The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Object
Erasmus, Jacobus Petrus
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My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the “infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalām cosmological argument. Concerning the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable theistic argument, namely, the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2) the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature.
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