who arrived at similar inferences that managers could decrease their required rate of return by lowering information risk by improving the levels of reporting. Lastly, there is a suggestion that increasing market information reporting could lower information asymmetry which could successively lower the firm's required rate of return (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35; Deborah & Patricia, 2012:39; Fu *et al.*, 2012:2; Healy & Palepu, 2001:405; Van Buskirk, 2011:411).

When crises arise due to the presence of information asymmetry in the stock markets, gesturing could be exploited to ease them (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35). Information disproportion could be decreased by companies by publicising information to less enlightened stakeholders (Fu *et al.*, 2012:2). For instance, a business corporation issuing the annual report to its stockholders (Fu *et al.*, 2012:2; Yafele, 2012:45). Signalling has been applied in former researches to describe managers' interests in freely releasing information about the forecasts of the disclosing firm to the stock market (Connelly *et al.*, 2010:39; Ozo & Arun, 2019:366; Ross, 1979:1). Superior

management performance pushes share prices upwards and poor performance force them down (Connelly *et al.*, 2010:39; Ozo & Arun, 2019:366; Fifield *et al.*, 2011:295). Nevertheless, this appraisal is only drawn from the information accessible to the market (Syed & Bajwa, 2018:416). Stock prices are pushed downwards by the market in a situation of extreme information asymmetry (Van Buskirk, 2011:411). The overall view is that inadequate corporate reporting suggests that there is unpleasant information being isolated from the market (Fu *et al.*, 2012:2; Van Buskirk, 2011:411). Improved corporate reporting has an upward impact on the corporation's stock prices (Balakrishnan *et al.*, 2014:2). The management compensation is likely to improve in relation to improved performance (Sponholtz, 2008:219; Syed & Bajwa, 2018:416). Nevertheless, the signalling theory neglects to explain non-financial incentives for stifling information release (Van Buskirk, 2011:411; Okcabol & Tinker, 1993:10).

Arguments supporting the notion that increased disclosure lower the cost of capital were acknowledged as early as 1957 (Horngren, 1957:1; Yafele, 2012:67). Fairly enlightened analysts and investors could positively affect the firm's stock prices (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35). Investors are responsible for investing choices and do so being influenced by the volume of information they have (Shores, 1990:164; Van Buskirk, 2011:411). Thus, there is some degree of risk implied as there is usually some kind of ambiguity over the accessible information (Fu *et al.*, 2012). Improved information disclosed about a disclosing business corporation could reduce some uncertainty that investors confront in the decision making procedure (Van Buskirk, 2011:411). In addition, information asymmetry normally causes higher transaction costs for trading stocks of a corporation (Fu *et al.*, 2012:2). This situation triggers a higher required rate of return and forces prevailing equity share prices downwards (Fu *et al.*, 2012:2). There are several authors who claim that managers who improve the corporate information accessible to the market causes a reduction in the levels of information asymmetry (Akins *et al.*, 2012:35; Botosan, 1997::323; Lambert *et al.*, 2012:2; Sengupta, 1998:459). This decline in information asymmetry ought to lead to the maximisation of the value of the disclosing business corporation (Van Buskirk, 2011:411; Yafele, 2012:45).

Investors ascertain the value of a business by the opinion they attribute to the management's malleability to the economic background upon which the corporation functions (Bekiros *et al.*, 2016:291; Trueman, 1986:53). The notion proposed in these research studies was that highly talented managers desire to display their competence by issuing voluntary earnings forecasts

(Yafele, 2012). This is done in order to publicise their calibre (Syed & Bajwa, 2018; Trueman, 1986:53). The purpose of the projections would be to offer investors with an optimistic evaluation of the management's capabilities (Sponholtz, 2008:219). The projections released, generally envisage fluctuations within the economic operating environment of the respective corporation and would thusly assist in choosing suitable production strategies (Loukil & Yousfi, 2012:30). It may be proposed that incomes projections could signify a solid position for the business in the future and this might cause a firmer stock price being inferred by the stock markets (Sponholtz, 2008:219).

4.3 Previous Empirical Work and Hypothesis Development

Extensive research studies (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Bernardi & Stark, 2018:16; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Feng *et al.*, 2017:330; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Lai *et al.*, 2016:165; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221; Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007:585; Oshika & Saka, 2017:625; Suttipun, 2017:133; Zattoni *et al.*, 2013:119) have been performed on the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency and business entity performance. After the discussion in *Chapter 3* and this chapter on current literature and the theoretic framework, it could be established that there is no specific theory to describe corporate reporting and transparency practices. *Chapter 3* reviewed the main conceptions associated with corporate governance in general and especially disclosure and transparency, as a preamble to the development of a several hypotheses to be examined in this study. *Section 4.1* of this chapter also discussed relevant theories of disclosure and transparency.

The major objective in this section was to develop hypotheses to evaluate the disclosure and transparency in three parts: firstly, the extent of disclosure and transparency in relationship with the release of the NCCGZ; secondly, the extent of disclosure and transparency in association with business corporation attributes; and thirdly, the link between disclosure and transparency practices and business corporation performance. Therefore, this section will analyse prior empirical work in order to develop these hypotheses.

According to OECD (2004:1) detailed disclosure and transparency of financial information is one of the critical elements of the corporate governance framework and is considered as a key indicator of good corporate governance practices. Corporations with higher corporate governance attributes make more informative reporting (Qaiser, 2011:47; Samaha *et al.*,

2012:168). Sadka (2004:1) provided both theoretical and empirical proof that the publication of financial and analyst reports has improved factor productivity and economic growth in thirty countries. In *Chapter 3* of this thesis corporate governance was described. Disclosure and transparency are essential elements of corporate governance as stockholders and additional stakeholders require adequate information about a corporation's activities and performance to evaluate risk and make investment decisions (Osama, 2013:1).

According to Osama (2013:1) theoretical and practical studies connected to corporate disclosure discussed components that might affect disclosure. For instance, there are three components which affect corporate disclosure and transparency, including intercontinental (foreign country), external (inside the country but external to the corporation) and internal (inside the country and within a corporation) (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006:277; Alsaeed, 2006:476; Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; Cooke & Wallace, 1990:79; Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:45; Gamerschlag *et al.*, 2011:233; Jensen & Berg, 2012:299; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515; Muttakin & Khan, 2014:168; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168). This study set hypotheses linked to these three factors after considering former studies.

A positive link exist between disclosure and transparency and firm performance, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306), related theories (Guthrie & Parker, 1989:242; Lambert *et al.*, 2012:1) and previous empirical studies (*see Appendix 1*). Research studies discovered that corporations could enhance their performance by conforming to good governance disclosure and transparency practices (Renders *et al.*, 2010:87; Rose, 2016:202; Zhang *et al.*, 2014:501). The study by Renders *et al.* (2010:100) accepted a hypothesis that suggested a positive association between fourteen variables of transparency and disclosure practices and corporation performance. Nevertheless, these associations and envisaged advantages of disclosure and transparency are very significant for developing markets including Zimbabwe as they are in extreme necessity of foreign funding to enable their economies for quicker growth. Hence, this research study does not intend to develop a theory but to explain the disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwean business corporations' annual reports as well as to assess the connection between the disclosure and transparency practices and several evaluated corporation performances. Furthermore, based on the analysis of the forgoing theoretical and experiential literature, this section formulates hypotheses and a conceptual framework relating to the degree of disclosure and transparency, the influence of

corporation attributes on disclosure and transparency, and the link between disclosure and transparency and corporation performance.

The rest of this section is structured as follows. *Section 4.3.1* offers an outline of the NCCGZ D&T Index. *Section 4.3.2* provides a review of corporate disclosure and transparency variations, and pinpoints the one research hypothesis and two sub-hypotheses. *Section 4.3.3* presents a review of disclosure and transparency and firm characteristics and identifies two research hypotheses and fifteen sub-hypotheses, examined in this research. *Section 4.3.4* analyses individual corporate governance systems and business corporation performance, and identifies one research hypotheses and seven sub-hypotheses, examined in this research. The section also reviews disclosure and transparency and firm performance, and identify one hypothesis which is tested in this study. *Section 4.3.5* gives a review of comparison of the degree of conformity to the codes of governance in various countries and *Section 4.4* provides the overview and conclusion of this chapter.

4.3.1 Corporate Governance Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI)

This study intends to examine the extent and determinants of disclosure and transparency in the annual reports of listed corporations in Zimbabwe. For the past few decades, the disclosure and transparency index or score criteria of corporate governance codes is being employed as a measure of corporate governance. According to Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:88) corporate governance disclosure index (CGDI) is a very important and useful tool to evaluate the corporate governance disclosure practices of any company at global level. Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:88) used CGDI for 18 banks listed in BANKEX (BSE) as on 1st January, 2010. Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:88) showed that financial performance (measured by return on assets - ROA) is positively related with financial and non-financial disclosures of corporate governance disclosures. In addition, Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:88) ascertained that financial disclosures are positively related with the return on assets and non-financial disclosures. Moreover, Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:94), in their calculations proved that there is a positive correlation between the performance of selected banks and the financial disclosures and non-financial disclosures [CGDI]. To evaluate the linkage between corporate governance and performance in Saudi listed companies, Albassam (2014) developed the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) consisting of 65 requirements. This index was made up of four corporate governance sub-indices, comprising of: (i) the board of directors and board

sub-committees; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) the internal control system; and (iv) the rights of stockholders and general assembly. The study by Albassam (2014) discovered that there is a significant and positive relationship between corporate governance practices represented by the Saudi Corporate Governance Index and company's ability to make profit determined by ROA. As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976:306), Solomon (2010) and recently Kılıç and Kuzey, (2018:120) , this agrees with the theoretical expectancy that sound corporate governance practices enhances answerability and upgrade internal control systems in business corporations, thereby reducing agency costs. Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016:768) established a more inclusive assessment of implementation applying a scoring system that merges trichotomous weighting of each governance component (as 1, 3, or 5) and trichotomous rating of implementation of each component (as 0, 0.5, or 1). An association analysis of the corporate governance scores and company-based measures (level and changes) showed that the relationship between these diverse variables varies considerably over the implementation window (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:770). The study of Price *et al.* (2011:90) constructed a governance score on the basis of the degree of conformity to the recommended provisions in the Code of 'Best' corporate practices filed with Mexico's regulators each year and used this score as a representation for the intensity of governance. The study finds that greater compliance with the code is related to increased dividend payments, consistent with better-governed companies being forced to adopt costly measures to reduce agency costs as opposed to obtaining benefits via financial reporting transparency.

Several studies (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:122; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:620; Sanan & Yadav, 2011:65) have utilised indices based on various benchmarks such as the Standard and Poor (S&P) Transparency and Disclosure, GRI Sustainability, Integrated Reporting, corporate governance codes and so forth to evaluate information reporting in different countries. Sanan and Yadav (2011:65) constructed a Corporate Governance Transparency and Disclosure Score (CGS) for the sampled 30 Indian BSE listed corporations on the basis of the qualities derived from the Standard and Poor's (S&P) Transparency and Disclosure Survey (2008). The key findings of the research by Sanan and Yadav (2011:78) are that the CGS for the study period (2001-02 to 2008-09) indicates that financial disclosures of the selected corporations have revealed a constant increase. In a study by Owusu-Ansah (1998:620) an index approach was employed to evaluate the level of obligatory annual report disclosure practices of the corporations in the sample. One of the key findings of the study by Owusu-Ansah (1998:620) is that the amount

of required information released by ZSE listed corporations in their audited annual reports and accounts are insufficient to satisfy the information requirements of users of corporate annual reports in Zimbabwe.

Kılıç and Kuzey, (2018:122) used a content analysis method to examine the total, quantitative and qualitative forward-looking disclosures of corporations by applying a forward-looking disclosure index (FLDI). The study by Kılıç and Kuzey, (2018:127) discovered that the level of total forward-looking disclosures varied significantly amongst sample firms, from 0.10 to 0.90 with a mean of 0.49.

4.3.2 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development released a chapter entitled *Disclosure and transparency* in 2015, amongst the six basic principles that could act as a guideline and increase consciousness of good corporate governance (OECD, 2015). The significance of this chapter by the OECD is the identification of the main areas of disclosure and it embraces the recognition of recent trends regarding items of non-financial information that corporations may disclose in their management reports, on a voluntary basis (El Hajj *et al.*, 2016:1). Hossain and Hammami (2009:260) stressed on the significance of optional or non-mandatory information. Hossain and Hammami (2009:260) claimed that non-mandatory information develops assurance with the stockholders, therefore the corporates must be sufficiently transparent in publicising. Non-mandatory disclosure improves transparency, which in turn lowers the information asymmetry between the internal and external parties of the business corporations (Burcu & Bengu, 2012:550; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:140). The management use their judgement to decide the content of information to voluntarily disclose, normally suggested as the best practice (El Hajj *et al.*, 2016). Zimbabwe is an emerging market; thus as discussed in *Section 4.2.1*, agency problems will appear in Zimbabwe. Agency theory suggested that managers share similar objectives with the shareholders. However, in some instances, their private objectives may overshadow and disadvantage those of the other shareholders. Therefore, it is more significant to examine the extent of disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwean corporations in relation to the release of the NCCGZ in an economy progressing to be an entirely market economy.

This present study examines the disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwean listed firms in their annual report during the recent years. The annual report is a largely inclusive text

accessible to everyone and is thusly the key disclosure medium (Baron, 2014:1; Marston & Shrides, 1991:195; Ribera, 2016:340; Rupley *et al.*, 2017:175). In Zimbabwe the annual report is even more weighty as various corporations does not publish interim reports because the Companies Act Chapter 24:03 do oblige them. In this research study the major aim is to assess annual reports of ZSE listed companies and evaluate the linkage between the level and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in Zimbabwe, using a self-developed composite D&T index. The central empirical research question in this study is: **“How does good corporate governance enhance the quality of corporate accountability and progress of embracing world-class corporate disclosure and transparency practices and business performance in Zimbabwean firms?”** In other words, the specific question was: Did the release of the National Code on Corporate Governance Code of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) in 2015 assist in enhancing corporate disclosure and transparency practices and does it affect the performance of Zimbabwean listed corporations? To respond to this important question, this key research question was aligned with the key empirical research objective and divided into supplementary or sub-objectives.

The second empirical research objective is to develop a sustainability oriented, composite D&T index based on the NCCGZ. This measuring instrument was used to score the degree of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed corporations. Hence the fourth empirical objective is to analyse and assess the trends in the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in annual reports of firms listed in the ZSE during the recent years. The release of the NCCGZ is one of the major factors affecting the enhancement of disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwean business corporations’ annual reports. Hence, in line with this thinking, this research study presumes that disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed firms improved during recent years as the initial hypothesis set as follows;

H₁: There is a statistically significant improvement in the extent of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed companies’ annual reports during the years from 2014 to 2016.

This research study expected to discover an enhanced level of disclosure and transparency practices during the sampled period. Developing economies may provide a more suitable environment for research study as these economies ordinarily have inadequate regulations and wider variations between business corporations in corporate governance practices (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:140; Gurvitch & Sidorova, 2012:30; Hassan *et al.*, 2009:90; Ho & Wong, 2001:139; Suttipun, 2017:138). In their research, two decades

ago, Ho and Wong (2001:140) discovered that there were considerable differences in optional disclosure practices amongst businesses in Hong Kong. Gurvitsh & Sidorova, (2012:26) found that sustainability reporting in annual reports was significantly varied among Estonian companies listed at Tallinn Stock Exchange. The study by Suttipun, (2017:133) discovered that integrated reporting was varied in the annual reports of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) across the eight industrial sectors. The economy of Zimbabwe has been experiencing infrequent economic transition and is characterised with weaker legislations which affect corporate disclosure and transparency practices across the economic sectors (CIGI, 2010). The study assumed sub-hypotheses proposing variances in disclosure and transparency practices in ZSE listed corporations' annual reports. These sub-hypotheses are set as follows:

H_{1a}: There are significant differences in disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations.

H_{1b}: There are significant differences in sustainability disclosure integrated into annual reports of ZSE listed corporations

4.3.3 Determinants of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

According to Osama (2013) three distinctive categories of corporation attributes exist that could influence the level of corporate disclosure and transparency: (i) comprises of the financial attributes of the firm (Hossain & Hammami, 2009:255); (ii) includes the corporation's corporate governance attributes (Bushman *et al.*, 2004:167); and (iii) comprises of market discipline variables (Nier & Baumann, 2006:332). However, Alsaeed (2006:476) classified these variables into three categories: (i) Structure-linked variables, including company size and gearing; (ii) Performance-linked variables, including liquidity and profit margin; and (iii) Market-linked variables, including industry type and audit firm size.

Former research studies (Jensen & Berg, 2012:310; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:125; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520; Owusu, 1998:620) discovered that the quality of corporate disclosure is linked to some corporation-specific attributes. There is extensive old and current international literature which examines the association between corporation attributes and levels of disclosure in corporate annual reports (Alsaeed, 2006:480; Buzby, 1974:423; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168) (*see also Appendix 1 of this thesis*).

This present research study investigated the influence of six corporation-specific attributes on the extent of disclosure and transparency in the annual reports of corporations listed in Zimbabwe. Some variables, both quantitative and non-quantitative, which were anticipated to describe various business corporation characteristics that could affect the level of disclosure and transparency, were suggested in this research. These variables are explained fully in the subsequent sections. In agreement with former research studies, this study comprises of corporate governance mechanism structure, evaluated by corporate governance key performance indicators (KPIs), financial performance or profitability, evaluated by profitability ratios, multinationality affiliation, evaluated by whether a firm is foreign owned or not; size of the business corporation, evaluated by total assets; age of the business corporation, evaluated in years; level of liquidity, evaluated by liquidity ratios; leverage levels, evaluated by gearing ratios. The methodology used was to develop a country-applicable disclosure and transparency index and to connect the extent of disclosure KPIs publicised to designated corporate attributes. The empirical research study objective number six in *Chapter 1* of this thesis was “To evaluate the extent to which the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in the annual reports is related to the corporation specific attributes of ZSE listed firms during the recent years”. The following subsections identified and discussed the seven main research hypotheses derived from the research framework and empirical objectives of this study. In addition, the prior literature identified numerous firm-specific attributes impact on transparency and disclosure. This research study anticipated to discover some corporation attributes influence on the level of disclosure and transparency.

4.3.3.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms

According to Yafele (2012:10) corporate governance mechanisms and their association with the level of disclosures have been researched over years. These mechanisms are deemed to be used in lowering agency difficulties between managers and shareholders (Bauer *et al.*, 2010:5; Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). It is claimed that optional disclosure highlighting the existence of corporate governance structures lowers information asymmetry, agency and political costs (Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221; Li *et al.*, 2018:60). Managers with privileged information about company performance could improve disclosure to external investors and reduce agency costs, thereby increasing company value (Diamond, 1985:1071; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221; Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Verrecchia, 1983:179). Business corporations could reduce the possibility of politicians interfering in their business operations by choosing

strategies that lower the level of government interference (Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). Such strategies currently comprise having governance structures consistent with recommended good practice (Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986:1). Corporate governance can be thought of as a worldwide trend both in practice and research (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368). Particularly, in the UK where the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has developed a UK Corporate Governance Code which provides corporate governance guidelines which are compulsory to corporations within the FTSE 350 category (FRC, 2014:1). For instance, Australia endorses that every Australian business corporation that is listed on the main stock exchange must apply fundamental governance elements enforced by the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council (Oshika & Saka, 2017:625). Such endorsements were made with the interpretation that corporate governance devices could reduce the enormity of the challenges that result from the division of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306; Oshika & Saka, 2017:625).

In this study, the intensity of corporate governance is evaluated by two major corporate governance instruments comprising of: (1) Board of directors characteristics (Albassam, 2014) and (2) ownership structures (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515). The research studies reviewed in the formulation of relevant hypotheses include various reporting types. They have, nevertheless, been selected as they were discovered to be applicable in the claim for the disclosure and transparency practices in the firms' annual reports. The general hypothesis is:

H₂: There is a statistically noteworthy connection between corporate governance instruments and the extent and quality of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed firms.

On the basis of the third sub-question and sixth empirical research objective this research study formulated sub-hypotheses linked to the aforesaid second hypothesis (**H₂**) as discussed in the following sub-sections.

Board of Directors Characteristics

According to Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016:740) the attributes of the board of directors are imperative in shaping corporate disclosure and transparency practices. In this research study, the corporate governance instruments examined comprises of: (i) board size; (ii) proportion of independent non-executive directors; (iii) audit committee size; and (iv) audit firm size.

(i) Board Size

Most Codes of Corporate Governance normally recommend that the board ought to be of a proper size for the business corporation (FRC, 2014:1; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:740; NCCGZ, 2014:1). However according to Yafele (2012) the overall trend of the relationship between board size and the extent of disclosure is uncertain. It is deemed that the decision-making procedure is more effectual by restricting the number of directors (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520). It can be reasoned that smaller boards are better in effectiveness than big boards due to disorganisations in the making of decisions and the incremental cost of deficient interactions linked to bigger boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520). The diligence of smaller boards could be thought of as diminished compared to bigger boards where additional viewpoints could possibly be proposed around (Wang & Hussainey, 2013:30). It could also be proposed that bigger boards are constrained to hold meetings more often to ensure congruency because there is a greater mix of different credentials in bigger boards (Wang and Hussainey, 2013:30). Moreover, larger boards may possibly be comprised of numerous persons from diverse upbringings who could produce a variety of competences (Wang and Hussainey, 2013:30). Additionally, they could also more probably focus on their areas of speciality (Yafele, 2012). This study therefore set a hypothesis that:

H_{2a}: There is a positive and significant link between board size and the degree of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed companies.

(ii) Proportion of Independent Non-Executive Directors (PINED)

The responsibility of non-executive directors has turned out to be more visible in modern research studies because of their role in business corporation operation (Yafele, 2012). It would be anticipated from a corporate governance perception, that independent non-executive directors would allow improved monitoring of the board and reduce managerial unprincipled conduct (Fama & Jensen, 1983:345; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:26). According to Chau and Gray (2010:93) a greater proportion of independent non-executive directors on the boards is possibly to cause improved monitoring of boards, leading to increased voluntary disclosure of corporate information. Despite this claim, former studies (Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014:578; Leftwich *et al.*, 1981:55) proposed that the association between independent directors and the extent of optional disclosure is vague. In addition, the higher the ratio of independent directors, the more probable they would exercise more power on management to release extra optional information in annual reports (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:518).

The task of non-executive directors is ordinarily an advisory one as described in the NCCGZ (2014, Paragraph 92). Portion of the code highlights the requisite for non-executive directors to offer objective decision on matters of policy, performance, resources, key appointments and codes of conduct. In particular, non-executive directors bring broader business expertise to the corporation including improved ideas and contemporary best practice learnt while performing duties for other corporations (Pearce & Zahra, 1992:411; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:28). It could be proposed that a large section of individuals who have these qualities would promote an improved level of disclosure in the annual reports of the respective corporations as they would have better impact on the entire board of directors (Wang & Hussainey, 2013:28; Yafele, 2012).

The empirical evidence is somewhat varied as discussed above. As discussed in *Chapter 2* of this study the NCCGZ states the principle that the board must be properly composed and structured in order to ensure that power is evenly balanced and that it is exercised in the best interest of the corporation (Paragraph 86). Moreover, the board must ideally have a majority of non-executive members, the majority of whom should be independent (Paragraph 87). In Paragraph 90, the code recommends that a board should not be overshadowed by a single person or a group of persons. On the other hand, the board should have an appropriate balance between executive and non-executive director and not less than sixty percent members should be non-executive directors and the majority of non-executive directors should be independent. This study, therefore proposes that since the size of the boards of ZSE listed firms are normally medium to large, independent directors would be more practical in ensuring better accountability and transparency. This improved transparency could result in more conformity to the NCCGZ guidelines by disclosures in the annual reports. Thusly, this research study formulated a hypothesis as follows:

H_{2b}: There is statistically significant positive correlation between the proportion of non-executive directors and the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed companies.

(iii) Audit Committee Size

The audit committee is an additional key variable for scrutinising management unscrupulousness (Madi *et al.*, 2014:486; Yafele, 2012). Audit committees represent superintendents for the boards of directors on issues of corporate governance and financial

reporting amongst other key functions (Madi *et al.*, 2014:486). Within this function, the audit committee oversees management together with the internal and external auditors with the aim to safeguard the interests of the corporation's stockholders (FRC, 2014:1; NCCGZ, 2014:1). Thus, the investors are informed of in-house events via added disclosures which would institute a sense of reassurance because various stakeholders might deem the audit committee as a function that examines the management's accountability (Madi *et al.*, 2014:489; Yafele, 2012:50). Drawing from the agency theory, directors constituting the audit committee verify whether the internal auditors, external auditors and management of the corporations are transparent amongst other accountabilities (Alsaed, 2006:485). If the different lines of management conduct their functions appropriately, stockholders' interests are then taken care of. Therefore, the existence of an audit committee verifies that these functions are performed with high degree of proficiency (Madi *et al.*, 2014:488). The existence of a bigger audit committee size might improve the protection of shareholder interests (Allegrini & Greco, 2011:190). In particular, boards with bigger audit committee will more possibly publicise an improved level of information that would affect decision making of stakeholders. The existence of an audit committee might also lower the possibility of concealment by the board of unfavourable financial disclosure information (Madi *et al.*, 2014:488). It might be proposed that a bigger audit committee is very influential to the management to reveal the risks that the corporation is confronting. This set up may also be a solution for the future regarding the avoidance of the humiliation of releasing such information which may portray the management as incompetent to users of annual report information. Based on the above reflections on audit committees, the following hypothesis was set:

H_{2c}: Audit committee size is a statistically significant positive factor of the level of disclosure and transparency practices in the annual reports of listed corporations in Zimbabwe.

(iv) Audit Firm Size

Barako *et al.* (2006:110) noted that even though management is totally accountable for the content of corporate disclosure, the agency and stakeholder theories suggest that audit companies could affect the extent of corporate reporting. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2007:185) audit companies represent an external corporate governance instrument vital in overseeing managers by auditing business corporation performance and disclosure. It could be reasoned that audit companies can restrict managers' unscrupulous conduct, which might aid in the reduction of agency conflicts. In the opinion of Eng and Mak (2003:330) it could thusly

be said that the excellence of external auditing can enhance the extent of corporate disclosure. Alsaeed (2006:480) discovered that big audit companies (big-four) have superior auditing performance standards than small audit companies. Barako *et al.* (2006:110) pointed out that big audit firms are most probably have very knowledgeable, skilled and qualified auditors. Debatably, big audit companies are most probably to be more independent (Albassam, 2014:80). Contrariwise, in Alsaeed (2006:480)'s view, because of possible financial constraints, small audit firms may be incapacitated to bargain for high-quality disclosures, as well as those concerning governance, than their bigger counterparts.

The heuristic literature on the association between the excellence of external auditing and optional corporate disclosure indicates either a positive or non-significant association (Albassam, 2014:90; Hossain *et al.*, 2007;; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:135; Naimah & Mukti, 2019:175). This association was examined by. Ntim *et al.* (2012:135) also ascertained that audit company size is positively related to the extent of optional corporate disclosure amongst listed corporations in South Africa. Contrariwise, Hossain *et al.* (2007) discovered that the type of auditor is not a significant explanatory variable of voluntary disclosure. In addition, Barako *et al.* (2006:112) wrote that audit company size is not significantly associated with the extent of corporate governance disclosure utilising a selection of listed firms in Kenya. The agency and stakeholder theories proposes a positive association between audit company size and corporate disclosure and transparency. The following hypothesis was therefore set and tested:

H_{2d}: There is a statistically significant and positive association between audit company size and the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in conformity to the NCCGZ.

Ownership Structures

Jensen and Meckling (1976:310) explained that the division of ownership and control generates agency costs caused by opposing interests between stockholders and managers. According to Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012:520) information in annual reports, particularly of the governance structures, are a possible source of decreasing monitoring costs for stockholders who may be averse to suffer huge expenses so as to determine whether that managers are operating in harmony with stockholders' interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976:310) revealed that the theoretical expectancy is that large stockholders are able to monitor managers, which could improve governance practices, including optional disclosure. For instance, Ruiz-Mallorquí and

Santana-Martín (2011:120) wrote that institutional ownership could cause enhanced corporate governance and disclosure practices, so as to draw foreign investors. Conversely, according to Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010:940) the results of empirical studies on the link between proprietorship composition and optional corporate disclosure are vague. The analysis in this subsection centres on three categories of ownership structure within Zimbabwe listed companies as discussed below:

(i) Government ownership

Referring to the stakeholder theory, state (government) ownership is an important component affecting corporate governance disclosure, especially in developing countries where clustered ownership structures are prevalent (Cornett *et al.*, 2010:75; Shleifer, 1998:135). The agency difficulties are most probably to be experienced where there is huge ownership, especially government ownership (Eng & Mak, 2003:325). Additionally, there exists a claim that government ownership ordinarily makes it highly likely for government to intervene in the business corporation's operations, leading to deficient corporate governance practices (Konijn *et al.*, 2011:1335). The government could exercise its influence to select directors and chief executive officers (CEOs), without considering the appointees' abilities and expertise (Cornett *et al.*, 2010:75). However, stewardship theory expects that CEOs and executive directors might not be influenced by state proprietorship as their concerns are unified with the concerns of other shareholders (Siebels & Knyphausen-Aufse, 2012:280). Conyon and He (2011:1158) insinuated that CEOs seek to enhance company performance in order to enhance their own future employability and to protect their own societal standings. Nevertheless, drawing from the resource dependence theory perception, government ownership might accord availability to essential resources including funding, state agreements and tax subsidisations, which could increase company results and reporting (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012:195; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007:585).

The connection between government shareholding and corporate governance disclosure has not been considerably examined in empirical terms (Eng & Mak, 2003:325; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121), and therefore continues to be a prolific researchable area, allowing input to be achieved towards the existing literature. The results of a sizable number of empirical researches propose a positive correlation. Eng and Mak (2003:330) examined the correlation between government ownership and optional disclosure applying a 1995 selection of 158 corporations

listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Their research discovered that huge government ownership is positively correlated to optional corporate disclosure. Additionally, Conyon and He (2011:1135) found out that government ownership improved corporate governance practices in a big sample involving 1,342 companies in China from 2001 to 2005. Ntim *et al.* (2012:130) also reported that there is a positive correlation between state ownership and optional corporate disclosure amongst 169 listed companies in South Africa.

As reviewed in *Chapter 2*, the government of Zimbabwe has considerable ownership stocks in many companies. The only closest study in Zimbabwe on ownership structures was done by Mangena and Taurigana (2007:53). There has been no research conducted to investigate the influence of government ownership on corporate disclosure and transparency. Mangena and Taurigana (2007:78) found out that state foreign stock ownership is expected to be more in corporations with more optional disclosure and efficient corporate governance structures in ZSE listed companies. Their study utilised a corporate disclosure checklist comprising of 86 voluntary disclosure items, and a selection from non-financial business corporation listed on the ZSE. This research study is aimed at contributing to the existing literature by strengthening and refining on the evidence of Mangena and Taurigana (2007:53). Granted the positive association discovered in former studies (Conyon & He, 2011:1135; Eng & Mak, 2003:335; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:130), the following hypothesis was examined:

H_{2e}: There is a statistically significant and positive correlation between government share ownership and the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations in conformity with the NCCGZ.

(ii) Institutional ownership

According to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991:1325) considerable ownership by institutional stockholders might also foster more disclosure to lower information asymmetry. Institutional investors are able to monitor companies and assist in the improvement of corporate governance disclosure (Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515). As written by Jensen and Meckling (1976:306) and Solomon (2010:1), the agency theory proposes that oversight is effective in decreasing conflict of interests between directors and investors. Institutional investors are motivated to safeguard their investment, particularly if withdrawing is pricey (Chung & Zhang, 2011:250). Accordingly, the existence of institutional stockholders guarantees a high level of responsibility occurs between stockholders and top management

(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006:1034). This implies that the existence of institutional ownership could lower agency costs (Albassam, 2014:90). Increase in optional disclosure may result in an increased stock price and improved business corporation value (Healy & Palepu, 2001:405; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121). As charged by Aggarwal *et al.* (2011:154), therefore institutional shareholders can aid in the reduction of information asymmetry and enhance corporation value. This is in support of Chung and Zhang (2011:250)'s claim that the ratio of institutions owning a company's stocks improves with the quality of governance. However, Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011:120) disputes this view claiming that institutional stockholders are not automatically a forceful component in increasing the extent of transparent reporting. In particular, these institutional investors might be ineffectual in influencing sound corporate governance practices because of their characteristically short-term investments (Albassam, 2014:90).

Empirical studies discovered the existence of a positive correlation between institutional ownership and optional corporate disclosure (Aggarwal *et al.*, 2011:160; Barako *et al.*, 2006:110; Chung & Zhang, 2011:260; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:125). By means of a little selection of 53 listed companies in Kenya, Barako *et al.* (2006:110) discovered that the degree of institutional ownership has a positive and significant impact on a company's transparency. By means of a sizable sample involving 12,093 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, an assessment of institutional investor inclinations in the USA financial market was conducted by Chung and Zhang (2011:247). They discovered that companies with high-level optional corporate governance conformity are very desirable to institutional stockholders. Likewise, Ntim *et al.* (2012:121) investigated 169 listed corporations in South Africa from 2002 to 2006. Their study revealed that corporations with greater institutional ownership released information significantly more than corporations with lesser institutional ownership. In addition, the results of numerous cross-country researches confirm the positive relationship discovered in former researches on just one country. For instance, 23 countries sampled between 2003 to 2008 were investigated by Aggarwal *et al.* (2011:154). Their research proposed that governance systems are improved in business corporations with higher institutional ownership. Therefore, it appears as if there is an agreement amongst the majority of current empirical research on the positive function played by institutional ownership in the endorsement of optional business disclosure.

The association between institutional ownership and optional corporate governance is yet to be investigated in the Zimbabwe business environment. Hence, this research study proffers empirical evidence on this specific association in Zimbabwe listed companies. Therefore, the hypothesis to be examined is as stated below:

H_{2f}: There is a statistically significant and positive correlation between institutional ownership and the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed companies in compliance with NCCGZ.

(iii) Board ownership

The significance of director share ownership arises from the influential function that the board of directors performs concerning corporate governance reporting processes (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306; Eng & Mak, 2003:325; Chalevas, 2011:138). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976:310) an increased quantity of stock proprietorship by the board of directors accords the directors to have the similar interests as stockholders hence prejudicing them to defend stockholder interests. Leftwich *et al.* (1981:55) noted that this results in the decrease in divergence of interests between the board and the stockholders, leading to a decrease in the agency overheads. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034) reasoned that, referring to the agency theory viewpoint, the association between director share ownership and optional business disclosure is inconclusive. Directors might desire to enlarge their affluence by exploiting privileged information just in issues which serve their self-interest, and not certainly for the optimum interests of the business corporation (McConnell & Servaes, 1990:595). In the opinion of Healy and Palepu (2001:405) directors possibly advocate for a larger amount of disclosure when they own stocks in a business entity to fulfil the conditions required by insider trading regulation as well as increasing the liquidity of the corporation's shares. Insider trading limitations also encourage managers to produce additional disclosures to adjust any alleged lower valuation well before the expiry of share option positions (Yafele, 2012). Nevertheless, if director share ownership is little, this can diminish directors' motivation to enhance performance, and could therefore result in lesser corporate governance reporting (Eng & Mak, 2003:325; Fama & Jensen, 1983:301). Jensen and Meckling (1976:310) noted that stockholders could oversee board conduct to abate agency difficulties, though this might escalate monitoring costs (Albassam, 2014:90). The conclusion was that non-compulsory disclosure may be deemed as a substitute for closely overseeing directors, which could similarly enhance corporate governance practices (Eng & Mak, 2003:330; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187).

Contrariwise, director share ownership leads to comparable fortification for directors and external shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:310). As written by Samaha *et al.* (2012:168), this is as a result of a unification of interests between directors and stockholders. This suggests that directors desire to improve corporate transparency and disclosure so as to improve business corporation value (Albassam, 2014; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520).

Some experiential research performed on director ownership proposed a negative correlation between director share ownership and corporate governance reporting. In particular, Eng and Mak (2003:340) reported that smaller board share ownership is linked to a high extent of disclosure, using 158 Singaporean listed firms. Samaha *et al.* (2012:170) analysed the board ownership-corporate disclosure correlation amongst a selection of 100 listed companies in Egypt. Their finding does not particularly back the hypothesis of a positive association between director share ownership and optional disclosure.

In ZSE listed companies, the connection between director stock ownership and corporate disclosure and transparency is yet to be examined. However, a more closer related research done by Owusu-Ansah (1998:610) examined the connection between the quantity of a corporation's stocks owned by insiders and the level of its mandatory disclosure. Based on the above reflections concerning linkage between director ownership and optional corporate disclosure, the hypothesis for testing was stated as follows:

H_{2g}: There is a statistically significant and positive correlation between board ownership and the degree of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports as per the NCCGZ.

4.3.3.2 Company Specific Characteristics

This research study assesses the impact of six corporation-specific attributes on the overall extent of disclosure and transparency in the annual reports of ZSE listed firms. Six variables, both quantified and non-quantified, which are assumed to describe diverse firm-specific attributes that can influence the extent of disclosure and transparency, were suggested in this study. The archetypal methodology applied was to develop a country-applicable disclosure scoring system and to link the extent of disclosure and transparency KPIs released to particular corporation attributes. This study anticipated to discover a firm attributes impact on the level of transparency and disclosure. The overall hypothesis is:

H₃: There is a statistically significant connection between annual reports reflecting top-quality disclosure and transparency, and firm-specific characteristics.

This subsection proposes and considers the six research sub-hypotheses linked to the above overall hypothesis (H_3) as follows;

Profitability

According to Song (2012:600) information asymmetry may subsist between two persons in a transaction procedure leading to bad choices. The signalling theory affirms that business corporations would publicise additional information to differentiate their excellent financial performance from corporations presenting bad operational performance (Jiao, 2011:648). In the opinion of Yafele (2012) it might be implied that very lucrative corporations may be deemed as of healthy governance. The degree of success is a key factor of the level of disclosure in annual reports. According to the signalling theory, corporations that are realising higher profitability are anticipated to release more information in quest to separate themselves from other poor performing business entities. Such information, will normally be mirrored in the stock prices of listed corporations instantly. Profitability has been known in former disclosure and transparency studies to be linked to the level to which corporations release obligatory disclosure items in their annual reports (Buzby, 1974:425; Cerf, 1961:1; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:615; Singhvi, 1967:1; Wallace & Naser, 1995:320).

Profitability is thought of as an evaluation of management performance. Therefore, the management of a profitable corporation possibly release more information to promote the extension of their positions and performance-linked compensatory schemes that might be payable to them (Cerf, 1961:1; Singhvi, 1967:1). Drawing from the agency theory which was considered in this chapter, it could be alleged that managers of highly successful corporations would release comprehensive information to back the extension of their appointments and remuneration engagements (Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:610; Yafele, 2012). Yafele (2012) offered evidence that this is applicable to both private and public listed business corporations. In the opinion of Buzby (1974:430) profit margin highlights the corporation's capability to absorb increasing expenses and hence a higher profitability ratio corresponds to a greater tendency of absorbance. Buzby (1974:430) posited that in such circumstances the management of this corporation will publicise information that discloses the company's capability to mitigate whichever harm that caused the increase in costs. Consequently, this would give an assurance of the long term performance in both private and public owned corporations. The most profit making firms can dedicate more resources to information

disclosure in order to publicise their operations (Garcia-Sánchez *et al.*, 2013:830). In addition, profitable corporation reveal information that would differentiate themselves from the unprofitable corporations and decrease their cost of capital (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:56).

Using the signalling theory Inchausti (1997:45) stated that management who have good news resulting from better performance are prone to release comprehensive information to the stock market to prevent undervaluation of their stocks. Contrariwise, Owusu-Ansah (1998:620) claimed that loss-making corporations will also tend to disclose more information in justification of the bad performance. Nevertheless, Yafele (2012) disputed this and reasoned that a corporation with little profit margin is inclined to attempt to conceal that fact by releasing fewer disclosures in the annual report. Yafele (2012) asserted that the contrast for this aforementioned state is correct where a corporation with huge profit margins inclined to publicise additional information to enable their strong position to be visible to stakeholders.

However, various academics have proposed that the link between profitability ratios and the level of corporate disclosure is vague (Lang & Lundholm, 1993:46). For instance Lang and Lundholm (1993:200) noted that the relationship of a firm's profitability level and disclosure level can be positive, neutral or negative subject to its performance. Based on the basis of the aforementioned claims, the ensuing hypothesis was set as follows:

H_{3a}: A company's profitability level (represented by ROA (H_{3a}^1), ROCE (H_{3a}^2) and ROE (H_{3a}^3)) positively and significantly influences the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of Zimbabwe listed companies.

Multinationality

According to Owusu-Ansah (1998:630) there is an assumption that a business corporation's obligatory disclosure strategies and practices are shaped by its membership with a Multinational Corporation (MNC). There are a couple reasons for this assumption. Firstly, since the directly provide funding for the investment in their subsidiaries usually located in developing economies, the MNCs are inclined to request a detailed information from the subsidiaries. Therefore, accountability and disclosure of information by subsidiary entities is usually a direct reaction to the overseas direct funding by multinational corporations. The parent corporations might request additional comprehensive disclosures to assess the performance and projections of their subsidiary companies. Secondly, since the political costs of subsidiary companies of MNCs are comparatively high, the performance, conduct, and

impacts of the activities of MNCs are often monitored, assessed, and examined. Various governments directly or via international inter-governmental organisations including the UN, the OECD, and the SADC, request comprehensive information from MNCs to act as a basis for policy making. This is partially described by the significant economic function played by MNCs in the advancement of their host countries and in the international trade. MNCs supply most goods and services as well as providing primary, secondary and tertiary employment by utilising the society's limited resources. The comparatively great extent of domestic economic interests controlled by foreign MNCs has triggered political pressure for the societal control of these business corporations and their local subsidiary corporations in developing economies.

Yafele (2012) wrote that when business corporations function in foreign countries, they are guided by the regulations in those external countries. These rules might be applicable to a specific industry, size of entity/or foreign entrants and so forth. It may be proposed that business corporations operational in other geographical divisions release more disclosures in their annual report because of these additional regulations. Owusu-Ansah (1998:630) revealed that some MNCs have been blamed by the countries they operate in of dodging tax by way of transfer pricing, evading tax, avoiding exchange controls, and inequitable practices. To enhance their negotiating influences with their host countries, MNCs are inclined to expect comprehensive information on the activities of their subsidiary companies. In addition, due to high political costs, MNCs will require entire conformity with all statutory and regulating prerequisites of the host nations by their subsidiary companies.

Yafele (2012) reasoned that the local people of the host country may also desire to invest in such MNCs corporations. As a result of the resulting dispersion of investors, monitoring costs may rise. The higher checking costs might be mitigated by improved disclosures as aforesaid. Additional stakeholder groupings including the government and public, consumers, employees and suppliers are also inclined to request added disclosures from both private and public MNCs corporations. Lopes and Rodrigues (2007:50) claimed that more globalised corporations will make an effort to explain to the stakeholders about the positive impacts of the corporation hence release further disclosures. Owusu-Ansah (1998:610) also explained that foreign direct investments by MNCs goes along with technology transfer comprising the accounting and information disclosure practices at home, to their subsidiary companies in developing economies. This transfer of foreign technology has enabled creativeness and modernisation in

the operations of their subsidiary companies as compared to other local corporations that are not linked to MNCs. Consequently, these subsidiary companies are most probably to have more advanced financial reporting techniques that expedite more disclosure in their annual reports. The multinationality affiliation hypothesis is, therefore, stated as:

H_{3b}: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between multinationality affiliation and the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in the annual reports of ZSE listed companies.

Company Size

The legitimacy theory proposed that bigger business corporations release additional disclosures in response to societal expectancies as they are characterised by more stakeholders than in smaller corporations (Abeysekera, 2013:230; Turturea, 2015:2165). Empirical studies considering firm size as a determinant variable for disclosure commenced sometime in 1961 by Cerf and numerous further research studies trailed afterward including Buzby (1974:425), Hossain *et al.* (1995:69), Wallace and Naser (1995:311), Owusu-Ansah (1998:605), Mangena and Taurigana (2007:53), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012:515), Panchasara and Bharadia (2013:88) and Turturea (2015:2165) among many. Hossain *et al.* (1995:70) stated that the agency theory predicted that bigger corporations will publicise more information in their annual reports to mitigate the possibility of wealth transfers from suppliers of outside capital to manager. Jensen and Meckling (1976:306) reasoned that agency costs increases with increased foreign capital. Leftwich *et al.* (1981:55) and Cooke and Wallace (1990:79) further suggested that the amount of foreign capital is inclined to improve with corporation size. Large corporations are commonly characterised by multi-product business corporations, operating across the global regions with numerous divisions (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118). Accordingly, this requires that the central management of such corporations to employ internal information system which will assist them in making operational and strategic decisions regarding the divisions as well as ensuring that the divisions' performance is adequate along the lines of the overall corporate objectives (Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:48). The additional expense of providing generic data to the public is possibly negligible because information system exists beforehand for mass manufacturing and dissemination of data for internal intentions. Larger business corporations are inclined to release more information than smaller ones (Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:48; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:119). The procedure of collecting, examining and issuing information can be pricey. Therefore, it is those larger corporations are required to

release more information since they are deemed to be having more resources (Frías-Aceituno *et al.*, 2013:48; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118). Bigger business corporations can afford to accumulate more information because of their larger revenue (Hossain & Hammami, 2009:256; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:520; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:610; Yafele, 2012:53). Yafele (2012:53) reasoned that bigger business corporations can shoulder the marginal costs of additional disclosure. Buzby (1974:425) supported this proposition, arguing that detailed disclosure puts small business entities in competitive difficulty with their bigger competitors in the industry. This implies that the opportunity cost of obligatory disclosure is more for small corporations than for big corporations. Thusly, these may release not as much of information than big corporations.

Watts and Zimmerman (1986:1) pointed out that the political costs theory proposes that big business corporations are amenable to political confrontations. For instance, the society's requirements for stronger rules including higher company tax system thresholds, transfer from private to state ownership and price limits and so forth. Firth (1979:275) suggested that large corporations are responsive to political costs and endeavour to reduce the possible costs by releasing more information. In contrast, it has been claimed that if business corporations disclose high-level profit margins, afterward the government may desire to interfere by enacting higher taxation tariffs (Yafele, 2012:53). Therefore, it has been posited by some that the association between corporation size and disclosure is indeed negative (Wallace & Naser, 1995:311). Owusu-Ansah (1998:620) also reasoned that it is not the size of a business corporation as such that causes the disclosure variation amongst business corporations.

Business corporation size seems to be a significant factor, which may be chosen to explain disclosure and transparency practices. Bigger corporations are expected to disclose more and to be more transparent than smaller corporations. This concurs with the agency theory and also agrees with related empirical studies (*see Appendix 1*). Having reviewed corporate disclosure and transparency literature, this research anticipates to discover that corporation size is positively linked with the extent of disclosure and transparency practices. Basing on these discussions on the effects of company size, this study set a hypothesis in this manner:

H_{3c}: There is a statistically significant positive influence between corporation size and the degree of disclosure and transparency practices in the annual reports of ZSE listed corporations.

Company Age

The level of a business corporation's disclosure might be affected by its age (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:610). Camfferman and Cooke (2002:10) argued that the age of a business corporation may be an applicable determinant because older corporations may have attained distinct know-how of business reporting over a long time. When a business corporation has its shares listed for a lengthy period, it may have additional reputable information disclosure and improved knowledge contrasted to recently listed companies. Conversely, newly listed business corporations might also opt to release more information disclosure to improve corporate governance (Osama, 2013:101). There are three components that may support this association (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:620). Firstly, newer corporations may endure competitive difficulty if they publicise particular set of information on research expenses, capital expenses, and product improvement. This competitive difficulty will occur if the details publicised by the recently launched corporations is manipulated to their disadvantage by the erstwhile contestants. Conversely, older corporations may unaffectedly be determined to release this detail as its report might be unlikely to harm their competitive status. Secondly, the possible causative element is the expense and the simplicity of collecting, administering, and publicising the requisite information. These expenses are possibly more burdensome for newer business corporations in contrast to their older counterparts. Thirdly, the last factor is the state that there may be deficiency of a 'trail record' to depend on for public release of information in younger business corporations hence may have inadequate information to release. In their research study, Camfferman and Cooke (2002:10) discovered numerous variables including the age of a firm to be considered by impending empirical studies. The reason for choosing the age of a firm variable rests on the likelihood that old corporations may have enhanced their financial reporting systems for a long time. However, other researches have observed that newer corporations have better disclosure attribute (Barton & Waymire, 2004:80). Alsaeed (2006:485) proposed that there is no relationship between the age of the corporation and corporate disclosure. Chi (2009:11198) investigated the relationship between corporate disclosure quality and firm age, using 'Information Transparency and Disclosure Rankings System' (ITDRS) for all Taiwanese listed companies as a proxy to represent the market's assessments of the completeness, clarity, transparency, and reliability of corporate disclosure policies. The study found that there is a negative association between the corporate disclosure quality and firm age. Based on the review of literature on this theme, this research expected to

discover that business corporation age is positively correlated to the extent of transparency and disclosure and the following hypothesis was set:

H_{3d}: Older corporations furnish more disclosure and transparency in their annual reports than younger corporations.

Liquidity

The link between liquidity levels and disclosure levels has been investigated in a numerous studies (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989:37; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:610; Wallace & Naser, 1995:311). According to Yafele (2012:70) it is the management's aim to apprise creditors on how their resources were utilised and update short term creditors that their dues will be honoured in agreed timeframes. Wallace and Naser (1995:315) claimed that regulatory bodies, financiers and creditors are specifically worried about the going concern standing of business corporations. On this basis, corporations capable to fulfil their short-term financial commitments without any risk of liquidation of their assets are motivated to reveal this by disclosing this information in their annual reports (Belkaoui & Kahl, 1977:32). Although the findings of the statistical test done by Belkaoui and Kahl (1977:32) back this hypothesised association between corporate disclosure and liquidity, those of Wallace and Naser (1995:315) empirical research do not. To afford more empirical proof in whichever direction, this study set a hypothesis as follows:

H_{3e}: Liquidity level significantly and positively affects the degree of disclosure and transparency practices in the annual reports of ZSE listed corporations.

Leverage

According to Wallace and Naser (1995:316) gearing explains a business corporation's capital structure and evaluates the enduring risk entailed by that structure. Financial leverage is measured by gearing, signifying the extent to which a business corporation's operations are funded by equity owners in contrast to creditors' funds (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:120). Corporations with higher debt levels suffer higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:306; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007:30; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53). It could be proposed that an effective method to decrease agency costs is to improve the extent of corporate disclosure (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Yafele, 2012). Leftwich *et al.* (1981:50) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007:30) wrote that when wealth moves from bondholders to equity stockholders, the leverage intensities rise. The rationale comes from the reality that when bondholders begin price shielding themselves, stockholders and managers are motivated to improve the degree of

monitoring including disclosure of detailed information in their annual reports (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118; Yafele, 2012:60).

The agency theory proposes a positive relationship between trading on equity and corporate financial disclosure. It has been submitted by many academics that agency problems related to gearing possibly rises as the ratio of the corporation's capital supplied by bond holders rises (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:306; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007:30; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986:1). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986:1) managers are motivated to publicise information about investment strategies that will improve the stock value of the respective corporation. For example, the issuance of additional debt and using the funds to pay dividends. Nevertheless, (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986:1) documented that this will likely cause an upsurge of agency costs in the form of a huge cost of debt. Since higher gearing levels implies higher agency costs, conformity with IAS and sound disclosure practices could be utilised to decrease agency expenses and information irregularities (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007:31). Zarzeski (1996:18) and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003:65), however, that support a negative relation between gearing ratio and disclosure. Lopes and Rodrigues (2007:30) reasoned that this claim is built on signalling components and depend on the fact that corporations with high gearing levels fall under bank-oriented financial systems. In these systems, stock markets are not deemed as a main source of funding and information about corporations is more classified. This claim, nevertheless, does not consider public debt. Therefore these claims show the incapability of only leverage to be a good alternative for the financial structure of a corporation concerning its link to the extent of disclosure as debt may be internal or external debt (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007:30). Nobes (1998:162) and Tarca *et al.* (2005:75) argued that business corporations with somewhat more external debt are more likely to use international financial reporting standards (IFRSs). They defined external debt as the amount of long term debt that is acquired from the public bond market.

In the opinion of Yafele (2012:131) the stakeholder and stewardship theories are applied partly to describe leverage in relation to the level of disclosure. It is rational to presume that corporations with greater leverage ratio have a higher more creditors. Following this perception, corporations would release additional disclosures meant for these stakeholders as the corporations have a role of answerability. Hence, stewardship is displayed once such business corporations communicate the use to which every funding provided to them was put.

Based on the theoretical considerations and former empirical studies, this research study maintains that the extent of disclosure is linked to leverage, without stating a direction for the correlation. A hypothesis was set in the following manner:

H_{3f}: There is a statistically significant positive association between leverage/gearing and the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations.

4.3.4 Disclosure and Transparency practices and Corporate Performance

The majority of empirical literature on corporate governance has been established on the agency theory (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:257). This theory suggests that diverse aspects of corporate governance are linked with firm performance to avoid principal and agent disputes and achieve the maximisation of shareholders' value. The association between firm disclosures and company profitability have been generally hypothesised as positive in previous studies (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; Garcia-Sánchez *et al.*, 2013:828; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Suttipun, 2017:135). There are former studies which discovered an adverse and considerable association between the degree of disclosure and firm economic performance (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002:5; Huang *et al.*, 2011:700). Moreover, Lang and Lundholm (1993:47) found that the association between the profitability and degree of corporation disclosure is vague. It can therefore be concluded that the results of the former research studies on the association between transparency and disclosure and corporate performance are varied. The diverse results of empirical proof suggest that additional substantiation is necessary on several issues. Variations in results might result from varied rules and regulations, corporate governance systems, markets, research methodology and design. This research is an addition to the increasing number of studies that assesses the connection between disclosure and transparency and corporation performance as signified by return on capital employed, return on equity and return on assets in Zimbabwe.

4.3.4.1 The Link between Corporate Governance Instruments and Corporate Performance

As considered in *Section 4.1*, theories of corporate governance, especially the agency theory, propose that improvement of corporate governance instruments increases corporate performance. There are several heuristic literature examining the connection among corporate governance instruments and corporate economic performance (Chalevas, 2011:138; Haniffa &

Hudaib, 2006:1034; Mangena *et al.*, 2012:S23; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998:383; Weir & Laing, 2000:265). Seven corporate governance characteristics are reviewed based on applicable previous literature as discussed in previous sections. These explanatory variables are Board size, the size of non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership. These corporate governance mechanisms were chosen because of their significant influence on board effectiveness and firm performance. To analyse all the seven corporate governance instruments, four key components were reflected: (i) an analysis of the theoretic literature on the relationship between a specific corporate governance instrument and corporate performance; (ii) an analysis of experiential researches performed in advanced and developing countries; and (iv) an appraisal of researches on ZSE listed firms and the associated corporate governance rules in Zimbabwe. Conclusively, based on these analyses, hypotheses were set to accomplish the sixth empirical research objective this study.

The agency theory proposes that a bigger board might swell managerial costs and therefore unfavourably impact company profitability (Yawson, 2006:75). In particular, a big board may amplify board costs including yearly remuneration, bonuses, travel and other allowances (Vafeas, 1999:199). Many decades ago, Jensen and Meckling (1976:306) write that this can result in a rise in agency costs and a decrease in corporation value. A big figure of directors might result in interaction and coordination challenges, which could adversely impact corporate performance (Yermack, 1996:185; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:27). However, according to Pfeffer (1972:218) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:121), big boards can imply that stakeholders are well represented in the board of directors (Pfeffer, 1972:218; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:121; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:27).

Yermack (1996:185) assessed 452 big industrial corporations sampled in the US from 1984 to 1991. Their research discovered a negative association between board size and corporation's worth. Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008:156) wrote that larger boards have a negative influence on corporation value. In particular, they assessed 240 Iranian corporations sampled from 2005 to 2006, and discovered that corporations with sizable boards have reduced return on assets, earnings per share and return on equity. found A positive association between board size and return on assets was discovered by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1060), utilising 347 listed

corporations in Malaysia. Lastly, Mangena *et al.*, (2012:S38) discovered that no considerable association exists between board size and corporate performance.

Bozec (2005:) investigated 25 corporations in Canada sampled from 1976 to 2000 using several performance measures comprising of return on assets, return on revenues and Tobin's Q. The study by Bozec (2005) discovered that company success and output were depressed in corporations characterised by a board which is overshadowed by independent members of the board. Mangena and Tauringana (2007:70), using a sample of 51 and 67 selected companies in Zimbabwe from 2002 to 2003, in that order, discovered that the ratio of autonomous members is significant and positively linked to an upsurge in foreign funding in the selected corporations. The study by Mangena and Tauringana (2007:70) suggests that overseas investors are appealed by corporations that retain a greater percentage of autonomous members of the board. Likewise, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) revealed that the probability of a corporation being disqualified from the South African Stock Exchange is less in public corporations with a greater number of non-executives, utilising 81 South African sampled companies. Correspondingly, Conyon and He (2011) used a big selection of 1,342 corporations in China between 2001 and 2005 to examine the association between independent directors and corporate performance. The study by Conyon and He (2011) found a positive association between independent directors and return on assets.

The agency theory proposes that board sub-committees can enhance internal control systems (Bauer *et al.*, 2010:1; Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563; Harrison, 1987:109). This implies that firms that have effectual board sub-committees must realise healthier financial performance (Bauer *et al.*, 2010:1; Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563). Audit committees are expected to assist external auditors in appraising the efficacy of the internal control system, thus facilitating the improvement of the quality of financial information (Bauer *et al.*, 2010:2; Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563; Harrison, 1987:109; Madi *et al.*, 2014:486). Nevertheless, a study by Dulewicz and Herbert (2004:263) discovered that audit and remuneration committees have a statistically insignificant effect on financial performance amongst 86 UK corporations.

Large outside (institutional) shareholders are regarded as an effective monitoring mechanism for a number of reasons (Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Leng, 2004; Smith, 1996:227). Investments made by institutional shareholders are so large that they have less capability than individual stockholders to move swiftly in and out of funds without impacting

the share price (Chung & Zhang, 2011:247; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134). Consequently, institutional investors have great interest not only in the financial results of the corporations in which they invest, but also in the strategies, activities, and other stakeholders of those corporations (Chung & Zhang, 2011:247; El-Diftar *et al.*, 2017:134; Smith, 1996:227). Leng (2004) examined seventy-seven randomly selected publicly listed companies in Malaysia over the period 1996-99 and discovered that the positive statistically significant parameter estimate for INST indicates that an increased proportion of institutional investors leads to increased returns on equity. Leng (2004) found that increased level of participation by institutional investors appears to lead to a greater monitoring role of these investors, ensuring a higher chance of improved financial performance.

Director ownership might increase agency complications (Chau & Gray, 2010:93). According to Vafeas and Theodorou (1998:383) and Konijn *et al.* (2011:1330), directors owning a huge amount of stocks render a corporation to be more susceptible to conspiracy between directors and the company's management. However, a high ratio of director ownership encourages boards of directors to boost corporate performance (Piesse *et al.*, 2012:645). Contrariwise, managerial signalling theory proposes that directors have extra information about the corporation than external stockholders (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010:939). Vafeas and Theodorou (1998:383) documented that no considerable association exists between director ownership and corporate performance in their research which used 250 publicly listed corporations sampled in the UK in 1994. Their findings reveal no significant association between director ownership and ROA. analysed A selection of 3,722 firm-year observations was analysed by Konijn *et al.* (2011:1330) between 1996 and 2001 in the US. Their study discovered that corporation's worth signified by Tobin's Q is adversely associated with large director stockholding. Mangena and Tauringana (2007:70) wrote that director ownership of companies in Zimbabwe is positively correlated with both return on equity and liquidity ratios. Based on the empirical researches review above, a general hypothesis has been formulated as follows;

H₄: A statistically significant link between corporate governance mechanisms and company performance exists.

In view of the empirical studies reviewed above, seven sub-hypotheses related to the above general hypothesis have also been set as follows;

H_{4a}: A significant and negative association between the Board size and corporate performance, as measured by ROA (H_{4a}^1), ROCE (H_{4a}^2) and ROE (H_{4a}^3) exists.

H_{4b}: A significant and positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4b}^1), ROCE (H_{4b}^2) and ROE (H_{4b}^3) exists.

H_{4c}: A significant and positive association between the audit committee size and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4c}^1), ROCE (H_{4c}^2) and ROE (H_{4c}^3) exists.

H_{4d}: A significant and positive association between the audit firm size and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4d}^1), ROCE (H_{4d}^2) and ROE (H_{4d}^3) exists.

H_{4e}: A significant and positive correlation between the government ownership and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4e}^1), ROCE (H_{4e}^2) and ROE (H_{4e}^3) exists.

H_{4f}: A significant and positive correlation between the institutional ownership and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4f}^1), ROCE (H_{4f}^2) and ROE (H_{4f}^3) exists.

H_{4g}: A significant and negative correlation between the director ownership and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H_{4g}^1), ROCE (H_{4g}^2) and ROE (H_{4g}^3) exists.

4.3.4.2 The Link between Corporate Disclosure and Transparency and Corporate Performance

There are several empirical studies which examined the link between corporate disclosure and transparency and corporate performance (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Ammann *et al.*, 2013:452; Bauer *et al.*, 2010:1; Black, 2001:89; Black & Kim, 2012:203; Broadstock *et al.*, 2018:48; Cremers & Nair, 2005:2859; Giroud & Mueller, 2011:563; Gompers *et al.*, 2003:107; Lee & Yeo, 2016:1221; Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017:536; Morey *et al.*, 2009:254; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:92; Renders *et al.*, 2010:87; Suttipun, 2017:133; Tariq & Abbas, 2013:565; Van Essen *et al.*, 2013:201). Some of these studies will be detailed in this section.

As hitherto clarified, this thesis includes an assessment of the association between a compound corporate governance disclosure and transparency index and corporate performance. This assessment was previously not employed by corporate disclosure and transparency studies performed in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, by employing this model, this research study intended to add to the extant literature on emerging countries overall and specifically Zimbabwe by investigating the relationship between disclosure and transparency practice and firm performance among ZSE listed companies. The National Code of Corporate Governance,

Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI) was constructed of 153 provisions so as to evaluate the disclosure & transparency-performance association in ZSE listed corporations. The NCCGZDTI comprises of four broad corporate governance categories namely: (i) ownership and control structure; (ii) information management and disclosure; (iii) governance of risk and structure; and (iv) board of directors and management structure.

Gompers *et al.* (2003:107) is regarded as one of the pioneer study examining the relationship between a compound corporate governance index and corporate performance. Gompers *et al.* (2003:107) utilised a selection of 1,500 big US corporations between 1990 and 1999 and discovered that sound corporate governance practices enhances corporation's worth, ability to make profit and revenue growth. Bauer *et al.* (2010:1) then investigated the association between Corporate Governance Quotient index (CGQ) comprising of 61 items and firm performance, utilising a selection of 210 US corporations between 2003 and 2005. Bauer *et al.* (2010:1) discovered a significant and positive association between CGQ index and financial performance. Bebchuk *et al.* (2009:783) also had discovered that there is an adverse association between a compound corporate governance index (Entrenchment-Index 'E-Index') and corporation value. According to Ammann *et al.* (2011:452), this adverse association might suggest that the expenditure of applying sound corporate governance practices most likely overshadow the connected advantages. Klein *et al.* (2005:769) and Gupta *et al.* (2009:293) utilised the Report on Business index (ROB) in Canada, and both discovered no proof of aggregate governance instruments facilitating to enhance corporate performance. Bauer *et al.* (2008) discovered a positive association between corporate governance and corporation performance amongst 315 corporations in Japan in 2004. Their research used the Metrics Institutional Index comprising of six varied governance measurements. Tariq and Abbas (2013:565) investigated the association between corporate governance practices and corporate performance amongst 119 listed corporations between 2003 and 2010. Employing a poly-dimension performance framework, their study discovered a significantly positive influence of conformity on corporate performance. Contrariwise to the proof of a positive impact of sound corporate governance on corporate performance documented by researches performed in emerging countries, Price *et al.* (2011:76) discovered that corporate performance is not influenced by sound corporate governance practices amongst a selection of listed corporations in Mexico. In particular, their study sampled 107 corporations in Mexico between 2000 and 2004 applying corporate and market performance specifications.

Adegboyegun *et al.* (2020:1) examined the relationship between integrated reporting (IR) and firm performance, making use of cross sectional data collected from the annual reports of thirteen (13) banking firms in Nigeria for a period between 2009 and 2018. Adopting the IR index and applying the Ordinary Least Square regression analysis, the study discovered that IR has no significant influence on firm performance. Suttipun (2017:133) analysed the impact of integrated reporting (IR) on the financial performance of 150 firms for three years to 2015 in Thailand. The study employed TOBINQ as the financial measure and also used the six capitals indices and discovered that disclosing of CSR issues as well as capital has positive influence on performance whilst environmental disclosure has negative effect on performance. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:115) used a content analysis method to examine the total, quantitative (QUANFLDI) and qualitative (QUALFLDI) forward-looking disclosures of corporations, applying a forward-looking disclosure index (FLDI). The study revealed that ROA had no significant impact on FLDI, QUANFLDI and QUALFLDI. Lee and Yeo (2016) examined the relationship between IR and firm valuation, utilising a sample of listed firms in South Africa. The study found that company valuation is positively related to IR disclosures. Lee and Yeo (2016) also suggested that since reporting have higher firm valuations, IR lessens the information asymmetry between company insiders and external providers of capital.

Mervelskemper and Streit (2016:536) investigated the moderating effects of various types of environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) disclosures on market valuation of ESG performance and analysed whether pursuing the current integrated reporting trend is beneficial. The study found that ESG performance is valued more strongly and is positively related the firm's ESG report, regardless of its type (stand-alone or integrated). Li et al. (2018:60), utilising a large cross-sectional dataset involving FTSE 350 listed companies, investigated whether top-quality environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) disclosure influences firm value. The study found that a positive relationship between the extent of ESG disclosure and firm value, signifying that better-quality transparency and accountability and improved stakeholder confidence boost firm value.

Since the empirical evidence from developing economies (*See Appendix 1*) mostly implies a positive association between corporate governance disclosure and transparency indices and corporate performance (e.g., Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Black *et al.*, 2012:203; Suttipun,

2017:133; Tariq & Abbas, 2013:565), the last hypothesis examined to achieve the seventh research objective was set as follows:

H₅: There is a statistically significant and positive association between corporate disclosure and transparency practices (represented by the NCCGZDTI) and corporate performance, as signified by ROA (H₅^a), ROCE (H₅^b) and ROE (H₅^c).

4.3.5 Comparing Level of Conformity with Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Guidelines

As considered in *Chapter 2*, the aim of a corporate governance code is to enhance both mandatory and non-mandatory corporate disclosure, corporate responsibility and transparency (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:376; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012:195). The last two decades has seen an increase in the development of corporate governance codes in several countries around the world, however there are geographical, traditional and structural variations in terms of the level of application and conformity (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:376; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006:1034; Ntim *et al.*, 2013:121). Moreover, conformity with many corporate governance codes is optional ‘comply or explain’ including the NCCGZ 2015, UK Code 2015, South Africa King III Report among others. However, conformity with a small number codes including the USA 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is obligatory (‘comply or else’). Accordingly, there has been an rising research interest to evaluate the extent of conformity with corporate governance codes and their consequent impact on financial performance (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010:939; Bozec *et al.*, 2010:684; McNulty *et al.*, 2013:183; Werder *et al.*, 2005:178). Provided the significance of the extent of conformity with corporate governance codes in enhancing corporate disclosure and transparency practices, the following sections aims: (i) to review previous researches that investigated the degree of conformity with corporate governance requirements; and (ii) to analyse the varied components affecting the extent of conformity with corporate governance provisions.

The degree of conformity with corporate governance codes differs depending on variations in company- and national-level governance practices (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168; Ștefănescu, 2014:113). Recently, there has been a noticeable upsurge in the figure of countries, be they advanced (e.g., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the UK) or emerging (e.g., Brazil, China, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Zimbabwe), that have instituted corporate governance codes to

improve corporate governance practices amongst listed corporations. Accordingly, the corporate governance empirical works has shown a keen interest in examining factors affecting both mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure (Abeysekera, 2013:227; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Turturea, 2015:2161). The next section considers the extent of conformity with corporate governance codes in advanced and emerging countries.

4.3.5.1 Extent of Conformity in Developed countries

Most of the research confirmations from advanced economies reveals a great extent of conformity with corporate governance codes for the past two decades. For example, in their review studies investigating conformity with the Cadbury commendations amongst UK corporations, Conyon and Mallin (1997:24) discovered extensive observance by an improving size of non-executive members on boards and committees. Pass (2006:467) also reported that 35% of UK corporations conformed entirely with the corporate governance requirements included in the 2003 UK Combined Code. Correspondingly, 45% attempted to conform or gave ‘satisfactory’ clarifications for non-conformity in this study performed on a small selection of 50 big listed corporations. Employing the content analysis method to assess annual reports for 2008 of corporations in the FTSE 100, Hegazy and Hegazy (2010:32) discovered that the average level of conformity with the 2003 Combined Code among UK corporations is almost 70%. In their study, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012:578) utilised data for 130 UK listed non-financial companies between 2003 and 2009, finding a great degree of conformity with the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index amongst UK listed corporations. The discoveries of both studies by Hegazy and Hegazy (2010) and Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012:578) imply that corporations in the UK overall conform with the UK Combined Code, thusly enhancing optional disclosure and governance practices.

The research by Werder *et al.* (2005:178) discovered that corporations on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange revealed a great degree of conformity with sound corporate governance practices required by the German governance code. Their study used of a 2003 selection of 408 German listed corporations. Similarly, Cromme (2005:362) documented that 75% of German listed corporations conformed with sound corporate governance principles recommended by the German governance code in 2003.

Constructing a scoring system comprising of 60 corporate governance requirements extricated from the 2007 civil governance code of Italy, Allegrini and Greco (2013:187) discovered that listed corporations in Italy improved their extent of governance practices and optional disclosure in their annual reports. Likewise, Salterio *et al.* (2013:23) investigated the extent of conformity with 16 corporate governance requirements enacted through the Canadian Securities Administrators utilising 742 listed corporations in Canada. Their research discovered that, averagely, 82% of the corporations conformed with certain of the endorsed sound corporate governance practices, whereas 39% of the corporations totally conformed with all 16 good governance provisions.

Overall, advanced countries demonstrate extensive conformity with corporate governance norms. This could be attributed to the presence of strong regulatory, economic and cultural systems in these nations, that are effective in instituting sound corporate governance practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:376; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:257; Salterio *et al.*, 2013:23).

4.3.5.2 Extent of Conformity in Emerging countries

There is broad variations in the degree of conformity with corporate governance disclosure in developing countries (Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Klapper & Love, 2004:703; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Solomon, 2010; Suttipun, 2017:133). At the national level, experiential researches in emerging countries discovered that the extent of conformity differs in relation to the kind of government in authority (El Hajj *et al.*, 2016:1; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168). Overall, though, numerous studies found that developing countries are characterised by weak institutions and weak extent of conformity with codes of sound governance in emerging countries (Ararat & Ugur, 2003:58; El Hajj *et al.*, 2016; Adegboyegun *et al.*, 2020:1; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738).

In their study, Ararat and Ugur (2003:58) offered an outline of the Turkish corporate governance structure. Ararat and Ugur (2003:58) underscored that the shortfalls consisting of shaky oversight and implementation by the regulating authorities, lead to the lower degree of conformity with the corporate governance requirements prescribed in the Turkish Corporate Governance Code amongst listed corporations in Turkey. Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006:126) employing a sample of 160 listed corporations in 2002 documented that merely a smaller number of Cypriot listed corporations conformed with the requirements of the

country's corporate governance code. This finding may have been influenced by the research study period, which concurred with the release of the Cyprus Corporate Governance Code in 2002.

A corporate governance index was developed to assess the extent of conformity amongst 22 listed corporations in Ghana between 2001 and 2002 by Tsamenyi *et al.* (2007:319), who discovered an average disclosure and transparency score of 52%. Moreover, in an African corporate context, Samaha *et al.* (2012:168) discovered a lesser extent of optional corporate disclosure amongst companies in Egypt by means of a 2009 selection of 100 listed corporations in Egypt after applying a disclosure scoring system comprising of 53 governance items.

A sample of 68 publicly traded corporations was selected by Schiehl *et al.* (2013:333) to assess the extent of optional disclosure with Executive Stock Option (ESO) plans issued in 2007 by the Brazilian stock market authority. Schiehl *et al.* (2013:340) discovered that the corporations released very little information about the ESO plans and in particular, on average, the business corporations observed 10 out of 23 endorsed requirements.

Contrariwise, other empirical studies have discovered a comparative increase in the degree of conformity in several emerging countries after the announcement of a corporate governance code. Particularly, Alves & Mendes (2004:290) documented that the release of the Portuguese Corporate Governance Code in 1999 caused a substantial improvement in the extent of optional corporate disclosure. Likewise, Barako *et al.* (2006:120) discovered that when corporate governance principles were established in Kenya in 1999, a steady improvement in the extent of conformity by all 54 listed companies was noted. Additionally, Chalevas (2011:170) discovered that observance of the 69 corporate governance standards increased amongst Greek corporations between 2000 and 2003. Likewise, Ntim *et al.* (2012:125) developed an index comprising 50 corporate governance requirements to assess the effect of the King II Report on corporate governance practices in 169 selected listed corporations in South Africa. The findings from this study suggested that corporate governance standards, in overall, refined since the announcement of the report in 2002. In fact, the study recorded that the degree of conformity rose from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006.

To conclude, present evidence mostly implies that there has been some increase in the degree of conformity with corporate governance practices in certain countries following the

introduction of a code of sound corporate governance. Most researchers claim that developing countries ordinarily experience inadequate legal systems, and hence could possibly implement a code of sound corporate governance practice to promote the attraction of possible investors and reducing the cost of capital (Bozec *et al.*, 2010:690; Munisi & Mersland, 2016:25; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:100).

4.3.5.3 Level Compliance in Zimbabwe

According to OECD (2015), corporate governance is built on principles, offering standards, good practices, in addition to the guidance on application, governance is based on transparency, accurate and applicable information on a timely basis, so as to assist the board members' decision-making. The code of best practice in corporate governance in Zimbabwe (NCCGZ), makes provisions for corporate disclosures including sustainability reporting and integrated reporting for Zimbabwean companies. Limited empirical researches have endeavoured to assess the degree of conformity with corporate governance standards in Zimbabwe (Mangena *et al.*, 2012:S23; Mangena & Taurigana, 2007:53; Maune, 2015:167; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Zimbwa, 2005:1). Although these studies were performed before the release of the NCCGZ, in general, these studies reported mixed results pertaining to the comparative increase in the extent of conformity over the past two decades of corporate governance reforms. More specifically, Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) examined 49 listed firms as of December 1994. The study by Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) was selected as it is the closest related study that is applicable to this present study. The study reported that obligatory disclosure practices of the selected firms listed on the ZSE, entirely seems sufficient as relevant disclosure items were released in their annual reports scoring from 63 to 85 per cent of the maximum index score expected of them. The study by Zimbwa (2005) found that that publicly listed corporations in Zimbabwe have low degree of transparency after using the Standard and Poor transparency (S&P) benchmark consisting of 90 questions drawn from the S&P index to assess the degree of transparency by 39 listed firms as of December 2003. Whereas Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) concentrated on obligatory disclosure, the scorecard used by Zimbwa (2005) consists of thirty-three percent obligatory and sixty seven percent non-mandatory disclosure items. Unlike the above studies, Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:34), who focuses on general voluntary disclosure, assess the level to which companies in Zimbabwe make shifts towards the triple bottom line (TBL) reporting and assess the balance of the three Ps (People, Planet and Profit). This was done through a content analysis of company annual reports of 40 listed

corporations in Zimbabwe for period 2009 to 2012. They find that whilst companies are making shifts towards the TBL reporting, the standard of reporting is still below one's expectation as there are a lot of irregularities between companies and sectors.

As considered in *Chapter 1*, this research is diverse from former studies performed on Zimbabwe in numerous ways. Firstly, former studies applying a corporate governance disclosure scoring system or checklist concentrated on few governance requirements (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53). Contrariwise, this research evaluated a bigger set of corporate governance requirements grouped into four sub-categories: (i) ownership and control structure; (ii) information management and disclosure; (iii) governance of risk and structure; and (iv) board of directors and management structure, with variations in the sum of provisions on the basis of the significance of every category. The governance information is also gathered from varied sources such as annual reports, companies' websites and ZSE's websites. It can be argued that the sources of data for this research study are wealthier than in former studies. Secondly, the majority of former studies using a corporate governance index did not definitely refer to the national corporate governance code when developing their corporate governance disclosure index. For instance, Zimbwa (2005:1) depended on the Standard and Poor transparency (S&P) benchmark developed by other studies, while Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) and Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:34) drew their disclosure items mostly from past literature. This may raise queries concerning the relevance of those indices in the Zimbabwe corporate environment. This thesis used a researcher-developed disclosure and transparency index drawn mainly from the 2015 NCCGZ, expected to be more relevant to the Zimbabwe corporate situation. Lastly, the current research utilises balanced panel data over a three year period (2014-2016), while former studies used cross sectional and unbalanced panel data over shorter periods (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Zimbwa, 2005:1). This improved the generalisability of the findings for ZSE listed companies.

4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This chapter gave an analysis of the theoretic and heuristic literature on the association between corporate disclosure and transparency and company attributes as well as company performance. In order to examine the applicable related studies, this chapter was split into two major segments: (i) a suitable and essential consideration of corporate disclosure and

transparency theories and (ii) a review of former empirical studies and hypotheses development.

