An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the city of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

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DECLARATION

I Elvin Shava, solemnly declare that, this thesis entitled, **An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality** is my own original work and all the sources used or cited have been duly acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this thesis has not been submitted in part of its entirety by me or any other person for degree purposes at this or any other institution

………….   …13 November 2017……………….

Signature   Date

DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this study to my beloved son Bradley Ryan and my wife Constance for their invaluable love and support they provided during the course of this study.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABSTRACT

The increased demand for quality service delivery has forced the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to exercise social accountability to citizens in communities under its jurisdiction. Many social accountability mechanisms such as public protests, elections, IDP forums, and social audits, were used to hold public officials accountable. Using a triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative approach, the Raosoft Sample Size calculator was used to draw 270 respondents from an estimated 2 921 488 people people in the municipality. 250 respondents were selected to respond to questionnaire surveys whereas 20 were key informants interviewed with adequate knowledge on social accountability. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was used to analyse quantitative data using descriptive statistical procedures whereas qualitative data was transcribed to verbatim and presented in themes in line with the research objectives. This research was organised in an article format where Chapters 3 to 5 constitutes articles with introduction, literature research methods and findings. Findings for the aforementioned chapters revealed that social accountability mechanism still needs to be embraced as communities have not fully realised their benefits due to low municipal response. Citizens as well are not aware of other innovative social accountability mechanisms such as public expenditure tracking and social audits that can be used effectively in holding the municipality accountable. The study concludes by recommending an innovative social accountability model that is grounded in the use of digital innovations and social networks to accelerate social accountability and service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Keywords: *Social accountability, Service delivery, Citizen Engagement, Community empowerment*

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC : African National Congress

APRM : African Peer Review Mechanism

COSATU : Congress of South African Trade Unions

CBOs : Community Based Organisations

CGE : Commission for Gender Equality

CSOs : Civil Society Organisations

CoT : City of Tshwane

IDP : Integrated Development Plans

IEC   Independent Electoral Commission

IMF : International Monetary Fund

NGOs : Non-Governmental Organisations

NPM : New Public Management

NDG : New Public Governance

NDP : National Development Plan

NTA : National Taxpayers Association

MFMA : Municipal Finance Management Act

MSA : Municipal Systems Act

MSA : Municipal Structures Act

PFMA : Public Finance Management Act

PSC : Public Service Commission

RBM : Results-Based Management

SADTU : South Africa Democratic Teachers Union

Stats SA : Statistics South Africa

SCOPA : Standing Committee on Public Accounts

UNDP : United Nation Development Programme

WDR : World Bank Report

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY

1.1 ORIENTATION AND BACKGROUND

The decline in the delivery of quality basic services in various governments in developing countries contributed to the evolvement of social accountability as an alternative mechanism to ignite change and promote good governance in service delivery (World Bank, 2011:14). Social accountability includes the collaboration of citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs) and free press to hold service providers accountable for their actions in service delivery. CSOs enabled citizens to voice their grievances by accessing information concerning government expenditures, budgets and accountability processes. Such information empowers citizens with knowledge on how to exercise their rights and demand social accountability from the state with the intention of improving service delivery (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2008). Therefore social accountability strengthens the relationship between communities, local governments, and service providers. The continued deprivation of citizens of basic services (e.g. water, electricity, clinics, etc.) due to corruption and mismanagement, led to the emergence of social accountability as a weapon to fight for better governance and service delivery (World Bank, 2004). Social accountability seeks to promote accountability of service providers although it depends on civic engagement where citizens directly participate in demanding services from public officials (World Bank, 2004). Social accountability is recognised as a poverty alleviation strategy that seeks to emancipate the poor (World Bank, 2001). Social accountability mechanisms involve traditional forms that include inter alia advocacy campaigns, public demonstrations, investigative journalism (Malena, Forster & Singh, 2004:4). The current forms include social audits, public expenditure tracking, and policy-making and tracking internal accountability mechanisms of the government, such as integrating citizens in public commissions, oversight hearings, and committees (Ringgold, Holla, Koziol and Srinivasan, 2012:9). These mechanisms have been in existence although they fail to enhance the accountability of public official in service delivery matters.

Fox (2014:346) explains that institutional performance can be improved by innovative social accountability strategies that promote the participation of CSOs and ensure

states responsiveness to public and corporations demands. In a wider sense, the concept encompasses a wide range of institutional innovations that encourage and project voice. Schroeder (2004:5) endorses four actors citizens, local government, service providers and government officials who actively took part in social accountability. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006:33) admit that social accountability fosters citizen engagement through a political process although it is different from political accountability of elected officials.

Based on the assertions above social accountability has gained legitimacy as a relevant approach for communities where representative government is weak, unresponsive or non-existent. Social accountability has been defined by Fox (2014:347) as a process which includes oversight and monitoring of government actions by citizens and CSOs. It involves citizen grievances, information dissemination and remedies public officials should take to enhance service delivery. It creates a space for community participation in policy making, budgeting and distribution of resources. However, in the wake of this diverse array of on-going institutional experimentation (both small and large scale) critics draws a distinction between advocacy reforms and citizen monitoring (Joshi & Houtzager, 2012).

Depending on the author accountability of officials in government departments is guided by four main questions as to *Who should give account? To whom? About What?* and *When?* (Bovens, 2005:6). Political accountability gives an account of the political relationship that has form roots in the principal-agent debacle between elected representatives, ministers, and voters. Improving social accountability can be achieved when political and downward accountability is spearheaded by elected officials through holding public officials accountable. This is crucial for enlightening concerning public policies which citizens can utilize to demand social accountability besides relying on elections (Aucoin & Heintznab, 2000). Sorenson (2012:6) argues that politicians can exhibit their accountability in public service delivery through their innovative capacities where they are in a position to drive policy innovation (steering) as a way of enhancing the efficiency of public service provision (rowing). Legal accountability concerns a situation where public managers answer to administrative and civil courts depending on the legal system and issues at stake (Boven, 2005:7). This statement is supported by Ababio (2007:6) who asserts that legal accountability involves the relationship between the accounted and the accountable which informs

the implementation of external oversight. This is further supported by Chapter 9 institutions that were established under Section 182(1) and 188(1) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) to support constitutional democracy. The Auditor General and Public Protector offices among others guarantee public officials to observe rules and regulations since courts often issue binding decisions for local municipalities to comply with. The failure by independent bodies to address certain cases requires the intervention of courts to legally settle the disputes (World Bank, 2004:18-19). Administrative accountability is often done by senior management (i.e. Municipal Managers, Chief Financial Officers, HODs, and Supervisors) to auditors, ombudsmen/public protectors, inspectors, and controllers. It should be noted that social accountability through such designed bodies can be regarded as an efficient mechanism to bridge government bureaucracy and introduce new strategies to solve challenges facing government (Yilmaz, Beris and Berthet, 2008). Professional accountability is done by public officials to their associations and professional peers meaning proving feedback to fellow employees in a transparent and accountable manner. Social accountability provides an account to citizens, interest groups, and media (Boven, 2005:7).

Elected officials as well can be held accountable through using term limits. Term limits have an impact on political accountability such as in re-election procedures can determine political accountability (Packel, 2008). Therefore; term limits foster social accountability and prevent elected officials from "gripping" to power in the process harming service delivery. Citizen oversight is supported by specific bodies that include Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and Public Service Commission (PSC) that act as checks and balances in avoiding public corruption in service delivery. Internal control systems in turn such as audit committees can improve financial accountability and governance in municipalities (Bianchi, 2010). Apart from the mentioned social accountability mechanisms, generic legislation such as the code of conduct for municipal officials in South Africa can be one way of holding public officials accountable in order to accelerate service delivery. Mafunisa (2003:85) and Franks (2014:1) write that, upon its transition to a democratic local government, South Africa inherited an enormous infrastructure backlog that was centered for the vast majority of the population. In some areas, underinvestment in municipal infrastructure deprived millions of people to access basic services such as sanitation, water, roads and refuse

collection. Such segregative service delivery was accounted for poor social accountability and lack of innovation by the post-1994 local government. Okundi (2014:11) warns that citizens anticipate an efficient and effective service provision and more individualization of services and they are calling out for an increased transparency and accountability in the innovation systems.

The UNDP (2013:104) reiterates that at the local government level, social accountability interventions involve empowering communities and not individuals in citizen monitoring to hold public officials accountable. Nonetheless, public officials need to be incentivised to provide an enabling environment for citizen participation in social accountability mechanisms. The provision on incentives for local officials need to be assessed in the line of accountability that may run upward to government and outward to communities. Usually, citizens do not have enough resources to implement social accountability mechanism hence a gap exists on how local government and CSOs can increase access to funding hep citizen hold officials accountable.

Poor service delivery in developing countries enabled social accountability mechanisms to attract global admiration as they boom and advance accountability of public officials. Private sector organisations have undertaken steps to implement social accountability as a way of lobbying the government to improve service delivery (Fox, 2007). To enhance social accountability, various scholars and practitioners such as Osborne and Brown (2011) and Walker (2014) developed a keen interest in public sector innovation. Their argument was necessitated by poor service provision in several local governments across the world, which led critics to brand public sector innovation a catalyst in problem-solving, capacity building of government department in response to community challenges (Damapour & Schneider, 2009). Social accountability, therefore; emanates from reforms such as (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) (Almquist et al., 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).

Islam (2015:141) acknowledges that NPM has been a dominant paradigm in public administration theory and practice since the 1980s. Its affinity with markets and private sector management as the old administrative model has been under severe criticism for its inability to effectively deliver well and services to the people. As a developmental paradigm, NPM is regarded as a normative conceptualisation entirely different in various ways from the traditional public administration. The reason is that NPM

presently aims to deliver services that citizens value to increase the autonomy of public managers and rewarding organisations and officials to enhance efficiency in the public service production.

The *Batho-Pele* Principles in South Africa rectified the gaps left by NPM in public service delivery. The World Bank (2011:54) asserts that consultation and redress are to main *Batho Pele* principles that support citizen voice and user power in South Africa. Citizens need to be consulted on the decision-making process their municipality undertakes. This is fundamental because citizens got the opportunity to identify the type of services they require instead of the municipality dictating the developmental path. The PSC (2008:13) endorses that Batho-Pele principles encourage citizen participation and a confident citizenry that hold officials to account without fear of reprisals, for instance, the withholding of services and benefits. Redressing the needs of citizens can be effectively done when citizens engage themselves in constructive social accountability mechanisms that re-engineer service delivery through demanding accountability from public officials (PSC, 2008). Redressing tackle cases of corruption and underhand dealings although the public has limited incentive to enforce good ethical conduct.

Prior to 1994, the enormous challenges faced by local government were supposed to be addressed through sound policies to ignite service delivery (PSC, 2010). In order to ensure accountability and transparency in local government, a White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) was implemented to make local government more "coherent, representative, a competent and democratic instrument for implementing government policies and meeting the needs of all South Africans." Halachmi (2011:24) acknowledges the need to implement social accountability programmes to ensure transparency and accountability in the South African Government. The marked increase in unethical conduct, lack of social accountability and corruption in local government in the past 5years forced the government to take urgent measures since it impacted negatively on public service provision (PSC, 2010).

The present study was grounded in the Organisational Learning Theory and New Public Management approach that guides public officials to be effective, effective and learners towards improving service delivery (see chapter 2). Other various theoretical and management foundation theories such as the Stewardship Theory which is an

ancient concept enjoying modern day resurrection in the public service informs social accountability (Ansell & Gash, 2013:1). The theory encourages leaders to promote public participation in idea formulation, communicate with the public and foster creativity and new ways of doing things (innovation). The theory was developed by Donaldson and Davis (1991 & 1993). Saltman & Davis (2000:733) contend that stewardship is based on good leadership. The scholars reiterate that leading with impact to enhance the effectiveness of an organisation underpins this theory hence public officials in safeguarding the interests of the organisation need to account for their actions. Good stewards like custodians employ a measured approach to risk, exercise careful management and driving towards the social good of the organisation. In this study, this theory acts as a foundation perspective where social accountability mechanism was developed. The Principal-Agent theory was another foundation theory discussed in this study (see chapter 2). It discusses the relationships between the principal (citizens) and agent (municipalities) which often turns sour due to divergent of interests. Rectifying the behaviour of agents is usually a challenge due to the separation of control from principals (Jensen and Meckling 1996). Lindberg (2013) observes this theory has an impact on organisations and the private sector where bosses often delegate to agents to steer development. This foundation theory has been extensively discussed in Chapter 2 to see how it influences social accountability.

1.2   PROBLEM STATEMENT

Achieving social accountability in service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality has its own challenges emanating from poor leadership, lack of compliance with legislation, political infighting, inadequate skills, poor monitoring and evaluation on development   projects, lack of commitment, corruption and limited understanding of various innovative social accountability mechanisms that can be used to enhance service delivery (AG Report 2016/17:6-9). Communities in the City of Tshwane have been suffering from poor service delivery such as poor water provision in communities such as Themba which results in service delivery protests. The service delivery challenges have been recurring leading to poor standards of living for the people. Furthermore, the vague understanding of the term social accountability become an obstacle among public officials who find it difficult to embrace new social accountability mechanisms such as social audits. Whereas social accountability in municipalities rests on good governance and the effective implementation of good

governance principles such as transparency, accountability and observance of the ethical code of conduct. Doorgapersad and Ababio (2010:413) highlight the ten principles of good governance which are participation, rule of law, transparency, equality, responsiveness, vision, accountability, oversight and professionalism. Nonetheless, the City of Tshwane encountered many challenges as stipulated in the findings of Auditor General Report 2016/17 where irregular expenditure, the absence of performance reports, poor auditing strategies and corrupt tendencies were highlighted as challenges that hinder accountability of municipal officials.

Residents in the municipality took to the streets in protest for poor service delivery which results from poor administrative techniques that was associated with incompetence of public officials, cadre recruitment, political corruption, embezzlement and improper implementation of public policies, failure to adhere to a code of conduct (e.g. Batho Pele Principles) and rampant mismanagement and nepotism has contributed to poor service provision in the metro. Fourie (2007:742) advocates for regular and transparent methods to hold public officials accountable through checks and balances in the three levels of government.

Kanyane (2013:127) claims that municipalities in South Africa are tainted with challenges in implementing service delivery options to revamp existing structures within the local government sphere. Mulgan (2014:4) claims that this is attributed to lack of public sector innovation where there are no investment models for innovation, lack of dedicated budgets, teams, processes, and skills, discouraging reward and incentive systems and lack of mature risk management methods for experimentation. Based on the declining state of social accountability this study proposes the use of innovative social accountability mechanisms to hold public officials accountable for service delivery. Therefore; the Organisational Learning and New Public Management approaches were proposed to guide public officials on the path to social accountability which is a pivotal way to accelerate service delivery in communities.

1.3   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

The secondary research questions for the study were as follows:

- What is the meaning and context of social accountability mechanisms used to hold public officials accountable in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan municipality?
- How effective are the social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metro?
- How can citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness to social accountability demands be examined?
- What are the internal and external barriers facing the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in implementing social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery?
- Which social accountability model is effective for improving service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality?

1.4   OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study is grounded in the following objectives:

- To assess meaning and context of social accountability mechanisms used to hold public officials accountable in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan municipality?
- To assess the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
- To assess the perceptions of citizens on local government responsiveness to social accountability demands for effective service delivery.
- To examine the internal and external barriers affecting the implementation of social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

- To provide a social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

According to Myers (2009:6) research is an original investigation undertaken in order to contribute to knowledge and understanding in a particular field. Kumar (2011:8) states that scientific research can be systematic, controlled, empirical and critical investigation of propositions about the presumed relationships concerning phenomena. Research methodology, therefore, can be defined as a systematic way to solve the research problem (Kothari 2004:8). Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28) state that research methodology encompasses various methods used to collect data as a way of complying with the demands of truth, objectivity and validity during the execution of the research. In a scientific study, therefore, a researcher should select appropriate research methods that are suitable to address a research problem (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2001:168). The following section discusses the research design, data collection instrument, data analysis and ethical considerations suitable for this study.

1.5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design as Polit and Hungler (1993:150) observe, indicates a strategy to be followed in any research to meet the objectives and hypothesis. Mouton and Marais (1993:32) describe a research design as a "the plan or blueprint of the study". Questions such as who, what, where and how of the subjects under study are examined. This study employed two types of research designs (qualitative and quantitative). A qualitative design relies on what the researcher intends to know, what he/she perceived to have the credibility to achieve using the available time and resources. In a qualitative design, no rules are followed for the sample (Patton, 2002:244). Quantitative research design as Bless & Higson (2002:86) observe, uses quantitative data to record aspects of society. It interrogated the social and human problems through testing a theory which includes variables measured with the number and subjected to statistical analysis procedures to determine if the predictive generalisations of the theory contained the truth (Creswell, 1994:1). This study, therefore, used both qualitative and quantitative designs to obtain numerical and

qualitative data on the implementation of innovative social accountability mechanisms and how they affect the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

1.5.2 RESEARCH APPROACHES

1.5.2.1 Quantitative approach

A quantitative approach has been described by Bless and Higson (2002:86) as an approach that utilises quantitative data to records aspect of society. Creswell (1994:1) affirms that "it is an inquiry into social or human problems based on testing a theory composed of variables measured with numbers and analyzed with statistical procedures in order to determine whether the predictive generalizations of the theory hold the truth". The quantitative approach is grounded in several assumptions. The first assumption is that it is based on positivism which is the application of scientific methods in social science research to obtain valid and reliable findings (Neuman, 2014). Therefore, the quantitative researchers prefer using numbers as opposed to words in describing a social context hence in the research designs they use surveys and experiments to gather data on programmed instruments which produce statistical data (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The quantitative approach is based on science to understand and predict people's experiences and if scientific methods are not applied in social research it means the findings are regarded invalid (Creswell, 2003). This approach was used because the researcher intended to interrogate the numerical value of the implementation of social accountability mechanisms in public sector innovation in the case study area.

1.5.2.2 Qualitative approach

The qualitative approach was used in this study to assess the success of social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for service provision. A qualitative approach is essential for participants since it gives answers to difficult problems hence it is grounded in the epistemology paradigm (Leedy and Omrod, 2010:94). Manson (1996:4) and Strauss and Corbin (1990:17) endorse that, qualitative studies enable researchers to understand how the world is experimented and produced. Qualitative research is interpretive and flexible for analysing and explain data hence it is viewed as sensitive for observing people's special characteristics in the social context where data is produced (Denzin and

Lincoln, 1994:2). The flexibility of the qualitative researcher helped the researcher to analyse data in a less complicated manner to give it the right meaning.

1.6 Research paradigms

According to Lincoln (1994:5) a research paradigm is defined as a "basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigation" In support of the above notion (Neuman, 2014:96) asserts that a research paradigm is a "general organizing framework for theory and research that include basic assumptions, key issues, models of quality research, and methods of answering questions". Both the definitions mentioned above revealed that research paradigms are philosophies and assumptions about how the world is understood. In social science research, the dominant paradigm used is positivist, constructivist and critical realism (Neuman, 2014).

Neuman (2014) elaborates that, each of the above-mentioned paradigms is made up of four parts which are methods, epistemology, ontology and methodology. Crotty (1998:3) explained that ontology is "concerned with the nature of existence". Epistemology is understood as the discovery of knowledge. (1998:8). Epistemology and ontology are important in understanding the research paradigms because they are the backbone on which research is built (Grix, 2004:58). Furthermore, the assumptions underpinned on them influence the method of research and methodology used in the study. Cohen *et al.,* (2003:44) asserts that methods are different approaches used in data gathering such as qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. The methodology is an action plan in which various techniques applied. For this study positivist and constructivist were applied since the research used a quantitative and qualitative approach to understand the use of social accountability mechanisms in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

1.6.1 Positivist paradigm

Neuman (2014:97) denotes that, the founder of the positivism was Augustus Comte, who suggested that the only accepted knowledge should be obtained through the application of scientific methods. This meant that observation and reasoning are two important concepts that should be applied to understanding the world view and human behaviour (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In support of the above argument (Krauss, 2005: Wahyuni, 2012) reiterate that the aim of acquiring knowledge is to describe the

worldview, therefore any methods applied which obtains findings that cannot be measured should not be accepted, but rather be discarded because only scientific methods are value free.

Positivists are researchers who apply natural science assumptions and theories in order to understand the phenomenon (Neuman, 2014). Positivists adopt a quantitative approach to understanding the worldview (Lincoln, 1994). A quantitative approach uses numbers/figures in presenting its findings when testing for a theory. Positivist understand the world in one direction, therefore they use only scientific ways contrary to qualitative researchers who apply various methods that do not produce untapped knowledge (Kraus, 2005).

In understanding ontology, positivists argue that reality exists on its own; therefore, using human intellects and their interpretation will only distort knowledge (Neuman, 2014:98). Furthermore, only observation and measurements (which are the foundation of natural science) can discover reality. Therefore, this study adopted a quantitative approach for it seeks to obtain accurate data which has been obtained through analysing it on statistical package for social sciences.

Positivists embrace natural science contrary to social science in understanding a phenomenon. In epistemology, positivist argues that knowledge exists in the world and it can be extracted by observation and measurement only (Linclon and Guba, 1994). Human beings by nature are passive and they can be controlled and influenced by the external environment and this distort knowledge, therefore the use of scientific methods results in obtaining reliable and value-free data (Henning, 2004).

The above argue supports that, positivist holds an "objectivist view". According to Creswell (2009) being objective is a foundation of a proficient inquiry. In this form of inquiry, the knower and object to be known are different/ opposite objects. This allows the findings of researchers to be unbiased and value-free as they uphold the application of natural science method which is factual.

1.6.2 Constructivism paradigm

Max Weber and Wilhem Diltthey came up with the philosophical ideas that led to the formation of constructivism paradigm. This paradigm is used by qualitative researchers who believe in understanding a phenomenon from its natural

setting/context (Neuman, 2006). Constructivist assert that the reality is extracted from the following categories: language, belief systems, people's interaction and social interaction (Neuman, 2006). Furthermore, human behaviour's, their perceptions, interpretation and social actors also play a vital role in understanding reality (Wahyuni, 2012).

Human interaction broadens the way of understanding a phenomenon as different people can understand the same notion in different ways, therefore multiple reality forms a backbone in understanding a phenomenon (Neuman, 2006:89). According to Neuman (2014:105) "Language cannot connect to the essential way but contains a worldview that colours how people see and experience the world" (Neuman, 2014:105). This shows that language is an important factor in understanding reality.

Constructivists view epistemology in qualitative research as the gathering of knowledge through learning participant's culture and beliefs, observing participants in their natural setting, taking part in the group under study and the researcher can learn their culture and beliefs (Krauss, 2005). In epistemology, the constructivist is "subjective" for they believe in multiple reality in inquiring a phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). The knower and object to be known are the same entities and influence each other. Schwandt (2001:71) describes the epistemology as the nature of knowledge and justification while ontology approaches inform the truth about a research. Many distinct orientations, intellectual and disciplinary traditions and approaches underpin qualitative studies.

The difference between positivist and constructivist is that positivist studies a portion of a phenomenon and generalize it to a larger context whilst constructivist studies the whole context (Linclon & Guba, 1985 & Krauss, 2005). Data obtained from qualitative researchers is reliable because it's derived from an interactive process with the participants (Krauss, 2005). In understanding ontology, constructivist supports multiply reality in understanding a phenomenon. Constructivists integrate ontological assumptions in understanding the reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1985).

1.6.2.1 Applicability of Positivism and Constructivism in this study

Positivism and constructivism were used in this study because it was underpinned by a qualitative and quantitative approach. Therefore, the researcher needed a thorough

understanding of the epistemological and ontological assumptions which underpin the phenomenon being investigated (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).

1.6.3 Methodological Triangulation

Triangulation as a concept has been subject to debate in social science researches. Various scholars (Campbell, Schwartza & Sechrest 1966; Denzin, 1978; Golafshani, 2003; Smith & Kleine, 1986 & Webb, 1966) argued that triangulation is employed to increase the accuracy of a study in this study context triangulation was used as a validity measure. Creswell and Miller (2000) endorsed triangulation as "a validity procedure where researchers look for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study"

Mixed methods research commonly known as methodological triangulation employs more than one type of method to study a phenomenon (Casey and Murphy 2009; Risjord et al., 2001). Authors (Denzin, 1978; Kimchi, Polivka &Stevenson, 1991 & Polit and Hungler, 1995) endorsed five types of triangulation such as data triangulation, theoretical triangulation, investigator triangulation, methodological triangulation and analysis triangulation. Amandeep (2014:100) argues that among these five types of triangulation only two distinctions had culminated into two types of methodological triangulation which are; 'across method' and 'within method'. It is imperative to highlight that, the between-method triangulation or across method triangulation was used in this study to achieve convergent validity as well as testing the degree of eternal validity. Also, the method can utilise both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques (Amandeep, 2014; Boyd, 2001; Casey & Murphy, 2009). The within method triangulation cross examines internal consistency Denzin, 1978). Quantitative methods as Risjord et al. (2001) observed involve statistical analysis or questionnaires that have standardised scales or measures expressed numerically. Qualitative methods are textual and explanatory as they include interviews, observations or documentary analysis (Risjord et al. 2001). Furthermore, the within method researches employ many complementary data collection procedures either quantitative or qualitative although they cannot use both. For instance, when a researcher seeks to increase the internal credibility of the research results that when questionnaire surveys and pre-existing database may be used. Whereas in qualitative

data interviews, observations may be used for data collection (Casey and Murphy, 2009; Denzin 1989; Kimchi *et al.* 1991 & Thurmond, 2001).

The nature of this study explained the reason behind the use of a triangulation approach since social accountability is a broad field of study of which data can be obtained using both interviews and questionnaires as well to get a balanced version of research results hence the two approaches to complement weaknesses of the other. Creswell (2008:9) defines mixed methods as a methodology which involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single research. The rationale for this method was to complement the weaknesses of each other. Neuman (2006:149) asserts that social sciences require researchers to analyse a phenomenon from different directions rather than with a single direction to obtain a holistic viewpoint triangulation. Various types of triangulations exist such as triangulation of measure, triangulation of observers, triangulation of theory and triangulation of methods (Neuman, 2006:149-150).

1.6.3.1 Advantages of triangulation

The use of triangulation is this study was triggered by the benefits of using two research methods which are useful in the confirmation of findings, increased validity, more comprehensive data as well as improved understanding of the studies phenomenon (Casey & Murphy, 2009; Halcomb & Andrews, 2005 & Foss & Ellefsen, 2002). Also, the triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative methods helped in complementing the weaknesses of each method hence strengthening the outcome of the study (Denzin, 1978 and Sharif & Armitage, 2004).

1.6.3.2 Disadvantages of triangulation

The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study created debate among researcher as they argue that, these two methods differ epistemologically and ontologically (Hunt, 1991). The triangulation of both research methods has been criticised for the use of incorrect methods as well as the ability to articulate important issues of a phenomenon (Oberst 1993). Furthermore, the use of triangulation requires a lot of time in comparison to single strategies dealing with huge amounts of data and disharmony base on investigators biases (Thurmond, 2001).

For the purposes of this study, the triangulation of two research methods was employed in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to assess the implementation of various social accountability mechanisms in the City of Tshwane Metro. Although these two approaches differ they blend well towards understanding a phenomenon from different directions (Neuman, 2006:151). Triangulation allowed the strengths of a qualitative approach to overcome the weaknesses of quantitative or vice versa and this is called the principle of complementary (Creswell, 2007; Ormrod and Leedy, 2013). However, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:21) argue that triangulation has its own weaknesses since the researcher should be thoroughly knowledgeable of each approach, its underlying assumptions and how they fit into the study to avoid biased findings.

1.7   POPULATION

Mouton (1990:34) describes a population as the collection of events, objects and individuals who have similar features for study purposes. This study selected municipal officials, political officer-bearers' officials and residents living in the City of Tshwane. From these role-players, a sample was selected as these respondents enabled the researcher to examine the implementation of social accountability mechanisms to enhance service delivery. A detailed description and the numerical figures of the population has been explained in the forthcoming section.

1.8   SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES

A sample is defined as a segment of the population selected for a particular study (Bryman, 2004:543). In this study, the sample was chosen from the entire City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality estimated population that constitutes 2 921 488 people (Stats SA, 2016). Using a Raosoft Sample Size Calculator the possible representative population for administering questionnaires was 270 respondents. The target population consisted of 270 respondents' that were selected through systematic and purposive sampling techniques. For the purposes of this study, the sample was made up of 270 people who were divided into 250 respondents and 20 participants. The systematic and purposive sampling methods were used in selecting the target population.

Systematic sampling as Neuman (2014:258) observes is a method that, adopts a simple random sampling at the beginning to establish a sampling interval that was created "a quasi-random selection method". This sampling technique falls under probability sampling which allows every person to be chosen as a respondent. (Neuman, 2014). The sampling interval informed the researcher on how to select the individuals to be as the respondents. The researcher selected the 1st respondent and the remaining (249) were selected using the sampling interval of 5th on the whole population. Purposive sampling technique was useful in identifying the public officials entitled in executing innovative social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery in the municipality. Teddlie and Young (2007:77) define purposive sampling as a "process whereby individuals are chosen to be part of the study based on their ability to have vast information in answering the research questions of the study". De Vos (2005), states that purposive sampling techniques rely on the opinion of the researcher. Respondents for this research were identified through the database of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality since there are public servants who implement service provision in relevant communities.

Table 1: Linking research questions to sources and methods and justification

RESEARCH QUESTION	SOURCE/METHOD	JUSTIFICATION
What is the meaning and context of innovative social accountability mechanisms used to enhance service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metro?	Literature review study to determine the context of social accountability. theories were discussed to see how they influence social accountability.	It is significant to explain the meaning and functioning of social accountability in global in the local context. Citizens in the CoT can be enlightened on how they use various social accountability mechanism to hold public officials accountable for service delivery

How effective are the social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metro	Citizens aged 18 to 60 years: <u>A</u> questionnaire was used . Citizens both males and females from selected communities, In-depth interviews with municipal officials selected from the political and administration offices.	Social accountability mechanisms used by citizens must be examined to see their effectiveness towards holding officials accountable. Weaknesses and gaps can be identified to enhance the implementation
How can citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness to social accountability demands be examined?	Citizens of ages 16-60 Semi-structured questionnaire. Semi-structured interview With municipal officials who have accounting authority from selected departments	Assessing the perceptions of citizens was crucial to see it they are contented with the existing social accountability mechanisms being used to hold public officials accountable for service delivery
What are the internal and external barriers facing the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in implementing social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery?	In-depth interview with public officials in the selected departments Semi-structured questionnaire with citizens in selected communities served by City of Tshwane	Assessing internal and external barriers was fundamental for identifying policy and implementation gaps hence remedies can be taken to enhance social accountability and service delivery in communities

Which social accountability model is effective for improving service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality?	The model was directed to the City of Tshwane to enhance social accountability and service delivery	Model development was fundamental for improving the capacity of the City of Tshwane to enhance social accountability and service delivery in communities.

1.9 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

Finn and Jacobson (2008:7) define data collection as a method or process for soliciting raw data to be able to respond to the research problem. The study used questionnaires; in-depth semi-structured interviews and literature from reviewed and peer-reviewed articles, internet, books, published and unpublished dissertations, policy statements, and pieces of legislation.

1.9.1 Questionnaires

A questionnaire is an instrument for data collection which is outside the physical reach of the researcher (Leedy & Ormrod, 2011). In this study, semi-structured questionnaires that are qualitative nature were self-administered meaning respondents completed the questionnaires on their own. In this study 220 questionnaires were self-administered and for the remaining 30, the researcher assisted them because they were illiterate. The researcher administered 250 questionnaires to residents in 5 selected communities of the City of Tshwane.

The reason was to assess the knowledge and perceptions of citizens on the use of various social accountability mechanisms that can used to public official accountable for service delivery. Babbie (2002:253) explains that the questions in a semi-structured questionnaire need to be asked in a chronological order. Every questionnaire contains open-ended and close-ended questions that did not restrict respondents' answers to any questions. Close-ended questions enabled respondents to select an answer from the given responses (Bailey, 1982:123). The open-ended questions were structured which simply means a questionnaire will simply mean it contained some spaces for free answers (Polity & Hungler, 1993:442). Other questions form part of a series of

related questions about a specific topic. These questions are often referred to as contingency questions will form a table of questions (Babbie, 2002:248).

1.9.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured in-depth interview questions that are open-ended were conducted with public officials, political office bearers in the City of Tshwane, who were obtained through the database of the municipality because they have adequate knowledge on the implementation of social accountability mechanisms used to improve service delivery in the City of Tshwane. Struwig and Stead (2010:98) assert that in such interviews, predetermined questions were posed to every participant in a systematic and consistent manner. Semi-structured interviews as Maree et al., (2009:87) pointed out, demands the participant to respond to a set of the predetermined questions with the opportunity for follow-up questions, in order to get clarification on the answers. Semi-structured interviews were used to create a naturalistic environment that enabled the collection of more information (Alston & Bowles, 2003). The interview questions consisted of 10 questions that were answered by political office bearers and public managers (public officials) who has knowledge of social accountability in their departments. The questions were structured in a manner that they probed the extent to which participants were familiar with the implementation strategies and challenges of social accountability mechanisms in communities of the City of Tshwane.

1.9.3 Literature study

The study utilised documents to examine the existence of social accountability mechanism in the City of Tshwane and how they were used by citizens in holding public officials accountable. Secondary sources such as Annual Reports for the City of Tshwane 2016/17, AG Reports 2017, legislation, commercial records, and peer-reviewed articles, past dissertations were used in this study. Myer (2009:122) explains that secondary data sources refer to any data that has been gathered and has been previously published. Documentary methods as Payne and Payne (2004:60) observed are essential for categorising, investigating, interpreting and identifying various limitation of physical sources especially written records in both the private and public domain. Documentary analysis carefully screens each document and choose relevant information that suits an intended study (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2006:208). The use of documents in this study was fundamental as they were readily available and reliable

to establish the foundation for social accountability. Nonetheless, Myer (2009:161) cautions over the use of documents as they often provide information that is not intended for a certain study hence their authenticity, credibility and representativeness are always questionable. However, documents sources were used effectively to establish the theoretical base of the existence of social accountability mechanism in the study area, which also presents some gaps that were explored and motivate the proposition of innovative social accountability mechanism in the City of Tshwane.

1.9.4   Validity for quantitative data collection instrument

Leedy and Omrod (2010) define validity as the accuracy and significance of the research study. To ensure the validity of the study research findings should not be generalized in other social contexts and the conclusions should be drawn strictly from the data provided by the respondents (2010:97). The validity of quantitative study and theses are construct, content and external validity. External validity was applied by using a multi-method approach that falls under external validity and was used to test the trustworthiness of the quantitative data.

1.9.5   Data trustworthiness for qualitative data collection

In social science studies, qualitative and quantitative researchers have distinct evaluation criterion for ensuring the accuracy of their data since the two approaches are explained using different methodologies and are grounded in diverse philosophical assumptions. Quantitative studies employ external validity, external validity, and external validity and objectivity and construct validity in determining data trustworthiness. Nevertheless, qualitative studies use data trustworthiness strategies that are different from those of quantitative. Qualitative studies use internal validity that can be superseded by credibility, external; validity by transferability, reliability by dependability and objectivity by conformability (Guba and Lincoln, 1982:3-4). For the purpose of this study four strategies identified by Schwandt (2007) namely credibility, dependability, conformability, and transferability were discussed to see how they inform the trustworthiness of qualitative findings. The strategies have been discussed as follows:

1.9.5.1 Credibility

Leedy and Omrod (2010:80) define credibility as the magnitude at which the collected data is believable or acceptable. Their argument is premised on the view that the validity of qualitative data is subjective hence there is a need to assess the multiple realities constructed by different people in their social context. It is the duty of every reader to examine and evaluate the credibility of a research in line with their own understanding. It is rare to find a single reality for every person's constructs of reality hence reality depends on what believes or want to be real (Smith and Ragan, 2005). Credibility was debated by previous studies (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004; Lincoln and Guba 1985) when they argued that credibility verifies whether findings signify plausible information collected from the subject's version of original understanding. Credibility corresponds to internal validity in quantitative studies since they both involve a test march for the realities of collected data (Babbie, 2009). This study tested credibility by running a pilot study of research instruments among citizens and public officials in the City of Tshwane and consulted and triangulated many data sources and approaches as shown in the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The principle of complementary was associated with the credibility of qualitative findings.

1.9.5.2 Dependability

Bitch (2005:86) defines dependability as the stability of findings over time. The researcher assesses analyses the recommendations, findings and interpretations of the study (Cohen et al., 2011). Babbie (2009:278) reiterates that dependability involves the replication of findings with the same participants in the uniform environment and still provide the same results. Dependability is equated to reliability in quantitative studies whereby the research findings should maintain consistency when being observed under the same circumstance (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Dependability was tested using coding and recoding and peer examination. The researcher tested the dependability of findings by using peer examination whereby the researcher discussed the research process, data analysis and findings with unbiased colleagues and other postgraduate's students at the North West University who are experienced in qualitative studies (Anney, 2014:279).

1.9.5.3 Conformability

This is a process whereby research findings are verified and corroborated by another researcher (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). Tobin and Begley (2004:392) assert that in qualitative studies, it ensures that the researcher does not falsify data and findings. For the purposes of this study, conformability was tested by clearly indicating how the data collection process was conducted and analysed which is essential for others to be able to test those findings. The researcher utilised triangulation and data auditing. Various types of triangulation such as triangulation of measure, triangulation observers, triangulation of theory and triangulation methods were observed (Neuman 2006:149-150). As alluded to before, the triangulation of two research approaches (quantitative and qualitative) was fundamental for confirming the data findings of this research.

1.9.5.4 Transferability

Anney (2014:227) describes transferability as the same as external validity that aims to uncover whether the findings of a study can be generalized in other contexts. Qualitative studies are often subject to criticism as generalizability is a problem as people have multi-interpretation on the same social phenomena (Guba and Lincoln, 1985). In this study, therefore; the researcher tested the transferability of data by employing thick descriptions via the use of verbatim quotations of participants and by utilizing a detailed description of the research context. This includes describing thoroughly the research methods and assumptions underpinning the study (Babbie, 2009). Anney (2014:278) concurs that detailed descriptions of research context involve explaining the research processes form the methodology used, data instruments, data collection and study context to the finalisation of the last report. The researcher further outlined clearly how the research was carried out in an effort to test the transferability of data.

1.10 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis is described by Finch (1990:20) as the interpretation of raw data to give it a meaning in line with a research objective. Newman (1997:426) asserts that data analysis encompasses the use of objects, literature, and behaviour and search for patterns. It is conducted to obtain the reliability and relevance of information against

the subject under investigation. Once suitable and sufficient data had been collected themes were identified and interpreted in accordance with a setting in which it transpired. In the analysis of data the researcher examined, sorted, categorized, evaluated, compared, contemplated the coded data and reviewed data. In order to give meaning to qualitative data four main categories such as evaluative, diagnostic, contextual and strategic are utilised (Huberman and Miles, 2002:305). The four categories were employed for data analysis in this study as all genuine data were described and interpreted to draw relevant conclusions. The descriptive statistical analysis was employed in the analysis of collected data whereas all factual information is described; explained and suitable observations are made. To analyse data from questionnaires through statistical procedures, the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software was employed. The results were interpreted by means of figures and charts followed by a textual explanation. Qualitative data were analysed inductively and involved integrating and synthesis of the narrative non-numeric data. Themes were formulated based on the objectives of the study to present qualitative data. Tables were used for responses and responses from open questions were processed for interpretation. After analysing all the data, conclusions are derived based on the responses from the respondents, and this was summarised in chapter conclusions.

1.11 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study was conducted in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality based in Pretoria, the administrative capital city of the Republic of South Africa. The municipality was chosen as an ideal case study due to social accountability challenges that have been experienced that compromise the effective delivery of services in communities (AG, 2017). The use of social accountability mechanisms by citizens has been assessed to see how the municipality responds to citizen demands for accountability and service delivery.

1.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Just like any other scientific studies, this study was limited by the unavailability of respondents as some the municipal officials targeted were not available to respond to interview questions due to their busy work schedules as some were reluctant to respond to questions. The researcher, therefore, relied on key informants from other

departments who were willing to cooperate in the study. The study encountered limited funding which inhibits the researcher from reaching all the intended respondents. Nonetheless, citizens, on one hand, cooperated although questions on service delivery and accountability raise their emotions.

1.13 RESEARCH ETHICS

Ethics are explained as the ability to know what is morally wrong or right as agreed upon by a group of people (De Vos and Strydom, 2005: 57).

