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DECLARATION

I declare that "The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between South Africa and China: A geopolitical case study considering African Realism (2010-2015)" to be my own work, that it has not been previously submitted for any degree or examination purposes at this or any other university, and that all the sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged to my best knowledge.

[Signature]

Kenneth Andrew Sinclair

Date: 30 November 2018
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to dedicate this thesis to:

- My mother, Sassa, and late father, Christo Sinclair, who have always been the pillars of hope, strength and support in my life; and,
- My spouse, Leona Alexander, who unconditionally supported me during my studies.

I am greatly indebted to the following people and entities who made this journey possible:

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- My children, Catea, Christopher, Ken and John-David and my grandson Eli von During; and,
- My sister and brother-in-law, Carla and Charles Duckitt, my brother Ivan and Dr Carl and Dorette Vogts.

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Lastly, thank you to my Creator for wisdom, courage and strength to embark on and complete this daunting endeavour.

"Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika"
ABSTRACT

Following the end of the Cold War and apartheid, both South Africa and China were rising politically and economically in a globalised multi-polar world order. South Africa rose to prominence after the first democratic elections in 1994, inspired by the liberation struggles of the African National Congress founded on the Freedom Charter, the national democratic revolution and the iconic persona of Nelson Mandela. “Made in China”, on the other hand, has become the international trademark of the People’s Republic of China, bolstered by “Chinese exceptionalism” since the introduction of the “Opening-up and reform” policies by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s. Chinese influence has since then infused the globe, laying the foundations of the “China dream”, sustained by more than three decades of exponential growth in the gross domestic product.

Sino–South African diplomatic relations were only formalised in 1998. By ending diplomatic links with Taiwan and endorsing the “One China” policy, South Africa became China’s most strategic partner in Africa, driven by the export of bulk mineral resources. Yet, the asymmetrical balance of trade between the biggest nation in the world and the biggest economy on the African continent, raised concerns about possible past colonial and imperialistic tendencies. Yet, state-to-state relations between South Africa and China followed an upward economic trajectory and led to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (CSPA) in August 2010. With ascension to the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) grouping in mid-2011 actively promoted by China, South Africa was catapulted into a different international league. Built on historic mutual interests and shared values, both states actively promoted a transformational agenda, focussing on traditional Brenton-Woods institutions like the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, whilst also establishing the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB).

South Africa nonetheless soon experienced the challenges and expectations of a new democracy as the idealistic veneer of democratic freedom diminished. The country faced serious challenges because of lower than expected economic growth, unemployment, crime, weak service delivery and questionable leadership, exacerbated by serous patterns of systematic decay. Matters were made worse internationally when South Africa’s image was tarnished for taking popular rather than principled decisions, protecting the constitutional imperatives of the much-acclaimed South African Constitution. Allegations of a shadow state infested with well-connected networks operating in almost every sector of society and fuelled by serious patterns of patronage and self-help, affected the legitimacy of the South African government. This was especially true for President Jacob Zuma, elected in 2009. This thesis uses the two elements of the meta-theory of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy, to establish if comprehensive strategic partnerships such as the CSPA, are in the best interest of South Africa or not.
KEYWORDS: African realism; China; Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement; Inverted legitimacy; Multilateralism; Neopatrimonialism; Realism; Sino–South African relationship; South Africa; Strategic partnerships
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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<td>AMCU</td>
<td>Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Bi-national commission</td>
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<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CADF</td>
<td>China–Africa Development Fund</td>
<td></td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CASC</td>
<td>China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China–Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>Great administration of customs</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GIBS</td>
<td>Gordon Institute of Business Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>IDZ</td>
<td>Industrial development zones</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>IRP</td>
<td>Integrated Resource Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL/ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWG</td>
<td>Joint Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Orientation

Intensified Sino–African relations and a changing world order after the end of the Cold War have been fuelling debate on China’s motivation for becoming involved in Africa (Kalu, 2012:1–2). Political scientists and scholars like Cardenal and Araujo (2013:254–255), Dowden (2009:54), Kahn (2011:38), Taylor (2007:2–11) as well as Wang and Rosenau (2009:6) concluded that China’s impact on Africa and the rest of the world has been the biggest global geopolitical shift of the early twenty-first century. In fact, this geopolitical shift has also raised claims and allegations from critics that the relationship between China and Africa could be categorised as one of neo-imperialism or neocolonialism (Alden & Wu, 2014:27–28; Kalu, 2012:20–30; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011:234).

Contrary to these claims, scholars like Kalu (2012:2) for instance, posits that it is necessary to understand what Africans are allowing China to do and why, and that Chinese concerns have entered Africa because African states want Chinese involvement in Africa. Wasserman (2012:33–34) aptly suggests that China’s presence in Africa has been viewed as controversial and paradoxical; it is often portrayed as “a Manichaean binary – either predator, or partner, friend or foe, or comrade or coloniser”. A consideration of the merits of these allegations necessitates an analysis and discussion of the motives for and implications of China’s involvement in Africa and, for the purpose of this study, South Africa. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (CSPA), attached as ‘Addendum E’, between South Africa and China is used as a case study to assess the motives and geopolitical effects of Chinese involvement with and in an African state.

1.1.1 Theoretical underpinnings

The study is embedded in the discipline of international relations (IR) and is viewed through the prism of the theory of realism in an effort to analyse the formal relationship (as stipulated by the CSPA from 2010 to 2015) between South Africa and China. Some proponents submit that realism has its roots in the writings of Thucydides, Sun Tsu, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau (Lawson, 2012:41). Similarly, Elman (2007:11) traces realism back to ancient times with claims that realist arguments can be found in works from Greece, Rome, India and China. Contemporary realist international theory consists of a cluster of ideas that developed over the last 70 years (Lawson, 2012:41). Four central propositions—groupism, egoism, anarchy and power-centrism or power politics—constitute realism (Wohlforth, 2008:132–133). These propositions, according to Wohlforth (2010:10), clarify a relationship between political order and security. As an important development in IR theory, Henderson (2015) proposes that it is
realism rather than liberalism or constructivism that best depicts African approaches to IR in the postcolonial period. A new take on realism promoted by Henderson (2015), is called *African realism*, and it forms the primary political theory underpinning the study. The crux of African realism is encapsulated in Henderson's (2015) neopatrimonial balancing thesis (NBT). Although noticeable elements of *realpolitik* are prevalent in African realism, neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy distinctly differentiate African realism from traditional realism.

Neopatrimonialism, which is derived from patrimonial authority as conceptualised by Weber, implies that the “... right to rule is ascribed to a person, rather than an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1998:61–62). Erdman (2013:59) suggests that neopatrimonialism refers to the coexistence and interaction of formal and informal institutions or a widespread informal behaviour within a formal polity such as a modern state. For Erdman (2013:61) the “... crucial feature of neopatrimonialism is the insecurity about the role of state institutions and the behaviour of their agents”.

Legitimacy in general refers to rightfulness (Heywood, 2002:250). Duverger (1964:26) defines an institution as legitimate when it “... corresponds to the dominant doctrines of a period, to the most widely held beliefs on the nature and the form of power”. Political power manifests itself in some form of authority or dominance. Weber, once again, initially contributed to the understanding of legitimacy as a sociological phenomenon by conceptualising three ideal types of authority, namely traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority (Heywood, 2002:211). In the conceptualisation of African realism, Henderson (2015:14) argues that neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy are indeed the key colonial “survivals” that impact on Africa’s IR developments. Henderson (2015:44), for example, defines inverted legitimacy as “... postcolonial African states that enjoy international legitimacy, but rarely domestic legitimacy”. The concepts of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy are therefore instrumental in analysing the geopolitical implications of the CSPA between South Africa and China from 2010 to 2015.

### 1.1.2 The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement

The meta-theoretical framework is founded in the theory of African realism. In an effort to contextualise the problem statement of the study, it is prudent to elaborate in brief on the development of IR that led to the formalisation of diplomatic ties between South Africa and China and the finalisation of the CSPA.

The struggle for freedom, dignity and equality in South Africa brought hope to millions when Nelson Mandela was inaugurated on 10 May 1994 in Pretoria as the first democratically
elected president of an African National Congress (ANC)-dominated government of national unity (Hartley, 2014:6; Sparks, 2003:2). Ushering in the end of apartheid, the first democratic elections paved the way for the South African government to position itself on the newly defined global agenda. Even while being a society in transformation, South Africa was added as an important role player in the new world order (Grimm et al., 2014:8). In the process, South Africa managed to establish itself as the most influential role player and strategic partner of China on the African continent (Grimm et al., 2014:15; Kahn, 2011:47).

After democratisation in 1994, the majority-led ANC government embarked on a transformational agenda guided by the national democratic revolution (NDR) doctrine to address the inequalities created by colonialism and apartheid (Jeffery, 2010:4-7). Notwithstanding these developmental intentions, the post-liberation realities of poor governance and service delivery, high levels of unemployment, crime and corruption, lower than expected economic growth, land uncertainty and violent xenophobic attacks on foreigners, are factors that reflect badly on South Africa (Cronje, 2014:95–122; Hartley, 2014; Jeffery, 2010; Johnson, 2010:445–506; Johnson, 2015:50–78; Simkins, 2011). Political volatility, specifically the instability of the Tripartite Alliance—the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions—adds to uncertainty in the political arena (Johnson, 2015:760). Regardless of the negative perceptions, South Africa’s involvement in prominent global intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) (Kegley, 2007:173) like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) forum, the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the African Union (AU), the G20 and the United Nations (UN), shows the significance of the country in the global arena and on the African continent (Hurrell, 2014:76–90). South Africa has also, according to Le Pere and Shelton (2007:160), “…emerged as an important strategic partner in China’s Africa policy”.

Despite China’s phenomenal annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of nearly 10% from 1978 to 2011, the country is facing serious challenges (Hu, 2015:8). Increasing pollution levels, dissident ethnic minorities, instability in Hong Kong, uncertainty about Taiwan and Tibet, human rights abuses, the expectations of a rapidly growing middle class, endemic levels of corruption and a drastically lower economic growth rate since 2011 all adversely affect the internal affairs of the country (Hu, 2015:8; Hutchings, 2001; Zondi, 2009:44–46).

South Africa and China have established extensive political and trade engagements since 1994. However, formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were only established in 1998 (Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 2010). The historic and important relationship eventually culminated in the formalisation of the Beijing Declaration
on the establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China, generally referred to as the CSPA (Alden & Wu, 2014:9; DIRCO, 2010; Grimm et al., 2014:16). The presidents of South Africa and China, Jacob Zuma and Hu Jintao, signed the agreement in Beijing on 24 August, 2010. It is based on the agreed imperatives of equality, mutual benefit and common development (DIRCO, 2010). The CSPA in sum can be seen as an all-encompassing strategic partnership, linked to the other MOUs specifically dealing with strategic matters considering both South African, as well as Chinese national interests.

The CSPA was concluded against the backdrop of approximately 690,000 job losses in the South African clothing and textile industry during the period from 2009–2015, mainly because almost 89% of all clothing and textile imports were coming from China (Langeni, 2010). Drastic increases in the bulk export of raw resources like iron ore, manganese, chrome and coal to China during this period fuelled suspicion that the focus of China’s interest in South Africa was rather economically motivated, than politically. Yet, in motivating the strategic importance of the agreement, both presidents elaborated on the significance of strengthening the bilateral relations in the interest of promoting the common development of the two countries, deepening China–Africa cooperation, strengthening South-South cooperation and jointly addressing global challenges (Campbell, 2010:17; DIRCO, 2010). The concluding paragraph of the agreement reiterates the South African government’s adherence to the One-China policy and support for the peaceful development of Cross-Straits relations and China’s national reunification cause (DIRCO, 2010).

1.1.3 An African realist perspective on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement

According to realist traditions, legal independent states act as main actors on the world stage (Smith, Owens & Baylis, 2014:4). Mearsheimer in Dunne and Schmidt (2014:98) claims that “... states are continuously searching for opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states”. Some scholars observe this phenomenon as exploitation and label it as neocolonialist or neo-imperialist (Kalu, 2012:20). If China is exploiting South Africa, such exploitation may lead to mistrust, fear and uncertainty between the two states. According to Baylis (2005:302), uncertainty, leading to a lack of trust, is inherent in the IR system and may result in an action-reaction cycle. Unintended consequences, different perceptions and the expectations of the South African and Chinese governments, political parties, political elite and other role players may augment the uncertainty and mistrust in the relationship and might jeopardise and compromise the CSPA, to the detriment of South Africa.
Of importance is Dunne and Schmidt’s (2014:99) argument that all realists subscribe to the following three S’s: statism, survival and self-help. Contributing to the list, Griffiths, Roach and Solomon (2009:2) identify four basic assumptions that key realist thinkers question:

- What are the main sources of stability and instability in the international system?
- What is the actual and preferred balance of power among states?
- How should the great powers behave towards one another and towards weaker states?
- What are the sources and dynamics of contemporary changes in the balance of power?

Considering these basic assumptions, Aron et al. (1979) established themselves according to Griffiths et al. (2009:3–63) as the key thinkers in the tradition of realism and IR. More modern contributions by Barkin (2010), Hurrell (2014), Kydd (2010) and Wohlforth (2008) confirm that realism as a theory is indeed a potpourri of realist traditions. Yet, Freyburg-Inan (2004:14) warns against “the potentially dangerous dominance of the realist paradigm”. Freyburg-Inan (2004:14) argues that both liberal and constructivist approaches should complement realist motivational assumptions to provide a more complete account of human motivation. Contrary to Griffiths et al, Freyburg-Inan (2004:5) raises the following questions that are represented by the motivational assumption of realism:

- What is the nature of the motivational assumptions of realism?
- What is the function of these assumptions in realist theory?
- What are the effects of using these assumptions?

Following the contemporary development of African realism and the NBT by Henderson (2015), these questions are considered in an effort to identify and demonstrate the influence of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy as crucial concepts of African realism. With these assumptions as guidelines, it is necessary to examine the African realist perspective of the CSPA.

The interaction between South Africa and China was thought to be mainly motivated by the energy and resource needs of China and further influenced by advantageous and constructive trade and aid imperatives (Alden & Wu, 2014:27; Botha, 2006:14; Botha, 2015:13; SAIIA, 2009:16). In general, South Africa does not have a favourable trade balance: exports of raw resources and products are higher than imports of manufactured and value-added commodities (Campbell, 2010:16). Statistics presented by Alden and Wu (2014:15) suggest that South Africa had a worldwide trade deficit of US$14, 9 billion in 2012.
However, since the finalisation of the CSPA in 2010, both the South African and Chinese governments made concerted efforts to have a more evenly balanced trade balance between them. Despite the plans, the slow implementation of the objectives of BRICS and the South African trade deficit with China of approximately US$4.9 billion during 2014, is of great concern (Botha, 2015:13). Botha (2015:13), for example, also questions the rationale of South Africa’s involvement in BRICS and more specifically the distorted economic relationship between South Africa and China. Analysts like Xiong (2012:7) suggest that it was China’s leverage that in essence assisted South Africa to obtain membership of BRICS.

A notable illustration of the cordial relations between South Africa and China is the capricious way that the South African government dealt with a number of visa applications of the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of Tibet. The Dalai Lama has visited South Africa three times since 1996 (1996, 1999 and 2004), without any interference from the South African government. Subsequent to the finalisation of the CSPA, three visa applications by the Dalai Lama were turned down, or in terms of the South African government’s response, “withdrawn”:

- The first application was during 2009 on the invitation of the South African World Cup committee. It was rejected on the basis that the visit would overshadow the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup (SWC) and South Africa’s national interest (Harvey, 2012:288–289; Zondi, 2009:44–46).
- The second application came when the Dalai Lama was invited to attend the 80th birthday celebration of Bishop Desmond Tutu, a fellow Nobel Laureate (Polgreen, 2011:11). The application was declined by the Department of Home Affairs, citing time constraints as the reason. Two political parties, namely the Congress of the People (COPE) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), challenged the matter in court. The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in a unanimous judgement on 29 November 2012 that “… the former minister of Home Affairs Nkosazama Dlamini-Zuma, had deliberately delayed her decision by four months…” (Dlodlo & Du Plessis, 2012).
- The last failed visa application was in 2014, when the Dalai Lama was invited to attend the Nobel Peace Laureates’ World Summit in Cape Town (Harvey, 2014:202).

The refusals to grant the Dalai Lama visas to visit South Africa raised concerns locally and abroad and questions about the objectivity and consistency of South Africa’s foreign policy, as well as on the conduct and credibility of the South African government. These refusals raise the question of whether it was purely a coincidence or unfortunate sequence of events that prevented the South African government from granting the Dalai Lama permission to visit South Africa after the finalisation of the CSPA in 2010. The question can also be asked
whether this was indicative of an unequal or perhaps even an exploitative approach by China that can be labelled as neocolonialist or neo-imperialist. The Dalai Lama saga is an example used to determine if there was possibly any ulterior motive or even undue pressure by the Chinese government to influence the actions of the South African government.

The study also considers whether China might be in a race against other mainly Western states as part of a global scramble for rare earth metals and resources. Jepson (2012:6) suggests that since 2010 a group of 17 little-known elements or rare earth elements (REEs) have attracted serious public interest. China accounted for 97% of the world’s rare earth mining in 2012, although Southern and East Africa, along with Australia and North America, are among the most lucrative regions for new sources of rare earth metals (Jepson, 2012:7). A Metals and Mining Strategy report compiled by Citibank in 2010, estimated that South Africa has the largest in situ mineral resource in the world, estimated at USUS$ 2,5 trillion (Maia, 2012:1).

This phenomenon described by Jarrett (1996:81) as the influence exercised by foreign powers over the policy and economic trajectory of less developed states through means other than direct political control. The two examples of firstly an apparently inconsistent approach to foreign policy by the South African government and secondly, the mineral wealth of South Africa, certainly support this notion. However, it is critical that this study assesses whether the influence of foreign powers such as China by means of agreements such as the CSPA would be positive or negative for South Africa’s own growth and development and to the benefit of the country.

1.2 Problem statement

The problem considered here through the prism of African realism is South Africa’s reasons and motivations for entering into an agreement with China by means of the CSPA. The study also asks whether the agreement is beneficial for South Africa? On the one hand it is possible that neocolonialist and neo-imperialist tendencies have been the driving force for China’s involvement in Africa and South Africa. Moreover, China’s involvement could have been experienced as being exploitative and a threat to sustainable Sino–South African relations (Botha, 2006:14–15; Kim, 2014:2).

On the other hand, the study considers the possibility that Sino–South African relations could in fact be beneficial and advantageous. The CSPA may be an impetus for favourable and constructive engagement between South Africa and China. Kalu (2012:183) for instance, in a study considering the relationship between Nigeria and China, concludes that, “[A]s African
and Chinese interests continue to converge and complement each other collaboration in an international regime can help promote and protect these interests in the global arena”. The individual and strategic benefit of both China and South Africa’s involvement in BRICS, FOCAC, UN and other international fora, can furthermore support the argument that the finalisation of the CSPA was a defining moment for both countries in an ever-changing global order (Xiong, 2012:52–54).

The primary research question of the study is therefore as follows:

*Are strategic partnership agreements such as the CSPA in the best interest of South Africa according to African realism?*

### 1.3 Research questions

Based on the above problem statement, the study aimed to answer the following questions:

1.3.1 What does African realism in IR entail?
1.3.2 What informs the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships such as the CSPA?
1.3.3 On what basis did South Africa sign the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 to 2015?
1.3.4 What were the primary reason(s) for South Africa signing the CSPA and continuing with its implementation?
1.3.5 Does the CSPA provide a constructive and geopolitical strategic partnership for South Africa with countries such as China?; and, finally to answer the primary research question:
1.3.6 Are strategic geopolitical partnership agreements such as the CSPA in the best interest of South Africa according to African realism?

### 1.4 Research objectives

Two sets of factors, according to Mouton (1996:101–105), co-determine the research objectives: the background knowledge (the epistemic dimension) of the phenomena and the cognitive interests (the sociological dimension) of the researcher. For these reasons, the research objectives were aligned with the research questions to ultimately address the primary research questions of the study:

1.4.1 To identify and demonstrate what comprises African realism in IR;
1.4.2 To consider and assess what the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships such as the CSPA, entail;
1.4.3 To determine and explain the basis on which South Africa signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 to 2015;

1.4.4 To ascertain and describe the primary reason(s) for South Africa to sign the CSPA and continue with its implementation;

1.4.5 To consider and establish if the CSPA provides a constructive and geopolitical strategic partnership for South Africa with countries such as China?; and,

1.4.6 To evaluate and assess whether or not strategic geopolitical partnership agreements such as the CSPA are in the best interest of South Africa according to African realism.

1.5 Central theoretical statements

Realism is the dominant interpretation of IR (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:92). It suggests negative assertions and a pessimistic view of human nature and its engagement with daily survival, intrigue, and world and social order (Elman, 2008:16; Kegley, 2007:18). In general, realism is presented as one of the theories of “… international relations which seek to tell it how it is, rather than how it ought to be” (Lawson, 2012:41). Most theories of IR are based on the idea that states always act in accordance with their national interest or in the interest of that particular state. State interests often include self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity and influence over other states. To this end, Heywood (2002:128) surmises that realism is grounded in an emphasis on power politics and the pursuit of national interests. Two factors, namely human nature and the absence of an international or world government, make IR a realm of power and interest (Donnelly, 2000:9; Griffiths et al., 2009:1). The exercise of power between states is called realpolitik or power politics. Realpolitik, a German word, refers to and can be defined as “… policies that maximise a state’s power in the anarchical international system” (McGowan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:408).

The formalisation of the CSPA between South Africa and China in 2010 was a defining event for both countries. The central question that is tested in this study is whether or not an agreement such as the CSPA benefits South Africa in an ever-changing, dynamic and competitive global order. Despite legitimate concerns and questionable realities about the relationship, both South Africa and China are prominent in the realignment of world politics in a new multipolar world order. The African realist meta-theoretical framework builds on the classical realist assumption that “… it is human nature that explains why international politics is necessarily power politics” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:96). Considering the reasoning behind African realism and the development of the NBT by Henderson, the study promotes the view that, notwithstanding the possible negative effect of neopatrimonialism and the influence of inverted legitimacy, agreements such as the CSPA are indeed beneficial to South Africa.
1.6 Research design and methodology

Bryman (2008:30) points out that a research design is a framework for the generation of evidence that is suited both to a certain set of criteria and to the research question in which the investigation is interested. In sum, the research design for this study was a plan, road map, guide or blueprint for the research (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:74; Mouton, 2014:55). The main constructs or variables of the topic determined the type of research design that was applicable. Variables, according to Mouton (1996:92), are characteristics or features that take on different values, categories or attributes. Bryman (2008:33) suggests that a variable is simply an attribute on which cases vary. The value of either dependent or independent variables is the manner in which they relate to each other. Accordingly, the study specifically focused on the CSPA in relation to the core concepts of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy and the causal relationship that were found to exist between the variables.

The research questions conceptualised earlier were answered by means of a case study design focusing on the CSPA as a specific bilateral strategic partnership agreement between South Africa and China. The case study is vested in a qualitative research tradition. A case study focuses on a single individual, unit, programme or event (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:640; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:108). Qualitative analysis is the non-numerical examination band interpretation of observations (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:646). The main purpose of qualitative research, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:96), is “to describe and explain, to explore and interpret and to build theory”. The methodological approach used for the study entailed gathering qualitative data through the analysis of relevant literature.

The following databases were consulted to establish the data and information available for conducting research on the topic:

- Catalogue of theses and dissertations of South African universities (NEXUS).
- Catalogue of books and journals: The Ferdinand Postma Library of the North-West University.
- Catalogue of books and journals: the library of the University of the Free State.
- Catalogue of books and journals: the library of the Northern Cape Provincial Legislature.
- Online sources and indexes.
It has also been determined with the assistance of the librarians at the Ferdinand Postma Library of the NWU that no other research has been undertaken on this specific topic.

1.6.1 Literature review

The theoretical paradigm of the study was realism, which according to Dunne and Schmidt (2014:98) is a broad category of theories that embrace a variety of authors and texts. Elman (2007:15–25) distinguishes between two main traditions of realism, namely classical realism and neorealism, and four variants or sub-schools of contemporary realism: “rise and fall” realism, neoclassical realism, defensive structural realism and offensive structural realism. Henderson (2015) recently coined the term African realism and motivates a dynamic shift in the realism debate. However, Freyberg-Inan (2004:15) warns against “realist bias” and a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” specifically in the field of IR. Juxtaposed to realist motivational assumptions, Freyberg-Inan (2004:13) argues that: “A comparison of three major schools of international relations theory—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—reveal that each of these schools coheres around one of the three basic motive categories: power, achievement, and affiliation”.

In view of the postcolonial dynamics their effect on the African continent, Henderson (2015:270), contrary to Freyberg-Inan, suggests that “... the landscape of Africa’s international relations today is shaped by the contours of African realism”. By scrutinising African conflict, Henderson (2015:15) contends that “... Africa’s domestic political institutions modify the decision-making calculus of its leaders and the policies they promote internationally, and these processes compel African leaders to employ a ‘neopatrimonial balancing’ strategy in their interaction with other African states”. While the NBT is rooted in traditional realist assumptions, Henderson’s (2015:266) contributions to the field are primarily vested in the modifications necessitated by the exigencies of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy.

It was essential to undertake a comprehensive literature review to develop a holistic perspective of current knowledge on African realism, with specific emphasis on the concepts of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy. The paradigmatic developments and schools of thinking, theoretical principles, theories and concepts of African realism were identified, analysed and described to enable the researcher to ground the study scientifically. The literature review further assessed the relationship and agreement between South Africa and China from an IR perspective by analysing the CSPA. In essence, the review framed the various constructs, dimensions, components and categories describing the geopolitical implications of the CSPA between South Africa and China from 2010 to 2015. The ultimate
objective of the literature review was to uncover the functional relationship within the context of the current partnership and the benefits that the agreement had for South Africa.

Of importance in terms of the perceived benefits for the South African society, was the fundamental role played by South African civil society organisations and faith-based institutions especially during the period under review since the time Jacob Zuma became president of South Africa during 2009. The State Capture Report by the former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, as well as the “Gupta Leaks” documents, paved the way for more open and transparent government in South Africa exposing self-help and serious patterns of patronage in the South African government. The involvement of sections in the South African society, who made it abundantly clear that they did not identified with the moral decay brought about by state capture, paved the way for the later establishment of various Commissions of Enquiries especially dealing with SOE’s. The Betrayal of Promise Report (Swilling, 2017:4) for example, made it clear that while the ideological focus of the ANC was ‘radical economic transformation’, Jacob Zuma’s presidency aimed at repurposing state institutions to consolidate the Zuma-Gupta link power elite. In addition, the drafters of the Betrayal of Promise (2017:4) report, suggested that although socio-economic transformation initially appeared to be a legitimate long-term vision to structurally transform South Africa’s economy to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality and unemployment, the repurposing of state institutions or ‘state capture’, threatened the viability of the state institutions that needed to deliver on this long-term vision.

Institutions and scholars like Alden and Large (2011), April (2012), Botha (2006), Edoho (2011), Freemantle and Stevens (2010), Glosny (2010), Hyslop (2012), Kahn (2011), Kalu (2012), Large (2008), Li (2007), Lumumba-Kasongo (2011), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) (2009), Sun (2013; 2014) and Taylor (2007) had done extensive research on numerous aspects of Sino–Africa relations. Yet it was evident even when considering the current (and available) literature, that there was a knowledge gap in terms of the Sino–South Africa relationship and what the real motives and perceived benefits for both South Africa and China would be. Scholars like Alden and Wu (2014), Bohler-Muller (2011), Campbell (2010), Grimm et al. (2014), Kim (2014), King (2010), Simon (2010), Wasserman (2012) and Xiong (2012) contributed on issues like aid, regional integration, mineral resources, BRICS as well as IR that affected the Sino–South Africa relationship. Notwithstanding that, the primary reasons for the finalisation of the CSPA and the subsequent impact on South Africa certainly warranted further research and academic consideration.
1.6.2 Data analysis

The collection of data ultimately converged in a systematised scientific manner in its analysis and presentation. According to Mouton (2014:108), the aim is to understand the constitutive elements of data through an inspection of the relationships between concepts, constructs or variables. In addition, the ultimate objective of analysing the data is to identify or isolate patterns or trends, or to establish themes. As such, it was essential to focus on specific research objectives and to limit the scope of research to make this achievable. It was furthermore imperative to outline possible shortcomings that may impact on the credibility and outcome of the study. The study and literature review were therefore limited to the following:

- The international relationship between South Africa and China and not the broader Sino–Africa relationship;
- The CSPA signed on 24 August 2010 in Beijing by presidents Zuma and Hu, although the agreement consisted of 38 paragraphs and was part of six Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) concluded from 24 to 26 August 2010;
- The period from 24 August 2010 to 5 December 2015 when the Sixth FOCAC Summit transpired in Johannesburg, South Africa;
- The meta-theoretical paradigm of African realism, analysing neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy; and,
- The study used a qualitative research methodology and not a quantitative or a mixed-method methodology.

The theoretical analysis of the CSPA between South Africa and China was considered in terms of the strategic partnership model devised by Wilkins (2008:354–383) to analyse the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership. Analysts like Adelle and Kotsopoulus (2017), Gajauskaite (2013), Geldenhuys (2015), considered European Union–South African, Polish–Ukrainian and Lithuanian–Ukrainian, South African–Russo and Russo–Chinese strategic partnerships using the relative same lexicon. African realism and the three sequential phases of the development of a strategic partnership, namely “formation, implementation and evaluation” (Geldenhuys, 2015:123), were therefore used to analyse the CSPA between South Africa and China.

1.7 Ethical considerations

The study resorted with the Research Focus Area of Social Transformation within the Faculty of Humanities at the North-West University (NWU), South Africa. The ethics guidelines of the Faculty of Humanities Ethics Committee as described by the NWU Institutional Research Ethics Committees were strictly implemented.
The following ethical aspects were considered. The information in this application is, as far as known, correct and no ethical codes were violated with the research. Second, the study was “managed” ethically and justifiably from start to finish. All intellectual property rights were respected throughout and any form of plagiarism was avoided.

1.8 Limitations of the study

Possible limitations of the study can be found at the following levels. First, the study took a relatively short period under review, this being from the finalisation of the CSPA during August 2010 to the conclusion of the Sixth FOCAC Summit in Beijing during December 2015. However, during this timeframe of just more than five years, a plethora of events transpired in the international arena that formed an important basis for the implementation of the CSPA and future bilateral engagements between South Africa and China. During this period, Sino–South African relations were elevated to intense levels, although the effectiveness of some of the activities and outcomes remain questionable and vague. Nonetheless, the five-year period (2010–2015) can be seen as the most dynamic and strong in the history of the relationship of the two nations.

Secondly, the meta-theory of African realism was relatively new and the available literature on the specific theoretical development remained inadequate and limited. Although volumes of information were available on realism, only one source could be traced that addressed African realism as a meta-theory, namely Henderson (2015). This limitation, however, served as justification to study and contribute to the specific topic. The study would certainly contribute to a growing body of knowledge in the academic field. Thirdly, given the importance of trade and investment relations between China and South Africa, qualitative research methodologies may have limited applications. Quantitative or mixed research methods can be a future consideration to address possible limitations in this regard. Lastly, a possible language barrier can be presented as a limitation. Given the fact that the study was based on a literature study, access to Chinese literature is problematic as the researcher was not proficient in Mandarin and had to rely on English-language sources.

1.9 Significance of the study

The significance of the study was rooted in the research questions and objectives set out earlier. Taking into consideration the potential outcome of the study, both academia and practitioners such as politicians, diplomats, government officials and the business fraternity, would benefit if the primary reasons and motivations for the Sino–South Africa relationship were demystified and unravelled.
Two possible outcomes determined the significance of the study. Firstly, should the study conclude that the CSPA is not beneficial for South Africa, the Sino–South African relation might be exploitative and can be labelled as neo-imperialistic. It would validate the criticism that South Africa has become a minion of China in Africa. This outcome would certainly have an adverse effect on the international perception of both the South African and Chinese governments and their leaders. It may also impact negatively on the perception of the respective countries' behaviour and foreign policies. However, such an outcome might sway and convince the respective governments to develop a more balanced and pragmatic foreign policy alignment. The outcome may even lead to the reconsideration or amendment of the CSPA.

Secondly, should the study determine that the relationship is valuable and beneficial to South Africa, it would enhance the view that South-South cooperation can be mutually beneficial and that multi-polarity in the post-Cold War order is indeed advantageous to the developing world. Such an outcome would obviously be helpful to both governments and would contradict the criticism of Chinese imperialism in Africa. It might reconfirm the leadership roles of both countries in IGOs like the UN, G20, FOCAC and the BRICS forum. Moreover, it would promote the notion that South Africa, through the CSPA with China, is indeed a significant role player in the realignment of the post-Cold War world order.
1.10 Chapter outline

The study consists of seven sequential chapters, as specified in the following figure primarily influenced and guided by the research questions and objectives.

**Figure 1.1:** Schematic presentation of the layout of the chapters of the study

**Chapter 1: Introduction**

Chapter 1 provided an orientation of the case study. While contextualising the theoretical paradigm of the study, a synopsis of the African realist perspective on the CSPA was also presented. Importantly, the chapter provides a problem statement, identified research questions coupled with research objectives and conceptualises a central theoretical
statement. The development of an appropriate research design, considering a qualitative methodological approach underpinned by ethical considerations, created a starting point to collect and analyse credible data that support the significance of the study. The introductory chapter finally elaborated on and summarised the specific chapters of the study.

**Chapter 2: African realism and international relations theory**

The differentiation of key concepts, constructs and theories embedded in the theoretical paradigm of the study were vital in any social research. The focus of Chapter 2 was therefore to identify and demonstrate what the meta-theory of African realism in IR theory entailed considering the context of the NBT as conceptualised by Henderson (2015). While reflecting on one another meta-theory of realism, namely neorealism, consideration was given to the importance and contribution of the international system focusing on African realism. The two concepts of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy, were scrutinised to establish whether African realism impacted on IR theory in the post-Cold war era and a multipolar world order. The second chapter served as the theoretical overview of the study.

**Chapter 3: The evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships**

Chapter 3 firstly considered and assessed what the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships such as the CSPA by comparing whether certain multi- or bilateral agreements between states are more important and comprehensive than others. The chapter furthermore questioned what model(s) were conceptualised to examine the formal architecture of strategic partnerships. The chapter secondly focused on Wilkins’ model (2008) and the sequential phases of the development of strategic partnerships, namely formation, implementation and evaluation. Factors like environmental uncertainty, strategic fit and a system principle were considered as part of the formation of strategic partnerships, while the challenge of building and maintaining a specific relationship were examined as a function of the implementation phase. The evaluation of strategic partnerships was the focus of the last section of Chapter three, which focuses on organisational cohesiveness and whether or not it improved the efficacy of strategic partnerships.

**Chapter 4: The basis on which South Africa signed and implemented the CSPA with China**

Chapter 4 determined and explained the international milieu in which the CSPA between South Africa and China evolved in terms of the countries’ respective foreign policies, specifically following the end of the Cold War. A synopsis of the development of both the South
African and Chinese foreign policies since the last decade of the 1990s were presented, paving the way for the consideration of the similarities and differences between the countries’ foreign policies. The advancement of bilateral ties between the post-apartheid South African government and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were considered from the establishment of ordinary diplomatic ties during 1998 to the finalisation of the CSPA during the latter part of 2010.

**Chapter 5: The primary reasons for the formation and continuation of the CSPA**

The purpose of Chapter 5 was to ascertain and describe the primary reason(s) for South Africa’s to sign and implement of the CSPA. The geopolitical developments between South Africa and China since 1998 were described against the background of the four factors that influenced the formalisation of a strategic partnership, namely the uncertainty in the political environment; the strategic fit; the system principle; and the involvement of the elite. The historical links between the ANC, SACP and China, as well as South Africa’s challenging decision to rather side with China than Taiwan after the end of apartheid, were also considered. The chapter thereafter scrutinised the trade asymmetry in favour of China; the manner in which the South African government bowed to pressure from the Chinese government, in particular since the Motlanthe and Zuma presidencies. Lastly, the involvement of the two countries in multiple initiatives on shared multilateral platforms, especially global fora such as BRICS, FOCAC, the UN and G20, were considered against the background of shared values and mutual interest in reforming the global architecture in favour of the needs of the developing world.

**Chapter 6: Implementing a constructive geopolitical partnership agreement**

Chapter 6 considered and established whether or not the CSPA offered South Africa a constructive and geopolitical strategic partnership with countries such as China. Given the organisational nature of partnerships, strategic partnerships such as the CSPA represented a meta-organisation of infinite complexity built on individual agreements, each with its own respective governmental dynamics of bureaucracies, philosophies, doctrines and policies. Five functional thematic areas formed the focus of the chapter to establish the degree to which Sino–South African relations intensified from 2010 to 2015 as a result of the finalisation of the CSPA. These areas were: the governmental, security and defence, economic, cultural and societal domains. Based on these five functional thematic areas, the chapter established and validated whether or not the coupling between the South African and Chinese governments could be presented as loose, moderate or tight.
Chapter 7: A concluding perspective on the evaluation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement

Chapter 7 provided a final evaluation of the CSPA as discussed in Chapters 3 through 6. This concluding chapter contains a closing assessment of the impact of the two elements of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy. The closing assessment relates to the Sino–South African relationship for the period 2010 to 2015. Most importantly, the chapter evaluated and assessed whether or not strategic partnership agreements, such as the CSPA, are in the best interest of South Africa according to African realism.
CHAPTER 2: AFRICAN REALIST THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1 Introduction

Realism is the product of a long historical and philosophical tradition, even though its direct application is of more recent vintage (Kozub-Karkut, 2014:26; Mingst, 1999:70). Since the Greek historian Thucydides captured the Melian dialogue on the Peloponnesian War in 416 BC and Sun Tzu’s classic work *The Art of War* unfolded in China, debates and theories on IR were primarily influenced by different realist, idealist and critical interpretations (Heywood, 2002:128; McGowan *et al.*, 2006:22–26). The realist tradition—building on the politics that transpire within and between groups, focusing on power politics with the concept of the state system at its basis, looking at the absence of international authority and the effect and influence of human nature—remains the most relevant and contemplated in the realm of IR (Barkin, 2010:17–25; Lawson, 2012:41–46; Mingst, 1999:70–79; Shimko, 2005:46–51; Valeriano, 2009:179; Wohlforth, 2008:133).

However, the end of the Cold War in the last decade of the twentieth century and the continued geopolitical evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar world order fuelled divergent debates and presented alternate theoretical perspectives on realism in particular. One of the significant debates is the influence of developing countries and emerging powers, for instance the unique partnership forged between South Africa and China in a multipolar world order (Alden & Wu, 2014:5; Mearsheimer, 2014:360–411; Xiong, 2012:4–8). Recent constructive contributions address the mainly unidirectional flow of knowledge in IR and the perceived marginalisation of Africa in the field (Smith, 2012:23; Tieku, 2012:36). This development can also be observed in the body of accumulated scholarship, for example the conceptualisation of African realism by Henderson (2015). The gist of this chapter is therefore to identify and demonstrate what African realist theory with reference to IR entails. To achieve this, the intention is to review the available body of knowledge, and to:

- Firstly, conceptualise realism, as an overarching tradition in the study;
- Secondly, reflect on one of the subversions of realism, namely neorealism, which is considered in the context of the importance and contribution of the international system focusing on African realism; and,
- Lastly, establish whether the two assumptions of African realism as conceptualised by Henderson (2015:113), namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy, indeed influence IR theory in the post-Cold war era and a multipolar world order considering the NBT.
The relationship of the chapter with the rest of the study can be presented as follows:

**Figure 2.1:** Chapter 2 layout: African realist theory and international relations

The discussion starts with a synopsis of the evolution of realism in general as a prelude to an explanation of African realism in particular, as presented in Figure 2.2 below. Philosophical, political and analytical contributions to the field of IR and politics over centuries and generations established realism as recently as 1939 as one of the most influential theories contextualising modern society.

The conceptualisation of African realism by Henderson (2015) is directly or indirectly a theoretical product of the contributions of *inter alia* Thucydides (c. 430–406 BC), Machiavelli (1532), Morgenthau (1948), Rousseau (c. 1750), Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2014) and
Zakaria (1999) and the evolution and development of IR. The primary aim of this chapter is to determine the role of African realism in the field of IR. The sections under discussion are the theories of classical realism, structural realism and African realism within the IR context.

Figure 2.2: Amended summary of the taxonomy of realisms (Own construct adapted from Dunne & Schmidt (2014:95))

- Thucydides (c.430-406 BC) – International Politics is driven by an endless struggle for power, which has its roots in human nature. Justice, law and society have either no place or are circumscribed.
- Machiavelli (1532) – Political realism recognises that principles are subordinate to policies; the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept, and adapt to, the changing political configurations in world politics.
- Morgenthau (1948) – Politics are governed by laws that are created by human nature. The mechanism we use to understand international politics is the concept of interests, defined in terms of power.
- Rousseau (c. 1750) – It is not human nature but the anarchical system that fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity.
- Waltz (1979) – Anarchy leads to a logic of self-help in which states seek to maximise their security. The most stable distribution of power in the system is bipolarity.
- Mearsheimer (2001 and 2014) - The anarchical, self-help system compels states to maximize their relative power positions.
- Zakaria (1998) - The systemic account of world politics provided by structural realism is incomplete. It needs to be supplemented with better accounts of unit-level variables such as how power is perceived, and how leadership is exercised.

- Henderson (2015) - The major impetus for Africa’s international politics in the postcolonial era is found in African domestic politics. Traditional realist assumptions like balance of power and the security dilemma are influenced and modified by the exigencies of Africa’s domestic institutions through neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy.
2.2 Classical realist theory in international relations

Essentially, realist theory promotes the idea that world politics is a perpetual struggle between self-interested states for power and position under anarchy, with each competing state pursuing its own national interests (Kegley, 2007:29). When realists contemplate change in the international system, the focus is on changes in the balance of power among states. They tend to discount the possibility of fundamental change in the dynamics of the system itself. The three most influential realist works of the twentieth century on realism, as presented by Mearsheimer (2014:14), are:

- Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939*, which was published in the United Kingdom shortly after World War II started in Europe and is still widely read today;
- Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, which was first published in the United States in the early days of the Cold War (1948) and which dominated the field of IR for at least two decades; and,
- Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, which has dominated the field since it first appeared during the latter part of the Cold War (1979).

Mearsheimer’s (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* subsequently became influential in the twenty-first century mainly because of the earlier conceptualisation of “offensive realism”. Mearsheimer’s 2014 edition of *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* further received both acclaim and criticism, specifically with respect to an additional chapter considering the question of whether China can rise peacefully or not. The debates amongst structural realists in addition, specifically between Waltz’s defensive realism and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism has particular relevance to the focus of the study and especially the CSPA. As presented in an amended summary of the taxonomy’s of realism in figure 2.2, both Waltz and Mearsheimer focussed on the defining role that anarchy of a state plays in structural realism, and will be considered in section 2.3.2 that deals with offensive-defensive realism.

The realist tradition is the oldest theory of international politics (Heywood, 2002:128). It represents the traditional dominant school of IR (Booth & Erskine, 2016:18). In the broadest sense, realism is (Quinn, 2014:242):

- the study of IR from the premise that humans instinctively divide into groups (the most important at present being states);
the view that in valuing their own group’s survival and well-being over that of others, there is an inherent tension of interest at the foundation of a group’s relationship with all others; and

the view that in an anarchical international environment, tension places inescapable limits on the extent to which collective interests and cooperative projects can ever transcend the national.

The unifying theme around which realist thinking converges is that states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy in such a manner that their security cannot be taken for granted (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2014:94). Realism, compared to liberalism, is a body of thought in IR that emphasises the insecurity of states and the necessity of seeking security by maximising the state’s relative power against other states (McGowan et al., 2006:407). By contrast, liberals stress the value and sheer necessity of the emergence of a system of global governance to regulate the complex relations of states at a variety of levels—political, economic, social, technological and legal (Spence, 2011:2). In addition, liberal theory assumes that people can really influence their conditions of existence (Kozub-Karkut, 2014:28). Consistent themes in liberal thought include a strong emphasis on a positive assessment of human nature; economic freedoms (including free trade); support for national self-determination; a world of states organised and regulated according to norms and rules and respect for the doctrine of non-intervention, while at the same time opposing authoritarian political rule within states in principle (Lawson, 2012:41–42). It is an approach to politics which, according to Burchill (2013:57), “champions scientific rationality, freedom and the inevitability of the human progress”. In general, liberal approaches remain influenced by the nineteenth century notion of there being a “harmony of ideas” among peoples. This is often identified in IR by varieties of what passes as idealism (Booth & Erskine, 2016:15). Idealists believe that moral ideals, such as the principle of fair play, equality before the law, and respect for the rights of others, can and should be part of the conduct in politics (Nel, 2006:25). Idealism is furthermore an approach to international politics based on liberal assumptions and principles. More optimistic or even utopian versions envision a world in which law, institutions and diplomacy replace power competition and the use of force (Shimko, 2005:51).

Juxtaposed with idealism, realism emphasises the constraints that human nature puts on politics and the significance of the absence of an international government. This makes IR largely a realm of power and interest (Donnelly, 2000:9). Realists pride themselves on being interested in only the cold facts of political situations and not in any moralising about how things could or should have been (Baylis et al., 2014:23). Typically, realism is contrasted with idealism, with the latter said to engage with the world as it ought to be, while realism engages
with it as it is (Booth & Erskine, 2016:18). Realists, according to Mearsheimer (2014:17), further agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. The field of IR is a domain of necessity, where states must seek power to survive in a competitive environment in a continuum over time (Griffiths et al., 2009:1). *Realpolitik*, more specifically, emphasises the theoretical outlook prescribing that countries should prepare for war to preserve peace (Kegley, 2007:29).

Realism can therefore not be considered an absolute theory, it is often compared to being “a big tent” with room for a number of variations on realist thought (Kozub-Karkut, 2014:26). Indeed, Lawson (2012:41) argues that there is no absolute variation of realist theory for international politics, while Dunne and Schmidt (2014:166) explicitly raise the question of whether there is one realist theory, or many theories? There is no final variation of realism theory for international politics, but rather a common centre of philosophical gravity in that international politics and politics in general is viewed as a constant struggle for power and security (Lawson, 2012:41). Critics opposing this view argue that as a political worldview, realism is traditionally opposed to idealism and, importantly, as a paradigm of IR and foreign policy, gravitates to either liberalism or pluralism, constructivism or globalism (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:2). These critics feel that too much emphasis has been placed on realism’s contribution to the field of IR and that due consideration is not given to other theories, like for instance liberalism and idealism. The notion that there is a monolithic theory of realism is increasingly rejected, both by those who are sympathetic to and those who are critical of the realist tradition (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:95).

### 2.2.1 Propositions of realism

Dunne and Schmidt (2014:165–167) broadly differentiate realism into three historical periods. First, classical realism up to the twentieth century; second, modern or structural realism (1939–1979); and lastly, neoclassical realism (1979 onwards). Realism can for example be defined as “[T]he theoretical approach that analyses all international relations as the relation of states engaged in the pursuit of power” (Baylis et al., 2014:421) or “a view of politics that emphasises the importance of power and self-interest, and disregards moral or normative considerations” (Heywood, 2002:430). Wohlforth (2008:132) surmises that there is a striking interconnection between four central propositions or characteristics, namely groupism, egoism, anarchy and power politics. In essence, power remains the most important proposition of realism. The four propositions serve as the basis on which the working definition of the traditions of realism are considered below.
2.2.1.1 Groupism

The globalised world order is now influenced by the interaction between groups more than ever before. In the majority of instances, the relationships culminate in an engagement and interface between states. Contemporary realist writings on the whole maintain the state as the unquestioned unit of IR in theory and practice and resists any constraints on sovereignty (Lebow, 2016:54). Although politics tends to involve primarily internal groups in societies and states, pressure and lobby groups like multinational firms, transnational civil societies and private and international civil societies (Van der Westhuizen, 2006:187) have developed as influential role players and non-state actors in the post-Cold War global order. The Cold War (1949–1991) was a 42-year rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union with their competing coalitions. They sought to contain each other’s expansion and win worldwide dominance (Kegley, 2007:109).