The first part of the chapter assessed corporate disclosure and transparency theories associated with both corporate disclosure and transparency and firm performance. This research applied a multiple-theoretical framework to perform the review which included the IASB Conceptual Framework, positive accounting theory, agency theory, shareholder primacy, enlightened shareholder value, stakeholder, legitimacy, resource dependence and capital market based theories. This assisted in developing the appreciation of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and also in the resultant explanation of the empirical findings. In the second part of the chapter, various former empirical studies were considered regarding the degree of conformity with corporate governance code and the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency practices; determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency and the link between disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance. The extant literature revealed that experiential researches on both advanced and emerging countries employ two distinct statistical models namely Model 2 and Model 3. The literature on compliance model was studied. Overall, current studies have not established decisive findings on the association between corporate governance and company performance, whether in advanced and emerging countries. The existing evidence suggests that advanced countries conform to the corporate governance codes more than emerging countries. This could be due to variations in the advancement and implementation of the legal, economic and cultural structures between advanced and emerging countries. The empirical proof from both advanced and emerging countries revealed that there are various governance instruments that affect the extent of observance of corporate governance codes including proprietorship composition, objectivity of directors, board size and audit company size.

The following chapter offer an explanation of the research design, methodology and procedures used in this study.

Chapter 5 Research Paradigm, Methodology and Design

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of how the data used for the research was chosen and amassed. The chapter also explains the manner in which the data was culled and processed in order to reach the concluding remarks in *Chapters 6 and 7*. Former studies such as Singhvi (1967); Owusu-Ansah (1998:610); Zimbwa (2005); Aksu and Kosedag (2006:277); Mangena and Tauringana (2007:53); Hassan et al. (2009:79); Gurvitch and Sidorova (2012:26); Faisal *et al.* (2012:19); Jensen and Berg (2012:299); Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012:515); Frias-Aceituno *et al.* (2014:56); Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:34); Van Zyl (2014:19); Lipunga (2015:130); Turturea (2015:2161); Lee and Yeo (2016:1221); Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016:738); Du Toit *et al.* (2017:654); Mervelskemper and Streit (2017:536); Suttipun (2017:133); Oshika and Saka (2017:625); Broadstock *et al.* (2018); Kılıç and Kuzey (2018) and Li *et al.* (2018) were reviewed and considered in order to establish the following issues (1) the best sample size to obtain judicious inferences, (2) the variables to be utilised in order to evaluate their association with corporate disclosure and transparency practices and (3) the methods which were employed by former researchers. This chapter reviews the constructivist study paradigm applied in this research and simultaneously take into consideration the alternative paradigms, namely Positivism and Realism, and the related explanations for their exclusion. The epistemological and ontological presumptions suitable to a constructivist viewpoint are then decoded into a mixed methodology adopted by this study which was predominantly qualitative.

The rest of the chapter is structured in this manner: *Section 5.2* summarises the viewpoints behind the methodologies applied in this research and the adoption of the method utilised to evaluate the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe listed firms; *Section 5.3* outlines the research design; *Section 5.4* provides research methodologies including the correspondence of the chosen research design with the research objectives and questions; *Section 5.5* reviews the research procedures including the NCCGZDTI design, content and specifications, data assemblage, validity and trustworthiness, processing and testing; *Section 5.6* explains the ethical and confidentiality aspects and *Section 5.7* provides the sum-up and conclusion of this chapter.

5.2 The Research Philosophical Paradigms

Saunders *et al.* (2012:1-728) define a research paradigm as “a loose collection of logically held together assumptions, concepts, and propositions that orientates thinking and research.” According to Osama (2013:142) research methodology is defined by the epistemological and ontological stance of the investigator referred to as the study philosophy. The perception of the investigator about the kind of realism that can be related to the phenomenon (ontology) have diverse assumptions that perform an essential part in the investigator’s comprehension of the phenomenon (epistemology). Consequently, gaining the appreciation has considerable influences on the study methodology and the techniques adopted for data assemblage (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520; Ryan *et al.*, 2002).

Table 5.1: Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

<i>Item</i>	<i>Positivism</i>	<i>Post-positivism</i>	<i>Critical Theory</i>	<i>Constructivism</i>	<i>Pragmatism</i>
Ontology (nature of reality)	Naïve realism – “real” reality but apprehensible	Critical realism – “real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible	Historical realism – virtual reality shaped by social, economic, political, cultural, ethnic, and gender values; crystallization over time	Relativism – local and specific constructed realities	Multiple subjective and objective realities. Fact v values
Epistemology (knowledge)	Dualist/objectivist; finding true	Modified dualist/objectivist; critical tradition /community; findings probably true	Transactional/sub jectivist; value-mediated findings	Transactional/ subjectivist/ created findings	Knowledge is both constructed and based on the reality of the world we live in. Accepts paradigm conflicts between quantitative and qualitative epistemologies Anti-philosophy.
Methodology (research strategies)	Experimental/manipulative; verification of hypotheses; chiefly quantitative methods	Modified experimental - manipulative; critical multiplism; falsification of hypotheses; may include qualitative methods	Dialogic/dialectic	Hermeneutical/ dialectical	Constant modification in a dynamic homeostatic of an infinite loop Dialectical eclecticism and pluralism of methods and perspectives


Source: Adapted from Denzin and Lincoln (2011), Onwuegbuzie et al. (2009), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004)

As summarised in *Chapter 1* of this thesis, the main philosophies from which the research design can develop are positivism and phenomenology. The positivistic paradigm includes the

quantitative, objective, scientific, experimentalist and traditionalist approaches. In contrast, the phenomenology paradigm encompasses the qualitative, subjectivist, humanistic, interpretive and social constructionist approaches. According to Mc Manus *et al.* (2017:1) the philosophical foundations which influence all researchers belong under consistent fundamental beliefs about the ontology and epistemology which shape the methodological choices as tabulated on Table 5.1.

To a greater extent this research operates in a naturalist/constructivist paradigm, which epistemologically suggests that knowledge, being time and setting dependent, is originated via the significances ascribed to the spectacle investigated and the investigator and subjects interrelate in such a way that “results” are the literal creation of the inquiry procedure (Krauss, 2005:758). A constructivist ontology assumes that there are manifold realities composed by human beings through their direct experiences with a spectacle of interest, and their viewpoint of these experiences orders how significance and ultimately knowledge is composed (Krauss, 2005:758). This study employed NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index to find the level and quality of disclosure and transparency by ranking scale in ZSE listed companies’ annual reports. In achieving the research objectives, this research used the research methodology outline captured in the “Research Onion” exhibited in Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1 The Research ‘Onion’



Source: Saunders *et al.* (2007:102)

The research methodologies structure portrayed has displayed the philosophies of study, methods, plans, options, time limits, and techniques and processes. The onion model developed by Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) was employed as the methodological design for this research study. The researcher deemed that both the phenomenology and ‘interpretivism’ and positivistic philosophies would be appropriate for this study (for more explanation see *Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2*). It can therefore be stated that a pragmatism philosophy has been utilised in which both phenomenological and positivist methodologies informed the study. Cameron (2009) writes that pragmatism has a solid philosophical footing in the mixed methods or methodological heterogeneity groups. This study is inclined more at the mixing of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies by adopting content analysis. White and Marsh (2006:22) write that quantitative content analysis draws from a positivist research convention and is deductive in its approach. Its aim is to investigate hypotheses, not to formulate them. Basing on related research and present, applicable theory, a researcher initially formulates one or more hypotheses that can be examined using content analysis. These hypotheses come from what is already acknowledged about the problem and the existing research questions. Contrariwise to the quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis draws from a humanistic convention and is inductive in nature. Although qualitative content analysis may generate testable hypotheses, that is not its direct aim. Predicting questions replaces the hypotheses. These are open questions that direct the research and shape the data that are collected. Additionally, in qualitative content analysis the document performs a somewhat unique role. For instance, as the researcher peruses through the data and analyses it thoroughly to discover conceptions and patterns, some conceptions and patterns may surface that were not predicted but that are, nonetheless, notable aspects to reflect. In that situation, the researcher may justifiably revise their interests and research questions to follow these new patterns. Therefore, the researcher in this study was guided by largely the inductive approach and to a lesser extent deductive approach because the centrepiece of this study is the construction of a Disclosure and Transparency Index and the scoring of annual reports to evaluate the quality of corporate disclosure and transparency practices of ZSE listed corporations. In fact, the focus of the investigation is on corporate disclosure and transparency practices; and for research purposes, qualitative dominant method has been employed.

5.2.1 Positivism

According to Creswell (2009:1-273) the positivism philosophy was established towards the end of the 18th century in the research work of certain early positivists namely; August Comte, Mill, Durkheim and Locke. Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2011:1-371) wrote that positivists suppose that reality is autonomous to the societal norms and assumptions. Therefore, they formulate theories established on empirical study including observation and experimentation. In addition, Walliman (2005:1-464) indicated that positivism produces information that is grounded on scientific judgement and mathematical evidence. Presently, researchers undertaking commercial research within a paradigm that originates from positivism, however, concentrate on theories to describe and/or envisage social phenomena (Collis & Hussey, 2009:1-420). Therefore, positivists continue to function with rational cognitive, accuracy and impartiality founded on scientific proof and examination instead of partiality and instinctive explanations (Albassam, 2014:119).

Various researchers posited that positivists describe causal associations between variables that could aid in formulating theories from the results. Additionally, positivists' viewpoint is that societal phenomena could be evaluated, and therefore could be explained employing quantitative analytical techniques (Bryman, 2012:1-766; Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). Creswell & Clark (2011:1-520). Hence, in this regard it can be suggested that researchers can make assertions to information on the basis of: (i) determinism or induce-and-impact rational; (ii) reductionism, by limiting and concentrating on choosing variables to interconnect; and (iii) thorough examinations and evaluation of the variables. The positivist paradigm was applied in this study to investigate the empirical association amongst company attributes including corporate governance instruments, corporate disclosure and transparency and company performance.

5.2.2 Interpretivism

As considered in *Chapter 1*, interpretivism is grounded on the principles of idealism and societal realism not being tangible. The explanation of societal phenomena is very biased and influenced by persons' perspectives and convictions (Collis & Hussey, 2009:1-420). The societal world of commerce and administration is extremely complicated to lend itself to hypothesising by distinct principles in similar way as the physical sciences (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). This research sympathises with such a view, hence this study was also partly

informed by the interpretivism research philosophy based on the arguments by Collis & Hussey (2009:1-420) that interpretivism was established in reaction to the alleged failure of positivism to meet the requirements of societal scientists. The identification of the blemishes of the positivism paradigm produced the following concepts about the interpretive philosophy: (i) it's impracticable to isolate persons from the societal environments in which they subsist; (ii) persons cannot be comprehended without studying the views they maintain of their own doings; (iii) a well organised research design entails limitations on the findings and might overlook other applicable results; (iv) study is not an factual undertaking, but component of what investigators perceive; and (v) portraying complicated phenomena with a specific measure is ambiguous. In particular, a positivist cannot evaluate perspectives and convictions in the depth expected to search the societal matters of an event. Therefore, the interpretive paradigm unlocks the societal world in inventive approaches. Whereas positivists emphasise on evaluating societal phenomena, interpretivism proposes investigating the intricacy of social phenomena to establish an interpretation (Bryman, 2012:1-766). In the opinion of Creswell & Clark (2011:1-520) the interpretivism paradigm is inclined to investigate, enlighten and elaborate an interpretation so as to explain or demonstrate the importance of terminologies. This paradigm does not correlate with the quantitative assessments of event that happen rationally in the societal world. Since the interpretive paradigm is ordinarily linked to the qualitative approach, this research study applies mostly the qualitative content analysis concurrently with the quantitative content analysis of data. Thus, the quantitative analysis is valuable in closing the gaps of the qualitative analysis, linking and complementing the findings from two methods (Saunders et al., 2009:1-656). Additionally, this will facilitate the development of a deeper knowledge of the empirical results (Cameron, 2009:1; Mc Manus *et al.*, 2017:1; Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656).

According to Cameron (2009:1) the debates surrounding research paradigms have a long history and were particularly active in the 1980s. At the extreme side of the argument are the 'conservatives' who claim that paradigms and methodologies should not be blended. The other category is the 'situationalists' who assert that certain methodologies can be used in particular situations. On the other extreme side of dispute are the pragmatists who are in complete disagreement with the 'purists'. This school of thought reasoned against a false separation between the qualitative and quantitative research philosophies and promote the economical use

of both approaches. Section 5.2.3 below presents details of the pragmatism research philosophy which has been adopted for this research.

5.2.3 Pragmatism

According to Lipscomb (2011:1) pragmatism is situated in mixed method work. Advocates of mixed methods research have been associated with those who are identified with the pragmatic philosophy (Cameron, 2009:1). In everyday speech pragmatism is, often, little more than a synonym for ‘sensibleness’. More formally pragmatism has been presented in research texts as a distinct paradigm (Lipscomb, 2011:1). Thus, Creswell & Clark present pragmatism as the equal of empirically reductionist ‘post-positivism’, ‘constructionism’ and what they term empowerment or issue orientated ‘participatory’ worldviews (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520). Pragmatism is commonly considered as the philosophical affiliate of the mixed methods methodology. It offers a set of suppositions about information and analysis that strengthens the mixed methods methodology and which separates the approach from wholly quantitative methodologies that are established on a philosophy of post-positivism and wholly qualitative methodologies that are established on a philosophy of interpretivism or constructivism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:14; Morgan, 2007:48).

Pragmatists and pragmatisms can, depending upon the version being considered, share much with the positions labelled by Creswell and Plano Clark’s post-positivism, constructionism and participatory worldviews. Eliding or subsuming divergent pragmatic perspectives under a single general heading (as Creswell & Plano Clark do) thus obfuscates and dilutes the meaning of the descriptor and conceptual muddle is likely to ensue if readers/researchers, unaware of the range of perspectives captured by the term, accept a singular pragmatism as a paradigm or worldview. If it is granted that pragmatism describes a broad range of philosophic positions, and this seems difficult to refute, then mixed method texts ought to clarify the meaning they attach to the term (Lipscomb, 2011:1). According to Denscombe (2010:1) it is achievable to detect four aspects of the way in which pragmatism causes the practice of mixed methods research as follows: (i) Pragmatism offers a *blending of methodologies*. Pursuing to challenge what are considered as sterile and unproductive dichotomies, some mixed methods investigators advocate a search for universal ground or some compatibility between the ancient paradigms of research (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003:207); (ii) Pragmatism offers a foundation for using mixed methods methodologies as a ‘*third alternative*’. This is another route open to

societal researchers if they judge that neither quantitative nor qualitative research alone will produce satisfactory results for the specific piece of research they are contemplating (Johnson *et al.*, 2007:112; Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007:207); (iii) Pragmatism is considered as a *new orthodoxy* established on the conviction that not only is it permissible to blend methods from diverse philosophies of research but it is also ‘*desired*’ to do so since well-intentioned societal research would practically certainly compel the application of both quantitative and qualitative research so as to produce an satisfactory answer (Rocco *et al.*, 2003:19) and finally (iv) Pragmatism is considered in the ordinary sense way as meaning ‘*expedient*’. These facets of pragmatism are not essentially equally exclusive options. Practically, there is likely to be a level of commonality between them. Mc Manus *et al.* (2017) pointed out that there is an increasing change through a pragmatic viewpoint, that a mixture of beliefs might cause a rounded procedure to solving research questions. Pragmatists deem it normal to apply quantitative approaches alongside qualitative approaches or qualitative approaches alongside quantitative approaches or mono-qualitative approaches, or mono-quantitative approaches subject to requisites of research. *Section 5.4.3* below discusses more details of the reason why this research adopted mixed methodology.

5.2.4 Paradigms and Application to the Study

According to Vasilachis de Gialdino (2011:1) the presence of a basic system of ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological assumptions with which researchers approach their research is widely accepted.

Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) write that ontology is involved with the nature of reality. Collis and Hussey (2009) pointed out that positivists regard societal reality as factual and peripheral to societal components. Likewise, quantitative research evaluates objectivity by means of statistical analysis (Molina-Azorin, 2011:33). Axiology is involved with the researcher’s viewpoint of the role of values in research (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). This research study is performed in the specific corporate environment and culture of Zimbabwe. This setting encompasses a unified framework consisting of regulators, legislations, corporations and stakeholders. One main feature of this research study was to reflect the corporate disclosure and transparency practices in the Zimbabwean corporate setting. The study also aimed to some extent to measure the communication between corporations and stakeholders through annual reports.

Bryman (2012:1-766) wrote that the epistemological aspect involves the question of what is (or should be) appropriate information in a discipline. Epistemology concerns what constitute acceptable knowledge in a field of study (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). Epistemological research assesses the connection between the investigator and what is being investigated. On the balance of this, Creswell (2009:1-273) stated that the researcher must be impartial of what they research in this paradigm. Hence, quantitative researchers endeavour to lower partiality by applying a suitable sampling method and strive for impartiality in conducting the research procedure, especially during data gathering and analysis (Albassam, 2014:119). Contrariwise, interpretivism restricts the space between the investigator and that being investigated (Collis & Hussey, 2009:1-420). Therefore, qualitative research is distinct from quantitative research as it permits tighter contact with human beings in the societal perspective, or examining societal phenomena for a lengthy period of time.

In this research study, corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe were investigated utilising the companies' annual reports. This allowed the investigator to be unbiased of what is being investigated. In fact, the researcher endeavoured to interpret exactly the capability of individual firms to address stakeholder expectations, specifically how they undertake their disclosure and transparency roles and responsibilities. Therefore, in order to do that, appropriate qualitative content analysis approach have been applied as discussed in *Section 5.2* above.

The axiological assumption strengthens the function of values in this research study. According to Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) researchers display axiological aptitudes to express these values as a basis for making conclusions about the research they are performing and the methods of conducting it. Positivists regard the themes under research unchanged by their study undertakings. However, there could be certain influence after the research is performed. Collis and Hussey (2009:1-420) wrote that interpretivists consider that researchers should display ethical and moral values. Thusly, qualitative research is more value-loaded and believes in research morals better than quantitative study (Creswell, 2009:1-273).

As discussed in *Chapter 1* of this research, this research study developed a corporate disclosure and transparency index to assess business corporations' conformity to the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) and its effect on firm performance. Therefore, the findings of this assessment were communicated in numbers. The other piece of this study

investigated the quality of certain disclosures and current corporate disclosure and transparency practices are really able to capture and assess the different relationships companies develop with their stakeholders in an explicit, clear and complete way; they were not communicated in numbers, but through a narrative evaluation of an inductive qualitative content analysis. In alignment with an inductive qualitative content analysis approach, this thesis intended to “systematically describe the meaning” of corporate disclosure and transparency practices by extracting categories from the data concerning perceived strengths and weaknesses of the NCCGZ’s framework and the general concept of corporate disclosure and transparency.

The methodological assumption entails how research must be assumed, together with the theoretical and philosophical context and its consequences for the selected methodologies (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). This study employed to a larger extent the inductive approach to investigate the level and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, to a lesser extent through the deductive procedure, corporate disclosure and transparency theories including agency, shareholder primacy, enlightened shareholder, stakeholder, resource dependence and market based theories were tested. Moreover, the study tested hypotheses to explicate corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This helped in fostering an appreciation of the statistical results.

5.3 The Research Design

According to Osama (2013:142) research design is a critical option and has a key part to play on the entire research. Various researchers rationalise that a researcher should decide on the research design at the initial stage of the research, because of the crucial part it plays on research undertakings and affects the whole research process considerably (Collis & Hussey, 2009:1-420; Creswell, 2009:1-273).


According to Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) the research design is ascertained by the degree to which the investigator is decisive about theory at the commencement of the research, to adopt either the deductive or inductive methodology. The deductive methodology entails establishing a theory and hypothesis by planning a research strategy to investigate the hypothesis. Conversely, the inductive methodology involves the collection of data and development of a theory as an outcome of data analysis by the researcher without using any existing theory. Additionally, both of these research methods are connected to the diverse research philosophies. In particular, the deductive method is linked mostly to positivism and the

inductive method is connected to the interpretive or the phenomenological paradigm (Osama, 2013:142). Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) documented that research design emphasises on transforming research questions and objectives into a research undertaking. It involves strategies, choices and time horizons of the research, which will be discussed in the following sections.

5.4 Research Methodology

Given (2008:1) states that research methodology entails a strategy which underscores the regulations and approaches that researchers implement in order to leave their work accessible to analysis, criticism, reproduction, reiteration, and/or modification and to select the research approaches. Research methodology lies along a continuum, in which one extreme side representing a range of unmixed qualitative research approaches and the other being unmixed quantitative research approaches which may be applied to examine data. Amidst both sides of a continuum are different mixed methods choices open to the researcher, conditional on their research questions as shown on Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Major Research Methods



Source: Mc Manus *et al.* (2017)

Walle (1997:524) explained that the contrast of both qualitative and quantitative is manifested in their characteristic features. Quantitative (or scientific) methodologies focus on formality and accuracy based on arithmetical instruments, while qualitative methodologies show attributes of awareness based on instinct and incline on reliance on written and narrative data.

Kothari (2004:1-401) explained the difference between methodology and methods, in which there may be a mix-up in the selection of description. For instance, methodology is linked to the philosophy that influence how information should be collected and the methodical way in which the research problem is resolved. However, research methods are the data collecting procedures applied in the performance of research.

As discussed in *Section 5.2.3* researchers are increasingly adopting pragmatic stance where a combination of research philosophies and approaches is possible. This suggest that pragmatists can use divergent procedures along the continuum (as illustrated in *Figure 5.2* above) by applying the ‘pragmatic rule’ which allows truth to be achieved by emphasising on ‘what works best’ to attend to the research questions (Johnson *et al.*, 2007:112; Wahyuni, 2012:69).

This study follows a qualitative dominant approach, which would place it within the interpretivist or phenomenological social enquiry. However, embedded in the qualitative content analysis, quantitative indicators will be generated (Breuning, 2011:1). Therefore, the researcher also utilised descriptive statistics to examine the quantitative data to explain the relationship between variables. It can therefore be stated that an eclectic approach has been utilised in which both phenomenological and positivist methodologies informed the study. Therefore, this study is certainly descriptive (Yin, 2003:1-181). At the same time, it is exploratory in nature because it intends to find out what is happening, seek new insights, assess the corporate disclosure and transparency phenomenon in a new light (that is, the sustainability and integrated reporting perspective), and generate ideas for further research (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). This study explored and investigated different corporate disclosure and transparency issues and how they relate to corporate governance, including their roles in influencing organisations’ overall performances (financial and non-financial); and secondly, it describes the different sets of relationships between company-specific attributes and disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance, emanating from use of the NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Measuring Instrument.

5.4.1 Qualitative Methodology

According to Kothari (2004:1-401) qualitative methodology is very essential in behavioural sciences as it encapsulates the highlighting descriptions for particular human behaviour. By employing instruments such as interviews and qualitative content analysis, the researcher utilises non-numerical written or narrative data, thereby resolving the ‘*why*’ questions of a

phenomena (Given, 2008:1; Saunders *et al.*, 2012:1-728). The qualitative methodology is based on interpretivism and or constructivism (Bryman, 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2011:33). It is inclined to a subjective ontological viewpoint of the world and in that reality is modelled in a social context (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). Therefore, qualitative research is judged to be more adaptable in nature, understanding the world from the viewpoint of the actor (Bryman, 1984:75). It factors in the multiple-constructed realities which cannot be clarified completely by studying numerical data (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:14; Saunders *et al.*, 2012:1-728). It consists of methods like grounded theory designs, life history descriptions, participating action research with direct dialogue with the participant and case study designs. (Wahyuni, 2012:69). Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) revealed that qualitative methodology favours the hermeneutics (interpretation) approach as the data cannot be abridged to numerals.

Generally, this research follows a qualitative methodology, and particularly one that is hermeneutical and dialectical. Hermeneutics denotes the ‘analysis of texts that stresses how prior understandings and prejudices shape the interpretive process’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:1-346), while in a constructivist philosophical viewpoint, dialectic denotes the comparison of many constructions through ‘iteration, analysis, critique, reiteration, reanalysis, and so on that leads eventually to a joint (among inquirer and respondents) construction of a case (i.e. findings or outcomes)’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:1-346).

5.4.2 Quantitative Methodology

Mc Manus *et al.* (2017:1) documented that in the corporate environment, quantitative methodology (or scientific methodology) has been portrayed as the conventional emphasis of social research which uses a natural science method (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:14). Therefore, quantitative methodologies are oriented towards law-like generalisability, referred to as nomothetic (Wahyuni, 2012:69). Therefore, quantitative methodology utilises numerical data as its main emphasis applying methods including questionnaires, surveys, and/or past arithmetical data to ensure authenticity (Saunders *et al.*, 2012:1-728). According to Chatha *et al.* (2015:487) quantitative researches can depend on either; (1) *Conceptual-quantitative secondary data*, where complex arithmetical methods are applied to generate and then test fresh architypes, or (2) *Experiential-quantitative primary data*, gathered by the researcher. Quantifiable analysis allows the researcher to achieve a statistical interpretation of the phenomena, since “*reliability and validity are tools of an essentially positivist epistemology*”

(Nahid, 2003:1). Hence, by following the logical selection of quantitative methodology, the researcher is trying to define the spectacle in question into quantifiable repeatable authentication records (Mc Manus *et al.*, 2017:1). In doing so, quantitative methods employed may face intense validation and stringency amongst peers (Walle, 1997:524). Therefore, as evident in this research study to a lesser extent, those implementing quantitative methodologies are inclined to assume an ontology of objectivism and a positivist epistemological approach to research, particularly when applied with predestined, hard, measureable findings with very organised data gathering procedures (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). Lastly, Mc Manus *et al.* (2017:1) wrote that quantitative approaches are intended to resolve the 'who' and the 'what' of the research question (Given, 2008:1) although they do not altogether resolve the 'why' of a spectacle.

5.4.3 Mixed Methods Methodology

Saunders *et al.* (2012:1-728) stated that mixed methods methodology primarily employs both quantitative and qualitative data gathering so as to resolve certain research questions performing concomitantly or successively with either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies taking predominance over the other. Thus, a pragmatist viewpoint emphasises on 'what works' is mostly connected to the mixed methods methodology (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520). The pragmatist paradigm, while studying theory and practice, is inclined to consider the viewpoints of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches (Johnson *et al.*, 2007:112). Johl *et al.* (2012:6369) claimed that the mixed research has been accepted because it succeeds in integrating the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. An analysis of former mixed-methods researches including Johl *et al.* (2012:6369), McNulty *et al.* (2013:183) and Zattoni *et al.* (2013:119) indicates that mixed-methods study is useful in establishing an awareness of corporate governance transformations and their link to the corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance.

According to Molina-Azorin (2011:33) mixed methodology surfaced towards the end of the 1980s, when various publications concentrated on clarifying what is currently renowned as mixed-methods research design. This approach originated in Western countries which speaks native language of English, particularly the US and the UK, in diverse disciplines including sociology, management and education (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520). Social science researchers commonly applied either positivism or interpretivism philosophies prior to mixed-

methods attaining acceptance in the field of social sciences (Collis & Hussey, 2009:1-420). Therefore, researchers in mid-19th century had no means to deal with a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data in the same research study. Mixed method research has a brief history as a recognisable methodological movement which can be traced to the early 1980s and has been portrayed as a ‘quiet’ revolution due to its effort of solving tensions between the qualitative and quantitative methodological movements (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007:207). Therefore, the significance of mixed-methods research has increased during the three decades (Molina-Azorin, 2011:33).

The consequence of mixed-methods approach was vital in devising the framework for this research. Creswell and Clark (2011:1-520) claimed that there are four major mixed-methods approaches: (i) the triangulation (convergent parallel) design; (ii) the embedded design; (iii) the explanatory sequential design; and (iv) the exploratory sequential design. The mixed methods frameworks are shown on Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Major Mixed Method Design Types

Design Type	Timing	Mix	Weighting/ Notation
Triangulation	Concurrent: quantitative and qualitative at the same time	Merge the data during interpretation or analysis	QUAN + QUAL
Embedded	Concurrent and sequential	Embed one type of data within a larger design using the other type of data	QUAN(qual) Or QUAL(quant)
Explanatory	Sequential: Quantitative followed by qualitative	Connect the data between the two phases	QUAN → qual
Exploratory	Sequential: Qualitative followed by quantitative	Connect the data between the two phases	QUAL → quan

Source: Adapted from Creswell & Plano Clark (2007: 85)

Firstly, the triangulation (convergent parallel) design involves performing quantitative and qualitative methods concurrently. This strategy entails that the investigator administers the approaches alike and treats them autonomously during data analysis and then integrate the findings to provide a complete interpretation. Secondly, the embedded design happens when the investigator gathers and examines quantitative and qualitative data inside a conventional quantitative or qualitative design. In particular, the researcher might supplement a quantitative method to a qualitative one, for example a case study, or include a qualitative method within a quantitative one, for example an experiment. Thirdly, the explanatory sequential design involves two different interaction stages. Investigators utilise successive scheduling, beginning with the quantitative design, to gather and examine data. Subsequently, the qualitative method

trails the empirical findings to decode the first results. For instance, if a researcher holds interviews to obtain comprehensive perceptions from quantitative findings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007:179; Johl *et al.*, 2012:6369). Fourthly, the exploratory sequential design is the converse of the explanatory sequential design, beginning with qualitative data in the initial stage.

Hence, as documented by Bryman (2006:97), it can be claimed that mixed methods provide balancing interpretation, which may not be attained by employing one methodology by increasing the deepness of inquest. Mixed methods entail the application of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies under the same framework. The researcher can perform these simultaneously with either qualitative or qualitative study preceding the approach of examination subject to the investigator's questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003:1). Therefore, mixed methods has been explained as the third methodological model, offering the potencies of quantitative and qualitative methodologies and trying to circumvent the flaws of both (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520). The shortfalls of several quantitative methods include the need to condense the description to its easiest likely elements without regarding the subjective description of the phenomenon. Contrariwise, qualitative approaches attempt to entirely comprehend the narrative through perspective derivative findings restricting the aptitude to repeatable confirmation (Walle, 1997:524). Thus, to exploit an approach which not only acknowledges repeatable impartial confirmation whilst simultaneously delivering subjective inference to an inquisition, it can be considered that a mixed method could fully resolve numerous research questions (Mc Manus *et al.*, 2017:1). According to Onwuegbuzie *et al.* (2009:114) thus, through '*multiple operationalism*', the application at least one approach assist in ensuring that the inconsistencies under the study spectacle or attribute are not only a function of the approach (Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009:114).

This study used the embedded or nested design. The justification for employing this design is reviewed hereafter. Firstly, the quantitative approach offers further analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance transformations such as legitimising sustainability reporting through corporate governance framework on enhancing corporate accountability practices (Molina-Azorin, 2011:33). Secondly, it sought to improve the robustness of the empirical results (Mengoli *et al.*, 2009:629) as the dominant qualitative analysis is enhanced or clarified from the quantitative analysis. Thirdly, it aims to shed light on statistical link between the

degree of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporation specific attributes and firm performance that is not obtained in the qualitative analysis (Mengoli *et al.*, 2009:629).

The mixed method design in this study was performed in two phases. The first phase started with the inductive qualitative content method on annual reports for ZSE listed companies. In the second phase, certain qualitative results required further clarification (Johl *et al.*, 2012:6369; Mengoli *et al.*, 2009:629). As discussed in *Section 5.3*, since in many cases, quantification is considered a characterising aspect of content analysis, this study deems it essential to use these results to develop the quantitative analysis method. More precisely, the research instruments for this study were designed to facilitate the concurrent and sequential timing of data collection and analysis procedures.

5.4.4 Content Analysis

Content analysis involves manual or automated coding, implying categorising the content of, for instance a document (Blumberg *et al.*, 2011:1-656), so as to draw replicable and rational inferences from documents (Krippendorff, 2004:1-440). According to Stemler (2001:1) content analysis can be described as a systemic, replicable procedure for compressing numerous words of text into fewer content categories. Weber (1990:1-96) document that content analysis is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text. Because of the different research purposes, content analysis may focus on the literal content of a text or aim at extracting deeper (or latent) insights. This has determined the adoption of a multiplicity of strategies for analysing text in a systematic way. Some of these strategies, including, for example, word counts, are easier to replicate; others are more interpretive and depend upon the judgment of the researcher working on the text.

Qualitative content analysis does not involve only counting words or extricating objective content from documents to consider meanings, themes and patterns that may be patent or hidden in a certain document (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1). Moreover Pickering (2004:1) writes that qualitative content analysis examines significant aspects of texts that are not amenable to quantitative techniques. Such techniques measure patterns of frequency and regularity in a large number of texts, but as Siegfried Kracauer (1952–1953) once argued..., what is perhaps most significant about a particular text may resist quantification. The main differences between quantitative and qualitative content analysis are presented in table 5.3.

The research used a double-step content analysis and does not focus on one method of content analysis only. The reason for choosing this approach is to combine the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff 2004:1-440, Neuendorf 2011:1-228). This study utilised a qualitative content analysis method to a larger extent. Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1277) defined qualitative content analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.” This data analysis approach is aligned with the selected study paradigm, as evidenced by literature which state that constructivist research focuses on the meanings embedded in textual and verbal accounts and generally involves the analysis of archival materials and documentary sources (Bisman & Highfield, 2013:3). The reason for using content analyses is because it enables the researcher to examine through voluminous data in a methodical way. Content analysis is useful to examine trends and patterns in documents and is also a powerful data reduction technique (Krippendorff, 2004:1-440).

Table 5.3 Main differences between quantitative and qualitative content analysis

	Quantitative content analysis	Qualitative content analysis
Research areas in which the methods were originally developed	Mass communication, in order to count manifest textual elements	Anthropology, qualitative sociology, and psychology, in order to explore the meanings underlying physical messages
Approach	Deductive	Inductive
Sampling	Random or stratified sampling	Purposefully selected texts
Final Outcomes	Numbers to be used in statistical methods	Descriptions, typologies, expressions reflecting the perception of the social world

Source: Based on Zhang and Wildemuth (2009:1-12)

5.5 Research Procedures

This research achieved its purposes and objectives by utilising three main procedures, namely a literature review (or historical procedure), the development of the measuring instrument and the survey procedure.

5.5.1 Literature Study

In the literature study, the research focussed on previous research that has been done on corporate disclosure and transparency and their components, as well as related concepts, such as corporate governance, sustainability reporting, integrated reporting, corporate accountability, etc. Data bases which have been consulted included the Internet and online scientific search engines (e.g. ProQuest & Science Direct), scientific journal articles, popular articles, books and other research studies (e.g. studies conducted by NGO's). As discussed in *Chapter 1* integrated and sustainability reporting are fairly new concepts, therefore this literature study procedure is to achieve the first, second and third objectives of the study. The review of literature also informed the research on the construction of a disclosure and transparency index used in this study. A review of the NCCGZ allowed the initial identification of subheadings and themes within which individual components and provisions of the code are analysed.

5.5.2 Construction of the NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index

The NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI) contains 153 corporate governance requirements including four broad categories (sub-indices), as follows: (i) Ownership and control structure (28 provisions); (ii) Information management and disclosure (77 provisions); (iii) Governance of risk and structure (21 provisions); and (iv) Board of directors and management structure (27 provisions) (*see Appendix 2*). All the NCCGZDTI categories did not have the same number of questions in the index because the different themes or focus areas have different number of dimensions. Also there was no comparison made between the diverse themes/areas, hence it was unsuitable to have the similar number of questions.

The major source for developing the index was the 2015 NCCGZ. The listed corporations are expected by the ZSE to disclose in compliance with the accounting disclosure prerequisites of the Companies Act, 2003 (Chapter 24:03), the listing requirements of the ZSE, and the accepted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRs). Usually, these legislative sources influence

the financial reporting and disclosure practices of public listed corporations in Zimbabwe. Moreover, as discussed in chapter one, the NCCGZ also make reference to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, GRI and IR frameworks. Accordingly, the disclosure items contained in the disclosure and transparency checklist were derived from these legislative sources and these were also utilised as other sources for constructing the index.

The use of a corporate governance disclosure and transparency index correspond with modern research studies on advanced countries (Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Bozec *et al.*, 2010:684; DeBoskey, 2006; Faisal *et al.*, 2012:19; Gupta *et al.*, 2009:293; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012:515; Price *et al.*, 2011:76; Salterio *et al.*, 2013:23) and emerging countries (Albassam, 2014; Al-Malkawi *et al.*, 2014:133; Beekes *et al.*, 2016:263; Golja & Paulisic, 2010:368; Gurvitsh & Sidorova, 2012:26; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006:1034; Hossain & Hammami, 2009:255; Lipunga, 2015:130; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:92; Ntim *et al.*, 2013:121; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Panchasara & Bharadia, 2013:88; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168; Tariq & Abbas, 2013:565; Turturea, 2015:2161). These research studies utilise either self-developed indices derived from national codes (Albassam, 2014; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Price *et al.*, 2011:76) or use other indices such as Standard and Poor Transparency and Disclosure (S&P D&T) index which are based on general governance principles (DeBoskey, 2006; Turner *et al.*, 2006:41) and also based on international corporate governance reporting frameworks, such as the GRI, IIRC, OECD, and so forth (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; De Villiers & Alexander, 2014; Faisal *et al.*, 2012:19; Gurvitsh & Sidorova, 2012:26; Panchasara & Bharadia, 2013:88; Turk *et al.*, 2013:75; Turturea, 2015:2161; Ullah & Rehman, 2016:1; Van Zyl, 2014:19). Corresponding with former researches (Albassam, 2014:119; Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Osama, 2013; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168), the requirements of the NCCGZDTI are overshadowed by the mostly significant corporate governance instruments, particularly information disclosure and transparency, board of directors and management structure, governance of risk and structure and ownership control and structure.

5.5.2.1 Reliability and Validity of the Developed Scoring System (Index)

There are the two specific aspects concerning measuring the attribute of the instrument specifically, reliability and validity (Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). According to Krippendorff (2004:1-440) reliability is described as “the ability of a

measurement instrument to reproduce consistent results on repeated measurements”. This means the capability of a tool to measure dependably (Albassam, 2014:119). In this viewpoint, two linked subjects are considered to evaluate the reliability of the coding process namely stability and consistency (Sekaran, 2003:1-464). Stability implies the capability of the measurement to be recurring, with the outcomes maintained over time (Aras & Crowther, 2009:279). For instance, the developed index is stable if it can be used repeatedly by the same investigator over time (Sekaran, 2003:1-464). Conversely, consistency is the level to which all sub-parts of a measurement device are measuring the same thing (Aras & Crowther, 2009:279; Sekaran, 2003:1-464).

According to Sekaran (2003:1-464) there are three conventional means of evaluating the reliability of the disclosure and transparency checklist: (i) inter-coder reliability; (ii) test-retest; and (iii) internal consistency. If the coding outcomes are the same after coding has been conducted by at least one coder, this implies inter-coder reliability. In order to maintain the constancy of the evaluating device, and internal consistency measures sameness in reliability, test-retest reliability is applied. In this study, the constructed disclosure and transparency index, test-retest and internal consistency techniques were used to enhance the reliability of the constructed disclosure and transparency index. The inter-coder reliability was not applied since this research was conducted by only one researcher.

In order to allow the constancy of the recording when utilising the test-retest technique, threefold stages were pursued. Firstly, the full contents of the annual reports of every corporation from 2014 to 2016 were perused before commencing the coding process. This aided in the identification of the appropriate and inappropriate details in the annual reports (Omar & Simon, 2011:166). Secondly, data for three years was coded for every sampled corporation. This approach enabled the reading of the annual reports repeatedly and correctly. The first series of coding took three months to complete, from February 2018 to April 2018. Thirdly, after scoring the annual reports of each sampled corporation, re-reading the annual reports made sure that all suitable corporate governance detail was considered (Omar & Simon, 2011:166). Underscoring the considered corporate disclosure and transparency requirements in the annual reports during the initial series of coding enabled repeated reading and hence enhanced the scoring accurateness. The second series of coding entailed repeated-reading of every annual reports. The subsequent series of coding took one and half month till mid-June

2018. Generally, the findings of the subsequent series show mostly analogous findings with the initial series, which proved the stability of the coding process.

Moreover, validity is a critical aspect in measuring quality of the measuring device. Validity is described as: “the extent to which data collection methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure” (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:1-656). In other words, as pointed out by Omar and Simon (2011:166) the index is valid if it displays the same feature that the investigator desires. According to Saunders *et al.* (2009:1-656) there are usually three aspects connected to validity: (i) criterion-related validity; (ii) content validity; and (iii) construct validity. According to Sekaran (2003:1-464), criterion-related validity “is established when the measure differentiates individuals on a criterion it is expected to predict”. Content validity signals that the measure is sufficient and is symbolic of the set of details (Sekaran, 2003:1-464). Construct validity entails the clarity of interpretations that are actually signified by measurement device (Beattie *et al.*, 2004:205; Sekaran, 2003:1-464).

In this research, the validity of the corporate disclosure and transparency index was enhanced by utilising three approaches. Firstly, the corporate disclosure and transparency index was developed by the researcher rather than utilising analysts’ ratings. This ensured that the index to reflected precisely on the corporate disclosure and transparency practices amongst ZSE listed corporations. In addition, the major sources of the index are the Zimbabwe corporate governance principles and rules. This improved the content validity of the developed index. Secondly, the disclosure index was constructed to improve the construct validity by making particular focus on the disclosure and transparency requirements. This also correspond with numerous business governance reporting researches (Albassam, 2014:119; Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; DeBoskey, 2006:1; Osama, 2013:142). Evidence of validity can be backed by the fact that the concepts for this research are comparable to former studies. Additional proof was by reviewing literature for researches examining disclosure in corporate reporting. The present research made references and cited references during the development and implementation of methodologies (e.g. the disclosure indices and scoring approaches). Thirdly, the disclosure and transparency measuring instrument was perfected through amending the draft before its finalisation, to improve the criterion and content validity. These amendments were performed in stages: (i) the draft disclosure and transparency requirements was sent to selected accounting and finance practitioners where commentaries were obtained from knowledgeable

professionals in the field of corporate disclosure and transparency; and (ii) the draft disclosure and transparency requirements were cautiously amended on the basis of the commentaries and consultations with the researcher's skilled promoters.

5.5.3 Survey

This section will present the design, methodology and data utilised in the present research to answer all the enquiry questions of this research in order to achieve the fifth, sixth and seventh objectives. As earlier implied (*see Section 5.2.3*), the empirical research was conducted from the pragmatism research paradigm employing a mixed-methods research design. A content analysis method was applied in this study to determine the level and determinants of disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations. As discussed above, content analysis is a mixed method research technique. However as discussed in *Section 5.2.2*, the qualitative research design will be the dominant approach throughout this research. The figure below displays the procedure of the research steps. As shown on Figure 5.3, the qualitative analysis is an iterative process.


5.5.3.1 Data Collection

Data gathering comprised of purposively sampled annual reports to enlighten the study questions under examination. In accordance with Labuschagne (2003:100), document analysis was utilised as the data gathering approach. This thesis used a double-step content analysis as shown on *Figure 5.3*. The annual reports had to be downloaded to the local computer in PDF (Portable Document Format) files and uploaded them into the ATLAS.ti project file, called the Hermeneutic Unit (HU).

Through qualitative content analysis this unprocessed data was summarised into main themes and categories with the use of ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative analysis software. The researcher used the ATLAS.ti content analysis software for all of the reasons that Dennis and Bower (2008:423) described in their article: "It provides quick access to the quotations of a particular code; it provides search features that let the researcher find patterns or strings within the primary document; it allows the researcher to assign more than one code to a quotation; and it allows the researcher to assign more than one quotation to the same piece of text." ATLAS.ti is flexible and easy to use. It is simple to make editorial changes; the researcher can rename, delete, merge, or unlink codes or quotations without difficulty. Quotations can be accessed quickly from

almost anywhere in the program, and it is easy to create a variety of reports (Dennis & Bower, 2008:423).

Figure 5.3: The procedure of the research project



Since this research also used quantitative content analysis the coding scheme was determined a priori, that is, before coding begins. A coding scheme operationalises concepts that may in themselves be amorphous (White & Marsh, 2006:22). It established categories that are relevant and valid. Relevant means that they allow for testing the hypotheses (White & Marsh, 2006:22). This research derived codes based on the self-constructed NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI) to test hypothesis developed in *Chapter 4* of this research. The complexity of the coding scheme in this research was such that individual codes were merged after the coding to construct a comprehensive measurement (index) or else categorised to reveal associations amongst the measures. According to White and Marsh (2006:22), merely because coding schemes are established a ‘p priori’ does not necessarily imply that the cases of

the categories become instantly noticeable and, hence, simple to code. Similar to qualitative content analysis, the analysis frequently demands cautious, iterative reading of the text.

Even if qualitative content analysis often lacks the explicit coding scheme that is needed for quantitative analysis (Breuning, 2011), this inquiry was carried out using the same 5-Likert scale NCCGZDTI recording instrument (*see Section 5.5.2*) to standardise data collecting (Van Zyl, 2014:19). In alignment with an inductive qualitative content analysis method, this research intended to “systematically describe the extent including quality” of disclosure and transparency practices ZSE listed companies by extracting categories from the data using the NCCGZ framework and the general concept of corporate disclosure and transparency. According to Elo and Kyngäs (2008:107), an inductive method to category development is suggested when there is inadequate or fragmented previous knowledge regarding the theme of examination. Cho and Lee (2014:1) suggest that an inductive content analysis method should observe the following procedure:

- Selecting the unit of analysis
- Open coding
- Creating categories
- Data coding
- Revising categories

To include application and compliance issues of corporate accountability examined by first and second sub-research questions discussed in chapter one, entire annual reports were selected (as per the data assemblage process given above) as the unit of analysis. The recording instrument was based on a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) organised according to a NCCGZ framework and also referring to the OECD, GRI and IR frameworks. As discussed in *Section 5.5.2* the coding categories, or the pieces of information checked for every company through the recording instrument total 153 provisions/KPIs (they are all included in the Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Report presented in *Chapter 6* of this thesis. Data was collected using the self-constructed NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency measuring tool to highlight the level of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed corporations in their recent annual reports and examine the existence of differences between corporations in disclosure and transparency practices in their annual reports. Additionally, the study investigated the statistically significant

increase in disclosure and transparency with seven corporation attributes of the ZSE listed corporations during the recent years in their annual reports.

5.5.3.2 Sample Population and Zimbabwe Listed Firms

In particular, theoretical sampling was utilised to purposefully select a sample of ZSE listed companies. The research relies on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:25) document that theoretic sampling basically implies that cases are selected for the reason that they are outstandingly appropriate for revealing and representing associations and logic amongst constructs. Simply as laboratory tests are not arbitrary selected from a population of tests, but instead, selected for the probability that they will provide theoretic intuition, so too are cases selected for theoretic motives, including exposure of an eccentric spectacle, repetition of results from additional cases, contrary repetition, removal of alternative clarifications, and amplification of the emergent theory. This means that firms were purposefully selected to further a careful analysis of recent development in the corporate disclosure and transparency evaluation and reporting field.

The idea is to select multiple cases (Yin, 2003) which are chosen because they are ‘extreme exemplars’ (that is, leading companies in the disclosure and transparency (including CSR/sustainability) field). According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:25) manifold cases allow comparisons that explain whether an emergent result is simply distinctive to a single case or reliably reproduced by numerous cases. Manifold cases also generate more robust theory since the proposals are more intensely grounded in diverse experiential proof. Manifold cases also allow broader examination of study questions and theoretic amplification. Furthermore, multiple cases within each category allow findings to be replicated within categories (Eisenhardt, 1989:532). Thus, in order to capture and understand the extent and current trends in corporate disclosure and transparency practices and interpret firms’ ability to address stakeholder expectations regarding value creation, sample companies from each economic sector or industry were selected.

The sample utilised to assess the extent and determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance was taken from Zimbabwe listed corporations. A total of 63 corporations were listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) as of 31 December 2016. The final sample includes all the economic sectors, except Pharmaceutical and Printing & Publishing in the ZSE’s database (*see Table 5.4*). Companies under these sectors were

excluded from the sample because their annual reports were not available on the ZSE website and the respective companies' websites.

Table 5.4: The Sampled Companies by Industry

Panel A: Industrial composition of companies listed on the ZSE available to be sampled as of 31/12/2016

Industry		No. in each industry	Percentage of sample (%)
Agriculture		9	14
Banking & Finance		7	11
Building & Associated Industry		6	10
Engineering		5	8
Food & Beverages		6	10
Industrial Holdings		5	8
Insurance		5	8
Mining		4	6
Paper & Packaging		2	3
Pharmaceutical		1	2
Printing& Publishing		1	2
Property		4	6
Retail		4	6
Technology		1	2
Tourism		2	3
Transport		1	2
Total companies available to be sampled		63	100
Less: Suspended and merged companies	3		
Companies with no yearly data available	21		
Companies listed recently (2015 to 2016)	4		
Total excluded firms	28	28	44
Final selected sample		35	56

Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled companies with full data

Industry		No. in each industry	Percentage of sample (%)
Agriculture		4	11.43
Banking & Finance		5	14.29
Engineering		4	11.43
Food & Beverages		4	11.43
Industrial Holdings		5	14.28
Insurance		4	11.43
Mining		1	2.86

Industry		No. in each industry	Percentage of sample (%)
Paper & Packaging		1	2.86
Pharmaceutical		0	0
Printing& Publishing		0	0
Property		2	5.71
Retail		2	5.71
Technology		1	2.86
Tourism		1	2.86
Transport		1	2.86
Final selected sample		35	100

Source: The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE)

Notwithstanding the fact that most present studies avoid financial institutes, this research considers them for four justifications. Firstly, both financial and non-financial corporations are guided by the same disclosure rules by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. In particular, corporate governance regulations in Zimbabwe, such as the Listing Rules, the Companies Act and the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ), are relevant to all corporations (NCCGZ, 2014; ZSE, 2002). Thus, the expectation was that there will be an overall concurrence concerning the of disclosure contents throughout all economical industries. Secondly, many extant researches on corporate disclosure and transparency, particularly in developed countries, concentrate on few economic sectors, for instance manufacturing companies (Ammann *et al.*, 2013:452). Therefore, this study sought to investigate all sectors (both financial and non-financial) to fulfil this gap in corporate disclosure and transparency literature. Thirdly, considering both financial and non-financial corporations is in line with several former researches in the corporate disclosure and transparency literature (Ammann *et al.*, 2013:452; Mangena & Taurigana, 2007:53; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Tsamenyi *et al.*, 2007:319).

5.5.3.3 Data Sources

To explore the association among corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance, two diverse kinds of data was utilised: (i) company characteristics variables; and (ii) corporations' financial and market performance. Firstly, the company characteristic variables were physically extricated from companies' annual reports by means of content analysis. The yearly reports were gathered from diverse sources, including: (i) the ZSE website database, in soft copy form from 2014 to 2016; and (ii) company website.

Secondly, corporate performance variables were extracted from audited companies' financial statements, which were extricated from the ZSE's database. The companies' market information was extracted from the ZSE's Market Data Statistical Reports.

In this research study, the NCCGZDTI relies mainly on companies' annual reports as the major source for numerous explanations. Firstly, as considered in of *Chapter 2*, the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the ZSE listing rules oblige listed corporations to publicise annual reports at the end of the financial year, comprising of the board of directors' report and financial statements. Since these reports are mandatory and are required by the supervisory and regulating bodies, including the ZSE and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, this renders them a very dependable source for corporate disclosure and transparency (Lipunga, 2015:130; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Zimbwa, 2005:1). Secondly, companies' annual reports are mostly produced for stockholders (Alsaed, 2006:476; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34), to whom the directors are answerable. Samaha *et al.* (2012) claimed that this strengthens the dependability of the annual reports. Thirdly, the annual reports publicise both financial and non-financial information, and listed corporations are required to release their annual reports officially on the ZSE website. This enabled maximum availability to the requisite data and assists in using balanced panel data. Moreover, this reduced missing data. Fourthly, in agreement with former researches performed either in Zimbabwe (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007:53; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605) or in other countries (Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168), the use of annual reports improves comparability. Finally, one benefit of analysing annual reports is that they have long been regarded the prime source of interaction between a corporation and its stakeholders (Eccles & Krzus, 2010:1). Additionally, listed firms were selected due to their greater necessity for transparency contrasted to private corporations so as to establish and uphold good rapport with investors (Frias-Aceituno *et al.*, 2014:56).

5.5.3.4 Research Sample and Selected Data

The present research chose the ultimate sample on the basis of two conditions: (i) the corporation's annual reports should be obtainable for all three years from 2014 to 2016, either in ZSE's website or the company's website; (ii) the obtainability of corporations' financial statements and corporations' capital market information for the three-year period. These main criteria are set for numerous justifications. Firstly, the criteria helps to fulfil the requisites of

balanced panel data analysis (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121). Employing balanced panel data has several benefits, such as: (i) considering both cross section of study population and sequence of discrete-time data observations; (ii) enhancing degrees of freedom; (iii) reducing the influence of multicollinearity complications (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121); (iv) helping determine whether cross-sectional relationship amongst corporate disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance continue eventually (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121); and (v) facilitating the minimisation of the potential endogeneity complications that might result from possible unobserved corporate-level heterogeneity (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121).

Secondly, in line with Albassam (2014), the sample period covered both before and after the year 2015, when the NCCGZ was instituted. This helped in evaluating whether the release of the NCCGZ has enabled the improvement of corporate governance standards in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, exploiting cross-sectional and time-series data correspond with the literature on corporate disclosure and transparency (Albassam, 2014; Mangena and Taurigana, 2007:53; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121; Tsamenyi *et al.*, 2007:319) which also enabled comparison of the findings of this research with those of former studies. Also, starting assessing annual reports from 2014 will help the researcher in contrasting the extent of corporate governance conformity prior and post the introduction of the 2015 Zimbabwe governance code. The selection ended in 2016 since this was the furthestmost up-to-date financial year wherein data was obtainable, since the data gathering took place from December 2017 to March 2018. Although, this timeframe may have been not adequate to evaluate this improvement, the research opened an avenue for future research.

5.5.3.5 Coding and Scoring of Annual Reports

Both qualitative content analysis and grounded theory methods incorporate open coding, which is the initial step of theoretical analysis that pertains to the initial discovery of categories and their properties (Breuning, 2011; Dennis & Bower, 2008:423; Glaser, 1992:1). In this research open coding was used as the researcher created codes for the first time (Dennis & Bower, 2008:423). Open coding was conducted by reading each selected annual report line by line and assigning conceptual labels to portions of text within the annual reports. Magnitude coding was concurrently applied as a refinement of the open codes through the addition of descriptive sub-codes, in order to indicate the frequency, direction, presence and/ or evaluative content (Saldana, 2009:1-224).

Many of the codes used in this project reflect the central theme of the quotation, using an annual report's own terminology whenever possible. The ability to assign multiple codes to a single statement, as in this case, was essential for proper classification of disclosures. The use of dichotomies and multichotomies, such as high/low, large/small, profitable/unprofitable, new/old, yes/no, and scale 0/scale 1/scale 2/scale 3/scale 4, were very useful in developing categories. It was invaluable to develop a hierarchical code structure from general to specific. Although many comments were specific, general comments were most common (Saldana, 2009:1-224).

After several codes were established, the "code by list" feature was utilised in order to keep the number of new codes to a minimum. The coding process proceeded faster once a relatively comprehensive set of codes was in place (Saldana, 2009:1-224). The ATLAS.ti options for renaming, deleting, and unlinking codes were conducive to the iterative process of coding, as was the "undo" feature. By the time the annual reports had been coded once, the researcher had developed a comprehensive set of codes that were then used to recode the annual reports. Recoding provides a means to check that all annual reports are coded properly and assures that some degree of consistency and reliability has been maintained throughout the iterative coding process. Any coding discrepancies identified in the recoding process were resolved. Codes with similar themes were examined and collapsed. Codes with few instances were merged with others of the same thematic nature (Saldana, 2009:1-224).

When collecting the annual reports for use in this research, the initial phase was to evaluate the level of disclosure and transparency as in former studies (Albassam, 2014; Gurvitch & Sidorova, 2012:26; Lipunga, 2015:130; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605). This was accomplished by scoring disclosure and transparency extents versus the developed checklist. This disclosure and transparency checklist was developed on the presumption that annual reports are of use to numerous users. Consequently, the provisions contained in the disclosure and transparency index were comprehensive and not limited to a particular user group as tried and checked in prior studies (Mangena & Taurigana, 2007:53; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168; Turturea, 2015:2161).

Subsequent to finding the data source, the coding method was outlined. According to Blumberg *et al.* (2011:1-656) what is investigated for in the documents (i.e., themes), can be discovered when perusing through the data or can be defined from the beginning. In this study, a pre-set

scoring system was developed. The design of the scoring system was not aimed at identifying particular words or phrases, but to examine whether particular criteria are observed in the text (the quality or comprehensiveness), as it enabled the level and specificity of the disclosures to be evaluated. This meant that the study discovered not merely what is being disclosed on or the volume but then again if the disclosures include adequate informational items to enlighten the reader of how sustainable value creation is improved. This is similar to what is described as an open perspective (Blumberg *et al.*, 2011:1-656).

The extent of quality/comprehensiveness of disclosure and transparency was based on the degree in which the information meet the fundamental qualitative characteristics, as applicable, of useful financial and non-financial information as set out in the International Accounting Standards Board Conceptual Framework and the IIRC guiding principles underpinning the preparation and presentation of an integrated report, informing the content of the report and how information is presented (IIRC, 2013:1). These characteristics include: relevance, materiality and faithful representation (IASB, 2018:1) and the guiding principles are; strategic focus and future orientation, connectivity of information, stakeholder relationships, materiality, conciseness, reliability and completeness, consistency and comparability.

Moreover, Blumberg *et al.* (2011:1-656) wrote that the connotation behind the provisions of the scoring system should be totally comprehended by the researchers and described in detail, since a common complication of an open content analysis is that what is noticed in the beginning has the risk to affect the continuance of the study. To circumvent this, the evaluations of a particular item were continually compared to each other.

5.5.3.6 The NCCGZDTI Scoring System and the Weighting Schemes

The requirements or questions of the scoring system were principally derived from the NCCGZ. The NCCGZ was broken down into operational questions with reference to previous studies on the particular subject or theme (Abeysekera, 2013:227; Faisal *et al.*, 2012:19; Gurvitsh & Sidorova, 2012:26; Jensen & Berg, 2012:299; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:115; Lipunga, 2015:130; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007:53; Maubane *et al.*, 2014:153; Mawanza & Mugumisi, 2014:34; Turturea, 2015:2161; Van Zyl, 2014:19), a report on what integrated reporting appears like by EY (2015) together with the GRI-G4-guidelines (GRI-G4, 2013) and OECD disclosure and transparency guidelines. Reference was made to the guidelines from the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in Zimbabwe's Annual Excellence in

Corporate Governance 2015 and 2016 Awards Adjudication Report of the ZSE-listed companies, so as to get familiarised with the scoring system. Buzby (1974:423) identified three groups of questions for analysing annual reports. One of these groups included questions answering to what level some item was disclosed; the first step being a general comment and the second step being a specific text. Every question of this study scoring system replicated this structure, examining the annual reports by measuring the level of specificity. This scoring system was selected because the intention of this thesis was to appraise to what level the NCCGZ framework is met in Zimbabwean companies' annual reports. Van Zyl (2014:19) have used a similar structure for analysing sustainability disclosures, using a five-point Likert scale, giving a score of one for no disclosure, two for disclosure is to a lesser extent, three for disclosure to some extent, four for disclosure to a larger extent and lastly five for significant disclosure. The NCCGZDTI scoring system developed for this study followed this structure, creating a more comprehensive assessment of the level of compliance with NCCGZ using a poly/multichotomous rating of the extent of each disclosure and transparency component as shown in *Appendix 1* of this study.

5.5.3.7 Trustworthiness and Validity of the Content Analysis

This section discusses aspects with regard to the trustworthiness of the analysis. In a quantitative study the criteria to assess the quality of research are typically validity, reliability, and generalisability, which are derived from the physical sciences (Breuning, 2011:1; Crowther and Lancaster, 2008:1). However, in an interpretive method like the qualitative content analysis, criteria differ and several studies (Bradley, 1993:431; Breuning, 2011; Franzosi, 2004:1; Lincoln & Guba, 1985:1; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1) specifically advance the following criteria:

Credibility, which denotes the sufficient depiction of the constructions of the social world being studied and can be assessed both in terms of the process used in eliciting those representations and in terms of the credibility of those representations for the community under study;

Transferability, which denotes the degree that the researchers' operational hypotheses about one context apply to the other;

Dependability, which denotes both to the consistency of the internal procedure and to the way the researcher accounts for varying circumstances in the phenomena; and,

Confirmability, which refers to the extent to which the characteristics of the data, as posited by the researcher, can be confirmed by others who read or review the research results.

Trustworthiness can be achieved and the related criteria can be assured by demonstrating extensive experience in the field, conducting persistent observation and iterative analyses, seeking negative or contradictory examples, searching for confirmatory data through triangulation, providing supporting examples for the conclusions drawn, and discussing the results with peers and members of the community under study (Bradley, 1993:431; Franzosi, 2004:1-500; Julien, 2008:1; Neuendorf, 2011:1-228).

In reference to the present investigation, the researcher who engendered the analysis is a chartered management accountant and an experienced scholar with more than fifteen years of activity in the governance/social/environmental/sustainability reporting field, including lecturing and supervision of academic research dissertations at undergraduate and post-graduate levels at the National University of Science and Technology in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the researcher identified the ZSE listed companies in 2014 and tracked their reporting activities over the recent years. In August 2017 a first analysis commenced and was performed on a sample of from ZSE listed firms whose 2014 to 2016 annual reports are readily accessible from the company website or ZSE website. Twenty coders with solid accounting and finance experience were invited from a Master of Science in Accounting and Finance class of students at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) to do the analysis and the scoring as a group assignment. The twenty coders concerned were educated about the setting and objectives of the study. Furthermore, they were guided by the researcher on the scoring technique (NCCGZDTI) that was used, including the decision making procedure employing both literature and demonstrations. Many researches that assent with the utilisation of professionals in the procedure of inter coder dependability tests were found and analogous measures were implemented in this study (Beattie *et al.*, 2004:205). This pilot exercise ended in November 2017, and this allowed the researcher to verify that the adopted approach works and to consolidate the interpretive and deductive method. In order to avoid biases in the pilot inquiry, the analysis of a corporate report and related documents (e.g., other corporate documents, pages of the firm's web site, and so on) was conducted on an iterative basis with an ongoing comparison with the results achieved in the study by the coders for each company.

After this pilot study and a further gathering of materials useful for research purposes, from January 2018 the 2014-16 annual reports including social/CSR/sustainability reports published by the selected firms were analysed. This procedure was carried out by the researcher (a single

coder) to ensure consistency in content analysis (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005:391). Again, an iterative process of continual analysis, comparison, further review, and so on, according to a circular scheme, was conducted. The goal of the analysis was not to count words or sentences, but, in synchrony with the original research questions, to check the quality of the reporting, that is, of the overall information provided. So, the entire work was quite labour intensive and time consuming.

For each company a specific report, including positive or negative evidence, comments, and reflections were drawn up, and a final concise judgment on the overall information quality was expressed. As previously underlined, the main focus of the analysis was on the annual reports, however, other information sources such as supplemental corporate documents, including the social/CSR/sustainability reports, or relevant sections of corporate web sites were examined in order to better interpret the quality of the information delivered by the firms. Therefore, triangulation of evidence was assured (Eisenhardt, 1989:532; Yin, 2003:1-181). In the second half of 2018 and first half of 2019 the research findings were discussed with other scholars, corporate and NGO/CSO representatives in different circumstances, in order to gather reactions, comments, and fresh insights.

Validity refers to “the extent to which a measuring procedure represents the intended, and only the intended, concept” (Breuning, 2011; Neuendorf, 2011:1-228; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1). Validity can be evaluated in many ways. Face validity, which is usual in content analysis, denotes the degree to which a measure “gets at” the fundamental viewpoints of the concept being evaluated. Face validity is integrally subjective. To ascertain face validity, researchers evaluate as impartially as possible the connection between what they measure and how they measure it. One way of verifying face validity is to have adjudicators work rearwards from the evaluation to ascertain the concept being evaluated (Neuendorf, 2011; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1). Other ways of evaluation are criterion validity, which depends on evaluating the connection between the code and criteria, such as simultaneous or prognostic behaviour or norms of behaviour; content validity, which looks at the completeness of representation of the concept; and construct validity, which refers to “the extent to which a measure is related to other measures (constructs) in a way consistent with hypotheses derived from theory” (Neuendorf, 2011:1-228; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:1).

5.5.3.8 Methods of Estimating Dependent Variables

The disclosure and transparency model developed in this study seeks to evaluate the extent and determinants of disclosure and transparency of listed corporations in Zimbabwe. Hereafter, the regression equation is considered. Variables incorporated in the equation are examined by considering the dependent variable first, ensued by the independent variables. This study on corporate disclosure and transparency makes use of polychotomous system methodology as the main measure to estimate the dependent variable. There are numerous prior studies that used similar measure to the one to be used in this research (Li *et al.*, 2008:1; Yafele, 2012:218).

As discussed in *Section 5.3.3*, since in many cases, quantification is considered a characterising aspect of content analysis, this study deems it essential to use these results to develop the quantitative analysis method. Therefore, to some extent the scientific procedure will be assumed in this research study. The scoring system of annual report disclosure and transparency KPIs was measured. Employing a multichotomous system for scoring the disclosure of KPIs, the existence of a KPI in the annual reports ranged from [1] where a KPI disclosure was made to a lesser extent to [4] where the KPI disclosure is considerable and [0] where the business corporation being considered do not report a specified KPIs in the annual report (*see also Section 5.5.3.6*).

The appropriateness of the disclosure items in the checklist to the firms being examined was considered so as to avoid misjudging corporations that did not reveal particular information items. The modification of non-applicable items has been applied in various former research studies (Li *et al.*, 2018:60; Li & Tang, 2007:1; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007:25; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605). Researchers consider this inappropriateness of information items on the universal level a unique case of missing data problem. There are numerous feasible methods of restraining the obstacles of missing data. Nonetheless, just two of them are applicable to disclosure studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605), and are examined hereafter. Firstly, is to omit the irrelevant provisions from the aggregate index and then establish succeeding examination on it. The omission procedure is proper if reasonably few provisions are irrelevant to the selected business corporations (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605). This research study omitted the irrelevant information items from the composite index to decrease the subjectivity problem. Secondly, is to design a relative index. This is the percentage of the actual disclosure noticed in an annual reports of a corporation to that a selected corporation is required to release within

the regulating system. In this research, the relative indexing approach includes the calculation of three varied, but interrelated scores. These are (a) maximum possible NCCGZ disclosure and transparency score, (b) actual NCCGZ disclosure and transparency score, and (c) relative NCCGZ disclosure and transparency score.

(a) Maximum possible NCCGZ D&T score

This is the highest achievable score that a selected corporation can earn on the index if all required items were publicised in its annual report. The highest score on the aggregate index is 612, if each of the 153 KPIs scored the maximum of 4 scores for significant disclosure. The maximum achievable score for each selected corporation was calculated by applying the following formula:

$$NCCGZDTIScore_{max} = \sum_{i=1}^{mx} d_{ix}$$

Where: d_{ix} = disclosure value of i item of information required of x sample company. four if the item d_i is disclosed to a significant extent; three if the item d_i is disclosed to a large extent; two if the item d_i is disclosed to some extent; one if the item d_i is disclosed to a lesser extent; zero, if the item d_i is not disclosed
 mx = the number of disclosure and transparency KPI items relevant to, and are supposed to be released by the x selected corporation, where in $mx=612$.

$NCCGZDTIScore_{max}$ = highest probable score that the x selected corporation can get

(b) Actual NCCGZ D&T score

This is the score achieved by a selected corporation for actually releasing the required and voluntary information items on the index in its annual report. It is the sum of the score for the disclosure and transparency KPIs that are actually noted to have been released in the annual report of a selected firm. Arithmetically, it is represented by the following formula:

$$NCCGZDTIScore_{act} = \sum_{i=1}^{ax} d_{ix}$$

Where: d_{ix} = disclosure value of i item of information required of x sample company. four if the item d_i is disclosed to a significant extent; three if the item d_i is

disclosed to a large extent; two if the item d_i is disclosed to some extent; one if the item d_i is disclosed to a lesser extent; zero, if the item d_i is not disclosed
 ax = number of disclosure and transparency KPI items applicable to the x sampled company disclosed by that company.

$NCCGZDTIScore_{act}$ = the actual score earned by the x sample company

(c) Relative NCCGZ D&T score

The relative score is the proportion of the actual disclosure score deserved by a selected firm to the maximum achievable score by the firm. The calculated relative score, for x selected firm, is denoted as:

Relative Score = Actual Score ÷ Maximum Possible Score

$$= NCCGZDTIScore_{rel} = \sum_{i=1}^{ax} d_{ix} \div \sum_{i=1}^{mx} d_{ix}$$

This study adopted both the actual and relative indexing procedure in conducting the statistical analysis for all the relevant research questions in order to enhance reliability and dependability of findings (Babbie, 1994:1; Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738).

In order to estimate the dependent variable derived from the level of disclosure and transparency, the chosen index for each firm is the total of all the disclosed KPIs collected from the research study selection of firms annual reports as in former studies (Cheung *et al.*, 2010:259; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016:738; Owusu-Ansah, 1998:605; Yafele, 2012:1). This procedure ensures that the extent of disclosure is computed on the basis of the characteristics that are applicable to the company being considered. The NCCGZDTI is employed to survey the extent of conformity to the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ). Also, the NCCGZDTI is the central variable used to assess the factors affecting disclosure and transparency among ZSE listed corporations. Additionally, the NCCGZDTI is employed to evaluate the connection between corporate governance instruments and corporate performance applying the compliance-index model.

5.5.3.9 Operationalising the Independent Variables

There are several variables being considered for the statistical analysis that can be evaluated in different ways such as gearing and profitability. Thus, it is essential to determine an

operationalising structure. Independent variables were chosen after taking into consideration of various challenges linked to the scoring of annual reports and weighting of the disclosure items.

Seven independent variables were examined under corporate governance structures and they are mainly linked to aspects concerning the internal corporate governance mechanisms of board of directors including board size, proportion of independent non-executive directors and audit committee size.

In addition, audit firm size relating to an external corporate governance mechanism and ownership structure variables including government ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership will be analysed in the study. As proposed by literature on corporate governance, the board of directors' attributes and ownership structure signifies the key factors affecting the extent and quality of corporate governance disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187; Chalevas, 2011:138; Eng & Mak, 2003:325; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002:391; Ho & Wong, 2001:139; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:121). Hence, corresponding to these research studies, this study used two key sets of variables as descriptive variables namely the corporate board structure and ownership structure as shown on *Table 5.5*.

The board of directors' attributes consist of board size (BDSIZE), independent directors (PINED), audit committee size (AUDCSIZE) and audit firm size (AUDFSIZE). This research study corresponds former studies in defining and measuring these descriptive variables (*see Table 5.5*). The other set of descriptive variables are the ownership structures. These variables comprise of three types of ownership: government share ownership (GOVSHARE), institutional share ownership (INSSHARE), and director ownership (DIRSHARE). These ownership structures are identified and evaluated in line with former research studies that investigate company disclosure and transparency (*see Table 5.5*). Both theoretical and empirical literature concerning the association between these governance structures and company disclosure and transparency were, consequently, examined in *Section 4.3.3.1* in *Chapter 4* of this thesis.

Table 5.5: Operationalisation of Corporate Governance Structures

Variable	Proxy	Measurement and Source
BDSIZE	Board size	Comprises the total number on the board of directors as discovered in the 2014-16 annual reports.
PNED	Proportion of non-executive directors	Symbolises the number of non-executive directors as a percentage of the total number of directors on the board. This information was obtained from the directors' biographies in the 2014-16 annual reports.
AUDCSIZE	Audit committee size	Represents the number of directors in the audit committee as a proportion of the total number of directors on the board. This information was obtained from the directors' biographies in the 2014-16 annual reports.
AUDFSIZE	Audit firm size	Denoted by 1, if a company is audited by a big-four audit firm (PwC, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), and 0, if audited by a small audit firm.
GOVSHARE	Government ownership	Represents the government' shareholdings in the corporation under review. The value is measured as the proportion of voting shares held by the government divided by the total issued shares.
INSSHARE	Institutional Investor ownership	Signifies the institutional investors' shareholdings in the corporation under review. The value is measured as the proportion of voting stocks owned by the institutional investors divided by the total issued stocks.
DIRSHARE	Director share ownership	Indicates the directors' shareholdings in the corporation under review. The value is measured as the percentage of voting stocks owned by the board members divided by the total issued stocks. The stock quantity did not comprise any stocks held in trust but comprised those held on behalf of family members.

Control variables were considered under firm specific attributes. The key aspects of the variables investigated under this set consider other aspects linked to the corporation including firm performance (e.g. profitability ratios) and capital market linked variables (e.g. foreign listing status). Table 5.6 outlines these control variables and how they are measured.

Table 5.6: Operationalisation of Firm Specific Characteristics

Variable	Proxy	Measurement and Source
Profitability(Firm performance)	ROCE ROA ROE	Measured by whether firm is profitable or not. The value is calculated as the percentage of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by capital employed. Capital employed is the total amount of capital that a company has utilised in order to generate profits. It is the sum of shareholders' equity and debt liabilities. Total net profit divided by total assets The amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders' equity.
Multinationality affiliation	MNCAffil	Measured by whether firm is foreign owned or not. The value is measured as the percentage of voting shares held by the foreign investors divided by the total issued shares.
Company size	CompSz _{log}	This figure is a calculated by the natural log of corporations' total assets agreeing to the Statement of financial position for the periods 2014-2016 annual reports measured in billions of dollars (\$bn).
Company age	CompAge	Measured in years since establishment/incorporation
Liquidity ratio	LQDTY	Measured as current assets divided by current liabilities agreeing to the 2014-16 annual reports figures.

Variable	Proxy	Measurement and Source
Leverage	LEVRG	Computed as long term debt divided by total assets from the 2014-16 annual reports figures.

5.5.3.10 Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Tests

The objective of the research is the major basis for the method of examining the hypotheses set for this research (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). To examine the associations between disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed corporations and corporate governance and firm specific attributes was among the key objectives of this research. This research intended to establish the explaining power of these variables on disclosure and transparency practices. The qualitative and quantitative measures were integrated for statistical interpretations. Thus, multivariate assessment was conducted to highlight the joint influences of a blend of independent variables to the dependent variable (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85).

Field (2009:1) wrote that there are two major types of tests that are likely to be conducted divided into parametric and non-parametric tests. The use of each type of statistical technique is conditional of data fulfilling specific criterion. Non-parametric tests are mostly centred on a model that involves very common circumstances. These tests do not involve a certain type of dispersion from which the selection was taken (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). Moreover, the examinations are simply expected to be independent and the variables being studied should have fundamental continuity (Field, 2009:1). The suppositions related to the parametric tests are more robust than those for non-parametric tests (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). In particular, it is suggested that non-parametric statistical techniques are usually regarded as less influential than parametric statistical approaches (Field, 2009:1). Hence, the adoption of parametric tests compels several additional strict prerequisites to be fulfilled.

Siegel (1956:1) proposes that the use of parametric tests relies on four main presumptions. Firstly, the observations should be independent. In other words, the choice of any one event from the population to be included in the sample should not prejudice the possibilities of any other event to be included, and the tally which is ascribed to any event should not prejudice the tally which is ascribed to some additional case. Secondly, the observations should be taken from normally distributed populations. Thirdly, in the event of inquiries of two groups, the

population should have similar variation. Fourthly, the variables should have been measured, as a minimum, on an interval scale, in order to achieve the interpretation, the findings.

Multivariate study in the formation of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was applied on panel data. Panel data (also referred to as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-series data) is a dataset in which the behaviour of entities is studied across time (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). These entities may be states, corporations, individuals, countries, etc. Panel data permits the researcher to control for variables you cannot observe or measure like cultural components or variation in business practices across corporations; or variables that fluctuate across time but not amongst entities (i.e. national policies, federal regulations, international agreements, etc.) (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). Thus, panel data takes into consideration individual heterogeneity. The core presumptions of this approach that have to be fulfilled before running the statistical tests are categorised into four. These are multicollinearity, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85).

5.5.3.11 Selection of Statistical Tests

The selection of statistical tests likely to be adopted sit inside the univariate or multivariate groupings (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). The major difficulty with univariate procedures is that they emphasise only on a specific causation for an occurrence (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). For instance, proposing that firm size is notably related to the level disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports. It is problematic to propose that firm size only is the determinant as there are some other likelihoods and hence it appears weak to merely centre on a single descriptive variable and submitting that it is the reason for adjustments in the extent of information disclosure in annual reports. It is important to incorporate some possible explanatory variables in a model together (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). However, one of the challenges of running multivariate tests is that they have specifications that must be fulfilled as considered beforehand (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). In particular, it could be impracticable to obtain a data set which is exactly normally distributed (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85; Yafele, 2012:1). Multivariate tests were selected in this study since it is more robust for the intention of the research. Nevertheless, as Field (2009:1) reasoned, it is important

to recognise that both settings of checks (univariate and multivariate) are characterised by advantages and disadvantages in statistical calculations.

5.5.3.12 Choice of Methods of Regression Tests

The statistical approach that was selected to establish the kind of the association between disclosure and transparency practices in annual reports of ZSE listed firms and explanatory variables is the multiple regression analysis. There are numerous methods that can be employed in running multiple regression analysis concerning the choice of independent variables to incorporate in the regression model (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85; Yafele, 2012:1). As written by Field (2009:1), the three main ones comprise of the standard or forced entry technique, the block wise entry technique, and the stepwise technique. This research chose the standard entry method, in which each independent variable is measured on the basis of its predictive influence, in addition to that obtainable from all other independent variables. The standard entry approach allows all the independent variables to be incorporated in the model concurrently (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). Some former studies suggested that this method also uncovers the magnitude of distinctive variation in the dependent variable which is explicated by every one of the independent variables (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85; Pallant, 2001:1; Yafele, 2012:80).