1.13.1 Informed consent

In order to comply with the ethical requirements of the university, the researcher acquired an ethical clearance from the Basic and Social Science Research Ethics Committee (BaSSRec) of the North West University. Further permission was sought from the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to interview the public officials and administer questionnaires to residents before embarking on data collection. Leedy and Ormrod (2014:105) acknowledge that informed consent involves the subjects being educated on the structure of the research. Before interviewing the participants and distribute questionnaires and interview guides, the researcher submitted an informed consent form to the respondents seeking their permission to interview them.

1.13.2 Avoiding plagiarism

The study avoided plagiarism which is an academic offence and all the sources used in this study were correctly referenced. Leedy and Ormrod (2013:108) argue that, "*Any use of another person's ideas or words demands full acknowledgement: otherwise, it constitutes plagiarism and documentary theft".* The researcher cited all the sources used in a truthful manner.

1.13.3 Voluntary participation

Babbie (2009:521) affirms that voluntary participation refers to when subjects personally make a choice of being involved in the study without any form of force or coercion. In this study, the respondents were not forced to participate and were informed of their right to withdraw in case they feel they no longer want to participate in the research.

1.13.4 Confidentiality of respondents

The research maintained the right to privacy of the respondents and all the sensitive issues that were revealed by respondents were treated with confidentiality, no identities of respondents were revealed. Hennick and Bailey (2011:71) affirm that confidentiality refers to not disclosing information that is discussed between the researcher and the participant. It can be regarded as a continuation of privacy, which refers to agreements between persons that limit others access to private information (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delport, 2005). The researcher, therefore, kept confidential the identities of participants in this research.

1.13.5 Avoidance of harm

Furthermore, the respondents were advised on the reason for the research and no harm was imposed on the participants during and after research process. In the event any harm occurred during the interviewing process, the debriefing of participants was done. Stangor (2007:41) holds that when dealing with human subjects caution needs to be exercised to avoid any harm to the respondents which is also ethical in social science research. The semi-structured questionnaire that involved open and closed-ended questions was used in soliciting information from respondents. Similarly, the interview guides were self-administered by the researcher and they were contained in open-ended questions. The subheadings were developed from the objectives of the study which rests on innovative social accountability mechanisms used to improve service provision in the City of Tshwane.

1.13.6 Privacy and anonymity

Before data collection, the researcher handed out research questionnaires to the target group without names of respondents to avoid bias i.e. anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. The researcher, towards the end of the allocated time for the study sensitized respondents about the remaining time available for the study and start to round off the study checking with the respondents if there is anything that the respondents wish to make a comment on. The researcher presented concluding remarks and convey his words of gratitude to the respondents. The anonymity of the respondents was maintained throughout the study (Babbie & Mouton; Denscombe 2002 & Creswell, 2014).

1.13.7 Management of information

When the research was completed; the findings were aggregated not only based on the individual but on the responses from all participants. All the collected data from questionnaires and interview guides were stored was stored safely in a locked cabinet and audio data in an online drop box with a password known to the researcher only. The researcher must keep the devices they use in data collection such as transcription (notepads, interview guides and questionnaire) and audio tape records safe (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The purpose of keeping the data safe was to ensure that no one has access to the information concerning the research and also maintaining the privacy of the respondents. The researcher, at the completion of the study, presented a copy of the thesis to the Accounting Officer of the Department.

1.14 CHAPTER LAYOUT

This study adopted an article option format which is one of the methods used to obtain a Doctoral Degree under the North West University regulations. Therefore using the article option format Chapter, one includes the overview of the study and methodology used. Chapter Two uses a literature review analysis to elucidate theories governing the study. Chapter Three, Four and Five discusses literature and presented empirical findings from a quantitative and qualitative study. Chapter Six provided an innovative social accountability model that can be used to enhance service delivery in the City of Tshwane. The detailed explanation of the study layout is presented as follows:

Chapter One: Orientation, problem and method

The chapter provided an overview of the implementation of various social accountability mechanisms and how they can be adopted to enhance service provision in the City of Tshwane. The objectives and questions, methodology, data collection analysis techniques were explained in detail. The sampling procedures, population and ethics were reviewed. This chapter serves as the summary of the evolving chapters.

Chapter Two: Theoretical exposition of Social accountability

This chapter focused on a detailed review of theoretical frameworks Organisational Learning and New Public Management to assess how they influence social accountability mechanisms in the City of Tshwane. Other foundation and management theories such as Stewardship theory and Principal-Agent Theory were discussed, explained and aligned depending on how they influence the research problem. This chapter discussed some enabling legal frameworks and Chapter Nine institutions (Public Protector, Auditor General, Commissions for Gender among others) that support social accountability in South Africa.

Chapter Three: Effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms

This chapter discussed and analysed the effectiveness of various existing social accountability mechanism such as *Imbizos*, Public Forums, Participatory Budgeting among others. The conceptual frameworks for social accountability were discussed to locate the study context. The nature of social accountability mechanisms being implemented by citizens in the City of Tshwane was assessed to see whether they are suitable to hold public officials accountable to improve service delivery in the municipality.

Chapter Four: Perceptions of citizens on municipal responsiveness to social accountability demands

This chapter discussed and assessed the various innovative social accountability mechanism used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for service delivery. The chapter examined the level of municipal response to service delivery demands and assess if the social accountability mechanism used meet citizen satisfaction in communities served by the City of Tshwane.

Chapter Five: Internal and External barriers facing the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in implementing innovative social accountability mechanisms

This chapter discussed the internal and external obstacles encountered when implementing social accountability mechanisms in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. The chapter examined the challenges facing residents when they intend

to implement social accountability mechanisms. Main gaps were identified and deductions made for model improvement on how social accountability can be conducted to enhance service delivery in the municipality.

Chapter Six: A social accountability model for the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

The chapter developed an innovative social accountability model and describes the steps on how to implement it as well as the determinants. Both quantitative and qualitative findings of the study were discussed in relation to social accountability mechanisms, in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. This chapter provided a summary of the study based on the findings, conclusions of the study. It discussed the policy implications for social accountability studies both in the global and local context and shows how innovative social accountability model can be used to improve service delivery in the City of Tshwane and similar municipalities facing same challenges. The chapter concluded by discussing the practical implications of this research to public administration theory and practise. Direction for further studies has been explained to guide future researchers in the field of social accountability.

1.15 CONCLUSION

The chapter introduced the study, background and orientation on what is social accountability and how it is conceptualised in the South African context. The study has provided an overview of the current situation analysis on the need to exercise social accountability given the current decline in public service delivery across many municipalities in the country, various social accountability mechanism that impacts on social accountability such as elections, chapter nine institutions, IDPs among others were discussed in brief with emphasis on their significance in holding government accountable. The chapter highlighted the theoretical frameworks that were used and discussed the research methods suitable for this study. From the brief overview of the literature on social accountability, it was shown that very few studies in South Africa have written on the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms citizen can use to hold the state accountable. This dearth in literature motivated this study as service delivery is a growing challenge in local government owing to the lack of transparency and openness in the way the civil service is conducted. The desire to maintain status quo, failure to appreciate innovation and concepts brought by NPM is still a challenge

in local government. The following chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks that underpin social accountability and it gives an exposition of legal frameworks and institutions that promote civic engagement of state officials in social accountability.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013:282) argue that the demand for the state to exercise accountability to citizens has grown and has become a buzzword towards an effective governmental performance. Schillemans (2008:16) denotes that, social accountability improves good corporate governance, management of municipal finances and municipal service delivery. Public accountability as Bekker (2009:1) observes minimises government expenditure as acts of misconduct and embezzlement of public funds are investigated. In South Africa, social accountability can help the local government avoid wasteful expenditure which results in bankruptcy and poor service delivery in communities. Curristine's (2005:127) opines that accountability helps address the citizen's ever-changing needs and wants at the same time improving the performance of local government to deliver public goods and services. Citizens and other non-state actors have increasingly demanded municipalities to account for actions taken which is fundamental for influencing policy-making and the actions of public officials in service delivery (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002:3). Governments have therefore adopted measures to consult citizen in policy making and decisions that affect communities with the aim of improving service delivery (Laking, 2005:25). The theoretical underpinnings alluded to before are discussed in the forthcoming section to indicate why municipalities should exercise social accountability to improve service delivery in communities. Mafunisa as cited in Moeti (2014) argues that the major challenge for governments is earning citizen trust. Usually, states fail to gain citizen trust due to unethical conduct, lack of accountability, and lack of integrity among officials and politicians which will be addressed using the stewardship and principal agent theoretical frameworks. Many scholars argue that theory informs practice hence the review of these theories provides a departure point as theories lay a foundation on which the study is based.

2.1.1 Framing the study

This chapter discusses the nexus between municipalities and citizens that is grounded in various theoretical underpinnings such as Organisational Learning and New Public

Management. These two theoretical frameworks anchor this study as they inform the state to become a learning organisation where performance can be improved through innovative mechanisms. The NPM revised the traditional public administration which had firm roots in bureaucracy and it advocates for change as public service should be development oriented. The foundation theories that have been used in previous studies to guide social accountability include Stewardship Theory and Principal-Agent theory where the state as the stewards need to take care of public money hence exercising accountability is the key to maintaining the relationship. The Principal-Agent Theory argues that municipalities as agents employed by the principals (government) need to exercise the will of the principals although there is divergent of interests as an agent always follow own selfish interests. This chapter further discusses other foundation theories that inform social accountability which includes inter alia Organisational Learning Theory and New Public Management Theory to see how they influence citizen demand for social accountability with the aim of improving services in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. The chapter further discusses the Batho Pele Principles, the enabling legal frameworks and state institutions governing social accountability in South Africa. Relevant concepts that inform social accountability will be discussed as well.

2.2   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.2.1   Organisational Learning Theory

2.2.1.1 Origins of Organisational Learning

This theory became popular in the 1950s when there was a dispute between behaviourists and economists. Prior to the end of Second World War economic models for private organisations developed by researchers that subscribed to behaviorist orientation was contesting their significance. March, Simon and Cyert, prominent behaviourists attacked the classical economic theory of the firm because they argue that, the models were overly simplistic and contradicted empirical evidence. Books that follow by Simon (1958) disputed economic models when they argue that organisational; decision outcomes are uniquely determined by environmental constraints. The main argument of core learning related idea in organisations was since organisations experience recurrent decision situations which made them respond to performance programs. In Africa, organisational learning gained

prominence following the need for both private and public organisations to enhance e the performance of organisations through learning or adopting new ways of doing things.

2.2.1.2 Underlying assumptions

Daft and Huber (1987) assert that organisational learning theory has both interpretive and systems structural dimensions. Interpretive dimensions provide a meaning which is apportioned to data whereas system structural perspectives involve organisation's systems and structures of decision making that disseminate information. DiBella et al. (1996:363) define organisational learning as the capacity or (process) within an organisation to maintain or enhance performance based on experience. Various assumptions of the organisational learning theory were derived by Holmqvist (2003). To begin with, organisational learning is based on the idea of experience on the individual and collective basis. Nonetheless, this raises questions on whether an organisation can be deemed intelligent or superior to an individual. Secondly, the theory assumes that organisational learning produces change. This is where the demand for social accountability is derived from as public officials are required learning new things to enhance change in the manner they deliver services to communities. Individually or collectively public officials need to acquire skills to enhance their works is the aim of the South African government through the Skills Development framework

2.2.1.3 Practical implication of Organisational Learning theory in Social accountability

The organisational learning theory provides a theoretical gap which can be explored to understand why public officials should socially account in public service delivery Organisational Learning theory offers valuable insight into how organisations act and change. This theory has been widely adopted in public sector organisations in policy-making and administration. The organisational theory as an innovation theory entails a multi-disciplinary area with contributions from psychology, sociology, political science, social anthropology, economics, and management. The theory has been categorized into four different theoretical perspectives namely: rational, natural, open systems perspective and new institutionalism (Egeberg, 1984 & Scott, 1992). The growing demands for social accountability in South African local government made many government departments to adopt the organisational learning perspectives as

they allow a room for growth and improvements in the way the public sector is run. The organisational learning provides public official with a room to enhance social accountability mechanism which can either be done through innovating news ideas in the public sector or adopting learning models to improve their skills capacity hence the theory fits well in the study since it promoters a paradigm shift in doing work towards learning to ignite performance and service delivery. Using the Organisational Learning Theory and New Public Management approach, public officials in South Africa can improve in the manner they conduct public duties and revamp the existing structures which are imperative towards improving service delivery. Based on the services delivery challenges facing the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, social accountability mechanisms can be implemented through the stewardship theory and principal-agent and news public management theories to enhance service delivery. Bovens et al., (2005) argue that an organisation which is characterized by a learning culture has an open and receptive attitude towards different opinions and alternative ways of doing things and has a tolerance for errors and risk-taking. In this regard accountability mechanisms more specifically the public nature of the account giving and the possibility of sanctions may provide the incentive for public officials to make changes in order to improve the performance of their organisation (Bovens et al., 2008; Wynen et al., 2014) the effective implementation of social accountability mechanisms can help the City of Tshwane Metro to encourage and promote learning in pursuit of continuous improvement in public governance and public management (Bovens, 2005; Bovens, Schillemans & Hart, 2008; Schillemans, Van Twist & Vanhommerig, 2013).

2.2.1.4 Criticism levelled against Organisational Learning theory in Social Accountability

As a social accountability theory in this study, the organisational learning theory was subjected to its various criticism due to several reasons. Firstly, the theory proposes that any organisation should have a learning culture or initiatives where employees receive training. Bunderson and Sutcliff (2003) argue that the theory overlooks emerging or small organisations that do not have the capacity to establish a learning environment for its employees. Edmondson (1999) reiterates that establishing a learning organisation requires employees to attain psychological safety which is necessary to enhance production. In social accountability, government departments

of developing countries often lack the resources to conduct skills training programmes to equip their public officials which can negatively affect their capacity to deliver services. The theory could not explain how power relationships are dealt with in an organisation since government departments subscribe to bureaucracy which can affect the learning of public officials (Contu and Willmott, 2003). Moreover, acquiring experience in an organisation has its own limitations since employees understand or develop skill at different times. So transferring knowledge to one another in a learning organisation is a challenge which the theory did not provide a satisfactory explanation (Darr et al, 1995; Szulanski, 1996). Emerging scholars on learning theory have proposed that motivation of public officials to trigger service delivery. However, the theory could not emphasize more on the use of incentives to enhance performance which exposes it to a barrage of criticism, from contemporary scholarship. Nonetheless, in social accountability, the organisational learning theory provides a benchmark for innovation in the public service where new techniques can be developed by public servants to stimulate service delivery in communities.

2.3   NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

2.3.1   Origins of New Public Management

Various assertions were prosed by scholars and analysts to trace the emergence of New Public Management (NPM). The NPM approach has been the widely debated topic of public policy-making circles and both local and international public administrations in the past generation. This may be because of its complexity, wide-ranging application and potential impact borrowed from the traditional Max Weberian perspective have gained momentum in Public Administration (Hood, 1991; Polidano 1999; Pollit, 1990). Existing literature has shown that NPM has a unique language which forces some scholars to name "NPM styles" or "NPM Type" probably due to its influence on modern-day public administration (Gerry 2001:447; Haque, Kelly, and Rubin, 2012:584; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2011; McCourt, 2001:116).

The introduction of NPM was meant to re-engineer the capacity of the public service to accelerate service provision and not to upset the status quo which has deep roots in the old public administration as other scholars perceive (Gruening, 2001:1). However, tapping insight from Gruening, his assumption was drawn from the fourteen theoretical approaches contrasted with the twenty-four attributes of NPM. The

theoretical approaches assumed are classical public administration, public choice, principal agent, property right, neoclassical public administration, transaction costs, Austrian school, discourse, policy analysis, rational public management, organic public management and new public management. These theories laid the foundation and a springboard at the same time for NPM as it quickly gained momentum in public administrations and private sectors in the OECD countries in the late 1970s (Hood, 1991; Pollit, 1993; Ridley, 1996). The adoption of NPM by many low incomes and middle-income countries around the 1980s was motivated by the economic crisis as fiscal measures implemented failed to turn around the economies of these countries (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Osborne, 2010; Hughes, 2003; Pollit, 1993). In the contemporary public administrations, NPM was adopted to redress the deteriorating state of service delivery (Minogue, 2001).

2.3.2 New Public Management Approach

The quest for social accountability in South Africa is informed by the New Public Management approach which has since been developed to address the service delivery challenges affecting local municipalities. The transition from the old bureaucratic public administration in South Africa into NPM bring about new governance model for running the public service. Naidoo (2015:23) asserts that the political transformation in South Africa enabled the restructuring of state bureaucracy in the early 1990s. The paradigm shift from traditional public administration into NPM saw government departments adopting NPM reforms as policymakers tap into the NPM approach to ignite service delivery in Europe, Denmark, and Sweden (Talbot and Johnson, 2007:59). The traditional public administration was regarded as an old-fashioned paradigm without tangible service delivery results hence NPM presented an effective managerial public service that can trigger efficiency in the public service (Hood, 1999:5). Hughes (2003:3) pronounces the NPM model as a compatible concept capable of driving the public service into realizing the value for money. Many legislations (PFMA, MFMA, and White Paper of Service Delivery) in South Africa were therefore promulgated in line with the principles of NPM as the government focuses on efficiency and effective delivery of public goods and services. The principles of NPM and how they affect social accountability and service delivery has been elucidated below.

2.3.2.1 Principles of New Public Management

Various aspects underpin NPM and these have an influence on how government departments in South Africa should exercise social accountability through NPM with the aim of improving service delivery. Hughes (2003:54) discusses the principles of NPM in detail.

2.3.3 Strategic Approach

This is when states develop long-term planning and strategic management Government decides on the organisation's mission, goals, and objectives organisational environment including strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities as well as potential threats that can harm the organisation.

2.3.3.1 Management within administrative framework

The NPM model demands professional management within the administrative realm, Managers are involved in policy as well as n politics. However, managers are expected to produce results

2.3.3.2 Focus on results

The NPM approach assumes that organisations must focus on outputs or outcomes instead of strictly focusing only on inputs. The NPM model represents the performance of individual agencies as they are expected to develop performance indicators as a way of assessing the progress made in an effort to achieve objectives. Holmes and Shand as cited in Hughes (2003:55) observe that NPM monitors and enhance the progress of employees and government agencies to reach intended objectives. Performance orientation is influenced by the availability of performance information. Therefore, more focus on incentives as they trigger performance management in government agencies although risk associated with budgeting needs to be taken into consideration.

2.3.3.3 Improved financial management

NPM ideology targets improvement in budget formulation. The concept stipulates that budgeting systems should be changed from the old-line item budgeting and accounting systems and replaced with new budgeting techniques. The focus under

line-item budgeting systems in on inputs rather than outputs. The NPM model utilizes the accrual systems that supersedes cash accounting systems. It should be highlighted that public management increased attention on the effective use of resources. In the quest for social accountability, this principle can be used to empower citizens to engage officials in participatory budgeting where they can submit their input to stimulate community service delivery.

2.3.3.4 Relationship with politicians

The distinct character of NPM approach is that managers are held accountable for achieving organisational objectives. The nexus between office bearers and politicians is fundamental for advancing the objectives of NPM as cooperation is required. The traditional public administration had several limitations as it promotes master-servant relationships in contrast to NPM approach which requires administrators to be actively involved in policy-making. Office bearers are increasingly taking an advisory role to political office bearers which is beneficial form organisational growth. The cooperation between politicians and officials is fundamental for social accountability as well as citizen demand services and the response from the two groups can trigger development in communities they serve.

2.3.3.5 Relation with the Public within the NPM approach ,

The NPM approach assumes that official need to exercise direct accountability to citizens. The concepts are premised on the notion that, citizens as clients have the right to demand accountability and public managers are required to respond to their needs, this idea has roots in the traditional public administration and has been modified under the NPM model when it speaks to results-based management model (RBM). Under the RBM model, a coherent and strategic planning and management based framework based on learning and accountability need to be established in a decentralized environment. This idea corresponds to the organisational learning theory which stipulates that an organisation is ever-growing to meet the demand of citizens. O'Flyn (2007:353) specifies that NPM model aims to improve the management and efficiency of public managers through accountability. The main goal is to monitor the progress of government officials to see if they are executing their duties accordingly to achieve organisational objectives.

To enhance the use of NPM, a paradigm shift from the old Weberian hierarchical control on Wilsonian dichotomy and Taylorist scientific management is required. There is a need to separate administration from politics to improve service delivery and social accountability of government departments (Minogue, Polidano and Hulme 1998:60). NPM, therefore, is the cornerstone of municipal service delivery and the PFMA and Treasury emphasize on the strategic planning and flexibility in the management of government departments.

2.3.3.6 Criticism levelled against NPM as a social accountability theory

As a social accountability theory, the NPM focuses more on efficiency disregarding the traditional public administration principles that speak to equality, fairness, equity, and control among others. The fact that it ignores these aspects makes scholars wonder if it can influence the present gap in terms of state accountability to communities (Christensen and Laegrei, 2004:27). The NPM further suffers from its vague assumption on the implementation of good ethical standards as it seems to focus more on productivity rather than the moral aspects of public officials to render services. NPM reforms as Andrews and Van de Welle (2013:765) observe disregard solidarity as it elevates enlightened citizen who can demand accountability hence its narrow focus on individuals sparks more questions than answers. This view in some way contradicts the aims of social accountability as it is premised on the understanding that citizen and CSOs need to collaborate to demand accountability from the public officials. The lack of social inclusiveness in the NPM model defeats the purpose of citizen engagement in social accountability as the aim is to integrate all concerned communities to speak in one voice which is fundamental for attracting government attention. Nonetheless, citizen participation is enabled under the NPM where social accountability mechanisms can be used to engage the public officials on service delivery matters (Hughes, 2003:56). The NPM has been rebuked for being an inconsistent theory as it could not accommodate policies used in governed departments hence it haphazardness and fragmentation nature makes it difficult for public organisations to implement for enhanced service delivery (Rubakula, 2014:85).

2.3.4 Foundation Theories that guide Social Accountability

2.3.4.1 Stewardship Theory

According to Schillemans (2013:541), the Stewardship theory was developed following gross dissatisfaction with the selfishness displayed by agents who acted unscrupulously on behalf of principals. As a management theory that is often used in Public Administration the theory was formed to revise the weaknesses of the principal-agent model. The stewardship theory assumes condition which agents may base their self-interests or rather act against the goals and objectives of their principals. The central aim of the theory has been elucidated by Davis et al. (1997:24) as follows:

> "Stewardship theory . . . was designed for researchers to examine situations in which executives as stewards are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals. In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward whose behaviour is ordered such that pro-organisational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours".

The stewardship model is based on the image of a medieval steward of the lord, unlike the rational agent model that projects the image of the provider of a service in a market (Reeves, 2005). In many circumstances, the stewards want to conduct a perfect job of taking care of corporate possessions (Block, 1993 & Davis, 1991).

Citizen's quest for social accountability is informed by the Stewardship Theory where the state act as a steward that give account to the owners who are the citizens. Nzimakwe and Mpehle (2012:280) explain that the Stewardship Theory involves an "obligation to provide services in an effective and efficient manner that meet the needs of the citizens [clients] of the South African public service institutions without exception". Waters (2013) highlights that, the Stewardship theory emphasis control of something whereby one is given the mandate to take care of something without taking full ownership. In most cases, therefore, public officials and politicians are entrusted with the care of the country's resources during their time in office. Therefore, citizen demand for accountability rests on the notion of good stewardship whereby the government should account for the manner they use public resources. The principles of Stewardship have roots in the public and private organisations where consultation

with communities being served is the key to enhance service delivery (Saner and Wilson, 2003).

The stewardship theory assumes good qualities and conditions as signs of good stewardship. Schillemans (2013:543b) argues that the stewardship theory revised the belief on the nexus between the principal and agent/steward. Whereas the agency theory emphasis on mitigating losses, the stewardship theory aims to establish an environment for good stewardship although the flourishing condition may apply (White, 1985).

The King Code of Governance Principles and the King Report on Governance in Southern Africa (King III) linked stewardship in local government as the exercise of intellectual honesty associated with accountability. If further involves commitments, boldness, and transparency in decision making in the process exhibiting knowledge and good leadership qualities to effectively deliver services (Institute of Directors, 2009). In local government context the concept of stewardship act as a driver for linking communities with service provider hence municipalities need to exercise good governance as part of promoting the relationship between state and communities (Saner and Wilson, 2003).

2.3.4.2 Practical Implications of Stewardship Theory in the City of Tshwane

The concept of stewardship is a two-way relationship whereby the municipality as the steward is accountable to the citizens who trusted the municipality with its resources. The City of Tshwane can adopt the Stewardship principles as the Constitution legally mandates the metro to safeguard and use public money to render basic goods and services in a transparent and accountable manner (Motubatse, Ngwake, and Sebola, 2017:95-96). In this study, the stewardship theory has been adopted to influence the accountability of officials to the citizens. This can be demonstrated through obtaining clean audits following Auditor General among other checks and balances mechanisms. The emphasis on stewardship rests on the demand side of accountability where citizens require the supply side (steward) to account for actions taken when delivering public goods and services. The stewardship theory presents a relevant analytical framework where the state of service delivery can be benchmarked and assessed do whether the City of Tshwane account to its citizens or not.

Podrug (2011) and Water (2013) illustrate that the Stewardship understanding point to the dichotomy between political office bearers and administrators when they are entrusted with citizen resources hence conflicts need to be managed. To further strengthen the role of the City of Tshwane as the steward, communities need to demand social accountability which may help identify weaknesses or corrupt tendencies. It is the principals (communities) that have the power to remove the greedy stewards (officials) from power in the event they turn their back on the citizens who elected them (Corruption Watch, 2013). Nevertheless, in the City of Tshwane the removal of stewards from power has been hindered by the high-level bureaucracy coupled with political interference which turns into violent protests as the principals (communities) fail to successful bring steward (municipality) to account. Therefore, good stewardship rests in the effective delivery of services and exercising social accountability in communities being served. Studies by (Mills and Keast, 2009; Van Slyke, 2006:157) have shown that stewardship theory can be used improve accountability of service providers. Stewards can be forced to account form the actions, however, this also depends on the willingness or strong regulatory frameworks that force the stewards to account to principals. Alban- Metcalfe and Alimo Metcalfe (2013:56) suggest that in the public service the stewardship aspect should empower citizen to effectively hold the state accountable. Ngwakwe (2012:322) cautions that being a good steward entails the municipality fostering good relations with the communities they serve through exercising social accountability. Responding to citizen demands for service delivery can enable the stewardship theory to be used effectively hence officials and politicians need to find common ground by being accountable in-service delivery matters (Mazibuko and Fourie, 2013:130).

2.3.4.3 Principal-Agent Theory

A brainchild of Susan Rose Ackerman, the principal-agent theory (PAT) gained momentum in the previous decades focusing on the relationship between the seller and purchaser of a service (Waterman and Meier, 1998:174). Although a management theory that is often used in public management, it shows the relationship between principals and agents' which is often compromised due to lack of understanding. PAT assumes that the interests of principals and agents are intrinsically misaligned, due to the theory's rationality assumption, such as individuals are opportunistic in that they pursue their self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Fama, 1980).

Agents are risk-takers whereas principals are risk averse which is the bone of contention in when government delegate municipalities to render service delivery (Sykuta and Chaddad, 1999; Ortmann and King, 2007).

To improve the implementation of PAT, agents need to act on behalf of principals following instructions from the one who sends them (Shapiro, 2005:275). In social accountability studies, the PAT can cause challenges as aligning the goals of the agent (officials, politicians) with those of the principal (citizen), usually costs are incurred in administering, structuring, enforcing and adapting to the terms of the contract. Mahoney (1992) argued that PAT mainly emphasizes on incentive and measurement problems, whereas the basic unit of analysis in transaction cost economics is the transaction, unlike in agency theory it is the individual.

The PAT assumes that in an agency relationship the agent possesses more information than the principal concerning individual tasks are given to him as well as his actions, preferences, and capabilities (Eggertsson, 1990). Karaan (1999:686) argues that agents always take advantage of the high cost of measuring their characteristics and performance and enforcing a contract and engage in shirking or opportunistic behavior. This is often in direct conflict with what the principals hope to achieve. Sykuta and Chaddad (1999:72) define shirking as a deliberate deviation from expected behaviour by employees that reduce the productivity of the firm concerned. It should be highlighted that most applications of agency theory focus on the incentive versus risk sharing trade-off of contracts aimed at aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal. Agency theory is thus very relevant to social accountability as local municipalities that act as agents deviate from the service delivery expectations by citizens and follow their own selfish interests (Ortmann and King, 2007:51).

2.3.4.4 Criticism levelled against PAT in Social Accountability

In social accountability studies, the PAT has been subjected to various criticisms as it had failed to address the principal-agent debacle that compromises service delivery in the case of local government. The PAT model is believed to be one-sided as it negatively characterizes individual agents moral and collective behaviour as self-seeking and power hungry, pride, wealth mongers in the process ignoring the goals and mission of the organisation (Donaldson, 1990; Perrow, 1986). Studies (Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2011; Persson, Rothstein and Torell, 2013) have shown that, the anti-

corruption mechanisms implemented based on the understanding of principal-agent theory were not effective as they focus more on public officials' ability to reduce corruption instead of monitoring and evaluating their conduct in the execution of public duties. Marquette and Peiffer (2015) argue that PAT ignores transparency and accountability which are key principles in getting agents (public officials) to account for their actions to the principals (citizens). In the opinion of Rothstein (2011), the PAT was not useful in curbing corruption as the anti-corruption mechanism based on the principal-agent model could not eliminate corruption hence incentivizing can mitigate corruption in public sector organisations. The principals have the power to ease corruption and fraud by incentivizing agents so that they meet their selfish needs. Nonetheless, in public sector, agents who are officials may not stop corruption although incentives are available which require strong principals to monitor and undertake stringent measures to mitigate fraud and corruption (Menocal et al. 2015; Rothstein, 2011). The implementation of PAT, therefore, is quite complex as corruption which constrains principal-agent relations is hard to control even though agents are incentivized. Other studies believe corruption should be regarded as a collection action instead of individual principal agent thing (Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2011; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015; Persson et al., 2013).

2.3.4.5 Practical Implications for Principal-Agent Theory in City of Tshwane

The PAT has the capability of promoting social accountability in local government although it has its own limitations as alluded to earlier. Municipalities in a South African context which are the implementing agents often divert from the principal's goals to deliver services to the communities. Principals experience difficulties in designing incentive schemes for managers that will align their personal objectives with those of the (principals) government (Ortmann and King, 2007). Based on the arguments raised, the principal-agent theory is fundamental for understanding the complexities which may be encountered by the government as the principal, in an effort to deliver services in an accountable and transparent manner. The PAT theory is valuable in public administration since it helps to understand the nature or problems which may arise in running public institutions since duties are usually delegated by higher authorizes (national government) to lower authorities (municipalities) that acts as agents in service delivery. In many instances exercising social accountability on the

side of agents is a challenge which culminates in community protest demanding services from the local authority.

In the City of Tshwane, the PAT can be implemented although relations between senior officials and junior officials should be maintained to implement service delivery, in the same manner, exercising social accountability to the citizens who are principals the municipality ac on behalf of. Moreover, given the politics-administration dispute implementing PAT can be a challenge as an unresolved issue on who should deliver services haunt local government despite the separation of powers the political office bearers often interfere which makes the theory weak in understanding social accountability and service delivery issues (Thornhill, 2008:492). Studies (Finkelstein et al. 2009) attest to the view when it revealed that political principals may fulfill their duties depending on their power hence it remains the duty of the council to influence administration to account for action taken. Other think tanks (Gormley 1989; Eisner and Meir, 1990) argue that agency officials have the potential to manipulate political principals and municipal structures and systems for personal aggrandizement thereby constraining social accountability. Further studies (Huruta and Radu 2010; Friedman 2011:59) argue that officials who act as agencies are hindered to exercise social accountability due to bureaucratic principles that are embedded in legislative values such as transparency, accountability, and fairness. The desire to achieve these principles is hindered by limited skills among agencies (municipalities) which culminate in poor service delivery in communities. The inferior understanding of what is social accountability and how agents (officials) should account for principals (government) appear vague although legislation correctly spells the procedures. These arguments show that in the case study it can be difficult for the administration to manipulate organisational systems for private gains as the political office may act as check mechanism hence accounting to citizens who are the principals may be a challenge.

2.4 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The demand for social accountability has increased in South Africa and the country has taken great strides in creating mechanism form citizens to engage local government on an on-going basis. This has been made possible by policies and legal

frameworks that were established under various statutory structures, bodies and programmes.

2.4.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996

As the supreme law of the land, the Constitution provides for public participation in social accountability mechanism. Citizen's voice is fundamental for directing the nature of services to be delivered. Cameron (2001:111) asserts that "The Constitution put much emphasis on participatory governance, namely, involving civil society in decision-making".

Section 59 of the Constitution informs social accountability by emphasizing public participation which is the prerequisite for influencing state accountability. Among the provisions, the Section states that: The National Assembly NA need to facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the assembly and its committees, b) conduct its business in an open manner and hold its sittings, and those of its committees in public, but reasonable measure may be taken to and regulate public access, including access to the media, to the Assembly and its committees and; ii provide for the searching of any person and, where appropriate, the refusal of entry to, or the removal of any person.

Furthermore, the National Assembly (NA) is supposed to regulate public access, including access to the media, to the Assembly and its committees, provide for the searching of any person and, where appropriate, the refusal of entry to, or the removal of, any person, the National Assembly (NA) may not exclude the public, including media, from a sitting of a committee unless it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society.

Provincial

Section 118 states that of the Constitution states that a provincial Legislature (PL) must c) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Legislature and its committees; and d) conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and those of its committees, in public, but reasonable measure may be taken to regulate public access, including access to the media, to the Legislature and its committees; and provide for the searching of any person and, where appropriate, the refusal of entry to, or the removal of, any person. Furthermore,

Provincial Legislature (PL) may not exclude the public, including the media, from a sitting of a committee unless it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society.

Local

In terms of Section 152 the Constitution mandates local sphere to provide a democratic and accountable government for local communities; ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic development; promote a safe and healthy environment; and encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government. Furthermore, a municipality is required to strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objectives set out in the subsection. This indicates that public participation is a mandatory aspect that is enshrined in the Constitution hence public participation should be attained through its structures. Public participation is fundamental for social accountability as a citizen can hold public officials accountable at forums such as *Imbizos* or IDP forums.

2.4.2 Public Finance Management Act 1999 (Act 1 of 1999)

This legislative framework foresees the effective management of public finances within the national and provincial government. The government is required to consult the public on how they should use public finances hence participatory budgeting which is a social accountability mechanism is key. In Section 87 & 91 of the PFMA, provides for the minister to formulate an Accounting Standard Board that has public input and voice on how it should function. The framework has significant in this study as it promotes citizen consultation and participation in matters affecting them. The municipality in this manner should be accountable to the people which are significant for improving service delivery.

2.4.3 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003

This framework came into existence following the need to establish a strategic, sound and sustainable framework for managing municipal finances and relevant institutions within local government sphere. It provides for the establishment of treasury norms and standards for local municipalities and dictates the effective measures for handling and managing local government finances. It further spells that, a municipality needs to account for how it uses public finances to the people upon demand. This is why

Section 23 of MFMA pronounce that "when the annual budget has been tabled, the municipal council must consider any views of the local community". The MFMA creates a platform for citizen participation in the municipal affairs in terms of how public finances should be used. The MFMA on Section 121 explains that a municipality should prepare an annual report which will be used to Provide a record of the activities of the municipality or municipal entity during the financial years of which the report relates; provide a report on performance against the budget of the municipality or municipal entity that financial year; and promote accountability to the local community for the decisions made throughout the year by the municipality and municipal entity.

This section declares that the municipality has the duty to exercise accountability to the communities in terms of finances used for that financial year since the municipality is there to serve community interests. Section 123 of MFMA speaks to disclosures of intergovernmental relations and other allocations. The clause provides the citizens with relevant information on how much a municipality has been allocated in the financial year hence showing transparency and openness on municipal conduct. Section 130 further challenges municipalities to conduct public forums in open spaces where citizens can reach to promote transparency. Meetings related to annual reports need to be conducted in time to allow communities to review and address the council which is vital for increasing service delivery.

2.4.4 Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000)

This legislation seeks to empower local government authorities to execute their duties. It complements pieces of legislation by regulating key municipal organisational, planning, participatory and service delivery systems. In Chapter 4 of the MSA, municipalities are required to develop and cultivate a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government that contains a participatory system of governance. Since municipalities are the closest sphere they provide a direct link to communities and their mandate is to provide a developmental local government capable of driving change in communities. In exercising social accountability, municipalities need to have formal governance structures that came into existence following elections. This is fundamental to ensure that every community is represented by councilors within the municipality structures. Citizen participation is the key to enhance service delivery in communities as public input is often integrated

into processes such as participatory budgeting hence the processes give rise to Integrated Development Planning (IDP) a component of Spatial Development Framework (SDF)

Chapter 5 of the MSA of 2000 provides the platform for establishing Integrated Development Planning that should be, developmental oriented planning; giving effect to the objectives of local government and developmental duties as provided in the Constitution; contribution to the progressive realization of human rights contained in the Constitution; and   cooperative governance: compliance with the planning requirements of other national and provincial legislation; commensurate with its resources; best suited to its circumstances; and in line with the priorities, objectives, indicators, and targets contained in IDP. The frameworks advocated for the promotion of a culture of performance management among political structures, office bearers and councillor in municipal administration. The framework informs social accountability as it requires the proper planning of public resources and how municipal officials should behave in a transparent and accountable manner, citizens often demand accountability hence this legal framework provides for an improvement in performance of public officials which is crucial for service delivery.

2.4.5 White Paper for Local Government, 1998

This legal framework which is often referred to as the "mini-constitution" provides strategies to make reforms in local government in South Africa. As the closest sphere to the people, the framework establishes the basis for systems of local government that render public goods and services with the aim of improving standards of living for the local people. The White Paper is a document which provides the local government in South Africa with the opportunity to become innovative and introduce new ways of delivering services and enhance the performance of local government officials. It focuses more on institutional roles that municipalities should play based on their categorization (Siphuma, 2009:62). The legislation informs a cooperative relationship within the three spheres of government although each should enjoy own autonomy.

Four main principles govern the White Paper on Local Government and these seek to ensure political leaders remain accountable within in their mandate, to allow citizens (as individuals or interest groups) to have continuous input into local politics, to allow service consumers to have input on the way services are delivered and to afford

organized civil society the opportunity to enter into a partnership with local government in order to mobilize additional services (National Policy Framework on Public Participation, 2005).

The White Paper states further that "municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation". The White Paper further informs public participation which is essential for social accountability mechanisms. The National Policy Framework on Public Participation suggests that forums should develop and initiate policies and participate in monitoring and evaluation, promote stakeholder involvement in council committees, participatory budgeting and promote the participation of Community Based Organisations CBOs. The local government sphere must establish democracy and develop strategies that promote citizens, and business community to engage municipal officials in social accountability mechanisms (Davids, 2005:103). Stakeholder participation in social accountability mechanisms is therefore crucial to influencing service delivery in communities as needs are identified based on priority instead of local government rendering preconceived services.

2.4.6 The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998)

This legislation provides for the formulation of municipalities in accordance with the requirements relating to categories and types of municipalities and to establish criteria for determining the category of the municipality to be established in an area (De Visser, 2010:90-91). The framework stipulates how internal systems, structures should be regulated by officers bearers in a municipality. The importance of Municipal Structures Act of 1998 was shown when it was amended in parliament and approved before local government elections to give effect to electoral systems (Ntsebeza, 2004:74; Tshandu, 2010:3). The MSA as Ondendaal (2003:591) observes "determines the parameters for the definitions, functioning, and demarcation of municipalities". To this end, therefore; municipalities need to consult the legislation as it expects municipalities to strive within their capacity to achieve the objectives as stipulated in Section 152 of the Constitution of South Africa. The MSA as Schroeder (2003:24) holds "is the principal statute governing the specific assignment of powers and functions". A municipality, therefore, represents an organ of state situated in the local government spheres constituted of

office bearers and political structures to ensure effective governance (Van der Waldt, 2006). This framework is important for this study as it stipulates the formulation of structures that can be used by officials to account for the citizen in terms of service delivery. In that manner, the framework promotes citizen demand for social accountability from the municipalities as they have legal ground to demand accountability. Despite the availability of these enabling legal frameworks, municipalities have a common problem of lack of compliance with legislation which results in communities embarking on protests to demand explanations on service delivery matters.