Fundamentally built on nationalism, religious orientation or a specific cause, groups or networks outside the parameters of the state can affect current world affairs drastically. Caldwell (1992) and Hurrell (1995) (cited in Adar, 2006:117) concur that in many areas, non-state actors are increasingly raking over the role of states. In some instances, these non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, extremists and pressure or lobby groups, have become the primary reason for conflict and wars. They also become the voices at international platforms for causes that may be perceived as minority or marginalised viewpoints. The following serve as examples:

- Islam is a driving force in the world, although the vast majority of Muslims do not support extremism and violence such as the conduct of the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIS or ISIL) (Cordesman, 2017:10–18).
- The Freedom Front Plus, a political party in South Africa, made a submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council during the 8th Session: Forum on Minority Issues on 25 November 2015 in Geneva, Switzerland, to draw the attention to the alarming increase in and continuation of brutal murders among farmers and farm workers in South Africa since 1994 (Mulder & Fourie, 2015); and,
- The plight of the Tibetan people for autonomy from China has for the last 50 years largely been promoted by the 14th Dalai Lama and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Tenzin Gyatso (Hilton, 2011).

States nonetheless remain the nexus of IGOs such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) forum, the UN, the AU and the FOCAC. Realism, as applied to contemporary world politics, views the state, which should answer to no higher authority, as
the most important players on the world stage (Kegley, 2007:29). However, the realities of
globalisation and the realignment of the world order after the end of the Cold War challenge
the traditional elements of statehood as encapsulated by the Westphalian Constitution, these
being territory, sovereignty and autonomy.

Globalisation is both a process and a project: as a process it refers to the shrinking of space
and time as a result of modern communications—from cheaper and speedier travel to the
interconnectivity of the internet. As a project, it refers to the spread of capitalism globally,
particularly its neoliberal form promoted by the United States of America (USA) and its major
associates (Booth & Erskine, 2016:14). Globalisation has led to systemic transformation of the
state because the distribution of power between states and markets is being contested by
multinational firms, transnational civil societies and various private and public international
organisations (Van der Westhuizen, 2006:187).

In addition, the interplay between the growing power of markets, the importance of the informal
and criminal sector and the influence of social movements are crucial interacting spheres that
affect societies in the South differently compared to its effect in the developed North (Van der
Westhuizen, 2006:186). The Global South is an imprecise term that refers both to countries
once called Third World and to the current movement of peoples in Third World areas of the
world and to advanced industrialised countries (Baylis et al., 2014:413). The Global North, on
the other hand, denotes the developed world, collectively represented in the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development. It includes Japan, the USA, Canada, most of
Europe, Australia and New Zealand (Van der Westhuizen, 2006:186).

Scholars like Smith (2012:28–29) argue that an important lesson from the African experience
is the inability of state-centric approaches to understand IR in Africa. In substantial parts of
the continent, the state as conceived in the Global North is no longer the main or dominant
form of organising people in a given territory (Engel & Olsen, 2012:57–59). States are suffering
losses in sovereignty, functions and power; borders have become porous which, according to
Huntington (1996:35), have led many to see the gradual end of the hard, “billiard ball” state
that has been the norm since the Treaty of Westphalia. A new political economy, a changing
military-strategic environment, tendencies of political decay and anarchy, escalating conflicts,
competitive political power bases and the scarcity factor are some of the indicators suggesting
that the once dominant position of the state is under siege (Duvenhage, 1998:2). It has
become increasingly difficult to maintain the “great divide,” as McGrew (2014:23) labelled the
two separate spheres of action, namely domestic and international. Groups, and in this context
states, nonetheless continue to play a central role in both spheres and therefore remains a
critical proposition of the realist paradigm. The second central proposition of realism is egoism, which is discussed next.

2.2.1.2 Egoism

Egoism, as the next proposition of realism, is rooted in human nature (Wohlforth, 2008:131). As Dunne and Schmidt (2014:95) surmise, the drive for power and the will to dominate are fundamental aspects of human nature. Realists recognise that human desires vary widely (Donnelly, 2013:33). Human nature is a mix of good and bad features, and the latter can never be completely eliminated (Shimko, 2005:46). Aristotle’s views on specifically ethics and politics are based on the assertion that man is by nature a social or political animal (Burns, 2009:83–85). Human nature realism, which is ever so often referred to as “classical realism” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:95; Mearsheimer, 2014:19) dominated the study of IR from the late 1940s when Morgenthau’s writings attracted large audiences. It continued until the early 1970s. It is based on the assumption that states are led by human beings who have a will to power hardwired into them at birth. Morgenthau calls this a limitless lust for power (Mearsheimer, 2014:19). Classical realists, according to Waltz (cited in Donnelly, 2013:33), saw “that conflict is in part situationally explained, but … believe that even were it not so, pride, lust, and the quest for glory would cause the war of all against all to continue indefinitely. Ultimately, conflict and war are rooted in human nature”.

Then again, many perceptions, beliefs and insights exist about what human nature entails. The same goes for the influence of culture, value systems, morality and religion. Moisi (2009:30–122) for example endorses how cultures of fear, humiliation and hope are reshaping the world. Yet, the majority of realist theories place fear, honour and interest at the core of human nature and state motivation (Donnelly, 2000:43). The important issue, however, is Morgenthau’s confirmation that the basic drive for power is rooted in human nature (Lawson, 2012:43). Dunne and Smith (2014:167) suggest that classical realists argue that it is from the nature of man that the essential characteristics of international features of international politics, such as competition, fear, and war, can be explained.

Being critical of the majority viewpoint about the dominance of realism in IR theory, Freyberg-Inan (2004:5) raises the question about the consequences of the realist view of human nature. Her central premise is that ideas have the power to shape human reality by affecting our interpretations of our observations and thereby influencing our reactions to them. Agreeing with Freyberg-Inan, Donnelly (2000:48–49) assents that realism as a theory of international politics cannot rely primarily on human nature. Within states, egoism is usually substantially restrained by hierarchical political rule (Donnelly, 2013:33). Classical realists recognise that
international anarchy—the absence of a governing authority over great powers—causes states to worry about the balance of power (Mearsheimer, 2014:19). This structural constraint, according to Mearsheimer (2014:19), is treated as a second-order cause of state behaviour. However, before considering the principal driving force in international politics—every state in the system’s will to power—it is necessary to reflect on the next proposition of realism, which is anarchy.

2.2.1.3 Anarchy

The absence of an international government to which states can be accountable, creates a vacuum or void driven by the uncertainty and insecurities of the actions and motives of other states and groups. Realists argue that there is a condition of anarchy outside the boundaries of the state. International society is anarchic in that there is no central political authority (Shimko, 2005:123), or, as Dunne and Schmidt (2014:93) reason, international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above the individual collection of sovereign states. Baylis (2014:406) defines anarchy in the context of IR as “a system operating in the absence of any central government”. An anarchic international system, as contextualised by Heywood (2002:129), is one in which each state is forced to help itself and give priority to its own national interest, defined most basically as state survival and territorial defence. This leads to self-help, which is the principle that in anarchy actors should rely on themselves (Kegley, 2007:29).

Important though, is Nel’s (2006:29) observation that anarchy does not mean there is no order, or that the state system is chaotic, it simply means there is no central authority that can make states obey rules they do not want to obey. The importance and necessity of an international organisation like the UN cannot be underestimated. The UN is a voluntarily organisation of independent states, and as motivated by Shimko (2005:123), is not, nor was it ever intended to be, a world government. Yet, it is unique with near-universal membership and a broad range of purposes and functions encapsulated in the UN Charter. It works to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and serves as a centre for the harmonisation of the actions of nations (Smith, 2006:154). The UN was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries and by 2013 had 193 members, South Sudan being the latest member following their independence from the Republic of Sudan in 2011 (Taylor & Curtis, 2014:234–238). It has six main organs: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice (Taylor & Curtis, 2014:234). The Trusteeship Council suspended
its operations on 1 November 1994, a month after the independence of Palau, the last remaining UN trust territory.

Within realism theory, the purpose of statecraft is focused on national survival in a hostile environment (Kegley, 2007:29). The doctrine of self-help in the context of an international anarchical environment assumes that each state must take care of itself (Baylis et al., 2014:422). Defined by Shimko (2005:123) as “the necessity for actors to make provisions for their own security in the absence of any central authority to protect them from potential threats”, self-help is indeed a core element of realism. Fundamentally, realists argue that no state or institution can be relied upon to guarantee another state’s survival.

A state’s desire to empower itself usually culminates in military mobilisation and armament, which creates an uncertain environment for other states. The term given to this “spiral of insecurity,” which is primarily the consequence of self-help, is the security dilemma (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:100). Mearsheimer (2010:81) argues that the essence of the security dilemma is that most of the steps a great power takes to enhance its own security decrease the security of other states, which leads to perpetual security competition. The security dilemma can at best be described by Aristotle’s motivation (Kegley, 2007:585) that, “a people without walls is a people without choice”, or as Hobbes so fittingly said (Kegley, 2007:30), “international politics is a struggle for power, a war of all against all”.

The signature realist argument of Wohlforth (2008:135) seems relevant here: Anarchy renders state security problematic and potentially conflictual, and is a key underlying cause of war. However, anarchy, like the other three propositions under consideration in this chapter—groupism, echoism and power politics—do not stand in isolation and are interrelated and interconnected. The interconnectedness is explained by Donnelly (2013:49) in that power politics is at the heart of IR, largely because of international anarchy. This is the next topic for consideration.

2.2.1.4 Power politics

To traditional realists, power is not only the currency of IR (Mearsheimer, 2010:78; Mingst, 1999:114), but also an elusive concept (Adar, 2006:111). Power is defined by most realists in terms of important resources such as the size of armed forces, gross national product and the population of a state (Baylis et al., 2014:420). They further believe that the one factor that explains the dynamics of IR, be it characterised by change or stability, is power (Nel, 2006:31). The reality is that power is endemic and a fundamental element in world politics. There is indeed few alternatives to power politics. States, no matter how big or small, are in continuous
competition and unrelenting pursuit of power to either gain power at the expense of others, or at least make sure that they do not lose power (Mearsheimer, 2010:77; Mearsheimer, 2014:3). Hegemony and super powers and power blocks continuously pursuing the position of the most influential hegemon, has become an integral part of daily survival and motivation in the post-Cold War global order. In realist theory, hegemony is the influence a great power is able to exert over other states in the system. The extent of the influence ranges from leadership to dominance (Baylis et al., 2014:414).

Huntington (1996:83) presents power as the ability of one person or group to change the behaviour of another person or group. Mainly because of the promotion of interests, realists argue that states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. The desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity (Elman, 2007:12). To increase capabilities, a state has to change and challenge behaviour, which might happen through inducement, coercion, or exhortation. The power-wielder, Huntington (1996:83) argues, requires economic, military, institutional, demographic, technological, social, or other resources. The power of a state or group is therefore estimated by analysing and estimating the sources (geographic size and position, natural resources and population) it has at its disposal against those of the other states or groups it is trying to influence or change (Huntington, 1996:83–84; Mingst, 1999:115). This could also be applicable to individuals.

In IR theory, McGowan et al. (2006:406) define power politics as state behaviour that seeks to increase state power relative to other states and to promote selfish national interests. Moreover, power politics is a perspective portraying IR as a realm of conflict and competition for power among states. According to Vasquez (cited by Shimko, 2005:121–122), peace through strength reflects a commitment to power politics: a perspective in which international politics inevitably entails “perceptions of insecurity (the security dilemma); struggles for power; the use of Machiavellian stratagems; the presence of coercion; attempts to balance power and the use of wars to settle disputes”. These are typical manifestations of what is commonly referred to as hard, coercive power, which is an alternate to soft power: the power of attraction, or of getting others to emulate your own society and values (Hurrell, 2014:83). Soft power and new emerging powers are explored next.

2.2.1.4.1 Soft power

In spite of the continuous competition for power between states and a realignment of the world order, a new approach to the manifestation of power politics has emerged during the last decade of the twentieth century. The concept of soft power is one of the most notable innovations in the discipline of IR since the end of the Cold War. Over the past two decades it
has turned into one of the most important new ideas in the discussions about global affairs (Stuenkel, 2016:354, 364). Soft power is a term coined by the US academic Joseph Nye to highlight the importance of persuasion, attraction and emulation, getting people to agree with you rather than trying to force them to do what you want through coercive or military power (Baylis et al., 2014:423). It requires that one is able to determine and shape the agenda and preferences of actors with the ultimate objective of making them realise that it is worthwhile to consider mutual interests, to engender a sense of cooperation rather than confrontation, thus reducing the need for the mobilisation of hard power with all its associated implications and costs (Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015:24).

In employing soft power, Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015:24) submit that “states mobilise this non-physical, abstract, subjective and often subtle attribute of power in three dimensions: culture, political values and foreign policies”. These dimensions are interrelated, as indicated in Figure 2.3 below, and can for example be influenced and coerced by arts, culture, sport, the status and type of leadership, and even the diplomatic qualities of a country. The non-tangible effects and benefits of soft power, specifically for the rising states of the Global South, have become critical considerations in the post-Cold War era. The roles that both China and South Africa fulfil in this era are examples of the importance and benefit of this development and this is expounded in the next chapter.

Figure 2.1: Soft power resources (Own construct adapted from Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike (2015:25))
The new and alternate establishment of a different global order, nonetheless, will certainly be tested against the following three theories, which remains the mainstay of power politics and IR theory:

- **Balance of power theory**: “It is a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states” (Baylis et al., 2014:406);
- **Balance of threat theory**: “Predicts that nations align against whichever nation is seen as posing the greatest threat, not necessarily against the powerful nation” (Shimko, 2005:127); and,
- **Preponderance or hegemonic stability theory**: “The proposition that free trade and interstate peace depend on the existence of a predominant great power willing and able to use economic and military strength to promote global stability” (Kegley, 2007:309).

### 2.2.1.4.2 New emerging powers

The role of new emerging powers has become pivotal in the development of the new global order. Hurrell (2014:86) argues that a central part of the problem of the global order in the twentieth century was the struggle of the Third World, or later the Global South, against what was widely understood as the Western dominance of the international system. For example, “The pervasive Afro-pessimism of 1980s and 1990s,” according to Shaw, Cheru and Cornelissen (2012:195) has given way to an image of Africa that is socially and economically vibrant, politically more open, with an assertive civil society, an entrepreneurial indigenous private sector and an aggressive free press playing a central role in an independent and authentic African development agenda.

Yet, while mainstream IR and political science tend to conceive of power as located primarily in the state and as associated with economic and military might, postcolonial approaches employ a more complex and multifaceted understanding of power (Abrahamsen, 2007:115). An important lesson from the African experience is for instance the deficiency of state-centric approaches in striving to understand IR in Africa (Smith, 2012:28). On the continent, more than perhaps anywhere else, the actors who engage in warfare and trade and who provide basic services to communities and around whom identities are shaped, are predominantly not states, but warlords, non-governmental organisations or ethnic groups (Smith, 2012:28). A distinct shift from the importance of the state apparatus to the influence and importance of groups and individuals are evident in the field of IR. This shift is also evident from the impact of soft power *vis-à-vis* hard power that has become a dynamic game-changer in the field of
IR. Stuenkel (2016:118) confirms this by submitting that “The concept of soft power is of great importance in gaining a better understanding of the less visible sources of power”.

In concluding the section on realism, it is necessary to ask the question: do groupism, egoism, anarchy and power politics, as central propositions of realism, provide for the dynamic shift in IR as experienced in the Global South and for the purposes of this study on Africa? For instance, neorealism’s canon gives precedence to the international system structure over the states emphasised by traditional realists and over explanations that focus on innate characteristics of human beings (Mingst, 1999:77). Could this variation on realism theory better explain IR in Africa? To answer these questions, it would be prudent to consider neorealism as a possible alternative.

2.3 Structural realist theory: Neorealism

During the 1980s, neorealism (sometimes also called new or structural realism) developed under the influence of Waltz and others (Heywood, 2002:129). As Kegley (2007:34) elucidates: neorealism in essence emphasises the anarchic nature of global society without governance rather than the traditional realist emphasis on the unceasing lust for power inherent in human nature. Reflecting on neorealism, Waltz (cited in Mingst, 1999:77), indicates that the most important unit to study is the international structure. In sum, neorealism’s testable implications according to Palmer and Morgan (2007:355) are: first, bipolar international systems are more stable than multipolar systems; second, neorealism leads to an expectation that states act to balance each other’s capabilities, though under some circumstances states may be expected to bandwagon; and, third, neorealism suggests that power parity between states is more likely to be conducive to peace than is one of power preponderance.

The realist worldview was revived with the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s influential and seminal work published in 1979, Theory of International Politics, which replaced Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations as the standard bearer for realists (Elman, 2007:13; Mearsheimer, 2010:82). Theory of International Politics, which has been branded the single most widely read contribution to neorealism, is a key text in the field (Griffiths et al., 2009:59). Conversely, according to Lawson (2012:44), an earlier work of Waltz (1979), Man, the State and War, set out the essential bases on which the neorealist theory rests (otherwise known as structural realism). Neorealists argue that cooperation tends to break down since states cannot resist the temptation to pursue selfish interests (Henderson, 2001:415).
2.3.1 Anarchy, hierarchy and capabilities of states

Waltz (cited in Elman, 2007:13; Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:96) furthermore argues that political structures have three elements: an ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical), the character of the units (functionally alike or differentiated), and the distribution of capabilities. He further claims that the first two elements of the structure of the international system are constants: the lack of an overarching authority means that its ordering principle is anarchy, and the principle of self-help means that all of the units remain functionally alike. Or, as Dunne and Schmidt (2014:97) put it: Waltz identifies two different organising principles: anarchy, which correspondence to the decentralised realm of international politics; and, hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic order.

Accordingly, the only structural variable is the distribution of capabilities, with the main distinction falling between multipolar and bipolar systems. This, according to Waltz (cited in Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:97), is of fundamental importance to understanding crucial international outcomes. Notably therefore, is the notion that structural realists believe that the relative distribution of power in the international system is the key independent variable in understanding important international outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics and the balance of power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:97). In the context of the study, it is prudent to speculate that the post-Cold War global order of multi-polarity will certainly be influenced by the structural variable of distribution inter alia of military, resources and leadership capabilities.

The continuous rise of China as a hegemon and the impact of increased regionalisation and global economic growth are examples of changing capabilities that are unfolding on a daily basis (Cronje, 2014:22). Both China and South Africa have become strategic and important role players in the post-Cold War era (Louw-Vaudran, 2016:199). However, the criticism has been levelled that instead of a system based on genuine regional cooperation, a return to older patterns of power politics is witnessed in which South Africa is sometimes perceived or accused of dominating for instance SADC (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:282). SADC is a regional grouping of 14 countries in South Africa and the Indian Ocean, established in 1992 for the purpose of promoting regional integration and development (McGowan et al., 2006:409). Moreover, Louw-Vauran (2016:200) argues that the often arrogant attitude of state officials and many business people has contributed to the impression that South Africa acts in a self-serving manner, leading many to believe that it has neocolonialist intensions.

In neorealism, as in realism, anarchy or the absence of central institutions above states is the most important and enduring property of the structure of the system (Kegley, 2007:35). Likewise, as suggested by Kegley (2007:53): states remain the primary actors, acting
according to the principle of self-help and seeking to ensure their own survival. Structural realists concur that international politics is essentially a struggle for power, but they do not attribute this to human nature (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:96). Instead, structural realists ascribe security competition and interstate conflict to the lack of an overarching authority above states. Or, as Dunne and Schmidt (2014:97) further motivate in the most general sense, Waltz states that especially the great powers have to be sensitive to the capabilities of other states. Of significance is that despite meaningful power being important, the ultimate concern of states is security. Rather than being power maximisers, states are security maximisers; thus, power maximisation often proves to be sub-optimal because it triggers a counter-balancing coalition of states (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:97).

2.3.2 Offensive-defensive realism

Waltz’s text had a profound influence on the paradigmatic development of scholarship in general and realist thought in particular. Critics like for instance Wohlforth (2008:137) postulate that it is not really a theory of international politics. They claim that neorealism does not address in any explicit way most of the phenomena encompassed by that term. Rather, Waltz presents a theory that purports to answer a few important but highly general questions about international politics: why the modern state system has persisted in the face of attempts by certain states at dominance; why war among great powers recur over centuries; and, why states often find cooperation hard (Wohlforth, 2008:137). However, Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* proved, according to Elman (2007:15), to be a remarkably influential volume, generating new debates and giving new impetus to existing ones.

A paradigmatic development that evolved out of Waltz’s conceptualisation of neorealism is the offensive realism theory, another variant of structural realism, as provided by Mearsheimer (2014) and Dunne and Schmidt (2014:97). The introduction of offensive-defensive theory by scholars such as Jervis, Quester and van Evera highlights the magnitude of the security dilemma in which states find themselves (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:76). Mearsheimer (2014:363) argues that the theory maintains that the basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. Although many of the basic assumptions of Waltz’s structural realist theory are shared according to Dunne and Schmidt (2014:98), Mearsheimer differs from Waltz when it comes to describing the behaviour of states. As Mearsheimer (2014:21) puts it: offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. The important difference between the two contemporary currents of realist variants is that they employ slightly different motivational assumptions (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:77). While offensive realism assumes that states always attempt to maximise their relative power and that military power is their highest
priority, defensive realists perceive themselves in a position secure enough to grant high
priority to other goals (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:77).

Global hegemony for some realists, is the ideal position, according to Mearsheimer (Dunne &
makes such global hegemony all but impossible, except through an implausible nuclear
superiority”. Fundamentally important, also for this study, is the fact that regional hegemony,
as the second best option, will certainly affect the variant of realism that might be applicable
considering the relationship between South Africa and China. Both countries have established
themselves as regional hegemons in their respective regions in the post-Cold War era. While
Mearsheimer (2014:361) argues that China’s economic growth will establish the country as a
regional hegemon in the Asia, the United States—with support from India, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, Russia and Vietnam—will go to enormous lengths to contain the Chinese.
Mearsheimer (2014:362) submits that China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil. Louw-Vaudran
(2016:198) suggest that over the past two decades (1994–2014), South Africa has been a key
role player in Africa and provided a model for peaceful transition to democracy that others
could aspire to. South Africa, on the other hand, also established itself as regional hegemon
in SADC. Further, both South Africa and China have proven themselves on the international
arena and enhanced their national influence and interest mainly through soft power (Zanardi,
2016:431). This certainly impacted on Sino-South African relations and the way that the CSPA
had been constructed.

In this context, the arguments of Stuenkel (2016) in his book Post-Western world, should be
noted. Stuenkel (2016:200–205) argues that:

- the Western-centric worldview leads to the under appreciation not only of the role
  non-Western actors have played in the past and are currently playing, but also the
  constructive role they are likely to play in the future;
- the economic rise of the rest, principally China, will allow it to enhance its military
  capacity and eventually its international influence and soft power;
- rather than directly confronting existing institutions, rising powers (primarily China)
  are quietly building a so-called parallel order that will initially complement today’s
  international institutions; and,
- as part of a hedging strategy, emerging powers—led by China—will continue to invest
  in existing institutions and embrace most elements of today’s “liberal hierarchical
  order,” but they will seek to change the hierarchy in the system to obtain “hegemonic
  privileges” so far only enjoyed by the United States.
In closing the section, neorealism can be a consideration as a possible theoretical justification and explanation, albeit that South Africa in the main is part of a “bandwagoning” exercise with respect to financial contribution, commitment and influence in the relationship between South Africa and China. Bandwagoning is the tendency of weak states to seek alliance with the strongest power, irrespective of that power’s ideology or form of government, to increase security (Kegley, 2007:490). The important point is that the post-Cold War global order is gradually and systematically shifting from being Western-centric to China-centric.

However, the question can additionally be posed whether or not neorealism is the best or most probable variant of realism to explain the current developments in Africa, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the postcolonial evolution of Africa. Although it is necessary to emphasise the crucial role that the state fulfils in the different variants of realism, including neorealism, the motives, objectives, motivations and behaviour of African leaders specifically, have become critical elements of academic scrutiny and consideration. Given the complexity and specific nuances of neocolonial Africa, little justification exists to argue and conclude that neorealism is the best and only realist theory to explain modern-day developments in Africa. African realism, as a variant of realism and conceptualised by Henderson (2015:113) is in the next section considered to establish whether the two assumptions of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy indeed influence IR theory in the post-Cold war era and a multipolar world order.

2.4 African realist theory within international relations

It is evident from the above discussions on the different realist traditions that contemporary issues in IR, especially with regard to the focus of this study, demand that special consideration should be given to alternative and more recent variations of realist theory to explain the decisions made by states. This is also relevant considering the post-Cold War realignment of the world order and the quest for a shift in the debate and contributions in the field of IR. This argument is supported by scholars such as Cornelissen et al. (2012:1–17), Donnelly (2000:159–160), Engel and Olsen (2012:51–65), Smith (2012:21–35) and Tieku (2012:36–50). The current reality that still prevails on the African continent in particular, is the lack of engagement with the developing world (Smith, 2012:21). While scholars like Cornelissen et al. (2012:2) have focused on how Africa is overlooked as an important object of study, Henderson (2015:8–10) has lamented the unsatisfactory tools with which IR tries to make sense of Africa.

For many IR scholars, Africa is mainly a region of terrible human suffering, worthy at times of humanitarian intervention but with little relevance to larger theoretical concerns (Henderson,
Then again, some scholars, like for instance Shaw et al. (2012:208), allege that an “imperial brain trust” is “… socialising students and inducting them into dominant and mainstream culture”. The dominant IR literature is still produced in the United States and the United Kingdom and the ideas generated elsewhere are often either not available in English or fall short of theoretical standards necessary to appear in leading academic journals or book publishers (Stuenkel, 2016:199). The impact of neocolonialism, which is the informal processes that keep former colonies under the power and especially economic influence of former colonial powers and advanced industrial countries (Baylis, 2014:418), can therefore not be ignored.

“African realist theory” is in this regard an attempt to explain Africa’s international conflicts in the postcolonial era (Henderson, 2015). Shaw et al. (2012:208) explain that “… the study of Africa, and scholarship on Africa, is embedded in the historical legacy of racism that was at the core of colonial policy”. This supports the claim made by Freyberg-Inan (2004:143–154) that classical and structural realist motivational assumptions function differently than what is commonly argued by contemporary realists. African realism attempts to explain Africa’s international conflicts, engagements and interactions of the postcolonial era (Henderson, 2015). The geopolitical relationship between South Africa and China can be considered a case in point. This relationship, which is primarily fuelled by soft power propositions as discussed, was formalised by the CSPA between South Africa and China. Strategic partnerships, the narrative of the CSPA and particularly the formation of the agreement between the South African and Chinese governments, are explained in more depth later in the study. Notably, African realism recognises the homogenising effect of the international system’s structure on the international behaviour and interaction of African states (Henderson, 2015:11).

Schraeder (cited by Henderson, 2015:23) recognises the need for a more balanced understanding of African politics and society because “for every famine, there exists an agricultural ‘success story’ such as Botswana, where forward-thinking-leadership has made that country a net exporter of foodstuffs,” and “… for every military coup d’état there exists a transition to civilian rule, such as Benin, where 19 years of military dictatorship (1972–91) were replaced by democracy (1991–present)”. He adds that for every ethnic conflict there is a well-meaning attempt to create multi-ethnic cooperation, such as South Africa’s democratisation under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and his successors.

In contrast to Afro-pessimism, Afro-optimism emphasises the positive developments in Africa (Henderson, 2015:20). Afro-pessimism is the belief that Africa’s economic and political record, in terms of economic growth, poverty, disorder and misrule, is such that the continent’s future is bleak (McGowan, 2006:390). Afro-optimism on the other hand is the belief that, despite
Africa’s many problems, recent developments—notably the end of the Cold War and the shift towards democracy in key African countries—provide a genuine opportunity for the continent to achieve sustained economic growth and good governance (McGowan, 2006:390). In support, Shaw et al. (2012:194) submit that for the first time in more than two decades, Africa has begun to find its rightful place in the world, attracting the attention of the traditional Western powers, as well as the leadership of emerging “Southern powers” such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea.

But, as indicated by Henderson (2015:23), neither Afro-pessimism nor Afro-optimism adequately captures the variability of African politics because both unnecessarily bracket the range of valences in Africa’s domestic and international politics around either largely negative or positive processes, outcomes, and developments, thereby precluding more balanced assessments of African politics. Scholars like for instance Cornelissen et al. (2012), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), Smith (2012) and Tieku (2012) suggest that African political processes, as a source or testing ground for IR theory, have been relatively neglected. Yet, new theoretical approaches and contributions by scholars of IR swayed some of the negative perceptions of Africa. Schoeman (2006:263), for instance, suggests that to increase the knowledge and understanding of Africa, studying the works of African writers like Chinua Achebe, Ben Okri, Bessie Head, Es’kia Mphamlele, Mariama Bai, Dembene Ousmane, Buchi Emecheta and Wole Soyinka could lead to a fairer understanding of Africa.

2.4.1 Beyond state-centrism in Africa

For political scientists and IR scholars, the major point of convergence and divergence still rests with the African state, its institutions, and the prominent practices it generates, especially its foreign policies (Henderson, 2015:24). Statehood was imposed on most African societies, resulting in artificial borders that in many instances separated communities and even created “new” ethnic groups (Schoeman, 2006:240). Engel and Rye Olsen (2012:51) surmise that in much of the continent after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, accelerated processes of globalisation and the weak institutionalisation of the post-independent state contributed to the demise of the state as the major regime of territorialisation. While precolonial Africa had diverse polities, including political institutions closely approximating sovereign entities and institutions such as obtained in the West, it is clear that the major political institution imposed on African politics at independence, the colonial state, was an artifice of non-African origin and orientation (Henderson, 2015:24). Then again, as Henderson (2015:24) continues: “It is evident that the territorial state is the major vehicle through which African international politics is formulated, articulated and actualised”.

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Clapham (2008) and Hyden (2006) (cited by Henderson, 2015:11) maintain that the major impetus for Africa’s international politics in the postcolonial era is found in African domestic politics, but consideration must also be given to the socialisation during the time of independence considering the background of European colonialism and the bipolar Cold War system. It recognises the homogenised impact of the international system’s structure on the international behaviour and interaction of African states. Henderson (2015:11) concedes that given the primacy of domestic politics in Africa’s international affairs, it may appear that IR theory has little to offer since its prominent paradigms largely “black box” domestic factors and privilege systemic ones, for example neorealism’s focus on system structure.

Contrary to that, Brown (2006) (cited by Smith, 2012:22), argues that classical and structural realist theory is inadequate for the realpolitik of Africa. For instance, there have been important advances in looking beyond neorealism’s state-centric approach to include factors that critics maintain are essential to understand IR in Africa. Important though, is the notion that African IR takes place outside the constraints of state-centrism (Smith, 2012:31). The acknowledgement of Smith (2012) per se supports Freyberg-Inan’s (2004:5) criticism that realism’s motivational assumptions function differently than what is commonly argued by realists. Every day experiences like poverty, crime, conflict and a lack of access to scarce resources like water are much more important to the people of the Global South than for instance high-level debates such as nuclear non-proliferation (Smith, 2012:32) or even the all-important climate change debate. A more pragmatic approach dealing with real-life daily survival might be more appropriate in a new era where IR is more receptive to other considerations and realities as presented by the states of the Global South. In support of Freyberg-Inan’s argument, Smith (2012:31–35) contemplates that in understanding Africa and broadening the field, consideration should for example be given to the following matters:

- Looking towards other academic fields like sociology, anthropology, philosophy and development studies;
- Considering the contributions of African statesmen such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, or writers such as Ngugi and Achebe;
- Popular arts and culture as a vehicle for political statements and expression;
- Potential political and normative implications of online activism such as the impact of blogs, Facebook and Twitter;
- The role of morality in IR, considering that IR is perceived by some as devoid of concern for humanity; and,
- The role of charismatic churches and religion.
2.4.2 Human nature, culture and Ubuntu

The above-mentioned matters are encapsulated in the ambit of human nature and could as such be classified as classical realism. But, emotions play an important role in human behaviour and conduct (Moisi, 2009:15). Associated with this is culture, which according to Moisi (2009:30–122) can express itself on a geopolitical level as fear, humiliation and hope. These feelings may influence people’s daily existence and survival. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines culture as including the whole complex of distinctive, spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or societal groups (Georghiou, 2015:497). It does not only include arts and culture, but also the modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, as well as traditions and beliefs (Georghiou, 2015:497).

Culture is defined as the sum of the norms, practices, traditions and genres produced by a community, including the beliefs and practices that characterise social life and indicate how society should be run (Baylis et al., 2014:409). Georghiou (2015:497) asserts that “culture is a set of traditions, beliefs and behaviours that a people express and hold”. Mazrui (1990:14) motivated over time that the dual paradigm in world order thinking has been shaped by two factors: the culture of politics, which tend to dichotomise, and the impact of monotheism on world culture. Both factors were fused by earlier versions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. A particular important perceptual factor, according to Mazrui (1990:27), is the tendency towards dualism in modes of identification, the culture of us and them.

The cultural differences between the people of the West and Africa or the Global North and Global South or even the developed and developing world amplify the importance of earnestly considering culture as a crucial factor in the post-Cold War and post-Western World. For instance, classical and structural realism are intricately linked to the culture of the West and its thinking, but in Africa it is different. Realism, which to a great degree is a product of the West, is a process through which European rules and norms, inspired by Latin Christendom, gradually spread and included the rest of the world in one universal normative space (Stuenkel, 2016:30). Stuenkel (2016) further argues in the book Post-Western world that the classic Western-centric historical account is one-sided and generates an understanding of global order that is unhelpful as opinion makers seek to understand and make sense of contemporary trends.

On the African continent the relationship to one’s fellow human being is of paramount importance and the cornerstone of societies and groups. The right of the group is in many instances perceived to be more important than the right of an individual. The term Ubuntu
became a strong currency at the end of apartheid, both as a political instrument and a paradigmatic lens to consider policy choices in South Africa (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:422). *Ubuntu* is defined by Qobo and Nyathi (2016:424) as “… a value-set that views the existence of an individual as deeply woven into the social structure founded on humanism and collectivist ways of being that are mostly associated with African social systems”. Western culture and Western-centrism is exactly the opposite: it stresses the importance of the individual. Individuals may for their own benefit agree with others to do something together, but such a relationship is not essential (Van der Walt, 1997:15). What matters from an African perspective is the relationship and behaviour patterns of the individuals within the group context. The expressions of *Ubuntu* also spilled over in various manifestations to the activities of the South African government. One of the examples is the 2011 white paper on foreign policy of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which defines South Africa’s diplomatic posture as, a “diplomacy of *Ubuntu*” (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:430).

Yet, whatever culture a people shares, as the world becomes more interconnected, its inhabitants should learn to understand each other better, and this is where diplomacy as a communication function should feature prominently (Georghiou, 2015:497). Diplomacy is considered to be official practices through which international actors (mostly states) communicate and negotiate with one another, being one of several instrumentalities available to secure foreign policy objectives (McGowan, 2006:395). Foreign policy therefore refers to the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument, possibly in association with other instruments such as economic or military force, to enable an international actor to achieve its policy objectives (Baylis *et al.*, 2014:410).

### 2.4.3 More of the same?

Realism in its various forms and variants affects Africa profoundly within the broader realm of IR. The continent’s states and societies are engaged in an array of activities and practices—formal, informal, institutional and ad hoc—and its markets and economic activities are shaped by themselves, which impact on a range of local, national and cross-border/transnational economic forces and flows (Cornelissen *et al.*, 2012:16). To keep up with the post-Western World as presented by Stuenkel (2016) and do justice to a dynamic, divided and volatile global order, albeit with enormous challenges and uncertainty, it is important to consider new developments in the field and to contribute to a growing body of knowledge. The ground-breaking book, *Navigating modernity: postcolonialism, identity, and international relations* by Albert Paolini (1999) presents the central argument that IR as traditionally constituted and in its mainstream trajectory, is narrow and increasingly limited as a discourse about world politics (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:69). African realism can to this end be presented as a less full-
throated endorsement of realism. There is recognition that in the context of global politics, African leaders have operated under certain constraints that prescribed, permitted and punished foreign policy behaviours and tendencies that approximated those employed by the dominant states in the system (Henderson, 2015:12). However, is it a case of more of the same old practices, specifically in Africa, or not? Further, is it realism with a state-centrism at its core, or is the role of the African state only one of a number of factors influencing the post-Western world order?

By answering these questions and specifically dealing with the question of what comprises African realism in IR, the developing world or the Global South, including Africa, can be perceived as different when considering real-life experiences and post-Cold War developments. IR as a discipline generally seems far removed and theoretically distant from the realities of daily life considering an African perspective (Smith, 2012:32). In the context of Africa therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the following examples presented by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:69–86):

- IR as a discipline cannot remain pitched only at the state level (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:85). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:85) asserts that IR must seriously engage with issues of identity, intersubjectivity and cultures based on the realisation that the local is always implicated in the global, and vice versa;
- The politics of identity and negative aspects such as nativism and xenophobia, have their roots in the tension between a cosmopolitan universalist trend that claims human membership irrespective of race within the condition of post-nationalism, and an opposing particularistic trend that emphasises difference, specificity, tradition and the values of the indigenous nature of a Constitution (Mbembe, as cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:85); and,
- Identity politics in their different forms and manifestations were shaped by a combination of historical realities and developments, some local and others global (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:86).

Although neorealism offers insight into the homogenised effect of major power practices on more recent states, Henderson (2015:12) nonetheless suggests that Africa’s international conflict practices are more clearly informed by classical realist practices given the latter’s focus on both the selective adaptability of balance of power practices on states’ foreign policy and its greater focus on the domestic characteristics of states as predictors of their foreign policy behaviour. Yet, Kalu (2012:43–64) for instance argues that state-centric realism is the phenomenon at work in growing engagement between China and African states. Kalu (2014:63) further asserts that in the context of state-centric realism, all actors are driven by
their own interests and act in pursuit of such interests. Given their contrast with liberal practices and the prevalence of many elements of traditional realism, including its sine qua non balance of power, Henderson (2015:12) refers to these practices as “African realism”. Henderson (2015:15) specifically contends that Africa’s domestic political institutions modify and address the decision-making calculus of its leaders and the policies they promote internationally. Importantly, he (Henderson, 2015:15) motivates that these processes compel African leaders to employ a “neopatrimonial balancing strategy” in their interaction with other African leaders. Linked to this view, Bratton and van de Walle (1998:268) convincingly argue that the institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule has shaped regime transitions in many African countries. However, before dealing with “neopatrimonial balancing strategy,” it is necessary to consider and explain two central elements of this study, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy.

2.4.4 Neopatrimonialism

The use of democracy to reproduce and reinforce pre-existing relations of domination is at the centre of the concepts neopatrimonialism and patronage (Stremlau & Iazzolino, 2017:10). Neopatrimonialism is derived from the concept of patrimonial authority, which Max Weber used to designate the principle of authority in the smallest and most traditional polities (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:61). Bratton and Van der Walle (1997:61–62) submit that in patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by personal prestige and power and ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the “big man’s,” “strongman’s” or “supremo’s” household, with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. In such an environment, charismatic figures may be able to seize the party or state machinery for personal aggrandisement and enrichment and, simultaneously, preserve a democratic veneer that commands legitimacy vis-à-vis external actors, such as international partners and donors (Stremlau & Iazzolino, 2017:5).

Conversely, Cilliers (2016:7) argues that most African governments (as in poor countries elsewhere in the world) are classified as neopatrimonial and/or rent-seeking, but the resilience of neopatrimonial practices as part of Africa’s democratisation has been remarkable. This argument corresponds with Englebert’s (cited in Henderson, 2015:135) recognition that there is a legitimacy/development trade-off that has implications for trade, related economic growth and stability. Instead of risking the uncertainty of losing power, the majority of African leaders strategically “feather their nests” through neopatrimonialism rather than “walk the tight-rope” and face the risk of losing power in traditional liberal democracies.
Bratton and van der Walle (1997:61) explain patrimonialism as a situation where a ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of influence, security and safeguarding in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favours and material benefits to the loyal followers who are not citizens of the polity so much as the rulers’ clients. Duvenhage (1998:5) posits that “patrimonialism is about people, their power sources and related benefits, instead of institutions and legal frameworks”. Patrimonialism can be presented as authority that is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler’s preferences and likings, rather than any codified system of formality and laws (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:61).

Patrimonialism flourishes in a patronage system of governance where linkages and personal obligations between a superior (the patron) and a subordinate (the client) are manipulated to obtain loyalty and obedience (McGowan, 2006:405). The work of Chabal and Daloz (cited in Stremlau & Iazzolini, 2017:5) has mostly revolved around the idea of patronage to explain how African politics work. Chabal and Daloz’s view is based on the observation that a leader’s legitimacy derives not only from the capacity to contribute to the public good in an impersonal manner, but rather from their inner networks and personal connections. Maintaining power through patronage is cumbersome, risky and expensive, but self-enrichment is part of the prize (Burgis, 2015:74). One example is the 32-year regime of Joseph Desire Mobutu during which time he amassed a family fortune of US$5 billion as president of the former Zaire, creating a classic kleptocracy (McGowan, 2006:306).

A kleptocracy or kleptocratic governance in essence means a government of thieves: more generally, governance with very high levels of corruption. Leaders use their elected and appointed offices to enrich themselves, their families and people close to them (McGowan, 2006:402). But, the proceeds of the amassed wealth must be transferred outside of the boundaries of the country that has been looted. Although some of the wealth buys elections to remain in power, much of it goes overseas: according to a US Senate report, kleptocrats from African resource states have used banks, including HSBC, Citibank and Riggs, to squirrel away millions of plundered dollars to the US alone, often concealing the origin of their wealth by shifting funds through secretive offshore tax havens (Burgis, 2015:74).

In order to comment on the difference with patronage, Bach (cited in Stremlau & Iazzolino, 2017:11) clarifies that neopatrimonialism in Africa is still classically viewed as the outcome of a confusion between office and officeholder in states endowed with modern institutions and bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, neopatrimonialism is characterised by hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with and suffuse rational-legal institutions (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:62). Neopatrimonial leaders are
primarily concerned with their own political survival, so they tend to view the foreign relations of their states largely in terms of the maintenance, expansion, or contraction of their patronage networks and influence that constitute the sinews of their power (Henderson, 2015:176). These impulses, according to Henderson (2015:176) “… are heightened for neopatrimonial leaders facing domestic conflict”.

Domestic conflict provides a powerful and necessary impetus for African neopatrimonialist leaders to extend the patronage networks upon which their political survival rests (Henderson, 2015:176). Emphasis should therefore also be placed on the strategic and fundamental role that security and military agencies like the military forces, police and intelligence services fulfil in a political climate infused by tendencies of neopatrimonialism. Duvenhage (1998:10–11) points out that during periods when weak states and patterns of political and institutional decay are prevalent, security and military agencies can play a meaningful, but questionable role to protect the interest of a certain elite or individual. He (Duvenhage, 1998:10) conceptualises this development as “neopatrimonial praetorianism” in an attempt to clarify the role and place of security institutions in a democratic environment where weak or corrupt states are the order of the day. At the centre of these military and security “interventions” is the protection and safeguarding of the domestic legitimacy of political leaders and their governments, which is discussed next.

2.4.5 Inverted legitimacy

The issue of legitimacy or the rightfulness of a regime or system of rule is linked to the oldest and one of the most fundamental of political debates: the problem of political obligation (Heywood, 2002:210). Why should citizens feel obliged to acknowledge the authority of government? Moreover, why should citizens respect their leaders, despite the fact that some leaders renegade the social accord between the elected representatives and the electorate? Legitimacy is therefore of great importance for a state to exercise its political authority and importantly, maintain stability (Omeje, 2008:183).

Civil society built on an active and involved citizenry can be seen as the ultimate anchor and barometer of legitimacy (Cox, 2008:92). According to Heywood (2002:210), legitimacy gives an order or command an authoritative or binding character, thus transforming power into authority. To this end, Cox (2008:92) surmises that “… legitimacy enables authority to act with sustained support and public acquiescence”. But, the decline in political trust and specifically political legitimacy in the developing world so characteristic of the information age, means that the citizenry is more than ever deeply involved and critical of the messages they receive via traditional media platforms due to the enhanced electronic networks and communicative
capacity created by the electronic and social media (Patomäki, 2016:203–205). This reality of electronic involvement of society via social media, has become one of the most powerful methods that governments in the developed and developing world are confronted with on a daily basis.

Weber provided the classic contribution to the understanding of legitimacy as a sociological phenomenon. He categorised three systems of domination (Heywood, 2002:211) namely:

i. Traditional authority, based on long-established customs that “always existed”;

ii. Charismatic authority, based on the power of an individual’s personality; and,

iii. Legal-rational authority, which links authority to a clearly and legally defined set of rules and is the typical form of authority operating in most modern states.

Government is legitimate when people accept the institutions and procedures of authority and the decisions that emerge, even if they do not agree to them or dislike them (Cox, 2008:92). Building on this, Omeje (2008:183–184) submits that a state’s relationship with various role players, including its citizenry and international society, can on the one hand be differentiated as:

- Passive legitimacy which occurs when those that are governed are compelled to cynically submit to or tolerate the authority of the political regime due to negative factors such as coercion, fear of repression and victimisation, fear of the destructive consequences of violence and the lack of a viable alternative to the current regime; and,

- Active legitimacy, which refers to expressions of support by significant sections or the majority of the governed, including the general public and influential people and institutions such as business moguls, corporates, religious institutions and traditional political authorities.

Legitimacy on the other hand is also sometimes conceptualised in the form of vertical and horizontal dimensions (Holsti, as cited in Omeje, 2008:184). Inverted legitimacy is defined as a condition passed on from colonialism to postcolonial African states typified by the simultaneous presence of international legitimacy and prominence and the relative lack, or in many cases, absence of domestic legitimacy (Henderson, 2015:177). The relationship turns out to be illegitimate when, according to Cox (2008:92), “… the general acceptance becomes eroded and when there is no general consensus that decisions have been properly arrived at”. Against this background, Labuschagne (2016:115) argues that the initial euphoria in South
Africa after the country was democratised after decades of white authoritarian rule, is starting to show distinct signs of disillusionment with democracy.

An important barometer of citizen involvement in democracy and government legitimacy remains voter turn-out, which dropped from 84% during the 1994 elections to 57% during the 2014 general elections in South Africa (Labuschagne, 2016:115). Absent voters outnumbered those who had voted for the ANC in the 2014 South African general elections, and the majority party’s apparent political dominance is therefore something of an illusion (Cronje, 2014:205). The reality is that the majority of South African citizens do not at present support the governing party. This for example creates a serious legitimacy crisis, fuelled by grave allegations of state capture and corruption involving the former South African president Zuma and his family and friends, as well as other influential politicians, government officials and business people (Pauw, 2017:110, 216, 285, 294 & 312).

The spread and prominence of international human rights activities in recent decades across the globe have altered national and international conceptions of political legitimacy: the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the decline of military dictatorship in Latin America in the 1980s are examples (Donnelly, 2000:154). Louw-Vaudran (2016:209) reflects on the way that South Africa was managed, controlled and governed under the leadership of President Zuma and posits that given South Africa’s current realities and numerous challenges, the country’s image has been tainted negatively as a declining superpower on the African continent, both in terms of soft and hard power.

Louw-Vaudran (2016:209) suggests that South Africa is often seen as acting in a neocolonialist and self-interested way. South Africa’s legitimacy in terms of its position as a perceived African leader in world politics, especially since 1994, is constantly waning. China, on the other hand, is systematically increasing its influence, presence and authority under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi Jinping, to become the next and most important superpower in the world. After the economic liberation of China, President Jinping’s focus on the “China dream” is an example of a concrete plan of action, strategically initiated by China’s ambitious “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) plan (Roach, 2017:1).

2.4.6 Neopatrimonial balancing strategies

Neopatrimonial balancing strategies (NBS) apply realist precepts such as the balance of power and the security dilemma to Africa’s international conflicts by building on previous studies that demonstrate the utility of realists approaches in explaining Africa’s wars and
circumstances (Henderson, 2015:174). The crux of Henderson’s claim is that NBS accounts for the prominent pattern of interstate conflicts observed on the African continent, which importantly, arises from African leaders reciprocally supporting and relying on each other’s rebels (Henderson, 2015:15). While interstate wars or conflicts refer to military activities between two or more countries, intrastate war suggests internal conflict and strife in one state (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:94).