5.5.3.13 The Regression Models

Following the above contemplations, it was then essential to administer the regression analyses. The purpose of administering the analyses was to determine the association between the dependent variable with the independent variables (including control variables). Three models were drawn up, that is, (1) The determinants of the degree of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed firms, (2) corporate governance structures and their association with corporate performance and (3) the extent of disclosure and transparency and company-specific attributes and their association with firm performance. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis that was used was stated in the formation of the models as follows:

Model 1 (Disclosure and Transparency Model)

$$NCCGZDTI_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 BSIZE_{it} + \beta_2 PNED_{it} + \beta_3 AUDCSIZE_{it} + \beta_4 AUDFSIZE_{it} + \beta_5 GOVSHARE_{it} + \beta_6 INSSHARE_{it} + \beta_7 DIRSHARE_{it} + \beta_8 ROCE_{it} + \beta_9 MNCAffilit + \beta_{10} LogCompSz_{it} + \beta_{11} CompAge_{it} + \beta_{12} LQDTY_{it} + \beta_{13} LEVRG_{it} + \varepsilon_i$$

Where

NCCGZDTI	The constructed Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Disclosure and Transparency Index
α	Constant term
BDSIZE	Board size
PNED	Proportion of non-executive directors
AUDCSIZE	Audit committee size
AUDFSIZE	Audit firm size
GOVSHARE	Government ownership
INSSHARE	Institutional ownership
DIRSHARE	Director ownership
ROA/ROCE/ROE	Profitability
MNCAffil	Government ownership
CompSz	Company size
CompAge	Company age
LQDTY	Liquidity
LEVRG	Leverage
ε	Error term or residual

Model 2 (Corporate Governance Structures- Corporate Performance Model)

$$FP_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 BDSIZE_{it} + \beta_2 PNED_{it} + \beta_3 AUDCSIZE_{it} + \beta_4 AUDFSIZE_{it} + \beta_5 GOVSHARE_{it} + \beta_6 INSSHARE_{it} + \beta_7 DIRSHARE_{it} + \beta_8 MNCAffil_{it} + \beta_9 LogCompS_{it} + \beta_{10} CompAge_{it} + \beta_{11} LQDTY_{it} + \beta_{12} LEVRG_{it} + \varepsilon_i$$

Where

FP	Firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA), Return on capital employed (ROCE) and return on equity (ROE), as accounting-based measures
α	Constant term
BDSIZE	Board size
PNED	Proportion of non-executive directors
AUDCSIZE	Audit committee size
AUDFSIZE	Audit firm size
GOVSHARE	Government ownership
INSSHARE	Institutional ownership
DIRSHARE	Director ownership
MNCAffil	Government ownership
CompSz	Company size
CompAge	Company age
LQDTY	Liquidity
LEVRG	Leverage
ε	Error term or residual

Model 3 (NCCGZDTI-Corporate Performance Model)

$$FP_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 NCCGZDTI_{it} + \beta_2 MNCAffil_{it} + \beta_3 LogCompSz_{it} + \beta_4 CompAge_{it} + \beta_5 LQDTY_{it} + \beta_6 LEVRG_{it} + \varepsilon_i$$

Where

FP	Firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA), Return on capital employed (ROCE) and return on equity (ROE), as accounting-based measures
α	Constant term
NCCGZDTI	The constructed Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Disclosure and Transparency Index
MNCAffil	Government ownership
CompSz	Company size
CompAge	Company age
LQDTY	Liquidity
LEVRG	Leverage
ε	Error term or residual

5.6 Ethical and Confidentiality Implications

This section reflected on how the ethical and confidentiality issues were envisioned and handled in this study. The ethical process was followed as per the NWU Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences requirements.

The data used for this research study was gathered from the business corporations' published annual reports. These reports are freely and readily accessible on the internet, on the companies' website, the ZSE website and the corporations' headquarters. Therefore, there were no material moral concerns to reflect during the gathering of data but that all data accumulated would be upheld under the control of the researcher. The researcher also undertook to acknowledge by citation of all sources utilised in this research study.

5.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This chapter explained the philosophical argument of methodology and delineating the method used in this research. This study follows a qualitative dominant method, which would place it within the interpretivist or phenomenological social enquiry. The chapter described the qualitative content analysis approach which was utilised to evaluate the level of disclosure and transparency practices of sampled ZSE listed companies from 2014 to 2016. However, embedded in the qualitative content analysis, quantitative indicators were generated. Therefore, this study implemented a mixed research approach to discover empirical findings to investigate the formulated hypotheses. Moreover, this study used a self-constructed index to score the annual reports during the period under study to determine the overall disclosure and

transparency levels. The matters connected to the validity and dependability of the variables measurement were also considered. Moreover, the current research also defined the variables used which clarified firm-specific attributes and firm performance.

This study is innovative in three ways. Firstly, it examined the level of disclosure in ZSE listed companies, and revealed whether there are differences in ZSE listed companies' disclosure and transparency practices in their annual reports. Secondly, it explored whether the level of disclosure and transparency is linked to corporate governance mechanisms and six corporate-specific attributes. Thirdly, it assessed the association between disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance.

The following chapter provides the findings of this research hypotheses tests and results for data gathering by NCCGZDTI score.

Chapter 6 Qualitative Empirical Results and Analysis

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 of this thesis reflects the way content analysis, the recording instrument and the ATLAS.ti 7.5 software program were employed to summarise, code, administer and study data so as to assess the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency in the annual reports of sampled ZSE listed corporations over the up-to-date recent three financial years. *Chapter 1* also outlined the four main categories of corporate disclosure and transparency variables which were evaluated including: (i) Board of directors and management structure, (ii) Governance of risk and structure, (iii) Information management and disclosure and (iv) Ownership and control structure. An explanation of how the evaluation procedure was performed was also provided.

In this chapter the results of the qualitative content analysis, previously described from the ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological standpoints, are presented. In each instance the analysis of the results is given under the four categories of disclosure and transparency. For every disclosure category, an economical sectors breakdown of the degree of disclosure was likewise presented so as to analyse the tendency and pattern of corporate reporting in diversified economic sectors wherein the investigated corporations operate.

In the first section, the data gathered with the aid of the ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative analysis software, through the recording instrument (NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency checklist) based on a set of KPIs organised according to the NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency framework, are shown. Thereafter, the specific corporate profiles are detailed and finally, a set of reflections emerging from the analysis are provided.

6.2 Results: The Codes-Primary Documents Matrix

As discussed in previous chapters, the study of the yearly reports, released by the firms and made available through the ZSE website or their corporate web sites, was carried out using a disclosure and transparency recording instrument/checklist (NCCGZDTI) to standardise data collecting (Perrini, 2006). The recording instrument was based on a set of KPIs organised according to a corporate governance framework and these are detailed in *Appendix 2*. The recording instrument allowed the creation of a data set which enabled this study to separately evaluate the quality and extent of D&T in ZSE listed corporations in their annual reports.

The results collected through the recording instrument are presented in the Codes-Primary Documents Matrix (*see Appendix 4*) an output report generated from the ATLAS.ti 7.5 program. It lists the frequency of codes or code families by documents or document families. The cell ‘numbered 1 or more’ means that this specific information is present in the corporate annual report representing the number of frequency of quotations about the topic; the cell ‘numbered 0’ means that the specific information is not included in the corporate annual report. The Codes-Primary Documents Matrix provides a first map of the findings, which was then used to generate a Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Report (*see Appendix 5*), which then was used to compute a Disclosure and Transparency Matrix (*see Table 6.1*) and then completed by the specific corporate profiles, included in the next section. In *Appendix 5* the ‘Y’ marked cell means that the specific information is disclosed in the annual report; the ‘N’ marked cell means that the specific information is not released in the annual report. Table 6.1 below shows percentage of KPIs disclosed at overall, category and sub-category level by the sampled firms grouped in their economic sectors. The percentage of D&T KPIs/provisions disclosed was ascertained by dividing the total number of D&T KPIs disclosed (Y) is divided by the total number of expected D&T KPIs (sum of D&T KPIs disclosed (Y) and not disclosed (N)):

$$(\sum Y \div \sum (Y + N)) \times 100.$$

In order to complement, integrate and summarise what has been presented in the Codes-Primary Documents Matrix, the specific corporate profiles are grouped according to their sectors, with a concise description and assessment of the reporting activities of every analysed firm detailed in *Appendix 9* of this thesis.

Table 6.1 Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Matrix

2014																					
Economic Sector	Company	Transparency of ownership	Concentration of ownership	Voting & shareholders meeting procedures	Ownership & control Structure	Financial disclosure	Sustainability disclosure	Integrated reporting	Information on auditors	Information management & disclosure	Principal risks identification	Risk management committee	Audit committee	Internal & external audit	Governance of risk & structure	Board structure & composition	Role of the board	Director training & compensation	Executive compensation & evaluation	Board of Directors & management structure	Overall
		D&T KPIs DISCLOSED (%)																			
Agriculture	Ariston	36	88	44	54	71	50	6	75	45	0	43	100	67	57	57	100	43	0	41	48
	NatFoods	36	88	44	54	86	33	12	75	40	100	86	100	100	95	57	100	43	0	41	50
	Padenga	45	88	44	57	86	52	12	75	51	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	53
	SeedCo	36	88	44	54	79	26	0	75	32	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	29	0	37	42
	All firms	39	88	44	54	80	40	7	75	42	75	32	100	92	71	68	100	32	0	29	48
Banking & Finance	Barclays	27	88	56	54	86	26	0	75	34	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	43	0	41	48
	CBZ	27	88	56	54	86	69	29	75	64	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	57	0	56	65
	FBC	27	88	56	54	79	36	0	75	38	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	50
	NMBZ	27	88	56	54	86	26	0	75	34	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	14	0	33	46
	ZB	27	88	56	54	86	33	0	75	38	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	49
	All firms	27	88	56	54	84	38	6	75	41	100	100	100	100	100	74	80	31	0	42	52
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	36	88	44	54	93	52	0	75	49	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	55
	Cafca	55	88	56	64	79	48	0	75	44	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	29	0	48	52
	Masimba	27	88	56	54	86	24	12	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	29	0	48	45

	Powerspeed	36	88	44	54	93	29	0	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	43
	Zimplow	45	88	56	61	71	33	0	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	46
	All firms	40	88	51	57	84	37	2	75	40	100	20	100	100	73	83	80	23	0	42	48
Food & Beverages	Afdis	27	88	44	50	71	21	0	75	29	50	0	29	67	29	57	100	29	0	37	34
	Colcom	55	88	56	64	86	43	0	75	43	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	48
	Delta	45	88	56	61	93	81	35	75	73	100	100	100	100	100	86	100	29	0	44	69
	Dairiboard	36	88	56	57	93	74	41	75	70	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	14	0	33	65
	All firms	41	88	53	58	86	55	19	75	54	88	50	82	92	74	64	100	21	0	26	54
Industrial Holdings	ART	27	88	56	54	93	57	0	75	52	0	29	100	67	52	100	100	43	0	52	52
	Innscor	36	88	56	57	93	55	24	75	56	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	43	0	52	57
	NTS	45	88	44	57	79	19	0	75	29	100	100	71	100	90	57	100	14	0	33	43
	TSL	45	88	56	61	79	19	0	75	29	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	14	0	37	41
	Turnall	45	88	56	61	93	76	24	75	68	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	0	0	41	61
	Willdale	45	88	56	61	57	36	0	75	34	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	0	0	30	42
	All firms	41	88	54	58	82	44	8	75	44	83	21	95	94	68	81	100	19	0	41	50
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	27	88	56	54	86	29	0	75	35	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	48
	FMHL	18	88	56	50	93	31	12	75	40	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	29	0	41	46
	Mashonaland	27	88	56	54	71	24	0	75	30	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	29	0	37	41
	Nicoz	55	88	44	61	79	40	6	75	42	100	86	100	100	95	86	100	86	0	59	56
	Old Mutual	45	0	56	36	71	40	0	75	39	0	0	0	0	0	57	100	14	0	33	32
	Pearl	27	88	56	54	86	29	0	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	44
	All firms	33	73	54	51	81	32	3	75	37	83	31	83	83	66	71	100	33	0	42	44
Retail & Services	African Sun	27	88	78	61	71	64	35	75	60	75	57	43	100	62	100	100	43	11	56	59
	Econet	55	88	44	61	86	62	53	75	65	100	86	100	100	95	100	100	29	0	48	65
	Edgars	27	88	44	50	71	40	0	75	39	100	86	100	100	95	86	100	14	0	41	49
	OK	27	88	56	54	71	38	0	75	38	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	29	0	37	44
	Unifreight	36	88	56	57	86	21	0	75	31	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	41	47
	All firms	35	88	56	56	77	45	18	75	46	95	66	89	100	84	89	80	23	2	44	53
2015																					
Agriculture	Ariston	27	88	44	50	71	62	6	75	52	0	43	100	33	52	57	100	43	0	41	50
	NatFoods	27	88	44	50	86	38	12	75	43	100	86	100	100	95	57	100	14	0	33	50

	Padenga	27	88	44	54	86	48	12	75	48	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	51
	SeedCo	27	88	44	54	86	29	0	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	42
	All firms	32	88	44	52	82	44	7	75	44	75	32	100	83	70	68	100	21	0	27	48
Banking & Finance	Barclays	27	88	56	50	93	29	0	75	36	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	43	0	41	48
	CBZ	27	88	56	50	79	74	41	75	68	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	57	0	56	67
	FBC	27	88	56	50	79	36	0	75	38	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	50
	NMBZ	27	88	56	50	86	31	0	75	36	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	14	0	33	47
	ZB	27	88	56	50	86	33	0	75	38	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	48
	All firms	18	88	56	50	84	40	8	75	43	100	100	100	100	100	74	80	31	0	42	52
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	27	88	44	46	93	64	0	75	56	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	57
	Cafca	27	88	56	57	79	71	41	75	66	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	29	0	48	61
	Masimba	27	88	56	50	86	19	12	75	32	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	29	0	48	43
	Powerspeed	27	88	44	54	93	29	0	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	43
	Zimplow	27	88	56	57	64	62	12	75	52	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	58
	All firms	29	88	51	53	83	49	13	75	49	100	40	100	100	80	83	80	23	0	42	53
Food & Beverages	Afdis	27	88	44	46	64	31	0	75	32	75	14	57	67	48	57	100	43	11	44	39
	Colcom	27	88	56	57	86	48	0	75	45	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	57	0	44	50
	Delta	27	88	56	54	93	71	35	75	68	100	100	100	100	100	86	100	14	0	41	65
	Dairiboard	27	88	67	57	93	71	65	75	74	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	14	0	33	67
	All firms	27	88	56	54	84	55	25	75	55	94	54	89	92	79	64	100	32	3	29	55
Industrial Holdings	ART	27	88	44	46	93	52	0	75	49	0	14	71	67	38	100	100	43	0	52	48
	Innsco	27	88	56	50	93	57	35	75	60	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	57	0	56	58
	NTS	27	88	44	54	79	19	0	75	29	100	100	71	100	90	57	100	14	0	33	42
	TSL	27	88	56	57	79	19	0	75	29	100	0	100	100	67	86	100	14	0	41	41
	Turnall	27	88	56	50	93	79	24	75	69	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	0	0	41	60
	Willdale	27	88	56	57	57	36	0	75	34	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	0	0	30	42
	All firms	27	88	52	52	82	44	10	75	45	83	19	90	94	66	83	100	21	0	42	49
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	27	88	56	50	86	31	0	75	36	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	43	0	41	48
	FMHL	27	88	56	54	93	24	12	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	29	0	41	44
	Mashonaland	27	88	44	46	79	26	0	75	32	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	0	0	30	39

	Nicoz	27	88	56	57	93	43	6	75	45	100	86	100	100	95	86	100	100	0	63	58
	Old Mutual	27	0	56	25	57	40	0	75	36	0	0	0	0	0	57	100	14	0	33	29
	Pearl	27	88	56	50	86	36	6	75	40	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	46
	All firms	23	73	54	47	82	33	4	75	38	83	31	83	83	66	71	100	33	0	42	44
Retail & Services	African Sun	27	88	67	54	71	71	18	75	60	75	57	86	100	76	100	100	43	0	52	59
	Econet	27	88	44	46	86	60	47	75	62	100	86	100	100	95	100	100	29	0	48	61
	Edgars	27	88	44	46	71	33	0	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	29	0	41	42
	OK	27	88	56	50	79	43	0	75	42	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	45
	Unifreight	27	88	56	57	79	29	0	75	34	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	41	48
	All firms	22	88	53	51	77	47	13	75	46	95	49	97	100	81	86	80	23	0	43	51
2016																					
Agriculture	Ariston	27	100	44	50	64	48	6	75	43	0	14	100	33	43	57	100	0	0	30	42
	NatFoods	27	100	56	54	86	43	12	75	45	100	86	100	100	95	57	100	57	11	48	54
	Padenga	27	100	44	50	86	60	12	75	55	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	43	0	52	55
	SeedCo	36	100	56	57	79	33	0	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	29	0	37	44
	All firms	30	88	50	53	79	46	7	75	45	75	25	100	83	68	68	100	32	3	29	49
Banking & Finance	Barclays	18	100	56	50	86	29	0	75	35	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	43	0	41	48
	CBZ	18	100	56	50	79	69	35	75	64	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	43	0	52	64
	FBC	18	100	56	50	86	69	24	75	62	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	62
	NMBZ	18	100	56	50	86	24	0	75	32	100	86	100	100	95	57	100	14	0	33	44
	ZB	18	100	56	50	86	31	0	75	36	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	48
	All firms	18	88	56	50	84	44	12	75	46	100	97	100	100	99	74	80	29	0	41	53
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	18	100	44	46	93	62	0	75	55	100	100	100	100	100	57	100	29	0	37	56
	Cafca	27	100	56	54	79	64	35	75	61	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	29	0	48	63
	Masimba	18	100	56	50	86	26	6	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	29	0	48	44
	Powerspeed	36	100	44	54	93	29	0	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	43
	Zimplow	36	100	56	57	86	69	35	75	65	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	65
	All firms	27	88	51	52	87	50	15	75	50	100	60	100	100	87	83	80	23	0	42	54
Food & Beverages	Afdis	18	100	67	54	64	36	0	75	35	100	43	57	100	67	57	100	43	0	41	44
	Colcom	36	100	56	57	86	50	0	75	47	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	49

	Delta	18	100	56	50	79	81	35	75	70	100	100	86	100	95	100	100	29	0	48	66
	Dairibord	18	100	56	50	86	69	71	75	73	100	86	100	100	95	57	100	14	0	33	65
	All firms	23	88	58	53	79	59	26	75	56	100	57	86	100	81	68	100	25	0	27	56
Industrial Holdings	ART	18	100	56	50	93	60	0	75	53	0	29	71	100	48	100	100	29	0	48	51
	Innscor	18	100	44	46	79	71	47	75	68	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	43	0	52	61
	NTS	36	100	44	54	79	24	0	75	31	100	100	86	100	95	57	100	14	0	33	44
	TSL	36	100	56	57	79	19	0	75	29	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	14	0	37	41
	Turnall	18	100	56	50	93	76	24	75	68	100	0	100	100	67	86	100	0	0	37	59
	Willdale	36	100	56	57	57	36	0	75	34	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	0	0	30	42
	All firms	27	88	52	52	80	48	12	75	47	83	21	93	100	68	79	100	17	0	40	50
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	18	100	56	50	93	31	0	75	38	100	100	100	100	100	86	100	43	0	48	50
	FMHL	27	100	44	50	86	31	0	75	36	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	14	0	37	43
	Mashonaland	18	100	44	46	79	14	0	75	26	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	0	0	30	36
	Nicoz	36	100	56	57	93	43	6	75	45	100	86	100	100	95	86	100	100	0	63	58
	Old Mutual	18	0	56	25	64	40	0	75	38	100	0	0	0	19	57	100	14	0	33	32
	Pearl	18	100	56	50	86	38	6	75	42	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	14	0	44	47
	All firms	23	73	52	46	83	33	2	75	37	100	31	83	83	69	76	100	31	0	43	44
Retail & Services	African Sun	18	100	56	50	71	57	12	75	51	0	57	43	100	48	100	100	43	0	52	50
	Econet	18	100	44	46	93	67	41	75	66	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	14	0	44	63
	Edgars	18	100	44	46	57	40	12	75	39	100	0	100	100	67	71	100	57	0	48	46
	OK	18	100	56	50	86	29	0	75	35	100	0	100	100	67	57	100	14	0	33	42
	Unifreight	36	100	56	57	79	31	0	75	35	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	41	49
	All firms	22	88	51	50	77	45	13	75	45	80	51	89	100	76	86	80	26	0	44	50

Source: Own Research Compilation

6.3 Discussion and Analysis of Key Qualitative Research Results

The main aim in this section is to summarise and review the empirical results stated from *Section 6.2* above. One of the objectives of this study was to achieve an improved knowledge of current approaches to disclosure and transparency (D&T) in corporate reporting. This study also analysed and evaluated the quality of D&T in annual reports of ZSE listed firms. The section also discussed and explained the findings while identifying and claiming the study's contribution to knowledge. The section explains findings in relation to the research questions proposed when planning this research study. Therefore, this section gives discussions of the empirical results concerning corporate disclosure and transparency as follows: the *sub-section 6.3.1* presents and considers the findings for the second sub-empirical research question (SEQ 2); and the *sub-section 6.3.2* gives and considers the findings for the third sub-empirical research question (SEQ 3).

6.3.1 Analysis of the Current Practices in Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

The sampled ZSE listed firms were grouped into seven combined ZSE economic sectors to enhance the presentation and discussion of the findings of this research. Some of the related economic sectors were combined to ensure sample size per sector compatibility, as shown on *Table 6.2*.

Since it may be impracticable for shareholders and the majority of other stakeholders to see the day to day operations of the business corporations directly, they depend on the publicised annual reports, company websites, bulletins, periodicals and so forth. All the thirty-five (35) sampled ZSE listed firms produce a traditional annual report comprising of comprehensive financial information and corporate governance report. This information is mostly required mandatorily by regulatory instruments such as the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03), ZSE listing rules and IFRSs. The number of firms producing an annual report incorporating a sustainability report or corporate social responsibility report has been very low but gradually increasing over the 2014 to 2016 financial years. *Table 6.2* shows that, thirteen (37%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2015, fourteen (40%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2015 and sixteen (46%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2016. The number of firms adopting integrated reporting is relatively low because only two (6%) of the sampled firms published integrated reports in 2015, four (11%) of the sampled firms published integrated reports in both years 2015 and 2016.

Table 6.2: Number of Sampled ZSE Firms Publishing Annual Report by Sector


Economic Sector	Annual report (including corporate governance report)	Annual report(including sustainability report)	Integrated Annual report
Agriculture	Number of firms		
2014	4	1	0
2015	4	1	0
2016	4	1	0
Banking & Finance			
2014	5	1	0
2015	5	1	1
2016	5	2	1
Mining & Engineering			
2014	5	2	0
2015	5	3	1
2016	5	3	1
Food & Beverages			
2014	4	3	0
2015	4	3	0
2016	4	3	0
Industrial Holdings			
2014	6	2	1
2015	6	2	1
2016	6	2	1
Insurance & Property			
2014	6	2	0
2015	6	2	0
2016	6	2	0
Retail & Services			
2014	5	1	1
2015	5	2	1
2016	5	3	1
TOTALS			
2014	35	13	2
2015	35	14	4
2016	35	16	4

Source: Own Research Compilation

Figure 6.1 also show that corporate reporting on sustainability aspects is now a fairly widespread activity among ZSE listed companies. This study indicates that most of the sampled companies now report on sustainability at varied levels. There are various reasons for the variations in corporate sustainability disclosure by these firms. For instance, the voluntary

nature of corporate responsibility activities for some companies; the evolving range of stakeholders; and the growing number of issues that companies are asked to address (e.g. recently, on climate change vulnerability). Worth mentioning is also that the degree of disclosure by some corporations appeared to be of high standard with well-described, transparent and non-generic disclosures with the exception of integrated reporting. This fairly

Figure 6.1: Number of Sampled ZSE Firms Producing Annual Report



Source: Own Research

widespread reporting on sustainability indicates that Zimbabwean companies might have come further along in the GRI G4 Sustainability Reporting adoption process than this study, focused on NCCGZ disclosure and transparency as a whole, indicates. The most apparent examples of these reports were Cafca, CBZ, Dairibord, Delta, Innscor, Padenga, RioZim, Turnall and Zimplow. The stand-alone sustainability reports integrated into the annual reports, where for example sustainability performances (economic, environmental and social) are presented, was well described compliance with the GRI framework. Although the NCCGZ advocates for companies to issue a single report that harmonises their financial and non-financial performance, there were a number of companies that did not include their comprehensive CSR or sustainability reports in their annual reports. The main report issued by these companies was still called an “annual report” containing either the corporate governance or fragmented sustainability disclosures. Even among companies embracing voluntary social and environmental codes, transparent public reporting is minimal, with best practices publicised and bad practices shrouded in silence.

The process of integrated reporting is slowly being adopted as shown on *Figure 6.1*. However, generally IR is still in its early years and will evolve over time. In the Zimbabwean economy, the listed companies play an important role in local and international economies. The purpose of this study therefore was to analyse the annual reports of these companies for the periods 2014 to 2016, to determine their application of the NCCGZ Guidelines. It was found that the results clearly suggest that the ZSE listed companies have not yet significantly implemented the NCCGZ Guidelines successfully as a means for demonstrating maximum transparency and accountability.


6.3.2 The Extent of the Quality of Disclosure and Transparency in ZSE Listed Firms

As discussed in chapter one of this thesis the study assessed the quality of disclosure and transparency (D&T) in ZSE listed firms in their annual reports based on three phase index comprising the comprehensive index, four categorised index, and fifteen subcategorised index. The disclosure and transparency assessment matrix had 153 items/ Key performance indicators (KPIs) that every business corporation in the selected study sample was supposed to release in its annual report. In this study, with a sample of the 35 companies listed on the ZSE, a total of 5 355 items were supposed to be disclosed. The quality of corporate disclosure and transparency is then expressed in percentage rather than the number of KPIs disclosed (Y) or not disclosed (N) in order to ensure comparability.

Drawing from the comprehensive/aggregate index scores, the findings of this study presents that for the overall D&T there was a slight improvement in D&T during the three years. According to *Table 6.1* in *Section 6.2* above, the quality of D&T in most of the ZSE listed companies' annual reports was fairly low during the sample period as these firms did not disclose 50% of the D&T KPIs in their annual reports. For instance, 21 firms (60%) in 2014 and 19 firms (54%) in both 2015 and 2016 did not disclose at least 50% of the expected D&T KPIs in their annual reports. This implies that the firms have not significantly decreased information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders (*see Chapter 4* of this thesis). This research study suggests that the extent of D&T increased slightly since the introduction of the NCCGZ in their annual reports (*See Figure 6.2*). According to *Figure 6.2* below, in 2014 49.7% of the items were disclosed, while 50% were disclosed in 2015 and 50.6% were disclosed in 2016. This negligible increase in the extent of aggregate corporate disclosure corresponds with the remark given by the Adjudication Panel for the Institute of

Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in Zimbabwe Annual Excellence in Corporate Governance Awards for 2016. This Panel observed that companies tend to be following some reporting templates year in and year out without serious efforts to disclose relevant information to shareholders. Companies did not make efforts to change their practices as evidenced by lack of new disclosures (ICSAZ, 2016).

Figure 6.2: Level of overall corporate disclosure in the ZSE sample



Key: Y = Disclosed; N = Not Disclosed

Source: Own Research

Table 6.3 shows the extent of the quality of aggregate corporate disclosure and transparency by sector. It reveals seven patterns of aggregate corporate disclosure and transparency based on the different industry sectors: The Food and Beverages sector had a comparatively high and increasing quality of corporate disclosure and transparency (54% in 2014, 55% in 2015 and 56% in 2016). The Insurance and Property sector on the other hand had a fairly steady but low disclosure and transparency level of 44% in all the three sample years; Agriculture sector had constant level of disclosure and transparency in both 2014 and 2015 (48%) while in 2016 49% of the KPIs were disclosed. The Banking and Finance sector had a similar pattern with both 2014 and 2015 annual reports disclosing 52% while 53% of the D&T KPIs were disclosed in 2016; Mining and Engineering sector show an upward trend with 48% D&T KPIs disclosed in 2014, 53% and 54% were disclosed in 2015 and 2016 respectively. The Industrial holdings sector show an inconsistent pattern whereby 50% of the items were disclosed in 2014, 49% in

2015 and 50% in 2016. The Retail and Services sector show a downward trend where 53% of the D&T KPIs were disclosed in 2014, 51% in 2015 and 50% in 2016.


Table 6.3: Extent of aggregate corporate disclosure by sector in the ZSE sample

Sector	2014				2015				2016			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Agriculture	295	48	317	52	295	48	317	52	299	49	313	51
Banking & Finance	396	52	369	48	398	52	367	48	407	53	358	47
Mining & Engineering	368	48	397	52	402	53	363	47	415	54	350	46
Food & Beverages	332	54	280	46	339	55	273	45	342	56	270	44
Industrial Holdings	455	50	463	50	446	49	472	51	455	50	463	50
Insurance & Property	407	44	511	56	405	44	513	56	407	44	511	56
Retail & Services	406	53	359	47	393	51	372	49	383	50	382	50
All sectors	2659	50	2696	50	2678	50	2677	50	2708	51	2647	49

Source: Own Research Compilation

As shown in *Figure 6.3* the extent and quality of disclosure by four categories of corporate information was overall low over the three-year period studied. Moreover, *Figure 6.4* presents

Figure 6.3: Extent of disclosure of categories of corporate D&T in the ZSE sample



Source: Own Research

that the governance of risk and structure category achieved the highest percentage of KPIs disclosure over the period reflecting 76% of the items disclosed in both 2014 and 2015 and 78% of the items disclosed in 2016. The ownership and control structure category trailed next attaining a disclosure extent and quality score above 50% during the sample period. A further observation from *Figure 6.3* is that the board of directors and management structure as well as the information management and disclosure categories had disclosure levels of D&T KPIs below 50% in the annual reports for the sample period.

Table 6.4 shows that the extent of disclosure in various sub-categories of corporate disclosure and transparency KPIs was mostly varied during the period investigated by the researcher. D&T sub-categories classified under the ownership and control structure category are: transparency of ownership, concentration of ownership and voting & shareholders meeting procedures. The study finds that disclosure levels of the D&T KPIs of concentration of ownership and voting and shareholders meeting procedures generally well disclosed with above 50% of the items being disclosed during the sample period. Most of the items in these two sub-categories are required mandatorily hence the level of disclosure is higher. Concentration of ownership had the highest level disclosing 85% in the annual reports for the sample period. Transparency of ownership sub-category had below 50% KPIs disclosed in the annual reports for the sample period.

D&T sub-categories classified under the information management and disclosure category are: financial disclosure, sustainability disclosure, integrated reporting and information on auditors. The level of disclosure of financial disclosure was 82% in both years 2014 and 2015 and 81% in 2016. There was thus a slight decline in 2016, however the level of financial disclosure is generally high over the sample period in ZSE listed firms' annual reports. The level of sustainability disclosure KPIs disclosed in annual reports is generally low but improving with 41% items disclosed in 2014, increasing to 44% in 2015 and 46% in 2016. A few firms produced integrated reporting and the extent of reporting was 9% in 2014, 11% in 2015 and 12% in 2016. The level of disclosed information on auditors is generally high in the annual reports of the sampled companies as 75% of the KPIs were disclosed in each of the published reports.

D&T sub-categories classified under the governance of risk and structure category are: principal risks identification, risk management committee, audit committee, internal & external

Table 6.4: Extent of disclosure of sub-categories of corporate D&T in the ZSE sample

	2014		2015		2016	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Transparency of ownership	36	64	25	75	24	76
Concentration of ownership	85	15	85	15	85	15
Voting & shareholders meeting procedures	53	47	52	48	53	47
Financial disclosure	82	18	82	18	81	19
Sustainability disclosure	41	59	44	56	46	54
Integrated reporting	9	91	11	89	12	88
Information on auditors	75	25	75	25	75	25
Principal risks identification	89	11	90	10	91	9
Risk management committee	45	55	45	55	48	52
Audit committee	93	7	94	6	93	7
Internal & external audit	94	6	93	7	95	5
Board structure & composition	76	24	76	24	77	23
Role of the board	100	-	100	-	100	-
Director training & compensation	26	74	27	73	26	74
Executive compensation & evaluation	0	100	0	100	0	100

Key: Y = Disclosed; N = Not disclosed

Source: Own Research Compilation

audit. All these sub-categories had very high level of D&T KPIs disclosed (above 85%) in the sampled firms' annual reports except for risk management committee sub-category with 45% of the items disclosed in both 2014 and 2015, while 48% of the items were disclosed in 2016.

D&T sub-categories classified under the board of directors and management structure category are: board structure & composition, role of the board, director training and compensation and executive compensation & evaluation. The role of the board sub-category has the highest level of disclosed KPIs with 100% of the items disclosed in all the sample years. Board structure and composition had 76% of the KPIs disclosed in both 2014 and 2015, increasing to 77% in 2016. Disclosure of director training and compensation was generally low with an average of 26% of the items disclosed during the sample period. The executive compensation & evaluation sub-category KPIs were not disclosed at all during the sample period. It can be concluded that the majority of the annual reports of ZSE listed firms include KPIs related to guidelines found in the NCCGZ framework. It is evident from the analysis that the mandatory disclosure is to a larger extent comprehensive.

6.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

The interpretive qualitative content analysis carried out and the data and evidence collected and presented in the previous sections of the chapter allow drawing some interesting and useful general conclusions with regard to the corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency including sustainability and integrated reporting.

Conceivably, the most apparent reporting driver in Zimbabwe is regulatory as all the sampled companies disclosed that the financial disclosures were done in compliance with the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03). Voluntary or optional disclosure is minimal as compared to the requirements of self-regulatory frameworks e.g. the NCCGZ. Most of the sampled companies have been referring to international codes of best practice including King III and more recently the NCCGZ. Nevertheless, the business corporations have numerous areas that requires improvement and to be defined better before satisfying the guidelines by these corporate governance frameworks. Little information beyond what is recommended by the Zimbabwe corporate governance code was released. This observation corresponds to the inference by PwC's benchmark study (PwC 2013) which states that governance is the least fully-reported area.

Sustainability and integrated reports are ordinarily published on a yearly basis, which amounts to a fairly long time frame as contrasted to the short period in which investment decisions are made. Additionally, numerous sustainability reports lack comparability qualities, especially disclosure on hard data on real sustainability risks which can include a lot of expression that obscures the critical information needed by investors and financial advisors. However, there is still room for companies to better identify and understand the sustainability-related information needs of stakeholders and then improve the frequency, emphasis and availability of the information being disclosed. Corporate reporting on sustainability aspects is now a fairly widespread activity, at least among ZSE listed companies. This study indicates that most of the sampled companies now report on sustainability at varied levels. There are various reasons for today's diversity in corporate sustainability disclosure. For instance, the voluntary nature of corporate responsibility activities for some business corporations; the changing range of stakeholders; and the increasing number of matters that corporations are required to manage (e.g. recently, on climate change vulnerability).

Sustainability reporting in most of the sampled companies frequently disclosed one part of business and not linked to strategy pertaining to development, stakeholder relations, community investment, human resources, business planning and risk management. Although, there is an undeniable rationality that materiality processes that feed into sustainability reporting should also feed into risk management, the evidence indicates that this is not yet a normal practice. This is despite recently released 2015 NCCGZ where there is now a requirement for companies to disclose their sustainability risks. GRI G3 or G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines featured as the primary reference framework but data and quantification of the indicators vary a lot across the sample. This means no real homogeneity or comparability in the data provided. Precise data and breakdown analyses are missing: to sum up, more talking than deeds.

The NCCGZ (para.316) states that 'integrated reporting integrates a company's strategy, governance, financial performance and prospective outlook in one report. The report must also cover environmental, social and governance issues which affect the firm's operations. The integrated report must also be guided by the requisites of the Global Reporting Initiative's Sustainability Reporting framework and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) framework as announced from time to time and any other respectable international reporting

framework.’ Lise Kingo, Executive Director of the United Nations Global Compact noted that “The new Sustainable Development Goals provide a clear and compelling direction for the future. For business, these new global goals are set to be a major driver of the markets of tomorrow and can unleash a wave of sustainable products, services and business innovations. All companies can play a role by doing business responsibly and finding opportunities for growth and innovation” (Woodgate, 2016:1).

Given the significance of sustainability disclosure and the benefits of releasing an integrated report, as discussed in *Chapter 3* of this study, corporations must contemplate enhancing their disclosures on sustainability and integrated reporting. The marginal cost of releasing may not increase much because the firms already have to produce part of the information in management reports or accounts for internal use (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2014b). In addition, the firms are recommended by the NCCGZ to produce some sort of integrated report. Since a broad set of stakeholders participated in the development of the NCCGZ framework, it can be considered as representing the information the stakeholders need. The findings of this research indicate that the annual reports of the corporations are generally not in conformity to the NCCGZ framework. Therefore, a gap between the stakeholders’ demands and what the corporations are providing still exist.

A few reports discuss integrated reporting or are labelled as ‘Integrated Reports’ (for example, Cafca (2016), CBZ (2015), Dairibord (2015-16), Econet (2014-16), Turnall (2016). However, the approaches are really far from an acceptable, common perspective as prescribed by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). When assessing the integrated reporting as disclosed in the annual reports, the business model and culture and links to value creation where most of the information to answer the questions in the NCCGZDTI could be located, the manuscript became general and brief. The NCCGZ, King III and the IIRC framework state that an integrated report is a “concise communication” of the link between a companies’ financial and non-financial performance. It should also be mentioned that since integrated reporting has been deemed to improve the efficiency of the whole firm (Eccles & Krzus, 2010), this should further encourage firms to adopt integrated reporting. Although integrated reporting is still a new management practice, it is being increasingly adopted by companies all over the world. Although, as discussed above, few companies in Zimbabwe have

issued an integrated report, many are producing sustainability or corporate social responsibility reports. This implies that the companies are generally taking a step in that direction.

In order to address the relevance gap (Aram & Salipante, 2003:189) and provide suggestions that could also be useful to firms in improving the quality of corporate disclosure and transparency practices, the data and evidence collected, and the specific and general interpretations developed through the qualitative content analysis – together with what emerges from the review of disclosure and transparency concepts conducted in the third chapter – are the basis of a proposal on corporate sustainability accounting and integrated reporting, which is outlined in chapter three.

The next chapter presents the findings of testing the research hypotheses and results in this study of the data collected through the NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index. The findings from the Ordinary Least Squares presumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity are also provided in this chapter. A multivariate regression analysis was then applied to examine whether the release of the NCCGZ has aided the improvement of corporate disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance.

Chapter 7 Quantitative Empirical Findings and Discussion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the descriptive statistics regarding variables involved in the regression testing and the findings achieved by assessing the multivariate regression. The objective of this chapter is to document the findings of the hypotheses tests regarding the comparative level of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed corporations, and the extent of disclosure and transparency links with the firm attributes. Additionally, this chapter presents the detailed empirical finding from the Stata and the SPSS programs. In particular, the chapter seeks to attain several aims. The first aim is to measure the Statistical Mean, Standard Deviation and statistically significance increases during the period under review for all corporations. The second aim is to determine, the Coefficient of Variation (CV) between corporations. The third aim is to measure the Statistical Mean, Standard Deviation, and statistically significant increases for total ZSE listed corporations, with six firm-specific attributes (governance mechanisms, profitability, multinationality affiliation, size, age, liquidity and leverage), and statistically significant increases for every category by two years (pair) and three years (above pair). Each of the statistics concerned were evaluated at three phases: The first one, is aggregate disclosure and transparency. The second one, are four categories outlined in *Figure 1.1* of this thesis. The third one, are fifteen subcategories outlined in *Figure 1.1* of this thesis.

This chapter also provides the descriptive statistics of the developed National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI). It recorded the evaluations of the extent of conformity with the developed NCCGZDTI from the entire selection of firms to address the first three study secondary empirical questions. Moreover, it presents the analysis of the extent of conformity on the basis of sub-categories. The motivation was to investigate the possible factors affecting the differences in the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ amongst the selected corporations. Secondly, the chapter seeks to ascertain whether the institution of the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) has enabled the improvement of corporate disclosure and transparency practices in the Zimbabwean business environment. Thirdly, the current chapter reports the descriptive statistics of the firm performance represented by accounting ratios (ROA, ROCE and ROE), corporate governance instruments and firm specific variables employed in the empirical models. Fourthly, the research performed diagnostic analyses concerning the

variables utilised in assessing the association among corporate disclosure and transparency practices and firm performance. Fifthly, the chapter explains the findings achieved after running the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) evaluation method applied to examine the factors of corporate disclosure and transparency (*Model 1*) to solve the fourth study secondary empirical question. Sixth, it discusses the findings from the OLS regressions linked to both *Model 2* and *Model 3* to resolve the fifth and sixth study secondary questions. Seventh, it evaluates the strength of the findings and checks for the presence of possible endogeneity complications.

The remainder of this chapter is structured in the following manner. *Section 7.2* addresses descriptive statistics of the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ. *Section 7.3* documents the statistical reviews of the independent variables employed in *Model 1*. *Section 7.4* presents the dependent and independent variables used in *Model 2* and *Model 3* that assessed the association amongst corporate governance instruments and corporate performance, whilst *Section 7.5* presents the findings of bivariate relationship and the Ordinary Least Squares assumptions. *Section 7.6* reports the results from the multivariate regression inquiries for the three models, whereas *Section 7.7* considers the integration between qualitative and quantitative findings.

7.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Developed Zimbabwe Corporate Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI)

This section provided a wide-ranging descriptive analysis of the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ to resolve the third sub-empirical question of this research: What is the quality and level of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of ZSE listed firms during the recent years? Corporate disclosure and transparency literature including Haniffa and Cooke (2002:391), Eng and Mak (2003:325), Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:115), Klapper and Love (2004:703), Samaha *et al.* (2012:168), Allegrini and Greco (2013:187) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:121) also argues that company-specific characteristics, such as company size, company age, multinationality affiliation, leverage, liquidity, profitability and corporate governance mechanisms, influence the level of compliance with corporate governance standards. Hence, consistent with the existing literature, this research performed a comprehensive examination of the influence of company attributes on the degree of corporate governance conformity by firms. In order to attain this aim, and corresponding with previous studies, including Werder *et al.* (2005:178) and Bauer *et al.* (2010:1), several representations

for these company characteristics were chosen. The variables concerned enabled the determination of whether corporate disclosure and transparency scores can be described by company attributes.

7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the NCCGZDTI on the basis of Complete Sample

This research developed a corporate disclosure and transparency checklist to assess the degree of conformity amongst a balanced selection comprising of 35 ZSE listed corporations between 2014 and 2016 (see *Chapter 5*). The NCCGZDTI comprises of 153 corporate disclosure and transparency KPIs/items, which were derived primarily from the NCCGZ. Table 7.1 shows that the extent of disclosure and transparency was generally low in the years from 2014 to 2016, but there was an improvement during this period by 5.3%. This study reveals that the aggregate corporate disclosure and transparency score for the NCCGZDTI is 40.74% in 2014, 41.94% in 2015 and 42.89% in 2016, with an average degree of conformity over the three years of 41.9%.

A different portrayal surfaced when the disclosure and transparency scores were disaggregated based on the NCCGZDTI categories and subcategories. For the purposes of policy recommendation, the NCCGZDTI was further split into four broad categories and fifteen subcategories. This procedure enabled this study to identify NCCGZDTI disclosure and transparency items which were complied with, and those which were not. In line with Owusu-Ansah (1998:605) policy makers in Zimbabwe can then direct their concentration on those requirements that were not being disclosed and where corporation observance of regulation seems unsatisfactory. The disaggregation analysis is shown in Panels B, C, D and E of table 7.1. The level of disclosure and transparency by four categories improved during the three years, howbeit at varying levels between the categories; the degree of ownership and control structure recorded a small rise of 1.3% (see *Table 7.1. Panel E*); the scores of governance of risk and structure are the highest amongst the four categories, showing an increase of 3.8% over the three years (see *Table 7.1. Panel C*); the extent of board of directors and management structure just marginally improved by 1.6% (see *Table 7.1. Panel B*); and the scores of information management and disclosure show an improvement of 9.3%.

This study also shows the level of disclosure and transparency with fifteen subcategories. The role of the board scores were the best averaging 97% during the three-year period, and followed by the board structure and composition score which increased from 73.83% in 2014 to 75.43% in 2016 (see *Table 7.1 Panels B1 and B2*). Director training and compensations was 19.77% in

2014, 19.80% in 2015 and 19.60% in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panel B3). The mean score for the executive compensation and evaluation sub-category were extremely low at 0.23% in 2014, 0.40% in 2015 and 0.77% in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panel B4). Principal risk identification, Audit committee, and internal and external audit subcategories scores were generally high at 70%, 84.80% and 70.71% respectively in 2014 and increasing to 74.49%, 85.14 and 71.91% respectively in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panels C1, C3 and C4). Risk management committee subcategory scores were low, averaging approximately 36.98% during the sample period (see Table 7.1 Panel C2). Financial disclosure and information on auditors' subcategories scores were fairly high at 62.74% and 63% respectively in 2014. Although financial disclosure subcategory improved to 65.17% in 2016, information on auditors remained unchanged at 63% in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panels D1 and D4). Sustainability disclosure score was low at 31.86% in 2014, however improved to 36.54% in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panel D2). Companies scored very low when rated for integrated reporting at 6.20% in 2014, 8.34% in 2015 and 9.03% in 2016 (see Table 7.1 Panel D3).

Table 7.1: Concise descriptive statistics for the National Corporate Governance Code of Zimbabwe Disclosure and Transparency Index (NCCGZDTI)

Panel	Variable	2014		2015		2016		All Years	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
A	Total Disclosure & Transparency	40.74	7.44	41.94	8.58	42.89	9.03	41.90	8.34
B	Board of Directors and Management Structure	38.69	7.08	38.80	7.53	39.29	7.49	38.90	7.30
B1	Board structure and composition	73.83	21.05	74.23	21.00	75.43	20.29	75.00	21.00
B2	Role of the board	96.60	10.01	96.63	8.19	97.31	6.35	97.00	8.20
B3	Director training and compensation	19.77	13.16	19.80	16.16	19.60	16.38	20.00	15.00

Panel	Variable	2014		2015		2016		All Years	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
B4	Executive compensation and evaluation	0.23	1.35	0.40	1.67	0.77	2.59	0.00	2.00
C	Governance of Risk and Structure	63.09	20.29	65.37	21.33	65.46	20.21	64.64	20.45
C1	Principal risk identification	70.00	26.58	71.40	27.14	74.49	25.90	72.00	26.40
C2	Risk management committee	34.14	35.33	38.97	37.85	37.83	37.44	36.98	36.59
C3	Audit committee	84.80	24.27	86.49	21.57	85.14	23.17	85.50	22.80
C4	Internal and external audit	70.71	14.20	70.00	15.81	71.91	13.46	70.90	14.40
D	Information Management and Disclosure	34.23	10.82	35.80	11.83	37.43	12.76	35.80	11.80
D1	Financial disclosure	62.74	13.23	64.74	8.58	65.17	7.55	64.20	10.10
D2	Sustainability disclosure	31.86	15.08	33.97	16.25	36.54	17.94	34.00	16.00
D3	Integrated reporting	6.20	10.92	8.34	13.92	9.03	15.11	7.90	13.00
D4	Information on auditors	63.00	0.00	63.00	0.00	63.00	0.00	63.00	0.00
E	Ownership and Control Structure	44.23	4.85	44.66	5.05	44.80	4.90	44.60	4.89

Panel	Variable	2014		2015		2016		All Years	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
E1	Transparency of ownership	17.66	5.48	19.17	5.71	19.17	5.71	18.70	5.62
E2	Concentration of ownership	85.49	14.88	85.49	14.88	85.49	14.88	85.49	14.73
E3	Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures	40.00	5.57	39.71	6.70	40.00	4.89	39.90	5.71

Source: Own Research Compilation

Since all of the documented studies in Zimbabwe did not examine the level of corporate disclosure and transparency among ZSE listed firms using a composite corporate governance index, comparable analysis results are non-existent in this regard. However, these statistical results are in line with related studies performed in other developing countries. For instance, Lipunga (2015:130) reports that there is a progress by Malawian listed companies towards adoption of IR philosophy with an average score of 43% of the constructed IR Index. Similarly, Albassam (2014:200) report an average degree of conformity during the seven years of 44% from the institution of the Saudi corporate governance code. Tsamenyi et al. (2007:330) reported a degree of conformity with non-mandatory corporate governance practices of 52% amongst listed corporations in Ghana. Additionally, Ntim et al. (2012:130) revealed that 61% of corporations in South Africa conformed with the voluntary King III Report. The statistically significant improvement in the level of disclosure and transparency practices over the sample period for this research, could be accredited to corporate governance transformations in Zimbabwe. The release of the NCCGZ increased corporate disclosure and transparency practices and resulted in reduced information asymmetry. However, this may confirm the assertion of several studies including Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009:376) which question the capability of a voluntary conformity system to enhance corporate governance practices in emerging countries.

H₁ states that There is a statistically significant improvement in the extent of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed companies' annual reports during the years from 2014 to 2016. To

test this hypothesis, a paired t-test was conducted to determine whether the average NCCGZDTI of 2016 is significantly higher than the average NCCGZDTI of 2014.

Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of Overall NCCGZ disclosure and transparency

NCCGZDTI	2014-2015		2015-2016		2014-2016	
	Stat	p	Stat	p	Stat	p
<u>Disclosure & Transparency</u>	1.89	0.07	2.00	0.05	2.75	0.01

Stat= Statistic, **p**= Significant value

As shown in Panel A of Table 7.1, the mean NCCGZDTI for 2016 is 42.89 and the 2014 NCCGZDTI mean is 40.74. That is a mean difference of 2.14. This study tested if the 42.89 is statistically significantly higher than 40.74 and found out that to be true since the p-value of 0.001 (one-tailed) is less than 5% (the cut-off point to test for significance.).

7.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the NCCGZDTI on the basis of the Categories and Sub-Categories

This section gives the descriptive numerical considerations of the degree of disclosure and transparency and conformity with the NCCGZ on the basis of the disclosure and transparency categories. As presented in *Appendix 1*, and consistent with present studies such as Munisi and Randoy (2013:92), the requirements that form the NCCGZDTI comprises of four categories, including: (i) board of directorship and management structure, with 27 provisions, (ii) governance of risk and structure, with 21 provisions, (iii) information management and disclosure, with 77 provisions, and (iv) ownership and control structure, with 28 provisions.

Table 7.2.1: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI by Four Categories

NCCGZDTI	2014-2015		2015-2016		2014-2016	
	Stat	p	Stat	p	Stat	p
Board of Directors & Management Structure	0.32	0.75	0.90	0.38	1.02	0.32
Governance of Risk & Structure	1.23	0.23	0.08	0.94	1.31	0.20
Information Management & Disclosure	2.08	0.05	2.07	0.05	2.74	0.01
Ownership and Control Structure	1.09	0.28	0.41	0.69	1.75	0.09

Stat= Statistic, **p**= Significant value

Table 7.2.1 above shows that, only the information management and disclosure category had statistically significant increase between two years 2014-15, 2015-16 and for all three years 2014-2016. The other three categories (board of directors and management structure, governance of risk and structure and ownership and control structure) did not record a

statistically significant improvement for the two years 2014-15, 2015-16 and for all three years 2014-2016.

This research reveals that 13 out of 15 subcategories scores did not improve significantly statistically during the three years. However, sustainability disclosure and transparency of ownership scores statistically increased significantly. There were statistically significant increases for sustainability disclosure, board structure and composition and the role of the board between overall pair years 2015-16, but the rest of the subcategories had recorded did not improve significantly statistically over two years. Only transparency of ownership scores reveals a significant improvement statistically for pair years 2014-15 ($F = 2.66$, $p = .012$) (see Table 7.2.2 below).

Table 7.2.2: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI by Fifteen Sub-Categories

NCCGZDTI	2014-2015		2015-2016		2014-2016	
	Stat	p	Stat	p	Stat	p
Board Structure & Composition	0.59	0.56	2.03	0.05	1.73	0.09
Role of the Board	0.04	0.97	2.10	0.04	0.82	0.42
Director Training & Compensation	0.02	0.98	-0.12	0.91	-0.09	0.93
Executive Compensation & Evaluation	1.00	0.32	0.88	0.39	1.08	0.29
Principal Risk Identification	0.865	0.393	1.019	0.315	1.41	0.17
Risk Management Committee	1.078	0.289	-0.8	0.431	0.77	0.45
Audit Committee	1.143	0.261	-1	0.323	0.59	0.56
Internal & External Audit	-1	0.324	1.957	0.059	0.97	0.34
Financial Disclosure	0.905	0.372	0.46	0.649	1.122	0.27
Sustainability Disclosure	1.925	0.063	2.318	0.027	3.085	0.004
Integrated Reporting	1.773	0.085	0.609	0.546	1.559	0.128
Information on Auditors	0	1.00	0	1.00	0	1.00
Transparency of Ownership	2.656	0.012	0	1.00	2.656	0.012
Concentration of Ownership	0	1.00	0	1.00	0	1.00
Voting & Shareholder Meeting Procedures	-0.33	0.741	0.264	0.793	0	1.00

Stat= Statistic, p = Significant value

Nonetheless, this research discovered a strong significant improvement statistically in the level of disclosure and transparency over the three years, and for the pair financial years between 2015-16, whilst the statistically significant improvement for the years 2014-15 was almost robust ($p = .007$). The extents of disclosure and transparency by four categories display an effective statistically significant improvement for only information management and disclosure scores for three years, while the rest of the categories did not record statistically significant rise

for pair years. As already discussed, the extent of disclosure and transparency with fifteen subcategories revealed that there were 2 out of 15 with effective statistically significant rise, whereas the remaining subcategory items recorded no statistically significant improvement of scores over the three years.

Therefore, **H₁** was accepted in this study, which revealed a statistically significant improvement in the extent of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed companies' annual reports throughout the financial years from 2014 to 2016. Table 7.2.3 presents the test of hypothesis as follows:

Table 7.2.3: Hypothesis Test of the Extent of NCCGZ Disclosure & Transparency

H	Hypothesis	Results		
		2014-2015	2015-2016	2014-2016
H ₁	There is a statistically significant rise in disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed corporations' annual reports, throughout the financial years from 2014 to 2016	R	A	A
	Board of Directors & Management Structure	R	R	R
	Governance of Risk & Structure	R	R	R
	Information Management & Disclosure	A	A	A
	Ownership and Control Structure	R	R	R


Source: Own Research Compilation

The study showed huge differences in the level of disclosure amongst the selected corporations and the required disclosure items over the sample period. Figure 7.1 demonstrate the difference in the degree of disclosure and transparency and also the inconsistent improvement in the degrees of disclosure and transparency during this three-year period in the Coefficient of Variation (CV). Moreover, Figure 7.1 reveals that there is a broader variation between corporations and the level of disclosure and transparency practices in ZSE listed corporations during these years and also that there was a great variability in sustainability disclosure integrated in the sampled firms' annual reports. Therefore, this study accepts the hypothesis (**H_{1a}**) that states that there are significant differences in' disclosure and transparency practices in the annual reports of ZSE listed corporations. The study also accepts the hypothesis (**H_{1b}**) which opines that there are significant differences in the extent of sustainability reporting integrated into annual reports among the ZSE listed companies.

There are several possible explanations for the disparity in the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ among the listed companies. It is noticeable from the NCCGZDTI that the provisions

recording high-level tallies are obliged by the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03), ZSE Listing rules as well as recommended by the NCCGZ. For example, top ten shareholders and shareholders owning more than 5%, which is required to be disclosed by the ZSE listing rules, scored 97% for the entire sample period, and the company provide accounts in internationally recognised accounting standards scored an average of 96% for the entire sample period.

Figure 7.1: Disclosure & Transparency Variations between ZSE Listed Companies




Vertical Axis-Coefficient of Variation, Horizontal Axis- Company Code¹

Another plausible reason for the different disclosure by the sampled corporations is their different reaction to rules possibly because of their different individual situations. For instance, some corporations might opt to not do anything, either due to them being already in conformity (i.e., they have been releasing this information voluntarily before the institution of the rule) or due to the huge cost of being compliant. Additionally, some corporations may undertake notable investments to fulfil the new regulations, whereas others may make only a moderate effort to conform, (Owusu-Ansah, 1998:620), and others may avoid to disclose completely (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:125).

¹ Afdis (1), African Sun (2), Ariston (3), Art Corporation (4), Barclays (5), Cafca (6), CBZ (7), Colcom (8), Dairibord (9), Delta (10), Econet (11), Edgars (12), FBC (13), Fidelity (14), FMHL (15), Innscor (16), Mashonaland (17), Masimba (18), National Foods (19), Nicos Diamond (20), NMBZ (21), NTS (22), OK (23), Old Mutual (24), Padenga (25), Pearl Properties (26), Powerspeed (27), RioZim(28), SeedCo (29), TSL (30), Turnall (31), Unifreight (32), Willdale (33), ZB (34) and Zimplot (35)

Figure 7.2 shows that, in line with Owusu-Ansah (1998:620) and Mawanza and Mugumisi (2014:40) there are disparities in the combined extent of disclosure and transparency based on the D & T categories or sub-indices. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:135) also, in their study, found a significant level variation of forward-looking disclosures amongst early adopters of integrated reporting. As shown on Table 7.1, the selected corporations reveal better conformity with the requirements associated with the governance of risk and structure. In particular, an average of 65% was scored by the listed firms throughout the entire sample period (see Table 7.1). However, 45% was scored on the provisions relating to ownership and control structure, 39% was scored on the provisions relating to the board of directors and management structure, and the level of disclosure and transparency on information management and disclosure is 36% (see Table 7.1). As discussed in *Sub-section 7.2.1*, the high level of disclosure and transparency with some provisions relate to the type of these requirements, enforced by regulating bodies, including the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03), the ZSE listing Rules, the Banking Act, and so forth.

Figure 7.2: An evaluation of the extent of conformity with the NCCGZ between corporations on the basis of the NCCGZDTI categories using calculated means



Source: Own Research

7.3 Descriptive Statistics of Model 1

This section gives the descriptive statistics of the corporate disclosure and transparency model. Moreover, it presents the descriptive reviews of the independent variables. *Sub-section 7.3.1* discusses the presence of extreme values. *Sub-section 7.3.2* reports the explanatory variables

and, split into two major groups, corporate governance mechanisms and firm specific characteristics. Corporate governance mechanisms include board size (BDSIZE), Percentage of non-executive directors (PNED), size of audit committee (AUDCSIZE), audit firm size (AUDFSIZE), government share ownership (GOVSHARE), institutional share ownership (INSSHARE) and director share ownership (DONR). The second set of variables consists of firm specific characteristics, including: Firm performance (ROCE/ROA/ROE), Multinationality affiliation (MNCAffil), company size (CompSz), company age (CompAge), Liquidity (LQDTY) and leverage (LEVRG).

7.3.1 Excessive Values in Firm Performance Measures and Explanatory Variables

The firm performance ratios and independent variables comprise of some excessive values or outliers. Outliers are data points or values in a range of a sample or population that reflect extreme characteristics. For instance, the highest value of return on assets is 19%, while the lowest value was -46%; the maximum value of ROCE is 38%, while the minimum value was -110% and the maximum value of ROE is 75%, while the minimum value was -100%. Likewise, multinationality affiliation (MNCAffil) maximum and minimum values were 90% and 0%, in that order; company size (CompSz) maximum and minimum values were US\$2.165 billion and US\$9 million, respectively; company age (CompAge) maximum and minimum values were 172 years and 12 years, respectively; Liquidity (LQDTY) highest and lowest values were 12 and 0, in that order; leverage (LEVRG) maximum and minimum values were 94% and 0%, respectively, indicating extremely huge difference between the maximum and minimum values. The corporate governance variables also include some excessive values. For example, it was noticed that the maximum value of percentage of non-executive directors (PINED) is 91% and the lowest value is 44%; the highest value of government ownership (GOVSHARE) is 63% and the lowest value is 0%; the highest value of institutional ownership (INSSHARE) is 100% and the lowest value is 1%; the highest value of director ownership (DIRSHARE) is 59% and the lowest value is 0%.

There are two possible explanations behind the occurrence of the outliers in this study, including (i) the sample consisted of big, medium and small corporations so as to enhance generalisability of the results, which caused disparity in the dispersion of the variables; and (ii) various corporations were impacted by the current Zimbabwe economic recession which took effect since the expiry of the Zimbabwe Government of National Unity in July 2013 (see

Chapter 2 of this thesis). According to Ntim *et al.* (2012:121), these outlier values could cause partialities in the results and possibly disrupt the OLS presumptions. There are two main techniques to deal with outliers: (i) trimming and (ii) winsorising. Trimming is the elimination or removal of extreme values. Winsorising involves assigning the next highest or lowest value found in the sample that is not an outlier (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). Trimming or winsorising less than 5% of the data points will not likely affect the hypothesis testing outcome, however, trimming or winsorising greater than 5% may affect the outcome results. For instance, reduces the power of analysis and makes sample less representative (Du Prel *et al.*, 2010:343; Nayak & Hazra, 2011:85). Some studies including Ammann *et al.* (2013:452) and Ntim *et al.* (2012:121), document that to reduce the influence of the outliers trimming and winsorisation could be adopted. Therefore, corresponding with the related studies on corporate disclosure and transparency, only the firm performance variables were winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. Consequently, the descriptive statistics for the same variables were examined as modified values as shown on *Table 7.4* in *Sub-section 7.4.1*. Trimming nor winsorising could be not be done on the rest of the variables because outlier data points exceeded 5% of the data points of the sample values.

7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables

Panels *B, C, D, E, F, G* and *H* of *Table 7.3* contain the analysis of board characteristics variables and audit firm size as the only external governance mechanism variable. Specifically, Panel *B* shows that the audit committee size among Zimbabwe corporate boards ranges between 8 and 2. This variation is consistent with the NCCGZ which requires the corporate boards to establish an audit committee but this will depend on the nature and size of the company and the complexity and diversity of its operations. Panel *C* reveals that the ratio of non-executive directors amongst Zimbabwe corporation boards extents from 91% to 44%, recording an average of 74%. The average score displays a stable rise over the selection period. It was notable that only two firms in the sample classified their non-executive into independent and non-independent non-executive directors. This implies that the firms have not yet adopted enough corporate governance transformations including the implementation of the corporate governance code in Zimbabwe in 2015 to increase the independence of corporate boards. The NCCGZ outlines the principle that the Board should ideally have a majority of non-executive members, the majority of whom should be independent as prescribed in Paragraph 87 of the NCCGZ. However, the finding of this study corresponds with several existing studies on

corporate governance in developing countries. Some former studies show comparatively low representation for independent directors. In particular, Chen (2011:334) documented that independent directors constitute 10% of the Taiwanese boards of directors. Panel D of Table 7.3 highlights the descriptive statistics of the size of board variable as evaluated by the total number of directors on corporations' boards. The board size amongst the sampled corporations extends from 5 to 15 board members, with an average of 8.94 board members. However, the NCCGZ does not specify the recommended corporate board size. This average is in line with the findings of Albassam (2014), who documented that the size of board in Saudi corporations is around 8.42. Nonetheless, Ntim *et al.* (2012:121) and Samaha *et al.* (2012:168) reported comparatively bigger sizes of 11.31 and 10.4 in South Africa and Egypt, respectively. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:130) reported that board sizes ranged from 4.00 to 16.00 with a mean of 10.64, using a cross-country sample of 55 companies.

Table 7.3: Concise descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1)

Panel	Variable	2014		2015		2016		ALL	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
A	Total Disclosure & Transparency	40.74	7.44	41.94	8.58	42.89	9.03	41.90	8.34
B	Audit committee	3.43	0.98	3.60	1.19	3.31	0.83	3.45	1.01
C	Non-executive directors proportion	73.71	10.50	73.91	11.24	75.09	11.94	74.24	11.15
D	Board size	8.83	2.18	8.94	1.92	9.06	1.94	8.94	8.94
E	Audit firm size	94%	24%	94%	24%	94%	24%	94%	24%
F	Government ownership percentage	10.49	16.19	9.87	16.16	10.58	17.17	10.32	16.36
G	Institutional Ownership	32.73	20.67	33.77	23.49	30.94	24.01	32.48	22.58
H	Board ownership percentage	7.81	13.58	9.74	17.21	7.93	15.45	8.49	15.36
I	Return on capital employed	6.95	22.77	6.21	12.90	10.25	11.27	7.80	16.39
J	MNC Affiliation/Foreign company ownership	21.30	23.60	20.76	24.32	21.00	25.65	21.02	24.30
K	Company size	18.43	1.35	18.45	1.38	18.49	1.39	18.45	1.36
L	Company age	60.71	31.58	61.71	31.58	62.71	31.58	61.71	31.58
M	Liquidity	1.90	1.57	2.14	2.38	1.94	1.93	2.00	1.97
N	Leverage/Gearing	28.52	33.47	35.14	37.43	23.98	29.33	29.21	33.56

Source: Own Research Compilation

Panel *E* in Table 7.3 reveals the descriptive statistics of audit firm size. This categorical variable uses a dualistic scoring system. As revealed in Table 7.3, 94% of the corporations are audited by a large audit company.

Panels *F*, *G* and *H* of Table 7.3 reveal a second group of variables which considers corporate proprietorship structure. Panel *F* of Table 7.3 reveals that government shareholding as a proportion of the overall quantity of shares varies from 0% to 63%, averaging 10.32%. As displayed in Table 7.3, government shareholding is consistent during the sample period, recording an average of 10.49% in 2014 and increased marginally to 10.58% in 2016. This low government shareholding in listed corporations is in line with research studies performed in Zimbabwe by Mangena *et al.* (2012: S23) and Munisi and Mersland (2016:30). Panel *G* of Table 7.3 reveals that institutional shareholding as a proportion of the aggregate quantity of stocks extends from 1% to 100%, with an average of 32.48%. As displayed on Table 7.3, institutional shareholding score is consistent during the sample period, averaging 33% in 2014 and reduced marginally to 31% in 2016. Panel *H* in Table 7.3 reveals that the maximum proportion of director shareholding is 59%, whereas the minimum proportion is 0%. Furthermore, the breakdown indicates that the director shareholding over the total sample averaged 8%. The small mean score is consistent with studies in both advanced and emerging countries. In particular, it was reported that the proportion of stocks owned by directors was 14% in Singapore (Eng & Mak, 2003:340). Likewise, it was discovered that director share ownership comprises of just 9% of total stocks in corporations in Egypt (Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170).

Panels *I*, *J*, *K*, *L*, *M* and *N* of Table 7.3 show a set of firm-specific characteristics variables. Panel *I* of Table 7.3 reveals the descriptive statistics of ROCE calculated as the percentage of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by capital employed. The aggregated ROCE extends from 38% to -21%, with an average of 8.82%. On considering the annual investigation, a decrease was noticed in the mean score values from 9.5% in 2014 to 6.72% in 2015, followed by an increase to 10.25% in 2016. This inconsistency in earnings generation can be ascribed to the unique economic environment in Zimbabwe as reviewed in *Chapter 2* of this report. Panel *J* of Table 7.3 shows the MNC Affiliation/Foreign company ownership in sample firms computed as the proportion of voting stocks owned by the foreign investors divided by the aggregate issued stocks. The maximum proportion of foreign shareholding is 90%, whilst the minimum proportion is 0%. Moreover, the breakdown reveals that the director shareholding on

the full sample averages 21%. Panel *K* of Table 7.3 displays the breakdown of company size determined by the natural logarithm of companies' aggregate assets. The extend of the company size variable is between 22 (US\$2.165 billion) and 16 (\$9 million), with an average of 19 (US\$281 million). The mean of company size marginally increased during the sample period. Panel *L* reveals that the corporations' age, symbolised by years since establishment/incorporation of the sample, has a highest of 172 years and a lowest of 12 years, with an average of 62 years. The mean estimate of the company age of the selected corporations displayed great extents of difference in ages of the sampled firms. Panel *M* of Table 7.3 presents the analysis of firm liquidity level measured by current assets divided by current liabilities. The range of the firm size variable is between 12 times and 0 times, with an average of 2 times over the sample period. Panel *N* of Table 7.3 reveals that, generally, the financial leverage amongst ZSE listed corporations is 29%, with a highest ratio of 94% and a lowest ratio of 0%. Alsaeed (2006:490) and Albassam (2014:165) discovered financial gearing values of 25% and 21%, respectively, which correspond with the results from this research. In some developing economies, the gearing ratio is also analogous with the results from this research. For example, it was discovered that amongst corporations in Malaysia the gearing ratio is 20% (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005:420) and in Kenya the gearing ratio is 27% (Barako *et al.*, 2006:120).

7.4 Descriptive Statistics of Model 2 and Model 3

As considered in *Chapter 5*, two diverse models were implemented to assess the association among sound corporate governance practices, especially disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance: *Model 2* and *Model 3*. In each of these models, the dependent variables are the accounting ratios representing firm performance (ROA, ROCE and ROE). The equilibrium-variable model uses several corporate governance instruments as independent variables. Conversely, the NCCGZDTI was utilised as an independent variable in Model 3. The other variables (firm specific characteristics) for these two models are the same as those utilised in the corporate disclosure and transparency model given in *Sub-section 7.3.2* and may be best described as control variables. Granted that the analyses of the NCCGZDTI and independent variables were considered earlier on, the next sub-sections presented the analysis of the firm performance ratios (ROA and ROE).

7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Firm Performance Ratios

Panel A of Table 7.4 reveals the descriptive statistics of return on assets calculated by dividing the operating earnings to the aggregate assets. The aggregate return on assets extends from 19% and -15%, averaging 4.77%. Considering the yearly analysis, a decrease from 5.92% in 2014 to 3.52% in 2015 can be observed, followed by an increase to 4.88% in 2016. This can be attributed to the impact of the unstable economic environment during the post July 2013 election period (Mangena *et al.*, 2012: S30). The return on assets average figure throughout the sample period is consistent with related literature on emerging countries.

Table 7.4: Concise descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate performance models (Model 2 & 3)

Panel	Variable	2014		2015		2016		ALL	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
A	Return on Assets	5.02	11.70	3.52	7.49	4.88	6.59	4.47	8.82
B	Return on equity	2.17	28.45	-3.29	32.03	10.66	19.37	3.18	27.50
C	Return on capital employed	6.95	22.77	6.21	12.90	10.25	11.27	7.80	16.39
D	Total Disclosure & Transparency	40.74	7.44	41.94	8.58	42.89	9.03	41.90	8.34
E	Audit committee	3.43	0.98	3.60	1.19	3.31	0.83	3.45	1.01
F	Non-executive directors' proportion	73.71	10.50	73.91	11.24	75.09	11.94	74.24	11.15
G	Board size	8.83	2.18	8.94	1.92	9.06	1.94	8.94	8.94
H	Audit firm size	94%	24%	94%	24%	94%	24%	94%	24%
I	Government ownership percentage	10.49	16.19	9.87	16.16	10.58	17.17	10.32	16.36
J	Institutional Ownership	32.73	20.67	33.77	23.49	30.94	24.01	32.48	22.58
K	Board ownership percentage	7.81	13.58	9.74	17.21	7.93	15.45	8.49	15.36
L	MNC Affiliation/Foreign company ownership	21.30	23.60	20.76	24.32	21.00	25.65	21.02	24.30
M	Company size	18.43	1.35	18.45	1.38	18.49	1.39	18.45	1.36
N	Company age	60.71	31.58	61.71	31.58	62.71	31.58	61.71	31.58
O	Liquidity	1.90	1.57	2.14	2.38	1.94	1.93	2.00	1.97
P	Leverage/Gearing	28.52	33.47	35.14	37.43	23.98	29.33	29.21	33.56

Source: Own Research Compilation

Data across countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey was exploited and a discovery was made that a return on assets of 9%, 10%, 5% and 5% respectively prevailed

amongst corporations (Klapper & Love, 2004:720). In addition, current researches on Mexico, Zimbabwe and South Africa reported return on assets averages amongst corporations of 3.2%, 4.8% and 11%, in that order (Mangena *et al.*, 2012: S35); Ntim *et al.*, 2012:130; Price *et al.*, 2011:90). In addition, former studies discovered a return on assets of 3.3% in Canada (Gupta *et al.*, 2009:304) and 6% amongst European countries (Renders *et al.*, 2010:100). Panel B of Table 7.4 summarises the statistical analysis of the findings of the ROE, described by the amount of net income generated as a percentage of stockholders' equity. The highest average percentage amongst the sampled corporations is 40%, whereas the lowest is -40% and the average is 5.34. Contrasting the mean over the sample years reveals a high degree of disparity. The ROE decreased from 5.60% in 2014 to 1.85% in 2015 and then increased to 8.57% in 2016. Panel C of Table 7.4 also highlights the statistical analysis of the results of the ROCE. The highest average percentage amongst the sampled corporations is 38%, whereas the lowest is -21% and the average is 8.82. The ROCE decreased from 9.50% in 2014 to 6.72% in 2015 and then increased to 10.25% in 2016.

7.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Corporate Governance Instruments

As considered in *Chapter 5*, the independent variables utilised in the *Model 2* are corporate governance instruments. Table 7.4 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables outlined in the following manner: Panels E, F, G, H, I, J and K present the audit committee (AUDCSIZE), non-executive directors (PINED), board size (BDSIZE), audit firm size (AUDFSIZE), government share ownership (GOVSHARE), institutional share ownership (INSSHARE) and director ownership (DIRSHARE) respectively. The descriptive statistics results for corporate governance mechanisms discussed in *Sub-section 7.3.2* are similar to the statistical analysis for the independent variables used in the equilibrium-variable model.

7.5 Bivariate Correlation and Ordinary Least Squares Assumptions

As reviewed in *Chapter 5*, multivariate regression was employed to evaluate the association amongst corporate governance instruments, firm characteristics, corporate disclosure and transparency and corporate performance. In line with corporate disclosure and transparency literature, including Black (2001:89), Gompers *et al.* (2003:107), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034), Ntim *et al.* (2012:121); Samaha *et al.* (2012:168) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:121), Ordinary Least Squares presumptions consisting of normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and linearity were checked. This aided in the development

of the “best” model considering that all the expected coefficients have the “right” signs (Albassam, 2014:137).

Firstly, the normality of constant variables was checked to investigate if the variables form a normal distribution (Black, 2001:89). In line with Ntim *et al.* (2012:121), this research assessed the normality of data utilising probability-probability (P-P), quintile-quintile (Q-Q) and histograms. The developed NCCGZDTI appeared to be normally distributed as illustrated in *Appendix 6* of this thesis. Contrariwise, the ownership variables revealed mixed findings. For instance, government and director ownership recorded non-normal distribution, whereas institutional ownership was fairly normally distributed. Additionally, the results imply that four (board size, proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee size and institutional share ownership) out of seven corporate governance mechanisms variables used in this research comparatively make a normal distribution. All the firm performance representations (ROA, ROCE and ROE) are fairly normally distributed. Furthermore, some of the firm-specific characteristics variables, such as multinationality affiliation, liquidity and leverage does not form a normal distribution.

The Skewness and Kurtosis tests confirm the result of somewhat normally distributed features in many of the variables. In particular, The NCCGZDTI was examined utilising Skewness and Kurtosis tests to confirm whether it is normally distributed. The rule of thumb concerning the Skewness test is that the value of symmetric distribution is at zero (Brooks, 2008:1; Gujarati, 2003:1). Table 7.6 reveals that the NCCGZDTI is skewed at 0.518 (somewhat skewed towards the right), denoting an estimate symmetrical curve (a normally distributed curve). Considering Kurtosis, the proposition of non-normality can be declined if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003:1). Table 7.6 reveals that the Kurtosis value of the NCCGZDTI is -0.21, which suggests that the data is fairly normally dispersed. Concerning return on capital, return on equity and return on assets, are skewed at -0.57, -1.19 and -0.27 respectively according to the statistical analysis in Table 7.6, indicating a somewhat negative skew. The Kurtosis value of 0.284, 1.96 and 0.000 implies a nearly normal distribution. Contrariwise, liquidity ratio is skewed at 2.73, implying a very positive Skewness as shown on Table 7.6. This suggests that the proposition of non-normality cannot be declined, whilst a Kurtosis value of 8.53 signifies a non-normal distribution of the liquidity ratio values. Concerning audit firm size, the statistical analysis in Table 7.6 shows that it is skewed at -3.87, signifying a highly negative skewness. The Kurtosis

value of 13.24 denotes a nearly perfect distribution. Concerning rest of the variables, Table 7.6 reveals that values for many of the continuous variables are skewed in the extend from -0.71 to 1.79, except for director ownership, whose value is 2.00. Concerning the Kurtosis test statistics, the variables are ranging from -1.07 to 3.46, signifying Skewness in particular selection of the data. It is challenging for any study data to be perfectly normally dispersed (Gujarati, 2003:1). Hence, a degree of non-normality in certain selection of the data is anticipated.²

Nonetheless, Brooks (2008:1) proposed that “*for sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality assumption is virtually inconsequential*”. Therefore, the sample used in this research managed to moderate the adverse effect of the prevailing non-normality of various variables. *Appendix 6* shows the histograms for these components. Moreover, and consistent with present literature including Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034) and Ramly (2012:1733), non-normality in selected variables was reduced by transformation and winsorisation of the data. As proposed by the related studies, the variables were altered to: (i) circumvent disruption of the Ordinary Least Squares presumptions; (ii) lessen the complications of non-normality, and (iii) as documented by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034), Ntim *et al.* (2012:122) and Ramly (2012:1733), limit homogeneity and extreme values.

According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034) and Ramly (2012:1733), there may be multicollinearity, a situation where intercorrelations amongst independent variables is significant (surpassing 0.8). In line with former studies, the Pearson association multipliers (parametric) and Spearman association multipliers (non-parametric) were summarised in Table 7.5 (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:122; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:121). This table shows the correlation coefficients to check the tendency and enormity of the linear association between the variables. This analysis assisted in the discovery of the possible existence of multicollinearity amongst the variables. *Table 7.5* reveals the association matrix for the dependent and independent variables used for the corporate reporting and transparency and corporate performance archetypes. Nevertheless, the extent and trend of both the Pearson association multipliers and Spearman association multipliers seem to be reasonably analogous. These results complement the substantiation that no considerable complication of non-normality amongst the variables in

² As clarified further below, the non-normality complication was tackled by the transformation and winsorisation of the concerned variables.

the models exists (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013:121). Additionally, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:121) reported that the associations amongst the variables are somewhat low, suggesting that no severe multicollinearity complication exists. However, Du Prel *et al* (2010:343) and Nayak and Hazra (2011:85) claim that multicollinearity might continue to cause a risk yet after administering every test connected to normal and transformed data.

Table 7.5 shows very high correlation between ROE, ROCE and ROA and this could result in getting unexpected negative correlations when all these variables are used in one model (see Table 7.8 where ROA and ROCE are negatively related to NCCGZ). To ensure that this high multi-collinearity did significantly influence Model 1 of this thesis, the researcher ran regression analysis using the same data but excluding ROA and ROCE. The researcher only kept ROE because it has the highest correlation with NCCGZ as shown on Table 7.5. The researcher found that the two models; (1) with all three measures (ROA, ROCE and ROE) and (2) with only ROE; are very much similar (See *Appendix 8* for these regression analysis). Furthermore, the r squared value of the first model with all three measures (ROA, ROCE and ROE) is slightly higher than in the model with ROE only. However, more importantly, the adjusted r-square value of the only ROE model is slightly higher. Therefore, the researcher was indifferent whether to include all the three measures in Model 1 or only one of them.