2.4.7 The Guidelines for Operation of Ward Committees of 2005

This legislative framework on Section 17 (a) of the Guidelines for Operation of Ward Committees of (2005) provides for the ward councilor to exercise accountability to community members he/she serves. The section elaborates that: (a) The ward councilor must ensure that full and proper records are kept of the minutes of ward committee meetings; (b) Ensure that the committee's available resources are properly safeguarded and used in the most effective and efficient way; (c) Ensure that all statutory measures applicable to the committee are complied with; (e) Ensure that all recommendations made by the ward committee are formalized and submitted to the office of the speaker or other designated political functionary for presentation to the council at intervals determined by the speaker or other designated political functionary; (f) Must report a view adopted by the ward committee to the council but may indicate his or her disagreement with the view in the report (Guidelines for Operation of Ward Committees, 2005). Ward committees are important in social accountability as they are closet to the people hence they can inform the citizen on the functioning of local municipalities. Ward committees act as the voice for the voiceless by lobbying to the municipality on the need to provide service to communities.

2.4.8 National Development Plan 2012-2030

The socio-economic blueprint of South Africa, the NDP in its Chapter 6 emphasis on the need for an integrated and inclusive rural economy that facilitates the creation of 643 000 direct jobs and 326 000 indirect jobs in the agriculture sector and other allied enterprise sectors by 2030. Nonetheless, to realise this the NDP proposes in its

Chapter 14, the need to fight corruption in all spheres of government and in every level in communities (The Department of the Presidency, 2009). The framework provides for the need to establish an anti-corruption body that fights corruption without any political interference. It should be resilient enough to stand the pressure that may emanate from powerful individuals that can be government officials (NDP, 2012-2030:445). The NDP seeks to promote transparency and accountability of public officials. It ascertains that many service delivery protests in South Africa are triggered by lack of citizen access to information which causes dissatisfaction, in the process violating section 32 of the Constitution which enshrines the right to access information. The framework encourages innovation and entrepreneurship among citizens to realise economic growth. The NDP advocates for an efficient, transparent and accountable fashion in the management of public resources (The Department of the Presidency, 2015). Public officials need to exercise social accountability which is fundamental for developing public trust and realise a development al state capable of delivering services to its citizens.

2.5 *BATHO PELE* PRINCIPLES OF 1997

Termed the mini-bible of public service in South Africa, *Batho Pele* Principles were established in 1997 to guide the work of public officials and increase delivery of quality services. Hall (1997:138) argues that the principles were introduced to increase accountability of public officials on how they spent public resources and guard against misuse of office and wasteful expenditure if followed properly. Akinboade, Kinfack & Mokwena (2012:138) reiterate that Bathopele principles aim to accelerate the capacity of public managers so that they become developmental oriented and committed to providing quality public goods and services. These eight principles have been discussed to see how they influence social accountability and service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metro.

2.5.1 Consultation

This principles emphasis that, citizen users need to be conducted in various ways that may include, group consultations, interviews, customer surveys. These strategies are meant to bring together citizen representative bodies, community-based organisations (CBOs), non-governmental organisation (NGOs), consumer representative bodies and integrated development plans (IDPs). This principle is fundamental for social

accountability as conducting citizens in service delivery matters is tantamount to improve service provision. Municipalities consult citizen in *Imbizos* and other public forums which are essential for exercising social accountability and informing citizens about how public resources have been utilized.

2.5.2 Service Standards

The responsibility of service provider's including to provide quality basic services to citizens who are the benefices of municipal conduct. Standards or quality of goods rendered need to be assessed to assess if they are worth or have value in the public domain. World Bank 2011 argues that service standards which are enshrined in *Batho-Pele* expose South Africa on the global scene and services rendered at local government level need to be compared with international products. Citizen demands accountability also involve their rights to comment on receive quality services from municipalities and other service providers.

2.5.3 Access

Increasing access to basic services is crucial to the success of social accountability in South African local government. This principle argues that the government needs to rectify the historical imbalances perpetrated by the former apartheid government. National resources need to be accessed and redistributed equally among all races and communities in order to create value for money. If citizens have access to resources they are able to evaluate the quality and this can help bring public officials to account in case the services rendered are of low quality.

2.5.4 Courtesy

This principles emphasis on respect when service providers are dealing with citizens. It is the work of service providers to treat citizens in a respectful and ethical manner which is also a concept borrowed from Ubuntu. To experience a developmental and effective public service in South Africa, public officials in municipalities need to value citizens, customers, and taxpayers. In social accountability treating citizens in a respectful manner help to foster good relations between the state and citizens. This can be of merit as social accountability can be exercised with either side deriving some benefits and less conflict as transparency mechanisms are in place.

2.5.5 Information

The availability of information is the key to unlocking the potential of citizens to appreciate the level of service delivery in their communities. This principle advocates for public ionisations to avail relevant information to citizens on where and when to get services. If implemented properly this principle, is important in social accountability as citizens need to be informed on which social accountability mechanism to use to hold municipalities accountable for service delivery. Providing information and feedback on service delivery grievances citizens could have raised is important hence increasing accesses to relevant and timeous information is essential for improving service delivery.

2.5.6 Openness and transparency

In their exercise of public duties, public officials are required to be transparent and accountable in their operations. The citizens need to know how national, provincial and local government operations and the manner they use public resources. These twin principles inform social accountability, as a citizen are required to seize the opportunity to force public officials to account for their action and provide alternative suggestions on how to improve service delivery. Under this principle, citizens have the right to query government officials as to why they have taken certain actions hence social accountability is exercised to hold public officials accountable for service delivery.

2.5.7 Redress

This principle requires public officials to rectify quickly any areas where there are weaknesses or where there are low service standards. In other words, it informs taking quick action for instance in corruption-related cases in the public service delivery should be rectified in a timeous and effective manner. Citizens are empowered by this principle to highlight the key areas where service delivery lacks and they should hold public officials accountable to ensure that they have rectified.

2.5.8 Value for money

To satisfy citizens in service delivery, public officials should use public resources in a manner that is cost saving at the same time producing the quality that can be valued by the end users who are the citizens. The principle states that failure to provide the

citizens with a satisfactory explanation of how a certain service has been rendered is deemed inappropriate. When citizen demand social accountability their quest is to realize the value their money has on service delivery in their communities. Nonetheless, service delivery challenges often affect municipalities in South Africa, derailing the achievement of this principle.

2.5.9 Have the Batho-Pele promoted social accountability and service delivery?

The discussion of *Batho-Pele principles* in South Africa has shown that the government has developed sound concepts that can be used to exercise accountability and deliver quality services to communities. However, municipalities as agents of social and economic change usually fail to adhere to these principles which is a hole that needs to be filled to improve community service delivery. World Bank (2011:4) affirms that, in South Africa, hypothetically, Batho Pele has been exercised through parliamentary democracy and free press that promotes citizen participation and influence in public policy-making. Nonetheless, citizen's voice has been weakened by lack of state accountability in some key sectors of service delivery. Batho-Pele principles have been criticized for lacking depth as they cannot be identified with the national, provincial and local government as well as electoral systems. Just like the concept of *Ubuntu*, Batho Pele principles suffer from poor implementation in the public service. Citizen's voice is often undermined as municipalities are controlled by political forces that tend to instill partisan reformations. In many circumstances, citizens engage in protests simply because they do not have adequate information on what is transpiring in local government, how and when services are going to be delivered. The service delivery channel in South Africa presently is in the hands of local government and provincial sphere though to a minimal extent. Therefore this form of centralized planning because challenges as accountability issues remain elusive an in many cases citizens are not aware of who to hold accountable between the two spheres. Communication and feedback can be used therefore to a promote state-citizen relationship that may trigger the effective delivery of services. Observations made in the discussion revealed that citizen participation is often missing in service delivery due to limited state accountability. As a result, Batho Pele principles existed but they are not effectively implemented and

aligned with municipal IDPs which is a challenge facing many government departments in South Africa (PSC, 2008:40).

2.6 STATE INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Chapter Nine institutions in South Africa were established by the Constitution where six independent bodies were created to support constitutional democracy. These include *inter alia* Public Protector (Ombudsman in international jargon), Auditor General, South African Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (the CLR Commission). These state institutions support social accountability as they promote citizen to effectively demand accountability from state departments through accountability. As a result, the institutions have been discussed extensively in the following sections to see how they have promoted social accountability and influence service delivery in local municipalities.

2.6.1 Public Protector

In South Africa, the Public Protector's office is established under the provision given in Section 181(1)(a) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. The office has been mandated to investigate all complaints, cases submitted at any sphere of government. This encompasses national, provincial and local government, any public office bearer, any parastatal and any statutory body. The Constitution on Section 182(1) requires the Public Protector to investigate the state of affairs of public administration in any sphere of government that is alleged or suspected to be improper or any result in any misconduct or prejudice and report on that conduct and take remedial action. However, the Public Protector is not mandated to investigate court decisions.

The Public Protector Act of 1994 stipulates additional powers and functions of the Public Protector that are states as follows: Strengthening constitutional democracy by investigating and redressing improper and prejudicial conduct, maladministration and abuse of power in state affairs, resolve administrative disputes or rectify any act or omission in administrative conduct through mediation, conciliation or negotiation. • Advise on appropriate remedies or employ any other expedient means and report and

make recommendations on findings. The Public Protector is also expected to advise and investigate violations of the Executive Members Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and resolve disputes relating to the operation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.

Reporting Function of Public Protector

Besides being the custodian of public democracy, the Public Protector is also accountable to the National Assembly and must report on his/her activities and performance or function at least once in a year. The Public Protector is supposed to submit at any time his/her findings concerning a particular investigation to the NA upon using own discretion or if it in public interest, requires the immediate attention of or any intervention by the NA or upon request from the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Furthermore, any report issued by the Public Protector should be open unless there is a reason for it to be confidential. It can see from these roles that, the Public Protectors' office strengthen the demand for social accountability as corrupt government departments can be investigated which is in the domain of citizens interest, although this office is legislated to guard against public democracy and resources, legislature soften fail to fully utilize this office to enhance service delivery. As an oversight independent body, the Public Protector's office act as the voice and defender of social accountability as government agencies are investigated in the process being forced to account to the citizens on how they spent public money. The use of PP's office in South Africa has been witnessed under the then Thuli Madonsela who unearthed high profile cases such as Nkandla Crisis and State Capture involving the Gupta family all believed to be linked to the current President Zuma. It can be observed further that unlike in other African states, the Public Protector's office in South Africa serves the citizen although it is often hampered by political interference and numerous fingerprinting as corrupt officials are exposed to corrupt activities.

2.6.2 Auditor General

The Constitution of South Africa (1996) establishes the Office of Auditor General (AG) under the Chapter 9 institutions. Section 181 of the Constitution states that the Auditor General should be an autonomous institution which is only subject to the Constitution and the law. The AG's office must act impartially, perform function and exercise

powers without fear or favor. Khalo (2013) explains that the AG, office is appointed by the President as the independent auditor of the Executive Authority in South Africa for a fixed, non-renewable term of between five and ten years. The Auditor General Act 1995 (Act 12 of 1995) given by the Constitution and Public Audit Act, 2004 govern the appointment, conditions of service, powers, duties, and related matters. In executing public duties, the AG is assisted by the Deputy Auditor-General supported by nine provincial auditors. These new provincial auditors are charged with the management of provincial government, specific statutory bodies, and municipalities. Furthermore, they are expected to report all related matter to provincial legislature including other provincial and local government institutions. The duties of the AG include auditing and reporting on all matters related to financial management at provincial and national departments. It involves are porting to all municipalities and relevant institutions that are assigned to be audited by AG. It involves auditing and reporting to National Revenue Fund and provincial revenue fund all financial management issues as well as submitting reports to parliament upon request.

Moreover, the AG is required to work closely with the Public Accounts Committees (PAC) which scrutinize the report of the AG and ensure that departments adhere to the recommendations of the AG. Reports from the AG are expected to be of a high quality such that the PAC can make sounds decisions hence the relationship between AG and PAC need to be mutually beneficial. Despite the fact that, AG reports are submitted for parliamentary examination, the AG can also sit in the PAC to discuss the reports. PAC has the executive authority to summon accounting officers or heads of public institutions to hearings is a relation to financial management matters and administration. Portfolio committees on finances are often invited to analyze reports made by the AG. It can be noted that the AG significance to social accountability lies in the fact that, it investigates issues related to fraud and corruption and force institutions to accounts for actions taken. The AG's office helps citizens to obtain clarity and accountability on how their monies have been spent which can help to improve service delivery in communities.

2.6.3 The Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (HRC)

Section 185(1) of the Constitution of South Africa provides for the (HRC). The primacy of the body is to the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities are to promote respect for the right of cultural, religious and linguistic communities and to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination, and free association.

2.6.4 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) serves as an independent body that foresees the running of elections in all the three spheres of government in South Africa. Section 190(1) of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 provides for the IEC to: manage elections of national, provincial, and municipal legislative bodies in accordance with the national legislation; ensure that those elections are free and fair; and declare the results of those elections within a period that must be prescribed by national legislation and that is as short as reasonably possible. Furthermore, Section 190 (2) of the Constitution mandate the Electoral Commission to execute additional powers and functions as prescribed by the national legislation. Section 191 stipulates that the electoral commission need to be made up of at least three persons and the number of those persons is identified in the national legislation.

2.6.5 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE)

The Commission for Gender (CGE) is mandated to promote and strengthen democracy and human rights of all gender across all spheres in societies. It was established by the Constitution of South Africa and it is expected to provide a recommendation to the legislature on issues affecting women. The CGE seeks to transform societies by exposing gender discrimination policies and practices with the aim of protecting the right of women as they are suppressed by societal laws. The CGE informs social accountability as it acts as an advocacy body to protect human rights from being infringed. The Commission can assist women who are being suppressed in workplaces such as local government by advocating for gender representation.

2.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on the detailed exposition of theories governing this study, legal frameworks and state institutions that support social accountability in South Africa. The Stewardship Theory that anchors this study shows that the relationship between state and citizen lies in the concept of stewardship where the state is entrusted with the duty to deliver services. However, the discussion has shown that municipalities as 'honest' stewards do not always deliver services nor exercise social accountability to citizens. This often causes a problem as citizens for example in the City of Tshwane took to streets to demonstrate on the poor service delivery. The principal-agent theory which complements the stewardship theory assumes the relationship between citizens and municipalities in the of agent and principal. This relationship between municipalities and government is often hidden as municipalities agents do not execute the mandate of principle government which led to conflict. These conflicts impact negatively on communities that act as principals on their own demanding service delivery form the municipalities. To increase the role of municipalities as agents, the New Public Model can be utilized as it informs public managers to be flexible and responsive to service delivery demands in a transparent and accountable manner. The NPM revised the traditional public administration dichotomy which has firm roots in bureaucracy derived from the Weberian concept or Taylorism principles. Meanwhile, the discussion deduced that organisational learning is a paradigm shift from the old public administration and adoption of innovative mechanism that can be used to enhance service delivery. The Organisational learning theory provides a space for public secret innovation which can be the answer to addressing service delivery changes in the City of Tshwane. Systems of innovation approach provide such a platform for new inventions info if of social and technological innovation with the aim of triggering municipal service delivery. The discussion deduces, that if relationships between citizen and municipality are maintained the potential to enhance service delivery is available. The following chapter discusses the understanding of social accountability in the global and local context to see how various governments respond to social accountability demands.

CHAPTER THREE

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

3.1   INTRODUCTION

The decline in the delivery of public goods and services in middle and low-income countries created a space for CSOs and citizens to demand accountability whilst anticipating service delivery improvements. Many developing states are characterised by corruption in government departments, declining standards in the basic services, which have an impact on social accountability, leading to protests in communities (Foresti, O'Neil and Wilde, 2013). The increasing demand for social accountability by CSOs, pressure groups and citizens indicates the knowledge on the meaning and use of social accountability mechanism is growing (Keefer and Khemani, 2012). In that sense, there is a need to hold policy makers and service providers accountable for service delivery.

This discussion provides a critical overview of the context and meaning of social accountability from a global to a local perspective. The term social accountability has been used to mean different things in different contexts. This chapter examines the nature of social accountability mechanisms being implemented in the City of Tshwane to see whether they are suitable to improve service delivery in the communities served by the municipality. The general framework of social accountability in theory and practice has been discussed. The research method suitable for this objective was discussed and the relevant findings presented quantitatively and qualitatively. The following sections provide a framework for this research, based on the emerging themes that guide the study of social accountability in the case study area.

3.2   Framing the Research

3.2.1   Accountability as a concept

The issue of accountability is common among public and private sector institutions. Accountability is often regarded as answerability. Khalo et al. (2007:100) define accountability as the obligation to answer for the fulfillment of assigned and accepted duties within the framework of the authority and resources provided. In delivering services, public accountability focuses on literally providing an account of one's activities, typically with respect to agree upon performance standards or outcomes. In

social accountability, the term accountability focuses on enforceability and answerability, whereby citizens are informed of their powers to hold public officials accountable (Mulgan 2003; Newell & Wheeler, 2006). Bawley (1999:9) regards accountability as the carrying out of assignments more or less specifically defined, honestly, efficiently and effectively at a minimal cost.

Norris (2010) contends that accountability can be regarded as 'vertical' or 'horizontal'. Whereas horizontal accountability is exercised among state structures such as (judicial bodies, legislature, ombudspersons), which act as checks and balances mechanisms to safeguard state abuse of power, vertical accountability exists outside state structures. In many cases, vertical accountability is exercised through periodic elections, whereas social accountability is exercised continuously, based on the demand for services by citizens. The need to get the citizens' voices recognised motivates social accountability rather than votes only, which is why social accountability provides a platform for political participation.

Civil society organisations often engage democratic states and challenge their bureaucracies to make reforms which benefit the citizens. In the process, accountability is exercised (Tembo, 2012). This study, therefore; adopts the UNDP (2013:2) definition which states that accountability is "…the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for their actions. It describes the dynamics of rights and responsibilities that exist between people and the institutions that have an impact on their lives, in particular, the relationship between the duties of the state and the entitlements of citizens."

3.2.2   Defining social accountability

Studies reveal that there is no universal definition of social accountability, although scholars commonly agree that it should include two things or subjects, that is, the 'accounter' and the 'accountees'(Lieberman et al. 2012 ; Vogel, 2012 & World Bank, 2013). Houtzager and Joshi (2008) define social accountability as "...a form of civic engagement that builds accountability through the collective efforts of citizens and civil society organisations to hold public officials, service providers, and governments to account for their obligations with responsive efforts." Malena and McNeil, in World Bank (2010:1) define social accountability as "…the broad range of actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state to account, as well

as actions on the part of government, civil society, media and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts."

World Bank (2004) further explains that such mechanisms are demand driven programmes backed by the state, civil society and citizens. The triple relationship, if well-coordinated, can enhance social accountability and increase service delivery. Claasen and Alpin-Lardies (2010:3) elaborate that social accountability is "…about how citizens demand and enforce accountability from those in power." This definition is largely concerned with citizen-led forms of accountability and claimed political space in between elections.

UNDP (2013) reiterates that social accountability provides a principle of a vibrant, dynamic and accountable relationship between governments and citizens, with the aim of ensuring equitable development. In this sense, a social accountability programme is a controlled intervention guided by this principle. Studies affirm that social accountability seeks to strengthen citizen engagement and voice with the sole aim of improving accountability and governance in many local government contexts (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai, 2012; Tembo, 2012; Vogel, 2012 & World Bank, 2013).

Gaventa and Barret (2010) opine that social accountability includes the frequent search for information by citizens concerning government expenditure, municipal budgets and general ways in which public resources are being utilised. Social accountability, therefore, fosters active citizen engagement in the quest to demand services from public officials. This study, therefore, adopts a definition by Hansen (2014:1) which states that social accountability targets the demand side of good governance and strengthens the voices of citizens to demand greater accountability and responsiveness directly from public officials and service providers. In this line of thinking, social accountability explains a citizen-based action to demand accountability from service providers.

The demand for social accountability is increasing following previous studies (Ackerman 2005; Foresti et al., Malena et al. 2004; Peruzzotti and Smulovitze, 2006) which attempted to conceptualise social accountability in growing democratic institutions. Further attempts to understand and assess the effects of social accountability on various government service delivery programmes were made by (Claasen et al. 2010; Novikova, 2007; Sirker and Cosik, 2007). These studies

interrogate transparency, accountability, and participatory budgeting among public entities to assess efficiency. Other studies (Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Gaventa and McGee 2010; McGee and Gaventa, 2010 & Rocha *et al.,* 2008) examined the growth and effects of social accountability in public institutions. They assessed how leaders in organisations conduct communication with the citizens, who are the end recipients of the services offered.

This chapter draws inferences from the critical context that seeks to shape, make and break social accountability mechanisms in both global and local context (Levy, 2011). It has been shown through a range of studies that social accountability has been successful in its objectives yet, at the same, failing to effectively spearhead development for the citizens in poor communities (Barrey, 2010; Devarajan et al., 2011). Social accountability mechanisms become successful, depending on the context and manner of implementation. Observers criticise social accountability practices for their failure to engage the reality on the demand side of governance approaches to address specific context challenges (Booth, 2011; Bukenya et al., 2012).

3.3 CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE ON SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

3.3.1 Government strategies in enhancing social accountability

Studies by Wetterberg, Jana, Hertz and Brinkerhoff (2015) have shown that addressing service delivery demands through social accountability mechanisms has become a function of the spheres of government, where the need to revamp the administrative capacities, policies and technical capacities are the key priorities. Brinkerhoff and Waterberg (2013) observe the rising criticism developing from the supply side approaches that blind states from responding to citizens' demands for increased social accountability. On the contrary, the demand side approaches motivate citizens to rise up and challenge the state to be accountable for the services delivered. This is because citizens are better positioned to identify service delivery gaps in their localities and voice their concerns to service providers, thus, bringing them to account (Agarwal and Van Wicklin, 2012; Gaventa and Barret, 2010); O'Meally, 2013; Tembo, 2013); Fox, (2014) and Carmago and Jacobs (2013) present findings which show how citizens can engage officials accountable for service delivery. In turn, the officials use the engagement as an opportunity to examine and identify key

areas of weakness on the supply side in order to devise alternative strategies to mitigate service delivery challenges.

Figure 1: Conceptualising Social Accountability

 (World Bank, 2003:49)

From Figure 3.1, it can be observed that the **long route to accountability** presents indirect accountability between service providers and service users via elected politicians and public officials. Usually, the citizens, as clients, utilise the political voice to influence policy makers and politicians to account through elections, and they, in turn, influence managers and frontline service providers through the compact (administrative rules and procedures, incentive arrangements, internal audits) to effectively deliver services (Batanon, 2005). The advantage of the long route to accountability is that citizens are empowered to challenge public officials in terms of how services have been rendered. Citizens can influence the type of policies that policy makers might decide to formulate and implement to address community challenges.

Short route to accountability- This is a form of direct accountability between service providers and service users through the exercise of client power: user-individually and collectively-directly influence participate in and supervise service delivery by providers. The World Bank (2004) introduced the accountability framework (Figure 3.1) to illustrate the three main sets of service delivery that are; citizens/clients of service providers, providers (who can be frontline staff, managers or local authorities involved in the administration) and delivery of services (public or private).

The framework further shows the state, which is represented by politicians and policy makers or high level elected officials/civil servants, who are mandated to execute legislative and regulatory responsibilities. The study asserts that collaboration and understanding among the three actors in service delivery are crucial and must be strengthened to hold policy makers and service providers accountable for their actions in service delivery. The advantage of this short route to accountability is that accountability challenges, as Commins (2007:1) observes, may be illuminated whenever service users are weak or unable to influence citizen action, thereby letting policy makers and service providers off the hook and 'victorious' as they will not be answerable to anyone.

In the past, intervention strategies adopted by countries to address service delivery challenges through social accountability mechanisms tended to pay more attention to the supply side of governance, thereby neglecting the importance of consolidating politicians, policymakers and service providers (World Bank, 2011). Notwithstanding the failure to integrate the three actors, the top-down approach mechanisms to social accountably have not enjoyed the perceived success due to other weak links, such as limited services and lack of user engagement.

Various low-income countries do not have strong monitoring mechanisms to hold service providers accountable or counteract the weak service provision (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2007:2). Arguably, service users seem to perform under an incentivised system of service delivery, which increases their desire to monitor service providers and public expenditure (Batanon, 2015). The view that the demand side of good governance needs to be incentivised creates a gap in terms of willingness to hold the state accountable and can diminish the voice of citizens, thereby leading to poor service delivery.

The WDR (2004) endorses the short route to accountability as the alternative to the long route to accountability or client power, as citizens may hold service providers accountable instead of the state. Just like any other social accountability approaches, this approach has been criticized as it could not address the political realities concerning service delivery (Walton, 2013) Also, the approach could not acknowledge the fact that citizens and CSOs are motivated by incentives to effectively hold the supply side accountable (Booth, 2012 & Levy, 2013).

The ineffectiveness of the framework illustrated above (Figure 3.1) compelled the World Bank to rethink on how citizens and CSOs could be incentivised to influence the long route to accountability (Tembo, 2013:35). The ODI (2013) further maintains that through networking, political and social organisations can be used to foster citizens, individuals and CSOs to collaborate on a common agenda to hold state institutions accountable. Based on this framework, therefore, the demand side, which involves CSOs, citizens, individuals and other social groups should not be neglected, as its influence to long route to accountability remains important towards improving service delivery.

3.3.2 Social Accountability in practice

In the previous years, the demand for social accountability has been championed by civil society organisations and development agencies. As it stands, social accountability as a concept "affirms direct accountability relationships between citizens and the state and puts them into operation… [It] refers to the broad range of actions and mechanisms…that citizens can use to hold the state to account, as well as the actions on the part of the government, civil society, media, and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts" (Sirker and Cosic, 2007:3).

Social accountability mechanisms, as (Arroyo and Sirker, 2005) observe, support civil society actors to engage policy makers in terms of service delivery, public expenditure tracking, budget preparation and analysis, and performance monitoring of service provision. The collaboration of these groups motivates the need to demand social accountability from service providers and government towards enhancing service provision (Cavill and Sohail, 2004: 155 & Thindwa *et al.,* 2007).

In practice, social accountability mechanisms are spearheaded by citizens, although the state can support the demand side, and operate from the bottom up. WaterAid (2006) reiterates that state support is of paramount importance as it improves the efficiency of service providers towards quality citizen service provision, at the same time cultivating their relations and increasing government revenue. It should be highlighted that social accountability mechanisms that evolve from the demand and supply side play an active role in both long and short routes to accountability (Velleman, 2010). This study focuses much on the short route to accountability that promotes citizen use of social accountability mechanisms to demand service delivery from service providers.

3.4 SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACHES

Considerable literature provides several distinct approaches to social accountability. Social accountability is believed to have emerged as a response to weak public financial accountability systems (Yilmaz, Beris & Berthet, 2008:24). The popular mechanisms for social accountability involve local government financial information accessible to the public, such as budgets and financial statements. The mechanisms further allow strong citizen participation in the budgeting process through participatory practices, independent budget analysis as well as public expenditure tracking programmes for monitoring budget execution or misuse of funds.

3.4.1 Citizen Participation in Budgeting and expenditure processes

Over the past few years in many developing states, citizen participation in the budgeting process, such as expenditure tracking, has quickly gained social momentum (Fox, 2015; Joshi, 2014). Many governments consider budgeting as a technical issue restricted to the executive branches of national or local governments. The reason is that policymakers are often technically disadvantaged to scrutinise budget processes at all levels of government. The increased demand for social accountability from government has led policy makers at the three spheres of government to actively participate in participatory budgeting to safeguard misuse of public funds (Gaventa & Barret, 2010; Tarrow, 2010). In Uganda, the national radio was used to exercise social accountability, whereby local government expenditures were discussed and disseminated to the public as a way of observing transparency and openness (Khemani, 2006:285; Keefer & Khemani, 2012).

International Budget Partnership (2010) asserts that citizens, including civil society organisations, have obtained skills and willpower to actively intervene in the budget process. Scholars (Aiyar & Mehta 2015; Friedman, 2013) agree that independent budget analysis adequately presents budget information to the citizens and influences budget allocation and revenue policies to be fair in regards to gender. Public participatory systems provide enabling platforms for citizens to demand budgetary reforms in local government service provision. Participatory budgeting, therefore, ensures that municipalities make available budget information to ordinary citizens on regular bases.

Empowering citizens on how to use social accountability mechanisms is fundamental to improving service delivery through proper accountability of municipalities (Yilmaz et al. 2008:28). The discussion deduced that citizen participation in budgeting processes creates a sense of ownership and trust between beneficiaries (citizens) and service providers (government). Chances are high that close cooperation between municipalities and citizens can improve social accountability and service delivery in communities.

In Brazil, participatory budgeting was used as a mechanism for exercising social accountability. The argument was that social accountability could promote tangible development impacts based on nationwide institutional practices, instead of simply being restricted to a field of the experiment (Fox, 2015). As a result, various municipalities in Brazil have been conducting participatory budgeting for extended periods, stretching to more than two decades ago (Joshi, 2013:31).

Some studies that were conducted independently to compare social indicators among Brazilian municipalities revealed that citizen input into the decision-making process was influential enough to ensure the fair allocation of resources (Goncalves 2014; Touchton & Wampler, 2014). This form of participatory budgeting was crucial to ensure equitable distribution of financial resources towards basic services such as sanitation and health services (Fox, 2015). These studies further pointed out that participatory budgeting inspired service providers to render quality basic services that represent the needs of the citizens while, at the same time, creating a platform for checks and balances.

3.4.2 Integrated Development Plan

In exercising social accountability public officials in South Africa use the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) at the local sphere of government. The Local Government Transition Amendment Act (1996) established the IDP as a principal planning instrument at local government, where citizens' input or engagement is fundamental to its success. The IDP reflects on the public priorities in a municipal budget. Communities submit their needs (transport, health, economic development, infrastructure development) in the IDP, which are then aligned to the municipal budget.

World Bank (2011:61) piloted a study in the City of Tshwane in 2006 to assess the effectiveness of IDP as a social accountability mechanism. This was after 2000 when a wall-to-wall demarcation of municipalities formerly demarcated as white and black areas across the country. The IDP was used by policy makers to produce citizen preferences and feedback which, together with participatory budgeting, clearly fitted into both long and short route to accountability. The IDP consultations in South Africa were viewed as an opportunity to lay service delivery grievances. The consultations were also found to influence service provider behaviour, which is the short route to accountability.

Nonetheless, IDPs have several weaknesses as social accountability mechanisms. To begin with, IDPs are five-year strategic visions with a concrete mechanism to influence annual budgeting and priority setting. UNDP (2002) argues that although citizen participation in IDP is mandatory, in reality, such involvement is somewhat limited. This has been further elucidated by a study conducted in Tshwane which reflected that only 17% of residents in selected townships have come across the term IDP (World Bank, 2011). Although the IDP allows consultation mechanisms, the voice of citizens is not actively emphatic due to limited participation which reduces the accountability of officials.

3.4.3 Technical Approach to Social Accountability

World Bank (2001) provides the first approach to social accountability that focuses on aid efficiency and development of specific outcomes. Hansen and Ravnkilde (2013:26) claim that the World Bank's social development department promotes this approach as a way of improving governance, increasing development effectiveness

and improving citizen empowerment. A World Bank (2001) report entitled "Attacking poverty" influences the 2004 World Development Report which has a theme '*Making service work for the poor people'.* These ideas instill confidence in citizens to contribute positively towards improving the standard of living and service provision through holding service providers and policymakers accountable for their actions (World Bank, 2003).

Hansen and Ravnkilde (2013:31) hold that social accountability through citizen engagement of public officials and policy makers and service providers is a fundamental and transparent way of improving service delivery. Challenges that arise in the communities, such as lack of basic service delivery, can be addressed when citizens voice their concerns and demand social accountability from service providers. Therefore, citizen participation helps to reduce poverty through empowerment as stipulated in the three conceptual pillars of the World Bank's social Development Strategy (Malena et al. 2004).

Mwakagenda (2011:3) argues that citizen participation in budgeting, planning, advocacy and oversight most likely influences government policies and results in improved service delivery. As alluded to in the previous section, the literature on social accountability points to various mechanisms which citizens can use to hold service providers accountable. Such mechanisms include service delivery satisfaction surveys and citizen feedback surveys. These social accountability mechanisms ensure citizen representation by creating locally based service institutions, such as ward committees in South Africa (World Bank, 2009).

3.5   FACTORS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

The review of the literature to date has identified five factors that shape social accountability in South Africa. These include context-based factors, provider factors, and the political and social environments.

3.5.1   Context-Based Factors

The macro contextual analysis in the field of social accountability is evolving despite the fact that contextual analysis for social accountability derives its strengths from various characteristics of general PEA such as freedom of the press. Studies by Bukenya, Hickey and King (2012); Bukenya and King (2012); McGee and Gaventa

(2011) and Joshi (2013) identified factors that run across success stories of social accountability in various governments. Hickey and Sophie (2016) provide various contextual factors that underpin literature on social accountability. This entails the involvement of different types of political institutions, type and capacity of civil society organisations which promote social accountability.

From the study conducted by Hickey and Sophie (2016), it emerged that 45 out of the 91 studies that were reviewed observed the absence of political will at different levels of governance. A typical example is an NGO in Madhya Pradesh which was successful in promoting higher levels of social accountability by sanctioning senior district officials to account for their corrupt junior officers (Chhotray, 2008). Nyamu-Musembi (2006:137) states that studies on social accountability were weakened by a shortage of citizen support in community management committees, for instance, in the Bangladesh health sector (Mahmud, 2007).

The success of social accountability is further constrained by bureaucrats and politicians who have vested interests in maintaining the status quo, hence sabotaging citizen efforts to hold them accountable for service delivery. In other countries such as India and Singapore, social accountability is being affected by the lack of political will among accounting authorities such as political office bearers. As a result, good governance of public institutions has been violated, leading to lack of citizen participation in social accountability, as the perceived benefits are few or limited (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Veron, 2005).

Democratic or citizen participation in social accountability mechanisms has been somewhat problematic in Brazil and South Africa, although the constitutions of these countries provide for the rights of citizens to demand social accountability in terms of service delivery (Hickey & Sophie, 2016). The prevalence of competitive judiciaries and constitutional liberties can be crucial for triggering legislative accountability. For instance, a movement such as COSATU in South Africa represents workers, while Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) champions the rights of people living with HIV/Aids (Campbell, Cornish, Gibbs and Scott, 2010). Other NGOs such as SPS in India depend on legislation to ignite citizen mobilization in social accountability mechanisms (Chhotray, 2008). Legislative accountability ensures transparency through the type of

regime in power, for instance, semi-authoritarian in countries such as Uganda (Robinson, 2006).

In order for social accountability mechanisms to be successful, they often depend on citizen participation. Corburge et al. (2005) warn that citizen participation is sometimes ineffective, especially in a situation where local government has insufficient resources and institutional incompetence. This has been seen in India, where poor citizen participation was experienced in local government due to lack of incentives and limited awareness. Drawing analysis from this assertion, therefore; civil society organisations are better placed to lobby for citizen participation and demanding social accountability from the political society.

Mobilising grassroots support is crucial for social accountability mechanisms. In South Africa, for example, harnessing grassroots support can be made possible by reminding citizens of the historic struggle or social injustices perpetrated by apartheid. Churches, academics and pressure groups often collaborate and stand with one voice in demanding accountability from either government officials or service providers (Campbell et al., 2010). It can be argued, therefore, that in the absence of political will and citizen participation, holding government officials through social accountability mechanisms might not be a reality.

3.5.2 Provider-specific factors

On the provider or supply side of social accountability mechanism lies capacity and institutional constraints that inhibit effective service delivery. Velleman (2010) acknowledges these challenges and mentions that lack of capacity in public institutions renders legislation useless and there are several misinterpretations, coupled with political interference that affects independent decision making. In India, for instance, the local government was affected by lack of incentives among public managers to effectively implement social accountability mechanisms (Yilmaz et al, 2008).

As highlighted above, lack of commitment derails service delivery and, consequently, communities suffer. World Bank (2011:3) argues that in South Africa, the supply-driven approach has been abused, mainly because citizens expect the government to

assume full responsibility for services, including the provision of assets such as personal household toilets. The increasing demand for accountability, as demonstrated by the prevalence of service delivery strikes and civil unrest, shows a growing dependency syndrome among the citizens, hence municipalities struggle to deliver the required services in many communities.

3.5.3 Politically-related factors

In any given context, social accountability cannot be entirely divorced from the political situation a country can find itself in. Some governments are autocratic where citizens engagement of public officials is minimalised. Other democratic governments like South Africa allow citizens to voice their concerns to local government officials in terms of service delivery. From the pilot studies conducted by the World Bank in (2007), it was revealed that social accountability is 80 percent political and 20 percent technical (Agarwal, 2009:6). These results are grounded on the fact that tools and methods used for social accountability heavily depend on the values and principles that are directed at the user and also depend on who is involved at that particular time. In a broader context, social accountability is focused mainly on transforming one's belief and fostering relationships, developing capacities while, in the process, remaining technical.

Batonon (2015:20) affirms that it is the nature of the state and political landscape that shape service delivery and influence social accountability mechanisms. Whereas popular belief assumes that in democratic states, where human rights are respected, service delivery is successful although it might not be due to social accountability initiatives. A study by McNeil and Malena (2010:189) discovered that Zimbabwe, at the time, was one of the examples where social accountability actors and practitioners have collaborated to set up comprehensive relationships to establish a sound budget in a state where human rights violations are rife and state control is unlimited.

The successful efforts of the CSOs can be credited to their tireless efforts to penetrate the political space, which can only be transformed through social accountability mechanisms. O'Meally (2013) contends that for social accountability approaches to succeed, one has to consider the citizen-state dynamics, such as the history of a

country, as their relationships determine, whether there are platforms for social accountability or not.

3.5.4 Socio-cultural and economic factors

The prevailing socio-economic environment of a country determines whether social accountability mechanisms may be implemented or not. McNeil and Malena (2010:186) attest to the viewpoint when they suggest that socio-economic characteristics have a collective influence on factors which include citizens' expectations of, and their association with, the state; willingness to interrogate authority; capacity and means to integrate citizens and community leaders to organise mass action.

However, the marginalisation of women and other minority groups in communities, coupled with illiteracy and inequalities, hinders social accountability as these groups may not see the benefits of participating in activities to hold the state accountable (O'Meally, 2013). Tembo (2013:89) concurs; "[P]revailing power and politics…create differential citizenship and the right to it." Such differences emanate from, among others, the diversity of citizens' backgrounds, levels of knowledge on rights and powers, attainment of quality service delivery and socio-economic dynamics towards participating in social accountability.

As a result of the above-stated reasons, some citizens may develop an inferiority complex which would discourage them from demanding services as they would not be adequately knowledgeable on which rights they are, or are not, entitled to. Increasing public awareness of social accountability mechanisms can play an important role in closing the rift between the lack of knowledge and effective implementation of social accountability mechanisms.

Poor people in communities, for instance, may be reluctant to participate in social accountability mechanisms as they perceive no gains accruing to them, even when they take part. Instead, they may choose to remain voiceless and continue doing what they perceive to be beneficial to them. A study by Levy and Walton (2013:13) showed that the socio-status of a person determines his/her participation in social accountability

3.5.5 Inter-elite relations

This broader theme focuses on horizontal power relations between political and economic elites. These economic elites include wealthy businesspeople or corporate executives who have the access to, and control of, resources and can shape social accountability to varying degrees. The willpower of economic and political elites enables the contextual variables that influence and shape social accountability mechanisms. Benequista (2010) observes that such powerful forces influence policy makers to design policies that may favour the corporate bosses while neglecting citizen empowerment. Hence, economic elites have a much more audible voice in influencing social accountability than ordinary citizens in poor communities.

Di John and Putzel (2004:4) advise of the need to enter into a political settlement whereby all social groups and civil society organisations bargain for what they want, depending on the approach they each want to take. The differences between urban and rural elites, and religious, economic and political elites necessitate the need for forging inclusive platforms where citizens discuss what developmental paths service providers or government could take. Parks and Cole (2010:6) reason that, whereas political settlement may be deemed necessary, it may disadvantage weaker classes and ignite disputes in the three tiers of government. So, based on these arguments, it could be argued that social accountability is shaped or influenced by both political and economic elites who dictate which direction service providers should take, as they have resources and, generally, a say in local affairs.

3.6 EXISTING/TRADITIONAL FORMS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.6.1 Oversight structures: committee system: a choice between Section 79 and Section 80 Committee

Social accountability in South Africa is exercised through oversight structures as provided by Sections 79 and 80 of the Structures Act. The Act stipulates that council must make decisions whether or not portfolio committees will be established using the given legislation. The generic requirements for the establishment of committees are legislated in the Act. The role of oversight committees is to assist the council with oversight on how municipalities operate. The Municipal Structures Act further requires

a municipality to establish committees when there is a need or signs that it will be efficient, and the powers of that committee are delegated by the municipal council to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of these powers and functions.