Dunne and Schmidt (2014:94) submit that since the end of the Cold War, intrastate war—or civil war—has become more prevalent, specifically in countries of the Global South. Africa for example, which is on the whole the most war-prone continent in the world, experienced the most destructive intrastate or civil wars in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan since the end of the Cold War (Henderson, 2015:25). However, structural realists maintain that when the sovereign authority of the state collapses, such as in Haiti or Somalia, internal wars or conflict happen for many of the same reasons that wars between states happen (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:94). Posen (cited in Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:95) has applied the key realist concept of the security dilemma to explain the political dynamics that result when different ethnic, religious and cultural groups suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security. The role and importance of security and military privatisation in Africa as presented by Abrahamsen (2012:162–176), is a pervasive feature of contemporary African societies, including the role of informal initiatives such as vigilantes. To this end, Abrahamsen (2012:175) contends that “... security privatisation in Africa poses a clear challenge to the state-centrism that has been such an enduring feature of much of IR theory”. However, Henderson (2015:25) warns that the rarity of interstate war in Africa should not be taken as evidence of the absence of interstate conflict in the region: throughout the postcolonial era, Africa has been the site of more than two hundred militarised interstate disputes.

The important argument remains that both interstate and intrastate war and conflict in Africa are influenced and prompted by the actions and conduct of leaders, events or factors in states and societies that directly impact on the outcome of IR. In the case of African realism, the current exigencies of neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy are fundamental assumptions that effect on the realities of IR theory in the post-Cold War order.

2.5 Conclusion

Chapter 2 identified and demonstrated what comprises African realism theory in IR. Against the overarching theoretical paradigm of realism, arguments were built on the evolution of the theory from classical realism to African realism. Realism per se cannot and will never be the
only school of thought influencing the field of IR. In an ever-changing globalised post-Cold War global order specifically, theories like for instance liberalism and idealism certainly affect the day-to-day IR realities.

African realism, with the NBS at its core, enhanced the positive and constructive development of the post-Cold War nuances and thinking on the African continent. Included in the continuous advancement of alternative thinking on Africa and the scholastic and academic development of the field, is the reality that state-centric approaches are continuously under scrutiny and pressure from group or society-centric realities. Neopatrimonialism has become a modern-day trademark of African governance modalities where rulers and presidents prefer to “feather their nests” in unison with a democratic model and system acceptable to the outside world.

The declining legitimacy of governments, highlighted for instance by the developments in South Africa under the Zuma administration, specifically from 2010 to 2015, coerced loyal securocrats into accepting neopatrimonialism as a useful catalyst to protect the interests of influential individuals through neopatrimonial praetorianism. Built on these arguments, African realism as a meta-theory is therefore ideally positioned to positively contribute to the field of IR and provide explanations about and justifications for current developments in the post-Cold War global order and subsequent geopolitical changes. One of these developments was the finalisation of the CSPA between South Africa and China as a strategic partnership agreement. The next chapter of the study considers and assesses the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships in the international society.
CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION AND ATTRIBUTES OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

3.1 Introduction

In an ever-changing post-Cold War world order, the international alignment and relationships between states and IGOs are undergoing noticeable metamorphoses (Wilkins, 2008:358). Traditional formations are constantly reconfigured and new state-to-state and state-to-IGO relationships continue to evolve regularly, for instance South Africa’s relationship with the AU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping, the FOCAC, the European Union (EU) and SADC continue to evolve regularly. Central to these developments in the international system are strategic partnerships, which ever so often begins as bilateral, state-to-state enterprises and expand to incorporate new partners in a multilateral environment (Wilkins, 2008:358). Essentially, the concept of strategic partnerships became an integral and essential part of political rhetoric and foreign policy after the end of the Cold War (Gajauskaite, 2013:189), and like for instance the BRICS grouping, has shifted from formal to informal IGO’s.

These metamorphoses were also evident in the development and evolution of the state-to-state relationship between South Africa and China in the golden era of Africa-China relations (Bodomo, 2009:170). The transformation was especially prevalent since the formalisation of diplomatic relations between South Africa and China during 1998. The finalisation of the CSPA between South Africa and China 12 years later in August 2010 reflects and confirms a geopolitical and domestic reorientation in the South African government’s approach to IR and the country’s foreign policy narrative (Matthee, 2016:15). Coupled with this was another significant development in the international arena: the configuration of the states-to-BRICS grouping where South Africa and China are with Brazil, Russia and India, two of the five developing countries reshaping the architecture of the international order.

It is an age-old phenomenon that certain multi- or bilateral agreements between states are more important and comprehensive or special and privileged than other agreements. Chapter 3 therefore considers and assesses what the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships entail. Consideration is also given to the model(s) that have been conceptualised to examine the formal architecture of strategic partnerships.
This chapter’s position within the larger study can be represented as follows:

**Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 layout: The evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships**

### 3.2 The evolution of strategic partnerships

Strategic partnerships evolved, according to Geldenhuys (2015:119), from the term *special relationship* coined by Winston Churchill in March 1946 when he suggested that the Western powers should stand together against the then perceived Soviet threat and so-called “Iron Curtain” spreading over Europe. This led to a united front where Western powers, mainly
driven by the US and the British Commonwealth with the support of Western Europe, formed an alliance against a perceived Soviet communist threat for much of the Cold War era from 1946 to the last decade of the twentieth century (Geldenhuys, 2015:119).

Both Gajauskaite (2013:190) and Kay (2000:15) motivate that the concept of a partnership defining a bilateral relationship was first mentioned during the Camp David summit in 1991 when President Boris Yeltsin of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and President George Bush of the United States of America (USA) jointly declared they no longer considered each other enemies and committed to develop a “partnership” based on mutual understanding and trust. During the same time, the concept of partnership also emerged within Chinese diplomacy according to Feng and Huang (2014:7).

Sithole (2015:9) suggests that after the concept of partnerships emerged, the pairing of the notion of partnership with strategy to form the concept of strategic partnership developed. This garnered momentum to signify diplomatic and military relationships in the 1990s when the US and the USSR further engaged on how to manage the uncertain post-Cold War environment. Blanco (as cited in Geldenhuys, 2015:119) suggests that the term “strategic partnership” is now used the world over.

China established its first strategic partnership with Brazil in 1993 (Feng & Huang, 2014:7). Feng and Huang mentioned more examples. China engaged in a:

- “strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination in the twenty-first century” with Russia in 1996;
- “collaborative partnership for the twenty-first century” with Korea in 1998; and,
- “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” with India in 2005.

The South African government also followed the new trend, albeit almost a decade later. They concluded for example the following partnership agreements (DIRCO, 2018: 1):

- “Declaration of principles concerning friendly relations and partnership” with the Russian Federation in 1999;
- “Pretoria declaration on the partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China” in 2000; and,
- “Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its member states, of the other part” which came to be known as the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, but only came into force in 2003.
A further notable example of the evolution of strategic partnerships is the manner in which the close and historical relationship between Europe and South Africa played out, especially since the dramatic developments in Europe that ended the Cold War and South Africa’s transformation to democracy in the 1990s (Landsberg & Hierro, 2017:116). Strategic partnerships, as a foreign policy tool, fulfilled an important role in the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, which according to Masters (2017:215) came into effect in 2007 through the Joint Action Plan. The significance of this is that the agreement is the only strategic partnership that the EU has with an African country (Haastrup, 2017:198). The important point is that the evolution of strategic partnerships gave way to a plethora of agreements in which both South Africa and China participated with each other, in the process reconfiguring their respective relationships and engagements with states and IGOs.

3.2.1 Hierarchy of alignments of strategic partnerships

The evolution and development of relationships and partnerships between states and IGOs, and the variety of the designations used as well as the intensity of the relations, suggest a particular level in the hierarchy of alignments (Geldenhuys, 2015:122). This can be presented by the schematic presentation presented in Figure 3.2 below. Common values, shared interests and mutual understanding enhance cooperation between states who are developing from alliances to partnerships. However, a partnership involves more than a contractual relationship between parties engaged in a joint venture (Geldenhuys, 2015:122). Since the 1990s states began displaying a preference for the adjective strategic to depict bilateral relationships that are supposed to be deeper and stronger than standard interactions (Geldenhuys, 2015:119). Importantly, these bilateral relationships excluded alliances, understood as formal agreements for military cooperation in the face of common threats (Geldenhuys, 2015:119). This is confirmed by Gajauskaite (2013:189), who suggests that the new form of international cooperation, namely strategic partnerships, replaced the Cold War politics of alliances.

Renard (2016:19) defines bilateralism as “… a dyadic relationship”. Such a relationship can be asymmetric due to either an imperfect balance of power or, alternatively, a difference in the nature of actors. The statistics put forward by the UN Treaty Series gives an indication of the popularity of bilateral engagements between states, confirming more than 50 000 bilateral treaties between states compared with only about 3 500 universal multilateral ones (Renard, 2016:20). Compared to bilateralism, multilateralism can be described as the coordinated relationship between three or more parties according to a set of rules and principles (Renard, 2016:20).
As Figure 3.2 indicates, the sphere of influence, commitment and activities of states substantially increases with every subsequent enhancement from for instance partnership to consultative partnership to strategic partnership to comprehensive strategic partnership and even to special and privileged strategic partnership as suggested by Geldenhuys (2015:122). Cheng and Wankun (2002:244–245) conceptualise an almost similar schematic presentation as presented in Figure 3.2 on the hierarchy of China’s partnership network, labelling levels of partnership relationships established by China with major powers and regional organisations facing the twenty-first century. On a scale of levels L1 to L6, Cheng and Wankun (2002:245) asserts that the Sino–South African constructive partnership, together with the Sino–Egyptian relationship of strategic cooperation and the Sino–Saudi Arabian relationship of strategic cooperation, all lie at a L6. Although the study by Cheng and Wankun was done almost eight years before the finalisation of the CSPA, the outcome at that stage was already indicative of China’s African focus, with the inclusion of both South Africa and Egypt.
The model conceptualised by the author of this thesis in Figure 3.2 has five levels that specifically deal with the evolution of the concept of partnerships. This is contrary to the model developed by Cheng and Wankun (2002), which has six levels. The reason for this is that Cheng and Wankun’s model seems to be overlapping and exorbitant. For instance, the Sino–ASEAN partnership based on good neighbourliness and mutual trust (L4), the Sino–Japanese partnership of friendship and cooperation and the Sino–Indian partnership of constructive cooperation deal with almost similar content.

3.2.2 Defining strategic partnerships

The concept of a strategic partnership in the IR domain can be regarded as a growing mechanism with which states choose to officially structure, define and conduct their relationships in a globalised world order. Yet, a universal definition of the term strategic partnership is difficult to find in IR literature (Adelle & Kotsopoulos, 2017:230). Geldenhuys (2015:121) asserts that strategic partnerships display great diversity in terms of their normative basis, goals, scope (issues or areas covered) and structures created. Given the evolution of strategic partnerships since the end of the Cold War, these partnerships could more easily be equated to structure cooperation between states for the purpose of reaching common strategic goals and objectives.

Despite the concept strategic partnership being frequently used in academic and political-diplomatic discourse, no consensus prevails as yet about the uniform definition or theoretical model regarding this form of engagement and cooperation between states and/or IGOs (Gajauskaite, 2013:189). Similarly, Feng and Huang (2014:8) suggest that “… the practice of strategic partnerships has escaped tight criteria or definitions”. As a result, it is prevalent that although the concept has been in use for some time, it is relatively new in the international diplomatic discourse and lexicon. It is therefore common cause that strategic partnerships are perceived not to be well-defined, neither are they adequately explained, nor is the term applied consistently (Panda cited in Sithole, 2015:11). Feng and Huang (2014:7) further speculate that partnerships remain largely unexplored, also in academic literature and policy debates, which is additional proof that the concept is still ill-defined.

The concept strategic partnership can therefore mean different things to different people and may even be used by the same scholars differently in different contexts. There is consensus that different authors ascribe different meanings to the term, while the focus on issues such as security and trade differ (Adelle & Kotsopoulos, 2017:230). Wilkins (2008:359) goes as far as to suggest that the term strategic partnership “… has been widely misused and misconstrued in international politics as to render it potentially meaningless”. The observation
by Geldenhuys (2015:120) that the proliferation in strategic partnerships between countries lead to IR scholars lagging behind state practice, captures the true state of affairs.

Yet, notwithstanding the uncertainty about an acceptable universal definition, strategic partnerships have become an important and well-used IR tool to formalise relations and engagements of a more serious and intense nature between states in the post-Cold War realigned world order. Although reservations exist according to Wilkins (2008:359) over its actual meaning, the term in addition has been embraced to describe relations as varied as American-India, American-Pakistan, EU-Russia, Israel-Turkey, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-EU and Russia-China, as well as Sino–South African relations.

Given the importance and emphasis that the Chinese government has put on strategic partnerships as an IR instrument, Feng and Huang (2014:7) suggest that “… the strategic partnership boom is a product of China’s embrace of globalisation and multidimensional diplomacy”. Focusing on the Chinese perspective, the Xiandai Hanyu Cidian [Modern Chinese Dictionary], indicates that the phrase huoban [partnership] comes from an ancient military system (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:238) where “Ten men formed one huo, the head of the huo was also in charge of the meals. Those who belonged to the same huo were huoban”. In modern terms this refers to “… those who have joined the same organisation or engaged in the same activities” (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:238). Further, the word Zhanlue [strategy], when considered in the realm of economy and politics, according to Feng and Huang (2014:7) “… refers to a plan, policy or tactic with overarching, comprehensive and decisive implications”.

Sithole (2015:11) is of the opinion that the basic elements of a real strategic partnership can include comprehensiveness, reciprocity, empathy and normative proximity, duration and the ambition to reach beyond bilateral issues. Essentially, this means that strategic considerations and decisions between states and/or IGOs are much more deep-rooted and intense than only considerations about power relationships. Considering this and using terminology from business and organisation studies as reference and a point of departure, Wilkins (2008:363) presents the following as a working definition for a strategic partnership:

“A strategic partnership is a structured collaboration between states (or other actors) to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges more effectively than could be achieved in isolation. Strategic partnering occurs both in and between the international and domestic sectors (levels). Besides allowing information, skills, and resources to be shared, a strategic partnership also permits the partners to share risk”.

Wilkins’ definition in essence highlights four important issues, namely economic opportunities, security challenges, strategic partners and risk. This is in line with elements like for instance
common values, shared interests and mutual understanding that were earlier emphasised to enhance cooperation between states that are in the process of developing from alliances to partnerships. Similarly, Geldenhuys (2015:121) postulates that a proposed definition of a strategic partnership “… falls somewhere between a formal agreement for military agreement in the event of aggression (that is, an alliance) and a bilateral agreement for limited cooperation in some functional area like trade or telecommunications”.

Wilkins (2008:361), however, stands critical to the dominant realist/neorealists explanations for alignment as they are balance of power and balance of threat theories. Wilkins (2008:361) argues that because strategic partnerships are not equivalent to an alliance (or coalition), existing theories of international alignment are by themselves inadequately equipped to accommodate more nuanced understandings of non-traditional alignments, especially dealing with the post-Cold War geopolitical realities. This includes the clarification of roles and the contributions of both powerful and/or less powerful states as indicated earlier.

It can therefore be argued that Wilkins’ drive (2008:362) for a novel and cross-disciplinary approach using organisational studies to fill the perceived analytical gaps, bring about a “… crucial and important role in the conceptual analysis of the evolution of strategic partnerships”. In addition, Wilkins (2008:363) importantly maintains that strategic partnerships as perceived in the study of IR are fundamentally informed by business and organisational study models. These are in turn influenced by predictable behavioural patterns common to organisational groupings. The crux of Wilkins’ (2008:363) motivation lies in that “… organisation theories describe the delicate conversion of conflict into cooperation, the mobilisation of resources, the coordination of effort that facilitate the joint survival of an organisation and its members”. All of these are also daily realities and challenges in a complex multipolar globalised world order where states (big or small) as IGOs strategise, compete and manoeuvre for influence, impact and survival.

Gajauskaite (2013:191), on the other hand, suggests that the term strategic partnership can be interpreted differently when considering a partner’s power or status in the international structure. In this context, a strategic partnership can be viewed as cooperation in various areas or the roles of key international actors, or as the cooperation between powerful and influential countries that can perform strategic actions in the international system. Notably, Gajauskaite (2013:192) argues that there is no single definition of strategic partnership and similar concepts are used to describe totally different forms of cooperation developed with different objectives. Each strategic partnership is unique because partners cooperate according to their own interests. To clarify this further, it is necessary to focus on the important attributes of
strategic partnerships that directly affect the relations between states and/or IGOs in the international system.

### 3.3 Attributes of strategic partnerships

Within the context of the end of the Cold War and realism, the concept of strategic partnerships primarily reflects on the structure of the international system. As expounded in the previous chapter, this proposes that states are considered to be sovereign international actors or role players aligned with other states that belong to a hierarchical category of power and operate under granted opportunities and constraints to maximise its benefits and minimise action costs. The primary strategic goal is national security (Gajauskaite, 2013:191).

However, the understanding of a strategic partnership has changed radically over time and the term *strategic* has been interpreted in different and more complex ways. Scholars like for instance Geldenhuys (2015:118) postulate that partnership agreements are better or more substantive than *ordinary* multi- or bilateral agreements, while Wilkins (2008:359) asserts that a strategic partnership is not a synonym for an alliance or coalition. Sithole (2015:9) highlights that strategic partnerships in IR are “… legally non-binding agreements or arrangements used by states to coordinate their diplomatic relationships”.

In order to consider and assess linkages and trade-offs between states, testing strategic partnerships necessitate dissecting their multiple functions and objectives as a foreign policy tool, thereby delivering a more sophisticated and comprehensive picture (Grevi, 2012:12). Central to this is the question: what are the attributes that influence and shape strategic partnerships, especially considering the realisation that the post-Cold War global order is much more balanced in terms of the balance of power than the maximisation of power? To answer the question, it would be appropriate to focus on the evolution of strategic partnerships and subsequently consider definitions of the concept of strategic partnerships.

Building on contributions by Cheng and Wankun (2002), Feng and Huang (2014), Gajauskaite (2013), Geldenhuys (2015), Renard (2016), Sithole (2015) and Wilkins (2008), the following five attributes are considered to be the cornerstones of strategic partnerships: a system principle, strategic cooperation, national interest, parity between states, and longevity and flexibility.

#### 3.3.1 System principle

Strategic partnerships, are according to Wilkins (2008:360) “… organised around a general purpose known as a system principle rather than a specific task, such as deterring or fighting
a hostile state”. Strategic partnerships can therefore be based primarily on common interests and are not necessary underwritten by shared values in a way typical of more entrenched alignments like for example alliances and coalitions (Wilkins, 2008:360). The former Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, at the end of 1997 stated that “… the world should respect each other in a multipolar power configuration …” (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:238–239). To this end, Grevi (2012:147) concedes that bilateral partnerships have always existed in unison with multilateral frameworks.

Moreover, strategic partnerships should be able to address issues and activities beyond bilateral concerns and matters that have the potential to solve regional and global challenges and issues (Sithole, 2015:10). Strategic partnerships have as a result evolved into multi-purpose partnerships, pursuing both bilateral and multilateral objectives that can shift focus across these and other dimensions of the relationships in a fairly pragmatic way, serving specific interests. The system principle in this context can therefore be presented as multilateralism. Contrary to unilaterism, which proposes an approach that relies on self-help and independent strategies by a specific state, or bilateralism, multilateralism promotes cooperative approaches to manage shared problems through collective and coordinated action involving numerous states (Kegley, 2007:124–125). It can therefore be argued that multilateralism has become the norm in the international society of the post-Cold War globalised world order.

Importantly, both South Africa and China share multilateralism as a denominator in both their foreign policies, as well as around issues with major consequences for African development and the rise of BRICS as contending forces of power and influence in the international arena (Cornelissen et al., 2012:3). The establishment of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is one of many examples of China’s decision to opt for multilateralism, affirming maybe the most important basic principle of today’s global order, namely multilateralism (Stuenkel, 2016:127). The AIIB, established during 2016 and with its headquarters in Beijing, is a multilateral development bank with 87 approved member states with a mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia and beyond by investing in sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors (AIIB, 2018). South Africa’s decision to openly opt to become a member of the BRICS grouping, is another example.

It is therefore highly improbable that any state could operate in isolation in a globalised multilateral international system and prefer not to align with one or the other power block(s). The important question, however, is what would determine the rationale for possible strategic cooperation between states and/or IGOs sharing the same system principle?
3.3.2 Strategic cooperation

Strategic partnerships have a strong empathic dimension focused on strategic cooperation and sharing mutual objectives and potential benefits, which are primarily goal-driven rather than threat-driven arrangements (Wilkins, 2008:361). States initiate strategic partnerships on purpose to increase their national security and economic sustainability and to reduce the lack of power. Moreover, acting as rational actors they deliberately choose such potential strategic partners after considering the biggest and most attractive possible benefits of all possible alternatives (Gajauskaite, 2013:192). In the majority of instances economic interests and specifically resource security is the dominant factor aligned with a potential strategic partner. Both partners must share a common understanding of their mutual and collective values and objectives.

To achieve that, it is essential that strategic partnerships are built on reciprocity and mutual benefit. Weizhun (2012) (cited in Sithole, 2015:10) suggests five vital probable common denominators for potential strategic partners: common interests, common values, influences, leverage and strengths. These common denominators, which could be described as strategic objectives as presented in Table 3.1, can be strategic goals, national interests, cooperation in strategically important areas, strategic actors or role players or importantly, strategic action. Five examples are listed in Table 3.1 that culminated in specific strategic partnerships between specific states (Gajauskaite, 2013:192).

Table 3.1: Examples of strategic partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>SPECIFIC STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strategic goal</td>
<td>NATO / EU membership</td>
<td>Lithuanian–Polish (1997–2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic national interest</td>
<td>Hegemony of USA</td>
<td>American–Polish; American–Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cooperation in the strategically important areas</td>
<td>Stimulation of projects beneficial to trade and economics</td>
<td>EU–Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strategic actors</td>
<td>(Potentially) powerful and influential states</td>
<td>American–EU; Russo–Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strategic action</td>
<td>Changes of international structure</td>
<td>Russo–Chinese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own construct based on Gajauskaite (2013:192)

The compatible standards or objectives presented in Table 3.1 in essence are the causal links that led to the formalisation of geopolitical strategic agreements between states or with IGOs.
and determined the intensity and commitment of their interactive engagements. Strategic cooperation is influenced by the national interests of states and are discussed in the next subsection of this chapter.

### 3.3.3 National interests

The state’s assumption of its own national interests remains one of the most important realities in the study of IR and foreign policy analyses (Landsberg, 2010:273). Importantly, Weizhun (cited in Sithole, 2015:10) maintains that partnerships also have cultural and societal significance and should be based on shared common values and interests. Without these essential and vital drivers, strategic partnerships can be of no real significance. Once the original common values and interests change or differ, strategic partnerships can become uncertain and difficult to manage. This is once again proof that a focused approach to national interests linked with shared common values and objectives of other states and/or IGOs, remains at the core of sustainable strategic partnerships.

Landsberg (2010:274) suggests that national interest is closely associated with the overbearing realist or power politics school and its preoccupation with power maximisation. However, too much emphasis on any specific interest, like for instance power maximisation, will lead to the ignorance of other factors, particularly to the ignorance of the importance of other common values in maintaining a relationship. Nuechterlin (as cited in Shelton, 2014:19), aptly argues that the national interests of a state could be subsumed under four basic groups: defence, economic, world order and ideological interests. It could therefore be accepted that for a state and/or an IGO, strategic partnerships should adhere to the purposes of cooperation and growth that above all serve the partners’ core national interests (Grevi, 2012:10).

An example of such a development was when South Africa received an invitation to join the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) grouping on 23 December 2010 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Yang Jiechi (Besada, Tok & Winters, 2013:1). The cosy Sino–South African relations lead to the admission of South Africa into the BRICS grouping on 14 and 15 April 2011 after an earlier invitation by China (Besada et al., 2013:1; Xiong, 2012:5). Membership of the five-country grouping of emerging markets spanning across the continents of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe significantly advanced South Africa’s national interests, the development of infrastructure and the promotion of regional integration, and gave substance to its interest in South-South cooperation (SAIIA, 2018:4; Xiong, 2012:5). The Sino–South African relationship is typical of a bilateral engagement, while the opportunity for South Africa to become the fifth member state of BRICS confirms multilateralism at work.
3.3.4 Parity between states

What remains important in terms of these latest developments in the evolution of strategic partnerships, is the shift from the beginning of the twenty-first century to include both powerful and less powerful states, and influential and less influential states. Protecting and promoting their national interest and security in a strategic partnership agreement between big and/or small states have become a priority. Further, parity between big and small states and the influence it yields, has become a norm in the IR architecture. Where super powers like for the instance China and Russia in the last decade of the 1990s were prone to conclude strategic partnerships with each other, a distinctive shift is prevalent.

New power blocks and alignments are the order of the day. A typical example is the focus of this study, namely the finalisation of the CSPA, where one of the most influential and powerful states in the world, namely China, concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership with South Africa during 2010. South Africa is perceived by some as the “power house” or entrance to Africa (Sithole, 2015:2). China’s phenomenal growth rate has seen the country rise to world leadership status, causing many analysts to question its regional and global aims and intentions (Konings, 2007:341). South Africa and China’s warm relationship has deepened significantly since 1998 and is proof of a big and smaller state that use strategic partnerships as a means to an end.

In line with this development, Sithole (2015:18) argues that the stronger and more significant among states are no longer the only ones that are important players in IR. In that context, Sithole (2015:18) reasons that “... the maximisation of power is not the sine qua non of international politics”. It is therefore possible that states that are perceived to be powerful, as well as those that are deemed to be small and less influential, can both play a meaningful part in the post-Cold War international system. It can thus be argued that the concept of strategic partnerships does create a structured IR product that provides for both influential and less influential states to be on a relative equal footing in terms of influence and impact. Parity between powerful and less powerful states is indeed a reality of the twenty-first century international order.

An important post-Cold War development is therefore the claim that states like China and South Africa for instance, can both fulfil an important role in an anarchic international political system (Sithole, 2015:18). In line with the system principle that has earlier been identified as multilateralism, factors that influence states, big and small, to cooperate and converge, are therefore primarily determined by national interests, including security and economic realities. This is in fact the raison d’être of strategic partnerships.
3.3.5 Longevity and flexibility

Some of the most fundamental attributes of strategic partnerships is longevity and flexibility: it refers to a partner’s obligation and commitment to develop and maintain long-term relations (Gajauskaite, 2013:193). To be compatible, strategic partnerships should at minimum mean a longer term contract and programme of action to bind states together in cooperative ventures in one or more fields of mutual value or interest for their common benefit (Geldenhuys, 2015:122). However, the higher the compatibility between the strategic partners for example political systems, ideology, foreign policy tradition, geopolitical situation and resources, the better the chances for long-term commitment and sustainability of a strategic partnership (Gajauskaite, 2013:195). Complementary and common interests between states as well as IGOs, are therefore key in terms of the longevity of agreements.

The use of phrases such as “facing the twenty-first century” and “straddling over the present and the next centuries” in the partnership relationships between for instance China and other major powers, signifies the Chinese leadership’s intentions to maintain such relationships among major powers over a long and stable term (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:239). However, in order to form common objectives, states have to identify and match their national interests, which naturally could still be subjected to power relationships.

Flexibility of strong and visionary leadership to tactically move and negotiate possible outcomes and mitigate risks, have become an essential asset to maintain the momentum and gist between states and/or IGOs that are partners to a strategic partnership. Soft power, which was considered earlier in the study, has become a major factor according to Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015:23) in the assertion of regional hegemony and middle-power status. This is of particular importance, especially in terms of the sustainability and attributes of strategic partnerships between big and small states as experienced for example between South Africa and China striving to maintain the objectives of the CSPA.

Chapter 3 has thus far dealt with the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships and their definitions. Yet, further clarity should be obtained to establish what differentiates one strategic partnership from another? The next section of the chapter therefore deals with the model developed by Thomas S. Wilkins (2008) to analyse strategic partnerships in international security to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the behavioural dynamics and organisational characteristics of the phenomenon.
3.4 Wilkins’ model

What Wilkins calls his “simple cognitive template”, is not merely an untested academic construct, but has been employed to analyse numerous strategic partnerships (Geldenhuys, 2015:123). Examples include:

- the strategic partnership between Russia and South Africa (Geldenhuys, 2015:118–145);
- the strategic partnership between Russia and China (Wilkins, 2008:358–383);
- a comparative analysis by Gajauskaite (2013:189–229) of Polish–Ukrainian and Lithuanian–Ukrainian strategic partnerships; and

What makes Wilkins’ model so unique is his argument that strategic partnerships have been inadequately served by theories that fail to distinguish between partnerships and other “systems of alignment”, for example alliances, coalitions and security communities (Adelle & Kotsopoulos, 2017:231).

The basic taxonomy used by Wilkins (2008:363) to investigate strategic partnerships, considers “… several organisational dimensions through a division into three sequential phases of development across a collaboration continuum namely formation, implementation and evaluation”. The ideal product of such an agreement between states and/or IGOs is what Geldenhuys (2015:122) refers to as a “… long term compatible strategic partnership that bind states together in cooperative ventures in one or more fields of mutual value and interest for their common benefit”.

3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of Chapter 3 was to consider and assess what the evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships are in the post-Cold War international society. The discussion also paid attention to Wilkins’ model, which had been employed by scholars to analyse numerous strategic partnerships, to conceptualise the formal architecture of strategic partnerships. However, noticeable metamorphoses in the manner that states and IGOs relate with each other since the end of the Cold War also affected the international relationship between South Africa and China, which is the focus of this study.

The evolution of strategic partnerships has reconfigured the international order. The hierarchy of strategic partnerships are further influenced by common values, shared interests and
mutual understanding between states and/or IGOs. Although the definition of strategic partnerships lacks uniformity and certainty, it has become an important and well-used IR tool. The chapter concluded that the concept strategic partnership can mean different things to different people and may even be used differently in different contexts by the same scholars. Moreover, different authors ascribe different meanings to the term, while the focus on important issues, such as security and trade can differ.

The definition used by Wilkins’ reflecting on strategic partnerships, highlighted four important issues, namely economic opportunities, security challenges, strategic partners and risk. This is in line with elements like for instance common values, shared interests and mutual understanding that were earlier emphasised to enhance cooperation between states that are in the process of developing from alliances to partnerships. Strategic partnerships in the main, are therefore informed by business and organisational study models influencing attributes such as a system principle, strategic cooperation, national interests, parity between states, as well as the longevity and flexibility of agreements between states and/or IGOs. Wilkins conceptualised three sequential phases, namely the formation, implementation and evaluation of strategic partnerships. Strategic partnerships, in sum, have become some of the most important international tools and mechanisms for states, both powerful and less significant, in foreign policy to formalise relations in the post-Cold War international society. Driven by security and economic imperatives and guided by national interests and strategic obligations of individual states, strategic partnerships have become the modern-day Magna Carta of IR since the end of the Cold War.

Wilkins’ three phases namely formation, implementation and evaluation, are used to consider the specific strategic agreement under review in the next three chapters. Chapter 4 will therefore determine and explain the rationale for and primary reasons why South Africa signed the CSPA and continued with the agreement from 2010 onwards.
CHAPTER 4: THE BASIS ON WHICH SOUTH AFRICA SIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED THE CSPA WITH CHINA

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 discussed and assessed the fact that strategic partnerships are key components of the contemporary foreign policy of many states and IGOs (Geldenhuys, 2015:11). In the case of China, its quest for a closer strategic partnership with postcolonial Africa has led to increased dynamic economic, political and diplomatic activities on the continent (Power & Mohan, 2010:462). Built on the notion of Chinese exceptionalism (Alden & Large, 2011:21), Sino–African relations embody both opportunities and threats in the realignment of a new global order (Edoho, 2011:121).

In the case of South Africa, the end of apartheid led to the lifting of sanctions, which provided an opportunity for the new post-1994 South African government to redefine the country’s foreign policy (Grimm et al., 2014:8). Grand strategy is the highest level of national statecraft. It establishes how states, or other political units, prioritise and mobilise military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their interests. Depending on one’s theoretical perspective, these perceived interests focus on the most minimal goal of ensuring the state’s survival, pursuing specific domestic interests or ideational coalitions, or establishing a specific regional or global order. A country’s grand strategy is usually evident in their pursuit of foreign policy.

Chapter 4 first determines and explains the respective dynamics of the foreign policies of both South Africa and China in the run-up to the finalisation of the CSPA. The focus then shifts to the similarities and differences between the two countries’ foreign policies. The chapter lastly reflects on the evolution of the IR between the two countries, which led to the finalisation of the CSPA in August 2010. The chapter determines and explains the basis on which South Africa signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 until 2015, as indicated in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 layout: The basis on which South Africa signed and implemented the CSPA with China
4.2 The political and diplomatic relationship between the governments of South Africa and China

After the formalisation of diplomatic ties in 1998, Sino–South African relations advanced progressively and lead to the finalisation of the CSPA during 2010. It started with an initial cautious approach by President Mandela, and developed to a more reality-driven repositioning of South Africa and Africa as part of the global South by president Mbeki under the guise of the African Renaissance, to an all-embracing engagement on both political and governmental levels during the Motlanthe and Zuma presidencies (Alden & Wu, 2014; Matambo, 2014:79). Analysts like Matthee (2016:2) for example suggests that the South African government’s foreign policy shift reflected a geopolitical reorientation where the governing party, the ANC, “… sees Chinese capitalism as its model for a developmental state”.

Party-to-party relations were bolstered by the continued adulation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) by the ANC. The amicable relationship between the governments of South Africa and China, especially since 2010, was yet again validated at the 2015 National General Council (NGC) of the governing party, the ANC (Anthony, 2016:2). During the policy conference, a discussion document identified “… a new Cold War, in which the exemplary role of the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China … should be a guiding lodestar of our own struggle” (Anthony, 2016:2). In addition, members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, attended management and organisational training in China. In the same vein, it was announced in 2014 that an ANC Party Institute or political leadership school, financed inter alia by the CPC and modelled on the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong, Shanghai, would be established for the training of party members at Venterskroon, a former gold-mining town in the North West province of South Africa (Anthony, Tembe & Gull, 2015:11; Findlay, 2014).

Both heads of states’ testimonials on the intensity of the relationship between the Chinese and South African governments ahead of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summits in Russia during July 2015 were further proof of the intensified bilateral relationship: President Xi congratulated China and South Africa on the tangible results in important sectors, which “… significantly enriched the connotation of the comprehensive strategic partnership between them”, whereas his South African counterpart, Jacob Zuma held that “… the bilateral ties are built on the foundation of high-level mutual trust” (Chinese Embassy, 2015). Encapsulating the importance of the CSPA, two distinct areas of progress in terms of the implementation could therefore be identified:
i. Bilateral cooperation between the South African and Chinese governments guided by the policies and doctrines of the ANC and CPC respectively; and,

ii. South African and Chinese engagements on shared multilateral platforms.

4.3 China’s post- Cold War foreign policy

China’s post-Cold War foreign policy can be traced back to 1949 when the then chairman of the CPC, Mao Zedong, announced the principle of “leaning to one side” by which China would seek an alliance with the USSR and fight against the United States of America (USA) and its Western Allies in (Tianbiao Zhu, 2001:7). However, China’s “Opening Up and Reforms Policy” under Deng Xiaoping, launched in 1978, started a period of incremental change towards its domestic economy and produced massive development gains over the next three decades (Alden & Wu, 2017:2). During the specific period, the Chinese government focused strongly on rural development and inspired the formation of rural enterprises and private businesses, liberalised foreign trade and investment, relaxed state control over some price fixing and invested in industrial production and the education of the workforce (April, 2012:106).

China’s active push for a multipolar world order has signified a new approach in the country’s international strategy in the post-Cold War era (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:237). What is more, is China’s arrival onto the African scene: The development has been signified as the most remarkable and notable feature in the external relations and engagements of the continent since the end of the Cold War (Clapham, 2008:361). Considering the historical transformations that changed the geopolitical architecture of mostly previous colonies in Africa in the late 1950s, five distinct periods that influenced China’s foreign policy since then can be distinguished (Van de Looy, 2006:1):

- Relationships were established between China and the majority of African nation states, excluding South Africa, as they gained independence (up to the end of the 1970s);
- China gained a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1971;
- The post-Maoist period was characterised by economic liberalisation and the subsequent remarkable growth of the Chinese economy since 1978;
- The meltdown of the Chinese economy (2008 onwards); and,
- The Xi-epoch (2012 onwards).
Importantly, Tull (2009:114) surmises that strategic considerations prompted a more active and globally-oriented foreign policy, and in addition, the search for partners on which China could depend in its pursuit of national and international geopolitical interests. Akin to other African countries, like for instance Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, South Africa with its abundance in mineral resources and anti-Western paranoia, especially since the election of Jacob Zuma as president in 2009, matched this narrative well (Matthee, 2016:14).

4.3.1 China’s exceptionalism

Against the reality of China’s constructive reforms and specifically the remarkable economic growth since 1978, the term “China’s exceptionalism” advanced as a normative modality of engagement (Alden & Large, 2011:21). Alden and Large (2011:21) concur that China’s exceptionalism seeks to structure relations in such a manner that, though they may remain asymmetrical in economic content, they are nonetheless characterised as equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing based on mutual respect and political equality.

Importantly, China’s foreign policy remained rooted in the following principles (Nathan & Ross, 1997; Panda, 2014):

- Maintaining independence and safeguarding national sovereignty;
- Opposing hegemony and safeguarding world peace;
- Upholding the “Five principles of peaceful coexistence” which is mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence;
- Strengthening solidarity of the developing countries and together opposing imperialism and colonialism; and,
- Improving relations with developed countries to promote common progress.

Nonetheless, at the outset of the reforms under Deng, China was marginalised and poor (Eckart, 2016:2). As the most populous country in the world with a population of almost 1.3 billion people, China had, according to Eckart (2016:2), a GDP per capita level similar to Zambia. It was lower than half of the Asian average and lower than two thirds of the African average. Deng’s reformist drive labelled as “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” can at best be summed up in his celebrated dictum according to the SAIIA (2009:13), “… it does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice”. The strategy implemented since 1978 that fuelled and promoted Chinese exceptionalism, created spectacular results. Per capita income has quadrupled since then and a number of analysts predicted that the
Chinese economy will be larger than the US by 2020 (April, 2012:106). Special economic zones (SEZs), which were part of the strategic outcomes of the industrial reforms under Deng, were one of the key instruments to promote economic growth. This elevated China to an economic power house of the post-Cold War order.

4.3.2 Special economic zones (SEZs)

The impetus of reform initiatives and Deng’s pledge to rejoin the international economy, provided politicians in Fujian and Guangdong in south-eastern China the go-ahead to create SEZs to take advantage of links with overseas Chinese communities (Paulson, 2015:21). SEZs were initiated in the early 1980s when market-oriented reforms were introduced in selected SEZ areas such as Shenzhen as indicated in Figure 4.2 (Zeng, 2015:1). In the mid-1980s, the establishment of open coastal cities such as Zhangzhou, designed to stimulate economic growth by leveraging their geographical location and economic opening, garnered further momentum. The importance of the critical logistical links with coastal cities and harbours have become one of the most important criteria of SEZs. The deliberate policy shifts in the economic diplomacy of the Chinese authorities to stimulate the establishment of effective and efficient economic hubs built on strong rural-to-urban migration shifts, would later be envied by many countries, including South Africa.

Of further relevance is the close proximity of mega-cities like Guangzhou and Shenzhen to Hong Kong and Macau (see Figure 4.2). The One China policy according to which the Chinese authorities insist that Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are part of China, remains the most important pre-requisite of the Chinese government in foreign policy directives when engaging and identifying potential strategic partners.
Figure 4.2: China's SEZs and development zones (Zeng, 2015:1)
4.3.3 Adoption of multilateralism

An important development in China’s contemporary diplomacy that has bearing on the country’s foreign policy, was the gradual acceptance and adoption of multilateralism (Wuthnow, Li & Qi, 2012:273). It affected the structure of global power, as well as the domestic reform and opening-up policy that called for China to establish sound relations with more countries worldwide (Feng & Huang, 2014:11). Fundamentally, China could not just focus on big or great powers anymore, but had to develop a multidimensional approach to also include smaller and less influential states in the post-Cold War world order. Feng and Huang (2014:11) argue that subsequent to the end of the Cold War, China initiated a new diplomatic approach called multidimensional diplomacy. Strategic partnerships fitted into this well.

Yet, China’s involvement in Africa was motivated primarily by the country’s growing resource and commodity needs and other geopolitical strategies, like aid and the development of new international power blocks. These factors had a definite impact on the transformation of its foreign policy (Tull, 2009:113). This enhanced foreign policy approach created new horizons, especially in the resource and commodity rich Africa. Premier Zhao Ziyang undertook an African tour in December 1982 to January 1983, where the Four Principles on Sino–African Economic and Technical Cooperation was announced, reformulating solidarity aid to “mutual interest” as the basis for economic cooperation (Alden & Wu, 2017:2). In 1996, President Jiang Zemin embarked on an important ground-breaking visit to Africa, which marked a distinct change in China’s Africa policy and a turning point from a focus on political solidarity to a more commercial engagement (Shelton, 2014:12). The focus of the next generation of Chinese leadership under President Hu Jintao, elected as Chinese president during 2002, was the pursuit of a policy of deeper integration into the global economy where trade and investment relationships were consolidated (SAIIA, 2009:14; Shelton, 2014:12). That deeper integration approach had a specific focus on the African continent.

Alden and Wu (2017:2) point out that China’s economic involvement in Africa remained miniscule up to the mid-1990s, but this began to change with the China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) investment in Sudan’s oil sector in 1995. Chinese investment in Africa’s oil industry, in conjunction with other Chinese endeavours, has grown from low levels to a key presence with important consequences for African politics and the continent’s relations with the rest of the world (De Oliveira, 2009:83). One example of China’s resource drive since the mid-1990s can be found in Figure 4.3, which presents Sudan and South Sudan’s oil export to East Asian countries. The export of oil and gas to China accounted for 67% of the production during 2010.
Figure 4.3: Sudan and South Sudan oil exports by destination for 2010 (World Energy Atlas, 2013)

Figure 4.4 gives a schematic illustration of the export from Africa to the USA, EU and China from 1998 to 2006, demonstrating noteworthy trends regarding the economic awakening of the continent. During this period, export to both the EU and US from Africa grew substantially with increases of 139% and 402% respectively. More important though, is the exponential growth of 2,216% from Africa to China, which is an increase of more than fifteen fold and fivefold compared to the EU and US respectively. This is further proof of the deliberate and structured foreign policy shift of the Chinese government that started in 1995 to be more involved in Africa, specifically in the African economies. While exports to previous colonisers of Africa in Europe remained limited, China’s surge for resources and commodities to supply and maintain their economic boom, snowballed during this period.
Another important fact is that China has doubled the available financial capital for development finance globally since 2006 and accounts for more such loans than the world’s six major multilateral institutions combined (Eckart, 2016:12). In sum, the opening-up policy in the late 1970s paved the way for an independent and open foreign policy eschewing formal preferential ties to specific countries linked to huge financial and investment opportunities primarily in the energy and resource sectors. The question, however, remains what the benefits for the recipient countries would be, and more importantly, what China’s motivations were? Did China become the neocolonial imperialists of the twenty-first century?

4.3.4 Soft power and the China dream

In the twenty-first century, soft power represents an important element of the CPC’s public diplomacy. Chinese political elites believe that it is a valuable tool to fill the power gap between China and the US in a long-term indirect and cost-effective way (Zanardi, 2016:433). Accordingly, there were discernible changes to Chinese official foreign policy discourse since
2012, particularly after President Xi Jinping came to power and laid out his vision of a “China dream” (Poh & Li, 2017). The China dream encapsulates the specific objectives of bringing about a “moderately prosperous society in all respects” when the CPC celebrates its centenary in 2021 and, an “affluent, strong, civilised and harmonious modern socialist country” by 2049 when China marks its centenary (Poh & Li, 2017). Zhang (2016:769) submits that Chinese foreign policy under the presidency of Xi has been at once dynamic and contentious.

China’s major diplomatic initiatives and innovations in diplomatic theory and practice in the dawning Xi era, according to Yang (cited in Zhang, 2016:769), include the:

- successful launch of the AIIB and the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) among the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) states;
- articulation of what is arguably a global vision with Chinese characteristics, given form in the ambitious project of creating the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI);
- active promotion of the concept of a new type of great power relations with the USA;
- and,
- prudently announced strategy of constructing a community of common destiny through its regional diplomacy.

The possibility that the AIIB could substitute the World Bank as the world’s leading lender in the future, is proof that China’s soft power initiatives are no longer a pipe dream, but a reality influencing the twenty-first century world order (Stuenkel, 2016:87). China, specifically under President Xi, has often used aid, investment and other economic leverage to compel its neighbours to deepen their economic dependence on and expand their security cooperation with China (Chellaney, 2015:2). Further proof is President Xi’s use of a US$40 billion Silk Road Fund and the AIIB to develop the OBOR, developing modern-day trade routes emulating the ancient overland and maritime routes that connected Asia to Europe (Solana, 2015:2). Zhang (2016:772), however, cautions that Chinese foreign policy, clearly directed by President Xi, is undergoing a major change from risk-averse to risk-embracing—a shift that makes China particularly vulnerable in the foreign policy sphere.

### 4.3.5 The Belt and Road Initiative

The BRI is the *pièce de résistance* of the Chinese government and one of the most ambitious undertakings in human history. It built on the links to the rest of Eurasia and African countries through the construction of so-called “Silk and Maritime Roads” as specified in Figure 4.5 (Stuenkel, 2016:168). The Silk Road Economic Belt is made up of interlinked rail lines,
communication networks and oil and gas pipe lines that run from Chongqing in western China to Duisburg in Germany, connecting the economic centres of the Pearl and Yangtze rivers with Rotterdam and Hamburg via overland infrastructure corridors including for example Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Poland and Holland (Van Staden, 2017:2). The twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road, on the other hand, is an ocean-based series of connected shipping lanes from Quanzhou in the Fujian province of China, to Piraeus in Greece built on a number of massive port expansions from Colombo in Sri Lanka to Mombasa in Kenya and Djibouti, gateway to the Suez Canal and Egypt, to the Mediterranean traversing overland to Rotterdam (Van Staden 2017:2).
President Xi sanctioned the BRI and cemented his grand vision for trans-regional integration as one of the foreign policy priorities of the Chinese government since taking office in 2014 (Stuenkel, 2016:168; Wu, Alden & Sidiropoulos, 2017:1). The biblical-size trade and mega-infrastructure projects could, according to Holmes (2018), cost 12 times as much as what the US spent on the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe following the end of the Second World War. The multinational professional services network, PricewaterhouseCoopers, doing business as PwC, estimated that the BRI will cost approximately US$1 trillion, with around US$250 billion of related projects already commissioned (Van Staden, 2017:10). The BRI at present has the participation of 76 countries from Asia, Africa and Europe and 130 transport pacts have been signed with partner countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (Holmes, 2018; Wu et al., 2017:2). Importantly, the BRI has been a public diplomacy and soft power tour de force by the Chinese government and has already generated significant global exposure and interest (Wu et al., 2017:2).

Building on the cordial and structured relationship between the South African and Chinese governments and the interest created by the BRI, the two countries furthermore agreed to jointly explore the converging points between the BRI and national development of South Africa to enhance policy coordination and pragmatic cooperation and to promote win-win cooperation and mutual learning to realise peaceful development and common prosperity for both countries (Brand South Africa, 2015:2). However, analysts like Wu et al. (2017:2) see the BRI “… as China’s alternative approach to globalisation in an era where powers, like the US seems intent on increasing protectionism and retreating from their global leadership role”. Further, BRICS stalwarts and partners like India are more concerned that the BRI can be hegemonic project of the Chinese government that not only challenges the current post-Cold War order, but seeks to replace it with a Sino-centric one (Stuenkel, 2016:171; Wu et al., 2017:2).

4.4 South Africa’s foreign policy

Guided by the Freedom Charter of the ANC adopted in Kliptown, Soweto on 26 June 1955, the South African Constitution inter alia provided in the preamble to “… build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations” (Zuma, 2013:17). South Africa’s re-entry into the community (or family) of nations in 1994 after decades of isolation under apartheid can be seen as remarkably successful, despite some predictions of an uncertain future and a looming racial war (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:249; Zondi, 2009:90). The new foreign policy ideals were based on the experiences of the ruling party, the ANC, as the key actor in the global anti-apartheid campaign, which evolved around a struggle for human rights, democracy and majority rule in South Africa (Le
Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:249). Throughout its period in exile, the ANC was tightly allied to the USSR, and its foreign policy positions reflected that fact (Johnson, 2015:193). The first post-1994 Government of National Unity, led by the ANC, inherited many of the diplomatic ties of the National Party (NP) regime that governed from 1948 to 1994. The country’s initial foreign policy can therefore be seen as a combination of the pre-1994 and the post-1994 state (Gelb, 2001). Sithole (2015:48) speculates that “… the RSA’s foreign policy has developed from the stance of the ANC while still in exile, to Mandela’s 1991 statement at the UN General Assembly to what it is today”.