Consistent with former studies, additional techniques were employed to examine the existence of multicollinearity amongst the variables, namely the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Cook's distance tests (Dam & Scholtens, 2012:233; Kajanathan, 2012:63). According to Gujarati (2003:1) and Kajanathan (2012:63), very high intercorrelations might be a complication if VIF values exceed 10 and tolerance levels are close to 0. Table 7.6 reveals that the VIF values of variables utilised in this research models extends from a highest figure of 7.503 to a lowest figure of 1.309, which implies that no serious problem of multicollinearity exists. Cook's distance is a commonly used estimate of effect of a data point when performing a least squares regression analysis. It is effective in the identification of outliers in the X values (observations for predictor variables). Some texts opine that points for which Cook's distance is higher than 1 are to be considered as influential. Other texts give a threshold of $4/N$ or $4/(N-k-1)$, where N is the number of observations and k the number of explanatory variables. The latter formula should yield a threshold around 0.1. Table 7.6 below shows that this research data is within this threshold.

Table 7.5: Pearson and Spearman association matrices of all factors for all 105 firm years

Variable	NCCGZDTI	BDSIZE	PINED	AUDCSIZE	AUDFSIZE	GOVSHARE	INSSHARE	DIRSHARE	ROA	ROCE	ROE	MNCAffil	CompSz	CompAge	LQDTY	LEVRG
NCCGZDTI	1	-.006	.072	.071	.161	.172	-.087	.310**	.031	.093	.069	.025	.226*	-.092	-.148	.11
BDSIZE	.065	1	.225*	.432**	.138	.190	.178	-.143	.021	.081	.053	.191	.460**	.030	.033	.17
PINED	.003	.205*	1	-.010	.083	.120	-.004	-.086	-.290**	-.264**	-.127	.147	.084	.112	-.041	.05
AUDCSIZE	.046	.389**	.030	1	.319**	.120	.140	-.078	.206*	.134	.001	.097	.149	.293**	-.111	.02
AUDFSIZE	.138	.158	.050	.273**	1	.096	.113	-.126	-.118	-.043	-.077	.179	.222*	.284**	-.045	-.09
GOVSHARE	.127	.225*	.098	-.045	.012	1	.242*	-.116	-.117	-.086	-.100	-.092	.022	-.069	-.009	-.02
INSSHARE	-.213*	.189	.061	.070	.109	.326**	1	-.288**	-.222*	-.126	-.122	-.029	.308**	.011	.064	-.10
DIRSHARE	.186	-.281**	-.102	-.104	-.079	-.181	-.243*	1	.104	.086	.129	-.033	-.120	-.079	.055	-.05
ROA	-.060	-.058	-.279**	.137	-.074	-.243*	-.214*	-.183	1	.840**	.748**	.109	-.007	.088	.321**	-.216
ROCE	-.032	.127	-.229*	.025	-.059	-.014	-.061	-.199*	.626**	1	.863**	.179	.229*	.053	.084	.02
ROE	-.083	.020	-.134	-.109	-.078	-.046	-.037	-.175	.662**	.716**	1	.205*	.263**	.096	.208*	.06
MNCAffil	.062	.144	.201*	.029	.166	-.196*	-.013	-.236*	.183	.112	.095	1	.446**	.286**	.098	.04
CompSz	.204*	.451**	.037	.041	.184	.205*	.300**	-.157	.081	.177	.174	.339**	1	.004	-.113	.245
CompAge	-.194*	.034	.116	.181	.239*	-.223*	.254**	-.105	.052	.037	.010	.495**	.177	1	.161	-.08
LQDTY	.083	-.141	-.070	-.236*	-.009	-.161	-.146	-.039	.237*	.075	.148	.193*	-.217*	.041	1	-.508
LEVRG	.013	.213*	.149	.024	-.062	.116	.027	-.033	-.249*	-.128	-.247*	.112	.325**	.087	-.339**	

Legend: The bottom left half of the table covers Pearson's parametric association multipliers, while the upper right half of the table reveals Spearman's non-parametric association multipliers ** and * signify significance at 1% and 5% levels, in that order.

Source: Own Research Compilation

Table 7.6: The Ordinary Least Squares Presumptions Tests

	VIF	Skewness		Kurtosis		Cook's Distances		
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error	Model	Min	Max
AUDCSIZE	1.780	1.404	0.236	3.463	0.467	NCCGZDTI	0.000	0.082
AUDFSIZE	1.271	-3.871	0.236	13.239	0.467			
DIRSHARE	1.415	2.004	0.236	2.769	0.467			
BDSIZE	1.829	0.168	0.236	-0.329	0.467			
GOVSHARE	1.435	1.792	0.236	2.164	0.467			
INSSHARE	1.615	1.087	0.236	1.028	0.467	CIM-ROCE	0.000	0.054
PINED	1.309	-0.710	0.236	0.016	0.467	CIM-ROE	0.000	0.112
CompAge	1.717	1.134	0.236	2.707	0.467	CIM-ROA	0.000	0.155
CompSz	2.131	0.546	0.236	-0.452	0.467			
LEVRG	1.660	0.793	0.236	-1.067	0.467			
LQDTY	1.585	2.734	0.236	8.532	0.467			
MNCAffil	1.927	1.335	0.236	0.907	0.467			
ROA	7.288	-0.274	0.236	0.000	0.467			
ROCE	7.503	-0.567	0.236	0.284	0.467	EVM-ROCE	0.000	0.197
ROE	3.244	-1.191	0.236	1.961	0.467	EVM-ROE	0.000	0.169
NCCGZDTI	1.142	0.518	0.236	-0.213	0.467	EVM-ROA	0.000	0.189

Legend: Variables and models are described in the following manner: Model 1 (NCCGZ D&T), Model 2 ROCE (EVM-ROCE), Model 2 ROE (EVM-ROE), Model 2 ROA (EVM-ROA), Model 3 ROCE (CIM-ROCE), Model 3 ROE (CIM-ROE), Model 3 ROA (CIM-ROA), the ZimCode index (NCCGZDTI). Chapter 5 gives the full descriptions of all utilised variables.

Source: Own Research Compilation

7.6 Multivariate Regression Analysis

Subsequent to the review of the Ordinary Least Squares presumptions in *Section 7.5*, the current section provides a review of the experiential findings. A multivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression assessing the factors of corporate reporting and transparency is evaluated from strongly balance panel data as discussed in *Chapter 5*. In addition, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, firm-specific characteristics and firm performance

was evaluated utilising two diverse models: Model 2 and Model 3, as represented by the accounting measurements including ROA, ROCE and ROE.

Table 7.7a: A summary of Hausman Test for Model 1

Hausman- fixed & random Test				
	Coefficients			
	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	$\sqrt{\text{diag}(V_b - V_B)}$
	fixed	random	Difference	S.E.
BDSIZE	0.045	-0.020	0.065	0.114
PINED	-0.065	-0.028	-0.037	0.022
AUDCSIZE	-0.872	-0.485	-0.387	0.306
AUDFSIZE	-0.517	-0.733	0.216	0.632
GOVSHARE	0.102	0.063	0.039	0.142
INSSHARE	0.023	-0.009	0.032	0.013
DIRSHARE	0.195	0.166	0.029	0.029
ROA	-0.084	-0.173	0.090	0.047
ROCE	0.000	0.057	-0.057	0.022
ROE	-0.008	-0.015	0.008	0.008
MNCAffil	-0.065	-0.017	-0.048	0.040
CompSz	2.045	2.569	-0.524	2.872
CompAge	0.840	-0.009	0.849	0.317
LQDTY	1.118	0.995	0.124	0.184
LEVRG	-0.044	-0.048	0.004	0.012
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic $\chi^2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^{-1}](b-B)$ = 39.22 Prob>χ^2 = 0.0006				

Source: Own Research Compilation

This section closes by showing comparison of the results achieved from Model 2 and Model 3. The fixed effects (FE) models and random effects (RE) models were run concurrently. FE investigate the link between predictor and outcome variables in an entity (country, person, corporation, etc.). The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant variations between the individuals, so that the approximated coefficients of the fixed-effects archetypes cannot be prejudiced because of excluded time-invariant features. The justification following random effects model is that, distinct from the fixed effects model, the difference across entities is expected to be haphazard and uncorrelated with the predictor or explanatory variables involved

in the model. To choose between fixed or random effects, a Hausman test was administered, where the null hypothesis is that the favoured model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects. The test evaluates the consistency of an estimator when compared to an alternative, less efficient estimator which is already known to be consistent. Table 7.7_a shows the Hausman diagnostic test results for Model 1 (see *Chapter 5*) of this thesis. The Prob $\geq \chi^2$ for Hausman test is equal to 0.0006 which is less than 0.05 therefore is significant. Therefore, the researcher used fixed effects model to run OLS regression for all the three models in this thesis since the data fits the fixed effect models better.

7.6.1 Findings of Model 1

As clarified in *Chapter 5*, Model 1 investigates the factors of corporate reporting and transparency amongst ZSE listed corporations. In particular, this archetype aimed to resolve the third study secondary question: Which components affect the extent of disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe listed companies? The constructed NCCGZDTI is the dependent factor, which represents corporate governance practices. The independent variables comprise seven corporate governance mechanisms and six firm specific characteristics variables. Table 7.7_b presents a synopsis of the hypotheses investigated and the results from the regression estimation of the associations among corporate governance instruments and the NCCGZDTI as well as the firm-specific characteristics and the NCCGZDTI.

Table 7.7_b shows that all the hypotheses are rejected at 5% significance level because their p-values (see *Table 7.8*) are all above 5% except hypotheses (**H_{2g}**), (**H_{3d}**) and (**H_{3e}**) for board ownership, company age and liquidity with a p-values of 0,001, 0.011 and 0.010 at 1% significant level for (**H_{2g}**) and at 5% significance level for (**H_{3d}**) and (**H_{3e}**). Company age was discovered to be positively and significantly linked to disclosure and transparency practices at the 95% level of confidence. This result is also consistent with the hypothesis (**H_{3d}**) formulated. The association between liquidity and the quality and extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports of ZSE firms is positive and significant. This finding is in line with the hypothesis (**H_{3e}**) developed in this research. On the basis of these findings, corporations that have high level of liquidity generate more comprehensive disclosure and transparency KPI disclosures. Better liquidity implies that corporations have finances obtainable to quickly fund investment opportunities. Liquidity also offers stability to the additional stakeholders such as suppliers.

Table 7.7b: A synopsis of all of the hypotheses and results for the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1)

Dependent variable	The NCCGZ Disclosure & Transparency				
	No. of Hypothesis	Expected sign	Finding sign	Finding significance	Hypothesis status
Board Size (BDSIZE)	H_{2a}	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Non-executive directors (PINED)	H_{2b}	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit committee size (AUDCSIZE)	H_{2c}	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit firm size (AUDFSIZE)	H_{2d}	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Government ownership (GOVSHARE)	H_{2e}	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Institutional ownership (INSSHARE)	H_{2f}	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Board Ownership (DIRSHARE)	H_{2g}	+	+	Significant at the 1% level	Accepted
Profitability (ROA)	H_{3a}^1	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Profitability (ROCE)	H_{3a}^2	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Profitability(ROE)	H_{3a}^3	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Multinationality (MNCAffil)	H_{3b}	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Company size (CompSz)	H_{3c}	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Company age (CompAge)	H_{3d}	+	+	Significant at the 5% level	Accepted
Liquidity (LQDTY)	H_{3e}	+	+	Significant at the 5% level	Accepted
Leverage(LEVRG)	H_{3f}	+	-	Significant at the 10% level	Rejected

Notes: The hypotheses are reviewed in Chapter Four.

Source: Own Research Compilation

The hypothesis (H_{2g}) states that there exists a positive correlation between director ownership and sound corporate disclosure and transparency practices. As displayed on Table 7.8, the finding after running the multivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression reveals that the factor is significantly positive at the 1% significance level and this resulted in the acceptance of the hypothesis. This result is backed by related literature which argues that the directorship board pursues the improvement of corporate disclosure and transparency practices so as to improve the competitive standing of their corporations (Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170).

As shown on Table 7.8, leverage is significantly inversely linked to the degree of disclosure and transparency KPI disclosed by reporting corporations at 10% level of significance. However, hypothesis (H_{3f}) states that leverage is positively related to the level of disclosure and transparency, therefore this study could not accept the hypothesis. This negative correlation is not consistent with some related studies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002:400; Naimah & Mukti, 2019:175), which suggested that corporations with extreme operating leverage might require to increase their oversight. Additionally, as claimed by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:130) corporations with higher gearing desire to release corporate governance information in order

to make their activities acceptable to lenders and stockholders likewise. Several prior research discovered no considerable association between gearing and non-mandatory corporate governance disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002:425; Ho & Wong 2001:150; Ntim *et al.*, 2012:140); Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:210). Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:140) also found that leverage had no significant impact on forward-looking disclosure or qualitative forward-looking disclosure in their study.

As presented in Table 7.8, the board size hypothesis (H_{2a}) states that the connection between the size of the board and the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency practices is positive. This table reveals a positive though statistically insignificant association between size of the board and sound corporate governance practices at the 5% significance level. This finding suggests a rejection of this hypothesis. This result is not backed by the resource dependence theory and other related studies. In particular, as claimed by some related studies, a big board is better able to monitor management practices than a minor board due to the directors' experience and their diversified involvements (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005:420; Fama & Jensen, 1983:320; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:40). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013:130) proposed that a rise in the size of boards enhances corporations' internal control systems and improves corporate governance practices. Bigger boards might be perceived of as the ones that provide greater robust monitoring related to corporation performance. This degree of monitoring possibly leads to improved disclosure of the KPIs of the corporation in the annual reports. Likewise, some studies discovered that big boards in corporations in South Africa (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:140) and Egypt (Samaha *et al.* 2012:170), are most probable to release corporate governance disclosures. Board size was reviewed in the section covering the ZimCode (NCCGZ). It recommends a minimum of two executive directors be appointed to the board and a minimum of three non-executive directors be appointed to the board.

The hypothesis on the proportion of non-executive directors states that there exists a positive correlation between the ratio of non-executive directors and corporate reporting and transparency practices. Table 7.8 reveals a negative and insignificant link between the ratio of non-executive directors and corporate disclosure and transparency. Therefore, respective hypothesis (H_{2b}) was rejected. Moreover, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976:306), Fama and Jensen (1983:305) and Lambert *et al.* (2012:1), the result does not correspond with the agency theory that proposes corporate governance practices are enhanced when boards are

comprised of independent directors and reduces information asymmetry. Furthermore, the theory of stakeholders proposes that autonomous directors ensure that the stakeholders' interests are better represented (Clarke, 2004:1). Empirically, the results of this study regarding non-executive directors is diverse from the results in former researches that reveal a positive association among board of directorship objectivity and corporate governance practices. Some related researches discovered a positive correlation, implying that the impartiality of the directorship board enhances the board's responsibility. For instance, a positive association was reported in listed corporations of Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002:400). Former studies performed in developing countries discovered positive relationships in Taiwan (Chen, 2011:345), Egypt (Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170) and South Africa (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:130). However, these findings also correspond with other former studies which discovered an inverse correlation between the percentage of non-executive directors and the level of disclosure (e.g. Eng & Mak, 2003:345, Barako *et al.*, 2006:120).

The audit committee size hypothesis states that there exists a positive association among the size of the audit committee and corporate disclosure and transparency practices. Table 7.8, however reveals an insignificantly negative association between the audit committee size and corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This resulted in the rejection of this hypothesis (H_{2c}). This finding is consistent with that of Naimah and Mukti (2019:178), who found no significant impact of audit committee size on intellectual capital disclosures. The audit firm size hypothesis (H_{2d}) states that there is a positive association between audit company size and corporate disclosure and transparency. Table 7.8 shows an insignificantly negative coefficient between size of audit company and corporate disclosure and transparency, leading to the rejection of this hypothesis. The result however, does not corroborate empirical results from former researches which insinuate that big audit companies (big-four audit companies)³ appear to be in a better state of independence in comparison to the smaller firms, and are better capable to check managers' devious practices because of their proficiency (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002:425; Eng & Mak, 2003:340).

The government ownership hypothesis (H_{2e}) indicates an insignificantly positive effect of government ownership on corporate disclosure and transparency. The findings from multivariate regression are summarised in Table 7.8 and this lead the study to reject this

³ The big-four audit firms are PwC, Deloitte & Touche, E&Y and KPMG.

hypothesis. This finding is not consistent with some extant empirical researches in developing countries. For instance, former studies discovered that government shareholding is considerably linked to improved corporate disclosure in Singapore (Eng & Mak 2003:340) and South Africa (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:140).

Table 7.8: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of the corporate disclosure and transparency model (Model 1)

NCCGZ Corporate Disclosure & Transparency Model						
	Fixed Effects			Random Effects		
Variables (H)	Coef	Std.err	P> t	Coef	Std.err	P> t
BoardSz (H_{2a})	0.045	0.346	0.897	-0.02	0.327	0.952
PINED (H_{2b})	-0.065	0.062	0.301	-0.028	0.058	0.629
AudComSz (H_{2c})	-0.872	0.741	0.244	-0.485	0.675	0.472
AudFirmSz (H_{2d})	-0.517	2.383	0.829	-0.733	2.298	0.750
GovOwnSh (H_{2e})	0.102	0.165	0.540	0.063	0.085	0.462
InstOwnSh (H_{2f})	0.023	0.034	0.493	-0.009	0.031	0.773
BoardOwnSh (H_{2g})	0.195***	0.057	0.001	0.166***	0.049	0.001
ROAwinsd (H_{3a}^1)	-0.084	0.14	0.553	-0.173	0.132	0.190
ROCEwinsd (H_{3a}^2)	0	0.088	0.998	0.057	0.086	0.508
ROEwinsd (H_{3a}^3)	-0.008	0.039	0.847	-0.015	0.038	0.690
MNCAffil (H_{3b})	-0.065	0.063	0.302	-0.017	0.048	0.722
CompSzLog (H_{3c})	2.045	3.094	0.511	2.569**	1.151	0.026
CompAge (H_{3d})	0.840**	0.321	0.011	-0.009	0.051	0.856
LQDTY (H_{3e})	1.118**	0.42	0.010	0.995***	0.377	0.008
LEVRG (H_{3f})	-0.044*	0.025	0.076	-0.048**	0.022	0.026
Constant	-42.36	55.32	0.447	-1.92	20.7	0.93
N	105			105		

Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

The institutional ownership hypothesis (H_{2f}) indicates that the connection between institutional shareholding and sound corporate disclosure and transparency practices is positive. As displayed in Table 7.8 below, the hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level of significance. This result does not support the agency theory which explains that a shareholder profile which constitutes institutional stockholders allows a better level of responsibility (Aggarwal *et al.*, 2011:178; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006:1034). Experientially, this result is inconsistent with some extant literature. For instance, the result varies from those by Barako *et al.* (2006:120), Aggarwal *et al.* (2011:175) and Ntim *et al.* (2012:140) that reported a significantly positive association. Table 7.8 reveals that, the profitability hypothesis (H_{3a}) as measured by the three

accounting ratios; ROA, ROCE and ROE denoted as sub hypotheses (H_{3a}^1), (H_{3a}^2) and (H_{3a}^3) respectively predict that a company's profitability level positively and significantly influences the level of corporate disclosure and transparency practices. The study discovered that there is no link between profitability as measured by ROA, ROCE and ROE with disclosure and transparency extent hence hypotheses H_{3a}^1 , H_{3a}^2 and H_{3a}^3 are rejected. This finding is not supported by the signalling theory proposes that corporations with higher performance most probably release more information about their performance. However, this finding is supported by the findings of Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:128) who found that ROA had no significant impact on FLDI, QUANFLDI and QUALFLDI. In addition, Naimah and Mukti (2019:178) revealed that profitability did not significantly influence intellectual capital disclosures (ICD). Other researches have indicated that lemons (less-performing corporations) are inclined to release fewer information to circumvent humiliation and publicity of their deficient performance (Akerlof, 1970:495). MNCAffil is insignificantly inversely related to the levels of disclosure and transparency practices by reporting firms. Therefore, hypothesis (H_{3b}) was not accepted. A company size hypothesis (H_{3c}) was set proposing that there is a positive correlation between company size and corporate reporting and transparency. As presented in Table 7.8, the multiplier on company size is positive and insignificant at 5% significance level, hence, this hypothesis was rejected. This finding is not backed by some related studies, who discovered a positive association between company size and sound governance practices (Allegrini & Greco, 2013:210; Eng & Mak, 2003:340; Omar & Simon, 2011:180; Naimah & Mukti, 2019:178); Ntim *et al.*, 2012:140; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:170). However, the findings by Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:125) revealed that firm size has a weak, positive and statistically significant effect on forward-looking disclosures, corresponding to the findings of this study.

7.7 Integration between Qualitative and Quantitative Findings

Chapter 6 and 7 gave separate reviews of the results using qualitative and quantitative data respectively. As considered in Chapters 1 and 5, this research used a mixed-methods design. The mixed method design is valuable in clarifying findings when both quantitative and qualitative data are utilised (Creswell & Clark, 2011:1-520). Lately, this method has been broadly accepted in the corporate disclosure and transparency literature and is regarded as applicable for establishing a great insight of corporate governance practice as documented by McNulty *et al.* (2013:183) and Zattoni *et al.* (2013:119). This research study applied the embedded concurrent and sequential design suggested by Creswell and Clark (2011:1-520).

Specifically, after obtaining deep insights from qualitative content analysis, the study examined the statistical findings from the quantitative content analysis. This offered a distinctive opportunity to enhance the researcher's aptitude to appreciate and clarify the statistical findings. The current section summarises the assimilation of the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data.

Mostly the results after the statistical analysis of the quantitative data supported and clarified the findings achieved from the qualitative content analysis. *Chapter 6* of this thesis considered that the degree of conformity to the NCCGZ slightly improved from 49.7% % in 2014 to 50.6% in 2016. This steady increase is credited to the corporate governance improvements. The quantitative statistical analysis concur that the extent of corporate reporting has increased in ZSE listed corporations during latest years reporting a 5% increase, with an average degree of conformity over the three years of 42%. Whereas the improvement could be said to be small from a qualitative standpoint, the quantitative statistical tests proved that this improvement was statistically significant. In addition, the assessment reveals that the contents of the companies' annual reports have also lately increased. The increase relates to mostly non-financial information in the annual reports since financial information is mostly a mandatory requirement.

Regarding the current practices in corporate disclosure and transparency, the descriptive analysis shows that the corporate sustainability disclosures improved during the recent years. For instance, the increase in sustainability disclosure from an average of 31.86% to 36.54% (see *Table 7.1*) was statistically tested to be significant ($F=3.085$, $p\text{-value}=0.004$) (see *Table 7.2.2*). This could be explained by the qualitative content analysis which observed low but gradually increasing number of firms producing an annual report incorporating a sustainability report or corporate social responsibility. Thirteen (37%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2015, fourteen (40%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2015 and sixteen (46%) of the sampled firms published sustainability reports in 2016.

With respect to the determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency, a number of factors and developments may be identified as having a potential influence on the progress of corporate reporting in Zimbabwe. Conceivably, the most apparent reporting driver in Zimbabwe is regulatory. The qualitative content analysis showed that mandatory information has been disclosed comprehensively in firms' annual reports as opposed to low levels voluntary

disclosures in annual reports. The requirements with fairly high scores are provided for by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), ZSE Listing rules as well as recommended by the NCCGZ. Moreover, a few Zimbabwean companies has issued an integrated report.

7.6.2 Findings of Models 2 and 3

This sub-section gives the experiential findings from the approximation of the association amongst corporate governance instruments, disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance. As clarified in *Chapter 5*, prior literature has examined these associations applying the two diverse models. For instance, Chalevas (2011:138) and Mangena *et al.* (2012:S38) applied Model 2 and Gompers *et al.* (2003:107), Ntim *et al.* (2012:122), Ammann *et al.* (2013:452) and Munisi and Randoy (2013:92) applied Model 3.

Findings of Model 2

The association among corporate governance instruments and corporate performance was assessed by utilising ROA, ROCE and ROE as accounting-based measures. This model aimed to address the fifth secondary question of this study: What is the association among specific corporate governance instruments and corporate performance? The variables investigated by Model 2 comprises of Board size (BDSIZE), the percentage of non-executive directors (PINED), audit committee size (AUDCSIZE), audit firm size (AUDFSIZE), government ownership (GOVSHARE), institutional shareholding (INSSHARE) and director shareholding (DIRSHARE).⁴

Table 7.9: A synopsis of all of the hypotheses and results for the firm performance models (Model 2 & 3)

Dependent variable	ROA, ROCE & ROE				
Explanatory variables	Hypothesis Number	Expected sign	Finding sign	Result significance	Hypothesis status
Panel A: Model 2 –ROA					
Board Size (BDSIZE)	H_{4a}^1	-	-	Significant at the 5% level	Accepted
Non-executive directors (PINED)	H_{4b}^1	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit committee size(AUDCSIZE)	H_{4c}^1	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit firm size(AUDFSIZE)	H_{4d}^1	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected

⁴ Chapter 5 gives the full description and approach of evaluating corporate governance mechanisms applied in this model.

Dependent variable ROA, ROCE & ROE					
Explanatory variables	Hypothesis Number	Expected sign	Finding sign	Result significance	Hypothesis status
Government ownership (GOVSHARE)	H_{4e}^1	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Institutional ownership(INSSHARE)	H_{4f}^1	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Board Ownership(DIRSHARE)	H_{4g}^1	-	-	Significant at the 5% level	Accepted
Panel B: Model 2 –ROCE					
Board Size (BDSIZE)	H_{4a}^2	-	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Non-executive directors (PINED)	H_{4b}^2	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit committee size(AUDCSIZE)	H_{4c}^2	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit firm size(AUDFSIZE)	H_{4d}^2	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Government ownership (GOVSHARE)	H_{4e}^2	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Institutional ownership(INSSHARE)	H_{4f}^2	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Board Ownership(DIRSHARE)	H_{4g}^2	-	-	Significant at the 10% level	Accepted
Panel C: Model 2 –ROE					
Board Size (BDSIZE)	H_{4a}^3	-	-	Significant at the 1% level	Accepted
Non-executive directors (PINED)	H_{4b}^3	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit committee size(AUDCSIZE)	H_{4c}^3	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Audit firm size(AUDFSIZE)	H_{4d}^3	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Government ownership (GOVSHARE)	H_{4e}^3	+	+	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Institutional ownership(INSSHARE)	H_{4f}^3	+	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Board Ownership(DIRSHARE)	H_{4g}^3	-	-	Insignificant at the 5% level	Rejected
Panel D: Model 3 –ROA					
NCCGZDTI	H_5^a	+	-	Significant at the 5% level	Rejected
Panel E: Model 3 –ROCE					
NCCGZDTI	H_5^b	+	-	Significant at the 5% level	Rejected
Panel F: Model 3 –ROE					
NCCGZDTI	H_5^c	+	-	Significant at the 10% level	Rejected

Source: Own Research Compilation

Panel A of Table 7.9 above presents a set hypotheses outline to assess the association between corporate governance structures and return on assets (ROA). Non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership and institutional ownership are

hypothesised to be positively related to ROA, while the connection among the size of the board and board shareholding and return on assets were proposed to be negative.

Table 7.10: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROA

Explanatory Variables	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
BDSIZE (H_{4a}^1)	-1.239**	0.604	-2.050	0.045	-2.449	-0.029
PINED (H_{4b}^1)	-0.016	0.117	-0.140	0.891	-0.251	0.219
AUDCSIZE (H_{4c}^1)	1.301	1.353	0.960	0.340	-1.407	4.009
AUDFSIZE (H_{4d}^1)	-5.536	4.501	-1.230	0.224	-14.546	3.474
GOVSHARE (H_{4e}^1)	-0.158	0.318	-0.500	0.620	-0.794	0.477
INSSHARE (H_{4f}^1)	-0.017	0.066	-0.260	0.797	-0.150	0.115
DIRSHARE (H_{4g}^1)	-0.255**	0.105	-2.420	0.019	-0.466	-0.044
MNCAffil	0.040	0.123	0.320	0.748	-0.207	0.286
CompSz	0.561	5.834	0.100	0.924	-11.116	12.239
CompAge	-0.464	0.621	-0.750	0.457	-1.706	0.778
LQDTY	0.442	0.815	0.540	0.589	-1.189	2.074
LEVRG	-0.072	0.043	-1.670	0.100	-0.157	0.014
F Value	1.500					
R-sq	24%					
Number of observations	105					

Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

As displayed in Table 7.10, the coefficients of non-executive directors, audit committee size and government ownership are positive although insignificant, leading the researcher to reject the hypotheses (H_{4b}^1 , H_{4c}^1 & H_{4e}^1). Zabria *et al.* (2016:294) discovered that there is no significant relationship between board independence with firms' ROA. This was also supported by Mangena *et al.* (2012: S23) who claim that the proportion of non-executive directors is not beneficial to the corporation in an environment of severe political and economic crisis.

Table 7.10 reveals that the relationship is negative at 5% significance level for audit firm size and institutional ownership with the level of firm performance. Therefore, these hypotheses (H_{4d}^1 & H_{4f}^1) could not be accepted. The board size hypothesis (H_{4a}^1) proposes that board size is adversely linked to return on assets. As displayed in Table 7.10, the association is inverse and significant at the 5% significance level. The hypothesis was thus accepted. This finding is supported by the study by Zabria *et al.* (2016:294) which revealed that there is a statistically significant negative association between board size and firms' ROA. As claimed by Vafeas (1999:220), this result suggests that a rise in the size of board of directors may cause an upsurge

in board expenditures including annual emoluments, windfalls, travel and additional stipends. However, the Mangena *et al.* (2012: S40) found that board size is not significantly associated with performance.

Table 7.10 shows that a negative and considerable connection was noticed between director ownership and corporate performance, leading to the acceptance of H_{4g}^1 . This finding is consistent with several extant related literature suggesting that director ownership adversely impacts company performance. However, Mangena *et al.* (2012: S40), revealed that the overall effect of executive directors' share ownership on performance is neutral.

Panel B of Table 7.9 exhibits a set hypotheses synopsis to examine the connection among corporate governance structures and ROCE. Non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership and institutional ownership were hypothesised to be positively related to ROCE, whereas size of board and board shareholding were assumed to be inversely linked to ROCE.

Table 7.11: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROCE

Explanatory Variables	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
BDSIZE (H_{4a}^2)	-1.314	1.106	-1.190	0.240	-3.527	0.900
PINED (H_{4b}^2)	0.016	0.215	0.080	0.940	-0.414	0.446
AUDCSIZE (H_{4c}^2)	-0.971	2.475	-0.390	0.696	-5.926	3.985
AUDFSIZE (H_{4d}^2)	-2.535	8.236	-0.310	0.759	-19.022	13.952
GOVSHARE (H_{4e}^2)	-0.395	0.581	-0.680	0.499	-1.559	0.768
INSSHARE (H_{4f}^2)	0.023	0.121	0.190	0.851	-0.219	0.265
DIRSHARE (H_{4g}^2)	-0.351*	0.193	-1.820	0.074	-0.737	0.035
MNCAffil	0.117	0.225	0.520	0.604	-0.333	0.568
CompSz	11.212	10.675	1.050	0.298	-10.157	32.581
CompAge	-0.113	1.136	-0.100	0.921	-2.386	2.160
LQDTY	0.428	1.491	0.290	0.775	-2.557	3.414
LEVRG	-0.128	0.078	-1.640	0.107	-0.285	0.029
F Value	1.450					
R-squared	23%					
Number of observations	105					

Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 7.11, reveals that the findings after running the regression suggest a positive association between corporate performance and ratio of non-executive directors (H_{4b}^2) and institutional

ownership (H_{4f}^2). The coefficients on these variables are positive although insignificant, leading the rejection of these respective hypotheses (H_{4b}^2 & H_{4f}^2). However as shown in Table 7.11 size of directorship board, audit committee size, audit company size and government ownership, the relationship is negative and insignificant at 5% significance level. Therefore, these hypotheses (H_{4a}^2 , H_{4c}^2 , H_{4d}^2 & H_{4e}^2) could not be accepted.

The director ownership hypothesis (H_{4g}^2) predict a negative association with ROCE. As shown in Table 7.11, the coefficients of both these components are adverse and insignificant at the 5% significance level. However, the coefficient for director ownership is significant at 10% significance level depicting a somewhat negative relationship hence the hypothesis (H_{4g}^2) is partially accepted.

Panel C of Table 7.9 displays an outline of the hypotheses set to examine the correlation among corporate governance instruments and ROE. Non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership and institutional ownership were hypothesised to be positively related to ROE, while size of directorship board and board shareholding were assumed to be inversely correlated to ROE.

Table 7.12: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of the Model 2 based on accounting ratio ROE

Explanatory Variables	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
BDSIZE (H_{4a}^3)	-4.983***	1.726	-2.890	0.005	-8.439	-1.527
PINED (H_{4b}^3)	0.465	0.335	1.390	0.171	-0.206	1.136
AUDCSIZE (H_{4c}^3)	2.166	3.865	0.560	0.577	-5.570	9.902
AUDFSIZE (H_{4d}^3)	-10.741	12.859	-0.840	0.407	-36.480	14.998
GOVSHARE (H_{4e}^3)	0.347	0.907	0.380	0.703	-1.469	2.163
INSSHARE (H_{4f}^3)	-0.047	0.189	-0.250	0.803	-0.426	0.331
DIRSHARE (H_{4g}^3)	-0.300	0.301	-1.000	0.324	-0.903	0.303
MNCAffil	0.156	0.351	0.450	0.658	-0.547	0.860
CompSz	22.811	16.666	1.370	0.176	-10.550	3.677
CompAge	0.129	1.773	0.070	0.942	-3.420	3.677
LQDTY	2.039	2.328	0.880	0.385	-2.621	6.700
LEVARG	-0.427***	0.122	-3.490	0.001	-0.672	-0.182
F Value	2.030					
R-squared	30%					
Number of observations	105					

Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, in that order.

As shown in Table 7.12, findings from the regression imply a positive but immaterial connection between corporate performance and proportion of non-executive directors (H_{4b}^3), audit committee size (H_{4c}^3) and government ownership (H_{4e}^3). The coefficients on these variables are positive and statistically insignificant at 5% significance level, leading to the rejection of these respective hypotheses (H_{4b}^3 , H_{4c}^3 & H_{4f}^3). However, Table 7.12 shows that audit firm size and institutional ownership have a negative relationship and though insignificant at 5% significance level. Therefore, these hypotheses (H_{4d}^3 & H_{4f}^3) could not be accepted.

The board size hypothesis (H_{4a}^3) and director ownership (H_{4g}^3) both predict a negative association with ROE. As presented on Table 7.12, the multiplier of size of the board is negative and considerable at the 5% significance level, hence the hypothesis was accepted. This is not supported by Zabria et al. (2016:294), who claim that there is no association between board sizes with firms' ROE.

However, director ownership hypothesis (H_{4g}^3) was rejected as the results show a negative but insignificant relationship with firm performance.

Findings of Model 3

As outlined in *Chapter 5* of this thesis, the compliance-index model employed a developed corporate disclosure and transparency index. This model facilitated in the examination of the impact of corporate disclosure and transparency (represented by a set of requirements/KPIs) on company performance. This archetype intended to address the sixth study secondary experiential question: What is the linkage between conformity to the 2015 NCCGZ and corporate performance? The present research constructed the NCCGZDTI consisting of 153 disclosure and transparency requisites drawn from the code of corporate governance of Zimbabwe. Findings from the multivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression investigating the association between the NCCGZDTI and corporate performance are reviewed below.

The final hypothesis (H_5) proposes that the association between the NCCGZDTI and firm performance represented by return on assets, return on capital employed and return on equity is constructive and statistically considerable. Panel A, B and C of Table 7.13 records that the coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level of significance for ROA (H_5^a) and ROCE (H_5^b), except for ROE (H_5^c) with a significantly negative coefficient at 10% significance level. Therefore, the three sub hypotheses (H_5^a , H_5^b , H_5^c) were rejected.

Table 7.13: Ordinary Least Squares regression results of Model 3 based on ROA, ROCE and ROE

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Panel A: Model 3 –ROA (H₅^a)						
NCCGZDTI	-0.578**	0.227	-2.540	0.013	-1.032	-0.124
MNCAffil	-0.008	0.121	-0.070	0.946	-0.251	0.234
CompSz	0.03	5.459	0.010	0.996	-10.876	10.935
CompAge	-0.1	0.651	-0.150	0.879	-1.401	1.201
LQDTY	0.907	0.813	1.120	0.269	-0.717	2.531
LEVRG	-0.081**	0.036	-2.260	0.027	-0.153	-0.009
F Value	1.860					
R-squared	15%					
Number of observations	105					
Panel B: Model 3 –ROCE (H₅^b)						
NCCGZDTI	-0.884**	0.408	-2.170	0.034	-1.699	-0.069
MNCAffil	0.034	0.218	0.150	0.877	-0.402	0.469
CompSz	12.152	9.795	1.240	0.219	-7.416	31.721
CompAge	0.504	1.169	0.430	0.668	-1.831	2.839
LQDTY	1.088	1.459	0.750	0.459	-1.826	4.002
LEVRG	-0.187***	0.065	-2.900	0.005	-0.317	-0.058
F Value	2.26					
R-squared	17%					
Number of observations	105					
Panel C: Model 3 –ROE (H₅^c)						
NCCGZDTI	-1.115*	0.659	-1.690	0.095	-2.430	0.201
MNCAffil	0.114	0.352	0.320	0.748	-0.589	0.816
CompSz	17.403	15.815	1.100	0.275	-14.192	48.999
CompAge	1.324	1.887	0.7	0.486	-2.446	5.093
LQDTY	2.794	2.356	1.190	0.240	-1.911	7.499
LEVRG	-0.344***	0.104	-3.3	0.002	-0.553	-0.136
F-Value	2.53					
R-squared	19%					
Number of observations	105					

Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, in that order.

These findings are in agreement with Suttipun (2017:138) who analysed the impact of integrated reporting (IR) on the financial performance and discovered that environmental disclosure has negative effect on performance. However, the same study by Suttipun (2017:138) revealed that disclosing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues as well as capital has positive influence on performance. Adegboyegun *et al.* (2020:1) also discovered that integrated

reporting (IR) has no significant influence on firm performance in contrast to this study. However, this result is not supported by other empirical studies.

Agency theory proposes that conformity to the corporate governance standards enhances internal control procedures and board of directors' performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:305; Allegrini & Greco, 2013:187). According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:1034) and Solomon (2010), this lowers agency costs and thus increases corporate performance. Agency theory proposes disclosure and transparency as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetry (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018:118). Referring to the theory of resource dependence perception, it could be suggested that sound corporate governance practices result in improved board's composition. This aids corporations in the acquisition of financial and non-financial resources (Pearce & Zahra, 1992:411; Pfeffer, 1972:218; Wang & Hussainey, 2013:26). Although the theoretical justification predicts a positive association, the results in this study corresponds to several studies performed on both advanced and emerging countries. In particular, several related studies reported that there is no considerable association among their developed corporate governance index and Q-ratio in Canadian corporations (Klein *et al.*, 2005:780; Gupta *et al.*, 2009:305; Bozec *et al.*, 2010:695; Price *et al.*, 2011:90).

The Findings of a Similarity Between Model 2 and Model 3

As considered in *Chapter 5* and former sub-sections, this research employed couple diverse models to assess the link among corporate disclosure and transparency and corporate performance. Although Model 2 used seven corporate governance structures, Model 3 employed a self-developed corporate disclosure and transparency index comprising of 153 requirements evaluating of corporate disclosure and transparency practices.

Table 7.14 exhibits that overall, the equilibrium-variable model is superior at clarification of the ROA, ROCE and ROE than the compliance index model. The R^2 is 24%, 23% and 30% respectively whilst for the compliance-index model it is 15%, 17% and 19% respectively. The *F-values* range from 1.410 to 2.220 for both models and Durbin-Watson values range from 1.332 to 2.042 for both models. To reiterate the above discussion, Model 2 plainly displays somewhat better clarification of the subject matter than Model 3 for the association among corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance. Nevertheless, the Model 2 and Model 3 have the matching descriptive power in clarifying the association among corporate disclosure and transparency and corporate's worth. Therefore, there exists no perfect

approach to examine the association among corporate disclosure and transparency and company performance. Consequently, this research used the two models to deliver greater understanding into the alterable impacts of applying varied approaches.

Table 7.14: Comparison of Model 2 and Model 3 utilised

Models	Model 2			Model 3		
	ROA	ROCE	ROE	ROA	ROCE	ROE
R-squared	24%	23%	30%	15%	17%	19%
F-Value	1.500	1.450	2.030	1.860	2.260	2.530
Durbin-Watson statistics	1.636	1.703	2.042	1.332	1.754	2.006

Source: Own Research

7.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This chapter presented the discussion of the empirical findings. In particular, it aimed to realise three main objectives. The first one was the examination of the main assumptions of the Ordinary Least Squares method. The normality test suggested that certain variables were somewhat not normally distributed. The winsorisation and transformation of data was performed to manage the non-normality issue. Winsorisation and transformation of the variables were then followed by several diagnostic tests which were conducted such as: (i) P-P and Q-Q scatter plots; (ii) histograms to test normality; (iii) Skewness and Kurtosis; (iv) Variance Inflation Factor; (v) tolerance statistics; (vi) Hausman (vii) Durbin-Watson; and (viii) Cook's distance. The findings of these tests suggested that there exist no considerable threat concerning non-normality, high intercorrelations and linearity. To explain the existence of heteroscedasticity, the robust standard errors technique was applied to approximate Ordinary Least Squares regression, and it could be observed that there exists no significant disruption of the findings achieved from the multivariate Ordinary Least Squares estimation. Secondly, the chapter presented the experiential findings of the three models used in this research. *Model 1* denoted the corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This archetype examined the association among seven corporate governance instruments and corporate disclosure and transparency practices. The results imply that only director ownership from seven corporate governance mechanisms variables investigated resulted in a statistically significant association with corporate disclosure and transparency, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Out of six company specific variables examined, company size and liquidity resulted in a statistically significant association with corporate disclosure and transparency at 5%

significance level. The study show that leverage has a statistically significant negative relationship with disclosure and transparency practices at 10% significance level, leading to the partial acceptance of the leverage null hypothesis. *Model 2*, which examined the relationship among separate corporate governance instruments and company performance employing three varied accounting ratios. The results reveal variations in the findings concerning the connection among the corporate governance components and company performance as represented by three varied ratios; ROA, ROCE and ROE. Board size and director ownership have a significantly negative correlation with ROA. Only size of the board has a negative and significant relationship with ROE. *Model 3*, which examined the link between conformity to the NCCGZ and company performance utilising a self-developed corporate disclosure and transparency index (NCCGZDTI). The results showed that the constructed disclosure and transparency index had a negative and significant relationship with firm performance as measured by ROA and ROCE at 5% significant level. However, the results show that the constructed disclosure and transparency index had a somewhat negative and significant relationship with firm performance as measured by ROE. Additionally, this study compared and contrasted the findings from *Model 2* and *Model 3*. This further helped in the assessment of the methodologies implemented to assess the association among corporate disclosure and transparency practices and company performance. Thirdly, this chapter presented the assimilation between the quantitative findings and the qualitative results. This helped in explaining the statistical findings and allowed profound knowledge of corporate governance practices.

The following chapter represents the finale of this research. In particular, it represents a review of the quantitative and qualitative results and policy propositions in the Zimbabwe corporate environment. It further addressed the inadequacies and commendations of this research.

Chapter 8 Conclusion, Contributions and Recommendations

8.1 Introduction

This thesis presented the case of the Zimbabwean economic environment as it relates to governance standards, rules and conformity amongst the companies in *Chapter 2*. The literature review in this research was provided in *Chapter 3*. The empirical study review and the set hypotheses were given in *Chapter 4*. The study methodology was considered in *Chapter 5*. The qualitative data on disclosure and transparency as gathered by qualitative content analysis using ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative analysis software was presented and analysed in *Chapter 6*. The quantitative data collected by the quantitative content analysis was examined using two statistical techniques (Descriptive statistics and multivariate OLS regression), and a discussion of the findings presented and analysed in *Chapter 7*. *Chapter 8* gives a review of the results from the quantitative and qualitative data, and discusses the integration of the two data sets. The chapter also discusses the implications for policy, additions and limits of this research. Finally, recommendations for upcoming studies were offered.

8.2 Summary of Results

The primary intention of this study is to firstly analyse the current practices of corporate disclosure and transparency among ZSE listed firms (see *Sections 6.4.1* of this thesis) and secondly, evaluate whether the quality and level of D&T in ZSE listed firms' annual reports improved since the release of the NCCGZ (see *Sections 6.4.2, 7.2.1& 7.2.2* of this thesis). Thirdly, to see whether there is a statistical association between the extent of D&T and the determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency practices among ZSE listed companies during the financial years 2014 to 2016 (see *Section 7.3*). Fourthly, to examine if there is an association between D&T practices and firm performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA) (see *Section 7.4*). To enable the achievement the general aim, certain specific objectives were identified for this study: a) To contextualise corporate disclosure and transparency by defining, exploring and systematically analysing the concepts of corporate disclosure and transparency from the literature; b) To develop a sustainability oriented, composite D&T index based on NCCGZ (with reference to OECD principles, GRI and IR frameworks); c) To determine the current corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency in corporate reporting; d) To analyse and evaluate the quality of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of firms listed in the ZSE during the recent years e) To evaluate the degree at which the corporate

disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices in the annual reports is associated with the firm specific characteristics and corporate governance instruments of ZSE listed firms during the recent years; f) To examine the connection amongst corporate governance instruments and corporate performance; g) To correlate the corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices and firm performance and h) To provide suggestions for improvements in corporate regulation, securities regulation, and corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe.

These objectives have all been successfully achieved through means of different concurrent and sequential investigations, which included:

1) A review of literature that contextualised corporate disclosure and transparency by defining and exploring certain related concepts, such as *Corporate Governance (CG)*, *Corporate Accountability (CA)* and *Corporate Sustainability (CS)*. These concepts are often interdependent on one another as all have important roles to play in shaping the relationship between business and society. The clarification of these concepts have contributed to a better understanding of the directions that society will compel business to head into, in order to enhance corporate accountability. The explorations of the NCCGZ and other various international corporate governance codes assisted in developing the NCCGZDTI and the scoring system. The review of literature therefore assisted in answering the first sub-empirical question: (i) How could a sustainability oriented, composite D&T index be developed based on the NCCGZ and literature?

2) An empirical study which meant the physical development of the measuring instrument (NCCGZDTI). The study then used the NCCGZDTI to explore the current corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency in corporate reporting, assessed the quality and extent of D&T in the Zimbabwean listed corporations, the influence of seven corporate governance mechanisms and six corporation attributes on D&T, and the effect of D&T on corporate performance. Firstly, NCCGZDTI was constructed to score the extent of business corporations' disclosure and transparency at three levels: overall D&T; four categories and fifteen subcategories. Secondly, the influence of seven corporate governance instruments and six firm attributes on D&T. Thirdly, the effect of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) practices on firm performance and fourth, the association between corporate governance instruments and corporate performance. The data for corporations' performance were gathered

from annual reports (*see Chapter 5*). The number of firms producing an annual report incorporating a sustainability report or corporate social responsibility report has been very low but gradually increased over the 2014 to 2016 financial years.

Following previous studies as discussed in *Chapter 5*, qualitative content analysis was used to answer the second and third sub-empirical questions: (ii) What are the current corporate approaches to disclosure and transparency in corporate reporting in Zimbabwean firms? and (iii) What is the quality and level of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of ZSE listed firms during the recent years? The results in chapter six showed that the number of firms producing an annual report incorporating a sustainability report or corporate social responsibility report has been very low but gradually increasing over the 2014 to 2016 financial years and at overall level the findings in this research reveal that for overall disclosure and transparency statistics there was a slight improvement in disclosure and transparency practices during the three years.

The quantitative content analysis and applicable statistical analysis were employed to address the third, fourth, fifth and sixth secondary experiential questions, which are: (iii) What is the quality and level of corporate disclosure and transparency (D&T) in annual reports of ZSE listed firms during the recent years? (iv) What are the factors that influence the level disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe listed companies? (v) What is the relationship amongst corporate governance instruments and corporate performance? and (vi) What is the association among the level of disclosure and transparency practices in conformity with the 2015 NCCGZ and firm performance?

Corporate Disclosure and Transparency

The findings in *Chapter 7* revealed that there is a statistically significant improvement of disclosure and transparency since the release of the NCCGZ and the level of D&T were varied from company to company. The aggregate corporate disclosure and transparency score for the NCCGZDTI is 40.74% in 2014, and increased up to 42.89% in 2016, with an average degree of conformity over the three-year period of 41.90%. This increase in the extent of conformity can be accredited to the corporate governance transformations. This result corresponds with prior literature on developing countries including Price *et al.* (2011:90), Ntim *et al.* (2012:130), Allegrini and Greco (2013:210), Albassam (2014) and Al-Malkawi *et al.* (2014:139), which discovered increase in the degree of conformity with enhanced governance standards.

The study found that there were variations among firms' extent of disclosure and transparency in their annual reports as evidenced in the aggregated sample. This finding is supported by the literature on corporate disclosure and transparency practices such as Kılıç and Kuzey (2018:125), Owusu-Ansah (1998:620), Ntim *et al.* (2012:130), Samaha *et al.* (2012:170) and Allegrini and Greco (2013:210), which clarified the variations in the degree of conformity amongst corporations in relation to their attributes including corporation size, corporation age, audit firm size, multinationality affiliation and so forth.

Regression results regarding the factors affecting the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency are in line with prior studies as reported in *Chapter 7* of this thesis. This study found that director ownership has a positive and significant influence on the level of disclosure and transparency and compliance with the NCCGZ. Board size has a positive but insignificant influence on the extent of disclosure and transparency and conformity with the NCCGZ. This finding is in line with the notion that the general tendency of the association between board size and the level of disclosure is vague (Yafele, 2012:344). Government ownership has a positive but insignificant influence on the extent of disclosure and transparency and conformity with the NCCGZ. Institutional shareholding has a constructive but insignificant influence on the extent of disclosure and transparency and conformity with the NCCGZ. This research finding does not concur with that of Diamond and Verrecchia (1991:190) who opine that substantial share ownership by institutional investors might also promote greater disclosure to lower information asymmetry. The analysis also found that the percentage of board non-executive directors is negatively and insignificantly correlated with the level of corporate disclosure and transparency. This finding disagrees with the assertion that a higher ratio of independent non-executive directors on the boards possibly result lead to effectual monitoring of boards, leading to more optional disclosure of corporate information (Fama & Jensen, 1983:320; Chau & Gray 2010:105). However, this finding also support other studies (Leftwich *et al.*, 1981:70) which proposed that the association between independent directors and the level of optional disclosure is vague. The analysis also found that the audit committee size is negatively and insignificantly related with the extent of corporate disclosure and transparency. This result does not correspond with corporate governance guidelines which state that audit committees play an oversight role for the boards of directors on issues of corporate governance and reporting amongst their key functions. In this position, the audit committee oversees management and both the internal and external auditors to ensure the protection of the interests

of the corporation's shareowners (FRC, 2014; NCCGZ, 2014). The analysis also found that audit firm size is negatively and insignificantly correlated with the level of corporate disclosure and transparency. This research finding supports some experiential literature on the association among the excellence of external auditing and optional corporate reporting which insinuated no significant relationship (Albassam, 2014). The study also found that company age has a constructive and significant correlation with the degree of disclosure and transparency and compliance with the NCCGZ. This finding supports other studies such as Camfferman and Cooke (2002:25), which claim that age of a corporation might be pertinent, since older corporations might have amassed unique familiarity with corporate disclosure over years. The study also found that liquidity has a positive and significant relationship with the level of disclosure and transparency and compliance with the NCCGZ. While the findings of statistical test conducted by Yafele (2012:344) support this theorised connection between disclosure and transparency and liquidity, those of Owusu-Ansah's (1998:620) study did not. Company size has a positive but insignificant association with corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This finding is not consistent with other studies which suggest that under the legitimacy theory the bigger corporations use improved disclosures to counter societal expectations since they are characterised by more stakeholders as compared to smaller corporations (Abeysekera, 2013:238; Turturea, 2015:2165). Profitability (measured by ROCE) has a positive but insignificant association with corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This finding is supported by various researchers who have proposed that the association between profitability ratio and the level of disclosure is vague. For instance Lang and Lundholm (1993:46) note that the association of a corporation's degree of profitability and disclosure could be constructive, unclear or adverse dependent on its performance. Leverage level has an insignificantly negative relationship with the level of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed firms' annual reports at 5% significance level. This finding defies the assumption that corporations with higher financial leverage ratio have a higher number of creditors and that corporations would release more information to these stakeholders to fulfil a duty of accountability (Yafele, 2012:344). Multinationality affiliation has an insignificantly negative relationship with the level of disclosure and transparency in ZSE listed firms' annual reports at 5% significance level. This finding is not supported by Lopes and Rodrigues (2007:40) who suggested that more globalised corporations would make an effort to show to their stakeholders their good citizenship and hence increase disclosure in the annual reports.

Firm Performance and Model 2

In the current study, seven corporate governance components were exploited to evaluate their effect on corporate performance. This corresponds with the literature as discussed in *Chapter 4*. These variables include percentage of non-executive directors, corporate board size, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership. To evaluate the association, three accounting measures were used: return on assets (ROA); return on capital employed (ROCE) and return on equity funds (ROE). These variables are extensively utilised in corporate disclosure and transparency studies (e.g., Mangena *et al.*, 2012: S35; Munisi & Randoy, 2013:100). The usage of three diverse measures aids to increase the comparability with the extant studies and enhanced the robustness of the results as claimed by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006:200) and Ntim *et al.* (2012:130).

As presented in *Chapter 7*, the results from *Model 2* are generally varied. This research found that board size has a negative and significant relationship with firm performance as measured by ROA and ROE. This finding supports to the agency theory which suggest that a bigger board may raise managerial costs and therefore negatively impact corporation profitability (Yawson, 2006). This study also found that board size is negatively and insignificantly related to ROCE supporting Mangena *et al.*, (2012: S35) who found that there is no significant association between board size and corporate performance. This research found that board ownership is significantly and negatively associated with ROA. Furthermore, the results from the multivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression also show that board ownership have a somewhat negative association with ROCE at a 10% significance level. These results are consistent with other studies which suggest that owning a high ratio of stocks make a corporation very susceptible to conspiracy between directors and the corporation's management (Konijn *et al.*, 2011:1335). This study, nevertheless, contradicts Piesse *et al.* (2012:670) who claimed that a higher percentage of director share ownership encourages boards of directors to increase corporate performance. Audit committee size is positively and insignificantly related to ROA, proportion of non-executive directors, audit firm size, government ownership and institutional ownership are negatively but insignificantly related with ROA. Instead, the ratio of non-executive directors and institutional ownership are positively but insignificantly related to ROCE, while board size, audit committee size, audit firm size, government ownership and director ownership are negatively and insignificantly related to ROCE. Furthermore, board size has a negative and significant influence on corporate

performance as measured by ROE. The study also shows that the following variables; the percentage of non-executive directors, audit committee size and government shareholding are positively but insignificantly related to ROE, while audit firm size, institutional share ownership and director share ownership have an inverse but insignificant association with ROE.

Firm Performance and the Model 3

As reviewed in *Chapters 4 and 5*, *Model 3* is a fairly new method, and not yet utilised in prior literature on Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, advanced countries released codes of best governance practice much earlier than emerging countries. For example, the Cadbury Report in the UK in 1992 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA in 2002. The assumption was that the association among the NCCGZDTI and corporate performance is constructive and significant. As reviewed in *Chapter 7*, the results achieved from *Model 3* imply that sound corporate disclosure and transparency practices, represented by the NCCGZDTI, are negatively but significantly correlated to return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE). These findings are in agreement with Suttipun (2017:136) who analysed the impact of integrated reporting (IR) on the financial performance and discovered that environmental disclosure has negative effect on performance. This finding also concurs with the study by Bebchuk *et al.* (2009:800) who found that there is a negative correlation among an aggregate corporate governance index (Entrenchment-Index 'E-Index') and corporation's worth. The study also found that corporate disclosure and transparency practices have a weak negative relationship with return on equity funds (ROE) in consistency with related study by Price *et al.* (2011:88) who discovered that corporate performance is not influenced by sound corporate governance practices amongst a selection of listed corporations in Mexico. Although these findings are not hypothetically backed by some extant literature, it corresponds with numerous researches performed on both advanced and emerging countries as discussed in *Chapter 7*. The insight obtained from the qualitative content analysis and the empirical findings best explain the prolonged political and economic crisis that Zimbabwean firms have experienced. This unique operational environment for businesses has resulted in some of the findings to be variant from some related studies.

With regard to the above discussion of summary of the results of this study, this study has made unique contributions to the research field of corporate governance and specifically disclosure and transparency measurement.

8.3 Study Contributions and Possible Implications

This research evaluated the quality and level of D&T practices by the ZSE listed corporations during the three years under review and reveals if there are differences between corporations in D&T practices. The study also looked at the extant literature on the impact of corporation attributes on the extent of D&T, and how corporate governance mechanisms influence D&T and also the effect of D&T practices on firm performance. Thus, the contributions of this study and its implications for policy-makers are considered in *sub-section 8.3.1 and 8.3.2* respectively below.

8.3.1 Contributions of this Study

As considered in *Chapter 1*, this research contributed to the literature on disclosure and transparency in many ways. Firstly, generally many commercial studies and particularly corporate disclosure and transparency are overshadowed by quantitative studies (Molina-Azorin, 2012). It could be reasoned that quantitative data only might not provide sufficient clarification of the results from statistic tests. Mixed-methods study produces more dependable and credible discoveries than any one approach employed (Molina-Azorin, 2011:33). Responding to the current demand for many mixed-methods study, this research used mixed-methods design to study corporate disclosure and transparency practices in Zimbabwe. Consequently, this research added to the corporate disclosure and transparency literature by demonstrating the way the results from quantitative and qualitative data could be assimilated to assess corporate disclosure and transparency practices. This opens avenues for forthcoming research in the context of corporate disclosure and transparency.

Secondly, this study added to the literature by applying a manifold-theoretic framework to infer the experiential results and to comprehend corporate disclosure and transparency practices in depth. This research study responded to the recent demands to apply balancing theories in experiential corporate governance researches to improve the appreciation of corporate disclosure and transparency practices. Thirdly, the Zimbabwe code was used as the major source in the construction of the NCCGZDTI. To the researcher's utmost knowledge, this

research was the earliest to reveal empirical proof of the degree of conformity with the Zimbabwe code of corporate governance (NCCGZ), and also to compare conformity before and after the release of the 2015 NCCGZ. Nonetheless, conformity with the NCCGZ is voluntary in nature, adopting the ‘apply or explain’ principle which is the reformulated version of the UK’s ‘comply or explain’ voluntary conformity regime. This research added to the literature by evaluating the practicality of implementing Western legislature meant to improve corporate governance structures in emerging African countries, particularly Zimbabwe.

Fourthly, this study provided empirical proof of the factors of conformity with corporate disclosure and transparency practices in ZSE listed corporations, such as internal corporate governance structures and ownership composition. This added to the present literature by explaining the significant components that affect the extent of obligatory and non-mandatory disclosure in conformity with corporate governance requirements in Zimbabwe. Fifthly, this research added to the existing literature by providing proof on the association among corporate disclosure and transparency practices and corporate performance in ZSE listed corporations. The literature which investigated this connection proposes the application of either *Model 2* or *Model 3*. Therefore, this research further added to the literature by applying these dual models which also assisted in the assessment of the impact of the selected approach on the results and their suggestions for upcoming studies.

Sixthly, to the researcher’s ablest understanding, this research is resourceful in Zimbabwe since it used a wide-ranging self-developed scoring system comprising of 153 KPIs/requirements, developed mainly from local corporate governance guidelines and with reference to international frameworks. The constructed index included four categories and fifteen sub-categories investigating corporate disclosure and transparency from varied governance positions. Therefore, this research added to the literature by utilising a researcher-developed scoring system that is perhaps most relevant to the Zimbabwe setting, and hence opening up new opportunities for forthcoming researches. Additionally, the NCCGZDTI constructed can be used in forthcoming studies.

This study also contributed to academia by confirming the overall standpoint that there is not yet an all-inclusive theory of accounting. The study was informed by several theories including three overarching (agency, legitimacy and stakeholder) theories as discussed in *Chapter 4* of this thesis. However, the analysis of the annual reports of ZSE listed corporations enabled a

better understanding of how corporate governance instruments and corporation attributes explain corporate disclosure and transparency practices including sustainability reporting using a legitimacy theory framework as the main theory in this study. A deeper insight into the multiple theories of disclosure and transparency used in this study reveals that attributes from these theories are embedded in the legitimacy theory framework. For instance, firstly with the agency theory, the contract between owners and managers to manage the corporation in the best interest of shareowners promotes the introduction of corporate governance instruments to improve the legitimacy of a corporation's operations. Secondly, in line with the stakeholder theory approach, it can be expected that the quality and extent of reporting is linked to the level of societal (stakeholder) pressure on corporations to release information on their social and environmental performance. The expectation is that corporations release a comprehensive information to satisfy the needs of these numerous stakeholders, securing the company's legitimacy. The legitimacy theory maintain that a corporation's disclosure policies are shaped by its legitimising strategy. The theory is grounded on the proposition that there is an implicit social agreement between a business corporation and society. The experiential findings signify that the standard level of sustainability reporting is increasing (from 31.86% in 2014 to 36.54% in 2016) (*see Table 7.1* of this thesis). Corresponding with the theory of legitimacy, these findings implies that these ZSE listed corporations utilise sustainability reporting as a legitimising means. Lastly, the results enabled the proposition of recommendations to policy-making institutions in the evaluation of corporate disclosure and transparency reforms, particularly disclosure and transparency as presented in Section 8.4 below.

8.3.2 Study Results and Inferences to Policy-Making Institutions

The discoveries of this research are of possible interest to policy making institutions, experts, companies' directorship board and the academic fraternity. The contributions of this research emphasise further on matters concerning corporate governance practices in overall and specifically corporate disclosure and transparency. The section gives the propositions for policy-making on the basis of the results.

Extent and Determinants of Corporate disclosure and Transparency Practices and Inferences for Policy-Making

As reviewed in the results discussion, the quality and extent of disclosure and transparency shows gradual improvement over the recent years. The statistically significant improvement

was due to increasing voluntary disclosures in the firms' annual reports particularly sustainability disclosure. This discovery has the following inferences: Firstly, corporate governance transformations in Zimbabwe, especially the institution of the National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCGZ) in 2015, have enhanced non-mandatory (optional) corporate disclosure. This implies that notwithstanding the weak legal order in Zimbabwe, the issuance of governance code and guidelines can advance the country's corporate governance practices. Second, as shown in *Appendix 3* of this study, the findings indicate a low level of disclosure of some KPIs in some categories and sub-categories of the NCCGZDTI. For instance, corporations hardly release information on executive compensation and evaluation. This suggest that it is necessary for governance bodies and authorities to encourage adequate corporate governance disclosures among the Zimbabwe corporations, particularly concerning important corporate disclosure and transparency KPIs that could impact stockholders' rights. Third, as shown in *Panel C of Table 7.1*, there are several sub-categories with disclosure and transparency statistical mean figures below 50% (e.g. transparency of ownership, sustainability disclosure, integrated reporting, risk management committee, director training and compensation and executive compensation and evaluation). The KPIs recording statistical mean below 50% reflect 'low' disclosure and transparency level, as opposed to KPIs recording statistical mean figures equal to or above 50% which implies 'high' disclosure and transparency level. Therefore, this finding enhances the supervision of firms by the regulatory authorities e.g. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, etc. The level of disclosure and transparency whether regarded as "high or low" when disclosed in the annual financial statements of Zimbabwean corporations will be known and this will facilitate the development of necessary solutions to increase the level of disclosure and transparency.

The findings reveal several significant implications concerning the factors and instruments influencing corporate disclosure and transparency practices. These inferences could be considered to upgrade internal and external corporate governance structures. Firstly, the study results reveal that board ownership, company age and liquidity have a positive and significant association with corporate disclosure and transparency. Hence, it is important for the regulatory bodies in Zimbabwe to encourage board ownership in companies and to improve their liquidity positions. Secondly, the results indicate that objectivity of the directorship board is insignificantly negatively correlated to corporate disclosure and transparency. As examined in

Chapter 7, this is divergent to the proposition in some empirical literature including Fama and Jensen (1983:300), Clarke (2004:) and Barako *et al.* (2006:120) that the presence of autonomous directors constrains devious executives, safeguards stakeholders' interests and guarantees gains from added expertise and capability. Therefore, it is important that the regulatory bodies to establish criteria for the appointment of independent directors and verification of the impartiality of candidates to enable their contribution to be effectual and considerable. Thirdly, the findings reveal that institutional shareholding is positive and insignificantly related to corporate disclosure and transparency practices in ZSE listed corporations. This is inconsistent with the empirical literature that proposes that institutional stockholders normally have greater motivation to observe corporations' performance and safeguard their investments (Chung & Zhang, 2011:265). Institutional investment is fairly depressed in ZSE listed corporations (an average of 30% institutional shareholding per firm). This might clarify the necessity to increase institutional ownership to enhance sound corporate governance practices. In particular, the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA) should urge people to invest by way of institutional investment instead of direct investment. Generally, the results of the research show that there are a number of factors and developments may be identified as having a potential influence on the progress of disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe.

Firm Performance and Implications for Policy-Makers

The findings achieved from the assessment of the association between corporate governance instruments and corporate performance have numerous implications. Firstly, an insignificantly positive relationship is found between proportion of non-executive director and firm performance measured by ROCE and ROE. Secondly, this research found that the majority of ZSE firms' governance reports in annual reports do not classify non-executive directors into independent and non-independent directors. This implies that there is a necessity to increase consciousness and understanding of the significance of board independence largely amongst stakeholders and especially amongst corporations and investors. Lastly, for the association between corporate disclosure and transparency index (the NCCGZDTI) and corporate performance, the results indicate a negative but significant association between corporate disclosure and transparency index and corporate profitability measured by ROA, ROCE and ROE.

8.4 Limitations of the Research

The preceding sections considered the contributions of this research and proposals for policy in Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, this research had several limitations. The confines are considered from two key standpoints: (i) the overall outline of the study; (ii) the mixed method (qualitative dominant) research design.

Concerning the overall framework of the research, this study had limits as follows: Firstly, while listed corporations are vital to the economy, there are non-listed corporations that considerably impact the Zimbabwean economy and are worthwhile of being researched. This present study concentrated on listed corporations because of the significance of transparency practices in these corporations. For example, they are characterised by a big number of stockholders whose wealthy should be safeguarded. Besides, it is very problematic to find data for unlisted corporations. Secondly, provided the varied nature of corporate accountability and transparency, the theoretic framework of this research depended on manifold theories to clarify corporate disclosure and transparency practices. Although several crucial theories were applied in this study exploiting other theories might increase manifold theoretic viewpoints and present a wealthier base for comprehending and investigating corporate governance transformations.

As documented by Creswell and Clark (2011:1-520), employing a mixed-methods research implicates several challenges concerning the time and expense required to design and perform the study. The embedded mixed method (QUAL(quant)) enabled the same sample size to be used for both the qualitative and quantitative study designs. Therefore, there were some limits that needed to be tackled. Firstly, the sample size of 35 listed corporations was fairly small relative to the 63 ZSE listed corporations as of 31 December, 2016. The sample of the corporations was based on two conditions: (i) as written by Ntim *et al.* (2012:121), the corporations had to fulfil the condition for balanced panel data examination, essential in evaluating if cross-sectional relationships among corporate governance mechanisms and D&T and firm performance continue throughout the research period; and (ii) annual reports for the corporations had to be obtainable for the three financial years of the research period.

Secondly, as reviewed in *Chapter 5*, this study utilised a corporate disclosure and transparency checklist researcher-constructed to assess the association among governance instruments and disclosure and transparency KPIs and firm performance. Conversely, analysts' scores are skilfully established on the basis of proficiency and expertise of analysts. Consequently,

contrasting analysts' scores, the researcher-developed index employed in this research might possibly have been affected by the investigator's prejudice. Notwithstanding this, the researcher laboured to enhance the validity of the index by: (i) depending on corporate governance regulations in Zimbabwe, particularly the NCCGZ as key sources of disclosure and transparency KPIs/items; (ii) choosing requirements which represent the key highlights of corporate disclosure and transparency; and (iii) forwarding the intended disclosure and transparency checklist through two phases before making it ultimate. These procedures alleviated any complications or inadequacies of the developed corporate governance scoring system.

Thirdly, polychotomous coding was applied for recording the corporate disclosure and transparency index, while binary coding is commonly used in many corporation disclosure researches (Gompers *et al.*, 2003:107; Ammann *et al.*, 2013:452). In order to alleviate the difficulty of weighing the index, the researcher undertook several steps, including: (i) as noted by Beattie *et al.* (2004:205), including a fairly big number of KPIs (153) in the NCCGZDTI decreased the difference between the requirements (KPIs); (ii) the research categorised the requirements into four categories; the more significant the category was, the more KPI items that category had in general NCCGZDTI; and (iii) corresponding with other studies, the scoring system scores were intended to evaluate the qualitative variations in governance information throughout the corporations' annual reports (Ntim *et al.*, 2012:121). This is different from several researches that evaluated just the presence of not many KPI items (e.g., Barako *et al.*, 2006:107; Samaha *et al.*, 2012:168).

Fourthly, though the study reduces the effect of overlooked variables by concentrating on the mostly significant independent variables, several variables could not be assessed because of unavailability of data. For instance, interesting contextual variables and challenges, including political factors, social factors, institutional factors and media freedoms, could not be operationalised and experientially checked. Nevertheless, these were normatively expressed as part of the significant inspirations of this research. As reviewed hereafter, upcoming studies could consider those aspects in their study design.

Fifthly, although the sample size (105 observations) is relatively less than the samples utilised in former studies regarding Zimbabwe corporations. However, the lengths of the firms' annual reports are more, ranging from 30-199 pages each. The ATLAS.ti 7.5 qualitative data analysis

software was used and this significantly reduced the time and effort required to execute the procedure.

Finally, the study analysed annual reports for financial years from 2014 to 2016 to evaluate the extent of improvement in corporate disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe. Although, this timeframe may have been not adequate to evaluate this improvement, the research opened an avenue for future research to analyse more annual reports published before and after the release of the NCCGZ.

8.5 Propositions for Upcoming Studies

The preceding section reviewed the limits of this research study. Some of the limits themselves create new opportunities for more corporate disclosure and transparency research. Several propositions and thoughts for upcoming studies are given in this section.

Firstly, study is limited to one country, therefore further research can be extended to other countries. Moreover, study was conducted during the period of low economic growth in the country, therefore to enhance the generalisability of the findings it is advisable to repeat the research in a stable economy. Secondly, future research could investigate non-listed corporations' degree of conformity with corporate disclosure and transparency practices. Whereas the majority of extant experiential researches were performed on listed corporations, a research investigating unlisted corporations might be a new possibility to evaluate the extent of conformity amongst listed and non-listed corporations in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, upcoming researches could investigate both balanced and unbalanced panel data. This could aid the determination as to whether the results are diversified on the basis of the methodology utilised and this could also assist in the generalisability of the findings.

Fourthly, fresh research might likely enhance the development of a corporate disclosure and transparency index by constructing a weighted scoring system. Innovative studies could perform reviews of groups and other professional firms that might aid in assessing the weighting of requirements and their comparative significance. Those studies might increase the validity and reliability of the developed checklist, and the fresh results might be likened with experiential researches that have by now utilised un-weighted indices. Additionally, upcoming studies may intend to consider and operationalise Zimbabwean specified contextual components, including political components, social norms, institutional factors and media

freedoms. Finally, as Zimbabwe is an emerging economy influenced by African culture and traditions. The impact of culture and education on sustainability disclosure and transparency in Zimbabwe might be a rich area for future research.

References

- Abd-El salam, O. & Weetman, P. 2003. Introduction International Accounting Standards to an emerging capital market: relative familiarity and language effect in Egypt. *Journal of international accounting, auditing & taxation*, 12(1): 63–84.
- Abeysekera, I. 2013. A template for integrated reporting. *Journal of intellectual capital*, 14(2): 227–245.
- ACCA (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants). 2013. What do investors expect from non-financial reporting? <https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/pdf-technical/sustainability-reporting/tech-tp-wdir.pdf> Date of access: 25 Nov. 2016.
- ACCA (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants). 2014. Stock Exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa: Capturing intent towards ESG requirements. <https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/pdf-technical/sustainability-reporting/tech-tp-seissa.pdf> Date of access: 25 Nov. 2016.
- AccountAbility. 2008. AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard 2008. <https://www.accountability.org/publication/aa1000-accountability-principles-standard-2008/> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2016.
- AccountAbility. 2005. Stakeholder engagement standard: Exposure draft. AccountAbility, London, UK.
- AccountAbility. 1999. AccountAbility 1000 (AA1000) framework: Standards, guidelines and professional qualification. <https://www.accountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/AA1000-Framework-1999.pdf> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2016.
- Adams, S. & Simnett, R. 2011. Integrated reporting: an opportunity for Australia's not-for-profit sector. *Australian accounting review*, 21(3): 292–301.
- Adegboyegun, A.E., Alade, M.E. & Ben-Caleb, E. 2020. Integrated reporting and corporate performance in Nigeria: evidence from the banking industry. *Cogent Business & Management*, 7(1): 1-12.

- Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M. & Matos, P. 2011. Does governance travel around the world? evidence from Institutional Investors. *Journal of financial economics*, 100(1): 154–181.
- Aguilera, R. & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2009. Codes of good governance. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 17(3): 376–387.
- Akerlof, G.A. 1970. The market for ‘lemons’: quality, uncertainty and the market mechanism’. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 84(3): 488–500.
- Akins, B.K., NG, J. and Verdi, R.S. 2012. Investor competition over information and the pricing of information asymmetry. *Accounting review*, 87: 35–58.
- Aksu, M. & Kosedag, A. 2006. Transparency and disclosure scores and their determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 14(4): 277–296.
- Albassam, W.M. 2014. Corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and financial performance: an empirical analysis of Saudi listed firms using a mixed-methods research design. UK: University of Glasgow. (Dissertation - PhD).
- Allegrini, M. & Greco, G. 2013. Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian listed companies. *Journal of management and governance*, 17(1):187–216.
- Al-Malkawi, H-AN., Pillai, R. and Bhatti, M.I. 2014. Corporate governance practices in emerging markets: the case of GCC countries. *Economic modelling*, 38: 133–141.
- Al-Najjar, B. & Abed, S. 2014. The association between disclosure of forward-looking information and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from the UK before the financial crisis period. *Managerial Auditing Journal*, 29(7): 578–595.
- Alsaeed, K. 2006. The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: the case of Saudi Arabia. *Managerial auditing journal*, 21(5): 476–496.

- Alves, C. & Mendes, V. 2004. Corporate governance policy and company performance: the Portuguese case. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 12(3): 290–301.
- Aman, H. & Nguyen, P. 2008. Do stock prices reflect the corporate governance quality of Japanese firms? *Journal of the Japanese and international economies*, 22(4): 647–662.
- Ammann, M., Oesch, D. & Schmid, M. 2013. Product market competition, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the EU area. *European financial management*, 19(3): 452–496.
- Aram, J.D. & Salipante, P.F. 2003. Bridging scholarship in management: epistemological reflections. *British journal of management*, 14: 189–205.
- Ararat, M. & Ugur, M. 2003. Corporate governance in Turkey: An overview and some policy recommendations. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 3(1): 58–75.
- Aras, G. & Crowther, D. 2008. Governance and sustainability. *Management decision*, 46(3): 433–448.
- Aras, G. & Crowther, D. 2009. Corporate sustainability reporting: a study in disingenuity? *Journal of business ethics*, 87: 279–288.
- Armstrong, C.S., Guay, W.R. & Weber, J.P. 2010. The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting. *Journal of accounting and economics*, 50: 179–234.
- Ashford, B.E. & Gibbs, B.W. 1990. The double-edge of organizational legitimization. *Organization science* 1(2): 177–194.
- Babbie, E.R. 1994. *The Practice of Social Research*. 7th ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Balakrishnan, K., Core, J.E. & Verdi, R.S. 2014. The relation between reporting quality and financing and investment: evidence from changes in financing capacity. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 52(1): 1–36.

Barako, G., Hancock, P. & Izan, Y. 2006. Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 14(2): 107–125.

Barkemeyer, R., Preuss, L. & Lee, L. 2015. On the effectiveness of private transnational governance regimes: evaluating corporate sustainability reporting according to the Global Reporting Initiative. *Journal of world business*, 50(2): 312–325.

Barker, R. & Teixeira, A. 2018. Gaps in the IFRS Conceptual Framework. *Accounting in Europe*, 15(2): 153–166.

Baron, R. 2014. The evolution of corporate reporting for integrated performance. Background paper for the 30th round table on sustainable development. OECD, Paris.

Barry, C.B. & Brown, S.J. 1986. Limited information as a source of risk. *Journal of portfolio management*, Winter: 66–72.

Bartłomiej, K. & Francis, N. 2013. Impact of Zimbabwe's Decade of 'Dynamics in Reverse' on its Exports Performance and Poverty. *Journal of Pro Poor Growth*, 01(01): 1–18.

Barton, J. & Waymire, G. 2004. Investor protection under unregulated financial reporting. *Journal of accounting and economics*, 38: 65–116.

Bauer, R., Eichholtz, P. & Kok, N. 2010. Corporate governance and performance: the REIT effect. *Real estate economics*, 38(1): 1–29.

Bauer, R., Frijns, B., Otten, R. & Tourani-Rad, A. 2008. The impact of corporate governance on corporate performance: evidence from Japan. *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal* 16 (2008) 236–25.

Beattie, V., McInnes, B. & Fearnley, S. 2004. A methodology for analysing and evaluating narratives in annual reports: a comprehensive descriptive profile and metrics for disclosure quality attributes. *Accounting forum*, 28: 205–236.