Sections 79 and 80 serve different purposes and they report differently to different entities. More importantly, the oversight committees are the ones that enhance municipal capacity to conduct oversight. The rationale is that the mayoral committee is not a committee of the council and does not have the right to conduct meetings on vital council matters without disclosing the contents of such meetings and opening them up for public scrutiny. Furthermore, Section 33 of the Municipal Structures Act allows the establishment of committees to ensure the smooth running of municipal affairs.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be deduced that oversight committees in local government in South Africa play a pivotal role in overseeing that municipal officials do not abuse the powers given to them and that they exercise transparency and accountability when executing public duties. The committees assist citizens who intend to demand social accountability from the municipalities as the committees can investigate and assess any key weaknesses or corrupt acts that may compromise the effective delivery of services.

3.6.1.1 Izimbizo

Izimbizo's were introduced by Thabo Mbeki, the former president of the Republic of South Africa. This is a platform where senior government officials and public managers conduct meetings with ordinary people from the local communities (Venter, 2007). Sikhakhane and Reddy (2011:93) point out that this form of citizen participation is fundamental as the government is taken to the people, who are the beneficiaries of the elected officials that represent each community. The significance of *Izimbizo* lies in the fact that citizens get the chance to ask from officials the nature and strategy of service delivery in their communities. Van der Waldt (2007:38) holds that *izimbizos* have since gained popularity among the citizens, as all criticism is screened, isolated and responded to, in order to curb individuals from misleading other citizens or accuse the government of underhand dealings.

At *izimbizo,* citizens constructively engage government in fruitful debates that spearhead the economic development of local communities. Nevertheless, the success of *izimbizo* as a social accountability mechanism is determined by citizen participation in policy development to ensure that local government responds to citizens' demands and is accountable and transparent to the public (Theron, 2005:64; Buccus & Hicks, 2008). The ward councilor, as van der Waldt (2007:38) perceives, should ensure that information on the need to participate at *izimbizo* is widely disseminated to communities since this is an enabling platform for demanding accountability from local municipalities. Citizens should, therefore, hold local government officials accountable for their actions in service delivery. It can be argued from this discussion that *izimbizo* provide an enabling platform for a citizen to engage public officials. However, citizens' participation is imperative to make *izimbizo* function well for effective service delivery.

3.6.1.2 Ward committees

At the grassroots level, the demand for social accountability in South Africa is championed by ward committees that came into existence in 2001 as principal mechanisms for community participation in local government affairs. Ward committees are believed to be powerful political tools for mobilising community support and improving the capacity structures of community forums (SALGA & GTZ South Africa, 2006). However, the significance of ward committees as social accountability mechanisms is somehow underrated, as their influence in holding the state accountable seems less influential. Whereas one may wonder why ward committees are claimed to be doing minimal justice to demanding social accountability, the reason might be the fact that, cultural diversities and little faith in ward councillors are the contributing factors.

Information from the Department of Local Government (DLG) (2007) shows the establishment of ward committees in six of the nine provinces of South Africa (Gauteng, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, Northern Cape, North West and Western Cape). The lowest rate of ward committee establishment was in Western Cape (66.4%), with an outstanding 105 wards going without these committees. Free State's establishment was at 84.7%, while Mpumalanga established committees in all wards, except one. These statistics show the implementation of ward committees as

social accountability tools to represent the people in communities, although many communities perceive them as either useless or dysfunctional.

3.6.1.3 Lessons learned

The extensive review of the literature shows that understanding social accountability in the global context seems to be shaped by the establishment of democratic environments that allow citizens and civil society organisations to actively engage government and demand accountability. The effectiveness of social accountability is debatable. Moreover, there is not much concrete evidence and researches that have been conducted thus far are inconclusive (Batanon, 2015). The few studies that have subscribed to the theory of change as a social accountability theoretical departure point have assumed the casual chain that cascades from inputs to outcomes and impact (Gaventa and McGee, 2010). These studies argued that the implementation of social accountability mechanisms to hold governments accountable have often been exaggerated as their impact relies on effective citizen mobilization and state willingness to respond to social accountability demands.

Citizen participation and CSOs may be a challenge, given the socio-economic differences that people in communities have. Whereas social accountability mechanisms often target to uproot and expose corruption, there is fairly little evidence, especially in South Africa, to strengthen the claims. Hence, using social accountability mechanisms can be a panacea for effective service delivery (Joshi, 2013:33). The review of literature further reflects that, in many developing states such as South Africa, innovative social accountability mechanisms such as social audits and public expenditure tracking still have a long way to be embraced as citizens themselves do not understand them or how they should function. This can be attributed to historical inequalities, where many black communities have less educated people, in contrast to white communities. Also, this may be due to escalating government corruption in all three spheres of government, with local government rated the most corrupt, hence making the citizens lose trust in government.

There is a growing habit of not exercising accountability and transparency, owing to patronage and political appointments that fail to recognize the significance of social accountability. Communities, not only in South Africa, suffer from poor service delivery as social accountability structures are either manipulated or ignored, thus, paving the

way to a state of lawlessness and poor accountability. The following section discusses and explains the research methods used in this study.

3.7 RESEARCH METHODS

3.7.1 Data collection

This chapter employs a triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques to gather data. For this study, the sample was chosen from the entire City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality that comprises 2 921 488 people (Stats SA, 2016). Using a Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, the possible representative population to whom questionnaires were administered is 270 respondents. The target population consisted of 270 respondents that were selected through systematic and purposive sampling techniques. As alluded to above, for the purposes of this study, the sample was made up of 270 people who were divided into 250 respondents and 20 participants. Respondents from selected communities in the City of Tshwane were be chosen systematically to respond to the questionnaire survey. The respondents are aged between 18 and 60 years. The purposive sampling technique was used to identify respondents from the selected five (5) departments (Water & Sanitation, Energy & Electricity, Research & Innovation, Governance & Politics, and IDP & Economic Intelligence) within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Such a judgmental sampling was based on the knowledge these key informants have in terms of social accountability and service delivery in the municipality.

3.7.2 Data analysis

The data analysis procedures for quantitative research were conducted using and the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) computer software, which was provided by the North West University to analyse quantitative data. Descriptive statistics are used to explain the basic characteristics of the data in the research (Gerber-Nel et al. 2005:2004). Frequency distribution, standard deviation and mean, median and mode scores were some of the descriptive statistics used in this chapter. Qualitative data from interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded and presented in themes, following the study objectives.

3.8 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.8.1 Perceptions of citizens on the understanding of social accountability

The success of social accountability in any organisation is hinged on the way managers or officials understood the concept and implement it. Studies (Mmari, Sinda and Kinyashi, 2014) endorse the view that social accountability mechanisms can be effectively implemented based on the knowledge citizen have in terms of the concept. The pie chart below presents the opinions of citizens on what social accountability is and how the existing social accountability mechanisms can be implemented to enhance service delivery.

Figure 2: Citizens understanding of Social accountability

The figure shows the distribution of citizens, based on their understanding of what social accountability is. It indicates that 69.2% of the respondents understand the meaning of social accountability while 30.8% of the respondents do not know what the meaning of accountability is. Findings from key informant interviews revealed that understanding social accountability was a complex matter as the mechanisms depend on the state-citizen relationship. The key informant revealed that in some cases:

> We attempt to call public meetings where we intend to inform the citizens
> on how their funds are being used. Few usually turn [up] for these

gatherings, as many seem not to understand the role they should play in demanding social accountability from city officials.

The key informant interviewee further responded by stating that to enhance the delivery of services in the municipality, public sector innovation remains a crucial part which can be implemented by city officials to enhance service delivery. However, the concept seems unpopular among public servants, although it is useful in social accountability. The key informant interviews showed that community members often appreciate innovation as a necessity to enhance social accountability.

The City of Tshwane exercised social accountability through *Digi Imbizo,* where they engage citizens in terms of service delivery. The *Digi Imbizo,* which entails digital understanding, is a platform whereby municipal officials engage with economically active citizens who air their views on how services can be improved. This innovative platform helps public officials to increase social accountability by responding to citizens' concerns on the level of service delivery.

The above-mentioned findings corroborate a study conducted by Brinkerhoff and Watterberg (2015), which revealed that understanding social accountability involves answerability and enforcement on the supply side since it is a vertical form of accountability for state institutions to account to the citizens. New approaches from Brinkerhoff and Watterberg (2014) indicate that the complex nature of social accountability mechanisms can hinder social accountability as officials may choose to ignore, or neglect to account to, the citizens, citing reasons ranging from lack of clarity on how social accountability should be implemented.

3.8.2 Existing social accountability mechanisms in the city of Tshwane

3.8.2.1 Perception of citizens on the efficiency of Public Forums as Social Accountability Mechanisms

The following results present the opinions of citizens on the existing social accountability mechanisms; whether they are efficient in holding public officials accountable or not.

Figure 3: Effectiveness of Public forums

The graph (Figure 3.3) indicates that 23.2% of the respondents who participated at public forums believed that the forums were very effective social accountability mechanisms, whereas 26.4% pointed out that they were slightly effective. 32.4% of the respondents believed that public forums were effective, whereas 13.2 claimed they were moderately effective. 4.8% disagreed that public forums are not effective at all as social accountability mechanisms**.**

The findings from key informant interviews reflected that citizens in the City of Tshwane hardly believed that officials respond to their demands for services on public forums. This is contrary to a study conducted by Sekeyere et al. (2015:5) which revealed that in holding public officials accountable, public forums can be utilized as important platforms for citizens to voice their concerns and needs in terms of service delivery. The National Planning Commission (NPC) (2012) concurs that the government needs to engage the citizens in their own forums instead of expecting them to attend state created forums.

The NPC (2012) observes; "In many respects, South Africa has an active and vocal citizenry, but an unintended outcome of government actions has been to reduce the incentive for citizens to be direct participants in their own development…" In most democratic governments, public forums are intentionally instituted by organisations to create an enabling atmosphere which is conducive enough to air public views,

debates, and suggestions. The study observes that if directed properly, public forums would enable citizens to directly demand services and answers from the public officials, which could likely reduce cases of corruption, owing to fear of being shamed publicly (Carmago and Jacobs, 2013). To further promote citizen participation in public forums, the state should incentivise citizen engagement through training, increasing opportunities for the marginalised groups in communities. Such actions can influence citizen engagement in forums that aim to hold municipalities accountable for service delivery.

3.8.2.2 Citizens satisfaction with the use of community score cards as a social accountability mechanism

The use of citizen scorecards as social accountability mechanism has been common in developed countries whereas in developing countries it has been low due to lack of adequate funding to conduct such an exercise (World Bank, 2011). The graph below presents the views of citizens on whether a community scorecard can be used effectively to hold public officials accountable in the CoT.

Figure 4: Effectiveness of Community Score Cards in social accountability

As depicted in the above graph, respondents were asked whether community score cards were effective tools for social accountability in the City of Tshwane. 14.4% of the respondents agreed that they were satisfied that community score cards were an efficient mechanism of assessing citizen satisfaction with service delivery, hence, they

deemed the mechanism as suitable for holding officials socially accountable. Furthermore, 13.6 % of the respondents believed that community scorecards were moderately effective in holding public officials accountable. 14.4% stated that community scorecards were not as effective as social accountability mechanisms.

Qualitative findings also indicated that community scorecards have a limited effect in holding public officials accountable in service delivery. This is supported by a study conducted by Ringold, Holla, Koziol, and Srinivasan (2012:7) which revealed that the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms on the demand side is often misleading, as they need cooperation between the supply side at various levels of government. The findings further point out that score cards, for instance, demand effective interactions between citizens and frontline service providers as well as programme managers. A point to note is that officials require incentives and capacity to respond to service delivery demands. In that sense, therefore, citizen score cards are tools that can be used by citizens to demand social accountability. However, the success of the mechanism depends on the civil society organisation's ability and willingness to make information available when citizens demand social accountability.

3.8.2.3 Perceptions of citizens on the use of the Integrated Development Plan as a social accountability mechanism

In South Africa, an IDP is being used as the main social accountability tool used by municipalities to account for service delivery actions (Fuo 2013; Sebei, 2013 & World Bank, 2012). Citizens are required to participate and submit their own input on which types of goods and services they want to be rendered in their communities. However, public participation in IDP processes is a challenge which degenerates into a lack of trust between communities and local municipalities. The pie chart below shows the varied responses of citizens on whether they understood or believed an IDP was an effective tool which they could use to demand accountability from the City of Tshwane.

Figure 5: Effectiveness of Integrated Development Plan as a social accountability mechanism

The pie chart above indicates that 13.6% of the respondents who took part in the survey believed that the IDP is very effective as a social accountability tool when used to demand service delivery. 28.0% felt that the IDP was slightly effective as a social accountability mechanism. The results further showed that 32.0% of the respondents believed that an IDP was an effective mechanism for holding officials accountable, while 17.6% stated that an IDP was moderately effective as a mechanism for demanding social accountability. 8.8% disagreed that an IDP was an effective social accountability mechanism.

These above findings reflect a distinct understanding of social accountability mechanisms by the citizens, who may see an IDP as a mechanism for the elite who participate in the IDP forums. Key informant interviews revealed that the IDP was being used to respond to the citizens on the social accountability demands. However, some communities do not understand what an IDP is, although that has long been implemented in municipalities as a tool to promote citizen participation in service delivery. To effectively implement an IDP, one official advises that:

> *One has to understand the history of the community, for instance, informal settlements. Obtaining such knowledge enables us to understand the demands of these people, based on their economic status, and how the settlements were established. As a municipality, we*

provide those services as a provision in the Constitution. There are backlogs in terms of service delivery as some socio-economic issues were created by the former apartheid spatial planning and have not been rectified up to now. We invite the community to participate in IDPs, but few come, which hinders service delivery, especially in informal settlements.

The official further added:

So, some of the issues related to housing can be delivered by the provincial mandate. As a local government, we have restricted areas, as mandated by legislation at the local government level. For instance, electricity challenges in Marabastad - we cannot account in terms of that. [It's the responsibility of] the national department, so the level of social accountability is somewhat limited, depending on the resources and governing legal frameworks.

Key informant interviews further revealed that the Integrated Development Plan was the main tool that had citizens' input and was being used to hold officials accountable.

The IDP official said:

As part of exercising social accountability, we facilitate a process for planning purposes and it cuts across all sectors in societies. In terms of service delivery, communities are required to participate in terms of planning, where people are given the opportunity to air their views in terms of the services they require, which will be incorporated into IDP.

The above assertions show that IDP is one of the social accountability mechanisms which are used by public officials to account to citizens in terms of service delivery. The IDP provides citizens with the opportunity to openly discuss and direct the municipality to provide services which are important to their communities. Furthermore, participatory budgeting, which is embedded in the whole IDP process, is used as a social accountability mechanism by which the local authority accounts for citizens.

3.8.2.4 Effectiveness of an Election as a social accountability mechanism

In many African states, elections have been used as a form of both political and social accountability. Maphunye (2010:58) argues that elections which involve voting using ballots are nothing, but the selection of representatives into power. The hope of citizens through elections is to hold the selected individuals accountable for service delivery, although this not often the case. Woodberry (2012:248), as cited in Maphunye (2014) asserts; "Athenian democracy was direct, limited to elite hereditary Athenian families, excluded more than 80% of Athenians, never expanded to Athenian-controlled territories, and was unstable." This assertion shows the extent of disappointment which elections can bring to citizens.

 The exclusion of some community groups can be experienced if the state is not held accountable. However, studies by Ace Project (2015) and Maphunye (2010) in countries such as South Africa, where democracy is championed by interest groups, pressure groups and other CSOs, revealed that elections can bring meaningful change, although they are sometimes diluted by the selfish interests of wealthy people who can sponsor a candidate in anticipation of future exploitations (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2010:68-77). Elections require huge financial and human labour, where accountability and transparency are exercised when voting a candidate into power. However, such a huge expenditure does not translate into improved service delivery and social accountability, since citizens are often ignored when they demand services.

Maphunye (2015) argues that elections are linked to the social contract of Rousseau, where citizens undertake a collective role to hold the state accountable. In many African countries, elections appeared to have lost their significance as they are marred by violence, rigging, and many irregularities. A number of studies validate to the above-stated notion and argue that electoral integrity in Africa has been compromised because free and fair elections are nothing but are mere talk and are practically abused and manipulated by governments (Annan et al. 2012; Motsamai, 2010; Norris et al. 2014; Shah, 2015). The graph below presents the views of citizens on the use of elections as a social accountability mechanism to hold the CoT officials accountable.

Figure 6: Election as a social accountability mechanism

From the bar graph above, it is shown that 34.8 % of the respondents believe that elections are very effective tools for holding public officials accountable for service delivery. 27.2% of the respondents believed that elections are slightly effective while 19.2% felt that elections are effective social accountability tools for demanding accountability. 14.0% believed that elections are moderately effective, whereas 4.8% did not believe elections were effective at all. Key informant interviews revealed that elections could be indeed used as effective mechanisms for social accountability, although they have their own limitations.

One key informant responded:

> *Elections are a better way of bringing elected officials to account for their actions, although politics sometimes affects their capacity to account. In some circumstances, if any elected official belongs to a powerful party he/she can be shielded from exercising social accountability because there will be corrupt tendencies behind the issues. Politics is playing a great deal in discouraging social accountability in our municipality, hence, dissatisfied citizens may sometimes not get answers to their service delivery demands.*

Political comradeship as the findings revealed, discourage social accountability as corrupt individuals often escape accountability, for fear of exposing their ringleaders or political parties. These assertions are corroborated by a study conducted by Khale

and Worku (2013) on factors affecting municipal service in Gauteng and North West Municipalities in South Africa. The findings of their study revealed that dissatisfied citizens often do not participate in elections as a move to express their disgruntlement on municipal conduct. A study by Tod (2012) corresponds to the earlier-stated findings when they indicate that elections are used as a mechanism for social accountability. However, citizens in communities where service delivery is poor do not actively participate in elections, as they believe that they do not bring any positive change.

It can be deduced from the cited findings that among the citizens who believe that elections can increase social accountability, the majority disregard elections because they often see officials abusing power, and indulging in corruption and mismanagement, which impede on service delivery to the community. Maphunye (2015) confirms this argument when he revealed that an election, as a social accountability mechanism, provides citizens with the opportunity to participate in selecting the person they want.

However, when elected, the officials may disappoint by failing to deliver as expected, as they usually tend to serve their own interests. For instance, the series of service delivery protests throughout the City of Tshwane in 2013 and 2016, reflect a failure by elected officials to provide, as mandated by their positions, quality public goods and services. Elections, therefore, reflect a gloomy picture as social accountability mechanisms on the supply side of public officials are either ignored or not done at all, therefore, culminating in service delivery protests by communities.

3.8.2.5 Participatory budgeting

Participatory budgeting refers to a process by which citizens participate directly in the different phases of budget formulation, decision making and monitoring of budget execution (World Bank, 2006). This tool has been used in service delivery circles to increase the transparency of expenditure and make remarkable improvements in achieving the aims of the budget. In South African local governance, participatory budgeting is embedded in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) where citizens are given the opportunity to contribute to their service delivery needs and make suggestions to a municipality.

Carmago and Jacobs (2013:9) reason that participatory budgeting can enhance local governance by making resource allocation more responsive to the expectations of the citizens. An example of budget-related social accountability practices involves an effort by citizens to analyse the impact and implications of budget allocations, demystify the technical content of the budget, and raise awareness about budget-related issues.

Rahman (2005) states that in Bangladesh participatory budgeting programmes are implemented at the lowest level of government called Union *Parishad* with the aid of NGOs that monitor government expenditure and initiate open budget sessions. The bar graph below presents the opinions of citizens on the use of participatory budgeting as a social accountability tool to hold officials in the CoT accountable for service delivery.

Figure 7: Effectiveness of Participatory budgeting as a Social Accountability mechanism

The above graph shows that 14.8% of the respondents who took part in the survey believed that participatory budgeting is very effective as a social accountability mechanism to hold public officials accountable, whereas 20.4% seemed to doubt, as they stated that participatory budgeting is slightly effective when used to demand accountability. Meanwhile, 26.8% of the respondents were of the view that participatory budgeting is effective when implemented as a social accountability mechanism. 25.6% felt that participatory budgeting was moderately effective, meaning that its impact as a social accountability mechanism is somehow minimal and cannot

entirely bring officials to account. 12.4% did not believe that participatory budgeting could effectively bring public officials in the CoT to account for their actions in service delivery. The responses are varied, based on the perceptions of respondents. However, on average, the responses show that participatory budgeting can somehow be employed as an effective social accountability tool to hold officials accountable. Findings from key informant interviews reflected that participatory budgeting was fundamental for bringing communities together to participate and voice their concerns, although limited turnout was often the challenge.

The municipality (CoT) strives in its capacity to exercise social accountability as one official noted:

Participatory budgeting is our duty. We set a programme every year… we set meetings with a number of community groups such as religious and business sectors. At ward level, we provide guidance to ward councilors on how development can be provided or directed. We provide guidance and a framework for guiding communities in all seven regions of City of Tshwane where we provide information on which services to implement depending on the backlogs. We also provide the socio-economic status of the regions and demographics which improves planning. We assess the level of infrastructure to see if such in such form of development can be rendered. We got a comment from concerned stakeholders in terms of their needs and priorities where were assist in improving participatory budgeting.

Moreover, the participants further revealed that when conducting participatory budgeting, communities are asked to identify their top priority needs since the municipality has limited financial resources to spearhead service delivery. The information acquired from various departments is consolidated and tabled for decision making within the municipality structures. After the consultations, a full document stipulating how service delivery can be rendered is compiled.

The findings also showed that once the consolidated report of the IDP has been finalised, the CoT officials call for a meeting with concerned stakeholders such as citizens, civil society organisations and other citizen groups to debate and see which areas need modification. Studies by Shah (2007) and Bither (2014) revealed that

citizen engagements in participatory budgeting are significant in pointing out the discrepancies between government policy priorities and resource allocations, as well as undertaking public education campaigns to improve budget literacy. However, reviewed literature points out a gap in terms of participatory budgeting, whereby citizens have, on several occasions, indicated their unwillingness to fully engage public officials to have their voices heard in terms of budgeting or policymaking that impact on budgeting processes.

One official said:

> *Every year we present directly to the communities on a public forum where a question and answer session will be conducted. We let people know what transpired and various departments support us in the initiative. We go to communities such as Hamanskraal [and] Mamelodi. We conduct meetings with traditional authorities, although we ask their needs first then make decisions later, depending on the availability of resources.*

The key informant explained that, as a municipality, planning is one of their mandates. The CoT also provides guidance to communities on the availability of the services they need. In addition, public officials go to communities and account for the actions taken in service delivery. These findings corroborates a study by Goncalves (2014) which showed that municipal officials investigate issues of accessibility to services and provide recommendations concerning needy communities. Levy and Walton (2013) echo the same sentiments when they posit that a municipality should socially account to the citizens it serves, which is a prerequisite for enhancing social accountability.

3.8.2.6 Public demonstrations/protests

Public demonstrations are common social accountability mechanisms in almost every government and private sector organisations in South Africa (HSRC, 2012; Kanyane, 2013 & Khalo, et al. 2007). These demonstrations have taken a centre stage as citizens demand accountability from service providers and government departments. Many people in South Africa believe demonstrations bring immediate accountability. However, in many circumstances, these protests turn violent when citizen block roads, rob local businesses and engage in criminal activities.

The graph below shows the various opinions of citizens on the use of public demonstrations to force public officials to account for actions taken in service delivery.

Figure 8: Public Demonstration/Protests as social accountability mechanisms

The graph shows that 31.6% of the respondents who participated in the survey were very satisfied that public demonstrations can be used effectively to demand social accountability from the CoT, as they bring an immediate reaction from the local authority. 22.4% of the respondents believe that public protests are slightly effective as a social accountability mechanism whereas 21.6% of the respondents believe that public demonstrations are effective as a social accountability mechanism. Meanwhile, 16.8% of the respondents believe that public protests are moderately effective, while 7.6% believe that they are not effective at all as social accountability mechanisms to hold officials accountable.

Key informant interviewees criticised the use of public demonstrations because citizens vandalise infrastructure when demanding for services. The findings reveal that citizens take a drastic approach to demanding accountability and destroying their own infrastructure does not only make them suffer but reverses development in communities. Apart from having peaceful dialogues, citizens need to confirm what the municipality is doing to exercise its social accountability and provide service delivery in communities. One official stated:

> *We use capital expenditure to account to the people. However, there are currently few measures done to respond to [the] needs of citizens.*

However, in some cases of service delivery protests, we respond when
we are alerted [that] there are strikes going on.

Drawing from the above findings, it shows that municipal officials do not always exercise social accountability unless citizens resort to mass action in the form of public protests. Only then are necessary remedies taken by the municipality. Jelmin, Lekvall and Valladares (2011:14) describe public protests or demonstrations as "...elements of open confrontation that, if incremental, have the potential to boost a sense of empowerment." For example, protests were conducted by the West Cliff Flats Residents Association in Durban when they campaigned against evictions and power cuts. The engagements between municipal officials and residents, in this regard, were ineffective as there was no obligation by the municipality to address the residents' grievances (Hinely, Hoffman & Naidoo, 2010).

Whereas public demonstrations are considered effective, in some contexts only a few people may benefit. Taking the West Cliff Flats scenario as an example, it is apparent that service delivery was poorly rendered in the area, which fell under the jurisdiction of an opposition party councillor; hence he was allegedly deprived of resources to develop the area. Public mobilisations seem to the quickest social accountability means which citizens use to demand services from municipalities, although they are often associated with violence and destruction of infrastructure.

In South Africa, as observed by Jelmin *et al.,* (2011:13), there is no straightforward relationship between mass mobilisation and accountable governance. Arguing from this perspective, the study suggests that protests provide immediate attention to service providers to address concerns. However, this may depend on the willpower of service providers to account. Protests can be utilised efficiently although they do not always guarantee improvement in service delivery.

3.8.2.7 Community radio stations

In an attempt to deepen democracy and freedom of speech in South Africa, community radio stations were introduced to help the public to communicate, lodge their grievances or raise awareness on issues affecting their communities. The use of community radio stations has seen dissatisfied communities calling for the removal of bureaucrats they accuse of corruption or not representing the needs of the people who

elected them (Pather, 2012). However, the effectiveness of community radio stations as social accountability mechanisms depends on the trust or relations between state and society or whether the concerned department responds to citizens' demands or not.

Previous studies have shown that community radio stations, as social accountability tools, can be empty vessels that may be abused under the guise of democracy, hence their impact may not be recognised. The pie chart below presents the views of the citizens of the CoT on how they perceive community radio stations as social accountability mechanisms to hold officials accountable and improve service delivery.

Figure 9: **Community radio stations as social accountability mechanisms**

The pie chart above shows that 16.4% of the respondents agree that community radio stations are effective as social accountability mechanisms, although 22.4 % of the respondents believe that community radio stations are slightly effective. Furthermore, 15.2% of the respondents indicate that community radio stations are not effective at all as mechanisms for holding officials socially accountable.

Key informant interviews revealed that community radio stations have been fundamental in increasing citizens' voices in communities, although they do not have the much-needed force to influence social accountability. For example, in Tanzania, FADECO and Karagwe radio stations were used as social accountability mechanisms for raising citizen awareness. The use of community radio stations enabled citizens to

submit social issues that were affecting their lives. The submissions were discussed and responded to by experts. Cases of corruption and misuse of public resources were debated and citizens could be informed on the strategies that they could use to force public officials to account.

A study by Keefer and Keeman (2011) further corroborates the findings. The study revealed that in Benin, the demand for social accountability increased through community radio stations that brought awareness education. Key informant interviewees further highlighted that, apart from community radio stations, hotlines have been important for whistleblowing, thus, frustrating any corrupt activities by either citizens or city officials in the city of Tshwane. The key informant interviewees also indicated that the presidential hotlines occupy a significant part of service delivery in the metro, as citizens often use the department to hold officials to account. The participant stated that, as a department, they received complaints/compliments lodged by the citizens in terms of services received. The grievances which are submitted by the citizens are then forwarded to the mayoral office for consideration and discussion, usually at Mayoral *Imbizos.* In this instance, social accountability is exercised by a senior authority who has the duty to handle customer complaints on certain rendered services.

The participant said:

> *We do not necessarily deal with protests, but citizens go to the Member of Executive Committee (MEC) where they hand over the memorandum. Usually, the political department handles the issues of protests, so our duty is to facilitate communication and customer care.*

The participant believes the presidential hotline is very efficient in exercising social accountability as citizen's report directly to the department which facilitates communication concerning service delivery to the concerned citizens' communities. The department signed a memorandum which is embedded in a departmental scorecard, where people record their grievances and use the Presidential Hotline.

However, findings also indicate that limited resources hinder the department from solving as many of the citizens' complaints as they can. For instance, reported cases of electricity theft in informal settlements may not be entirely solved due to limited

budgets to deploy city officials to investigate. The participants lamented that in most cases the municipal budget is limited to the extent that some citizens might not be covered by the municipal help. Although the municipality tries to account to the people, there is always an undertone of mistrust by the public on how municipalities use public funds.

3.8.2.8 Effectiveness of Oversight committees as social accountability mechanisms

In South African local governance, oversight committees have been used as means of checks and balances to monitor the work of public officials so as to avoid mismanagement and leakage of funds due to corruption and bad governance (DPLG, 2005). The graph below indicates the views of citizens of the CoT on how they perceive oversight committees as a social accountability mechanism for demanding accountability in service delivery matters.

Figure 10: Effectiveness of Oversight committees as social accountability mechanisms

The graph above indicates that 6.0% of the respondents who participated in the survey felt that oversight committees were very effective as a social accountability mechanism, whereas 29.2% of the respondents believed that oversight committees are moderately effective. 29.6% of the respondents believed that oversight committees are slightly effective as a social accountability mechanism, whereas 15.2% endorsed the idea that oversight can be used to effectively hold public officials accountable.

Lastly, 6.0% of the respondents believed that oversight committees were very effective when used to demand accountability form the municipality.

3.8.2.9 Effectiveness of Ward committees as social accountability mechanisms

The handbook for ward committees in South Africa stipulates that communities need to participate in the municipal affairs, from IDP to policy making. Ward committee structures function as grassroots connections between communities and local government (DPLG, 2005). They harness communities to engage officials in service delivery matters hence their significance in social accountability remains unquestionable. Nonetheless, in South Africa, very few studies have documented the success of ward committee forums as an accountability mechanism. The graph below shows the perceptions of citizens on the use of ward committee structures to demand social accountability and service delivery from the City of Tshwane metro.

Figure 11: Ward committees as social accountability mechanisms

The graph above shows that 5.6% of the respondents believed that ward committees were very effective when used to demand social accountability from the municipal officials, whereas 15.2% believed that ward committees are slightly effective for demanding accountability from the CoT. 10.4% of the respondents believed that ward committees are effective as a social accountability mechanism, while 30.0% thought ward committees were moderately effective. 38.8% argued that ward committees

were not effective at all as social accountability mechanisms for holding the municipality accountable.

The varied responses indicate that people have little faith in ward committees as a grassroots social accountability mechanism, hence their influence in demanding accountability is regarded as negligible. Key informant interviews revealed that ward committee forums are the most common structures nearest to the people that can be used to hold the state accountable. Nonetheless, they are weak due to factional politics and public mistrust of ward councilors. The implementation of social accountability mechanisms using ward committee structures has some inherent limitations which may compromise the delivery of public goods and services.

One of the interviewed participants explained:

> *Since we play a facilitating role we depend on other factors in understanding the role we play. Communities are also considered on what they think in terms of service provision. There is a need to implement strategic goals to achieve service delivery in the future. However, social accountability is difficult in a way that communities often pursue selfish interests, whereby they demand immediate services which are not timeous or relevant at a particular time.*

This observation reflects the diversion of interest and misunderstanding between citizens and the municipality as a service provider. These differences affected service delivery as citizens could not understand the current economic environment which may not have been favorable to implement a certain service. In some cases, mistrust of the municipality sparked public demonstrations as local citizens demanded services. These findings corroborate a study by Buccus and Hicks (2008) which revealed that mistrust of ward committees by citizens was often a challenge that hindered citizens from participating in social accountability mechanisms. These results point to a gap in terms of information dissemination, whereby the citizens need to be informed well in advance of the challenges encountered by the municipality. Such a step may minimize service delivery protests and improve social accountability.

3.8.2.10 Effectiveness of Mayoral Imbizos as social accountability mechanisms

The participants were asked to explain how they respond to citizens' demands for social accountability. The majority of participants cited Mayoral *Imbizos* as one of the most efficient methods they used to exercise social accountability to the citizens. On this platform, citizens have the opportunity to ask questions and the Mayor and his team take time to respond to the citizens' concerns. Depending on the demand for accountability or service delivery protests *Imbizos* can be conducted many times throughout the year in various communities that are served by the City of Tshwane Municipality. This is done to increase transparency and accountability in service delivery.

Figure 12: Mayoral Imbizos and social accountability

The graph above shows that 27.6% of the respondents who participated in the survey strongly agreed that mayoral *imbizos* could be used as innovative social accountability mechanisms to hold the state accountable. 8.0% of the respondents strongly disagreed that mayoral *imbizos* function to optimum capacity as social accountability mechanisms to hold the municipality accountable. 19.6% remained neutral on whether mayoral *imbizos* were effective in bringing municipal officials to account for their actions in service delivery. Key informants revealed that mayoral *imbizos* could be effective as citizens render their input on how service delivery should be rendered.

At one mayoral *imbizo* one participant stated:

> *As part of exercising social accountability, we facilitate a process for planning purposes and it cuts across all sectors in societies. In terms of service delivery, communities are required to participate in terms of planning where people are given the opportunity to air their views in terms of the services they require which will be incorporated into IDP.*

These assertions show that IDP is one of the social accountability mechanisms used by public officials to account to citizens in terms of service delivery. The IDP provides citizens with the opportunity to openly discuss and direct the municipality to provide services which are important to their communities. Furthermore, participatory budgeting, which is embedded in the whole IDP process, is used as a social accountability mechanism to account for citizens.

Another official added:

> *Participatory budgeting is our duty. We set a programme every year we set meetings with a number of community groups such as religious and business sector. At ward level, we provide guidance to ward councilors on how development can be provided or directed. We provide guidance and a framework for guiding communities in all seven regions of the City of Tshwane, where we provide information on which services to implement, depending on the backlogs.*

> *We also provide the socio-economic status of the regions and demographics which improves planning. We assess the level of infrastructure to see if such form of development can be rendered. We got a comment from concerned stakeholders in terms of their needs and priorities where we assist in improving participatory budgeting.*

Moreover, the participants further indicated that when conducting participatory budgeting, communities are asked to identify their top priority needs since the municipality has minimized financial resources to spearhead service delivery. The information acquired from various departments is consolidated and tabled for decision making within the municipality structures and then a full document stipulating how

service delivery could be rendered is compiled. Once the consolidated report of the IDP has been finalised, the IDP officials call for a meeting with concerned stakeholders such as citizens, civil society organisations and other citizen groups to debate and see which areas would need modification.

3.8.2.11   Funding for social accountability mechanisms

For social accountability to be successful, adequate funding is needed. Reviewed literature reveals that for citizens to effectively hold public officials accountable, they should have access to funding (O'Meally, 2013; Velleman 2010; Yilmaz et al. 2008). Nonetheless, the researcher that in the CoT, funding from the supply side is minimal, as the allocated budget is often directed towards programmes that are stipulated in the IDP. The graph below presents the views of citizens on whether they have access to funding for their bid to oversee the implementation of social accountability mechanisms, or not.

Figure 13: *Funding for social accountability mechanisms*

The table above indicates the distribution of social accountability and funding available in the community. It indicates that 61.6% of the respondents believed that availability of funding for social accountability could trigger effective delivery of services in the communities. The graph shows that 74.0% of the respondents do not have any

knowledge of the source of funding to facilitate social accountability in the community. Comparing these percentages might imply that very few people are aware that the City of Tshwane has a budget to conduct social accountability programmes such as Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and *Imbizos.* This stems from poor information dissemination from either the CSOs or the municipality itself.

One municipal official responded:

> *Funding for social accountability is very limited in our municipality due to [the] service delivery backlogs we have that need to be addressed. In some cases, the budget we receive from the national treasury does not adequately [cater for] the needs of communities, for instance, informal settlements. As result, citizens protest demanding services, not knowing we have to render services based on priority needs and available budget to execute development programmes***.**

The success of social accountability, as literature alluded previously, requires a huge funding base. Based on these findings, it is apparent that social accountability in the City of Tshwane is being hindered by limited funding from both the supply and demand sides, seeing as national treasury does not allocate funds based on the population, but on availability. These findings correspond with a study conducted by Hansen and Ravnkilde (2013:31) which indicates that funding for social accountability is a global challenge as many civil society organisations that champion social accountability mechanisms relied on funding from World Bank and development partners such as UNDP. Funding has been crucial in increasing citizens' voices through lobbying in undemocratic governments.

3.7.12 Overall satisfaction rate between public forums and oversight committees

The graph below shows the comparison of the satisfaction rate between public forums and oversight committees as social accountability mechanisms to improve service delivery.

Figure 14: Public forums versus oversight committees

The graph above indicates the distribution of social accountability and funding available in the community. It indicates that 36.8% of the respondents were very satisfied that public forums contribute to the satisfaction rate in which citizens can participate in social accountability. 30.0% of the respondents were satisfied that oversight committees contribute to satisfaction rate in ways in which citizens can participate in social accountability. 14.4% of the respondents were very dissatisfied that public forms are effective for holding public officials accountable, whereas 14.4% were also dissatisfied that oversight committees are effective in holding officials accountable. 8.8% of the respondents were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with public forums as social accountability mechanisms whereas 12.8% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with oversight committees as a social accountability mechanism. Based on the above graph shows that public forums and oversight committees have not been embraced by citizens as a mechanism to hold public officials accountable. In many circumstances, citizens resort to public protests if they are dissatisfied with the levels of service delivery.

3.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on an extensive overview of social accountability, from the global and local viewpoints. The meaning and implementation of social accountability

mechanisms in South Africa is still a challenge, as evidenced in the City of Tshwane Metro.

Based on the findings and discussion of relevant literature, South Africa is one of the leading countries in Sub Saharan Africa that allows her citizens to engage or demand accountability from service providers and state departments. Nonetheless, the freedom to express one's own opinion is somewhat abused as citizens go to extremes when demanding services. Quantitative findings have shown that City of Tshwane communities still need to be enlightened on what and how they can use social accountability mechanisms to demand service delivery from the local municipality.

The study has shown that if public officials in the City of Tshwane exercise social accountability, chances are high that service delivery can be improved in many communities. Civil society organisations need to take a leading role in raising awareness on the availability of various social accountability mechanisms that citizens can tap into in order to hold public officials accountable. Citizen participation is, therefore, the key to demanding social accountability and service delivery in communities. The following chapter focuses on assessing citizen perceptions on the level of municipal response to social accountability and service delivery demands.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Social accountability is not a 'one size fits all' approach to ensuring good governance and effective service delivery in communities. The concept of accountability is not new; in fact, it is an ancient concept that is enjoying modern day resurrection in status. Whereas many have the misconception that social accountability was introduced by international organisations, the truth is that it has long been in existence, although governments had been reluctant to account to citizens in terms of service delivery.

Johnston (2014:1) claims that practitioners and academics seem to be in cahoots that citizen engagement can effectively uproot corruption in the public service, whereby public officials are forced to account to the public for their actions in service provision. The basis of this statement is that citizens if empowered can influence social accountability mechanisms in the fight against corruption. Previous studies acknowledge that, in the wake of service delivery protests in most local governments across the world, social accountability has fast emerged as an indispensable strategy to attain good governance through citizen engagement (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009; Damapour & Schneider, 2009; World Bank 2007 & UNDP, 2013).

The continued deprivation of basic services (water, education, electricity, clinics) that is experienced by citizens due to corruption and mismanagement saw the emergence of social accountability as a weapon to fight for better governance and service delivery (World Bank, 2004). The UNDP (2010) reiterates that citizens are required to actively engage in monitoring certain activities, such as quality assessment as a way of generating actionable inputs for deterring corruption and enhancing development in local government. Camargo and Stahl (2016:4) note that the end goal is to ensure public officials and service providers directly account and respond to the needs of the communities they serve through justifying how they utilize public resources (Almquist et al., 2013; Hui et al., 2011; Jorge de Jesus & Eirado, 2012).

Having discussed this background, one may question whether citizens have a constitutional mandate to hold government accountable. How can they do that? Who

can assist them to hold the government accountable? Is citizen engagement effective in holding public officials accountable? This chapter interrogates these questions and assesses the use of innovative social accountability mechanisms by citizens to hold the City of Tshwane accountable.

4.1.1 Why citizen engagement in social accountability?

Social accountability initiatives have attracted global admiration as they boom and advance transparency and social accountability fields. This includes high profile open government reforms and a proliferation of voluntary multi-stakeholder initiatives that aim to set social and environmental standards in the public sector (Fox, 2007). Various scholars and practitioners such as Osborne and Brown (2011) and Walker (2014) have developed a keen interest in social accountability.