4.4.1 South Africa’s new dawn after apartheid

Since mid-1994, South Africa’s foreign policy moved from total isolation from IGOs to memberships of countless international bodies (Ogunnubi & Okeke- Uzodike, 2015:34). In the process, it turned its pariah status into an iconic one built around the iconography of its political transition and negotiated settlement, eradication of all forms of global oppression, and the persona of Mandela in the early stages of post-apartheid South Africa (Zondi, 2009:91). As a result of South Africa’s newfound international popularity, the country set up 93 resident missions abroad by 1995 and established full diplomatic relations with 46 African countries (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:250). Prinsloo (2017:10) further confirms that since the democratisation, the South African capital (Pretoria) became one of the most sought-after diplomatic capitals in the world. By March 1999 for instance, formal diplomatic relations had been established with 164 countries and more than 70 international agencies (Prinsloo, 2017:10).

However, following the post-apartheid reintegration into world politics, South Africa faced serious challenges on both the African continent and in the international arena. There were expectations of a new role in a marginalised Africa and an appeal for greater involvement in diplomacy and peace support operations in various African countries confronted with widespread internal conflict, like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. There were calls for intervention in the economic collapse and human rights violations in Zimbabwe. These are just a few examples of the complexities that placed demands on the country’s approach to its foreign affairs (Du Plessis, 2005:119). Internationally, South Africa had to deal with pending reforms at the UN, the countries emergence as a middle-power as part of the Global South as well as China’s dramatic rise as a superpower and world leader (Du Plessis, 2005:119–120).

Officially, South Africa perceived its role in global governance as that of contributing to the transformation of a global system that has become increasingly based on uneven power
relations (Naidu, 2015:3). Mills (cited in Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:429) points out that during the
democratic transition in the early 1990s, there were four assumptions about South Africa's
foreign policy:

- Firstly, that government would develop a coherent set of foreign policy goals with a
  strategy to achieve these;
- Secondly, that morality, in particular an emphasis on human rights, would occupy the
  centre stage of the country's foreign policy, in contrast to the apartheid past;
- Thirdly, that South Africa would, in the age of globalisation, offer an exportable model
  of development to the rest of the continent; and,
- Lastly, that South Africa would provide a leadership role in Southern Africa and the
  broader African continent.

Moreover, the South African government had, according to Neethling (2011:37), openly
undertaken to:

- Actively engage in efforts to secure international peace and security, promote
disarmament, prevent genocide, restrict the proliferation of arms and secure a new
world security compact through the UN as part of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), AU, SADC, the Commonwealth and other
multilateral fora;
- Promote multilateralism to secure a rules-based international system;
- Promote the democratisation and reform of the UN system and the Bretton Woods
Institutions, for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank;
- Promote the agenda of the South through South-South cooperation and North-South
partnerships;
- Eradication of poverty through the attainment of the millennium development goals
(MDG) by 2015; and,
- Through the implementation of agreements such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Doha Development Agenda, the Monterrey Finance for Development, World
Conference against Racism and the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
play a meaningful role in the post-Cold War order.

Importantly, the South African government’s focus shifted to a “developmental foreign policy”
that according to Prinsloo (2017:10), “… could be understood as a revisionist foreign policy,
in that it strove for partnerships between developing countries to vigorously reshape the global
agenda to incorporate development issues”. The first partners that were considered were
South Africa’s neighbours and the broader SADC community and the countries that supported the ANC during the liberation struggle, the majority of them in Africa.

### 4.4.2 An African agenda

All post-apartheid governments, from that of President Mandela, through the Mbeki presidency and even during the brief caretaker term of President Kgalema Motlanthe, according to Landsberg (2010:289) “pursued a domestically-driven foreign policy” that stressed the values of *Ubuntu* and human rights (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:429). In addition, they were also a core element in President Mbeki’s African Renaissance project in the form of Millennium Partnership for the Africa Recovery Programme (Pityana, 2001), which crystallised into New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Geldenhuys, 2015:48–49). During the Mbeki administration (1999 to 2008), South Africa’s foreign policy was increasingly shaped by an “African Agenda”, which prioritised democratic governance, peace and security and accelerated economic growth (Prinsloo, 2017:14).

Most importantly, President Mbeki himself played a fundamental role in transforming the Organisation of African Unity into the AU between 1999 and 2002. Moreover, President Mbeki also prioritised the right for the AU to intervene against military coup d’état’s and, in cases of egregious human rights abuses (Prinsloo, 2017:14). However, it was particularly during the Mbeki period that the idealism of the Mandela era collided with issues of African solidarity, as witnessed in Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards President Robert Mugabe’s dictatorship in Zimbabwe (Anthony *et al.*, 2015:6). Anthony *et al.* (2015:6) suggest that this questionable and precarious relationship put strain on the South African government’s relations with many in the Euro-American world because it was perceived that the South African government carelessly chose African solidarity over principles of democracy and human rights.

Matthee (2016:18), however, cautions that the international environment that President Mbeki (and other later South African presidents) had to deal with, was significantly different compared to the Mandela presidency. Global power had moved in China’s direction and Beijing had furthermore become increasingly influential and involved in Africa. Besides, Qobo and Nyathi (2016:432) suggest that the sharp turn in the South African government’s foreign policy to pursue what must be referred to as “unprincipled pragmatism” occurred mainly after President Mbeki made way for Jacob Zuma, who was elected as South Africa’s fourth president in 2009.
4.4.3 The Zuma presidency (2009–2017)

The foreign policy arena that President Zuma entered into in 2009 was one where the South African government was embracing South-South cooperation, consolidating the Africa agenda and increasingly emphasised economic diplomacy with new rising powers (Anthony et al., 2015:7). The incandescent ideas that were a trademark of Mbeki’s presidency, however, dimmed under President Zuma, with the centre of gravity of foreign policy thinking shifting to the ANC party headquarters in Luthuli House, which came out with antagonistic foreign policy positions towards the West (Qobo & Dube, 2015:151). Proof of this anti-Western, particularly anti-USA paranoia, was a policy document called A Better Africa in a Better and Just World, that set the parameters for foreign policy discussions at the ANC’s policymaking NGC during October 2015 (Matthee, 2016:15).

A central element from the outset of the Zuma administration’s foreign policy was to assert the link between domestic socio-economic priorities and South Africa’s IR (Alves & Sidiripoulus, 2010). Prinsloo (2017:14) argues that whereas President Mbeki sought leadership at AU level, President Zuma’s approach gave South Africa greater exposure and influence at the continental level. President Zuma’s administration further pursued a national interest-driven foreign policy, which according to Landsberg (2010:289) “… has proved little more than conjecture and supposition”. Qobo and Dube (2015:151) surmise that during the Zuma administration, foreign policy tilted acutely towards countries such as China and Russia. Cilliers (2017:221) concurs with the statement by submitting that despite the continued strength of economic, social and cultural ties with many countries in the West, South Africa strategically sided with the other BRICS countries, specifically China and Russia. This approach was confirmed in the foreword of the Draft White Paper on the Republic of South Africa’s foreign policy approved by the South African cabinet on 5 December 2012, which inter alia declared that (DIRCO, 2012:1):

“In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest”.

Prinsloo (2017:14) argues that the most important shift in the South African government’s foreign policy under President Zuma was ending the frosty and hostile relationship that developed between President Mbeki and Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos during Mbeki’s tenure. President dos Santos had been president of Angola, an oil-rich ex-Portuguese
Angola was under the top seven oil and gas producing countries in the world, according to the 2009 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) crude oil production statistics presented in Figure 4.6.

![Figure 4.6: OPEC 2009 crude oil production (EIA, 2009)](image)

However, during the Dos Santos presidency, the president apparently assisted his daughter, Isabel dos Santos, among others, with four construction contracts worth over US$22 billion to become Africa’s wealthiest woman amidst other allegations of the Angolan presidential family’s capture of state assets, including state-owned oil reserves (De Morais, 2018:1–7). The contracts of his daughter have recently been nullified by his successor and once close confidant, Genl. Joao Lourenco, according to the *Maka Angola* (De Morais, 2018:1–2).

President Zuma’s drive to normalise state-to-state relations between South Africa and Angola, however, seems dubious and questionable, specifically given the facts pertaining to his family’s and collaborators’ involvement in oil and mining activities in Angola and the rest of Africa and serious allegations of state capture and corruption against him in South Africa. The cosy relationships between Presidents Zuma and Dos Santos, can be seen as an example of how resources, and in this instance oil, became a lucrative attraction that were used under the
4.5 Similarities and differences between the foreign policies of the South African and Chinese governments

After considering the development of recent foreign policies of both the South African and Chinese governments, a clear trend of convergence can be seen. Based on a number of similarities, which are discussed next, it is clear that the Sino–South African relationship is built on more than purely friendly and cordial relations. Deeply entrenched narratives are guiding the intense and deep-rooted international cooperation between the two states. The attributes of strategic partnerships, which was presented in Chapter 3, are indeed present in the diplomatic relationship that started in 1998 between the two countries. However, significant differences, that also need consideration, are also prevalent.

4.5.1 Similarities

The South African and the Chinese governments share many similar objectives with regard to strategic multilateral issues and the need for the reform of international multilateral political (e.g. UNSC), economic and financial architecture (e.g. IMF and World Bank) (Sithole, 2015:54). The fast growth of the collective South Africa-China friendship and the broad range of strategic collaborations since formal diplomatic recognition in 1998, suggests strong commonality in the following shared national interests (Shelton, 2014:18–22):

4.5.1.1 Government

Both South Africa and China, with other developing countries, share and promote ideological interests embracing a South-South solidarity underpinned by the philosophical constructs of the 1955 Bandung Conference’s vision or cooperation in counter-global injustice. The narrative underpinning South Africa’s foreign policy foundations of peace, stability and development is intimately related to redefining the power structures through which continental and ultimately global governance arrangements are developed to reflect the changing structure of the international system (Naidu, 2015:4). Party-to-party relations also thrived since 1998 as the SACP initially and later the ANC and the CPC maintained closer ties and harboured cordial relationships (Alden & Wu, 2014:11; Sithole, 2015:54).

Global restructuring features as a key foreign policy objective of both governments, outlined initially in 2001 and consolidated in the CSPA of 2010 (Alden & Wu, 2014:12). In Pretoria’s view, the reordering of the global system entailed strengthening the rules-based focus, aligned
to a just and equitable world order (Naidu, 2015:3). At a political level, South African behaviour in the realm of IR in recent years suggests a shift away from western norms (Anthony et al., 2015:11) and a closer association with counterparts in the Global South. Anthony et al. (2015:11), however, suggest that this deliberate shift on the South African side, especially during the Zuma era, had benefits and disadvantages domestically as well as internationally.

The positive expressions of mutual support have, according to Alden and Wu (2014:12), given concrete meaning through four multilateral fora in particular, namely the UNSC, FOCAC, BRICS and the G-20. South Africa is currently the co-chair of FOCAC (2010–2018) of the tri-annual ministerial meeting that highlights areas of cooperation and growth in China–Africa relations (Alden & Wu, 2014). This is confirmed by Naidu (2015:3), augmenting the argument that South Africa wants to promote the interests of developing countries with regard to poverty reduction, debt relief and the democratisation of IR. The drive is achieved by assuming a leadership role in multilateral fora such as the AU, the NAM, the G-77+ China, various UN structures and SADC (Naidu, 2015:3–4).

Another similarity is soft power. The reality is that although both the South African and Chinese governments have developed their soft power as a fundamental foreign policy tool, they still struggle to rival established Western powers in most of the concept’s dimensions (Stuenkel, 2016:99). Yet, China has built the most elaborate and systematic mechanism for marshalling soft power: the charm offensive covers everything from globally promoting Confucian thought to building networks of friendship with African nations from whom it imports raw materials (Gallarotti, 2016:470). Important though, is the fact that soft power in China is seen as a potent political tool for enhancing national influence: it complements hard power (Zanardi, 2016:431). Zanardi (2016:431) submits that this is enshrined in the concepts of zheng and qi postulated by Sun Zhe in The art of war. Zheng depicts the use of direct forces while qi depicts the use of indirect forces. This is illustrated in the way that the Chinese government launched a vigorous soft offensive through the vehicles of Confucius Institutes (CIs) and its navy (Zanardi, 2016:444) to establish a worldwide presence.

4.5.1.2 Security

Both countries have a common interest in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping to advance international peace and stability, especially in Africa (Shelton, 2014:19). South Africa is a relative newcomer to peace operations—the country only became involved in earnest after the promulgation of the White Paper on South African participation in peace missions in 1999 (Heinecken & Ferreira, as cited in Prinsloo, 2017:15). China also took a keen interest in
participating in UN peace operations, especially since 2003/2004 when it started deploying large numbers of police and armed forces to partake in these operations (Sun, 2014:118).

4.5.1.3 Economy

China’s African experience and capacity makes it a key partner for South Africa in promoting SADC’s integration process and advancing regional economic growth and prosperity (Shelton, 2014:21). Moreover, Alden and Wu (2014:14) point out that the rapid pace of China-South African economic relations is a testament to how far the relationship has progressed over a relative short space of time. In 2008 for example, only a decade after formal diplomatic links had been established, China was South Africa’s primary import and export partner (Davis as cited in Alden & Wu, 2014:14). The most important similarity was the South African government’s initiative, primarily under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry, to reposition itself in the world economy by the establishment of the industrial development zones (IDZ) programme, borrowing extensively on the original SEZ model of the Chinese government that was considered earlier in this chapter. The programme’s main focus was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and the export of value-added commodities (DTI, 2017). Although there are major achievements with the IDZs, serious weaknesses led to policy review and the introduction of a new SEZ policy. The policy review and the new SEZ programme, which began in 2007, was also brought about by the developments in national economic policies and strategies such as the National industrial policy framework, and the New growth path, as well as developments in the global economic environment such as the formation of BRICS (DTI, 2017).

4.5.2 Differences

Nonetheless, Sithole (2015:52) claims that the areas of commonality between the two countries are dwarfed by areas of divergence. South African, which arguably has one of the most liberal and comprehensive constitutions, has committed itself to human rights, democracy and rule of international law and to internationally shared mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts (Sithole, 2015:52). Sithole (2015:57) furthermore indicates that contrary to China, South Africa also has a strong labour movement and worker protection legislation. Qobo (2013:17) points out that the South African government’s longstanding commitment to political liberalism, a human rights culture, a liberal business climate and regulatory transparency places it at odds with countries such as China. The Chinese government, guided by the policy imperatives of the CPC, remains critical and careful on the democratisation of the market, deepening of democracy and the empowerment of the individual and civil society.
China’s stance remains that principles such as democracy and human rights in particular, are internal affairs of sovereign and independent states (Sithole, 2015:52).

4.6 The evolution of bilateral ties between post-apartheid South Africa and China

China within 12 years (1998 to 2010) elevated the bilateral relationship with South Africa from ordinary diplomatic ties established in 1998 between the two states to the most important strategic partnership in 2010.

Practically, this meant a partnership agreement in 2000, to a programme of cooperation on the deepening of the strategic partnership between China and South Africa on 23 June 2006, followed by a strategic partnership during 2008 and the finalisation of the CSPA on 24 August 2010 (Sithole, 2015:62–66). The escalation of bilateral cooperation and agreements between the governments of China and South Africa is presented in Figure 4.7. Each level of escalation is discussed below.
4.6.1 Ordinary diplomatic ties

The establishment of formal diplomatic ties in January 1998 between South Africa and China began a period of gradual intensifying bilateral political engagement, mirrored by initial limited economic involvement that was to lay the foundation for the current relationship (Alden & Wu, 2014:7). With the onset of official recognition of China in 1998, South Africa entered a new era characterised by a reorientation of its diplomacy and, increasingly, its economy, away from a sole focus on Europe and North America (Park & Alden, 2013:1). President Nelson Mandela made the first official trip to China in May 1999. During the visit President Mandela bestowed on Chinese President Jiang Zemin a first-class Golden Cape Medal, the highest honour that could be conferred on a foreign leader by South Africa (China Daily, 2013). A series of bilateral declarations and agreements followed, reflecting a deepening of the formal political relationship. Alden and Wu (2014:7) argue that during this period, there was clearly a gap between the formal political aspirations expressed in these public declarations and the actual economic consequences that characterised ties for much of the first decade. This initial period of formal diplomatic engagement between South Africa and China was marked by cordial cooperation and cautious optimism.

4.6.2 The Pretoria Declaration and the 2004–2007 strategic partnership agreement

In April 2000, Presidents Jiang and Mbeki signed the Pretoria Declaration during an official visit by the Chinese president to South Africa (Shelton, 2014:260). The reason for the signing of the declaration was to establish a bi-national commission (BNC) with a more generalised commitment to improve conditions conducive to mutual economic benefit in the form of expanding trade and investment, especially in the areas of natural resources, mining and manufacturing (Huajie cited in Alden & Wu, 2014:7). Relations evolved quickly from the Pretoria Declaration, with the first BNC meeting in December 2001 and the elevation of ties at the second during June 2004 to that of a strategic partnership (DIRCO, 2004).

As part of the strategic partnership agreement, South Africa decided to grant China “market status”, an important step that narrowed the parameters for kinds of trade disputes in terms of WTO criteria (Alden & Wu, 2014:8). This coincided with the opening of negotiations for a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union. The two sides committed themselves to “intensifying” interaction and consultation between their foreign ministries, as well as taking steps to promote agricultural exports and education (Alden & Wu, 2014:8). As President Mbeki’s diplomatic focus during this time was directed at a diverse strategy of continental initiatives, starting with the articulation of the African renaissance in 1998 and NEPAD, whose central aim was to strengthen aid and investment ties with the G-8 countries,
China was, according to Alden and Wu (2014:7) relatively neglected by the South African government during this time.

4.6.3 The events leading up to the CSPA

By 2008, the Chinese government saw new opportunities to strengthen its relationship with their South African counterpart when Kgalema Motlanthe became president (Alden & Wu, 2014:9), albeit for a relative short period of 228 days. South Africa further saw advantages to have deeper ties with China following the global financial crisis in 2008. South Africa observed how resilient China’s economy was during these turbulent times, especially for countries supporting and promoting the more traditional Bretton Woods institutions.

However, when considering for example the South African Revenue Services’ (SARS) trade import and export trade figures between China and South Africa during 2008, which excluded gold and arms data, an interesting picture emerges. As presented in Table 4.1, it is clear that products imported from South Africa to China are in the main natural resources and commodities exported in bulk, while the imported articles from China to South Africa have been value-added and mainly consists of household goods and articles manufactured in China. Ores in bulk of various minerals were exported to China, while cell phones, computers, printers, televisions, electric equipment and clothing were imported from China.

Table 4.1: Top 10 products and articles exported and imported between South Africa and China during 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>TOP 10 PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM SOUTH AFRICA BY CHINA DURING 2008</th>
<th>TOP 10 ARTICLES IMPORTED FROM CHINA BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites</td>
<td>Cell phones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Manganese ores and concentrates</td>
<td>Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Chromium ores and concentrates</td>
<td>Printing machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ferro-alloys</td>
<td>Televisions and video projectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Platinum, unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms</td>
<td>Shoes from rubber or plastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of stainless steel of a width of 600 mm or more</td>
<td>Electric generators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Copper ores and concentrates</td>
<td>Kettles, heaters and hairdryers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Copper waste and scrap</td>
<td>Coal coke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Crude petroleum oils</td>
<td>Bags and suitcases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Polymers or propylene or of olefins, in primary forms</td>
<td>Shoes – leather</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Patel (2009:10–11)
In a speech titled *Defining the strategic partnership between South Africa and China*, Minister Ebrahim Patel (2009:16), South African Minister of Economic Development, at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development at the Gordon Institute of Business Science of the University of Pretoria on 23 November 2009 motivated that in these challenges and suggestions, both South Africa and China have enormous gains to make—South Africa because of its place on the African continent and China because of its interest in Africa.

Minister Patel continued to argue, focusing on how to remedy the trend presented in Table 4.1, that China could do so in ways that can complement South Africa’s efforts to lift the African continent from a decades-old pattern of simply being the raw materials provider to the world. These remarks by Minister Patel, almost six months after President Zuma had been elected as president and a year before the finalisation of the CSPA, paved the way for more structured, symmetrical and improved economic cooperation and relations between South Africa and China. Fundamentally, Minister Patel called for efforts to ensure that the then trade structure in which South Africa supplied raw materials and Europe and North America exported manufactured goods back to the country, should not be replicated (Alden & Wu, 2014:9).

An interesting fact observable from Figure 4.8 considering the trade between Africa and the US and China from 2000 to 2013 came about almost at the same time as minister Patel’s remarks. China in 2009 overtook the US in terms of the quantum in trade with Africa. Since then, the trade with China continued to grow, while trade volumes to the US (and the EU) declined drastically. Trade volume between China and Africa hit a record in 2009 when the country emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner when bilateral trade increased 43.5% year-on-year to US$114.8 billion (China Daily, 2010:1).
In 2008, 82% of the imports from Africa were mineral products, while just more than 50% of the exports from China to Africa were value-added products like mechanical and electrical products according to Figure 4.9. During this year (2008), Figure 4.9 also provides statistics that indicate that South Africa was the biggest importer from China on the continent with almost a fifth of the bilateral trade (19.1%). The reason for Minister Patel’s call was therefore not without reason. Another important statistic is that Africa only received 3.66% of the total worldwide export from China, while Asia (38.6%), the EU (20.23%) and the US (17.67%) received the bulk. Almost similar statistics prevail in terms of the global import statistics to China.

However, while trade was still dominated by Chinese exports of finished products and Chinese imports of African resources as confirmed above, the investment picture in some countries is starting to reflect Chinese FDI into manufacturing, media, property and services (SAIIA, 2009:7). The World Resources Institute, according to SAIIA (2015:7), drawing on the MOFCOM 2012 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, nonetheless observed that Africa represented only 4% of China’s total global outward FDI stock, with South Africa receiving 22%, Zambia and Nigeria 9%, Algeria, Angola and Sudan 6% and the rest of the continent 42%.

The situation in the run-up to the finalisation of the CSPA can therefore be summarised as follows: Although the bilateral relations between the South African and Chinese government
grew expeditiously, serious challenges still existed on two levels. Firstly, South Africa in the main was an exporter of raw materials to China and an importer of value-added goods from China. Secondly, despite China’s intense involvement in Africa and with countries like South Africa, the investment and volume of trade were still minute compared to the rest of the world. Could the finalisation of the CSPA between the governments of China and South Africa address such an asymmetrical relationship? Or, was South Africa’s cosy involvement with China more focused on the multilateral benefits that could be bestowed on South Africa? These questions are linked to the core of the research question of the study.
Figure 4.9: China’s exports and imports from specific African countries (2008) (World Trade Atlas (Global Trade Information Services))
4.6.4 The finalisation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement

Jacob Zuma’s presidential campaign in the run-up to the 2009 general election, touted the advantages for South Africa of adopting an Asian-style “development state” approach (Alden & Wu, 2014:9). At the invitation of President Jintao, President Zuma had his first state visit to China from 23 to 26 August 2010 (DIRCO, 2010:1). According to DIRCO (2010:1), the presidents “reviewed with satisfaction the progress made in consolidating relations between the two states, had in-depth exchange of views on international and regional issues of mutual interest and reached consensus on a number of major issues”. Recalling the Pretoria Declaration of 2000, the forging of a strategic partnership in 2004 and the Programme of Cooperation on Deepening the Strategic Partnership in 2006 (DIRCO, 2010:1), the two presidents signed what became known as the Beijing Declaration on 24 August 2010. The CSPA was thus presented as an international agreement based on equality, mutual benefit and common development between South Africa and China (DIRCO, 2010).

Reference to the agreement as the Beijing Declaration however, tend to create confusion. During 1995, a first Beijing Declaration was signed in Beijing as the Fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing Declaration. Given the importance of the first declaration, which elevated and promoted women’s rights, very few references in general are made to the Beijing Declaration between South Africa and China in the literature. Because of this, the study refers to the Beijing Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China as the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between South Africa and China.

4.7 Conclusion

The purpose of Chapter 4 was to determine and explain the basis on which South Africa signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 as an example of larger geopolitical shifts and a changing world order since the end of the Cold War. The CSPA evolved from the inception of diplomatic ties in 1998 and was formalised 12 years later as a geopolitical comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and China. By considering the foreign policies of both the South African and Chinese governments, specific trends could be registered, confirming the original objectives of the intention to conclude the CSPA. These objectives included the intensification of bilateral relations promoting the common development of the two countries, to deepen China–Africa cooperation; to strengthen South-South cooperation and, to jointly address global challenges.

Built on Chinese exceptionalism, SEZs became important and strategic geopolitical instruments to structure and develop the most populated state’s economy initially built on the import of bulk
mineral resources and commodities and export of value-added goods. The growing resource and commodity needs of China necessitated new horizons, which led to greater involvement in Africa, using primarily soft power to pursue the Chinese Dream as conceptualised by President Xi Jinping since 2012. By adopting multilateralism as a post-Cold War policy directive, smaller states like for instance South Africa became important strategic geopolitical partners for China.

South Africa’s remarkable entry into the community of nations in 1994 was a new dawn after colonialism and apartheid. By using the country’s short-lived iconic status, the South African government promoted a strong African agenda, impacting on the transformation of the global system and IGOs like the UN and the AU. Two central tenets of South Africa’s foreign policy derived from the Bandung Conference in 1955, namely Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity in the main informed the objectives of the foreign policy. South Africa’s ambitions to play a notable role in the international society were affected by the country’s privileged involvement in FOCAC and BRICS. The election of Zuma as president of South Africa in 2009 initiated an important drive between the internal socio-economic priorities and the international exposure of the country.

Despite differences on human rights, labour movements and union matters, similarities in terms of defence and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping, specifically in Africa, economic cohesiveness impacting on worldwide trade and investment, an anti-Western campaign and a shared pragmatic socialist ideology between the South African and Chinese governments, created the basis for the finalisation of the CSPA. The next chapter ascertains and describes the primary reasons why South Africa signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 onwards.
CHAPTER 5: THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR THE FORMATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

5.1 Introduction

The CSPA was signed on 24 August 2010 in Beijing, China by the then heads of state of South Africa and China. The crux of this particular partnership agreement was the national interests of both the South African and Chinese governments (DIRCO, 2010), namely:

- to further strengthen bilateral relations promoting the common development of the two countries;
- to deepen China–Africa cooperation;
- to strengthen South–South cooperation; and
- to jointly address global challenges.

The anticipated direct outcomes were to further strengthen and deepen the existing amicable exchanges and cooperation in the political, economic, trade and investment, people-to-people, cultural and social sectors, as well as to influence international and regional affairs. Sithole (2015:54), however, maintains that the initial relationship between the South African and Chinese governments was beset with inconsistencies that were difficult to settle and that required a concerted effort to address, like for instance the South African government’s stance on human rights and the policy on black economic empowerment. Challenges and uncertainties between the two countries necessitated that formal relations had to be structured to influence and build an enabling environment conducive to the challenges and realities of the post-Cold War era. During the years leading up to the signing of the CSPA, both China and South Africa were rising politically and economically, following the end of the Cold War and apartheid. Yet, their respective political and economic models and their geopolitical realities were vastly different. Given these discrepancies, this chapter focuses on ascertaining and describing the reason(s) why the South African government entered into such a far-reaching and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with China. The next figure positions the chapter within the larger study.
Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 layout: The primary reasons for the formation and continuation of the CSPA

- The factors influencing the formation of strategic partnerships between states
  - The (political) environment uncertainty
  - Strategic fit
  - System principle
  - Elite involvement
5.2 The factors influencing the formation of strategic partnerships between states

There are four factors that are considered to affect or shape the formation of strategic partnerships (Wilkins, 2008:363–364), namely:

i. the (political) environment,
ii. the strategic fit,
iii. the system principle, and,
iv. the involvement of the elite.

The next section aims to determine and describe how these four factors influenced the formation of the CSPA.

5.2.1 The (political) environment

Foreign policy is a crucial element of IR for every state. In a globalised world loaded with interstate intrigue and challenges, the imperatives of sound diplomatic policies are essential to build and maintain strategic international partnerships. In this regard, analysts like Neethling (2017:39) argues that South Africa’s foreign policy drifted away from an initial appeal to Western powers towards the establishment of new relationships with the Global South in the post-Cold War era, in particular with Asia and Latin America. Neethling (2017:39) in addition says that “… the favouring of the BRICS partnership and a rising tone of anti-Western sentiments have increasingly been evidenced in South Africa’s contemporary foreign policy, which are of major significance to the nature and direction of its economic-diplomatic strategy”.

Geldenhuys (2015:124–125) submits that strategic partnerships, as foreign policy instruments, typically emerge in reaction to uncertainty in the international environment. Such uncertainty manifests as a security dilemma. In addition, Prinsloo (2017:34) reasons that “… in international relations, the security dilemma is understood as a two-level predicament in relations between states or other actors”. It can also be seen as a pendulum that oscillates between the motives, intentions and capabilities on the one side and the most rational way of responding on the other (Prinsloo, 2017:34). Adding to this, Shiping Tang (2009:596) advocates the bottom line of a security dilemma to be “actions and reactions” viz-a-viz “material and psychological regulators”.

At the heart of the security dilemma is the notion that security is a comparative concept: All actors cannot have more of it (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2010:350). Or, as Shimko (2005:123) fittingly motivates: A security dilemma is the problems nations face when the actions taken to make one nation feel more secure unavoidably make other nations feel less secure. The uncertainty that in essence affected the Sino–South African relationship after 1994, and also manifested as a
security dilemma, can be presented at two levels: A new post-Cold War international society and Taiwan’s relations with South Africa during and just after the end of apartheid.

5.2.1.1 A new post-Cold War international society for China and South Africa

Both the governments of China and South Africa were weighing up their options on how to conduct and enhance their international engagements with other states after the end of apartheid and the end of the Cold War in a reconfigured globalised world order. South Africa perceived its role in global governance as that of contributing to the balancing and transformation of a globalised post-Cold War international system (Naidu, 2015:3). Contrary to that, China’s position can be perceived as unique: It had one foot in the developing world and another in the developed world, with a permanent seat in the UNSC (Konings, 2007:341). Yet, relations between China and South Africa changed from the time of the end of apartheid to the conclusion of the CSPA in 2010 (Matambo, 2014:32). Importantly, Matambo infers that “[t]he two countries have helped to shape the international system and have also been shaped by it”.

5.2.1.1.1 South Africa

Democracy was established in 1994 after decades of colonialism, white minority rule and an apartheid regime in South Africa, which led to wide-ranging sanctions and isolation. But, the post-apartheid society faced an array of challenges and soon realised the necessity and importance of international partners to overcome a burdensome legacy (Grimm et al., 2014:9). While the Mandela-administration with great success re-integrated post-apartheid South Africa into the global community, President Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, directed his efforts mainly to Africa’s development (Mpungose, 2018:1). According to Mpungose (2018:1), the most notable achievements of President Zuma in the international arena, who succeeded President Motlanthe (who succeeded Mbeki), were:

- joining the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping in 2011;
- the strengthening of South Africa’s relationship with China; and,
- the persistent call for a more represented and equitable governance structure in global multilateral IGOs like the WTO and the UNSC.

From a regional perspective South Africa, especially during the Zuma presidency, evolved from being a strategic and intellectual founder of key institutions such as the AU on the continent to a multilateral actor with vested interests aligned with emerging powers, for instance BRICS (Mpungose, 2018:5). The South African government also established itself as one of the significant role players in the FOCAC. Multilateralism became an indispensable element of the foreign policy objectives of the South African government. However, one area of potential foreign policy change that has been identified by scholars such as Anthony et al. (2015:7–9), was a shift
in South Africa's voting patterns at the UN. Where it used to follow mainly Euro-American patterns up to 1998, the BRICS allies—in particular Russia and China, who hold permanent seats on the UNSC—seemed to influence South Africa’s voting patterns in the UN (Anthony et al., 2015:7).

Nevertheless, South Africa’s distinctive position in Africa coupled with its allure in global affairs and a resource-based economy, made it a logical consideration as a potential partner for the world’s most populous and prominent emerging giant, China (Alden & Wu, 2014:27). With this as background, Mpungose (2018:3) avers that South Africa’s partnership with China could be perceived as beneficial for the coordination of common interests, which included advancing national interest, South-South cooperation and the AU’s Agenda 2063, which is a strategic framework for Africa’s socio-economic transformation.

5.2.1.1.2 China

China on the other hand, was reaping the benefits of the “Opening up and reform” policies and the positive impact of the economic liberalisation on the Chinese society started by Deng Xiaoping since the late 1970s (Dillon, 2015:246). Analysts like for instance Du Toit (2015:4) nonetheless aver that the Chinese success story of the least 30 years in the main was based on the availability of abundant and cheap labour. Consideration should also be given to important factors such as the emergence of globalisation, the digital revolution, lower capital transaction costs and the availability of large numbers of well-trained Chinese graduates, as well as access to capital (Du Toit, 2015:4). The role of the Chinese government, however, remains the most important factor. According to Du Toit (2015:4), the mere fact that the government commands a large portion of national assets and income and that it is not subjected so much to the pressures faced by other democratic governments, created a unique ability and capacity to act.

But then again, China had resisted the global fall of the communist political system by violent means while liberalising its economy, making it initially a difficult cooperation partner (Grimm et al., 2014:9). The Tiananmen Square protest in Beijing in June 1989 after the death of pro-reform Communist leader Hu Yaobang from natural causes, was one of the most traumatic and controversial chapters of China’s modern history (Dillon, 2015 272). The protests led by students with the sympathy of other groups were caused by growing economic disparity, rising inflation and party corruption and resulted in a widespread government crackdown on the night of 3–4 June 1989, with estimates ranging from a few hundred to thousands of demonstrators that were killed and injured by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Dillon, 2015:272–273; SAIIA, 2009:12). Despite Deng's pivotal role in generating the economic impetus that dragged millions out of poverty and paved the way for China to become a global super power, he cannot be absolved of blame for his role in the massacre (Dillon, 2015:276).
The Chinese government nonetheless continued to implement especially economic reform measures and focused heavily on the rural areas. Statistics provided by the UN MDG Report (2015) as presented in Figure 5.2 paint an interesting picture. The report, according to China’s State Council Information Office (2016:1) reveals that the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in China fell by half from 61% in 1990 to below 30% in 2002, and continued the trend to 4.2% in 2014. In addition, more than 770 million people were raised from poverty in China since 1978 according to Figure 5.2, which accounted for 70% of the world’s total up to 2015. Although China was driving a strategic global agenda and its emergence as one of the key players in the international arena, addressing domestic issues like unemployment and poverty, remained a priority. Analysts like Sithole (2015:41), however, claims that despite China’s phenomenal economic growth and dominance to become the world’s second biggest economy, China remained a developing country with a notable section of its population poor and on par with other developing countries.

![Poverty levels in China’s rural areas according to the current rural poverty standard](image)

**Figure 5.2:** Poverty levels in China’s rural areas according to the rural poverty standard (2015) (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2016)
China in sum had three long-term diplomatic priorities:

i. The first priority was to safeguard the Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, which promoted unification with Taiwan where cross-straits rapprochement was taking place (PMG, 2010:2);

ii. The second diplomatic priority was economic development, with the aim of progressing China as a great power (PMG, 2010:2). The outcome of this was economic prosperity that replaced ideology and a focus on developing a "socialist market economy", or as presented earlier, socialism with Chinese characteristics; and,

iii. The third priority was the achievement of international status as China wanted to be respected as a great power with global influence (PMG, 2010:2). Although there was (and still is) a major challenge from the US to prevent it, the Chinese authorities were hesitant to displace the US as the world’s biggest economy. Domestic priorities, as well as challenges and the need to divert resources to national development, were more important than global pride. China rather supported a multipolar world in which the hegemon of the US was confined. South Africa and China shared the uniform goal of economic development and political acceptability (Matambo, 2014:66).

5.2.1.2 The “two Chinas dilemma”

The uncertainty about how to deal with the diplomatic relations that existed before 1994 between South Africa and the Republic of China, generally known as Taiwan, was the second conundrum. Williams and Hurst (2018) show that when President Mandela took office in May 1994 he was immediately confronted with vexing foreign policy complications, for example how to balance South Africa’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan and China’s “One China” principle. In 1971, UN Resolution 2758 declared that there is “… only one China in the world, and that the government of China’s is the sole legal government that represents the whole China” (Lin, 2017:1).

Relations between Taiwan and South Africa were initially established in 1949, soon after the NP gained power in 1948. After the Chinese revolution led by Mao Zedong in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang leadership of Genl. Chiang Kai-Shek was exiled to Taiwan (Matambo, 2014:52). The NP government chose to maintain diplomatic ties with the nationalists of China, who moved to Taiwan instead of the newly established PRC, which was built on communist doctrine (Park & Alden, 2013:2). Apartheid South Africa and Taiwan developed solid political and economic relations based on shared anti-communist, nationalist ideologies and the pariah status of both states within the international society (Anthony et al., 2015:1). In response to what Geldenhuys (1984:42) calls “Western indifference” during the latter part of apartheid government in South Africa, the country further strengthened ties with Taiwan, which led Prime Minister PW Botha to pay a formal visit to Taiwan in October 1980.
As labour and input costs increased in Taiwan during this time, companies shifted their manufacturing base abroad (Anthony et al., 2015:2). South Africa became a lucrative destination for Taiwanese investors, who had invested over 100 million US dollars by 1987, positioned primarily in the textile industry at the fringes of the apartheid homelands, which were close to available cheap labour (Anthony et al., 2015:2). Taiwanese businesses were further supported by South African government economic developmental programmes and incentives (Hartley, 2014:108). The political and economic shifts in South Africa in the mid-1990s nonetheless had an important effect on these tendencies, despite President Mandela’s assurance that the Taiwanese investors would be able to continue their business. The Mandela administration initially did not take sides: Instead, its approach was an unprecedented attempt at dual recognition (Williams & Hurst, 2018). There were several reasons for this attempt. Firstly, Taiwan was South Africa’s sixth largest trading partner and a major investor in South Africa. Secondly, Taiwan had donated 10 million US dollars to the ANC election campaign in 1993, and thirdly, President Mandela was uncertain about the future of China considering the earlier collapse of communism and the impact it had on the USSR (Williams & Hurst, 2018). A fourth reason for keeping up relations with ROC was the narrative that Taiwan was the only truly democratic country in Asia and that SA in wishing to promote democracy in the South needed to support countries such as this.

Yet, the dual approach or “two Chinas dilemma” as it was labelled, left the ANC government in a predicament (Matambo, 2014:68). China became more adamant after the election in 1994, urging the ANC-led South African government to recognise Beijing and abandon Taipei. The internal debate in the ANC favouring formal relations with China eventually tilted the argument in favour of China and prevailed over President Mandela’s middle-of-the-road approach. After two and half years of contemplating a dual recognition approach, President Mandela announced in 1996 that South Africa would terminate formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and establish formal relations with China.

In a step that can be regarded as the normalisation of South African diplomatic relations, Pretoria formalised diplomatic allegiance with China in January 1998 (Grimm et al., 2014:6). Grimm et al. (2014:6) surmise that in line with the usual requirements of China, South Africa’s new diplomatic relations with China entailed an official renouncement of ties with Taiwan and the recognition of the “one China” policy according to which Taiwanese sovereignty was viewed as illegitimate. Besides the staggering economic rise over three decades since 1978, the potential scope of having China as a partner and ally was overwhelmingly obvious: China was a permanent member of the UNSC and had a population of more than 1.3 billion people, while Taiwan, with a population of 23 million, was internationally almost marginalised (Grimm et al., 2014:25). The Chinese government achieved its goal in terms of the country’s foreign policy prescripts, but could not
circumvent the positive trade and economic realities between South Africa and Taiwan, which also affected Hong Kong and Macau. A special resolve had to be found.

Clearly overshadowed by the newly established Pretoria–Beijing axis, Taiwan maintained a set of institutions that actively pursued mostly bilateral trade with South Africa (Anthony et al., 2015:2). This included official bodies such as the Economic Division of the Taipei Liaison Office, Taiwan’s official delegation to South Africa. Moreover, South African interests in Taiwan, are still represented by the Liaison Office of South Africa in Taipei (DIRCO, 2018).

These actions and reactions that led to a security dilemma between South Africa and China, were certainly infused by material and psychological regulators, driven by both South African and Chinese modalities. But, as Wilkins (2008:364) explains: desirable partners are assessed on the basis of mutual interests (and possibly shared values or ideology) for an overall potential strategic fit. What were the worthwhile capabilities or benefits that South Africa and China brought to this reputed partnership by way of a strategic fit?

5.2.2 Strategic fit

Adelle and Kotsopoulus (2017:236–237) fittingly aver that “The more closely common interests, values and goals align, the more cohesive the partnership and the stronger the incentive for participants to cooperate to achieve mutual payoffs”. The strategic fit that guided the common interest and shared values of the two developing nations were based on shared historical values and the advent of democracy in South Africa during 1994. The commitment by senior leaders of the ANC and CPC representing the South African and Chinese governments focusing on the geopolitical narratives of multilateralism and the democratisation of international relations encapsulated in the CSPA, based on common interests and shared values paved the way for enhanced Sino–South African relations. Moreover, these alignments of the common interests and shared values also affected especially South Africa’s foreign policies.

There was (and still is) a great admiration in the most prominent South African government circles regarding the Chinese authority’s successes with transforming its economy into an international powerhouse in less than three decades (Park & Alden, 2013:16). Confirmation of this is the fact that South Africans of all walks of life, along with leaders and people from every level and fragment of society, frequent China. However, Harvey (2012:290) for instance registers a concern about President Motlanthe’s “… long standing infatuation with China”. President Motlanthe, as well as his successor Jacob Zuma, have been some of the leading voices for strong relations with China. President Zuma’s repeated mantra that “South Africa must learn from China, not just economically, but politically” (Johnson, 2015:131), was a clear indication that the ANC and one of its alliance partners, the SACP and the South African government per se were particularly
impressed and supportive of the Chinese government’s policies and political ideology of socialism. The features encapsulated in the CSPA were an indication of:

- Firstly, the ANC government’s commitment to recognising China’s legitimate rise, as well as the CPC’s doctrines and policies;
- Secondly, the CPC’s close political connections with the ANC and the acknowledgement of the importance of the South African government’s role on the African continent, as well as on global platforms in the post-Cold War order;
- Thirdly, to enhance coordination in promoting common preferences built in the main on shared cultural underpinnings and values influenced by national interests in the realignment of the post-Cold War global order to create a more symmetrical and equitable multipolar international society using foreign policy tools like the CSPA; and,
- Lastly, to provide effective and efficient mechanisms and structures to manage progress, coupled with areas of dispute and discontent in order to steadily augment the inclusive bilateral relationship.

5.2.2.1 China and South Africa: A socio-economic comparison

The diverse and multi-facetted South African society had a population of over 56.5 million people as per the 2011 census and consists of a wide variety of cultures, languages and religious beliefs (Brand South Africa, 2015). On the other hand, China, with an estimated population of 1 379 302 771 in July 2017, is the most populated state in the world (CIA, 2018). By just considering the population of the respective countries, some analysts like Sithole (2015:2) perceive South Africa and China as “… an odd or asymmetric pair”. Consideration is therefore given in the next section to some of the socio-economic realities of both nations.

African people are in the majority and constitute almost 80% of South Africa’s populace. The coloured and white people are both close to 9.0%, while the Indian or Asian populations stand at 2.5%. The 11 official languages of the country according to the 2011 estimate were isiZulu (22.7%), isiXhosa (16%), Afrikaans (13.5%), English (9.6%), Sepedi (9.1%), Setswana (8%), Sesotho (7.6%), Xitsonga (4.5%), siSwati (2.5%), Tshivenda (2.4%), isiNdebele (2.1%), sign language (0.5%) and other languages, 1.6% (CIA, 2018). However, despite English being the mother tongue of less than 10% of the population, it has become the *lingua franca* of South Africa since 1994, especially in government and academic circles. Religious preferences are further, in terms of a 2011 estimate, Protestant (36.6%) (Zionist Christian 11.1%, Pentecostal 8.2%, Methodist 6.8%, Dutch Reformed 6.7%, Anglican 3.8%), Catholic (7.1%), Muslim (1.5%), charismatic Christian (36%), while 15.1% is agnostic or atheist (CIA, 2018). The South African society can therefore be presented as a potpourri of different cultures, languages and religions that all contribute to a heterogeneous, multi-cultural and diverse society.
The Chinese government officially recognises 56 ethnic groups, consisting of Han Chinese (91.6%), Zhuang (1.3%) and other minorities (7.1%) which include Hui, Manchu, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai, Korean, Hani, Li, Kazakh and Dai groupings (CIA, 2018). Standard Chinese or Mandarin, commonly known as Putonghua based on the Beijing dialect, is the sole official language, while Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan and Hakka dialects are considered minority languages (CIA, 2018). Statistics indicate that 52.2% of the Chinese population is unaffiliated in terms of religion and is officially classified as atheist. However, religions like for example Buddhism (18.2%), Christianity (5.1%), Muslim (1.8%), folk religion (21.9%), Hindu and Jewish (both less than 0.1%) as well as Daoist (Taoist) (0.7%), are prevalent in the Chinese society. In the same vein, Hutchings (2001:357) asserts that the variety of religious experiences in China, including Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, as well as Christianity, Islam and Lamaist Buddhism, remains huge as a source of personal belief and devotion and continue to retain a hold over the popular mind of the Chinese society.

Table 5.1 is at a glance additional testimony of some of the distinct differences considering geopolitical realities. In 2013, the unemployment rate in China was stabilising at 4%, compared to South Africa’s almost 25%. Further, South Africa consists of 18.5% of the geographical area of China with a coast line of 14 500 km, compared to South Africa’s 2 798 km. Given the size and scale of the stark differences between the two countries, Sithole (2015:2) suggests that “… the gargantuan PRC dwarfs minnow South Africa”.

Table 5.1: Illustration of asymmetry between China and South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Eastern Asia, bordering the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea and South China Sea between North Korea and Vietnam</td>
<td>On the southern tip of the African continent, bordering both the Indian and Atlantic oceans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>6 596 960 sq. km</td>
<td>1 219 090 sq.km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>14 500 km</td>
<td>2 798 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>Extremely diverse, from tropical in the south to subarctic in the north</td>
<td>Mostly semi-arid, but subtropical along the east coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government type</td>
<td>Communist state (Socialist)</td>
<td>Republic (Democratic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expenditure: USUS$ 2.251 trillion</td>
<td>Expenditure: USUS$: 105.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military forces (2013)</td>
<td>2 285 000 (active) 800.000 (reserve)</td>
<td>39.445 (active) 12.300 (reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (2013)</td>
<td>4.100%</td>
<td>24.900%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence date</td>
<td>221 BC (unification under the Qin or Ch’in Dynasty) 31 May 1910 (Union of South Africa)</td>
<td>1 January 1912 (Dynasties replaced by the Republic of China) 31 May 1961 (South Africa) 1 October 1949 (PRC established) 27 April 1994 (First democratic government)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own construct based on Central Intelligence Agency (2015)

On the substantive matter of government type, a notable example is South Africa’s status as a constitutional democracy while China is a self-avowed socialist state governed by a communist party (Sithole, 2015:58). South Africa’s constitution, adopted in 1996, have been labelled as one of the most liberal democratic constitutions in the world. Based on this, McGowan (2005:279) asserts that the South African constitution was “… rapidly developing a democratic political culture based on respect for human rights”.

5.2.2.2 The issue of human rights

The post-apartheid South African government’s foreign policy ideals were grounded in the involvement of the ANC as the pivotal actor in the anti-apartheid global campaign, which evolved around a struggle for human rights, democracy and majority rule in South Africa (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:249). Human rights were so important to the ANC after the atrocities committed during the apartheid regime from 1948 to 1994 that Mandela as early as 1993, during the transition to democracy, declared according to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2006:249) that “… human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs”. Notwithstanding the noble intentions of the South African government, the practicalities and reality of being responsible for the administration and governance of a state proved otherwise, both in terms of South Africa’s domestic conduct and international demeanour.