Bebchuk, A., Cohen, A. & Ferrell, A. 2009. What matters in corporate governance? *Review of financial studies*, 22(2): 783–827.

Bebchuk, L. & Weisbach, M. 2010. The state of corporate governance research. *The review of financial studies*, 23(3): 939–961.

Beekes, W., Brown, P., Zhan, W. & Zhang, Q. 2016. Corporate governance, companies' disclosure practices and market transparency: a cross country study. *Journal of business finance & accounting*, 43(3&4): 263-297.

Bekiros, S., Gupta, R. & Majumdar, A. 2016. Incorporating economic policy uncertainty in US equity premium models: a nonlinear predictability analysis. *Finance Research Letters*, 18: 291–296.

Belkaoui, A. & Kahl, A. 1977. What Canadian bank financial statements don't tell. *CA Magazine*, June, p.32-35.

Belkaoui, A. & Karpik, P.G. 1989. Determinants of the corporate decision to disclose social information. *Accounting auditing & accountability journal*, 2(1): 36–51.

Belkaoui, R.A. 2004. *Accounting Theory*. 5th ed. London: Thomson Learning.

Bennett, M. & James, P., eds. 1999. *Sustainable measures: evaluation and reporting on environmental and social performance*. Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing.

Berglöf, E. & Claessens, S. 2004. Enforcement and corporate governance. Policy research working paper; No.3409. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14242>
License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.

Berle, A. & Means, G. 1932. *The modern corporation and private property*. New York, US: Macmillan. <https://andrewsmith.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/berle-and-meanss-the-modern-corporation-and-private-property-for-upload-jan-2017.pdf> Date of access: 30 Apr. 2017.

Bernardi, C. & Stark, A.W. 2018. Environmental, social and governance disclosure, integrated reporting, and the accuracy of analyst forecasts. *The British Accounting Review*, 50(1): 16–31.

- Bhatia, A. & Tuli, S. 2014. An empirical analysis of sustainability disclosure practices: evidence from India and China. *IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review*, 3(2): 135–148.
- Bhatia, A. & Tuli, S. 2014. Sustainable disclosure practices: a study of Sensex companies in India. *Indian journal of corporate governance*, 7(1): 39.
- Bisman, J.E. & Highfield, C. 2013. The road less travelled: an overview and example of constructivist research in accounting. *Australasian accounting business and finance journal*, 6(5): 3–22.
- Black, B. 2001. The corporate governance behaviour and market value of Russian firms. *Emerging markets review*, 2(2): 89–108.
- Black, B. & Kim, W. 2012. The effect of board structure on firm value: a multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data. *Journal of financial economics*, 104(1): 203–226.
- Blumberg, B., Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. 2011. Business research methods. 3rd ed. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Borkowski, S.C., Welsh, M.J. & Wentzel, K. 2009. Johnson & Johnson; a case study on sustainability reporting. *IMA educational case journal*, 3(2): 1-15.
- Botha, E. & Makina, D. 2011. Financial regulation and supervision: theory and practice in South Africa. *International business and economic research journal*, 10(11): 27–36.
- Botosan, C.A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. *The accounting review*, 72(3): 323–349.
- Bozec, R., Dia, M. & Bozec, Y. 2010. Governance performance relationship: a re-examination using technical efficiency measures. *British journal of management*, 21(3): 684–700.
- Bradley, J. 1993. Methodological issues and practices in qualitative research. *Library quarterly*, 63: 431–449.

- Breuning, M., *ed.* 2011. Content Analysis. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Broadstock, D.C., Collins, A., Hunt, L.C., & Vergos, K. 2018. Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business performance: assessing the first decade of reporting. *The British Accounting Review*, 50(1): 48–59.
- Brooks, C. 2008. Introductory econometrics for finance. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brundtland Commission. 1987. Our common future: Report of the World Commission on environment & development.
<https://www.sustainabledevelopment2015.org/AdvocacyToolkit/index.php/earth-summit-history/historical-documents/92-our-common-future> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2016.
- Bryman, A. 1984. The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: a question of method or epistemology? *The British Journal of Sociology*, 35(1): 75–92.
- Bryman, A. 2006. Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it done? *Qualitative Research*, 6(1): 97–113.
- Bryman, A. 2012. Social research methods. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burcu, A. & Bengu, V. 2012. The relationship between financial ratios and transparency levels of financial information disclosures within the scope of corporate governance: evidence from Turkey. *Journal of applied business research*, 28(4): 543–554.
- Bushman, R.M., Chen, Q., Engel, E. & Smith, A. 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. *Journal of accounting and economics*, 37(2): 167–201.
- Buskirk, A. 2012. Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry. *Review of quantitative finance and accounting*, 38(4): 411–440.
- Buzby, S.L. 1974. Selected items of information and their disclosure in annual reports. *The accounting review*, 49(3): 423–435.

Camfferman, K. & Cooke, T.E. 2002. An analysis of disclosure in the annual reports of U.K. and Dutch companies. *Journal of international accounting research* 1(1): 3–30.

Cerf, R.A. 1961. Corporate Reporting and Investment Decisions.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Cerf+AR+%281961%29+Corporate+reporting+and+investment+decisions.+Institute+of+Business+and+Economic+Research%2C+University+of+California%2C+Berkeley&btnG= Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

Chalevas, C. 2011. The effect of the mandatory adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on executive compensation. *The international journal of accounting*, 46(2): 138–174.

Chatha, K.A., Butt, I. & Tariq, A. 2015. Research methodologies and publication trends in manufacturing strategy: a content analysis based literature review. *International journal of operations & production management*, 35(4): 487-546

Chau, G.K. & Gray, S.J. 2010. Family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Hong Kong. *Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation*, 19(2): 93–109.

Chen, H. 2011. Does board independence influence the top management team? evidence from strategic decisions toward internationalization. *Corporate governance: an international review* 19(4): 334–350.

Chen, J. & Roberts, R. 2010. Toward a more coherent understanding of the organization–society relationship: a theoretical consideration for social and environmental accounting research. *Journal of business ethics*, 97(4): 651–665.

Cheung, Y-L., Jiang, P. & Tan, W. 2010. A transparency disclosure index measuring disclosures: Chinese listed companies. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 29(3): 259–280.

Chi, L-C. 2009. Do transparency and disclosure predict firm performance? evidence from the Taiwan market. *Expert systems with applications*, 36: 11198–11203.

- Cho, J.Y. & Lee, E-H. 2014. Reducing confusion about grounded theory and qualitative content analysis: similarities and differences. *The qualitative report*, 19(64): 1–20.
- Chung, K. & Zhang, H. 2011. Corporate governance and institutional ownership. *Journal of financial and quantitative analysis*, 46(1): 247–273.
- CIGI (2010) The Environment and Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Policy Brief. <http://www.cigionline.org/publications>. Date of access: 30 Jun. 2016.
- Clarke, T., ed. 2004. Theories of corporate governance: the philosophical foundations of corporate governance. London, New York: Routledge.
- Clikeman, P. 2004. Return of the socially conscious corporation. *Strategic finance; Montvale*, 85(10): 22-27.
- Coetsee, D. 2010. The role of accounting theory in the development of accounting principles. *Meditari accountancy research*, 18(1): 1–16.
- Coffee, J.C. 2005. A theory of corporate scandals: why the USA and Europe differ. *Oxford review of economic policy*, 21(2): 198–211.
- Collis, J. & Hussey, R. 2009. Business research: a practical guide for undergraduate & postgraduate students. 3rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Connelly, B.L., Certo, S.T., Ireland, R.D. & Reutzel, C. 2010. Signalling Theory: a review and assessment. *Journal of Management*, 37(1): 39–67.
- Conyon, M. & He, L. 2011. Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. *Journal of corporate finance*, 17(4): 1158–1175.
- Conyon, M. & Mallin, C. 1997. A review of compliance with Cadbury. *Journal of general management*, 22(1): 24–37.
- Cooke, T.E. & Wallace, R.S. 1990. Financial disclosure regulation and its environment: a review and further analysis. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 9(2): 79–110.

- Cooper, S.M. & Owen, D.L. 2007. Corporate social reporting and stakeholder accountability: the missing link. *Accounting, organizations and society*, 23(2007): 649–667.
- Cornett, M., Guo, L., Khaksari, S. & Tehranian, H. 2010. The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: an international comparison. *Journal of Financial Intermediation*, 19(1): 74–94.
- Correa-ruiz, C. & Moneva-abadía, J.M. 2011. Special issue on social responsibility accounting and reporting in times of sustainability downturn/crisis. *Revista de Contabilidad*, 14: 187–211.
- Cremers, K. & Nair, V. 2005. Governance mechanisms and equity prices. *Journal of finance*, 60(6): 2859–2894.
- Creswell, J. & Clark, V. 2011. *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. 2nd ed. London, UK: SAGE Publications
- Creswell, J.W. 2009. Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. 3rd ed. Los Angeles, London: SAGE.
- Cromme, G. 2005. Corporate governance in Germany and the German corporate governance code. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 13(3): 362–367.
- Cronje, C.J. 2007. Corporate annual reports (CARS): accounting practices in transition. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. (Thesis – PhD).
- Crowther, D. & Lancaster, G. 2008. Research methods: a concise Introduction to Research in Management and Business Consultancy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Dam, L. & Scholtens, B. 2012. Ownership type matter for corporate social responsibility. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 20(3): 233–252.
- Davis, J. Schoorman, F. & Donaldson, L. 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(1): 20–47.

Deborah, B. & Patricia, E. 2012. Intellectual capital disclosure commitment: myth or reality? *Journal of intellectual capital*, 13: 39–56.

DeBoskey, D.G. 2006. Corporate transparency: key factors and their impact on US firms. USA: The State University of New Jersey. (Thesis - PhD).

Deegan, C. 2002. The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures: a theoretical foundation. *Accounting, auditing & accountability journal*, 15(3): 282–311.

Deegan, C. & Blomquist, C. 2006. Stakeholder influence on corporate reporting an exploration of the interaction between WWF-Australia and the Australian minerals industry. *Accounting, Organizations & Society*, 3(4-5): 343-373.

Deloitte. 2011. Integrated reporting by business will bring extensive benefits to organisations and to stakeholders. South Africa: Deloitte.

Denis, D.K. & McConnell, J.J. 2003. International corporate governance. *Journal of financial and quantitative analysis*, 38(01): 1–36.

Dennis, B.W. & Bower, T. 2008. Using content analysis software to analyze survey comments. *Portal: libraries & the academy*, 8(4): 423–437.

Denscombe, M. 2010. Communities of practice: a research paradigm for the mixed methods approach. *Journal of mixed methods research*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689808316807>
Date of access: 30 Apr. 2016.

Denzin, K.N. & Lincoln, Y.S. 2005. The Sage handbook of qualitative research. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

De Villiers, C. & Alexander, D. 2014. The institutionalisation of corporate social responsibility reporting. *The British accounting review*, 46(2): 198–212.

De Villiers, C., Venter, E.R. & Hsiao, P-CK. 2017. Integrated reporting: Background, measurement issues, approaches and an agenda for future research. *Accounting & Finance*, 57(4): 937–959.

- Diamond, D. & Verrecchia, R. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. *Journal of finance*, 46(4): 1325–1360.
- Diamond, D.W. 1985. Optimal release of information by firms. *The journal of finance*, 40: 1071–1094.
- Dore, D., Hawkins, T., Kanyenze D, Makina, D. & Ndlela, D. 2008. Comprehensive economic recovery in Zimbabwe. UNDP, Zimbabwe.
- Dragomir, V. 2009. Environmentally sensitive disclosures and financial performance in a European setting. *Journal of accounting & organizational change*, 6(3): 359–388.
- Dragu, I-M. & Tiron-Tudor, A. 2013. The integrated reporting initiative from an institutional perspective: emergent factors. *Procedia - social and behavioral sciences*, 92: 275–279.
- Du Plessis, J.J., Hargovan, A. & Bagaric, M. 2010. Principles of contemporary corporate governance. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Du Plessis J.J. & Rühmkorf, A. 2015. New trends regarding sustainability and integrated reporting for companies: what protection do directors have? *Company Lawyer*, 36 (2): 51 - 64.
- Du Prel, J-B., Röhrig, B., Hommel, G. & Blettner, M. 2010. Choosing Statistical Tests. *Deutsches Aerzteblatt Online*, 107(19): 343–348.
- Du Toit, E., van Zyl, R. & Schütte, G. 2017. Integrated reporting by South African companies: a case study. *Meditari Accountancy Research*, 25(4): 654–674.
- Dulewicz, V. & Herbert, P. 2004. Does the composition and practice of boards of directors bear any relationship to the performance of their companies? *Corporate governance: an international review*, 12(3): 263–280.
- Dumay, J., Bernardi, C., Guthrie, J. & Demartini, P. 2019. Integrated reporting: a structured literature review. *Accounting Forum*, 40(3): 166–185.

Eccles, R. 2015. Corporations, sustainability, and innovation: early results a mixed bag. <http://www.ifac.org/global-knowledge-gateway/sustainability/business-resilience> Date of access: 15 Sept. 2015.

Eccles, R., Ioannou, I. & Serafeim, G. 2014. The impact of corporate sustainability on organisation processes and performance. *Management science*, 60(11): 4-6.

Eccles, R.G. & Krzus, M. 2010 *One Report: Integrated Reporting for a Sustainable Strategy*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. (Winner of PROSE Award for Excellence in Business, Finance & Management "For Professional and Scholarly Excellence" presented by Association of American Publishers.)

Eccles, R.G. & Saltzman, D. 2011. Achieving sustainability through integrated reporting. *Stanford social innovation review*, 9(3): 56–61.

Eccles, R.G. & Serafeim, G. 2014. Corporate and integrated reporting: a functional perspective. (In Mohrman, S.A. ed. *Corporate stewardship: achieving sustainable effectiveness*. Sheffield, Greenleaf Publications, pp 156–171.)

Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. *Academy of management review*, 14: 532–550.

Eisenhardt, K.M. & Graebner, M.E. 2007. Theory building from cases: opportunities and challenges. *Academy of management review*, 50: 25–32.

El Hajj, M.C., Akiki, M. & Sassine, A. 2016. Non-financial corporate in Lebanon: who governs? "The governance myopia". (IRMBAM-2016, July 11-12, 2016, Nice, France). <http://khuongnguyen.free.fr/IRMBAM2016/ProgramIRMBAM-2016.pdf> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2016.

El-Diftar, D., Jones, E., Ragheb, M. & Soliman, M. 2017. Institutional investors and voluntary disclosure and transparency: the case of Egypt. *Corporate Governance*, 17(1): 134–151.

Elo, S. & Kyngäs, H. 2008. The qualitative content analysis process. *Journal of advanced nursing*, 62(1): 107–115.

- Eng, L. & Mak, Y. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 22(4): 325–345.
- Ernstberger, J. & Grüning, M. 2013. How do firm- and country-level governance mechanisms affect firms' disclosure? *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 32(3): 50–67.
- EY (Ernst & Young). 2015. A survey of integrated reports of South Africa's top 100 JSE-listed companies: Excellence in Integrated Reporting survey.
<https://www.ey.com/za/en/issues/ey-integrated-reporting-2015-award> Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.
- Faisal, F., Greg, T. & Rusmin, R. 2012. Legitimising corporate sustainability reporting throughout the world. *Australasian accounting business and finance journal*, 6(2): 19–34.
- Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. *Journal of law and economics*, 26(2): 301–325.
- Feng, T., Cummings, L. & Tweedie, D. 2017. Exploring integrated thinking in integrated reporting: an exploratory study in Australia. *Journal of Intellectual Capital*, 18(2): 330–353.
- Fernandez-Feijoo, B., Romero, S. & Ruiz, S. 2014. Commitment to corporate social responsibility measured through global reporting initiative reporting: factors affecting the behaviour of companies. *Journal of cleaner production*, 81: 244–254.
- Field, A. 2009. *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*. 3rd ed. London, England: SAGE Publications.
- Fifield, S.G.M., Campbell, K. & Ohuocha, C. 2011. The stock market reaction to stock dividends in Nigeria and their information content. *Managerial Finance*, 37(3): 295–311.
- Filatotchev, I. & Boyd, B.K. 2009. Taking stock of corporate governance research while looking to the future. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 17(3): 257–265.
- Filipova, F. 2017. The Problem of Measurement in the Revised Conceptual Framework of IFRS. 7th International Conference on Application of Information and Communication

Technology.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326668160_The_Problem_of_Measurement_in_the_Revised_Conceptual_Framework_of_IFRS Date of access: 30 June 2018.

Firth, M. 1979. The impact of size, stock market listing, and auditors on voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. *Accounting and business research*, 9: 273–280.

Francis, J.R., Huang, S., Khurana, I.K. & Pereira R. 2009. Does corporate transparency contribute to efficient resource allocation? *Journal of Accounting Research*, 47(4): 943–989.

Franzosi, R. 2004. Content Analysis. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

FRC (Financial Reporting Council). 2014. The UK Corporate Governance Code. www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.

Freeman, E., Harrison, J., Wicks, A., Parmar, B. & De Colle, S. 2010. Stakeholder theory: the state of the art. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Frias-Aceituno, J.V., Rodríguez-Ariza, L. & Garcia-Sánchez, I.M. 2014. Explanatory factors of integrated sustainability and financial reporting. *Business strategy and the environment*, 23(1): 56–72.

Frías-Aceituno, J.V., Rodríguez-Ariza, L. & García-Sánchez, I.M. 2013. Is integrated reporting determined by a country's legal system? an exploratory study. *Journal of cleaner production*, 44: 45–55.

Friedman, M. & Friedman, R.D. 1982. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. <http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1985/A1985AMS1900001.pdf> Date accessed: 30 Jun. 2017.

Fu, R., Kraft, A.G. & Zhang, H. 2012. Financial Reporting Frequency, Information Asymmetry, and the Cost of Equity. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 54(2-3).

Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K. & Verbeeten, F. 2011. Determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure: empirical evidence from Germany. *Review of managerial science*, 5: 233–262.

- García-Sánchez, I-M., Rodríguez-Ariza, L. & Frías-Aceituno, J-V. 2013. The cultural system and integrated reporting. *International business review*, 22(5): 828–838.
- Gareth, O. 2013. Integrated reporting: a review of developments and their implication for the accounting curriculum. *Accounting Education*, 22(4):340-356
- Gilbert, D. & Rasche, A. 2007. Discourse ethics and social accountability: the ethics of SA 8000. *Business ethics quarterly*, 17(2): 187–216.
- Gilbert, D. & Rasche, A. 2008. Opportunities and problems of standardized ethics initiatives: a stakeholder theory perspective. *Journal of business ethics*, 82(3): 755–773.
- Gilbert, S. 2002. The Transparency Evolution. *Environmental forum*, 19(6): 18-27
- Giroud, X. & Mueller, H. 2011. Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity prices. *Journal of finance*, 66(2): 563–600.
- Gittins, R., ed. 2014. Review: six capitals by Jane Gleeson-White on accounting for the environment. Australia: The Sydney Morning Herald's Economic Editor.
- Given, L.M. 2008. The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods. 2nd ed. London: SAGE Publications.
- Glaser, B. 1992. Emergence vs forcing: basics of grounded theory analysis. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.
- Gleeson-White, J. 2014. Six capitals: the revolution capitalism has to have - or can accountants save the planet? Sydney: Allen & Unwin. (In The Sydney Morning Herald's Economic Editor.)
- Globescan. 2008. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) monitor 2008. www.globescan.com Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.
- Golja, T. & Paulisic, M. 2010. Corporate governance, social responsibility and corporate reputation: an empirical analysis of the situation in Croatia. *International journal of economic policy in emerging economies*, 3(4): 368.

Golja, T. & Paulišić, M. 2011. What can we expect from corporate reporting? the case of Croatia. *Journal for labour and social affairs in Eastern Europe*, 14(1): 51–60.

Gompers, P., Ishii, J. & Metrick, A. 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. *Quarterly journal of economics*, 118(1): 107–156.

Gould, S. 2015. Corporate governance and transparency: the chicken or egg of sustainable development. <https://www.ifac.org/global-knowledge-gateway/governance/discussion/corporate-governance-and-transparency-chicken-or-egg>
Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

Gouws, D.G. & Cronje, C.J. 2008. Corporate annual reports: accounting practices in transition. *South African business review*, 12(2): 108–133.

Grandori, A. 2004. Corporate governance and firm organisation: micro foundations and structural reforms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gray, R. 2010. Is accounting for sustainability actually accounting for sustainability... and how would we know? an exploration of narratives of organisations and the planet. *Accounting, organizations and society*, 35(2010): 47–62.

Gray, R. & Bebbington, J. 2007. Corporate sustainability: accountability or impossible dream. (In G Artkinson, S Dietz, & E Neumayer eds. 2007. Handbook of sustainable development, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.)

Gray, S.J., Meek, G.K. & Roberts, C. 1995. International capital market pressure and voluntary annual reports disclosure by US and UK multinationals. *Journal of international financial and management accounting*, 6: 43–67.

GRI (Global Reporting Initiative). 2008. Podcast academic session: stakeholder engagement and reporting relevance. <https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/GRI-Organizational-Stakeholders-share-their-reporting-knowledge-in-new-Project-.aspx> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

GRI, UNCTAD & WBCSD. 2015. SDG Compass: the guide for business action on the SDGs. [http:// www.sdgcompass.org](http://www.sdgcompass.org) Date of access: 30 Nov. 2015.

- GRI-G4. 2013. G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.
<https://www2.globalreporting.org/standards/g4/Pages/default.aspx> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.
- Guidry, R.P. & Patten, D.M. 2012. Voluntary disclosure theory and financial control variables: an assessment of recent environmental disclosure research. *Accounting forum*, 36: 81–90.
- Gujarati, D. 2003. Basic Econometrics. 4th ed. London, UK: McGraw-Hill.
- Gupta, P., Kennedy, D. & Weaver, S. 2009. Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from Canadian capital markets. *Corporate ownership and control*, 6(3): 293–307.
- Gürtürk, A. 2016. Integrated reporting and sustainability-related assurance. GmbH: Kassel University Press. <https://www.upress.uni-kassel.de/katalog/abstract.php?978-3-7376-0280-8> Date of access: 30 Mar. 2017.
- Gurvitch, N. & Sidorova, I. 2012. Survey of sustainability reporting integrated into annual reports of Estonian companies for the years 2007-2010: based on companies listed on Tallinn Stock Exchange as of October 2011. *Procedia economics and finance* 2: 26–34.
- Guthrie, J. & Abeysekera, I. 2006. Content analysis of social, environmental reporting: what is new? *Journal of human resource costing & accounting*, 10(2): 114–126.
- Guthrie, J. & Farneti, F. 2008. GRI sustainability reporting by Australian public sector organizations. *Public money & management*, 28(6): 361–366.
- Guthrie, J. & Parker, L.D. 1989. Corporate social reporting: a rebuttal of legitimacy theory. *Accounting and business research*, 19(76): 242–252.
- Haniffa, R. & Cooke, T. 2002. Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian corporations. *A journal of accounting, finance and business studies (Abacus)*, 38(3): 317-349.
- Haniffa, R. & Hudaib, M. 2006. Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. *Journal of business finance and accounting*, 33(7-8): 1034–1062.

- Haniffa, R. & Hudaib, M. 2007. Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: the case of Saudi Arabia. *Journal of international accounting, auditing and taxation*, 16(2): 179–206.
- Haniffa, R.M. & Cooke, T.E. 2005. The impact of culture and governance on corporate social reporting. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 24(5): 391–430.
- Harrison, J. 1987. The strategic use of corporate board committees. *California management review*, 30(1): 109–125.
- Hassan, O., Romilly, P., Giorgioni, G. & Power, D. 2009. The value relevance of disclosure: evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. *International journal of accounting*, 44(1): 79–102.
- Havlová, K. 2015. What integrated reporting changed: the case study of early adopters. *Procedia economics and finance*, 34: 231–237.
- Hawkins, D.E. 2006. Corporate social responsibility: balancing tomorrow's sustainability and today's profitability. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
<https://www.worldcat.org/title/corporate-social-responsibility-balancing-tomorrows-sustainability-and-todays-profitability/oclc/64487320> Date accessed: 30 Sept. 2015.
- Healy, P.M. & Palepu, K.G. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure and the capital markets literature: a review of the empirical disclosure. *Journal of accounting and economics*, 31(2001): 405–440.
- Hegazy, M. & Hegazy, K. 2010. Corporate governance in the U.K: audit committees and disclosure arrangements - a web-based analysis. *Journal of business studies quarterly*, 1(2): 32–55.
- Hendriksen, E.S. 1982. Accounting theory. 4th ed. Homewood, IL: Irwin.
- Hermalin, B.E. & Weisbach, M.S. 2012. Information disclosure and corporate governance. *The journal of finance*, 67(1): 195–233.

Hesse-Biber, S.N. & Leavy, P. 2011. The practice of qualitative research. 2nd ed. London: SAGE

Ho, J.K.S. 2009. Corporate accountability in a globalizing environment empirical evidence. UK: University of Dundee. (Thesis – PhD)

Ho, S.M. & Wong, K.S. 2001. A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. *Journal of international accounting, auditing and taxation*, 10(2): 139–156.

Hopwood, A.G., Unerman, J. & Fries, J., eds. 2010. Accounting for sustainability: practical insights. London: Earthscan.

Horton, J. & Serafeim, G. 2010. Market reaction to and valuation of IFRS reconciliation adjustments: first evidence from the UK. *Review of accounting studies*, 15: 725–751.

Hossain, M. & Hammami, H. 2009. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of an emerging country: the case of Qatar. *Advances in accounting, incorporating advances in international accounting*, 25: 255–265.

Hossain, M., Perera, M. & Rahman, A. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. *Journal of international financial management and accounting*, 6(1): 69-87.

Hsieh, H.F. & Shannon, S.E. 2005. Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative health research*, 15(9): 1277–1288.

Hu, A.H., Chen, L-T., Hsu, C-W. & Ao, J.G. 2011 An Evaluation Framework for Scoring Corporate Sustainability Reports in Taiwan. *Environmental Engineering Science*, 28(12): 843–858.

Huang, S.H., Fu-Hsing, C. & Chung-Jen, F. 2011. Impact of information disclosure and transparency rankings system (IDTRS) on investors in Taiwan. *International research journal of applied finance*, 2(7): 770-708.

Hussainey, K. & Al-Najjar, B. 2012. Understanding the determinants of risk metrics/ISS ratings of the quality of UK companies' corporate governance practice. *Canadian journal of administrative sciences*, 29(4): 366–377.

Iatridis, G. 2008. Accounting disclosure and firms' financial attributes: evidence from the UK stock market. *International review of financial analysis*, 17: 219–241.

ICAEW (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales). 2009. Developments in new reporting models. <https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/financial-reporting/information-for-better-markets/ifbm-reports/developments-in-new-reporting-models.ashx> Date of access: 30 Oct. 2015.

ICSAZ (Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in Zimbabwe). 2016. ICSAZ Annual Excellence in Corporate Governance Awards Adjudication Report 2016. <http://www.icsaz.co.zw/> Date of access: 30 Apr. 2017.

IIRC (International Integrated Reporting Council). 2013. The international integrated reporting framework. <http://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf> Date of access: 30 Sept 2015.

IIRC (International Integrated Reporting Council). 2011. Discussion paper: framework for integrated reporting and the integrated report. <http://integratedreporting.org/resource/discussion-paper/> Date of access: 30 Mar. 2015.

Inchausti, B.G. 1997. The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on information disclosed by Spanish firms. *European Accounting Review*, 6(1): 45–68.

IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2007. Stakeholder engagement: a good practice handbook for companies doing business in emerging markets. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_stakeholderengagement__wci__1319577185063 Date of access: 15 Sept. 2015.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2020. Zimbabwe Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation. <http://www.imf.org> Date of access: 30 Apr. 2020.

- IoDSA (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa). 2009. King III report on corporate governance for South Africa. Johannesburg: IOD.
- IODZ (Institute of Directors Zimbabwe). 2015. Values of the IoDZ. Harare: IODZIM
- Islam, M.A. & Deegan, C. 2008. Motivations for an organisation within a developing country to report social responsibility information: evidence from Bangladesh. *Accounting, auditing & accountability journal*, 21(6): 850–874.
- Jensen, J.C. & Berg, N. 2012. Determinants of traditional sustainability reporting versus integrated reporting: an institutionalist approach. *Business strategy and the environment*, 21(5): 299–316.
- Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of financial economics*, 3(4): 305–360.
- Jesover, F. & Kirkpatrick, G. 2005. The revised OECD principles of corporate governance and their relevance to non-OECD countries. *Corporate governance*, 13(2): 127–136.
- Jiao, Y. 2011. Corporate disclosure, market valuation, and firm performance. *Financial management*, 40(3): 647–676.
- Johl, S., Bruce, A. & Binks, M. 2012. A study on the use of mixed method approach via sequential procedure to investigate corporate governance in corporate entrepreneurship among the 100 UK Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) companies. *African journal of business management*, 6(21): 6369–6377.
- Johnson, R.B. & Onwuegbuzie, A.J. 2004. Mixed methods research: a research paradigm whose time has come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7): 14–26.
- Johnson, R.B., Onwuegbuzie, A.J. & Turner, L.A. 2007. Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of mixed methods research*, 1(2): 112–133.
- Jones M.J. 1996. Accounting for biodiversity: a pilot study. *The British accounting review*, 28(4): 281–303.

Julien, H. 2008. Content Analysis. SAGE Publications.

<https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/research/n65.xml> Date of access: 30 January 2017.

Kajanathan, R. 2012. Effect of corporate governance on capital structure: case of the structure listed manufacturing companies. *Journal of arts, science and commerce*, 3(4): 63–71.

Kamete A (2019) A Decade of Zimbabwe. Politics, Economy and Society 2008-2017. BRILL. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004404335> Date of access: 30 September 2019.

Kanyenze, G., Chitambara, P. & Tyson, J. 2017. The Outlook for the Zimbabwean Economy. <http://www.set.odl.org> Date of access: 30 March 2018.

Karthik, R. 2013. A framework for research on corporate accountability reporting. *Accounting Horizons*, 26(2).

Kawewe, S.M. & Dibie, R. 2000. The impact of economic structural adjustment programs [ESAPs] on women and children: implications for social welfare in Zimbabwe. *The journal of sociology & social welfare*, 27(4): 79-107.

Khor, A.K. 2003. Social contract theory, legitimacy theory and corporate social and environmental disclosure policies: constructing a theoretical framework. Nottingham University Business School.

Kılıç, M. & Kuzey, C. 2018. Determinants of forward-looking disclosures in integrated reporting. *Managerial Auditing Journal*, 33(1): 115–144.

King, M. Prof. 2014. Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting Honorary Membership. London: ICAEW.

Kiron, D., Unruh, G., Kruschwitz, N., Reeves, M, Rubel, H. 2017. Corporate Sustainability at a Crossroads: progress toward our common future in uncertain times. <http://sloanreview.mit.edu/sustainability2017> Date of access: 30 June 2018.

Kiyanga, B.P. 2014. Corporate disclosure quality: a comparative study of Botswana and South Africa. South Africa: University of South Africa. (Dissertation – Masters).

Klapper, L.F. & Love, I. 2004. Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. *Journal of corporate finance*, 10(5): 703–728.

Klein, P., Shapiro, D. & Young, J. 2005. Corporate governance, family ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 13(6): 769–784.

Kochetygova, J. 2004. Transparency of beneficiary ownership in Russia: paper presented at the OECD Roundtable.

Kolk, A. 2008. Sustainability, accountability and corporate governance: exploring multinationals' reporting practices. *Business strategy and the environment*, 17(1): 1–15.

Konijn, S., Kraussl, R. & Lucas, A. 2011. Blockholder dispersion and firm value. *Journal of corporate finance*, 17(5): 1330–1339.

Kothari, C.R. 2004. Research Methodology: methods & techniques. 2nd ed. New Dehli. New Age International Publishers.

Kothari, S.P., Shu, S. & Wysocki, P.D. 2009. Do managers withhold bad news? *Journal of accounting research*, 47(1): 241–276.

KPMG. 2008. Sustainability Reporting: A Guide.

<https://www.in.kpmg.com/.../aci/files/sustcorporateresponsibilityreportingsurvey2008.pdf>

Date of access: 15 Sept. 2015.

KPMG. 2011. Integrated Reporting: Performance Insights through better Business Reporting. <https://home.kpmg/ru/en/home/insights/2011/10/integrated-reporting-performance-insight-through-better-business-reporting.html> Date of access: 15 October 2015.

KPMG. 2011. KPMG international survey of Corporate Responsibility reporting 2011. <https://www.kpmg.de/docs/Survey-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2011.pdf> Date of access: 15 Oct. 2015.

KPMG, Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa & Global Reporting Initiative. 2013. Carrots and Sticks - Sustainability reporting policies worldwide, today's best practice, tomorrow's trends (2013 Survey). www.globalreporting.org Date of access: 30 Oct. 2015.

Krambia-Kapardis, M. & Psaros, J. 2006. The implementation of corporate governance principles in an emerging economy: a critique of the situation in Cyprus. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 14(2): 126–139.

Krauss, S.E. 2005. Research paradigms and meaning making: a primer. *The qualitative report* 10(4): 758–770.

Krippendorff, K. 2004. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.

Labuschagne, A. 2003. Qualitative research: airy fairy or fundamental. *The qualitative report*, 8(1): 100–103.

Lai, A., Melloni, G. & Stacchezzini, R. 2016. Corporate Sustainable Development: is 'Integrated Reporting' a legitimization strategy? *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 25(3): 165–177.

Laird, C.G. 1971. Webster's New World Roget's A-Z Thesaurus. Cleveland, Ohio: Macmillan USA.

Lambert RA, Leuz C and Verrecchia RE (2012) Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital. *Review of Finance* 16: 1–29.

Landrum, N.E. 2008. Murphy Oil and the El Dorado promise: a case of strategic philanthropy. *Journal of business inquiry*, 7(1): 79–85.

Landrum, N.E. & Daily C.M. 2012. Corporate accountability: a path-goal perspective. *International journal of business and information technology*, 4(3): 50–62.

Lang, M.H. & Lundholm, R.J. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analysts' ratings of corporate disclosure. *Journal of accounting research*, 31(2): 46–271.

- Lee, K-W. & Yeo, G.H. 2016. The association between integrated reporting and firm valuation. *Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting*, 47(2016): 1221–1250.
- Leftwich, R.W., Watts, R.L. & Zimmerman, J.L. 1981. Voluntary corporate disclosure: the case of interim reporting. *Journal of accounting research*, 19(Supplement): 50–77.
- Lenssen, G., Perera Aldama, L. & Zicari, A. 2012. Value-added reporting as a tool for sustainability: a Latin American experience. *Corporate governance: the international journal of business in society*, 12(4): 485–498.
- Lev, B. 1992. Information disclosure strategy. *California Management Review*, 34(4): 9–32.
- Lewis, R. & Pendrill, D. 1985. Advanced financial accounting. 7th ed. London: Pitman.
- Lewis, S. 2011. Lessons on corporate "sustainability" disclosure from Deepwater Horizon: New Solutions. *A journal of environmental and occupational health policy*, 21(2): 197–214.
- Li, J., Pike, R. & Haniffa, R. 2008. Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate governance structure in UK firms. *Accounting and business research*, 38: 137–159.
- Li, W. & Tang, Y. 2007. An evaluation of corporate governance evaluation, governance index (CGI) and performance: evidence from Chinese listed companies in 2003. *Frontiers of business research in China*, 1(1): 1–18.
- Li, Y., Gong, M., Zhang X-Y & Koh, L. 2018. The impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure on firm value: the role of CEO power. *The British Accounting Review*, 50(1): 60–75.
- Liew, P.K. 2007. Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia: the key leading players' perspectives. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 15(5): 724–740.
- Ligteringen, E. & Zadak, S. 2005. The future of corporate responsibility codes, standards and frameworks: an executive briefing by the Global Reporting Initiative and AccountAbility. <http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/19BBAB6F5->

9337-42B0-B66D-A3B45F591938/0/LigteringenZadekFutureOfCR.pdf Date of access: 18 Nov. 2015.

Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G. 1985. *Naturalistic inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.

Lipscomb, M. 2011. Critical realism and realist pragmatism in mixed method research: the problematics of event identity and abductive inference. (*In American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, 8th - 12th April, 2011*).

Lipunga, A.M. 2015. Integrated reporting in developing countries: evidence from Malawi. *Journal of management research*, 7(3): 130.

Lock, I. & Seele, P. 2016. The credibility of CSR (corporate social responsibility) reports in Europe: evidence from a quantitative content analysis in 11 countries. *Journal of cleaner production*, 122: 186–200.

Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J. & Bracken, C.C. 2002. Content analyses in communication: assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. *Human Communication Research*, 28: 587–604.

Lopes, P.T. & Rodrigues, L.L. 2007. Accounting for financial instruments: an analysis of the determinants of disclosure in the Portuguese stock exchange. *The international journal of accounting*, 42(1): 25–56.

Loukil, N. & Yousfi, O. 2012. Firm's information environment and stock liquidity: evidence from Tunisian context. *Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies*, 2(1): 30–49.

Lozano, R. & Huisingh, D. 2011. Inter-linking issues and dimensions in sustainability reporting. *Journal of cleaner production*, 19(2-3): 99–107.

Lynch, N.C., Lynch, M.F. & Casten, D.B. 2014. The expanding use of sustainability reporting: standards setting and assurance opportunities for CPAs. *The CPA journal*, March 2014: 18-24.

Madi, H.K., Ishak, Z. & Manaf, N.A.A. 2014. The impact of audit committee characteristics on corporate voluntary disclosure. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 164(2014): 486–492.

Mahadeo, J.D. & Soobaroyen, T. 2016. A longitudinal study of the implementation of the corporate governance code in a developing country: the case of Mauritius. *Business & society*, 55(5): 738–777.

Makina, D. 2010. Historical Perspective on Zimbabwe's Economic Performance. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 26(1): 99–123.

Malinga, W. 2017. From an agro-based to a mineral resources-dependent economy: a critical review of the contribution of mineral resources to the economic development of Zimbabwe. *Forum for development studies*, 45(1): 71–95.

Mallin, C. & Jelic, R. 2000. Developments in corporate governance in Central and Eastern Europe. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 8(1): 43–51.

Mallin, C. & Ow-Yong, K. 2012. Factors influencing corporate governance disclosures: evidence from Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies in the UK. *The European Journal of Finance*, 18: 515–533.

Mangena, M. & Taurigana, V. 2007. Disclosure, corporate governance and foreign share ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. *Journal of international financial management & accounting*, 18(2): 53–85.

Mangena, M., Taurigana, V. & Chamisa, E. 2012. Corporate boards, ownership structure and firm performance in an environment of severe political and economic crisis. *British journal of management*, 23: S23-S41.

Mapira, J. 2017. The mining industry in Zimbabwe: challenges for sustainable development. *European journal of social sciences studies*, 2(8): 313–328.

Marshall, D.H., McManus, W.W. & Viele, D.F. 2007. Accounting: what the numbers mean. New York: McGraw Hill Education.

- Marston, C.L. & Shrives, P.J. 1991. The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: a review article. *British accounting review*, 23(3): 195–210.
- Martínez-Ferrero, J., Garcia-Sanchez, I.M. & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B. 2015. Effect of Financial Reporting Quality on Sustainability Information Disclosure. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 22(1): 45–64.
- Mashayekhi, B. & Bazaz, M. 2008. Corporate governance and firm performance in Iran. *Journal of contemporary accounting and economics*, 4(2): 156–172.
- Maubane, P., Prinsloo, A. & Van Rooyen, N. 2014. Sustainability reporting patterns of companies listed on the Johannesburg securities exchange. *Public relations review*, 40(2): 153–160.
- Maune, A. 2015. Corporate governance in Zimbabwe: an overview of its current state. *Asian economic and financial review*, 5(1): 167–178.
- Mawanza, W. & Mugumisi, N. 2014. An assessment of the extent to which Zimbabwean organizations have in practice begun to make the shift towards triple bottom line reporting (TBL). *The international research journal of commerce and behavioural science*, 3(3): 34–42.
- Mc Manus, P., Mulhall, S., Ragab, M. & Amr, A., eds. 2017. An investigation in the methodological approaches used in Doctoral Business Research in Ireland. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317903293_An_Investigation_in_the_Methodological_Approaches_used_in_Doctoral_Business_Research_in_Ireland Date of access: 15 Jul. 2017.
- McConnell, J. & Servaes, H. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. *Journal of financial economics*, 27(2): 595–612.
- McNulty, T., Zattoni, A. & Douglas, T. 2013. Developing corporate governance research through qualitative methods: a review of previous studies. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 21(2): 183–198.

Meek, G.K., Roberts, C.B. & Gray, S.J. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K., and Continental European multinational corporations. *Journal of international business studies*, 26(3): 555–572.

Melloni, G., Caglio, A. & Perego, P. 2017. Saying more with less? disclosure conciseness, completeness and balance in Integrated Reports. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 36(3): 220–238.

Mengoli, S., Pazzaglia, F. & Sapienza, E. 2009. Effect of governance reforms on corporate ownership in Italy: is it still pizza, spaghetti, and mandolino? *Corporate governance: an international review*, 17(5): 629–645.

Merton, R.C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. *The journal of finance*, 42: 483–510.

Mervelskemper, L. & Streit, D. 2017. Enhancing Market Valuation of ESG Performance: is Integrated Reporting keeping its promise? *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 26(4): 536–549.

Millar, C.C., Eldomiaty, T.I., Choi, C.J., & Hilton B. 2005. Corporate governance and institutional transparency in emerging markets. *Journal of business ethics*, 59(1): 163–174.

Millon, D. 1993. New directions in corporate law: communitarians, contractarians, and the crisis in corporate law. *Washington & Lee law review*, 50(1993): 1373–1374.

Molina-Azorin, J.F. 2011. Mixed methods research in strategic management: impact and applications. *Organizational research methods*, 15(1): 33–56.

Morey, M., Gottesman, A., Baker, E. & Godridge, B. 2009. Does better corporate governance result in higher valuations in emerging markets? another examination using a new data set. *Journal of banking & finance*, 33(2): 254–262.

Morgan, D.L. 2007. Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. *Journal of mixed methods research*, 1(1): 48–76.

- Munisi, G. & Randoy, T. 2013. Corporate governance and company performance across Sub-Saharan African countries. *Journal of economics and business*, 70(November): 92–110.
- Munisi, G.H. & Mersland, R. 2016. Ownership, board compensation and company performance in Sub-Saharan African Countries. *Journal of emerging market finance*, 15(2): 1–34.
- Muttakin, M.B. & Khan, A. 2014. Determinants of corporate social disclosure: empirical evidence from Bangladesh. *Advances in accounting*, 30(1): 168–175.
- Myburg, J.E. 2001. The informativeness of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of listed industrial companies in South Africa. *Meditari accounting research*, 9: 199–216.
- Nahid, G. 2003. Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The qualitative report*, 8(4): 597–607.
- Naimah, Z. & Mukti, N.A. 2019. The influence of audit committee's and company's characteristic on intellectual capital disclosure. *Asian Journal of Accounting Research*, 4(2): 170–180.
- Nayak, B.K. & Hazra, A. 2011. How to choose the right statistical test? *Indian journal of ophthalmology*, 59(2): 85–86.
- NCCGZ (National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe). 2014. Zimbabwe National Code on Corporate Governance. ZimCode.
- Ndhlela, T. 2011. Evolution of Zimbabwe's economic tragedy: a chronological review of macroeconomic policies and transition to the economic crisis.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253235928> Date of access: 30 Nov 2015.
- Ndhlukula, R. 2017. End-term review of the ease of doing export business rapid results project for increasing value-added exports. Zimbabwe.
- Neuendorf, K.A. 2011. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Nhavira, J.D. & Pindiriri, C. 2011. Sub-Saharan time-consistency: a comparison of SADC and the RBZ Law. *Journal of strategic studies*, 2(1): 63–87.

Nhavira, J.D.G., Mudzonga, E. & Mugocha, E. 2013. Financial regulation and supervision in Zimbabwe: an evaluation of adequacy and options.

<http://www.uz.ac.zw/index.php/commerce-departments/105-business-studies/staff-busstudys/214-dr-j-d-nhavira> Date of access: 30 Dec 2015.

Nicholson, G. & Kiel, G. 2007. Can directors impact performance? a case-based test of three theories of corporate governance. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 15(4): 585–608.

Nier, E. & Baumann, U. 2006. Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. *Journal of financial intermediation*, 15(3): 332–361.

Nitkin, D. & Brooks, L.J. 1998. Sustainability auditing and reporting: the Canadian experience. *Journal of business ethics*, 17(13): 1499–1507.

Nobes, C. 1998. Towards a general model of the reasons for international differences in financial reporting. *Abacus*, 34(2): 162–187.

Ntim, C., Opong, K., Danbolt, J. & Thomas, D. 2012. Voluntary corporate governance disclosures by post-apartheid South African corporations. *Journal of applied accounting research*, 13(2): 122–144.

Ntim, C. & Soobaroyen, T. 2013. Black Economic Empowerment disclosures by South African listed corporations: the influence of ownership and board characteristics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 116(1): 121-138.

Nyabereka, M. 2017. An Exploration of the Effects of Structural Adjustment and BRICS Engagement on Development in Zimbabwe Over the Periods 1991–1995 and 2009–2013. *Politikon*, 44(1): 1–21.

OAG Zimbabwe. 2015. Report of the Auditor-General for the Financial Year Ended 31 December 2015 on State Enterprises and Parastatals. <http://www.auditorgeneral.gov.zw> Date of access: 30 June 2016.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development). 2004. OECD Principles of corporate governance. <http://www.oecd.org/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf>
Date of access: 30 Sept. 2016.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development). 2014. The evolution of corporate reporting for integrated performance. OECD Headquarters, Paris.
<http://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/The%20Evolution%20of%20Corporate%20Reporting%20for%20Integrated%20Performance.pdf> Date of access: 30 Oct. 2015.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development). 2015. Principles of Corporate Governance - OECD: Corporate governance. <http://www.oecd.org> Date of access: 30 Nov. 2015.

Okcabol, F. & Tinker, T. 1993. Dismantling financial disclosure regulations: testing the Stigler-Benston hypothesis. *Accounting, auditing and accountability journal*, 6: 10–38.

Omar, B. & Simon, J. 2011. Corporate aggregate disclosure practices in Jordan. *Advances in accounting, incorporating advances in international accounting*, 27(1): 166–186.

Onwuegbuzie, A.J., Johnson, R.B. & Collins, K.M. 2009. Call for mixed analysis: a philosophical framework for combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. *International journal of multiple research approaches*, 3(2): 114–139.

Osama, B.M. 2013. Transparency and disclosure, company characteristics and financial performance: a study of the emerging Libyan stock market. Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, England: University of Huddersfield. (Thesis – PhD).

Oshika, T. & Saka, C. 2017. Sustainability KPIs for integrated reporting. *Social Responsibility Journal*, 13(3): 625–642.

Owusu-Ansah, S. 1998. The impact of corporate attributes on the extent of mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. *The international journal of accounting*, 33(5): 605–631.

- Ozo, F.K. & Arun, T.G. 2019. Stock market reaction to cash dividends: evidence from the Nigerian stock market. *Managerial Finance*, 45(3): 366–380.
- Pallant, J. 2001. SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using SPSS for Windows (Versions 10 and 11). 3rd ed. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Panchasara, B.M.Dr. & Bharadia, H.S.Ms. 2013. Corporate governance disclosure practices and firm performance: evidence from Indian banks. *Paradigm*, 17(1&2): 88–98.
- Pass, C. 2006. The revised Combined Code and corporate governance: an empirical survey of 50 large UK companies. *Managerial law*. 48(5): 467–478.
- Patel, S., Balic, A. & Bwakira, L. 2002. Measuring transparency and disclosure at firm level in emerging markets. *Emerging markets review*, 3(4): 325–337.
- Pearce, J. & Zahra, S. 1992. Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. *Journal of management studies*, 29(4): 411–438.
- Perrini, F. 2006. The practitioner's perspective on non-financial reporting. *California management review*, 48(2): 73–103.
- Pfeffer, J. 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: the organization and its environment. *Administrative science quarterly*, 17(2): 218–228.
- Pickering, M.J. 2004. Qualitative Content Analysis. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Piesse, J., Strange, R. & Toonsi, F. 2012. Is there a distinctive MENA model of corporate governance? *Journal of management & governance*, 16(4): 645–681.
- Pindiriri, C. 2018. The engineering sector in Zimbabwe: a survey of the sector prepared for the National Employment Council (NEC). Zimbabwe.
- Price, R., Román, F.J. & Rountree, B. 2011. The impact of governance reform on performance and transparency. *Journal of financial economics*, 99(1): 76–96.
- Kaiser, R.Y. 2011. Corporate governance and firm performance: an analysis of family and non-family controlled firms. *The Pakistan development review*, 50(1): 47–62.

- Raffournier, B. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. *The European accounting review*, 4(2): 261–280.
- Ramly, Z. 2012. Impact of corporate governance quality on the cost of equity capital in an emerging market: evidence from Malaysian listed firms. *African journal of business management*, 6(4):1733-1748.
- Renders, A., Gaeremynck, A. & Sercu, P. 2010. Corporate governance ratings and company performance: a cross- European study. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 18(2): 87–106.
- Rensburg, R. & Botha, E. 2014. Is integrated reporting the silver bullet of financial communication? A stakeholder perspective from South Africa. *Public relations review*, 40(2): 144–152.
- Riahi-Belkaoui, A. 1999. Value added reporting and research: state of the art. Westport, Conn., London: Quorum.
- Ribera, J.M. 2016. The integrated reporting: a presentation of the current state of art and aspects of integrated reporting that need further development. *Intangible Capital*, 12(1): 336–356.
- Robertson, C.J., Diyab, A.A. & Al-Kahtani, A. 2013. A cross-national analysis of perceptions of corporate governance principles. *International business review*, 22(2013): 315–325.
- Rocco, T.S., Bliss, L.A., Gallagher, S., Perez-Prado, A. 2003. Taking the next step: mixed methods research in organizational systems. *Information technology, learning and performance journal* 21(1): 19–29.
- Roloff, J. 2008. Learning from multi-stakeholder networks: issue-focussed stakeholder management. *Journal of business ethics*, 82(1): 233–250.
- Romolini, A., Fissi, S. & Gori, E. 2014. Scoring CSR reporting in listed companies: evidence from Italian best practices. *Corporate social responsibility and environmental management*, 21(2): 65–81.

- Ronen, J. & Livnat, J. 1981. Incentives for segment reporting. *Journal of accounting research*, 19: 459–481.
- Rose, C. 2016. Firm performance and comply or explain disclosure in corporate governance. *European management journal*, 34(3): 202–222.
- Ross, S.A. 1979. Disclosure regulation in the financial markets: implications of modern finance theory and signalling theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309045507_Disclosure_regulation_in_financial_markets_Implications_of_modern_finance_theory_and_signaling_theory Date of access: 30 May 2017.
- Rossouw, G.J. 2005. Business ethics and corporate governance in Africa. *Business & society*, 44(1): 94–106.
- Ruiz-Mallorquí, M. & Santana-Martín, D. 2011. Dominant institutional owners and firm value. *Journal of banking & finance*, 35(1): 118–129.
- Rupley, K.H., Brown, D. & Marshall, S. 2017. Evolution of corporate reporting: from stand-alone corporate social responsibility reporting to integrated reporting. *Research in Accounting Regulation*, 29(2): 172–176.
- Ryan, B., Scapens, R. & Theobald, M. 2002. Research method and methodology in finance and accounting. London: Thomson Learning.
- Sadka, G. 2004. Financial reporting, growth and productivity: theory and international evidence. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=652301 Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.
- Saldana, J. 2009. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. 3rd ed. Arizona State University, USA: SAGE
- Salterio, E., Conrod, J. & Schmidt, R. 2013. Canadian evidence of adherence to ‘comply or explain’ corporate governance codes: an international comparison. *Accounting perspectives*, 12(1): 23–51.

- Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K. & Stapleton, P. 2012. The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: the case of Egypt. *Advances in accounting*, 28(1): 168–178.
- Sanan, N. & Yadav, S. 2011. Corporate governance reforms and financial disclosures: a case of Indian companies. *The IUP journal of corporate governance*, 10(2): 62–83.
- Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. 2009. Research methods for business students. 5th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. 2012. Research methods for business students. 6th ed. Essex: Pitman.
- Schiehl, E., Terra, P. & Victor, F. 2013. Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil. *Journal of management and governance*, 19(4): 333–343.
- SECZ (Securities Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe). 2008. Who is SECZ. <http://www.seczim.co.zw/about-secz/who-is-secz> Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.
- Sekaran, U. 2003. Research methods for business: a skill building approach. 4th ed. US: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. *The accounting review*, 73(4): 459–474.
- Sengupta, P. & Zhang, S. 2015. Equity-based compensation of outside directors and corporate disclosure quality. *Contemporary accounting research*, 32(3): 1073–1098.
- Sethi, S.P. 1977. Advocacy Advertising, and Large Corporations. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Sharma, N. 2013. Theoretical framework for corporate disclosure research. *Asian journal of finance & accounting*, 5(1): 183–196.
- Shleifer, A. 1998. State versus private ownership. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 12(4): 133–150.

- Shores, D. 1990. The association between interim information and security returns surrounding earnings announcements. *Journal of accounting research*, 28(Spring): 164–181.
- Siddiqui, M., Razzaq, N., Malik, F. & Gul, S. 2013. Internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency cost: evidence from large KSE listed firms. *European journal of business and management*, 5(23): 103–109.
- Siebels, J. & Knyphausen-Aufseß, D. 2012. A review of theory in family business research: the implications for corporate governance. *International journal of management reviews*, 14(3): 280–304.
- Siegel, S. 1956. *Nonparametric Statistics*. 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages.
- Singhvi, S.S. 1967. *Corporate disclosure through annual reports in the USA and India*. Columbia, United States of America: Columbia University. (Thesis – PhD).
- Skouloudis, A., Jones, N., Malesios, C. & Evangelinos, K. 2014. Trends and determinants of corporate non-financial disclosure in Greece. *Journal of cleaner production*, 68: 174–188.
- Smith, A. 1776. *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*. (In Cannan, E., ed. Methuen and Co., Ltd: careful 1904 compilation of Smith's fifth edition of the book (1789)).
- Smith, M.P. 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: evidence from CalPERS. *Journal of finance*, 51: 227–252.
- Social Investment Forum. 2009. *Corporate sustainability disclosure practices in emerging markets*. <https://www.ussif.org/pubs> Date of access: 15 Oct. 2015.
- Solomon, J. 2010. *Corporate governance and accountability*. 2nd ed. Chichester, UK: Hoboken, NJ, Wiley.
- Song, X. 2012. Corporate characteristics and internal control information disclosure: evidence from annual reports in 2009 of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. *Physics procedia*, 25: 630–635.

Sponholtz, C. 2008. The information content of earnings announcements in Denmark. *International Journal of Managerial Finance*, 4(1): 4–36.

SSE. 2016. List of partner exchanges. <https://www.sseinitiative.org/sse-partner-exchanges/list-of-partner-exchanges/> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

Stacchezzini, R., Melloni, G. & Lai, A. 2016. Sustainability management and reporting: the role of integrated reporting for communicating corporate sustainability management. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 136: 102–110.

Stakeholder Research Associates Canada, Inc. 2005. From words to action: the stakeholder engagement manual, Volume 1: the guide to practitioners' perspectives on stakeholder engagement. <http://www.unep.fr/shared/publications/pdf/webx0115xpa-sehandbooken.pdf> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

Staubus, G.J. 2010. Accounting, accountability, auditing, and financial scandals over the centuries. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228319025_Accounting_Accountability_Auditing_and_Financial_Scandals_Over_the_Centuries Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.

Ștefănescu, C.A. 2014. Transparency and disclosure requirements: an analysis of corporate governance codes. *Atlantic economic journal*, 42(1): 113–114.

Stemler, S. 2001. An overview of content analysis. *Practical assessment, research and evaluation*, 7(17): 1–6.

Sternberg, E. 1997. The defects of stakeholder theory. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 5(1): 3–10.

Stout, L.A. 2013. The shareholder value myth: how putting shareholders first harms investors, corporations, and the public. <https://www.amazon.com/Shareholder-Value-Myth-Shareholders-Corporations/dp/1605098132> Date of access: 30 Oct. 2015.

Stubbs, W. & Higgins, C. 2012. Sustainability and integrated reporting: a study of the inhibitors and enablers of integrated reporting. <http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30064924> Date of access: 30 Mar. 2016.

- Stubbs, W. & Higgins, C. 2014. Integrated reporting and internal mechanisms of change. *Accounting, auditing & accountability journal*, 27(7): 1068–1089.
- SIRAN-KLD. 2007. SIRAN-KLD study of S&P100 index companies on environmental, social, and governance issues <http://www.siran.org/SIRANPR20070427.pdf> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.
- Suttipun, M. 2017. The effect of integrated reporting on corporate financial performance: Evidence from Thailand. *Corporate Ownership and Control*, 15(1): 133–142.
- Syed, A.M. & Bajwa, I.A. 2018. Earnings announcements, stock price reaction and market efficiency: the case of Saudi Arabia. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*, 11(3): 416–431.
- Landrum, N.E. 2011. Is strategic management still responsible for the demise of society. *IJBIT*, 3(3):62-69.
- Tambudzai, Z. 2003. Privatisation: a review of the Zimbabwean experience (1991-2002). Zimbabwe.
- Tarca, A., Moy, M. & Morris, R. 2005. An investigation of the relationship between use of international accounting standards and source of company finance in Germany. *A journal of accounting, finance and business studies*, 49(1): 74-98.
- Tariq, Y. & Abbas, Z. 2013. Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance. *Economic modelling*, 35(September): 565–575.
- Tashakkori, A. & Creswell, J.W. 2007. Exploring the nature of research questions in mixed methods research. *Journal of mixed methods research*, 1(3): 207–211.
- Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C. 2003. Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Terry, G. 2008. Green: why corporate leaders need to embrace sustainability to ensure future profitability. Cape Town: SAICA.

Tilling, M.V. 2008. Refinements to legitimacy theory, social and environmental accounting. School of Commerce, Flinders University.

Tilling, M.V. & Tilt, C.A. 2010. The edge of legitimacy: voluntary social and environmental reporting in Rothmans 1956-1999 annual reports. *Accounting, auditing & accountability, Journal* 23: 55–81.

Tricker, B. 2012. Corporate governance: principles, policies and practices. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? *Journal of accounting and economics*: 53–72.

Tsamenyi, M., Enninful-Adu, E. & Onumah, J. 2007. Disclosure and corporate governance in developing countries: evidence from Ghana. *Managerial auditing journal*, 22(3): 319–334.

Turk, B.K., Shackleton, C.M. & Whittington-Jones, K. 2013. Prevalence of sustainability reporting practices of a sample of listed companies on established and emerging stock exchanges. *SAJEMS NS*, 16(1): 75–82.

Turner, G., Vourvachis, P. & Woodward, T. 2006. Heading towards sustainability reporting: a pilot study into the progress of embracing the global reporting initiative in the United Kingdom. *Journal of applied accounting research*, 8(2): 41–70.

Turturea, M. 2015. Social and environmental reporting as a part of the integrated reporting. *Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis*, 63(6): 2161–2170.

Ullah, Z. & Rehman, A. 2016. The impact of corporate accountability & transparency on the performance of manufacturing firms listed on KSE. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 10.2139/ssrn.2756977, (2016).

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2015. Review of good practices on enhancing the role of corporate reporting in attaining sustainable development goals. United Nations: The International Accounting and Reporting Issues 2015 Review.

UNECA (UN Economic Commission for Africa). 2002. Guidelines for enhancing good economic and corporate governance in Africa. May, Addis Ababa: UNECA

UNECA (UN Economic Commission for Africa). 2018. Zimbabwe Country Profile. <http://www.uneca.org> Date of access: 20 June 2018.

United Nations. 2008. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008. UN Publication.

United Nations. 2010. The Millennium Development Goals 2010. UN Publication.

United Nations Global Compact. 2004. About the Global Compact: the ten principles. <http://unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGc/theTenprinciples/index.html> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

United Nations Global Compact & IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2009. *Corporate Governance: the foundation for corporate citizenship and sustainable businesses*. Washington, DC.

Uwuigbe, O.R. & Fakile, A.S. 2012. The effects of board size on financial performance of banks: a study of listed banks in Nigeria. *International journal of economics and finance*, 4(2): 260-267

Vafeas, N. 1999. The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate governance. *Journal of business finance & accounting*, 26(1-2): 199–225.

Vafeas, N. & Theodorou, E. 1998. The relationship between board structure and firm performance in the UK. *British accounting review*, 30(4): 383–407.

Van Bommel, K. 2014. Towards a legitimate compromise? *Accounting, auditing & accountability journal*, 27(7): 1157–1189.

Van Buskirk, A. 2011. Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry. *Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting*, 38(4): 411–440.

Van Essen, M., Engelen, P. & Carney, M. 2013. Does “good” corporate governance help in a crisis? the impact of country-and firm-level governance mechanisms in the European financial crisis. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 21(3): 201–224.

Van Zyl, A.S. 2014. Sustainability and integrated reporting in the South African corporate sector. *Journal of sustainability management (JSM)*, 1(1): 19.

Vandekerckhove, W. 2012. Responsible investment in times and turmoil. Dordrecht: Springer.

Vasilachis de Gialdino, I. 2011. Ontological and epistemological foundations of qualitative research. *Qualitative social research*, 10(2): 1–85.

Verrecchia, R.E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. *Journal of accounting and economics*, 5: 179–194.

Vormedal, I. & Ruud, A. 2009. Sustainability reporting in Norway: an assessment of performance in the context of legal demands and socio-political drivers. *Business strategy and the environment*, 18: 207–222.

Wahyuni, D. 2012. The research design maze: understanding paradigms, cases, methods and methodologies. *Journal of applied management accounting research*, 10(1): 69–80.

Wallace, R. & Naser, K. 1995. Firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. *Journal of accounting and public policy* 14(4): 311–368.

Walle, A.H. 1997. Quantitative versus qualitative tourism research. *Annals of tourism research*, 24(3): 524–536.

Walliman, N. 2005. Your research project: a step-by-step guide for the first-time researcher. London, UK: SAGE.

Wal-Mart. 2008. Sustainability progress to date 2007-2008.

https://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/d7/53/7a981f2d4fc5997065f87460e2e3/2007-2008-sustainability-progress-report_129823711863183730.pdf Date of access: 30 Apr. 2016.

- Wang, K.O., Sewon, O. & Claiborne, M.C. 2008. Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: evidence from China. *Journal of international accounting, auditing and taxation*, 17(1): 14–30.
- Wang, M. & Hussainey, K. 2013. Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. *Journal of accounting and public policy*, 32(3): 26–49.
- Watts, R. & Zimmerman, J. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- WBCSD. 2008. Measuring socio-economic impact. A guide for business. www.wbcsd.org/Pages/eDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=15387&NoSearchContextKey=true Date of access: 15 Sept. 2015.
- Weber, R. 1990. Basic content analysis. Thousand Oaks, California, United States of America: SAGE Publications.
- Webster's New World dictionary. 2014. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Weir, C. & Laing, D. 2000. The performance-governance relationship: the effects of cadbury compliance on UK quoted companies. *Journal of management and governance*, 4(4): 265–281.
- Werder, A., Talaulicar, T. & Kolat, G. 2005. Compliance with the German corporate governance code: an empirical analysis of the compliance statements by German listed companies. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 13(2): 178–187.
- White, M.D. & Marsh, E.E. 2006. Content Analysis: a flexible methodology. *Library trends*, 55(1): 22–45.
- Wolk, H.I., Dodd, J.L. & Rozycki, J.J. 2013. Accounting theory: conceptual issues in a political and economic environment. 8th ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Woodgate, E. 2016. 2016 Global Opportunity Report. www.globalopportunitynetwork Date of access: 30 May 2019.

World Bank. 2011. Reports on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC): Zimbabwe Accounting and Auditing.

World Bank. 2016. The Zimbabwe Economic Update (ZEU). Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2017. Zimbabwe Economic Update: The State in the Economy.
<http://www.worldbank.org> Date of access: 30 March 2018.

Yafele, A. 2012. Key performance indicator disclosures by large UK private and public listed companies. UK: Bournemouth University. (Thesis – PhD).

Yawson, A. 2006. Evaluating the characteristics of corporate boards associated with layoff decisions. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 14(2): 75–84.

Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. *Journal of financial economics*, 40(2): 185–211.

Yin, R.K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Zabria, S.M., Ahmadb, K. & Wahc, K.K. 2016. Corporate governance practices and firm performance: evidence from top 100 public listed companies in Malaysia. *Procedia economics and finance*, 35: 287–296.

Zarzeski, M.T. 1996. Spontaneous harmonization effects of culture and market forces on accounting disclosure practices. *Accounting horizons*, 10(1): 18–37.

Zattoni, A., Douglas, T. & Judge, W. 2013. Developing corporate governance theory through qualitative research. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 21(2): 119–122.

Zhang, Q., Chen, L. & Feng, T. 2014. Mediation or moderation? the role of R&D investment in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance: empirical evidence from the Chinese IT industry. *Corporate governance: an international review*, 22(6): 501–517.

Zhang, Y. & Wildemuth, B. 2009. Qualitative analysis of content: Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science. Libraries Unlimited, 2009. pp. 1-12.

[https://www.scirp.org/\(S\(vtj3fa45qm1ean45vvffcz55\)\)/reference/ReferencesPapers.aspx?ReferenceID=675664](https://www.scirp.org/(S(vtj3fa45qm1ean45vvffcz55))/reference/ReferencesPapers.aspx?ReferenceID=675664) Date of access:30 Mar. 2017.

Zimbabwe.1980. Stock Exchange Act (Chapter 24.18) of 1980.

Zimbabwe.2002. Insurance and Pension Commission Act (Chapter 24.21) of 2002.

Zimbabwe. 2004. Reserve Bank Act of 2004.

Zimbabwe.2003. Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) of 2003.

Zimbabwe. 2009. Public Financial Management Act (Chapter 22.19) of 2009.

Zimbabwe. 2013. Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013.

Zimbabwe. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 2016. 2017 National budget statement: “Pushing Production Frontiers Across All Sectors of the Economy”. Zimbabwe

Zimbwa, C. 2005. An empirical assessment of corporate transparency in Zimbabwe.

<https://issuu.com/ijstr.org/docs/an-investigation-into-determinants-/7> Date of access: 30 Sept. 2015.

ZSE (Zimbabwe Stock Exchange). 2002. Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Rules.

ZSE (Zimbabwe Stock Exchange). 2014. A synopsis of the listings rules revision project.

ZSE (Zimbabwe Stock Exchange). 2019. Gazetting of ZSE Listing Requirements.

www.zse.co.zw Date of access: 15 May 2020.

Appendix 1: Summary of Empirical Studies on Disclosure and Transparency, Determinants and Firm Performance

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
I. Developed					
1.USA	Borkowski Susan C., Welsh Mary Jeanne & Wentzel Kristin (2012)	Sustainability reporting	Case study- Johnson & Johnson	Content analysis	Sustainability reporting merges a firm's financial and economic data with social and environmental information. Moving sustainability into the heart of a company's strategy seems key to effective reporting.
2.USA	Gompers <i>et al.</i> (2003)	Corporate governance and firm performance	1,500 large firms from IRRC 1990 – 1999	Constructing GIM index extracted from IRRC	Significant positive relationship with firm value and financial performance As measured by; Tobin's Q, Net profit margin, ROE, Sales growth
3.USA	Cremers and Nair (2005)	Corporate governance and firm performance	1,500 firms per year 1990 – 2001	Applying GIM index and constructing Takeover Protection Index (ATI)	Positive link with abnormal returns and corporate value as measured by; Tobin's Q & Stock returns
4.USA	Bauer <i>et al.</i> (2010)	Corporate governance and firm performance	509 firm-year observations 2003 – 2005	Utilising CGQ index provided by ISS on basis of public disclosure documents	Significant and positive link with corporate value and financial performance Measured by; Tobin's Q, ROA, ROE, net profit margin and sales growth
5. Canada	Nitkin and Brooks (1998)	Sustainability auditing and reporting	174 Canadian corporations	Descriptive analysis	Sustainability auditing is more common in larger corporations of private sector rather than public sector.
6.Canada	Klein <i>et al.</i> (2005)	Corporate governance and firm performance	263 firms 2002	Applying ROB index constructed by the <i>Globe and Mail</i> Report on Business	No proof that the aggregate governance index influence corporate value measured by Tobin's Q
7.Canada	Gupta <i>et al.</i> (2009)	Corporate governance and firm performance	158 firms 2002 – 2005	Utilising ROB index constructed by the <i>Globe and Mail</i> Report on Business	No relationship with financial performance and corporate value measured by; Tobin's Q, ROA, Market to book ratio

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
8.Canada	Bozec <i>et al.</i> (2010)	Corporate governance and firm performance	188 firms 2001 – 2005	Using ROB index published by the <i>Globe and Mail</i>	Positively related with financial performance and no relation with firm value measured by; Tobin's Q Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
9. UK	Turner <i>et al.</i> (2006)	Heading towards sustainability reporting	32 valid responses, UK; 2005	Questionnaire	Of these 32 valid responses,17, or 53%, claim not to have heard of the GRI and six respondents indicated that they did not use any of the suggested guidelines in their reporting, this shows limited acceptance of GRI guidelines.
10.Australia	Guthrie & Farneti (2008)	Sustainability reporting by Australian public sector organisations	7 Australian organizations;2005-2006	semi-structured interviews with SR preparers	Only 32% of the GRI's elements were used by the selected organizations and the Labour Practices category showed the highest disclosure of 54%.
11.Australia	Stubbs Wendy, Higgins Colin and Milne Markus (2013)	Sustainability reporting	23 companies	In depth interviews	Despite classifying the participating firms as 'non-reporters', all engage in some communication with stakeholders about social/environmental issues.
12.Denmark	Turturea Mihaela (2015) Caspar Rose (2016)	Integrated reporting Firm performance and comply or explain disclosure in corporate governance	case study 155 listed firms	Quantitative Content analysis Content analysis	These findings are consistent with the results achieved in a previous research and confirm the affirmation of Eccles and Armbrester (2011) which supports the idea that integrated reporting helps companies in achieving higher performance. The analysis shows that there is a positive link between ROE/ROA and Danish firm total corporate governance comply or explain disclosure scores.
13.Norway	Vormedal Irja and Ruud Audun (2009)	Sustainability reporting	100 largest companies in Norway	Content analysis	It is widely asserted that the Norwegian private sector, in concert with its Scandinavian neighbours, enjoys a solid reputation for being at the forefront of the corporate responsibility movement.
14. Netherlands	Koen van Bommel (2014)	An exploration of Integrated	interviews with a wide range of	Explorative survey-multiple methods	The author's analysis suggests that integrated reporting combines the disparate domains of industrial, market, civic and green order of

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
		Reporting in the Netherlands	relevant actors,		worth. These different logics of valuation need to be reconciled in a compromise in order for integrated reporting to become a legitimate practice.
15. Greece	Antonis Skouloudis a, Nikoleta Jones b, Chrisovaladis Malesios c, Konstantinos Evangelinos (2014)	Trends and determinants of corporate non-financial disclosure in Greece	100 largest companies operating in Greece	Content analysis	Indeed, the majority of assessed companies provide information on at least one topic of NFD. Nevertheless, disclosure is for the most part qualitative, inadequate and descriptive in manner.
II. Emerging					
1. India:	Hossain Mohammed (2008)	Mandatory & voluntary- The Extent of Disclosure in Annual Reports of Banking Companies: The Case of India	38 banks listed on BSE and NSE-India	Disclosure index	India, in this case, has achieved the highest standard of disclosure practice, especially in mandatory disclosure and has made some progress in voluntary disclosure. In other words, voluntary disclosure is not as high as mandatory disclosure, however, some voluntary information, such as corporate social disclosure, corporate governance, and risk-related voluntary information, has been disclosed in the annual reports in the Indian banks to an acceptable level.
2. India	Bhatia Aparna, Tuli Siya (2014)	Sustainable Disclosure Practices: A Study of Sensex Companies in India	14 firms	Content analysis- GRI index	As evident from above results, 14 companies out of 30 SENSEX companies i.e. near to 50% have provided separate sustainability reports for the year 2010-2011. Also, majority of these companies 12/14 i.e. 86% have A+ or A application levels as per GRI.
3. India	Pankaj M Madhani (2014)	Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices of Indian Firms: An Industry Perspective	54 firms	Corporate governance disclosure score	A clear picture emerges from this study that in the Indian scenario, there is no statistically significant difference in the corporate governance and disclosure score of firms across various sectors.
4. India	Panchasara, BM Dr & Bharadia, HS Ms (2013)	Corporate Governance Disclosure Practices and Firm Performance:	selected Indian Banks	Corporate Governance Disclosure Index	Regression analysis indicates that the CG disclosures are positively associated with financial performance indicators of the banks

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
		Evidence from Indian Banks			
5. South Africa	Maubane Pat, Prinsloo Andre, Van Rooyen Nadia (2014)	Sustainability reporting patterns of companies listed on the Johannesburg securities exchange	74 companies listed on the 2010 JSE SRI Index.	Content analysis-JSE SRI index	The results indicate that overall, the six selected market sectors reported according to the requirements of the JSE SRI Index on the three broad ESG categories. This suggests that in general, all companies in all the selected market sectors complied with the requirements of the JSE SRI Index.
6. South Africa	Ntim, C, Opong, K, Danbolt, J & Thomas, D (2012)	Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosures by Post-Apartheid South African Corporations	169 SA listed corporations from 2002 to 2006	Broad voluntary CG disclosure index	The results imply that while conformity with, and disclosure of, good CG practices differs substantially amongst the sampled companies, CG standards have generally improved over the five-year period assessed. The authors also find that block ownership is negatively linked to voluntary CG disclosure, while board size, audit firm size, cross-listing, the presence of a CG committee, government share ownership and institutional share ownership are positively linked to voluntary CG disclosure.
7. South Africa	Rensburg Ronel, Botha Elsamari (2014)	Integrated reporting	421 respondents	online survey-Stakeholder perspectives	One of the greatest challenges facing companies today is how to concisely communicate valuable investment information to all stakeholders, via the communication channels or platforms that the latter prefer, and in so doing without great cost to the company.
8. South Africa	Van Zyl, AS (2014)	Sustainability And Integrated Reporting In The South African Corporate Sector	23 Companies on the JSE SRI index	evaluation matrix	The study found that although many companies are attempting or claiming to be creating Integrated Reports, the level of integration and the understanding of what a truly Integrated Report should represent is still very low.
9. Estonia	Gurvitch Natalja, Sidorova Inna (2012)	Voluntary-Survey of sustainability reporting integrated into annual reports of Estonian companies	15 companies	Content analysis	The findings of the survey have various implications: first, they emphasize the fact, that sustainability reporting in Estonia is not a “stranger in the night” but a “friend, one would like to spend more time with”. Secondly, it seems rational that more efforts should be made in Estonia to provide all possible support to

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
					companies with regards to sustainability reporting.
10. Malaysia	Chang A, Leng A (2004)	Corporate governance	77 firms	Multiple regression	3 variables which were found to be significant in influencing the rate of return on equity were: the degree of ownership of shares in a company by institutional investors, the gearing ratio or the level of debts, and the size of the company
11. Zimbabwe	Mangena & Taurigana (2007)	Voluntary disclosure	51 companies	Disclosure index	Using a dataset relating to listed Zimbabwean companies for the period 2001–2003, we find that foreign share ownership is positively related to voluntary disclosure, proportion of non-executive directors, institutional share ownership and audit committee independence.
12. Zimbabwe	Mangena, M, Taurigana, V & Chamisa, E (2012)	Corporate Boards, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe Political and Economic Crisis	53 Firms	Content analysis	Overall, our results suggest that large boards and ownership concentration are more important in an environment of severe political and economic crisis. These findings are interesting and support the literature suggesting that the effects of corporate board and ownership structures on performance depend upon the environment of the firm
13. Zimbabwe	Mawanza & Mugumisi (2014)	Tripple Bottom Line (TBL) reporting	40 ZSE listed firms	Content analysis	Firms generally making shifts towards TBL reporting
14. Zimbabwe	Owusu-Ansah, S (1998)	The impact of corporate attributes on the extent of mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe	49 non-financial ZSE listed companies	disclosure measuring instrument	The results of this analysis suggest that the amount of mandated information disclosed in the annual reports and accounts of these companies is inadequate for the information needs of users of annual reports and accounts in Zimbabwe.
15. Malawi	Lipunga (2015)	Voluntary-Integrated reporting	12 companies	Content analysis/Disclosure checklist	The results of analysis suggest some progress towards the implementation of IR indicated by an average IRI of 0.43 and on the other hand revealing a bigger IR gap of 0.57 that needs filling.
16. Taiwan	Hu Allen H., Chen Liang-Tung, Chia-Wei Hsu, and Ao1 Jia-Gang (2011)	Corporate Sustainability Reports	16 reports published by companies	Disclosure scoring index	The main contribution of this article is the promotion of Taiwanese reports, not only for them to increase but also to do

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
			operating in Taiwan		better in the coming years as well. Obviously, the number of sustainability reports participating in the Taiwan Corporate Sustainability Reports Award has increased from 16 in 2008 to 25 in 2010.
17. China	Yan-Leung Cheung a, Ping Jiang b, Weiqiang Tan (2010)	A transparency Disclosure Index measuring disclosures	100 major Chinese listed companies	Transparency Index	The results reveal that there is a positive and significant relation between company transparency and market valuation.
18. Mexico	Richard <i>et al.</i> (2011)	The impact of governance reform on performance and transparency	107 firms	Content analysis	A significant increase in compliance over 2000–2004 indicating Mexican companies view non-compliance as costly. However, no association between the governance index and firm performance, nor is there a relation with transparency. Performance measurement by ROA, Tobin's Q, Sales growth, Stock market returns
19. Saudi Arabia	Khalid Alsaeed (2006)	The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure	2003 annual reports of 40 firms	disclosure checklist (Content analysis)	The results show that the mean of the disclosure index was lower than average. Also, it was found that firm size was significantly positively associated with the level of disclosure. The remaining variables, however, were found to be insignificant in explaining the variation of voluntary disclosure.
20. Kenya	D. G. Barako, P. Hancock and H.Y. Izan (2006)	Relationship between corporate governance attributes and voluntary disclosures in annual reports	43 Firms	Disclosure index	The presence of an audit committee is positively and strongly associated with companies' voluntary disclosure practices. The board composition variable has a significant negative association with the extent of voluntary disclosure, contrary to the hypothesised positive relationship.
21. Turkey	Burcu Adiloğlu & Bengü Vuran (2012)	The relationship between the financial ratios and transparency levels of financial information disclosures within the scope of	57 largest manufacturing companies which are listed in ISE 100 indice	Transparency checklist (Content analysis)	The results reveal that transparency level has statistically significant effect between the group means of three variables. These variables are namely return on asset, total debt / total assets, long-term debt / total assets and corporate governance index.