Poor service provision by several local governments across the world led critics to brand social accountability mechanisms as a catalyst to problem-solving and capacity building of government departments, in response to community challenges (Damapour & Schneider, 2009). Social accountability in public service delivery has been linked to reforms such as New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) (Almquist et al., 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011;).

Fox (2014:346) explains that institutional performance can be improved by innovative social accountability strategies, which promote both civic engagement and public responsiveness of states and corporations. In a wider sense, the concept encompasses a wide range of institutional innovations that encourage and project the voice of the public in service delivery issues. Government is increasingly perceived as one array of legitimate actors who exercise public authority in the delivery of services. Criticism of social accountability targets is aimed at state providers (Ackerman, 2005; Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004 & O'Neil et al. 2007).

In the opinion of Dowbor and Houtzager (2014) the foregoing is a narrow focus, with growing fragmentation of the state through decentralisation, contracting out and privatisation, public/private partnership, and providers of public services that are non-state actors. What is questionable, however, is the extent to which the poor are able to effectively hold service providers accountable for service delivery. Therefore; social accountability mechanisms are increasingly expected to facilitate positive

development outcomes, inter-alia, more responsive local government, exposing government failure and corruption, empowering marginalized groups and ensuring that national and local government respond to the needs of the poor (Camargo and Jacobs, 2013).

4.1.2 Citizen engagement, civil society participation in social accountability

Claasen, Lardies & Ayer (2010:2) assert that active participation, citizen engagement and civil society organisations in policy formulation and implementation can enhance social accountability and overall good governance. To this end, Schroeder (2004:5) identifies four actors that are active in local accountability systems. These are; local residents, local governments, and producers of local government services and higher levels of government (including central government). These actors are required to exercise social accountability in their line of work.

Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006:33) admit that social accountability builds citizen power, vis-a-vis the state. It is a political process, although it is distinct from political accountability of elected officials. This distinction brands social accountability as an especially relevant approach for communities where representative government is weak, unresponsive or non-existent. However, in the wake of this diverse array of on-going institutional experimentation (both small and large-scale) critics draw a distinction between civil society monitoring and broader public interest advocacy reform initiatives (Joshi & Houtzager, 2012).

4.1.3 Citizen engagement and public sector corruption

Carmago and Stah (2016) note that citizen engagement in social accountability mechanisms assists in uprooting public sector corruption. Johnston (2014:1) remarks; "Corruption will continue – indeed, may well be the norm - until those with a stake in ending it are able to oppose it in ways that cannot be ignored." Practically, this assertion implies that if citizens are actively empowered in social accountability programmes, they can play a fundamental role in curbing the endemic corruption. The assertion is further premised on the notion that, the service providers (government officials) needs to be accountable to the communities that they represent.

Nonetheless, to make provider accountability a reality, communities need to actively engage in quality assessments and citizen monitoring, which are crucial aspects of developing an innovative mechanism to detect corruption in development programmes. McGee, Rosie and Gaventa (2011) argue that various mechanisms, where citizens and communities become engaged in social accountability, have been established. This indicates an improvement in citizens' willingness to participate in social accountability mechanisms which enhance governance and socio-economic change in communities.

4.2 CHALLENGES FACING CITIZENS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The review of social accountability literature has identified five key challenges which need to be mitigated to achieve the implementation of social accountability mechanisms in South African local government. These are:

- Lack of track records on the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms;
- Skills to implement social accountability interventions;
- Poor citizen participation in social accountability;
- Lack of capacity development; and
- Lack of monitoring and evaluation (Carmago and Jacobs, 2013).

4.2.1 Citizens do not have track records on social accountability programmes

McGee and Gaventa (2010:22) and Gaventa and Barrett (2010:14) bemoan the lack of track records on the effectiveness of social accountability approaches as expressed by present empirical evidence. Scholars such as Booth (2011) and Andrews and Shah (2002) suggest that the significance of fostering social accountability initiatives to enhance governance in the delivery of basic services is often overstated. Their argument is premised on the notion that, participatory mechanisms in local government have limited impact on the accountability of public officials, which leaves gaps in the implementation of social accountability mechanisms.

4.2.2 Skills shortage among citizens in social accountability

Whereas social accountability mechanisms are considered effective in holding public officials accountable, they often fail due to several factors ranging from skills deficit, negligence and corruption in local government (Camargo & Jacobs, 2013). Schouten

(2011:2) concurs that social accountability mechanisms tend to be implemented in areas of unwarranted statehood due to their inadequate formal governance structures. The prevalence of high factionalism or particularist interests and low levels of security, especially in South African local government, poses a threat to the mobilization and participation of citizens in social accountability mechanisms (elections, public commission hearings).

Carmago and Jacobs (2015) criticise the lack of administrative capacity, coupled with the lack of community trust and other constraining effects of poverty, which have inhibited the effective implementation of social accountability mechanisms. These scenarios compelled critics to interrogate the ineffectiveness of social accountability mechanisms through citizen engagement. The critics also ponder on the best way forward in enhancing service delivery through other alternative social means.

4.2.3 Poor citizen participation in social accountability mechanisms

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2011), in its report on the Proceedings of Development Workshop in Vienna, asserts that citizen engagement is being constrained by failure to reach the beneficiaries of the services, which often leads to misrepresentation of interests by intermediaries. Such actions can distort the relationship between state and citizens by introducing vested interests that do not represent the interests of the intended recipients. Another challenge is that intermediaries, if unchecked, can undermine the sustainability of citizen engagement as interests are likely to vary in the long run.

Social accountability through citizen engagement is facing a dilemma since the beneficiaries of public services are not willing to participate without any external interference. In most cases, citizens need a motivation to engage, which is a growing challenge in holding public officials to account for their actions in service delivery. Houtzager et al. (2016) submit that citizens in South Africa tend to lack confidence in the delivery of services and this harms their desire to engage the municipal officials in participatory budgeting or performance monitoring. Marginalised groups in communities are the most affected as their voices are not heard due to their reluctance to participate in social accountability mechanisms. This gap in citizen engagement

made critics question the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms in public service delivery.

4.2.4   Lack of capacity development among citizens

The UNDP (2013:104) reiterates that social accountability interventions at the local level require capacity development, not just for communities and individuals engaged in monitoring, but also for subnational officials, who must be willing and incentivised to create space for enhanced participation by communities. At this level, it is important to analyse the incentives that local officials may have for accountability and to understand the lines of accountability that may run upward to the central government and outward to communities (Hickey and King, 2016:1230).

Local officials must have the financial and human resources and capacities to respond to community demands if they are to be held accountable for delivery. This provides a gap for this study to develop an innovative model of how public officials can improve service delivery by implementing social accountability mechanisms. Hyden (2013:922) holds that "African countries typically lack an independent middle class that can place meaningful policy demands on the government."

The opinion by Hyden (2013:924) indicates that in reality, citizens have limited capacity to effectively demand public services from service providers. His reasoning stems from the fact that, although the state may be willing to render services, lack of capacity is the obstacle to enhance the performance of public officials. Improving social accountability compels the government to have highly qualified staff that has the potential to respond to citizen demands, although this is a nightmare in many public institutions.

Booth (2012) affirms that for social accountability to enter the modern era, political systems should become less patrimonial and adhere to new principles of public management that speak to modern administrative systems. Many Sub-Saharan Africa countries have exercised social accountability through elections. However, emerging evidence has pointed out that voters may influence the state to account, but elected officials quickly vanish from the map as soon as they ascend to power (Maphunye, 2014). In most cases, the demand side suffers from lack of accountability from public

officials, which calls for more radical policies or shift in policy frameworks to increase state capacity to account for services rendered (Benington, 2009).

4.2.5 Lack of monitoring and evaluation

Social accountability entirely depends on the collaborative participation of civil society organisations and citizens in holding the state accountable. CSOs need to initiate campaigns that inform citizen on their rights and the services they are supposed to obtain and perform third-party monitoring (Ringgold, Holla, Koziol and Srinivasan, 2012). This may be done through analysis in the form of public expenditure tracking (PET), which monitors how the public funds are used. It is arguable that citizen monitoring, in this regard, is a prerequisite in ensuring social accountability (Koziol and Tolmie, 2010; Rogers & Koziol, 2011).

Implementing monitoring and evaluation techniques is fundamental in circumstances where the government does not exercise accountability in development initiatives. Ringgold et al. (2012) provide an example of World Bank-sponsored health projects in states such as Argentina and Zambia, where disbursements to service provision are dependent on factors such as the number of children and women receiving prenatal care. The need to establish a results-based approach lies in the rationale to obtain results, hence, monitoring and evaluation of social accountability projects are necessary if improved service delivery is to be realised. This discussion has revealed the significance of citizens in exercising M & E, which are twin concepts necessary for the detection of government corruption and the enhancement of service delivery.

4.3 BUILDING BLOCKS TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The World Bank (2003:49) argues that social accountability derives its roots from the three-building blocks that are common in social accountability approaches. These building blocks are;

   a) access to information

   b) making the voice of citizens heard and;

   c) engaging in a process of negotiation and change.

This paper argues that acquiring information is imperative for effective social accountability. The availability of information promotes informed citizen engagement with service providers, especially in the way public resources are used for service delivery by public officials.

4.3.1 Citizens' right to access information

The UNDP (2013:3) maintains that social accountability in the delivery of services by public institutions entails compliance with international legal frameworks that encourage the dissemination of new information to citizens, thus enlightening them to know their rights to hold public officials accountable for service provision. Gaventa & Barret (2010) further reiterate that social accountability initiatives should provide citizens with relevant information, with regards to their rights, obligations and institutional framework of service delivery.

This is a significant step in fostering active and effective citizen engagement. Green (2008:10) argues that active citizenship includes a combination of rights and obligations that link individuals to the state. It also involves paying taxes, adhering to laws and exercising the entire range of political, civil and social rights. To this end, therefore, active citizen engagement compels the state or public officials to be responsive and accountable for their actions, as an incentive for effective service delivery.

4.3.2 Making the voice of citizens heard

The social accountability of public officials can be considered effective when the citizens rise up in their great numbers and voice their concerns without fear or prejudice. Chatiza et al. (2014) admit that citizens' voices necessitate good communication between government officials, service providers and the recipients of services through effective social accountability. Creating an enabling platform for citizen engagement increases the delivery of services in public institutions.

Strengthening civic engagement amplifies the voice of citizens as well. McNeil and Malena (2010:35) indicate that social accountability mechanisms are implemented to increase transparency and good governance in various government spheres. Social accountability mechanisms are implemented at the local, provincial and national level.

The main aim of exercising these mechanisms is to hold public officials as service delivery agents accountable to the citizens for their actions in service delivery.

4.3.3 Engaging citizens in negotiation and change

At the height of deteriorating public service delivery in local government due to corruption and mismanagement, citizen engagement of public officials through social accountability mechanisms facilitates civic engagement amongst the citizens and civil society to hold public officials accountable for the decisions they take in the administration of community affairs. Nevertheless, social accountability, as Houtzager and Joshi (2008) hold, build civic engagement and accountability by harnessing the collective efforts of citizens and non-sate actors in holding public officials to account for their actions in service delivery.

The UNDP (2013:14) concludes that social accountability mechanisms provide a vibrant, dynamic and accountable relationship between citizens and government, where the latter ensure the equitable and sustainable development of communities through efficient service delivery. Based on this analysis, citizen engagement closes the principal agent gap, where citizens rely on intermediaries to report their needs to the government. Instead, by opening public forums, citizens can directly demand accountability from public officials, which is essential in improving service delivery.

Citizen engagement in social accountability initiatives can be attributed to the desire to attain quality service provision in communities. Nevertheless, Buhlungu and Atkinson (2007:32) note several challenges associated with social accountability mechanisms which make the initiatives weak or ineffective. There is lack of clarity on how citizen engagement can reduce public sector corruption (Sikhakhane & Reddy, 2011:92-93). Scholars have a misconception of focusing on social accountability initiatives which target transparency and voice of the citizens while neglecting the actual responsiveness of social accountability mechanisms on service delivery (Joshi, 2010).

4.3.4 Importance of citizen engagement in social accountability

Citizen participation in social accountability mechanisms is fundamental for improving service delivery and realising the value for money. Studies claim that in developing

countries, research on politics and governance has shown that social accountability is the key driver for service delivery and citizen empowerment (Batley, McCourt & Mcloughlin, 2012). Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg (2015:274) argue that social accountability efforts target government entities, laws and regulation.

They also target processes (the supply side), citizens and civil society organisations (demand side). The last group is often termed social accountability and has often concealed supply-led reforms in line with policy and research attention on accountability. This study, therefore, critiques the engagement of citizens and civil society in social accountability programmes that aim to enhance service delivery. Citizen engagement of state departments in social accountability has been successful in some contexts where service delivery was improved (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009).

Notwithstanding the fact that the success of social accountability has been exaggerated in the international donor community, citizen engagement has been vital in development projects, especially in developing countries (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015:274). This study argues that the success of social accountability depends on the demand and supply factors which determine the relationship between state actors and citizens. This relationship further determines the type of accountability exercised by both state institutions and citizens and how these can co-exist towards achieving social accountability.

4.4 CLARIFYING THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEMAND, SUPPLY, STATE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Many scholars on social accountability suggest that for social accountability to be a success the views of various actors, such as demand (citizens), supply (service providers) state (government) and the community at large need to be taken into consideration (Grandvoinnet, Aslam & Raha, 2015; Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2016; Williamson, 2015; Wetterberg, Hertz & Brinkerhoff, 2015). Tapping from this assumption, the World Bank submits a principal-agent accountability model which connects citizens to politicians, policy makers to service providers and service providers to citizens (World Bank, 2004). The shorter route to accountability consists of a direct service delivery links between citizens/clients and service providers. The long route to accountability involves the supply side accountability connection, which

includes state actors that use regulatory oversight and exercise general management to signal and monitor service providers.

O'Meally (2013:8) observes that the success of social accountability, in this case, depends on whether the demands and interests of principals (citizens and agents; service providers and the state) converge and align, or not. Debates in literature around social accountability revolve around whether the demand and supply sides of accountability interact to achieve the expected outcome. Joshi (2014) further contends that the principal-agent relationship between state actors and citizens influences the effectiveness of social accountability towards achieving service delivery.

4.4.1 Demand-related attributes

Many factors influence the demand-related side, where citizens are expected to actively participate in social accountability initiatives. Booth (2012) cautions on the dangers that may accrue from failure to appreciate the role of civil society in lobbying for social accountability. Ignoring the role of civil society often results in the marginalisation of citizens' voices. Another challenge on the demand side is that some groups who may be privileged within a community may not share same sentiments with the affected groups, thus, hindering demand for social accountability to improve service delivery (Williamson, 2015).

On the contrary, social accountability depends on the socio-economic status of citizens within communities. Drawing insight from the principal agent debacle, social accountability relies on whether various groups that demand a certain service make a collective action against the agents (state actors, service providers) expressing their dissatisfaction. The public to be mobilised needs to be identified from among the affected stakeholders, rather than selecting a general public with diversified interests and needs (Lee, 2011). However, civil society organisations, citizens, professionalised civic society organisations and other less privileged groups are the suitable target audience for social accountability. A community scorecard assessment can be administered among these groups to assess the level of service delivery satisfaction and establish the reasons why the groups participate in service delivery demonstrations.

McGee and Gaventa (2011) argue that, through "accountability politics," mobilised groups often contribute directly to empowerment and enhanced service delivery as they demand social accountability from service providers. O'Meally (2013) further advises that mobilizing collective action to demand social accountability depends on citizen willingness. Civil society and related organisations that demand social accountability need to have proper managerial skills, sufficient resources, skills and relevant knowledge, good support structures and alliances to construct a long-term mechanism to engage in social accountability mechanisms.

4.4.2 Supply-related attributes

Citizen engagement in social accountability requires structures and processes of state-centred accountability, which directly relates to the will power and capacity of citizens to hold state actors accountable in service delivery. Studies by Holland et al. (2012) revealed that in developing countries, states are failing to provide acceptable levels of performance in terms of service provision. This results from limited resources, incompetent civil service staff, political patronage, poor oversight, corruption and general mismanagement. It should be highlighted that these weaknesses cripple the long route to accountability, thereby increasing the demand for social accountability.

Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg (2015) further elaborate that whereas the above constraints can hinder social accountability, citizens' expectations to hold public officials accountable for service delivery may be compromised, given the lack of accountability and institutional capacity in government departments. Furthermore, the supply side needs proper financial systems to undertake social accountability and other related programmes which improve monitoring and evaluation of services rendered. Often, the long route to accountability is based on an electoral system that communicates citizens' needs and priorities to politicians and legislative systems, processes, policies, budgeting and oversight agencies that address such demands. It is imperative to further highlight that government departments need to have well-functioning systems to render information and legal services, among other responsibilities, to citizens. Likewise, courts and audit commissions require adequate resources to enforce laws and regulations and safeguard against political interference in the work of public officials. Nonetheless, citizen involvement in social accountability does not necessarily foster political accountability since those factors depend on the

discipline or regulations imposed by the upper echelons of the bureaucratic governments (Brinkenhoff & Azfar, 2010).

4.4.3 State-community nexus

Citizen-state relations are fundamental to the success of social accountability. These relations, if well-cultivated, result in three forms of accountability, which include governance and empowerment improved service delivery. The government often has the power to support or obstruct the implementation of social accountability mechanisms. In democratic states, where citizens can freely engage governments, social accountability can thrive as the state can respond to, and address, the raised concerns. In the process of so doing, the state will be exercising social accountability (Blair, 2011).

State machinery such as the ombudsman's offices, oversight committees, parliament and citizen monitoring groups are used to safeguard state abuse of power and ensure that the government exercises social accountability, which is important for attaining good governance, citizen empowerment and service delivery in communities.

In Indonesia and The Philippines, the demand and supply sides of social accountability have been running smoothly as the governments have adequate resources and independence, hence the governments are accountable to their citizens and civil society organisations through their actions in service delivery (Hickey and King, 2016). Nonetheless, the accountability of this government to their citizens does not entirely mean there are no challenges. As Blair (2011) claims, patronage and cronyism are the twin evils that have engulfed such states. Social accountability in Indonesia, for example, is being disrupted by the attitudes of public officials who do not want to embrace change; hence they choose to maintain the status quo that is embedded in huge bureaucratic structures (Brinkenhoff and Wetterberg, 2013). In these cases, citizen engagement of the state improves social accountability. At the same time, citizens can appreciate the value for their money when the state is accountable at every step. The state, on one hand, may not indulge in corrupt activities, as the citizen groups act as watchdogs to manage and monitor government expenditure.

Blair (2011:43) reiterates that social accountability mechanisms can be viable in the event the state provides the supply side function, which the demand side heavily depends on. Mutual cooperation of state and community facilitates a platform for trust and fair citizen bargaining, where the state legitimately delivers services to its citizens (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg & Dunn, 2012). In many circumstances, an effective local government or service provider is trusted by citizens, based on the enhanced quality of service provision. Since a number of social accountability mechanisms take time to show change, citizen trust of the state is developed upon indicating signs of progress in terms of service delivery.

As alluded to earlier, fair bargaining between state and society culminates into effective social accountability for improved service delivery in communities. The state-society relations remain the cornerstone of social accountability; hence alternative and innovative social accountability mechanisms can be proposed to enhance accountability in development programmes.

4.4.4 Social accountability under the social contract

Hickey and King (2016:1240) elaborate on state-society relations when they argue that social accountability in states is shaped by the political development of mechanisms for social accountability in an attempt to institutionalise more transparent forms of development to tighten state-society relations. The way the politics of an environment or country operate often determine whether social accountability can flourish or not or whether social groups adhere to the governance mechanism a state is following or not (Di John & Putzel, 2009).

State-society relations are discussed in line with the social contract, which argues that a government needs to be legitimate to rule in the sight of citizens and, in turn, citizens have the obligation to hold the state accountable and pursue social justice. It can be noted that the social contract platform presents an enabling framework for politics, social accountability, and social protection. Therefore, social accountability and social protection can be recognised as concepts that are aimed at aiding and promoting more democratic and socially viable forms of social contract, as indicated in participatory budgeting done in Latin America and cash transfers held in Brazil, respectively (Alston, Melo, Goldfrank, 2007; Mueller & Pereira, 2013).

The notion of social contract is believed to have evolved from the Western history where theories of state formation and change were developed. The literature on social contract projects social accountability as an independent and well cognisant strategy which citizens can use to make public officials responsive in service delivery (Hickey, 2011). State-society relations in other developing states are, therefore, based on the systems of patronage or partisan politics, which are contrary to the Western ideologies and theories that inform good governance and change (Booth, 2012).

The aforementioned discussions focus on how the social contract ideology can influence social accountability in states. The recurring observations for this discussion were that, social accountability under a social contract depends on the type of government in power, as some semi-authoritarian governments may persuade or incentivise their citizens to support their ideologies, whereas some autocratic states would create a system of patronage where loyalists adhere to partisan politics and, in the process, hinder the states from accounting for their actions.

Given the South African context, therefore, the social contract principles are used in some instances where the government incentivises loyalists in key positions, which explains their reluctance to account to the ordinary citizens for their actions in service delivery.

4.5 FACTORS ON DEMAND SIDE /THIRD PARTY MONITORING

4.5.1 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) & /Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

The role of citizens in holding the state accountable is complemented by third parties who monitor and keep the government in check. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) act as the collective voice of the people who are often suppressed by the Big Man Rule or upper-class people in communities (Gaunt and Kabeer, 2009). In some circumstances, citizens feel isolated and do not have a sense of ownership or entitlement, hence, their participation in social accountability is weak (Gauri, 2011). CSOs and NGOs play a fundamental role in raising consciousness and spelling out citizens' rights to demand social accountability

from service providers. In South Africa, for example, the Legal Resources Centre, a local NGO has international links and specialises in raising consciousness and building entitlements in civil rights.

In Bangladesh, two NGOs, Samata and Nijera Kori focus on increasing citizen awareness of their own social accountability. Nega and Milofsky (2012) point out that for CSOs and NGOs to become influential in social accountability, they have to establish a legal, political and financial environment where they can assist citizens and champion social accountability mechanisms. Gauri (2011) cautions that the activities of such organisations sometimes threaten the ruling governments. In most such instances, the NGOs are accused of attempting to change government agenda. Although CSOs and NGOs can provide an enabling platform where the state is forced to account, Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2011:7) advise that it is the commitment and collective effort of citizens to participate and demand social accountability from the state that matter the most.

4.5.2 Media /investigative journalism

Various forms of media platforms (television, radio, newspapers, and posters, flyers, websites, booklets etc.) have been used in many countries to enhance the social accountability of governments. Gauri (2011:23) asserts that two-way communication is used to address service delivery challenges. To begin with, agencies and redress venues are used to provide information, including redress procedures, to clients.

Secondly, the independent media is useful for disseminating information on dispute remedies regarding service delivery backlogs. Therefore, in social accountability, the independent media publicise citizen grievances and complaints, thereby sparking a fire to service providers and state departments to improve on the level of service delivery. The independent media uses posters, flyers, websites booklets, and social networks (Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook). The use of such media tools for exercising social accountability is growing in popularity (Gauri and Brinks, 2008). In South Africa, for example, the City of Tshwane is using Facebook as a mechanism for accounting to local residents. Citizens are able to engage the mayor for about two hours on that platform in what they call *digi-imbizo,* which will be addressed in the forthcoming sections.

Norris and Odugbemi (2008) declare that investigative journalism questions the mechanisms that can be adopted by service providers to address service delivery challenges. However, in some contexts, the media has been accused to be "agenda setters" or "gatekeepers". In a broader sense, the media are the watchdogs which whistle blow on government corruption or inefficiencies and bring awareness to citizens on how they can hold the state to account.

As the third party in monitoring, the media have adequate resources to challenge the government to pay attention to citizens' demands. The collaboration of media, CSOs, and citizens assists in strengthening the demand for social accountability from service providers. For example, the independent media were influential in enforcing a social policy that addresses the needs of citizens and attempts to curb corruption (Lindert & Vincensini, 2008:2).

4.5.3 ICTs & social network platforms (Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook) as social accountability mechanisms

The growing popularity of independent media saw the rise in the use of social networks, which include, inter-alia, Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp as enabling platforms where citizens can engage service providers in service delivery (Park, Kang, Rho & Lee, 2016:1265). Governments across the globe have established structures that allow the dissemination of current and dependable communication networks to mitigate the information flow challenges to citizens (Pieterson & Johnson, 2011). Information communication technologies (ICTs) have been widely embraced as effective communication channels to increase citizens' voice towards holding government accountable. The motivation lies in the fact that, trust in ruling government is a growing challenge in fully grown and developing economies (Morgenson, Vanamburg & Mithas, 2011).

The use of social networks such as Twitter promotes the use of G2C capabilities that enhance accountability, transparency, cooperation and responsibilities (Golbeck, Grimes and Rogers, 2010). Twitter, as a medium of communication between citizens and government, is influential, depending on the willingness of both parties to send inquiries and receive responses. Studies have shown that users' responses to Twitter

communication were overwhelming, as their trust developed based on the responses they got (Aharony, 2012; Park, Kang, Rho and Lee, 2016; Sobaci and Karkin, 2013).

Nonetheless, to increase citizens' trust of state, there is a need to provide the facilities such as the internet or free WiFi connectivity where citizens can engage and lodge grievances on service delivery and the government responds to them (Park and Jung, 2010). If used properly, ICTs that encompass all new technologies can improve state accountability in events where citizens actively engage the local government regarding service delivery (Morgeson et al. 2011).

It is imperative to highlight that social media have inevitably attracted the attention of many government agencies and private sectors to implement them as sound modes of communication to deliver messages and interact with service users (Lee and Kwak, 2012). Given the rate at which technology is being proliferated by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, ICTs can be the alternative way in which citizens may use to holds public officials accountable. However, related literature has alluded that local government response determines the successful use of ICTs; hence a close relationship between citizens and service providers needs to be strengthened, so as to achieve effective social accountability.

4.6 FORMAL COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

According to Carmago and Stahl (2016:7), there are various components of social accountability, as presented in Figure 4.2. These components show the relationship between the service providers and the citizens, which is the basis for social accountability. The rationale of the presentation is to show the significance of state-citizen relationship which is punctuated by **voice**, **enforceability**, and **answerability**. These three concepts, if adhered to, can create an enabling environment for exercising social accountability between the state and the citizens. Figure 4.2 indicates a conceptual framework where assessment, consisting of various components and all vital aspects that allow social accountability is formulated.

Figure 15: Components and steps involved in effective social accountability initiatives

Adapted from (Camargo and Jacobs, 2013)

4.6.1 Voice

According to the UNDP (2010:11), the voice comprises various formal or informal mechanisms, which citizens use to express their opinions, preferences, views and demand social accountability from accounting authorities. In a broader sense, the voice does not mean a mere collection of comments or complaints which citizens adopt. There are three aspects that are associated with the voice. Citizens need to have a clearer understanding of the functioning of public entities and how they should be assessed for their performance, which entails transparency and accountability. For citizens to understand how public institutions should account, awareness needs to be raised through capacity building programmes on social accountability mechanisms. Doing this increases the voice of citizens towards social accountability.

Citizens need to be empowered to be able to analyse and act upon the feedback that emanates from social accountability mechanisms. Launching complaints and service delivery grievances should be properly articulated so that public officials are examined on whether they exercise social accountability or not to the citizens. In other words, the demand side (citizens) should be able to effectively hold the supply side (officials) accountable by using relevant social accountability mechanisms.

In addition, citizens may have the capacity to gather information that may trigger them to demand services from public institutions. Nevertheless, a citizen may not have the means or willpower to act upon the information; hence relevant actors need to be involved to effectively hold the state accountable. Citizen voice in this instance can be more influential in the event a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship has been established between the two groups (state and citizens). This can be achieved through public consultative meetings or *imbizos,* where such issues can be discussed and debated in a conducive environment that facilitates development.

4.6.2 Enforceability

This is a stage of rectifying the weaknesses of a failed mandate and mitigating the resultant effects. In social accountability, enforceability is a perilous attribute which incentivises service providers to render services in a responsive or less responsive manner among the localities they serve. Service providers often complain about the lack of appreciation from citizens, hence incentives can be vital for rewarding performance or, if a citizen is not satisfied, disciplinary measures should be taken through either commission of inquiry or oversight committees or public hearings.

4.6.3 Answerability

The UNDP (2010) describes answerability as the right to account for one's actions by giving a response. In social accountability, answerability mostly remains the obligation of service providers to citizens. The notion of answerability can be a two-way process which entails the citizens directly engaging with the government and related service providers. The concept is further underpinned by feedback on the raised service delivery grievances, which citizens often demand from service providers (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg, 2015). Answerability, in this case, assists in showing whether the service providers are willing to listen to citizens' complaints or not. The state is expected to shed more light on how public money is spent; hence answerability is a complex but fundamental stage in addressing social accountability related issues.

4.7 INNOVATIVE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS USED BY CITIZENS TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE

Reviewed literature has proposed various innovative social accountability tools and mechanisms that can be used to hold public officials accountable for service delivery.

In South Africa, these tools and mechanisms include; citizen-based monitoring, community scorecards, social audits, public expenditure tracking, Service Delivery Satisfaction Surveys and social networks. The mechanisms have been discussed in detail as follows:

4.7.1 Citizen-based monitoring

Various social accountability mechanisms were established in South Africa with the aim of enhancing citizen engagement in governance. The mechanisms consist of legislated statutory mechanisms that include, inter-alia; ward committees, school governing bodies, community forums and police forums (Sekyere, Motala, Ngandu, Sausi and Verryn, 2015). Whereas these mechanisms promote state-society relations, they also provide citizens with feedback on government action, thereby monitoring performance. Such form of citizen-based monitoring is fundamental for improving social accountability where the state reports on its activities to the citizens.

The NPC (2012:25) asserts that citizen platforms create a space for development actors such as; NGOs, private sector organisations, and community-based organisations to tap into citizen efforts to hold officials accountable through lobbying the government to adhere to the Constitution and other legally mandated provisions. The significance of citizen participation in these social accountability mechanisms enables the state to account for its actions when delivering services and bringing the much needed socio-economic transformation.

This study argues that holding state and service providers accountable is fundamental for improving the quality of services in communities. The NPC (2012:27) further affirms; "The state cannot merely act on behalf of the people – it has to act with the people, working together with other institutions to provide opportunities for the advancement of all communities." This assertion is premised on the notion that social accountability exists alongside communities; its success depends on the willpower and participation of both state and society.

4.7.2 Public expenditure tracking survey

Hansen (2014) describes public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) as a quantitative survey created by the supply side to track the flow of public funds and material from the central government level. This is achieved through the administrative hierarchy for

the frontline service providers. Batanon (2015:23) states that the aim of PETS is to enhance the quality of services rendered to communities by asking citizens questions such as; "Are you satisfied with the level of service delivery in your community?"

In Uganda, PETS were effectively used as social accountability mechanisms to determine how funding intended for service providers reached the intended beneficiaries. The PETS enabled the government to find out where there was leakage of funds in district schools; hence corrective measures were adopted to address the problem.

Studies have shown that PETS can be conducted by citizens to "follow the money" from the budgets of local government to service providers (Kozoi and Tolmie, 2010; Rogers and Koziol, 2011). This is important for identifying areas of weakness in order to urgently undertake decisions to address the key areas of concern. However, from the examples given, there is a gap in terms of PETS because they appeal only to the knowledgeable people in communities, which breeds a sense of inferiority among ordinary citizens. As a result, municipalities need to improve the awareness of PETS as their success depends on collective citizen engagement to demand accountability from municipalities. McNeil and Malena (2010:199) consent to the foregoing analysis by affirming that for PETS to be effective as a social accountability tool, citizen structures should be well-arranged and credible to enable citizens to effectively influence and demand social accountability.

4.7.3 Social audits

The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) (2013) describes a social audit as "a monitoring process through which organisational or project information is collected, analysed and shared publicly, and investigative findings are shared and discussed publicly." As social accountability tools, social audits have been widely used, mainly in developed countries, to enable citizens to engage public officials on how they spent public money. Ringgold, Holla and Srinivasan (2013:10) posit that social audits are effective intervention strategies because they involve face to face interaction between citizens and service providers.

In South Africa, very few studies have been conducted to assess the use of social audits when demanding social accountability from officials. An example of where a

social audit was conducted was in Khayelitsha, in Cape Town, where the audit was done by the Social Justice Coalition, in partnership with HSRC and National Development Agency in 2015. The audit was meant to establish the perceptions of local residents to foreigners or what triggers xenophobia. The findings from this audit revealed gross dissatisfaction among residents, as basic services were in a bad state. The residents raised grievances such as lack of toilets and clean water, inadequate accommodation and schools, as well as poor health facilities.

The audit showed the eagerness of citizens to participate in surveys. This provides a clear picture that incentivising citizens are a plausible way of achieving participation in social accountability. It can be further argued that citizens often participate only in social accountability programmes whenever they anticipate something in return. This mentality needs to be challenged, as service delivery failures can be attributed to limited citizen engagement in holding local government accountable. A change of mindset is, therefore, needed to transform people's way of thinking.   Such transformation can be achieved through conducting awareness campaigns using media platforms such as social networks and other public forums.

4.7.4 Service delivery satisfaction surveys

The World Bank (2017) describes service delivery satisfaction surveys (SDSSs) as quantitative assessments conducted to assess government performance and service delivery based on citizen experience. SDSSs often depend on collected data on a wide range of topics such as citizen perceptions of elected officials and perceptions of citizens on the level of service delivery. SDSSs have been previously used in many countries to monitor the quality of basic service delivery. For instance, in South Africa, the Public Service Commission (PSC) conducted an SDSS to assess the perceptions and satisfaction levels of citizens in many sectors. The survey assessed knowledge and competence of service providers and rated the value for money on services delivered.

The findings of the South African PSC survey reflected that, among public officials, the value of money was not clearly understood. This lack of understanding was indicated by the service delivery backlogs (PSC, 2016). The World Bank (2017) further points out that citizen satisfaction surveys have been carried out in many Africa countries

using the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) or the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ). Governments, civil society organisations or private sectors may conduct these surveys often to accelerate the delivery of services.

4.7.5 Citizen scorecards

Mdee and Thorley (2016:9) argue that donors and civil society organisations popularise social accountability through using mechanisms such as public expenditure tracking and citizen scorecards, as they provide feedback to citizens on the actions of service providers. Citizen scorecards were used effectively in Malawi and in Oxfam work as social accountability mechanisms to hold the state accountable (Green, 2015; Wild and Harris, 2012).

However, Fox (2014) affirms that citizens are often subjected to useless information that does not promote smooth negotiations between government and citizens, hence weakening citizens' demand for social accountability. Marcus et al. (2016) opine that social accountability approaches sometimes do not effectively improve state accountability because civic engagement is diluted by the diversion of interests and political contestations. For example, elections are used as social accountability mechanisms, although they are very blunt and weak in holding the state accountable. The rationale behind this is stressed out by Joshi (2010:23) who claims that state accountability depends on the type of government in power; whether it promotes democratic civic engagement or not, and whether service delivery channels are accountable or not.

In South Africa, citizens, political parties and civil society organisations have been advocating for a change in leadership with the hope that, such a change can trigger service delivery improvements. However, there is no certainty that leadership will result in improved service delivery. Booth (2012) criticises the limited knowledge citizens have on the availability and use of social accountability mechanisms that they can implement to hold the state accountable. The few citizens who may want to implement social accountability mechanisms can be isolated by the political climate in which they exist, hence hindering the success of social accountability mechanisms. In the wake of this observation, holding the state accountable through civic engagement may rely on the desire by the service providers or state to account, although it is

essentially a legislative mandate to do so (Hyden, 2014; McGee, 2014 & Tembo, 2012).

4.7.6 Citizen charters

The World Bank (2007:50) regards citizen charters as pacts between the community and service providers. These pacts stipulate the roles and expectations of each party and, in the process, create an enabling platform for citizens to actively interact with the municipality. The significant part of citizen charters as social accountability mechanisms is that they spell out the expected standards of services by identifying the responsible party and stating the procedures for the redress of complaints.

4.7.7 Do service providers respond to citizens' demands?

Ringold, Margaret and Srinivasan (2012:16) affirm that service providers and state institutions often fail to respond timeously to citizens' demands and this leads to civil unrest or protests In South Africa, citizen protests are being widely used to force municipalities and other government agencies to account to citizens. Whereas many scholars acknowledge that public protests are efficient, they admit that, at the same time, the protestors may be placated with empty promises as service providers may take too long to address grievances.

This dearth of service provider accountability has affected the socio-economic development of various states, including South Africa. Studies that assessed the rate of service providers' response to service delivery demands have shown that information dissemination from the supply side to demand side of citizens remains relatively low.

4.8 FACTORS BEHIND CITIZENS' FAILURE TO HOLD STATE ACCOUNTABLE

4.8.1 Information inaccessibility

Various factors contribute to citizens' failure to hold the state accountable through social accountability mechanisms. Accessing information about where, when and how to hold the government accountable in service delivery remains one of the challenges that citizens face (Batanon, 2015). Service users need help to advocate for change, which can be provided by third-party monitoring agents (CSOs, NGOs, and CBOs).

This study observes that for social accountability to be successful, adequate information should be provided to citizens and concerned groups.

In their study, Bjorkman de Walque and Svensson (2013) found out the significant roles that information played in stimulating citizen participation in health initiatives which led to improved health care delivery. Lack of knowledge and information on the way to demand social accountability inhibit citizens in some communities from holding the government accountable. High levels of education may be needed for one to understand how social accountability works. For example, to fully appreciate how the public expenditure tracking survey works, the citizen should be well educated in order to know how to monitor government expenditure (Agarwal and Wicklin, 2011:8-10).

Although CSOs may be of assistance in some cases, they are out of reach in other instances since their active participation depends on the type of ruling government, that is, whether it allows advocacy or third-party monitoring agencies to influence change. O'Meally (2013) further maintains that relevant and quality information may assist citizens to track government expenditure, thereby addressing all inconsistencies and discrepancies.

However, the question still remains: "Do citizens have enough influence to hold the state accountable?" This has been addressed in other sections of this study, although reviewed literature indicates that, on paper, citizens really have power. However, practically, service providers and state agencies seem to have the upper hand in exercising social accountability.

4.8.2 Inadequate funding challenges for social actors

Social accountability mechanisms in many states are championed by the civil society (NGOs, Pressure Groups, Women Groups, Community Based Organisations, and Human Rights Groups) who have the democratic right to hold the state accountable. Nonetheless, issues such as funding and legitimacy hinder these actors from effectively holding the state to account due to their somewhat loose or weak connection with the citizens. Heck, Courtney and Tolmie (2010:14) stress; "NGOs rarely interact with citizens and community organisations' and therefore 'may not be a good vehicle to carry forward the voices of citizens."

Menocal and Bhavna (2008) make another observation on donors who sponsor NGOs and other civil society organisations to conduct social accountability of states. For example, in Bangladesh, as 'NGOs often are unable to build true consensus' and 'simply advocate what they think is the best solution, due to lack of time and resources' (Menocal and Bhavna, 2008). Based on these observations, the complex role of civil society organisations in spearheading social accountability in states can hinder socio-economic development. Although CSOs claim to represent citizens' interests, their lack of legitimacy and accountability dents their credibility. Several CSOs acquire funding from the international donor community, which can disrupt their ability and willingness to hold the state accountable.

4.8.3 Lack of legitimacy

In social accountability, achieving legitimacy is crucial, especially for third-party monitoring agents to instill or gain public confidence and government recognition when demanding social accountability. Civil society organisations that rely on donor funding are on the verge of being isolated from the broader political and social spectrum, since transforming communities require firm roots in what the people want or believe the government should do for them (Jalali, 2013:55).

This study has shown that CSOs are prone to the donor dependence syndrome, which usually hampers their willingness to influence social accountability. Menocal (2008:45) cautions that too much of foreign influence in terms of funding can lead CSOs to divert their agenda to suit their funders' demands. Studies by Hudson (2009) and World Bank (2003) corroborate the above assertions and propound that unscrupulous CSOs may exist for the sole purpose of tapping into donor funding without necessarily acting as the voice of the citizens in social accountability.

It can be argued, therefore, that external funding may increase CSOs capacity to influence social accountability while, at the same time, misdirecting the agendas and goals of CSOs. In the process, this tendency cripples the short route to accountability. Studies by Lewis (2013:115) have shown that communities are likely to paint a negative picture of CSOs in terms of bad leadership and lack of formalised structures to influence social accountability.

The depoliticisation of CSOs leverages them to effectively link with other citizen groups that seek to demand accountability from the state, although the actual social initiatives may be disrupted by lack of funding (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013). This means that the success of social accountability programmes through CSOs intervention funding is the key to unlocking the citizens' capacity to participate in, and demand, accountability which is imperative for enhancing service delivery.