Despite the dominance of the ANC in South African national politics by winning general elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 as well as 2014 with more than a 60% majority, there have been notable increases in public disobedience and protest action. Many of these protest actions were marked by violence, with disgruntled community members attacking government officials and vandalising government and private property. Cronje (2014:62) reveals that by 2010, the South African Police Services (SAPS) reported dealing with more than four incidents of violent protests a day. The stand-offs between SAPS and angered communities and groupings in extreme instances led to confrontations reminiscent of police brutality during apartheid South Africa. One example was the Marikana Massacre.
On 16 August 2012, the SAPS fatally shot 34 striking miners belonging to the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) at Marikana in the North West province, wounding more than 70 others (Cronje, 2014:63; Malala, 2015:100). AMCU was a rival union of the National Union of Mineworkers, which used to be the backbone of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, an alliance partner of the ANC. Cilliers (2017:178) remarks that the unfortunate incident close to the Lonmin platinum mine, “… placed the spotlight squarely on state violence”. The Marikana Massacre, as it has come to be known, drew similar comparisons with the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960, when police opened fire on anti-apartheid protestors, killing 69 people and injuring 180 (Cronje, 2014:63; Malala, 2015:100).

The Marikana Massacre further damaged South Africa’s already tarnished international status as an investment destination, as well as the country’s credibility due to the government’s track record with human rights in the international society. In fact, the South African government, especially during the Zuma presidency, has not always lived up to the core values of its foreign policy built on Ubuntu and multilateralism, as presented earlier. In this regard, four notable examples in South Africa’s conduct in the IR arena can be considered:

- Firstly, the malleability that emanated according to Sithole (2015:49) when, despite South Africa’s affirmation of human rights as a key principle of its foreign policy and relations, diplomatic relations with China took precedence over Taiwan as discussed earlier. China has a terrible human rights record, especially during the reign of the founder of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Mao Zedong. During the “anti-rightist” campaign (1957–1958) and the turbulent period known as the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in China, millions of citizens suffered intense persecution and public abuse. Many were subjected to brutal beatings, torture, imprisonment, forced labour, internal exile or executions, often carried out by mobs under the leadership of the Red Guards or party cadres sanctioned by the communist regime (Cohen, 1987:2).

  Deng Xiaoping, China’s post-Mao leader, publicly pronounced that nearly one million people died by mob action under the rule of the “Gang of Four”, a political bloc aligned to Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution (Zheng, 2015). Importantly, Dillon (2015:xiv) avers that the concept of human rights as it is understood in the twenty-first century did not feature in Deng’s political thinking. Deng Xiaoping, an old fashioned Marxists trained in the Stalin period, according to Dillon (2015:xiv) accepted the argument that “… social problems could ultimately only be solved by revolution”. In spite of various attempts to address the unacceptable practices since Deng Xiaoping became the leader in 1978, the Chinese government is still criticised for human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch (2018:2) for instance contends that since President Xi took office
in March 2013, the Chinese government has tightened its control over society and stepped up its campaign against independent activists, lawyers and others deemed a threat to the CPC.

- Secondly, the South African government’s decision to decline three visa applications in 2009, 2011 and 2014 of his Holiness the Dalai Lama despite previous non-eventful visits to the country in 1996, 1999 and 2004 (Anthony et al., 2015:8–9). The Dalai Lama, who has been in exile in India since 1958, is according to Hutchings (2001:94–95), “… the biggest obstacle to China’s claim to Tibet”. Further, the Dalai Lama is the only leader of a government in exile who enjoys the allegiance of people under Chinese control (Hutchings, 2001:94). Du Toit (2015:3) indicates that Sino–South African relations received negative media coverage after a visa application by the Dalai Lama was denied by the South African government in 2009 to attend an international peace conference. Two other rejected visa applications in 2011 and 2014, calls Du Toit to comment that South Africa’s relations with China was the obvious reason why the visas were denied. Other analysts like Hartley (2014:202), Harvey (2012:289) and Malala (2015:131) considered the refusal to allow the Dalai Lama to officially visit South Africa to be at the behest of China and an attempt to get in favour with and please China. After the Dalai Lama debacle, another political commentator, Max du Preez according to Papenfus (2010:790) asked: “Is this the final sign that the (South African) government has abandoned all pretence of being a moral state where human rights are highly valued?”

- Thirdly, the contradictory decisions during the two terms that South Africa served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (Sithole, 2015:49). South Africa was endorsed by the AU and consequently elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the periods 2007–2008 and 2011–2012 (Prinsloo, 2017:5). South Africa’s vote against action to hold Myanmar accountable for human rights abuses and its change of heart after voting in support of a no-fly zone over Libya during the war against Muammar Gaddafi neglected the values of democracy and human rights entrenched in the South African constitution according to Sithole (2015:49).

- Lastly, South Africa’s conduct in dealing with warrant of arrest for the Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir. South Africa was obligated as a signatory of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to arrest al-Bashir when he attended an AU Summit in June 2015 for crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Sudan between 2003 and 2005 (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:430). In spite of this, some officials, apparently with the support and knowledge of President Zuma and other South African ministers, connived and facilitated al-Bashir’s passage out of the country while a restriction order was in place not to leave South Africa pending an urgent high court application for his arrest (Qobo & Nyati, 2016:430). The way that the South African government dealt with the matter led
Malala (2015:129) to speculate that “There is no doubt that al-Bashir’s escape was deliberate and was orchestrated by the President of our republic himself”.

The examples discussed above clearly indicate a diversion from the principles and imperatives of the South African constitution, especially considering human rights. Moreover, these examples support the notion by Qobo and Nyathi (2016:431) that there is “… a lacuna between South Africa’s commitment in its diplomacy of Ubuntu and the domestic socio-economic realities, in ways that undermine any claim to upholding the values of Ubuntu towards the socially excluded”. Yet, Huntington (1996:28) argues that in the post-Cold War order, culture can be both a divisive and a unifying force. To this end, Huntington (1996:29) aptly suggests that “Cultural communalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms and associations of states”. Mazrui (1990:61), on the other hand, maintains that the most extensive cultural transition in the current world order has created two notable crusades in the past two millennia: The power of the sovereign state and the force of capitalism. Within the realm of African realism as presented earlier in the study, these two intensified campaigns would certainly impact on the implementation of the CSPA.

5.2.2.3 The cultural identities of South Africa and China

Analysts like Du Toit (2015:5) contend that there is a natural affinity between African and Chinese philosophical ideas, essentially built on Ubuntu and Confucianism. A probable explanation for this, according to Du Toit (2015:5), is the shared underpinnings of both philosophies that humans are born and brought up in the context of a family, and that the world is nothing but an enlarged or extended family. Moreover, it is important to take note of Huntington’s (1996:29) assertion that countries with cultural affinities, cooperate economically and politically. Previous examples of the intensified political and diplomatic Sino–South Africa relationship and the exponential trade and investment growth between South Africa and China since 1998, must certainly hold true for the CSPA as an embodiment of such cultural affinity.

However, Qobo and Nyathi (2016) caution that Ubuntu at times is used in a conservative setting to affirm a status quo, and on other times in ways that portray African people as belonging to fixed social and cultural categories, almost as another sub-human species. Chai and Chai (2001:32) on the other hand, promote the view that Confucianism is not merely the sovereignty of people, but rather the rule of people, or democracy.

5.2.2.3.1 Africa’s Ubuntu

Murithi (cited in Qobo & Nyathi, 2016:423) suggests that “Ubuntu is an African way of viewing and being in the world”. Yet, the philosophy of Ubuntu is difficult to define and many definitions, each emphasising different elements of the concept, exist (Mabovula, 2011:38). Murithi further emphasises that Ubuntu is a world view that endeavours to capture the essence of what it means
to be human, accentuating connectedness and a sense of responsibility to others. The concept *Ubuntu* originates from the Xhosa expression “*Umuntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu*”, which means that each individual’s humanity is in essence ideally articulated in relationship to others (Battle, 1996:99). The most basic explanation of *Ubuntu* therefore, can be presented as “I am, because we are”.

The core characteristics of *Ubuntu*, which can be depicted as caring, humility, thoughtfulness, considerateness, understanding, wisdom, generosity, hospitality, social maturity and sensitivity, as well as virtue are humanistic attributes that, according to Mabovula (2011:40) promote conciliation more than confrontation. Importantly, Jolley (2011:59) and Bernhard (2011:43) aver that “… *Ubuntu* became one of the key concepts of the new democratic South Africa which inspired people of different races to embrace one another after apartheid”. *Ubuntu* in sum, has been used as a catch-all term, according to Qobo and Nyati (2016:423), to characterise the norms and values that are inherent in many traditional African societies.

The Bill of Rights, which is the cornerstone of the South African constitution, was conceptualised out of the African spirit of *Ubuntu* (Mabovula, 2011:40). Moreover, Thabo Mbeki, the second president of South Africa, became the main embodiment of African Renaissance or Pan-Africanism (Sidiripoulus and Alden & Le Pere cited in Matambo, 2014:79) and revived those African and South African values that formed the basis of *Ubuntu*. The South African government regarded the concept of *Ubuntu* of such significance that the draft *White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy* approved by Cabinet on 5 December 2012 for submission to Parliament was called “Building a better world: The diplomacy of *Ubuntu*” (DIRCO, 2012:1–47). In addition, the preamble of the document promotes that South Africa’s unique approach to global issues has found expression in the concept of *Ubuntu*. Yet, Qobo and Nyathi (2016) contend that notions of justice, fairness, equity and solidarity often associated with *Ubuntu* are not exclusively African. Further, there are primeval customs that are not congruent with modern-day impulses for liberty and freedom, such as the marginalisation of women and archaic property relations under traditional or cultural law.

### 5.2.2.3.2 China’s Confucianism

Historically, Confucianism dominated China’s feudalistic society for thousands of years before the establishment of China in 1949 (Du Toit, 2015:5). Confucius (*circa* 551–479 B.C.) promoted the ideal of a “Grand Commonwealth” in which the governing elite would be elected and composed of people of talent and virtue (Chai & Chai, 2001:31). The core values of Confucianism can be presented as altruism or selflessness (*ren*), ritual and etiquette (*li*) and filial piety (*xiao*), which have some affinities with *Ubuntu* (Du Toit, 2015:6). The importance of well-balanced relationships between ruler and ruled, patriarch and family and other members of the family are endorsed as
the most important attributes of Confucianism. Moreover, these ethical values are applied to the so-called “five bonds” between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother and friend and friend: the first four bonds are explicitly hierarchical, while the fifth deals with relations between equals (Berger 2012:2–3).

When Mao Zedong rose to power with the new creed of a Marxist Chinese state in 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) denounced Confucianism as well as Daoism and Buddhism, coupled with a later virulent anti-Confucian campaign by the Red Guards, especially during the Cultural Revolution (Hutchings, 2001:86, 356). However, some elements of the Confucian tradition were incorporated in support of communist ideology, even during the Maoist period which continued with Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of a desire for social and political order (Chai & Chai, 2001:36). Chai and Chai (2001:36) claim that “… by the mid-1990s, China showed definite signs of a resurgence of Confucian studies, under the broad rubric of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’.”

Analysts like Cardenal and Araujo (2013:38–40) concur that Confucianism has been one the main reasons for a cross-border nationalism that evolved for millions of Chinese citizens who, “… despite living at opposite ends of the world, find a cohesive element in China’s homeland and culture, albeit to varying degrees”. It can therefore be submitted that Chinese nationalism and patriotism, driven by the imperatives of realism e.g. sovereignty and power politics, as well as Confucianism, have become important silent traits of the Chinese diaspora, both in their motherland or in a foreign country. Importantly, Chai and Chai (2001:37) aver that Confucianism insists on the sovereignty of people and on the government’s devotion to the well-being of its people. In spite of that, Mearsheimer (2014:403–407) argues that China has done little more than to pay lip service to Confucianism in the past. In addition, it is unlikely that China as an exceptional great power, would eschew realistic logic and behave in accordance with the principles of Confucian pacifism (Mearsheimer, 2014:407). To the contrary, Christensen and Goldstein (cited in Mearsheimer, 2014:407) submit that “China might be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War” and “China’s contemporary leaders, like their predecessors in Imperial China, prize the practice of realpolitik”. The important point is that although the perception exists that the underpinnings of Confucianism are the drivers of the Chinese society, the realities moulded a different society based on the prescripts of realism.

5.2.2.4 The shared narratives of Ubuntu and Confucianism influencing the Sino–South African relationship

Despite the huge population gap and other divertive factors discussed above, notable shared cultural communalities and differences can be observed in the South African and Chinese societies:
Firstly, China’s Han community consists of more than 90% of the population, while South Africa on the other hand, and has a black community of more than 80%. The important difference is that the black community in South Africa’s instance consists of nine ethnic minorities, each with its own language, customs and traditions. Although both countries have shared multi-ethnic underpinnings, China can be seen as a predominantly homogenous society, whereas South Africa is heterogeneous and a distinctly diverse society;

Secondly, while Mandarin is the official and most prominent Chinese language, South Africa has nine official languages. English has become the language of prominence and prestige in virtually all spheres of South African society. Moreover, given South Africa’s past as a British colony, the legislative and the judicial systems are constitutionally ensconced in Western and Commonwealth democratic models. Further, the Western lifestyle primarily based on American and European trends and tendencies in terms of choice of music and entertainment, dress-code, role models and even religious activities, have further become the norm, especially in previously disenfranchised communities; and,

Lastly, contrary to a common Chinese loyalty and patriotism as espoused in centuries of Confucian moral and cultural guidance, a serious lack of South African nationhood prevailed. The national pride and loyalty that was evident during the iconic Mandela era, made way for a sceptical and divisive South African society, especially during the Zuma presidency. Despite hosting a successful 2010 soccer world cup that lifted the South African unity, the euphoria of the Rainbow Nation dwindled, while patterns of ethnic and racist tension as well as xenophobia became the order of the day. Many South African professionals of all spheres and sectors of society emigrated mainly because of affirmative and corrective policies of the South African government for better career prospects. Figure 5.3 provides an analysis of emigration patterns from South Africa for the decade 2006 to 2016. Most importantly, 25.7% of the emigrants that left South Africa during this period, did so in 2015. That was a clear barometer of at least a section of the South African society’s pessimism at the end of the period under review.
Therefore, while Chinese nationalism was on the rise, an acute degree of pessimism and cynicism could be observed in South Africa. Despite this, the shared narratives of *Ubuntu* and Confucianism contributed to commonalities that definitely advanced the implementation of the CSPA. While *Ubuntu* and Confucianism anchored the Sino–South African relationship, the formation of the CSPA was rooted by shared struggle credentials and cultural underpinnings and values guided by the national interests of both countries.

In sum, the socio-economic realities and the realignment to developing countries, led the South African government’s behaviour to be imbued by opportunistic tendencies, rather than principled decisions and action. The deliberate shift away from principled human rights considerations to siding with questionable role players, including some of the developing world and BRICS grouping, raised serious concerns and questions about the mutual interests and shared values influencing the South African governments conduct. Therefore, given the examples and the anomalous nature of the Sino–South African relationship, what mutual interests and shared values could have influenced South Africa to conclude the CSPA with China?
5.2.2.5 Mutual interests and shared values

Geldenhuys (2015:125) in principle suggests that given the environmental uncertainty as discussed earlier, the states or IGOs involved would enter into a strategic partnership based on mutual interests and possible shared values or ideologies that can be presented as a strategic fit. Historically, the ANC, the SACP, and the CPC were grounded in the same philosophical ideas as the Soviet model and maintained a close though intimate relationship (Johnson, 2015:131) built on shared values of the socialist doctrine. Yet, the demise of apartheid led to a new dawn, bringing new alternatives and mutual interests shaping the Sino–South African relationship.

5.2.2.5.1 Shared historical values

The ANC and SACP did not always have good relations with China. The most important reason was that South African liberation movements, excluding the Pan Africanist Congress which had a closer affiliation with China, aligned themselves with the USSR and “… denounced China as a bellicose state” (Matambo, 2014:27). The cordial and friendly relations that China had with the USSR came to an end in the 1950s because of what Matambo (2014:49) labels “Mao’s inclination to Stalin’s type of enormous personal power”. The breakdown of the Sino–Soviet relations catapulted China to the centre of global political controversy and continued up to the Bandung Conference during 1955 (Matambo, 2014:49–50). The split in communist ranks between the USSR and China added a further complication when the Chinese Prime Minster Zhou En Lai in the early 1960s asserted that Africa, according to Southall and Conway (2005: 201) “… was ripe for revolution”. The SACP and ANC, like many other African leaders, during this period rather sided with the USSR and found merit in the Premier of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev’s, policy of peaceful existence with the West (Matambo, 2014:49). Senior SACP and ANC officials like Yusuf Dadoo and Walter Sisulu nonetheless visited China during the 1950s and 1960s, but these events were overshadowed by the close relations between themselves and the USSR (Alden & Wu, 2014:6).

Yet, a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia during 1982 between Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and the exiled ANC president, Oliver Tambo, brought a turning point in the hostile relations between China, the ANC and the SACP when party-to-party relations were restored (Alden & Wu, 2014:6). Improved relations, including financial support and military training for ANC and SACP cadres in China, followed. The unbanning of liberation movements in South Africa by President FW de Klerk and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in February 1990, paved the way a year later for discussions between diplomats in Beijing aimed at formalising bilateral engagements between South Africa and China (Alden & Wu, 2014:6). China’s deliberate involvement in Africa and specifically the close and strategic partnership with the ANC and SACP, especially since the early 1980s, can therefore be seen as a meaningful contributor to end of
colonisation in Africa, and apartheid in South Africa in particular. The common denominator was the shared value of socialism.

5.2.2.5.2 A new dawn in South Africa

The demise of apartheid resulted in the end of the international diplomatic isolation of South Africa, which led to the lifting of economic sanctions that had been implemented against the NP regime (Grimm et al., 2014:8). South Africa’s post-apartheid ANC government found itself in a situation of reinventing its foreign relations, at least realigning to new partners and making use of new opportunities. This included engaging in mitigating new global risks in an increasingly globalised economy and post-Cold War order. South Africa’s unique position in Africa and in global affairs, coupled with its resource-based economy, made it a plausible partner for an emerging giant like China (Alden & Wu, 2014:27). Situated strategically on the southern tip of the African continent and boasting rich mineral resources, a sophisticated infrastructure, a well-regulated market and sound legal system, South Africa was according to Lin (2017:2) “… not only the strongest African power in overall strength, but also the African country that is readiest for deeper China–African mutual beneficial cooperation”.

South Africa presented China with an environment that is unlike what it encountered with other countries in Africa (Sithole, 2015:56). For example, South Africa as the most advanced economy in Africa and the 24th largest economy in the world, has a world-class infrastructure, leading technology and industrial capability in several areas on par with many developed countries (Sithole, 2015:56). The trade relations between South Africa and China recorded firm and healthy growth since the formalisation of diplomatic relations in 1998. Moreover, China’s dramatic rise as the largest developing country in the world since 1978 created the foundation for mutually beneficial interaction with South Africa (PMG, 2010:3). The positive trade developments made the Chief Director of South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI): International Trade and Economic Development, Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter suggest that China presented lucrative export opportunities, as well as the potential to absorb value-added exports from South Africa (PMG, 2010:3).

China, on the other hand, was (and still is) Africa’s biggest trading partner and has done more to end poverty than any other country, paying for infrastructure, development, business, agriculture and food security (Hyslop, 2012:18). China further offered both opportunities with accompanied challenges in the international markets due to its increased international market presence, which also affected South Africa’s exposure and market share (PMG, 2010:4).
Figure 5.4, which presents a graphical breakdown of China’s import from and export to Africa from 2000 to November 2009, confirmed exponential growth between the superpower and the continent. In addition, from relative low baseline activities during 2000, total bilateral trade at the end of November 2010 increased 43.5% year-on-year to US$114.8 billion (China Daily Europe, 2010:1). In addition, by the end of 2009, China had provided support for the construction of more than 500 infrastructure projects in Africa (China Daily, 2010:2). China’s Africa strategy was clearly long term, with contemporary investments paving the way for decades of bilateral cooperation (Freemantle & Stevens, 2010:14). The bilateral trade between China and South Africa also experienced an upward trajectory since 2002: the total trade strengthened by 2% in 2009, as compared to approximately US$8 billion in 2008 (PMG, 2010:3). However, what continued as a negative and concerning reality, was the South African trade statistics that depicted a sustained trade surplus in favour of China since 2003, although a decline from approximately US$3 billion in 2008 to US$1,5 billion was reported in 2009 (PMG, 2010:3).

What was further prevalent, is the fact that although Sino–South African relations were characterised by strong trade figures, FDI from China was lacking and the statistics were distorted.
Table 5.2: Foreign direct investment between South Africa and China: Official aggregate data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK</th>
<th>CHINESE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA FDI Liabilities from China, stock USDm</td>
<td>SA FDI assets in China, stock USDm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2876</td>
<td>3126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4604</td>
<td>13744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5616</td>
<td>13992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gelb (2010)

Alden and Wu (2014:18) aver that although a trend of limited increased Chinese FDI in South Africa existed, Chinese investment in South Africa has a long way to go to match South Africa’s investment in China. Of greater concern, as indicated by statistics provide by Gelb presented in Table 5.2, was that substantial disparities existed in terms of the FDI figures presented by both countries. Gelb’s research, according to Alden and Wu (2014:18) submitted that Chinese business represented just more than 1% (78) of the 4 100 officially registered business that operated in South Africa during 2009. Figure 5.4 indicates that according to the South African Reserve Bank South Africa’s FDI assets, China was estimated at US$13, 992 billion during 2010, while the Chinese Ministry of Commerce could not provide statistics.

Lin (2017:2) nonetheless asserts that President Xi instructed that in conducting relations with Africa, the principles of sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith should always be followed and that the values of friendship, justice and shared interests should be upheld. Grounded on the historical and ideological affection between the two parties, the basis for the government of South Africa’s relations with China therefore rests on four pillars (April & Shelton, 2014:1):

i. China’s contributions to the defeat of colonisation in the rest of Africa, and particularly apartheid in South Africa;

ii. China and South Africa’s shared strategic approach to global issues and IR;

iii. China’s support of Africa’s development efforts, coinciding with South Africa’s foreign policy commitment to the African agenda; and,

iv. The Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa alliance (BRICS).
The continued growth and strengthening of Sino–South African cooperation can, despite challenges, in summary be seen as a hallmark of the relationship (Alden & Wu, 2014:12). The strategic fit between South Africa and China is therefore presented as a convergence of beneficial economic diplomacy and trade including investment imperatives, rather than principled values and ideologies. However, analysts like Matambo (2014:75) warn that despite the positive and mutually beneficial picture that Sino–South African trade relations may have suggested, trade relations in the run-up to the finalisation of the CSPA, were in China’s favour and to the detriment of South Africa. Moreover, the South African government clearly has a fixation on the strong socialist and economic policies of the Chinese government as mandated by the CPC. The examples presented in terms of challenges that the South African government experienced contemplating dealing with both internal as well as external human rights issues, the premeditated decision to choose China over Taiwan, as well as the continued negative trade balance and the skewed and inaccurate investment picture, are proof of that.

Important though, is what the general common purposes were that establish the basis of the CSPA and whether these purposes would be able to address the shortcomings as identified. Geldenhuys (2015:127) refers to this factor of the formation of strategic partnerships as the system principle.

### 5.2.3 System principle

The common purposes become solidified into an overarching framework of mutual agreement and understanding and provide the *raison d'être* for the partnership on the global and bilateral spheres (Geldenhuys, 2015:127). Wilkins (2008:364) further emphasises that the system principle need to be distilled into a set of common goals. On a global level, the CSPA reiterated that the two sides shared the view that multilateralism and democratisation of IR enjoy greater popular support today in the international community (DIRCO, 2010:1). The CSPA further stated that consensus prevailed in the international community that in order to build a harmonious and better world for all, characterised by enduring peace and common prosperity, win-win progress can be achieved through all-inclusive international cooperation (DIRCO, 2010:1). Paramount however, is the reality that the CSPA was the first such agreement by China with any country (Lin, 2013:28).

The pursuit of a range of shared goals is the essence of a strategic partnership (Geldenhuys, 2015:127) and in the case of the CSPA, entailed 38 distinct paragraphs (DIRCO, 2010:2–8). The CSPA highlights four overarching focus areas as shared or collective goals namely:

- Political relations and bilateral dialogue;
- Economic area;
• Other areas of cooperation; and,
• International and regional affairs that set out specific objectives.

5.2.3.1 Political relations and bilateral dialogue

In terms of the first goal, the focus of the CSPA was to have frequent contact between the two presidents, strengthen the BNC chaired by the deputy president and vice-president of South Africa and China on a bi-annual basis, strategic dialogue between DIRCO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, frequent meetings and exchange visits at senior officials level of the same departments and continued encouragement to strengthen cooperation between respective national legislative bodies, through closer exchanges between high-level legislative leaders, committees and administrative bodies (DIRCO, 2010:2). This was confirmed by the fact that China and South Africa had according to Chen (2018:4) maintained close high-level exchanges and a multi-layered, wide-ranging and all-dimensional cooperation framework that had taken shape.

The official relations between Africa and China was established in 1955 during first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia focused on promoting economic and cultural cooperation by the developing world (Wasserman, 2012:34). Power and Mohan (2010:476) argue that China’s colonial history and struggle against poverty laid the basis for the “… Chinese claim that their unique understanding of Africa’s economic dilemma lies at the root of Sino–African solidarity and serve as a strong foundation for cordial relations”. Beyond the significance of the intense bilateral diplomatic and governmental relations discussed in the previous section, South Africa and China also had shared communalities in terms of their approach to Africa, primarily built on economic and resource needs as well as trade and investment opportunities especially identified in the post-Cold War order.

Africa was the only continent that had consistent economic growth of 4.7% from 2000 to 2014 mainly on the back of strong commodity prices driven by increased demand from China and India (Owusu-Sekyere, 2017). China, on the other hand, had a remarkable economic growth rate of 10% for more than three decades between 1979 and 2010, but then bottomed out from 2010 to 2015 to about 6% (Cronje, 2014:66–67). “The new normal” as the slowdown of the Chinese economy was coined by president Xi, led to a worldwide drop in the demand and prices of commodities and impacted negatively on bilateral trade and investment, also in South Africa (SAIIA, 2015:3).

Yet, when considering the role of China (and India) in Africa, Shaw et al. (2012:197) summarise the situation as follows: “The glass is half full and half empty – for Africa, there are opportunities to exploit and rough currents to avoid”. These challenges and opportunities that existed at the turn of the twentieth century fuelled common uncertainty and questions that both China and some
African countries raised emphasising the need to reinforce more sustainable China–Africa cooperation (Li et al., 2012:16–17). Initiatives at the beginning of the twenty-first century, especially from Madagascar and the Department of African Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs elevated China–African cooperation to another level with the establishment of FOCAC (Li et al., 2012:17).

5.2.3.1.1 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

The establishment of FOCAC was the formalisation of the Sino–African relationship: in the case of Africa it was about a multilateral approach engaging China, while China was more concerned about how the engagement will be structured and formalised (Naidu, 2015:7). The establishment of FOCAC was according to SAIIA (2015:2) “… an exemplary form of South-South cooperation, demonstrating the strengths of utilising an incremental and practical approach to tackling development issues of mutual concern”. However, the opening remarks by President Zuma at the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Conference during 2012 in Beijing, China drew intense interest when he said that (Presidency, 2012):

“On the other hand, Africa’s commitment to China’s development has been demonstrated by the supply of raw materials, other products, and technology transfer.

As we all agree, Your Excellency, this trade pattern is unsustainable in the long term.

Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious when entering into partnerships with other economies. We are particularly pleased that in our relationship with China we are equals and that agreements entered into are for mutual gain. This gathering indicates commitment to mutual respect and benefit.

We certainly are convinced that China’s intention is different to that of Europe, which to date continue to attempt to influence African countries for their sole benefit”.

President Zuma’s remarks and concerns touched sensitive nerves especially in the Chinese hierarchy in terms of the asymmetrical nature of Sino–African relations. Alden and Wu (2014:11) nonetheless argued that a shared view did exist with the Chinese government that the contemporary economic foundation of the relationship had to shift away from the pattern of unequal exchange, if it was to thrive. The Chinese government and leadership had to act decisively and swiftly to address the negative perceptions about China’s relationship with the African continent. President Xi, the new Chinese president succeeded his predecessor, president Hu during 2012 as part of a next generation of Chinese leadership and an immediate change in the Chinese government’s approach could be observed articulating foreign and economic policies matching China’s global status (Siritopulos et al, 2016:4). Yet, some special event had to transpire to capture the initiative of the China dream linked to the BRI that was considered earlier.
The hosting of the Johannesburg Summit and Sixth Ministerial Forum of FOCAC in 2015 promised to be a major event on the diplomatic calendar of the South African government (Alden & Wu, 2014). The participants, especially China, did not disappoint in terms of the commitment towards Africa of the new Chinese leadership. The ‘Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the FOCAC’ submitted by China and 50 African countries under the theme China–Africa Progressing Together: Win-win Cooperation for Common Development was proof of a new impetus (SAIIA, 2015). An accompanying declaration upgraded FOCAC to a ‘new type of comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership’ with the AU, linking Africa’s transformation aspirations to China’s own ongoing transformation (Carey & Li, 2016). During the forum, president Xi pledged a development package of US$60 billion towards Africa’s development. China, in fact, had increased its investments in the continent around 520% since the beginning of the twenty-first century, according to Global Trade Magazine (Holmes, 2018).

The successful and productive outcome of the Johannesburg Summit and the Sixth FOCAC Ministerial Meeting concluded during the first week of December 2015, was indicative of the fact that the political and diplomatic relationship between the governments of South Africa and China, constituted the basis for the successful implementation of the CSPA. Yet, China’s relationship with South Africa has not only deepened significantly on diplomatic and governmental level, but also economically. Both governments through shared policies enhancing state capitalism as well as the private sector of both countries, contributed to two-way trade that flourished under the Zuma administration.

5.2.3.1.2 BRICS membership

BRICS membership has earlier been defined as one of the four pillars considering the mutual interest and shared values of Sino–South African relations. After the finalisation of the CSPA during August 2010, both South Africa and China retreated somewhat to come to terms with the landmark agreement that was concluded between the two governments. President Zuma and his inner circle realised that South Africa had been catapulted into a new league of the international society with the formalisation of the CSPA, whilst China benevolently could celebrate a better defined footprint in Africa. The international focus nonetheless moved swiftly to the South African government’s next objective, namely BRICS membership. South Africa’s ascent into the BRICS grouping in late December 2010, followed an extensive lobby process with the individual members e.g. Brazil, Russia, India and as expected China, who courteously promoted South Africa’s ambitions (Alden & Wu, 2014:13). South Africa’s and China’s participation in BRICS can be presented as (Naidu, 2015:7):

- Rectifying the disproportions of the international society and system;
- Addressing disparities in global hegemony; and,
Reinforcing sustainable development across reformed global and regional architecture, through inclusivity and shared benefits to all.

The invitation to join the group was issued on 24 December 2010 after President Zuma visited each of the BRIC members during the year. Commentators like Hervieu (2011) suggested that President Zuma was rewarded with a diplomatic victory and “... lost no time endorsing his new partners' concerns about the massive influx of foreign assets currently plaguing emerging countries, where yields are higher than in developed nations”. Yet, Jim O'Neill, the chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management International who originally coined the BRIC term, remarked that "For South Africa to be treated as part of Bric doesn't make any sense to me, but South Africa as a representative of the African continent is a different story" (Hervieu, 2011). The geopolitical parameters that binds the BRICS countries together, nonetheless seemed logical: Its identity is derived from a broad consensus that the global status quo could not continue (Naidu, 2015:7). The fact that the BRICS grouping represents 43% of the world population, has a combined national GDP estimated at USD$13, 7 trillion and controls almost 17% of the world trade according to the head of the South African delegation to the Fifth BRICS Academic Forum, Siphamandla Zondi (2009:5), must have supported the South African government's intentions. Yet, analysts like Pant (2013:102) remained critical towards BRICS and the collective contribution to the global order. Pant’ s (2013:102) remarks that “The BRICS contribution to global order remains tentative at best and problematic at worst” provided a different, although concerning take on the rising alternative international structure.

On 14 and 15 April 2011 South Africa was invited to attend the third BRIC summit in Sanya on Hainan Island, south eastern China for the first time, as a full member of the group of emerging nations (Besada, 2013:1). Importantly, South Africa’s attendance heralded the transformation of BRIC to BRICS. President Zuma was accompanied by a strong delegation from government, as well as business, including the Ministers of Trade and Industry, Economic Development and International Relations and Cooperation. Sharma (2011) suggested that the summit drew attention for two reasons:

- Firstly, with the membership of South Africa, the group had an additional presence from the African continent for the first time, and,
- Secondly, all five members of BRICS were also members of the UNSC. Russia and China were permanent members with veto power, while Brazil, India and South Africa were non-permanent members with a fixed tenure of two years each.

President Zuma used the event to express appreciation for South Africa’s invitation to BRICS membership and to confirm the strategic importance that the country attaches to the multilateral partnership (Brand South Africa, 2015). Moreover, the South African President pushed for the
alignment of the BRICS agenda with the development and economic priorities of the African continent, which included infrastructure development and beneficiation of minerals. In line with this, the president also presented South Africa as the gateway to the African continent and its one billion potential consumers and clientele (Hervieu, 2011). The ascent of South Africa into BRICS via the Chinese seal of approval already proofed its worth, albeit as the gateway to Africa and perceived voice of the continent.

During the yearly heads of state BRICS meetings, South Africa continued to promote the potential for broader engagements, mainly with countries from and aligned to the Global South. Naidu (2015:7) for example registers South Africa’s important role in initiating the Africa Outreach Partnership inviting African heads of state to the BRICS summit in Durban during 2013. Most importantly though, was the establishment of the BRICS NDB. This decision, including the announcement to base the Regional African office of the NDB in Johannesburg, led Naidu (2015:7) to speculate that the event was “… a strategic milestone for BRICS, as it signifies the formation of a new global order”. A further example was President Zuma’s remarks during the plenary session of the seventh BRICS summit held during July 2015 in the Russian Federation: He submitted that South Africa benefited substantially from economic cooperation with its BRICS partners (Neethling, 2017:40). Proof of the benefits on paper reflected in the figures: In 2014, South Africa’s total trade with BRICS was R382 billion, up from R268 billion in 2011 (Neethling, 2017:40). What President Zuma however not raised was the asymmetrical structure of the trade by the continued export of bulk resources, as well as the South Africa’s lasting negative trade balance.

5.2.3.2 Economic area

The second goal focusing on the economic area, was the most elaborate and comprehensive. It entailed 16 paragraphs providing guidance from improved trade between the two countries, increased investment in South Africa’s manufacturing industry and the promotion of the creation of value-adding in close proximity to the sources of raw materials to the exploration of cooperation opportunities in infrastructure construction projects, such as roads, railways, ports, power generation, airports and housing. (DIRCO, 2010:3). This goal continued to promote, on the South African side, the implementation of the FOCAC projects in South Africa by the Chinese side in the form of preferential loans suited to the specific needs of South Africa; agricultural, agro-processing and fishery products as well as quarantine and customs matters; deepen exchanges and cooperation in the areas of transportation, railways and civil aviation; create conditions to facilitate practical cooperation between South African and Chinese energy-related companies, as well as considering third-party involvement in energy-related areas, such as fossil energy, renewable energy, electricity, nuclear energy, energy efficiency and energy infrastructure (DIRCO, 2010:3–4). Engagements on science and technology fields, geology and mineral
resources, exchanges between government departments, tourism and the simplification of visa procedures, conclude the exhaustive list of economic goals (DIRCO, 2010:4–5).

5.2.3.3 Other areas of cooperation

The third goal labelled as ‘Other Areas of Cooperation’ is wide-ranging and can be seen as all-embracing and to some extent generic. Focusing on current agreements and memoranda dealing with arts and culture, education, medical sciences, forestry and water resource management, it also intended to strengthen and expand existing bilateral defence cooperation, cooperate in the fields of urban and rural planning, poverty eradication and community development and strengthen and expand the existing bilateral immigration cooperation, jointly combat illegal immigration while cooperating to facilitate exchanges between the peoples of the two countries (DIRCO, 2010:6–7).

The evolution of China-South African relations, according to Alden and Wu (2014:23) was taking place within the context of a growing mutual interest in public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, an integral element of Soft Power as discussed in chapters two, three and four, has become a prominent foreign policy tool used by many progressive governments, including South Africa and China. Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015:33) for instance submit that South Africa’s political and economic successes had presented Africa and the developing world with a political recipe to enhance their achievements. The same accolades need to be bestowed on China in terms of the role played by the country, especially in postcolonial Africa. The importance of public diplomacy in promoting the successes and achievements of the CSPA, therefore need to be an important element of this specific goal.

5.2.3.4 International and regional affairs

‘International and Regional Affairs’ are the last goal of the CSPA. In terms of the realignment of the post-Cold War era, some goals maintained the golden thread of both Chinese and South African foreign policies to reaffirm the commitment of both countries to promote and protect multilateralism and the democratisation of internal relations, enhance the effectiveness, accountability, credibility and legitimacy of the decision-making bodies of international institutions, as well as the increase of the representation and voice of developing countries in international institutions (DIRCO, 2010:7).

The reform of the UNSC and the increased representation of developing countries, especially African countries, have been prioritised and emphasis was placed on the need to promote economic development through developing finance, fair trade, global economic governance and the reform of the international financial system in support of developing countries (DIRCO, 2010:7). However, three paragraphs were dedicated on recognising positive contributions made
by the G20 Summit, the role that both countries were playing in advancing peace and security as well as socio-economic development in Africa and the contribution made by FOCAC to strengthen the equal and mutually beneficial cooperation and the new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa (DIRCO, 2010:8). These goals however, can be perceived as aggrandisements of perceived achievements, rather than specific goals.

The CSPA in sum outlined 38 bilateral cooperation agreements—ranging from political dialogues and trade and investment to mineral exploration and agriculture (Alden & Wu, 2014:10). Anthony et al. (2015:10) contextualises the aim or goal of the CSPA to strengthen cooperation through concrete measures, politically commit to UN and FOCAC joint efforts and economically enhance balance or value-added trade. By supporting this, Sithole (2015:65) argued that the declaration clearly demonstrates very strong and comfortable political and economic bilateral relations between China and South Africa. However, Alden & Wu (2014:10) indicate that most of the agreements “… were identical to or elaborations of the areas identified in the strategic cooperation agreement six years beforehand”. What differentiated the CSPA from previous agreements, was a palpable focus on practical undertakings and commitments on both sides despite the residual slant on what China will do for South Africa (Sithole, 2015:65). Notably though, is the closing paragraphs of the agreement that, like all previous partnerships and strategic partnerships since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1998, reiterated the South African government’s adherence to the one China-policy and support for the peaceful development of Cross-Straits relations and China’s national reunification cause (DIRCO, 2010:8).

5.2.4 Elite involvement

The building of a strategic partnership is a top-down or elite-driven process (Wilkins, 2008:364). A partnership’s prospects therefore depend according to Geldenhuys (2015:128) on the direct involvement and support of top leaders from the partner states. In terms of the specific relationship under scrutiny, the then Foreign Minister of South Africa confirmed that regular interactions between South Africa and China at different levels intensified immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties between them in 1998 (Sithole, 2015:62).

5.2.4.1 Reciprocal visits by heads of state

Since the first visit by President Mandela as head of state to China during 1999 to meet President Jiang, regular reciprocal visits by the leaders of both countries transpired (Alden & Wu, 2014:7). This included formal visits by President Jiang in April 2000, also a first for a Chinese head of state to South Africa (Alden & Wu, 2014:7; Sithole, 2015:75), President Hu from 6 to 8 February 2007 (DIRCO, 2017:1) and President Mbeki’s visit to China in December 2001 at which time he formally launched the South African-China BNC, setting the agenda for longer term South-African-China
cooperation and commercial expansion (Shelton, 2014:17; Sithole, 2015:76). In August 2010 President Jacob Zuma led a South African delegation of 17 cabinet members and 300 business people to China, where they signed the *Beijing Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and South Africa* (Du Toit, 2015:2–3).

### 5.2.4.2 Provincial and local governments engagement

Moreover, South African provinces as the second tier of the South African government system, keenly engaged the opportunities presented by the broader Sino–South African partnership. A list of provincial and local government twinning agreements (attached as ‘Addendum C’ and ‘Addendum D’) provided by the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser of the South African Treaty Section at DIRCO on 15 September 2017 indicated that the total number of agreements concluded by South African provinces and Chinese counterparts totalled 33 as at 15 September 2017. The first provincial treaty was signed between the Shandong Province of China and the Province of the Western Cape in South Africa on 12 March 1998. Twenty-seven treaties were signed by six provinces namely Western Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Province (provincial name changed to Limpopo during 2002), KwaZulu-Natal and North West since the inception of diplomatic ties during 1998 to the conclusion of the CSPA on 24 August 2010. Since the finalisation of the CSPA, eight provinces have concluded treaties, including the Northern Cape and Gauteng. The only South African province that has not concluded an agreement with counterparts in China, according to the information provided by DIRCO, is the Eastern Cape. It need however, to be registered that it is probable that agreements might have been concluded between Chinese and South African authorities that were not coordinated by DIRCO.

The involvement of the elite in terms of the development of relations between South Africa and China is also prevalent at local government level. Only six treaties have been concluded up to the formalisation of the CSPA on 24 August 2010, but, interestingly enough no agreements between local authorities were finalised from 2010 onwards according to DIRCO's record as provided.

### 5.2.4.3 Party-to-party relations

Anthony *et al.* (2015:10–11) suggest that in addition to the deepening of state ties between the two countries, party-to-party relations between the ANC and CPC have also strengthened in recent years. Over the last two decades the links between the two political parties especially have deepened, with regular exchanges taking place (Alves & Sidpiroupolus, 2010). Members of the NEC of the ANC for example, attended three weeks of management and organisational training in Beijing (Anthony *et al.*, 2015:11). Moreover, it was announced in 2014 that the ANC will be
building a Party institute in South Africa, funded by China and modelled on the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong, Shanghai (Anthony et al., 2015:11).

With these examples as background, it is certain that the elite, specifically involving politicians of all three spheres of government in South Africa and representing in the main politicians and office-bearers of the ANC and the Chinese political elite are highly involved and supportive of the growing evolution and formation of the relationship between the two countries.

5.3 Conclusion

The purpose of Chapter 5 was to ascertain and describe the primary reasons why South African signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 onwards. The geopolitical developments between South Africa and China since 1998, were described against the background of the four factors which influenced the formalisation of strategic partnerships (the (political) environment uncertainty; the strategic fit, the system principle, and, the involvement of the elite). Consideration was further given to the historical links between the ANC, SACP and China. This allowed for the determination that the common denominator of the amicable Sino–South African relations were rooted in socialism as espoused by the Chinese government.

The tacit shift to a more realpolitik-driven agenda illustrated in South Africa’s challenging decision to rather side with China than Taiwan after the end of apartheid, had occurred in tandem with the global phenomena of China’s drastic rise and the particular economic focus on the African continent. Both country’s repositioning in the global arena brought serious changes and challenges, but even more possibilities. The initial uncertainty after 1994 turned into new opportunities for both countries, albeit that the trade asymmetry in favour of China, remained a constant reminder of the complexities of the Sino–South African relationship. However, the manner in which the South African government, in particular since the Motlanthe and Zuma presidencies, bowed to pressure from the Chinese government and the BRICS grouping, renegaded one of the most important founding principles of the South African Constitution, namely human rights. South Africa and China nonetheless confidently cooperated in the realignment of the post-Cold War order. The involvement of the two countries on shared multilateral platforms, provided mutual support in global fora such as BRICS, FOCAC, the UN and G20 on multiple initiatives, which reflected their shared and mutual interests in reforming the global architecture in favour of the needs of the developing world.

The reasons for the South African government to have concluded the CSPA during 2010, and continue with it, were based rather on the combined shared values and common interests of China and South Africa, than South Africa’s perceived national interests. Since 2009 primarily, the South African government deliberately and with vigour sided with the Global South and especially China
and Russia under the auspices of President Zuma. With the support of the Chinese leadership, South Africa enhanced the national interest of both countries as stipulated in the opening paragraphs of the CSPA to further strengthen bilateral relations promoting the common development of the two countries, to deepen China–Africa cooperation, to strengthen South–South cooperation and to jointly address global challenges. This however, is not a fusion of the foreign policies of China and South Africa, but rather confirmation that the South African foreign policy, correctly or incorrectly, aborted the principles of Ubuntu and human rights in favour of the convergence of Sino–South African economic diplomacy. The next chapter will consider and establish if the CSPA provided a constructive geopolitical strategic partnership for South Africa with China, or not?
CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTING A CONSTRUCTIVE GEOPOLITICAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

6.1 Introduction

As argued previously, a formal agreement between states and/or IGOs creates the basis for the implementation of strategic goals by means of the institutionalisation of relations. The partners implement joint, coordinated actions in the areas of cooperation based on shared values and mutual interests (Gajauskaite, 2013:196). These shared values and mutual interests importantly also affect the way that states relate to each other, including in the governmental, security and defence, economic, cultural and societal areas of their relationships.

Jacob Zuma during his first official visit to China as President of South Africa, co-signed the Beijing Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China on 24 August 2010, hosted by his counterpart, Hu Jintao in the capital, Beijing (Sithole, 2015:64). The CSPA built on earlier bilateral Sino–South African partnerships and strategic partnerships since the formalisation of diplomatic ties in 1998. Both sides built on shared values and common interests to register issues and address concerns particularly of the Global South in the post-Cold War order. Moreover, the South African government in a short space of time established itself, especially under the Zuma administration, as one of China’s most important strategic partners in the global arena, as well as on the African continent (Naidu, 2015:5).

Yet, once a strategic partnership like for example the CSPA has been formalised, the partners have to contend with another key challenge: The implementation through building and maintaining the relationship (Bergquist, cited in Wilkins, 2008:364). The implementation phase according to Wilkins (cited in Geldenhuys, 2015:129) entails “… the diffusion of an institutional structure” that controls interaction between the partners. Given the organisational nature of partnerships, strategic partnerships such as the CSPA represent a meta-organisation of infinite complexity built on individual agreements, each with its own respective governmental dynamics of bureaucracies, philosophies, doctrines and policies.

Considering input by Gajauskaite (2013:196–198) and Wilkins (2008:364–366), the following five functional thematic areas are the focus of the chapter to establish the degree to which Sino–South African relations intensified from 2010 to 2015 as a result of the finalisation of the CSPA:

i. Government,

ii. Security and defence,
iii. Economy,  
iv. Culture, and  
v. Society

By considering the five thematic areas, the chapter considers and establishes whether the coupling between the South African and Chinese governments can be presented as loose, moderate or tight. The terminology, which estimates the intensity between states involved in strategic partnerships, has been used by analysts like Adelle and Kotsopoulos (2017), Gajauskaite (2013), Geldenhuys (2015) and Wilkins (2008). The analysts for instance, considered EU–South African, Polish–Ukrainian and Lithuanian–Ukrainian, South African–Russian and Russo–Chinese strategic partnerships using the lexicon. Chapter 6 therefore considers and establishes if the CSPA is indeed a constructive geopolitical strategic partnership from South Africa’s viewpoint, focusing on the relationship with China. This chapter links with the rest of the study as follows:
Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 layout: Implementing a constructive geopolitical partnership agreement
6.2 The CSPA in context with other MOUs

The CSPA, concluded by the heads of state of South Africa and China on 24 August 2010, can be seen as the anchor MOU, interrelated to other MOUs between the two states focusing on environmental management, energy, transport and railway related issues. Of the seven MOUs initially presented, six came into force between 24 to 26 August 2010, while the agreement that dealt with the visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports, was not pursued for unknown reasons. The CSPA can therefore be seen as an all-encompassing strategic partnership, linked to the other MOUs specifically dealing with strategic matters considering both South African, as well as Chinese national interests.

6.2.1 Memorandum of understanding signed from 24 to 26 August 2010 between South Africa and China

Six MOUs were signed between South Africa and China from 24 to 26 August 2010 according to an undated DIRCO document specifying all the bilateral agreements or MOUs signed by the South African government, from 1 January 1994 up to 15 May 2011.

An important example that culminated in the signing of the MOU in the field of environmental management, is the illegal poaching of rhino's and elephants, as well as the illegal harvesting of abalone in South Africa. A significant demand in China and Vietnam for wildlife products, is according to Burgess and Esterhuyse (2015:1) placing major pressure on African wildlife, including the lucrative South African industry. The majority of the illegal trade in these wildlife products like rhino horn, elephant tusks and abalone is smuggled to the East, specifically to China for perceived medicinal purposes. The main objective of the MOU, which is interrelated to the CSPA, was the promotion of cooperative efforts of environmental protection between South Africa and China.