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
		corporate governance			
22. Egypt	Samaha <i>et al.</i> (2012)	The Extent of Corporate Governance Disclosure and its Determinants in a Developing Market: The Case of Egypt	A sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX)	Disclosure checklist	Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt.
23. Ghana	Tsamenyi, M, Enninful-Adu, E & Onumah, J (2007)	Disclosure and Corporate Governance in Developing Countries. Evidence from Ghana'	22 listed companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange	Disclosure checklist	Consistent with findings reported in studies from other developing countries the study finds that the level of disclosure in Ghana is low. Furthermore, ownership structure, dispersion of shareholding, and firm size (measured as total assets and market capitalization) all have significant effect on disclosure. However, the correlation between disclosure and leverage is insignificant.
24. Russia	Black (2001)	Corporate governance index and firm performance	21 major firms 1999	Using governance index developed by the Brunswick Warburg Investment Bank	CG behaviour has a powerful positive effect on market value positive effect on market measured by market to book value
III. Cross-national:					
1. Twenty countries ⁵	Frias-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza & García-Sánchez (2014)	Voluntary & Mandatory-Explanatory Factors of Integrated Sustainability and Financial Reporting	3042 observations from 1590 companies	Archival	It has been observed that the international standards report shortly to be issued should be based on GRI considerations. This would simplify the future publication of integrated reports, as the IIRC 2011 Discussion Paper suggests that the IIRC reporting guidelines will probably build upon the GRI recommendations. Companies enjoying monopolistic situations are less likely to publish an IR. Company size and

⁵ The 20 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
					profitability have a positive impact on the likelihood of this type of report being produced. Business growth opportunities and industry are not significant drivers
2. Twenty countries ⁶	Frias-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza & García-Sánchez (2013)	Voluntary-integrated reporting and country's legal system	750 companies	Logit methodology is applied to panel data	Some leading companies have begun to develop a new form of information provision, known as integrated reporting, which provides a coherent, logically-ordered summary of the available information on a firm's strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in a way that reflects the commercial, social and environmental context within which it operates. In conclusion, integrated sustainability reporting design can be partially attributed to the same legal framework that brings about an isomorphism among companies located in these institutional settings, which favours their long-term survival.
3. Twenty four countries ⁷	Faisal, F., Greg, T. and Rusmin, R. (2012)	Voluntary-sustainability	125 companies	Content analysis-sustainability disclosure index, descriptive s, one way ANOVA and regression	Overall, the findings of this study are consistent with legitimacy theory that predicts firms disclose their sustainability activities to legitimise their operations (Deegan 2002). High profile industries disclose more sustainability information in order to minimise pressure and criticism from society (Patten 1991) and respond to the information needs of stakeholders who wish to know the risks from firm's activities (Hackston & Milne 1996).
4. Thirty countries ⁸	Barkemeyer Ralf, Preuss Lutz, Lee Lindsay (2015)	Voluntary-sustainability reporting	933 sustainability reports	Content analysis	To put it bluntly, it seems that stakeholders expect companies to publish sustainability reports but do not necessarily expect to read

⁶ These 20 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

⁷ The 24 countries are Malaysia, China, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, France, Japan, Singapore, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, United States

⁸ The 30 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
					these. Both reporting companies and their stakeholders will need to step up their efforts in order to allow sustainability reporting to reach its full potential.
5. 8 countries ⁹	Brendan K Turk, Charlie M Shackleton and Kevin Whittington-Jones (2012)	Voluntary-Sustainability reporting	four developed and four emerging stock markets; top 20 and bottom 20 companies in each	Disclosure scoring index	The results indicate that the differences in SR reporting are larger between the top and bottom companies listed within developed or emerging markets, respectively, than between the two sectors. Overall, this study indicates that SR is prevalent, especially among market-leading companies, and that emerging markets are not lagging too far in this respect.
6. World; Europe, North and South America, Asia, Australia + New Zealand, Africa	Kristýna Havlová (2015)	Integrated reporting	48 firms	Content analysis	We studied the differences between listed and non-listed units. We found out that listed ones disclose more information. This confirms the findings of (James, 2014) and therefore we agree with the statement that integrated reporting should be mandatory for all listed enterprises.
7.25 countries ¹⁰	Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero, Isabel M. Garcia-Sanchez and Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros (2015)	Financial reporting quality & sustainability disclosure	747 international listed non-financial companies	Panel data	In recent years, there has been a profound increase in public awareness of both social and environmental problems and a corresponding increase in the information reported about these topics. Accordingly, companies have begun adopting common patterns of social behaviour, in order to meet their stakeholders' needs.
8. 24 countries ¹¹	Faisal et al. (2012)	Legitimising sustainability reporting	125 public companies ;2009	Content analysis, , one way ANOVA and regression	Sustainability disclosure shows surprisingly high percentage i.e. 61.9 percent and further reveals that high profile industries and additional assurance procedures influence the disclosure of more sustainability information.

⁹ The eight countries are; Developed: OMX (Nordic), PSX (Paris), ASX (Australia), SWX (Swiss) Emerging: JSE (Johannesburg), ZSE (Zimbabwe), ISE (Istanbul), BMX (Bombay)

¹⁰ The 25 countries are USA, UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia, Germany, Holland, Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Japan, China, Hong Kong Administrative Region, Singapore, and Korea

¹¹ The 24 countries are Malaysia, China, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Netherland, Norway, Denmark, France, Japan, Singapore, Canada, United, Kingdom, Australia, United States

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
9. 10 countries ¹²	Social Investment Forum International Working Group (2009)	Corporate Sustainability Disclosure in Emerging Markets	largest publicly traded companies (100)	Descriptive analysis	South Africa was leading country and Energy was the best sector.
10. 43 countries ¹³	Jensen Julia Catharina and Berg Nicola (2012)	Determinants of traditional sustainability versus integrated reporting	339 companies	disclosure index, Environmental Performance Index, Human Development Index	The present study reveals that the characteristics of IR companies differ significantly from those of TSR companies in terms of the institutional conditions under which they operate. IR companies are more likely to originate from countries with higher investor protection. The financial system is characterized by a higher degree of market coordination and dispersed ownership structures.
11. India and China	Bhatia Aparna, Tuli Siya (2014)	Sustainability Disclosure Practices: Evidence from India and China	36 companies from	Content analysis	The results reveal that the sustainability disclosure scores are higher with respect to Indian companies as compared to Chinese companies.
12. France, Germany & UK	Turturea Mihaela, (2015)	Social & environmental reporting as a part of the IR	18 Companies	Content analysis	The results show that companies fail to present a complete picture regarding their social and environmental performances and implicitly fail to achieve the intended purpose of the IIRC in promoting accountability for sustainability
13. worldwide organizations	Dragu Ioana-Maria, Tiron-Tudor Adriana (2013)	Voluntary-integrated reporting	58 companies	Content analysis-disclosure index	The findings suggest that these emergent factors have a small influence of 8.1% on IR disclosure. Further on, statistical tests show both positive and negative correlations between IR and its determinants- political, economic, and cultural.
14. Worldwide organisations	Lozano Rodrigo , Huisin gh Don (2011)	Inter-linking issues and dimensions in sustainability reporting	3 companies	Case studies and grounded theory	SR is being increasingly recognised as an important driver and vehicle to engage with and to report on a company's efforts towards becoming more sustainable. Several guidelines have been developed and increasingly more companies are publishing SRs.

¹² The 10 countries are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Russian Federation, South Africa and South Korea

¹³ The 43 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, USA

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
15. Worldwide organisations	Havlová Kristýna (2015)	What Integrated Reporting Changed: The Case Study of Early Adopters	48 from 76 enterprises that joined to the IIRC pilot programme before 2012	empirical analysis of the reports published	Most of those enterprises adopted integrated reporting within five years and they all tried to follow the requirements. With greater adoption of integrated reporting number of reports is decreasing although the companies still publish more than one disclosure. The study found out that listed ones disclose more information.
16. Worldwide sectors	María del Mar Alonso-Almeida, Josep Llach and Frederic Marimon (2014)	A Closer Look at the 'Global Reporting Initiative' Sustainability Reporting as a Tool to Implement Environmental and Social Policies: A Worldwide Sector Analysis	1852 firms completed the GRI report in 2011	descriptive analysis of the available GRI data on a worldwide scale	First, this study has found that GRI is growing in particular sectors, while its adoption is almost non-existent in other sectors. Marimon et al. (2012) suggest that the decision to participate in this initiative may be informed by internal and external motivations. Second, the adoption of the GRI has occurred earlier and more rapidly in those sectors that place the environment and society at increased risk and that have higher visibility in capital markets. GRI is continually evolving
17. 20 EU States	Cristina A. Ștefănescu (2014)	Transparency and Disclosure Requirements – an Analysis of Corporate Governance Codes		D&T S Index	Countries of English legal origin still provide the highest quality of shareholder protection, while Continental European countries have improved their legal system up to the standard set by the English one, the dominant legal strategy across countries to address this protection being the improvement of corporate transparency.
18. Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait	Husam-Aldin N. Al-Malkawi, Rekha Pillai, M.I. Bhatti (2014)	Corporate governance practices in emerging markets: The case of GCC countries	222 non-financial firms listed	CG Content Index	The simplicity and objectivity in the CGI developed makes it easily replicable and modifiable for further research in similar areas.
19. 16 EU States ¹⁴	Jürgen Ernstberger a,1, Michael Grüning (2013)	How do firm- and country-level governance mechanisms affect firms' disclosure?	1044 firms	computerised approach that uses artificial intelligence ;AIMR rating, Standard &	The impact of corporate governance on disclosure is particularly pronounced in weak legal environments. Thus, the results provide evidence for a substitutive relationship between firm-level and country-level governance with respect to effects on corporate disclosure.

¹⁴ The 16 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

Country(ies) studied	Researcher(s) and year of study	Focus/Theme	Sample size	Statistical technique used	Findings
				Poor's T&D Score and other rating methods	
20. 23 Countries ¹⁵	Wendy Beekes, Philip Brown, Wenwen Zhan and Qiyu Zhang (2016)	Corporate governance, companies' disclosure practices, and market transparency	2,078 unique firms in 18 countries	document analysis	In summary, the results show there is a complementary relationship between CG and disclosure frequency for all countries.
21. 24 Countries ¹⁶	Faisal, F, Greg, T & Rusmin, R (2012)	Legitimising corporate sustainability reporting throughout the world	541 sustainability reports from 24 diverse countries from around the world.	Sustainability Disclosure Index (SDI)	The results of this study indicate that firms in a high profile industry and those that include an additional assurance statement have greater levels of sustainability information communication.
22. 10 Sub Saharan countries ¹⁷	Munisi, G & Randoy, T (2013)	'Corporate Governance and Company Performance across Sub-Saharan African Countries		Corporate governance index	Companies in Sub-Saharan African countries typically comply with just over half of the "good corporate governance practices" that we include in our index. From the dynamic GMM analysis, we find that the corporate governance index score has a positive and significant association with the companies' accounting performance (ROA).

¹⁵ The 16 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.

¹⁶ The 24 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.

¹⁷ The 10 countries are Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia

Appendix 2 NCCGZ Disclosure and Transparency Index or Evaluation Matrix

The Likert Scale should be interpreted as follows:

Scale 0: No Disclosure - This issue is not stated in the report.

Scale 1: Disclosure to a lesser extent - The issue is only stated pithily in the report (which may include measured results) with little or no background given.

Scale 2: Disclosure to some extent - The issue and measured results are reflected and a measurable target is given for the current and/or future.

Scale 3: Disclosure to a large extent - The current year performance is reflected against the target and mitigation is given to enhance performance.

Scale 4: Significant disclosure – Full integration is attained by clear reference to regulating instruments, relating the risk, target, and mitigation with the financial aspects and linkage to the ability to create value

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIS AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
	<i>Company Name:</i> _____ <i>Annual Report Year:</i> _____					
	OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL STRUCTURE					
	<i>Transparency of ownership</i>					
1	Does the report give a description of share classes?					
2	Does the report give a review of stockholders by type?					
3	Does the report provide the number of issued and authorised equity stocks?					
4	Does the report provide the number of authorised but non-issued equity shares?					
5	Does the report provide the par value of issued and authorised equity shares?					
6	Does the report provide the par value of authorised but non-issued equity shares?					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
7	Does the report provide the number of issued and authorised of preferred, non-voting, and other classes?					
8	Does the report provide the number of authorised but non-issued shares of preferred, non-voting, and other classes?					
9	Does the report provide the par value of issued and authorised of preferred, non-voting, and other classes?					
10	Does the report provide the par value of authorised but non-issued shares of preferred, non-voting, and other classes?					
11	Does the corporation release the voting rights for each class of shares?					
	Total Transparency of Ownership					
	Concentration of ownership					
12	Does the corporation release Top 1 stockholder(s)?					
13	Does the corporation release Top 3 stockholders?					
14	Does the corporation release Top 5 stockholders?					
15	Does the corporation release Top 10 stockholders?					
16	Does the corporation release stockholders owning more than 10%?					
17	Does the corporation release stockholders owning more than 5%?					
18	Does the corporation release stockholders owning more than 3%?					
19	Does the corporation release percentage of cross-ownership?					
	Total Concentration of Ownership					
	Voting and shareholder meeting procedures					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
20	Is there a calendar of notable stockholder dates?					
21	Does the corporation release a review of shareholder meetings (could be minutes)?					
22	Does the report describe procedure for proposals at stockholder meetings?					
23	Does the report disclose how stockholders convene an extraordinary general meeting?					
24	Does the report disclose how stockholders nominate directors to board?					
25	Does the report describe the process of putting inquiry to board?					
26	Does the annual report refer to or publish Corporate Governance Charter?					
27	Does the annual report refer to NCCGZ or publish Code of Best Practice?					
28	Does the annual report refer to the Articles of Association or Charter Articles of Incorporation published?					
	Total Voting and Shareholder Meeting Procedures					
	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE					
	Financial disclosure					
1	Does the corporation discuss its accounting policies?					
2	Does the corporation release accounting standards it uses for its accounts?					
3	Does the company provide details of director certification of the financial report?					
4	Does the corporation provide accounts in internationally recognised accounting standards?					
5	Does the corporation provide the SOFP according to international accounting financial reporting standards?					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
6	Does the company provide the SOCI according to international accounting financial reporting standards?					
7	Does the company provide the SOCF according to international accounting financial reporting standards?					
8	Does the company provide the SOCE according to international accounting financial reporting standards?					
9	Does the corporation release methods of asset valuation?					
10	Does the corporation release information on method of non-current assets depreciation?					
11	Does the corporation refer to the Companies Act/RBZ Act/ZSE listing requirements, etc?					
12	Does the corporation provide a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake?					
13	Does the corporation release the corporate ownership structure Group?					
14	Is there a list/register of related party transactions?					
15	Is there a list/register of group transactions?					
	Total Financial disclosure					
<i>Sustainability disclosure</i>						
16	Does the annual report disclose a discussion of corporate strategy?					
17	Does the report show details of the nature of business it is in?					
18	Does the corporation give an overview of trends in its industry?					
19	Does the report show details of the products or services produced/provided?					
20	Does the corporation provide a segment analysis, broken down by business line?					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT			Results				
			0	1	2	3	4
21	Does the corporation release its market share for any or all of its businesses?						
22	Does the corporation refer to the NCCGZ or the ZimCode?						
23	Does the company refer to the governance charter, King 111 code, GRI, etc?						
24	Does the corporation report disclose output in physical terms?						
25	Does the corporation give an output forecast of any kind?						
26	Are targets and KPIs disclosed						
27	Is there a link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets						
28	Does the corporation discloses details of its corporate governance mechanism?						
29	Does the corporation provide efficiency indicators (ROA, ROE, etc.)?						
30	Does the corporation provide any industry-specific ratios?						
31	Does the corporation disclose accolades or awards won on governance and sustainability operations/reporting?						
32	Does the company refer to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting?						
33	Is there disclosure of any other forward-looking information? Is there disclosure of any other forward-looking information?						
	Social performance - does the report disclose the following issues or explain why they are not disclosed:						
34	Human Resources policy?						
35	HIV and AIDS and occupational health?						
36	Safety of employees?						

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT			Results				
			0	1	2	3	4
37	Employee empowerment?						
38	Fair employment practices?						
39	Support for employee's unions?						
40	Fair labour practices?						
41	Community activities?						
	Environmental performance - does the report disclose the following issues or explain why they are not disclosed:						
42	Material waste and spills?						
43	Climate change?						
44	Water?						
45	Energy?						
46	Emission?						
47	Biodiversity?						
	Governing stakeholder relationships - does the report disclose the following issues or explain why they are not disclosed:						
48	Stakeholders' perceptions affect a company's reputation (value)?						
49	Stakeholders are continuously identified and engaged?						
50	There is transparent and effective communication to stakeholders?						

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT			Results				
			0	1	2	3	4
51	Does the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only?						
52	Does the corporation disclose if the sustainability report is independently assured?						
53	That there is effective leadership based on ethical foundation?						
54	That there is responsible corporate citizenship?						
55	Does the company disclose mechanisms in place for communication with shareholders?						
56	Does the company disclose IT governance mechanisms?						
	Total Sustainability disclosure						
	Integrated Reporting						
57	Is the annual report integrated?						
58	Does the integrated report disclose the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates?						
59	Does the integrated report disclose how does the organisation’s governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term?						
60	Does the integrated report identify its key stakeholders and provide insight into the nature and quality of the organisation’s relationships with its key stakeholders, including how and to what extent the organisation understands, takes into account and responds to their legitimate needs and interests?						
61	Does the integrated report provide insight about the resources and the relationships used and affected by the organisation, which are referred to collectively as the capitals and how the organisation interacts with the capitals to create value over the short, medium and long term?						
62	Does the integrated report describe the organisation’s business model?						

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
63	Does the integrated report explain the extent to which the organisation has achieved its strategic objectives for the period and what are its outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals?					
64	Does the integrated report describe the company’s strategic direction (Where does the organisation want to go and how does it intend to get there)?					
65	Does the integrated report explain what challenges and uncertainties is the organisation likely to encounter in pursuing its strategy, and what are the potential implications for its business model and future performance?					
66	Does the integrated report answer the question: How does the organisation determine what matters to include in the integrated report and how are such matters quantified or evaluated?					
67	Is the integrated report concise?					
68	Does the integrated report include all material matters, both positive and negative, in a balanced way and without material error?					
69	Is the information in an integrated report presented: ● On a basis that is consistent over time? ● In a way that enables comparison with other organisations to the extent it is material to the organisation’s own ability to create value over time?					
70	Does the integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the organisation’s ability to create value over time?					
71	Does the integrated report disclose information about matters that substantively affect the organisation’s ability to create value over the short, medium and long term?					
72	Does the company disclose if the report was independently assured?					
73	Does the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports?					
	Total Integrated Reporting					
Information on Auditors						

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
74	Does the corporation disclose the name of its auditing firm?					
75	Does the corporation reproduce the auditors' report?					
76	Disclose how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor?					
77	Disclose any non-audit fees paid to auditor?					
	Total Information on auditors					
	GOVERNANCE OF RISK AND STRUCTURE					
	Principal risks identification					
	Does the report release the following or explain why they are not released:					
1	That the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed in order to mitigate or reduce damage and losses to the company?					
2	The details of the range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent or mitigate the identified risks?					
3	The details of how the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the company's business?					
4	That the board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance?					
	Total Principal risks identification					
	Risk management committee					
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why they are not disclosed:					
5	That the risk management committee assists the Board in carrying out its risk responsibilities?					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT			Results				
			0	1	2	3	4
6	The Board delegates the process of risk management to management?						
7	The Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis?						
8	Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks?						
9	Management implements appropriate responses to risk?						
10	Risk disclosure is made to stakeholders?						
11	The Board receives assurances regarding the effectiveness of the risk management processes						
	Total Risk management committee						
	Audit committee						
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why there is no such disclosure?						
12	That the committee is effective and independent?						
13	That the committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director?						
14	That the committee oversees corporate reporting?						
15	That the committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model to improve efficiency in assurance activities?						
16	That the committee oversees internal audit?						
17	That the committee is integral to the risk management process?						
18	That the committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties?						

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
	Total Audit committee					
	<i>Internal and External Audit</i>					
	Does the report release the following or explain why they are not released:					
19	Is there disclosure of a presence of an effective risk-based internal control?					
20	That a written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management and is presented to the board?					
21	Is the auditor's opinion on the financial statements qualified or unqualified?					
	Total internal and external audit					
	<i>BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE</i>					
	<i>Board Structure and composition</i>					
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why there is no disclosure:					
1	The name of the chairman and that the chairman of the Board is an independent non-executive director?					
2	Is there a list of directors and details about the directors?					
3	That the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors who are independent?					
4	Details about current employment/position of directors provided?					
5	Details about previous employment/positions provided?					
6	When each of the directors joined the board?					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
7	Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director?					
	Total Board Structure and composition					
	<i>Role of the Board</i>					
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why there is no disclosure:					
8	Details about the role of the board of directors of the company?					
9	That there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions?					
10	A review of the last board meeting? (e.g., minutes)					
11	The existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee?					
	Total Role of the Board					
	<i>Director training and compensation</i>					
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why there is no disclosure:					
12	Whether they provide director training and evaluation?					
13	The number of shares in the company held by directors?					
14	The decision-making process of directors' pay?					
15	The specifics of directors' pay (e.g., the salary levels etc.)?					
16	The form of directors' salaries (e.g., cash, shares, etc.)?					
17	The specifics on performance-related pay for directors?					
18	That regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted?					
	Total Director training and compensation					

NCCGZ DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY INDEX KPIs AND MEASUREMENT		Results				
		0	1	2	3	4
	<i>Executive compensation and evaluation</i>					
	Does the report disclose the following or explain why there is no disclosure:					
19	The list of the senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)?					
20	The backgrounds of senior managers disclosed?					
21	The number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed?					
22	The number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers?					
23	The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay (e.g., salary levels etc.)?					
24	The decision-making of managers' (not Board) pay?					
25	The form of managers' (not on Board) pay?					
26	The specifics on performance-related pay for managers?					
27	The details of the CEO's contract disclosed?					
	Total Executive compensation and evaluation					

Appendix 3: The level of conformity with the NCCGZ provisions amongst the sampled firms (%)

The level of compliance with the NCCGZ provisions among the sampled firms (%)					
		Pre-2015	Post-2015(i.e., after NCCGZ was released)		
		2014	2015	2016	Average of 3 Years
<i>Yearly Average of level of compliance</i>					
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership					
1	Description of share classes	7	7	7	7
2	Review of shareholders by type	2	2	2	2
3	Number of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	69	75	75	73
4	Number of authorised but non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	15	28	28	24
5	Par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	76	76	76	76
6	Par value of authorised but non-issued ordinary shares	24	21	21	22
7	Number of issued and authorised of preferred, non-voting, and other classes	0	0	0	0
8	Number of authorised but non-issued shares of preferred, non-voting, and other classes	0	0	0	0
9	Par value of issued and authorised of preferred, non-voting, and other classes	0	0	0	0
10	Par value of authorised but non-issued shares of preferred, non-voting, and other classes	0	0	0	0
11	The voting rights for each class of shares disclosed	0	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership					
12	Top 1 shareholder(s) disclosed	97	97	97	97
13	Top 3 shareholders disclosed	97	97	97	97
14	Top 5 shareholders disclosed	97	97	97	97
15	Top 10 shareholders disclosed	97	97	97	97
16	Shareholders owning more than 10% disclosed	97	97	97	97
17	Shareholders owning more than 5% disclosed	97	97	97	97
18	Shareholders owning more than 3% disclosed	97	97	97	97
19	Percentage of cross-ownership disclosed	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures					
20	Calendar of important shareholder dates provided	81	77	81	80
21	Review of shareholder meetings (could be minutes)	0	0	0	0
22	Procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings disclosed	73	73	75	74
23	How shareholders convene an extraordinary general meeting disclosed	75	75	75	75
24	How shareholders nominate directors to board disclosed	75	75	73	74
25	The process of putting inquiry to board disclosed	0	0	0	0
26	The annual report refer to or publish Corporate Governance Charter	4	4	0	3
27	The annual report refer to NCCGZ or publish Code of Best Practice	11	11	16	13
28	The annual report refer to the Articles of Association or Charter Articles of Incorporation published	41	39	41	40
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure					
1	The annual report discusses the company's accounting policies	100	100	100	100
2	The company disclose accounting standards it uses for its accounts	0	0	0	0
3	The company provide details of director certification of the financial report	88	86	91	88

	The level of compliance with the NCCGZ provisions among the sampled firms (%)				
		Pre-2015	Post-2015(i.e., after NCCGZ was released)		
		2014	2015	2016	Average of 3 Years
4	The company provide accounts in internationally recognised accounting standards	97	100	91	96
5	The company provide the SOFP according to international accounting financial reporting standards	75	75	75	75
6	The company provide the SOCI according to international accounting financial reporting standards	75	75	75	75
7	The company provide the SOCF according to international accounting financial reporting standards	75	75	75	75
8	The company provide the SOCE according to international accounting financial reporting standards	75	75	75	75
9	The company disclose methods of asset valuation	75	73	71	73
10	The company disclose information on method of non-current assets depreciation	75	73	71	73
11	The company refer to the Companies Act/RBZ Act/ ZSE listing requirements, etc	94	79	90	87
12	The company provide a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake	31	32	32	32
13	The company disclose the corporate ownership structure Group	46	50	48	48
14	a list/register of related party transactions	60	64	64	63
15	a list/register of group transactions	14	16	17	16
	Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure				
16	The annual report disclose a discussion of corporate strategy	72	71	75	73
17	The report show details of the nature of business it is in	62	62	68	64
18	The company give an overview of trends in its industry	64	62	63	63
19	The report show details of the products or services produced/provided	60	64	66	63
20	The company provide a segment analysis, broken down by business line	56	54	58	56
21	The company disclose its market share for any or all of its businesses	36	34	34	35
22	The company refer to the NCCGZ or the ZimCode	20	34	49	34
23	The company refer to the governance charter, King 111 code, GRI, etc	51	47	58	52
24	The company's annual report disclose output in physical terms	9	10	16	12
25	The annual report gives an output forecast of any kind	13	14	9	12
26	Targets and KPIs disclosed	64	72	74	70
27	Link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets disclosed	5	7	9	7
28	Details of corporate governance mechanisms disclosed	69	67	49	62
29	The annual report provides efficiency indicators (ROA, ROE, etc.)	33	29	25	29
30	The company provide any industry-specific ratios	23	25	31	26
31	Disclosure of accolades or awards won on governance and sustainability operations/reporting	6	9	9	8
32	The company refers to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting	14	26	26	22
33	Disclosure of any other forward-looking information	62	66	66	65
34	HR policy disclosed	14	15	22	17
35	HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies disclosed	29	31	33	31
36	Safety of employees disclosed	31	29	36	32
37	Employee empowerment disclosed	34	44	42	40
38	Fair employment practices	36	38	41	39
39	Support for employee's unions disclosure	15	19	16	17

	The level of compliance with the NCCGZ provisions among the sampled firms (%)				
		Pre-2015	Post-2015(i.e., after NCCGZ was released)		
		2014	2015	2016	Average of 3 Years
40	Fair labour practices disclosure	31	37	42	37
41	Community activities disclosure	44	55	44	48
42	Material waste and spills disclosure	29	34	36	33
43	Climate change disclosure	0	3	3	2
44	Water sustainability disclosure	29	33	36	33
45	Energy sustainability disclosure	29	33	36	33
46	Emission sustainability disclosure	26	30	32	29
47	Biodiversity sustainability disclosure	26	29	31	29
48	Disclosure on stakeholders' perceptions and company's reputation (value)	11	18	22	17
49	Disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement	16	26	34	26
50	Disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders	15	24	30	23
51	The sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only	0	0	0	0
52	The company disclose if the sustainability report is independently assured	0	0	0	0
53	Disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation	39	51	57	49
54	Disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship	47	55	54	52
55	Mechanisms in place for communication with shareholders disclosed	64	60	56	60
56	Disclosure of IT governance mechanisms	13	12	10	12
	Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting				
57	The annual report integrated	8	12	13	11
58	Disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates	20	22	26	23
59	Disclosure on how does the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term	19	20	16	18
60	Disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship	9	15	20	15
61	Disclosure on the capitals and how the organisation interacts with the capitals to create value over the short, medium and long term	9	11	10	10
62	The organisation's business model disclosed	2	7	9	6
63	The extent to which the organisation has achieved its strategic objectives for the period disclosed	1	0	5	2
64	The company's strategic direction disclosed	6	11	6	8
65	Disclosure of what challenges and uncertainties is the organisation likely to encounter in pursuing its strategy	6	4	0	4
66	Disclosure on how does the organisation determine what matters to include in the integrated report	2	4	6	4
67	The integrated report concise	0	0	0	0
68	The integrated report include all material matters, both positive and negative	0	9	9	6
69	Integrated report information presented consistently and enhances comparability	2	0	2	1
70	The integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors	6	4	9	7
71	Disclosure on information about matters that substantively affect the organisation's ability to create value	0	0	0	0
72	The company disclose if the report was independently assured	0	0	0	0
73	The integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports	12	14	17	14
	Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors				

	The level of compliance with the NCCGZ provisions among the sampled firms (%)				
		Pre-2015	Post-2015(i.e., after NCCGZ was released)		
		2014	2015	2016	Average of 3 Years
74	The name of its auditing firm disclosed	100	100	100	100
75	The company reproduce the auditors' report	75	75	75	75
76	how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor	75	75	75	75
77	Disclosure on any non-audit fees paid to auditor	0	0	0	0
	Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification				
1	The Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected an	70	74	74	72
2	The details of the range and type of risk control measures	69	71	75	72
3	The details of how the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time	71	71	75	72
4	The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance	69	71	74	71
	Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee				
5	Disclosure that the risk management committee assists the Board in carrying out its risk responsibilities	34	36	39	36
6	The Board delegates the process of risk management to management	36	43	39	39
7	The Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis	36	41	41	39
8	Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place	34	39	38	37
9	Disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk	36	41	40	39
10	Risk disclosure is made to stakeholders	30	34	34	33
11	The Board receives assurances regarding the effectiveness of the risk management processes	24	29	25	26
	Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee				
12	Disclosure that the committee is effective and independent	86	84	90	86
13	Disclosure that the committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director	85	88	89	87
14	Disclosure that the committee oversees corporate reporting	90	93	86	90
15	Disclosure that the committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	72	74	73	73
16	Disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit	89	91	90	90
17	Disclosure that the committee is integral to the risk management process	86	86	85	86
18	Disclosure that the committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties	86	89	83	86
	Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit				
19	Disclosure of a presence of an effective risk-based internal control	75	73	75	74
20	A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management	66	66	69	67
21	Disclosure on the auditor' opinion on the financial statements whether qualified or unqualified	73	71	69	71
	Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition				
1	Disclosure of the name of the chairman of the Board and whether an independent non-executive director	98	98	98	98
2	A list of directors and details about the directors	94	96	99	96
3	Disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors who are independent	95	96	98	96
4	Details about current employment/position of directors provided	45	42	43	43
5	Details about previous employment/positions provided	42	39	40	40

	The level of compliance with the NCCGZ provisions among the sampled firms (%)				
		Pre-2015	Post-2015(i.e., after NCCGZ was released)		
		2014	2015	2016	Average of 3 Years
6	When each of the directors joined the board	53	50	54	52
7	Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director	97	98	98	98
	Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board				
8	Details about the role of the board of directors of the company	95	97	100	97
9	Disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions	97	97	97	97
10	A review of the number of board meetings attended provided	97	94	96	96
11	The existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee	97	97	97	97
	Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation				
12	Disclosure on whether they provide director training and evaluation	7	8	8	8
13	The number of shares in the company held by directors disclosed	46	52	46	48
14	The decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	24	20	25	23
15	The specifics of directors' pay (e.g., the salary levels etc.)	9	4	9	7
16	The form of directors' salaries (e.g., cash, shares, etc.) disclosed	36	34	29	33
17	The specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	2	5	5	4
18	Disclosure that regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	14	14	14	14
	Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation				
19	The list of the senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)	0	2	0	1
20	The backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0
21	The number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	1	0	2	1
22	The number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers	0	0	0	0
23	The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay (e.g., salary levels etc.)	0	1	1	1
24	The decision-making of managers' (not Board) pay	0	0	0	0
25	The form of managers' (not on Board) pay	0	0	0	0
26	The specifics on performance-related pay for managers	0	0	0	0
27	The details of the CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0

Appendix 4: The Codes-Primary Documents Matrix

Report created by Patrick - 17/07/2018 10:43:20 PM

HU: [C:\Users\Patrick Korera\Documents\Scientific Software\Disclosure and Transparency -PhD.hpr7]

Annual Reports

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes	2014 Afdis	2015 Afdis	2016 Afdis	2014 African Sun	2015 African Sun	2016 African Sun	2014 Ariston	2015 Ariston	2016 Ariston	2014 ART	2015 ART	2016 ART	2014 CBZ	2015 CBZ	2016 CBZ
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	3	3	2	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	1	2	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
Articles of Association published	1	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

How shareholders nominate directors	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
The process of putting inquiry to board	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															
A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
A list of group transactions disclosed	1	1	1	1	3	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
A list of related party transactions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Consolidated financial statements disclosed	0	0	0	1	3	3	4	4	2	4	4	4	4	4	4
Directors certification of financial reporting	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	3	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/etc.	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	0	0
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOFP disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure															
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	3
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	3	5	3
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	2	2	1
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Corporate structure disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	0

Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	0	0	2	3	4	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	1	2
Corporate strategy disclosed	0	0	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	1	1	1	4	5
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	5
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2
Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	0	0	0	8	7	3	2	2	1	1	2	2	4	5
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	0	0	0	3	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	0	0
Nature of business details disclosed	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	3
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	4	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	4
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	0	0	0	5	5	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	1	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	2
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	2	2	5	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	3
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	1	1	1	4	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	2	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	3
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting														

Annual report integrated	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Name of auditing firm disclosed	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	1
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	1
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	2	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														

The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	2	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit															
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	0	0	0	3	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	0	1
A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition															
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	3
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	3
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	0	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
When each director joined the board disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board															
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	0	2	1	2	0	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	2	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	2
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation															
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	0	3	2	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Specifics of directors' pay egg salary levels, etc disclosed	2	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation															
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	2014 Dairibord	2015 Dairibord	2016 Dairibord	2014 Delta	2015 Delta	2016 Delta	2014 Econet	2015 Econet	2016 Econet	2014 Edgars	2015 Edgars	2016 Edgars	2014 FMHL	2015 FMHL	2016 FMHL
Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes															
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	2	2	2	1	3	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															

A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
A list of group transactions disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	2	2	0	0	1	1	1	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Consolidated financial statements disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Directors certification of financial reporting	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/etc.	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	0	0	0	1	1	1
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOFP disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure															
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	3	4	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	2	2	3	1	1	0	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	2
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Corporate structure disclosed	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	1
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	2
Corporate strategy disclosed	2	2	3	0	0	1	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	2

Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	2	2	2	3	3	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	1	1
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	1	2	2	4	4	2	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	2	2
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nature of business details disclosed	2	2	3	2	3	3	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	4	4	4	1	1	2	1	0	0	0
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	1	2	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	1	1	0	1	1	1
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	2	2	1	2	2	1	3	3	1	3	3	1	0	1	1
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	1
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	2	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	3	2	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting															
Annual report integrated	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	1	1	3	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	4	1	0	0	1	1	1
Organisation's business model disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	0	1	2	2
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	2	0	0	1	2	2
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	2
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	2
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	1	0	0	1
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	1	1	0	0	0
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	0
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit															
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition															
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2
When each director joined the board disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	0	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board															
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation															
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation															
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes

Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership

	2014 Inncor	2015 Inncor	2016 Inncor	2014 Mashonaland	2015 Mashonaland	2016 Mashonaland	2014 Masimba	2015 Masimba	2016 Masimba	2014 Natfood	2015 Natfood	2016 Natfood	2014 Nicos Diamond	2015 Nicos Diamond	2016 Nicos Diamond
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	0	0	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership

Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures

NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure

A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
A list of group transactions disclosed	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Consolidated financial statements disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Directors certification of financial reporting	1	1	1	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/etc.	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
SOPF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure														
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	2
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	3	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	0	0	1	2	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Corporate structure disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Corporate strategy disclosed	1	1	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	2
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
KPIs and targets disclosed	2	2	3	0	1	2	5	5	3	3	3	3	2	2
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Nature of business details disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	1	1	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting														
Annual report integrated	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	1	1	1	3	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	1	1	0	3	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	1	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	1	1	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit															
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition															
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
When each director joined the board disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board															
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation															
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2
Director training and board evaluation is provided	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation															
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes	2014 NMB	2015 NMB	2016 NMB	2014 OK	2015 OK	2016 OK	2014 Padenga	2015 Padenga	2016 Padenga	2014 Powerspeed	2015 Powerspeed	2016 Powerspeed	2014 RioZim	2015 Rio Zim	2016 RioZim
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	2	2	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															
A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
A list of group transactions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Consolidated financial statements disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Directors certification of financial reporting	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/etc.	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOFP disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure														
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
Corporate structure disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3
Corporate strategy disclosed	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	3
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	0	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	3	5
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Nature of business details disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	2	2	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	1
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	2
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	1
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting															
Annual report integrated	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	1	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit														
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition														
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	0	0	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
When each director joined the board disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board														
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation														
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation														
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes	2014 Seedco	2015 Seedco	2016 Seedco	2014 unifreight	2015 unifreight	2016 Unifreight	2014 FBC	2015 FBC	2016 FBC	2014 Colcom	2015 Colcom	2016 Colcom	2014 Old Mutual	2015 Old Mutual	2016 Old Mutual
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Review of shareholder meetings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															
A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of group transactions disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Consolidated financial statements disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Directors certification of financial reporting	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/e.t.c	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOFP disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure														
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
Corporate structure disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	2	1
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	0
Corporate strategy disclosed	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	2	0	0
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	2
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	2	1

Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1	1	1
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	3	5	3	3	3	1	1	1
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nature of business details disclosed	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	3	3
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting															
Annual report integrated	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	0	1
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	0	1
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	1
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit														
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0

A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition															
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	2	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
When each director joined the board disclosed	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board															
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation															
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation															
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes	2014 Fidelity Life	2015 Fidelity Life	2016 Fidelity Life	2014 Barclays	2015 Barclays	2016 Barclays	2014 TURNALL	2015 TURNALL	2016 TURNALL	2014 ZB	2015 ZB	2016 ZB	2014 Pearl Properties	2015 Pearl Properties	2016 Pearl Properties
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate governance charter reference	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															
A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
A list of group transactions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Consolidated financial statements disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Directors certification of financial reporting	1	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/e.t.c	1	1	1	1	3	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOPF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure															
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	2
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
Corporate structure disclosed	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	2	2	1	1	0	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate strategy disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	2
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nature of business details disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	1
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting														
Annual report integrated	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	2
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit														
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition														
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1
When each director joined the board disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board														
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation														
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation														
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Disclosure and Transparency KPIs Codes	2014 Zimplot	2015 Zimplot	2016 Zimplot	2014 NTS	2015 NTS	2016 NTS	2014 TSL	2015 TSL	2016 TSL	2014 Willdale	2015 Willdale	2016 Willdale	2014 Cafca	2015 Cafca	2016 Cafca
Ownership and Control Structure-Transparency of ownership															
Number and par value of authorised non-issued ordinary shares disclosed	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Number and par value of authorised non-issued preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number and par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares disclosed	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Number and par value of issued and authorised preferred, non-voting and other share classes disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Classes Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shareholders Type Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Share Class Voting Rights Disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership and Control Structure-Concentration of ownership															
Shareholders Owning ≥10% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥3% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shareholders Owning ≥5% Disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top1 & top3 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Top10 Shareholders Disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Top 5 shareholders disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership and Control Structure-Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures															
NCCGZ or Code of best practice reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Articles of Association published	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Key shareholder dates Calendar disclosed	3	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate governance charter reference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How shareholders convene an AGM/EGM	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
How shareholders nominate directors	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Proposals procedure at shareholder meetings	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review of shareholder meetings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The process of putting inquiry to board	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Financial Disclosure															
A list of affiliates in which firm has minority stake	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of group transactions disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A list of related party transactions	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Accounting policies disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asset valuation methods disclosed	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Consolidated financial statements disclosed	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Directors certification of financial reporting	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
International accounting standards used	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Non-current assets depreciation methods	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ownership structure of affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reconciliation of domestic accounting standards to IFRSs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to Companies Act/Banking Act/ZSE rules/e.t.c	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
SOCE disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCF disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOCI disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SOFP disclosed according to IFRSs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Sustainability Disclosure															
Communication mechanisms with shareholders	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Sustainability strategy/policy & (SDGs) contribution	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in sustainability reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Corporate governance charter/RBZ guidelines/King III Report reference	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Reference to GRI Guidelines/ISO & commitment to sustainability reporting	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Any other forward-looking information disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Earnings forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Characteristics of assets employed disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate change details disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Company overview of trends in its industry disclosed	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate governance mechanism disclosed	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate structure disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Value creation process and reference to IIRC disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commitment to sustainable operations disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2
Investment plans in the coming years disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Products/services produced/provided disclosed	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporate strategy disclosed	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Effective leadership based on ethical foundation disclosed	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
Efficiency indicators (ROA,ROE,etc) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
Environmental performance-biodiversity impact disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
Environmental performance- impact on water and energy	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
Environmental performance-details on emissions disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
Environmental performance-material waste and spills details disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2

Industry-specific ratios disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information technology governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPIs and targets disclosed	2	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	6	6
Market share for any/all of its businesses disclosed	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Nature of business details disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	2
Output forecast of any kind disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Output in physical terms disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accolades/awards in corporate governance disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Any accolades/awards in sustainability reporting disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corporate governance charter, RBZ guidelines, and King III report disclosed	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reference to the NCCGZ disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainability disclosure-responsible corporate citizenship details disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Segment analysis, broken down by business line disclosed	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Separate sustainability report disclosed and independently assured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social performance-community activities disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Social performance-employment empowerment disclosed	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	2
Social performance-fair employment practices disclosed	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	3
Social performance-fair labour practices disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-HIV & AIDS and occupational health disclosed	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-HR policy disclosed	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Social performance-safety of employees disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
Social performance-support for employee's unions disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Stakeholder relationship-continuous stakeholder identification and engagement details disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-stakeholder perceptions vis firm value disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Sustainability disclosure-stakeholder relationships-transparent and effective communication details disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Information Management and Disclosure-Integrated reporting														
Annual report integrated	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
A linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports disclosed	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Challenges and uncertainties likely to be encountered in pursuing company strategy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company's strategic direction disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resources (capitals) and the relationships to create value over the short, medium and long term	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
All material matters both positive and negative disclosed in a balanced way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
How the organisation determine what matters to include in the IR and how are such matters quantified/evaluated disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Information in IR being disclosed consistently and in a way that enables comparison with other organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Key stakeholder identified and nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Extent to which strategic objectives were achieved and the outcomes in terms of effects on the capitals disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the company's ability to create value over time disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
How the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Main activities and the environment the company operates disclosed	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Organisation's business model disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information Management and Disclosure-Information on auditors														
Audit fees paid disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Auditors' report disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Name of auditing firm disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Principal risks identification														
The range and type of risk control measures which may be put in place to prevent/mitigate the identified risks disclosed	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3
How the board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected and managed to reduce damage or losses disclosed	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3
The board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance disclosed	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3
How the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time to account for changes in the control environment of the business disclosed	1	2	3	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3
Governance of Risk and Structure-Risk management committee														
How management implements appropriate responses to risk disclosed	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on continuous basis disclosed	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Risk management committee assists board in carrying out its risk responsibilities disclosed	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The board delegates the process of risk management to management disclosed	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Risk frameworks and methodologies are in place to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks disclosed	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Risk disclosure made to stakeholders	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Assurance regarding the effectiveness of risk management processes disclosed	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Audit committee														
The committee evaluates the appropriateness of combined assurance model	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
The committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director disclosed	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1
The committee is effective and independent disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1
The committee is integral to risk management process disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee oversees internal audit disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The committee reports to the board and shareholders on how it displayed its duties disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
The committee oversees corporate reporting disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Governance of Risk and Structure-Internal and External Audit														
The presence of an effective risk based internal control disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1

A written assessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal controls and risk management is disclosed	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
The external auditor's opinion on AFS qualified or unqualified	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Board structure and composition															
A list of directors and details about directors disclosed	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Current employment/position of directors disclosed	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Previous employment/positions of directors disclosed	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director disclosed	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1
The board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of independent non-executive directors disclosed	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1
When each director joined the board disclosed	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
The name of the chairperson and that the chairman is an independent non-executive director disclosed	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Role of the Board															
A review of board meeting attendance disclosed	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
The role of the board of directors of the company disclosed	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
There are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	1
Existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee disclosed	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	1
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Director training and compensation															
Decision-making process of directors' pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular performance appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors are conducted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Director training and board evaluation is provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Form of directors' salaries e.g. cash, shares, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Number of shares in company held by directors disclosed	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Specifics of directors' pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Specifics on performance-related pay for directors disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Board of Directors and Management Structure-Executive compensation and evaluation															
The CEO's contract disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
List of senior managers (not on the Board) disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers disclosed	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The decision-making of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The form of managers (not on Board) pay disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics of managers' (not on Board) pay e.g. salary levels, etc disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers disclosed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix 5: Disclosure and Transparency Assessment Report

2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Adopted Report			Ownership and Control Structure														
					Transparency of ownership												Concentration of ownership		
					KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire														
		Annual including Governance Report	Annual including Sustainability/CSR Report	Integrated Annual Report	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

	Zimplot	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Innscor	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FMHL	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Ownership and Control Structure													Information Management & Disclosure				
		Concentration of ownership					Voting & shareholder meeting procedures								Financial disclosure				
		KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire																	
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	5
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y

	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Innscor	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

2014									D&T KPIs										
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management and Disclosure																	
		Financial disclosure(Contd...)										Sustainability disclosure							
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Innscore	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	

	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	Old Mutual	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Retail & Services	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Sustainability Disclosure (Contd...)																	
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	NatFoods	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
	Padenga	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
	SeedCo	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
	CBZ	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	FBC	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	ZB	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Cafca	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Masimba	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Powerspeed	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Zimplow	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Food & Beverages	Afdis	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Colcom	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Dairiboard	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	Innscor	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	NTS	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	TSL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	Willdale	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	FMHL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
	Mashonaland	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	Nicoz	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	Pearl	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
	Econet	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Edgars	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	OK	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Unifreight	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Sustainability disclosure (Contd...)															Integrated reporting		
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	NatFoods	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y

	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	CBZ	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	ZB	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Cafca	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	Masimba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	Zimplow	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Food & Beverages	Afdis	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Colcom	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Delta	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Innscor	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	Old Mutual	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
2014					D&T KPIs														

Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Integrated reporting (Contd...)														Information on auditors			
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77		
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Innscor	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Turnall	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Econet	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Edgars	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk and Structure																	
		Principal risk identification					Risk management committee							Audit committee					
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18		
Agri cult ure	Ariston	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Dairibord	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	Innscor	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

2014				D&T KPIs																
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure (Contd...)			Board of Directors and Management Structure															
		Internal & external audit			Board structure & composition							Role of board			Director training & composition					
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																		
		19	20	21	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	
	Innscor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	

Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
2014					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure																	
		Director training & compensation			Executive compensation & evaluation														
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27						
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Padenga	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	SeedCo	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	CBZ	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	ZB	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Cafca	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Zimplow	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						

Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Colcom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Delta	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Dairibord	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Innscor	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Turnall	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Mashonaland	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Nicoz	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Econet	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	OK	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Adopted Report			Ownership and Control Structure														
					Transparency of ownership												Concentration of ownership		
					KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire														
					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Innscor	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	FMHL	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Mashonaland	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Nicoz	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Old Mutual	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	
	Pearl	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	African Sun	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Retail & Services	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	OK	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Unifreight	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Ownership and Control Structure													Information Management & Disclosure				
		Concentration of ownership					Voting & shareholder meeting procedures								Financial disclosure				
		KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire																	
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	5
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y

Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Innsco	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management and Disclosure																	
		Financial disclosure(Contd...)										Sustainability disclosure							
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & En	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	Innscor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Sustainability Disclosure (Contd...)																	
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

		Padenga	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
		SeedCo	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Banking & Finance		Barclays	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
		CBZ	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
		FBC	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
		NMBZ	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
		ZB	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Mining & Engineering		RioZim	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
		Cafca	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Masimba	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		Powerspeed	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		Zimplow	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Food & Beverages		Afdis	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
		Colcom	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Delta	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Dairiboard	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings		ART	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
		Innscor	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
		NTS	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		TSL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		Turnall	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
		Willdale	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Insurance & Property		Fidelity	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		FMHL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
		Mashonaland	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
		Nicoz	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
		Old Mutual	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
		Pearl	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
Retail & Services		African Sun	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Econet	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Edgars	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
		OK	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Unifreight	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		2015				D&T KPIs														
		Information Management & Disclosure																		

Economic Sector	Company Name	Sustainability disclosure (Contd...)																Integrated reporting	
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	NatFoods	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	Padenga	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	CBZ	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	ZB	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	
	Masimba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	
	Zimplow	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Colcom	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	Delta	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	Dairiboard	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Innscor	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
	TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	
	Turnall	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
	Old Mutual	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	

	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Econet	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Integrated reporting (Contd...)														Information on auditors			
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
Agriculture	Ariston	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	NatFoods	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Padenga	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	CBZ	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	ZB	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Cafca	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Masimba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Zimplow	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
Food & Beverages	Afdis	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Colcom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Delta	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	
	Innscor	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	

	TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Turnall	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Pearl	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Econet	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Edgars	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk and Structure																	
		Principal risk identification				Risk management committee						Audit committee							
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
Agriculture	Ariston	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Industrial Holdings	Innscor	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Insurance & Property	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	African Sun	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Retail & Services	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	2015					D&T KPIs													
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure (Contd...)			Board of Directors and Management Structure														
		Internal & external audit			Board structure & composition							Role of board			Director training & composition				
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		19	20	21	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N

Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Innsco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
2015					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure																	
		Director training & compensation				Executive compensation & evaluation													
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	

		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27						
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Padenga	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	CBZ	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Mining & Engineering	ZB	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	RioZim	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Cafca	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Food & Beverages	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Zimplow	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N						
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Industrial Holdings	Delta	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Dairiboard	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	ART	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Innsco	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Insurance & Property	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Turnall	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Retail & Services	Fidelity	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	African Sun	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Econet	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						

	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
2016					D&T KPIs														
		Adopted Report			Ownership and Control Structure														
					Transparency of ownership												Concentration of ownership		
					KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire														
		Annual including Governance Report	Annual including Sustainability/CSR Report	Integrated Annual Report	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Economic Sector	Company Name																		
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

		Powerspeed	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Zimplot	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Food & Beverages		Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Colcom	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Delta	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Dairiboard	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Industrial Holdings		ART	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Innscor	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		NTS	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Willdale	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Insurance & Property		Fidelity	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		FMHL	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Mashonaland	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Nicoz	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Old Mutual	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	
		Pearl	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Retail & Services		African Sun	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		OK	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
		Unifreight	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
2016						D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Ownership and Control Structure														Information Management & Disclosure				
		Concentration of ownership					Voting & shareholder meeting procedures									Financial disclosure				
		KPIs per D&T Evaluation Matrix questionnaire																		
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	5	
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	

	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Innsacor	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y

	OK	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
2016					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management and Disclosure																	
		Financial disclosure(Contd...)										Sustainability disclosure							
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Mining & Engineering	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Food & Beverages	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ART	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Innsacor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Insurance & Professional	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y

	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2016					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Sustainability Disclosure (Contd...)																	
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Padenga	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
	SeedCo	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
	CBZ	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	FBC	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	NMBZ	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	ZB	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Cafca	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Masimba	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	Powerspeed	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Zimplow	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	Colcom	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

	Dairiboard	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Innscor	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	TSL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	Willdale	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	FMHL	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Nicoz	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Old Mutual	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	Pearl	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	Econet	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Edgars	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	OK	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
	Unifreight	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
2016					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector		Information Management & Disclosure																	
		Sustainability disclosure (Contd...)																Integrated reporting	
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
	Company Name	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	NatFoods	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
	CBZ	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N

		ZB	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
Mining & Engineering		RioZim	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
		Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
		Masimba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
		Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
		Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Food & Beverages		Afdis	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
		Colcom	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
		Delta	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
		Dairiboard	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Industrial Holdings		ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
		Innscor	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
		NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
		TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
		Turnall	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
		Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Insurance & Property		Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
		FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
		Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
		Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
		Old Mutual	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
		Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Retail & Services		African Sun	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
		Econet	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
		Edgars	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
		OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
		Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
2016						D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Information Management & Disclosure																		
		Integrated reporting (Contd...)															Information on auditors			
		Question number per D&T Evaluation Matrix																		
		60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	

Agriculture	Ariston	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	NatFoods	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Padenga	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	SeedCo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Banking & Finance	Barclays	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	CBZ	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	ZB	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Cafca	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Masimba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Food & Beverages	Afdis	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Colcom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Delta	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Industrial Holdings	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Innsacor	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	TSL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Turnall	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Nicoz	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Pearl	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Econet	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N


2016					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk and Structure																	
		Principal risk identification				Risk management committee								Audit committee					
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Agriculture	Ariston	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
Food & Beverages	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	Dairiboard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	ART	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Industrial Holdings	Innsco	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Insurance & Property	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

		Old Mutual	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Retail & Services		African Sun	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
		Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2016						D&T KPIs													
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure (Contd...)				Board of Directors and Management Structure													
		Internal & external audit				Board structure & composition						Role of board				Director training & composition			
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		19	20	21	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Agriculture	Ariston	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	NatFoods	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Padenga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	SeedCo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	CBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	FBC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	NMBZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	ZB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Mining & Engineering	RioZim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	Cafca	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Masimba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Powerspeed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Zimplow	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Colcom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Delta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Dairibord	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y


	Innskor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	NTS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	TSL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Turnall	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Willdale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
	FMHL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Mashonaland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	Pearl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Econet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
	Edgars	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	OK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Unifreight	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
2016					D&T KPIs														
Economic Sector	Company Name	Governance of Risk & Structure																	
		Director training & compensation				Executive compensation & evaluation													
		Question numbers per D&T Evaluation Matrix																	
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27						
Agriculture	Ariston	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NatFoods	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N						
	Padenga	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	SeedCo	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Banking & Finance	Barclays	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	CBZ	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FBC	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NMBZ	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	ZB	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Mining & En	RioZim	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						

	Cafca	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Masimba	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Powerspeed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Zimplow	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N						
Food & Beverages	Afdis	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N						
	Colcom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Delta	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Dairiboard	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Industrial Holdings	ART	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Innsacor	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	NTS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	TSL	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Turnall	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Willdale	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Insurance & Property	Fidelity	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	FMHL	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Mashonaland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Nicoz	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Old Mutual	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Pearl	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
Retail & Services	African Sun	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Econet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Edgars	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	OK	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						
	Unifreight	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N						


Appendix 6: A Histogram of Distribution of the NCCGZDTI and Firm Performance Measures




A histogram of distribution of the NCCGZDTI



A histogram of distribution of the ROA



A histogram of distribution of the ROCE



A histogram of distribution of the ROE

Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Disclosure and Transparency Practices

<i>Appendix 7-A: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Firms Years</i>					
Year of Annual Report	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Variance
2014	40.7	7.44	25	57	55.4
2015	41.9	8.58	24	59	73.6
2016	42.9	9.03	27	59	81.5
All	41.9	8.34	24	59	69.6

<i>Appendix 7- B: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Categories Years</i>						
Year of Annual Report	Statistical Option	Board of Directors and Management Structure	Governance of Risk and Structure	Information Management and Disclosure	Ownership and Control Structure	Total Company score
2014	Mean	38.7	63.09	34.2	44.2	41
	Std. Deviation	7.08	20.29	10.8	4.85	7.4
	Minimum	25	0	19	21	25
	Maximum	54	96	61	50	57
	Variance	50.2	411.5	117	23.5	55
2015	Mean	38.8	65.37	35.8	44.7	42
	Std. Deviation	7.53	21.33	11.8	5.05	8.6
	Minimum	28	0	23	21	24
	Maximum	58	96	65	50	59
	Variance	56.8	455	140	25.5	74
2016	Mean	39.3	65.46	37.4	44.8	43
	Std. Deviation	7.49	20.21	12.8	4.9	9
	Minimum	23	18	22	21	27
	Maximum	58	99	65	50	59

Appendix 7- B: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Categories Years

Year of Annual Report	Statistical Option	Board Directors and Management Structure	Governance of Risk and Structure	Information Management and Disclosure	Ownership and Control Structure	Total Company score
	Variance	56	408.4	163	24	82
ALL	Mean	38.9	64.64	35.8	44.6	42
	Std. Deviation	7.3	20.45	11.8	4.89	8.3
	Minimum	23	0	19	21	24
	Maximum	58	99	65	50	59
	Variance	53.3	418	139	23.9	70

Appendix 7- C: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Sub-Categories Years

Year of Annual Report		Transparency of ownership	Concentration of ownership	Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures	Financial disclosure	Sustainability disclosure	Integrated reporting	Information on auditors
2014	Mean	17.7	85.49	40	62.7	32	6.2	63
	Std. Deviation	5.48	14.88	5.57	13.2	15	11	0
	Minimum	7	0	31	0	10	0	63
	Maximum	27	88	61	80	68	44	63
	Variance	30	221.3	31	175	227	119	0
2015	Mean	19.2	85.49	39.7	64.7	34	8.3	63
	Std. Deviation	5.71	14.88	6.7	8.58	16	14	0
	Minimum	14	0	17	43	12	0	63
	Maximum	27	88	53	78	66	56	63
	Variance	32.6	221.3	44.9	73.6	264	194	0

Appendix 7- C: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Sub-Categories Years								
Year of Annual Report		Transparency of ownership	Concentration of ownership	Voting and Shareholder meeting procedures	Financial disclosure	Sustainability disclosure	Integrated reporting	Information on auditors
2016	Mean	19.2	85.49	40	65.2	37	9	63
	Std. Deviation	5.71	14.88	4.89	7.55	18	15	0
	Minimum	14	0	31	42	13	0	63
	Maximum	27	88	53	77	71	62	63
	Variance	32.6	221.3	23.9	57	322	228	0
Total	Mean	18.7	85.49	39.9	64.2	34	7.9	63
	Std. Deviation	5.62	14.73	5.71	10.1	16	13	0
	Minimum	7	0	17	0	10	0	63
	Maximum	27	88	61	80	71	62	63
	Variance	31.6	217	32.6	101	270	178	0

Appendix 7- C: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Sub-Categories Years (Continued)									
Year of Annual Report		Principal risk identification	Risk management committee	Audit committee	Internal and external audit	Board structure and composition	Role of the board	Director training and compensation	Executive compensation and evaluation
2014	Mean	70	34.14	84.8	70.7	74	97	20	0
	Std. Deviation	26.6	35.33	24.3	14.2	21	10	13	1
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	43	56	0	0
	Maximum	100	100	100	75	100	100	64	8
	Variance	706	1248	589	202	443	100	173	2
2015	Mean	71.4	38.97	86.5	70	74	97	20	0
	Std. Deviation	27.1	37.85	21.6	15.8	21	8.2	16	2

Appendix 7- C: Descriptive Statistics of NCCGZDTI for All Sub-Categories Years (Continued)									
Year of Annual Report		Principal risk identification	Risk management committee	Audit committee	Internal and external audit	Board structure and composition	Role of the board	Director training and compensation	Executive compensation and evaluation
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	43	75	0	0
	Maximum	100	100	100	75	100	100	82	8
	Variance	736	1432	465	250	441	67	261	3
2016	Mean	74.5	37.83	85.1	71.9	75	97	20	1
	Std. Deviation	25.9	37.44	23.2	13.5	20	6.4	16	3
	Minimum	0	0	0	25	43	81	0	0
	Maximum	100	100	100	92	100	100	82	11
	Variance	671	1401	537	181	412	40	268	7
Total	Mean	72	36.98	85.5	70.9	75	97	20	0
	Std. Deviation	26.4	36.59	22.8	14.4	21	8.2	15	2
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	43	56	0	0
	Maximum	100	100	100	92	100	100	82	11
	Variance	695	1339	521	208	424	68	230	4

Appendix 7- D: Descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate disclosure and transparency model				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variable				
Panel A: NCCGZDTI				
Mean	41.86	40.74	41.94	42.89
Std. Deviation	8.34	7.44	8.58	9.03
Minimum	24.00	25.00	24.00	27.00
Maximum	59.00	57.00	59.00	59.00
Median	40.00	39.00	40.00	40.00
Independent/ Control variables				
Panel B: Audit committee				
Mean	3.45	3.43	3.60	3.31
Std. Deviation	1.01	0.98	1.19	0.83
Minimum	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Maximum	8.00	6.00	8.00	6.00

Appendix 7- D: Descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate disclosure and transparency model				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variable				
Median	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Panel C: Non-executive directors proportion				
Mean	74.24	73.71	73.91	75.09
Std. Deviation	11.15	10.50	11.24	11.94
Minimum	44.00	50.00	44.00	44.00
Maximum	91.00	90.00	90.00	91.00
Median	75.00	75.00	75.00	78.00
Panel D: Board size				
Mean	8.94	8.83	8.94	9.06
Std. Deviation	2.00	2.18	1.92	1.94
Minimum	5.00	6.00	6.00	5.00
Maximum	15.00	15.00	13.00	13.00
Median	9.00	9.00	9.00	9.00
Panel E: Audit firm size				
Mean	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
Std. Deviation	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel F: Government ownership percentage				
Mean	10.32	10.49	9.87	10.58
Std. Deviation	16.36	16.19	16.16	17.17
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	63.00	61.00	62.00	63.00
Median	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
Panel G: Institutional Ownership				
Mean	32.48	32.73	33.77	30.94
Std. Deviation	22.58	20.67	23.49	24.01
Minimum	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
Maximum	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Median	26.00	30.00	29.00	23.00
Panel H: Board ownership percentage				
Mean	8.49	7.81	9.74	7.93
Std. Deviation	15.36	13.58	17.21	15.45
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	59.00	47.00	57.40	59.00
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90
Panel I: Return on capital employed				
Mean	8.82	9.50	6.72	10.25
Std. Deviation	11.37	11.52	11.35	11.27

Appendix 7- D: Descriptive statistics of variables of the corporate disclosure and transparency model				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variable				
Minimum	-21.00	-21.00	-20.00	-17.00
Maximum	38.00	28.00	22.00	38.00
Median	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00
Panel J: MNC Affiliation/Foreign company ownership				
Mean	21.02	21.30	20.76	21.00
Std. Deviation	24.30	23.60	24.32	25.65
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	90	90	90	90
Median	9.50	14.00	9.00	7.00
Panel K: Company size				
Mean	18.45	18.43	18.45	18.49
Std. Deviation	1.36	1.35	1.38	1.39
Minimum	16	16	16	16
Maximum	22	21	21	22
Median	18.40	18.26	18.42	18.41
Panel L: Company age				
Mean	61.71	60.71	61.71	62.71
Std. Deviation	31.28	31.58	31.58	31.58
Minimum	12	12	13	14
Maximum	172	170	171	172
Median	63.00	62.00	63.00	64.00
Panel M: Liquidity level				
Mean	2.00	1.90	2.14	1.94
Std. Deviation	1.97	1.57	2.38	1.93
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	12	7	12	8
Median	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.30
Panel N: Leverage/Gearing level				
Mean	29.21	28.52	35.14	23.98
Std. Deviation	33.56	33.47	37.43	29.33
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	94	90	94	80
Median	9.40	7.90	13.00	9.10

Appendix 7- E: Descriptive statistics of variables of the firm performance models				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variables				
Panel A: Return on Assets				
Mean	4.77	5.91	3.52	4.88
Std. Deviation	7.54	8.45	7.49	6.59
Minimum	-15.00	-15.00	-14.00	-11.00
Maximum	19.00	19.00	16.00	16.00
Median	4.00	5.00	4.00	3.50
Panel B: Return on equity				
Mean	5.34	5.60	1.85	8.57
Std. Deviation	16	17.00	17.10	13.32
Minimum	-40.00	-40.00	-40.00	-34.00
Maximum	40.00	33.00	18.00	40.00
Median	7.00	7.00	6.00	10.00
Panel C: Return on capital employed				
Mean	8.82	9.50	6.72	10.25
Std. Deviation	11.37	11.52	11.35	11.27
Minimum	-21.00	-21.00	-20.00	-17.00
Maximum	38.00	28.00	22.00	38.00
Median	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00
Independent variables				
Panel D: NCCGZDTI				
Mean	41.86	40.74	41.94	42.89
Std. Deviation	8.34	7.44	8.58	9.03
Minimum	24.00	25.00	24.00	27.00
Maximum	59.00	57.00	59.00	59.00
Median	40.00	39.00	40.00	40.00
Panel E: Audit committee				
Mean	3.45	3.43	3.60	3.31
Std. Deviation	1.01	0.98	1.19	0.83
Minimum	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Maximum	8.00	6.00	8.00	6.00
Median	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Panel F: Non- executive directors proportion				
Mean	74.24	73.71	73.91	75.09
Std. Deviation	11.15	10.50	11.24	11.94
Minimum	44.00	50.00	44.00	44.00
Maximum	91.00	90.00	90.00	91.00
Median	75.00	75.00	75.00	78.00
Panel G: Board size				
Mean	8.94	8.83	8.94	9.06
Std. Deviation	2.00	2.18	1.92	1.94

Appendix 7- E: Descriptive statistics of variables of the firm performance models				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variables				
Minimum	5.00	6.00	6.00	5.00
Maximum	15.00	15.00	13.00	13.00
Median	9.00	9.00	9.00	9.00
Panel H: Audit firm size				
Mean	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
Std. Deviation	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel I: Government ownership percentage				
Mean	10.32	10.49	9.87	10.58
Std. Deviation	16.36	16.19	16.16	17.17
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	63.00	61.00	62.00	63.00
Median	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
Panel J: Institutional Ownership				
Mean	32.48	32.73	33.77	30.94
Std. Deviation	22.58	20.67	23.49	24.01
Minimum	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
Maximum	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Median	26.00	30.00	29.00	23.00
Panel K: Board ownership percentage				
Mean	8.49	7.81	9.74	7.93
Std. Deviation	15.36	13.58	17.21	15.45
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	59.00	47.00	57.40	59.00
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90
Panel L: MNC Affiliation/Foreign company ownership				
Mean	21.02	21.30	20.76	21.00
Std. Deviation	24.30	23.60	24.32	25.65
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	90	90	90	90
Median	9.50	14.00	9.00	7.00
Panel M: Company size				
Mean	18.45	18.43	18.45	18.49
Std. Deviation	1.36	1.35	1.38	1.39
Minimum	16	16	16	16
Maximum	22	21	21	22
Median	18.40	18.26	18.42	18.41
Panel N: Company age				

Appendix 7- E: Descriptive statistics of variables of the firm performance models				
Variables	All	2014	2015	2016
Dependent variables				
Mean	61.71	60.71	61.71	62.71
Std. Deviation	31.28	31.58	31.58	31.58
Minimum	12	12	13	14
Maximum	172	170	171	172
Median	63.00	62.00	63.00	64.00
Panel O: Liquidity level				
Mean	2.00	1.90	2.14	1.94
Std. Deviation	1.97	1.57	2.38	1.93
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	12	7	12	8
Median	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.30
Panel P: Leverage/Gearing level				
Mean	29.21	28.52	35.14	23.98
Std. Deviation	33.56	33.47	37.43	29.33
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	94	90	94	80
Median	9.40	7.90	13.00	9.10

Appendix 8: Regression Analysis

Appendix 8-A: Model with All Variables Including ROA, ROCE and ROE

SUMMARY OUTPUT

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.542
R Square	0.294
Adjusted R Square	0.175
Standard Error	7.576
Observations	105

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	15	2129	141.9	2.4723	0.0045
Residual	89	5108	57.4		
Total	104	7237			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	-7.79	15.13	-0.52	0.61	-37.85	22.26	-37.85	22.26
AUDCSIZE	1.30	0.97	1.34	0.18	-0.63	3.24	-0.63	3.24
AUDFSIZE	2.29	3.64	0.63	0.53	-4.94	9.52	-4.94	9.52
DIRSHARE	0.14	0.06	2.44	0.02	0.03	0.25	0.03	0.25
BDSIZE	-0.27	0.49	-0.55	0.58	-1.24	0.70	-1.24	0.70
GOVSHARE	0.10	0.05	1.80	0.08	-0.01	0.21	-0.01	0.21
INSSHARE	-0.10	0.04	-2.46	0.02	-0.19	-0.02	-0.19	-0.02
PINED	0.03	0.08	0.44	0.66	-0.12	0.18	-0.12	0.18
Comage	-0.05	0.03	-1.47	0.15	-0.11	0.02	-0.11	0.02
CompSizeLOG	2.43	0.80	3.02	0.00	0.83	4.02	0.83	4.02
LEVRG	-0.03	0.03	-1.10	0.28	-0.09	0.03	-0.09	0.03
LQDTY	0.85	0.47	1.79	0.08	-0.09	1.79	-0.09	1.79
MCAffil	0.03	0.04	0.79	0.43	-0.05	0.12	-0.05	0.12
ROAWINS	-0.16	0.27	-0.59	0.56	-0.69	0.37	-0.69	0.37
ROCEWINS	0.23	0.18	1.29	0.20	-0.13	0.59	-0.13	0.59
ROEWINS	-0.15	0.08	-1.80	0.08	-0.32	0.02	-0.32	0.02

Appendix 8-B: ROA AND ROCE Excluded as Variables

**SUMMARY
OUTPUT**

Multiple R	0.5292
R Square	0.2801
Adjusted R Square	0.1772
Standard Error	45.594
Observations	105

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	13	73590.2	5660.785	2.723096	0.002719
Residual	91	189171.2	2078.805		
Total	104	262761.4			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	-13.01	90.13	-0.14	0.89	-192.04	166.03	-192.04	166.03
AUDCSIZE	7.67	5.39	1.42	0.16	-3.04	18.39	-3.04	18.39
AUDFSIZE	19.37	21.45	0.90	0.37	-23.25	61.99	-23.25	61.99
DIRSHARE	0.76	0.33	2.33	0.02	0.11	1.41	0.11	1.41
BDSIZE	-1.44	2.91	-0.49	0.62	-7.21	4.34	-7.21	4.34
GOVSHARE	0.61	0.32	1.87	0.06	-0.04	1.25	-0.04	1.25
INSSHARE	-0.59	0.24	-2.42	0.02	-1.07	-0.10	-1.07	-0.10
PINED	0.05	0.43	0.11	0.91	-0.81	0.91	-0.81	0.91
Comage	-0.35	0.19	-1.86	0.07	-0.72	0.02	-0.72	0.02
CompSizeLOG	13.60	4.83	2.82	0.01	4.01	23.19	4.01	23.19
LEVRG	-0.06	0.16	-0.39	0.70	-0.37	0.25	-0.37	0.25
LQDTY	4.55	2.69	1.69	0.09	-0.80	9.89	-0.80	9.89
MCAffil	0.20	0.26	0.77	0.44	-0.31	0.71	-0.31	0.71
ROEWIND	-0.44	0.32	-1.38	0.17	-1.07	0.19	-1.07	0.19

Appendix 9: Reporting Profiles of the Analysed Companies and Their Sectors

Agricultural Sector

According to Malinga (2017) the agricultural sector is the backbone of many economies in Southern Africa and Zimbabwe is no exception. Zimbabwe was once seen as the food basket of Southern Africa. However, the country has experienced a sharp decline over the last two decades in the performance of the sector due to a number of reasons. The sector has dwindled as a result of the diverse policies and reforms enforced by the Government such as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which resulted in the decline of agricultural produce and subsequently agricultural exports (Malinga, 2017). As considered in *Chapter 2* of this thesis, the agriculture sector contributes significantly to the country's GDP.

Ariston Holdings Limited

The annual reports reveals that 'Ariston Holdings Limited is a group of three subsidiary entities and two joint ventures. Claremont Estate is located in the Nyanga area with a unique micro climate for horticultural production. Claremont Estate is one of country's key producers of pome and stone fruit. Southdown incorporates three tea estates in the picturesque Chipinge and Chimanimani areas of Zimbabwe with 1,200 hectares of tea, 60 hectares of bananas, 450 hectares of macadamia nuts and 12 hectares of avocado trees. This business unit also does the packaging of tea for the domestic market. Infrastructural development includes tea factories, schools, clinics and workers' housing. Kent Estate is located in Norton with 5 hectares of greenhouse vegetables. The estate has capacity to produce over one million broilers a year and has beef cattle, irrigated crops and dry land crops. Nyanga Trout Farming (Private) Limited is a joint venture between Ariston Management Services (Private) Limited and Three Streams Holdings (Proprietary) Limited formed with the goal to engage in trout farming at the Claremont Trout Farm which is situated at Claremont Estate in the Nyanga area of Zimbabwe. Claremont Power Station is a joint venture between Ariston Management Services (Private) Limited and Goldsaif (Private) Limited formed to rehabilitate the micro-hydro electricity generation facilities at Claremont Estate to enable uninterrupted electricity supply at Claremont Estate. The latest financial highlights show that the Group's revenues declined from US\$11.8 million in 2015 to US\$9.2 million in 2016. Profit before taxation improved to US\$0.6 million in 2016 from a loss of US\$2.6 million in prior year. The Group's gearing ratio improved to 68% in 2016 from 110% in prior year.'

Ariston publishes an annual report, which incorporates a corporate governance report for the sampled period. There are two main sections of the 2014-2016 annual reports that disclose the details on board of directors and management structure. The list of names of the main board of directors, classified into executive and non-executive directors is shown under the section 'Directorate and Administration' of the annual reports. Moreover, the name of the chairperson of the board and the names of directors for the various board committees are also listed in this section. This is detailed on page 3 of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 Ariston's annual reports. The 'Corporate Governance' section of the annual reports describes the board composition and its role. For instance, on page 9 of Ariston's 2014 - 2016 annual reports it is disclosed that 'The Board of directors is chaired by a non-executive director and comprises six non-executive directors (including the chairman) and one executive director. The Board enjoys a strong mix of skills and experience. It is the primary governance organ. The role of the Board is to determine overall policies, plans and strategies of the Group and to ensure that these are implemented in an ethical and professional manner. The Board meets regularly, at least four times a year, and guides corporate strategy, risk management practices, annual budgets and business plans.'

Ariston disclosed governance of risk and structure KPIs in sections of the annual reports marked 'Directorate and Administration', 'Corporate Governance' and 'Notes to Financial Statements'. Generally, details on the audit and risk committee composition and the key roles of this committee were disclosed to a larger extent as evidenced by the following statement appearing in all annual reports 'The Audit and Risk Committee is chaired by a nonexecutive director and the independent auditors have unrestricted access to the committee and attend all meetings. It reviews the interim and annual financial statements, the Group systems and controls and ensures that audit recommendations are considered and where appropriate, implemented.' Moreover, the firm does not have a separate audit and risk committees. The firm disclosed to some extent its financial risk management policies in the annual reports stating that 'The Group does not use derivative financial instruments in its management of foreign currency. Derivative financial instruments are not held or issued for trading purposes.' It is also worth noting that none of principal risks identification KPIs were disclosed in the annual reports. This information is detailed on pages 3, 9 & 47 of the 2014 annual report, pages 3, 9 & 45 of the 2015 annual report, pages 3, 9 & 46 of the 2016 annual report).

The following sections of Ariston's annual reports presents the information management and disclosure KPIs: 'Corporate Structure', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman Statement', 'Operational Overview', 'Report of the Directors', 'Corporate governance', 'Report of the Independent auditors', 'Group Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Statements of Financial Position', 'Statements in Changes in Shareholders Equity', 'Group Statement of Cash Flows' and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. These sections which details disclosure relating to the company and its business in all its varied forms are found on pages 1-51 of the 2014 annual report, pages 1-49 of the 2015 annual report and pages 1-48 of the 2016 annual report. Financial information is presented in the form of financial highlights, group financial statements and notes to the financial statements according to the international reporting standards and the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03). Sustainability information is generally disclosed to a lesser extent, mainly in the chairman's statement, group operation overview and corporate governance report. Products and markets for the firm are disclosed under the topic 'Corporate Structure' and corporate strategy is discussed in the chairman's statement. Environmental and social performances were briefly discussed in the corporate governance section of the report. For example, on environmental performance the annual reports only state that 'The Group adopts a responsible approach and complies with all regulatory and legislative requirements to ensure the protection and maintenance of the environment in which it operates.'

Ownership and control structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Report of the Directors', 'Shareholders Profile' and 'Notice to Shareholders'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures are presented. The report of the directors highlights the authorised share capital, issued share capital and unissued share capital of the firm. This section also reveals the directors' shareholding in the company. Shareholders profile section presents categories of shareholders and top twenty shareholders. Notice to shareholders' section gives the date notification of the annual general meeting and agenda of the meeting. The company's ownership and control structure is detailed on pages 8, 52 & 54 of the 2014 annual report, pages 8, 50 & 52 of the 2015 annual report and pages 8, 49 & 51 of the 2016 annual report.