4.9 RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter employs a triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques to gather data. The sample for this study was chosen from the entire City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality that constitutes 2 921 488 people (Stats SA, 2016). Using a Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, the possible representative population for administering questionnaires was 270 respondents. The target population consisted of 270 respondents who were selected through systematic and purposive sampling techniques.

For the purposes of this study, the sample was made up of 270 people who were divided into 250 respondents and 20 participants. Respondents from selected communities in the City of Tshwane were chosen systematically to respond to the questionnaire survey. The respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 60 years. The purposive sampling technique was used to identify respondents from the selected five (5) departments (Water &Sanitation, Energy & Electricity, Research and Innovation, Governance & Politics, IDP & Economic Intelligence) within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

The aforesaid judgmental sampling was based on the knowledge these key informants have in terms of social accountability and service delivery in the municipality. The data analysis procedures for quantitative data were conducted using and the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) computer software, provided by the North West University, to analyse quantitative data. Descriptive statistics are used to explain the basic characteristics of the data in the research (Gerber-Nel et al. 2005:2004). Frequency distribution, standard deviation and mean, median and mode scores were some of the descriptive statistics used in this chapter. Qualitative data from the interviews were transcribed and verbatim and presented in themes following study objectives.

4.10 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.10.1 PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZENS ON INNOVATIVE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

4.10.1.1 Citizens' perceptions of social audits as social accountability mechanisms

The use of social audits in South African municipalities is still in its infancy stage; hence awareness needs to be raised by academics and research institutions. Of significance, a social audit was once conducted by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) (2012) in Khayelitsha, in Cape Town, to assess local government expenditure and the perceptions of citizens towards municipal service delivery.

In the City of Tshwane, studies have not yet been conducted to assess the use of social auditing; hence the research probes the citizens on whether they are aware of this innovative mechanisms that can be used to hold public officials accountable. The graph below shows the opinions of respondents on the use of social audit as a social accountability mechanism.

Figure 16: Social audits & social accountability

The graph shows that 29.2% of the respondents strongly agree that a social audit can be used as a social accountability mechanism to hold public officials accountable. 9.2% of the respondents strongly disagree that social audits can be used effectively to hold the municipality accountable. 22.0% remained neutral on whether a social audit

can be used effectively as a social accountability mechanism to hold officials accountable.

The findings from the key informant interviews pointed out that social audits are still a new concept that needs to be clearly understood and articulated in the local government context in South Africa. Many public officials in the city of Tshwane are not aware of this mechanism as they are used to existing mechanisms such as Imbizos and IDPs, among others.

Against this understanding, therefore, social auditing still needs to gather momentum and awareness, as raised by relevant stakeholders and it calls for more skills development and training workshops to enlighten politicians and office bearers on how they can respond to them when citizens demand social accountability and service delivery. Aiyar and Mehta (2015) concur that social audits require extensive awareness of the demand side, particularly on how they can use them to demand accountability from service providers. This means that social auditing can be used effectively in event that citizens know its benefits. Such knowledge can trigger their participation.

4.10.1.2 Citizens' perceptions of oversight hearing as social accountability mechanisms

Prior to the attainment of democratic rule in 1994, oversight hearing was a common method for interrogating government officials on the use of public funds. All acts of corruption and manipulations were heard in these hearings, where the public was invited to obtain more knowledge on how they could work and participate meaningfully in social accountability.

Figure 17: Oversight hearing & social accountability

4.10.1.3   Citizens' perceptions of public expenditure tracking as a social accountability mechanism

The use of public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) as social accountability mechanisms is common in developed countries, although in Uganda the PETS was conducted as a social accountability mechanism to hold the government accountable for service provision. The PETS is often created by the service provider to help recipients of service delivery to track the flow of funds and government expenditure (Hansen, 2014). Usually, PETS is fundamental for curbing corruption and any leakages in financial management systems (Kozoi et al. 2011).

In South Africa, PETS is a new phenomenon, although some argue that it can be equated to an IDP since it contains a provision for the citizen to track and demand accountability on municipal expenditure. The bar graph below shows varied views of citizens in the CoT on whether they know PETS or have used it before as a social accountability mechanism to hold officials accountable.

Figure 18: Public expenditure tracking & social accountability

The graph above shows that 5.6% of the respondents strongly disagree that PET can be used as a social accountability mechanism to hold officials accountable, whereas 38.8% strongly agree that PET can be used to demand accountability for actions that were taken by officials. 10.4% remained neutral on whether PET can influence the demand for social accountability in the CoT, while 15.2% disagree that PET can be used efficiently as social accountability mechanisms. Lastly, 30.0% agree that PET can be used efficiently as a social accountability mechanism to hold officials accountable for service delivery.

The above responses may show a growing understanding in PET as an innovative mechanism for demanding social accountability. The key informant interview revealed that conducting PET in the municipality is a costly exercise, although the mechanism can be used just like citizen scorecards to improve the accountability of public officials. A study by Joshi and Houtzager (2012) showed that using PET requires extensive resources, hence its implementation is limited. Also, there is limited empirical evidence on the success of PETS, hence governments hesitate to implement them as social accountability mechanisms. The other weakness of PETS is that it needs to be implemented alongside traditional social accountability mechanisms and requires huge community participation to make it a success (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009). These assertions correspond with the views of key informants who felt PET implementation can incur huge expenditures, which can strain the municipal limited budget.

4.10.1.4 Citizens' perceptions of advocacy campaigns as social accountability mechanisms

Among the actors that demand social accountability from the government are third-party monitoring agents that encompass human rights groups, social workers, pressure groups and women groups. These agencies act as watchdogs in ensuring that governments adhere to human rights and exercise accountability to their citizens. In many instances, advocacy is their duty and they are supported by lawyers to ensure they represent the rights and needs of citizens. In South Africa, likewise, advocacy has been championed by groups such as AfriForum, among others. The pie chart below shows various opinions of citizens on the use of advocacy campaigns to force the CoT to account to the citizens in service delivery.

Figure 19: Advocacy campaigns as social accountability mechanisms

The pie chart above indicates that 14.4% of the respondents strongly disagree that advocacy campaigns are effective and innovative social accountability mechanisms for holding the CoT accountable. 23.6% of the respondents agree that advocacy campaigns can be used effectively as social accountability mechanisms whereas 33.2% remained neutral on whether advocacy campaigns are effective or not. 15.6% of the respondents strongly agree that advocacy campaigns can be used to raise awareness and force the municipality to account to citizens. However, 13.2% of the

respondents disagree that advocacy campaigns can influence the demand for social accountability in the CoT.

Key informants explained that advocacy campaigns can be used as social accountability tools to raise awareness on particular issues. Nevertheless, their effectiveness is somewhat minimal as they often fail to receive the recognition the campaigners need. This is due to the fact that, a particular ministry they may advocate for to go under the parliamentary process may take ages to undergo such scrutiny. As a result, using social accountability to demand services from the CoT can be influential on the needs or policies that citizens or particular groups need to be addressed. Advocacy can be an effective mechanism for reminding officials of the need to exercise social accountability.

4.10.1.5   Public policy making & social accountability

In South Africa, public policy making is the cornerstone of municipal service delivery although its success is dependent on citizen participation in policy-making processes. In local government public policy directs what a municipality should do or not do. The politics-administration dichotomy often hinders the proper formation of public policies in local government (Cameroon, 2010; Mafunisa, 2003; Svara, 2003 & Thornhill, 2008). The interface between administrative office bearers and political office bearers can have negative effects on the level of service delivery. The graph below represents the possible opinions of citizens in the CoT on how public policy making can be used as a social accountability mechanism to hold the municipality accountable.

Figure 20: Public policy making & social accountability

The bar graph above shows that 26.4% of the respondents strongly agree that public policy making is the key to influencing social accountability in the CoT, in contrast to 9.6% of the respondents who disagree that public policy making has any effect on increasing social accountability demand from the municipality. 34.0% of the respondents remained neutral, which may imply that they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied that public policy making can be used effectively as a social accountability mechanism to hold officials accountable. 28.0% of the respondents agree that public policy making is used as a social accountability mechanism and 2.0% of the respondents strongly agree that public policy making can be used to demand social accountability from the municipality.

Findings from key informant interviews point to a gap in terms of citizen participation in public policy making. Although awareness has been increased through media such as posters and ward committee forums, the participation of citizens in public policy is very weak. In many communities in the CoT, citizens tend to complain and engage in protests but the majority are reluctant to attend public forums where policies are debated, hence this can compromise service delivery.

4.10.1.6 Citizen-based monitoring & social accountability

To assess if public officials are using citizen money properly, citizen monitoring is the key to tracking government expenditure. Sekyere et al. (2015) contend that citizen monitoring mechanisms bring together community forums, police forums, school

governing bodies and ward committees. These groups can unite and decide to demand social accountability from service providers using citizen monitoring techniques. Municipalities are required to provide reports to the citizens on how they incurred certain expenditures. Citizen monitoring helps to detect weaknesses or any forms of unscrupulous activities on the supply side early. The bar graph below presents the views of citizens on the use of citizen-based monitoring as a way of demanding social accountability and tracking government expenditure.

Figure 21: Citizen-based monitoring & social accountability

The graph shows that 26.85% of the respondents who participated in citizen monitoring strongly agree that it is a useful mechanism for demanding social accountability, while 4.4% strongly disagree that citizen-based monitoring has any effect on social accountability and service delivery in the CoT. 26.0% of the respondents remain neutral; while 14.8% disagree that citizen monitoring can be effective as a social accountability mechanism.

Key informant interviews provided a lukewarm response to the use of citizen-based monitoring as a social accountability mechanism. They pointed to a lack of unity, diversity in culture and race, religious, political and social differences as barriers that inhibit the success of citizen-based monitoring activities. Nonetheless, citizen-based monitoring can be quite influential in holding municipalities accountable. In the municipality, however, citizen-based monitoring is inhibited by limited skills and knowledge on the demand side, as citizens ponder on how or where to start conducting

citizen monitoring. Limited awareness among the citizens acts against the success of this mechanism.

4.10.1.7 Service delivery satisfaction surveys (SDSS) & social accountability

The use of SDSS as social accountability mechanisms has been common in developed countries whereas in South Africa it is minimal. Studies conducted by HSRC (2012) and World Bank (2012) assessed the satisfaction of citizens in various municipalities such as OR Tambo and City of Tshwane using citizen report card which is almost similar to SDSS. Citizen in these municipalities complains of the deteriorating state of service delivery. The graph below presents the perceptions of citizens on the use of SDSS as forms of social accountability mechanism for improving service delivery.

Figure 22: Service delivery satisfaction surveys

The bar graph above shows that 10.0% of the respondents strongly disagree that SDSS are effective as social accountability mechanisms, whereas 29.2% strongly agree that SDSS can be used to hold officials accountable for service delivery. 9.6% of the respondents disagree that SDSS are influential in the demand for social accountability, while 23.6% remain neutral on whether SDSS can be fundamental in social accountability. 27.6% were neutral, meaning that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with SDSS as social accountability mechanisms and their influence on the demand for serviced delivery.

The findings from key informant interviews revealed that citizens who could access information on the effectiveness of service delivery satisfaction survey lacked the much-needed competence, time and skills to effectively hold officials accountable. This is confirmed by a recent study conducted by Mogiliansky (2015:159) which reveals that although citizens have complete information on the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms, they lack the potential to conduct systematic verification. Citizens lack the time and information processing capacity, coupled with their unwillingness to audit activities of officials in service delivery. This challenge has proved to be a stumbling block embedded in the principal-agent discourse where the citizens, as the principals, can be unwilling or do not have the capacity to bring officials to account for their actions in service delivery.

4.10.1.8   Perceptions of citizens on the use of Petitions to influence social accountability

Disgruntled government officials in South Africa use petitions as a way of holding employers of senior management accountable for actions taken. In many cases a petition is associated with a list of grievances the public officials want to be addressed, either to improve their working conditions or demand accountability. Citizens can as well use petitions to demand accountability or removal of government officials whom they consider to be corrupt. Although petitions are easy to conduct, their impact in South African local government remains dubious as responding to citizens' demands depends on the political willpower of officials, hence its impact should not be overrated.

Figure 23: Citizen Perception on Petitions as social accountability mechanisms

The pie chart shows that 35.6% of the respondents strongly believe that petitions are an effective mechanism which citizens can use to demand social accountability form the City of Tshwane. 7.2%, however, strongly disagree that petitions can be efficient as social accountability mechanisms to hold officials accountable. 21.6% of the respondents agree that petitions are effective, unlike 14.4% of the respondents who remained neutral on whether petitions can be used effectively by the citizens to hold public officials accountable.

A key informant interview attests to the above responses, although they place limitations on the use of petitions to demand social accountability from public officials. The findings revealed that petitions in some circumstances are able to unite citizens to take collaborative measures to speak in one voice and submit their grievances to government officials. Nonetheless, the success of petitions is hinged on the capacity and willingness of senior management to respond. The informant was quick to point out that sometimes petitions took time to be responded to, which can frustrate citizens to embark on a protest or public demonstration to force the government to quickly respond to their demands.

The key informants stated that petitions often have weaknesses, as some citizens submit unrealistic demands that do not correlate with the available resources of the municipality.

One key informant remarked:

In informal settlements, we go and account in terms of electricity and water. In informal settlements basic service delivery is happening, for instance, in Mabopane we provided services to informal settlements there. We account through maintenance service where we repair basic services such as toilets for the communities.

However, in signing their petitions, some citizens do not understand that service delivery is rendered according to the available resources and time restrictions, as stipulated in the IDP. As stated above, residents of informal settlements are sometimes at the forefront of public protests, demanding that the municipality has to facilitate basic service provisions, or rather build houses for them. The argument is based on the fact that petitions are commonly used by citizens in the city, although they are based on citizens' selfish interests, and not aligned to the municipal IDPs,

4.10.1.9 Social networks/social media platforms & social accountability

The introduction of modern information communication technologies and digital innovations increase the capability of the City of Tshwane to exercise social accountability in communities it serves. The use of social networks is increasing ad reflected on the graph. A study by Kim, Park and Rho (2015:328) assessed the use of social media (Twitter) to enhance the dependability of government in service delivery. The use of social media as a medium of communication increases government legitimacy and transparency (Golbeck et al. 2010). The review of literature revealed that governments across the globe have deteriorated in terms of citizen trust hence the use of social media can increase their reliability in the domain of citizens (Morgenson, 2011; Kim et al. 2015; Park, 2011; Pollet, Roberts & Dunbar, 2011 & Welch, 2005).

Figure 24: Social networks in social accountability

The graph above shows that 32.4 % of the respondents agreed that social networks such as Twitter, Facebook can influence the municipality to account to citizens as a way of improving service delivery. 7.2% of the respondents did not believe that social networks can increase the capability of citizens to hold officials accountable. Surprisingly a huge number of respondents 44.0% were neutral which they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied that social networks can indeed trigger the demand for social accountability from officials. Key informant interviews revealed that apart from social networks, the municipality responds to citizen demands for social accountability through digital innovations and other innovative mechanisms such as online applications (Tshwane safety applications), that are crucial for creating state-client relationships. These findings are supported by Choi et al (2011) who revealed that the use of social networks such as Twitter increases citizen participation, accountability and transparency thereby bridging the communication gap. Social media allows collaborations of government departments towards service delivery (Dawes, 2009). The finding from key informants revealed that CoT introduced the Tshwane Wifi which was another way of improving social accountability on services rendered. Residents in the city can access free Wi-Fi where they can locate municipal services and other social platforms where they can engage public officials on the services provided. This innovative mechanism is being enjoyed by citizens hence communication barriers and access to municipals services have been improved. McDermott (2010) contends that the use of social media as an innovative social

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accountability media has transformed citizen perceptions towards government action and has unlocked various opportunities for both citizen and government to explore.

4.10.1.10 Tshwane Safety Application

The participants revealed that the municipality piloted a Tshwane Safety Application as part of increasing social accountability. Citizens have access to this application, which is meant to show the number of services being offered by the metro. This application can assist in reducing crime in communities, as one participant explained:

> *One can report a crime and sent a location to the police who can respond to see what illegal activities are happening there.*

Another participant added:

> *Citizens as well have about two hours to engage the municipality on the quality of services being rendered, which is fundamental for effective service provision. The Tshwane E-Services, where citizens could pay rates online without going to the municipal departments to pay, [was introduced]. This innovative strategy increases efficiency in social accountability.*

Based on the findings, the Tshwane Safety Application is an innovative social accountability mechanism, which is vital for information dissemination. Citizens have adopted it as a means to communicate with the municipality. Similarly, the significance of the Tshwane e-services as a modern application for service delivery is recognised as it reduces citizens' mobility and overcrowding in municipal offices.

Nonetheless, the use of these two applications can be beneficial if the majority of citizens could afford cell phones with internet access. Given the impoverished state of some communities in City of Tshwane that are still being haunted by squatter camps (Mamelodi and Mabopane), the use of this application may be limited to few urban working class who can afford such services.

Findings from key informant interviews show that the growth in technology enabled the City of Tshwane to exercise social accountability and render quality services through the use of biometric systems in the health department. Two forms of

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innovation were piloted in the Health Department and Social Health Department of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Below, an official remarked on the use of technological innovations in the management and dispensation of chronic medication:

> *We were unable to detect if a person was moving from one place to the other in search of medication. Using open innovation systems we piloted in three sites where biometric systems were installed to record citizen Identity Documents and fingerprints which was effective to curb reduplication of medical care between medical centres. The biometric systems were fundamental to detect acts of fraud on the side of citizens hence the biometric innovation ensures the monitoring of medical service provision among citizens.*

Another participant added:

> *The project was a success and we handed it over to the City of Tshwane management to be fully integrated and officially recognized as an innovative mechanism that can be used to improve delivery of Health Care within the municipality.*

The participant revealed further that biometric systems reduce the waiting time for patients who need chronic medication as they receive SMSes on their cell phones informing them that their medicine is ready for collection. This was achieved by engaging the services of a young innovator who redirected the innovation to suit the needs of the citizens. The participant believes these forms of innovation address social accountability. Moreover, the participant explained that the City of Tshwane Health Department introduced the Biometric System which was meant to reduce the waiting time for citizens when looking for services. This system could tell whether a patient is in need of chronic medication or not.

The introduction of these digital innovations improves social accountability of municipal officials to citizens in the City of Tshwane. As part of improving the skills gap among economically active citizens, several Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)

were signed by the CoT and various universities to enhance the research capacity of officials and students.

4.11 CONCLUSION

The use of various innovative social accountability mechanisms such as social audits, public expenditure tracking and citizens' scorecards, among others, in South Africa in general and in the City of Tshwane in particular, has not been adequately successful due to numerous reasons. Joshi and Houtzager (2012:143) noted that, the use of social accountability mechanisms, such social audits, failed to recognise or interrogate the capacity and responsiveness of local government to the citizens' demands and to assess if the environment the officials operate is conducive.

The findings of this chapter have revealed that the use of innovative social accountability mechanisms (public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring) in South African local government has been constrained by limited knowledge on how they should operationalise them. Studies conducted in South Africa (Ambe and Baden-Horst-Weiss, 2012; Kanyane, 2013, Mahlaba, 2004; Munzhedzi, 2013 & Vorster, 2012) substantiated the claim when they pointed to corruption in local government without necessarily investigating why public officials and politicians fail to account to the citizens they serve in terms of service delivery.

In this chapter, the researcher further deduced that although the citizens engaged the municipality via public protests, as alluded to in Chapter 3, the accountability of municipal officials' remains very low. The evidence available puts emphasis on the use of IDPs, public demonstrations and *Imbizos,* to mention a few. Therefore, there is need to conduct ex-post independent studies to verify and measure how the existing social accountability mechanisms can be modified or how the citizens may adopt other mechanisms, such as social audits, to demand accountability from officials (Joshi, 2010; McGee and Gaventa, 2010).

Empirical findings revealed that citizen participation in social accountability is relatively low due to negativity and mistrust of the municipality in communities, as they blame the local municipality for lack of accountability and transparency in their operations. However, the City of Tshwane responds to service delivery demands through *digi-imbizos* and social networks where the municipality engages the citizens for about two

hours on either Facebook or Twitter. The use of modern technology showed that the City of Tshwane has become quite innovative in responding to service delivery demands. However, constraining factors emanate from the demand side of citizens as some people are still to embrace technology; hence engaging public officials can be a challenge for them. The findings have, however, shown that citizens in the case study area are increasingly demanding social accountability, although they often resort to violent public protests to express their grievances. The following chapter elucidates more on the internal and external barriers affecting the City of Tshwane in terms of exercising social accountability.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BARRIERS FACING CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY IN IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous literature (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg, 2015; Carmago and Jacobs, 2015; Claasen, Lardies & Ayer, 2010; Fox, 2014; McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Sarker and Rahmnan, 2014:323) has shown that social accountability is a challenge in municipalities due to limited citizen engagement of public officials, weak understanding of social accountability and poor accountability of public officials among others. These challenges provide loopholes in terms of conceptualising social accountability which can be closed by analyzing the key factors that cause poor social accountability and propose innovative ways in which local government can enhance service delivery. The applicability and use of social accountability mechanisms in the public sector have grown considerably although they own practical challenges (World Bank, 2005). Policy makers and donor agencies are aware of various fundamental questions that need to be answered concerning this approach (Gaventa and Barret, 2010). Various arguments, questions, and debates around social accountability emanate from the mixed records of successes and failures of this approach in various public sectors globally (McGee and Gaventa, 2010).

The failure by scholars to provide a conceptual clarity for social accountably is evidently making it difficult to contextualize intervention strategies. Schouten (2011:2) opines that social accountability programmes seem to be influential in areas of perilous statehood due to the shortage of formal structures of governance. For instance, the low levels of security, rampant violence often discourage mobilisations of citizens to demand services from government. In some contexts, particularist interests fuelled by high factionalism inhibit participatory democracy which an indispensable function for social accountability, in the process exacerbating elite capture and exclusionary use of projects.

Carmago and Jacobs (2013:13) assert that social accountability is often hindered by lack of administrative capacity which strains community trust over rising poverty and

negatively affects project design and implementation. The authors warn that barriers to social accountability are often not practical in nature since the universal applicability of the social accountability is generally questionable. The controversy associated with social accountability often discourages citizens to actively participate as they do not see the potential benefits. Studies (World Bank 2011; Ackerman 2004; Blair 2011) argue that the success of social accountability is hinged on a number of factors that include inter-alia favourable socio-political environment, enabling legal frameworks, state support, institutional capacities, and strength of civil society as well as institutionalization of social accountability initiatives. However, in many democratic governments, these principles are not available which leads to low level of citizen engagement in social accountability initiatives. This chapter is therefore framed around six main dimensions of social accountability a) contextualizing social accountability, b) factors affecting social accountability in developing countries, c) internal barriers affecting City of Tshwane Metro d) External Barriers affecting the City of Tshwane Metro, e) fostering *Batho Pele* Principles f) conceptual literature on social accountability. The chapter further examined how various social accountability mechanisms can be used to promote effective service delivery. The discussion was dominated further by various social accountability mechanisms can be used to mitigate the challenges identified in the City of Tshwane Metro which can be essential for enhancing service delivery in communities.

5.2 FACTORS AFFECTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

5.2.1 Rampant corruption in Upper Echelons of Government

Sarker and Rahman (2014:322) pronounce that good governance provided an enabling platform where civil society organisations in the developing countries can engage government officials and hold them accountable in service delivery matters. The government-sponsored local economic development programmes in developing countries are marred by, three evils which include corruption, capture and clientelism (Ackerman, 2005 & Blind, 2011). Social accountability is being affected by government corruption and elite capture as many development projects and resources are rendered through patronage networks which do not have any transparency and accountability mechanism in place (Maphukhunye, 2014). Nonetheless, the so-called

state-centered social accountability mechanisms do not do any justice to combat corruption which has ripped the public sector apart through limited citizen engagement (Azfar, 2007). Analysts question the role of CSOs in holding the government to account, champion socio-economic development, advocating for political and social justice for poor citizens. In developing countries, the role of civil society is somewhat limited especially in an autocratic state where state machinery, law enforcement are used to silence advocacy groups. Malana *et al.,* (2004) advise that in situations where the state undermines democracy, citizens are encouraged to voice their concerns against government injustices and demand their rights, needs, and services. In this sense, public participation is the key to force the government to adequately allocate resources, lessen corrupt activities and effectively deliver services.

In the public sector, corruption represents a significant obstruction to quality service delivery (Vian, Brinkerhoff, Salomon & Vien, 2012:49). Whereas corruption is widely accepted as the gross misuse of public office for personal gain (Ambe and Baden-Horst-Weiss, 2012; Mafunisa, 2013; Public Service Commission, 2013 & Thornhill, 2012), many governments and CSOs have undertaken interventionist strategies to enhance public sector accountability (Bardhan, 2006). Meanwhile, the establishment of various independent agencies in South Africa, for example, Public Protector, Auditor General, and Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) as checks and balances on government corruption has not yielded any fruitful results as social accountability to communities remain low due to corruption and manipulation of accountability structures (Doig, 2012 & Collins, 2012). The anti-corruption structures that have been established in various developing states have not been fully addressed to fill the fissures created by poor accountability instead the reforms targeted individuals thereby neglecting the need for government to exercise social accountability which is fundamental for enhancing service delivery in communities. Heeks and Mathisen (2012) reiterate that the context and nature of corruption have not been given enough consideration as a public organisation has not only adopted a repressive approach or organisational development regardless of the efficiency of the anti-corruption mechanisms (De Sousa, 2010). The challenge is many developing states is that corruption has popularly become an acceptable norm which has serious ramifications on social accountability as citizens suffer from poor service delivery with

no one to account. In such a scenario, citizens need to be assisted by CSOs, NGOs, interest and pressure groups to hold the state accountable.

5.2.2 Poverty and Inequalities in States

Many developing African countries have been recipients of the effects of colonialism which may have derailed development and growth of states. Nonetheless, other think tanks argue that we cannot blame underdevelopment in many African states as the sole cause of colonialism. Instead, they argue that colonialism brought more good than harm although, from an Afrocentric point of view, the debate is still unsolved. Social accountability in modern African governments seems to be a borrowed phenomenon or a Western idea which does not have firm roots in the traditional approach to governance which perpetuates one-party states or monarchies (Swaziland). Corruption is the scourge which has ripped government efforts from exercising social accountability which if fundamental for service delivery. Studies (Marquette 2012; Persson et al. 2010 & Rothstein, 2011) condemned systematic corruption among government officials which makes them reluctant to hold agents accountable for service delivery. A study conducted by Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer revealed that close to 79% of the citizens regard political parties as the organisations engulfed by corruption whereas public officials constitute of 62% with parliaments occupying 60% (Transparency International, 2010:9). These statistics show the reason why social accountability is failing in public institutions as the accounting authorities are the ones at the helm of corruption which discourages service delivery. Jenkins (2007:142) laments over the political and administrative corruption being perpetrated in public administration which requires close monitoring of principals as outlined in the global anti-corruption agenda (Persson, 2011; Rothstein, 2011).

Doig (2007:129) suggests that to mitigate corruption and increase social accountability of states horizontal agencies which involve anti-corruption agencies may intervene to hold states accountable although they may fall in the same bandwagon of corrupt tendencies. The lack of good ethical conduct is another contributing factor to government corruption which another point to lack of incentives and institutional inefficiencies (Gebel, 2012; Rossouw 2008 & Webb, 2012). The literature reviewed have shown that there are few studies conducted to show how good ethical conduct

can promote social accountability in countries (Marquette, 2012). Schatz (2013:172) opines that the failure of traditional anti-corruption policies had devastating effects of corruption in various governments left social accountability mechanisms isolated and difficult to implement to enhance service delivery. Nevertheless, the extensive review of the literature has shown that corruption in public administration has led to economic inequalities and underdevelopment as resources are not equitably distributed due to corruption and fraud (Mafunisa, 2003). Systematic monitoring through horizontal mechanism has been suggested as an immediate remedy to strengthening social accountability (Jelmin, 2012:14). This study argues that social accountability in local municipalities in South Africa can be successful in event horizontal mechanisms and independent agencies such as Public Protector, Auditor General, and Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) took a stand to help citizen hold government officials accountable. Such a move can help in protecting state violations of civil rights as social accountability is a legal obligation of officials to account for the value of public money as enshrined in the *Batho Pele* Principles.

5.2.3 The "Big Man" Rule

Depending on what context one has to discuss it or what message one wants to pass, the Big Man Rule concept has been misused with some analysts refer to as a state of dictatorship, patronage or intimidating way of governing. Discussing it in South African context, the concept of Big Man Rule has been aligned to patronage systems of the ruling which some often refer cadre deployment associated with political appointments. In terms of social accountability, the Big man rule has serious threats to social accountability as it does not promote the democratic participation of citizens which has effects on the quality of services delivered. Rossouw (2008) and Webb (2012) criticised the patronage systems in government which have firm roots in the historical and traditional Big Man Rule discourse that have negatively affect the functioning of public administrations. In many circumstances, public sector organisations that subscribe to the notion of Big Man Rule are not accountable; they are a law unto themselves which often trigger poor service delivery in communities.

5.2.4 African Solutions to African problems

The dream of a United States of Africa made the late Libyan President Muammar Al Gaddafi a self-proclaimed linchpin of African politics as his ideology dominated African

summits (Sarrar, 2010). The African solutions to African principle concept which has firm roots in Pan Africanism were coined by the late Colonel Muammar Al Gadaffi, the Libyan former president. His vision for Africa was that the continent should use a global currency- an African united that is able to solve its own problems without the interference of the Western countries. Although the concept looks good theoretically it produces negative effects on those few countries who attempt to implement as state institutions become unaccountable entities and government become autocratic knowing fully that no one can interfere in the face of the rhetoric. Nevertheless, the capacity of African states is hindered by lack of willpower and mainly corruption that has ripped social accountability. Lufunyo (2013:27) declares that many public sector organisations across the globe have underwent many reforms prior to end of World War II as a mechanism to instil change, many of these reforms which are presently underpinned in the new public management (NPM) dichotomy such as efficiency, accountability, transparency, cost-effectiveness, better performance management with the end product of delivery quality services. However, despite all these efforts progress in terms of social accountability remains slow given the contemporary rhetoric of African solutions to African problems (Ghobhadian, Viney & Redwood, 2009:1514 & Lufunyo, 2013:28). Social accountability in many African states has been negatively affected by autocratic states that do not account to their citizens, in most cases corruption is the cause which led to instability and fragility of states. Dennis, Rondinelli and Behrman (2000) assert that African governments of the 21st century suffer from the institutional capacity to render public goods and services to their citizens. This derails socio-economic development of countries. This calls for capacity building programmes among state to improve the skills capacity to implement good governance principles that are fundamental to economic transformation. Analysing from the perspective of African solutions to African problems, social accountability, may be hindered given the view that, undemocratic states follow what one may call communist ideologies that do believe in state accountability. As a result, the study argues, that for African states to solve their own problems, more democratic and principles of good governance need to be practiced, where citizens have a voice to hold the state accountable. In such a scenario chances are high that, if democratic institutions are put in place economic development of Africa content as a whole can be experienced though it might a long-term wish that needs collaborative efforts and state's willingness to achieve.

5.3 INTERNAL BARRIERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

The success of social accountability mechanisms in South African municipalities is dependent on various enabling factors that can work for and against the capacity or willpower of state institutions to account to citizens. Previous discussions have affirmed that there are internal barriers that may affect the municipality (City of Tshwane Metro) to account to its citizens. This section identifies various internal obstacles such as limited skills, cadre deployment, corruption, poverty and inequalities, lack of good leadership among others. The external barriers such as overpopulation, foreign immigration, and global economic recessions were identified as potential threats that may reduce the capacity of the municipality to exercise social accountability in service delivery matters. The discussion dwells much on how these factors affect social accountability and the level of service delivery in local communities.

5.3.1 Lack of Skills and Competence

The success of social accountability mechanisms rests on the capacity of institutions to implement the mechanisms such as social audits or public expenditure tracking. Service providers including government actors in South Africa have before undertaken steps to try and implement social accountability mechanism although their efforts were derailed by lack of competence among public officials which leads to outsourcing. Political will and capacity often determine the implementation of social accountability mechanism as citizens may want to engage the state and service providers without success due to reluctance to account for their actions (Melena, Forster and Singh, 2004). However, caution needs to be exercised as citizen groups and other CSOs may lack the capacity themselves to hold government accountable due to ideological or political differences. In that situation, Batanon (2015:26) and McNeil and Melena (2010:202) advise that line ministries should, therefore, be responsive and copy with the information flow from the lower to top levels systems within an organisation. In the same vein, policy makers should establish enabling policy frameworks that allow citizen participation in social accountability mechanism such as participatory budgeting. As a tactical method to increase state accountability, Agarwal and Van Wicking (2011:8) hold that, a performance-based reward system is necessary for

developing performance standards and codes of conduct. Incentivising public officials can be subject to debate although it can be instrumental in enhancing social accountability and willingness to deliver quality services. The effect of not incentivizing public officials was witnessed in Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality in the Free State Province in South Africa for their financial year 2014/15 where about R996 million was lost in fruitless and wasteful expenditure as a result of poor performance and general managerial incompetence (Gerick, 2016:4). However, in some situations no matter how many public officials are incentivised, the scourge of corruption is rampant in both all three tiers of government which results in poor service delivery in communities.

5.3.2 Politics-Administration dichotomy

Cameroon (2003:53) acknowledges that describing the Politics/Administration dichotomy remains a subject of debate among public administration practitioners, political scientists, and theorists. Svara (2001:178) cautions about concretizing the view that public administration developed the dichotomy but moved into broader roles, although it provides a distinctive interpretation. The Political/Administrative interface in South Africa occurs at (political office bearers, officials, and chief officials). It should be highlighted that at these levels in municipality do conflicts occur that have adverse effects on social accountability and municipal service delivery (Cameroon, 2003:69). Southall (2007:14) states that the municipal manager is the head of the municipal administration and he plays an oversight on municipal service delivery and is mandated to ensure public officials under his/her command respond to service delivery demands and the needs of local communities as well as keeping a good working relationship with councillors. Nealer (2007:180) maintains further that, straining the interface between municipal manager and mayoral office due to partisan conflicts derail service delivery in municipalities. Cameron (2010:28) asserts that local government in South Africa after 1994 faced a myriad of challenges to enhance service delivery to its citizens due to the inequitable allocation of resources emanating from the politics and administration disputes in local municipalities. The confusion on who should drive service delivery remains a challenge in local government as political office bearers often clash with administrators. Political office bearers often fight for high municipal posts and political appointment to loyal members dominate the selection of politicians to a municipal platform (Nengwekhulu, 2009:344).

The existing interface between political office bearers and officials in South African local government has devastating consequences on the level of service delivery and social accountability. Municipalities as Mafunisa (2012:556) observes are having challenges of undue influence of political whereby the mayor can interfere in the supply chain management decision making processes at the same the municipal managers are supposed to have his input. Such confusion creates a situation of who is accountable to who/ and who should drive service delivery between mayoral office and municipal manager (Maserumule, 2007:147; Tahmasebi and Musavi, 2011). These clashes are rampant in South African municipalities leading to corruption and poor service delivery. A study by Luyenge (2011) examines the relationship between chief officials and political office bearers in the housing programmes in King Sabata Dalindyebo local municipality. Results show clashes in the policy-making decisions that govern the municipality. Ndudula (2013) in his study of politics- administration interface in Mnquma Local Municipality discovered that politicians and administrators have various conflicts that derailed effective service delivery in the municipality. These studies have been chosen to assess the extent of social accountability which was seen to be compromised by the sour relationship between the two offices of the mayor and municipal managers have. Thornhill (2005:117) argues that politicians in many contexts do not account for their actions despite the availability of legal frameworks whereas administrators who are mandated to drive the business or demand side struggle to exercise social accountability due to high-level bureaucratic corruption among other factors. Mayors in municipalities often interfere with supply chain management decision making process which causes clashes with municipal managers' roles (Mafunisa, 2012:556). Such conflicts exacerbate poor service delivery as municipalities fail to exercise social accountability to communities they serve.

5.3.3 Cadre deployment

It is in the interest of many democracies to defend their sovereignty by establishing diplomatic or loyal policies or individuals within both the private and public sector. In Africa and other global government deploying dependable "comrades' or members to influential positions is a common thread and other developing states to guard against sabotage (Hartley, 2012). Prior to the attainment of democratic in 1994, the ANC controlled government introduced the cadre deployment policy which was based on

political appointment to key positions in government institutions and other diplomatic missions. The cadre deployment policy though persuasive in theory create gross incompetence and harm the accountability of state department to stakeholders they serve. Mkongi (2013) declares that cadre deployment involves the appointment of the politically connected public servants in municipalities and the public service challenges the promotion of quality public services. Prior to the implementation of this policy, the quality of service provision declined in many South African municipalities. Mamogale (2013:3) argues that this form of political patronage via state jobs is global phenomenon dispensed by governing political party or parties but this phenomenon in Africa lead to poor institutional quality or performance of the state.

Trade unions such as Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South Africa Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) were hijacked and used as pawns and implementing agents for the ANC cadre deployment policy (Letseka, et al. 2012). The extent at which the cadre deployment policy was implemented in local government caused many service delivery challenges as the performance of municipalities declined due to lack of professionalism as appointed cadres lack either experience nor qualifications occupy key positions. Ndevu & Muller (2017:13) described the South African public service as a crisis while Bloch (2009) describes it as "in tatters". Twala (2014) and Etheridge (2013) however defended the cadre deployment policy as a transformation agenda of the ruling ANC government which was a hard task to bring about change at the three levels of government and enhance community development. Social accountability in local government in South Africa is under siege following the cadre deployment policy as these officials often do not account to anyone which has negative effects on municipal service delivery.

5.3.4 Corruption

In South Africa, government corruption has been escalated to higher levels with the popular term state capture taking the center stage. Top leadership has been subjected to the media rhetoric on state capture which presents higher levels of bureaucratic corruption which hinder social accountability. Du Plessis and Breedt (2013:2) affirm that corruption in South Africa has grown dramatically and manoeuvred its way into the three spheres of government leading to increased government expenditure and erosion of the moral fabric of local communities. In many cases, the lack of

transparency and accountability on the state-side cause citizen to mistrust the government actors who deliver services. Pillay (2004:589) and Ristey (2010:348) argue that corruption has flourished due to institutional weaknesses or poor design of state departments. Corruption in many municipalities in South Africa is being normalized despite the fact that, it is derailing socio-economic development. Citizen resources are being plundered as the social accountability mechanisms on the supply side of the state are either ignored or manipulated to suit elite or individual needs. Mahlaba and Munzhedzi (2013:284) criticise the wasteful expenditure of taxpayer's money every year in the hands of government institutions. Studies conducted by McNeil and Malena (2010:197) and O'Meally (2013:8-12) revealed that social accountability mechanisms are being affected by lack of transparency, accountability and poor leadership which discourages citizen groups, oversight groups, public or ward committees to participate and holds the state accountable. To regain credibility and legitimacy government institutions need to conduct research and identify key areas of weakness that discourage accountability and engage relevant stakeholders through networking and capacity building exercise on the way forward to enhance social accountability for effective service delivery in communities (World Bank, 2011). Awareness, on public policy-making initiatives, can be raised to enlighten citizens on the mechanisms or routes they may take to obtain useful information concerning service delivery (Malena, Forester and Singh, 2004:13).

5.3.5 Poverty and Unemployment

Local governments across developing countries including South Africa have been affected by poor social accountability and service delivery challenges that hinder them from achieving sustainable and poverty-free economies. In the World Bank Report (WDR) (2004) it was revealed that the global state of basic service provision in states has declined to constrain the poor in communities to attain an average living standard. Batanon (2015) asserts that some countries have undertaken measures to mitigate poverty and promote human development, still inadequate resources act as a barrier. Levy and Walton (2013:5-6) lament the limited access to resources, inequitable distribution of wealth, poor infrastructure and corruption as barriers to social accountability and improved service delivery. In South Africa, the legacy of the apartheid as some would like to say, left irreparable damage on many black communities that still have inadequate resources. Franks (2014:1-5) contends that the

former apartheid regime led to a fragmented and disjointed local government associated with corruption that inhibits state actors to account. Nengwekhulu (2009:344) concurs that wealth reallocation was a contest for the post-1994 Mandela government as corruption, incompetence, poverty and inequalities hinder the transition process into forming a democratic local government. Social accountability thereof in South African municipalities is being inhibited by corruption and fraud which have caused citizen mistrust of state institutions (Moloi, 2012:2). State failure to account for services delivered has devastating consequences on the poor people who would lack the basic services let alone the voice to hold the state accountable (Wild and Forestri, 2013:2). Moreover, the failure of state institutions to account for citizens hinder service delivery as communities suffer without any fruitful response nor action form her service providers (Joshi, 2010).