South Africa faced serious developmental challenges, especially since 2007 in terms of infrastructure needs, as well as severe maintenance backlogs on electricity generation plants, road and railway networks. One of the South African Government’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and only power utility, Eskom resorted to national rotational ‘load shedding’ from late in 2007 to protect the power system from a total blackout. The failure in electricity generation however, could not be stopped and eventually led to a national emergency declared on 25 January 2008 followed by ‘rolling blackouts’ (Joffe, 2012:33). These electricity blackouts impacted negatively on the South African economy and led the government to adopt an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010 to 2030, which was promulgated in May 2011 (Joffe, 2012:36). The IRP envisaged that dependence on coal-fired electricity generation would fall from 90% to 65% by 2030, while renewable energy like solar and wind power generation, would increase from
negligible to 9% (Joffe, 2012: 36). Notably, President Zuma, with the support of his cabinet, promoted an ambitious nuclear-built programme, which anticipated that the nuclear energy generation share would increase from 5% to 23% by 2030 (Joffe, 2012: 36). To address the funding needs for these massive capital intensive projects, the South African government strategically chose to engage China and use the goodwill and cordial relationship to harness investment and loans. These infrastructure needs found fruition in the signing of the following four MOUs, linked to the CSPA:


ii. ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Transport Related Matters;’

iii. ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of South Africa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China regarding the Establishment of the China-South Africa Energy Cooperation Sectorial Committee;’ and


It can therefore be surmised that the CSPA laid the foundation for further and more intensified engagements between three distinct focus areas, namely the environment as well as financial support and access to capital, specifically in the fields of energy and railways. Of interest, is specifically the way that the energy and railway needs would later play out, considering the elements of African realism and how it manifested in the broader realities of the CSPA.

6.2.2 Areas of cooperation confirmed by South African minister of IR and cooperation

Coincidentally, the focus areas of the CSPA, were very similar to the functional thematic areas identified earlier in this chapter namely governmental, security and defence, economic, cultural and societal. During a press conference on the South African delegations return from China, the Minister of IR and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane reiterated the significance of the engagement by submitting that:

“It is a reflection of the growing economic relations between South Africa and China, and the increase in people-to-people contacts between our two nations. It also mirrors the fact that the rise of the Chinese economic has not gone unnoticed in South Africa”. (DIRCO, 2010).

President Zuma was accompanied by 14 Ministers and more than 380 business persons to the finalisation of the CSPA, which confirmed the unprecedented interest the official trip enjoyed in South Africa (DIRCO, 2010). What however, differentiated the CSPA from previous partnerships,
was a substantial focus on practical undertakings and pledges on both sides, despite the residual slant on what the Chinese authorities would do for South Africa (Sithole, 2015:15). DIRCO’s Minister confirmed on return from China that the overall objective of the visit was to strengthen and deepen the relations between South Africa and China, to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership (DIRCO, 2010). To this end, China had for the first time committed themselves to the following deliverables in the CSPA (DIRCO, 2010):

- Worked towards more equal trade balance between the two countries,
- Encouraged trade in manufactured value-added products in South Africa,
- Increased trade and investment missions,
- The establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on trade statistics,
- China had to encourage its enterprises to increase investment in South Africa’s manufacturing industry,
- Promoted value-adding activities in close proximity to the source of raw materials,
- Beneficiation at source of specifically mineral resources, had to be facilitated,
- Mutual technical support in the areas of green economic, skills development and industrial financing had to be provided, and
- Companies from both countries had to explore cooperation opportunities in infrastructure construction projects such as roads, railways, ports, power generation, airports and housing.

As can be seen, the above agreements that constituted the core of the CSPA, were similar to the five theoretical functional identified earlier to validate the implementation of a comprehensive strategic partnership. In addition, the South African and Chinese governments according to the Minister would also in due time consider the following areas (DIRCO, 2010):

- Science and technology,
- Agriculture and agro-processing, as well as forestry,
- Water,
- Vocational training, and,
- Tourism development, poverty alleviation and rural development

The Minster of DIRCO also confirmed that both governments agreed to cooperate on the G20, Climate Change, the reform of UNSC and South-South Cooperation (DIRCO, 2010). Within the FOCAC, China agreed to assist with the inter-regional North-South Road Corridor, which will after construction not only benefit South Africa, but also the SADC. It was further agreed to hold the BNC every two years at Deputy Presidential level, as well as annual Ministerial consultations (DIRCO, 2010). Notably, it was agreed that the respective Presidents will meet at bilateral and
multilateral levels when the need and opportunity arises. The next session will consider the functional thematic areas in terms of the impact that the implementation of the CSPA had on the Sino–South African relations.

6.3 The five functional thematic areas of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between South Africa and China

The functional thematic areas mainly contributed to the intensity of the successful implementation, or not, of a strategic partnership. To validate the intensity of each of the identified functional thematic areas, the focus of the next section will be to consider and establish whether the respective areas contributed to a constructive geopolitical comprehensive strategic partnership, such as the CSPA. Each of the functional thematic areas will reflect on the aim(s) as specified in the CSPA, the activities that transpired during the implementation of the CSPA and, the validation of the specific functional thematic area. The first area that will be considered, is the governmental interaction.

6.3.1 Functional Theme One: Governmental interaction

The CSPA referred to the governmental area as ‘Political relations and bilateral dialogue.’ Yet, another section in the CSPA namely, ‘Other areas of cooperation’ is generic and included a number of paragraphs that are also relevant to this specific thematic area. In addition, a section ‘International and Regional Affairs’ of the CSPA, was also prominent. The important point is that this thematic area dealt with a broad spectrum of activities that were driven by the foreign policy objectives of the Chinese and South African governments, guided initially by Presidents Zuma and Hu, but had since 2013 been greatly influenced by the dynamism of President Xi. The aim of the governmental interaction, will be considered in the next sub-section.

6.3.1.1 The aim of Governmental interaction

The overall aim of the governmental area in the CSPA can be categorised in three fields. Firstly, maintain and strengthen frequent contact between the top echelons of the South African and Chinese governments including the respective presidents, deputy-presidents, ministers, senior officials as well as legislative bodies e.g. parliaments through bilateral and multilateral meetings with the aim to promote and guide cooperation at the highest political and economic level, in order to enhance mutual understanding of and support for each other’s positions and interests. Secondly, strengthen and expand existing agreements in the fields of education, health, e-skills development, social security, public services and administration and gender mainstreaming, as well as forestry and water resources management and bilateral immigration cooperation. Lastly, reaffirm the commitment of both countries in the field of international and regional affairs to promote and protect multilateralism and the democratisation of IR including the support of the
reform of the UNSC to priorities the increased representation of especially African countries. Other important developments in the international arena by China and South Africa included the positive contribution of the G20 Summit, the UN MDG, Climate Change initiatives building on the Bali Roadmap and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as peace and security and socio-economic development in Africa and the significant contribution to the implementation of programmes of the FOCAC, reaffirmed the importance of the CSPA. The idealistic aims, however, had to be implemented. This was done by the following governmental activities.

6.3.1.2 Governmental activities that contributed to the implementation of the CSPA

Considering the overall aims identified, the discussion will now focus on the following important governmental activities that contributed to the successful implementation of the CSPA, namely contact by the top echelons of the South African and Chinese government, miscellaneous portfolios like education and health as well as multilateralism and the democratisation of IR. However, reflection will also be made on areas in the CSPA that did not perform as anticipated.

6.3.1.2.1 Contact by the top echelons of the South African and Chinese government

Numerous meetings by Presidents Zuma and Hu, and since 2013 President Xi, were the norm rather than the exception from the time of finalisation of the CSPA during 2010. Every possible opportunity was used to create platforms for the presidents to seal and build on the close and comfortable relationship between the two countries. This led to frequent meetings like for instance during middle July 2012, when President Zuma led a South Africa delegation to attend the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Meeting in Beijing (Du Toit, 2015:2). However, the change of guard of the CPC during the latter part of 2012 was a crucial event for China, as both President Hu (labelled as “the African” because of his close relationships with African leaders) and Premier Wen Jiabao retired (McDonald, 2012:12). President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang came to power at the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPC in November 2012 and were subsequently appointed as leaders of China during 2013 (Lam, 2016).

The cosy relationship between especially the heads of state blossomed. President Xi for example called the South African President “the Chinese people’s old friend and good friend” when welcoming President Zuma on his second formal state visit to China during 2014 (Basu, 2014). Interesting enough, the meeting transpired just months after the South African government declined a visa to the Dalai Lama, who was scheduled to attend the World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in Cape Town during October 2014 (Basu, 2014). During President Xi Jinping’s state visit to South Africa in March 2013, both sides signed the Terms of Reference for the Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group (Alden & Wu, 2014:10). The purpose was to supplement mechanisms and co-ordinate the implementation of major projects and bilateral agreements. Flowing from this,
the Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group and the Technical Committee on Trade Statistics, had for instance more practical aims namely to firstly co-ordinate and promote the implementation of major projects in trade, investment, infrastructure, energy, communication, agriculture, regional cooperation and human resources development; secondly, exchange information on the above and explore opportunities; and, lastly, conduct in-depth analysis on the challenges to find solutions (Alden & Wu, 2014:7).

The Foreign Ministry of China published a memorandum indicating that the CSPA in addition continued to deepen with the following formal exchanges and cooperation during 2013 (see table 6.1):

Table 6.1: List of formal meetings between South African and Chinese government dignitaries during 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DIGNITARY</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circa 27 Jan 2013</td>
<td>South African Minister Marthinus van Schalkwyk</td>
<td>Signed the ‘Agreement between the PRC and the RSA on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 7 Feb 2013</td>
<td>Chinese Vice Minister of Land and Resources Wang Min</td>
<td>Attended the Mining Indaba in Cape Town, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 to 18 Feb 2013</td>
<td>Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi</td>
<td>Met with South African President Zuma and had talks with Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of IR and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2013</td>
<td>Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi</td>
<td>Met with South African Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane on the sidelines of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 to 30 Oct 2013</td>
<td>South African Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>Co-chaired the Fifth Plenary Meeting of China-South African BNC with Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao and also met President Xi Jinping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 5 Nov 2013</td>
<td>South African Minister of Mineral Resources Susan Shabangu</td>
<td>Attended 2013 China Mining Conference in Tianjin, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 7 Dec 2013</td>
<td>State Councillor Yang Jiechi</td>
<td>Attended the Fourth Meeting of BRICS High Representatives for Security Issues and met with South Africa’s Minister of State Security, Siyabonga Cwele</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own construct

A further example was when President Zuma described the current status of the engagement during his state visit in December 2014 as one that is “ready to advance economic partnership with China in pursuit of inclusive growth and job creation” (Naidu, 2015:5). Priorities that were identified during the visit, included China’s interest in Operation Phakisa, which entailed South Africa’s blue economic programme that involved marine transport and manufacturing activities, offshore oil and gas exploration as well as aquaculture and marine protection services and ocean governance (Simon, 2010:1). President Zuma further encouraged the Chinese authorities to invest in areas such as beneficiation of mineral resources, improving industrial capacity, enhancing agro-processing as well as energy, in particular nuclear cooperation (Simon, 2010:1). The establishment and operationalisation of the proposed NDB of the BRICS grouping, with headquarters in Shanghai and an African Regional Centre in South Africa, were also prioritised. However, of interest, was the following MOU’s that were concluded during the specific visit by the South African delegation to China (Simon, 2010:2; Smith, 2015:2):

- The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa and the China–Africa Development Fund (CADF), provided co-funding in terms of the South African government’s industrial policy;
- An investment transaction of R7 billion between the RuiXing Group and CADF in Profert Holdings Proprietary Limited; and,
- A collaboration agreement between Transnet and the China Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Group in relation to the design, manufacture and distribution of rolling stock in South Africa and the rest of Africa.

The visit also cemented Beijing’s status as a strategic partner in Pretoria’s national development priorities, especially the country’s socio-economic development plans, including the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030. Confirmation of this can be seen in the raft of agreements that was signed, which included a ‘Five to Ten Year Strategic Programme on Cooperation’ between the two governments, which focused on various forms of bilateral cooperation, including mutual political trust and strategic coordination, mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade, people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, African affairs and China–Africa relations,
cooperation in international affairs and, importantly BRICS-related issues (Naidu, 2015:6). While there was no reference in the CSPA to BRICS, it soon became an important platform where South African and Chinese interests and ambitions converged in a burgeoning relationship, which further contributed to the realignment of the international society.

On behalf of the South African government, President Zuma hosted a Chinese delegation on 3 December 2015 led by President Xi in Johannesburg before the start of the Sixth Ministerial FOCAC summit planned from 4 to 5 December 2015 (Chinese Embassy, 2015:1). This important engagement was a defining moment that confirmed the intensified bilateral Sino–South African relations that culminated into the establishment of the CSPA more than five years earlier on 24 August 2010 in Beijing. During the engagements, the heads of state, evaluated the progress achieved in terms of the Five to Ten Year Strategic Programme for Cooperation adopted during President Zuma’s visit to Beijing a year earlier (Simon, 2010:1–2). As a result of the engagements in China during December 2014, the progress report presented during the meeting in Johannesburg on 3 December 2015, sketched the goals achieved by the South African and Chinese role players in the implementation of the Five to Ten Year Strategic Programme for Cooperation concluded a year earlier with specific reference to the six priority areas identified: (Brand South Africa, 2015:1; Matthee, 2016:2):

- Alignment of industries to accelerate South Africa’s industrialisation process;
- Enhancement of cooperation in SEZ’s;
- Enhancement of marine cooperation;
- Infrastructure development;
- Human resource cooperation; and,
- Financial cooperation

Notwithstanding the fact that earlier agreements provided for regular interaction through the BNCs co-chaired by the vice-Presidents, the CSPA provided for direct annual strategic dialogue between China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South Africa’s Department of IR and Cooperation (DIRCO) (China Daily, 2010:1). According to Sithole (2015:64) this arrangement is “… a rarity in China’s international relations”, and must be seen as affirmation of the sincerity and intensity of the relationship between the two governments.

6.3.1.2.2 Miscellaneous portfolios

The initial aim captured in the CSPA was to strengthen cooperation in basic education the fields of Early Childhood Education and the training of educator trainers in mathematics, science and technology, as well as the teaching of Mandarin Chinese at some schools. The sharing of experiences in the management and research outputs of specialised institutes and in skills
training were further promoted. These commitments only became more practical during 2014 when further programmes were signed to build human resources and capacity. This led to the agreement during President Zuma’s visit to China during December 2014 when China committed to increase short-term development courses and extend participation in training programmes to 2 000 trainees from 2015–2020 (Naidu, 2015:5).

The real value of these commitments only became a reality during a visit to China from 13 to 17 July 2015 by South African Deputy President Ramaphosa. This was after an agreement was reached between the Chinese Academy of Governance and the South African National School of Government to place South African government officials and business leaders on a training and skills development programme at the facility in China (SA News, 2015). After the Minister of Basic Education, signed an agreement with China during March 2014, Mandarin was officially included in the South African school curriculum to a selected number of schools since January 2016 after a growing demand from parents (Businesstech, 2015). It was also anticipated that hundreds of teachers and police officers would receive training at three CIs (Businesstech, 2015:1-2). Confucian Institutes have been established at Rhodes University, Tshwane University of Technology in Pretoria which subsequently was shut down and re-established at Durban University of Technology, Stellenbosch University and the University of Cape Town (Du Toit, 2015:8). Yet, the South African Democratic Teachers Union bemoaned the decision, describing it as the “worst form of imperialism” (Businesstech, 2015). In the same vein, academia like for example Jonathan Jansen said that it was pointless to introduce Mandarin in South African schools, when the teachers are not able to teach local languages professionally (Businesstech, 2015). Jansen said that “Bringing in Mandarin is political gat kruiping”, which means to unnecessary cuddle-up with somebody.

Provision was further made for the cooperation in the portfolios or fields of health, e-skills development, an incubation programme for information and communication technology (ICT) for small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME), comprehensive social security, public services and administration as well as gender mainstreaming, planning, poverty eradication and community development and forestry and water resources management. Very limited information is available for the period under review in the literature in terms of activities or bilateral engagements by role players of South Africa and China. The impact on the implementation of the CSPA in these fields can therefore be seen as negligible.

6.3.1.2.3 Multilateralism and the democratisation of international relations

The commitment of both countries to promote and protect multilateralism and the democratisation of IR was again confirmed in the CSPA, as was the case in earlier strategic partnership agreements between the two governments. The aims continued with the enhancement of the
effectiveness, accountability, credibility and legitimacy of the decision-making bodies of international institutions, as well as the increased representation and voice of the developing countries in international financial institutions. In addition, the participation of South African and China on the four multilateral platforms in particular FOCAC, BRICS, UNSC and the G20 can be seen as shared and collective interests in the reform of the global governance architecture to address the aspirations and needs of the developing world.

During the finalisation of the CSPA during 2010, the two countries committed themselves to enhance joint efforts in the global arena, such as in the UN and FOCAC (Alden & Wu, 2014:10). Moreover, these intensified Sino–South African relations, paved the way to South Africa’s acceptance into BRICS during December 2010, which came to be the most important, strategic and valuable foreign policy decision since the dawn of democracy during 1994. The importance for South Africa to join BRICS and the countries involvement in other multilateral fora like FOCAC, the UNSC and the G20 will be evaluated in Chapter 7. Yet, the Sino–South African relationship intensified to the degree that President Xi declared in an article in the Pretoria News on 2 December 2015 that “… our relations have made a historic leap forward and became one of the most dynamic and important bilateral ties in our respective foreign relations”.

However, analysts like Qobo and Dube (2015:151) aver that South Africa’s foreign policy drifted away from “… cajoling Western countries towards strengthening ties with new friends in Asia and Latin America”. In addition, under the Zuma administration the country’s foreign policy tilted acutely to China and Russia, which would receive more attention at a bilateral level, especially in diplomatic and commercial relations (Qobo & Dube, 2015:151). Importantly, some analysts like Matthee (2016:23) suggested a deliberate shift by the ANC government under President Zuma by wrapping domestic and foreign policy in the mantle of racial liberation whereby the tilt towards Russia and China and the condemnation of the West, were necessary to destroy the claims of continued neocolonialism. The political and economic closeness that developed between especially China (and Russia) during the Zuma administration, was a clear suggestion that pragmatism had taken root in South Africa’s foreign policy approach in the post-Cold war era (Matambo, 2014:93). The basis for this was underpinned by multilateralism and the pursuit of the democratisation, as well as the continued transformation of the international order as encapsulated in the CSPA. The role that both South Africa and China and South Africa fulfil in this regard, will be considered in the next sub-section namely the security and defence functional thematic area.

6.3.2 Functional Theme Two: Security and Defence

Alden and Wu (2014:11) affirm that although military-to-military relations only featured as a minor composite of bilateral ties, it also followed a pattern of gradual upgrade since official ties in 1998.
With other African countries like Nigeria and Ethiopia, South Africa is jointly involved in peace and security initiatives on the continent (Louw-Vaudrun, 2016:65). China, on the other hand, has provided more peacekeepers than any other permanent member of the UNSC and was the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget (Li, 2007:7). To further establish the intensity of the implementation of the CSPA, consideration will now turn to the security and defence functional thematic area.

6.3.2.1 The aim of the security and defence thematic area

The aim that the security and defence activity in the CSPA endorsed, was promoting the role that both countries played in advancing peace and security, as well as socio-economic development on the African continent. The CSPA reflected on China’s appreciation for South Africa’s initiatives in support of strengthen the organs of the AU, Regional Economic Organisations (RECs) and the implementation of NEPAD. Reference was also made about South Africa’s appreciation for China’s contribution in promoting peace and socio-economic development in Africa. Although the CSPA provides for cooperation and bilateral defence, it does not envisage mutual security commitments nor exchanges involving military technologies, products and services that both have (Sithole, 2015:65).

6.3.2.2 Security and defence activities on the African continent that contributed to the implementation of the CSPA

South Africa has invested heavily in the pursuit of peace and security in the African continent, including hotspots such as Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well neighbouring states like Zimbabwe and Lesotho (Cilliers, 2017:207). Moreover, South Africa has been a member of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU numerous times since inception during 2001. The PSC is the permanent organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is a key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture, which is the umbrella term for the main AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (African Union, 2018). The South African government deemed the involvement in peacekeeping such as priority that DIRCO released the ‘Revised White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions’ on 7 November 2012. Particular reference was made to the principles that would guide “… South Africa’s participation in peace missions, namely: clear mandate, consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, credibility, legitimacy, promotion of national and local ownership, entry, transition and exit strategy, adequate means, transparency and the unity of effort”. (DIRCO, 2012).

Yet, South Africa’s peacekeeping image was tarnished by the unfortunate involvement of South African troops in armed conflict in the CAR during 2013, a country which some outsiders mainly
associate with conflict minerals and diamond smuggling (Louw-Vaudrun, 2016:65; Prinsloo, 2017:32). The main question, that in all probability will never be answered, was the reasons for South Africa’s involvement in the ‘Battle of Bangui’ from 22 March to 24 March 2013 without parliamentary engagement by the President, as required by the South African Constitution. Besides, not one of the principles of the White Paper that was referred to earlier, were adhered to. Two hundred South African Special Force combatants fought a series of running battles outside Bangui, facing 4 000 to 7 000 well-armed Seleka rebel forces (Heitman, 2013:6). Regrettably, 13 South African soldiers were killed and 27 wounded in one of the hardest and bravest fought actions that the South African military ever experienced (Heitman, 2013:7). The ill-fated military action by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), backed and justified by President Zuma, raised serious questions and concerns about the motives for the deployment of the South African forces. Analysts like Prinsloo (2017:34) afterwards questioned the SANDF functionality and operational status, as well as the projection of soft power through peace operations. In the same vein, Malala (2015:211) averred that the SANDF soldiers “… died far from home, in pain and without proper medical care, for a cause we don’t know”.

Despite the Battle of Bangui fiasco, the expanded role in peacekeeping, as well as the Chinese government’s supportive role at the UNSC and at the AU, resulted in greater enthusiasm in South African and Chinese military circles for cooperation during the Zuma administration (Alden & Wu, 2014:11). Senior South African and Chinese military staff of the SANDF and the PLA reiterated their appreciation for collective help and support in achieving the AU’s objectives of building its own strong, effective and efficient peacekeeping capability and endorsed the desire for closer coordination between the two militaries in bringing stability on the continent (Alden & Wu, 2014:11; Chinese Embassy, 2015:2).

China’s enhanced role in African peace and security on the other hand, was one of the consequences of its increased economic exposure to changing conditions on the continent. Alden & Wu (2017:9) suggest that while Beijing’s non-interference principle historically constrained direct involvement, a gradual transformation since 2004 could be observed in key areas of security cooperation. This distinct shift included a commitment guided by the Chinese government to participate directly in UN peace support operations, to contribute to the UN’s Peace Building Fund as well as the AU peace missions and to engage in sensitive conflict mediation in the conflict-ridden Sudan’s (Alden & Wu, 2017:9). It is important to recall as discussed in earlier chapters, that China’s economic and resource involvement in Africa by the China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) investment in Sudan’s oil sector in 1995, was the impetus for the resource scramble by China. Since then, it was not business as usual for the Chinese in Africa and also impacted on the Chinese government’s commitment to peace and security in Africa. This for example was confirmed by President Xi’s pledge of an additional US$US 60 million to be made
available for the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises during the Sixth FOCAC Ministerial Summit in 2015 (Aden & Wu, 2017:9). President Xi in addition, vowed to continue in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa by contributing 8 000 troops to the UN in September 2015 and supported African countries’ capacity building in areas such as defence, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control (Aden & Wu, 2017:9). This shift, marked a significant digression from the initial treasured foreign policy principle of ‘non-intervention’ of the Chinese government.

In terms of commercial transactions between the South African armaments manufacturer and SOE Denel, and the Chinese military sector, Alden and Wu (2014:11) pointed out that the PLA has taken delivery of South African technologies including anti-aircraft gun ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles, as well as air-to-air missiles. The detail is however, not known. The Chinese equivalent to Denel has however, been unsuccessful in penetrating the South African market. According to an unknown source quoted by Alden and Wu (2014:11), Chinese pilots received flight training from ex-South African air force and navy personnel in Mafikeng in the North West province of South Africa, since 2010 (Alden & Wu, 2014:11).

6.3.3 Functional Theme Three: The economic area

The next significant link, apart from diplomatic and governmental relations discussed earlier, is the economic thematic area. The momentum garnered behind more than a decade and a half of Sino–South African cooperation since 1998, produced close and wide-ranging economic ties, which emulated the burgeoning bilateral diplomatic relationship. The question can therefore be asked what the aims were for the inclusion of extensive sections in the CSPA, dealing specifically with the economic relations between South Africa and China.

6.3.3.1 The aim of the economic thematic area in the CSPA

The CSPA strove to:

- Improve, through a concerted effort, the structure of trade between South Africa and China, essentially working towards a more balanced trade profile and promoting trade in the manufacturing and value-added sectors;
- Increase trade and investments missions and to establish a JWG on trade statistics analysis under a Joint Economic and Trade Committee, to address the discrepancies registered in terms of bilateral trade;
- Increase investment with the support of Chinese enterprises in South Africa’s manufacturing industry and to promote the creation of value-adding activities specifically focusing on beneficiation at source in the mining industry;
• Actively support key sectors which included the green economic, together with renewable energy such as solar and wind generation and the manufacturing of equipment for renewable technology and agro-processing;

• Encourage South African and Chinese companies to explore cooperation opportunities in infrastructure construction projects such as roads, railways, power generation, airports and housing including the provision of financing support for companies involved in the fields; and,

• To promote economic development through development financing, fair trade, global economic governance and the reform of the international financial system in support of developing countries, were also registered as a priority.

The ambitious intentions specified in the particular sections of the CSPA had one aim in mind: to close the digressing trade gap that South Africa had to deal since the economic crisis of 2009.

Two-way trade increased more than 20-fold since inception of formal diplomatic relations in 1998 and further accelerated exponentially since 2009, when President Zuma came into power (Alden & Wu, 2014; Chen, 2018:4). In line with the economic buoyancy between South Africa and China, Matambo (2014:76) argued that the “… stupendous scale of trade relations over a short period of time evinces the importance that South Africa and China attached to each other”. Moreover, China became the largest bilateral trading partner of both South Africa and the African continent in 2009, overtaking the US (Du Toit, 2015:4).

6.3.3.2 Economic activities that contributed to the implementation of the CSPA

Powered by increased market share in the Asian economic, South Africa had been China’s largest trading partner in Africa for seven consecutive years since 2010 (Chen, 2018:4). Two-way trade in 2016 reached according to Chen (2018:4) US$35, 3 billion. During the same visit by President Zuma to China during August 2010 to finalise the CSPA, South African and Chinese companies signed more than a dozen agreements covering investments in railways, power transmission construction, mining, insurance, telecoms and nuclear power (Alden & Wu, 2014:10). However, like most other African countries South Africa is outsized by China’s huge socio-economic realities which inter alia led to substantial influx of Chinese merchandise, a negative trade balance favouring China and an investment posture not addressing deteriorating local unemployment (Owusu-Sekyere, 2017). To put the economic activities however, into context, it is necessary to differentiate between the two elements directly impacting on the economic thematic area, namely Trade and FDI.
6.3.3.2.1 Trade

The period since the formalisation of diplomatic relations between South Africa and China in 1998, experienced fundamental changes in the trade patterns between South Africa and the rest of the world. In 2000, approximately 53% of South Africa’s exports were destined for Europe, the United States of America (USA) and Japan, but shrunk to 37% by 2014 (National Treasury, 2015). According to statistics of the South African government’s National Treasury department (2015), a significant expansion into SADC and a more than tenfold increase in trade with China, was reported for the period 2000 to 2014. The primary reason for the exponential increase, was the rapid increased trade with the BRICS countries since 2000 driven predominantly by the resource needs and economic growth of the Chinese economy (National Treasury, 2015). Ensor (as cited in Sithole, 2015:80) highlights that 90% of South Africa’s top exports to China are in raw materials, while 100% of South Africa’s top imports from the Asian giant are manufactured products. This was in sum, proof of the asymmetric nature of the trade relations between China and South Africa.

Paradoxically, one of the strongest features of the Sino–South African strategic partnership namely trade, also became the most concerning and challenging. South Africa had been according to commentators like Basu (2014) vocal about these concerns. This lead for example to President Zuma’s remarks during 2012 that “… Africa’s lopsided trade relationship with China is unsustainable in the long term”. During an ‘Inward Buying Mission’ hosted by the DTI in South Africa on 30 November 2015, the asymmetrical nature of especially trade relations was raised again. Senior officials in the DTI stated that the South African government was concerned about the tilted trade patterns in favour of the Chinese business, as over 85% of South African exports to China comprised of raw materials (DTI, 2015).

The asymmetrical nature of the flow of trade created a large trade deficit to the detriment of South Africa, driven by high imports of value-added goods and export of bulk resources to the economic powerhouse. The value of mineral products exported to China from South Africa increased from 0.26 billion US dollars in 2004 to its peak of 9.44 billion US dollars in 2011 (National Treasury, 2015). The red bar chart in Figure 6.2 reveals how South Africa’s trade balance with China deteriorated over the years under review. Cumulatively, the negative trade balance between the two countries from 2010 to up to November 2016, stood at 384.1 billion rand. Juxtaposed to that, it was reported that South Africa’s cumulative positive trade balance with the US was 28.3 billion rand.
Apart from the continued negative trade balance, there were also concerns about the structure of trade between South Africa and China. Alden and Wu (2014:15) reported that China imports resources mainly in bulk from South Africa, while South Africa on the other hand imports Chinese value-added manufactured products.

To confirm this trend, Alden and Wu (2014:15) indicated that during 2013 for example, the top five South African exports categories to China were mineral products (76% of exports), base metals, textiles, precious and semi-precious metals and stones as well as wood products. South Africa on the other hand, imported a range of valued-added Chinese merchandise such as clothing, data processing machines, printing machinery, bulldozers and motor vehicles. These export- and import trends are confirmed in Figure 6.3 which provided data as per product type between South Africa, to and from China and the USA. What stands out, is the export of ‘Mineral
Products’ to China to the cumulative value of 430, 6 billion rand viz-a-viz the South African import of ‘Machinery’ from China to the value of 451, 2 billion rand for the period.

Another example of South Africa’s commitment to address the trade gap between the two countries was an initiative whereby South African companies participated in the 17th annual China International Fair for Investment and Trade in September 2013 in Xiamen (Alden and Wu, 2014:17).

Figure 6.3: Trade balance per product between South Africa, China and the USA (South African Markets Insight, 2017)
However, there have been concerted government-driven efforts to improve the trade balance. The DTI of the South Africa, in line with the aim presented in the CSPA that both countries would work together to ensure the inclusion of more value-added products, took the lead to address the lopsided trade pattern. The Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davis led a delegation of 68 companies to the South African Expos 2012 in Beijing and Shanghai (DTI, 2012:1). An important outcome of the initiative was South Africa’s identification of the ‘Top 10 Export Sectors / Products and Investment Projects’ that would prioritise South Africa’s engagements with China (DTI, 2012:2). When announcing the initiative, Minister Davis according to Alden and Wu (2014:17) said that:

“… the best way to celebrate the 15 years of diplomatic and trade ties with China would be to ‘overhaul [the] system of relying on exporting raw resources and invest in the processing and beneficiation of the value chain’.

An important shift by the Chinese government’s approach to bilateral agreements and strategic partnerships was however, observed by Sithole (2015:65): The CSPA opened the interaction between the countries to non-governmental actors, by agreeing to encourage companies from both countries to explore cooperative opportunities in infrastructure construction projects, such as roads, railways, ports, power generation, airports and housing. Proof of this was the conclusion of more than 20 agreements and contracts to the value of US$ 918 million during the China Inward Buying Mission that transpired in Sandton, Johannesburg during the last week of November 2015 (DTI, 2015). This was in addition to the Chinese government’s focus on and successes by the SOE’s and their appetite for energy and infrastructure projects. These developments reached a climax on the eve of the Sixth FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg on 3 December 2015, when eight important and ground-breaking MOU’s agreements were concluded. Although it happened more than four years after the finalisation of the CSPA on 24 August 2010, the MOU’s and agreements in essence concluded on a number of outstanding infrastructural and financial deals, focusing in the main on South Africa’s distressed SOE’s namely Eskom and Transnet. The MOU’s and agreements will be subjected to closer scrutiny in Chapter 7, which deals with the evaluation of the CSPA and how African realism impacted on the Sino–South African relationship.

6.3.3.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Although China became South Africa’s major trading partner during 2009, the FDI relationship lacked the same tenacity (Gelb, 2010:21). The figures discussed below might at first appear to show that FDI improved drastically. However, it will be shown that many of these transaction used to calculate the FDI were based on announced figures which did not represent actual real investment for the period under review. In addition, it should be noted that before the finalisation
of the CSPA during 2010, visionary South African companies had already done very well in improving their investments in China.

While bilateral trade grew exponentially since 1998, the investment picture varied and registered some of the unique characteristics of Sino–South African relations (Alden & Wu, 2014:18). One of these characteristics was that South African companies invested more in China, than their Chinese counterparts had done in South Africa. Moreover, South Africa is the only African country with investments in China, especially in mining and textiles (Owusu-Sekyere, 2017). Given China’s huge foreign exchange reserves, that stood at least US$US 2, 5 trillion in 2010 (Scissors, 2010:1), there were expectations that substantial investment would flow into South Africa, given the close relationship especially after the finalisation of the CSPA in 2010. The reality however, proved different.

Since the event of democracy, three multinational companies with South African origins stood out as entities that created substantial returns and dividends for their shareholders because of early deals with Chinese companies:

- SAB-Miller’s partnership with China Resource Enterprise in CR Snow, which is the largest brewer in China with 71 breweries and a 20% market share (Shevel, 2011:1);
- Naspers media group shareholding in its subsidiary, Tencent (Alden & Wu, 2014:22). The initial stake of US$US 32 million into China's largest Internet company increased to more than USUS$ 14 billion during 2011 (Gelb, 2010:21; Shevel, 2011:1); and,

The benefits for investors of these companies have resulted that Chinese and South African-owned assets became significant in the aggregate stock of the respective foreign-owned assets abroad (Gelb, 2010:21). One of South Africa’s blue-chip companies and government parastatal Sasol, however, could not conclude a 94 000 barrel a day coal-to-synthetic fuels facility with the Shenhua Ningxia Coal Industry Group planned in the Ningxia province of China (Alden & Wu, 2014:22; Shevel, 2011:1). Although a joint venture was initially established, alleged conflicts over intellectual property and profit sharing, derailed the transaction (Alden & Wu, 2014:22). Interestingly, all the above transactions transpired before the formalisation of the CSPA in 2010, and happened with limited government support.

Nonetheless, from an almost zero-base investment profile in 1998, pledges of Chinese investment into the South African economic peaked at almost US$US 60 billion in 2014 as indicated in Figure 6.4. The unfortunate reality however, is that many of these pledges are still under consideration, while other investment and loan agreements were used to bail out struggling
SOEs like Eskom and Transnet. The South African government nonetheless kept the momentum and announced a multi-billion-dollar investment programme in infrastructure in 2012 focusing on infrastructural initiatives that would boost transportation networks, power outputs and rail capacity (Alden & Wu, 2014:20).

![Chinese foreign direct investment in South Africa](image)

**Figure 6.4: Chinese FDI in South Africa (Kuo, 2018)**

A notable example of investment in South Africa, was the involvement of Chinese renewable energy companies in the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) facilitated by the Department of Energy and the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Burgess & Esterhuyse, 2015:2). Companies like Jinko Solar and the Longyuan Power Group cashed in along with other international investors, in the Renewable Energy boom in South Africa and created substantial investments in the poverty-stricken rural areas of South Africa, like the Northern Cape (Burgess & Esterhuyse, 2015:2). Importantly, both Chinese companies invested in local manufacturing, created jobs and benefitted from investment incentives provided by the DTI.

The outstanding features of trade and investment between South Africa and China can be presented in two-fold. Firstly, that a continued asymmetrical trade balance in favour of China, impacted negatively on the South African economy. Secondly, that the perceived benefits especially into South African SOE’s, in the main were loans to keep the ailing entities like Eskom and Transnet, financially afloat. However, the impacts of both the trade and investment elements
of the functional thematic economic area, could also be observed in the cultural, as well as the societal areas of the South African society. This will be considered in the following sub-sections.

6.3.4 Functional Theme Four: The cultural area

Earlier reference was made in the study about the geopolitics of emotion as conceptualised by Moisi (2009) and how cultures of fear, humiliation and hope are reshaping the post-Cold War order. As expected, these cultures also impacted on South African and Chinese societies, as two of the most prominent countries in the realignment of the international society, guided essentially by foreign policies still influenced by the agreed imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955. Influenced by two unrelated phenomena, namely cultural Americanisation of the world and the economic rise of Asia and especially China, globalisation in addition tested and shaped these imperatives (Moisi, 2009:10). Core to these, is also the cultural identities of China and South Africa built on Confucianism and Ubuntu discussed in Chapter 5. Since the first engagements to normalise diplomatic relations between the two diverse countries, focus had been on the importance and potential of cultural affinity between the two societies building on the two concepts. The drive also found its way as an important part of the CSPA, as was the case with earlier Sino–South African bilateral and partnership agreements.

6.3.4.1 The aim of the cultural thematic area in the CSPA

Public diplomacy in the information age has become an important foreign policy tool of soft power focusing on the cultural identities of countries. The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy suggested that cultural diplomacy can be the “... exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interest” (Wu, 2015). The South African and Chinese governments are no exceptions in this regard, using cultural diplomacy to increase their global outreach as well as enhance their image and influence (Alden & Wu, 2014:23). Mechanisms like the media, mega-sport events and tourism promote the cultural uniqueness of respective countries. The 2009 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 SWC were typical examples used effectively by China and South Africa to endorse the profiles and cultural diversity of the respective nations. As argued earlier, Ubuntu and Confucianism anchored the Sino–South African relationship, although the shared struggle credentials as well as cultural underpinnings and values, guided the national interests of both countries. Building on these concepts, the CSPA focused on the strengthening and expansion in accordance with earlier agreements of cultural exchanges and cooperation, with the aim to promote better knowledge and understanding of the cultural diversities of both South Africa and China.
6.3.4.2 Cultural thematic areas activities that contributed to the implementation of the CSPA

The implementation of the CSPA has been enhanced by three distinct activities in the broader cultural thematic areas from 2010 to 2015. Firstly, the 2010 World Expo that transpired between May to October 2010 in Shanghai, China (Alden & Wu, 2014:23). The six-month long event attracted 73 million visitors developing China’s public diplomacy through collaborations, reaching out to various role players such as governments, civil societies, businesses, countries and international organisations, while at the same time promoting the country as an economic powerhouse and responsible nation (Yu, 2010:48). The South African government used the opportunity to the full and participated in the Expo to further the ‘vibrancy’ of its cities, address negative perceptions in China about South Africa and Africa, and gain international exposure. With the theme of ‘It’s Time! Ke nako’, the South African Pavilion at the Expo promoted a different theme each month including the 2010 SWC, remodelling of urban communities, tourism and heritage, environment and climate change as well as trade and investment to the country (DIRCO, 2010). Importantly, South Africa in addition profiled its economy by introducing some of South Africa’s pillar industries including agro-processing, beneficiation of metals and mining technology, defence technology, ICT, as well as bio-fuels and alternative energy (DIRCO, 2010).

Secondly, the role that language, and especially Mandarin played in the Sino–South African relationship. The Chinese government used soft power even stronger after 2004 when the project of CIs was launched by the ‘China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language’ or commonly referred to as the Hanban (Procopio, 2015:99). The aim of the project was according to Procopio (2015:99) to meet the “… demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of multiculturalism and the building of a harmonious world”. By the end of 2013, 440 CIs as well as 646 Confucius classrooms had been established globally (Du Toit, 2015:8). In terms of the African continent, 25 Confucian institutes had been launched, usually linked to institutions of higher education (Du Toit, 2015:8). South Africa, along with Kenya, is home to more CIs than any other country (Alden & Wu, 2014:24). Confucian Institutes in Southern Africa countries are situated at the universities of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Antananarivo in Madagascar, as well as four CIs in South Africa as reported in Chapter 5 (Du Toit, 2015:8). Importantly though, is the drive that the Confucian institutes seem to be the desired instrument to promote cultural links between the two countries. The main aim of these institutes is to teach Mandarin, albeit a simplified traditional Chinese. A study by Procopio published in 2015 called the “The effectiveness of Confucius Institutes as a tool of China’s soft power in South Africa,” concluded that while the initiative’s aim of exposing people to China is capably fulfilled, attempts by a number of Chinese actors to promote their presence and activities in South Africa, can only be seen as partially effective tools of soft power.
Lastly, 2014 and 2015 had been labelled ‘South Africa Year in China’ and ‘China Year in South Africa respectively.’ The rationale for the public diplomacy campaign was according to Alden and Wu (2014) addressing misperceptions within the South African and Chinese societies built around a range of events to promote better understanding of the relationship. The initiative was introduced during President Xi’s visit to South Africa in 2013, when both sides emphasised the need for increased people-to-people engagement (Wu, 2015).

Flowing from this, the South African government hosted a number of promotional events in China, like for instance the Nelson Mandela exhibition in the upmarket 798 Art Zone in Beijing in 2014 (Wu, 2015). During an address to the ‘China-South Africa Business Forum’ meeting in Beijing during December 2014, President Zuma declared that “We are grateful to President Xi Jinping and the government of China for declaring 2014 the year of South Africa in China. This has served to promote South African culture and the economy and to advance cooperation in many spheres. We look forward to a successful Year of China in South Africa next year”. (DIRCO, 2014). China in turn hosted a series of events in South Africa during 2015, which started with a grand opening at the South African State Theatre (Wu, 2015). The activities culminated to the all-important Sixth FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg during the first week of December 2018, co-chaired by both the heads of state of South Africa and China. However, despite the pomp and ceremony of the formal functions, very little information is available on other activities involving ordinary citizens of both countries, as well as the impact that these activities would have had on the intensification of the implementation of the CSPA.

6.3.5 Functional Theme Five: The societal area

The cultural and societal thematic areas are closely interwined as it deals with people-to-people interaction in the main. However, except for an introductory remark inter alia referring “… to further strengthen and deepen the friendly exchanges and cooperation in the people-to-people, cultural and social areas … “, no specific section in the CSPA address the important and substantive matter. Sithole (2015:5), citing Yap and Leong Man, Accone and Harris, indicated that South Africa has a significant multi-generational native Chinese population and “… host the largest Chinese population in Africa, dating back to the arrival of Cantonese traders in 1891, contract labourers in 1904, and immigrants from China, Taiwan and Singapore in recent years”. Given this background, it would be worthwhile to reflect on the Chinese diaspora in South Africa and their interaction with and within the South African society.
6.3.5.1 The aim of the societal thematic area in the CSPA

Based on the importance of the Chinese population in South Africa, it is derived that the strengthening and deepening of people-to-people relations could be presented as the aim of the societal thematic area.

6.3.5.2 Activities that contributed to the implementation of the CSPA

Although the aim might be perceived as broad, it can be honed down to three important aspects or activities that could have influenced the implementation of the CSPA.

Firstly, the way that the Chinese diaspora is structured in South Africa. Forming associations is a worldwide phenomenon through which Diasporas establish communities in order to preserve identity and culture, support the arrival of new immigrants and promote social and economic opportunities (Vivier et al., 2013). The Chinese in South Africa are in this regard, no exception. The sense of nationalism which Beijing promotes among its population, has spread beyond Chinese borders and filtered through to the overseas community (Cardenal & Araujo, 2013:40). The number of Chinese immigrants in Africa has risen sevenfold over less than two decades, although most still plan to return home for retirement, according to a recent survey (Zhou, 2017). The global Chinese diaspora can be estimated at 45 million people, with the Africa continent attracting about one million Chinese nationals, as indicated in Figure 6.5.

![Key Population of Overseas Chinese by Location](image)

**Figure 6.5:** Reflection on the key population of overseas Chinese by location (Greater Pacific, 2018)
According to Park and Alden cited in Alden and Wu (2014:27), Chinese migrants in South Africa stood at more than 350,000 during 2012, which constitute just more than 30% of the Chinese population on the African continent. In addition, a 2010 publication by Park and Chen speculated that there might be more than 120 different Chinese associations throughout South Africa and one of the neighbouring states, Lesotho. These included associations of the earliest immigrants that have been sustained by their descendants, as well as various associations established by and for primarily the Taiwanese community, as well as groups formed by the most recent post-2010 immigrants from China. The organisations are predominantly based on village or province of origin in their mother country. An example, is the Fujian association, which boasts a membership of nearly 70,000 across largely rural Southern Africa and who are in the main involved as shopkeepers (Park & Chen, 2010).

The Chinese community in South Africa can nonetheless be seen as complex, consisting of various ethnic Chinese groups that originated from diverse political, economic and social assimilations (Alden & Wu, 2014:27). Despite these complexities, the Chinese diaspora in South Africa has established themselves as an integral part of the South African society. An example of this, is the fact that three South African citizens of Chinese origin have already been elected to the South African parliament since 1994, representing three different parties namely the ANC, Democratic Alliance and the IFP.

Secondly, the establishment of the South Africa–China People’s Friendship Association (SACPFA). The phenomenon to establish associations spilled over to the broader Sino–South African society, with the establishment of SACPFA modelled on the China–US or China–Japan Friendship Associations, essentially to promote economic and cultural engagements specific to China-South Africa in 2013 (Alden & Wu, 2014:24). Former Northern Cape Premier, turned business magnate and President of SACPFA, Manne Dipico said at the founding ceremony that "There has never been such a broad platform for exchange and cooperation between the peoples of both countries". The purpose of SACPFA has according to him been defined as to (SACPFA, 2013):

- Actively promote bilateral exchanges between local governments in both countries;
- Launch a certain number of commercial and scientific projects to promote exchange and cooperation among enterprises and industries in areas such as economy, business, science, and technology;
- Expand communication and exchange in the cultural area; and,
- Enhance cooperation with other friendly organisations and social groups.
Limited information is however, available in the literature on the activities and progress of SACPFA since the launch during 2013.

The third aspect has to do with the negative perceptions about people and products of Chinese origin by some in the South African society. Importantly, analysts like Alden and Wu (2014:25) surmise that “China–South Africa ties are not merely high-level engagements driven by elite interests”. In addition, Park and Alden (2013:643) fittingly claim that the two broad dimensions of Sino–South African relations resonate and shape Vale’s portrayal of South African IR being composed of an ‘Upstairs’ and ‘Downstairs’ focused on two levels: official and unofficial, which hinges on informal and social interaction (Park & Alden, 2013:643). Accordingly, they argue, that it is the informal and subtle spaces e.g. Downstairs in society that shape the agenda of the more formal relationships e.g. Upstairs through un-orchestrated engagements. This is also applicable in terms of the Sino–South African relationship, which in the final instance is influenced rather by the Downstairs than the Upstairs dimensions. Two contemporary examples that might contribute negatively to the perceptions about China in terms of the Downstairs dimension, are the popularised term ‘Fong Kong,’ referring to inferior merchandise manufactured in China, and the involvement of people from Chinese origin in the illegal trade of rhino horns, abalone and other wildlife products (Alden & Wu, 2014:25). Contrary to this, Park and Alden (2013:653) highlight the other side of the coin namely the bigger cities that each boasts a number of Chinatowns, and Chinese businesses scattered over rural South Africa, providing almost every possible product to poor communities.

It can therefore be surmise that despite the absence of clear aims in CSPA about the involvement of people-to-people interaction, both positive and negative activities transpired that impacted on the implementation of the agreement. What however, surfaced, was the advantage that the Downstairs dimension has over the Upstairs dimension in the way that the unstructured social engagements influence and determine the public perception.

6.4 The validation of the functional thematic areas of the CSPA

The typology—loose, moderate or tight—has not been clarified in the study as yet and therefore needs some consideration. In order to validate each functional thematic area a relative comparison was devised between the different functional thematic areas using the same criteria or elements (as given in the CSPA itself). It was determined that each functional thematic area consisted of four elements. The first step was to allocate a score according to the success of the implementation of each one of the four elements. The elements could therefore be assessed on a descriptive scale from a score from one (minimum) to five (maximum) (see Tables 6.2 to 6.5). These scores were considered to be a representative relative comparison and are referred to as
the ‘validation value’ of the specific element. The main elements were referred to as the ‘validation criteria.’ The four validation criteria were:

i. The relative success achieved in meeting the aims of the respective functional thematic area;

ii. The relative consideration for the implementation of the functional thematic area;

iii. Commitment to implement the agreements within the functional thematic area; and

iv. The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional thematic area.