It is interesting to underline that in general Ariston produced a generic corporate governance report in its recent annual reports. On page 9 of all 2014-16 annual reports read 'Ariston

Holdings Limited (“the Group”) is committed to maintaining the highest levels of integrity and accountability in all its business practices and its corporate governance policy is aimed at these objectives. This is achieved by ensuring the Group is correctly structured and appropriate reporting and control mechanisms are in place.’ The annual reports do not make reference to any specific code of best practice or the NCCGZ. The annual reports reflect comprehensive financial information as this disclosure is mandatory. This is confirmed by the independent auditors’ reports’ which gives an assurance that the financial statements were prepared according to the IFRSs and in a style provided for by the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03). However, there is less attempt to disclose sustainability information or produce an integrated report. This is in violation of the NCCGZ’s recommendation that the ‘board should ensure that information which must be disclosed in terms of the law and this Code is disclosed in an integrated manner which gives a holistic and integrated picture of the corporation’s performance in terms of its finances and its sustainability.’ This non-compliance with the NCCGZ could be interpreted in various ways in line with main theories discussed in chapter four of this thesis. The lack of sustainability reporting can be explained with reference to a range of weak market-based, societal, political, regulatory and ethical drivers for non-financial disclosures. For instance, the pressure on companies to disclose information on their social, environmental and ethical performance from stakeholder groups could be weak. This results in the reluctance to recognise stakeholder needs and demands by business, thus automatically leading to lower (and for some non-satisfactory) levels and quality of sustainability disclosures.

National Foods Holdings Limited

Natfoods Limited’s vision is to be the preferred supplier of branded FMCG and stock feed products in sub-Saharan Africa. The firm does flour and maize milling, prepacking and sale of dry groceries. Manufacturing of stock feeds, vitamin and mineral premixes for stock feed applications. It is the principal operating company amongst several subsidiary entities with the National Foods Holdings Limited group. According to the 2016 financial year chairman’s statement ‘The Group recorded a strong performance for the year under review, posting profit before tax of \$19.04 million which was 10% above the prior year. Given the difficult operating environment volume performance was encouraging, with 560,000 tons sold representing an increase of 13% over prior year. The increase was primarily driven by a strong performance from the maize division and to a lesser extent by beef feed. Revenue increased by 5.2% to \$330 million, while average selling prices declined by 7.3% due to increased maize sales in the mix,

lower flour prices on account of lower wheat pricing and general price discounting to hold share in an increasingly competitive market.

Annual reports, which incorporate a corporate governance report for the sampled period were produced by the company. The 2014-2016 annual reports for NatFoods were analysed and the following findings were noted. Details on board of directors and management structure is disclosed in the following sections of the company's annual reports: 'Directorate and Administration' and 'Corporate Governance'. The list of names of the main board of directors, classified into executive and non-executive directors is presented under the section 'Directorate and Administration' of the annual reports. In addition, the name of the chairperson of the board and the names of directors appointed for the various board committees are also listed in this section. The corporate governance section of the annual reports further reveals the board structure and composition and the role of the board including various board committees. For instance, the annual reports read 'The Boards of Directors of the Holding Company and of the Principal Operating Company retain full and effective control over the Group. The Boards meet regularly, no less than four times a year to review strategy, planning, operational performance, acquisitions and disposals, stakeholder communications and other material matters relating to performance of executive management. The majority of Directors of the Holding Company are non-executive bringing objective judgement to bear on issues of strategy and performance. The Group Chairman is an independent non-executive Director.' The above information on board of Natfoods' directors and management structure is found on pages 5 & 12 of the 2014 annual report, pages 7 & 12-15 of the 2015 annual report, pages 7 & 12-15 of the 2016 annual report.

Governance of risk and structure is an important category of disclosure and transparency. Details of the KPIs in this category are disclosed in the following sections of the Natfoods' annual reports: 'Directorate and Administration', 'Corporate Governance' and 'Notes to Financial Statements'. As board composition and structure is critical in risk management process, these details are disclosed to a larger extent in the 'Directorate and Administration' section of the annual reports. In addition, information about the audit committee and risk management committee was detailed in the 'Corporate Governance' section of the annual reports. Moreover, the annual reports disclose that the firm have a separate audit and risk committees. The audit committee details in the annual reports read 'The Group has an audit committee comprising of non-executive directors and is chaired by a non-executive director.

The external auditors have unrestricted access to this committee. The audit committee reviews the effectiveness of internal controls in the Group with reference to the findings of both the internal and external auditors.’ The risk management committee is mandated as follows ‘The Group has established a risk management committee which is responsible for overseeing and reporting on the overall group risk. This provides an on-going process for identifying, evaluating and managing the significant risks faced by the Group. This committee reports to the Board on key areas of risk that have been identified in the Group.’ Finally, financial risk management details are disclosed in the ‘Notes to Financial Statements’ section of the report. The company identified the main financial risks as treasury risk, credit risk, interest risk, liquidity risk and foreign currency risk and detailed the policies in place to mitigate against these risks. The above details are found on pages 5, 12 & 47 of the 2014 annual report, pages 7, 12-15 & 51 of the 2015 annual report, pages 7, 12-15 & 52 of the 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of Natfoods’ annual reports: ‘Financial Highlights and Value added Statements’, ‘Group structure’, ‘Directorate and Administration’, ‘Chairman Statement’, ‘Corporate governance’, ‘Review of Financials’, ‘Ratios and Statistics’, ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Statement of Directors’ responsibility’, ‘Report of the Independent auditors’, ‘Consolidated Financial Statements’, ‘Notes to the financial statements’ and ‘Company Statement of Financial Position’. Financial information is presented comprehensively in the form of financial highlights and value added statements, group financial statements and notes to the financial statements in accordance with international reporting standards and the Zimbabwe Companies Act as evidenced by the following statement in the ‘Statement of Directors’ responsibility’: ‘The financial statements have been prepared under the historical cost convention, are in agreement with the underlying books and records and have been properly prepared in accordance with the accounting policies set out in note 2 of the financial statements, and comply with International Financial Reporting Standards and the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the relevant regulations made thereunder.’ Sustainability information is generally disclosed to some extent, mainly in the ‘Chairman Statement’ and ‘Corporate governance’ sections of the annual reports. Some of the sustainability disclosure KPIs (e.g. Link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, an overview of trends in its industry, a discussion of corporate strategy, details of the products or services produced/provided, details of the nature of business it is in, etc.) are disclosed to a larger extent

in the chairman's statement. Some of the sustainability disclosure KPIs (Fair employment practices, fair labour practices, responsible corporate citizenship, effective leadership based on ethical foundation, reference to the NCCGZ or the ZimCode and corporate governance mechanisms) disclosed to a larger extent in corporate governance section of the annual reports. Information on auditors (e.g. the name of its auditing firm, the auditors' report and audit fees) is disclosed to a larger extent in the 'Directorate and Administration', 'Report of the Directors' and 'Report of the Independent auditors' sections of the annual reports. Finally, the accounting standards and frameworks used for the preparation of information are also disclosed. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 1-50 of the 2014 annual report, pages 1-55 of the 2015 annual report, pages 1- 57 of the 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of Natfoods' annual reports: 'Directors' Report', 'Shareholders Analysis' and 'Notice of Annual General Meeting'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and calendar are presented. The directors' report highlights the authorised share capital and issued share capital of the company. This section does not reveal the unissued share capital and directors' shareholding in the company. 'Shareholders' Analysis' section presents categories of shareholders and major shareholders (top ten shareholders). 'Notice of Annual General Meeting' section of the annual reports presents the date notification of the annual general meeting and agenda of the meeting. The above details are found on pages 17, & 51-53 of the 2014 annual report, pages 19, & 56-62 of the 2015 annual report, pages 19, & 58-62 of the 2016 annual report.

Natfoods' recent annual reports include a corporate governance report, articulating the Board composition and committees as well as pledging to observe the highest ethical standards consistent with the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. The corporation subscribes to the principles of discipline, independence, accountability, transparency, responsibility, integrity, fairness and social responsibility, identified as the primary characteristics of good governance in the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, contained within the King III Report on Corporate Governance, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance as highlighted on page 12 of 2015 annual report and the principles of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe as laid out in the Manual of Best Practice highlighted on page 12 of 2016 annual report. However, the company does not 'formally adopt a suitable reporting

framework for use by management in integrated and sustainability reporting’ as advocated by the NCCGZ (Paragraph 317 (b)). Corporate social responsibility and sustainability information is scattered in the annual reports, especially in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ section. The Financial information is comprehensive and complies with the Companies Act and IFRSs according to the company’s independent auditors’ report as written on page 19 of 2014 annual report; page 21 of 2015 and 2016 annual reports.

Padenga Holdings Limited

Padenga’s mission statement sums up the nature of Padenga’s business: ‘To be the principal and preferred supplier of premium grade crocodilian skins to the luxury brand houses of the world’. The chairman’s statement in 2016 annual report reads ‘The group once again achieved excellent results which were a consequence of surpassing the targeted crocodile skin sales volumes without compromising the premium quality grades required by the market, coupled with astute management of expenses. The group recorded an operating profit before depreciation, amortisation, impairment and fair valuation adjustments of \$12,615,760 (\$9,985,704 – FY15) from turnover of \$31,272,712 in the twelve months to December 2016. This compared to turnover of \$27,491,537 for the prior period to December 2015. The group benefited from an export incentive of \$1,393,460. Profit before tax increased by 11% over prior year to \$11,040,379 (\$9,950,208 – FY15)’.

Padenga Holdings produced annual reports, which incorporate a corporate governance report and a sustainability development report for the sampled period. These annual reports were analysed and the following findings were noted. The 2014-2016 annual reports for Padenga has each been divided into nineteen sections. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Corporate Information’, ‘Corporate Governance Statement’ and ‘Report of the Directors’. The ‘Corporate Information’ section reveals the full names and positions of the directorate and management, highlighting their role and composition. For instance, the annual reports state that ‘The primary responsibility of the Board is to discharge its fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders and the Group. The Board is accordingly, the highest policy organ of the Group and sets its strategy. Meeting quarterly, the Board receives and acts on key information pertaining to the operations of Padenga. The Board consists of three executive directors and three non-executive directors, comprising a cross-section of professionals and major shareholder representatives’. The ‘Corporate

Governance Statement' section present further details about the board composition, structure and roles as confirmed by the following statement in the annual reports 'The Board sub-committees are chaired by independent directors and have a majority of independent members.' In addition, full details of the board of directors are shown in this section (e.g. Details about current employment/position of directors, details about previous employment/positions, when each of the directors joined the board, etc.). All these detailed are written on pages 2, 8 & 15 of the 2014 annual report, pages 2, 7 & 16 of the 2015 annual report, pages 3, 7 & 19 of the 2016 annual report.

Details about the company's governance of risk and structure are disclosed in the following sections of Padenga's annual reports: 'Corporate Information', 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Report of Independent Auditors', and 'Notes to Financial Statements'. Details about the audit committee existence, composition and roles are presented in the 'Corporate Governance Statement' section of the annual reports 'Padenga has an audit committee that assists the Board in fulfilment of its duties. The committee currently comprises two independent non-executive Directors and one executive Director. An independent non-executive Director chairs the committee. The committee meets three times a year with the internal and external auditors to monitor the appropriateness of accounting policies, the effectiveness of systems of internal control and to consider the findings of the internal and external auditors. The committee's responsibilities include monitoring risk management, internal control, financial reporting and compliance matters...' The annual reports also disclose that risk management is a function of the audit committee instead of risk management committee. Financial risk management details are disclosed in the 'Notes to Financial Statements' section of the report. The annual reports read 'The Group's principal financial liabilities comprise bank loans, trade and other payables and overdrafts. The main purpose of these financial instruments is to raise finance for the Group's operations. The Group's principal financial assets include trade and other receivables and cash and cash equivalents. The main risks arising from the Group's financial instruments are interest rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign currency risk and credit risk. The board reviews and agrees policies for managing each of these risks'. The above details on the company's governance of risk and structure can be seen on pages 2, 8, 17 & 54 of the 2014 annual report, pages 2, 7, 18 & 54 of the 2015 annual report, pages 3, 7, 21 & 59 of the 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of Padenga's sampled annual reports: 'Mission Statement', 'Corporate Information', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman Statement', 'Corporate governance Statement', 'Sustainable Development Report', 'Directors' responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements', 'Company Secretary's Certification', 'Report of the Directors', 'Report of the Independent auditors', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Shareholders' Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Accounting Policies', and 'Notes to the financial statements'. Financial information is largely mandatory and is disclosed to a larger extent in the formats mandated by the various regulatory instruments as written in 'Directors' responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements' section of the annual reports that 'The Directors of the Company are required by the Companies Act and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange listing regulations to maintain adequate accounting records and to prepare financial statements that present a true and fair understanding of the state of affairs of the Company and the Group at the end of each financial year, and of the profit or loss and cash flows for the period. In preparing the accompanying financial statements, generally accepted accounting practices have been followed. Suitable accounting policies have been used and consistently applied, and reasonable and prudent judgements and estimates have been made...' Sustainability information is generally disclosed to a larger extent for some sustainability disclosure KPIs, mainly in the 'Sustainable Development Report', 'Chairman Statement' and 'Corporate governance' sections of the annual reports. For instance (a discussion of corporate strategy, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, Employee empowerment, Fair employment practices, community activities, material waste and spills, emission sustainability, water sustainability, energy sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, continuous stakeholders engagement, transparent and effective communication to stakeholders and responsible corporate citizenship) are disclosed to a larger extent in the 'Sustainable Development Report' section of the annual reports. To emphasise its commitment to sustainability reporting the annual reports read 'In recent years, there has been a measurable shift in the expectation of consumers globally with regards to the sustainable use of natural resources. These changing expectations have led to an increase in the demand for transparency pertaining to the manner in which businesses manage their operations, and Padenga is no exception to this. With this in mind, the company is committed to not only set the standards for sustainable development within the industry, but to also meet the expectations of the customers

and end users of the products produced by Padenga. To further this commitment, the company has engaged a consulting firm to advise on its sustainability reporting and to assist in developing this to the desired standards. Whilst looking to the future is imperative, the company has at the outset, maintained its focus on the management of the resources that are available to it as well as on minimising its environmental footprint.’ Stakeholder groups explicitly included are as follows: employees; customers; investors; government and regulators; community; suppliers and service providers. However, the sustainability development report does not refer to GRI G4 Sustainability reporting framework. The following sustainability performance KPIs: (a discussion of corporate strategy, details of the products or services produced/provided, details of the nature of business it is in and forward looking information) are disclosed to a larger extent in the chairman’s statement. Some of the sustainability disclosure KPIs (effective leadership based on ethical foundation, reference to the NCCGZ or the ZimCode and corporate governance mechanisms) are disclosed to a larger extent in ‘Corporate Governance section of the annual reports. Information on auditors (e.g. the name of its auditing firm, the auditors’ report and audit fees) is disclosed to a larger extent in the ‘Directorate and Administration’, ‘Report of the Directors’ and ‘Report of the Independent auditors’ sections of the annual reports. The details above are found on pages 2- 57 of 2014 annual report, pages 2-58 of 2015 annual report, pages 2- 63 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections of Padenga’s annual reports: ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Notes to the Financial Statements’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Shareholders’ Calendar’ and ‘Notice to Members’. The ‘Report of the Directors’ highlights the authorised share capital and issued share capital of the company. Directors’ shareholding in the company are given in Note 18 of the financial statements. This note also presents the number and par value of unissued shares. ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’ section presents categories of shareholders and major shareholders (top ten shareholders). ‘Notice of Annual General Meeting’ section of the annual reports presents the date notification of the annual general meeting and agenda of the meeting. Generally, information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented on pages 15, p.48 & 58-60 of 2014 annual report, pages 16, 48 & 59-61 of 2015 annual report, pages 19, 53 & 64-66 of 2016 annual report.

The corporate governance statement section in Padenga's most recent annual reports explicitly refer to the key principles outlined in the King Governance code, and the Principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe, as laid out in the Manual of Best Practice. Although the 'Sustainable Development Report' section in these recent annual reports does not make reference to the UN Sustainable Development Goals or GRI G4 Sustainability Reporting guidelines, the structure of this report is really impressive and comprehensive. The report discloses transparent and non-generic sustainability performance indicators including; sustainable farming operations, environmental sustainability, stakeholder engagement and corporate social responsibility and human capital management as written on pages 11-13 of 2014 annual report; pages 10-14 of 2015 annual report; pages 10-17 of 2016 annual report. This could be attributable to multinational affiliation level in Padenga as the other subsidiary entity for alligator operations are based in USA.

Seed Co Limited

On the first page of all the annual reports Seed Co Limited introduces itself as 'Seed Co Limited, a public listed company incorporated in Zimbabwe and quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, is the leading producer and marketer of certified crop seeds in Southern Africa'. The chairman's statement in the 2016 annual report reads 'Despite many exceptional negative factors, overall the Group produced outstanding results.'

Seed Co published annual reports comprising mainly the financial and corporate governance reports. Details on board of directors and management structure are disclosed in the following sections of Seed Co's annual reports: 'Board of directors', 'Group Administration' 'Report of the Directors' and 'Corporate Governance Statement'. The list of names of directors is presented in the 'Board of directors' section and the procedures of retirement and election of directors is discussed in 'Report of the Directors' section. The 'Corporate Governance Statement' reveals the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees as reflected in the following statement in the annual reports 'The Directors of Seed Co Limited are committed to the principles of good corporate governance. The Board is responsible to the shareholders for the performance of the Group, its strategy, values and governance. The Board is also committed to acting with utmost good faith in its dealings with all stakeholders. The Board is composed of twelve directors, the majority of whom are non-executive. Board meetings are held at least quarterly to monitor the performance of executive management and

deliberate on issues of company strategy and policy’. The above details are written on pages 12, 14, 17, & 62 of 2014 annual report, pages 16, 18, 24, & 72 of 2015 annual report, pages 16, 18, 22, & 69 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is in the sections of Seed Co’s annual reports: ‘Report of the directors’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Report of Independent Auditors’, ‘Group Administration’ and ‘Notes to Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. For instance, in the annual reports it is written ‘The Board delegates some of its responsibilities to the Audit Committee, which is composed of four non-executive directors. The Audit Committee liaises with the company’s external auditors on accounting, internal control and financial reporting matters... The Committees reviews the effectiveness of the internal control systems and risk management processes with the Group and has set up an internal audit unit to ensure compliance with rules, regulations and policies.’ Therefore, risk management is a function of the audit committee instead of a separate risk management committee. There is also a section on ‘Risk Management’ which reveals the principal risks identified, context, impact and mitigation measures by the Group. These details are written on pages 14, 17, 20, 52 & 62 of 2014 annual report, pages 18, 24, 28, 61 & 72 of 2015 annual report, pages 18, 20, 22, 26, 58 & 69 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections of Seed Co’s annual reports: ‘Performance Highlights’, ‘Contribution to Group Revenue’, ‘Chairman Statement’, ‘Group Chief Executive’s Review of Operations’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Corporate governance Statement’, ‘Directors’ Approval of Group Financial Statements’, ‘Report of the Independent auditors’, ‘Consolidated and Company Statement of Profit or Loss’, ‘Consolidated and Company Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows’, ‘Consolidated and Company Statement of Changes in Equity’, ‘Group Administration’ and ‘Notes to the financial statements’. The 2015 annual report has an additional section on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. Financial disclosure is significantly comprehensive in accordance with the law in Zimbabwe as asserted by directors in the ‘Directors’ Approval of Group Financial Statements’ section of the annual reports ‘These financial statements which have been prepared under the historical cost convention are in agreement with the underlying books and records and have been properly prepared in

accordance with the accounting policies set out in note 2 of the financial statements, and comply with the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the relevant regulations made there under. The financial statements comply with the requirements of IFRS.’ Some of the sustainability information is generally disclosed to a larger extent in the ‘Chairman Statement’, ‘Group Chief Executive’s Review of Operations’ and ‘Corporate governance Statement’ sections of the annual reports. For example, (a discussion of corporate strategy, targets and KPIs, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, details of the nature of business it is in, market share for any or all of its businesses and forward looking information) are disclosed in the ‘Chairman Statement’, ‘Group Chief Executive’s Review of Operations’ sections. The above information is detailed on pages 2-58 & 62 of 2014 annual report, pages 2-66, 70, & 72 of 2015 annual report, pages 2- 65 & 69 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections of Seed Co’s annual reports: ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Analysis of Shareholders’, and ‘Notice to Shareholders’. The ‘Report of the Directors’ highlights the authorised share capital and issued share capital of the company. ‘Analysis of Shareholders’ section presents categories of shareholders and major shareholders (top ten shareholders). ‘Notice to Shareholders’ section of the annual reports presents the date notification of the annual general meeting and agenda of the meeting. In summary, these sections reveal information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar as disclosed on pages 14 & 59-61 of 2014 annual report, pages 18 & 67-69 of 2015 annual report, pages 18 & 66-68 of 2016 annual report.

The annual reports disclose in the ‘corporate governance’ section that the Group has adopted a Corporate Governance Manual that sets out in detail, the basic corporate governance principles that will be pursued by Seed Co Limited. The reports do not refer to any code of best practice or the NCCGZ. The financial statements are comprehensive and are prepared in compliance with the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) as disclosed in the section ‘Directors’ Approval of Group Financial Statements’. It is interesting to underline that in general the annual reports lacks sustainability reporting, although only the 2015 annual report includes a section on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’.

Banking and Financial Sector

As at 31 December 2016, there were 18 operating banking institutions, as well as above 181 registered money lending and credit-only microfinance institutions, 4 deposit-taking microfinance institutions, and 2 development institutions under the supervision of the RBZ. In 2016 the banking sector generally remained safe and sound as reported by the RBZ, in spite of the challenging operating environment. Default risk remains the most significant challenge facing the banking sector, whilst liquidity constraints also compound the smooth operation of some banking institutions. During the period under review, a number of financial soundness indicators, as reported by the RBZ in its 2017 Monetary Policy Statement, also improved, amongst them; Total Assets, Total Loans, Net Capital Base, Total Deposits, Net Profit, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Capital Adequacy Ratios, Loans to Deposits and Non-Performing Loans Ratios. Moreover, the quantum of deposits held by the banking sector improved substantially relative to inflation, registering an annual growth of 19.2%, from US\$4.765 billion in December 2015 to US\$5.681 billion in December 2016. Credit growth in the banking sector remained subdued during 2016, with banking sector loans and advances declining from US\$3.81 billion reported as at 31 December 2015 to US\$3.69 billion as at 31 December 2016. In 2016 the financial services sector contributed about 7% to GDP and total banking sector assets grew by 9.6% from US\$10.26 billion in September 2017 to US\$11.25 billion at the end of 2017.

Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited

The chairman's statement in the 2014 annual report reads 'At 103 years of operating in the country, and counting up, Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe is resolute in its chosen Purpose: to help people achieve their ambitions - in the right way. The Bank's shares continued to be widely and publicly held. The customer base has continued to grow. The Bank has also continued to create employment and provide career fulfilment opportunities to its employees. Over this period, the Bank has sustained a community involvement agenda; the thrust over the last two years being to empower youths through skills transfer and partnerships on programs designed to unlock their potential. The Bank is committed to continue to provide opportunity for its various stakeholders to prosper.' It is worth noting that at the time of writing of this thesis, Barclays Bank notified the public that they will be undergoing a name change from Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited to First Capital Bank Limited. However, in this thesis the name 'Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited' will be maintained since it existed during the sample period.

The recent annual reports for Barclays has each been divided into several sections. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directors' Report' and 'Corporate Governance Statement'. The list of directors and their composition is disclosed in the 'Directors' Report'. The board structure and role is highlighted in the 'Corporate Governance Statement' which reads 'The Board of Directors is led by an independent non-executive Chairman, thereby ensuring effective and constructive checks and balances between executive management and the Board. The Board of Directors held eight (8) board meetings for the year ended 31 December 2014 pursuant to execution of the Board's mandate. Special focus was given to the strategy of the bank with three (3) of the Board meetings being strategy review meetings. The Board comprised two executive directors and five independent non-executive directors. The Board has delegated some of its duties and responsibilities to sub-committees to ensure the efficient discharge of the Board's mandate'. The disclosures on board of directors and management structure are highlighted on pages 6 & 7 of 2014 annual report; pages 8 & 9 of 2015 annual report, pages 2 of 2016.

Information on governance of risk and structure is disclosed in the following sections of Barclays' annual reports: 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Independent Auditors' Report', and 'Notes to Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. For instance the annual reports reveal the functions of the audit committee as expressed by the following statement: 'The primary functions of the Committee are to review the Bank's accounting policies, the contents of the financial reports, disclosure controls and procedures, management's approach to internal controls, the adequacy and scope of the external and internal audit functions, compliance with regulatory and financial reporting requirements, oversee the relationship with the Bank's external auditors, as well as providing assurance to the Board that management's control assurance processes are being implemented and are complete and effective. At each meeting, the Committee reviews reported and noted weaknesses in controls and any deficiencies in systems and the remediation plans to address them. The Committee also monitors the ethical conduct of the Bank, its executives and senior officers and advises the Board as to whether or not the Bank is complying with the aims and objectives for which it has been established.' The annual reports also disclose that risk management is a function of the audit committee instead of a separate risk management committee 'This Committee ensures that the management and operation of the Bank's business

is done within the governance and control framework established by Barclays and other regulatory bodies. It determines and approves business level policies, ensuring alignment and consistency with the Barclays Group policies. It assists the Board of Directors in the discharge of its duties relating to corporate accountability and associated risks in terms of management, assurance and reporting. At every meeting, the Committee reviews internal audit reports and assesses the integrity of the risk control systems as well as ensuring that the risk policies and strategies are effectively managed. The Committee also monitors external developments relating to the practice of corporate accountability and reporting of specific associated risks, including emerging risks and their potential impact'. Details on governance of risk and structure are written on pages 7, 8, 10 & 45 of 2014 annual report; pages 8, 9, 12 & 41 of 2015 annual report and pages 2 & 6 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of Barclays' annual reports: 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman Statement', 'Managing Director's Review of Operations', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate governance Statement', 'Independent auditor's Report', 'Statement of Financial Position', 'Statement of Profit or Loss and other Comprehensive Income', 'Statement of Cash Flows', 'Statement of Changes in Equity', and 'Notes to the financial statements'. Financial information is disclosed to a larger extent in the financial statements. Some sustainability KPIs (a discussion of corporate strategy, targets and KPIs, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, details of the nature of business it is in, market share for any or all of its businesses, employee empowerment, community activities disclosure, responsible corporate citizenship, corporate governance mechanisms and forward looking information) were disclosed in the 'Chairman Statement', 'Managing Director's Review of Operations' and 'Corporate governance Statement'. Information on auditors (name of its auditing firm, the auditors' report and audit fees to the auditor) is disclosed in 'Directors' Report' and 'Independent auditor's Report' sections of the annual reports. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed in the 'Notes to the financial statements' section. The above information is detailed on pages 2-59 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-59 of 2015 annual report and pages 2- 59 of 2016 annual report.

Details of ownership and control structure are disclosed in the following sections of Barclays' annual reports: 'Report of the Directors', 'Analysis of Shareholding', 'Notice of Annual

General Meeting’ and ‘Annual General Meeting Form of Proxy’. Details about the number and par value of authorised share capital and issued share capital are presented in the ‘Report of the Directors’ section of the annual reports. Categories and number of shareholding by category are disclosed in the ‘Analysis of Shareholding’ section of the annual reports. Finally, ‘Notice to Shareholders’ section of the annual reports presents the date notification of the annual general meeting and agenda of the meeting. Basically, information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar is disclosed on pages 6 & 60-63 of 2014 annual report; pages 8 & 60-63 of 2015 annual report; pages 7 & 60-63 of 2016 annual report.

The Bank subscribes to the principles of international best practice as guided by, among others, local regulatory and the Barclays Group Corporate Governance guidelines as disclosed on page 7 of 2014 annual report and page 8 of 2015 annual report. In addition, the 2016 annual report discloses that the Bank subscribes to the principles of international best practice in corporate governance as guided by, among others, the Banking Act, the Corporate Governance Guideline, the National Code on Corporate Governance (NCCGZ), the King III report on Corporate Governance as well as the Barclays Group Corporate Governance guidelines. Sustainability information is fragmented in various parts of the annual reports but mostly in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ and ‘Managing Director’s Statement’ sections. The financial statements are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and in the manner required by the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) and the Banking Act (Chapter 24.20) as disclosed on page 10 of 2014 & 2015 annual reports and page 2 of 2016 annual report.

CBZ Holdings Limited

The following details are disclosed in the recent CBZ annual reports ‘Established in 1980, as the Bank of Credit and Commerce Zimbabwe Limited (BCCZ) - a joint venture between the Government of Zimbabwe and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International Holdings Limited (BCCIH) –CBZ Holdings Limited has grown through diversification, organic growth and acquisitions to become a diversified financial services Group. CBZ Holdings Limited is a diversified financial services Group listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and operates throughout Zimbabwe, employing 1 359 staff. The Group has subsidiaries in Banking, Insurance (long and short term) and Asset Management. In addition, the Group has a significant

property portfolio managed by its subsidiary, CBZ Properties (Private) Limited.’ CBZ discloses that ‘The Group and its subsidiaries continued to post commendable profits in the year 2016. This was achieved through a number of initiatives, including cost containment and promotion of high volumes of transactions across the Group.’

The analysis of the recent annual reports for CBZ resulted in the findings discussed below. Details on board of directors and management structure are disclosed in the following sections of CBZ’s annual reports: ‘Corporate Governance Statement’ and ‘Financial Statements’. The list of directors, size, role, structure and their composition is disclosed in the ‘Corporate Governance Statement’. The annual reports highlight that ‘The primary role of the Board is that of trusteeship to protect and enhance shareholder value through strategic direction to the Company. As trustees, the Board has fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the Company has clear goals aligned to shareholder value and its growth. The Board exercises its duties with care, skill and diligence and exercises independent judgment. The Board sets strategic goals and seeks accountability for their fulfilment. The Board also directs and exercises appropriate control to ensure that the Company is managed in a manner that fulfils stakeholders’ aspirations and societal expectations. We believe that our Board requires an appropriate mix of Directors to maintain its independence, and separate its functions of governance and management. The Company’s Board size is determined by: -

Provisions in terms of the Articles of Association Article 79 of the Articles of Association of the Company provides as follows: -

“Until otherwise determined by the Company in a general meeting, there shall be not less than four (4) or more than thirteen (13) Directors.” This information is detailed on pages 42-50 & 56 of 2014 annual report; pages 58-81 & 86 of 2015 annual report and pages 54-90 & 98 of 2016 annual report.

Information on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the CBZ’s annual reports: ‘Corporate Governance Statement’, and ‘Financial Statements’. The annual reports disclose the Audit and finance committee report, part of which reads ‘The Committee considers the adequacy and effectiveness of Group internal controls. Its main objective is to provide effective financial governance in respect of the Group’s financial results, the performance of both the internal audit function and the external auditors, and the management of the Group’s systems of internal control, business risks and related compliance

activities.’ The annual reports also disclose the existence of a risk management committee ‘The Committee assists the Board in discharging its responsibilities in overseeing, reviewing and recommending to the Board, the establishment of a risk management policy and the management of the Group’s compliance with statutes, directives and internal policies. The functions of the Committee include:

- Reviewing of the Company’s risk management and compliance framework as well as setting the risk appetite;
- Reviewing of risk and compliance reports and management of risk; and
- Reviewing arrangements established by management for compliance with regulatory financial reporting and best practice requirements including the requirements and recommendations of relevant regulatory or supervisory bodies.’

Therefore, in general these sections of the annual reports disclose information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management as disclosed on pages 42-50, 57 & 77 of 2014 annual report; pages 58-81, 87 & 110 of 2015 annual report and pages 54-90, 99 & 127 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of CBZ’s annual reports: ‘Group Overview’, ‘Group Communication Statements’, ‘Corporate Profile’, ‘Shareholder Information’, ‘Subsidiaries Communication Statements’, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Financial Statements’ and ‘Other’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. Financial information is disclosed to a larger extent comprehensively as per statutory requirements. The annual reports reveals that ‘The Directors are responsible for keeping proper accounting records that disclose with reasonable accuracy at any time the financial position of the Group and enable them to ensure that the financial statements comply with the Companies Act Chapter (24:03). They have general responsibility for taking such steps as are reasonably open to them to safeguard the assets of the Group and to prevent and detect fraud and other irregularities. The Directors are responsible for preparing the Annual Report and Group financial statements. These Statements have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Statements (IFRS), (promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which include standards and interpretations approved by the IASB as well as International Accounting Standards (IAS) and Standing Interpretations Committee

(SIC) interpretations issued under previous constitutions); the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), Grouping Act (Chapter 24:20), Insurance Act (Chapter 24:07); the Building Societies Act (Chapter 24:02) and Statutory Instruments (SI 33/99 and SI 62/99).’ Sustainability information is to a large extent detailed in the ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ sections of the annual reports. This section focussed on the environmental and social sustainability KPIs disclosure. For instance, it is reported in the annual reports that ‘CBZ Holdings remains cognisant of the impact of its operations on the environment. Our operations are closely scrutinized to strict monitoring of: Utilisation of resources; location of our activities; waste management and impact of our activities on natural habitats. CBZ Holdings has a clearly defined Corporate Social Responsibility policy which was signed off by the Group Executive Committee and communicated to all staff members. The policy together with other Group policies are uploaded on the Group’s Intranet platform which is accessible to all staff members. Our Corporate Social Investment (CSI) focus areas and initiatives are uploaded on our website.’ Several awards and recognitions have been achieved in corporate governance practices as evidenced in the annual reports ‘CBZ Holdings continued to seamlessly integrate corporate governance practices into its operations. Our efforts did not go unnoticed at the country’s highly acclaimed corporate governance awards, the Institute of Chartered Secretaries of Zimbabwe (ICSAZ) recognised CBZ Holdings through a number of awards’. This information is found on pages 2-128 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-167 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-191 of 2016 annual report. The 2015 and 2016 annual reports disclose how CBZ creates value. On page 3 of both annual reports, it is written; ‘In conducting its business, the Group identifies key value pillars which drive current and future growth. Effective implementation of these value drivers, has seen the Group operating profitably over the years. We highlight in the following pages, how these pillars have contributed to the Group’s success by creating stakeholder value.’ This is an evidence that CBZ is adopting IIRC reporting framework, although a lot of improvement is required for the report to comply with the framework.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of the CBZ’s annual reports: ‘Shareholder Information’, and ‘Other’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Shareholder categories and number of shareholding are presented in the ‘Shareholder Information’ section of the annual reports. Notice to members, date and agenda of annual general meeting are disclosed in ‘Other’ section of the annual reports. The

information on ownership and control structure are detailed on pages 18-20 & 125-128 of 2014 annual report; pages 26-28 & 163-167 of 2015 annual report and pages 26-28 & 188-191 of 2016 annual report.

CBZ includes in its detailed ‘Corporate Governance’ section explanation of their governance framework and how they are aimed at ensuring the ongoing sustainability of the business, and the creation of long-term shareholder value. Detailed descriptions of the responsibilities and the tasks of the board and committees are included as well as an extensive explanation of the risk management and compliance function. Moreover, the reports disclose that the Group has in all material respects voluntarily applied the 2009 King Code of Governance Principles (King III) and complied with other mandatory corporate governance provisions in Zimbabwe which include the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Guidelines and the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20) as well as the recently launched Zimbabwe Code on Corporate Governance. Overall this highly contributes to insight into the strategic decision-making process of the company. The corporate social responsibility report integrated in to the annual reports is interesting though it is mainly descriptive with no or little metrics to support the narrative. This renders it less effective in terms of communication impact, reporting and accountability. Sustainability performance is also disclosed in this CSR report and in many parts of the annual reports including the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ and the ‘Group CEO’s Report’. It is interesting to note the 2015 and 2016 annual reports highlight the value creation process without making specific reference to the IIRC framework. On page 3 of 2015 & 2016 annual reports, it is disclosed that ‘In conducting our business, the Group identifies key value pillars which drive current and future growth. Effective implementation of our value drivers, has seen the Group operating profitably over the years. We highlight in the following pages, how these pillars have contributed to Group success by creating stakeholder value.’

FBC Holdings Limited

FBC Holdings is an investment holding company listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, whose principal activities are domiciled in Zimbabwe. The Group offers diverse financial services through subsidiaries that span commercial banking, mortgage financing, short-term insurance, re-insurance, securities trading and micro financing. The Group comprises FBC Bank Limited, FBC Building Society, FBC Reinsurance Limited, FBC Securities (Private) Limited, Eagle Insurance Company Limited, and Micro-Plan Financial Services (Private)

Limited. The 2016 annual report reveals that ‘Group profit after tax increased by 21% to US\$21.9 million compared to US\$18.1 million for the prior year, on the back of a 14% improvement in the Group’s total income. Total income increased to US\$93 million from US\$81.9 million, underpinned by a 22% increase in net interest income from US\$36.6 million to US\$44.8 million and a net fee and commission income growth of 24% from US\$20.9 million to US\$25.9 million. The aforementioned revenue lines benefitted from an improvement in net interest margins and increased transaction volumes due to widespread adoption and use of e-commerce driven platforms.’

The findings of the analysis of FBC’s recent annual reports are detailed below. Information on board of directors and management structure is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directors’ report’, ‘Board of Directors’, and ‘Corporate Governance’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Details on board structure and composition (e.g. the name of the chairman of the Board and whether an independent non-executive director, a list of directors and details about the directors, that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors who are independent, details about current employment/position of directors, when each of the directors joined the board and classification of directors as an executive or an outside director) are disclosed in the ‘Board of Directors’ section of the report. The structure and role of the Board are detailed in the ‘Corporate Governance’ section of the annual reports which reads ‘The Board meets regularly, with a minimum of four scheduled meetings annually. To assist the Board in the discharge of its responsibilities a number of committees have been established.’ The information on board of directors and management structure is detailed on pages 42-50 & 56 of 2014 annual report; pages 20, 25 & 27 of 2015 annual report and pages 29-32, 34-35 & 36-41 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is in the following sections of FBC’s annual reports: ‘Corporate Governance’, and ‘Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent. The annual reports disclose details about the Audit committee that ‘The Committee is chaired by a non-executive director and comprises of independent non-executive directors only. All the members of the Audit Committee were subjected to an assessment of their independence at the end of 2016 in line

with the provisions of the King IV Report on corporate governance. All the members passed the independence test. The Divisional Director of Internal Audit, the Group Chief Executive, the Group Finance Director and other executives attend the committee by invitation. The Committee is constituted at Group level and oversees subsidiary companies. The Committee meets regularly to: Review compliance with statutory regulations, review the effectiveness of internal controls, review and approve the financial statements and review reports of both internal and external auditors' findings and instituting special investigations where necessary.' The annual reports also disclose about the risk management committee that 'The Risk and Compliance Committee is constituted at Group level and is responsible for the group risk management function. It is chaired by a non-executive director. The Committee's primary objective is to maintain oversight of the Group's risk and regulatory compliance processes and procedures and monitor their effectiveness.' In addition, the annual reports also disclose that 'FBC Holdings Limited manages risk through a comprehensive framework of risk principles, organisational structure and risk processes that are closely aligned with the activities of the entities in the Group.' The most important risks that the Group is exposed to are: credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, reputational risk, strategic risk, operational risk and compliance risk. The information on governance of risk and structure is highlighted on pages 25 & 88 of 2014 annual report; pages 27 & 82 of 2015 annual report and pages 36-41 & 95 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in FBC's annual reports sections as follows: 'Group Structure', 'Destiny, Cause and Calling', 'General Information', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Group Chief Executive's Report', 'Directors' Report', 'Board of Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Independent Auditor's report', 'Consolidated and Company Statements of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statement'. The 2016 annual report has additional sections; 'FBC Footprint', 'Our Pillars of Strength', 'Our Promise to Our Stakeholders', 'Sustainability Report', and 'Company Secretary's Certification'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial information and other mandatory information is disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports to a larger extent. The annual reports read 'The Directors are responsible for the preparation and the integrity of

the financial statements that fairly present the state of the affairs of the Group as at the end of the financial year, the statement of comprehensive income, changes in equity and cash flows for the year and other information contained in this report. The Group's financial statements have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") and International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee ("IFRIC") interpretations and in the manner required by the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), and the relevant Statutory Instruments ("SI") SI 33/99 and SI 62/96. The financial statements are based on statutory records that are maintained under the historical cost convention as modified by the revaluation of property, plant and equipment, investment property and financial assets at fair value through profit or loss.' Sustainability disclosure KPIs are detailed in the 'Sustainability Report' section of the 2016 annual report and also in the 'Chairman's Statement', 'Group Chief Executive's Report' and 'Corporate Governance' sections of the annual reports during the sample period. The KPIs disclosed are as follows: The company refers to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, accolades or awards won on governance and sustainability operations/reporting, emission sustainability, material waste and spills, fair labour practices, continuous stakeholders engagement, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, biodiversity sustainability, targets and KPIs, a discussion of corporate strategy, its market share for any or all of its businesses, etc. The bank also won two Corporate Governance Awards at the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in Zimbabwe (ICSAZ) Excellence in Corporate Governance Awards Dinner held in 2016 as follows: (Best Banking Internal Audit Disclosure - 2nd Prize and Best Banking Risk Management Practices - 2nd Prizes. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 4-118 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-119 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-127 of 2016. The 2016 annual report provides stand-alone sustainability report integrated to the annual report found on pages 20-28.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directors' report', 'Shareholder's Information', 'Notice of Annual General Meeting', and 'Proxy Form'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Number and par value of authorised and issued share capital is disclosed in the 'Directors' report' section. The categories and number of shares are shown in the 'Shareholder's Information' section. Notice to members, date and agenda of annual general meeting are disclosed in 'Other' section of the

annual reports Ownership and control structure KPIs are detailed on pages 119-121 of 2014 annual report; pages 120-122 of 2015 annual report and pages 136-139 of 2016 annual report.

FBC annual reports disclose in the 'Corporate Governance' section that the Board is committed to the principles of openness, integrity and accountability. It recognises the developing nature of corporate governance and assesses its compliance with local and international generally accepted corporate governance practices on an ongoing basis through its various subcommittees. In addition, the bank from time to time strictly adheres to Guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and continuously reviews compliance check lists. It is worth noting that FBC presented its first 'Sustainability Report' prepared in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G4 Guidelines in the 2016 annual report. Sustainability information is disclosed to a larger extent but lacks financial metrics for effective communication. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'Our compliance to sustainability reporting is further enhanced by the presence of foreign shareholders in our shareholding structure in the form of Shore Cap II Limited and Concillium who require that the Group constantly report certain ESG aspects of our business on an annual basis.' This implies that multinationality affiliation in FBC influenced the extent of disclosures. Financial information is largely disclosed to a larger extent since this disclosure is mandatory.

NMBZ Holdings Limited

The NMBZ Holdings Group (the Group) comprises the company (NMBZ Holdings Limited) and the operating subsidiaries, NMB Bank Limited (the Bank) and Stewart Holdings Limited (equity holdings). The Bank was established in 1993 as a merchant bank incorporated under the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and is now registered as a commercial bank in terms of the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20). It operates through a branch network in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru. The Bank's branch network is constantly growing to service customers and meet demands in suitable and convenient locations. Set out below are the Bank's branch locations. The recent annual reports for NMBZ has each been divided into several sections. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the following sections of NMBZ's annual reports: 'Report of the Directors' and 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. It is worth noting the annual reports clearly made a distinction between independent and non-executive directors. Board of directors and management structure KPIs

are detailed on pages 8-15 of 2014 annual report; pages 7-15 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-13 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the sections; 'Report of the Directors', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Independent Auditors' Report', and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that board committees include an audit committee and risk management committee. The committee oversees the Group's financial reporting process, monitoring the integrity and appropriateness of the Group's financial statements; evaluating the adequacy of the Group's financial and operational processes, compliance, internal controls and risk management processes and the selection, compensation, independence and performance of the Group's external and internal auditors. The risk management committee oversees the quality, integrity and reliability of the Group's risk management systems and reviews all group-wide risks. Details on governance of risk and structure of the company are found on page 8-16 & 33-80 of 2014 annual report; pages 7-16 & 30-86 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-17 & 30-77 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Financial Summary', 'Enquiries', 'Group Profile', 'Chairman Statement', 'Report of the Directors', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Report of the Independent Auditors', 'Statements of Comprehensive Income', 'Statements of Financial Position', 'Statements of Changes in Equity', 'Statements of Cash Flows', 'Significant Accounting Policies', 'Notes to the Financial Statements' and 'Historical Five Year Financial Summary'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. For instance in the 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility' section of the annual report reads 'The Group's Directors are responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these consolidated and separate financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and in the manner required by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) of Zimbabwe and the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20) of Zimbabwe and for such internal control as the directors determine necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.' In the annual reports, the directors of the bank

also assert that ‘The Group recognises its responsibility in the society within which it operates. The Group’s social investments were channelled into the country’s educational system, the disadvantaged, vulnerable groups, protection of the environment, wildlife conservation, the arts and various sporting disciplines.’ The annual reports however do not include any detailed sustainability report to substantiate this assertion except for scanty details in the ‘Chairman Statement’ section of the annual reports. Information management and disclosure KPIs are disclosed on pages 2-83 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-89 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-80 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Notice to Members’, ‘Explanation Regarding the Notice of the Annual General Meeting’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Shareholders’ Information’, ‘Secretary and Registered Office’ and ‘Annual General Meeting Form of Proxy’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Number and par value of authorised and issued share capital is disclosed in the ‘Report of the Directors’ section. Board interest and ownership is also outlined in this section. The categories and number of shares are shown in the ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’ section. Notice to members, date and agenda of annual general meeting are disclosed in ‘Notice to Members’ section of the annual reports. Ownership and control structure KPIs are highlighted on pages 8-13 & 84-90 of 2014 annual report; pages 7-13 & 90-99 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-11 & 81-90 of 2016 annual report.

NMBZ Holdings Limited adheres to international best practice with regards to corporate governance. In particular, the group emulates corporate governance principles set out in the Combined Code of the United Kingdom, the King III report of South Africa and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Corporate Governance Guideline as disclosed on page 12 of 2014 & 2015 annual reports and page 10 of 2016 annual report. The 2015 annual report discloses that since the National Code on Corporate Governance (NCCGZ) was launched more recently, the Group is working on adopting principles enunciated in this code as well. Sustainability information is generally disclosed to a lesser extent and can be gleaned from various sections of the reports, particularly the ‘Chairman’s Statement’. Financial information is disclosed mostly to a larger extent as this disclosure is required by law. In general, there is no

improvement in disclosure and transparency pattern in all categories as it seems that a consistent reporting template is being over the recent years.

ZB Financial Holdings Limited

ZB Financial Holdings Limited (ZBFH) was incorporated in May 1989, as the holding company for a group of companies which had been providing commercial banking, merchant banking and other financial services since 1967.

The recent annual reports for ZB has each been divided into several sections and the key findings of the analysis are as follows: Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections; 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Directorate', 'Report of the Directors' and 'Directors' Statement of Responsibility'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Some of the KPIs disclosed to a larger extent in this category are: disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors; disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions; the number of board meetings attended provided; disclosure on whether they provide director training and evaluation and a list of directors and details about the directors. The information on board of directors and management structure is detailed on pages 10, 15, 34 & 36 of 2014 annual report; pages 12, 17, 37 & 39 of 2015 annual report and pages 13, 18, 41 & 44 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure KPIs are detailed in the following sections of the ZB's annual reports: 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Report of the Directors', 'Directors' Statement of Responsibility', 'Independent Auditors' Report', and 'Notes to Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that board committees include a separate audit committee and risk management committee. The Audit Committee comprises three non- executive directors and the following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent: disclosure that; the committee is effective and independent, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, that the committee oversees internal audit and that the committee is integral to the risk management process. The Risk Management Committee comprises two non-executive directors and one executive director and the following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent: Disclosure that; the risk management committee assists the Board in carrying out its risk responsibilities, the Board ensures that risk

assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis, risk frameworks and methodologies are in place, the details of the range and type of risk control measures and that management implements appropriate responses to risk. The details on governance of risk and structure KPIs are written on pages 10-15, p.34-36 & 117 of 2014 annual report; pages 12-17, p.37-39, 42 & 115 of 2015 annual report and pages 13-19, 41-44, 47 & 61-156 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed in the following sections of ZB's annual reports: 'Corporate Information', 'Vision, Mission and Values', 'Group Corporate Structure', 'Company and Product Profile', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directorate', 'Corporate Social Investment Initiatives', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Group Chief Executive's Report', 'Economic Overview', 'Five Year Financial Review', 'Report of the Directors', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Extracts from the Report of the Actuary', 'Report of the Independent Auditors', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Company Statement of Financial Position', 'Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Company Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Statements of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated and Separate financial statements' and 'Group Footprint'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial information is disclosed to a larger extent due to its mandatory nature. The annual reports read that 'The directors of the Group take full responsibility for the preparation and the integrity of the consolidated and separate annual financial statements and financial information included in this report. The financial statements are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20), the Building Society Act (Chapter 24:02), the Insurance Act (Chapter 24:07) and the relevant statutory instruments (SI33/99 and SI62/96).' However, sustainability KPIs information are generally disclosed to a lesser extent mainly in the 'Corporate Social Investment Initiatives', 'Chairman's Statement' and 'Group Chief Executive's Report' sections of the annual reports. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on pages 1-142 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-137 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-157 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of ZB's annual reports: 'Report of the Directors', 'Notice to Shareholders', 'Shareholders' Information', 'Detachable Form of Proxy'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Number and par value of authorised and issued share capital is disclosed in the 'Report of the Directors' section. The categories and number of shares are shown in the 'Shareholders' Information' section. Notice to members, date and agenda of annual general meeting are disclosed in 'Notice to Shareholders' section of the annual reports. Ownership and control structure information is detailed on pages 3-4 & 147 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-4 & 143 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-5 & 163 of 2016 annual report.

ZB's 2014 annual report discloses that ZB Financial Holdings Limited (ZBFH) is listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and upholds the principles of the code of corporate practices and conduct contained in the third report of the King Commission (King III Report on Corporate Governance) as well as the listing requirements of the ZSE. The Group complies with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements and the provisions of its Memorandum and Articles of Association at all times. Both 2015 and 2016 annual reports disclose that ZB endeavours at all times to uphold principles of good corporate practice and conduct as enunciated in the Zimbabwean National Code on Corporate Governance which was launched on the 9th of April, 2015. The Group also complies at all material times with the Continuing Listing Requirements of the ZSE, the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03), the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20), the Building Society Act (Chapter 24:02), the Insurance Act (Chapter 24:07), any regulations made under these acts, general laws governing trade in Zimbabwe. The corporate governance report discloses significantly the corporate governance mechanisms in place and also the financial and ownership structure information is disclosed to a larger extent due to regulatory requirements. The company does not produce a stand-alone sustainability report integrated in the annual reports. However, within the 'Corporate Governance' section of the annual reports, there is a section on Corporate Social Investment which details 'initiatives focused on creating a sustainable social and economic impact, empowering communities whilst engendering increased environmental awareness'.

Mining and Engineering Sector

According to Mapira (2017) mining plays a key role in Zimbabwe's economy, contributing 5% and 23% to the country's gross domestic (GDP) and total exports, respectively. It also generates foreign currency and supplies raw materials to some industries. As a 'robber' industry, it extracts minerals from the earth without replacing them. It also creates deep shafts and ugly pits which damage the landscape. In addition, it causes environmental pollution and is a threat to the tranquillity of the natural environment. Pindiriri (2018) writes that macroeconomic problems which include among others low demand, cash challenges, low investment, and lack of foreign currency continue to haunt the engineering & iron and steel sector. Other micro problems being faced by the sector include power outages, unavailability of raw materials, high utility costs & local fees and competition from cheap imports. The findings show a dire situation of the sector. The sector has continued to deteriorate since 2004. Many large firms in the sector have significantly down scaled through retrenchments and non-replacement of leaving workers. Today about 68 per cent of the businesses in the engineering & iron and steel sector employ less than 20 people.

The mining sector is estimated to have grown by 6.9% in 2016, underpinned by significant output growth for minerals such as platinum (19.4%), nickel (11.7%), gold (8.9%) and copper (8.2%). Growth in output was complemented by modest recovery in the prices of platinum (7.7%) and gold (5.1%) between January and December 2016. Meanwhile, the country recorded a 17% rise in gold delivered to Fidelity Printers and Refiners (FPR) from 18.3 tonnes in 2015 to 21.4 tonnes in 2016. Gold delivery to FPR, excluding gold from the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), is expected to reach 25 tonnes in 2017. The rise in gold output is mainly attributable to growth in the contribution of small-scale miners. Statistics show that small-scale producers contributed 9.7 tonnes, while primary producers totalled 11.7 tonnes in 2016. According to the World Platinum Investment Council (WPIC) 4th Quarter 2016 Report, Zimbabwe registered an 18.5% increase in refined platinum production, from 405 000 ounces in 2015 to 480 000 ounces in 2016.

RioZim Limited

The 2016 annual report reads 'The year 2016 marked the 60th anniversary of nationally recognised and respected brand and company, RioZim Limited ("RioZim"). Founded in 1956, the Company was initially incorporated to develop and mine the Empress Nickel deposit in Kadoma, Zimbabwe. However, the Company has over the years managed to diversify and

expand its business to mining gold, chrome, coal and diamonds. At the heart of RioZim's operations is its commitment to the communities within which it operates. The Group's revenue grew by 15% to US\$65.2million up from US\$56.5million in 2015, despite Empress Nickel Refinery ("ENR") remaining under care and maintenance. The Group closed the year with a net profit after tax of US\$2.5million (2015: US\$8.8million loss) for the first time since the introduction of the multicurrency system.'

The recent annual reports for Rio were analysed and the following findings were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure KPIs is detailed in the following sections of RioZim's annual reports; 'Directorate', 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Report of the Directors' and 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in these sections: disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, number of board meetings attended, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director and the name of the chairman of the Board. Information on board of directors and management structure KPIs is disclosed on pages 5 & 18-22 of 2014 annual report; pages 6 & 24-29 of 2015 annual report and pages 7 & p.23-28 of 2016 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Report of the Directors', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent Auditors' Report', and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports disclose that a combined Audit and Risk Committee exists. The committee's responsibilities include the review of internal controls, the review of accounting policies and important accounting issues, establishing appropriate risk and control policies and assuring the integrity and reliability of financial statements. The annual reports also disclose the 'The Group is exposed to a variety of financial risks: market risk (including currency risk, fair value interest rate risk, cash flow interest rate risk and commodity price risk), credit risk and liquidity risk.' The following principal risk identification KPIs were also disclosed: details of how the risk

management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time and the details of the range and type of risk control measures. Details on governance of risk and structure of the company are found on pages 18-22, 24-25 & 76 of 2014 annual report; pages 24-29, 31-32 & 77 of 2015 annual report and pages 23-28, 30-35 & 92 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Performance Highlights', 'Location of Operations', 'Company Overview and Operating Structure', 'Directorate', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive Officer's Review', 'Healthy, Safety and Environment', 'Social Performance and Labour Practices', 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Report of the Directors', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent Auditors' Report', 'Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Statements of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Statement of Changes in Equity' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The annual reports disclose that 'these financial statements, which have been prepared under the historical cost convention, are in agreement with the underlying books and records and have been properly prepared and comply with the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act [Chapter 24:03] and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent and comprehensively. Sustainability disclosure KPIs are detailed mainly in the 'Healthy, Safety and Environment' and 'Social Performance and Labour Practices' sections of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent: biodiversity sustainability disclosure, details of impact on water and energy, emission sustainability, material waste and spills disclosure, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, responsible corporate citizenship, fair labour practices, employee empowerment, community activities, a discussion of corporate strategy, an overview of trends in its industry, continuous stakeholders engagement, transparent and effective communication to stakeholders disclosure. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on pages 2-84 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-84 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-99 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Report of the Directors', 'Direct and Indirect Shareholding of Directors', 'RioZim

Top 20 Shareholders’, ‘Dematerialisation of Securities’, ‘Notice of Annual General Meeting’ and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Number and par value of authorised and issued share capital is disclosed in the ‘Report of the Directors’ section. Director ownership of shares in the company are disclosed in the ‘Direct and Indirect Shareholding of Directors’ section. The categories and number of shares are shown in the ‘RioZim Top 20 Shareholders’ section. Notice to members, date and agenda of annual general meeting are disclosed in ‘Notice of Annual General Meeting’ section of the annual reports. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 23 & 85-87 of 2014 annual report; pages 30 & 85-86 of 2015 annual report and pages 29 & 100-103 of 2016 annual report.

Corporate sustainability disclosure is very comprehensive and therefore interesting. The following sections of the annual reports disclose sustainability information to a larger extent; ‘Chairman’s Statement’, ‘Chief Executive Officer’s Review’, ‘Healthy, Safety and Environment’ and ‘Social Performance and Labour Practices’. Although the 2014 annual report does not refer to any specific governance code framework, both the 2015 and 2016 reports disclose that RioZim endeavours to continuously improve its corporate governance systems towards alignment with voluntary codes such as the National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe and the King III Code on Corporate Governance and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

Listing Requirements. The corporate governance report in the annual reports discloses to a larger extent the governance mechanisms in place including the existence of a ‘Sustainable Development Committee’. In general, financial and ownership profile information, being mandatory, is disclosed to a larger extent.

Cafca Limited

CAFCA Limited (“CAFCA”) is quoted on the Zimbabwe, Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges. Established in 1947, CAFCA is part of CBI Electric African Cables incorporated in South Africa, which in turn is owned by Reunert Limited incorporated in South Africa. It has been at the forefront of the cable industry in the region for more than 60 years, supplying large volumes of cable to power and telecommunication utilities as well as the mining, agricultural and industrial sectors. CAFCA has been operating profitably over the sample period despite a very difficult operating environment characterised by reduced economic activity and limited availability of foreign currency.

The recent annual reports for CAFCA were analysed and the following findings were observed. Disclosures on board of directors and management structure KPIs are detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate and Administration', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Report', 'Directors', and 'Directors' Declaration'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Most of the KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 4-7 & .14 of 2014 annual report; pages 2, 4-7 & 11 of 2015 annual report and pages 2, 4-7 & 11 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure of governance of risk and structure KPIs is detailed in the following sections: 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors Report', 'Directors', 'Directors' Declaration', 'Independent Auditors' Report', and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that management of business risk is a function of the audit committee. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis. Information on governance of risk and structure KPIs of the company are detailed on pages 4-7, 14-15 & 20-46 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-7, 11-12 & 20-44 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-7, 11-12 & 20-47 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Company Profile', 'Mission Statement', 'The Period in Brief', 'Milestones', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Report', 'Directors', 'Operations Report', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Managing Director's Report', 'Directors' Declaration', 'Independent Auditors' Report', 'Statements of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Financial statements', 'Ratios and Statistics', 'Group Performance Review', 'Shareholder and other Supplementary Information' and 'Sustainability Report' . These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial information is disclosed comprehensively in compliance with the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) and IFRSs. Sustainability disclosure in the annual reports is comprehensive and the following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent: the company refers to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, Employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. A few integrated KPIs were noticeable and were disclosed to some extent in the 2015 and 2016 annual reports including disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship, disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates, disclosure on how does the organisation determine what matters to include in the integrated report, the integrated report include all material matters, both positive and negative and the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 2-46 of 2014 annual report; pages 2- 46 of 2015 annual report and pages 1- 48 of 2016 annual report. A sustainability report is integrated into the annual reports and is prepared in compliance with the GRI G4 guidelines as disclosed on pages 50-64 of 2015 annual report and 50-64 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Directors' Report', 'Analysis of Shareholding', 'Shareholders Calendar', 'Notice to Shareholders' and

‘Shareholders Information’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. The following KPIs in the ownership and control structure category were disclosed to a larger extent or comprehensively in the annual reports: top 10 shareholders, Shareholders owning more than 3% disclosed, Calendar of important shareholder dates provided, Review of shareholders by type and how shareholders nominate directors to board. Ownership and control structure information is disclosed on pages 5-6 & 47-48 of 2014 annual report; pages 5-6 & 47-49 of 2015 annual report and pages 5-6 & 48-49 of 2016 annual report.

In general, CAFCA’s recent annual reports discloses most of its corporate governance mechanisms in place to a larger extent. However, the company does not refer to any specific local or international code of best practice but simply discloses that it fully supports the highest standards of corporate governance and is committed to the principles of openness, integrity and accountability in dealings with all stakeholders. Sustainability information in the 2014 annual report is disclosed in several sections of the report but mostly in the ‘Operations Report’ section. Although this report disclosed metrics on Cafca’s carbon footprint in 2014, the rest of the text became generic and short. However, 2015 and 2016 annual reports are very interesting and innovative as they include a stand-alone sustainability report integrated to the annual report. The reports were prepared in accordance with GRI G4 Guidelines for sustainability reporting. On pages 51 & 52 of 2015 & 2016 annual reports, a more focused use of the Materiality Matrix, covering the sustainability performance/CSR areas was presented. There is an interesting use of KPIs, which link the thirteen areas for action of the sustainability/CSR strategy with measurement/reporting as disclosed on pages 51 & 52 of 2015 & 2016 annual reports. The reports disclose to a larger extent CAFCA’s risk management system and how it supports its strategic goals, key sustainability risks and opportunities, stakeholder engagement, economic performance, environmental performance and social performance.

Masimba Holdings Limited

Masimba Holdings Limited is a well-established Zimbabwean contracting and industrial group, providing innovative engineering and infrastructure client solutions to the agriculture, commercial, communications, housing, mining, water and public sectors within the southern African region. It has been listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange since 1974. In the 2016 annual report, it is reported that ‘The business recorded a turnover of US\$19,139,918 (2015:

US\$10,039,549), gross profit of US\$3,311,897 (2015: US\$1,845,656) and earnings before interest tax and depreciation of US\$1,713,168 (2015: US\$245,467) for the year ended 31 December 2016. The revenue growth was mainly driven by construction activities in the mining, manufacturing and non-governmental organisation sectors which collectively accounted for 56% of turnover. Projects executed during the year were, on average, of low values and short term durations and to that end we have been able to successfully remodel our business to ensure profitability is attained in this key and growing market. Public sector funded projects remained limited in the period due to the constrained fiscal position.

The recent annual reports for Masimba were analysed and the following key findings were noted. KPIs disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections: 'Company Directorate', 'Governance' and 'Directors' Report'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. The following KPI items were disclosed to a larger extent: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, details about current employment/position of directors provided, details about previous employment/positions provided, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, the number of shares in the company held by directors and the name of the chairman of the Board. However, there is no detail whether the chairman is an independent non-executive director and also on director training and compensation. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 14-20 of 2014 annual report; pages 16-21 of 2015 annual report and pages 9-11 & 16-17 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of Masimba's annual reports: 'Directorate', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors Report', 'Report of the Independent Auditor' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements.' Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that there is combined Audit and Risk Committee. This committee considers changes to the company's accounting policies and reviews its interim and annual financial statements before the Board and reviews the effectiveness of the system of internal controls during the period and reports thereon to the

Board. The annual reports also disclose that ‘The main risks arising from the entity’s financial instruments are cash flow risk, foreign currency risk, interest rate risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. Executives of the Group meet on a regular basis to review and agree on policies to manage each of these risks. Treasury management strategies together with currency and interest rate exposures are re-evaluated against revised economic forecasts. Compliance with the Group policies and exposure limits are reviewed at Audit and Risk Committee meetings. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on page 14-21 & 48 of 2014 annual report; page 16-22 & 57 of 2015 annual report and pages 9, 10-11, 16-21 & 54 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Company Profile and Nature of Business’, ‘Group Structure’, ‘Financial Highlights’, ‘Five Year Review’, ‘Ratios and Statistics’, ‘Statement of Value Created’, ‘Chairman’s Statement’, ‘Chief Executive’s Report’, ‘Mission and Values’, ‘Company Directorate’, ‘Governance’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Independent Auditors’ Report’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows’, ‘Accounting Policies’ and ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial statements’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent and comprehensively as assured by the company’s independent auditors report ‘In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements have been properly prepared in compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the relevant Statutory Instruments SI 33/99 and SI 62/96.’ A few sustainability disclosure KPIs were captured to a larger extent in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ and ‘Governance’ sections of the annual reports. These include details of corporate governance mechanisms disclosed, disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation, safety of employees, any other forward-looking information and an overview of trends in its industry. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on page 2-58 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-62 of 2015 annual report and pages 2- 59 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Notice to Shareholders’, ‘Shareholders’ Diary’, and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration

of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Some KPIs were disclosed comprehensively including review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure information is disclosed on pages 18 & 59-62 of 2014 annual report; pages 20 & 63-66 of 2015 annual report and pages 16 & 60-65 of 2016 annual report.

Masimba's governance report section of the annual reports does not make a specific reference to any local or international code of best practices. However, there is disclosure that the Board of Masimba Holdings Limited is committed to adherence to the principles of good corporate governance in order to attain the goal of responsible corporate behaviour and full accountability to its shareholders and stakeholders. Furthermore, the Board has approved a Code of Conduct which sets out the entity's core values relating to lawful and ethical conduct of business. There is fragmented sustainability disclosure in different sections of the annual reports but no formalised sustainability report, even on the company's website. In general, mandatory disclosure is to a larger extent and the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) is the main reference legislation framework.

Powerspeed Electrical Limited

Powerspeed Electrical has a long history which began in the 1970's as part of a diversified group known as Mashonaland Holdings. With the unbundling of Mashonaland Holdings in 1999, Powerspeed was formed and obtained separate listing in the year 2000. In recent times, the company has redirected its focus to retail which constitutes the core business. The group employs over 400 people in the fields of retail and wholesale, engineering and manufacturing throughout Zimbabwe. The company's 2016 annual report discloses that 'Turnover for the year rose 3.7% to US\$41.6 million, while gross margin declined marginally from US\$12.01million to US\$11.95 million, due to competitive pressures. Sundry revenue, mainly from rental income, declined by US\$142 000. In response to the declining disposable incomes, substantial effort was applied to reducing expenses. As a result, expenses for the year rose less than 2%, to US\$10.9 million and EBIT declined 24%, to US\$1.42 million. Finance costs for the year rose marginally from US\$799 000 to US\$861000, resulting in a profit before tax of US\$559 000,

compared to US\$1.070 million, for the previous year. Finally, income attributable to shareholders came in at US\$454 000, down from US\$780 000, for the last financial year.'

The recent annual reports for Powerspeed were analysed and the following key findings are noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Our Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', and 'Directors' Report'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Some KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent comprehensively in these sections, including the name of the chairman of the Board, a list of directors and details about the directors, that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions and the number of board meetings attended. However, there is no disclosure of details identifying independent non-executive from the list of the board of directors. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-13 of 2014 annual report; pages 8-13 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-13 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Our Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', and 'Directors' Report', 'Auditors' Report' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that there is no risk management committee but the finance and audit committee. The finance and audit committee consists of non-executive directors and meets periodically to discuss accounting, auditing, internal control and financial reporting matters. It has free access to the Group's external and internal auditors and Powerspeed Electrical Limited's executive management. The committee reviews interim and annual results of the Group before publication. Furthermore, the annual reports details that the Group's principal financial liabilities comprise finance lease liabilities, loans payable, bank overdrafts and trade payables. The main purpose of these financial liabilities is to raise finance for the Group's operations. The Group has various financial assets such as trade receivables and cash and short term deposits, which arise directly from its operations. Exposure to credit,

interest rate and currency risk arises in the normal course of Group's business and these are main risks arising from the Group's financial instruments. The Board of Directors reviews and agrees policies for managing each of these risks. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-14 & 41 of 2014 annual report; pages 8-14 & 39 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-16 & 41 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'A Glance at Powerspeed and Brands', 'Vision, Mission and Values', 'Our Structure', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Our Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Directors' Report', 'Auditors' Report', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Group Statement of Accounting Policies' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. Financial disclosure KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent as asserted in the 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility' that 'The consolidated financial statements set out in this report have been prepared by management in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03). They are based on appropriate accounting policies which are supported by reasonable prudent judgements and estimates.' Sustainability disclosure is generally to a lesser extent and only the following KPIs were disclosed: details of the products or services produced/provided, a discussion of corporate strategy and details of the nature of business it is in. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on pages 2-43 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-41 of 2015 annual report and pages 2- 43 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections 'Directors' Report', 'Shareholder Information', 'Shareholders' Calendar', 'Corporate Information', and 'Notice to Shareholders'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Some KPIs were disclosed comprehensively including review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder

meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure information is disclosed on pages 12 & 44-46 of 2014 annual report; pages 12 & 42-44 of 2015 annual report and pages 12 & 44-46 of 2016 annual report.

Powerspeed Electrical Limited discloses that it fully supports the King Reports on corporate governance and endorses the need to conduct its business in accordance with the highest standards of corporate practice. The statement on corporate governance discloses significantly the corporate governance mechanisms in place, however the sustainability disclosure KPIs are less detailed and included in several sections of the reports including; ‘A Glance at Powerspeed and Brands’, ‘Vision, Mission and Values’, ‘Our Structure’, ‘Financial Highlights’, ‘Chairman’s Statement’ and ‘Our Directors’. The Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) is the basis for all mandatory disclosure which is generally to a larger extent comprehensively reflected in the annual reports.

Zimplow Holdings Limited

Incorporated in 1939 Zimplow is the largest manufacturer and distributor of farming, infrastructure and mining equipment in Zimbabwe. The business consists of seven business units: (i) Farmec: holds franchise agreements for a range of tractors, generators and agricultural equipment from international brands like Massey Ferguson, Valtra, Perkins, Monosem, and Falcon, (ii) Mealie Brand: produces a complete range of animal drawn implements which cover the needs of the farmer from breaking the soil to planting the crop, (iii) Afritrac: Afritrac CC is a leading distributor of animal traction implements and conservation tillage tools in Southern Africa, (iv) Northmec: is the CASE IH Tractors and Combine Harvesters distributor in Zimbabwe, (v) Barzem: represents ‘world leading’ manufacturers Caterpillar and Hyster. Both brands are synonymous with premium-quality dependable products, (vi) CT Bolts: is a manufacturer and distributor of steel bolts, nuts and nails and a wide range of other fasteners and (vii) Manica Road Investments: Houses the fixed properties for the Group.

The company reported in the 2016 annual report that ‘Overall financial performance saw the Group’s turnover slowed down by 21% to US\$24.2 million with the impact being acutely felt in the first half of the year. Full year 2016 results show a tale of two halves with turnover for the second half of the year double the first half at US\$15.9 million versus US\$8.3 million and losses of US\$2 million in the first half and were only US\$500 000 in the second half. Despite the material reduction in turnover our operating loss more than halved from US\$5,4 million in

2015 to US\$2,5 million in 2016 and this was due to greater cost discipline across most of the businesses as well impact of the restructuring efforts undertaken in 2015 and early 2016.’

The recent annual reports for Zimply were analysed and the following findings were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure KPIs are detailed in several sections of the annual reports including: ‘Directorate & Administration’, ‘Group Executive Committee’, ‘Corporate Governance Approach’, ‘Board Profile’, ‘Directors' Responsibility Statement’, and ‘Directors’ Report’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, details about current employment/position of directors provided, details about previous employment/positions provided, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended , the number of shares in the company held by directors and the name of the chairman of the Board. However, there is no detail whether the chairman is an independent non-executive director and also on director training and compensation. Board of directors and management structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 10-16 & 21-22 of 2014 annual report; pages 22-29 & 45-46 of 2015 annual report and pages 26-33 & 45-46 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure of governance of risk and structure KPIs is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directorate & Administration’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Group Executive Committee’, ‘Corporate Governance Approach’, ‘Directors' Responsibility Statement’, and ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Independent Auditors’ Report’ and ‘Annual Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the Board Committees include audit and risk committee. The annual reports disclose that ‘The audit and risk committee deals, inter alia with compliance, internal control and risk management. The committee currently comprises of 3 (three) non-executive directors. A non-executive director chairs the audit committee. The committee meets at least 3(three) times a year with the Group’s internal and external auditors to consider compliance with financial reporting requirements, monitor the appropriateness of accounting policies and the effectiveness of systems of Internal control and consider the findings of the internal and external auditors. Both the internal and

external auditors have unrestricted access to the audit committee to ensure their independence and the objectivity of their reports.’ Governance of risk and structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 10-16, 21-23 & 77-79 of 2014 annual report; pages 22-29, 45-47 & 100-102 of 2015 annual report and pages 26-33, 45-51 & 100-102 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; ‘Introducing Zimplow Holdings Limited’, ‘Directorate and Administration’, ‘Corporate Governance Statement’, ‘Board Profile’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility Statement’, ‘Sustainability Reporting’, ‘Chairman’s statement and Review of operations’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Independent Auditors’ Report’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income’, ‘Consolidated and Company Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity’ , ‘Consolidated and Company Statement of Cash Flows’, ‘Group Statement of Accounting Policies’, ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial statements’, ‘Value Added Statement’ and ‘Financial Review’ . Additional sections were added for both 2015 and 2016 annual reports; ‘Scope of this Report’, ‘Business Profile and Timeline’, ‘Corporate Structure and Locations’, ‘Business Unit Overview’, ‘Group Executive Committee’, ‘Stakeholder Engagement’, ‘Human Capital Management’, ‘Environmental Management’, ‘Social and Community Engagement’, ‘Compliance Regulatory and Ethics’ and ‘Value Creation and Value Added Statement’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent. Sustainability disclosure KPIs are detailed mainly in the ‘Sustainability Reporting’ section of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent: biodiversity sustainability disclosure, details of impact on water and energy, emission sustainability, material waste and spills disclosure, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, responsible corporate citizenship, fair labour practices, employee empowerment, community activities, a discussion of corporate strategy, an overview of trends in its industry, continuous stakeholders engagement, transparent and effective communication to stakeholders disclosure, the company refers to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting. It is worth noting that a few integrated reporting KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the recent annual reports including: disclosure on key stakeholders’ identification and relationship, disclosure on the capitals and how the organisation interacts with the capitals to create value over the short, medium and long term,

the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates and the organisation's business model. Information management and disclosure KPIs were highlighted on pages 7-85 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-104 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-108 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Report of Directors', 'Shareholder Analysis' and 'Annual General Meeting Notice'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Some KPIs were disclosed comprehensively including review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 6, 21-22, 84 & 86-87 of 2014 annual report; pages 46 & 106-107 of 2015 annual report and pages 46 & 111-112 of 2016 annual report.

Zimplot's corporate governance and sustainability strategy is summed up in the following annual report statement 'Zimplot's board of directors continues to provide effective leadership based on sound, ethical business foundations. The board considers the group's appropriate application of best practice including King III as an essential feature of the way the group behaves as a responsible corporate citizen and an integral part of the group's drive to remain a leading business'. The governance report is to a larger extent comprehensive, disclosing governance mechanisms in place. The company also issues a stand-alone sustainability report based on the GRI and the quality of disclosure have improved over the recent years. On pages 17-18, the 2014 sustainability report was brief and short, but 2015 and 2016 reports are comprehensive disclosing to a large extent, interesting KPIs such as economic impact, environmental impact, social impact, stakeholders' engagement and value creation process. Mandatory disclosure is done to a larger extent as per the requirement of regulatory instruments including the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03).

Food and Beverages Sector

The food and beverage industry has a unique role in expanding economic opportunity because it is universal to human life and health. The industry operates at multiple levels of society including growing of crops for consumption by farmers, trading of fresh produce and home-

processed goods by communities, transformation of crops by local and international companies for local and international markets. Therefore, the sector also falls under the manufacturing sector. As discussed in Chapter two of this thesis, the manufacturing sector continues to face such constraints as antiquated equipment, capital, low aggregate demand, liquidity, high costs of utilities and unfair competition from imports (*see Section 2.2*).

African Distillers Limited (AFDIS)

In 1951 African Distillers became a public quoted Company. In 1974, the Company moved to its present headquarters at Stapleford, a complex just outside Harare which houses production, warehousing and distribution facilities. The core business of African Distillers Limited is the manufacture, distribution and marketing of branded wines, ciders and spirits for the Zimbabwean market and for export. The Company has six depots in Bulawayo, Harare, Kwekwe, Masvingo, Mutare and Victoria Falls which ensure a first-class distribution service. The company's 2016 annual report discloses that 'Net turnover rose by US\$2.8 million to US\$25 million and operating income increased by US\$1.4 million to US\$4 million during the period under review. This performance is a result of an 18% volume increase complemented by a reduction in overhead. The Company incurred a net exchange loss of US\$0.36 million due to a significant foreign currency (Rand) exposure of US\$2.2 million. The full impact of this was however reduced by interest income of US\$0.137 million earned from investment of surplus cash. The prior year Profit after Tax was adversely affected by reorganisation costs and an investment write off totalling US\$1 million. If the distortion relating to this is removed, the Earnings per Share and Profit after Tax would have increased by 31% in the period under review. The balance sheet is strong with a current ratio of 2.54 compared to 2.28 in prior year and significant cash resources of US\$7.5 million. Cash generated from trading amounted to US\$4.8 million, a 64% increase on prior year.

The recent annual reports for AFDIS were analysed and the following main findings are noted. Disclosure of board of directors and management structure KPIs is detailed in the following sections of the annual report: 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility Statement' and 'Directorate'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. The following KPIs were disclosed comprehensively: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors,

classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, when each of the directors joined the board, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions and the number of board meetings attended. Board of directors and management structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 11-15 & 41 of 2014 annual report; pages 9-14 & 38 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-12 & 43 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual report: 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility Statement', 'Report of the Independent Auditors' and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the Audit Committee is responsible for risk management issues of the company. The Audit Committee comprises four non-executive directors and the managing director. A non-executive director chairs the committee which meets twice a year. External auditors review accounting, auditing, financial reporting, internal control and risk management issues. The external auditors are appointed each year based on recommendations of the Audit Committee. An internal audit function is also in place. The risk management process at African Distillers Limited involves the identification, assessment and prioritisation of risk that may impact the achievement of strategic business objectives. The environment in which the Company operates is subject to change and regular assessment of risk is necessary. The Board, through the Audit Committee is ultimately responsible for maintaining risk management strategies for the Company and monitoring performance through regular assessment. The Board Audit Committee meets twice a year to consider issues relating to financial and accounting controls as well as risk management. Governance of risk and structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 11-16 & 39-40 of 2014 annual report; pages 9-15 & 37-38 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-16 & 38-40 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Company Profile', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Review of Operations', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility Statement', 'Report of Independent Auditors', 'Statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income', 'Statement of Financial Position', 'Statement of Cash Flows',

‘Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity’, ‘Notes to the Financial statements’ and ‘Directorate’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial disclosure is generally comprehensive as required mainly by the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) and IFRSs as certified by the directors of the company in the ‘Directors’ Responsibility Statement’ section of the annual reports. Sustainability disclosure KPIs are largely missing and only a few were disclosed to a lesser extent including: details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information, disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on pages 2-41 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-39 of 2015 annual report and pages 3- 43 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Notice to Shareholders and Proxies’ and ‘Corporate Information and Shareholders’ Calendar’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented in these sections. Some KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively including review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 11 & 42-44 of 2014 annual report; pages 9 & 40-42 of 2015 annual report and pages 8 & 44-47 of 2016 annual report.