5.3.6 Lack of political leadership

The promulgation of representative public service in South Africa led to several citizens being recruited to administrative positions although many possessed little skills to drive change and service accountability in their work. In an attempt to execute social accountability mechanisms, municipal officials in South Africa often lack the political will and good leadership that can initiate the service delivery transformation agenda. McNeil and Malena (2010:201) acknowledge the fear of change associated with service providers in supporting social accountability mechanism. Although civil society organisations actively engage government demanding social accountability, they encounter stiff resistance and unwillingness from influential state institutions to spearhead social accountability campaigns. Batanon (2015:23) argues that despite lack of political will, citizen groups can orchestrate and invest their time and resources towards influencing government to account for their actions. These assertions are showing a gap in terms of state unwillingness to cooperate in social accountability mechanisms. This hinders the effective delivery of services in communities as service providers lie at the core of social accountability. Levy and Walton (2013) provide an example of Kenyan National Taxpayers Association (NTA) where senior politicians felt threatened in the attempt to support citizen monitoring in the Constituency Fund whereas other politicians perceive the need to gain political mileage through exhibiting good management of these funds and were prepared to participate. A broader analysis of these arguments can make one draw conclusion that good political leadership can

correspond to improvement in social accountability and service delivery (McNeil and Malena, 2010).

5.3.7 Limited Citizen Participation in Policy Making

Batanon (2015:23) and Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2011:8) argued that mobilising grassroots citizens to participate in social accountability mechanisms such as policy-making and participatory budgeting or citizen scorecard is not an easy task. Citizen mobilization and participation are based on the level of incentives the programme or action can bring. In South Africa, public participation in policy-making is being affected by the politics-administration interface which is the roots of conflicts and challenges on the way to channel service delivery. The politics administrative interface as De Visser (2010:94) observes has become the 'Achilles heel' in most municipalities. The phrase is premised on the view that, conflicts have become rife in local government which degenerates into improper planning, poor understanding, and interpretation of legislation and interference in the separation of powers doctrine between political office bearers and administrators. The challenges do affect policy making as citizens are often found in the middle of the political infighting of which side to support in policy making although, the political office often override administration and victorious due to political influence. Public policy making is further affected by the institutionalization of politics in the administration and political structures in municipalities are municipalities are used as pawns in the race for political party dominance in the affairs of a municipality, as a result policies that govern municipal service delivery are not properly formulated as accountability structures are either manipulated or are failing to adhere to legislation (Ndudula, 2013:30). Whereas another social accountability mechanism such as Integrated Development Plans may give citizens the voice to influence the priority services they need, limited participation is an obstacle.

Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2011:8) argue that this can be a result of poor information dissemination to citizens on the need and perceived benefit of participation in the mechanism that holds the state accountable (Furthermore, media campaigns, networking can be used to foster citizen participation is social accountability mechanisms that affect their well-being (Bailey and Harris, 2014). Incentives may be used however given the level of underfunding or dilapidated state of municipal finances this can be a challenge, especially in a South African local government

context. Citizens, on the other hand, need to harness their potential and willingness to engage in social accountability mechanisms which is the most important strategy of improving service delivery by holding service providers to account for their actions.

5.3.8   Lack of compliance with legislation

Complying with legislation is a challenge for local government in South Africa. Empirical evidence has indicated that municipalities in South Africa are often given negative audit reports by the Auditor General annually due to failure to comply with the legislation or code of conduct governing their work (Kanyane, 2013). One may pose a question as to why do public officials fail to adhere to legislation in terms of social accountability. Previous literature in South Africa (Mafunisa, 2003; Meiring, 2001:48; Paradza, Mokwena and Richards, 2010:43 & Thornhill, 2008:34) pointed to a failure by public officials to understand legislation with regards to social accountability. Some do not want to account for their actions due to fear of being exposed hence they hide behind the bureaucratic lens. However, the growing popularity of the municipal manager' s office to challenge the political office bearers to exercise social accountability is on significance over municipal service delivery (Haque, 2000:607). Service delivery presently in local government is being hindered by a series of political appointment that does not comply with legislation nor account on actions taken, in most cases the manipulation of recruitment systems is associated with cadre deployment from the political office hence administrator are often caught unaware on how the dispute can be mitigated (Nealer, 2007:180). It has become common that, the politicization of municipal services compromise social accountability and development in local communities.

Nengwekhulu (2009:344) remarks that "In politics, people want to employ in higher municipal posts individuals they consider supportive of the political and ideological direction of the government". This form of political manipulation is the cause of poor compliance with legislation in local government as service delivery is hijacked by superpowers that seek to drive political agendas. The current state of local government in South Africa is marred by challenges ranging from corruption, lack of compliance with legislation and financial mismanagement. These woes emanate from politicization which Peters and Pierre (2004:2) define as "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and

disciplining of members of the service". Cameron (2010) affirms that politicisation in local government has done irreparable damage as it affected governance structures in the administration politics interface. Given these flaws, Nealer (2007:176) endorses that there is need to revisit the politics-administration interface as service delivery and social accountability cannot flourish under heavy bureaucratic politicisation and corruption. Therefore, it can be argued that social accountability thrives well under democratic systems of governance that allow citizen engagement in a transparent environment where every municipal conduct is availed for public scrutiny.

5.4 EXTERNAL BARRIERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

5.4.1 Global economic recessions

The recent economic downgrades by rating agencies (S&P Global Ratings) to junk status in South Africa have an impact on social accountability as the government was caught unaware in the process failing to account to citizens as to what brought that situation. Different conflicting views were proposed against political leadership as the main cause for the country being dragged into the economic blizzard or recession. Previous economic global recessions which date from 2008 and presently in South Africa occurred and the country seems to be struggling to come out of the economic mud as the rand is getting weak against major currencies. Bakrania and Lucas (2009) argue that Africa's weak global linkages may spare the continent of the global crisis that affects many developed and emerging market economies. IMF (2009) indicates that the continent a whole experiences a downturn and growth estimates were persistently lowered from 5 percent in 2008 to 1.7 percent in April 2009. This was attributed to the recession-induced a slowdown in foreign financial flows of all types into Sub-Saharan Africa African and the region's dependency on commodity-based export growth. Whereas there is a need for sound economic decisions to improve the economy of the country, bad political decisions are being made which have harmful effects on ordinary citizens.

In South Africa, literature has revealed that the political effects of economic recessions are unpredictable. They may be influenced by elections although, the ANC government managed to stabilise the economy in the process of maintaining its hegemony. However, other critics labeled elections a blank cheque that cannot

rejuvenate the economy of the country from recession nor increase social accountability of state to citizens. Mchunu (2012:125) argues that South Africa ranges the highest in terms of citizen protests due to the incompetence, corruption and, maladministration of public institutions. Citizens in South Africa protest against government bureaucracies that have breed corruption and poor service delivery in communities. Khale and Worku (2013:61) conducted a study in municipalities in North West province revealed that the economic hub Gauteng province has been marred by endemic corruption which results from lack of accountability, weak financial governance, corruption and fraud and deteriorating service delivery. Other schools of thought (Devajaran, Khemani & Walton, 2014:29; World Bank, 2011) suggest that social accountability in South African municipalities has been eroded by political patronage which is associated with heavy bureaucratic structures. These structures have no desire no conscience to account to citizens which is a step backward towards achieving social accountability.

5.4.2 Foreign immigration and Overpopulation

South Africa, the 'Rainbow nation' as many would like to call has been home to millions of foreign immigrants from all over Africa and other continents as well. The huge influx of economic migrations can be argued to be adding impact to the skills pool at the same creating many problems in the host country such as human trafficking, prostitution, criminal activities and largely undocumented migrants. Whereas, migration on its own isn't a crime it has caused many service delivery issues and governance problem in the major cities of Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the City of Tshwane, foreign immigrants have led to the establishment of many squatter camps or informal settlements in communities such as Attredgiville, Mamelodi, Mabopane, and Hamanskraal just mention a few.

Tshwane Vision 2055 asserts that, besides being the smallest province in South Africa, Gauteng in the City of Tshwane lies is the most densely populated province. As the hub of main economic activity, the city is being strained on its resources to provide for the ever-growing population. The rural to urban migration is another hindrance for the municipality to effectively account to citizens for the public expenditure. The shortage of economic opportunities saw the rise in criminal activities especially in informal settlements that are mushrooming in areas such as Winder veldt

and *Mabopane* –locations under the City of Tshwane. The huge influx of economic migrants and local in Gauteng province as a whole is causing administrative issues that impact negatively as the municipality is not aware of other shanty or informal settlement that does not have access to basic services hence social accountability becomes a challenge.

5.4.3 Unpreparedness to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Social accountability in the 21st century seems to be determined by the proliferation of modern technological devices that creates efficiency at the same time complex challenges for organisations and the public in general (World Economic Forum, 2016). The encroachment of the technological wave of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may exert immense pressure on developing states like South Africa to adapt and adjust their technological capacity to keep ahead with modern development (Schwab, 2016; Paunova, 2016). Whereas the technological gap is still evident in public organisations, social accountability can presently be spearheaded using mobile technology. However, due to limited skills capacity, many officials tend to maintain status which makes modern technology less lucrative although chances are high that exercising social accountability through technology can be less expensive yet so complicated given the low levels of education among the citizens (Jessop, 2016; Kobyakov, 2016). In other African countries, including South Africa for instance, social accountability is still being exercised using the traditional mechanism such as public forums and *imbizo's* that sometimes do not bring the much-needed momentum to hold officials accountable. This study argues, embracing technology proliferated by Fourth Industrial Revolution may increase social accountability not only in the City of Tshwane but in Africa as a whole. The socio-economic inequalities still grappling the country explains the reasons behind the technological gap.

5.4.4 Fostering *Batho-Pele* Principles for Social Accountability in South Africa

In South Africa, social accountability does not exist in a vacuum but it is implemented alongside *Batho-Pele* principles, which are embedded in good ethical standards for public officials when serving the public (World Bank, 2011). The significance of *Batho-Pele* Principles lies in the short-route to accountability in service delivery. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in its Country Report for South Africa pointed out

Batho Pele principles are "best practice". Nevertheless, APRM (2007:104) confesses that the innovative initiative (Batho Pele) is unfortunately misunderstood hence it has failed to mitigate service delivery issues in local municipalities.

PSC (2008:53) warns of the impending danger of not using Batho Pele when exercising social accountability.

PSC (2008) cautions that,

"It should come as no surprise that public participation was enshrined in the Constitution as one of the values and principles of public administration. Equally important also is the fact that given its history, ours is a citizenry that not only values but also expects public participation. Practically, this means that if state institutions do not institutionalize and adequately promote public participation, citizens are likely to find other ways to express themselves and attract attention, even if this involves using less constructive mechanisms".

The desire to participate in service delivery decisions force citizens to actively engage municipalities in protest actions which often turn ugly as police intervened to restore order. As part of social accountability, public participation is fundamental to government often do not provide adequate information to the public on the state of affairs (PSC, 2008:53).   The World Bank (2011) affirms further that, in South Africa, the short route to accountability is largely underdeveloped. This was evidenced in the Citizen Satisfaction Survey conducted by PSC (2007) on service delivery by Department of Land Affairs, Agriculture, Water, and Forestry. Findings from the survey indicate that consultation rate was minimal when officials meet with clients. This is in contrary to *Batho Pele* principles that advocate for proper consultation when citizens are demanding services form the municipality.

Improving the short route to accountability in South Africa is a growing challenge which is being faced by various governments globally. Information provision to citizens or accepting consultation has proved to be difficult for many public organisations which dismiss the citizen capacity to hold officials accountable for service delivery. PSC (2008:13) maintains further that, redress and consultation which form part of Batho Pele principles and support citizen voice and action have not been equally addressed in South Africa. This is due to weaknesses in senior

management and incompetence and limited public participation in implementing the principles to improve social accountability. It is imperative to highlight the success of Batho Pele principles in social accountability depends on effective citizen participation in demanding accountability from officials (PSC, 2008).

5.4.5   Results-Based Management

The declining service delivery standards in South African municipalities made the government implement the Results Based Management (RBM) which is embedded in the New Public Management discourse which was meant to ensure efficiency and effective public service capable of delivering services to the citizen (Booysens, 2011). In an effort to increase state accountability in service delivery the South African government implemented several reforms strategy that includes inter alia Rapid Results Approach (RRA), Transformative Leadership, Values and Ethics, Contracting, and Institutional Capacity Building (Turok, 2011). It should be highlighted that many of these reforms were implemented following public discontentment with the quality of service delivery in local communities hence these reform increase citizen participation in policy making a step closer to accelerating service delivery (IRR, 2012). Other reform strategies such as economic recovery strategies (ERS) refines the public service and improves the planning, budgeting, and performance e management of local municipalities (Mahlangu, 2013). In its attempt to improve service delivery, the South African government implemented the First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012) aligned with NDP (2012-2030). It should be noted that these reforms were implemented in the previous years were an attempt to improve service delivery and become accountable to the citizen in service delivery. Nonetheless, just like any other government programmes, social accountability of state institutions is hindered by unwillingness, corruption, misunderstanding on roles and duties on how local government can become responsive to the demands and needs of citizens. In many scenarios in South Africa, this led to service delivery protesters where citizen demand services and state accountability.

5.4.6   Lessons learned

In many developing states including South Africa, social accountability is failing because of limited research and evaluation culture on the supply side of state

government tends to deliver basic services without carefully considering the diverse or priority needs of communities which often lead to service delivery protests as citizens demand own priority service. The provision of pre-conceived services leads to poor social accountability by state officials to the citizens (Jaaskelainen, Laihonen, Lonnqvist, Palvalin, Sillanpaa, Pekkoka & Ukko, 2012:45-51). The missing link is, therefore, adequate research which is further constrained by lack of monitoring and evaluation to ensure public officials accountable to the citizen in terms of service delivery which shows the value for money as enshrined in *Batho Pele* doctrine. As literature suggested this may is a reason which emanates from the principal agent debate whereby agents implement preconceived programmes without consulting the citizens'. Social accountability in South Africa is still to be achieved given the complexity of the concept and unpreparedness of many local municipalities to conduct scientific research to assess the needs of communities (Akinboade, Mokwena & Kinfack, 2013:458). A study by Hickey and King (2016:1225) discovered that social accountability is shaped by power and politics. This has been shown in many social intervention programmes where the evidence base is relatively weak. In Malaysia studies (Amir, Ahmad & Mohamad, 2010:734) revealed that municipal bylaws need to be enforced and monitored consistently to realize their effectiveness. In South African municipalities, social accountability has been adequately legalized which leads to controversies, misalignments, misunderstandings surrounding the concept and how it can be used to influence service delivery (PSC, 2011:55; Engela and Ajam, 2010:20). De Lange (2011:34) warns that M&E as a tool to enhance social accountability in local municipalities is being constrained by the rampant corruption and mismanagement of funds which negatively affect service delivery.

Menocal and Sharma (2008:5) advise that the more institutionalized political analysis is needed to understand context and design mechanism for social accountability as donor agencies sometimes lack the research and evaluation capacity to drive best practices to enable social accountability. Since political environment differs across regions, Devarajan et al. (2011:32) warn that there is a need to draw a causal link between external support and internal functional of governments which is fundamental for understanding which social accountability mechanism to implement. Nevertheless, a radical shift in the implementation procedures for social accountability mechanisms

needs to monitor and evaluated as a way of understanding the depth and context of the politics.

A learning approach as McGee and Gaventa (2011:3) is therefore needed to assess the power and politics that underpin the central monitoring systems for social accountability. Often politics are contextual factors hinder social accountability hence the success and sustainability rely on the manner in which citizen groups understand the process and legal provisions. Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2011:12) endorse that, despite the enabling legal frameworks, the civic society has the potential to hold government accountable although public participation is often the challenge. Levy (2014) suggests the need to differentiate political power and institutional capacity as these can work for or against the success of social accountability mechanisms. This study argues that social accountability can be successful in even there is a political will among officials to account to citizens. Whereas it is a legal mandate for the municipality to do so, what is missing is the monitoring and evaluation strategies to follow up on whether the state does account or not. This makes social accountability mechanisms conditional tools which are either weak or irresponsive. The following sections discuss the objectives and research methods for this chapter.

5.5 RESEARCH METHODS

5.5.1 Data collection

This chapter employs a triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques to gather data. This study, the sample was chosen from the entire City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality that constitutes 2 921 488 people (Stats SA, 2016). Using a Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, the possible representative population for administering questionnaires was 270 respondents. The target population consisted of 270 respondents' that were selected through systematic and purposive sampling techniques. For the purposes of this study, the sample was made up of 270 people who were divided into 250 respondents and 20 participants. Respondents from selected communities in the City of Tshwane were chosen systematically to respond to the questionnaire survey. These were starting from the ages of 18 to 60 years of age. The purposive sampling technique was used to identify respondents from the selected 5 departments (Water &Sanitation, Energy & Electricity, Research and Innovation, Governance & Politics, IDP & Economic Intelligence) within the City of

Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Such a judgmental sampling was based on the knowledge these key informants have in terms of social accountability and service delivery in the municipality.

5.5.2 Data analysis

The data analysis procedures for quantitative were conducted using and the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) computer software provided by the North West University. Descriptive statistics was used to explain the basic characteristics of the data in the research (Gerber-Nel et al. 2005:2004). Frequency distribution, standard deviation and mean, median and mode scores were some of the descriptive statistics used in this chapter. Qualitative data from interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded and presented in themes following study objectives.

5.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section discusses the results interprets and analyze the quantitative and qualitative data collected from both citizen and municipal officials in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Various themes were derived from the research objectives to guide the discussion on data.

5.6.1 Public official's response to the grievances of the people in service delivery

The response of public officials to Social accountability demands depend on the political will power of public officials, participation of citizen and civil society organisations to become successful (Batanon, 2015:22-23). Public protests for basic service delivery have been a persistent obstacle in South African municipalities (Franks, 2014). The city of Tshwane has been experiencing series of service delivery protests due to poor communication and feedback strategies between citizens and the municipality. The graph below presents the responsiveness of municipalities to the social accountable grievances of the citizens.

Figure 25: Municipal response to citizen demands

From the above graph, the respondents were asked on whether officials do listen to their grievances or address service delivery queries in their communities or not. 31.2% of the respondents who participated in the study strongly agree that municipal officials do not listen to their grievances on the need to improve social accountability. 7.6 % of the respondents who participated in the survey strongly disagreed that public officials do not listen to their grievances on social accountability. About 21.2 % of the respondents who participated in the survey remained neutral on whether public officials do not respond to service delivery demands or not. Comparing these percentages it shows that, a significant number of respondents are not satisfied with the manner the municipality responds to their grievances which may imply that, feedback on what transpired at either *imbizo's* or public forums takes long.

Findings from key informant interviews revealed that in an attempt to implement social accountability in various communities, the City of Tshwane encountered many obstacles that compromise the effective delivery of services. In some situations, residents took to the streets protesting for delays or unavailability of services. In communities such as Hamanskraal and Mamelodi and some parts of Pretoria urban, violent community protests become rampant as citizens accused the municipality of corruption and failure to exercise transparency and accountability. One official interviewed responded:

Public demonstrations sometimes do not have anything to do with service delivery. For example, in Temba, the issues of poor housing as people reside in dilapidated buildings causes service delivery protests. To mitigate challenges emanating from communities on service delivery, from an innovation perspective, we partner with the Centre for Science, Innovation, and Research (CSIR), industries and research institutes to solve a common problem and foster innovative means to deliver services.

Another official added:

When we run our campaigns where we address issues such as cable theft. These challenges do not reflect our negligence but a human error on the side of citizens. Since we are at the core of service delivery people tend to blame us although some of those challenges are beyond our capacity. Some citizens cause a stir for political mileage which is a challenge we may not be able to solve. Community-based forums are often conducted where people engage the municipality on some service delivery concerns.

Drawing insight from the assertions social accountability in the municipality was not effectively exercised as communities took a violent route to force officials to account for their actions in service delivery. Such a scary scenario due to bad communication between the municipality and communities ignite some criminal events as some citizen's protest for services at the same time shoplifting shops and other businesses belonging to foreign immigrants. The arguments paint a picture that, delays or failure by communities to inform citizens on the current state of service delivery create a situation of discontent and misinterpretations on the demand side of citizens. Findings revealed further that public demonstrations in some cases do not have anything to do with social accountability as some unscrupulous citizens seize the opportunity to engage in some criminal acts under the guise of poor service delivery. So, the municipal officials could not entirely take the blame for not providing feedback to citizens as resources are not always at their disposal and the communication channels are often distorted either due to incompetence or lack of good will among elected community representatives.

5.6.2 Communities accessibility to resources (financial & human, expertise) to implement social accountability mechanisms

Studies (Hickey and King 2016; Theopista, Steen, Rutgers, 2015) conducted in Uganda, India and Brazil have a common thread which indicates that social accountability mechanism needs adequate resources for them to become successful. In South Africa, the demand for social accountability by communities is limited by lack of resources to bring the officials to account for actions taken in service delivery (Nengwekhulu, 2009; Khale and Worku, 2013). The bar graph below presented the opinions of citizens on the availability of resources to conducted social accountability.

Figure 26: Community access to resources

The bar graph shows that 25.2 % of the respondents who participated in the survey agree that communities do not have enough human and financial resources to conduct social accountability. Whereas 19.6% of those respondents strongly disagree that communities lack resources to initiate social accountability programmes which are crucial for holding officials accountable. The graph indicates further than 20.8 % of the respondents remained neutral on whether communities do not have adequate human and financial resources to conduct social accountability.

Findings from key informant interviews revealed that in most cases citizens are not aware of the availability of innovative opportunities which they may tap into to increase social accountability as a result public officials are blamed for lack of transparency and

accountability. These findings corroborate a study by Bell and Bland (2014) which reveal that in contexts where citizen are eager to engage public officials limited resources is the hindrance hence social accountability mechanisms. The participants pointed out that, there is a need to increase awareness in communities served by the metro as this can help citizens understands how local government works and where to report in case they are disgruntled about a certain service. The findings revealed further that, although the lack of resources seems to be a challenge among citizens, other disturbing situations was observed as citizens continue to litter their surroundings blaming the city for poor service delivery. To enhance service delivery one municipal official noted that:

> *Incentivizing is another way the municipality can do to improve the delivery of services. It motivates people to work or contribute positively to local development knowing that there are incentives. However, this view attracts criticism as critics' question why people should be paid to keep their environment clean.*

The above assertion reveals a distinction angle where public officials can incentivize the citizens to improve social accountability and service delivery in the community. The findings revealed further incentivizing can be conducted on the part of office bearers just say thank you for a job well done. In some cases, as literature has alluded in Chapter 3, exercising social accountability depends on the willpower of official so without incentives there can be no motivation to pre-services in communities being served

5.6.3 Level of Citizen Participation in social accountability programmes

The literature (Anuradha and Houzager, 2012:2; Levy, 2010; Houtzager, Gurza & Acharya, 2010) reviewed in the global and local context shows that the success of social accountability mechanism depends on citizen participation to effectively hold public officials accountable Borrowing insight from the stewardship theory, the municipality as an honest steward need to raise awareness of the benefits of participating in social accountability. However, due to the principal-agent debacle, as highlighted in Chapter 2, municipalities in South Africa as implementing agents often follow selfish interests that disregard the objectives of the government or citizens who

can be the principals. The pie chart below shows the level of citizen participation in social accountability mechanism in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Figure 27: Level of Citizen Participation in Social Accountability

The chart indicates that 34.4% of the respondents who participated in the survey disagreed that they are ignorant of and do not want to participate in social accountability mechanisms. Although these respondents disagreed on citizen participation 24.8% of the respondents strongly agree that in communities' citizens are willing to engage public officials in social accountability mechanisms. 22.4% of the respondents remained neutral in their opinion on whether citizens do participate in social accountability mechanisms or not. Findings from key informants revealed that in an attempt to implement social accountability in various communities, the City of Tshwane encountered many obstacles that compromise the effective delivery of services. In some situations, residents took to the streets protesting for delays or unavailability of services. In communities such as Hamanskraal and Mamelodi and some parts of Pretoria urban, violent community protests become rampant as citizens accused the municipality of corruption and failure to exercise transparency and accountability. One official responded:

> *When we call people to attend meetings on service delivery, the turnout*
> *is relatively low as many people they choose to complain form their*
> *homes. Prior to conduct public meetings, we disseminate information*

through posters, community radios and municipal website and social network pages. However, public participation in public forums remains low which is a challenge to use as we are not aware of which service to render in which community and at what particular time.

Drawing insight from the assertions social accountability in the municipality was not effectively exercised as communities took a violent route to force officials to account for their actions in service delivery. Such a scary scenario due to bad communication between municipality and communities ignite some criminal events as some citizen's protest for services at the same time shoplifting shops and other businesses belonging to foreign immigrants. Grandvionnet, Aslam & Raha (2015) argue that delays or failure by communities to inform citizens on the current state of service delivery create a situation of discontent and misinterpretations on the demand side of citizens. Wetterberg, Hertz and Brinkenhoff (2015) contend that citizen participation in social accountability is fundamental to influence service delivery and avoid unnecessary mass actions. Based on these assertion analyses of findings it can argued that public demonstrations in some cases do not have anything to do with social accountability as some unscrupulous citizens seize the opportunity to engage in some criminal acts under the guise of poor service delivery.

5.6.4 Citizen's access to information on social accountability mechanisms

Scholars of social accountability (O'Meally, 2013; Menocal, Roca & Sharma; Malena & McNeil, 2010; McGee & Gaventa, 2010) believe for social accountability to be successful municipalities need to be cautious to respond to the demands of citizens. The relationship between a municipality and communities served should be maintained in such a manner that citizen queries or grievances need to be responded to (Tembo, 2012). The implementation of social accountability mechanisms in the City of Tshwane Metro is hinged on the viability of communication channels between citizens and communities. The graph below presents the various opinions of citizens on the level of municipal response to social accountability demands.

Figure 28: Municipal dissemination of information to citizens

This bar graph shows that 31.6% of the respondents who participated in the survey agree that, the municipality does not properly disseminate information to citizens on social accountability. This explains low citizen participation in public forums and other IDP forums. About 14.8% of the respondents disagreed that, the municipality properly communicate with communities' concerning social accountability. They do not believe the communication channels are ineffective. Findings revealed further than 5.6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that ineffective communication channels are the reason why social accountability is not a success in communities governed by the City of Tshwane. 18.4% decided to remain neutral which may imply that, these citizens are either aware of the strategies used by the municipality to respond to service delivery demands or not.

Findings from key informant interviews revealed that in most cases citizens are not aware of the availability of innovative opportunities which they may tap into to increase social accountability as a result public officials are blamed for lack of transparency and accountability. The participants pointed out that, there is a need to increase awareness in communities served by the metro as this can help citizens to understand how local government functions, where and how to report in case they are disgruntled about a certain service. The findings indicated further that when demanding social accountability from the municipality, citizens often took a wrong way by littering the streets emptying dustbins and burning tyres although the aim of the municipality is to deliver quality services. Participants revealed that this may result from lack of

incentivizing is another thing lacking when rendering services. It motivates people to work or contribute positively to local development knowing that there are incentives. However, this view attracts criticism as critics' question of why people should be paid to keep their environment clean. Nonetheless, the City of Tshwane embarked on a campaign which was meant to increase social accountability through interacting with citizens on environmental protection issues.

The municipal official states:

> *Using Batho-Pele Principles we have platforms called City of Tshwane awards where people are rewarded for a job well done. Recently the Mayor moved service delivery awards away from his office to another office which is efficient in delivering services.*

Findings from key informant interviews reflected further that, incentives does not mean money but just appreciation for a job well done this motivate even public officials to increase social accountability. Participants argue that incentivizing the citizens can be another well of exercising social accountability although different opinions may disregard this view. These findings corroborate a study conducted by Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2011:8) which revealed that performance-based reward systems are fundamental for enhancing performance standards and adhering to the code of conduct in the public sector. The findings revealed further that, the use of social networks was another issue raised by the participant which may be fundamental in exercising social accountability to the citizens. However, due to factors such as low levels of education, poverty, and inequalities some citizens are not able to purchase modern cell phones that have access to a social site such as Facebook, Twitter. Very few people use Twitter in the City of Tshwane for example which is a challenge to the municipality to account for the services rendered in such a platform. Based on this argument awareness on the use of information communication technology (ICT) and digital innovations need to be increased in the municipality to realize effective social accountability in service delivery matters.

5.6.5   Public policy-making structures and social accountability

Holmes (2011:4) states that citizen has increasingly participated in their own government which is a step towards improving service delivery. Citizens are involved

in policy making as a way of empowering themselves with a voice to influence service delivery (Molepo, 2013). In South Africa, public policy-making could have been the core of service delivery in case citizens are willing to participate to give their views on the type and nature of which policies to formulate to guide development in communities. Below are the opinions which citizens in the City of Tshwane could have concerning policy making as a social accountability mechanism to hold the municipality accountable for service delivery.

Figure 29: Viability of public policy-making structures in social accountability

The bar graph shows that citizen's participation in social accountability depends on the availability of policy frameworks that guide the programmes. The Constitution of South Africa and the municipal Integrated Development Plan provides an enabling framework for citizen participation although some analysts disagree. 12.8% of the respondents who participated in the survey strongly agree that policy-making structures are important for promoting citizen participation towards improving service delivery. The graph indicates that 35.6% of the respondents agree that public policy making can be utilized as a suitable platform for demanding social accountability from public officials. 26.8% were neutral on whether public policy making is influential towards bringing officials to account or their actions in service delivery whereas 14.4 disagreed that public policy making has any effect on social accountability. Lastly, 10.4 strongly disagreed that public policy making is fundamental for citizens when demanding social, accountability.

Findings from key informant interviews reflected that citizens are reluctant to participate in public policy making structures citing reasons of no benefits whatsoever in the affairs of the municipality. One key informant holds that:

> *Implementing social accountability mechanisms in communities is a challenge because citizens do not attend nor participate in social forums where we discuss service delivery matters. Many citizens seem ignorant or maybe they do not see the benefits of tracking municipal expenditure to see if their funds are being used properly. As a result of providing information to citizens through ward councillors is being done but still, attendance is low.*

These findings show that public participation in policy making is a huge challenge that rests on the perceived benefits they will receive. Findings have shown further that communities in the City of Tshwane do not actively participate in public policy-making as a social accountability mechanism, and can affect the level of service delivery as municipal officials are not aware of the needs communities want to be delivered. These findings are supported by Molepo (2013) who find out that communities in the CoT rarely participate in policy making which is a barrier to social accountability and community service delivery. These findings are further corroborated by a study conducted by the Human Research Scientific Committee (HSRC), in (2012) which revealed that of the focus groups conducted in the City of Tshwane public participation was 17% which is relatively low considering the population.

5.6.6 Stakeholder intervention (NGOs, Pressure Groups, Human Rights Groups, and CBOs) in Social Accountability mechanisms

The entrance of civil society organisations mentioned above into mainstream politics of South Africa can have an effect on the accountability of public officials. McNeil and Malena (2010) acknowledge that civil society organisations can influence social accountability by challenging government fear. Nonetheless, Batanon (2015) criticises the lack of political will among CSOs which present them as weak links in influencing social accountability. In South Africa, Studies conducted on public accountability and citizen participation has shown that stakeholder intervention has an impact towards forcing the government to account because they conduct investigative journalism on

government actions hence they can expose corrupt acts of officials (Molepo, 2013; Kanyane, 2013 &Thornhill, 2012). The pie chart below queries the opinion of a citizen on the availability or intervention of civil society organisations in social accountability mechanisms.

Figure 30: Stakeholder intervention in social accountability

The pie chart above shows that 7.6% of the respondents strongly disagree that there is stakeholder intervention in social accountability mechanism whereas 20.8% strongly agree that civil society organisations intervene in social accountability mechanism that is used to hold an official accountable for service delivery. 12.8% of the respondents disagreed that stakeholders intervene in social accountability whereas 24.4% remained neutral on whether stakeholder interventions have an impact not in demanding social accountability from the municipality. Key informant interviews revealed that civil society organisations do help citizen to demand accountability from official especially in services provision related to housing. CSOs raise awareness on the poor conditions citizens are residing in their communities for instance where there is a lack of basic services such as sanitation, water, and health. One key informant lamented that:

People often get angry with the waiting period for RDP housing which results in complaints. Other departments within the municipality that coordinate the government programme is not consistency and in some way, there are signs of favouritism in how the houses are distributed. Many of the poor people reside in shacks which becomes difficult to lead a normal life. Feedback on when new houses are going to be built is often a challenge hence citizen resort to violent strikes to force the municipality to account.

Poor communication and feedback experienced in basic housing delivery is a common challenge which affects social accountability in the CoT. Pieterson and Johnson (2011) in their study revealed that in many government programmers, the lack of reliable and recent information is a challenge which discourages the success of many poverty alleviation programmes. Based on this assertion there is a need for the municipality to improve the provision of communication among citizens through ICT which increases social accountability. A study by Morgeson et al. (2011) revealed that the government adopted ICTs in order to regain public trust through improving communication channels. In the municipality, the adoption of ICTs can be another way of exercising transparency and openness in terms of service delivery as citizens can easily reach or hold government accountable using modern technology.

5.6.7 Corruption and poor governance in social accountability mechanisms

Studies conducted in South African municipalities (Mafunisa, 2013; Public Service Commission, 2013; Thornhill, 2012) concur that corruption is the scourge that has destroyed the capacity of local government to exercise accountability. In South African municipalities corruption has been exposed by Public Protector's and Auditor General Offices. In the City of Tshwane, many corruption cases have been recorded that could have hampered the effective delivery of services. The graph below shows the opinions of citizens on the state of corruption and how it affected service delivery in communities.

Figure 31: Corruption & poor governance and deterrents for Social accountability

The graph shows that 35.6% of the respondents who participated in the survey agreed that corruption is the root cause of misusing resources that target social accountability programmes. This may be the reason why citizens do not want to engage officials in the manner they deliver services. 10.4% of the respondents, however, disagreed that corruption and poor governance discourage social accountability. About 32.4 % of the respondents strongly agree that corruption and poor governance affect the implementation of social accountability programmes and disrupt citizens to engage officials in social accountability mechanism that aim to improve service delivery. Meanwhile, 16.0% of the respondents who participate in the survey remained neutral on whether corruption or bad governance discourage citizen participation in social accountability. These findings provide a departure poi of analysis as they rev4ealed that, a significant number of respondents do believe corruption and poor governance affect the potential of the municipality to exercise social accountability in communities it serves.

Key informant interviews reflected that corruption in local government has escalated to the extent of compromising service delivery. One official lamented:

In our department corruption has been tolerated for a long time and no one is being held accountable. If you try to raise your head to talk about corruption issues you can be either isolated in municipal meetings or fellow officials may plot your downfall. There are very powerful political voices behind corruption for example in the procurement systems government tenders are being manipulated where they are granted to relatives and friends. Nobody is being held accountable as long as you are affiliated with the ruling party.

Another participant added

Talking about corruption raises my emotions as in some cases the national government does what they call money dumping. This is when the excess budget is allocated to local government for use in forms of tenders and these funds are always abused by the powerful forces. Citizens, in this case, have no say in holding officials accountable as their voice is unheard unless in few cases when the internal auditing picks some issues of corruption.

Studies conducted previously (Manyane, 2014; Molepo 2013) on public participation and governance in the City of Tshwane reflected that corruption is rife and is hard to control as it happens on the upper echelons of administration hence evidence is often hidden or manipulated. These findings concur with a study conducted by Du Plessis and Breed (2013) which revealed that corruption in South African municipalities has reached alarming levels and has made the lives of ordinary South Africa much harder as services are not efficiently delivered in communities. Masilone and Dinntwe (2014:181) in their study consented to the findings arguing that corruption has become a complex societal ill the government as to contend with. Given these arguments, it could be deduced from the assertions that citizens are reluctant to participate in social accountability mechanism due to corrupt actions of the municipality which does not adequately provide feedback on how public money is being spent on service delivery

5.6.8 Political environment and social accountability

Wild and Foresti (2013:2) explain that weak capacity of citizens and state as a result of political environment determine the extent of social accountability. Muchadenyika (2014) observe that in undemocratic institutions where politics in very volatile citizens are unwilling to demand social accountability from government departments. Previous literature (Fox, 2014; Gaventa and Barret, 2010) points out that, the type of environment determines the implementation of social accountability mechanisms. This view is advocated for by the NPM principles that require public managers to create an enabling environment for exercising accountability. The pie chart below presents the views of citizens on whether the current political environment in South Africa has any effect on their participation in social accountability.

Figure 32: Political environment & its influence on Social accountability

The pie chart above shows that 25.6% of the respondents who participated in the survey strongly did not believe that the political environment is a barrier to exercising social accountability. This can be accounted to the freedom of speech and association enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa in 1996. 18.8% of the respondents who took part in the survey strongly believe that the political environment indeed influences social accountability. Nonetheless, 26.8% remains neutral on whether politics have a

say in the way municipal officials exercise social accountability in communities. This percentage may represent those citizens that do not have anything or reluctant to participate in any political movement in their communities.

Key informant interviews reflected that political interference when rendering services is another challenge faced by the Department. The political differences can be a challenge as politicians tend to override officials which is a challenge to effectively implement social innovation programme as political influence always a stumbling block. Citizens are, therefore, left weak and indecisive on whether to engage public officials in social accountability or not. Fox (2014) suggests that if citizen groups and civil society groups collaborate they can force the government to account for its action in service delivery. A study by Bratton (2010) revealed that various social characteristics such as age, gender, and social class determine citizen attitudes towards holding officials accountable. Van de Walle & Jilke (2013) assert that ideological disposition, partisan ideology can trigger citizens to participate in social accountability or not as supporting government policies may be affected what benefit or outcome which can come from engaging officials for instance in participatory budgeting. Findings from key informant interviews revealed that citizens have limited capacity to hold officials accountable for service delivery despite the abundance of social accountability mechanisms. The researcher probed further if citizens can effectively hold officials accountable taking into consideration the political factors that always influence or drive service delivery. The municipal official responded:

> *Yes, they can and they have the law on their side. Citizens themselves have the duty to play in society to improve service delivery not relying on government. For instance, when a community went on a rampage to protest for services by burning schools, roads they may hinder social accountability as the officials should sit down and plan again on which service to render first based on priority. So, citizen action sometimes disrupts social accountability and socio-economic development. The government needs to raise awareness of citizens in terms of service delivery. They must not destroy the existing infrastructure but demand services in a responsible manner.*

Tapping from these assertions social accountability in the City of Tshwane is often hindered by political interference that disrupts or distort citizen action during service delivery protests which delay decision making and cause prioritization of services to render first. The destruction of infrastructure by angry citizen proves to be a challenge to the municipality which often does not have enough human and financial resources to restore such broken infrastructure. Also, such violent communities are not conducive for the officials to go and conduct public forums with the citizens and map way forward on which services to provide.

5.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the internal and external factors that may inhibit the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality into becoming an effective service provider in communities it serves. The study deduced that a myriad of factors such as corruption, limited skills, lack of compliance with legislation, manipulation of recruitment systems, cadre deployment among other affect the municipality internally in its attempt to render services and exercise social accountability to communities it serves. The study observes further that, global economic recessions, unpreparedness of the municipality to embrace new technologies proliferated by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, overpopulation and foreign immigration affected the technical capacity of the municipality to deliver quality basic series to its citizen. However, as literature observes, corruption is cancer that has ripped the municipality's capacity to exercise social accountability as the political atmosphere is dominated by power hungry individuals who do not have the moral conscience to account to citizens. Findings of this chapter found out that, municipal officials hardly exercise social accountability although IDP forums can be hailed on the part of the municipalities and *digi imbizos*. Findings reflected that the growth in technology made the municipality to exercise social accountability through social network platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and municipal website.

Successful technological innovations stories have been witnessed in the municipality in form of free Wi-Fi hotspots which is a step towards exercising social accountability and rendering free service delivery to the citizens. However, the use of ICTs to account for citizens has its own limitations as there are time restrictions. The study noted the limited participation in social accountability mechanisms as one key weakness that

discourages or gives officials the leverage to manipulate the accountability mandate. Citizens need wide engagement and enlightening on how social accountability mechanism such as social audits, citizen-based monitoring can be utilized to bring officials to account for their actions in service delivery. The study has revealed further, that enacting service provision in the City of Tshwane is possible given the vast innovative technologies being produced such as free wifi that can be used to lobby or force the municipality to account. The study concluded that social accountability can be further enhanced through public sector innovation where officials can improve on their way and effectively render public goods and services. The following chapter provides a possible model for social accountability and it derived conclusions and possible recommendation for the study based on the findings of the discussed chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

AN INNOVATIVE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL FOR THE CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the cleavages that have been exhibited in the literature (Brinkerhoff, Wetterbeg & Dunn, 2012; Carmago and Jacobs, 2012; Fox, 2014; McNeil and Malena, 2010; World Bank, 2014) reviewed on social accountability mechanisms and analyses of research findings, the implementation of social accountability mechanisms can be improved by proposing an innovative social accountability model that can mitigate the challenges emanating from both the demand and supply side. Grandvoinnet, Aslam and Raha (2015:63) argue that social accountability intervention programmes have a risk of exacerbating tensions rather than mitigating them. This is because state-society relationships in terms of accountability are associated with conflicts as citizens often demand services without necessarily considering the capacity and will power of the service providers. In many democracies, public service delivery has been always the duty of the state, especially, in the local government context which is closest to the people. Brinkerhoff and Watterberg (2013) observe rising criticism from supply side methodologies for failing to effectively design intervention strategies that respond to citizen demand for social accountability in service delivery matters. The demand side approaches as Agarwal and Van Wicklin (2012) observe address the gaps left by the supply side hence citizen voice can influence service delivery at the frontlines. A considerable body of literature (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015; Carmago and Jacobs, 2016; Gaventa and Barrett, 2010; Tembo, 2013; World Bank, 2012 & O'Meally, 2013) examines the significance of citizen engagement in service delivery using social accountability mechanisms.