The validation values were determined according to the following descriptive weights as presented in the following tables:

**Table 6.2:** Description of validation levels in terms of the relative consideration of elements for the implementation of a functional thematic area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Description of the validation level</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>Very little consideration (a score up to two out of five)</td>
<td>1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate consideration (a score of three out of five)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent consideration (a score of 4 to 5)</td>
<td>4–5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.3:** Description of validation levels in terms of the relative consideration for the equal consideration for implementing all of the five functional thematic areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Description of the validation level</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal consideration for implementing all of the five functional thematic areas</td>
<td>Very little consideration (a score up to two out of five)</td>
<td>1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate consideration (a score of three out of five)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent consideration (a score of 4 to 5)</td>
<td>4–5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.4: Description of validation levels in terms of the relative consideration for the commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Description of the validation level</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>Low commitment (a score up to two out of five)</td>
<td>1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate commitment (a score of three out of five)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent commitment (a score of 4 to 5)</td>
<td>4–5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: Description of validation levels in terms of the strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Description of the validation level</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>Very little impact (a score up to two out of five)</td>
<td>1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate impact (a score of three out of five)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent consideration (a score of 4 to 5)</td>
<td>4–5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each functional thematic area was assessed by comparing the results of the different scores of the combined total validation values of the validation criteria. This was done by simply adding the validation values (with a possible maximum of 20) of all the functional thematic areas (with a possible maximum of 100). This allowed to relatively judge the four validation criteria according to the "Description of the validation level" as given in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. To provide a judgement on whether the CSPA itself could be deemed ‘loose,’ ‘moderate,’ or tight,’ all of the validation scores were added, and an average was calculated by dividing the total scores of all five functional areas by five. Based on the outcome of the exercise, it was possible to judge whether or not the CSPA was technically a constructive geopolitical strategic partnership from a South African viewpoint. Accordingly, the process began through assessing each theme’s validation value (see section 6.4.1) and concluded in a summary of the outcomes (see section 6.4.6). The first thematic area will be discussed next.

6.4.1 Functional Theme One: Validation of governmental interaction

The overall aim involving the three fields of the governmental thematic area has been discussed for the period under review. Firstly, the continued interaction and intensity especially between the heads of state of South Africa and China to build on the imperatives of the CSPA, was proof of
an intense relationship that involved almost all organs of the state. From the time of the finalisation of the CSPA in 2010 to the Sixth FOCAC summit in Johannesburg during December 2015, the government-to-government relationship intensified exponentially and filtered down to almost all spheres of government, including the blossoming relationship between the governing political parties e.g. the CPC and the ANC.

Secondly, the intensity in terms of the impact of miscellaneous portfolio’s like education, were however, low. Although Mandarin was introduced in South African schools and certain government institutes since 2015, the impact on the South African society still remains minute and questionable. The most important and constructive however, was the establishment of Confucian Institutes in South Africa, as registered earlier. Other fields like for example health, e-skills development, an incubation programme in ICT for SMME, comprehensive social security, public services and administration as well as gender mainstreaming, planning, poverty eradication and community development and forestry and water resources management did not progress beyond embryonic stages.

Lastly, the consolidation of the Sino–South African cooperation on global affairs, has been the hallmark of the implementation of CSPA (Alden & Wu, 2014). Both South Africa and China fulfilled important roles in the international society, albeit sometimes clouded with controversy especially dealing with issues of human rights as highlighted in earlier chapters. Both governments, but especially Presidents Zuma and Xi played the international game masterfully and establish South Africa and China as notable role players in fora like BRICS, FOCAC, UNSC and the G20. Importantly, South Africa for the first time emerged as a ‘middle-power’ influenced by multilateralism. The South African leadership realised that it cannot act alone effectively, but might have a systematic impact in a small geopolitical group like SADC or even greater influence in the international society through involvement in IGOs (Prinsloo, 2017:10). Although more progress still needs to be made in terms of the objectives of the two countries in the transformation of IGOs like the UNSC specifically, the establishment of alternative funding institutions like the NDB of the BRICS grouping, proved worthwhile. South Africa’s role on the African continent, especially the relationship with Nigeria and other Francophone countries like the Central African Republic (CAR), however, impacted negatively on a cohesive performance. Considering the criteria under review as presented in Table 6.6, a combined validation value of 15 was determined for the governmental interaction between the leadership of South Africa and China.
Table 6.6: The validation value of the functional thematic area governmental interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of the respective thematic area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.2 Functional Theme Two: Validation of the security and defence thematic area

It can therefore be argued that given the potential for cooperation and interaction in the security and defence thematic area implementing the CSPA, progress in the attainment of peace and security in Africa, has been made by both the South African and Chinese governments. The contributions however, was average and were blemished by SANDF’s involvement in the Battle of Bangui. The reasons can vary from the size and efficacy of the PLA that overshadowed the SANDF in all aspects, to political will and the motives of political leaders. The security and defence functional thematic area is therefore presented in Table 6.6 as 9.

Table 6.7: The validation value of the security and defence functional thematic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of the respective thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4.3 Functional Theme Three: Validation of the economic thematic area

The crux of the aim of the economic thematic area was to improve the negative trade balance structurally by promoting trade in the manufacturing and value-added sectors. When validating the two elements namely trade and FDI, it can be surmise that despite serious efforts by both the South African and Chinese governments, the results for the period under review were less than expected. Although billions of dollars were involved in paper transactions, the negative trade balance increased because of one important reality—the failure to substantially improve the manufacturing capacity of South Africa. To this end, Matambo (2014:77) avowed that “… this has put South Africa at the disadvantage end of the trade equation”.

The majority of the substantive agreements and MOUs that were concluded, only transpired at the end of 2014 and, in all probability will take years to impact on the undesirable trade balance and structure. In addition, the South African economy including the transport networks are geared towards an export-driven economy, and despite initiatives from the South African government and specifically the DTI, the balance of trade will rather deteriorate than improve. A glimmer of hope was the involvement of Chinese companies in REIPPP, which positively impacted on the local manufacturing capacity of the Alternative Energy industry. It was however, short lived, because of the declining GDP of South Africa, a much lower energy demand and a delay in the announcement and conclusions of next rounds of REIPPP.

The primary consideration was the inability of especially the South African government to be innovated and have the political will to implement the letter and spirit of the CSPA. Essentially, the South African government should have protected and enhanced South Africa’s national interests by inter alia focusing on basic matters like the implementation of economic policies, which would have at least decreased the negative trade balance with China. In the main, the functional thematic economic area is scored at eight considering the four elements.

Table 6.8: The validation value of the economic functional thematic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of the respective thematic area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4.4 Functional Theme Four: Validation of the cultural thematic area

The aim of the cultural thematic area in sum was to promote better knowledge and understanding of the cultural diversities of both South Africa and China. Both governments were highly involved and effective in the successes of the 2010 Expo in Shanghai. Importantly, it exposed South Africa’s cultural diversity to a broad spectrum of attendees to the Expo, and also stimulated interest for the 2010 SWC. The establishment of Confucianism Institutes in South Africa, further kindled interest in Mandarin as a way to close the cultural gap. Although relative low numbers of people were involved, it led to the introduction of Mandarin as an extra language in a few schools, mainly in Gauteng and even in some government departments such as the SAPS. Given the limited information that is available of the 2014 and 2015 South Africa in China and China in South Africa projects, the only conclusion that can be reached is the that the impact was insignificant and in all probability did not enhance the implementation of the CSPA. The cultural functional thematic area is therefore validated as 13.

Table 6.9: The validation value of the cultural functional thematic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of the respective thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.5 Functional Theme Five: Validation of the societal thematic area

Validating the role that the societal thematic area played in the implementation of the CSPA, must be done against the realisation that the Chinese society, albeit minute, had become an integral part of the South African society. Through an abundance of well-structured and deep-rooted associations and networks, the Chinese diaspora in South Africa has become involved in the length and breadth of Southern Africa. The functionality of the strategic role that the CSPA is playing still needs to be determined. However, given the involvement of the influential South African and Chinese opinion makers the friendship association will certainly enhance the imperatives of the CSPA positively. To gauge the public perception of the broader South African
society on China and especially the influence it portrays, remains an open ended exercise. The societal functional thematic area is therefore scored at 11.

Table 6.10: The validation value of the societal thematic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Criteria</th>
<th>Validation value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of the respective thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment to implement the agreements within the functional area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scores given for each functional area are summarised as follow and the total score out of a maximum of 100, will be used to finally validate the implementation of the CSPA. The interpretation of the validation scores and the outcome of the summary, will be discussed in the next section.

6.4.6 Interpretation of the results on validation

The summary of the validation scores are given in Table 6.11. The aggregate of the scores are then averaged to provide a subjective judgement on the effectiveness of the CSPA. In other words, the validation scores were added up with a maximum score of 100 (five functional thematic areas times a maximum validation score of 20 points).

Table 6.11: Summary of the validation scores presented as a score out of 100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Scores of individual functional thematic areas</th>
<th>Total score out of 100 max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional Theme One</td>
<td>Functional Theme Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (56/5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This allowed for the overall scaling comparison and complete the validation results for the implementation of CSPA and resulted for a comparable description in the typology of the technical intensity of the implementation of the CSPA being either loose, moderate or tight (see Table 6.12).
In the case under review, the combined functional thematic areas scored a point of 56, and on average was calculated at 11.2. According to the scale presented in Table 6.12, 11.2 gives a validation descriptor of “moderate”. This implies that the degree of coupling between South Africa and China formalised by the CSPA as a comprehensive strategic partnership, can be seen as average. Despite the fact that the economic functional thematic area is often found at the forefront of collaborative activities, the impact of the aggravating impacts of the negative trade balance, were a significant factor from 2010 to 2015.

Table 6.12: The validation descriptor based on the combined validation value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined validation value (Average)</th>
<th>Validation descriptor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5–9</td>
<td>Loose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>Tight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5 Conclusion

The purpose of Chapter 6 was to consider and establish if the implementation of CSPA provided a constructive strategic partnership for South Africa with, for instance China. Five functional thematic areas namely governmental, safety and security, economic, cultural as well as societal, were the focus of the chapter to establish what impact they had on the intensification of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two developing countries. What importantly has been established, is that South Africa’s relationship with China had advanced beyond a ‘minerals exchange’ compared to the rest of SADC and some other Africa countries on the resource rich African continent (Owusu-Sekyere, 2017). It is therefore possible to surmise that the decision to push forward from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership, was the culmination of shared common interests and shared values, driven by a contemporaneous desire by Beijing to strengthen coordination and planning between South Africa and China (Alden & Wu, 2014:10).

The implementation of the CSPA can therefore be seen as a collective attempt by both governments to make South Africa the jewel in the African crown. At the time of the finalisation of the CSPA during 2010, South Africa was according to Sithole (2015:64) “… the first developing and only African country to sign such a declaration with China” while “… China had entered into such partnership with only eleven other countries”. As a result, analysts like Sithole (2015:64) averred that the CSPA “represents the most significant partnership for South Africa and is, amongst the most important for China”.

Yet, the Sino–South African relationship can also be seen as a relationship of paradoxes, breaking with many of the assumptions that underpinned contemporary analyses and preconceived notions of China–Africa ties. For instance, from 2010 to 2015 South African investments into China exceeded those of China into South Africa. Furthermore, while economic ties and trade between the two countries have extended beyond the practices of resource extraction and infrastructure financing seen in other African countries, the continued trade gap in favour of China impacted negatively on internal South African socio-economic realities, like for instance unemployment and the decline in the GDP of South Africa.

Importantly, an amended model used by analysts like Adelle and Kotsopoulos, Gajauskaite, Geldenhuys and Wilkins was used to consider whether the aims as presented in the CSPA in the respective functional thematic areas were loose, moderate or tight. Based on the summary of the validation of the functional thematic areas of the CSPA built on four distinct elements, namely the relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of a respective thematic area, relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area, the commitment to implement the agreements within the functional thematic area, as well as the strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area, it was proven that the intensity of the implementation of the CSPA between South Africa and China, can be presented as moderate.

It can therefore be submitted that, although the economic thematic area and specifically the South Africa’s negative trade balance with China negatively impacted on the aims of CSPA, the agreement and subsequent MOUs and other bilateral agreements provided a constructive comprehensive strategic partnership for South Africa with China. Under the careful guidance and strategic leadership of specifically President’s Xi and Zuma, the CSPA acted as an enabler that elevated the close relations between the South African and Chinese’s governments beyond reproach. However, it was also established in the chapter that although some functional thematic areas like societal and cultural are contributing positively to the relationship between South Africa and China, the economic functional thematic area impacted negatively on the relationship. Coupled to the theoretical paradigm of the study namely African realism, it would however, be worthwhile to evaluate and assess whether or not strategic partnership agreements such as the CSPA, are in the best interest of South Africa. That will be the focus of the final chapter of the study, Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 7: A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVALUATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

7.1 Introduction

South Africa and China have established extensive political and trade relations since 1994. After the end of the Cold War, intensified Sino–African relations and a changing world order have critically influenced the debate considering the pros and cons of the involvement of China in Africa. However, the role and global influence portrayed by China were not only crucial to the post-Cold War order, but also intensified especially since the election by the CPC of President Xi as leader of the most populated nation on earth. China’s impact on Africa and the rest of the world could therefore be seen as the biggest global geopolitical shift of the early twenty-first century.

Some analysts perceive the interaction between South Africa and China, mainly driven by the energy and resource needs of China and influenced by trade and aid imperatives, as advantageous and constructive. Others, again, are convinced that neocolonialist tendencies are the motivation for China’s involvement in Africa. Moreover, China’s involvement is experienced as a threat and a curse. South Africa has nonetheless emerged as an important strategic partner in China’s Africa policy. The relationship was formalised as the Beijing Declaration on the establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China, ordinarily referred to as the CSPA. The presidents of South Africa and China, Jacob Zuma and Hu Jintao signed the agreement in Beijing on 24 August 2010 in China. The CSPA is supported by multi- and bi-national agreements between the respective governments.

The primary research question of the study (“Are geopolitical strategic partnership agreements such as the CSPA in the best interest of South Africa according to African Realism theory?”), was up to now considered from both a pragmatic and theoretical perspective. Pragmatic, considering whether the CSPA was successful and favourable to South Africa and theoretical, in the manner in which it was agreed to and affected by the South African government’s adoption of an African realism approach. The focus of Chapter 7 shifts to an evaluation and assessment of whether or not strategic geopolitical partnership agreements such as the CSPA, are in the best interest of South Africa according to the meta-theory of the study, namely African realism.

The first part of the discussion focuses on an evaluation of the CSPA based on the outcomes of the assessments of the formation and implementation of the important bilateral agreement between the South African and Chinese governments as discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 of the study.
(see section 7.2). The second section of this chapter (Section 7.3) assesses the theoretical impact of African Realism on the CSPA. This includes the impact that the two elements of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy, had on the Sino–South African relationship for the period 2010 to 2015. The final section of the chapter deals with possible recommendations for further research. The conclusion of the study links with the rest of the study as follows:

Figure 7.1: Chapter 7 layout: A concluding perspective on the evaluation of the CSPA
7.2 Understanding the pragmatic context of the CSPA

7.2.1 The evolution and attributes of strategic partnerships such as the CSPA

As discussed in earlier chapters of the study, it remains an age-old phenomenon that certain multi- or bilateral agreements between states are more important and comprehensive or ‘special' and ‘privileged' than other agreements. The evolution of strategic partnerships reconfigured the international order. The hierarchy of strategic partnerships are further influenced by common values, shared interests and mutual understanding between states and/or IGOs. It was highlighted that although the definition of strategic partnerships lacks uniformity and certainty, it has become an important and well-used international relations tool. Strategic partnerships are informed by business and organisational study models impacting on the following attributes namely a system principle, strategic cooperation, national interests, parity between states as well as longevity and flexibility of agreements between states and/or IGOs. Wilkins conceptualised three sequential phases namely the formation, implementation and evaluation of strategic partnerships.

7.2.2 The basis on which South Africa signed the CSPA with China and continued with the agreement from 2010 to 2015

The CSPA evolved from the inception of diplomatic ties in 1998 and was formalised 12 years later as a geopolitical comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and China. By considering the foreign policies of both the South African and Chinese governments, specific trends could be registered confirming the original objectives of the intention to conclude the CSPA. These objectives included the intensification of bilateral relations promoting the common development of the two countries, to deepen China–Africa cooperation; to strengthen South–South cooperation and, to jointly address global challenges.

Built on Chinese exceptionalism, SEZs became important and strategic geopolitical instruments to structure and develop the most populated state’s economy initially built on the import of bulk mineral resources and commodities and export of value-added goods. The growing resource and commodity needs of China, necessitated new horizons which led to greater involvement in Africa using primarily soft power to pursue the Chinese Dream as conceptualised by President Xi Jinping since 2012. By adopting multilateralism as a post-Cold War policy directive, smaller states like for instance South Africa, became important strategic geopolitical partners for China.

South Africa's remarkable entry into the community of nations during 1994, led to a new beginning after colonialism and apartheid. By using the country’s short-lived iconic status, the South African government promoted a strong African Agenda impacting on the transformation of the global system and IGOs like the UN and the AU. Two central tenets of South Africa’s foreign policy,
from the Bandung Conference in 1955, namely Pan-Africanism and South–South solidarity in the main informed the objectives of the foreign policy. South Africa's ambitions to play a notable role in the international society, were affected by the country's privileged involvement in FOCAC and BRICS. The election of Zuma as president of South Africa in 2009 initiated an important drive between the internal socio-economic priorities and the international exposure of the country. Despite differences on human rights, labour movements and union matters, similarities in terms of defence and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping specifically in Africa, economic cohesiveness impacting on world-wide trade and investment, an anti-Western campaign and a shared pragmatic socialist ideology between the South African and Chinese governments, created the basis for the finalisation of the CSPA.

7.2.3 The primary reason(s) for South Africa to sign the CSPA and continue with its implementation

The geopolitical developments between South Africa and China since 1998, were described earlier in Chapter 5 against the background of the four factors which influenced the formalisation of strategic partnerships (the (political) environment uncertainty; the strategic fit, the system principle, and, the involvement of the elite). Consideration was further given to the historical links between the ANC, SACP and China. This allowed for the determination that the common denominator of the amicable Sino–South African relations were rooted in socialism as espoused by the Chinese government.

The tacit shift to a more realpolitik-driven agenda illustrated in South Africa's challenging decision to rather side with China than Taiwan after the end of apartheid, had occurred in tandem with the global phenomena of China's drastic rise and the particular economic focus on the African continent. Both country's repositioning in the global arena brought serious changes and challenges, but even more possibilities. The initial uncertainty after 1994 turned into new opportunities for both countries, albeit that the trade asymmetry in favour of China, remained a constant reminder of the complexities of the Sino–South African relationship. However, the manner in which the South African government, in particular since the Motlanthe and Zuma presidencies, bowed to pressure from the Chinese government and the BRICS grouping, renegaded one of the most important founding principles of the South African Constitution, namely human rights. South Africa and China nonetheless confidently cooperated in the realignment of the post-Cold War order. The involvement of the two countries on shared multilateral platforms, provided mutual support in global forums such as BRICS, FOCAC, the UN and G20 on multiple initiatives, which reflected their shared and mutual interests in reforming the global architecture in favour of the needs of the developing world.
The reasons for the South African government to have concluded the CSPA during 2010, and continue with it, were based rather on the combined shared values and common interests of China and South Africa, than South Africa’s perceived national interests. Since 2009 primarily, the South African government deliberately and with vigour sided with the Global South and especially China and Russia under the auspices of President Zuma. With the support of the Chinese leadership, South Africa enhanced the national interest of both countries as stipulated in the opening paragraphs of the CSPA to further strengthen bilateral relations promoting the common development of the two countries, to deepen China–Africa cooperation, to strengthen South–South cooperation and to jointly address global challenges. This however, is not a fusion of the foreign policies of China and South Africa, but rather confirmation that the South African foreign policy, correctly or incorrectly, aborted the principles of Ubuntu and human rights in favour of the convergence of Sino–South African economic diplomacy.

The attainment of goals had become a priority, if the Sino–South African partnership was to become sustainable.

7.2.3.1 Goal attainment

South Africa’s middle-power status made the country susceptible to multilateralism and potential partnerships at global and continental levels (Neethling, 2017:44). In line with the argument of Renard (2016:31), that bilateralism is the default level of international relations, the buoyant Sino–South African relations led to the finalisation of the CSPA, which was a stepping-stone to BRICS membership. Importantly the system principle, as one of the attributes of strategic partnerships as discussed in section 3.3.1, substantiated that both South Africa and China share multilateralism as a denominator in their foreign policies. South Africa’s inclusion in the BRICS group, had major consequences for African development, supported by the rise as a contending force of power and influence in the international society.

De Kadt (2010:22) argues that "... the end of the Cold War marked the end of a period in which the principal conflict that defined global politics was between two fundamentally different and incompatible economic systems, and between the ideological constructs through which they were represented and defended". After the removal of the constructs, the balance of power and influence shifted from the West to the East. Supporting the argument, Yu (2010:1) motivates that "Historic changes occurred in the first decade of the twenty-first century". This created the third great power shift of the modern era. Putting the order in perspective, Zakaria (2008:2) submits that "... the first was the rise of the western world around the 15th century. The second shift was the rise of the United States in the nineteenth century. It is now the third shift called the rise of the rest". With a population of about 1.3 billion people, China is central to this new world order.
Yet, the realignment of global power from the West to the East brought critical issues to the international arena and globalised world (Mahbubani, 2008; Roach, 2017; Yu, 2010). Most important, is the impact of the economic liberalisation of China started in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping “… set in motion China’s gradualist road of capitalist-orientated development” (Alden, 2007). Reflecting on these gains, Freemantle and Stevens (2010:2) submit that “… the Chinese economy has expanded by an average of 9, 87% y/y each year since 1978”. Consequently, the considerable increase in trade, development and economic activity during the last three decades has established China as the de facto leader of the developing world.

South Africa, on the other hand, established itself as the most influential role player in Africa. After democratisation in 1994, the ANC government embarked on a transformational agenda to address the inequalities created by colonialism and apartheid. Despite the good intentions, the post-liberation realities of poor governance and service delivery, crime, corruption and political volatility have created instability and insecurity in South Africa (Johnson, 2008:445–506). Nonetheless, regardless of the recent negative perceptions, South Africa’s involvement in the SADC, BRICS, and Forum for China Africa Cooperation FOCAC, AU, the G20 and the UN validate the significance of the country in the global arena.

7.2.3.1.1 Renewed agreements and MOUs: Sixth FOCAC Summit

As part of the progress between the two countries in terms of the implementation of the CSPA, the action plans, renewed agreements and new MOU’s as pointed out in ‘Annexures A and B’, were concluded during the first week of December 2015 in the run-up to the Sixth FOCAC summit co-chaired by South Africa and China in Johannesburg (Brand South Africa, 2015). Guided by the ‘Action Plan on the Strengthening of the Joint Working Group between China and South Africa’, it was evident that the approach to the Sino–South Africa relationship was extra intense and focused. Where in the past, it was more rhetoric than achievement, greater detail was spelled out in the action plans, MOU’s and agreements concluded before the start of the important event.

The message presented by President’s Xi and Zuma during the Sino–South African bilateral meetings, was that the time for talk was over and that detailed implementation of agreements was a priority. Twelve action plans, MOU’s, agreements and business deals worth USUS$ 6,5 billion were concluded, which included a wide spectrum of topics and projects incorporating procurement, health and science engagements, energy and electricity transmission, culture as well as educational exchanges (Gaffey, 2015:1). Of greater relevance, was the scope of a variety of action plans which emphasised for instance the procurement of locomotives, the civilian nuclear energy project, investment in renewable energy, investment cooperation in industrial parks, trade promotion, focusing on South African product expos and Chinese trade missions, promoting the export of South African products to China and cooperation in the South African governments
Black Industrialists Programmes, visa facilitation, financial cooperation and the upgrading of national electricity transmission and distribution systems. Although many of the specific projects were on the face of it general bilateral agreements, others like the nuclear energy and locomotive deals, already had to raise serious concerns about the motives and objectives of the proposed transactions.

The agreements and MOUs signed during the Sixth FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg, heralded a new era of Sino–South African relations, albeit that some deals subsequently became overshadowed with controversy. According to the BBC (Gaffey, 2015:1), Chinese businesses signed 26 deals during the visit by the Chinese delegation to Johannesburg, the largest of which was an initial USUS$2.5 billion Chinese investment with a South African state-owned rail company, Transnet to provide locomotives. The agreement by Transnet to buy 359 electric locomotives from China South Rail Zhuzhou Electric and 232 diesel locomotives from China North Rail Rolling Stock in October 2012, linked to provisions for technology transfer to local operators, was initially welcomed (Alden & Wu, 2014:20; Basson & Du Toit, 2017:103). Alden and Wu (2014:20) suggest that given the continued failure of Transnet to deliver to the promise of export-led growth during a period of rising resource prices, the transaction could have facilitated improvements in China–South Africa trade. A further USUS$500 million loan to ESKOM, South Africa’s financial distressed government owned power utility company, was also concluded (Gaffey, 2015:1).

Unfortunately, these business dealings became some of the most controversial and investigated transactions in post-apartheid South Africa given the flawed and corrupt manner in which the almost 50 billion dollar transactions, unfolded. The procurement of locomotives and the possible finalisation of the procurement of nuclear energy technology, became highly publicised and contested in terms of the alleged state capture (Madonsela, 2017) and serious patterns of corruption and patronage in all-ready distressed SOEs such as ESKOM, Transnet and Denel. President Zuma as well as ministers, handpicked business cartels and family members, were directly implicated. An interdisciplinary, interuniversity research partnership that aimed to contribute to the public discourse about state capture in South Africa, labelled as The state capacity research project (Swilling, 2017) in detail documented how the Zuma-centred power elite built and consolidated a symbiotic relationship between the constitutional state and a shadow
state in order to execute a silent coup. The report has fittingly been branded: *Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa was Stolen* (Swilling, 2017). This perceived coup dominated public debate about the future of democratic governance in South Africa ever since then Public Protector Thuli Madonsela published her report entitled *State of capture* in late 2016. Further considered will be given to the matter in the subsection that deals with the elements of African realism, and in particular neopatrimonialism.

What is clear from especially Annexure B, was the trend to adopt elaborate plans built on areas of the CSPA to address a broad spectrum encapsulating each sector of society. An important addition, was the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road’, which was considered earlier in the study. The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) has become a trade mark of the Chinese Dream, contra to the American Dream, strongly promoted by President Xi since his ascent as President during 2013. According to the MOU, both South Africa and China were committed to jointly promote the massive projects. The ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road project, or commonly referred to as the BRI, was again endorsed by the South African government during the same meeting in Johannesburg on 3 December 2015. Yet, given South Africa’s location on the southern tip of Africa, possible benefits and advantages of the BRI for South Africa remains uncertain and questionable.

7.2.3.1.2 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Where South Africa in the past was promoted as the ‘Gateway to Africa’, the BRI is favouring the Kenyan port of Mombasa and Djibouti, strategically located on the Horn of Africa. China’s first overseas military base has been constructed in Djibouti, from where it keeps an eye on one of the most focal maritime checkpoints in the world: the Gulf of Aden, specifically the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, through which an estimated 12.5% to 20% of global trade passes every year (Wang, 2018). To this end, Mao (2017:10) avers that although South Africa served as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa and especially the Southern African region, the country’s role is declining because of fast growing African economies such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya. This viewpoint is shared by Naidoo (2018) that contends that the BRI delivers a final blow to South Africa’s foreign policy claim to be the preferred gateway to Africa. What however can save the day for South Africa going forward, was the beneficial partnership between Pretoria and Beijing which culminated as the CSPA and elevated South Africa’s status to an influential multilateral and global role-player at regional, continental and international fora such as SADC, the AU, FOCAC, BRICS, the G20 as well as the UNSC. South Africa’s, as well as China’s role globally and on the African continent, could therefore be seen as greatly entrenched in the broader imperatives of the CSPA striving to achieve the shared goals.
The allegations of impropriety implicating a number of senior South African politicians, including the head of state, as well as government officials and board members, must have tainted the country’s image as a credible, worthwhile and honest partner. It can certainly be seen as a factor that could jeopardise the goal attainment, especially in the interconnected BRICS grouping and South Africa’s role as the Gateway to Africa. The perceptions of partners, especially in the volatile African context, could however be important than anticipated by the South African authorities.

7.2.3.2 Mutual perceptions by the partners

Flowing from the attainment of goals, mutual perceptions importantly draw attention to issues that may impact on the integrity of a specific strategic partnership (Geldenhuys, 2015:137). The factors highlighted by Geldenhuys (2015:137) can include historical legacies, ideological leanings, cultural affinities and mutual trust, which could over a period of time, be indicative of the permanency of a partnership. Wilkins (2008:367) contends that although some strategic partnerships may dissolve or continue more in form than substance, others could expand by taking in new partners or evolve into a closer relationship culminating in an alliance. The BRICS alliance, is an example of such a development.

7.2.3.2.1 BRICS attributes

Naidu (2015:7) promotes the view that the most prominent attribute of BRICS, in the context of global economic governance, is that the grouping’s identity originated from a general consent especially from the developing world that the global economic and political status quo cannot continue.
Figure 7.2: BRICS: Chart of Indicators (IMF, 2011)

This focus can be seen as the ‘glue’ that keeps the BRICS countries together. Flowing from that, South Africa’s membership in BRICS should according to Zuma (2013:17) “… be viewed in the context of recasting South Africa’s international relations after decades of isolation during the apartheid era as a pariah state”. In addition, South Africa and China view their involvement in BRICS as rectifying the imbalances and unfairness of the global system by correcting disparities in the global distribution of power and through a reformed global architecture (Naidu, 2015:7). Serious questions were however raised in terms of the commonality and shared aims between South Africa and other BRICS states (Xiong, 2012:42). Furthermore, was South Africa punching above its weight in the international arena? Did South Africa deserve to be part of the perceived elite of the rising powers?

When comparing the statistics between BRICS states provided in Figure 7.2, it is clear that South Africa is indeed dwarfed by almost all the indicators. Out of the five indicators under consideration,
South Africa was the country with the smallest population (49 million people) as well as geographical area (1 219 090 km²) and also had the smallest GDP in 2012 (US$366 billion). Brazil had a lower GDP growth rate (1, 5%) than South Africa (2, 5%) in 2012, whilst both India (US$3 978) and China (US$9 451) had lower GDP per capita than South Africa (US$11 859).

A fundamental point however is that the BRICS grouping was never about the numbers only, and had other geopolitical undertones and motivations. Or, as Xiong (2012:43) appropriately argued:

“… the intension of the BRICS grouping was to evolve beyond mere economic association in the perception of the global investment community—the BRICS political grouping at summit level is a coordinated attempt to translate combined economic power into international clout. Therefore, accounting for the economic gap between South Africa and BRIC partners are geopolitical considerations and diplomatic strategy”.

The inclusion of South Africa into the BRICS grouping during 2010 in addition strategically provided the Zuma presidency with a robust platform for engagement in two struggles that previously escaped the country: First, to establish South Africa as a Sub-Saharan regional leader and secondly, an ability to demand and take to task some IGOs, such as the UN and the IMF (Anthony et al., 2015:7). It can therefore be surmised that from a foreign policy perspective, President Zuma masterminded South Africa’s inclusion into the BRICS grouping with zest and perfection, albeit with the support of one of the countries closest allies, namely China and to the ire of the majority of Western countries.

7.2.3.3 External factors

In line with the above assessment, as well as research conducted by Neethling (2017:39–61) on the opportunities offered by a more nuanced and pragmatic South African foreign policy designed on multilateralism, four important viewpoints can be inferred in terms of the impact of external factors on South Africa’s BRICS membership. The first factor is South Africa’s global image.

7.2.3.3.1 South Africa’s global image

BRICS members established the evolving state category of BRICS partners as well as potential BRICS powers, which included Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Mexico and South Korea. Although South Africa initially seemed ill-fitted to the BRICS formation, the country established itself as the SADC regional leader, as well as promoting the African agenda on global platforms. As a middle-power, South Africa also deemed itself as an interlocutor among the great powers, although South Africa’s role as superpower on the African continent became dubious, as well as questionable. South Africa could no longer gain from the erstwhile struggle credentials of the ANC, neither on the heroic Mandela persona that characterised the first few years of democracy after 1994 (Louw-
Vaudrun, 2016:209–210). Sighting the Battle of Bangui debacle in the CAR, the Al-Bashir fiasco and continuous xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa that were discussed earlier in the study as examples, Louw-Vaudrun (2016:209–210) suggests that South Africa was a declining superpower in Africa, both in terms of soft and hard power. A global perception grew that South Africa lost the moral authority to fulfil a leadership role on behalf of the African continent. It was worsened by alleged impropriety by President Zuma, including the involvement of family, friends and cohorts in state capture and the looting of South African SOE’s such as Transnet, ESKOM and Denel. South Africa however was exposed to the second factor namely global networks, influenced by multiple identities.

7.2.3.3.2 Global networks and multiple identities

The benefit of BRICS affiliation for South Africa could be found in the access to opportunities through the many interconnected globalised political and economic networks of the partners. South Africa however, deliberately decided to engage on bandwagoning (presented in Chapter 2) with super powers like China. The South African government strategically aligned itself with especially China (and Russia), with the expectation that a new post-Cold War anti-Western world order would be a reality rather sooner than later. Importantly, Neethling (2017:39) contends that “... South Africa with its low economic growth, high levels of poverty and lack of employment opportunities cannot afford to follow an approach of narrow interest in relation to the BRICS formation”. The South African government was therefore advised to adopt multiple identities in terms of its foreign affairs policies. Analysts like Landsberg (2010:289) for example motivated that the Zuma-administration had to close the domestic-foreign policy gap when dealing with national interests. However, contrary to the advice and policy documents like the NDP 2030, the ANC’s NGC discussion documents during September 2015 articulated the ruling party’s strong anti-Western and anti-imperialist perspective of the world during September 2015 (Siridopoulos et al., 2016:2). With this ANC policy position of the ANC as background, the next factor should consider the realities of globalisation.

7.2.3.3.3 “Talk left and walk right”

Expectations by the South African government that the BRICS formation, with China in control, could serve as a counter ideological hegemonic power block against the West, must be treated with caution. The reality remains that in a globalised multi-polar world order, Chinese trade and investment continues to be mainly directed towards the big economies of the Western world. Moreover, the cohesiveness of the BRICS grouping is also in question according to Qobo & Soko (cited in Besada et al., 2013:9), considering for instance:

- the conflicting policies and interests amongst partners;
economic competition between China and India;
China’s bid against India as a permanent member of the UNSC,
China’s allegiance with Pakistan inter alia involving the highly contested Kashmir border dispute with India; as well as,
the decades long unresolved feud over Tibet, also involving China and India.

Although South Africa’s foreign policies are deeply entrenched in anti-Western rhetoric, Neethling (2017:57) argues that insufficient evidence existed for the period under review linking actions of China, Brazil or India to anti-Western rhetoric, including ideological motives related to the creation of a counter-hegemonic alliance in the global order. Interestingly, Anthony (2016:3) speculates that when it comes to international political economy, no one “talks left and walk right” more than the Chinese themselves. The crux of Anthony’s (2016:3) argument is imbued in the fact that both South Africa and China “… are part of a broader post-Cold War economic pragmatism in which domestic and foreign policies, be they left, right or centre, are subordinate to the market imperative”. This, importantly relates to the last external factor that could impact on South Africa’s BRICS membership, namely the link between foreign affairs policies and domestic challenges.

7.2.3.3.4 Foreign affairs policies and domestic challenges

The need for the formulation of foreign policies detached from the limitations of a narrow ideological foreign policy stance, as well as the South African government’s pressing domestic challenges (such as unemployment and joblessness, policy uncertainty, crime and corruption and poor service delivery) that escalated since 1994, certainly needs urgent attention. Whilst political analysts like Mutambara (2013:54) denounces Western-style democracy and promotes effective engagements with the Chinese governments, Neethling (2017:57) cautions against the constant rallying against the US and ‘the West’, as it “… undercuts the traditional investors in the South African market”. These sentiments were over time shared by foreign policy analysts such as Georghiou (2015), Landsberg (2010), Qobo and Dube (2015) as well as Qobo and Nyathi (2016), inter alia motivating for a more-balanced and nuanced foreign policy approach crafted on multiple identities based on the convergence of domestic challenges with foreign affairs policies.

Recent incidents, however, have given rise to questions on the actual motives for the South Africa-China relationship. The most prominent case in point was the way that the South African government dealt with the visa application of the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of Tibet in 2011. The Dalai Lama was invited to attend the 80th birthday celebration of Bishop Desmond Tutu, a fellow Nobel laureate (Polgreen, 2011:11). The application was declined by the Department of Home Affairs, citing time constraints as the reason. COPE and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) challenged the matter in court. The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in a unanimous judgement on 29 November 2012 that “… the former minister of Home Affairs
Nkosazama Dlamini-Zuma had deliberately delayed her decision by four months...”. (Dlodlo & Du Plessis, 2012).

As aptly illustrated by Zapiro, many perceived the behaviour of the South African government as if the puppet master (Hu) is dictating to the puppet (Dlamini-Zuma) on how to conduct South Africa’s foreign policy in the cartoon presented in Figure 7.3. Hu is symbolically covering Africa with stretched legs, which supports the notion of a neocolonialist threat. It would be argued that the assertion referred to earlier by Jarrett is probable and a reality in terms of the Sino–South African relationship.

![Figure 7.3: Cartoon (Hainebach, 2012)](image)

Other examples that strengthen the argument include South Africa’s position on the Security Council of the United Nations, supporting China (and Russia) on their positions regarding the civil war in Syria (United Nations, 2012). Papenfus (2010:63) refers to this approach as “… friendships masquerading as technicalities and processes over issues of principal substance”.

In sum, South Africa’s membership in BRICS was strategically initiated and masterfully concluded by President Zuma with the finalisation of the CSPA during 2010. Yet, whilst elements like international networks promoting the Global South and exposure to global platforms elevated South Africa to a next level in the international society to pursue and embrace changing
geopolitical and economic realities, the country could not afford to forsake or alienate Western allies and partners. The reality nonetheless indicates that anti-Western conduct and an overbearing Global South allegiance instilled by Chinese influence, became the norm during the Zuma presidency. The next section will against this background, evaluate the impact of African realism on the CSPA.

7.3 The impact of African Realism on the CSPA

It was argued in Chapter 2, that realism in its various forms and variants, impact drastically on Africa and the broader realm of IR. Yet, reference was also made to the contention of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:69) that IR, as traditionally constituted and in its mainstream trajectory, is narrow and increasingly limited as a discourse about world politics. African realism, as conceptualised by Henderson (2015), provided a new meta-theoretical paradigm on the complexities when considering real life experiences and post-Cold War developments, in the developing world, as well as on the African continent. In addition, Kalu (2014) claimed that in the context of state-centric realism, all actors are driven by their own interests and act in pursuit of them. Coupled with the prevalence of many elements of traditional realism, including balance of power, Henderson (2015) referred to these practices as “African realism”, where the majority of African leaders employ a “neopatrimonial balancing strategy” influenced by two central elements, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy.

7.3.1 Neopatrimonialism, Sino–South African relationships and the Zuma presidency.

Earlier reference was made in the study to the use of democracy to reproduce and reinforce, pre-existing relations of domination, which is at the centre of the concepts neopatrimonialism and patronage (Stremlau & Iazzolino, 2017). Flowing from this, it was tendered in Chapter 2 that neopatrimonialism, could be seen as a personalised authoritarian political regime type that is a distinctive hallmark of African regimes (Bratton & Van De Walle, 1994:458). Van den Berg (2018:140) further avers that “… relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and bureaucratic office for personal wealth and status rather than for public service”. Moreover, this type of hierarchical system focuses on the role of a cadre or member of the party in power in relation to preferential treatment and employment (Van den Berg (2018:140).

7.3.1.1 President Zuma, the “Big Man”

As president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma stood central to the activities of the government, as well as the manner in which international relations with other countries played out since his ascend to power in 2009. He was indeed the man of the moment in the ANC and South African governmental circles, especially during the period under review (2010–2015). Moreover, Zuma established himself in the words of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) as the charismatic “big man”,
“strongman” or “supremo” of the South African society. The focus of this subsection is therefore to evaluate and assess President Zuma’s role in the context of neopatrimonialism as one of the elements of African realism.

Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as the President of South Africa on 9 May 2009, with the previous president, Kgalema Motlanthe as his deputy, after the ANC garnered 65.9% of the votes during the fourth National and Provincial General Elections (Van den Berg, 2018). Important, Zuma reconfigured the government departments and appointed an extended cabinet of 38 ministers and 23 deputy-ministers. The exorbitant size of the cabinet raised serious concerns from commentators, given the relative small South African population and the countries dwindling GDP. Of importance, was the fact that President Zuma made nine cabinet reshuffles up to the end of 2015, replacing credible and senior ministers with relative unknown ANC cadres with no or little experience (Van den Berg, 2018:424). In addition, Zuma’s conduct as Head of the State, made commentators like Basson and Du Toit (2017:3) to remark that “[t]here has been an all-consuming and singular focus on himself and his own desires since assuming office “.

7.3.1.2 The Zuma-Gupta link

The reasons for President Zuma’s apparent haphazard conduct and irrational decisions as the head of the South African state since 2009, would soon become the focus of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of the State, Commission of Enquiry appointed by President Ramaphosa, less than six months after his inauguration as South Africa’s fifth president during the beginning of 2018. A statement by Pravin Gordhan (2018), a former Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (SARS) and previous Minister of Finance (that was also unceremoniously removed by President Zuma) presented to the Commission, shared additional perspectives on the modus operandi of the Zuma-Gupta link. Gordhan (2018) used the framework conceptualised in the Betrayal of Promise report (Swilling, 2017) to elucidate how various groupings perform different roles in state capture and patronage networks. All indications are that avarice brought Zuma and some of his family into contact with the relative unknown Gupta family from Saharanpur, India which immigrated to South Africa since 1993 (Anon., 2013).

The Zuma-Gupta link paved the way for one of the biggest state-capture misdemeanours on the African continent (which is currently being invested by a judicial commission of enquiry) and made both families and their acquaintances very wealthy and affluent. A fundamental issue is the broad perception that South Africa experienced a silent coup that has removed the majority party, the ANC from its place as the primary force for transformation in society, which was replaced by a shadow-state run by the Zuma-Gupta-link. According to the report (2017) four public moments or events, define this new era:
i. the Marikana Massacre on 16 August 2012;
ii. the landing of the Gupta plane at Waterkloof Air Base in April 2013;
iii. the attempted bribing of former Deputy Minister of Finance Mcebisi Jonas to sell the National Treasury to the shadow state in late 2015; and,
iv. the Cabinet reshuffle in March 2017.

7.3.1.3 The ‘#Guptaleaks’

The extent of the state capture involving many facets of the South African government, has been exposed by the so-called ‘#GuptaLeaks’, a series of reports released by investigative journalists during 2017 (Basson, 2017:266). The #GuptaLeaks, which subsequently became the primary sources of numerous books and exposés in the media like for example the “The Presidents Keepers: Those Keeping Zuma in Power and Out of Prison”, revealed how President Zuma positioned himself as the kingpin or ‘supremo’ of the South African state. The #GuptaLeaks was however preceded by the ‘State of Capture’ report by a previous Public Protector, Tuli Madonsela (Pauw, 2017:312). The 355-page report made known according to Pauw (2017:312) “… how much control the Gupta family wields over the country’s resources and exposed a web of deceit, patronage and corruption”. President Zuma, in the main presented by his son Duduzane and the Gupta brothers, created a typical hybrid system in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism coexisted with rational-legal institutions as encapsulated by Bratton and Van de Walle (1998:62).

Almost every sphere and section of the state, excluding the judiciary, were captured by Zuma-Gupta linked cohorts ranging from the State Security Agency (SSA), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), SARS, the Cabinet, including Ministers and senior government officials, Premiers and Provincial Executive Committees, but most importantly the SOEs namely Transnet, ESKOM and Denel. The Zuma-Gupta linked networks moved swiftly to register their claim and controversially capture lucrative billion dollar transactions ranging from mining, arms technology, computer software, consultancy, media outlets and even dairy farming, to name but a few. The most alarming however, was the manner in which the Gupta’s captured President Zuma. They in essence established a shadow presidency in their luxurious Saxonworld compound in Johannesburg, where they ‘summoned’ and met ministers, senior government officials, board members and CEO’s of SOEs.

7.3.1.4 State capture and Sino–South African trade and investment

State capture also spread to the intensified Sino–South African trade and investment relations, especially after the conclusion of numerous bilateral and MOUs since the finalisation of the CSPA during 2010. The golden thread of potential areas like the procurement of railway stock and
possible nuclear deals, were systematically targeted after the formalisation of the agreements and MOUs by the politicians. The best example of patronage and neopatrimonialism, transpired during the procurement of locomotives, which was part of a massive infrastructure development drive announced by President Zuma during the State of the Nation Address (SONA) in February 2012 (Basson & Du Toit, 2017:102). A chronological layout by Basson and Du Toit (2017:103–107) exposes how various role-players, including President Zuma, newly appointed ministers, the Gupta’s and their acquaintances as well as Zuma’s son (Duduzane), connive and eventually benefitted to the tune of R5, 3 billion from two transactions between Transnet and China South Rail Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive and China North Rolling Stock for the procurement of locomotives.

It can therefore be submitted that President Zuma, in the broader engagement between South Africa and China, used his patrimonial authority as the head of the South African state to establish a network of patronage that carefully used a foreign policy instrument like the CSPA, to capture the organs of the South African state, to personally enrich themselves. The procurement of locomotives by Transnet from the two Chinese SOEs, was a classic example of neopatrimonialism as envisaged by Henderson in his conceptualisation of African realism. The next section will consider the other element of African realism, namely inverted legitimacy.

7.3.2 Inverted legitimacy

It was earlier surmised in Chapter 2 that the issue of legitimacy or the rightfulfulness of a regime or system of rule, is linked to the oldest and one of the most fundamental of political debates, the problem of political obligation (Heywood, 2002:210). Moreover, as discussed above, personal rulers bank on the distribution of state resources, to buy legitimacy for their regimes (Venter & Duvenhage, 2008:633). Questions that can be raised, include why citizens should feel obliged to acknowledge such authority of government? Why should citizens respect their leaders, despite the fact that some leaders, like President Zuma shattered the social accord between the elected representatives and the electorate? Why should the South African society allow its state coffers to be looted, as was elucidated to in the previous section? Building on the previous example, consideration will now be given to inverted legitimacy and the impact that for instance President Zuma’s conduct had on African realism.

7.3.2.1 Repurposing state institutions

Jacob Zuma’s political ascent to the presidency of South Africa was not smooth. It was, to the contrary, embroiled in political intrigue and mischief filled with the internal dynamics of a revolutionary party in transformation and clouded in Zuma’s personal misgivings. As an ANC stalwart that went into exile during the apartheid era, Zuma served his political party and South
Africa in numerous senior and executive positions: from ANC intelligence head during the mid-1980’s, to Deputy President in 1999 (which he was requested to resign from by President Mbeki in 2005) and later President of South Africa in 2009 (Basson, 2012:7). Despite the extraordinary combination of internal turmoil and external challenges that the ANC had to deal with since the 2007 Polokwane Conference, as well as the legal difficulties faced by Zuma virtually up to the day of the election, the ANC secured a 66% majority during 2009 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009:83). Schulz-Herzenberg (2009:84) suggests that the new ANC leadership, under the helm of Zuma, boasted with the stamp of electoral approval.

It was clear according to Van den Berg (2018:238) that within the Zuma-led political jurisdiction, the concept of South Africa as a social developmental state gained impetus. The Zuma era could furthermore be seen as entering the second phase of the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution (NDR), whereby the focus importantly moved from political power consolidation towards socio-economic freedom and transformation (Van den Berg, 2018:238). The Betrayal of Promise Report (Swilling, 2017:4), made it clear that while the ideological focus of the ANC was ‘radical economic transformation’, Jacob Zuma’s presidency aimed at repurposing state institutions to consolidate the Zuma-Gupta link power elite (2017:4). The drafters of the Betrayal of Promise report, suggested that although socio-economic transformation initially appeared to be a legitimate long-term vision to structurally transform South Africa’s economy to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality and unemployment, the repurposing of state institutions or ‘state capture’, threatened the viability of the state institutions that needed to deliver on this long-term vision.