African Distillers Limited follows the principles and general guidelines set out by the King Reports on Corporate Governance. The Company also complies with the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange requirements and other regulatory authorities. The governance report is fairly comprehensive however sustainability disclosure is lacking with scanty information disclosed in several sections. Mandatory disclosure is significant in compliance with the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03).

Colcom Holdings Limited

Colcom Foods Limited is a long established meat-processing company in Zimbabwe. It is principally a pork company, with a joint venture, Associated Meat Packers (AMP) producing beef products. Colcom Foods is part of the Colcom Holdings Group, which in turn is majority owned by Innscor Africa. Both Innscor and Colcom are listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'he Group recorded revenue of US\$59.90 million, 7% down on the previous financial year. Within that result, Colcom Foods Limited (incorporating Triple C Pigs and Colcom Foods Division) reported a 5% decrease whilst the Associated Meat Packers subsidiary (trading through AMP, Texas Meats and Texas Chicken) recorded a 12% decrease in revenue. Production efficiencies at the Triple C Pigs production units yielded improved margin contribution from that division which was partly offset by margin reduction at the Colcom Foods Division resulting from pricing decisions made during the course of the year. This margin reduction was itself compensated for by disciplined management of operating expenses (reducing by 9% from the previous financial year) allowing the Group to deliver an operating profit of US\$9.09 million, a growth of 1% on the previous financial year.

The recent annual reports for Colcom were analysed and the findings are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate, Executive Management and Corporate Information', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Statements' and 'Report of Directors'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. The following KPIs were disclosed comprehensively: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, when each of the directors joined the board, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions and the number of board meetings attended. Board of directors and management structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 5, 7, 13-14 of 2014 annual report; pages 5, 7, 12 & 13 of 2015 annual report and pages 5, 7, 12 & 13 of 2016 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate, Executive Management and Corporate Information', 'Corporate Governance', 'Report of Directors', 'Report of the Independent Auditor' and 'Notes to the

Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'The Company has an audit committee comprising representation by non-executive Directors and is chaired by a non-executive Director. The external auditors have unrestricted access to the committee and in addition, a representative attends all audit committee meetings. The audit committee meets three times a year. The committee reviews the effectiveness of internal controls in the Group with reference to the findings of internal and external auditors. Other areas covered include the review of important accounting issues, specific disclosures in the financial statements, financial reports and major audit recommendations. The company does not have a risk committee, however the annual reports disclose that 'The Group's principal financial instruments comprise bank loans and overdrafts, forward cover contracts, cash and short-term deposits. The main purpose of these financial instruments is to raise finance for the Group's operations or to achieve a return on surplus short term funds. The Group has various other financial assets and financial liabilities such as trade receivables and trade payables, which arise directly from its operations. The main risks arising from the Group's financial instruments are interest rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign currency risk and credit risk. The Board reviews and agrees policies for managing each of these risks. Governance of risk and structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 5, 7, 13-14 & 49-52 of 2014 annual report; pages 5, 7, 12-13 & 47-50 of 2015 annual report and pages 5, 7, 12-14 & 47-50 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Vision and Mission', 'Group Structure', 'Financial Highlights', 'Directorate, Executive Management and Corporate Information', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Corporate Governance', 'Corporate Social Responsibility', 'Financial Review, Ratios and Statistics', 'Report of Directors', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Statements', 'Report of Independent Auditors', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity' , 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial disclosure is comprehensive. This is certified by the directors of the company in the 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Statements' section of the annual reports which state that 'The

Directors of Colcom Holdings Limited are required by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) to maintain adequate accounting records and to prepare financial statements for each financial year that present a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Company and the Group at the end of each financial year and of the profit and cash flows for the period in line with International Financial Reporting Standards. In preparing the accompanying financial statements, generally accepted accounting practices have been followed, suitable accounting policies have been used and consistently applied, and reasonable and prudent judgments and estimates have been made.’ Although the annual reports have a ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ section, sustainability disclosure KPIs are largely missing and only a few were disclosed to a lesser extent including: details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, community activities disclosure, any other forward-looking information, disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation, fair employment practices, fair labour practices and support for employee’s unions. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on pages 2- 55 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-52 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-52 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Notice to Shareholders’, ‘Shareholders’ Calendar’ and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Some KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively including review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board and the number of shares in the company held by directors. Ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 12 & 58-63 of 2014 annual report; pages 12 & 53-61 of 2015 annual report and pages 12 & 53-59 of 2016 annual report.

Colcom’s corporate governance report discloses to a larger extent corporate governance mechanisms in its annual reports, but no specific reference is made to any local or international codes of best practice. The corporate social responsibility report is brief, disclosing that Colcom is a corporate member of the Business Council for Sustainable Development Zimbabwe (BCSDZ). Additional sustainability information is evident in several sections of the annual

reports including the ‘Chairman’ statement’. Mandatory disclosure is generally adequately comprehensive.

Delta Corporation Limited

Delta Corporation Limited is listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and was first listed in 1946 as Rhodesia Breweries Limited. The Company is a principally a beverages company with a diverse portfolio of local and international brands in lager beer, traditional beer, Coca-Cola franchised sparkling and alternative non-alcoholic beverages. It has investments in associate companies whose activities are in cordials and juice drinks (Schweppes Holdings Africa Limited), wines and spirits (African Distillers Limited).

The findings of the analysis of the recent annual reports for Delta are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Corporate Governance’, and ‘Directors’ Responsibility for Financial Reporting’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Most of the KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 26-30 of 2014 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure are disclosed in the following sections of the annual report; pages 28-32 of 2015 annual report and pages 26-30 of 2016

reports: ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility for Financial Reporting’, ‘Independent Auditor’s Report’ and ‘Annual Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is also responsible for risk management. The annual reports disclose that ‘The Audit Committee of

the Board deals, inter alia, with compliance, internal control and risk management. It is regulated by specific terms of reference, is chaired by an independent non-executive director and is comprised of non-executive directors and incorporates the Chief Executive Officer who is a non-voting member. Other governance of risk and structure KPIs disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports include the following: the range and type of risk control measures, how the risk management policy and plan is reviewed from time to time and that the board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk tolerance. Governance of risk and structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 26-78 of 2014 annual report; pages 28-77 of 2015 annual report and pages 26-78 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; 'Value Statements', 'Company Profile', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Review of Operations', 'Report of Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Report of Independent Auditors', 'Annual Financial Statements', 'Group Statistics', 'Sustainable Development Report', 'Group Structure', 'Portfolio of Businesses', 'Directorate and Management', 'Directorate' and 'Group Management Committee'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports in compliance with regulatory instruments. This is evidenced by the directors' statement in the 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting' section of the annual reports that 'Delta Corporation Limited's ("Delta" or "the Company") Directors are required by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) to maintain adequate accounting records and to prepare financial statements for each financial year which present a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Company and the Group at the end of the financial year and of the profit and cash flows for the period. In preparing the accompanying financial statements, generally accepted accounting practices have been followed, suitable accounting policies have been used, and applied consistently, and reasonable and prudent judgements and estimates have been made. The financial statements incorporate full and responsible disclosure in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards and best practice. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the 'Sustainable Development Report' section of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively: reference to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, , link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees,

material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. A few integrated reporting KPIs were noticeable and were disclosed to some extent in the annual reports including disclosure on key stakeholders' identification and relationship and disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on pages 2-93 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-93 of 2015 annual report and pages 2- 95 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections 'Report of Directors', 'Notice to Members' and 'Shareholders' Analysis'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. The following KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 26 & 94-95 of 2014 annual report; pages 28 & 94-95 of 2015 annual report and pages 26 & 96-97 of 2016 annual report.

Delta's recent annual reports disclose that it has in place throughout the company, responsive systems of governance and practice which the Board and management regard as entirely appropriate and in accordance with the code of Corporate Practices and Conduct contained in the Cadbury and King Reports on Corporate Governance. The corporate governance section also discloses significantly the governance mechanisms in place and the 2016 annual report also refer to NCCGZ. The sustainable development report is significantly comprehensive disclosing how the company integrate sustainable development into the day to day management of the business by focusing on specific priority areas for which we measure, track and evaluate performance using a bespoke Sustainability Assessment Matrix (SAM) stairway. Mandatory disclosures are significant and largely comply with regulatory instruments (e.g. the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03).

Dairibord Holdings Limited

Dairibord Holdings Limited is a manufacturer and marketer of quality milk, foods and beverages. The company is listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). Its operating subsidiaries are Dairibord Zimbabwe (Private) Limited and Dairibord Malawi Limited. The Group produces an extensive range of products which include liquid milks (long and short shelf life), foods (yoghurts, ice creams, condiments and spreads) and beverages (cordials, ready to drink dairy and non-dairy, tea and water) which are marketed and distributed in domestic and export markets. Dairibord Holdings Limited is one of the largest manufacturing and marketing companies in Zimbabwe with over 45 brands. The Group has factories in Harare, Chitungwiza and Chipinge. The 2016 annual report discloses that ‘While revenue decreased by 10% over 2015, operating costs decreased at a lower rate by 2%. Resultantly the Group recorded an operating loss of US\$3.9 million, down from an operating profit of US\$3.9 million in 2015. Of the operating loss of US\$3.9 million, manufacturing segment contributed US\$4.3 million in loss, whilst logistics and properties segments contributed operating profits of US\$0.5 million and US\$0.6 million, respectively. Corporate services had a loss of US\$0.6 million. Significant impairments of receivables, inventories and equipment, amounting to US\$2.8 million were recorded during the year. Notwithstanding these impairments, the business remained unprofitable due to misalignment of the cost structure to the level of activity.’

The recent annual reports for Dairibord were analysed and the findings are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections: ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Dairibord Holdings Limited Board and Management’, ‘Statements of Directors’ Responsibility’ and ‘Report of Directors’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs

were disclosed on pages 20, 21, 38-39 of 2014 annual report; pages 19, 20, 37-38 of 2015 annual report and pages 18, 19, 34-35 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Governance and Ethics', 'Dairibord Holdings Limited Board and Management', 'Risk Management & Opportunities', 'Statements of Directors' Responsibility', 'Report of Directors', 'Independent Auditor's Report' and 'Annual Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the finance and audit committee is also responsible for risk management. The committee monitors the company's overall control procedures, risk management, and financial reporting. It provides direct oversight and liaison on behalf of the Board with both internal and external auditors. The Committee reviews all significant Group risks, as well as risk mitigation initiatives and their effectiveness on a quarterly basis. The 'Risk Management & Opportunities' section of the annual reports comprehensively discloses that 'Risk is embedded in the Group's activities and is not separable from opportunity. The management of risk across the Group is not a standalone activity but rather an integral part of our operations. The risks identified in this report are the major uncertainties in terms of likelihood and impact. The board continues to monitor the business and the operating environment to identify and develop strategies to mitigate emerging risks. The Board is terminally responsible for risk governance. The Board has delegated the risk management function to the Finance and Audit Committee. The composition of the Finance and Audit Committee is made up of Non-Executive Directors only. The sub-committee is accountable to the main Board of Directors. The mandate of the Finance and Audit Committee regarding risk is to ensure that the Group has adequate systems to identify, measure, predict, prepare for and respond adequately to any risks that the organization may face.' Most of the KPIs under this D&T category were significantly disclosed. Governance of risk and structure KPIs were disclosed on pages 20, 28, 38-79 of 2014 annual report; pages 19, 25, 37-79 of 2015 annual report and pages 18, 23, 34-76 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Value Statements', 'Corporate Profile', 'Vision, Mission & Values', 'Group Structure', 'Group Brands & Markets', 'Our Business Model', 'Group Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Group Chief Executive's Statement', 'Corporate Governance &

Ethics', 'Dairibord Holdings Limited Board and Management', 'Sustainability Strategy', 'Risk Management & Opportunities', 'Material Issues and Report Boundary', 'Stakeholder Engagement', 'Sustainability Performance', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Report of Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent Auditor's Report', 'Annual Financial Statements', 'Glossary of Terms' and 'GRI Content Index'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility' section of the annual reports discloses that 'The Directors are required by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) to prepare financial statements for each financial year giving a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and the Group as at the end of the financial period as well as the profit and cash flows for the same period. The Directors are responsible for maintaining records, which disclose with reasonable accuracy the financial position of the company and the Group, and which enable them to ensure that the consolidated financial statements comply with the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03).' Financial disclosure is consequentially largely comprehensive in the annual reports. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the 'Sustainability Strategy' and 'Sustainability Performance' sections of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively: reference to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, , link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. Several integrated reporting KPIs were noticeable and were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship, disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates, the company's strategic direction, disclosure on the capitals and how the organisation interacts with the capitals to create value over the short, medium and long term, the organisation's business model, the integrated report include all material matters, both positive and negative, the integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors, the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports,

disclosure on how does the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term. Information management and disclosure KPIs were disclosed on pages 3-88 of 2014 annual report; pages 3- 81 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-79 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections 'Report of Directors', 'Notice to Members' and 'Shareholders' Analysis'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. The following KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 39 & p.83-88 of 2014 annual report; pages 38 & p.82-87 of 2015 annual report and pages 35 & 80-84 of 2016 annual report.

Dairibord's annual reports disclose that the group continues to upholds the corporate governance manual based on the following codes of practice; Principles of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe, the King III report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2002, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1999) Principles of Corporate Governance, and Principles of Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (CACG Guidelines 1999). This manual is used as a reference point for the company's corporate governance practices. The 2016 report also reveals that the Group endeavours to align existing corporate governance practices by adopting the National Code of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe (ZIMCODE) launched during the year 2015. The governance disclosures are significantly comprehensive. Furthermore, the group adopted the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines as a tool for measuring performance in its sustainable business initiatives and practices. To sum up, the Sustainability Report is very rich and detailed, especially with regard to the disclosure of KPIs in the following sections; 'Sustainability Strategy', 'Risk Management & Opportunities', 'Material Issues and Report Boundary', 'Stakeholder Engagement', 'Sustainability Performance' of the performance indicators and the GRI Content Index. In compliance with relevant regulatory instruments, mandatory information is disclosed to a larger extent.

Industrial Holding

Most of the companies in the industrial holding sector have extensive manufacturing operations. As discussed in Chapter two of this thesis, the manufacturing sector continues to face such constraints as antiquated equipment, capital, low aggregate demand, liquidity, high costs of utilities and unfair competition from imports.

Amalgamated Regional Trading (ART) Holdings Limited

Amalgamated Regional Trading (ART) is a Zimbabwe Stock Exchange listed industrial group whose reputation has been built on diversity, operational excellence and quality brand custodianship. ART is involved in the manufacturing and retailing of Lead-acid batteries, Pens, Stationery, Tissues, Hygiene products and Forestry Resource Management. These products are manufactured and distributed through our world class manufacturing and distribution operations in Zimbabwe and Zambia. The Group's units include Chloride Zimbabwe, Chloride Zambia, Exide Express, Eversharp, Kadoma Paper Mills, National Waste Collection, Softex Zimbabwe and Mutare Estates. ART products are also distributed in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia as well as other African countries. The company's 2016 annual report discloses that 'Revenue at US\$29.8 million was at similar levels with prior year whilst margins improved to 37% compared to 2015 margins of 35%. This was a result of reduced manufacturing costs arising from factory automation and purchasing efficiencies. Operating expenses were 13% lower than last year due to benefits of the restructuring and cost containment strategies initiated during the prior year. Operating profit increased by 93% to US\$3.7 million. The interest expense of US\$1.2 million still remains a significant strain on the business. Overall the Group achieved a profit after tax of US\$1.9 million, a significant improvement compared to a loss of US\$590,000 in 2015.

The recent annual reports for ART were assessed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate and Management', 'Directors' Report' and 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this D&T category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined

the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure are disclosed on pages 14-18 of 2014 annual report; pages 16-22 of 2015 annual report and pages 16-18, 19-22 of 2016 annual report.

Information on governance of risk and structure is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate', 'Unit Leaders', 'Directors' Report', 'Independent Auditor's Report' and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is also responsible for risk management. The following KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by a non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis. Information on governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 14-24 & 59-63 of 2014 annual report; pages 19-24 & 55-58 of 2015 annual report and pages 16-24 & 61-63 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'ART at A Glance', 'Financial Highlights', 'Corporate Information', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Review of Operations', 'Directorate', 'Unit Leaders', 'Directors' Report', 'Independent Auditor's Report', 'Group Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Group Statement of Financial Position', 'Group Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Group Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Financial Statements', 'Company Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Company Statement of Financial Position' and 'Company Statement of Changes in Equity'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information

and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers about 80% of the annual reports. Sustainability information is mostly brief and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's Statement', 'Review of Operations' and 'Directors' Report'. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly and to some extent including: details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information, disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation, employee empowerment, fair employment practices, fair labour practices, safety of employees, material waste and spills disclosure, water sustainability, emission sustainability, Disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies. Information management and disclosure KPIs are disclosed on pages 2-76 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-73 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-79 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections 'Shareholders' Analysis', 'Notice to Members' and 'Detachable form of Proxy'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 18 & 77-81 of 2014 annual report; pages 19 & 74-78 of 2015 annual report and pages 19 & 80-83 of 2016 annual report.

Art's 2014 and 2015 reports disclose that the group is committed to achieving high standards of corporate governance as set out in the King report. The 2016 report discloses that the Group is committed to achieving high standards of corporate governance as set out in the King IV Report and the Zimbabwe Code of National Governance. Corporate governance disclosure has been significant over the recent years. Sustainability disclosure is fragmented in several sections of the annual reports including 'Review of operations' and 'Directors' report. In general, mandatory disclosure is included in annual reports to a larger extent.

Innscor Africa Limited

Innscor Africa Limited is a diversified Pan African Management Holding Company. Innscor manufactures, distributes and retails fast moving and durable consumer goods to the mass market through a managed and where strategically appropriate, vertically integrated portfolio of businesses. The company's 2016 annual report disclose that 'On a continuing operations' basis the Group's revenue grew by 6% against the prior year. Improved efficiencies at both the margin and operating profit levels resulted in operating profit increasing by 26% and profit before tax increasing by 25% over the same period. A more balanced profit contribution by each business as compared to the prior year was the main reason for the Group's headline earnings per share increasing by 107% from 1.64 US cents to 3.40 US cents. This was a very pleasing result and management is to be commended.'

Innscor's recent annual reports were analysed and the finding are discussed below. Details of board of directors and management structure are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Governance and Approaches', 'Directorate and Management', 'Directors' Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements', 'Company Secretary's Certification' and 'Report of Directors'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. The annual reports also disclose the classification of non-executive directors into independent non-executive directors and non-independent non-executive directors. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 18-26 & 31-33 of 2014 annual report; pages 18-26 & 39-42 of 2015 annual report and pages 12-21 & 42-43 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Governance and Approaches', 'Directorate and Management', 'Directors'

Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements’, ‘Company Secretary’s Certification’, ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Report of Independent Auditors’ and ‘Group Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports disclose that ‘The Group has an audit committee that assists the Board in the fulfilment of its duties. The audit committee deals, inter alia, with compliance, internal control and risk management. The committee currently comprise two independent, non-executive Directors. A non-executive Director chairs the committee. The committee meets at least three times a year with the Group’s external and internal auditors to consider compliance with financial reporting requirements, monitor the appropriateness of accounting policies and the effectiveness of the systems of internal control and consider the findings of the internal and external auditors. Both the internal and external auditors have unrestricted access to the audit committee to ensure their independence and objectivity of their findings and scope of work. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are detailed on pages 18-26, 31-34 & 84-88 of 2014 annual report; pages 18-26, 39-43 & 98-101 of 2015 annual report and pages 12-21, 42-44 & 119-123 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including ‘Vision and Mission Statement’, ‘Scope of this Report’, ‘Group Structure and Activities’, ‘Financial Highlights’, ‘Chairman’s Statement and Review of Operations’, ‘Governance and Approaches’, ‘Directorate and Management’, ‘Sustainability Reporting’, ‘Human Capital Management’, ‘Corporate Social Investment’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements’, ‘Company Secretary’s Certification’, ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Report of Independent Auditors’, ‘Group Financial Statements’, ‘Company Statement of Financial Position’ and ‘Corporate Information’. Both 2015 and 2016 annual reports have additional sections: ‘Sustainability Strategy and Governance’, ‘Key Material and Report Issues’, ‘Stakeholder Engagement’, ‘Sustainability Performance’, ‘Glossary of Terms’ and ‘GRI Content Index’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial disclosure is consequentially largely comprehensive in the annual reports because of statutory requirements. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the ‘Sustainability Reporting’, ‘Human Capital Management’ and ‘Corporate Social Investment’ sections of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports: reference to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to

sustainability reporting, link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. A few integrated reporting KPIs were noticeable and were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship, disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates, the company's strategic direction, the integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors, the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports, disclosure on how does the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term. It is worth noting that the annual reports disclose that 'The Group's approach is to identify potential environmental and climate hazards, evaluate the risk and take appropriate measures to control or eliminate the risk. Group units have standard environmental policies which must be followed to minimise impacts on the environment, climate and biodiversity. The Group ensures that its response to environmental impacts is recognised as a contribution to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).' Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 1-89 & 92 of 2014 annual report; pages 1-105 & 108 of 2015 annual report and pages 1-128 & 131 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Report of Directors', 'Shareholders' Analysis and Calendar', 'Notice to Members' and 'Form of Proxy'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 33, 90-91 & 93 of 2014 annual report; pages 41 & 106-107 & 109 of 2015 annual report and pages 43 & 129-130 of 2016 annual report.

It was disclosed in the 2014 annual reports that Innscor Africa Limited is committed to a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct based on the principles laid out in the King Reports and the Principles of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe as laid out in the Manual of Best Practice. Moreover, the Group undertook to align the existing code with the upcoming National Code of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe and other such recognised international best practices in corporate governance. Corporate governance mechanisms are disclosed significantly in the governance report. It is also interesting to point out the sustainability disclosure statement in this report: ‘The Group strives to operate its business in a sustainable manner that recognises environmental and social impacts. The Group believes that identifying, measuring and being accountable to its stakeholders through sustainability reporting (Economic, Environmental, Social and Governance) has potential for long-term business success. To this end, the Group has set a vision of moving towards sustainable business practices contained in the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI’s) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in informing the way we will engage with our stakeholders, identify material issues, respond to matters and being accountable to our broad range stakeholders.’ Overall, the sustainability report is to a larger extent comprehensive, especially with KPIs disclosed in the following additional sections of the 2016 annual report; ‘Sustainability Strategy and Governance’, ‘Key Material and Report Issues’, ‘Stakeholder Engagement’, ‘Sustainability Performance’, ‘Glossary of Terms’ and ‘GRI Content Index’. Mandatory disclosure is significantly comprehensive, making reference to the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) and IFRSs.

National Tyre Services Limited

The origins or roots of National Tyre Services Limited date back to 1926. From that time a number of company mergers took place, notably in October 1961 and again in November 1963. In September 1969 National Tyre Services became a public listed company on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. It is the largest retailer in Zimbabwe of new tyres and tubes, (Imported and locally manufactured). The other main activity is relugging of agriculture and earth moving tyres and the procurement of truck tyres for the Zimbabwe Transport Industry. The 2016 annual report discloses that ‘Revenue declined by 8% to US\$13.05 million in comparison to the prior year whilst the loss before tax increased to US\$766,474 from US\$182,289 recorded in the previous year. This was due to the squeeze on margins in a highly competitive market which impacted negatively on performance for the year. The benefit of supplier engagement on trading terms only began to be felt towards the end of the second half of the financial year’

The recent annual reports for NTS were analysed and the key findings are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate, Management and Administration', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance Statement' and 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 2 & 5-8 of 2014 annual report; pages 2 & 4-8 of 2015 annual report and pages 2 & p.5-8 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate, Management and Administration', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance Statement' and 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Report of Independent Auditors' and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is also responsible for risk management. The annual reports disclose that 'The Audit Committee, comprised of three non-executive Directors, met four times during the year prior to the Board meetings to consider compliance with financial reporting requirements, accounting policies, effectiveness of internal control systems and risk management issues. Any issues arising were brought to the attention of the Board. There was interaction with internal and independent auditors in order to ensure that internal controls were effective and reliable. Management is responsible for implementing the strategy to ensure that an appropriate risk management framework is operating effectively across the company. The company does not speculate in trading of derivative or other financial instruments. Management of the company meets on a weekly basis to analyse, amongst other matters, currency and interest rate exposures and to re-evaluate treasury management strategies against revised economic forecasts.' Governance of

risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 2, 5-10 & 38-40 of 2014 annual report; pages 2, 5-10 & 38-40 of 2015 annual report and pages 2, 5-10 & 37-38 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; 'Directorate, Management and Administration', 'Chairman and Group Managing Director's Report', 'Directors Report', 'Corporate Governance Statement', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Report of the Independent Auditors', 'Statement of Profit or Loss and Comprehensive Income', 'Statement of Financial Position', 'Statements of Changes in Equity', 'Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is mostly brief and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman and Group Managing Director's Report' and 'Corporate Governance Statement' sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information, disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation and disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 2-40 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-41 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-43 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Report of Directors', 'Analysis of Shareholders' and 'Notice of Annual General Meeting'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5 & 41-44 of 2014 annual report; pages 5 & 41-43 of 2015 annual report and pages 5 & p.44-47 of 2016 annual report.

NTS does not make reference to any local or international codes of best practice, but refer to the NTS's code of business conduct with emphasis on company values, honesty and accountability in our corporate affairs. Corporate governance mechanisms are disclosed to a larger extent. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is scattered in several sections of the annual reports including the chairman and managing director's report. Mandatory information is disclosed as per the requirements of relevant regulatory instruments.

TSL Limited

TSL Limited is a holding company incorporated and domiciled in Zimbabwe, whose shares are publicly traded on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. TSL, through its subsidiaries, has substantial interests in logistics, agriculture and real estate. The Company was founded in 1957 and through the energetic pursuit and implementation of a diversification strategy has grown to become a significant player in its chosen spheres of operation. The company's 2016 annual report disclosed that 'Group profit before tax decreased by 18% to US\$4.3 million. In previous years, the Group benefited from the recovery of financing costs from its former associate. As a consequence of the disposal of the Group's interest in the associate in 2015, net financing costs, in absolute terms, have increased from US\$1.1 million to US\$1.5 million. This additional cost has been largely offset by the fair value uplift in the Group's investment properties of US\$0.95 million, which was based on independent, professional valuations. Group profit after Tax has decreased by 3% to US\$3.2 million.

The recent annual reports for TSL were analysed and the following findings were noted. Information on board of directors and management structure is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate and Management', 'Group Management', 'Corporate Governance', 'Report of Directors' and 'Statement of directors' responsibility'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs

are disclosed on pages 5-6, 10 & 12-13 of 2014 annual report; pages 5-6, 9 & 11-12 of 2015 annual report and pages 5-6, 10 & 12-13 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure of governance of risk and structure KPIs is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: Directorate and Management', 'Group Management', 'Corporate Governance', 'Report of Directors', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Report of Independent Auditors' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'TSL Limited has a Finance and Risk Committee consisting of four non-executive directors, one of whom is the Chairman. The Committee meets at least three times per annum together with the TSL executive management, external and internal auditors. The Committee has written terms of reference which have been approved by the Board of Directors. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5-6, 10, 12-14 & 62-66 of 2014 annual report; pages 5-6, 9, 11-13 & 61-64 of 2015 annual report and pages 5-6, 10, 12-14 & 65-68 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including 'Financial Highlights', 'Company profile and mission statement', 'Group structure', 'Directorate and Administration', 'Group management', 'Chairman's Statement and Review of Operation', 'Review of Operations', 'Corporate Governance', 'Definitions', 'Report of Directors', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibility', 'Independent auditors' Report', 'Consolidated Income Statement', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is scarcely disclosed and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's statement and Review of Operation' section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are

highlighted on pages 2-69 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-68 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-72 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Shareholders Analysis’, ‘Notice of Annual General Meeting and ‘Shareholders’ Diary’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 12 & 70-73 of 2014 annual report; pages 11 & 69-72 of 2015 annual report and pages 12 & 73-76 of 2016 annual report.

TSL discloses its corporate governance mechanism to a larger extent despite the report referring to any local or international codes of best practice. The annual reports only include the following generic statement ‘TSL Limited is committed to maintaining high moral and ethical standards within the Group.’ Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is fragmented in several sections of the annual reports. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive and reference is made to applicable regulatory instruments e.g. the Companies Act (Chapter 24.03) and IFRSs.

Turnall Holdings Limited

For more than 50 years, Turnall Holdings Limited has been a regional market leader in the manufacture and supply of fibre cement products made from select quality Chrysotile Asbestos Fibres. The local operating subsidiary comprises two main sub-divisions namely: Turnall Building Products; and Turnall Piping Products. The 2016 annual report discloses that ‘The Group recorded a turnover of US\$16.99 million, which is a 41% decrease from the prior year turnover of US\$29.0 million. Sales were negatively affected by liquidity constraints, subdued aggregate demand and uncompetitive pricing in the regional markets. Export sales contributed 0.52% against the previous year contribution of 1.82%. Export sales were affected by pricing issues owing to high cost of production in Zimbabwe, a direct consequence of the weakening regional currencies against the United States Dollar. The Group reported a loss from operating

activities of US\$0.5 million compared to a profit of US\$1.5 million recorded in the previous year.’

The recent annual reports for Turnall were analysed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Our Governance and Ethics Approach’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements’, ‘Company Secretary Certification’ and ‘Directors’ Report’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 14-19 & 31-34 of 2014 annual report; pages 14-19 & 31-34 of 2015 annual report and pages 14-19 & 31-34 of 2016 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Our Governance and Ethics Approach’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements’, ‘Company Secretary Certification’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Report of the Independent Auditors to the members of Turnall Holdings Limited’ and ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is also responsible for risk management. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis, risk frameworks and

methodologies are in place. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 14-19, 31-36 & 67-71 of 2014 annual report; pages 14-19, 31-35 & 63-68 of 2015 annual report and pages 14-19, 31-39 & 73-77 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate History', 'Our Vision, Mission and Values', 'Group Profile', 'Our Business Portfolio and Products', 'Highlights of Our Performance', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Management's Review of Operations', 'Our Governance and Ethics Approach', 'Our Sustainability Approach', 'Principal Risks and Opportunities', 'Stakeholder Engagement', 'Our Sustainability Performance', 'Directors' Responsibility and Approval of Financial Statements', 'Company Secretary Certification', 'Directors' Report', 'Independent Auditor's Report to the members of Turnall Holdings Limited', 'Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of changes in equity', 'Consolidated Statement of cash flows', 'Notes to the consolidated financial statements', 'Corporate Information', 'Glossary of Terms' and 'GRI Index'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. The annual reports disclose that 'The Directors are required by the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) to maintain adequate accounting records and to prepare financial statements for each financial year which present a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Group at the end of the financial period and the performance and cash flows for the period. Financial disclosure is thus largely comprehensive in the annual reports. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the Sustainability Approach', 'Principal Risks and Opportunities', 'Stakeholder Engagement' and 'Our Sustainability Performance' sections of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively: reference to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, , link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. Several integrated reporting KPIs were noticeable and were disclosed comprehensively in the annual

reports including disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship, disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates, the company's strategic direction, the integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors, the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports, disclosure on how does the organisation's governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on pages 1-74, 78,79 & 89 of 2014 annual report; pages 1-69, 74,75 & 81 of 2015 annual report and pages 1-81, 85,86 & 93 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in several sections of the annual reports including 'Directors' Report', 'Shareholders' Information', 'Notice to Shareholders', 'Shareholders Diary' and 'Detachable Form of Proxy'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 33-34, 75-77 & 87 of 2014 annual report; pages 33-34, 71-74 & 79 of 2015 annual report and pages 33-34, 82-84 & 89 of 2016 annual report.

The 2014 annual report discloses that 'To reflect our commitment to good corporate governance and sustainable business practices, we have included our third sustainability report using the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI's) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. As custodians of good governance and strategy direction, we strive to ensure that there is clear allocation of responsibilities to demonstrate balance of power and authority. The Group endeavours to improve its corporate governance systems toward alignment with the National Code on Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe and other voluntary codes such as King III Report in South Africa.' The governance mechanisms are significantly disclosed and the sustainability disclosure is significant with comprehensive KPIs presented in sections; 'Our Sustainability Approach', 'Principal Risks and Opportunities', 'Stakeholder Engagement' and

‘Our Sustainability Performance’. It is also noteworthy that Turnall was the Overall Winner of the Inaugural Corporate Governance Awards 2013 - Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators of Zimbabwe (ICSAZ) and also Overall Winner in Sustainability Reporting Category 2013 - Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators of Zimbabwe (ICSAZ).

Although the reports are labelled ‘Integrated Annual Report’, they fall short of compliance with the IIRC framework. Mandatory information is disclosed comprehensively with references to applicable regulatory frameworks.

Willdale Limited

Willdale Limited was founded in 1957 in Harare, Zimbabwe. The Company was listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in March 2003 following its demerger from Mashonaland Holdings Limited. Willdale Limited is currently the largest brick making company in Zimbabwe and the only brick company listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). Revenue declined by 12% to US\$7.7 million compared to the prior year as a result of an 8% drop in sales volumes and a 5% decrease in average prices. Operating profit was US\$0.4 million (2015: US\$1.2 million) after charging US\$0.9 million to depreciation of property, plant and equipment (2015: US\$1 million) and taking into account US\$0.09 million in other income (2015: \$0.4 million). Ongoing cost management initiatives resulted in a 16% decrease in overhead expenses compared to the prior year. Net cash flows generated during the year were US\$0.2 million compared to the prior year’s US\$0.5 million reflecting the tough operating environment. Capital expenditure for the year amounted to US\$0.99 million and was financed through cash flows from operations. The board and management are working on restructuring the company’s debt in order to significantly reduce the interest burden and improve profitability.

The recent annual reports for Willdale were analysed and the findings below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directorate and Administration’, ‘Directors’ Report’ and ‘Corporate Governance Report’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended,

existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 7 & 12-16 of 2014 annual report; pages 7 & 11-14 of 2015 annual report and pages 4 & 10-15 of 2016 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate and Administration', 'Directors' Report' and 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Independent Auditor's Report' and 'Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'The Finance and Audit Committee comprises of three non-executive Directors. The Company Secretary who is also the Finance Director, the Chief Executive Officer and representatives of the external auditors also attend the committee's meetings by invitation. It meets quarterly to review the interim financial statements. It also reviews half-year and year-end financial statements prior to their final approval by the board and subsequent publication. The Finance and Audit Committee ensures that internal financial controls and audits are carried out and it has direct access to the external auditors. It also reviews recommendations and requirements of the International Financial Reporting Standards and ensures compliance as applicable to the Company's activities. The Company's principal financial liabilities comprise of finance lease (for Willdale Transport Services), loans payable, redeemable preference shares and trade payables. The main purpose of these financial liabilities is to raise finance for the Company's operations. The Company has various financial assets such as trade receivables and cash and short term deposits, which arise directly from its operations. The Company does not use derivative financial instruments. Exposure to credit, interest rate and liquidity risk arise in the normal course of the business and these are the main risks arising from Financial Instruments.' Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 7, 12-17 & 38-41 of 2014 annual report; pages 7, 11-15 & 38-40 of 2015 annual report and pages 4, 10-20 & 49-52 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Vision, Mission and Values', 'Financial Highlights', 'Directorate and Administration', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Summary of Financial Statements', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Independent Auditor's Report' and 'Financial Statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the

financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is scarcely disclosed and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's statement' section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 5-44 of 2014 annual report; pages 5-44 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-56 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Notice of Annual General Meeting', 'Directors' Report' and 'Shareholders' Information'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 10 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 4, 12-15 & 45 of 2014 annual report; pages 4, 11-12 & 45 of 2015 annual report and pages 2, 10-12 & 57 of 2016 annual report.

Willdale's recent annual reports disclose that the company endeavours to operate to the best of ethical standards in accordance with accepted corporate governance paradigms which conform to the requirements of the Principles of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe as contained in the Manual of Best Practice, and in full compliance with the requirements of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Corporate governance disclosure is to a larger extent comprehensive. Sustainability information, however is disclosed to a lesser extent fragmented in several sections of the reports including 'Chairman's Statement'. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive.

Insurance and Property Sector

As discussed in Chapter two of this thesis the insurance sector continues to be affected by high claims, low uptake of products, cancellations, policy surrenders and failure by employers to remit contributions deducted from employees. The real estate market remained subdued as

reflected by the fact that only 1.60% of bank credit issued in the market was absorbed by the construction industry. Low demand for space, increasing vacancy levels due to voluntary space surrenders and evictions compounded by increasing defaults characterised the property market. These market conditions negatively affected rental levels and property values in selected sub-sectors of the property market, with the central business district offices and large factory and specialised manufacturing industrial sectors being the worst affected.

Fidelity Life Assurance Limited

The Group is engaged in life assurance, funeral assurance and services, asset management, actuarial consultancy, property development and micro-financing services. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'The Group recorded net insurance premiums of US\$14.8 million against US\$16.6 million in the prior year. The difficult operating environment impacted on the Group's premium income generation and collection ability. With the Southview Park project now in its final stages, income from sale of stands was lower than 2015. Total revenue generated by the Group closed the year at US\$36.6 million. Insurance claims were US\$7.2 million against US\$6.7 million in the prior year. Property development expenses were significantly lower at US\$4.5 million compared to US\$20 million in the prior year reflecting the near completion of the Fidelity Life Southview Park project. The acquisition of the Langford Estates land bank resulted in the Group assuming debts of US\$14 million in a land for debt swap transaction that increased the finance costs incurred to US\$2 million against US\$0.5 million in prior year. Profit for the year amounted to US\$2.3 million.

The recent annual reports for Fidelity were analysed and the following findings were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Board of Directors', 'Executive Management', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Report' and 'Directors' Responsibility Statement'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 3-4, 6-

9, & 14 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-5, 7-11 & 17 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-7, 9-11 & 17 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the sections of the annual reports listed below: ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Executive Management’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Directors’ Report’ and ‘Directors’ Responsibility Statement’, ‘Actuarial Solvency Certificate’, ‘Report of the Independent Auditors’ and ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that ‘The Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee deals with financial reporting, compliance, actuarial issues, internal controls and risk management issues through the internal audit department. The Committee meets with the Group’s external auditors to discuss accounting, auditing, internal controls and financial reporting matters. The external auditors have unrestricted access to the Committee and where necessary, the external auditors are invited to attend the meetings of the Committee. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 3-4, 6-9, 14-17 & 46-51 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-5, 7-11, 17-19 & 50-54 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-7, 9-11, 17-23 & 55-61 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed in several sections of the annual reports including: ‘Company Profile’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Executive Management’, ‘A Brief History’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Chairman’s Statement’, ‘Managing Director’s Report’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility Statement’, ‘Actuarial Solvency Certificate’, ‘Directorate and Administration’, , ‘Summary Of Financial Statements’, ‘Corporate Governance Report’, ‘Report of the Independent Auditors’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Changes In Equity’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows’ and ‘Notes To The Consolidated Financial Statements’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry,

details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 2-57 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-61 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-69 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Notice of Annual General Meeting', 'Directors' Report' and 'Shareholders' Information'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-9 & 58-59 of 2014 annual report; pages 9-11 & 62-64 of 2015 annual report and pages 10-11 & 71-72 of 2016 annual report.

The recent annual reports disclose that Fidelity Life Assurance of Zimbabwe is committed to principles of transparency, accountability, and integrity in its dealings with stakeholders but does not make specific reference to any local or international code of corporate governance. The governance report is however comprehensive to a larger extent disclosing governance mechanisms in place. Sustainability information is disclosed in several sections of the reports but no single report is dedicated to sustainability disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive.

First Mutual Holdings Limited (FMHL)

First Mutual Holdings Limited (FMHL) is incorporated and domiciled in Zimbabwe, and is an investment holding company. The main business of the FMHL group and its subsidiaries is that of provision of short-term insurance, health insurance, life and pensions, reinsurance, property management and development, actuarial consultancy services and wealth management. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'The Group had an investment profit of

US\$8.8 million in 2016 compared to investment losses of US\$4.7 million in 2015 mainly due to the increase in fair value gains on quoted equities following the recovery of the stock market

in the fourth quarter of 2016, a lower negative fair value adjustment on investment property and increased interest income arising from higher money market investment. The Group achieved profit for the year of US\$9.3 million compared to US\$0.1 million in the previous period. Total comprehensive income attributable to the equity holders of the parent company for the year was US\$8.8 million (2015: US\$0.2 million).

The recent annual reports for FML were analysed and the findings below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate', 'Board of Directors', 'Boards of Directors - Subsidiary Companies', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Statements of Directors' Responsibilities' and 'Certificate of Compliance'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 4 & 10-23 of 2014 annual report; pages 5 & 14-30 of 2015 annual report and pages 5 & 14-32 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Directorate', 'Board of Directors', 'Boards of Directors - Subsidiary Companies', 'Executive Committee Members', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Statements of Directors' Responsibilities', 'Certificate of Compliance', 'Independent Auditors' Report' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'The Combined Audit and Actuarial Committee comprises four (4) non-executive directors, one of whom is the Chairperson. The Group Chief Executive Officer and Group Finance Director attend these meetings in ex-officio capacities. The Combined Audit and Actuarial Committee has written terms of reference and is tasked with ensuring financial discipline within the Group, sound corporate values and financial procedures. This Committee is further tasked with reviewing and recommending the interim

and annual financial statements of the Group and considering any accounting practice changes. The Committee also recommends the appointment and reviews the fees of the external auditors. The Group's Audit and Risk Management Executive and the independent auditors are invited to attend all meetings and have unrestricted access to this Committee to ensure their independence and objectivity. Risk Management is practised within the Group in order to protect assets and earnings against exceptional financial losses and legal liabilities. Operational risks are managed through formalised procedures and controls, well trained personnel and where necessary back-up facilities. The Group manages risk of all forms including operational, market, reputational, liquidity and credit risks. These risks are identified and monitored through various channels and mechanisms. The Group Internal Audit and Risk Management Department is responsible for the assessment of the overall risk profile which is managed by the Managing Directors and General Managers on an on-going basis. Emphasis is placed on continuous improvement of systems and ways of working through business process reengineering as well as internal and external audits. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 4, 10-24 & 63-68 of 2014 annual report; pages 5, 14-31 & 58-70 of 2015 annual report and pages 6-7, 9-11, 17-23 & 55-61 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; 'Vision, Mission and Values', 'Corporate Information', 'Directorate', 'Group Chairman's Statement to Shareholders', 'Group Chief Executive Officer's Review of Operations', 'Board of Directors', 'Boards of Directors - Subsidiary Companies', 'Executive Committee Members', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Statement of Responsibility', 'Certificate of Compliance', 'Declaration by Group Finance Director', 'Independent Auditor's Report', Consolidated and Company Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes In Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows' and 'Notes To The Consolidated Financial Statements'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's Statement' section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking

information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are disclosed on pages 3-72 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-105 of 2015 annual report and pages 1-122 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Top 20 Shareholders’, ‘Notice to Shareholders’ and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-9 & 73-76 of 2014 annual report; pages 18-20 & 106-109 of 2015 annual report and pages 21-23 & 123-127 of 2016 annual report.

Mashonaland Holdings Limited

Mashonaland Holdings was incorporated in July 1966 with the Mashonaland & Provincial Trust Company (Pvt) Ltd and Mashonaland Real Estate (Pvt) Ltd forming the original structure, and other early acquisitions included complementary construction and development companies, including the brickfields west of Harare now operated by Willdale Limited. Much of the Greystone Park flat and housing development was undertaken at that time by Mash. In 1969 Mash become the first property company to be listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. In the early 2000’s the decision was taken to rationalize the Group’s operations. Two major un-bundling exercises were undertaken. The electrical and light engineering manufacturing businesses, along with various trading operations, were incorporated into Powerspeed Limited which was then listed as a public company on the ZSE. Similarly, the brickmaking operations were listed under Willdale Limited. Following these de-mergers, Mash was left with a core of properties into which the then major shareholders and other interested parties reversed their own property portfolios in order to establish, by way of a rights offer, the “new Mash” in October 2003. Thus the company returned to its original core business. It is now a fully-fledged property investment and development company with its headquarters in ZB Life Towers in central Harare. The 2016 annual report discloses that ‘The Group posted an operating profit of

US\$1.9 million (2015: US\$2.4 million). The operating profit ratio declined to 33% (2015:40%). Although the Group traded profitably, the decline in capital values on investment property (US\$8.0 million) resulted in a loss for the year of US\$5.9 million (2015: US\$6.0 million-loss).

The recent annual reports for Mashonaland were analysed resulting in the following findings. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections; 'Directorate and administration', 'Statement of corporate governance', 'Report of the Directors' and 'Directors' Responsibility Statement'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5 & 10-14 of 2014 annual report; pages 5 & 10-14 of 2015 annual report and pages 5 & 10-14 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the sections of the annual reports listed below: 'Directorate and administration', 'Statement of corporate governance', 'Report of the Directors' and 'Directors' Responsibility Statement', 'Independent Auditors' Report' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is also responsible for risk management issues. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis, risk frameworks and methodologies are in place. Governance of risk and structure KPIs

are disclosed on pages 5, 10-14, 17 & 40-43 of 2014 annual report; pages 5, 10-14, 17 & 40-43 of 2015 annual report and pages 5, 10-14, 17 & 43-45 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including: 'Financial Highlights', 'Directorate and Administration', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive's Review of Operations', 'Statement of Corporate Governance', 'Report of the Directors', 'Directors' Responsibility Statement', 'Financial Review', 'Group Statistics', 'Independent Auditor's Report', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements', 'Other Information' and 'Social Responsibility'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's Statement' and 'Chief Executive's Review of Operations' sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 2-47 & 51 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-47 & 51 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-48 & 52 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections of the annual reports listed as follows: 'Notice to Members', 'Report of Directors', 'Analysis of Shareholders' and 'Shareholders' Calendar'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 3,12 & 48-50 of 2014 annual

report; pages 3,12 & 48-50 of 2015 annual report and pages 3,12 & 49-51 of 2016 annual report.

FMHL's corporate governance disclosure is generally comprehensive to a larger extent, although there is no specific reference to any local or international code of best practice. However, it refers to its internal Code of Ethics. Sustainability information to a lesser extent is disclosed in several sections of the reports e.g. 'Chairman's Statement' and 'Chief Executive's Review of Operations'. Mandatory disclosure is to a larger extent comprehensive with reference to applicable regulatory frameworks e.g. the ZSE listing requirements.

Nicoz Diamond Insurance Limited

NicozDiamond is one of the leading players in the Zimbabwe short term insurance market comprised of 23 insurance companies. The company's market segments range from individuals right through to large corporations and the company's product range depicts its diversified portfolio. NicozDiamond distributes its products through Bancassurance partnerships, brokers and agents. The company also operates in the region through its subsidiaries and associate companies namely: United General Insurance of Malawi, Diamond General Insurance of Zambia and Diamond Seguros of Mozambique. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'The Group made an overall profit after tax of US\$959,798 from continuing operations and US\$426,125 after incorporating discontinued operations. This was largely buoyed by the good performance from the company which posted a profit after tax of US\$1,725,016, a significant improvement in performance from the US\$119,124 of 2015.'

The recent annual reports for NicozDiamond were analysed and the following findings are noted and discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Governance', 'Directorate', 'Management' and 'Report of the Directors'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, details about previous employment/positions provided, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. The annual reports also

reveal that non-executive directors are classified into independent and non-independent non-executive directors. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-15 & 23-25 of 2014 annual report; pages 8-15 & 23-25 of 2015 annual report and pages 7-16 & 24-26 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Governance', 'Directorate', 'Management', 'Report of the Directors', 'Directors' Responsibility Statement', 'Independent Auditors' Report' and 'Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that there is a combined audit and risk management committee responsible for risk management issues. The Audit and Risk Management Committee monitors internal control policies and procedures designed to safeguard company assets and to maintain the integrity of financial reporting. Among the specific responsibilities set out in its Charter, the Audit and Risk Management Committee reviews all published accounts of the company; reviews the scope and the independence of the internal and external audits; monitors and assesses the systems for internal compliance and control and advises on the appointment, performance and remuneration of external auditors. The Audit and Risk Management committee of the Board approves the Group risk management policies. These policies define the Group's identification of risk and its interpretation, limit structure to ensure the appropriate quality and diversification of assets, align underwriting and reinsurance strategy to the corporate goals, and specify reporting requirements. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-15, 23-26 & 82-90 of 2014 annual report; pages 8-15, 23-27 & 82-97 of 2015 annual report and pages 7-16, 24-32 & 89-94 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in several sections of the annual reports including 'Corporate Values', 'Product Overview', 'Distribution', 'Corporate Social Responsibility', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directorate', 'Management', 'Chairman's statement', 'Managing Director's Report', 'Report of the directors', 'Independent auditor's report', 'Financial Statements', 'Other information' and 'Corporate Social Responsibility'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. The 'Report of the directors' section of the annual reports certify that 'The financial statements have been prepared on a

going concern basis since the Directors have every reason to believe that the company and the Group have adequate resources to continue in operation for the foreseeable future. The financial statements have been prepared in full compliance with all Financial Reporting Standards and the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03).’ Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ and ‘Statement of Corporate Governance’ sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed less comprehensively including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on pages 2-94 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-100 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-100 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Analysis of Shareholders’, ‘Notices to Shareholders’, and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top ten shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by directors, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 23-25 & 95-99 of 2014 annual report; pages 23-25 & 101-103 of 2015 annual report and pages 24-26 & 101-105 of 2016 annual report.

Nicoz Diamond and its associated companies is committed to good corporate governance and is guided by the National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe as well as the King reports as disclosed in its recent annual reports. Corporate governance mechanisms in place are disclosed to a larger extent. The corporate social responsibility section together with several others disclose to a lesser extent sustainability information. Mandatory information is comprehensively disclosed to a larger extent, with reference to applicable regulatory framework including the Companies Act Chapter 24.03 and IFRSs.

Old Mutual Zimbabwe Limited (OMZIL)

The 2016 annual report discloses that ‘Adjusted operating profit (AOP), which is comprised of operating profit plus a normalized investment return, was US\$76 million, which was the same result as in 2015, despite the deterioration in the business environment. The normalising of investment returns allows for easier year-on-year comparability of results by adjusting for short term volatility in investment markets. This is done in order to highlight the performance of the core business operations.’

The recent annual reports for Old Mutual were analysed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the in the ‘Directors’ Report’ section of the annual reports. In this section the board structure and composition and the role of the board are disclosed. A board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 6-7 of 2014 annual report; pages 6-7 of 2015 annual report and pages 10-11 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Auditors’ Statement’ and ‘Notes to the Abridged Financial Statements’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports disclose that OMZIL’s principal risks have been determined by assessing the possible effects on its reputation, its stakeholders, its earnings, capital and liquidity, and the future sustainability of its business. The risk landscape is changing rapidly, particularly in the context of the persistent volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global and local macro-economic environment. OMZIL’s business is also affected by a number of risks inherent to the products it offers and the industry it operates in, such as exposure to market levels, interest rates and insurance liability risk. The risks are closely monitored and overseen by OMZIL Group management and reported to the Board on a regular basis. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 6-7 of 2014 annual report; pages 6-7 of 2015 annual report and pages 10-11 & p.39-40 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; ‘Chairman’s statement’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Group Statement of Profit or Loss’, Group Statement of

Comprehensive Income’, ‘Group Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Group Statement of Changes in Equity’, ‘Group Statement of Cash Flows’, ‘Notes to the Abridged Financial Statements’ and ‘Responsible Business Report’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. The annual reports disclose that ‘The consolidated abridged financial statements which have been prepared under the historical cost convention are in agreement with the underlying books and records, have been properly prepared in accordance with the significant accounting policies set out in note 2, and comply with the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the relevant regulations made thereunder, the Insurance Act (Chapter 24:07), the Pension and Provident Funds Act (Chapter 24:09), the Building Societies Act (Chapter 24:02), the Asset Management Act (Chapter 24:26), the Collective Investments Schemes Act (Chapter 24:19) and the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25). Financial disclosure is largely comprehensive in OMZIL’s recent annual reports. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the ‘Responsible Business Report’ and ‘Chairman’s Statement’ sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 4-18 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-18 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-40 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Notices to Members’ and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 6-7 & 19-21 of 2014 annual report; pages 6-7 of 2015 annual report and pages 10-11 & 41-43 of 2016 annual report.

Corporate governance mechanisms are disclosed to some extent in several sections of the annual reports. Sustainability information is disclosed to some extent in stand-alone corporate social responsibility report accessible on the company's website. Mandatory disclosure complies with the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the relevant regulations made there under, the Insurance Act (Chapter 24:07), the Pension and Provident Funds Act (Chapter 24:09), the Building Societies Act (Chapter 24:02), the Asset Management Act (Chapter 24:26), the Collective Investments Schemes Act (Chapter 24:19) and the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25).

Pearl Properties

Pearl Properties (2006) Limited ("Pearl Properties" or "the Company") is incorporated in Zimbabwe, and its principal activities are property investment, development and management. Pearl Properties (2006) Limited listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in August 2007. The company's 2016 annual report reveals that 'Revenue for the Group at US\$7.983 million declined by 5.72% in 2016 compared to FY2015. The decline in revenue is driven by pressure on rentals as macroeconomic fundamentals worsened during the year, increasing pressure on rental and occupancy levels. The weighted average occupancy levels for 2016 declined to 72.34% from 78.56% in 2015. At 31 December, the year-end occupancy level stood at 71.77%. The pressures on occupancy levels, driven by low demand for space, resulted in rental income declining by 7.36% to US\$7.728 million (FY2015: US\$8.342 million).

The recent annual reports for Pearl Properties were analysed and findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the sections of the annual reports listed as follows: 'Profile of Directors', 'Report of the Directors', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibilities' and 'Certificate of Compliance by Group Company Secretary'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several board structure and composition KPIs were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of

directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5-9 & 18-27 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-5 & 14-23 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-5 & 14-22 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Profile of Directors', 'Report of the Directors', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibilities', 'Certificate of Compliance by Group Company Secretary', 'Independent Auditors' Report' and 'Notes to the Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee responsible for risk management issues. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by an non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis, risk frameworks and methodologies are in place. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5-9, 18-28 & 65-67 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-5, 14-24 & 71-75 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-5, 14-24 & 73-77 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; 'Corporate Information', 'Profile of Directors', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Managing Director's Report', 'Report of the Directors', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Statement of Directors' Responsibilities', 'Certificate of Compliance by Group Company Secretary', 'Independent Auditor's Report', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss', 'Consolidated Statement of Other Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements' 'Company Statement of Financial Position'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections.

Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 3-69 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-76 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-78 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Report of Directors’, ‘Top 20 Shareholders’, ‘Notices to Shareholders’, and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 4-5 & 70-71 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-5 & 77-78 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-5 & 79-82 of 2016 annual report.

Pearl Properties’ 2014 and 2015 annual reports refer to the Group’s Code of Ethics and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing requirements for highest ethical standards. Corporate governance mechanism is disclosed to a larger extent comprehensively but sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent in several sections of the reports including the ‘Chairman’s statement’ and ‘Managing Director’s Report’. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive to a larger extent in reference to the requirements of the regulatory frameworks e.g. the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03).

Retail and Service Sector

As discussed in Chapter two, the retail sector is negatively affected by the deepening economic slowdown as evidenced by increased company closures and higher unemployment. These negative trends have caused depressed consumer demand and difficult trading is being experienced by most business sectors. Liquidity constraints is persisting while local manufacturing continues to decline. The country has experienced the collapse of commodity

prices and de-industrialisation, which have been compounded by the ongoing drought and liquidity challenges, putting considerable strain on an already fragile economy. The resultant effects, such as job losses, continued deflation and increasing in formalisation has continued to negatively affect disposable income. The telecommunications industry remains pivotal to the service sector's development, signs of weakening domestic demand are likely to dampen its growth prospects in the short-term. The tourism and transport sectors remain depressed but important to the service sector development.

African Sun Limited

African Sun Limited ("the Company"), is a leading hotel investment company in Zimbabwe. The Company and its subsidiaries ("the Group") currently has two divisions which are: Hotels under Management and Owner Managed operations. The owner managed operations comprise of InterContinental Hotels Group ("IHG") Franchised Hotels, The Victoria Falls Hotel Partnership, Stand Alone Hotels and Sun Casinos which include a stand-alone charity casino (Harare Sun Casino) and a hotel based casino (Makasa Sun Casino) at The Kingdom at Victoria Falls. The Company's hotels are located in all the tourist destinations in Zimbabwe, as well as in Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. The Group adopted a targeted volume stimulation drive backed by cost reduction initiatives to mitigate the composite effect of the local, regional and international markets downturn on our hotels' occupancy and room rates. These initiatives included targeting regional convention business, increasing the Group's representation in our source markets and attendance at international travel and trade shows, and increased promotions to our domestic market. The initiatives culminated in a successful turnaround of our business as the Group reported a profit for the year of US\$4.81 million compared to a loss of US\$8.31 million posted in the 15 months' period ended 31 December 2015. Zimbabwe tourism continues to show its resilience in spite of macro-economic conditions.

The recent annual reports for African Sun were analysed and the findings are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Certificate by The Company Secretary', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Directors' Declaration', 'Board of Directors' and 'Management'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the

directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 21-27, 107 & p.112 of 2014 annual report; pages 21-30, 99 & 103 of 2015 annual report; and pages 23-31, 102 & 105 of 2016 annual report.

Information on governance of risk and structure is disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Certificate by The Company Secretary', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Directors' Declaration', 'Independent Auditors' Report', 'Notes to the Financial Statements', 'Board of Directors' and 'Management'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'The Finance and Audit Committee incorporates the audit, risk and finance oversight functions. The Committee deals, inter alia, with compliance, internal control risk management and the review and preliminary approval of the major investment decisions of the Group. It is regulated by specific terms of reference and is chaired by a non-executive director. All members of the Committee not being less than (3) three at any given time are non-executive directors. Executives of the Group including the Managing Director and Finance Director attend the meeting by invitation. It meets with the Company's external auditors to discuss accounting, auditing, internal control and financial reporting matters. The external and internal auditors have unrestricted access to the Finance and Audit Committee. The Group's activities expose it to a variety of financial risks; market risk (including foreign exchange risk, fair value interest rate risk, cash flow interest rate risk and price risk), credit risk and liquidity risk. The Group's overall risk management programme focuses on the unpredictability of financial markets and seeks to minimise potential adverse effects on the Group's financial performance. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 21-30 & 53-59 of 2014 annual report; pages 21-31 & 50-57 of 2015 annual report and pages 23-36 & p.54-60 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Corporate Profile’, ‘Our Business Overview’, ‘Financial Highlights’, ‘Message From The Chairman’, ‘Our Strategy’, ‘Group Chief Executive’s Report’, ‘Accounting Philosophy’, ‘Certificate by The Company Secretary’, ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility for Financial Reporting’, ‘Independent auditor’s report’, ‘Statement of Financial Position’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity’, ‘Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows’, ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements’, ‘Group Supplementary Information’, ‘Group Structure’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Corporate Information’, ‘Management’ and ‘Corporate and Hotel Directory’. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. The annual reports disclose that ‘African Sun Limited directors are required by the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements, to maintain adequate accounting records and to prepare financial statements for each financial year which present a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Group at the end of the financial year, and of the profit or loss and cash flows for the year then ended. In preparing the financial statements, generally accepted accounting practices have been followed and suitable accounting policies have been used and applied consistently. Reasonable and prudent judgements and estimates have been made. The financial statements incorporate full and responsible disclosure in line with the accounting philosophy of the Group. Consequently, the financial disclosure is mostly comprehensive in the annual reports. Sustainability information is mainly disclosed in the ‘Sustainability Reporting’, ‘Human Capital Management’ and ‘Corporate Social Investment’ sections of the annual reports. The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports: Disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, disclosure of IT governance mechanisms, the company give an overview of trends in its industry, the report show details of the products or services produced/provided, link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, community activities, a discussion of corporate strategy, details of the nature of business it is in and fair labour practices disclosure. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 3-102, 106-112 & 116 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-94, 98-103 & 106 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-98, 101-105 & 109 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Directors’ Report’, ‘Shareholders’ Profile’, ‘Notice to Members’, and ‘Shareholders’ Diary’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 22, 103 & 113-115 of 2014 annual report; pages 22-23, 95 & 104-105 of 2015 annual report and pages 24, 99-100 & 106-108 of 2016 annual report.

African Sun’s corporate governance report is comprehensive to a larger extent, with the recent annual reports disclosing that African Sun Limited personnel are committed to a long-published code of ethics which runs through the whole Group in all the jurisdictions in which it operates. The Group adopted a Corporate Governance Charter and certain recommendations made in the King Report III. In addition, the 2016 annual report discloses that the Group is committed to adhering to the principles espoused in the National Code on Corporate Governance (NCCGZ). Sustainability information is disclosed to some extent in several sections of the reports including the ‘corporate social responsibility report’ included in both 2015 and 2016 annual reports. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive in accordance with applicable regulatory frameworks.

Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Limited

Econet Wireless Zimbabwe is Zimbabwe’s largest provider of telecommunications services, providing solutions in mobile and fixed wireless telephony, public payphones, internet access and payment solutions. Econet launched its network on 10th July 1998 and listed on 17th September 1998. It is one of the largest companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalisation. Key subsidiaries and associates of Econet are Liquid Telecom, the largest internet service and access provider in Zimbabwe, and Transaction Payment Solutions, a leading provider of financial transaction switching, point-of-sale and value-added support services. Econet’s 2016 annual report discloses that ‘Average revenue per user (ARPU) declined from US\$8.15 per month to US\$6.84 and Earnings Before Interest, Taxation

Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) closed at US\$238.4 million compared to US\$285.6 million for the prior year. Profit after tax was US\$40.2 million compared to US\$ 70.2 million for the prior year, impacted by high depreciation charge of US\$136.6 million, compared to US\$126.3 million in the previous year. The debt to equity ratio continued to show marked improvement, decreasing from 36% to 31%, after repaying a total of US\$86.7 million to lenders for the period under review.'

The recent annual reports for Econet were analysed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Board of Directors', 'Form the Directors', 'Governance Statement', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary' and 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 23-31 & 47-48 of 2014 annual report; pages 20-29 & 44-46 of 2015 annual report and pages 28-31 & 50-51 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in several sections of the annual reports including 'Board of Directors', 'Form the Directors', 'Governance Statement', 'Risk Report', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent Auditors' Report', 'Notes to the Financial Statements', 'Board of Directors' and 'Management'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the Board Committees include a separate Audit Committee and Risk Committee is responsible for risk management issues. The Audit Committee focuses on the quality of the Group's financial reporting and the effectiveness of the Group's systems of

internal control and, in conjunction with the Risk Committee, risk management processes. It also oversees the integrity of internal audit and assurance and manages the relationship with the Group's external auditors. The latter responsibility entails ensuring that the external auditors provide an effective and independent audit. The Risk Committee's primary role is to oversee the effectiveness of risk and compliance management within the Group. The identification and management of risk are central to the Group's objective of creating long-term shareholder value. Risks have the potential to impact the Group's overall performance as well as its reputation. The Committee plays the critical role of identifying, analysing and assessing risk issues in order to prevent or minimize the likelihood of that impact. The Committee co-ordinates and reviews information on risk management and ensures that the risk management systems are operating effectively. It reviews on behalf of the Board both operational and strategic risks with a view to ensuring that these are addressed timeously and effectively. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 23-32, 47-49 & 78-92 of 2014 annual report; pages 20-30 & 74-85 of 2015 annual report and pages 28-37, 50-58 & 122-134 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Performance Highlights', 'Shareholder Value Delivery Report', 'Share Price Movement from February 2009 to February 2015', 'Six-year Trading History', 'New Products and Services', 'Our Business', 'Corporate Profile', 'Chairman's Statement to Shareholders', 'Chief Executive Officer's Operations Review', 'Board of Directors', 'From the Directors', 'Governance Statement', 'Risk Report', 'Corporate Social Investment', 'Our People and our Community', 'Econet Coverage Map- February 2015', 'Certificate by the Group Company Secretary', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent auditor's report', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements', 'Policy Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements', 'Administration' and 'Our Strategic Business Partnerships'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Financial disclosure is mostly comprehensive in the annual reports as the information is required according to the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03). Sustainability information is disclosed in various sections of the annual reports. It is important to note that the annual reports disclose that 'In line with the United

Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set on 25 September 2015, the business continues to assess the level of integration of sustainability requirements into the business operations and activities.’ The following sustainability disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively: details of the nature of business it is in, reference to GRI, ISO and discloses commitment to sustainability reporting, link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies, safety of employees, material waste and spills, water sustainability, energy sustainability, emission sustainability, biodiversity sustainability, the sustainability report format comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only, disclosure on continuous stakeholders engagement, disclosure on transparent and effective communication to stakeholders, employee empowerment disclosed, fair employment practices, fair labour practices disclosure and climate change disclosure. Several integrated reporting KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including disclosure on key stakeholders identification and relationship, disclosure of the main activities of the organisation and the environment of which it operates, the company’s strategic direction, the integrated report show a holistic picture of the combination, interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors, the integrated report comprise a linked separate economic, governance and sustainability reports, disclosure on how does the organisation’s governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term, the company’s strategic direction disclosed and the organisation’s business model disclosed. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 3-120 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-112 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-140 of 2016 annual report. The 2015 annual report have an additional section reading ‘Stakeholder Value Creation’ on pages 4-8 and the 2016 annual report also have an additional section reading ‘Value Creation’ on pages 9-15.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘From the Directors’, ‘Shareholders’ Analysis’, ‘Financial Diary’, ‘Notice to Members’, and ‘Proxy Form’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top 20 shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure

KPIs are disclosed on pages 25 & 121-124 of 2014 annual report; pages 23 & 113-114 of 2015 annual report and pages 30 & 141-144 of 2016 annual report.

Econet's recent annual reports are interesting and innovative. All labelled 'Integrated annual reports', the reports disclose that Econet issues integrated reporting covering social responsibility investment, environmental issues and ethical reporting. The corporate governance statement discloses that the Group observes generally accepted best practice standards of transparency and accountability; it complies with the widely accepted principles enunciated in the King Codes and, at the local level, with the regulatory obligations applying to listed companies in Zimbabwe, among these being the ZSE Listing Rules and the recently adopted Zimbabwe National Code on Corporate Governance. The Group is also subject to government regulations affecting various areas of its operations. The Group makes it a policy to comply with these regulations. Corporate governance mechanism is disclosed to a larger extent comprehensively. Sustainability information is disclosed to a larger extent in several sections including the 'Risk Report', 'Corporate Social Investment' and 'Our People and Our Community'. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive as per the requirements of the applicable regulatory frameworks.

Edgars Stores Limited

Edgars Stores Limited is a limited company incorporated and domiciled in Zimbabwe whose shares are publicly traded. The company's core business is the retailing of clothing, footwear, textiles and accessories. The annual reports disclose that 'Through our credit and cash stores we aim to supply our customers with value for money by providing quality merchandise for the family at competitive prices. We are Zimbabwe's market leaders in this field and it is our resolve to remain so.'

The recent annual reports for Edgars were analysed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Board' and 'Corporate Governance Report'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an

executive or an outside director, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-9 & 12-18 of 2014 annual report; pages 9 & 13-18 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-9 & 11-15 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Board', 'Corporate Governance 'Certificate by The Company Secretary', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Independent Auditors' Report' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also discloses that 'The Audit Committee continuously evaluates the Group's exposure and response to significant risk, reviews the appropriateness and adequacy of the systems of internal financial and operational control; reviews and evaluates accounting policies and financial information issued to the public, ensures effective communication between directors, management, internal and external auditors, reviews the performance of the internal and external auditors, recommends the appointment of the external auditors and determines their fees. The Audit Committee comprises three non-executive directors. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 8-9, 12-18, 20-21 & 67-70 of 2014 annual report; pages 9, 13-19 & 65-68 of 2015 annual report and pages 8-9, 11-20 & 60-65 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Our Business', 'Group Financial Highlights', 'Corporate Board', 'Group Chairman's Report', 'Corporate Governance Report', 'Edgars Club', 'Independent Auditor's Report', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Independent auditor's report', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements and 'Corporate Information'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and

covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the ‘Chairman’s Statement’ section of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on page 4-71 & 78 of 2014 annual report; pages 5-70 & 79 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-69 & 75 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; ‘Analysis of Ordinary Shares’, ‘Shareholders’ Financial Calendar’, ‘Notice to Members’ and ‘Form of Proxy’. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, the number of shares in the company held by director, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 72-77 of 2014 annual report; pages 71-78 of 2015 annual report and pages 70-74 of 2016 annual report.

Edgars’ recent annual reports disclose that the directors believe that they have applied and complied with the principles incorporated in the principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe– Manual of Best Practice, Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct as set out in the King Report. Corporate governance mechanisms are to a large extent disclosed in the corporate governance report. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent in several sections of the reports. However, mandatory disclosure is comprehensive to a larger extent as per the requirements of the Companies Act Chapter 24.03 and other applicable regulatory frameworks.

OK Zimbabwe Limited

OK’ 2016 annual report disclose that ‘Revenue generated for the year decreased to US\$437.5 million from US\$462.7 million posted in prior year. Profit before tax was down at US\$1.2

million from US\$10.6 million in the previous year, while profit after tax decreased to US\$0.7 million from US\$7.5 million in 2015.’

The recent annual reports for OK were analysed and the findings discussed below were noted. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is in the sections; ‘Directorate and Management’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Corporate Governance’ and ‘Directors’ Responsibility for Financial Reporting’. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 3-4, 13-15 & 17 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-4, 13-15 & 17 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-4, 13-15 & 17 of 2016 annual report.

Details on governance of risk and structure are disclosed in the following sections of the annual reports: ‘Directorate and Management’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Report of the Directors’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Directors’ Responsibility for Financial Reporting’, ‘Report of Independent Auditors’ and ‘Group Financial Statements and Notes’. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that the audit committee is responsible for risk management issues. The following KPIs were disclosed to a larger extent in the annual reports: disclosure that the committee is effective and independent, that the committee is chaired by a non-executive director, that the committee oversees corporate reporting, disclosure that the committee oversees internal audit, that the committee is integral to the risk management process, the Board delegates the process of risk management to management, the Board ensures that principal risks are timely identified or detected, the details of the range and type of risk control measures, disclosure that management implements appropriate responses to risk, the Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on a continuous basis, risk frameworks and methodologies are in place. Governance of risk and structure KPIs are

disclosed on pages 3-4, 13-15, 17-18 & 49-50 of 2014 annual report; pages 3-4, 13-15, 17-18 & 51-52 of 2015 annual report and pages 3-4, 13-15, 17-18 & 50-52 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Corporate Information', 'Directorate and Management', 'Board of Directors', 'Organisational Vision', 'Financial Highlights', 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive's Report', 'Group Profile', 'Report of the Directors', 'Corporate Governance', 'Accounting Philosophy', 'Directors' Responsibility for Financial Reporting', 'Report of the Independent Auditors', 'Group Financial Statements and Notes' and 'Company Financial Statements and Notes'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive's Report' and 'Group Profile' sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation, disclosure of IT governance mechanisms, community activities disclosure, disclosure on responsible corporate citizenship, HIV and AIDS and occupational health policies. Information management and disclosure KPIs are detailed on pages 2-55 of 2014 annual report; pages 2-55 of 2015 annual report and pages 2-54 of 2016 annual report.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Report of the Directors', 'Shareholders Analysis', 'Notice to Members' and 'Shareholders' Calendar'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top ten shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are

disclosed on pages 13 & 56-59 of 2014 annual report; pages 13 & 56-60 of 2015 annual report and pages 13 & 55-57 of 2016 annual report.

OK's recent annual reports discloses that its Board is committed to the principles of good corporate governance and best practices, which endorse a culture of business ethics, openness, transparency, integrity and accountability in its dealings with all stakeholders. The Group's structures, operations, policies and procedures are continuously assessed and updated for compliance with the law and generally accepted standards of good corporate governance. Corporate governance mechanisms are disclosed to a large extent in the corporate governance report in the annual reports. However, sustainability disclosure is minimal and fragmented in several sections of the reports including the 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive's Report' and 'Group Profile'. Mandatory disclosure is comprehensive to a larger extent.

Unifreight Africa Limited

Unifreight specialises in courier, express-freight, full loads and consolidated shipments through its renowned brand, Swift Transport. Fully maintained and monitored contract-hire fleets are managed through premier brand Bulwark and all international courier and freight services are handled through the SkyNet Worldwide Express brand, ensuring Unifreight Africa Limited provides all its customers with a comprehensive end to end logistic solution. The organisation has the largest depot distribution network of any transport operator in Zimbabwe, with 33 depots strategically situated around the country. The 2016 annual report discloses that 'We are very pleased to be able to report a comprehensive income for the year of US\$1.720 million compared to a comprehensive net loss of US\$4.421 million in 2015. Although the Group's revenue from continuing operations of US\$23.834 million was 4.5% down on the prior year, there was a massive US\$3.172 million turnaround in Profit before tax from continuing operations compared to the previous year. This was mainly due to a reduction in overheads of US\$5.176 million from the previous year attributable to the restructuring and cost reduction exercises embarked on in 2015.'

The recent annual reports for Unifreight were analysed and the findings are discussed below. Disclosure on board of directors and management structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Board of Directors', 'Directors' Report' and 'Corporate Governance'. In these sections the board structure and composition, role of the board and board committees are disclosed. Several KPIs in this category were disclosed comprehensively to a larger extent

including: a list of directors and details about the directors, disclosure that the Board comprises of a balance of power with a majority of non-executive directors, the name of the chairman of the Board, when each of the directors joined the board, classification of directors as an executive or an outside director, details about current employment/position of directors, details about the role of the board of directors of the company, disclosure that there are well-structured committees and oversight of key functions, the number of board meetings attended, existence of an audit committee and names of directors on the audit committee. Board of directors and management structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5-6 & p.10-11 of 2014 annual report; pages 7-8 & 12-13 of 2015 annual report and pages 9-10, 14 & 19-20 of 2016 annual report.

Disclosure on governance of risk and structure is detailed in the following sections of the annual reports: 'Board of Directors', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Report of the Independent Auditors' and 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements'. Within these sections information about the audit committee composition, internal controls and risk management is disclosed. The annual reports also disclose that 'An independent Non-Executive Director chairs the Audit, Finance and Risk Committee. The Audit Committee has adopted the terms of Reference recommended for an Audit Committee. In particular, it assists the Board in the discharge of its duties relating to financial reporting to all stakeholders, compliance and effectiveness of accounting, business risks and management of information systems. The Group's activities expose it to a variety of financial risks: market risk (including currency risk, interest rate risk and cash flow interest rate risk), credit risk and liquidity risk. The Group therefore adopts a non-speculative approach in managing risk whilst maximising profits. Risk management is carried out by the Board's Strategy Committee under policies approved by the board of directors. Group treasury identifies, evaluates and hedges financial risks in close co-operation with the Group's operating units. The board provides principles for overall risk management, as well as policies covering specific areas, such as foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, use of non-derivative financial instruments, and investment of excess liquidity.' Governance of risk and structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 5-6, 10-13 & 30-31 of 2014 annual report; pages 7-8, 12-14 & 30-31 of 2015 annual report and pages 9-10, 14, 19-24 & 37-38 of 2016 annual report.

Information management and disclosure KPIs are presented in sections; 'Mission - vision statement', 'Corporate Information', 'Board of Directors', 'Group Structure', 'Chairman's

Statement', 'Directors' Report', 'Corporate Governance', 'Report of the Independent Auditors', 'Consolidated Statement of Financial Position', 'Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income', 'Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity', 'Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows', 'Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements' and 'Supplementary Information'. These sections disclose financial information, sustainability information and information on auditors. The accounting policies and standards are also disclosed. Most of the financial disclosure KPIs are disclosed comprehensively and covers more than 80% of the annual reports sections. Sustainability information is disclosed to a lesser extent and is mainly disclosed in the 'Chairman's Statement', 'Chief Executive's Report' and 'Group Profile' sections of the annual reports. Several sustainability disclosure KPIs were disclosed briefly including details of the nature of business it is in, an overview of trends in its industry, details of the products or services produced/provided, any other forward-looking information and disclosure on effective leadership based on ethical foundation. Information management and disclosure KPIs are highlighted on pages 3-50 of 2014 annual report; pages 4-46 of 2015 annual report and pages 4-52 of 2016 annual report. The 2015 annual report has an additional section 'Swift turns 70' on page 5 and the 2016 annual report has additional sections; 'About the Unifreight Group', 'CEO's Report' and 'Corporate Social Responsibility' on pages 4 & 15-18.

Ownership and control structure information is disclosed in sections; 'Directors' Report', 'Shareholders' Analysis and Calendar' and 'Proxy Form'. Information about board ownership, concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedures and shareholders calendar are presented. Several ownership and control structure KPIs were disclosed comprehensively in the annual reports including: review of shareholders by type, number of issued and authorised ordinary shares, par value of issued and authorised ordinary shares, top shareholders, the number of shares in the company held by director, calendar of important shareholder dates, procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings and how shareholders nominate directors to Board. Ownership and control structure KPIs are disclosed on pages 10 & 51 of 2014 annual report; pages 12 & 47-49 of 2015 annual report and pages 14 & 53-54 of 2016 annual report.

Unifreight's 2014 annual report discloses that its Board has taken further steps to promote transparency, integrity and accountability in the running of the Group by endorsing the King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Both 2015 and 2016 annual reports

disclose that pursuant to the promulgation of the Zimbabwe Code on Corporate Governance in 2014, its Board has taken further steps to promote transparency, integrity and accountability in the running of the day-to-day operations. Several policies are being reviewed and amended in line with the recommendations provided for in the Code. Best practice methods are being continuously adopted to ensure sustainability, development and superior results. The governance report is to a larger extent comprehensive; however, sustainability reporting is to a lesser extent disclosed in several sections of the reports. Overall, mandatory disclosure is generally comprehensive in the annual reports.