This chapter observes gaps left in previous literature where citizens are not familiar with much social accountability mechanisms that can be used to hold the state accountable (Campbell, *et al.,* 2010; Hansen & Ravnkilde, 2013). The unwillingness of the state to account for own actions in service delivery matters has been noted as a barrier to social accountability. Public officials still subscribe to the traditional public administration where bureaucracy affects decision making and accountability of officials in service delivery (Mwakagenda, 2011). It is against this background that, the

researcher saw the need to design an innovative social accountability model that can be implemented in the City of Tshwane and other similar contexts to improve on the implementation of social accountability mechanisms that are directed towards effective service delivery. The model if implemented properly can mitigate challenges such as lack of compliance, provision of information and feedback to citizens, lack of transparency and openness. Therefore; this chapter is framed as follows; conceptualisation of the model to give insight into how and why models are implemented in research. The section discusses the distinct rationale for using models and how the proposed model can be used to mitigate social accountability challenges in the study area. The methodological considerations for model development have been highlighted in the third section where the following section illustrates the proposed innovative social accountability model.

6.2   Conceptualising the model

The growth in the use of models in Social Science studies and other international research institutes and institutions of higher learning attracts the attention of the research community who believe that models are ideal for problem-solving (Gilbert & Boulter, 2000; Greca & Moreira, 2000; Fanco, 1999 & Taylor, 2000). As models gather momentum, metaphors analogies are already in existence being used as teaching tools in science education (Duit, 1991; Harrison & Treagust, 1996). Shafique and Mahmood (2010:4) assert that model development is regarded as an effective research method as it enables researchers, investigators and scientists to relate more accurately to reality. A model helps to describe, predict, test and understand a complex system of events. Van der Waldt (2013:4) concurs that models were established through scientific thinking and they intend to solve a problem or particular phenomenon. Models reflect scientific knowledge and understanding of concepts hence they indicate an ideal practice towards addressing problems encountered in any given context. Models, therefore, provide a framework for conducting research and actual objects that can be presented in form of abstract forms, sketches, mathematical formulas, charts and diagrams (Busha and Harter, 1980).

A model in scientific research represents an abstraction or a mental framework for the analysis of a system and simplified representations of real-world phenomena (Powell and Connaway, 2004:60). In this sense, therefore, models are deemed necessary for

knowledge generation, spearheading a common understanding and finding solutions to a problem (Graham, Henrie and Gibbons, 2014:13). Nevertheless, the significance of a model is derived from a theoretical framework although some analysts (Adeyemi, 1975; Haider & Mahmood 2007:407; Van der Waldt 2013:5) cautioned against using the term model as the same with a theory. Although there is a thin line between the two, model building separates the contradiction as it has guidelines and steps on how it should be implemented, unlike a theory which relies on assumptions without an intention to provide alternative strategies for implementation in a specific context.

Leimkuhler (1972:84-86) as cited in Shafique and Mahmood (2010:4) identifies five characteristics of a proposed model in scientific research. He states that the model needs to have:

- Relatedness to other models and techniques;
- Transparency, in terms of ease of interpretation;
- Robustness or sensitivity to the assumption made;
- Fertility or richness in deductive possibility; and
- Ease enrichment or ability to modify and expand.

Given the above characteristics, it is important to discuss why a model is important in a scientific research of this nature. Models in research are used to influence the given organisation or individual to assess the relationship between the subjects under investigation and the researcher (Adeyemi, 1975; Busha and Harter, 1980). To this end, therefore, models provide guidance for the establishment of systems and completion of work and represented world phenomenon. Adeyemi (1975:50) contends further that, since a model is an abstraction of reality, it should appear less complicated to understand; hence it is a symbol of the reality being investigated. Shafique and Mahmood (2010:5) warn that extra caution needs to be exercised when constructing a model to avoid overgeneralisations and exaggerations.

6.3 Methodological considerations for model construction

Grandvoinnet, Aslam & Raha (2015:64) argue that previous studies on social accountability suffer from methodological constraints as the impact evaluation studies undertaken by World Bank in countries such as Uganda, South Africa among others have failed to yield any positive turnaround as achieving social accountability using

various mechanisms in these countries is still be achieved. Grandvoinnet *et al.,* (2015) argue that impact evaluations were instigated as a way of measuring the impact of service delivery using social accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, many impact evaluation studies have not been conducted to assess the voice and empowerment of citizens in social accountability approaches which provides a missing link any social accountability model can mitigate (World Bank, 2012). In Indonesia for example, parents who engage in a public protest demanding accountability for free education turned out to be the same parents previously holding positions in school management bodies. The protest though genuine could not succeed as the social accountability approach was not influential and conceptualized within the methodological paradigms of social accountability (Rosser and Joshi, 2012). Measuring the impact of social accountability interventions can be very complex in research. The imbalances in the impact evaluations stem from the Principal-Agent Model that focuses on information asymmetries reduction and attempts to measure institutional impact are likely to experience factual methodological difficulties. Societal attitudes often cause methodological challenges to design a social accountability model. Measuring social accountability outcomes is a challenge as the concept is loosely defined or contested (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007).

Concepts such as empowerment and participation are not easily defined and properly structured within service delivery outcomes. Changes in societal attitudes (increased awareness, shifting incentives) and relationships can enhance state-society relationships which are difficult to quantify that improve service provision hence, in general, testing them cannot be difficult (Grandvoinnet *et al.*, 2015). Furthermore, social accountability mechanisms involve many contributing actors and strategies that make the mechanisms difficult to implement and evaluate. Guijt (2007:27) observes that attribution is "a recurring headache for those engaged in multi-actor, multi-location, multi-level and multi-strategy change work." Drawing analysis from this assertion, it can be argued that civil society activism in which citizens participate in social accountability programmes are based on a set of dynamics that make them difficult to be separated from other factors such as structural, political, social and institutional factors as well as actions of non-state actors. The other challenge is that Social accountability approaches present stiff evaluation challenges as various organisations lack the resources nor institutional capacity to measure the efficiency

and effectiveness of social accountability programmes (World Bank, 2014). However, to succeed in social accountability initiatives, citizens need to effectively engage public administrators and politicians to enable their responsiveness to service delivery demands. An adversarial approach based on dialogue and negotiation can be adopted to enhance social accountability in government departments. Citizens need to engage officials with the help of civil society organisations to hold the executive to account for actions taken in service delivery (McGee and Gaventa, 2011).

Figure 33: Showing gaps in social accountability

(Source: O' Neil *et al.,* 2007)

The model was implemented by O' Neil *et al.,* (2007) to enhance public participation in a government department which is a prerequisite for social accountability mechanisms to function well. The model shows that state-society relationships are shaped by receptivity and responsiveness. When citizens demand services from the state, receptivity should be exercised by responding to citizen voices. Responsiveness' entails the corrective measures a state undertakes to rectify citizen demands for services (Moore and Teskey, 2006). It should be noted that the model shows a gap in terms of responsiveness and accountability between powerful elites and citizens (UNDP, 2002). The model failed to indicate the intervention of civil society organisations (CBOs, NGOs, and Pressure Groups, Women groups) to assist with

funding for social accountability mechanisms. Many communities have inadequate knowledge of what social accountability is so, CSOs are fundamental for raising awareness and linking communities to service providers. The model does not reflect much on empowerment as there are conditions for citizens to be empowered. This can be done by third-party monitoring due to their flexibility nature CSOs can influence both women and men to engage in social accountability by producing adequate information on the way the mechanism works. Against these assertions, the modified social accountability model has been proposed below (figure 6.2) to increase state responsiveness to citizen demands for social accountability which is crucial for improving service delivery.

6.3.1 Proposed Innovative Social Accountability Model

Based on these robust discussions, analyses, and understanding of challenges facing social accountability mechanisms, an innovative social accountability model has been proposed (see figure 6.2). The development of this model was influenced by the gaps identified in the literature, where government departments struggle to implement social accountability mechanisms, hence communities engage the service providers violently in citizen protests. The two main theoretical perspectives Organisational Learning and New Public Management influence the construction of this model as they propose that public officials need to be effective and efficient in service delivery hence learning and introducing new models is consequential to social accountability.

This twin approaches emphasis more on the responsiveness and accountability (See O'Neil, 2007) of local government where the public officials are required to inform the citizens on how it spent their money hence this form of mutual accountability between the two actors is required. The nature and type of environment as indicated in figure 6.2 have an influence on the implementation of this model.

Figure 34: An innovative social accountability model

Socio-Economic Environment.

Job opportunities, Entrepreneurship opportunities, access to funding

State Institutions Local Authority

Political Environment

No intimidation of citizens, free press, CSOs

Advocacy Lobbying

Accountability

Responsiveness

Create conducive environment & Use of digital innovations

Civil Society Organisations & Private Organisations

-Information

-Funding

Citizens

Effective service delivery

Access to health

Education

Water

Technological Environment

Citizen use of technology, Digital innovations, Social networks (Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp

Determinants

. Participation
. Capacity
. Commitment
. Credibility
. Legitimacy
. Networking

Legal Environment

. Good public policies

(Own illustration, 2017)

The model assumes that to achieve social accountability civil society organisations need to take a leading role assisting citizens with an influential voice which the local authority can listen to. The model is functional in a way that citizens as the main demand side can utilize influential citizen groups or individuals to make the local authority respond to their demands hence the model cuts across all sectors. The main aim of this model is to ensure that public officials respond to social accountability

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demands and citizen actively participate in social accountability mechanisms that are used to hold the state accountable to enhance service delivery. Citizen involvement in social accountability mechanisms and state responsiveness are the key issues that need to be understood in the functionality of this model. The determinants such as participation, commitments, capacity are important for citizens to have them when demanding social accountability from service providers. In many cases, government departments take long to respond due to high-level bureaucracy hence commitment and active participation is needed to persistently pressurise the local government to account for actions taken in service delivery.

The model assumes further that, the use of digital innovations enabled by the technological environment to exercise social accountability can be useful in improving municipal accountability for service delivery. This view is grounded in the notion that citizens who can access online systems can tap into the activities of the local authority and the municipality can respond using online platforms which is efficient for accountability. Cook, Pachler & Bachmair (2013) assert that using modern mobile technologies for communication and sharing new opportunities can be presented for citizens to engage service providers on the level of service delivery in the process holding them accountable. Nevertheless, Repetto and Trentin (2013) warn against the use of mobile technology for spearheading social accountability as it has its own limitations that are biased toward the responsiveness of service providers to respond to service delivery demands. The model assumes further that, the intervention of CSOs can strengthen citizen's voice hence such collaboration can help force the government to account for service delivery. Nonetheless, CSOs need to have the credibility, capacity, and legitimacy in the eyes of citizens to be able to pressurise the government to account for service delivery. The engagement of citizens and local municipality is crucial for improving service delivery and maintaining trust.

6.3.2 Making the model work

Step 1: Conduct a situational analysis in communities

Before implementing this model, the municipality is required to conduct a baseline study where it assesses and identifies the needs of the communities and how best to engage the local citizens to inform them on the level of service delivery. In many accountability and service delivery contexts, many organisations have a tendency of

implementing preconceived programmes, so conducting extensive research on the culture, level of education and quality of living for a community is crucial for the model to work properly. Birkland (2014:230) observes that identifying stakeholder problem is crucial for designing an effective solution to a given problem. The analysis of local communities helps the service provider to understand how the citizen lives in communities and develop appropriate strategies for intervention and render services.

Step 2: Identify the key stakeholders (citizens, civil society groups)

It is fundamental to identify the real partners before implementing the model or any social accountability programme. Citizens usually are the end recipients or clients for service delivery although for them to hold local government accountable they require the help of civil society organisations and other concerned groups. The local authority when implementing the model needs to be aware of this and should what social accountability mechanisms when reporting or accounting for public resources. This helps reduce conflict and foster relationships based on trust. Furthermore, identifying key stakeholder enables the local authority to attain legitimacy which is crucial for social accountability.

Step 3: Identify the capacity building needs of main actors and develop social accountability mechanisms that trigger service delivery

The local authority before implementing this model need to be aware of the level of skills among the key stakeholders such as citizens, human rights groups, and internal staff. This is important because the concept of social accountability is loosely understood so skills are necessary to implement this model to enhance service delivery. Le Roux (2009:170) ascertains that analysing stakeholder capacity is fundamental since such actors have an impact on the development of any organisation, so municipality needs to a value stakeholder input when implementing this model. The skills gap can be mitigated by public sector training where officials are taught how to implement social accountability mechanisms.

Step 4: Assess the determinants/factors for implementing the social accountability model

Studies (Nieuwenhuizen, Badenhorst-Weiss, Rossouw, 2008) caution that, the macro environment which includes the external environment need to be assessed since its

factors are hard to control for an organisation. Such an environment includes (social, economic, political-legal, technological environment). In a model implementation, these types of environment are fundamental to successful implementation. The model assumes that for social accountability to be successful, the economic environment in South Africa needs to be balanced into allowing municipalities to source enough funding to render social accountability programmes that trigger service delivery. In determining the social influence of social accountability mechanisms, actors in the political environment should know when and how to conduct social accountability programmes as the existing political environment can affect the implementation of the social accountability model as public officials tend to account depending on the ruling party present. When political parties are conflicting, communities as the end recipients of service delivery suffer because municipalities will be absorbed in factional politics as different politicians and public administrators are quarreling. The societal environment as well must be assessed as the levels of awareness on the use of social accountability mechanisms in societies determine the success of the proposed model. Some communities are not aware of social accountability mechanisms which act negatively against their participation. The legal or policy environment determines the implementation of social accountability models. Some public policies may not be enabling as officials may tend to focus on the traditional public administration.

Step 5: Conducting a partner capacity building programme

This will allow actors to articulate the various social accountability challenges faced by communities and local municipalities in their areas and develop appropriate responses. Secondly, such a capacity building programme can help stakeholders to develop context-specific programmes that can be useful in addressing citizen demand for social accountability and other challenges related to service delivery.

Step 6: Building Confidence by engaging local authorities and relevant stakeholders

When implementing this model it is fundamental for the municipality to include key stakeholders such as citizen groups, civil society organisations, business community to get their opinion and view on how the municipality should render services. This helps build relationships and trust between the municipality and service providers. Networking and coalition building is significant for attracting funding to support the implementation of social accountability mechanisms.

6.4   POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

6.4.1   Raising awareness of social accountability mechanisms

The role of local government in raising awareness of social accountability mechanisms towards the demand side of citizens has been questionable. Findings from Chapter Three revealed that citizen knowledge on the meaning and use of social accountability is very low owing to limited information dissemination in their communities. As a result, such hollow creates a space for private sector organisations and other CSOs to increase community access to information which can improve the chances of holding public officials accountable. The limited understanding of social accountability mechanisms hinders citizen participation in social accountability programmes. Citizens are mainly used in public forums but they are not aware of the innovative social accountability mechanisms such as social audits that can be used to hold the municipality accountable for service delivery. Therefore, private organisations and free press need to embark on the education of communities on the need to hold the municipality accountable. This can be done by establishing vocational schools to educate people on how to use modern technology to demand services from the service providers.

6.4.2   Training of public officials to enhance competence

Skills training is fundamental to improve the implementation of social accountability. Politicians and office bearers need to receive adequate training on how to implement the social accountability mechanism in communities. This can be done if the municipality collaborates with institutions of higher learning, research institutes such as Human Research Science Council (HSRC) and other private consulting companies. These institutions can help enhance the understanding and knowledge of social accountability to the CoT. Communities as well need to be taught through various structures such as ward participatory meetings and other *imbizos* where they can know their rights and procedures to follow when demanding social accountability.

6.4.3   Increasing community access to funding

Social accountability on the demand side (citizens) and supply side (state) have been constrained by limited funding. Against this understanding, the government of South Africa needs to rectify a budget for local government which is strictly for social

accountability and other community outreach programmes. This can assist communities to identify where and how to get funding which can be used to call the municipality to account for its actions. The City of Tshwane needs to increase its networking and foster relationships with other economic giants such as Banks, Private individuals who can channel funding for social accountability programmes.

6.4.4 Incentivising social accountability mechanisms

Some gaps identified in the literature and research findings point to lack of incentivising of social accountability mechanisms. Findings from a study by Walton (2013) revealed that social accountability mechanisms do not address the political realities that may hinder service delivery. This is inconsistent with other the studies (Booth, 2012; Levy and Walton, 2013) that pointed out that incentivising citizens and CSOs increases the chance of participation in social accountability mechanisms that lead to holding public officials accountable for service delivery. Findings of Chapter 4 revealed that using many social accountability mechanisms, citizens stand a chance to hold municipal officials accountable for service delivery. The analysis of data indicated further that, citizens need to be enlightened on how to use social accountability mechanisms to effectively hold officials accountable. Drawing analysis from these assertions, therefore; the CoT can provide rewards to public officials which can motivate them to conduct social accountability programmes to communities they serve. Rewards go a long way in showing appreciation hence accountability can be done in a time bound and effective manner. Communities, on one hand, need to be motivated to participate in social accountability programmes which can assist to enhance service delivery.

6.4.5 Fostering public sector innovation

The extensive review of literature (Amdam, 2014:2; Damapour & Schneider, 2009; Teigen 2007:15; Osborne & Brown, 2011 & Walker, 2014) and research findings have shown that public officials are failing to conduct social accountability programmes due to lack of security to enter into communities and deliver updates on how public money was spent. As a result, this study recommends the use of innovative mechanisms such as websites and online platforms that can be used to interact with citizens and give them feedback on the way public money has been used. Also, public officials need to

invent or introduce new ways of doing things which can improve their efficiency; hence public-sector innovation is key to enhancing social accountability mechanisms.

6.4.6 Public sector monitoring and evaluation

Social accountability programmes often fail due to lack of monitoring and evaluation. Findings of chapter five indicate that citizens have relatively little power to monitor officials no matter how much they try. However, citizen monitoring and evaluation can be conducted by citizen groups, CSOs and concerned stakeholders to assess how public resources are being used. There is a need to improve the research culture to be able to implement sound programmes that promote social accountability. The lack of research on social accountability has been identified in the literature (Fox, 2014; Ringgold *et al.,* 2012) and findings of the study. Therefore, conducting research enhances M & E of public officials to see if they adhered to their mandate of delivery quality basic services in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner.

6.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DISCIPLINE AND ACTIVITY

6.5.1 Contribution to the discipline of Public Administration

The discipline of Public Administration has been created to guide the delivery of public goods and services to the communities. As a discipline, Public Administration includes the professional training of public servants to increase efficiency in the delivery of goods and services. It involves the use of policies, theories, and concepts that can be used to respond to citizen demands for quality service delivery. The implementation of social accountability mechanisms indicate that public officials in the delivery of public services need to account to the people who elected them to public offices. Using various pieces of legislation in South Africa such as Constitution and *Batho Pele* principles, public officials are required to exercise transparency and openness which are prerequisites for the study of Public Administration as a discipline. The search for literature and analyses of findings revealed that Public Administration needs to development-oriented where public officials engage citizens in dialogues, public forums, and other innovative platforms to discuss service delivery issues. Deducing from these assertions, social accountability has a strong impact on the functioning of Public Administration.

6.5.2 Contribution to the praxis of public administration

The practical implications of social accountability to the study of public administration as an activity have been highlighted by proposing an innovative social accountability model that can be useful for improving service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. The New Public Management approach and Organisational Learning Theory propose efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation in public administration which this study intends to achieve. So, the accountability of public officials to citizens' show that public administration as the activity requires municipalities to be effective and developmental service providers as enshrined in various pieces of legislation such as the Constitutions, *Batho Pele* and White Paper on Local government 1998. Since public administration includes administrative processes, organisations, and individuals to execute legislation, rules, and regulations, it gave impact to social accountability mechanism that seeks to influence public officials to account for actions taken in service delivery. Furthermore, social accountability advocates for local government to form relationships with citizens based on trust which is the aim of developmental public administration. It can be deduced that as an activity public administration requires public officials to be proactive and execute public duties in an honest and accountable manner.

6.5.3 Recommendation on areas for further studies

The field of social accountability and service is very wide and still a fertile ground for exploration. This study only focused on the use of various existing social accountability mechanisms (*Imbizos*, Public Forums, IDPs) citizens use to hold officials in the City of Tshwane accountable in-service delivery. The study proposed the use of other innovative mechanisms (social audits, public expenditure tracking, and citizen scorecards) that can enhance citizen involvement in holding officials accountable although skills and funding often lack to effectively implement these techniques. The study did not interrogate the political accountability side although social accountability cannot be entirely divorced from political accountability. Future quantitative and qualitative studies can, therefore, be conducted to assess the political and economic capacity of South African municipalities to conduct social accountability. These studies can as well as examine the use of digital innovations to increase awareness on social accountability as literature in South Africa point to a gap in terms of that. Media can

as well play a pivotal role in championing social accountability although the researcher is not aware of any study that has examined that area in the South African context. The role of the media has been seen in a parliamentary democracy where it reveals parliamentary cases but little has been said about media raising awareness on social accountability. To this end, therefore, future studies have rich grounds to explore and examine to see if social accountability mechanisms have been embraced in the South African context or they are just mere tools hypothetically useless to ignite change and service delivery in communities. The common rationale is to improve the implementation of social accountability mechanisms for enhanced service delivery in communities.

6.6 CONCLUSION

The chapter deduced that social accountability occupies a central position in public administration as a disciple as municipalities are mandated by legislation in South Africa need to account for actions taken in service delivery. The NPM and *Batho Pele* principles guide municipal officials to exercise accountability and transparency in the execution of public duties. As a field of practice, social accountability informs that, the actions of public officials need to be put on a scale by exercising accountability to communities. Citizens need to engage officials physically on *Imbizos*, IDP forums just to mention a few to demand social accountability from officials. As a field of practice public administration, therefore, requires officials to exercise courtesy and openness as the closest sphere to the people. Such a physical interaction can help communities to acquire the answers needed towards improving service delivery. The chapter draws conclusions based on the findings and provided policy recommendations to the City of Tshwane on how it can enhance social accountability. Public officials must be incentivised (through rewards, promotions, performance bonuses) to improve social accountability. Networking between citizens, CSOs and communities can help foster trust and legitimacy that are imperative for the implementation of social accountability mechanisms.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: NWURERC Ethics approval letter

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
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ETHICS APPROVAL CERTIFICATE OF STUDY

Based on approval by the **Basic and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (BaSSREC)** at the meeting held on **06/10/2016**, the North-West University Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-IRERC) hereby **approves** your study as indicated below. This implies that the NWU-IRERC grants its permission that, provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other authorisation that may be necessary, the study may be initiated, using the ethics number below.

Study title: An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Study Leader/Supervisor: Prof Costa Hofisi
Student: Mr Elvin Shava

Ethics number:	N	W	U	-	HS	-	2	0	1	6	-	0	1	2	0
		Institution			Study Number				Year			Status			

Status: S = Submission; R = Re-Submission; P = Provisional Authorisation; A = Authorisation

Application Type: Original project
Commencement date: 2016-10-10   **Expiry date**: 2019-10-10   **Risk:**   Low

Special conditions of the approval (if applicable):

- Translation of the informed consent document to the languages applicable to the study participants should be submitted to the BaSSREC (if applicable).
- Any research at governmental or private institutions, permission must still be obtained from relevant authorities and provided to the BaSSREC. Ethics approval is required BEFORE approval can be obtained from these authorities.

General conditions:

While this ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, please note the following:

- *The study leader (principle investigator) must report in the prescribed format to the NWU-IRERC via BaSSREC:*
  - *annually (or as otherwise requested) on the progress of the study, and upon completion of the project*
  - *without any delay in case of any adverse event (or any matter that interrupts sound ethical principles) during the course of the project.*
  - *Annually a number of projects may be randomly selected for an external audit.*
- *The approval applies strictly to the proposal as stipulated in the application form. Would any changes to the proposal be deemed necessary during the course of the study, the study leader must apply for approval of these changes at the BaSSREC. Would there be deviated from the study proposal without the necessary approval of such changes, the ethics approval is immediately and automatically forfeited.*
- *The date of approval indicates the first date that the project may be started. Would the project have to continue after the expiry date, a new application must be made to the NWU-IRERC via BaSSREC and new approval received before or on the expiry date.*
- *In the interest of ethical responsibility the NWU-IRERC and BaSSREC retains the right to:*
  - *request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the study;*
  - *to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modification or monitor the conduct of your research or the informed consent process.*
  - *withdraw or postpone approval if:*
    - *any unethical principles or practices of the project are revealed or suspected,*
    - *it becomes apparent that any relevant information was withheld from the BaSSREC or that information has been false or misrepresented,*
    - *the required annual report and reporting of adverse events was not done timely and accurately,*
    - *new institutional rules, national legislation or international conventions deem it necessary.*
- *BaSSREC can be contacted for further information or any report templates via Charmaine.Lekonyane@nwu.ac.za or 018 210 3483.*

The IRERC would like to remain at your service as scientist and researcher, and wishes you well with your project. Please do not hesitate to contact the IRERC or BaSSREC for any further enquiries or requests for assistance.

Yours sincerely

Prof LA Du Plessis
Digitally signed by Prof LA Du Plessis
Date: 2016.11.22 16:09:15 +02'00'

Prof Linda du Plessis
Chair NWU Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (IRERC)

Appendix 2: Proposal approval letter from C.CAD

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS ®

PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark
South Africa, 1900

Basic and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Tel: +27(16) 910-3483
Web: http://www.nwu.ac.za
Email: Charmaine.lekonyane@nwu.ac.za

19 September 2016

Dear Mr Elvin Shava and Prof Costa Hofisi

ETHICS APPLICATION: **NWU-HS-2016-0120**

An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

Thank you for your application.

At the meeting of the Basic Sciences Research Ethics Committee (BaSSREC) on 8 September 2016, the committee concluded that the above ethics application should be conditionally approved with minor changes as follows:

- Proof of gatekeeper permission and proof of training were not attached and no explanation was given.
- How the applicant will deal with the protection of the data collected is not indicated
- Dissemination of the study needs to be clearly stated as per all the different levels of stakeholders.

Please send the revisions to the BaSSREC Chairperson (Jaco.Hoffman@nwu.ac.za) for assessment and final approval. Should you need any further clarification, feel free to contact the BaSSREC secretariat (Charmaine Lekonyane - Charmaine.Lekonyane@nwu.ac.za) to whom all communication should be copied.

With best wishes,

Prof Jaco Hoffman
BaSSREC - Chairperson

Appendix 3: Requisition letter of the study

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS

PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark
South Africa 1900

Tel: 002716 910-3111
Fax: 002716 910-3116
Web: http://www.nwu.ac.za

School Basic Sciences
Public Management and Administration
Tel: 002716 910-3111
Email: costa.hofisi@nwu.ac.za

16 AUGUST 2016

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

This serves to confirm that Mr Elvin Shava is a registered student for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Management and Governance at the Vaal Triangle Campus of the North-West University. As part of the requirements for this degree programme, the student is expected to conduct a research which is solely meant for academic purposes only.

We humbly request you to allow the student to conduct the research in your institution and to interact with relevant selected office-bearers and officials. We have instructed the student to observe professionalism and ethical considerations by maintaining anonymity of all the participants concerned. The student has also been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality in her interactions with respondents. Once the research is complete, it can be availed to your institution upon request. We hope that the findings of the research will benefit your institution and all the relevant stakeholders.

Your support in this research undertaking is greatly appreciated. Should you need any further clarification please do not hesitate to contact me on the details given.

We are looking forward to your assistance.

Regards

Prof. Costa. Hofisi

1

Appendix 4: Requisition letter for student

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS

PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark

South Africa, 1900

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

My name is Elvin Shava and I am full time Doctoral Student at the North West University Vaal Triangle Campus. I kindly request permission to conduct research in your municipality titled, "An innovative social accountability mechanism for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality". The research is done as part of the Doctoral Degree requirements in Public Management and Governance. The research is done strictly for academic purposes only. The information solicited will be kept confidential and anonymity is assured.

The research will be beneficial to the City of Tshwane as an innovative model to effectively deliver service will be developed. Upon completion of this study, a copy will be delivered to your office.

I do hope you will grant me the permission to conduct this study

Regards

Elvin Shava

Appendix 5: Approval letter from City of Tshwane

Office of the Deputy City Manager
Governance and Support Services

20th Floor Isivuno House | 143 Lillian Ngoyi Street | Pretoria | 0001
PO Box 440 | Pretoria | 0001
Tel: 012 358 6251/4869| Fax: 086 2148421
Email: FransBos@tshwane.gov.za | www.tshwane.gov.za | www.facebook.com/CityOf Tshwane

My ref:	Research Permission	Tel:	012 358 2000
Contact person:	Zukiswa Ncunyana	Email:	Zukiswanc@tshwane.gov.za
Section/Unit:	Integrated Research	Date	28 September 2016

Re: Mr Elvin Shava
P. O. Box 1174
Vanderbijrlpark
Gauteng, 1900

Dear Mr. Shava

RE: Approval to Conduct Research within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

I have the pleasure to inform you that your request to conduct research on the topic *"An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality"* has been reviewed and permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

It is noted that your research aims to assess the implementation of innovative social accountability mechanism to enhance service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan municipality. In addition, please be informed that as a researcher you are required to sign the Confidentiality Agreement Form with the City prior data collection. Research and Innovation Department will be facilitating the whole process; therefore communication should be directed to this department.

Once you complete your research in the City, you will be requested to present your findings and submit the final report/ a copy of your dissertation.

Yours faithfully

_____
Frans Boshielo (Mr)
Deputy City Manager
Governance and Support Service

3/10/2076
Date

IT'S MY RESPONSIBILITY
TO PAY MY MUNICIPAL ACCOUNT IN FULL, ON TIME.

Office of the Deputy City Manager

Appendix 6: Language editing confirmation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LANGUAGE EDITING

Date: 13 November 2017

Name of Client: Elvin Shava

This is to certify that Language Editing has been carried out on the following

Article/dissertation/thesis

Title of article/dissertation/thesis

An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Language editing was carried out to appropriate academic standards, including syntax, grammar and style.

Edmore Mutekwe PhD (UJ), M.Ed (UZ), MBA (NUST),

B.Ed (UZ), Cert Ed (UZ), Dip. Pers. Man (IPMZ)

Tel: 018 3892032

Mobile: 074 4660068

emutekwe@yahoo.com
mutekwe@nwu.ac.za

Signature: *EMutekwe*

Professor of Educational Sociology

INFORMATION LEAFLET AND CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS.

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS
PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark
South Africa, 1900

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT: **An innovative social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality**
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Elvin Shava
UNIVERSITY No: (27844722)
Address: 42 Hans Van Rensburg SE7 Vanderbijlpark Gauteng 1900
CONTACT NUMBER: 0780071181; Email: ellyshava@gmail.com

You are invited to take part in a research study that forms part of my Ph.D. Degree in Public Management and Governance from November 2016 – January 2017. This form explains the purpose of the study, how you will be involved and your rights as a participant. Please know that your participation is entirely voluntary, you will not be forced to take part in the study but you are kindly being requested to help. The study has been approved by the Committee for Advanced Degrees (CAD) of the faculty of Humanities of the North West University, Vaal Triangle Campus and the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

The study will be conducted within residential areas in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Methods of study will be a questionnaire survey, and in-depth interviews that will be held with selected public officials. The objectives of this study are:

- To assess the meaning and context of social accountability mechanisms used to improve service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
- To examine the conceptual and theoretical framework for social accountability

- To assess the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms used by citizens to hold public officials accountable for service delivery City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
- To examine the internal and external barriers affecting the implementation of social accountability mechanisms for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
- To provide a social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

Participants: The following participants will be invited from the City of Tshwane officials, politicians and residents.

You have been invited to participate because:

You are   EITHER a City of Tshwane resident who participates in social accountability mechanisms OR

You are a City of Tshwane official who deals directly with social accountability mechanisms.

You would be excluded if:

- You do not have any knowledge on social accountability

- You do not stay in the residential areas of City of Tshwane

-

Your participation: As a City of Tshwane resident, you will be expected to complete a standardised questionnaire that will check your perception on the use of social accountability mechanisms in your communities. You will simply tick off the answer that's suitable for you from those given for each question and write your comments in spaces provided for the relevant questions in the questionnaire. You are kindly expected to complete this questionnaire once.

If you are a City of Tshwane Municipal official, you will be expected to participate in a key-informant interview in understanding the perceptions of the residents towards social accountability mechanisms that are used to improve service delivery in the City of Tshwane. You will also be kindly asked for copies of official documents in the form

of Service Delivery Charters, Annual Budgets, Citizen Engagement Minutes and Governance issues.

Benefits and Risks of the study: The study will not provide direct benefits to you. However, your contribution and the research findings may help to reveal strengths and weaknesses of the internet/online application method and your suggestions may further improve the efficiency of the district as well as school administration front and back office staff, enhance public schools' admission processes and promote speedy and quality services to applicants/ citizens. There are no identifiable risks associated with your participation in this study. However, should you have any concern or discomfort associated with your participation, please feel free to make the researcher aware?

Compensation for participation: You will not be paid to take part in this study. The researcher or research assistants will come to you for the interview or distribute questionnaires, therefore, no costs for traveling will be involved on your part.

Confidentiality: the interviews and focus group discussions will be tape-recorded. However, your names and any identifying information will not be used in any part of the research report. All your information and interview responses will be kept confidential and they will not be shared with anyone else besides the researcher's supervisor.

Research findings: A pdf electronic copy of the dissertation, the research report summary and abstract will be submitted to the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality where you can access them for your own viewing or it can be given to you by the researcher upon request.

Anything else you need to know? Please contact my supervisor, Prof. Costa Hofisi on this number 016 910 3455. You will receive a copy of this information and consent form for your own records.

Declaration by participant

By signing below, I …………………………….…………. agree to take part in a research study. I declare that;

I have read and understood this information and consent form and it is written in a language with which I am fluent and comfortable.

I have had a chance to ask questions to both the person obtaining consent, as well as the researcher (if this is a different person), and all my questions have been adequately answered.

I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and I have not been pressurised to take part.

I understand that what I contribute (what I report/say/write could be reproduced publically and/or quoted but without reference to my personal identity.

I may choose to leave the study at any time and will not be penalised or prejudiced in any way.

I may be asked to leave the study before it has finished if the researcher feels it is in my best interests, or if I do not follow the study plan, as agreed to.

Signed at ....….......…………….. On…......2016

Signature / Mark of participant…………………………………………..

Signature of person obtaining consent   …………………………………………..

Appendix 8: Questionnaire for residents in the City of Tshwane

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS

PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark
South Africa, 1900

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Elvin Shava. I am a final year PHD student in the Department of Public Management and Administration, Faculty of Humanities at North West University (Vaal Triangle Campus). My thesis is entitled "**An innovative social Accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality**". The research is done as part of the PhD Degree requirements in Public Management & Governance. The research is done strictly for academic purposes only. The information solicited will be kept confidential and anonymity is assured. You are cordially requested to complete the questions that follow.

SECTION A (DEMOGRAPHIC AND OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION)

Please mark with an **(X)** where appropriate

1. Age

Less than 21years	21-30 years	31-40 years	41-50 years	51-60years	61years and above

2. Gender

Male	Female

3. Marital status

Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed

4. Educational Qualifications

Matric	Certificate	Diploma	Degree	Postgraduate	Other

5. Duration on the job

Less than a year	1 to 5 years	6 to 10 years	Above 10 years	Not working

6. Residential Area

High Density	Medium Density	Low Density	CBD

SECTION B: RESIDENTS' UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Please respond by ticking in a box your understanding of social accountability in your municipality.

1. Do you understand the meaning of social accountability?

YES	NO

Explain your answer

……
……
……
……

2. The following are the existing social accountability mechanisms that citizens may have used to hold public officials accountable in the City of Tshwane. How effective were they in improving service delivery?

Rate from 1-5

1 = Very effective**, 2 =** Slightly effective, **3 =** Effective **4.** Moderately effective**=, 5 =** Not effective at all

ITEMS	1	2	3	4	5
1.Citizen Score Card					
2. Integrated Development Plan					
3. Public Forums/*Imbizo's*					
4. Elections					
5. Participatory Budgeting					
6. Public Demonstrations/Protests					
7. Community Radio Stations					
8. Oversight Committees					
9. Ward Committees					

b.) Were the above social accountability mechanisms efficient towards increasing service delivery in communities?

YES	NO

Explain further……………………………………………………………………………………………

………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………..

4. Do you have any source of funding available in your community to facilitate Social Accountability?

YES	NO

Please explain further

SECTION C: CURRENT SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM USED BY CITIZENS TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE IN SERVICE DELIVERY

Instructions

Below are various innovative social accountability mechanisms in which citizens can use to hold public officials accountable for service delivery. Kindly express your opinions on the effectiveness of each.

Please mark with an x

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree

Rate ways in which citizens can participate in Social Accountability	1	2	3	4	5
1. Mayoral Imbizo's					
2. Social Audit					
3. Oversight hearings					
4. Public Expenditure Tracking					
5. Advocacy campaigns					
6. Public Policy Making					
7. Participatory Budgeting					
8. Citizen-Based Monitoring					

9. Service Delivery Satisfaction Surveys					
10. Petitions					
12. Social networks					
13. Public Forums					

SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACED BY RESIDENTS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Listed below are statements that represent possible opinions that **YOU** may have concerning social accountability in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by (**ticking**) on each statement on the right column.

1. The citizens in this community have enough knowledge on the meaning and purpose of social accountability.

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

2. Public officials (City of Tshwane) listen to the service delivery demands/ grievances of the people

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

3. Communities have adequate resources (financial, human, expertise) to implement social accountability mechanisms

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

4. The citizens actively participate in social accountability programmes

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

5. The municipality responds to citizens demands for social accountability

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

6. The political environment is suitable to exercise social accountability

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

7. Public policy making structures promote social accountability

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

8. Stakeholder intervention (NGOs, Pressure Groups, Human Rights Groups & CBOs) to promote social accountability

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

9. Corruption and poor governance discourage citizen participation in social accountability mechanisms

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral,	Disagree	strongly disagree,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY

Appendix 9: Interview Guide for Politicians and Administrators

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
VAAL TRIANGLE CAMPUS

PO Box 1174, Vanderbijlpark

South Africa, 1900

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CHIEF OFFICE BEARERS, ADMINISTRATORS IN THE CITY OF TSHWANE

My name is Elvin Shava. I am a full-time PhD student in the Department of Public Management and Administration, at the North West University. Title of my research reads "**An innovative social accountability model for effective service delivery in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan municipality".** The research is done as part of the Doctoral Degree requirements in Public Management. The research is done strictly for academic purposes only. The information solicited will be kept confidential and anonymity is assured. You are cordially requested to complete the questions that follow

QUESTIONS FOR OFFICE BEARERS

SECTION A: ADMINISTRATORS OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

1. What is your understanding of the concept of social accountability?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

2. What social accountability mechanism do you use to account to the citizen in service deliver? Elaborate

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

……

……

3. Do you use any other innovative social accountability mechanisms to deliver services in your municipality?

……

……

……

……

4. How effective are the existing social accountability mechanisms you use to deliver services in your municipality?

……

……

……

……

……………………………

6. In your opinion do you think citizens have the poor to hold public officials accountable?

……

……

……

……

……………………………

5. Do you get funding for implementing social accountability mechanisms?

……

……

……

………

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………

………

……

SECTION B: CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT OF POLITICIANS & OFFICIALS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

6. How do you respond to social accountability demands by citizens in your municipality?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………

7. Are there any feedback mechanisms to inform citizens on the manner in which their grievances have been handled?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

8. Is the political environment conducive for citizens to demand social accountability from the municipality? Explain

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

SECTION C & D: BARRIERS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

9. What internal or external challenges are you facing in implementing social accountability?

………

………

………

………

10. In your own opinion, what do you think should be done to improve social accountability in your municipality?

………

………

………

………

………