Yet, despite Zuma’s popularity in the ANC, he soon after the advent of democracy in 1994, already had scandals that plagued him. This included pending corruption charges relating to the controversial Arms Deal, rape charges (of which he was acquitted), numerous sex scandals and traditional weddings, as well as the notorious Department of Public Works building project estimated at US$16 million at Zuma’s private homestead at Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) (Basson, 2012:54–55,156,158). Moreover, a disturbing picture of the Zuma’s family business involvement from the time of his election as the ANC presidency at Polokwane during December 2007, unfolded. Zuma’s weakness to differentiate between his role as the head of the state and a politician viz-a-viz his business interests and inability to manage his financial affairs, started to catch up with him. Basson (2012:138) conducted research that revealed that out of 16 adults (wives, lovers and children) formally linked to Zuma, 15 were in business accounting for 134 company directorships or memberships of close corporations. At least 83 companies (62%) have been registered since the post-Polokwane period when Zuma’s political future was secured (Basson, 2012:138). It was clear: For Zuma it was about the money. However, his blatant involvement in patronage and patrimonialism, eventually caught up him.
President Zuma nonetheless passionately represented South Africa in the international society, especially dealing with China and Russia, for the period under review (2010–2015). He was instrumental, as averred to earlier in the study, for South Africa’s acceptance as the fifth BRICS partner, as well as the important role that the country was fulfilling in FOCAC. What however became more apparent, was that Zuma’s popularity as the Head of the State was declining rapidly, and eventually led to his forced resignation as President of South Africa during February 2018 after surviving numerous motions of no-confidence in parliament.

7.3.2.2 The angry South African society

Of greater relevance regarding inverted legitimacy, was the involvement of the South African citizenry during elections. Voter turn-out deteriorated from 84% during the 1994 election to 57% during the 2014 general election in South Africa (Labuschagne, 2016:115). Absent voters outnumbered those who had voted for the ANC in the 2014 General Elections, which led Cronje (2014:205) to observe that the majority party’s apparent political dominance, was something of an illusion. In reality, South Africa was governed by a party that did not have the electoral support of the majority of citizens eligible to vote. The lack of interest in democracy and to vote, for example created a serious legitimacy crisis further fuelled by the state-capture and corruption allegations involving the President Zuma and his family, friends and cronies as well as other influential politicians, government officials and business people (Pauw, 2017:110, 216, 285, 294 & 312).

However, according to Buqa (2015:1), the situation in South Africa since the event of democracy in 1994 exposes disturbing narratives about the philosophical basis of Ubuntu and the hardship of the day-to-day realities of the majority of South Africans. Driven largely by increasing inequality among Africans, the Gini coefficient—the international measure of economic inequalities—for the South African population rose from 0.62 in 1996 to 0.66 in 2008 (Jeffery, 2010:184). This points to the fact that South Africa was faced with the challenge of having one of the world’s most divided societies, also in terms of the disparity between the rich and the poor (Russell, 2009:46).

Despite Ubuntu’s inclusion as part of the underpinnings of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, the incessant realities of racism, xenophobia, violence, crime including murders and attacks on farmers and farmworkers, unemployment, corruption, patterns of state capture, poor service delivery and poverty, created angry and frustrated South African communities far removed from the idealistic imperatives of the Rainbow Nation that was so eloquently describe by Bishop Desmond Tutu during 1994 (Tutu, 2008).
7.4 Overall evaluation of the CSPA

Evaluation in the context of this study is about the assessment of the effectiveness of strategic partnerships (Geldenhuys, 2015:136). In the same vein, Gajauskaite (2013:198) surmises that the evaluation of strategic cooperation between states can include the analysis of the broader international society, motivation for specific bilateral engagements, power relations, national interests, benefits and the rate of the successful implementation of the bilateral agreements. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, strategic partnership can be evaluated focusing on predetermined specific functional thematic areas such as governmental activities, security and defence, economy, culture and societal validating the implementation of strategic partnerships.

Chapter 6 considered and established if the CSPA provided a constructive and geopolitical strategic partnership for South Africa with countries such as China. Five functional thematic areas namely governmental, safety and security, economic, cultural as well as societal, were the focus of the chapter to establish what impact they had on the intensification of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two developing countries. What importantly has been established, is that South Africa’s relationship with China had advanced beyond a ‘minerals exchange’ compared to the rest of SADC and some other Africa countries on the resource rich African continent. It was surmised that the decision to push forward from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership, was the culmination of shared common interests and shared values, driven by a contemporaneous desire by Beijing to strengthen coordination and planning between South Africa and China. The implementation of the CSPA was therefore seen as a collective attempt by both governments to make South Africa the jewel in the African crown.

Yet, the Sino–South African relationship was also presented as a relationship of paradoxes, breaking with many of the assumptions that underpinned contemporary analyses and preconceived notions of China–Africa ties. For instance, from 2010 to 2015 South African investments into China exceeded that of China into South Africa. Furthermore, while economic ties and trade between the two countries have extended beyond the practices of resource extraction and infrastructure financing seen in other African countries, the continued trade gap in favour of China impacted negatively on internal South African socio-economic realities, like for instance unemployment and the decline in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Africa.

Although the economic thematic area and specifically the South Africa’s negative trade balance with China negatively impacted on the aims of CSPA, the agreement and subsequent MOUs and other bilateral agreements created opportunities for especially economic interaction. Under the guidance and strategic leadership of specifically President’s Xi and Zuma, the CSPA acted as an enabler that elevated the close relations between the South African and Chinese’s governments beyond reproach. However, the chapter established that although some functional thematic areas
like societal and cultural were contributing positively to the relationship between South Africa and China, the economic functional thematic area impacted negatively on the relationship.

Importantly, an amended model used by analysts like Adelle and Kotsopoulus, Gajauskaite, Geldenhuis and Wilkins was used to consider whether the aims as presented in the CSPA in the respective functional thematic areas were loose, moderate or tight. Based on the summary of the validation of the functional thematic areas of the CSPA built on four distinct elements, namely the relative success achieved in meeting the objectives and aims of a respective thematic area, relative consideration for implementing the functional thematic area, the commitment to implement the agreements within the functional thematic area, as well as the strategic geopolitical impact of the deliverables of the functional area, it was proven that the intensity of the implementation of the CSPA between South Africa and China, can be presented as moderate. This in essence confirmed that although there was a lot of “bells and whistles” about the Sino–South African relations for the period 2010 to 2015, the reality in terms of practical results, sloped to the contrary.

7.5 Recommendations for future research

The interest in Sino–South African relations by the student was stimulated by Chinese businesses and shops that are operational from the most up-market urban mall, to the most remote and rural townships in South Africa. On closer inspection, one would observe that the shops are all mostly fully stocked, although clientele can sometimes be perceived as limited. This led to the formal conceptualisation of the study based on the theoretical and meta-theoretical framework of the study, namely African realism. Although the study strove to be as comprehensive as possible, it only touched on the broader imperatives of the important bilateral engagements between South and China in the field of IR.

However, the need for future research and academic scrutiny between the two countries, can be related to almost every sphere of society. Examples of these include:

- The impact of Chinese investment in Alternative Energy projects in the rural areas of South Africa;
- The role of the BRICS NDB in the Developmental Corridors in SADC;
- The impact that ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ had on the NDR of the ANC, or even,
- The potential to relocate South African rhinos to Chinese sanctuaries to save the species.

It can therefore be surmised that huge potential exists for future research in the field.
7.6 Conclusion

The study aimed to assess and evaluate whether or not strategic geopolitical partnership such as the CSPA are in the best interest of South Africa according to African Realism theory. The final chapter of the study furthermore contained the concluding assessment on the impact that the two elements of African realism, namely neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy, had on the Sino–South African relationship for the period 2010 to 2015. Against the over-arching theoretical paradigm of realism, arguments were built on the evolution of the theory from classical realism to African realism. It was also submitted that realism per se cannot and will never be the only school of thought impacting on the field of IR. In an ever-changing globalised post-Cold War global order specifically, theories like for instance liberalism and idealism certainly impact on and influence the day-to-day IR realities.

African realism enhanced the positive and constructive development of the post-Cold War nuances and thinking on the African continent. Included in the continuous advancement of alternative thinking on Africa and the scholastic and academic development of the field, is the reality that state-centric approaches are continuously under scrutiny and pressure from group or society-centric realities. Neopatrimonialism has become a modern-day trademark of African governance modalities whereby rulers and presidents prefer to “feather their nests” in unison with a democratic model and system acceptable to the outside world.

Declining legitimacy of governments, highlighted for instance through the developments in South Africa under the Zuma-administration specifically from 2010 to 2015, coerced loyal securocrats into accepting neopatrimonialism as a useful catalyst to protect the interests of influential individuals through neopatrimonial praetorianism. Built on these arguments, African realism as a meta-theory is therefore ideally positioned to positively contribute to the field of IR and provide explanations about and justifications for current developments in the post-Cold War global order and subsequent geopolitical changes. It is therefore contended that the research objective has been met.

Based on the outcome of earlier assessments of the formation and implementation of the important bilateral agreement between the South African and Chinese governments this chapter assessed the organisational cohesiveness and the effectiveness of the CSPA, based on the following definitive criteria namely goal attainment, mutual perceptions by the partners and external factors.

It was assessed that although South Africa’s rise into the BRICS was in the best interest of the country, the overbearing interest in especially China and Russia, negatively impacted on a balanced and nuanced foreign policy approach. What however impacted worse on especially the
potential of the CSPA, was the creation of a shadow state in South Africa through which patronage and self-help, created a neopatrimonial footprint with limited internal legitimacy. It was concluded that President Zuma, in the broader engagement between South Africa and China, used his patrimonial authority as the head of the South African state to establish a network of patronage that carefully used a foreign policy instrument like the CSPA, to capture the organs of the South African state, to personally enrich themselves.

It can therefore be submitted that a conundrum faced by the South African government of having greater legitimacy internationally, as opposed to domestically as well, is in line of the prescripts of inverted legitimacy. In addition, both elements of African realism namely neopatrimonialism as well as inverted legitimacy, confirm that African realism, as a meta-theory is indeed prevalent in the Sino–South African relationship formalised by the CSPA. Most importantly, the prevalence of state capture in South Africa whereby the CSPA was also ‘captured’, proved that geopolitical strategic partnership agreements such as the CSPA are under the circumstances of Africa realism, not in the best interest of South Africa. At best, only a few connected individuals would benefit under such circumstances mostly to the detriment to the general population of South Africa. It is therefore finally submitted that although the CSPA has its benefits in terms of South Africa’s regional, continental and global role, the impact that neopatrimonialism and inverted legitimacy had on the bilateral relationship, sacrificed the potential for the general population to benefit from the agreement. As such, in the final analysis, the reality is that strategic partnership agreements like the CSPA have to be in line with the democratic principles especially those checks and balances contained within the South African Constitution.
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## ADDENDUM A

**List of action plans, agreements and new Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) concluded between the South African and Chinese governments in Johannesburg, South Africa on 3 December 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENEWED ACTION PLAN, AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA</th>
<th>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Action Plan on the Strengthening of the Joint Working Group between China and South Africa</td>
<td>To accelerate bilateral cooperation on major projects, both sides agreed to further strengthen the Joint Working Group through the action plan to emphasise the following aspects: locomotive procurement, civilian nuclear energy project, investment in renewable energy, investment cooperation in industrial parks, trade promotion, specifically focused on South African product expos and Chinese trade missions, promoting the export of South African products to China and cooperation in Black Industrialists Programmes, visa facilitation, financial cooperation and the upgrading of national electricity transmission and distribution system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Memorandum of Understanding on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road</td>
<td>South Africa and China are committed to jointly promote the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road (the Belt and Road) through this memorandum of understanding (MOU). China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in an endeavour to uphold the spirit of the Silk Road, which includes peace, cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning, mutual benefit and win-win results and to enrich its meaning with the characteristics of the new era. The memorandum also aims at creating opportunities for mutual learning, realising better exchange and integration of goods, technology, capital and personnel and promoting the coordinated development and common progress of countries concerned in the fields of economy, society, environment and culture, thereby facilitating dialogues and integration of different civilisations. South Africa and China have agreed to jointly explore the converging points between the Belt and Road Initiative and national development of South Africa, to enhance policy coordination and pragmatic cooperation, promote win-win cooperation and mutual learning so as to realise peaceful development and common prosperity for both countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agreement between the Department of Environmental Affairs and the National</td>
<td>The objective of the Agreement on Strengthening Cooperation in the Oceans Economy is to create cooperation and a consultation platform and to</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENEWED ACTION PLAN, AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA</td>
<td>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development and Reform Commission on Strengthening Cooperation in the Oceans Economy</td>
<td>promote cooperation on the oceans economy between the two countries and related Organisations and enterprises. The agreement outlines broad areas of cooperation in the following areas: maritime transport; offshore petroleum resources development; ocean drilling platform building; aquaculture and processing of fish products; port development/construction and operation; port industrial park development; skills development and capacity building; research, technology innovation and technology transfer; oceans environment conservation and management; and other areas of mutual interest as agreed by the parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agreement on the Waiver of Visa Requirements for Diplomatic and Official Passport Holders</td>
<td>The Agreement on the Waiver of Visa Requirements for Diplomatic and Official Passport Holders allows for those citizens from South Africa and China, who hold valid diplomatic or service passports, to enter into, exit from, transit through, or stay in the country of the other party for a period not exceeding 30 days to be exempt from the requirement of having to obtain a visa for the duration of that period. Accredited diplomatic and consular staff, as well as members of their families, shall not be required to obtain a visa for the duration of their accreditation. The agreement shall replace the existing agreement regarding the Waiver of Visa Requirements for Holders of Diplomatic Passports, signed on 24 August 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Health and Medical Sciences between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>The objective of the MOU in health and medical sciences between South Africa and China is to expand exchanges in the fields of public health, health care delivery systems and biomedical sciences, as well as establish regular cooperation between health institutions. Areas of cooperation include: public health services and biomedical research, medical research; primary health care, including family medicine; quality assurance in health care and standards practice; education and training in, and research of, traditional medicine; healthy lifestyles; regulation of medicine, including traditional medicine; pre-hospital emergency medicine; HIV and Aids and TB and MDR-TB treatment; recruitment of health professionals; and human resource development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Development of Science Parks</td>
<td>Following the Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation concluded between South Africa and China on 30 March 1999, the Five to Ten Year Strategic Framework for Cooperation between South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENEWED ACTION PLAN, AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA</td>
<td>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa and China (2015–2024) signed on 4 December 2014; and the China–Africa Science and Technology Partnership Programme that was launched in November 2011, the two countries have committed to continue to expand cooperation in the field of science parks on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in order to enhance bilateral research and development partnerships and innovation activities. The MOU on science park cooperation highlights cooperation between the two countries in business incubation, high-end skills development and ICT research and development investment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of South Africa on the Establishment of a China Cultural Centre in the Republic of South Africa | The government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of the Republic of South Africa wish to promote the cultural and exchanges expertise and cooperation between the two countries and strengthen the mutual understanding and friendship. China will establish a China Cultural Centre in South Africa that will provide quality and publicly accessible cultural programmes through friendly collaboration with its partners. |

| 8. Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Public Enterprises, Republic of South Africa, and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China | The MOU between South Africa’s Department of Public Enterprises and China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission intends to facilitate strengthening cooperation in terms of infrastructure construction projects; information communications, as well as cooperation between Chinese and South African energy related companies. The agreement will create a legal framework for South African and Chinese state-owned enterprises within their oversight control to conduct exchanges and cooperation in the areas of common interests, and as well as to share information and expertise in their respective enterprises. |

<p>| 9. Memorandum of Understanding on Anti-Monopoly Cooperation between the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and the Economic Development Department of South Africa | The purpose of the MOU is to enhance the partnership of Chinese Ministry of Commerce and South Africa’s Economic Development Department by providing a sound mechanism for their communication and cooperation in the fields of competition law and policy, including enforcement. It will allow exchanging information regarding developments in their respective competition legislation, enforcement and policy; providing comments on drafts of each other’s competition law, regulations and other legal or guidance documents; exchanging information on issues including, but not |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENEWED ACTION PLAN, AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA</th>
<th>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>limited to, definition of relevant markets, theories of harm, the competitive impact assessment and the design of remedies; sharing competition law enforcement experience; sharing practice and experience with respect to law enforcement capacity building; and exchanging views on issues relating to international cooperation on competition law and policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Memorandum of Cooperation between the South African Revenue Service of the Republic of South Africa and the Great Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>The memorandum of cooperation between the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and China’s Great Administration of Customs (GAC) intends to strengthen cooperation in the field of administrative assistance in customs matters with the focus on improving mutual understanding of the participants’ customs practices. The agreement will create a legal framework for SARS and the GAC to promote communication and cooperation in customs administration; technology application, the formulation and implementation of laws and regulations; capacity building; and trade statistics. The memorandum will also pave the way for the participants to enhance cooperation by developing their capabilities through particular activities, projects and arrangements as well as facilitate cooperation in specific areas, namely the exchange of trade statistics; trade facilitation and identifying and controlling trade risks; improving the existing collaboration in terms of anti-smuggling; exchanging customs valuation methodologies; capacity building as well as exchanging views in areas applicable to multilateral contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Action Plan on Cooperation in Human Resource Development between the Department of Higher Education and Training of the Republic of South Africa and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>The government of China is offering 2 000 training opportunities to South Africa for the period of 2015 to 2020. South Africa’s Department of Higher Education and Training and China’s Ministry of Commerce drafted an action plan on cooperation in human resource development as part of the implementation programme for these training offers. The action plan will also assist in strengthening the promotion of personnel exchanges, as well as in enhancing mutual friendship between the two countries. It is part of the Five to Ten Year Strategic Programme for Cooperation between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China 2015–2024.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENEWED ACTION PLAN, AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA</td>
<td>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Report on the Statistical Discrepancies of Merchandise Trade between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China</td>
<td>In recent years, the bilateral merchandise trade between South Africa and China has grown rapidly. From 2004 to 2014, the total bilateral trade value increased 28.4% (compound annual growth) according to Chinese statistics and 20.4% according to South African statistics. The discrepancies between the trade data of the two countries have been a concern and have had an effect on the objective of understanding and evaluating bilateral trade. Consequently, a joint working group on trade statistics analysis between South Africa and China was established in November 2010, comprised of the Department of Trade and Industry, SARS and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The working group conducted a cooperative study on the cause of the statistical discrepancy in the 2004 to 2009 bilateral merchandise trade data and focused on critically analysing the trade data of 2007 and 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brand South Africa (2010)
### ADDEDENDUM B

**List of state-owned enterprises agreements signed on 3 December 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENTS</th>
<th>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES AS PROVIDED BY THE RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation entered into between Eskom Holdings and State Corporation of China</td>
<td>The MOU between Eskom and State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) intends facilitating the strengthening of cooperation between South Africa and China in the field of energy. The agreement will create a legal framework for Eskom and the SGCC to establish a strategic partnership in order to deepen their cooperation in international business and to exchange experience in technical, managerial and financial fields. The MOU will also allow the parties to pursue commercial opportunities and exchange information on projects in geographic regions of mutual interest in the fields of transmission and distribution projects, renewable energy projects and off-grid rural electrification programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Loan Agreement between the China Development Bank Corporation and Eskom</td>
<td>Eskom and the China Development Bank will conclude a loan agreement to facilitate South Africa-China investment and trade cooperation and to further support Eskom’s infrastructure construction. The loan facility is to the value of US$500-million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Framework Cooperation Agreement between the China Export Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) and Transnet</td>
<td>Transnet and Sinosure will conclude a framework agreement of cooperation. Sinosure is willing to provide insurance support to Transnet with respect to the financing activities with a total amount of no more than US$2.5-billion (the “quota”) in the first phase of cooperation with Transnet, in relation to the procurement by Transnet of mechanical and electrical products and whole-set equipment from Chinese enterprises, and projects contracted by Chinese enterprises in South Africa, as well as operation, maintenance and other related services. The quota will be preferably used for projects in South Africa, for example railway, ports and pipeline, and other projects recognised by both parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strategic Cooperation Agreement to Fund Infrastructure and Industrial Development Projects in South Africa and the Rest of Africa between China Construction Bank</td>
<td>The parties will fund infrastructure and industrial development projects, directly and indirectly in South Africa and the rest of Africa, subject to their internal funding processes. The parties will, inter alia, fund project opportunities in South Africa and the rest of Africa, with the Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES AS PROVIDED BY THE RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation and Industrial Corporation of South Africa Limited (IDC) taking underlying project risk and China Construction Bank taking project risk at the IDC level. This would involve debt funding. Sectors to be considered for funding include industrial infrastructure, which encompasses energy renewable and conventional; agro-processing; manufacturing and mining beneficiation; among others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Beijing Automotive Group and the IDC</td>
<td>It is the mutual intention of the parties to cooperate with each other by establishing motor vehicle manufacturing facilities in South Africa at a coastal city – either Durban or East London. The manufacturing facility is intended to create jobs and sell motor vehicles in South Africa and the rest of the African continent in accordance with the terms of reference referred to in this MOU to make reasonable profit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cooperation Framework Agreement between the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) and the China Communications Construction Company</td>
<td>The purpose of this agreement is to assist in establishing and developing a long-term friendly cooperation relationship between the parties in order to fund and implement new projects in the water and sanitation sector in South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Agreement on the Final Acceptance for CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa between the South African National Space Agency and the China Aerospace, Science and Technology Corporation</td>
<td>With the support of the China–Africa Science and Technology Partnership Programme (Castep) launched by Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology in 2009, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has appointed the China Center for Earth Resource Satellite Data &amp; Application (Cresda) to execute the task of CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa for the South African National Space Agency (Sansa). In October, 2015, Cresda completed installation, integration, and training of the CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa. From 17 October to 31 November 2015, Sansa successfully completed a test run of the CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa. On 2 December 2015, Cresda and Sansa signed a final acceptance agreement for the CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa to certify that the CBERS-04 Satellite Ground System in South Africa is accepted by Sansa and is formally handed over to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Project Management Cooperation Agreement for CAP1400 Project between State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation and</td>
<td>The agreement will allow for State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and the South African Nuclear Corporation to enhance bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear power. China and South Africa have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES AS PROVIDED BY THE RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>the South African Nuclear Corporation</td>
<td>enormous potential in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The SNPTC owns the CAP1400 Project, a nuclear power plant,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>operated by its subsidiary, State Nuclear Power Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plant Company. Through this agreement, SNPTC agrees to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>provide an opportunity for Necsa’s personnel to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in the construction management of the CAP1400 Project Site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brand South Africa (2015)
## ADDENDUM C

Amended list of treaties signed between South African provinces and their Chinese counterparts as provided by DIRCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>DATE SIGNED</th>
<th>TREATY WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>19980312</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Joint Communique visit of the Director-General of the Shandong Provincial Peoples’ Government Mr Wu Zhongshu to the Province of the Western Cape in the RSA 9–13 March 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>19981126</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Protocol on the Establishment of Friendly Relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1990430</td>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Development and Cooperation</td>
<td>19990430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>20000327</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Memorandum for Further Economic and Trade Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>20000607</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Joint Communique on Cooperation</td>
<td>20000607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>20000612</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>20001031</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding between the Northern Province of the RSA and Anhui Province of the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of Inter-Provincial Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>20001031</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding in the field of Mining Industry between the Northern Province of the RSA and Anhui</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>DATE SIGNED</td>
<td>TREATY WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>ENTRY INTO FORCE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>20001031</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding between the Northern Province of RSA and the Anhui Province of the Republic of China on the Development of Cooperation between Provinces on Tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>20021016</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation</td>
<td>20021016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>20030911</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding between the Hunan Province of the People's Republic of China and Northern Cape of the RSA on the Establishment of the Provincial Friendship Relationship</td>
<td>20030911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>20040617</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Joint Declaration to Further Develop Friendship and Cooperation in the Fields of Culture and Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>20050920</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Declaration of Intent concerning the Development of Friendly Exchange and Cooperative Relations between Henan Province of the People's Republic of China and the Limpopo Province of the RSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>20060712</td>
<td>Free State of Bavaria (Germany) Upper Austria (Austria) Quèbec (Canada)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional leaders Summit: Final Declaration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>DATE SIGNED</td>
<td>TREATY WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>20060720</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Joint Declaration to Further Consolidate and Develop Cooperation between the Two Provinces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>20060720</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Framework Agreement for Further Collaborated Projects between the Western Cape Province of the RSA and the Province of Shandong of the People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>20060720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>20061213</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Agreement between the Province of KwaZulu-Natal of the RSA and the Province of Fujian of the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of Friendship Province Relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>20061213</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Friendship Cooperation Arrangement between the Province of KwaZulu-Natal (RSA) and Fujian Province (The People's Republic of China)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>20070125</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding between Shandong Province of the People's Republic of China and the Western Cape Province of the RSA to further enhance cooperation in the field of Education</td>
<td>20080408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>DATE SIGNED</td>
<td>TREATY WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>ENTRY INTO FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>20070329</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing Friendly Cooperation between KwaZulu-Natal Province of the RSA and Jiangsu Province of People's Republic of China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>20071031</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Joint Declaration to further Consolidate Cooperation between the Two Provinces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>20080326</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Economic Development and Tourism of the Western Cape and the Shandong Provincial Tourism Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>20080408</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>Agreement between Henan Province of the People's Republic of China and the North West Province of the RSA on the Establishment of Friendship Province</td>
<td>20080408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>20080807</td>
<td>Free State of Bavaria (Germany)</td>
<td>Georgia (United States of America)</td>
<td>The Fourth Regional Leaders Conference: Final Declaration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quèbec (Canada)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shandong (China)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Austria (Austria)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>20081027</td>
<td>City of Shanghai</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Memorandum of Cooperation on Friendly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>DATE SIGNED</td>
<td>TREATY WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>ENTRY INTO FORCE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>20081027</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange between the City of Shanghai of the People's Republic of China and KwaZulu-Natal Province of the RSA for 2008–2010</td>
<td>20081027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>20100508</td>
<td>Jiangyin</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Memorandum on the Establishment of Friendship Province Relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>20130722</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Further Strengthening Friendship between Jiangsu Province, the People's Republic of China and Free State Province, the Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>20130722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>20130724</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Free State Province of the RSA and the People's Government of Jiangxi Province of the People's Republic of China</td>
<td>20130724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
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<td>SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNTER-PART.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>20150624</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Cooperation Memorandum between the Hebei Province and Mpumalanga Province</td>
<td>20150624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>20150624</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Cooperation Memorandum between the Health and Family Planning Commission of Hebei Province, P.R. China and the Department of Health of Mpumalanga Province, Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>20150624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIRCO (2017)
## ADDENDUM D

Amended list of treaties between some South African and Chinese local authorities as provided by DIRCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>TREATY WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA</th>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITY IN SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CCPIT Liaoning Sub-Council</td>
<td>Makhado Municipality</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding to promote the Development of Trade and Economic Communication and Cooperation between CCPIT LIAONING Sub-Council (People's Republic of China) and Makhado Municipality Council (South Africa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>City of Ningbo</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality</td>
<td>Sister City Agreement between the City of Ningbo in the People's Republic of China and the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality in the RSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism Authority</td>
<td>Agreement between China Travel Services, Zhejiang in the People's Republic of China and Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism Authority, Port Elizabeth, in the Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>20051103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ningbo</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism Authority</td>
<td>Agreement between Ningbo Travel Bureau in the People's Republic of China and Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism Authority in the Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>20051117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ningbo</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay Tourism Authority</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding Ningbo and Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality furthering Sister City Relations and Promoting Exchanges and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipality</td>
<td>Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Friendly Exchange between Shanghai Municipality of the People's Republic of China and the City of Johannesburg of the RSA</td>
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Source: DIRCO (2017)
ADDENDUM E

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (DIRCO, 2010)

BEIJING DECLARATION ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma of the Republic of South Africa paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China from 23 to 26 August 2010. The Presidents reviewed with satisfaction the progress made in consolidating relations between the two countries, had an in-depth exchange of views on international and regional issues of mutual interest and reached consensus on a number of major issues.

The Presidents reviewed with satisfaction the relations between South Africa and China since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1998. The Presidents recalled the Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China of 2000, the forging of a strategic partnership in 2004 and the Programme of Co-operation on Deepening the Strategic Partnership between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China in 2006 and concluded that bilateral relations had developed rapidly in a comprehensive manner.

The Presidents shared the view that South Africa and China, as developing countries, should further strengthen their bilateral relations in the interest of promoting the common development of the two countries, deepening China-Africa co-operation, strengthening South-South co-operation and jointly addressing global challenges. To this end, the two sides expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen the friendly exchanges and co-operation in the political, economic, trade, people-to-people, cultural and social areas, as well as international and regional affairs which prevail between them, by establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development.

The two sides shared the view that multilateralism and Democratization of international relations enjoy greater popular support today in the international community. Consensus prevails in the international community that in order to build a harmonious and better world for all, characterized by enduring peace and common prosperity, win-win progress can be achieved through all-inclusive international co-operation. In this respect, the Presidents encouraged all countries to join hands and share opportunities and experiences for development and rise to address common challenges facing humanity.

The Presidents agreed to pursue the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the following areas:
Political Relations and Bilateral Dialogue:

1. Maintain frequent contact between the two Presidents through bilateral and multilateral meetings for the purpose of promoting and guiding co-operation at the highest political and economic level, in order to enhance mutual understanding of and support for each other's positions and interests.

2. Strengthen, under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the function and role of the Bi-National Commission (BNC), in order to guide and coordinate exchanges and co-operation on political and economic matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and multilateral spheres. In principle, the BNC plenary session, co-chaired by the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa and the Vice President of the People's Republic of China, is to be held every two years, alternating between the two countries. Sectoral Committees, established under the BNC, will guide, coordinate and implement department-to-department co-operation. New Sectoral Committees may be established as and when required, based on mutual consent.

3. Hold an annual strategic dialogue at Ministerial level between the Department of International Relations and Co-operation of the Republic of South Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in order to promote political consultations, co-operation and mutual understanding between the two sides and prepare for bilateral high-level exchanges and the plenary session of the BNC.

4. Arranges frequent meetings and exchange visits at senior officials' level between the Department of International Relations and Co-operation of the Republic of South Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, encourage increased contact and co-operation between their diplomatic academies and training institutions.

5. Continue to encourage and strengthen co-operation between their respective national legislative bodies, through closer exchanges between high-level legislative leaders, committees and administrative bodies.
Economic Area

6. Improve, through a concerted effort, the current structure of trade between the two countries, in particular by working towards a more balanced trade profile and encouraging trade in manufactured value-added products. In this regard, agree to increase trade and investment missions and to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) on trade statistics analysis under the Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETC). The JWG will study the statistical discrepancies in the bilateral trade area.

7. China, in this spirit, will encourage its enterprises to increase investment in South Africa's manufacturing industry and to promote the creation of value-adding activities in close proximity to the source of raw materials. Both sides agree to actively support key sectors which include, but are not limited to, the green economy (including renewable energy and parts and equipment for renewable technology) and agro-processing. Beneficiation at source is to be facilitated.

8. Co-operate and provide mutual technical support in the areas of the green economy, skills development and industrial financing. In relation to industrial financing, both sides would work to find ways to strengthen the participation of their capital markets in funding for industrial development and small business development at concessionary rates in order to promote sustainable development.

9. Encourage Chinese and South African companies to explore co-operation opportunities in infrastructure construction projects, such as roads, railways, ports, power generation, airports and housing. Furthermore, encourage their financial institutions to strengthen co-operation and provide financing support for companies engaged in the aforementioned fields.

10. Welcome the commitment of the Chinese side to establish an aquaculture demonstration centre, renovate vocational training institutes and implement other mutually agreed projects in South Africa. China will continue to provide human resources training to South Africa in support of its efforts to promote employment and development of the economy.

11. Promote, on the South African side, the implementation of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) projects in South Africa with support
by the Chinese side in the form of preferential loans suited to the specific needs of South Africa.

12. Welcome the trade in agricultural, agro-processed and fishery products and encourage personnel and technical exchanges and co-operation in the aforementioned fields to improve food security.

13. Strengthen co-operation in the areas of agricultural products inspection and quarantine, food safety and industrial products inspection and continue to have consultations on specific issues in this regard.

14. Implement the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, by establishing a dialogue mechanism to discuss issues of mutual interest and address common challenges, strengthen information exchange and enhance co-operation in the World Customs Organization.

15. Deepen exchanges and co-operation in the areas of transportation, railways and civil aviation. In this respect, focus on maritime transport, road and rail infrastructure construction, transport safety, transport services, road traffic, transport management and air transport.

16. Create conditions to facilitate practical co-operation between South African and Chinese energy-related companies, as well as considering third-party involvement in energy-related areas, such as fossil energy, renewable energy, electricity, nuclear energy, energy efficiency and energy infrastructure.

17. In accordance with the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Co-operation between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China, promote co-operation and exchanges in science and technology fields closely related to the economic and social development of both countries. These areas include agriculture, information and communication technology, space technology, nano-technology and new materials, new and renewable energy, the environment and mining technology. Strengthen the implementation of the South Africa-China Joint Scientific and Technological Research Programme, through mutually agreed joint research programmes and capacity building in scientific research and development, innovation, technology transfer and the transfer of skills in science.
and technology.

18. Maintain close consultations to promote co-operation in the fields of geology and mineral resources.

19. Support exchanges and co-operation between South African and Chinese government departments and their corporate sectors in information communication areas, such as the development and application of information technology. Enterprises of both countries are to be encouraged to carry out mutually beneficial co-operation in the fields of communication networks and telecommunication services. Strengthen consultation and co-operation in the aforesaid areas in international organizations.

20. Co-operate in tourism training, capacity building, promoting and developing cultural and medical tourism, promotion campaigns and information-sharing, in the acknowledgement thereof that the tourism industry is a generator of economic growth and empowerment, employment and foreign exchange.

21. Adopt effective measures to promote and enhance sound and orderly personnel exchanges, and simplify visa procedures to increase effective co-operation in these areas.

Other Areas of Co-operation

22. Strengthen and expand the existing bilateral defence co-operation between the two countries.

23. Strengthen and expand, in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Co-operation in the Fields of Arts and Culture and its Implementation Programme, cultural exchanges and co-operation, and promote better knowledge and understanding of cultural diversities in the respective countries.

24. Strengthen and expand co-operation in the fields of higher education and basic education in accordance with the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa, through its Department of Education, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, through its Ministry of
Education, on Co-operation in the Field of Education. Strengthen co-operation in basic education in the fields of Early Childhood Education and the training of educator trainers in mathematics, science and technology, and in the teaching of Mandarin Chinese at some schools. Promote the sharing of experiences in the management and research outputs of specialized institutes and in skills training.

25. Cooperate in the field of health as provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Public Health and Medical Sciences Co-operation, which entered into force in 2006. Furthermore, to enter into negotiations on a new agreement as the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding is due to expire in June 2011.

26. Co-operate in the fields of e-skills development, an incubation programme in ICT for Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), comprehensive social security, public services and administration and gender mainstreaming. Share experiences and best practices in support of vulnerable groups and coordinate positions on these issues in international labour organizations and fora.

27. Co-operate in the fields of urban and rural planning, poverty eradication and community development.

28. Strengthen co-operation, as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the Field of Forestry between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China on forestry resources management, including relevant policies and regulations, research and development, trade and commerce, institutional capacity building and personnel training.

29. Strengthen co-operation as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the Field of Water Resources Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of China, particularly with regards to the exchange of ideas and best practices, research, technology exchange, infrastructure development and capacity building in all aspects of integrated water resources management.

30. Strengthen and expand the existing bilateral immigration co-operation, jointly combat illegal immigration while cooperating to facilitate exchanges
between the peoples of the two countries.

**International and Regional Affairs**

31. Reaffirm the commitment of both countries to promote and protect multilateralism and the democratization of international relations, enhance the effectiveness, accountability, credibility and legitimacy of the decision-making bodies of international institutions, as well as increase the representation and voice of developing countries in international financial institutions.

32. Welcome the strengthening of the status, effectiveness, role and efficiency of the United Nations, through all-dimensional reform in a wide range of areas in order for the United Nations to realize its full potential in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Furthermore, support reform of the UN Security Council, and give priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially African countries. In order to maintain the solidarity among Member States and give full consideration to the concerns of developing countries, such reform should be based on democratic consultations, for the purpose of seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

33. Recognize the positive contributions made by the G20 Summit to promote international co-operation in addressing the global financial crisis and facilitating global economic recovery. Support the G20 Summit as the premier forum of international economic co-operation, which is to play an important role in global economic governance. Strengthen consultation and coordination within the G20 framework in order to increase the representation and voice of developing countries.

34. Emphasize the need to promote economic development through development financing, fair trade, global economic governance and the reform of the international financial system in support of developing countries.

35. Call upon the international community to expedite the realization of the UN Millennium Development Goals.

36. Reiterate that all countries should work for positive progress in the Bali Roadmap dual-track negotiations in accordance with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities under the framework of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. Actively discuss the establishment of a partnership for addressing climate change, by consolidating and strengthening dialogue on climate change, with a view to coordinating positions in the international climate negotiations, and by exchanging information on the policies and measures to address climate change, and work to promote practical co-operation in this area.

37. Note with satisfaction the role that both countries are playing in advancing peace and security and socio-economic development in Africa. China expresses its appreciation for South Africa's initiatives in support of strengthening the Organs of the AU, Regional Economic Organizations (RECs) and the implementation of NEPAD. South Africa, in turn, expresses its appreciation for China's contribution in promoting peace and socio-economic development in Africa.

38. Commend the significant contribution made by FOCAC to strengthen the equal and mutually beneficial co-operation and the new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa. Undertake to work jointly to enhance institution-building and the implementation of FOCAC programmes. The Chinese side expresses appreciation for South Africa's active participation in FOCAC affairs and welcomes the offer by South Africa to host the 6th Ministerial Conference in 2015.

The South African Government reiterates its adherence to the one China policy and support for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and China's national reunification cause.

The Chinese side applauds South Africa's success in hosting the 19th FIFA World Cup. South Africa highly commends the Expo 2010 Shanghai China and wishes it full success.

Signed in Beijing on 24 August 2010

[Signature]
Jacob G. Zuma (signed)
President of the Republic of South Africa

[Signature]
Hu Jintao (signed)
President of the People's Republic
Republic of China
南非共和国和中华人民共和国

关于建立全面战略伙伴关系的北京宣言

应中华人民共和国国家主席胡锦涛的邀请，南非共和国总统雅各布·祖马于二〇一〇年八月二十三日至二十六日对中国进行国事访问。访问期间，两国元首满意地回顾了两国合作关系的发展历程，就双方共同关心的国际和地区问题深入交换了意见，并就一系列重大问题达成共识。

两国元首满意地回顾了一九九八年南中建交以来的双边关系。双方忆及二〇〇〇年《南非共和国与中华人民共和国关于伙伴关系的比勒陀利亚宣言》、二〇〇四年确立战略伙伴关系和二〇〇六年《南非共和国和中华人民共和国关于深化战略伙伴关系的合作纲要》，认为双边关系取得全面快速发展。

两国元首认为，南中同为发展中国家，应进一步加
强双方关系，以促进两国共同发展、深化中非合作、加强南南合作、共同应对全球性挑战。为此，双方愿在平等互利、共同发展的基础上建立全面战略伙伴关系，以进一步加强和深化两国之间业已存在的政治、经贸、人文、社会等领域和国际及地区事务中的友好交往与合作。

双方认为，当前多边主义和国际关系民主化在国际社会更加深入人心。国际社会普遍认为，为了建设一个持久和平与共同繁荣的更加美好的和谐世界，要通过最广泛的国际合作实现互利共赢。为此，双方倡议世界各国携手努力，共同分享发展机遇和经验，共同应对人类所面临的各种挑战。

两国元首同意从以下方面促进双方全面战略伙伴关系：

**政治交往和对话**

一、通过双边和多边会晤保持两国元首的经常性接触，在最高政治和经济层面推动和指导合作，以增进对彼此立场和利益关切的相互理解和支持。
二、在全面战略伙伴关系框架内加强南中双方委员会的功能和作用，以指导、协调双方在共同关心的双边和多边政治经济事务中的交流与合作。国家双边委员会全会由南非副总统和中国国家副主席共同主持，原则上每两年举行一次，在两国轮流举办。双边委员会下设分委会，用以指导、协调并落实两国政府对口部门合作，在双方同意的基础上，可根据需要适时设立新的分委会。

三、南非国际关系与合作部和中国外交部每年举行一次部级战略对话，以促进双方政治对话、合作和相互理解，为双边高层交往以及国家双边委员会全会做好筹备工作。

四、安排南非国际关系与合作部和中国外交部间经常性高官级会晤和互访，同时鼓励双方外交学院和外交官培训机构间增进联系与合作。

五、加强两国立法机构高层领导人、专门委员会和办事机构间的交往，以继续鼓励和加强两国全国立法机
关间的合作。

经济领域

六、同意共同努力以改善两国间现有贸易结构，特别是努力使贸易更加平衡，鼓励高附加值工业制成品贸易。为此，双方同意增加贸易投资团。双方同意在经贸联委会机制下建立统计分析联合工作组，研究双边贸易领域的统计差异。

七、中方将鼓励中国企业增加对南非制造业的投资，推动原材料产地附近地区的高附加值产品生产。双方将积极支持关键产业，包括但不限于绿色经济（包括可再生能源和可再生技术设备及零部件）和农业深加工。为在原产地开展矿产品深加工提供便利。

八、在绿色经济、技能开发和产业融资等领域开展合作和相互提供技术支持。在产业融资方面，双方将设法加强其资本市场参与，为产业开发和小企业发展提供优惠利率的资金支持，以推动可持续发展。

九、鼓励两国企业探讨在公路、铁路、港口、电站、
机场、房屋建设等基础设施建设项目方面的合作。双方鼓励两国金融机构加强合作，为两国企业开展上述合作提供融资支持。

十、南方欢迎中方在南非建立水产养殖示范中心，升级改造职业培训学院，并实施其他双方商定的项目。中方将继续为南非提供人力资源培训，以支持南非创造就业和发展经济的努力。

十一、在中方按照南非具体需求提供的优惠贷款支持下，南方将推动中非合作论坛框架内有关项目在南非的落实工作。

十二、欢迎农业、农业深加工和渔业产品贸易，鼓励上述领域人员和技术交流与合作，以提高粮食安全水平。

十三、加强农产品检验检疫、食品安全和工业品检验等合作，并为此就具体问题继续开展磋商。

十四、执行《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于海关事务的互助协定》，建立对话机制，商讨共同
关注的问题，应对共同挑战，并加强信息交换，同时加强双方在世界海关组织中的合作。

十五、深化两国在交通、铁路、民航等领域的交流与合作，重点包括：海运、公路、铁路基础设施建设，以及交通安全、交通服务、道路交通、运营管理、航空运输等。

十六、为两国能源企业在化石能源、可再生能源、核能、能效和能源基础设施等能源相关领域开展务实合作创造条件，并考虑第三方参与。

十七、根据《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府科技合作协定》，加强在与两国经济和社会发展息息相关的科技领域的合作与交流，包括农业、信息通信、空间技术、纳米与新材料、新能源与可再生能源、环境、采矿技术等领域。加强“南中联合研究计划”的实施，开展双方商定的联合科研项目，包括科学研究与开发能力建设、技术创新、技术转让和科技部门的技能转让。

十八、保持密切沟通，进一步推动双方在地质和矿
产资源领域的合作。

十九、支持两国政府部门和产业界在信息通信领域开展信息技术开发、应用等方面的交流与合作，鼓励两国企业在通信网络建设和电信服务等领域开展互利合作。双方将加强在该领域国际组织中的磋商与配合。

二十、认识到旅游业是经济增长和发展、就业和增加外汇收入的动力，愿在旅游培训和能力建设、推动和开发文化旅游和医疗旅游、宣传推广及信息交流等方面开展合作。

二十一、为促进各领域合作的有效开展，双方同意切实采取有效措施，促进和加强两国人员健康、有序往来，简化有关签证手续。

其他领域

二十二、加强和扩大现有双边防务交流与合作。

二十三、同意根据《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府文化艺术合作协定》及其《执行计划》，加强和扩大两国文化交流与合作，促进对彼此文化多样性的深
入了解和认识。

二十四、按照《南非共和国教育部和中华人民共和国教育部教育合作协议》，加强和扩大两国在高等教育和基础教育等领域的合作。双方还同意加强在儿童早期教育以及数学、科技和部分学校汉语普通话教学教师培训等方面的基础教育合作，并加强在专业类研究机构的管理和研究成果以及在技能培训方面的经验交流。

二十五、根据二〇〇六年生效的《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于公共卫生和医学科学谅解备忘录》开展卫生领域合作。同时鉴于该备忘录将于二〇一一年六月到期，双方同意商签新的合作协议。

二十六、开展在电子技术开发、信息通信领域的中小企业孵化器项目、综合社会保障、公共服务和管理、性别主流化、支持弱势群体成功经验共享等方面的合作，并在国际劳工类组织和论坛中就上述问题协调立场。

二十七、在城乡规划、减贫、社区发展等领域开展合作。
二十八、根据《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于林业合作的谅解备忘录》，加强在森林资源管理领域的合作，包括相关政策与规定、研究与开发、贸易与商务、机构能力建设与人才培训等。

二十九、根据《南非共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于水资源合作的谅解备忘录》，加强在水资源领域的合作，重点开展经验交流、技术交流、合作研究、基础设施建设、能力建设等方面的合作。

三十、加强和扩大两国已有的移民领域合作，共同打击非法移民活动，进一步便利两国人员的正常往来。

国际和地区事务

三十一、双方重申致力于促进和维护多边主义和国际关系民主化，增强国际机构决策机制的作用、责任、信誉和合法性，增加发展中国家在国际金融机构中的代表性和发言权。

三十二、欢迎通过全方位、多领域的改革，加强联合国的地位、效力、作用和效率，以使联合国充分发挥
《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则所赋予的功能；并支持对联合国安理会进行改革，优先增加发展中国家、特别是非洲国家代表性；主张改革应坚持民主协商，寻求能获得会员国最广泛政治支持的方案，以维护会员国的团结并充分照顾发展中国家的关切。

三十三、肯定二十国集团峰会对国际社会合作应对金融危机、推动世界经济复苏作出的积极贡献。支持二十国集团峰会作为国际经济合作主要论坛，在全球经济治理中发挥重要作用。继续加强在二十国集团框架内的磋商与协调，以促进提高发展中国家代表性和发言权。

三十四、强调应通过发展融资、公平贸易、全球经济治理以及有利于发展中国家的国际金融体系改革，来促进经济发展。

三十五、呼吁国际社会加快落实联合国千年发展目标。

三十六、重申各国应在《联合国气候变化框架公约》和《京都议定书》框架内，按照“共同但有区别的责任”
原则，推进“巴厘路线图”双轨谈判取得积极进展。双方将积极探讨建立应对气候变化伙伴关系，巩固和加强在气候变化方面的对话，以协调双方在气候变化国际谈判中的立场，交流双方应对气候变化的政策措施，促进双方在该领域的务实合作。

三十七、满意地注意到双方正在为促进非洲和平、安全和经济社会发展所发挥的作用。中方对南方关于加强非盟机构、地区经济组织建设和实施非洲发展伙伴关系计划的倡议表示赞赏。南方也对中方为促进非洲和平与经济社会发展所作出的贡献表示赞赏。

三十八：积极评价中非合作论坛为加强中非平等互利合作和中非新型战略伙伴关系作出的重要贡献，愿为加强论坛建设、落实论坛各项举措共同努力，以促进非洲的和平与发展。中方赞赏南非积极参与中非合作论坛事务，欢迎南非提出承办论坛第六届部长级会议。

南非政府重申坚持一个中国政策，支持两岸关系和平发展和中国统一大业。
中方高度评价南非成功举办第十九届世界杯足球
赛。南方高度评价并预祝中国二零一零年上海世博会圆满成功。

南非共和国总统
雅各布·祖马
（签字）

中华人民共和国国家主席
胡锦涛
（签字）

二零一零年八月二十四日于北京
ADDENDUM F

Declaration of language editing

DETERMINATION OF LANGUAGE EDITING

I, Christina Maria Etrecia Terblanche, hereby declare that I edited the
research study titled:

The comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between
South Africa and China: A geopolitical case study considering
African realism (2010-2015)

for KA Sinclair for the purpose of submission as a postgraduate study for
examination. Changes were indicated in track changes and implementation
was left up to the author.

Regards,

CME Terblanche
Cum Laude Language Practitioners (CC)
SATI accr nr: 1001066
Registered with PEG
ADDENDUM G

Declaration of bibliographist

PostGradSupport

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QUALITY CONTROL: REFERENCING PROTOCOL

To whom it may concern

I, Elsa Maria Esterhuizen, hereby declare that the quality control of the referencing style according to the NWU Harvard guidelines, as used in the thesis submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Security Studies and Management at the Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University by

K.A. Sinclair (0000-0003-2110-0548):

was conducted and completed on 27 November 2010.

E. Esterhuizen

E.M. Esterhuizen
(R.A, UED, H.LD, M.Ed. Educational Technology)